Alexander Dugin: Geopolitics at the Confluence of Theology, Tradition, and Eurasia

John Cody Mosbey

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Supervisor: Dr. Andrew Pierce
Summary

This dissertation examines the development and impacts of contemporary Russian Geopolitical Theologian Alexander Dugin and his Fourth Political Theory. It addresses the question: how does Dugin propose to counter the perceived evils of Western Liberalism, its secular worldview, efforts toward globalization, and goal of unipolar hegemony; and how does his Geopolitical-Theology propose to thwart these perceived evils while maintaining a multipolar world?

I primarily employ qualitative research methodology to address this question and develop a body of primary and secondary data for analysis. My use of primary and secondary data will be examined consistent with comparative analysis and coincide with concepts of historical methodology. My examination focuses through the receptive lenses of Western political and theological vantage points to examine how Dugin and his impact are perceived in the West. By examining this increasingly prominent figure and his theory, I acknowledge Dugin’s evolution from a little-known activist in the 1980s to a controversial geopolitical theologian with growing recognition on the world stage where he is a severe critic of the West and its characteristic Western Liberalism. I, therefore, examine political theology and Dugin’s concept of Liberal Democracy.

In light of Dugin’s claims to be a Traditionalist and a Eurasianist, in addition to exploring the features of both of these classifications, I use two major research strategies to examine and comment on these assertions: first, I consider Dugin as an interpreter and commentator of the West; second, I review key observations, comments, critiques, and conclusions of selected Western interpreters and commentators on Dugin and his theory.

This study gathered data from a variety of mostly Western sources, books, interviews, newspapers, journals, published reports, websites, and blogs. The methodology of this dissertation progresses topically with each of Dugin’s claims, with the supporting evidence examined, first from Dugin’s perspective, then from the standpoint of his commentators. In this process, I compare and
contrast Dugin’s development of his Fourth Political Theory, his hermeneutical presuppositions, and the constituent elements of both.

My conclusions are that Dugin is a Neo-Traditionalist, a Neo-Eurasianist, and a Geopolitical-Theologian of significant force and impact. I find that the effects of Dugin’s geopolitical theology are, and will likely continue to be, reflected in Russian geopolitical policy. The degree of this influence is difficult to predict; however, its potential impression could be significant. Dugin’s influence on Russian policy will, in turn, affect Western reception and reaction.

Chapter One presents my thesis and introduces the major topics of Geopolitical Theology, Liberal Democracy regarding Dugin, Traditionalism, Eurasianism, and Reception; it then proceeds to a pertinent Review of Literature. Chapter Two presents Dugin’s background, assuming that he is an interpreter and commentator of the West; the chapter next examines his views and explanations of Political Theology, his Neo-Traditionalism, his Neo-Eurasianism, his critique of Western Liberalism, his Metaphysical and Hermeneutical approaches, his Conspiriology, and concludes with his Eschatology. Chapter Three proceeds topically reflecting Chapter Two through the comments and critiques of Dugin interpreters and commentators; this chapter proceeds to offer a presentation of Reception, how Dugin is accepted, and his reception as a fascist. Chapter Four presents my overall conclusions and comments.
Acknowledgments

Like others acknowledging their debt and gratitude to those who have helped materially, academically, and sacrificially, I find myself humbled and fearful. Humbled that so many have given so much of their time, effort, and care to help me through this endeavor, and fearful that I will leave someone out. I want to start by thanking several extremely special and influential people who imparted wisdom to me and gave me a seemingly never-ending thirst to learn and to pursue knowledge in formal academics and life lived every day – my parents, a few special teachers, coaches, professors, and military mentors.

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My wife helped me with initial edits and has been unfailing in her support even when it meant time apart. I think that so much of this mission has been a joint effort and an amazing journey for Melinda and me with the encouragement and support of our children and grandchildren. Many others, college staff, friends, and colleagues unnamed and unrecognized here, I thank in my heart.
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*Soli Deo Gloria*
Table of Contents

I. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1
I.1. The Locus of this Study ................................................................................................. 1
I.2. The Question ................................................................................................................ 4
I.2.1. Thesis Statement ....................................................................................................... 4
I.3. Methodology ................................................................................................................ 5
I.4. Critical Recognitions .................................................................................................. 8
I.5. The Way Forward in this Study .................................................................................... 8
I.6. The Roadmap ............................................................................................................... 9
1.0. Review of the Literature ............................................................................................ 10
1.1. Geopolitics .................................................................................................................. 10
1.1.1. Geopolitics of the Heartland .................................................................................... 13
1.1.2. Geopolitics of Culture ............................................................................................ 14
1.1.3. The Sacred Geo of Geopolitics ................................................................................. 17
1.1.4. Developing Geopolitics in Fourth Political Theory ................................................ 19
1.2. Political Theology ....................................................................................................... 20
1.2.1. Considering Dugin’s Purpose for Theological Language ........................................ 21
1.2.2. Political Theology is Critical to Governance .......................................................... 25
1.2.3. Theology in the Development of the State: Schmitt and Blumenberg ..................... 28
1.3. Aspects of Dugin’s Perception of Liberal Democracy ................................................. 33
1.4. Dugin – Literature Review ......................................................................................... 36
1.4.1. The Main Pillars of Dugin’s Writing In this study .................................................. 38
1.4.2. Development of Dugin’s Writing .............................................................................. 40
1.5. Traditionalism – Literature Review ............................................................................ 41
1.5.1. Timeless Tradition and Temporal tradition .............................................................. 50
1.5.2. The Added Ingredient of Revelation ....................................................................... 54
1.5.3. The Battle Line between Traditionalism and Modernity ........................................ 57
1.5.4. Fundamentalism’s Relationship with Traditionalism ............................................. 57
1.5.4.1. Fundamentalism’s Evolution others .................................................................... 59
1.6. Eurasianism – Literature Review .............................................................................. 61
1.6.1. Sacred Geography/ Sacred Space ........................................................................... 65
1.7. Reception – Review of Literature ............................................................................... 68
1.7.1. The Reception Process ............................................................................................ 70
1.7.2. Encoding-Decoding ................................................................. 76
1.8. Conclusions to Chapter One .................................................... 79
2.0. Dugin: Geopolitical-Theologian and Western Commentator .... 80
2.1. Alexander Dugin: Background ............................................... 80
2.1.1. Reactions to Dugin .............................................................. 81
2.2. Dugin’s Political Theology ...................................................... 87
2.2.1. The Metaphysics of Debris .................................................. 89
2.3. Development of Dugin’s Neo-Traditionalism ....................... 93
2.3.1. Dugin’s Neo-Traditionalism .............................................. 94
2.3.2. Dugin’s Movement Toward Evola .................................... 96
2.3.3. Dugin’s Critique of “Inauthentic” Christianity ................. 98
2.3.4. Rejection of The New World Order ................................. 100
2.3.5. The Radical Subject ........................................................... 101
2.3.6. Vertical Platonism vs. Horizontal Atomism ..................... 103
2.3.7. Building on Heidegger ......................................................... 104
2.4. Development of Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianism ......................... 109
2.4.1. Dugin’s Infusion of Traditionalism into Neo-Eurasianism ... 112
2.4.2. Expanding on Dugin’s Sacred Geography/Sacred Space .... 114
2.4.2.1. The Spiritual Shift of the North-South Axis .................. 120
2.4.2.2. The Great North and South War .................................. 121
2.4.2.3. Earth and Ocean ............................................................. 123
2.4.2.4. Portraying the West as Atlantis .................................. 125
2.4.3. Modeling Neo-Eurasianism .............................................. 127
2.5. Dugin’s Critique of Liberalism .............................................. 132
2.6. The Hermeneutics of Fourth Political Theory .................... 140
2.6.1. Hermeneutic of Political Theology .................................. 143
2.6.2. Hermeneutic of Traditionalism ....................................... 145
2.6.3. Hermeneutic of Anti-Modernism/Anti-Westernism .......... 147
2.6.4. Hermeneutic of Sacred Geography/Sacred Space ........... 148
2.6.5. Hermeneutic of Messianic Russia/Eurasia and Manifest Destiny ................................................................. 149
2.6.6. Hermeneutic of Third Rome .............................................. 151
2.6.7. Hermeneutic of Identifying Antichrist ............................. 152
2.6.8. Hermeneutic of the Catechon (the Restrainer) ................. 155
2.6.9. Assigning Identity ............................................................... 155
2.7. Examples of Dugin’s Metaphysical Esoteric Mindset ........... 156
3.6. Concerning Dugin as Conspirologist ...........................................260
3.7. Regarding Dugin’s Russian Orthodoxy ........................................268
3.7.1. Comments on Symphonia .....................................................270
3.8. Concerning Dugin’s Apocalyptic Eschatology ...............................271
3.8.1. Reflections on Dugin’s idea of Hastening Armageddon ..............273
3.8.2. Secular Apocalyptic Manifestations .......................................274
3.9. Reception and Reaction to Dugin ..............................................276
3.9.1. The Peoria Question ............................................................278
3.9.2. The Expanding Range of Dugin’s Reception ...............................279
3.9.3. Dugin’s Mackinderian Influence ............................................281
3.9.4. Putin’s Reception of Dugin ...................................................283
3.9.5. Reception of Dugin Outside Russia and in the West .................289
3.9.6. Dugin’s Growing Reception in the U.S. ..................................292
3.9.7. Receiving Dugin as a Fascist ................................................292
3.10. Conclusions to Chapter Three ...................................................296
4.0. Conclusions of the Study ..........................................................298
4.1. Dugin is Neo-Traditionalist .......................................................298
4.2. Dugin is Neo-Eurasianist ..........................................................301
4.3. Dugin’s Ideology is Expressed in his Fourth Political Theory ..........304
4.4. Reception of Dugin Matters .......................................................307
4. 5. The Future in Light of this Study .................................................309
I. Introduction

I.1. The Locus of this Study

Relegated almost to cliché is Carl von Clausewitz’s often paraphrased maxim: war is a continuation of politics by other means. Modifying Clausewitz’s definition slightly, it can be restated today that war is a continuation of geopolitics by other means. This study of Alexander Dugin demonstratively presents his geopolitics, and it is concerned with the Clausewitzian extension that conflict is part of the geopolitical continuum. Moreover, involved here are my observations and interpretations of Dugin’s inclusion of his theologically related considerations in his overall geopolitical outlook. Lastly, the reception afforded to Dugin and his ideas is considered.

Dugin is a contemporary Russian scholar, sociologist, philosopher, and political theologian deeply engaged in geopolitics, that is, “international relations, as influenced by geographical factors.” This study begins by acknowledging two broad descriptive geopolitical classifications – unipolar

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1 Cf. One of the many editions and translations, e.g., Carl von Clausewitz, On War (London: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1918).
2 On the use of italics: throughout, italics will be used to note standard publication titles where appropriate (as in On War above). Italics will also be used to note various non-english words (e.g., raison d’être). Italics will be favored over inverted commas (quotation markings) for introducing and/or emphasising certain words and short phrases (as in geopolitics, in this case).
3 Aleksandr Gelyevich Dugin (Александр Гельевич Дугин). Hereafter, Alexander Dugin, unless his name is given a different spelling in quoted material. Alexander Dugin, born 1962. Here, and throughout, I attempt to maintain the exact spelling in the source reference as spelling anomalies are fairly common in translations. Translations of Dugin’s work (and others cited herein) frequently omit the uppercase capitalization and articles normally present in English.
4 When referring to the West and Western, I adopt the Oxford Dictionaries’ (OED) definitions and connotations, Cf. OED, (https://en.oxforddictionaries.com). The OED states that Historically, “the non-Communist states of Europe and North America, contrasted with the former Communist states of eastern Europe;” and currently, “Europe and North America seen in contrast to other civilizations.” In addition, I also include the countries formally colonized by Great Britain where English is the common language, referred to as the Anglosphere. Cf. Daniel Hannan, Inventing Freedom: How the English-speaking Peoples Made the Modern World (New York: Broadside Books, 2014). West and Western will be capitalized when derived from the definitions above; Cf. footnote 6 herein. Daniel Hannan is a writer, journalist, and former Member of the European Parliament for South East England.
5 OED. Although I will address theological subject matter from several aspects in this study, I will not assume that Dugin is an academic or ecclesial theologian in any sense that would satisfy members of either of these two categories. Dugin certainly uses an abundance of theologically related material in his speaking and writing, and his employment of such clearly supports viewing him as a practitioner in the field of political theology. Unless applying broad definitional latitude to the term, theologian, I will limit my endorsement of Dugin’s theological credentials within the field of political theology and no farther.
and multipolar. The embedded strife between these two political concepts is apparent; it is also intense. If more than one geopolitical power strives for unipolar hegemony, war (as the continuation of geopolitics) is a real threat. If a geopolitical power striving for unipolar hegemony is opposed by a geopolitical power, or powers, insisting on multipolarity, war (by the same Clauswitzian conclusion) is a risk as well.

Dugin argues that the West, especially the United States, intends to be the unipolar power – the single dominant hegemon. He strongly advocates that Russian expand geopolitically to become the Eurasian power, one of the regional powers in a multipolar world. Conflict, even catastrophic conflict, between adversaries that are multipolar and unipolar proponents is a real risk – studying how Dugin and his ideology contributes to this risk is, therefore, prudent.

Dugin’s introduction of significant measures of metaphysical material infused into the geopolitical conversation highlights a dimension not widely appreciated in current Western European and United States politics. This

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6 In most cases I project the term West (as does Dugin) primarily on the United States and its geopolitics, especially when addressing a Western point or counterpoint to Dugin’s Russian and/or Eurasian multipolar or anti-Western rhetoric. When addressing the West in more general terms, I am referring to the Anglosphere, NATO, and European and other countries (post-Soviet Union) historically aligned with the Western powers – Israel, for example. Dealing with capitalization (Eurasian in this case) throughout this study is a constant concern. Because I am dealing with political, theological, religious, and philosophical beliefs and practices, movements, and theories, I will capitalize terms such as Liberal, Modern, and Traditional, etc. when I am addressing these and similar terms as characterizing a more-or-less definable idea or ideology. Hence, Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianism or Western Liberalism. I will capitalize Liberalism when it is mentioned as a specific ideology or contrasted as such with attributes of Fourth Political Theory. I will use lowercase first letters when dealing with more general characterizations – e.g., modernity, postmodern, and liberalism. Spelling of these types of terms within quotations, titles, etc., will not usually be altered. Where applied to Dugin, I will capitalize Geopolitical- Theology throughout. The use of uppercase letters (e.g., Pivot Area) is employed in lieu of inverted commas and will appear throughout for words or terms often found within inverted commas in the body of literature cited or reviewed in this study; inverted commas (quotation marks) are be reserved for specific quotations. For theological uppercase/lowercase applications, I generally rely on “Wood’s Guide to Capitalizing Theological Terms” as much as practicable.

7 This argument is developed in detail by Mark Lilla. Cf. Mark Lilla, The Stillborn God: Religion, Politics, and the Modern West (New York: Vintage Books, 2008). While counter arguments supporting religious factors contributing to modern liberal democracy are made, the evidence that, whatever the reasons, theological discourse is largely absent in current
study centers on Dugin’s geopolitical stance, his application of political theology, and the reactions his combination of these two elements elicit in Western academic and political commentary arenas. In short, it examines how he constructs and describes what he identifies as Fourth Political Theory.8

This study focuses on Dugin through the lens of his being an interpreter of the West.9 But, there are two counter-directional movements involved here. One is the vector of Dugin’s frequently encountered interpretation of the West – its character, motives, and goals ascribed by him. The second vector involves the West’s reception of Dugin – the impressions of Dugin formed by interpreters and commentators, and their perceptions of Dugin’s influence on current and future Russian geopolitical actions.

The substance of Dugin’s stance is contained in his geopolitics with its embedded theologically related material. This tripartite topology (geography, politics, and theology) requires that I closely attend to how Dugin adapts Traditionalism, Sacred Space, and other theological and metaphysical elements into Fourth Political Theory.10 I maintain that it is not merely the venues of academe and governmental institutions throughout contemporary Western liberal democracies is commonly accepted. Cf. e.g., Daniel Philpott, “Political Theology and Liberal Democracy,” Review of The Stillborn God: Religion, Politics, and the Modern West, by Mark Lilla, The Immanent Frame, January 23, 2008, accessed September 14, 2018, https://tif.ssrc.org/2008/01/23/political-theology-liberal-democracy/. While this may be a trend, it is by no means a fait accompli. There are efforts by commentators and scholars to reverse this trend. Cf. e.g., Richard John Neuhaus, “Politics and Religion: ‘the Great Separation,’’ First Things, January, 2008, accessed September 15, 2018, https://www.firstthings.com/article/2008/01/religion-and-politics-the-great-separation#print. Cf. 1.2.2. for further mention of the exclusion of theology from the curricula of the academy. Mark Lilla is a professor of humanities at Columbia University. Daniel Philpott is a professor of political science at Notre Dame. Richard John Neuhaus, 1936-2009.8 Traditionalism, refers to the metaphysical “theory that all moral and religious truth comes from divine revelation passed on by tradition, human reason being incapable of attaining it,” according to the OED.

9 Although the term West lacks specificity, in my research Dugin seems to refer to West and the West (including derivatives e.g., Western, etc.) applying the same, or very similar, meaning as does the OED (Cf. footnote 4 herein). Considering Dugin’s attention to The New World Order, for example, Dugin appears to focus on the United States at the top of a Western geopolitical higharchy. Except for the United States, Dugin does not tend to specifically identify Western countries, preferring to collectively group them under the Western designator.

10 The terms Sacred Space and Sacred Geography are used interchangeably throughout. However, within quotes or specific references to quotes and/or certain other references, the terms may or may not be capitalized depending on the spelling the source employed;
ideas contained within Dugin’s Geopolitical-Theology that matter – the acceptance of his ideas portends far more significant consequences. Conclusions derived from this study depend, in large part, on how expressions of Dugin’s ideas are encountered in the West – that often means their clarity when rendered in English. More than this is how Dugin’s explanations, reactions, and critiques – also often rendered in English – are perceived and interpreted in the West. If Fourth Political Theory is to contribute to Dugin’s goal of a multipolar world, with Eurasia representing one of the dominant poles, how the West – especially the Anglosphere – responds to it bears upon its ultimate realization.

My study is broad-scoped. It is necessary, in the interest of academically recognized parameters, that I stipulate some positions and presuppositions that I determined to be instrumental in explaining Dugin in the complexity of his Geopolitical-Theology. Especially here in the first chapter, I attempt to acknowledge my positions, opinions, assumptions, and presuppositions as such. I approach this study with an awareness that my geopolitical education and experience comes from a decidedly American perspective. Additionally, I freely acknowledge that I advocate increasing awareness, consideration, and application of religious and theological discussion in the public forum.

I.2. The Question

How does Alexander Dugin propose to counter the perceived evils of Western Liberalism, its secular worldview, efforts toward globalization, and goal of unipolar hegemony, and how does his Geopolitical-Theology propose to thwart these perceived evils and maintain a multipolar world?

I.2.1. Thesis Statement

Dugin’s Geopolitical-Theology projects his vision of a future Russian led Eurasian constituent of a multipolar world. Dugin’s Fourth Political Theory reflects a Neo-Traditional political theology, and his geopolitical Neo-Eurasian intentions are saturated with a messianic Manifest Destiny. Dugin otherwise both will be capitalized in the text. Dugin seems to prefer Sacred Geography, but I conducted no thorough survey of his works to determine this.
champions a Eurasia in direct opposition to Western global and unipolar aspirations. Therefore, systematically exposing Dugin’s Geopolitical-Theology will allow for more accurate reception, response, and engagement to the extent that Russian National Policy reflects Dugin’s ideas.

I.3. Methodology

I primarily employ qualitative research methodology to address my Research Question and to satisfy the affirmatives of my Thesis Statement.\textsuperscript{11}

Qualitative research is an approach for exploring and understanding the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a social or human problem. The process of research involves emerging questions and procedures, data typically collected in the participant’s setting, data analysis inductively building from particulars to general themes, and the researcher making interpretations of the meaning of the data.\textsuperscript{12}

Following John W. Creswell, my first subcategory under the qualitative method will present and analyze Dugin’s directly produced words and writings as primary data and develop a body of secondary data for analysis. Melissa P. Johnston explored the research utility of secondary data analysis in some detail, underscoring its viability.\textsuperscript{13} Johnston offered Catherine Hakim’s definition that secondary analysis is “any further analysis of an existing dataset which presents interpretations, conclusions or knowledge additional

\textsuperscript{11} Cf. e.g., 4.4. and 4.5. for quantitative exceptions (although still in keeping with secondary data analysis).

\textsuperscript{12} John W. Creswell, Research design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches, 4th ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2016), 4. John W. Creswell, a two-time Fulbright Scholar, was formally Professor of Educational Psychology at the University of Nebraska–Lincoln.

\textsuperscript{13} Melissa P. Johnston, “Secondary Data Analysis: A Method of Which the Time Has Come,” Qualitative and Quantitative Methods in Libraries, 3, no. 3 (September 2014): 620. Johnston also noted that “the concept of data analysis first emerged with Glaser’s discussion of re-analyzing data which were originally collected for other purposes.” Here Johnston is citing B.G. Glaser, “Retreading research materials: The use of secondary analysis by the independent researcher.” The American Behavioral Scientist, 6 no. 10 (1963): 11. Melissa P. Johnson is Associate Professor of Library and Information Studies at the University of West Georgia (U.S.). B.G. Glaser is a long-time sociology scholar and founder, along with A.L. Strauss, of the Grounded Theory Institute.
to, or different from, those presented in the first report on the inquiry as a whole and its main results.”

Most research begins with an investigation to learn what is already known and what remains to be learned about a topic through reviewing secondary sources and investigations others have previously conducted in the specified area of interest. Secondary data analysis takes this one step further, including a review of previously collected data in the area of interest.

“This may well involve looking further afield, at classic books or articles that are not specifically on ‘your’ subject,” noted Cambridge scholar, Jim Secord.

“For example, he wrote, “it may be that you could find some helpful ideas for a study of modern scientific portraiture in a book on the eighteenth century.” Secord went on to write, “the best history almost always depends on developing new approaches and interpretations, not on knowing about a secret archive no one has used before.”

My use of qualitative research methodology through primary and secondary data sources will acknowledge, in my second subcategory, that “comparative method is of great importance throughout the social sciences.”

The comparative method is especially useful in this study because the selection of objects of comparison “may be biased towards particular nations, regions, races, classes, genders, creeds, political groupings or belief systems.”

Examining the development of Dugin’s Neo-Eurasian model, for example, allows for Peter Buckley’s conclusion that “comparisons across time, holding place constant, are the essence of ‘history.’” In comparative analysis, “critical

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17 Secord, “Tools and Techniques.”
18 Peter J. Buckley, “Historical Research Approaches to the Analysis of Internationalisation,” Management International Review 56, (December 2016), 886.
19 Buckley, “Historical Research Approaches,” 883.
appraisal of all sources” is an essential requirement for statements, archives, documents or interviews.”

Therefore, in concert with my use of primary and secondary data, I will follow the notion that sources “should be triangulated against other sources.”

Overall, my qualitative research, engaging in comparative aspects of Dugin-initiated primary data and commentator-initiated secondary data, and systematically explaining Dugin’s Geopolitical-Theology, will coincide with concepts of historical methodology. “Historical methods involve the collection of both primary and secondary sources of data, which are then analyzed to establish relationships between cause and effect,” according to Buckley. Furthermore, Buckley concluded that “historical methods enable the researcher to examine the way in which such factors develop over time.”

As Dugin’s ideological development is both a past and on-going process, Buckley’s explanations of historical research methods apply.

Moreover, because Dugin is deeply engaged in geopolitical propositions, keeping in mind that “a sense of place involves understanding both the global macro context and the particular location,” is necessary. Remarking on a particularly applicable example, Buckley noted:

We should also remember that history interacts with geography – context is crucial. To quote the historian Peter Brown’s work on wealth in the early Christian period, “A true history of Latin Christianity requires an unremitting sense of place.”

Dugin’s work is a confluence of political theology and geography conceived and developed in metaphysical and historical contexts and presented as desired outcomes. His Neo-Traditional and Neo-Eurasian proposals lend

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21 Ibid., 894-95.
22 Ibid.
25 Buckley, “Historical Research Approaches,” 896.
themselves to examination through a qualitative methodology, including historical and comparative data analysis.

The methodology I employ in this study follows three primary vectors. First, an examination within the areas of politics and theology that provide a contextual exposition of Dugin’s works deemed able to deliver significant impact in the West. Second, accounting and appraisal of the ramifications of Dugin’s views, primarily (but not exclusively) from within the Western scholarly community. Third, my judgments of Dugin’s Geopolitical-Theology positions and my opinions informing further future research questions.

I.4. Critical Recognitions

Proceeding systematically through this study requires realizing several essential elements supporting my thesis:

- Dugin as a Geopolitical-Theologian – his presentation of political theology
- Liberal Democracy – viewing the West as the geopolitical and metaphysical opponent
- Traditionalism – understanding Dugin’s adaptation of this metaphysical element of his Geopolitical-Theology as a foil to Liberal Democracy
- Eurasianism – understanding Dugin’s adaptation of this element of his Geopolitical-Theology as a divinely inspired Manifest Destiny

I.5. The Way Forward in this Study

Before proceeding into a review of Dugin literature and the literature of others regarding Dugin and contributing to understanding Dugin and his theoretical projects, it will be necessary to address the topics of geopolitics, political theology, and Liberal Democracy. To discuss Dugin as a Geopolitical-Theologian, it is imperative, from the outset, to determine what such a definition means in Dugin’s case. Therefore, an introduction and review of the literature of geopolitics, political theology, and Liberal Democracy as they apply to Dugin are initially
engaged. Traditionalism, Eurasianism, and Reception are subsequently addressed.

I.6. The Roadmap

This study is mapped from the introduction through conclusions as an examination of Dugin’s Geopolitical-Theology. To ground Dugin in this significant area of his worldview, I undertake a review of both his, and other, pertinent writings. I continue with a study of the development of his current geopolitical positions. I then consider the observations of Dugin commentators and others whose work bears substantially on interpreting and illuminating Dugin’s views. Throughout, I give attention to the reception afforded Dugin, especially in the West. Finally, I present my conclusions and suggestions for continuing to study Dugin, his work, and his impact.

I proceed topically following these pathways:

- Laying the groundwork of Geopolitics, Political Theology, and Liberal Democracy
- Reviewing Dugin’s primary source texts necessary to support my thesis
  - Reviewing the literature of principal Dugin commentators
  - Acknowledging literature from various other sources
- An account and appraisal of Dugin’s impact amongst the Western scholarly community in the areas of geopolitics and political theology.
  - A brief examination of the role of Reception as it applies to Dugin’s work
  - Dugin’s life and work
    - Including Dugin as interpreter and commentator of the West
  - Dugin’s impact as assessed through his principal commentators
    - Acknowledgment of various other commentators
  - My assessments of Dugin’s impact
    - Present
    - Future
1.0. Review of the Literature

In this chapter, I engage in an examination of Dugin’s Geopolitical-Theology by first reviewing the more general fields of geopolitics and political theology. I then move into a brief presentation of the criticality of theological material to any understanding of Dugin’s political theory and his view of Liberal Democracy. Next, I review literature, first that of essential Dugin material, then topically: Political Theology, Liberal Democracy, Traditionalism, Fundamentalism, Sacred Geography/Sacred Space, Eurasianism, and Reception. I close out this chapter with conclusions drawn and a preview of the following sections.

1.1. Geopolitics

The study of geopolitics involves the “analysis of the geographic influences on power relationships in international relations,” according to John H. Deudney.\(^{27}\) The OED states that it is “politics, especially international relations, as influenced by geographical factors.”\(^{28}\) Use of the term Geopolitics has been employed for slightly over a century since being coined by Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellén.\(^{29}\)

“What is geopolitics?” queried Colin Flint.\(^{30}\) He then went on to say that it is about geography, and actions – specifically about how those actions have been portrayed or represented.\(^{31}\) “It is about how the powerful have created worlds,” was Flint’s summary.\(^{32}\) Moreover, it involves “connected actions and actors and the geographies they make, change, destroy, and maintain.”\(^{33}\) I believe this sentence captures the essence of Dugin’s geopolitical thinking –


\(^{28}\) OED

\(^{29}\) Deudney, “Geopolitics.” Deudney states that, “In contemporary discourse, *geopolitics* has been widely employed as a loose synonym for international politics.” Italics in original. Rudolf Kjellén, 1864-1922.

\(^{30}\) Colin Flint, *An Introduction to Geopolitics*, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2011), 2. Colin Flint is a political scientist and the Director of Graduate Studies at Utah State University.

\(^{31}\) Ibid.

\(^{32}\) Ibid.

\(^{33}\) Ibid.
the Eurasian world he wishes to make, the present world he wishes to change, the unipolar world he wishes to thwart, and the traditional worldview he wishes to maintain.

Classical Geopolitics, Flint wrote, “should not be interpreted as historic, past, and hence redundant,” instead as something “alive and well.” With the end of the nineteenth century came the “classical’ theories” such as those of “Sir Halford Mackinder, Alfred Thayer Mahan, and General Karl Haushofer.” Notably, the classical approach to geopolitics is still a very active factor to and through Dugin, and evident in various manifestations to be explored within Fourth Political Theory.

Dugin, realizing the importance of Classical Geopolitics to his developing ideas, built on the work of the previous geopoliticians in his book, *Foundations of Geopolitics*, thus doing much to keep their theories alive and well in Russia. Indeed, a prevalent approach to geopolitics today is of the Classical variety – and it is the starting point for Dugin. However, Dugin’s treatment of geopolitics is somewhat different, as will be seen. “The influence of Foundations [*Foundations of Geopolitics*] was profound if measured by book sales,” wrote Charles Clover. This influence was “even more profound if measured by the true yardstick of the scribbler – plagiarism,” he added. Dugin’s ideas “were reprinted in dozens of similar manuals and textbooks, all of which devoted themselves to the theories of Mackinder, Haushofer and others.”

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34 Ibid., 3.
35 Ibid. Halford Mackinder, 1861-1947. Alfred Thayer Mahan, 1840-1914, was president of the U.S. Naval War College and a leading nineteenth century proponent and authority on sea power. General Karl Haushofer, 1869-1946, was a German general and geopolitician who also influenced the geopolitical development of Rudolf Hess.
36 Cf. e.g., Dugin, *Osnovy Geopolitiki: Geopoliticheskoe Budushchee Rossii* (Moscow: Arktogeya, 1997). This is a Russian citation of Dugin’s work, *The Foundations of Geopolitics*.
39 Ibid.
René Guénon considered modern chemistry to be the progeny of alchemy.\textsuperscript{40} Likewise, physics may be regarded as the offspring of magic. Dugin characterized geopolitics as occupying a genealogical position “in an intermediate place between traditional science (sacred geography) and profane science,” claiming that it too is descended from esoteric beginnings.\textsuperscript{41} In a 1999 article, Clover prophetically stated that “victory is now to be found in geography rather than history; in space rather than time.”\textsuperscript{42} Astutely and succinctly, Clover approached an essential essence of Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianism – giving geography star billing alongside history. Speaking to the crucial place of geography in politics, Dugin stated:

In contrast to “economical ideologies” it is founded on the thesis: “geographical conditions as destiny.” Geography and space in geopolitics serve the same function that money and means of production serve in Marxism and Liberalism – all fundamental aspects of human being are reduced to them, they are the main method of explaining the past, the main factors of human being, around which all other aspects of existence are being organized.\textsuperscript{43}

\textsuperscript{40} René Guénon, 1886-1951. Guénon is recognized as one of the most prominent figures of Integral (or Classical) Traditionalism. His influence on Traditionalism and Dugin will be addressed in greater detail as this study progresses.


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1.1.1. Geopolitics of the Heartland

Mackinder, the British geopolitical academician, is remembered for famously stating: “whoever rules East Europe commands the Heartland; whoever rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; whoever rules the World-island commands the World.” Mackinder’s ideas are recognized in geopolitical circles as Heartland Theory. The Heartland Mackinder referred to corresponds to Eurasia, a region that, in a 1904 paper, he termed the Pivot Area. Nicholas Spykman, a Dutch-born American who became head of Yale’s Institute of International Studies, developed a similar, but somewhat challenging theory to Mackinder’s ideas. Visualizing Eurasia as the Heartland, Spykman argued that controlling the periphery of Eurasia was tantamount to controlling Eurasia itself – hence, the destiny of the world. The Eurasian periphery was dubbed the Rimland in Spykman’s theory. Resonance of Spykman’s Rimland Theory is recognizable in the Cold War Containment Policy advanced by George Kennan.

At his dacha, standing before a map of the newly expanded Soviet Union shortly after Germany’s surrender in May 1945, Josef Stalin nodded with approval. The vast buffer he’d carved

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44 Halford J. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1996), 113. This work was first published by Henry Holt and Company, 1919. The World Island refers to the continents of Europe, Asia, and Africa. The Offshore Islands refer mainly to the British Isles and the Japanese islands. The Outlying Islands refer to the continents of North America, South America, and Australia.


out of Soviet-occupied Eastern Europe would now protect his empire against future Napoleons and Hitlers.48

1.1.2. Geopolitics of Culture

As central to Dugin’s geopolitics as geography is, there is also the addition of culture – of civilization, if you will. Speaking of the world after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Samuel Huntington wrote that “the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic.”49 Huntington’s hypothesis was that it would primarily be cultural. There can be little doubt that Dugin reflects elements of Huntington’s ideas about a perceived “clash of civilizations.”50 One need go no farther than Dugin’s statement that “Samuel Huntington described in a realistic manner the obstacles which inevitably face the supporters of a Unipolar World and the fanatics of the End of History” to verify this assertion.51

As part of his campaign against Western Liberalism, Dugin attacked the hubris of Francis Fukuyama’s bold 1990s pronouncement that, with the triumph of Western Liberalism, the world experienced the End of History.52 From his vantage point, Dugin asserted the accuracy of Huntington’s thesis contradicting Fukuyama’s proclamation. By analyzing the phenomena of the situation of geopolitics after the fall of the Soviet Union, Huntington correctly

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50 Huntington, “Clash of Civilizations?”
“arrived at the conclusion that they could be included under a single denomination: civilizations.”

Dugin emphatically stated this belief:

Huntington formulated a new political-scientific concept...a new dimension of international politics which was born after the demise of the USSR...the Atlanticist milieus discovered that they would face an enemy which, unlike the Soviet Union, is not based on an explicitly formalized ideology, but which nonetheless has begun to question and undermine the foundations of the liberal and Americano-centric “New World Order.” The enemy is now the civilizations, and no longer only countries or states.

In direct opposition to any End of History claims, Dugin stated that in considering “all civilizations, only the Western civilization has presented itself as universal, pretending to be in this way ‘the civilization’ (singular).” “In reality,” according to Dugin in his interpretation of Huntington, “the great majority of men and women who live outside of the European or American space reject this dominion, and continue to be rooted in different historical-cultural types.” The correct view, agreeing with Huntington, is that there is a “resurgence of civilizations” not any broad striving for globalization on the American model.

Comparing the two, Fukuyama is globalism’s optimist and Huntington is the pessimist, in Dugin’s opinion. It was Huntington “who analyzed the risks and measured the dangers.” Dugin clarified Huntington’s conclusion that a clash of civilizations is real into an identification of the participants. There are only two – if “there must be a ‘clash’ of civilizations, it has to be a clash between the West and the ‘rest of the world.’” At the end of the Cold War, Huntington speculated, international politics moved from the conflict between

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53 Dugin, “Huntington, Fukuyama, and Eurasianism.”
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
two superpowers toward one of Western and non-Western civilizational interaction and actions from within the non-Western world itself.\textsuperscript{61}

Dugin is attempting to assist this move by diminishing internal hostile actions in the non-Western world.\textsuperscript{62} Diminishment is a task of “reorienting the hostility,” not eliminating it, and redirecting it “against the United States and Western Civilization, instead of against neighboring civilizations.”\textsuperscript{63}

We must organize the common front of civilizations against one civilization which pretends to be the civilization in singular. This prioritary common enemy is globalism and the United States, which is now its principal vector. The more the peoples of the Earth will be convinced of that, the more the confrontations between non-Western civilizations can be reduced. And Eurasianism is the political formula which suits this “rest.”\textsuperscript{64}

There are points of disagreement between Huntington and Dugin to be sure. An obvious point of departure is Huntington’s call “for the strengthening of transatlantic relations between Europe and the United States.”\textsuperscript{65} In a siren call to Europe, Dugin first claimed that “the destiny of Europe is not on the other side of the Atlantic.”\textsuperscript{66} Then, harkening to a future fracturing of the West, Dugin becomes tempter, “Europe must clearly establish itself as a distinct civilization, free and independent.”\textsuperscript{67} “It has to be a European Europe, not American and Atlanticist,” Dugin wrote.\textsuperscript{68}

It must construct itself as a postmodern democratic empire, through the reclaiming of its cultural and sacred roots, as a part of its future as well as something residing in its past. A Europe which does not also rise up against the United States would betray its roots at the same time that it would condemn itself to not having a future.\textsuperscript{69}

\textsuperscript{61} Huntington, “Clash of Civilizations?” 38.
\textsuperscript{62} Dugin, “Huntington, Fukuyama, and Eurasianism.”
\textsuperscript{63} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{64} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{65} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{66} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{67} Ibid. Contrast this position with Dugin’s “Dublin to Vladivostok” desires. Cf. e.g., 1.6.1.
\textsuperscript{68} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{69} Dugin, “Huntington, Fukuyama, and Eurasianism.”
1.1.3. The Sacred Geo of Geopolitics

Dugin develops his Geopolitical-Theology as a remarkable blend of politics, geography, culture, and political theology. This blending is nowhere more evident than in Dugin’s embrace of Sacred Geography. Mark Bassin, addressing the observation of a fellow Russian political observer, remarked that “Eurasianism, as Stephen Shenfield reminds us, means many things.”

Foremost of these things, for Dugin, is the sacred nature of Eurasia’s geography. To Dugin, Eurasia is not just a classification of continental geography; it is a divine combination of geography with history, realized as Tradition and metaphysics in the spiritual manifestation of Sacred Space.

Dugin does not place Sacred Geography tangential to human development; instead, he ascribes it an essential place. “According to the given logics of natural cosmic symbolism,” wrote Dugin,

the ancient traditions organized their “sacred space,” founded their cultic centers, burial places, temples, and edifices, and interpreted the natural and “civilizational” features of geographical, cultural and political territories of the planet.

Dugin stated that the very structure “of migrations, wars, campaigns, demographic waves, building of empires etc. was defined by the original, pragmatic logics of sacred geography.”

Mikhail Epstein, noting Dugin’s opinion that “the upheavals in the contemporary world are derived from the competition between two prehistoric civilizations – Atlantis and Hyperborea,” indicated that this view

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71 Dugin, “From Sacred Geography,” under, East and West in Sacred Geography.

72 Ibid.
arises from Dugin’s “more esoteric level.” Epstein also wrote that Dugin affirms an ancient Atlantis-Hyperborean War and associates it with “conventional “meta-geographical” terms in theosophy and other occult sciences,” to connect his ancient analogy to the current geopolitical situation.

Dugin displayed a Manichaean understanding of the metaphysical elements of his geopolitics and his characteristic fusion of the two when he stated that “the affirmation of primordial duality displayed by geographical structure of the planet and historical typology of civilizations is the basic law of geopolitics.” The “premortal duality” refers to his consistent expressions of a long and enduring conflict between Land-Power and Sea-Power – Tellurocracy and Thalassocracy.

This duality is being expressed in the opposition between “Tellurocracy” (land power) and “Talasocracy” (sea power). The character of this opposition is being reduced to a conflict between mercantile civilization (Carthage, Athens) and military authoritarian civilization (Rome, Sparta) or, in other words, to a duality between “democracy” and “ideocracy.” Fundamentally, this duality possesses the character of enmity of its constitutional poles.

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73 Mikhail Epstein, The Russian Philosophy of National Spirit: Conservatism and Traditionalism, report (Washington: National Council for Soviet and East European Research, 1994), 18. Dugin suggests an ongoing strife between the West and Eurasia and he depicts the West as Atlantis, the maritime power, and Eurasia as Hyperborea, the land power. Hyperborea was a mythical and idyllic Northland that Dugin implies has sacred associations within his Eurasian construct. Mikhail Epstein is Professor of Cultural Theory and Russian Literature at Emory University.

74 Epstein, Conservatism and Traditionalism. 18.

75 Ibid., 26. Manichean in the OED sense of “Religious or philosophical dualism.”

76 Ibid. Tellurocracy is a combination of the Latin (tellus) for land and the Ancient Greek word κράτος (power), hence, to rule by power on the land. Thalassocracy is the counterforce, the rule of sea-power. Note: Thalassocracy is often found rendered as Thalassocracy. Cf. e.g., Christy Constantakopoulou, “Thalassocracy,” The Encyclopedia of Ancient History, ed. R. S. Bagnall (Blackwell Publishing Ltd, October 26, 2012), accessed October 26, 2016, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781444338386.wbeah04305. Constantakopoulou wrote that “Thalassocracy” is the phonetic adaptation of a noun meaning ‘sea power’ in Greek. Ancient Greek historians, and particularly Thucydides, used the concept of ‘thalassocracy’ as an analytical tool in investigating the past.” Within this quote can be seen a conflict of spelling alternatives encountered throughout this study. I will attempt to be consistent in my spelling choices except when offering direct quotations where I will endeavor to provide the spelling in the quoted material – though sometimes offering notations.
Dugin commented that the one, associated with water, is more fluid – therefore unstable, while the other, associated with land, is more solid – consequently more stable. Dugin wrote:

Geopolitical outlook on history is a model of the development of planetary duality to its final extremes. The Land and the Sea expand their primordial conflict onto the whole world. The history of the human kind is nothing else but the expression of this struggle and the path towards making it absolute.

1.1.4. Developing Geopolitics in Fourth Political Theory

Dugin combines classical geopolitics with his metaphysical illustrations of Sacred Geography to create his vision of a future Eurasia. Dugin laid out his Geopolitical-Theology applied to his vision for a future multipolar world in his book, The Fourth Political Theory. The contents represent an accumulation of Dugin’s political thought regarding the trajectory of Russia’s political future and the demise of Western political power in the world arena. Fourth Political Theory incorporates Dugin’s ideas of Traditionalism and Eurasianism and articulates a competitive alternative to Western Liberalism.

Dugin envisions a multipolar global political landscape upon which Liberalism, already severely damaged by postmodernity, is curtailed and

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77 Ibid.
78 Dugin, Foundations, 29.
79 Dugin, The Fourth Political Theory, trans. Michael Millerman and Mark Sleboda, ed. John B. Morgan (London: Arktos, 2012). The 2012 edition of The Fourth Political Theory, (Arktos, 2012) will be used as the primary source throughout. There are other editions available in the body of literature. It is often confusing as to which edition is being referred to or quoted as pagination may be different, and some material may be markedly different from the edition I use herein. For example, there is a 2012 online edition published by the “Eurasian Movement,” redacted by Sleboda and translated by Nina Kurpianova, et al that is different in some wording and pagination. The Fourth Political Theory (Четвертая политическая теория) was originally published in Russian in 2009. Translations of these editions (and others – or excerpts from them) often appear online and in other publication media.
80 John B. Morgan, “A Note From the Editor,” in The Fourth Political Theory, ed. John B. Morgan, trans. Michael Millerman and Mark Sleboda (London: Arktos, 2012), 7. Here Morgan wrote, “The bulk of the text in this book was published as Chetvertaia politcheskaia teoriiia, which was published in St. Petersburg in 2009 by Amphora. The text has been revised by the author, and additional chapters have been added to this edition from other writings by Professor Dugin which were published later, dealing with the same theme.” John B. Morgan was Editor-in-Chief of Arktos (publishing house) when this edition of The Fourth Political Theory was published.
supplanted by Fourth Political Theory. The nascent theory has been sketched out, but Dugin admits it lacks the detail or experiential elements needed to thoroughly compare its viability with that of its long extant rival, Liberalism. Dugin characterizes his introduction to this fourth way as an “invitation” to participate in the full development of a new political paradigm. The specific invitees of this invitation are not clearly identified, but Dugin’s ideas have gained traction with the more right-leaning political groups and politicians, first in Russia, then Europe, and, increasingly, in the United States. How much more traction Fourth Political Theory earns and where it is obtained is a matter of immediate interest.

In The Fourth Political Theory, Dugin posits that modernity produced three major political movements: Liberalism, Communism, and Fascism. Of the three, Liberalism prevailed and was the only viable survivor, although Dugin maintains that it too has fallen – a victim of postmodernity. Dugin claims that Liberalism, spawned by the Enlightenment, is a product of the West. Furthermore, it will become evident that he utterly rejects the assumption that Liberalism is either positive or desirable to the East in general and Russia in particular.

1.2. Political Theology

Saul Newman observed that “the term ‘political theology,’” comes “from the nineteenth-century Russian anarchist Mikhail Bakunin.” Bakunin coined it “in a polemical essay from 1871 titled ‘La théologie politique de Mazzini et

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81 The OED states that postmodernity is “a period or movement representing a departure from modernism and characterized by the self-conscious use of earlier styles and conventions, a mixing of different artistic styles and media, and a general distrust of theories.” Britannica states, in part that, “postmodernism is largely a reaction against the intellectual assumptions and values of the modern period in the history of Western philosophy (roughly, the 17th through the 19th century). Indeed, many of the doctrines characteristically associated with postmodernism can fairly be described as the straightforward denial of general philosophical viewpoints that were taken for granted during the 18th-century Enlightenment, though they were not unique to that period.” Cf. https://www.britannica.com/topic/postmodernism
82 Dugin, Fourth Theory, 35ff.
83 Ibid. 35.
84 E.g., the Russian New Right (RNR) and the European New Right (ENR).
85 Dugin, Fourth Theory, 19.
l’Internationale,” where he “reproaches the great Italian politician and republican Guiseppe Mazzini for illegitimately mixing religion and politics.”

“Political theology, an enigmatic term, generally refers to the interpenetration of religion and politics.” More precisely, it refers to the way in which political concepts, discourses and institutions – particularly sovereignty – are influenced, shaped and underpinned by religious categories of thought. Dugin’s particular Geopolitical-Theology represents his expression derived from the broader field of political theology. The extent and depth of his Geopolitical-Theology are abundantly evident as he declares that the state’s very meaning is contained in its spiritual mission.

Newman pointedly suggested that “Just as God transcends the world and nature, the state transcends and stands above society; the same principle of absolute sovereignty is at work in both.” Religion and politics have always been intertwined,” Newman wrote, elaborating that “the entire history of the Christian West, in its shifting relationship between religious and political power, between church and state, might be said to revolve around the politico-theological problem.”

1.2.1. Considering Dugin’s Purpose for Theological Language

Derived from Greek through Middle-English, theology is, quite literally, talking about God or the conclusions derived from such talk. Originally a word used in describing specialized biblical and ecclesial subjects among the academic clergy in a Christian context, theology, is now applied across

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88 Ibid., 4.
89 Ibid., 5.
90 It is important to note again that herein I do not argue for, or necessarily accept, the merits of Dugin as a theologian in either the academic or ecclesial sense. I do accept that he is a political theologian in the defitional sense explained, and that he pervasively embeds theologically related material and language, metaphysical references, and spiritual subject matter throughout his Fourth Political Theory conversations.
93 Ibid.
religions. Hence a current definition implying “the study of religion and beliefs.”  

Dugin’s purpose in his Fourth Political Theory is not to expound on theology, per se, but to build a geographic-centric political theology. Dugin develops Fourth Political Theory, in its entire array of conversations, using imprecise definitional applications concerning theology. Although, however imprecise his definition, metaphysical references are ever-present and discernible, even if not always specifically religious or theological. While I consider theology as the contemplation, study, and discussion of God and Creation, and humankind’s relationship to both, I feel Dugin may avail himself of less precise parameters. Dugin does not define theology with any strict academic or ecclesial preciseness, but his purpose for implying its presence in his words and writings is germane.

Karl Barth wrote in a letter responding to an invitation, “in the church of Jesus Christ there can and should be no non-theologians.” However, lack of a sufficient degree of academic rigor, a too broad multi-religious ecumenism, and infusion of mystical, gnostic, and even occultic characteristics in his Geopolitical-Theology suggest that Dugin should not be approached in this study as a Christian theologian. Still, it is evident that Dugin builds the geopolitical and theologically related elements of his Fourth Political Theory wielding a theologically derived conversation. Dugin undertakes to use theology in its general understanding and appears motivated by his desire to further his expanded political theology.

I address Fourth Political Theory and its included derivatives, Neo-Traditionalism and Neo-Eurasianism, as a form of God-talk. Dugin’s political

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96 I confine this statement to considerations of his Fourth Political Theory and his ideas concerning Traditionalism and Eurasianism. As this is not a study of Dugin as a strict theologian (either Christian or otherwise), I confine him within the definition of political theology as explained.
strands contain strong theologically related components. This study presupposes that no proper examination of Dugin can succeed absent the assumption that geopolitical God-talk – that is, his political theology fused with geography – matters to Dugin. Beginning his discussion of Michael Fishbane’s *Sacred Attunement: A Jewish Theology*, David Novak wrote that “the word theology means literally God-talk.” Commenting on Fishbane’s approach, Novak wrote:

For Fishbane, the movement toward theology begins from a nontheological starting point... This natural preparation for theology could be metaphysical, ethical, or aesthetic. That one can be led into theology metaphysically, owing to one’s seeing the multiplicity of the natural phenomenal world, seems to presuppose a higher singularity lying beyond its horizon. (This is the way of medieval Jewish theologians from Saadia to Maimonides.)

Dugin’s approach in *Fourth Political Theory*, his God-talk, follows a path of metaphysical preparation. It is adamant in its insistence on interpreting “the multiplicity of the natural phenomenal world,” especially evident in his view of Sacred Geography with “a higher singularity lying beyond its horizon.”

Dominican Bernard Bourdin, a political theologian himself, suggested that the influence of two political philosophers, Carl Schmitt and Hans Blumenberg, were instrumental in twentieth century development of political theology.

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Dugin invokes Schmitt as he establishes the basis of his Fourth Political Theory, and Blumenberg is remarkable for his contrasting views to those of Schmitt, thus, providing a foil to Dugin as well. I maintain that an essential element in understanding Dugin’s Geopolitical-Theology is summed up in Schmitt’s statement:

All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts not only because of their historical development – in which they were transferred from theology to the theory of the state, whereby, for example, the omnipotent God became the omnipotent lawgiver – but also because of their systematic structure, the recognition of which is necessary for a sociological consideration of these concepts.\(^{101}\)

I accept Schmitt’s conclusion because I believe it captures one of Dugin’s underlying worldviews. I also presuppose that Schmitt’s observation that “any decision about whether something is unpolitical is always a political decision, irrespective of who decides and what reasons are advanced,” holds, by extension, that deciding whether something is theological or non-theological is, in fact, a theological decision.\(^{102}\) I believe that Dugin embraces these same two conclusions. I contend that this understanding is critical to grasping the bedrock assumption that forges the link of Dugin’s politics and its theological ingredients. As essential as this understanding is, it is not my intent to prove or disprove Dugin’s assumptions; I intend to present his Geopolitical-Theology systematically and to highlight the results of how his metaphysical and political visions may be becoming engrained and expressed in Russian political policy.

Viewing Dugin’s theological inclusions as a form of Schmittian political theology seems the best course. I find myself in agreement with Gavin Rae in

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102 Schmitt, “Political Theology,” 2. Italics in the original quotation, italics in the remainder of the sentence added.
applying my thoughts on Dugin’s theology, in the context of his Geopolitical-Theology, as Rae does in applying his thoughts to Schmitt:

The basic point guiding my argument is that Schmitt’s thinking is premised on a particular theological sentiment that not only shapes the responses he gives to a number of the issues he engages with but also actually plays a fundamental role in the solutions he devises to them.\(^{103}\)

Rae suggested “that we need a more nuanced understanding of what the ‘theology’ of political theology entails that does not reduce it to ‘faith in (a) religion,’ but which recognizes a more fundamental sense of political theology rooted in epistemic faith alone.”\(^{104}\) Rae’s conclusion has direct applicability to Dugin’s use of theology in his particular political ideology. Rae decided that “we need, therefore, to distinguish between two forms of theology: a religious form of theology, rooted in faith in divine revelation, and an epistemological form of theology, rooted in recognition of the limits of human reason.”\(^{105}\)

Dugin’s Geopolitical-Theology, like “Schmitt’s political theology,” when adopting Rae’s thinking, “is not premised on the truth of a religion, but on the narrower epistemological principle that faith or belief provides access to the truth.”\(^{106}\) The theological elements in Dugin’s work are discernable in various manifestations. They may take the form of metaphysically infused political discussion, as an integral element of geopolitical projections (e.g., in his Neo-Eurasian ideas of Sacred Geography), or as elements of his engagement in theologically related areas such as eschatology and apocalypticism.

1.2.2. Political Theology is Critical to Governance

My third presupposition is intimately connected and subordinate to my first and second. Dugin, like Schmitt, believes that proper governance involves an integrated political theology. Dugin uses “governance” in what his editor,

\(^{103}\) Gavin Rae, “The Theology of Carl Schmitt’s Political Theology,” *Political Theology* 17, no. 6 (July 2015): 555. Gavin Rae is a Research Fellow at the Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. References and conclusions regarding Dugin’s theological and related expressions throughout this study are too numerous to list.

\(^{104}\) Rae, “The Theology of Carl Schmitt’s Political Theology,” 557.

\(^{105}\) Ibid., 570.

\(^{106}\) Ibid., 571.
John B. Morgan, styled as the “French” sense of “the art of governing.”107 “Geopolitics is the science of how to rule,” wrote Dugin.108

Theological and religious discussion matters to Dugin in the premise that political theology not only offers avenues of common-core dialogue with other nations, regions, and groups, but allows for acceptance and accommodation of the critical dimensions of the human spirit, society, and culture. Dugin emphasizes that in sizable portions of the world – certainly in Russia – religious strands are woven throughout politics and social life. Conversely, he stresses that the West is increasingly secular and prideful of humanism derived from the Enlightenment. Dugin argues that adopting secularism ultimately weakens the West by placing it in a position of being unable (or at least unwilling) to engage in constructive communication with a significant part of the world – expressly Russia, in the present case.109

Though it may be able to stifle, secularism appears unable to succeed in removing theological discussion or some form of religious dialogue, from the political forum. The existence of former official Soviet apparatus supports the argument that, even in an avowedly secular government, a goal of abstaining from religious dialog is not practically achievable.110 Even the self-proclaimed atheistic government of the former Soviet Union was unable to exclude religious engagement from its governance.111

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108 Dugin, Foundations, 25. Malić notes that the emphasis was placed by Dugin in the original.
109 Dugin’s critique of Western secularism, humanism, and embrace of Enlightenment ideas will be evident throughout.
111 Coyer, “(Un)Holy Alliance.” A similar conclusion can be reached with respect to the current situation in China where the atheistic claims of the government do not preclude at least some religious dialogue (e.g., 2018 formal negotiations with the Roman Catholic Church regarding
A long-time debate continues in Western academic circles over the place of theology as subject matter outside of narrowly defined curricula. While the actual merits of the discussion are not in question in this study, acknowledgment of the perception of exclusion, especially for the formally prominent inclusion of Judeo-Christian curricular material, is important. Dugin advocates for a broad religious presence in the public forum. His condemnation of Western secularism reflects a perception that the West is purposefully engaged in suppressing serious religious engagement, especially in its public expression.

Commenting on the current perception of religious exclusion in the United States, R.C. Sproul wrote that there was a time when theology was known as “‘Queen of the Sciences,’ and all other disciplines saw her as their matron and themselves as her handmaidens.” James R. Stoner wrote that this time has passed, and theology has almost completely fallen away from the mainstream curricula of Western colleges today. Stoner asked, “not whether theology ought to be restored as the queen of the sciences, but whether she belongs among them at all?” He made the point that “holding theology not to be a form of knowledge creates the entire way religion is approached in our

the selection process for bishops). Herein, the terms Soviet Union and USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) will be used interchangeably.


culture.”117 “When philosophers, following John Rawls, speak of ‘public reason’ as the test of what arguments and what positions are valid in public,” Stoner said,

they mean to subject public discourse to the censorship of the secular professoriate. They know, I think, that they will never actually suppress the voice of faith in everyday politics, but they mean to exclude it from the higher reaches of the law, from journalism and the media, from professional and corporate networks, and the like.118

1.2.3. Theology in the Development of the State: Schmitt and Blumenberg

In 1922 Schmitt published his influential concepts of political theology, in which he articulated his theory of the state and its sovereignty.119 Having experienced the First World War, Schmitt attempted to influence the constitutional construction of the Weimar Republic in ways that would enhance its ability to establish and maintain order, and respond to various disruptions with authority and effectiveness.120 Schmitt was concerned that the concept of sovereignty had become corrupted in the nineteenth century movement toward secular democratic government.

Arthur Versluis wrote that, for Schmitt, “Hobbes’s Leviathan arguably signals an intellectual point of origin for the modern secular state.”121 “Schmitt accepted the Hobbesian emphasis on the authority of the sovereign,” according to Versluis.122 Schmitt thought that the Sovereign of the Cosmos, “in the deistic view of the world,” though conceived as residing outside it, “had remained the engineer of the great machine.”123

117 Ibid., 22.
121 Ibid. Thomas Hobbes, 1588-1679.
122 Ibid.
Newman stated that:

Schmitt saw the sovereign as analogous with God as the supreme lawgiver, and the state of exception as akin to the miracle in theology. The sovereign is the redeemer and saviour of the people in a time of nihilism and political neutralisation, which is why at the same time it demands absolute obedience and sacrifice.  

Schmitt explained the world instituted by a sovereign power, with the sovereign being analogous to a machine’s engineer. In Schmitt’s combined political and theological outlook, the Sovereign of the Universe, as its creator, is the ultimate engineer, with earthly monarchs being subordinate engineers of the machine-of-state. Schmitt believed the Sovereign was being pushed aside by political movements that abandoned “theistic and transcendental conceptions.” An out of control machine-of-state was a chaotic afront to Schmitt, as it is to Dugin. “The machine now runs by itself,” was Schmitt’s observation, absent the Sovereign Engineer a state is a self-driving machine running amuck.  

Throughout their history, most European states had been monarchical, but Schmitt saw that changing. He wrote that “the development of the nineteenth-century theory of the state displays two characteristic moments.” These moments were first, “the elimination of all theistic and transcendental conceptions,” and second, “the formation of a new concept of legitimacy.” Thierry Gontier wrote that Blumenberg critiqued Schmitt’s expression that “all significant concepts of modernity are secularized theological concepts,” and labeled Schmitt’s belief, “secularization theorem.” Gontier claimed that “it was Carl Schmitt who gave Blumenberg

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127 Schmitt, “Political Theology,” 51.
128 Ibid., 48.
129 Ibid., 51.
130 Ibid.
the model for the articulation of the secularization ‘theorem.’”\textsuperscript{132} Blumenberg stated that “the proposition that ‘all the significant concepts of the modern doctrine of the state are secularized theological concepts’ was first laid down by Carl Schmitt in 1922.”\textsuperscript{133}

Blumenberg went on to say of Schmitt’s doctrine of the modern state, “both in the factual assertion that it contains and also in the deductions that it inaugurates, it is the strongest version of the secularization theorem.”\textsuperscript{134} Gontier wrote that Schmitt employed Secularization Theorem in contrast to “rationalistic and liberal modernity,” and elaborated:

\begin{quote}
The claims to autonomy advanced by this modernity are no more than illusory; the modernity of the Enlightenment is unable to liberate itself from the theological. It is, moreover, impossible for us ever to escape from the theological. The only real choice is that between an orthodox, coherent political theology capable of accepting itself as such and a heterodox, contradictory, and latent political theology.\textsuperscript{135}
\end{quote}

Rae’s analysis noted that Schmitt explained Western government in modernity originating from a transformation of God’s sovereignty, with its attributes of monotheistic authority, transferred nearly one-for-one to the temporal sovereignty of the state.\textsuperscript{136} Blumenberg rejected Secularization Theorem as mistaken. Western society did become modern, and Blumenberg recognized that it also became increasingly secular. However, Western society did not become more secular because of “the substitution of the absolute power of Man for that of God,” according to Blumenberg.\textsuperscript{137} “Modernity cannot be reduced to a process of secularization by which theological concepts

\textsuperscript{132} Ibid., under, Modernity as Secularized Theology.
\textsuperscript{134} Blumenberg, \textit{Legitimacy of the Modern Age}, 92.
\textsuperscript{135} Gontier, “Blumenberg Legitimacy,” under, Schmitt’s Substitution of the State for Religion.
\textsuperscript{136} Rae, “Theology of Schmitt’s Political Theology,” 558.
\textsuperscript{137} Gontier, “Blumenberg Legitimacy,” under, Blumenberg’s Critique of Schmitt.
are transformed into political ones,” is the way Bourdin reduced Blumenberg’s argument.\textsuperscript{138}

Gontier, critiquing Schmitt’s theory that ideas expressed in modernity are no more than secularized theological concepts, tentatively agreed that if Schmitt was correct, modernity arrived through a process of secularization.\textsuperscript{139} On the other hand, Gontier thought that Blumenberg was not suggesting that politics are entirely devoid of theology.\textsuperscript{140} “Modernity,” as Gontier interprets Blumenberg, “expropriates theological notions, transferring them outside of their authentic semantic context and into another context in which they are trivialized and their meaning dissolved.”\textsuperscript{141}

In his comparison of the contrasting views of Schmitt and Blumenberg, Richard Faber offered that, in modernity, Schmitt viewed government as a transfer of God’s sovereign authority to the state.\textsuperscript{142} Faber concluded that Blumenberg, on the other hand, applied a polytheistic explanation in contrast to Schmitt’s monotheistic characterization.\textsuperscript{143} Faber explained the use of polytheistic terminology with the claim that polytheism is a metaphor for the more pluralist sovereignty of the modern state.\textsuperscript{144} Robert Wyllie explained Faber’s interpretation this way:

Blumenberg, whose later work explores how metaphor orients thought, proposes a “polytheistic” alternative to “monotheistic” political theology. Polytheism is an early modern metaphor for plural sovereignty, underlying the checks and balances of liberalism.\textsuperscript{145}

\textsuperscript{138} Bourdin, Theological-Political Origins, 4.
\textsuperscript{139} Gontier, “Blumenberg Legitimacy,” under, Modernity as Secularized Theology.
\textsuperscript{140} Ibid., under, Deprecating All Modernity as “Secularization.”
\textsuperscript{141} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{143} Faber, “A Critique of Hans Blumenberg,” 180.
\textsuperscript{144} Ibid., 182.
\textsuperscript{145} Robert Wyllie, “Against Schmitt’s Political Theology, Prometheus or Pandora? Hans Blumenberg and Walter Benjamin as Political Theologians,” Teloscope, July 30, 2013, http://www.telospress.com/against-schmitts-political-theology-prometheus-or-pandora-
Dugin echoes Schmitt when claiming that proper understanding of political ideologies involves realizing that they are all renditions of theological modeling. Schmitt claimed that liberal influences of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution eliminated “all theistic and transcendental conceptions,” and replaced them with humanistic concepts of legitimacy. At a time when most European and Asian nations had transitioned or were moving away from monarchical political structures, with their various claims of divine association, Schmitt was critiqued as archaic. If that charge was leveled then, how much more archaic must Dugin’s adaption of Schmitt be seen by some critics today?

Eric Voegelin, interestingly, considering Dugin’s penchant for gnosticism, claimed that, at its core, modernity is gnostic. Voegelin’s gnostic characterization can be paired to Versluis’ observation that Blumenberg, in his *The Legitimacy of the Modern Age*, opened by asserting that modernity is properly identified with gnosticism. Versluis was not surprised that Blumenberg began by referring to Voegelin’s claim that the modern age “would be better entitled the Gnostic age.”

Voegelin, characterizing as a gnostic endeavor the move away from transcentent Christian monotheistic inspired society, including government, wrote that “a line of gradual transformation connects medieval with contemporary gnosticism.” Voegelin then speculated whether the present social environment should be classified as “Christian,” owing to its outgrowth from medieval Christian heresies. His conclusion was, “the best course will

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hans-blumenberg-and-walter-benjamin-as-political-theologians/. This article is an examination of Faber’s “Critique of Hans Blumenberg.” Robert Wyllie was a PhD candidate at Norte Dame when this article was published.

147 Schmitt, “Political Theology,” 51.
151 Ibid.
153 Ibid.
be to drop such questions and to recognize the essence of modernity as the growth of gnosticism.” Schmitt’s political theology has been viewed as an attempt to revive the Sovereign and retrieve government from its gnostic trends. Schmitt recognized this perspective well, championing his brand of political theology as an effort to break the gnostic line of gradual transformation and re-introduce recognizable monotheism back into the prevailing Western political discourse.

1.3. Aspects of Dugin’s Perception of Liberal Democracy

Broadly, Liberal Democracy may be understood as a “democratic system of government in which individual rights and freedoms are officially recognized and protected, and the exercise of political power is limited by the rule of law.” Regrettably, given the frequency it occurs within this study, the broad definition can only go so far when encountering the term. As expressed by Sylvia Chan:

The meaning of ‘liberal democracy’ and the liberal-democratic discourse has been an ever-developing and ever-changing one, and it may be unrealistic to expect contemporary notions of ‘democracy’ or ‘liberal democracy’ to be any more final than any of the earlier constructs.

Perhaps the best thing is to accept both the broad definition and the somewhat disturbing but persistent fact that various authors apply the term Liberal Democracy in different ways. Dugin’s perception of the label is critical to the discussion in this study. I attempt to put as fine a point on his use of it as possible while allowing him the space to apply the term in context.

Dugin’s perspective can be extrapolated from a Mark Sedgwick example. First, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Boris Yeltsin and others,

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154 Ibid.
156 OED. Herein, it is assumed that the term is synonymous with the term Western Democracy.
157 Sylvia Chan, Liberalism, Democracy, and Development (New York, NY: Cambridge University, 2002), 14. Sylvia Chan was a Visiting Scholar at the University of California, Berkley, at the time this book was published.
“accepted some vision of a liberal democratic Russia on reasonable terms with the West,” Sedgwick explained. Second, from the early 1990s, “Neo-Eurasianism has been growing in importance in the evolving discourse on Russia’s future, a discourse in which alternatives to Western-style liberal democracy have significant support.” Employing Sedgwick’s two parameters: characterizing a Russia that displays some degree of Western Liberal Democracy as Liberal Democratic Russia, and understanding a Russia evolved into Neo-Eurasia as an alternative to Liberal Democratic Russia, allows space where Dugin’s concept of Liberal Democracy may be examined and understood.

Within this space, Dugin seems to view a Liberal Democrat as anyone who accepts some degree of Liberal Democracy and is on reasonable terms with the West. Dugin’s references to Western Liberal Democracy may be interpreted to mean the way of Western political doctrine and practice, and, at the same time, as the way of Western culture. Care must be taken here, although Dugin expresses contempt for Western Liberal Democracy, condemning any embrace of a Liberal Democratic Russia, he recognizes that liberalism is superficial at this level. It is often challenging to separate Dugin’s contempt for Liberal Democracy praxis, at the more popular and superficial level, from his deeply held theoretically and philosophically based opposition to Liberalism as a political philosophy. While Dugin expresses respect for seriously committed liberals of the classic mold, he none-the-less rejects the liberalism represented as Western Liberalism.

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161 Ibid., 152-53.

162 Ibid., 153. Here Dugin says that “the real liberal is the one who acts in compliance with the fundamental principles of liberalism.” Adding that these real liberals will do so even when there are serious consequences for doing so – including imprisonment or death. Dugin uses Mikhail Khodorkovsky as an example. Dugin contemptuously remarks that Khodorkovsky is the exception, implying that the “liberals who remain free” are only the practitioners of a popular, shallow, and superficial liberalism. Mikhail Khodorkovsky is an exiled Russian oligarch now living in London.
Dugin condemned Fukuyama’s ideas concerning the End of History as an arrogant and mistaken belief in the absolute victory of Western Liberalism.\textsuperscript{163} Dugin views the West’s acceptance of the superiority of Western Liberalism as a subjective but bedrock element of a Western reality, borne out of modernism.\textsuperscript{164} It may well be that Dugin’s take on the most exact definition and critical observations of modernism, and by extension the Western Liberal Democracy it incubated, have been articulated, not by Dugin himself, but by Václav Havel, the former Czech president, and playwright. Havel stated:

> The modern era has been dominated by the culminating belief, expressed in different forms, that the world and Being as such is a wholly knowable system governed by a finite number of universal laws that man can grasp and rationally direct for his own benefit. This era, beginning in the Renaissance and developing from the Enlightenment to socialism, from positivism to scientism, from the Industrial Revolution to the information revolution, was characterized by rapid advances in rational, cognitive thinking.\textsuperscript{165}

Havel provided keen observations of the Western Liberal Democracy that emerged from modernism. Although Dugin criticized Havel as having caved-in to Western influences, one could not find a more concise understanding of the presumptions of modernism than Havel provided.\textsuperscript{166} Modernism, Havel said, “gave rise to the proud belief that man, as the pinnacle of everything that exists, was capable of objectively describing, explaining and controlling everything that exists, and of possessing the one and only truth about the world.”\textsuperscript{167} Dugin would undoubtedly agree with Havel here.


