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Political Parties in New and Established Democracies: Explaining Party Pluralism, Party Unity and Party Death

A thesis submitted to the University of Dublin, Trinity College
in partial fulfilment of the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Political Science, University of Dublin, Trinity College

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Supervisor: Prof. Kenneth Benoit
I dedicate this thesis to
my Mother, Iryda Staniek
and
my Children, Miko and Milosh

In Memory of my Father, Stanisław Staniek
Declaration

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Summary

This dissertation is comprised of three distinct but related research papers which seek to contribute to our understanding of institutional development of legislative parties and party systems in new and established democracies. On a macro scale, institutionalization in a competitive political environment is both a process and a product of the complex interaction between a variety of structural conditions emergent from and shaped by voter and elite choices. Each of the three papers addresses a different but crucial aspect of that process: party pluralism in new democracies; party unity at the elite level; and electoral death of parties in parliament.

Party Pluralism

The aim of the first research project is to explain party pluralism in fifty-nine newly democratized countries between 1945 and 2003. The principal focus of this study is to assess the impact of cultural pluralism on the effective number of electoral parties. The cultural approach to political outcomes is then evaluated against the institutional view derived from Duverger’s twin hypotheses about the impact of electoral institutions on the number of parties in the system. The results of the Ordinary Least Squares regression (OLS) demonstrate that neither cultural variables nor institutional factors, most notably district magnitude, appear to explain the variation in the number of effective parties in the first two rounds of democratic elections; however, changes in voter turnout and GDP per capita, and to a lesser extent, the size of the electorate are significant predictors of the number of parties in the legislatures of post-authoritarian states.

Party Unity

The second paper investigates the impact of personal vote on party unity as it has been shown that organizational stability at the elite level contributes to the institutionalization of political parties and stability of party systems. In collaboration with Raimondas Ibenskas, I examine how the possibility of voters to select their preferred candidates provided by the flexible-list proportional representation (PR) rules affects party unity in
legislative voting. This project tests existing scholarship concerning the nexus between electoral formulas and personal vote seeking by analyzing empirically how electoral laws shape MPs’ incentives to cultivate personal vote. Using the OLS regression method, we examine the dissension rate in casting of roll-call votes in the 2001-2007 Polish Sejm under the pure PR electoral rules and in the 2003-2006 Lithuanian Seimas under the mixed PR-SMD system. We find that the MP’s list position has no effect on the dissension rate among Polish and Lithuanian MPs. Legislative voting unity is more affected by the personal support received by each elected MP (either through preference or personal vote), rather than by a party-controlled mechanism, such placement on the party list.

Party Death

The third paper is an in-depth investigation of party strategies with respect to policy dynamism and policy orientation under varying electoral rules, and an assessment of the effects of these factors on the risk of electoral death for 429 parties in twenty-eight national legislatures of new and established European democracies between 1945 and 2010. Employing survival methodology, i.e., the stratified Cox Proportional Hazards model, I find that while in Central Eastern Europe policy does not appear to be a significant predictor of legislative party longevity, in Western Europe, vote-foraging parties prone to frequent policy shifts on issues of high relevance to the voters have a lower hazard of electoral death than parties, which remain consistent in their policy orientations over time. Furthermore, policy positions on key issues under different electoral rules play a role in explaining party durability in Western European democracies. This finding supports the well established research on the tendency of political parties to cluster around the center of the ideological spectrum in systems with low district magnitude and low to moderate levels of multipartyism, and to spread their policy orientations in systems with high district magnitude and high levels of multipartyism.
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My Father did not live to see me through my PhD studies. But his adventurous spirit, his lifelong curiosity, his diligence at work, and his boundless passion for the things he loved have made me a better person.

I dedicate this dissertation to my family.
Paper One: What Determines the Number of Parties in New Democracies? 
Culture and Institutions Revisited 

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OVERVIEW

"Essentially, all models are wrong, but some are useful."
George E.P. Box (1919-2013)

1. Introduction

Expounding on the use of polynomials in statistical models, George Box famously reminds us that models are not reality, and that the "useful" ones are merely approximations thereof. This is especially worth remembering when studying political phenomena. However, the quote also implies that falling short of reality should not detract us from the pursuit of knowledge through scientific inquiry, i.e., assessing the relative usefulness of the various models in order to find the most reliable and credible formula that fits the purpose and sheds light on the question of interest.

This dissertation is fundamentally about institutionalization of parties and party systems. While the discipline has equipped us with an array of theoretical and empirical tools to help us understand the processes of institutional development in democratic polities, the challenge of any research endeavor is to "bring something new to the show", in this case, to uncover something interesting and worthy of further investigation about the dynamics and trajectories of life of political parties. Bearing in mind Box's aphorism about the approximate nature of models, the three papers presented here aim to contribute to our knowledge of these key institutions of democratic representation through a conceptual framework that is both synthetic and analytical as it incorporates elements of three widely used and highly useful models of party competition: office-seeking, vote-seeking and policy-seeking.

These three models of competitive strategies reflect three complementary dimensions of institutional development: parties not only seek to win office, but they also seek to maximize votes, and they formulate policies to win elections (Downs cf. Janda 1993:176.) Thus, the analytical framework of each of the three papers is based on the assumption that parties are office-driven, party elites are vote-driven, and policy outcomes result from on-going interactions between utility-maximizing elites and voters.
— a process that is inherently dynamic and time-dependent. In the remainder of this overview, I place each of the three papers sequentially in a broader context of relevant scholarship on party institutionalization, sketching out the key findings and pointing out their contributions to the current state of knowledge.

2. Paper One

A look ahead

Consolidation of parties into a viable and durable system of institutional alternatives through which the electorate can channel its policy preferences is one of the principal challenges for any new democracy. Continuity of party alternatives and the overall institutional stability has been linked to the composition of the party system through the impacts of electoral institutions and socio-cultural factors. This paper is concerned with the nexus between cultural characteristics and the number of parties in the first two multi-party elections in fifty-nine post-1945 new democracies. The effects of cultural segmentation (linguistic and religious) on party pluralism are evaluated against and in combination with institutional factors (district magnitude, compensatory tier), controlling for economic factors and the attributes of the electorate. This study has implications for the literature on the number of parties in democratic systems across the world.

Institutionalization as office-seeking: culture, institutions and the number of electoral parties

When it comes to identifying the defining characteristics of an institutionalized party system, the literature points to a variety of operational aspects of the process and the product: attitudinal, organizational, structural, and procedural (e.g., Mair 1997 and 2001, Toka 1997, Morlino 1998, Randal and Svasand 2002, Rose and Munro 2003, Sartori 2005.) While Sartori’s (1976) definition of a party system as a structure of interactions resulting from inter-party competition is generally accepted among the scholars, there is an ongoing debate about the nature of the relationship between system-ness, i.e., the patterns of inter-party competition, and institutional development. This debate is particularly important in the context of new democracies where the stability of political institutions, such as parties is a tenuous phenomenon (e.g., Rose and Munro
2003, Meleshevich 2007.) It has been observed that the first few rounds of democratic elections tend to produce unstable party formations – a common feature especially among the Third Wave Central Eastern European states (Olson 1998, Krupavicius 1999.)

For example, evidence from the early Polish election surveys indicates that while in principle the Polish voters viewed political parties as indispensable to democracy, at the same time, they perceived existing parties both in government and in opposition as petty and corrupt (e.g., Markowski and Tucker 2007, 2010, Tucker and Owen 2010.) The term “couch party”, popular during the first decade of the democratic transition, had a distinctly sarcastic connotation: it meant that one could sit all the members of a typical Polish party on one’s living room couch. This illustration of the cynicism of the Polish electorate about the high level of party pluralism and the general lack of organizational sophistication of the nascent party system points to an important challenge of democratic consolidation in many transitioning states, notably the impact of the multitude of parties on the overall stability of party systems and on the process of democratic consolidation (e.g., Duverger 1954, Pedersen 1983, Bartolini and Mair 1990, Roberts and Wibbels 1999, Tavits 2005.) Thus, the underlying premise here is that there are important differences in the political processes and outcomes between older democracies with more mature and entrenched political institutions and transitioning states in the early stages of institutional development.

While the paper is not directly concerned with political stability in post-authoritarian countries, the key motivation for this study is that better understanding of the factors that affect the emergence of the different types of party systems in new democracies may contribute to the ways in which we define and measure political stability across the board. Within the broad field of research on institutional development and democratic consolidation, both cultural factors and social cleavages hold special significance. Upholding Weber’s (1905) legacy, cultural and sociological explanations, associated with the classic works of Eckstein and Apter (1963), Lipset and Rokkan (1967), Rose and Urwin (1969), Eckstein (1988) focus on the role of social structure and primordial cleavages shaping mass political behavior, structuring political competition, and driving political outcomes, such as the shape of the party system, through the process of internalization of norms, roles, and expectations (other notable studies in this tradition
include, e.g., Campbell et al. 1960, Almond and Verba 1963, Wildavsky 1987, Inglehart 1997, Putnam 1993.) Pertinent to the number of parties in a political system, social cleavages are said to represent the first phase in the process which produces the effective number of seat-winning parties. Amorim Neto and Cox (1997) propose that in the initial stage, often ignored in the institutionalist models, social cleavages are translated into partisan preferences, which are then translated into votes, which are in turn translated into parliamentary seats (1997:152.)

One cleavage that is most likely to be politically mobilized and converted into party affiliation is language, which according to some scholars, is one of the most salient forms of collective social identity (Crawford 1996, Birnir 2007.) Therefore, rather than adopting a reductive approach of some studies which aggregate different forms of social segmentation into a single designation of “cultural heterogeneity” (e.g., Bartolini and Mair 1990), I assume that different cleavages can have different impact on the number of parties and, while testing the impact of both linguistic and religious pluralism on the number of parties, I focus explicitly on linguistic fragmentation as the main cultural predictor of the number of parties in new democracies.

Any research on political parties, no matter how focused, necessarily involves some aspect of a party system, and no research on party systems can ignore the effect of electoral institutions. Since many contemporary approaches to the study of party systems acknowledge the influence of both social variables and institutional factors on the number of parties in the system, this paper evaluates cultural effects against the impact of electoral institutions on the number of effective parties in new democracies. While the general mechanics of electoral systems shaping the party spectrum are well established and commonly accepted in the scholarship, the more specific effects of electoral laws, especially in the context of young party systems remain unclear. Bowler (2006) warns that focusing exclusively on the mechanics of proportionality (extensively studied by e.g., Lijphart 1985, Gallagher 1991) can give us false sense of confidence in the ability of party elites to fully understand electoral mechanisms and engage in electoral engineering with the aim of producing a predicted effective number of vote-getting parties which will then produce a predicted effective number of seat-winning parties (also Bowler et al. 2006).
Several recent studies have stressed the importance of uncertainty in the making of winners and losers in the party competition for parliamentary seats. Andrews and Jackman (2005) identify three types of uncertainty in older democracies: uncertainty about the number of parties resulting from a specific type of electoral formula, uncertainty about voter preferences, and uncertainty about the overall impact of electoral systems. Similarly, Birch et al. (2003) argue that the lack of understanding of the specific aspects of electoral rules in Central Eastern Europe hampered the ability of political elites to design them to suit their political goals and frequently resulted in unintended consequences, for example, the unanticipated success of the ultra-nationalists in Russia (2003:170.) In other words, during the initial phase of competitive elections, political parties are in the early stages of institutional development, and both parties and voters are just beginning to learn how the electoral process functions. Although it can be expected that with the passage of time, the uncertainty over the electoral process will be reduced as both political elites and voters will start benefiting from the learning curve, the prevalence of this uncertainty in the “big bang” phase of democratization may figure into the way in which electoral system impacts the number of parties in parliament.

While decades of academic research on the factors shaping party systems across the world has produced a plethora of contending explanations, which follow either the socio-cultural, or the institutional models, some scholars propose that both electoral laws and social cleavages jointly affect the number and configuration of parties in a system. Ordeshook and Shvetsova’s (1994) findings that there is significant interaction between social structure and electoral system are confirmed by Amorim Neto and Cox (1997) who find multiplicative effect of social heterogeneity and electoral institutions on the effective number of parties. Thus, given the lack of clarity about the role culture and institutions play in determining the number of parties in national parliaments during the formative stages of democratic development, this study tests these competing explanations empirically on fifty-nine emerging party systems across the world.

The key contribution of this paper to the literature on party pluralism is the finding that cultural variables fail to explain effectively the variation in the number of parties across new democracies. But perhaps an even more surprising discovery is that the most common indicator of the shape of the party system, i.e., district magnitude, does
not appear to have a statistically significant effect on the number of electoral parties in
the initial stages of democratization. Also, there is no evidence that the interaction
between electoral institutions and cultural heterogeneity affects the number of effective
electoral parties, as suggested by some scholars (Powell 1982, Ordeshook and Shvetsova
1994, Amorim Neto and Cox 1997.)

While the country data are limited to the countries that fit the definition of a post-
1945 democracy (thereby excluding several linguistically heterogeneous Western
European states) and consequently, the analysis is based on a modest number of
observations, the results are robust to inclusion of a number of important control
variables concerning economic factors and the characteristics of the electorate. Here the
most noteworthy finding is that changes in voter turnout and GDP per capita appear to be
the most important predictors of party pluralism in newly democratized countries, and
there also appears to be a weak association between the size of the electorate and the
number of effective parties.

Thus, the overall picture that emerges from this study is that there is no evidence
that cultural factors, expressed as either linguistic or religious cleavages, are detrimental
to party system pluralism in new democracies. Rather, the number of electoral parties
appears to be contingent on the attributes of the electorate, and this finding should
provide additional impetus for future studies on the relationship between voter behavior
and political outcomes within a broader framework of institutional arrangements and
politics of identity in new democracies.

3. Paper Two
A Look ahead

Building on the premise that party unity is the key component of
institutionalization of parties in parliament, I argue that understanding of the voting
behavior of party elites is both relevant and important. Using roll call vote data from
Poland and Lithuania, the second paper in my dissertation tests the effects of personal
vote on MP vote defection under flexible-list PR rules. This study has direct implications
for the literature on party unity in new democracies.
Institutionalization as vote-seeking: personal vote and party unity

Lack of unity at the elite level is often cited as one of the main characteristics of political parties in many transitioning Central Eastern European states. This lack of strong internal cohesion has also been linked to party system volatility (significant changes in the parties’ vote share between elections), fragmentation (high number of parties with small share of the vote), and fluidity (new parties competing in successive elections.) For example, analyzing the causes of the 2001 electoral defeat of the Polish center-right and the demise of the Solidarity Electoral Action as a political party, experts have often pointed to low levels of internal cohesion within the party ranks, among other factors. Following the transition to democracy, Poland had one of the highest rates of institutional volatility at the level of elites and voters in Central-Eastern Europe (e.g., Rose and Munro 2003, Powell and Tucker 2008.) And in the twenty years of transition from a one party state to a multiparty polity, “behavioral pluralism” (Kelley 1992), i.e., proliferation of new parties and other forms of political organization had remained one of the defining features of Polish political landscape. This is important because the meaning of institutionalization of parties and party systems is to a large extent determined by how we define party unity at the elite level.

Although there is an abundance of studies on institutionalization in new democracies such as Poland, a considerable body of work is concerned with party system institutionalization (e.g., Kitschelt 1992, Roskin 1993, Agh 1994, Marody 1995, Bielskiak 1997) while institutionalization of parties remains an under-researched area. The main reason for this is the tendency to equate (implicitly or explicitly) the institutionalization of the party system with the institutionalization of particular parties, and consequently, little attention is given to the institutionalization at the level of individual parties, especially in the new democracies. Randall and Svasand (2002:6) underscore the propensity among the scholars “to elide the issue of party institutionalization with that of party system institutionalization, the implication being that the institutionalization of single parties must contribute to the overall institutionalization of the party system and thence to democratization.” But as the states of Central Eastern Europe are in the process of solidifying democratic institutions and processes, any analysis of party systems will benefit from more research at the level of individual parties, particularly in countries.
such as Poland, in which until very recently it was premature to refer to a *system* of parties – a designation that generally implies a level of internal organizational stability and continuity of party alternatives.

According to Carey and Shugart (1995), one of the main factors contributing to the institutionalization of political parties is the internal stability at the elite level. Party elites are the key ingredient in the creation of party culture, and their loyalty to the party brand, their teamwork and high level of unity are indispensable to the smooth functioning of party organization. The assumption that individual political parties act as unitary rational actors has been a work-horse of the rational choice school within the scholarship on parties and party systems. But in the day-to-day struggle for survival, parties, like most living organisms, are much more complex and tend to be prone to internal breakdowns as the MPs of individual parties are not always united in purpose and deed. Going back to one of the earliest systematic accounts of parliamentary behavior by Rice (1928), scholars have long recognized this and subsequent studies of elite behavior followed two general paths: sociological and institutional. Sociological explanations contend that the process of socialization plays a key role in explaining legislative behavior. According to this view, party unity is explained by norms, roles, and expectations internalized through the process of acculturation to a given social context (e.g., Crowe 1983, Jackson 1987). Formal systems of rules, rewards and sanctions still exist but they are not detrimental; rather the reasons for political outcomes are normative (Kam 2009:13-14.)

In contrast, the institutional school regards legislative behavior as constrained by formal rules and procedures, such as different types of electoral laws or varying levels of party control over the nomination process. In other words, the institutional environment constrains MP preferences which then affect the level of unity within the parties. The purely institutional approach is closely related to the preference-driven model according to which individual legislators have clearly defined preferences, which in aggregate determine legislative outcomes such as the result of the floor vote. Here, the key to predicting party cohesion in a given vote is knowing each MP’s preferences on the

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1 This argument also extends beyond national level politics. For example, in their analysis of parties within the European Parliament, Hix, Noury and Roland (2007) contend that strong parties (and by implication, parties that survive and institutionalize) are internally and externally cohesive along broad policy dimensions so that the MEPs will consistently vote with the party preference.
particular issue as legislators vote to optimize their preferences. Although, this proposition may be problematic in systems with high levels of party discipline, the preference model of legislative behavior is exemplified by Krehbiel’s argument that when casting a vote, MPs always vote with the party supporting the position that is closest to that MP’s own preference (1993, 1999.)

Drawing on both, the institutional and the preference models, the concept of party unity adopted in this paper is based on the notion of selective incentives, or “procedural devices”, such as roll call voting – one of the principal instruments of discipline enforcement (Kistner 2006). So, while the level of unity in the floor vote is indicative of the level of party cohesion, which is in turn a manifestation of similar policy preferences and shared vision among the party’s MPs (Ozbudun 1970, Kitschelt and Smyth, 2002, Carey 2007), this paper argues that within the framework of MPs’ preferences and institutional constraints on these preferences, what matters for the unity of parties in parliament is the level of personal support received by each legislator in her constituency.

While there is no shortage of scholarly research that suggests positive effects of internal party unity on government stability and the overall stability of party systems, the motivating factor for focusing on the personal vote was provided by the lack of clarity in the literature on what factors affect voting cohesion. Studies on the impact of electoral rules on party voting unity find that in proportional representation (PR) systems where legislators are elected on party lists, MP voting cohesion and party unity tends to be higher than in countries with winner-take-all, single-member-plurality (SMP) systems where MPs are less beholden to the party for their political survival and consequently are more likely to behave independently (Ames 2001, Morgenstern 2004, Carey 2007.) However, a study by Clarke, Martinaitis and Dilba demonstrates that in the Lithuanian mixed electoral system, deputies elected under the single seat mandate tend to be more cohesive in their voting behavior than deputies elected in proportional representation constituencies (Clarke et al. 2008.) But the authors caution that this unexpected finding may be an artefact of the idiosyncratic features of a split mandate system. Other research on the mixed mandate effects in post-1989 Eastern Europe presents an equally cloudy picture in respect to the consequences of PR vs. SMP systems on legislative party unity (Haspel et al. 1998, Herron 2002, Thames 2001 and 2005.)
Therefore, the evidence regarding the links between the type of mandate and legislative voting behavior is particularly mixed and requires further analysis. In this regard, relatively little attention has been paid to the effects of personal support received by each MP on her voting independence in the legislature. Especially, when it comes to the Central Eastern European region, there is a shortage of studies investigating whether the MPs’ voting independence is affected more by “personal vote”, i.e., the popularity of the legislators with the voters or by party controlled mechanisms, such as list position.

Furthermore, across the board, roll call vote data appears to be underutilized in the study institutionalization of parties and party systems in new democracies. Although the Polish Sejm has a two-decades long track record of roll call voting, a few notable exceptions notwithstanding (e.g., Dobrowolski, et al. 1999, Kistner 2006, Mazurkiewicz et al. 2006, and Makowski 2008), legislative voting in Poland remains understudied. This points to another shortcoming in the scholarship: insufficient attention given to the role party elites play in this process of party institutionalization, which is an interesting oversight considering that political parties in Poland (and elsewhere in the region) were created by the elites.

Given the lacunae and ambiguities outlined above, this paper updates previous findings regarding the placement of legislators on party lists. It examines how the possibility of voters to select their preferred candidates provided by the flexible-list PR rules affects party unity in legislative voting under the pure PR system in Poland and mixed PR-SMD system in Lithuania. In line with the vote seeking approach to party competition, the main argument in this study is that the flexible-list PR system, in which both the list position and the number of preference votes jointly determine which candidates are elected, creates a dilemma for the legislators seeking to maximize their re-election chances. On the one hand, they need to follow the party line in order to satisfy the leadership of the party and increase their chances of acquiring a high position on the electoral list. On the other hand, they also need to cultivate a personal vote in order to obtain a sufficient number of preference votes to be elected.

We find that in Poland preference votes cast under the flexible-list PR system matter for legislative party unity whereby the MPs who had the highest share of preference votes among their party colleagues defected most often. The list position has
no effect on the dissension rate. To add robustness to the theory, we compare the findings from the Polish case with the MP behavior in a mixed electoral system in Lithuania and we find that there the legislators who obtained enough preference votes to enable them to move from the list position where they would not have been elected to a list position where they got elected defected more often than other MPs. There is also no difference between SMD and PR deputies in Lithuania in terms of party unity. The key contribution of this paper is the finding that legislative voting unity, one of the key indicators of the overall party cohesion and internal strength, is affected more by the personal support received by each elected MP, rather than by a party-controlled mechanism, such as placement on the party list. This suggests that the contrast between the factors that shape party voting in preferential PR systems and their Atlanticist FPTP counterparts may not be as sharp as postulated in the literature. Perhaps Krehbiel’s (1991, 1993) argument about the US legislators’ votes mirroring the preferences of the constituents through the filter of re-election warrants further investigation in the context of mixed electoral systems and the more permissive candidate-centered PR systems, in which the role of the party organization does not appear to be a very prominent driver of MPs’ voting behavior.

4. Paper Three

A look ahead

There are many ways to think about institutionalization; however, at the most basic level, institutional development of party systems is fundamentally linked to party survival. In this paper I examine party strategies with respect to policy dynamism and policy orientation under different electoral rules, and analyze the effects of these two factors on the risk of electoral death for 429 parties in twenty-eight national legislatures of new and established European democracies from 1945 to 2010. Given that to date, there has been no comprehensive cross-national empirical research on party death with the explicit focus on party policy, this paper contributes to the literature on the effects of policy on the institutionalization of parties in parliament. It also makes the case for a more targeted, comparative investigation of party survival strategies, and for employing duration models to analyze institutional survival.
In his seminal article, Pedersen (1982) famously observed that parties are mortal organizations and as such, they are characterized by the notion of a life-span. This observation informs the main premise of my research: the ability of legislative parties to survive subsequent elections forms the basis of an institutionalized party system with stable party alternatives and structured inter-party competition. Studies on electoral sustainability emphasize the importance of the initial phase in the life of new parties (e.g., Holleyer and Bischoff 2012.) On a national level, electoral sustainability refers to the capacity of new legislative parties to win subsequent elections after the initial breakthrough through the consolidation of voter support. As electoral support, or vote share, has different value in different systems depending on electoral laws, in the present study, electoral sustainability or survival of parties in the legislature entails not only the act of nominating candidates for elections and continued capacity to remain competitive in the eyes of the electorate and other parties, but most importantly, the ability of parties to maintain at least one parliamentary seat in consecutive democratic elections.

Even a cursory examination of the pattern of persistence of legislative parties in European national legislatures reveals that while some party systems consist of mostly the same set of parties regularly contesting elections and winning seats, other systems have very low levels of party permanence. The vulnerability of legislative parties to early defeat is particularly evident in the Central Eastern European region during the first decade of democratic transition, where organizationally new parties entering the legislature for the first time became part of a system which did not have sufficient time to consolidate and thus was prone to instability. The shock of entry into national politics for a party with little experience is compounded by the fact that the infrastructure of the existing electoral laws had not been internalized and properly understood by the party elites and voters. Thus, there is a marked difference in parties surviving consecutive national elections in established Western European democracies and in new democracies of Central Eastern Europe. But there is also a great variation in party longevity within both regions indicating that institutionalization of political parties takes place in both time and space.
In general terms, the focus of this paper on parties’ permanence in national institutions reflects Harmel and Janda’s conceptualization of a competitive political party as an organization whose raison d’être consists of running candidates in competitive elections for the purpose of placing them in political office (1994.) In line with this, political parties which manage to persist in political office (in this case, in the national legislature) are institutionalized through aggregating and solidifying their distinct interests and ideas into cohesive organizational structures over time (Janda 1980, 1993, Pedersen 1982.)

In more specific terms, the capacity of parties to re-gain representation under the respective electoral systems hinges on a multitude of factors, among which party ideology and its programmatic manifestation, i.e., party policy, play a key role (Duverger 1963:230.) Thus, the argument here is that an in-depth study of the ideological-programmatic profiles of parties in national legislatures will add to our understanding of the reasons why some parliamentary parties persist while others vanish in the first few elections. Consequently, the most important variable in this paper predicting party survival is party policy. I posit that there is a nexus between policy positions of legislative parties and their risk of electoral death and I propose a theoretical framework which ties the risk of party death to party identity through the programmatic offer based on which it competes with other parties for votes. The independent variables designed to measure the risk of legislative party death are derived from spatial theories of party competition in representative democracies (especially Benoit and Laver 2007a, 2007b, Laver and Serganti 2011) and from the theory of brand dilution inspired by the organizational literature on brand recognition (e.g., Lupu 2012.) The main argument here is that in the world of party competition, party brands, or clearly identifiable ideological and policy profiles, help voters distinguish what the parties stand for and, over time, contribute to the formation of enduring partisan attachments.

