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POST-CONFLICT GOVERNMENTS 1975-2004: DESIGNING EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE

Thesis

PhD in Political Science

2013

By Catherine Riordan
Declaration

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Summary

Understanding the causes and consequences of internal conflict has become a priority for researchers in economics, international relations and political science over the past two decades. Conflict patterns have changed over this period, with the result that internal conflict has become the dominant conflict type, particularly in low-income countries. This thesis proposes that governments after internal conflict are particularly vulnerable, in several ways: vulnerable to relapses into conflict, to economic adversity, to internal political instability, and to political defeat because they fail to meet voter expectations. At least twenty per cent of all civil conflicts recur within the first four years after conflict has ended (Collier et al, 2006). Where post-conflict governments are operating in a new democracy, they are often operating in a climate of ‘extreme electoral fluidity’, characterised by ephemeral parties, weak voter loyalties, and limited experience of democratic process (Hagopian, 2007: 583, 585).

Governments after conflict face a daunting set of tasks: they often need to undertake military stabilisation, rebuild infrastructure, ensure the basic survival needs of their constituents, and rebuild the economy. These tasks must be undertaken in a climate in which public expectations are often high, and government capacity to deliver on those expectations may be low. The close scrutiny of the international community and the pressure to undertake these tasks rapidly render this process still more difficult. This research examines why some governments between 1975 and 2004 succeeded after internal conflict and others did not. It suggests that because of the vulnerable nature of these governments, several different factors may assist them in performing their tasks: high national income, appropriate institutions, and external support in the form of peacekeeping missions and aid. These supports to government are hypothesised to increase the performance of post-conflict governments as they navigate the first ten years after conflict. High GDP per capita should enable post-conflict rebuilding and enable countries to better withstand price shocks; Institutions which emphasise unity over debate and consensus may have a stabilising effect as governments are able to make unilateral decisions and govern, even if at the expense of some groups. Peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations have multiplied in number and have become increasingly sophisticated; and the provision of aid
from external sources, both in the form of financial and technical assistance, should enable the rebuilding of infrastructure and the reshaping of institutions.

Government performance after conflict was measured by a score, constructed from measures of democracy, the rule of law, independent government of sovereign territory, government delivery of basic services, the absence of conflict, and economic stability or growth. When these scores of government achievement were regressed against income, institutions, peacekeeping missions and aid levels, some of these factors were correlated with government success after internal conflict, while others were not statistically significant. GDP per capita was not significant in explaining post-conflict government success, but institutional types were influential: Presidential systems were negatively correlated with success, while proportional representation electoral systems were positively correlated. The presence or type of peacekeeping force was not statistically significant, nor the level of overseas aid provided, but several control variables were important: the ratio of primary commodity exports to GDP, the degree of ethnic fractionalisation within countries, and the time control.

Case studies examine Timor-Leste, Namibia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in detail to draw lessons from the internal conflicts in those countries and their aftermath. These countries, which experienced conflict during the period examined by this project, come from different geographic regions and have been assisted by different types of peacebuilding operations. They share some common institutional types which have evolved very differently in each country. The project concludes with several policy recommendations for designing effective assistance to post-conflict countries, suggesting that consensus-based institutions may be more effective in post-conflict societies; that considering the context in which institutions must function is crucial; that building democracies takes time, and exit strategies must take this into account; and that certain factors deserve extra attention in the post-conflict period, such as the presence of substantial ethnic minorities, and resource abundance, particularly in low-income countries. Further research into the operation of executive and electoral systems, and the role played by ethnic fractionalisation in post-conflict countries may cast further light on the causal mechanisms by which these factors influence government performance.
Dedication

This work is dedicated to

My husband, Kilian Perrem
Acknowledgements

The study of societies after conflict has held a fascination for me for some time. I wish to thank Professor Antonia Chayes for her inspiring teaching on the law and politics of managing conflicts. Studying this topic in some depth led to my continuing interest in how societies can be rebuilt after war, and the legal and political constraints faced by those seeking to do so.

I would like to acknowledge the helpful advice and comments of my supervisor Professor Ken Benoit during the research and writing of this thesis, particularly in relation to the quantitative sections of the thesis. The comments provided at the proposal stage of this project by Professors Michael Gallagher and Michael Marsh assisted greatly in improving the design of this project. Professor Richard Rosecrance initially encouraged me to think of doctoral studies, and Professor Michael Lewis-Beck provided lucid insights on how best to measure governance. The comments of the examiners were very helpful in improving this thesis.

Much of the background information for my Timor-Leste case study was gained during two months I spent there in 2002, where I was kindly hosted by the Judicial System Monitoring Programme, and funded by the Harvard Centre for International Development. This insight into life in a post-conflict country, and the complexities faced by international actors working there, continue to inform my research.

The encouragement I received from my parents and friends during the writing of this thesis was invaluable, as was the joy brought by my two daughters. I received tremendous assistance and support from my husband, Kilian Perrem, during the research for and writing of this thesis. His encouragement and quiet wisdom have been much appreciated.
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Judging the success of any government is a complex matter, with markers of success sometimes difficult to separate from the economic times in which the government finds itself, and the events with which the government must contend. Evaluating the success of governments following internal conflict is even more challenging, as the government must not only attempt to conduct the usual business of government: ensuring national security, collecting revenue, providing services, and passing legislation, but must often do so in the most difficult circumstances. In some post-conflict situations, constitutions must be passed, legislature buildings must be rebuilt and elections held before legislators can begin to pass legislation; roads, railways and airports must be rebuilt before commerce can resume and revenue be collected; and the dead must be buried and the survivors tended to before the government can assess which services are needed and how they might be provided. In other countries which have experienced internal conflict, however, the economy is healthy, business continues to be transacted, and democratic governance was not affected by the conflict. This heterogeneity of post-conflict countries presents one of the major challenges in measuring their governance, but also makes them more interesting to examine in detail.

In recent years, peace operations have expanded their role, and many have been given the task of establishing new institutions of government in countries after conflict. International organisations often hold or monitor the conduct of democratic elections, and assist in the establishment of legislatures, courts and civilian police. Despite their assistance, many post-conflict governments are not functioning effectively. Some are constrained by continued partisan infighting, while others collapse periodically and are resuscitated. Although the creation of new democracies by external actors has been a hallmark of the
late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, creating stable, functioning and durable democracies has proved a more difficult and lengthier process than many had imagined.

This project proceeds from the theory that governments following conflict are highly vulnerable politically, economically, and in terms of security, and it explores the effectiveness of several different factors in supporting these governments.

Countries emerging from conflict have a high chance of violence returning within the first ten years after the conflict ends (Collier, Hoeflner and Soderbom, 2008), and many of the strategies employed during violent civil conflicts, such as the use of child soldiers and the targeting of civilians, leave a legacy of psychological damage and a population with lasting grievances. Recovering economically from civil conflict is also challenging. Countries which become embroiled in such conflicts are frequently poor and resource-dependent. This dependence brings with it susceptibility to commodity price shocks, and the slow economic growth which often follows internal conflict is itself a risk factor for conflict recurrence (Collier, Chauvet and Hegre, 2008: 9). External debt in post-conflict countries is higher and shows different patterns to that in non-conflict countries. Levels of uncertainty are higher in the post-war period, economic institutions are weaker, financial needs for reconstruction are higher, and foreign aid dependence is higher (Alvarez-Plata and Brück, 2008:501). Post-conflict governments often govern in testing political situations: they frequently work within a climate of ‘extreme electoral fluidity’, characterised by unstable parties, high electoral volatility, and limited experience of democratic process (Hagopian, 2007: 583, 585).

There are a number of factors which have the potential to act as ‘scaffolding’ for these vulnerable post-conflict governments, and to make them more likely to succeed, despite their weaknesses. These factors include high national income, which enables the reconstruction of infrastructure, resumption of government services, and re-starting of the economy after conflict; high levels of aid, which assists which economic development, as well as promoting social goals; ‘rigid’ or majoritarian institutions, which provide a more structured environment in which to conduct the business of government, as opposed to
consensus-based institutions, which require greater levels of agreement in order to function; and peacekeeping operations, particularly multidisciplinary operations, which provide institution-building capabilities as well as conflict prevention. A number of control variables which have been researched for their importance to the incidence or aftermath of conflict are also included to assess their importance relative to the four main factors outlined here.

This thesis will assess the performance of governments after internal conflict between 1975 and 2004, and will attempt to explain why some post-conflict governments are more successful than others. The performance of the governments is assessed using a small number of criteria including, absence of conflict; economic performance, basic levels of democracy, delivery of government services, and respect for the rule of law. An original panel dataset forms the basis of a large-n study which will gauge which of four hypotheses is most influential in explaining the success of governments after internal conflict between 1975 and 2004. Countries in which no conflict has occurred are included in the dataset as a comparison, and the unit of analysis is the country-year.

Three case studies of governments in countries after war more closely examine the factors affecting government effectiveness after war. Exploring the issues which led to conflict, the events shaping politics after conflict in Timor-Leste, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Namibia, and how these governments operated after war allows a fuller consideration of which factors have influenced government performance over time. The project will conclude with an analysis of the findings of both qualitative and quantitative sections, and with recommendations for policy-makers in this area.

Background

The early part of the period studied, the 1970s, saw increasing numbers of intrastate conflicts. The Carnation Revolution in Portugal in 1974, and Portugal’s subsequent decision to withdraw from its remaining colonial possessions (Mozambique, Timor-Leste, Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde), the end of the Vietnam War and the independence struggle in Namibia, all marked this period. In the 1980s, the number of intrastate wars declined slightly, but the number of UN peacekeeping missions began to
increase. Missions were established to supervise the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, oversee the Iran-Iraq ceasefire, assist Namibia’s transition to independence, and monitor the ceasefire in Nicaragua. New conflicts in key regions of the world began, influenced by the ideologies of the major powers. Conflicts commenced in Afghanistan, between Iran and Iraq, in Nicaragua and in the Falklands during the 1980s, and the Cold War between the US and the USSR seemed an unchangeable feature of the international system. The late 1980s, however, saw reforms taking place in the USSR involving greater government openness and restructuring, more far-reaching treaties between the United States and the USSR concerning nuclear weapons, and the reunification of Germany. Former Soviet republics began to break away from the USSR, which was officially dissolved in 1991.

The post-Cold War era has seen substantial changes to the global balance of power, to patterns and modes of conflict throughout the globe, and to the way the United Nations operates. Two countervailing trends in conflict became apparent in the early 1990s: as military and economic assistance to allies by the United States and Russia ended, many wars came to an end; but as Russia’s control over many of its neighbours and former Soviet republics was lessened, new conflicts erupted as ethnic groups asserted their independence and attempted to establish or redefine states (such as in Azerbaijan, Georgia and the former Yugoslavia). The effect of this on overall conflict numbers was that incidence of internal conflicts rose, peaking in 1992, and then declined, while the number of inter-state conflicts also declined. Extensive media coverage of conflicts and their aftermath led to a perception that conflict was on the rise during the 1990s and early 2000s, although this was not borne out by the actual numbers of conflicts (Mack, 2005:15, 17).

The cessation of covert hostilities between the United States and Russia also broke the decades-long deadlock on the United Nations’ Security Council, enabling it to more closely fulfil its intended function of promoting peace and security. Prior to this, the frequent exercise of veto power by either the United States or the USSR meant that the Security Council, although holding substantial powers under the UN Charter, was unable to exercise many of its prerogatives. Security Council mandates to peacekeeping forces began to include duties relating to state reconstruction and democratization, and reconstruction tasks
began to appear amongst the terms of peace agreements. Changes in the world of aid and development were taking place at the same time, as international financial institutions began to impose conditionalities on recipient nations which were tied to political and economic reforms (Grimm, 2008:531). In some ways these aid conditionalities were similar to those which had previously been used to promote ‘Washington consensus’-style economic reforms, but with a focus on democratic, liberal governance. The UN began to examine its role in peacekeeping and peacebuilding, with the publication of An Agenda for Peace in 1992 and A Supplement to an Agenda for Peace in 1995.

As well as the UN’s shift in willingness and ability to act, international law norms in relation to intervention in conflict were also changing. The humanitarian crises brought about by intense ethnic conflicts, particularly in former communist states, combined with intense media coverage of the civilian casualties of these conflicts, led to reflection amongst academics and practitioners on the intersection between state sovereignty and international protection of human rights.

The loss of life stemming from the Rwandan genocide and the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, as well as the failure of the traditional peacekeeping model to prevent these from taking place, led both to changes in peacekeeping practice and the idea that the principle of state sovereignty might, in some cases, be overridden by a moral imperative to protect human life. The International Commission on State Sovereignty and Intervention (ICISS) suggested in 2001 that this imperative be defined as ‘the responsibility to protect’, which has been described as a ‘... moral guideline for international action in the face of humanitarian emergency’ (Day and Freeman, 2005, 139). The bombing of the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon in the United States on September 11, 2001, and the realisation that many of the bombers had been trained in Afghanistan, focussed attention in defence, academic and policy circles on the idea that failed or failing states, rather than simply being worthy of assistance, might pose an active threat to other nations. It was also suggested that a right to democratic governance might be emerging, in which states gain legitimacy from other states in the international system on the basis of the democratic nature of their governance (Franck, 1992). Some of the official rhetoric prior to the United States’ 2003 invasion of Iraq implied that protecting the rights of those living under an
undemocratic regime, as well as the perceived threat the regime posed to the United States, might justify military action and the subsequent occupation of Iraq\(^1\). The nature of these military interventions, which frequently involved the collapse of state institutions, meant that a different kind of post-conflict operation was called for, one which would enable war-torn countries to re-establish effective governments (Chesterman, 2011:4).

The evolution of peacekeeping

The combination of increasing numbers of internal conflicts, a newly-active Security Council, and a moral imperative to prevent large-scale loss of civilian life led to a significant increase in the number of peacekeeping missions launched after the late 1980s. The number of UN peacekeeping forces deployed during this period rose from 8 during the 1980s to a total of 34 during the 1990s\(^2\).

Previously, the United Nations had primarily been involved in what is now known as ‘classic peacekeeping’ – monitoring compliance with ceasefires or patrolling disputed borders, with the consent of the conflicting parties. The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (the Brahimi report) noted that traditional peacekeeping tended to treat the symptoms rather than the causes of the conflict, and that in the absence of resolution of issues fuelling the conflict, peacekeeping missions could persist for several decades (as those on the India/Pakistan border and in Cyprus have done) (UN Security Council 2000: Para 17).

Peace enforcement involves intervention into conflicts which may be ongoing, and may require military force to protect civilians, combined with diplomatic efforts to end the conflict. While there is some debate as to whether it involves creation of a ceasefire by forcefully separating combatants, or merely maintaining a ceasefire or reinstating a lapsed ceasefire (see, for example, Snow, 1993:7), the use of force is required for peace enforcement (ICISS, 2001:X). Peace enforcement operations in Somalia, northern Iraq and the former Yugoslavia had mixed success in halting conflict and preventing loss of

\(^1\) See, for example, then President G. W. Bush’s address to the United States people of 17 March 2003, URL: http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/03/17/sprj.irq.bush.transcript/
civilian life, and also raised the question of the most appropriate action for interveners to take after the peace had been enforced.

Undertaking a degree of post-conflict reconstruction offered the possibility of stabilising and securing states after conflict, and the United Nations made policy in this area (in the form of the Secretary-General’s 1992 report, An Agenda for Peace, and its 1995 Supplement), and practised peacebuilding in numerous peace operations during the 1990s. Peacekeeping missions evolved from boundary and ceasefire policing to multidisciplinary missions which registered voters, held elections, re-established courts, helped to demobilise military personnel and assisted in de-mining former combat areas. Peacebuilding became a central theme of most peace operations by the late 1990s (de Carvalho and Aune, 2010, citing Paris and Sisk, 2007).

**From peacekeeping to post-conflict situation**

The evolution of peacekeeping from negotiating and policing the cessation of military hostilities, to rebuilding the institutions of state in post-conflict settings, involved considerable risk and innovation on the part of the international agencies involved. Although the military aspects of peacekeeping were relatively well-established, the institution-building which then began to be undertaken had few established precedents, apart from the reconstructions of Japan and Germany by the United States after the Second World War. There was, therefore, an element of trial and error in attempts to establish new institutions in post-conflict countries, and the international organisations concerned have been ‘learning on the job’ for the past two decades.

Their record of success has been mixed. Some post-conflict missions have been extremely successful at establishing functioning states after war: Namibia has formed a coherent and successful, though not wealthy society, since the UN assisted it to hold its first elections in 1989; Mozambique has emerged from decades of violent conflict to become a poor, but reasonably stable nation. But there have also been notable failures, such as the operations in Angola (where elections led to renewed violence), Cambodia and Liberia, where superficial democratization was followed by a return to authoritarianism (Paris, 2009:57,
Cheslennan, 2011:14). The training and effectiveness of UN troops and police has been called into question in some instances (Gowan, 2011: 1-2), as has their conduct.

A number of different solutions have been proposed to increase the chances of success of peacebuilding/statebuilding missions in contributing to stable polities after conflict. As early problems were experienced following the quick withdrawal of peacekeeping forces, the second wave of missions focussed particularly on their exit strategy as a key factor in preventing a regression into violent conflict. Paris (2009) suggested that attempting to establish a free-market economy and a pluralist democratic state at the same time was doomed to failure; he proposed ‘institutionalization before liberalization’ as one important part of improving outcomes in post-conflict situations.

To date there has been little cross-national, readily comparable data which might help to explain why some post-conflict governments succeed in establishing stable democracies, and others are unable to maintain peace and security, and relapse into conflict or authoritarianism. There was a focus in the 1990s on examining ‘lessons learned’ from former missions, which gradually became more systematic and focussed on evaluation techniques frequently used in the development field (de Carvalho and Aune, 2010:5-6). The ‘lessons learned’ movement has also become an established part of the military establishments of many countries.

Post-conflict governments present a number of challenges for research and analysis. There is a relatively small number of recent case studies, which differ from each other in significant respects; there is little consensus in the literature about what should be studied, or even what the markers of success for governments in this situation should be; and finding reliable empirical data on these countries is difficult. During conflict, government structures and organs often cease operations, or at least turn their attention to prosecuting the war rather than collecting data; data can be manipulated by wartime governments for political purposes; files may be lost or destroyed; immediately after conflict, the gathering of statistics by national governments may not be possible and is almost certainly not a

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3 See, for example, www.internationallessonslearned.org
priority; and statistics gathered by aid or peacekeeping agencies after conflict may not be reliable due to the unstable nature of many post-conflict societies. Despite these constraints on gathering accurate data, it is crucially important to do so in order to be able to measure the impact and effectiveness of different peacebuilding and state-building strategies. Why study post-conflict governments?

Post-conflict governments and the factors likely to make them more successful are an important subject of study for a number of reasons.

Firstly, the well-established links between conflict and poverty mean that unchecked and recurrent armed conflicts may impoverish some nations or exacerbate existing poverty in warring states, undermining human and economic development objectives. The United Nations Development Fund’s Human Development report for 2005 observes that ‘Apart from the immediate human costs, violent conflict disrupts whole societies and can roll back human development gains built up over generations ... violent conflict is one of the surest and fastest routes to the bottom of the Human Development Index table – and one of the strongest indicators for a protracted stay there’ (United Nations Development Program, 2005: pp151, 154). World Bank President Robert Zoellick estimates that “A civil conflict costs the average developing country roughly 30 years of GDP growth, and countries in protracted crisis fall over 20 percentage points behind in overcoming poverty” (World Bank, 2011: vi). Conflict can have a lasting and destructive effect on economies and institutions. As well as the physical destruction which it generally involves, conflict is frequently accompanied by the breakdown of social norms, radical changes to the economic environment, and the suspension of some or all human rights protections. Resources are often diverted from commerce to conflict, and the ordinary business of government may be suspended, if the government is able to function at all. While preventing violent conflict from occurring in the first place is clearly the best way to avoid its human and economic costs, the establishment of stable governments after conflict ends may help to prevent relapses into conflict, and place formerly war-torn countries on a more productive path.
Secondly, there is an increasing appreciation of the important role that good governments play in creating stable and productive societies, particularly in developing economies. Good performance by governments has been linked with a higher probability of success for aid projects (Burnside and Dollar, 2000), with economic growth (Chong and Calderón, 2000a), with reductions in poverty (Chong and Calderón, 2000b); and with higher per capita incomes (Kaufman and Kraay, 2002). Examining what makes some governments successful after conflict, and others less successful, may help to establish more robust and effective government institutions which are able to manage the challenges of reconstruction without regressing into conflict.

Thirdly, many billions of dollars have been spent by international organisations, governments and NGOs on attempts to rebuild collapsed and fragile states. It was estimated in 2009, for example, that Timor-Leste had received approximately US$8.7 billion in foreign aid in the decade since it declared its independence in 1999.\(^4\) The United Nations is estimated to spend more than US$7 billion each year on peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and currently has 16 peace operations deployed\(^5\). Peacekeeping, however, is relatively inexpensive compared with other military operations: placing a UN peacekeeper in the field costs only 20% as much as to deploy a NATO soldier (Gowans, 2011:2). By 2006, the US Government was estimated to have spent close to US$200 billion on the conflict in Iraq (Fukuyama, 2006:239) and in 2011 the cumulative total appropriated by the US Government for the Iraq war was US$806 billion, with $444 billion being spent in Afghanistan (Belasco, 2011:1). Between 2009 and 2010, the monthly cost of the Afghanistan operation rose from US$4.4 billion to US$6.7 billion per month. It is estimated that Bosnia has received more per capita assistance than Europe did under the Marshall Plan (Chesterman, 2011:7, citing International Crisis Group, 2010).

The continued investment of these tremendous sums will become increasingly difficult to justify if there remain few ways to determine the success or failure of these peacebuilding/statebuilding missions, and inadequate institutional learning from one mission to the next.

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It has been noted that with increased expenditures on peacekeeping and the ‘mixed’ results of many operations, have come increased demands for accountability, but that the literature in this area so far remains ‘scant’ (De Carvalho and Aune, 2010:5).

Fourthly, and of great concern, is that in the past decade at least two conflicts have been initiated on the premise that external actors can create functioning democracies in non-democratic countries within a relatively short space of time. The experience of the past decade in Iraq and Afghanistan has shown that this is not the case. Governments established by externally-driven elections may suffer from inherent legitimacy problems, even where apparently democratic elections are held, and in underdeveloped or fragile states, these governments may be unable to provide even basic services to their populations. Fukuyama notes that in Iraq, “The desire to maintain American ... ownership of the reconstruction reflected a misplaced confidence about how easy the process would ultimately be” (2006:139).

Given the stakes involved, it seems worth exploring which factors make a difference to post-conflict governments: do particular combinations of institutions make these governments more likely to work? Does the presence or absence of a UN or other peacebuilding mission make a difference? Does the level of aid funding provided to a country after conflict assist or hinder its development?

Establishing useful measures of success and failure for the post-conflict context has the potential to help policy-makers and interveners (whether from international organisations, non-government organisations or foreign governments) to assess which interventions are more likely to be successful and which less so, and enable operations in progress to correct their course if need be. At worst, they may prevent costly and ineffective interventions being undertaken more than once; at best, they have the potential to improve peacebuilding and statebuilding practices overall, saving money, preventing unnecessary loss of life, and improving quality of life for the citizens of fragile and conflict-prone states.

The stakes are so high and need for ‘success’ in post-conflict operations so pressing because of the tremendous political stakes involved. Peace operations are a high-profile
activity of international organisations: their success or failure influences the level of political and financial support for these organisations. The UN was strongly criticised when its relatively small peacekeeping operation in Rwanda failed to prevent the genocide there in 1994, and when its peacekeeping force in the former Yugoslavia was unable, acting within the terms of its mandate, to prevent the killings of civilians in Srebrenica. After the failed attempt to capture General Mohammed Farah Aideed by US Forces in Somalia, which resulted in 18 US fatalities and 77 injured soldiers, as well as approximately 300 Somali deaths and 800 people wounded, the US decided to withdraw from the UN operation there: these casualties caused a reversal of public opinion and a change of political will. Twelve months after the US withdrawal, the UN finished its operation in Somalia. It had cost US$1.64 billion, 136 peacekeepers’ lives had been lost, and six months after the UN’s departure, malnutrition and disease were once more increasing, and fighting had recommenced in Mogadishu (Rosegrant and Watkins, 1996). For organisations such as NATO, the Organisation of American States and the African Union, which undertake peacekeeping or peace enforcement missions, success in these missions may contribute to their legitimacy both regionally and internationally; while failure may diminish their stature and relevance. There is also the question of the appropriate place in peace operations for bodies such as the World Bank and humanitarian aid organisations; and the provision of competent support to peace operations and in fragile states may be a source of continued legitimacy and donations for NGOs.

Gathering and analysing empirical data concerning which peacebuilding strategies are more likely to be successful has the potential to offer great benefits: better practices, better advice about institutions and tactics, and greater legitimacy for all peace operations if more of them produce positive outcomes. The costs of peacebuilding operations may also be lowered if more appropriate strategies are employed from the first moment of intervention, rather than through a process of trial and error. In recent years, development agencies (both international and national) have increased their focus on measuring development outcomes, particularly those relating to governance. This focus has come somewhat belatedly to peacebuilding and humanitarian operations, but is needed for much the same reasons: obtaining data about the effects of interventions, improves the chances of making
those interventions effective, and of heightens the probability of institutions making quick and successful choices in future times of crisis.

There is not, of course, universal support for peacebuilding and state-building as undertaken by international organisations and development agencies. Although some observers have noted that the decreasing number of conflicts and increasing popularity of negotiated settlements as a way of terminating conflict may be due to the UN’s growing expertise in managing conflict and post-conflict situations (Human Security Centre 2008b:44-45), the expanded version of peacekeeping is not considered to be an unqualified benefit. Concerns have been raised about the effects that expanded peacekeeping missions have on state sovereignty: the contradictions between the extensive powers frequently exercised by unelected transitional administrations, and the democratic self-determination they promote (Chesterman, 2004), the effects of peacekeeping missions on fragile post-conflict economies, and the weak and dependent states they may create (Suhrke, 2009).

In many conflict situations, peacebuilding/statebuilding takes place without the consent of those who are governed, but because of other imperatives: concerns about regional security, refugee flows, resource security, or belief in the responsibility to protect. Because of the deep incursions which some forms of peacebuilding and statebuilding make into national sovereignty, and the concerns about neo-colonialism raised by Chesterman and others, those undertaking peace operations must be as certain as possible that the actions which are being taken are those which are most likely to be effective. It has been noted that although complex peacekeeping operations have been reasonably successful at ending violent conflict, they have been less successful at their broader goal of ‘creating the good society’ (Barnett and Zürcher, 2009, in Paris and Sisk, 2009). Questions about the legitimacy of statebuilding missions are yet to be comprehensively answered.
CHAPTER 2

INTERNAL CONFLICT AND POST-CONFLICT GOVERNANCE

Better plans, better people, more troops might have given us a small advantage in 2003, but direct foreign rule, I guessed, was never going to turn Iraq into a liberal democracy... We were controlling the lives of people who had not invited us in and who had not voted for us.

Rory Stewart, Prince of the Marshes

As noted in the preceding Chapter, after the Second World War ended, the number of civil wars began to increase, and the incidence of interstate armed conflict began to decline sharply. The number of civil wars peaked in the early 1990s, as geopolitical shifts such as the end of the Cold War, reduced colonial patronage, and regime changes in sub-Saharan Africa meant that long-standing balances of power were altered. Ninety new armed conflicts commenced between 1989 and 1996, almost all of them internal conflicts (Forman et al, 2000, cited in Burke, 2006:3). Low-income countries were particularly prone to civil conflict (Collier et al, 2008). Understanding the causes and results of internal conflict has become a priority for researchers in economics, international relations and political science over the past two decades (Kalyvas, 2007).

This chapter will examine the existing literature in relation to internal conflict, governance after conflict, and the measurement of governance. Since the end of the Second World War, internal conflict has become the most common type of conflict, affecting more than one-third of developing nations. The reasons put forward for this are many, including the breakdown of the former Soviet Union and the independence struggles of many colonial states in Africa; the breakdown of the former Yugoslavia; a gradual build-up of civil wars beginning after the second World War (Fearon and Laitin, 2003) and changes brought by modernization and increasing political freedom in many formerly authoritarian states. Civil war has been termed 'the most poorly understood system failure in the domestic political process' (Sambanis, 2002:217).
Enquiring into the origins of internal conflict is a complex endeavour, as it can be difficult to distinguish cause and effect, and endogeneity problems are pervasive (Kalyvas, 2007; Wood, 2003: 154, Sambanis, 2001: 232). Internal conflict occurs more commonly in countries where incomes and income growth are low (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998; Hegre and Sambanis, 2006); and in turn such conflict tends to further impoverish the countries in which it takes place (Gates, Hegre, Nygard and Strand, 2012; Murdoch and Sandler, 2002; Collier et al, 2003; Collier, 2004). Internal conflicts often occur in countries in which national income is reliant on natural resources (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004); and the economic disruption which conflict causes may discourage investment and make those countries even more reliant on resource exports. And finally, countries which have experienced civil conflict are far more likely to experience it again within five years (Collier et al, 2003; although see Suhrke and Samset, 2007). Despite these problems of causation, enquiring into the causes of such conflicts offers the opportunity to better understand their origins, characteristics and consequences. Academics from different disciplines emphasise different sources of conflict: scholars of international relations frequently stress the role played by ethnic heterogeneity, comparativist scholars often investigate the contribution of weak state capacity and development economists have considered the role of natural resources in civil conflict (Kalyvas 2007). Recent trends in the conflict literature include a greater emphasis on micro-level effects and processes, which it is hoped will facilitate deeper enquiry into issues which remain unclear despite extensive research. These include causal connections between poverty and conflict, resources and conflict incidence; and individual combatants’ decisions to fight.

Theories of conflict

A number of theories of conflict attempt to address the question of why conflict occurs within states and how winners and losers are determined. The ‘contest model’ of conflict has been termed the ‘workhorse of the formal conflict literature’ (Blattman and Miguel, 2010:9), and treats civil conflict as a contest for resources between rebel groups and the government. The probability of side 1 achieving victory over side 2 is determined by inputs (such as weapons) and their effectiveness in determining the winner. Within this model, the efficacy of each side’s weaponry, leaders, training and foreign bases (‘fighting
technology') increases the probability of their winning and consuming side 2’s economic output (Garfinkel and Skaperdas, 2007). This model provides some support for the empirical link (which will be discussed further below) between poverty and civil war: for people who are poor and perhaps unemployed, or living at subsistence level, the opportunity cost of fighting in wars is lower, and wage-earning may be less attractive to individuals than fighting (Blattman and Miguel, 2010: 10); although theoretically, greater wealth should mean that there is more to fight for in terms of total national wealth (Garfinkel and Skaperdas, 2007).

Internal conflict can also occur under conditions of asymmetrical information: when one party miscalculates its likelihood of victory, or underrates the strength of the opposing party (Powell, 2002). This seems at best an incomplete explanation of the occurrence of many conflicts, as exaggerating one’s military strength may heighten security dilemmas and increase the likelihood of being attacked, and disparities in military strength ought to be revealed on the battlefield, and in any case are less likely to be surprising in an age of satellite surveillance (Fearon, 2004a; Powell, 2006, cited in Blattman and Miguel, 2010: 12). Information asymmetries may also affect conflict duration: the greater the number of veto players who must agree to a settlement, the more difficult it may be to reach a peace agreement. Because asymmetries of information may be more marked, incentives not to reach agreement may be high, and alliances between parties may shift (Cunningham, 2006).

Another theoretical explanation for internal conflict is that of commitment problems. Under this model, even if both sides have complete information about each other’s relative capabilities and their respective likelihood of winning, they are unable to make a credible commitment to settle the conflict: “...Negotiations fail because civil war opponents are asked to do what they consider unthinkable” (Walter 1997: 335). The temptation to renege on a peace settlement makes it difficult for both sides to credibly make a binding agreement which will ensure peace, particularly in the absence of strong state institutions which might enforce the terms of such an agreement over time (Blattman and Miguel, 2010: 11). The presence of democratic institutions may reduce the risk of civil war, provided measures of state weakness are controlled for (Gleditsch and Ruggeri, 2010), and
the international community may also play a role in helping to enforce agreements (Walter, 1997).

Although these theoretical models have been examined by empirical research which seeks to prove their validity, it has been observed that none of them has been entirely confirmed, and that more research into group cohesion, conflict triggers, and individual motivations for engaging in fighting is needed (Blattman and Miguel, 2010).

Defining internal conflicts

Internal conflict is a term often used interchangeably with ‘civil war’, ‘civil conflict’, and ‘intrastate conflict’. Internal conflict can occur in several ways: it may involve the government of a state in conflict with a rebel organisation; two non-state actors at war with each other; the defence force of a state attempting a coup against the government; or a secessionist movement attempting to break away from the state. Internal conflicts may be conventional, but are more likely to be non-conventional conflicts, involving one regular army in conflict with a guerrilla force, with few set-piece battles or defined front lines; and the forces concerned may be symmetric or asymmetric, depending on their relative strength (Kalyvas, 2007; Balcells and Kalyvas, 2007). Part of the complexity of studying civil wars arises from the fact that they are ‘deeply endogenous processes’ – that “...Collective and individual preferences, strategies, values and identities are continuously shaped and reshaped in the course of a war, while the war itself aggregates all kinds of cleavages from the most ideological to the most local. Popular loyalty, disloyalty, and support cannot be assumed as exogenous and fixed” (Kalyvas, 2007: 430).

A number of definitional issues arise in relation to these conflicts. Most datasets rely on death counts for the inclusion of conflicts, but there is debate over which deaths should be counted: whether battle-deaths only should be tallied, whether civilian deaths should be included, or whether both are relevant. How they should be counted (whether cumulatively or annually) is also a matter for debate (Sambanis, 2002:238; Cramer, 2007, cited in Blattman and Miguel, 2010). Where datasets have a 1,000-death threshold for inclusion, selection problems may occur: datasets may select for incidences of violence in more
heavily populated countries where large casualty counts are more likely to be recorded (Sambanis, 2002:238). The number of deaths in a conflict may also be related to other characteristics of government: it has been found that a smaller ruling coalition correlates to greater numbers of deaths in civil conflict, although this relationship can be reversed in democratic settings (Heger and Saleyhan, 2007).

Analysing different subtypes of civil conflict may be problematic as they are small in number, posing problems for statistical analysis; and they may be endogenous to the repressive capacity of the state, the strength of rebel forces, the strength of political grievances, and the perceived probability of military victory (Blattman and Miguel, 2010:31). For these reasons, civil conflicts will be analysed here as a group, rather than by their conflict subtype.

For the purposes of this thesis, the definition of internal conflict (and the associated data) used by the Uppsala/Peace Research Institute of Oslo Armed Conflict dataset will be used: “... a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths.” (Uppsala Conflict Data Project/Peace Research Institute of Oslo, 2006)

Civil wars have traditionally been analysed distinctly from other types of political violence such as riots, assassinations, genocides and coups d’état (Cramer, 2007, cited in Blattman and Miguel, 2010), however, new datasets which deal with smaller-scale violence, such as the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED: Raleigh, Linke, Hegre and Karlsen, 2010) and track violent events by location or in real time are providing much finer-grained data, and will permit connections to be made between these smaller-scale violent events and larger episodes of civil conflict⁶. These datasets commenced too recently to be included in this project, but will be of considerable use for scholars studying more recent conflicts.

⁶See, for example, the September 2012 Conflict Trends Report, available at http://strausscenter.org/ccaps/
Causes of internal conflict

Poverty

One of the most robust associations in the civil conflict literature is that between conflict and poverty: Conflict occurs more frequently in poor countries (Collier and Hoeffler, 1999; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon and Laitin, 2003, Sambanis, 2002), and is of longer duration in those countries (Collier and Hoeffler, 1999). Considerable research into the causes of civil war has been framed around the question of whether ‘greed or grievance’ is the primary motivating factor in triggering civil conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004), and to date ‘greed’, or the opportunity to gain wealth, has proved a more powerful explanation than political or other types of ‘grievance’. Collier and Hoeffler measured political motivations for conflict, such as inequality of wealth, low levels of human rights protection, and ethnic/religious cleavages in society (although they conceded that finding proxies for ‘grievance’-related variables was problematic). They also considered the role of ‘opportunity’ variables, such as the ratio of primary commodity exports to gross domestic product (GDP), GDP per capita, geographic dispersion, and population size. They concluded that increased opportunities for rebellion, particularly the availability of finance and natural resources, were associated with an increased incidence of civil conflict; but that ethnic fractionalisation, income inequality, and democracy were not reliable predictors of conflict risk.

Fearon and Laitin (2003) considered similar questions of civil war causation, but came to different conclusions: they considered the likelihood of civil war onset, theorising that it was a product of per capita income, population, geography, democratic measures and social measures, including ethnic and religious fractionalisation. Like Collier and Hoeffler, they found that social measures poorly predicted conflict onsets, but found instead that ‘anocracies’ (states which are neither fully democratic nor entirely autocratic), new states, and states in which there had been recent political instability, were more likely to experience civil wars than states without these features. They disagreed with Collier and Hoeffler concerning the importance of primary commodity exports, but agreed concerning the importance of income, which they saw as a sign of a ‘well-financed and
administratively competent government’, meaning a state which is able to effectively suppress conflict. The differences in findings between these two important contributions to the literature are explicable by the differences in variables used (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Blattman and Miguel, 2010:23), definitions of civil war and questions posed, but both contain useful insights into the correlates and possible causes of civil conflict.

The role that price and income shocks may play in triggering armed civil conflict is still the subject of debate. If income shocks lead to job losses, they may increase the risk of conflict as there is a lower opportunity cost of fighting for soldiers (Chassang and Padró i Miquel 2009). Increases in import prices have been associated with increased incidence of civil conflict (Besley and Persson, 2008), which may be attributed to declines in real wages; but rises in export prices are also associated with increased conflict, perhaps because takeover of the government and its revenues becomes more lucrative. On a sub-national level, the picture is more complex and some evidence suggests that the type of resource may influence the effect of price changes on conflict. In the Colombian context, international falls in the price of coffee (a labour-intensive export commodity) were associated with increased violence in coffee-producing regions, while increases in the price of oil were associated with more violence in oil producing regions (Dube and Vargas, 2008). Conflict events were more frequent in Liberia in areas of absolute and relative wealth (Hegre, Østby and Raleigh, 2009), lending weight to ‘opportunity’ explanations for conflict.

Recent micro- and country-level studies suggest that one reason for the correlation between war and poverty may be that for the poor, or those living at subsistence level, war represents an employment opportunity (Justino, 2007: 19). Both poverty and promises of material rewards increased the likelihood that individuals would join rebel groups in Sierra Leone (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2008).

The contribution of social inequality to civil conflict has also been explored in the literature, although the evidence for its effect on the incidence of conflict indicates that the relationship is not straightforward. Income or asset inequality can fit into either the ‘greed’ or ‘grievance’ explanations of economic incentives for conflict: economic inequality can
provide an economic incentive for poorer groups to try to seize control of state assets and revenues; or anger over economic and social inequality can provide the fuel for ‘grievance’-based conflict (Blattman and Miguel, 2010:18). Measuring grievances directly is problematic, and it has been noted that grievances are far more prevalent than civil wars (Kalyvas, 2007).

Recent findings indicate that in societies characterised by greater levels of inequality, members of both wealthy and poor ethnic groups are more likely to be involved in conflict than those whose income is near the national average (Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch, 2011). This could be explained by the engagement of the wealthy in conflict to defend their property, and the engagement of the poor in order to increase their wealth; or as a synergistic product of inequality: poor people increasingly participate in conflict as they become poorer, and wealthy people have more to contribute financially to conflict as they become wealthier, meaning that greater inequality drives greater participation in conflict (Esteban and Ray, 2011). In Rwanda, both the working poor and farmers who rented land were over-represented among genocide perpetrators, and landlords were over-represented among victims: (Verwimp 2003, 2005).

The evidence regarding links between conflict and inequality is somewhat contradictory: There is some empirical support for the proposition that when overall inequality in a country is lessened, conflict increases, as traditionally deprived groups have the means to engage in conflict (Besançon, 2005). When examined at the micro-level, however, areas of countries which had more absolute poverty were more prone to outbreaks of conflict, suggesting that inequality increased the risk of conflict (Buhaug, Gleditsch, Holtermann, Østby and Tollefsen, 2011). It seems that not only does inequality play a role in the incidence of conflict, conflict itself further exacerbates economic inequality, although this effect diminishes over time and inequality typically returns to pre-war levels within five years after conflict ends (Bircan, Brück and Vothknecht, 2010). Further micro-level studies of the motivations of combatants and the location of conflict events may assist in further explaining these findings.
Ethnic differences and conflict

The question of whether ethnic differences give rise to conflict was examined extensively during the 1990s, when many apparently ethnically-based conflicts in Europe and Africa erupted, and the former Russian republics became independent from the former Soviet Union. By one measure, more than two-thirds of the internal conflicts occurring since 1945 have been fought between or within ethnic groups (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Ethnic groups are theorised to engage in violent conflict for a number of reasons, including, for example, strong family-like relationships between group members (Horowitz, 1995), incompatibilities between ‘civilisations’ (Huntington, 1993), or disputes over indivisible territory (Toft, 2003).

While researchers have yet to identify how ethnic identity influences conflict, this strand of enquiry continues to be researched, perhaps because it offers an intuitively powerful explanation for many conflicts. As ‘grievances’, there are only weak associations at cross-country level between the occurrence of conflict, ethnic fractionalisation and economic inequality (see, for example, Fearon and Laitin, 2003, Hegre and Sambanis, 2006), although poor provision of public goods, which is strongly linked to ethnic diversity, may provide part of the explanation for this (Habyarimana et al, 2007), and a number of writers have questioned the efficacy of the commonly-used ethno-linguistic fractionalisation index in conceptualising and measuring ethnic difference (Posner, 2004, Sambanis, 2002; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005). As discussed further in Chapter 3, a different measure of ethnic diversity within society is used for the purposes of this thesis.

The importance of ethno-cultural identity is considered by Gurr to be one of the main determinants of civil war (2000); ethnic polarization (as opposed to mere diversity) has been shown to be important to civil war incidence (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005), and the number of politically relevant ethnic groups is strongly and negatively correlated to economic growth in African countries (Posner, 2004). Conflict has been found to be more probable in cases where there are ethnic links between groups in neighbouring conflicts, and it has been proposed that ethnic links across national borders constitute a central mechanism of conflict contagion (Buhaug and Gleditsch, 2008).
**Institutions and conflict**

The links between institutional types and incidence of internal conflict are not, as yet, well understood. Weak institutions (as proxied by low per capita income and the absence of political and civil rights) have been linked to increased likelihood of civil war occurrence, and partly free societies (sometimes termed anocracies) are also conflict-prone (Fearon and Laitin, 2003, Hegre et al, 2001, Goldstone et al, 2010), but the relationships between particular types of political institutions and the outbreak of civil conflict have not yet been identified. Regime type can be a strong predictor of the likelihood of internal conflict, with partial democracies with ‘factionalism’ the most conflict-prone type, and non-contested, unified regimes the most resilient to internal conflict (Goldstone et al, 2010). The very fact of civil war can be a signal: "...that the incumbent state is somehow weak or lacks state capacity", although the type and degree of lack of capacity in individual cases varies widely (Kalyvas, 2007:425). Societies in transition are vulnerable, unless their central institutions are robust (Mansfield and Snyder, 2002), but despite Reynal-Querol’s 2002 findings concerning the lower probability of rebellion in proportional systems, overall “...we have a poor understanding of the specific political and legal institutions capable of enforcing commitments and facilitating compromise between competing groups” (Blattman and Miguel, 2010: 19).

**Natural resources**

The link between conflict and a country’s dependence on natural resources has been considered at length in the literature. Resources are thought to influence armed conflict in a number of ways: the desire to control resources may act as part of the motivation for conflict; the proceeds of sale of such resources may finance conflict, particularly in a post-Cold War world in which foreign ‘backers’ of civil conflict are less common; the unequal distribution of the proceeds of resource extraction may lead to political grievances; or natural resources may increase a country’s susceptibility to conflict by weakening political institutions’ ability to resolve conflicts (Le Billon, 2001; Humphreys, 2005, Auty: 2004). Collier and Hoeffler (2004) considered natural resources as part of the ‘greed’ explanation for conflict, asking whether the share of a country’s GDP comprising natural resource exports (including agricultural as well as mining exports) correlated with its likelihood of a
civil conflict commencing within a five-year period. They found that the two were highly correlated.

Other authors have since attempted to explain this correlation between resources and conflict, but have used different data, and have not replicated Collier and Hoeffler’s results (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2002). The literature in this subfield has been criticised for failing to demonstrate the causal mechanisms by which resources impact on conflict, as well as for problems in measuring relevant variables, endogeneity, and lack of robustness (Humphreys, 2005; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Ross, 2006).

Recently, however, new data has been gathered on the location and type of natural resources, although there is not yet agreement on which type of resources are more closely associated with conflict. It has been suggested that ‘lootable’ resources – those which are easily extracted and highly valuable, such as diamonds, are more likely to fuel civil war than ‘point source’ resources such as minerals, oil and plantation crops (Ross, 2003b). Dependence on agriculture has been suggested to be a greater problem than the presence of any type of resources (Humphreys, 2005), and new data on diamond and mineral wealth has been used to show a strong relationship between diamond production and civil war onset (Lujala, Gleditsch and Gilmore, 2005). Further, “...hydrocarbon and diamond production are robustly correlated with civil war onsets” (Ross, 2006). It appears that additional research is needed before broad agreement can be reached on the impact of such resources on civil conflict and the causal mechanisms by which it occurs.

**Geography**

A number of geographical factors, including climate, topography, water availability and population density, have been shown to be relevant to the incidence of civil war. The availability in recent years of more detailed data on conflict, income and geographical factors has enabled research to examine the interaction of these at a sub-national level, in contrast to much of the previous work which utilised state-level information and often focussed on interstate conflict.
Civil conflicts are more likely to occur in less-populated border regions which are far away from the national capital (Buhaug and Rød, 2006), and near petroleum fields. The proximity of international borders, presence of resources, and conflict duration all influence the size of the conflict zone (Buhaug and Gates, 2002). Mountainous terrain is strongly associated with both conflict onsets and with conflict intensity in Nepal (Do and Iyer, 2007) and with minority engagement in conflict with the state (Fearon and Laitin, 1999).

More recent research has examined the effect of climate change and resource availability on conflict. Benjaminsen, Alinon, Buhaug and Buseth (2012) find that climate variability is not a driver of conflicts in Mali: rather, structural factors including official corruption, agricultural encroachment, and opportunistic behaviour by local actors were more useful in explaining conflict; and Buhaug, Hegre and Strand (2010) and Theisen, Holtermann and Buhaug (2011) found little evidence of a ‘drought-conflict’ or ‘climate change-conflict’ connection in Africa. The effect of climatic stresses may be modified by political institutions: Gizelis and Wooden (2012).

Population size is relevant to conflict occurrence: civil wars occur more commonly in countries with large populations than in those with small populations (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Hegre and Sambanis, 2006), although the reasons for this remain elusive: whether this is to do with a greater number of ethnic groups which might be found in a more populous country, the difficulties of maintaining state functions over large distances, or because many levels of government are needed to effectively govern them is still in question (Raleigh and Hegre, 2009). Examining finer-grained localised data on conflict events and populations, Raleigh and Hegre find that conflict events occur more commonly in heavily populated local areas. As this type of data covers more countries and regions, further research into these effects in different contexts may permit cross-country comparisons to be made.
Contagion effects

The presence of civil wars in neighbouring countries can increase the likelihood that nations will experience civil conflict: Hegre and Sambanis (2006) note that war in an adjoining country is a 'robust predictor' of internal conflict. A number of mechanisms may be responsible for this: ethnic groups which transcend national boundaries (Gleditsch, 2007; Buhaug and Gleditsch, 2008; Saleyhan, Gleditsch and Cunningham, 2011); or the presence of refugees who may be used as recruits for rebel forces and may assist in smuggling arms (Saleyhan and Gleditsch, 2006). Internal conflicts can lead to international disputes through intervention into neighbouring country conflicts, by way of proxy war, protection of ethnic kin group members, or externalisation (Gleditsch, Salehyan, and Schultz, 2008).