\textsuperscript{164} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{167} Havel, “address, World Economic Forum.”
1.4. Dugin – Literature Review

Of obvious necessity, Dugin’s works are central to my study. I have also reviewed material mentioned by Dugin within the context of his writings. Additionally, I have examined external literature, not directly cited within the body of Dugin’s work, that I have determined to be germane to better understanding Dugin’s geopolitical and theologically related development and proposals. After a look at Dugin’s works, I topically consider works of other authors featuring Dugin and works of other authors concerning significant areas of Dugin’s interests.

Attempts to define Dugin, his impact on Western action and the West’s reaction to Russian political policy and practice, are rendered more difficult because of the work-in-progress reality of his endeavors. Because of the seemingly universal availability of the World Wide Web and the ubiquitousness of social media in this second decade of the twenty-first century, it was necessary to tap material from websites and other online sources. Attempting to balance the rapidly growing mass of Dugin’s work currently available online and in electronic formats, with books, journals, and other print media, was both a goal and a challenge.

Dugin’s works cover a broad range of geopolitics and political commentary, theologically and metaphysically related commentary, conspiriology, philosophy, and sociology engaged in no particular chronological sequence. Therefore, I selected a systematic topical approach to literature produced by Dugin, literature presented about Dugin, and literature providing an understanding of his wide-ranging interests, to arrive at both the foundational elements and my conclusions regarding his Geopolitical-Theology.

Awareness of Dugin is rising in the Western news and commentary media. Dugin’s geopolitical and, though to a lesser degree, theologically and metaphysically related works, are the subject of various literary reviews, news media features, journal and magazine articles, blogs, and other online sources. His writing is increasingly the subject of books of both academic and more general audience appeal. Literature related to topics essential to my study is
available from these same sources but is increasingly found in media not previously considered proper for comprehensive academic examinations. While I attempted to avoid references and material found outside normal academic channels, some venturing into the fringes of esoteric metaphysical literature was unavoidable. Dugin is frequently featured in media widely considered outside the usual boundaries of standard academic research. So, I must occasionally go there as well.

Dugin is a prolific writer, lecturer, and blogger. His earlier works, from the 1980s until around the mid-1990s, were not widely available to the West in English translation. However, because of European interest in Dugin’s work, initially fueled mainly by adherents and observers of the European New Right (ENR), a significant amount of his early work was published or otherwise made available in French and other European languages. Dugin is increasingly proficient in English, and his publications and website postings in English are now readily accessible. Since 2000 many of Dugin’s writings, transcripts of his lectures and addresses, and video of his speaking engagements are also available in English.

As this study is not primarily a survey of Dugin’s works, I mainly focus on the areas of Dugin’s Geopolitical-Theology broadly outlined and expressed within Fourth Political Theory and its reception in the current Western environment. Besides Dugin’s two principal and defining works, Foundations of Geopolitics and The Fourth Political Theory, there is a growing body of Dugin material, including books, articles, commentary, reviews, lectures, and interviews. I have narrowed the field to Dugin’s works, and the contributions of others, that provide a solid foundation for understanding Dugin’s grasp of political theology and useful insight within the current arena of Western reception.

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1.4.1. The Main Pillars of Dugin’s Writing

In this study, *The Fourth Political Theory* is a structural column of my study as it provides an overview of the thrust of Dugin’s Geopolitical-Theology. My comparatively less reliance upon his *Foundations of Geopolitics* could be somewhat surprising. I did not ignore this work, but Dugin’s following work is more pertinent to his current and near-term Western reception. *The Fourth Political Theory* aims at a much broader audience than does *Foundations of Geopolitics*, which was reportedly adopted as a text for advanced Russian military coursework. Not only has *The Fourth Political Theory* been edited and published for Western readership, but it is also available in several languages, and is reinforced by any number of Dugin-related and inspired blogs and websites. The style of *The Fourth Political Theory* is accessible and conducive to reception from Western audiences. It is concise and readable, yet it provides ample material, albeit controversial, that is conducive to Western consumption.

John B. Dunlop emphasized Dugin’s upturn in notoriety after publication of *The Foundations of Geopolitics*. I believe Dunlop was correct some years ago when he wrote:

> There has probably not been another book published in Russia during the post-communist period which has exerted an influence on Russian military, police, and statist foreign policy elites comparable to that of Aleksandr Dugin’s 1997 *Foundations of Geopolitics*.\(^{169}\)

As noted, Dunlop stated that Dugin produced *Foundations of Geopolitics* for Russian consumption specifically for the “Russian military, police, and statist foreign policy elites.”\(^{170}\) A current review of the literature reveals that today Dugin is interested in a much broader audience.

Traditionalism, modified into Neo-Traditionalism by Dugin, finds additional support outside of *The Fourth Political Theory* and *Foundations of Geopolitics* in his article, “We Are Going to Cure You With Poison,” and a

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\(^{170}\) Ibid.
presentation, “Traditionalism and Sociology/The Figure of the Radical Subject.” Additional work supporting his theological, metaphysical, and philosophical underpinnings include his articles “Ideology of the World Government,” “Russian Orthodoxy and Initiation,” and “Liberal, Post-Modern Europe Is Rotting to Pieces – Strong Christian Russia Doesn’t Need Her.” Also, Dugin’s interviews, “Against Universalism” and “The Long Path,” are useful in exploring his more metaphysically and theologically oriented thinking applied to his Neo-Eurasianist ideas.

In addition to the works above, supporting Dugin’s development of his Eurasian concept (the result I will characterize as Neo-Eurasianism) relies primarily upon an article, “From Sacred Geography to Geopolitics,” derived from a 1996 work titled, Misterii Evrazii. Further reliance is placed on his articles, “The Eurasian Idea” and “Eurasia Above All: Manifest of the Eurasist [sic] Movement.” These mentions do not pretend to be in any way


173 Dugin, “Against Universalism.” Also, Dugin, “The Long Path: An Interview with Alexander Dugin,” Open Revolt, May 17, 2014, accessed June 11, 2017, https://openrevolt.info/2014/05/17/alexander-dugin-interview/. This interview is posted in English. Open Revolt does not state if this interview was originally conducted in Russian or English, nor make any notes on its translation.


exhaustive, and other Dugin works are cited as well. These works, though listed here categorically, are frequently found supporting Dugin’s thoughts and projections outside and across the borders of the subject parameters mentioned above.

1.4.2. Development of Dugin’s Writing

Andreas Umland’s efforts to chronicle Dugin’s development allow significant events in Dugin’s career to be recognized. For example, Umland noted that during the 1980s and 1990s, “Dugin’s activities resembled those of other politically active intellectuals of this period.” During this time, Dugin “was building up his research and publication center,” wrote Umland. At this time, Dugin was “trying to propagate his ideas among ultranationalist political organizations and further potential supporters in such spheres.”

Umland covered Dugin’s early recognition within Russia, and he continues following him to the present day. A review of Umland’s Dugin material yields a trove of comprehensive quantitative and qualitative historical research of Dugin’s works. Umland’s study, “Aleksandr Dugin’s transformation from a lunatic fringe figure into a mainstream political publicist, 1980–1998: A case study in the rise of late and post-Soviet Russian fascism,” covered some examples of early Dugin publications from which his development may be traced. Dunlop and Marlene Laruelle also collected and commented on

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176 Andreas Umland, “Aleksandr Dugin’s Transformation from a Lunatic Fringe Figure into a Mainstream Political Publicist, 1980 – 1998: A Case Study in the Rise of Late and Post-Soviet Russian Fascism,” Journal of Eurasian Studies 1, no. 2 (May 21, 2010): 148. This article is also available online at, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1879366510000242. Andreas Umland, a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation in Kyiv, Ukraine and researcher at the Institute for Central and East European Studies at the Catholic University of Eichstaett-Ingolstadt, is a prolific scholar of the geopolitics of Russia, Ukraine, and Dugin.


178 Cf. Umland, “Dugin’s transformation.”
Dugin’s work.  In addition to his cataloging, Anton Shekhovtsov’s article, “Aleksandr Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianism: The New Right à la Russe,” along with the established work of Vadim Joseph Rossman and Epstein provided a good deal of background material concerning Dugin’s earlier work and rise to prominence.

Dugin began editing Elementy, in 1992. Dunlop pointed out that much of each edition of the once or twice-yearly release contained articles of a geopolitical nature. Laruelle listed Dugin’s editorial development commenting on Elementy (9 issues between 1992 and 1998), Milyi Angel (4 issues between 1991 and 1999), Evraziiskoe vtorzhenie (published as a supplement to the weekly Zavtra, with six special issues in 2000), and Evraziiskoe obozrenie (11 issues from 2001 to 2004) in her article “Aleksandr Dugin: A Russian Version of the European Radical Right?”

1.5. Traditionalism – Literature Review

Traditionalism refers to the belief that there exists a body of Truth inherited from the past – Truth correctly handed-down from time-out-of-mind. This Truth was present from before the Fall described in the Hebrew and Christian Scriptures. Traditionalism holds that this Truth is contained in a body of

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179 Marlène Laruelle is the Associate Director and Research Professor at the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies of the Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University. Anton Shekhovtsov is a Research Associate at the Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation (Ukraine).


183 The use of uppercase Truth here is employed to contrast a divinely inspired and unchanging sacred characteristic of Traditionalism with the profane truth of factual statements, concepts, or beliefs. Cf. footnote 6 herein.
knowledge that exists unchanged and unaltered from the time of the original
divine Revelations. The OED states that the historical definition of religious
tradition is “the theory that all moral and religious truth comes from divine
revelation passed on by tradition, human reason being incapable of attaining
it.” Despite being somewhat circular, this definition is adequate for a broad
understanding. I turned to well-recognized writers within the fields of
Traditionalism and fundamentalism for elucidation.

Although I encountered several attempts to define Traditionalism, I do not
offer any one of them as being precise. I prefer to allow for some definitional
slack to be present as various contributors suggest their views and
understandings of tradition and Tradition. While current scholarship attaches
the term Integral Traditionalism or Classic Traditionalism with Guénon’s
work, I found no evidence that he favored either descriptor. More
consequential here is Dugin’s explanation of Traditionalism. He expresses a
Traditionalism that contains politically active elements not found in the
Integral (Classical) Traditionalism of the twentieth century. Though
acknowledging Dugin’s Traditionalist beliefs and their application to his
Geopolitical-Theology, it is not my purpose to advocate a specific disciple of
Traditionalism.

In my research, I first attempted to trace Traditionalism’s historicity through
its association with Perennialism. I then explored Dugin’s adaptations of
Integral Traditionalism. However, I do not dwell on Dugin’s interpretation of
Traditionalism for anything more than its utility as a foundational element in
his Geopolitical-Theology. I briefly examine fundamentalism because I view
Dugin as a fundamentalist in its expanded definition, because of its kinship to
Traditionalism, and because of the potential toxicity in the West associated
with the fundamentalist label.184

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184 The Traditionalist/Fundamentalist topic is expanded at 1.5. (especially 1.5.4.). Cf. Rosalind
Marsh, “The ‘New Political Novel’ by Right-Wing Writers in Post-Soviet Russia,” Forum Für
Osteuropäische Ideen -und Zeitgeschichte 14, no. 2 (2010), for her comments on the St.
Petersburg Fundamentalists and relationships with the RNR. Dugin is mentioned in this
article several times. Cf. https://doi.org/10.7788/frm.2010.14.2.159 for a copy of this article.
Rosalind Marsh is Emeritus Professor of Russian Studies at the University of Bath.
For an overview, I employed Aldous Huxley’s seminal work, *The Perennial Philosophy*. Using Huxley as my foundation, Renaud Fabbri, James Cutsinger, Karen Armstrong, Sedgwick, and others provided useful material. Muhammad Legenhausen received consideration for his writing regarding the growth of Eastern religious awareness and acceptance in Europe. His work, along with Fabbri, Randolph Dible, Frithjof Schuon, and Jill Kraye, provided material establishing the present-to-past linkages needed to connect the esoteric writings of Guénon with their historical antecedents. The observations and research of Peter Brooke, along with Epstein, are also considered with the other contributors already mentioned. Rossman and Laruelle, too, have made significant contributions to the body of commentary on Dugin’s Neo-Traditionalist and Neo-Eurasianist literature.

I view Traditionalism mainly from the perspective of the Integral Traditionalism ascribed to Guénon and adherents to the twentieth century expressions of his beliefs and practices. I acknowledge the claims that

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186 Renaud Fabbri was formally a Visiting Scholar at the Center for the Study of World Religions at the Harvard Divinity School. James Cutsinger is Professor Emeritus at the University of South Carolina where he focused on Traditionalism in comparative religion. Karen Armstrong is a well-known religious scholar and author.
Traditionalism is an understanding of eternal Truth. Because Dugin claims to be a Traditionalist, proclaims his heritage to be derived from Guénon and Julius Evola, and emphatically states that Traditionalism is a critical element of Fourth Political Theory, it is necessary to expound on just what he is claiming for himself and his theory. A review of relevant literature will assist in this endeavor.¹⁹¹

Traditionalism is closely related to Perennialism. Traditionalist claims are practically identical with those of Perennialism, so close that I will treat them as the same. A current explanation of Traditionalism and Perennialism notes that both “are nearly synonymous and are, most often, interchangeable.”¹⁹² I assume the equivalent and interchangeable characteristics of both terms.

Traditionalism, rather than Perennialism, seems to have become the more common identifier, but both are encountered in literature and other media. Traditionalist terminology used alongside or in place of Perennialist terminology is relatively recent. Even so, descriptive language regarding Traditionalism is remarkably like that previously applied to Perennialism. Traditionalism incorporates the Perennialist assumption that revelation of unchanging Truth has transcendental origins and that certain of the Ancients were aware of the pure form and worthiness of passage via tradition (apostolic-like linkages) from initial reception to succeeding generations.

Reference works tend to apply similar definitions of Traditionalism and Perennialism.¹⁹³ Apparent are the visible overlapping definitions of terms –

¹⁹¹ Cf. e.g., Dugin, Fourth Theory, 193ff. Julius Evola, 1898-1974.
¹⁹³ The OED states that Traditionalism is “the upholding or maintenance of tradition, especially so as to resist change.” The OED does not address Perennialism as such, but definitions similar Traditionalism are common in other sources. Fundamentalism is defined in the OED as “a form of a religion, especially Islam or Protestant Christianity, that upholds belief in the strict, literal interpretation of scripture.” Note that the OED here applies current usage. Historical development of the term is addressed elsewhere in the body of this study. Cf. 1.5.f.
essential elements appear blurred from the outset. A Traditionalist website states, for example:

All of the major twentieth [century] writers in this area wrote of Tradition. By this they meant the entirety of the intellectual, religious, cultural, and artistic aspects that tie a people to a Revelation or to a sacred origin. Thus, such an entity as this Tradition is itself considered sacred. All things centered on this Tradition, such as a civilization, its arts or crafts, doctrines, etc., all can be referred to as “traditional.”

And:

“All Traditional” is not used by these writers [Traditionalists] just to designate cultural artifacts passed along from one generation to another by sheer habit. Instead, it is used to indicate, for example, those civilizations whose ideas, practices, creations, and so on are still guided and formed by the attraction to and the principles of the domain of the Spirit. People who study Tradition are called “traditionalists,” and all such traditionalists accept the premises of the Perennial Philosophy.

In the Western Liberal environment, Traditional strands or threads are sometimes difficult to discern because both the lenses used to bring them into focus and the labels applied to them are products of historicism – an assumption that the Renaissance and Reformation eclipsed the esotericism of the Middle Ages. Will-Erich Peuckert, in Wouter J. Hanegraaff’s view, denied this assumption, positing that esoterism adapted and survived. Historians, Hanegraaff observed,

looked at the early modern period either from the perspective of “Reformation versus Counter-Reformation,” or from that of the Renaissance as a rebirth of antiquity. Both perspectives, Peuckert observes, are essentially “catastrophe theories:” they describe how the old breaks down and vanishes at the arrival of the new. As a result of this narrow focus, historians overlooked

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194 “Are Perennialists and Traditionalists the Same or Different?,” under, “Definition of Perennial Wisdom.” Brackets added. Italics in original.
195 Ibid. Brackets added.
the many ways in which pre-modern thinking continued right into the early modern world and took on new creative shapes.\textsuperscript{197}

Peuckert identified closely with Theophrastus von Hohenheim, best-known by his pseudonym, Paracelsus.\textsuperscript{198} Paracelsus claimed that “two wisdoms exist in this world, one that is eternal and one that is mortal; the eternal one springs from the light of the Holy Spirit, the other one from the Light of Nature.”\textsuperscript{199} “What it comes down to,” in Peuckert’s judgment, is that “Paracelsus develops a new understanding of magic grounded in the double light of Nature and Grace.”\textsuperscript{200} What Peuckert told us is that Traditionalism is still with us; it has not been eclipsed, has not vanished, and remains just beyond the vision of myopic modernism. Modernism, looking through the lens of Nature only, sees what is mortal and does not see Traditionalism that is only visible in light that is eternal.

Unlike the Christian fundamentalist movement, with its discernible chronological beginnings, Perennialism and its later-defined near-twin, Traditionalism, has its origins in a much more distant and less-discernible past. Still not well developed, the historical background of Traditionalism is sketchy in mainstream academic literature before Guénon and the other Integral School Traditionalists made the subject better known.\textsuperscript{201} Perennialism, also a belief system involved with uncovering, maintaining, and transmitting ancient Truth, has to be relied on to offer historical linkages. Although Perennialist evidence also lacks a consistent written historical trail,

\textsuperscript{197} Hanegraaff, “Peuckert and the Light,” 285. Here referring to Peuckert, \textit{Pansophie}, IX. Italics in original.
\textsuperscript{198} Ibid. Here the quotations are assumed to be from Peuckert. Theophrastus von Hohenheim, ca. 1493-1541. As a physician, Paracelsus attempted to reform the medical practices, in the vein of Martin Luther. This effort earned Paracelsus censure and professional marginalization for much of his life. Cf. e.g., Sašo Dolenc, “Paracelsus - Martin Luther of Medicine,” Kvarkadabra, June 18, 2016, under, A new approach to healing, accessed October 3, 2016, \url{http://www.kvarkadabra.net}. Sašo Dolenc, a writer and philosopher of science, is Editor-in-Chief of the online science journal Kvarkadabra.
\textsuperscript{199} Hanegraaff, “Peuckert and the Light,” 288.
\textsuperscript{200} Ibid., 291.
it provides a more discernible look into the distant past when compared to available Traditionalist sources.

Realizing that Perennial sources often rely on material esoteric and sometimes occult, making empirical determinations difficult, Vojtěch Hladký’s consideration of Plethon provided a Zoroastrian perspective. Through Plethon, Hladký linked Perennialism back in antiquity to Zoroaster (Zarathustra), suggesting an ancient pedigree. Also noteworthy is Hanegraaff’s study of the life and influence of Peuckert. Hladký and Hanegraaff help establish the link, admittedly often esoteric, between twentieth century Traditionalism and its predecessors.

Huxley traced Perennialism stretching back through Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz to the sixteenth century writings of Augustinius Steuchius and beyond. Along with Huxley, Dible, Fabbri, and other scholars provided evidence of Perennial thought in deep antiquity. However, there is a vast and perhaps unbridgeable gap in Perennial literature from the Late Middle Ages until the more mainstream writing on the subject was taken up by the Traditionalists and Huxley. The gap remains mostly unfilled unless I rely

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206 Middle Ages is an imprecise term referring to a period of time from (roughly) the fall of the Roman Empire in the West to the Fall of Constantinople in 1453. Cf. Encyclopaedia Britannica, s.v. “Middle Ages (Historical Era),” updated July 4, 2019, accessed July 16, 2019, https://www.britannica.com/search?query=Middle+Ages+. The Britannica states that the Middle Ages cover “the period in European history from the collapse of Roman civilization in the 5th century CE to the period of the Renaissance (variously interpreted as beginning in the 13th, 14th, or 15th century, depending on the region of Europe and on other factors).”
on overtly gnostic, esoteric, and occult literature – a remedy outside the scope of my intentions for this study.

The thoughts and works of Guénon and Evola, are prominently featured in writing emanating from within Traditionalism, and they are subjects of continuing scholarship from external sources as well. This study recognizes both men, primarily due to the frequency of their mention within *The Fourth Political Theory* and other of Dugin’s works. Guénon, the preeminent Integral or Classical Traditionalist, and Evola, the Italian Traditionalist with his pronounced political focus, are often credited with having exerted a significant influence on Dugin.

Along with Guénon, there are other significant Integral Traditionalists. However, when considering Dugin, noteworthy proponents such as Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, Ali Lakhani, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, and others are considered secondarily to Guénon and Evola for my purposes. Schuon, for example, is notable for creating the Maryamiyya along with Titus Burckhardt. The Maryamiyya, a Sufi order, became a principal Traditionalist religious locus. Schuon followed Guénon’s Traditionalism – even into Sufism – and became a well-known Traditionalist proponent although he and Guénon eventually fell out. Schuon receives less attention here because most of his concentration is centered within Sufism and Buddhism; therefore, he is of less direct

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210 Ca. 1950.
significance to Dugin’s Neo-Traditionalism with its defining active component.\textsuperscript{211}

Sedgwick conducted significant contemporary exploration into Traditionalism. He covered both a broad overview and a good deal of in-depth study in his \textit{Against the Modern World}, the title of which purposefully recalls Evola’s \textit{Revolt Against the Modern World} and Guénon’s \textit{Crisis of the Modern World}.\textsuperscript{212} Sedgwick’s book is the source of much of the renewed interest in Traditionalism. For many in the West, it was their first introduction to Guénon, Evola, and Dugin. Additionally, \textit{Against the Modern World}, is germane because it emphasizes the conflict between Traditionalism and Western Liberalism that Dugin so often highlights in his work.

There is a body of Perennialist/Traditionalist work in Theosophy as well as an ample selection of esoteric and occult subject matter originating in the nineteenth century. The primary nineteenth century proponents of Theosophy were Helena Petrovna Blavatsky and Colonel Henry Olcott.\textsuperscript{213} Aleister Crowley left an enormous volume of work that is the subject of


\textsuperscript{213} Helena Petrovna Blavatsky, 1831-1891. Colonel Henry Olcott, 1832-1907. The two well-known works attributed to Blavatsky are, \textit{Isis Unveiled: A Master-key to the Mysteries of Ancient and Modern Science and Theology} and \textit{The Secret Doctrine: The Synthesis of Science, Religion and Philosophy}. Cf. Blavatskaja, Elena Petrovna, \textit{Isis Unveiled: A Master-Key to the Mysteries of Ancient and Modern Science and Theology} (New York: Bouton, 1893) for one of many reprints. Cf. Blavatsky, \textit{The Secret Doctrine: The Synthesis of Science, Religion and Philosophy} (London: Theosophical Pub. House, 1893) for one of the various editions of this work. “Authorship of both books,” wrote Sedgwick, “was attributed to ethereal sources, but both were in fact drafted by Blavatsky and then turned into publishable form by human ‘ghost’ writers – by Olcott in the case of \textit{Isis Unveiled}, and in the case of \textit{The Secret Doctrine}, by two English brothers who took over after Blavatsky’s original choice of editor had refused the task in dismay on reading her disorganized first draft.” Cf. Sedgwick \textit{Against the Modern World}, 44 footnote 25, where he credits Bruce F. Campbell, \textit{Ancient Wisdom Revived: A History of the Theosophical Movement} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 34, 40. I do not explore Theosophy it in any depth primarily due to Dugin not writing of it in any substantial way when compared to his emphasis on the Traditionalism of Guénon, other Integral Traditionalists, and Evola. The second reason is that Guénon criticized Theosophy thoroughly, the subject becoming the basis of books he published in 1921 and 1923. Sedgwick wrote that Guénon’s criticisms amounted to “sophisticated demolitions of Theosophy, spiritualism, and occultism, proceeding from a familiarity with the occultist milieu that Guénon had acquired between 1906 and 1912.” Cf. Sedgwick, \textit{Against the Modern World}, 24.
attention from within the Academy proper and in the literature of the occult.214 Mysticism and esotericism, are also evident in the avant-garde art, music, and writing of those nineteenth century times. Active remnants in these media are discernable today.

Although outside the boundaries of this study, comprehensive research focused on Traditionalism per se should include inquiry into kindred strands of Traditionalism, including Theosophy, Kabbalism, and the occult adaptations of Crowley and others. Sedgwick gave just such attention to these subject areas.215 Various threads connecting Dugin’s esoteric and mystic inclinations to the much broader and deeper regions of the occult and other metaphysical manifestations do appear periodically throughout this study. Dugin’s Traditionalist proclivities are noted, but without my becoming sidetracked into fascinating but distracting corollary inquiries.

1.5.1. Timeless Tradition and Temporal tradition

Jaroslav Pelikan contributed valuable conversation on traditionalism.216 Pelikan demonstrated aspects of more conventional traditionalism in his Jefferson Lectures and his subsequent book, The Vindication of Tradition.217 Pelikan’s comments on the themes of tradition in the music and lyrics of Fiddler on the Roof may seem trivial but are very much on-point.218 Religious milieus often inspire varied artistic genres. Fiddler on the Roof expounds traditional themes, but in some creative media Integral Traditionalism is also recognizable. The poetry of T.S. Eliot and the writing of Umberto Eco offer


215 I avoided chasing after the amazingly prolific Joséphin Péladan, the poetry of Stanislas de Guaita, the music of Erik Satie, Symbolist expression in fine art, and the occultism and gnostic metaphysics of Martinism of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Cf. A Martinist, according to the OED, adheres to “a form of mystical pantheism developed by the French philosopher L. C. de Saint-Martin (1743–1803).”

216 Here I am referring to tradition as social and cultural custom rather than in the context of Traditionalism’s revealed Truth claims. Jaroslav Pelikan, 1923-2006.


two well-known examples of the latter.219 Sedgwick addressed Traditionalism in the fine arts in his article, “Traditionalism and art – and perhaps more than art.”220 Eco’s writing frequently explores Traditionalist themes and conspirology.221 For more on the subject of Traditionalism’s reach beyond the strict confines of its spiritual borders, Eliot’s essay, “Tradition and the Individual Talent,” is instructive.222

The Traditionalist movement, according to Sedgwick, views Tradition, “as belief and practice transmitted from time immemorial – or rather belief and practice that should have been transmitted but was lost to the West during the last half of the second millennium A.D.”223 Tradition is tradition, but it is also more than tradition. Tradition contains the preserved essential Truth and knowledge of the ages. Therefore, Traditionalism, as viewed by Integral Traditionalists, is not merely the tradition of customs, practices, or general history preserved from generation to generation.


220 Sedgwick, “Traditionalism and Art.”

221 Cf. 3.6. for examples of Eco’s writing that include Traditionalist and conspirology themes and references.


223 Sedgwick, Against the Modern World, 21.
Transmission and the content transmitted are critical to Traditionalists. Guénon’s consideration of Traditionalism permeates the main body of his published work, but his most concise treatment is contained in his article, “What is meant by Tradition?”224 Guénon defined Traditionalism by first addressing tradition. “Etymologically,” he wrote, “tradition simply means ‘that which is transmitted’ in some way or other,” an opinion endorsed by both Sedgwick and Cutsinger.225 Agreeing, Fabbri stated, “tradition implies the idea of a transmission (tradere).”226 Guénon, Sedgwick, Cutsinger, and Fabbri all agreed that Traditionalism is more expansive in its concept than the mere act of transmission. Ordinary transmissions, however accurate, may or may not convey truth, or more pointedly, in this case, Truth. Cutsinger added that things merely customary or nostalgic cannot be the criterion for Traditionalism.

The passing along of a thing received also accounts for mere custom and habit. This, of course, is the concern of the critic: that the conservative is simply nostalgic for the way things were done in the past, irrespective of their truth or adequacy. One would perhaps be justified in replying to this observation by pointing out that the very length of a given usage almost certainly implies a correspondingly deep human need. But this is not my response here. I prefer to admit instead that a greater precision is called for than is afforded by etymology.227

All tradition involves knowledge or practices acquired from the past, yet much passed down material does not qualify as Integral Traditionalism. As Cutsinger explained, tradition “is the action or result of handing down or transmitting.”228 Careful not to allow everything handed-down to be counted as Traditional, Cutsinger hastened to add that, “at the same time it is important to clarify that not everything handed-down is traditional in the sense at stake here.”229

224 Guénon, Essential Guénon, 93-5.
225 Ibid., 93.
229 Ibid.
Although Traditionalism (as identified with the uppercase T) is not contained within tradition (as identified with the lowercase t), it is not correct to say that tradition is absent in Traditionalism. Guénon reminded us that certain traditional elements are foundational for Traditional construction. Regarding the presence of tradition in things Traditional, Guénon pointed out that within Tradition “it is necessary to include “secondary and derived elements” that are present and “important for the purpose of forming a complete picture.”

Cutsinger used Scripture to provide clarity concerning Traditional and traditional.

The Thessalonians were exhorted to standfast and to hold the tradition they received from Saint Paul, but the Colossians were warned against the traditions of men. It appears that not every giving and receiving is good for us. The fact of a transmission itself, let alone its duration or the number of its successive receptions, is not the point. Any particular custom may be older than any particular tradition.

Cutsinger stressed the difficulty of the Traditionalist’s task. “Not only must he [the Traditionalist] find fresh words for a familiar topic so as to say something new about something old,” Cutsinger concluded that “he must insist in this case that the old really is the new.”

While tradition and custom are tied to a temporal process of handing down, Lakhani observed Coomaraswamy’s missive that “Tradition has nothing to do with any ‘ages,’ whether ‘dark,’ ‘primaevaeal,’ or otherwise.” Coomaraswamy underscored the timeless characteristic of Tradition; the unchanging principle is one that implies that it has been, and is, and will be, unchanged and unchanging. Thus, Coomaraswamy separated Traditionalism from a strictly historical perspective.

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230 Guénon, Essential Guénon, 93.
232 Ibid., 294.
As must be already apparent, study involving Traditionalism encounters definitional overlaps between Traditionalism usually expressed with the uppercase T, and traditionalism often expressed with the lowercase t. While traditionalism, with its adherence to custom and historical practice, is discernible within Traditionalism, the two concepts are not identical. Traditionalism claims unbroken links to eternal Truth and is often accessible only through gnostic pathways, while traditionalism is much more the recognition of associated practices closely akin to custom.

Recognizing the uppercase T is essential as it emphasizes that the Truth of Tradition may be separated temporally from either truth or tradition in the lowercase. “Tradition,” Coomaraswamy continued, “represents doctrines about first principles, which do not change.” As “first principles” are deemed eternal and unchanging, so must Tradition be eternal and unchanging. Coomaraswamy’s explanation was that Tradition is eternal and detectable as consistent Truth that is conveyed generationally in the temporal human realm – the unchanging Truth that passes from the past to present to future.

1.5.2. The Added Ingredient of Revelation

If there is one thing that definitively separates lowercase tradition from uppercase Tradition, it is the addition of Revelation. Traditionalism claims it possesses divinely revealed Truth. However historically accurate it may be, tradition does not attempt to make this claim.

Cutsinger is a practicing Orthodox Christian in addition to his being a Traditionalist Scholar. His perspectives provide clarity to two critical areas evident at this stage. First, Cutsinger provided definitional insight into Traditionalism; his writing is clear and concise, as he explains Traditionalism

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234 This holds true for the variants of both: Traditionalist/traditionalist, Traditional/traditional, etc.
235 Paradoxically, by resorting to circular definitions, it is accurate to state that Traditionalism contains traditionalism, but traditionalism does not contain Traditionalism.
237 Ibid.
238 Ibid.
from a current perspective. Second, he presents the foundational elements of Traditionalism in a readable style, but with a depth indicative of a subject matter expert.\textsuperscript{239}

While custom and Tradition involve repetitive transmission, Tradition possesses the added ingredient of revealed Truth. In Cutsinger’s words, the Traditionalist “must defend what is old, not as old but as true, as the temporal expression of something which is always springing fresh from eternity.”\textsuperscript{240} It is not that everything old is also true, rather that the Traditionalist defends and conveys what is both old and true – unchanging Truth handed-down from the most distant times.

The Truth Cutsinger is referring to above is derived from revelation. Cutsinger stated that Traditionalism should be “paired with revelation.”\textsuperscript{241} The essential ingredient differentiating Tradition from custom is its “contact with revelation and thus with God.”\textsuperscript{242} Fabbri suggested that “for Guénon and his followers, tradition does not have a human origin and may be considered as principles revealed from Heaven and binding man to his divine origin.”\textsuperscript{243} Lakhani provided a further explanation when comparing Tradition against things modern; Tradition, in contrast to modernity, designates those immutable principles, the \textit{Sophia Perennis} or primordial wisdom, which are rooted in the Transcendent.\textsuperscript{244}

The Transcendent Nature of Traditionalism became even more apparent with Cutsinger’s definitional clarity:

\begin{quote}
My own definition of tradition requires that it be paired with revelation. The former, we might say, is horizontal, while the
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{239} Cf. Cutsinger, “An Open Letter.”
\textsuperscript{240} Ibid., 300.
\textsuperscript{241} Ibid., 294-95.
\textsuperscript{242} Ibid., 295.
\textsuperscript{243} Fabbri, “Perennialist School,” under, Modernity, tradition and Primordial Tradition.
latter is vertical. Where revelation is the projection of God into space, tradition is the extension of revelation through time...The distinction of space from time is too simplistic, of course. In entering space, God also enters time. And in their extension through time, the modes by which tradition carries the force of revelation – be they words, gestures, symbols, saints, shrines – take up a certain space. But however one pictures it, revelation and tradition are to be seen, I suggest, as two parts of a single movement from God to man.\footnote{Cutsinger, “An Open Letter,” 294-95. Compare with Dugin’s use of vertical/horizontal representations at 2:3.6.}

Cutsinger reinforced Guénon’s contention that “there is nothing and can be nothing truly traditional that does not contain some element of a superhuman order.”\footnote{Guénon, The Reign of Quantity and the Signs of the times, trans. Walter James (Hillsdale, NY: Sophia Perennis, 2004), 253.} Cutsinger also echoed Guénon in the claim that the supernatural quality of Tradition “is the essential point, containing as it were the very definition of tradition and all that appertains to it.”\footnote{Guénon, Reign of Quantity, 211.} As will be apparent, Dugin, professing a Traditionalist position, does not hesitate to proclaim supernatural intervention in his Neo-Eurasian development.

Schuon agreed that Tradition emanates from a divine source.\footnote{Deon Valodia, “Glossary of Terms Used by Frithjof Schuon,” http://www.frithjof-schuon.com/Glossary\%20Schuon\%20Revised.pdf} Lakhani emphasized revelation in explaining the metahistorical nature of Traditionalism in contrast to a particular religious tradition that embraces it. Noting the eternal attribute of Revelation, Lakhani related that it “is not a historical event: it is based in the eternal present and is continuous.”\footnote{Lakhani, “Understanding ‘Tradition,’” 53.}

1.5.3. The Battle Line between Traditionalism and Modernity

Pelikan famously stated, “Tradition is the living faith of the dead, traditionalism is the dead faith of the living.”\footnote{Pelikan, Vindication of Tradition, 65.} Provocative this may be, but Pelikan used the statement not so much to provoke as to introduce an analysis of the conflict between what is orthodoxy and what is orthopraxis. He also cast doubt on the tendency to glorify a return to an atavistic state. One of the primary friction points between embracing Traditionalism and living in the present is the strife – often described as “revolt” – which Traditionalism promotes against modernity.\footnote{Cf. e.g., Sedgwick, Against the Modern World, Guénon, The Crisis of the Modern World, trans. Marco Pallis, Arthur Osborne, and Richard C. Nicholson (Hillsdale, NY: Sophia Perennis, 2001), and Evola, Revolt Against the Modern World.} Pelikan put his finger on the friction point between Traditionalism and modernity by stating that “reformers of every age, whether political or religious or literary, have protested against the tyranny of the dead, and in doing so have called for innovation and insight in place of tradition.”\footnote{Pelikan, Vindication of Tradition, 65.} Thus, is the battle line between the inherently progressive nature of modernity and the inherently conservative nature of Traditionalism drawn.

1.5.4. Fundamentalism’s Relationship with Traditionalism

Fundamentalism, in its more strict and historical definition, shares essential common threads with Traditionalism. One of the most critical threads being an imperative to ensure proper transfer and reception of unaltered Truth. Indeed, knowing, discovering, or uncovering the exact body of revealed Truth, faithfully engaging its precepts, preserving it, and consequently passing it on intact, comprises the raison d’être of Traditionalism and fundamentalism.

In its treatment of fundamentalism, the OED states, “fundamentalists reject a larger portion of secular society, maintain strong commitments to strict literalism, premillennial dispensationalism, and moral traditionalism.” The terms fundamentalist and Traditionalist refer to similar things. However, definitional interpretations have sometimes been derived directly from practitioners of fundamentalism or Traditionalism. Other times, definitions have been profoundly influenced by twentieth and twenty-first century writers.
and thinkers who constructed definitions from outside the accepted definitional elements applied by those within either belief system.

In the literature, fundamentalism and Traditionalism share several common characteristics evident in the way both project their Truth claims. Christian fundamentalism, as a self-identified biblical hermeneutic, has identifiable reactionary beginnings. Michael O. Emerson and David Hartman concluded that “fundamentalism of the early Twentieth Century was not so much a battle with the secular state as it was an intrareligious fight with other U.S. Protestant people and organizations.” The fundamentalist movement began when specific aspects of modernism that had pervaded Christian denominations were interpreted by the initial Christian fundamentalists as being non-biblical, heretical, and dangerous.

The militant nature of fundamentalism received useful treatment from historian George Marsden and theologian Rolland McCune. Perhaps the most instructive work to this end was that of Michael Barkun. His work is remarkable for its clarification of violent tendencies present in current interpretations of fundamentalism vice the original nonviolent characteristics of the Christian fundamentalist movement. Additionally, baseline research into fundamentalism included Yvonne Luven’s extensive Scoping Study. Seminal research in the field by Martin E. Marty and the Fundamentalism

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254 Michael O. Emerson and David Hartman, “The Rise of Religious Fundamentalism,” Annual Review of Sociology 32, no. 1 (August 11, 2006): 132. Michael O. Emerson is provost of North Park University in Chicago. David Hartman was a researcher at the University of Notre Dame when this article was published.


258 Yvonne Luven, Engaging Religious Fundamentalisms (Dublin: Irish School of Ecumenics, Trinity College Dublin), 2008. This report is designated as a Scoping Study by the Irish School of Ecumenics. Yvonne Luven is a scholar of comparative religion in Dublin.
Project was another very relevant, in-depth, and informative study essential to my research.259

Armstrong’s, The Battle for God, and “Fundamentalism and Literature,” by Ihab Hassan, are both concerned with fundamentalism in its expanded definition.260 Both of these works examine elements of non-Christian-centric fundamentalisms, including Islamic and other manifestations, in scholarly and well-documented forums. The Battle for God provides foundational information but is dated in its presentation of specific fundamentalist groups. Hassan’s presentation is especially impressive as it covers art and literary topics in their organic relationship with fundamentalism in a non-typical literary style reminiscent of the sophisticated writing of Eco. Armstrong considered the evolution of violent groups claiming religious purity and orthodoxy, and acknowledged characteristic resemblances found among these fundamentalist groups.261 The importance of family-like resemblance in the context of organized movements is underscored by the supporting literature of Huntington and

1.5.4.1. Fundamentalism’s Evolution others.262

According to Emerson and Hartman, “the term fundamentalism was first used to describe a conservative strain of Protestantism that developed in the United

259 Martin E. Marty, “Too Bad We’re So Relevant: The Fundamentalism Project Projected,” Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 49, no. 6 (March 1996). This report was presented to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences at conclusion of the well recognized 6-year Fundamentalism Project. May be accessed at http://www.illuminos.com/mem/selectPapers/contentsSelectList.html. Martin E. Marty is the Fairfax M. Cone Distinguished Service Professor Emeritus of the History of Modern Christianity of the University of Chicago.


261 Armstrong, Battle for God, xii.

States roughly from 1870 to 1925.”263 As a descriptor, fundamentalism was initially applied in the first quarter of the twentieth century.264 However, fundamentalist threads linked to the movement that emerged are traceable to the Puritans and other dogmatic sects or groups.265

The Protestant fundamentalists were reacting in part to the residual effects of the Enlightenment. Liberalism in the form of more secular or popular religious interpretations spawned significant changes in Protestant hermeneutics, especially in the latter nineteenth and throughout the twentieth centuries. The reaction of some Protestants regarding their understanding of changing theological dogma away from traditional interpretations was, in its way, an expression of anti-modernism; it was their revolt against the modern world.

After a purely Christian attempt to return to the basic tenants of the Faith determined by the original definers, the second phase of fundamentalism’s evolution involved the infusion of militancy into its definitional character. There can be little doubt that the inclusion of a militant aspect within fundamentalism has contributed to broadening its definition to include non-Protestant Christian actors that express ideology with militancy, aggression, and violence. Fundamentalism’s time confined within the definitional boundaries of foundational Christian beliefs in response to, and in opposition of, modernism was short-lived. The rapid evolution of Christian

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264 Online Etymological Dictionary, s.v. “Fundamentalist,” accessed February 23, 2018, https://www.etymonline.com/word/fundamentalist. Excerpts: 1920 in the religious sense (as is fundamentalism), from fundamental + -ist. Coined in Amer.Eng. to name a movement among Protestants c.1920-25 based on scriptural inerrancy, etc., and associated with William Jennings Bryan, among others. Fundamentalist is said (by George McCready Price) to have been first used in print by Curtis Lee Laws (1868-1946), editor of “The Watchman Examiner,” a Baptist newspaper. The movement may have roots in the Presbyterian General Assembly of 1910, which drew up a list of five defining qualities of “true believers” which other evangelicals published in a mass-circulation series of books called “The Fundamentals.” A World’s Christian Fundamentals Association was founded in 1918. The words reached widespread use in the wake of the contentious Northern Baptist Convention of 1922 in Indianapolis. In denominational use, fundamentalist was opposed to modernist.
fundamentalism quickly resulted in broader definitional descriptions that are now commonly held.

Following mostly unsuccessful forays into the public arena of the 1920s and 1930s, Christian Fundamentalism adopted a more separatist or isolationist posture. This posture was prevalent until moves, especially noticeable since the 1970s, toward a more open and visibly combative stance occurred. Whatever the original intentions of the founders of the Christian fundamentalist movement, its evolution soon exhibited militant characteristics.

1.6. Eurasianism – Literature Review

Long recognized are the seven continents of Asia, Africa, North America, South America, Antarctica, Europe, and Australia. Combining Asia and Europe as Eurasia, a single continent, reduces the number from seven to six.266 As geopolitical concepts and perceptions developed independently in the East after the disintegration of the Western portion of the Roman Empire, a realization of continental Eurasia developed.267 This recognition originated as the East looked westward, not as a Western European enterprise looking eastward. Dugin referred to this time as “a formative period of classical Eurasianism.”268

Laruelle stated that Vladimir I. Lamanskii proffered a theory possessing distinctly identifiable Eurasian elements before the end of the nineteenth century:269

Russia did not exist in two continents, European and Asiatic, but in one unique Eurasiac continent in which three radically different worlds confronted each other: the Romano-Germanic world, the Greek-Slavic world of the middle, and a non-Christian

268 Ibid.
269 Laruelle, “The Orient in Russian Thought at the Turn of the Century,” in Russia between East and West Scholarly Debates on Eurasianism, ed. Dmitry Shlapentokh (Boston: Brill, 2007), 24. Vladimir I. Lamanskii, 1833-1914, was a prominate Slavic historian.
world, Asia. Russia at the same time encompassed the whole and was encompassed by the whole, an empire inside the Greek-Slavic world. Bassin indicates Pre- or proto-Eurasian evidence in his observation that “external sources have been particularly important for the development of Russian nationalist thought, from at least the early 18th century.” Laruelle wrote that several scholars developed doctrines that would justify the Russian presence in Asia. For example, Vasilii V. Barthold, an official historian under both the Tsars and Soviets, “advocated for a cultural rapprochement between people from different origins,” suggested that “worldwide empires” represent a “historical necessity,” and welcomed a Russian move into Central Asia.

Laruelle stated that “according to N. M. Przheval’skii, peoples of Mongolia and Sing-Kiang were waiting to be under the domination of the ‘White Czar.’” Going a step further, Lamanskii and Vasilii V. Dokuchaev proffered theories postulating a “third continent” situated between Europe and Asia. Joining Lamanskii and Dokuchaev in this suggestion was the economist Peter B. Struve, who went on to become Petr Savitsky’s professor.

Rémi Tremblay credited Nikolai Trubetskoï with being the founder of the Eurasian movement and identified Trubetskoï’s friend, Claude Lévi-Strauss, as the source of Eurasia’s pluralistic ideas. Reflecting pluralistic thinking,

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275 Ibid. Vasilii V. Dokuchaev, 1846–1903.
276 Ibid. Peter Berngardovich Struve, 1870–1944. Pyotr Nikolaevich Savitsky (sometimes rendered Savitski or Savitskiy in English), 1895–1968, was a prominent Dugin Eurasianist predecessor. Dugin renders it Savitsky in the edition of The Fourth Political Theory preferred herein. I will use this spelling except in quoted material or citations.
Tremblay characterized universalism as an outgrowth of the Enlightenment and proclaimed that Eurasianism is in diametric opposition to this development.  Neo-Eurasianism supposes a multipolar world.  Tremblay identified the “first and most important position of the Eurasian philosophy” as “its idea of a pluralistic world,” and, correspondingly, “as the rejection of Western universalism.”

While he undoubtedly would admit to significant historical antecedents, with an academic certainty rarely encountered, Dmitry Shlapentokh precisely pinpointed that “Eurasianism as an intellectual and political trend emerged in 1921 when a group of Russian émigrés published the brochure, ‘Turn to the East.’” The movement grew, and well before WWII, a bifurcation yielded a leftist version in contrast to the much more rightist and monarchist leanings of the Russian Diaspora.  Bassin emphasized that “important aspects of the thinking of the Eurasian movement of the 1920s and 1930s – which, we can surely all agree, was nothing if not nationalist – were heavily influenced as well by imputs [sic] from outside Russia, specifically from Western Europe.”

Yigal Liverant suggested that Eurasianism inspired and largely established by Trubetskoi began to wane “as early as the 1930s, and its fate was sealed in 1938,” with his death. Trubetskoi died, but the seed of the Eurasian concept survived, revived by Lev Nikolayevich Gumilev.  “By the end of World War II, Eurasianism had become known in the USSR, with Lev Gumilev as one of the major representatives,” a point highlighted by both Shlapentokh and

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Trubetskoy is often rendered as Trubetskoi or Trubezkoy in English.  Dugin uses Trubetskoi in my preferred edition of The Fourth Political Theory, so I will use it except in quotes and appropriate citations.  Nikolai Sergeyevich Trubetskoi, 1890-1938.  Claude Lévi-Strauss, 1909-2009.

278 Tremblay, “Thoughts of Dugin’s ‘Eurasian Mission.’”

279 Ibid.


Laruelle. Gumilev’s theories are widely acknowledged in Russia and throughout the Eurasian region. The creation of Gumilyov National University and its official *raison d’être* is tangible evidence of this, but his theories find no similarly widespread reception in the West.

Russia’s historical movement into Ukraine, the Baltics, Poland, all the countries that came to make up the Warsaw Pact, combined with expansion both eastward and southward, appears to support the Russian desire to control the Heartland and the Rimland of Eurasia. However, there is a less deliberate explanation to be considered: “Russian policies can be explained not by ideologies but by the circumstances surrounding Russia.” Eric Shiraev explained:

> These circumstances were unique. For example, Russia grew in size and expanded because it could: there were only a few natural barriers holding its Eurasian expansion. Although Russia could be viewed as an aggressive and imperialist state, its policies were determined by Russia’s unique geographic position, under which the policy of expansionism was a natural one.

While this may be the argument articulated by Shiraev and supported by the writings of Jared Diamond, Dugin presents the much more metaphysical

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284 As the University name so clearly indicates, Gumilyev’s popularity and fame are such that the University, founded in 1996 and located in Astana, Kazakhstan, was named for him. The official university website states the main purpose of the university is found in the “idea of Eurasian Union.”


286 Shiraev, *Russian Government and Politics*, 61. Andrew C. Kuchins is the former Director of the Russian & Eurasian Program and a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and former Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center. Anders Åslund is a Swedish economist and Senior Fellow of the Atlantic Council.
imperative of Sacred Geography embedded in his ideas of messianic Manifest Destiny in the Neo-Eurasian construction of Fourth Political Theory.\textsuperscript{287}

1.6.1. Sacred Geography/ Sacred Space

Paul Coyer noted the impact of \textit{Duginsque} thinking by highlighting the spiritual importance Vladimir Putin attached to Russia’s claims in Ukraine.\textsuperscript{288} Coyer connected Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 with its “sacred” links to the “birthplace of the Russian nation,” and quoted Putin saying that Crimea is, “spiritual soil” where “our ancestors first and forever recognized their nationhood.”\textsuperscript{289} Dugin imagines Eurasia as much more than a classification of physical geography. He realizes Eurasia as Sacred Geography – Sacred Space.\textsuperscript{290} Dugin further anticipates Eurasia as a combined spiritual and geopolitical reality stretching from the boundaries of Europe on the west to those of Asia on the east – from Dublin to Vladivostok.\textsuperscript{291}

In Dugin's perception, Eurasia contains a spiritual dimension that is inextricably melded with its physical reality. Sacred Geography is compatible with ideas of Sacred Space – recognizing that various land and water locations

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contain significant and persistent metaphysical properties. Dugin has written in some depth concerning his ideas of Sacred Geography. His article, “From Sacred Geography to Geopolitics,” is comprehensive and provides a useful window into Dugin’s thinking.\textsuperscript{292} In this work, Dugin’s conception is compatible with a range of Sacred Geography/Sacred Space literature, and other research focused on indigenous peoples and their concepts of the spiritual aspects of land and water.

I give attention to several writers and their treatment of Sacred Geography/Sacred Space preparatory to overlaying more overtly geopolitical layers on Dugin’s Neo-Eurasian model. Among the core works in this endeavor was Rossman’s extensive and valuable, “Anti-Semitism in Eurasian Historiography: The Case of Lev Gumilev.”\textsuperscript{293} Rossman’s claim that Russians, more than others, place critical importance on geography is necessary to understanding Dugin. Lacking depth of metaphysical awareness, the contemporary West is not able to adequately grasp Rossman’s extensive evidence that “Russians regard space as sacred.”\textsuperscript{294}

Dugin has an affinity with other awarenesses of Sacred Geography. This affinity serves to shed light on Dugin’s perceptions and conclusions; therefore, I devote some time to kindred concepts that Dugin acknowledges. Dugin endorses, as reality, sacred characteristics of geography that the West holds as imaginary and superstitious. The Western interpretation of geographical reality is the product of materialistic-centered misunderstanding, in Dugin’s opinion.\textsuperscript{295}

Judaism, Christianity, and Islam are replete with examples of Sacred Geography, and “religious theories of sacred space were pioneered by Mircea

\textsuperscript{292} Cf. Dugin, “From Sacred Geography.” This article, in its entirety, provides a window into Dugin’s thinking and reveals clear examples of his metaphysical and esoteric mindset.
\textsuperscript{293} Cf. Rossman, “Anti-Semitism in Eurasian Historiography.” Lev Nikolayevich Gumilev, 1912-1992, was a Russian ethnologist and Eurasianist.
\textsuperscript{294} Ibid., 164. Here Rossman is quoting Dugin; Cf. Rossman’s note: 1994b, i.e. “Apologiia natsionalisma.” In Konservativnaiia revolutsiia. 142.
\textsuperscript{295} Dugin, “From Sacred Geometry,” under, From Continents to Meta-Continents.

Geoffrey Simmins, in his book, *Sacred Spaces and Sacred Places*, displayed his comprehensive research into Native American perceptions of Sacred Space and the importance attached to cardinal compass directions. Simmins’ work bears interesting parallels to the considerable treatment Dugin gives to the cardinal points and their metaphysical connections. Hui-Chih Yu’s commentary on color associations in their geographical context can also be linked to Dugin’s Sacred Geography conclusions.

When examining Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianism, John Fiske’s notions of Imperializing Power and Localizing Power are useful. Bill Kirkpatrick said that these two powers represent “a powerful framework for thinking through different kinds and directionalities of power, resistance, governmentality, and agency.” “Imperializing power seeks to extend its reach as far as possible over physical reality, society, and consciousness,” said Kirkpatrick. Fiske’s notion is pertinent and important in assessing the impact of Dugin within

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300 Hui-Chih Yu, “A Cross-Cultural Analysis of Symbolic Meanings of Color,” *Chang Gung Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences* 7, no. 1 (April 2014): 49-74. Hui-Chih Yu was Associate Professor, Department of English, Shih Hsin University at the time of this article.


302 Kirkpatrick, “Play, Power, and Policy.”

303 Ibid.
both Russian and Western academic and political circles because of Dugin’s Fourth Political Theory expansionist and imperialist leanings.

Dugin’s critique of the West may incorporate elements of Imperializing Power as he disparages Western globalist desires. Interestingly, Imperializing Power ideas can offer insights into both Eurasian expansionism and Western Globalism. Dugin suggests that Eurasian expansion is limited to defined geographic ambitions, whereas Western global desires describe a universal imperialistic undertaking.

1.7. Reception – Review of Literature

Reception is a process, as the label implies, of receiving, and receiving is dependent upon response to transmission. Some scholars have characterized the method of transmitting and receiving as a linear construction progressing from the originator to the listener, reader, or viewer. Others have conceptualized more complex models, including feedback loops and other transmitter-receiver interactions. No matter the model, achieving a better understanding of how reception occurs is useful as the sender’s intent and intensity, and the reaction or response of the receiving audience translates into observable action. Observable action is the activity best able to gauge the current traction of Fourth Political Theory.

John F.A. Sawyer, known for his research into biblical reception, told us that “reception in the analysis of literary texts,” is not a new thing.304 The ancient Greeks were deeply appreciative of the transmission and reception of spoken and written words. Transmission and reception have always been crucial to communication. Sawyer added that “although the terms are relatively new,

the importance of reception in the analysis of literary texts was appreciated already in ancient Greece.”

The Greeks developed entire schools of thought dedicated to the transmission and reception of spoken and textual words. The Greeks admired those who were proficient with words and much admired those who were masters of rhetoric. Eric Hoffer instructed that “the preliminary work of undermining existing institutions, of familiarizing the masses with the idea of change, and of creating a receptivity to a new faith, can be done only by men who are, first and foremost, talkers or writers and are recognized as such by all.”

The medium of the written word has exploded, as have correspondingly similar eruptions in other media, in the latter part of the twentieth century and the first part of the twenty-first. Adaptations of the various reception theories must likewise expand. A wide range of transmission options, especially in the rapidly enlarging arena of social media, must be considered in attempts to understand the relationship between the intent of the original transmitter and the acceptance and response of the receiver. Sawyer recognized these phenomena by noting that reception is no longer limited to the study of literature:

> Businesses spend millions on consumer research to analyze the effect marketing strategies have on their customers. The success of films is measured by box office returns, and television programmes are judged by their share of the potential viewing public.

Emphasizing the transmission and reception of rhetoric, Sawyer stressed that, “rhetoric, after all, is the art of persuasion and is very much concerned with the effect a text has on its readers.” Transmission is complex. “It refers to all those literary devices designed to get the reader or listener to respond to a text in various ways,” According to Sawyer. Plato’s warning that “letting people read literature that might arouse in them emotions that are difficult to

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305 Sawyer, “Role of Reception Theory.”
306 Hoffer, The True Believer, 129.
307 Sawyer, “Role of Reception Theory.”
308 Ibid.
309 Ibid.
control,” is apropos to Dugin – and Dugin well illustrates the lessons of Hoffer and Sawyer.\footnote{Ibid.} There can be no argument that Dugin intends for his words to affect his audience, arouse emotions, and elicit responses.

Reaction is a function of reception. How the West reacts to Dugin and his geopolitical and theological manifestations is a function of how the West receives Dugin and perceives the content of his transmissions. Dugin should be considered in the context of his claims that Fourth Political Theory continues the historical consistency of revealed Truth through Traditionalism and supports the overthrow of a unipolar world through the reality of Neo-Eurasianism.\footnote{Dugin, Fourth Theory, 193-97.} Affirming or rejecting Dugin constitutes reception in either case. So, in the bigger picture, it is the interpretive reception of Dugin’s Geopolitical-Theology rather than the accuracy of its transmission that will determine any subsequent response from the West.

If Russia’s future National Policies employ Dugin’s proposals, its strategic decisions reflecting Duginesque elements will influence the West’s response to Russian actions regardless of whether Dugin is acknowledged or not. Western reception will determine Western response. While even the most informed and accurate interpretation of Dugin’s reflected influence on Russian policy may not prevent potentially dangerous friction, a misinformed and inaccurate interpretation will likely ensure it.

1.7.1. The Reception Process

Like Hoffer, Sawyer explained that rhetoric is concerned with the effect of a text on its readers through the psychological impact of words.\footnote{Sawyer, “Role of Reception Theory.”} Sawyer employed the Konstanz School term Rezeptionsaesthetik, noting its similarity to Reader-Response Criticism, in referencing the historical development of reception.\footnote{Ibid. Cf. Hans Robert Jauss, Towards an Aesthetic of Reception, trans. Timothy Bahti (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982). Konstanz is often rendered Constance. Hans-Robert Jauss, 1921-1997.} In Sawyer’s words, “the term reception theory itself or Rezeptionsaesthetik goes back to the Sixties and to the Konstanz School of
literary studies.” Sawyer identified Rezeptionsaesthetik as the “German equivalent of the preferred American term ‘Reader-Response Criticism.’”

Sawyer suggested that the writer and reader may or may not share the interpretation of a transmission. For Western receivers, the notion “that the reception of a text is more important than the text itself,” is paramount. Sawyer’s explanation of this perception was that,

It is like the philosophers’ old question: If a tree falls in the forest and no-one hears it, does it make a sound? A text without a reader has no meaning. It is the readers of a text that imbue meaning. In a sense, the reader creates at least as much textual meaning as does the author.

Sylvia Plath was not willing to allow the writer even this much ownership. “Once a poem is made available to the public,” she said, “the right of interpretation belongs to the reader.” Others agreed. Hans-Robert Jauss and Stanley Fish, placing heavy emphasis on reception, argued that text could not exist without the reader.

Considering Dugin’s transmission and its reception, the Rezeptionsaesthetik of the intentionalist viewpoint of the Cambridge School is germane. J. G. A. Pocock, Quentin Skinner, John Dunn, and others maintained that the intent of the author and the influence of the historical context at the time and period of the writing should drive reception.

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314 Ibid. Sawyer wrote that Rezeptionsaesthetik “is particularly associated with the name of Hans Robert Jauss whose book Towards an Aesthetic of Reception appeared in 1982.” Italics added.
315 Ibid.
316 Ibid.
319 Cf. e.g., Jauss, Aesthetic of Reception and Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in This Class? (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982). Stanley Fish is a well-known literary theorist and legal scholar.
the identifier applied to Pocock, Skinner, Dunn, and others promoting an intentionalist view, hold that the author – the transmitter, within the historical context of the period of the writing, is the critical element of reception. Emphasis on the transmitter is consistent with the Traditional position.

Strict constructionists of textual material (be they religious, artistic, political, judicial, or historical) make claims regarding the meaning of the texts based upon the original intent and meaning imbued by the author. The rub, of course, lies in conflicts that arise over determining the actual intent stated or implied by the originator. In the past, appeals to authority, such as the Church, settled disputes of this nature. However, in an age where an opponent's appeal to authority is afforded little credence, various textual criticisms and more postmodern deconstruction methods are commonly applied.

There are long-standing and persistent arguments over the correctness of individual texts. Examples include accurate reception of texts depending on faithfulness to the author's original intent, contextual influences surrounding the writing, or interpretations considering the currently accepted norms of

professor of political science and Director of the Center for British Studies at the University of California, Berkeley.


Modernists depart from the stubborn Traditionalist insistence upon preserving intentional contextual consistency. Insofar as Traditionalists argue the consistent and enduring qualities of meaningful texts, The Cambridge School seems to more readily accommodate a Traditionalist position; excepting that the Cambridge School does not accept the level of contextually consistent veracity claimed for Traditional transmissions.

Cf. e.g., Daniel A. Farber, “The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed,” Ohio State Law Journal 49, no. 4 (1989): 1086; “When reading a law or applying constitutional principles, strict constructionists ignore context and consider only the words on the page. The circumstances or potential result of a judicial ruling do not factor into a strict constructionist's decision-making process. They believe that legal texts carry the same meaning from the day that it is written until the day it is amended or repealed. Strict constructionists seek to understand and apply the original meaning of the legal text.” Cf. https://study.com/academy/lesson/strict-constructionism-definition-beliefs-examples.html. Addressing U.S. Constitutional Law, but applicable to the subject here is Farber’s missive that, “Originalists are committed to the view that original intent is not only relevant but authoritative, that we are in some sense obligated to follow the intent of the framers.” Daniel A. Farber is Professor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley.
criticism. Traditionalists would argue that the intent, the original meaning imparted to the document (or other media), is paramount – the content of the text itself is consistently enduring. For Dugin, the Cambridge School approach should be considered at least partially applicable. To the Western receiver, the Social History and Konstanz School approach hold sway. As ambiguous as it may seem on the surface, given the stance of Traditionalists on original intent, Dugin's reception is crucial in the international security environment, not in its intentional context so much as in its reductionist interpretations.

How Dugin’s transmissions, in the context of current geopolitical perceptions (with their multiple social and cultural overlays), are received is arguably of more consequence than what Dugin intends to express. In the postmodern environment, Dugin’s perception in the West, given current geopolitical constructions (with their multiple social and cultural overlays), outweighs Dugin’s original intent. However, this receiver-interpreted reception is entirely in keeping with Konstanz School understandings. Despite the Traditionalist affinity to the Cambridge School priorities of authorial and textual intent, Dugin’s reception derives relevance in the international environment owing to the influence of the Konstanz School. For Dugin, the Cambridge School approach should be paramount to the Western receiver. In reality, the modern, now postmodern social- and cultural-history paradigms predominate.

The messenger, not just the message, is also a factor in reception. Sawyer commented on the diminished impact of marginalized individuals with some utility. Still, there are myriad examples of the rampant reception of urban myths that are relevant to understanding the power of propaganda in popular reception. Dugin, it should be remembered, gained traction as a marginalized individual before his much more popular reception occurred. All that

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324 The result of this application is that Dugin is revealed as more Oriental than Western in his exertions of his Fourth Political Theory. For clues concepts of Orientalist approaches to geopolitics, Cf. Christopher Goto-Jones, “If Not a Clash Then What? Huntington, Nishida Kitarō, and the Politics of Civilizations,” *International Relations of the Asia Pacific* 2 (2002): 223-43. Christopher Goto-Jones is Dean of Humanities and Professor of Philosophy at the University of Victoria.
approach the marketplace of ideas risk exposing the contents of the baggage they bring with them.

Rudolf Bultmann, for example, believed that a “presuppositionless” exegesis is impossible.\textsuperscript{325} Ironically, any presupposition that attempts an entirely objective view toward a presentation of ideas only serves to prove Bultmann’s point. Reception insists on some degree of subjectivity, for the receiver’s presuppositional baggage, the impossibility of unsullied transmission, interpretation, and lack of precise common cores of experience corrupt the transmitter’s pure intent. Just as Dugin cannot be purely objective – for he brings all his subjective baggage along for inspection – neither can examining Dugin be a purely objective exercise.\textsuperscript{326} Sawyer offered an observation similar to Bultmann’s:

Given the opportunity to consider a variety of different readings of a text, we may evaluate them using aesthetic, theological, ethical, ideological, academic or other criteria, reflecting our particular hermeneutical stance.\textsuperscript{327}

Terry Eagleton offered up an intriguing possibility.\textsuperscript{328} Almost musing, Eagleton readily suggested that “most of us recognize that no reading is innocent.”\textsuperscript{329} He then characterized the realization of this recognition as “reader guilt.”\textsuperscript{330} The manifestation of this guilty awareness is “that there is no such thing as purely ‘literary’ response.”\textsuperscript{331} Sawyer wrote that “it seems as though, intentional or not, ‘texts have more than one meaning, and different meanings are largely due to differences in the reader’s hermeneutical stance

\textsuperscript{326} Despite my attempted objectivity to systematically present Dugin, I am sure Bultmann’s belief applies to me as well.
\textsuperscript{327} Sawyer, “Role of Reception Theory.” Cf. Sawyer, “Old Testament and Its Readers,” 76. Here it should be added that Sawyer’s observation applies to me as well. I am, no doubt, unable to approach this study employing a “presuppositionless” exegesis.
\textsuperscript{328} Terence Francis Eagleton, British literary theorist and critic, is a Distinguished Professor of English Literature at Lancaster University.
\textsuperscript{330} Eagleton, Literary Theory, 89.
\textsuperscript{331} Ibid.
or horizon of expectation.”\textsuperscript{332} Eagleton’s similar conclusion was that “the kind of social and historical individuals we are” impacts the transmission of the text and our reception of it.\textsuperscript{333}

The potential receptive audience input has predictive value. Sawyer credited Fish with coining the term “interpretive community,” and he recognized Fish’s claim that texts usually have a defined readership projected before publication or distribution.\textsuperscript{334} Sawyer concluded that an interpretive community determines the acceptability of ideas and actions.\textsuperscript{335} His thoughts on interpretive communities suggest that the extent and import of Dugin’s Geopolitical-Theology and its resulting Fourth Political Theory will be tested in the various institutional communities throughout Europe and the rest of the Western world.

To objectively arrive at predictions regarding the interpretive community, Sawyer refined several revealing questions:

- Who is reading the text?
- What kind of baggage are they carrying when they come to the text – what presuppositions?
- What do they make of the text?
- What effect does the text have on them? \textsuperscript{336}

Sawyer explained that “‘valid’ or ‘correct’ interpretations are normally those of the experts, while those of the uneducated, marginalized, anarchic or eccentric are not to be taken seriously.”\textsuperscript{337} Sawyer’s comments on the diminished impact of marginalized individuals may have some utility. But there are myriad examples of rampant reception of urban myths that are relevant to

\textsuperscript{333} Eagleton, \textit{Literary Theory}, 89.
\textsuperscript{334} Sawyer, “Role of Reception Theory.”
\textsuperscript{336} Ibid.
understanding the power of propaganda and may argue against Sawyer’s claim.338

1.7.2. Encoding-Decoding

Cultural theorist Stuart Hall developed an encoding-decoding model of communication that underscores the unpredictable nature of transmission and reception.339 Simon During, writing an introduction to Hall’s chapter, “Encoding and Decoding,” in The Cultural Studies Reader, observed that transmissions exhibit dominance structures, implanted in the transmission process, that remain intact to some degree at the reception stage.340 Because of this dominance structure persistence, power relationships may be intentionally or unintentionally transferred in the encoding and decoding processes.341 The consequences of this transfer may result in the intended encoding being decoded in unintended ways resulting in unintended consequences.342

Hall’s encoding-decoding model, according to Julie Martin, “essentially states that meaning is encoded by the sender and decoded by the receiver and that these encoded meanings may be decoded to mean something else.”343 During observed, “a message can only be received at a particular stage if it is recognizable or appropriate.”344 Senders encode their messages and embed their intent into them. Receivers decode these same messages “according to their own ideals and views.”345 Often the results of this encoding and decoding lead “to miscommunication or to the receiver understanding something very different from what the sender intended.”346

338 Cf. Hoffer, The True Believer. In this book Hoffer goes into some detail on the tendency to believe propaganda and the willingness to adopt unfounded rumor as truth.
341 During, “Editor’s Introduction Encoding and Decoding,” 90.
342 Hall, “Encoding and Decoding,” 93ff.
344 During, “Editor’s Introduction Encoding and Decoding,” 90.
345 Martin, “Audiences and Reception.”
In the reception area of his encoding-decoding model, Hall suggested there may be several hypothetical decoding positions. He offered three for consideration: the Dominant-Hegemonic position, the Negotiated Code (or position), and the Oppositional Code position (although not stated, the alternate term “oppositional position” may be assumed). Each of these possible decoding positions, except the first, is fraught with misunderstanding often encountered when language is employed cross-culturally.

In the Dominant-Hegemonic position, the viewer takes the connoted meaning, from a television newscast or current affairs program, for example, and decodes the message in terms of the encoded intent. Next, a majority of decoding audiences probably understand quite adequately what has been dominantly defined and professionally signified in the Negotiated Code. Finally, in the Oppositional Code position, it is possible that a viewer perfectly understands both the literal and the connotative inflection imparted by discourse but decodes the message in a contrary way – in the decoder’s preferred code.

Other encoding-decoding perspectives are encountered in the literature of reception. Acknowledging Eco’s contributions to the field of encoding and decoding, Cristinel Munteanu commented that Eco’s terminological phrase, Aberrant Decoding, originated in a “study on semiotics regarding television.” Munteanu introduced an Eco-inspired classification scheme produced by John Hartley consisting of four classes or types of Aberrant Decoding stemming from people:

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347 Hall, “Encoding and Decoding,” 101-03.
348 This obscuring phenomenon is demonstrated with irony in the quote often attributed to former U.S. Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan: “I know you think you understand what you thought I said but I’m not sure you realize that what you heard is not what I meant.” This interesting note is Attributed to Greenspan by Rupert Cornwell, Cf. “Alan Greenspan: The buck starts here,” The Independent, April 27, 2003), citing an unspecified Capitol Hill hearing. Cf. https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Alan_Greenspan.
349 Adapted from Hall, “Encoding and Decoding,” 101-3.
350 Ibid.
351 Ibid.