Since the essence of representative democracy is that policy positions of the electorate are represented by the policy positions of political parties, it is reasonable to assume that voters evaluate parties based on their policy positions (e.g., Benoit and Laver 2007a.) In a recent research on parties in Latin America, Lupu (2012) argues that consistent policy choices strengthen party brand and contribute to the overall health of
political parties, whereas party breakdowns are more likely to occur when the brand is diluted. In short, strong and clearly discernable ideological brands and coherent programmatic direction are detrimental to party survival. This paper applies the logic of brand dilution to the newly democratized countries of Central Eastern Europe and to the established Western European democracies and proposes that brand integrity lowers the risk of party death while the dilution of brand integrity, or frequent and profound policy shifts increase voter uncertainty about what the party stands for and contributes to a higher risk of electoral death.

In addition to providing evidence that the risk of death is affected by the variation in ideological and policy orientations of parties over time, I also test the impact of policy extremism under different electoral rules. Scholarship on the effects of electoral institutions on the level of ideological dispersion demonstrates that different electoral systems produce either centripetal or centrifugal policy incentives for parties which adopt policies they believe will help them gain and maintain parliamentary representation (Cox 1990, Blais and Bodet 2006, Calvo and Hellwig 2011.) Here the key assumptions are that parties, as rational actors, adopt policies which they believe will ensure their long-term survival, and that political institutions shape the incentives structure for parties and voters, and that electoral rules create a particular environment for party competition. Therefore, following Downs’ (1957) model of centripetal incentives for two party systems under plurality rule and Cox’s (1990) findings that multiparty systems with large district magnitudes provide incentives for parties to advocate more extremist policy positions, I expect lower risk of electoral death for parties with more moderate policy positions in systems with less parliamentary parties, i.e., in systems with a lower number of effective parties in the national legislature (ENPP)^2, and for parties which adopt more extreme policy positions in high multi-partyism/high ENPP settings. Conversely, parties with more extreme policies in small ENPP systems and parties which tend to moderate toward the middle of the policy spectrum in large ENPP systems are expected to have a higher risk of death.

^ My classification of party systems follows Siaroff’s (2000) taxonomy, which ranges from a two-party system with ENPP of 1.92 to the extreme multiparty system with ENPP of 5.56 or more. In this analysis, I differentiate between party systems with either two parties or moderate party pluralism and the extreme multiparty systems. Siaroff’s cut off of 3.96 between the two categories of party systems corresponds to the ENPP median of 3.9 for all parties in my data set.
Empirical analysis of the impact of policy on party survival reveals that in the established Western European democracies, the theory of brand dilution is not supported by evidence. Instead, the results appear to support Laver and Sergenti's (2011) findings that parties more prone to policy vacillation on issues of high relevance to the voters have a lower hazard of electoral death than parties that stick to their "brands" by remaining consistent in their policy orientations over time. Frequent and profound policy shifts can lead to an increased hazard of electoral death for parliamentary parties only in the new democracies of Central Eastern Europe and only in respect to the policy on planned economy. Moreover, in the established Western European democracies, policy positions on key issues under different electoral rules seem to affect party survival. This finding confirms the well established scholarship on the tendency of political parties to cluster around the center of the ideological spectrum in low district magnitude/low ENPP systems and to spread their policy orientations in high district magnitude/ high ENPP systems.

Thus, the third paper considers the whole life-spans of legislative parties in new and established democracies and uses duration methodology to test two distinct theories of legislative party failure. While policy effects on the survival of legislative parties appear to be significant only in more institutionalized party systems of Western Europe, this study might be a first step to a more targeted analysis on the longevity of parties with other attributes, such as varying electoral strength, or to an even more comprehensive analysis which might include parties from democratic systems outside of Europe.

Although institutionalization is difficult to model and measure directly, the literature on institutional development of parties and party systems is perhaps the most voluminous in the field of political science. There is a multitude of studies on the number of parties, electoral incentives of MPs, and the evolution of parties' electoral support over time – the three major strands in the scholarship which provide the motivational concern of the three research projects comprising this dissertation. However, as Goethe aptly observed, "the greater the knowledge, the greater the doubt," and thus as our knowledge grows, new questions emerge. This study makes use of the well established models of party competition: seat-, vote-, and policy -seeking in order to answer some of these open
questions and to suggest heretofore unexplored directions of research: Do culture and institutions matter for the shape of party systems in the early stages of democratic development? What types of electoral incentives matter more for party unity under flexible list PR rules? Is there a link between policy and the longevity of parties in national legislatures?

Summing up the findings of the three papers, firstly, we have learnt that, for parties seeking legislative office in newly democratized states, neither the size of the district nor linguistic and religious social make up have a significant impact on the number of effective parties in the system, suggesting that different forces determine political outcomes at different stages of democratic development. Secondly, we have found that flexible list PR rules not only allow the MPs to enhance their visibility in their respective districts and, in many instances, win a seat by gathering sufficient number of votes to override the default ordering of the party lists, but also that personal and preference vote rather than list position allows MPs greater independence in acting as agents of their constituencies in a floor vote. However, as voting unity is relatively high in the two countries examined here, it is possible that, in general, parties in flexible list PR systems allow some measure of dissent in exchange for greater voter support in the next elections. Thirdly, assuming that parties formulate policies to win elections, it has emerged that in a free, competitive political environment, party policy is consequential for party survival. On balance, in the established democracies of Western Europe, parliamentary parties that tend to shift their policy positions on issues of high relevance to the voters tend to live longer than parties that remain constant in their policy orientations over time. Furthermore, parties that cluster around the center of the ideological spectrum in low district magnitude/low ENPP systems and parties that spread their policy orientations in high district magnitude/ high ENPP systems have a significantly lower risk of electoral death. The conjecture on these findings is that contending parties need not be overly concerned about the purity of their ideological label; instead when it comes to policy choices, “win-stay, lose-shift” might be a more effective survival strategy. At the same time, to the extent that electoral institutions condition the ideological spectrum and the programmatic offer of parties in parliament, “me too” politics appears be the winning strategy in systems with low to moderate party
pluralism, i.e., parties whose policy positioning follows the Downsian dynamic of inter-party competition have greater survival odds than parties that do not, while the reverse is true in systems with high and extreme party pluralism.

As primary facilitators of democratic representation and key agents of democratic survival especially in young democracies, political parties warrant continued research. The theories advanced and tested in this dissertation contribute to several areas of scholarly interest, including the role of culture and institutions in the composition of party systems; the political consequences (both direct and indirect) of the various elements of electoral systems on party pluralism, party unity, and party persistence; democratic representation manifest in the way in which personal vote conditions voting independence of elected representatives; and the impact of policy dynamism on the life spans of parties in parliament. Most importantly, this study highlights that parties and their competitive strategies are fundamental features of democratic politics.
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PAPER ONE

WHAT DETERMINES THE NUMBER OF PARTIES IN NEW DEMOCRACIES? CULTURE AND INSTITUTIONS REVISITED

Abstract:
The question of what causes party pluralism has generated considerable body of scholarly work over several decades, providing varying evidence on what are the reasons for the wide divergence in the number of political parties in democratic systems across the world. Building upon existing research, this paper examines the impact of cultural pluralism, expressed as linguistic and religious fractionalization, on the effective number of political parties in fifty nine post-1945 new democracies. The cultural approach is evaluated against the institutional view which follows Duverger's famous proposition about the impact of electoral institutions on the number of parties in the system. The findings suggest that cultural variables fail to provide an effective explanation of the variation in the number of parties across new democracies. But perhaps the most noteworthy finding is that district magnitude – the staple institutional parameter generally regarded as one of the key indicators of party pluralism, does not appear to have a statistically significant effect on the number of electoral parties in the first two rounds of free elections following transition to democracy. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the effective number of parties is a function of the product of the interaction between electoral institutions and cultural heterogeneity, as suggested in the literature (Powell 1982, Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994, Amorim Neto and Cox 1997.) In contrast, changes in voter turnout and GDP per capita seem to be the most important predictors of party pluralism in newly democratized countries, and there also appears to be a weak link between the size of the electorate and party pluralism. Consistent with scholarly research on new democracies, these findings might be indicative of the high levels of uncertainty about electoral system effects in the early stages of institutional development, and of the lack of an established pattern of the relationship between culture, institutions and political outcomes in transitioning countries. The study provides substantive evidence that in the initial democratic elections, neither cultural factors nor core electoral institutions are as important as we might think in the shaping of the party systems.
1. Introduction

One of the most frequently visited areas in comparative political research is the question of divergence in the number of political parties in democratic systems across the world, and the investigation of this question has generated considerable body of scholarly work. The following paper will build upon existing research, but it will narrow the scope of the above question by investigating whether cultural factors explain the differentiation in the levels of party pluralism in newly democratized states. However, electoral rules are generally assumed to play a decisive role in explaining party system size in established democracies, which would suggest that both cultural and institutional factors need to be integrated into a theoretical framework to develop a convincing account of the causes of party pluralism in new democracies. Thus, drawing on key literatures from the two broadly defined traditions in political science: cultural-sociological and the institutional, this study examines the impact of core cultural and institutional factors on party pluralism in fifty nine post-1945 newly democratic countries.

Empirical findings demonstrate that accounting for the distinctiveness of the fifty nine cases, the basic cultural model fails to explain the causes of party system pluralism in new democracies. Even when institutional and economic variables were added to the base-line cultural model, the evaluation of the relative merits of the two approaches suggests that party pluralism cannot be attributed to socio-cultural effects. But perhaps most noteworthy, the key institutional parameter – district magnitude - is an equally poor predictor of the number of parties in post-authoritarian states. Only political characteristics of the electorate and economic fortunes appear to have an effect on party pluralism, with voter turnout change between the first two democratic elections being the most significant predictor.

These findings indicate that new democracies are different from the established democracies in at least one significant aspect: during the initial phase of democratization, marked by post-transition instability and greater levels of volatility at the level of political elites and voters, the “rules of the game” (i.e., the interplay between social cleavages, electoral laws, and political outcomes) have not been internalized and assimilated by political entrepreneurs and by the electorate, and consequently neither cultural nor institutional variables can predict the size of the party systems in new democracies. This
is important as it suggests that the effects of culture and institutions may not be automatic, rather they might be contingent on the “learning curve,” which requires time to set in the collective mind of elites and voters.

The reminder of the paper is organized as follows: In the next two sections, I summarize scholarship on key aspects of party pluralism relevant to this study and provide a rationale for further investigation of this subject. Then, I present my hypotheses and describe the variables and data. Subsequently, I discuss the method and the model. This is followed by a discussion of empirical findings and their implications. I conclude with a brief statement summarizing the project and the findings.

2. Theoretical Considerations: Culture, Institutions, and the Number of Parties

2.1. Main argument: culture vs. institutions

Very broadly, the theoretical approaches to the study of the determinants of political outcomes can be grouped into two categories: cultural/sociological and institutional. The cultural/sociological explanations contend that political behavior and outcomes are driven by social structures in which norms, roles, and expectations are internalized through the process of acculturation to a given social context. Accordingly, formal systems of rules, rewards and sanctions exist as an expression of the structure of the society, whereby the process of socialization is the main driver of individual and mass behavior and plays a key role in explaining the institutional environment which then serves to further routinize human behavior. (e.g. Weber 1905, Campbell et al 1960, Almond and Verba 1963, Wildavsky 1987, Inglehart 1990.)

In contrast, the institutional approach adopts the Downsian view that political institutions, formal rules and procedures, such as the electoral system, or the incentives structure, constrain political behavior and determine political outcomes (Downs 1957). Generally, the institutional models fall within the rational choice school of utility optimization within the context of bounded rationality (i.e., procedural and substantive limits on goal-driven behavior), whereby “satisfising” (e.g., Simon 1985, 1986, 1996) and

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3 Other examples of this approach in the context of this study include Rae (1971), Riker and Ordeshook (1973), Shepsle (1979), March and Olsen (1984), Taagapera and Shugart (1989), Riker (1990), Tsebelis (1990), and Cox (1997, 2000.)
information short-cuts reduce the costs of acquiring and processing complex political information in a decision making process (e.g., Popkin 1994, Lupia and McCubbins 1997.) Consequently, the number of parties in a given political setting will reflect the institutional context of formal rules and procedures rather than the cultural make-up of a polity and the values attached to its social architecture.

2.2. Causes of party pluralism

Early systematic studies of political parties attributed their emergence and perpetuation to the political consequences of the Industrial Revolution, namely the extension of franchise (Ostrogorski, 1902) or oligarchic tendencies of political leaders who use social organizations to solidify their power at the expense of popular interests (Michels 1911.) Ostrogorski and Michels’ anti-party critique, and especially, Michel’s “iron law” later informed the main assumption of the rational choice theory – the office seeking behavior of political elites. Other scholars of group politics looked also at economic mechanisms to explain emergence of political parties and development of party systems as an “organic” process (Bentley 1908, Truman 1951.) According to this view, politics is a “marketplace” in which parties periodically emerge, especially in times of acute disturbance or crisis (economic downturn, immigration pressures) where issue salience is increased. This logic follows the rule of supply and demand: if the demand is there, the new parties are going to arise to fill the policy gap and disappear from view when their policy agenda loses relevance.4

The more recent research on the factors that shape parties and party systems falls into two main approaches: the first follows Duverger’s legacy by treating the party system as a dependent variable resulting from a specific type of electoral system (Duverger 1954, Book II.)5 According to this view, the institutional impact is direct:

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4 With its volatile cocktail of right-wing reaction parties, post-communist nostalgia parties, single-issue protest parties, etc., post-transition new democracies such as Poland, Lithuania, or Romania offer a good example of this type of demand-side depiction of party system formation; however, such a mechanistic view fails to take into account the complexity of the political environment by assuming the emergence of political parties to be a “given” part of the political process when certain social and economic conditions are met. A more refined version of this argument emerged more recently within the research on volatility of party systems. This will be discussed in more detail in the next section of the paper.

electoral laws affect the number of parties in a system, even though Duverger also noted that the causal relationship may not be entirely unidirectional as electoral systems are chosen by political actors. Nonetheless, the twin propositions, dubbed as “Duverger’s law” and “Duverger’s hypothesis” have generated much scholarly debate since they were first published in 1951. In addition to the early critiques by Grumm (1958), Eckstein (1963), and Lipson (1964), many contemporary scholars continue to re-examine their conceptual foundations and empirical validity. For example, several scholars (e.g., Boix 1999, Benoit 2002, 2006, 2007, Benoit and Hayden 2004, Colomer 2005) point out that there might be an endogeneity problem inherent in Duverger’s propositions about the direction of the impact of electoral institutions on the number of parties: assuming the utility maximizing behavior of political parties, the composition of a party system may be the cause rather than the consequence of an electoral system. Furthermore, Andrews and Jackman (2005) caution against this direct, deterministic view, noting that there are three types of uncertainty which constrain the behavior of parties and voters and act as a deterrent to changes in electoral systems: uncertainty about the number of parties resulting from a specific type of electoral formula, uncertainty about voter preferences, and uncertainty about the overall impact of electoral systems.

Other scholars contend that the institutional approach is too general to be useful (Jesse 1990 cf. Amorim Neto and Cox 1997:150) or too narrow - neglecting the more important socio-cultural variables, such as the social cleavage structure (Rokkan 1970, cf. Amorim Neto and Cox 1997: 150 ) Thus, the second approach represents a reassessment of Rae’s (1971) seminal investigation of the relationship between institutions and the number of political parties by positing the “the number and depth of cleavages in the society” in the center of analysis (Lijphart 1990: 488.) Scholars have long viewed social structure as a key factor affecting political outcomes – for example, Lipset and Rokkan’s famous “freezing hypothesis” postulates a deterministic relationship between social equilibrium and the stability of European party systems since the 1920’s through the 1960’s (1967:50.) Here the impact of socio-cultural factors on the number of parties is less direct: a well defined, stable social cleavage structure induces stability in voting

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6 “Duverger’s law” pertains to the association between single member district, plurality systems and a dualist party systems, whereas “Duverger’s hypothesis” refers to the tendency of PR systems to produce multi-party system (Benoit 2006.)
behavior, which in turn has a stabilizing effect on the number of party alternatives and the composition of a party system (e.g., Eckstein 1963, Rose and Urwin 1970, Bartollini and Mair 1990.)

Indeed, Amorim Neto and Cox caution against adopting a monocausal approach to the relationship between electoral institutions and party systems, while relegating the impact of social institutions to a residual error (Amorim Neto and Cox 1997:151.) When hypothesizing about the effects of electoral institutions vs. cultural factors on the number of parties in a political system, it is difficult to imagine that the U.S. would remain a two-party duopoly if it adopted the 1991 Polish electoral law, or that Poland would continue to have 29 legislative parties in the Sejm, even after enacting a string of electoral law changes throughout the 1990’s aimed at stabilizing and streamlining the party system. So, it would seem that in these two contexts, the institutional impact might be more influential than social cleavages or other cultural variables. While both the real world and academic research provide varying evidence about the reasons for the wide divergence in the number of political parties in democratic systems across the world, the studies of Ordeshook and Shvetsova (1994), and Amorim Neto and Cox (1997) are particularly noteworthy as they contend that both electoral laws and social cleavages jointly affect the number and configuration of parties in a system. Specifically, Ordeshook and Shvetsova’s findings suggest that district magnitude not only matters in explaining the number of parties, but it also has a moderating impact on party pluralism in heterogeneous societies. These findings are confirmed by Amorim Neto and Cox who find the multiplicative effect of social heterogeneity and electoral institutions on the effective number of parties. Whereas Ordeshook and Shvetsova consider several data sets containing only Western states, Amorim Neto and Cox also include developing democracies in their analysis but confine their study only to the polities with an election during the 1980’s decade. I view these competing explanations as open questions to be tested empirically in the context of new democracies, across regions and time.
3. Rationale for Studying Party Pluralism in New Democracies

3.1. Importance of Party Pluralism for Comparative Analysis

Taagepera and Shugart contend that: "[i]f one had to give a single number to characterize the politics of any country that employs competitive elections, it would be the number of parties active in its national assembly" (1993:455.) While acknowledging that the sheer number of legislative parties does not present the whole political picture of a given state, the authors argue that the level of party pluralism affects other institutional structures, such as cabinet duration (Lijphart 1984), and the functioning of political systems, such as the policy-making capacity of elected representatives (Powell 1989.) Furthermore, the number of parties is one of the key parameters in any comparative analysis, both qualitative and quantitative, across time and space. For example, Lane and Errson (1987) identify the differences in the number and strength of constituent parties, as the first key dimension of variation in European party systems. The number of parties has been the focus of research on the theories and properties of party systems for many other scholars (e.g., Taagepera and Grofman 1985, Scarrow 1986, Herzog 1987, Lijphart 1990, Blais 1991, Molinar 1991.) In his extensive review of the state of literature on parties and party systems, Janda contends that the emergence of political competition in post-1989 Central/Eastern Europe has offered scholars new insights into the dynamics of party politics, including various configurations of the relationships between electoral rules, number of parties, economic performance, political order, and social cleavages (1993:180.) Thus, given the continued expansion of the number of democratic countries worldwide and the ongoing research into the connection between the configuration of parties within a party system and the stability of party alternatives, and the overall political stability of states, it is both interesting and important to study the causes of party pluralism in newly democratized countries.

3.2. Number of Parties and the Stability of Party Systems

Although, in most system-level analysis, political parties figure within a larger context of inter-party competition, the focus on the number of parties and stability of party alternatives can bring us closer to a micro-level analysis of the constituent components of the system, i.e., the individual parties. This is especially relevant in the
post-1989 CEE, where a “hundred party system” was a relatively common occurrence in the first decade of the transition. This is not very surprising given that unstable party formations are generally the main defining feature of the early developmental stages of most democratic party systems in which elections are an action-forcing trigger (Krupavicius 1999:17, Olson 1998:12.)

Although many scholars disagree on what constitutes a system of parties and on how the level of system-ness reflects and reinforces institutional development, Sartori provides a generally accepted definition of a party system as “the system of interactions resulting from inter-party competition” (Sartori 1976: 44.) Given this definition, when examining the stability of party systems, we can distinguish two mutually reinforcing dimensions: the supply of parties and political elites and the demand of voter preferences (Kitschelt et al. 1999; Rose and Munro 2003.) The supply side of stable parties within a system is linked to a demand side via a pattern of elite – electorate exchanges. As voter policy preferences stabilize over time, political elites respond to these preferences by establishing a system of parties with distinct policy positions. In turn, as the system of party alternatives becomes institutionalized, the electorate will channel their preferences within the established framework of parties. So, the time dimension clearly impinges on the acquisition of stable preferences by the voters and on the consolidation of parties into a viable and durable system. Following this line of thought, it is thus reasonable to expect that bereft of adequate time to consolidate and develop into a stable system of parties, new democracies might be different from established democracies when it comes to the causes of party system pluralism.

The two key aspects of the supply - demand dynamic: the emergence and success of new parties in the electoral arena and the strategic coordination between voters and party elites have been explored by Hug (2001) and Cox (1997). Other notable studies on this subject with a focus on system-level volatility are Bartolini and Mair (1990, esp. pgs.131-145), Pedersen (1983), Roberts and Wibbels (1999), and Tavits (2005.) They all

\[ \text{\footnotesize \textsuperscript{7} For example, Mainwaring and Torcal (2006) offer a very relaxed approach whereby any set of parties regardless of the level institutionalization can be considered a system, while Sartori (1976) and Mair (1997) restrict the definition of party system only to parties that are institutionalized.} \]

\[ \text{\footnotesize \textsuperscript{8} It can be argued that the emergence of new parties becomes interesting when these parties win a meaningful share of the vote or when they cross the threshold of representation.} \]
found an impact of party system pluralism measured with the effective number of parties (Laakso and Taagepera 1979) on total system volatility.9

3.3. Stability of Party Systems and Stability of States

In the few years following the transition from non-democratic political systems to multiparty polities, many “Third Wave” democracies have witnessed an explosion of “behavioral pluralism” (Kelley 1992), i.e., with each election, there is a proliferation of new parties and other forms of political organization making it in some cases difficult to establish stable party systems (for example as was the case with the first four democratic elections in Poland.) While in recent years the stability of individual parties and party systems in these states has increased as demonstrated by the overall stabilization of the dimensions of party competition (Whitefield and Rohrschneider, 2009), increasing levels of partisan identification (Dalton and Weldon 2007), decrease in electoral volatility (Tavits 2005), less party fragmentation and candidate switching (Shabad and Slomczynski 2004), and decrease in the emergence of new parties (Tavits, 2008), the link between the composition and stability of party systems and the overall political stability of states remains one of the key questions in the scholarship.

The vital role of political parties as the institutional *sine qua non* of modern democracy in newly democratizing states was first thoroughly explored in Huntington’s seminal work in which he argued that the combination of well organized political parties and low levels of popular participation contributes to the general political stability, while the risk of instability is higher in states where parties have emerged later in the democratization process and where the level of political participation is higher (Huntington 1968.) It has also been suggested that in these more volatile contexts, political parties have weak programmatic identities (Kitschelt 1995) while the electorate is characterized by weak party attachments and undeveloped partisan identities (Schmitt and Holmberg 1995, Rose and Mishler 1998.) Other scholars take the view that instability in party alternatives can be attributed to weak social cleavage structures

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9 However, we must be cautious when looking at a raw number of parties in order to make inferences about the overall stability of party systems as some party systems can be highly fragmented and generally stable. In terms of averages, in the first decade after the transition the mean of legislative parties in the CEE region was 7.2 while in Western Europe it was 7.0 for the 1945-1989 period (Lane and Ersson, 1994: 183.) The most stable systems were the Czech Republic and Hungary, while the least sable were Latvia and Bulgaria (Krupavicius 1999:17.)
evident in many of the CEE countries in which communist ideology had a homogenizing effect on pre-existing ethnic, linguistic, religious or class divisions (van Biezen 2003:36), while the more stable party structures in established European democracies are reinforced by stable, well defined social cleavage structures (Mair 1997, ch.8.)

The main reason why the argument about the deterministic link between party system stability and the overall political stability is particularly relevant in the context of new democracies is that many scholars of political competition in post-authoritarian Central and Eastern Europe and in Latin America have suggested that political parties define and structure the political process in these countries more than any other factor (Mainwaring and Scully 1995, Toka 1997, Grzymala-Busse 2002, Rose and Munro 2003.) Here the literature offers a twin argument that high levels of social fragmentation and party pluralism can contribute to political instability – a proposition which has a long and distinguished pedigree (e.g., Bentley 1908, Truman 1951, Almond 1956, 1960, Almond and Powell 1966, Huntington 1968, Dahl 1971, Eckstein 1966, Nordlinger 1972, Przeworski 1975.) For example, Neumann (1956) and Duverger (1954) argue that there is a strong relationship between party pluralism and democratic stability. According to Neuman, a multiparty system “does not hold great promise of effective policy formation,” while for Duverger, the two-party system “seems to correspond to the nature of things […] and tends to be more stable than a multiparty system because it is more moderate” (cf. Lijphart 1977, 12-13.) Against this backdrop I set out to investigate empirically the impact of the core cultural and institutional determinants of party pluralism in new democracies.

4. Data, Variables and Hypotheses

4.1. Assumptions and Case Selection

Present empirical analysis of the determinants of party pluralism in new democracies proceeds from three key assumptions:
1) there are observable differences in political processes and outcomes between new and established democracies;

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10 Notably, a recent study by McAllister and White 2007 found evidence of increasing levels of social cleavage voting in the region and the resulting stabilization of party systems in the CEE region.
2) cultural and institutional factors add to our understanding of the mechanisms that generate political outcomes

3) different social cleavages have different impacts on the number of parties (Birnir 2007)

Following Ordeshook and Shvetsova (1994) and Amorim Neto and Cox’s (1997), the observed variation in the number of parties is first tested solely as a function of socio-cultural factors, adding institutional variables and controls to the baseline specification. In the final specification, I test the interactive effect of cultural heterogeneity and institutions, i.e., the product of linguistic fragmentation and district magnitude. The sample in my study includes most of the new democracies and many of the same variables as the 2007 study by Johanna Birnir, “Divergence in Diversity? The Dissimilar Effects of Cleavages on Electoral Politics in New Democracies,” in which the author investigates the effects of social cleavages on mass political behavior, namely vote stability. However, the focus of my research is party pluralism rather than electoral volatility because Birnir’s argument has one potential problem: the number of parties could be endogenous to the existing socio-cultural heterogeneity, both of which are treated in Birnir’s analysis as independent explanatory variables impacting vote stability. The data set in this study is cross-sectional and it includes one observation for each new democracy which held at least two free consecutive elections between 1945 and 2003. New democracies are states which established political pluralism and open, contested elections after 1945. There are fifty-nine such cases in the data set, with a single observation per case (except where indicated.) The list of countries used in the analysis detailing the year of their first democratic election and the level of linguistic fractionalization in each country is presented in Appendix 1, while the description of the variables and the results analysis of the data are presented in Appendix 2.