Consequences of internal conflicts

Political consequences

The political consequences of civil war can be far-reaching, particularly if the outcomes of the civil war include a change of government, a change of political system, or both. The experience of internal conflict, as opposed to interstate conflict, means that the damage to infrastructure and institutions (both physical and otherwise) is experienced entirely within the country in which the conflict takes place. There is a degree of endogeneity involved in studying the after-effects of internal conflict, as some of the same factors which played a role in generating conflicts are still relevant after the conflict has ended. Allegiances, whether ethnic or political, still exert strong influences after conflict. For example, in Macedonia, support for the Framework Agreement was strongly predicted by individuals' ethnic grouping, to the exclusion of other allegiances such as spatial and demographic factors (Dyrstad, Buhaug, Ringdal, Simkus and Listhaug, 2011).

There are a number of dangers which face governments after conflict. Perhaps the greatest is the risk of a return to conflict: almost half of all civil wars are due to relapses into conflict (Collier, Hoeffler and Soderböm, 2008; although see Suhrke and Samset, 2007).
The first ten years after a conflict are identified by Bigombe, Collier and Sambanis as ‘unusually risky’, and within this period, approximately 31% of civil conflicts will have restarted (2000:323). Conflict recurrence may occur for several reasons: hardship, dissatisfaction, and limited options for nonviolent political change (Walter, 2004); the exacerbation of pre-existing risk factors for conflict by the conflict itself, such as dependence on natural resource rents (Collier, 2000); the operation of parallel economies (Wennman, 2005); or political instability which becomes violent (such as post-election violence). Conflict may restart more easily because civil war leaves ‘a legacy of an armed population, desensitised to violence’, and because former soldiers may be easily recruited to later rebellions (Azam et al, 1994:11-12).

Holding democratic elections in the immediate aftermath of conflict was thought to encourage democratic development, to provide a viable ‘exit strategy’ for external interveners, and to allow citizens to choose their legitimate leaders after conflict. The experience of a number of post-conflict elections during the early 1990s proved otherwise: elections in Angola led to renewed conflict; in Bosnia created the appearance of democracy but entrenched the position of nationalist political parties; and in Haiti were undermined by poor administrative processes (Reilly, 2002). Elections may offer the possibility of debating divisive issues rather than fighting over them; but they may also serve to deepen the differences between groups within society, to expose differences of opinion on ‘indivisible’ issues, and to confer legitimacy on leaders with authoritarian aims (Zakaria, 2003). Democratizing states are at particular danger of experiencing conflict (Mansfield and Snyder, 1995; Fearon and Laitin, 2003).

This risk is explored further by Collier, Hoeffler and Soderböm, who note that post-conflict elections in general tend to reduce the risk of conflict recurrence in the year in which the election is held, but increase the risk of conflict recurrence in the following year (2008:470). Greater political participation (as measured by Polity scores) has been linked with lower levels of conflict recurrence (Walter, 2004).

The risks for post-conflict governments are also political ones. Particularly if a post-conflict country is making a transition to democracy, it may well be facing conditions of

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‘extreme electoral fluidity’ (Hagopian, 2007), in which parties’ portion of vote share may vary widely between elections, parties may emerge and disappear rapidly, and policy positions are weak and unstable. The average rate of change in party votes from one election to the next is two and one-half times greater in emerging democracies than in advanced industrial democracies (Bartolini and Mair, 1990:68), and electoral volatility persists over numerous electoral periods (Mainwaring and Torcal, 2006:12, cited in Hagopian, 2007:587). Particularly in states with little or no experience of democracy, the expression of strong political opinions and the encouragement of debate on contentious issues may seem inflammatory. For party members, jockeying for position may lead to instability within parties as allegiances and policy preferences are worked out. Weak civil society organisations and a nascent free press may be unable to effectively scrutinise political behaviour, and patronage and clientilism in politics can lead to corruption.

**Economic consequences**

Ascertaining the consequences for national economies of having undergone a civil conflict is a complex task, with inherent endogeneity problems: countries in which economic difficulties played a role in instigating conflict may still have economic problems after the conflict, but these may have been a cause rather than the result of conflict. Further, there may be selection bias in quantitative studies, as countries which recover well from conflict are more likely to collect economic data systematically, while those in which central governments have failed are unable to do so (Blattman and Miguel, 2010: 39).

Paradoxically, wealthy countries are sometimes presumed to benefit economically from conflict: the ‘war dividend’ is sometimes assumed to add to national income, as increases in production capacity and advances in technology intended for military purposes lead to greater economic power in the post-war period. Recent research indicates, however, that even in the case of United States, the way the conflict is funded (whether from tax increases, savings, or a combination of the two) has a significant impact on how the country recovers economically (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2011). Another key factor impacting post-conflict economies is whether reparations are payable from the ‘losers’ of the conflict to the ‘winners’. While reparations may be less common after
intrastate conflict than interstate conflict, terms may be included in peace agreements which deal with economic recovery, such as the provision of employment for former combatants, or of funding for formerly neglected regions (Humphreys, 2003:19). Humphreys notes that such provisions in peace accords in Mali eventually led to no further conflict (after initial delays in providing funding which led to more intense conflict); while lack of such provisions in Liberia may have contributed to conflict recurrence (Humphreys, 2003: 19).

One key task of post-conflict economic reconstruction is to restore infrastructure which has been damaged by the conflict. It has been noted that civil wars may be local in scale and may involve small arms rather than large-scale bombing, meaning that the destruction of physical capital may be less than in interstate conflicts (Blattman and Miguel, 2010: 39); however the losses to individual households may be devastating. During the civil war in Mozambique, cattle stocks owned by Mozambicans were reduced by eighty per cent (Brück, 1997); in Timor-Leste, many houses were burned following the 1999 post-election violence; and many households in Northern Uganda lost their entire assets due to conflict, including their homes and cattle (Annan, Blattman and Horton, 2006). In Rwanda, twenty per cent of the population moved into poverty after the genocide there (Justino and Verwimp, 2006).

Other tasks of economic reconstruction involve reviving production and trade, finding employment for former combatants, encouraging domestic investment, and persuading foreign investment to return (Humphreys, 2003; Collier, 1999); but the financing needed to undertake these tasks may be lacking, as greater funds may be being expended on security in order to maintain peace and public order, and both the tax base and the government’s ability to collect revenue may be reduced (Azam et al, 1994). It has been suggested that a useful benchmark for a post-conflict state’s readiness for donor exit is whether the state is able to fund its recurrent budget from its own “internally generated revenues” (Chand and Coffman, 2008). Output has been found to decline 6 per cent immediately after a civil conflict, although it rebounds quickly, while economies take much longer to recover from financial crises (Cerra and Saxena, 2008). The Basque region in Spain has had lower economic growth since the late 1960s than control regions without terrorism (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003).
Post-conflict aid may play an important role in bringing a country back to economic health. Aid may reduce the overall risk of conflict, as it can help to raise per capita incomes (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002), although the endogeneity problems noted above must be considered as Blattman and Miguel note that neither aid nor civil conflicts are randomly distributed (2010:40). De Ree and Nillesen (2006) disagree that aid flows diminish the probability of conflict onsets, but did find that a 10% increase in aid to an African country reduces conflict risk by 6%.

**Human costs**

The population of a country is usually reduced after conflict, for several reasons: due to the deaths of combatants; the deaths of civilians; or as a result of disease, famine or displacement. Wars are estimated to have resulted in 269,000 deaths, and 8.44 million years of disability in 1999, as a result of the immediate effects of all conflicts fought in that year (World Health Organisation, cited in Ghobarah, Huth and Russett, 2003 and 2004). Conflict victims are mainly civilians, and indirect deaths are mainly seen among poor, women, children and old people (Ghobarath, Huth and Russett, 2003). Paradoxically, birth rates tend to rise after conflict, although infant mortality is also high. The deaths of male household heads in combat can increase the number of households moving into poverty, and displacement because of conflict can further increase poverty (Justino, 2007:12).

There is not, as yet, clear evidence on how long the effects of internal conflict persist in populations after the conflict ends. There appear to be significant and measurable negative impacts on local populations in relation to a number of key indicators. Gates, Hegre, Nygard and Strand (2012) find that a medium-sized conflict\(^7\) is estimated to increase undernourishment by 3.3% and infant mortality by ten per cent; to lower life expectancy by 12 months, and to deprive almost two per cent of the population of access to potable water. These impacts have lasting negative effects on the lives of individuals, reducing the adult height and number of years of schooling attended for children who were malnourished in Zimbabwe (Alderman, Hoddinott and Kinsey, 2006). Similarly, children in parts of

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\(^7\) Defined by Gates et al (2012) as a conflict in which 2500 battle-deaths were recorded.
Burundi which were affected by conflict were significantly lower in height-for-age than children from areas which had not experienced conflict (Bundervoet, Verwimp and Akresh, 2009).

War can disrupt children’s access to education, both by interrupting the supply of education by the state, and by interfering with individuals’ ability to attend schools and colleges (Stewart et al, 2001a and 2001b, cited in Justino, 2007:10). Even when a conflict has ended, children exposed to conflict are less likely to be enrolled in school, and more likely to complete fewer years of schooling and to perform poorly if they are enrolled (Shemyakina, 2006, Bundervoet, 2012). These results have been gathered in contexts as diverse as Tajikistan and Burundi.

 Civilians (particularly women and children) are often significantly affected by conflict, but the negative impact of conflict on former combatants must also be considered. Research is beginning to be undertaken on the long-term impacts of conflict on combatants. It appears that the combatants who experienced the most violence are least likely to be accepted by their communities after the conflict has ended, although the studies are divided as to the long-term impacts on their employability and wage-earning capacity (Blattman and Annan, 2009; Humphreys and Weinstein, 2006 and 2007; Blattman and Miguel, 2010).

*Areas requiring further study*

Despite the considerable research which has been undertaken into the causes and after-effects of civil conflict, the survey of literature above reveals considerable division on many issues within scholarly circles, as well as a lack of certainty about the causal mechanisms involved in conflict initiation. Much work remains to be undertaken at the sub-national scale, on the motivations which lead individuals to fight or refrain from fighting, and the processes which take place within armed groups during conflict (Justino, 2009; Blattman and Miguel, 2010). Detailed exploration of the effects of conflict on individual households, and its impact on the opportunities, well-being and life paths of household members would provide better information on how to ameliorate the negative impacts of conflict on communities.

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Smaller-scale research, which uses fine-grained data on the location and timing of conflict events, and survey data of household members and former combatants, offers the possibility of exploring these themes more deeply. One limitation of the closer scale of these studies is the lack of cross-country comparability; but an accumulation of work of this type offers the possibility of aggregating many studies across different contexts and comparing them. Further investigation of the types of conflict resolution which are most effective in civil conflict also remains to be undertaken (Sambanis, 2002); as well as the impacts of civil conflict on institutions, culture and social norms (Blattman and Miguel, 2010: 46). It is hoped that further research in these areas may assist in preventing conflicts and in designing effective assistance policies for post-conflict situations. As will be discussed further below, it is intended that the research contained in this thesis may contribute toward this aim.

**Measuring the success of peace operations and post-conflict governments**

The measurement of good performance in peace operations and post-conflict situations has developed rapidly in recent years. Most international organisations involved in these operations have developed guidelines for measuring operational success, and many use participative as well as top-down measures to assess the success of peace operations. The development of policy and measurement in this area has been largely atheoretical, and mainly focussed on policy and guidelines documents rather than academic research. The research which exists tends to centre on complex analysis and offers little guidance to those seeking empirical support for particular policy directions (Blattman and Miguel, 2010: 44). There is very little academic literature advancing theoretical explanations for post-conflict success or failure, Doyle and Sambanis’ 2006 book being a notable exception.

There is some overlap between measuring the success of peacebuilding operations and the success of governments after conflict. The primary purpose of most peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions is to restore a stable peace; maintaining that peace is generally also a goal of the government which takes office after conflict. The government’s goals, however, are generally much broader and extend further in time, including economic growth, the delivery of services, passage of legislation, and ensuring political stability.
In post-conflict states in which there has been a peacekeeping operation, measurement of its effectiveness does not usually continue after the peace operation ends; the task of monitoring social and economic indicators is then undertaken by development agencies and donors. This can mean, however, that important connections between the activities and nature of the peacebuilding mission and the ultimate success of the post-conflict government are not examined. This thesis seeks to explore this link, as well as other factors which affect post-conflict governance.

Measuring peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction operations has become more important in recent years for several reasons. Firstly, increasing demands for accountability within international organisations have led to a greater demand for transparent and open measures of performance. New tools are available to assist in measuring performance: advanced methods of evaluation have evolved from audit tools to performance measures in the public sector, international organisations and humanitarian/peacebuilding operations (De Carvalho and Aune, 2010: 6, 9). More stringent accountability requirements have coincided with global financial uncertainty and pressure on national budgets. As budgets become less generous, those responsible for funding peace operations require more detailed information concerning their effectiveness (de Coning and Romita, 2009:2). Evidence that peacebuilding goals are being achieved can assist in maintaining support for peace operations even in fiscally straitened times.

Secondly, high-profile peacekeeping failures have led to an increased desire to learn from past mistakes and improve performance to protect peacekeepers and civilians. Having measures against which progress can be assessed may enable better decisions to be made during peacebuilding operations as well as better assessments of effective strategies after those operations end. The US General Accounting Office (USGAO) suggests that the peacekeeping operations in Timor-Leste and Sierra Leone might not have suffered the setbacks that they did had they used “…results-oriented measures to assess the security situation” in those countries prior to withdrawing some peacekeeping troops (USGAO, 2003:1). Better measurement and assessment may also speed the pace of institutional learning, enabling even large institutions to evolve more quickly and adjust their practices.
rapidly in the light of recent experience. Finally, improved performance in peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction minimises the chances that peace operations will have a negative impact on the people they seek to assist (de Coning and Romita, 2009:2, Meharg, 2009:219).

**Measuring peacebuilding success**

Defining and measuring the success of a peacebuilding operation or a post-conflict government is a challenging task. Achievement is defined differently depending on the actor measuring it, and the initial goal of the operation. There are, however, areas of common purpose between the two.

Perhaps the most important task of the peacekeeping/peacebuilding operation is to halt conflict and bring lasting peace (United Nations, 2001; Stedman, 2002: 50; Paris, 2004:56; Hegre et al, 2010). To meet this criterion, the conflict must be “...terminated on a self-enforcing basis so that the implementers can go home” (Downs and Stedman, 2002:50). Doyle and Sambanis suggest that this threshold is reached if peace endures for two years after peacekeepers leave (2006; Sambanis, 2011).

Whether peace should be measured merely by the absence of conflict or by a higher standard has been debated: at a minimal level, the absence of measurable conflict might mean peace; but for many commentators, additional factors are necessary, including the promotion of conflict resolution (Diehl, 1993, cited in Druckman and Stern, 1997), economic stabilisation and addressing the root causes of conflict (Downs and Stedman, 2002); or improving the state’s capacity to peacefully resolve social conflicts (Call, 2008:191). Schwarz (2005) suggests that an enlightened approach to post-conflict peacebuilding must take into account the three primary functions of the state: security, welfare and representation.

Assessing whether the original mandate of a peace operation has been fulfilled is problematic as a means of assessing its success: if this were to be a standard measure of success, mandates could be designed in order that they could be easily fulfilled (Downs and Stedman, 2002). Adherence to the mandate may, however, be an indication that the
mission met its initial goals, and may be a sign of political ‘success’ (Pushkina, 2006). As peace operations have evolved into far more complex endeavours than originally envisaged, with tasks including holding elections, disarmament and reintegration of former combatants, to only judge them by whether or not there is peace fails to assess many key components of their work. There are warnings, too, against over-reliance on standardised indicators regarding participation and governance capacity, which should not assume greater importance than context-specific strategies to peacefully resolve social conflicts (Call, 2008: 174).

Academic research in this area has proposed several different measures of success of peace operations. Peacekeeping success, at its simplest, involves the absence of conflict, at least during the term of the peacekeeping mission (Heldt, 2001). Peacebuilding success is frequently measured via changes in Polity IV and Freedom House indicators before and after democratization efforts (Grimm, 2008, Zuercher, 2011), although this approach has also been criticised on the basis that it does not fully take account of ‘the extent to which salient social groups feel sufficiently invested in the polity not to take up arms’ (Call, 2008:191). Sambanis and Doyle (2006) measure peacebuilding success in internal conflicts as represented by ‘sovereign peace’ or ‘participatory peace’. Sovereign peace is achieved if the civil war has not resumed within two years of the end of the conflict, if residual violence is not present, and if the state has authority over its entire territory. A state with all three of these characteristics is said to have sovereign peace; for the higher standard of participatory peace, it must also have a minimal level of democracy (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006:136-137).

Diehl and Druckman suggest that peace operations must go beyond containing the conflict to settle the dispute, maintain good relations with the population and uphold organisational values. (2010:127-8). Completion of the mission mandate, together with contribution to security and reduction of suffering is the ‘recipe for success’ offered by Pushkina (2006) and Martin-Brulé (2012). Caplan proposes that in addition to basic physical security, the presence of legitimate institutions and the rule of law, and the conditions for economic and social development are indicators of a consolidated peace (2012).
Donor and peacekeeping organisations, however, are measuring peacebuilding for operational performance reasons and take a different approach to measurement. Meharg considers the performance metrics used by a number of agencies working in post-conflict situations and finds that many have simple systems of measurement based on goal setting and achievement. While this kind of measurement is useful as a 'to-do list', there are many dimensions of post-conflict recovery which it fails to capture. The OECD suggests formulating criteria according to the five OECD Development Assistance Committee measures for evaluating development assistance: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact, and breaking down these into numerous questions, many requiring deep qualitative inquiry (OECD, 2008:33, 40-44). The United Nations relies on results-based budgeting (RBB) to assess its peacebuilding performance. RBB relies on identifying ‘expected accomplishments’, ‘indicators of achievement’, and performance measures for each indicator, and has been criticised as not being responsive enough to manage the fluidity inherent in peacekeeping situations (Lipson, 2010:273).

A number of scholars have written about the importance of adapting benchmarks in each sector to take into account what is ‘normal’ in the country in question and in comparable countries (Stave, 2011a), and adapting measures to local context (Druckman and Stern, 1997:164; Call, 2008:191; MacGinty, 2010; Stave, 2011b:4). Local context would also enable:

"...creative understanding of the contextual signals that reflect the condition and development of peace in a society. The contextual signals could be the growth or decline in a particular economic activity which highlights people's focus on longer-term investments, and/or which are associated with a peaceful society in the past; or it could be particular features of interaction among young people from different social groups in (for example) education institutions or public spaces" (Stave, 2011b:4).

MacGinty proposes further possible locally-defined indicators such as the resumption of cultural practices which had been absent during conflict, an increase in luxury goods in the market, or the repainting of storefronts by shopkeepers (2010:2). Meharg also suggests that perhaps indigenous populations should be allowed to identify their own measures of effectiveness over time (2007:43), an approach which is consistent with the third-generation governance indicators discussed earlier in this chapter. One drawback of this
method may emerge when trying to compare the results of evaluations between different missions, if the indicators have been tailored too closely to the local conditions for each mission.

Recent writings aimed at practitioners take a quasi-academic approach and advocate the use of ‘theories of change’ in planning and evaluating peacebuilding projects: identifying the causal mechanisms through which particular projects or actions are believed to bring progress toward peace, and later evaluating whether these theories proved useful and the projects achieved their goals (Ober, 2012).

Qualitative vs. quantitative measures

There is some debate about whether qualitative or quantitative measures of performance are better suited to assessing the success of peace operations. On one hand, demands for precise data which can measure performance across different peace operations, different regions or countries, and over time are increasing. Statistical techniques offer the analytical power to identify patterns in large quantities of data, and fit with existing performance measurement and analytical tools used in academia, government and the military. In addition, quantitative assessments are sometimes seen as more credible and objective than qualitative measures (Stave, 2011b:3). On the other hand, many aspects of post-conflict situations are complex, multi-faceted, and difficult to represent numerically (Meharg, 2009:220), and there are concerns that focusing on quantitative measures of peace operation success, and the cost of these measures, may attract attention at the expense of the operations themselves and hinder their effective assessment (De Carvalho and Aune, 2010:7).

Evaluations of peace operations are complex, as many actors are often operating in the post-conflict space, and are affecting the results of each others’ operations, but most evaluations of peace operations are undertaken by single actors. Although there have been attempts to undertake multi-donor assessments, not many have attempted to measure the system-wide impact of peace operations (de Coning and Romita, 2009:2, although see Blum and Kawano-Chiu, 2012). Measures of success in these contexts can be political in nature, and the use of human rights and gender equity goals based on western values may not be appropriate for use in cultures based on different values (Stave, 2011b:4).
critical issue in measuring the effectiveness of actors operating in reconstruction/stabilization situations is ‘whether or not activities have produced more of a socio-cultural effect than would have occurred without the intervention, or compared with alternative interventions.’ (Meharg, 2007:41).

Challenges of measurement in this context

There are considerable challenges involved in measuring the performance of peace operations and post-conflict governments. Gathering data in difficult and dangerous circumstances may be required, and these circumstances may, at times, compromise the quality as well as the quantity of the data gathered. The OECD suggests that those undertaking evaluations should be aware of the risks not only to themselves but also to interpreters and other local staff and aid beneficiaries (OECD, 2008:22).

Obtaining reliable data in developing countries may be challenging, particularly obtaining baseline data against which to measure progress in situations in which government data collection may be unreliable or non-existent (de Carvalho and Aune, 2010:20, 21). Safety issues mean that the reliability of data may be traded off against the risks of obtaining it in a way which would be unacceptable in other contexts; and imperfect proxies may be used because better measures cannot be obtained (Stave, 2011a:6-7). Even obtaining information first-hand can be challenging:

"Post conflict situations teem with all types of information: rumours, conjectures, half-truths, first-hand, second-hand and third-hand information, mis-information and sometimes, too, the right information, at the right time to the right people. Interests and agendas of all kinds, concerns over survival and recovery, daily pressures and hopes for a better future affect the dissemination of information in many different ways. Adding to the confusion, few international staff are likely to speak the local languages and radio and television services may be patchy or non-existent."


As well as practical challenges, there may also be ideological challenges: a need to find a common framework of analysis between multiple actors; to try to evaluate success without
being influenced by the values held by the heterogeneous groups with interests in the outcome of peace operations (Druckman and Stern, 1997:164). Different agencies operating in post-conflict environments often find it difficult to establish ‘inter-operable’ systems of assessment, even if they are from the same country (Meharg, 2007:33). The number of actors which may be involved in a post-conflict situation (aid, development, military/police, international organization, political, etc), and their varying organizational cultures, terminologies and timeframes of operation can further complicate evaluation of operational success (Meharg, 2009:130-31; Chuter, 2009:184-5; de Carvalho and Aune, 2010:15). Standardization of terminologies between organizations might help to overcome some of these problems (de Carvalho and Aune, 2010:17-8). There is also a bias toward collecting data from urban areas, and few data sources collect information concerning the experiences of minority groups or women (Parsons et al, 2010: 216).

Setting realistic and achievable goals is important. If goals for missions are too ambitious, it is easy for those charged with meeting them to be discouraged (Druckman and Stern, 1997:163), and they may be deterred from tracking them carefully; alternatively, measures may be chosen which only display what has been achieved, and which conceal or omit setbacks or failures (Stave, 2011a:5, Chuter, 2009:183). Because peace operations are always risky and sometimes unpopular with the public, admitting failure is difficult for governments (Chuter, 2009:183). Development professionals face a similar difficulty to those working in peace and humanitarian operations: they must attempt to measure outputs, such as improvements in the time taken to undertake criminal trials, not merely inputs like building new courts and recruiting judges. These outcomes are far more difficult to measure; it is much easier to list what has been done than to report fully on what results it has had (Meharg, 2007:32). The newer ideas of ‘local ownership’ of metrics were discussed earlier in this chapter, but there is still some confusion concerning the manner, sequencing and timing of implementing this concept (Sherman, 2009:211).

Problems of causation are non-trivial: attributing particular peacebuilding activities to system-wide effects can be challenging in environments where many agencies are active (Stave, 2011a:1). A number of important questions remain: are the quantitative methods used in the development field suitable for evaluating peace and conflict operations? Are indicators used for long-term growth appropriate for assessing short- and medium-term
developments in peace operations? How can ‘peaceful development’ best be measured? Work on conflict and peacebuilding tends to occur in ‘highly politicised environments’ (OECD, 2008:12) – ones in which the stakes are high, and there are many stakeholders with differing interests.

Assessing the effectiveness of post-conflict administrations can pose particular challenges. Legitimacy is crucial to the success of international administrations, which lack the electoral mandate of a democratically elected government, and must seek to establish this legitimacy through good governance, transferring power to local authorities and effectively providing a range of entitlements (Kostovicova, 2008:643).

What do we know already about peacebuilding success?

There have been relatively few quantitative studies of the effectiveness of post-conflict governments, although there is a growing literature concerning the effects and the success of peacebuilding operations. The most detailed quantitative studies of the success of peacebuilding operations after civil wars to date were authored by Sambanis and Doyle (2001 and 2006), and they investigate the factors affecting peacebuilding success. They define success at two levels: ‘sovereign peace’, involving the cessation of conflict, absolute sovereignty, no residual violence and no major state-sponsored human rights abuses; and ‘participatory peace’, which requires sovereign peace plus a minimal level of political openness. They theorize that peacebuilding success after conflict can be represented by a triangle, and that it is positively affected by the presence of international peacekeepers and higher local capacities, and negatively affected by the depth of war-related hostility (2006: 69-70). The standard set by Doyle and Sambanis for peacebuilding success has been criticised as too lax (Zuercher, 2006), however their finding that peacekeeping missions make conflict less likely to recur is echoed by a number of other studies: Fortna, 2004c; Fortna, 2008; Gilligan and Sergenti, 2007; and United Nations, 2004.

Zuercher proposes a set of criteria for measuring the success of peacebuilding missions, by estimating the intrusiveness of the mission into local politics, the level of difficulties faced by the peacebuilding mission (proxied by length of war, battle deaths and level of
development at the end of the conflict), and post-conflict success (measured by the absence of conflict, re-establishment of the full monopoly over the means for violence, economic development, democracy, and institutional capacities). His findings are sobering: he concludes that while recent UN operations, particularly ‘highly intrusive’ missions, have had considerable success in ending wars, they have been far less successful in establishing functioning polities which meet his criteria for success. He notes that improved institutional capacities lag far behind increased security and that “...there is little reason to assume that foreign-led state-building can produce economic miracles” (2006:21-22).

The relationship between development aid and political stability in post-conflict societies is examined by Breuning and Ishiyama (2004), who measure political stability using data from the Governance Matters Index variable as the dependent variable, and the extent to which aid is ‘infused’ in a country after conflict as the main independent variable. They measured only post-conflict countries, and found that internal political variables (such as ethnic fractionalisation and democracy as measured by a Polity IV score) were much more important in explaining political stability than external ones such as the timing and provision of foreign aid (2007:89).

Howard (2008) examines why some peacebuilding missions fail after civil wars, and others succeed, and takes as her criteria for success both the implementation of mandates and the functioning of domestic institutions after the peacekeeping mission. Using structured questions, she explores whether institutions which the UN created, reformed or monitored continue to function after the guidance of the UN is withdrawn. She concludes that the institutional learning undertaken by the peace operation is critical to success. State failure, security dilemmas which have not been resolved, conflicts between minorities and loss of societal trust all make the success of external-led democracy-building efforts less likely, even if they utilise peacebuilding strategies which have been successful in other contexts (Grimm, 2008:545).

Previous work on post-conflict democracies have examined them from a number of standpoints and have detailed the successes and failures of nation-building efforts, as well as providing prescriptions for the success of future post-conflict countries. More recent writings focus on the necessity for long-term involvement by outside forces or
organisations, and the priority which ought to be given to institution-building once the physical safety of the populace has been secured. The diversity of views, however, points to both the wide variations in circumstances between countries emerging from conflict, and the different paths they have followed in attempting to (re)build functional societies. The relative rarity of quantitative work in this area and the lack of consensus about the proper goals to be set for, and means to assist, post-conflict nations, emphasises the importance of further research in this area.

One question which should be considered in discussing the assessment of post-conflict governance is the purpose of the measurement. What kinds of evaluations are useful, both to those working in post-conflict settings, and to those seeking to improve practices in this field? De Carvalho and Aune suggest a typology of evaluations of peace operations, and distinguish those which assess policies, outcomes and impacts from assessments of internal processes, symbolic effects, ability to attract funding, and from system-wide evaluations involving several stakeholders (2010:10-13).

**Governance after civil conflict**

Assessing government performance has been an increasing focus of research in the past decade, as the importance of good governance to economic and social development and social stability has been explored in the economics and development literatures (McLean, 1987; World Bank, 1998; Burnside and Dollar, 2000). Governments have sought to improve their own performance, and aid donors have endeavoured to measure the impact of their governance interventions (World Bank, 1991 and 1998). There has been an increasing emphasis on measuring government performance, as ambitious targets for improved performance have been set by the Millennium Development Goals, and there has been a growing emphasis in international fora on the monitoring and evaluation of aid effectiveness (Mcloughlin and Walton, 2011).

**The study of governance**

The Greek verb kubernain (meaning to pilot a ship or a chariot) was first used by Plato to denote the act of governing, and it became part of the Latin and early European languages. The French word, ‘gouvernance’ (meaning the manner of government) passed into English
in the fourteenth century, retaining its meaning, but falling into disuse in both French and English-speaking nations. The term ‘governance’ began to be used again in the 1990s by political scientists, economists and development professionals, mainly to mean the ‘art or manner of governing’, but also including new notions of participation in civil society (Huynh-Quan-Suu, 2002:1), as well as the manner in which corporations, international organisations and the internet are governed. It has been suggested that the term has been popular with donor agencies and governments because of its ‘apolitical nature’ (Landman, 2009:9); however, it has also been conceived as “... the delivery of political goods to the citizens of nation-states” (Besançon 2003: 1). One influential definition of governance states that it is: “the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised”, include:

1) the processes by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced,
2) the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies, and
3) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them. (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2004: 3).

The growing interest in the manner in which countries were governed began to be influential in development discourse: governments, which had been viewed by some free-market advocates as a hindrance (without interference from which markets would operate efficiently and development would proceed swiftly), began to be seen as one of the keys to economic development. The World Bank stated in 1991 that “...The Bank’s experience has shown that when programs and projects appear technically sound but fail to deliver results, the reasons are sometimes attributable to weak institutions... good governance is central to creating and sustaining an environment which fosters strong and equitable development, and is an essential complement to sound economic policies” (1991:i-ii).

Given the mixed success of many economic reforms promoted under the Washington consensus, it is interesting to note that attention shifted to the context in which reforms were to be carried out, rather than focussing on whether the policies or theories behind those economic reforms were themselves flawed. In 1998, the World Bank published an influential report entitled Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn’t, and Why, which argued that aid works best in a good policy environment, and that improvements in
governance had the potential to lead to significant progress in poverty reduction (1998:2-3).

By 2000, the World Bank’s position concerning the importance of governance had strengthened, and a Bank strategy document stated that “Poorly functioning public sector institutions and weak governance are major constraints to growth and equitable development in many developing countries.” (World Bank, 2000: xi). As the concept of governance grew in importance, promoting ‘good governance’ became popular. Good governance includes notions of participation, transparency, accountability, and efficiency; it promotes the rule of law and equal justice under the law (UNDP, 1999:15). Impartiality in performance of government functions has also been proposed as a strong indicator of quality of governance (Rothstein and Teorell, 2008). Poor governance, on the other hand, is characterised by corruption, lack of the rule of law, overregulation, misallocated resources and non-transparent decision-making (World Bank, 1991:5-6), and governments which are ineffective, arbitrary, despotic and unaccountable (Moore, 2001:2).

The emphasis on governance as a facilitating factor for aid effectiveness, and growing use of aid conditionalities to enforce governance conditions on loans from international financial institutions, served to further institutionalise the concept. Research suggested that aid had a more positive impact on growth in countries with good policies (indicated by budget surplus, inflation rate and economic openness) (Burnside and Dollar, 2000).

Measuring governance

A number of different ‘generations’ of governance indicators have been identified (see, for example, Knack et al, 2003, and Wilde, 2011). Early studies of government performance employed comparative methods, and relied on detailed study and investigation for their explanatory power (see, for example, Almond and Verba’s 1963 study of the importance of civic culture in government effectiveness, and Putnam et al’s work on regional government performance in Italy (1994)). Early empirical measures of democracy and governance assessment were initiated between the 1970s and 1990s by academics seeking to study the new democratic transitions occurring in Europe and Latin America, and by non-government organisations and research centres which studied peace, democracy and the
promotion of human rights. Databases created during this period included the Polity Index, Freedom House’s Freedom in the World index, Przeworski’s Democracy and Development Extended Dataset, and Cheibub’s classification of regimes, and this period also saw the development of surveys which generated further data, such as the World Values Survey, Global Barometers (covering Africa, Asia and Latin America), and the Gallup World Poll (Wilde, 2011:2). The establishment of databases enabled political scientists to use quantitative methods to analyse political data.

The second generation of governance indicators focussed on ranking and rating country governments, and ‘naming and shaming’ poor performers (Wilde, 2011). Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index is one example of these indicators; The Index, first published in 1995, ranks 146 national governments based on the degree of corruption which local and international business communities consider exists amongst public officials and politicians. The Annual Freedom House survey, now known as Freedom in the World, surveys 192 countries and provides a numerical ranking of the degree of freedom enjoyed by the citizens of each country in exercising these rights. Countries are ranked as ‘free’, ‘partly free’ or ‘not free’. Another source of measures of governance is the World Bank’s World Development Report (WDR), published each year. The Reports list criteria for governance such administrative capacity, effective and responsive institutions, freedom of the press, a good investment climate, and macroeconomic stability.

The World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (formerly the Governance Matters Index) are another source of ranking information, dividing governance into six dimensions and aggregating information from a wide range of sources to provide statistics on government performance. The Ibrahim Index of African Governance focuses on governments within Africa and groups 84 indicators into four broad categories: safety and rule of law; participation and human rights; sustainable development opportunity; and human development. A new index, the Global Peace Index, measures the degree of peace in each country, and uses measures of safety and security (level of perceived criminality), political instability, level of respect for human rights, potential for terrorist acts, level of violent crime, number of people in jail, number of police per 100,000 people, measures of militarism such as the percentage of GDP spent on defence, ease of access to small arms,
and military capability/sophistication (Global Peace Index, 2011). This broader approach to peace offers a novel perspective: rather than merely considering whether a threshold of violence has been reached which means that a country is at war, the Index considers the ‘peacefulness’ of the lives of the inhabitants of a country, as well as activities which could generate conflict elsewhere, such as arms sales.

A third generation of governance indicators has recently emerged, and the emphasis for these is on the process by which indicators are gathered (Wilde, 2011:6). Examples of these include the State of Democracy assessment developed by International IDEA, UN-HABITAT’s Urban Governance Index, and the UNDP Global Programme on Democratic Governance Assessments. The State of Democracy assessment enables citizens to examine their own governance systems, by measuring their own systems against a range of indicators, both qualitative and quantitative. It is intended to provide citizens with the tools to assess their governments and thus to increase domestic demand for democracy. The Urban Governance Index utilises measures of good urban governance to enable citizens to measure the governance of their urban area, and to act as a catalyst for local demands to improve governance quality (UN-HABITAT, 2005: 3).

The citizen-based approach behind these concepts echoes other initiatives in the development sector in recent years, with the rise of the concept of social capital as a driver of development (see, for example, Woolcock, 1998) and the inception of community-driven development programmes like the World Bank’s Community Development Programme (KDP) in Indonesia. There are disadvantages to bottom-up approaches, such as concerns about who should undertake the work of developing indicators and assessing governments, and concerns about impartiality in assessing one’s own government. These types of assessments, however, take away the ‘naming and shaming’ aspect of earlier governance indicators, offer the possibility of harnessing domestic demand for good governance, and enable meaningful self-examination by the governments of involved countries.
Criticism of the ‘good governance’ agenda

The expanded concept of governance and its application has been the subject of criticism. The long list of characteristics of good governance has been critiqued as ‘overwhelming’ and as presenting unrealistic goals for most developing nations (Grindle, 2002:1-2). Many definitions of governance are said to be overly focussed on economic development (Rothstein and Teorell, 2008) and inappropriate for postcolonial nations, which may develop along a different trajectory to countries in North America and Western Europe (Koelble and Lipuma, 2008:1). Perceptions-based indicators (such as the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index) have also been criticised on the basis that they lack transparency, are unable to be compared over time, and that they do not offer help to developing countries to improve the quality of their governance (Arndt and Oman, 2006:11). There may also be errors in subjective indicators which may make the most careful quantitative assessment inaccurate (Bollen and Paxton, 2000). Quantitative measures have been criticised as ‘leading to a tendency to treat governance as an exact science and governance indicators as fully reliable measures’ (Williams, 2011:5).

The impartiality of those carrying out governance assessments may also be questioned: most governance assessments tend to be carried out by parties with a stake in the outcome, which makes objectivity difficult. For example, donors need feedback on project performance in order to ascertain which strategies are effective and which are not; but they also may wish to report positive findings in order to maintain their own funding (Giannone, 2010; Green and Kohl, 2007:152; Schmitz, 2007). It may be tempting to focus on achievable, short-term outcomes, rather than assessing the impact an intervention has had on long-term problems such as corruption or judicial independence (Green and Kohl, 2007:155-6), which is likely to be far less dramatic. Measuring the effects of intervention as opposed to inputs is also challenging: it is easy to measure the number of gender empowerment workshops delivered by an organisation, but far more challenging to measure changes in attitudes to women and the incidence of violence toward women.

International organisations and aid donors promoting governance reform have been accused of taking an overly simplistic view of the mechanics of institutional change. It has
been claimed that the World Bank, despite its new emphasis on the importance of good governance, still views the state as a supplier of legal and regulatory institutions, but "...treats governance virtually as a managerial tool with which to achieve decision-making rationality and market efficiency...it has paid scant attention to the fact that institutional reforms would tamper with the existing political bargains that involve powerful interests" (Zhang, 2006:171). The use of standard governance indicators and similar prescriptions for success is also critiqued by Andrews, who notes that developed-country models are often prescribed in developing-country settings, although they frequently do not translate well (2010:380), and Williams, who notes that the idea of good governance "...embodies normative assumptions about how countries should be governed, often based on models from OECD countries" (2011:6).

Attitudes of impartiality and public interest may have taken a long time to develop, and the idea that jobs in the government are not merely assets which can serve one’s family, tribe or clan may well have evolved over a considerable period (Rueschemeyer 2005, cited in Rothstein and Teorell, 2008:184). Khan concurs that institutional change is a lengthy process, and that speedy reforms should not be expected of developing countries:

"Case-study evidence strongly suggests that successful developing countries did not achieve good governance before they began to develop as a precondition for development. Rather, they developed because they had state capabilities that allowed them to overcome significant market failures, and they began to approximate to good governance conditions rather late in their development trajectories" (Khan, 2010:5).

The difference between outcomes and outputs in governance must also be considered: outputs of greater GDP may be considered successful, but outcomes of greater economic and political equality may be more important to individual citizens.

Conclusion

This chapter has considered existing theory and research on civil conflict and on governing in the aftermath of conflict; it has also reviewed a number of means of measuring governance, and measures of peacekeeping and peacebuilding success. Civil conflict has been extensively studied over the past two decades, providing greater insights into its
incidence and consequences. There are a number of theoretical explanations for conflict, including contested resources, information asymmetries, and commitment problems. The characteristics of the countries most likely to become involved in civil conflict, such as poverty and inequality, ethnic diversity, geography and resource wealth, have been considered, together with the economic, social, political and human costs of such conflicts.

Many issues remain to be fully understood, however, including the reasons why individual citizens decide to join an armed struggle, the circumstances which mean that some countries succumb to conflict but others with similar characteristics do not, and the long-term impacts of conflict on individuals and households. Micro-level data which links conflict events with geographical locations, and survey data from former combatants may assist in deepening our understanding of these matters. Endogeneity problems are adverted to in the literature, but remain troubling: for example, countries which have low per capita national incomes are considerably more likely to become engaged in internal conflicts; the conflicts serve to further impoverish them; and a cycle of conflict and poverty is established which becomes increasingly difficult to break.

A review of the literature on post-conflict governance reveals a growing interest among academic and policy communities in the most effective ways to measure government performance after conflict, but few criteria specifically aimed at measuring post-conflict governance. Governments after conflict face a number of uniquely challenging circumstances, and while considerable work has been undertaken on the measurement of peacebuilding success, less attention has been focussed on the work of these fragile post-conflict governments, which are particularly vulnerable to economic shocks, renewed conflict and political instability.

A number of specific challenges arise in measuring governance after conflict: identifying the contributions of the many actors operating in the post-conflict situation; obtaining reliable feedback on the results of particular interventions, projects or development goals, and obtaining baseline data against which to measure progress. The collection of data may be difficult and dangerous.
Defining and measuring governance has become increasingly common over the past decade, as the tools to measure government performance have spread beyond the auditing profession to be used in assessing non-financial aspects of government performance. As good governance has been recognised as a key component of development, theories behind measuring governance and methods of measurement have advanced, and the importance of impartiality, efficiency, transparency and the rule of law has been recognised. Early research into government performance focussed on comparisons between the government culture of different countries and regions; while later work assembled large multi-country datasets to enable statistical comparison of different aspects of government performance. Indexes which enabled the ranking of particular characteristics of government performance were the next development, and the most recent methods of measurement of governance are those which seek the perceptions of the people who are governed as to the performance of their governments, with the goal in some cases of increasing domestic demand for competent and efficient governance. The promotion of ‘good governance’ is not without its critics, some of whom contend that it merely adds another list of objectives for developing country governments to meet, but it seems now to be entrenched as part of the development agenda.

The next chapter takes previous research into post-conflict governance into account, and uses it to frame the question: Which measures of government success are most appropriate for post-conflict governments? Chapter 3 sets out in more detail the methods which will be used to measure post-conflict governments, detailing the dependent variable and its construction, the independent variables to be tested against it, and previous research concerning all of these variables.
CHAPTER 3

MEASURING GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE AFTER INTERNAL CONFLICT

The pursuit of peace and progress cannot end in a few years in either victory or defeat. The pursuit of peace and progress, with its trials and its errors, its successes and its setbacks, can never be relaxed and never abandoned.

Dag Hammarskjöld

Post-conflict governments in many countries face particularly challenging circumstances as they seek to perform their functions. They may need to undertake reconstruction of infrastructure and institutions damaged by conflict, build trust in the political system, and deliver government services, at a time when the governments themselves are weak in a number of ways. They are vulnerable to violence: countries emerging from conflict are highly prone to relapses into conflict, whether major or minor (Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom, 2008). They may be subject to political crises, including political defeat at the ballot-box, internal instability, inability to achieve their legislative programmes, and a degree of voter and party volatility far higher than that found in established democracies. Expectations of government performance may be high; but capacity to deliver is frequently low, leading to voter disillusionment and a desire for change. Economically, their budgets are likely to be susceptible to price shocks, particularly in the commodity sector: countries which are conflict-prone are more likely to be poor and to be dependent on mineral or agricultural resources for much of their income; and the disruption which conflict often causes to employment, revenue collection and patterns of investment can make the process of post-conflict economic recovery protracted and uneven. This thesis suggests that these vulnerable governments may be assisted by a number of factors during this recovery period, which can act as ‘scaffolding’ to support them while they rebuild economically, politically and socially.

This project seeks to compare the success of governments in the post-conflict period over the period 1975-2004. It does not seek to measure the success of peacekeeping operations which may have been present during or immediately after the conflict, although the
effectiveness of the government may well be related to the effectiveness of the peacekeeping operation which preceded it. Here, the performance of governments after conflict is assessed using metrics which are appropriate to post-conflict countries. This chapter sets out the rationale for the method of measuring government performance used in this project, the variables used and reasons for their inclusion. A table summarizing the data used, their sources and the way they have been operationalised for this project can be found at the end of this Chapter, together with summary statistics for all variables.

Hypotheses

Income

As discussed in the preceding chapter, there has been considerable exploration of the link between conflict and poverty (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998 and 2004a). Countries which are poor are more likely to be involved in a conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, above, Fearon and Laitin, 2003), and countries which engage in violent conflict are likely to become poorer in the process (World Bank, 2011). It seems likely, then, that wealthier countries are not only less likely to enter conflicts, they are likely to recover from conflict better. Several mechanisms are likely to be responsible for this effect. Wealthier countries have greater resources with which to repair war damage, better infrastructure, and more developed economic systems which may be more resilient to the effects of conflict. They are less likely to be heavily resource-dependent and so should be less vulnerable to commodity price shocks, which have been shown to have destabilising effects (Chassang and Padro-i-Miquel 2009). Countries with higher income may be able to introduce subsidies to moderate the effect of price shocks, or may be able to provide both financial and non-cash benefits to citizens which may ameliorate their effect. In addition, wealthy nations are likely to be able to offer a range of safer and more remunerative employment opportunities to their citizens than a return to fighting. Some writers have suggested that GDP per capita is a useful proxy for a well-functioning government (Fearon and Laitin, 2003: 80). This may be so for several reasons: a high national income probably correlates to a functioning bureaucracy, lower levels of corruption, and a healthy environment for both foreign and
domestic investment. Economic strength, here measured by GDP per capita, is hypothesised to be an important component of post-conflict government performance.

**Hypothesis 1:** Post-conflict governments are likely to perform better in countries with higher GDP per capita

**Majoritarian institutions**

Considerable research has been carried out concerning the importance of institutions to development and economic growth (North, 1989; Knack and Keefer, 2005; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2002). There is debate in the literature as to the most suitable institutions for moderating conflict (see, for example, Lijphart, 1999; Horowitz, 1985, 1991 and 2008; de Zeeuw, 2005, Wolff, 2011). While Lijphart’s advocacy of consociational institutions as moderators of conflict has been influential, and Horowitz’s recommendations to ‘make moderation pay’ (1991) are persuasive, some practitioners suggest that countries immediately post-conflict require the stability often associated with majority government, and politicians in those countries are not best placed to undertake the negotiations required for coalition governments to function. Majoritarian institutions may provide a more robust ‘holding environment’ (Heifetz, 1998) for governments, particularly in the crucial first years after conflict, in which political instability and conflict recurrence are more likely.\(^8\) It is suggested that a less flexible environment, in which there are clear winners to political contests, and negotiation is not necessarily required in law-making and political decision-making, may provide greater certainty and fewer opportunities for disagreement than consensus-based institutions.

The greater certainty about leadership and the ability to legislate provided by majority governments furnishes a more stable basis for government in the wake of civil conflict. Majoritarian political institutions, while criticised for their lack of inclusiveness, tend to provide a speedy result after elections due to ease of vote counting, and usually deliver a

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\(^8\) Heifetz notes that the term ‘holding environment’ originated in psychoanalysis to describe the therapist-patient relationship, in which the patient is ‘held’ by the therapist through the process of developmental learning. Heifetz extends the use of this term beyond parental and therapeutic relationships to relationships between nations, between politicians and their constituencies, and between managers and subordinates (1998:104-5). Here it is used more broadly still to indicate the institutional framework within which political life is transacted.
stable majority government which is able to make and achieve its legislative programme. Governments operating with a clear majority are able to continue functioning even in the face of disagreement, preventing veto players from bringing the machinery of government to a halt, as has occurred in Bosnia.

The stability created by a single, unified government may offset the potential downsides of this electoral system type: the possible entrenchment of power with whichever party wins the first post-conflict election, the tendency for such systems to result in two-party systems, and the lower efficacy of each individual vote, with the accompanying risk of loss of legitimacy for the entire political system. This hypothesis seeks to test the efficacy of majoritarian institutions against the performance of proportional representation (PR) electoral systems and institutional features during the immediate post-conflict period. The institutions examined are electoral systems, systems of executive authority, district magnitude (the number of seats per electoral constituency), and federalism.

