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Exceptional Wars: How were the US military interventions in the 'War on Terror' possible?

Submitted in part completion of the PhD in Political Science,
Trinity College Dublin
2010

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Acknowledgements:

A thesis can at times be a solitary process, and ultimately responsibility for it, particularly the errors and omissions lie with the author. But there are many people without whom this thesis would never have happened to whom I'd like to express my heartfelt thanks.

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Finally, I'd like to dedicate this thesis to the memory of my grandparents, Matty and Gretta 'Mum' Corr who are no longer with us, but played an important role in setting me on this path to knowledge.

Summary

How were the US military interventions in the 'War on Terror' possible? This thesis argues that intervention in the 'War on Terror' was rendered possible through the strategic use of language that located intervention as consistent with pre-existing societal narratives of national identity in the American context, particularly those associated with the idea of American Exceptionalism. The thesis will treat of the Foreign Policy discourse of the Bush Administration after September 11th 2001 in order to answer the above question. A secondary aim of this thesis is to contribute to the growing body of literature that takes a Discourse Theory approach to the study of International Relations. This chapter will begin with a preliminary examination of the case at hand in order to establish the relevance of the question, it will then move on to briefly introduce the approach being adopted before outlining the expected findings and giving a brief chapter by chapter outline of the thesis.

At 08:46:40, American Airlines Flight 11 crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade centre (WTC) in New York City. Approximately 17 minutes later a second aircraft, United Airlines Flight 175, crashed into the South Tower. A third aircraft, American Airlines Flight 77, crashed into the Pentagon, Washington D.C. just over half an hour later. The fourth and final aircraft, United Airlines Flight 93, came down in a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania, apparently as a result of passenger intervention in the hijacking at 10:02:23. At 09:59 the South Tower of the WTC collapsed, followed by the North Tower just under half an hour later. 2973 were killed in New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania on the morning of September 11th

2001[1]; a day that would enter the political lexicon as 9/11.[2] But what exactly had happened? As R.B.J. Walker put it

> "Was this a proper war? Or was it just a crime? If it was a war, precisely what states were at war with each other? If it was a crime, precisely who was it a crime against – America? Humanity? Modernity? Liberalism?"[3]

This project seeks to establish how the Bush administration in the US answered these questions and how in answering these questions they made possible the ways in which the US would respond to the 9/11 attacks. This thesis will argue that the attacks on 9/11 were not in themselves self-evident and automatic causes of the 'War on Terror' that followed; that is to say that the attacks themselves were necessary but not sufficient conditions for the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Rather, in order to understand how the interventions were made possible, we need to examine the discursive construction of the 'War on Terror' in terms of the securitization of terrorism as a threat not just to the United States' material interests but more importantly to its way of life, its identity, by the Bush administration. These claims to identity can only be understood in the context of longer standing identity narratives that make up the cultural resources which the administration drew upon to successful securitize these threats. Thus, it will be demonstrated that the discourse of the 'War on Terror' constructed the 9/11 attacks as a security threat to the US in terms of an atavistic, evil threat under the term 'terror' or 'terrorism' that sought to destroy the United States because of the things it stood for namely, freedom, liberty, democracy. Furthermore, parallels were drawn between the contemporary terror threat and previous evil 'others' that had posed risks for the US in the past. The success of

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[1] These times and figures are taken from *The 9/11Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist attacks upon the United States* The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Norton, New York

[2] See James Der Derian "In Terrorem: War, Terror, Judgement" in Booth & Dunne (eds) *Worlds in Collision* (Basingstoke, 2002) for a discussion of the term '9/11' as a signifier for these events.

[3] RBJ Walker "War, Terror, Judgement" in Bulent Gokay & RBJ Walker (eds) *11 September 2001: War, Terror and Judgement* Frank Cass Publishers, London 2003 p.69

the articulation of the need to intervene militarily in Afghanistan first, and later Iraq, was based on the degree to which the Bush administration was able to construct a plausible narrative that constructed the American 'self' and the enemy 'other' in manner that echoed with sedimented narratives of 'self' and 'other' in American political and cultural discourse. In other words it was not simply the articulation of Afghanistan and Iraq as threats that made the interventions possible but their articulation as threats at the level of collective identity.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Introduction

How were the US military interventions in the 'War on Terror' possible? This thesis argues that intervention in the 'War on Terror' was rendered possible through the strategic use of language that located intervention as consistent with pre-existing societal narratives of national identity in the American context, particularly those associated with the idea of American Exceptionalism. The thesis will treat of the Foreign Policy discourse of the Bush administration after September 11th 2001 in order to answer the above question. A secondary aim of this thesis is to contribute to the growing body of literature that takes a Discourse Theory approach to the study of International relations. This chapter will begin with a preliminary examination of the case at hand in order to establish the relevance of the question, it will then move on to briefly introduce the approach being adopted before outlining the expected findings and giving a brief chapter by chapter outline of the thesis.

Background

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This project seeks to establish how the Bush administration in the US answered these questions and how in answering these questions they made possible the ways in which the US would respond to the 9/11 attacks. The immediate media response certainly held little doubt that this was a war with references to the 'Pearl Harbour of the 21st century' being commonplace.[4] However there is a degree of uncertainty as to what extent the events of 9/11 constituted an act of war at least in any conventional sense. Indeed, President Bush's initial response indicated the degree of this uncertainty. At about 9:30, the President addressed the nation for the first time from the elementary school where he had been engaged in a photo opportunity with school children to promote his child literacy programme. The address took place after the towers had been struck but before the Pentagon had been hit and before either tower had collapsed. In the statement President Bush called on the FBI to conduct

> "a full-scale investigation to hunt down and to find those folks who committed this act."[5]

At this stage, at least, it appeared that the attacks were to be treated as a criminal act requiring law enforcement and not as an act of war requiring a military response.

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[1] The above times and figures are taken from *The 9/11Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist attacks upon the United States* The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Norton, New York

[2] See James Der Derian "In Terrorem: War, Terror, Judgement" in Booth & Dunne (eds) *Worlds in Collision* (Basingstoke, 2002) for a discussion of the term '9/11' as a signifier for these events.

[3] RBJ Walker "War, Terror, Judgement" in Bulent Gokay & RBJ Walker (eds) *11 September 2001: War, Terror and Judgement* Frank Cass Publishers, London 2003 p.69

[4] See for example "Bush puts nation on war footing" *The Irish Times,* 21/09/2001; "Everyone was screaming, crying , running. Its like a warzone" *The Guardian*, 12/.09/2001; "Red, White and Blue Highways" *The New York Times*, 21/09/2001; & "Then and Now" *The New York Times*, 29/09/2001

[5] Bob Woodward *Bush At War* Pocket Books, London 2003, p.16

However, by evening the construction of the attacks in the rhetoric of the administration had shifted, although specific mention of the attacks being an act of war was left out in order to avoid unnerving the American people.[6] President Bush was later to claim that as soon as he had been told that the second tower had been hit he knew he was at war.[7]

The problem of defining 9/11 stems from the fact that if this was an act of war, then it was very different from any previous act of war; not in effect but in execution. Unlike in Pearl Harbour in 1941 or when the British burned the Capitol in 1815 there was no clear chain of responsibility leading back to a foreign capital. The perpetrators of the attacks had all been killed in the execution of the attacks leaving little or no trail of the kind of command and control structure that would normally govern conventional military action. Indeed the 19 hijackers had all been based within US jurisdiction in the period leading up to the attacks; the four flights had taken off from domestic terminals at airports in Boston, Newark and Dulles and were heading for destinations within the United States.[8] The question has to be asked as to how it became so clear that this was an act of war and not a crime, with the concomitant responses forthcoming. The point here is not to in any way question the responsibility of Al Qaeda for the events on 9/11, but rather to highlight the construction of the attack as an act of war, requiring a military response rather than as an act of terrorism that required a criminal investigation as in the case of the 1993 WTC bombings which were also carried out by Islamic extremists or the Oklahoma bombing in 1995 which were initially believed to have been.[9] It is also to highlight how an event contained

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[6] Ibid p.30/21

[7] Ibid. p.30

[8] *The 9/11 Commission Report*, Chapter 1 [passim]

[9] For the early response, including reference to a possible Middle Eastern connection, to the Oklahoma bombing see for example "Terror in Oklahoma City: The investigation; at least 31 are dead; scores

within the sovereign boundaries of the state can be (re)constructed as an external attack, a foreign threat, and a threat best deal with by a military response.

In his address to the American people on the evening of September 11th, President Bush stated that

> "We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbour them...America and our friends and allies join with all those who want peace and security in the world, and we stand together to win the war against terrorism."[10]

Clearly then the attacks were to be responded to in a military fashion. Thus even though the attacks were not declared as being acts of war specifically, the idea of a 'War on Terror' made its debut at this point[11], although perhaps the full implications of this were not immediately apparent at the time. Nine days later, in an address to the joint sessions of congress the President issued an ultimatum to the Taliban government to hand over Bin Laden and to dismantle the terrorist infrastructure in Afghanistan.

> "The Taliban must act and act immediately. They will hand over the terrorists or they will share in their fate."[12]

At this point we can start to see how the administration answered the questions posed by R.B.J. Walker cited above, this clearly was an act of war, it was committed by a group called Al Qaeda led by Osama Bin Laden[13], against America because "we're

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missing after car bomb attack in Oklahoma City wrecks 9 storey Federal Office building" *New York Times,* 20/04/1995

[10] George W. Bush *Address to the nation, September 11th 2001* available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html, accessed 25/07/2006

[11] This was not however the first time the term 'War on Terror' had been used by a Presidential administration in the US. See discussion in Chapter 5 of this thesis.

[12] George W. Bush *Address to the Joint Sessions of Congress, September 20th 2001* available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html, accessed 25/07/2006

[13] There is no formally accepted transliteration for the Arab alphabet into the Latin alphabet, therefore Bin Laden tends to change in spelling depending on the source – Osama Bin Laden, Usama Bin Laden, Ben Laden, Bin Ladin, Ben Ladin etc. I have chosen this form simply because it is the most familiar to European readers.

the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world"[14], and ultimate sovereign responsibility lies with the Taliban government in Afghanistan. An interesting point to note here is that the response to 9/11 immediately shifted to a focus on the territorial base of the putative head of Al-Qaeda rather than the dispersed 'network of networks' of radical Islamists that were more directly responsible.[15]

On October 7th, US forces began bombing raids against Taliban and Al-Qaeda targets in Afghanistan as the first military strike in the 'War on Terror'. Under National Security Presidential Directive 9 "Defeating the Terrorist Threat to the United States", the efforts against terrorism were not to be confined solely to Al-Qaeda but rather were to be extended to a global war on terrorism, including terrorists and those who harbour them. The goal was the "elimination of terrorism as a threat to our way of life."[16] This first battle had four phases of operations. Phase 1 involved the build up of forces in the region and the securing of basing rights and cooperation from neighbouring countries. Phase 2 would involve the combined efforts of air strikes and CIA and military Special Operations forces. It would also rely on helping and supporting local Afghan forces who opposed the Taliban. Phase 3 marked the move to 'decisive operations' with a major push against the Taliban regime. By November 13th, the Taliban had been forced out of Mazar-e-Sharif in northern Afghanistan and the capital Kabul. By early December all major cities had fallen to the coalition, and on the 22nd of that month Hamid Karzai was appointed head of the interim government. In March 2002 the largest engagement of the campaign took place in the

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[14] George W. Bush *Address to the nation, September 11th 2001* available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html, accessed 25/07/2006

[15] For example only one person has ever been successfully prosecuted in the United States in connection with the attacks. Furthermore a definite decision was taken to avoid making Bin Laden the target of the 'War on Terror', an early CIA document which had a graphic representing Bin Laden in a 'no smoking' type sign was edited to remove this reference. See Woodward, op. cit., 2003, p.75 The idea of a 'network of networks' is elaborated by Jason Burke in his seminal *Al Qaeda: the true story of Radical Islam*, Penguin, London 2004, particularly ch.16.

[16] National Security Presidential Directive 9 as quoted in *The 9/11 Commission Report* p.334

Shah-I-Kot area south of Gardez. The 3-week battle is seen as the effective end of major combat operations although Bin Laden and Mullah Omar remained at large. Phase 4 of the campaign involved what armed forces call 'security and stability operaitons'.[17] As of September 2009 these operations remain ongoing. Bin Laden's whereabouts remain unknown although subsequent communications confirm that he survived the assault.[18] We can see here to a certain extent how the nomenclature of war or the war paradigm were at cross purposes with the declared objectives of preventing further attacks and punishing the perpetrators of the initial attacks. Arguably a lower scale intervention more directly targeted as a law enforcement effort against Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda would have had a greater chance of success. The large scale nature of the intervention executed on a relatively short timescale meant that US and allied forces had to rely on local allies in order to prosecute the war against the Taliban. The battle at Tora Bora is often singled out as the event where this tactic directly impeded the capture or killing of Bin Laden.[19]

Although the rhetoric of the 'War on Terror' even in this early stage had constantly referred beyond Al-Qaeda and Afghanistan[20], in practice the military aspects of the 'War on Terror' had largely remained focused on these two targets. In this sense the 'War on Terror' was focused on the prevention of any further attacks and targeted directly those who had provided planning and support for the

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[17] Ibid. p.337-8

[18] Bin Laden is still apparently at large, see for example "Bin Laden Tap challenges 9/11 conviction" *The Guardian, 26/05/2006* where he downplays the role of Zaccarias Moussaoui in the 9/11 attacks.

[19] See for example Mary Anne Weaver "Lost at Tora Bora" *New York Times* 11/09/05, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/11/magazine/11TORABORA.html?pagewanted=print accessed 30/10/08; most recently a tape claiming to be from Bin Laden surfaced on 13th September 2009, see Mark McDonald "New Message reported from Bin laden" in *New York Times* 14/09/09, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/15/world/15tape.html accessed 17/09/09

[20] Pehaps the best known example of this generalised enemy came in the State of the Union 2002 but already in late 2001, references were being consistently made to conflict beyond Afghanistan. See for example the Thanksgiving address by President Bush on 24/11/2001 where he states "We will face difficult times ahead. The fight we have begun will not be quickly or easily finished. Our enemies hide and plot in many nations." Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011124.html , accessed 25/07/2006

perpetrators of 9/11. The generalised enemy, which for want of a better term we shall call 'terror', remained unspecific and faceless and as such was potentially enabling in terms of Foreign Policy options. That is to say that by leaving open the potential threats covered by the term 'terror' the administration created opportunities to strategically use the term as a means of legitimising other Foreign Policy goals. This extension of the threats covered by this broad conception of terror is in evidence in the State of the Union Address in January 2002 where George W. Bush specifically named the most important threats.

> "States like these [Iran, Iraq & North Korea], and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger."[21]

This had not been the first time Iraq had been mentioned in connection with 9/11 and the 'War on Terror'[22] but the emergence of an idea of an 'Axis of Evil' marked the beginning of the steady ratcheting up of pressure on Iraq that ultimately ended in war in March 2003.

The response then to the attacks on 9/11 was marked in part by two large-scale interventions in Muslim countries, Afghanistan and Iraq. In both cases the existing regime has been removed and attempts were made by the US and its coalition partners to install some form of constitutional government based on a rule of law and electoral politics. This response was presented both in policy and practice as being a natural and defensive response to the attacks and the best way of ensuring that attacks such as those on 9/11 would not happen again. The path from the attacks on 9/11 to these military assaults has been represented as a clear and direct one. However even the cursory account presented above has suggested otherwise. The question that has to be raised is how an attack organised and coordinated largely within the sovereign

[21] President George W. Bush "State of the Union" 29/01/2002 available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html, accessed 23/11/05
[22] See Richard Clarke *Against All Enemies* Simon & Schuster, London , 2004

boundaries of the US, perpetrated by 16 Saudi citizens, 2 Emerati citizens, and one each from Lebanon and Egypt lead to large-scale interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. This thesis aims to answer the question: how were the US military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan made possible?

The Argument and Approach

The central argument of this thesis is that rather than simply being a straight forward security response to the 9/11 attacks, the discourse of the 'War on Terror' constructed the terrorist threat in a manner that securitised the threat from a generalised enemy called terror in terms of an existential threat, not to particular strategic interests, but rather to American identity and way of life. This construction of the terms of the conflict rendered dissent difficult to articulate and thus shifted the balance of probabilities towards the approval of military action.[23] However this argument is not based on the assertion of a causal connection between the articulation of national identity and Foreign Policy action but rather a discussion of the necessary condition for such action. 'How possible' questions deal with necessary conditions. To say that 'a' is a necessary condition of 'b' is not the same as saying that where 'a' obtains, 'b' obtains. Rather it is to say that for 'b' to obtain, 'a' is necessary. That is to say that 'a' is a condition of possibility for 'b' but not sufficient to bring 'b' into existence in and of itself.[24] For the purposes of this thesis, the argument would be that the discursive strategies of the Bush administration were necessary for the 'War on Terror' to be pursued in the manner it was but that such strategies were probably not sufficient to cause those strategies.

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[23] For a similar argument see Ronald R Krebs & Jennifer K Lobasz "Fixing the meaning of 9/11: Hegemony, Coerion and the road to war in Iraq" in *Security Studies* Vol 16 No 3, 2007 pp.409-451

[24] See for discussion Roger Wertheimer "Conditions" in *The Journal of Philosophy* Vol 65 No 12, 1968 pp.355-364. Particularly the following passage: "The confusion is that between the conditions of P itself and the conditions of P's being a condition of Q. If P is a condition of Q, then Q does not enter into the conditions of P. But obviously, Q must be involved in the logical conditions of P's being a condition of Q. But this is trivial." Ibid. p364

In order to deal with this question this thesis will address primarily the discourse of the 'War on Terror'. Discourse is conceived of here as a structural feature of the social word, albeit one that is primarily linguistic. This conception of discourse allows for strategic action within discourse, the success of which is limited only by the degree to which such strategic interventions are successful in convincing their target audiences that they are meaningful with reference to their discursive setting or as Milliken puts it, their 'grid of intelligibility'.[25] Thus the focus is on how the Bush administration articulated the security threat of terrorism and an exploration of the cultural resources upon which these articulations drew. This thesis will focus on how this discourse drew upon existing discourses of American identity in order to construct the terror threat in a particular way. Identity here is conceived of as a social phenomenon that is constituted "relationally and discursively".[26] Identities are a product of political practices but also act as a constraint on such practice in that they legitimate or make possible a certain course of action or argument while excluding others.[27] However, this thesis does not make the case that identity acts causally but rather that appeals to identity can help to constitute problems in a particular way and thereby legitimate certain courses of action.

The structures of the emerging discourse of the 'War on Terror' were immediately apparent in even the earliest statements from the Bush administration. In one of his first addresses to the nation after the attacks, at 8:30pm on September 11th 2001, Bush began with the following:

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[25] See Jennifer Milliken "The study of discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and methods" in European Journal of International Relations Vol 5 No 2, 1999, p.229-230

[26] Lene Hansen *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War* Routledge, London, 2006 p.37

[27] This issue is often explored under what Milliken terms as the play of practice aimed at studying 'subgjugated knowledge'. That is knowledge that is excluded or rendered unintelligible in terms of a dominant or hegemonic discourse. See Milliken, op. cit, p230

> "Today, our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly attacks."[28]

Immediately the attacks on America were constructed as being attacks on the very idea of being American – freedom, justice, and morality.

> "America was targeted for attack because we're the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world."[29]

Feeding directly from the discourse of exceptionalism, the coming conflict was framed as being simply one between freedom and tyranny, good and evil.

> "Today, our nation saw evil, the very worst of human nature. And we responded with the best of America."[30]

Again the oppositional nature of the conflict is being framed in existential terms based on a fundamental conceptualisation of the self and the other – 'we' in this discourse are good, free, moral, 'they' are evil, unfree, immoral. Furthermore it was made apparent where the lines of this Manichean worldview were to be drawn, as with all binaries those mentioned above represent a relationship not simply of opposition but of hierarchy – good over evil, free over unfree, moral over immoral, self over other.

Characterised in this fashion the 'War on terror' presented a stark choice between 'us' or 'them', the classic "you're either with us or against us". Now this may seem unproblematic in the context of the 9/11 attacks and indeed would be to a certain extent if the definition of terror remained restricted to the perpetrators of the hijackings and those who aided and abetted them; however as Walker notes,

> "the response to specific terrorists became both a generalised 'War against Terrorism' (promising a broader war against all and sundry, beginning with Iraq), and a specific intervention into a civil war in Afghanistan."[31]

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[28] President Bush "Address to the nation" 11/09/01, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html accessed 30/10/08
[29] Ibid.
[30] Ibid.
[31] RBJ Walker "War, Terror, Judgement" in RBJ Walker & Bulent Gokay *September 11 2001: War, Terror and Judgement* Frank Cass, London 2003 p.69

It is in this more generalised 'War on Terror' that I am interested here. By locating the motivation for the attacks in the conflict between freedom and tyranny, the enemy that was targeted in the discourse of the 'War on Terror' was not the 19 hijackers nor even primarily Osama Bin Laden, although they were no doubt included in the list of targets, but rather a generalised enemy called 'Terror'.

There are two implications of this generalisation of the 'War on Terror', the first relates to the categorisation of the attacks as an act of war and the second relates to questions of identity and the methods to be used in the war. Speaking on September 12th 2001, the President made the following statement

> "The deliberate and deadly attacks which were carried out yesterday against our country were more than acts of terror. They were acts of war."[32]

The decision to refer to the attacks as acts of war had been made on 9/11 but the reference was removed from the President's first speech in the interests of promoting calm.[33] The implications of defining the acts as acts of war are obvious as it shifts the focus from the perpetrators as criminals to the perpetrators as 'enemies', and the attacks from being criminal damage targeted at centres of political and economic importance to attacks on the sovereign body, the US, as a whole. President Bush concludes the sentence as follows:

> "This will require our country to unite in steadfast determination and resolve. Freedom and democracy are under attack."[34]

This strategic move shifts our attention then to the second implication of this generalisation. By characterising the attacks as attacks on 'Freedom and democracy', the implication for the enemy is that it is not just those who perpetrated the attacks but also all enemies of 'Freedom and democracy' so defined. It will be argued that this

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[32] President Bush "Remarks by the President in Photo opportunity with the National Security Team" 12/09/01 available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010912-4.html accessed 30/10/08

[33] Bob Woodward *Bush at war* 2003 p.30

[34] President Bush "address" 12/09/01 op. cit.

open-ended definition of the enemy in the discourse of the 'War on Terror' was crucial in making possible the push towards war in Iraq in 2003.

Chapter Outline

Chapter 2 - Literature Review

This chapter is broken up into three separate sections. The first is an overview of the existing literature on intervention and warfare in IR. The goal here is to locate the project within the broader IR literature and also to highlight some of the gaps in the existing literature. The second section will deal explicitly with the existing literature on the 'War on terror'. This section includes an introduction to cognitive approaches to FPA, particularly those approaches which focus on the role ideas play in policy formation; the criticism here is that 'the add ideas and stir' approach of much of this work throws up as many problems as it does solutions. The final section will deal with Copenhagen School approaches to the 'War on Terror' as one possible means of addressing some of the shortfalls outlined in the previous approaches.

Chapter 3- Security, Identity and Discourse

The argument of this thesis is that the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan were made possible by the Bush administration by the manner in which the threats posed by international terrorism were articulated in what we will call the discourse of the 'War on Terror'. This discourse constructed the threat of Al-Qaeda as an existential struggle between a good self and a pathologically evil and destructive other. This chapter sets out to define the key concepts of discourse, identity, security and legitimacy and the relationship between these concepts in general terms before moving on in the latter part of the chapter to identify the specific discourses of relevance to the question in hand

Chapter 4 – Theory, Method & data

Having discussed the theoretical underpinnings of this thesis in the previous chapter this section will outline the central approach of the thesis, how it is to be researched, and how the conclusions will be drawn. As discussed in the previous chapter, this thesis argues that in order to understand how the military interventions in the 'War on Terror' were possible we need to examine the discursive construction of these threats that tell us who or what was under threat, what the nature of the threat was and how the United States should responds to this threat. Specifically Jutta Weldes' concepts of 'articulation' and 'interpellation' and the Copenhagen School's 'grammar of security' were identified as being useful means of examining this discursive construction of threats. This chapter discusses how these concepts will be operationalised in this thesis. It will also discuss how texts will be selected and examined in the chapters that follow.

Chapter 5 –Framing the 'War on Terror'

This chapter seeks to explore the historical role of identity discourse in US Foreign Policy (USFP). Part of this will inevitably involve a historical overview of US Foreign Policy – the statements and policy documents, the institutional structures, the actions taken. The purpose of this chapter is to give some background to the institutional and discursive frames that have been employed by American governments in times of perceived or proclaimed crisis. As discussed in the previous chapters, the success of securitizing moves or indeed any attempt to define a particular concept within discourse is limited by the extent to which they can either be linked to pre-existing discursive understandings or where actors can successfully articulate a radically different set of understandings based upon the perceived

incongruence between the existing discourse and events.[35] This thesis will set out to argue that the discourse of the 'War on Terror' was successful for the former reasons, namely that it was able to present a convincing narrative of both the events and the response that was congruent with pre-existing understandings of the United States role in the world. This chapter then aims to examine the sedimented discursive understandings of the US' role in the world that would render intelligible contemporary calls to action when put in those terms.

Chapters 6 – Securitizing Terror

Having discussed in the previous chapter the role that the interplay between Foreign Policy and national identity has played in US history, this chapter sets out to explore the initial response to the 9/11 attacks. It charts the construction of the attacks from the initial appeal to law enforcement to the gradual assertion of the military nature of the events up to and including the military campaign in Afghanistan. It will look at the securitization of terrorism in a manner that made possible the intervention in Afghanistan through a discourse which constructed the American self and Terrorist other in a particular way. The focus will be in part upon the role this construction of radically opposed identities by the Bush administration had in making a military response appear to be the appropriate and legitimate response to the 9/11 attacks. That is the view that the conflict was fundamentally a conflict between starkly contrasting opponents – 'us' representing liberty, freedom, and good versus 'them' representing tyranny, oppression, violence and evil. The term 'Manichean' is used to denote this construction in the text although some have argued that such an epithet is a disservice to the Manicheans.[36] Essentially though the argument presented here is premised on

[35] For an example of the radical break in discursive understanding see Stuart Croft, *Culture, Crisis and America's War on Terror* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2006

[36] Dan Skinner for example argues that the Manichean's did not believe that good could destroy evil, in fact their dualism was based on the premise that the nature of man was based on a duality of spirit, man

the idea that by constructing the enemy in the 'War on Terror' in such stark terms it created the conditions of possibility for the conflict that followed. A second point that is highlighted here is the construction of a more generalised enemy than those specifically responsible for the 9/11 attacks – a 'War on Terror' rather than a War on Al-Qaeda or Bin Laden. As such the construction of the 'War on Terror' not only made military action in Afghanistan possible but it also created the possibility of extending the target of such action beyond the initial one.

Chapter 7 – Iraq and the 'War on Terror'

Whereas the previous chapter dealt with the initial response to the 9/11 attacks this chapter turns its focus to the build up to the other major conflict of the 'War on Terror' – the war in Iraq. The previous chapter concluded with reference to the fact that the Bush administration had successfully securitized the problem of international terrorism but that this definition was not, at least as far as the securitizing move was concerned, limited to the Taliban or Al-Qaeda or Bin Laden but rather to a general threat to the United States called 'terror'. This chapter contends that the successful securitization of the threat posed by Saddam Hussein's Iraq was based on the ability of the administration initially to maintain the sense of insecurity and fear based on the 9/11 attacks and then to engage in a rhetorical strategy to link Saddam Hussein to the general threat called terror. In other words, the intervention in Iraq was made possible by the construction of the threat posed by Saddam in terms that linked Iraq effectively to the threat of global terrorism which in turn was constructed in terms of a fundamental existential threat to the American way of life. This is not to argue that this was the sole reason for the intervention in Iraq. Other motivations certainly

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needed to be aware of his evil side in order to allow his good side to dominate but not eradicate it. Skinner argues that Bush's eschatological view of the battle between good and evil would be better viewed as a form of Zorastrianism. See Dan Skinner "Calling Bush's views Manichean is an insult to the Manicheans" 27/09/04 available at http://hnn.us/articles/7202.html accessed 27/10/08

played a role in guiding the administration's hand, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to determine what those motivations were but this thesis will argue that the ability to effectively securitize Iraq and thereby make possible the US intervention against that state was dependent on the linking of the Iraqi threat to the broader discourse of the 'War on Terror'. The chapter will begin by looking at the securitizing moves of the administration between January 2002 and March 2003. It will then examine the audience response in both Congress and the general public in the United States in the same period. It will also discuss the intersection between the strategic discourse and the securitizing discourse of the 'War on Terror', before drawing conclusions on how the intervention in Iraq was made possible through the strategic use of language that built on existing themes of American identity and security that predated 9/11 but also developed from the discourse of the 'War on Terror' that followed 9/11.

Chapter 8 – Evaluation and concluding remarks

The final chapter will draw together the arguments raised in the previous chapters and deal with issues relating to verification and further avenues of research.

Expected findings

This thesis sets out to highlight the puzzle of the relationship between the 9/11 attacks and the two subsequent large-scale conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. In order to address this puzzle it will be proposed that a Discourse Theory approach that builds on a combination of the Copenhagen School and post-positivist theories be developed as the most appropriate means of answering the question outlined. The first half of the thesis will be used to outline in detail the theoretical approach aimed at understanding how the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq were made possible and how it relates to existing attempts in the literature to either understand or explain the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. This theoretical approach will build on the Copenhagen school

concept of securitization and link it with other post-positivist approaches to security and identity, particularly the work of Jutta Weldes. The second half of the thesis will then apply this theoretical approach to the cases in hand. This section will begin with a discussion of the historical relationship between intervention, expansion and discourses of identity, particularly exceptionalism, in the US before turning to explore in detail the build up to the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq.

How then, to return to the original research question, were the US military interventions in the 'War on Terror' possible? This thesis will argue that the attacks on 9/11 were not in themselves self-evident and automatic causes of the 'War on Terror' that followed; that is to say that the attacks themselves were necessary but not sufficient conditions for the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Rather, in order to understand how the interventions were made possible, we need to examine the discursive construction of the 'War on Terror' in terms of the securitization of terrorism as a threat not just to the United States' material interests, but more importantly to its way of life and its identity, by the Bush administration. These claims to identity can only be understood in the context of longer standing identity narratives that make up the cultural resources which the administration drew upon to successfully securitize these threats. Thus, it will be demonstrated that the discourse of the 'War on Terror' constructed the 9/11 attacks as a security threat to the US in terms of an atavistic, evil threat under the term 'terror' or 'terrorism' that sought to destroy the United States because of the things it stood for. Namely freedom, liberty, and democracy. Furthermore, parallels were drawn between the contemporary terror threat and previous evil 'others' that had posed risks for the US in the past. The success of the articulation of the need to intervene militarily in first Afghanistan, and later Iraq, was based on the degree to which the Bush administration was able to

construct a plausible narrative that constructed the American 'self' and the enemy 'other' in manner that echoed with sedimented narratives of 'self' and 'other' in American political and cultural discourse. In other words it was not simply the articulation of Afghanistan and Iraq as threats that made the interventions possible but their articulation as threats at the level of collective identity.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Before turning to a discussion of the specific theoretical approach to be taken in this project, it is first necessary to set it in the broader context of the field of IR and discussions of the 'War on Terror'. This chapter deals with the general approach to intervention and warfare as a Foreign Policy option in the IR and Foreign Policy Analysis literature, and the specific approaches to the 'War on Terror' and an account of attempts within the FPA and IR literature to deal with the issue of perception and identity in policy formation.

In order to deal adequately with these topics this chapter is broken up into 3 separate sections. The first is an overview of the existing literature on intervention and warfare in IR. The goal here is to locate the project within the broader IR literature and also to highlight some of the gaps in the existing literature. The second section will deal explicitly with the existing literature on the 'War on Terror'. This section includes an introduction to cognitive approaches to FPA, particularly those approaches which focus on the role ideas play in policy formation; the criticism here is that 'the add ideas and stir' approach of much of this work throws up as many problems as it does solutions. The final section will deal with Copenhagen School approaches to the 'War on Terror' as one possible means of addressing some of the shortfalls outlined in the previous approaches. The following chapter will argue that a Discourse Theory approach, building on the securitization literature that focuses on the relationship between security, identity and legitimacy provides the most comprehensive answer to the gaps raised in the existing literature.

Intervention and the International system

International Relations theory has had something of an ambivalent relationship with intervention in world politics. On the one hand, the sovereign state was reified as the

sole important actor in IR by Realism while on the other, as Hedley Bull notes in his introduction to a collection of essays on intervention, it [intervention]

> "in fact is a ubiquitous feature of modern international relations, perhaps even an inherent feature of it."[1]

Bull goes on to contrast this fact with the strong norm that existed in the literature that intervention is both legally and morally wrong except in extreme cases.

The UN charter, for example, expressly prohibits warfare except in cases of self-defence, in carrying out enforcement actions on behalf of the UN and in cases of a perceived threat of imminent attack. This provision is detailed in Chapter I, Article 2:4 which states:

> "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations".[2]

Article 2:7 continues:

> "nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII".[3]

Coupled with the recognition of the sovereign equality of all member states[4] and the exceptions to this principle of non-intervention being restricted to "any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression"[5] identified by the Security Council or self-defense[6], albeit with the proviso that the action be then referred to the Security Council, the protection of the principle of sovereignty is quite robust. In other words the UN Charter represents the zenith of the recognition of what had been emerging

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[1] Hedley Bull *Intervention in World Politics* Oxford University Press, Oxford 1984 p.2
[2] *Charter of the United Nations*, San Francisco, 26th June 1945 available at http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/ accessed 07/11/2006
[3] Ibid
[4] Ibid, Chapter I Art 2.1
[5] Ibid, Chapter VII Art 39
[6] Chapter VII Art 51 "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security". Ibid.

since the decline of the medieval international system[7] as customary international law that states had a right to freedom from interference in either their domestic affairs or their territorial integrity provided they did not directly threaten either of the same of their neighbours.

The ubiquity of violations of this norm as noted by Bull does not in invalidate the existence of the norm itself. The International Court of Justice ruling in the Nicaragua case put it as follows:

> "It is not to be expected that in the practice of States the application of the rules in question should have been perfect, in the sense that States should have refrained, with complete consistency, from the use of force or from intervention in each other's internal affairs. The court does not consider that, for a rule to be established as customary, the corresponding practice must be in absolutely rigorous conformity with the rule. In order to deduce the existence of customary rules, the Court deems it sufficient that the conduct of States should, in general, be consistent with such rules, and that instances of State conduct inconsistent with a given rule should generally be treated as breaches of that rule, not as indications of the recognition of a new rule. If a State acts in a way prima facie incompatible with a recognised rule, but defends its conduct by appealing to the exceptions or justifications contained within the rule itself, then whether or not the State's conduct is in fact justifiable on that basis, the significance of that attitude is to confirm rather than to weaken the rule."[8]

Put simply, the occurrence of aggressive acts against the sovereignty of states does not necessarily suggest that a norm against such action does not exist. The question of interest then becomes under what circumstances is the violation of the norm of

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[7] Although the rise of the modern state system is often associated with the peace of Westphalia 1648, this claim has effectively been debunked by Andreas Osiander in a 2001 article. He convincingly argues that the standard IR account of the peace is largely based on 19th century accounts of the emergence of the state system which in turn by and large accepted at face value anti-Hapsburg propaganda of the 17th century. Ossiander gives the following description of the Westphalian treaties: "It is silent on the issue of sovereignty, or, less technically, independence, of European actors. It does not refer to any corollary of sovereignty either, such as non-intervention. It does not deal with the prerogatives of the [Holy Roman] emperor, nor does it mention the Pope. There is nothing in it about the balance of power." See Ossiander, "Sovereignty, International Relatiosn and The Westphalian Myth" in *International Organisation* Vol 55, No. 2 (Spring 2001) P266. What we can say, following Ossiander, is that somewhere between the mid-17th century and the signing of the UN Charter in 1945 there emerged an established norm of sovereignty and non-intervention in international society for which, the peace of Westphalia provided a foundational myth.

[8] *"Nicaragua Case (jurisdiction and admissibility)"* , ICJ Reports (1984) 551, para 186

sovereignty considered legitimate? Or in what ways do states seek to legitimate violations of this norm.

The question of legitimacy however was relegated to the backseat in the mainstream of IR scholarship on intervention and warfare during the Cold War.[9] Indeed, the Reagan administration argued explicitly that commitment to the UN Charter had to be balanced against the realities of a Cold War against an 'evil empire' that many felt was willing to disregard such commitments. As Jeane Kirkpatrick, the US representative to the UN stated:

> "unilateral compliance with the Charter's principles of non-intervention and non-use of force may make sense in some instances but is hardly in itself a sound basis for either US policy or for international peace and security."[10]

However with the end of that conflict, the question of a 'right of intervention' moved increasingly to the fore with the various interventions, wars and gross human rights violations of the 1990's in Iraq, the former Yugoslavia and intermittently in Sub-Saharan Africa.[11] However, as MacFarlane notes, a fundamental problem remained with the literature on intervention, namely:

> "that there are few efforts to merge legal and ethical with political perspectives...at its root, intervention is a political act and is considered as such here."[12]

MacFarlane goes on to argue that the ethical and legal debate around intervention is largely missing the point as

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[9] See for example Kenneth Waltz *Theory of International Politics* McGraw Hill, New York 1979

[10] As quoted in Christine Gray *International Law and the Use of Force*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2004 p.27

[11] For examples see Simon Chesterman *Just War or Just Peace?: Humanitarian Intervention and International Law* Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001, Michael Ignatieff *Virtual War* Vintage, London 1999, Nicholas Wheeler *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society* 2000, and Francis Abiew *The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention* Springer, Amsterdam 2000. Here we can see a swing from a Realist/neo-realist account to more liberal account of the role intervention plays in international relations, thus it emerges not just as practice of power but also as a practice of justice. See Wheeler (2000) in particular but also the writings of Michael Doyle *Ways of War and Peace* WW Norton, New York 1997 & to a lesser extent Bruce Russett *Grasping the Democratic Peace* Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1995

[12] S. Neil MacFarlane "Intervention in Contemporary World Politics" *Adelphi* Paper 350, IISS, 2002 p.10

> "the displacement of raison d'etat by international norms is more apparent than real."[13]

At the heart of MacFarlane's analysis is a realist conception of international politics – intervention is conceived as a tool of power in the international system

> "a coercive application of force intended to affect the domestic political processes and outcomes."[14]

This conception of intervention permeates the literature and, indeed, is reinforced by both the policy and actions of states. Thus the picture that emerges is one where intervention is seen as effective, rational and in certain cases a legitimate course of action for states. Importantly for this research, there is a consensus that no legal right exists for intervention except in the exceptional circumstances outlined above and therefore in the absence of these its existence is inherently linked to political concerns or more explicitly to power. However despite the above, war has remained a recurrent feature of the international system. Contrary to the expectations of many the 20th century proved to be bloodier than any previous century with advances in technology allowing for destruction on a scale previously unimaginable. This, coupled with the growing debate surrounding humanitarian intervention and qualifications on the norm of sovereignty,[15] has lead to a resurgent interest in the question of how interventions might be possible. Or put another way, what are the enabling conditions for one state to undertake violent action against another? This thesis attempts to address this 'how possible' question in relation to the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Following MacFarlane, one possibility that needs to be addressed is whether states simply pursue their own interests. Public justification of such action is merely post hoc

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[13] Ibid. p.10
[14] Ibid. p.14
[15] See for example Philip Bobbitt *The Shield of Achilles* Knopf, New York 2002, Bobbitt argues that democracy and human rights trump any sovereign claims and therefore failure to live up to these norms effectively equates to a forfeiting of sovereignty.

rationalisation for decisions already taken based upon the national interest. The next section deals explicitly with this question in relation to the 'War on Terror'.

IR Accounts of the 'War on Terror'

Since 9/11 there has been a plethora of attempts by the IR community to grapple with the complexity of the events, to identify the key problems, and to predict the long term effects, if any, that these events would have on the world. In seeking to explain the causes and effects the familiar boundaries of the discipline have (re)emerged and been (re)presented in the debates within the discipline. For neo-realists little has changed; for neo-liberals international law and communities have been placed under stress by the resurgent unilateralism of the US in particular but their ultimate prognosis is that international cooperation is the last best hope for humanity; for the Marxists a distinct whiff of petroleum hangs in the air; and for the rest the challenge of policy relevance looms larger than ever. The following discussion seeks to look at how the existing IR literature attempted to address the 'how possible' question in relation to the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. It begins with a discussion of realism before turning to the FPA literature that deals explicitly with decision makers. It then turns to the constructivist and post-structuralist literature before finally looking in some detail at the Copenhagen School.