[Table 1 about here]

11 This endogeneity has been demonstrated by Ibenskas (2008) in his replication of Birnir’s article. Through a two-stage OLS model, Ibenskas shows that vote stability is affected by linguistic fractionalization through the number of parties (ibid, 12-14.)

12 Countries where democracy was interrupted for less than three years are not included the sample. Greece, Turkey and Uruguay are included in the data twice (see Appendix 1.)
4.2. Dependent Variable: Effective Number of Electoral Parties

Bearing in mind that the standard measures of the number of parties may not always reflect the raw number of parties in a given country, in this analysis, I use Lasko and Taagepera's (1979) measure of effective number of electoral parties (ENEP), calculated as $\frac{1}{\sum(V_i)^2}$ where $V_i$ is the vote share obtained by the $i^{th}$ party in the second democratic election. This measure takes into account the differences in the size of electoral parties as well as their number, with higher scores representing greater distance from a pure two-party system. ENEP correlates very strongly with another widely used measure of the number of parties, i.e., ENPP or effective number of parliamentary parties. Since the two measures are nearly interchangeable in the models, in this analysis I apply ENEP as the most relevant measure of the structure of party systems in new democracies. The variation of the dependent variable is demonstrated in Figure 1 which shows the histogram of the number of parties in new democracies.

4.3. Main Independent Variable: Linguistic Fractionalization

For Amorim Neto and Cox, a social cleavage is “an enduring social difference that might become politicized, or might not […]” (1997:152), while Gallagher et al. define social cleavage as a social division that arises out of a sense of collective identity of a group in part as a result of some form of social organization that gives expression to that identity (2006:264-65). In their seminal study on “Fractionalization” Alesina et al. (2002) argue that when people persistently identify with a particular group, such as linguistic or religious, they form potential interest groups that can then be manipulated by political leaders, who may choose to mobilize some coalition of these groups to the exclusion of others. In the most extreme cases, politicians can mobilize support by exploiting existing social cleavages and singling out some groups for persecution to

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13 I would like to thank Michael Gallagher for drawing my attention to the distinction between the number of parties and the fragmentation of the party system - a difference that is more than semantic in that if a country has many parties but one is much larger than the rest, its ENP score many not show the system to be very fragmented.

14 Amorim Neto and Cox point out that the reduction of electoral parties to parliamentary parties occurs through a mechanical feature of an electoral formula (1997:6) and in this research the focus is on the output of the number of voted-for parties rather than on the mechanics of translating votes into seats.
advance some policy goals (Alesina et al. 2002:7.) Thus, I adopt here a definition of a social cleavage as articulated by Gallagher at al. (2006) as an enduring social division rooted in a sense of collective identity, which is consciously expressed as some form of social organization.

Following Birninr (2007) I propose that the main socio-cultural cleavage to be tested for its impact the structure of the party system is the level of linguistic fractionalization. In her article, Birninr considers three manifestations of ethnic cleavages, e.g., language, race, and religion. However, it can be argued that not all components of ethnic identity are equally important when it comes to the impact of ethnic cleavages on politics, and Birninr contends that “race adds little to the overall measure of fragmentation because racial categories are few and large and most societal fragmentation in this sample occurs along linguistic lines” (2007:608.) Similarly, Crawford (1996) found that language was the only salient form of social identity that was mobilized during the democratic transition in Eastern Europe while Birninr further asserts that linguistic identity is more likely to be translated into party affiliation than any other social cleavage. Therefore, contrary to studies that collapse social cleavages into a single category (for example, Bartolini and Mair 1990 use a single indicator of “cultural heterogeneity”), one of the key assumption of my research is that different social cleavages and cultural expressions may have different impact on the fractionalization of the party system in new democracies. Thus, the first hypothesis centres the relationship between linguistic cleavages and party pluralism and states that higher levels of linguistic fractionalization will result in greater number of parties in those countries than in linguistically more homogenous states (H1a.)

Linguistic fractionalization is measured as an index of the level of fragmentation whereby 0 denotes a perfectly homogenous country and 1 denotes a perfect heterogeneity. The index has been compiled by Alesina et al. (2003) using Herfindahl’s concentration index subtracted from 1.15

4.4. Subsidiary Cultural Variable: Religious fractionalization

While in this research, the main measure of cultural pluralism in new democracies is the linguistic cleavage, Alesina et al. (2003) and Birninr (2007) suggest that it might be

15 The formula for the index is as follows: 1-Σni=1s2i where si is the i_th share of group i(i=1...n)
useful to disaggregate socio-cultural heterogeneity and separately examine the effects of religious pluralism. Thus, a corollary of the main hypothesis about the positive relationship between linguistic fragmentation and party pluralism is the proposition that, new democracies which are highly fragmented along religious lines will have greater levels of party pluralism than states which are religiously more homogenous (H1b.) The measure of religious fragmentation is Alesina et al. (2003) 0 to 1 index also used to measure linguistic fragmentation.

These measures are an improvement over existing measures in that language, which has thus far been considered a standard criterion used by ethnologists and anthropologists to define the concept of ethnicity, is now used in isolation of any racial or physical characteristics to construct the ethnic fractionalization variable. Also, the authors compute a separate variable for religious fractionalization, pointing out that the distinctions in this data are “less controversial and subject to arbitrary definitions than the data on linguistic and ethnic fractionalization, since the boundaries of religions are more clear and definitions consistent across countries” (Alesina et al, 2002: 4.)

4.5. Control Variables: Other Factors Affecting Party Pluralism

4.5.1. District magnitude

Political institutions hold great prominence in comparative research, and thus the main alternative against which I evaluate the socio-cultural hypothesis is the institutional view which posits a causal relationship between institutions, such as electoral institutions, and political outcomes, such as the number of parties in the system. The key institutional variable in this analysis is district magnitude. The rationale for controlling for district magnitude is embodied in Duverger’s “mechanical effect” thesis and in the vast

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16 Scholarly research on parties and party systems has long been concerned with electoral volatility which in the newly democratizing states can pose a major challenge to the establishment of stable party systems and often results in schismatic policy choices. The main reason for controlling for this variable would be that electoral volatility is considered to be one of the most important indicators of party competition in democratic settings and can therefore affect the composition of the party system and the number of parties in the legislature. However, as noted before, due to the possible endogeneity, i.e., the number of parties may be a direct or proximate cause of electoral volatility, rather than its consequence. This endogenous relationship makes theoretical sense and it was noted by Birnir in her article and subsequently empirically tested and proven by Ibenskas (2008.) Therefore, electoral volatility will not be used as an independent variable in this analysis.
scholarship on the effects of electoral rules on the composition of party systems. Indeed, Gallagher et al. (2006) find some evidence of this "mechanical effect" of electoral institutions among European democracies during the 2001-2004 period. While cautioning that this relationship may not be deterministic, especially in PR systems, they contend that the effect of district size on the number of parties appears to be most pronounced in plurality electoral systems (2006:364-366.) Being cognizant of the limits of the "mechanical effect" proposition, I test the expectation that seat allocation rules affect the number and concentration of political parties with single member districts more likely to produce limited, two-party systems while multi-member districts will result in greater number of parties (H2a) for the simple reason that in a first-past-the-post system, there is no way of dividing one representative into several parties. Consequently, as postulated by Downs (1957), in single member plurality and majoritarian systems, parties will tend to gravitate toward the middle of the political spectrum in order to capture the median voter. Per Colomer (2005), the average district magnitude is the arithmetic mean computed by dividing the total number of seats in the legislature by the total number of electoral districts in a given country. This variable is logged as the linear model assumptions are more fully satisfied with the log scale according to the customary diagnostics.

4.5.2. Upper Tier

Measuring district magnitude becomes complicated in systems where there is more than one tier of seat allocation. Since the simple average district magnitude ignores the upper tier, I also employ a separate measure in order to account for electoral systems with this characteristic, rather than combining them into an effective magnitude. In her study of mixed electoral systems in Eastern Europe, Birch (2000a) points out that the systems in which voters are represented in the national assembly by two legislators are a growing phenomenon, especially in that region, and while the precise electoral mechanisms of mixed systems can vary widely, virtually all of them consist of a combination of SMP/SMM and PR. This variable is measured as the percentage of all assembly seats allocated in the upper tier and I expect that the presence of a compensatory tier in the national legislatures of new democracies will have positive
effect on the effective number of parties (H2b). Although Birch and other scholars have demonstrated that SMP/SMM systems or single member tiers in mixed electoral systems in the transitioning Eastern European countries do not have a reductive impact on the number of parties and can even be more fragmenting than PR systems (Birch 2000a, Krupavicius 1997, Moser 1999), it is reasonable to expect that across the whole spectrum of new democracies, if there are multiple channels of entry into parliament, more parties are likely to emerge (Birch 2000:2.)

It is worth noting that hypotheses H1a, H1b and H2a and H2b echo Powell who finds that party system “fractionalization is encouraged above all by [...] non-majoritarian electoral laws, but also by all of the heterogeneity measures” (Powell 1982:101.)

4.5.3. Size of the electorate^17

Another consideration in determining the causes of party pluralism is the number of eligible voters. Here, the rationale for including the size of the electorate in the model is the expectation that in new democracies, more parties will form from a larger pool of voters, as neither the voters nor the political elites had sufficient time to co-ordinate policy preferences and agendas and to coalesce along clearly defined policy lines. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that in the first several elections larger number of parties will emerge in countries with larger electorates (H3a) due to the lack of prior knowledge of the parties by the voters and the challenges of coordinating a larger electorate as the effective channels of communication between the voters and the elites have not yet been established. Furthermore, as Sikk and Taagepera contend, it is also reasonable to expect that small countries with tiny electorates would simply not have room for many parties (2012:2.) This variable is represented as the absolute number of voters taking part in the first democratic elections for each country in the sample.

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17 This variable *ipso facto* reflects the geographic size of a country (in most cases) and, in democratic systems, the size of the population, and can thus be used as a proxy for these two measures. In the context of this study, it is arguably a more appropriate measure of the country’s political characteristics than size or population.
4.5.4. Turnout change

As the relationship of voters to political parties changes over time due to a multitude of factors, such as party funding, political maturation of the electorate, etc., I also control for the absolute change in the number of votes cast between the first two democratic elections and I expect that in countries experiencing higher rates of turnout change, the number of electoral parties will be also be higher (H3b.) This expectation is logically anchored in the literature on electoral volatility. Since it has been argued that electoral laws establish the upper bound for the effective number of parties through strategic voting at the district level (Duverger 1954, Cox 1997), the number of parties can in turn impact stability of voter preferences, with the higher number of parties corresponding to higher rates of electoral volatility (Powell and Tucker 2008: 12-13.) Given the climate of great instability of party alternatives – a by-product of democratic transitions, in general, and a central feature of the process of party system development in the Central Eastern European region, it is not surprising that fluctuation in voters’ party preferences is more pronounced in new democracies than in more mature, institutionalized democracies. Consistent with such a volatile environment, it might be logical to expect that, controlling for electoral institutions and other relevant factors, greater changes in the number of people voting between the first two democratic elections may result in a wider spectrum of electoral parties.

4.5.5. GDP growth and GDP per capita:

As economic conditions can be affected by social and political factors, so can the economy affect the way people vote, which can in turn translate into the party system composition (Fiorina 1981.) Consequently, it might be reasonable to expect that poor economic performance provides a propitious context for the emergence of new parties (Tavits 2008) and increased electoral support for greater number of party alternatives. Thus, I control for the impact of the economy and hypothesize that positive changes in the GDP per capita and an increase in GDP growth in new democracies will result in lower levels of party pluralism (H4.)
4.5.6. Region and Decade

It might be reasonable to expect that historical experience, such as the impact of one-party orthodoxy in the former USSR and Central Eastern Europe, the legacy of past colonial experience followed by the various pan-African ideologies and national unity movements in Africa and Asia, or the not so distant memory of military dictatorships and dominant-party structures in Latin America could have a potential residual effect (either as a backlash or a continuation of former patterns) on the propensity of new forms of political organizations, such as electoral parties, to form in the initial post-transition period. Therefore, following Birnir (2007), I also control for regional effects using five dummy variables for each of the following regions: Eastern Europe, Former Soviet Republics (including the Baltics), Latin America, Asia, and Africa while Western Europe is a reference category in the three models. The additional potential effect of the time period during which the second election took place is controlled by a decade variable, where 1 represents the 1940s and 7 represents the 2000s.

To help visualize the density estimates for the independent variables used in the analysis (except the region and the decade), Figure 2 presents kernel density plots, where the white points represent median values, the black boxes connect the 25\textsuperscript{th} and 75\textsuperscript{th} percentiles, the thin black lines connect the lower adjacent value to the upper adjacent value and the shaded area depicts density plotted symmetrically above and below the horizontal box plot.

[Figure 2 about here]

The plots demonstrates that some variables have well distributed data points (e.g., linguistic and religious fractionalization, GDP/cap, GDP growth) while others are skewed (e.g., turnout change) with very long tails and clear outliers that warrant attention and checking for leverage on coefficient values (e.g., district magnitude, size of the electorate.)

Clearly, other variables, such as federalism or presidentialism, could also be included in the model. However, the objective here is to test two competing sets of theories pertaining to the effects of socio-cultural structure, on the one hand, and political
institutions, on the other hand, on the output of parties in new democracies rather than maximal accounting for this output.

5. Specifications of the Model

In order to test the main hypothesis that there is an observable causal relationship between party pluralism and socio-cultural heterogeneity operationalized as linguistic fragmentation, I will use the following expressions of the OLS regression model:

(1) In the first, base-line model, I examine the influence of a single cultural variable, linguistic heterogeneity on the number of parties, taking into account the region and the decade to control for the impact of history and other region-specific factors as well as the effects of time.

(2) Similarly, the second model predicts a simple linear relationship between linguistic heterogeneity and the effective number of electoral parties; however, it also includes an additional cultural variable, religious pluralism, to test for the impact of the diversity of group identities on the number of parties.

(3) The third, expanded model accounts for the hypothesized impact of electoral institutions, characteristics of the electorate and economic conditions. Thus, the final expression includes cultural, institutional, and economic variables, and also assesses the multiplicative effect of linguistic heterogeneity and district magnitude to explain party pluralism in new democracies.

6. Results

6.1. Analysis of the Data

Contrary to the main expectation, the results of the analysis indicate that there is a statistically insignificant, weakly negative relationship between linguistic heterogeneity and party pluralism. This is illustrated by a scatterplot with a log-transformed ENEP scale (i.e., the values on the Y axis are ENEP, but the scaling is log transformed) where nearly all data points are scattered in the lower end of the ENEP scale lacking a clearly discernible pattern. It appears from the plot that two data points, Russia 1993 and Benin 1991 are outliers. However, they are left in the data set because they did not result from a recording error and may provide important information in further analysis. Also, Cook’s distance on the residuals vs. leverage plot is in both cases less than 0.5.
This finding is corroborated by the OLS estimates of all three models, which show that socio-cultural factors are poor predictors of party system pluralism in new democracies. The regression results for the three specifications of the model are presented in Table 2.

Model 1 demonstrates that taking into account the impact of time and regional factors, linguistic divides do not have a significant effect on the number of parties in new democracies. The second model, which introduces an additional expression of cultural diversity, religious fractionalization, is consistent with the initial findings about the lack of statistically significant association between cultural identification and the number of parties. Although some explanatory power is gained by the inclusion of an additional cultural variable in model 2, the absence of statistical significance for linguistic fractionalization and religious cleavages in explaining party system pluralism in new democracies, combined with the negative sign of the coefficient for these two variables is noteworthy as it runs counter to the initial expectation (H1a and H1b) that cultural cleavages play a significant role in predicting how many parties will be represented in the national legislatures of new democracies.

A comparison of regression results of the last model clearly demonstrates that the expanded model with controls for institutional, economic and electorate characteristics is superior to the more limited models 1 and 2 as it shows that when these additional variables enter into the analysis, the overall fit of the model is vastly improved (lower p-value of 0.002 and doubled the R-squared.) In model 3, the coefficients for the main independent variable, linguistic fractionalization, and for religious fractionalization remain negative and statistically insignificant. In other words, it would appear that in new democracies, greater linguistic or religious heterogeneity has a reductive effect on the number of parties; however, we cannot attribute the level of party pluralism to these two

19 Model 3 also performs well in diagnostic tests for heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation and multicolinearity.
cultural variables due to the lower than conventionally accepted statistical significance of their coefficients. Thus, the main hypotheses (H1a and H1b) regarding a positive relationship between linguistic fragmentation and party pluralism have not been borne out by the data.

In respect to the institutional variables, remarkably, the key parameter - district magnitude does not appear to have a significant impact on the number of parties in newly democratized countries. This finding is particularly noteworthy as it contradicts many previous studies on the relationship between district size and the number of parties in the system. The coefficient estimates demonstrate that the loss of one party in the effective number of parties would require an increase of 23.81 in district magnitude (or conversely, an increase of 1 in district magnitude reduces the effective number of parties by 0.042.) Thus, in the real world of party competition, it is very unlikely to imagine a situation of such a dramatic increase in the average district magnitude to produce a loss of a single effective party. Similarly, there is no strong evidence to suggest that presence of a compensatory tier in the national legislatures of new democracies affects the number of electoral parties. Thus, hypotheses H2a and H2b are not supported by the analysis.

Similarly, when the impact of linguistic fragmentation is not independent but is mediated by district magnitude, the interaction remains insignificant in model 3 but the coefficient changes from negative to positive. Thus, contrary to the expectations and previous scholarly findings (e.g., Amorim Neto and Cox 1997; Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994), empirical results in model 3 seem to suggest that when mediated by electoral institutions, cultural factors do not appear affect the size of the party systems. This finding further disproves hypotheses H1, H1a, H2a and H2b.

On the other hand, partial regression coefficients for turnout change and the size of the electorate are positive and statistically significant at 99.9% and 90% levels respectively, thus confirming hypotheses H3a and H3b that new democracies with greater turnout change between elections and more eligible voters and will be more likely to produce more electoral parties. The finding concerning the effect of the size of the electorate on the number of parties in the system is particularly significant as it

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20 This was confirmed by visual inspection of the confidence intervals for district magnitude and upper tier, which shows that they are very tight and contain zero.
corroborates Sikk and Taagepera's (2012) findings that population is a valid predictor of the average effective number of parties. Specifically, the Sikk and Taagepera find that the averages of the effective number of parliamentary parties (ENPP) in countries with M=1 or nation-wide districts can be predicted solely by the size of the population, whereas in countries with PR rules and multi-seat districts, the ENPP averages can be predicted indirectly by population size and district magnitude. However, an important caveat is that the authors find no evidence of a direct impact of country size on the effective number of parties and their theoretical and empirical models concern an indirect relationship between country size and party system working through the size of the assembly via the cube root law. But the results of present analysis suggests that in new democracies the link between the size of the electorate and the size of the party system, although slightly under the conventional level of 95% significance, appears to be direct, and that at least in the first few democratic elections, population may indeed be “destiny, as far as party system is concerned” (2012:17.)

Turning to the economic performance, the estimates in model 3 show that the relationship between GDP per capita and party pluralism is positive and statistically significant at 95% confidence level, indicating that ceteris paribus, wealthier countries tend to have more parties. This finding appears to disprove hypothesis H4. However, the coefficient for GDP growth is not significant, and as the precise mechanism in respect to the impact of economic factors on the number of parties cannot be ascertained within the scope of this study, we need to be cautious in the interpretation of the functional relationship between these variables, and more analysis is needed to establish whether economy is indeed a valid predictor of party pluralism in post-authoritarian countries.

In respect to the time and space controls, with the exception of the Former Soviet Republics, the variables accounting for region and decade are not significant.

6.2. Discussion of Findings

The main proposition explored in this paper contends that there are important differences between old and new democracies in respect to the forces shaping the size of

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21 In the Sikk and Taagepera's (2012) study, population can also predict the averages of the largest seat share and the duration of cabinets.
party systems. The hypotheses tested here are derived from the literatures on parties, voting, and elections, which fall into two broad categories based on their theoretical emphases and assumptions about the determinants of political behaviour shaping political outcomes: cultural and institutional. First, the notion that social and cultural cleavages are detrimental to the number of parties in a system is grounded in cultural theories. Here, in respect to the main hypotheses, which test the impact of linguistic and religious fragmentation on the number of parties, the standard assumptions of cultural theories about the effects of cultural cleavages on the political outcomes, in this case on party pluralism, do not seem to hold in the initial phase of democratization. One explanation for this could be that in contrast to the older democracies with less electoral volatility and more identifiable party profiles, the parties in new democracies do not yet have well established profiles reflecting the existing cleavage structure of these polities and thus the usual assumptions about the links between culture and political participation whereby voting decisions reflect individual perceptions of social reality (e.g., “schema” theories of Allen, Dawson and Brown 1989; also Carbonell 1981, Conover and Feldman 1980) or “life-style” issues (e.g., Lieske 1990, 1991 and Wildavsky 1987) do not apply in these cases. In other words, higher levels of electoral volatility and the general indeterminacy of parties and party systems in the early stages of democratization make it difficult to translate cultural cleavages into stable political structures, which is why higher levels of social fragmentation (in this case, linguistic and religious) will not result in greater number of parties in those countries than in linguistically more homogenous states. This finding concurs with studies that find relatively high levels of volatility during their formative stages of democratization. More importantly, however, the results confirm the expectation that in newly democratic states the impact of social cleavages on the size and shape of the party system may not be direct and therefore should not be overstated, and it indicates that there is a need for more research on the precise relationship between culture and political outcomes in the initial democratic elections.

Second, the institutional school explains the variation in parties across countries and regions in terms of specific institutional arrangements and legal factors, where the average district magnitude is a staple parameter. The notion that electoral institutions are the main determinants of the size and shape of party systems follows the Downsian
model of an economic voter (1957), which assumes an atomized electorate of autonomous, self-maximizing, materially calculating voters. According to this perspective the enormous costs of acquiring even rudimentary information in a complex political system are beyond the means of most individuals so that voting decisions are not emanating from primary group socialization, but can be conceived of as a schematic short-cut to reduce the costs of political information in a decision making process. Similarly, Lupia (1992) and Lupia and McCubbins (1997) emerge from the basic rational choice school, positing a theory of electoral behavior in situations of imperfect information whereby assessments of options and formulation of voting decisions are determined by the cues from agenda-setting actors. Here, the regression results of the final model warrant at least two comments: in respect to the negligible impact of district magnitude on the number of parties, Cox (1997) observes that during the initial stages of democratic development, the “psychological effect” of electoral institutions has not taken root in the collective psyche of the electorate to have an enduring effect on political outcomes. In fact, Duverger himself had suggested that there are “two factors working together: a mechanical and a psychological factor” ([1954]1963:224.) Accordingly, the mechanical effect represents the constraint on the process of conversion of votes into seats, whereas the psychological effect is responsible for “the shaping of voter (and party) responses in anticipation of the electoral law’s mechanical constraints” (Benoit 2006:72.) As pointed out earlier, many scholars have suggested that Duverger might have gotten the causality backwards and that it is the party system itself, or the seat-maximizing, utility-driven behavior of parties within the system that determines electoral rules. Consequently, in the context of new democracies, the endogeneity of electoral institutions in combination with their weak “psychological effect” and a heightened level of uncertainty about the exact impact of electoral rules might in part explain why district size is a poor predictor of the number of parties in these states. In other words, in light of this important finding, an argument could be made that in newly democratic countries the learning curve has not kicked in yet and the parties have not had enough time to learn how to manipulate electoral rules to their advantage. The existing literature provides some support for this argument. In her study of electoral volatility in post-transition Central Eastern Europe, Tavits suggests that in young democracies, party elites tend not
to act strategically, rather they are “inconsistent, impatient and in search of instant gratification” giving the voters very little chance to form partisan attachments and to vote consistently (2008:541.) This has been echoed by other scholars, e.g., Birch (2000b), Rose et al (2001), and Zielinski 2002, while Bakke and Sitter (2005) demonstrate that in terms of the number of parliamentary parties, the party systems in Central Eastern Europe stabilized only after the second or third elections.

Overall, the findings of this study suggest that when analyzing the causes of party pluralism in new democracies, socio-cultural factors have weak explanatory power. Moreover, the results of the analysis demonstrate that the changes in voter turnout, and to a lesser extent, the sheer size of the electorate matter more in the shaping of the party landscape in new democracies than how many MPs represent the electorate in each district and how culturally diverse that electorate happens to be. Most importantly, the lack of statistical significance for the two sets of core explanatory variables featured prominently in comparative literature on the established democratic systems i.e., culture and institutions, makes it hard to make unqualified statements about competing explanations for party pluralism in new democratic systems, in which social and cultural cleavages and institutional incentives have lacked the necessary passage of time to mature and solidify into more permanent features of electoral competition.

7. Conclusion and Directions for Future Research

Clearly, the study of parties and party systems is a manifold endeavor, especially in respect to new democracies. It warrants continued efforts to examine and understand the factors that contribute to the formation of parties and to the emergence of different types of party systems. While this research was not directly concerned with identifying building blocks of political stability in newly democratized states, the underlying motivation for this project was that better understanding of what causes party pluralism in states transitioning from the dictatorship of the proletariat and other types of authoritarian, totalitarian, or corporatist designs might ultimately also contribute to the conceptualization and measurement of political stability in new democracies.

The main objective here was to investigate the hypothesized impact of socio-cultural factors on party pluralism in new democracies. The hypotheses were based on the
assumptions that there are important differences in the political processes of new and established democracies, that socio-cultural factors matter, and that different cleavages may have different impact on the number of parties. While the focus was on the linguistic cleavage, I also examined separately the effects of religious fractionalization as an expression of socio-cultural cleavage. Since contemporary approaches to the study of party pluralism acknowledge both the influence of social variables as well as institutional factors, I tested the hypothesized effects of these two cultural variables against the key institutional variable, district magnitude, and other theoretically relevant factors. Although the country data were limited (for example the study excluded linguistically heterogeneous Western European states, such as the Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzerland, which did not fit into the "post-1945 new democracy" definition), the overall picture that emerges from the analysis is that cultural cleavages conceived as either linguistic or religious pluralism are not detrimental to party system fragmentation in new democracies. Rather, party pluralism appears to be affected to a greater extent by the characteristics of the electorate, i.e., turnout change between the first two democratic elections, and to a lesser extent, by the size of the electorate, which might be indicative of a more general pattern of the relationship between voter behavior and political outcomes. Thus, future research might explore the effects of other hues of societal pluralism (e.g., the level of religious identification within states) and additional permutations of institutional arrangements (e.g., presence of presidential executives) and economic factors (e.g., income distribution) on the structure and composition of party systems in new democracies.