**Hypothesis 2:** Countries with majoritarian political institutions are likely to have more successful post-conflict governments;

**Peacekeeping support**

Considerable research has been undertaken on the impact of peacebuilding and peacekeeping missions. So far, results indicate that even if selection effects are taken into account, peacekeeping missions have a positive impact on the duration and quality of post-conflict peace (Fortna, 2003 and 2004; Doyle and Sambanis, 2006). The presence of external assistance often assists in halting internal conflict, helping the warring parties to reach a peace settlement, and, if the mission is a multidimensional peacebuilding mission establishing new institutions after conflict. Peacekeeping missions can act as a type of 'scaffolding' to post-conflict governments in a number of ways: by securing the peace and preventing relapses into conflict; by policing the terms of ceasefires or peace

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9 Multidimensional peacebuilding missions are defined by Doyle and Sambanis as operations that 'involve the implementation of complex, multidimensional peace agreements designed to build the foundations of a self-sustaining peace and ... utilized primarily in post-civil war situations. In addition to the traditional military functions, the peacekeepers are often engaged in various police and civilian tasks, the goal of which is a long-term settlement of the underlying conflict" (2006:14).
agreements; by managing the process of holding post-conflict elections; by providing technical assistance to new governments in establishing government structures and processes; by training (or retraining) security sector personnel; by taking on many of the administrative functions of government; or by providing an ongoing source of support and advice to the new post-conflict government. The type and sponsoring organisation of a peacekeeping mission has been shown to have an impact on the likelihood and quality of peace (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006: 113), and non-UN peacekeeping missions have increased in number along with UN missions over the past fifty years. The number of non-UN peace operations since the end of the Second World War is greater than the number sponsored by the UN, although UN missions tend to be of longer duration (Heldt and Wallensteen, 2004:13).

This hypothesis examines whether the presence or absence of a peacekeeping mission, the type of mission undertaken, and the mission’s sponsoring organisation, affect the quality of post-conflict governance. The number and type of peacekeeping missions has altered dramatically over the period surveyed, moving from an emphasis on classic peacekeeping to multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations, and from the United Nations as primary provider of peacekeeping operations to a range of other conflict management options, some delivered by regional organisations or coalitions of interested nations.

Hypothesis 3: Post-conflict governments in countries in which peace operations have been carried out are likely to perform better than those without peace operations; and those undertaken later in the period surveyed are likely to have a more positive impact on government performance.

Development aid

Aid after conflict may come in several different forms: in the form of peacekeeping missions, expert advisers provided by development organisations, or loans from international financial institutions. As the links between poverty and conflict, and poor governance and conflict have become increasingly clear, the question of whether and how external aid benefits post-conflict governments has been more closely examined. While Breuning and Ishiyama (2004) suggest that internal political variables are more influential...
than the timing or amount of aid in determining post-conflict political stability, Collier and Hoeffler (2004b) find that aid is more effective in driving growth in post-conflict societies than elsewhere, although this finding is challenged by Suhrke et al (2004). While selection effects must again be taken into account in considering which countries are aid recipients, the question of the impact of aid in post-conflict societies is an important one for donors and recipient countries to explore. Here it is proposed that aid can be a valuable component of support for post-conflict governments, in several ways: by providing access to capital to which post-conflict countries would not otherwise have access, to enable physical and economic reconstruction; by providing experienced advisers who can train local politicians and bureaucrats; and by increasing employment opportunities in the post-conflict period, which may discourage former combatants from returning to conflict.

Hypothesis 4: Governments which are supported by aid in the post-conflict period will perform better than those which are not given such support, and more aid in the immediate post-conflict period is likely to lead to better performance.

Measuring success in post-conflict countries

The movement towards improving or rebuilding governance in countries after conflict has arisen from the increasing recognition of the importance of good governance for economic development, as well as from the increased prevalence of civil conflicts after which the machinery of government may need to be reconstructed. The higher incidence of civil war since the early 1990s has led to a greater demand for this kind of peace operation. As noted above, the liberal peacebuilding agenda has embedded within it a model of the kind of democratic governance that is enjoyed by most Western countries, as well as the liberal economic markets which are also prevalent in such countries.

The examples of indicators for good governance and peacebuilding/peacekeeping success reviewed in the previous chapter provide a considerable selection of potential indicators against which to measure the performance of governments after conflict. The most important question in deciding which indicators to select is determining the purpose for which the data is to be used. Clear identification of a few problem areas may be important.
for a government seeking to improve its performance; alternatively, for an aid organisation or the head of a peacekeeping mission, receiving detailed, timely data about the hundreds of tasks being performed and their immediate impact may be crucial.

Complex composite indicators such as the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators have been criticised as being too difficult for subject countries to 'untangle' (see, for example, Grindle, 2003): without knowing which of hundreds of indicator data are negative, it can be difficult to take concrete action to improve government performance. Simpler indicators, however, may not provide the comprehensive picture of government performance which is sought.

Here, the data are to be used for the analysis and exploration of factors affecting the performance of post-conflict governments. The situation to be measured here is a country in the first ten years after internal conflict, which in some cases will be able to deliver very little in terms of governance outcomes, and in other cases will be a developed country with a high level of governance. Given the heterogeneity of cases, and the need for transparency and simplicity, the criteria on which government performance will be measured will be relatively brief, focussed on high-priority items, and informed by the concept of third-generation, citizen-centred governance indicators discussed in Chapter 2. Although the indicators for this project are not themselves formulated by citizens of post-conflict countries, they are those which are inferred to be the most important criteria from the perspective of the ordinary person.

Ensuring the physical security of the population is the most important criterion for performance: without this, the conflict cannot be said to have ended, and most other forms of post-conflict recovery cannot take place. The growing human security agenda recognises the importance of this measure. Security and safety; freedom from fear; and the ability to go about the business of daily life without fear for their physical well-being are all critical parts of citizens' lives. It has been stated that "Security is a necessary precursor to stabilisation and progress towards a return to something approaching 'normal' economic and political activity" (Brinkerhoff, 2005:6). The most important component in re-establishing security is the maintenance of order, and for the government to retain, or regain, a monopoly on state-sponsored violence. This is also achieved by the military.
returning to their non-combat roles, by many former combatants demobilising and returning to civilian life, and by disarmament of the population, whether former combatants or not.

The second desire citizens are presumed to have is for political freedom: the ability to speak freely, to vote for candidates of their choice, to be governed by a government they have played some role in choosing, and to be informed about their government by a media which is reasonably free to criticise as well as praise the government. Thirdly, it is important that the elected government is in charge of the country: that it is not a possession of some other country, nor the subject of a protectorate, and that it is able to govern independently of the assistance of international organisations. Fourthly, citizens hope that the economy of their country is stable or growing: that it provides an environment in which business can be done and employment found; and that the government is able to collect revenue and make expenditures on behalf of its people. Fifthly, citizens expect that a certain level of basic services will be delivered or facilitated by their government: that essential services such as water, electricity and sewerage will be restored following conflict, and that telephone services, schools, and health services will be restored to their pre-conflict levels. Finally, respect for human rights on the part of the government, including rights to fair legal processes, is a sign of post-conflict recovery. Special powers of arrest, detention and interrogation are often employed by governments during times of crisis or conflict, but the resumption of stronger protections for individual human rights can be a sign that the ‘state of emergency’ or conflict has ended, and the protection of the individual once more takes precedence over state security.

Most post-conflict governments will not meet all of these expectations soon after conflict; but it seems likely that certain situations, institutions or characteristics of the country or the conflict will make achieving them more attainable. This thesis has chosen a mixed-methods approach which will utilise quantitative techniques to discern patterns from an original dataset, and qualitative inquiry to draw lessons from the detail of each case study. It is intended that the use of cross-national data as well as the greater detail about context and history from the case studies will provide a richer picture of post-conflict governments than the use of either method alone.
Performance of post-conflict governments

As discussed in the preceding chapter, a number of approaches to measuring the success of governments have been taken in the literature, both subjective (such as surveys and perceptions-based indicators) and relatively objective (including composite indicators and economic indicators). This project attempts to assess the success of governments after civil conflict by measuring the success of those governments using a compound measure comprising six components, which can be collected in most countries during and immediately after conflict. It then seeks to establish which of the four hypotheses listed above most persuasively explain government performance after conflict. Because internal conflict has become the dominant conflict type over the course of the period surveyed, the cases in which other types of conflict have occurred will be not be considered. Figure 3.1 below represents this in graphic form:
Figure 3.1: Measurement of government performance

Dependent variable = Government success

Absence of civil conflict
Independent government of territory
Economy stable or growing
Level of democracy
Provision of basic services by government
Respect for the rule of law

Regressed against independent variables:

Independent variables
GDP per capita
Institutions:
Executive Structure
Electoral system
District Magnitude
Federalism
Peacekeeping operations: presence and type
Foreign aid per capita

Control variables:
Resources
Time
Ethnic diversity
Size of peacekeeping mission
Previous conflicts
Ethnic conflict
Unit of analysis

The unit of analysis for this project is the country-year. Each country with a population greater than 100,000\textsuperscript{10} is listed for each year between 1975 and 2004. This time period was chosen in order to consider both the high-profile internal conflicts involving peacekeeping missions (which began in the late 1980s and continued through the 1990s), and internal conflicts which began and ended before this type of response to conflict became relatively frequent. Examining government performance both before and after multidimensional peacekeeping and internationally-sponsored institution-building became more frequently used will, it is hoped; provide insights into the way government performance after conflict works in the absence as well as the presence of these interventions.

Measuring governance after conflict

As discussed in the preceding chapter, a number of approaches to measuring the success of governments have been taken in the literature, both subjective (such as surveys and perceptions-based indicators) and relatively objective (including composite indicators and ‘hard’ economic indicators). Post-conflict governments and the peacekeeping operations which have assisted them have also been assessed, mainly using comparative or qualitative methods (see, for example, Howard, 2008, Meharg, 2009, Diehl and Druckman, 2010) but in several cases using quantitative methods (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006, Zuercher, 2009, Breuning and Ishiyama, 2004, Gizelis and Kosek, 2005).

Earlier methods adopted for measuring governance have been criticised for a number of reasons. The Worldwide Governance Indicators, the methodology and results of which were discussed in more detail in Chapter 2, have been criticised for their complexity: Grindle in particular has suggested that the many sources used to compile the index make it difficult for governments of countries to identify exact areas of underperformance, or to attempt to fix deficiencies in governance identified by the Index (Grindle, 2003). Breuning and Ishiyama sought to measure post-conflict governance using one indicator from this

\textsuperscript{10} All countries with populations greater than 100,000 are included in this survey with the exception of Turkish Cyprus, which does not appear as a separate country in many datasets, and is not recognised as a separate state by many nations.
index as their dependent variable, and, measuring only post-conflict countries, found that internal political variables (such as ethnic fractionalisation and democracy as measured by a Polity IV score) were much more important in explaining political stability than external ones such as the timing and provision of foreign aid (2004:89).

Doyle and Sambanis’ analysis of post-conflict peacebuilding success focused on whether a country has achieved ‘sovereign peace’, defined as no war recurrence, no residual violence, and undivided sovereignty two years after the end of the war. ‘Participatory peace’, an even higher standard, includes sovereign peace plus a minimum level of political openness, as defined by the Polity Index. Although Doyle and Sambanis’ methods are thorough and their conclusions are persuasive, their study covers the time period 1945-1999, and in relation to peacekeeping, only deals with UN peacekeeping forces.

Zuercher (2006) seeks to measure the success of post-conflict statebuilding by assessing the effectiveness of peacebuilding missions. He does this by assessing them on three dimensions, but his explorations are limited in time and in scope: he only considers 17 peacebuilding operations, commenced between 1989 and 2001.

The dependent variable: government success

The construction of the dependent variable in this study aims to make the assessment of post-conflict governments as simple, relevant, and transparent as possible. The performance of post-conflict governments is measured using a composite variable which indicates their performance on six indicators judged to be relevant to the situation of post-conflict countries: absence of conflict, independent government, level of democracy, economic stability, delivery of government services (here represented by telephone lines), and human rights protection. Other authors have represented government performance after conflict in different ways. Doyle and Sambanis (2001 and 2006) dichotomized peacebuilding success for their surveys, while Breuning and Ishiyama (2004) used the Political Stability score from the Governance Matters index as their dependent variable.
Decisions to be made when undertaking index and scale construction include choosing a method of combining variables and appropriately weighting units. Combining data to create indexes and scales has led to the creation of many of the governance indicators political scientists and economists now use for information concerning the functioning of governments. The following examples demonstrate how several of these indicators are compiled. The Worldwide Governance Indicators (formerly the Governance Matters Index) is constructed by gathering data on perceptions of governance from a wide range of sources, clustering them into six categories, then using an Unobserved Components Model to standardise the data into comparable units, build an aggregate indicator, and construct error terms (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2010). Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index is constructed by averaging the scores for each country across a number of questions regarding the perceptions of corruption in 17 different sources, standardising the scores to a 0-10 scale using ‘matching percentiles’, then applying a beta-transformation to them, and averaging the transformed scores for all sources into a score for each country for each year the index is compiled.11

The Global Peace Index is constructed by considering 23 indicators which measure the absence of violence or the fear of violence, both within countries and between countries. The scores for each indicator are placed on a scale of 1-5 (if quantitative indicators) or 1-9 (if quantitative indicators), classified according to whether they relate to internal or external peace, and then given a weight within those classifications by an independent committee of experts. The Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Index, one component of which is included as part of the dependent variable here, is constructed using a polychotomous variant of Mokken Scale Analysis (MSA), which is an extension of Guttman’s deterministic scale analysis (Cingranelli and Richards, 1999). Data concerning human rights transgressions were coded according to the number of human rights violations in a given year. Further examples of indexes in common use within the political science literature include the Freedom House Freedom in the World index, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index, the State Failure Index, and the Polity Index. Indexes are also

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widely used by psychologists and sociologists, particularly in assessing attitudes and values using survey data.

Indexes such as this one may be criticised on a number of bases. Firstly, the construction of the index and the weighting of the data can be criticised on the basis that it does not reflect the reality of the situation it is attempting to measure. Here, a composite index has been used to aggregate information from the different indicators of government performance, containing data from each of the dependent variable components, combined according to the weights set out below in Table 3.1. The components have been weighted according to their perceived importance to a country’s post-conflict recovery, with the most important elements (absence of conflict, independent sovereignty and economic growth) given a higher value than levels of democracy, provision of government services and the rule of law, which may take longer to establish. Using the methodology utilised by the Global Peace Index, the dependent variable components are scaled to between 0 and 1, and weighted as follows:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Components</th>
<th>Weighting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Absence of conflict</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic stability or growth</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent government</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity score</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision of government services (telephones)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect for the rule of law (human rights of physical integrity)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.1: Calculation of the dependent variable
This method was chosen because it offered the possibility of constructing a comparative index which would have some intrinsic meaning, as well as providing countries with a score for the purposes of comparison. Because the index construction method is relatively simple, and composed of relatively few components, it aims to address the criticism of some of the more complex indexes: mainly that they are composed of so many elements that the contribution of each element to the index becomes obscured, making it impossible for countries which are the subjects of the analysis to analyze or take action on a poor result, or even for those countries which obtain high scores to determine why they are excelling.

The data which were chosen to form part of the dependent variable were selected not only for their relevance but for their coverage of the wide range of countries which are surveyed here during the time period used: 1975-2004. Information regarding corruption would have been included in the dependent variable, had reliable data been available for the time period concerned. The most widely-used corruption measure, Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index only dates from 1989, almost halfway through the survey period, and thus could not be utilised. Similarly, many measures could have been chosen to represent adherence to the rule of law, but the CIRI Human Rights index was the one which offered the broadest coverage of countries over the time period studied, and adherence to human rights standards was considered to be a good proxy for the rule of law. Thirty-one different measures of the rule of law were considered for inclusion in this project (Parsons et al, 2010), however none offered the coverage of both the time period and the relevant countries offered by the CIRI Index.

Absence of civil conflict

The absence of violence, whether large-scale or minor, is crucial to ensuring a country’s recovery after conflict. The termination of conflict is not only integral to citizens’ sense of security, but also important to many other indicators of progress: economic growth, domestic and foreign investment, the re-establishment of agriculture and markets, the return of refugees and demobilisation of the armed force, and the resumption of education and health services. Here, the absence of violence is measured using the UCDP/PRIO
Independent government

Independent government of sovereign territory has been included as one of the criteria for successful governance. To obtain a positive score on this criteria, the government of a country (whether democratically elected or not) must be in control of its territory and governing independently: the country cannot be under the control of another country (such as a colonial possession or an occupied nation), nor can it have been under the control of an international administration such as a UN transitional administration or the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia. This criterion refers to the holders of central political authority in a country; it does not deal with lower-level instances of external influence on government such as external backing for political parties or the funding or arming of rebel groups by external parties. This criterion was also utilised by Doyle and Sambanis in their 2006 examination of the success of peacekeeping forces (they termed it 'undivided sovereignty'). The reason for its use here is to establish whether or not the government whose effectiveness is being measured was in charge of the country during the year in question.

Economic growth or stability

Positive or stable gross domestic product (GDP) in the given year is used as a measure of overall economic capacity. Although countries recovering from conflict are likely to show different patterns of growth from countries which have been at peace, economic stability or growth is a positive sign, particularly in a post-conflict period, while declining GDP could well be a sign of a failing economy, poor institutions, or a lack of confidence in the government’s ability to manage the fiscal affairs of the country.

One difficulty in using this indicator as a marker of government success is that economic indicators in particular countries are not simply a product of each country’s internal situation; they also reflect broader global patterns of economic activity. A country which has negative GDP growth for a particular year may have a government which is not
managing its resources well, or it may be managing them very well but in the middle of a
global recession, or a time of crisis for its major trading partner. The withdrawal of aid
from a country as it recovers from conflict may also have a considerable impact on that
country’s GDP.

This variable cannot predict the many different circumstances independent of poor
government performance in which GDP could decline, but as countries which have not
experienced conflict are also included in the dataset, it is possible to explore how periods of
global economic challenge affect both nations involved in conflict and those which are not.
The dataset was examined to see whether there were periods in which all countries declined
economically, but found that while there were some periods of economic challenge during
the period studied (1975-2004), they did not affect all countries.

**Democracy**

The level of democracy has been included as one of the criteria for successful governance,
as a measure of the extent of political participation and political choice afforded the
citizens of each country studied. Strictly speaking, democracy is not necessary for peace;
authoritarian regimes may successfully suppress conflict for decades. Nor is it necessary
for the effective delivery of government services: many public services were provided
more effectively by the Communist regime in the former Soviet Union than by its
successors in the early years of democracy in Russia.

Political choice and participation are only available to citizens of democratic countries,
although the quality of these may vary considerably. There is ongoing debate as to why
democracies are more likely to be peaceful in their relations with other democracies than
with non-democracies (see, for example, Russett, 1994). It seems that established
democracies and autocracies tend to be peaceful while democratising nations and semi-
democracies are prone to conflict (Mansfield and Snyder, 1995; Hegre et al, 2001), and
wealthier democracies are more peaceful than poorer ones (Collier and Rohner, 2008).
Here, a minimal level of democracy is considered an important component of government
success after conflict, and democracy is measured by the Polity Index (Marshall and
Jaggers, 2007), using the Polity2 variable introduced in the Polity IV dataset, which modifies the original Polity variable for use in time series analysis. This variable converts cases of foreign 'interruption' (originally coded -66) to missing values, cases of 'interregnum' or anarchy (coded -77) to a 'neutral' score of 0, and cases of transition (coded -88) are prorated across the period of the transition.

**Government delivery of services**

One key measure of a government’s performance is its ability to deliver services to the public. Ensuring that basic essential services such as electricity and sewerage, telephone lines and clean water are available is a crucial part of ensuring that society is able to function, and where these services have been disrupted by conflict, their restoration is one of the first and most visible signs that a country’s recovery from conflict is progressing.

The data used to indicate delivery of government services here are the number of telephone lines available per 100 people. These data are drawn from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Dziedzic, Sotirin and Agoglia (2008) suggest that comparisons between the availability of essential services such as water, sewerage, telephone, rubbish collection and public transport) pre- and post-conflict can provide measures of institutional performance (2008:43). Knack, Kugler and Manning (2003) also suggest that the number of telephone lines per 1000 people can be used as a second-generation governance indicator (2003:349)^12. Inglehart suggests that telephone lines, together with several other indicators such as roads, country size and mountainous terrain, are arguably endogenous to the concept of state capacity (2009:176).

It is acknowledged that this indicator is an imperfect measure of a government’s ability to deliver services, for several reasons: telephone services are not always provided solely by the government: they may also be provided by private sector companies; and a lack of telephone lines in a country may be an indicator of poverty rather than of government inability to provide this service. In recent years the availability of fixed telephone lines

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12 Although Knack et al suggest that it might be used as an indicator for the following target: “In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications”, indicating that progress against this indicator might not be entirely due to the government.
may have been rendered irrelevant by the increasing use of mobile telephone services, even in poor countries and regions. These problems are also true, however, of a number of other indicators in this area: electricity services may also be provided by the private sector; health clinics may be provided by private sector or by humanitarian/development aid providers, and may be indicative of health problems in an area rather than of good government service provision; and education services such as primary schooling may also be undertaken or assisted by external aid providers, and their numbers may be indicative of the population’s age profile as well as of government capacity.

Respect for the rule of law

The rule of law has been defined as:

"... a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards."


Rebuilding respect for the rule of law is particularly important in post-conflict societies as they attempt to create, or recreate the norms of a peaceful society. The rule of law can also be important for economic development, as enforceable property rights and contracts are considered to provide a secure environment for trade and investments (Haggard et al, 2008); although China’s economic development provides a counter-example to this proposition (Carothers, 2003).

While programs intended to increase adherence to the rule of law have been undertaken in developing and post-conflict countries for at least two decades, Samuels notes that “...still little is known about how to bring about these difficult and interdependent social goods” (2006:2). Rule of law programs have more recently tried to incorporate elements of traditional justice structures such as the gacaca ('grass') courts in Rwanda, and the jirga (ad hoc traditional conflict resolution mechanism) in Afghanistan (The Liaison Office, 2008) to provide a bridge between the familiar, inexpensive and local methods of dispute
resolution and more formalised justice systems. Some post-conflict nations choose to hold Truth Commissions, which encourage public dialogue about wartime atrocities; others choose War Crimes tribunals to formally try and punish war criminals (Sieff and Wright, 1999). In recent years, a number of measures of the rule of law have been developed, including those which focus on the quality of policing, corruption, human rights indicators, the judiciary, corrections and informal justice (Parsons et al, 2010).

In this case, the measure chosen for the rule of law emphasises the protection of human rights, in particular rights of physical integrity. The Physical Integrity Rights Index deals with torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and disappearance. It is an additive index which forms part of the Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Data Project (Cingranelli and Richards, 1999) and ranges from 0 (which denotes no government protection for the four rights comprising the index) to 8 (full government protection for these rights). Here this variable is rescaled from 0 to 1 for the purposes of constructing the government success measure used in this project. While other human rights such as rights involving political empowerment could have been chosen, it was felt that the overlap between these and the Polity Index utilised above would mean that these rights would be duplicated within the dependent variable. Because the data for this variable only begin in 1981, data have been inferred for this variable for the years 1975-1980 and prorated across this period.

**Independent variables**

The following independent variables, falling under these three broad headings, are tested against 'government success', as described above, to determine which are the most influential.

**GDP per capita**

Conflict affects rich countries and poor countries differently, with poor countries more likely to become involved in conflict and to fall back into conflict once they have ceased fighting. It has been suggested that persistent poverty fuels social discontent, and can make
conflict more likely, as well as making the recruitment of fighters far easier (Chronic Poverty Research Centre, 2008:2).

After conflict ends, those living in persistent poverty may improve their situation if labour market demand rises, or they may find themselves displaced as a result of conflict, with no assets and no means to survive once humanitarian agencies leave the area (CPRC, 2008:3). Wealthy countries, on the other hand, may benefit from the economic stimulus provided by war; additional manufacturing capacity used for wartime purposes can be converted to manufacturing goods for local and overseas sale; and they may already have large and well-equipped armed forces with which to fight the conflict, meaning that expensive arms purchases are not necessary. Of course, this depends on the conflict in question – for example, the United States’ long-term occupation of Iraq has been tremendously costly, even for a wealthy country.

Institutional choices

The importance of institutions to political and economic life is a theme which has been explored extensively in the political science and economics literature over the past two decades (see, for example, North, 1989, 1990, and 2002; Knack and Keefer, 1995). Institutions have been described as “… rules that govern social interactions, constraining the behaviour of and the options open to actors” (Carey, 2001:735); and as: “…the rules of the game in a society, or, more formally, the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” (North, 1990:3). The countries which transitioned from colonial possessions to democracies during the past fifty years have provided rich data about the characteristics, effects and relative merits of different institutional choices, although “Democratic constitutions do not guarantee democracy; nor, however carefully crafted, do they necessarily reduce conflict” (Bastian and Luckham, 2003:304). More recently, the post-Soviet transitions in Eastern Europe have furnished further examples of how institutional choices affect incentives and outcomes, and institutional innovations have provided still further choices on the ‘menu’. Owen notes that in the bulk of cases, states recommending institutions for other nations promote institutions like their own (2002:396). Where choices are available to the people of the country, staff of external organisations such as the
UN or foreign aid agencies may actively promote institutions with which they are familiar and which they believe to be effective.

Countries emerging from conflict face a wide array of institutional choices. The form and type of constitution, and how it will be made; the form which executive government will take; the number of chambers in the legislature, and the relative powers of executive and legislature; whether government will be federal or unitary; the type of electoral system, and the character of the legal system, to name a few. In some post-conflict situations, initial elections have been held under electoral systems chosen by external experts; at other times, relatively inexperienced local representatives have been involved in constitution-making exercises, which, while more democratic, presents different problems. Considerable academic attention has been paid to the effects of different institutional choices in developed- and developing-country settings; but the question of which choices are the most appropriate ones for post-conflict countries, or whether there is one optimal prescription for all post-conflict countries is one which remains to be settled.

Simonsen notes that there are three main categories to consider in the design of political institutions: the design of constitutions, electoral systems, and the choice between federal or unitary government (2005:307). All three are considered here to assess their relative significance in contributing to the success of governments after conflict. As discussed earlier in Chapter 3, the hypothesis to be tested here proposes that more rigid/majoritarian institutions provide a firmer ‘holding environment’ for post-conflict societies.

**Executive structure**

One of the most important choices a new democracy faces is that of how executive authority should be exercised. The choice between presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary systems of government is one which is influenced both by a country’s institutional history, the wishes of political players (both local and external) at the end of a conflict, and by the experience of other comparable countries. Stepan and Skach suggest that the key difference between presidential and parliamentary regimes is that in parliamentary regimes, the executive power and the legislature are mutually dependent (as
the chief executive must be supported by a legislative authority, but can also dissolve the legislature), while in presidential regimes, both legislature and executive are mutually independent, and each is legitimised by their own electoral mandate (1993:3-4). They argue that parliamentarianism supports the consolidation of democracy more than pure presidentialism because parliamentarianism requires that governments have majorities in order for them to affect their legislative programs, is more effective in a multi-party setting, discourages executives from ruling at the margins of the constitution, and is less vulnerable to military coups (1993:22). Lijphart suggests that Presidential systems are majoritarian in character because they involve executive dominance, while prime ministers enjoy a more balanced relationship with the legislature. Presidents do not hold office based on the confidence of the legislature, are independently elected, and do not need to be collegial in their decision-making (1999:116 - 118).

Presidential regimes tend to be of shorter duration than parliamentary democracies, even controlling for wealth, economic performance or social conditions (Cheibub, 2002:132), and it has been argued that such regimes cannot support the degree of legitimacy and representativeness needed to sustain democratic government (Riggs, 1997:253).

These findings are not unchallenged: Power and Gasiorowski (1997) claim that in developing nations the choice of institutional type is not related to the survival of democracies, and the so-called ‘failure of presidential democracy’ has been suggested to be a result of selection bias on the part of researchers: the countries which have adopted presidentialism have greater obstacles to the establishment of successful democracy than those which have chosen parliamentarism, meaning that the institutional model appears to be less successful (Shugart, 1995:171). A strong presidential figure elected with a large majority and powers to lead can serve as a driving force in a country’s recovery process after conflict, although a strong presidential system has the potential to be a “…divisive contest between leaders of opposing groups” (Chesterman, 2004:212), as was the case in Angola.
Of interest here is the extent to which executive structure is linked in the literature to post-conflict government success. Chesterman suggests that presidentialism has the potential to either unify a post-conflict nation under a single strong leader, or to divide such a country through competition between leaders of opposing groups (2004:212). Simonsen argues that presidential systems are ‘...far from what a divided society might need’, and notes that they may be less stable and shorter-lived than parliamentary systems, because they lead to more ‘win/lose’ situations than the latter (2005:308). Bermeo notes that there are higher costs associated with electoral competition in presidential systems than in parliamentary ones (2003:168). Lijphart groups presidential forms of government within the ‘majoritarian’ category, as in his view they are characterised by executive dominance, rather than parliamentary systems in which the prime minister may be dismissed if she or he does not enjoy the confidence of the legislature (1999: 117).

Type of electoral system

Electoral systems have a significant role to play in shaping the political climate in a country. Reilly suggests that they “...can play a powerful role in promoting both democracy and successful conflict management...by changing the incentives and payoffs available to political actors in their search for electoral victory, astutely crafted electoral rules can make some types of behaviour more politically rewarding than others” (2002:156). Horowitz, however, sounds a cautionary note: he observes that “…the work of electoral systems is vulnerable to the offsetting effects of other variables: the strength of the conflict, the way territory has been carved up, [and] the timing of innovation...” (1985:651).

The effects of different electoral systems on party and voter behaviour have been extensively studied (see, for example, Duverger (1972), Sartori (1994), Lijphart (1999 and 2004), Reynolds and Reilly (1997)), as have the effects of electoral systems in conflict-ridden and divided societies (see Reilly (2002), UNDP (2004)). Duverger’s law, as it is termed, broadly states that majoritarian electoral systems tend to promote two-party political systems, while proportional representation electoral systems tend to produce political systems with a high number of effective parties. Proportional representation (PR)
systems seem to promote greater diversity in the composition of Parliament, and are argued to translate votes into seats more proportionally than majoritarian systems (Lijphart, 1999). Farrell (2001), however, notes that debates about the methodology used to measure proportionality have led to some disagreement and the production of different rankings by different authors. The weighting given to district magnitude, electoral formula and ballot structure can affect the outcome. Katz (1997) has also found that when comparing proportional and non-proportional systems, electoral formula is a key variable; however when comparing proportional systems amongst themselves, district magnitude seems to be a more important factor in determining proportionality.

Key issues to consider when choosing electoral systems after conflict are their likely effect on the number of political parties, the composition of the legislature, and the stability of government. Achieving stable government is a key element of bringing a country back to peace and prosperity after conflict. The single-party governments which majority-vote systems often produce are considered by some to have greater stability than the coalitions which proportional representation (PR) systems regularly generate (Blais and Massicotte, 2002), which may be crucial in a post-conflict context. Laver and Schofield (1990, cited in Blais and Massicotte, 2002) claim that in most developed democracies, governing coalitions are mainly stable, but this leaves the question of how these systems work in transitional and post-conflict settings. A wide range of institutional options exist to meet the particular needs of post-conflict situations, such as guaranteed representation for minorities or bans on ethnicity-based parties (Simonsen, 2005:209).

The degree of proportionality a system delivers is also important for its legitimacy: the efficiency with which a system translates votes into seats in the legislature is important in any election, but may be particularly vital in building confidence in a new electoral system after conflict. An election result in which the votes of a significant minority of voters are ineffective (that is, they do not lead to their chosen candidate being elected) may reduce confidence in the system and in the new government which is elected. In his survey of 36 democracies Lijphart (using the Gallagher index) found that the lowest degrees of disproportionality were enjoyed by countries with PR or PR-like electoral systems (1999).
The question of which electoral systems are most appropriate in post-conflict situations is still under discussion in the literature. A number of academic writers are of the view that majoritarian electoral systems in single-member districts are not appropriate for divided societies (Bogaards, 2004:3); preferential electoral systems which make politicians dependent on votes from outside their own ‘group’ of voters may be appropriate for some heterogeneous societies, but context is all-important (Reilly, 2002: 168-9).

Clearly a number of factors are relevant to this institutional choice, including the nature of the conflict, the degree of social heterogeneity, and the other institutions chosen in each case – that is, the political institutions for which the electoral system is utilised to choose candidates. The differing systems of incentives established by different electoral systems have the potential to bring greater stability to nations after conflict, or to facilitate renewed conflict. They can ameliorate the effects of ethnic or religious divides within society, or exacerbate them; they can produce large and definitive majorities in legislatures, or coalitions of many smaller parties.

For many peace-building missions during the 1990s, the holding of ‘free and fair’ elections was seen as the logical conclusion to the mission; the assumption being that once democratic elections had been held, a country would be ready to govern itself and that the international community should leave the country to manage its own affairs. Regrettably, the holding of elections did not prove to be the panacea many had hoped for. The process of forming parties, seeking votes and actively contesting an election has the potential to expose many of the differences in ideology and policy which led to the conflict in the first place. At worst this led to renewed conflict (as in Sierra Leone and Angola), or to a government which had the support of a majority of voters, but the active and vocal opposition of the remainder (as occurred in Kosovo).

Proportional representation systems are generally seen as better for divided societies, as they frequently result in coalition governments which are seen as more inclusive (Lyons, 2002:221), however the example of Bosnia, discussed in further detail later in this thesis,
illustrates that veto players can deadlock a system which requires a degree of consensus to function. The hypothesis tested here, however, is the contrary proposition: that majoritarian institutions are better in post-conflict situations because they promote greater stability, ease of central decision-making and require less agreement from the parties to function. Data for this variable were drawn from the World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions (2010).

*District Magnitude*

District Magnitude refers to the number of seats available in each electoral constituency. Some electoral systems rely on only one member being elected from each constituency, while others effectively treat the entire country as one district, so that the district magnitude is equal to the total number of legislators (ACE Project, 2009). District magnitude affects the way a country’s electoral system operates; a system which has one elected member per district (a district magnitude of 1) operates almost like the UK’s first-past-the-post system in its tendency to produce clear legislative majorities (and its low rate of turning voters’ preferences into seats, relative to votes cast in multi-member seats), while multi-member seats (with a district magnitude of more than 1) allow more voters’ preferences to influence the allocation of seats and may give minor parties a greater chance of getting elected, although they lower the incentives for parties to merge and represent broader interests (Beck et al, 2000:21). Data for this variable were drawn from the World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions (2010).

*Federal/unitary government*

Federal systems distribute power between a central government, which plays a coordinating role, and sub-national governments, which have greater powers over matters which more directly affect their regional area. It has been said that “Federalism is a political organization in which the activities of government are divided between regional governments and a central government in such a way that each kind of government has some activities on which it makes final decisions” (Riker, cited in Lijphart, 1999:186). Voters are able to express their electoral preferences differently between federal and state entities if they wish. Unitary systems, on the other hand, centralise power in a nation’s
capital with one central government, although they often establish local government bodies to deal with municipal matters in their local jurisdiction. Lijphart considers federalism “...the most typical and drastic method of dividing power: it divides power between entire levels of government” (Lijphart, 1999:185).

Federal states may have a number of advantages in post-conflict situations. They allocate power more evenly throughout a country, rather than centralizing it in the capital city; the checks and balances usually involved in a federal government may prove a restraint on corruption; and the division of one larger nation into smaller geographical units may allow the creation of sub-national units which are homogenous along one or more dimensions (ethnic/linguistic/religious) and may reduce the likelihood of conflict recurring. Elazar suggests that although unitary governments emphasise neat and efficient organisation of power, the federal model “...is attuned to the dispersion and diffusion of power and hence is in principle easier for accommodating political, cultural and related differences within the body politic” (1997:243). It has been suggested that federalism can help a political system to deal with conflict by ‘quarantining’ conflicts within regions (Weiner 1989:36, cited in Manor, 1998:21), and that it may “...provides the combination of self-rule and shared rule that can help hold a divided country together” (Bermeo, 2003:166). Federalism also offers the possibility of experimentation with policies and programs in one region, which can then be adopted by other regions if it is successful.

Chesterman, however, notes that the dispersal of institutions which is part of a federal state has the potential to “…undermine the development of strong central institutions which are needed to build trust in a post-conflict state”, although he concedes that federal structures may be more appropriate and lead to greater stability where ethnic divisions are regionally based (2004:211-2). Federal systems carry greater costs, both financial and human; they will often involve multiple decision-making bodies, requiring the provision of premises and payment of salaries to a greater number of politicians, and they divide the available pool of capable and experienced leaders between them. Federalism may also lead to the development of sub-national parties with a territorial base, which may exacerbate linguistic or cultural differences and create greater divisions within nations (Weaver, 2002:122).
Simonsen suggests that federalism has often been used to devolve power in order to defuse separatist claims, although he observes that it has the potential to either solidify or diffuse ethnic-identity based politics, depending on the basis on which the sub-national units are created (2005:309). Blattman and Miguel, 2010, cite Zinn's 2005 study of Nigeria, in which "many factors contributed to civil war risk, but there was no full-blown conflict in the 1980s and 1990s. The federal structure of Nigeria may have helped diffuse ethnic rivalry at the center". This argument follows Horowitz’s suggestion of "...federalism as an institutional reform that changes the locus of political conflict from the center to an increasingly large set of smaller conflicts in different federal states" (Blattman and Miguel, 2010:36).

**Peacekeeping mission**

The involvement of peacekeeping operations in ending conflicts and assisting with reconstruction is an important factor in the performance of the governments which follow them or work alongside them. Peacekeeping operations have changed considerably in character and in number over the time period used for this study. The United Nations Security Council authorises peacekeeping operations using a combination of the powers granted to it by Articles 6 and 7 of the UN Charter. Early peacekeeping operations were mainly observer missions, intended to monitor the implementation of peace agreements. Later missions employed what is now known as ‘classical peacekeeping’, in which peacekeepers were armed but neutral: they did not engage in conflict, except in self-defence. With the end of the Cold War, there was a dramatic rise in the number of internal conflicts, and the United Nations began to employ more robust ‘peace enforcement’ operations, in which forces operating under the UN banner were entitled to use force to protect civilians.

As it became increasingly clear that merely overseeing or monitoring the signing and implementation of a peace agreement was not enough to prevent countries from relapsing into conflict, the UN began to move beyond a military focus to undertake the holding of

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elections, so that a democratically installed government could be in place when the peacekeepers leave. Most recently, the UN has, in cases where a country lacks a functioning state, assumed complete authority for governing a state, until that authority can be safely returned to the government of the country. Such multidimensional peace operations can include military, policing and political components, and were utilised in both Timor-Leste and Kosovo.

The great increase in the number of peace operations since the 1990s, together with the variety of situations in which peacekeepers are expected to operate and the high expectations of them, have required the UN to reconsider the principles within which its peacekeeping operations function. Two major reviews of peacekeeping have taken place, the Report of the Panel on Peacekeeping Operations (the Brahimi Report) in 2000, and the development of the “capstone” guidelines in 2008, which still stress the basic principles of consent of the main parties, neutrality and non-intervention. It has recently been suggested that although the UN’s peacekeeping capacities have been stretched by a number of crises – the operation in Darfur and flare-ups of violence in Timor-Leste and the Democratic Republic of the Congo - the UN system as a whole is moving toward a coherent concept of integrated peacekeeping missions (Gowan, 2008:457).

There has been some research on the effectiveness of UN peace operations in ending war and promoting peace, although the results to date are mixed. Call and Cook noted in 2003 that “Of the eighteen single countries that experienced UN peacebuilding missions with a political institution-building component between 1998 and 2002, thirteen (72 percent) were classified as some sort of authoritarian regime as of 2002” (2002:233-4). On the other hand, Doyle and Sambanis found in 2006 that the presence of a UN peace mission, particularly a multidimensional peacekeeping or peace enforcement mission, had a strong positive influence on the probability of ‘peacebuilding success’ two years after the end of the war – regardless of the success or failure of the UN operation itself (2006:91, 109-110).

Doyle and Sambanis’ work examines the effect of UN peace operations in civil wars from 1944-1999, and their coding of types of peacekeeping operations was used for this thesis.
Additional information was needed to deal with the broader scope of this survey, which extends until 2004, and this information was obtained from the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations website, which sets out detailed information on each UN-sponsored peace operation including its mandate and its term.

There is a potential endogeneity problem in assessing the effect of a UN operation on a particular conflict or its aftermath: it could be argued that any conflict in which the UN staged an operation was particularly difficult and thus UN involvement might be correlated with greater damage as a result of conflict and a lower government success score; conversely, the UN might tend to intervene in ‘easy cases’, leaving the seemingly insoluble conflicts alone, meaning that UN involvement might equate to less serious conflicts and greater government success. Doyle and Sambanis, however, declare that “…as an empirical matter, the UN seems to intervene in the ‘hard’ cases. Average levels of deaths and displacements are higher, local capacities lower, and numbers of factions [are] higher in cases where the UN has sent peacekeepers as compared to the rest of the cases [in their study]” (2006:62). Fortna (2004b, 2004c, and 2008) also finds empirically that peacekeepers tend to be sent to the most difficult cases, and that they are positively associated with longer durations of peace following conflict. This makes ‘…successful cases of peacekeeping … all the more noteworthy’ (Howard, 2008, cited in Fortna and Howard, 2008). There are, however, limits to the utility of econometric analysis in situations where missions are ‘selective and heterogeneous’ (Fortna, 2004c, 2008; Doyle and Sambanis, 2000, 2006, cited in Blattman and Miguel, 2010:28).

The involvement of non-UN peacekeeping forces could mean that a conflict is minor, and unlikely to attract the involvement of the United Nations; that a conflict is highly politicised, with differing interests between the permanent members of the Security Council; or that a conflict is intense and likely to be contagious to surrounding nations, which have a significant interest in banding together to stop the conflict before it spreads to their territories; or that it is minor, and only of interest to regional powers. There have been a number of successful non-UN peacekeeping operations, including the Multilateral Force Organisation (MFO) created to assist in verifying compliance with the Camp David
Accords between Israel and Egypt in 1979, and Australia’s regional peacekeeping missions to Bouganville in Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands (Fleitz, 2002).

Aid per capita

The amount of aid received by a country proportional to its population is an important indicator of that country’s financial independence, as well as its level of development. Countries in the immediate post-conflict period often attract considerable financial and other assistance from donor nations hoping to prevent the recurrence of violence and to assist in post-conflict reconstruction. As many peacekeeping operations have become more complex and involved a greater degree of institution-building, development and peacekeeping initiatives have converged and integrated missions have become more common (Griffin, 2003). There are concerns, however, that the merging of development and security agendas may come at the expense of the interests of the poor (Wild and Elharawy, 2012), and that imposing peace conditionalities on aid recipients alters the balance of power in those countries, and can affect economic outcomes (Boyce, 2002).

Research into the most effective amount, type and timing of aid to post-conflict countries has been undertaken, although the results are not conclusive. Aid has been found to be more effective at assisting growth in post-conflict situations than in other circumstances (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004), and reduces the likelihood of conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002); while post-conflict aid does not seem to increase the risk of real exchange rate appreciations and ‘Dutch disease’ (Elbadawi et al, 2008). Other researchers suggest that internal political variables explain post-conflict political stability more effectively than the presence and timing of aid (Breuning and Ishiyama, 2004), and that aid has little effect on the emergence of democracy after conflict (Ishiyama, Sanders and Breuning, 2008).

Blattman and Miguel suggest caution in drawing conclusions from these correlations given that neither foreign aid nor civil conflict occur randomly (2010:40). Post-conflict countries behave differently to non-conflict countries, and lenders must take account of this in setting

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14 Indeed, Chand and Coffman (2008) have suggested that donors should only exit from post-conflict countries when “…the intervened state has acquired the capacity to fund its recurrent expenditure from domestic taxation” (2008:3).
terms for loans (Alvarez-Plata and Brück, 2008: 501). There are many different ways to measure the amount of aid received by a country, including the amount of aid as a percentage of GDP; the amount of grants, as opposed to loans, received by a country, or the amount of bilateral or multilateral aid received; the indicator used for the purposes of this thesis is the ‘Net ODA (overseas development aid) received per capita’ indicator from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, which consists of the amount of loans made on concessional terms, plus the amount of development aid received from OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) country members and non-DAC countries, divided by the population estimate for the middle of each country-year, and expressed in 2012 US dollars.

Control variables

Resources

A growing body of research links poor economic growth with abundant natural resources. The type of resources measured varies within the literature on this topic: some writers measure agricultural resources, others only utilise data on mineral and fuel resources, and still others include the size of the primary production sector (Rosser, 2006:8). Sachs and Warner utilised the proportion of a country’s exports which were represented by primary produce in 1970, and found that plentiful natural resources were negatively associated with GDP growth between 1970 and 1989 (Sachs and Warner, 1997). Auty (2001) presented evidence that per capita incomes of resource-poor countries grew two or three times more quickly than those in resource-rich economies between 1960-1990. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) linked natural resource abundance with increased likelihood of civil war commencing, due to the better funding available for rebel groups. They also suggested that increased natural resources correlated with longer duration of civil wars (1998). Fearon, while criticising Collier and Hoeffler’s aggregation of data into five-year periods, and some of their findings, agreed that their result was plausible, although he attributed it to oil wealth rather than general resource wealth (2005:19).
Some writers have examined whether the type of natural resources makes a difference to development outcomes and have found evidence that it does; Isham et al (2002) found that countries rich in ‘point source’ natural resources such as oil, minerals and plantation crops, grew more slowly than countries with ‘diffuse’ natural resources such as wheat, rice, cocoa and coffee, and Fearon and Laitin (2003) have shown that the level of primary commodity exports is not significant in determining the onset of civil wars, but that the level of oil wealth is useful in this regard. Countries with high levels of natural resources are less likely to undertake microeconomic reforms (Amin and Djankov, 2009), while natural resource abundance has been strongly and negatively correlated with peacebuilding success (Doyle and Sambanis, 2001). More recently, however, it has been suggested that previous research has failed to account for the ways in which political and social structures, shaped by historical and other factors, mediate the relationship between abundant natural resources and development outcomes, to account for the fact that some resource abundant countries use their natural resources and enjoy high levels of development, while others remain underdeveloped (Rosser, 2006:7-8, citing Schrank, 2004 and Snyder and Bhavnani, 2005). The data used here for this variable are from Collier and Hoeffler (2004).

Time

A control variable has been used in the dataset to indicate the year of the survey period (1975-2004) in which each country-year occurs. The time control is intended to proxy the degree of institutional learning about peacekeeping and post-conflict administration which has been carried out both by the UN and other regional peacekeeping organisations during the period studied here. As discussed in Chapter 1, the number and type of peacekeeping operations increased greatly over the period studied, with early peacekeeping operations mainly intended to halt overt conflict, but later missions given complex institution-building responsibilities in addition to conflict prevention.
Size of Peacekeeping Mission

The size of the peacekeeping mission sent to a country may reflect a number of factors: the perceived severity of the conflict involved; the presence of spoilers who may undermine the mission; the number of troops the sponsoring body is able to marshal for the mission; or the complexity of the mandate given to the mission by the Security Council, if the peacekeeping mission is sponsored by the United Nations. Findings concerning the impact of mission size on the likelihood of mission success are mixed. Some writers have found that mission success is not predicted by mission size (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006, and Heldt, 2001:129), but later findings indicate that larger UN troop deployments during the 1990s coincided with a fall in the number of internal armed conflicts (Heldt and Wallensteen, 2006), and mission size is related to the level of co-operation with peacekeeping forces by both governments and rebel forces (Ruggeri, Gizelis, and Dorussen, 2012). Doubling expenditure on peacekeeping operations reduced the risk of conflict recurrence from 40% to 31% (Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom, 2008). Hegre, Hultman and Nygard also found a reduction in levels of major conflict associated with higher levels of expenditure on peacekeeping operations (2010:17).

This variable is included here as a control variable, and Heldt’s method of measuring the total number of people involved in a mission (both civilian and military) divided by the country size in kilometres is used, although the variable has been recalculated from original sources to cover the time period and unit of measurement of this survey. As in Heldt, 2001, country size data was drawn from the CIA World Factbook, and average annual mission size was calculated using the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations website, the websites of individual peacekeeping operations (such as www.mfo.org) or from other sources, including Mays, 2011.