Realism and the 'War on Terror'

Of the 'traditions' in IR theory, the attacks on September 11th posed the greatest challenge to Realism. While power in traditional realist accounts had been measured in terms of military strength, economic resources and the force of will, the attacks on 9/11 only fulfilled the latter category. Sheer determination it seemed was sufficient to render the tenets of realism at least suspect if not entirely fallible. However, realism's

defenders were quick to counter any suggestion that the terrorist attacks had in fact changed anything. As Waltz put it

> "Terrorist attacks do not change the two main bases of international politics or alter the condition of recurring crises"[16]

Likewise Robert Jervis has argued that

> "the threat of terrorism is not as new as is often claimed; terrorism reinforces state power more than it either undermines it or exemplifies the diminished importance of states;...But, contrary to what I believed at first, it is now clear that September 11 has led to major changes in Russian and, even more, US Foreign Policy and has triggered assertive American hegemony"[17]

Although frequently critical of US Foreign Policy, the traditional realist and neo-realist school has argued that little if anything has changed regarding the fundamentals of international politics.[18] However others working within a broadly conceived realist paradigm have suggested that since the end of the Cold War but particularly since 9/11 there has been a significant shift in the manner in which threats are assessed, or rather more accurately that risk has replaced threat as the measure of action in international politics.[19] This is also borne out by the 'one percent doctrine', the idea that even if there is a one percent chance of a country sponsoring or organizing a terrorist attack then this is sufficient to justify a preventive/pre-emptive strike.[20]

Speaking at the launch of the House Intelligence committee's latest report on September 20th 2006, Pete Hoekstra, the Republican chairman, gave the following account of the current security situation:

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[16] Kenneth N. Walz "The Continuity of International politics" in Ken Booth and Timothy Dunne (eds) *Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order* Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke. 2002 p.353

[17] Robert Jervis *American Foreign Policy in a New Era* Routledge, New York, 2005, p.37

[18] See for typical examples of the discussions within realism see the following issue of *International Politics* Vol 41 No 1 March 2004 and the special section entitled 'Four more Years' *Survival* Vol 47 No1 Spring 2005

[19] Yee Kuang Heng *War as Risk Management* Routledge, London 2006

[20] Ron Suskind *The One Percent Doctrine: Deep inside America's Pursuit of Its Enemies Since 9/11* Simon & Schuster, New York 2007

> "His message was that America is at war, that the battleground is the whole planet, and that radical Islamist terrorists could strike anywhere."[21]

The message sent out by Hoekstra and indeed by the political establishment more generally is that we (the US) are at war, there is a constant threat of attack. The most prominent example of this constant conscious level of insecurity is the traffic light system of security levels, which never slips below 'Yellow' (Significant risk of terrorist Attacks) and was carried as a constant digital onscreen graphic (DOG) by several major networks. It is unsurprising then that this general sense of insecurity has affected scholars working in the field of international relations where there is unease at the use of the nomenclature of war to describe the current fight against terrorism, increasing criticism of the conduct of the campaign particularly in the case of Iraq, and yet a sense that indeed something must be done about the real threat of international terrorism.

A closer examination of one particular piece may clarify the kind of conundrum many academic commentators find themselves in. Chris Brown in an assessment of the 'War on Terror' in 2004, makes the following points in his conclusion:

> "The War on Terror will last for a long time…there is a danger that the negativism of the popular media…will come to sap the will of the US and others to continue the struggle…sooner or later, there will be another major terrorist outrage in the West, and then another. There is I think, no way of avoiding such atrocities although we can hope we get lucky as often as possible.
> The key point is to realise that there is no magic way of making all this go away…The war is something we are going to have to learn to live with, whether we want to or not."[22]

On the one hand Brown appears to be exhibiting a sense of fatalism about the reality of future terrorist attacks while on the other defending the essential task of fighting

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[21] "The Uses of Scare talk" *The Economist* 21/09/06
[22] Chris Brown "Reflections on the 'War on Terror', Two years on" in *International Politics* Vol 41, No 1 March 2004 p.62

the 'War on Terror'. He suggests we should not be too harsh in our judgements about the effectiveness of the 'War on Terror' while conceding that in its primary goal of stopping terrorist attacks it is doomed to failure. In the same passage he acknowledges the need to address social injustice and the Palestine issue

> "because we ought to be in favour of social justice, not because they are going to have any effect on this war."[23]

We are doomed then to a world of insecurity, fighting a war that cannot be won but never-the-less must still be fought. The brief interregnum of the post Cold War period is over and we are returned to the normal state of the world – war. Others such as Stephen Errera have suggested that

> "a 'struggle against terrorism' may be better than using the shorthand ''War on Terror'' (even ignoring the fact that terrorism is a tactic[24], not an enemy)".[25]

However the underlying sense of permanent insecurity remains the same. More recently the negativism that Brown refers to has grown even stronger with a plethora of disgruntled (or if not disgruntled at least very far from being gruntled) ex-officials and other commentators focussing on criticism of the 'War on Terror' particularly as it relates or rather doesn't relate to Iraq.[26] This thesis will argue that the problems highlighted above stem from the discursive construction of the 'War on Terror' as more than a targeted campaign against a single terrorist organisation or particular group of terrorists and instead as a campaign against a generalised concept called 'Terror' under which a number of diverse and conflicting aims were subsumed.

One of the key problems for a realist approach to the 'War on Terror' is how it addresses the issue of definition, namely what precisely was the nature of the threat to

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[23] Ibid p.62

[24] Indeed as Terry Jones has suggested it's rather difficult declaring war on an abstract noun, it seems military strategist go where linguists fear to tread. See Terry Jones "Why grammar is the first casualty of war" in *London Daily Telegraph* 12/01/2002 available at http://www.commondreams.org/views02/0112-02.htm accessed 20/09/09

[25] Stephen Errera "Three Circles of Threat" in *Survival* Vol 47, No 1 Spring 2005

[26] See for example Bob Woodward *State of Denial* Simon & Schuster, New York, 2007

the national interest and/or national security posed by Al Qaeda and how best could US power be deployed by the administration to address this threat? One response in the realist literature was to treat these problems as unproblematic. Al Qaeda, as the administration stated, were set on defeating the US through violent means and the US should therefore respond in kind using its technological and numerical superiority to defeat this threat. Furthermore in the realist view:

"Terrorists need states to operate from; hence the focus on rogue regimes"[27]

The appropriate response then was to find the state sponsors of a particular terrorist group and to punish them for enabling terrorist activity on their territory. This in itself was not a new approach to countering international terrorism from the US perspective.[28] The problem for such an approach, though, was the dispute both over the efficacy of such an approach and the selection of appropriate targets. Writing in late 2001, Rob de Wijk warned that:

> "The September 11 attacks demonstrated that terrorism no longer can be considered a tactical or local challenge, requiring cooperation between the national intelligence services and the police. The new terrorism is a strategic or international challenge, requiring international cooperation between intelligence services and armed forces."[29]

The question here wasn't one of whether or not a military response was appropriate but rather whether the appropriate force structures were in place for delivering the desired outcome, or as De Wijk put it:

"Meeting the challenge requires a new approach as well as new assets."[30]

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[27] David Dunn "Myths, motivations and 'misunderestimations': the Bush Administration and Iraq" in *International Affairs* Vol 79 No 2, 2003 p284

[28] See for discussion Charles T Eppright "Counterterrorism and Conventional Military force: The Relationship between political effect and Utility" in *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* Vol 20 No 4 1997, pp 333-344; Capt. Mark E Kosnik "The Military Response to Terrorism" in *Naval War College Review* Vol LIII No 2, 2000; and Walter Gary Sharp, Sr, "The use of armed force against Terrorism: American Hegemony or Impotence?" in *Chicago Journal of International Law* Vol 1 No 1, 2000,pp37-47

[29] Rob De Wijk "The Limits of Military Power" in *The Washington Quarterly* Winter, 2002 p75-76

[30] Ibid. p76

One of the recurrent themes of realist criticism of the 'War on Terror' was the failings of the conventional military approach.[31] The other central plank of criticism came from those who disagreed either about the selection of target states or the prosecution of conflicts in Afghanistan and, particularly, Iraq.[32] Indeed as Hinnebusch put it:

> "The [Iraq] war is a puzzle for realist IR theory...the war might be thought to validate some aspects of a realist world view, particularly the notion that, in the absence of countervailing power, great powers' natural tendency is to expand...Yet, if such an order is a permissive and probably necessary condition of the war, it is not a sufficient condition, leaving driving motives unaddressed"[33]

Crucial to these driving motives were the manner in which the Bush administration formulated its conception of the terrorist threat. Dunn outlines the three guiding questions and answers as follows:

> "(1) Who is the enemy?...The enemy are the terrorists and governments that support them.
> (2) Why do they hate us?...they hate us because we are free, they attack us because they are evil and their aim is to destroy us.
> (3) How to respond?...they [the terrorists and governments that support them] were to be hunted down and eradicated."[34]

The critical step then is the progression from the specific questions about who, why and how to the answers that lead to the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. In asking how were the interventions possible, a straightforward realist approach can only suggest certain necessary conditions, namely a threat to national interests, but not why specific policy choices came about. One means through which this interpretive

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[31] See for example Jeffrey Record "The Limits and temptations of America's conventional military primacy" in *Survival* Vol 47 no 1, 2005, pp.33-50 & Frederick W Kagan "War and Aftermath" *Policy Review* August-September 2003

[32] See for example Daniel Byman "Five Bad Options for Iraq" *Survival* Vol 47, No 1, 2005, pp.7-32; John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt "The Israel Lobby" *London Review of Books* 23/03/2006 available online at http://www.lrb.co.uk/v28/n06/print/mear01_.html accessed 20/11/2007; John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt "An Unneccessary War" *Foreign Policy* No 134 (Jan-Feb 2003), pp50-59

[33] Raymond Hinnebusch "The US invasion of Iraq: Explanations and Implications" in *Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies* Vol 16. No. 3, 2007, p209-210

[34] David H Dunn "Bush, 11 September and the Conflicting Strategies of the 'War on Terrorism'" in *Irish Studies in International Affairs* Vol 16, 2005 p13-14

process has been addressed that is consistent with the Realist approach to IR is in the Cognitive approach to Foreign Policy Analysis.

Foreign Policy Analysis and International Relations

The relationship between the subfield of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) and International Relations (IR) more generally has always been rather odd. In one sense all work in IR is in one way or another an attempt to explain some aspect of Foreign Policy (FP). However, despite this, most grand theories of IR place little emphasis on understanding or even acknowledging the role played by FP itself or by those responsible for making it. In a sense, FPA can be considered the drunken uncle of the IR family, always invited to family occasions but rarely directly spoken to or of. One of the goals of this thesis is to re-centre FP in IR theory, and to argue that in order to do this FPA needs to adequately take into account the various ontological and epistemological innovations that have occurred in and around debates in IR over the past 25 years or so. Of particular importance, this thesis will argue, is the growth of what could broadly be termed discursive and poststructuralist approaches in IR.

FPA emerged as a distinct sub-discipline in the two decades following the Second World War. The initial thrust of the discipline was to make the policy making process more efficient and more open to democratic scrutiny. Part of the motivation for the development of the field was in partial response to the simplistic accounts of Foreign Policy-making in IR more generally. The behaviouralist turn in American social science in the 1950s and 1960s had a profound impact on FPA, leading ultimately to the emergence of the comparative study of Foreign Policy (CFP). Despite the initial promise of CFP, which lead some to suggest that FPA was emerging as a 'normal science', the research programmes did not produce the expected results and FPA failed to develop as a normal science. From the mid-1970s

onwards FPA, which at one point seemed to have an emergent coherent identity, began to diffuse into an array of eclectic and often incompatible approaches. However, throughout much of this period another stream of FPA scholarship developed, with a particular focus on the role of perception and decision making in the creation of Foreign Policy.[35]

This approach could be broadly referred to under the title 'Cognitive perspectives', although the influence of psychology varies widely among the different protagonists.[36] Essentially these approaches shared a largely rationalist and positivist view of Foreign Policy makers, indeed the motivation for most of these theorists was at least in part to explain away the apparent irrational tendencies of policy makers. Following Tetlock and McGuire, the core of the Cognitive Research Program can be stated as follows:

1) The international environment imposes heavy information-processing demands upon policymakers.
2) Policy makers have limited capacity to process this information and, thus, resort to simplifying strategies to deal with this complexity.

Policymakers behave 'rationally' but only in the context of these simplified subjective representations of reality.[37] What we have then is a view of the world as consisting of individual actors with limited capacities and a complex international system that from time to time throws up crises that need to be dealt with. In other words, traditional cognitive perspectives maintain a dualist ontology between agent and structure, and focus on how an agent's misperception of the structural situation influences their

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[35] For a more detailed discussion of this history see Walter Carlsnaes "Foreign Policy" in Carlsnaes, Walter, Thomas Risse & Beth A. Simmons *Handbook of International Relations* Sage, London, 2002

[36] See for example Stanley Hoffman *Gullivers Troubles: or, the setting of American Foreign Policy* McGraw Hill, New York, 1968; Robert Jervis"Hypotheses on Misperception" *World Politics* 20, April, 1968

[37] See Philip E. Tetlock & Charles B McGuire, Jr. "Cognitive Perspectives on Foreign Policy" in G. John Ikenberry *American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays* London, Longman 2002 p.489

actions, hence the focus on misperception rather than perception per se. As Jervis puts it

> "In determining how he will behave, an actor must try to predict how others will act and how their actions will affect his values. The actor must therefore develop an image of others and of their intentions."[38]

Of particular interest in this approach is the re-instating of the human agent at the centre of the policy making process. In a sense it gives a better intuitive fit of how we imagine policy making takes place.

The question for these authors is, then, how exactly do these perceptions affect policy making? I have chosen to focus on Yuen Foon Khong's work *Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965* (1995) as Khong argues, and it must be said quite convincingly, the strong case that perceptions actually do inform if not directly cause actions and he gives a reasonably detailed framework of how this occurs. The basic idea, derived from cognitive psychology, is that people, when faced with novel situations, will attempt to fit the new data into existing schema based on surface similarities. The mechanism through which this occurs, Khong argues, is analogical reasoning which can be outlined as follows: AX:BX::AY:BY. What this means is that if past event A and current event B have X in common, given that Y was the outcome of A, and the common factor X then if the same reaction occurs again in situation B then Y will likewise come about. To put this in less abstract terms, the Vietnam situation in 1965 was seen to have several things in common with the Sudetenland in 1938, particularly the idea that it fell victim to a hostile totalitarian power; appeasement at Munich lead to WWII, therefore appeasement in Vietnam will lead to WWIII; therefore action must be taken to avoid this.

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[38] Robert Jervis "Hypotheses on Misperception" in *World Politics* Vol. 20, No. 3 (April 1968) p.454

We can see from the example above elements of the six diagnostic tasks that constitute the cognitive function of analogical reasoning. These are as follows; 1) Define the nature of the situation – in the example above, Vietnam is defined as a crucial moment in history, 2) Assess the stakes – in this case WWIII is at stake, 3) Provide prescriptions – in the Munich case it is assumed that if the Allies had stood up to Hitler then WWII could have been avoided, therefore the US must stand up to aggression in Vietnam, 4) Predict outcomes – if action is taken it will be successful, if not then WWIII, 5) Evaluate morality – obviously the greater good of avoiding WWIII is a moral one, 6) Warn about Dangers – in the Vietnam case, Khong argues that the use of the Dien Bien Phu analogy could have given more effective information about the dangers than the Munich one, which suggested the main danger was inaction.[39] Khong argues that the Analogical Explanation (AE) framework seeks to identify what policy makers are likely to use analogies for and how analogies might affect their policy choices. It also "has allowed us to explain decision outcomes at a level of precision not obtained by other approaches."[40]

To sum up then, the cognitive perspectives in FPA are important because they argue the importance of perception in determining the decisions taken by actors. But they do so with a critical imperative, that is to say that the motivation of most of the works mentioned above was to explain why policymakers consistently 'misread' situations when making decisions and to improve this state of affairs by pointing out these mistakes. Thus actors and structure are seen as mutually independent. Khong's work is slightly set apart in that he focuses specifically on the cognitive functions of analogies thus suggesting why policymakers stick to certain analogies even in the face of overwhelming counter evidence, he does however share the same epistemological

[39] See Yeun Foon Khong *Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965* , Routledge, London, 1995 p.254
[40] Ibid. p.254

and ontological assumptions of the other authors. The importance of these works is that they opened the door for a systematic account of the role ideas play in FP decision-making; they do so, however, with arguably a flawed method.

The central difficulty with cognitive approaches to Foreign Policy is that they treat interpretations as unproblematic data – in a sense they took the same approach many of their IR counterparts did when attempts were made to extend the field such as feminism, cultural studies, and environmentalism. For the cognitive analysts of Foreign Policy this was largely a case of 'add perceptions and stir' without reflecting on the ontological and epistemological implications of placing interpretation at the core of their analyses. There are three main problems that largely derive from the simplistic account of language taken by the cognitive approach in FPA. These are 1) Attribution 2) Structure v Agency 3) Interpretation - all of which I will argue can be more adequately dealt with through a discourse approach to FPA.[41]

The problem of attribution can be stated as follows; most of the 'cognitive perspective' approaches lack any clear account of the relationship between perception and Foreign Policy behaviour, leaving themselves open to criticisms that the expressed perceptions are merely ideological or rhetorical. The ideological/rhetorical critique gains further from the positivist ontology adopted by many of these theorists. Khong focuses on the psychological role analogies play in order to counter these criticisms. In a sense he concedes that ideas are in one sense epiphenomenal but that they do play an important role in determining how actors respond to the actual

[41] Henrik Larsen offers a similar critique to these approaches in the first chapter of his work *Foreign Policy and Discourse Analysis: France, Britain and Europe* 1997, he highlights the focus on individual policymakers, the positivistic treatment of language, and the assumption that language is a transparent medium as being the key problems. However he goes on to outline an alternative discourse analysis approach that falls victim to some of the problems outlined above because of its overly linguistic conception of discourse. The distinction between Larsen's approach and the approach being advocated here is broadly along the lines suggested by David Howarth as being between Discourse Analysis and Discourse Theory. See Howarth, David & Jacob Torfing *Discourse theory in European Politics: Identity Politics and Governance* Palgrave Macmillan, London 2004 Chapter 13

phenomenon in hand, that is via the six diagnostic tasks. However he fails to give an account of where these analogies come from, or why one particular analogy may be chosen over another. For example, he suggests that American interests would have been better served had the decision makers at Vietnam paid more attention to the Dien Bien Phu analogy than Munich. The problem was

> "that there was so strong a consensus about the lessons of Munich and Korea and their relevance to Vietnam that the lessons of Dien Bien Phu failed to provoke new questions about the fundamentals."[42]

Surely such a conclusion calls for an analysis of how such a consensus emerges and sustains itself.

The question of which analogies are chosen and why also begs the question of what events they are applied to. For example, Khong's analysis doesn't question the fact that the Vietnam issue was necessarily presented as a security problem for the United States. Likewise Jervis' *Hypotheses on Misperception* assumes that both the subject-agent (the Foreign Policy maker) and the object-structure (the international system) are ontologically independent. That is to say that the international system throws up security problems for the policy-maker to deal with which in turn are often distorted by the policy-maker's perceptions due to time constraints and a lack of perfect information.[43] What this fails to acknowledge is that in many ways Foreign Policy practice is constitutive of the international system that policy makers deal with. A possible alternative to this dualist ontology of agent and structure could be Wendt's structuration approach, derived from Roy Bhaskar's scientific realism and to a lesser extent Anthony Giddens, which posits that the relationship between agent and structure is in fact iterative. That is that while agents' choices are limited by actually

[42] Khong, op cit, 1995 p.263
[43] Jervis, op. cit., 1968 Passim

existing structures their actions can in turn affect that structure, which, in its new state limits the choices of the next agent.[44]

This shift to the level of meaning requires an account of the role played by interpretation. By making cognition and perception the centre-piece in explaining policy-maker's decisions, they open up a field of contestable interpretations of what is actually being perceived and how these perceptions affect actions. Furthermore there is a hermeneutic issue related to the position of the academic who, in most of the accounts outlined above appears to sit in godlike isolation, able to judge on misperception without having to give any account of her own perspective or cognitive map. Take for example Jervis' Hypothesis 9, which states that

> "actors tend to see the behaviour of others as more centralized, disciplined and coordinated than it is...Frequently, too many complex events are squeezed into a perceived pattern."[45]

To which he adds in a footnote without the slightest hint of irony

> "The Soviets consciously hold an extreme version of this view and seem to believe that nothing is accidental."[46]

Although this is a somewhat innocuous example, it does highlight something of a paradox in the existing cognitive approaches that it is taken for granted that policymakers, lacking perfect information and perhaps time, necessarily rely on heuristic devices such as analogies or cognitive maps in order to cope but that academics operating in similar circumstances have no such difficulties. The argument here is for at least some acknowledgement of the need for a more reflexive approach

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[44] See Alexander Wendt "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory" in *International Organisation*, Vol 41, No 3 (Summer 1987), p.335-370 passim. This differs from the dualist approach advocated by Archer, she argues that structuration "provides an insufficient account of the mechanisms of stable replication versus the genesis of new social forms" Margaret S Archer "Morphogenesis versus Structuration: On combining structure and action" in *The British Journal of Sociology* Vol 33 No 4, 1982 p.479 In other words she argues that by making structure and agency interdependent structurationist approaches cannot account for change. There are difficulties with her own approach however and I will argue that contra to certain approaches Discourse theory can and does account for change.

[45] Jervis, op. cit, 1968 p.475

[46] Ibid. p.475

to the study of the role of perception in decision-making. In other words such approaches must at least give some account of the academic's own 'dasein' (being-in-the-world).[47]

A major source of many of the issues outlined above is the simplistic account of language employed by much of the cognitive approach theorists. Basically, these theorists treat language as a transparent conduit of meaning where words refer to things in the world in an uncomplicated and straightforward manner. This ignores almost the entirety of linguistic philosophy in the last century from Saussure onwards. The basic points to be made are as follows:

- That particular analogies are only meaningful to the extent that they are congruent with broader social discourses, and that the present is just as constructed as the past in this regard. This is not to deny the existence of an external objective world, but rather to claim that events such as the attacks on September 11th or the invasion of Afghanistan are only rendered meaningful through existing discursive formations.
- Identity – in constructing threats via analogies or other discursive devices, the Foreign Policy maker is just as much creating the self. I will expand on this idea in my discussion of a discourse approach to the 'War on Terror'. Likewise an academic engaged in this kind of research needs to make explicit her own interests and preconceptions

[47] 'Dasein' or being-in-the-world is a Heideggerian concept adopted by Hans Georg Gadamer in his account of Hermeneutic approaches to interpretation. The basic point is that all human beings have prejudices that are conditioned by their historical and geographical backgrounds that limit their ability to engage in objective interpretation. For Gadamer this meant that people had to engage in a hermeneutics of tradition that dealt with texts on their own terms and attempted a fusion of horizons between the past and present. Habermas on the other hand argued that it was in fact possible to judge texts on universal criteria. For an interesting overview of the debate between Gadamer and Habermas on the possibility of judging interpretations see Alan How *The Habermas-Gadamer debate and the nature of the Social: Back to Bedrock* Aldershot , Avebury 1995

- This has in turn implications for Agency and Structure, in that they should be conceived as mutually constitutive – a discursive formation contains the rules that construct subjects and locates them in relation to an equally constructed structure embedded in a system of practices for dealing with these subjects. This is a form of post-structuralism following Foucault. Crucially this form of Discourse Theory includes institutions and practices within the discourse and thus departs from the predominantly linguistic conception of discourse advocated by Larsen[48]
- Practice – both speech and actions are implicated in the production and reproduction of structures in this sense and thus the relationship between practice and perception is mutually reinforcing. In this sense a discourse can be seen as analogous to a Kuhnian paradigm[49] in that it embodies a core set of fundamental ideas or attitudes as to what the social world consists of and these in turn inform social practices which affect actually existing human beings rather than the objects of scientific research.

In defence of the cognitive approach to FPA some of the works mentioned above come from the early years of the research programme, particularly Jervis but also Khon; however later theorists are said to have a more sophisticated approach. However, even in later works there is an acceptance that interpretation and identity influence decision makers in a way that isn't necessarily accounted for by the rationalist accounts of the mainstream. It is worth quoting Donald Sylvan at length here, in his discussion at the end of a published collection of FPA that focuses on problem representation:

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[48] Larsen, op.cit., 1998 passim
[49] There are limitations to the Kuhnian analogy, these will be dealt with below.

> Even though a discursive practices approach differs philosophically with some of the assumptions of the information-processing approach adopted throughout much of this volume, I do not see the two as fundamentally antagonistic approaches to understanding problem representation. Rather, I argue that each illuminates critical portions of the way in which problems are represented, and that it is important to learn from both approaches. A discursive-practices approach focuses on the manner in which groups of decision makers use language to communicate and thereby define the nature of the issues with which they are dealing. Using a discursive-practices framework, objects and events become inseparable from the processes of apprehension with which they are formed. This emphasis on language as a key to problem representation is quite compatible with virtually all of the chapters in this volume.[50]

As such the approach being explored here seeks to place a Discourse Theory approach very much in the centre of the academic debate about the role of perception and meaning in Foreign Policy formulation. The implications of such an approach are discussed in the next two chapters. The discussion will move on to alternatives to the cognitive approach as represented by constructivism and to a lesser extent the 'Copenhagen School' of Security Studies.

Constructivism, Post-structuralism, Identity and the 'War on Terror'

As the issue of identity and its relationship to the 'War on Terror' will be discussed at length in later chapters, comments here will be kept brief. There are two key aspects of the discussion of identity in the literature, the first relates to a civilisational model of identity, culture and politics, the most prominent example being Samuel Huntington's 'Clash of Civilisations' thesis which was swiftly dusted off and reprinted following 9/11. This model argues that with the decline of the ideological division of the world between Communism and Democracy and the advent of globalisation future conflict is likely to occur on civilisational lines, particularly between Islam and its

[50] Donald Sylvan in Donald Sylvan and James F Voss *Problem Representation in Foreign Policy Decision Making* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1998 p.334

neighbours. As Huntington put it "Islam has bloody borders."[51] This line of argument has found support among several commentators, such as Bernard Lewis, others have approached the question more subtly but arrived at more or less the same conclusions.[52] The other dimension of the discussion in the literature relates to American identity, American nationalism and the effects of the 'War on Terror' on American identity. As already mentioned Barber argues that the unilateral tendencies of the Bush administration go against the fundamental values of America and argues instead for a return to these values as the best guide for future action. Anatol Lieven argues that American nationalism emerges from the tension between a radical, progressive democratic ideology which he terms the 'American Creed' and a conservative pole which

> "reflects the continuing conservative religiosity of many Americans;... it also has always been an expression of social, economic, ethnic, and above all racial anxieties."[53]

Neither Lieven nor Huntington though can be said to have any major commitments to a constructivist approach to IR. Identity is used either as an additional variable or as an ideological cipher through which interests and actions can be derived. Other approaches suggest that justifications of state action need to be analysed more deeply as not merely justifying certain courses of action through reference to pre-existing identities but also actively constituting those identities and security problems. One strand in this literature has focussed on how the

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[51] See Samuel Huntington "The Clash of Civilizations?" in *Foreign Affairs* Summer 1993. When the book version was published the question mark was dropped.
[52] See for example Fareed Zakaria "Why do they hate us?", available at www.fareedzakaria.com/ARTICLES/Newsweek/101501_why.html , accessed 20/07/2006. For a counter argument see Edward Said "The Academy of Lagadoo", *London Review of Books*, Vol 25, No 8 17/04/03 available at www.lrb.co.uk/v25/no8/said01_.html accessed 20/07/2006
[53] Anatol Lieven *America Right or Wrong: An anatomy of American Nationalism* Harper Perrennial, New York, 2005, p.7

representational struggle over 9/11 had political effects on the conduct of International Relations. As Devetak put it:

> "The political consequences of accepting Bush's representation of events has become one of the key issues in world politics today"[54]

Devetak explores the role of narrative, specifically gothic narrative, in the Bush administration's framing of the 9/11 attacks and the problem of international terrorism. The themes of ghosts and monsters looms large in the administration's political imaginary in Devetak's account; however, as with the term Manichean discussed in Chapter 1, the effect of invoking monsters is less determinate than one would initially suppose:

> "Monsters help to reinforce boundaries between self and other, civilisation and barbarism, good and evil...But monsters have the unsettling effect of destabilising the very categories and oppositions that Bush and others presuppose...Monsters...are a sign of the impossibility of once and for all eliminating contestation over meanings of civilisation, good and evil, freedom and tyranny, and so on."[55]

Thus Devetak argues that although the administrations narrative of the 'War on Terror' constructs a particular self/other dichotomy such constructions are not necessarily definitive or capable of achieving closure. The challenge for a critical account of such narratives is to exploit the open-endedness of such constructions to create space for resistance and critique.

In a similar vein Croft argues that moments of crisis create the conditions through which a particular discursive narrative can acquire hegemony; however such hegemony is limited.

> "Over time, discourses decay under the weight of internal contradictions and external alternative narratives"[56]

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[54] Richard Devetak "The Gothic scene of international relations: ghosts, monsters, terror and the sublime after September 11th" in *Review of International Studies* Vol 31, 2005 p621
[55] Ibid. p642
[56] Stuart Croft *Culture, Crisis and America's War on Terror* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006 p 12-13

For Croft the September 11th attacks were a real world crisis that allowed the Bush administration to construct the 'War on Terror' discourse in such a manner that legitimised its Foreign Policy goals in Iraq in particular. He measures the success of a discourse in achieving hegemony in terms of the degree to which it succeeds in both setting the terms of the debate and in adapting to resistance and criticism.[57] This question of resistance and criticism points to the need for discursive accounts of Foreign Policy actions to address both the question of who needs to be convinced for a discourse to be successful and how we know that this crucial audience is convinced. Susan Faludi argues that the success of this hegemonic discourse lies with unique intersection of patriarchy and history in the American experience particularly the recurrent theme of insecurity which has been masked by a frontier myth of masculine heroism and feminine frailty. This myth, she argues, somewhat contra Croft, was not the product of 9/11 but rather represented

> "what September 11 revealed about all of us and, to that degree, about the opportunities that this great tragedy provided to look at ourselves anew"[58]

This thesis will similarly argue that sedimented identity narratives play an important role in bridging this gap as will be discussed in the next chapter.

Richard Jackson's *Writing the War on Terrorism* takes a critical discourse analysis approach to the Bush administration's 'War on Terror'. It is worth exploring this work in some detail in order to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the CDA approach in dealing with the role of identity and the strategic use of discourse in the Bush administration's Foreign Policy discourse. Jackson's work

> "describes how the official language of counter-terrorism has been reproduced and amplified across society and the impact this has had on American political life."[59]

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[57] Ibid. Chapters 5 & 6
[58] Susan Faludi *The Terror Dream: Fear and Fantasy in post-9/11 America* Metropolitan Books, New York 2007 p.15

He argues that mobilising a society towards a particular goal

> "requires a significant degree of political and social consensus and consensus is not possible without language."[60]

The discourse of the 'War on Terror' is in this case the discourse of the government, put forward and orchestrated in order to legitimise the actions to be undertaken. As such its construction as a discourse of legitimation is an intentional strategy of an actor within the state, in this case the US government. Although he does suggest that discourse is not reducible to language and texts alone, it is also embodied in institutions and organisational practices, discourse here is conceived as an exercise of power, "it works for someone and for something".[61] As such the discourse of the 'War on Terror' is described as a deliberately and consciously conducted effort to shape the debate about Terrorism after 9/11:

> "to normalise and legitimise the current counter-terrorist approach; to empower the authorities and shield them from criticism; to discipline domestic society by marginalising dissent or protest; and to enforce national unity by reifying a narrow conception of national identity."[62]

The goal of Jackson's study then is very much a case of attempting to speak truth to power, not as he stresses that the government were actively engaged in deceiving or duping the public but rather to examine the strategic use of language as

> "administration officials deliberately deployed language to try to persuade the American people of the logic, reason and rightness of their decisions."[63]

What follows then is a study of various official statements and texts linked in places to broader social and historical themes that show how discourse of the 'War on Terror' was constructed by the Bush administration as being a logical and

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[59] Richard Jackson *Wtiting the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter-Terrorism* Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2005 p.2
[60] Ibid p.1
[61] Ibid p.2
[62] Ibid p.2
[63] Ibid p.27

necessary response to the attacks on 9/11. The first substantive chapter deals with how the attacks were constructed as an act of war, the next chapter moves on to the construction of American goodness against Terrorist evil, the next chapter deals with the level of danger faced by the US in the 'War on Terror', namely that terrorism represented a potentially catastrophic threat to US society, and the final chapter deals with the construction of the 'War on Terror' as continuing the tradition of 'good' or just wars engaged in by the United States throughout its history. The overall effect is of an accurate and thorough descriptive account of one aspect of the discourse of the 'War on Terror'. However little evidence is presented to suggest why the discourse was successful in "becoming fully institutionalised and normalised." [64] One of the contributions of this thesis is to outline how narratives of identity can be strategically invoked in order to make possible certain courses of action. As will be seen in the discussion of Copenhagen School accounts below and in the next chapter, it is crucial that such an argument has both a clear definition of who the audience for certain speech acts are and how we can know that speech acts have been successful. As Jackson rightly notes at the end of his study:

> "The success of the discourse, therefore, can be measured by the absence of informed, rigorous and vibrant debate about terrorism and the response of the democratic state; it can be measured by the diminution of real politics...the political space to question and challenge the discourse must be recaptured"[65]

The discourse of the 'War on Terror' is an act of power, aimed at legitimating a particular set of actions and restricting the capacity for criticism or resistance.

In several articles Edward Said has highlighted the relationship between power, knowledge and practice in the 'War on Terror', and the folly of ignoring the silences therein.

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[64] Ibid p.3
[65] Ibid p.179

> "The idea that Iraq's population would have welcomed American forces entering the country after a terrifying aerial bombardment was always utterly implausible."[66]

He cites the role of Orientalist scholars such as Bernard Lewis and Fouad Ajami in propagating this myth and in its inclusion in US Foreign Policy. Similarly Slavoj Zizek makes the point that the

> "underlying presupposition [of the war on Iraq] is the old one: under our skin, if we scratch the surface, we are all Americans, that is our true desire."[67]

The idea that our true desire is to be American is based on a progressive view of history, with each epoch marked by a great civilization, each one superior to the last. In the current period, the U.S. occupies this role, seeing itself as the pinnacle of civilization or the 'white castle on the hill'. As freedom and civilization are assumed to be the desires of all rational people, being American is the fulfilment of these desires. What is at stake here is just that question of normalisation Campbell was referring to – the U.S. or the West is constructed as normal with the terrorist/non-western 'other' being constructed as deviant and in need of correction. Thus intervention is exposed, related to a Hegelian concept of historical progress and that the agents of democracy can help others along the path to Freedom. To quote George W. Bush

> "Freedom is not America's gift to other nations, it is God's gift to humanity."[68]

In other words, America is cast in the role of a world-historical figure by the discourse of the 'War on Terror'.

> "The great individuals of world history, therefore, are those who seize upon this higher universal and make it their own end. It is they who realize the end

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[66]Edward Said "The academy of Lagado", 17/04/03 available at http://www.lrb.co.uk/v25/n08/print/said01_.html accessed 30/10/08

[67] Slavoj Zizek "The Iraq War" 13/03/03 available at http://lacan.com/iraq.htm accessed 30/10/08

[68] Ibid.

appropriate to the higher concept of the spirit. To this extent, they may be called heroes."[69]

And the tool by which they shall remould the world is intervention. This project will attempt to build on this literature by laying bare some of the assumptions and silences in the discourse of the 'War on Terror' and to highlight the importance of identity and interests in constructing the actors and actions involved. Part of the goal of this thesis is to explore not only the projected identity of the other but also the kinds of 'self' being mobilised by the United States in its 'War on Terror.' And how these articulations of identity made the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan possible.

Securitizing the 'War on Terror'

One possible avenue for pursuing this type of question would be to build upon the work of the Copenhagen School on 'Securitization'.[70] Broadly speaking such an approach focuses on the articulation of existential threats to a particular society which in turn justifies extreme measures and the allocation of resources outside of normal political decision making and action. The focus for this form of analysis is on the 'speech-act' which, if successful, securitizes a particular issue. For the Copenhagen School:

"Security is thus a self-referential practice, because it is in this practice that the issue becomes a security issue—not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat"[71]

Buzan et al. argue that the speech-act that presents something as an existential threat to a referent object should be regarded as a 'securitizing move' and only as a successful securitization when the audience at whom it is directed accepts it as such. This acceptance is defined not in terms of whether extreme action actually takes place

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[69] GWF Hegel "Philosophy of History: Introduction" in Stephen Houlgate (ed) *The Hegel Reader* Blackwell, Oxford 1998 p.410

[70] See Barry Buzan, Ole Waever & Jaap de Wilde *Security: A new framework for Analysis* Lynne Rienner, London 1998.

[71] Ibid. p.24

but rather in terms of whether the conditions for legitimating such action are deemed to exist and that the audience has accepted the definition of the security threat as proposed by the securitizing actor. [72] On the next page Buzan et al. describe a successful securitization as having three components:

> "existential threats, emergency action, and effects on inter-unit relations by breaking free of rules"[73]

And further that:

> "The distinguishing feature of securitization is a specific rhetorical structure (survival, priority of action 'because if the problem is not handled now it will be too late, and we will not exist to remedy our failure"[74]

Presumably, the use of the term securitization in the above quote is erroneous and should be replaced by the term 'securitizing move' as discussed above. The key, though, for this approach is the focus on the language of the securitizing agent rather than objective threats. In other words, something becomes a security issue not because of the actual or objective danger it presents to the referent of security but because it is spoken of as such a threat and this 'speech-act' is accepted by the target audience however so defined. As Buzan et al. put it:

> "For the analyst to grasp this act, the task is not to assess some objective threats that 'really' endanger some object to be defended or secured; rather, it is to understand the processes of constructing a shared understanding of what is to be considered and collectively responded to as a threat."[75]

This focus on the internal logic of the speech-act itself, as opposed to any reference to either external objective threats[76] or the social context in which such threats are

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[72] Ibid. p.25
[73] Ibid. p.26
[74] Ibid. p.26
[75] Ibid. p.26
[76] As Bill McSweeney argues "A critical difference appears, however, when we consider that the perception and fear of threats to security can, in principle, be checked by observing and evaluating the facts external to the subject". See Bill McSweeney "Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School" in *Review of International Studies* 1996, Vol 22 No 1, p.87

articulated,[77] has left the Copenhagen School approach open to much criticism. However, before turning to examine these criticisms in more detail, we will first examine examples of Copenhagen School approaches to the 'War on Terror', more specifically the war in Iraq.

Bryn Hughes suggests the internal logic of securitization points toward two possible explanations for the Bush administration's approach to the Iraq war:

> "The motives of securitizing actors are inconsequential insofar as what matters is that an audience believes a particular security frame. This means that in the case of Iraq securitization logic can handle either the prospect that the Bush administration made an honest mistake in claiming Iraq constituted an immanent existential threat, or that it deliberately fabricated the case for its own purposes"[78]

Hughes locates the critical moment of securitization in relation to Iraq in September 2002, prior to this he argues that although the Bush administration had outlined its disdain for Saddam's regime, it had not raised it to the level of existential threat. Post September 2002 he cites three reasons articulated to justify regime change—Iraq's WMD capability, the link to terrorism and the human rights record of the regime.[79] Hughes argues strongly that both the timing, the one year anniversary and the use of spurious links to terrorism suggest that the securitization move was more likely to imply the latter more cynical explanation outlined above. However, he leaves underdeveloped what this thesis sees as a significant aspect that explains the success of this securitization move:

> "This case shows how the security present (as well as the past) can be manipulated. As such, the socialisation of the target audience (drawn broadly) mattered significantly, since without the embedded dominant discourses of America's moral superiority, it's role as international policeman, and a largely

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[77] See Holger Stritzel "Towards a theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond" in *European Journal of International Relations* Vol 13 No 3, pp.357-383

[78] Bryn Hughes "Securitizing Iraq: The Bush Administration's Social construction of Security" in *Global Change, Peace and Security* Vol 19 No 2, 2007 p.87

[79] Ibid. p.91

> simplistic and negative view of Middle Eastern Arabs, it is difficult to imagine that audience support would have been forthcoming"[80]

In a similar vein, albeit with a greater emphasis on the role of the mainstream US media in facilitating the acceptance of the securitization move in Iraq's case, O'Reilly argues that:

> "there is a direct correlation between levels of nationalism and patriotism and the ease by which a securitizing actor can successfully legitimize something or someone as a threat to national security."[81]

In both cases the success of the securitization move in relation to Iraq is predicated on appeals to a sense of collective identity, that is an appeal to some sense of American nationalism that defines the 'us' who are threatened in a particular way.

The crucial role an appeal to a credible collective identity plays in the success of these securitisation moves is further evidenced by the relative failure of similar moves to securitize Iraq in other cases. This interrelationship between security, identity and legitimacy will be developed in some detail in the next chapter. Roe argues, for example, that the Blair government were successful in securitizing Iraq insofar as getting the general public and parliament to accept that Iraq presented a threat but failed in mobilising the public in favour of military action, though parliament was eventually convinced.[82] In relation to the EU as whole, Stahl has argued that the failure of a common policy on Iraq was due to the differences in threat perception among the member states. If the EU is considered a securitizing actor then it was not capable of engaging coherently in a securitizing move due to disagreement over both the nature of the problem and the appropriate response:

> "The EU neither believed in the urgency nor the definition of the threat 'Iraq'. This is why even the members of the 'coalition of the willing'...did not

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[80] Ibid. p.101

[81] Ciaran O'Reilly "Primetime Patriotism: News Media and the Securitization of Iraq" in *Journal of Politics and Law* Vol 1 No 3, 2008, p.68

[82] Paul Roe "Actor, Audience(s) and Emergency Measures: Securitization and the UK's decision to invade Iraq" in *Security Dialogue* Vol 39 no 6, pp.615-635

> securitise Iraq before January 2003. To them, the major threat was not Saddam's regime but a possible damage to transatlantic relations...For that reason, the famous newspaper article on 30/1/2003 did not read "Saddam's WMD are threatening Europe" but "Europe and America must stand united."[83]

In this case the 'us' that was threatened was 'the West' and the threat was derived from potential inaction rather than an external attack.

