can neocolonialism. Indeed, their work will be crucial to building such a connection. A weakness of the two texts lies in their neglect to inquire into the impact of American goods overseas or the early transnational translation and traffic of business practices. Postcolonial perspectives would have added a great deal on both counts. Domosh acknowledges this limitation in her current work, but Agnew seems less convinced that such considerations are important. Indeed, there is a touch of (strategic?) essentialism about American culture in Hegemony as, for example, when Agnew cites “routines derivative of or compatible with those first developed in the United States” (p. 13) or writes of a consumer culture that “has a number of distinctive roots in the American historical experience” (p. 100). But these limitations open up a vast terrain for future research about the nature of America’s imperial formation. Hegemony and American Commodities deserve to be widely read, and Agnew and Domosh should both be generously applauded for their tight, compelling, and path-breaking works.

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One response to the emergence of the pseudo-scientific “geopolitics” during the Second World War relayed in Neil Smith’s biography on “Roosevelt’s Geographer,” Isaiah Bowman (1878-1950), can be drawn from Henry Luce’s Time magazine of the period. The comment not only provokes a belly laugh, but also undermines the earnestness of Smith’s Marxist-inflected polemic: “Politicians are bad enough when it comes to settling world problems, but geographers!”

The research in this densely constructed tome is meticulous and at times outstanding. Bowman provides Smith with a Horatio Alger-like protagonist who is ultimately undermined in the tale. He was a hardscrabble kid from a poor farming family in Brown City, Michigan (and a Canadian immigrant besides) who matriculated to Harvard, taught at Yale, and then trekked to the Andes to research his PhD, all the while remaining an outsider to the Ivy League elite. Bowman left academia for a series of such influential positions as the head of the American Geographical Society and member of Woodrow Wilson’s Inquiry, the consortium that reconceived the bloody puzzle of European geography after the First World War. Soon thereafter, Bow-
man was appointed President of John Hopkins University, where he is portrayed as a martinet with anti-Semitic tendencies. (As distasteful as this might appear, Smith’s elision of the scale and impact of the genocides perpetrated by Hitler and Stalin do not contribute to a balanced account of the period.) Bowman was a founding member of the Council on Foreign Relations, a body whose structures were later adopted by the US State Department. During the Second World War, Bowman served on various committees for Roosevelt, secured massive defense funding for research at John Hopkins, and helped to frame the United Nation’s constitution and charter.

This skeleton of Bowman’s biography allows Smith to discuss a number of topics of specific interest to geographers—environmental determinism; Mackinder’s “Geographical Pivot” of history; the Kantian university; emerging liberal internationalism; the German school of Geopolitik; and the foundation of the military-industrial complex. Smith takes on his own personal bailiwick, globalization, arguing that it enabled the United States to emerge as a twentieth-century superpower. Smith drapes his personal theme in Luce’s declaration of the “American Century,” elaborating upon the “unequivocal role of geography” in drafting the US “blueprint for today’s global ambition.” Smith traces the emergence of American imperialism from William McKinley’s 1898 victory in the Philippines to Woodrow Wilson’s global primatur on twentieth-century European political geography during the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. Set against the backdrop of the Allied campaign against Hitler and the Axis, Franklin D. Roosevelt’s postwar planning with Churchill and Stalin set the stage for what Smith refers to, somewhat problematically, as an “American Lebensraum” that produced the United Nations, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Organisation. (Suspiciously regarded at the time as spectres of Communism, contemporary academics of Smith’s bent view these institutions as Augean stables of neoliberalism.) Though Bowman was only seventeen when McKinley’s forces took Manila, he organized a local militia in rural Michigan and drilled them using wooden rifles. His role in Paris as Wilson’s geographical adjutant, and as “Roosevelt’s Geographer” during the Second World War, were a bit more significant, as Smith records with pedantic detail—the former more so than the latter, as is perhaps suggested by the book’s title, in which Bowman’s name is curiously absent.

Smith’s premise is that the United States made itself a world empire during the twentieth century by establishing hegemony over economic, not territorial space; rather than making and maintaining colonies, it created markets backed by military force. The British Foreign and Colonial Offices’ best-laid plans flummoxed as a result. It is an interesting, if not a completely original, reading of US foreign policy, and one that invokes Henri Lefebvre’s conception of relational space. Smith’s application of Friedrich Ratzel’s leben-
sraum is more problematic, however. Ratzel’s theory equated a nation with a living organism and argued that a country’s search for territorial expansion was similar to a growing organism’s search for space. The Monroe Doctrine certainly provided the United States with a regional hegemony, and territories secured from 1889 to 1919 can be seen in this light. But as Smith himself illustrates, US expansion after the Second World War has been largely economic. Defeat in Vietnam and the current boondoggle in Iraq show the practical shortcomings of the American military’s territorial expeditions in quest of empire, notwithstanding contemporary delusions embodied in the “Project for a New American Century.”

Smith’s initial Lefebvrean premise concerning US economic and cultural imperium in the pursuit of capital accumulation is accurate; his application of Ratzel’s spatiality upon American geopolitical ambition is not. Smith should have expanded upon the former without jettisoning the latter. This is indeed ironic, because it was in the Upper Plains of the American West that Ratzel first conceived his idea, as Sven Lindqvist’s text *Exterminate All the Brutes* (1997) illustrates. In *Der Lebensraum* (1904), Ratzel wrote of the late nineteenth-century US Indian Wars as an “annihilating struggle, the prize for which was the land, the space.” Smith’s idea of an American Lebensraum, it seems, is a century too late. In his forward, Smith thanks David Harvey and Derek Gregory for proofing his draft manuscript. Given their recent tracts on American imperialism, he would have done well to pursue his breathtakingly original Lefebvrean instincts more strongly, rather than to pour his new wine into the old skins of their respective works, *The New Imperialism* (2003) and *The Colonial Present* (2004). In the end, Smith’s criticism of the Cold War’s binary geography is embedded within the similarly binary logic of dialectical Marxism’s critique of nineteenth-century capitalism. It would have been more interesting if Smith had incorporated a reading of Antonio Gramsci’s Americanism and Fordism to accompany his Lefebvrean theoretical praxis.

Despite Smith’s criticisms of Bowman’s personality, ambitions, and geographical practice, it seems that his maligned protagonist was a better mapmaker: Bowman’s map of the Urubama River in the Andes of Southern Peru (p. 65) is a fine piece of cartography compared to the maps in Smith’s text, which show a careless disregard for the political geographies of Europe and the natural fluvial patterns of Persia.

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