Ethnic diversity

The role played by diverse ethnic groups in promoting or prolonging conflict has been debated considerably in the conflict literature and quantitative research to date has given mixed results. While some writers have predicted higher levels of conflict in societies with greater ethnic diversity (see, for example, Horowitz, 1985, and Huntington, 1996) and attributed the causes of many ongoing conflicts to this diversity, empirical findings have
been more equivocal. Some research has discovered a positive correlation between ethnic diversity and internal conflict (see, for example, Sambanis, 2001; Hegre and Sambanis, 2006); while other inquiries have found no correlation at all (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Collier and Hoefler, 2004). Others still have found a non-monotonic relationship between ethnic diversity and length of conflict, with intermediate levels of ethnic fractionalisation being associated with internal conflicts of longer duration (Collier, Hoefler and Soderbom, 2004; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000, cited in Fearon, 2004a).

Ethnic fractionalisation has been associated with lower levels of economic growth (Easterly and Levine, 1997; Alesina et al, 2003); poor-quality institutions (Alesina et al, 2003); and low GDP per capita. The lack of support from many quantitative studies for ethnic diversity as a cause of conflict has been attributed to poor data, and a focus on the degree of diversity in a society rather than the degree of distance between ethnic groups in that society (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005: 796-797). The measure used here for ethnic diversity is Alesina et al’s 2003 ‘Fractionalisation’ data, which measures ethnic, religious and linguistic fractionalisation for 190 countries for the year 2001. The formula used is as follows:

$$FRACT_j = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^{N} s_{ij}^2$$

where $s_{ij}$ is the share of group $i$ ($i = 1 \ldots N$) in country $j$.

The ethnic composition of each country is assessed using a mixture of racial and linguistic characteristics. While the data are used in this inquiry to estimate the degree of ethnic fractionalisation between 1975 and 2004, Alesina et al note that ‘...ethnic fractionalisation displays tremendous time persistence’ (2003:161), and the alternate measure of ethnic diversity most commonly used in the literature, the Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalisation Index, was taken from a Soviet atlas published in 1964, the Atlas Narodov Mira, and so may suffer from similar charges of being time-bound, while covering fewer countries than the present data source (112 versus 190).
Previous conflicts

A history of conflict may have a bearing on a country’s ability to govern itself well, and has been shown to have a strong impact on both economic growth and the likelihood of further conflicts (see, for example, Collier and Sambanis, 2002; Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom, 2008). The so-called ‘conflict trap’ involves a cycle of increasing societal resentments, weakening democratic institutions, and strengthened insurgencies caused by poor economic conditions, unstable neighbouring countries, and capital flight (Hegre et al, 2011). Living conditions which encourage enlistment in rebel armies have also been argued to contribute to recurrent conflict, as have the duration and outcome of previous conflicts in a country (Walter, 2004:385) and the existence of parallel economies (Wennman, 2005). One study found that even UN intervention into conflict had no apparent effect on the likelihood, timing or intensity of future conflict (Diehl, Reischneider and Hensel, 1996). The way previous conflicts ended has been shown to have an impact on the likelihood of conflict recurrence: negotiated settlements are more likely to be followed by renewed conflict than military victories (Fortna, 2004c; Licklider, 1995; Mack, 2007; all cited in Call, 2008).

This variable seeks to measure how conflict-prone a country is by measuring the number of conflicts a country has experienced since 1946. This provides a sufficient sample period prior to the commencement of the period of study for this thesis (1975-2004), and does not include long-finished conflicts which are unlikely to affect countries’ likelihood of future conflict. The variable only counts the number of individual conflicts a country has been involved in, and does not indicate their duration or intensity – so a country may have been involved in one conflict for the entire sample period, or may have been involved in multiple small conflicts during the period. The data for conflict used for this variable are drawn from the Gleditsch et al (2002) Armed Conflict dataset 1946-2005.

Ethnic conflicts

This variable indicates whether or not a conflict is considered to be an ethnic conflict. As discussed in Chapter 2, ethnic divisions within societies are considered to be one of the potential causes of internal conflict, and 57% of internal conflicts between 1945 and 1999
are 'ethnic' in the sense that rebel groups mobilised and recruited according to an ethnic cleavage, or advocated for a religious or ethnic group (Fearon and Laitin, 2011). Ethnic wars are defined by Gurr and Harff (1997) as:

"Episodes of violent conflict between governments and national, ethnic, religious or other communal minorities (ethnic challengers), in which the challengers seek major changes in their status."

It has been observed that the extent to which ethnic origin forms the basis of political affiliation varies widely across different regions: in sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and the Caribbean, ethnically-based parties are relatively frequent, while this is not the case in other regions such as Western Europe and North America (Reynal-Querol, 2002; Lijphart, 1984, cited in Reynal-Querol, 2002). Fearon and Laitin (2003) found that conditions favouring insurgency (poverty, political instability, rough terrain and large populations) better predicted civil conflict than ethnic or religious characteristics. The data on ethnic conflict here are drawn from Fearon and Laitin’s 2003 paper, “Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War”, which coded conflicts as ethnic or 'partially ethnic', based on whether combatants were mobilised primarily along ethnic lines, in countries with at least a 5% ethnic minority.

Conflict/Post-conflict periods

The term post-conflict has been applied in a variety of ways to countries in and emerging from conflict. It has been used in situations where political violence comes to an end; where a peace agreement has been signed, but violence has recurred; and where one side has been defeated in a military conflict, although an organised resistance remains (Call, 2008:174-5). Identifying the end of a conflict can be difficult, and no society is entirely free of conflict, making identifying 'post-conflict' situations problematic. Bryden suggests that ‘...At best, it refers to a situation after the cessation of violent conflict or after the conclusion of a peace agreement’ (Bryden et al, 2005).

Here, the term 'post-conflict' is used to refer to country-years in which conflict has fallen below the minimum threshold for recognition of a minor conflict by the dataset used here:
25 battle-deaths per year. For the purposes of this study, countries are considered to be in a post-conflict stage for ten years after conflict ends. If conflict recurs, the post-conflict period has ended, and the country is once more recorded as being in conflict. There is some precedent for this: Collier (2003) sets the post-conflict period at ten years.

The process of recovery from civil conflict varies widely between countries depending on the intensity of the conflict and the amount of physical damage to infrastructure and economic disruption the conflict involved. A relatively small but long-running internal conflict in one part of a nation little effect on the nation's economic life and may have little impact on a government's likelihood of being successful as defined in this study; or a rebel group seeking to seize control of the central government may stage a successful coup after bitter fighting, which may take a country decades to fully recover from. Many countries with recurring conflicts are in the 'post-conflict' phase for a year or two several times during the time period of this survey, but never move beyond it before relapsing into conflict.

Data collection

In this survey, although the most reliable data sources available have been utilised for each variable, data collected under these circumstances must be interpreted with knowledge of the difficulty of exact accuracy in estimating, for example, numbers of battle-deaths. The Polity dataset makes this explicit and has three codes (-66,-77,-88) which refer to situations where a country's government is suspended because of conflict or external intervention – the implication being that when such a situation is occurring, data on its political institutions is either difficult or impossible to gather, perhaps because they have ceased to function\(^\text{15}\). The very nature of conflict and post-conflict situations makes the gathering of data difficult and risky and can make its accuracy questionable. Political considerations can also mean that governments are motivated to over- or understate numbers of casualties, or to avoid the collection of such statistics altogether (Mack, 2005:18).

\(^{15}\) For the purposes of time-series statistical analysis in this thesis, however, these three variables have been modified, as discussed earlier in this Chapter – their presence is only referred to here to illustrate the circumstances in which the assessment of democracy may be attempted.
Downs and Stedman (2002), writing in the context of measuring the effectiveness of implementation of peace agreements after civil wars, note that "...it is difficult to think of an environment that is less conducive to the conduct of evaluation research [than a post-conflict situation]. The number of cases is small and the measurements of potentially important variables, such as the military capability and political goals of different parties, are often unreliable." The first step in evaluating the success of any transformative mission is to gather or assess baseline data in order to 'have a clear understanding of the point of departure against which to measure' (de Carvalho and Aune, 2010: 21), but this may pose particular challenges in the post-conflict setting. Official figures may not have been collected for a number of years, or may be unreliable due to a strong informal sector of the economy. Data from rural areas may be too dangerous to collect, and it has been suggested that the 'evaluation agenda' which has been utilized in the development field may be too ambitious for the conflict field (de Carvalho and Aune, 2010:22).

**Conclusion**

The indicators by which government success is to be measured and the variables against which it is to be tested have been set out in this Chapter. The rationale for these indicators has been the consideration of the minimum expectations which citizens of post-conflict countries might have of their countries: that conflict is absent; that some level of democracy is present; that the country is independently governed; that there is some respect for the rule of law, as evidenced by protection of rights of physical integrity; that government services are being delivered; and that the economy is beginning to recover from the conflict and is stable or growing. The measurement of governance and government performance has shifted away from external, large-scale measurement to more citizen-centred modes of measurement, and while survey-based data which would enable citizen perceptions to actually be measured could not be compiled within the scope of this project, this approach has informed the measurement methods used here. The measure of government used here is intended to be as simple, transparent, and context-relevant as possible, and to provide some breadth in its coverage without including so many indicators that the sources of poor performance become obscured by detail.
These indicators will be combined into a score to express each country's success for each year of the survey period, and the characteristics of this score and its distribution will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4 following. As detailed in Table 3.1, the components of the overall score are weighted to indicate the differing levels of importance given to the components of the score within existing literature in this field, as well as their imputed importance in practice: provision of security (in terms of the absence of further conflict) is weighted most heavily, comprising almost 30 per cent of the score, economic growth or stability and level of democracy (as measured by the Polity score) are each weighted at 20 per cent of the total score. The distribution of these variables and their relationships to each other will be discussed in some detail.

The independent variables against which the resulting score will be regressed test the hypotheses that post-conflict governments may be assisted by high national income, peacekeeping operations, 'rigid' political institutions, and high aid levels during the post-conflict period. This period comprises the first ten years after civil conflict for the purposes of this inquiry. A number of control variables which have been explored in the conflict and peacekeeping literature are also included, to ascertain whether these variables have significance for post-conflict governance. They include the presence of natural resources, the country's history of conflict, the degree of ethnic heterogeneity, whether the conflict is classified as an ethnic conflict, and a time variable which aims to capture whether the capacity for peacebuilding (as measured by the performance of governments after conflict) has improved over time. The measurement of governance factors in post-conflict settings must be undertaken in the knowledge that data gathering in these settings can be difficult and extremely dangerous, so figures may be less accurate than would be acceptable in other circumstances.

Many of these factors have been well-researched, and previous findings concerning their interrelationships were touched on in Chapter 2 preceding; the measurement of governance after conflict against these variables by quantitative means, however, is novel, and will be undertaken in Chapter 4.
### Tables of variables

#### Table 3.2: Measuring government success: components of the dependent variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Metric</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Absence of violence</strong></td>
<td>Lack of conflict</td>
<td>Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset, Armed Conflict Location and Event Database</td>
<td>1, 0</td>
<td>No violence = 1, conflict = 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Democracy</strong></td>
<td>Basic level of democracy</td>
<td>Polity IV database, 2007 version</td>
<td>-10 to 10</td>
<td>Special categories (-66, -77) coded 0, -88 prorated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic capability</strong></td>
<td>GDP percentage growth stable or positive</td>
<td>World Bank World Development Indicators</td>
<td>1,0 for Y/N</td>
<td>Calculated with constant 2000 US dollars, PPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government ability to deliver basic services</strong></td>
<td>Number of telephone lines per 100 people</td>
<td>World Bank World Development Indicators</td>
<td>0 to ∞</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government success score</strong></td>
<td>Degree of success enjoyed by country government in that country-year</td>
<td>Calculated by reference to the above, using formula outlined above in Ch 3</td>
<td>0-10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rule of law</strong></td>
<td>Rule of law as evidenced by respect for rights of physical integrity</td>
<td>Cingranelli-Richards Rule of Law Index</td>
<td>0-8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.3: Explaining variations in performance: independent variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Metric</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aid per capita</td>
<td>Net ODA received per capita, 2012 SUS</td>
<td>World Bank World Development Indicators</td>
<td>0-∞</td>
<td>Aid calculated in current US dollars, based on net official development assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral system, lower house</td>
<td>Electoral system governing all or the majority of seats in the lower house of the legislature</td>
<td>Database of Political Institutions 2010 (World Bank)</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>0=Proportional representation 1=Plurality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Structure</td>
<td>Form of executive government</td>
<td>Database of Political Institutions 2010 (World Bank)</td>
<td>0,1,2</td>
<td>0=Direct Presidential 1=President elected by assembly 2=Parliamentary Split into dummy variables</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federalism</td>
<td>Are state or provincial governments locally elected?</td>
<td>Database of Political Institutions 2010 (World Bank)</td>
<td>0,1,2</td>
<td>0 = No 1 — local legislature elected only 2- local legislature and executive elected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>World Development Indicators, World Bank</td>
<td>0 to ∞</td>
<td>Calculated in constant 2000 US dollars with PPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean district magnitude, lower house</td>
<td>Mean district magnitude of House seats</td>
<td>Database of Political Institutions 2010 (World Bank)</td>
<td>0 - ∞</td>
<td>District magnitude = number of members to be elected in each electoral district</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping mission</td>
<td>Presence and type of UN or non-UN peacekeeping force during conflict</td>
<td>UN peacekeeping: Sambanis and Doyle, 2006; Non-UN peacekeeping: Heldt, 2008</td>
<td>1 to 5 integer values</td>
<td>1=Observer mission 2=Traditional peacekeeping operation (PKO) 3=peace enforcement 4=multidimensional PKO 5=Non-UN peacekeeping force Split into dummy variables</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 3.4: Assessing external influences: control variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Metric</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Resources</strong></td>
<td>Ratio of primary commodity exports to GDP</td>
<td>Collier and Hoeffler, 2004</td>
<td>0 to ∞</td>
<td>Data only available in 5-year increments, so entered as same value across each 5-year period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Years Post-conflict</strong></td>
<td>Distance in time from conflict</td>
<td>Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset</td>
<td>0 - ∞</td>
<td>Number of years since conflict ended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Size of UN Mission</strong></td>
<td>Number of people assigned to UN mission/area of country concerned</td>
<td>UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations data/CIA World Factbook/other sources (table in bibliography)</td>
<td>1-∞</td>
<td>Calculated in the same way as Heldt, 2001 mission size variable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethnic conflicts</strong></td>
<td>Whether conflict is considered an ethnic conflict or otherwise</td>
<td>Fearon and Laitin, 2003 data</td>
<td>0-2</td>
<td>0=not ethnic conflict, 1 = ambiguous/mixed 2= ethnic conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Previous conflicts since 1945</strong></td>
<td>Total number of conflicts since 1946</td>
<td>Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset</td>
<td>0-∞</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Time control</strong></td>
<td>Number of years since the start of the dataset</td>
<td>Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset</td>
<td>0-30</td>
<td>Intended to measure institutional learning on the part of UN and other peacekeeping bodies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethnic diversity</strong></td>
<td>Ethno-linguistic diversity</td>
<td>Alesina et al <em>Fractionalization</em> data</td>
<td>0-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.5: Summary statistics for all variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Name</th>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aidnum</td>
<td>Net ODA per capita</td>
<td>3709</td>
<td>1848.23</td>
<td>1065.71</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>Conflict variable: 1 if no conflict, 0 if internal conflict present</td>
<td>5310</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conftype</td>
<td>Type of conflict</td>
<td>1022</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eth</td>
<td>Ethnic fractionalisation</td>
<td>4963</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethconf</td>
<td>Whether conflict is an ethnic conflict or not</td>
<td>1372</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Execstruc</td>
<td>Executive structure: type of Executive office in political system</td>
<td>4830</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federalism</td>
<td>Whether state/provincial governments are locally elected</td>
<td>3636</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gdp</td>
<td>GDP per capita with PPP, constant 2000 US dollars</td>
<td>4195</td>
<td>7558.10</td>
<td>8068.58</td>
<td>466.20</td>
<td>64,298, 64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gdpchange</td>
<td>Economic capability GDP change dummy: 1 if GDP growth is positive or zero; 0 if growth is negative</td>
<td>5310</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govserv</td>
<td>Number of telephones per 100 people</td>
<td>4897</td>
<td>12.44</td>
<td>16.45</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>74.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housesys</td>
<td>Electoral system used for electing lower house of legislature</td>
<td>3407</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawscore</td>
<td>Scaled rulelaw score (Rulelaw/8)</td>
<td>4301</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mdmh</td>
<td>Mean district magnitude, lower house of legislature</td>
<td>3339</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>22.08</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Msize</td>
<td>Size of UN mission: number of personnel divided by size of country in sq kilometres</td>
<td>1005</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKO</td>
<td>Whether peacekeeping operation in place &amp; what type of PKO</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>3.29</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity</td>
<td>Polity score</td>
<td>4472</td>
<td>-3.11</td>
<td>18.38</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polscore</td>
<td>Scaled polity score</td>
<td>4451</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-conflict</td>
<td>Post-conflict dummy variable: 1 if country in post-conflict period, 0 if not</td>
<td>5310</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preconf</td>
<td>Number of previous conflicts in country since independence</td>
<td>5293</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td>3.47</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rulelaw</td>
<td>Respect for the rule of law as expressed by rights of physical integrity</td>
<td>4301</td>
<td>4.83</td>
<td>2.41</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Servscore</td>
<td>Scaled goserv score: number of telephones per 10,000 people</td>
<td>4897</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Succeedscore</td>
<td>Dependent variable: Government success score</td>
<td>3931</td>
<td>5.38</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>7.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sxp</td>
<td>Resources: Ratio of primary commodity exports to GDP</td>
<td>4141</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>2.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timecont</td>
<td>Number of years since commencement of dataset</td>
<td>5310</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>8.66</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yrspc</td>
<td>Years post-conflict: number of years since conflict ended</td>
<td>752</td>
<td>3.73</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 4

EXPLORING POST-CONFLICT SUCCESS

No-one starts a war – or rather, no-one in his senses ought to do so – without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.

Carl von Clausewitz, on War

Determining the reasons why some governments succeed and others fail after internal conflict poses a number of challenges. The potential causes of success or failure are diverse, and include the likelihood of conflict recurrence, the country’s degree of financial or political health prior to the conflict, and the type of post-conflict assistance given to the country. Many authors have addressed issues of the optimal timing and sequencing of reforms in post-conflict reconstruction (see, for example, Burke, 2006, Woodward, 2002, and Chayes & Chayes, 1999), but there is no consensus on a ‘prescription’ for success after conflict.

The central question addressed by this chapter is whether post-conflict government performance is affected by the following four factors: high national income (GDP per capita); appropriate institutions; peacekeeping operations; and foreign aid (specifically, high foreign aid per capita). It proceeds from the assumption that most governments after civil conflict are highly vulnerable, due to the probability of renewed conflict, economic fragility, and the potential for political instability, and seeks to determine whether these factors affect government performance in first ten years after conflict. A number of control variables which have been discussed in the internal conflict literature are also tested to examine their impact on government performance in this period: resources, ethnic fractionalisation, size of peacekeeping mission, history of conflict, and ethnic conflict. A time control is also included to proxy the effect of institutional learning by peacekeepers and international organisations on government performance.
This chapter summarises the data collected and the results obtained when they were analysed. The analysis of quantitative data presented in this chapter establishes the background for the more detailed comparative examination of the post-conflict governments in three case study countries in Chapters 6, 7 and 8.

Data

The data comprise records for 177 countries for the years 1975-2004 inclusive, which comprise all countries in the world with populations larger than 100,000, with the exception of Turkish Cyprus. This country was omitted because it is not always classified as a country in its own right, and so is absent from most datasets. The unit of analysis is the country-year. The dataset is a panel dataset, meaning that information is gathered for as many variables as possible for each country for each year of the survey period.

Conflict

One hundred of the 177 countries experienced conflict during this time period, and the dataset records a total of 181 conflicts. Although the most common situation was an absence of conflict (occurring in 80.79% of country-years), where conflict occurred, the most common type was internal armed conflict (68.10% of country-years in which conflict occurred), followed by internationalized internal armed conflict (21.04%), and interstate armed conflict (10.86%). These project analyses only country-years of civil conflict, including both internal conflict and internationalized internal conflict (as coded by the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset), so the remainder of this chapter will analyse the post-conflict country-years following them.

Income

National income is measured here by gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, measured in constant 2000 US dollars, and adjusted for purchasing power parity. These figures, drawn from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, represent the GDP of each country for each year in the dataset, divided by that country’s population at the middle of
that year\textsuperscript{16}. In this dataset, the mean GDP per capita is $7558.10, with a standard deviation of $8068.58, but the minimum was $466.19 (Sierra Leone in 1980), while the maximum was $64298.64 (Luxembourg in 2004).

GDP per capita was not normally distributed in the dataset, with most countries falling short of the average: $4307 was the median. The data for this variable were drawn from the World Bank's World Development indicators, but it is recognised that these are an imperfect source and data were not collected for a number of countries for at least some years of the survey period, in particular from poorer countries. For this reason, the dataset may understate the incidence of poverty (as calculated by GDP per capita) in the countries studied.

GDP is correlated with a number of other variables: positively correlated (0.46) with Parliamentary systems and more weakly with federalism (0.28). It is negatively correlated with ethnic heterogeneity (-0.32) and weakly negatively correlated with resource endowments (-0.06).

Using GDP per capita as a measure of national wealth has a number of limitations: it does not give information about how the national income is divided amongst the citizens of a nation, nor does it show from where the income derives – e.g. from agricultural exports, manufactured goods, or exploitation of natural resources; this function is performed in this survey by the resources variable. It is, however, available for most countries for most years of this survey and so provides a comprehensive picture of relative wealth between nations. Measures of GDP which utilised more recent currencies than constant 2000 US dollars were considered for use in this dataset, but these measures were often inferior to the one currently employed, in that they did not provide data for the first five years of the dataset, or did not provide data adjusted for purchasing power parity.

\textsuperscript{16} Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is defined as "...the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products". It does not make deductions for depreciation nor for the use or natural resources in production. (World Bank, World DataBank)
Institutions

Executive Structure

Of the three types of executive structure recorded by this dataset, directly-elected presidential systems were the most common, comprising 54.47% of total country-years. Parliamentary governments were next most common, present in 31.45% of country-years, and in 14.08% of country years, there were strong presidents elected by an Assembly. Executive structure was related to the incidence of internal conflict: during the sample period, countries with direct presidential systems spent more country-years involved in conflict than countries with any other type of executive structure, and more than would have been expected given their proportion of all countries. Countries with strong presidential systems were in conflict roughly in proportion to their overall representation, and countries with Parliamentary systems were less frequently in conflict than other types. This is illustrated by Table 4.1 below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Executive government type</th>
<th>Frequency of executive government type</th>
<th>Percent of country-years with this government type</th>
<th>Country-years of internal conflict for this type</th>
<th>Percent of total country-years spent in internal conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct Presidential</td>
<td>2631</td>
<td>54.47%</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>68.72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong president, elected by assembly</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>14.08%</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>13.27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>1519</td>
<td>31.45%</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4834</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>844</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.1 Conflict frequency by government type

There are several factors which may be responsible for this: Presidential systems have different sources of executive and legislative power, which may prove a focus for differences; presidential systems are most common in Latin America, Africa and South America.
Asia, and the latter two regions have experienced more conflict during the sample period, so conflict contagion effects may be involved; alternatively, many countries with presidential systems democratized relatively recently, and may be more prone to conflict during this transition period (Mansfield and Snyder, 1995). Stepan and Skach suggested in 1993 that Parliamentary democracies ‘seemed to provide a more supportive evolutionary framework for consolidating democracy than pure Presidentialism’ (1993:22).

There are no clear linkages between executive structure and electoral system type. Because plurality electoral systems are more common than proportional systems (see further discussion on this below), they are more common across each type of executive structure, although parliamentary governments were most commonly linked to proportional electoral systems.

Electoral systems

The most common electoral systems in use in the dataset are plurality systems. This dataset only includes information about the system for electing the lower house of Parliament as it is usually the one which determines the government, and is often the house which is elected in a more democratic fashion. Plurality systems comprise 58% of the country-years in this dataset, while proportional systems comprise 40.89%. In cases where the majority of legislators are appointed or indirectly elected, this variable is coded ‘indirect’, which occurs in 38 cases (1.11%). Countries with plurality and proportional electoral systems are involved in a similar percentage of country-years of conflict in this dataset – countries with proportional representation systems were involved in internal conflict for 232 country-years, or 16.65% of the total country-years for that system type, and countries with plurality systems were involved in internal conflict for 258 years, or 13.06% of the total for that system type. It would seem that electoral system type does not have a decisive impact on a country’s likelihood of being in conflict during the sample period (or that other factors are at work which mean that these proportions are similar).

Federalism

The federalism variable in this dataset is based on whether sub-national governments are locally elected (Keefer, 2010). This data was available for 68% of cases, and of these, 27.06% of country-years involved federal systems in which only the legislature were
locally elected. Both legislature and executive were locally elected in 25.14% of country-years, and in 47.8% of cases neither was locally elected. Governments within Parliamentary systems were most likely to have locally elected legislatures and/or executives (comprising 69.95% of country-years for this system type), while governments with directly elected Presidents were least likely to have federal systems (37.29%). There were also correlations with electoral system type, with countries with proportional representation electoral systems more likely to have federal systems, while those with plurality electoral systems were less likely to have federal systems.

**District Magnitude**

District magnitudes in this dataset refer to the number of members of the lower house of the legislature per electoral district, and values for this variable range between 0.7 and 150, with a mean of 9.90 and a median of 2.2. Although it has been updated recently, this variable has a high number of missing values (37%), which limits its explanatory power. Figure 4.1 below illustrates the predominance of lower district magnitudes in the dataset.

![Figure 4.1 Frequency of mean district magnitude](image)

**Peacekeeping mission**

Peacekeeping missions, both those launched under the auspices of the United Nations, and those sponsored by other nations or organisations, have been in progress in countries in
approximately 318 (5.99%) of the country-years in this survey. Figure 4.2 shows both the increasing frequency of peacekeeping operations in the 1990s and early 2000s, and the changes in the type of mission launched.
Number and Type of Peacekeeping Missions, 1975-2004

Figure 4.2 Peacekeeping Operations by type, 1975-2004
In the early part of the period examined there were few UN missions and these tended to be traditional peacekeeping operations, such as the one in Cyprus. The total number of UN missions rose substantially in the early 1990s, peaking in 1994 with 24 missions. As the type of conflicts occurring changed during the period surveyed, the type of mission employed by the UN also changed, with the introduction of multidimensional peacekeeping missions and peace enforcement missions. It is interesting to note the fall in all kinds of UN missions except multidimensional peacekeeping missions in the 2000s, no doubt linked to the lower numbers of conflicts occurring overall, although the number of missions ongoing at the end of the survey period is still substantially higher than that at the commencement of this period. The numbers of non-UN peacekeeping missions were significant, and became more so over the period surveyed, peaking in 1999 when 17 such operations were in place. Regional organisations are becoming more frequent providers of peacekeeping services, although their record of success is mixed to date and their capacity to undertake peacekeeping and peacebuilding varies considerably between different organisations.

For the purposes of the regression table shown later in this Chapter, the peacekeeping variable was converted into dummy variables which express whether a UN mission of each type was present during each country-year. The data used for this variable were drawn from Sambanis and Doyle’s 2006 survey of UN peace operations, apart from the data on non-UN peacekeeping missions, which were obtained from Heldt, 2008.

The fall in all types of conflict during the 2000s, has been suggested to be the result of increased support for post-conflict peacebuilding from the international community, and more stable negotiated peace settlements. (Human Security Centre, 2008a:35). The intervention of peacekeeping forces which monitor ceasefire provisions may prevent insecurity and lack of information from spiralling into renewed conflict. They can also provide a stopping-point preventing accidents or minor skirmishes from deteriorating into renewed conflict, and can make deliberate aggression physically more difficult (Fortna, 2004b, 517). While selection issues mean that peacekeeping forces may be sent to more difficult conflicts and those lacking a definitive resolution such as a peace treaty (Fortna, 2004c), their effectiveness in managing conflict and preventing renewed conflict has been supported by several quantitative studies (Fortna, 2004b, Fortna, 2004c).
**Foreign aid per capita**

The amount of overseas development aid received per capita is an important measure of a country’s economic health: it indicates how well a country is able to provide for its own citizens from within its own resources. The amount of aid received varies considerably between post-conflict countries, however. A low-income post-conflict country might receive considerable amounts of overseas development assistance, particularly in the first few years after conflict, while a high-income country may not need any external assistance after conflict.

The measure of aid used here is the amount of overseas development assistance received per capita, expressed in current US dollars, drawn from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. The average amount of aid received per capita is $1848, with a standard deviation of $1065.94. Figure 4.3 below illustrates the distribution of aid per capita against national income per capita. While aid is usually distributed to countries with low per capita incomes, there are a number of outliers, including South Africa, Uruguay, and Sierra Leone. There are possible explanations for these outliers: Sierra Leone has particularly high scores for resource exports as a proportion of GDP, which may indicate that its wealth is concentrated amongst those who are in control of resources, leaving others in need of externally provided aid; and South Africa has a particularly high rate of HIV/AIDS infection, despite its relatively high GDP per capita, and also has high levels of income inequality (its Gini index for 2000 was 57.8), suggesting that it has areas of poverty as well as of considerable wealth. Uruguay was under military rule at the time of its high outlying scores.

Although aid is most commonly given to countries with low incomes, Figure 4.3 illustrates that the amount of aid received by post-conflict countries does not appear to depend only on the amount of national income per person. Some low income countries received very little ODA for some years of the dataset, while others with higher incomes received more, indicating that other factors are likely to be influencing donor decisions. These may include the recipient country’s ability to absorb aid, donor countries’ ability to disperse aid in dangerous situations, and the presence of areas of specific need within middle-income countries, for example impoverished rural districts.
Control variables

Resources

The resources variable measures the ratio of primary commodity exports to GDP. It is drawn from Collier and Hoeffler’s widely cited paper “Greed and Grievance in Civil War” (2004), and their follow-up paper “Beyond Greed and Grievance” (2009). They note that:

“The ratio of primary commodity exports to GDP proxies the abundance of natural resources. The data on primary commodity exports and GDP were obtained from the World Bank. Export and GDP data are measured in current US dollars.” (2009:28).

Because of the impact that large concentrations of mineral resources are argued to have on government performance, particularly economic growth (discussed in Chapter 3 above) this variable was introduced as a control variable to assess its impact on

17 ‘Primary commodities’ are defined by reference to Standard International Trade Classifications 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 and 68, and include the following: Food and live animals, beverages and tobacco, crude materials such as textiles, rubber and wood products, mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials, animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes, and non-ferrous metals (such as silver, copper, nickel, aluminium, lead and tin).
government performance. The mean value of this variable across the dataset is 0.16, with a standard deviation of 0.18. The country-year with the highest ratio was the Bahamas in 1980-84 with a primary commodity export/GDP ratio of 2.139, and the lowest was Japan in 1995-99, with a primary commodity export/GDP ratio of 0.002. Although their data have been criticised for lacking specificity (Collier and Hoeffler's data for this variable are only available in five-year increments) and for being too broadly focussed (as noted in the footnote below, the data cover not only mineral and petroleum resources but also agricultural exports), this variable has also been widely used in the resources literature and is utilised here to enable comparison with earlier papers in this subfield.

Time since dataset began

This variable shows how far through the dataset each country-year falls. Its purpose is to represent the degree to which institutions such as the United Nations have undertaken institutional learning and improved their performance at peacekeeping/statebuilding over the period surveyed.

Ethnic diversity

Ethnic diversity is the degree to which a society is made up of members of distinct ethnic groups. As discussed earlier, this diversity has been measured using several different variables, and its implications for conflict and for other economic and political aspects of society are still debatable. The variable utilised here is the ‘ethnic’ component of Alesina et al’s (2003) Fractionalization data. As discussed earlier in Chapters 2 and 3, while differences between ethnic groups offer an attractive explanation for conflict, empirical evidence for this is mixed to date (see Sambanis, 2001; Hegre and Sambanis, 2006; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; and Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). The degree of ethnic diversity within countries varies widely, as shown by Figure 4.3 below. Ethnic diversity is negatively correlated with GDP per capita (-0.32) and federalism (-0.16), although correlations with other institutional types and phenomena such as ethnic conflict are very weak.
Previous conflicts

This variable measures the number of conflicts a country has experienced since 1945, as a way of measuring whether the conflict-prone nature of some countries has long-term impacts on their governance, particularly in the post-conflict period. The average for this variable is 2.01, although it exhibits a wide degree of variation and values range from 0 to 41 conflicts within this period, with the highest values belonging to India in 2003 and 2004.

Ethnic conflict

The data on ethnic conflict in this thesis are based on Fearon and Laitin’s 2003 data, which classifies a conflict as an ‘ethnic conflict’ if combatants are mobilised primarily along ethnic lines, in countries with at least a 5% ethnic minority. Here, the data indicate that of 688 country-years of conflict recognised by Fearon and Laitin’s data, 435 country-years (63.23%) involved ethnic conflict and 109 country-years (15.84%) were mixed, or at least partly ethnic. This might be argued to reflect the high incidence of civil conflict during the period studied, but in fact civil conflicts in this dataset (whether internal or internationalized internal conflicts) are no more likely to be ethnic conflicts than interstate conflicts. This finding must be qualified by the fact that the sample size of interstate conflicts occurring during this period is relatively small, with only thirty-seven country-years of interstate conflict occurring during the period studied. Table 4.2 below illustrates the incidence of conflict types and the incidence of
ethnic conflict, showing that while country-years of interstate conflict are slightly more likely to be ethnic conflicts than country-years of internal or internationalized internal conflicts, broadly speaking the number of ethnic conflicts for each conflict type reflects that conflict type's incidence in the dataset. Data for this variable were inferred for the post-conflict period to reflect the type of conflict which had taken place prior to that period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict type</th>
<th>Interstate</th>
<th>Internal conflict</th>
<th>Internationalized internal</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic conflict</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not ethnic conflict</td>
<td>2 1.53%</td>
<td>102 77.86%</td>
<td>27 20.61%</td>
<td>131 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed ethnic/non-ethnic</td>
<td>4 4.08%</td>
<td>77 78.57%</td>
<td>17 17.35%</td>
<td>98 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic conflict</td>
<td>31 8.71%</td>
<td>269 75.56%</td>
<td>56 15.73%</td>
<td>356 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>37 6.32%</td>
<td>448 76.58%</td>
<td>100 17.09%</td>
<td>585 100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.2: Conflict types and ethnic conflict

NB Percentages shown are row percentages

Government success

The dependent variable for this dataset is government success, a composite variable which expresses how well a government is functioning for each country-year. Its distribution for all country-years is shown below in Figure 4.4: it is strongly skewed to the left, with a peak at 7.82.
Figures 4.5 and 4.6 below show the relationship between the government success variable and per capita income for all country-years, then only for post-conflict country-years. The figures show that post-conflict countries tend to have slightly lower income than the group of all countries, although post-conflict countries are not clustered at the bottom of the government success score. Countries which have been involved in conflict are heterogeneous, and include a few high-income, democratically governed countries such as Australia, an outlier in Figure 4.6, as well as countries such as Uganda, which is both lower-income and rated relatively low for government success in the same Figure. Because all of the countries in Figure 4.6 are not in conflict, they each score a minimum of three points for the absence of conflict, meaning that the lowest end of the scale is empty. Figure 4.5, however, shows countries in conflict as well as those at peace, and demonstrates the lower scores obtained by these countries without this three-point ‘peace bonus’ under the scale used here. The high scores obtained by many post-conflict countries demonstrate not only the heterogeneity discussed above, between countries involved in conflict during this period, but also the fact that not all countries which have been involved in conflict perform poorly on all indices of government functioning.
While the two graphs demonstrate that post-conflict countries have, in general, lower national incomes than many of the countries in Figure 4.5, many post-conflict countries enjoy high scores of government success, meaning that despite having been involved in conflict they are able to provide some level of democracy, economic growth, human rights, and basic government services. This may be because their economies are able to grow rapidly in the post-conflict period; because for many countries the conflict does not impact on their government services or level of democracy; or because the internal conflict and its principal effects are localised to one area of the country and do not affect the functioning of the national government.

Figure 4.5: Success score plotted against GDP per capita for all country-years
Figure 4.6: Success score plotted against GDP per capita for post-conflict country-years
Regression analysis and results

The success score for each country-year was regressed against each of the factors in the four hypotheses outlined in Chapter 3 in order to determine which was most useful in explaining government success in post-conflict nations.

Dummy variables were generated for a number of categorical independent variables, and regression analysis was performed on country-years in which the country was deemed to be in a post-conflict period (that is, for the first ten years after an internal conflict ended).

The data are collated as a panel dataset, in which the variables for each country are measured each year for the 30 years between 1975 and 2004. In order to analyse the data efficiently, the xt suite of commands within Stata was used.

Table 4.3 Regression results for post-conflict country-years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Government success score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>-2.31e-07 (2.90e-05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>-0.530* (0.276)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-presidential</td>
<td>-0.248 (0.387)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>Dropped (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral system, lower house</td>
<td>-0.470** (0.226)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean district magnitude, lower house</td>
<td>0.00524 (0.00647)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federalism</td>
<td>0.0860 (0.193)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No UN mission</td>
<td>-0.318 (0.539)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observer mission</td>
<td>-0.443 (0.576)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional peacekeeping mission</td>
<td>Dropped (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace enforcement</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multidimensional PKO</td>
<td>0.138 (0.643)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-UN peacekeeping force</td>
<td>-0.307</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The results of the regression of the government success score discussed above against the independent variables and the control variables provided a number of useful insights. This regression analysis was performed on the subset of countries in the post-conflict period, defined here as the first ten years after conflict ended. The results are first discussed in relation to their relevance to the four hypotheses set out in Chapter 3 above.

**Hypothesis 1: Post-conflict governments are likely to perform better in countries with higher GDP per capita**

This hypothesis was not proven by the results above: GDP per capita was not only not statistically significant, but the size of the coefficient in this regression was extremely small (although this might be expected given that the values for GDP per capita ranged
from approximately $460 to $64,000). This echoes the results shown in Figures 4.5 and 4.6 above, which show that GDP per capita and performance under this measure of government success are not strongly related. There are several possible reasons for this result.

Firstly, countries in conflict and recovering from civil conflict are highly heterogeneous. Despite the strong links between poverty and conflict found by previous research and discussed in Chapter 2, and the frequency with which poor nations engage in conflict, some wealthy countries also became involved in internal conflict during the period studied. Countries such as the United Kingdom and Australia participated in internationalised internal conflicts as members of multinational coalitions in Iraq and Afghanistan; and NATO countries were involved in the internal conflict in Bosnia. The regression was run again with the outlier case of Australia excluded, which did not alter the result in relation to GDP: this variable remained insignificant. The regression was also run again several times excluding high-income countries, and GDP remained insignificant until only countries with GDP per capita of less than $1000 were analysed, in which case GDP was statistically significant to government performance after conflict. Regrettably, this result was drawn from only 13 observations, so it should be treated as indicative rather than conclusive.

A second possible explanation for the lack of a link between GDP and success scores here is that the success scores of all countries have risen slightly over the period studied, regardless of national income, making differences in success scores between wealthy and less wealthy countries less significant – for example, increasingly universal norms regarding the protection of human rights, advances in technology and increasing pressure for countries to adopt norms of democratic governance mean that most countries are moving upward on the ‘success’ scale as measured here. Figure 4.7 shows the mean government success score over time for post-conflict countries, and illustrates that that mean score does rise slightly over the course of the period surveyed.
A third possible explanation is that the governments of low-income countries are not significantly less successful after conflict than those of middle and high-income countries, when success is measured on the criteria used here. Given the strong associations between conflict and poverty found in the previous published literature and discussed earlier in Chapter 2, the lack of an association (for all except the poorest countries) between government performance and GDP per capita (both in basic correlation and within multivariate regression) in this study seems anomalous and worthy of further investigation.

_Hypothesis 2: Countries with majoritarian political institutions are likely to have more successful post-conflict governments;_

This hypothesis suggested that governments comprised of majoritarian political institutions were more likely be effective than those with consensus-based institutions, as majoritarian institutions require less agreement between parties (who may be recent opponents in combat), often produce quicker results after elections, allow governments to commit to and carry out a legislative program, and are less vulnerable to deadlocks if veto players cannot agree. Their shortcomings are that each vote cast by a voter is less likely to be an effective vote than in a proportional system; usually only one party is represented in cabinet; and these systems can promote a ‘winner takes all’ style of government which may exclude non-winning groups from decision-making processes.
Electoral systems, systems of executive authority, district magnitude and federalism were examined for their impact on the performance of post-conflict governments. Two institutional types were found to be significant: Presidential executive systems and proportional representation electoral systems, and this hypothesis was disproved by the results. Having a presidential executive system was statistically significant at the p<0.05 level. Presidential systems were associated with a 0.53 lower performance on the government success score variable. As discussed earlier in Chapter 3, presidential systems are characterised by Lijphart as majoritarian rather than consensus-based because they involve executive dominance, rather than a balanced relationship between executive and legislature (1999:116). Presidential systems have been associated in previous research with shorter regime duration (Cheibub, 2002), vulnerability to military coups (Stepan and Skach, 1993: 12), and divisive politics (Chesterman, 2004). These characteristics may prove particularly detrimental to governments after conflict. In situations in which governments are already vulnerable to internal instability, where they are operating in a climate of ‘extreme electoral fluidity’ (Hagopian, 2007), a system in which the executive and the legislature may be at odds with each other may introduce an added element of divisiveness and potential instability.

Another possible reason for this result relates back to the argument discussed earlier in chapter 3: that Presidential systems often score poorly on measures of democracy because they have been adopted in a number of developing democracies over the past several decades, and the typical problems of developing democracies are attributed to the regime type rather than to the country’s stage of political development (Power and Gasiorowski, 2007; and earlier, Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997). This is a plausible explanation, and could well account for the result shown here: Presidential systems have been adopted by many new democracies in Latin America and in East Asia (see, for example, Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997; and Fukuyama et al, 2005).

The other finding in relation to institutions, post-conflict countries, and government performance was that proportional representation electoral systems, which often produce coalition governments, were positively associated with government performance after conflict. The ‘housesys’ variable, a binary variable which expresses whether a country’s electoral system for a given year is proportional or majoritarian
(0 = proportional, 1 = majoritarian) carried a negative coefficient of -0.47, and was significant at the p < 0.05 level, from which it is concluded that having a majoritarian system of voting carries a penalty in terms of government performance after conflict. While the potential drawbacks of consensus-based systems after conflict will be discussed in greater detail in the case studies which follow this chapter, this quantitative analysis shows that they can generate positive outcomes. The finding that electoral systems are statistically significant in post-conflict situations relates well to the observation that electoral matters are significant in post-conflict settings. It has been observed that post-conflict elections ‘...often bring conflicting groups back to the positions which created conflict in the first place’ (Blanc, Hylland and Vollen, 2006:iii), and there were a number of recurrences of conflict following elections during the 1990s, such as occurred in Angola and Sierra Leone. In some post-conflict situations, reaching a lasting peace means that groups which had turned to violence because they felt they had no chance of obtaining influence through legal means are given a real chance of gaining influence through a non-violent channel – in this case, elections (Blanc et al, 2006:68), and the electoral systems which tend to enable the most groups to participate in government tend to be proportional ones.

Overall, this hypothesis was not proven – majoritarian political institutions did not lead to improved government performance after conflict. Presidential systems were negatively associated with such performance, while proportional electoral systems were positively associated with government performance. This could mean that representing a diversity of views within government is more important than the greater likelihood of having a clear majority in Parliament, such as that often offered by first-past-the-post electoral systems; that enacting legislation in an assembly comprising representatives of diverse parties produces better legislative outcomes; or that countries which have proportional systems in the post-conflict period are more likely to perform well on other measures of good performance used here, including the rule of law, provision of services by government, and levels of democracy. Finer-grained research into the mechanisms of government and the operation of post-conflict democracies may help to provide more satisfactory explanations for these findings. The case studies in the succeeding chapters also examine the question of the operation of political institutions during the post-conflict period.
Hypothesis 3: Post-conflict governments in countries in which peace operations have been carried out are likely to perform better than those without peace operations; and those undertaken later in the period surveyed are likely to have a more positive impact on government performance.

This hypothesis suggested that peace operations should have a positive impact on government performance after conflict, and that more recent peace operations were likely to have a greater positive effect. Peace operations and their consequences have been extensively researched over the past two decades to attempt to determine the impact of these operations and to improve practice in this area. As the number of peace operations has increased, the role they play has expanded from a purely military one to involve peacebuilding and statebuilding functions, and the rationales for external intervention have expanded, careful examination of the role played and results generated by these operations has become necessary. Previous research has shown mixed results of peace operations: Doyle and Sambanis (2006) found that multidimensional peace operations were associated with peacebuilding success; but Call and Cook (2003) found that many countries which had been the subject of institution-building by UN operations had reverted to authoritarianism a few years later.

The results of this analysis did not find that peace operations of any type were statistically significant determinants of government performance. While the results showed that multidimensional peace operations carried a positive coefficient, and non-UN peacekeeping forces carried a negative coefficient, none of the peace operations, nor the absence of a peace operation were statistically significant, and this hypothesis is not proven.

These coefficients are consistent with some earlier research in this area, in particular Doyle and Sambanis (2006) and Fortna (2004b, 2004c and 2008), who found that multidimensional peace operations were associated with positive peacebuilding outcomes and longer durations of peace. In many ways, however, this result is counter-intuitive: given the role played by the United Nations in its expanded version of peacebuilding, which often involves the reconstruction of legal, political and bureaucratic institutions, it might have been expected that post-conflict governments which have received such assistance might perform better. The fact that they do not
perform significantly better might be due to the fact that the UN tends to intervene into the most difficult conflicts (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006; Howard, 2008; Fortna 2004b, 2004c, and 2008), so those governments which receive the most assistance from the UN were probably those which were in the most dire circumstances prior to that assistance.

Although not statistically significant, non-UN peacekeeping is negatively associated with government performance after conflict. The numbers of UN and non-UN peacekeeping forces since 1945 are broadly comparable (Heldt, 2008: 10), although the non-UN forces may be more variable in their composition and performance in peacekeeping.

The second part of this hypothesis suggests that peace operations later in the period surveyed were more likely to contribute to better post-conflict governance than those occurring earlier in the period. This was hypothesised to be because the changes in peacekeeping during this time have improved the outcomes of peacekeeping operations, which should improve the quality of government in the post-conflict period. The time control variable was added to the dataset to measure this proposition and it was statistically significant at the \( p < 0.01 \) level, although with a coefficient of only 0.063. Given that the peacekeeping variables were all insignificant, however, it seems unlikely that the increased performance of governments over the period surveyed was due to improvements in peacekeeping practices. It seems more likely that the rise in average success scores, as shown above in Figure 4.7, was responsible for this. As discussed above, it is suggested that the increased influence of norms of democracy and human rights protection, improvements in technology, and economic growth during this period have played a part in increasing average government success scores over this time. This result might also reflect the fact that this regression measures only post-conflict countries, and that the performance of these countries is likely to improve the further away in time each country is from the conflict.
Hypothesis 4: Governments which are supported by aid in the post-conflict period will perform better than those which are not given such support, and more aid in the immediate post-conflict period is likely to lead to better performance.

This hypothesis suggested that the provision of development aid to post-conflict countries was likely to result in improvements in government performance, and that greater amounts of aid were likely to result in better performance. This hypothesis was not borne out by the quantitative results shown above in Table 4.3. These results showed that aid was not statistically significant, although its effect on government performance was positive (albeit extremely small, which was to be expected given the number of aid dollars per capita being measured against a success score on a 1-10 scale).

This finding is at odds with Collier and Hoeffler’s findings concerning the importance of post-conflict aid both to economic growth (2004) and to reducing conflict recurrence (2002). It is, however, consistent with Breuning and Ishiyama’s 2007 finding that internal political factors (such as ethnic fractionalisation and levels of democracy) better predicted political stability after conflict than external factors such as the timing and provision of development aid, and Ishiyama, Sanders and Breuning’s later research suggesting that aid did not affect the emergence of democracy after conflict (2008).