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• Who did not know the language (what meanings did the Greeks, and then everyone until Jean-François Champollion, ascribe to Egyptian hieroglyphics?)

• From future generations (what meanings did medieval Christians ascribe to Greek and Roman art?)

• From different belief systems (what meanings do tourists ascribe to the stained-glass windows of cathedrals such as Chartres?)

• From different cultures (what meanings do white people ascribe to Aboriginal art?).353

Eco emphasized that Aberrant Decoding may involve “ignorance of the original codes,” such “as when Achaean conquerors misinterpreted Cretan symbols.”354 He expanded the application to include when later-created codes are superimposed over earlier ones. Eco’s examples were “when early Christians overlaid a Christian meaning upon a pagan symbol or ritual, or when post-romantic scholars find erotic images in what an earlier poet conceived of as philosophical allegories.”355

Receiving Dugin is a complex process of both coding and decoding. Neither Dugin’s coding nor Western decoding is perfectly accomplished. Aberrant Decoding may contribute to Dugin’s reception issues in the West. Given the inherent imperfections, however, a realization that it is on the reception-side where the dialog with Dugin’s ideas is given direction is paramount. For, it is on the reception-side that reactions must most accurately match and respond to any Dugin inspired policies to lessen the risk of unintended consequences.

Sawyer’s conclusion that “we are mostly members of an interpretive community of some kind where a consensus is reached on what is acceptable, academically and ethically, and what is not,” is instructive.356 It may be


355 Ibid. Here Munteanu is citing Eco via O’Sullivan et al., Key Concepts, as above.

paraphrased as the West is made up of an interpretive community of political, economic, academic, cultural, and religious institutions where a consensus is reached on what is acceptable, in each of these fields, and what is not. It is not just in the political capitals of the West where the extent and import of Dugin’s Fourth Political Theory will be tested, but also in the various global reaches and institutions of politics and power.

1.8. Conclusions to Chapter One

In this chapter, I introduced the direction of this study: Examining Alexander Dugin through his Geopolitical-Theology. I outlined the methodology of the study, critical points that must be recognized, such as viewing Dugin as a Geopolitical-Theologian, considering his opinions of Liberal Democracy, and his interpretations of Traditionalism, and Eurasianism.

I introduced the notion that Dugin’s Fourth Political Theory conflicts with Western Liberalism. I offered that Dugin’s geopolitics amount to a Clausewitzian extension, assuming that conflict is part of the geopolitical continuum. I also introduced my observations and interpretations of Dugin’s inclusion of theological considerations to his geopolitical outlook. I explored the broad ideas and the literature informing on this Study: geopolitics, political theology, Traditionalism, and Eurasianism. Lastly, I considered the West’s reception afforded Dugin and his ideas.

From here, my study will examine Dugin and his geopolitical works in greater detail, through both his lens, as an interpreter of the West, and through the lenses of his major commentators and others. Finally, I will present my overall conclusions and recommendations for future studies.
2.0. Dugin: Geopolitical-Theologian and Western Commentator

Chapter One provided an overview of the development of my thesis, including an introduction to the major topics I am pursuing, a review and sampling of Dugin’s subject literature, selected topical literature, and offerings of some Dugin commentators and interpreters. In this chapter, I review Dugin’s background and delve into his development of Geopolitical-Theology as a Neo-Traditionalist.

I progress through this chapter following several prominent Dugin themes: the development of his political theology and persistent philosophical thinking, Neo-Traditionalism, Neo-Eurasianism, and theological elements of his work – his metaphysical and hermeneutical approaches, his Russian Orthodoxy, and his eschatological leanings. The first part of the chapter, Dugin’s background and reactions to him, is much like a literature review. The second part, beginning with Dugin’s political theology, presents Dugin as a geopolitical theologian and a commentator on the West.

2.1. Alexander Dugin: Background

Dugin was born on January 7, 1962, in Moscow to Galina Viktorovna Dugina, a medical doctor, and Gelij Alexandrovich Dugin, a senior officer in the KGB.357 His baptism at the age of six was overseen by his great-grandmother (likely to avoid issues with his father’s military and political superiors).358


Dugin was awarded a Ph.D. in Sociology in 2004. Dugin’s wife also holds a doctoral-level degree, and they have two children.

Andrey Tolstoy and Edmund McCaffray claimed, “Dugin’s rise has been partly camouflaged by an intellectual biography that is complex and at times contradictory.” Despite his rather recent appearance in the more mainstream American media, Dugin is no overnight sensation. His status as a current Russian geopolitical figure has evolved from the 1980s. Laruelle identified four main vectors of Dugin’s “intellectual tendencies.” These she named as political theory inspired by Traditionalism, Orthodox religious philosophy, Aryanist and occultist theories, and geopolitical and Eurasianist conceptions. Contrary to what one might expect, Laruelle commented that Dugin’s range of “ideological diversity” went through a relatively short evolutionary stage, and “did not emerge in succession but have co-existed in Dugin’s writings since the beginning of the 1990s.”

2.1.1. Reactions to Dugin

Dugin, as a geopolitician, philosopher, and finally, geopolitical theologian evolved from those days in the 1990s, the time when he initially gained Western recognition. The early Dugin was outwardly esoteric, even mystical, in his expressions of the trajectory of Russian history and its projected future flight. Today, though remaining staunchly conservative and traditional, and thereby controversial, Dugin projects a more consistent and defined image.

Tolstoy and McCaffray portrayed Dugin’s anti-communist stance in the 1980s in contradistinction to his work “with the remnants of the Communist Party

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359 Ibid., “He has defended his post-graduate degree in Philosophy in Rostov-Na-Donu with the dissertation ‘The Evolution of the Paradigmatic Foundations of Science’ in 2000 and the PhD in the Faculty of Sociology in the same University in 2004; theme: ‘The Transformation of the Political Structures and Institutions in the Process of Modernization of the Civil Society.’”

360 Ibid. Dugin’s wife holds a Ph.D. in philosophy, according to this site.


362 Laruelle, Russian Version of European Radical Right, 1.

363 Ibid.

364 Ibid.
after the fall of the Soviet Union.” They noted Dugin’s association with the National Bolshevik Party (NBP), implying an association with Eduard Limonov, and remarked that Dugin “praised Joseph Stalin and the Soviet Union while also supporting family and religious values.” Dugin has since distanced himself from the NBP. Moreover, he appears to have taken a much more mainstream approach to politics relative to Limonov and his associations, with their various revivals and Frankenstein’s Monster-like constructions and reconstructions of neo-Bolshevik parties and sub-parties.

Perhaps there was a desire on Dugin’s part to avoid being associated with the anti-Putin activities exhibited by Limonov and his various confederates. There may have been other reasons. Dugin may have anticipated that Limonov’s activist role was headed in a direction that he did not wish to explore. After Dugin’s separation from the NBP, Limonov served prison time on charges of weapons dealings. The roles of Dugin and Limonov in creating the NBP can be reviewed in Clover’s Black Wind, White Snow: The Rise of Russia’s New Nationalism, and Thomas Parland’s, The Extreme Nationalist Threat in Russia. “Putin’s Brain: Alexander Dugin and the Philosophy Behind Putin’s Invasion of Crimea,” by Anton Barbashin and Hannah Thoburn, is also valuable for insight into Dugin’s NBP history.

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369 Barbashin and Thoburn, “Putin’s Brain.”
The NBP and other neo-Bolshevik groups created various coalitions that formed, broke up, and re-formed over time. Factions within the NBP, not satisfied with Limonov, split off in 2006, and the NBP was eventually banned by the government. Limonov published *Limonka*, a counterculture newspaper that was also banned but has continued to reappear in various guises, and he continues to be involved in politics.370

The increase in Dugin’s popularity in Russia has been relatively gradual. Umland, chronicling Dugin’s development, commented that “in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Dugin’s activities resembled those of other politically active intellectuals of this period.”371 At this time in his life, Dugin “was building up his research and publication center,” according to Umland, “and trying to propagate his ideas among ultranationalist political organizations, and further potential supporters in such spheres.”372 In the period between 1980-1990, Dugin made various organizational and literary attempts to gain a toehold among the myriad of late Soviet-era dissidents, skeptics, and aspiring academics and critics. Then, in the early 1990s, Dugin gained traction. Umland remarked on two of Dugin’s benchmark successes: “the Historical-Religious Association Arktogeya (Northern Country) which also functions as a publishing house,” and “the Center for Special Meta-Strategic Studies,” a think-tank that later became the Center for Geopolitical Expertise.373

Umland attributed Dugin’s traction to such things as his “frequent contributions by, or references to, inter- and post-war Western authors in Dugin’s journals and books.”374 Umland recognized that Dugin’s incorporation of “esotericism might have also contributed to his growing popularity in some Russian sub-

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372 Ibid.


374 Ibid.
cultures devoted to various brands of Russian and international occultism, Traditionalism, [and] paganism."375 Barbashin and Thoburn stated that Dugin’s 1991 pamphlet, “The War of the Continents,” was his earliest claim to fame.376

Regarding Dugin’s reception with the ENR, political journalist Roman Horbyk wrote that Bassin, “who studies the connections between Putin and Eurasians says, ‘the links between Russian and Eurasian radical conservatism were established a long time ago.’”377 Horbyk credited Umland with observing that Dugin hosted Alain de Benoist’s visits to Moscow State University, while Dugin reciprocated by visiting Paris at Benoist’s invitation.378 In the early 1900s, various right-wing groups emerged in Russia. Labeled Black Hundreds, these groups are often characterized as fascist today. Walter Laqueur’s in-depth study of these groups, captured in his work, Black Hundred: The Rise of the Extreme Right in Russia, focused on the comeback of these groups following the fall of the Soviet Union, especially Pamyat, the People’s National-Patriotic Orthodox Christian Movement.379

Dugin was an active participant in Pamyat in the late 1990s and sought traction within it for his historical and prophetic views of Russia and its future manifestations.380 Eventually, Pamyat and Dugin parted ways. Perhaps Dugin

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375 Ibid. Brackets added.
376 Barbashin and Thoburn, “Putin’s Brain.” There is confusion as to the exact title of Dugin’s “The War of the Continents” (as cited by Barbashin and Thoburn). This is likely a translation issue. The publication date, and the source (pamphlet or some other medium) are also unclear. Cf. e.g., http://www.tfmetalreport.com/blog/6670/eurasianism-dugin-and-ukraine-part-1?page=2, where the title is cited as “The Great War of Continents” and the date of the subsequent “notoriety” of Dugin as 1992. Perhaps the best source to cut through this confusion is Dugin himself. Cf. “Alexander Dugin: The Great War of Continents,” Open Revolt, February 3, 2013, accessed May 5, 2016, https://openrevolt.info/2013/02/03/alexanderdugin-the-great-war-of-continents/. Here Dugin states that “This text was originally published as Part III of ‘Konspirologya’ Arktogeya, Moscow 1992.”
378 Horbyk, “The Right Model,” under, Putin a “new rightist”? Alain de Benoist de Gentissart, who has also gone by, Robert de Herte, Fabrice Laroche, and other names, is a well-known figure in the ENR and founder of the Nouvelle Droite.
380 Laqueur, Black Hundred, 204ff.
was unwilling to adopt Pamyat’s brand of conspiracy theory with its overt anti-Semitism and Nazi expressions and symbolism. After splitting with Pamyat, Dugin became involved in various projects, including his instrumental efforts with the Arctogaia publishing house.

Umland traced acknowledgment of Dugin’s growing recognition by identifying some notable developmental aspects and events such as the “establishment, in 2001, of Dugin’s Socio-Political Movement “Evraziya (Eurasia)” and its later transmutation into the so-called International “Eurasian Movement” through its “Eurasian Youth Movement.” Dugin’s momentum increased in an energetic flurry of projects and publications in the last decade of the twentieth century. “Contributing frequently to Den’ and other newspapers, in July 1992, Dugin launched what would become the periodical establishing his reputation in Russia and abroad, the journal Elementy: Evraziiskoe obozrenie (Elements: Eurasian Review; 9 issues published in 1992–1998),” Umland reported.

In addition to print media, Dugin gained exposure through various radio and television programs, as well as other projects. For example, Dugin has been featured on the radio presentation, Finis Mundi (1997), the weekly television broadcast, Vekhi (Landmarks) (beginning 2005), and frequent print, radio, television interviews, and guest appearances. Even so, as recently as 2009, Umland, though acknowledging that Dugin had “been mentioned in a number of influential Western outlets,” was still of the opinion that he, at that time, remained “an obscure figure” to Russia watchers. Over time, Dugin’s Western exposure has substantially increased thanks to numerous

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381 Ibid., Cf. e.g., 210, 213.
385 Ibid. Cf. 1.4.2. for a more detailed listing.
386 Cf. Umland’s and Laruelle’s articles cited above.
387 Umland, “Dugin’s transformation,” 145.
publications in French and English, and through web-based blogs and sites and the ubiquitous social media, Twitter and Facebook.

Geoffrey Hosking addressed Dugin’s more recent reception and growing acceptance in his review of Clover’s *Black Wind, White Snow*. Though perhaps an unlikely source, the Risk Management Lab of the New Bulgarian University reported on the Russian Government’s reception of Dugin through his personal and professional links and contacts. The report provided detail with an example of Dugin’s relationship with Igor Girkin, who uses the name Strelkov to identify himself, along with his connection to Putin associate, Konstantin Malofeev. While the veracity of this claim may be questionable, its implication of a Dugin-Putin link deserves mention.

Dugin’s development has not come without controversy. Umland did not hesitate to pin the label “obscurantist pseudo-scholar” onto Dugin in 2011, claiming that Dugin “uses ‘conservatism’ as a cover for the spread of a revolutionary ultranationalist and neo-imperialist ideology.” To charge that Dugin is a controversial figure is to engage in a remarkable understatement. He appears to have existed in an ethereal world where he at once wielded power through his influence while at the same time being politically out of favor. At one time, he was listed as Head of the Department of Sociology of

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International Relations at Moscow State University.\textsuperscript{392} Then he was reportedly dismissed from the faculty in mid-2014, for reasons unclear, only to become later the subject of conflicting reports from the University (and other sources) regarding his actual employment status.\textsuperscript{393} Controversy seems to dog Dugin’s development.

\section*{2.2. Dugin’s Political Theology}

Dugin’s complexity is obscured.\textsuperscript{394} Where his geopolitics are reasonably accessible and open to examination and debate in the West, his theological outlook is less so. In Western circles, much of the academic conversation of Dugin’s geopolitics lacks the necessary inclusion of his political theology and its metaphysical implications. This lack is especially evident where an organized or systematic treatment of Dugin’s political theology is desired. Yet, to call Dugin a theologian, one who engages primarily from a purely theological perspective in a strict sense, is too broad a stretch.

Applying metaphysics, Dugin affords himself engagement with theological and religious terms that support his geopolitical endeavor.\textsuperscript{395} In keeping with the multipolar world anticipated by Fourth Political Theory, Dugin does not advocate the world where a single hegemon determines religious belief or practice. In a multipolar world that negates the dominance of Western

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\textsuperscript{392} Cf. “Biography,” Alexander Dugin, accessed July 1, 2017, http://dugin.ru/biography, contains Dugin’s posted CV. This Website is in Russian and was translated with Chrome. This CV showed that from September 2009 to June 2014 Dugin was “Head of Department of Sociology of International Relations, Sociology Department of Moscow State University.”

\textsuperscript{393} Cf. e.g., Catherine A. Fitzpatrick, “Russia This Week: Dugin Dismissed from Moscow State University?” The Interpreter, June 29, 2014, accessed January 27, 2015, http://www.interpretermag.com/russia-this-week-what-will-be-tweeters-fate-in-russia/. Apparently, the original posting was June 27 and it was updated on June 29. Catherine A. Fitzpatrick is a writer and translator at The Interpreter online news site. Cf. “Biography,” Alexander Dugin, accessed July 1, 2017, http://dugin.ru/biography, contains Dugin’s posted CV. This Website is in Russian and was translated with Chrome. This CV showed that from September 2009 to June 2014 Dugin was “Head of Department of Sociology of International Relations, Sociology Department of Moscow State University.”

\textsuperscript{394} Recall Tolstoy and McCaffray’s observation. Cf. footnote 361 herein.

\textsuperscript{395} Again, it is not my purpose to defend the academic or religious soundness or consistancy of Dugin’s theological assertions. I maintain that Dugin is a theologian when allowing a broad definition of the term. At the very least it may be said that he freely and frequently intersperses theologically related metaphysical discourse into his works. Throughout, when I refer to Dugin as a theologian, or refer to his theology, I am applying the terms to explain Dugin’s Geopolitical-Theology, keeping in mind that I derive this aspect from definitions of political theology – especially the political theology of Schmitt.

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Liberalism, Fourth Political Theory rejects the civil religion of Post-Revolutionary France as well as the civil religion that arose from it in its modern and postmodern manifestations. Avoiding the shallow trappings of civil religion, Dugin began constructing his Fourth Political Theory on the foundation of Schmitt’s explanation of the theological origins of the State. His theory dismisses civil religion and coalesces around more complex theological and metaphysical notions.

Dugin has developed his concept of Neo-Traditionalism as the basis for the anti-modernism found within Fourth Political Theory. Evident in his Neo-Traditionalist stance is the presence of a theological framework on which he overlays his Eurasianist geopolitical worldview. Dugin’s understanding was expressed well by Voegelin: “All the early empires, Near Eastern as well as Far Eastern, understood themselves as representatives of a transcendent order, of the order of the cosmos; and some of them even understood this order as a ‘truth.’” Dugin would share Voegelin’s understanding of temporal imperial power endowed with transcendent authority. He welcomes its fruition in a Eurasian reality.

Considering the conflicted viewpoints of Schmitt and Blumenberg, Pini Ifergan, who is a Blumenberg scholar, addressed political theology coinciding with Dugin’s understanding. “The term political theology conceptualizes an attempt to rediscover and expose the theological dimension entwined within the fabric of politics,” wrote Ifergan. He was correct that the current practical understanding of Western governments, free from overt religious influence, is a youthful one considering the centuries of non-separation prior to the monumental eighteenth century social and political revolutions. By stressing the interweaving threads of theology and politics within a composite fabric, Ifergan’s understanding and Dugin’s find common ground.

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397 Voegelin, New Science of Politics, 54.
398 Pini Ifergan, “Cutting to the Chase: Carl Schmitt and Hans Blumenberg on Political Theology and Secularization,” New German Critique, 111th ser., 37, no. 3 (Fall 2010): 149. Italics in original. Pini Ifergan is a scholar at Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel.
399 Ifergan, “Cutting to the Chase,” 149ff.
As Dugin overlays his Neo-Traditionalism with purposeful geopolitical elements, he moves it significantly away from the center to a point beyond the pale of Integral Traditionalism. With this movement, Dugin mounts forays into apocalyptic territory with an active Traditionalism that Evola may have condoned, but Guénon never would.\footnote{Guénon was opposed to having Traditionalism be associated with active political engagement. Cf. e.g., Guénon, \textit{Crisis of the Modern World}, 33ff. In the chapter titled “Knowledge and Action” Guénon makes the case of the superiority of contemplation over action. Cf. page 37 in particular where Guénon stated that “the Eastern doctrines are unanimous, as were the ancient doctrines of the West, in asserting that contemplation is superior to action, just as the unchanging is superior to change.” The critique of Dugin made by Shekhovtsov and Umland also addresses Guénon’s resistance to action.} Adding active political motives and eschatological purposes to his Neo-Traditionalism innovation marks the separation of Dugin from Guénon.

Dugin’s Geopolitical-Theology can be examined considering his treatment of it in the following areas:

- Neo-Traditionalism
- Neo-Eurasianism
- Hermeneutics – the geopolitical and theological categories of Dugin’s interpretations
- Assigned Identity – how Dugin views Eurasia envisioned in Fourth Political Theory in contrast to his view of the West
- Conspirology – Dugin as Conspirologist
- Russian Orthodoxy – Dugin’s expression of Orthodox Christianity in his Neo-Traditionalist terms
- Eschatology – Dugin’s Apocalyptic view of the End-Time (Armageddon)

2.2.1. The Metaphysics of Debris

While Dugin’s Neo-Traditionalism serves as the vehicle for much of his political theology, his geopolitics are largely expressed in his Neo-Eurasianism. Dugin arrived at the current station on his Neo-Traditional/Neo-Eurasian journey, in part, by building with material derived from previous construction attempts – both his and others. This pattern, developing modifications and adaptations of earlier Traditionalist and
Eurasianist efforts, is Dugin’s purposeful application of what he characterizes as the Metaphysics of Debris.\(^{401}\)

Dugin described his formulation of Fourth Political Theory as a process that extended across years. As his project matured, Dugin eventually rejected the idea that neither communism nor fascism could be used to form a synthesis that eliminated the abhorrent manifestations of Soviet praxis and the unspeakable aberrance of Germany’s National Socialist deviance. By way of explanation, Dugin stated that he rejected attempting any modification of Communism (as the second theory) or Fascism (as the third theory) beginning in 2008.\(^{402}\) Since then, Dugin wrote, he concentrates “exclusively on the elaboration of [a] fully independent Fourth Political Theory.”\(^{403}\)

This independence involves some leeway to employ a kind of salvage operation of the second and third theories. Engaging Alexander Sekatsky’s ideas on the Metaphysics of Debris, Dugin gleaned the marginal, discarded, and peripheral remains of communism and fascism, for useful Fourth Political Theory construction material.\(^{404}\) Within the detritus of the second and third theories can be found items that “may, unexpectedly, turn out to be extremely valuable and saturated with meaning and intuition.”\(^{405}\) It is the marginal elements in communism and fascism, not their complete ideologies, that are worthy of consideration in Dugin’s mind.\(^{406}\) Dugin rightfully rejects anything close to total trust in either the second or third of the political theories but does advocate examining the marginal elements remaining on the periphery of these two theories for useful salvage.\(^{407}\) According to Dugin, his Fourth Political Theory may not be viewed as merely an extension of the second and

\(^{401}\) Dugin, *Fourth Theory*, 22-24
\(^{403}\) Ibid. Dugin makes this statement as part of his response to the first question which asked him to elaborate on his intellectual path. Brackets added.
\(^{404}\) Dugin, *Fourth Theory*, 22-24. Here Dugin discusses the three theories (Liberalism, Communism and Fascism) and mentions the “Metaphysics of Debris” while pointing out the utility of using “marginalia” and “marginal elements.” Sekatsky is often rendered Sekatski in English. Alexander Sekatsky is a contemporary publicist, academic (St. Petersburg State University), and philosopher.
\(^{405}\) Ibid., 24
\(^{406}\) Ibid.
\(^{407}\) Ibid.
third theories. Dugin stated that neither is acceptable as “starting points for resisting liberalism.”\textsuperscript{408}

Traditionalism, with its claims of possessing eternal Truth, is immensely attractive to Dugin. He identifies the presence of Traditionalist underpinnings supporting both Communism and fascism while acknowledging that neither may have consciously realized their Traditional linkages.\textsuperscript{409} Dugin’s recognition of the Traditionalist threads in the second and third theories may at least partially explain why he mined them for salvageable material. He denies that neither possesses correct orthodoxy but does not wholly disregard either. Dugin directly alluded to the concept of the rejected stone becoming the cornerstone as he contemplates his salvage operation.\textsuperscript{410}

“The second and third theories must be reconsidered,” He wrote, “selecting in them what must be discarded and that which has value in itself.”\textsuperscript{411} In contrast, discernible Traditionalist threads in liberalism (as the first theory) are either non-existent or so obscure that Dugin deemed mining it an unproductive undertaking.\textsuperscript{412}

Dugin suggests that the positives of communism include anti-capitalist, anti-liberal, anti-cosmopolitan, and anti-individualist elements.\textsuperscript{413} But, allowing that even communism was stained by materialism and cosmopolitanism, Dugin insists that merely recycling communism will not do; these taints plus the considerable stumbling block of atheism eliminate communism from contention for resurrection.\textsuperscript{414} As for fascism, Dugin rejects it as well – condemning it at the same time he does Western Liberalism, saying:

\textit{As for the theories of the Third Way – which were dear, up to a certain point, to some traditionalists such as Julius Evola – there}

\textsuperscript{408} Ibid., 23.
\textsuperscript{409} Ibid., 24.
\textsuperscript{410} Ibid., 22 and Dugin’s footnote 12. Cf. Mark 12:10, NASB: “Have you not even read this Scripture: The stone which the builders rejected, This became the Chief Corner Stone.”
\textsuperscript{411} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{412} Dugin believes that Fourth Political Theory looks at everything preceding modernity for inspiration, thus he mostly excluded modernity from his mining operations. Cf. e.g. Dugin, \textit{Fourth Theory}, 27.
\textsuperscript{413} Ibid., 195.
\textsuperscript{414} Ibid.
were many unacceptable elements, foremost among these being racism, xenophobia and chauvinism. These were not only moral failures, but also theoretically and anthropologically inconsistent attitudes. Differences between ethnicities do not equate to superiority or inferiority. The differences should be accepted and affirmed without any racist sentiments of consideration. When one society tries to judge another, it applies its own criteria, and so commits intellectual violence. This ethnocentric attitude is precisely the crime of globalisation and Westernisation, as well as American imperialism.415

As stated, Dugin does not view Fourth Political Theory as merely an extension of the failed second and third major political theories of modernity. Dugin makes his case that neither can be the vehicle on which to construct or resurrect a Russia that can champion a multipolar world. Even so, some are not so sure that Fourth Political Theory does not mean to produce “a copy of a totalitarian state from Europe’s dark past, dressed in 21st century clothing.”416

Dugin also mined Traditionalism in keeping with the Metaphysics of Debris. In doing so, he derived elements of his Neo-Traditionalism from various pieces of Integral Traditionalism he retrieved. “A tradition can give birth to a product at one stage of its existence which it could not produce at an earlier time,” wrote Edward Shils.417 Using this line of thinking, Dugin mines Integral Traditionalism for material that he then uses in his current construction project. Mining Traditional material for his new project places Dugin in a position described by the celebrated and influential sociologist, Talcott Parsons.418 “While traditions work forward in time,” Parsons explained,

415 Ibid. As used here, the “Third Way” refers to Fascism.
418 Talcott Parsons, 1902-1979, long-time Harvard professor, is well known for his influence on sociology in the twentieth century.
constructing an “inspirational tradition is a temporal movement in the reverse direction.”

2.3. Development of Dugin’s Neo-Traditionalism

Applying a Traditionalist label to Dugin and determining the depth of his acceptance of it allows for more accurate and usable insight into Fourth Political Theory. What this theory’s message is, how Dugin envisions it, and why knowledge about it matters, must be considered given Dugin’s claim that Fourth Political Theory has Traditionalist foundations. What exactly is Dugin claiming to be, does he belong in a Traditionalist belief-system category, and what are the implications of the answers to these questions?

Traditionalism, while not a religion per se, involves religiously related discourse intensely interested in uncovering, recovering, and passing on Truth imparted to humankind through divine Revelation but mostly lost to the major religions today. It is gnostic in its belief that correct ancient understandings have been passed down through the ages through sages and holy men. Integral Traditionalism rejects the materialism of modernity in favor of a contemplative approach to understanding the cosmos through initiation into awareness of Truth.

Dugin credited Guénon, Evola, Burckhardt, Leopold Ziegler, and other Traditionalists for mounting a twentieth century defense of Traditionalism. While not claiming to duplicate their Traditional views, Dugin emphasized that he shares “the vision” of Guénon and Evola,

who considered Modernity and its ideological basis (individualism, liberal democracy, capitalism, consumerism, and so on) to be the cause of the future catastrophe of humanity and global domination of the Western lifestyle as the reason for the final degradation of the earth.

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421 Ibid., 193.
Traditionalism clashes with modernity. Dugin highlighted the contrast using the example of Traditionalism and sociology:

The difference between traditionalism and sociology lies in the fact that sociology starts from modernity and judges Tradition from the point of view of modernity. Traditionalists do the opposite: they see modernity from the standpoint of Tradition. Modernity puts all reality in time, in history. Tradition considers things in light of eternity. So sociologists think pre-modernity diachronically as something past. Traditionalists regard modernity as an aspect of eternity.422

2.3.1. Dugin’s Neo-Traditionalism

Dugin includes what amounts to Traditionalist redux as a foundational part of his Fourth Political Theory. As presented, it is a modified Traditionalism – a Neo-Traditionalism – genetically altered to display an active characteristic Guénon would have no doubt rejected.423 Integral Traditionalists consider themselves to be something of an ideologically consistent community of a mostly static body of Traditional belief and practice across their various religious affiliations. In contrast, Dugin considers Traditionalism to be part of a present, potent, and active force with a political aspect; and he applies it accordingly. Hence, Dugin’s version is appropriately labeled Neo-Traditionalism.424

Dugin applies elements of the Integral Traditionalism of Guénon and other Traditionalist interpreters with the much more politically active adaptations of Evola. Dugin’s Neo-Traditionalism differs from Integral Traditionalism in two essential ways: it is active, and it is applied.425 Dugin’s applied Neo-Traditionalism is part of his Geopolitical-Theology, not a specific self-fulfilling end in-and-of-itself. Where Integral Traditionalism aims at an inwardly directed spiritual perfection, Dugin’s applied Neo-Traditionalism manifests itself as an active part of an overall opposition to Western Liberalism. Where

422 Dugin, “The Figure of the Radical Subject,” under, Part 1. Traditionalism and Sociology - The Modern and the Eternal.
423 Cf. 3-2-3.
424 Dugin’s characterization as a Neo-Traditionalist is attested to throughout this study. Cf. citations of Shekhovtsov, Umland, Laruelle, Epstein et al.
425 Cf. Epstein, Conservatism and Traditionalism, 10-11 for Epstein’s discussion of Radical Traditionalism.
Integral Traditionalism strives for a passive internal realization of Truth, Dugin’s applied Neo-Traditionalism intends to project itself outwardly as part of a viable political theology alternative to Western political and cultural hegemony.

Dugin is entirely capable of holding forth on Integral Traditionalism. His discussions of the early twentieth century Traditionalists, historical figures and events, thoughts, and concepts derived from Traditionalist and Perennialist sources attest to his knowledge and understanding of the subject. Dugin pulls from a range of mystically oriented sources, and in doing so, displays the broad inclusionary traits characteristic of Traditionalists. Dugin wrote that Guénon was “the most correct, the most intelligent and the most important person of the twentieth century.” Dugin claimed that, in his youth, he “was deeply inspired” by the Traditionalism of Guénon and Evola. Dugin insisted, like Guénon and Evola before him, that his position is “on the side of sacred Tradition against the modern (and post-modern) world.”

Moreover, Dugin openly connects his Traditionalist philosophy with Russian Orthodox practice. He has “laid the basis for Traditionalist thought trying to apply the ideas of Guenon and Evola to the Russian Orthodox Christian tradition.” Western reception of Dugin and Fourth Political Theory must give considerable weight to his assertion that he stands “for spiritual and religious values against actual decadent materialist and perverted culture.” Recognition also must be afforded to Dugin’s claim that his Traditionalism “rests central [sic] as the philosophic focus of all my later developments.”

To determine the depth of Dugin’s Traditionalist credentials correctly, examples taken from along Dugin’s path are useful. Dugin became a

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427 Dugin, “The Long Path,” as part of his response to the first question.
428 Ibid.
429 Ibid.
430 Ibid.
431 Ibid. Brackets added.
Traditionalist, at least by his reckoning, years before his Neo-Eurasianist impact was felt in Russia, and many years before it gained recognition in the West. Laruelle reported that Dugin was part of a group that created the “New University” founded in 1998. This educational endeavor undertook to provide Traditionalist and occultist teachings.

In the 1980s, Dugin became acquainted with an active group of Traditionalists.

Depressed and alienated from the Soviet reality around him, he encountered by chance, through a neighbor of his parents, a secretive group of intellectuals who gave him the existential home he sought. The three most important members of this circle, who first came together in the 1960s, were all scholars steeped in the mystical traditions of Europe or the Orient: Yevgeny Golovin, a specialist in European mystical literature and poetry; Yuri Mamleyev, a Christian philosopher; and Geidar Jemal, a Muscovite of Azeri origin who specialized in the metaphysics of Islam.

During this period, Dugin began translating works in English, French, and German. Through this work and his Traditionalist friends, he became familiar with the literary works of Guénon and Evola. Shenfield remarked that at this time, “Dugin rapidly made himself a valued member of the Golovin circle.” Also, “Dugin spent much of 1989 on visits to West European countries, where he strengthened his links with such European New Right (ENR) figures as the Frenchman Alain de Benoist, the Belgian Jean-François Thiriart, and the Italian Claudio Mutti,” by Shenfield’s account.

2.3.2. Dugin’s Movement Toward Evola

Even as Dugin acknowledged the influence of both Guénon and Evola, there is no clear evidence that Dugin was ever a strict follower of the former. If

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433 Ibid.
435 Ibid.
438 Ibid.
Dugin was initially a disciple of Guénon, he is no longer on the same path. Dugin’s Traditionalism is more that of Evola. Shekhovtsov and Umland found some redemptive value in Dugin’s translation and publication of Traditionalist literature, and they acknowledged these activities as a genuine contribution to Integral Traditionalism.\footnote{Shekhovtsov and Umland, “Is Dugin a Traditionalist?,” 672.} But, they and some other Dugin critics, have never fully endorsed Dugin’s Traditionalist claims. This situation is probably due, in part, to the difficulty encountered in reconciling the characteristically active Traditionalist praxis of Dugin and Evola with the more passive and contemplative Traditionalism of Guénon.

Dugin employs his Traditionalist beliefs within his active geopolitical agenda – something Guénon assuredly would not have done. Dugin is thus compelled to adopt a Neo-Traditionalism, instead of Guénon’s version, to mesh with his active and somewhat complicated mix of theology, geopolitics, and assigned identity. The action-infused characteristic of Dugin’s applied Neo-Traditionalism is more closely related to the militant aspects of fundamentalism than it is to the passive nature of its Integral forebearer. Dugin’s Neo-Traditionalism allows him the flexibility to be overtly active – even militant, while at the same time, bringing the full weight of Traditionalism’s anti-modernism down on the West, especially the United States.

Guénon is recognized in practically all discussions of Traditionalism. This one is no exception, but what are we to make of Dugin’s statements concerning the supremacy of Guénon?

What can you say about postguenonism (Traditionalism) in relation to the Russian situation? For us, the implementation of the programme of postguenonism is paramount, the only major state, national, social and cultural task. We only have one author that should be read is [sic] Rene Guenon.\footnote{Dugin, “Traditionalism as Language,” under, Traditionalism and Russia. Brackets added.}

The conclusion can only be that Dugin initially grounds himself in Traditionalism but then adapts it to the activism of Fourth Political Theory.
In this study, Integral Traditionalism becomes less the focus, and more the foil, for Dugin’s Traditionalism is not a copy of Guénon’s. Within the parameters of Guénon’s work, Integral Traditionalism is restricted to passive expressions allowing Dugin’s more active innovations to be examined and considered in contrast. Dugin is engaged in direct action against Western Liberalism, and in daring to face it down, his fundamentalism and applied Neo-Traditionalism become the objects of Western Liberalism’s concentrated scorn.

In his move away from Integral Traditionalism, Evola began to overtake Guénon in Dugin’s Neo-Traditional pantheon.

Evola is a paradigmal [sic] figure of traditionalism, along with Guenon. The more time passes, the more impressive his shape. None of the Guenonists – Burkhardt [sic], Valsana, Schuon, not to mention the less important, could even relatively compare to Evola. Guenonists are becoming commonplace, have become conformists and Masons or fell into a weak-minded “new age,” but Evola’s case remains a monument of spirit in this dark age.

Dugin stresses that, as a product of modernity, Western Liberal Democracy elevates the individual. All Traditionalists tend to emphasize communal or collective cohesiveness. Dugin cited the opinion of sociologist Louis Dumont in describing “two types of society – the holistic society and the individualistic society,” concluding that “Modernity is essentially individualistic.” Dugin’s Neo-Traditionalism “emphasizes the dualism that exists between two worlds: the world of tradition and the modern world.”

2.3.3. Dugin’s Critique of “Inauthentic” Christianity

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442 This is adequately supported by Sedgwick, Shekhovtsov, Umland, and others in references throughout.
445 Ibid.
Many Traditionalists believe that most religions contain elements of Truth, but suggest that all religious traditions have become, to some degree, corrupted. Also present is the belief that only a relative few, the enlightened Adepts, possess Truth in its pure and original forms. Dugin takes a very Traditional attitude rather than a doctrinally orthodox Christian one in his pronouncement that, “Judeo-Christian Christianity is not the real ‘perennial Christianity’ associated with the grand Tradition.” Because Dugin does not go into detail as to what “perennial Christianity” entails, we are left speculating that it is a type of Christianized Traditionalism.

Dugin credited Guénon with the notion that a dual structure consisting of the esoteric as one area and social and legal systems as the other is necessary for a mature or “complete” society. Dugin suggested that Guénon looked on Judaism and Islam as being complete – both developed to an esoteric and initiatic level, and both went to the further step of fully realizing a social and legal dimension. Dugin added that while this dual structure is the reasonable expectation, Christian society was an exception. Christianity developed esoteric and initiatic characteristics, as did Judaism and Islam, but did not continue this development internally.

“Guenon believed that the Christian tradition, unlike Judaism and Islam, was originally incomplete,” wrote Dugin. Guénon claimed Christianity was forced to import pagan Roman Law rather than waiting for the internal maturation of its own indigenous social and legal structures. Supporting his claim, Dugin offered the lack of “consideration in the New Testament of any legal or social dimension which constitutes the essence of any exotericism.”

“Only in later eras did Christianity ‘descend’ to the exoteric level in adopting

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447 Dugin, “Russian Orthodoxy and Initiation,” under, Religion and Initiation according to Guenon.
448 Ibid., under, The uniqueness of Christianity.
449 Ibid.
450 Ibid.
451 Ibid.
452 Ibid.
the socio-religious basis of a revised code of Roman law,” according to Dugin.453

Dugin wrote that for Guénon, “the existence of precisely such a dual structure in traditional society is a necessary condition for any society to be considered normal and fully-fledged.”454 Whereas Judaism and Islam both contain much that is exoteric within their sacred texts, it was only in the first few Christian centuries that Canon Law and other exoteric fixtures were appended to Christianity. Hence, Guénon believed Christianity to be incomplete. Christianity, in its esotericism, is accepted by Dugin, its exotericism is not granted the same consideration.

2.3.4. Rejection of The New World Order

American multiculturalism, a prominent feature of the New World Order, where “it is usually assumed that with all the cultural/regional differences, humanity is striving for ‘government for the people and by the people,’” gets it wrong from Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianist view. 455 Evident within Dugin’s rejection of Western Liberalism is his belief that it is inextricably bound to globalism and ultimately to the West’s desire for geopolitical and cultural hegemony. In place of Western Liberal domination, Dugin suggests a multipolar world where Eurasia represents a major pole and maintains political assumptions that differ dramatically from Western Liberalism.

Proponents of Fourth Political Theory seem to impart the New World Order with much more universal and global intent than perhaps President G.H.W. Bush intended in his repeated references to it between 1990 and 1995.456 Dugin perceived that the evils of Western Liberalism are embedded in mondialism, a homogeneous projection of the world he rejects regardless of Western assurances of overarching justice and egalitarianism.457 Dugin assumed that Bush believed that with the New World Order, “genuine global

453 Ibid.
454 Ibid., under, Religion and Initiation according to Guenon.
457 Mondialism is used here synonomus with globalization. Cf. OED.
cooperation” between the United States and the Soviet Union was not just possible but probable.\textsuperscript{458} Given Dugin’s assumption, the New World Order was “presumably a product of convergence theory.”\textsuperscript{459} In accordance with this theory, “synthesis of the Soviet socialist and Western capitalist political forms and close cooperation” in dealing with regional issues were expected.\textsuperscript{460}

Dugin and Fourth Political Theory disciples read much more threatening overtones into New World Order yearnings than just the relatively tame goals of cooperation and Soviet and Western convergence. They feared that the New World Order was ultimately a pretense for the hegemony of universalism based on Western Liberalism and globalism tightly controlled by and for the primary benefit of Western elites. Although American references to a New World Order are seldom heard today, Fourth Political Theory adherents still hold that the U.S. led West maintains all the despised New World Order ambitions.

\textbf{2.3.5. The Radical Subject}

The Radical Subject embraces “the concept of Gottesnacht, ‘the night of God,’” in which there is darkness – a dark age.\textsuperscript{461} Dugin also characterized it as “the Iron Age,” where the “organized world,” the world as it should be, is replaced by chaos.\textsuperscript{462} As Dugin expounds on the Radical Subject, a glimpse at the proximity of esotericism to the surface of his thinking is possible. In his treatment of the Radical Subject, Dugin demonstrates the extent of his

\textsuperscript{458} Dugin, \textit{Fourth Theory}, 71.
\textsuperscript{459} Ibid. Convergence Theory is used here in the sense of nations emerging from industrialization and converging onto a common ground of shared Western Liberal values. Cf. e.g., https://www.thoughtco.com/convergence-theory-3026158.
\textsuperscript{460} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{462} Ibid.
elevated view of Traditionalists. Radical Subjects occupy the upper echelons of genuine understanding. Comparatively, the progressive liberal rush to advance reveals a headlong fall into decay. Dugin applies the identity of “the Antichrist Collective” to these progressive proponents.⁴⁶³

In the non-Traditional world, the sacred things of Traditionalism, such as initiation into the mysteries of perennial Truth, have disappeared, and humankind is left occupying a vacuum.⁴⁶⁴ For Traditionalists and Neo-Traditionalists alike, this vacuum is a starting point; it is where they find themselves in Gottesnacht.⁴⁶⁵ “The Radical Subject goes with the world without being of this world,” not afraid of modernity, the Radical Subject “is in the modern world and wants to be here, not beyond this world.”⁴⁶⁶ The Radical Subject realizes the transitory nature of the present world and wishes to remain temporarily in its chaos to actively help end it.⁴⁶⁷ Dugin characterized Evola and other Neo-Traditionalists in terms of the Radical Subject, and there can be little doubt that here he includes himself.⁴⁶⁸

As Dugin expounded on the Radical Subject, he employed Heidegger’s comparison of the four types of men.⁴⁶⁹ Dugin’s Neo-Traditionalists occupy the position of the New Philosophers in Heidegger’s four-types model. They are Radical Subjects in the terminology Dugin used to describe Neo-Traditionalists in their desire to be in the epicenter of the postmodern

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⁴⁶³ Ibid. The OED identifies three major categories of Antichrist interpretation: “A personal opponent of Christ expected to appear before the end of the world. “A person or force seen as opposing Christ or the Christian Church.” “A person or thing regarded as supremely evil or as a fundamental enemy or opponent.” Dugin mostly employs the term as in the third definition.
⁴⁶⁴ Ibid.
⁴⁶⁵ Ibid.
⁴⁶⁶ Ibid.
⁴⁶⁷ Ibid. Here Dugin is directly alluding to Christian Scripture. Cf. John 17:14 NASB: “I have given them Your word; and the world has hated them, because they are not of the world, even as I am not of the world.” Cf. Romans 12:2 and others, e.g., Hebrews 13:14.
⁴⁶⁸ Ibid.
⁴⁶⁹ Ibid. The four types being (adapted from: “The Figure of the Radical Subject,” under, Part 2. The Figure of the Radical Subject and the Traditionalist without Tradition): The Simple and Ignorant – people who cannot choose anything and change with the world and society; Conservatives – people afraid of Gottesnacht, of decadence who want to conserve what exists against time, but time devours everything; Progressives – people who want to go in the direction of decay faster and faster still, the ones responsible for the current situation – liberals, the World Government, together can be called “The Antichrist Collective;” The New Philosophers – those not afraid of Gottesnacht rather they seek it – Heidegger said of them: these philosophers are faced with the “hard knowledge of nihilism” (schwere Wissen des Nihilismus).
Placement within Gottesnacht proves the nature of the Radical Subject’s soul. Gottesnacht is the dark place of the present, the center of the night, the center of hell as Dugin described it, using the words of Golovin, the Traditionalist poet.

2.3.6. Vertical Platonism vs. Horizontal Atomism

Dugin demonstrated his Dualist inclination by contrasting the Platonic and atomistic worlds. “Platonism is a philosophy essentially vertical,” wrote Dugin.

Platonism is built around the vertical axis. Above are the Ideas. Below are the things, the phenomena. The Platonic world is the hierarchical, vertically organized world.

Dugin then contrasted the “essentially vertical” Platonism with “horizontal” atomism, the philosophy of Democritus, Epicurus, and Lucretius. In modernity, atomism became “scientific orthodoxy,” and Platonism was marginalized. Dugin claimed that modernity is built on atomism. Atomism, in Dugin’s view, is a democratic philosophy, “it begins from below, by the material particles,” and “doesn’t know the ideas, the platonic lights.” Democritus then is proto-modern; he “can be understood as a representative of the counter-initiation in the world of Tradition.”

There is a legend that Plato set the writings of Democritus on fire in his Academy. The platonics [sic] regarded atomism as “the world upside down,” the impossible world, the world contrary to the natural order of things.
Aversion to governance “from below” – “the world upside down” – is evident throughout Dugin’s Geopolitical-Theology. Dugin’s assertion that atomism “doesn’t know hierarchy,” is critically important. 481 Dugin is telling us that the Platonic vertical demonstrates a hierarchical characteristic where enrichment and understanding are monarchical – knowledge and light come down from above as from a sovereign.

Dugin presents modernity as a choice; “we can choose to be modern – atomists, materialists, liberal democrats,” he said.482 We can also choose not to be modern, opting to be Platonic; thus, understanding Eternity as the “Present” and rejecting the supposed linear progressivism of modernity.483 Atomism “goes against verticality.”484 From above, events are viewed with the perspective of all eternity, not limited by the obscured visibility of atomism’s horizontal and linear world.

2.3.7. Building on Heidegger

“At the dawn of philosophical thought,” Dugin wrote in The Fourth Political Theory, “people (more specifically, Europeans, even more specifically, the Greeks), raised the question of Being as the focal point of their thinking.”485 Dugin concluded that the Greek philosophers became “confused by the nuances.”486

Dugin contends that Plato and other Greek philosophers erred in their attempts to categorize Being. Commenting on the Greek philosophers’ discussions of Being and employing the terminology of Heidegger, Dugin stated that, by thematizing Being,

they risked getting confused by the nuances of the complicated relationship between Being and thought, between pure Being (Seyn) and its expression in existence – a being (Seiende),

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481 Ibid.
482 Ibid.
483 Ibid.
484 Ibid.
485 Dugin, Fourth Theory, 28. Parentheses in original.
486 Ibid.
between human Being in the world (Dasein – being-there) and Being-in-itself (Sein).487

He wrote that “it is obvious in Parmenides’ work, and, finally, in Plato, who placed ideas between man and existence, and who defined truth as that which corresponded to them – the referential theory of knowledge – reached its culmination in failure.”488

Avoiding the confusion of Plato and adopting the concepts of Being fostered by Heidegger, Dugin proclaimed that Fourth Political Theory is “a fundamental ontological theory which contains the awareness of the truth of Being at its core.”489

Here, we should pay attention not only to theologies and mythologies, but also to the reflective philosophical experience of one particular thinker who had made a unique attempt of constructing a fundamental ontology – the most summarizing, paradoxical, profound, and penetrating study of Being. I am talking about Martin Heidegger.490

As Dugin contemplates Being, he borrows heavily from Heidegger (and acknowledges the debt). Dugin relates Being, using Heideggerian terms, Sein – being in itself – and Dasein – being there, being present. Dugin credits Heidegger for the significant development of Sein and Dasein.491 Relying on Heidegger’s consideration of Being, Dugin purposely placed Fourth Political Theory into the current postmodern milieu.492 Fourth Political Theory is concerned with Being (which Dugin equates with Sein) and with Being-there (being in the existential moment, which Dugin relates with Dasein).493

Also noteworthy is his treatment of the relationship between Sein and the development of technology. Hence, Fourth Political Theory contends that

487 Ibid., 28. “This failure already occurred in the teaching of Heraclitus regarding the phusis and the logos,” according to Dugin. Emphasis in original. Morgan makes the editorial footnote that phusis refers to nature, that which exists, and logos refers to that which orders the universe. Cf. Morgan, in Fourth Theory, 28, footnote 29.
488 Ibid.
489 Ibid., 54.
490 Ibid., 28.
491 Ibid. 28-29.
492 Ibid. For additional explorations into Heidegger’s treatment of Being, Cf. e.g., Macquarrie, Martin Heidegger (Richmond: John Knox Press, 1968).
493 Ibid.
Heidegger related that modernity’s increasing reliance on and embrace of technology resulted in a corresponding decreasing awareness of Sein – technology replaces Being, and this replacement produces an ever-increasing nihilism.\textsuperscript{494} Dugin places much of the blame for the increased embrace of Dasein, with its corresponding love of the moment, and the corresponding decrease of Sein, on Western Liberalism.

Dugin bluntly stated that Heidegger “bitterly hated liberalism, considering it an expression ‘of the calculative thinking’ which lies at the heart of ‘Western nihilism.’”\textsuperscript{495} In postmodernity, Sein suffers a terrible fate at the hands of nihilism. “Postmodernity,” Dugin wrote, “is in every sense, the ultimate oblivion of Being.”\textsuperscript{496} “Little by little, man lost sight of pure Being,” with the advent of postmodernity.\textsuperscript{497} As nihilism progresses in this “New Era,” technical development “displaces Being and crowns ‘nothingness.’”\textsuperscript{498}

Even with the recognition of “the midnight” resulting when nihilism “begins to seep from all the cracks,” Dugin entertains none of the opinions that Heidegger’s philosophy was “hopelessly pessimistic.”\textsuperscript{499} Rejecting pessimistic interpretations, Dugin emphasized Heidegger’s paradoxical “flip side of pure Being.”\textsuperscript{500} Although Heidegger would view postmodernity as the ultimate destroyer of Being, Dugin suggested that the flip-side of that opinion allows “thinking mankind” the chance to “save itself with lightning speed at the very moment of its greatest risk.”\textsuperscript{501}

The lightning speed of “this sudden return of Being” is identified by Heidegger as Ereignis – the “event.”\textsuperscript{502} Ereignis occurs “exactly at midnight of the world’s
night – at the darkest moment in history." Heidegger vacillated on whether Ereignis is upon us or is somewhere in the “not quite yet,” according to Dugin. Affirming the “not quite yet” places Ereignis in an almost here but still approaching future.

Thus, at the heart of the Fourth Political Theory, as its magnetic centre, lies the trajectory of the approaching Ereignis (the ‘Event’), which will embody the triumphant return of Being, at the exact moment when mankind forgets about it, once and for all, to the point that the last traces of it disappear.

Somewhat similar to his acceptance of Ereignis is Dugin’s acknowledgment of Heidegger’s Between.

Heidegger mentioned inzwischen, or the “between” while talking about existence of Dasein. The principal nature of Dasein is being “between.” Dasein is inzwischen. We should not use the system of classical political dualism, the scientific topography of both modernity and Aristotle’s time while talking about the Fourth Political Theory, and presume the fact that the subject and the core, the basis of the Fourth Political Theory pole, is Dasein.

“What is the subject of the Fourth Political Theory?” Dugin asked. “The subject of the Fourth Political Theory is Dasein or Zwischen, the “between” in the space between the subject and object.” “Zwischen, on the border between the internal and external,” is where Heidegger placed Dasein and where Dugin conceives Fourth Political Theory to dwell. Dugin’s interwoven metaphysical elements found throughout his geopolitical thinking are evident in this folding of Heidegger into Neo-Traditionalist construction.

Consider Dugin’s assertion that Traditionalism has never known, nor would it accept Cartesian or Kantian Dualism involving any strict separation of “the

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503 Ibid.
504 Ibid.
505 Ibid.
506 Ibid.
507 Ibid., 179.
508 Ibid., 189.
509 Ibid., 190.
‘subjective’ from the ‘objective’ (‘phenomenal’ and ‘noumenal’).”510 Dugin explained that “the sacred determinism of North or South is nor [sic] just a physical, natural, landscape-climatic factor (i.e., something ‘objective’).”511 Not being objective, it would seem to follow that it must be an idea or concept “generated by the minds of such or such individuals (i.e. something ‘subjective’).”512 Placing it in an unfamiliar space, Dugin claimed that “Sacred Determinism” is neither objective nor subjective, “but something of a third kind, exceeding both the objective and subjective poles.”513

Here, one can see that Dugin, like Heidegger, acknowledges a Between. That is, Heidegger’s and Dugin’s Between is a location or condition that is neither wholly objective nor subjective.514 We must recognize Heidegger’s Between, not as a definitive border beginning at the edge of something – rather, as space at the end of one subject and the beginning of another. Sacred Determinism, as Dugin relates it, lies in this Between.

Dugin’s active Neo-Traditionalism builds on Evola. To the metaphysical structure of his Neo-Traditionalism, Dugin adds the philosophy of Heidegger. With the acknowledged centrality of Heidegger’s concepts of Sein and Dasein through his adoption of corollaries like Heidegger’s Ereignis and Between, Dugin made it clear that it is Heidegger who provided the proximate philosophical framework of Fourth Political Theory. He stated, “Heidegger’s philosophy may prove to be that central axis threading everything around it – ranging from the reconceived second and third political theories to the return of theology and mythology.”515

510 Dugin, “From Sacred Geography,” under, Sacred North and Sacred South. Parentheses in original.
511 Ibid. Parentheses in original. Brackets added.
512 Ibid. Parentheses in original.
513 Ibid.
515 Dugin, Fourth Theory, 29. In Dugin’s opinion, Heidegger’s work on Being was not anecdotal or incomplete. Quite the contrary, “Many researchers have lost sight of the fact that Heidegger, especially, in his middle period between 1936 and 1945, developed a complete history of philosophy centered around Dasein, which, apparent in retrospect, can form the basis of a full-fledged and a well-developed political philosophy,” Dugin wrote in Dugin, Fourth Theory, 41.
2.4. Development of Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianism

Dugin acknowledges the heritage of his Neo-Eurasianism and is careful to give it an identifiable and credible genealogy. Dugin remarked that it was two Eurasianists, pioneers of phonology and renowned structural linguists, Roman Jakobson and Trubetskoï, who “were the mentors of Levi-Strauss and had taught him the skills of structural analysis.”\(^{516}\) With this in mind, Dugin extrapolated the chain of Neo-Eurasian intellectual heritage: from Eurasianism to Structuralism to Neo-Eurasianism.\(^{517}\)

Laruelle observed that as Eurasianism developed politically and ideologically, it changed and became more diverse.\(^{518}\) To be sure, Dugin has deviated from previous visions of Eurasianism, but essential consistencies remain. What has not changed is that most Eurasianists, and this includes Dugin, “assumed that Russia-Eurasia is a distinct civilizational unit, different from both Asia and Europe.”\(^{519}\) Summarizing his views on the development of Eurasianism, Dugin explained:

> The Eurasian Idea represents a fundamental revision of the political, ideological, ethnic, and religious history of mankind, and it offers a new system of classification and categories that will overcome standard clichés.\(^{520}\)

And,

> The Eurasian theory went through two stages – a formative period of classical Eurasianism at the beginning of the 20th century by Russian emigrant intellectuals (Trubeckoy, Savickiy, Alekseev, Suvchinckiy, Iljin, Bromberg, Hara-Davan, et al.) followed by the historical works of Lev Gumilev and, finally, the

\(^{516}\) Ibid., 100. The structural roles and relationships in Dugin’s construction of his Neo-Eurasianism are powerful. Similar to Legenhausen’s accusation aimed at Traditionalism, it may be a fair speculation to suppose that Neo-Eurasianism is largely a reaction to Westernism rather than an independent geopolitical formulation. Cf. footnotes 906 and 908 herein. Roman Osipovich Jakobson, 1896-1982.


\(^{519}\) Ibid.

\(^{520}\) Dugin, “The Eurasian Idea,” under Eurasianism as a Philosophical Struggle.
The results of the Russian Revolution stymied late nineteenth century and early twentieth century attempts to stimulate Russia’s Eurasian desires as the Soviet Union was more interested in creating a western buffer between the USSR and Europe than in expanding its physical boundaries. Dugin lamented the demise of the early Eurasian pioneering efforts.

Alas, historically, this remarkable movement was not appreciated in due measure. The impressing successes of Marxist ideology made the refined conservative-revolutionary perspective of the eurasist [sic] ineffective, superfluous. By the end of the ‘30s, the original impulse of the eurasist [sic] movement, both in Russia and among the Russian emigration, had definitively died away.522

But Neo-Eurasianism involves more than physical considerations. “Classical Eurasianism might have passed,” Dugin surmised, “but neo-Eurasianism has given it a second birth, a new sense, scale, and meaning.”523 The Neo-Eurasian view of the Eurasian movement’s key doctrinal positions includes the acceptance of the idea of the West in opposition to the rest of the world, “the West against mankind.”524 Dugin claimed this Western position forms a pattern of unipolar totalitarianism.525 Comprehending this pattern, he accuses the West of attempting “economic, political and cultural domination.”526 Dugin believes that the West’s view is grounded in a deep-seated belief that there is a constantly ongoing desire of all people to pursue Western ideals culminating in New World Order globalization. Dugin, disagreeing, suggested that,

Adherents of globalization deny any alternative plan of the future, but today we are experiencing a large-scale phenomenon – contra-globalism, and the Eurasian Idea coordinates all opponents of unipolar globalization in a constructive way.

521 Ibid.
525 Ibid.
526 Ibid.
Moreover, it offers the competing idea of multipolar globalization (or alter-globalization).\textsuperscript{527}

Dugin emphasized his point that Neo-Eurasianism, “does not see the creation of a world government on the basis of the liberal-democratic values as the one and only path for mankind.”\textsuperscript{528} Agreeing with the earlier Eurasianists that the West must be opposed in its quest for domination, Dugin concurred that effective opposition is available through a credible geopolitical rival to the West. The worthy rival, in the minds of the Classical Eurasianists, was Eurasia itself. Unfortunately for this option, Eurasia does not exist as a distinct geopolitical reality. To achieve Eurasian reality, Dugin concluded that, “Russia needs not simply to go back to its roots,” it needs to combine “a conservative and a revolutionary new start.”\textsuperscript{529}

Writing of his Eurasianist forebears, Dugin emphasized the deeply seeded anti-Westernism embedded in Eurasian geopolitical thought. Doing so, he downplayed Western influence on Russia; yet he also suggested that some purposeful Eurasian reasoning has allowed for the specific reception of some Westernization. Dugin was careful to note that Western experience, techniques, and methods are employed, “with the only purpose” being, “to confront the West with its own weapons.”\textsuperscript{530} Dugin styled Russia’s adoption of the desired Western imports and the rejection of any accompanying cultural replacement as “modernisation without westernization.”\textsuperscript{531} He claimed that by so doing, “Russia also managed longer than other traditional societies to effectively counter the pressure of the West.”\textsuperscript{532}

Dugin does not eschew all technological advancement even if it means cherry-picking technologies and other useful advances from the West. Neo-Eurasianism can be selectively anti-Western as long as it avoids absorption into Western globalism. This technique of selective borrowing allows Dugin to visualize that Russia can actively modernize, develop, and open somewhat to

\textsuperscript{527} Dugin, “The Eurasian Idea,” under, Unipolar globalization has an alternative.
\textsuperscript{528} Ibid., under, Eurasianism as Pluriversum.
\textsuperscript{530} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{531} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{532} Ibid.
the surrounding world, but still save and harden its own identity. Dugin carefully and methodically cataloged Russia’s strengths and motivations while noting its primacy among other Eurasian counterparts.

- Previous Eurasianists purposely conceived Russia as the avant-garde of the East against the West
- Russia is the forward defense of traditional society against modern, secular, ordinary, rationalized society
- Russia is different from other Eastern societies
  - In the centuries-old struggle for preserving a cultural ego, Russia actively acquired experience from the West
  - Russia selectively adopted techniques applied by the West and borrowed some Western methods

In a seeming contradiction, Dugin declared that Neo-Eurasianism is postmodern. It is undoubtedly postmodern in that it is a player remaining on the field after modernity’s demise. Dugin’s declaration was more than a proclamation of survival; it addressed a postmodernism that is radically different from the current state of that evident in the West. Compared to the Western version, Neo-Eurasianism is postmodernism, “with radically different inner substance.”

2.4.1. Dugin’s Infusion of Traditionalism into Neo-Eurasianism

Postmodern Neo-Eurasianism challenges Western Liberalism, its postmodern rival, and adds an infusion of Tradition. Neo-Traditionalism will not just generally oppose its evil postmodern rival; it will directly challenge it. Dugin believes that the Traditionalism of his Neo-Eurasianism will prevail where more general traditionalism did not.

It is not overly difficult to connect the dots, as Dugin does, and arrive – as one is bound to do – firmly at the intersection of lowercase traditionalism and

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533 Ibid.
Eurasianism. Arrival at the intersection of uppercase Traditionalism and Eurasianism is not as obvious, but Dugin erased any doubt of his view of this confluence in his explanation. Neo-Eurasianism “implies a positive re-evaluation of the archaic, of the ancient,” in Dugin’s mind. 536 Providing crossover between Traditional and Eurasian relationships, Dugin noted Eurasianism’s closeness to “the traditionalism of Guénon, who also thought that ‘contemporiety’ was a ‘western’ notion.”537 Dugin also pointed out that it is not a coincidence that the first Russian author who referenced “Guénon’s book East and West, was the Eurasianist N.N. Alekseev.”538

The Eurasian legacy, “fervently refers to the past, to the world of Tradition.”539 Neo-Eurasianism involves the development of a cultural process with a new emphasis on the archaic – “the insertion of original cultural motives in the fabric of modern forms.”540 “Conservatism,” in Dugin’s words, “in its most general sense means a positive attitude towards historical tradition.”541 “The priority in this area is given back to national motives, to the sources of national creativity, to the continuation and revival of traditions,” says Dugin.542 The standard of Neo-Eurasian conservatism is also the standard of Russian conservatism. Dugin made this clear in his comparison that “contemplating contemporary Russian conservatism is basically contemplating Eurasianism, which is a synthesis of Russian political history on the basis of a unique geopolitical and civilisational methodology.”543

537 Dugin, Fourth Theory, 99. Assumed that Dugin means Integral Traditionalism in this case. It is interesting to note that in at least one online version of The Fourth Political Theory, the passage is rendered, “eurasianists partly draw closer with Guénon’s traditionalism who also considered that ‘modernity’ is a ‘western’ concept.” Cf. https://www.scribd.com/document/233578477/The-Fourth-Political-Theory, 137, accessed May 4, 2015.
540 Ibid.
541 Dugin, Putin vs Putin: Vladimir Putin Viewed from the Right (Leipzig: Renovamen Verlag, 2016), 145. Italics in original.
543 Dugin, Putin vs Putin, 156. Cf. Dugin’s footnote 24: “Kievan Rus’ was a loose tribal confederation that had its capital in Kiev, and from which the modern-day states of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus are descended. It lasted from the tenth until the thirteenth centuries.” Cf. Also published by Arktos in 2014; Cf. Dugin, Putin vs Putin: Vladimir Putin Viewed from the Right, (London: Arktos, 2014); and https://www.scribd.com/document/268017818/alexander-Dugin-Putin-vs-Putin-pdf.
“Moreover,” Dugin wrote, “conservatism is based on the premise that the people and the state have a certain historical mission.”

Dugin believes that Russia’s historic mission lies in a messianic Manifest Destiny, which is an essential element of Russian national identity. For a Traditional conservative, past, present, and future “are tied together in a single integral project striving toward a clear national goal.” Believing in the ultimate messianic triumph of Eurasianism, implying divine favor, and linking conservatism with Traditionalism through ageless correctness, Dugin stated, “after all, as Arthur Moeller van den Bruck once said, ‘Conservatism has eternity on its side.’”

2.4.2. Expanding on Dugin’s Sacred Geography/Sacred Space

Dugin’s understanding of Russia as the nation with a divinely given messianic mission includes accepting that it occupies sacred space. The very geography of Russia, Dugin believes, contains specific holy features. Acknowledging the underlying Fourth Political Theory idea of Russia’s messianic Manifest Destiny is also necessary when accepting his concept of Eurasia. Essential to Fourth Political Theory is Dugin’s development of Neo-Eurasianism that depends on a Eurasian reality constructed within Sacred Space, Russia’s, hence Eurasia’s, messianic mission, and its Manifest Destiny.

Physical features figure prominently in concepts of Sacred Space. Dugin emphasized that “varieties of landscape in sacred geography are understood as symbolical [sic] complexes linked to the specificity of state, religious and ethical ideology of the different peoples.” These linkages are more than mere longings or recognitions. Physical geography itself is deeply connected with “‘spirit,’ ‘contemplation,’” and “resignation to superhuman force” in

544 Ibid., 146.
545 Cf. references to Russian Identity and Manifest Destiny.
546 Dugin, Putin vs Putin, 146.
Dugin is conscious of sacral geometrical constituents within Sacred Geography. He believes that the world is situated along various axes of power. Alignment of the axes connecting Sacred Poles governs the location and recognition of sacred geography. Dugin does not describe the cardinal points of Sacred Geometry by celestial and seasonal changes, as do many allegorical renditions, but draws axes of power by connecting the Sacred Poles. In a similar vein, Philip Sheldrake remarked, “For Eliade, every sacred place was thought of as an axis mundi, the center of the world, with boundaries separating it from surrounding secular or profane space.” Sheldrake clarified that “Such places were a kind of Jacob’s ladder linking heaven and earth.”

Following this construction, the characteristics and attributes of the cardinal points supporting Sacred Geography in Dugin’s theory may be examined:

Along the East-West axis were drawn peoples and civilizations, possessing hierarchical characters – closer to the East were those closer to Sacral, to Tradition, to spiritual wealth. Closer to West, those of a more decayed, degraded and dying Spirit. Similarly, Dugin related that “in sacred geography the West is the side of death, darkness, and decline, the East of life, bloom, and light.”

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549 Ibid., under, East and West in Modern Geopolitics.
550 Ibid. Brackets added.
551 Ibid., under, East and West in sacred geography. Dugin describes several of these axes in this article.
552 Ibid.
553 Ibid.
555 Ibid.
556 Ibid.
claim that “the West and the Jewish tradition are associated with Atlantis,” whereas “the pure primordial tradition” is associated “with Hyperborea,” demonstrates his persistent co-mingling of spiritual and geographical elements.558

Metaphorically, the “South is a civilization of the Moon receiving the light from the Sun” associated with a North civilization.559 The moon reflects the sun’s light, “preserving and diffusing it for some time, but periodically losing contact with it,” waning until it becomes a new moon.560 It would be unperceptive not to associate the solar and lunar symbolism used here with the symbolic language of many indigenous and pagan religious traditions. Dugin holds that Nordic-type persons better recognize the persistence of awe and other pointers toward perennial Truth.561

In contrast, those belonging to the South worship life as the highest authority. Southern people relate to carpe diem, instead of being in the world but not of it – those belonging to the South worship life as the highest attainment.562 People of the South live “by passions and rushes,” putting “the psychic above the spiritual” that they do not understand.563 “The cult of the Great Mother” defines their worship, however unconscious they are of it.564 Therefore, the South’s focus is materialistic; matter-generating-matter is the shallow extent of its existential awareness.565

“The man of the South is a Mondmensch,” according to Dugin.566 Dugin’s conception of Mondmensch seems close to José Ortega’s explanation of the “Mass-Man.”567 The Mass-Man is surrounded by marvelous instruments, effective medicines, comfort, and “watchful governments.”568 But, despite the

558 Ibid. Here quoting Dugin, as above. Dugin bestows the mantle of Hyperborea on the East.
559 Dugin, “From Sacred Geography,” under, The People of the South.
560 Ibid.
561 Ibid., under, The People of the North.
562 John 17: 14-15, NASB.
564 Ibid.
565 Ibid.
566 Ibid.
568 Ortega, Revolt of the Masses, 102.
environment, “he is ignorant how difficult it is to invent those medicines and those instruments and to assure their production in the future.” Not only that, but Mass-Man also does not realize the instability of the state organization, nor recognize any personal obligations to it.

In stark contrast to Mondmensch – the Moon Man of the South – stands Sonnenmensch – Sun Man of the North. “The man of North is a particular kind of being possessing a straight intuition of the Sacred,” wrote Dugin, and Sonnenmensch well understands that “the cosmos is a texture of symbols, each of them called out of secret by the eye of the Spiritual First Principle.” “The man of North” is the “solar man,” and is not Mondmensch – the “mass man” described by Ortega. Sonnenmensch is “not absorbing energy, as black holes do;” he is not an existential materialist, but a source of light, force, and wisdom flowing from creation.