It is also possible that in new democracies the effect of institutions on party pluralism is indirect. Since empirical analysis shows that changes in voter turnout impinge on the number of parties, electoral institutions could affect turnout by defining an incentive structure that emphasizes particular benefits or costs of voting or by providing incentives for parties and candidates to mobilize votes (Jackman and Miller 2005) and thereby influence the level of party pluralism in a more indirect manner. This potential relationship could be tested in future studies with alternative statistical techniques, such as a two-step regression model. Furthermore, more research is needed to determine whether the positive effect of turnout change is also present in future elections.
or if it is most profitably cast as a function of the transition period and the “newness” of democratic participation. Another avenue to explore might be the impact of the variables used in this analysis on the prospects of party survival in new democracies.
### APPENDIX 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Fractionalization Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>0.0399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>0.1522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>0.0925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>0.6303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>0.224</td>
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<td>0.3031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>1989</td>
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## Table 1. Summary Statistics for Variables in the Analysis

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<th>Mean</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
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<td>0.301</td>
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For description of data sources, see References and Data Sources below.
Table 2. OLS Coefficient Estimates: Determinants of Party Pluralism in New Democracies (First and Second Elections)

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<td>Former Soviet Republics</td>
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<td>Adjusted R²</td>
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<td>0.160</td>
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Note: Table shows coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses). *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, ****p<0.001

Reference category: Western Europe
Figure 1. Effective Number of Electoral Parties in New Democracies

Figure 2. Kernel Density Estimates for Independent Variables in the Analysis
Figure 3. Party Pluralism and Linguistic Fractionalization

Figure 4. Party Pluralism and District Magnitude
DATA SOURCES FOR VARIABLES IN THE ANALYSIS

Effective number of electoral parties (ENEP/Nₘ)


Note that in Golders database, the values for the variable represent the number of electoral parties once the ‘other’ category has been corrected by using the least component method of bounds suggested by Taagepera 1997 (for a more detailed description, see Golder: http://homepages.nyu.edu/~mrg217/codebook_es1.pdf)

Linguistic and religious heterogeneity


Average district magnitude


In cases where Colomer et al. do not provide a precise data on the number of seats and electoral districts, additional sources were used:


Matt Golder’s database on electoral institutions, which provides the average size of districts in the lowest tier of the electoral system: http://homepages.nyu.edu/~mrg217/elections.html

Missing information for Mozambique and Nigeria were obtained from the African Elections Database: http://africanelections.tripod.com/ng.html, and Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa: http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/countryindex.htm

Additional data were obtained from: National election commission of Portugal. http://eleicoes.cne.pt/sel_eleicoes.cfm?m=raster#
Grand National Assembly of Turkey.
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/secim_sorgu.genel_secimler

**Size of the electorate and turnout change**
IDEA 2013: www.idea.int

**GDP per capita and GDP growth**
Penn World Table 7.1, Heston et al 2012: Heston Alan, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, *Penn World Table Version 6.1*, Center for International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania (CICUP)
In cases where there were no economic data were available, then Groningen Growth and Development Centre data were used: Angus Maddison Archive, University of Groningen, http://www.ggdc.net/MADDISON/oriindex.htm
REFERENCES


Angus Maddison Archive, University of Groningen, http://www.ggdc.net/MADDISON/oriindex.htm


Heston Alan, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, *Penn World Table Version 6.1*, Center for International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania (CICUP)


Laasko, M and R. Taagapera. 1979. “’Effective’ Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to West Europe,” *Comparative Political Studies*. 23: 3-27


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Tóka, Gábor. 1997. "Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in East Central Europe." Studies in Public Policy No. 279, Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde


PAPER TWO

Personal Vote and Party Unity:
The Case of Poland and Lithuania
(with Raimondas Ibenskas)

Abstract

This paper examines how the possibility of voters to select their preferred candidates provided by the flexible-list PR rules affects party unity in legislative voting. We hypothesize that high number of preference votes will make the legislators more likely to defect from the party line, i.e., that the legislators who depend the most on preference votes for their re-election will have the highest incentives to defect from the party line when the perceived interests of their constituents contradict the position of the party. In contrast, we expect that the list position matters less for the candidate's defection rate. We test our theory using roll call vote data from the 2000-2007 Polish legislature, and we find that preference votes cast under the pure PR system matter for legislative party unity whereby the MPs who had the highest share of preference votes among their party colleagues defected most often. As hypothesized, the list position has no effect on the dissension rate. We then compare these findings with the MP behavior in a mixed electoral system in 2003-2006 Lithuanian legislature, and we find that there the legislators who obtained enough preference votes to enable them to move from the list position where they would not have been elected to a list position where they got elected defected more often than the remaining MPs. A noteworthy finding is that here was also no difference between SMD and PR deputies in Lithuania in terms of party unity. These results suggest that legislative voting unity is affected more by the personal support received by each elected MP, than by a party-controlled mechanism, such as placement on the party list.
1. Introduction

In the 2001 Polish election more than 100 candidates moved through the exercise of personal vote under the flexible-list PR system from the list position where they would not have been elected to a position which allowed them to be elected. And in March 2010 the four-party government in Lithuania lost its majority in the legislature when Vidmantas Žiemies, a legislator in the faction of the Homeland Union, switched to the newly established Party of Christians. An interesting fact about Mr Žiemies, which influenced his decision to switch, is that being ranked the last on the list of the Homeland Union in the 2008 parliamentary election, he managed to gather enough preference votes to obtain a seat in the legislature.

The prevalence of such cases suggests that the flexible-list PR system has important implications on legislative behaviour. In such a system voters can distinguish between the candidates of the same party, but the list position still matters in terms of which candidates get the mandate. The legislator elected under the flexible-list PR rules should therefore have strong incentives to cast a personal vote in order to maximize her re-election chances (Carey and Shugart 1995). On the other hand, as Hix (2004) notes, in most cases the probability of re-election under such institutional setting depends largely on the placement of the candidate on the party list, since in general, the list position still matters a great deal for the probability of re-election.

This paper examines how legislators combine these two competing demands under the flexible-list PR system. First, we analyze legislative behaviour in form of the dissension rate in casting of roll-call votes in the 2001-2007 Polish legislature. We suggest that the number of preference votes cast by voters under the flexible-list PR rules may matter in two ways. First, a high number of preference votes should make the legislator more likely to defect from the party line, as she feels safe about her re-election prospects. Second, the legislators who depend the most on preference votes for their re-election should have the highest incentives to defect from the party line when the perceived interests of their constituents contradict the position of the party. In contrast, we expect that the list position of the candidate matters less for her defection rate. To check the robustness of our theory, we test empirically the same model using the votes cast in the Lithuanian legislature between 2003 and 2006.
Overall, our findings provide support to our main argument. We find that the list position had no effect on the dissension rate in either country. In respect to the effect of personal vote, in Poland, the MPs who had the highest share of preference votes among their party colleagues defected most often, while in Lithuania, the legislators who obtained enough personal votes to enable them to move from the list position where they would not have been elected to a list position where they got elected defected significantly more often than the remaining MPs. Furthermore, we also find that the SMD deputies and PR deputies defected at the same rate in Lithuania, which suggests that the findings of Clarke et al (2008) about the higher dissension rates among the PR deputies may not have been supported by sufficiently strong evidence.

We start our analysis by providing a rationale for our case selection and explaining the two types of electoral systems. Then we move to a theoretical discussion in which we define the concepts of party unity and personal vote, and propose a theoretical model of the effects of personal vote under the flexible-list PR system on voting unity of legislative parties. Next, we present theoretical arguments for including the relevant independent variables. This is followed by a brief discussion of the substantive motivation for selecting Poland and Lithuania to test our propositions. Next, we outline our research design and describe the measurement of the variables included in our model. Subsequently, we present and interpret the results of our study for Poland and follow with a comparative examination of the impact of personal vote on party unity in Lithuania. We conclude with a discussion of findings and directions for further research.

2. Rationale for Case Selection

Lithuania and Poland are well suited for the purposes of this study as they are similar in many respects. They both have hybrid semi-presidential systems, they have experienced uninterrupted democratic trajectories since the transition from communism and have demonstrated relatively low levels of party system institutionalization (Powell and Tucker 2008). In both, Lithuania and Poland, all legislative votes are roll call votes.

22 There is some evidence in the scholarship that parties in presidential systems tend to be less unified than in parliamentary systems while the impact of the hybrid system, such as in Poland and Lithuania, on legislative party cohesion has not been thoroughly investigated (for a discussion, see Carrey 2005.)
are public, and therefore the meaning of the vote is the same across the two states.\textsuperscript{23} However, while both countries use similar systems of placing candidates the party lists, their electoral systems are different. In the 2001 and 2005 elections under Poland’s pure PR system 460 legislators were elected in 41 districts of magnitude between 7 and 19.\textsuperscript{24} On the other hand, Lithuania used a mixed-member plurality system in the 2000 election and mixed-member majoritarian system in the 2004 election. In both elections 70 MPs were elected in a single multi-member district and the remaining 71 MPs were elected in single member districts. Thus, in spite of the many important similarities between both countries, which validates our case selection, the key difference in the electoral systems between Poland and Lithuania should also tell us if party unity is affected by personal vote under flexible list rules in both types of electoral systems.

There are many variations of list voting systems.\textsuperscript{25} The electoral system in Poland is often described as open list (e.g., Millard 2003, Gwiazda 2008) since while the ballot paper lists candidates according to party preferences, intra-party allocation of seats is based entirely on nominative votes. However, following Bogdanor’s (1983) classification of electoral systems as a continuum divided between rigid, flexible, open and free lists, we refer to the Polish system and the PR component of the Lithuanian system as flexible-list. According to Bogdanor, both flexible and open list systems use the plurality method for the allocation of seats within party lists, i.e., those candidates with the largest number

\textsuperscript{23} The method of voting in the legislatures has been a problem for some cross-country comparisons as in many countries the legislators’ names are not recorded (e.g., in the German Bundestag) thus rendering a different meaning to the vote cast.


of nominatives votes are elected, but in flexible list systems voters may cast either a “list vote” or nominative votes for particular candidates from a party list arranged according to the party’s own ranking, whereas in open list systems candidates are usually listed alphabetically on party lists and the voter is allowed to vote for one candidate. (In rigid lists systems voters cannot express preference among party’s candidates while in free list systems candidates are listed alphabetically, but the voter has the possibility to vote for candidates of more than one party.)

The 2001 and 2005 Polish elections were contested according to a new electoral law (third since 1989) which retained proportional representation, “but with new formulae and larger district magnitude intended to benefit small to medium-sized parties and to counter the strength of the Alliance of the Democratic Left (SLD)” (Millard 2003:368.) The 2000 and 2004 Lithuanian elections were held according to the 2000 electoral reform, which introduced preference voting in multi-member constituencies (before that, under the 1992 law, closed and blocked lists were used in the proportional tier.)

In both Poland and in Lithuania’s PR component of its mixed-parallel system, MPs are elected by party lists from which voters can select particular candidates. Under the 2001 electoral law of Poland, the party decides who can be nominated as a candidate and the ordering of the names of the party list. Intra-party choice is compulsory and voters are allowed to cast only one preference vote for a particular candidate within a party group by marking an “X” in the box next to the candidate’s name. If no preference is given, the ballot is invalid; however if there is more than one candidate selected from a party list, the ballot is considered valid, but the vote goes to the candidate who has the highest position on the party list. So, the number of votes received by all candidates on the party list determines the vote share of the party while the number of votes received by each candidate determines whether she is elected.

In Lithuania’s PR component, in the 2000 and 2004 elections voters had to choose the party list first and then they had an option of selecting up to five candidates from that list (so they could select none, one, two etc. up to five). All preference votes had the same weight but the parties arranged the order of names. This final ranking of the candidates was based both on the position of the candidate on the original list proposed by the party
and the number of preference votes received by candidates. There was complicated system where each candidate was assigned a number of points based on these two criteria and then these points were added up. So there was not really a well-established threshold required for going up on the list - all candidates were ranked based on their total score. The system was changed in 2008 when the final ranking was based only on preference votes.

Evidently, preference systems reduce party control of political recruitment to a much greater degree than non-preference systems thereby increasing uncertainty. But although in preference systems voters have a say in who is elected to fill the seats won, party elites maximise party control by putting their leaders, their most visible candidates, in top list places to act as list-pullers or "locomotives". According to Marsh (1985) and Lakeman (1974), first-placed candidates generally enjoy considerable advantage over their co-partisans placed in the lower list positions. Since neither Poland nor Lithuania use a random draw or alphabetical order lists, in most cases, voters indeed chose first-placed candidates ahead of other candidates. For example, in the 2001 election, more than 80 per cent of candidates placed first by their parties were also the first choice of the voters. Although both Poland and Lithuania could be described as strong preferential systems since there is no "approval" threshold and only individual votes are relevant for the selection of MPs (Karvonen 2004), the crucial role a party plays in signalling to the voters its strongest candidates makes Bogdanor's classification most appropriate for the two test cases in our study.

3. Party Unity: The Concept

Carey and Shugart assert that organizational stability at the elite level contributes to the institutionalization of political parties (1995). In other words, in order to function as stable basis for the political process, a level of unity, teamwork and loyalty needs to be achieved within the parties. Although it is common in the literature on legislative politics to treat parties as unitary, rational actors, it is also clear that this assumption does not imply that parties are monolithic and that the MPs of individual parties are always united in purpose and deed.
Party unity manifests itself in many ways, and when it comes to defining it on the conceptual level, scholars tend to use the terms “cohesion,” “discipline,” and “unity” interchangeably. In an effort to disentangle this conundrum, we contend that, conceptually, party unity is predicated on Olson’s (1965) notion of selective incentives, or a system of rewards and punishments put in place to overcome the problems of social choice and collective action and to ensure organizational stability. Relevant to our research, one type of these selective incentives has been described in the literature as “procedural devices” that include roll call voting as a key instrument to enforce party discipline (Bowler et al. 1999, Kistner 2006). Researchers have observed that because in many parliamentary systems most votes are by a show of hands, “the decision to request a recorded vote is itself a political act, restricted to particular conditions that may make roll-calls unrepresentative of normal party political behaviour” (Hix and Lord, 1997:155.) Similarly, Kistner suggests that in these instances a call for a roll call vote is itself a form of discipline (Kistner 2006:20.)

Since deciding what constitutes a “normal party political behaviour” is not an easy task and cannot be addressed within the narrow confines of this study, for the purpose of this research, we take the view that the voting unity of legislative parties is indicative of the level of party cohesion, defined by Ozbudun (1970) as “the degree to which members of the same party can be observed to work together in pursuance of the party’s goals” (1970:35). In other words, party cohesiveness implies, ipso facto, that members of the same party have similar preferences which, in practical terms, manifest as the level of MP voting unity (Carey 2007).

To sum it up, as the system of selective incentives to induce party cohesion can be very complex and can vary according to temporal and situational contexts, in our analysis, we conceptualize party unity as the observed degree to which individual deputies of the same party in the lower houses of the Polish and Lithuanian parliaments vote in unison. Furthermore, our analysis takes the view of legislative behavior that is constrained by formal rules and procedures. Consequently, we follow the institutional

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26 Additional rationale for thus operationalizing of the concept of party cohesion is also provided by Jackson 1987, whereby party cohesion is achieved through discipline involving application of sanctions or inducements. In countries, such as Lithuania and Poland, where deputy votes are recorded, the importance of voting unity in intra-party politics is highly significant as not only does it determine the level of overall party cohesion, but it also provides party leaders an effective mechanism of control over party ranks.
approach which postulates strategic behavior of MPs within the framework of electoral institutions acting as constraints on individual preferences.

4. Personal Vote and Electoral Formulas

In 1985, Marsh observed that the number of electoral systems, which allow the voters the option to express personal preference for a candidate (or in some cases, multiple candidates) was on the rise in Europe (Marsh 1985.) With the addition of the many post-communist states to the growing number of representative democracies, this trend has accelerated (Karvonen 2010.) In their seminal study on the nexus between electoral formulas and personal vote-seeking, Carey and Shugart (1995) developed a theoretical framework for empirically analyzing how electoral laws shape MPs' incentives to cultivate a personal vote (ICPV.) The model is built on two well established premises which we share throughout this study: 1) that both candidates for legislative office and incumbent legislators seek (re)election (e.g. Epstein 1967, Rae 1971, Mayhew 1974, Taagepera and Shugart 1989), and 2) that there is a possible discrepancy between the collective interests of the party and the electoral interests of an individual MP under different electoral systems whereby individual MPs can benefit at the ballot-box by developing personal profiles distinct from the profiles of the parties which they represent (e.g., Cox 1987, Mainwaring 1991, McCubbins and Rosenbluth 1994, Reed 1994.) Carey and Shugart's framework is designed to estimate the relative value to candidates for legislative office of cultivating personal reputation vs. party reputation based on four characteristics of electoral competition: district magnitude, party control over candidates through ballot placement, pooling of the votes within a party, and whether voters cast ballots for individual candidates, parties or both. The different combinations of ballot, pool and votes in varying degrees allow candidates to pursue tactics that help them stand out from their parties in the eyes of the electorate. Accordingly, greater incentives to pursue a personal vote result in lesser reliance of the legislators on their parties' collective reputations and consequently certain activities such as constituency service and the delivery of "pork" are valuable commodities for election-minded candidates.

Given the candidates' desire to get elected, other studies, e.g. Shugart (2005) point out that in countries with electoral systems that pit candidates from the same party
against each other (as in open or flexible PR systems), there are significantly more legislators with, what Tavits (2009, 2010) calls, “personal vote earning attributes” (PVEA) such as local birthplace, local level political experience, etc. During the elections, the candidates with higher levels of PVEAs will have a clear incentive to cultivate personal vote insofar as the electoral system allows for exploitation of localism, and once in parliament, they will also be more likely to break party unity. Voters are more prone to make their choice on the basis of candidate rather than a party, also in the single transferable vote PR systems, such as Ireland, where they must rank candidates, including co-partisans, in order of preference (Marsh 2007.)

Similarly, in their study of personal vote seeking incentives in Slovakia, Crisp and Malecki (2009) found that semi-open party lists enhance individual candidate’s chances for election by inducing personal vote seeking behavior. The main finding of their study is that the single most important factor affecting a candidate’s electoral prospects is her pre-election list position, and that in the semi-open list context, breaking with the party ranks frequently and behaving in an individualistic manner ensures a top list position (2009:17.)

Two conclusions relevant to our study can be drawn from the scholarship on this subject: 1) the incentives to cultivate personal vote and to exploit personal vote earning attributes are shaped by the type of electoral rules under which candidates are elected, and 2) electoral institutions matter for party unity. Therefore, both theoretical and empirical models of the effects of electoral rules and the parties’ use of these rules on the behavior of individual MPs can be useful for the study of aggregate, party level outcomes such as explaining the levels of party unity in a specific electoral context. However, given the indeterminate nature and at times conflicting findings generated by the studies on mandate divide (e.g., Thames 2001, 2005; Ferrara 2004; Herron 2002; Haspel et al 1998; Crisp 2007; Clarke at al. 2008 discussed below), a more targeted investigation of the effects of personal vote on party unity is needed.

27 In her two studies, Tavits (2005) tested the assumptions of the incentives to cultivate personal vote in a single country context (Estonia) and in cross-national comparative study of Estonia, Finland, Norway, Poland and Switzerland, and found that local attributes (particularly local level political experience) not only enhance candidates electoral success, but they also foster more individualistic behaviour in parliament.
5. Personal Vote and Party Unity under Flexible-List PR System

Our main argument in the paper is that personal support for the legislator, expressed by the number of preference votes, matters for her dissension in legislative voting. Based on the premise that the main goal of politicians is to be elected, we contend that incumbent MPs and candidates for legislative office obviously care about other things, such as policy or executive offices; however, the electoral success is a *sine qua non* condition for the achievement of these other goals.

For parties having fairly centralized procedures of candidate selection (which include all parties considered in this study) the probability of re-election to large extent depends on the leadership of the party. Therefore, legislators will have high incentives to appease the party leader in order to be nominated to a safe district or a high position on the list of the party's candidates. Following the instructions of the party is one of the main ways in which such an appeasement can take place, as party leaders highly appreciate party unity. Therefore, generally speaking, we would expect for party unity to be high under the PR electoral system.

However, even under closed-list PR system not all legislators from the same party are expected to stick to the party line to the same level. Looking at countries with mixed electoral systems, Herron (2002) and Ferrara (2004) hypothesize that the propensity of legislators to dissent will depend on their *electoral path*. These authors test the tentative hypothesis that the legislators who follow the party line most thoroughly are those who face higher electoral uncertainty. In contrast, deputies with high relative seat safety will have more space for individualistic behavior.

The seat safety under closed-list and flexible-list PR rules depends first and foremost on the list position of the legislator. In general, MPs with low position on the list are expected to dissent less, since they face high electoral uncertainty and therefore their best hope in getting re-elected is to use their parties (Ferrara 2004; Herron 2002; Haspel et al 1998). In particular, following the party line could induce the leadership of the party to nominate these MPs to higher positions on the list in subsequent elections.

In contrast, the legislators who had high list positions in the previous election are more certain about their re-election prospects and should, therefore, defect more often.
Consequently, our first hypothesis contends that *deputies with high list positions in the last election are more likely to defect in legislative vote (HI.)*

While under the closed-list PR system and centralized candidate selection process within the party the chances of the legislator who is placed at a low position on the party list are low, the flexible-list system provides the legislator with an alternative way to get re-elected. Specifically, acquiring a relatively high number of preference votes allows the legislator to gain a seat even if her list position is low. It follows then that those legislators who acquired a high number of preference votes would feel more insulated from the whims of the party leadership and therefore more likely to defect. Furthermore, defecting should also contribute to the maintenance of personal support, especially in those cases when the legislator feels that the interests of her voters are different than the prevailing party line. For example, in Slovakia the legislators who dissented most acquired significantly more preference votes than their party colleagues who followed the party line more strictly (Crisp and Malecki 2009: 15). Hence, our second hypothesis states that *deputies who acquired a high number of personal votes in the last election are more likely to defect in legislative voting (H 2.)*

The flexible-list PR system may also matter in a different way for legislative party unity. The legislators whose re-election depends most on preference votes should be the ones who are most eager to defect on the party line when it goes against the interests of their constituents. We argue that this group includes those MPs who obtained enough preference votes to move from the otherwise unelectable list position to a position which allowed them to be elected. Given their low list positions, cultivating their personal reputations through dissension in legislative voting should be the best strategy for those MPs to get re-elected. Therefore, we also hypothesize that *deputies who acquired enough personal votes to move from the position where they would not have been elected to a position where they got elected are more likely to defect (H 3.)*

6. Alternative Explanations

A number of alternative explanations could account for the variation in the levels of party unity. Below we address the impact of the mixed electoral system (for the
Lithuanian case) and individual-level factors (party switching, party leadership, and incumbency.)

6.1. Individual Level Factors

6.1.1. Party switching

An important aspect of legislative behavior is party switching, which is highly prevalent in Central and Eastern European democracies, including Poland and Lithuania (see Kreuzer and Pettai 2002, Shabad and Slomczynski 2004, Zielinski et al. 2005, Hazan 2006.) The theoretical argument for examining the stability of party ranks in the context of party voting unity is straightforward: cohesive and stable parties whose elites are loyal to their party’s label, ideology and policy will be less likely to defect from the party line in a vote. In Poland, much like in the more established democracies, electoral control and political accountability works through the parties whereby policy outcomes are closely linked to the electoral fortunes of political parties. For example, Zielenski et al. found that “when economic outcomes are bad, voters in Poland punish those legislative incumbents who belong to a governing party, and they reward those incumbents who belong to an opposition party” (2005:375.) In this context, the fluidity of the party system in countries such as Poland and Lithuania provides the governing party incumbents with a convenient institutional mechanism to avoid punishment at the ballot box and increase their chance of electoral success by simply switching to a non-governing party.

This may in part explain what Kreuzer and Pettai call the Wunderlust of Eastern European political elites (2002:2) which can potentially impinge on party system institutionalization since fluidity within and between the parties undercuts strategic voting and hinders political representation and electoral accountability (Moser 1999, Birch 2003, Mainwaring and Zoco 2007.) While many scholars observe that party switches occur within the same ideological family (Kreuzer and Pettai 2003, Shabad and Slomczynski 2004), porous party borders inhibit party unity and can make parties vulnerable at the ballot box and, in some cases, can lead to political extinction. Thus, following previous studies (e.g. Herron 2002), we control for party switching expecting for party switchers to be more likely to break party unity.
6.1.2. Party leaders

In addition to the characteristics of an MP’s party and his loyalty to that party, other personal career attributes can also shape voting behavior. Thus, we refine our hypotheses by considering the proposition that a legislator’s position within the party hierarchy is likely to affect the way she votes. Legislators in leadership positions wield disproportionate amount of power over the rank and file MPs as they can propose bills and influence bill rapporteurships, control the speaking agenda, control committee assignments, influence the ordering of party lists in elections, etc (e.g., Cox and McCubbins 2005). They also constitute a tight pool for which a future Prime Minister be drawn and they represent the “face” of the legislative party during and between the elections. Generally, it can then be expected that party leaders, as primary agenda setters within party structures, will have, ipso facto, high incentives to support the party position on a bill.

6.1.3. MP seniority status

Another career attribute that can condition the way a legislator votes is her seniority status in the legislature. Literature on political ambition suggests that ambition shapes legislative behavior (e.g., Black 1972, Copeland 1989, Rhode 1979) and that a legislator’s career path can have a bearing on her voting decisions (e.g., Meserve et al. 2009, Tavits 2010.) Given their career ambitions, it is reasonable to expect that incumbents may feel more beholden to the party leadership in their pursuit of career advancement. Furthermore, they will also be more likely to be involved in formulating party policies. Therefore, we expect that the MPs who served in the previous term will be more likely to tow the party line in a vote.

6.2. Party Level Factors

We also control for party affiliation, since party unity may be conditioned by party ideology and party organization. Furthermore, party dummies control for the possibility that government parties will be more united.
6.3. Electoral System Factors (for the Lithuanian case)

Recent research on the impact of a mixed electoral system on legislative behavior (e.g., Haspel et al. 1998, Thames 2001, 2005, Herron 2002, Ferrara 2004, Crisp 2007, Clark et al. 2008) has investigated whether the legislators elected in single member districts are more likely to dissent than their colleagues elected under PR rules. The results of these studies are mixed, with only some studies finding that the mandate divide exists.

The implications of these studies for Lithuania, however, are rather limited, as they examine the effect of the mixed electoral system under the presence of the closed-list PR system. However, since Lithuania uses flexible-list PR system, PR deputies in Lithuania should also have strong incentives to cultivate personal vote, especially because they all are elected in a single nationwide district with a large magnitude. According to Carey and Shugart (1995), these incentives should be at least as high as those that SMD deputies face. Although Clarke et al. (2008) miss this point, using party-level data, they find that Lithuanian MPs elected under PR rules were significantly more likely to break party unity than the legislators in SMD seats.