Conclusion

The foregoing discussion began by looking at the place of interventionary warfare in both international law and discussions in the academic realm. Generally the conclusion drawn from this discussion was that there is a strong presumption against intervening in other state's affairs. Thus such actions require some explanation. One possible approach to explaining this, following MacFarlane's assertion that intervention is first and foremost a political act, is Realism. However, as highlighted above, although Realism gives a credible explanation as to why states may take actions in the national interest, in the case of the 'War on Terror' both defining the national interest and particularly the best course of action to pursue that interest has been a source of some dispute. Cognitive approaches to FPA were then explored in general as a possible source of explaining how the particular set of options chosen by the Bush administration came to be perceived as the national interest. One of the issues with basing an approach on Cognitive FPA, though, is the lack of access to elite level discussions and thought processes necessary. Furthermore, although, analogical reasoning clearly does play a role, further questions must be asked as to why certain analogies are successfully put forward or found to be credible. The proposition put forward is to conceive of FP as a socially constructed phenomenon. Furthermore, that this construction does not occur in a vacuum but rather emerges

[83] Bernhard Stahl "Incoherent securitisation: The EU in the Iraq crisis" in *Hamburg Review of Social Sciences* Vol 3 2006, p.98

through tensions and contestations within a broader discursive context. This thesis argues that the 'War on Terror' represents an exemplary case of this construction and reconstruction of identities and events within a FP discourse. Attempts to deal with FP as a discourse in this fashion are not new in the literature however they remain very far from the mainstream. Therefore the next chapter sets out to develop the concepts of discourse, security, identity and legitimacy. Building on the discussions of critical constructivists, postmodernists and Copenhagen School approaches to the relationship between security, identity and legitimacy; the next chapter focuses on outlining why we might argue that the discourse of national identity invoked by the administration in its construction of the discourse of the 'War on Terror' was a necessary condition for the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq.

Chapter 3: Discourse, Security and Identity

Introduction

The argument of this thesis is that the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan were made possible by the Bush administration by the manner in which the threats posed by international terrorism were articulated in what we will call the 'discourse of the 'War on Terror''. This discourse constructed the threat of Al-Qaeda as an existential struggle between a good self and a pathologically evil and destructive other. It will be argued in detail in Chapters 6 & 7 that the success of this discourse was based on the degree to which the construction of identity in the discourse of the 'War on Terror' was congruent with pre-existing conceptions of the American self in broader discourses of American nationalism, particularly those concerned with American exceptionalism, that had been articulated in both Foreign Policy rhetoric and practice in the past, as will be outlined in Chapter 5. This chapter sets out to define the key concepts of discourse, identity, security and legitimacy and the relationship between these concepts in general terms before moving on in the latter part of the chapter to identify the specific discourses of relevance to the question in hand. Chapter 4 deals with the more prosaic matters of data selection and method including some consideration of external validation for the conclusions drawn by this thesis.

What is discourse?

Discourse Theory traces its roots to developments in linguistics in the early twentieth century, although some argue that the intellectual antecedents stretch back as far as Kant. The significant differences between Kantian idealism[84] and post-structuralist Discourse Theory being that the latter rejects the a-historical and invariable nature of the conditions of possibility, and locates these conditions not in the human mind but rather as a "structural feature of contingently constructed discourses."[85] In the 20th

[84] The Kantian roots of the idealist/discourse approach to the social world is one of the key criticisms of post-structuralist Discourse Theory by advocates of Critical Realism. See Patomaki, Heikki and Colin Wight "After Post-Positivism? The promises of Critical Realism" in *International Studies Quarterly* Vol 44, No 2, 2000. However I suspect this criticism is based on a misreading of post-structuralist ontology, this will be dealt with in more detail in the relevant section below.

[85] Jacob Torfing in Howarth & Torfing op. cit, 2005 p9-10

century however the origins of Discourse Theory can be found in the structuralist turn in linguistics following Saussure. The idea of treating language as a social system and meaning as a product of that system rather than of the 'world-out-there' had profound implications for social theory. A number of different theories of language emerged in the 20th century that fed into the development of postmodern Discourse Theory such as 'Speech act' theory as developed by Austin and later by Searle, or Wittgenstein's conception of language as rule bound behaviour. The Discourse Theory approach adopted in this thesis derives from French post-structuralism and will be introduced at the end of this chapter and then discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

However discourse approaches to the study of society do not necessarily involve a commitment to post-structural or post-modern ontologies, several strands of Discourse analysis reject the ontological status of language that forms the basis of Discourse Theory and instead focus on discourses as mediating between externally given reality and social outcomes. In this tradition Discourse analysis can be seen as a class of the study of ideology or rhetoric where the discursive conditions of possibility are measured as to the extent they are seen to distort the truth in the interests of power. Of these theories, the Birmingham School generally associated with the approach known as Critical Discourse Analysis is perhaps the best known, including theorists such as Fairclough and Van Dijk whose studies of mass media as discourse have made a major contribution.[86] In International Relations however the CDA approach has been less successful, with the notable exception of the work by Jackson discussed in the previous chapter, or at least has been adopted less often by a field that is generally known for its voracious parasitic tendencies.

While I would agree with the general thrust of its argument, the critical discourse analysis approach falters when asked to carry too much explanatory weight. By making the discourse a function of elite agency and therefore aiming to expose the manipulations of 'truth' by an elite group, discourse is rendered ontologically second to the world out there. In doing this, CDA is limited to describing discursive

[86] Jacob Torfing *New Theories of Discourse* Wiley-Blackwell, London, 1999 p.212-217

formations without being able to adequately explain their success or failure. Jackson does briefly refer to hegemony as one way in which a discourse can achieve dominance within a particular milieu but he does not adequately define what he means by hegemony or how it is achieved. Other theorists, such as Laclau and Mouffe, have adapted the Gramscian concept of hegemony to Discourse Theory and it is surprising that Jackson does not do likewise. In a sense the CDA approach by rejecting the ontological status of discourse is restricted to a descriptive account of discursive statements which it then is obliged to cut and paste into the real world. The problem is to give a convincing account of how these discursive constructs impact on outcomes in that real world. Of course it would be unfair to accuse CDA of the above flaw without also implicating all theories of discourse.

The introduction of the term constructivism to the discipline of IR is generally credited to Nicholas Onuf and his work *World of our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations* (1989). Since that introduction, as with most terms in the discipline, a staggering variety of theorists and researchers have adopted or been branded with the label.[87] However although both Onuf and Wendt are recognisable (and indeed identify themselves) as constructivists the implications of their approaches are rather different. To an extent Onuf also retained a 'rump materialism' in his account of what constitutes the 'social', however he rejects the idea that in studying the social world it is the matter in and of itself that is determinant. As he put it "matter also matters [but] never without rules being implied"[88] Therefore while Onuf accepts that the material world exists, the idea that in studying the social world we should adopt a positivist approach is questionable.

> "The physical world may exist more or less as we sense it, but the social world exists because we participate in it and bring our wishes to bear upon it...[this] raises the possibility that the positivists are right, after all, to insist on the unity

[87] See for example the 'Rationalist Constructivists' referred to by Ole Waever in "The Sociology of a not so International Discipline: American and European developments in International Relations" in *International Organization* Vol 52 No 4, 1998 pp.687-727

[88] Nicholas Onuf, *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations* University of South Carolina Press, Columbia 1989, p.22

of the physical and social worlds, but wrong to think about it in 'natural' terms."[89]

Onuf's constructivism then is focused on language, speech acts and rules. In an approach broadly based on Searle's speech act theory, Onuf suggests that three kinds of rules influence human relations – instruction-rules, commitment-rules, and 'directives'. He also rejects the attempt to prioritise either agent or structure arguing that both are mutually constituted. The key figures for Onuf and the Miami Group are Wittgenstein, Winch and Searle. Of particular importance (and not least because Onuf rejects the idea that International Relations deals with a realm that is inherently separate from the rest of the social world) theorising for Onuf begins with people as agents, thus avoiding the pitfall of making States pre-social entities.

> "Although Onuf thinks that social collectivities can be agents, he is clear that they are not pre-social...rather...he sees them as produced by the rule-governed behaviour of individuals."[90]

Such an approach, though not directly compatible, is certainly far more amenable to debate both with the rationalist mainstream and the more radical postmodernist approaches. This is not to say that no disagreements are likely, as Kubálková, Onuf, and Kowert put it

> "Constructivism is a constructive response to the challenge of the 'post' movement. It rejects the 'slash and burn' extremism of some post-modern thinkers who leave nothing behind them, nowhere to stand, nothing even for themselves to say."[91]

However the rule-oriented approach and the recognition of the distinct nature of the social world at least allows the possibility of dialogue. Indeed as one commentator put it: "in identifying his three rule categories Onuf could have taken a Foucauldian track."[92] Likewise Smith suggests that "Onuf's version of social construction ... has much in common with the work of many reflectivist scholars."[93]

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[89] Vendulka Kubalkova, Nicholas Onuf, & Paul Kowert "Constructing Constructivism" in Vendulka Kubalkova, Nicholas Onuf, & Paul Kowert (eds) *International Relations in a Constructed World* M.E. Sharpe, New York 1998, p.16

[90] Steve Smith "Foreign Policy is what states make of it: Social Construction and International Relations Theory" in Vendulka Kubalkova *Foreign Policy in a Constructed World* M.E. Sharpe, New York 2001 p52

[91] Kubalkova et al, 1998, op.cit. p.20

[92] Marlene Wind "Nicholas G Onuf: the rules of anarchy" in Iver Neumann (ed) *The Future of International Relations: Masters in the Making* Routledge, London, 1997, p252

[93] Steve Smith, 2001, op. cit, p53

The American academy has proven fertile ground for these more radical constructivist approaches. Indeed, even a name call of the more prominent 'posty' theorists suggests that as in other areas of the discipline, the radical reflectivists have an American hegemony of their own – Ashley, Der Derian, Shapiro, Connolly.[94] This is not to underplay the contributions of European and other scholars but to highlight the extent to which a lively 'dissident' community exists within the US. Indeed, if further evidence were needed, a glance at the publications catalogue of the Minnesota University Press should satisfy the sceptic that not only do reflectivists thrive across the Atlantic but that they have outlets for their work as well. Rather than retread the well worn paths of the epistemological and ontological debates between 'posty' IR and other constructivists (and indeed rationalists) before turning to a discussion of the ontological and epistemological basis of the approach to be adopted I want to deal with one of the most common substantive criticisms of these approaches, that is that while the philosophical points raised by 'posty' theorists are all very valid, where do we go from here? How do we avoid "becoming self-referential and disengaged from the world"?[95] The underlying thread to this argument is that the work of 'posty' theorists does not constitute 'real' social science and generally fails to address the problems in the 'real' world. As Keohane again put it

> "Their [reflectivists] advocates have been more adept at pointing out what is omitted in rationalistic theory than in developing theories of their own with *a priori* content. Supporters of this research programme need to develop testable theories."[96]

In other words they need to fashion their research programme into the image of the rationalists. However, the claim that Discourse Theory is self-referential and does not speak to the 'real' world, demonstrates an ignorance, wilful or otherwise, of the work of many such theorists. As George notes

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[94]See for example Richard K Ashley "The poverty of neorealism" *International Organisation,* Vol 38 No 2, 1984 pp.225-86; James Der Derian, *On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement* Oxford, Basil Blackwell 1987; Michael Shapiro *Language and Politics* NYU Press, New York 1984; William Connolly *Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox* Cornell University press, Ithaca NY, 1991

[95] Peter Katzenstein, Robert Keohane & Stephen Krasner "International Organization and the study of world politics" *International Organisation* Vol 52. no 4, 1998 p678

[96] Robert Keohane, 1989, op.cit. p.393

> "from a postmodernist perspective, the critical tasks are to illustrate how the textual and social processes are intrinsically connected and to describe, in specific contexts, the **implications** of this connection for the way we think and act in the contemporary world. In this way, postmodernism refocuses ... to a greater extent even than Critical Theory, on theory *as* practice." [bold emphasis is mine, italics in original][97]

In other words, conventional criticisms of Postmodernism tend to focus solely on the theoretical implications of this work rather than in engaging with the 'real' world implications of the insights provided. For example in his discussion of Michael Shapiro's work on US Foreign Policy toward Central America, George highlights how on the one hand Shapiro explores the representation practices of self and other in relation to the US and Guatemala but he also focuses on the

> "'practical' implications for a state such as Guatemala of dominant representational practices in International Relations."[98]

In highlighting the practical implications of postmodernist theorising for the practice of International Relations, George effectively answers the critics of these approaches who focus solely on the ontological and epistemological aspects of the debate. The question is whether the Academy at large can accept these approaches as valid without somehow undermining the rationalist mainstream? The present answer appears to be in the negative suggesting a motivation for the gate-keepers persistence in manning the boundaries of the discipline to ward off such an attack.[99]

Returning to the kind of Discourse Theory being suggested for use in this thesis, the intellectual aspects of such a discourse can be likened to a Kuhnian scientific paradigm. For Kuhn there is a fundamental conceptualisation of reality that guides the practice of normal science. This fundamental conceptualisation consists of determining what are the fundamental elements of which the universe is composed, what is their relationship to each other and to the senses and what questions can legitimately be asked about these entities and what methods are appropriate in seeking answers. Kuhn argues that these aspects of a paradigm are fundamentally embedded

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[97] Jim George, *Discourses of Global Politics: A critical reintroduction to International Relations* Lynne Rienner, New York 1994 p.191

[98] Ibid. p205

[99] Roland Bleiker "The aesthetic turn in International Political Theory" in *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* Vol 30, No. 2, 2001 pp. 509-533

in the process of scientific education and therefore the practice of research in a normal science becomes "a strenuous and devoted attempt to force nature into the conceptual boxes supplied by professional education."[100] In other words, the practices of normal science are determined by this fundamental conceptualisation of reality rather than simply being determined by reality itself. Such a discourse can then be characterised as a sub-set of the Kuhnian paradigm, in that it embodies a core set of fundamental ideas or attitudes as to what the social world consists of and these in turn inform social practices. The point of note for the social scientist is that the practices in question affect actual human beings rather than simply objects of scientific research. The goal then of discourse analysis is to explain how particular discourses interpret the world and how these interpretations inform and affect social practices.

By way of example, Michel Foucault's *Discipline and Punish* (1977) demonstrates how such a discourse affected the social world. Foucault's focus is on the changing nature of the treatment of criminals in the 18th and 19th century. He opens with an account of the public and gruesome execution of Damiens the regicide in 1757 and contrasts this with the rules of the house of young prisoners drawn up some 80 years later by Léon Faucher. As Foucault puts it, "we have, then, a public execution and a timetable."[101] What Foucault then goes on to argue is that these differences in the treatment of criminals were not simply a reflection of the severity of crimes but rather were related to a fundamental shift in how the criminal was perceived vis-á-vis society. In the 18th century criminality was associated with religious ideas of good and evil and therefore criminals were to be punished in a manner that matched the brutality of the crime, the goal simply being retribution. Thus public torture and public executions were commonplace. Foucault argues that the ending of these practices in the 80 years or so that followed the execution of Damiens was related to a fundamental shift in the discursive understanding of criminality. By the end of the period in question the criminal was no longer

[100] Kuhn, Thomas S. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* 2nd edition, Chicago, University of Chicago Press 1975, p.5

[101] Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* Penguin Books, London 1977, p7

understood as being simply fundamentally bad or evil and in need of punishment but instead was seen as abnormal and in need of reform or discipline. Thus, at the end of this period, instead of retribution there was "a furious desire on the part of judges to judge, assess, diagnose, recognise the normal and abnormal and claim the honour of curing or rehabilitation."[102] The penal system came to focus on rehabilitation and regulation instead of retribution in Western Europe. Obviously other considerations also need to be taken into account such as the coterminous growth of the state apparatus and advances in technology in order to explain the growth of the modern prison system. The point is that these explanations also have to take into account the discursive shift that occurred. In other words how the shift in perception of a particular human subject, in this case the criminal, made possible a shift in the methods of interaction and treatment that were deemed appropriate and effective i.e. the shift from public torture to incarceration and reform.

Returning to the discursive turn in International Relations, this project will ask the question how does the discourse of the 'War on Terror' create the possibility for certain kinds of action. In order to do this, this thesis will build on the work of discourse theorist such as Der Derian and Campbell. Der Derian's significance derives from his use of the genealogical method in his study of diplomacy in order to explain how a discourse can shape and constrain actors and actions in the 'real' world. Or as he puts it "how the power of diplomacy, in the absence of sovereign power, constituted and was sustained by a discursive practice, the diplomatic culture."[103] That is to say how a particular perspective of the diplomatic realm, in this case the view of diplomacy as mediation between alienated subjects, singles out certain interactions as appropriate and inappropriate. One aspect of the how possible question being asked in this thesis is to understand how the discursive construction of the security threat in the 'War on Terror' legitimated the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq.

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[102] Ibid. p304
[103] James Der Derian op.cit, 1987 p.4

Campbell, on the other hand, has highlighted the importance of identity in constructing the Cold War, that is to say he explores how U.S. Foreign Policy during the Cold War was as much based on domestic conceptions of US identity as it was on any 'real' threat from the USSR. In other words it was based on a conception of self and other that both predated and outlasted the Cold War. Campbell concludes that contemplating

> "the future of United States Foreign Policy rests upon considering whether the United States can develop an orientation to the inherently plural world that is not predicated on the desire to contain, master, and normalize threatening contingencies through violence"[104]

A cursory analysis of the response to the attacks on 9/11 and of the 'War on Terror' would appear to confirm a negative response to this question. However Campbell's arguments have been criticised as placing too great a causal weight on the role of identity. As McSweeney notes:

> "Identity theory [under which he subsumes Wendt and Campbell] exaggerates the causal role of identity and fails to account for the evidence of its manipulation by interest groups and the role of interests in constituting the process by which actors learn to shift to a new position on the continuum of anarchy"[105]

Furthermore, McSweeney argues that the implicit causal argument in Campbell's work is as follows:

> "The perception of crisis (never satisfactorily defined), related to the fissiparous character of American society, generates a critical reflection within the state leadership to repair the threatened solidarity by recourse within the state leadership to the images and discourse of external threat. Thus, American security policy is driven by the impulse for a coherent identity."[106]

Although, as indeed McSweeney acknowledges, Campbell would resist the characterisation of his work on American security and identity as a causal approach, the above quote does adequately highlight the logical implications of Campbell's thesis that US security policy is as much about policing the boundaries of identity as it is about the security of the state. This assertion about the relationship between identity

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[104] David Campbell *Writing Security* 2nd Edition, 1998, Manchester University Press, Manchester p.198
[105] Bill McSweeney *Security, Identity and Interests: A sociology of international relations* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1999, p.210
[106] Ibid. p129

and security embodied in a discourse is central to the claims made in this thesis about how the discourse of the 'War on Terror' relied on sedimented narratives of US identity and thereby made possible the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, contra Campbell, this proposition is not proposed as a causal relationship. This articulation of identity and security is rather viewed as a necessary condition of the interventions but not a sufficient one. This is to concede that interests and material factors outside the scope of the focus of this thesis played an important and indeed, necessary, role in the decisions to invade Afghanistan and Iraq. However, this thesis argues that without the articulation of threats (and more particularly the articulation of who is threatened by whom) by the Bush administration in the discourse of the 'War on Terror' then the interventions as they occurred would not have been possible.

In brief terms then, this thesis takes as its starting point the idea that the concept of 'discourse' is a useful means for understanding the social processes that constitute Foreign Policy behaviour. Milliken outlines three distinct analytical claims that Discourse Theory makes. These are worth quoting at length:

> "*Discourses as systems of signification*: this first commitment is to a concept of discourse as structures of signification which construct social realities…(the material world does not convey meaning)…emphasis is given to the relationships in which things are placed in a sign system…[and] discourses are expected to be structured largely in terms of binary oppositions…that…establish a relation of power such that one element in the binary is privileged.
> *Discourse productivity*: … beyond giving a language for speaking about (analysing, classifying) phenomena, discourses make intelligible some ways of being, and acting towards the world…endorsing a certain common sense, but making other modes of categorizing and judging, meaningless, impractical, inadequate or otherwise disqualified.
> *The play of practice*: the theoretical commitment of discourse productivity directs us towards studying dominating or hegemonic discourses, and their structuring of meaning as connected to implementing practices and ways of making these intelligible and legitimate. However, even if dominating discourses are 'grids of intelligibility' for large numbers of people, the third theoretical commitment is to all discourses as being unstable grids, requiring work to 'articulate' and 'rearticulate' their knowledges and identities."[107]

Discourse can, then, be conceived of as a structural feature of the social word, albeit one that is primarily linguistic. However this structural aspect is limited due to the

[107] Jennifer Milliken "The study of discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and methods" in *European Journal of International Relations* Vol 5 No 2, 1999, p.229-230

instability of discourses linked to the 'play of practice'. This conception of discourse allows for strategic action the success of which is limited only by the degree to which such strategic interventions are successful in convincing their target audiences that they are meaningful with reference to their discursive setting or as Milliken has it above their 'grid of intelligibility'. This thesis will argue that in order to adequately understand the discourse of the 'War on Terror' we first need to understand the 'grid of intelligibility' to which it relates. In particular, it will be argued, to the discourse(s) surrounding American identity as it related to past Foreign Policy challenges. This will be explored in greater detail in Chapter 5, the remainder of this chapter focuses upon the key concepts of identity, security and legitimacy and the relationship between these concepts.

The critical issue for a Discourse Theory approach to the relationship between material reality and language is the reconciliation of the positive and necessary insights of broadly speaking reflectivist approaches with the equally positive and necessary aim of scientificity. This section attempts to deal with the issue of the relationship between post-structuralist approaches and social science as a whole. In doing so it will explore the possibilities of Critical Realism which increasingly through the work of a variety of scholars[108] is being proposed as a possible via media to resolve the issues identified in the third debate.[109] Although the terminology here is a little unfortunate given that Patomaki and Wight explicitly reject the idea that a 'middle way' conceived of as literally a synthesis of two opposing positions, does not offer the best way forward.

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[108] See for example Patomaki & Wight, op cit., 2002; and for a different reading of the same approach see Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*,Cambridge Univesity Press, Cambridge 1999

[109] Within IR theory, the adoption of Discourse Theory approaches in the 1980's lead to what has come to be termed the 'Third' or 'inter-paradigm' debate. As with the other 'Great debates' in IR theory, the 'Third' debate is both notable for its polarising nature and its historical dubiousness. On the one hand the American mainstream of the discipline proceeded toward a 'neo-neo' synthesis of Realism and Liberalism based largely on either 'soft' or 'hard' Rational Choice approaches to the international system, while on the other hand a number of theorists on both sides of the Atlantic turned towards post-structuralist French philosophy for inspiration. See Robert Keohane "International Institutions: Two Approaches" *International Studies Quarterly* Vol 32 No 4, 1989, Richard K . Ashley "The poverty of neorealism" *International Organisation* 1984, Jim George *op.cit,* 1994 for a variety of perspectives on the 'Third Debate'

> "A synthesis based on two problematic metaphysical systems produces only a synthesis of two problematic metaphysical positions – not an improved metaphysical position."[110]

The problem, they argue, is that in effect the criticisms made by reflectivists against rationalists ring true and vice versa but that the conclusions drawn are incorrect, nor is 'constructivism' the best answer as rather than resolving the issues at stake it instead combines the problems in an even more problematic fashion. The alternative they argue is for IR theorists to jettison the Humean baggage of positivism and post-positivism and adopt a Critical Realist ontology that would allow the discipline to move forward.

Wight et al derive their metaphysical position from the work of Roy Bhaskar. Bhaskar sets out in his philosophy of science to

> "reclaim reality for itself. To reclaim it from philosophical ideologies – such as empiricism or idealism – which have tacitly or explicitly defined it in terms of some specific human attribute, such as sense-experience, intuition or axiomatic ratiocination, for some or other restricted – individual or group – interest."[111]

Underpinning Bhaskar's attempt to 'reclaim reality' is an interest in human emancipation, by asserting the objectivity of the real he hopes to pave the way for the science and particularly the human sciences to "empower the project of human self-emancipation."[112] Bhaskar argues that the dominance of empirical realism is a product of the society from which it emerged. Or as he put it that "there is something about the market and what Marx called the value and wage forms which makes empirical realism the account of reality or ontology that is spontaneously generated therein."[113] Bhaskar sums up critical realism as it relates to realism in philosophy more generally, as follows:

> "(i) The theory of perception…that material objects exist independently of our perceiving them, and in the domain of the social sciences for the idea that the conceptual and the empirical do not jointly exhaust the real…
> (ii) The theory of universals, where, opposed to nominalism, conceptualism and Wittgensteinian resemblance theory, it stands for

[110] Patomaki & Wight, 2000, op.cit. p.215
[111] Roy Bhaskar *Reclaiming Reality* London, Verso, 1989 p.vii
[112] Ibid p.vii
[113] Ibid p.192

> the existence of universals independently (like Platonic Realism) or as the properties of material things (like Aristotelian realism)...some...classes or ways of classifying objects, constitute natural kinds but most do not...
> (iii)The philosophy of science...it [philosophical realism] asserts that the objects of scientific knowledge (such as causal laws) exist relatively independently of their knowledge. Transcendental [critical] realism not only affirms this, but articulates the general character that the world must have...if it is to be a possible object of knowledge for us."[114]

But what then are the implications for social sciences and for International Relations theory in particular? Patomaki and Wight outline a number of possible implications. First methodological pluralism; they argue that by adopting a Critical Realist ontology that recognises the dynamic nature of reality there is no a-priori way of ruling out different approaches. In a way "anything goes, as far as there are good reasons for it and it gives the promise of advancing our knowledge." [115] Secondly there are implications for how IR theory deals with causality, by separating prediction from explaining causation a Critical Realist IR rejects the 'covering law' model of scientific explanation. As they put it

> "In open systems, outcomes might be the result of many different causes and the same cause might lead to different outcomes."[116]

As such, identifying cause is a matter of outlining the agency and structure, Critical Realism rejects both holism and individualism rather

> "every social act, event, or phenomenon is only possible insofar as the conditions for action exist as well as the agents which act."[117]

This in turn has implications for the 'levels of analysis' problem, by rejecting the ontological status of the agent/structure problem defined as states and state system then the levels of analysis problem as traditionally defined in IR theory becomes problematic, therefore Patomaki and Wight advocate theoretical work to establish where the actual levels of analysis lie rather than reifying certain social and/or theoretical constructs.[118] Finally in relation to the facts/values distinction, Critical Realism rejects both the positivist position that facts and values are distinct and the

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[114] Ibid p.190/1
[115] Patomaki & Wight, op. cit, 2000 p.227
[116] Ibid p.229
[117] Ibid p.230
[118] Ibid p.232/3

post-positivist position that facts are "nothing but disguised values."[119] Instead Critical Realism argues that while facts and values are related neither is reducible to the other, instead it aims at a critique of both facts and values that is

> "able to identify the possibility of a transition from an unwanted, unnecessary, and oppressive situation to a wanted and/or needed and empowering or more flourishing situation."[120]

Critical Realism argues then for a 'Third Way' out of the 'Third Debate' that retains the possibility of methodological pluralism while clearing away some of the unnecessary philosophical debris that have caused so much consternation within the discipline.

The question is whether the Discourse Theory approach is consistent with Critical Realist ontology and if so, what are the implications of adopting that ontology for engaging in research. Wight and Patomaki argue that Post-positivists reduce the world to human conceptions of it and therefore fail to provide adequate accounts of the independently existing world in their theories. However, this appears to be a similar misreading of the post-positivist position already outlined in the discussion of Wendt above. They do not argue, necessarily, that brute material forces do not exist but rather that in and of themselves they are neither the source of social behaviour nor are they of much interest for the social theorist. Take the following extreme example, man A kills man B. Can we move on from these facts to give an explanation of what has happened? Apart from that simple statement we cannot go much further without understanding more about the context. What was the relationship between the two men and how was that relationship located within the broader social context? Were they soldiers and as such the killing was part of the broader social institution of war? Were they an executioner and condemned man and therefore implicated in the judicial system? Is man A a cannibal? Was it a crime? And if so, of what? Passion? Greed? In order to say something interesting to Social Science about the above event, we move very quickly from the description of the brute reality (which in itself can hardly be said to be value-free as it can only be described through language) and into a realm of

[119] Ibid p.234
[120] Ibid p.234

what I would argue are discursive and social contexts in which the act may have taken place.

How then, exactly, does reality affect the discursive, or rather, given that the focus of this study will be on the discourse of the 'War on Terror', how the discursive is related to, affects and is affected by the material world? The question is to what extent are social constructs constrained or limited by material constraints, and to what extent these material constraints can be known in the absence of discursive constraints. Wendt maintains that we must reject the 'ideas all the way down' position in order to properly conceive of the relationship between what he terms ideas and material forces.

> "So the relationship between material forces and ideas works both ways, but we can only properly theorize this relationship if we recognise that at some level they are constituted as different kinds of independently existing stuff. This formulation of the materialism-idealism problem is ultimately Cartesian...But I do not see any other way to think about the problem if we are to be scientific realists about social life"[121]

Discourse Theory in general does not deny the existence of mind-independent reality, but rather questions the 'knowability' of that reality in an objectively neutral manner. Material forces do constrain discursive construction but they do so in a manner that is under-determined by the material constraint in and of itself. In order to clarify what is being argued here, the remainder of this section will engage in a discussion of Quine's ontological relativism and an extension of this in Hacking's discussion of Pickering's work on the social construction of quarks, which arrives at similar conclusions to that of Quine, albeit from a different direction.

The relevance of Quine here is two-fold, on the one hand he advocates an ontological relativity that is commensurate with both the scientific realism outlined above and the post-structuralism of Discourse Theory, while on the other hand he does so in a language that is both amenable to and based upon an empirical approach to knowledge that enables a level of translatability between ontological relativism and positivist social science. As O'Grady notes

[121] Alex Wendt, 1999, op. cit., p.112

> "Quine is an empiricist first and foremost: whatever basis there is for knowledge lies in observation."[122]

Quine bases this argument on a concept of knowledge acquisition based on stimulus and response. The problem however is that our concept of a 'thing' is determined not by the thing in itself but rather goes hand in hand with our acquisition of language. As such

> "Quine is arguing that the notion of an absolute fact about reference, independent of any context, framework of ideas, or theory, is something that doesn't make any sense."[123]

Although our knowledge is gained through the response of our senses to external stimuli, our understanding of that knowledge is gained through the medium of language acquisition. As Quine puts it:

> "Our talk of external things, our very notion of things, is just a conceptual apparatus that helps us to foresee and control the triggering of our sensory receptors in the light of previous triggering of our sensory receptors. The triggering, first and last, is all we have to go on...But there remains the fact – a fact of science itself – that science is a conceptual bridge of our own making, linking sensory stimulation to sensory stimulation; there is no extrasensory perception"[124]

Quine develops this conception of the inscrutability of reference through first the example of the problem of translating from a previously unknown language into English and then generalises the problems of ostensive definition to the process of language acquisition itself, in the case of a child learning to use its first expressions. The point is that logically there may be more than one way of interpreting any sensory stimulus, as a result what we have is a relativist ontology based on:

> "what exists[being] expressed in our talk about the world...thus there is no absolute fact of the matter about questions such as 'Is this x the same as that y?.' There is a fact relative to a theory expressing principles of individuation. This theory can be reinterpreted into another theory and so on. But we stop at some theory and take that as basic, just like a home language when translating some foreign tongue."[125]

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[122] Paul O'Grady *Relativism* Acumen Publishing, Chesham 2002, p.64
[123] Ibid p.66
[124] W.V.O Quine *Ontological Relativity and Other Essays* Columbia University Press, New York 1969 p.1
[125] O'Grady 2002, op. cit.,p.67

This basis is the limit Quine places on his relativism, but also what sets him apart from positivist ontologies. For Quine there is always some conceptualisation upon which our observation rests, ontology therefore is relative to our theory of the world. This does not involve any denial of the external existence of things but rather asserts that our knowledge of these external stimuli always rests on a pre-defined 'home' language or theory.

The next step then in relation to Discourse Theory is the effect of this 'home' language in terms of shaping perceptions of the world out there. In his discussion of Pickering's *Constructing Quarks* Ian Hacking raises the difference between Quine's conception of the under-determination of theory by the observable facts, as he puts it "that many incompatible theories are logically consistent with any given body of experience"[126] and Pickering's argument that post-war physics need not have taken a Quarky route. The nub of the difference is that between under-determination and contingency. Pickering, Hacking argues:

> "never denies that there are quarks. He maintains only that physics did not have to take a quarky route. His type of argument is quite general. Physics did not need to take a route that involved Maxwell's Equations, the Second Law of Thermodynamics, or the present values of the velocity of light."[127]

However, this is not because different theories could be consistent with the observations that led to the discovery/construction of Quarks but rather that a different accommodation between the various variables of research and the observable reality could have been found that produced a physics research programme that would have been as successful as the 'quarky' one but different. This difference is a contingent result of the accommodation of the various "apparatus, beliefs about the apparatus, interpretations and analysis of data, and theories"[128] to the observations of physicists. The problem of contingency is then, methodological not metaphysical. Adjustment can be made to any of the above and as a result the actual fit arrived at is contingent. Hacking argues that this has nothing to do with the Quinean concept of

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[126] Ian Hacking *The Social Construction of What?* Harvard University Press, 2000 p.73
[127] Ibid p.70
[128] Ibid p.73

'underdetermination'. However it does, in the present context, have some relevance. I discuss elsewhere the parallels between the concept of discourse operative in this thesis and Kuhnian scientific paradigms. Pickering is relevant here in clarifying the relationship between discourse and practice. I would argue that as the accommodation between a research programme and reality can occur in a number of ways, so too can a discourse affect practice in a fashion that is not predetermined, rather the relationship between discourse and practice is contingent and not deterministic.

Therefore the Discourse Theory approach being argued for here does not, as some of its critics might suggest, deny the importance of the material but rather argues that "it is always mediated."[129] The purpose of the research is to outline the discursive structures through which a particular set of events, the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, have been mediated and the effects this mediation has had in legitimating and making possible these practices. In other words, the aim is to outline the 'home' language through which the events of 9/11 were translated. Furthermore, the argument is not that the interventionary wars that followed were a product of the identity at the core of this home language in a deterministic sense but rather the framing of Afghanistan and Iraq in terms of notions of collective identity in the discourse of the 'War on Terror' were necessary conditions for the interventions that followed, that they made these actions possible by constructing them in a manner that made them legitimate and intelligible responses to the terrorist attacks on September 11th.

What is identity?

The term identity has proven to be a difficult and complex one to incorporate into analyses of the social world, and yet also an indispensable one. One's identity is something which on the individual level one may feel quite certain about and yet it is difficult to define. Furthermore, the components of one's identity are a complex mix

[129] Lene Hansen *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War* Routledge, London 2006 p.22

of natural or brute facts such as race or biological sex and social facts both chosen and inherited such as religion, language, and even your favourite football team. One of the basic starting points for thinking about identity in contemporary social science is the assumption that:

> "our identities, whether group or individual, are not 'natural facts' about us, but are things we construct – fictions, in effect"[130]

Although the term 'fiction' is provocative, and perhaps deliberately so, it does get at the heart of the socially constructed nature of identity. That is, even when based upon 'brute facts' as markers of identity, the content and significance of identities only emerge through social interaction. The question is how then can we incorporate identity into our understanding of the social world in an intelligible and useful manner?

A common approach in the Discourse Theory literature has been to focus upon identity as being predicated on the articulation of difference.[131] Such approaches are particularly focussed on the construction of binaries and the attendant normative implications outlined by Milliken above. Within the poststructuralist tradition identity is viewed as being both a product of and constitutive of political practice.[132] The complexity of dealing with identity can be explained in terms of its inherent instability. As Waever has noted, with reference to Campbell:

> "These paradoxical features of identity stem from the general property that identities are never completely closed, never fully satiated, one is never simply that which one is."[133]

Identities then are conceived as social phenomena that are constituted "relationally and discursively".[134] They are a product of political practices but also act as a constraint on such practice in that they legitimate or make possible certain course of

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[130] John E. Joseph *Language and Identity* Palgrave, London 2005 p.6
[131] See for example David Campbell, op cit, 1998
[132] See William Connolly, op.cit., 1991; David Campbell, op cit. 1998; Michael Shapiro, op cit., 1984, among others
[133] Ole Waever "European Security Identities" in *Journal of Common Market Studies* Vol 34 No 1, 1996, p.115
[134] Lene Hansen *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War* Routledge, London, 2006 p.37

action or argument while excluding others.[135] In relation to Foreign Policy practice this process of identity construction may involve a process of radical othering. Campbell argues that the US government has a need to construct and reconstruct US national identity through a process of radical othering where a rational, civilised self is threatened by a pathological, evil other that must be resisted as at all costs and that this drive to police the boundaries of identity is more relevant to the conduct of Foreign Policy than the existence of objective threats.[136] Whereas for Campbell security is written in relation to an external enemy, Waever has argued that the 'other' may be temporal. For example, he argues that the EU is constructing its identity in relation to Europe's own violent past:

> "'Europe' is not primarily built as a political category through nation-state imitating rhetorics of cultural identity and shared ancestry, but rather through a peculiar security argument. Europe's past of wars and divisions is held up as the other to be negated, and on this basis it is argued that 'Europe' can only be if we avoid renewed fragmentation"[137]

A third form of 'Othering' has been outlined by Burke in relation to the beginnings of Australia as penal colony, a product of a desire to construct:

> "a healthy 'Commonwealth' against the virulent Other of the criminal, which could, it seemed, be excised from the social body like a cancer. Whether it be in the figure of the non-economic savage or the morally debased, criminal poor, the Other was already a vast, enabling shadow across Australia's future."[138]

Critical here is the role that a process of 'Othering' is linked to the legitimation of certain political outcomes or practices. For Campbell in the US these practices include the McCarthy trials and the Cold War in general, for Waever and Europe the creation of European institutions, and for Burke the transportation of criminals and other miscreants that formed the basis of the new colony of Australia. In each case, what this thesis would term the discursive construction of identities ascribed to the 'other', and by default relationally to the self, made possible certain courses of action in terms

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[135] This issue is often explored under what Milliken terms as the play of practice aimed at studying 'subgjugated knowledge'. That is knowledge that is excluded or rendered unintelligible in terms of a dominant or hegemonic discourse. See Milliken, op. cit, p230

[136] See Campbell op. cit 1992 & 1998.

[137] Ole Waever, 1996, op cit. p.128

[138] Anthony Burke *Fear of Security: Australia's invasion anxiety* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008 p19

of how the state would deal with this other. In a similar manner, it will be argued that the identity construction of self and other in the discourse of the 'War on Terror' played a crucial role in making the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq possible.

Two issues need to be addressed; the first relates to whether or not identity is necessarily defined in terms of a radical other and the second relates to the role of identity in relation to interests in terms of determining policy. In each of the cases outlined above the 'other' is defined as radically different to the self, the question is whether this form of radical othering is a necessary feature of the construction of identity. Hansen argues strongly that such a proposition would unnecessarily limit the scope of accounts of Foreign Policy that investigate the role of identity. She argues that identity can be and is constructed in more ambiguous and complex constructions of difference in practice and that the degree and mode of difference should be a question for research carried out in this vein rather than an a-priori assumption.[139] This thesis agrees with this formulation of how to deal with identity as a feature of Foreign Policy practice and adopts:

> "an ontology of identity that is flexible as to the forms of identity that one might encounter in concrete foreign policies."[140]

However, the argument of this thesis is that in the case of the Bush administration's discourse of the 'War on Terror', the identity of the terrorists is constructed as a radical other and that this had implications for and was reinforced by the interventionary practice that followed. This brings us to the second point of concern.

How do constructions of identity make possible certain courses of action? As mentioned above McSweeney has argued that what he terms the identity thesis overstates the causal role of identity in influencing practice:

> "The opportunity is missed to explore the extent to which Yugoslavia, far from exemplifying the autonomy of identity as a social fact, is perhaps an outstanding

[139] See Hansen, op cit, p38-41
[140] Ibid. p. 41

> example of the manipulation of identity by political elites in an area remarkable for its historical forgetfulness"[141]

McSweeney has identified a number of key points that need to be addressed by proponents of this 'identity thesis'. First, to what extent is identity manipulated by elites? Second, does identity exist independently of such manipulation? Thirdly, what role does identity play in making possible political action? And finally, he raises the point of historical forgetfulness which lies at the heart of much of national identity constructions. We will return to the final point in chapter 5 in our exploration of American national identity. The first three points must be addressed. The first two are related points that identity does not exist as a social fact and to some extent political elites are responsible for manipulating identity narratives to pursue pre-chosen political ends. Underlying these two related points is McSweeney's proposition that interests exist independently of claims of identity and that the latter is largely a product of the former, or at least that proponents of the identity thesis need to take such a proposition seriously and give reasonable grounds for rejecting it. Fierke argues that there is more ambiguity to McSweeney's position:

> "McSweeney emphasizes the failure of identity theorists to take interests seriously, and sometimes suggests that the latter are prior to identity. But the notion that leaders and others are always 'jostling' with the two reinforces that identity and interests cannot be separated and dealt with as a causal relationship, in one direction or another."[142]

Rather, what she terms a constitutive discourse analysis is required so that we examine the complex matrix of identities and interests and how they are transformed over historical time. In this case neither identity nor interests are given ontological priority but the empirical challenge is to explore how the two interact to produce policy outcomes. The example she gives is particularly germane to this thesis:

> "while the American interest in invading Iraq preceded the attacks of 11 September 2001, the change in identity, or the consolidation of identity rendered by the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, made the invasion in 2003 possible."[143]

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[141] Bill McSweeney "Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School" in *Review of International Studies* Vol 22 No 1, 1996, p87

[142] Karin Fierke *Critical Approaches to International Security* Polity, Cambridge, 2007 p.81

[143] Ibid. p81

In other words, it was the interplay of identity and interests after 9/11 that produced sufficient conditions for the invasion of Iraq.

This brings us to the third point – what role does identity play in making political action possible? In Fierke's example the construction of 9/11 in terms of an attack against American national identity as articulated by the administration created one of the conditions of possibility for the invasion of Iraq. Hansen uses a similar argument in relation to the divergent identity discourses proposed by Las Casas and Cortés in Todorov's account of their encounter with native Americans. In both cases the identity ascribed to the natives was one of 'savages' and both Las Casas and Cortés shared an interest in the incorporation of the new lands to Christendom and the Spanish empire. However for Cortés the term 'savage' equated with non-human and therefore implied that the 'savages' should and could be annihilated whereas for Las Casas the term 'savage' was constructed to include the natives as humans and therefore capable of conversion and redemption.[144] As with 9/11 the interplay of identity discourses and interests has the potential to produce radically different results that go beyond mere manipulation of identity for the pursuit of pre-given interests.