The lack of significance of the amount of overseas development aid per capita could be attributed to a number of factors. Aid, particularly in the short term, might not immediately affect the measures of success used here: the development or improvement of democratic institutions, growth of respect for the rule of law, and the ability to govern independently may be factors which take time to develop and which are not susceptible to immediate influence by overseas aid. It might be expected that national income and the provision of government services would be affected in the shorter term by the amount of aid provided, but there were only weak correlations between these variables and aid.

It should also be remembered that selection effects are at work, and that countries which are aid recipients are those which are judged by international organisations or by other countries to be in need of assistance. It may be that countries which are aid
recipients are already scoring lower on the government success measure used here, and that the aid received does not assist them in a way which significantly alters their performance on this criterion.

Control variables

Several of the control variables tested here for their impact on post-conflict government success proved to be significant. The time control has been discussed above, but both the ratio of primary commodity exports to GDP and the degree of ethnic fractionalisation were found to be significant to government performance.

The ratio of primary commodity exports to national income was both highly significant (at the p<0.01 level) and positive, when tested for all cases. This result was surprising because it differs from other widely cited research findings concerning this variable. Doyle and Sambanis (2001) found that abundant natural resources were negatively correlated with peacebuilding success; Collier and Hoeffler linked resource abundance with greater likelihood of civil conflict and longer conflict duration (2004 and 1998); and Sachs and Warner (1997) and Auty (2001) found that countries with abundant natural resources had lower GDP growth than resource-poor countries.

When this regression was run again for countries with lower incomes, however, the results were more closely aligned to this previous research. The resources variable was shown to be positively associated with government success when all post-conflict countries were included, and when upper- and middle-income countries were included, but to have a negative coefficient for countries with GDP per capita of lower than $1000. This data is based on only a few cases, as the data on many countries with lower incomes contain more missing variables, but this avenue of research might be followed up in greater detail to explore the reasons for this finding. It may be that the resource abundance in low-income countries which may lack the institutional framework to ensure that the benefits are spread throughout society may be associated with poorer governance overall.

Ethnic fractionalisation was also statistically significant in this analysis (p<0.05), and carried a coefficient of -1.326. Previous research on ethnic diversity and conflict has
produced mixed results, with several theorists predicting higher levels of conflict in ethnically diverse societies (see, for example, Horowitz, 1985, and Huntington, 1996), but only some empiricists finding quantitative correlations to prove these theories (Sambanis, 2001; Hegre and Sambanis, 2006), and other researchers finding no correlation (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). This finding is interesting because it indicates that governments perform less well after conflict in countries in which there are greater ethnic divisions, although having had a conflict divided along ethnic lines was not significant. It may be that establishing good government after internal conflict is more difficult in countries with multiple internal factions, as managing different political viewpoints and balancing the rights of multiple groups may add an additional level of complexity for governments to contend with.
Table 4.4: Log-likelihood tests for significance of independent variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>succscoreb</td>
<td>0.000434**</td>
<td>lnsig2u</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>(0.000221)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>-2.676**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.336)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-presidential</td>
<td>-0.751</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.894)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>Dropped (0)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral system, lower house</td>
<td>-1.590</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.331)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean district magnitude, lower house</td>
<td>0.0457</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0659)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federalism</td>
<td>-1.004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.790)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No UN mission</td>
<td>-16.67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(7141)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observer mission</td>
<td>-18.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(7141)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional peacekeeping mission</td>
<td>Dropped (0)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace enforcement</td>
<td>-1.822</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(17880)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multidimensional PKO</td>
<td>-16.82</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(7141)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-UN peacekeeping force</td>
<td>17.22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6760)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas development aid as a percentage of GDP</td>
<td>0.000323</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000409)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio of primary commodity exports to GDP</td>
<td>5.041</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(7.127)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time control</td>
<td>0.115*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0623)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic fractionalisation</td>
<td>-1.334</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.736)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of peacekeeping mission</td>
<td>-6.393</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.077)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous conflicts since 1945</td>
<td>-0.0357</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.138)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic conflict</td>
<td>-0.283</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.559)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Log likelihood ratios

The dependent variable was recategorised as a binary variable and a logit regression was performed to assess the contribution of each independent variable to the initial regression results discussed above. Because the independent variables were not themselves reclassified as binary, their coefficients in this regression should not be taken as conclusive, but their statistical significance is important. Here, GDP per capita was found to be statistically significant in relation to government success after conflict, as were Presidential systems, but electoral systems were not significant. The time control was again significant, but resources were not, and nor was ethnic fractionalisation. The overall chi-squared test assesses the null hypothesis that all coefficients in the model, except the constant, equal zero, and here this equals 0.1322, meaning that for this regression, it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis. The results here were slightly different to the earlier regression in terms of which variables were statistically significant: for this regression, GDP per capita was significant, Presidential systems were again significant and positive, and the time control was also significant and positive. None of the other variables were significant.

R-squared

The r-squared statistic is the proportion of variance on dependent variable which is explained by independent variables. The r-squared statistic shows that the independent variables account for 54% of the variance between units, 15% of the variance within units, and 32% of the variance overall. It has been suggested that r-squared statistics tend to be lower when panel datasets are being analysed as the explanatory effects of the intercepts are not included for this type of regression.
Postestimation tests

Postestimation tests were performed on the data to establish whether autocorrelation was present. The Wooldridge test for autocorrelation showed that the null hypothesis – that there was no first-order autocorrelation – could not be rejected. The regression was repeated again with robust standard errors, which reduced the standard errors, but did not alter the variables which were significant or their coefficients. Fixed effects could not be used here because of the time-invariant characteristics of many variables in the dataset, but Stata performed a generalized least squares regression with random effects by default in the results shown in Table 4.3.

Summated ratings scales

When constructing a summated rating scale such as this one, it is usual to use Cronbach’s alpha test, which measures the common variance shared by scale components, to examine the contribution which each variable makes to the scale and the internal consistency of the scale itself. When the test was performed on this scale, Cronbach’s alpha coefficient was 0.34. While measures of less than 0.7 are usually not considered to be sufficiently high in the social sciences (Nunally, 1978, cited in Yu, 2001), however the alpha coefficient may be artificially low in this case. It is possible that the score measures several latent dimensions of governance, rather than one, which reduces the alpha score, but does not invalidate it (Yu, 2001:1). Yu gives the example that a student’s scores on the Graduate Record Exam for verbal, quantitative and analytical portions of the test may not be correlated because they evaluate different kinds of knowledge. Conversely, a high alpha score may be obtained, even in circumstances where there is low intercorrelation between items (Cortina, 1993:103). Cronbach’s alpha assumes one-dimensionality, but most research questions have multiple dimensions (Vehkalahti et al, 2006:16), and the scale above measures several different, although overlapping aspects of governance. The alternative to a summated rating scale is usually to analyse the data using the components of the scale individually. Gliem and Gliem note that the reliability of these ‘single items’ is usually very low (2003:84). Given the question concerning the result of the Cronbach’s alpha test in this situation, and the uncertain reliability of alternate measures, it was decided to proceed using the summated rating for the dependent variable as planned, and to
interpret the results obtained cautiously, on the basis that the dependent variable may represent more than one dimension of governance.

Conclusion

The results of the regression analysis shown above in Table 4.3 do not purport to provide a conclusive picture of the many factors which drive post-conflict government performance. They do, however, test the hypotheses drawn from previous research into conflict and post-conflict situations, and provide data which may form the data for the basis of further research into this topic. The hypotheses were not proven: based on this method of measuring government success, it seems that national income, aid and the presence and type of peacekeeping mission were not the most significant factors influencing success for post-conflict countries, and that consensus-based institutions such as proportional representation electoral systems and non-Presidental systems of executive authority performed better in the post-conflict period than majoritarian institutions such as Presidential systems and first-past-the-post electoral systems.

Several of the control variables were significant: the ratio of primary commodity exports to GDP was positively associated with government performance, although not at lower levels of national income; ethnic fractionalisation was negatively associated with performance, which confirmed some earlier research findings in this area, although was not related to ethnic conflict, which was insignificant; and the time control. The statistical significance of the time control could partly be explained by the overall rise in government success scores over the thirty years of the period surveyed, but this variable’s importance does not confirm the original hypothesis that improvements in peacekeeping practice have led to better performance of governments after conflict, as all types of peace operations were found to be insignificant.

One possibility which was considered in assessing the results of this analysis was whether the weighting of the individual factors making up the success score could be improved. Several different weightings were trialled, including one in which independent government was given only one point, and level of democracy was given two points of the ten in the scale, but when the success score variable was recalculated
using these weightings and regressed against the independent and control variables, the same variables were found to be significant, although their coefficients varied slightly.

The mechanisms by which electoral and executive systems operate and influence the overall performance of government have been extensively studied in Western countries, particularly in Western Europe; and have also been considered fairly extensively in the Latin American context. The particular ways in which these systems operate in post-conflict environments remain to be thoroughly investigated, and these issues will be considered in some detail in Chapters 6, 7 and 8 via the case studies.

The difficulty of making conclusive findings in this area may stem from several factors: the difficulty of gathering and representing data in these environments, the heterogeneity of post-conflict countries, and the complexity of political and social environments after conflict, which is not easily captured by statistical data. Collecting reliable data from post-conflict countries is extremely difficult. Many variables are missing, even in authoritative datasets, for conflict and often for post-conflict years. This means that many variables were dropped from the regression results, and of 826 post-conflict years, the government success score could only be calculated for 703 country-years. Of those years, only 204 cases had a full complement of independent variables and were considered by the statistical software when calculating the regression results above. In the analysis above, data were inferred where this could reasonably be undertaken, but this was not possible in many cases. The heterogeneity of post-conflict countries may be another reason for the difficulty in making convincing statistical findings in this area. Countries recovering from internal conflict may have moderate incomes and have suffered relatively little damage from the conflict; or they may have low incomes and little infrastructure after lengthy internal conflicts. They may have functioning governments which have successfully dealt with rebel forces; or they may be emerging from periods of occupation and must establish entirely new governments. Attempting to capture these differences in a meaningful way using reliable statistical data is a challenging task.

The following chapter introduces the case study portion of this thesis, and provides an outline of the method used to select case studies as well as the characteristics of the case study countries. The implications of the quantitative findings outlined in the above chapter for the case study analysis are also considered.
CHAPTER 5: INTRODUCTION TO CASE STUDIES

"...the post-Westphalian view holds that states have responsibilities to their citizens, instability in one state is likely to destabilize others, and individual states are accountable to international society. International society, in turn, has a responsibility to assist and – if needs be – force states to fulfil their responsibilities”

Bellamy and Williams, 2011

The next section of this thesis deals with several case studies of countries and their governments after conflict. Three case study countries have been selected here for detailed examination: Timor-Leste, Namibia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. These countries were selected for variation upon the dependent variable, government success. The government of Timor-Leste after the 1999 conflict is considered to be a qualified success; the government of Namibia since independence from South Africa has been successful; and the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina has not yet fully met the challenges of ruling the tripartite state since its inception.

There are also a number of other characteristics which differentiate the case study countries: they come from different regions of the world: Europe, South-East Asia, and Africa; they have had different colonial pasts: Timor-Leste was colonized by the Portuguese, then occupied by the Indonesians; Namibia was colonized by the Germans, and then the South Africans; Bosnia was not colonized at all. Both Bosnia and Namibia are poor countries by global standards, although Namibia is one of the less poor countries in sub-Saharan Africa; and Bosnia, while not wealthy by European standards, is wealthier than either of the other countries. Timor-Leste is one of the poorest countries in the world and was recently the poorest country in South-East Asia.

The conflicts which led to the study of these countries differ in some respects: both Timor-Leste and Namibia successfully fought wars of independence; while the Bosnian conflict was a more typical civil war, in which several parties within a state (a former sub-state entity) fought for control of territory. The terminations of the three conflicts also differed, with two peace agreements and an international intervention bringing the conflicts to a close. The war proper in Bosnia was concluded by the Dayton
Agreements, signed in 1995, which established the form of the new government in that
country and continue to set the framework for its operation almost twenty years later.
The conflict in Namibia similarly concluded with a peace agreement, signed by South
Africa, SWAPO and Angola, which outlined the steps the parties would take toward
peace. In Timor-Leste, the conflict was stopped by the intervention of an international
coalition, which was later replaced by the most ambitious UN peacekeeping mission
which had been undertaken to date.

The quantitative results discussed above in Chapter 4 indicated that Presidential
systems tended to be negatively correlated with government success after conflict (as
here defined). All three of the case study countries have Presidential systems, although
Namibia had a semi-Presidential system for the first four years of independence, which
was later changed to a Presidential system. Bosnia’s Presidential system is unique, in
that three Presidents (one from each of the three major ethnic groups in Bosnia) are
elected democratically, and the position is rotated between the three during their term.
Timor-Leste’s system involves both a Prime Minister who is the leader of the most
numerous party in the legislature, and a directly elected President. As will be seen in
subsequent chapters, the same political systems can operate quite differently in each
context, as local factors including the influence of resistance leaders, the entrenchment
of powerbrokers and ethnic group loyalties exert their influence on post-conflict
politics.

Proportional representation systems were also positively correlated with government
performance in post-conflict countries, and all three case study countries utilise these
electoral systems: Timor-Leste’s Parliament is elected through a closed-list proportional
representation system; Bosnia’s Parliament is elected through an open-list proportional
representation system; Namibia’s Parliament is elected via a closed-list proportional
representation system. As will be discussed further below, these very similar systems
have led to very different political outcomes in each context: in Namibia, the ruling
party, which arose from the resistance struggle, has become entrenched; in Bosnia,
ethnic interests have remained paramount and at times the entire political system has
ground to a halt as these have taken precedence over other factors; and in Timor-Leste,
the former resistance party was initially elected by a large majority, but the situation has
changed over subsequent elections and smaller parties now play a more important role in government there.

This thesis set out to explore the most effective means of assisting post-conflict governments, on the basis that these governments were particularly vulnerable to political, economic and security challenges in the post-conflict period. Each case study country considered in the succeeding chapters has faced its own particular difficulties following conflict. The Namibian conflict almost re-started soon after the deployment of the UN Mission in Namibia, when a misunderstanding about the terms of the peace agreement nearly led to a clash between PLAN forces returning from Angola and the retreating South African forces. Timor-Leste had to contend not only with widespread destruction of private property and public infrastructure, but also with an extensive refugee problem following the 1999 post-election violence, and the social disruption caused by many Timorese people participating in violence against their neighbours and family members. The brutal inter-ethnic violence which characterised the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the terms of the Dayton Agreement which aimed to ensure the representation of all ethnic groups in government have resulted in a polity which seems permanently divided along ethnic lines. The consensus which is required for the consociational political institutions in Bosnia to operate has not been present recently, resulting in deadlocks in the Parliament, some lasting many months.

Each country has also been assisted in different ways by external forces. As noted above, Timor-Leste was initially assisted by a multinational force (INTERFET) which was later replaced by a multidimensional United Nations peacekeeping force. In the absence of any functioning government in Timor-Leste, the United Nations assumed all legislative, executive and judicial authority within the country, and set about establishing these institutions for the Timorese. The conflict in Bosnia was initially the subject of intervention by a UN force, later by a NATO operation, and finally by an ad hoc international political mission which is still in place there some seventeen years after the Dayton Agreement was signed. International pressure as well as domestic political and military action were all important to obtaining independence for Namibia, and the United Nations peacekeeping operation (UNTAG) which assisted with the holding of the first elections and the drafting of Namibia’s first constitution was crucial to the smooth transition to domestic government in Namibia. Although the quantitative
results detailed in Chapter 4 indicated that peacekeeping missions were not statistically significant in the performance of post-conflict governments, it is difficult to imagine what would have happened in the three case study countries had international intervention not been available in each case.

The case studies in the next three chapters will examine the history of each country, its progression toward conflict and the course of the conflict, and the challenges facing each country as it emerged from conflict. As suggested earlier in this Chapter, each country represents a different level of successful governance after conflict and it is hoped that a detailed examination of how each has been governed since conflict may yield some lessons which may be of assistance in peace operations elsewhere.
"Those of us who were in East Timor, despite the constant warnings and signals of what was about to happen, had been caught by surprise by the extent of the killing, depopulation and destruction that had been carried out around us. In the end, the United Nations, foreign governments and the media either ignored the obvious warning signals, or figured the violence was a fair price for the Timorese to pay for their independence."

John Martinkus, *Dirty Little War*

After 400 years of Portuguese occupation, and 25 years of Indonesian occupation, Timor-Leste declared its independence in 2002 and has been governed by a democratically elected government since that time. When independence was declared, there did not appear to be any internal divisions between Timorese; there were no rival factions to be managed by complex power-sharing institutions, and no internal borders to be policed. The legislature was controlled by a large majority of FRETILIN, the political wing of the old resistance army, and the United Nations operation which had set the framework for self-government had involved thousands of peacekeepers, police and political staff in the United Nations' most complex nation-building effort to date. It appeared to be a recipe for stable government and future prosperity. The post-independence history of Timor-Leste has been an object lesson in how such advantages, while important, are not sufficient to ensure stability and prosperity.

Timor-Leste makes an interesting case study in relation to the effectiveness of institution-building measures after conflict because of its small size, the nature of its post-conflict situation, and the amount of international support it received as it became independent. The events of the past ten years in Timor-Leste provide lessons about both the uses and the limitations of external assistance in establishing new nations after conflict. This country was commonly referred to in the English language as East Timor, but on independence in 2002, adopted the name Timor-Leste. It will be referred to as Timor-Leste throughout this chapter, except where quoting from documents.
Background

Timor-Leste is located at the Eastern end of the Indonesian archipelago. It was deemed the poorest country in Asia (ADB, 2009: xxxiii), and in terms of non-oil income the poorest country in the world (National Democratic Institute, 2007). It ranked 147 (of 177 countries) on the 2011 UN Human Development Index, having improved its rank by three positions since 2007/8. The population of Timor-Leste was estimated at 1,175,880, in 2011, and its average annual income per capita for that year was $896 (measured in current US dollars: World Bank World Development Indicators 2012). Life expectancy at birth is approximately 62 years (World Development Indicators, 2012), and the adult literacy rate is estimated at 50% (UNDP, Human Development Report 2012). Timor-Leste has some natural resources: it has arable land, crops of coffee, rice and corn, and reserves of oil and natural gas off its southern coast. Approximately 22 per cent of the population suffer from hunger, and in 2009, Timor-Leste had the highest proportion of underweight children under 5 years old in the Asia-Pacific region (ADB, 2009:87).

History

Peoples

The land now known as Timor-Leste has been occupied by a number of different tribes. It was originally home to a people known as Atoni Pah Mero (people of the dry land), who now mainly live in West Timor. Later, Timor was settled by Indo-Malays in two migrations in approximately 3000BCE and 200BCE (Nicol, 2002: 22-23). This diversity of origins has led to a diversity of languages and subcultures within Timor, and as many as 15 different languages and many more dialects are now spoken. Tetum, the most commonly used indigenous language, is spoken by approximately half of the population in Timor-Leste, and understood by a further 25% of the population (Nicol, 2002: 23-24), while Mambai, Kemac and Makassae are spoken by more than 300,000 people (Dunn, 2003:3). The ethnic and linguistic diversity of Timor-Leste has proved significant in its post-colonial phase as the divisions between different groups have become a source of conflict.
Portuguese colonisation

A ship from the Portuguese explorer Ferdinand Magellan’s fleet landed on the northern coast of Timor in 1522 (Kingsbury, 2009:28). In 1566, Dominican friars built a fortress on the nearby island of Solor. Their influence on Timor-Leste was at first confined to trade in sandalwood and religion, and a Portuguese governor of Timor was not officially nominated until 1701. Many Timorese kingdoms fought against Portuguese rule and only in the mid-19th century were military and administrative posts established in the inland districts. For much of this time Dili, now the seat of colonial administration was under siege from powerful tribal chieftains. As the sandalwood trade declined in importance, and Portugal grew weaker as a colonial power, Timor grew less important and Dunn notes that ‘life in the colony lapsed into apathy, corruption and squalor’ (2003:15). Lord Wallace noted in the mid-19th century that

“The Portuguese government in Timor is a most miserable one. Nobody seems to care the least about the improvement of the country...after three hundred years of occupation there has not been a mile of road made beyond the town, and there is not a solitary European resident anywhere in the interior. All the government officials oppress and rob the natives as much as they can and yet there is no care taken to render the town defensible should the Timorese attempt to attack it. Timor will, for many years to come remain in its present state of chronic insurrection and mis-government”

Wallace, 1869, cited in Dunn, 2003: 16

The lack of sealed roads beyond Dili persisted until the 1940s, and stifled trade opportunities between different parts of the nation, as well as isolating different language groups within Timor-Leste, which had little contact with each other (Kingsbury, 2009:38).

The Portuguese claim to Timor-Leste was not formalised until the early 20th century, by a decision in the international court in The Hague in 1913. This followed a rebellion against the Portuguese by Timorese chiefs in 1912 which was subdued using military force, at a cost of some 3,000 lives (Taylor, 1999, 11, cited in Wise, 2006: 20). During the Second World War the island was invaded by both the Allied forces and the Japanese army, and it is estimated that 40,000 to 60,000 Timorese died before the conflict ended. (Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in Timor-Leste (CAVR), 2006: Chapter 3, p10). After the war ended, Portuguese colonial rule of Timor-Leste resumed, although as the 20th century continued, Portugal was to come under increasing pressure to grant its colony independence. While the period of
Portuguese rule is sometimes spoken about nostalgically by Timorese people, it was not an entirely idyllic time, and compared to other colonising nations, the Portuguese undertook little institution-building. Kingsbury suggests that Portugal’s failure to invest in Timor-Leste, both in terms of physical and human capital plays a large part in Timor’s lack of development today (2009:37).

Portuguese withdrawal and brief independence

In 1974, a coup by the armed forces in Lisbon (known as the Carnation Revolution) ousted the Caetano regime, and the rapid decolonisation of Portugal’s colonial possessions began. The governor of Timor-Leste issued a proclamation allowing the establishment of political associations in May 1974, and three parties were established (Wise, 2006:24). Local elections were conducted in February and March 1975, with both Fretilin and the Timorese Democratic Union (UDT) winning the support of 90 per cent of the population. In August 1975, members of the UDT who favoured Timor’s integration with Indonesia staged a coup against Fretilin, and on 20 August, Fretilin counter-attacked. After three weeks of fighting, an estimated 2,000 Timorese had died and the Portuguese rulers of Timor-Leste fled first to Ata’uro Island, then to Darwin, in northern Australia before returning to Portugal (Wise, 2006:25). The Timorese enjoyed a brief period of independence, in which the Fretilin party formed an administration and began making policy, and on November 28 1975, Fretilin declared Timor-Leste to be an independent state. Indonesia, however, had decided to take over Timor-Leste, and Indonesian military forces had been making armed incursions into border towns for some months in 1975. On November 30, members of disaffected (and unsuccessful) Timorese political parties signed a declaration in Balibo, near the border with West Timor, which claimed Timor-Leste was integrated with Indonesia. Kingsbury suggests that this declaration gave Indonesia the excuse it needed for its next actions (2009:50).

Indonesian takeover

On December 7, 1975, the Indonesian army invaded Timor-Leste. The Indonesian government claimed to be acting to prevent civil war in Timor-Leste, and to prevent the ‘communist’ Fretilin party from gaining control of the country (State Department, 2009). It has been suggested that the Indonesian government feared that a leftist state on its eastern frontier might be vulnerable to influence from Beijing (Barwise and White, 2002:243). Full-scale attacks on Timor-Leste by the Indonesians lasted four
years and killed as many as 200,000 people, approximately one-quarter of the then population of Timor-Leste (Wise, 2006:26-27). The Indonesians used crop destruction, torture and aerial bombing to deter the Timorese from seeking independence (Barwise and White, 2002: 243-44). Their domination of Timor-Leste began as a military occupation, but in later years it began to take the form of a ‘hearts and minds’-type attempt to convert the Timorese to the broader Indonesian ideology (Wise, 2006:27-28). The Indonesians did undertake some infrastructure projects such as roads and bridges (Kingsbury, 2009:50).

Resistance movement

The resistance movement against Indonesian occupation grew out of the Fretilin political party. The FALINTIL (Forcas Armadas de Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste) resistance forces led the armed struggle against the Indonesian occupiers. Initially, the resistance was centrally controlled, but later, as its numbers became depleted, it fragmented into small guerrilla units, took shelter in the mountains, and was supported in secret by Timorese people. (Wise, 2006:29). The resistance put up a show of force against the Indonesians, but without external support to re-arm and refuel the resistance, arms and ammunition were quickly depleted, and sickness, hunger and successful attacks by the Indonesians reduced their numbers and effectiveness (Kingsbury, 2009:51). Between 1977 and 1979, the occupying Indonesian forces determined upon completely destroying the Timorese resistance.

Santa Cruz massacre

In 1991, a funeral procession for a young man killed by Indonesian intelligence officers turned into a protest, with approximately 2000 protestors joining the funeral procession to the Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili. Indonesian soldiers opened fire on the crowd, killing 271 people, arresting 80 more (who were shot several days later), and injuring others, who were murdered in a military hospital shortly afterward (Amnesty International 1994, 50-52, cited in Kingsbury, 2009:61). Footage of the incident was smuggled out of Timor-Leste and broadcast around the world, strengthening the international solidarity campaign and may have served as a ‘turning point’ in the question of Timor’s independent status. After this, the Portuguese government was increasingly vocal on Timor’s behalf, and the question of whether Timor’s integration with Indonesia was necessary became more commonly discussed (Kingsbury, 2009:63).
Referendum

In 1998, President Suharto, who had been president of Indonesia for 31 years, was forced to resign after public protests, food shortages and rapid inflation left him out of control of the Indonesian economy. He was replaced by President B J Habibie, who after nearly a year in office surprised many by offering to hold a referendum on independence in Timor-Leste.

In June, the UN Secretary-General’s representative, Ian Martin, arrived in Dili, and the UN Security Council established UNAMET, the UN Mission in Timor-Leste, which had the job of organising and holding the elections: registering and educating voters, and managing the polling process. On 30 August 1999, 98% of registered voters in Timor-Leste voted by a majority of 78% for independence from Indonesia (Wise, 2006:33). Although the success of the referendum was cause for excitement, since the announcement of the referendum, the Indonesian military had been arming local militia groups in the towns and villages to harass and intimidate Timorese people before the vote. A massacre took place at Liquica in May 1999, where 200 people were killed (Kingsbury, 2009:69).

Kilcullen suggests that militia members (many of whom were very young Timorese men) may have joined the militias due to peer pressure or intimidation, or may have been enticed by access to money, drugs and the relative power of their position in local society. (2009:201). In the weeks leading up to the poll, violence against people and property escalated, with houses being burned, activists murdered, and militia members rioting, destroying and killing in Dili (Kingsbury, 2009:72).

Post-referendum violence

After the vote, the militias pursued a scorched-earth policy in Timor-Leste. Over the next two weeks they killed at least 1400 people, razed more than 70% of Timor’s buildings, and left major towns without water, electricity or telephones. The Indonesian army in some cases participated in the violence and destruction, and in others failed to take any steps to prevent it occurring (Kingsbury, 2009:73). The precise role of the Indonesian military in these events remains somewhat unclear: there appears to be little firm evidence as to whether they acted under orders to orchestrate or participate in this destruction, whether some soldiers joined in with it of their own accord, or whether they
were simply responsible for arming and training the militias which carried out these acts.

On 10 September, the UN mission decided to evacuate its staff, as they were trapped inside a compound, and food and water supplies were running out. Unfortunately they left behind their Timorese staff, who were vulnerable to attack by militias bent upon revenge (Wise, 2006:34). The decision to leave the Timorese staff behind was controversial and many UN staff and foreign journalists opposed the UN’s decision to leave Timor-Leste at this juncture, particularly since they had encouraged the Timorese to vote on the basis that they would protect them following the ballot. Martinkus notes that

"...Indeed, that was the main message of the entire [UN] mission in East Timor – the UN had told the East Timorese to vote according to their heart, despite the constant violence. Posters printed in three languages – Portuguese, Tetun, and Indonesian – saying the UN would not abandon the East Timorese after the ballot still hung all around the compound. The East Timorese had believed the international community would not abandon them, and responded with 98 per cent of all those eligible voting in the ballot and 78 per cent of those voting for independence. Now, after all that, the UN was just going to walk out and leave them in the middle of a destroyed and depopulated city, surrounded by those who were still looting the place" (Martinkus, 2001:331-332).

Many Timorese fled to the mountains in the country’s interior, while militias forcibly moved thousands of Timorese into refugee camps in West Timor. Most schools, homes, and systems for water and electricity supply were completely destroyed (US State Department, 2009). There was no telephone service, no medical facilities, most schools were destroyed and most teachers had fled (Kingsbury, 2009:78). Martinkus notes that the violence which occurred after the ballot was precisely what the Indonesian military and militia leaders had been warning of for months – but that the UN and political leaders elsewhere had been caught by surprise that they had carried out their threats (Martinkus, 2001:348).

**INTERFET and UNTAET**

Following the outbreak of violence, great pressure was put on the Indonesians to allow international peacekeeping forces into Timor-Leste to end the violence sweeping the nation. Twenty-one days after the referendum, the INTERFET multinational peacekeeping force led by the Australian army began to land in Timor-Leste. The
peacekeeping forces found a country that had been almost destroyed, and now lacked not only basic services and infrastructure but also skilled people. Kingsbury notes that "Almost all of the trained personnel in East Timor were either Indonesian or sympathetic to Indonesia and had fled across the border, meaning there were almost no trained personnel left in East Timor and no institutions for them to work in. Government records were all but completely stolen or destroyed, while virtually all medical facilities and staff were removed, along with almost all secondary teachers and a large proportion of primary teachers" (Kingsbury, 2009:78).

The United Nations decided to establish UNTAET, the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, by way of UN Security Council Resolution 1272 of 1999. The Transitional Administration had extensive powers and, during its term it exercised all legislative and executive power over the people of Timor-Leste, as well as power to administer the judiciary. Its responsibilities included security, establishing an effective administration, assisting in the development of civil and social services; coordinating humanitarian assistance, supporting capacity-building for self-government, establishing conditions for sustainable development. It had responsibilities for policing, humanitarian assistance and military matters, and it was given the authority by the UN Security Council to take 'all necessary measures to fulfil its mandate' (Security Council Resolution 1272 of 1999, emphasis added). It conducted elections for a Constituent Assembly, advised the Assembly on drafting the new Timorese Constitution, and established the basic components of a functioning government for Timor-Leste.

UNTAET carried out these tasks in an environment in which it also had to establish the most basic conditions in which to work – power, water, sewerage, telephones and office accommodation – in a limited timeframe, with limited resources. The UN had learned from its previous missions and wanted to limit the timeframe in which the operation took place; and the commitment of donors, while strong, was limited in terms of the personnel – both military and civilian – they were able to provide, and the funds they were willing to contribute.

Chesterman neatly summarised one of the central philosophical difficulties in the United Nations' establishment of administrations such as UNTAET as follows:

"The governance of post-conflict territories by the United Nations embodies a central policy dilemma: how does one help a population

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18 UNTAET Regulation 1999/1 on the Authority of the Transitional Administration in East Timor, UN Doc. UNTAET/REG/1999/1 (27 Nov. 1999)
prepare for democratic governance and the rule of law by imposing a form of benevolent autocracy? And to what extent should the transitional administration itself be bound by the principles that it seeks to encourage in the local population?” (2004:127).

Chesterman also noted that UNTAET itself had little democratic legitimacy, as the Special Representative of the Secretary General (Sergio Vieira de Mello) had absolute power in Timor-Leste, and the Security Council which authorised the mission was ‘...a body whose permanent members continued to reflect the balance of power at the end of the Second World War’ (Chesterman, 2004:142).

Elections were held for the constituent Assembly in August 2001, and 88 members were chosen to undertake the task of drafting the national Constitution. Fretilin won 55 of the 88 seats, and the constituent assembly was able to remain in power as the first Timorese legislative assembly after independence. When Mari Alkatiri (who was later to become Timor-Leste’s first Prime Minister) returned to Timor from Mozambique, where he had spent many years during the Indonesian occupation, he brought with him a draft Constitution based on the Constitution of Mozambique. This document, with some amendments, became the constitution which was put to the Constituent Assembly (Kingsbury, 2009:101). The draft constitution was adopted by the Constituent Assembly in March 2002, and the Presidential elections were held in 2002, with the first President, Xanana Gusmão, elected just before independence.

There were complaints while the UNTAET mission was in place that it proceeded in a cavalier fashion, and did not sufficiently consult with the Timorese (Chesterman, 2004:136), and that many of the well-remunerated jobs went to international staff rather than to Timorese. Baltazar observes that for most Timorese people, the “...political decision-making about the transitional process only took place at the level of the political elite” (2002:11). Gusmão argued that for most Timorese, their experience of the UN administration was “...limited to watching hundreds of white four-wheel-drive vehicles driving around Dili and receiving a succession of regulations passed by the UN administration”\(^\text{19}\). The wide disparities in income and standard of living between Timorese and international staff caused considerable resentment amongst the Timorese,

\(^{19}\) Chesterman, 2004:140, citing Mark Dodd, ‘Give Us a Free Hand or We Quit, Leaders Say’, *Sydney Morning Herald*, 5 December 2000
and the standards of dress and behaviour of the internationals caused great offence to the conservative, mainly Catholic population.

By the time UNTAET’s operations were drawing to a close, there was considerable resentment against the mission on the part of the Timorese; Timorese people were impatient to begin administering their own country, although many were unaware how difficult this would prove in practice. The differences in the resources, both financial and human, available to UNTAET and to the new Timorese government, were great: at its peak, the UNTAET staffing budget was over US $600 million; while the Timor-Leste state budget for 2001-2 was $59 million (Cotton: 2007:19). Matsuno points out that the many years of colonial and Indonesian occupation meant that Timorese society was not accustomed to managing its own affairs in a democratic way (2008:54) and that there were many unresolved internal conflicts which went back to the 1970s, when the brief civil war between UDT and Fretilin had taken place (2008:61).

The recruitment of public servants for the new Timorese government led to resentment as it favoured those people with ‘experience, expertise and capacity’—which tended in practice to be those who had worked as civil servants for Indonesians, had left Timor-Leste and gained experience abroad, or who had been educated abroad and spoke Portuguese and English. This disadvantaged those who had remained in Timor-Leste and did not have the experience, education or language skills required for the new civil service (Matsuno, 2008:65-66). The recruitment of the new army and police force was also problematic, as only 600 of 1800 former Falintil fighters were selected for the army, most of them sympathisers with Xanana Gusmão, and many of the police force had formerly worked for the Indonesian police (Matsuno, 2008:66-67). There was considerable resentment on the part of those who were not selected for the FDTL (Forças Defesa Timor-Leste), and this resentment turned into violence a few years later.

Independence

The newly independent republic of Timor-Leste was established on 20 May 2002. When Timor-Leste became independent, UNTAET’s mandate ended, and it was replaced by UNMISET (the UN Mission of Support in East Timor), a much more modest operation aimed at assisting the new Timorese government, providing support
to the police service, and providing peacekeeping support. UNMISET gradually handed over authority to the Timorese government in the following two years and its mandate was completed in May 2005. It was replaced by a smaller political mission (UNOTIL – the UN Office in Timor-Leste. In the years immediately following independence, the Timorese government functioned, although poorly, with patronage playing a strong role in public sector appointments, and policing and army functions (under Timorese control from 2005) also being poorly executed (Kingsbury, 2009:115, 188).

2006 crisis

Although difficulties had been growing within the Timorese army (the F-FDTL) for some time, they came to a head in 2006. For some time differences between army officers from the East of the country (where FALINTIL had been most active) and the west (which had been better integrated into Indonesian power structures, and where Indonesian had been more commonly spoken) had been growing (Cotton, 2007:15). 600 soldiers, headed by Major Alfredo Reinado brought a petition to President Gusmão outlining their allegations that those from the Western part of Timor-Leste were being discriminated against by those from the Eastern part of the country in relation to promotion and privileges. In February 2006, these petitioners deserted their barracks, and those who failed to return to duty were sacked.21

In April 2006, fighting between youth from East and West Timor-Leste broke out in Dili, with 5 people were killed and 100 houses destroyed (ICG, 2006:9). The Timorese government made an official request for military assistance from Australia, New Zealand, Portugal and Malaysia, which arrived in late May 2006, and is scheduled to end in late 2012. The violence continued and on May 31, President Gusmão declared a State of Emergency for 30 days, with himself in charge of military and police forces. Despite this, however, there continued to be further unrest in Dili with riots, looting and

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20 See, for example, the UNMISET issues paper, “Institutional Tensions and Public Perceptions of the East Timor Police Service (TLPS) and the East Timor Defence Force (F-F-FDTL)”, UNMISET issue paper, November 2002, which noted that people from the East of East Timor made up 56 per cent of F-FDTL, but 85 per cent of the officers.
23 “East Timor: 10 years on”, The Canberra Times, 29/8/2009
arson attacks. It was estimated by the United Nations that more than 120,000 Timorese had fled their homes since the violence began. On 22 June President Gusmão made a speech stating that he would resign unless Alkatiri resigned (ICG 2006:13-15). Prime Minister Alkatiri issued a statement announcing his resignation on 26 June, and Jose Ramos-Horta was appointed as Prime Minister on 8 July.

At this time the UN operation in Timor-Leste, UNOTIL, was about to finish its mandate, and several sessions of the Security Council decided to extend UNOTIL’s mandate, first for a month, then later for several months until the crisis had been resolved. The crisis itself led to other problems, creating many thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) within Timor-Leste. It is estimated that up to 163,000 Timorese fled their homes, and toward the end of 2006, more than 100,000 were still IDPs, many of whom were not able to return to their former homes (Kingsbury 2009:146).

It has been suggested that this crisis originated partly in internal political disputes within the Fretilin party dating from before independence, partly in the ‘poorly implemented demobilisation’ of former FALINTIL fighters, and partly in the rivalry between Prime Minister Alkatiri and President Gusmão (ICG, 2006:3). It has also been proposed that the capacity of Timor-Leste’s institutions to cope with this crisis was low and that the Timorese army (F-FDTL) was both too small to properly protect Timor-Leste against Indonesia and too large for Timor to afford (consuming about 8% of the national budget), as well as being too politicized for a young and fragile democracy (Kingsbury 2009:135). Kilcullen suggests that tensions within Timorese society – east/west, and elite/non-elite, took three to five years after independence to reach crisis point (2009:203).

One writer suggested that despite the fair and democratic elections, and the machinery of government which had been put in place, that “…politics in post-independence Timor-Leste was only superficially democratic” (Matsuno, 2008:52). The initial optimism of many Timorese following independence had turned to disappointment, and there were grave concerns for Timor-Leste’s future. The CSIS Pacific Forum stated:

"Today, Timor has all the attributes of a "collapsing state" or a state on
the verge of failure. If not for the potential oil wealth, it does not have
any major natural resources that could be the lifeline of the incipient
nation. Its population base is small, its economy weak; people are lowly-
educated and its national infrastructure poorly-developed. Most critical
of all, as has been amply exposed by the recent violence, its leadership is
divided and worse, at loggerheads". (Pacific Forum CSIS, 2006:1)

2007 elections

By the following year, the political situation in Timor-Leste began to improve.
Elections at both presidential and Assembly level went well. In the Presidential
election, turnout was high, with 82% of registered voters voting in the first round, and
77% voting in the second round (National Democratic Institute, 2007). Xanana
Gusmão was replaced by Jose Ramos-Horta as president. Ramos-Horta was elected
with 70% of the primary vote.

The National Democratic Institute observed the elections to be free and fair, although
the EU Observer mission criticised the candidates for running an unnecessarily divisive
campaign (National Democratic Institute, 2007a). The Assembly elections, held in
June 2007, were also generally agreed to be free and fair (US State Department, 2009).
Fretilin won the most seats in the Parliament, although not a majority and in August
2007, the President asked former President Xanana Gusmão, now leader of a coalition
of parties who controlled majority of seats in Parliament, to form a government (US
State Department, 2009). The handover of power to the new coalition by Fretilin, and
the installation of Xanana Gusmão as Prime Minister, was a significant event in
Timor’s political development. Unfortunately it was followed by violent
demonstrations in the cities of Dili, Baucau and Viqueque as Fretilin supporters
protested this turn of events (US State Department, 2009). Fretilin challenged the
legality of the new government because it was composed of a coalition of minority
parties and thus might not meet the Constitutional requirements for a governing party
(Kingsbury 2009:194). The legal challenge to the new government was unsuccessful.
After Parliament returned, Fretilin continued to question the legitimacy of the Alliance
with a Majority in Parliament, Gusmão’s coalition (AMP) but, significantly, also
continued to participate in the political process following a relatively peaceful transfer
of power. Since that time the new government has functioned well, taking the initiative
on matters such as dealing with internally displaced persons and disgruntled members
of the military (US State Department, 2009). The desire for a change of government
has been at least partly attributed to Fretilin’s authoritarian style of government, which
has been described as ‘needlessly confrontational and divisive’ (Kingsbury 2009:182).

2008 violence

In early 2008, President Jose Ramos-Horta was shot and Prime Minister Gusmão’s life
was threatened. The attempted assassination was believed to have been engineered by
the aggrieved ex-army officer Alfredo Reinado, and was carried out by himself and
three accomplices, with Reinado being shot dead later. Although tragic, Reinado’s
death broke a deadlock in ET politics, and allowed the new government to begin
resettling IDPs and finding a resolution to the claims of the petitioners. Ramos-Horta
was in hospital for two months in Darwin to recover from the shooting.

Timor Leste’s institutions

Timor-Leste’s institutions are currently in a transitional phase. Although it is more than
ten years since the country formally declared its independence, its institutions, laws and
people are still involved in a transition from colonial rule by Portugal and Indonesia to
full independence: they still receive support and technical assistance from a number of
key donors including the World Bank.

Government system

Timor-Leste has a semi-presidential system of government, with a popularly elected
President. The Constitution establishes a unicameral parliament with between fifty-two
and sixty-five members, elected for five years (section 93). At present the Parliament
has 65 members elected in 2007. The powers of the President are relatively weak under
the Timorese Constitution, and the President is unable to dismiss the Prime Minister
unless the Parliament has twice rejected his or her program. Fretilin insisted on
relatively constrained Presidential powers during the Constitution-making process,
correctly anticipating that Xanana Gusmão, an ex-Fretilin leader would be elected as
President.

27 http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2007/s2161267.htm
28 http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2007/s2220442.htm
Timorese people expressed discomfort during the Constitution-making process about strong disagreements being expressed in Parliament, about voting along party lines, and about dominance of the party holding the most seats. These concerns were thought to be linked to the desire for national unity expressed by many Timorese (National Democratic Institute, 2002:14), but also show a lack of familiarity with the way Parliaments work in developed democracies, where disagreements are debated and ideally are resolved, rather than being expressed through physical violence. The transition from a clandestine organisation to a political party in an open democracy appears to have been quite difficult for the Fretilin party, and there were complaints during its term in government about its dictatorial and non-consultative style of government.

**Electoral system**

Timor-Leste has two separate electoral systems for the President and the members of Parliament. The President of Timor-Leste can be elected by an absolute majority of voters in a single vote. If an absolute majority is not reached by any candidate, there is a runoff election between the two most popular candidates from the first round. Members of Parliament are elected using a proportional representation party-list system. Both the President and members of Parliament are elected for five years (IFES Election Guide).

The choice of a proportional representation system for voting in Timor-Leste was made on the recommendation of UNTAET. There was a very real concern that Timor-Leste would become a one-party state, because of the overwhelming popularity of the Fretilin party, and that this party would dominate politics in the new country to an unacceptable degree. They proposed that the Timorese adopt a proportional representation electoral system in the hope that it would guarantee better representation for smaller parties (Chesterman, 2004:141). To date the system has produced a first 'government' – the members of the Constituent Assembly, who later became the first legislators – which was largely constituted by one party (Fretilin), a second coalition government, a more typical result for a proportional representation electoral system, and a third coalition government. The 2007 elections led to the appointment of representatives from 8 different political parties, and after the 2012 elections, a coalition was formed without
the Fretilin party, although this was accompanied by some violence. The election results in 2012 showed some of the fluid nature of politics in new democracies: seven new parties contested these elections, making a total of 21 parties; five parties were not returned to Parliament, including one party which won 16% of the vote in 2007 (Maia and Ingram, 2012). It is interesting to note that the electoral system in Timor-Leste has worked differently than might have been anticipated. The first elections produced a large majority of votes for Fretilin, which enjoyed strong sentimental support as the party of the Resistance movement. The second and third elections have elected more smaller parties, which is a more typical result for a PR electoral system. The presidential system of executive authority did allow people to express different electoral preferences at legislative and executive elections, but may also have created a source of division within the government. The quantitative finding discussed in Chapter 4 above, that Presidential systems are associated with lower performance in post-conflict governments may be partly due to this division of power.

Unitary system

Timor-Leste adopted a unitary system of government in its constitution, with provision made in the Constitution for local governments to be set up (Article 72, Constitution of the Democratic Republic of East Timor). For a country of its small geographical size and relatively small population, this seems to have been a pragmatic decision – to attempt to introduce State or provincial legislatures as well as a national government would have overtaxed Timor’s human and financial resources. There will ultimately be municipal governments as well as the central government, although local elections were delayed until after the Presidential and legislative elections in June 2012 in order to allow more time for human resource and institutional development, and for the creation of municipalities (Report of the Secretary-General, 2010:3).

Government performance since independence

The performance of governments in Timor-Leste since independence has been imperfect, but despite several crises, they have continued to exercise authority and have (with international assistance) maintained political and social order. The government has survived several security-related challenges, from the 2006 and 2008 violence to the
post-election riots in 2012, but overall the governments of Timor-Leste at the time of these events have retained power and survived the instability.

Prudent decisions have been made in relation to the investment of moneys from Timor-Leste’s petroleum revenues, there has been an alternation of power after a democratic election, and the government has survived an attempted coup. In late 2009 the security situation in Timor-Leste was said to be ‘strikingly improved’ on 12 months before (International Crisis Group, 2009). Based on the Polity IV rankings, which are used for the quantitative portion of this thesis, Timor-Leste is now marginally more democratic than it was when it was first independent in 2002, and it has become more democratic over this time. The country began with a ranking of 6 on the Polity scale in 2002, and has since progressed to a 7, indicating a good level of democracy.

Economic performance

Timor-Leste faces tremendous challenges in attempting to recover from the Indonesian occupation and to establish itself as an independent nation. The scorched-earth *(bumihangus)* tactics of the retreating Indonesian army and its militias destroyed an estimated 70% of infrastructure (Haughton, 2002:291, Greenlees and Garran, 2002: 201). The oil and gas resources off Timor-Leste’s southern coast have begun to produce revenues, although few jobs are available for Timorese as gas is piped to Australia, and oil is also refined in Australia. The Timorese Parliament approved the creation of a Petroleum Fund in June 2005 for oil and gas revenues, to maintain the country’s only sources of significant wealth for the benefit of future generations. As at December 2011, this fund was estimated to be worth US $9.3 billion (CIA World Factbook, 2012).

It has been suggested that the Alkatiri government (the first post-independence government) managed Timor-Leste’s finances well, perhaps erring too far on the side of caution in disbursing revenues, to the point where the country was not able to progress economically. On the other hand, it was feared that if a non-Fretilin government were elected in 2007, acting on Ramos-Horta’s campaign speeches suggesting a fast distribution of money with the goal of alleviating poverty, the Petroleum Fund could be ‘squandered’, rather than maintained as a source of funds for the country’s future (International Crisis Group, 2007: 9). While the country remains vulnerable to oil price

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shocks, the fact that much oil revenue is saved for the future means that it is cushioned from the impact of these on the national budget from year to year.