This argument then implies that the SMD deputies should not be more likely to defect than the PR deputies. However, it may be the case that the number of personal votes matters less for those deputies who were elected in the SMD tier but also ran in the PR tier, because their primary focus is on getting re-elected in their districts. Therefore, our expectation concerning the impact of personal vote in the mixed electoral system in Lithuania on legislative party unity is that the type of mandate does not matter for party unity and that for SMD deputies, the number of preference votes acquired does not matter.

7. Data, Measurement and Method

7.1. Data

We test our argument using roll-call votes from two parliamentary terms of 2001-2005 and 2005-2007 of the Polish Sejm and we run two separate models for each term. We considered 13,380 votes in the 2001-2005 term and 3,097 votes in the 2005-2007 term. In the Polish Sejm, the voting is open ballot whereby the deputies cast votes by a
simultaneous show of hands and by pressing a button on a vote recording machine. This ensures that all votes are recorded. The decisions are based on a simple majority rule, the vote of each deputy is read aloud, all roll call votes are recorded, and the records of the votes are made public on the Sejm website at the end of each parliamentary session (www.sejm.gov.pl). Since all votes in the Sejm are recorded and organized into parliamentary sessions, and since we are analyzing all votes cast during the two terms, there is no possible bias which could arise from sampling procedures and our data set is representative of the overall MP voting behavior.

Having tested and analyzed the effects of personal vote on party unity in a Poland, we then compare our findings using the data from the Lithuanian Seimas between July 2003 and January 2006. These data come from two terms, as Lithuania held parliamentary elections in October 2004. Consequently, we run two separate models for each of the terms, in which we considered 2,290 legislative votes held in the 2003-2004 and 1809 votes held in 2004-2006.

7.2. Operationalization

Following Thames (2005) and Carey (2000), as our dependent variable we use individual weighted scores of unity $iUNITY_j$ for each legislator $j$. In order to construct these scores, we code each legislator’s vote $k$ as either 1, if she voted with the party’s majority position, or -1, if she voted against the party’s majority position. We then compute the closeness of the vote, where $CLOSE_k = 1 - (1 / THRESHOLD^* THRESHOLD - pctyes)$. In this formula $THRESHOLD$ equals the percentage of deputies needed to pass the particular piece of legislation (Carey, 2000:7.) Thames (2005:300) notes that [a]s $CLOSE$ nears 1, the distribution of “for” and “against” votes approaches 0. Thus votes that are closer weigh more heavily than those that are not. Because a close vote would denote a contentious issue, party support on this issue is of more critical importance.

Furthermore, we also compute an indicator measuring the percentage of legislators participating in the vote $ATTEND_k$, because that is also a measure of vote’s importance. The individual weighted score is then described by the following formula

$$
UNITY_i = \frac{\sum \limits_{j,k=1}^{N} CLOSE_k * ATTEND_k / \sum \limits_{j,k=1}^{N} CLOSE_{jk} * ATTEND_{jk}}{N}
$$
Essentially, this formula is the share of votes in which the legislator voted together with the majority of her party out of the total number of votes she participated in, weighted by the importance of the vote, which is measured by the closeness of the vote and the attendance rate. Therefore, the highest possible value of 1 would indicate that the legislator voted together with the majority of her party in all votes and the value of -1 means that she defected from her party in all votes that she participated.

Our first main independent variable is the personal vote (PVOTE) which is computed as the ratio between the number of preference votes of the legislator and the number of votes her party acquired in the MP’s district (in the Lithuanian case we simply use the ratio between the number of preference votes of the legislator and the total number of votes of her party). The higher values of this variable should lead to lower values of the individual unity index (see Hypothesis 2).

Another important independent variable is PERSONAL, which takes the value of 1 if the legislator acquired enough personal votes to move from the position where she would not have been elected to a position where she got elected. The value of this variable for all other MPs is 0. The value of 1 should depress the values of the individual voting unity index (see Hypothesis 3).

We measure the impact of the list position by taking the natural logarithm of the candidate’s position of her party’s list (log(POSITION)). The logarithmic transformation accounts for the non-linear effects of the list position, i.e., we would expect that the improvement from the second position on the list to the first position would have higher effects on the individual unity scores than climbing up from the 11th position to the 10th position. The higher values of this variable should lead to higher values of the unity index (see Hypothesis 1).

In the Polish case we also control for the district magnitude (DISTMAG), in order to adjust for the fact that the list position in different districts creates unequal chances of electoral success. For example, being second on the party’s list in a 7-member district has a different meaning from being second on the list in a 19-member district. There are also theoretical reasons for including this variable, as legislators should be more prone to cultivate personal reputations in larger districts (Carey and Shugart 1995).
In order to control for the effects of mixed electoral system in Lithuania, we code the variable SEAT, which takes the value of 1 if the legislator was elected in a single member district and 0 if she holds a PR seat.

We have also included a variable for party switchers (SWITCHER), which takes the value of 1 if a given MP switched parties at least once during the period under consideration and 0 if no switch took place. If the legislator switched parties, we take that affiliation of the MP under which she participated in most votes. We then discard those voting decisions of the legislator which were made when she had different affiliation.

The LEADER variable takes values of 1 for the leaders of the parties and the leaders of party caucuses in the parliament and 0 for all remaining MPs. We measure the seniority status of individual MPs using a dummy variable (INCUMBENT), which takes the value of 1 if the legislator was also an MP in the previous term and 0 if this is not the case. Finally, we also include dummy variables for the parties.

7.3. Descriptive Statistics

The descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis is provided in Table 1. Overall, parties in Poland appear quite cohesive with Unity Index ranging from 0.734 to 0.992 and the mean of 0.993 in 2001-2005, and 0.904 to 0.998 and the mean of 0.978 in 2005-2007. An interesting fact to mention is that the levels of party unity are much higher in Poland than in the comparative case of Lithuania, although both countries have been considered as having fluid party systems. Furthermore, there is some intra-country variation in Poland: parties were significantly more cohesive in the 2005-2007 parliament than in the 2001-2005 parliament. No such temporal change is observed in Lithuania – the values of the individual voting unity index were actually slightly lower in 2004-2006 than in 2003-2004. And looking at the vote dispersion, in the 2001-2005 term the standard deviation is 0.0485 while in 2005-1007 the average deviation from party line is 0.016 indicating a relatively low levels of vote dispersion.

[Table 1 about here]

28 We also do not consider independent MPs and the legislators of the faction of the Lithuanian Union of the Peasants and the New Democracy on the 2003-2004 term, as this small faction (7 MPs) included several legislators from other parties, which would obviously impact on its unity.
7.4. Models

We use OLS regression for testing our hypotheses. While our dependent variable is theoretically bounded between -1 and 1, there is only a single observation (in the 2004-2006 Lithuanian dataset) taking the value of 1 and no observations with the value of -1 in any of the data sets. Furthermore, the fitted values for all observed data in each OLS model are in the range (-1,1), which allows treating the dependent variable as not bounded. The literature also provides examples of the use of least squares models in similar situations (Herron 2002; Ferrara 2004). In order to account for heteroscedasticity, we used robust standard errors in all models.

8. Results and Analysis: Poland

Table 3 presents the results of the regression analysis for Poland. The results provide evidence to the conjuncture that personal support matters for the dissension of legislators. PVOTE variable was significant in the models for both terms (see Models 1 and 3.). An increase from the minimum value of the share of preference votes to the maximum value decreases the voting unity index by 0.028 in 2001-2005 and by 0.015 in 2005-2007. The relationship between the two variables is also illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. These results provide support to Hypothesis 2. However, MPs who were elected due to their preference votes were not more likely to defect on the party line, as shown by the insignificance of the PERSONAL variable in any of the two models. The list position of the legislator (POSITION) also had no impact on the level of dissension in legislative voting in any of the models. Therefore, in the Polish case, the results do not support Hypotheses 1 and 3.

We can draw a few conclusions from this pattern of responses. The results imply that Polish legislators react to the incentives created by the flexible list system, but only in respect to the general popularity with the voters expressed by the overall share of district votes. In Poland, it is the number of votes that matters for party unity while the list position appears to be of little or no consequence to the legislative behavior. Notably,
those legislators who were placed low on the party list, but managed to get elected due to their popularity with the voters in their districts did not seem to be more prone to breaking the party ranks than the MPs in the electable list positions. Thus, the empirical analysis of the voting behavior of Polish parliamentarians suggests that although deputies from the same party tend to vote together in large numbers, the flexible-list system creates incentives for highly popular candidates across the board to be more independent of their party and more responsive to their constituents. At this stage we do not have a convincing explanation for the overall ineffectiveness of the preference votes for voting unity in Poland. However, without making any definitive claims, we can make the following observations that could potentially factor into the resulting picture:

First, although there are no formal barriers to the re-ordering of party lists in Poland, i.e., the candidates for the Sejm do not have to cross a specified threshold in order to move on the party’s list in order of preference votes, as it is common in many flexible list systems, during the two terms combined less than 20% of all candidates had actually moved from a non-electable to an electable position which resulted in a parliamentary seat. Thus, in terms of the structure of the data, one possible reason why the PERSONAL variable fails to reach the usual level of significance is that given an unbalanced distribution of values for this binary regressor, the standard errors of the coefficients could be inflated thereby reducing its significance. In practice, moving from a non-electable to an electable position is relatively rare even in the absence of vote quotas, and for the vast majority (about 80%) of Polish MPs, the number of preference votes did not change their status from an outsider to an insider. So, given that on average only 1 in 5 MPs had benefited form list reordering, perhaps cultivating personal reputation by defying the party line on the chamber floor is not considered a significantly more effective vote earning strategy among these MPs than it is for the rest of the deputies.

Second, since party control over the nomination process is a common feature of most parliamentary systems, it is reasonable to expect that there exists a close

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29 The frequency of list re-ordering is even lower in list systems with candidate vote quotas and it has been noted by Crisp et al. (2013) in their most recent study of vote earning strategies in Slovakia, and it has even prompted some scholars to refer to flexible-list systems as closed list-systems in disguise (e.g., Farrell 2001, Andeweg 2005.)
relationship between voting behavior and list position of deputies, our second covariate of primary interest. Party lists are constructed in such a way that they usually give priority to the current MPs whereby the MPs’ voting records can determine the list position. Furthermore, party leaders tend to put their top vote earning MPs from past elections on top of the lists. But, it must be noted that in the case of the Polish elections of 2001 and 2005, several parties were newly formed and had no history of competing in previous elections. In these instances, the deputy’s voting record could not be used as a form of party discipline or as a factor determining her list placement in subsequent elections. Generally, the precise process of coordination between the parliamentary club, the national and the local party organization is rather complex and it differs among parties (Kistner 2007:86.)

While some scholars (e.g. van Biezen 2000, Kistner 2007) point to a significant degree of overlap between the legislative and extra-parliamentary party organization (e.g., when the same individuals hold leadership position at the parliamentary and national level), that overlap is not perfect, especially for large parties, such as the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), but also for smaller ones, such as Workers’ Union (UP) in which only about fifty per cent of the MPs were also members of the Executive Committee (Kistner 2007:112.) So, while theoretically, a record of breaking with party ranks in a floor vote should preclude an MP from advancing within the party ranks and relegate her to a low position on a party list, in reality this process is not always automatic as different levels of party organization which contribute to the nomination process may have divergent interests and priories. This was especially the case with the ruling Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) during the 1997-2001 legislative term and was a major source of tension with its coalition partner, Freedom Union (UW), which in turn has been described by one of its own leaders as “the most undisciplined party in the Independent Polish political history” (Kistner 2007:97.) Cognizant of an imperfect convergence between the local levels and the parliamentary level of party organization, deputies with strong voter support in their districts may feel not only less constrained by

For example, in 2001 Civic Platform (PO) and Law and Justice (PiS); in 2005 Ruch Ludowo Narodowy (NPM) formed in 2006 by 15 defectors from other parliamentary clubs, or SDPL formed as a splinter party from SLD in 2004.
the prevailing position of their party, but they may also be less fearful of "punishment" in the form of low list placement in the next election.

Furthermore, voting according to the party position is not always a requirement within parliamentary parties. For example, the League of Polish Families allowed their deputies to "vote with their conscience" assuming that they all share the same values and will therefore endorse the same policies. Whereas party voting unity is generally required on votes of particular importance, such as votes of confidence in the government, or votes on budget, there are votes on which some parties permit their deputies to exercise their own judgment. These may include votes on certain sensitive subjects, such as abortion or other moral issues\textsuperscript{31}. In these situations, there might be even less incentive, particularly for the MPs with a solid constituency support, to vote with the party. These are just some possible explanations related to the formal and informal organizational structures and practices of the Polish parties, which might need further exploration in the context parliamentary discipline and party unity; however, at this stage we cannot convincingly argue that any of them is the unqualified mechanism explaining our results.

In respect to the control variables, as expected, party switchers were significantly more likely to defect in Poland in the 2001-2005 term, even though the size of the coefficient was not very large. The incumbent MPs defected more often than freshmen MPs, but the effect was not very substantial. Party leaders also defected significantly less in Poland in 2001-2005, but this effect was not present in the 2005-2007 legislature.

Party dummy variables were the best predictors of voting unity. In 2001-2005 the main governing party, the Democratic Left Alliance (which serves as a reference category in all models) was the most united in vote of all parties, while when it was in opposition in the 2005-2007 term, it was less united than the main party in government, the Law and Justice. These results suggest strong support to the hypothesis that government parties are more cohesive than those in opposition in post-communist countries.

\textsuperscript{31} A good example of this is UW in the 1997-2001 term, when the party leadership allowed its deputies to vote their conscience on a highly contentious policy issue of abortion.
9. Results and Analysis: Lithuania

Table 3 presents the results of regression analysis for the Lithuanian data. The results provide rather mixed support to the hypothesis on the relationship between the rate of defection and the strength of personal vote. On the one hand, the share of the personal vote obtained by the candidate (PVOTE) does not have a significant effect on the dissension rate in any of the two terms, even though the signs of the coefficients in both models are negative and therefore support Hypothesis 2 (see Models 5 and 7). However, the dummy variable defining those MPs who got elected due to preference votes (PERSONAL) is significant, even if only at the 0.1 level in 2003-2004, (Model 6) and has a very substantial impact on the voting unity of MPs in 2004-2006 (model 8.) On the average, the value of the individual voting unity index for those legislators was between 0.8 and 0.1 points lower than for the remaining MPs. These results provide moderate support for Hypothesis 3.

[Table 3 about here]

Regarding the impact of the list position, it was significant in only one of the two specifications of the model for the 2004-2006 data (see Model 7). Its effect was counter-intuitive – the lower list position was related to lower values of the index of voting unity. Furthermore, the impact of the list position was also very substantial – the increase from the minimal value of this variable to the maximal value decreases the value of the voting unity index by 0.16. However, this effect completely disappears when controlling for PERSONAL variable. Therefore, the results provide very little support for Hypothesis 1.

It is also worth noting that the SMD variable was not significant in any of the models, which, in contrast to the conclusions of Clarke et al (2008) and in support of the expectations above, implies that there is no clear divide between SMD deputies and PR deputies in Lithuania. The interaction effect between SMD and PVOTE is also not significant. However, the interaction effect between SMD and PERSONAL (to control for the MPs who won a seat in the single member district and also climbed up on a party list in a PR tier) is significant at the 0.1 level in Models 6 and 8 and, and in line with our expectations, the sign of the coefficient is positive. This would tentatively imply that even if the legislator was elected because of a relatively high number of personal votes, she did
not dissent more if she also obtained a seat in a single member district. The effect of this interaction might be counterintuitive, since if an MP is elected in SMD and also went up on the party list from a non-electable to an electable position in the PR tier because of preferences votes, she should be even more likely to defect than another MP who was elected in PR due to a high number of preference votes. Our explanation is that this result might be a peculiarity of a few deputies from a relatively small pool of MPs who moved from a non-electable list position to a position which resulted in a parliamentary seat. In that sense Mr Žiemelis was an exception as there were not many MPs who got elected from a non-electable position due to preference votes in the first place. Another thing to note is that the sign of the coefficient for the interaction term in models 6 and 8 is positive because it is an adjustment for the PERSONAL and the SMD variables. If the coefficients for the constituent terms were added together, then the result for the MPs who were elected in the single member district but who also went up on the party list in the PR tier due to preference vote would be nearly indistinguishable from 0 in model 6 \([-0.090(\text{PERSONAL})+0.000(\text{SMD})+0.098(\text{PERSONAL}*\text{SMD})]\) and in model 8, there would be a barely discernable from zero, small negative effect \([-0.100(\text{PERSONAL})-0.015(\text{SMD(\text{SEAT})})+0.081(\text{PERSONAL}*\text{SMD})]\). Therefore, we should interpret the meaning of these coefficients with caution and at this stage we are unable to explain this result in more certain terms.

The overall picture of the effects of personal vote on party unity in Lithuania indicates that, much like Polish legislators, the Lithuanian MPs react to the incentives created by the flexible list system, but they do that in a different way than the MPs in Poland. Overall, these results suggest some support to Hypothesis 3 that the dissension in legislative voting is partially driven by those MPs who had relatively low list positions and a moderate number of preference votes, allowing them to climb up on the party list to an electable position. Furthermore, tentatively it can be argued that this relationship did not hold for the part of this group of legislators who also managed to get SMD seats.

With regard to other control variables, in the first instance, party switchers were somewhat more likely to defect on their parties in the 2003-2004 term. Second, somewhat counter-intuitively, the incumbent MPs defected more in the 2004-2006 term. Third, the leadership of the party did not matter much for the defection rate. Finally, MPs from the
Liberal and Centre Union were significantly more likely to defect than the legislators from the Social Democratic Party (a reference category in all models). This is not surprising, given that this party was in opposition in the period under consideration and had experienced a split in 2005. MPs from the two other opposition parties, the Homeland Union and the Liberal Democratic Party, were also more likely to defect than the legislators of the Social Democratic Party in the 2004-2006 term. In contrast, the defection rates of the legislators of other government parties, such as the New Union and the Labour Party, were not significantly higher in comparison to the Social Democratic Party. These results seem to support the expectation that government parties are more united in legislative voting.

10. Discussion of Findings and Conclusions

The goal of this paper was to examine how the possibility of voters to select their preferred candidates provided by the flexible-list PR rules affects party unity in legislative voting under pure PR system in Poland and mixed electoral system in Lithuania. We argued that the flexible-list PR system, in which both the list position and the number of preference votes jointly determine which candidates are elected, creates a dilemma for the legislators seeking to maximize their re-election chances. On the one hand, they need to follow the party line in order to satisfy the leadership of the party and increase their chances of acquiring a high position on the electoral list. On the other hand, they also need to cultivate personal vote in order to obtain a sufficient number of preference votes.

Our primary findings suggest that under flexible-list PR rules, legislators' defection is not much affected by their list positions. These findings contradict studies which argue that legislators placed on higher positions should be more likely to deviate from the party line (e.g. Haspel et al 1998, Herron 2002, Ferrara 2004). However, we provide evidence showing that the level of legislators' defection from the party line depends on their personal support, as expressed by the number of preference votes they received in the last election. Specifically, we find that in Poland, the legislators who had the highest number of preference votes defected most, even if their list positions were high enough to provide them with reasonable chances of getting re-elected. This is not
surprising, as these legislators are the ones who depend most on personal vote for their re-election. In contrast, in Lithuania, legislators who had enough preference votes to improve their list position to an electable one were significantly more likely to defect from their parties in a floor vote. Our explanation for this finding is that a high personal support of these MPs makes them less dependent on the leadership of the party for their re-election.

Evidently, there could be context-specific factors, such as legislative organization and practices, which might account for the different impact of personal reputation in the two countries. Poland has a highly decentralized legislature with some of the largest, most autonomous committee systems in CEE (Olson and Crowther 2002:176), weak agenda control by the government and few formal means of defending legislation against rival particularistic bills and amendments (Goetz and Zubek, 2007.) In this kind of environment, the MPs with large winning margins and high levels of personal support from the voters have less to fear from their party at the parliamentary level and can afford to be more independent when voting on bills and amendments.

In Lithuania, in addition to the fact that half of the MPs are linked directly to their constituencies, there is also an overall orientation toward the individual parliamentarian in legislative practice: neither parliamentary committees (which are among the smallest in Central Eastern Europe) nor party groups can propose legislation and there is an even greater opportunity for autonomous legislative activity than in Poland due to the fact that within the Seimas only individual legislators may initiate bills (Pettai and Madise 2006.) Consequently, the more candidate-centred legislative rules and procedures in Lithuania may facilitate greater independence among the “also-ran” MPs whose parties placed them low on the district lists and who therefore must rely on constituency support to move from a no-seat list position to an electable position. These MPs would have not only strong incentives but also the opportunity to act more autonomously on behalf of their constituencies, which could explain to some extent their propensity to dissent from the party line.

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32 Legislative activity in Lithuania is partially shaped by the government which can also propose bills, but parliamentary committees can reject bills or refuse to submit them to a plenary reading (Pettai and Madise 2006: 299-301.) Overall, in Lithuania, there is a greater concentration of policy making in the government than in Poland (Olson and Crowther 2002:192)
Furthermore, there are some potentially significant differences between the two types of list systems in Poland and in the PR tier in Lithuania: they vary according to the number of nominative votes allowed. In Poland the voter is permitted to select only one candidate from a party list whereas in Lithuania up to five preference votes are permitted. The two electoral systems also differ in terms of the impact of the party ordering of candidates on the outcome of the election. In Poland, the order of elected MPs within a party group is entirely determined by the number of nominative votes the candidates receive whereas in Lithuania, a combination of party ordering and nominative votes determines which candidates will be elected, i.e., the voter marks on the ballot the list of candidates whom she is voting for and enters the numbers of five chosen candidates in designated spaces of the ballot. This is important, according to Marsh (1985), who states that "the most interesting difference of type is that between systems where seats are allocated between candidates purely on the basis of preference votes and those where the ordering of the list by the party is also a factor" (1985:1-19.) Thus, the differential effect of list ordering on the allocation of seats among the party's candidates in the two electoral systems may also be reflected in the differential impact of the two types of preference vote on party unity.

While at this stage we are unable to explain conclusively why the type of effect of preference votes on legislative party unity varies across the two countries, the paper shows that the number of preference votes matters and it matters more than the list position. Therefore, future research could address this puzzle and the precise causal mechanism of this relationship in the context of other countries. Another important finding of the paper is that there are no discernible differences between the legislative behavior of SMD deputies and PR deputies in Lithuania. This finding contributes to the literature on the mandate divide in countries using mixed electoral systems.

33 For a detailed description of the Polish and the Lithuanian ballot, see Appendix 2.
34 According to Zenonas Vaigauskas, the chairman of the Lithuanian General Election Committee (VRK), the opportunity to rate the candidates is not usually taken by those who vote for the smaller parties. Generally about 20 per cent of the voters do not rate the candidates on party lists. While voters can only rate candidates from one party list, preference voting is not mandatory (http://www.lithuaniatribune.com/16632/one-fifth-of-voters-do-not-rate-party-candidates-when-voting-201216632/)
In sum, the results of this study demonstrate that the overall effects of our covariate of greatest theoretical interest - personal vote on party unity hold in the two types of flexible-list PR system, i.e., where the intra-party allocation of seats is based entirely on nominative votes for the candidates (Poland) and systems where intra-party allocation of seats is based on both nominative votes and party ordering of candidates (Lithuania.) Furthermore, personal vote affects party unity under both, pure-PR system and mixed electoral system, albeit in different ways, with no evidence of mandate divide.