What is security?

It has become a commonplace to suggest that how security should be defined has been debated ad nauseum in the aftermath of the Cold War. Baldwin even goes so far as to suggest that redefining security has become something of a "cottage industry."[145] However he goes on to reject the proposition that security has become an 'essentially contested concept' in Gallie's sense. Rather, he argues, it is the referent to which security properly applies that has become contested in the post Cold War era. Instead Baldwin argues for a definition of security, following Wolfers, that suggests security is:

"a low probability of damage to acquired values"[146]

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[144] Hansen, op cit. p42-3
[145] Davd A. Baldwin "The concept of security" in *Review of International Studies* Vol 23, 1997, p.5
[146] Ibid. p13 and passim, see also Arnold Wolfers " 'National Security' as an Ambiguous Symbol" in *Political Science Quarterly* Vol 67 No 4, 1952 pp. 481-502

Following from that, the question becomes what acquired values are properly the domain of security, and how do we define the level of probability? Thus, although security as a concept is not contested in the sense Gallie intended, being neither appraisive nor actually contested[147], accepting this proposition though does not get us very far in understanding what security is in a political sense or rather, and more pertinent to this thesis what it means to claim something is a security issue.

In order to address this, we can return to the discussion of the Copenhagen School. This school's approach to security can be situated within the broadening of security after the Cold War. For the Copenhagen School, security is the product of a social process through which a particular issue or set of issues is 'securitized' via a speech-act naming a particular issue as a security issue.[148] The concept of security, conceived as a low probability of damage to acquired values, is less important than the referent – that is the definition of the values that need to be protected. This conceptualisation of how security works in practice seems to suggest that the potential for something to be a security issue is almost infinitely broad. For the Copenhagen School what is interesting in securitizing acts is the attendant practices that are deemed to be justified once an issue has been successfully transported into the realm of security.[149] However, constraints are placed by the theory in terms of what may or may not be properly considered to be effective securitization:

> "As a speech-act, securitisation has a specific structure which in practice limits the theoretically unlimited nature of 'security.' These constraints operate along three lines. First...in practice it is structured by the differential capacity of actors to make socially effective claims about threats, by the forms in which these claims can be made in order to be recognized and accepted as convincing by the relevant audience, and by the empirical factors...to which these actors can make reference...the claims that are likely to be made, the forms in which they can be made, the objects to which they refer, and the social positions from which they can be effectively spoken are usually deeply 'sedimented'...finally empirical contexts and claims...provide crucial resources and referents upon which actors can draw in attempting to securitize a given issue"[150]

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[147] See Baldwin, 1997, op. cit. passim for discussion
[148] See Buzan et al, 1998, op. cit. Chapter 1
[149] Ibid.
[150] Michael C Williams "Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics" in *International Studies Quarterly* Vol 47 No 4, 2003, p.513-4

Thus any study of securitization needs to take into account both the internal logic and consistency of securitizing speech-acts and the context external to that act including events and sedimented discourses and institutions. Crucial to the success or otherwise of such acts is the role of the audience in receiving and accepting that a particular issue be securitized.

However, the Copenhagen School has been criticised, and correctly so in my view, for under-developing its theory of audiences and how or when a securitizing act is deemed to be or is likely to be successful.[151] This is particularly problematic given that, as Hansen has noted:

> " 'Security', as defined by the Copenhagen School, is not only about survival, it is, as a general rule, about *collective* survival"[152]

For Buzan et al. a securitising speech-act must follow the security form or the grammar of security. This involves the construction of a plot that identifies something as an existential threat, a point of no return looming that demands some form of action, and a possible way of dealing with this threat. The success of such a speech-act depends upon two external conditions – the position of the securitizing actor in terms of her credibility, social capital and/or official position and secondly, the threat itself:

> "It is more likely that one can conjure a security threat if certain objects can be referred to that are generally threatening"[153]

However, for such an act to be successful, the securitizing move needs to be accepted by the audience which in turn is dependent, according to Balzacq, on three facilitating conditions – the audience, context and securitizing agent. For the audience we need to be aware of its frame of reference, how it perceives the securitizing actor, and its ability to influence or permit the actor's actions. In other words, does it have a formal or moral role in facilitating the security actions? In terms of context, Balzacq refers to

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[151] See for discussion Matt McDonald "Securitization and the Construction of Security" in *European Journal of International Relations* Vol 14 No 4, 2008, pp.563-587; Stritzel,2007, op. cit. pp.357-383; and Thierry Balzacq "The three faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context" in *European Journal of International Relations* Vol 11 No 2, 2005, pp.171-201

[152] Lene Hansen "The Little Mermaid's Silent Security Dilemma" in *Millennium: Journal of InternationalStudies* Vol 29 No 2, 2000, p.290.

[153] Buzan et al, op. cit. 1998 p.33

the zeitgeist and the immediate situation that the audience finds itself in and through which it interprets the securitiser's arguments. And finally, the securitizing actor must be able to use the appropriate words and frames of reference to convince an audience.[154] A further concern in this regard is, as pointed out by Roe, that in this relationship between actor and audience what precisely the audience is being asked to accept. Is it merely to accept that a particular thing is a threat or that:

"given that this is a threat, this is what I propose we do about it"[155]

This differentiation between the acceptance of something as a threat and the acceptance of the proposed action adds an important nuance to the securitization framework in that it allows audiences, or parts of audiences, to accept that an issue is a security threat but to argue that it is best dealt with through other means.[156] Such a distinction allows us to explore debates that occur within an accepted security frame on the possible course of action available to deal with the securitized threat.

Thus for an adequate account of securitization we need as outlined by Stritzel a more "comprehensive awareness of the existence of *social sphere.*"[157] In similar terms Hughes argues that:

> "security is conceived as inescapably political, that it ultimately resides in the perception of an audience and has little to do with the avoidance of harm. Analysis then is about 'who can 'do' security in the name of what?"[158]

However, in order to understand how a particular securitization is successful we need to go beyond the internal logic of the speech act itself and examine the context in which the act occurs. The analysis in this thesis will take as its starting point the Copenhagen school concept of a securitizing speech-act but will go on to examine the broader frame of reference within which these speech-acts occurred in order to explain how the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq were made possible. This thesis aims to:

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[154] Balzacq, op. cit., 2005 p.192
[155] Roe, op. cit. 2008 p.622
[156] Ibid. p.622 and Ronald R Krebs & Patrick Thaddeus Jackson "Twisting tongues and Twisting arm: the power of political rhetoric" in *European Journal of International Relations* Vol 13 No 1, 2007, pp.35-66
[157] Strizel, op. cit. 2007, p.365
[158] Hughes, op.cit. 2007, p87

> "focus more on the understanding or discourse of security underpinning particular representations and practices rather than the act of 'securitizing'"[159]

Identity, security and legitimacy

The argument of this thesis is that the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were made possible not merely because the Bush administration engaged in securitizing speech-acts that successfully securitized the threats in each case but also because those speech acts relied upon pre-existing narratives of American identity that made the use of military force in these cases intelligible and legitimate. What we are discussing then is how the invocation of a collective identity via securitizing discourse produces the moral and formal approval of the decision to go to war. The question then becomes what level of identity is relevant to making certain foreign policies possible and how are foreign policies implicated in the production and re-production of identities. In other words, while securitization is a useful concept for analysing specific speech-acts in order to be able to understand their success we need to adopt a more critical constructivist position that examines how identities are produced and re-produced through securitizing practices. Thus there is a tension for studies such as this between the structural aspects of discourse and the more-agent focussed approach that treats the use of discourse as strategic action. Although a full resolution of this issue is beyond the scope of this thesis, I argue that the relationship between structure (Discourse) and agency (the use of language by actors) can be conceived of as analogically similar to the role of grammar in ordinary language. That is to say although there are rules that govern how a sentence can be constructed meaningfully, these rules are not deterministic in terms of content. For the purposes of this thesis and answering the question of how the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq were made possible, the focus will be on the strategic use of language and its effects. However in order to support the argument that such language use was a necessary condition of making these wars possible we need to address the discursive context within which these strategic moves were made.

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[159] Matt McDonald, op. cit., 2008 p.582

This relationship between identity, security and action as proposed by Barnett is a useful starting point:

> "In general, as we think about the relationship between state identity and Foreign Policy behaviour, we should remain attentive to two issues. First, national identity is a source of interests. Identity, however, does not cause action but rather makes some action legitimate and intelligible and others not so. Second, political actors are likely to have competing interpretations of the meanings associated with that identity, and compete to fix a particular national identity."[160]

Barnett argues that a crucial step in the road to the Oslo Peace Accords was the creation of what he terms a 'cultural space' that resonated with Israeli national identity but allowed space for the change in strategic direction away from a military solution to the security problems Israel faced towards a negotiated one.[161] Crucially this articulation of a 'cultural space' had to rely on reconstituting existing narratives of national identity:

> "the cultural foundations that make action possible are not fixed but are malleable within certain limits."[162]

It is this idea of limits that requires some attention to what Weldes terms 'cultural raw materials'[163] in making a case for examining the broader context in which strategic discursive action can be successful. This involves an examination of how certain ideas and concepts assume the role of common sense within a particular political community. Crucial to this process is the 'articulation' of these threats in terms "drawing on and constrained by the array of cultural and linguistic resources already available within the security imaginary"[164] that serve to create subject positions for the self and other that in turn imply or make possible particular courses of action. As Weldes argues:

> "That imaginary [the US security imaginary] circumscribed a remarkably limited set of possible objects and quasi-causal arguments with which to represent events in international politics. According to this view, virtually all human beings either shared a commitment to or aspired to the same American values and institutions. Virtually all discomfiting events were understood to be

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[160] Michael Barnett "Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change: Israel's Road to Oslo" in *European Journal of International Relations* Vol 5 No 5, 1999, p10
[161] Ibid, passim
[162] Ibid. p.28
[163] Milliken, op. cit., p239
[164] Jutta Weldes *Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis* Minnesota University Press, Minneapolis, 1999 p.13

> brought about by external enemies with nefarious and often devious plans of aggression or subversion that threatened the free way of life either in the United States or elsewhere...The United States had therefore to respond with vigor to re-assert the credibility of its global and hemispheric leadership."[165]

Although this thesis is sympathetic to the above articulation of how security practices are related to identity construction, Weldes position veers too close to a causal role for identity to answer the 'how possible' question addressed here. Rather, it is suggested that Weldes concept of a 'security imaginary' as representing the raw materials through which security threats may be articulated is a useful way of conceptualising the context in which securitising acts take place. Further, it will be argued that this form of articulating security issues in terms of identity played a crucial role in legitimating the Foreign Policy practices of the 'War on Terror' particularly the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. A second aspect of Weldes approach which will be adopted are the concepts of 'Articulation' and 'Interpellation' which will be developed in the next chapter in more detail.

The question then is where is it appropriate to look for these 'raw materials'. Jackson has located the relevant discourse of identity for the 'War on Terror' at the national level. National identity involves the shared construction of identity by a political community which in turn involves a normative claim that prioritises that community in relation to others and legitimises that community's claim to political autonomy. Such claims rest on the ability of such a community to create and maintain boundaries between itself and others, not members of this community. The concept of 'difference' then plays a crucial role in constructing national identity.[166] It is this conception of national identity as constructed through the articulation of difference that informs much of the literature on Foreign Policy practice from a Discourse Theory perspective.[167] This thesis will argue that this formulation of a self/other distinction in the formulation of the discourse of the 'War on Terror' was a necessary step in legitimating the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq and that the success of this discursive formulation was in part based on its ability to resonate with dominant

[165] Ibid, p227
[166] See Richard Jackson, op. cit., 2005 Chapter 3
[167] See Campbell op. cit. 1998; Weldes op. cit. 1999; Hansen op. cit, 2006; Larsen op. cit. 1997

themes in the discourse of US national identity and the discursive (re)construction of past interventions and engagements with the United States 'others.' However as Krebs and Lobasz point out, and indeed as acknowledged above in discussion of Stritzel's work, the existence of such binaries in identity or Foreign Policy narratives is not sufficient to explain the outcomes. Other interpretations and narratives that imply different policy outcomes are indeed possible.[168] The success of a particular rhetorical strategy is based on the confluence of discursive traditions or resources, the institutional positions of the speakers, and the historical context.[169]

For this thesis the immediately relevant historical context was the 9/11 attacks themselves and therefore the question has to be addressed as to whether much discursive construction was necessary given the immediacy of the security threat. As Balzacq has noted:

> "For instance, the common frame of reference and the perceived speaker's knowledge of the security problem would bear more weight in securitizing an issue absent of a sensitive external context. By contrast, if the external context provides potent clues for the existence of a security hazard, the importance of the speaker's knowledge and the influence of the common frame of reference would decrease."[170]

With regards the 9/11 attacks, potent clues were obviously provided to the existence of an external security threat, however as argued elsewhere the nature of the threat and the appropriate response were far from self-evident. Holland has argued, following Croft, that the 9/11 attacks created a void of meaning that exceeded the capacity of existing US Foreign Policy discourses to understand and incorporate the events into their narratives:

> "It seems self-evident that 9/11 was intimately related to the War on Terror, but this common sense must be made strange. It was not inevitable that the War on Terror would follow 9/11. Rather 9/11 had to first be constructed in a particular and contingent way"[171]

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[168] See for discussion Ronald R Krebs and Jennifer K Lobasz "Fixing the Meaning of 9/11: Hegemony, Coercion, and the Road to War in Iraq" in *Security Studies* Vol 16 No 3, 2007, pp.409-451

[169] Ibid. p412

[170] Balzacq, op. cit., 2005, p193

[171] Jack Holland "From September 11th 2001 to 9-11: From Void to Crisis" in *International Political Sociology* Vol 3 No 3, 2009 p.290

I argue that although Holland, and Croft, are correct to argue that 9/11 was constructed in a particular way by the emergent discourse of the 'War on Terror' and that the 'War on Terror' was not an inevitable consequence of the attacks, at least in its current form, they overstate the degree to which that shift represented a break in existing US Foreign Policy discourse. Rather it was the degree of continuity with pre-existing narratives of the United State's role in the world that gave the discourse of the 'War on Terror' such rhetorical and effective power – by appealing to narratives of identity that reached back through the Cold War, World War II, to the founding fathers and beyond, it effectively placed 9/11 within the context of an American Exceptionalist narrative of US identity and the place of the US in the world. The content of this narrative will be explored in more detail in Chapter 5.

Before concluding this chapter, one important caveat should be made. The argument here that the securitizing of the 9/11 acts in terms of an existential threat to the collective identity of the US is not meant to endorse such an outcome. The focus of both Copenhagen School and post-positivist approaches on dominant state discourses has been criticised for reproducing these dominant narratives in a manner that excludes alternative narratives or alternative conceptions of security based on the individual.[172] Although this thesis continues in this vein it is with a view to help point out the limitations and ultimately negative effects of such a focus on state policy. Thus it is recognised that when the term American identity or discourse of national identity is used that this refers to a specific and limited discourse dominated by a particular subset of Americans. However, as the concern of this thesis is with how particular state actions were made possible such a focus is unavoidable.

Conclusion:

This thesis sets out to answer the question: how were the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq possible? In answering these questions, it has rejected the proposition that the

[172] See for example Ken Booth "Security and emancipation" in *Review of International Studies* Vol 17 No 4, 1991 pp.313-326

interventions are best explained as Realist responses to an objective terrorist threat with the 9/11 attacks as a catalyst. Rather, following Jackson, Krebs and Lobasz, Holland and others, it argues that the connection between the 9/11 events and the wars that followed needs to be questioned and examined. While acknowledging that both interests and the actual attacks themselves played a role in making the interventions possible, this thesis argues that the discursive construction of the attacks in terms of an existential conflict between a noble self and radically opposite other was a key step in making the interventions possible. In order to establish this, I have argued in this chapter that the Copenhagen school theory of securitization is a useful starting point for examining how problems can be framed in a manner that makes possible military or other security response. It is further argued that in order for a securitizing move to prove successful we need to pay attention to the social and discursive context in which the move is made, identifying the relevant audiences for a securitizing move and establishing how and why they might be convinced. It will be argued over the course of the remaining chapters that the appeal of securitizing moves to group security places discourses of national identity at the heart of understanding how these moves may be successful In relation to the discourse of the 'War on Terror' the relevant audiences can be seen as the United States public who may grant the moral authority or legitimacy for military action to the state and the Congress who have the institutional position of granting formal authority. The next chapter deals with how we will answer this question in more formal terms – what are the relevant data, how do we know when an audience is convinced, how will texts be read.

Chapter 4 – Theory, Method, Data & Cases

Having discussed the theoretical underpinnings of this thesis in the previous chapter this section will outline the central approach of the thesis, how it is to be researched, and how the conclusions will be drawn. As discussed in the previous chapter, this thesis argues that in order to understand how the military interventions in the 'War on Terror' were possible we need to examine the discursive construction of these threats that tell us who or what was under threat, what the nature of the threat was and how the United States should respond to this threat. Essentially the theory is that in order to fully understand why intervention was possible in fighting the 'War on Terror' one has to understand the discourse that is used to articulate identity and threats in the practice of American Foreign Policy. This discourse constructed America in a particular way and defines it against its 'other' - anti-democratic, anti-freedom, anti-Christ?, anti-humanity. It will be argued that this discourse is grounded in an idea of America that can be found in a discourse of American national identity and reproduced in Foreign Policy practice. Its history can be traced back to the founding myths of the US and democracy itself. In a sense, what this thesis is proposing is to take seriously and at face value the claims made about the cause of freedom and democracy in American Foreign Policy speech and practice and to draw out the implications of the subject positions these statements and practices create and reproduce in terms of how they can be seen to make certain types of action appear legitimate and possible.

Theory & Method

There are a number of key issues then have to be discussed. How does the discourse of the 'War on Terror' relate to the material reality of the wars in Afghanistan and

Iraq? What are the key frames through which the 'War on Terror' has been constructed? How has identity been produced and reproduced in the discourse of the 'War on Terror'?

One possibility in discussing how the relationship between the discourse of the 'War on Terror' relates to the material reality of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq is to adopt the approach taken by Chris Coker in his forthcoming *Etiquettes of Atrocity: the ethics of war in the twenty-first century* [1] Coker suggests that John Lynn's development of a discourse model for understanding warfare is a useful tool of analysis.

> "Lynn uses the term [discourse of war] to refer to cultural conceptions of war that tend to structure our perceptions of its essence, its purpose and the problems we use it to solve. It helps to make sense of the world 'out there' and thus reduce it to manageable proportions. It makes it more rational or open to reason although the decisions we take on the basis of what we perceive to be real are not necessarily rational at all"[2]

Lynn suggests a basic model for the relationship between a particular society's discourse of war and the reality of a particular conflict. He does so by exploring a number of case studies ranging from ancient Greece to the October war between Egypt and Israel in 1973. He suggests that a society's discourse on war interacts with the reality of war in a number of ways outlined in the table below:



Fig 4.1 Reproduced from John Lynn *Battle: A history of Combat and Culture* Westview Press, Cambridge MA, p. 332

[1] Forthcoming, copy supplied to the author 2008
[2] Ibid p.53

Lynn argues that the interaction between a society's discourse on war and the reality of that war can be instructive in understanding how, why and when shifts in tactics and strategies either occur or fail to occur. He argues that cultures attempt to fit the reality of war to their preconceptions insofar as possible. Normally this process of what he terms 'reformation' results in minor modifications of reality or rather something akin to the rationalisation alluded to by Coker above. Occasionally, the cultural need for the reality to fit cultural norms is so great that a society may construct a 'replacement' reality or perfected reality. Lynn cites medieval tournaments as an example of just such an attempt to preserve chivalric codes and the status of a particular caste by engaging in ritualised forms of violence. Generally, he argues, however, modification has been sufficient. Where there is a serious breakdown between a society's discourse of war and its reality, a feedback process occurs where material losses provide a significant incentive to adjust the discourse. Lynn cites the First World War as an example of such a misalignment. Finally, where the reality of war is "so at odds with the discourse that Adjustment is unacceptable; the result is 'rejection' of the violence as outside the conceptual boundaries of war."[3] The result is the construction of an alternative discourse which in turn recognises a more 'extreme reality' where the norms and mores of war can be rejected or ignored.

"Lynn is no social constructivist".[4] As Coker notes, the model of discourse put forward by Lynn is by and large consistent with idea of cognitive maps adopted in Foreign Policy analysis discussed in the chapter 2. Lynn's conception of discourse is what we might term projective. It is a set of ideas about the world, held in common by a particular society or subset within society which is used as a toolbox of sorts to place an order on perceived reality. Where the projection breaks down, it is either

[3] John Lynn *Battle: A history of Combat and Culture* Westview Press, Boulder CO., 2003, p.332
[4] Coker, op. cit., 2008 p.53

reformed or reality is referred to another alternative discourse. However, it is precisely this idea of alternative discourses and 'extreme realities' that suggests Lynn's model to be a fruitful one in attempting to understand the 'War on Terror' particularly with regards to the relationship between a securitising move and the context in which such a move takes place. Croft (2006) and Holland (2009) have argued that the events of 9/11 represented a crisis point that rough maps onto the 'extreme reality' concept proposed by Lynn and thus discursively produced a new security reality for US. This thesis argues that although the events of 9/11 are key to catalysing the discourse of the 'War on Terror', this discourse was built upon existing discourse of US national identity and represented continuity rather than radical change in terms of the US' relationship to the world.

The concept of identity underpinning this analysis is one which has been developed by a number of poststructuralist writers in International Relations broadly influenced by the work of Foucault among others.[5] The key insight of these approaches to identity is that it is not a pre-given or fixed phenomenon "rather, identity is constituted in relation to difference"[6] which in turn is not fixed by nature nor planned, but each is performatively constituted through the inscription and re-inscription of boundaries "which serve to demarcate an 'inside' from an 'outside', a 'self' from an 'other', a 'domestic' from a 'foreign.'"[7] At the level of the state, there is then for Campbell, a key problem relating to the precarious instability of what we might term a corporate or national identity. The instability of the state's identity is compounded by the need for the state (at least in the age of nationalism) to rely on a pre-given, stable identity upon which it can rest its claims to legitimacy. Therefore,

[5] See for example Campbell op. cit, 1992; Michael Shapiro *op.cit,* 1984; William Connolly *op. cit,* 1991.
[6] Campbell, op. cit, 1992, p.8
[7] Ibid. p.8

Campbell argues we need to radically reconceptualise our ideas about the nature and purpose of Foreign Policy, in particular what he terms the 'discourse of danger':

> "The constant articulation of danger through Foreign Policy is thus not a threat to a state's identity or existence; it is its condition of possibility."[8]

The implication of this insight for the model outlined above is as follows:



Rather than the referent of the discourse existing externally as an objective danger or conflict, it is instead focused on the identity of the collective which the speaker is suggesting is endangered and appealing to for approval of action to offset this danger. Crucially, this is not to say that identity is a cause of Foreign Policy behaviour but that Foreign Policy discourses rely on appeals to the collective identity of a group which is, as discussed in chapter 3, socially constructed, in order to legitimate and justify a particular course of action. This argument extends the Copenhagen School's 'grammar of security' beyond the need to identify that something is a threat to include a need to identify that which is threatened - the identity which it (re)produces. The intransigence of discourse to fit the reality, then, does not refer to the material outcomes as in the case of a discourse of war but rather it is measured in terms of its goodness of fit to pre-existing cultural forms, specifically the conception of 'self' that

[8] Ibid p.12

has been stabilised through the practice of Foreign Policy in the past. This is not to say that the material aspect is unimportant but rather that the construction of and response to threats/dangers is articulated in terms of pre-established conceptions of the 'self/other' dichotomy. The model adopted by Lynn, however, relies on a problematic, at least in the context of this study, conception of the relationship between discourse and actors.

Hansen argues that when faced with critical discourses resisting the official discursive construction of a particular crisis or event a government has essentially three options on what she terms "a sliding scale of responsiveness"[9]. First, a government can significantly change its policy-identity construction, however as will be discussed later this is not entirely unproblematic and is restricted in terms of the possible reformulations that can credibly be pursued by an administration. For example, in the case of the Srebrenica massacre, discussed by Hansen, the shift that occurred in the discursive policy-identity of the Clinton administration involved a recognition of the massacre as genocide and therefore requiring action rather than 'passive advocacy' rather than any shift in the referent identity of the US and therefore the shift would fit within the diagram above as a form of modification of the practical aspect rather than the identity aspect of the Foreign Policy discourse. The second, and more commonly used option, is to acknowledge the facts but to explain them within the existing discursive frame, as in the case of the insurgency in Iraq where contrary to the construction of a liberated Iraq greeting US forces, the insurgency was ascribed to regime loyalists and 'dead-enders'. Again in terms of Lynn's model this stays within the reformulation/modification of the discourse rather than idealisation or complete rejection. Finally a government may choose to attempt to deal with difficulties by

[9] Hansen op. cit, 2006 p.48

ignoring the counter-evidence and attempting to pass the facts by in silence. Hansen suggests the decentring of WMD as a key justification for the Iraq war given the failure to find any evidence is an example of this, as the US government shifted the discursive focus from WMD to the link between the Ba'athist regime and terrorism and the liberation of the Iraqi people.[10] In a sense, this retreat from reality could be equated with the idealised option outlined by Lynn, although as Hansen acknowledges, such attempts are extremely difficult to successfully pull-off given the level of media coverage given to Foreign Policy issues. At the centre of this model of explaining Foreign Policy is the role of identity, the next step is to outline the role identity plays in Foreign Policy formation and how such a role can be operationalised in a research design.

Hansen suggests the following as a basic model of a discourse analysis research design:



Figure: Research Design for discourse analysis
Source: *Security as practice - Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War*, p.86

Her approach involves what she terms a 'case-plus study' approach to designing discourse research. She argues that four key decisions need to be made in designing discourse research, the number of selves or the identities being examined, the type of intertextual model, the temporal perspective and the number of events. The role of identity will be discussed below, and the temporal perspective and events will be

[10] Ibid P49

discussed in the section discussing case selection. She suggests three intertextual models: 1) focussing on official or government documents, 2) looking at the wider Foreign Policy debates, and 3) looking at wider cultural debates or marginal political discourses.[11] The model(s) selected depends on the identity, focus and temporal perspective of the study. The implications of the study for text selection and analysis will be discussed in the data section below. First the elaborated model will be examined and the application of this model to this study will be discussed.

The elaborated research design below outlines the number of choices to be made in designing discourse research. It is based on a recognition of the centrality of the concept of identity and performance at the heart of poststructuralist discourse analysis.



Figure: Elaborated research design for discourse analysis
Source: Ibid. p.92

[11] Hansen op. cit. 2006 p.77

The first step in such an analysis is a study of the history of the identity/practice in question in order to understand the frames used to address a new security threat. As Hansen has noted:

> "Foreign Policy problems are furthermore not handled *de novo* as their solution is written into a discursive terrain that is already partially structured through previously articulated and institutionalised identities...To argue policies that radically break with these constructions is not impossible, but it is a daunting task, in particular when political opposition can mobilise these historically (re)produced constructions."[12]

This point is not just significant in terms of justifying the approach in the next chapter but also for the degree of voluntarism implied by a Discourse Theory approach. The point being that the policymakers do not have a completely free hand in deciding which discursive frame is applied to a security crisis. Thus, the next chapter will be a study of the history of the practice of intervention in US Foreign Policy (USFP), the particular focus will be on the kinds of frames and legitimating practices that emerged and evolved in connection with the role of intervention in USFP. This history is best described as a genealogy. Genealogy as mentioned is an analytical strategy developed by Nietzsche and Foucault and adapted to International Relations by Campbell and Weber.[13] The point of a genealogy is not to trace a direct lineage to some pristine point of origins but rather to explore the structures of historical continuities and discontinuities that produce a particular present. Nietzsche in his original genealogy, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, acknowledges this distinction explicitly. Rather than asking what the difference between good and evil is, he reframes the question as follows:

> "Some schooling in history and philology, together with an innate sense of discrimination with respect to questions of psychology, quickly transformed my problem into another: under what conditions

[12] Ibid. p.43
[13] See Cynthia Weber Simulating Sovereignty: Intervention, the State and Symbolic exchange Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1995 & Campbell, op.cit. 1992 & 1998

> did man invent the value-judgements good and evil? *And what value do they themselves possess?*"[14]

The question then has shifted to focus on the conditions of emergence of the notions of morality in society and rejects the idea that somewhere, in some distant point a pristine originary form of morality would be found. As Anderson notes "The genealogy of morals subsequently revolves around 'the conditions and circumstances out of which [these values] have grown, under which they have developed and shifted."[15] Genealogy is not then concerned with origins but rather with the question of emergence. Foucault echoes this concern in his description of his goals in *Discipline and Punish:*

> "I would like to write the history of this prison, with all the political investments of the body that it gathers together in its closed architecture. Why? Simply because I am interested in the past? No, if one means by that writing a history of the past in terms of the present. Yes, if one means writing the history of the present."[16]

The next chapter then will be an attempt at a history of the present of US intervention and its relationship to US identity. The shape such an approach would take in relation to identity and the practice of USFP is focussed on the construction and production of US identity that is outlined below.

> "Kindly separated by nature and a wide ocean from the exterminating havoc of one quarter of the globe; too high minded to endure the degradations of others." – Thomas Jefferson[17]

The notion of American exceptionalism embodied in this quote from Jefferson represents a fundamental part of the discursive frame through which the security discourse of the 'War on Terror' has been constructed. From this perspective, both

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[14] Friedrich Nietszche *On the Genealogy of Morals* Oxford University Press, Oxford 1996, p.5
[15] Niels Akerstrom Andersen *Discursive Analytical Strategies: Understanding Foucault, Koselleck, Laclau, Luhman* The Policy Press, Bristol, 2003
[16] Michel Foucault *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* Penguin Books, London 1977, p.31
[17] Trevor McCrisken American *Exceptionalism and the legacy of Vietnam: US Foreign Policy since 1974* Palgrave Macmillan, NewYork 20032003 p.10

morally and physically, the US is viewed as being separate and in many ways above the pathologically violent ways of the Old World. McCrisken identifies two major strands of exceptionalism in US Foreign Policy, the missionary and the exemplar. Both draw their substance from the idea of the United States as a 'City upon a Hill' with the eyes of the world upon it. The difference is that the former strand believes that the US should actively engage in spreading its ideals across the world while the latter believes that the US should focus inward and act as an example to the world, the logic being that when the world sees the achievements of liberty in one land they will follow suit. Inherent to both these strands of exceptionalism is the idea that the founding ideals and principles of the US are universal. Thus the US is identified as a moral and noble state, whose principles are the principles for the better organisation of all mankind and, therefore, the US is in the position of moral leadership in the world.

However, this desire/duty to lead is tempered by the almost equally powerful idea that on the physical front, the United States is also set apart. Again going back to the quote from Jefferson the idea of being physically apart from the Old World has been an extremely important part of the US conception of itself, particularly since the articulation of the Monroe Doctrine and has been reinforced by the course of history in the 20th century despite technological advancements that have reduced the importance of these distances. Indeed Reagan's 'Star Wars' and its more recent incarnation in Bush's National Missile Defence could be understood as symptoms of the tension between America's desire to lead the world and yet remain secure from its vagaries.

This tension between being separate from the world and yet leading it can be seen being played out in the ambivalent relationship between the United States and

various international institutions from the refusal to join the League of Nations to withdrawal from the Kyoto protocols and opposition to the International Criminal Court. For many outside of the US, these tensions are often used to demonstrate the artificial nature of American exceptionalism, in other words to argue that the United States is driven by self interest and the desire for power just as much as any other great power in history. Although there is some truth to this argument, it misinterprets the nature and the role identity plays in forming American attitudes to the world and indeed to itself. Following David Campbell then, this study

> "by taking 'Foreign Policy' to be an important (though not predominant) practice of security, and by taking United States Foreign Policy to be an important (though not overriding) practice in international politics, ... examines the way in which the identity of '(the United States of) America' has been written and rewritten through foreign policies operating in its name."[18]

This concept of being American should not be confused with citizenship in any juridico-political sense. Rather it means that opposition and criticism of the United States is pathologised and linked to the irrational and anti-modern tendencies of certain elites. It is this view, drawn directly from a conception of identity, which feeds into the logic of interventionism that has characterised much of the history of US Foreign Policy from incursions in the Philippines in the 19th Century to Kosovo in 1999. It should also be noted at this point what is not being said. I would not argue that this conception of identity is the sole driver of Foreign Policy, at least not in a classical causal sense, but rather that by examining Foreign Policy as part of the mode of governmentality that regulates and inscribes this particular conception of identity, we can gain a greater understanding of the motives, methods and effects of such policies. Rather than arguing that a particular construction of identity 'causes' a particular form of Foreign Policy what is being proposed here is a

[18] Campbell, 1992, op. cit., p.vii

> "discursive research agenda focussed on the construction of identity and policy and the way in which the two are linked within political discourse [and practice]."[19]

The next chapter will outline the institutional and discursive frames through which 9/11 was likely to be interpreted and which were likely to play a role in shaping the response to it. Part of this will inevitably involve a historical overview of US Foreign Policy – the statements and policy documents, the institutional structures - including the traditional tensions between state and defence, military and civilian intelligence and the actions taken. Particular focus will be on the early Cold War which perhaps in the eye of policymakers holds the greatest relevance to the 4 years that followed 9/11, but also the first 'War on Terror' under Reagan in the 1980's, George H.W. Bush's 'War on Drugs' and military intervention and terrorist attacks on the US under Clinton. The idea is to give some background to the institutional and discursive frames available to an American president in times of perceived or proclaimed crisis. This chapter will be a genealogy of the 'War on Terror' tracing the emergence of the concepts of security and self that created a Terrorism that required military intervention as its remedy rather than criminal justice.

Using Hansen's model outlined above the research design appropriate to this chapter is as follows:

[19] Hansen, 2006, op. cit. p45



Figure: Research design for Chapter 5

The focus then is on the evolution of US identity and the practice of intervention over the period in question. As the sources addressed in this particular model will be largely secondary, it will involve multiple intertextual models as outlined by Hansen.[20] The significance of this chapter in the context of the thesis as a whole is that it fills in the nature of the self in question in the 'War on Terror' by outlining the emergence of the hegemonic discourse of USFP in the twentieth century that would frame decisions and decision-makers in the 'War on Terror'. It should also be re-emphasised that discourses by their very nature are unable to completely close their system of representation. As Andersen notes "the necessary incompleteness of the [discursive] structure is, regardless of the specific focus or perspective, a recurrent theme throughout Discourse Theory."[21] This point is not entirely dissimilar to Quine's ontological point of the under-determination of theory by facts[22], a discourse is unable to locate a firm point outside of itself on which to fix permanently and therefore,

[20]Hansen, op. cit, p. 82-7
[21] Andersen 2003 op.cit., p. 51
[22] See discussion of Quine in Chapter 3 above

although from time to time a particular discourse may become hegemonic, it is never indefinitely stable and fixed.

Having examined the emergence of the hegemonic[23] frame of USFP, the focus of thesis will shift to the present 'War on Terror'. If Chapter 5 is concerned with the diachronic emergence of intervention and identity, chapers 6 & 7 will be concerned with outlining the synchronic discursive structure of the 'War on Terror'. The focus will be on examining the discursive moments where Afghanistan and Iraq were securitised and how these moves were accepted through formal mechanisms such as congressional votes and informally in the realm of public opinion and debate. Following Hansesn, the model for Chapters 6 & 7 then is as follows:



Figure: Research design for Chapter 6 & 7

The purpose of these chapters is to explore the discourse of the 'War on Terror', to understand the relationship between the construction of US identity by the Bush administration as the target of the security threat in the 'War on Terror' and the practice of intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq.

[23] The term hegemonic here refers to the emergence of a particular understanding as dominant or coming to appear to be common sense. This is not to say that resistance to such an understanding either doesn't exist or is impossible but that that understanding is the dominant one. See Krebs and Lobasz, op. cit., 2007, p.411-2

The periods chosen for the substantive empirical section of this thesis are the build-up to, invasion and aftermath of the US-led interventions in Afghanistan (October 2001) and Iraq (March 2003). The periodisation chosen is from September 11th to the announcement of the end of hostilities in Iraq on 1st May 2003. In choosing these particular cases to answer the research question "How the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq were made possible?" a number of issues need to be dealt with. Hereunder, I will outline the role of cases in discourse research, linking them with the idea of critical case studies. Bartelson describes genealogy as being effective, episodical and exemplary. It is effective in that it historicises the present. It is episodical in that it:

> "does not aim to depict an age, an event or a culture in its entirety as does conventional history, but only those historical accidents and details which serve to make the present more intelligible."[24]

This in turn means that in its search for cases to examine, a genealogical study searches for exemplary cases that allows us to examine the emergence of the episode of the present. In a similar manner, this thesis focuses on the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq as exemplary moments that allow us to understand the complex role identity construction plays in making possible certain courses of action. The logic of such selection is, I would argue, compatible with the logic of crucial case studies in positivist social science.

> "The essential abstract characteristic of a crucial case can be deduced from its function as a test of theory. It is a case that must closely fit a theory if one is to have confidence in the theory's validity, or, conversely, must not fit equally well any rule contrary to that proposed".[25]

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[24] Jens Bartelson *A Genealogy of Sovereignty* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1995, p76
[25] Harry Eckstein "Case Study and theory in political science"in Roger Gomm, Martyn Hammersley & Peter Foster (eds) *Case study method: Key issues, key texts* Sage, London, 2000 p.148

If we are proposing that the legitimation of the practice of intervention is linked to the construction of identity through a discourse, then I would argue that the US interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq are crucial case studies following the logic of 'most-likely' cases.

Thus the criteria for judgement is that the cases can be shown to support the theory and that this fit is not superseded by other possible explanations. The final chapter of the thesis will include some discussion of alternative explanations.

Furthermore as Yin has noted:

> "Multiple-case studies...include two or more cases within the same study. These multiple cases should be selected so that they replicate each other ...predicting similar results...or contrasting results"[26]

Also:

> "The rationale [of exemplary case designs] fits a replication logic well, because your overall investigation may then try to determine whether similar causal events within each case produced these positive outcomes."[27]

In this study, the multiple cases are the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Furthermore the, albeit less detailed, historical study in Chapter 5 should provide further 'test' cases for the research question. The extent to which a Discourse Theory approach can be considered to be 'testable' is discussed in the next section.

Data

Having argued above for the significance of discourse, hereunder I outline the data that will be looked at in order to explore the question: How were the US military interventions in the 'War on Terror' made possible? Both texts and things are relevant to the Discourse Theory approach outlined in this chapter. For the next chapter which explores in broad terms the discursive frames through which 9/11 was interpreted,

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[26] Robert Yin *Case study research: design and Methods* Sage, Thousand Oaks 2003 p.5
[27] Ibid. p.13

secondary sources will predominate. For the chapters on the two cases, a combination of primary and secondary sources will be used including speeches, statements, manuals, strategies, actions and events.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3A	Model 3B
Analytical focus	Official Discourse: Heads of states, Governments Senior Civil servants, High ranked military, Heads of international institutions, Official Statements by international institutions	Wider foreign policy debate, Political Opposition, The media, Corporate institutions	Cultural representations, Popular culture, High Culture	Marginal political discourses, Social movements, Illegal associations, academics, NGOs
Object of Analysis	Official Texts, Direct and secondary intertextual links, Supportive texts, Critical Texts	Political Texts, Parliamentary debates, Speeches, statements, Media texts, Editorials, Field reporting, Opinion - debate, Corporate institutions public campaigns, Recurring intertextual links	Film, Fiction, television, computer games, photography, comics, music, poetry, painting, architecture, travel writing, autobiography	Marginal newspapers, websites, books, pamphle Academic Analysis
Goal of Analysis	The stabilization of official discourse through intertextual links, The response of official discourse to critical discourses	The hegemony of official discourse, The likely transformation of official discourse, The internal stability of media discourses	Sedimentation or reproduction of identities in cultural representations	Resistance in non-democratic regimes, Dissent in cases of model 1 & 2 hegemony, Acaden debates

Table: Intertextual Research models Source: Hansen, op.cit, 2006 p.77

In the research design outlined above, Chapter 5 is to include aspects of all three models, therefore the types of texts selected will range from official documents, to secondary commentaries, to academic works, to cultural artefacts such as films, novels and theatre. Chapters 6 and 7 on the other hand, focus on the first model and second models, and data will therefore be drawn from official texts, although occasionally external intertextual links will be explored. The key questions though are how these texts will be selected and how they will be read?

On the issue of selection, once the intertextual model to be applied has been selected, the relevant texts are almost self-evident. As Waever has noted

> "The flippant, but not wholly incorrect, answer is: any text, so long as you read for long enough!"[28]

The principles being that as discursive structures are to be found on the surface then they will be found in any political text within the frames of reference of the study. However, as this study is aimed at exploring the interlinking of particular constructions and practice, further consideration of the relevant texts for Chapters 6 and 7 is apposite. Hansen suggests that text selection for contemporary general material should meet three criteria:

> "they are characterised by the clear articulation of identities and policies; they are widely read and attended to; and they have the formal authority to define a political position"[29]

This study's focus on the articulation of security threats by the Bush administration suggests that the following types of texts are relevant:

1) Official policy statements by prominent administration officials e.g. Presidential statements, senior cabinet member's addresses, and senior military statements
2) Congressional speeches directly related to the question of approving intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq
3) Official planning documentation – force estimates, strategic plans, definitions of roles and aims of military missions.