![Timor-Leste GDP per capita](image)

**Figure 6.1: Timor-Leste’s GDP per capita, 1999-2011**

Figure 6.1 above shows the progress of GDP per capita since the 1999 violence, which is the first year for which World Bank statistics are available for Timor-Leste as a separate country. As can be seen, there was a spike in GDP per capita in 2000, presumably caused by the influx of peacekeepers and well-paid international staff into Timor-Leste, but after the peak in 2000/2001, GDP declined and continued to decline until 2007. After this time, however, it began to grow, and the 2011 report on Timor-Leste noted that the economy has grown relatively quickly over the past three years in an improved security environment, with non-oil growth averaging 11% between 2007 and 2009, although it also enjoys the dubious distinction of being the most oil-dependent economy in the world, and its financial sector is at ‘an embryonic stage of development’ (International Monetary Fund, 2011:1).
A report presented to Prime Minister Alkatiri in 2006 stated that most members of parliament did not understand Portuguese, although they were debating laws drafted in this language; the command structure of the police force was confused; the legal system was not able to operate in multiple languages which it was required to do because of the constitutional imposition of Tetum and Portuguese; and Parliament was not able to act as a brake on the executive as many members were frequently absent, parliament did not meet often, and members were unwilling to use their initiative independent of the Cabinet (Cotton, 2007:15-16).

Although the financial position of the government has improved with the years since independence and the addition of oil revenues has provided an additional, much-needed source of revenue, there are still considerable problems with bureaucratic functioning. For example, in 2007 the government was still only spending about half its budget each year (International Crisis Group, 2007:6, note 26), and the non-oil economy has not been performing strongly. The violence in 2006, 2007 and subsequently has discouraged private sector investment in Timor-Leste, so the advice of a World Bank/ADB report in 2007 that government spending offered the best chance for economic progress in the short term is likely still relevant (World Bank/ADB, 2007:15). Maintaining the integrity of the Petroleum fund and resisting the temptation to ‘dip into’ the fund will also pose a challenge. ‘Sustainable’ budget spending from that fund was estimated in 2007 at about $300 million US per year, although several sources have noted that the petroleum revenue has been greater and has arrived sooner than was originally predicted (see, for example, World Bank/ADB, 2007:15).

Issues

Language

One issue which is important in terms of national identification and communication is that of language. At the time of independence, the Timorese leadership, many of whom had been in exile in Portugal or Mozambique for long periods during the Indonesian occupation, voted to make Portuguese one of the official languages of Timor, rather than Indonesian. The other language was to be Tetum, the most widely spoken and understood of the indigenous languages of Timor. The fact that the speaking and
teaching of Portuguese was banned during the period of Indonesian occupation may also have played a role in the decision to adopt it as a national language. The adoption of Portuguese was largely driven by the Timorese elite, which the UN treated as the voice of the Timorese people (Kingsbury in Kingsbury and Leach, 2007:23, Chesterman, 2004:136), and it has all kinds of implications. It enabled those speaking Portuguese to get jobs in the government and with international organisations (Wise, 2006:184). It also meant that many younger members of Parliament were voting on Bills which they could not read and about which they could not debates. Younger members of Timorese society were similarly excluded from the democratic process. Chesterman estimates that Portuguese was spoken by less than 10 per cent of the Timorese population and by virtually no-one under 30 years old, and Cotton describes this policy as

"...contentious and wasteful... [it] hobbled the Parliament, obstructed the functioning of the legal system, and enmeshed the educational system in a linguistic farrago...it is hard to avoid the inference that the Lusophone diaspora who assumed control of Fretilin...were prepared to wear something of this cost to society at large in exchange for the privilege it bestowed upon them" (Cotton in Shoesmith, 2007: 16).

Divisions within society

There remain a number of deep divisions in Timorese society. One primary division is that between the people who remained in Timor for the period of Indonesian occupation, and those who were elsewhere. Some were in Mozambique (particularly a large portion of the ruling elite, some of whom are known as the Maputo Clique), and others who were in Portugal or in Australia. Those who remained behind see those who left as having escaped the worst excesses of the human rights violations inflicted by the Indonesians. There is a belief in Timorese society that many of the politicians who spent most of the Indonesian occupation away from Timor-Leste have not taken sufficient steps to improve the living standards of rural-dwelling Timorese (Kilcullen, 2009:203). There are case studies of returnees from who were rejected by 'locals' and 'stayers' who saw them as outsiders and foreigners (Wise, 2006:173-4). Many younger Timorese resent the wealthy expatriates who have returned more than they resent the Indonesians (Wise, 2006:174).

"Gradually since the United Nations intervention in 1999, there has been an increasing sense of disenfranchisement among local East Timorese, those who don't speak English or Portuguese and those who are poor or uneducated. They have been marginalized
by many of the processes set in place by the United Nations and 
the international NGO community working in East Timor. The 
international staff (and that includes East Timorese from the 
diaspora) – on international salaries, engaged in conspicuous 
consumption, and working in the best and best-paid jobs – have 
come to represent 'the West' to Timorese locals. The imposition 
of Portuguese in the workplace and in schools compounds this 
resentment among the younger local generation, most of whom 
speak neither English nor Portuguese. They are disadvantaged 
in obtaining good employment because they must compete with 
East Timorese returned from Portugal and Australia, many of 
whom speak Portuguese, and those from Australia have the 
added advantage of English. There have been many angry 
clashes over this issue in particular” (Wise, 2008:179).

The return of the Timorese diaspora has had both positive and negative effects. There 
is less social cohesion as new values and experiences are integrated into the broader 
society; experience of different societies, and well-functioning democratic 
governments, may alter returnees’ political perspectives; but the new perspectives, 
skills and resources (financial and otherwise) which returnees bring have the potential 
to benefit Timor-Leste greatly.

The current leaders of Timor-Leste are mainly drawn from the generation who were 
leaders when Timor had its first brief experience of independence in the 1970s. The 
Gusmao family, and those of many other leaders, were assimilados, Timorese who 
‘baptised, clothed, and educated themselves in European fashion’ (Niner, 2007:113). 
They may have intermarried with staff of the Portuguese colonial administration. 
Gusmão attended the Dare seminary and learned Portuguese there. The older Timorese 
leadership were shaped by the ‘old-world Latino culture’ – a very different culture to 
the Indonesian military dictatorship under which next generation grew up (Niner 
2007:114).

Many of these leaders also spent considerable time in exile, often in Portugal or 
Mozambique, during the period of Indonesian occupation, and they are sometimes 
called the ‘Maputo clique’.

In this case, language is a marker for a number of other characteristics: social class, 
having had the ability (and the financial resources) to leave Timor, and having been 
absent from Timorese society during Indonesian occupation. The choice of Portuguese 
as one of the official languages for Timor, and as the working language of the Timorese
Parliament, while attractive to these leaders, has excluded an entire generation of younger Timorese from service in and comprehension of the proceedings of government, and from the public life of the new country. While it is a decision which may be revisited at a later date, given that all Timorese children are now being taught Portuguese in schools, it may be difficult for political leaders to change the official language in future, and those who grew up in Timor-Leste during the Indonesian occupation may remain effectively disenfranchised.

Other divisions within Timorese society include the division between people who are from the East of Timor-Leste, and those from the West, and that between those who joined the pro-Indonesian militias in 1999 and those who supported Fretilin.

**Poverty**

Combating the pervasive poverty which is experienced by many Timorese is a first priority task for whichever government is in power. The World Bank estimated the basic needs poverty line in Timor-Leste to be $0.88 cents per day, the estimated cost of purchasing 2100 calories for each person and meeting some non-food needs, and found that approximately half of the Timorese population lives on less than this each day (World Bank, 2008:2-3). Poverty was slightly more prevalent in rural populations than urban populations, and levels of poverty increased significantly between 2001 and 2007. Increasing poverty has been linked to low levels of overall economic growth, despite some oil revenue being utilised. Educational indicators (school attendance and literacy) improved between 2001 and 2007, probably due to a policy of free primary and secondary education which has protected school enrolments from worsening economic conditions and raised enrolments overall, but child health indicators (height and weight for age, and height for weight) worsened (2008:7-9). The declining child health indicators are problematic as they indicate ‘a deterioration in nutritional measures for children under 5, who account for 49% of the poor in Timor-Leste (2008:9-11), and may presage future problems given that malnutrition during childhood can cause health problems and damage to cognitive development.

The World Bank and the Asian Development Bank suggest that there is an urgent need for a ‘social safety net’ to protect the poorest people, with ideas including public works programs to employ people, a transfer program for the disabled, and school feeding or
cash transfer program to improve school enrolments etc, as well as a universal cash transfer program (similar to that employed in Alaska) to share a small part of petroleum revenue with everyone. In the medium term, more private investment will be needed (2007:16).

Dealing with the past

Even after the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation, there are still questions about international/national justice processes. Few of those who committed acts of violence at the time of the referendum in 1999 have been arrested or punished. Two-hundred and seventy-nine individuals were indicted for serious crimes, but only 18 people were tried by Indonesian courts over a two-year process, at end of which only one person was found guilty. Eurico Guterres, a militia member, was sentenced to prison for 10 years, and released in April 2008. Abilio Soares, the former governor of Timor-Leste, was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment (Kingsbury, 2009:209). Other senior Indonesian military officers were either found not guilty or if convicted, their convictions were overturned on appeal, but none were jailed.

Serious Crimes process

In 2004, Timor-Leste and Indonesia established a “Commission for Truth and Friendship” which was to investigate the events occurring before and after the independence vote in 1999. This Commission, which comprised an equal number of members from Indonesia and Timor-Leste, had no power to prosecute individuals for offences, and was held in Indonesia. It “found that the violence and destruction in East Timor was ‘systematic, coordinated, and carefully planned’...but did not recommend charges ... be heard by an international criminal tribunal” (Kingsbury 2009:119). Timorese leaders, particularly Xanana Gusmão, =, have spoken publicly about the need for Timor-Leste to look to the future, and not to antagonize their larger and more powerful neighbour, and it seems unlikely that any punitive sanctions will be taken against members of the Indonesian military who were in command at the time of the 1999 violence.

The conflict and the years of oppression which preceded it have left a legacy of violence: state violence (clashes with the police, military and former combatants) and domestic violence, as well as ongoing trauma suffered by torture survivors, often now
leaders. The International Rehabilitation and Torture Council carried out a large-scale survey in Timor-Leste in 2000 to try to assess the extent of trauma and torture and their impact on Timorese people. After surveying 1033 households, ninety-seven percent of respondents had been exposed to at least one traumatic event (Modvig et al, 2000: 1763). Fifty-seven percent had experienced one of the forms of torture inquired about: psychological torture (40%), physical beating (33%), beating the head (26%), submersion in water (12%), electric shock (12%), crushing of hands (10%) or rape or sexual abuse (5%). Twenty-two per cent had seen a family member or friend murdered in front of them. The impact of such experiences on the general population is not yet well-known; however the effects of post-traumatic stress disorder on individuals can be corrosive and long-lasting, particularly where there is no treatment available. It has been said that:

"...The societal costs of PTSD [post-traumatic stress disorder] are likely to be substantially greater in the many countries throughout the world that have been ravaged by years of political and ethnic violence. These countries must reconstruct a viable social structure and economy so that they can take their place within the world order. This task requires a citizenry possessing basic cognitive and interpersonal skills that are lacking among victims of widespread trauma. In the absence of this human capital, it is difficult to see how viable social structures can be created."
(Kessler, 2000:12)

Resources

Timor-Leste’s oil and gas resources are beginning to be exploited, and significant resource flows are beginning to accumulate as a result of their exploitation. Although Timor-Leste’s oil and gas reserves are quite small by global standards, they form almost 75% of the country’s total income and place it among the most oil-dependent nations in the world (International Monetary Fund, 2009:2). All funds from petroleum exploitation go directly from oil companies to the Petroleum Fund, which was established by legislation in 2005, managed by Central Bank and currently all invested in the US Federal Reserve, with an annual return of around 5.2% (International Monetary Fund, 2009:5). This fund is based on the Norwegian model of a sovereign fund, and was established with technical help from the International Monetary Fund (International Monetary Fund, 2009:5). The decision to withdraw funds from Petroleum Fund can only be made by a vote of Parliament, and must follow input from
the Petroleum Fund Consultative Council, which includes representation from civil society. Revenue withdrawn from the Fund can only be deposited into an account of the state budget (Drysdale, 2007:78). Before money can be withdrawn, Parliament must be informed of the Estimated Sustainable Income from the fund, but is not limited to this amount, and the amount is highly dynamic, depending on oil prices, estimates of remaining oil, and future oil sales, among other factors.

Drysdale notes that when resource revenue is not managed well, corruption, conflict and mismanagement of funds can all arise because of the inflow of considerable sums of money (2007:77). Natural resource revenue has the potential to weaken productive institutions, and strengthen destructive ones such as corruption and nepotism; and institutional quality can affect how natural resources revenue is used (Drysdale, 2007:78). The income provided from oil revenues in Timor-Leste has the potential to provide cash, but not employment, and one considerable challenge is determining how to convert this resource wealth into a broader increase in living standards for all Timorese (International Monetary Fund, 2009:5).

Timor’s institutions for managing petroleum revenue were not affected by the 2006 crisis, and they appear to be strong, although the standard of living for most Timorese has not improved since the Petroleum Fund was established (Drysdale, 2006:80). Budget projections in 2009 were that the Petroleum Fund would grow quickly, reaching approximately $13 billion in the fund by about 2023, when oil supplies in that field are estimated to run out – however these estimates were based on current oil prices, only apply to the oil field currently being exploited, and assume the oil supply will not be interrupted (International Monetary Fund, 2009:12).

Important challenges for Timor include using its Petroleum Fund money sustainably and in a way which has long-term positive impact. The International Monetary Fund has expressed the opinion that the fund has so far worked well and represents a significant achievement for Timor-Leste, but that there are still reasons for caution and a need to monitor government spending, which has the potential to raise inflation and crowd out private investment in Timor-Leste (International Monetary Fund, 2009:13). Oil price fluctuations could lead to variability in the amount the government is able to
withdraw from the petroleum fund, which could lead to macroeconomic instability and slow economic growth (2009:13).

The quantitative results discussed in Chapter 4 suggest that in the post-conflict period, abundant natural resources can be of benefit to the governments of high-income countries, but of detriment to government performance in countries where GDP per capita is less than $1000 per year. In Timor-Leste, however, the prudent management of oil wealth has meant that it is being invested and spent cautiously for public benefit, rather than diverted for private benefit.

**Security Sector**

One source of discontent and continuing instability since independence in Timor-Leste has been the security sector, in particular the former resistance fighters of Falintil. When recruiting took place for the Timorese army, recruiters could not accept all of the soldiers who used to fight for Falintil. A substantial number of former soldiers were left unemployed and with a strong sense of grievance that they had suffered and made considerable sacrifices for their country, which was now unable to employ them. Feelings about the independence struggle are still strong, and outbreaks of violence from former combatants still possible. A number of martial arts clubs were set up under the Indonesians and are now still operating. To some extent these clubs served as focus for discontent during 2006 violence, and there is some concern that they are effectively training young people for violence (Kingsbury 2009: 144). There are also concerns that the police force is inefficient and poorly trained, despite considerable investment by successive UN missions in training Timorese police.

**Conclusions**

By the standards of peace enforcement and stabilization operations, the UN mission to establish a government in Timor-Leste was a highly successful operation. It has been referred to as "... a smooth, nonviolent transition to civilian-led democratic government, without any significant rejection response or exploitation of unrest by external actors, and with no major internal unrest for years afterwards." (Kilcullen, 2009:203).
The government which this successful mission established has generally performed well since independence, and has weathered several significant challenges. The institutions established by UNTAET have remained largely unaltered, and political power has changed hands from one party to two different coalitions of parties. Despite this electoral fluidity, and the violence which has accompanied the election results in 2007 and 2012, power has been passed between the major parties without a return to major conflict.

The violent disputes which disturbed the peace in 2006 can be attributed to a number of causes: poor management of security sector reform following the conflict, little-understood ethnic tensions, dissatisfaction with the new government, and personality-based disputes which harked back to the days of the resistance movement. One Timorese leader told the International Crisis Group that to find a solution to this crisis “‘We may have to sacrifice some of our heroes’ ” (International Crisis Group, 2006:20). It has also been suggested that the ‘culture of command’ within Timorese political life, which developed within the secretive resistance movement, needed to be changed (Aderito de Jesus Soares, Timorese Jurists Association, quoted in Chesterman, 2004:142). Since 2006, however, there have been no further crises of this magnitude, and a change of government has been accomplished, although it was accompanied by some violent demonstrations. Timor-Leste’s legal and political institutions – the courts, the legislature, and the Constitution – have been tested by these situations, and have remained in place, which is a testament to their durability and legitimacy. Elections have been free and fair and power has been transferred between parties on two occasions, meeting Huntington’s ‘two-turnover test’ of democratic consolidation.

A number of factors have worked in Timor-Leste’s favour in establishing a post-conflict state: a great deal of international support, both political and financial has been provided to Timor-Leste; considerable technical and military assistance from UN missions has enabled the reconstruction of state apparatus there; a sustainable and

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29 Samuel Huntington, in *The Third Wave: Democratization in the late Twentieth Century*, 1991, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, p267, suggested the ‘two-turnover test’: democracies are only consolidated if governments have been removed by electoral means on two occasions. Huntington suggests that the second peaceful turnover of power shows that: “First, two major groups of political leaders in the society are sufficiently committed to democracy to surrender office and power after an election. Second, both elites and publics are operating within the democratic system; when things go wrong, you change the rulers, not the regime. Two turnovers is a tough test of democracy.”
prudent scheme for managing its oil revenues aims to avoid Timor-Leste suffering from the 'resource curse', and allow it to spread the benefits from its oil revenue over a long time-period; and considerable flows of development aid in the post-conflict period and afterward are aimed at alleviating poverty and improving the health, education and life expectancy of the Timorese people.

There remain significant challenges for Timor-Leste to address in coming years: poverty, illiteracy and unemployment; a weak justice sector; a large portion of the population excluded from effective participation in political life by the choice of official language; reforms to the security sector, and a lack of accountability for many wrongdoers following the violence in 1999. Nine years after independence, however, there are a number of signs which give the observer grounds for optimism concerning its future. The Constitution and the structures of governance in Timor-Leste have survived a number of challenges since independence, the young democracy there is showing signs of consolidation, and the international community is still highly invested in the success of the Timorese nation-building project. The Timorese police have been responsible for national policing since 2011, the United Nations mission is ending ten years after it began, and in recent elections, power was transferred from one coalition of parties to another for the second time. The prospects for the future seem bright.
CHAPTER 7

CASE STUDY 2 – NAMIBIA

“As of today, we are masters of the pastoral land of our ancestors. The destiny of this country is now in our own hands”

President Sam Nujoma, 21 March 1990

Namibia has been an independent nation since 1990, and has enjoyed stable government since gaining independence. There has been no recurrence of the conflict which took place during its struggle for independence from South Africa, and the diverse ethnic and tribal groups within Namibia have been able to work well together within a democracy. Namibia faces a number of significant challenges, including dealing with the high incidence of HIV/AIDS, combating endemic poverty, and broadening its political representation, but it has built a strong base from which to undertake all of these objectives.

Namibia, formerly known as South-West Africa, was administered as a mandate by South Africa after the First World War, until after the Second World War, when South Africa annexed it. In 1966 the South West African People’s Association began a guerrilla war for independence in the territory, and the UN assumed control of the territory. South Africa installed an interim administration in what was then South West Africa in 1985, and in 1988 agreed to end its administration. Namibia declared its independence from South Africa in 1990, following UN-sponsored elections secured by UNTAG, a peacekeeping force which included police, military and civilian electoral workers.

Since independence, there have been no significant outbreaks of conflict, with the exception of an unsuccessful secessionist movement in the Caprivi region in 1998-99. The SWAPO party has dominated Namibian politics since independence, although the first President, Sam Nujoma was recently succeeded by Hifikepunye Pohamba, also from SWAPO. Namibia has maintained stable, multi-party democracy since

independence, and the government has offered amnesty to all former combatants and promoted a general policy of national reconciliation. Despite having a relatively successful transition from conflict to democracy, Namibia faces a number of challenges: although it has high GDP per capita compared to other countries in the region, income is distributed very unequally, and Namibia’s budget was only in surplus for the first time since independence in 2007. The country is relatively resource-dependent, and unemployment levels were at 29.8% in 2008.

Background

Namibia is located in South-West Africa, on the coastline between South Africa and Angola. The population of Namibia has been estimated at 2.13 million (World Bank, 2009). GDP per capita for 2011 was $7500(CIA World Factbook). Poverty remains common, with a 2003/04 Namibian household income survey finding that 28 per cent of households fell into the ‘poor’ classification, with 4 per cent being classed as ‘extremely poor’, although these figures had improved considerably since a decade earlier, when the figures were 37 per cent and 8.2 per cent respectively (World Bank, 2009:2). Namibia mostly comprises deserts – only 0.99% of the country is arable land (Central Intelligence Agency, 2010), and it has considerable mineral resources, particularly diamonds (World Bank, 2009) and uranium (NEPRU, 2009). Namibia was ranked 128 of 182 countries in the UNDP’s Human Development Index in 2009; adult literacy was estimated to be 88.0%, and life expectancy at birth is approximately 60.4 years (United Nations Development Program, 2009). Namibia is considered ‘free’ in terms of the Freedom House assessment of political rights and freedoms (Freedom House, 2010).

History

Early settlement in Namibia was by several distinct tribes or peoples: the Caprivians, who inhabit the Caprivi Strip to the north-east of Namibia, the Hereros, who inhabited the semi-arid lands in the centre of Namibia, and the Ovambo and Kavango tribes, who live in the northern area of Namibia near the border with Angola (Griffith, 1998:95). The Namas and the Berg Damaras live in the southern part of Namibia. In the middle of the nineteenth century the Basters, a mixed-race group which spoke Afrikaans,
migrated to Namibia and settled in Rehoboth, in central Namibia. Small groups of Swana and San (Bushmen) live near the Kalahari Desert (Griffith, 1998:96).

There was competition between tribes for possession of fertile land in the Central Plateau of Namibia in the second half of the nineteenth century, but it was German colonial settlement in Namibia which began to fundamentally reshape the distribution of land in Namibia. The Namas and the Hereros both resisted German attempts to settle on tribal lands, but the Herero chief, Kamaherero, ultimately signed a protectorate agreement with the Germans, assuming (incorrectly) that this also meant that the Germans would protect his tribes and their protectorate lands from the marauding Namas (Griffith, 1998:97). In 1904, the Hereros went to war against the Germans, with disastrous results – approximately 80% of the tribe (some 60,000-65,000 people) were killed, with the remainder fleeing to the neighbouring British protectorate of Bechuanaland (now Botswana). Hearn notes that much of the killing was done after the conflict had ended, when a \textit{vernichtungsbefel} (extermination order) decreed that every Herero on German territory must be shot, whether armed or unarmed (1999:36).

As the German nation went to war in Europe from 1914-18, the South African government seized control of South West Africa after a brief conflict. A peace treaty was signed and South Africa took charge of South West Africa. South-West Africa was then given to South Africa as a mandate by the League of Nations. South Africa, while implementing a different policy for dealing with the Africans than the Germans had, had a policy of creating native reserves which were located in semi-desert areas and which meant they could not farm and were forced into labouring work (Griffith, 1998:100). The Namas rebelled, but were quelled by use of machine guns and aircraft bombing, and the rebellion of the Basters was also met with force. A Legislative Assembly was established in 1925, but only European voters were allowed to vote, and it was felt that ‘...it would be undesirable to press the African beyond his capacity for absorbing European institutions’ (Griffith, 1998:101).

After World War II, Jan Smuts, who was representing South Africa in San Francisco at the drafting of the United Nations Charter, sought to have South West Africa incorporated into South Africa, which he felt was only formalising the existing situation. The South African government felt that there was ‘...no prospect of the
Despite the support of some African chiefs, the request was refused, and the UN asked South Africa to place Namibia under the jurisdiction of the Trusteeship Council (Griffith, 1998:101). In 1947 Smuts advised the UN that his government had decided not to incorporate Namibia into South Africa, however in 1949, six Members and two Senators (elected by Namibia’s European population) were allowed to go to Pretoria and represent Namibia in the South African Parliament (Griffith, 1998:102). By the late 1950s, South Africa had put its apartheid system into operation in Namibia and was governing Namibia through an Administrator-General, making it a de facto fifth province of South Africa. South Africa’s strong interests in Namibia’s mineral and diamond mines, when added to a wish to protect the white minority’s way of life, meant that tensions increased (Howard, 2002:100).

The Hereros petitioned the UN General Assembly to seek an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice concerning the future of Namibia. The 1950 opinion confirmed the continuing existence of South Africa’s mandate in South West Africa, and clarified that South Africa could not unilaterally change the territory’s status. That status could only be altered through a cooperative decision between South Africa and the United Nations. This ruling pleased neither those hoping for independence nor the South Africans. – The South Africans did not accept that the United Nations, as the successor to the League of Nations, had continued jurisdiction over their administration of South West Africa, and the international community were not pleased that the UN did not have the sole jurisdiction to compel South Africa to place South West Africa under a trusteeship. The South African government refused to accept the ruling and set up an inquiry which in 1963 recommended the establishment of ethnic homelands in South West Africa and the integration of its administration with South Africa.

International action on South West Africa was frustrated by South Africa’s refusal to negotiate over the territory’s future throughout the 1950s, and South Africa stubbornly maintained that its obligation was to the League of Nations, and because that body was no longer functioning, it had to explain itself to no one. By the mid-1950s, this stance had strengthened; South Africa refused even to cooperate in filing reports, facilitating petitions, or providing the United Nations with any information on South West Africa (Sparks and Green, 1992:28). South Africa implemented an apartheid system in South
West Africa in 1968-69, which involved forcibly relocating communities into ethnic zones. The local population responded with violent demonstrations and petitions to the United Nations (Griffith, 1998:102). In 1966, the General Assembly voted to end South Africa’s mandate and to set up a UN Commissioner for Namibia. The International Court of Justice in 1971 confirmed that South Africa’s continued rule over Namibia was illegal. The court went further, and called for South Africa’s withdrawal from Namibia, for UN members to recognize that South Africa’s occupation of Namibia was illegal, and for members to refrain from giving assistance to South Africa which might help it to continue this occupation of Namibia (Sparks and Green, 1992:37).

Political party organisation in Namibia began through non-political organisations, both educational and religious. In 1958, the Ovamboland People’s Congress was established in Cape Town by Andimba Toivo ya Toivo and Andreas Shipanga, and in 1959, ya Toivo and Sam Nujoma, a railway worker, began to organise a political party in Windhoek called the Ovamboland People’s Organisation (OPO) (Griffith, 1998:104). The introduction of apartheid in Namibia in the late 1960s, with its pass laws, restrictions on travel, and forced movement of Africans to ‘homelands’, had created considerable resentment which began to find voice in these organisations, particularly amongst workers who were living in South Africa. The leaders of these organisations realised that they needed to make them more representative of the population of South West Africa as a whole and OPO was shaped into the South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO), although its membership base was overwhelmingly members of the Ovambo people (Griffith, 1998:104). After 1962, SWAPO’s strategy changed to include violent resistance to South African rule (Sparks and Green, 1992:29). The military arm of SWAPO, PLAN (the People’s Liberation Army) formed in 1963, and was trained and supported by the Soviet Union, Ghana, Egypt, Algeria and Tanzania, with a base in Zambia (Griffith, 1998:106).

Other ethnic groups also formed political organisations at around the same time (Griffith, 1998:107). The South African government branded many of these groups as terrorist and/or Communist, and while it stopped short of banning them outright, the enactment of numerous laws and repressive measures against activists effectively forced group members to go underground" (Sparks and Green, 1992:29). The resistance groups were not all alike in their outlook: SWAPO placed more emphasis on
lobbying the United Nations for change, and wanted free elections which were based on equal suffrage (which, as the numerically more populous party, it would likely win). The South West African National Union (SWANU) aimed to organise the people of South West Africa to move towards change from within, and lobbied for a constitutional convention, which would give it greater bargaining power in a constitution-making process. The Herero Council ‘sought to preserve precolonial systems and hierarchies’ (Sparks and Green, 1992:29). SWAPO was the best-organised of the resistance groups, and commanded the greatest number of supporters, which is why it became recognised by international bodies as the group which best represented the people of South West Africa (Sparks and Green, 1992:30).

In 1971 a general strike by 13500 contract workers in protest against poor pay and conditions and the pass system, had a devastating effect on the economy, particularly in farms, mines and towns (Griffith, 1998:105). The administration, in response, imposed martial-law type restrictions in Ovamboland, particularly affecting freedoms of movement and assembly, and ‘...backed by arbitrary, secret, harsh and indefinite detention’ (Griffith, 1998:105). The strike continued until the second half of 1972. SWAPO also organised a successful boycott of the local elections in Ovamboland in 1973, in which only three per cent of people eligible to vote actually voted. It has been suggested that the success of this boycott was a significant factor prompting the UN General Assembly to recognise SWAPO as the best representative of the Namibian people in 1973 (Hearn, 1999:41, citing General Assembly Resolution 3111 of 12 December 1973).

Conflict

The armed struggle to free Namibia began in earnest in 1966, as SWAPO began to fight for the future of Namibia, both from within the country and from bases in other countries, particularly Angola. SWAPO attacked a number of South African base facilities in Ovamboland in 1966 and killed two bodyguards. In response South African authorities arrested most of the leadership, including Herman Toivo ya Toivo (Griffith, 1998:106). After legal measures to obtain independence appeared to have failed (with the unfavourable ICJ rulings), the conflict became more serious as SWAPO realised it might only be by violent means that they obtained their independence from South
Africa (Sparks and Green, 1992:31). Similar battles were taking place in other countries in Africa, as liberation movements took action in Angola, South Africa, Zimbabwe and Mozambique (Howard, 2002:100).

By 1973, PLAN was fully established and had commenced operations from its Zambian base, moving across the border into the Caprivi Strip. The South Africans developed military capacity in this area and more of Namibia was gradually militarised (Griffith, 1998:108). SWAPO was able to base some operations in Angola before launching them into Namibia, with the support of sympathetic politicians in Angola. SWAPO was committed to supporting the MPLA (one of the major Angolan political parties struggling for control of Angola), and its links with the war in Angola, which was supported by the USSR and Cuba, helped to justify South Africa's military presence in the southern part of Angola (Griffith, 1998:120).

**International action**

Although South Africa disputed continued UN jurisdiction over Namibia, the International Court of Justice gave an advisory opinion in 1971 reaffirming the UN's jurisdiction over Namibia. Then followed UN resolutions in 1973, 1975, 1978, and finally in 1989, all failing to recognise South Africa's continued control of Namibia, and calling for elections to be held in Namibia and for Namibia's independence.

The UN resolutions undoubtedly accelerated a process moving toward Namibian independence which South Africa, left to its own devices, would never have initiated. The UN General Assembly in 1966 began to co-ordinate a campaign of sanctions aimed at blocking military aid and oil supplies to South Africa, but this was blocked by the Western powers on the Security Council (France, the UK and the US) (Sparks and Green, 1992:36). South Africa was accustomed to resisting UN and other sanctions in relation to its apartheid policies, so resisting international pressure and sanctions on the basis of its continued occupation of Namibia over the course of several decades did not require any change to its already oppositional stance. Having said this, it has been suggested that the international pressure which was brought to bear on South Africa may have ultimately influenced its decision to negotiate Namibia's independence (Sparks and Green, 1992: 36). The UN revived its Council for Namibia, which had
been created earlier to assist in Namibia's peaceful transition to independence, and the Council promoted Namibia's cause internationally, assisted Namibians in exile and sought (and gained) the support of UN members for Namibian independence (Sparks and Green, 1992:37). Furthermore, in 1973, the UN recognised SWAPO as the 'sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people' (SWAPO, 1981:303, cited in Sparks and Green, 1992:17).

**Turnhalle Conference**

South Africa held a conference on Namibia’s future governance from 1975-1977, which proposed a three-tiered governance structure (federal, regional and local), and the division of Namibia into 12 regions along ethnic lines. The conference, held in a gymnasium in Windhoek, is usually referred to as the Turnhalle conference ('Turnhalle' meaning gymnasium in German). South Africa preferred its own internal solution to the unrest in Namibia and intended that the proceedings of this conference would be used to ‘accelerate the implementation of apartheid in South West Africa’ (Sparks and Green, 1992:38). SWAPO and SWANU, despite being the opposition parties with the greatest popular support, were excluded from this conference. Even though the conference excluded SWAPO and thus the “...range of political involvement was limited,...[its] significance lay in the fact that it was the first multiracial conference on the constitutional future of the territory brought into being by South Africa’s apartheid government” (Griffith, 1998:112).

Namibian politician Dirk Mudge was partly responsible for the success of Turnhalle as a multiracial forum to discuss Namibia’s political future – he wanted to separate politics in Namibia from the apartheid system promulgated by South Africa. Mudge’s challenge to the South African National Party ideology ‘...gradually transformed Turnhalle into a functioning multiracial conference discussing formulas for political power-sharing in the framework of an interim government”, and the conference overall began the process by which the South Africans became more used to the idea of a Namibian nation (Griffith, 1998:113-116).

After the Turnhalle conference, South Africa held elections for a Namibian National Assembly, but there are allegations that the elections were manipulated to ensure a
DTA victory (see, for example, Forrest, 1994:90). The National Assembly did have some legislative authority, and made some progress towards dismantling racial segregation in Namibia, but all of its actions were subject to the ultimate authority of the Administrator-General of Namibia. The National Assembly collapsed in 1983, and was replaced by a Multiparty conference, which was later renamed the Transitional Government of National Unity and operated until 1989.

There were a number of attempts at negotiation of a settlement to the question of Namibian independence during the 1970s and 1980s. After the Turnhalle process, South Africa proposed to inaugurate an internal Constitution for Namibia in June 1977, and this proposal prompted several Western powers to initiate further diplomatic action. The US initiated actions involving four NATO countries: Canada, France, the UK, and Germany, and together with the US these became known as the Contact Group. This Group negotiated with South Africa in relation to independence for Namibia. The prominence of the Contact Group’s members made it difficult for South Africa to ignore its deliberations, and gave weight to the Western commitment to a peaceful settlement of the Namibian question (Griffith, 1998:118).

Negotiations between SWAPO and South Africa under the auspices of the Contact Group were successful in obtaining a number of concessions from SWAPO and cooperation between South Africa and the UN to the extent that settlement proposals were endorsed by the Security Council as Resolution 435 (Griffith, 1998:122). Although Vorster, the then South African Prime Minister accepted the proposals put forward by the Contact Group in 1978, no timetable for implementation of the proposals could be agreed on, and South Africa later avoided resolving the Namibia issue for more than a decade. Griffith observes that:

"It soon became clear that the moment of critical opportunity for the implementation of Resolution 435 had passed, when P W Botha, the new South African Prime Minister, described the plan as a plot to establish a Marxist state across the Orange River... for Botha, Namibia was not so much a territory to be negotiated into independence, but one to be integrated into the front-line buffer defence against Marxism-Leninism" (Griffith, 1998:124).

By the middle of 1982, SWAPO negotiations through the Contact Group appeared to have reached an agreement for the election of a Constituent Assembly which would
adopt a Constitution for Namibia, but South Africa did not accept this proposal until 1984. South Africa attempted to get SWAPO to play a more active role in politics, by joining a Multi-Party Conference of eight parties, but SWAPO declined, putting the pressure back on an internationally-brokered solution, probably by means of implementation of Resolution 435. In December 1983, South Africa launched a military campaign in Angola, but discovered that the Cuban-backed Angolan forces were a formidable opponent (Griffith, 1998:137). Global geopolitics were changing: with Gorbachev’s election in Moscow in 1984, the Soviet Union’s policies of support for foreign conflicts, and its fiscal capacity to provide this support were both waning. The conflict in Angola continued for several more years, but the underlying basis on which it was being fought was changing – in the background, conciliation and mediation were taking place with a view to settling the dispute without further bloodshed (Griffith, 1998:141-2).

South Africa suffered several military reverses in Angola, in which Angolan and Cuban forces, together with SWAPO fighters, outflanked South African forces. South Africa had invaded Angola in 1987-88, but this military operation led to higher than usual casualties for the South Africans, a poor strategic position which may have led to their forces being trapped without a line of retreat, and a failed attempt to capture the town of Cuemba further north in Angola (International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, 1989:8). South African forces withdrew from Angola altogether in May 1988. This has been described as the turning point in the conflict, as well as the decisive factor in South Africa deciding to accept the UN’s plan at the end of 1988 (IDAF, 1988:7). At the same time, SWAPO revitalised its organisation and membership within Namibia, student protests in Namibia continued and intensified, and the labour movement increasingly affiliated with the SWAPO, leading to increased industrial action in 1988 (IDAF, 1989:13-14). US intermediary Chester Crocker met with the Angolan president Dos Santos in January 1988, and the Cubans and the Angolans indicated that a Cuban withdrawal was possible.

**Peace agreement**

Negotiations in London in May 1988 saw South Africa agreeing to move forward with implementing UN Resolution 435 (Griffith, 1998:143). When the independence of Namibia and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola were finally able to be
agreed on together, a peace agreement was reached in December 1988 (Paris, 2004:236), although Howard notes that the agreement was between South Africa, Angola and Cuba, and excluded SWAPO (2002:106). Under the agreement, implementation of Resolution 435 would begin on 1 April 1989, and the agreement set target dates for implementation (Griffith, 1998:144, Sparks and Green, 1992:48). Chester Crocker, one of the US negotiators who brokered the settlement between South Africa, Namibia and Angola, is quoted as saying that the agreement was attributable to “…the right alignment of local, regional and international events like planets lining up for some rare astronomical happening”31. There were a number of reasons why agreement became possible at this time: the cost of the war, both financially and in terms of lives lost, to South Africa, was growing steadily, and the South African economy could ill afford the expense; non-Western international actors were both willing to exert pressure on South Africa, and increasingly effective at doing so; and the changing relationship between the US and the USSR, which meant that the USSR’s support for clients in the region was significantly diminished as it pursued other foreign policy aims (Sparks and Green, 1992:48).

Implementation of the peace accord was not entirely problem-free: different understandings of the terms of the accord by South Africa and SWAPO led South Africa to misinterpret the movement of 1700 PLAN troops into South West Africa in March 1989 as a hostile action, rather than as refugee return; the South African Defence Force (SADF) attacked and 273 returnees and 23 SADF soldiers were killed; South Africa threatened to call off the agreement altogether, but quick diplomatic measures and pressure on South Africa prevented this (Sparks and Green, 1992:49-50).

**UNTAG**

UNTAG, the UN mission established to implement Resolution 435 and guide Namibia towards independence, was a ground-breaking UN mission in a number of ways. It was one of the first multi-disciplinary missions of the modern day, and several innovations used by that mission (including UN ‘civilian policing’ and information programmes) are still in use today (Howard, 2002:99). UNTAG was given the tasks of supervising free and fair elections for the new Constituent Assembly in Namibia and overseeing the

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ceasefire and withdrawal of South African troops and the demobilization of the SWAPO combatants. UNTAG was also responsible for refugee return and oversight of police. At its maximum strength UNTAG comprised 4,493 military personnel, 1,500 civilian police and almost 2,000 international and local staff. Additionally, approximately 1,000 extra international staff arrived in Namibia to assist with the elections. At maximum deployment, between 7 and 11 November 1989, there were nearly 8,000 personnel in Namibia, and overall the mission cost $368.6 million.

The success of UNTAG has been attributed to a number of factors: a ‘clear and comprehensive’ mandate, giving the UN operation a central role in the transition; sufficient resources, financial and otherwise; a strong commitment from the UN for the operation; a strong presence across Namibia, which improved public confidence in the operation’s ability to fulfil its mandate; and a strong commitment from both South Africa and SWAPO (Dzinesa, 2007:651, 653-5). The UNTAG operation began in April 1989 and terminated in March 1990, which is a very short mission duration compared to more recent multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations. Eleven months would now be considered far too little time to oversee a ceasefire at the end of a civil war of this duration, supervise elections, assist the newly elected Constituent Assembly to draft a suitable Constitution, and oversee the establishment of a new government. However in this instance, the short operation seemed to be successful, and it may be that the relatively brief operation here worked better than a longer one would have: there were fewer opportunities for the government to become dependent on high levels of assistance and advice from external stakeholders, and less economic distortion as a result of a long-term peacekeeping operation.

UNTAG’s successful supervision of the transition process and the elections in Namibia has been called “...a harbinger of the expanding role of international observers as conflict mediators” (McCoy et al, 1991: 106) because of the role that the election process played in resolving the conflict between South Africa and Namibia over the previous decades.

The transition process was complex as the South African-appointed Administrator-General and his registrars, lawyers, bureaucrats and 6000 police were formally required

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to co-operate with Marti Ahtisaari, the Special Representative of the Secretary General, but in practice Louis Pienaar, the Administrator General, ‘... resisted the abolition of the final stages of apartheid in Health and Education’ (Griffith, 1998:154).

UNTAG personnel were physically present throughout Namibia, and interacted extensively with the local population: they were not merely based in Windhoek (the capital), but were throughout rural districts as well. Staff were given flexibility in how they interacted with Namibians, so many took on local interpreters where needed in order to implement a comprehensive information programme over nine months to inform the public about the elections and the coming constitution-making process. They worked through churches, community groups, traditional groups, professional associations and unions (Howard, 2002:112-114).

The problematic commencement of the UNTAG peacekeeping operation was referred to earlier in this chapter, in which the return of several hundred PLAN soldiers from Angola was misinterpreted by South African troops as a resumption of military hostilities. This situation was made more difficult by the fact that the UN operation did not yet have all of its military personnel in place, and was unable to militarily force a ceasefire. There were a number of possible causes of this incident, which almost ended the peace process at its commencement: a misunderstanding by PLAN fighters, who believed that they should return to Namibia to stay on bases there, perhaps due to the fact that SWAPO had been excluded from the later stages of the peace process; budget and deployment delays for UNTAG which left them unprepared and unable to manage this situation; or lack of compliance with the terms of peace agreement on SWAPO’s part (Howard, 2002: 108-109).

UNTAG’s military component appeared less significant than its civil component, partly because the work of the military component occurred in more remote areas, away from general populace. The military component of the mission received less funding because the level of military threat was downgraded, but military functions were performed well. UNTAG was the first UN peace operation in which the training of civilian police forces was included in the peacekeeping mission. This training of police (known as CIVPOL) was placed under the direct control of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, rather than being delegated to the military part of the mission. (Howard, 2002:117-8).
Elections

There was a constant threat of violence between SWAPO and DTA supporters at political rallies, and further controversies related to refugee return, with allegations that SWAPO was guilty of human rights abuses in SWAPO camps in Angola and Zambia (Sparks and Green, 1992: 52-53). There was some violence against SWAPO and UNTAG during the pre-election period, which the Commonwealth Observers found to be due to ‘extreme right-wing whites’ (Griffith 1998:158).

There were difficulties with varieties of election fraud: denial of registration to blacks who could not provide proof of age (which might be impossible if their births had not been formally registered), long waits at registration places, perhaps intended to discourage registrants, and allegations that some Angolans were using false papers to cross the Angolan border and register. High rates of illiteracy (60 to 80%) and a small population widely dispersed across large areas of land posed further problems. Ultimately over 700,000 people registered to vote (Sparks and Green, 1992:54, Griffith 1998:157). There were a number of issues with the registration of political parties – initially, forty-five parties wanted to register, but it was thought that this would produce instability so conditions were put in place to require a substantial deposit (10,000 rand – about $4500) as well as a petition with over 2000 signatures prior to registration, and in the end only ten parties registered, of which seven were successful in putting members into the Constituent Assembly (Howard, 2002:123). A code of conduct for the elections was agreed on and signed by 9 of the 10 parties, and complaints regarding breaches of the code were handled by the UN (Howard, 2002: 124).

Voting took place over a five-day period, from 7-11 November 1989, and SWAPO won by a narrow majority (57.3 per cent of votes and 41 of 72 seats. DTA won 21 seats. The turnout for the elections was 96% of eligible voters, and the elections were considered to have been, in the main, free of intimidation and violence (Fortna 1995:287, cited in Paris, 2004:237).

SWAPO was not able to entirely dominate the constitution-making process, as constitutional motions required a two-thirds majority of the Constituent Assembly to pass. In fact, SWAPO needed to add seven votes to those of its existing members in order for its proposed constitution to become law, so a negotiating process began.
Namibia’s first Cabinet was multiracial, and the theme of the first government was reconciliation (Sparks and Green, 1992:55-6, 61). List proportional representation was chosen as electoral system and was effective at this first election as parties, rather than individuals, were competing against each other (Griffith, 1998:153). The Constituent Assembly, despite containing a number of parties with widely differing political viewpoints, debated and settled on the Constitution by consensus rather than through majority votes. The members of the Assembly expressed pride that matters had been amicably settled between the differing parties (Howard, 2002: 125).

Independence

Namibia became an independent nation in 1990 when the Constitution was passed by the National Parliament. Namibia was the last of the colonized countries south of the Sahara desert to gain its independence (World Bank, 2009, vii).

Politics after independence

Namibian politics since independence have been dominated by SWAPO. Early reports of politics in Namibia after independence described a ‘free and tolerant’ political culture and a free press. A number of farmers marched to protest tax increases in 1993, and they were not only permitted to march through the streets of Windhoek, but they also reportedly received a friendly wave from the President as they marched past his official residence. The government strove for co-existence with the traditional chieftains and the systems of traditional law operating at village level in Namibia (Forrest, 1994:97). SWAPO adopted a policy of ‘national reconciliation’ in the late 1980s, and this principle was implemented by the party once in government in the independent Namibia. The government took a ‘hands-off’ policy with regard to the white community in Namibia, for example assuring white commercial farmers, who own large swathes of land that they did not need to fear land resumption by the central government. This policy meant that many of the educated commercial and farming members of Namibia’s communities remained in Namibia, rather than leaving on independence. The disadvantage to this policy is that it meant continued alienation from the land and poverty for many subsistence farmers in Namibia. Legislation which would deal with land disputes was passed in 2003, but these issues have not caused the same battles in Namibia that they have in Zimbabwe and South Africa, and the backlash
by black farmers which some expected to occur in rural Namibia has not occurred (Howard, 2002:125, Forrest, 1994:98). The government declared in 2004 that any land could be expropriated, and 30 farms were targeted, but by 2009 only five had in fact been expropriated (Freedom House, 2010).

In the Constituent Assembly debates, the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance proposed the creation of the National Council, a second house of Parliament, based on regional representation. SWAPO opposed this, on the basis that it might be merely another way to prolong the apartheid system, but finally agreed to the proposal, provided the National Council was only limited to a review function, not able to veto bills passed by the national Assembly, and that it would not be established until regional boundaries were re-drawn on the basis of non-ethnic factors (Forrest, 1994:93-94). These stipulations were included in the Constitution, and the redistricting process was complete in 1992. Regional elections were held in late 1993, and SWAPO gained control of 9 of the 13 regional councils, and 32 of 53 local authorities (Forrest, 1994:94).

Writing in 1994, Forrest noted that the government’s policy of national reconciliation seemed to have produced mainly favourable results. Some white Namibians had adapted well to the new circumstances in Namibia and continued to work as civil servants, while others found it difficult to be directed by black supervisors (Forrest, 1994:97). Howard observes that the Namibian government set up parallel structures to those in the old South African administration, which was criticised as resulting in an overstuffed administration, although Deputy Minister of Trade Wilfried Emvula has been quoted as saying “Better to live with a bloated civil service than a war” (Wilfried Emvula, interviewed by Howard, 2002:125).

The policy of national reconciliation may have succeeded for a number of reasons: while in exile, SWAPO leaders began to believe that social peace was a path to economic development; cultural norms in Namibia are said to encourage tolerance of outsiders; the multi-racial National Assembly which began operation after the Turnhalle conference gave politicians and their constituents a decade of experience of multiracial forums; and many Namibian whites felt themselves to be ‘Namibian’, not merely South Africans living in an outpost (Forrest 1994:98).
SWAPO is the dominant political party and has held power at every election since independence. The first President, Sam Nujoma was replaced after 15 years of rule in 2005 by the second President, Hifikepunye Pohamba, in a peaceful transfer of power, although Pohamba too comes from the SWAPO party. He again won power in the 2009 elections, although the fact that Pohamba’s main rivals at this election were a number of small, new, breakaway parties from SWAPO is encouraging evidence that a greater degree of political competition may have become part of Namibian politics. The Rally for Democracy and Progress (RDP), the main competitor party, fielded both the first runner-up in the 2009 presidential election (Hidipo Hamutenya) and won eight seats in the 72-seat legislature (while SWAPO won 54). SWAPO also continued to dominate local and regional elections held in November 2010, winning a total of 226 council seats, while the RDP only won 48 (Freedom House, 2010). There are claims that SWAPO initiated smear campaigns against several RDP members, particularly against the party President, Hamutenya, and it’s Secretary General, Jesaya Nyamu (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2009).