Consistent with his Traditionalist position, Dugin espouses Northern superiority, “the sacred North, the archetype of North,” half immersed in history derived from the natural landscape, and half immersed in Nordism – the concept of being Northern. Nordism can still be found, according to Dugin, wherever “true spirituality, supra-rational Mind, divine Logos,” and the capacity to see the “secret Soul” of the world is present. Dugin stated that “Northness” may be perceived across a wide range of references and offers the example of “ancient Iranian and Zoroastrian texts.” These texts mention “the northern country of ‘Aryiana Vaejao’ and its capital ‘Vara,’ from where the ancient arians [sic] were expelled by glaciation.”

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569 Ibid.
570 Ibid.
571 Dugin, “From Sacred Geography,” under, The People of the North.
572 Ibid.
573 Ibid. Cf. Ortega, Revolt of the Masses, 58ff. Ortega’s elaboration on the “mass man:” “the free expansion of his vital desires, and therefore, of his personality; and his radical ingratitude towards all that has made possible his ease of his existence.”
574 Ibid.
575 Ibid., under, Sacred North and Sacred South.
576 Ibid., under, The People of the North.
577 Ibid., under, Sacred North and Sacred South.
578 Ibid. Brackets added.
Dugin’s examples also include the Veda, were ancient texts “speak about the Northern country as the ancestral home of the Hindu, about a Sveta-dipa, White Land laying [sic] in the far north.”\(^{579}\) Examples extend throughout the cyclic concept of space-time with Dugin associations of a Nordic Race of Teachers with the Sacred North.\(^{580}\) He will have us accept that these Nordic Teachers carry on today, although the pure Nordic civilization was lost with the disappearance of the ancient paleocontinent of Hyperborea.\(^{581}\) Trace evidence of a “Hyperborean Cult,” remains and can be found among the North American Indians, ancient Slavs, founders of the Chinese civilization, and natives of the Pacific.\(^{582}\) Dugin maintained that this slender evidence could also be detected in blond Germans, black shamans of Western Africa, red-skinned Aztecs, and “among the Mongols with wide cheek-bones.”\(^{583}\)

Care should be taken not to assign overt racism to Dugin's characterization of Nordism. The ancient Nordics, “the race of the ‘white teachers’” associated with the North “in the primordial epoch, does not coincide at all” with the “white race” of today, Dugin explained.\(^{584}\) True Nordism today is not based on physical characteristics or skin color, according to Dugin.\(^{585}\) In other words, to the discerning, the evidence for the Sonnenmensch can be detected even in the world’s diversity. “There is [sic] no such people on the planet, which would not have a myth about the ‘solar man,’” Dugin wrote.\(^{586}\) “Wherever there is Sacred Purity and Wisdom, there invisibly is the North,” in Dugin’s view.\(^{587}\)

There is a subtle but profound difference between east-west and north-south comparisons in Dugin’s conception of Sacred Geography. It appears that the primary reason for this difference is the symbolic and mystical superiority of the North over the other three cardinal points. Dugin stated:

\(^{579}\) Ibid. Brackets added.
\(^{580}\) Ibid., under, The People of the North.
\(^{581}\) Ibid.
\(^{582}\) Ibid.
\(^{583}\) Ibid.
\(^{584}\) Ibid., under, From Continents to Meta-Continents.
\(^{585}\) Ibid.
\(^{586}\) Ibid., under, The People of the North. Brackets added.
\(^{587}\) Ibid.
It is possible to say that all sacred traditions are in essence the projection of a Single Northern Primordial Tradition adapted to every different historical condition. North is the Cardinal Point chosen by the Primeval Logos in order to reveal itself in History, and each of its further manifestations reinforced the primeval polar-paradise symbolism.\(^{588}\)

Although there are apparent geographical correlations in Dugin's interpretation of Sacred Geography, the thrust and tone are symbolic and mystical. Cultural and political development followed an east-to-west movement in the Northern Hemisphere, and geopolitical narratives more often describe east-west rather than north-south relationships. Dugin's explanations of Sacred Geography and Sacred Space appear to contradict the tendency to view the narratives as east-west comparisons. For Dugin, the north-south juxtapositions are more crucial. Dugin underscored the priority by stating, “it is important to mark that in sacred geography the North-South axis is more relevant than the East-West axis.”\(^{589}\)

Furthermore, considering the superior North-South axis, the North occupies the dominant position.

The most ancient and original layer of Tradition univocally affirms the primacy of North above the South. The symbolism of North relates to a Source, to an original northern paradise, from where all human civilization originates.\(^{590}\)

Dugin's emphasis on the North-South axis is clear. “The North-South pair in sacred geography is not reduced to an abstract opposition of Good and Evil,” and though it may be tempting to classify it as such, there is a subtler opposition in play.\(^{591}\) Dugin does not merely resort to labeling Western unipolar globalism as evil. He explains that the essence of the North-South opposition in Sacred Geography “is rather the opposition of Spiritual Idea to its coarsened, material embodying.”\(^{592}\) This interpretation lends itself to

\(^{588}\) Ibid., under, Sacred North and Sacred South.
\(^{589}\) Ibid.
\(^{590}\) Ibid.
\(^{591}\) Ibid.
\(^{592}\) Ibid.
establishing once more Dugin’s disdain for the West’s priority of the material over the spiritual.

While there is a hierarchy of the cardinal points evident in Dugin’s descriptions of Sacred Geography in east-west comparisons, more pronounced and more remarkable is the hierarchical evidence in his north-south contrasts. Dugin believes that Nordic Teachers laid the foundations for all proper perceptions of Sacred Geography. It is the North that attempts to bring knowledge and understanding to the South. The Nordic Teachers strive to “spiritualize” the South and imbue it with Tradition.593 “In normal cases, as the primacy of North is recognized by the South,” a harmonious relationship exists.594

If the proper hierarchical relationship is dishonored, there are far-reaching cosmic consequences. “If the South fails to recognize the primacy of North, the sacred opposition, the ‘war of continents’ begins, and from the point of view of tradition the South is responsible for this conflict by breaking the sacred rules.”595 Dugin’s perceived War of Continents does not seem particularly relevant to contemporary world geopolitics when contemplated as a superior North versus a rebellious South confrontation. Nevertheless, for Dugin, it is both pertinent and prescient. Dugin recognized that a cosmic shift in the Sacred Geography has occurred and, in effect, north has become east and south has become west.596

2.4.2.1. The Spiritual Shift of the North-South Axis

Hyperborea, in either reality or myth, disappeared long ago. Although it “does not exist on a physical level,” it does remain “a spiritual reality,” on which the spiritual vision of the enlightened is focused reflecting Hyperborea’s original and Traditional position.597 Dugin’s Sacred Geography narrative is attempting to expose spiritual Truth within a Traditionalist understanding: “North in

593 Ibid.
594 Ibid.
595 Ibid.
596 Ibid.
597 Ibid., under, From Continents to Meta-Continents.
Tradition is a meta-historical and meta-geographical reality,”598 Moreover, with equal certainty and the same Traditional approach, he affirms the existence of “the ‘hyperborean race’ – a ‘race’ not in the biological, but in [a] pure spiritual, metaphysical sense.”599

Evola wrote in his autobiography that “three levels of racism ought to be distinguished in order to reflect the three kinds of races: the first level of racism pertaining to the race of the body, the second to the race of the character, and the third to the race of the spirit.”600 Dugin informed that “the continents and their populations in our epoch have gone extremely far from those archetypes, which corresponded to them in primordial times.”601

Between real continents and real races (the realities of modern geopolitics), on the one hand, and meta-continents and meta-races (the realities of traditional sacred geography), on the other hand, today there exist not just a simple discrepancy, but almost an inverse correspondence.602

A metaphysical shift has occurred, and the Traditional views formerly held concerning the North and its Nordic Race have been transposed into the Sacred Geography of the East. Not only that, but the cosmic War of the Continents has also now become an east-west vice a north-south engagement. Herein lies Dugin’s critical geopolitical and metaphysical concerns for today – the subsuming of the Sacred Geography of East and West into the current geopolitical juxtapositions of a multipolar and anti-modern East and a unipolar and a materially focused West.

2.4.2.2. The Great North and South War

The Preacher in Ecclesiastes tells that there is no longer anything new or original in this world.

598 Ibid. Dugin makes this point with certainty – Traditionalism is an expression of ultimate Truth. Cf. numerous references herein.
599 Ibid. Brackets added.
601 Dugin, “From Sacred Geography,” under, From Continents to Meta-Continents.
602 Ibid.
That which has been is that which will be, and that which has been done is that which will be done. So there is nothing new under the sun. Already it has existed for ages which were before us.  

As part of this continuous cycle, Dugin tells that a great war has been raging in cyclic space-time – it rages now and will continue until the end-times. In what Dugin referred to as “antidiluvian’ times,” the time before the flood described in Genesis and elsewhere, there were two “ancient paleo-continents,” Hyperborea and Gondvana. Dugin associated North and South attributes, both geographically, spiritually, and allegorically with these two now-lost continents. In the axial shift that occurred sometime in deep pre-history, the qualities of the sacred North and South have become correspondingly attributed to East and West. The symbolic, metaphorical, and allegorical attributes of East and West remain. But they are now invested with the sacred qualities heretofore respectively assigned to North and South.

The great war of North and South, Hyperborea and Gondvana refers to “antidiluvian” times. In the last phases of the cycle it becomes more hidden, veiled. The paleo-continents of North and South themselves disappear. The testimonial sign of opposition is passed to East and West.

The East inherits tradition and origin and is sacred. The West inherits decay and is profane. A direct link is detectable from the esoteric “testimonial sign of opposition,” inherited by the East, to the style of anti-Westernism so vividly displayed in Fourth Political Theory and throughout Dugin’s other offerings. Dugin believes that “Modern geopolitics understands the terms ‘North’ and ‘South’ as wholly different categories than sacred geography does,” Sacred Geography understands that “the symbolical North univocally corresponds to positive aspects, and the South to negative,” wrote Dugin. But, “in an exclusively modern geopolitical picture 

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603 Ecclesiastes 1:9-10, NASB.
604 Dugin, “From Sacred Geography,” under, Sacred North and Sacred South Dugin.
605 Ibid.
606 Ibid. This theme is consistent throughout this article.
607 Ibid. Likewise, this theme is consistent throughout the article.
608 Ibid., under, Sacred North and Sacred South.
609 Ibid., under, From Continents to Meta-Continents.
610 Ibid.
of the world everything is much more complex, and to some extent even turned upside down.”

2.4.2.3. Earth and Ocean

In his explanation of Sacred Geography, Dugin radically reduced the four ancient elements of Earth, Water, Air, and Fire to only two – Earth and Sea, saying that they

are in essence the major categories of earthly existence, and for mankind it is impossible not to see in them some basic attributes of the universe. As the two basic terms of geopolitics, they preserve their significance both for civilizations of a traditional kind and for exclusively modern states, peoples and ideological blocks.  

These two broad categories connect to the two related terms, Tellurocracy and Thalassocracy. In these definitions, it is not difficult to detect discernable links to Dugin’s Atlantis associations with oceans and sea-power. Dugin noted that historically, “thalassocracy is linked to the West and the Atlantic Ocean.” Thalassocratia is the geopolitical territory characterized by its close association with the sea, and as it is able, primarily projects sea power. Thalassocratic states often have, or had an active colonial component, and their territory is often not contiguous.

Dugin implied that this non-contiguous characteristic “creates an element of discontinuity” within Thalassocratic states. Tellurocratia is the geopolitical territory characterized by its close association with the land and primarily projects land power. Tellurocratic states usually locate their capitals and

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611 Ibid.
612 Ibid., under, Land and Sea.
613 Ibid.
614 Dugin’s use of terms Atlantis, Atlantic, and various associated and translation altered spellings, usually refer to the same subject: the sea-power orientation of America and most, if not all, of the Anglosphere. Cf. Hannan, Inventing Freedom.
615 Dugin, “From Sacred Geography,” under, Land and Sea.
616 Ibid.
provinces contiguously – there is territorial continuity. Dugin associates Telluocraticia with the East and Eurasia.617

Dugin claims that empires do not settle themselves in mountain regions. Expansion is not initiated from the mountains. Instead, there are sanctuaries, fortresses, and retreats, where “the victims of the geopolitical expansion of other telluocratic forces” are concentrated.618 “No empire has its centre in mountain regions,” according to Dugin.619 This observation led Dugin to suggest that the expression, “mountains are populated by demons,” may reflect the historical dearth of mountain-centered states.620 Nonetheless, mountains are the habitat of things spiritual.

Dugin stated that “it is even possible to say that in telluocraticies a mountain corresponds to some spiritual power.”621 “On the mountains the sacred centres of tradition are placed,” said Dugin.622 Consider Mount Olympus or Mount Sinai as examples of the sacred attachment to geographical features. Some biblical scholars believe Jesus’ Sermon on the Mount to have occurred at a site where its divine importance may be associated with symbolic similarity to the transmission of the Law to Moses on Sinai.623

Although Dugin rejects the mountain as a telluocratic political center, he does recognize the authority and power bestowed by elevation. Dugin suffuses the development of physical elevation symbolism into his Geopolitical-Theology – hills being located between the elevated spiritual power of the mountain and the “secular level of the steppe.”624 “The hill,” not the mountain, “is a symbol of imperial might,” Dugin stated.625 The hill is “above the secular level of the steppe, but not reaching the limit of supreme

617 Ibid. Dugin writes that the example of Japan being Telluocratic “is explained by the stronger ‘attractive’ effect of Eurasia.”
618 Dugin, “From Sacred Geography,” under, Symbolism of landscape.
619 Ibid.
620 Ibid.
621 Ibid.
622 Ibid.
624 Dugin, “From Sacred Geography,” under, Symbolism of landscape.
625 Ibid.
power,” the mountain – the dwelling place of the gods.⁶²⁶ Mountains are the abode of divine beings, the lesser high ground being associated with temporal authority and power. “A hill is a dwelling place for a king, a count, an emperor,” Dugin wrote, adding that “capitals of large tellurocratic empires are placed on a hill or on hills.”⁶²⁷

Dugin does not consider forests as the location for the capital of a Tellurocracy. Dugin explained, “the forest in sacred geography is close to the mountains in a definite sense.”⁶²⁸ That is to say, “the symbolism of the tree is related to the symbolism of the mountain.”⁶²⁹ “Therefore,” Dugin elaborated, “in tellurocracies the forest also plays a peripheral function – it, too, is the ‘place of the priests’ (druids, magi, hermits), but also at the same time,” as a residual of the ancient past, it is the “place of demons.”⁶³⁰

2.4.2.4. Portraying the West as Atlantis

Dugin connects Fourth Political Theory through symbolism, allegory, and metaphor to Greek and Platonic thought. Perhaps the most familiar of these connections is Dugin’s frequent references equating the West with Atlantis. Casting Proclus in the role of a prototype Neo-Platonist, Dugin commented that, “in his commentary on the dialogue ‘Critias’ of Plato,” Proclus described “the war between the Greeks and the prehistoric people of Atlantis as the paradigmatic war between two orders of being: one perfect and the other degraded.”⁶³¹ It should be no surprise which attributes Dugin attaches to Eurasia and which are identified with the West. “Proclus said that the Greeks were connected to the earth and the Atlanteans to the sea.”⁶³² Dugin somewhat mischievously claimed that Proclus was an ancient geopolitician.⁶³³
Dugin’s Eurasia channels the mythical Northern Continent of Hyperborea. Hyperborea fought against Atlantis in an ancient war that Dugin applied to the present day. In later mythology, the Greeks also fought Atlantis. The Greek-Atlantis war is strikingly similar to the Hyperborean-Atlantis conflict. “The Greeks were alongside the Olympian gods and the people of Atlantis alongside Titans,” Dugin wrote. “The maritime geopolitics of the Titans against the telluric geopolitics of the Gods,” is how Dugin put it. Dugin projects the strife between both Greece and Atlantis and Hyperborea into the present – Hyperborea/Greece representing Eurasia and Atlantis representing the West.

Dugin continually contrasts the Western secular approach to geopolitical questions with his metaphysical beliefs. “Geopoliticians,” Dugin stated for example, “stared at the fact of a fundamental difference between ‘insular’ and ‘continental’ powers, between ‘western,’ ‘progressive’ civilization and ‘eastern,’ ‘despotic’ and ‘archaic’ cultural forms,” and missed a critical element. Because, for Western geopoliticians, “the question about Spirit in its metaphysical and sacred comprehension never arose in modern science,” they left it aside, wrote Dugin. Western geopoliticians prefer “to evaluate the situation in different, more modern terms, rather than through the concepts of ‘sacred’ and ‘profane,’ ‘traditional’ and ‘antitraditional.’”

Dugin has written that he understands the Western affinity towards universalism, but he rejects any claim that universalism is inevitable. While his “Eurasianism absolutely rejects the universalism of Atlantism and Americanism,” Dugin admits that there is a pattern in the development of “Western-Europe and America,” that possesses “many attractive features that

634 I use “Channels” here considering the OED definition of the verb associated with a medium and spirit.
635 Dugin, “The Figure of the Radical Subject,” under, Part 1. Traditionalism and Sociology - The Modern and the Eternal.
636 Ibid.
637 Ibid.
638 Dugin, “From Sacred Geography,” under, East and West in modern geopolitics.
639 Ibid.
640 Ibid.
641 Dugin, Fourth Theory, 136.
can be adopted and praised.”\textsuperscript{642} With this admission, Dugin expressed the Eurasian idea of multipolarity, where the Atlantic Zone will remain. Although, “it is merely a cultural system that has the right to exist in its own historical context along with other civilizations and cultural systems.”\textsuperscript{643}

2.4.3. Modeling Neo-Eurasianism

Instead of viewing the various religious expressions present in Europe and Asia as a hindrance to geopolitical cohesiveness, Dugin projects an ecumenical outreach. Dugin claims that Neo-Eurasianism involves “integration of civil societies and its key institutions, taking into consideration cultural, ethnic and confessional features.”\textsuperscript{644} Dugin’s ecumenism allows for a “constructive solid dialogue between the creeds traditional for Russia – Orthodoxy, Islam, Judaism, Buddhism.”\textsuperscript{645} Dugin suggests that there are similar spiritual views within the religious Eurasian confines. This element of spiritual kinship “does not eliminate at all differences and originality of tenets,” but it is “a serious and positive basis for rapprochement, mutual respect, mutual understanding.”\textsuperscript{646}

Dugin envisions an idealistic Russia; he then establishes it as the keystone in the main arch of his Neo-Eurasian construct. This keystone, “gives the integration of Europe a Eurasian dimension in both the symbolic and geographic senses.”\textsuperscript{647} Russia and Turkey, related Dugin, are both ancestors of the Europeans, “and Russia is historically connected with the Turkic, Mongolian, and Caucasus nations.”\textsuperscript{648} This connection and similar historical and civilizational perspectives are part of the mortar that Dugin uses to cement his Neo-Eurasian construction. Emphasis on the Slavic, Turkic, Mongolian, and Caucasus lash-up and their ultimate intertwined historical

\textsuperscript{642} Dugin, \textit{Eurasian Mission: An Introduction to Neo-Eurasianism} (Leipzig: Renovamen Verlag, 2016), 44.

\textsuperscript{643} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{644} Dugin, “Eurasian Idea and Postmodernism,” under, Actuality of Movement to current politics.

\textsuperscript{645} Dugin, “Eurasia Above All,” under, Priorities of the Eurasia movement.

\textsuperscript{646} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{647} Dugin, “The Eurasian Idea,” under, Integration of the Eurasian Continent.

\textsuperscript{648} Ibid.
destiny is not original with Dugin, although he is astute to adopt it and bold to proclaim it.\footnote{Ibid. This line of thinking is evident throughout the article. Dugin acknowledges Eurasian pioneers and endorses the mutual commonality of the Eurasian destiny of the various ethno groups involved.}

Dugin presents his Neo-Eurasianism as part of a construct wherein the nation-state declines in importance and power as the world becomes much more geopolitically focused. In Dugin’s scheme, multipolar powers appear to emerge more as geographically and culturally centered zones and less as defined nation-states. Despite this, Dugin’s commitment to the decline of nation-states, at least one of them (Russia itself), is doubtful. Dugin’s Eurasia will comprise one of these zones, and it will be recognizably Russian in many respects. The long-term outcome may be a non-Russia-centric Eurasia, but Dugin’s preferred near-term technique to achieve this result appears to be Russian expansion.

Dugin’s argument is evident in a single paragraph wherein he concisely articulates his basic geopolitical trajectory.

The Eurasian model is a contemplation of our current situation on the basis of a qualitative civilisational space. We must preserve the main impulse (geographical, historical, cultural, civilisational) of the previous stages in the development of our state and develop a brand new and unique mentality for twenty-first century Russia. We must move forward: not just go back into the past, but create a new synthesis.\footnote{Dugin, \textit{Putin vs Putin}, 134.}

Creating a new synthesis is not an easy task, however. Dugin cannot merely fill-in an outline on the map and call it Eurasia. In Dugin’s thinking, a peaceful multipolar world is largely unimaginable to the unipolar-minded West. The particulars of a world where political theology is a featured characteristic appears beyond the pale of current Western acceptance. Dugin rejects any notion of a \textit{Pax Americana} founded on unipolar globalization. Although a peaceful multipolar world may be possible, a mere glance at both
history and the current conflicts around the globe presents a stark and contrasting reality.

Defining a foundational block of Neo-Eurasianism, Dugin wrote that instead of following the Western path to its unipolar worldview, “the Eurasian Idea suggests that the planet consists of a constellation of autonomous living spaces partially open to each other.”

These areas are not nation-states but a coalition of states, reorganized into continental federations or “democratic empires” with a large degree of inner self-government. Each of these areas is multipolar, including a complicated system of ethnic, cultural, religious and administrative factors.

**Dugin’s Four-Zone Neo-Eurasian Model**

Dugin envisions the globe divided into zones where “Eurasian plans for the future presume the division of the planet into four vertical geographical belts (meridian zones) from North to South.” Surprisingly, perhaps especially to

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652 Ibid.
653 Adapted from: Dugin, “Eurasian Idea.” Some researchers connect Australia with the American Meridian zone. Cf. http://www.4pt.su/en/content/eurasia-above-all for another map rendition of Dugin’s Zones and Great Spaces. Dugin’s Four-Zone Neo-Eurasian Model has been illustrated in several different iterations; this figure is based on conceptions current at the time of this writing.
654 Ibid., under, Three Eurasian belts (Meridian Zones).
those who believe that Dugin aspires to world domination for the future Eurasia, one of the planned zones, the Atlantic, contains both North and South America. This Atlantic Zone “will form one common space oriented on and controlled by the USA within the framework of the Monroe Doctrine.”

Dugin’s Neo-Eurasian model contains four poles, and their associated four zones are:

- Atlantic
- Euro-Africa (with the European Union as its center)
- Russian-Central Asian
- Pacific

Dugin’s Neo-Eurasian concept depends on the multipolar counterbalance of the whole where each zone interacts with the others. The significant global outreach of the Atlantic Zone is counterbalanced by the combined strength of the remaining three zones.

### The Great Spaces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Atlantic Zone</th>
<th>Euro-Africa Zone</th>
<th>Russia-Central Asia Zone</th>
<th>Pacific Zone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Great Spaces</td>
<td>Great Spaces</td>
<td>Great Spaces</td>
<td>Great Spaces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American-Canadian, Central and South America, Australia*</td>
<td>The European Union, the Arab, Trans-Saharan Africa, the Middle East</td>
<td>Russian Federation (with several countries - the Eurasian Union), Continental Islamic countries, Asian countries of the CIS, Hindustan</td>
<td>China, Japan, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Australia*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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655 Ibid.
656 Adapted from: Dugin, “Eurasian Idea.” There appears to be some conflict here; assuming a Dublin to Vladivostok reality, the EU would have to become a Eurasian subset.
658 Adapted from: Dugin, “Eurasian Idea.”
The Great Spaces in Dugin’s model are applied to correspond to the boundaries of the predominant civilizations with minimal regard for included nation-states or their current diplomatic or military agreements with one another.659 According to Dugin, “the Meridian zones of the Eurasian project consist of several ‘Great Spaces’ or ‘democratic empires.’”660 Each of these Great Spaces “possesses relative freedom and independence but are strategically integrated into a corresponding meridian zone.”661

The inclusionary reach of the expansion-minded Eurasianists was, according to Dugin, a much broader effort than it was under the expansionists during the days of the Russian Empire. “The founding-fathers of Eurasism for the first time gave the highest possible estimation to the multi-national (imperial) nature of the Russian State,” in Dugin’s assessment.662 Dugin’s division of the globe recalls the vision of a Eurasian expanse from Dublin to Vladivostok.

“If we consider the alliance of the USA and Western Europe as the Atlantic vector of European development, European integration under the aegis of the continental countries (Germany, France) may be called European Eurasianism,” Dugin wrote, almost pondering.663 Then, as if to complete his thought, he added that his speculation “becomes more and more obvious” if a theory of Europe from the Atlantic Ocean to Vladivostok is considered.664 Dugin then stated the obvious and underscored the massive geography involved with his understated conclusion that, “the integration of the Old World includes the vast territory of the Russian Federation.”665

“Eurasianism is based on the multipolar vision,” not a continuation of the unipolar hegemony of American globalism, Dugin explained.666 Dugin believes that world events in the recent past decades in Russia and elsewhere

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660 Ibid.
661 Ibid.
664 Ibid.
665 Ibid.
666 Dugin, “The Long Path,” as part of his response to the second question.
have created an urgent and essential need for continuing development of the Neo-Eurasian model. Marxism has lost its appeal, but there is yet to appear a fully developed alternative to American-led Westernism, the “world monster” in Dugin’s mind – a monster about which “even the Europeans, the grandparents of the world monster, begin to feel nervous.” Dugin’s Eurasian model, “protects not only anti-Atlantic value systems, but the diversity of value structures.” Dugin’s Eurasian construct “provides living space for everyone, including the USA and Atlantism, along with other civilizations, because Eurasianism also defends the civilizations of Africa, both American continents, and the Pacific area parallel to the Eurasian Motherland.”

2.5. Dugin’s Critique of Liberalism

Dugin wrote that “political ideologies, having reached the peak of their dominion and influence in the Twentieth century, were the product of the new, modern era.” The culmination of political ideology, according to Dugin, is manifested in the three political theories of Liberalism, Communism, and Fascism. With the demise of Fascism and the collapse of Communism, Liberalism remained as the sole political ideology on the field. Despite the victory, Dugin claimed a situation of ultimate irony has occurred in which “the triumph of liberalism coincided with its end.”

Ever in the background of Dugin’s Fourth Political Theory are ills Dugin pointedly attributes to liberalism, modernism, and postmodernism. Dugin condemns liberalism – to be more specific, Dugin denounces Western Liberalism. He characterizes modernism and liberalism as carriers of a disease that brings forth the homogenizing power of globalism and the self-indulgence of a narcissistic individualism. Dugin sounds a warning about freedom that is grounded in the self-centered individual rather than in

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668 Ibid., under, Atlantism is not Universal.
669 Ibid.
670 Dugin, Fourth Theory, 15.
671 Cf. Dugin, in Fourth Theory, and throughout his writings.
672 Ibid., 17.
community. This freedom centered on the individual, “is always fraught with chaos,” according to Dugin. 673 “Placed into the narrow framework of individuality, the amount of freedom becomes microscopic, and, ultimately, fictitious,” was Dugin’s verdict. 674 To give freedom at the individual level is a mistake because the individual cannot handle it properly. Freedom given to an individual “will remain contained within the tiny scope of his individuality and that over which he has direct control,” in Dugin’s opinion. 675

Guy Debord, in his book The Society of Spectacle, describes “the means by which the capitalist establishment maintains its authority in the modern world,” wrote Alain Soral when commenting on Debord’s influence. 676 The “Spectacle” reduces “all genuine human experiences to representational images in the mass media, thus allowing the powers-that-be to determine how individuals experience reality.” 677 Focus on the individual is “the flip side of liberalism,” Dugin observed. 678 “At its core, it is totalitarian and intolerant of differences,” he added. 679 Here is a situation both paradoxical and inconsistent – liberalism spouts individual freedom but is guilty of token tolerance. 680 It is ultimately intolerant of any mindset that differs more than marginally from its accepted dogma. 681

Liberalism, Dugin charged, “is only prepared to tolerate small people.” 682 Dugin stated, liberalism protects not the rights of man generally, but, rather, only the rights of the “small man.” 683 The inconsistency of liberalism is

673 Ibid., 53.
674 Ibid.
675 Ibid.
676 Guy Debord, Society of the Spectacle (Detroit: Black and Red, 1977). Originally published in French in 1967, this work of Marxist Critical Theory and philosophy has been published several times in English and is also available in various translations from online sources. Cited in Alain Soral, “Why We Should Read Alexander Dugin,” Foreword, in The Fourth Political Theory, trans. Sergio Knipe, 9. Guy Debord, 1931-1994. Alain Soral, aka Alain Bonnet or Alain Bonnet de Soral, is a Franco-Swiss conspiracy theorist who was sentenced to a year in prison in France for denying the Holocaust.
677 Morgan, in Fourth Theory, 9, footnote 1. The Spectacle, as described, could apply as well to Communism, Fascism, and other forms of governance. Cf. e.g., Hoffer’s descriptions and explanations of the power of propaganda in The True Believer and other of his works.
678 Dugin, Fourth Theory, 53.
679 Ibid.
680 Ibid.
681 Ibid.
682 Ibid.
683 Ibid. For comparison with the Mass-man, Cf. 2.4.2.
underscored here because the “‘small man’ can be allowed to do anything, but, in spite of all his desire, he will be unable to do anything.”

The inability of the small man to affect change produces no threat to liberalism or its controlling elites. Thus, Dugin claims that liberalism promises freedom but only insomuch as it conforms with the prevailing liberal dogma.

Dugin detects hypocrisy in this prevailing dogma. Despite its promises of individual freedom, there is a demand for conformity. Dugin wrote that “conservatism, fascism and communism, together with their many variations, lost the battle and triumphant liberalism mutated into a lifestyle: consumerism, individualism, and a postmodern iteration of the fragmented and sub-political being.”

Liberalism is still even today modernist orthodoxy, but in reality, it is a *Deadman Walking* because as soon as it was victorious over its challengers, Fascism, Communism, and even itself, according to Dugin, the Postmodern Era began.

Modernism, in Dugin’s view, has given way to postmodernism. He went so far as to say that in the postmodern environment, liberalism has morphed into post-liberalism. Fourth Political Theory is an anti-Western expression of a postmodern construct – a contrary expression within the prevailing postmodern milieu. Dugin posits that modernity sowed the seeds of its own decline. Dugin is saying that modernity yielded to postmodernity, and postmodernity, characterized by its deconstructive tendencies, will eventually deconstruct itself.

Dugin believes that “the idea of modernization is based on the idea of progress,” and he predicts that pursuing a liberal agenda to its logical

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684 Ibid.
685 Ibid., 12.
686 Ibid. This seeming paradox, Liberalism’s victory overall, including itself, is a recurring theme throughout *The Fourth Political Theory*. *Deadman Walking* refers to a term (probably of American origin) applied to an inmate on death row (in those remaining state and federal jurisdictions still retaining the death penalty in the U.S.) as he is moved from place to place within prison – because of the sentence, the prisoner is ironically referred to as if already dead. Also, as a cautionary announcement that the inmate should be considered dangerous given that they have nothing to lose as they are already under a sentence of death.
687 Ibid., 19.
688 Ibid., 18-19.
conclusion contributes to societal decline and does not achieve the progress it claims.\textsuperscript{689} For Dugin, progress applied to modernism leads to postmodernity, the normlessness embodied in Émile Durkheim’s anomie, and the characteristic destruction inherent in nihilism.\textsuperscript{690} The general course of postmodernism, according to Fourth Political Theory, is first a chaotic deconstruction of culture and society, and then the substitution of false, imitative, almost caricature-like, renditions of values, norms, and virtues.\textsuperscript{691} Dugin asserts that modernism, as a product of Western Liberalism, has itself fallen, and the victor is a postmodern reality that is dominated by deconstruction and anomie.\textsuperscript{692}

Friedrich Nietzsche did not believe that humans are evolving towards perfection.\textsuperscript{693} Dugin would agree that progress, as viewed in the West, is not an evolutionary inevitability. He offered an alternative, “instead of always looking for modernization and growth, we should orient ourselves in the direction of balance, adaptability, and harmony.”\textsuperscript{694} Dugin expressed the view that “we must adapt to that which exists, to understand where we are, and to harmonize socio-political processes” rather than striving for linear progress.\textsuperscript{695} Considering progress as a linear evolution is in keeping with the thinking of Herbert Spencer, and thus, with the concept of Social Darwinism wherein the struggle for survival yields a more perfect society.\textsuperscript{696} This Darwinian process is in constant upward motion – a more perfect society is

\textsuperscript{689} Ibid., 55.
\textsuperscript{690} Anomie is a condition of Lawlessness or normlessness. It is the “Lack of the usual social or ethical standards in an individual or group,” according to the QED. Cf. Émile Durkheim, \textit{Suicide} (New York: Free Press, 1951). This work as gone through numerous reprints and translations. Durkheim adopted the term \textit{anomie} in his publication of \textit{Suicide} (first published in 1897). Use of the term is evident in other of Durkheim’s works and, with various definitional variations, in the work of other nineteenth and twentieth century scholars to the present day. Émile Durkheim, 1858-1917.
\textsuperscript{691} Dugin, \textit{Fourth Theory}, 18ff.
\textsuperscript{692} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{694} Dugin, \textit{Fourth Theory}, 65.
\textsuperscript{695} Ibid.
better fitted for survival and is continuously becoming even more fit through natural selection.697

Dugin interprets Spencer as purporting two phases of social development. The first is the struggle characterized by physical force.698 The second, more subtly, is in the market arena:

The struggle in the market sphere between the strong (meaning rich) and the weak (meaning poor) becomes more efficient and leads to higher levels of development until super-rich, super-strong, and super-developed countries appear.699

“Liberal discourse, meaning the analysis of the liberal ideologist, is a completely animal discourse,” Dugin explained.700 He concluded that the liberal idea of becoming ever more modern means enhancing “the social, political, cultural, spiritual, and informational scenario.” 701 This enhancement results in the “aggression of the strong against the weak.”702 Dugin looks on the West and sees the aggression of the strong played out through universalism and globalism. The contradiction between the aggressiveness of the strong and the triumph of the weakest elements in Western society, referred to by Nietzsche, exposes the fallacy of Social Darwinism advanced by Spencer and criticized by both Nietzsche and Dugin.703

Dugin referred to Oswald Spengler’s idea of the rise and decline cycle of civilizations, and predicted that “the inertia of postliberal politics is such that a change of course is impossible: to save the West, unrestrained ‘emancipated technology’ will search for more efficient, but a purely technical, technological means.”704 Dugin, picking up on the theme of the rise, decline, and fall of peoples and civilizations, stated: “with regard to cultural studies and philosophy, Nikolai Danilevskii, Oswald Spengler, Carl Schmitt, Ernst Jünger,
Martin Heidegger, and Arnold Toynbee showed that all the processes in the history of philosophy and the history of culture are a cyclical phenomenon.”

Before Western Liberalism’s victory, “societies, at least theoretically, were able to select their subject of choice,” picking class, racism, statism, or individualism. Dugin concluded, “the victory of liberalism resolved this question: the individual became the normative subject within the framework of all mankind.” Liberalism’s victory was pyrrhic, however. Even as Liberal Democracy has attempted to devour all in its path, the deconstructionist elements inherent in postmodernity have been simultaneously dismantling many of the twentieth century liberal accomplishments. This irony is despite liberalism gaining the field over vanquished communism and fascism. Dugin recognizes Plato’s disdain for rule-by-the-many and would almost certainly agree that democracy is driven by unnecessary or, at worse, unlawful appetites if it becomes a tyranny of the majority.

Dugin shares the Platonic anti-democratic phobia and holds the presuppositional position that the global inclusivity of Liberal Democracy is a universal evil, not a universal good. From the Fourth Political Theory vantage point, Liberal Democracy’s victory is giving way to a postmodern hegemony of a kind of capitalistic globalization. “Postmodernism today won [its] most desired victory – control over history,” Dugin asserted. Then cataloging its evils, he said postmodernism tends to globalization, “transgender operations, unisex marriage and clone production.” Facilitating these woes was a combination of a television advertising-style distortion of reality and shaky financial substitutions for solid economic principles.

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706 Ibid., 18.
707 Ibid.
708 The Republic, Book VIII.
709 Cf. e.g., Dugin, Fourth Theory, 18.
711 Ibid.
712 Ibid.
The Classic Liberalism celebrated by Ludwig von Mises was replaced by a nihilistic theatrical façade, a liberal caricature.\textsuperscript{713} “Europe has ceased to be herself, she became a parody of freedom that rots in postmodernism,” was how Dugin put it.\textsuperscript{714} “It was not only the defeated political ideologies” of communism and fascism “that left the stage, but politics itself, and even liberalism, in its ideological forms, exited,” Dugin wrote.\textsuperscript{715} In a similar reference, acknowledging the influence of Daniel Bell, Dugin referred to the End of Ideology, a concept Bell developed. Reminiscent of Fukuyama’s End of History was Bell’s observation that “everyone speaks, more and more frequently, of the ‘crisis of ideology,’ or even the ‘end of ideology.’”\textsuperscript{716}

Dugin denounced Fukuyama’s End of History.\textsuperscript{717} With the End of History, the world was to have achieved a global marketplace and witnessed the demise of competing political ideologies. All this Dugin rejected out-of-hand – first as undesirable, then as a contradiction of experiential reality. Dugin believes that “to move forward” in the development of Fourth Political Theory, “it is necessary” to move away from Jean Baudrillard’s “Post-History” – the “world of deadlocks, blind alleys, and the endless recycling of ‘the same old things.’”\textsuperscript{718}

Dugin, believing that modernism’s postmodern offspring has engaged in matricide, characterizes postmodernism with:

- Globalization
- Ultra-liberalization

\textsuperscript{714} Dugin, “Russians must save Europe.”
\textsuperscript{715} Dugin, \textit{Fourth Theory}, 12.
• Domination of a world that strives to be unipolar

Postmodernism cancels traditional forms of identity: national states, confessions, ethnic groups, and eventually even family and gender. Dugin warned that the “Open Society” that postmodernism has created will be substituted for effective government. Religious extremism and religious indifference will replace traditional confessions. The individual will be elevated to a position above community and nation, and clones and cyborgs will increasingly replace common people. “Postmodernism destroys modernism in every aspect,” was Dugin’s conclusion – the postmodern child has eaten its modern parent.

Progressives, the Western Liberal Democrats, who, according to Dugin, insist that tradition belongs in the past, have expressed no fear that Traditionalism could reappear to threaten the End of History narrative in any meaningful way. Dugin wrote that “when modernism began evolving it was opposed by traditional society,” but the traditional opposition was easily overcome. Remarkably, a remnant of tradition survived and “invested its energy into new ideology,” that had an outer shell of modernism and an inner core of more traditional values and norms. Dugin is making his appeal to this remnant – the inner core.

Fourth Political Theory purports to oppose postmodernity, but Dugin’s theory is also postmodern in the sense that it exists chronologically after modernity. But, instead of losing itself in the normlessness of anomie, Fourth Political Theory reaches back and retrieves the perennial Truth of Traditionalism and grounds itself with the values of Spirituality. Those betting “only on growth

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720 Ibid.
721 Ibid.
722 Ibid.
723 Ibid.
724 Ibid.
725 Dugin, “The Figure of the Radical Subject,” under, Part 1. Traditionalism and Sociology - The Modern and the Eternal.
727 Ibid.
and development, act against all norms of history, against all sociological laws, and against the logic of life,” will lose the bet in Dugin’s opinion. They will lose because, “unidirectional modernization, such growth, such development, and such progress do not exist.” The false narrative of a continuous line of unbroken progress espoused by the West is a relic, a “myth of the 19th century,” Dugin wrote. “Life, in contrast, is connected to eternal return,” which is a Traditional quality in Dugin’s mind.

2.6. The Hermeneutics of Fourth Political Theory

More keys to understanding Dugin are found in an exploration of his core hermeneutical assumptions. Dugin’s hermeneutical presuppositions drive Fourth Political Theory and all its associated accompaniments. For example, Dugin establishes the identity of the West by drawing on his hermeneutical assumptions. Doing this, he identifies Russia, and by extension Eurasia, as Third Rome – the Catechon, and the West he identifies as Antichrist. Dugin’s hermeneutical approaches appear as refrains that are evident throughout his written works and spoken words, and even in his choice of photographs and visual illustrations, his allusions, and metaphors. “The central hermeneutic must be accepted,” David Brannan said, “but once that leap is made, everything apparently falls into place.”

The detectable emphasis on the theological and metaphysical as an integral and essential component of Dugin’s political thought is consistent with the

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728 Dugin, *Fourth Theory*, 64. Italics in original.
729 Ibid.
730 Ibid., 65.
731 Ibid.
732 Cf. 2.3.5., 2.6.9., and 3.5.5. for other mentions and treatment assigned identity. David Brannan’s examination of Assigning Identity is useful in considering Dugin’s hermeneutical approach in the designation of his specific identity labels. Cf. David Brannan, “Violence, Terrorism and the Role of Theology: Repentant and Rebellious Christian Identity,” PhD diss., (University of St Andrews, 2007). When explaining motivations and rational behind identity, Brannan several times remarked to me, “it’s all in the hermeneutics.” By this, he meant that realizing how a text or idea is interpreted provides the real key to understanding the direction the interpreter will take it. My position maintains that Brannan’s assertion holds true regarding Dugin. David Brannan is a professor at the Center for Homeland Defense and Security of the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School.
733 A visit to any number of websites will yield photographs of Dugin illustrating this point, as will his bookcovers and other graphics.
Schmittian hermeneutic combining politics and theology. Dugin’s classifications of themes and refrains suggest “Hermeneutics as the methodology of interpretation,” in keeping with the entry in the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.* Viewed from the academic perspective of hermeneutics as a refined subject area, Jean Grondin suggested confining hermeneutics to “theory of interpretation.” “By ‘hermeneutics’ we mean the theory of interpretation,” agreed Werner G. Jeanrond while lecturing in theology at Trinity College Dublin.

Jeanrond provided the insight that “an ideology may be understood as a rigid attitude over against any object of understanding.” Going further, Jeanrond advocated a more holistic outlook with his understanding that “the interpretation of the overall sense of our universe depends on the interpretation of the many textual or artistic approaches to reality, including the approach to the interpreter’s own self.” I believe Jeanrond’s expansion of his basic definition is critical to understanding Dugin’s hermeneutical approach. For, in addition to extracting elements of Traditionalism and Eurasianism, including geographical, political, and theological ideas, to build his theory, Dugin is also “concerned with problems that arise when dealing with meaningful human actions and the products of such actions.” Dugin’s hermeneutical usage agrees with the definitional expansions of Jeanrond and Chrysostomos Mantzavinos.

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736 Jean Grondin, *Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), 18. Italics in original. Jean Grondin is a Canadian professor and philosopher who specializes in Kant, Gadamer, and Heidegger. Cf. An applicable definition, when considering Dugin’s approach to hermeneutics, is found in Alister McGrath, *Christian Theology* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 490: “the principles underlying the interpretation, or exegesis, of a text, particularly of Scripture, and particularly in relation to its present-day application.” The “present-day application” portion of this definition seems especially relevant to Dugin.

737 Werner G. Jeanrond, *Theological Hermeneutics: Development and Significance* (New York: Crossroad, 1991), 1. Werner Jeanrond is Professor of Systematic Theology at the University of Oslo.


739 Ibid., 5.

740 Cf. Mantzavinos, “Hermeneutics.”
A hermeneutical hierarchy in the structural framework of Fourth Political Theory is evident from the themes or refrains repeated throughout Dugin’s written and spoken works. Dugin situates his Fourth Political Theory under the aegis of the Hermeneutic of Geopolitical-Theology. Moreover, he expresses the theological aspects of his geopolitics from his Neo-Traditionalist viewpoint. Therefore, his Hermeneutic of Traditionalism is to be considered alongside the Hermeneutic of Political Theology, both under the heading of Geopolitical-Theology. Dugin’s other hermeneutical subordinates are the Hermeneutics of Sacred Geography/Sacred Space, proclaiming a Russian Manifest Destiny, accepting Russia as the Third Rome with its subsequent attempts of Revealing Antichrist and viewing Russia as Catechon – The Restrainer that holds back Antichrist.

Dugin’s hermeneutical categories may be arranged under the Geopolitical-Theology heading as:

- Political Theology
- Traditionalism (expressed as Neo-Traditionalism)
  - Anti-modernism/Anti-Westernism
- Sacred Geography/Sacred Space
  - Messianic Russia
  - Manifest Destiny
- Russia as the Third Rome
  - Revealing Antichrist
  - Catechon – the Restrainer that holds back Antichrist

Of the four major hermeneutical categories distinguishable under the overarching Hermeneutic of Geopolitical-Theology, the first three fall rather neatly underneath. The fourth, Russia as the Third Rome, is not quite as comfortable a placement as the three above it. This hermeneutical category contains both Traditional and sacred geographical elements. Russia is distinctively Traditional as the successor of revealed Truth entrusted to Rome, then to Constantinople, when it assumed the sacred mantle for itself, and finally to Russia with the fall of Christian Byzantium. Russia, as the Third Rome, is also distinguished because of its sacred location. Third Rome
advocates, like Dugin, ascribe Russia with remarkable sacred geographical characteristics.

2.6.1. Hermeneutic of Political Theology

A critical sub-set ingredient of Dugin’s Geopolitical-Theology is, of course, political theology. Dugin consistently expresses the Schmittian idea wherein politics contains a discernable theological component. There is a significant, distinguishable, and purposeful theme of intertwined or embedded political intent in his theologically connected presentation – and vice versa.

There is an active theological aspect, albeit decidedly esoteric, in Dugin’s Fourth Political Theory. Dugin applies his spiritual outlook not only to his view of history but his view of the present and future as well. Dugin maintains the same position as that stated in Max Weber’s observation and Schmitt’s paraphrase: “it is possible to confront irrefutably a radical materialist philosophy of history with a similarly radical spiritualist philosophy of history.”

In his Fourth Political Theory, Dugin demonstrates his belief in just such a claim. Dugin accepts Secularization Theorem and rejects Blumenberg’s polytheistic explanations. In Dugin’s opinion, “in order to understand politics, one must regard it as a religious phenomenon.”

Schmitt, according to Dugin, wrote, “all political ideologies and systems are integral theological models with religions, dogmas, institutions, and rites of their own.”

I view Dugin’s Hermeneutic of Political Theology following two pathways. The first “presupposes the existence of the political telos,” its purpose or goal, “which can be constructed by man, like Hobbes’ Leviathan.” The second recognizes political theology as being “of non-human construction, such as the [Roman] Catholic model of imperium, which was close to Schmitt’s heart.”

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741 Schmitt, “Political Theology,” 42. Here Schmitt employs Max Weber in making his point that there is a counterargument to the purely rational approach of liberalism in issues of governance. Max Weber, 1864-1920.
742 Dugin, Fourth Theory, 175.
743 Ibid., 174-75.
744 Ibid., 175. The Editor’s footnote 6 claims that telos is defined here meaning “purpose” or “goal” as in Classical Greek. Italics in original.
745 Ibid. Italics in original. Brackets added.
Dugin incorporates the first and espouses the second in his adoption of Hobbes and Schmitt. Dugin engages in the political construction of Fourth Political Theory, but he does so believing in a theologically created imperium – building with the authority of the Divine Sovereign.

Dugin, like Schmitt, finds “the machine” that “now runs by itself” objectionable. Also like Schmitt, Dugin doubts that the machine that runs without the power of a sovereign in firm control, especially in times of crisis, will not likely run for long, or will careen into a collision and be destroyed. Moreover, as does Schmitt, Dugin finds ample reasons that the State requires a strong central authority equipped to exercise the exceptional force of the state. Finally, Dugin, agreeing with Schmitt, firmly believes in authority that possesses transcendent attributes, writing that, “society should be created not from below but from above.”

While Dugin no doubt believes that the state has the responsibility of “assuring citizens of order and stability,” he does not make this responsibility the raison d’être of the state, as did Schmitt. “The meaning of the State is its spiritual mission,” Dugin claimed in more of a proclamation than a statement. Indeed, it is the state’s spiritual mission, its intertwining of the temporal and the spiritual – the fusion of political and theological elements, that likely makes Dugin, and by extension his Neo-Eurasian vision, so difficult for the West to accept. Dugin finds agreement with Hobbes’ vision of the state’s duty to law and security:

Thomas Hobbes used biblical imagery of Leviathan the Sea Monster in his description of a powerful state able to keep peace and provide its citizens with security across the spectrum from personal to national. Hobbes was fain to envision the population of Leviathan the State contracting away most or all power to a single authority be it a single person or a relatively

746 Dugin, “Against Universalism.”
748 Dugin, “Against Universalism.”
small authoritative council able to enforce the law and relieve the security concerns of the masses.\textsuperscript{749}

Dugin shares much of this Hobbesian philosophy of the power of the state but adds to it – blends with it – significant elements of theologically related metaphysics.

\subsection*{2.6.2. Hermeneutic of Traditionalism}

Fourth Political Theory speaks to historically consistent Russian values and aspirations as well as to theological Truth in the Traditionalist sense of perennial norms and revelations. The mystical and esoteric nature of Dugin’s Neo-Traditionalism is apparent throughout his writing and speaking, but nowhere more so than in his statement regarding the rationalism of Enlightenment-spawned Liberalism. “Tradition is an antithesis to Cartesianism,” is Dugin’s declaration of his belief.\textsuperscript{750} “Formal logic,” Dugin went on to say, “was where the Morning Star began the subversion of our majestic, sacral world.”\textsuperscript{751} Within these statements, Dugin is expressing a worldview that permeates his thinking and influences the articulation of all of his metaphysically grounded geopolitical theory. Cartesianism represents the Western Liberal worldview of formal logic and rationality, and the Morning Star, Dugin’s allusion to Satan, has adopted the Cartesian approach in his usurpation of God and his Creation.\textsuperscript{752}

Dugin’s Geopolitical-Theology involves a decidedly dualist view. Dugin sees Traditionalism as the worthy opponent to progressive Western Liberalism that asserts secular and civil religion dominance, and where long-established

\textsuperscript{750} Dugin, “Cure You With Poison,” under, Serpents against Serpents.
\textsuperscript{751} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{752} Cf. Isaiah 14:12-15, NASB. “How you have fallen from heaven, O star of the morning, son of the dawn!” (verse 12). Although there is debate about the term \textit{morning star} being applied to both Satan and Jesus in Scripture, it is clear here that Dugin’s interpretation in his reference is to Satan. The term \textit{morning star} in Isaiah 14 is rendered \textit{Lucifer} in the King James Bible. It is clear in the totality of the verse that it is not referring to Jesus, but to a created being (thus, “son of the dawn”). The desire of this being (the morning star, the son of the dawn) to be like God is more than adequate to assure that the subject is not Jesus the Messiah; verses 13-15 are clearly not referencing Christ.
religious institutions and mores are subject to internal as well as external deconstruction. Dugin warned that “inter-confessional wars and tensions work for the cause of the kingdom of the Antichrist who tries to divide all the traditional religions in order to impose its own pseudo-religion, the eschatological parody.” Political figures and academics in the West, where only civil religion is safe ground, are not used to such counter-enlightenment pronouncements boldly spoken by one who wields such a degree of potential influence.

Dugin is nowhere willing to cede the contest between Traditionalism and modernity to secular or civil religion. He wrote:

“In the spirit of Peter Berger, we can open up the prospect of “desecularisation” (throughout history, religious organisations frequently act as political subjects) or, together with Carl Schmitt, we can rethink the influence of Tradition on a political decision.”

Understanding Dugin’s identified Traditional Hermeneutic also provides a more unobstructed view of his preference for Sufist Islamic expressions, and its accommodation to Traditionalist views, as opposed to those of Wahhabist or Salafist leanings. Dugin insisted that “atomism is the doctrine of the asharitas and of the aggressively anti-Sufi, anti-esoteric theologian, Ibn Taymiyyah, father of contemporary Wahhabism and Salafism.”

Dugin embraces the conservatism inherent in Traditionalism. He places his Hermeneutic of Traditionalism beneath the overarching tent of Geopolitical-Theology. Beneath this hermeneutical heading, Dugin arranges the Hermeneutic of Anti-Modernism, often expressed as anti-Westernism. Dugin took the anti-modernism found in Guénon’s school of Integral Traditionalism,

753 Dugin, Fourth Theory, 196.
755 Dugin, “The Figure of the Radical Subject,” under, Part 1. Traditionalism and Sociology - The Modern and the Eternal. Cf. 2.3.6. for Dugin’s condemnation of atomism. Ibn Taymiyyah, Taqi al-Din Ahmad, 1263-1328.
modified it with active elements of Evola’s political brand of Traditionalist thought, and, using both, produced a hyper-anti-Western hybrid.

2.6.3. Hermeneutic of Anti-Modernism/Anti-Westernism

Even a casual reader of Dugin quickly picks up on his anti-Western bias that is partially based on his vehement condemnation of globalism’s rampant materialism. The constitutive ideology of the West contains efforts to expand Western globalism and the secular notion that elevates the individual over the traditional community. Dugin classifies both globalism and individualism as tenets of Western Liberalism. Dugin sees America as the “ominous and alarming country on the other side of the ocean.” In a telling selection from Vladimir Moss’s English translation of Absolutnaia Rodina, Dugin stated that America is a country “without history.” “It is the result of a pure experiment of the European rationalist utopians.” It is also,

without tradition, without roots. An artificial, aggressive, imposed reality, completely devoid of spirit, concentrated only on the material world and technical effectiveness, cold, indifferent, an advertisement shining with neon light and senseless luxury; darkened by pathological poverty, genetic degradation and the rupture of all and every person and thing, nature and culture.

Dugin continued with his condemnation of America saying that with “its planetary dominion, the triumph of its way of life, its civilizational model over all the peoples of the earth,” America sees “progress” and “civilizational

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756 Cf. e.g., Dugin, Fourth Theory, 88.
758 Ibid.
759 Ibid. Moss is quoting Dugin as above.
760 Ibid. Again, Moss is quoting Dugin as above.
norms” only in itself. Moss wrote that, in Dugin’s opinion, America refuses the right to choose values and culture to everyone else on the planet.

### 2.6.4. Hermeneutic of Sacred Geography/Sacred Space

The backdrop of Sacred Geography is an ever-present reality with Dugin. Critical to correctly viewing Dugin in the development of his Eurasian concept is realizing his consistent reliance on a spiritual understanding of geography. This element of geography and space is absent, or nearly so, in the West’s geopolitical perception. Dugin believes that there is a conflict between the priorities of modern Western geopolitics and “the paradigm of sacred geography.”

There is also a direct contradiction between things considered “positive” by the majority of people in the West and those adhering to a belief in Sacred Geography/Sacred Space. According to Western geopolitics, “such concepts as ‘progress,’ ‘liberalism,’ ‘human rights,’” for example, “are today positive terms for the majority of people.” For those subscribing to Fourth Political Theory and a Sacred Geography/Sacred Space paradigm, evaluation of things “positive” spring “from a completely opposite point of view.”

Dugin’s continued use of metaphorical language exposes his belief that deep-felt spiritual connections are inextricably part of the human condition. Superficially, many Westerners think they are entirely divorced from their ancient ancestral antecedents. Yet, even common expressions such as a person being under a cloud, or describing the natural world as Mother Nature, betrays the persistence of uncanny awe and spiritual associations with nature’s myriad phenomena. According to Dugin, “even in our antisacred [sic]world, at an ‘unconscious’ level almost always archetypes of sacred

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762 Ibid.
763 Ibid. “From Sacred Geography,” under, East and West in Modern Geopolitics.
764 Ibid.
765 Ibid.
766 Ibid.
geography are preserved in their integrity, and are awoken in the most relevant and critical moments of social cataclysms.”

Shils related that human societies seeking ultimate references for solidarity usually turn to either the sacred or the “objective ties of blood and soil.” Dugin takes a position contrary to the “blood” aspect of Shils’ “blood and soil.” Specifically, Dugin related that, contrary to other peoples, “Russians distinguish themselves not by blood, ethnicity, phenotype or culture.” Unlike others, Russians identify more with space, an identification that Dugin characterizes as a “national intoxication.” In the Russian mindset, geographical connections may supersede racial or ethnic ties. Put directly, “Russians regard space as sacred,” according to Dugin. This interpretation of their land as Sacred Space may help explain Dugin’s observation that “in many cases Russians prefer non-Slavic people affiliated with Russian space to other Slavs.”

Comprising both the Geo of Dugin’s Geopolitics and an essential element of the theology in his Geopolitical-Theology is Dugin’s realization of the sacredness of particular locations and geological features. For Dugin, geography comprises much more than the physical characteristics of land and sea. Dugin believes in a material world imbued with an inseparable spiritual dimension. Dugin weaves spiritual yarn throughout the projection of his Eurasian ideas with his concept of Sacred Geography/Sacred Space.

2.6.5. Hermeneutic of Messianic Russia/Eurasia and Manifest Destiny

Dugin’s Hermeneutic of Sacred Geography/Sacred Space allows him to project his vision of Eurasia through the lenses of Manifest Destiny terms and
understandings. Woven deeply into the Hermeneutic of Sacred Geography/Sacred Space are the hermeneutically derived imperatives of Messianic Russia, expressed in Manifest Destiny terms and understandings, and passed on and expanded as a messianic Eurasian mission. While Manifest Destiny is often spoken of with derision in the postmodern West, Dugin does not express the concept in negative terms.

Dugin’s mind – and this applies to many Russian thinkers – is Eastern, in that it contemplates theological and metaphysical considerations as a matter of course, unlike the purposeful intent of many Western thinkers who tend to exclude anything theological or spiritual altogether. It is instructive to observe that Dugin applies a theologically inspired approach to American development in its philosophical heritage, the effects of the Enlightenment on it, and to its geographical growth expressed in Manifest Destiny.

As a historical product of Western Europe during its evolution, the New World very early on realized its “messiah” destiny, where the liberal-democratic ideals of the Enlightenment were combined with the eschatological ideas of radical protestant sects. This was called the theory of Manifest Destiny, which became the new symbol of belief for generations of Americans. According to this theory, American civilization overtook all cultures and civilizations of the Old World and in its current universal form, it is obligatory for all nations of the planet.774

Russia, too, possesses a messianic mission. There is a difference, however. Where Dugin implies a messianic destiny to the United States, he does so mainly in a metaphorical sense – underscoring America’s expansionist fervor. When he addresses the messianic mission of Russia, he insists on its divine appointment. “We are a divine nation,” is the distillation of Dugin’s belief.775 The messianic destiny assignation of the U.S. is mostly a metaphorical device to explain its expansionist motives. In contrast, the messianic mission of

Russia envisioned by Dugin is actual, divinely directed, and divinely imperative.

In an interview by Alternative Right, Dugin was asked by Tremblay, “you oppose American Manifest Destiny, but how does Orthodox Messianism differ?” Dugin, in part, replied, “Manifest Destiny exists, not in the singular but in the plural.” Dugin suggested that, rather than a single Manifest Destiny, there are “Manifest Destinies: American, European, Russian, Islamic, Chinese, and so on.” It is the exclusiveness of a singular American Manifest Destiny that Dugin opposes, and the divinely directed messianic mission of Eurasia that he proclaims.

2.6.6. Hermeneutic of Third Rome

Dugin employs a hermeneutical approach that recognizes Russia/Eurasia as the Third Rome and, as such, as Catechon – the Restrainer that holds back Antichrist – the New World Order being the Collective Antichrist. With the fall of First Rome – the Western portion of the Roman Empire – Constantinople became the seat of Roman power – Second Rome. The Bishoprics of Rome and Constantinople were nominally equal, but Rome more and more assumed not just the title of Chair of Peter, but also increasingly claimed the primacy. Eventually, internal doctrinal fighting led to the division of the Church into separate Eastern and Western entities.

Dugin wrote that “After the schism that split the Churches into Western (Catholic) and Eastern (Orthodox) hemispheres, the New Rome, Byzantium, remained the one guardian of true Christianity while the Catholics fell into the

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776 Dugin, “Against Universalism.”
777 Ibid.
778 Ibid. Emphasis in original.
void of apostasy.”780 Second Rome fell as well. The Ottomans occupied Greece, formerly under Byzantine protection, after the fall of Constantinople in 1453. “But in a northern kingdom, in snowy and wild lands populated by a strange, pensive, contemplative people immersed in the fury of their secret mission, everything remained the same,” Dugin related, “as if that terrible event,” the fall of Second Rome, “had not taken place.”781 According to Dugin, when Moscow took over the mission as the stronghold of Eastern Christianity, the Third Rome came into being.782

So did Rus become the one country where the teachings and norms of true Christianity remained extant. Thus, the eternal city moved to the North, to Moscow. Henceforth, Moscow took upon itself the baton of being the subject of history. Later, a Patriarchy was established in Rus, and the “symphony of powers” was fully affirmed. Moscow became a synonym for Orthodoxy in the post-Byzantine era.783

2.6.7. Hermeneutic of Identifying Antichrist

The Apostle Paul warned his fellow Christians not to become overly concerned even if they got a letter purportedly written by him, not even if a spirit should deliver information that “the day of the Lord has come.”784 The clear implication being that such a letter must be a forgery, and such a message from a spirit must be from an evil one. The reason such news could not be real is that such a day cannot come “unless the apostasy comes first.”785 Before the “day of the Lord,” the “man of lawlessness” will be revealed.786 This “man of lawlessness” is spoken of as if he is Antichrist – if not, then some forerunner or prototype.787

781 Ibid.
782 Ibid.
783 Ibid.
784 2 Thessalonians 2: 2, NASB.
785 2 Thessalonians 2: 3, NASB.
786 2 Thessalonians 2: 3, NASB, “Let no one in any way deceive you, for it will not come unless the apostasy comes first, and the man of lawlessness is revealed, the son of destruction.”
787 2 Thessalonians 2: 9, NASB, “that is, the one whose coming is in accord with the activity of Satan, with all power and signs and false wonders.”
Dugin is confusing, sometimes even contradictory, concerning the specifics he attributes to the manifestation of the Antichrist. To arrive at a clearer understanding of how he entertains multiple Antichrist candidates, it is useful to realize Dugin’s Orthodox and schismatic Old Believer background.\textsuperscript{788} According to Rossman, Old Believer adherents claim, “that the Antichrist has already come and often identified him with one of the Russian emperors.”\textsuperscript{789} As an Old Believer, it would follow that Dugin would likely adopt a similar conclusion.

Rossman has also suggested that:

\begin{quote}
Judaism does not have the soteriological element common in all other religions; the Messiah of Judaists does not bring any “good news” and does not promise the “return” to the original state. It is not surprising then that the Jewish Messiah is identified in “eternal Christianity” and other traditional religions with the Antichrist.\textsuperscript{790}
\end{quote}

Given Dugin’s Traditional embrace of the “eternal Christianity” referred to by Rossman, it could follow that Dugin accepts that the Jewish Messiah is Antichrist.\textsuperscript{791} Dugin contends that Judaism and Christianity share common terms regarding concepts such as eschatology, messiahship, and demonology, though they sometimes differ greatly as to their meanings.\textsuperscript{792} For example, “in the Judaic consciousness the Messiah is not a Divine Hero who comes down from Heaven to rectify the worn cosmos and to save the degraded human community, as it is for the Christians,” according to Dugin.\textsuperscript{793}

\textsuperscript{788} Dugin’s identification as an Old Believer/Old Ritualist is addressed more fully herein. Throughout, mentions of Old Ritualist and Old Believer are used interchangeably. Old Ritualists/Old Believers are Orthodox schismatics who split from mainstream Orthodoxy in 1666. Patriarch Nicon introduced the New Rite ca. 1666-67 resulting in placing the Old Ritualists/Old Believers under anathema. Anathema was officially rescinded in 1971, but a lack full restoration remains evident.
\textsuperscript{790} Ibid., 174.
\textsuperscript{791} Ibid. Cf. references throughout referring to authentic, original, and eternal Christianity. Also, the association of these terms with Old Believer/Old Ritual Orthodoxy.
\textsuperscript{792} Ibid.
Dugin wrote that the messiah described in Judaic sources “cannot be identified with the direct and triumphal revelation of the Transcendental.” He concluded that this Jewish Messiah would not usher in anything new – no New Heaven and New Earth as in Christian doctrine. Dugin ultimately decided that the Jewish Messiah is not on the side of Light and Truth.

There is a third possibility. Imbuing the Antichrist with a collective nature, Dugin suggests a “Moshiah of the World Government” – Antichrist manifested as the New World Order. In the early 1990s, as President Bush began proclaiming the arrival of a New World Order, Dugin began to announce its inherent evil. “After the Gulf War,” Dugin wrote, “almost all mass media outlets in Russia, as well as in the West, injected into the common speak the formula ‘New World Order,’ coined by George Bush, and then used by other politicians including Gorbachev and Yeltsin.”

Dugin immediately applied theological implications to these New World Order announcements claiming that Orthodox Christianity and Islam “clearly identify ‘new religiosity,’ New World Order, and Moshiah with the most sinister player in the eschatological drama, the Antichrist (Dadjal in Arabic).”

Dugin’s repeated claims that America is Antichrist, or a close associate, conflict with the Old Believer doctrine of the already accomplished appearance of Antichrist. His claims also seem to contradict any projection of

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794 Ibid. Rossman credits Dugin as above.
795 Ibid. Again, crediting Dugin as above.
796 Ibid.
797 Dugin, “Ideology of World Government.” What Dugin renders here as Moshiah is also encountered as Moshiach or Mashiah – the Messiah – in Jewish messianic interpretations. Cf. e.g., Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, vol. 3, 813-14 for discussion of the Antichrist as not necessarily being an individual, perhaps being a power.
798 Ibid. While Dugin and others apply various theological interpretations to Bush’s New World Order proclamations, there is scant evidence from Bush’s several speeches on the subject that he attached any religious emphasis to the concept. For Bush, the New World Order references appear to be political and promote the advancement of the attributes of Western Liberal Democracy absent any overt religious agenda. Mikhail Gorbachev, born March 2, 1931.
799 Ibid. Here messianic mention is more in the vein of traditional Judaism (still anticipating the coming) than the Orthodox Christian belief in Messiah Jesus as an already accomplished temporal and spiritual fact. Parentheses in original.
the Jewish Messiah as Antichrist. As with much of Dugin’s esoteric rhetoric, it is difficult to know how much to accept literally.

I strongly believe that Modernity is absolutely wrong and the Sacred Tradition is absolutely right. USA is the manifestation of all I hate – Modernity, westernization, unipolarity, racism, imperialism, technocracy, individualism, capitalism. It is in my eyes the society of Antichrist.800

Russia, the core of Eurasia, is the opponent of a New World Order morphed from the Western inheritance of the Enlightenment. To proponents of Fourth Political Theory, The Enlightenment, and hence the New World Order, produced a false faith, the pseudo-religion of Liberal Western globalism. The extensions spawned in evil – modernity, postmodernity, and the New World Order – represent the Moshiah, the Antichrist, of this world. Dugin Believes that the “Moshiah of the World Government is not simply a ‘cultural project, new ‘social myth,’ or ‘grotesque utopia,’ but is something much more serious, real, terrible.”801

2.6.8. Hermeneutic of the Catechon (the Restrainer)

Dugin emphatically identifies Russia both past, present, and future as the Catechon.802 The Catechon is the one who restrains Antichrist.803 “The mystery of lawlessness is already at work,” Paul wrote, “only he who now restrains will do so until he is taken out of the way.”804 “He who now restrains” is part of the mystery surrounding the Antichrist. The idea of Russia as Catechon can be seen as Dugin’s way of placing messianic Russia in the divine position of blocking the expansion of Western globalism; thus, does Russia restrain the Antichrist.

2.6.9. Assigning Identity

800 Dugin, “Maoism Is Too Modern for Me,” under, Five Questions for Alexander Dugin, The Fourth Political Theory, March 26, 2015, accessed May 5, 2016, http://4pt.su/en/content/maoism-too-modern-me. E.g., Dugin alternately applies Antichrist to America, the New World Order, the Roman Catholic Church, the Jewish Missiah, and Western Culture in general. This was part of Dugin’s response to the first question.
801 Dugin, “Ideology of World Government.”
802 Cf. 2.6., 2.6.6. and other references throughout that support this contention.
803 2 Thessalonians 2: 7, NASB. Cf. verses 1-12. (Katechon – κατέχον)
804 2 Thessalonians 2: 7. Italics in original.
To attach a theological hermeneutic to Russia and the West, Dugin must bestow them with religious Identities. As described by Brannan, establishing this identity is accomplished through a dynamic hermeneutical process. Dugin has done this. He applied a hermeneutical method during his construction of Fourth Political Theory and Neo-Eurasian projections. Jeanrond’s definitional expansion allows identity to be incorporated where required in Dugin’s hermeneutical categories. This expansion of hermeneutical parameters enhances Dugin’s ability to apply mystical, symbolical, and conspiratorial metaphysical identity assignments to various players within his hermeneutical structure.

2.7. Examples of Dugin’s Metaphysical Esoteric Mindset

Grasping just how tightly Dugin binds esoteric metaphysics to his day-to-day thinking is probably extremely difficult for Western geopoliticians. The Cartesian comparison, Traditionalism versus logic, Dugin uses illustrates the distance between the esoteric realm and the perceived reality of the West. Because Dugin tends to place mystical narratives to the fore, he often ignores contrary empirical evidence. His tendency to do this often proves a vexation to Western commentators.