The first of these sets of documents fulfils all three of the criteria for selection, and their inclusion in the study is uncontroversial. Selection within this universe of statements will give priority to texts that are 'widely read and attended to' such as

[28] Ole Waever in Howarth and Torfing, op. cit., 2003 p.40
[29] Hansen, op. cit., 2006, p. 85; see also p.82-87 for further discussion.

public addresses carried in the national media. Further texts within this group will also be analysed to demonstrate the consistency of the discourse and that the main texts are indeed representative. In relation to the second set of texts, these may fail to meet all three of the criteria for selection, being particularly prone to failure on the second criterion. However their inclusion is necessary to demonstrate the extent to which the positive votes giving formal approval to the securitising moves of the administration were based on the acceptance of the administration's articulation of the nature of the threat and the stakes involved in terms of action. The final set of texts are arguably more controversial in their inclusion as they step outside the rhetorical realm which is the focus of this dissertation. However, it will be argued that changes in institutional practices in the military were significant in determining how the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq were presented in the securitizing discourse and that their inclusion adds to our understanding of how these actions were possible. As McDonald has noted:

> "an exclusive focus on language is problematic in the sense that it can exclude forms of bureaucratic practices or physical action that do not merely follow form securitizing 'speech-acts' but are part of the process though which meanings of security are communicated and security itself constructed."[30]

The inclusion of discussion of the RMA and other bureaucratic changes in practice in Chapter 6 is aimed at avoiding the lacunae identified by McDonald in this study.

One final set of non-textual evidence will also be included. As mentioned the success of the speech act is determined by its acceptance in terms of formal approval from the relevant institutions, in this case Congress, but also in terms of its wider acceptance by a national audience. Therefore public opinion data will be used to demonstrate the extent to which the American public accepted the construction of Iraq

[30] McDonald, op. cit., 2008 p.568-9

and Afghanistan as security threats and their approval of the proposed course of action that followed.[31]

Reading texts

Given that the structures of discourse are to be found at the surface, in other words they are liminal on the text, the Discourse Theory approach is empirical in character. This means that in principle any one account of a discursive formation is 'falsifiable' in a limited sense. It is 'falsifiable' in the sense that the credibility of the account can be weighed against possible alternative readings of the relevant texts, it is limited in that the criteria for judgement of which account is to be chosen does not refer to an objective level of verisimilitude beyond the discourse itself. Moreover in order to aid transparent and critical judgment on the part of the reader, Appendix II & III include a representative sample of primary documents not directly referenced in the analysis that support the conclusions reached. The question of how such texts have been read must also be addressed. In order to answer the question how were the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq possible it has been argued that we need to understand both how the threats were securitized, that is made subjects of security action, and given the claim to collective identity, who it is that is to be protected and who are the enemy. On the one hand then, answering this question demands we look at the securitising moves of the Bush administration in terms of the Copenhagen School's 'grammar of security' and at how US identity was constructed within these moves in a manner that made possible the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The first step then is to examine the first set of texts, the official statements of the administration, for 'securitizing moves', that is the identification of threats in a manner that is consistent with the

[31] The limitations of public opinion data in this regard are discussed in the final chapter.

> "grammar of security, and construct a plot that includes existential threat, point of no return, and a possible way out [a course of action]."[32]

This will allow us to outline the basic structure of the security threat constructed by the administration. Similarly, the second group of texts will be used to demonstrate that congressional members had accepted and internalised this understanding of the security situation and further public opinion data will be used to show that the administration was successful in convincing the public not just of the threat itself but also of the second aspect of successful securitization, that the response outlined by the administration was the appropriate one. However, in order to answer our 'how possible' research question, this account only tells a partial story.

It has already been argued that the success of the securitizing move is dependent upon the ability to convince audiences that the representation being proposed is an appropriate and accurate one. Operating as it does at the level of collective security, this thesis argues that for successful securitization to occur one must examine the subject positions articulated by securitizing discourses in relation to sedimented discourses of identity within a given political setting. Thus the texts will also be examined in terms of 'articulation' and 'interpellation.' As Weldes argues:

> "The construction of national interests...works as follows: Drawing on and constrained by the array of cultural and linguistic resources already available within the security imaginary, state officials create representations that...populate the world with a variety of objects, including both the self...and others...Each of these objects is given an identity...endowed with characteristics."[33]

This is the articulation of the world by policy makers in a fashion which is functionally similar to the securitization process outlined above. However it is the second term 'interpellation' that requires a second reading of both the first and second

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[32] Buzan et al., op. cit., 1998, p.33
[33] Weldes, op. cit., 1999, p13

set of texts. That is the process through which the audience of a securitizing move come to accept a representation as accurate:

> "The interpellation of the audience into U.S. subject position...produce a 'we.'...crafted out of the resources provided by the U.S. security imaginary. The typical response ...was...one of recognition: 'Yes, 'we' are like this (that is, a tough leader, democratic, and in favour of freedom) and not like that (that is, alien, despotic, and aggressive).'"[34]

Weldes goes on to suggest that the acceptance of this subject position then provides enabling conditions for accepting that challenges from the 'other' must be met with firmness and even military force. This is not a causal argument but again one focussed on how particular policy options come to be seen as both plausible and possible. Chapter 5 aims at outlining aspects of the US security imaginary as they emerged over time. Chapter 6 and 7 will be more focused on an analysis of official texts that allow us to outline the subject positions articulated and interpellated by the administration. This means that the first and second set of texts will be examined for the construction not just of security threats but for constructions of who exactly is threatened and who is doing the threatening. In practical terms this will involve predicate analysis to examine the construction of subjects in the discourse of the 'War on Terror' with a particular focus on the construction of identity in terms of self/other dichotomy.

> "Predicate analysis focuses on the language practices of predication – the verbs, adverbs and adjectives that attach to nouns. Predications of a noun construct the thing(s) named as a particular sort of thing, with particular features and capacities. Among the objects so constituted may be subjects, defined through being assigned capacities for and modes of acting and interacting."[35]

Such constructions of subjects need not be in terms of radical othering, however it will be argued that this is the form of subject constructed in the discourse of the 'War on Terror' and further that this form of self/other relationships is critical to understanding how the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq were made possible.

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[34] Ibid. p.230; see also Milliken, op.cit. 1999 p.239
[35] Milliken, op. cit. 1999, p232

Conclusion

The above discussion has been an attempt to outline systematically the methodological implications of adopting a Discourse Theory approach that builds on both the Copenhagen School and more post-positivist and critical approaches to the study of Foreign Policy and intervention in the cases in question. The application of the models outlined above in the chapters that follow will be made as explicitly as possible to facilitate an assessment of the arguments being put forward on a basis compatible with the requirements of a PhD and Social Science more generally. The point, though, is not to construct some 'via media' between positivist and post-positivist approaches, but rather to demonstrate that adopting post-positivist methods should not excuse a study from the application of rigorous research design. Nor should it be an excuse to exclude the study from the broader science. The case being made here is for a degree of methodological pluralism driven by choosing the most appropriate method to answer the question in hand. The case being made in this and the previous chapter is that a Discourse Theory approach is the most appropriate to answering the question of how the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq were made possible. The next three chapters seeks to outline the discursive frame through which 9//11 was defined and the relationship of this discursive framing to the practice of the 'War on Terror' in terms of how particular strategic moves were made within a discourse to make the interventions possible.

Chapter 5 – Framing the 'War on Terror'

> "To return to the subject, namely punishment, we must distinguish two things: first, the relatively enduring aspect, the customs, the act, the 'drama,' a certain strict succession of procedures; on the other hand, the fluid aspect, the meaning, the aim, the expectation which attends the execution of these procedures...Today it is impossible to say definitely why punishment is meted out: all concepts in which a whole process is comprehended semiotically, escape definition; only what has no history is definable..." Nietszche, *On the Genealogy of morals* 1887[1]

The next chapter will outline the specific discourse through which 9/11 was constructed as a security problem and which played a role making possible the militarised response to it. This chapter seeks to explore the historical role of identity discourse in US Foreign Policy (USFP). Part of this will inevitably involve a historical overview of US Foreign Policy – the statements and policy documents, the institutional structures and the actions taken. The purpose of this chapter is to give some background to the institutional and discursive frames that have been employed by American governments in times of perceived or proclaimed crisis. As discussed in the previous chapters, the success of securitizing moves or indeed any attempt to define a particular concept within discourse is limited by the extent to which they can either be linked to pre-existing discursive understandings or where actors can successfully articulate a radically different set of understandings based upon the perceived incongruence between the existing discourse and events.[2] This thesis will set out to argue that the discourse of the 'War on Terror' was successful for the former reasons, namely that it was able to present a convincing narrative of both the events and the response that was congruent with pre-existing understandings of the United States role in the world. This chapter then aims to examine the sedimented

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[1] As quoted in Walter Kaufman *The Portable Nietszche* Penguin Books, London 1982 p.450-1; see also for alternate translation Nietzsche *On the Genealogy of morals* Oxford University Press, Oxford 1996, p. 60-61. This version uses the more frequently quoted "only that which has no history can be defined" but translates 'comprehended semiotically' as 'summarized in signs', the former I feel is more appropriate in the current setting.

[2] For an example of the radical break in discursive understanding see Croft, op. cit., 2006

discursive understandings of the US's role in the world that would render intelligible contemporary calls to action when put in those terms. Buzan et al. have argued that they:

> "believe even the socially constituted is often sedimented as structure and becomes so relatively stable as practice that one must do analysis on the basis that it continues"[3]

This thesis argues that the term structure overstates the degree to which such sedimentation can successfully stabilise the meanings of concepts such as security or national identity and opts instead to look at this sedimentation as a process constructing the 'security imaginary', that creates the conditions for the articulation of

> "discursive objects and relationships out of 'cultural raw materials' and 'linguistic resources"[4]

This chapter sets out to discuss the emergence of these resources over time.

The focus then is on the evolution of US identity and the practice of intervention over the period in question. The role of this chapter in the context of the thesis as a whole is that it outlines the emergence of the hegemonic discourse of USFP that would frame decisions and decision-makers in the 'War on Terror'. A further point is, that although within a specific discursive setting one identity may become dominant, this is not the only possible identity. As such where the term "American Identity" is used in this chapter it refers to that American identity which is claimed to be dominant at that particular point in time within official American discourse related to Foreign Policy, and is not to suggest that this is the only identity that could be covered by that particular epithet. In other words the purpose of this chapter is to begin to identify the vocabulary of American identity within the practice of American Foreign Policy. To paraphrase Marx, we choose our own words but not

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[3] Buzan et al, op. cit., 1998 p.35
[4] Milliken, op. cit., 1999 p239

in discourses of our own making. We begin with a discussion of the concept of 'American exceptionalism' before turning to examining some of the earliest manifestations of one form of this distinct American identity, we then move on to discuss some exemplary moments in 19th and early 20th Century USFP before turning to look briefly at the Cold War and Post-Cold War world that immediately predate the 9/11 attacks. The chapter ends with a brief outline of the Bush administration's approach to the world prior to the 9/11 attacks.

This chapter relies predominantly on secondary sources on the subject of US history and Foreign Policy. It does however include examples of primary texts that demonstrate particular articulations of American identity by speakers that fulfil the three criteria outlined in the previous chapter. What is presented here is an 'exemplary' history in the sense proposed by Bartelson, rather than a complete history of the concepts under discussion which would be outside the scope of this thesis.[5] Furthermore, the purpose of this chapter is not to suggest that these articulations of identity caused USFP to evolve in the manner it did, but rather to look at these articulations as making possible and comprehensible the courses of action that followed.

American Exceptionalism

> "American exceptionalism, summarized, is the notion that the United States was created differently, developed differently, and thus has to be understood differently – essentially on its own terms and within its own context"[6]

The idea of American Exceptionalism is best summarised then as the proposition that the United States is unique. Such a proposition though does not get us very far in understanding what it is about the US that makes it unique or what role this

[5] See Hansen, op. cit., 2006 p.84 and Bartelson, op. cit., 1995

[6] Byron Shafer "What is the American Way? Four themes in search of their next incarnation" in Byron Shafer (ed) *Is America different? A new look at American Exceptionalism* Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1991 p.??

uniqueness plays in shaping the United States role in the world. Goodhart suggests that there are, at least, three ways of thinking about American Exceptionalism:

> "Historical exceptionalism refers to claims about America's unique historical origins and development [...] behavioural exceptionalism [is] the thesis that America's actions, policies, and endeavours are unique and distinctive [...] Cultural exceptionalism refers, loosely, to claims about the traits, beliefs, habits and attitudes of Americans concerning their world and their place in it"[7]

Both historical and behavioural exceptionalism are essentially empirical claims about what America is or has been. Within American historiography, debate over the usefulness of historical exceptionalism has been ongoing for decades.[8] Similarly, the idea of American behavioural exceptionalism has been discussed at length.[9] For the purposes of this thesis though, we are interested only in the third form – Cultural Exceptionalism. That is to say we are not interested in whether exceptionalism is or is not a useful heuristic for understanding American history or whether the US either behaves or claims the right to behave differently to other states in the international system but we are interested in what role the cultural understanding of the US as being exceptional has played in the discourse of American nationalism and Foreign Policy.

Huntington identifies a number of key features of the 'American creed' or American nationalism that are relevant to the idea of exceptional accounts of the United States' role in the world:

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[7] Michael Goodhart "Reverting to Form: American Exceptionalism and human rights after 9/11" unpublished manuscript, 2008, p.4-6 available at https://www.ucis.pitt.edu/euce/events/conferences/PDFs/Goodhart.pdf accessed 14.09.2009

[8] See for discussion Michael Kammen "The problem of American Exceptionalism: A reconsideration" in *American Quarterly* Vol 45 No 1, 1993 pp.1-43 and Ian Tyrrell "American Exceptionalism in an Age of International History" in *The American Historical Review* Vol 96 No 4, 1991 pp. 1031-1055. For an empirical defence of American exceptionalism see Seymour Martin Lipset *American Exceptionalism: A Double Edged Sword* WW Norton & Co, New York, 1996

[9] Michael Ignatieff "Introduction: American Exceptionalism and human rights" in Michael Ignatieff (ed) *American Exceptionalism and Human Rights* Princeton University Press, Princeton 2005, pp.1-26 & Daryl Glaser " Does hypocrisy matter? The case of US Foreign Policy" in *Review of International Studies* Vol 32 No2, 2006, pp.251-268

> "Throughout the history of the United States a broad consensus has existed among the American people in support of liberal, democratic, individualistic, and egalitarian values...they have provided the core of American national identity since the eighteenth century"[10]

In later work Huntington has gone on to outline the threat to this core identity from the influx of migrants, particularly from Latin America, who do not share the White Anglo-Saxon Protestant (WASP) heritage of the original settlers.[11] More important though, than the substance of Huntington's argument is the status accorded to these features of American identity:

> "The United States has no meaning, no identity, no political culture or even history apart from its ideals of liberty and democracy and the continuing efforts of Americans to realize those ideals."[12]

As discussed above what is important here is not the objective truth of this statement but the fact that this conception of the American self plays a key role in American cultural and political discourse of which Samuel Huntington's article and other writings are an example.[13]

The question then is what role do claims to be exceptional play in affecting the course of American foreign relations. Stanley Hoffman has argued that the US has a particular approach to international affairs derived from the unique confluence of "its past, its principles and its pragmatism"[14] which in turn have implications for how the United States relates to the outside world.

> "Each nation tends to see itself as unique. Two, France and the United States, consider themselves as exceptional because-or so they claim-of the universality

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[10] Samuel P Huntington " American Ideals versus American Institutions" in *Political Science Quarterly* Vol 97 No 1, 1982, p1

[11] See Samuel P. Huntington *Who are we? America's Greatest Debate* Free Press, Simon & Schuster, London 2004

[12] Huntington, op. cit. 1982, p.36

[13] See for further discussion Louis Hartz *The Liberal Tradition in America: An interpretation of American Political Thought* Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, San Diego, 1991; Anatol Lieven *America Right or Wrong: An anatomy of American Nationalism* Harper Perenniall, London, 2004, particularly Chapter One; and for the broader cultural implications see Deborah L Madsen *American Exceptionalism* Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh 1998

[14] Stanley Hoffman "The American Style: Our past and our principles" in *Foreign Affairs* Vol 46 No. 2, 1968, p362

> of their values. One only, the United States, has tried to develop foreign policies that reflect such exceptionalism"[15]

From a similar perspective, Andrew Bacevich has argued that this exceptionalist model informed the worldview and practices of President Woodrow Wilson[16] and David Reynolds has argued that although from a historian's point of view the concept of exceptionalism should be disregarded:

> "the idea that the United States is both historically unique and morally exemplary…has shaped the form of America's power projection overseas"[17]

From a historical perspective, then, exceptionalist discourse has played an important role in justifying and making possible political action. This is not to say that the formulation of exceptionalism, or in a broader sense US national identity, caused political action but rather that in appealing for the support of the 'imagined community'[18] of the American nation, political actors did so in a manner that both appealed to and helped to reinforce American exceptionalism as part of the cultural mythology of US nationalism.

That the notion of American exceptionalism is largely mythical has been well argued by Godfrey Hodgson who instead locates US political culture as an outgrowth of and a part of the European world which claims to exceptionalism would have it escape.[19] Indeed Hodgson argues that the continued use of this myth is not only factually misleading, but is ultimately damaging to the American commonwealth, a point also raised by Andrew Bacevich in both his work on American militarism and more recently on exceptionalism and American power itself.[20] In both cases though,

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[15] Stanley Hoffman "American Exceptionalism: The New Version" in Michael Ignatieff (ed), op. cit., 2005, p.225

[16] Andrew Bacevich *The New American Militarism: How Americans are seduced by war* Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005, p.11

[17] David Reynolds *America: Empire of Liberty A new history* Allen Lane, 2009, p.580

[18] See for discussion Michael Billig *Banal Nationalism* Sage, London 1995

[19] See Godfrey Hodgson *The myth of American Exceptionalism* Yale University Press, 2009

[20] Bacevich, op. cit, 2005, passim and Andrew Bacevich *The limits of Power: the end of American Exceptionalism* Metropolitan Books, New York, 2008

Bacevich and Hodgson appeal to the US to remember itself and return to its 'true ideals.' To a degree then both are appealing to a similar exceptionalist myth. The flexibility of the myth of American exceptionalism is derived from its existence as a form of nationalist discourse which mobilises an imagined past but also involves a process of forgetting.[21] As Philpot and Mutimer have noted:

> "This process of active and conscious forgetting and reconstruction explains the form of amnesia from which the highly interventionist and violent US suffers. This 'condition' enables a constant reproduction of the national-self that accords with the narrative demands of any given political epoch"[22]

American Exceptionalism then, although based upon a certain form of historical knowledge, is a rhetorical claim based on a constructed vision of the past that legitimates and normalises a particular state of affairs or course of action in the present. Bacevich has outlined four core assumptions that he argues guided US policy after WWII which sum up the core of American Exceptionalist discourse. 1) That history has a purpose. 2) That the United States embodies freedom. 3) That the United States has a divinely ordained mission to advance freedom and 4) That the United States will only be secure when its values, which it views to be universal, have spread throughout the world.

This chapter then aims to outline how Exceptionalist claims in the past have served to justify state actions and thereby helped to provide the 'security imaginary' or cultural resources for the discourse of the present. The close alliance of exceptionalism, national identity and political action is significant as McCrisken has noted:

> "As far as America is concerned, American strength and power carry their own justification; America's essential goodness is rooted in its history and founding

[21] This idea of national identity being built on a process of forgetting echoes with the 19th Century articulation of Nationalism by Ernest Renan. See Ernest Renan *Qu'est-ce Qu'une nation?* Mille et Une Nuits, France, 1997

[22] Simon Philpot & David Mutimer "The United States of Amnesia" in *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* Vol 22 No 2, 2009 p.316

values. In the more extreme forms of this frame of mind, to question the war on terrorism is to question America itself"[23]

This thesis will argue, following Krebs and Lobasz, that discourse of the 'War on Terror' itself represents an 'extreme frame of mind' that has effectively reduced the legitimate space for dissent by constructing the 'War on Terror' in terms of the discourse of American exceptionalism and thereby made possible the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq.

A very brief overview of American history/identity/intervention

In the discourse of American Exceptionalism the earliest settlers of what was to become the United States are constructed as being instrumental in defining what it would mean to be American and what role this 'New World' would play in the history of mankind. One of the earliest and most famous manifestations of this idea of America is the sermon given by John Winthrop in 1630:

> "For we must consider that we shall be as a city upon a hill. The eyes of all people are upon us. So that if we shall deal falsely with our God in this work we have undertaken, and so cause Him to withdraw His present help from us, we shall be made a story and a by-word through the world."[24]

Two aspects of what was to evolve into the concept of 'Manifest Destiny' in the mid to late 19th century are evident in this quote. The first is the concept of beginning the world anew as a people chosen by God to lift humanity out of it's moral decay, a theme that continues in US policy discourse throughout the post-independence era, albeit in a more secularised form. Indeed the idea of a new beginning in a new world

[23] Trevor McCrisken *American Exceptionalism and the legacy of Vietnam: US Foreign Policy since 1974* Palgrave Macmillan, NewYork 2003 p.161

[24] John Winthrop "We Shall be as a city upon a hill" 1630, in Owen Collins & Andrew Young *Speeches that changed the World* Westminster John Knox Press, London, 1999 p.65

was something the settlers would have carried with them from Europe.[25] The second, and arguably as significant though less often highlighted, is the sense of insecurity inherent in the statement. The exemplar impulse in Winthrop's speech is a positive one – the oft quoted "city upon a hill" – but it also carries the dangers inherent in not living up to the ideals upon which the city is built and the punishment that follows such a betrayal.[26] This is not to say that the long standing significance of Winthrop's sermon in national terms was either evident or intentional at the time but over the roughly 150 years that preceded independence and more so in the 200 plus years since, the exemplar image and its inherent insecurity became, albeit in a secularised form, central to the debates on both the expansion of the Western frontier and the engagement of the US with the world beyond its immediate neighbourhood.[27]

The secularised version of the exemplar ideal can be found in the writings and speeches of the early Presidents. Jefferson described the situation of the new state as follows in 1801:

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[25] See Tzvetan Todorov *The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other* University of Oklahoma Press, Norman 1999

[26] Such arguments have been a feature of the post-9/11 era in both a Christian form, Pat Robertson or Jerry Falwell blaming the attacks on the US's liberal policies in relation to Homosexuality, and in a secular form not least in Ward Churchill's infamous 'on the justice of roosting chickens' and later in relation to debates on Abu-Ghraib, Guantanomo and the use of torture in interrogation. What is interesting here is that failure to live up to certain ideals rather than the ideals themselves which is put under question. Most recently, and with no guilt through association, Barack Obama's speech on race relations in the US carries within it the tendency to view departures from liberty and justice for all in the US as being inherently resolvable through the institutions already in existence – original sin of the union, the ability to fix it within the institutions so created. See Stephen H Webb "Jerry Falwell was right" in *Christianity Today* 28/08/2007 available at http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2007/august/24.55.html accessed 20/10/08; Ward Churchill *On the Justice of Roosting Chickens* AK Press, Edinburgh 2003; Barack Obama "A more perfect union" 18/03/08 available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/03/18/obama-race-speech-read-t_n_92077.html accessed 20/10/08. See also the discussion of the character Slothrop in *Gravity's Rainbow* by Madsen for an alternative view on the outcome of departing from the United States puritan roots, op. cit., 1998 pp.154-55

[27] See David Reynolds, op cit, 2009, p33-4 for a discussion of Winthrop's sermon that suggests that "Winthrop was simply reiterating biblical commonplaces and his sermon had little contemporary impact."

> "Kindly separated by nature and a wide ocean from the exterminating havoc of one quarter of the globe; too high minded to endure the degradations of others." [28]

Washington likewise implored his successors to "steer clear of permanent alliances"[29] lest the US be dragged into the machinations of the Old World. Likewise, John Quincy Adams argued that the US should not "go abroad in search of monsters to destroy."[30] Even so the tension between the desire to remain apart from the Old World and yet also lead humanity to a better future manifested itself quite clearly in the early years of the Union. At first it involved debates about the relationship between the old colonial power Britain and the fledgling republic and then, in the mid 1800's, to a more aggressive expansionist policy across what was to become the continental United States. In this period a number of key issues are worth looking at in more detail. Firstly, the expansion of the state into the Western frontier and its effect on ideas about American identity and America's place in the world. Second, the divisions of populations under US political authority into different categories of foreignness with a particular focus on Native Americans and colonialism in the Philippines, Hawaii and South and Central America. And finally, the conflict in Foreign Policy debates between isolationist and internationalist tendencies, both of which compete within a frame of more fully embodying the exemplary tradition.

Debating the role of the Western Frontier has been something of a cottage industry in American historiography and the purpose here is not to recap the debates or to take one or other side.[31] Rather, the point is to touch on the role the Western frontier had in shaping the discursive resources through which US Foreign Policy was

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[28] Thomas Jefferson "First Inaugural Address" 1801 in Richard D, Heffner (ed) *A Documentary History of the United States* 7th Edition, Penguin, New York 2002 p.81

[29] George Washington "Farewell address" 1796 Ibid. p.68

[30] John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, "Speech to the US House of Representatives", 1821 available at http://www.fff.org/freedom/1001e.asp accessed 20/10/08

[31] For a useful overview of the debates see Margaret Walsh *The American West: Visions and Revisions* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2005

articulated, particularly in how it affected the evolution of what might be called 'national identity', or at least that national identity that was to find its expression in the debates on and practice of Foreign Policy. The central relationship is the concern with the 'other' which in this case ranged from Native Americans, the French and the Spanish governments and American frontiersmen. The argument is that the discursive framing of each had implications for the policy options pursued. These discursive frames ranged from dehumanisation in the case of Native Americans, to mutual recognition in the case of Spanish and French territorial claims, to idealisation in relation to the American frontiersman as representing the best kind of American and a goal for the nation as a whole to aspire to.[32] Indeed this conceptualisation of the 'other' and its relationship to policy practice both domestic and foreign arguably dates to the earliest contacts between Europeans and Native Americans. As Todorov notes:

> "I can conceive of these others as an abstraction, as an instance of any individual's psychic configuration, as the Other – other in relation to myself, to me; or else as a specific social group to which we do not belong. This group can in turn be interior to society: women for men, the rich for the poor, the mad for the "normal"; or it can be exterior to society, i.e., another society which will be near or far away, depending on the cultural, moral, historical plane; or else unknown quantities, outsiders whose language and customs I do not understand, so foreign that in extreme instances I am reluctant to admit they belong to the same species as my own."[33]

It is the latter categorisation of groups that we see evident in the slow progress of expansion of the USA in the nineteenth and into the twentieth century, from the categorisation of Native Americnas, slaves, women and dependents to dealing with Spain, Britain and other challengers to the emergent state. Fundamentally the constructed relationship between the 'Self' and 'Other' has important implications on the morality of interactions between the two and, as a result, on the nature of the

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[32] Indeed the trope of the frontiersman continued right into the mid to late twentieth century, perhaps best embodied in the popular Western film genre and John Wayne in particular. It's no coincidence that the more morally nuanced (Anti)Hero of the Sergio Leone Westerns only followed after the upheavals of the civil rights movement and Vietnam.

[33] Tzvetan Todorov op.cit. 1999, p.3

practices involved in dealing with different categories or degrees of 'otherness'. Such differentiation also tends to tell us as much about the kind of 'Self' that is being projected than it does about the 'objective' nature of the 'Other'. This relational construction is reflected in the tensions outlined above between exemplar and missionary strands in American exceptionalism in the nineteenth and into the twentieth century. A number of examples are worth exploring in more detail. First the role of Exceptionalist discourse in the progress of Western expansion, particularly during the Presidencies of Jackson and Polk, second the American Civil War, thirdly the rise of American colonialism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century and finally the denouement of Wilsonian idealism and the return of isolationism in the inter-war period.



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[34] Map of US Territory in 1830, available at http://images.google.ie/imgres?imgurl=http://history.sandiego.edu/gen/maps/1800s/1830america3200.jpg&imgrefurl=http://history.sandiego.edu/gen/maps/list-

As the above map shows, in the 1830's the US was far from a continental power. British territory lay to the north presenting a security threat as exemplified in the War of 1812 while to the south and west an expanding independent Mexico represented an alternate pole of power. However the process that would ultimately lead to the annexation of the territory of Texas, Nevada, California and the rest of the West was already under way. As Billington notes:

> "The pattern of conquest which eventually added all the Far West to the United States was perfected in Texas"[35]

This pattern was a process of settlement by American frontiersmen, usually of Anglophone and Protestant descent, beyond the boundaries of the US either in Native American territory, or in this case, the territory of independent Mexico. Indeed in Mexico the process had been initiated by the Mexican government beginning in the 1810's as an attempt to bolster population numbers in the province of Coahuila-Texas. A later attempt in the early 1830's to change the character of such migration to one with a more continental European flavour was unsuccessful.[36] With the growing Americanisation of Texas, the voices of those seeking 're-admission' to the United States grew louder in not calling for a right of return but rather an annexation of the newly occupied lands.[37] Underlying the tensions between the Anglo-Protestant settlers and their Hispanic Catholic rulers was the perceived cultural differences and latent sense of superiority on the part of the former.

> "Because Mexican institutions were different they were, by definition, inferior. This inferiority...stemmed from the degraded nature of Mexican people...Yet fate had placed these slovenly, dirty, slothful, inefficient, backward misfits in

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1800s.html&h=2122&w=3200&sz=1509&hl=en&start=1&um=1&tbnid=BtIplf9RukxrWM:&tbnh=99&tbnw=150&prev=/images%3Fq%3DAmerica%2B1830%26um%3D1%26hl%3Den%26sa%3DN

[35] Ray Allen Billington *The Far Western Frontier 1830-1860* Harper Brothers, New York, 1956 p.116

[36] Ibid. p.118-119

[37] Margaret Walsh *The American West: Visions and Revisions* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2005 p.23

temporary control of Americans! Surely the Divine Plan intended something different"[38]

A secondary undercurrent to this cultural tension was the issue of slavery. Many of the American settlers in Texas in this period were slaveholders and saw no conflict between their cherishing of individual freedom and that institution. Indeed, as Billington outlines, they rather saw attempts by Mexican authorities to outlaw slavery as acts of tyranny by an essentially alien authority. The gradual build up of tensions between the settlers and the Mexican authorities resulted in a series of confrontations ultimately culminating in a Texan declaration of independence and subsequent war in 1836. The war included one of the most famous battles in American history – the Alamo,[39] the symbolic defeat later to become a touchstone of the Frontier myth and a powerful symbol of resistance to perceived unjust authority. Despite an expansionist president in the White House, independent Texas had to wait almost a decade before being 're-admitted'[40] to the Union. Only when Polk succeeded in his campaign for the White House in 1844 was Texas admitted:

"I have no hesitation in declaring...that I am in favour of the Immediate Re-annexation of Texas"[41]

Two interrelated aspects of the Westward expansion and absorption of Texas are particularly relevant here. One is the role of American Exceptionalism and the other is the 'moral cartography' of American expansion. In relation to the former, the Anglo-Protestant settlers dismissive view of Mexican political institutions stems from their inherent inferiority to their US counterparts. As Billington outlines the reasoning of the settlers:

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[38] Billington, op. cit., 1956 p.120-1
[39] Ibid, Chapter 6 passim.
[40] In the various debates on Texas' future from a US perspective the argument was that it had always been a natural part of the Union and that Mexican authority was alien to the territory and therefore should be ended.
[41] James K Polk, 1844 as quoted in Billington, op. cit., 1956 p.144

> "In Spain and Mexico authority stemmed from the right or power of rulers, and the government's purpose was to exact unquestioning obedience from its subjects...the habit of absolutism was so strong that Mexican leaders moved constantly toward a centralized government less responsible to the people. This Americans could understand, for history taught them that all rulers were tyrants, but they could never realise why Mexicans accepted these oppressions without protest. With this lack of understanding went lack of respect."[42]

Underlying the rejection of the legitimacy of the political authority in Mexico City was the affirmation of the universality of the US model of political institutions. Only in the latter could true freedom be enjoyed and the rights of the individual guaranteed. This in turn has implications for the 'moral cartography' of the United States. Lands held by inferior groups, be they Native American or Hispanic, were open to annexation and settlement. Indeed, the case was made that not only had Americans a right, but also a duty, to make these resources productive and to serve liberty by expanding its reign to the Continental United States, this phenomenon is often subsumed under the term manifest destiny:

> "that claim [to Oregon] is by the right of our manifest destiny to overspread and to possess the whole of the continent which Providence has given us for the development of the great experiment of liberty and federated self-government entrusted to us...The God of nature and of nations has marked it for our own."[43]

Underlying the rationale for expansion was a categorisation of otherness in differing degrees with implications for how the other would and should be dealt with. Contrast, for example, the annexation of Mexican or Indian lands with the US relationship with British Canada which, although coveted, was expected to be absorbed either through agreement and consultation or economic entanglement rather than conflict.[44] As we shall see, even after the end of slavery, this moral cartography persisted in shaping US expansionary and later Foreign Policy, not in a causal sense but rather in how this

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[42] Ibid p.121

[43] *New York Weekly News,* Editorial attributed to John L. O'Sullivan, 07/09/1846 as quoted in Julius W Pratt "The Origins of Manifest Destiny" in *The American Historical Review* Vol 32, No. 3 1927, p.796

[44] See discussion in Walter La Feber *The New Empire: An interpretation of American Expansion 1860-1898* Cornell University Press, London 1998

discursively constructed moral cartography made expansion possible. The next period of expansion in the 1890's is indicative of this.

The late nineteenth century was a period of imperial expansion across the world driven by a combination of economic and ideological forces, one of the key questions was whether or not the republican United States would join the imperial game. The expansionary impulse of the US had been stalled by the period of civil war and reconstruction in the mid-nineteenth century, but with both economic and ideological forces working in the newly stable US, a new tide of expansion was emerging. Initially the drive was to longstanding contiguous or at least nearby potential additions, both Cuba and Puerto Rico had long been seen as part of the natural boundaries of the state. As early as 1823 John Quincy Adams put it thusly:

> "[Cuba and Puerto Rico are] natural appendages to the North American Continent…It is scarcely possible to resist the conviction that the annexation of Cuba to our federal republic will be indispensable to the continuance and integrity of the Union itself"[45]

However, Adams, along with his successors, believed that such a process of union would proceed naturally as European power, in the case of Cuba and Puerto Rico specifically Spanish power, receded. Due in part to domestic turmoil, no progress was made on this journey until the latter part of the 19th Century except for the assertion of the Monroe Doctrine in the same year:

> "We owe it, therefore, to candour, and to the amicable relations existing between the United states and those powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their political system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety…We could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing [the newly independent nations], or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States"[46]

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[45] As quoted in Peter H Smith *Talons of the Eagle: Dynamics of US-Latin American Relations* 2nd Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2000, p.23

[46] Ibid p.18

Although at face value, the doctrine appeared to be a rallying call to defend the independence of South and Central America, in practice it appeared to be an assertion of the Realpolitik of US preponderance in the region. It wasn't, however, until the 1890's that the country was in a position to pursue with real vigour the rights claimed by the Monroe Doctrine. Initially, the aims of expansion were the acquisition of nearby strategic assets but ultimately the combination of new strategic thinking, ideological pressures couched in terms similar to those outlined above in relation to Texas and economic forces drove the US towards a more typical European imperial model. To Cuba and Puerto Rico, Panama was added as a desirable acquisition and ultimately Hawai'i and the Philippines needed to be integrated further into American reach. Three divergent discourses can be traced in explaining and, to some extent driving, these expansive urges – the doctrine of exceptionalism, naval strategy oriented towards a two-ocean navy, and the myth of the frontier spirit. In many ways these ideational forces mirrored the European story of imperialism where there was:

> "the belief that the advance of European power meant progress, self-realization, in the long run at least the possibility of freedom, for the peoples subject to European rule...if necessary to override in doing so the resistance of peoples too barbaric and societies too stagnant to understand the greatness of the benefits they were being offered"[47]

In similar fashion the drive to US expansion beyond its shores was accompanied by the same constructions of identity of 'self' and 'other' that had driven the expansion Westward, drawing sharp contrasts between the virile, progressive force that was the frontiersman and the passive indolent native, and also extending the frontier mythology as an explanatory factor in creating and maintaining US institutions. The Turner thesis, which captured this necessity for continued expansion, argued:

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[47] MS Anderson *The Ascendancy of Europe 1815-1914* 2nd Edition, Longman, New York 1985

> "landed expansion became the central factor, the dynamic of American progress. Without the economic power generated by expansion across free lands, American political institutions could stagnate"[48]

The problem was that with America had reached the Pacific in the west, British Canada lay to the North and a reactionary, Catholic and Hispanic Mexico lay to the South, the only option for continued expansion appeared to be overseas. The cases of Puerto Rico and the wars with Spain and war in the Philippines are examples of the manifestation of this outward urge. In particular the former case, which lead to the cession of Puerto Rico, Guam and the Philippines, brings out some of the contradictions involved in aligning the United States' imperial policy with its own republican identity.

The issues involved were laid bare in a series of cases taken by merchants involved in trade between the territory of Puerto Rico and New York. Downes & Co. sued the collector of the Port of New York for collecting levies on goods imported from San Juan. Arguing that such trade was covered by the uniform taxation clause in the US Constitution, they ruled against the Plaintiff arguing that (albeit in 5 different opinions):

> "Whilst in an international sense Porto [sic] Rico was not a foreign country, since it was subject to the sovereignty of and was owned by the United States, it was foreign to the United States in a domestic sense, because the island had not been incorporated into the United States, but was merely appurtenant thereto as a possession"[49]

At issue was the nature of the relationship between the United States and its external territorial possessions and the nature of membership of citizenship of the US itself. As Kaplan notes, the discussions of the case by all of the justices involved invoked the threats and dangers of misinterpreting the nature of this relationship. Any wrong step

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[48] Walter LaFeber *The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion 1860-1898* Cornell UniversityPress, Ithaca, 1998 p.66

[49] Justice Edward Douglas Wright 1901 as quoted in Amy Kaplan *The Anarchy of Empire in the Making of US Culture* Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass., 2002 p.2

and the integrity of US citizenship, the rights it entailed and indeed the Union itself would be in peril. Parallels were drawn in the decision with earlier cases involving disputes of the rights of dependent nations such as the Cherokee Nation v The State of Georgia in 1831, while on the dissenting side the argument was made that extending jurisdiction without rights was an even greater peril, making the republic foreign to itself in forcing it to become absolutist, at least in relation to its territories outside of the constitution. In this sense "the meaning of the nation itself is both questioned and redefined through the outward reach of empire."[50] The practice of expansion was under the Turner thesis necessary to the creation of the US and its distinct character but also operated as a threat in harbouring the potential to transform the US domestic polity either by changing the racial and ethnic character of the population or by damaging the institutions of the republic and engendering authoritarian tendencies in the government.

At the turn of the century, then, the US was faced with the dilemma of reconciling its republican identity with the reality of colonial possessions and ongoing foreign engagements. Indeed from 1798-1900, only in 14 of those years did the US not have some engagement on foreign soil.[51] Clearly the desire to stand apart from the world was as yet unfulfilled. In the half century that followed, the Foreign Policy debate (at the elite level) oscillated between isolationist and missionary tendencies, with the latter frequently associated with presidents and the former with Congress. Even still, some discrepancies emerged which reveal some aspects of the normative frame guiding such debates. While the first twenty years of the century were viewed as a period of isolationism in ascendancy culminating in the refusal to ratify the Versailles Treaty and take up membership of the League of Nations in 1919, between

[50] Ibid. p.12, for the foregoing discussion see ibid. pp.1-12
[51] See Richard F Grimmett *Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2001* Congressional Research Service: Report for Congress, February 5th, 2002 *passim*

1898 and 1920, US marines invaded Caribbean countries no fewer than twenty times.[52] The reason for such profligate use of force was, however, couched in moral paternalism, best captured in Theodore Roosevelt's corollary to the Monroe Doctrine:

> "Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilised society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilised nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power."[53]

Thus US engagement abroad was always a response to external circumstances forcing it to act in the name of universal ideals. The debates on isolationism versus engagement largely, on the other hand, focused on engagement in European affairs. This dichotomy was apparent in the US attitude to the First World War and even in President Wilson himself. Indeed, the process of finally entering the War is indicative of the kind of moral frame that needed to come into place as a condition of bringing about a change of policy. From the beginning of the war Wilson justified both his own country's neutrality and his post war plans for collective peace on the basis of adhering to the best of American political traditions and ideals. He also firmly believed in historical progress toward a liberal, democratic endpoint. In order to shift from neutrality to active involvement on one side, the conflict would have to be construed as one of defending the ideals outlined above, such a shift only became apparent in Presidential discourse in 1917. In explaining his decision to break diplomatic relations with Germany after Germany had sunk three American merchant ships he argued in April 1917 that:

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[52] Joan Hoff *A Faustian Foreign Policy: From Woodrow Wilson to George W Bush Dreams of Perfectibility* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2008 p.34
[53] Ibid p.34

> "A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations...No autocratic government could be trusted to keep faith with or observe its covenants"[54]

However, the isolationist argument returned to ascendancy in the aftermath of the First World War, helped in no small part by the economic crisis of 1929 and the ensuing Great Depression. Only an external shock would swing the balance back in favour of engagement as occurred in 1941 with the attacks on Pearl Harbour. The justification of the US involvement in the Second World War is echoed in much of the public discourse in the aftermath of 9/11. The 9/11 attacks were, after all, the first attack by a foreign power since Pearl Harbour on American soil, and arguably the first attacks on the US mainland since the British burnt down the Capitol in 1812. However, it is argued here that it is more relevant to look at the Cold War and post-Cold War periods to examine the role of identity, intervention and engagement in US Foreign Policy in this era as the discursive construction of the other plays a similarly prominent role in making certain courses of action intelligible and thereby possible.