It is interesting to note that although a proportional representation electoral system was introduced on independence, and these systems tend to favour smaller parties and produce coalition governments, SWAPO has maintained a large majority in government since independence. Legislative majorities in Africa are in fact highest in countries using proportional representation for their assembly elections – Namibia and South Africa (von Craneburgh, 2007:960). Whether this is due to particular features of political life in these countries (loyalty to particular parties associated with the resistance or to tribal parties), or because of some other feature of post-conflict polities would make an interesting subject for further research.
Government performance since independence

Economic growth

Namibia’s economy is one of the strongest in Southern Africa. The country’s GDP per capita growth from 1989-2004 is shown in Table 7.1. Namibia is a strong economic performer in Southern Africa, and its economy is positively rated for its ease of doing business and competitiveness (Freedom House, 2010).

Table 7.1: GDP per capita growth in Namibia, 1989-2004

Immediately after independence, however, there were concerns about Namibia’s financial future. The South African government insisted that Namibia take fiscal responsibility for foreign debt incurred when Namibia was part of South Africa, in the amount of approximately R727 million (comprising approximately 20 per cent of Namibia’s then GDP). Just before independence, South Africa had also allowed Namibian civil servants to invest their pension funds in South Africa, which led to a further R400 million loss of capital stock to Namibia (Cliffe, 1994:230). This meant that the incoming government was nearly bankrupt, and a donor’s conference was held in June 1990 to attempt to attract funding from overseas donors to help the fledgling country to begin governing itself. The conference succeeded in attracting donor pledges of US$696 million over a three-year period. Namibia joined the IMF, the World Bank, and the Lome Convention of the EC, but was not considered eligible for
least-developed country status because its GDP per capita was more than $1000. This was unfortunate as this figure said more about the grave inequalities in Namibia than about the conditions of the average Namibian, which were not good (Cliffe, 1994:230-1).

Namibia’s financial situation has improved since independence: Namibia has had a current account surplus each year, and its financial system is relatively sophisticated, boasting four commercial banks, a large number of micro-lending institutions, a stock exchange, many insurance companies and several pension funds (World Bank, 2009:viii). The World Bank attributes this economic success to ‘...generally prudent fiscal policies, a stable political environment, a fairly developed infrastructure, and a strong legal and regulatory environment’ (World Bank, 2009:9). Minerals account for more than half of all exports, while the services sector dominates the economy and is responsible for approximately 59% of output (World Bank, 2009:6). Despite Namibia’s mineral wealth, it appears to have avoided the poor governance and tendencies toward violent conflict which sometimes afflict other resource-rich nations (see discussion in Chapter 3 and results in Chapter 4 concerning the implications of natural resources for government performance). Indeed, given its per capita income, and according to the results discussed in Chapter 4, the income from resources in Namibia may well be contributing to the good performance of its government.

The Bonn International Centre for Conversion’s Resource Conflict Monitor classes Namibia as a High Resource Governance Country, with high levels of resource governance and low levels of conflict intensity. In July 2011, the Mines and Energy Minister for Namibia, Mr Isak Katali, announced that huge reserves of oil had been discovered off the Southern Namibian coast. It is hoped that the oil wealth, when it begins to be generated from the exploitation of these offshore reserves, is managed in a responsible fashion for the benefit of all Namibians. Namibia might consider the example of Timor-Leste’s sovereign wealth fund (discussed earlier in Chapter 5) in considering how best to do this. Despite its many successes, Namibia has not emulated the economic success of its neighbour South Africa, although its economic fate is

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34 R Gryenberg, 2011: "Is it Norway or Nigeria for Namibia?", Mmegi online, Friday 19 August
closely linked to South Africa: the Namibian dollar is pegged at par to the South African rand, Namibia is part of the South African Customs Union, and most of its food and vehicle imports come from South Africa (Namibian Economic Policy Research Unit, 2010). The Namibian economy is largely dominated by private sector companies, although many essential services are provided by semi-state bodies, including power, water, telecommunications and transport. While these semi-state bodies are sometimes accused of mismanagement and corruption, the government has not indicated that it intends to privatise them (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2009).

**Democratic performance**

Namibia’s Polity score has remained constant at +6 since independence, according to the Polity Project. The Freedom House Freedom in the World 2011 report classifies Namibia as ‘free’, giving it a score of 2 for Political Rights and 2 for Civil Liberties (Freedom House, 2011). Namibia has held repeated elections which have been declared to be free and fair, although there were some concerns that the most recent elections in 2009 were marred by concerns that the government radio station was markedly pro-SWAPO, the counting of votes was delayed, and there were a number of organisational calamities during the process of holding the polls (Freedom House, 2010). Broadly speaking, human rights are respected in Namibia, the media are free (if influenced by the government), and the separation of powers between the legislature and the judiciary are respected (Freedom House, 2010).

**Institutional choices**

The Namibian Constitution, which was introduced when Namibia became independent, not only sets out the structure of the government, but also contains a number of guarantees of human rights protections, including a prohibition on apartheid being practised in any form, some principles on which state policy should be based, and establishes the court system and judiciary in Namibia.

**Executive Structure**

The Namibian Constitution provides for an independently elected president, as well as a legislature and an independent judiciary. It has been termed ‘semi-presidential’ as the head of state (the President) is elected separately to the head of government (the Prime Minister, who is accountable to the legislature. The President’s cabinet must be drawn
from the members of the National Assembly (the lower house of the legislature), and the main powers of the President (saving in a state of emergency) are to appoint heads of armed forces and police, and sending laws to Parliament to consider. The President has the power to dissolve the National Assembly if the government cannot govern effectively, and dissolution must be followed within 90 days by elections of both the Assembly and the President.

There are five-year fixed terms, and the Namibian Parliament is bicameral with the upper house, the National Council, having a role in reviewing legislation. The role of the Prime Minister is not as strong as in some other political systems, as in this system the President has responsibility for appointing Ministers. The first President of Namibia was Sam Nujoma. Murray (1992:10) noted that former exiles and former members of SWAPO are dominant in the first Namibian Cabinet. There were a number of white members of the government, including the finance minister, attorney general, deputy trade minister, and deputy works and transport minister (Murray 1992:11). The first government was balanced in terms of ethnic and regional composition, and enjoyed a productive first year in office, but the slow pace of economic recovery in the first years after self-government threatened to cause problems (Murray 1992:11). This experience is common to many post-conflict and post-communist states in which much is expected following the transition to democracy. There is frequently frustration at the slow pace of change and the failure of democratic political systems to immediately deliver high standards of living, and this can lead to electoral dissatisfaction and changes of government in the early stages of democratisation.

The Constitution provided for term limitations, meaning that the President could only stand for election twice, until then-President Nujoma and his supporters amended the Constitution in 1999 to allow Nujoma, as first President of Namibia, to run for a third term. He pledged not to run for a fourth and did not do so. Having a President in addition to a Prime Minister has not been a source of instability for Namibia, but because both have been drawn from the same party, the President and Prime Minister may not have acted as a check on each other’s power either. The interconnection of President and legislature established by the Namibian Constitution has probably acted to entrench SWAPO’s position, and may have meant that when Nujoma wanted to amend the Constitution, there was little meaningful opposition to his plans.
**Federal vs. Unitary Government**

Regional and local governments in Namibia were provided for in the Constitution, with elections first scheduled to be held in 1992. For these purposes, the country is divided into thirteen regions, the boundaries of which were determined by a delimitation commission and approved by the Namibian cabinet (Murray, 1992:12). Regional governments in Namibia have been instrumental in cementing SWAPO's hold on the government there, for two reasons – firstly, except in certain areas, they have been strongholds of support for SWAPO, and secondly, because regional governments vote for members of the National Council, so SWAPO's high primary vote in the regional councils meant that it was represented by even more members of the central government.

**Electoral system**

The President of Namibia is directly elected by an absolute majority of adult Namibians voting. The bicameral legislature consists of the National Assembly, of which 72 members are elected by list proportional representation, and six members are directly appointed by the President, and the National Council, which has 26 seats whose members are appointed by regional councils. The Assembly sits for a five-year term, although it may be dissolved by the President before this term expires, and Council Members sit for six-year terms.

Not all went smoothly in the first years after independence in Namibia: there were concerns that violence between white farmers and SWAPO supporters could erupt; but SWAPO's attempts at reconciliation were effective at defusing this situation (Cliffe, 1994:218-9). In some reserves and in the northern parts of Namibia, there was violence immediately after the Constituent Assembly election results, and there were suspicions that some of this violence was orchestrated and not merely random. Occasional acts of sabotage by white, right-wing extremists continued, and there was some frustration with the government's failure to modify the economic and social inequalities inherited from the South African system. Public anger became even stronger when it seemed that members of the new government were benefiting from their positions as well, and there was a strong negative reaction when President Nujoma ordered and received his executive jet in 1992, at the same time as many people in Namibia were victims of a
severe drought and foreign development agencies were being asked to contribute funds to assist them (Cliffe, 1994: 229). There are more recent concerns that the bureaucracy in Namibia is ‘bloated and inefficient’, and that its personnel lack the technical skills to implement programs to address inequality and poverty in Namibia. Important government policies on decentralisation, land reform and creation of a Competition Commission have not been implemented over many years, with these problems attributed to poor political decision-making, lack of training and funding problems within the civil service (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2009).

**Issues**

*One-party dominance*

The SWAPO party’s dominance of Namibian politics began with the first election after independence, at which SWAPO obtained 57% of the votes, and continues to this day: the SWAPO party is still the dominant political force in the country. The first government team included members from different factions within Namibia – two white ministers were given posts, and the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance were offered the opportunity to participate, although they declined, on the basis that it would not be compatible with their role as Opposition party in the National Assembly (Murray, 1992:10). Senior posts were given to the former SWAPO leaders, however, including the Prime Ministership, the ministries of foreign affairs, home affairs, defence, justice, trade and industry, and mines and energy. SWAPO’s initial and continuing appeal may be linked to its role as the party most associated with the liberation struggle in Namibia (Salih, 2007:676), and it has been suggested that its beginnings as a liberation movement have left a legacy in the party of an ‘authoritarian and hierarchical character’, and a low tolerance for dissent (Van Craneburgh, 2006:600). Similar observations were made of the Fretilin party which arose from the liberation struggle in Timor-Leste.

The party system in Namibia, which has been called a ‘hyper-majoritarian’ system, has effects on the way other organs of government function: the fact that individual party members rely on the party both for selection and ballot position under the list

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proportional representation electoral system may strengthen the dominance of the party executive (Van Craneburgh, 2006:595-6); and the fact that the President appoints the Cabinet, and to date has always been from the same party as the majority of Assembly members, further reinforces this dominance. Further, the President has mainly chosen members of the Assembly as Cabinet appointees, so the Assembly’s role of oversight over the government is said to be undermined by the fact that most Cabinet members are members of both the Assembly and the government (Van Craneburgh, 2006: 596); although in Parliamentary systems all Ministers are drawn from members of the houses of Parliament, without apparent detriment. Because of SWAPO’s dominance of regional councils, from which delegates to the National Council (the upper house of the Namibian legislature) are chosen, both houses of the bicameral system, as well as local governments, and the Presidency, are dominated by SWAPO (Van Craneburgh, 2006:597).

Although the institutions in Namibia meet many of the features Lijphart prescribed for a consociational polity, the behaviour of elite actors and the political culture within Namibia means that the state does not operate as a consociational entity (Van Craneburgh, 2006:599). The President’s ability to nominate the top 30 of 72 candidates on SWAPO’s election list further centralises power, and backbenchers fear criticising the party as they may lose their nomination, and it has been observed that “…It is ironic that it is precisely this formal provision in Namibia, which is associated with the PR electoral system with party lists so much favoured by Lijphart, which strongly enhances the power of the one-party government” (Van Craneburgh, 2006:601). There are also concerns that because many Parliamentarians are also members of the executive branch (either as ministers or deputies), that there is not a proper separation of powers between the legislature and the executive (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2009). Then President Sam Nujoma’s successful attempt to change the Constitution in 1999 to allow himself another term as President led to disunity within SWAPO and the formation of a breakaway party, the Congress of Democrats. Members of this new party were criticised by the President and the Home Affairs Minister, and opposition parties were intimidated by SWAPO supporters at various places in Namibia during the 1999 election process (2006:600).
Support for democracy (as opposed to other kinds of government) in Namibia declined slightly over a four-year period, according to several Afrobarometer surveys, while satisfaction with the way democracy was being delivered in Namibia rose slightly during the same period, and the degree to which a country is perceived as democratic by its citizens has been linked to the recency of democratic alternation (Bratton, 2004: 149-151, 156-7). Civil society plays an important part in public debates in Namibia, with opinions expressed by civil society groups being sometimes more influential than those of the official political opposition (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2009).

Namibia does not meet Samuel Huntington’s ‘two-turnover’ test for the consolidation of democracy; in fact it does not even meet a ‘one-turnover test’, as SWAPO has been in power since independence, dominating both the National Assembly and the Presidency. Despite this lack of alternation between political parties, which is sometimes a sign of a repressive regime, Namibia scores well on other democratic measures. It is considered by other writers to be a ‘consolidated democracy’ – one of the few in Southern Africa (Elgie, 2005:103). Political parties other than SWAPO, such as the DTA (Democratic Turnhalle Alliance), and Congress of Democrats (COD) are free to operate and have had members elected to the National Assembly over the course of several elections. Political rights and freedoms are largely respected, as discussed earlier in this Chapter.

Recently, power was turned over from the first president Sam Nujoma to the second president Hifikepunye Pohamba, and although the second president is from the same party, and the change occurred after what has been described as a ‘...bitter succession contest within the party’ (Freedom House, 2010), the transfer of power was effected without violence, and Pohamba won the Presidential election with 75 per cent of the vote (Freedom House, 2010). SWAPO’s dominance of Namibian politics since independence may merely be characteristic of this relatively early phase of the development of democracy in Namibia: the strength of the SWAPO party may decline as the country moves further away in time from the events of the liberation struggle, and the party’s moral claim to leadership wanes.
Poverty and Inequality

Although it is classed as a middle-income country, Namibia has the dubious distinction of having the most unequal distribution of wealth in the world, as measured by the Gini index. GDP per capita has doubled in real terms, but the poverty rate is the same as it was (Economist, 2011), suggesting that the growth in GDP continues to benefit only the rich, and that the poor will continue to remain poor unless major changes are made. It has been suggested that this is part of the legacy of apartheid, in which these separatist policies led to a ‘highly dualistic society, with income and wealth skewed toward the minority white elites, creating one of the most highly inequitable societies in the world’ (World Bank, 2009: 2). There is a new black elite, which has arisen through the program of Black Economic Empowerment, who have also benefited from Namibia’s increasing wealth, but the economic benefits have not diffused further to benefit the majority of Namibians (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2009).

Inequality in Namibia has been ameliorated since independence: Namibia’s Gini coefficient has improved from 70 in 1993/94 to 60 in 2003/04 (Economist, 2011), but it remains extremely high. The poorest ten per cent of households in Namibia receive only one per cent of Namibia’s total income, while the wealthiest ten per cent of households receive more than half of the country’s total income. The number of poor and extremely poor households in Namibia declined between the early 1990s and the early 2000s, and access to basic education and primary health care improved (World Bank, 2009: viii). There are some problems which have proved more difficult to solve, however: unemployment is rising, particularly among the young: there is 57% unemployment among 20-24-year-olds, and between 1991 and 2005, the total unemployment rate rose from 19% to 37% (World Bank, 2009: ix).

Namibia does not have a comprehensive welfare system: AIDS orphans receive a state allowance, as do people over 60 years old, but as life expectancy in Namibia is falling it is sobering to realise that many Namibians will not live long enough to qualify for a pension (Economist, 2011). Howard notes that “Namibia remains economically

36 The Gini index measures the extent to which income distribution among individuals or households deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Gini index of 0 represents perfect equality of income distribution, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality of distribution: World Bank, Development Research Group.
37 For comparison, Albania’s Gini coefficient in 2004 was 31, and Argentina’s was 51.
dependent on South Africa and economically stratified internally, between a growing rich non-white and white class, and a large poor black underclass. Thus, while the political forms of apartheid have been outlawed, economic divisions persist.” (Howard, 2002: 126). The existing inequalities of income in Namibia have been attributed to the way the apartheid system restricted access to resources and income for the majority of Namibians, as well as to the current economy’s heavy reliance on mineral resources, which are capital- but not labour-intensive in their production (Republic of Namibia, 2008:37).

Existing inequalities of resources are compounded by weaknesses in the educational system, meaning that those who grow up in poverty are more likely to lead their lives in poverty as well. A large proportion of adults in Namibia are functionally illiterate, even if they have completed primary and sometimes secondary education. Even though enrolment rates are rising, the World Bank considers that the quality of education in Namibia is generally poor. (World Bank, 2009:5). There are low rates of completion of tertiary education, which does not bode well for the development of a professional workforce. Only 20% of those commencing degrees in science, 35% of those commencing degrees in the humanities, and 44% of those starting degrees in education complete them (World Bank, 2009: ix). An IMF study has strongly linked unemployment to lack of skills in Namibia, as compared to other countries where unemployment affects skilled and unskilled workers alike (IMF, 2006, cited in World Bank, 2009:6). A government-sponsored study into poverty and inequality in Namibia found that households which were female-headed, rural and had one or more children were far more likely to be poor (Republic of Namibia, 2008:39), and proposed that policy interventions should target these households for maximum effectiveness.

Conclusion

Namibia has, by most measures, been a successful nation since independence: it is one of only nine African countries classified as ‘free’ by Freedom House, it receives the second-highest ranking from Freedom House (2 out of 7) for both political rights and civil liberties, GDP has grown on average by 4.2% per year since independence, and there are generally good relations between the different races, and a free press (Economist, 2011). After a long-running conflict with South Africa, and a range of
tribal and ethnic divisions which could easily have led to internal unrest, Namibia’s government has been very successful at establishing a new nation. Despite initial economic fragility, and ongoing problems with poverty, Namibia has maintained stable government since independence.

The liberation struggle may have proved a unifying force for many Namibians of different ethnic and tribal backgrounds. The leaders of the resistance used their time in exile to make plans for the future of an independent Namibia, planning programs for medical care, education, political training, rural development, job training, child care, and sports. SWAPO programs in South West Africa were considered pilots for projects to be undertaken in an independent South West Africa (Sparks and Green, 1992:31). The commitment of SWAPO leaders to developing the skills of Namibians, even those in exile in refugee camps, speaks to a resilience and optimism which probably helped Namibia considerably when it did become independent.

The manner in which the Namibian Constitution was made has also been cited as one cause of its success: the fact that all the parties interested in the constitutional reform process agreed in 1981 on the principles under which the Constituent Assembly was to be established, and on which the Constitution of Namibia would be based, was crucial to the later success of the constitution-making process in Namibia, during which the Constituent Assembly adopted these principles unanimously (Benomar, 2004:84-85). The time taken to discuss and debate the constitution may also have been important. One of Benomar’s suggested guidelines for any constitution-making process is that talks among the major stakeholders be ‘unhurried and thorough’ – this was certainly the case in Namibia, and for example, was not the case in Timor-Leste, where discussions, and particularly the national debate regarding the Constitution were often hurried to meet the timetable of the UN mission rather than the internal tempo of discussions. Namibia had ‘intense long-term public participation’, as the public were kept well-informed about constitutional issues through the political party campaigns and information disseminated through national radio stations (Benomar, 2004:88).

The long process of UN resolutions in relation to Namibia, together with the Turnhalle conference in mid-1970s, provided representatives from most ethnic groups with opportunities to debate the shape of the future Namibia. People from the different groups became accustomed to being involved in the political process and began
debating the shape of Namibia’s future Parliament and Constitution some 15 years before independence was finally obtained (see Griffiths, 1998:114-116). This process, and the participation by all of these groups in it, meant that the journey toward independence and the process of political empowerment began much earlier for Namibians than, for example, it did for the Timorese.

National unity may also have been assisted by the fact that there was only one main resistance group involved in ousting the colonial power – although Namibia is diverse in terms of tribes as well as incorporating some mixed-race and German settlers, the Namibians had overcome internal divisions to some extent, and were united against their common foe. Paris suggests that that the lack of effective enemies of the government in Namibia played a part in its success after conflict: South African military forces were entirely withdrawn from Namibia after the conflict ended, and the white settlers who remained in Namibia were not able to wage war against the new Namibian government, and were forced to accommodate themselves to the new regime (2004: 139-140). Retaining these settlers may have helped Namibia to maintain its economy and government services after independence.

SWAPO effectively managed the transition from a national liberation organisation (which included a military component) to a political party. Security sector reforms proceeded relatively smoothly after independence, with the formation of a National Defence Force, which combined ex-PLAN soldiers, and former members of the South West Africa Territorial Force (Murray, 1992:14). The brief term of the UN mission may also have assisted the Namibian government in gaining in stability and self-reliance from an early stage. Because the mission was of relatively short duration, there was no chance for the people to become dependent on the UN: in other countries where the UN has had a longer presence, the presence of many well-paid international advisers has had a significant impact on the economy, and ‘bubbles’ have often formed around real estate, employment and the provision of services to international staff. Local staff with marketable skills (particularly language and literacy skills) are advantaged over those who do not have such skills, often upsetting established social orders, and prices for real estate soar as accommodation is found for highly-paid international workers. Because this mission was so short, these kinds of distortions were less likely. Howard cites her interview with then Namibian Prime Minister Hage Geingob, “UN diplomacy in Namibia played a major part in the independence process. Namibia today is the child
of international solidarity. It's because of the UN connection that we've been so successful" (2002:127).

Many key aspects of the shape of the independent Namibia were determined concurrently by the military struggle for independence, and the political struggle for legitimacy. Perhaps this is part of the key to the success of the Namibian government after conflict: many of these questions, which can be divisive, were worked out prior to independence. In addition, the lack of significant internal divisions in Namibia among ethnic groups, and the political consensus that SWAPO should continue to administer the country have been unifying factors.

After almost 20 years of independence, Namibia has maintained a peaceful, multiracial society, albeit one increasingly dominated at both local and federal levels by SWAPO. Lack of political will for land redistribution may mean that political power is concentrated in the mainly Ovambo SWAPO politicians, while economic power remains concentrated in the hands of the land-owning white minority. To date, all parties seem to have realised that their greater interests lie in maintaining the status quo in relation to property rights. SWAPO’s electoral dominance has been obtained at elections which are generally agreed by international observers to have been free and fair. Namibia’s post-conflict government has achieved political stability, economic growth, and the foundations of a stable society, which are considerable accomplishments.
CHAPTER 8

CASE STUDY 3 – BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

“No language can describe adequately the condition of that large part of the Balkan peninsula – Serbia, Bosnia, Herzegovina and other provinces. Political intrigues, constant rivalries, a total absence of public spirit. Hatred of all races, animosities of rival religions and absence of any controlling power.”

British Prime Minister, Benjamin Disraeli, remarks in a Parliamentary debate on the Balkan situation, October 1878

Introduction

Bosnia-Herzegovina was part of the former nation of Yugoslavia until 1992, when it was recognised as an independent nation. Shortly after independence was declared, Bosnia-Herzegovina began a three and a half-year civil war, in which fighting took place between the three major ethnic groups within the country: Bosnian Serbs, Muslims and Croats. Military and peacekeeping interventions by the United Nations and NATO were eventually successful in halting the fighting, and a peace accord was signed in 1995. The Dayton Accords created a federal state with two highly autonomous sub-states (Republika Srpska and the Bosniac/Croat Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina) and an internationally supervised district (Brcko) within the nation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (referred to as Bosnia in the remainder of this chapter). The Dayton Accords also established the Office of the High Representative (OHR), an ad hoc international body which was intended to oversee implementation of the civilian part of the agreement, but which has persisted and gained in power since that time.

Although conflict has not recurred in Bosnia, deep divisions remain within society and government. The government remains split along ethnic lines, and individuals report discrimination in access to services, employment and housing in areas where their ethnic group is not dominant. Corruption is perceived to be a significant problem within the government, police force and customs service. The continued presence of the OHR more than a decade after the signing of the peace accords is testament to the uncertainty felt by international observers about the ability of the disparate ethnic groups in Bosnia to live together peacefully, and to concerns felt about the institutional deadlock which has plagued the nation in recent years.
Background

Bosnia is located in the Balkan region of south-eastern Europe. Its population is estimated at 3,759,633 people (World Development Indicators, 2011), a fall from the figure of 4.38 million reported in the 1991 census there. This is thought to be partly attributable to the conflict, in which it is estimated that 100,000 people were killed, and partly due to a decline in the birth rate over a long period (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008). Emigration may also have played a part in this decrease. Life expectancy at birth is approximately 75 years (World Development Indicators, 2011).

The adult literacy rate in Bosnia is 98%, and GDP per capita is $8752 (measured in current international dollars, with purchasing power parity: World Bank World Development Indicators, 2011). Bosnia and Herzegovina’s economy was growing steadily, averaging 5% per year growth in GDP between 2000 and 2008, mainly driven by consumer demand. In 2009, however, the economy contracted 3.1%, and in 2010 it only grew 0.8% (World Bank World Development Indicators, 2011).

History

The country we now know as Bosnia was occupied from Palaeolithic times onwards (Lovrenovic, 2001:13). Early in the first millennium BC, the permanent settlement of ethnic and cultural groups began to occur in Bosnia (Lovrenovic, 2001: 19). In 391, the edict of Theodosius made the Christian faith the official religion of the region (Lovrenovic, 2001: 37-9). From the sixth century onwards, Illyrium was largely populated by Slavs. After the Slavs conquered Bosnia, they became intermingled with the earlier inhabitants of the area, and were converted to Christianity. Islam came to Bosnia from the first half of the 15th century, and the 16th and 17th centuries saw four civilizations co-existing in Bosnia: Catholic-Croat, Muslim-Oriental, Jewish-Sephardic, and Orthodox-Serb (Lovrenovic, 2001:234-5). From 1878-1918, Bosnia-Herzegovina was occupied by the Austro-Hungarian Empire, being formally annexed as part of the Empire in 1908. (Malcolm, 1996, 150).

After the First World War ended, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was founded (from 1929 this was called the Kingdom of Yugoslavia) and continued until 1941, when Bosnia and Herzegovina was incorporated into Croatia. From 1945-66,
Bosnia and Herzegovina had quasi-colonial status within the Yugoslav state, and from 1966-1982, the republics within Yugoslavia became more and more autonomous (Lovrenovic, 2001:237).

Compared to the other parts of Yugoslavia, Bosnia was in decline in the 1950s and 1960s: it produced a dwindling amount of national income, and had the lowest rate of economic growth of all the republics. In 1961, the majority of Bosnia was declared to be an under-developed region. It had the highest rate of emigration within Yugoslavia, mainly comprising Serbs moving to live in Serbia. One result of this population movement was that the Muslim proportion of the population overtook that of the Serbs, and by the middle of the 1960s Muslims were the most numerous component of the populace (Malcolm, 1996:201-2).

As communism began to decline in the then Soviet Union and throughout Eastern Europe in the late 1980s, the doctrine of unity and tolerance which it had upheld in Yugoslavia also began to lose force, and the ethnic divisions which had existed for centuries within Bosnia took on a greater importance (Malcolm, 1996). More broadly, the Yugoslav republic began to break up along ethnic lines. In November 1990, the first democratic, multi-party elections were held in Yugoslavia, and three nationalist parties were successful in gaining power: the Party of Democratic Action, the Serb Democratic Party and the Croat Democratic Union. After these elections, members of these three parties began to talk about a possible compromise in relation to Bosnia’s future.

The idea that Bosnia could be a sovereign nation was supported by Muslim and Croatian politicians, but opposed by Serbian leaders (Donia and Fine, 1994: 229). Serbian and Croatian nationalism had been on the rise since 1989, with Slobodan Milosevic, the Serb President, and Franjo Tudjman, the Croatian President both ambitious to add Bosnia to their portion of Yugoslavia (Malcolm, 1996:217-8). In the final years of the Yugoslav republic, nationalist rhetoric became more common on government-controlled radio and television stations in Croatia, and state-controlled enterprises in Croatia dismissed thousands of Serb workers; a referendum was held by

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39 The Communist Party in Bosnia (as well as in most of the other republics) had disbanded in early 1990 and had been replaced by nationalist or national parties (Malcolm, 1996:217).
Serbian activists in majority Serb areas of Croatia, which voted overwhelmingly in favour of autonomy (Donia and Fine, 1994:223).

Serbian activists in Croatia, encouraged by the Serb media in Belgrade, held a referendum in Serbian areas of Croatia in August-September 1990, and those who voted were overwhelmingly in favour of autonomy. In response, and contrary to Croatian authority, the Serbian National Council proclaimed the ‘Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina’ within Croatia (Donia and Fine, 1994:223-4). Serb paramilitaries in Croatia were given arms by the Yugoslav People’s Army (YPA), and the Croatian defence forces also increased their arms holdings. When the Serbian autonomous region was declared, less than four weeks passed before armed skirmishes between Serbs and Croatian police began. These escalated, and when Croatia held a referendum in May 1991 on independence from Yugoslavia, the ‘Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina’ held its own referendum, at which 99% of those who voted opted to leave Croatia and join Serbia. At the main referendum, boycotted by most Serbs, 94% of voters in Croatia were in favour of independence (Donia and Fine, 1994:224-5). Slovenia also announced its independence, and the conflict over Croatia and Slovenia began. The conflict over Slovenia ended relatively quickly, only 10 days after it had commenced (Kumar and Puri, 2009: 77). The conflict in Croatia, however, was far more serious, and the Yugoslav army used bases inside Bosnia to bomb Dubrovnik and other Croatian cities.

In August 1991, the Badinter Commission was established by the EC to decide on the criteria which could be used to determine whether the new ex-Yugoslavian states could be recognised by the EU. The Commission decided that each of the former Yugoslav republics could be recognised as independent states if they met certain minimum conditions, including popular support for independence, and protection for minorities. This decision alarmed many Serbs, as 26% of Serbs were resident outside Serbia (Cousens and Harland, 2004:53-4). Bosnian Serbs first wanted to keep Bosnia within a smaller Yugoslavia, in which Serbs would still be predominant, but they then sought their own territory, ‘Republika Srpska’ (Cousens and Harland, 2004:54-55).

Vukovar and Dubrovnik were bombed by the YPA, and as the conflict grew more intense, international powers began to seek a negotiated solution. The European Union
and the United Nations sent diplomats, and in January 1992, UN Envoy Cyrus Vance, the former US Secretary of State, was able to announce that a ceasefire had been agreed between the YPA, Serbia and Croatia, and that a UN peacekeeping force (UNPROFOR) would be coming in to maintain the ceasefire in Croatia (Donia and Fine, 1994:226-7).

Croatian independence meant that Bosnia needed to seek independence too, otherwise it would be part of what was left of Yugoslavia (often termed ‘rump Yugoslavia’), under Serb control (Malcolm, 1996:230). The Croatian war had other impacts on Bosnia too – the YPA had used the Serb-dominated regions of Bosnia as bases to stage their operations in Croatia, and preparations had been made for a conflict in Bosnia. By the time a ceasefire was agreed upon in January 1992, the YPA was ready to seize control of much of the countryside in Bosnia (Donia and Fine, 1994:227-9).

Between 29 February and 1 March 1992, a referendum was held on whether Bosnia and Herzegovina should be an independent state. Almost two-thirds of eligible citizens voted in the referendum (the major Serb political party urged its supporters to do so), and of those, 99.7% voted in favour of Bosnian independence. The Bosniac-led government then announced Bosnia-Herzegovina’s independence and on 6 April 1992 Bosnia was recognised as an independent state by the European Commission, its first independence as a state since 1463.

Conflict erupted as Serb militias tried to gain and hold as much Bosnian territory as possible. As early as the day when independence was proclaimed, Serb snipers in Sarajevo attacked peace demonstrators with machine-gun fire (Donia and Fine, 1994:238). As a proportion of the Croat population also wished to separate from Bosnia, the Bosnian government and the Bosniac (Bosnian Muslim) population were left very vulnerable (Polity IV, 2009:2).

Although UN peacekeeping troops began arriving in the Serbian border area of Croatia in January 1992, in March and April 1992, Bosnia-Herzegovina was attacked by the armed forces of the Serb Democratic Party and the Yugoslav People’s Army. On 6 April Sarajevo was shelled and subject to sniper fire. War crimes began to be committed in eastern Bosnia, Podrinje and the Sana valley. The YPA’s change of position from being an army protecting all Yugoslavs to effectively becoming a Serb
army and an agent of Serb nationalism has been suggested as one of the major factors which contributed to conflict in Bosnia (Donia and Fine, 1994:220). The UN peacekeepers’ mandate was enlarged in June 1992 to include maintaining Sarajevo airport’s operation, and to ensure that humanitarian supplies were able to be delivered to the people of Sarajevo. In September UNPROFOR’s mandate was extended again to ensure delivery of humanitarian supplies throughout Bosnia, and monitoring the ‘safe havens’ around five towns and Sarajevo.

The parties to the conflict were ill-matched: Bosnian Serbs controlled approximately 90,000 troops in Bosnia, as well as more than 40 fighter planes, hundreds of tanks and heavy artillery, and thousands more troops in Serbia; while the Croatian Territorial forces had approximately 12,000 men stationed in western Herzegovina (Donia and Fine, 1994: 239). There were approximately 50,000 Bosnian Territorial forces, armed mainly with small arms and a single tank, who were completely overpowered by the YPA and its allies (Donia and Fine, 1994: 239-40).

The Serbs achieved their aims quickly, taking control over a great deal of Bosnia within several weeks. The Serbs held Sarajevo under siege for three years, allowing in enough humanitarian assistance to keep most people alive, but also using snipers and artillery which killed approximately 10,000 civilians, mainly Bosnian Muslims (Cousens and Harland, 2004:56).

The YPA were ordered, under pressure from the international community, to end aggression in Bosnia, and the federal Presidency of rump Yugoslavia ordered the YPA to leave Bosnia (Donia and Fine, 243). Fourteen thousand troops withdrew, but about seventy-five thousand remained, on the basis that they were of Bosnian origin, and the heavy weaponry of the YPA remained with them. The YPA was thus divided into two, and the Bosnian component was retitled the Army of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia, under the command of General Ratko Mladic (Donia and Fine, 244).

40 United Nations, URL:

Approximately three weeks after the conflict began, an estimated 370,000 Bosnians were refugees; eight weeks after the beginning of the conflict, the UNHCR estimated that the number had grown to 750,000. Nearly 1,000,000 refugees stayed in Bosnia, but others fled to Croatia and Serbia, and to other Western European nations (Donia and Fine, 1994:244-5). These refugee flows were created in part by the policy of ‘ethnic cleansing’, which was carried out by all three parties to the conflict in Bosnia, although it is suggested that the Serbian forces and the YPA were responsible for the worst instances of this violence (Donia and Fine, 1994:245-6). Ethnic cleansing has been defined as: “...terror practiced openly and ostentatiously, calculated to drive from their homes those long-time inhabitants belonging to the ‘wrong’ ethnic group...the ethnic cleansers of Bosnia use killings and other atrocities to sow fear and panic and to induce flight” (Donia and Fine, 1994:247).

In 1993-94, intense fighting broke out between the Croat Defence Council and the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. A mortar shell launched into the marketplace in Sarajevo in February 1994 killed 68 civilians and wounded 200 more; this incident triggered a more forceful international response than had previously been possible. It was agreed that NATO air strikes would be used against the Serbs, and NATO demanded that all heavy weapons be withdrawn from a newly-created exclusion zone around Sarajevo by February 21, which caused the end of the heavy artillery attacks on that city (Donia and Fine, 1994:168-9). On 18 March 1994 the Washington Agreement was signed, bringing an end to hostilities between these parties, and establishing the federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The conflict reached its most intense phase in July 1995 when the Bosniac ‘safe haven’ of Srebrenica was invaded by Serb forces. Although this town was ostensibly protected by UNPROFOR, the UN force was hampered by strict instructions allowing its members to only act in self-defence, and lacking clarity about acting in the defence of civilians. Without adequate protection from the UN or NATO, more than 7000 Bosniacs were killed over the next four days. They were executed by firing squads, beaten, or killed by grenades or gunfire. The Serbs then attempted to conceal the evidence of the killings by burying the bodies of those killed using earth-moving equipment (Cousens and Harland, 2004:59). The conflict continued for several more months, in which the Croat and Bosniac forces began to gain ground on the Serbs, until the Serbs, who had had to cede slightly more than half of Bosnian territory, began to
sue for peace. UNPROFOR supervised the disengagement of the three forces (Cousens and Harland, 2004: 61).

**Dayton settlement**

On 1 November 1995, negotiations toward a peace settlement began at the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio. Negotiations were conducted by the United States, with representatives of the EU and the Contact Group (comprising the US, the UK, France, Germany, Italy and Russia) observing. The Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs were represented in negotiations by Croatia and Serbia. An ad hoc group of more than fifty states which professed an interest in the peace process was also set up and named the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) (Cousens and Harland, 2006:66). The peace agreement had three goals: to end the fighting permanently, to establish a state within Bosnia, and to "restore the multiethnic fabric of Bosnian society" (Cousens and Harland, 2004: 61). The Dayton Agreement has been called "...one of the most comprehensive constitutional modelling exercises ever undertaken...a compendium of contemporary thinking on conflict resolution" (Cox, 2004:253).

On 21 November 1995, an agreement was signed. The Dayton agreement, formally known as the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, provided for the termination of military hostilities between the parties, the division of the country into two distinct sub-national entities (Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina), and for the political arrangements which would serve the new country. Military enforcement of the peace agreement was to be managed by the NATO force commanded by the US (IFOR), and the political transition would be managed by the High Representative, a senior European-appointed official. On December 20 the NATO IFOR force deployed into Bosnia and Herzegovina.

IFOR’s first priority was to secure the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL), which was to separate the 51 per cent of territory allocated to the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the 49 per cent awarded to Republika Srpska. There were several problem areas: the town of Gorazde, which was majority Bosniac but was attached to the Federation only by a narrow strip of land, and town of Brcko which was ‘ethnically cleansed’ during conflict. The parties all agreed to the balance of forces between the
three sides to the dispute: there was a ratio of 40 percent Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to 30 percent Croatia to 30 percent Bosnia, with Bosnia's military forces divided in a ratio of 2:1 between the Federation and Republika Srpska (Cousens and Harland 2004:63).

The agreement provided for elections after 9 months, as long as a context of political neutrality could be established, and for a three-person presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Power would be shared between the three ethnic groups and between the Federal state, and the two sub-national entities. The entities retained control of their own armies, police, judiciary and social sectors, regional taxes and duties, and the federal Bosnian state was reliant on tax transfers from them (Cousens and Harland, 2004:63).

A number of annexes to the peace agreement promised a right of return for refugees, adherence to a number of human rights conventions, and the protection of minorities. They also provided for the establishment of joint authorities for the administration of transport, postal services, telecommunications and energy (Cousens and Harland 2004:65).

The agreement has been criticised for imposing too ambitious a timeframe for the withdrawal of peacekeeping troops and holding of elections, and secondly for the weak co-ordination mandate it provided for the Office of the High Representative (OHR) (Cousens and Harland, 2006:76-77). In 1998, the High Representative was granted what became known as the ‘Bonn Powers’, which allowed him or her to vet public appointments, remove public officials, or impose legislation on Bosnia. It has been suggested that: “This gradual empowerment involved an increasingly stark trade-off between results and ‘ownership’” (Cousens and Harland, 2006:77), and that the use of these powers weakened the engagement of local politicians with the reform process (Economist, 2008:5).

After the September 1996 elections were managed in peace, IFOR’s mission as set out in the Annexes to the Dayton agreement was complete, but further work needed to be done to stabilise society in Bosnia. NATO leaders decided to establish a follow-up mission, SFOR, which was charged with deterring renewed hostilities, promoting the
furtherance of the peace process, and supporting civilian organisations where possible.\(^{41}\) NATO’s SFOR Stabilisation force in Bosnia was active between January 1996 and December 2005, and during this time it de-militarized the Breko district, and supported the operations of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. At the conclusion of the SFOR mission, peacekeeping duties were handed over to EUFOR, a European Union force. EUFOR commenced operations in December 2004, with the goal of ensuring continued maintenance of peace and security in Bosnia. EUFOR operated until February 2007 at this level, and then the European Council decided to reduce force levels and reduced troop numbers to about 1600, with many Liaison and Observation Teams spread throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.\(^{42}\)

**Institutions**

**Government system**

The Dayton Accords set out a Constitution for Bosnia and Herzegovina at Annex 4. This provided for a directly elected President of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Presidency is tripartite, with three candidates elected from each of the three constituent ethnic communities within Bosnia (one Bosniac, one Croat and one Serb), each elected for two years after the first election, then for a four year term. The three members rotate every eight months.

**Electoral system**

The lower house of the legislature (the National House of Representatives) in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is directly elected by an open-list proportional representation system, with the upper house (the House of Peoples) indirectly elected by the parliaments of the entities. The President is elected by a plurality electoral system. The Parliamentary Assembly is bicameral, consisting of the House of Peoples, which comprises 15 seats (5 Croat, 5 Bosniac, 5 Serb), members of which are elected by the Federation House of Representatives and the RS National Assembly, and the House of Representatives, 42 seats, proportionally elected: 28 Bosniak-Croat, 14 Serb.

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\(^{41}\) [http://www.nato.int/sfor/docu/d981116a.htm](http://www.nato.int/sfor/docu/d981116a.htm), accessed 21/6/2011

Each party can veto any bill it deems ‘destructive of a vital interest’ (Reynolds, 2005:60).

The central state has powers over foreign affairs and trade, but more power lies with the entity legislatures. The electoral law until 2000 involved proportional representation with closed-party lists, but it was then amended to enable more moderate/non-ethnic parties to have a better chance of gaining seats in the house: Since then it has been a hybrid system, with a first past the post system for the Presidential elections, open-list proportional representation for the Parliament, a 3% electoral threshold, preferential voting and compensatory seats (Nenadovic, 2010: 1163).

Federal system

The Dayton Accords provided for a federal system of government in Bosnia. In addition to the division of power between the federal government, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the two entity governments, the Federation is subdivided into ten cantons: in five of these, Bosnian Muslims are predominant, in three Bosnian Croats are more numerous, and in the last two, the numbers of Muslims and Croats are approximately equal.

Government performance since independence

Economic growth

Economic growth in Bosnia has been strong, despite the fragmentation of the political system. A financial system has been established within Bosnia, and the national government administers customs and other taxation (Bartlett, 2008:41). There is a single currency within Bosnia, the Bosnian marka, replacing the three which were formerly used (the Bosnian dinar, the Croatian kuna and the Yugoslav dinar). The Bosnian marka was initially pegged to the German mark and is now linked to the euro at a fixed exchange rate (0.669 euro in 2011) (International Monetary Fund, 2011). Figure 8.1 below shows GDP growth in Bosnia since 1994.
Some problems, however, remain: there is considerable dependence on aid from external donors, a high current account deficit, high unemployment, and widespread poverty, with an estimated 30 per cent of Bosnians living in poverty (Bartlett, 2008:41). The fragmentation which affects all aspects of political life in Bosnia is also problematic in managing the economy here: there are separate ministries of finance between the entities and the local cantons, and a number of different government agencies other than the finance ministries can authorise public spending, making adherence to the budget challenging (Bartlett, 2008:42). Since 2005, government spending has outpaced government revenues, and the government has gone from having a modest budget surplus of 2 per cent in 2005 to a 3.5 per cent deficit in 2008. The IMF and the World Bank have recommended that reforming rights-based benefits such as those for veterans and former combatants, and wages and public administration will assist in returning the economy to a more sustainable state (IMF, 2011b:2-3).

Democracy

While Bosnia fulfils some of the criteria for a democracy, it falls short in a number of respects, and its performance as a functioning democracy has been mixed. The graph below (figure 8.2) illustrates the Freedom House scores for Bosnia for the period from
when conflict broke out to 2009. At present, Bosnia-Herzegovina is considered to be ‘partly free’, due to a number of factors: weak enforcement of freedom of the press, pressure on the judiciary by ethnic nationalist parties, and serious problems with corruption (Freedom House, 2011a).

Figure 8.2: Freedom House scores, Bosnia-Herzegovina 1992-2009

Elections in Bosnia have been extensively monitored by international observers, and have been declared to be relatively free and fair (Polity IV, Freedom House, 2011). Elected representatives meet in the Parliament, make legislation, and debate issues of national importance. However, there are a number of respects in which Bosnian democracy is not functioning well. It has been suggested that Bosnia ‘...falls short on democratic substance’ – that although it meets the formal qualifications for a democracy, there is not true freedom for the media, active participation by citizens in politics, or a genuine public debate driven by issues (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2009:2).

Independent government

Although Bosnia has maintained peace since the end of the conflict in 1995, and has relatively peacefully elected several governments, these governments cannot have been said to be independently governing Bosnia. The presence and actions of the Office of the High Representative (OHR), has meant that the elected government of Bosnia is not the only source of law or executive action within the country. Appointments to the executive branch of government must be made in consultation with the OHR, and the OHR has removed a number of public officials for corruption (Knaus and Martin,
Although meetings of the Peace Implementation Council regularly discuss the prospect of discontinuing the OHR’s role in Bosnia, they have never yet agreed that the time is right to do so. The High Representative is appointed from outside Bosnia, and the lack of accountability of the OHR is part of the central contradiction of all international administrations such as this one: the democratic ends which they claim to seek are often at odds with the autocratic means which they employ (Caplan, 2005b:464; see also Chesterman, 2004).

**Issues**

*Return of refugees*

Although many refugees have returned, many more remain to return to their homes, even at the time of writing, seventeen years after the signing of the Dayton Accords. During the conflict in Bosnia, over 2 million people were refugees, and the UNHCR stated that there were more than 1 million external refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) who had returned by mid-2006 (Amroso, 2011), with more than 100,000 IDPs still to be returned in mid-2011 and approximately 6000 Croatian refugees to be returned as well (UNHCR, 2011). Approximately 7000 refugees were still living in refugee camps in late 2010. Annex 7 of the Dayton Agreement provided for the return of refugees and IDPs to return home safely, and to either resume their lost property or be justly compensated. This provision was intended to undo the effects of ethnic cleansing, whilst recognising that not all refugees may want to return to their homes – for example, a significant number of Bosnian Serbs wished to remain in Republika Srpska, in which case compensation was a more appropriate option than property return (von Carlowitz, 2005), and a number of people have reclaimed property in order to sell it and live elsewhere (Perry, 2009:215).

Although many decisions were made on property return and restitution, it has been queried whether the architects of this scheme truly considered what it might be like for those returning, both socially and economically (Von Carlowitz, 2005:554); On the whole, the work of the Commission has been considered to be successful: the rights of refugees and internally displaced people were protected, and the operation contributed to national reconciliation (Von Carlowitz, 2005:557-8).
Security Sector Reform

The security sector in the new post-Dayton Bosnia required considerable reform in order to enable it to function. A credible national army and police force needed to be created, former combatants needed to be demobilised, and military ordnance also needed to be dealt with. The state constitution for Bosnia did not specifically allocate responsibility for defence matters to the central state in Bosnia, and initially both entities claimed defence matters as the responsibility of entity governments. This meant that there were two armies, much as there had been during the war. Two agreements negotiated in 1996 enabled the two forces to coexist somewhat better (Vetschera and Damian, 2006:30-1).

The OSCE worked to downsize the two security forces, partly for budget reasons but also to encourage the creation of a state-level defence force. In 2002, it emerged that arms exports from a factory in Republika Srpska were taking place to Iraq, in breach of the UN embargo, and the High Representative insisted that Bosnia take control of arms exports at a state level (Vetschera and Damian, 2006:32). New legislation on arms exports was quickly drafted and marked the first time that military matters had truly been dealt with at state level.