One possible implication of our findings for Poland and Lithuania is that preference voting system can potentially foster personalisation of politics and the weakening of parties. Although the overall levels of party unity in both countries remain relatively high, conceivably, the role of parties could be diminished as candidates competing for votes might feel compelled to run increasingly personal campaigns in order to differentiate themselves from their co-partisans and, once in office, MPs elected through personal vote may feel that they should remain close to their constituents and be responsive to the constituency’s preferences in order to secure re-election (Ortega 2006.) However, as Crisp et al (2013) point out, this might be a good bargain for the parties as candidates who bring votes are valuable party assets, even if they do so through increased individual notability attained in part by occasionally voting against the party line in a floor vote. In other words, the costs of lower (within acceptable bounds) party unity can be offset by the benefit of added voter support for the dissenting MP as voters would be drawn to the party by both the opportunity and the incentive to express preference for an individually notable candidate. Finally, we also need to stress that even though the estimated effects of personal vote generally comport with our expectation regarding its impact on vote cohesion within the party ranks, the importance of the strength of personal support for the unity of legislative parties should not be over-estimated. Party affiliation explained a much higher share of the variation in the unity in legislative voting. Hence, as demonstrated in other contexts (Samuels 1999), parties should be able to overcome the institutional constraints on their legislative behavior.
APPENDIX 1: DATA DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS

Table 1: Summary Statistics for Variables in the Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Lithuania 2003-2004</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unity index</td>
<td>0.5777</td>
<td>0.9527</td>
<td>0.8356</td>
<td>0.0823</td>
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<tr>
<td>Share of preference votes (PVOTE)</td>
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<td>0.5797</td>
<td>0.0803</td>
<td>0.1467</td>
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<td>Log of the list position (log (POSITION))</td>
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<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.3917</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbents</td>
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<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.2167</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party switchers</td>
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<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.0563</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERSONAL variable</td>
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<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.1500</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lithuania 2004-2006</strong></td>
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<td>0.0991</td>
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<tr>
<td>PERSONAL variable</td>
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<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.1333</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Poland 2001-2005</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Unity index</td>
<td>0.7343</td>
<td>0.9923</td>
<td>0.9350</td>
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<td>Share of preference votes (PVOTE)</td>
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<td>Party switchers</td>
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<td>PERSONAL variable</td>
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<td>0.2665</td>
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</tr>
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<td><strong>Poland 2005-2007</strong></td>
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</tr>
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<td>Unity index</td>
<td>0.9044</td>
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<td>Share of preference votes (PVOTE)</td>
<td>0.00920</td>
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<td>PERSONAL variable</td>
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<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.1940</td>
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# Table 2: OLS Coefficient Estimates: Personal Vote and Party Unity in Poland

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<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.993*** (0.007)</td>
<td>0.986*** (0.006)</td>
<td>0.981*** (0.004)</td>
<td>0.977*** (0.003)</td>
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<td>Share of preference votes (PVOTE)</td>
<td>-0.028* (0.014)</td>
<td>-0.015* (0.007)</td>
<td>-0.002 (0.002)</td>
<td>-0.002 (0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Votes (PERSONAL)</td>
<td>0.003 (0.005)</td>
<td>0.003 (0.005)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.001)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.001)</td>
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<td>Log of the list position (log (POSITION))</td>
<td>0.001 (0.002)</td>
<td>0.002 (0.003)</td>
<td>-0.001 (0.001)</td>
<td>-0.001 (0.001)</td>
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<tr>
<td>District Magnitude (DISTMAG)</td>
<td>-0.001* (0.000)</td>
<td>-0.001* (0.000)</td>
<td>-0.000 (0.000)</td>
<td>-0.000 (0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Leader (LEADER)</td>
<td>0.027** (0.010)</td>
<td>0.019* (0.008)</td>
<td>0.002 (0.006)</td>
<td>0.002 (0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seniority Status (INCUMBENT)</td>
<td>-0.007* (0.003)</td>
<td>-0.007* (0.003)</td>
<td>0.0004*** (0.001)</td>
<td>0.0005*** (0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Switchers (SWITCHER)</td>
<td>-0.010* (0.004)</td>
<td>-0.010* (0.004)</td>
<td>0.0003 (0.002)</td>
<td>0.0003 (0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>League of Polish Families</td>
<td>-0.063*** (0.006)</td>
<td>-0.067*** (0.006)</td>
<td>-0.003 (0.003)</td>
<td>-0.003 (0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law and Justice</td>
<td>-0.025*** (0.005)</td>
<td>-0.028*** (0.005)</td>
<td>0.017*** (0.002)</td>
<td>0.018*** (0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic Platform</td>
<td>-0.049*** (0.005)</td>
<td>-0.051*** (0.005)</td>
<td>0.006** (0.002)</td>
<td>0.007** (0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish People's Party</td>
<td>-0.104*** (0.006)</td>
<td>-0.104*** (0.006)</td>
<td>-0.019*** (0.004)</td>
<td>-0.018*** (0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Defense of the Republic of Poland</td>
<td>-0.056*** (0.008)</td>
<td>0.058*** (0.008)</td>
<td>-0.007*** (0.003)</td>
<td>0.006* (0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People's Democratic Party</td>
<td>-0.055† (0.030)</td>
<td>-0.059* (0.029)</td>
<td>0.003 (0.003)</td>
<td>0.003 (0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish Agreement</td>
<td>-0.028† (0.012)</td>
<td>-0.037*** (0.011)</td>
<td>0.111 (0.011)</td>
<td>0.111 (0.011)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Catholic National Movement</td>
<td>-0.040** (0.012)</td>
<td>-0.042*** (0.011)</td>
<td>0.003 (0.003)</td>
<td>0.003 (0.003)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland</td>
<td>-0.078† (0.046)</td>
<td>-0.078† (0.046)</td>
<td>-0.007*** (0.003)</td>
<td>-0.006* (0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative People's Party</td>
<td>-0.151*** (0.021)</td>
<td>-0.152*** (0.021)</td>
<td>-0.007† (0.014)</td>
<td>-0.006† (0.014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor Union</td>
<td>-0.034*** (0.007)</td>
<td>-0.033*** (0.007)</td>
<td>0.007 (0.014)</td>
<td>0.006 (0.014)</td>
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<td>National People's Movement</td>
<td>0.007 (0.014)</td>
<td>0.006 (0.014)</td>
<td>0.487 (0.487)</td>
<td>0.487 (0.487)</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.690</td>
<td>0.687</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>0.493</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adj. R²</td>
<td>0.679</td>
<td>0.676</td>
<td>0.487</td>
<td>0.480</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Table 3: OLS Coefficient Estimates: Personal Vote and Party Unity in Lithuania

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.850*** (0.044)</td>
<td>0.820*** (0.030)</td>
<td>0.960*** (0.045)</td>
<td>0.903*** (0.028)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of preference votes</td>
<td>-0.064 (0.100)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.063 (0.135)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Votes (PVOTE)</td>
<td>-0.090† (0.051)</td>
<td>-0.034** (0.013)</td>
<td>-0.100*** (0.027)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of the list position</td>
<td>-0.002 (0.014)</td>
<td>0.010 (0.008)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of the list position (log</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMD deputies (SEAT)</td>
<td>0.016 (0.021)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.014)</td>
<td>0.030 (0.020)</td>
<td>-0.015 (0.017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PVOTE*SMD</td>
<td>0.025 (0.118)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.103 (0.137)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERSONAL *SMD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.08† (0.049)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seniority Status (INCUMBENT)</td>
<td>0.006 (0.024)</td>
<td>0.011 (0.021)</td>
<td>-0.049* (0.022)</td>
<td>-0.045* (0.022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Switchers (SWITCHER)</td>
<td>-0.093† (0.049)</td>
<td>-0.076† (0.045)</td>
<td>0.008 (0.051)</td>
<td>-0.026 (0.048)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Union</td>
<td>0.036† (0.020)</td>
<td>0.039* (0.019)</td>
<td>0.052† (0.030)</td>
<td>0.060* (0.029)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal and Centre Union</td>
<td>-0.058* (0.027)</td>
<td>-0.049† (0.026)</td>
<td>-0.103* (0.041)</td>
<td>-0.068† (0.038)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Democratic Party</td>
<td>-0.040 (0.026)</td>
<td>-0.044† (0.026)</td>
<td>-0.225*** (0.065)</td>
<td>-0.199*** (0.058)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeland Union</td>
<td>-0.001 (0.040)</td>
<td>-0.003 (0.038)</td>
<td>-0.103*** (0.028)</td>
<td>-0.087** (0.028)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of the Peasants and New</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.072* (0.029)</td>
<td>-0.057* (0.028)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.025 (0.022)</td>
<td>-0.021 (0.022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.205</td>
<td>0.271</td>
<td>0.410</td>
<td>0.474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R²</td>
<td>0.132</td>
<td>0.205</td>
<td>0.352</td>
<td>0.422</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significant at † p<.01; * p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001
Party reference category – SLD (Democratic Left Alliance).
Figure 1. MP Unity Score and Personal Vote in the Polish Parliament, 2001-2005

Figure 2. MP Unity Score and Personal Vote in the Polish Parliament, 2005-2007
DATA SOURCES FOR VARIABLES IN THE ANALYSIS

Poland

Party Unity (roll call votes)


Electoral Data: Personal Vote, Preference Vote, List Position, District Magnitude

Panstwowa Komisja Wyborcza:

Electoral Data: Party leaders, Party switchers, Seniority Status

Sejm Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej, Kancelaria Sejmu, IV Kadencja: Informacja o działalności Sejmu (19 October 2001 - 18 October 2005)


Lithuania

Party Unity (roll call votes)

Seimas of the Republic of Lithuanian: www.lrs.lt

Electoral Data

REFERENCES


CSPP University of Strathclyde
http://www.balticvoices.org/lithuania/lithuanian_elections.php#elect_int


Inter-Parliamentary Union, PARLINE http://www.ipu.org/parline/reports/2189.htm


Legislationline http://legislationline.org/topics/country/17/topic/6


Abstract

In this paper, I investigate party strategies with respect to policy dynamism and policy orientation under varying electoral rules, and assess the effects of these two factors on the risk of electoral death for 429 parties in 28 national legislatures of new and established European democracies from 1945-2010. Recent research suggests that party breakdowns occur when parties dilute their ideological brands and lose policy coherence (Lupu 2011, Lucardi and van Schuur 2011). Also, several seminal studies demonstrate that different electoral rules tend to produce either centripetal or centrifugal policy incentives for parties which adopt policies they believe will help them gain and maintain parliamentary representation (Cox 1990, Blais and Bodet 2006, Calvo and Hellwig 2011). However, to date there has been no comprehensive empirical research on party failure across time and space with explicit focus on party policy. Present study fills this gap and it makes the case for employing duration methodology to analyze institutional survival.

The results show that in the established Western European democracies the theory of brand dilution does not appear to hold. Here, the evidence supports Laver and Sergenti’s (2011) findings that vote-seeking parties prone to frequent policy shifts on issues of high relevance to the voters have a lower hazard of electoral death than parties which remain consistent in their policy orientations over time. Only in respect to policy on planned economy in Central Eastern Europe, frequent and profound policy shifts can indeed lead to increased hazard of electoral death for parliamentary parties.

Furthermore, policy positions on key issues under different electoral rules play a role in explaining party durability in older democracies of Western Europe. This finding supports the well-established research on the tendency of political parties to cluster around the center of the ideological spectrum in low district magnitude/low ENPP systems and to spread their policy orientations in high district magnitude/high ENPP systems.
1. Introduction: The Puzzle of Legislative Party Survival

The matter of life and death of political parties has important implications for the size and shape of party systems in modern democracies and for the ability of elected governments to implement the normative ideal of representative democracy. Parties serve as a nexus between society and the state, and it has been argued that programmatically oriented political parties engender responsiveness and accountability characteristic of high quality democratic governance (Kitschelt et al 1999). While some party systems are relatively contained with mostly the same parties regularly contesting elections or winning seats in parliament, others have wildly varying levels of party permanence. In recent decades, party spectra in several established democracies have become more crowded with the entry and electoral success of green and left-libertarian parties, and with the proliferation of the new right and populist parties (Zaslove 2003.) According to Mair, within the crowded moderate pluralism, which tends to be the prevailing type of party system among today's competitive democracies, "almost all parties have become salonfähig" (2006:69.) But in spite of this widening range of socially palatable parties, clearly, not all parties successful in winning a seat in the national legislature are equally successful in maintaining parliamentary presence. Why then do some legislative parties which have been competitive and successful in past elections, lose parliamentary representation? What are the key factors that contribute to the variance in the life spans of legislative parties and the resulting differences in the stability of party alternatives?

To answer these questions, the objective of this paper is to investigate whether there is some universal mechanism that helps explain the demise of political parties. To this end, I examine the possible causes of legislative party death by investigating party strategies with respect to programmatic orientation and policy dynamism. I assess the effects of these factors on the survival of parties in national legislatures of new and established European democracies. I expect that the risk of electoral death for parties in parliament will be greater when: 1) parties dilute their ideological brands by frequent and profound shifts in their policy positions, and 2) adopt extreme policy positions in small district magnitude settings and moderate toward the middle of the policy spectrum in large district magnitude systems.
Bearing in mind that the party in parliament is the central actor in politics of both new and established democracies, the justification for studying party failure is best summed up by Pedersen: “the notion of a party lifespan is based upon an assumption which many political scientists forget, and very few politicians like to ponder, namely that parties are mortal organizations” (Perdersen 1982:6.) Thus, a comprehensive, cross-national analysis of the longevity of parliamentary parties might generate important information not only about the changes in individual parties but also about the changes in party systems. To my knowledge, this approach has not yet been taken directly in the literature.

2. Why Is Party Death Important?

The key premise of my research is that an institutionalized party system with stable party alternatives and structured inter-party competition is contingent upon durability of legislative parties, i.e., their ability to survive in parliament. From this premise, I target party longevity more directly, and hold it up as a manifestation of party institutionalization that has been seldom if ever examined systematically, cross-nationally, over time. Thence, I set out to examine the relationship between the ideological-programmatic profiles and policy trajectories of parties and their duration in national legislatures. The unit of analysis is a legislative party and the dependent variable is its survival until the time of electoral death.

A legislative party is a competitive political party which gained at least one seat in the national legislature. This follows Harmel and Janda’s definition of a competitive political party as “an organization that pursues the goal of placing its avowed representatives in political office, which it does by running candidates in competitive elections” (1994:272.) Furthermore, political parties are characterized by a concept of a party lifespan whereby party institutionalization is a process of aggregating distinct interests and ideas in cohesive structures and, over time, embedding and solidifying these structures into a durable system of political organization (Janda 1980, 1993, Pedersen 1982.)

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35 In dual chamber national legislatures, I only consider the parties in the lower house.
Thus conceptualized party institutionalization implies not only a state but also a process of political survival. In other words, "implicit in the concept of institutionalization is the time dimension. [...] A party cannot be said to be institutionalized if it is not able to survive over time" (Huntington in Randall and Svåsand 1999:10.) Institutionalization of political parties takes place in both time and space. Figures 1 and 2 in Appendix 2 illustrate the frequency of party death and the regional variation in parties surviving consecutive national elections in established Western European democracies and in new democracies of Central Eastern Europe.

3. Existing Research

Given that there is a high variation in the life spans of legislative parties in both new and old democracies, there is a conspicuous shortage of research with an explicit focus on party death. At the same time, there is no shortage of studies on party formation, thus it might make some intuitive sense to apply the existing approaches to party formation to explain party decline and death. For example, electoral institutions have been widely used in the literature to explain emergence of new parties: following Duverger (1954), many scholars have found that PR-systems with large districts are more conducive to the formation of new parties than plurality SMD systems (e.g., Taagepera and Shugart 1989, Lijphart 1994, Willey 1998, Tavits 2006.)

Other explanations of new party formation employ the demand and supply logic, whereby the shift from materialist to post-materialist social values precipitated the demand for new parties more in tune with the collective post-materialist esprit of the electorate (Inglehart 1990.) According to the demand and supply mechanism, the failure of established alternatives due to inertia or other reasons opens up space for new parties (Hauss and Rayside 1978, Ahrne and Papakostas 2001) or new forms of organization (Lawson and Merkl 1988.)

However, there are two main objections here. First, party birth explanations centred exclusively on electoral institutions tell us only a part of the story as they are limited to spatial variation between party systems (rather than individual parties) at given points in time (rather than encompassing processes over time.) In respect to the party supply and demand explanations, it could be argued that they are borderline tautological,
i.e., in a zero-sum setting of party competition, there are no reasons for new parties to form (and, *ipso facto*, for the established parties to die) if the existing parties optimally channel and respond to voter demands (Erlingsson, 2008)

Second, Tavits (2008) cautions that formation of political parties and their electoral success should be analytically differentiated as the parameters determining the two events are substantively different. Similarly, in her theoretical analysis of party formation and adaptation, van Biezen points that all too often scholars confuse the notion of party formation with party adaptation (i.e., survival), and argues that the conceptual confusion of these two distinct processes undermines our understanding of party development (2005:147.)

In terms of the literature on party death, Janda (1980) offers perhaps the most extensive large-N comparative analysis of 158 political parties between 1950 and 1962 which proposes a detailed classification scheme of the mode of party termination. However, the study is largely descriptive and lacks more recent data. Only a handful of recent studies explicitly address the phenomenon of party death; this includes research by Haughton and Deegan-Krause on the patterns of survival of six “hardy perennials” in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia (2011), Lucardie and van Schuur on party decline in Canada, Germany and the Netherlands (2011), and Jupskáš on the demise of old populist parties in Scandinavia (2011.) Though a step in the right direction, all of these analyses are small-N, case-oriented studies and thus have limited external validity.

In a more comprehensive contemporary analysis, Wolinetz (2011) found that within fourteen Western European party systems, with the exception of France and Italy, the parties least likely to die are older parties which constitute the system’s core, i.e., those that have defined and anchored the party system over the years, and that proportional representation rules enable these major parties to survive even in spite of diminished support. In respect to Central Eastern Europe, much of the comparative research follows Bartolini and Mair (1990) by concentrating on the systemic aspects of party competition (e.g., Wittenberg 2006, Tavits 2008, Powel and Tucker 2009) while the transience of CEE parties and the overall indeterminacy of post-communist party systems has been linked to rapid economic changes and disadvantages of incumbency (Roberts 2008), charismatic but ephemeral leadership (Lewis 2006), weak party membership (van
Biezen 2005), disloyalty and party switching among party elites (Shabad and Slomczynski 2004), or the patterns of party formation and success (e.g. Sikk 2005, 2006, 2012, Tavits 2008.)

A notable exception are two recent studies of the patterns of new party persistence and decline across 17 advanced democracies by Bolleyer and Bischoff (2012) and Bolleyer (2013.) In her analysis of 148 new parties over the past fifty years, Bolleyer (2013) finds that that factors facilitating party building, such as ties to societal groups, and party maintenance, such as low access barriers to free broadcasting and state funding, have significant positive effects on new party persistence, whereas most success and reward measures, such as average vote support do not appear significant. According to Bolleyer this indicates that new parties which act as ‘organizational actors’ rather than strategic, instrumentally driven entities are more likely to persist over the long run.

As the story of the demise of parties in parliament has never been told as a large-N comparative analysis and the research on legislative parties lacks a more direct approach to the puzzle of party death, this project intends to address this lacuna on two levels, theoretical and empirical. In this paper, I set out to explain the duration of parties in parliament by applying an actuarial approach but with political science theory. Specifically, I propose a theoretical framework which ties the risk of legislative party death to party identity, i.e., the programmatic offer based on which it competes with other parties for votes, and I present evidence that the risk of death is affected by the variation in ideological and policy orientations of parties over time and across space. The independent variables designed to measure the risk of legislative party death are derived from the literature on party policy and spatial theories of party competition.

Second, this paper is intended to contribute to the continued development of methodologies that go beyond conventional analysis by handling data dynamically. The view taken here is that the study of institutionalization of parties and party systems is fundamentally a study of the patterns and causes of change. As such, empirical methodology which reflects the dynamic process of change from one state to another is

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36 My theoretical propositions and empirical models owe a great deal to the recent scholarship on the dynamics of party competition in representative democracies (e.g., Benoit and Laver 2007a, 2007c, Laver and Serganti 2011.)
particularly well suited and event history models can provide more leverage in explaining
the dynamic nature of the longevity of parties in parliament. I am unaware of any cross-
national, comprehensive empirical analysis focusing on the impact of policy on
legislative party death using survival methodology techniques\textsuperscript{37}.

4. Defining Legislative Party Death

Since the unit of analysis is a party in parliament, the key consideration is to decide
when a party has died. According to Laver and Sergenti (2011), this is important as both
the absolute and the effective number of parties in any political system depends on
defining a political party and deciding when it has died.\textsuperscript{38}

The view adopted here follows Sartori’s (1976) definition of a political party as an
electoral vehicle\textsuperscript{39}. A party’s lifespan is, \textit{ceteris paribus}, reflected in electoral cycles
whereby a party lives as long as it nominates candidates in elections (local, regional or
national) and it dies when it stops participating in the electoral process.\textsuperscript{40} However, this
paper deals only with parties in national legislatures, bypassing sub-national parties and
the multitude of parties which never gained parliamentary representation. Thus, given the
narrower scope of this research, a more useful approach to party death is offered by Laver
and Sergenti (2011) who, in their recent book on party competition, observe that in the
language of political science, most parties "die" when they fall through some arbitrary
threshold, even though they may still be effectively alive. Laver and Sergenti describe
three types of thresholds: 1) \textit{explicit thresholds} of parliamentary representation embedded
in electoral formulas, e.g., 5% in Germany or 2% in Israel; 2) \textit{implicit thresholds} present
in all political systems which reflect the interactions between the constituency and
national level thresholds, district magnitude and the distribution of party support and
constituency level (also Cox 1997, Taagepera 2002, Gallagher and Mitchell 2008) and 3)

\textsuperscript{37} While survival analysis features prominently in economics, business and sociology, in spite of increased
availability of temporal data and the expansion of computational power and techniques, the vast majority of
political science research (especially on institutionalization) is conducted using static models (Box-
Steffensmeier and Jones 1997.)

\textsuperscript{38} Laver points out that the Effective Number of Electoral Parties (ENEP) is less affected by the multitude
of nano-parties in a system (Laver 2011.)

\textsuperscript{39} This is consistent with the instrumentalist view that parties are goal oriented actors anticipating electoral
success in their core institutional arenas.

\textsuperscript{40} This happens when a party ceases to operate as an autonomous organization, e.g., it dissolves itself,
merges with another party, splits into separate entities, etc.
de facto survival thresholds which, according to Laver and Sergenti, are the levels of electoral support below which parties lose relevance, cease to compete in a meaningful way, and wither away (2011:158.) So, party death can be operationalized as the duration of organizational survival, i.e., as an uninterrupted tenure of a parliamentary party in national legislature until the party fails to cross some specified threshold.

Given that there is more than one way to conceptualize the threshold of survival and, axiomatically, death, in this paper I draw on two sources. First, organizational literature refers to a failure of an organization as organizational mortality, organizational exit, retrenchment, or decline. There is a broad, common sense understanding of organizational failure as shrinking of resources and deterioration of organizational capacity to the point that the resulting manifestation of failure is exit from the area of operation or cessation to exist (Cameron, Sutton, and Whetten 1988, cf. Mellahi and Wilkinson 1998.) Secondly, owing to Duverger’s twin hypotheses, recent electoral systems literature made significant advances in the study of the dynamics between electoral laws and rules of the game, on the one hand, and the size and composition of the party system, on the other (e.g., Boix 1999; Benoit 2002, 2004; Colomer 2005; Taagepera 2006; Gallagher and Mitchell 2008.) In the words of Taagepera, electoral systems and party systems are inextricably intertwined and “electoral systems can sometimes make or break a party” (2006:3-5.) Consequently, consistent with the concept of a political party as a goal-driven electoral machine, in my analysis survivors and casualties are narrowly defined in terms of electoral victory or loss, whereby party death is simply a failure of an existing legislative party to cross the threshold of representation. For legislative parties in established democracies, this means failure to maintain parliamentary representation in any consecutive democratic election since 1945. Alternately, if a party dissolves itself, or splits or merges with another party and loses much of its previous identity at any point during the electoral cycle, I will also consider this a party death. Thus operationalized party death will be applied in my empirical analysis.

41 Only elections which give the voters meaningful choice are considered. Thus, I use the Polity IV Project Combined Polity Score as a filter for my case selection of countries. The Polity score is derived by subtracting the composite indicator for Autocracy from the composite indicator for Democracy which results in a Polity scale range from +10 (strongly democratic) to −10 (strongly autocratic.) Only countries with an average score of +8 or above during the period of observation are considered in the analysis.

42 The view adopted here is that a party merger or split signifies an organizational failure as it generally
To sum it up, we can think of party death as the right censored risk of failure of legislative parties to persist above a threshold of representation over time due to hypothesized effects of relevant exogenous variables. Accordingly, party survival is the number of electoral cycles elapsed before the change from one state to another state – in this case, from the first time a party gains parliamentary representation (after May 1945 for Western European democracies, or following the first democratic elections for Greece, Portugal, Spain and the former communist states of Central Eastern Europe) to the first time the same party fails at the ballot box by falling below the threshold of representation.  

5. Theory: Ideological Brand, Policy Content and the Risk of Death

This research is about party death, or more precisely, about the risk of death a party faces during its legislative life. Given the multitude of factors that can affect the lifespan of parties in parliaments, it would be very difficult to engage in any type of large scale comparative analysis without considering the key attribute that constitutes the essence of all political parties, namely their ideology.

Ideology and policy have been at the core of theoretical and substantive analyses of parties and party systems. Considerable amount of research has been dedicated to positional analysis and measurement of the ideological content of party manifestos and voting records of parties in parliament. From the time of the first recorded physical manifestation of ideological positioning going back to the seating arrangement in the 1789 French Constituent Assembly, positional representation of political actors on issues has often been subsumed under the broad rubric of ideology. In respect to political parties, spatial orientation of parties in and out of legislatures on political, social, involves policy compromise or other types of accommodation whereby the original identity and integrity of the party has to be altered in order to ensure electoral or office success. This would happen particularly under the vote- and office- seeking models of party competition. Under the policy- seeking model, parties are unlikely to merge, as this allows party leaders to advocate policy positions which are congruent with his ideal points on the policy spectrum. For a detailed discussion of party mergers and splits, see Ibenskas 2012.

Several parties in my sample have been formed prior to 1945, and thus, they are left censored. The choice to include these parties in the analysis is justified by the fact that WWII was a watershed event in global history and that the pre-1945 political environment in Europe was very different from the post-WWII order, and therefore any residual impact of pre-1945 historical legacies is probably negligible.
economic, cultural, and other issues of importance has been the workhorse of both case oriented studies and comparative cross-national research. In his seminal work, *Political Parties*, Duverger argued for the centrality of ideology in party theory, for example for the inclusion of extremist and moderate tendencies within particular ideological cleavages (1963:230) and demonstrated its importance as a crucial variable affecting not only other characteristics of political parties, but also the shape of politics, in general (1963:234-239.)

In this analysis I follow the spatial theory of party competition which assumes the existence of a left-right dimension of ideological identification, applicable in any electoral context. I do not claim that this approach represents some "ground truth" about the behaviour of political competitors, merely I use it as a convenient analytical tool to examine the hypothesized nexus between ideological and policy positioning of legislative parties and their risk of electoral death. The fundamental point here is that in assessing the risk of party death in established and new democracies, the most important variable examined in this study is the ideological-programatic profile of parties in national legislatures. While there may well be other factors that affect the risk of party death, this research is concerned with two specific attributes: the strength of party brand and the content of party policy orientation subsumed under the concept of party ideology.

5.1. Brand Dilution on Death of Legislative Parties

A key aspect defining the identity of political parties, ideology is a brand which identifies a party in the eyes of the electorate and other parties, and helps voters evaluate distinct attributes of a particular party. A substantive manifestation, or an output, of a party brand is its policy. In other words, ideology provides a framework for concrete policy decisions within the context of strategic considerations involving internal party politics, policy positions of other parties, voter preferences, etc. (e.g., Goldstein and Keohane 1993.) In broad terms, the essence of representative democracy is that policy positions of the electorate are represented by the policy positions of political parties and a common assumption among scholars involved in spatial modelling is that voters evaluate

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44 This proposition assumes congruence between party ideology, generally articulated in its Manifesto or party program, and party policy.
parties based on their policy positions (e.g., Benoit and Laver 2007a:6.) In accordance with the "policy evaluation" approach, clearly identifiable ideological brands and consistent policy choices can make political parties resistant to negative retrospective evaluations (Lupu 2011: ii) while the "party persuasion" school offers a hypodermic needle image of parties injecting the electorate with policy promises to win votes later (e.g., Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009.) But there is also evidence to suggest that voters do not automatically respond to parties' policy shifts by adjusting their own loyalties, rather they respond to their perceptions of these shifts (Adams et al. 2011) Nonetheless, the key argument here is that in the real world of party competition, party brands help voters distinguish what the parties stand for and, over time, help form partisan attachments.

Also relevant to my argument about the importance of party brands for voter decision making, and ipso facto for party survival, is the vast scholarship on voting and elections which can be organized into two general categories based on theoretical emphases and assumptions about the determinants of political behaviour. On the one hand, there are the sociological and cultural explanations. Scholars who subscribe to this school of voting behaviour articulate the concept of a party as a cognitive object for the individual voters in order to discover how political attitudes and beliefs are formed and how individuals with marginal interest in politics are able to navigate the complexities of the political world. The prime example are the Michigan studies of Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes (1960, 1966) who have pioneered this approach to understanding how party identification is related to voting behaviour. In the Michigan model, the focus is on the affective dimension whereby socialization, perception and selective attention are the dominant building blocks of party loyalty, and party identification with a specific party brand is highly durable and constitutes the primary determinant of voting behaviour – most of the time (ibid, also Bartels 2000.) So, for the Michigan-style explanations, the problem with policy movement to non-traditional areas is that it depletes the party brand through too much redefinition. Especially in policy areas of high importance for the voters, there is only so much vacillation that a party's supporters will accept, and if a party loses its base, then partisan supporters may feel it is no longer the party they knew and identified with.
On the other hand, there is the Downsian model of an economic voter (1957) which assumes an atomized electorate of autonomous, self-maximizing, materially calculating voters. The rational choice theorists, in the tradition of Downs argue that party identification is based on cognitive assessments of outcomes and past performance and on utility-driven decision making. Sharply critical of the Michigan model of partisanship, Popkin (1994) echoes Downs in suggesting that the enormous costs of acquiring even rudimentary information in a complex political system are beyond the means of most individuals. In this sense voting decisions are not emanating from a-rational primary group socialization, but can be conceived of as a schematic short-cut to reduce the costs of political information in a decision making process. Here party brand is an important cost-saving device.