The Cold War

From the overview above, we can see there are distinguishable threads in the making of US Foreign Policy, or rather in the discursive web that tends to explain or contextualise individual Foreign Policy acts. It is argued here that US policy in this regard is generally couched in exceptionalist terms but tends towards either a missionary zeal to engage in the outside world and improve it or in an isolationist inward looking approach that, while acknowledging the universal appeal of the USA and what it stands for, attempts to withdraw from the world for fear that the US might become sullied by contact with the old politics. The former can be seen in the US

[54] Woodrow Wilson as quoted in Lloyd E. Ambrosius *Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition: The Treaty fight in perspective* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987

involvement in the Russian Civil War (however unsuccessfully) while the latter is apparent in the interwar debates on Neutrality including the successive neutrality acts passed in the 1930's.[55] The swings from one to the other generally involved some form of exogenous shock, whether it was a stock market crash or the attacks on Pearl Harbour. The post-war dispensation is interesting in that in this case the shock is less obviously apparent; at the end of WWII the USA emerged as the sole nuclear power, with an economy and military largely unscathed (at least compared with their European counterparts, foes and allies alike) – it is interesting then to ask why Foreign Policy quickly descended to one of fear and paranoia in a period of such apparent opportunity. This section will begin with a discussion of the early Cold War to highlight the understandings that were guiding policymakers in their decision making. It will then look at a number of cases that highlight the insecurity that guided policy in the era with specific reference to the forms of identity that were performed and (re)enforced through the practice of the Cold War

One of the reasons for this pervasive sense of insecurity or at least one of the conditions of its possibility, was rapid demobilisation after the war. This in itself was not unusual; the US prior to WWII maintained a relatively small army and arsenal with peaks in recruitment and production during times of war. In 1845, prior to the Mexican war, the army stood at 9,000 men, in 1904 this had only increased to 53,000 before peaking in WWI and levelling off again afterwards to 139,000 on the eve of WWII.[56] During the war mobilisation peaked with 15 million men called up, with slightly over 10% rejected on neuro-psychiatric grounds, and the pattern appeared to be returning to normal with a rapid period of demobilisation from 1945-47 reducing

[55] See for discussion John C. Donovan "Congressional Isolationists and the Roosevelt Foreign Policy" in *World Politics* Vol 3. No. 3, April 1951 pp. 299-316; David S Foglesong *America's Secret War against Bolshevism: U.S. Intervention in the Russian Civil War* The University of North Carolina Press, 2001

[56] Sidney Lens *The Military-Industrial Complex* Pilgrim Press, Philadelphia 1972, p.13

force numbers to 1.5million. Still considerably larger than the military had been prior to the war but even so the military leadership was sufficiently worried to warn President Truman that in the event of war with the Soviet Union only Britain could be defended.[57] In the context of a breakdown of the Allies relationship in the aftermath of WWII such a weak standing was unacceptable to the Joint Chiefs and with a shift, or at least a sharpening, in the perception of the Soviet Union political opinion followed suit. A key to this shift was the 'Long Telegram' sent by George Kennan, then a diplomat in Moscow, which was also published anonymously in *Foreign Affairs* in 1947. The language of the document and of the subsequent NSC 68 which outlined the principles of what came to be known as the Truman Doctrine are key examples of the discursive shift that was occurring at elite levels at this time. For example, NSC 68 argued that the nature of the conflict was to be found in the fundamental conflict between freedom and slavery:

> "The Kremlin regards the United States as the only major threat to the conflict between the idea of slavery under the grim oligarchy of the Kremlin, which has come to a crisis with the polarization of power described in Section I, and the exclusive possession of atomic weapons by the two protagonists. The idea of freedom, moreover, is peculiarly and intolerably subversive of the idea of slavery. But the converse is not true. The implacable purpose of the slave state to eliminate the challenge of freedom has placed the two great powers at opposite poles. It is this fact which gives the present polarization of power the quality of crisis."[58]

Coupled with the consolidation of a powerful military bureaucracy at the Pentagon, new institutions such as the National Security Council, and a permanent and substantial armaments industry, the United States entered into the Cold War.

The NSC 68 is particularly revealing given that at the time of its drafting it was classified. As noted by Campbell among others, the language of the document is

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[57] Christopher Coker *Reflections on US Foreign Policy since 1945* Pinter Publishers, London, 1989 p.37

[58] *NSC 68*, 14/04/1950, available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-68.htm accessed 30/10/08

remarkable given the extent to which it reflects the language of public diplomacy at the time.[59] Written in 1950, its analysis of the world situation and the US role in it is revealing. First the new pervasive sense of insecurity is explained:

> "On the one hand, the people of the world yearn for relief from the anxiety arising from the risk of atomic war. On the other hand, any substantial further extension of the area under the domination of the Kremlin would raise the possibility that no coalition adequate to confront the Kremlin with greater strength could be assembled. It is in this context that this Republic and its citizens in the ascendancy of their strength stand in their deepest peril"[60]

It goes on to outline the nature of the Soviet Union and the United States and the goals of each in the new post-WWII world:

> "The fundamental purpose of the United States ...Our determination to maintain the essential elements of individual freedom, as set forth in the Constitution and Bill of Rights; our determination to create conditions under which our free and democratic system can live and prosper; and our determination to fight if necessary to defend our way of life, for which as in the Declaration of Independence, "with a firm reliance on the protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our lives, our Fortunes, and our sacred Honor.""[61]
> "The fundamental design of those who control the Soviet Union and the international communist movement is to retain and solidify their absolute power... the complete subversion or forcible destruction of the machinery of government and structure of society in the countries of the non-Soviet world and their replacement by an apparatus and structure subservient to and controlled from the Kremlin... The United States, as the principal center of power in the non-Soviet world and the bulwark of opposition to Soviet expansion, is the principal enemy whose integrity and vitality must be subverted or destroyed by one means or another if the Kremlin is to achieve its fundamental design."[62]

Of particular significance is the clear moral distinction between the Soviets and the United States. The nature of the conflict is distinguished from traditional conflicts of power and instead modelled as a clash of civilisations, of conflicting, but not equal, ideologies. One, communism, equated with slavery; the other with freedom and human dignity, these being the predicates associated with the Soviet Union and

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[59] David Campbell 1992, op cit. p.23-25
[60] National Security Council *NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security* 14/04/1950 available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-68.htm accessed 31/07/08
[61] Ibid
[62] Ibid

United States respectively. The conclusions then are not surprising in that they call for strengthening both the material and moral resources of the Free World with the US at the helm.[63] The moral aspect to the conflict was based on a basic idea about the nature of the United States that echoes with the account of exceptionalism, as Truman recounts when asked what Foreign Policy achievement he would most like to be remembered for:

> "We completely defeated our enemies [the Axis powers] and made them surrender...and then we helped them to recover, to become democratic, and to rejoin the community of nations. Only America could have done that"[64]

The above statement is a prime example of interpellation, the use of the term 'we' inviting the reader to view the world from the perspective of the US and further constructing 'America' in a manner that makes the US unique (only), strong (we completely defeated') and magnanimous (helped them to recover, to become democratic, and to rejoin the community of nations). The framing of the Cold War in such fundamental and identity oriented terms was to continue throughout the period that followed but, as significant as the rhetorical framing was, the institutionalisation of military strength that coincided with (and played no small part in) the outbreak of the Cold War. As mentioned above, prior to the Cold War the US at peacetime maintained a relatively small arsenal and standing army. After WWII this pattern appeared to be repeating itself with rapid demobilisation. Calls from the military establishment coupled with suspicions over Soviet intentions led to a reversal of this trend and the establishment on a permanent footing of several institutions. In 1947, the National Security Act created the National Security Council, a Secretary for Defense, a National Military Establishment, the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Resources Board. In other words a national security bureaucracy

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[63] Ibid, see conclusion and recommendations
[64] Harry S Truman as quoted in Henry Kissenger *Diplomacy* Simon & Schuster, New York 1994 p.425

emerged on a permanent footing to coordinate foreign and security policy with clear links to the military and to industy.[65] Although the NSC has varied in character and importance over the years, the creation of institutional apparatus to link industry, security and Foreign Policy, albeit not without precedent[66], was a significant development and posed challenges for how the US would reconcile this footing with its own self-image. As President Eisenhower warned in his final address to the nation:

> "Until the latest of our world conflicts, the United States had no armaments industry. American makers of plowshares could, with time and as required, make swords as well. But now we can no longer risk emergency improvisation of national defense; we have been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions. Added to this, three and a half million men and women are directly engaged in the defense establishment. We annually spend on military security more than the net income of all United States corporations.
> This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence -- economic, political, even spiritual -- is felt in every city, every State house, every office of the Federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society.
>
> In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.
> We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together."[67]

The challenge throughout the Cold War would be for the US, in its own terms, to maintain itself as the city upon the hill, the exemplar state but also to actively contain and where possible roll back advances of its enemy – Soviet Communism. In the

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[65] See Office of the Historian *History of the National Security Council 1947-1997* Bureau of Public Affairs, US Department of State, August 1997 available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/NSChistory.htm accessed 10/07/2006

[66] See Albert A Blum "Roosevelt, the M-Day Plans, and the Military Industrial Complex" in *Military Affairs* Vol 36, No. 2 (April, 1972), pp. 44-46

[67] President Eisenhower "Farewell Address to the Nation" January 17th, 1961 available at http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/ike.htm accessed 31/07/2008

period that followed the discourse of Cold War conflict would continue to present the conflict in Manichean terms between liberty and light on the one hand and authoritarianism and slavery on the other. As Eisenhower's successor put it:

> "We dare not forget today that we are the heirs of that first revolution. Let the word go forth from this time and place, to friend and foe alike, that the torch has been passed to a new generation of Americans -- born in this century, tempered by war, disciplined by a hard and bitter peace, proud of our ancient heritage, and unwilling to witness or permit the slow undoing of those human rights to which this nation has always been committed, and to which we are committed today at home and around the world.
> Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, to assure the survival and the success of liberty."[68]

Using such a simple model of the world was to provide several difficult chapters in the history of US Foreign Policy. After the relative successes of the Korean War, the Berlin Blockade, and elsewhere the US in the 1960's had appeared to come through the early Cold War largely successfully. One of the first signs of trouble came in President Kennedy's first year in power. Under Fidel Castro, Cuban revolutionaries had overthrown the Batista regime in January 1960. Castro himself is an interesting case as his Communist credentials were not entirely clear. However, as the then head of the Caribbean desk in the State Department, William Wieland, put it:

> "Fidel Castro is surrounded by commies. I don't know whether he himself is a communist...[But] I am certain he is subject to communist influences"[69]

In other words even the suspicion of communist connections was enough to render the new regime suspect. Furthermore, linking the Castro threat with the broader Cold War effectively enlarged the nature of the threat beyond a regional dispute into a prime battlefield in the global struggle against Communism. Plans for a counter-revolution were already under-way under the outgoing Eisenhower administration and the presidential campaign in 1960 had made the future of Cuba an area of contention

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[68] President Kennedy "Inaugral Address" 20/01/1960 available at http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/jfkinaugural.htm, accessed 31/07/2008
[69] As Quoted in Smith 2000, op. cit., p166

between the candidates, Kennedy and Nixon. On assuming office Kennedy was briefed on the existing plans for a US trained Cuban force to return to Cuba and seize power and was assured of the certainty of success by the CIA. The subsequent failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion had two major effects. One, it decidedly pushed Castro into the Soviet bloc giving the Soviets a much desired foothold in the Western Hemisphere and two, the failure ran counter to the prevailing narrative of the Cold War from an American perspective – for, arguably the first time, it appeared success was not assured.

In the year that followed, the Soviets used their new ally to begin locating missiles on the island of Cuba. After the failure of the Bay of Pigs, Kennedy felt that he must respond decisively, not least because the issue had electoral significance in the 1962 mid-term elections. However divisions existed within his cabinet over how best to respond. On the one hand the Joint Chiefs, Rusk, Nitze, McCone and Acheson supported air-strikes against the installations while McNamara, Sorensen and Robert Kennedy came to the conclusion that a blockade was the answer. The President ultimately decided on the latter.[70] However it was largely the same set of advisers that would, with Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, take the US into the conflict that would shake the notion of American Exceptionalism to the very core – Vietnam.

The process of entering the conflict in Vietnam was a prolonged one; it began under the Kennedy administration with the dispatch of American military advisors to support and train South Vietnamese forces that were fighting in the civil war that followed the French withdrawal from this part of South East Asia. Arguably, US involvement dates back to similar support for the French under Eisenhower in the 1950's. Either way the course of US involvement was set when President Johnson

[70] See Graham Allison "Conceptual Models and the Cuban missile crisis" in *The American Political Science Review*Vol 63, No. 3, (September 1969) pp689-718

came to office in 1963. The aim of US involvement was to be found in the logic of containment. To prevent the spread of Communism in South East Asia particularly after the stalemate in North Korea and the fall of Nationalist China.[71] The problem is that the escalation of American involvement at no point seemed to bring the ultimate goal of helping the Vietnamese to save themselves from Communism any closer. As then Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, pointed out to President Johnson as he chose to 'Americanise' the war:

> "In essence, we find ourselves – for the point of view of the important war (for the complicity of the people) – no better, and if anything worse off. This important war must be fought and won by the Vietnamese themselves. We have known this from the beginning. But the discouraging truth is that, as was the case in 1961 and 1963 and 1965, we have not found the formula, the catalyst, for training and inspiring them into effective action"[72]

Just as Zizek pointed out in relation to the Iraq war, the assumption was that at heart the Vietnamese were American, that that was their true desire.[73] The reality was that a significant number of the Vietnamese were willing to choose a different path and to fight in order to protect that right of choice. The decade that followed marked a nadir in both American self-confidence and for those making the case for American exceptionalism. Domestic events hardly helped matters with the assassinations of Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther King, Watergate and the first oil crisis emphasising the precariousness of the American dream. It wouldn't be until a retired actor and former Governor of California returned to the Oval office that the missionary aspect of US Foreign Policy would be fully reignited.

By the end of the 1970's in the aftermath of two oil crises, the Watergate scandal, the evacuation of the embassy in Saigon, and the Iran-hostage crisis a sense

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[71] See James C Thompson "How could Vietnam happen? An Autopsy" in *The Atlantic Monthly* April, 1968

[72] As quoted in Larry Berman *Lyndon Johnson's War: The road to stalemate in Vietnam* WW Norton & Company, New York, 1989

[73] As discussed by Zizek, 2003, op.cit.

of decline had entered the public psyche.[74] This sense of decline is perhaps best captured in Carter's inauguration speech where he said:

> "We have learned that more is not necessarily better, that even our great nation has its recognized limits, and that we can neither answer all questions nor solve all problems."[75]

In 1979 President Carter warned that the greatest threat to the US position in the world was not external but rather the crisis of confidence in their own government.[76] The problem for Carter was that he was unable to separate himself from this crisis in confidence and lost the subsequent election to the Republican candidate Ronald Reagan. Reagan's presidency is significant to the argument of this thesis for two main reasons – the rhetoric used by the President is mirrored both consciously and unconsciously by the current administration and it is under Reagan that the term 'War on Terror' was first used in US Foreign Policy discourse. Before turning to discuss Reagan's 'War on Terror', his role in the latter stages of the Cold War is worth discussing, particularly the transformation of the identities ascribed to the Soviet Union over the period of his presidency.

> "The years ahead will be great ones for our country, for the cause of freedom and the spread of civilization. The West will not contain Communism; it will transcend Communism. We will not bother to denounce it, we'll dismiss it as a sad, bizarre chapter in human history whose last pages are even now being written."[77]

> "Let us beware that while they [Soviet rulers] preach the supremacy of the state, declare its omnipotence over individual man, and predict its eventual domination over all the peoples of the earth, they are the focus of evil in the modern world.... I urge you to beware the temptation ..., to ignore the facts of history and the aggressive impulses of any evil empire, to simply call the arms

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[74] See for example RW Tucker "American Decline: The Foreign Policy of 'Maturity'" *Foreign Affairs* Vol 58 No 3., 1979

[75] Jimmy Carter "Inaugural Address" 20/01/1977 available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/carter.asp accessed 21/10/08 Arguably this period in American history is the strongest case for a moment of crisis where a different discursive understanding of the US role in the world came close to being adopted by US officials.

[76] See Coker op. cit., 1989 p131

[77] Ronald Reagan,1981, as quoted in J Salmon "The US Military Build-up 1980-85: What the one trillion dollars purchased" in *Defense and Peace Economics* Vol 8 Iss, 1, 1997

race a giant misunderstanding and thereby remove yourself from the struggle between right and wrong, good and evil." 1983[78]

The two quotes above are representative of the public position taken by Reagan on the Soviet Union and echoed with the earlier representations of the nature of the struggle dating back at least to the Truman administration if not beyond. Indeed Reagan, who had made his name as an articulate advocate for conservatism and anti-communism in the 1960's[79], was feared by many to be too much of a hardliner to be trusted with managing US Soviet relations. However 1984 saw a marked softening in tone by the Reagan administration, one that arguably reflected the reality of the administration's approach to relations with the Soviet Union which could hitherto be described as a process of cautious engagement frustrated only by the mortality of successive Soviet leaders. Brezhnev died in office in 1982, his successor Yuri Andropov died in 1984, whose successor Constantin Chernenko only managed to survive a matter of months in office, dying in 1985.[80] Reagan, speaking in a campaign speech, imagined a conversation between two couples, Ivan and Anya and Jim and Sally, one Russian one American. He suggested that the discussion would quickly turn to day-to-day things – children, work, the weather. Underlying this folksy approach was a serious point though, that ordinary Soviet and American citizens shared common concerns. Importantly though in practice, the administration maintained the idea that this commonality could only be achieved when the Soviets abandoned communism completely and brought freedom to the people both of the Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe, as memorably captured by the President when in West Berlin he

[78] Ronald Reagan, 1983, as quoted in *USA Today* 06/06/2004 available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2004-06-06-reagan-quotes_x.htm accessed 20/10/08
[79] Stephen Graubard *The Presidents* Penguin, New York, 20042005, op. cit. P550-1
[80] Reagan is reported as complaining "How am I supposed to get anywhere with the Russians…if they keep dying on me?" As quoted in PBS "Reagan: Transitions" available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/presidents/video/reagan_21.html#v149 accessed 20/10/08

called on Mr Gorbachev to "tear down this wall."[81] The early years of the Reagan administration can be read as reinstating the early Cold War discourse of a battle between good and evil that had taken a battering in the 1960's and 1970's. The later softening of tone created space for the possibility of change in the relationship between the two superpowers albeit one that still was derived from the moral superiority, as the US would have it, of the Western Capitalist system, reflecting in many ways the assumption of the universality of the appeal of the American way of life. Thus although rhetorically the tone was softened the underlying message remained that Communism be consigned to the ash-heap of history.

With the collapse of communism across Eastern Europe in 1989 and the subsequent demise of the Soviet Union, the 41st President of the United States was able to express the hope that the world would fundamentally change:

> " Out of these troubled times ... a new world can emerge, a new era, freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of peace...A world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle. A world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice. A world where the strong respect the rights of the weak."[82]

During the Bush administration three military campaigns were undertaken - one explicitly to enforce the 'New World Order' (NWO) he called for in the above speech at the UN, another to overthrow a regime in the context of the President's 'War on Drugs'[83] and the third, ostensibly, to defend basic human rights, namely the right to life. These three interventions in Iraq/Kuwait, Panama and Somalia respectively met with differing degrees of success. The war against Iraq was successful in its aims to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwaiti territory but democratisation or even regime change

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[81] Ronald Reagan "Remarks at the Brandenburg Gate" 12/06/1987, available at http://www.reaganlibrary.com/reagan/speeches/wall.asp accessed 30/10/08

[82] George HW Bush as quoted in Simon Chesterman *Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law* Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001 p121

[83] See Harry L Marsh "Law enforcement, the military and the War on Drugs: Is the military involvement in the war on drugs ethical?" in *American Journal of Police* Vol 10, No 2, 1991

did not follow in its wake. Likewise in Panama, General Noriega was successfully removed from power and sent for trial in the US but what emerged in Panama could hardly be held up as an example of the NWO, while the Somali intervention happened so late in the President's single-term that the consequences of it only became apparent afterwards.[84] However despite these setbacks to the creation of a 'New World Order', President Bush called on the United States and his successor to continue the US's role of leadership in the world, invoking the same imagery of the American self as his predecessors:

> "the fires of World War II cooled into a longer cold war, one that froze the world into two opposing camps. On the one side, America and its allies and on the other, the forces of freedom thus against an alien ideology that cast its shadow over every American...History's lesson is clear. When a war-weary America withdrew from the international stage following World War I, the world spawned militarism, Fascism and aggression unchecked, plunging mankind into another devastating conflict. But in answering the call to lead after World War II, we built from the principles of democracy and the rule of law a new community of free nations, a community whose strength, perseverance, patience and unity of purpose contained Soviet totalitarianism and kept the peace...But let's be clear. The alternative to American leadership is not more security for our citizens but less. Not the flourishing of American principles but their isolation in a world actively held hostile to them"[85]

Similarly, President Bush's successor in the White House, Bill Clinton, emphasised the importance both of encouraging the spread of democracy and American leadership albeit in a more modest manner:

> "During the Cold War, we spent trillions to protect freedom where it was threatened. In this post-Cold War era, the West can spend a fraction of that amount to nurture democracy where it never before existed. America's challenge in this era is not to bear every burden, but to tip the balance"[86]

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[84] See John R. Bolton "Wrong turn in Somalia" in *Foreign Affairs* Jan/Fed 1994; for a different view see Chester A Crocker "The Lessons of Somalia: Not everything went wrong" in *Foreign Affairs* May/June 1995

[85] President George H.W. Bush "Address at Texas A&M", 16/12/1992 As quoted in *New York Times* available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E0CE2D6103AF935A25751C1A964958260 accessed 24/06/08

[86] President William Jefferson Clinton as quoted in Kathryn M. Olson "Democratic Enlargement's Value Hierarchy and Rhetorical Forms: An analysis of Clinton's use of a Post-Cold War Symbolic Frame to Justify Military Interventions" in *Presidential Studies Quarterly* Vol 34, No. 2, June 2004 p 311-312

Both President Clinton and Bush struggled with what the latter termed 'the vision thing.' As Campbell and others have noted, the practice of Foreign Policy stabilised the American sense of self by contrasting it with an 'other'. Even internal opponents could be 'alienated' in this way, as in the McCarthy era when union membership or homosexuality were used as signifiers of difference and 'Un-American.'[87] The problem was that in a post Cold War era, the Soviet Union no longer existed and no other menace had come to take its place. Where previously Communists, Japanese Imperialists or even Native Americans could be used as lynch pins to secure American identity through policy practice, no obvious contender stood out. As Walter Russell Mead noted in relation Bush's Foreign Policy:

> "The US government seems lost without something to contain. Souvenir hunters had barely dismantled the Berlin Wall when the United States found a new and deadlier menace than Communism: instability. At a time of diminishing national resources and power the US has not lowered its Foreign Policy horizons, it has universalised them"[88]

Clinton for his part enhanced this focus to justify his major military involvements in Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo. As Edwards notes, Clinton in his inaugural address highlighted the complex of problems the US faced:

> "Ancient hatreds and new plagues...bloody ethnic, religious and civil wars...weapons of mass destruction...hunger and disease...malignant neglect of the global environment...and terrorism"[89]

The problem was that such a complicated vision of the insecurity facing the US failed to create the desired unity of purpose that such missions in the past had done – the good war in WWII, the struggle against Communism in the early Cold War and made noble again under Reagan in the 1980's. Neither Clinton nor George H.W. Bush appeared to be able to articulate a vision to match the US sense of destiny as outlined

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[87] As discussed in Campbell, 1992, op. cit.
[88] As quoted in Olson "Value Hierarchy and Rhetorical Forms" 2004 p334
[89] As quoted in Jason A. Edwards "Defining the enemy in the Post-Cold War World" *International Journal of Communication* 2 (2008) p.835

above.[90] This was the world President George W. Bush emerged into in January 2001 and for the first 8 months of his term in office it seemed that he would continue to struggle with 'the vision thing.' However before turning to those first 8 months, the next section deals with the issue of terrorism in the latter part of the twentieth century. Particularly the first 'War on Terror' under Reagan, when the term was coined, and its continuation in fits and starts under Clinton in the 1990's.

The first wars on terror

Unlike many of its Western counterparts, domestic terrorism rarely played more than a bit part in the history of the United States. Although some small groups such as the 'Weathermen' who have returned to prominence in the most recent Presidential election campaign did use terrorism in campaigns such as the anti-Vietnam protests of the 1960's, the US has to date not been subjected to a systematic and sustained terrorist campaign in the manner of the IRA campaign from the early 1970s to the mid 1990's or the Bader Meinhof gang in Germany in the 1970's. Rather concern with international terrorism was mainly focussed on threats to US citizens abroad rather than on the domestic front and it is in this context that the first 'War on Terror' emerged. In the 1970's most international terrorist events were what might be termed 'events of duration', that would involve hostage taking followed by the issuing of demands often related to a specific political cause. In the 1980's, international terrorist events switched to 'conclusive events' such as bombing passenger airlines and often reflected the interests of state sponsors particularly, from a US perspective, Iran and Libya. In the 1990's a further shift occurred as previously obscure groups with in some cases even more obscure motives engaged in acts of terrorism that

[90] There was for example a plethora of literature dealing with notions of decline and even ennui in the post-cold war world. See for example Francis Fukuyama *The End of History and the Last Man* Free Press, New York 1992; Paul Kennedy *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* Vintage, London 1989

exceeded the scale and ambition of their earlier antecedents.[91] It was in this context of the transformation of international terrorism from 'Old' to 'New' terrorism that the practice arose of responding to terrorist attacks with military means.[92]

Confronted by a series of attacks on American and other Western targets, the Reagan administration became increasingly concerned with Libyan sponsorship of terrorism. When in April 1986 a bomb was detonated in a German disco killing two American soldiers and a Turkish woman and wounding another 229 people the administration decided that a response was necessary.[93] President Reagan argued, in a statement signing into law the 'Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act 1986' that the nation "must remain resolute in our commitment to confront this criminal behaviour [terrorism] in every way...when necessary, militarily."[94] The response to the attacks took the form of 'Operation El Dorado Canyon', an air strike against five targets in Libya. In arguing for the attacks President Reagan stated:

> "For us to ignore, by inaction, the slaughter of American civilians and American soldiers, whether in night clubs or airline terminals, is simply not in the American tradition. When our citizens are abused or attacked, anywhere in the world, on the direct orders of a hostile regime – we will respond ...I warned that there should be no place on Earth where terrorists can rest and train and practice their deadly skills"[95]

The rhetoric of Reagan was echoed later in President Bush's address to congress in September 2001. Both men emphasised the role of state sponsors or collaborators, the innocence of the victims and the importance of defending the American self against

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[91] See Roger Medd & Frank Goldstein "International Terrorism on the Eve of a New Millennium" in *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* Vol 20 No. 3, 1997 p282-285 for discussion

[92] See Morgan, Matthew J. 2004. 'The Origins of the New Terrorism.' *Parameters* 34(1)., although the concept can be challenged it is very much the account of 'New' terrorism and the new terrorist that informs much of the practice of the later 'War on Terror' regardless of the accuracy of its account of the differences between older and more recent terrorist groupings and events.

[93] Mark E. Kosnik "The military response to Terrorism" in *Naval War College Review* Vol LIII, No. 2 p.3

[94] 'Statement on signing the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986" 27/08/1986 available online at http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1986/082786a.htm accessed 06/06/08

[95] Ronald Reagan as quoted in David C. Willis *The First War on Terrorism* Rowman & Littlefield, 2003 Pennsylvania, p.4

these external enemies. The effectiveness of Reagan's military response is more questionable particularly in relation to collateral damage which included the French embassy in Beirut and a significant number of civilians.[96] As a result the military response to terrorist attacks took the back seat for a time. For example, despite clear suspicions of Libyan involvement in the Lockerbie bombing, President Bush did not use military strikes to force Libya to hand over the suspects involved. Furthermore when President Reagan spoke in detail of the terrorist attacks he rarely did so using the same Manichean concepts adopted later by Bush. International Terrorism remained, for the President and the US, a minor security concern.[97] The concept of a 'War on terror' remained a live issue for the administration that followed.

Within three weeks of his inauguration, President Clinton was faced with the largest international terrorist attack until then on American soil. As Badey has noted:

> "The explosion at the World Trade Center left behind more than just a 100-ft by 100-ft crater and 110 floors of smoke-filled rooms in the North Tower.2 Killing six and injuring 1,000 people, it provided the Clinton administration with a new enemy."[98]

We've already briefly discussed the problem of facing an ill-defined external threat that dogged both the Clinton and GHW Bush administrations, but despite this the newly inaugurated Clinton did not separate out 'terrorism' as the single guiding focus of his administration but rather saw it as part of the nexus of 'chaos' that characterised the Post-Cold War world for his advisers. The response to the first World Trade Center attacks was one of law enforcement rather than war. But with further attacks in Oklahoma in 1995, this time by domestic terrorists and in 1998 in Kenya and

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[96] See Kosnik "The Military Response" 2000, although he does go on to argue that the long term effects were more satisfactory in that they demonstrated the relative weakness of Col. Qaddafi and deterred him from taking further action.

[97] For example see President Reagan's speech in 1983 in response to the bombing of the US military base in Lebanon. 27/10/83 available at http://www.beirut-memorial.org/history/reagan.html accessed 20/06/08

[98] Thomas J. Badey "US Anti-terrorism policy: The Clinton Administration" in *Contemporary Security Policy* Vol 19 No 2 1998, p51

Tanzania by terrorists linked to Osama Bin Laden the pressure to take more decisive action mounted. In response to the latter attacks, President Clinton ordered missile strikes in Sudan and Afghanistan targeting what were believed to be Al Qaeda linked chemical sites and training camps respectively. However, neither strike achieved its objective. The Sudanese plant appeared to be innocent of any connection to the Al Qaeda organisation and the bombing of Afghanistan proved futile. In terms of the importance of terrorism in the scheme of the administration's plans, the attacks and their aftermath proved that it was far down the list of Presidential priorities. The administration was concerned with the ongoing conflicts in the Balkans and political discourse in the US was concerned with the President's domestic tribulations with the Republican congress.[99] The wars on terrorism in the 1980's and 1990's proved to be little more than sideshows to broader US foreign policies in both eras, significantly in neither case was terrorism cast as an apocalyptic threat to the US, rather terrorist incidents were viewed both discursively and institutionally as isolated and relatively minor events.[100]

Conclusion – 11th September 2001

It was in this climate that President George W. Bush was elected and from the first 8 months of his administration there was little evidence that terrorism would be in focus or indeed that the new President would be any more successful in solving the conundrum of America's role in a Post-Cold War World. Despite further Al-Qaeda attacks, this time in Yemen against the USS Cole in October 2000, international terrorism did not feature in the President's inaugural address, instead his brief

[99] See *The 9/11 Commission Report* op. cit. Chapter 4.

[100] For example in *Imperial Hubris* the author notes that even though Bin Laden had declared war on the US in 1996 and had orchestrated the attacks on the USS Cole in 2000, no plans were in place to respond to an attack on the US mainland as occurred on 9/11. See Anonymous *Imperial Hubris: Why the West is losing the War on Terror* Brasseys, Washington D.C., 2004 p.24

mention of Foreign Policy mentioned world leadership, WMD threats and defence spending:

> "We will build our defenses beyond challenge, lest weakness invite challenge. We will confront weapons of mass destruction, so that a new century is spared new horrors. The enemies of liberty and our country should make no mistake: America remains engaged in the world by history and by choice, shaping a balance of power that favors freedom. We will defend our allies and our interests. We will show purpose without arrogance. We will meet aggression and bad faith with resolve and strength. And to all nations, we will speak for the values that gave our nation birth."[101]

The first eight months of the Bush administration were marked by a continuation of Clinton's policies in relation to defence spending and Iraq but a break from the policies of his predecessor in relation to multilateralism, signalling the withdrawal of US support for the Kyoto protocol in March and instructing his officials to oppose the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the International Criminal Court and Biological Weapons Convention.[102] As Daalder and Lindsay note:

> "In putting his mark on his administration...Bush failed to push his advisers to tackle...terrorism...and Al Qaeda in particular. He seldom mentioned terrorism publicly during his first months in office. In early May, he announced a new Office of National Preparedness for terrorism...but gave it no new resources. Except on the handful of occasions in which he justified abandoning the ABM Treaty because of the 'terrorist threat that faces us,' he did not mention the subject of terrorism again publicly before September 11th."[103]

On the morning of September 11th 2001, President Bush was engaged on a school visit in Florida to promote reading as part of his campaign to garner support for his 'No Child Left Behind' education plan. For a man who had promised to be the Education President this was a major part of his domestic political programme. At 9:35 local time, his plans and his Presidency were changed irrevocably.

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[101] George W. Bush "Inaugural Address" 20/01/2001, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/inaugural-address.html accessed 21/06/08

[102] Ivo Daalder & James Lindsay *America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy* Wiley, New Jersey, 2003 p64

[103] Ibid. p.73

The question then is how were the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq made possible? In the next two chapters this thesis will describe how the Bush administration discourse on the 'War on Terror' constructed the attacks in terms of a struggle between forces of darkness and evil and forces of good. The model of American exceptionalism explored in this chapter, that located an American 'self' by separating itself and contrasting itself with an atavistic and savage 'other', features prominently in the post 9/11 discourse. The linking of exceptionalism and insecurity creates a powerful template for legitimating action in US political discourse.

Chapter 6 – Securitizing Terror

Introduction

Having discussed in the previous chapter the role that the interplay between Foreign Policy and national identity has played in US history, this chapter sets out to explore the initial response to the 9/11 attacks. It charts the construction of the attacks from the initial appeal to law enforcement to the gradual assertion of the military nature of the events up to and including the military campaign in Afghanistan. It will look at the securitization of terrorism in a manner that made possible the intervention in Afghanistan through a discourse which constructed the American 'Self' and Terrorist 'Other' in a particular way. The focus will be in part upon the role this construction of radically opposed identities by the Bush administration had in making a military response appear to be the appropriate and legitimate response to the 9/11 attacks. That is the view that the conflict was fundamentally a conflict between starkly contrasting opponents – 'us' representing liberty, freedom and good versus 'them' representing tyranny, oppression, violence and evil. The term 'Manichean' is used to denote this construction in the text although some have argued that such an epithet is a disservice to the Manicheans.[1] Essentially though the argument presented here is premised on the idea that by constructing the enemy in the 'War on Terror' in such stark terms it created the conditions of possibility for the conflict that followed. A second point that is highlighted here is the construction of a more generalised enemy than those specifically responsible for the 9/11 attacks – a 'War on Terror' rather than a War on Al-Qaeda or Bin Laden. As such the construction of the 'War on Terror' not only

[1] Dan Skinner for example argues that the Manicheans did not believe that good could destroy evil, in fact their dualism was based on the premise that the nature of man was based on a duality of spirit, man needed to be aware of his evil side in order to allow his good side to dominate but not eradicate it. Skinner argues that Bush's eschatological view of the battle between good and evil would be better viewed as a form of Zorastrianism. See Dan Skinner "Calling Bush's views Manichean is an insult to the Manicheans" 27/09/04 available at http://hnn.us/articles/7202.html accessed 27/10/08

made military action in Afghanistan possible but it also created the possibility of extending the target of such action beyond the initial one. The next chapter deals in more detail with the consequences of this extended construction of the terrorist 'Other' for US Foreign Policy.

Two practical issues need to be addressed before continuing to the analysis in this chapter. First, what texts will be selected for analysis and second, how these texts will be analysed. As posited in Chapter 4, securitization moves, when articulated by state forces, operate at the level of collective identities. As a result, it was argued, we need not only analyse securitizing speech acts for their adherence to the 'grammar of security', but to pay attention to how these acts would be successful in defining an issue as a security issue and in convincing an audience to give assent or approval for the proposed course of action. The first set of relevant texts are those authored by the Bush administration. Although securitization theory does not by definition restrict the act of securitizing to the state or its officials, in relation to the security sector the state is the central actor.[2] Furthermore, the Presidency has been recognised as one of the key drivers of Foreign Policy agendas.[3] Finally texts of speeches and other addresses by members of the administration by definition fulfil two of the three criteria suggested by Hansen:

> "they are characterised by the clear articulation of identities and policies; they are widely read and attended to; and they have the formal authority to define a political position"[4]

As not all such documents will be widely read and attended to, the priority in this chapter will be given to key documents in September 2001 where either President Bush or his cabinet members directly addressed the American people through the

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[2] See Buzan et al, op cit, 1998 p.40

[3] See for discussion Daalder, Ivo & James Lindsay *America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy* Wiley, New Jersey, 2003

[4] Hansen, op. cit., 2006, p. 85; see also p.82-87 for further discussion.

media or where their responses to questions were broadcast and/or widely reported. However, it should be noted that the texts presented here represent only a proportion of the total texts analysed.[5] The restriction of the time period relates to the timing of both the congressional vote authorising the use of force on September 17th and the actual launching of military action in Afghanistan on October 7th. However, in order to look at the maintenance of the securitization discourse beyond the outbreak of the conflict and particularly the articulation of threat in terms of a generalized threat called 'Terror' later texts are also analysed.

The second relevant set of texts then relates to one of the key audiences for the administration's securitizing move - the United States House of Representatives and the Senate. We could simply point to the successful passing of House and Senate resolutions that authorised the use of force as evidence that the administration's securitizing move had been successful in both defining Afghanistan, or rather terror, as a security threat and gaining support for the course of action proposed as a means of dealing with that threat. However, as we wish to argue that the formulation of identity at the centre of the administration's discourse played an important role in this process we will also examine the congressional debates to see to what extent members of congress adopted or articulated the same kind of identity configuration, in particular do we see evidence of exceptionalism as outlined in the previous chapter in the congressional debates on intervention. We also will argue that these appeals to identity at the level of the national community were key to convincing the American people to give their moral consent to the wars. However, although we can refer to some secondary evidence that ordinary people adopted the same discursive

[5] See the note on sources in the Bibliography

understanding of the conflict as the administration[6], we will have to rely on proxies to measure the response of this audience. In particular, public opinion data will be provided to show broad and growing support for both the securitizing actor and the actions themselves from September to October 2001.[7]

A third set of texts will also be analysed that relate to debates on military planning. Although these arguments are not central to the general question as to how the intervention in Afghanistan was made possible, it will be argued that these debates did play an important role in affecting the type of intervention that took place. Finally, some reference will be made to narrative or historical accounts of the events in hand. It should be noted that explanatory weight is not being placed on the accounts of motivations in these accounts, but they are useful for establishing timelines.

Having discussed the texts that will be used in this chapter, our attention now turns to how these texts were read. The first and second sets of texts were each examined twice. The first analysis looked for evidence of the 'grammar of security'. In the administration texts this focussed on the construction of the terror threat, that it was indeed constructed as an existential threat, the outlined consequences of inaction and the proposed course of action for dealing with the threat in hand. Then the congressional records were examined to see to what extent these constructions were accepted by members of congress in their debates on the authorisation of military force. The second analysis of the texts looked at the articulation of identities in both sets of text, how the collectivity under threat was defined, who the enemy was and how these definitions suggested courses of action and reduced the scope for legitimate dissent. It will be argued in this chapter, based on these analyses, that the Bush administration effectively mobilised the discursive resources of the US security

[6] See for example Holland, op cit, 2009
[7] This limitation is discussed in more detail in the concluding chapter.

imaginary outlined in the previous chapter, largely defined in terms of American exceptionalism, to make possible, that is deemed to be appropriate and legitimate, its decision to engage in military intervention in Afghanistan.

Securitizing 9/11 and Terrorism

On the morning of September 11th, President Bush was in Sarasota, Florida in an elementary school promoting the educational policy that for much of his early presidency was to the fore of his administration. He was informed of the attacks by an aide, and his immediate reaction has been well documented. Once the reading was cut short, President Bush gave a short statement to the gathered press before departing for Washington (albeit via several airbases en route). Although marginal to the overall discourse of the 'War on Terror' that followed the tenor of these early remarks are interesting in themselves:

> "Ladies and gentlemen, this is a difficult moment for America. I, unfortunately, will be going back to Washington after my remarks...Today we've had a national tragedy. Two airplanes have crashed into the World Trade Centre in an apparent terrorist attack on our country. I have spoken to...the director of the FBI, and have ordered that the full resources of the federal government go to help the victims and their families, and to conduct a full-scale investigation to hunt down and to find those folks who committed this act. Terrorism against our nation will not stand...Thank you very much"[8]

The above remarks were made after the second plane had hit the second tower, but before the President had received word that the Pentagon had also been attacked and before either tower had collapsed. Furthermore access to images of the attacks would have been limited for the president and his staff at this stage and as such, the muted tone of the statement may have reflected a lack of information on the President's part

[8] President George W Bush "Remarks after two planes crash into WTC" Emma Booker Elementary School, Sarasota Florida, 09/11/01 available at: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911.html accessed 10/09/09

as much as a possible alternative shape to a response to the attacks. However the direct reference to the FBI and the need for a full-scale investigation do suggest that at the time a different interpretation of the events was possible and under consideration. Therefore at this point, the problem of terrorism was not 'securitized' as such, rather a 'tragedy' had occurred and law-enforcement resources would be mobilised to deal with those responsible. Such a formulation does not meet the requirements of the Copenhagen School's 'grammar of security' as it neither cites an existential threat nor does it seek to mobilise resources or capabilities outside of normal politics. Had this construction of the nature of the events remained in situ a very different response to the 'War on Terror' would have been possible. However as time elapsed from the President's initial statement calling for help for the victims and a full investigation, a stronger narrative of a nation at war began to take prominence in the administration's statements, one that clearly defined the conflict as an exceptional state of threat, that clearly defined who the enemy was and why 'we' were attacked.

By evening a clearer narrative was emerging on the attacks, one that was to remain core to subsequent articulations of the variety of viable and desirable responses:

> "Today, our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist acts."[9]

From being a specific attack on particular targets, the terrorist attacks are reframed as an existential threat to not only US citizens but to America and the idea of America itself. The construction of the attacks builds on the events themselves – 'our fellow citizens' – the attacks are expanded to being a threat to the collective identity defined in terms of a 'way of life' and 'freedom'. The threat is constructed as a generalised

[9] President George W Bush "Address to the Nation" Oval Office, Washington DC 11/09/01 available at: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html accessed 10/09/01

rather than a specific threat and one that requires a large scale response beyond the means of the legal-judicial apparatus. President Bush went on in his address:

> "America was targeted because we're the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world. And no-one will keep that light from shining...Our military is powerful and well prepared...Our first priority is to get help to those who have been injured, and to take every precaution to protect our citizens at home and around the world from further attacks...America and our friends and allies join with all those who want peace and security in the world, and we stand together to win the war against terrorism."[10]

Without directly declaring war or naming those responsible, President Bush made clear that the nature of the response was to be both martial and international. Furthermore the 'enemies' in this new 'War on Terror' were enemies of freedom and liberty, even 'evil' contrasted with the identity of the 'Self' with freedom, liberty and 'good'. Now, obviously all nations at war argue the virtues of their own cause and the vices of the enemy, so it should not be a surprise that the US government framed the 'War on Terror' in a similar fashion. What interests us here is how this articulated discourse was likely to affect the legitimation of the practice of the fight against terrorism. On September 13th in a press conference President Bush again articulated the nature of the struggle in which his administration would now become engaged:

> "My resolve is steady and strong about winning this war that has been declared on America. It is a new kind of war, and this government will adjust. People, who conducted these acts, and those who harbour them, will be held accountable for their actions."[11]

President Bush and other members of the administration were to spend the next few days speaking publicly on whom these people were and how they would be targeted.