Consider Dugin’s treatment of the Arthurian Narrative, Charlemagne, and Apollo, as he looks to the future of Russian and Europe in one short paragraph. First, Dugin claimed that the basis of what he terms the “Russian vision” is found in Russian Orthodoxy and Russia’s past Eurasian empire. He then supposed, “that the future of Europe lies in the restoration of the Charlemagne heritage and of the eschatological anticipation of the return of King Arthur.” Adding, that some may even “hope for the new Roman Empire professed by Virgil, who thought that Apollo would return and this time for eternity.” Dugin was in no way attempting to argue the

805 Cf. 3.5.5.
806 Cf. 2.6.
808 Dugin, “Against Universalism.”
809 Ibid.
810 Ibid.
811 Ibid.
historicity of his examples; he was purposefully presenting them in spiritual and heroic terms.

2.7.1. The Example of Turbo-Capitalism and the Cosmic Egg

There are myriad examples of Dugin’s esoteric mindset and how he incorporates it into standard mainstream dialog. Consider his writing on “The problematic ontology of turbo-capitalism.”812 Dugin unhesitatingly inserts Traditionally recognizable allusions and illustrations into his discourse on any number of subject areas he is discussing – in this case, economics. First, Dugin wrote of how Turbo-Capitalism is “eroding the system of things and invoking a system of signs.”813 Dugin addressed the move from an economy based on exchanges in material things to a “new economy” based on “contemplation and sensorial stimulation.” 814

In turbo-capitalism we reach not simply the borders of ontology, as the borders of the ontology of the third state, the limits of the bourgeois system of measures. And the “new economy” itself is not yet a new era – it is an ambiguous and pluri-significant [sic] challenge to say goodbye to the old, but not offering at the same time anything new.815

Second, he addressed the move from material accumulation to sensorial stimulation, “in which the essential element is not so much possession,” but one where there is a “proliferation of narcotics, television networks and computer games.”816 Then, Dugin abruptly made a leap into the esoteric:

True, the extreme conservatives (R. Guénon) say that the present phase of post-materialism corresponds to the “opening of the cosmic egg from below,” while in the epoch of the traditional societies it was opened from above, and later (during classic capitalism) it was closed from all sides.817

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814 Ibid.
815 Ibid. Brackets added.
816 Ibid.
817 Ibid.
The Cosmic Egg, Dugin’s Egg of the World in his 2011 Paris lecture, refers to the representation of the creation of the world (or the Cosmos) in the creation narratives of various sacred and esoteric texts.818

In Paris, in 2011 I gave a lecture under the title: “René Guénon as a sociologist.” René Guénon in his book “The Reign of Quantity and the Signs of the Times” used the traditional and sacred symbol of the Egg of the World. In Guénon’s perspective, the pre-modern world corresponds to the Egg of the World open on the top and closed on the bottom. The spiritual rays enter the world and so the cosmic and material things receive the sacred qualities.819

“Modern society corresponds to the Egg of the World closed on the top and on the bottom,” Dugin explained.820 He went on to say that the Cosmic Egg, closed at both ends, “is the materialistic, atheistic, consumerist civilization,” it comprises “the scientific, mechanical and atomistic worldview.”821 Perhaps even worse, “Postmodern society corresponds to the Egg of the World open on the bottom and closed on the top.”822 Dugin added that this “demonic post-human and post-social civilization,” happens to be “the reality in which we live.”823

These excerpts are not intended to examine the validity of Dugin’s economic ideas and observations but to emphasize the rapid change of direction he took in his otherwise economic discourse. Dugin moved from the economics of material accumulation to the Cosmic Egg without missing a beat. These deviations from a dialog that is understood, or at least that engages with familiar words and phrases, to the esoteric realm of mystical symbolism are likely disconcerting to most Western audiences. For Dugin, such leaps are commonplace and show the esoteric bend of his Neo-Traditionalism.

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818 Dugin, “The Figure of the Radical Subject,” under, Part 1. Traditionalism and Sociology - The Modern and the Eternal. Creation narratives involving the Cosmic Egg idea are widespread; Cf. e.g., the Upanishads, the Brahmaṇḍa Purana, the Orphic Egg of Ancient Greek narrative, etc.
819 Ibid.
820 Ibid.
821 Ibid.
822 Ibid.
823 Ibid.
2.7.2. The Example of the Serpent

Recalling the enmity proclaimed in the Book of Genesis, Dugin understated, “there is a bad attitude towards the serpent.” Dugin understated, “there is a bad attitude towards the serpent.”824 Snakes, to memorialize “the temptation of Eve in Paradise,” are penalized by being “deprived of legs” and having to “creep on their bellies upon damp, crude ground.”825 But what of the Serpent, blamed for all snakes’ hipless and shoulderless curse? Most certainly, the Serpent described in Genesis is Satan acting out his role as the Deceiver. Satan possesses an inherent dualism – he is angelic yet demonic. Though in his fallen state, he is no longer an angel of light, he attempts to appear so.826 He is not of this world, yet he is its prince for a time. Contributing to his success as the Deceiver, serpents are not always synonymous with Satan. Sometimes a snake is depicted as a symbol of Goodness – even analogous to Christ Himself.

The early Christians were aware of an amazing symbol, the Anfisbena, a two-headed serpent consisting of two halves, one black and one white, the two participants of the last struggle with a common body.827 Here, intertwined snakes of the Anfisbena represent Evil and Goodness, not in a dualism of personality, but in a close struggle of Darkness and Light, of Antichrist and Christ. It is the appearance of goodness that camouflages the Deceiver’s evil. The more truth the Dark Serpent can mix with his lies, the more like the Serpent of Light he appears to be.

A much more mundane symbol is that of the mole. Not eliciting the same degree of visceral repugnance as does the snake, the mole is seemingly cast poorly and out-of-character as an evil and sinister actor on the world stage. Dugin related that “Marx named the mole as a symbol of capitalism.”828

Like a blind mole Capitalism digs gloomy holes in the hearts of the blotto people, rushing around in the vampiric labyrinths

825 Ibid.
826 Cf. 2 Corinthians 11:14 NASB.
827 Dugin, “Cure you with Poison,” under, Serpents against Serpents.
828 Ibid., under, The Evolution of Capitalist Animals.
with increasing value for the benefit of the meanest minority and for the uncountable sufferings of the silliest majority.\textsuperscript{829}

For a time, the mole dominated the stage, but the Time of the Mole has passed. Dugin claimed that French philosopher, Gilles Deleuze, was correct in saying that we have now come to the “phase of the serpent.”\textsuperscript{830} It is not that the serpent replaced the mole – capitalism replaced by an entirely different ideology – instead, the mole has morphed into the snake.

The serpent is the symbol of capitalism gone to the extreme. “The old monetary mole is the animal of the space of enclosure, but the serpent is that of the societies of control,” wrote Deleuze, adding, “we have passed from one animal to the other, from the mole to the serpent.”\textsuperscript{831}

In the modern globalist world the distinction between dominating and dominated, between men and women, full and hungry, doctors and patients, teachers and scholars is erasing itself. An open society is constructed in accordance with the serpent principle. Everything merges into everything else, the continuous social surfing penetrates the strata of global society. Capitalism no longer bribes Labour, but creates Labour in the form of entertainment.\textsuperscript{832}

Dugin recalled the Copper Serpent, the serpent on a cross found in Orthodox churches. It is this other serpent, the not-Satan serpent, the Copper Serpent, “whose image was erected in the desert by Moses.”\textsuperscript{833} The Copper Serpent, Dugin reminded us, is “considered to be a prototype of the Redeemer,” to whom Traditionalists turn to defeat the Dark Serpent symbol-bearing capitalism of the West.\textsuperscript{834} Dugin believes that the Serpent of Light will emerge victorious in its struggles against the Serpent of Darkness – triumphant Traditionalism will overcome postmodernity.

2.7.3. Dugin as Conspirologist

\textsuperscript{829} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{830} Ibid. Gilles Deleuze, 1925-1995.
\textsuperscript{831} Gilles Deleuze, “Postscript on the Societies of Control,” \textit{October} 59 (Winter 1992): 5.
\textsuperscript{832} Dugin, “Cure you with Poison,” under, The Evolution of Capitalist Animals.
\textsuperscript{833} Ibid., under, Serpents against Serpents. This serpent is described in various translations as made of brass, bronze, or generally that it was “brazen.”
\textsuperscript{834} Ibid.
An excursion on the voyage into the deterministic persecution-complex-filled regions of conspirology could be entertaining but will not be embarked on here. Although, Dugin’s assertion that he is a “conspirologist” by itself validates exploration into this facet of his Neo-Traditionalism; “Dugin introduced himself as a ‘metaphysician, conspirologist, and expert in sacred geography.’”\textsuperscript{835} Some examination of Dugin’s references to various perceived conspiracies is in order because Dugin displays recognizable conspirological themes in Forth Political Theory metaphysics.

Karl Popper expounded on Conspiracy Theory at some length.\textsuperscript{836} His work, \textit{The Open Society and Its Enemies}, anti-totalitarian and widely lauded for its defense of Liberal Democracy, also examines Conspiracy Theory.\textsuperscript{837} Popper explained that Conspiracy Theory is a social phenomenon where many of the events of society, especially the negative ones, are believed to be contrived by members of an enormously influential group.\textsuperscript{838} Epstein explained it like this, “the notion of conspiracy presupposes that history is designed according to some initial plan, so that all particular events – wars, revolutions, natural disasters – can be explained as part and parcel of a grand scheme.”\textsuperscript{839}

Dugin and his like-minded cohorts link the New World Order with commonly mentioned Conspiracy Theory actors: the Trilateral Commission, the Bilderberg Group, and the cabal of “occult” international bankers.\textsuperscript{840} Dugin suspects the entire New World Order enterprise to be part of a broad conspiracy. The seriousness of the implications Dugin and his colleagues of the journalistic magazine, \textit{Elements}, placed on Bush’s repeated use of New

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{835} Rossman, “Russian Intellectual AntiSemitism” 38.
\item \textsuperscript{836} Karl Popper, 1902-1994.
\item \textsuperscript{838} Popper, “Autonomy of Sociology,” 435.
\item \textsuperscript{839} Epstein, \textit{Conservatism and Traditionalism}, 13.
\item \textsuperscript{840} Dugin, “Ideology of World Government.”
\end{itemize}
World Order phraseology immediately took on conspiriological tones with statements such as:

The New World Order, based on the establishment of One World Government, as has been candidly admitted by odeologists [sic] of the Trilateral Commission and Bildenburg [sic], is not simply a question of politico-economic domination of a certain “occult” ruling clique of international bankers. This “Order” bases itself on the victory on a global scale of a certain special ideology, and so the concept concerns not only instruments of power, but also “ideological revolution,” a “coup d’État” consciousness, “new thinking.”

In addition to the New World Order, Dugin displays other conspiratorial projections. Dugin remarked that there is a “deep, sacred, and well-grounded mystical and theological hostility of Russian nationalism” directed toward all things Jewish. There is a substantial amount of Dugin material, before the past ten or more years, that links Dugin, through his writing, with Jewish Conspiracy themes. Dugin’s thrust appears directed toward his eschatological focused associations of the Jewish Messiah with Antichrist.

Dugin’s conspirology is both a cause and a symptom of his stance against Western Liberalism and its historical development. If the New World Order is a real conspiracy directed at a unipolar world endgame, it is natural to realize Dugin’s opposition to Western hegemony. On the other hand, if a unipolar world goal is only a perception of Dugin’s misunderstanding of Western intentions, conspiracy may only be a symptom of his misperception.

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841 Ibid.
844 Cf. e.g., Rossman, “Anti-Semitism in Eurasian Historiography,” 175. This should be considered alongside Dugin’s associations of America as Antichrist.
2.8. Dugin’s Christianity

Dugin is drawn to the “esoteric underpinnings of Orthodoxy.” He noted these foundational elements “can be clearly traced and are evident in the sacred architecture of churches, initiatic iconography, and a widespread apophatic theology as well as in the monastic contemplative practices in Hesychasm, the Old Believers, and the traditions of the Holy Fools,” and others. Dugin’s attraction to Russian Orthodoxy is part of his Russian heritage. Given his proclivity to mysticism, the orthopraxis of Russian Orthodoxy adds to its appeal.

Dugin practices his Orthodoxy, not in the mainstream Russian Orthodox Church but in the Schismatic confines of the Old Believers. Schismatic leadership did not accept the reforms instituted by the Orthodox Church under Patriarch Nikon of Moscow in a synod convened in 1666. The Old Believers (or Old Ritualists) – due to their holding to the pre-1666 reforms and the old liturgical forms – split from the Orthodox Church. Old Believers were held to be schismatic until anathema was lifted in 1971. Cancelation of anathema allowed for restoration within the Orthodox communion.

Dugin demonstrates the depth of his mystical intimacy with the “esoteric specificity of Orthodoxy” in his observations of the proper separation of the altar from the laity.

Thus, the sacrament of the altar is genuinely exoteric and “descends” to the outer level. In Orthodoxy, however, the gates of Iconostasis – the Royal Gates – are open only for a short

845 Dugin, “Russian Orthodoxy and Initiation,” under, Orthodoxy and the East.

847 Dugin, “Russian Orthodoxy and Initiation,” under, Orthodoxy and the East.
period during the key moments of the liturgy (the exception being on certain holidays). This symbolizes the unique revelation of the apophatic, unknowable Principle on the other side of the cataphatic vision of the sacred world which in a normal state is presented only by symbols.\textsuperscript{848}

There is a mystical element in Dugin’s Neo-Traditionalism that displays an affinity to Orthodox Christianity. A similar relationship with Western Protestantism and Roman Catholicism is mostly absent. Not only this, Dugin’s claims that the Old Believer position is sympathetic to Traditionalism should also be considered.

I came to the conclusion that there is an ideal form, which actually is our “national guenonism.” It’s the Old Believers, of old Christianity, which, since the second half of the seventeenth century, actually is in the ontological, eschatological and apocalyptic state, where it is crystal-clear and easy to understand the positions expressed by Guenon. There is not just the proximity or similarity of the positions (at the level of discourses), but almost complete identity. Adequately internalized Guenonism (i.e. postguenonism) in Russia and in the framework of Orthodoxy is an extremely old reality which preserves the paradigmatic traditionalist language, upon which rests the entire Christian tradition. Cycloplegia (or historical “ecclesiology”) of Christianity is adequately represented in this sector of Orthodoxy.\textsuperscript{849}

Of the factors contributing to Dugin’s affinity for Orthodoxy, including its inseparable bonds to Russian culture, Russian Orthodoxy’s accommodation of Old Believer doctrine affording Christian approaches to Traditionalism is not the least.

\textbf{2.8.1. Symphonia}

In addition to the mystical attraction of the Orthodox Church, I suggest that Dugin is drawn to the potential for synchrony and symbiosis in the church and state relationship evident throughout Eastern Orthodoxy. The “Bases of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church,” states that humans, not

\textsuperscript{848} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{849} Dugin, “Traditionalism as Language,” under, Russian and Traditionalism. The word \textit{seventeenth} was written entirely in uppercase in the original.
God, introduced temporal rule. Given the human demand for the Hebrew monarchy in Israel, Orthodox Christianity recognized that kingship was not a substitute for, or subordination of, the divinely created Priesthood. Accepting that neither church nor state is in the superior position combined with no proscription regarding a working relationship between the two resonates in Dugin’s Geopolitical-Theology.

From the Eastern Orthodoxy of Byzantium emerged Symphonia Theory, the close interdependence, without subordination, between church and state. “One way of explaining the Byzantine political ideal of symphonia is to say that, under its auspices, Byzantine society sought a ‘balance’ between church and state,” wrote David J. Dunn. There is little evidence of this concept in Christianity today outside of Eastern Orthodoxy, and its presence there may account for Dugin’s own Symphonia leanings and subsequent rejection of contemporary Western ideas of church and state separation.

Dugin rejects the severe Western Democratic practice of isolating religion and proposes rediscovering, advocating, and entwining theological elements in his geopolitical constructions. His attitude towards the symphony of governance and faith bears a remarkable similarity with what is evident in much Islamic political expression. This similarity likely contributes to Dugin’s syncretistic attitude regarding religious inclusiveness in his Neo-Eurasian idea.

Comparing Eastern Orthodoxy with Roman Catholicism, Dugin explained that, “the Orthodox Patriarch, unlike the Pope, is first and foremost the spiritual center of the Church,” yet he “does not directly influence public and

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851 Ibid. Cf. 1 Samuel 8.
852 David J. Dunn, “Symphonia in the Secular: An Ecclesiology for the Narthex” (PhD diss., Vanderbilt University, 2011), 110. Cf. Stanley S. Harakas, Living the Faith: The Praxis of Eastern Orthodox Ethics (Minneapolis, MN: Light and Life Pub, 1993), 259-93. Here Harakas explains his view that there are four possible categories of Church/State relationships: Separation of church and state – in this case, the state can be neutral, friendly, or antagonistic to the church; Papocesarism (theocracy) – the church, or religious authority, is the government; Caesaropapism – the church is governed by the state; and Symphonia theory – where the church and state are complementary and exhibit mutual respect. The Rev. Dr. Stanley S. Harakas, is an American Greek Orthodox priest, writer, scholar, and Emeritus Professor of Orthodox Theology.
853 Cf. Dugin, “Russian Orthodoxy and Initiation,” under, Orthodoxy and the East.
political life.” Also of interest is Dugin’s notion of the Ghibelline Archetype and his claim that this concept “was embodied in the sacred attitude towards the Russian Tsars,” where it was the Tsar who occupied “the sacred center of the Russian imperial ecumene.” According to Dugin, the Tsar was the focus of all the “immanent religious energies” of the population of the Empire.

Dugin related that “this ‘Ghibelline’ aspect is typologically close to the Shiite understanding of the sacred nature of authority. Shiite doctrine (unlike Sunni) insists on the rule of only the Aliites, the holy invested descendants of the first of the Imams.” The Shiites believe that no-one outside of this line has any “sacred” or “initiatic” right to rule. Here, Dugin expressed the syncretism of Shiite doctrinal propositions within the Neo-Traditionalism of Fourth Political Theory. Dugin acknowledges the so-called Separation of Church and State position, that, in effect, attempts to place a wall between governmental and religious expressions in much of Western political practice. He rejects this proposition.

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854 Ibid.
855 Ibid. In twelfth and thirteenth century Italy, the Guelph family and their faction sided with the Papacy, the Ghibelline family and their faction sided with the Empire. These designations are used by many writers to distinguish a conflict between Church or other religious attempts to control the State and the State to attempt to control the religious institution(s).
856 Ibid.
857 Ibid.
858 Ibid.
2.9. Dugin’s Eschatology

Eschatological thinking figures prominently in Dugin’s theological projections of Fourth Political Theory. As an example, Dugin interpreted the fall of Communism as an eschatological event. Evident in his remark that “the victory of liberalism over communism was the proof in my eyes of its eschatological nature,” is Dugin’s belief in the overt theological nature of the conflict of the three political theories preceding the introduction of his fourth one.\(^{860}\) Dugin has no wish to remain temporally fixed within the reign of Antichrist. For Dugin, it seems that there are only two possible alternatives – endure the abominations of Antichrist or hasten his exit. “As follows from the very logic of apocalyptic drama,” Dugin stated, “in the course of the last struggle, the clash will occur not between the Sacred and the profane, nor between Religion and atheism, but between Religion and pseudo-religion.”\(^{861}\)

Dugin is quick to demonstrate his default setting to metaphysics where mondialism, a broad term encompassing the concept of a unipolar world, is concerned. A kingdom here on earth ruled over by the Jewish Messiah, awesome and powerful as it may be, is absent the presence of the Divine Hero Messiah. Dugin has no desire for a secularized Jewish Messiah, nor has he any appetite for the triumph of Fukuyama’s End of History. No matter that liberalism has succumbed to post-liberalism, the environment is still conducive to globalism and Western hegemony. For Dugin, the reign of a Collective Antichrist is no less a calamity than the rule of an individual one.

2.9.1. Hastening the Apocalypse

As Dugin opposes Fukuyama’s 1990s vision of the End of History, he also opposes Kabbalistic Eschatology that would terminate history with the kingship of the Jewish Moshiah. However, it is a mistake to think that Dugin is entirely opposed to the End of History in reality. On his terms, “Dugin has expressed that Russia’s messianic role – a role that may involve hastening the end of the age coinciding with the defeat of Antichrist – is also Russia’s

\(^{860}\) Dugin, “The Long Path,” as part of his response to the first question.
\(^{861}\) Dugin, “Ideology of World Government.”
eschatological purpose.” Dugin wrote in The Fourth Political Theory. In this statement and similar ones, Dugin suggests the possibility of hastening the Apocalypse. “If the Fourth Political Practice is not able to realise the end of times, then it would be invalid,” Dugin says, implying that the arrival of the end-times requires assistance through the application of his theory. Dugin answers the question of why the Traditionalists should desire to be in Gottesnacht by stating that it is to help bring about the end of the modern world.

2.10. Conclusions to Chapter Two

In a worthwhile pondering, Dugin asks a question concerning the viability of a multipolar environment resulting if his Neo-Eurasian Model were to become a reality: “how can modernity exist in the traditional world?” It is clear and evident that the tradition can survive in the modern world,” but is the opposite true, Dugin asks? Contemplating the impact of Traditionalism is essential to any clear reception of Fourth Political Theory. The influence of Guénon and Evola, especially Evola, on Dugin and hence on Dugin’s political theories about Eurasianism permeate his thinking. While Dugin’s interpretation of Traditionalism may differ from the Integral variety, as part of Fourth Political Theory, Dugin’s Neo-Traditionalism must be given due consideration.

To properly understand Dugin in his Neo-Traditional assumption, it is also necessary to grasp the relationships between fundamentalism and Traditionalism. Fundamentalism is a crucial ingredient in forming a clear idea of how Dugin develops the Neo-Traditional element of his Fourth Political Theory. Recalling the earlier treatment of the fundamentalism/Traditionalism relationship affects viewing Dugin as a

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862 Mosbey, “Wild Ride on Leviathan.”
863 Dugin, Fourth Theory, 183.
864 Ibid.
865 Dugin, “The Figure of the Radical Subject,” under, Part 2. The Figure of the Radical Subject and the Traditionalist without Tradition.
867 Ibid.
fundamentalist. As he restricts his Fourth Political Theory to strict hermeneutical parameters and insists on the rejection of Western Liberalism and modernity, Dugin’s fundamentalism is exposed.

Dugin’s application of Traditionalism is not the same as Guénon’s. But, whether orthodox or heretical, Dugin’s Neo-Traditionalism as an influence in contemporary Russia must be taken into account. It matters little on the cold stage of geopolitical reality if hindsight locates Dugin in history as an Integral Traditionalist, a Neo-Traditionalist, or a Traditionalist by some other name. It matters that a more proper reception can be had by studying Dugin’s Neo-Traditionalism and its place in Fourth Political Theory. Informed Western policy decisions will be critical as Russia continues to develop a more Eurasian persona.

Dugin sees himself as a Radical Subject and, I believe, wishes the world to see him as such. Dugin appears to believe in a participatory eschatology – the end-times can be hastened according to the applied Neo-Traditionalism version of the genre. As a Radical Subject, Dugin can be, and wishes to be, in the center of Gottesnacht. The express purpose for enduring such a hellish position is to hasten the end.

Dugin is not content to be a disciple; he must innovate and create. Thus, Traditionalism is the earth wherein Dugin grounds his Fourth Political Theory while he raises the radical innovation of applied Neo-Traditionalism from it. Better understandings of Traditionalism, its antecedents, and its kinships allow for a better understanding of Dugin’s Neo-Traditional innovation. Dugin is not merely rehashing Guénon – he is intent on building something active and radical. With his Fourth Political Theory, Dugin is attempting to occupy the postmodern world. Not just that, he wishes the occupation to dominate.

Dugin believes that traditionalism (that is, traditionalism in the lowercase) did oppose modernism but lost. In Dugin’s view, Neo-Eurasianism, with its Neo-

\footnote{Cf. 1.5.4.}
Traditionalist foundations, will have the strength to confront the West in this new present era. Dugin proposes opposing one postmodern reality – globalism – the evil postmodern spawn of the West, with a more potent postmodern reality – Fourth Political Theory’s Tradition based Neo-Eurasianism.

Consider this example where Dugin does not hesitate to resort to esoteric metaphysical illustration, allusion, and metaphor in his descriptions of things Russian:

We Russians are a blessed nation. Therefore all our manifestations – lofty and shabby, comely and terrifying – are sanctified by otherworldly senses, by rays of the otherworldly city, are washed by transcendent moisture. In the abundance of the national Grace the good and the evil are mixed, pour from one to another, and suddenly the dark lightens, whereas something white becomes a mere hell. We are as unknowable as the Absolute. We are a divine nation. Even our Crime is incomparably superior to some other’s virtue.  

The alchemy involved in reversing the moral standard whereby crime becomes more virtuous than virtue itself speaks to Dugin’s access to an incredibly esoteric toolbox indeed. The basis of Dugin’s belief is certainly arguable – but the point of its elevated Russian chauvinism is not.

Separating Dugin’s theologically slanted ideology from its co-joined geopolitical twin is not surgically possible. Evidence throughout confirms that Dugin is a Geopolitical-Theologian; his worldview cannot be adequately considered unless his geopolitical, metaphysical, and theological ideas are examined in tandem. The subsequent hermeneutical precepts Dugin displays are derived from his overarching Hermeneutic of Geopolitical-Theology. Sacred Geography/Sacred Space includes Dugin’s concepts of Messianic Russia, Third Rome, Catechon, and his notion of the Collective Antichrist. His Neo-Traditionalism exposes the extent of his anti-Western manifestations.

869 Dugin, “Dostoyevsky and the Metaphysics of St. Petersburg.”
Dugin is touting a multipolar model of the world. A critical part of this model is Eurasia. Dugin’s concept of Eurasia is based on previous models and is, hence, properly a Neo-Eurasian development. Dugin constructs his geopolitical model using the theological and metaphysical ingredients of Neo-Traditionalism. There is no other way to correctly parse Dugin and his ideas without resorting to his particular Geopolitical-Theology explanations.

Dugin wants more than a Russian audience for his Neo-Eurasianist ideas. Moreover, this is readily understandable, assuming the nature of the Eurasia he envisions. For the emergence of a major regional power stretching from Dublin to Vladivostok to become more than a notional scrap in Dugin’s mind, the idea must gain traction in Western Europe and Asia. Dugin is thinking much more broadly than the size and extent of current Russian borders – *Dugin is thinking empire*

It should be remembered that Dugin is not a rank newcomer to American political dialog, where he has a history of both critique and commentary. Dugin’s Ideas have moved westward due in no small part to the efforts of Dugin himself. Dugin has not sprung full-grown, Athena-like; he has developed, evolved. His development is likely not over, but it is sufficiently advanced to allow this observation: what can now be seen in Dugin is the manifestation of his Neo-Traditional Geopolitical-Theology.
3.0. Interpreting Dugin

This chapter examines Dugin through the lenses of others – how significant observers are engaged in interpreting Dugin and his Fourth Political Theory in the main, and in its multiple tributaries. I survey those who are direct Dugin commentators and a selection of those whose words and works were significantly influential on Dugin’s ideological development. I incorporate a variety of Dugin’s intellectual antecedents, philosophers, scholars, social and religious commentators that have engaged in various subject areas where Dugin is the recipient of their multiple legacies. I follow the topical areas explored in Chapter 2 to facilitate direct comparison and contrast. The primary purpose of Chapter 3 is to illuminate the legacy and reception of Dugin and his ideas.

3.1. On Dugin’s Political Theology

Fourth Political Theory presupposes “the collapse of modern ideology,” and allows theology, all but excluded in Western Liberalism, to return to fill the vacuum. However, according to Peter J. Leithart, “the theology that returns isn’t necessary [sic] the theology of Christian orthodoxy.” Despite Dugin’s claims to a form of Russian Orthodoxy, the sources of his Geopolitical-Theology include more ecumenical sources, including some from outside of Christianity. Dugin gives wide-ranging consideration to theological and metaphysical aspects in tandem with his geopolitics.

Although it was his proffering on geopolitics that first gained Dugin Western recognition, less visible to the Western eye was the metaphysical and theological substratum running below the entirety of Dugin’s work. Epstein wrote of metaphysical and political relations within the context of Russian Nationalism in his 1994 study of conservatism and tradition. In this study, Epstein also provided an early introduction to Dugin and his political

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871 Epstein, Conservatism and Traditionalism.
Capturing the essence of the Traditionalism adopted by Dugin, Epstein wrote:

Radical traditionalism is the most extreme variety of Rightist Russian philosophy, challenging both liberalism and moderate, humanistic conservatism and attempting to make the twenty-first century the epoch of another worldwide revolution, spiritually opposed to the democratic and communist revolutions of recent history.\(^{873}\)

Epstein’s examination is pertinent, and, given the date of his research, groundbreaking. Epstein conducted his study into Russian Conservatism and Traditionalism in the early years of the 1990s, thus providing valuable viewpoints from the time Dugin enjoyed scant recognition in the West. Searching for common ground available at the time of his Dugin research, Epstein selected Russian conservatism as a place to fix Dugin’s geopolitical position. In his comparison of Dugin’s Russian conservatism to that of Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Epstein made this observation:

[Dugin inspired] Traditionalists distinguish themselves from more moderate conservatives, like Solzhenitsyn, since they do not want to restore the pre-revolutionary past, but rather to implement a new, Rightist revolution. Also in contradistinction with Solzhenitsyn, their political strategy is not isolationist, but presupposes the consolidation of Rightist movements all over the world.\(^{874}\)

Recognizing the Symphonia bordering on Papocaesarism inherent in Dugin’s Neo-Traditionalism, Epstein succinctly noted that “the connection between metaphysics and politics is dictated by the very essence of total traditionalism, which denies the liberal principle of the separation of powers and specialization of knowledge.”\(^{875}\) Properly engaging with Fourth Political Theory requires a presumption that the geopolitical and the theological are inseparable. Separation of the two, more accurately the near-total absence of

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\(^{872}\) Ibid., 10ff.

\(^{873}\) Ibid., second page of Epstein’s “Abstract.”


\(^{875}\) Ibid., 18.
the latter, is a dominant presuppositional refrain one finds repeated in contemporary Western Liberal conversation.

Gordon R. Middleton frankly stated that the “Eurasia view is in stark contrast with the militant atheism of the Left and with the Right’s reliance upon formal, organized religious entities for religious practice (which in the American version is done in complete separation from the political realm).”876 He went on to note that “Dugin is emphatic that the primary means to achieve Eurasianism’s goals are through spiritual, even theological, revival.”877 Ifergan’s conception of rediscovering theology entwined in the political fabric is especially applicable to Dugin. The theological dimensions of Traditionalism, Orthodox Christianity, gnosticism, and other esoteric and metaphysical elements Dugin weaves into the fabric of Fourth Political Theory are evident. Dugin does not hesitate to use Traditional ideas, with a culture-particular logic, in the vision of Eurasia that emerges from Fourth Political Theory.

Because Dugin is at once a political and theological figure of varying degrees, reception of his work should be considered from both political and theological perspectives. This dual-reception approach is a much more comfortable process in Eastern rather than Western contexts. Francis X. Clooney, a scholar well versed in the concept of the reader becoming a receptive homo lector – a person who learns by conscious active and even passionate study – presents a practical understanding of this dual-reception in Dugin’s case.878 Applying Clooney’s and Richard Hanson’s thinking, this approach is germane to Dugin because “the full meaning of a theology, [in dialogical contexts], is no longer contained entirely within its own religious tradition.”879 It is the “back

877 Ibid.
and forth dynamic’ of interreligious dialogue,” described by Hanson, that is scarce in Western geopolitical circles.\textsuperscript{880}

Both Bonald and Lamennais recognized that traditional societal norms place humans in communal relationships that are similar and symbiotic in function. Modern aspects of society involve many individualistic selections made within a system requiring a high degree of what Durkheim would later term Division of Labor.\textsuperscript{881} Dugin favors communal relationships, with their symbiotic nature, when placed against the individualist characteristics of societies such as those exhibiting a high degree of Division of Labor.

Edmund Burke’s position on tradition challenges reason as an ultimate determinant in political discourse, and the inherent inequality of rank and authority bear some noticeable traits later echoed in Dugin.\textsuperscript{882} A trail can also be discerned from Hobbes and Locke to Dugin, though the path from Plato through Burke to Dugin seems to be several degrees more natural. Burke is widely regarded as a founding spokesman of Western political conservatism.\textsuperscript{883} Ian Harris stated:

> **Burke's mind, by the time he left Trinity [Trinity College Dublin], had two facets: one was an orientation towards religion, improvement and politics, the other a philosophical method.**

\textsuperscript{880} Hanson, “Dialogical Theism,” 66.
\textsuperscript{883} Cf. e.g., Weintraub, “Reading Edmund Burke.”
The latter derived from his university education, the former from reflection on the Irish situation.\footnote{884} While perhaps not attended well enough in the current context of geopolitical affairs, Burke’s thoughts on the French Revolution, British eighteenth century treatment of both the American Colonies and the Irish Catholics, combined with his diverse corpus of writing, deserves serious attention. “Burke is perhaps the least studied of political classics, but he is certainly amongst the small number with whom anyone who aspires to have an adequate political education must engage,” in Harris’ opinion.\footnote{885}

Speaking in political and philosophical terms that support ideas embedded within Fourth Political Theory, Burke viewed political elements possessing long-term attributes supporting societal legitimacy.\footnote{886} These attributes include traditions embedded within family, community, and common religion that provide societal cohesiveness.\footnote{887} Burke opposed over-reliance on reason, thinking that doing so undermines tradition; he classified much rational thought as a form of despotism.\footnote{888} Given these positions, Burke’s thinking and Fourth Political Theory display several common themes. Burke’s views concerning the utility of certain prejudices may likely be favorable to a Dugin-esque interpretation as well. Prejudice learned through social tradition may reflect protective and instructive elements to society that are positive and useful, according to Burke.\footnote{889}

Dugin classifies Burke as a “liberal conservative,” and notes Burke’s pushback to Enlightenment ideals after the French Revolution.\footnote{890} Liberal conservatives, according to Dugin, “are distinguished by the following qualitative structural characteristics: Agreement with the general trends of modernity, but
disagreement with its more avant-garde manifestations, which seem excessively dangerous and unhealthy.” Burke viewed authority, rank, and the inequality inherently embedded in them as positives for society when they were deserved and applied using legitimate processes. Dugin’s respect for traditional aspects of authority and his favorable stance on monarchical government, as examples, tend to mesh well with Burkean political philosophy.

The political theology of Schmitt, Bonald, Lamennais, Durkheim, and the political philosophy of Burke are important when placing Dugin firmly in his specific geopolitical position. Dugin’s position is conservative to the point of being fundamentalist, and he folds both into his avowed Traditionalism. That is, his conservatism exhibits decidedly fundamentalist characteristics, and both descriptors are evident in his style of Traditionalism. However much the location of Dugin’s geopolitical position is determined by his political, theological, and philosophical influencers, accurate reception of Dugin requires interpretation of his Neo-Traditionalism and his Neo-Eurasianism as well.

3.2. Development of Dugin’s Neo-Traditionalism

Epstein suggested that a long-reach look-back into the past is an inherent aspect of Dugin’s Neo-Traditionalism:

Among the multiplicity of conservative movements that arose with the collapse of Soviet Marxism, one stands out as perhaps the most radical, both in political and metaphysical terms. Its radicalism is paradoxical because it calls for the resurrection of ancient esoterism as the antithesis of contemporary rational and democratic convention; hence the movement often identifies itself as “radical traditionalism,” though it goes by a number of other names, such as “continentalism,” “anti-mondialism,” “the third way,” “revolutionary conservatism,” etc.

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891 Ibid., 91.
892 Cf. 3.2.1. to refer back to an elaboration on fundamentalist aspects of this relationship.
893 Epstein, Conservatism and Traditionalism, 10-11. I submit that Dugin’s Neo-Traditionalism conforms with Epstein’s idea of Radical Traditionalism.
Epstein pointedly connected Dugin with the “radical traditionalism,” he mentioned. “The two preeminent spokespersons of this movement,” Epstein claimed, “are Alexander Prokhanov and Alexander Dugin.” Epstein concluded that Dugin’s conception of Traditionalism, his radical version, consists of four distinct levels of meaning. At its deepest level, Dugin places “a direct knowledge of the Divine accessible only to a spiritual elite.” Where the first level is esoteric, the second is exoteric. Epstein also recognized Dugin’s strong affinity for Church and State syncretism at the second level.

Dugin is anxious to distinguish the genuine traditionalist esoterism, which recognizes traditional religions and Church dogmas, from Satanic distortions of esoterism, which attack Christianity and Islam and attempt to destroy the dogmatic integrity of Tradition. That is why a second level of Tradition is exoterism, the sphere of sacred knowledge open to everyone, as long as they participate in the life of the Church. In this sense, traditionalism supports theocracy, [and] “presupposes the restoration of the central position of the Church in the State.”

Achievement at the third level involves the “spiritual stratification of society and the establishment of a hierarchy of estates or castes.” Epstein indicated he believes Dugin is suggesting that a “truly sacred civilization” recognizes different types of people based on their “spiritual origins.” At the fourth level, sacred science and art regain their rightful places. This level indicates a return to various teachings of alchemy and magic arts, and holds that science, as it is known and practiced in advanced societies today, is profane.

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894 Ibid., 11. Alexander Prokhanov is Editor-in-Chief of the newspaper, Zavtra (formerly, Den’). Epstein notes that “Dugin associated himself with the extreme nationalist factions: Pamiat’ and Natsional’noe edinstvo,” also noting that Dugin “was editor in chief of Cherished Angel and Elements and is the author of the books Mysteries of Eurasia (1991), Hyperborean Theory (1992), and Conspirology (1992).” Epstein said Prokhanov is a well-known Russian novelist and writer, and claimed that he “in Brezhnev’s time, was celebrated as the bard of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and was mocked by the liberal press as the ‘Nightingale of the General Staff.’”

895 Ibid., 12.

896 Ibid.


899 Ibid.

900 Ibid., 13.
and material. Society at Dugin’s fourth level moves away from modernity’s view of science to a position far less empirical.

Brooke, himself holding an Orthodox Christian perspective, pointedly asked, “What does Dugin mean by “Tradition”?” Rather than declare what Dugin is not when compared to the Integral Traditionalists, Brooke directly addressed the critical question. Brooke did not ask intending to challenge the orthodoxy of Integral Tradition; instead, he asked to get to the heart of how Dugin differs from the earlier twentieth century Traditionalists. Shekhovtsov and Umland asked as well. They argued persuasively against Dugin being a Traditionalist in the mold of Guénon.

Shekhovtsov and Umland associated Dugin much closer to Evola than to Guénon, and thus, established parameters of Dugin’s Neo-Traditionalism. Although not precisely labeling Dugin’s derivative of Integral Traditionalism as Neo-Traditional, Epstein was prescient in his understanding of how Dugin, in contrast to Solzhenitsyn, would employ it. Epstein noted the dynamic nature of Dugin’s brand of Traditionalism, its revolutionary character, and its designs outside Russia proper. In practice, Dugin exhibits a practical Traditionalism rather than the profoundly spiritual one found in that of Guénon and the leading twentieth century adherents of the Integral School. Dugin’s Traditionalism adopts characteristics identified with Integral Traditionalism, such as anti-modernism, but it is recognizably different in its employment of overt action in the political arena.

Traditionalism evaluates tradition and judges the purity of its initial revelation as well as its continuity through time. Herein lies the criticism that Traditionalism is self-validating. Mostly unidentified elements within Traditionalism itself determine what traditional elements constitute Truth. Although a valid criticism, self-validation is commonly employed, wide-spread, and not exclusive to Traditionalism. Legenhausen offered an

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902 E.g., Despite the Western penchant for the scientific method, internal validation yet remains prevalent in institutional settings. U.S. Governmental agencies frequently make internal decisions on findings, then make requirements, enact codes and regulations, enforce compliance, and adjudicate violations in a closed system of self-validation.
additional challenge to Traditionalist claims addressing apparent gaps in empirical evidence linking current Traditional awareness to the Ancients. “Traditionalism is a modern European reaction against modernism,” Legenhausen wrote, noting its appearance “in a variety of religious movements: Jewish, Catholic, Protestant and Islamic.”

Legenhausen pointedly fixed Traditionalism as a reactionary actor. That is, Traditionalism is a response to the nineteenth century European shift toward the secular that continued to expand on the anti-religious ideas of the Enlightenment. To Legenhausen’s mind, Traditionalism’s reactionary beginning evidenced a relatively recent construct leaving Traditionalism without any legitimate claims to its ancient pedigree. Legenhausen’s bottom line criticism was that Traditionalism uses intuition as validation, not historical facts.

Dugin is not an Integral Traditionalist. Still, one cannot arrive at understanding and appreciating Dugin’s Neo-Traditional stance without at least a brief requisite journey along the Integral Traditionalist paths of Guénon and his colleagues. Traditionalists trace their development using a preponderance of Eastern sources, and these sources are decidedly esoteric. The Western Academy has been reluctant, perhaps ill-equipped and ill-disposed, to afford esotericism a place in the rationally and empirically dominated arena of historical evidence. Legenhausen’s anti-Traditional argument may be valid, but divorcing Traditionalism from any traceable esoteric connections to a Perennialist heritage risks being subject to the charge of excluding evidence for mostly Western cultural reasons.

Lakhani did not directly dispute Legenhausen. He did address the historicity of Traditionalism differently, emphasizing both the non-historical and the

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904 Ibid., 2.
905 Ibid., 8-9. Here Legenhausen stated, “The Traditionalists, on the other hand, claim that through intellectual intuition they are able to discern the common essence. The method used is implausible. It is assumed at the outset that the religions have a common esoteric essence, and the texts are interpreted so as to accord with this principle. This is question begging.”
transcendental nature of Traditionalism through his interpretation of Traditionalism as a “metahistorical” revelation.\textsuperscript{906} 

[Traditionalism’s] only relation to the past resides in the linkage of a particular religious tradition to its original source, which is to say, the revelation that authenticates it, the foundational scripture and its expressive forms of worship transmitted through the protective medium of the particular tradition. But this relation between a particular tradition and its historical origins is in a sense merely incidental. The relation between Tradition as such and Revelation as such transcends history.\textsuperscript{907} 

Granted, Traditionalism’s kinship with Perennialism is discernable in its gnostic interpretation of Truth. However, acknowledging this kinship does not constitute empirical proof that Traditionalism is the recipient of an unbroken chain of uncorrupted divine Revelation. To accept that a significant body of perennial Truth has been passed untainted and intact from the ancient Adepts via face-to-face and mouth-to-ear transmission to the initiated Traditionalist adherents today is not adequately supported by the available evidence. To argue that the evidence exists, but that it is hidden, secret, and protected, requires acceptance of self-validation as equal to empirical proof. For the Academy to recognize Traditionalism as a revival of Perennialism’s precepts and principles is undoubtedly feasible; to accept it as a set of provable facts passed down via a continuous and inerrant initiatory process is not.

Legenhausen argued Traditionalism’s historicity legalistically. Lakhani expressed the position that Traditionalism possesses transcendental elements that render its truth-claims immune from the rigidity of legalism. Legenhausen denied Traditionalism’s claim to an unbroken chain-of-custody and argued that this deficiency is fatal. Lakhani’s implied retort was that, even if empirical evidence does not support the chain, Traditionalism’s transcendent revelations overcome that deficiency. This Enlightenment-

\textsuperscript{907} Ibid. Here Lakhani expounded on his interpretation of Nasr.
permeated Western worldview conflict with Eastern Esotericism is another in the continuing battle of modernism versus Traditionalism.

Asking what Dugin means when invoking Tradition, Brooke agreed with other Dugin scholars in that Dugin “has said that he regards Guénon, together with Heidegger, as the most important influence on his thought.” However, when Brooke compared Dugin and Guénon, he questioned Dugin’s Traditional orthodoxy. “contrary to the spirit of Guénon,” Dugin, “is not at all concerned with whether or not these traditions are authentic,” Brooke explained. Brooke stated that Dugin appealed “to the huge body of twentieth century anthropological writings, notably Franz Boas and Levi-Strauss, to argue that, however mutually contradictory they may be, different cultures dismissed by the modern world as ‘backward’ have their own logic.” Brooke offered that “this individual and multipolar logic “is in its own terms perfectly valid” to the culture applying it to itself.

3.2.1. Fundamentalist Aspects of Dugin’s Political Theology

“The influence of Traditionalism on Dugin seems to be fundamental: it constitutes his main intellectual reference point and the basis of his political attitudes as well as his Eurasianism,” wrote Laruelle. Dugin is emphatic on this point as well. Not only was Traditionalism’s influence fundamental, but Dugin’s Traditionalism is also, in itself, fundamentalist. “Dugin’s Eurasianism embodies a triumphalist form of cultural fundamentalism (Traditionalism) which attempts to bridge ethnic divisions by a call to pre-historic glory and persisting common elements,” observed Middleton. With this remark,

908 Brooke, “Third Rome, Third International, Third Reich,” under, Against ‘modernity.” Here, as a sub-heading, Brooke directly asks, “What does Dugin mean by ‘Tradition’?” Evola is noteworthy here due to absence of his being mentioned. It would be wrong to make too much of this omission as Brooke is emphasizing the Dugin-Guénon relationship at this point in this article. Brooke, other Dugin commentators, and Dugin himself have all acknowledged Evola’s influence.
909 Ibid.
910 Ibid.
911 Ibid.
912 Laruelle, Russian Version of European Radical Right, 10.
913 Cf. e.g., Dugin, Fourth Theory, 193-94.
Middleton reinforced the link between Traditionalism and fundamentalism and connected both with Dugin.

Dugin’s awareness and acceptance of Schmitt are impressive on multiple levels, not the least of which is that it reveals how political theology emanating from conservative sources (both Dugin and Schmitt, for example) is gaining attention in the West. Dugin’s entry into the light of Western recognition coincides with Schmitt’s. To this end, Joseph W. Bendersky wrote that “until the 1980s few in North America had even heard of Schmitt — and most of them worked under the then prevalent, though erroneous notion, that he was a Nazi thinker.”

Bendersky’s mention of Nazi associations with Schmitt is pertinent because of similar proclivities attached to Dugin. Indeed, Schmitt was academically shunned in the West for many years due to his willingness to work within the prevailing governmental system, whether the Weimar Republic or Hitler’s National Socialist regime. Schmitt is still accused of being an evangelist of National Socialism by John P. McCormick. Bendersky stated that McCormick feared “Schmittian paths in America, Europe and the Third World.” He identified these possible paths as “neo-Nazism, militia movements, ‘Christian identity’ ideologies, ethnic cleansing, racially motivated mass rape, violent attacks on emigrant workers and foreigners,” as well as, “bombing of abortion clinics and state administrative buildings.” Bendersky countered that “Scholars in Europe, Japan, and America have long refuted the 1950s
interpretations of Schmitt as someone who undermined the Weimar Republic and saw his ideas come to fruition in the Third Reich.\footnote{Bendersky, “Definite and the Dubious,” 35.}

McCormick’s and Bendersky’s disputes involving supposed “Schmittian paths” lead to considerations of extremist political theologies. Discussions of radical political theologies include fundamentalist language. It is evident, given his characterization of Schmittian paths, that McCormick ascribes Schmitt’s political theology with militant attributes. Discussing the intersection of militancy and fundamentalism, McCune stated that militancy “has been a defining characteristic of fundamentalism from the beginning.”\footnote{McCune, “Self-Identity of Fundamentalism,” 22.}

Militancy, most evident in its use of confrontational methods, became distinguishable within fundamentalism very early on. McCune made direct references that focus attention on this militant characteristic. These references include the observation by George Dollar that “the militant exposure of all non-Biblical expositions and affirmations and attitudes” is part of the accepted definition of Christian fundamentalism today.\footnote{George W. Dollar, \textit{A History of Fundamentalism in America} (Greenville, SC: Bob Jones University Press, 1973), xv; quoted in McCune, “Self-Identity of Fundamentalism,” 22. George Dollar, 1917-2006.} Marsden wrote that the attributes of an early Christian fundamentalist included being a “believer in the fundamentals” who was “willing to take a militant stand against modernism.”\footnote{Marsden, \textit{Reforming Fundamentalism}, 10; quoted in McCune, “Self-Identity of Fundamentalism,” 23.} This militant stand is evident in Fourth Political Theory.

McCune summed up the second stage of the evolutionary process of fundamentalism in contrast to its primary stage by noting that, “the most clearly observable distinctives [sic] of the movement are militancy and separatism.”\footnote{McCune, “Self-Identity of Fundamentalism,” 10. Brackets added.} Here similarities between Fourth Political Theory and early Christian Protestant fundamentalist thought are evident in the multipolar aspirations of Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianist efforts. Hoffer provided insight:
Those who are awed by their surroundings do not think of change, no matter how miserable their condition. When our mode of life is so precarious as to make it patent that we cannot control the circumstances of our existence, we tend to stick to the proven and the familiar.  

“As for the hopeful,” Hoffer wrote, “they all proceed recklessly with the present, wreck it if necessary, and create a new world.” The militancy of fundamentalism is rooted in its hope for change, not in hopelessness that things will never change. Hoffer’s observation highlights Dugin’s hopefulness and is reflected in the growing recognition of Rightist movements in Europe and elsewhere.  

Movements demanding strict orthodoxy and orthopraxis often reject elements of the contemporary society and culture where they find themselves. The same goes for believers who find identity in a designated hermeneutical position or a specific exegesis. Adherents of movements that adopt identities purposely away from the center tend to collect at one of the poles of a given social continuum, not because they do not wish to occupy the center, but because they are pushed away by political and societal power. In response, fundamentalists of all stripes, including Dugin, push back against being marginalized. Their reaction to assignment at the social and political margins is often to adopt radical activism calling to mind Armstrong’s observation that in their strife with modernity,

Fundamentalists do not regard this battle as a conventional political struggle, but experience it as a cosmic war between the forces of good and evil. They fear annihilation, and try to fortify their beleaguered identity by means of a selective retrieval of certain doctrines and practices of the past.

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926 Ibid.
927 It may be that the rise of Trump and his impact lends itself to fundamentalist interpretations.
928 E.g., Hadisic Jews and the Amish, to name two.
Marty pointed out the polemical nature of fundamentalist thinking and identified friction points along the fault lines of internal division and external separatism:

fundamentalisms are Manichaean in the sense that they sharply differentiate between the realm of their god and their satan, between the elect people and the outsiders, between “us” and “them,” allowing for no middle ground. Because of this characteristic, fundamentalisms may and often do resist some features of political life, including compromise. In fact, fundamentalists tend to be more disdainful and wary of the moderates within their own religious complexes than they are of liberals or representatives of other faiths, who are unmistakably “other.”

Fourth Political Theory resonates with similar Manichean dualism in its claims of messianic Russia and the evil otherness of the Western Antichrist.

Barkun thought that “What is usually referred to as ‘fundamentalism’ is in effect any claim to exclusive authenticity within a religious tradition.” Traditionalists make this claim with their insistence on their knowledge of unaltered Truth; Dugin makes it in stating his case for the authentic Christianity of the Old Believers. Barkun’s opinion demonstrates just how far fundamentalist labeling has traveled along the trail of etymological evolution. It also underscores the family resemblance and fundamentalist nature of Traditionalist and Old Believer elements within Fourth Political Theory.

3.2.2. On Dugin’s Rejection of the New World Order

Sedgwick pointed out that Dugin’s rejection of Western conceptions of reality had its genesis in Dugin’s experiential impressions. “Dugin’s own explanation,” as Sedgwick related it, is that “in 1989 [Dugin] made several
trips to the West, addressing New Right audiences in France, Spain, and Belgium." These visits were catalysts bringing about a sea change in Dugin’s orientation. Having, for most of his life, believed the “Soviet reality” to be “the worst imaginable,” Sedgwick suggested that Dugin found to his surprise that the Western reality was even worse.

Dugin’s perception of Western reality grew with the conclusion that it would culminate in the New World Order, the fruit of Fukuyama’s premature, much-ballyhooed, then backed-away-from, End of History. According to Shlapentokh, the mistake of New World Order thinking lies in how America perceives multiculturalism. He suggested that Americans fail to acknowledge that cultural variances often belie fundamental civilizational differences. This point is crucial to understanding Dugin’s Neo-Eurasian and Western New World Order globalism and their diametrically opposed positions.

Dugin abhors any notion of the New World Order. His position is evident, for example, in his conspirology. Rossman perceived that the End of History, as a precursor to the New World Order, “predicts the death of ethnicities, religions, national states, isolated unique civilizations, and ideologies, that is, the major agents of history.” In this perception, Rossman captured many of Dugin’s fears for what the New World Order would bring.

### 3.2.3. Dugin’s Neo-Traditionalism Viewed as Heresy

When ideologies, philosophies, and religions mature, a first phase development of orthodoxy and orthopraxis occurs. In the second phase,

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934 Ibid.
935 Shlapentokh, “Eurasianism and Soviet/Post Soviet Studies,” 4ff. Here Shlapentokh wrote “It is true that the idea of ‘cultural diversity’ is constantly reinforced in American academia; in fact, this maxim is repeated with the same frequency as references to Marxism Leninism the USSR in Soviet times. Still, the American notion of multiculturalism is rarely acknowledged as a fundamental civilizational difference; it is usually assumed that with all the cultural/regional differences, humanity is striving for ‘government for the people and by the people.’”
936 Ibid.
937 Cf. 2.7.3.
938 Rossman, “Anti-Semitism in Eurasian Historiography,” 175-76.
orthodoxy matures. At this juncture, bureaucratic and institutional orthopraxis may begin to overshadow orthodoxy. In the third phase, orthodoxy and orthopraxis continue to develop, alternative or counter-arguments arise, collide with their mature parent planets, and heresies spin-off as fragments. Finally, new orthodoxies may evolve from the fragments, becoming planets themselves.

One utility in a belief system becoming orthodox is that it allows for heresy to exist. For, without orthodoxy, there can be no heresy. Heresy affords followers, scholars, and students a choice while providing opportunities to evaluate alternatives and deviations from orthodox positions. Heresy develops in cyclic stages where departure from orthodoxy given time spawns heresy, which given time may generate an entirely new orthodoxy. Hence, the heretical Judaism of Jesus’ followers became Christianity, and the heretical Christianity of Luther and the Reformers became Protestantism.

Traditionalism can likewise spin-off heresies. Integral Traditionalists consider Dugin’s Neo-Traditionalism to be one. Dugin himself speaks of modernism as a Traditional heresy – perverted Tradition – with his recognition of Guénon’s classification of modernity as a “great parody” of ancient Atlantis. As Guénon gained followers, the body of religious, spiritual, and academic writing concerning him and his beliefs increased. After Guénon, the work and ideas of other Traditionalist School founders and their followers coalesced into Integral Traditionalism. Heresy then appeared as should have been expected. Thus, the twenty-first century’s Neo-Traditionalist heresy is a product of the third and final evolutionary stages.

Evola and Dugin are the designated heretics, at least as characterized by Shekhovtsov and Umland. In their challenge to the legitimacy of Dugin’s Traditionalism based on their interpretation of Integral Traditionalism’s Guénonian orthodoxy, Shekhovtsov and Umland claimed that,

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939 Dugin, “The Figure of the Radical Subject,” under, Part 1. Traditionalism and Sociology - The Modern and the Eternal.
Dugin’s case raises a question also applicable to the assessment of Evola’s and the ENR’s interpretation of Integral Traditionalism: are Evola’s theories and the ENR’s ideology legitimate successors of Guénon’s teaching? The answer, we believe, is that they are not, or that they are at best skewed reinterpretations of Integral Traditionalism.940

The orthodoxy ascribed to Guénon’s articulation of Traditionalism is evident in Shekhovtsov and Umland as they proceeded to offer specific examples of Evola’s and Dugin’s heretical deviations:

The universalist core of the deist worldview of classical Traditionalism is lost in the outlooks of Evola, the ENR, and the disciples of “neo-Eurasianism.” Dugin plainly rejects the “transcendent unity of religions”—a central concept of Integral Traditionalism.941

“Neither Evola’s worldview nor the doctrines of the ENR and Dugin constitute the unequivocal rejection of Modernity that Integral Traditionalism explicitly demands,” wrote Shekhovtsov and Umland.942 Despite the volume of his rhetoric, Dugin only partially rejects modernism, accepting perhaps the technological aspects of progress in much the same way the Soviet Union desired to possess technology that rivaled the West without adopting the liberalism that would usher in Liberal Democracy and Cultural Westernization.943

Brooke observed that in The Fourth Political Theory, Dugin does not seem to be overly concerned with the authenticity of Integral Traditionalism as it relates to Truth as a “single, universal, potentially knowable” reality.944 Brooke’s interpretation, questioning Dugin’s Integral Traditionalist credentials, supports the charge of heretical Traditionalism. Brooke also

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940 Shekhovtsov and Umland, “Is Dugin a Traditionalist?,” 666; Cf. their footnote 16. Here the authors refer to Dugin’s Filosofija traditsionalizma (Moscow, 2002), 42–3, 100–1, as evidence from Dugin’s own work. To access an interview with Benoist, the key ENR proponent, Cf. Alain de Benoist, “The ‘European New Right’: Defining and Defending Europe’s Heritage,” Interview by Ian Warren, Journal of Historical Review, 1994, 28–37. A transcript of this interview is available online at, http://ihre.org/jhr/v14/v14n2p28_Warren.html. Ian Warren was the pen name of Donald Warren who was a professor at Oakland University (Michigan). Donald Warren, 1935-1997.
941 Ibid. Cf. their footnote 59.
942 Ibid., 669.
943 Ibid. Cf. e.g., Legenhausen, “Not a Traditionalist,” 21, for a similar argument.
stated that Dugin wishes to measure cultural logic “by the (again very un-Guénonian) values of sophistication, consistency and complexity.”

Shekhovtsov and Umland may have correctly identified heresy in the Traditionalism of Evola and Dugin. However, heterodoxy versus orthodoxy in the academic or theological sense will not be the overriding concern if Dugin’s Fourth Political Theory becomes manifest in Russian geopolitics. Nevertheless, the activity involved in creating a Fourth Political Theory-inspired Eurasia would by itself confirm Dugin’s heresy. “Contemplation’ versus action was one of the most fundamental antitheses for Guénon, who considered contemplation or cognition an expression of the ‘traditional spirit,’ and action itself an ‘anti-traditional’ one,” according to Shekhovtsov and Umland. So, by the orthodox precepts of Integral Traditionalism, the application of action, however dressed-up as Traditionalism, would relegate Fourth Political Theory into the realm of Traditional heresy.

Shekhovtsov and Umland admitted that “many of Dugin’s works are an amalgamation of Traditionalist concepts, Evola’s theories, geopolitical ideas, and the ideology of the German interwar ‘Conservative Revolution.’” It is noteworthy that Dugin claims Traditionalism, yet the ingredients and applications of the “amalgamation” contribute a great deal to the rightful exclusion of Evola and Dugin from the halls of orthodoxy. Fabbri speculated that Evola was infected with Nietzsche’s philosophy and racist ideas before he came under the influence of Guénon. Nietzsche’s influence led to Evola’s deviation “from the core of Perennialist teaching on far too many points to be considered as part of Guénon’s legacy.” Dugin’s attraction to Evola may be symptomatic of Dugin’s deviations as well.

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945 Ibid.
946 Shekhovtsov and Umland, “Is Dugin a Traditionalist?,” 668, footnote 29. Here Guénon is being referenced from, Guénon, Crisis of the Modern World, 33-36.
947 Ibid., 665.
948 Fabbri, “Perennialist School,” under, Julius Evola and the Perennialist School.
949 Ibid.
Shekhovtsov and Umland conceded, “There is no doubt that Dugin has contributed to the development of Russian Traditionalism.” They stated that Dugin’s contribution to Russian Traditionalism might be due to his industrious publishing rather than as a Traditional thinker or writer. Ultimately, given the totality of his contributions and the extent of his adaptations of Guénon and Evola, the conclusion must be that Dugin is a Traditionalist – albeit most likely a heretical one.

3.3. Considering Development of Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianism

Clover pointed out that when Dugin wrote *Foundations of Geopolitics*, “it didn’t seem to matter,” that an inspired Eurasian trajectory in Russian policy, “seemed completely insane.” At that time, Clover reported, “Russia’s GDP was smaller than that of the Netherlands, while the once formidable Red Army had just been defeated on the battlefield and forced into a humiliating peace by a ragtag group of Chechen insurgents.” However, in light of the Russian resurgence, it matters now.

3.3.1. The Emergence of Eurasian Ideas

Tremblay, in his article, “Thoughts of Dugin’s Eurasian Mission,” credited Trubetskoï and anthropologist Lévi-Strauss for their establishment of baselines on Eurasianism as a geopolitical concept – Trubetskoï for the cohesive formulation and Lévi-Strauss as the source of Trubetskoï’s pluralistic

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950 Shekhovtsov and Umland, “Is Dugin a Traditionalist?,” 672.
951 Ibid. Shekhovtsov and Umland may be engaged in academic hair-splitting, but so it is within the academy where orthodox and heretical arguments are involved.
953 Ibid.
adaptations.\textsuperscript{954} Even so, proto-Eurasian ideas are identifiable before the twentieth century, preceding those of Trubetskoï.\textsuperscript{955}

Laruelle wrote that Lamanskii identified recognizable Eurasian structure and identity in his 1892 book, \textit{Tri mira euro-aziatskogo materika}.\textsuperscript{956} Laruelle further remarked that Lamanskii recognized that, “Russia did not exist in two continents, European and Asiatic, but in one unique Eurasiatric continent.”\textsuperscript{957} In this Eurasian continent, “three radically different worlds confronted each other: the Romano-Germanic world, the Greek-Slavic world of the middle, and a non-Christian world, Asia.”\textsuperscript{958}

Eurasianism matured significantly from the 1920s onward, although many other pre- and non-Eurasian sources contributed significant elements to its development. The debt Eurasianism owes to Pan-Slavic thinkers is not insignificant – Laruelle, for one, acknowledges the debt Eurasianism owes to Nikolai Danilevskii and other pan-Slavists.\textsuperscript{959} Identifying the pan-Slavic theme, Laruelle stated that “Eurasianism borrowed many of its historical and philosophical patterns from Danilevskii and other conservative pan-Slavists.”\textsuperscript{960}

Among the borrowed items are concepts of cyclic history, ongoing European and Russian opposition, philosophy of territory, and “a Platonic existence of a hidden reality ‘truer’ than material appearance.”\textsuperscript{961} While Danilevskii’s theories characterized Russia as only Slavic, “Eurasianism took the assumptions of Danilevskii but let the Turco-Mongols enter the stage,” resulting in an integrated creation – Slavic and oriental combined with inputs from the Russian Steppes.\textsuperscript{962} Neo-Eurasianism inherits its pan-Slavic nature mainly from its Eurasianist past, though it inherits its expansionist nature.

\textsuperscript{954} Tremblay, “Thoughts of Dugin’s ‘Eurasian Mission.’”
\textsuperscript{955} Cf. e.g., Laruelle, “Orient in Russian Thought,” 24.
\textsuperscript{956} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{957} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{958} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{959} Ibid., 23. Nikolai Danilevskii, 1822–1885.
\textsuperscript{960} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{961} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{962} Ibid.
from a time long before defined Eurasianist ideas developed. Reza Parchizadeh identified historical antecedents of Russian Expansion detectible in the southward and eastward movement evident after the Romanov ascension in the early seventeenth century.\footnote{Cf. Reza Parchizadeh, “The Historic Roots of Russian Expansionism in the Middle East,” American Thinker, October 18, 2015, accessed January 23, 2016, http://www.americanthinker.com/articles/. Reza Parchizadeh, the Iranian-born political theorist, is a researcher in Middle Eastern and English literature and politics.}

It should be remembered, however, that Russia’s Westward movement experienced periods of expansion and contraction beginning in the sixteenth century, even before the reign of Peter the Great beginning in 1682. Andreas Kappeler commented on the mid-1500s Russian attempts to expand into the Baltics.\footnote{Andreas Kappeler, The Russian Empire: A Multi-ethnic History, trans. Alfred Clayton (London & New York: Routledge, 2013), 60. Kappeler was a Professor of East European History at the University of Cologne and the University of Vienna until his retirement in 2011.} The westward expansion phase rekindled in 1654 and again in 1700. The building of St. Petersburg commenced in 1703, and in 1721 Tsar Peter I declared Russia an empire. Eldar Ismailov and Vladimer Papava wrote that after the declaration of the Empire, Russian expansion was evident in “all segments of the Pivot Area.”\footnote{Eldar Ismailov and Vladimer Papava, “The Heartland Theory and the Present-Day Geopolitical Structure of Central Eurasia,” in Rethinking Central Asia (Washington: Johns Hopkins University/Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, 2010), 95. Eldar Ismailov, scholar and publisher, is the founder and Director of the Institute for Strategic Studies of the Caucasus (Baku). Vladimer Papava is a professor of economics of the Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University, Georgia. He is the former Georgia Minister of Economy and a former member of the Georgian Parliament.} Additionally, Kappeler emphasized that from the mid-1600s Russia attempted to integrate parts of Ukraine into the Empire.\footnote{Kappeler, Russian Empire, 61. According to Vladimir Sazonov, Putin is greatly influenced by the concept of Russkiy Mir (Russian World) that expresses the nostalgic desire for the supposed glories of Russia-past and the duty to protect Russian speakers throughout Eurasia. Cf. Vladimir Sazonov, “The Ideology of Putin’s Russia and Its Historical Roots,” in Vladimir Sazonov, Holger Mölder, Kristiina Müür (ed.). Russian Information Warfare against the Ukrainian State and Defense Forces: April-December 2014, Russian Information Warfare against the Ukrainian State and Defense Forces, report, April-December (Riga: NATO Strategic Communications Center for Excellence, 2014), 20ff. Russkiy Mir also is employed by Moscow in its expansionist efforts directed toward Ukraine and elsewhere. Vladimir Sazonov is a University of Tartu senior research fellow in Ancient Near Eastern Studies.}

Russia’s current raison d’État, anticipated through history, were recognized in remarks made by Andrew Wood:

Russia’s current raison d’État, anticipated through history, were recognized in remarks made by Andrew Wood:
Putin’s Russia has sought a renewed claim to eminence whether by virtue of Moscow’s victory in 1945, or by at various times asserting its guardianship of traditional morals and/or its geopolitical position at the center of Eurasia. All these claims rest on Russia’s effectiveness as a centralized and militarily powerful state covering a major part of the world’s land mass.\textsuperscript{967}

Especially noteworthy, in this context, are Wood’s observations regarding Russia’s interpretation of guardianship responsibilities and its Eurasian geopolitical situation when considered as elements of Russia’s Historic National Interests.\textsuperscript{968}

And what are these Russian Historic National Interests? Julia Gurganus and Eugene Rumer provided a recent examination of this subject from the contemporary look-back vantage point:

Continuity with the Soviet era and even earlier periods of Russian history is a hallmark of the Kremlin’s current foreign policy and the toolkit it relies on to advance its goals. It is therefore essential to review the foreign policy legacy of the Soviet Union. Core components of the current Russian toolkit have withstood the test of time, and there is every indication that Moscow will continue to rely on them, even in a post-Putin era.\textsuperscript{969}

“Contemporary Russian foreign policy displays the unmistakable presence of three centuries-old drivers of Moscow’s posture on the world stage,” wrote Gurangus and Rumer, remarking on Russia’s Historic National Interests.\textsuperscript{970}


\textsuperscript{968} There is an obvious underlying thread of recognition of Russia’s Historic National Interests running throughout Dugin’s works. My use of Historic National Interests attempts to categorize Russia’s long-standing efforts to accomplish identifiable national goals across Empire, USSR, and current Russian Federation history. Cf. Bassin, “Eurasianism and Russian Identity.” Cf. references to Russia’s Historic National Interests throughout.


\textsuperscript{970} Gurganus and Rumer, “Russia’s Global Ambitions in Perspective.”
Summarizing and, at the same time, reiterating these consistent interests they stated:

Chief among these drivers is Russia’s quest for strategic depth and secure buffers against external threats, which, considering the country’s geography and absence of natural protective barriers between it and neighboring powers, has guided its geographic expansion. Along with physical insecurity and expansion, the second key driver of Russian foreign policy has been its ambition for recognition as a great power, which the Kremlin has long seen as necessary for legitimizing its geographic conquests and geopolitical ambitions. The third driver, related to the first two, is Russia’s complicated relationship with the West, which combines rivalry with the need for cooperation.971

Bassin examined Eurasianism in pursuit of points of comparison to Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianist proposal.972 Dugin is an innovator; his modifications to classical Eurasianism follow his pattern of mining earlier projects for salvageable material that can support new construction. Dugin suggested that “the Eurasian theory went through two stages,” the first being “a formative period of classical Eurasianism at the beginning of the 20th century by Russian emigrant intellectuals.”973 Dugin then went on to list Trubetskoi, Savitsky, Gumilev, and others as the Russian intellectuals responsible for the formulation of classical Eurasianism.974 The second stage involves the development of Neo-Eurasianism from the 1980s to the present.975

If there is one glaring reason Dugin had to move from the established expressions of Eurasianism espoused by Trubetskoi, Savitsky, and Gumilev, it is the required isolation of Eurasia from Europe. Andrei P. Tsygankov wrote that “following Savitskiy and Gumilev, [Gennadiy] Zyuganov emphasized that, as a unique civilization with a unique geographic location, Russia must be isolated from the West to survive and preserve its uniqueness.”976 Because of

971 Ibid.
972 Cf. e.g., Bassin, “Eurasianism and Russian Identity” and Bassin, “Eurasianism ‘Classical’ and ‘Neo.’”
974 Ibid.
975 Ibid.
the need for European integration in Dugin’s Neo-Eurasian conception, Tsygankov’s claim of Gumilev’s rejection of Russian/European mixing cannot be squared with the Dublin to Vladivostok ambitions Dugin expresses.