The main implication of the two theoretical approaches concerns the overall picture of the electorate. For the Michigan-style voter, voting decision emanates from a “funnel of causality” measured through “levels of conceptualization,” integrating a host of psychological and socio-economic factors. Thus conceived, the electorate is relatively quiescent, stable, non-ideological, and strongly and steadily partisan. On the other hand, the Downsian economic voter is autonomous, self-maximizing, materially self-interested and calculating. While the two schools suggest divergent notions of electoral motivation and of the dynamics between the parties and the voters, in terms of standard voting literature, the significance of party brand for the electorate is substantial. According to the Michigan tradition, party brand solidifies deeper roots of partisan attachments which are durable and generally immutable, while according to the Downsian school, party brand represents an information shortcut by signalling a policy choice for the voter who makes a rational calculation to support a party whose position on a specific set of issues is closest to his own. Therefore, we can conclude that when parties dilute their brands by frequent and profound policy shifts, voters are likely to lose the bonds that bind them to the parties which they have been socialized to support, or they may no longer perceive party brands as credible policy signals. Either way, brand dilution can be fatal for parties in parliament.

Recent research on the breakdowns of well established parties in Latin America highlights the importance of party brands for the overall health of political parties by
suggesting that party breakdowns occur when the brand is diluted making party performance the determining factor at the ballot box. In his analysis of party breakdowns in Argentina and Venezuela, Lupu asserts that “[…] when such dilution is accompanied by poor incumbent performance, voters defect en masse from established parties” but “[…] poor performance only leads to collapse when it is preceded by brand dilution” (ibid: 24.) Lupu’s conclusions are corroborated by another recent study of the patterns of party longevity in Canada, Germany and the Netherlands by Lucardi and van Schuur (2011) who find evidence that strong and clearly discernable ideological brands and coherent programmatic direction are detrimental to party survival. Their analysis demonstrates that even some small niche parties which have never gained access to the national government, such as the the Reformed Political Party (SGP) - the longest living, “testimonial” party in the Netherlands, are able to survive the challenges facing most peripheral parties due to their “strong” ideology (2011:10,19.)

I apply this logic to both the newly democratized countries of Central Eastern Europe and to the established Western European democracies and propose that brand integrity is especially important in transitioning democracies where clearly identifiable, consistent ideological profile, assures higher level of partisan support and enhances the chances of electoral success for legislative parties. Conversely, dilution of brand integrity, or frequent and profound ideological shifts in these countries make the voters uncertain about what the party stands for and contributes to a higher risk of electoral death.

Therefore, of particular interest is the question of whether the support for specific policies by the parliamentary parties varies at different stages of their legislative life and how this level of ideological fluctuation affects party longevity. Figures 3 and 4 in Appendix 2 demonstrate the variation in the general policy orientation of legislative parties in established and new democracies during their tenure in national legislatures. The interpretation of these plots is straightforward: over time, some parties exhibit far greater changes in their overall policy orientation than others.45

45 Laver 2005 and Laver and Serganti 2011 propose a classification scheme of decision rules on policy positions available to party leaders operating in a competitive political setting. They suggest that within a multi-party, democratic environment, legislative parties can be grouped into distinct profiles in respect to their policy orientation across time. The four dimensions of decision rules and the corresponding party
According to Laver and Sergenti (2011), on the one side of the spectrum, there are the parties which tend to hold onto their original policy platforms irrespective of the moods of the electorate or the configuration of parties in a given electoral cycle. These Stickers parties (to use Laver and Sergenti’s nomenclature) are the true-believers unwilling to sacrifice their entrenched policy doctrines for political expediency and instant gratification of electoral success and are also relatively immune to the influence of political campaign media. An example of a party with a very static policy orientation is the German FDP whose policies remained virtually unchanged over its life-span and stayed confined within a very narrow range of +0.17 and -0.74 on the CMP Rile scale.

On the other side of the spectrum, there are the vote-foragers, or Hunter parties, who are less interested in staying committed to a specific policy orientation. As competitive vote-seekers they present the most tenacious challenge to other parties in a representative system of government. They are the “free agents,” unconstrained by their past voting record, historic roots, or partisan identification of the voters. They actively monitor the mood of the voters and the political campaigns of other parties. Laver and Sergenti (2011) observe that these types of parties maintain the same policy direction as long as they get tangible rewards in the form of votes; however, as soon as there is a drop in the vote share, they shift in the opposite policy direction, e.g. The Swedish Social Democrats (SSDP) whose policy positions shifted between +3.04 and -4.26 on the Rile scale during their parliamentary life are typical of parties operating according to the principle: “win-stay, lose-shift” (2011:72.)

Having established that political parties exhibit varying patterns of policy responses throughout their legislative lives, I test the proposition that the variance in the life spans of legislative parties can be explained by the strategies they pursue in respect to policy dynamism and that party brands, or clear and consistent ideological positions play an important role in reducing the risk of failure. In accordance with the theory of brand dilution, clearly identifiable policy profiles should lower the risk of legislative party death. Consequently, I hypothesize that ideological vacillators, i.e., parties prone to

profiles include Sticker, Aggregator, Hunter and Predator (based on Laver 2005.) They are described in detail in Laver and Sergenti 2011:49, 70-73.
frequent and pronounced policy shifts will have higher hazard of death than parties whose policy orientations are more constant over time. (H1.)

5.2. Party Policy and Legislative Party Death under Different Electoral Rules

Why should policy matter for the lifespan of legislative parties? Assuming that the goal of legislative parties is survival in the legislature, it is reasonable to expect that parties will pursue strategies which they expect will ensure them the best chances of survival and the lowest hazard of death. In respect to policy content, parties will adopt policies that reflect the environment in which party competition takes place.

Anthony Downs (1957) famously postulated policy convergence in a two party system operating under plurality electoral rules. Building on this classic model of party competition, Cox (1990) constructed a set of formal propositions and mathematical proofs to demonstrate that in a uni-dimensional policy space, parties in low district magnitude settings will have centripetal policy incentives, while in settings with high district magnitudes party policy positions will exhibit centrifugal tendencies. Consistent with Cox’s analysis, Blais and Bodet (2006) empirically show that proportional electoral rules result in greater diversity of policy positions and less centrist parties. However, contrary to these findings, Ezrow finds no evidence of increased average policy extremism in multi-party systems (2008), and shows that there is even a small gain in the vote share for parties that tend to converge to the middle of the voter distribution under PR rules (2005, also 2011).

Given the mixed evidence on the nexus between electoral laws and policy positions, I examine the effects of policy positions on electoral death of parties in parliament, I combine the insights on the relationship between electoral rules and the composition of party systems (Taagepera 2003, 2006, Gallagher and Mitchell 2008) with Cox’s (1990, 1997) findings that larger district magnitudes encourage parties to adopt

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46 However, Adams and Somer-Topcu (2009) note that parties in two-party, candidate-centered elections, may not converge to the center of the voter distribution since party nominees may be selected by primary electorates who hold radical policy preferences relative to the general electorate (e.g., Owen and Grofman 2006). Some US Congressional elections are a good example of this situation.

47 But the authors also find that coalition governments tend to move to the centre of the policy spectrum which produces a negligible overall effect of PR on congruence between voters and government policy positions.

48 Examples of other recent studies are Dow 2001, Merrill and Adams 2007, Calvo and Hellwig 2010.
more extreme positions while lower district magnitudes have a moderating effect on policy positions, reducing ideological dispersion and causing parties to cluster around the middle of the policy spectrum. Extending this body of research, I propose that as parties' policy positions will be different depending on the rules and laws of electoral systems under which they compete, we can expect that the effects of parties’ policy positions on their persistence in the legislature will be mitigated by electoral rules. Specifically, I hypothesize that the risk of electoral death will be decreased for parties which moderate their policy positions in low district magnitudes and for parties which adopt more extreme policy positions in high district magnitudes. Conversely, parties which adopt more extreme policies in small magnitude systems and parties which tend to moderate toward the middle of the policy spectrum in large magnitude systems will face a higher risk of death (H2.)

6. Data and Measurement

In order to test the two hypotheses suggested above, I draw on spatial theory and positional measurement of ideological-programmatic profiles of individual parties and coalitions (e.g., Franklin and Mackie 1984, Budge and Kaman, 1990, Laver and Shofield 1990.) The left – right ideological continuum is a widely accepted standard in political science and over the years it has been augmented to include new dimensions, which reflect more accurately party policy positions in specific political contexts (Laver and Hunt 1992, Budge et al. 2001, Benoit and Laver 2006, 2007a, 2007b.) Nonetheless, Benoit and Laver (2007a) suggest that in spite of the great complexity of issues and positions of parties across time and space, the policy positions of most major parties can be accommodated by a single left-right continuum, particularly when examining party positions within individual countries.

The most comprehensive time series study of policy positions of political parties, both living and extinct, is the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP.) Grounded in saliency theory, CMP utilizes content analysis of party manifestos from 1945 onward to estimate the position of each party on relevant policy issues at a particular election point, making it particularly suitable to estimate the impact of relevant policy positions of parliamentary parties on their risk of failure. The data set used in this analysis consists of
338 elections (49 elections in Central Eastern Europe and 289 elections in Western Europe) from 1945 to 2010 for 429 parties (180 in Central Eastern Europe and 249 in Western Europe) in twenty-eight countries (ten in Central Eastern Europe and eighteen in Western Europe.) Of these, 175 parties are right-censored, i.e., they survived beyond the end of measurement; while 254 parties failed to remain above the threshold of representation at any given time during their legislative tenure. Countries and regions are listed in Appendix 1 along with summary statistics for the variables in the analysis.

[Table 1 about here]

6.1. Dependent Variable: Legislative Party Death

The response variable in all model specifications describes whether a legislative party is alive or dead. The party is dead if it fails to secure at least one seat in any consecutive election; otherwise the party is alive. The dependent variable takes binary values: 0 = alive, 1 = dead.

6.2. Explanatory Variables: Party Policy and Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties

The following measures are used to operationalize the ideological-programmatic orientation of legislative parties with logit-scaled estimates of party policy positions adopted from Lowe et al. (2010, 2011). To test the first hypothesis, I measure the fluctuations in policy positions of each legislative party by taking the absolute value of the change on each policy issue (deltapolicyi). In addition, I also measure policy fluctuation of each party’s overall policy position using a measure of its overall ideological position (deltarile). This provides a measure of the policy shift between two consecutive elections, whereby 0 indicates no policy shift, while increasing values indicate more extreme shift. Similarly, to test of the second hypothesis, I employ Lowe et al. (2011) logit-scaled estimates of policy positions from the CMP data which “weights”

49 The actual number of deaths in the analysis is 258 because one party re-entered the legislature once following earlier loss of representation, i.e., it died twice, while another party (RF Justice Party in Denmark) died three times.

50 The logit-scaled CMP data by Lowe et al. 2011 was obtained from Kenneth Benoit but it can also be accessed from http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/Mikhaylov/faces/study/StudyPage.xhtml?globallId=hdl:1902.1/17073.
each party on the right-left ideological spectrum based on the relative balance of issues in party manifestos. The policies used in the analysis were selected based on the voter policy priorities identified in the World Values Survey and supplemented by the data from Eurobarometer, European Social Survey, and Comparative Study of Electoral Systems.

In respect to electoral institutions, as postulated in the literature, different electoral systems tend to produce either centripetal or centrifugal policy incentives for parties, whereby decreases in district magnitude are associated with cumulative policy orientations among parties, while increases in district magnitude are found to produce non-cumulative policies. But when choosing the operational measure of electoral laws, we must keep in mind that there is substantive difference between explicit thresholds of representation and the real world outcome in which party competition takes place. For example, in spite of very similar electoral formulas in the UK and in the US, the US has two parties in the federal legislature, while the UK has ten, which is the same number of parties in the Dutch national legislature, in spite of the fact that the Netherlands has a very different electoral system from the UK (Laver and Sergenti 2011:159.)

Empirical features of electoral rules can be represented by indices such as effective magnitude, $M$ (Taagepera and Shugart, 1989), or effective threshold, $T$ (Lijphart, 1994) which are derived from the notions of district magnitude, i.e., the number of seats allocated within an electoral district and from legal thresholds (Taagepera 2003.) These measures are in turn interconnected with the number of parties in a system; for example, Taagepera’s empirical effective threshold is an output-based measure working back from the observed effective number of parties (2006: 177-186.)

Thus, to reflect the actual surroundings a legislative party faces which may matter more for party death than an electoral formula that should lead to a given number of parties, in this analysis, I present the model with an electoral system output variable, i.e., the number of parliamentary parties based on seats (ENPP.) This measure of the

51 For a detailed discussion of this measure, see Empirical Note 1 in Appendix 2.
52 Per Lijphart (1994), I use ENEP and ENPP which denote the number of effective electoral and parliamentary parties in a party system, but a more appropriate scientific notation is offered by Taagepera (2006) – $N$, and $N_e$ and Gallagher and Mitchell (2008) – Eff $N$, and Eff $N_e$. The ENPP data used in my analysis are available from: http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/staff/michael_gallagher/ElSystems/Docts/ElectionIndices.pdf

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electoral system is particularly well suited for my analysis, because in the context of Sartori's insights about ideological distance of parties, it may give us important information on whether the political dynamics are more centrist or polarizing. However, it should be noted that ENPP measures only quantitative changes in the number of parties within a given institutional context; it is not a metric of qualitative changes within individual parties or party systems.

In the Hypothesis 1 test, ENPP is a continuous variable, but to test Hypothesis 2, it has been transformed into a categorical variable by breaking it into two groups: ENPP < 3.96 and ENPP > 3.96. The choice of this cut off point is not arbitrary – it follows Siaroff's (2000) classification of party systems, which refines the typology proposed by Blondel (1968) who was the first scholar to move beyond the simple tallying of parties but also took into account their relative size and strength. While Siaroff presents an eightfold classification ranging from a two-party system with ENPP of 1.92 to the extreme multiparty system with a balance among the parties, ENPP of 5.56 or more, in this analysis, I chose to differentiate between the extreme multiparty systems on the one hand and party systems with either two parties or moderate party pluralism on the other hand. Siaroff's cut off of 3.96 between the two categories of party systems corresponds to the ENPP median of 3.9 for all parties in my data set. The data source for this variable is Gallagher's election indices (2012) based on Gallagher and Mitchell (2008.)

6.3. Control Variables: GDP growth and GDP per capita

As there is no shortage of literature, both classic and more recent, linking economic fortunes with political outcomes (e.g., Lipset 1960, Gerschenkron 1962, Huntington 1968, Lewis-Beck and Stegmeier 2000), it is also reasonable to control for the impact of economic factors on the durability of parliamentary parties. Thus, two country-level economic variables are included in the model: GDP per capita and GDP growth. The

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53 For a more detailed discussion on the operationalization of this variable, see Empirical Note 2 in Appendix 2.
source for this variable is Carey and Hix, Electoral System Design Project 2010 and the Angus Maddison Archive.54

7. Empirical Analysis and Discussion of the Results55
What follows is an empirical test of my theory of legislative party death using the stratified Cox Proportional Hazards regression model.56 In Appendix 1, Table 2a and 2b, I present seven specifications of the policy fluctuation model in Western and Central Eastern Europe: models a-f test the impact of vacillation in individual policy positions on party survival while model g is a composite policy model testing the combined effect of changes in relevant policies on party survival. Table 3 shows three specifications of the electoral rules interaction model for each of the three significant policy positions (a-c) and one specification with the composite policy effect (d) in Western Europe.

To test the first hypothesis, I analyzed the effects of the shifts in the policy positions of parties in parliament on the risk of electoral death. Based on the theory of brand dilution, I expected that legislative parties with clearly identifiable policy profiles whose policy positions tend to be more constant over time will have a lower the risk of death than parties which have diluted their brands by frequent and profound policy shifts. The results indicate that policy fluctuation is a more significant predictor of party survival in established democracies of Western Europe than in the new Central Eastern European democracies. But contrary to expectations, in Western Europe, the risk of instantaneous death is significantly lower for parties whose policy orientations tend to vacillate more dramatically than for parties whose policy positions tend to be more constant over time. Here, the signs of the coefficients are all negative for policy changes on state economy

54 Available from http://www.dartmouth.edu/~jcarey/Data_Archive.html (for most values) and Groningen Growth and Development Centre Angus Maddison Archive. “Statistics on World Population, GDP and per capita GDP, 1-2008 AD” http://www.ggdc.net/MADDISON/oriindex.htm (for the missing values.)
55 All statistical analyses were conducted using R version 2.15.1 (2012.06.22)
56 The main advantage of the Cox PH model over other survival models is that it is a semi-parametric model which does not make any assumptions about the form of the underlying hazard, but assumes parametric form for the effect of the predictors on the hazard. The model is particularly well suited for this analysis as I am more interested in parameter estimates than in the shape of the hazard. (Cox and Oakes, 1982:16.) See Empirical Note 3 for a more detailed discussion of the Cox PH model and for a justification for stratifying on county level.
indicating that greater shifts in each of these policy areas lower the hazard of death over time. All coefficients for these policy areas are significant at \( p < 0.05 \), while the coefficient for state economy is significant at \( p < 0.01 \) level. Notably, for every unit of change in policy position on state economy, legislative parties in Western Europe can expect nearly 40% reduction in the hazard of death \( (\exp(\text{coef}) = 0.586) \). 

While there does not appear to be any statistical evidence to support the first hypothesis as far as legislative parties in the established democracies, the empirical results seem to support the findings by Laver and Sergenti (2011) in respect to Western European parties. In their analysis of life expectancy of parties using different decision rules, the authors find that parties using the Hunter rule, i.e., the vote foragers prone to policy shifts, survive much longer than parties using the other three decision rules, especially when survival thresholds are low and that consequently, in the evolutionary setting of party competition, there are more surviving Hunter parties (2011:123-124.) In other words, the vote-seeking behaviour of Hunter parties associated with the most dramatic and frequent changes in policy positions may be more effective in finding higher concentrations of voter support than remaining consistent to specific policy positions and loyal to the party brand. This is illustrated by the Kaplan – Meier plot of survival probability for legislative parties with high and low policy vacillation profiles. However, and important caveat here is that the biggest effect is in the initial movement, i.e., the greatest gain in survivability is in the first shift on the policy scale. For example, while legislative parties which move their position on state economy one point on the scale in any direction decrease their hazard of death by approximately 40%, a two point shift decreases the risk of death by 66% reduction and five point shift corresponds to a 93% reduction in the hazard of death. Furthermore, the Kaplan – Meier survival curves comparing time to death for high and low policy vacillators also demonstrate diminishing returns of policy shifts over time as
the confidence intervals for the two groups of parties begin to overlap around the eight electoral cycle.

[Figure 1 from Appendix 1 about here]

However, in line with the theory of brand dilution, in Central Eastern Europe changes in policy positions on planned economy appear to have significant effect on party survival as evidenced by the positive sign of the coefficient for this policy predictor (0.103.) Here, every unit of change in policy position on planned economy results in about 10% acceleration in the hazard of party death \((\exp(\text{coef}) = 1.108.)\) Thus, the findings seem to lend very limited support to the theory of brand dilution only in CEE democracies, whereas there seems to be much stronger empirical support for the proposition that policy tourism as a vote seeking strategy seems to help parties live longer in older democracies. However, it should be noted that this lack of stronger and more conclusive results for Central Eastern Europe could be attributed to a markedly lower number of data points, i.e., electoral observations, compared to the more extensive data both in terms of the number of parties and the number of elections in Western Europe.

[Table 2b about here]

In sum, while it would appear that a strong commitment of legislative parties to their policy positions on planned economy in Central Eastern Europe can indeed extend the life of legislative parties in that region, the staying power or the demise of parties in parliament in the established democracies of Western Europe cannot be explained in terms "brand-name" recognition or other marketing concepts.

To test the second hypothesis, I investigated the patterns of party survival and failure relative to policy content. This hypothesis is based on Benoit and Laver’s (2007c) findings that parties have a higher risk failure at the edges of the policy spaces, i.e., more extreme parties will have a greater hazard of failure and thus shorter survival probability than the parties whose policy positions are less extreme. Conversely, we can then expect
that parties which have moderated their policy direction and electoral appeal have a lower risk of failure than parties which exhibit frequent policy shifts. However, an important caveat to this hypothesis involves the role of electoral institutions in the shaping of policy spaces and the resulting impact of policy positions under different electoral rules on the risk of party death. This follows Downs’ (1957) model of centripetal incentives for two party systems under plurality rule and Cox’s (1990) seminal findings that multiparty systems with large district magnitudes provide incentives for parties to advocate more extremist policy positions. Assuming that parties, as rational actors, adopt policies which they believe will ensure their long-term survival, I expected that policy dynamism may vary under different electoral rules, whereby the risk of electoral death will be decreased for parties with more moderate policy positions in lower ENPP settings and for parties which adopt more extreme policy positions in high ENPP setting. Conversely, parties with more extreme policies in small ENPP systems and parties which tend to moderate toward the middle of the policy spectrum in large ENPP systems will face a higher risk of death.

The results indicate that, consistent with the second hypothesis, in the established democracies, electoral rules associated with lower ENPP which tend produce larger parties and drive them to moderate their policy positions also tend reward these parties with longer legislative life spans, while the opposite appears to be true for party longevity in larger ENPP settings. In Western Europe policy extremism on planned economy (model 3a), liberal-conservative divide (model 3b) and multiculturalism (model 3c) appears to be of consequence for the duration of parties in parliament. In regards to planned economy and multiculturalism, in small ENPP settings, neither coefficient is significant; however, the survival increases for more extreme parties in larger ENPP settings. Here, the coefficient for multiculturalism (-0.456) is significant at p < 0.01 and for planned economy (-0.265) is significant at p < 0.05. However, it must be noted that while the negative signs of the coefficients in the constituent terms agree with the hypothesis, the lack of statistical significance on the interaction term and low significance for the ENPP in models 3a and 3c at p<0.1 means that the effect is not very strong. On the liberal-conservative divide, however, the evidence is strong that extreme policy positions in small ENPP settings tend to reduce the life of legislative parties (0.458,
p<0.05.) Furthermore, the negative sign of the coefficient for electoral institutions in multiculturalism (-0.599, p<0.1) and planned economy (-0.620, p<0.1) model specifications, and in the liberal-conservative model specification (-0.934, p<0.05) indicates that parties in smaller ENPP environments generally associated with low district magnitudes and FPTP electoral systems tend to have lower hazard of death than parties in larger ENPP environments, typical of higher district magnitudes and PR systems\textsuperscript{57}.

In respect to parliamentary parties in new democracies of Central Eastern Europe, the hypothesized effect of policy extremism (or moderation) under different electoral rules is not borne out by the analysis as none of the coefficients is significant at the conventional level. Again, this might be an artefact of a fairly limited data for that region or it might be due to a small number of low ENPP observations (while the median ENPP for Western Europe is 3.76, for CEE the ENPP median is 4.26.) Interestingly, economic factors do not appear to have any bearing on legislative party durability in any of the models\textsuperscript{58}.

An improvement of the empirical model might involve the operationalization of the key explanatory variables, i.e., the policy positions. Upon identifying the most relevant voter policy priorities, I used separate models to analyze the impact of the corresponding party policies on the hazard of death as described above. While some of the coefficients for the policy variables conform to the conventional statistical significance level, it was to be expected that any individual policy may not have a very strong effect party survival. For example, when testing policy extremism under different electoral rules, can we really expect that only one policy is going to impact the life of a party in any significant way? In other words, would most voters decide on just one policy area? Evidence presented in this paper demonstrates that on some policies (i.e., planned economy, multiculturalism, liberal –conservative divide) that is indeed the case, but

\textsuperscript{57} This tendency is demonstrated by Nishikawa (2011) in respect to ruling parties in the initial phase of their life, although, according to her findings, this trend reverses over time.

\textsuperscript{58} As none of the policy and control variables in Hypothesis 2 is significant for Eastern Europe, table 3 presents only the coefficients for Western Europe.
perhaps we could make a more general statement about policy fluctuation and policy extremism and assess its aggregate impact on party survival. To this end, I created a composite variable of policy positions. This derived variable model allows me to capture the combined effect of policy fluctuations and policy extremism in each of the relevant policy areas simultaneously without holding the other policy variables constant. If all policy variables were put into a single regression model, it would mean that only one policy would have an effect while all of the other policies were neutral whereas the composite policy variable allows for testing of the two hypotheses when the parties have generally extreme positions in these policy areas collectively.

To test the first Hypothesis, the explanatory variable is composed of the following policy positions: state economy, Keynesian economics, traditional morality and the liberal – conservative divide. For the second Hypothesis, the explanatory variable is composed of the following policy positions: planned economy, liberal-conservative divide, multiculturalism, with two additional key policy areas - traditional morality, and nationalism. The derived variable model testing across a whole range relevant of policy positions represents a vast improvement over the other models which tested the impact of individual policies on party survival. In respect to the first Hypothesis, Table 2a, model g shows that in Western Europe the effect of the composite variable is highly significant: -0.191 at p<0.001 level, indicating that the combined effect is very strong and that for every unit of change in the combined party positions on Keynesian economics, state economy, liberal – conservative divide, and traditional morality, there is almost a 20% reduction in the hazard of death (exp(coef) = 0.823.)59 While this is contrary to expectations based on the theory of brand dilution, as in the individual policy model, the results of the composite policy model strongly support Laver and Sergenti’s (2011) findings that in the established Western European democracies, parties prone to change their policy orientations in search of votes tend to have longer legislative lives.