A Defence Reform Commission met in 2003 and published a blueprint for reforms needed if Bosnia were to gain admission to the NATO Partnership for Peace, and a new law dealing with Defence of the State was adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia in December 2003. It gave responsibility for the defence of the state to the Presidency, with decisions to be made by consensus, established a state Minister for Defence, and established clear lines of authority. Police reform has also taken place, with a reduction in the number of police, some cross-border co-operation between entities, and an agreement on police restructuring being adopted in 2005 (Vetschera and Damian, 2006:36).

Politics in Bosnia after Dayton

Politics in Bosnia since the Dayton agreement have been complex, highly contested, and frustrating to many observers. Nationalist and identity-based politics continue to
play a key role, and international supervision continues to be required to ensure stability.

Considerable progress has been made in the first stage of reconstructing Bosnia following the conflict. Extensive reconstruction of infrastructure, including roads, rail and airports, was undertaken by NATO forces. The number of peacekeepers was reduced from approximately sixty thousand in 1996 to only a few thousand; several rounds of national, entity and municipal elections have been successfully held; property has been returned to pre-war owners, and many refugees and IDPs have returned (Perry, 2009:207-8).

The holding of ‘free and fair’ democratic elections has been part of the exit strategy for international organisations in some post-conflict settings, such as Namibia, Haiti, and Cambodia. In Bosnia, it was assumed that electoral engineering could alter the balance of power in the party system by encouraging strong alternative parties to emerge, and by giving the nationalist parties incentives to become more moderate (Manning, 2004:63). Regrettably, these goals have not been achieved – despite incentives for compliance such as EU membership, and penalties for non-compliance which include sanctions by the High Representative, politics in Bosnia have not moved away from their ethnic bases and toward more issue-based politics.

The Bosnian polity has experienced difficulties in moving from this initial reconstruction stage to the next stage of political development, in which government functions relatively smoothly without the need for the intervention of external bodies such as the Office of the High Representative (Knaus and Cox, 2005:48). There was hope in 2006 that international supervision of Bosnia might be about to come to an end. Ten years after the Dayton accords were signed, the leaders of major political parties agreed to work together on a new constitution, albeit under pressure from EU and US. An agreement was made in 2005 to unite the country’s military and police forces in 2006. The High Representative suggested that international bodies in Bosnia might end their mission in 2007 (Polity IV, 2008:3-4). Police forces, however, did not unite, and were still ethnically based and not apolitical; in February 2007, the International Crisis Group suggested that Bosnia was not yet ready for independent government and must be still supervised, stating that “...This is not the time for disengagement: Bosnia
remains unready for unguided ownership of its own future” (International Crisis Group, 2007a:1).

Manning also suggests that the power of institutional engineering to change the political balance of power in Bosnia is limited by the uncertain economic situation there, as well as by the ongoing uncertainty as to the ultimate future of the current constitutional arrangements there (Manning, 2004:69). In addition, the political system does not require any politician to obtain cross-factional support: “No politician needs the support of anyone from another ethnic group to get elected” (Manning, 2004:71). This could be contrasted with the alternative vote electoral system used by Papua New Guinea prior to its independence in 1975, which required candidates to obtain support from outside their own tribal group in order to be elected (Reilly, 2002: 165).

It is regrettable that the consociational structures set out in the constitution have not acted as opportunities for the different ethnic groups in Bosnia to co-operate and learn to cohabit in their shared country peacefully, but rather as ways in which each group can frustrate the ambitions of the others. It has been said that: “…Ethno-territorial veto points at state-level [are] accompanied by a complicated division of competencies shared between the state and entities, which require high levels of co-operation to function and seriously constrain the ability of the state institutions to perform their functions” (Foreign Policy Initiative BH, 2007: Governance Structure in BiH, cited in Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2009:8). The system, which depends on co-operation to work, has the potential to be paralyzed by non-co-operation, and has been on several occasions. In 2007, the Bosnian Serb Prime Minister Nikola Spiric resigned because the then High Representative, Miroslav Lacjak, changed the laws which had led to a legislative deadlock, by reducing the number of ministers which needed to be present in order for the government to pass laws, and by empowering Deputy Ministers to act in the place of Ministers where necessary. Under the new scheme, it was not possible for one ethnic group to walk out of Parliament and cause a deadlock.43 A different problem

has occurred more recently: elections were held in late 2010, but the parties were
unable to agree on the formation of a government until November 2012.
Was the constitutional scheme enshrined in the Dayton Accords an appropriate one for
Bosnia? It could be argued that at the time the Accords were signed, the appropriate
scheme was one which would ‘stop the bleeding’ – halt the conflict, the human rights
abuses, and the refugee flows into neighbouring countries, and make space for
reconstruction and reconciliation. There are concerns, however, that a short-term end to
the conflict may have been negotiated at the expense of longer-term solution to the
problems faced by Bosnia. The division of the country into several ethnically-based
substates may have quarantined the conflicting parties from each other to some extent,
but may also have had the effect of preserving the divisions of the conflict indefinitely.
Bosnia’s government system has been called a “...crude, identity-freezing form of
consociation” (Reynolds, 2005: 60), and it has been suggested that ethnic civil wars are
rarely resolved by partition or by power-sharing arrangements (Kuperman, 2006: 28-9).

Some of the difficulties being experienced lie in the shape of the governmental
architecture determined by the Dayton Accords, and in the assumptions underlying
them; some in the behaviour of the political actors in Bosnia and neighbouring
countries since the conflict; and some in the way the country has been ‘managed’ by
international powers.

Constitutional architecture

The division of Bosnia into two entities and a third territory (Brcko) under a weak
federal state has had the effect of solidifying the ethnic divisions which had already
been exacerbated by the conflict. It has been suggested that the way that ethnicity has
been entrenched in the political system in Bosnia has further reduced its chances of
democratic consolidation and ethnic integration (Reynolds, 2005:60). He suggests that
“In Kosovo, as in Bosnia, it is the politicizing of ethnicity and de facto ethnic
segregation that stand in the way of further democratization, and the local political elite
has so far managed to resist international pressure for a more inclusive and democratic
regime” (2011:86).

Each of the entities within Bosnia and Herzegovina also has its own constitution,
进一步 establishing a separate identity, and it may be that establishing these separate

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government bodies at the time of the peace settlement was a mistake which has consolidated and institutionalized the differences between these parties. Alternatively, perhaps the political climate was simply too ‘hot’ after such a bloody and bitter conflict for the parties to join a single polity, and some provision had to be made for the government of Bosnia immediately after Dayton. Recent political events mean that perhaps even now the people of Bosnia are not ready to re-make the Constitution, which would require either a large and stable majority in the constitution-making body (and with that comes the risk of creating a permanent and dispossessed minority), or a high degree of consensus and maturity among participants such that they are prepared to agree with each other on mechanisms even if their politics remain different.

Political behaviour

The politicians who have been elected to public office and their behaviour in office seem to have maintained the ethnic divisions between the different parties in Bosnia. Political parties are still highly ethnically dominated, and the more nationalist they are, the more successful they seem to be. Some responsibility for this may be attributed to the consociational political system established by the Dayton Agreement. Despite the endorsement by some scholars, particularly Lijphart, of consociational political systems as appropriate for divided societies (Lijphart, 2004; Reilly, 2002:157), it is questionable whether they ought to be advocated so quickly after a violent ethnic conflict.

The voting patterns of Bosnian voters have rewarded candidates who promise the best outcome for their ethnic groups, and the political system, which divides both voters and candidates by their ethnic grouping, does little to discourage this voting behaviour. Perhaps expectations that politicians who have been elected on this basis will then work together in a collaborative manner are somewhat unrealistic. It has also been suggested that: “...when domestic demand for democracy is lacking, there is a limit to what even the broadest international engagement can accomplish.” (Zuercher, 2011:89).

At present the political landscape is shifting as more people and groups become disenfranchised with the current arrangements. The elections held in 2010 resulted in a Bosniak, Zeljko Komsic, being elected as the Croat member of the Presidency, meaning that Bosniaks held two-thirds of the Presidency. Bosniak interests may be represented at the expense of Croat interests, and there are suggestions that there is growing Croat
support within Bosnia, and Croatia, for the Croatian-dominated parts of Bosnia to secede and join with Croatia (Parish, 2011:1).

*International influence*

International influence in Bosnia at present is felt in two principal ways: through the operations of the Office of the High Representative, and through the early moves toward EU membership. The Office of the High Representative, established to oversee the implementation of the Dayton Accords, has endured in Bosnia in a supervisory role far longer than was initially intended. While the High Representative has been able to take decisive action on a number of important issues such as corruption and legislative deadlocks, he or she is not accountable to the people of Bosnia and cannot be removed from office by any action of theirs. It has been noted that this accountability is also seen in Bosnian electoral politics, where politicians are not held accountable by voters for corruption or fraud (Nenadovic, 2010:1165, citing Open Society Institute report on Bosnia, 2006), and that the presence of international administrators can provide a convenient excuse for this lack of accountability, as local politicians blame international administrators for the slow progress of reforms (Nenadovic, 2010: 1166-1167). A further problem of having an international ‘adjudicator’ present is that the coercive powers which are used to deal with Bosnian political problems were initially only intended to be used to respond to threats to the peace process, but are now being used to achieve reform objectives, instead of strengthening local capacity (Knaus and Cox, 2005:49).

The prospect of EU membership has been held out to Bosnian politicians as an incentive to implement reforms in Bosnia. The process of EU accession is lengthy for whichever countries attempt it, involving a complex harmonisation of laws and practices with EU standards. The European Council in Thessaloniki recognised Bosnia as a potential candidate for EU membership in 2003, and a Stabilization and Association Agreement was signed between Bosnia and the EU in 2008. Since 2007, the High Representative has performed a dual role as High Representative/EU Special Representative. There are considerable advantages for Bosnia in obtaining membership of the expanded EU, however no formal moves have been made towards making a
formal application for membership since 2009\textsuperscript{44} and the current political situation must be resolved before any such application could be made.

\textit{Corruption}

Corruption is a significant problem for Bosnia, and is considered to have arisen from a number of sources: the large sums of foreign aid money which flowed into Bosnia during and after the conflict, without adequate controls or functioning legal/political machinery to control its expenditure; the black economy which sprang up in the wake of the conflict; and from cronyism and nepotism. In addition to the other difficulties being experienced in Bosnian politics, there are concerns that corruption here may inhibit the growth and development of competent government institutions (Ware and Noone, 2003:193).

Bosnia scores poorly on a number of corruption indices, scoring 3 on the Corruption Perceptions Index in 2009, in which a ranking of 0 indicates a ‘highly corrupt’ country, and 10 indicates a country which is not corrupt, and ranking 99\textsuperscript{th} of 180 countries considered. The World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report for 2008-9 also asserts that the level of corruption is inhibiting the development of business in Bosnia, together with government and policy instability, inefficient regulation and poor infrastructure (Chène, 2009: 2). Corruption is present in all forms in Bosnia, and affects all sectors of the government, including the judiciary, customs, taxation, government purchasing and all major political processes (Chène 2009:1).

The problem of aid and reconstruction moneys fuelling corruption is not unique to Bosnia: hard currency, when introduced into a combat zone, may enable the development of black markets in which people buy goods in order to survive, and to obtain goods which legitimate markets cannot supply to them. Foreign workers, even those working for organisations such as the UN, may be involved more directly in corrupt activities, using official vehicles for transportation of black-market goods, utilising access granted by official passes to smuggle goods, and bringing in relief moneys which may be ‘skimmed’ (Andreas, 2009: 33,35,45).

\textsuperscript{44} EU Enlargement : Bosnia-Herzegovina web page, URL : \url{http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/potential-candidate-countries/bosnia_and_herzegovina/eu_bosnia_and_herzegovina_relations_en.htm}, accessed 8/9/11

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Corruption was a part of the early stages of the reconstruction of Bosnia as cronyism dictated the awarding of contracts at inflated prices, and competitors were discouraged from competing for business; those who were successful were also required to pay a ‘commission’ to local leaders; and organisations which were tasked with reconstruction projects were sometimes pressured to re-arrange their reconstruction priorities (Chêne, 2009:9). UN policing of the siege of Sarajevo is said to have contributed to the enforcement of the siege, as police patrols of Sarajevo airport grounds, under which a tunnel was dug to facilitate bringing in black market supplies, as well as the UN’s refusal to comply with demands from the Serbs that the tunnel be closed, both helped the smugglers to profit from smuggling the goods, and institutionalised the siege (Andreas, 2009:34-35).

It has been suggested that illicit business activities do not always have a negative impact on peace operations: for example, the Ukrainian troops making up part of UN peacekeeping forces apparently sold petrol, after siphoning it from official vehicles, and traded in food and pornographic videos; but this source of fuel became essential to both the foreign press and to some locals (Andreas, 2009:36).

In the longer term, however, corruption undermines the legitimacy of governments which do not act against it, creates a hostile environment for business, and does not enable well-functioning government entities to develop (Ware and Noone, 2003:194). The government does not receive taxes, duties and customs payments where goods are illegally smuggled; and goods which have been smuggled are often cheaper and crowd out goods on which such duties have been paid, forcing those attempting to trade legally either out of business or into the black economy (Devine and Mathisen, 2005:19). Losses to the Bosnian state budget as a result of corruption are estimated at US$1 billion annually (Devine and Mathisen, 2005:8). Lord Paddy Ashdown was High Representative in Bosnia from 2002-2006, and he focussed on anti-corruption efforts. In 2005 Dragan Covic was dismissed from his office of President by Ashdown, one day before Covic was to be tried for customs evasion, corruption and abuse of office (Polity IV, 2008:3).

The ongoing corruption in Bosnia has been linked to the political structures established by the Dayton Agreement, and their complexity and inefficiency (Chêne, 2009:3); pre-
independence Communism, with its weak institutions, lack of accountability, and non-transparent decision-making (Devine and Mathisen, 2005:1, 12); the ‘political vacuum’ following the conflict, which enabled corrupt politicians to gain power; and ‘cross-ethnic collusion’ between criminal networks and political elites (Devine and Mathisen, 2005:1).

Dealing with the past

The UN Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (formally known as the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia) in May 1993, in the middle of the violence in south-eastern Europe. It was the first war crimes tribunal established since the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals, and was established under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The Tribunal, which sits at The Hague, was established to try the individuals most responsible for murder, rape, torture, enslavement, property destruction, and other acts listed in the Tribunal’s statute. The Tribunal has charged 160 people with crimes related to the war in the former Yugoslavia, and has convicted 60 people, with 40 people in different stages of proceedings before the Tribunal. In February 2007, the International Court of Justice confirmed Serbia’s involvement in the massacre of Bosniacs in Srebrenica in 1995. The Court stated that Serbia was responsible for not preventing the genocide (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2010). Its work, including hearing potential appeals, is expected to be finalised by the end of 2014.

Orentlicher details the ways in which the work of the Tribunal failed to meet the expectations (sometimes reasonable, sometimes not) of the people of Bosnia, from the disappointment that all war criminals were not able to be prosecuted by the Tribunal to the anger and disappointment felt at the brevity of many sentences (2010:14). There was also considerable disappointment at reductions in sentences which were given to many of those who pleaded guilty, the length and complexity of the legal proceedings (particularly those against Slobodan Milosevic, which ended after four years when he died), and the focus on high-level perpetrators being punished, which has led some Bosnians to come into regular contact in their neighbourhoods with unpunished individuals who may have raped them or killed their relatives (2010:14-16). Many

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45 www.icty.org/sections/AbouttheICTY
Bosnians were, however, pleased that the massacre at Srebrenica had been found to be genocide, empowered by the Tribunal’s forthright treatment of crimes of sexual violence, and believed that it had provided a valuable forum for those who were witnesses to or victims of war crimes to bear witness (Orentlicher, 2010:17-19). The Tribunal judges set new legal precedents in ruling that rape was used as an instrument of terror by Bosnian armed forces. After a number of challenges at the outset of the Tribunal’s work – difficulties in creating the panel of judges, in finding an acceptable chief prosecutor, and in ‘gathering evidence of crimes committed in a zone of ongoing conflict’ (Orentlicher, 2010:24), it has been extremely successful in carrying out its functions.

There was some public support for the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Bosnia. Such an initiative was initially not supported by the ICTY on the basis that it might overlap with or conflict with the work of the Criminal Tribunal, but as pressure on ICTY increases for it to complete its mandate, it has become more supportive of such proposals (Perry, 2009:214).

The after-effects of ethnic war such as this are long-lasting, particularly given the tactics used by the invading Serb army, including rape, torture, and the use of concentration camps, where many people almost starved. Women who survived ‘rape camps’ or sexual assault are still ashamed and afraid, many years after the events (UN Population Fund, 2010:8). Crimes such as this can be extremely divisive of communities,

"...women in Bosnia and Herzegovina often say that they have been pained by the lack of community support to help them through their most terrible hours. When many returned home they were abandoned and cursed by relatives and erstwhile friends. They are still shaken to remember that men who had also survived detention, humiliation and torture, or who had narrowly escaped death, somehow could not find in themselves understanding and sympathy for women, who were instead accused of dishonouring their families." (UN Population Fund, 2010:8).

Subotic suggests that there should be societal responsibility for these war crimes: that Serbs collectively were also responsible for acts committed by their leaders, and that coming to terms with societal complicity is an essential first step towards true

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46 URL: www.icty.org/sections/AbouttheICTY
reconciliation between Serbs and the other ethnic groups in Bosnia (2011:167). There are some signs of reconciliation between ordinary Bosnians following the highly divisive events of the conflict. Data about people’s return to places from which they had been ejected gives some clues: some Bosniacs have returned to Brcko, and a book has been published containing examples of people helping each other across ethnic and religious boundaries during the war (Perry, 2009:216). An Inter-Religious Council brings together leaders of the four main religious communities in Bosnia and has made some progress in drafting a law on religious freedom, although ‘religious leaders continue to maintain close ties to the nationalist parties and to focus solely on their specific congregations” (Perry, 2009:220). Attempts have been made to introduce a course in Bosnian schools which would teach children about the four faiths present in their country (Perry, 2009:220).

There are also some signs of formal reconciliation: there was an apology by Croatian President Stipe Mesic in 2003 for ‘all of the evils caused during the war’, and in 2004 Bosnian President Boris Tadic apologised ‘in his own name’ for crimes committed ‘in the name of the Serbian people’ during the war (Perry, 2009:223). Still, the legacy of the violent actions committed by members of the communities continues and the psychological damage suffered by many will continue to hamper efforts towards reconciliation between groups, as well as hampering the overall national recovery from the conflict.

Recent events in Bosnia

In early 2011, the International Crisis Group issued a call for the international community to “...make 2011 the year when the lead international role in Bosnia shifts from the Office of the High Representative to a reinforced EU delegation” (International Crisis Group, 2011a:1), on the basis that Bosnia needs guidance to prepare it for EU membership, rather than international oversight to maintain security and legislate for it. ICG note that the Peace Implementation Council’s December 2010 communiqué was the first for years not to mention the imminent closure of the OHR (ICG, 2011a:6).
Elections were held in late 2010, but a government had still not been formed one year later. Ultimately it took fourteen months after the elections to form a government, and that government collapsed after six months, in May 2012. The European Court of Human Rights ruled in 2009 in the Sejdic-Finci case that the constitutional arrangements established by the Dayton Agreement which require the posts in the three-member Presidency and the House of Peoples to be divided equally between Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks, infringe the European Human Rights Convention because they deny access to members of other groups (International Crisis Group, 2012). Only in November 2012 were the six main political parties in Bosnia able to come to an agreement which would end the deadlock between them. The parties agreed to ensure full institutional equality among the three main groups and minorities. If the Bosnian government can function effectively, it may be able to move forward with neighbouring countries and join the European Union – if not, it runs the risk of being excluded from the Union and becoming isolated in Eastern Europe.

Conclusion

The fact that there is still an international administration in place in Bosnia would seem to be a strong indicator that Bosnia is not yet entirely ready for sovereign democratic self-rule (Nenadovic, 2010:1167). The Dayton Agreement provided peace, but has also given Bosnia a political system which is highly complex and not functioning well. It has failed in its primary objective of building peace by forcing the different parties to the conflict to work together, and has been criticised for solidifying the ethnic divisions which emerged as highly divisive forces during the conflict.

In a national survey in 2007, 72% of respondents said that the system of government in Bosnia was too complicated and needed to be changed, and 50.3% felt that the Dayton Peace Accords had not worked (59.2% of Bosniaks, 31.7% of Serbs, and 70.3% of Croats) (UNDP, 2007, cited in Clarke, 2010:76). The population in Bosnia is declining, and was measured at an estimated 3.84 million in mid-2006, down from 4.38 million in 1991. This reflects both the effects of the conflict, in which approximately 100,000 people were killed, and a long decline in the birth rate (Economist, 2008:11).

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Despite the considerable external support and more than a decade of experience by all parties, there remains the question of whether Bosnia-Herzegovina can survive as a distinct state. The Bosnian case demonstrates the practical difficulties of attempting to run a power-sharing state in a post-conflict nation. The institutional arrangements which mean that former enemies must deal with each other constantly have, at times, resulted in complete deadlock of government and breakdown of the power-sharing institutions. The Office of the High Representative’s presence has meant that government can largely continue functioning, as with Northern Ireland where the British government has taken on a ‘disciplinary’ role in relation to the behaviour of the Northern Irish Assembly.

In the light of current events, it is difficult to conclude that the governance of Bosnia since the conflict has ended has been successful. The international authorities working there, and the institutions established by the peace process have failed to transfer authority permanently to local authorities, to conclusively end the conflict between the parties, to maintain the rule of law in respect of corruption, and to find a new engine of economic growth and prosperity. Ethnic divisions, which were linked in the quantitative results of this thesis to poorer post-conflict government performance, have certainly proved a stumbling-block to post-conflict development in Bosnia. The divisions between people of different religions and races, perhaps made deeper by the events of the conflict here, prevent national unity and have dominated national politics since 1995.

The post-conflict reconstruction of Bosnia has had some successes: substantial reconstruction was carried out, the conflict was stopped by the peace process and has not recurred, unlike Kosovo, political assassinations and interethnic violence are ‘almost non-existent’ (Perry, 2009:228), and the country has functioned, if sub-optimally, since 1995. If it becomes patently obvious that Bosnia as it is presently constituted will not survive, should it be allowed to separate into three separate mini-states, in a peaceful fashion? It is also questionable whether the long-term outcome of nation-building efforts in Bosnia lends weight to Luttwak’s ‘Give War a Chance’ hypothesis: should the conflict in Bosnia have been allowed to continue to its logical conclusion until a military victor claimed the spoils? In addition to the considerable
investments made in the current constitutional arrangements in Bosnia, it may be that the international community is reluctant to abandon the notion that external interveners can provide lasting solutions to internal conflicts; and that international intervention is always better than domestic solutions, no matter how bloody. While the peacekeeping missions of early 1990s and 2000s are still being analysed, perhaps the international community is not yet collectively ready to acknowledge the failures of peacekeeping and nation-building.

It has been suggested that the most viable future for Bosnia may result if the international community agrees to the Serb Republic’s demands for strong regional autonomy, and stop pressuring Bosnians to strengthen central state, but falls short of allowing Serb Republic legal separation from Bosnia, which ‘remove the last potential casus belli of any significance in Bosnia’ (Kuperman, 2006:44). Current political events make it seem that perhaps a united, self-governing Bosnia is simply a dream which will not come true. Whether because of poor institutional design, lingering hostility and distrust between factions, or bad management by the international administrators, it is difficult to conceive of post-conflict governance in Bosnia as being successful. A new solution, which takes into account the present-day realities of politics in Bosnia, rather than the dream of a multi-ethnic state created by peace treaty, may be the only way forward.
Chapter 9

Conclusions: Promoting Good Governance After Conflict

"Cynical people will please themselves by saying that independence solves nothing. People like us should have known that independence only begins to solve anything. The moment it's achieved it is no longer an end."

Nadine Gordimer, A Guest of Honour

Introduction

Governing a country after internal conflict can pose a unique set of problems, as governments attempt to prevent renewed violence, disarm combatants, re-establish the delivery of essential services, and restore confidence in the economy. Recent examples of post-conflict reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan highlight the difficulties for external reformers in attempting to make lasting improvements to governance. Dealing with insurgents and regional warlords, attempting to build ‘licit livelihoods’ for farmers, reforming the police force and attempting to improve health outcomes for rural populations are some of the tasks which have been undertaken by military forces, police, international organisations, and humanitarian aid organisations in these countries during the past ten years. Despite considerable assistance, however, their prospects of sustaining democratic systems in the absence of external assistance are not yet hopeful. Countries emerging from conflict may have a unique opportunity to change their institutions and their economic conditions, but they can be hampered in their efforts to do so by “...extremely poor levels of governance and economic policy” (Collier, 2006:4). The assistance countries need to rebuild sound governments must be tailored to the type of support each country is likely to need and able to absorb.

Designing effective interventions requires an insight into the type of institutions and conditions which are most likely to be effective in post-conflict countries, as well as a thorough understanding of the particular national context in which interventions will be made. This chapter summarises the inquiry carried out by this thesis and the findings of

both the quantitative and case study portions of the project. Recommendations are made for policies which could implement these findings, and for areas of further research which could extend the work begun here.

**Summary of the project**

This project theorises that post-conflict governments are particularly vulnerable to instability from several sources: they face security challenges, because the likelihood of conflict recurrence is high, and the causes of the internal conflict may remain unresolved. They may also face political challenges, as the post-conflict environment, particularly if it involves a transition to democracy, may involve new parties, inexperienced politicians and voters, and a rapidly shifting political environment. The expectations of voters may be high; and the government may have a limited capacity to deliver its election promises or to carry out a legislative programme. Previous research has indicated that internal conflicts are more common in countries which have lower incomes and those which are commodity dependent. This not only has the potential to make their recovery from conflict more protracted, as resources for rebuilding may be limited, but also renders these governments more exposed to commodity price shocks.

The effectiveness of governments after conflict was measured and analysed to determine which of four possible factors have a positive influence on government performance in the post-conflict period. These factors are per capita national income; 'rigid' or majoritarian institutions, which do not require cross-group consensus in order to function; peacekeeping operations; and overseas aid per capita. A number of control variables which were shown to be important in the analysis of civil conflicts were also included to investigate their impact on post-conflict governments. In addition to the quantitative component, this thesis also included case-study investigations of the history and governance of three countries recovering from internal conflict.

Previous research on internal conflict, post-conflict governance, and the measurement of governance and of peace operations was considered in Chapter 2. Considerable research in the past two decades has greatly increased our understanding of the causes, characteristics and consequences of internal conflict. There is still debate amongst academics concerning the reasons why individuals and groups decide to fight, and the role of factors such as resources, political grievances, ethnic differences, and state
capacity in internal conflict. New datasets offer insights into conflict mechanisms at the local level, allowing the analysis of regions of countries and small-scale violent events in more detail. The great increase in the number of peacekeeping missions launched during the 1980s and 1990s has been matched by increased interest in analysing the performance of individual missions, and on establishing broader criteria for the measurement of success in peace operations generally. Similarly, the emphasis on the importance of good governance for economic growth in the academic and policy literatures has led to considerable research into measuring and improving governance. While early measures of governance were comparative in nature, and frequently focussed on the 'culture of government', subsequent generations of governance indicators took the form of indexes which enabled governments to be rated and ranked on their performance in particular areas. The most recent measures of governance employ a citizen-based approach which focuses on people assessing their own government’s performance. Measuring government after conflict, however, poses particular challenges, including the collection of reliable data, finding criteria which are useful measures of government performance in this situation, and assessing the contributions of the multiple actors often operating in this context. The criteria used for measuring governance after conflict, the rationale for the research design used here, and previous findings concerning the independent variables were discussed in Chapter 3.

Chapter 4 marked the beginning of the analysis of the data for this project, in which variables within the dataset were explained, assessed and compared. The most statistically significant factors associated with government performance after conflict were those related to institutions, resources, and time. The four hypotheses put forward in Chapter 3, although grounded in the conflict and governance literature, and intended to expand on previous research in this area, were not proven. Some of the control variables were statistically significant, although their significance changed between high- and low-income countries. These quantitative results are discussed in more detail in the next section.

Chapter 5 linked the quantitative findings and the case study portion of this thesis by outlining the method of selection of case study countries and by relating the results of the quantitative section to some characteristics of the case studies. Timor-Leste’s history of conflict and colonisation was considered in some depth in Chapter 6, as well
as the operation of UNTAET, the multidisciplinary UN operation, and its successor missions. The Timorese government has weathered several significant challenges since independence, and democracy appears to be consolidating there. The peace operation, elections, post-conflict state and the challenges facing Namibia were explored further in Chapter 7. Namibia has been a stable democracy since its independence in 1990, if one heavily dominated by one party, but government there must face challenges similar to those of many other sub-Saharan African countries: poverty, significant inequalities of income, and management of natural resources. The relatively brief and successful peace operation in Namibia, and the inclusion of many ethnic groups in the Constitution-making process and in the first Namibian government seem likely to have established the background for stable and effective government there.

The history of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the conflict which took place as the former Yugoslavia disintegrated, and the structure of the post-conflict political architecture established by the Dayton Accords were discussed in Chapter 8. The power-sharing institutions which were intended to fairly divide power between the three ethnic groups in Bosnia, and to facilitate dialogue between these groups, have served instead to calcify the ethnic divisions present at the close of the conflict. The reconciliation which was hoped for when the Accords were signed has not eventuated. Rather, politics has become even more ethnically-based, and the checks and balances built into the institutions have served to paralyse them when the parties cannot agree.

The central question of this thesis remains: Which factors make a difference to the success of post-conflict governments? And which external interventions are most likely to be effective in assisting these governments?

Quantitative findings

The quantitative investigations in this thesis were based on the investigation of four hypotheses relating to the factors presumed most likely to assist post-conflict governments. It was hypothesised that post-conflict government performance would be better in countries with high national incomes; with ‘rigid’ or majoritarian political institutions which did not require a high degree of consensus to operate; where
peacekeeping operations had been in place; and where foreign aid per capita was higher.

Briefly, national income was not significantly correlated with good government performance after conflict, and the dependent variable, government success (here restricted to post-conflict country-years) was not highly correlated to national income: low-income country governments were not necessarily less successful than wealthy ones, although previous research shows that they are more likely to become involved in internal conflict. Presidential systems were significantly and negatively associated with post-conflict government performance, while proportional representation electoral systems were statistically significant and positively associated with performance. District magnitude and federalism were insignificant, although weakly positive.

The presence and type of peacekeeping mission was insignificant in explaining government performance after conflict here, which contrasted with earlier research in which these factors had been found to be significant to the duration of peace after conflict (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006). The amount of overseas development aid per capita was also not statistically significant, although this did corroborate some earlier research which had found the amount of aid less important to post-conflict political stability and the emergence of democracy than internal political factors (Breuning and Ishiyama, 2004, Ishiyama, Sanders and Breuning, 2008).

Two of the control variables proved to be statistically significant: time since the start of the dataset and resources. The time elapsed since the beginning of the dataset was positively correlated with post-conflict government performance, although it did not seem to be an indicator of improved performance by peacekeeping missions given their statistical insignificance here. This variable’s significance might be attributed to increase in the mean performance of all governments after conflict, which improved by about one point (on a scale of one to ten) over the course of the survey period, possibly because of the increasing influence of norms of human rights and democratic governance, and improvements in technology, even in low-income countries.

Unexpectedly, natural resources as a proportion of GDP were positively associated with government performance, except in countries with incomes of less than $1000 per year,
in which case the association was negative. Considerable earlier research has associated natural resource abundance with negative outcomes both in terms of conflict and governance. The finding that the association changed for countries at different income levels may indicate, however, that wealthier countries with social and political institutions to manage resource income may benefit from it in the post-conflict period, but countries lacking these institutions may suffer from it. Some researchers have suggested that political and social factors mediate the relationship between resource abundance and development outcomes (Rosser, 2006:7-8, citing Schrank, 2004; and Snyder and Bhavnani, 2005).

Previous research findings on the impact of ethnic diversity have been mixed, with some writers suggesting that ethnic fractionalisation is positively correlated with the incidence and duration of internal conflict (Sambanis, 2001; Hegre and Sambanis, 2006), while others contending that there is no correlation between these factors (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Collier and Hoefller, 2004). Here, it was found that ethnic diversity was negatively correlated with the performance of governments after conflict, although having had an ethnic conflict was not significant. The difficulty of reconciling the needs of different ethnic groups, balancing their interests and of forming a cohesive society after internal conflict despite these differences might account for the negative impact of this factor on government performance. Neither the size of peacekeeping missions nor the number of conflicts a country has been involved in since 1946 were statistically significant.

**Findings from case studies**

The three case studies provided a detailed enquiry into the conflicts in Timor-Leste, Namibia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and their aftermath, and a number of lessons can be drawn from these three countries.

*Political institutions can produce different results in different post-conflict settings*

The tendencies of proportional representation systems to encourage multi-party democracies, coalition governments and representation for minorities; and for majoritarian systems to be associated with two-party systems and single-party
governments are well-researched (see, for example, Duverger, 1986; Sartori, 1994; Lijphart, 1999). The case studies, however, demonstrate that different considerations may be more influential in the years following conflict, such as loyalty to the party which formed from the resistance movement, or to fellow ethnic group members, or path dependence once a particular party has become entrenched.

Namibia has a list proportional representation (PR) electoral system, which according to experience in other jurisdictions, should encourage the election of coalition governments, and favour smaller parties. Namibia also has a federal system, which enables electors to express different preferences for parties at provincial and federal level. Despite this, its politics have been entirely dominated at both levels of government by SWAPO, the party of the liberation struggle, and this situation has continued for 20 years after independence. Certain features of the system of government there have served to reinforce this pattern, such as the fact that members of the President’s Cabinet are drawn from the National Assembly, and the fact that members of regional governments (mostly SWAPO members) are empowered to vote for members of the upper house of Parliament, the National Council. While these measures may have been meant to ensure checks and balances were part of the Namibian political system, since SWAPO was initially voted into the lower house of Parliament and the regional governments, and its candidate was elected President, they have served to reinforce SWAPO’s dominance.

In Bosnia, consociational power-sharing institutions were agreed to as part of the Dayton Accords, including a rotating presidency and a legislature made up of representatives of each of the ethnic groups in Bosnia. These institutions serve to encourage dialogue and to moderate conflict, according to their proponents. However, more than 15 years after the Dayton Accords, politics in Bosnia seem to be more, rather than less ethnically based. The legislature has been deadlocked several times and for a long period in 2011-2012, elected representatives refused to take their seats. Bosnia is still under international administration, and the consociational institutions intended to compel the parties to negotiate with each other have instead allowed veto players to bring the government to a standstill.
In Timor-Leste, a list proportional representation system is also utilised for elections to the National Parliament. The first elections held in 2001 were for the Constituent Assembly, and 88 members of the Assembly were elected. 55 of the 88 were members of Fretilin, the political party associated with the resistance movement. During the making of the Constitution, Fretilin dominated proceedings (Saldanha, 2008) and was the subject of complaints from members of other parties for failing to consult them or to take their views into account. The Constituent Assembly transformed into the National Parliament of Timor-Leste, and Fretilin dominance was retained. The second parliamentary election in Timor-Leste resulted in a more typical result for this system type, a coalition government headed by the former President, Xanana Gusmão, and the third election resulted in a different coalition, also headed by Gusmão.

These three case studies show how electoral institutions which might be expected to produce similar results, based on research and experience in other jurisdictions, have instead produced three very different types of government. Two of these governments, while imperfect, are functional, and one is barely functional. It seems likely that different factors are influencing voter and political behaviour in these post-conflict democracies.

*International assistance is important but not determinative of success*

International assistance to post-conflict governments (either in the form of development aid or peacekeeping missions) was not shown to be statistically significant in the quantitative results discussed in Chapter 4 and summarised above. Despite this, the peacekeeping operations described in the three case studies were very important to all three case study countries, even though the results of post-conflict peacebuilding in those countries have differed.

The United Nations launched one of its first multidisciplinary peacekeeping missions in Namibia, and after a difficult start, in which returning Namibian troops were attacked by South African forces, that peace operation is considered to have been a success. Although the groundwork for the mission was laid by the lengthy peace process, the international supervision and electoral assistance were very important in assisting
Namibia to build a stable democracy, and the military presence of peacekeeping troops maintained largely public order during the withdrawal of South African troops.

In Timor-Leste, the United Nations took on a role as the interim government of the country while the reconstruction process began. Because Timor-Leste had never been independently governed, and because of the scorched-earth policy pursued by the departing Indonesian army, the scale of intervention had to be extremely comprehensive in order to provide both the military security needed to end the fighting, and the political and administrative support to establish a functioning government. Although the UN administration in Timor-Leste was at times criticised for not being sufficiently consultative, its overall impact on the new nation was positive. The staged withdrawal of UN personnel has also been a successful feature of this operation, which has been reduced gradually over a long period.

The UN presence in Bosnia, however, has had a more mixed history, and its inability to prevent the massacre at Srebrenica was considered one of the UN’s major failures in the 1990s. Other international bodies – NATO and the Office of the High Representative, have played a more important role in Bosnia, although the UN peacekeeping mission presence in Bosnia after the Dayton Agreement was signed did enable the safe withdrawal of troops. Despite considerable international assistance from multiple benefactors, Bosnia could not yet be said to be a functioning democracy. Whether this is due to a flawed peace agreement, poor institutional design, or the aftermath of a particularly intense ethnic conflict, the high levels of assistance from international bodies and governments have not yet yielded an independent government which is able to represent the interests of all Bosnians fairly.

*For post-conflict governments, success takes time*

The case studies show examples to support the proposition that establishing a functioning government after conflict takes some time: it is not a task which can be accomplished in a year or two. Reading accounts of Namibian independence and political conditions soon after independence and 20 years after independence shows how early predictions were in some cases justified (reconciliation between races has
been largely maintained), but in other cases were overly optimistic (SWAPO dominance has been maintained and increased).

In Timor-Leste, concerns that the government would collapse after the 2006 violence proved to be unfounded, and after three elections for the National Parliament, democracy continues to grow in that country. Democracies take considerable time to fully consolidate: it takes some time for institutions to become established and robust, and for societies to learn and successfully use the rules of democracy. Kapoor states that “...political development is a long-term process. Institutional and socio-political change most often happens slowly and incrementally” (1996:6). Reilly also notes the importance of continuity of experience, and of political learning over the course of several elections (2002:167-168). Because success in this context takes time, commentators and practitioners should be careful of judging a post-conflict country or a peace operation too quickly: events which seem disastrous can be overcome, with the right support, and issues which seem intractable can sometimes be resolved.

The sponsors of peace operations, particularly multi-disciplinary peace operations with responsibility for holding elections and building institutions, are caught between two competing imperatives: because of the high cost of international interventions, and limits to the willingness of funding and troop-contributing countries to provide funds and personnel for such operations, there are pressures to make operations as brief as possible. However, time must be taken to stabilise countries and to ensure that new institutions are working properly before countries are left to govern themselves. Chesterman gives several examples of this with regard to recent peace operations:

"The mission in Bosnia was always expected to last beyond its nominal 12-month deadline, but might not have been established if it had been envisaged that troops would remain on the ground for a full decade or more. Donors contemplating Afghanistan in November 2001 balked at early estimates that called for a ten year, $25 billion commitment to the country. And in the lead up to the war with Iraq, the Chief of Staff of the US Army was similarly pooh-poohed – and later forced into retirement – by the leadership of the Defense Department when he testified to the

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The first elections in Timor-Leste in 2001 were for the Constituent Assembly, the body which made the Constitution for Timor-Leste, which then became the first National Parliament after the Constitution commenced operation.
Two decades of experience in multidimensional peacekeeping operations has provided ample evidence that holding elections alone is not a satisfactory exit strategy from a post-conflict country. Doyle and Sambanis point out that time must be allowed for ‘intercommunal hostility’ to abate before elections are held; but that elections delayed for too long risk the peacebuilders being viewed as ‘colonial oppressors’ (2006:341). In addition to the above considerations, peacebuilders have come to realise that their missions can have negative impacts on local populations and on post-conflict economies, creating bubbles around the provision of housing, food, and services to international staff, as was seen in Timor-Leste, or unwittingly encouraging corruption and organised crime, as was experienced in Bosnia.

**Policy recommendations**

One difficulty in dealing with post-conflict situations lies in formulating general recommendations from particular situations, although this does not stem the tide of policy advice issuing from think tanks, international organisations and academics. Some aspects of each post-conflict country are unique, and recommendations regarding them would be patently unsuitable for anywhere else; but after the experience of observing many countries after internal conflict in the last twenty years, some generalised lessons can be drawn. The same mistakes were made in several situations, such as withdrawing too soon after post-conflict elections, as occurred in Angola; failing to give peacekeepers strong enough mandates to protect civilians, as occurred in Bosnia and Rwanda; and stopping conflict but not addressing the root causes of conflict so peacekeeping operations must stay in place for decades, as has occurred in Cyprus. There can also be a considerable gap between what is studied academically and what is useful to those undertaking post-conflict state-building. Mack (2002) notes that academic research can at times seem inaccessible to practitioners, to be based on contentious data, and its subjects irrelevant to those working in this field. Noting the caveats above, several policy recommendations can be made on the basis of the quantitative and qualitative inquiries carried out here:
Consociational institutions should be recommended for post-conflict societies; Institutions which enable a diversity of opinions to be expressed through political processes, and which concentrate power in democratically elected bodies appear to have advantages in post-conflict situations. The reasons for this remain to be fully identified, although it can be conjectured that electoral systems which maximise the chances of voters’ choices being effective ones enable diverse opinions to be expressed and encourage voters to remain engaged in the electoral process; and that facilitating the representation of multiple parties in Parliament and in Cabinet enables the resolution of disputes by political rather than military means. The dynamic nature of politics in new democracies, in which parties can be established, elected and lose support within the space of one electoral term may also be more suited to this type of political institution. This policy recommendation must be qualified by the recommendation which follows it, as to the importance of national context.

The context in which institutions function is fundamental to their success; The evolution of political life after conflict in Timor-Leste, Namibia and Bosnia-Herzegovina shows the diversity of paths which countries can follow in recovering from conflict, and the importance of national context in determining those paths. Culture, pre-existing institutions, the type and intensity of conflict, and the shape of post-conflict institutions all play a role in determining how individuals and groups will act. The case studies demonstrate the different ways in which similar electoral systems can operate in the post-conflict context, to produce multi-party democracy, single-party dominance, or deadlock. Similarly, Presidential systems can enable voters to express different preferences at legislative and executive level; or can promote divisive politics and unstable governance, depending on the behaviour of actors within each system. Perhaps expecting Bosnian politicians to be able to negotiate and compromise with each other so quickly after such a heated conflict (which included war crimes and human rights violations) was unwise; or perhaps the degree of co-operation required to operate these institutions is simply not suitable for the post-conflict context (difficulties have been experienced in Northern Ireland with consociational institutions as well). Those choosing institutions, as well as those recommending institutions must take account of the context in which they will operate in making these significant decisions.
Building democracies takes time, and exit strategies must take this into account;
Both the case studies and the quantitative portion of this thesis show that significant
improvements in the performance of post-conflict governments take place over time.
The precise cause of those improvements is not identified by the quantitative data,
although the case studies would seem to indicate that greater experience with
democracy and increasing political stability as time passes since the end of conflict may
contribute to them. Early reports on the future of Timor-Leste were quite pessimistic,
and following the violence in 2006, some commentators were of the view that the
Timorese government was unlikely to survive in the face of the violence there. With
the assistance of external security forces to stabilise the security situation, and the
ongoing presence of the small UN mission which replaced UNTAET, the government
did survive, and Timor-Leste has recently celebrated ten years of democracy. Similarly
gloomy predictions were made shortly after the Namibian government was elected,
which also proved to be untrue. Expecting immediate success from post-conflict
governments is highly unrealistic, and allowing time for institutions to become
established and political players to gain experience is vital. There are competing
imperatives for those sponsoring missions: the high political and financial cost of
peacekeeping and statebuilding missions provides incentives to minimise the length of
any intervention; but the experience of some missions where peacekeepers left too soon
and conflict recurred, or where peacekeepers remained in place and renewed conflict
was prevented may provide good reasons to prolong missions. Seeing exit from a post-
conflict country as a process rather than an event, and undertaking it on the basis of
conditions in that country, rather than external political imperatives, may provide a
sounder basis for ending peacebuilding missions productively (Caplan, 2012).50

Certain factors deserve extra attention in the post-conflict period
The quantitative results of this thesis revealed that two of the control variables were
statistically significant: ethnic fractionalisation and resource abundance. Ethnic
fractionalisation was negatively correlated with government performance in the post-
conflict period, while resource abundance was positively correlated. The links between
the presence of large ethnic groups within a population and its likelihood of

50 See also the following interview with Richard Caplan: http://theglobalobservatory.org/interviews/396-
2012.
experiencing conflict has been researched, although as noted earlier in this chapter the results to date have been mixed. Here, the relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and government success was negative and significant; but the relationship between having had an ethnic conflict and government success was insignificant. It appears that some characteristics of the heterogeneous society may hamper government performance in the post-conflict period, but that these may not be differences between the ethnic groups large enough to inspire conflict. It may be that intra-group loyalties and political preferences mean that economic growth is slower, or that multiple ethnic groups may lead to a more fragmented polity with entrenched interests which are more difficult to govern. In either case, those intervening into countries with significant ethnic group representation should be aware of potential difficulties.

The role of resource abundance in economic growth, likelihood of internal conflict and general government functioning is contested, and even the results from this survey are divided between high-income and lower-income countries. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, the mechanisms by which resources affect government performance, conflict-proneness and economic growth are not yet clear, but the associations between these factors have been found by a number of different researchers, frequently using different measures of resources. Some writers are starting to note that the correct institutions may enable resource wealth to be managed equitably and for the benefit of all; and that in the absence of such controls, corruption and slow growth may be found. Being aware of the potential pitfalls of resource abundance may enable countries and those who seek to assist them to take steps to ensure that their benefits are used wisely. The sovereign fund set up to invest and manage Timor-Leste’s oil revenue is one example of a productive and prudent way to manage resource wealth.

Conclusion

Designing interventions into post-conflict countries is a complex task, requiring knowledge of measures which have proved effective in other post-conflict contexts, and an understanding of the country to be intervened into, so that measures appropriate to the context may be taken. The two-stage inquiry carried out by this thesis sought to test several hypotheses about which factors might positively affect government performance
after conflict, and to examine three post-conflict countries in detail in order to see how these factors operated under closer scrutiny.

The quantitative results revealed that none of the four hypotheses were confirmed; but yielded a number of interesting results in relation to the variables tested. Institutions were important, and consensus-based institutions were shown to have a positive effect on government success; aid, peacekeeping operations and national income were less important than expected, while natural resource endowments and ethnic diversity were more important than was anticipated. The case studies showed three countries with diverse histories and geography, all the recipients of assistance in the form of aid and peacekeeping, and showed how the differing circumstances and strategies of each country and its government have affected the evolution of their political institutions and the success of these governments after conflict.

The outcomes of this research have raised a number of questions which could form the subject of future research. The question of why electoral and other governmental systems behave differently in post-conflict environments than in countries which are not in conflict deserves further investigation. As discussed above, the three case studies here provide an excellent example of the evolution of polities after conflict and the way in which political systems can evolve in this environment. Questions regarding the factors driving choices of institutions, selection of candidates and the electoral decisions of individual voters in post-conflict elections offer fertile ground for new research. The relative insignificance of income to post-conflict governance as measured here, the differing effects of resource abundance between high-income and low-income countries after conflict, and the reasons for the negative impact of ethnic fractionalization on post-conflict recovery are all topics which seem likely to reward further exploration.

Issues of data coverage and quality in conflict and post-conflict environments need to be considered and improved. Despite the difficulties in gathering data, obtaining accurate and comprehensive data is crucial to accurate analysis of post-conflict situations. It has been suggested that national census or household survey data could begin to include information on war experiences, whether from combatants or from civilians (Blattman and Miguel, 2010:46).
Assisting countries to recover from conflict, and more specifically, helping post-conflict governments to function effectively has been a major focus of the military, academic and development communities for the past two decades. Despite considerable research, there is as yet no consensus as to a prescription for successful transition, although important lessons have been learned through experience and via research. The project contained in this thesis has examined post-conflict governments and attempted to identify factors likely to assist their success. It is hoped that this will assist those who seek to rebuild after violence to build peaceful, robust and effective governments.
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