Tsygankov pointed out that “Europe, in Gumilev’s racist writings, represents an alien Supraethnic group and can never be mixed with Russia,” a claim that has resonance in the contemporary debates on Muslim migration and the merits of effective integration. This claim brought Eurasianism to a boundary – on one side, Eurasianism before Dugin, on the other, Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianism. Pre-Dugin Eurasianists subscribed to the opinion that, as Gumilev warned, “adaptation to the West would mean nothing less for the Russian people than the loss of their own ‘ethnos and soul.’” Therefore,

As has been noted, Eurasianism in both its classic prewar and later “Gumilevian” interpretations basically saw Russia/Eurasia as a self-contained unity. Russia/Eurasia was constrained by geographical, cultural, and “bio-cosmical” limits – at least in Gumilevian interpretations – and had no desire to spread outside this geopolitical niche to the outside world.

Stephan Wiederkehr thought that Trubetskoj took a broad view of what constitutes “Russianness.” Through Wiederkehr, Eurasian themes emerging in Trubetskoj are exposed, including Slavic and Thracian elements that both became incorporated into Russia’s “historical mission” in


980 Stephan Wiederkehr, “Eurasianism as a Reaction to Pan-Turkism,” in Russia between East and West Scholarly Debates on Eurasianism, ed. Dmitry Shlapentokh (Boston: Brill, 2007), 51. Stephan (Stefan) Wiederkehr is a Swiss historian and librarian.
Trubetskoi’s scheme. Trubetskoi also made the point that Russian culture must have ecumenical characteristics and not be based solely on Eastern Orthodoxy.

The refrain of inclusion is a prominent characteristic of Eurasian thought from its beginning. Wiederkehr observed that this feature even predates Eurasianism when pointing to the fact that Russians living together with Turanians “is a recurring motif throughout Russian history.” Reminiscent of Clooney’s ideas of deep learning across borders, Trubetskoi remarked that “for a correct national self-knowledge we, Russians, have to take into account the presence of the Turanian element in ourselves, we have to study our Turanian brothers.” Eurasian, and hence Neo-Eurasian, movements evolved from being Slavic-oriented to much more multicultural and multinational inclusiveness. “Eurasianism, rather than pan-Slavism for Russians, Pan-Turanianism for Eurasian Turanians, or Pan-Islamism for Eurasian Muslims, should become predominant,” suggested Trubetskoi.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Advisor to President Carter, wrote that “Eurasianism was given an academic gloss in the much-quoted writings of Lev Gumilev, a historian, geographer, and ethnographer.” Brzezinski believed that Gumilev’s books, *Medieval Russia and the Great Steppe*, *The Rhythms of Eurasia*, and *The Geography of Ethnos in Historical Time*, “make a powerful case for the proposition that Eurasia is the natural geographic setting for the

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Russian people’s distinctive ‘ethnos.’”

Ethnos, as Brzezinski read Gumilev, is “the consequence of a historic symbiosis between them [the Russian people], and the non-Russian inhabitants of the open steppes, creating thereby a unique Eurasian cultural and spiritual identity.”

Savitsky also clearly articulated the essential multinational and multicultural nature of Eurasianism that was picked up by Dugin in his formulation of Neo-Eurasian doctrine. “Russians and those who belong to the peoples of ‘the Russian world,’” quoting Savitsky, “are neither Europeans nor Asians.”

Savitsky summed up the feeling, now shared by Dugin, by proclaiming, “we are not ashamed to declare ourselves Eurasians.” Savitsky alluded to a “secret affinity of souls,” which allows Russian culture to be comprehensible to East Europeans and Asians.

Not only does this Affinity of Souls help make Russian culture understandable, it also contributes to a high degree of closeness to Russian culture among the East European and Asian populations. Related to Affinity of Souls is Passionarost. In his review of Black Wind, White Snow, Hosking commented on Clover’s interpretation of Gumilev’s concept of Passionarost – social solidarity characterized by “creative energy, lust for expansion and ruthlessness combined with a capacity for suffering and endurance in pursuing the common cause.”

Without the benefit of Savitsky’s Affinity of Souls, Trubetskoi believed that ethnic nationalism creates a “one-sided link” in an attempt to realize a Eurasian reality. This belief led to the fear that “the centrifugal energies of particular ethnic

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988 Ibid. Brackets added.


993 Hosking, “Theory of Russian History.” Often rendered as Passionarnost. Both spellings will be used herein depending on the style employed in the reference.

nationalisms,” would prevent ties of “brotherhood” from coalescing within the Eurasian construct.995

Trubetskoi suggested that with true Eurasian brotherhood, Eurasianism would not rely on any single link of ethnic nationalism, but on multi-linked criteria bound up in a common historical destiny.996 “Passionarnost,” Gumilev maintained, “not technological or moral progress,” provides the key to world history.997 Passionarnost is a saturated and abiding grit bound up in deep, ancient, and persistent, loyalties and allegiances that contribute so meaningfully to the Russian persona – to Russianness. Passionarnost thus provides the real key to understanding the Soviet tenacity and sacrifice in its WWII victory over Germany.998 Passionarnost is an Eastern characteristic and understanding. The Russians possess Passionarnost, wrote Hosking, and with “that in common with the peoples of Central Asia they formed a civilisation quite distinct from that of Europe.”999

Along with the Affinity of Souls, Passionarnost explains much that makes Russia resistant to Western globalism. Laruelle drew on Lev P. Karsavin’s views of Western Culture in explaining the Eurasianists aversion to Western Democracy.1000 Dugin is not alone; rejecting not just Eurocentrism, Karsavin “discarded Western culture because of its stress on the individual and particular.”1001 Laruelle emphatically stated, “Karsavin and in fact all Eurasianists implicitly discarded the notion of Western democracy,” suggesting, that for them, Western democracy constituted “the dictatorship of the elite which manipulated the electorate.”1002

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995 Ibid. Again, quoting Trubetskoi as above.
996 Ibid.
998 Ibid.
999 Ibid.
1001 Ibid., 10.
1002 Ibid., 11.
Providing a pointer to Dugin, in his 1920 manifesto, *Europe and Mankind*, Trubetskoï suggested that the concept of Russian opposition to the West could be concentrated into a coalescence of outliers in opposition to Europe.\textsuperscript{1003} Referring to Europe, Trubetskoï mainly alluded to those countries engaged in colonial rule. He identified the outliers in this instance to include “Slavs, Chinese, Indians, Arabs, Negroes and other peoples, all of whom, regardless of color, are groaning under the heavy Romano-Germanic yoke and squandering their national energies on the production of raw materials for European factories.”\textsuperscript{1004}

Trubetskoï was emphatic in his calls for a Eurasian creation, saying it “is not only pragmatically valuable; it is nothing less than a vital necessity.”\textsuperscript{1005} Trubetskoï may have been prophetically speaking about the collapse of the Soviet Union in its failure to provide “the awakening of self-awareness as a single, multiethnic Eurasian nation.”\textsuperscript{1006} Trubetskoï wrote that “the destinies of the Eurasian peoples have become interwoven with one another, tied in a massive tangle that can no longer be unraveled.”\textsuperscript{1007} He posited that a proper Russian–Eurasian creation would be able to provide “the ethnic substratum of statehood without which it will eventually fall to pieces.”\textsuperscript{1008}

Bassin surmised that Trubetskoï believed that the Russian revolutions of 1917 spelled the end of any formal existence of the Russian Empire.\textsuperscript{1009} Therefore, henceforth any distinctly “Russian element” could not “legitimately claim its traditional hegemonic position within the larger geographical-political realm

\textsuperscript{1004} Ibid. Cf. Bassin, “Eurasianism and Russian Identity,” 264. Here Bassin wrote that “Russia in other words was part of the colonial realm, of what some decades later we would become accustomed to call the 3rd World, and the stigma associated with this colonial status was particularly apposite at the moment he was writing, in the immediate aftermath of the revolution, for a weakened and defenseless Russia would be utterly powerless to resist European efforts to subjugate and exploit her even more fully.”
\textsuperscript{1006} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1007} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1008} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1009} Bassin, “Eurasianism and Russian Identity,” 260.
of Eurasia.” Trubetskoi recognized the “true and properly homogenizing element of the Eurasian culture zone, however, was not Russian but a more general and comprehensive Eurasian culture.” The success of the Bolsheviks forever altered the Eurasian concept to a much less Russia-centric construct. Trubetskoi realized that “with the revolution, the old situation had undergone a fundamental transformation that was not to be undone.”

The Soviet Union was unable to create the Eurasia Trubetskoi envisioned, and Dugin proposes. Even so, lessons were gleaned from the emerging and resulting Soviet Union. Among the lessons-learned, Trubetskoi recognized that a “critical impetus” could be realized from Russian resistance to the then European hegemony. This critical impetus, this “mankind against Europe” idea, could be used by Russia to secure the emancipation of the colonial empires produced by “Romano-Germanic oppression.” Although Trubetskoi saw that Russia could provide impetus, Bassin recognized the formulation of Trubetskoi’s opinion that occurred after the 1917 Russian Revolution was based on the understanding that the “homogenizing element” required for Eurasian cohesion must be Eurasian, not Russian. Trubetskoi acknowledged the importance of Russia’s Historic National Interests. Still, he was also astute enough to realize that Russia alone, Russia as a specific national and cultural entity, could not accomplish the establishment and maintenance of a Eurasian conglomerate – a new creation was required.

By virtue of its imperial legacy, it was obviously quite out of the question that the Russian element could supply the unifying basis for national cohesiveness, and thus an entirely new identity

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1010 Ibid.
1011 Ibid.
1012 Ibid.
had to be supplied, which could assemble and unify the different parts of the former state.\textsuperscript{1016}

Trubetskoi believed in “the superiority of cultural over anthropological or racial criteria.”\textsuperscript{1017} Bassin appreciated the significance of Trubetskoi’s insistence that a new creation replace Imperial Russia. Trubetskoi’s then yet unrealized new alternative would be Eurasia.\textsuperscript{1018}

To replace imperial Russia, Trubetskoi offered the alternative of Eurasia: a cultural edifice as yet “under construction,” as he conceded with admirable frankness, but which he nonetheless quite sincerely believed to correspond to historical, cultural, and political reality.\textsuperscript{1019}

Trubetskoi’s Eurasia could not embrace a “return to the situation in which Russians were the sole owner of the state territory.”\textsuperscript{1020} The Russian Empire and subsequently the Soviet Union consisted of a multiethnic mix with several separate nationalisms. Trubetskoi’s solution was to advocate for the creation of Eurasia – a nation called Eurasia, “its territory Eurasia, and its nationalism Eurasianism.”\textsuperscript{1021} Nationhood is justified, for “Eurasia constitutes a geographical, economic, and historical whole.”\textsuperscript{1022} Laruelle expressed the opinion that twentieth century “Eurasianism provided the opportunity for a variety of geopolitical arrangements.”\textsuperscript{1023} Gumilev proposed one of the most influential arrangements before Dugin’s Neo-Eurasian introduction. Like Dugin, Gumilev was concerned with the rise, decline, and fall of peoples and civilizations.\textsuperscript{1024}

Hosking noted that Gumilev’s Eurasianist theories were anti-Marxist.\textsuperscript{1025}

Being the son of well-known poets, and a poet, literary character, and critic in

\textsuperscript{1016} Ibid., 266.
\textsuperscript{1017} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1018} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1019} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1021} Ibid., 267. Here Bassin is quoting Trubetskoi, as above. Bassin notes that this portion of the quote was given emphasis in the original.
\textsuperscript{1022} Wiederkehr, “Eurasianism Reaction to Pan-Turkism,” 52. Here quoting Trubetskoi.
\textsuperscript{1024} Cf. 2.5.
\textsuperscript{1025} Hosking, “Theory of Russian History.”
his own right, Gumilev ran afoul of the Stalinist authorities and became familiar with the Gulag system on more than one occasion. Gumilev, personally acquainted with Savitsky, engaged in regular correspondence with him. Gumilev’s official biography on the L.N. Gumilyov Eurasian National University website notes this fact. While in the Gulag, he met Savitsky, who was to prove a vital link between Trubetskoi and the later Eurasianists. Notably, Gumilev was also part of that link himself. WWII intervened, and when Gumilev was out of the Gulag system, he was into the Red Army.

After the war, Gumilev’s academic career was somewhat checkered as his anti-Stalinist labeling, his Gulag experiences, and his associates may have contributed to his academic inconsistencies. Gumilev began postgraduate work at the USSR Institute of Oriental Studies but was not allowed to continue. In 1948 he was accepted into the postgraduate program at Leningrad State University and eventually earned a doctoral degree with a thesis on the ancient Turks. In 1976 it appears he was refused a second doctoral degree with his dissertation “Ethnogeny and Earth’s biosphere.” Even within the prevailing repressive atmosphere, Gumilev developed a sizable following in ethnology, although much, or even most, of his writing was suppressed and left unpublished until pre-collapse Soviet reforms relaxed the restrictions on his work.

Dugin’s Eurasian modification, his Neo-Eurasianism, is composed of more than just geopolitical elements. Gumilev suggested that one of the ingredients is a biological determinant. Akin to the manipulation of perceived reality in Debord’s Spectacle, Dugin acknowledges manipulation by Biopolitics as described by Michel Foucault in The History of Sexuality. Morgan characterizes Biopolitics as the “means by which a political system regulates

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1026 Eurasian National University, “Gumilev Biography.”
1027 Ibid. Despite the awkward English evident in this biography, the gist is clear. Brackets added.
1028 Ibid.
1029 Ibid.
1030 Ibid.
1031 Hosking, “Theory of Russian History.”
the actual physical, biological lives of the people it governs, such as through health and medicine, sexuality and reproduction, and family life.”

Gumilev was somewhat deterministic when he suggested that history becomes predictable. Gumilev advanced a concept of Cultural DNA whereby ethnicities have been formed over centuries, perhaps millennia, through a geographical association with the very soil and terrain they have inhabited. Jonathan Rushbrook offered a critique of Gumilev’s applications:

While the Eurasianists posited a largely religious and cultural definition of Russianness, the ethnic theories of Lev Gumilev are an example a purely biological and pseudo-scientific understanding of the Russian nation that is defined purely by a biological determinism and social Darwinism.

Dugin tends to agree with Gumilev’s explanation that the attraction of soil is a powerful determinant of Eurasian cohesiveness.

3.3.2. The Revival of Eurasian Ideas

A resurgence of Eurasianist ideas occurred in the latter decades of the twentieth century. “At the national level,” Bassin observed, “a variety of very different Eurasian perspectives and doctrines have been articulated,” and he pointedly acknowledged those of Evgenii Primakov and Zyuganov along with Dugin. While Zyuganov is a well-recognized figure, of these, “the best known and most important representative of post-Soviet neo-Eurasianism is Alexander Dugin,” according to Bassin.

“Yevgeny Primakov was the architect of Moscow’s geopolitical reorientation from the West to the Eurasiatric space,” in Emanuel Copilaş’ concise

1033 Morgan, in Fourth Theory, 12, footnote 5.
1034 Cf. Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism, 116, for an examination considering these points.
1037 Ibid.
Primakov, a Soviet and later Russian Federation official, served as Foreign Minister beginning in 1996, and as Prime Minister under Yeltsin for a short time from 1998 to 1999. Copilaş acknowledged that “the neo-Eurasianist inspiration of Primakov’s geopolitical concept is undeniable.”

Copilaş recognized the mantel, “the Primakov Doctrine,” attached to Primakov’s geopolitical prescriptions, and claimed it to be “the political articulation of Neo-Eurasianism.”

Dugin addressed the Eurasian portion of the Primakov Doctrine, stressing the emphasis on creating a robust Eurasian pole to oppose the Western unipolar objective:

The multipolar vision recognizes the integration on the basis of the common civilization. So we speak of Eurasian civilization common not only to Russians and slaves [Slavs] and/or Orthodox peoples but also to the Turkish and aboriginal peoples of Central Asia, Siberia and the Caucasus. Putin’s foreign policy is centered around multipolarity and Eurasian integration that is necessary to create the full standing pole.

The arrival of the Primakov Doctrine and Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianism brings us to the state of Eurasianism today but, the rise of Neo-Eurasianism notwithstanding, much Russia-centered nationalism remains. Zyuganov, the ardent Communist Party leader, set a confrontational tack toward a Neo-Eurasian cultural and geopolitical future. Quoting James Gregor regarding Zyuganov’s placement of Russia at “the core and foundation of the main Eurasiatic block,” claiming the Murmansk to Vladivostok “Big Space,” Copilaş pointed out that Gregor highlighted Zyuganov’s concept of a Russia serving

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1038 Emanuel Copilaş, “Cultural Ideal or Geopolitical Project? Eurasianism’s Paradoxes,” Strategic Impact 3, no. 2009, 74. Cf. this article may be accessed at https://www.scribd.com/doc/47787411/Cultural-Ideal-or-Geopolitical-Project-Eurasianisms-Paradoxes. Emanuel Copilaş is Lecturer at West University, Timișoara, Romania.

1039 Copilaş, “Cultural Ideal or Geopolitical Project,” 74.

1040 Ibid. Using Copilaş, the Primakov Doctrine can be summed up as: the U.S. refuses to accept a multipolar world; NATO’s aspirations eastward are intended to weaken one of the major multipolar actors – the Russian Federation. For an more detailed explanation of the Primakov Doctrine, Cf. e.g., Ariel Cohen, “The Primakov Doctrine: Russia’s Zero-Sum Game with the United States,” Heritage Foundation, F.Y.I. (Heritage Foundation, December 15, 1997), https://www.heritage.org/report/the-primakov-doctrine-russias-zero-sum-game-the-united-states. Ariel Cohen, formerly with the Heritage Foundation is a Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council Eurasia Center and a member of the Council of Foreign Relations.

1041 Dugin, “The Long Path,” as part of his response to the first question. Brackets added in the assumption that “Slavs” corrects a typographical error.
“as a defense line against Western hegemony.” Zyuganov has opposed the unipolar inclined West, placing Russia, not a Eurasian creation, as the bulwark against Western postmodern globalism. So, we see that the Eurasian geopolitics of Dugin regarding the macro-political applications and defense against Western power projections are also shared by Russian-centric thinkers as well.

The predominant Western view, based on the assumption that the entire world is striving for government constructed on the Western Liberal Model, is that the multicultural aspects of societies are mostly superficial differences. Shlapentokh criticized the notion that multiculturalism has universal appeal. Extrapolating Shlapentokh’s criticism, one can conclude that assuming multiculturalism as a superficial development is mistaken, as it is fundamentally a civilizational difference. This interpretation is consistent with Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianist assumption.

3.3.3. Filling Eurasia

3.3.3.1. Movement to the East and South

Russian expansionist desires are nothing new. Historical Russian expansion may be viewed as a precursor to any developed concept of Eurasianism. For example, in 1903, Sergei M. Seredonin developed notions of a more eastward looking Russia, “to justify the ‘need for space’ of Russia and its natural orientality [sic].” Laruelle said:

More than a millennium of cohabitation and interpenetration between Russians and Asians, the inheritance of Byzantine empire — antechamber of Asia — and the Mongol yoke, as well as the easy conquest of the cold spaces, caused [Seredonin] to conceive an Asian Russia, oriented toward Orient but not

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1044 Ibid., 4ff.

1045 Ibid., 4.

Europe, which was considered as too insular and too populated.\textsuperscript{1047}

While the eastward leanings expressed by Seredonin were decidedly pre-Eurasian insofar as any geopolitical movement was concerned, they do present a recognizable historical foundation on which later more discernable concepts of the Eurasian movement were erected. Acknowledging the bridge and therefore the debt owed by Eurasianists to earlier more Slavic-centered exponents, Laruelle astutely observed that while Eurasianists may have drawn “their intellectual knowledge from the inheritance of Pan-Slavists and Soloviev, they were also heirs of geopolitical currents turned toward [the] Orient.”\textsuperscript{1048} Pan-Slavic elements, Oriental leanings, and Russian mystical messianic ideas of Sacred Geography were all at play in the pre-Eurasian milieu. Evidence of Eurasianism as the beneficiary of these ingredients is found in Bassin’s observation that Trubetskoi grafted the “old belief” of Russia’s messianic mission into his Eurasian project.\textsuperscript{1049}

Practical expansion took “the shape of a pacific [sic] colonization by Russians that would follow the construction of the Trans-Siberian railway.”\textsuperscript{1050} The Trans-Siberian and its associated tributary lines were the existential manifestations preceding from both the Great Game between the Empires of Russia and Great Britain, as well as Eurasian development in the twentieth century. Hundreds of years before the Great Game was played out, and long before railroads were contemplated, other historical events provided some of the early foundations that would later contribute to Russia’s Orientalism. In 1279 the vast Mongol Empire of Genghis Khan, significantly expanded by his scions – notably, Kublai Khan – extended from the Sea of Japan in the East to present-day Turkey and Ukraine in the West before it receded and faded in history. The empire of the Khans ended and the residual elements of culture, genetics, and received myth and legend paled but remained. Parchizadeh stated that just over 300 years after the Mongol Empire, the Romanovs

\textsuperscript{1047} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1048} Ibid., 23. Brackets added.
\textsuperscript{1049} Bassin, “Eurasianism and Russian Identity,” 265.
ascended in Russia and “developed major tendencies for expansionism
towards the east and the south.”

Parchizadeh reported that eastward “lay the powerful Tartar khanates whose
lords were the descendants of the great medieval Mongol conqueror, Genghis
Khan.” It took more than three centuries to subdue the Tartars; but, the
efforts of the Russian Empire and later the Soviets gradually succeeded.

Historical and cultural attractions are evident in Russia’s eastern expansionist
efforts. The penchant for looking to its historical past and adopting
ingredients from it is also a Russian characteristic. “The role of the heritage of
Gengis-Khan, trustee of the Tatar statehood assimilated by Moscow in the XVI
century, was seen as a decisive turn of Russia to the East, to its origins, to its
own values,” Dugin remarked.

Turning southward, Parchizadeh related that the Russo-Persian Wars
effectively established Russian military supremacy over Persia. This
southward expansion “led to the imposing of two humiliating ‘Accords’ on
Persia,” said Parchizadeh. The Golestān and Turkmanchay agreements ceded
sizable Persian territories to the Russian Empire. Parchizadeh wrote that,
as a result, “the Tsar acquired the title of Protector of the Persian Crown,
effectively making Persia a protectorate of the Tsar.” Persian developments
have exerted tremendous influence on Russian regional policy, political
actions, and military strategy from Czarist times, through Soviet times, and
into the present day. Parchizadeh reminded that from the time of the Russo-

1051 Parchizadeh, “Historic Roots of Russian Expansionism.”
1052 Ibid.
1053 Ibid.
1054 Dugin, “Eurasia Above All.”
1055 Parchizadeh, “Historic Roots of Russian Expansionism.”
1056 Cf. e.g., Vahid Rashidvash, “History of Iran: The Circumstances of Signing Golestan and
Turkmanchy Treaties and Its Contents,” International Review of Social Sciences and
Humanities 3, no. 1 (March 2, 2012): 246–61. Golestān (Golestan) is also found rendered as
Gulistan. For an English translation of the Treaty of Golestan, Cf.
http://mfa.gov.az/en/content/809. For an English translation of the Treaty of Turkmenchay,
Cf. http://mfa.gov.az/en/content/810. Vahid Rashidvash is a researcher in Iranian studies at
Yerevan State University, Armenia.
1057 Parchizadeh, “Historic Roots of Russian Expansionism.”
Persian Wars, through successive iterations, “Russia/Soviet Union/Russia has been one of the most influential players on the Persian/Iranian stage.”\textsuperscript{1058}

The Ottomans were much more successful than the Persians in resisting outright Russian absorption and domination as they “put up a heavy resistance to the Russian encroachment for around two centuries.”\textsuperscript{1059} Ottoman resistance was not without its setbacks, however. Parchizadeh remarked that “along the way,” the Ottoman Empire “would be forced to concede many obligations and cede vast tracts of lands to the expanding Tsarist Empire.”\textsuperscript{1060} The Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca concluded between Tsarist Russia and the Ottoman Empire in 1774 is noteworthy because “after decades of tension, struggle and war between the Russians and the Turks in the proximity of the Black Sea basin,” it “ceded de facto control over the strategic lands around the Sea of Azov, like the Crimean Peninsula, to the Russians.”\textsuperscript{1061}

The obvious significance of this diplomacy resonates to this day. Peter Alexeyevich – Tsar Peter I, Peter the Great – frequently castigated by Dugin and the Neo-Eurasianists for displaying Europhile leanings, was none-the-less instrumental in giving clear access to long-sought-after, ice-free southern ports, and oceans.\textsuperscript{1062} Despite setbacks and improved Russian naval avenues to the south, the Ottoman Empire still represented a real barrier to Russian access to the present-day Middle East, and for over 200 years obstructed “full-throttle expansion southwards.”\textsuperscript{1063} Parchizadeh correctly pointed out that this covers a period when “the British Empire was also at the height of its

\textsuperscript{1058} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1059} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1060} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1062} Ibid. Parchizadeh claims that this fulfilled the “foremost desire” of Peter I in contrast to those who claim Europeanization of Russia was primary. Perhaps the two are complementary; at the least, acquisition of ports to support a modern fleet could help place Russia in a more balanced political position \textit{vis-a-vis} the powers of Europe. Cf. Jardar Østbø, 
\textsuperscript{1063} Ibid.
power, and would lend a hand to the old Ottoman Empire if necessary, as it did in the case of the Crimean War.”

With the establishment of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, the “Tsarist Empire was acknowledged as the ‘protector’ of both the Christian sites of worship in the Holy Land and the Christian pilgrims.” The Protector role is accepted as a responsibility of immense importance in the Neo-Eurasian worldview of Dugin and his geopolitical colleagues. It figures prominently in formulations of the Third Rome. For its part, Russia coveted both expansions southward with the ice-free ports that would come as a result and its role as the protector of the Christians within the Ottoman Empire. This two-fold desire, with its long history, remained intact after the Russian Revolution and the rise of the Soviet Union and remains intact still.

Tekin Alp, often mentioned in histories and studies of Pan-Turkish and later Kemalist development, wrote that “the alliance between the Ottoman Empire and Germany in World War I was the conscious expression of an unconscious thousand-year-old brotherhood in arms against their common enemy, the Slavs.” Alp’s recognition of the centuries-old Turk-Slav animosity was rendered more pointedly as he “explicitly advocated the destruction of the Russian Empire with the support of Germany in order to achieve a ‘union of all Turks of the world’ under the leadership of the Ottomans.” Still smarting after its defeat in the Crimean War, and the loss of the use of the Black Sea for the Southern Fleet, Russia was able to recover somewhat after the 1887-88 Russo-Turkish War. However, the geopolitical landscape in the

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1064 Ibid.
1065 Ibid.
1066 Wiederkehr, “Eurasianism Reaction to Pan-Turkism,” 44. Wiederkehr cited Alp’s pamphlet, Türkismus und Pantürkismus. Tekin Alp (often Tekinalp), philosopher and supporter of the Pan-Turkish movement, was the name assumed by Jewish born Moiz Cohen. Tekin Alp, 1883-1961.
aftermath of WWI seriously altered the track of both Turkish and Russian ambitions.

Hopes for the success of Pan-Turkish goals to destroy the Russian Empire were dashed against the much more formidable rocks of the growing military might of the Soviet Union. Conversely, Russian hopes of southward expansion were stymied by its withdrawal from WWI and the subsequent carving up of the Levant and the present-day Middle East by the Western Allied powers. The attempts by post-WWI Turkey and the Soviet Union to control all or parts of the region led to conflict, making for the real possibility of war. Joseph Stalin and other Caucasian Bolsheviks attempted to regain control of the Transcaucasia after the fall of the Russian Empire of the Romanovs. While this was happening, a more modern and more secular Turkey was being created by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the Young Turks.

Realistically, neither Turkey nor the Soviet Union was desirous of armed conflict; both were war-weary and aware of the possible lasting adverse consequences inherent in a draining war. Both had internal and external enemies that would exploit weaknesses exacerbated by mobilization and combat operations. They both entered into diplomatic efforts with the resulting 1921 Treaty of Moscow signed on March 16th. This treaty was reaffirmed and somewhat refined with the subsequent Treaty of Kars signed a few months later in October 1921.

The continuing significance of this southern conflict with the Ottoman Turks and subsequent treaty action still lies heavily in the historical memory of, first, the Russian Empire, then the USSR, and now Putin’s Russia. Russian expansion and influence are essential and relevant to current expressions of Neo-Eurasianism. There is also a recognition within Neo-Eurasianism that it

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1068 Joseph Stalin, 1879–1953.
1069 Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, 1881–1938.
contains an element of possessive zeal akin to various pronouncements claiming that *Dar al-Islam* confers an eternal aspect of ownership over any territory once conquered.

Gurganus and Rumer connected the nineteenth century complaints of Danilevskii directly to the current Russian complaints directed at the West:

In the mid-nineteenth century, Russian historian and writer Nikolay Danilevsky complained about Russia’s unfair treatment by Europe, which had turned a blind eye to Prussian and Austrian aggression against Denmark following the annexation of two Danish provinces yet criticized Russia’s efforts to protect the rights of its coreligionists in “barbaric” Turkey. Danilevsky’s complaint was, in effect, a precursor of Putin’s lament about the West’s double standards in dealing with Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the severing of Kosovo from Serbia.1072

Russia’s disastrous war with Japan foretold a dark period of Russian expansionist efforts. Humiliating as it was, Russia’s exit from WWI was worse. The 1918 Treaty of Brest was nothing short of catastrophic to the Bolsheviks’, but it did grant them some respite during the Soviet Union’s tumultuous infancy.1073 In the twentieth century, the fledgling Soviet Union avoided a possible debilitating military conflict with Turkey at a time when its viability was far from a sure thing, and unwelcome international intervention was possible. The USSR did pay a cost, a cost today’s Russia inherited – the loss of hard-won possessions and control in the south. Dugin does not view territorial losses as a permanent reality given the possessive zeal of his Neo-Eurasianism. As Winston Churchill and Bassin observed, Russia has a very

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1073 The Treaty of Brest to the Russians is better known in the West as The Treaty of Brest-Litvsk. Cf. https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/bl34.asp#treatytext for a text of this treaty.
long memory and a strong commitment to its long-standing Historical National Interests.\textsuperscript{1074}

As the end of the nineteenth century neared, Russia was a player in the Great Game with Britain, a series of high-stakes gambles involving dominant influence in Central Asia and, for one of the players, control of India. Afghanistan was conjured up to separate the two players and continues as a troubled buffer and oftentimes battlefield. Still, throughout the Great Game, Russia was able to cast its eye farther east, and development along the Siberian Railway continued. Russia, potentially powerful but hampered by its cumbersome and ineffective bureaucracy and its industrial shortcomings, desired to be counted among the world powers. Unfortunately for Russian ambitions, moves to the east, and building a fleet intended to be a credible challenge on international seas, culminated in the disastrous war with Japan.

The head-on conflict between Japan and Russia began in 1904, though the seeds of discord were sown long before. Always desirous of year-round warm-water portage for its fleet, Russia had leased Port Arthur in China’s Liaodong Province. Japan considered Russian expansion into the region as a threat to its strategic interests, and the proximate cause of the conflict was the failure of negotiations on what territories and control-zones the potential belligerents would accept. The Japanese commenced hostilities with a surprise attack on Port Arthur on February 8th, 1904. Russia attempted an incredible almost 20,000-mile sailing to Vladivostok with the intent to relieve Port Arthur. Upon arrival in-theater with a fleet of some eight battleships, plus cruisers, destroyers, and other vessels, the Russian squadron attempted to make a night run between Korea and Japan. The Russians were sighted, and in the

Tsushima Straits on the 27th and 28th of May 1905, they were engaged by the Japanese.

In the Straits, the Japanese fleet, executing textbook precision and tactical daring, dealt the Russian fleet an unqualified military disaster. In a maneuver known as “Crossing the T,” the Japanese were able to bring their ships in a battleline across the course of the Russians sailing in column-type formation.1075 From above, this maneuver would resemble a giant “T.” The result allowed the Japanese to bring many guns to bear from broadsides at similar ranges, whereas Russian fire was constrained because their ships were mostly deployed one-behind-the-other. The battle lines effectively screened the Japanese ships, often requiring the Russians to fire through their formation to engage. Maneuvering developed the running battle into more of a circular affair where the Japanese were consistently able to cross or turn the Russian battle line in its attempt to continue to make for Vladivostok. The disaster resulted in the Russians able to escape with only three of some 38 of their warships.

With this epic naval catastrophe and accompanying land and other sea losses, the elusive dream of warm water ports evaded the Russian grasp yet again. Russia had tasted expansion, but a taste was all it would get. The mid-nineteenth century losses in the Crimean War, the end-of-century blocking maneuvers of Britain in the Great Game, combined with the Japanese victory in the early twentieth century to hold Russian expansion in check. For Russia, the frustration of unrealized potential and vexation of containment continued.

3.3.3.2. Movement to the West

Like using tree trunk rings to mark growth, Russian history may be viewed considering its periods of territorial expansion and contraction. Reckoning just from the period of the Romanovs beginning in 1613, Russia expanded, then contracted when previously gained territory was subsequently lost, only

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to have the cycle begin again. In 1682, Tsar Peter I began an expansion period that included not only territorial acquisition but cultural development as well. An increasingly European, therefore Western, perspective was encouraged and embraced – at least at Court and among the Russian wealthy and aristocratic elite. With the increased attention toward Europe also came a period of westward expansion.

Kappeler examined the expansion-contraction characteristic as he considered Russian attempts to move westward into the Baltic region in 1558. Kappeler found that during the Livonian War, “which lasted for twenty-five years, large parts of Livonia and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania were temporarily under Russian rule.” Then contraction occurred with “the defeat of Russia and the partitioning of Livonia between Poland-Lithuania and Sweden.” The westward expansion phase was initiated again in the Northern Wars commencing in 1654 and again in 1700. With its increased territory, Russia also acquired problems of integration of European populations into its governmental scheme. Centralist and autocratic Russia “was confronted with the task of integrating societies which possessed a corporate organization, different estates and regional traditions,” observed Kappeler.

Russian access to the Baltic Sea and acquisition of Baltic territory was vividly underscored with the founding and building of St. Petersburg and relocation of the Capital there beginning in 1703. In 1721 Peter I declared that Russia had become the Russian Empire. The practical result of acquisition and integration is especially pertinent to Dugin’s somewhat simplified assumption of Eurasian cohesiveness. For with the Baltic and Polish additions,

The basic dilemma of Russian policy on nationalities became clearly evident for the first time, since Russia, which was superior in military and political terms, was annexing areas

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1076 Kappeler, *Russian Empire*, 60.
1077 Ibid.
1078 Ibid.
1079 Ibid.
whose socio-political organization, economy and culture were more advanced than those of the metropolis.\textsuperscript{1080}

Nancy Shields Kollmann wrote, in agreement with the dilemma Kappeler identified, that, as a result, “these lands were allowed to maintain their well-articulated political systems and social elites.”\textsuperscript{1081} The Ukrainian expansions reverberate still. From the mid-seventeenth century, “the ensuing gradual integration of a part of Ukraine into the Russian empire have been and continue to be the subject of controversial debates” was Kappeler’s understated observation.\textsuperscript{1082}

3.3.3.3. The Pivot Area and the Rimland

Dugin does not fail to grasp the significance of Heartland and Rimland Theories. One of the keys to unlocking Fourth Political Theory involves engaging the views of Mackinder and Spykman. The deliberate-expansion argument gains strong geopolitical support from Mackinder. In 1904 Mackinder presented his paper, “The Geographical Pivot of History,” to the Royal Geographic Society. Mackinder knew that “the core area of Eurasia” was protected from attack by the maritime powers of his day.\textsuperscript{1083} Stephen Mladineo related that with this paper, Mackinder “first offered the theory of the ‘Pivot Area,’ a designation for the core area of Eurasia,” reasoning “that the development of the potential power of this area could enable the continental power that controlled it to dominate the world.”\textsuperscript{1084}

Mackinder’s main concern at the time of his paper and subsequent book was with the threat Germany presented to Europe and the world. Mladineo stated that Mackinder realized that Russia represented little danger at the time.\textsuperscript{1085} However, Mackinder also recognized that in the future, a buffer would be required between the two Eurasian powers of Germany and Russia.\textsuperscript{1086}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{1080} Ibid., 60–61.
\textsuperscript{1081} Nancy Shields Kollmann, \textit{The Russian Empire 1450-1801} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 103. Nancy Shields Kollmann is a Scholar and professor at Stanford University.
\textsuperscript{1082} Kappeler, \textit{Russian Empire}, 61.
\textsuperscript{1083} Mladineo, “Introduction,” xviii.
\textsuperscript{1084} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1085} Ibid., xix. The “two great historical organizers” refer to Germany and Russia.
\textsuperscript{1086} Ibid.
\end{flushright}
Mackinder designated the buffer areas partially surrounding Eurasia, the “Inner Crescent” and the “Outer Crescent.”

In Spykman’s somewhat competing theory, attention focused on the nations “on the periphery of the World Island.” Mladineo wrote that “Spykman renamed the inner crescent the Rimland, and argued based on his analysis of power politics that Mackinder’s slogan should be recast as ‘Who controls the rimland rules Eurasia; who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world.’” Control of the Rimland indeed proved to be a significant element of the Western policy during the Cold War. Containment Policy, incorporated aspects of both the Inner and Outer Crescents identified by Mackinder, and the control of the Rimland. According to the U.S. Department of State Historian's Office:

Despite all the criticisms and the various policy defeats that Kennan suffered in the early 1950’s, containment in the more general sense of blocking the expansion of Soviet influence remained the basic strategy of the United States throughout the cold war. On the one hand, the United States did not withdraw into isolationism; on the other, it did not move to “roll back” Soviet power, as John Foster Dulles briefly advocated. It is possible to say that each succeeding administration after Truman’s, until the collapse of communism in 1989, adopted a variation of Kennan’s containment policy and made it their own.

The importance attached to both Mackinder's and Spykman's concepts to Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianism must be contemplated considering the combined elements of Heartland Theory, Rimland Theory, Containment Policy, and the historical references and inferences of Fourth Political Theory. Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianist proposal exhibits characteristics that reflect both Heartland and Rimland Theories, and tacitly acknowledges and opposes Containment Policy.

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1087 Ibid.
1088 Ibid. As previously mentioned, the “World Island” can be understood as Europe, Asia, and Africa (or at least the northern portion) around the heartland. The “off-shore” islands are mainly composed of the UK, Ireland, and Japan. The “outlying” islands are the Americas and Australia.
1089 Ibid., xx, footnote 7. Mladineo is quoting Spykman; Cf. 1.1.1.
1090 U.S. State Department, “Kennan and Containment.”
Contemporary scholars, Ismailov and Papava elaborated on Russian expansion and its connections with the ideas of Mackinder and Spykman.\textsuperscript{1091} They recognized that a nineteenth century expanding Russian Empire “conquered the strategically important littoral strips in the west (the Baltic states and Finland), in the east (Kamchatka, Sakhalin, the Maritime Area, and Alaska), and in the north (the littoral part of the Arctic Ocean).”\textsuperscript{1092} The result of this expansion was Russian-gained access to three oceans, allowing it to become a combined “land and sea power able to function as a geopolitical actor in the Heartland and Rimland simultaneously.”\textsuperscript{1093}

Ismailov and Papava note that “the Russian Empire began moving into all segments of the Pivot Area” by the mid-1800s. Russia had “conquered the entire Central Caucasian region by the 19th century and was looking westward at Central Europe and eastward at Central Asia.”\textsuperscript{1094} “Initially, the ethnic Russians lived mainly in the East European segment of the Heartland,” Ismailov and Papava observed.\textsuperscript{1095} In the nineteenth century, Russia “gained domination over all the key segments of the Pivot Area,” including Central Europe, Central Caucasia, and Central Asia, “in the form of the Russian Empire.”\textsuperscript{1096}

Expressing inclusion, but with a decided nod toward primacy, Savitsky, in \textit{Exodus to the East}, articulates the Eurasian position with his emphatic, “we do not want to confine it within the narrow bounds of national chauvinism.”\textsuperscript{1097} Savitsky added, “we direct our nationalism not merely toward ‘Slavs,’ but toward a whole circle of peoples of the ‘Eurasian’ world, among

\textsuperscript{1091} Ismailov and Papava, “Heartland Theory,” 95.
\textsuperscript{1092} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1093} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1094} Ibid., 94.
\textsuperscript{1095} Ibid., 95.
\textsuperscript{1096} Ibid.
whom the Russian people has the central position.” Thus, he affirmed his inclusive attitude but made it clear that Russia would be first among equals.

### 3.3.3.4. Concern over a Neo-Eurasian Reality

While concern with Putin’s Russia occupies a significant amount of attention in the West, an increasing focus from Russia to a broader Eurasian context is discernable. Brzezinski was one of the first to give notable Western, especially American, attention to a Eurasian geopolitical reality as a potential threat to continuing American superpower supremacy. Echoing Mackinder, Brzezinski observed:

> How America “manages” Eurasia is critical. A power that dominates Eurasia would control two of the world’s three most advanced and economically productive regions. A mere glance at the map also suggests that control over Eurasia would almost automatically entail Africa’s subordination, rendering the Western Hemisphere and Oceania geopolitically peripheral to the world’s central continent.

These are strategically significant points. Brzezinski pointed out another with his observation that “about 75 percent of the world’s people live in Eurasia, and most of the world’s physical wealth is there as well, both in its enterprises and underneath its soil.” The combined potential of Eurasia is unprecedented in comparison to most, if not all, of the rest of the world.

Although decades have intervened, Brzezinski’s concern on how to manage Eurasia is still recognizable in the West today. Not confining himself to a narrow economic focus, Brzezinski warned of the overall threat of rising Eurasian Power exemplified in his statement that, “it is imperative that no Eurasian challenger emerges capable of dominating Eurasia and thus of also challenging America.”

America is now the only global superpower, and Eurasia is the globe’s central arena. Hence, what happens to the distribution of power on the Eurasian continent will be of decisive

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1098 Ibid.
1100 Ibid.
1101 Ibid., xiv.
importance to America’s global primacy and to America’s historical legacy.\textsuperscript{1102}

While much Neo-Eurasian rhetoric appears to be defensive – providing a bulwark against the juggernaut of U.S. led Western global domination – voices in the West have expressed similar conclusions. Brzezinski, for example, stated his case clearly and concluded prophetically:

\begin{quote}
In the long run, global politics are bound to become increasingly uncongenial to the concentration of hegemonic power in the hands of a single state. Hence, America is not only the first, as well as the only, truly global superpower, but it is also likely to be the very last. \textsuperscript{1103}
\end{quote}

Dugin would agree with Brzezinski concerning Eurasia’s potential importance. The agreement appears to stop there. Taking up the Eurasian standard, Dugin not only opposes Brzezinski’s doctrinal pronouncements implying the desirability of American hegemony, he directly challenges them. Brzezinski’s goal, when overlaid on today’s geopolitical situation, was to forestall a potentially overly powerful Eurasian political creation. In contrast, Dugin’s goal is to limit the power of America – in his eyes, the world monster.\textsuperscript{1104} “It follows that America’s primary interest is to help ensure that no single power comes to control this geopolitical space and that the global community has unhindered financial and economic access to it,” as Brzezinski expressed the American view.\textsuperscript{1105} Dugin’s ambition is to see the creation of a multipolar world featuring a Russia-centric Eurasia. Thus, are the lines drawn.

To deny that Russia is casting a longing gaze on all of Ukraine, Poland, the Balkans, and Scandinavia is to engage in a naïveté that disregards Russia’s Historic National Interests. Richard M. Langworth asked if Russia would “one day seek to reclaim the conquests of Peter the Great, regaining her ice-free Baltic coastline, which the Czars had dominated for centuries?”\textsuperscript{1106} “In the

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{1102} Ibid., 194. We must, of course, consider this statement from the perspective of the elapsed time since Brzezinski wrote it.
\textsuperscript{1103} Ibid., 209.
\textsuperscript{1104} Dugin, “Eurasia Above All,” under, Neo-Eurasism.
\textsuperscript{1105} Brzezinski, \textit{The Grand Chessboard}, 148.
\end{footnotes}
early 1930s,” Langworth wrote, “the small republics could only hope that the
Soviet treaties would hold, or that Germany would insist on preserving Baltic
integrity for its own security interests.”1107 At the time, others, including
Churchill, “were less optimistic.”1108

Ignoring Dugin’s desires for Russia to continue beyond mere reclamation of
the old Warsaw Pact territory – to the point of geographically expanding from
Dublin-to-Vladivostok – disregards Dugin’s repeated assertions. Recall that
“Trubetskoï did not miss the opportunity to translate the old belief in Russia’s
messianic mission of salvation into terms appropriate to the early 20th
century.”1109 Neither does Dugin; he consciously and unflinchingly invests
Eurasia with Tradition and a theologically based messianic and prophetic
legacy.

3.4. Considering Dugin’s Metaphysics and Philosophy

When expanded into a worldview, there are three major “global-metaphysical
systems” into which “the variety of the world’s political ideologies” can be
divided, wrote Epstein of Dugin’s perspective.1110 Epstein’s consideration of
Dugin’s metaphysical worldview included an interpretation of these three
concepts: Absolute Unity, Transcendental, and Magical Materialism.1111

Absolute Unity is the condition of humankind like it was before the Fall,
where there was a closeness with God now unknown except to the
Traditionalist Adepts.1112 In his 1994 analysis of Dugin, Epstein concluded by
fully embracing the “esoteric doctrine of immanence,” Dugin accepts Absolute
Unity as achievable.1113 Relevant to interpreting Dugin is the realization that
he identifies Absolute Unity as the gnostic “noblest of all worldviews.”1114
Furthermore, he believes that Absolute Unity is witnessed in the historical

1107 Langworth, “Churchill and the Baltic.”
1108 Ibid.
1109 Bassin, “Eurasianism and Russian Identity,” 265.
1110 Epstein, Conservatism and Traditionalism, 14.
1111 Ibid.
1112 Ibid. Here Epstein cites Dugin, “Metafizicheskie Korni Politicheskikh Ideologii,” Milyi
1113 Ibid.
1114 Ibid.
manifestations of the sacred imperialism of the Ghibellines, the beliefs of Cathars and Albigenses, in the teachings of Rosicrucianism, and in German National Socialism. While accepting that the esoteric doctrine of immanence was characteristic of the Ghibelline supporters of the Holy Roman Empire in its quarrels with the Popes may be arguable, it was nonetheless familiar to the Cathars and Albigenses. Rosicrucian acceptance of immanence, expressed similarly to Dugin’s Absolute Unity, is no doubt present in its gnostic approach to religion in general and Christianity in particular.

Dugin associates specific archetypes personified within the state of Absolute Unity; here, the personalities of the Divine Subject, the Hero, the Angelic Leader, and the Sacred Emperor are recognizable. For Dugin, there is “no higher metaphysical principle” than that embodied in the Divine Subject within Absolute Unity. Herein is the pinnacle of Dugin’s metaphysical fusion with politics – in Absolute Unity, man “is absolutely free and inseparable from God.”

This total inseparability – absolute immanence, God’s complete indwelling – “is personified in the figure of a ‘Divine Subject, Hero, Angelic Leader, Sacred Emperor,’” in Dugin’s hermeneutic. While it seems that the personification of this relationship is individualized, Dugin’s examples of their manifestation are more in keeping with a community relationship.

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1115 Ibid. Interestingly, Epstein includes German National Socialism in his list of Absolute Unity manifestations. Epstein’s suggestion that Dugin maintains a “sacred imperialism” linked to National Socialism is interesting given accusations of Dugin fascist leanings. Cf. 3.9.7. for more discussion of Dugin’s fascism.

1116 “God, the Great Spirit, in Whom we actually and in fact ‘live and move and have our being,’ is the Power that permeates and sustains the whole Universe with Its Life; but while that Life flows into and is immanent in every atom of the six lower Worlds and all contained therein.” This quotation is from “The Sevenfold Constitution of Man.” Cf. https://www.rosicrucian.com/rcc/rcceng03.htm.


1118 Ibid. Cf. Epstein’s note 33, where Epstein cites Dugin as above.

1119 Ibid.

1120 Ibid.

1121 Ibid. Dugin claims examples were present within Ghibelline imperialism, the Cathar and Albigensian heresies, Rosicrucian teachings, and German National Socialism.
Metaphysical Transcendentalism follows Absolute Unity in Dugin’s formulation. According to Epstein’s understanding, Dugin believes Metaphysical Transcendentalism is the position that mainstream Christianity attempts to maintain. However, leveling a charge of heresy, Dugin claims that the Roman Church departed from the Orthodox purity of original Christianity, a purity now preserved only by its Gnostic remnant. Moreover, both Roman Catholicism and Protestantism fail to maintain a place in Metaphysical Transcendentalism today.

Metaphysical Transcendentalism expresses adherence somewhat between the “Paradise Principle” of Absolute Unity of Traditionalism and the irreconcilable transcendence of Judaism. While Christianity doctrinally recognizes Christ as the mediator, the intercessor, that is a bridge across the otherwise irreconcilable separation of human existence from Paradise after the Fall, Christianity largely failed to restore the order of Paradise through “God and man in the figure of Christ.”

Dugin believes that, in the main, Christianity failed to achieve the immanence present in Paradise. The failure occurred because Christianity “surrendered to Jewish transcendentalism,” and became a religion consumed by the depravity of sin and a need to constantly seek repentance. The Roman Church abandoned its true mission, restoration of the order of Paradise through Absolute Unity, and settled for control of Christianity by the rationing of forgiveness. Therefore, the Roman Church stands condemned in gnostic teachings, and is henceforth viewed “as Satanic and Luciferian.” Epstein wrote that Dugin accepts the gnostic teaching condemning the Roman Catholic Church for corrupting the notion of Absolute Unity representing “the...
true manifestations of original Christianity.”1130 What Dugin is advocating, as Epstein expressed it, “is the struggle of authentic Christianity against its Judaic distortions.”1131

Magical Materialism occupies the lowest rung on Dugin’s Metaphysical Systems ladder. Materialism, in Dugin’s opinion, has been falsely endowed with near-magical properties to solve the world’s ills without resorting to monotheistic religion.1132 The technological power of humanistic evolution is thought to be all that is required to address any, and all, issues.1133 The materialistic element in Magical Materialism is easy to identify, and Dugin’s anti-Western, anti-globalist scorn is easily detected.

Dugin accuses the Magical Materialism of the West as being a false religion where super-technology supplants the supernatural. Magical Materialism, as a practical matter, elevates scientism into the realm of authentic religion “where paradise is identified with purely material comfort and technological progress.”1134 Interestingly endowed with a diverse membership, Magical Materialism is also the category where Dugin deposits Soviet Communism, Western consumer-oriented globalism, Roman Catholicism and Protestantism.

When unpacking Magical Materialism, the materialistic element is easy to identify. The “magical” modifier may seem almost flippant but is understandable in the sense of trusting in the seemingly magical ability of evolutionary humanism to solve all problems. “Where there is the necessary technical skill to move mountains, there is no need for the faith that moves mountains,” quipped Hoffer.1135 Because for Dugin, the degree of faith required to move mountains through technology imitates, albeit poorly,

1130 Ibid.
1132 Ibid.
1133 Ibid.
1134 Ibid.
supernatural faith; he, therefore, accuses Western materialism of being a false religion.\textsuperscript{1136}

Magical Materialism is the category where one may expect to find Atheistic and totalitarian Communism. At the same time, it is where the American and other Western models of consumer-oriented societies are found. In places where Enlightenment-inspired humanistic consumerism is the model, “paradise is identified with purely material comfort and technological progress.”\textsuperscript{1137} Dugin readers in the West may find it somewhat shocking that he so readily relegates Protestantism within the same category of Global Metaphysics as he does Soviet Marxism and American Liberalism. Dugin does it with no apparent compulsion.\textsuperscript{1138}

Metaphysics occupies a prominent place in Dugin’s conception of Russia’s relationship with the West. In a future Russia/Eurasia, highly infused with Traditionalism, he sees Absolute Unity as attainable. Western Globalism, with its inherent materialism, is relegated to a place where technological magic becomes the dominant, but none-the-less false religion of Scientism.\textsuperscript{1139} Additionally, Dugin’s assessment of the immanent understandings and manifestations of German National Socialism are particularly interesting due, in no small part, to widespread accusations of Dugin’s Fascist leanings.\textsuperscript{1140}

\section*{3.4.1. Considering Dugin’s Critique of Liberalism.}

Similar to Dugin’s contention that Liberalism contributed to its own demise, Voegelin associated the humanistic values of modernity with a “Gnostic civilization,” and paradoxically blamed the resulting success of such a civilization with its ultimate failure.

The more fervently all human energies are thrown into the great enterprise of salvation through world-immanent action, the farther the human beings who engage in this enterprise move away from the life of the spirit. And since the life of the spirit is

\textsuperscript{1136} Cf. e.g., Dugin, \textit{Fourth Theory}, 196.
\textsuperscript{1137} Epstein, \textit{Conservatism and Traditionalism}, 15.
\textsuperscript{1138} Perhaps relating it to the Protestant work ethic that produced much of Western capitalism.
\textsuperscript{1139} Dugin, \textit{Fourth Theory}, 196.
\textsuperscript{1140} Cf. 3.9.7. for comments on fascist accusations.
the source of order in man and society, the very success of a Gnostic civilization is the cause of its decline. 1141

Because Dugin’s Neo-Traditionalism is inherently gnostic, depending, as it does, on Traditionalism’s correctly handed-down knowledge, Voegelin’s interpretation is difficult to reconcile with Fourth Political Theory. Although they seem to result in similar conclusions – the inherent collapse of modernity – if Voegelin’s prediction is correct, Dugin’s very gnostic Neo-Eurasianism is bound to fail. The explanation must lie in how each applies the term. Voegelin used it to describe the anthesis of Schmitt’s monotheistic approach to politics. For Dugin, it is a necessary part of the esoteric Traditionalism he uses to build his Eurasianism. Dugin concluded that the Western Liberal Model of modernity is doomed to fail.

There is scant evidence that Western Liberalism has ever considered Traditionalism a threat other than of the lowest order. Alexander Zinoviev argued that “liberals lie to us when they speak of the ‘end of ideology,’” but actually, “remain believers in their ideology and simply deny all others the right to exist.”1142 If Traditionalism is thought of at all, it is as a non-player or a deceased example of quaint religiosity. Conversely, there can be little doubt that Dugin considers Western Liberalism a threat of the highest order. With Fourth Political Theory, Dugin is, like Guénon and Evola, making his opposition to modernity and his support for Traditionalism emphatically clear. Recalling characterizations made by Guénon, Evola, and emphasized by Sedgwick, Fourth Political Theory constitutes Dugin’s revolt against the modern world.

3.4.1.1. So, what is Dugin’s Problem?

Before looking at the opinions and observations of Dugin critics and commentators, a brief look at the subject of Dugin’s ire is warranted. At the heart of Dugin’s combined geopolitical and theological thinking is the belief that Western Liberalism is evil. Evident in this belief is Dugin’s

1141 Voegelin, New Science of Politics, 131.
contemplation of Good and Evil, and for Dugin, this contemplation is at once a political and theological endeavor. It is on top of profound rejection of the fruits of Western Liberalism that Dugin constructs Fourth Political Theory. Dugin does not believe that Western Liberalism is merely less politically desirable than Fourth Political Theory; he claims it is a geopolitical and theological expression of the Antichrist.

Duncan Bell mentions that Judith Shklar wrote that “before we can begin to analyse any specific form of liberalism we must surely state as clearly as possible what the word means.” Through “overuse and overextension,” liberalism now serves as a term of both abuse and praise. “In the course of so many years of ideological conflict it [liberalism] seems to have lost its identity completely,” Shklar commented. Liberalism is such a significant factor in any Dugin discussion that it may not be discounted regardless of its definitional ambiguity. So, the definitional water, however murky, must be entered. Liberalism must be considered in its general nature and then, more specifically, as to how Dugin applies it in the context of Fourth Political Theory.

Bell rhetorically asked, “what is liberalism?” Then, (also, rhetorically) he observed that liberalism “is construed in manifold and contradictory ways.” Recalling Shklar’s advice to state the definition of liberal before analyzing it specifically, the media often labels particular political thinkers as liberal or conservative (left or right) in keeping with Shklar’s observation regarding praise or condemnation. Like so many conceptual constructions, ideas, thoughts, writings, and utterances, elements that are now considered to be

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1145 Ibid. Brackets added.


1147 Ibid.
ingredients of liberalism evident in hindsight may not have been considered as such in their given historical context.

Bell offered examples of liberalism “as an embattled vanguard project and constitutive of modernity itself, a fine-grained normative political philosophy and a hegemonic mode of governmentality, the justificatory ideology of unrestrained capitalism and the richest ideological resource for its limitation.” Bell suggested that perhaps liberalism’s definition should be ignored, saying that one may merely go about “deploying the term as if its meaning was self-evident.” While shying away from producing anything approaching a succinct definition himself, Bell did offer that “the scope of the liberal tradition was massively expanded during the middle decades of the [twentieth] century, chiefly in the United States, such that it came to be seen by many as the constitutive ideology of the West.”

3.4.2. The Growth of Classical Liberalism

Political Philosophy was part of the luggage that the Renaissance brought with it on its rapid journey from the Middle Ages. Niccolo Machiavelli and Francis Bacon, two of but many, promoted the merits of various forms of government in terms of Middle Age ideas of sacred and profane. As positions emerged, relationships and relevance of Church and State, along with alchemy and science, came increasingly into question as the profane ascended over the sacred. The result, over time, was that when compared to the secular, metaphysical aspects and conceptions were diminished.

The post-Renaissance ideas of Hobbes and Locke are also significant factors in Dugin’s geopolitics. Each is considered by some to be the Father of Liberalism. Shklar, however, said that “Hobbes is not the father of liberalism,” reasoning,

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1148 Ibid.
1149 Ibid. Though tempting, I doubt that Bell desired for this course of action to be employed.
1150 Ibid. Brackets added.
1151 Niccolo Machiavelli, 1469-1527. Francis Bacon, 1561-1626.
1152 John Locke, 1632-1704.
No theory that gives public authorities the unconditional right to impose beliefs and even a vocabulary as they may see fit upon the citizenry can be described as even remotely liberal.¹¹⁵³

Shklar viewed Leviathan as just this kind of authoritarian power, denying the conjectures of some that proto-liberalism is found within readings of Hobbes.¹¹⁵⁴ Neither making a case for nor against Shklar, but contrasting the Western Liberal view with that of Dugin’s, in today’s environment, Hobbes’ appears to be much more amenable to Dugin in his conservatism given Shklar’s critique.

Locke, also often credited with being the Father of Liberalism, was an empiricist, social contract thinker, and proponent of Bacon. Locke was also an advocate of tolerance and separation of powers in government. Revered by Thomas Jefferson, Locke’s influence is evident in the Declaration of Independence, written mainly with Jefferson’s pen.¹¹⁵⁵ Dugin recognizes Locke’s influence, crediting him with the power it exerted on Adam Smith, who, “on the basis of his teacher [Locke], analysed business activity and laid the foundations for political economy, having written the political and economic Bible of the modern epoch.”¹¹⁵⁶

Locke was a believer in Natural Rights – the concept of derivative rights from Nature and Nature’s God embedded in The Declaration of Independence. In time, liberal thinkers rejected Natural Rights for a much more humanistic approach to political and social theory. This rejection may account for some of the loss of Locke’s luster with later liberals such as John Stuart Mill.¹¹⁵⁷ Dugin, no supporter of the resulting acceptance of democracy adapted in no small measure from Locke, none-the-less, resonates more with Locke’s derivative elements of Natural Rights than with the more humanistic views of Mill.

¹¹⁵⁴ Ibid.
¹¹⁵⁵ Thomas Jefferson, 1743-1826.
¹¹⁵⁷ Cf. e.g., Bell, “What is Liberalism?,” 695 for a discussion of Locke being ignored as a model of liberalism. John Stuart Mill, 1806-1873.
3.4.3. The Nineteenth Century Shift

In his notes to *The Modern Political Tradition*, Cahoone states that Plato recognized five models of the *polis*, what would be called the state today.\(^\text{1158}\) In Book VIII of the *Republic*, Plato argues that excepting tyranny, the governments of monarchy, aristocracy, and oligarchy are all superior to democracy. Plato was all too aware and remained forever bitter that democracy, with a mob-like mentality, issued the death warrant to Socrates. Subsequently, all four of the Christian New Testament Gospels serve to underscore the danger of democratic mob-mentality – the immediate plebiscite of the majority present that resulted in the crucifixion and death of Jesus.\(^\text{1159}\)

Except for the brief experiment with parliamentary government by the English, throughout history, until the great shift that occurred beginning in the late eighteenth century and extending into the nineteenth, rule by the first, fifth, and occasionally the third of Plato’s models prevailed. Then, in the West, dramatic changes occurred. Providing a preview of things to come, the immediate outcome of the English Civil War was both a warning and a precursor of the mind-bending and world-changing paradigm shifts that transpired toward the end of the eighteenth century and throughout the nineteenth. Two revolutions – first the American, then the French – rocked the aristocratic *status quo* of an entire age. With these changes, the liberal politics of the West, born in the seventeenth century, stopped crawling, passed through the walking stage, and began to run.

Bell wrote that the majority of those concerned with the “development of modern political thought contended that there had been a radical break – both intellectual and political – at the end of the eighteenth century.”\(^\text{1160}\)

\(^{1158}\) Cahoone, *Hobbes to Habermas*, 12. Plato’s Five Models of the Polis (adapted from Cahoone, *Hobbes to Habermas*): Aristocracy or Monarchy: The best and highest virtue; rule by the seekers of wisdom. Timocracy: rule by honor-seeking guardians or warrior-civil servants; driven by the “spirited” part of the soul – the Thymos. Oligarchy: rule by the wealthy; driven by necessary or stable appetites. Democracy: rule by the many or the poor; driven by unnecessary or unstable appetites. Tyranny: rule by an evil and malevolent despot. \(^{1159}\) Matthew 27:22, NASB, “Pilate said to them, ‘Then what shall I do with Jesus who is called Christ?’ They all said, ‘Crucify Him!’” \(^{1160}\) Bell, “What is Liberalism?,” 695.
world had dawned,” Bell observed, “and there was little space in it for Lockean political theory.”

The progeny of this incredible shift was Western Liberalism. The individual rather than the cohesive community based on age-old feudal loyalties and religion emerged triumphantly. Suddenly, “nineteenth-century social and political thought was antithetical to the rationalist deductions of Locke,” According to Bell. Just as suddenly, “accounts of natural rights, natural law, and above all the social contract were widely denigrated as primitive.” The American Revolution was the lastborn offspring of Classical Liberalism. The French Revolution was the firstborn of the humanism and modernism of the Enlightenment envisioned by such as Voltaire.

Mises greatly admired Classic Liberalism but castigated its twentieth century derivative. His opinions, expressed in the 1962 Preface to the English-language edition of his book, Liberalism, resonate in Dugin’s criticism of the universal aims of Western Globalism in which “the tenets of this nineteenth-century philosophy of liberalism are almost forgotten.” Reminiscent of the debate on the definition of Liberalism discussed earlier, Mises, considering Classical Liberalism, stated:

In continental Europe it is remembered only by a few. In England the term “liberal” is mostly used to signify a program that only in details differs from the totalitarianism of the socialists. In the United States “liberal” means today a set of ideas and political postulates that in every regard are the opposite of all that liberalism meant to the preceding generations.

Bell remarked on Mises’ original 1927 observation that Spencer noted the movement of Western Liberalism away from its classic heritage half a century

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1161 Ibid.
1162 Ibid.
1163 Ibid.
1164 Ibid.
1165 Voltaire, 1694-1778, was the nom de plume of François-Marie Arouet.
1167 Mises, Liberalism, xvi-xvii.
earlier. The movement, Bell credited Mises with observing, from Mill onward has resulted in a liberalism that has “degenerated into socialism.”

“The American self-styled liberal,” said Mises, “aims at government omnipotence, is a resolute foe of free enterprise, and advocates all-round planning by the authorities. Mises’ verdict was that this “American self-styled liberal” is advocating socialism. Recalling Dugin’s pronouncements regarding the death of liberalism and the ascension of post-liberalism, Leithart stated Dugin’s belief that “Communism and Fascism have collapsed.” He then attached to “liberalism, the final twentieth-century ideology,” Dugin’s assertion that it “turned into libertine postmodernism as soon as it triumphed.”

3.4.4. McWorld: The Globalist Product of Western Liberalism

Benjamin Barber dramatically exposed the impact of globalization, so emphatically rejected by Dugin, with his McWorld interpretation. Not only did Barber present globalization in a way Dugin would appreciate, but he also went in-depth to enlighten on how Western globalization engenders such vehement resistance among non-Western actors. In 1992 Barber wrote a well-received article, then a bestselling book, on what he termed “Jihad vs. McWorld.” Barber wrote that when Jihad is

Strictly applied to religious war, it is used only in reference to battles where the faith is under assault, or battles against a government that denies the practice of Islam. My use here is

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1169 Ibid.
1170 Mises, Liberalism, xvii.
1171 Ibid.
1172 Leithart, “Fourth Political Theory.”
1173 Ibid.
1175 Cf. Barber, “Jihad vs. McWorld” (Atlantic) and Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld.
rhetorical, but does follow both journalistic practice and history.\textsuperscript{1176}

“McWorld” was Barber’s clever play on the ubiquitous nature (at least in 1992) of MTV, Macintosh, and McDonald’s – all metaphorical renditions of American-style globalism.\textsuperscript{1177} “Enlightenment science and the technologies derived from it are inherently universalizing,” Barber explained.\textsuperscript{1178} McWorld greatly impacted twentieth and twenty-first century global economies with homogenizing cultural effects more far-reaching than either formal colonization or Mercantilism. “McDonald's in Moscow and Coke in China will do more to create a global culture than military colonization ever could,” Barber wrote.\textsuperscript{1179} The brand names “convey life-style images that alter perception and challenge behavior” in ways even more seductive than the products they represent, was Barber’s opinion.\textsuperscript{1180}

\textbf{3.4.5. Individualism and Progressivism}

Dugin warns of a tyranny of individualism acting outside of community, similar to that suggested by Ortega, where immense freedom granted to or assumed by, the individual results in chaos – each individual becoming the source of their own law.\textsuperscript{1181} Writing in the 1930s of the uncoordinated behavior of large groups possessing excessive amounts of individual freedom, Ortega observed, “we are witnessing the triumphs of a hyperdemocracy in which the mass acts directly, outside the law.”\textsuperscript{1182} Durkheim’s explanation of Division of Labor extols the virtues of Western Liberalism by emphasizing the solidarity derived from the interdependence of individualized tasks in modern society.\textsuperscript{1183} Conversely, Durkheim’s notion of anomie provides much fodder for Dugin to use in his critique of modernity.

\textsuperscript{1176} Barber, “Jihad vs. McWorld” (\textit{Atlantic}), 10. Page numbers are from the online version of \textit{The Atlantic}.

\textsuperscript{1177} MTV stands for Music Television, Macintosh refers to the Apple laptop computer, and McDonald’s is, of course, the popular hamburger restaurant chain.

\textsuperscript{1178} Barber, “Jihad vs. McWorld” (\textit{Atlantic}), 5.

\textsuperscript{1179} Ibid., 6.

\textsuperscript{1180} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{1181} Dugin, \textit{Fourth Theory}, 53. Genesis 3:4-5, NASB, “The serpent said to the woman, ‘You surely will not die!’ For God knows that in the day you eat from it your eyes will be opened, and you will be like God, knowing good and evil.’”

\textsuperscript{1182} Ortega, \textit{Revolt of the Masses}, 17.