In Table 3, model d, the results of the derived variable model for the second Hypothesis demonstrate that in Western Europe there is a decrease in the hazard of death

59 The combined effect of the derived variable might be difficult to interpret in terms of the unit of change. However, the main point is that a party has to have high values on all relevant variables in order to improve its lifetime; having a high score on just one variable will not have a significant effect. That is why the derived variable, combining the different policy positions is statistically significant when individually these policies may not be as significant.
for parties with extreme policy positions across the board (-0.180, p<0.001), but significantly, this decrease in hazard is much greater in large ENPP systems. When the composite measure of policy positions is interacted with ENPP, the evidence points that extreme policy positions in small ENPP settings tend to reduce the life of legislative parties (0.170, p<0.05). In other words, there is a very large gain in survivability of parties supporting extreme positions in large ENPP systems whereas the gain is either only marginal or negative as the ENPP decreases (0.170, p<0.05). This is largely consistent with the expectations of the second Hypothesis based on Cox (1990) and with the results of the individual policy models. Furthermore, the negative coefficient for parties in small ENPP systems (-1.326, p<0.01) indicates that survivability of legislative parties is greater under plurality rules or in low district magnitude institutional settings. As in the other models, the economic factors by themselves do not appear have any bearing on party survival.

None of the variables in the derived variable model are significant for legislative parties’ life spans in Central Eastern Europe. Again, this might be attributed to insufficient number of observations. Whereas in Western Europe there are 135 party deaths out of 1,729 electoral observations, in Central Eastern Europe there are 123 deaths out of only 327 electoral observations, i.e., there are only about 2.5 readings before death in CEE compared to over ten readings in Western Europe. However, separate test (not included in this analysis) has shown that region is a very strong predictor of party death, i.e., legislative parties in new democracies of Central Eastern Europe have fifteen times greater hazard of failure than their counterparts in established democracies thereby justifying separate analysis for the two regions the regions. This is illustrated by the histograms of deaths of legislative parties in consecutive elections (Appendix 2, Figures 1 and 2.) Given that the duration of competitive party politics in Central Eastern Europe has been considerably shorter than in Western Europe and that that on the whole, party systems in Central Eastern Europe have experienced significantly higher levels of instability since the democratic transition, it is reasonable to expect that in emerging democracies, the significantly higher risk of losing parliamentary representation in consecutive elections may be attributed in part to other, non-policy related factors of the
transition period, making the prospect of survival for the new legislative parties in many countries of that region highly uncertain.

8. Conclusion and Directions for Future Research

In this paper I sought to test two theories of legislative party failure taking into account the temporal dimension. Based on the well established as well as more recent research on party competition, I suggested a conceptual framework of party strategies to investigate policy dynamism and its effects on the survival of parliamentary parties in select European democracies. I used a theory of brand dilution to explain the differential impact of the fluctuations in relevant policy orientations of legislative parties on their survival in both regions. Consistent with the first hypothesis, frequent and profound shifts on policies pertaining to planned economy can lead to increased hazard of failure for parliamentary parties in Central Eastern Europe, while in the established Western European democracies, the theory of brand dilution does not appear to hold. Here, the evidence seems to support Laver and Sergenti’s (2011) findings that vote-seeking parties which change their policy positions have a lower hazard of electoral death than parties who are consistent in their policy orientations over time.

It is assumed that political institutions shape the incentives structure for parties and voters and that electoral rules create a particular environment for party competition. Testing my second hypothesis, I demonstrated empirically that policy positions on key issues under different electoral rules play a role in explaining party durability in older democracies of Western Europe, even though this effect is not significant for any of the key policy areas in Central Eastern Europe. This dynamic could be explained by the consolidation of democracy and by the maturation of the party system in Western Europe, where parties had more time to develop particular policy strategies in the context of the institutional environment in which they operate and to establish a more stable voter base. Thus, building on the well established research on the tendency of political parties to cluster around the center of the ideological spectrum in low district magnitude/low ENPP systems and to spread their policy orientations in high district magnitude/ high ENPP systems, I shifted the attention to the effects of the combination of these two factors on
legislative party longevity. This provided new opportunities to explore the underlying forces driving political stability from a different perspective.

Although this study attempted to investigate how policy dynamism and relevant policy positions affect the risk of electoral death of parties in parliament, more theoretical refinement and empirical improvements might be necessary. For example, this research does not explore how shifts in policy positions or the interaction between electoral rules and policy extremism affect legislative parties with different electoral strength. Calvo and Hellwig's (2010) demonstrate that centripetal policies are only evident for parties favoured by electoral rules (i.e., larger parties in small district magnitude/small ENPP), while smaller parties are pushed toward the edges of the policy spectrum and see their vote share decline. Whether a legislative party is in government or in opposition may also affect its risk of death the ballot box, particularly in the context of economic (mis)fortunes. Thus, the impact of parties' government/opposition status on survival can be analyzed singly and in combination with economic indicators. So, future studies might also examine the impact of policy dynamism of different types of parties in different institutional settings on their longevity.
APPENDIX 1: DATA DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS

Countries and Regions

I. Western Europe (n=18)
Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Great Britain, Ireland

II: Central Eastern Europe (n=10)
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia

III. Party Policies Analyzed
Planned Economy, State Economy, Keynesian Economics, Traditional Morality, Multiculturalism, Nationalism, Liberal-Conservative, Right-Left (Rile)

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in the Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Covariate</th>
<th>Western Europe</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>St. Dev.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Planned Economy</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>2.703</td>
<td>3.906</td>
<td></td>
<td>74.300</td>
<td>4.509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Economy</td>
<td>-7.011</td>
<td>-1.129</td>
<td>-1.193</td>
<td>4.394</td>
<td>1.546</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keynesian Economics</td>
<td>-3.365</td>
<td>1.597</td>
<td>1.492</td>
<td>5.872</td>
<td>1.691</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional Morality</td>
<td>-5.371</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.937</td>
<td>5.958</td>
<td>1.781</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiculturalism</td>
<td>-5.790</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-0.619</td>
<td>4.990</td>
<td>1.506</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>-5.557</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.816</td>
<td>5.614</td>
<td>1.514</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal-Conservative (log)</td>
<td>-4.977</td>
<td>0.548</td>
<td>0.594</td>
<td>5.252</td>
<td>1.331</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right-Left (log)</td>
<td>-4.770</td>
<td>-0.214</td>
<td>-0.235</td>
<td>4.511</td>
<td>1.161</td>
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<tr>
<td>ENPP</td>
<td>1.720</td>
<td>3.760</td>
<td>4.073</td>
<td>9.050</td>
<td>1.415</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (thousands)</td>
<td>2.502</td>
<td>13.620</td>
<td>13.690</td>
<td>35.360</td>
<td>5.844</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP growth (%)</td>
<td>-3.800</td>
<td>2.900</td>
<td>3.400</td>
<td>31.700</td>
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<th>Covariate</th>
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<th>Mean</th>
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<th>St. Dev.</th>
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<td>23.762</td>
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<td>Traditional Morality</td>
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<td>1.574</td>
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<td>-0.780</td>
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<td>Nationalism</td>
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<td>1.634</td>
<td>5.572</td>
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<td>Liberal-Conservative (log)</td>
<td>-0.729</td>
<td>1.430</td>
<td>1.532</td>
<td>5.707</td>
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<td>Right-Left (log)</td>
<td>-1.744</td>
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<td>0.161</td>
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<td>ENPP</td>
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<td>GDP per capita (thousands)</td>
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### Table 2a. Cox Proportional Hazard Estimates: Effects of Policy Fluctuations on the Survival of Legislative Parties in New and Established European Democracies, 1945-2010

**Hypothesis 1 — Individual and Composite Variable Model for Western Europe**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DV : Party Death</th>
<th>a</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>c</th>
<th>d</th>
<th>e</th>
<th>f</th>
<th>g</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>IV (Western Europe)</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Delta (Western Europe)</td>
<td>0.174 (0.110)</td>
<td>0.178 (0.109)</td>
<td>0.178 (0.108)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Delta(state economy)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Delta (keynesian)</td>
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<td>Delta (traditional morality)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Delta(log) liberal/conservative</td>
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<td>-0.375* (0.162)</td>
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<td>Delta(log) liberal economy</td>
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<td>-0.546* (0.024)</td>
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<td>Delta (planned economy)</td>
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<td>-0.033 (0.026)</td>
<td>-0.191*** (0.052)</td>
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<td>Delta(state econ)+Delta(keynesian)+Delta(trad morality)+Delta(log)+lib econ</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>ENPP</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP/head</td>
<td>-0.002 (0.001)</td>
<td>-0.002 (0.001)</td>
<td>-0.002 (0.001)</td>
<td>-0.002 (0.001)</td>
<td>-0.002 (0.001)</td>
<td>-0.002 (0.001)</td>
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<td>GDP growth</td>
<td>-0.015 (0.032)</td>
<td>-0.021 (0.032)</td>
<td>-0.019 (0.031)</td>
<td>-0.013 (0.032)</td>
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<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>Concordance</td>
<td>0.623</td>
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<td>0.603</td>
<td>0.592</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wald test</td>
<td>13.94**</td>
<td>10.35*</td>
<td>11.75*</td>
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<td>11.83*</td>
<td>7.63</td>
<td>19.89***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Score(logrank) test</td>
<td>14.37**</td>
<td>10.59*</td>
<td>10.59*</td>
<td>12.04*</td>
<td>21.21*</td>
<td>7.73</td>
<td>20.81***</td>
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Table 2b: Cox Proportional Hazard Estimates: Effects of Policy Fluctuations on the Survival of Legislative Parties in New and Established European Democracies, 1945-2010

<table>
<thead>
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Note: * indicates statistical significance at the 5% level.
<table>
<thead>
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<th>Hypothesis 2 – Individual and Composite Variable Model for Western Europe</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>DV: Party Death</strong></td>
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<td><strong>IV (Western Europe)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENPP&lt;3.96*[(log)planned economyl</td>
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<tr>
<td>I[(log)planned economyl</td>
</tr>
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<td>ENPP&lt;3.96*[(log)liberal-conservative]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I[(log)liberal/conservative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENPP&lt;3.96*[(log)multiculturalism]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imulticulturalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENPP&lt;3.96*[(log)plan econ]+[(log)lib con]+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>l trad morality]+[(multicul]+[nationalism]</td>
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<td>I[(log)plan econ]+I[(log)lib con]+</td>
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<td>l trad morality]+[(multicul]+[nationalism]</td>
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<tr>
<td>ENPP&lt;3.96</td>
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<td>Score(logrank) test</td>
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Table 3. Cox Proportional Hazard Estimates: Effects of Policy Extremism under Different Electoral Rules on the Survival of Legislative Parties in Established European Democracies, 1945-2010†
Note: Tables show coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) \( \dagger p<0.1, {\ast p}<0.05, {\ast\ast p}<0.01, {\ast\ast\ast p}<0.001 \) (two-tailed test).


Source for ENEP/ENPP: Gallagher Election Indices.

Source for GDP per capita and GDP growth: most values from Carey and Hix. 2010. “Electoral System Design Project.” For the missing values, the Groningen Growth and Development Centre Angus Maddison Archive. “Statistics on World Population, GDP and per capita GDP, 1-2008 AD (GDP per capita, 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars, divided by 1000.)

Figure 1. Hypothesis 1: Kaplan – Meier Plot of Survival Probability for Parties with High and Low Policy Vacillation

![Kaplan-Meier Plot](image)

APENDIX 2: ADDITIONAL FIGURES

Figure 1. Party Deaths in Consecutive Elections, Western Europe

Figure 2. Party Deaths in Consecutive Elections, Eastern Europe

Figure 3. Changes in Right – Left Policy Positions for Parties in Western Europe

Figure 4. Changes in Right – Left Policy Positions for Parties in Central Eastern Europe

APPENDIX 3

EMPIRICAL NOTE 1:
SOME PROBLEMS WITH THE COMPARATIVE MANIFESTO PROJECT (CMP) DATA AND RATIONALE FOR USING THE LOGIT-SCALED POLICY POSITION ESTIMATES

In political research, texts such as speeches, debate transcripts, and party manifestos afford scholars an opportunity to extract meaning from text using quantitative content analysis. As a research technique, quantitative content analysis has been widely used to analyze content of political communication in an objective and systematic manner (or so goes the claim.) Manifesto Research Group/Comparative Manifesto Project (hereafter CMP) is one of the main sources of data for a quantitative comparative analysis of relative ideological positions of parties on issues ranging from commitment to welfare and redistributive justice to military intervention. Despite the widespread use of this source in cross-national, longitudinal research, CMP has been criticized on both theoretical and methodological grounds (e.g. Kitschelt 1994.) In this note, I outline briefly the theoretical underpinnings and the method of CMP as a research tool for comparative analysis and I discuss some challenges and limitations of using CMP data in time series and cross-national research. I conclude by explaining my decision to employ the logit-scaled CMP data by Lowe et al. (2011.)

Grounded in saliency theory, CMP sets out to create spatial maps of parties’ ideological positions. This is done based on a single aspect of the manifesto data: the relative frequency of textual reference to specific policy issues. CMP coders divide the entire text of each party manifesto into linguistic units called quasi-sentences and assign each quasi-sentence into one of the fifty-six non-directional issue categories within one of the seven non-overlapping policy domains. While the policy domains are designed to be non-ambiguous and the issue topics are non-directional, the premise of the scheme is controversial as it assigns a specific orientation (positive, negative, neutral) within a given topic. The relative balance of issues (or how many times an issue has been mentioned in a manifesto) and the directional orientation matter as they are used to “weigh” a party on a right-left ideological scale (Budge et al. 1994, 2001)
The first theoretical consideration is that the CMP scheme is concerned only with the content of party manifestos, i.e., with the observable content that resides on the surface of political communication. In line with the saliency theory and with the requirements of the scientific objectivity, the content that is being counted is, for example, how many times the text refers to the free markets or traditional morality. While this is an appropriate and valid method of content analysis, arguably not all interesting research questions can be addressed in this manner. As many researchers would acknowledge, political texts, like any other form of human communication, contain a latent dimension or the interpretative content that goes beyond the dictionary definition of words and that cannot be revealed through mechanistic, error-prone counting of quasi-sentences (Benoit et al 2009.) And going beyond pure texts as bags of data - electoral campaigns, public addresses and media debates have styles and formats which may also be indicative of policy direction, and albeit largely subjective and interpretative, there are analysts who contend that some latent content can be coded in a directional way to reveal and compare ideological positions of parties examined. Consequently, while texts are a good source of data for empirical analysis, when making inferences from textual content of party manifestos, we must bear in mind that they may provide only a partial picture of party politics.

In estimating parties’ ideological positions, the key questions are both conceptual and empirical: what are we measuring and how are we measuring it? One of the key aspects of text analysis is identification of representative texts and segments of text that will be categorized and analyzed. As the project’s name suggests, CMP is concerned with party manifestos and its entire date base contains over 3,000 election manifestos for more than 650 parties in over 50 countries. Official manifestos are indicative of the general ethos of a party and they may signal a party’s location in an ideological space, but it must also be acknowledged that ideological position of parties during campaigns for which most manifestos are produced may differ from their actual policy positions. In line with the vote maximizing, office seeking model of party competition, it has been argued that in election campaigns and in public manifestos, parties’ positions are often shaped in order to appeal to the largest share of the electorate. In effect, parties’ ideologies are “adjusted” to fit election fads and therefore may not be the most valid representation of
the true ideological position of the party, but rather of the image the party is seeking to present to the voters. Accordingly, as manifestos and campaign pledges mediate between party's actual ideological position, the political trends of the day, and the voters, a party's position on CMP's right-left scale may reflect an "image" rather than the actual policy position of a party at a given time (Jahn and Henn 2000:37.) Arguably then, when using CMP as a data source in research, there is a chance that we are looking at a derivative rather than the actual thing, and that as such, the image that the party creates for electoral purposes may vary more significantly than the actual party position on issues measured at different points during the electoral cycle or when using different methods of analysis. Evidently, this is compounded by the basic premise of saliency theory concerned only with the relative salience of issues in parties' official communication rather than the substantive position of parties on these issues (Laver and Garry 2000.)

From a methodological standpoint, the extent to which "observable" content of political texts is a valid instrument to assess the ideological position of a given party depends on the following criteria: objectivity, reliability, and replicability. In the case of CMP, the validity of metrics involves the precise mechanism of deriving parties' ideological positions from text. This is done through a content analytical technique called unitizing, whereby researchers strive to select a linguistic unit that multiple coders can reliably identify and that reflects most appropriately and encompasses most fully the construct being sought. CMP's coding procedure of quasi-sentences, or identifiable, topic-specific phrases as the main unit of analysis is inherently error prone due to its reliance on human agency. In this instance, the most obvious problem associated with the use of human coders is the subjective assessment of what constitutes a quasi-sentence and the interpretative assignment of the quasi-sentence into a specific issue category and policy domain. The reliability and replicability of the instrument is further compromised by CMP's reliance on a single coder to generate data for each party manifesto. As human coding is fundamentally interpretative, it has been reported that CMP coders who have been trained in unitization and categorization techniques were able to code correctly only between 30% and 60% of the text; the correlation with a "master manifesto" for experienced coders on a second coding contract is 0.85 (Benoit and Laver 2007d.)
If we conceive of the reliability of a coding scheme as a continuum beginning with intra-coder stability (i.e. a coder agreeing with himself over time), through inter-coder reliability (i.e., multiple coders agreeing with each other) to replicability (i.e. multiple researchers or groups of researchers applying the coding scheme reliably), CMP’s lack of replication and coder reliability mechanism should be regarded as a serious weakness that needs to be addressed.

Benoit, Laver and Mikailov (2009) also demonstrate the susceptibility of CMP coding scheme to stochastic and non-systematic error and propose ways to correct the bias. While their focus is only on non-systematic error, the results of their replication and correction model of CMP data used in two AJPS studies reveal error contaminated covariates which can (and do) render potentially flawed inferences. Clearly, this has serious implications for political research, given that CMP has been considered the industry standard for the last three decades and that its data has been widely used to create explanatory variables for empirical analyses across the field.

Another aspect of the CMP that has potentially significant implications for time-series and cross-national research is the ideological continuum, or the “rile” scale on which a party is positioned according to the score derived from the content analysis of its manifesto. The main consideration is the fact that the substantive content of the “rile” scale and the way in which it weights left-right positions has remained static since the inception of the project in the 1980’s. Benoit and Laver (2007a) contend that the meaning of left and right (and everything in-between) has surely changed over the last thirty years which is evident in the emergence of new issues, such as the environment and global terrorism, as an important part of contemporary political discourse. Conversely, other subjects, such as the communist threat have lost their relevance. The point is that the current positions of parties on some issues form our understanding of left and right that may be different from the collective perception of left and right thirty years ago when the scale was devised using manifestos whose average year of origin was 1965 (Benoit and Laver 2007a, p.104.) Thus, the main concern here is that when employing CMP data in cross-sectional time series analysis, the time-bound ideological scale can thus result in invalid estimates of party positions.
The validity of the “rile” scale is further compromised by the fact that the fixed coding scheme largely ignores country context. Here also the content of the left and right depends to a large extent on the country, i.e., while immigration may not be an issue in Iceland, it is the talk of the day in France and it features prominently in National Front’s manifesto in the same way that the word “unemployment” was until recently virtually unheard of in the political debates of the Swiss parties whereas it remained high on the political agenda of parties in Brazil or in Italy. These inter-country differences regarding the issues of importance and the “lost in translation” meaning of what is left and what is right in a specific political context are problematic as they do not always fit very well into the one-size-fits-all CMP scale.

However, the sheer scale of this project and the massive amount of data on party policy positions across space (Western and Central Eastern Europe) and time (1945-2010) required to perform this analysis make CMP an attractive and valuable source of information in spite of some of its more problematic aspects outlined above. So, for this analysis, I had to chose the lesser evil and decide that validity of an instrument should not be sacrificed for the sake of reliability. I also had to consent that using alternative (and perhaps more reliable) sources of information on party policy positions, such as expert surveys, would greatly limit the scope of this research thereby constraining the extent to which I could draw inferences from a much smaller number of cases (see Benoit and Laver 2006 for a review of data sources on policy positions of political actors.)

Thus, to mitigate the effect of some of the flaws inherent with the CMP data, I opted to use the logit-scaled policy positions developed by Lowe et al. (2011.) This data set employs the logarithm of odds-ratios and involves scaling of continuous left-right policy positions from political text coded into discrete categories. The logit scales are validated through comparison to independent expert surveys. The authors demonstrate that their approach can be applied to improve existing policy estimates for the most commonly used CMP scales and provide more valid measures of the policy positions. Details of the logit scales and their advantages over the CMP data are discussed in Lowe et al. (2010.)
EMPIRICAL NOTE 2:
RATIONALE FOR USING THE EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF PARLIAMENTARY PARTIES AS THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM VARIABLE

In order to test the two hypotheses, my aim was to use a measure that would reflect the actual surroundings of legislative parties, shaped by electoral thresholds and the level of disproportionality.

In this brief note, I discuss the reasons why I opted to use the effective number of parliamentary parties as an electoral system variable. It is reasonable to expect that electoral laws and mechanisms of translating votes into seats affect the electoral fate of parties in national legislatures. The use of thresholds for entry into the legislature and the level of disproportionality are of consequence for party survival. For example, in the US, the highly majoritarian system coupled with the steep costs of entry, and lack of campaign spending limits severely disadvantages new entrants, and thus the older parties tend to survive. Even in some highly disproportional PR systems, minor parties are compelled to accumulate more votes in each election to pass the threshold of representation, thereby diminishing the benefits of voting for the supporters of those parties who may feel compelled to act strategically and vote for another party with a more realistic chance of winning. To calculate the level of disproportionality, the least squares index is particularly well suited for event history models such as this one, as it measures disproportionality per election (Gallagher 1991:40.)

However, on his website, Gallagher cautions that it might be misleading to project the effective threshold from constituency level to national level and that to calculate the formula for the national level effective threshold, we must take into consideration number of seats as well as average district magnitude. Taagepera (2002) calculates the formula for the effective national threshold by including district magnitude (M) and the number of electoral districts and hence assembly size (S): “When all seats are allocated in M-seat districts, $T=75\%/[ (M+1)(S/M)^{0.5}]$ and $n=(MS)^{0.25}$. T and n are connected by $T=75\%/[n^2+(S/n^2)]$” (2002:383)

When calculating district magnitude (M), it is difficult to decide if the mean or the median should be used. Taagepera cautions that the impact at the district level is often
overridden by second tier allocation or another form of legal threshold. In *Predicting Party Sizes* (2006: 290), he identifies about thirty $M=1$ countries and only ten $M>1$ countries for which district level $M$ truly is the determining factor and for these countries median $M$ may be used. Taagepera (2006: 177-186), offers an output-based empirical effective threshold, working back from the observed effective number of parties. Per Taagepera's suggestion, I opted to use the effective number of parties to reflect the actual surroundings a party faces which may matter more for party failure than an electoral formula that should lead to a given number of parties. Thus, I control for the effective number of parliamentary parties (ENPP) rather than a threshold of representation or some other measure of disproportionality.
EMPIRICAL NOTE 3
RATIONALE FOR USING THE COX PROPORTIONAL HAZARDS MODEL FOR ANALYZING PARTY SURVIVAL

Given that the focus of my study is party survival, I find that the most appropriate empirical approach is the event history analysis where “the concern is with pattern and causes of change” (Yamaguchi 1991, c.f., Box-Steppensmeier and Jones 1997:1414.) It seems that survival analysis is more conducive to the study of duration - a process that is intrinsically dynamic – than the more widely used, yet: more static regression models. The statistical model I use to test empirically the hypothesized effect of the independent variables on party survival is the Cox Proportional Hazards model. In this case, the most basic mathematical part in respect to party survival according to the Cox PH model is the hazard function, because it plays a central role in survival analysis. The hazard function is a measure of the instantaneous risk the party is exposed to at a given time:

\[ h(t) = \lim_{\Delta \to 0^+} \frac{P(t \leq T \leq t + \Delta | T \geq t)}{\Delta} \]

In this case, it is the limit of the probability of a party surviving for an additional time \( \Delta \) given the fact that a party has survived to time \( t \), divided by \( \Delta \), as \( \Delta \) tends to zero (from the positive direction). The hazard is a number between zero and infinity which represents the risk of failure for a party at a given instant: higher hazard over an extended period implies shorter survival and vice-versa.

In its most general form: 

\[ h(t) = h_0(t)\psi(t) \]

where we usually take: 

\[ \psi(t) = e^{Xt\beta} \]

In other words, \( \psi(t) \) is what the (baseline) hazard is multiplied by and that in turn is based on a log-linear regression. Thus, the ultimate dependent variable is the failure time of a parliamentary party measured as the hazard which is dependent on the baseline hazard and the factor \( \psi(t) \), which is the dependant variable in a log-linear regression.

In sum, the proportional hazards model is a survival model which assumes that different independent variables lead to a multiplicative effect on the hazard of failure. This means that the hazard continues to change (increase/decrease) in the same way over time, but different explanatory variables scale it up or down. With the addition of time-varying independent variables, we can go further and have the multiplicative effect vary over time, though this requires careful treatment as it may complicate interpretation. The proportional hazard and accelerated failure time models are the two best known survival
models. The advantage of the Cox PH model over other survival models (e.g., the accelerated failure time) is that I can estimate the effect of independent variables without having to make any assumption about the hazard function, i.e., without having to make a distributional assumption about the survival time (Cox and Oakes, 1984:16.) There is no known way to achieve this under the accelerated failure time model, with which I would have to first demonstrate that data follow an exponential, Weibull, or some other known distribution before I could estimate the effect of the independent variables on survival.

To test my hypotheses, I use a stratified Cox PH model, whereby each country forms a separate stratum. This allows each country to have a different underlying lifetime distribution which is multiplicatively affected by the explanatory variables but crucially, where the effect of each variable is considered the same across the stratum.

In the stratified Cox PH model, the predictor of interest is policy fluctuation between elections (H1) and policy extremism (H2), but in this case, I also want to adjust for country effects when making inferences about the main predictor’s relationship to time-to-event endpoint, i.e., electoral death. Thus, a stratified analysis can be performed by adjusting for country effects without estimating their effect on the outcome. In other words, the stratifying of countries means that we are allowing the unknown baseline hazard to vary from country-to-country, but we are estimating a common multiplicative effect on the different baseline hazards. This should help reduce the impact of natural country-to-country differences in lifetime distribution. We should therefore allow the different countries to have different base hazards (i.e. lifetime distributions) whilst still estimating a common proportional effect on those hazards due to explanatory variables. This is different than an interaction.
DATA SOURCES FOR VARIABLES IN THE ANALYSIS

Source for policy position variables

Source for Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties ($N_k$)

Sources for GDP per capita and GDP growth

Sources for the selection of policy areas
REFERENCES


Angus Maddison Archive, University of Groningen, http://www.ggdc.net/MADDISON/oriindex.htm


Carey Data Archive, http://www.dartmouth.edu/~jcarey/Data_Archive.html


http://www.gapminder.org/data/

http://www.gapminder.org/documentation/documentation/gapdoc001.pdf


World Bank Development Indicators https://spreadsheets.google.com/a/tcd.ie/pub?key=OAkBd61yS3EmpdHo5S0J6ekhVOF9QaVhod05QSGV4T3c&gid=0