In a series of statements that followed 9/11, the shape of the coming conflict was further outlined and the picture of the enemy was clarified. On September 13th,

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[10] Ibid.

[11] President George W. Bush "President Pledges assistance for New York in phone call with Pataki, Giuliani" 13/09/01 available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010913-4.html accessed 10/09/09

Colin Powell appeared on PBS in an interview to outline the nature of the administration's forthcoming response and the attempts to build international cooperation to:

> "conduct a campaign against terrorists who are conducting war against civilized people"[12]

Furthermore he goes on to argue that the American people are facing a "long tough campaign" and not one that is solely focussed on Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda:

> "Osama Bin Laden and his terrorist organisation is not the only terrorist organization out there...we have to see this not just in terms of Osama Bin Laden...there are many others out there responsible for crimes against American citizens and citizens of other nations. So it will be a long campaign against many terrorist organizations and the whole world has to be united in that campaign."[13]

Thus the conflict is not only about defending America from a specific threat, Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda, but is rather framed in much broader terms as a clash between the civilized world, with which the US is firmly identified, and barbarity. This formulation also raises the issue of a third level of audience – the international community – which is outside the scope of this thesis, but given the broad support of the international community for the initial Afghan campaign the securitising move appears to have been successful.[14] The 'interpellation' of this structure by placing the US as the vanguard of civilisation is, as will be demonstrated further in the chapter, key in the limiting effect of this discourse on the possibility of alternative paths in the 'War on Terror'.

On September 15th, echoing the rhetoric of the frontier, President Bush outlined the administration's approach:

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[12] Colin Powell in "a Newshour with Jim Lehrer", PBS, 13/09/2001, transcript available online at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/military/july-dec01/powell_9-13.html accessed 15/09/09

[13] Ibid.

[14] See for example Suzanne Daly "After the attacks: The Alliance; for First time, NATO invokes Joint Defense Pact with US" in *New York Times* 13/09/01 available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/13/us/after-attacks-alliance-for-first-time-nato-invokes-joint-defense-pact-with-us.html accessed 08/09/09

> "We're going to meet and deliberate and discuss – but there's no question about it, this act will not stand; we will find those who did it; we will smoke them out of their holes; we will get them running and we'll bring them to justice"[15]

In the discussion that followed, involving Secretary of State Powell and AG John Ashcroft, the AG announced that the list of 19 suspects has been released and both Powell and President Bush reinforce the distinction between attackers and victims as one between barbarians and civilisation. With variations on the theme mentioned on at least three occasions. More interestingly though, is the emergent shape of the enemy. Secretary Powell emphasises:

> "And what we have to do is not just go after these perpetrators [of 9/11], and those who gave them haven, but the whole curse of terrorism that is upon the face of the earth."[16]

Likewise President Bush emphasises "it's not just one person"[17] and goes on to reiterate the martial theme that had emerged as early as the evening of 9/11. This theme continues through a series of Presidential addresses and 'Q&A' sessions throughout September 2001.[18]

On September 16th, in an interview with ABC, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld elaborated on what was at stake in the coming conflict:

> "by taking the battle to them. The terrorist activity that we experienced...is something that strikes at our way of life – the way of life of a free people...the only thing we can do is what the President said: We have to wage a war, and it has to be taken to them, where they are."[19]

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[15] President GW Bush "President Urges Readiness and Patience" Remarks by the President, Secretary of State Colin Powell and Attorney General John Ashcroft; Office of the Press Secretary, September 15th 2001 available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010915-4.html accessed 10/09/09

[16] Ibid.

[17] Ibid.

[18] See for example President Bush' Radio address to the nation, 15/09/01 available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010915.html ; Remarks on the South Lawn, 16/09/01 available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010916-2.html ; Radio address to the nation, 29/09/01 available at: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010929.html all accessed 10/09/09

[19] Donald Rumsfeld, "Interview for ABC news This Week", 16/09/01, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1886 accessed 08/09/09

The above statement is probably the most succinct statement of the securitizing move in the discourse of the 'War on Terror', a threat is identified – 'the terrorist threat', the stakes are set – 'strikes at our way of life', and a course of action is identified – 'war'. Furthermore the statement 'articulates' in Weldes sense the security problem in a manner consistent with the US 'security imaginary' where the US is identified with freedom – 'our way of life - the way of life of a free people' – that is consistent with the US discourse of exceptionalism. Finally the use of 'our' and 'we' in the final part of the statement hails the reader/viewer to identify with being threatened and therefore with rallying around the response – 'war'. As outlined by Weldes in relation to the Cold War, this form of security discourse helps to facilitate martial responses to external threats that are viewed in terms of an eschatological struggle between a good 'Self' and evil 'Other'.[20] However, a President does not have the power to formally declare war and as such the above examples from the administration can only be seen as securitizing moves as opposed to successful securitizing speech acts. The next section discusses the audience responses within Congress in particular but also at the level of the general public.

Securitizing Succeeds – Audience responses in Congress and the general public

On September 14th Congress passed S.J.Res.23 and H.J.Res.64 "A joint resolution to authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against those responsible for the recent attacks launched against the United States". The resolution passed the senate by 98 votes to 0, and passed in the House of Representatives by 420 votes in favour to 1 against.[21] Therefore it can be argued that the securitizing move by the Bush administration was clearly successful, particularly given that the authorisation was quite wide reaching as it allowed the administration room to define who was

[20] See Weldes, op cit, 1999, p239

[21] See The Library of Congress http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/D?d107:64:./list/bss/d107HJ.lst::lTOM:/bss/107search.html| accessed 11/09/09

responsible and how the armed forces would be used.[22] Such strong support is unsurprising given Congress' initial reaction to the 9/11 attacks. On September 12th members of both houses of Congress had gathered on the steps of the Capitol to express their solidarity with their country and their unity in the face of attacks, including a rendition of 'God bless America'.[23] Mention of war was frequent in quotes from Senators and Representatives and both Bin Laden and the fact that he was suspected to be in Afghanistan were mentioned by Senator Kerry and Senator Hatch respectively.[24]

Similarly the respective debates in both houses tended to reflect a consensus view that the attacks were acts of war and that war was the appropriate response. Significantly though, both Senators and Representatives justified their votes in favour of the authorisation in terms that resonated with the administration's construction of the attack and the broader discourse of exceptionalism.

Senator Hutchison argued:

> "To make sure we keep the freedom we have known... we must act decisively when an act of war has been perpetrated on innocent people in our country...we are going to rid the world of the despots who believe they can prey on innocent citizens against freedom-loving people in the world"[25]

The US is constructed as the protector of freedom and of innocent people. Further the attacks themselves are constructed as being not just on the US but on all 'freedom-loving people in the world.' Then Senator Biden outlined the scope given to the President in terms that lauded the United States constitutional tradition:

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[22] For example the terms of H.J.Res 64 states "IN GENERAL- That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons." Available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c107:H.J.RES.64:, accessed 11/09/09

[23] CNN "Congress vows unity, reprisals for attacks" 12/09/01, available at http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/11/congress.terrorism/index.html accessed 16/09/09

[24] Ibid.

[25] See "A United Response" US Senate, 14/09/01 available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/C?r107:./temp/~r107zWk850 accessed 16/09/09

> "We went to our civic bible, the Constitution, and we said: What does it call for here? What it calls for is the U.S. Congress to meet its constitutional responsibility, to say: Mr President, we authorize you, in the name of the American people, to take action, and we define the action in generic terms which you can take."[26]

Thus the authorisation granted reflected the securitizing move by the administration to make 'Terror' the enemy rather than specific targets such as Bin Laden or even Afghanistan. The terms of the Senate statements continue in this vein and further examples are available in appendix V.

The House of Representatives' statements similarly reverberate with the imagery of an 'evil' 'Other' and noble 'Self' that has been forced into taking action but now that it had been roused would not cease until it had achieved its goals. As the Speaker of the House, Rep Hastert put it:

> "They [the attackers] do not seek our mere defeat. They are intent on our destruction...The demonic horror of these deliberate attacks remains inconceivable...Our enemies' message was stark and inescapable. They will make war on all of us wherever we exist...No creed which revels in the slaughter of innocents can be included in the human community. No cause which aligns itself with evil can be allowed to exist among us. Toleration of such things not only invited our destruction, it is a mortal sin"[27]

This construction of the nature of the enemy not only argues that they are evil but in fact dehumanises them, placing them outside our normal moral frame whose existence alone threatens not just our bodies but our immortal souls. Rep. Hastert goes on to argue in forceful terms for the approval of military action. The remainder of the representatives all spoke in similar albeit less stark terms with the exception of Representatives Paul of Texas, Waters and Woolsey, both of California (who each raised caveats about the appropriate use of the powers given to the presidency) and the sole opponent of the resolution, Rep Lee of California who warned that:

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[26] Ibid.

[27] House of Representatives "Authorising use of armed force against those responsible for recent attacks against the United States" 14/09/01. available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/C?r107:./temp/~r1077Q2Zhd accessed 16/09/09

"As we act, let us not become the evil that we deplore"[28]

Therefore it can be argued that not only was the administration's securitizing move successful in terms of receiving formal authority through the congressional votes, but it also received the moral authority expressed by members of congress adopting and accepting the same subject positions articulated by the administration in terms of the 'Self' who was attacked and the 'Other' who did the attacking.[29]

The second audience to which the securitizing moves were addressed was the American people at large whose support and approval, though not formally necessary, would facilitate a successful military campaign. Assessing public attitudes presents certain difficulties particularly if we wish to make arguments about the extent to which the public understood and accepted the 'articulations' or speech-acts of officials. Some caution is particularly necessary when we note the Representative for New Jersey, Mr Pallone, arguing:

> "They [his constituents] did not want bombing and ground troops to go into Afghanistan or some other places unless it was actually going to mean that we were going to get the terrorists and the people responsible, or the people that harboured [sic]. They did not just want us to get involved in an indiscriminate war that might impact innocent people"[30]

Therefore it could be argued that the public at large had misgivings insofar as the generalised security threat 'terror' were concerned. However, Holland has argued, based on interview evidence, that many ordinary Americans internalised the discourse of the 'War on Terror' and advocated military solutions.[31] What we can say is that at a macro level public opinion supported both the Presidency and the decision to intervene in Afghanistan and further that this level of support rose between September

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[28] Ibid

[29] Full excerpts from the Speakers quoted above are included in the appendices, samples of the full debates can be found through the Library of Congress website and a sample of the other contributions can be found in appendix V. See note on sources in Bibliography

[30] Rep PalloneNJ, H6244 "Congressional Record – House" Oct 3, 2001 available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/C?r107:./temp/~r1073aosil accessed 17/09/09

[31] See Holland, op. cit, 2009

and October 2001. According to a CBS News poll, support for President Bush in September was at 79.1% rising to 90.7% in October. Similarly, approval for his handling of the attacks rose from 81.8% to 88.3%. Support for military action was much lower in September, supporting the quote above, 67.9% when no specific target was included in the question. But this rose in October to 88.3% when Afghanistan was specifically named as the target.[32] These figures would tentatively suggest that the Bush administration was successful in convincing its broader audience that the war in Afghanistan was justified and in the interests of the United States.

The practice of Security

A final concern in understanding how the intervention in Afghanistan was made possible is what shape the appropriate securitized response would take. The level of support suggested above would give the administration a fairly free hand in determining the scale of the response. However, the immediate option was for a relatively lightweight force structure which needs to be understood in the context of ongoing debates within the security sector. The ideas of those in positions of power, the Secretary of Defense and his staff, about what are the most appropriate security approaches clearly played a role in determining how the US would respond to the terrorist threat. This section aims at examining not just how intervention was possible but more specifically how *this* intervention was possible. We will briefly discuss the background to the relevant security debates before drawing out the implications for the practice of security in the 'War on Terror'.

Once the Department of Defense was established in 1947, periodic reviews were undertaken of defence policy. For example, Truman reformed defence institutions for the Cold War, Kennedy and Johnson focussed on counter-insurgency

[32] CBS News Monthly Poll September and October 2001 accessed via ICPSR available at http://dx.doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR03351 and http://dx.doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR03376 respectively, accessed 05/09/09

and flexibility, Nixon and Ford looked at arms control and diplomacy, while Reagan's increase in military expenditure were all oriented toward maintaining US power and security in the Cold War world.[33] When the Cold War ended, further reconfiguration was required, under President George HW Bush 'uncertainty', mirroring the Foreign Policy discourse mentioned in the previous chapter, became the key consideration for strategic planning. The conclusions were based on the idea of being able to fight two regional wars simultaneously, expecting roughly 500,000 troops to be engaged per conflict.[34] Under Clinton, the apparent recognition of the need for change continued but little changed in practice apart from the 'procurement holiday' that "put Pentagon weapons spending on a decade long hold."[35] The net result was on the one hand a series of reviews of the role, shape and size of the US military but little change in the actual institutions apart from lack of research and downsizing of military forces. As O'Hanlon put it, the focus should not be:

> "to worry so much about a simultaneous worst-case war scenario in both Korea and the Gulf...that the country underfunds readiness, research and preparing for the challenges of the future."[36]

Yet that is, arguably, precisely what happened. US forces on the eve of the twenty-first century remained oriented towards a concept of limited warfare that reflected the most recent US conflicts in the Gulf than the more likely conflicts in the future. In the academic community debates circled around how and whether to maintain US hegemony in an increasingly complex world.[37] In the aftermath of the USS Cole

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[33] See International Institute for Strategic Studies "The Quadrennial Defense Review" *Strategic Comments* Vol 11 No 1 2005, p1

[34] Ibid. p1

[35] Ibid. p.1

[36] Michael O'Hanlon "Prudent or Paranoid? The Pentagon's Two-war plans" in *Survival* Vol 43 No 1, 2001, p.49

[37] See for example Eugene Gholz, Daryl G. Press, & Harvey M Sapolsky "Come Home., America" *International Security* Vol 21 No 4, 1997 pp. 5-48; Samuel P Huntington "America's Changing Strategic Interests" *Survival* Vol 33 No. 1 1991, pp. 3-17; William Kristol & Robert Kagan "Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy" in *Foreign Affairs* Vol 75 No 4 1996 pp.18-32; and Zalmay Khalilzad "Losing the moment?: The United States and the World after the Cold War" *Washington Quarterly* Vol

bombings, Tom Donnelly highlighted what he perceived as the key problem in orienting US defences at the time:

"Failing to see that we are at war, we also fail to see our enemies"[38]

Donnelly was linked to a think tank called the Project for the New American Century (PNAC) that included among its supporters future Vice-President Dick Cheney, future Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and future Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz.[39] The PNAC called for a more forceful and coherent US foreign and security policy that sought to project US power and maintain US hegemony in the Twenty-First century in order to create a world friendly to US security, prosperity and principles. As the statement of principles noted:

> "Such a Reaganite policy of military strength and moral clarity may not be fashionable today. But it is necessary if the United States is to build on the successes of this past century and to ensure our security and our greatness in the next."[40]

The intellectual influence of PNAC has been frequently highlighted in critical accounts of the Bush administration's Foreign Policy[41] and undoubtedly the close relationship between PNAC supporters and administration officials played a role in shaping the security policy of the new administration. However, one contention of this thesis is that the PNAC programme does not represent a major departure from US foreign and security policy discourse, but instead draws upon a long line of missionary exceptionalism that has a long history in the US as outlined in the previous chapter. The incoming administration then came into office with a clear intention of

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18, No 2 1995 pp.87-107; William Kristol & Robert Kagan "The Present Danger" in *The National Interest* No 59 2000, pp.57-69

[38] Tom Donnelly "America at War: What the attack on the USS Cole tells us" in *The Weekly Standard* 30 October, 2000 p11

[39] Project for the New American Century "Statement of Principles" 03/06/1997, available online http://www.newamericancentury.org/statementofprinciples.htm, accessed 04/07/08

[40] Ibid.

[41] See for example Mel Gurtov *Superpower on Crusade: The Bush Doctrine in US Foreign Policy* Lynne Rienner, London 2006

reforming the military to meet the new challenges highlighted by the USS Cole incident and ultimately 9/11.

President Bush and particularly Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld came into office as strong supporters of pushing defence reform with a particular focus on pushing new technologies and creating a light manoeuvrable and flexible force.[42] Indeed one of the reasons that the level of defence spending did not rise in the first budget of the administration despite President Bush's criticism of Clinton's under-funding of the military was to 'starve the beast' in order to force a conservative Pentagon to rapidly decommission out-dated technologies and engage in the kinds of transformation the new administration called for. The question was what shape that new understanding would take. The Quadrennial Defense Review Report, dated 30th September 2001, highlights the nature of the shifting understanding of security that was guiding defence reform:

> "A central objective of the review was to shift the basis of defense planning from a 'threat-based' model that has dominated thinking in the past to a 'capabilities-based' model for the future...the United States must identify the capabilities to deter and defeat adversaries who will rely on surprise, deception and asymmetric warfare to achieve their objectives"[43]

Other authors have discussed the obvious risk elements of the new approach[44] but what is clear is that a military that had spent much of the twentieth century preparing for a conventional Theatre war, most likely in Europe, would have to fundamentally re-configure its force footing and indeed its understanding of its mission in the

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[42] Ibid.

[43] Department of Defense *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* September 30th 2001, PIV available at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/qdr2001.pdf accessed 31/08/09

[44] See for example Heng op. cit. 2006, Mikkel Rasmussen *The Risk Society at War* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006

world.[45] As Secretary Rumsfeld highlighted in a speech at the National Defense University:

> "Here we are in the year 2002, fighting the first war of the 21st Century, and the horse cavalry was back and being used, but being used in previously unimaginable ways. It showed that a revolution in military affairs (RMA) is about more than building new high tech weapons, though that is certainly part of it. It's also about new ways of thinking, and new ways of fighting."[46]

In other words, the RMA is not only about access to and use of new technologies but also a fundamental paradigm shift in the understanding of the military's role and what it means to provide security. In the same speech Rumsfeld goes on to outline the six pre 9/11 objectives of the RMA before talking about how the experience in Afghanistan contributed to the development of the programme of transformation:

> "First, to protect the US Homeland and our bases overseas. Second, to project and sustain power in distant theatres. Third, to deny our enemies sanctuary…Fourth, to protect our information networks from attack. Fifth, to use information technology to link up different kinds of US forces so that they can in fact fight jointly. And sixth, to maintain unhindered access to space and protect our space capabilities."[47]

What we have then is a revisioning of military policy and strategic objectives that involves everything from horses to shuttles, from traditional military power to a range of economic, political and diplomatic tools – in other words a template to be tested as the response to the challenge of a global risk such as International Terrorism. As Huntley noted, one problem that had previously impeded largescale reform of the military under previous reviews since the end of the Cold War was the "inadequate focus on a definite 'thing' or a short list of 'things.'"[48] The post-9/11 provided the

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[45] The new marine handbook is a good example of this as is the US Army War College paper by Samuel J Newland *Victories are not enough: Limitations of the German Way of War* December 2005

[46] Secretary Donald Rumsfeld "On 21st Century Transformation of US Armed Forces (transcript of remarks and question and answer period)" Remarks delivered at the National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington DC, 31st January 2002, available online: http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2002/s20020131-secdef.html, accessed 02/01/2004

[47] Ibid.

[48] Richard O. Huntley *Past Revolutions Future Transformations: What can the history of revolutions in military affairs tell us about transforming the US military?* RAND, 1999, p.88

focus for the administration to pursue its reform agenda with specific types of state and non-state threats in mind, as Secretary Rumsfeld noted:

> "The attack on the United States and the war that has been visited upon us highlights a fundamental condition of our circumstances: we cannot and will not know precisely where and when America's interests will be threatened, when America will come under attack, or when Americans might die as the result of aggression...Adapting to surprise – adapting quickly and decisively – must therefore be a condition of planning."[49]

The use of the verb 'to visit' here is worth noting, as again it constructs the attacks as an unpredicted and unexpected act, almost an act of God or fate. When linked to the preceeding sentence which reads, "It is a war against America and America's way of life. It is a war against all that America holds dear. It is a war against freedom itself", we can see that Secretary Rumsfeld is using the same frames of reference as President Bush. A passive, good, US was attacked by a primordial, evil force. In more general terms, what we had then was a representation of the shift in the institutional understanding of security, on the part of the Pentagon and the RMA and an attack from what was, potentially at least, just the sort of enemy the RMA was preparing for. The precise nature of the transformation involved was captured by Secretary Rumsfeld, speaking in January 2002, describing the success of the Afghan campaign and the lessons learned:

> "We decided [in the Quadrennial Defense Review] to move away from the "two major theatre war" construct for sizing our forces, an approach that called for maintaining two massive occupation forces capable of marching on and occupying capitals of two aggressors at the same time and changing their regimes. This approach served us well in the immediate post-Cold War period, but it really threatened to leave us reasonably prepared for two specific conflicts and under-prepared for the unexpected contingencies of the 21st century"[50]

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[49] Secretary Rumsfeld "Foreward" in Department of Defense *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* 30/09/2001 p III

[50] Secretary Rumsefeld "21st Century Transformation' of US Armed Forces (transcript of remarks and Q & A period) 31/01/02, Washington DC, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2002/s20020131-secdef.html accessed 02/01/2004

Just as in the transition from punishment to discipline, you had a shift in both the discursive framing of the issue at hand and the institutional structures which can also be understood discursively. As outlined in chapters 3 and 4, the concept of securitization and discourse involves both a commitment to the study of texts and of institutional structures and settings. The shifts in military doctrine and practice are both relevant to the context in which the discursive frame through which 9/11 was constructed. If we think about this in terms of the 'grammar of security', this transformation in the security sector had clear implications for the type of solution chosen and how these solutions would be pursued. The question then, given the combination of the Manichean framing of the division between 'us' and 'them' and the military tools at hand, was what response was pursued? In other words returning to the question in hand – how was this intervention possible? Part of the answer is that given the framing of the conflict at its most stark as being one between good and evil coupled with the institutional capacity and desire "to project and sustain power in distant theatres"[51] a firm concept of national security had emerged that challenged traditional distinctions between inside and outside the state, not just domestically but also in relation to every other state in the world. As Richard Haas, a State department official, put it:

> "Sovereignty entails obligations. One is not to massacre your own people. Another [and this one is new] is not to support terrorism in any way. If a government fails to meet these obligations, then it forfeits some of the normal advantages of sovereignty, including the right to be left alone in your own territory. Other governments, including the United States, gain the right to intervene. In the case of terrorism, this can lead to a right of preventive or pre-emptory, self-defence. You essentially can act in anticipation if you have grounds to think it's a question of when, and not if, you're going to be attacked"[52]

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[51] Ibid.
[52] In interview in April 2002, as quoted in Gurtov, 2006, p41

What we have in embryo here then, is the 'Bush Doctrine' that fully takes shape in the National Security Strategy of September that year. What it suggests is an orientation toward intervention that was likely to dominate the 'War on Terror' that followed. That's not to say that only conventional military solutions would be pursued, clearly other options were pursued, for example in relation to Terrorist financing[53], but that military intervention had been effectively constructed as both effective and legitimate in the context of winning the 'War on Terror' and furthermore that that legitimacy extended beyond the initial targets of Afghanistan and Al-Qaeda. The next section outlines the construction and implementation of intervention in Afghanistan in the period leading up to President Bush's State of the Union address in 2002. The following section briefly outlines the 'disappearance' of Afghanistan in the discourse of the 'War on Terror', before returning in the conclusion to explore how the broad scope of the generic enemy called 'Terror' was bringing other regimes and targets into its sights.

The practice of anti-terror: targeting Terrorists and Afghanistan

Having received formal authority to use all appropriate means to target those who had attacked America, President Bush used his State of the Union address on September 21st 2001 to publicly issue his ultimatum to the Taliban to dismantle the terrorist bases on their territory and to turnover Bin Laden and his associates to US custody. As mentioned above, Bin Laden had regularly appeared as the prime suspect and his presence in Afghanistan was widely discussed. Indeed, when President Bush was issuing the ultimatum in public, the first US forces were already inside Afghanistan as evidenced by the Presidential "Afghanistan Combat Zone Executive

[53] See for example Anne L. Clunan, 'The fight against terrorist financing', *Political Science Quarterly,* Vol. 121, Number 4, December 2006. For a similar view, see John B. Taylor, *Global Financial Warriors: the untold story of international finance in the post-9/11 world,* New York: W.W Norton, 2007

Order" signed in December 2001 that dated combat operations to September 19th 2001 – two days before the State of the Union.[54]

A significant factor in that response was the articulation of the nature of the conflict at hand. On September 20th 2001, President Bush made an address to the joint sessions of Congress broadcast live to the nation, where he outlined the shape of the conflict to come and issued his ultimatum to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. This speech has been chosen as an exemplary moment in the construction of the 'War on Terror' where a number of themes that had been emerging in the public discourse since 9/11 are articulated forcefully and coherently. Documents in Appendix II show further examples of these constructions. President Bush began his address with a reassuring tone, highlighting that the union is in a good state of health demonstrated by the response to the attacks, the rallying of neighbours, friends and volunteers to help and the expressions of solidarity in flags, candles and prayers across the nation. However the speech quickly switches to the need to respond to the attacks:

> "Our grief has turned to anger, and anger to resolution. Whether we bring our enemies to justice or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done"[55]

The use of the passive voice in 'justice will be done' echoes with notions of American identity derived from providence and destiny, as a beacon of freedom mentioned early and apart from the world. A sentiment echoed later in the address with reference to God.

> "Who attacked our country? The evidence…points to a collection of loosely affiliated terrorist organizations known as Al-Qaeda…its goal is not making money; its goal is remaking the world…In Afghanistan we see Al Qaeda's vision for the world…The United States respects the

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[54] President George W Bush *Afghanistan Combat Zone Executive Order* 14/12/2001, available online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/print/20011214-8.html accessed 03/04/08

[55] President George W Bush "Address to a joint session of Congress and the American People" September 20th 2001 available at: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html accessed 07/09/09

> people of Afghanistan...but we condemn the Taliban regime...the United States of America makes the following demands on the Taliban: Deliver to United States authorities all the leaders of Al Qaeda who hide in your land...Close immediately and permanently every terrorist training camp...and hand over every terrorist...These demands are not open to negotiation and discussion...Our war on terror begins with Al-Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group with global reach has been found, stopped and defeated."[56]

President Bush goes on to outline not only the specific perpetrators of the attacks, Al Qaeda, but also the more general nature of those responsible, the responsibility of those who failed to prevent or facilitated them, the Taliban, and the distinction between the ordinary people of Afghanistan and the Taliban regime. The ultimatum to the Taliban was effectively a declaration of war, as even had the will been there, the state, such as it was, lacked the resources to carry out the tasks requested. Indeed it has been speculated that rather than representing an actual chance to save themselves, the ultimatum to the Taliban was used to allow the US military time to build up sufficient forces in the region and to deflect criticisms of inaction in this period.

What is more interesting in this speech is the constant re-invocation of the roles and identities ascribed to the opposing parties in the 'War on Terror'. On the one hand you had Al-Qaeda and the Taliban who were:

> "the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century. By sacrificing human life to serve their radical visions – by abandoning every value except the will to power – they follow in the path of fascism, and Nazism, and totalitarianism."[57]

While on the other you had the United States, and arguably more generally the West, who were under attack, or as President Bush put it:

> "and night fell on a different world, a world where freedom itself is under attack"[58]

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[56] Ibid
[57] Ibid
[58] Ibid

This contrast between freedom and tyranny, light and dark, even good and evil runs throughout the discourse and constructs a narrative that renders criticism difficult and makes a militaristic response almost inevitable. Perhaps the starkest rendering of this contrast comes in the President's closing remarks:

> "The course of this conflict is not yet known, yet its outcome is certain. Freedom and fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at war, and we know that God is not neutral between them."[59]

The course of the war that followed has already been outlined briefly in chapter one and will be returned to below, what is significant here is that even within nine days of the initial attacks the narrative structure that was to dominate the post-9/11 security discourse in the United States was already in place. It drew on prevailing narratives of the American 'Self', and built an 'Other' that was both doomed to failure yet ever threatening to succeed, that was linked to the 'Others' of the past however tenuously, and that hated 'us' for what we were rather than anything we ever did. This 'Other' was both imminent and invisible, specific and generalisable, and other possible security threats could be projected through and shaped by this narrative lens. Furthermore, it copper-fastened the image of an enemy that could only be met and dealt with through the use of force.

As with the initial securitizing move, this construction of the nature of the conflict was echoed in discussions in Congress. Representative Pitts argued:

> "The Taliban of Afghanistan is at the very top of the list. As we prepare to deal with them, we have to remember the civilians of that country. We must be careful to minimize the impact on the innocent people of Afghanistan ."Mr. Speaker, I am a veteran. I know that sometimes innocent people die in war, but in the case of Afghanistan , perhaps more than any other, we will be at war with the terrorist organizations and with the government that aids and abets them, not with the people. The people of Afghanistan are victims too. They have been

[59] Ibid

> brutalized by the Taliban, by the communists who were there before them. They have not known peace for decades. Millions have starved and become refugees. We will need to help those surrounding countries that will be impacted by the refugees...and that once Osama bin Laden and the Taliban are gone, and they will be gone, we want to be a friend and ally to the people of Afghanistan ."[60]

This construction echoes the President's distinction between the Taliban and Al-Qaeda who fall under the rubric of the enemy 'Other' and the Afghan people, to whom the US is offering help and friendship. In similar terms Senator Wellston argued that:

> "As the Administration reviews all its options, it must consider the humanitarian consequences of any military action against terrorist sites in Afghanistan, and take urgent steps now to address them."[61]

Another significant feature of Congressional discussions on Afghanistan was the significance and prominence attached to women's rights. A search on Afghanistan and women in the Congressional record between September 20th and October 31st produces 12 results which were solely addressing women's rights in Afghanistan and a further 33 where the issue was raised as relevant.[62] At a time when the US was either preparing or already engaged in war this attention to the status of women was unusual. It can only be understood as part of the broader construction of the discourse of the 'War on Terror' that sought to differentiate between the Taliban and Al-Qaeda on the one hand and the Afghan people on the other.[63]

Sixteen days after the State of the Union, US military action in Afghanistan formally began on October 7th. The tactics and approach to the Afghan campaign reflect the broader approach to the challenge of international terrorism as well as reflecting a firm belief in the utility of high tech warfare to achieve complex

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[60] Rep. Pitts, H6167 "America's response to terror" House of Represenatives, 03/10/2001
[61] Senator Wellstone "Refugee Crisis in Afghanistan" 01/10/01, available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?r107:154:./temp/~r107V9ejbv:: accessed17/09/09
[62] See The Library of Congress, http://thomas.loc.gov/home/r107query.html, Accessed 18/09/2009
[63] For a discussion of the possibly cynical nature of such attention to womens rights see Susan Faludi *The Terror Dream: Fear and Fantasy in post-9/11 America* Metropolitan Books, New York 2007

objectives.[64] Two aspects are key here, the first is the administration's belief in the utility and effectiveness of light military forces combined with overwhelming airpower meant that, arguably at least, insufficient time was given to force planning and post-conflict planning. Secondly, and more importantly for the purposes of this thesis, the linking in of domestic reform in Afghanistan and ultimately the removal of the Taliban that imposed a second and possibly contradictory strategic objective on the use of force in Afghanistan.[65] In effect, by so clearly linking issues of democratisation, human rights and ultimately regime change in Afghanistan in their public statements, the administration not only raised the stakes of the conflict but also the difficulty of achieving success. In practice these aims were attempted by dropping aid as well as bombs from US planes flying over Afghanistan.[66] Furthermore, it wasn't necessarily apparent that such commitments were strictly necessary as domestic support for the President had arguably given the administration a blank cheque in terms of potential action.[67] Indeed, not only did the broadened framing of the conflict make it more difficult to achieve success but the means pursued to achieve those goals made it more difficult to maintain the Manichean division between good and evil that had been so central to the earlier discourse. One report

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[64] Although the epithet 'high tech' needs to be tempered by the acknowledgement of the extensive use of horses by special forces on the ground, as Rumsfeld joked "When President Bush called me back to the Pentagon after a quarter of a century, he asked me to come up with a new defense strategy…He knew I was an old-timer, but I'll bet he never imagined for a second that we'd bring back the cavalry". Remarks at National Defense University, op cit, Jan 31st 2002

[65] See for example the discussion of the conflict in Carl Conetta *Strange Victory: A critical appraisal of Operation Enduring Freedom and the Afganistan War* Project on Defense Alternatives, Research Monograph 6, 30/01/2002

[66] Although the efficacy of dropping aid packs was questioned at the time, particularly as the bright yellow packaging was not dissimilar to the yellow markings on US munitions also being used. See George Monbiot "Folly of Aid and Bombs" *The Guardian* 09/10/01, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2001/oct/09/afghanistan.britainand911 accessed 24/06/08

[67] Public opinion in the US after 9/11 saw 88% of people supporting military action in Afghanistan. See "America and the 'War on Terror'". AEI Public Opinion Study. Retrieved on 2007-09-27. Published July 24, 2008.; while the Presidents approval rating soared to 87%, see "Historical Bush approval ratings" available at http://www.hist.umn.edu/~ruggles/Approval.htm accessed 30/10/08

noted that the rate of civilian casualties in the Afghan conflict was far higher than in the Kosovo campaign of 1999 which

> "Given that fewer weapons were expended a higher level of civilian fatalities in Operation Enduring Freedom implies that the bombing campaign in Afghanistan was less accurate than the one associated with the 1999 Balkans war."[68]

As early as October 29th, Secretary Rumsfeld was forced to defend the tactics being used:

> "War is ugly. It causes misery and suffering and death, and we see that every day. But let's be clear: no nation in human history has done more to avoid civilian casualties than the United States has in this conflict"[69]

That key distinction between targeting the Taliban and the Afghan people appeared to be weakening. What followed was a shift to a greater focus on coordinating the air campaign with the 'boots on the ground', in this case predominantly made up of local Afghan fighters who were anti-Taliban. The Northern Alliance became more central to the US campaign and fits in well with the flexible cooperative model of force under the RMA. Secretary Rumsfeld gave the following description of the battle at Mazar-e-Sharif in late November:

> "the battle for Mazar was a transformational battle. Coalition forces took existing military capabilities from the most advanced laser-guided weapons to antique, 40-year-old B-52's...to the most rudimentary, a man on horseback. And they used them in unprecedented ways, with devastating effect on enemy positions, on enemy morale, and this time, on the cause of evil in the world."[70]

Not only does Secretary Rumsfeld give a clear account of the military doctrine in play, but by emphasising the 'evil' nature of the enemy he echoes the Manichean framing of the conflict in the broader discourse. Within a short period beginning around November 10th the Taliban were rapidly pushed out of Kabul and ultimately

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[68] Carl Conetta "Operation Enduring Freedom: Why a higher rate of civilian bombing casualties?" Project on Defense Alternatives, *Briefing Report #11*, 18/01/02 available at http://www.comw.org/pda/0201oef.html accessed 23/01/06

[69] Ibid. P16

[70] Secretary Rumsfeld "21st Century Transformation", 2002, op. cit.

Kandahar too. By the end of 2001, and contrary to many naysayers who predicted a quagmire and ominously warned of entering the 'graveyard of empires', one of the strategic objectives of the Afghan campaign had been achieved – the Taliban had been removed and a liberalising and at least quasi-democratic regime took its place. We'll return to the question of what happened then in the conclusion below, but first some mention of the other strategic objective needs to be made – namely the pursuit of Bin Laden and other senior Al-Qaeda members.

On a number of occasions in the course of the conflict reports circulated that either Bin Laden had been killed or that he was on the verge of capture by American or Northern Alliance forces.[71] However, despite the presence of US and local forces Bin Laden has evaded capture throughout the conflict, most likely escaping over the border to the relatively lawless North Western Frontier Province of Pakistan. General Pervez Musharraf was equally unsuccessful in tracking the Al-Qaeda leader down and he remains at large today, signalling his existence with periodic releases of televised and audio recordings through Islamic websites. What is most remarkable about this is not that Bin Laden managed to evade capture – given the force levels involved and the porous nature of the Afghan border any capture would have been the result of no small amount of luck. But that concern with capturing Bin Laden was dismissed by the President and other members of the administration. In the January 29th 2002, State of the Union Address, President Bush's 1st anniversary in office, Bin Laden doesn't feature at all as he accentuates the positives of the Afghan campaign:

> "In four short months, our nation has comforted the victims, begun to rebuild New York and the Pentagon, rallied a great coalition, captured, arrested and rid the world of thousands of terrorists, destroyed Afghanistan's terrorist training

[71] See Dana Priest & Ann Scott Tyson "Bin Laden Trail 'stone cold'" in *The Washington Post* 10/09/06 available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/09/AR2006090901105.html accessed 30/10/08

camps, saved a people from starvation, and freed a country from brutal oppression"[72]

But no mention of Bin Laden or other senior Al-Qaeda officials. Instead he moves on to talk in detail about the more general problems of terror and in particular linking these problems directly to Rogue states specifically the 'Axis of Evil' of Iran, Iraq and North Korea.

President Bush goes on to cite the success of the Afghan campaign as an example of the justness of America's cause and the rightness of its approach:

"No people on Earth yearn to be oppressed...If anyone doubts this, let them look at Afghanistan, where the Islamic 'street' greeted the fall of tyranny with song and celebration"[73]

The underlying assumption here is the universality of the American model of government and ideas of freedom and liberalism. As we will see in the next section from January onwards and even within the same speech, Afghanistan begins to take a back seat in the discourse of the 'War on Terror', even though the largest single engagement only took place in March 2002 in Shah-I-Kot and low scale insurgency not only continues today but is actually on the increase, with word of a potentially resurgent Taliban among a number of other potential problems.[74]

Security, Identity and the 'War on Terror'

One of the reasons that alternative views on how to approach the terrorist threat were in the minority in the aftermath of 9/11 is due to the success in the Bush administration in defining the nature of the conflict in terms that, as McCrisken put it, meant:

"to question the war on terrorism is to question American itself"[75]

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[72] President Bush, State of the Union, 29/01/02 available at: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html accessed 10/09/09
[73] Ibid
[74] Barnett R Rubin *Afghanistan's Uncertain transition from turmoil to Normalcy* Council on Foreign Relations, CRS No. 12, March 2006
[75] Trevor McCrisken, op. cit., 2003 p161

How did the administration construct this understanding? Through the process of 'interpellation', constructing subject positions which the reader/listener will feel empathy and identify with, a 'we' and drawing sharp contrasts with the 'Other.' For example, on the 13th September Colin Powell was asked by Jim Lehrer:

> "Why do these people hate us so they would fly an airplane into targets and kill themselves in order to kill Americans?"[76]

His response set the tone for the construction of the terrorist 'Other' in administration rhetoric:

> "The reasons are very, very complex and in some instances they don't like our value system; they don't like the system that treats every individual as a creature of God with the full rights of every other individual. They don't like our political system, our form of democracy. They don't like who some of our friends are in the Middle East and the fact that we are strong supporters of Israel and will remain so. They resent in many instances our successes as a society. But rather than debating us on our values and rather than listening as we listen to them, they choose another form of debate on the battlefield. They choose terrorism, a weapon that is available to them, because they can't defeat us on a conventional battlefield."[77]

In this construction 'we' have values, democracy, success, even a God that they resent. Furthermore, 'we' are willing to listen to their resentment and be compassionate but they chose another course – terrorism. Both 'their' – the terrorists' – subject position and tactics make them problematic, and point towards confrontation and conflict as the only way of dealing with them as "they choose another form of debate…the battlefield."

The administration though was at pains to stress that this implacable foe should not be confused with Islam. In an address symbolically held at the Islamic Centre of Washington D.C., President Bush was at pains to mark the distinction between Islam and those responsible:

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[76] Jim Lehrer "a Newshour with Jim Lehrer", PBS, 13/09/2001, transcript available online at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/military/july-dec01/powell_9-13.html accessed 15/09/09

[77] Ibid.

> "The face of terror is not the true faith of Islam. That's not what Islam is all about. Islam is peace. These terrorists don't represent peace. They represent evil and war."[78]

The distinction between peace and war, mirrors the distinction in Islam of 'Dar-al-Islam' and 'Dar-al-harb' and could be read as an attempt to undermine any claim to religious legitimacy of Al-Qaeda's campaign by placing the terrorists firmly in the world of war and outside of the Ummah or Islamic community. The key though is the refusal to limit the definition of threat to one particular subset or category of identity. This dynamic is reinforced in relation to Afghanistan where clear distinctions are drawn between the Taliban controlled government and the general population. Part of this dynamic is the outright rejection of rational motivations for the attacks. As President Brush argued in a Press Conference on October 15th 2001:

> "how do I respond when I see that in some Islamic countries there is vitriolic hatred for America? I'll tell you how I respond: I'm amazed. I'm amazed that there is such misunderstanding of what our country is about, that people would hate us. I am, I am -- like most Americans, I just can't believe it. Because I know how good we are, and we've go to do a better job of making our case. We've got to do a better job of explaining to the people in the Middle East, for example, that we don't fight a war against Islam or Muslims. We don't hold any religion accountable. We're fighting evil. And these murderers have hijacked a great religion in order to justify their evil deeds. And we cannot let it stand."[79]

Not only was the President careful to distinguish between the perpetrators of the attacks and Muslims more generally, the argument he makes rests on the premise of a universal worldview, that simply cannot conceive of legitimate criticism of the United States and its policies. Rather those who articulate such visions have 'hijacked a great religion in order to justify their evil deeds.' Earlier in the same press conference President Bush emphasised the distinction between Islam in general and those responsible for the attacks:

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[78] President Bush "Islam is Peace", Remarks by the President at Islamic Centre of Washington, 17/09/2001. available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010917-11.html accessed 15/09/09

[79] President George W. Bush "President Holds Prime Time News Conference" 15/10/01 available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011011-7.html, accessed 04/05/2008

> "Our war on terrorism has nothing to do with differences in faith. It has everything to do with people of all faiths coming together to condemn hate and evil and murder and prejudice."[80]

Similarly in speeches at the Islamic Center of Washington, D.C., referred to above, and in the Oval Office with King Abdullah of Jordan on the 17th and 28th of September respectively, he reiterated this idea and the call for a universal response to terrorism.