\textsuperscript{1183} Durkheim, \textit{Division of Labour}, 406.
Criminologist Cecil L. Willis’ study of solidarity and anomie continues to provide insight with an eye to Dugin’s interpretation of both.\footnote{1184}

Durkheim, whose work extended into the twentieth century, saw Division of Labor as a potent element of modernity in his 1893, \textit{The Division of Labour in Society}.\footnote{1185} Willis stated that “according to Durkheim the primary threats to social solidarity in modern societies are weak or ineffective structural constraints on individualistic needs and desires.”\footnote{1186} Durkheim’s opinion was that the Division of Labor, as a consequence of progress witnessed in modernity, may produce solidarity among societal members. Durkheim wrote that Division of Labor “creates among men an entire system of rights and duties which link them together in a durable way.”\footnote{1187}

Despite the desired outcome, solidarity produced by the Division of Labor is not a guaranteed result. There is a real danger of Division of Labor producing a very detrimental effect. Anomie, a state of normlessness identified by Durkheim, is a real downside risk encountered in Division of Labor experience for various reasons. For example:

\begin{quote}
Differentiation does not enhance solidarity if it results in an unequal social order, class conflict, greater social distance among the diverse functions and meaningless, or alienating social roles. Thus, Durkheim’s discussion of anomie in \textit{The Division of Labor} shows that complex conditions must exist in order for divided labor to produce solidarity.\footnote{1188}
\end{quote}

Advocates of Western Liberalism, as well as Dugin, tend to assume polemic attitudes toward Durkheim’s Division of Labor theory. Western Democracy advocates argue that Division of Labor with its individualist reinforcements, enhances societal solidarity. Dugin insists that the compound conditions

\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{1185} Cf. Durkheim, \textit{Division of Labour}.
\item \footnote{1186} Willis, “Durkheim’s Concept of Anomie,” 106.
\item \footnote{1187} Durkheim, \textit{Division of Labour}, 406.
\item \footnote{1188} Willis, “Durkheim’s Concept of Anomie,” 108.
\end{itemize}
necessary for successful Division of Labor are too elusive and that anomie is too often the end-product of Durkheim’s individual-centered model.

Of perhaps equal importance, where Dugin is concerned, is the work of Ferdinand Tönnies. Considered in tandem, Tönnies and Durkheim provide insightful resources into the depth of Dugin’s geopolitical construction. Tönnies’ influential and seminal Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft – Community and Society – published in 1887, explored the conflicts between modern and traditional communities and is beneficial when considering Dugin. Tönnies suggested nothing less than an increasing acceptance of modernity results in the subsequent loss of the essence of traditional community. “In community, individuals developed their identities within the wider, coexisting, whole,” is the way that the “General Introduction” to the Cambridge 2001 edition of Community and Civil Society describes Tönnies’ view.

In Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft Tönnies proposed that Gesellschaft – society, (modern society, in this case) – had achieved superiority by its wider acceptance over Gemeinschaft, the traditional sense of community. Tönnies also related that it is Wesenwille, the essential will of the individual emanating from community that imparts a cohesive morality so necessary for harmonious community existence. With the elevation of individual choice over the collective will of the community, it is the community that suffers, for it is within community that individual identity is developed.

Weber considered the trend of replacing tradition through a rational process of self-control. In doing so, he acknowledged the continuing theme of

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1189 Ferdinand Tönnies, 1855-1936.
1190 Ferdinand Tönnies, Community and Civil Society, ed. Jose Harris, trans. Jose Harris and Margaret Hollis, Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). Various editions and translations have been published since Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, was originally published in Leipzig in 1887.
1191 Jose Harris, “General Introduction,” in Ferdinand Tönnies, Community and Civil Society, ed. Jose Harris, trans. Margaret Hollis, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), xviii. Jose Harris is Emeritus Professor of Modern History, University of Oxford
1192 Harris, “General Introduction,” xviii.
1193 Ibid.
modernity wherein the individual is elevated over the traditional societal
element of community. In his 1918 lecture, “Science as a Vocation,” Weber
spoke of an ascension of empirical separation of facts overcoming the
judgment of values.\textsuperscript{1195} Weber believed that in modernity, life aims or ends
compete with one another, thereby, requiring individual choice.\textsuperscript{1196} The
strength of individual choice and competition of aims and ends is
unavoidable; adoption of an all-encompassing religious view is required to
change this paradigm.\textsuperscript{1197} Progress, although some assume that it provides
meaning, may tend to undermine meaning given Weber’s explanation.\textsuperscript{1198}

Stephen Kalberg noted the social conflict of the emerging community-
individual paradigm shift. He addressed his view on Weber’s identification of
social action as a four-types model: “Weber’s fourfold typology of social action
– affectual, traditional, value-rational, and means-end rational action – refers
to universal capacities of Homo sapiens.”\textsuperscript{1199} Kalberg claimed that these
fourfold typologies are located “outside of history.”\textsuperscript{1200} That is, they are
“anthropological traits of man,” not dependent on society, culture, or
history.\textsuperscript{1201}

For Weber, rational process, though a paradigm shift, is an inherent human
characteristic, at least to some degree. It was not exclusively the product of an
Enlightenment inheritance. Highlighting Weber’s position, Kalberg wrote:
the fact that the values in premodern societies diverged widely from modern values did not, for Weber, call into question the basic capacity of man to orient his actions rationally on the basis of values. On the other hand, traditional and affectual action were not uprooted and swept away to the degree that modernization movements advanced.\textsuperscript{1202}

To these remnant elements of “traditional and affectual action” Weber appears to have traced much of the angst of modernity. He did not see adequate substitutions in Western industrial society “capable of replacing ethical salvation religions.”\textsuperscript{1203} Failure to completely replace traditional elements left remnants of them available and in conflict with their various Division of Labor substitutions. The logical end to a “mere means-end rational calculation of self-interests,” by “the onslaught of formal, practical, and theoretical rationalization processes,” will be “the rule of authoritarian force,” according to Kalberg’s reading of Weber.\textsuperscript{1204}

In the heady days of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, social and political revolutions changed the face of the world, especially the West – Western Europe and North America. Additionally, there was a massive change in industrial technique and output, which in both the metaphorical and literal sense, accelerated the tremendous need for fuel – first coal and later oil. Titanic shifts in demographics occurred as potential workers left the traditional rural life and flocked to the rapidly overcrowding and industrializing cities. The middle classes of Europe and America were on the rise. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, acquirable items, leisure time, and growing social and political power, previously only available to the aristocracy, gave rise to the notion that there could be no end to the progress of man. Already huge and still growing portions of the populations of the West felt they could say along with Hamlet,

\begin{quote}
What a piece of work is man! How noble in reason! How infinite in faculty! In form, in moving, how express and
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[\textsuperscript{1202}] Ibid.
\item[\textsuperscript{1203}] Ibid., 1176.
\item[\textsuperscript{1204}] Ibid.
\end{footnotes}
admirable! In action how like an angel! In apprehension how like a god!1205

The idealism of this parade of progress toward rational perfection was subsequently rained-on by Nietzsche and Sigmund Freud.1206 Nietzsche acknowledged that the march of progress from the supernatural world of pre-Enlightenment metaphysics to the modernity of the late nineteenth century had profoundly changed things. “God is dead,” Nietzsche famously pronounced, affirming something the intelligentsia had assumed for quite some time, and startling everyone else. Freud added the frightening possibility that the fearsome Snake is not an external Satan but is, it would seem, ourselves; at least one of the persons of the unholy trinity of our id, ego, and superego.

Often, it seems the more idealistic superego must watch helplessly as the id, the core of individual Freudian being, controls the direction of individual actions.

One might compare the relation of the ego to the id with that between a rider and his horse. The horse provides the locomotor energy, and the rider has the prerogative of determining the goal and of guiding the movements of his powerful mount towards it. But all too often in the relations between the ego and the id we find a picture of the less ideal situation in which the rider is obliged to guide his horse in the direction in which it itself wants to go.1207

Because God was dead to the Enlightenment modernists, they understood Nietzsche’s pronouncement. They knew it to be so, because, as Nietzsche pointed out, they had killed Him.1208 In the thinking that emerged from the Renaissance, to hold a contrary opinion on the death of God and piety was viewed as primitive in the minds of many in the intelligentsia. It is ironic that

1205 Shakespeare, Hamlet, Prince of Denmark, Act II, Scene ii.
1206 Sigmund Freud, 1856-1939.
Francesco Petrarca – Petrarch – commonly referred to as the Father of Humanism, and sometimes the Renaissance itself – held a contrary view. “It happened that I once quoted some maxim of Augustine’s to a man with a great name,” Petrarch related in a writing on the subject of ignorance. Petrarch’s companion “took a deep breath and said that it is a pity that such a genius as Petrarch “was so deeply entangled in empty fables!” Petrarch’s comment was, “what else might he hope for me than that I should silently agree with him in his contempt of piety?”

In an observation relevant to Dugin’s elevation of Traditionalism over Modernism, Paul James wrote that “the changing senses of space and time in Petrarch’s writing, suggest a person caught in unsettled tension between two different but contemporaneous ontological formations: the traditional and the modern.” Expressing ideas contrary to the intellectual elite, be it in the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, or the present, always risks condemnation. Condemned in Progressive quarters, Nietzsche also shocked those marching in or gleefully cheering along the progress parade by suggesting that the seemingly unstoppable spectacle is not bound to continue. First articulated a bit obscurely:

In infinite time, every possible combination would at some time or another be realized; more: it would be realized an infinite number of times. And since between every combination and its next recurrence all other possible combinations would have to take place, and each of these combination conditions of the entire sequence of combinations in the same series, a circular movement of absolutely identical series is thus demonstrated:

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1210 Petrarch, “On His Own Ignorance,” 91.

1211 Ibid.

1212 Paul James, “Emotional Ambivalence across Times and Spaces: Mapping Petrarch’s Intersecting Worlds,” Exemplaria 26, no. 1 (2014): 82. I doubt that Petrarch was “caught” there, instead that he was, in the Biblical sense, in the world, but not of it. Paul James, of the Institute for Culture and Society, is a social theorist and professor at West Sidney University.
the world as a circular movement that has already repeated itself infinitely often and plays its game in infinitum.\textsuperscript{1213}

Then very plainly:

Species do not evolve towards perfection: the weak always prevail over the strong – simply because they are the majority, and because they are also the more crafty.\textsuperscript{1214}

Together, Nietzsche and Freud fairly cut the legs from under the endlessly advancing progressive illusions of the Victorian Age. America, at least the intellectual elite, industrial magnates, and middle-class, did not get the message, however. Political progressives such as Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, and Franklin Roosevelt, continued to urge the progress parade forward.\textsuperscript{1215} Perhaps WWI and the resulting Depression had disillusioned Europe for a time, but they only served to strengthen the progressive resolve of America. Progressive fervor did resume in Western Europe after WWII. The Progressive Movement did not take hold in Eastern Europe until the collapse of communism; then, it came in a rush. The aftermath of WWII produced another reality, America’s emergence as an authentic world superpower. The only one, until the Soviet Union obtained the military clout requisite for membership in the same club.

The twentieth century was not devoid of explanations clarifying the progressive movement and suggesting alternative paths. Shils, for example, did raise alternatives similar to what Dugin would later confirm and incorporate into Fourth Political Theory. Shils identified and explained his conception of personal, civic, primordial, and sacred social ties and suggested that if Western Liberalism is not the desired path, there are other choices.\textsuperscript{1216} Shils maintained that the alternative routes to solidarity are collective; they


\textsuperscript{1215} Theodore Roosevelt, 1858-1919. Woodrow Wilson, 1856-1924. Franklin Roosevelt, 1882-1945.

\textsuperscript{1216} Cahoone, Hobbes to Habermas, 247.
require communal ties, not individualistic ones. Shils’ alternative pathways are not the roads of globalism and universalism, both hallmarks of Western Liberalism. They are, in fact, the spiritual, ethnic, and geographical routes that are hallmarks of Fourth Political Theory. Shils wrote that the combined elements of the modern conception of society include:

concepts of social system, of society and its constituent institutions, of social stratification and social mobility, of elites and ruling classes, of social status, of role, of bureaucracy and corporate organization, of kinships and local community, of history and tradition, of intellectuals and ideology, of consensus, anomie, and alienation, of conformity and deviance, of charisma, of the sacred and rebellion against institutions, have all “been grouped into a conception of modern society (and its variant of mass society).”

This large grouping is then “further defined by contrast with a conceptual construction variously designated as folk society, traditional society, or Gemeinschaft,” according to Shils.

To the progressive mindset in the Cold War era, Western Liberal Democracy had only to better explain itself to the rest of the world, the Developing World, whose very label betrayed Western progressiveness, and all would get on board. Containing Soviet advancement and adequately explaining Liberal Democracy would do the trick. Later, as it seemed explanation was not working quickly enough, Western Manifest Destiny advocates decided that various regime changes and nation-building based on a Western Liberal Democracy model might speed things along. Yet, even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, at a time when America was once again the lone world superpower, significant cultural constituents holding traditionalist worldviews – in some cases Islamic – resisted American Westernization initiatives. Khalid bin Sayeed illustrated this point:

Western modernization theory, particularly its American version, has assumed that eventually the whole world is likely to

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1217 Ibid.
be transformed into an industrialized, consumption-oriented culture.\footnote{Khalid Bin Sayeed, 

Sayeed accurately pointed out that “Islamic society may not be such a fragile traditional society.”\footnote{Sayeed, \textit{Western Dominance and Political Islam}, 85.} Yadulla Kazami wrote that “it is almost axiomatic for people to think of tradition in opposition to modernity.”\footnote{Yudulla Kazami, “Reclaiming Tradition: An Essay on the Condition of the Possibility of Islamic Knowledge,” \textit{American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences} 15, no. 2 (1998): 99.} Kazami went on to note that “when the Europeans cast their eyes across the globe they perceived the societies of the world as either traditional or modern.”\footnote{Kazami, “Reclaiming Tradition,” 99.} Rejecting the Western embrace of progress for progress’ sake, he observed that tradition “is not a spectacle to be viewed from a distance, but an ongoing historical reality which is real only to the extent that we participate in it.”\footnote{Ibid., 102.  A similar opinion to Dugin’s can be easily detected here.}

3.5. Comments on Examples of Dugin’s Hermeneutics

3.5.1. On the Hermeneutic of Sacred Geography/Sacred Space

In considering the interwoven threads of place, metaphysics, and politics, the nature of place may be readily assumed. In Dugin’s case, place is much more than physical reality. “The origins of geography are entangled with the origins of Western philosophy in Greek thought,” wrote Tim Cresswell, addressing the ancient origins of contemplating terrain.\footnote{Tim Cresswell, \textit{Place: an Introduction}, 2nd ed. (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 2015), 25.  Tim Cresswell is the Ogilvie Professor of Human Geography at the University of Edinburgh.} Concepts addressing the physical world are indeed ancient, but there is another aspect addressed by both Cresswell and Sheldrake, at least as old. Capturing the essential of Dugin’s conception of Sacred Geography, Sheldrake wrote that “the human sense of place is a critical theological and spiritual issue.”\footnote{Sheldrake, \textit{Spaces for the Sacred}, 1.}

John Inge agreed, concluding that the narrative of the Old Testament “supports a relational view in which God, people and place are all
important.”¹²²⁷ Not stopping there, he wrote that the New Testament also supports the notion of place being of vital significance in God’s dealings with humanity.¹²²⁸ So, the ancient contemplation of the physical and the theological – the material and the metaphysical – are at play. Adding a third ingredient, old, but not ancient, using the term, Russian Nationalism, Rossman introduced geopolitics to the mix. He, like Clover, was one who described Dugin’s affinity for Sacred Geography as a combination of geopolitics and religious ingredients.¹²²⁹ Dugin wrote, “Russian nationalism is inseparably linked with space,” and Rossman discusses this critical aspect extensively.¹²³⁰

“A major part of the rationale given by Putin as to why he annexed Crimea in 2014 was due to its ‘sacred’ nature as the spiritual birthplace of the Russian nation,” explained Coyer.¹²³¹ Putin made it very clear that Crimea has “sacred meaning for Russia, like the Temple Mount for Jews and Muslims.”¹²³² Putin added that Crimea is “spiritual soil” and “the spiritual source of the formation of the multifaceted but monolithic Russian nation” where Russia’s forebears first realized themselves as a nation.¹²³³ So saying, Putin acknowledged Sacred Geography as part of the Russian narrative.¹²³⁴ Coyer explained that it is in Crimea where Vladimir, Prince of Kiev, received the “Baptism of the ‘Rus,” his

¹²²⁷ John Inge, A Christian Theology of Place (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2017), 58. John Inge is John Geoffrey Inge is a bishop in the Church of England. He is currently the Bishop of Worcester and a member of Parliament.
¹²²⁸ Inge, A Christian Theology of Place, 58.
¹²³⁰ Ibid. Throughout this section, Rossman examines aspects of Russian Nationalism. Here Rossman quoted Dugin from “Apologiia natsionalisma,” Konservativnaiia revolutsiia. Cf. Rossman’s note 1994b: 142, 163-64. Rossman lists the components of Dugin’s Russian Nationalism as: Religious and Messianic, Geopolitical, Imperial, and Communal. In Rossman’s interpretation of Dugin, the geopolitical aspects of Dugin’s theological associations combine these four main features to produce a unique conception of Russian Nationalism
¹²³¹ Coyer, “Patriarch Pope Ukraine.”
¹²³³ Ibid.
¹²³⁴ Cf. Sheldrake, Spaces for the Sacred, 1. “The concept of space refers not simply to geographical location but to a dialectical relationship between environment and human narrative.”
baptism into the Eastern Church, and thus, where the official conversion of his subjects simultaneously occurred.1235

Coyer was probably correct that the linkage between Vladimir’s Kievan state “and the political entity that later became ‘Muscovy’ and then evolved into modern day Russia,” is questionable.1236 It is instructive to realize that the connection that Putin draws is reflective of the often allusion-rich and symbolic nature of Dugin’s hermeneutic concerning place, not necessarily of empirical facts. The concept of Sacred Geography/Sacred Space is present in the West, but mainly as a sub rosa level of awareness. Individuals may identify in some vague way with the concept that a place may possess a holy nature. Awareness may arrive, for example, through an ethereal experience in a cathedral, in elements of nature, while visiting the graves of loved ones, or in the space where something monumental has occurred.

Contemplating sites such as Stonehenge and New Grange as more than cultural and historical artifacts may be a first step in grasping concepts of Sacred Geography/Sacred Space. Considering examples that illustrate that closely integrated natural and spiritual realizations of the world were long the rule rather than the exception aids reception of Sacred Geography. The ancient Druids, for example, recognized strong ties between themselves and the spiritual aspects of geography. Appreciating this spiritual emphasis allows for the elevation of Sacred Space over purely physical interpretations of artifacts and geography in keeping with Dugin’s Sacred Geography hermeneutic.

Native American peoples display a deep involvement with Sacred Space, perhaps the most accessible indigenous example in America that can

1235 Coyer, “Patriarch Pope Ukraine.” Here Coyer went on to say, “What is not mentioned by either the Kremlin or the ROC is that Vladimir converted not for reasons of piety, but in order to marry the Byzantine Emperor’s sister and to tie himself geopolitically to the Byzantine Empire, which significantly boosted his domestic political prestige and also gave him a valuable foreign alliance.”

contribute to an understanding of where Dugin is grounded. Simmins wrote that among the “aboriginal groups on the Great Plains, there is a conception of geography divided into realms, each of which are connected with cycles of life, the seasons, and particular abstract human attributes.”

Dugin’s perceptions also involve mystical geographic connections. Simmins related that the “cardinal points (and their associated life-cycles and seasons) are also connected with four elements: earth, wind, water and fire.”

Contrasting the cardinal point applications of Native Americans to Dugin’s cardinal point attachments also provide fascinating points of comparison.

Using the American Plains Indians as an example, Simmins made the point that their metaphysics consider human beings to “consist of four distinct parts.” These parts are distributed into categories: emotional, mental, physical, and spiritual. The four distinctions are associated with the four cardinal points and are additionally linked with corresponding colors. Simmins listed the linkages as cardinal points, and associated colors, objects, and activities: physical (north, white, pipe holder); spiritual (east, red, sweetgrass); emotional (south, yellow, sweat lodge); mental (west, black, sun-dance).

Cardinal point, color, and object/activity associations with various sacred connections are not uncommon to cultures that embrace Sacred Space.

The compass directions and the colors referred to in the Hebrew and Christian Bibles yield such examples as the physical orientation of the Temple and the symbolic linking of colors to the four apocalyptic riders in Revelations in the Christian New Testament. There can be no doubting that the colors are purposely assigned to the horses. The color of the fourth horse, for example, demonstrates such a close association with its purpose that it repeatedly appears in literature in the metaphorical sense.

I looked, and behold, an ashen horse; and he who sat on it had the name Death; and Hades was following with him. Authority was given to them over a fourth of the earth, to kill with sword

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1237 Simmins, Sacred Spaces and Sacred Places, 15.
1238 Ibid.
1239 Ibid.
1240 Ibid.
1241 Ibid.
and with famine and with pestilence and by the wild beasts of the earth.\textsuperscript{1242}

Hui-Chih Yu, explaining the intricacies of colors, told that colors “display a cosmic symbolism” in various cosmologies and help illuminate divine details.\textsuperscript{1243} “For example,” he explained,

they play an important part in the Navaho story of the creation of the Sun. The Navaho had already partially separated light into its several colors. Next to the floor was white, indicating, dawn, upon the white blue was spread for morning, and on the blue, yellow for sunset, and next was black, representing night.\textsuperscript{1244}

Dualism is prevalent in Chinese cosmology where the two universal principles of life are perceived and illustrated as being both tightly pressed against one another while yet remaining separate. Often thought of as opposites or contrasts – different, but somehow complementary – the Yin and Yang are symbolized within a circle separated by contrasting dark and light colors.\textsuperscript{1245}

The Dualism displayed in the Yin and Yang is strongly reminiscent of the Anfisbena discussed in detail by Dugin.\textsuperscript{1246}

The overtly metaphysical attributes that Dugin espouses in his concept of Sacred Geography must find residence in Eurasia as the inheritor of Russia’s messianic mission. Combining Sacred Geography with Neo-Eurasian geopolitics may be difficult for Western geopoliticians to deal with, but it is necessary to do so in parsing Dugin’s ideas. Because humans exist in a temporal dimension, place is a reality of being. It is, Inge related, where “meeting and activity” occur “in the interaction between God and the

\textsuperscript{1242} Revelations 6:8, NASB. Some translations famously render the translation “behold a Pale Horse.” For other symbolic color examples, Cf. Micah 3:6, Job 30:6, Judges 8:26, Daniel 5:7, Mark 15:17, Isaiah 1:15, among others.


\textsuperscript{1244} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{1245} Ibid. Footnote 6 cites Charles Alfred Speed Williams, \textit{Chinese Symbolism and Art Motifs}, (Tokyo: Tuttle, 1999), 458. “Yang signifies heaven, sun, light, vigor and male. It is symbolized by the Dragon and is associated with azure color. Similarly, Yin stands for earth, moon, darkness, female. It is symbolized by the Tiger and is associated with orange color.” Charles Alfred Speed Williams, 1884-unk.

\textsuperscript{1246} Cf. 2.7.2.
world.” Simmins wrote, remarking that the intersection “is particularly true of mountains, caves, and springs (and some groves), rocks, canyons, and of mountains.”

Though not in an exact correlation, Simmins and Dugin made similar claims, recognizing the common tendency of spiritual peoples to ascribe sacred attributes to geographical features, celestial geometry, and the bonds of place. Simmins’ study of the American Plains Indians yielded results in common with Dugin’s recognition of the cardinal points associated with spiritual qualities. Simmins’ association was by no means exclusive to the Plains Indians. There are numerous examples of cardinal point associations. For example, the Tabernacle, the Temple of Solomon, the restored Temple, and the rebuilt Temple were oriented facing to the east, suggested Eden, and were said to model Paradise.

John M. Lundquist’s research has shown that common temple design in the ancient Levant, South-West Asia, and Africa was, “oriented toward the four world regions or cardinal directions, and to various celestial bodies such as the polar star.” Due to their individually surveyed positioning, ancient temples may have served as astronomical observatories “to assist the temple priests in regulating the ritual calendar.” In the contemporary world, references to east and west are often intuitive – the East is Oriental, and the West is Occidental – East is Asia, and West is Europe, North America, and the rest of

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1248 Simmins, *Sacred Spaces and Sacred Places*, 16.
1251 Lundquist, “What is a Temple?” 92. Some ancient temples, like Solomon’s Temple and the later rebuilt Jewish Temples, shared this modeling aspect.
the Anglosphere. Overlaying Sacred Space is allegorically and metaphorically consistent applied to east and west. The fact that the earth rotates so that the sun appears to rise in the east and set in the west is consistent with the mystical idea that beginnings, such as birth, have eastern associations, and endings, such as death, have western ones.

Many Christian churches and burial grounds are oriented to the east-west cardinal points. In churchyards, the head of the deceased is frequently arranged to the west and the feet to the east. This orientation recognizes that when Jesus returns to reign as Messiah-King, it will be realized first from the east. Thus, the face of the person buried will be toward the coming Messiah when rising in the Resurrection, “for just as the lightning comes from the east and flashes even to the west, so will the coming of the Son of Man be.”

The dramatic rise of civilization in the Northern Hemisphere, the eastern rotation of the earth, and the declination of the earth’s axis at approximately 23.5° off vertical makes it easier to imbue Sacred Space with east-west allusions than with ones of north and south. Because solar events are typically witnessed as east-west events, it appears more consistent with Northern and Western Hemispheric experience to overlay east-west physical geography with east-west Sacred Geography than to make a north-south overlay. The fact that the sun seemingly rises in the east and sets in the west allows for scores of varied birth and death allusions. The tilt of the earth and the orbital rotation around the sun combine to produce the seasons as we know them, and seasons, as well as compass directions, abound with associations to birth and death.

Cardinal point associations are not limited to east-west allusions. Even considering the tendency favoring east-west associations, development of civilization in the Northern Hemisphere, with its profusion of writing, exploration, and trade, produced many allusions specifically relevant to north-south observations of physical geography. Comparisons related to heat and cold, observations of celestial events viewed from the Northern Hemisphere,

1252 Matthew 24:27, NASB.
and Northern cultural narratives fraught with allusions and allegory reflecting the world perceived through Northern eyes abound. Additionally, Dugin’s interpretation of “Northness” and the assumption of Eastern attributes by the North must be taken into account.\footnote{2.4.2.}

\textbf{3.5.2. On Messianic Russia/Eurasia and Manifest Destiny}

Marshall Poe stated that “several Russian philosophers of the late nineteenth century developed the thesis that Russia was a ‘messianic’ nation.”\footnote{Poe, \textit{Moscow Third Rome}, i. Marshall Tillbrook Poe is an American historian, writer, and Russian scholar.} Poe’s work revealed that by the turn of the twentieth century, “the ‘messianic’ understanding of ‘Third Rome’ was a commonplace that could be found in any number of influential historical surveys.”\footnote{Ibid., ii.} William Cavanaugh claimed that the idea of what constitutes a messianic nation has its roots in the doctrine of election; “the doctrine of election is based in the notion of God’s choice of a particular people at a particular moment in history.”\footnote{William Cavanaugh, “Messianic Nation: A Christian Theological Critique of American Exceptionalism,” \textit{University of St. Thomas Law Journal} 3, no. 2 (Fall 2005): 262. Although written about messianic nation arguments concerning America, this article is useful for understanding other messianic nation concepts as well. William T. Cavanaugh is Director of the Center for World Catholicism and Intercultural Theology and professor of Catholic studies at DePaul University.} In Christian theology, more particularly in Reformed Christian doctrine, election is an eternal reality from before the Creation and is thus predestined.\footnote{Cf. e.g., Wallace M. Alston and Michael Welker, eds., \textit{Reformed Theology} (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2007).} Manifest Destiny is terminology coined by John L. O'Sullivan in an 1845 editorial “to urge the annexation of Texas, California, Oregon, and other western territories” into the United States.\footnote{Marc Becker, “Manifest Destiny,” \textit{Encyclopedia of U.S. Military Interventions in Latin America}, ed. Alan McPherson, vol. 2 (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2013), 368. Cf. John O’Sullivan, “Annexation,” \textit{The United States Magazine and Democratic Review} 17, no. 1 (July/August 1845): 5-10, accessed June 10, 2017, https://pdcrodas.webs.ull.es/anglo/OSullivanAnnexation.pdf. Marc Becker is a professor specializing in Latin American Studies at Truman State University in Missouri.}

Rather than a specific policy, manifest destiny was a belief in the superiority of the so-called Anglo-Saxon race and that westward expansion was divinely inspired, wise, and inevitable. This expansion would bring civilization and economic development
to areas that previously had lain outside of areas of U.S. influence.\textsuperscript{1259}

Manifest Destiny is strongly associated with the expansionism that endows a state or people with a sense of transcendent guidance or implies inspiration – even the command – of divine or spiritual force. “Proponents commonly pointed to the alleged inherent virtue of U.S. institutions and people and a divinely ordained mission to spread democratic institutions with a goal of remaking the rest of the world in the image of the United States,” in Marc Becker’s opinion.\textsuperscript{1260} For opponents, in the 1800s as well as today, it implies an unjustified and colonial sense of a privilege to subjugate through intimidation or application of force, either economic or militaristic.\textsuperscript{1261}

Coyer wrote that the Russian Orthodox Church “strongly backed Putin’s annexation of Crimea and intervention in eastern Ukraine, framing the conflict in apocalyptic, theological terminology in perfect harmony with Russia’s historic sense of messianic destiny.”\textsuperscript{1262} Coyer stated that both the Crimean annexation and the eastern Ukrainian conflict are framed as “Holy War” by the Kremlin and the Russian Orthodox Church.\textsuperscript{1263} He explained that the Kremlin and the Russian Orthodox Church view the Crimean and larger Ukrainian conflict “as a civilizational struggle between ‘Holy Orthodox Russia’ (a concept hundreds of years old) and an overly-secularized, morally decadent West (a Russian perception of the West that also predates Putin and Alexander Dugin by centuries).”\textsuperscript{1264} It is noteworthy to recognize the characterization of this conflict as a “civilizational struggle” given Coyer’s claim that it “continues to be the most important field of civilizational conflict from Moscow’s point of view.”\textsuperscript{1265}

\textsuperscript{1260} Ibid., 368.
\textsuperscript{1261} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1262} Coyer, “Patriarch Pope Ukraine.”
\textsuperscript{1263} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1264} Ibid. Parentheses in original.
\textsuperscript{1265} Ibid. Cf. 1.1.2. for comments on civilizational conflict from Dugin’s and Huntington’s perspective.
3.5.3. Concerning the Hermeneutic of Third Rome

Rossman wrote that Dugin believes that in the Russian view, “Orthodoxy is neither ‘a branch of Christianity’ (as Protestantism) nor the universal Catholic Church.” Rossman wrote that Dugin believes that in the Russian view, “Orthodoxy is neither ‘a branch of Christianity’ (as Protestantism) nor the universal Catholic Church.” 1266 What then is it in Dugin’s view?

After the fall of Constantinople, Orthodox Russia became “the last shelter of Christ’s truth in a world of apostasy” and “the last unspoiled bulwark of faith and sacredness in a world of evil.” The doctrine of “Moscow – the Third Rome” of the monk Philotheus, Dugin argues, presupposes that Russia is the Fourth Empire and the “Restraining Force,” “the catechon” of the second Epistle of Paul to the Thessalonians. 1267

The Rossman excerpt above is loaded with elements of Dugin’s Geopolitical-Theology. Dugin’s hermeneutical presupposition of Russia hence Eurasia as the Third Rome, embodying a restraining force, the Catechon identified by Paul, is foundational to Fourth Political Theory. Versluis recognized Third Rome represents the “the paramount importance of historicity.” 1268 But, is historical authenticity Dugin’s goal? His citation of Mikhail Agursky’s work, The Third Rome: National Bolshevism in the USSR, in The Fourth Political Theory, and subsequent conversation, suggests the concept of Third Rome is more to Dugin than just a piece of historical foundation. 1269 Dugin does not use theological material as a tangential contact with politics. Dugin attempts to saturate Fourth Political Theory with theological intent – the intent to support his scheme of Geopolitical-Theology.

Poe reported that “the writings of the Russian monk Filofei of Pskov in the early sixteenth century,” gave Third Rome its first recorded appearance. 1270 Poe explained, “Filofei, like other clerics of the era, was concerned that the

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1266 Rossman, “Anti-Semitism in Eurasian Historiography,” 164. Parentheses in original. Cf. Rossman’s footnote 36. Here Rossman noted, “Dugin refers to the theory of the Old Believers, schismatics who split from the Orthodox Church in the late seventeenth century. They believe that the Antichrist has already come and often identified him with one of the Russian emperors.”
1267 Ibid.
1268 Versluis, “Schmitt Secret Roads Inward,” 31
1270 Poe, Moscow Third Rome, 1.
Russian monarchy was not doing enough to stamp out heresies such as astrology.”

Filofei, Poe related,

wrote a letter to an official in which he argued that the Muscovite grand prince was obliged to protect the church because he was the ruler of the “Third Rome.” If the Russian ruler failed in this duty, humanity could not be saved, because, according to “books of prophecy” that Filofei never identified, there would be no “Fourth Rome” before the last judgment.

In the Executive Summary to his study on Third Rome, Poe wrote that the Old Believers found Third Rome concepts important enough to ensure that in claiming the mantle of being the designated keepers of Third Rome they could be distinguished as holding the True Faith:

The “Old Believers,” a major sectarian movement of the second half of the seventeenth century, did adopt “Third Rome.” They believed that the Russian orthodox church had abandoned the “true” faith and the obligations of being the “Third Rome.” The Old Believers separated themselves from Russian orthodoxy and claimed their community alone represented the “Third Rome.”

As Poe concluded from his research, the influence of opinions supporting the Third Rome concept – Russia, as a “messianic’ nation” – was accepted by several Russian philosophers.

The idea first became politically significant in connection with the “Panslav” movement in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The Panslavs believed that it was Russia’s duty to protect and unite all orthodox Slavs in a federation under Moscow’s control. They saw “Third Rome” as evidence that Russia was historically and even divinely destined to fulfill this task.

Poe realized that by following up on the nineteenth century support for the Third Rome and Messianic Russia in the 1950s and 1960s, Western commentators connected the origins of Soviet “expansionism” to “Russian

1271 Ibid.
1272 Ibid.
1273 Ibid.
1274 Ibid.
1275 Ibid., ii.
messianism” and thence to continuing Third Rome allusions. “More recently,” Poe explained, “Russians have begun to explore ‘Third Rome’ as a way to comprehend what they believe is their national psychology.” Although Dugin would probably not explain it as “national psychology,” more likely preferring a description with overtones of inheritance of Divine Presence, he is most certainly one of the Russians who expound Third Rome, as Poe suggests.

In the face of Dugin’s promotion of Third Rome allusions underlying Fourth Political Theory, it is disappointing that Poe did not address Dugin’s developing beliefs in his 1997 work. Poe concluded that there is no historical validity in the contention of the past advocates of Third Rome. Hence, there can be no validity for advocates, and Dugin is undoubtedly one, supporting the reality of a Third Rome. Despite Poe’s assertion, of more concern in evaluating Dugin is the recognition given to his Third Rome assumptions. Wood wrote that

Russia has always had a singular conceit of itself as a Third Rome, an expanding imperial power, and then as the center of world revolution. The West has over the centuries been the object of both fascination and resentment for Russia. Russia’s borders have enlarged and contracted over the centuries. The proposition that other Slavs, like the Ukrainians, are somehow really Russian has a long history.

Poe’s academic argument against the historicity of Third Rome notwithstanding, it is Wood’s opinion of Russian self-identity as Third Rome coupled with geography that more accurately reflects the West’s interpretation of Russia’s Historic National Interest. It is hard to overestimate the role of geography as a driver behind Russia’s foreign policy,” wrote Gurangus and Rumer, adding that “geography has shaped Russian identity and its rulers’

1276 Ibid.
1277 Ibid., i.
1278 This is puzzling because Epstein had covered Dugin quite extensively in his work published some three years earlier as part of the same overall National Council for Soviet and East European Research project. It seems that Epstein’s work should have been familiar to Poe.
1279 While there may be merit in continuing the debate over the validity of the Third Rome claims, this is not that forum.
1280 Wood, “Cold War II?”
understanding of security throughout the entire existence of the Russian state.”

Recent events demonstrate the fact that Third Rome is a living concept despite any weakness in its true lineage. Curiously, the meeting between Pope Francis and Patriarch Kirill reinforced Third Rome’s conceptual viability. In the nineteenth century, Vladimir Soloviev developed a philosophical and theological ecumenism that called for a reconciliation of the Orthodox and Roman Churches and “a mystical syncretism between Orient and West.” But, this meeting of the Pope and the Patriarch “had far more import for geopolitics than it did for the reconciliation of two long-alienated branches of Christianity,” in Coyer’s opinion.

Coyer stated three Russian goals for Kirill’s participation in the meeting pertinent to this study. The first was gaining Francis’s approval, and thereby, the Vatican’s moral authority, for Moscow’s role in Syria. Russia portrays itself as being in Syria partially for the critical reason of protecting Christian minorities subject to the violence and under threat by Daesh. Russia, it must be remembered, takes the mission of safeguarding Christians throughout Southwest Asia as a critical element of its Historic National Interests.

Although Russia indeed recognizes and promotes its cultural and religious pluralism since the tsarist times, it is equally undeniable the importance played by the Orthodox faith throughout the centuries in the creation and definition of the Russian identity and the shaping of the foreign policy, as shown by the “Autocracy, Orthodoxy and Nationality” 19th

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1281 Gurganus and Rumer, “Russia’s Global Ambitions.”
1283 Coyer, “Patriarch Pope Ukraine.”
1284 Ibid. Daesh is an Arabic acronym referring to the same group known as IS (the Islamic State), Isis or ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), and Isil or ISIL (the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant). Cf. e.g., the BBC reported that “Daesh is essentially an Arabic acronym formed from the initial letters of the group’s previous name in Arabic – ‘al-Dawla al-Islamiya fil Iraq wa al-Sham.’ Although it does not mean anything as a word in Arabic, it sounds unpleasant and the group’s supporters object to its use.” Cf. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27994277.
century doctrine or by the will to defend pilgrims and Christian worshippers living in the Ottoman-ruled Holy Land.1285

Secondly, Kirill wanted Russia to gain visibility for Russian as a “Christian nation.”1286 The third goal is most appropriate for this study: “the blunting of Turkey’s ability to frustrate Russia’s goals in Syria. As Sergey Kholmogorov wrote, a major Russian motivation for the meeting was “Third Rome [Moscow], Meeting First Rome [the Papacy], to Neutralize Second Rome [Constantinople/Turkey].”1287 Kholmogorov indeed connected the dots linking Moscow with Third Rome, and Coyer quickly picked up on the fact that he did so.1288

Schmitt wrote that “The history of the Middle Ages is the history of a struggle for, not against Rome.”1289 It was a struggle that attempted to recreate the idealized power and governance of the Roman Empire. The empire that constituted First Rome had become Christian but had fallen. The subsequent formation of what later became known as the Holy Roman Empire is evidence showing that the wish to recover that which was lost was much more than romantic nostalgia.1290 Dugin’s hermeneutical endeavors fit together

1285 Emanuel Pietrobon, “Russias Return as Defender of Christianity,” Inside Over, November 6, 2019, accessed, December 19, 2019, https://www.insideover.com/religion/russias-return-as-defender-of-christianity.html. Cf. Leonid Issaev & Serafim Yuriev, “The Christian Dimension of Russia’s Middle East Policy,” The Sharq Forum, March 2017, accessed July 3, 2018, https://www.hse.ru/mirror/pubs/share/217045866: “From the Russian Church’s perspective, any kind of aid to suffering Christians wherever they are in the world is undoubtedly a positive thing, fully reflecting the historic mission of Russia as a katechon state – the strongest Orthodox power and the successor to the Byzantine Empire in the role of protector of Orthodox Christians throughout the world.” Cf. Britannica: “Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality, Russian Pravoslaviye, Samoderzhashiye, I Narodnost, in Russian history, slogan created in 1832 by Count Sergey S. Uvarov, minister of education 1833–49, that came to represent the official ideology of the imperial government of Nicholas I (reigned 1825–55) and remained the guiding principle behind government policy during later periods of imperial rule.” Emanuel Pietrobon is a University of Turin educated scholar of geopolitics, religion, and Russian conflict issues. Leonid Issaev is a senior lecturer at the Department for Political Science at the Russian National Research University Higher School of Economics. Serafim Yuriev is Deputy Head of the Faculty of Social Sciences at the Higher School of Economics of the Russian National Research University.

1286 Coyer, “Patriarch Pope Ukraine.”

1287 Ibid. Brackets in original.

1288 Coyer claims that Sergey Kholmogorov is a former Russian politician with strong ties to the Kremlin.


1290 It is interesting to note that before the middle of the twelfth-century to as far back as at least 1034 it was referred to simply as the Roman Empire vice the Holy Roman Empire. Cf.
interdependently. Dugin accepts Moscow as the Third Rome, and his acknowledgment of Third Rome is bound tightly with the identification of Third Rome as the Catechon.

3.5.4. On the Hermeneutic of the Catechon and Antichrist

Before the thirteenth century, Rome and its successor monarchies and empires proved to be merely temporal. They were, nonetheless, continually striving to attain, then maintain, the power of Christian Rome. “The decisive historical concept of this continuity,” according to Schmitt, “was that of the restrainer: katechon.”1291 This desire to maintain the power of Rome “meant the historical power to restrain the appearance of the Antichrist and, the end of the present eon.”1292 The image and acceptance of the Catechon were mythically powerful in the time of the Holy Roman Empire. So much so that Schmitt stated that the “empire of the Christian Middle Ages lasted only as long as the idea of the katechon was alive.”1293

The katechon represents, for Schmitt, a “historical concept” of “potent historical power” that preserves the “tremendous historical monolith” of a Christian empire, and it does so by opposing the perceived activity of Satan in others. One can hardly avoid the paramount importance of historicity here.1294

One of the problems encountered with Dugin’s hermeneutic concerning the Catechon is the identity of Antichrist.1295 Some material suggests that Dugin associates Antichrist with Jewish messianic concepts. Rossman wrote that Dugin claims “eternal Christianity” and other traditional religions identify the Jewish Messiah as the Antichrist.1296 But, if the Jewish Messiah is Antichrist, he would either have already appeared or is yet to come. Both of these

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1292 Ibid.
1293 Ibid., 60.
1295 The issue is one of just who or what is being restrained? Is an individual being restrained? Or, is the Antichrist a collective subject?
possibilities would clash with Old Believer assignations of a former Tsar or Dugin’s claims of a Collective Antichrist filling the role.

Accepting the Byzantine emperors as the Catechon assumes they restrained Antichrist for a time. However, in making this assumption, Antichrist should be present in the world today because after the Byzantine empire fell in 1453, there would have been no Restrainer. Absent the Catechon Antichrist should have appeared. Why did this not happen? Moss suggests that, as the Old Believers profess, “according to the great mercy of God,” a kind of ‘Indian summer’ of truly Orthodox statehood, the ‘Third Rome’ of Moscow, prolonged the ‘thousand-year reign of Christ’ into the modern period.

Confusion over dates when attempting to reconcile the Old Believer Millennial Model creates calculation contradictions. Does the Millennial Reign of Christ depend on determining whether the Antichrist was loosed on the world since either 1656 or 1666-67, or until Peter I effectively set aside the Patriarchy in the early 1700’s and attempted to continue his subordination of the Church to State rule? Whatever the exact date, it is evident that Dugin believes that Russia is the Catechon divinely charged to resist the Collective Antichrist in the present day.

Versluis commented that, while discussing Hobbes, Schmitt “revealingly” acknowledged Guénon’s views of the Antichrist. Schmitt recognized the power of the Catechon in “Guénon’s observation that the collapse of medieval civilization into early modernity by the seventeenth century came about because of secret forces operating in the background.” Schmitt realized that “Guénon saw the early modern period as inaugurating the progressive

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1297 2 Thessalonians 2: 6, NASB, “And you know what restrains him now, so that in his time he will be revealed.”
1299 Ibid. Dugin then would have the roughly 1000-year Byzantine Period from the Edit of Milan (312) to the fall of Constantinople in 1453 equate to the “thousand-year reign of Christ” in Revelations 20.
1300 Moss, “Meaning of History,” under, Dugin’s Eschatological Ecclesiology. Moss notes that in 1656, Patriarch Nicon introduced the New Rite. The Council of 1666-67, placed the Old Rite under anathema. Peter the Great, set aside the Patriarchate ca. 1721, culminating years of his resistance to allowing a Patriarch to be named.
1302 Ibid.
decline that modernity represents for him, which would conclude in the appearance of the Antichrist and the end of the world,” Versluis wrote.1303

Newman’s comment that “it is difficult to tell whether sovereignty serves as the katechon (‘restrainer’) or conductor of the coming disorder,” serves to underscore Dugin’s criticism of Western governments, as they seem to be, in Dugin’s view, unleashing Antichrist.1304 “The apocalyptic and nihilistic condition that Schmitt warned us of seems to be coming about precisely through the breakup of the liberal global order and uncanny return of the dream of sovereignty,” Newman added.1305 Moss interprets Dugin’s understanding of Russian history as one in which the Eastern Roman Empire continued to be viable through the times of the Tsars. More than that, it did not end with the Russian Revolution in 1917. “In some mysterious way,” the Eastern Roman Empire “continued to exist under Soviet power, and continued to serve God and the True Church by opposing the real Antichrist – American power.”1306

There seems to be continuing confusion over assigning identity to Antichrist. To whatever or whomever the identity is properly assigned, Rossman’s observation that Dugin accepts that, “Russians are the eschatologically chosen people entrusted with the ‘mystery of grace’ and empowered to prevent the appearance of the Man of Sin,” is key.1307 In a profound combination of geopolitics and theology, Dugin believes that Russia/Eurasia is the Third Rome. Bound up in his belief is that Third Rome is the Restrainer, the Catechon that holds back Antichrist.

1303 Ibid. Schmitt directly referred to Guénon, La Crise du monde moderne, Paris, Bossard, 1927. Note the similarity with Dugin’s Collective Antichrist ideas.
1304 Newman, Political Theology, 3-4.
1305 Ibid., 4.
1307 Rossman, “Anti-Semitism in Eurasian Historiography,” 164. The “mystery of grace” connotation may apply in this instance to the granting an understanding about the Messiah given to specific prophetic voices throughout the ages and/or to a blessing upon Russia of the ability to make such understanding known. For an example of the “mystery of grace” discussion, Cf. George Vandervelde, “The Grammar of Grace: Karl Rahner as a Watershed in Contemporary Theology,” Theological Studies 49, no. 3 (September 1, 1988): 445-59. George Vandervelde, 1939-2007.
3.5.5. Regarding Assigned Identity

Jeanron’s expanded definition of hermeneutics, which allows identity as a constituent of hermeneutical construction, permits Dugin to be interpreted through his assignment of various identifications. Jeanron’s expanded definition, combined with Brannan’s conclusions on identity, permit Dugin’s hermeneutical paradigms to become more apparent. Brannan conducted extensive research on self-defined Christian Identity groups in America in his study that resonates in Dugin’s self-identity and the identity he applies to the West. Brannan’s investigation into one group led him to report that:

Those from within the movement took Identity as a name for their belief system from the idea that they – the descendants of White Europeans – were the literal and true Israel of God. Jewish people were not seen as descendants of the Old Testament people of God. Rather, the true “identity” of Israel, was to be found in the British, other European and American Caucasian people.1308

By stating that “the understanding or presupposition of Israel being hidden within the British and their extension elsewhere then serves as the predominant hermeneutic for their later exegesis of scripture,” Brannan highlighted the driving Hermeneutic of Christian Identity.1309 “If one is willing to accept this all-important presupposition,” that the true “identity” of Israel is now found elsewhere, in Christian Identity, “then later assertions appear to follow a coherent system of thought.”1310 Brannan proposed a dynamic process, one that involves hermeneutical presupposition and the following acceptance of its subsequent hermeneutical subsets.

While other hermeneutical elements and themes are present in Dugin’s work, three dominant categories falling under his overarching Hermeneutic of Political Theology – Sacred Geography/Sacred Space, Third Rome, and Traditionalism – remain consistent, constant, and readily identifiable. To understand Dugin, first, understand his core hermeneutical assumptions. “Without this acceptance of the pre-suppositional hermeneutic,” Brannan

1309 Ibid., 146.
1310 Ibid.
assured, “the system will fail to convince.”¹³¹¹ Likewise, if Dugin’s hermeneutical presuppositions are consistent within Fourth Political Theory, they will remain coherent – this is not to say universally evident, accepted, or correct, but coherent. “The central hermeneutic must be accepted,” Brannan said.¹³¹² Once acceptance is granted, all other suppositions fall into place below it.¹³¹³ Brannan’s claims may be applied directly to Fourth Political Theory through his highlighting of the centrality of hermeneutical presuppositions.

“Due to personal or social reasons,” Jeanrond wrote, “ideological interpreters defend their particular ‘readings’ at all cost and remain hostile to all calls for a change of attitude, perspective or world-view.”¹³¹⁴ Dugin’s assertions of self-identity as a Traditionalist and Eurasianist fall within the boundaries of Jeanrond’s observation. Dugin’s aggressive application of identity to others and to ideologies not his own are also demonstrations of Jeanrond’s view. Thus, identifying Russia-led Eurasia as the Third Rome, the Restrainer, and the West as Antichrist are consistent with Brannan’s and Jeanrond’s conclusions.

3.6. Concerning Dugin as Conspirologist

The many and varied Masonic Orders, the Illuminati, the Trilateral Commission, Opus De, The Bilderberg Group, and countless other shrouded enclaves draw widespread attention from serious scholars in the Academy to strange but equally serious conspiracy groupies dwelling on the outer fringe of paranoia. Eco offered John Chadwick’s example: “Even the least curious mind is roused by the promise of sharing knowledge withheld from others.”¹³¹⁵ Eco thought that conspiracies gain traction “because they purport to offer

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¹³¹¹ Ibid.
¹³¹² Ibid., 150.
¹³¹³ Ibid., 150.
¹³¹⁴ Jeanrond, Theological Hermeneutics, 6.
explanations in ways that appeal to people who feel they’ve been denied important information.” 1316 The field is at once graced with limited amounts of legitimate scholarship and strewn with seriously flawed diatribes posing as such.

Branko Malić, a Dugin critic, praised Dugin’s authorship of *Konspirologija* while castigating Fourth Political Theory as chaotic and contradictory. 1317 Malić wrote that “Dugin notes that [the] conspirological notion of history and every-day life is something quite common in [the] public mind.” 1318 Dugin’s 1991 book, *Konspirologija*, “presents us with [a] well educated and meticulous author, interested in problem[s] on [the] academic margin, i.e. conspiracy theories,” according to Malić in his review. 1319

The conspiratorial tendency recalls the earlier mentioned attention given to Traditional strands in language and the arts. 1320 While it may be less conspicuous in other media, Conspiracy Theory finds ample expression in literature. Eco illustrates this point in various of his books, where he employed Conspiracy Theory to support the structure of his storyline. 1321 Reading Eco is also valuable for his non-fictional examinations of Conspiracy Theory and the trails he explored into the paranoid elements of its nature. In his article, “A Theory of Conspiracies,” Eco demonstrated the considerable research power evident in his fiction writing. 1322 One of Eco’s research trails

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1316 Eco, “A Theory of Conspiracies.”
1319 Ibid.
1320 Cf. 1.5.1.
1322 Ibid.
led to Chadwick’s observation that “the urge to discover secrets is deeply ingrained in human nature.”

Conspiriology by itself is not a theology, but oftentimes it involves religious and theological subjects and issues. Conspiriological spawned fictions are frequently read works in popular literature. Often these fictional works center on religious groups, gnostic intrigues, and secret societies. There is an entire genre of Conspiracy Theory. Here dwell speculations and conjectures yet unproven, and more often unprovable. Conspiracies proven are, of course, no longer theories; they exit the genre to take up residence elsewhere.

Popper wrote at length on conspiracies as social constructs and identified his “Conspiracy Theory of Society” as:

The view that an explanation of a social phenomenon consists in the discovery of the men or groups who are interested in the occurrence of this phenomenon (sometimes it is a hidden interest which has first to be revealed), and who have planned and conspired to bring it about.

Popper then insisted this view arises from the “mistaken theory” societal evils, such as wars and economic disparities, are “the result of direct design by some powerful individuals and groups.” Popper maintained that part of the blame for societal inequity rests in historicism – the belief that societal and cultural events are determined by natural laws. Reminiscent of Schmitt, Popper explained that the attitude of modernity toward natural laws is the “typical result of the secularization of a religious superstition.” Popper concluded that Conspiracy Theory is older than historicism, and historicism

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1323 Ibid. Here Eco is quoting Chadwick, *Decipherment of Linear B*, 1.
1324 The genre contains literature that ranges from trivial and fringe to that is academically, politically, and socially serious. Cf. e.g., Svetlana Boym, “Conspiracy Theories and Literary Ethics: Umberto Eco, Danilo Kis and The Protocols of Zion,” *Comparative Literature* 51, no. 2 (1999): 97-122. Svetlana Boym, 1966–2018, was Professor of Slavic and Comparative Literatures at Harvard University.
1325 Perhaps even in doctoral dissertations.
1327 Ibid., 435-36.
1328 Ibid., 436.
1329 Ibid.
is, in fact, a derivative of it. In Conspiracy Theory, the human determinism of the conspirators replaces supernatural determinism.

In Popper’s theory, belief in supernatural determinism is replaced through a very human substitution wherein the gods “are abandoned.” They are replaced “by powerful men or groups – sinister pressure groups whose wickedness is responsible for all the evils we suffer from – such as the Learned Elders of Zion, or the monopolists, or the capitalists, or the imperialists.” Groups, organizations, and associations that are secretive or exclusive, become magnets that often attract an incredible amount of attention.

One culmination of Dugin’s background and development is that his perception of the New World Order, expanded to its universalist and globalist extremes, fits Fourth Political Theory into a conspiriology framework. Keeping in mind that Dugin claims that Western Liberalism is attempting to create a unipolar hegemony, materialistic and universal in its globalism, it is evident that Dugin believes the New World Order is active in furtherance of its goal. “Ideology attempts to mobilize the collective will of society for the construction of a deferred paradise,” wrote Epstein. In line with Epstein’s idea, Dugin’s accusations of the New World Order conspiracy are an attempt to mobilize his Fourth Political Theory adherents to “oppose the demonic plots which destroyed the original paradise.” Dugin then rallies support for the creation of a Eurasian barrier to foil the Western plot aimed at world domination.

Epstein presented conspiriological constituents of Traditionalism in his discussion of the “hermeneutic suspicion of historical reality.” This concept gains traction because it demonstrates that Dugin’s interest in Traditionalism is subject to conspiratorial influences. If so, Dugin is conditioned to read history from a conspiratorial perspective. Not only that, he purposefully

1330 Ibid., 435-36.
1331 Ibid., 436.
1332 Epstein, Conservatism and Traditionalism, 14.
1333 Ibid.
1334 Ibid., 13.
assigns a collective identity to the Antichrist through decidedly conspiratorial conclusions aimed at the West and the New World Order.

Traditionalism has some fascinating conspiratorial aspects. As mentioned, Epstein pointed to a “hermeneutic suspicion of historical reality.” Epstein’s observation suggests that liberal and Traditionalist perspectives of things spiritual, political, professional, and economic point to a similar hermeneutic. For the liberal, each of these areas noted by Epstein is “governed by their own particular laws.” For the Traditionalist, “even the most concrete and seemingly arbitrary facts” within the same subject areas “are conditioned by some underlying principles and therefore testify to an all-comprehensive determinism.”

Because, as previously discussed, the liberal label has lost specificity as a descriptor, substituting Epstein’s Marxism example for comparison with Traditionalism allows for a better understanding of his point. “Where Marxism, with its materialist assumptions, speaks about ‘laws,’” Epstein observed, “traditionalism, with its spiritual bias, identifies concealed ‘volitions’ and ‘intentions.’” Thus, both subscribe to a recognizable Hermeneutic of Suspicion – laws are suspect in the former, and volitions and intentions are suspect in the latter. Under this Hermeneutic of Suspicion, there is a realization that something beyond events themselves is pulling at the strings. In Epstein’s view, this hermeneutic compels the Traditionalist to read and interpret history “in terms of ‘conspirrology,’ the science of conspiracies.”

Epstein identified and explored five conspiratorial themes that he claimed surface in Dugin’s thinking: foremost was the Jewish Conspiracy followed by

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1335 Ibid.
1336 Ibid.
1337 Ibid.
1338 Ibid.
1339 Ibid.
1341 Epstein, Conservatism and Traditionalism, 13.
the popular conspiracies ascribed to the Masons and Bankers. Epstein also observed those to whom “the idea that capitalism and communism are two strategies of a single conspiracy, conceived by Zionists and Masons and designed to crush Russia as the world’s last bastion of true Christian spirituality.” Here, one can see evidence, from Epstein’s perspective, of Dugin’s Jewish and Masonic Conspiracies.

In a popular version of conspirology, the plot can be traced to an ancient Jewish and Masonic attempt to take over the world, and both Soviet Communism and American Capitalism are seen as participants in this conspiracy, whose antagonism is merely a simulation concealing their basic collaboration. Rossman also claimed that the basis for Dugin’s Conspiracy Theory is anti-Semitic. Rossman expressed the opinion that one of Dugin’s five conspiracies is the overarching and permeating conspiracy, as Dugin’s description of each conspiracy has “more or less pronounced anti-Semitic implications.” Rossman stated that with Dugin’s adoption of the Jewish Conspiracy, it “is discerned as a central and most basic one.”

The idea of Jewish conspiracy, undoubtedly, corresponds to deep unconscious archetypal energies of very remote and diverse human communities. It is most likely that this theory is the activation of unconscious energies, which constitute the ‘conspirological instinct’ at its source.

Dugin appears conflicted and inconsistent in the anti-Semitism accusation. Victor Shnirelman offered a somewhat similar view to Rossman’s but with reservations. “After Dugin read a book by the Eurasian Yaakov Bromberg (1931) in the mid-1990s, he stopped considering all the Jews the ‘enemies of humanity,’” Shnirelman wrote. Dugin may now view the Hasidim

1342 Adapted from Epstein, Conservatism and Traditionalism.
1343 Ibid., 13.
1345 Rossman’s note: 1993c: 20; i.e., Dugin, Konspirologiia, Moscow, 20.
orthodox sect of Jews as conservatives and “allies of the Eurasians,” and “secular assimilated Jews” as “Westernisers” and enemies.  

Historian Richard Hofstadter’s 1964 Harper’s article employs the psychiatric term paranoid applied to conspiracy theorists. Hofstadter’s research led him to the work of Norman Cohn and the remarkable association of pre-seventeenth century European Millennial Sects with their psychological “preoccupations and fantasies.” Hofstadter’s opinion – the paranoid conspiracy theorist, views the ultimate result of conspiracy apocalyptically – is directly applicable to Dugin’s eschatological thinking. If Dugin’s conspirology culminates in the Jewish Conspiracy striving for the goal of unipolar globalism, perhaps symptoms of a kind of non-clinical paranoia are visible. Hofstadter noted that the paranoid “sees the fate of conspiracy in apocalyptic terms – he traffics in the birth and death of whole worlds, whole political orders, whole systems of human values.” Given this interpretation, Hofstadter could be imagined to be writing with Dugin specifically in mind.

Eco explained, “Hofstadter used the word ‘paranoid’ not in a clinical sense, but as a rhetorical device.” “The clinically paranoid person,” Eco continued, “thinks that others are plotting against him personally, whereas the socially paranoid person believes that occult powers are persecuting his class, his nation, his religion.” Eco advanced this especially pertinent observation that should be considered in Dugin’s case: “I would argue that the latter is more dangerous, because he sees his plight as one that’s shared—perhaps by millions of other people.” This perspective, as perceived by the Conspiracy

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1350 Ibid.  
1354 Ibid.  
1355 Ibid.  
1356 Ibid.  
1357 Ibid.
Theory adherent, “validates his paranoia and seems to him to explain current as well as historical events.”

Hofstadter was clear that Conspiracy Theory is not a recent phenomenon. Remarking on research that studied “the millennial sects of Europe from the eleventh to the sixteenth century,” Hofstadter wrote that “Norman Cohn believed he found a persistent psychic complex that corresponds broadly with what I have been considering – a style made up of certain preoccupations and fantasies.”

Cohn described these “preoccupations and fantasies” as:

The megalomaniac view of oneself as the Elect, wholly good, abominably persecuted, yet assured of ultimate triumph; the attribution of gigantic and demonic powers to the adversary; the refusal to accept the ineluctable limitations and imperfections of human existence, such as transience, dissention [sic], conflict, fallibility whether intellectual or moral; the obsession with inerrable prophecies.

Cohn stated that “these attitudes are symptoms which together constitute the unmistakable syndrome of paranoia.” He then observed two points that should be given weight in Dugin’s case. First, “a paranoid delusion does not cease to be so because it is shared by many individuals,” and second, it does not cease to be paranoia “because those individuals have real and ample grounds for regarding themselves as victims of oppression.” Dugin may be somewhat paranoid; in-and-of-itself, however, this does not mean his Fourth Political Theory is not supportable.

While no less enthusiastic about pressing on his ideas of New World Order conspiracies, Dugin may have stepped back from outright Jewish Conspiracy Theory, according to Benjamin Parker.

He may easily be called a Russian supremacist and would probably agree that he is a nationalist, but he is not necessarily an anti-Semite because he does not reserve for Jews special fear, hatred, or discrimination. If the Kremlin – or at least one part of

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1358 Ibid.
1359 Hofstadter, “The Paranoid Style,” 86.
1360 Cohn, Pursuit of the Millennium, 52. Brackets added.
1361 Ibid.
1362 Ibid.
it – is truly are [sic] enamored of Dugin’s theories, it is possible that they could share his imperialist Russian supremacism without anti-Semitism. The problem, however, is how they could so easily accept Dugin while rejecting his influences and intellectual ancestors.\textsuperscript{1363}

Shnirelman remarked on Dugin’s vacillations regarding his belief in a Jewish conspiracy.\textsuperscript{1364} “For an attentive reader it is evident that the author’s views changed with almost every new book he read,” Shnirelman wrote of Dugin.\textsuperscript{1365} To that observation, Shnirelman added, for Dugin, “a development of a new concept never resulted in throwing away an earlier one.”\textsuperscript{1366}

\textbf{3.7. Regarding Dugin’s Russian Orthodoxy}

I believe Dugin can be more easily understood considering his identification with Old Believer/Old Ritual theology. Epstein asserts that Dugin contends that the Old Believer form of Orthodoxy more closely resembles the original Christian expression than does that of either the Western Roman Catholic or Protestant Churches.\textsuperscript{1367} Moss, a controversial figure in his own right, has written that Dugin is an Old Ritualist – an adherent of the Russian rites and praxis of pre-1666–67 Russian-centric Orthodoxy.\textsuperscript{1368} In an observation from the Orthodox perspective, Moss noted that 1990 was the year

Dugin became an Old Ritualist; whether he actually joined the schism or only the yedinoverie (Old Ritualist) section of the official Moscow Patriarchate is not clear. What is clear is that the Old Ritualist understanding of Russian and world history has deeply influenced his thought.\textsuperscript{1369}


\textsuperscript{1365} Ibid., 450.

\textsuperscript{1366} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{1367} Epstein, Conservatism and Traditionalism, 20.

\textsuperscript{1368} Moss, “Meaning of Russian History,” throughout the article. Moss is accused in some areas of the blogosphere of being schismatic and not truly Orthodox. Other bloggers praise the quality and depth of his research. My intent here is to neither denounce nor defend Moss, it is to present his voice as one that offers an opinion on Dugin’s Orthodox views. Cf. numerous mentions of Old Believer/Old Ritualist throughout.

\textsuperscript{1369} Moss, “Meaning of Russian History.”
Moss suggested a way to capture an essential element for understanding Dugin is to consider him in light of his being an Old Believer; at least consider him in light of his positive reception of Old Rite doctrine.\textsuperscript{1370} In Moss’ view, “it is more fruitful and accurate to see his thought as a product of a kind of modernized Old Ritualism than as a species of right- or left-wing politics.”\textsuperscript{1371} Moss, thus, provides insight into how the combined geopolitics and theology of Dugin arranges itself.

Epstein maintained that Traditionalists, and he would include Dugin here, are much more eclectic than other conservatives regarding their Orthodox Christianity:

The range of their mystical interest is as ‘cosmopolitan’ as their political strategy. Although they praise Orthodoxy, they see in it only a external manifestation of a much deeper esoteric tradition, which unites pagans, Muslims, gnostics, Christian heretics and Indian holy men.\textsuperscript{1372}

Epstein suggested that Dugin’s affinity to the Orthodox Church arises in large part “because of its closeness to an ancient, paganist worldview,” which Dugin believes “is more faithful to original Christianity” than is the belief and practice of the “Western churches.”\textsuperscript{1373} Some expected measure of disagreement from the Orthodox community regarding the accusation of its inclusion of things pagan notwithstanding, there is ample evidence presented throughout this study supporting the contention that Dugin identifies with pagan concepts in his Neo-Traditionalist worldview.\textsuperscript{1374}

In Paris, after his exile from the Soviet Union, Vladimir Lossky, the Orthodox theologian, published \textit{The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church}.\textsuperscript{1375} In this work, Lossky provided insights into mystical elements of Orthodoxy that

\textsuperscript{1370} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1371} Ibid. While I agree with Moss to some degree, I would submit that it is “more fruitful and accurate” to consider Dugin’s affinity to Old Rite doctrine as an agreeable expression of his Geopolitical-Theology and an amalgamation of his Neo-Eurasianist thought and advocacy.
\textsuperscript{1372} Epstein, \textit{Conservatism and Traditionalism}, 21.
\textsuperscript{1373} Ibid., 20.
\textsuperscript{1374} Ibid.
help explain the foundations of Dugin’s Geopolitical-Theology. Lossky’s views are helpful to a Western audience that, with its Protestant heritage, lacks experience in the degree of mystical fusion found within Eastern Christianity. Many factors contribute to Dugin’s acceptance of Russian Orthodoxy. When taken together, it is likely that not the least of them is, as Lossky put it, “eastern tradition has never made a sharp distinction between mysticism and theology; between personal experience of the divine mysteries and the dogma affirmed by the Church.”

As previously mentioned, Old Believer doctrine teaches that Moscow is the Third Rome, and they, the Old Believers, ultimately represent the True Faith in this doctrine. If Moss is correct, then Dugin accepts that until the fall of Constantinople “true piety was preserved,” in that the Byzantine emperors were the de facto Restainers and “held back the appearance of the Antichrist.” Here it is important to emphasize, as Rossman did, “Dugin’s appeal to the replacement theology suggested by the seventeenth-century schismatics and abandoned by the Orthodox Church.” The theology that Dugin appeals to refers to his belief that the Millennium, the Thousand-year Reign of Christ was realized through Byzantium. Rossman wrote that “Dugin believes the schismatics preserved the most authentic aspects of Orthodox tradition. According to Dugin, Russia has inherited the “divine presence” that had belonged to Byzantium.

3.7.1. Comments on Symphonia

Schmitt argued that the State, installed through Divine Sovereignty, can legitimately exercise the power of exception, to rule as seen fit in an emergency. Even so, this power can be employed by a purely secular sovereign as well. Advocating a stronger inclusion of spiritual power over even the desired divinely imbued power of the State Sovereignty, Gabriel-Ambroise de Bonald, and Hugues-Félicité-Robert de Lamennais deserve

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1377 Ibid., 8.
1380 Ibid. Cf. Rossman’s footnote 37.
1381 Ibid.
attention. Taking positions mainly supportive of the Vatican, Bonald and Lamennais were voices that argued the superior political authority of the Church and Pope over temporal powers. In a political theology pre-dating Schmitt by about a century, Lamennais, a supporter of the Restoration in France, favored spiritual input – Roman Catholic in this case – in State matters in the belief that religion is a necessary element, especially in its contribution to public order.

Complimenting Symphonia observations previously mentioned, Thomas Bokenkotter, a Catholic historian, presented material useful in evaluating Dugin’s theological infusion into the geopolitical sphere with his commentary on Bonald and Lamennais. Church historian Bernard Reardon also provided analysis of Lamennais, that sheds historical illumination on Church and State relationships. Both Bonald and Lamennais are worthy of note for their assertions of faith and state inseparability. Lamennais is of added interest to Dugin scholars because of his support for a return to traditional authority and his firm belief that “political havoc” was the result of “the anarchy of reason.”

3.8. Concerning Dugin’s Apocalyptic Eschatology

Much apocalyptic literature is theologically dualistic in nature. Dugin’s eschatology tends to dualistic expressions as well. When Mervyn F. Bendle

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1383 Cf. Bokenkotter, *Church and Revolution*.

1384 Ibid.

1385 Bernard M. G. Reardon, *Liberalism and Tradition: Aspects of Catholic Thought in Nineteenth-century France* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). In this work Reardon devoted two chapters on Lamennais that are useful regarding the Church/State discussion. Reardon related that Bonald’s influence on Lamennais was substantial; Cf. Reardon, *Liberalism and Tradition*, 64. Bernard M.G. Reardon, 1913-2006.

1386 Reardon, *Liberalism and Tradition*, 86.
compared Dugin’s various eschatological apocalyptic expressions, he concluded:

Dugin’s view is dualistic, depicting the world as a battleground within which the forces of good and evil, light and darkness, spirit and matter, contend for the fate of the planet. In Dugin’s version of apocalypticism, it is the “Atlanticist New World Order” based on liberalism, modernity, and materialism, that represents the forces of evil, while the peoples of Eurasia with their stronger spirituality constitute (or will soon constitute) the “New Eurasian Order” and form the vanguard for the forces for good.1387

According to Moss, Dugin employs a three-phase chronology of Church history.1388 The first Moss labels the “Pre-Constantinian Phase,” noting that lasted until the Edict of Milan in 312.1389 The second is the “Byzantine Phase,” from 312 until the Fall of Constantinople in 1453.1390 Moss highlighted that this phase corresponds to the thousand-year reign of Christ of Revelation 20.1391 The third is the “Post-Byzantine Phase,” in which we are now — the reign of Antichrist.1392

Two other views indicate interpretations of Dugin’s eschatology. First, Rossman said that for Dugin, “mondialism, especially the mondialistic concept of the ‘end of history,’ is only a secularized version of Jewish

1388 Moss, “Meaning of Russian History,” under, Dugin’s Eschatological Ecclesiology. Moss credits Dugin, Absolutnaia Rodina, for his understanding of these three epochs.
1389 Ibid. The Edit of Milan was a “proclamation that permanently established religious toleration for Christianity within the Roman Empire. It was the outcome of a political agreement concluded in Mediolanum (modern Milan) between the Roman emperors Constantine I and Licinius in February 313. The proclamation, made for the East by Licinius in June 313, granted all persons freedom to worship whatever deity they pleased, assured Christians of legal rights (including the right to organize churches), and directed the prompt return to Christians of confiscated property.” Cf. Encyclopaedia Britannica, s.v. “Edict of Milan (Roman History),” updated August 8, 2019, accessed August 9, 2019, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Edict-of-Milan.
1390 Ibid.
1391 Ibid. Revelations 20: 1-3, NASB. “Then I saw an angel coming down from heaven, holding the key of the abyss and a great chain in his hand. 2 And he laid hold of the dragon, the serpent of old, who is the devil and Satan, and bound him for a thousand years; 3 and he threw him into the abyss, and shut it and sealed it over him, so that he would not deceive the nations any longer, until the thousand years were completed; after these things he must be released for a short time.”
1392 Ibid.
‘kabbalistic eschatology,’ which lacks a soteriological dimension.”1393 The second example comes from *The Fourth Political Theory* itself, and suggests that Dugin appreciates Agursky’s ideas, especially his “review of the Soviet period as a special, ‘eschatological’ version of the traditional society.”1394 Whatever he specifically had in mind regarding Agursky’s eschatological reference, Dugin’s interest in the relevance of various eschatological references and approaches reveals either a less than fully developed theology in this area, or an as yet immature Western interpretation of it.

“One approach to the enigma of Dugin,” said Moss, “is through a discussion of his little-known ‘eschatological ecclesiology,’ and his understanding of the role of the Orthodox Church and Russia in the last times.”1395 If correct, the entirety of Dugin’s Chronology of Church History, viewed from Moss’ perspective, firmly positions the current world circumstance in the Post-Byzantine period of the reign of Antichrist.

### 3.8.1. Reflections on Dugin’s idea of Hastening Armageddon

Aiding and abetting Armageddon is not a Dugin exclusive. Commentators have considered Dugin’s views and the views of others regarding attempts to provide catalytic action triggering the Apocalyptic end of the present age on earth.1396 A brief examination of examples reflecting some similarities with Dugin’s position offer perspective.

The violent religiously radical group, Aum Shinrikyō, attacked the Tokyo Subway System in March 1995 with the Apocalypse in mind. In addition to

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1393 Rossman, “Anti-Semitism in Eurasian Historiography,” 175.
1395 Moss, “Meaning of Russian History.” This quote is from the introduction portion of the post. Whereas Shekhovtsov and Umland have focused an argument criticizing the authenticity of Dugin’s Traditionalism, Moss, writing from an Orthodox perspective, criticizes the authenticity of his adherence to Orthodox Church doctrine.
1396 Cf. e.g., Matthias Riedl, “Apocalyptic Politics – On the Permanence and Transformations of a Symbolic Complex.” Paper Delivered to The Franklin Humanities Institute – Politics and Religion: A Humanities Futures Cross-Departmental Seminar, Duke University, Durham, NC, December 3, 2014, 5. Riedl explains that “Apocalypsis means a revelatory unveiling of a historical structure of decline, which will culminate in the battle between good and evil at the end of times and Judgment Day. Then will follow the destruction of this world and the dawn of a new world, into which the true believers will be transferred and where they will establish a truly theocratic society, the Heavenly Jerusalem.” Matthias Riedl is Chair of Comparative Religious Studies at Central European University.
the innovative use of sarin gas, a non-explosive weapon of mass destruction, as the fatal medium, Aum Shinrikyō combined Tibetan Buddhism and the New Testament book of the Revelation into the metaphysical basis for their attempt to accelerate the End of Days. Matthias Riedl, wrote that the ideology of Aum Shinrikyō was “based on the teaching of their guru Shōkō Asahara.”\(^{1397}\) Asahara, in turn, drew on Tibetan Buddhism and other Eastern spiritual sources.\(^{1398}\) Claiming Divine intervention, Asahara said, “My guru, the god Shiva, suddenly said to me: ‘Now is the time to decode the Book of Revelation, receive its message, and start Aum’s salvation work,’” Lifton reported.\(^{1399}\)

There are similarities to between Aum Shinrikyō and Dugin’s proclaimed mission to hasten the Apocalypse. In the viewpoint of psychiatrist Robert Lifton, “the gas attack was meant as a ‘self-assigned project of making Armageddon happen.’”\(^{1400}\) Similar too is the esoteric characteristic of Shōkō Asahara to selectively draw from multiple religious traditions.

### 3.8.2. Secular Apocalyptic Manifestations

It is tempting to lump the apocalyptic efforts of Dugin and Asahara with other advocates of radical change, but care demands that the element of spiritual inspiration claimed by Dugin and Asahara be a defining factor. The degree of metaphysical motivation involved alone is a reason to distinguish between theologically inspired kinetics and that fueled by secular anarchism or Luddite

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1399 Ibid. Riedl cites Lifton, *Destroying the World to Save It*, 47; Cf. Riedl’s note: Lifton 1999, 47.
Riedl, in his paper on Apocalyptic Politics, drew on source material as varied as the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s, *Project Megiddo*, and Voegelin’s essay, *The Political Religions*. Despite similarities, when Considering the Oklahoma City Murrah Federal Building bombing, Riedl found that Timothy McVeigh relied on secular apocalyptic texts rather than sacred sources:

McVeigh – like other far-right terrorists – was inspired by the racist novel The Turner Diaries, published pseudonymously in 1978 by the far-right leader William L. Pierce. McVeigh had followed in detail the description of a car bomb attack on a federal building that he found in the book.

Riedl also stated a basis for a valid apocalyptic comparison. “The Turner Diaries are more than just a terrorist manual in the disguise of a novel,” Riedl concluded, “they are also an apocalypse.” The Turner Diaries “emulate the narrative of ancient apocalypses,” Riedl wrote, “when the hero is granted inspection of a secret book and in an ecstatic vision gains insight into the whole course of human history.”

Riedl’s association of The Turner Diaries with apocalyptic literature may be valid. However, McVeigh left no substantive writings to indicate he subscribed to the eschatological leanings of The Turner Diaries. While he attempted to ascribe a political motive to his actions, there is little to no evidence that he associated his extreme violence with any form of apocalyptic vision. Likewise, Theodore Kaczynski did not write or promote any significant eschatological message in his attempts to thwart a technological society that he viewed as

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1401 OED: “A person opposed to new technology or ways of working.” Historically: “A member of any of the bands of English workers who destroyed machinery, especially in cotton and woollen mills, that they believed was threatening their jobs (1811–16).”


1404 Ibid. Italics added.

1405 Ibid.
decidedly opposed to his concepts of Natural Law. Kaczynski, the so-called Unabomber, is anti-modern – especially anti-technological – but cannot be classified as metaphysical.1406

Anders Breivik, still imprisoned in Norway, was responsible for the deaths of scores of mostly young people in Norway, comes closest of the three (McVeigh, Kaczynski, and himself) to imbuing his cause with religious elements and promoting a form of spiritual conflict through a bizarre form of retro-Templar “knighthood.” Nevertheless, Breivik's writings exhibit a dearth of definable eschatological elements.1407 So, while he may have displayed tinges of gnostic trappings associated with an apocalyptic genre, Breivik too, fell well short of a credible Dugin-like comparison.

Anti-modern praxis does not require a definitive apocalyptic framework, so there is more than just anti-modernism at work in Dugin’s eschatology. Dugin’s Neo-Traditionalism begins on a religious foundation and concludes with eschatological certitude; it is, therefore, more than just the revenge, anti-modernism, or xenophobia witnessed in McVeigh, Kaczynski, and Breivik – despite whatever degree of Luddism they possess in common.

3.9. Reception and Reaction to Dugin

With the publication of Foundations of Geopolitics Dugin began to gain serious attention in Western circles, especially from Russian-focused military and political analysts. Dugin also gained early Western attention from scholars of Russian subjects studying the developing political and social policy of the then still emerging Russian Federation.


In the sphere of the Russian Federation’s social policy creation and development, scholars such as Epstein, Laruelle, Poe, Rossman, Sedgwick, and Shekhovtsov, gave attention to Dugin. Outside of the more narrowly focused military and security commentators, and various esoteric and occult observers, the social and metaphysical perspective provided the West with the earliest and most comprehensive scholarly views of Dugin.

Less obvious in Western geopolitical spheres were some of the theological aspects of Dugin’s reception. Even as Dugin gains Western attention, the theological elements of his Geopolitical-Theology will likely be the least recognized facet of his works. Nevertheless, Dugin continues to garner attention in geopolitical and theological circles within Russia and beyond its borders. His Geopolitical-Theology, espousing a Neo-Eurasian empire stretching from Dublin to Vladivostok, is becoming increasingly well known. There is substantial evidence that Putin’s strategic agenda reflects distinct elements of Dugin's Neo-Eurasianism. This observation is remarkable even if Putin’s strategic thinking does not rely on his direct reception of Dugin. The impact of Dugin’s influence, even indirectly, may already be significant.

Dugin is a controversial player on the world stage; characterized hyperbolically as “Putin’s Brain,” “Putin's Rasputin,” a satanist, an apocalyptic prophet, and a neo-Nazi inhabitant of the lunatic fringe. Playing to a predominately Russian audience, Dugin is noteworthy; his recognition as a player on the broader world stage is also significant and becoming more conspicuous. Given his increasing recognition, it is appropriate to inquire after Dugin’s broadening contemporary influence and to speculate on his staying power.

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While Umland called Dugin a “pseudo-scholar,” claiming that Dugin “uses ‘conservatism’ as a cover for the spread of a revolutionary ultranationalist and neo-imperialist ideology,” Liverant, on the other hand, describes Dugin as a “gifted and charismatic intellectual.” Liverant wrote of, “an undeniable connection between Dugin’s politics and the regime change led by Putin.”

Dugin was once Head of the Department of Sociology of International Relations at Moscow State University, then reportedly dismissed from the faculty in mid-2014 amid conflicting reports from the University and others regarding his actual employment status. Hence, Dugin seems to exist simultaneously in an ethereal world of credibility, ridicule, political influence, and official disfavor. Dugin also dwells in a world of intertwined politics and theology to a point little appreciated in contemporary Western culture. The force of Dugin’s impact must be considered both internally, in Russian geopolitical circles, and more especially as concerns this study, externally, in the corresponding Western arena.

3.9.1. The Peoria Question

The notorious trope often attributed to Groucho Marx, “but how will it play in Peoria?,” has been used by comedian Jack Benny, uncountable vaudevillian, print, cinema, and television entertainers as well as political figures and commentators. Initially, the question addressed the ability of a theatrical play or stage show to succeed broadly in mainstream America regardless of the success it had or had not achieved in the confined venue of New York City. So, how will Dugin play in Peoria? That is, how will Dugin be received outside

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1410 Liverant, “Prophet of the New Russian Empire.”
1411 Cf. e.g., Fitzpatrick, “Russia This Week: Dugin Dismissed from Moscow State University?”
of the confines of politically conservative venues such as the ENR? More specifically, how will Dugin and his Geopolitical-Theology be accepted throughout the West?

If Putin is infusing Russia’s strategic future with a Dugin-inspired geopolitical philosophy and metaphysics, Western reception of Russian policies embedded with Neo-Eurasianist Fourth Political Theory elements will impact the West’s response to Russian actions across the entire range from near- to long-term. Using Peoria as the metaphor for the West, “how will it play in Peoria?” is the most critical question to be asked of Dugin’s Fourth Political Theory. For it is Western reception that will determine Western response. While even the most informed and accurate interpretation of Fourth Political Theory may still result in dangerous confrontations, a misinformed and inaccurate analysis guarantees such outcomes.

3.9.2. The Expanding Range of Dugin’s Reception

When asking, “how does Dugin play on the political stage within Russia?” And “how will he perform in the Peoria-like venues in the West?” It is important to be mindful that both questions are critical to the depth and longer-term reception of Dugin and his Fourth Political Theory.

Clover related that Dugin’s audience has widened from the time of the publication of Foundations of Geopolitics.\textsuperscript{1413} It “sold out in four editions, and continues to be assigned as a textbook to the general staff academy and other military universities in Russia,” Clover reported.\textsuperscript{1414} “There has probably not been another book published in Russia during the post-communist period which has exerted a comparable influence on Russian military, police, and statist foreign policy elites,” in Dunlop’s opinion.\textsuperscript{1415}

In September 2008, Fred Weir wrote:

\textsuperscript{1413} Clover, “A New Eurasianism,” 16.
\textsuperscript{1414} Ibid.
This summer’s lightning war with Georgia and the emerging political crisis in next door Ukraine are happening right on Dugin’s schedule. President Dmitry Medvedev’s recent foreign-policy manifesto, outlining Russia’s claim to its own sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union, might have been penned by Dugin.\footnote{Fred Weir, “Moscow’s Moves in Georgia Track a Script by Right-wing Prophet,” \textit{The Christian Science Monitor}, September 20, 2008, accessed March 8, 2015, https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2008/0920/p01s01-woeu.html. Fred Weir is a Canadian journalist living in Russia where he is the Christian Science Monitor’s Moscow correspondent.}

In 2011 Natalia Morozova styled Dugin as, “the leading contemporary proponent of neo-Eurasianism.”\footnote{Natalia Morozova, “The Politics of Russian Post-Soviet Identity: Geopolitics, Eurasianism, and Beyond” (PhD diss., Central European University, 2011), 137. Natalia Morozova is an instructor at the National Research University, Higher School of Economics, Nizhny Novgorod, Russia.} Morozova wrote that Dugin “is hailed in the academic literature as the face and the leading representative of contemporary Russian geopolitics.”\footnote{Natalia Morozova, “Politics of Russian Identity,” 30.} Dugin is rightly established as “heir to the classical geopolitical tradition,” in Morozova’s opinion.\footnote{Ibid.} “Through his translation and publishing work Dugin has been instrumental in introducing the Russian public to ‘geopolitics’ as a distinct and self-sufficient tradition of theorizing international relations,” according to Morozova.\footnote{Ibid.} In 2009, Umland observed that,

\begin{quote}
In spite of Dugin’s, already in the early 1990s, notable publicistic \[\textit{sic}\] successes within the far right, the study of the ideas, entourage and activities of this non-conformist writer has, until recently, been seen as the domain of an exclusive group of students of Russian sub-culture, esotericism and occultism with a taste for the bizarre in post-Soviet society.\footnote{Umland, “Dugin’s transformation,” 145.} 
\end{quote}

Considering the degree of acceptance afforded Dugin and his ideas in Russia and among the ENR and other groups oriented to the political right, how those same ideas are received in the West – particularly among center- and left-leaning audiences are just beginning to be appreciated.
3.9.3. Dugin’s Mackinderian Influence

In May 2009 Elena Ovcharenko of Izvestia, a state-owned newspaper, interviewed Nikolai Patrushev, Chairman of Russia’s Security Council, in Moscow. Clover wrote that this was nothing new; Ovcharenko had interviewed Patrushev some five times previously. What was new was embedded within the overall response given by Patrushev in answer to a question regarding conflicts over natural resources. Initially, Patrushev stated that “the history of the formation, development, unification and the collapse of European and Asian countries, suggests that the political climate here is mainly determined by the interests of the world’s leading nations and peoples living in these territories.”

Clover commented that this statement was not particularly noteworthy – what was involved Patrushev’s elaboration. Patrushev went on to offer a recital of Mackinder’s Heartland Theory. He expounded on the Mackinderian idea that whoever can determine the fate of the Heartland may decide the future of the world. Clover reported that Ovcharenko did not choose to follow up on Patrushev’s Mackinderian observations, but Kremlin watchers did.

In this published Patrushev interview, a leading Russian journalist can be observed reporting on the reception given to aspects of Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianism by a member of Putin’s inner circle. Clover marked the importance of this event by highlighting its considerably more significant impact compared to the rest of the interview responses. The piece caused a stir in some circles, not because of the mention of world domination by one of the most influential men in Russia, but because of the way that Mackinder,

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1423 Ibid.
1424 Ibid.
1425 Ibid., 13-14. Clover notes that Izvestia published a transcript of the Patrushev/Ovcharenko conversation. In the transcript (according to Clover), Patrushev accurately phrased and summarized Mackinder’s theory as, “Who controls eastern Europe, rules the Heartland. Who controls the Heartland, he commands the ‘World Island.’ Who rules the ‘World Island,’ he rules the world.”
and his theory, had found his way onto his desk, Clover pointed out.\textsuperscript{1426} Calling to mind the Coding and Decoding mentions earlier,

Patrushev’s message was classic “dog whistle” politics, communicating a message to supporters which only they could hear. “Mackinder” and “heartland” were two code words which meant very little to the uninitiated. But to those who were familiar with conservative theories of nationalism which have made dramatic inroads into Russian politics since the end of the Cold war, it meant a great deal. For them, Mackinder is like a barium meal, a visible sign of the progress of these ideas through Russia’s postcommunist society, which Patrushev clearly wanted certain audiences to see.\textsuperscript{1427}

Even more telling for purposes here is Clover’s pronouncement that “Patrushev’s words signaled to close observers of Russian politics that a new ideology had taken hold in the Kremlin among top decision-makers: ideas which ten years before had been dismissed as completely barking mad were now mainstream.”\textsuperscript{1428} Patrushev was prophetically stating the leanings of Moscow some five years before the Russian invasion of Crimea. Russian political ideology has taken on noteworthy geographical aspects — aspects that tend strongly toward Mackinderian Geopolitics.

“The Putin era,” Clover wrote, “has seen the emergence of this fringe strain of imperial nationalism as a shadow ideology in Russian politics.”\textsuperscript{1429} Putin’s “shadow ideology“ is not one of Soviet-style attempts at mass mobilization characterized by propaganda and sloganeering, rather it concentrates on “consolidating an elite behind a set of understood if unspoken truths, deniably vague statements and opaque policies.”\textsuperscript{1430} Putin’s approach “is not the subject of booming speeches, but one of whispered codes,” Clover wrote; perhaps unintentionally bringing images of esoteric aspects of Traditionalism to the fore.\textsuperscript{1431}

\textsuperscript{1426} Ibid., 14.  
\textsuperscript{1427} Ibid. The “dog whistle” expression itself indicates a specific encoding technique where, like a high-frequency dog whistle inaudible to humans, but easily heard (decoded) by dogs, the encoded message is missed by those without the proper decoding ability.  
\textsuperscript{1428} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{1429} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{1430} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{1431} Ibid.
Marking the emergence of Geopolitics into the mainstream of Russian political discourse, theory, and praxis, Clover cited Moscow bookstores as examples, writing that Dom Knigi or Biblio Globus now have entire sections devoted to Geopolitics.1432 “In the State Duma, Russia’s lower house of parliament, there is a geopolitics subcommittee,” Clover wrote.1433 Now, “at Moscow State University,” Clover continued, “there is a chair of the geopolitics department.”1434

Clover’s crediting of Dugin for the emergence of current Russian geopolitical awareness was remarkable. “The man who had without a doubt put Mackinder on Patrushev’s tongue was an obscure rightwing pamphleteer and ideologist named Alexander Dugin,” is the way Clover put it.1435 Clover, recognizing the magnitude of Dugin’s Russian reception, wrote that Dugin’s “works have come into vogue following the arrival of Vladimir Putin in power in 2000.”1436 “And now, thanks to Dugin,” Clover stated, “the [Heartland] theory seems to have pervaded Kremlin thinking.”1437

Dugin’s reception among decision-makers inside Russia can now be safely assumed as fact. Clover attested to Dugin’s influence in his observation that, “Mr. Patrushev’s assessment of Halford Mackinder as ‘one of the leading political scientists of the 20th century’ was, as we can see, extremely generous to the man.”1438 “However,” Clover observed, “in Russia, he has assumed the proportions described by Patrushev, thanks to Dugin.”1439

3.9.4. Putin’s Reception of Dugin

Commenting on the Putin/Dugin connection, Tolstoy and McCaffray noted that Mikhail Leontiev, allegedly Putin’s favorite journalist, happens to be a

1432 Ibid., 15.
1433 Ibid.
1434 Ibid.
1435 Ibid.
1436 Ibid.
1437 Ibid. Brackets added.
1438 Ibid., 16.
1439 Ibid.
founding member of Dugin’s own Eurasia Party. They also wrote that Dugin stated, “I support Putin because he declares and fulfills the goals and ideals that are essentially mine,” To the contrary, Tolstoy and McCaffray claimed it is, in fact, Putin who supports Dugin because of the pathways he creates in national and foreign policy.

Tolstoy and McCaffray wrote that “there are signs that Putin believes in an international struggle that corresponds to Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianist vision.” Additionally, they indicated that the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) “has Dugin’s intellectual fingerprints all over it.” Beyond this, Dugin’s “crowning achievement,” according to Tolstoy and McCaffray, “is to have become the spokesman for a systematic anti-liberalism that has allowed Vladimir Putin to advance not as an unprincipled tyrant but as the representative of an international philosophy whose writ stretches from the backwaters of Russia to the capitals of Europe.”

While Dugin’s ability to directly influence Putin continues to be a matter of some debate, evidence of his indirect influence is acknowledged. Speaking specifically about Dugin's reception within circles of Russian power, Bassin questioned the evidence for Dugin’s influence before going on to answer his own query:

In Russia, you can’t be a TV anchor person without official approval. Although the channels of his influence are little understood, the very fact that he directs a research centre in Moscow State University points to his status. Moreover, Dugin has always been an authority for the military. Students in military academies study by his books; some may have even been printed with the financial support of the army.

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1441 Ibid.
1442 Ibid.
1443 Ibid.
1444 Ibid. The founding members of the EEU are Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. The EEU has an unmistakable Eurasian unity aspect.
1445 Ibid.
Horbyk wrote that after time with the NBP and Limonov, Dugin became “one of the chief ideologists” in the Putin regime. Despite his reported impact, Dugin appears to play down any direct connections with Putin in the public forum. Indications are that Dugin does not operate within the inner sanctum as a Putin advisor. “The two men might not have even ever met,” wrote Laruelle in 2015, adding that Dugin “has never bragged about having met the Russian president.”

Hosking wrote of the reception of Dugin’s Neo-Eurasian ideas but also addressed the reliability of Putin’s political consistency.

Russian politicians usually adopt ideologies not because they believe in them but because they are useful at certain stages of their careers. Dugin modified Eurasianism is helpful to Putin while he faces conflict in Ukraine combined with western sanctions, and while he challenges the “unipolar” model of international affairs imposed by the US.

While admitting an initial reception, Hosking doubted the staying power of Dugin’s influence. He stated, “if later [Putin] decides Russia needs to work more closely with the west, to defeat Islamist terrorism or to prevent conflict getting out of hand, then the tropes of Eurasianism will fall out of his discourse.”

Still, reflecting on the success of Dugin’s *The Foundations of Geopolitics*, and Its reception, one must acknowledge a growing influence of almost twenty years.

The Risk Management Lab of the New Bulgarian University also thought that Putin’s reception of Dugin is observable through personal and professional linkages. “Dugin and Girkin are close collaborators,” the Risk Lab reported. The report went on to claim that both Dugin and Girkin “are in

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1447 Ibid.
1449 Hosking, “Theory of Russian History.”
1450 Ibid. Brackets added.
1451 Risk Management Lab, *Hypotheses Propaganda and Forecasts*, 4. Girkin, also known as Igor Ivanovich Strelkov, is deeply involved in the pro-Russian Ukrainian Separative Movement. Cf. e.g., http://www.4pt.su/en/content/igor-strelkov-name-russian-myth for an example of Dugin’s praise of Strelkov.
fact paid servants of Malofeev, the Russian oligarch and Putin associate financing a great part of the invasion in Ukraine.”

It is not the veracity of this claim so much as its implied reception on Putin’s part that deserves mention here.

Umland suggested that Dugin and Putin met, or were close enough to have done so, in December 2001 at the VI World Russian Popular Assembly. The Assembly was a meeting of religious representatives, “held since 1993 under the aegis of the Russian Orthodox Church.” Putin was present at this event as were highly placed government officials and members of the hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church, including the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russians, Aleksii II. Dugin’s organization, Eurasia (Evraziya), “apparently sponsored a number of presentations at this congress and managed to place two of its representatives, Dugin and [Talgat] Tadzhuddin, as speakers of the main Plenary Session of the congress.” Based on Umland’s reporting, it is possible to believe that Putin may have at least been audience to hear Dugin’s presentation even if they did not meet.

In his writing, Horbyk expressed the opinion that Putin also enjoys the cooperation of the Orthodox clergy and consciously promotes his cultish macho image. The combination of Putin’s nationalism, foreign policy, support

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1455 Ibid.

1456 Ibid. Brackets added. Talgat Tadzhuddin, was formally Chief Mufti of Russia and head of the Central Muslim Spiritual Directorate of Russia, from 1992 to 2015.

1457 Ibid., 127-28. Umland wrote that “Dugin and Tadzhuddin had the opportunity to officially present themselves on a par with a number of influential Russian figures such as Putin and Aleksii II whom they explicitly addressed in their speeches. Dugin’s publishing house Arktogeya-Tsentr produced, afterwards, a small collected volume which commemorated this occasion, with a print-run of 1,000. The book included apart from texts by Putin, Aleksii II, the Head of the Writers Union of Russia Valerii Ganichev, the Metropolitan of Smolensk and Kaliningrad Kirill, and the Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada (Supreme Soviet) of the Republic of Crimea Leonid Grach, pieces by various supporters of ‘neo-Eurasianism,’ among them several academics sympathetic to Dugin, e.g. Aleksandr Panarin.”
of Russia’s predominant religious institution, and macho image “appeals to the far rightists,” Horbyk explained.\textsuperscript{1458} Further, Horbyk implied that Dugin’s Neo-Eurasian constituency and his extra-Russian connections are conscious elements of Putin’s current geopolitical strategy.\textsuperscript{1459} The affectations implied by Horbyk plus his connecting Dugin to Putin’s current strategy, are clear indications that Putin purposefully employs rhetoric identified with rightist populism.\textsuperscript{1460}

In 2001, Ilan Berman claimed that “the previously obscure doctrine of Eurasianism has emerged as a major force in Russian politics.”\textsuperscript{1461} Berman stated that this approach to Russian foreign policy was noteworthy because it was appealing as the basis for a “renewed quest for national greatness.”\textsuperscript{1462} Moreover, Berman remarked that impacts of Eurasianism “appear to have begun to animate many of President Putin’s international maneuvers.”\textsuperscript{1463} Emphasizing Dugin’s role in this course change from the Yeltsin days, Berman wrote that “a great deal of this newfound appeal can be attributed to Eurasianism’s main ideologue – Alexandr Dugin.”\textsuperscript{1464} Berman concluded that even Dugin’s “checkered past” as “a former member of the radical anti-Semitic Pamyat organization,” his associating with Limonov and “the racist Conservative Revolution,” has not kept him from being recognized as “Russia’s premier geopolitician.”\textsuperscript{1465}

Berman acknowledged Putin's reception of Dugin in Eurasian matters. Dugin’s influence on Putin regarding “Russia’s international importance, ‘Eurasian’ cultural distinctness, and economic-political alliance building can clearly be felt,” he said.\textsuperscript{1466} Berman noted “striking similarities” between many

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{1458} Horbyk, “The Right Model,” under, An example to be followed.
\textsuperscript{1459} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1460} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1461} Ilan Berman, “Slouching Toward Eurasia,”\textit{ Perspective}, Volume 12, Number 1 (September - October 2001), 1. Cf. a copy of this article may be accessed at: http://dcommon.bu.edu/bitstream/handle/2144/3589/perspective_12_1_bernan.pdf?sequence=1, accessed, June 17, 2016. Ilan Berman is Senior Vice President of the American Foreign Policy Council.
\textsuperscript{1462} Berman, “Slouching Toward Eurasia,” 1.
\textsuperscript{1463} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1464} Ibid., 2.
\textsuperscript{1465} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1466} Ibid., 4.
\end{footnotesize}
of Dugin’s Eurasianist ideas and Putin’s policy directions. “Of course, Russian foreign policy is both multifaceted and multidirectional, and may well evolve along a different path over time,” Berman added in his 2001 article. In hindsight, nearing two decades later, Berman’s article appears to be remarkably revelatory, and Russia’s Eurasianist path seems to remain constant and consistent.

Berman felt that Dugin’s strategic geopolitical ideas gained traction with Putin. “a great many of President Putin’s recent foreign policy initiatives appear to have been lifted directly from the strategist’s playbook,” said Berman, referring to Dugin's ideas. An example of Dugin’s influence underscores Berman’s percipience. Berman’s observation that “in line with Dugin’s recommendations, Putin has placed great emphasis on the strengthening of the Russo-Iranian strategic partnership,” is still pertinent.

Alan Ingram made a point of listing Russian political and business figures that he feels Dugin has influenced and who, in turn, influence Putin. Ingram wrote that “during the Yeltsin era, figures such as Dugin were officially regarded as beyond the pale.” Under Putin,” Ingram conceded, “Dugin himself seized upon Putin’s description of Russia as a ‘Euroasiatic’ entity.” Further, Ingram observed, “something of a rapprochement has also occurred between the Presidency and the Duma.” Ingram implied that Dugin’s position as director of a Centre for Geopolitical Expertise within the Duma might have influenced this rapprochement, and further remarked that Dugin “is regularly quoted on the website of Gleb Pavlovsky, a controversial adviser to Putin.”

1467 Ibid., 6.
1468 Ibid.
1469 Ibid., 4. “Recent” refers to the time of Berman’s article in 2001.
1470 Ibid., 5. Again, realizing that “recent” refers to the time of the Berman article.
1471 Alan Ingram, “Alexander Dugin: Geopolitics and Neo-fascism in Post-Soviet Russia,” Political Geography 20, no. 8 (2001): 1032. Alan Ingram is Associate Professor of Geography at University College London.
1473 Ibid.
Portraying Dugin as a sibylline character, John Rice-Cameron noted that “as far back as the 1990s, Dugin eyed Ukraine as a target for integration into Russia.” Obliquely referring to Dugin, Rice-Cameron maintained that “throughout the 2000s, Eurasianists, through organizations such as the Eurasian Youth Union, fomented pro-Russian sentiment among ethnic Russians in Ukraine, ultimately laying the groundwork for the 2014 civil war. Much less obliquely, Rice-Cameron wrote that in *The Fourth Political Theory*, “Dugin wrote that a ‘direct military clash’ with Ukraine over Crimea and Eastern Ukraine was a real possibility.” Rice-Cameron concluded that “by helping to build the foundation for Putin’s invasion of Crimea and Ukraine’s destabilization, Eurasianists scored a major victory for the Eurasian project.”

### 3.9.5. Reception of Dugin Outside Russia and in the West

Regarding Dugin’s reception by the ENR, Horbyk wrote that Bassin, studying connections between Putin and Eurasians, observed that “links between Russian and Eurasian radical conservatism” are long-established. Recall that Dugin’s initial significant reception grew from his ca. 1992 pamphlet regarding The War of Continents. It has continued to grow.

In May 2008, Paul Goble, commenting on Eurasian issues, titled his blog post, “Aleksandr Dugin - a ‘Zhirinovsky for the Intellectuals.’” “Dugin’s rise,” wrote Goble, “has less to do with his own thought and efforts than with his ability to reflect and articulate some of the deepest feelings of contemporary

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1476 Rice-Cameron, “Eurasianism Is the New Fascism.”

1477 Ibid.

1478 Ibid.

1479 Horbyk, “The Right Model,” under, Putin, a “new rightist”?

1480 Barbashin and Thoburn, “Putin’s Brain.” Regarding confusion as to the exact title, Cf. 2.1.1.

Russian nationalist thought as they have evolved since the late 1980s.”\textsuperscript{1482} Goble's inclusion of this remark at the beginning of his article reveals the reception afforded in Russian circles as Dugin began to be noticed by Western observers.

Goble highlighted the contemporary Russian nationalist thought reflected by Zhirinovsky, an advocate of an expanded Russia along Duginesque lines.\textsuperscript{1483} Ariel Cohen, a political scientist of the Fletcher School, wrote that Zhirinovsky “became an internationally recognized figure when his Liberal Democratic Party won almost a quarter of the Russian vote in parliamentary elections on December 12, 1993.”\textsuperscript{1484} Cohen questioned Zhirinovsky’s selection of party name as an affectation, and also criticized the title of Zhirinovsky’s autobiography taken from Zhirinovsky’s support of a “Final Thrust South.” Cohen claimed the party name, “Liberal Democrat,” is “dangerously misleading.”\textsuperscript{1485} Cohen then stated that “Zhirinovsky's 1993 autobiography, \textit{The Final Thrust South}, reveals a chauvinistic, imperialist perspective on domestic Russian politics and world affairs that is neither liberal nor democratic.”\textsuperscript{1486}

Umland explained the concept behind “Russia’s Final Thrust South” is contained in Zhirinovsky’s assertion, “that the main source of troubles in Russia has been its southern neighbors.”\textsuperscript{1487} Of particular interest regarding the reception of Dugin by Zhirinovsky and vice versa is Umland’s interpretation of Zhirinovsky’s assertion that “Russia must annex not only the territories of the former Soviet Union but also Afghanistan, Iran, and

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\textsuperscript{1482} Goble, “Zhirinovsky for the Intellectuals.” Here Goble notes Mikhail Duinov’s argument in \textit{Russkiy zhurnal} (assumed to be the 2008 issue current when Goble posted his article).
\textsuperscript{1483} The more accurate statement may be that Dugin advocates an expanded Russian in very “Zhirinovskyist” terms. This chicken and egg issue is more likely the result of cross-pollination of ideas within the Eurasianist community. Who spoke first is not the primary concern here.
\textsuperscript{1485} Cohen, “Zhirinovsky in His Own Words.”
\textsuperscript{1486} Ibid. Title italics added. The title is obviously related to the Russian penchant for expansion in its Manifest Destiny assumptions.
Turkey.”1488 Umland listed four reasons Zhirinovsky advocates proceeding with this annexation: to strengthen its southern borders; to “pacify” bellicose nationalities of the region; to obtain access to warm seas; and, to restore its great-power status.1489 Comparisons of Zhirinovsky’s ambitions with those of Dugin yield marked similarities regarding Russian/Eurasian expansion. Significantly, Dugin’s reception outside of Russian Nationalist circles appears to have exceeded Zhirinovsky’s.

An article by “Erasmus,” on a blog site of The Economist, asked, “who is Mr Dugin?” then responds that he is, “an exponent of ‘Eurasian’ geopolitical thought which dreams of a great Slavic-Turkic land empire under Moscow’s command.”1490 In furtherance of this dream, Dugin and “some figures on the nationalist fringe of [the] Russian Orthodox church, gave moral support to the leaders of the Russian-backed rebellion against the government of Ukraine.”1491 Perhaps giving too slight a nod to Dugin’s metaphysical depth while avoiding any dubious claim of purely theological endeavors, Erasmus did acknowledge Dugin’s religious associations.

Dugin sometimes describes his credo as Orthodox Eurasianiam [sic], but he is not much interested in Christian theology as such: more in Orthodoxy as a mark of distinction from the West. Among the thinkers whose guiding hand he acknowledges is Julius Evola, an Italian guru of the far right; he also draws on a “traditionalist” school of religious philosophy which sees wisdom in many ancient and elaborate faiths and loathes secular modernity.1492

The article reported that Dugin “saw his influence soar during the early months of the conflict in eastern Ukraine in 2014.”1493

1488 Umland, “Zhirinovsky’s Last Thrust,” 35.
1489 Ibid.
1492 Ibid. Brackets added.
1493 Ibid.
3.9.6. Dugin’s Growing Reception in the U.S.

Given the entirety of Dugin’s recognition already discussed in this study, some degree of his reception in the United States may be assumed. In other words, any recognition afforded Dugin by Western commentators has impacted American reception from marginal, among the general public, to center-stage, among Russian observers and scholars. To be sure, heretofore, Dugin has enjoyed some measure of notoriety for a number of years, even if only on the margins of academic and political awareness. Throughout, I have presented evidence of acknowledgment by more mainstream scholars and political analysts.

Illustrative of the depth of Dugin’s American reception is Morozova, who wrote that “Dugin’s highly idiosyncratic and even radical views expressed in his numerous geopolitical writings have earned him the title of Russia’s most prominent and prolific geopolitician.” Morozova added that this reception is “mainly for confirming the worst Western fears about a wide-spread and deep-seated anti-American feeling shared by the Russian public.”

3.9.7. Receiving Dugin as a Fascist

“Putinism rests on the ethics of personal enrichment,” in Horbyk’s mind, and Putin imbues it with “fascist elements” that are an “exploitation of the rhetoric of national renaissance, radical nationalism, aggressive foreign policy and imperialism.” Horbyk’s opinion indicated two noteworthy elements: first, Western commentators apply the Fascist label to current Russian geopolitics; second, given assumptions of Dugin’s influence on Putin and Horbyk’s inclusion of “rhetoric” that is frequently attached to Dugin in the West, Dugin is likely to be painted as Fascist along with Putin.

Regarding the first of Horbyk’s elements, Ingram expressed a belief that “many writers and activists who can be argued to lie within this tradition reject the Fascist label for themselves, particularly in Russia where the term is

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1495 Ibid.
1496 Horbyk, “The Right Model,” under, An example to be followed.
generally applicable only to the Nazi regime.”\textsuperscript{1497} Regarding the second, Ingram suggested that “it is useful to consider Dugin in relation to what might be thought of as a broad fascist tradition.”\textsuperscript{1498}

While Dugin may not be cast from the original Nazi mold, he “certainly makes reference to many writers (such as Carl Schmitt and Oswald Spengler) from whom fascists draw considerable inspiration,” commented Ingram.\textsuperscript{1499} Bringing to mind Dugin’s mining according to the Metaphysics of Debris, “fascist themes” are among the things that Dugin “recycles,” Ingram wrote.\textsuperscript{1500}

Umland also expressed a level of concern similar to that encountered in Ingram’s critique of Dugin’s fascist characteristics when he wrote that “Dugin is now working toward establishing his ‘neo-Eurasianist’ ideology as Russia’s new foreign policy doctrine.”\textsuperscript{1501} Umland claimed that Dugin employs “conservatism” as a term to “cover for the spread of an actually revolutionary neo-imperialist program that amounts to a blueprint for an armed confrontation with Russia’s neighbours and the West.”\textsuperscript{1502} Umland wrote that Dugin “openly propagated fascism in the 1990s.”\textsuperscript{1503} Umland wrote that during this time Dugin repeatedly displayed sympathy for selected aspects of Fascism and National Socialism, such as the SS and the Ahnenerbe (‘Ancestral Heritage’) Institute.\textsuperscript{1504}

“Fascism is a genus of political ideology whose mythic core in its various permutations is a palingenetic form of populist ultra-nationalism,” as defined by Roger Griffin in 1991.\textsuperscript{1505} Despite Griffin’s efforts, Fascism has been separated from this definition and become a pejorative to be carelessly hurled.

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{1497}{Ibid.}
\footnote{1498}{Ingram, “Geopolitics and Neo-fascism,” 1033.}
\footnote{1499}{Ibid., 1034. Parentheses in original.}
\footnote{1500}{Ibid.}
\footnote{1501}{Ibid., “Fascist Tendencies in Russian Education.” Cf. Umland’s note 27 for his references to other opinions regarding Dugin’s position.}
\footnote{1502}{Ibid.}
\footnote{1504}{Umland, ‘‘Neo-Eurasianism,’ the Issue of Russian Fascism,” under, Aberrations of the Intelligentsia. Parentheses in original.}
\footnote{1505}{Roger Griffin, \textit{The Nature of Fascism} (London: Pinter, 1991), 26. Roger Griffin is Emertis Professor of Modern History at Oxford Brookes University.}
\end{footnotes}
at opponents of most any political position. George Orwell writing in 1944 captured the issue succinctly with his observation that “it will be seen that, as used, the word ‘Fascism’ is almost entirely meaningless.”¹⁵⁰⁶ Emphasizing his point *ad absurdum*, Orwell explained:

In conversation, of course, it is used even more wildly than in print. I have heard it applied to farmers, shopkeepers, Social Credit, corporal punishment, fox-hunting, bull-fighting, the 1922 Committee, the 1941 Committee, Kipling, Gandhi, Chiang Kai-Shek, homosexuality, Priestley’s broadcasts, Youth Hostels, astrology, women, dogs and I do not know what else.¹⁵⁰⁷

Orwell realized that “underneath all this mess there does lie a kind of buried meaning,” that is useful in the present context.¹⁵⁰⁸ Orwell wrote that “even the people who recklessly fling the word ‘Fascist’ in every direction attach at any rate an emotional significance to it.”¹⁵⁰⁹ “By ‘Fascism,’” Orwell meant, “roughly speaking, something cruel, unscrupulous, arrogant, obscurantist, anti-liberal and anti-working-class.”¹⁵¹⁰ Orwell concluded that “almost any English person would accept ‘bully’ as a synonym for ‘Fascist,’” and found, “that is about as near to a definition as this much-abused word has come.”¹⁵¹¹

Realizing the broad and amorphous nature of Fascism, Griffin redefined it as a revolutionary form of nationalism bent on mobilizing all ‘healthy’ social and political energies to resist the onslaught of ‘decadence’ so as to achieve the goal of national rebirth, a project that involves the regeneration (palingenesis) of both the political culture and the social and ethical culture underpinning it.¹⁵¹²

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¹⁵⁰⁷ Ibid.
¹⁵⁰⁸ Ibid.
¹⁵⁰⁹ Ibid.
¹⁵¹⁰ Ibid.
¹⁵¹¹ Ibid.
Griffin’s redefining suggestion is especially interesting because of the apparent parallels embedded in Dugin’s Neo-Traditionalism, Neo-Eurasianism, and his resistance to the “decadence” of the West.

Umland has also provided definitional boundaries useful in the context of this discussion of Dugin’s fascist leanings:

In the post-Soviet discourse, the term “fascism” is equated with German National Socialism and its external trappings, such as the swastika or Roman salute. Occasionally, the propagandistic usage of the term “fascism” goes so far as to include all ideas regarded as “anti-Russian.” It then, paradoxically, becomes a rhetorical instrument in xenophobic agitation campaigns of Russian ultra-nationalists.1513

Clover saw that Dugin included in *Foundations of Geopolitics*, “thinkers associated with the far right wing, most of whom you have never heard of, some quite mad ones and not a few Nazis.”1514 Analogies comparing Russia to Weimar Germany were frequent at this time. As such, Clover thought that “Dugin’s book was evidence that the same dark forces radicalized by Germany’s interwar collapse were on the ascent in Russia.”1515 The *Foundations of Geopolitics* “preached that the country’s humiliation was the result of foreign conspiracies, its cover bore a runic symbol known in occult circles as the “star of chaos,” according to Clover, and it portrayed Nazis in a favorable light.1516

Griffin addressed the postmodern inclusiveness of Fascism in its current manifestation, writing that “one symptom of the extreme right’s rhizomic structure is an ecumenicalism unthinkable in the ‘fascist era,’ expressed both in the way web-linkages exist and in cross-currents of influence detectable between diffuse currents of fascism.”1517 Griffin’s examples included Universal

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1515 Ibid.
1516 Ibid.
1517 Griffin, *A Fascist Century*, ed. Matthew Fieldman (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 199. Griffin explains that “if a political network has a rhizomic political structure it means that it forms a cellular, centreless, and leaderless network with ill-defined boundaries and no formal hierarchy or internal organisational structure to give it a unified direction.”
Nazism, Christian Identity, Third Positionism” and “the New Right.” Referencing Dugin’s occupation of a Neo-Fascist position, Griffin pointed out that

the ‘Eurasianism’ of Arctogaia, for example, draws upon the influences of home-grown, pre-Soviet tradition of Russian ultranationalism; Russian dialectics of post-Soviet national Bolshevisim; the French New Right; the Traditionalist Italian New Right; Third Positionism; New Age and occultist fascism; and even the punk-rock strand of ‘White Noise’.

Dugin’s ecumenical inclusiveness is evident in Griffin’s comment that “in August 1998 the [Arctogaia] website paraded the name of Jonny Rotten (of the notorious anarchic punk band Sex Pistols) next to those of Alain de Benoist and Julius Evola as prophets of the new age.”

Backing away from the polemic Fascist label, Umland observed that Dugin has become more cautious “and now refers to himself as an ‘anti-fascist.’” Ingram’s position stated that “if Dugin cannot be considered a fascist in the narrow historical sense of the word, he certainly inhabits a closely related ideological space, referring to the supremacy of will as well as environmental determinism.” Exhibiting an opinion closer to that of Umland, Ingram’s ultimate conclusion was that “in some senses, Dugin can be considered a neo-fascist, as well as a geopoliticalician.”

### 3.10. Conclusions to Chapter Three

In this chapter, I looked at Dugin through observations and expressions of his commentators. Additionally, I presented the works of others who influenced Dugin and Fourth Political Theory. I followed the topical areas explored in

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1519 Ibid.


1521 Umland, “Fascist Tendencies in Russian Education.”

1522 Ingram, “Geopolitics and Neo-fascism,” 1034.

1523 Ibid.
Chapter Two, making some comments on comparison and contrast to Dugin’s expressed ideological thinking and presenting commentators that provide a range of opinion of Dugin and his ideas.

Dugin commentators have presented his Traditionalism in comparison and contrast to the Integral Traditionalism. The consensus opinion is that Dugin is not an Integral Traditionalist. At the same time, his active applied Neo-Traditionalism is heretical; although tainted, it is nonetheless still Traditional after a fashion. Likewise, writers and scholars – commentators all – address Dugin’s Eurasianism allowing him to be correctly categorized as a Neo-Eurasianist. Additionally, more than sufficient evidence was presented to ensure a conclusion that Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianism is metaphysically saturated and imperialistic.

Dugin is a severe critic of Western Liberalism. Despite the fog surrounding definitions, contemporary liberalism, with its globalist and unipolar ambitions is Dugin’s avowed enemy. Dugin can be viewed through the eyes of his various interpreters and commentators as one actively engaged in a systematic and logical effort to thwart Western Liberalism and promote his Fourth Political Theory as its substitute. Moreover, Dugin’s hermeneutics have been shown to support his Traditional, Eurasian, and eschatological development and purposes consistent with this logic.

Finally, in this chapter, reception to Dugin and his Fourth Political Theory has been addressed. Dugin is a force seeking traction. All indications are that he is content to be a force behind a force – a change agent affecting his desires by influence as opposed to overt leadership. Initially, he sought influence in Russia; now, he seeks it on the broader world stage.
4.0. Conclusions of the Study

Because Dugin not only proposes but advocates Russian expansion geopolitically as the Eurasian Power, one of the polar powers in a multipolar world, he views a future Eurasian reality in the totality of its cultural and geopolitical manifestations; and he interprets the West in a similar fashion. He argues that the West, especially the United States, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, has intended to be the unipolar Power – the singular geopolitical superpower of the world. Conflict, even catastrophic conflict, between multipolar and unipolar competitors is a potential risk – studying how Dugin and his ideology contributes to this risk is, therefore, prudent and necessary.

Dugin’s Fourth Political Theory alternative to Western Liberal hegemony is founded in the certainty that the Western ideological juggernaut is not destined to achieve unipolar global dominance. Dugin is representative of the RNR and the Nouvelle Droite, the ENR, movements that pose counter-current arguments to the progressive Liberal Democratic political and social model that currently prevails in the West.

Dugin views a multipolar world from the perspective of his Geopolitical-Theology. That is to say that he interprets reality as a combination and interdependence of geography, politics, and theology – the physical, the philosophical, and the spiritual. Dugin approaches the differences of geopolitics and theology between his Neo-Eurasian model and the prevailing Western Liberal model with an outlook that reinforces the cliché that East and West shall never meet.

4.1. Dugin is Neo-Traditionalist

Dugin is a Geopolitical-Theologian. Sometimes esoteric to the point of fantasy in the minds of Western observers, Dugin displays consistency in applying mystical esotericism to conclusions of his various hermeneutical exercises. For example, his areas of hermeneutics: Neo-Traditionalism, the Collective Antichrist, and Third Rome as the Catechon, all directly support his Neo-
Eurasianist construction while displaying esoteric attributes. Moreover, Dugin’s Neo-Traditionalism is active and strives for political change. I characterize it as applied Neo-Traditionalism and I suggest that Dugin’s active Traditionalism removes him from consideration as an Integral Traditionalist in the same category with Guénon.

Dugin refuses to accept the world with Western hegemony, for “in the plastic flowers of Globalization, there is a serpent hiding.” The serpent, in this case, being the Collective Antichrist that Dugin must resist. Moreover, it is the esoteric and applied Neo-Traditionalism, and derived Neo-Eurasianism of Fourth Political Theory that Dugin insists is the only adequate challenger to the unipolar globalism of the increasingly postmodern Western, now post-liberal, Antichrist.

There are meaningful political and theological definitional connections between Dugin’s Neo-Traditionalism and beliefs and practices characterized in the current civil and academic forum as Fundamentalist. These connections are evident in the family resemblances between aspects of Traditionalism and Fundamentalism. Examining these connections alongside Dugin’s Traditionalist explanations, I conclude that Dugin may also be characterized as a Fundamentalist when the term is understood in contemporary cross-border religious interpretations.

There can be no proper understanding of Fourth Political Theory without giving considered attention to the way Dugin involves theology throughout his entire body of work. There is no escaping theology in politics. Dugin claims that postmodernity rejects the presupposition of political telos because that would move politics into the realm of political theology. “However – and this is at the crux of the matter – atheism itself is not an escape route from

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1524 Malić, “Leviathan and Behemoth,” under, Dugin’s questionable Traditionalism.
1525 For further exploration into family resemblance aspects of Traditionalism and Fundamentalism, Cf. Huntington, Clash of Civilizations, 96; Marty, “Too Bad We’re So Relevant” and, Armstrong, Battle for God, xii. Although “the term is not perfect,” Armstrong wrote, “[Fundamentalism] is a useful label for movements that, despite their differences, bear a strong family resemblance. Brackets added.
1526 Dugin, Fourth Theory, 175.
theology,” wrote Gontier, “to rebel against God is not to escape religion.”

“The state’s abandonment of religion – the abolition of religion from the public political domain – leads only to the religion of the state,” was Newman’s blunt assessment.

“Any belief system – especially one which is in part theologically derived and which makes truth claims – is immediately suspect and marginalized,” Brannan claims, recognizing the predominant Western Liberal perspective.

Just so, the West is spring-loaded to disregard and marginalize Dugin and his theology-laced Fourth Political Theory. Dugin does not merely display a religious bend or tendency, he assigns an active sacred attribute to the State as he boldly proclaims his religious ideology. Moreover, Dugin’s “religious ideology is closely connected with the geopolitical identity of Russians,” Rossman wrote. It is an ideology wherein Dugin believes religion legitimizes Russian identity.

An examination of the contemporary world is all that is needed to see Dugin’s Geopolitical-Theology being played out. Coyer’s commentary directly addresses the present Russian geopolitical and theological thinking with its tendency toward syncretism very much in keeping with Fourth Political Theory proscriptions.

Because Moscow has portrayed the conflict [Crimea] in the apocalyptic terms in which it has, religious allegiances have been as important as, and closely correlated with, political allegiances. This has resulted in the Russian authorities in Crimea and the pro-Russian forces in eastern Ukraine conducting a “holy war” against all who are not Russian Orthodox, seeing them as enemies of Russia.

Russia plays prominently in the geopolitical eschatology of Fourth Political Theory. “The meaning of Russia is that through the Russian people will be realized the last thought of God, the thought of the End of the World,” Dugin
is quoted as saying – it is hard to get more geopolitically theological than this.\footnote{Bendle, “Putin’s Rasputin.” Here Bendle is quoting Dugin by way of Shenfield, \textit{Russian Fascism}, 197.}

4.2. Dugin is Neo-Eurasianist

Dugin’s Ideas have moved westward due, in no small part, to the efforts of Dugin himself. Dugin wants more than a Russian audience for his Neo-Eurasianist ideas; this is readily understandable, assuming the nature of the Eurasia he envisions. For the emergence of a \textit{bona fide} regional power stretching from Dublin to Vladivostok to become more than a notional scrap in Dugin’s mind, the concept must gain traction in Western Europe. Dugin thinks much more broadly than the extent of current Russian borders – Dugin thinks empire.

Nations currently within the European Union and their non-EU neighbors must be brought within the sphere of Russian influence to a degree utterly unthinkable since the collapse of the Warsaw Pact alliances of the Soviet days. Imperial Russian expansion, Soviet \textit{de facto} control of neighboring states, and present Neo-Eurasian aspirations are all linked to Russian Historic National Interests.\footnote{Cf. 3.3.3. and included footnotes. E.g., Cf. Mosbey, “Churchill Was Right.” Cf. Bassin’s, “Eurasianism and Russian Identity.”} An Angus Ross and Andrew Savchenko observation is appropriate:

Most Russians would not identify the present Russian Federation as what they understand by “Russia.” Increasingly, they would rather use the term “Russian world” – a vaguely defined, nebulous entity that transcends the boundaries of the Russian Federation and sometimes even as far as those of the former Soviet Union. The majority of Russians seem to consider it morally justified to use force in pursuit of Russia’s interests within the “Russian world.”\footnote{Angus Ross and Andrew Savchenko, “The Obvious Question: What does Russia Want?” National Interest, April 11, 2018, accessed July 2, 2019, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-obvious-question-what-does-russia-want-25327.}
Even more is required, however; substantial portions of Europe must join or be coerced to buy-in with Russia and its Eurasian expansion if Dugin’s Neo-Eurasian goals are to move from vision to reality.

Heretofore unthinkable since the Cold War, rejecting the occurrence of an alliance between various European states and Russia as impossible disregards both history and prudence. Russia, in its Soviet manifestation in the still not-too-distant past, signed treaties before WWII that afforded it western territorial gains into Europe. Then, after WWII, the Soviet Union gained European territory and exerted de facto control over a significant portion of what is today too readily assumed to be firmly within an unassailable European Union sphere of influence. Perhaps surprisingly, the EU structure is proving to be assailable, at least from within.

Dunlop wrote that “according to Dugin, as a result of a grand alliance to be concluded between Russia and Germany, the two countries will divide up into spheres of influence all the territories lying between them.” This division of Europe would not be the enduring status because “Dugin confides that all arrangements with ‘the Eurasian bloc of the continental West,’ headed by Germany, will be merely temporary and provisional in nature.” Dugin’s ultimate goal is that all of Europe come under what Dunlop described as “Russia-Eurasia.”

Regarding the UK’s leaving the European Union – Brexit – Dugin claims that “Britain is not just leaving the EU - it is disappearing from history.” “We are watching the end of Europe,” is Dugin’s conclusion.

Brexit and the SCO [Shanghai Cooperation Organization], which is becoming an important force, are shifts in the center of civilizations, the center of the world order is completely in the

1537 Ibid.
other half of the world. This is a transition from the West to the Eurasian world. It is, in fact, our celebration. The founders of Eurasianism said: “The West and the Rest.” Brexit is the collapse of the West and it is a victory for humanity, which is opposed to the West and seeks to go its own way. And the flagship of mankind is the SCO, Russia, the current sovereign free multipolar Russia led by Putin, and those who are in the Eurasian Club.1539

Eurasianists of all stripes tend toward having an Eastern outlook. Applied to Dugin, distinctions advanced by Christopher Goto-Jones yield the conclusion that Dugin is decidedly more Oriental than Occidental in his explanations of Fourth Political Theory.1540 “Am I the East and the defender of the Eastern values? Yes, it is exact,” said Dugin.1541 Given Anti-Westernism as a Eurasianist trait, Dugin echoes the consistent Eurasianist anti-Western (often expressed as anti-American) position well illustrated by Umland in the contemporary environment:

The primitive and profound anti-Americanism seen, for example, in prime time political television shows like Odnako (“However,” hosted by Mikhail Leontiev), Realnaia politika (“Real Politics,” hosted by Gleb Pavlovsky), or Post scriptum (hosted by Alexei Pushkov) is raised to the level of a Manichean world-view, where the US is made responsible for the majority of mishaps and failures in recent Russian, and, indeed, global history. In these accounts, US society mutates into the negative Other of Russian civilization.1542

For all its posturing as the Russian led “Eurasian Club” and the global counterbalance to the unipolar domination of the West, there is a prevailing irony present in Eurasianism. Eurasianists, including Dugin, criticize Tsar Peter I, for his embrace of Western Culture and his supposed attempt to alter Russia’s ingrained culture to one more inclusive of the Western concepts of

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1539 Dugin, “Europe is Falling.” Brackets added. The SCO is a Eurasian economic, security, and political organization. SCO member States: China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, India, and Pakistan. Afghanistan, Belarus, Iran, and Mongolia.
the Enlightenment. One irony of Trubetskoi’s Eurasian project, indeed ironic to any Eurasian projects including Dugin’s, is that they employ Tsar Peter I’s Western embrace by way of defining concepts and terms applied to Eurasia that are Western in origin.1543

### 4.3. Dugin’s Ideology is Expressed in his Fourth Political Theory

Dugin observed that “it turns out that the triumph of liberalism, the first political theory, coincided with its end.”1544 With this realization, Dugin and other opponents of Western Liberalism found themselves to be shadowboxing. “Those who do not agree with liberalism find themselves in a difficult situation – the triumphant enemy has dissolved and disappeared; now they are left struggling against the air,” Dugin explained.1545 Dugin, echoing Fukuyama, asked, “how, can one engage in politics, if there is no politics?”1546 In contrast to Fukuyama, however, Dugin did not conclude that we are now at the end of politics. There is still a way forward Dugin surmised, adding that,

> the classical political theories, both the winners and the losers, strain our imaginations, seize the reality of the new world, correctly decipher the challenges of postmodernity, and create something new – something beyond the political battles of the Nineteenth and Twentieth centuries.1547

For Dugin, “such an approach is an invitation to the development of the Fourth Political Theory,” and proved a chance to move on from all three predecessors.1548 Dugin posits that globalization coincides with present-day post-industrial society. Globalization and post-industrial society share billing, not coincidentally, with the arrival of postmodernity. The resulting situation, the impending death of Liberalism combined with the advent of postmodernity, is the current state of post-liberalism.1549 Dugin will have us believe that “the form which all three political theories took in the twentieth

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1543 Bassin, “Eurasianism and Russian Identity,” 266.
1544 Dugin, Fourth Theory, 17.
1545 Ibid., 12.
1546 Ibid.
1547 Ibid.
1548 Ibid.
1549 Ibid., 18–19.
century is no longer useful, effective, or relevant.”\textsuperscript{1550} Created for a different time, all three “lack the ability to explain contemporary reality or to help us understand current events.”\textsuperscript{1551} Worse, they created a world where they are now incapable of coping.\textsuperscript{1552}

In Dugin’s construction, “Fourth Political Theory is conceived as an alternative to Postliberalism.”\textsuperscript{1553} Therefore, Fourth Political Theory is counter- or anti-postmodern, and the anti-Westernism expressed in Fourth Political Theory is both a recognition that Western Liberalism today is postmodern and that Dugin rejects it. The current battle in which Fourth Political Theory engages is no longer just with Western Liberalism but with postmodernity. Fourth Political Theory is a “Crusade” against:

- Postmodernity
- Post-industrial society
- Liberal thought realized in practice
- Globalism and its logistical and technological bases\textsuperscript{1554}

Dugin offers Fourth Political Theory as his response to post-liberalism. It is the scourge of postmodernity and its manifestation in globalization that Dugin so vehemently opposes. Dugin’s alternative offers Traditionalism rather than deconstructionism. Dugin acknowledges his philosophical inheritance as part of the foundational material upon which Fourth Political Theory is built. It is an inheritance of Platonism that opposes atomism – Hyperborea versus Atlantis.

Dugin also refuses to accept the prevalent three-option view of geopolitical worldviews: Liberalism, Communism, and Fascism. Instead, he postulates a fourth view that he rather vaguely describes as, Fourth Political Theory. Although Dugin has begun to build over the framework of Fourth Political Theory, it is still largely unfinished. What can be determined, even at this

\textsuperscript{1550} Ibid., 19.
\textsuperscript{1551} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1552} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1553} Ibid., 20.
\textsuperscript{1554} Ibid., 21.
stage, is that it advocates a multipolar geopolitical alternative to the unipolarity of Western Liberal Democracy.

Fourth Political Theory displays a metaphysical view of the West as an evil manifestation of Enlightenment ideals. To that end, Dugin proposes that Fourth Political Theory offers Traditionalism’s rejection of much of the Modernity it opposes. The multipolar world envisioned in Fourth Political Theory projects a Region-State construction as opposed to the Nation-State model prevalent in the current world make-up.

Dugin rejects the centrality of the individual and decries the progressiveness of Spenser’s Political Darwinism. In doing so, he accepts Nietzsche’s critique of progress but denies any suggestion that God is absent an active role in guiding Creation – especially in the messiahship of the Third Rome. Fourth Political Theory acquires an inheritance that prefers Sein over Dasein. Dugin embraces the Heideggerian formulation of Sein that condemns elevation of Dasein, Being-there – an individualistic approach to a self-centered present – over the communal and covenantal bonds of the Third Rome, Sacred Geography, and Traditionalism.

Dugin and his colleagues of the RNR, and other like-minded groups do not accept Western Liberalism’s claims, especially those claims marking Liberalism as the end of history. Dugin does see historical validity in the rise and fall of all three political theories of modernity, and the misguided ideology of now emerging postmodernity. Liberalism views itself as belonging to the natural order of things and assumes the defeat of Fascism and the collapse of Communism to be part of the perfection process of natural selection.1555 This assumption leads to the inflated claims of absolute victory, whereby Liberalism was left standing entirely alone on the field of political theory. John Lukacs, the Hungarian born historian, expressed this assumption as one

1555 Ibid., 12.
where there is a “sense that this modern age might last for a very long time – indeed, perhaps forever.” Agreeing, Dugin wrote,

Liberalism itself has changed, passing from the level of ideas, political programs, and declarations to the level of reality, penetrating the very flesh of the social fabric, which became infused with liberalism and, in turn, it began to seem like the natural order of things.

A sense of permanence clouded the Western Liberal mind and resulted “in the inability, or perhaps in the unwillingness of people to contemplate that, like the other ages of mankind, the Modern Age too may or will come to an end.” Dugin is not at all afflicted with this inability or unwillingness.

4.4. Reception of Dugin Matters

The sticking power of Dugin’s ideas hinges upon, not only their acceptance and resonance within Russian centers of power – especially in the inner-circle around Putin and his successors – but on how the West perceives Dugin’s influence on these Russian centers of power. Additionally, the strength of Fourth Political Theory and its associated concept of Neo-Eurasianism depends upon their acceptance by potential Eurasian entities that could either partner with Russia in a geopolitical effort to create a regional power to rival the West, or presume to replace Russia as the locus of such an effort.

The Pew Research Center’s, *The Future of World Religions: Population Projections, 2010-2050* provides evidence that the expansion of a secular worldview, characteristic of Western geopolitical expression, will not dominate the first half of the current century. The Pew projections are especially relevant given Dugin’s attraction to Traditionalist expression and

his Geopolitical-Theology. However amorphous, any trending away from secular dominance will likely be interpreted as a positive indication by Dugin.

The Pew projections suggest little change in the Christian percentage of the Russian population over the first half of the twenty-first century, but continuing expansion of Islam, in both Asia and Europe. Another Pew study notes that indications are that only 7% of the Russian population strongly supports democratic government. There is a propensity toward traditional religious and cultural belief and practice apparent in both Orthodox Christianity and Islam, the two predominant religions in the Eurasian region. This propensity plus the lack of faith in, or familiarity with, the Western Democratic mindset may provide the soil conducive to the growth of Fourth Political Theory.

It is unclear at this time how effective Fourth Political Theory will be in securing the multipolar world Dugin envisions. Globally, the unipolar trend in the West is beginning to be counterbalanced by Russian and Chinese efforts to remain polar in their own right. Major geopolitical competition with the West, coupled with various nationalistic movements, tend to support a multipolar environment. The amount of traction gained by Dugin’s interpretations within Russian political circles is reflected in policy. The degree of this reflection affects the degree of Western reception and reaction; and thus, reception has the potential to significantly impact the world’s geopolitical landscape.

The potential for conflict, therefore, dwells in both the reception of Dugin’s ideas in Russia, as well as in the near-abroad and the West. The problems for the West are to first correctly interpret Fourth Political Theory. And second,

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1560 “The Future of World Religions,” 62 and 71. Islam, like Russian Orthodoxy, is overtly steeped in tradition. The prevalence of traditional inclinations (in Islam and elsewhere) may increase the possible positive reception of Fourth Political Theory and is part of the common ground that Dugin seeks in establishing Neo-Eurasian reality.

to accurately determine the power of Dugin’s ideas on potential actions and reactions of Russia toward the U.S., and across the board.

4. 5. The Future in Light of this Study

Recent trends in world events suggest that the U.S. and Western Europe are no longer the solid alliance of WWII and the Cold War Era. NATO has enlarged, but there are threats of fractures in the alliance, notably, with Turkey. China is both an economic and military powerhouse – decidedly, not built on the Western Liberal model. India is making scientific advances and is projected to become the world’s most populous country before the current century is halfway over.\textsuperscript{1562} Russia is exhibiting expansionist tendencies in keeping with its Historic National Interests and these expansionist intentions display characteristics familiar in both past and present Eurasianist models. While there is political momentum in the West for open borders bespeaking a desire for a more World Government-styled arrangement, there is strong factional nationalistic resistance evident in the U.S., Europe, the Middle East, and elsewhere as well. All these factors point to the uncertainty of a unipolar world and the pressure for establishing and maintaining a multipolar environment.

Dugin has gained traction in Russian military and political circles and among ENR and other populist and anti-progressive movements outside of Russia and in the West. The entirety of the Brexit situation and the polarization of the social and political environment in the U.S. may be pointing to a derailment in Western unipolar momentum – at least in Dugin’s mind. Fourth Political Theory and its geopolitical implications for a multipolar future, especially regarding relations between the West and Russia, by themselves, provide more than ample significance for this study. Studying Dugin and Fourth Political Theory should be part of the preparation for an increasingly possible future.

In National Security circles, both at the tactical and strategic levels, questions are often reduced for clarification to three: What? So What? And Now What? This study has examined the What question – Dugin’s development as a Neo-Traditionalist Geopolitical-Theologist. Moreover, the So What question has been expressed in terms of the consequential risks of serious conflict occurring as a result of a Clausewitzian process of geopolitics by other means.

The third question – the Now What question – remains. While the third question is always the critical one (individually as well as collectively), the intent of this study was to systemically present the first two questions. Without understanding Dugin’s grasp of Geopolitical-Theology – his hermeneutical approach – and its potential consequences should Russia adopt them, the What question would go unanswered. Consequently, without examining Dugin’s Geopolitical-Theology, neither the What question nor the So What question could have been addressed.

This study leads geopolitical players to the conclusion that Dugin’s ideas must be considered in order to determine to what extent they have and will influence Russian Policy and pursuits. Further, this study demonstrates that there is an active and potent theological presence in Dugin’s Fourth Political Theory that accentuates (it does not create), the theological element evident throughout the entirety of Russian geopolitics. The conclusion is that without serious consideration of its theological aspects, any comprehensive study of Russian geopolitics will be found lacking.

The final conclusion must be to press forward – the Now What question – through both geopolitics and theology. Critical international political questions must be expanded to geopolitical questions. But, this expansion, while necessary, is not adequate. To understand Dugin and the implications of Fourth Political Theory, geopolitics must be further expanded to geopolitical theology.

As a Geopolitical-Theologian, Dugin sees the world in classic geopolitical terms where geography, physical and cultural, is a determining factor.
However, there is more to Dugin’s Geopolitics – there is the ever-present element of things theological, and Dugin’s view of the world will not entertain their absence. Dugin’s Geopolitical-Theology is projected through metaphysical and philosophical media – his Neo-Traditionalism and Neo-Eurasianism.

The religious weight inherent in Eastern political thought and practice contrasts sharply with the uneven recognition of theological elements of politics in the West. By excluding appropriate consideration of the theological aspects of Dugin's Fourth Political Theory, Western analysts of Russian geopolitical strategy cannot gain anything approaching an adequate understanding that will allow for a sufficient degree of accuracy in predicting the course of future Russian actions.

Dugin places Russia at the confluence of Theology, Traditionalism, and Eurasia. In his Fourth Political Theory, the multipolar power commanding Dugin’s attention is Russia expanded into Eurasia. Dugin believes that this expanded Russia is imbued with spiritual qualities. More than this, its mission is, in fact, messianic – invested with divine Manifest Destiny. The penultimate conclusion, the one before the Now What can be adequately addressed, must be that ignoring Dugin and assuming Russia will not continue to execute policy reflecting his Fourth Political Theory exposes the West to a serious and an imprudent risk.
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