> "There are thousands of Muslims who proudly call themselves American, and they know what I know – that the Muslim faith is based upon peace and love and compassion. The exact opposite of the teachings of Al-Qaeda, which is based upon evil and hate and destruction"[81]

Attempts by the administration to differentiate from Muslims in general and the Al-Qaeda specifically were consistent and coherent throughout the early period. Even when the President misspoke of a 'crusade' a retraction was quick to follow. James Carroll noted that his aides were quick to argue that Bush meant to use the term as a synonym for war, although Carroll is sceptical of the claim himself arguing instead that it was a window to President Bush's worldview.[82] There are arguments for both sides, on the one hand the charge of racial overtones is difficult to sustain given the explicit distinctions cited above and in evidence elsewhere in the administration's statements. On the other hand, the use of the term sits well with the Manichean vision of good versus evil that runs throughout the framing of the 'War on Terror.' On balance, the term appears to have been ill-used by the President rather than representing a planned construction. A similar point can be made regarding the change of name of the US-led attack on Afghanistan from 'Operation Infinite Justice' to 'Operation Enduring Freedom'. The former being the sole preserve of Allah,

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[80] Ibid, accessed 04/05/2008

[81] President Bush "King of Jordan:'We will stand behind you'" 28/09/01 available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010928-4.html accessed 20/05/08

[82]. See James Carroll "The Bush Crusade" *The Nation* 02/09/04 available online: http://www.thenation.com/doc/20040920/carroll accessed 22/05/08

although the latter name apparently failed to note the possible dual meaning of the verb 'to endure'.[83]

One of the reasons that this distinction between Muslims in general and Al-Qaeda in particular was open to question is the relative openness of the definition of the terrorist threat employed by the administration. This brings us to the second theme that needs highlighting: the refusal to limit the identification of the enemy to a specific individual or even group. Much was made, both at the time and since, of President Bush's response to a question from a journalist at a White-House photo-op with former Thai Prime Minister and former Manchester City owner Thaksin Shinawatra. When asked whether he wanted to capture Bin Laden or kill him, Bush replied:

"I don't care. Dead or alive, either way, I mean, I – it doesn't matter to me"[84]

The obvious harmonies with themes of the Wild West fitted well with the conventional international image of the gung-ho cowboy president. However, this slip aside, the administration were at pains to both not create a martyr of Bin Laden and to maintain the extended conception of terror as the enemy. For example an early CIA document, which featured a picture of Bin Laden with a red circle cut by a diagonal line on each page, was edited under orders by the President to remove the offending image.[85] In public too, as outlined above, the extension of the 'War on Terror' to all those engaged in terrorism was explicit and repeated. As emphasised by President Bush on September 19th:

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[83] See for example Gary Gordon "Bush Launches Operation Enduring Freedom: Double meaning intended says Administration Wordsmith" *The Fictional Times 15/09/01-13/12/01* available at http://www.garygordonproductions.com/quagmire_archives.html accessed 22/05/08

[84] President Bush "Prime Minister of Thailand reiterates full support to U.S." 14/12/01, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/20011214-5.html accessed 30/10/08

[85] Bob Woodward, 2003, op. cit, p34-6

> "This is a war not against a specific individual, nor will it be a war against solely one organization. It is a war against terrorist activities."[86]

Likewise, as Richard Devetak noted:

> "these characteristics create the impression that bin [sic] Laden's al-Qaeda is both elusive and uncontainable. Even should particular terrorist nodes be exposed and captured, the dynamic structure of the network enables it to survive in altered form"[87]

The argument here is that the degree of uncertainty was extended far beyond even the elusive concept of Al-Qaeda to what Secretary of State Colin Powell termed 'the whole curse of terrorism.'[88] Likewise the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld argued:

> "This is not a war against an individual, a group, a religion or a country. Rather our opponent is a global network of terrorist organisations and their state sponsors, committed to denying free people the opportunity to live as they choose. While we may engage militarily against foreign governments, we may also seek to make allies of the people those governments suppress."[89]

Not only does Rumsfeld maintain the openness of the concept of the enemy but he also reinforces the universal call for cooperation. This distinction between governments and people was to play an important role in the planning and execution of the conflicts that followed. Secretary Rumsfeld, though, reiterates the nature of the identities at play:

> "But if this is a different kind of war, one thing is unchanged: America remains indomitable. Our victory will come with Americans living their lives day by day, going to work, raising their children and building their dreams as they always have – a free and great people"[90]

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[86] President Bush "President Building Worldwide campaign against terrorism" Remarks by President Bush and President Megawati of Indonesia in [sic] a Photo opportunity, The Oval Office. 19/09/2001 http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010919-1.html accessed 15/09/09

[87] Richard Devetak "The Gothic Scene of International Relations: ghosts, monsters, terror and the sublime after September 11" in *Review of International Studies* Vol 31, 2005, p.637

[88] Powell, 15/09/01, op. cit.

[89] Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld "A new kind of war" 27/09/01, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=440, accessed 25/05/08

[90] Ibid.

The discussion to this point has focussed on how intervention was made possible as the particular tool to pursue Bin Laden and his associates in Afghanistan through the articulation of the terror threat in existential and identity terms and differentiating the targets between the Bin Laden and the Taliban on the one hand and the Afghan people on the other. But how did these constructions tie in with the longer term 'War on Terror'?

Disappearing Afghanistan after Jan 2002

Given the relative ease with which Operation Enduring Freedom achieved some of its strategic objectives, it is perhaps unsurprising that Afghanistan receded into the background of the 'War on Terror'. In his State of the Union address in January 2002, George Bush shifted the focus of his attentions to the nexus of rogue state, terrorism and WMD that provided the core security concern of the 'War on Terror':

> "States like these [Iran, Iraq and North Korea], and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic.
> We will work closely with our coalition to deny terrorists and their state sponsors the materials, technology, and expertise to make and deliver weapons of mass destruction. We will develop and deploy effective missile defenses to protect America and our allies from sudden attack. And all nations should know: America will do what is necessary to ensure our nation's security.
> We'll be deliberate, yet time is not on our side. I will not wait on events, while dangers gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons."[91]

[91] President George W Bush "State of the Union address", 29/01/2002, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html accessed 23/06/08

If the initial response to the 9/11 attacks was to focus on Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, then what we have here is the articulation of the nature of the broader threat. Throughout the speech Afghanistan is held up as an example of success:

> "In four short months, our nation has comforted the victims, begun to rebuild New York and the Pentagon, rallied a great coalition, captured, arrested, and rid the world of thousands of terrorists, destroyed Afghanistan's terrorist training camps, saved a people from starvation, and freed a country from brutal oppression."
> "America and Afghanistan are now allies against terror."
> "The last time we met in this chamber, the mothers and daughters of Afghanistan were captives in their own homes, forbidden from working or going to school. Today women are free, and are part of Afghanistan's new government."
> "Afghanistan proved that expensive precision weapons defeat the enemy and spare innocent lives, and we need more of them"[92]

In the above excerpts we can see the claims to success in Afghanistan and the re-invoking of the contrast between both the American 'Self' and the true Afghan 'Self' and the 'Other'. Where once women were oppressed they are now free, where once terrorism had a haven, it is now opposed. As in the quote in the preceeding section about the greeting of liberation by the Afghan's, the discursive construction here is about stabilizing and identifying US identity with the side of justice and the 'Other' with that of evil. Significantly Al Qaeda is only mentioned by name once, and Bin Laden is only referred to obliquely:

> "terrorist leaders who urged followers to sacrifice their lives are running for their own"[93]

What this speech marked then was a turning point in the focus of the 'War on Terror', the first step had been achieved in that the Taliban had been removed from power, Afghanistan was on the road toward democracy and Al-Qaeda and its leaders were on the run. We'll return in the next chapter to discuss the reorientation of focus in the prosecution of the 'War on Terror' and examine it as a second securitizing move by

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[92] Ibid.
[93] Ibid.

the administration, hereunder we'll discuss the 'disappearance' of Bin Laden and Afghanistan from the construction of the 'War on Terror' and some of the effects of this on the conduct of post-conflict operations.

Despite the general air of success surrounding the President's description of Afghanistan, as mentioned above, fighting continued with the largest single battle taking place in March 2002 in Shah-I-Kot:

> "In Afghanistan, hundreds of trained killers are now dead. Many have been captured. Others are still on the run, hoping to strike again. These terrorist fighters are the most committed, the most dangerous, and the least likely to surrender. They are trying to regroup, and we'll stop them. For five months in Afghanistan, our coalition has been patient and relentless. And more patience and more courage will be required. We're fighting a fierce battle in the Shah-i-kot Mountains, and we're winning. Yet, it will not be the last battle in Afghanistan. And there will be other battles beyond that nation.
> For terrorists fleeing Afghanistan ... there must be no refuge, no safe haven. Every terrorist must be made to live as an international fugitive, with no place to settle or organize, no place to hide, no governments to hide behind, and not even a safe place to sleep"[94]

Even here speaking of a specific battle, the President maintained the generalised nature of the enemy. 'Every terrorist' must be targeted and not just those in Afghanistan. Furthermore we see the construction of those responsible for further fighting as remnants seeking to regroup and even more committed to wrongdoing. This pattern becomes the staple explanation of continued violence in Afghanistan and as we shall see in the next chapter in Iraq.

Even more revealing were the President's comments when pressed on the whereabouts of Osama Bin Laden. The exchange is worth detailing in it's entirety:

> Q Mr. President, in your speeches now you rarely talk or mention Osama bin Laden. Why is that? Also, can you tell the American people if you have any more information, if you know if he is dead or alive? Final part -- deep in your heart, don't you truly believe that until you find out if he is dead or alive, you won't really eliminate the threat of --

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[94] President Bush "President thanks World Coalition for Anti-Terrorism Efforts" 11/03/02, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020311-1.html accessed 24/06/08

"THE PRESIDENT: Deep in my heart I know the man is on the run, if he's alive at all. Who knows if he's hiding in some cave or not; we haven't heard from him in a long time. And the idea of focusing on one person is -- really indicates to me people don't understand the scope of the mission.

Terror is bigger than one person. And he's just -- he's a person who's now been marginalized. His network, his host government has been destroyed. He's the ultimate parasite who found weakness, exploited it, and met his match. He is -- as I mentioned in my speech, I do mention the fact that this is a fellow who is willing to commit youngsters to their death and he, himself, tries to hide -- if, in fact, he's hiding at all.

So I don't know where he is. ***You know, I just don't spend that much time on him, Kelly, to be honest with you.*** I'm more worried about making sure that our soldiers are well-supplied; that the strategy is clear; that the coalition is strong; that when we find enemy bunched up like we did in Shahikot Mountains, that the military has all the support it needs to go in and do the job, which they did.

And there will be other battles in Afghanistan. There's going to be other struggles like Shahikot, and I'm just as confident about the outcome of those future battles as I was about Shahikot, where our soldiers are performing brilliantly. We're tough, we're strong, they're well-equipped. We have a good strategy. We are showing the world we know how to fight a guerrilla war with conventional means.

Q But don't you believe that the threat that bin Laden posed won't truly be eliminated until he is found either dead or alive?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, as I say, we haven't heard much from him. And I wouldn't necessarily say he's at the center of any command structure. And, again, I don't know where he is. I -- ***I'll repeat what I said. I truly am not that concerned about him. I know he is on the run. I was concerned about him, when he had taken over a country. I was concerned about the fact that he was basically running Afghanistan and calling the shots for the Taliban. But once we set out the policy and started executing the plan, he became -- we shoved him out more and more on the margins.*** He has no place to train his al Qaeda killers anymore. And if we -- excuse me for a minute -- and if we find a training camp, we'll take care of it. Either we will or our friends will. That's one of the things -- part of the new phase that's becoming apparent to the American people is that we're working closely with other governments to deny sanctuary, or training, or a place to hide, or a place to raise money.

And we've got more work to do. See, that's the thing the American people have got to understand, that we've only been at this six months. ***This is going to be a long struggle***. I keep saying that; I don't know whether you all believe me or not. But time will show you that it's going to take a long time to achieve this objective. And I can assure you, I am not going to blink. And I'm not going to get tired. Because I know what is at stake. And ***history has called us to action, and I am going to seize this moment for the good of the world, for peace in the world and for freedom***."[95] [emphasis added]

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[95] President Bush "Press Conference" 13/03/2002, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020313-8.html accessed 21/06/08

What we have in the above interchange is a revealing insight into the administration's framing of the 'War on Terror', Bin Laden himself has been marginalised and if not quite neutralised then at least rendered irrelevant to the broader 'War on Terror'. He is no longer of concern to the President or his administration, in that the goals of the 'War on Terror' go far beyond his capture or killing. What this suggests is that the 'long struggle' would continue regardless of whether or not Bin Laden was captured or killed. Instead of an action targeted against a specific individual, the 'War on Terror' has a much broader scope oriented towards world order and not just removing the regime in Afghanistan, as evidenced by the final quote – this is an eschatological conflict that goes beyond individual people, organisations or countries and is instead oriented at a global level.

In the period that followed, Afghanistan receded into the background in the rhetoric of the 'War on Terror'. On the practical side, low-scale military activity continues with a reduction in scale from the initial assaults although with more troops on the ground from both the United States itself and its NATO allies.[96] On the rhetorical side the emphasis was on the continued military struggle combined with what we might term the practice of liberation:

> "You've got to understand that as we routed out the Taliban, they weren't sent in to conquer; they were sent in to liberate. And they succeeded... The battles in Afghanistan are not over. American and allied troops are taking risks today in what we call Operation Mountain Lion -- hunting down the al Qaeda and Taliban forces, and keeping them on the run... peace will be achieved by helping Afghanistan develop its own stable government. Peace will be achieved by helping Afghanistan train and develop its own national army. And peace will be achieved through an education system for boys and girls which works. We're working hard in Afghanistan. We're clearing minefields. We're rebuilding roads. We're improving medical care. And we will work to help Afghanistan to

[96] US troop levels were higher in 2007 than they had been in the initial invasion, reflecting in someways the complexity of pursuing stabilisation operations versus more straightforward military assaults. See for example Associated Press "US will keep troop levels steady in Afghanistan" *International Herald Tribune* 09/02/2007, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/02/09/news/afghan.php accessed 20/06/08

develop an economy that can feed its people without feeding the world's demand for drugs."[97]

The combined theme of chasing remnants of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda and reconstructing and renewing Afghanistan is revisited throughout 2002.[98] However the implications of the broader focus of the 'War on Terror' were also becoming clear. In November, six Al-Qaeda operatives including Qaed Al Harethi, suspected of planning the USS Cole bombing, were killed as an unmanned CIA aircraft struck their jeep with a missile in Yemen.[99] Likewise the global war on terrorist financing was already taking shape.[100] At the rhetorical level as well, focus was increasingly turning to how the US would deal with one member of the axis of evil, namely Iraq, as it sought to increase pressure on Saddam Hussein via the UN. Afghanistan represented a battle in the 'War on Terror' but it was clear from the beginning that it was very far from being the whole war.

Conclusion

So what conclusions can be drawn from the above discussion? Let us return again to the original research question "How were the US military interventions possible?" What I have argued here is that one of the key factors at play was the discursive framing of the conflict along two dimensions – the grammar of security and the articulation and interpellation of identity positions. We charted the initial securitizing move by the administration in the immediate aftermath of the attacks. The terrorist attacks were shifted from a legal frame in the initial response to requiring a military response by the evening of September 11th. That this shift was successful was

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[97] President Bush "President Outlines War Effort" 17/04/02, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/04/20020417-1.html accessed 19/06/08

[98] See documents in Appendix I & II

[99] "Al-Qaida [sic] Operatives Killed in US Missile Strike in Yemen" 04/11/02 available at http://www.ict.org.il/spotlight/det.cfm?id=842 accessed 04/01/04

[100] See Kenneth McDonagh & Yee-Kuang Heng "The Other War on Terror Revealed: global governmentality and the Financial Action Task Force's campaign against terrorist financing" *Review of International Studies* Vol 34, 2008 pp.553-573

evidenced by the strong congressional support both in voting and rhetorical terms and at public opinion level by the high approval ratings for both the President and the actions taken. On the security side, the RMA and campaign for reform within the armed forces and Pentagon had accelerated the shift in the understanding of security in the aftermath of the Cold War and in the institutional approach to planning and executing strategy. The emphasis on flexible and innovative solutions appeared to be an ideal approach to respond to the challenge of eradicating terrorism in a number of complex theatres from horses in the mountains of Afghanistan to the desert of Yemen, where Qaed Al-Harethi, largely held responsible for planning the USS Cole bombing in 2000, was killed by a satellite guided missile launched from an unmanned drone while driving in a 4x4. The second and arguably more important dimension was the framing of the terrorist threat along the identity dimension. As discussed in the theoretical chapters, successful securitization requires an appeal to a collective sense of identity. Furthermore, this collective appeal would be 'articulated' in terms that built upon the cultural resources of the US, particularly in terms of American exceptionalism. We examined the Manichean division between 'Self' and 'Other', the term 'evil-doers' becoming a commonplace in referring to the generic terrorist threat. The only response to a pathologically violent enemy is violence. And there is the second key point on the identity axis, not only was a stark contrast drawn between the civilised world and barbarian terrorists but the latter designation was not restricted to mean those either directly responsible for the 9/11 attacks or linked to Al-Qaeda. Instead the emphasis was on a generalised enemy called terror which, in the course of 2002, was increasingly linked with Rogue states, WMD and Iraq in particular:

> "States like these [Iran, Iraq and North Korea], and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world...these regimes pose a grave and growing danger"[101]

Thus the discursive structure of the 'War on Terror' created a prerogative to intervene against a variety of threats both actual and potential, but in a manner that was consistent with some of the oldest themes in US Foreign Policy discourse. For example, the images of providence and goodness that had informed political practice in the US from the very earliest settlers was re-invoked in the response to the 'War on Terror'. 9/11 represented a radical encounter with the US' 'Other'. As in previous historical examples whether it was Native Americans, Mexicans, Japanese, Soviets or Islamists the political discourse constructed the conflict at the level of core identities. This radical construction makes practices that you would not consider applying to those you recognized as being in some ways similar easier to justify. In the case of the 'War on Terror' such exceptions are seen in both intervention against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda and the interrogation techniques in Guantanamo and later Abu-Ghraib. Such a construction of the nature of the 'Other' in the 'War on Terror' is then an enabling factor for the practice of that War, that is it makes it possible by successfully articulating the threat in identity terms that make counter arguments difficult if not impossible. Particularly given that the 'Other' remained a generalized concept rather than a set of discreet and specific targets, 'terror' rather than Al-Qaeda, 'evil' as opposed to Bin Laden. The implications of this broad construction will be explored further in the next chapter, when we look at the case of Iraqi.

[101] President Bush, State of the Union, op cit. 29/01/02

Chapter 7 – Iraq and the 'War on Terror'

Introduction

Whereas the previous chapter dealt with the initial response to the 9/11 attacks, this chapter turns its focus to the build up to the other major conflict of the 'War on Terror' – the war in Iraq. The previous chapter concluded with reference to the fact that the Bush administration had successfully securitized the problem of international terrorism but that this definition was not, at least as far as the securitizing move was concerned, limited to the Taliban or Al-Qaeda or Bin Laden but rather to a general threat to the United States called 'terror'. This chapter contends that the successful securitization of the threat posed by Saddam Hussein's Iraq was based on the ability of the administration initially to maintain the sense of insecurity and fear based on the 9/11 attacks and then to engage in a rhetorical strategy to link Saddam Hussein to the general threat called 'terror'. In other words, the intervention in Iraq was made possible by the construction of the threat posed by Saddam in terms that linked Iraq effectively to the threat of global terrorism which in turn was constructed in terms of a fundamental existential threat to the American way of life. This is not to argue that this was the sole reason for the intervention in Iraq. Other motivations certainly played a role in guiding the administration's hand, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to determine what those motivations were but this thesis will argue that the ability to effectively securitize Iraq and thereby make possible the US intervention against that state was dependent on the linking of the Iraqi threat to the broader discourse of the ''War on Terror''. The chapter will begin by looking at the securitizing moves of the administration between January 2002 and March 2003. It will then examine the audience response in both Congress and the general public in the same period. Finally, it will discuss the intersection between the strategic discourse and the

securitizing discourse of the ''War on Terror'', before drawing conclusions on how the intervention in Iraq was made possible through the strategic use of language that built on existing themes of American identity and security that not only predated 9/11 but also developed from the discourse of the ''War on Terror'' that followed 9/11.

As with the previous chapter a range of sources were used to investigate and establish this claim. The first set of texts are those authored by the Bush administration again focusing on texts which were 'widely attended to'; as such President Bush's State of the Union addresses in January 2002 and 2003 as well as his address to the United Nations in September 2002 can be seen as key interventions in the securitization process. Other texts featuring other members of the administration and the President will likewise be examined for the articulation of certain identities and for the 'grammar of security'. The second set of texts relate to one of the key audiences for the administration's securitizing move, US Congressional debates were looked at to see to what extent the Congress either agreed or dissented with the administration's construction of the security threat. The focus here was on the debates on the motion to authorise the President to use force in September 2002 and statements around the period of the commencement of hostilities in March 2003. Also public opinion data was used as a proxy to capture the extent to which the public can be said to have been swayed by the administration's arguments. Finally, the form of the intervention itself will be addressed by looking at the strategic debates within the administration about how to conduct the intervention.[1]

Securitizing Iraq

As highlighted in the preceding chapter, one of the key features of the early discourse of the 'War on Terror' was the generalised nature of the enemy. Freedom was under

[1] As with the previous chapter, please see the note on sources in the Bibliography

attack on 9/11 and therefore all enemies of freedom would be the targets of the response. But to paraphrase the quote from Rob Walker in Chapter 1, if enemies of freedom are the target then who are these enemies? Where are they? And what can be done about them? Having dealt with the initial phase of the ''War on Terror'' in Afghanistan, the administration began to publicly extend the answer to that question from January 2002 onwards. But before turning to that framing, it is worth noting the general air of uncertainty and insecurity that pervaded US and, indeed, Western societies more generally in the aftermath of 9/11. The 'War on Terror' context is critical in understanding why claims to existential threats might be more credible than in times when no recent event had occurred to crystallise these fears in the minds of audiences. In the US, an already edgy nation was subjected to a series of attacks using the bacteria Anthrax. Ultimately 5 people died and the individual responsible is yet to be brought to justice.[2] Even though the death toll remained relatively low the disruption caused by the attacks was widespread – two branches of government, Congress and the Supreme court, were temporarily shut down, costs to the US postal system were enormous – estimated at $3billion, with cleanup costs in Congress estimated at $24million.[3] The other major incident was the 'Shoe-bomber' incident in December 2001. Richard Reid, a British national was prevented from detonating a device hidden in his shoe while onboard a Boeing 767 from Paris to Miami. Initially Reid was believed to be working alone but later examination of the concealed device suggested he had at least some help. Remarkably, it was Reid's second attempt at

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[2] "US Anthrax Attacks", available at http://www.gwu.edu/~cih/anthraxinfo/public/publicthreat_attacks.htm, accessed 20/08/08. The alleged main suspect in the case, a US scientist that had worked for US Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases, committed suicide in 2008. See Bob Considine " Anthrax Suspect's colleague blames FBI for suicide" MSNBC, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26007186/ accessed 20/08/08

[3] David Heyman *Lessons from the Anthrax attacks: Implications for US Bioterrorism Preparedness* Centre for Strategic and International Studies and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, April 2002, p.VII available at http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/cbw/dtra02.pdf accessed 21/08/08

aviation terrorism. On the previous day Reid had attempted to fly to Miami from Paris but his dishevelled appearance, the fact that he paid in cash and carried no luggage set off alarm bells. He was questioned for so long that he missed his flight.[4] Indeed in his State of the Union Address President Bush mentioned the Reid incident in order to make a point about the necessity of continued vigilance among citizens:

> "America will continue to depend on the eyes and ears of alert citizens. A few days before Christmas, an airline flight attendant spotted a passenger lighting a match...quickly subdued the man, who had been trained by Al-Qaeda and was armed with explosives. The people on that plane were alert and, as a result, likely saved nearly 200 lives."[5]

The constant state of fear and suspicion brought on by a combination of actual terrorist attacks and official announcements created a fertile environment for pursuing security objectives. Indeed in March 2002, the logical outcome of the sustained sense of fear came about as the state institutionalised its means of signalling threat levels to the public. A new colour coded system was to be introduced ranging from green - no risk of attack - to red - highest or severe risk of attack by the Department of Homeland Security. As the head of the newly created Department, Tom Ridge, noted:

> "Chances are we will not be able to lower the condition to green until...the terror networks of global reach have been defeated and dismantled"[6]

In practice the alert level has oscillated between Yellow, elevated risk, and Orange "which indicates a very, very high risk of attack"[7] It was against this backdrop of pervasive insecurity that President Bush began to publicly identify the possibility of military action against Iraq as being a further step in the fight against terrorism.

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[4] Michael Elliott "The Shoe-Bombers World" in *Time* 16/02/2002, available at http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,203478,00.html accessed 20/08/08

[5] President Bush "State of the Union" 29/01/01 available at: accessed 23/04/07

[6] Governor Tom Ridge "Remarks by Governor Ridge Announcing Homeland Security Advisory System" 12/03/02 available at: http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/speeches/speech_0053.shtm accessed 26/10/08

[7] Ibid.

In his State of the Union Address in January 2002, we again find President Bush invoking the contours of the 'War on Terror' in terms of a binary opposition between the good, rational, 'Self' and the pathological demonic 'Other'. Despite the declared success in Afghanistan the terrorist threat, the threat to freedom remains at large:

> "The depth of their hatred is equalled by the madness of the destruction they design...Thousands of dangerous killers, schooled in the methods of murder, often supported by outlaw regimes, are now spread throughout the world like ticking time bombs, set to go off without warning...tens of thousands of trained terrorists are still at large. These enemies view the entire world as a battlefield, and we must pursue them wherever they are. So long as training camps operate, so long as nations harbour terrorists, freedom is at risk. And America and our allies must not, and will not, allow it."[8]

Our freedom is at risk from thousands of faceless killers, not just in the homeland but everywhere – 'the entire world is a battlefield' – so we must fight them wherever they are. He then adds a second layer to the nature of the threat at hand, expanding it beyond the 'faceless individuals'[9] of Al Qaeda to a network of state sponsors and WMD:

> "Our second goal is to prevent regimes that sponsor terror from threatening America or our friends and allies with weapons of mass destruction. Some of these regimes have been pretty quiet since September the 11th. But we know their true nature. North Korea is a regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, while starving its citizens.
> Iran aggressively pursues these weapons and exports terror, while an unelected few repress the Iranian people's hope for freedom.
> Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror... States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an ***axis of evil***, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our

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[8] President Bush "State of the Union" 29/01/02, op.cit.

[9] Speaking on the afternoon of the 9/11 attacks President Bush described the attack as follows: "Freedom itself was attacked this morning by a *faceless* coward, and freedom will be defended" As quoted in Mike Allen "Bush reacts to attacks, Moves to Nebraska" *Washington Post* 11/09/2001, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/articles/bush091101.htm accessed 06/09/08. This notion of a shifting and shapeless enemy, it is argued here, is crucial to understanding the shape of the 'War on Terror' that followed.

allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, ***the price of indifference would be catastrophic***."[10] [my emphasis]

Having already made a rhetorical case for extending the 'War on Terror' to the entire world, he then names specific states that pose the greatest risk. The term 'axis of evil' evokes both the historical memory of foes past – the axis powers in World War II - and the use of the term 'evil' links these states directly to the 'War on Terror' which was constructed in these terms from the very beginning. From January 2002 on then the breadth of the 'War on Terror' becomes apparent, it is not limited to the individuals responsible, nor the group to which they are connected, nor even to the state that harboured them, but rather to a number of states defined in terms of their enmity to freedom, their evilness, for want of a better term, and the need to offset the risks they pose due to their potential use or spreading of WMD. In the next few lines we see the articulation of the right to pre-empt these threats:

"We'll be deliberate, yet time is not on our side. I will not wait on events, while dangers gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons."[11]

Thus the securitizing move that this second phase of the discourse of the 'War on Terror' was trying to achieve – naming Iraq as a security threat, setting the stakes in terms of an existential threat and pointing toward a solution – disarming these states through force if necessary. We will return in the next section to explore the shifts in military and strategic thinking that were embodied in the *National Security Strategy 2002* and their implications for the practice of the 'War on Terror', it is enough here to note the linking in the discourse of the 'War on Terror' of the disparate threats of Rogue states, WMD and Terrorism.

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[10] President Bush "State of the Union" 29/01/02, op.cit.
[11] Ibid.

As with the discussion of Afghanistan and Al-Qaeda the previous September, President Bush again echoes the Manichean version of the conflict, in particular he focuses on the universality of the goals of the conflict and hints at notions of a divine mission:

> "History has called America and our allies to action, and it is both our responsibility and our privilege to fight freedom's fight."[12]
> "America will lead by defending liberty and justice because they are right and true and unchanging for all people everywhere. No nation owns these aspirations, and no nation is exempt from them. We have no intention of imposing our culture. But America will always stand firm for the non-negotiable demands of human dignity: the rule of law; limits on the power of the state; respect for women; private property; free speech; equal justice; and religious tolerance."[13]
> "Deep in the American character, there is honor, and it is stronger than cynicism. And many have discovered again that even in tragedy -- especially in tragedy -- ***God is near***. In a single instant, we realized that this will be a decisive decade in the history of liberty, that ***we've been called to a unique role in human events***. Rarely has the world faced a choice more clear or consequential."[14] [my emphasis]

The final quote is particularly relevant here, linking as it does the mission of the United States with a divine plan, albeit not in so many words, but the close positioning of the reference to God and to being called is unlikely to have been accidental. Furthermore, the insistence on the universality of the goals of the 'War on Terror' in defeating evil and protecting freedom, echo similar calls in the past for the US to play the role of "the last, best hope of man on Earth."[15] The articulation of the 'us'in this passage echoes the familiar themes of American national identity discourse particularly in its exceptionalist strands.

Throughout 2002, then, the practice of the 'War on Terror' progressed on the military front in Afghanistan, and indeed Yemen, and more quietly in relation to cooperative efforts on anti-terrorist financing and domestic security. By March 2002,

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[12] Ibid.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ronald Reagan "We will be a city upon a hill" 25/01/1974, available at http://reagan2020.us/speeches/City_Upon_A_Hill.asp accessed 27/10/08

it was becoming clear that Iraq was being securitised in a manner that suggested it was the most likely target of any future security response. In response to a question at a press conference almost exactly a year prior to the beginning of the war, President Bush had the following to say:

> "This is a nation [Iraq] run by a man who is willing to kill his own people by using chemical weapons; a man who won't let inspectors into the country; a man who's obviously got something to hide. And he is a problem, and we're going to deal with him. But the first stage is to consult with our allies and friends, and that's exactly what we're doing."[16]

In the same press conference, the President mentioned Iran only once and North Korea not at all.[17] Throughout 2002, the focus on Iraq became more intense accelerating in the lead up to the Congressional vote on a motion that would authorise the use of force in September 2002.

It should be noted though that military planning for an Iraqi operation predated the September 11th attacks. Indeed regime change in Iraq had been stated US policy since 1998 and the US military had been engaged in ongoing operations in the Iraqi theatre more or less since the end of the war over Kuwait in 1991.[18] Furthermore Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz and John Bolton, all members of President Bush's first term administration had signed a letter in 1998 arguing that Saddam Hussein must be overthrown. Prior to 9/11 the administration was divided between one group centred on the office of the Vice-President that advocated a more aggressive strategy toward Iraq, albeit stopping short of calling for an invasion, and another group centred on the Department of State that favoured pressuring Iraq via the sanctions system.[19]

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[16] President Bush "President Bush Holds Press Conference" 13/03/2002, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020313-8.html, accessed 27/10/08

[17] Ibid.

[18] See for example the 'Iraq Liberation Act 1998' 31/10/1998 available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/iraq/libact103198.pdf accessed 27/10/08; on the ongoing US military activity in Iraq see Thomas E Ricks *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq* Allen Lane, London 2006, Chapter 2

[19] Scilla Elworthy and Paul Rogers "The ''War on Terror'ism': 12 month audit and future strategy options" Oxford Research Group, 11/09/02 p.6 available at:

Elworthy and Rogers argue that the post-9/11 framing of Iraq as part of the 'War on Terror' was a case of the latter providing "a convenient umbrella for the pursuit of unrelated Foreign Policy goals."[20] This argument may well be correct, however this thesis contends that the war on Iraq was made possible in the context of the 'War on Terror' and that in particular it was the discursive construction of the nature of the conflict, Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi people and the potential outcomes in a manner that mirrored the contours of the discourse of the 'War on Terror' that made it possible. In the next section we will deal in more detail with the transformation of security practices that enabled the Iraq war to take place, hereunder we examine the path to war as it was constructed through the administration's constant invocation of insecurity and identity from September 2002 onwards.

Speaking to the UN General Assembly in September 2002, President Bush began by invoking the memory of the attacks of the previous year:

> "We meet one year and one day after a terrorist attack brought grief to my country, and brought grief to many citizens of our world...We've accomplished much in the last year -- in Afghanistan and beyond. We have much yet to do -- in Afghanistan and beyond. Many nations represented here have joined in the fight against global terror, and the people of the United States are grateful."[21]

> "Above all, our principles and our security are challenged today by outlaw groups and regimes that accept no law of morality and have no limit to their violent ambitions. In the attacks on America a year ago, we saw the destructive intentions of our enemies. This threat hides within many nations, including my own. In cells and camps, terrorists are plotting further destruction, and building new bases for their ***war against civilization***. And our greatest fear is that ***terrorists will find a shortcut to their mad ambitions when an outlaw regime supplies them with the technologies to kill on a massive scale***.
> In one place -- in one regime -- we find all these dangers, in their most lethal and aggressive forms, exactly the kind of aggressive threat the United Nations was born to confront...Iraq"[22]

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[20] Ibid., p.7
[21] President Bush "President's Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly" 12/09/2002, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-1.html, accessed 04/09/2004
[22] Ibid.

He goes on to list a 'rap-sheet' of Iraq's transgressions in the past including developing nuclear weapons, human rights abuses, the use of chemical weapons, violations of UN resolutions. As with his address to congress in September 2001, he again highlights the distinction between the Iraqi people and the regime being targeted:

> "The United States has no quarrel with the Iraqi people; they've suffered too long in silent captivity. Liberty for the Iraqi people is a great moral cause, and a great strategic goal. The people of Iraq deserve it; the security of all nations requires it. Free societies do not intimidate through cruelty and conquest, and open societies do not threaten the world with mass murder. The United States supports political and economic liberty in a unified Iraq."[23]

Again we see in this construction the argument for universality of the liberal model of political organisation, the assumption that once the regime is removed the problems associated with it will disappear. The question then is why now? These ideas about Iraq have been common currency at least since the first Gulf War. As mentioned above regime change had been stated US policy since 1998 and members of the Bush administration had previously called for Saddam's removal. However, the ability to define something as a security threat is limited by both the material and discursive context. This thesis argues that the 'War on Terror' discourse was an enabling condition that allowed the administration to construct Saddam and his regime as a threat in a manner that would not have been credible or viable outside of a discourse constructed in these terms. Although Iraq had long been highlighted as a country of concern, the immediacy of the problem in a post-9/11 world could be articulated more easily. President Bush in his call for action at the end of his UN address articulates this urgency:

> "The history, the logic, and the facts lead to one conclusion: Saddam Hussein's regime is a grave and gathering danger. To suggest otherwise is to hope against the evidence. To assume this regime's good faith is to bet the lives of millions

[23] Ibid.

and the peace of the world in a reckless gamble. And this is a risk we must not take."[24]

He goes on to call on the other member states to recognise this danger is urgent and to work together to meet it:

"We must choose between a world of fear and a world of progress. We cannot stand by and do nothing while dangers gather. We must stand up for our security, and for the permanent rights and the hopes of mankind. By heritage and by choice, the United States of America will make that stand. And, delegates to the United Nations, you have the power to make that stand, as well."[25]

However in the second last line, we can see that the President is separating the US from the UN more generally – "America ***will*** make that stand" whereas the other delegates "***have the power to***". Therefore the United States retains for itself the right to act as it deems appropriate, they would like the international community to follow but this is not set as a necessary criterion for action.

In the months that followed the President's address at the UN, a twin track process was set in motion; on the one-hand the UN produced Security Council Resolution 1441 which called for Iraqi compliance with Weapons Inspectors and full disclosure of present and past WMD programmes. Article 13 of the resolution:

"13. *Recalls*, in that context, that the Council has repeatedly warned Iraq that it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations."[26]

While on the other hand, military planning for the Iraq invasion continued apace within the US, as will be outlined in the next section. The negotiations leading up to resolution 1441 and its aftermath reflected significant differences not just over how to deal with Iraq but also in the perception of the Iraqi threat. For example already in August 2002, Gerhard Schroder argued that "it would be a mistake to intervene

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[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid.
[26] UNSC Resolution 1441, 08/11/2002, available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/682/26/PDF/N0268226.pdf?OpenElement accessed 17/10/08

militarily in Iraq."[27] Russian and French opposition to a carte blanche for military action was one of the main reasons for the ambiguity of Article 13. For the French and the Russians, the phraseology of the resolution meant that any further action would have to be brought back to the Security Council for approval. Whereas the British, and particularly the Americans, argued that although consensus was desirable, Res 1441 and previous resolutions gave sufficient legal authority for military action.[28]

Although weapons inspectors did return in November 2002, the US continued to argue that Iraq was not cooperating fully and that their own intelligence sources provided evidence of this. Colin Powell's set piece address to the UN Security Council, which raised comparisons with a similar presentation by Adlai Stevenson at the time of the Cuban Missile crisis[29], was designed to influence world opinion.[30] In his address Secretary Powell outlined what the US perceived to be the nature of the Iraqi threat:

> "The material I will present to you comes from a variety of sources. Some are U.S. sources and some are those of other countries. Some of the sources are technical, such as intercepted telephone conversations and photos taken by satellites. Other sources are people who have risked their lives to let the world know what Saddam Hussein is really up to.I cannot tell you everything that we know, but what I can share with you, when combined with what all of us have learned over the years, is deeply troubling. What you will see is an accumulation of facts and disturbing patterns of behavior. The facts and Iraqis' behavior, [sic] Iraq's behavior, demonstrate that Saddam Hussein and his regime

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[27] As quoted in Klaus Larres "Mutual Incomprehension: U.S.-German Value Gaps beyond Iraq" *Washington Quarterly* Spring 2003 p.23

[28] For an argument supporting that view see William H. Taft "Pre-emption, Iraq and International Law" in *The American Journal of International Law* Vol 97. No. 3, 2003 pp.557-563; for the counter-argument see Ronald C. Kramer & Raymond J. Michalowski "War, Aggression and State crime: A criminological analysis of the invasion and occupation of Iraq" in *British Journal of Criminology* Vol 45 No.4, 2005 pp.446-469

[29] See for example Adam Clymer "Threats and Responses: U.N. Footnote; Powell in the Security Council: Will echoes of Stevenson fill the chamber" *New York Times* 04/02/03, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C05E5DA1138F937A35751C0A9659C8B63 accessed 24/06/03; Others argued to the contrary that Powell's was not a 'Stevenson' moment. See Stephen Zunes "Mr Powell, You're no Adlai Stevenson" *Foreign Policy in Focus* 06/02/03, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/attack/2003/0206stevenson.htm, accessed 25/06/03

[30] A Pew Global Attitudes survey shows that outside of the US no other likely coalition ally had a population with a majority in favour of military action. See Pew Global Attitudes Project "America's image further erodes, Europeans want weaker ties" 18/03/03, available at http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=175 accessed 25/06/03

have made no effort, no effort, to disarm, as required by the international community".[31]

He goes on to emphasise why this combination of factors is of particular concern in the contemporary context:

> "Our concern is not just about these illicit weapons; it's the way that these illicit weapons can be connected to terrorists and terrorist organizations that have no compunction about using such devices against innocent people around the world."[32]
> "Al-Qaida continues to have a deep interest in acquiring weapons of mass destruction. As with the story of Zakawi and his network, I can trace the story of a senior terrorist operative telling how Iraq provided training in these weapons to al-Qaida. Fortunately, this operative is now detained and he has told his story. I will relate it to you now as he, himself, described it.
> This senior al-Qaida terrorist was responsible for one of al-Qaida's training camps in Afghanistan. His information comes firsthand from his personal involvement at senior levels of al-Qaida. He says bin Laden and his top deputy in Afghanistan, deceased al-Qaida leader Mohammed Atef, did not believe that al-Qaida labs in Afghanistan were capable enough to manufacture these chemical or biological agents. They needed to go somewhere else. They had to look outside of Afghanistan for help.
> Where did they go? Where did they look? They went to Iraq. The support that he describes included Iraq offering chemical or biological weapons training for two al-Qaida associates beginning in December 2000. He says that a militant known as Abdullah al-Araqi had been sent to Iraq several times between 1997 and 2000 for help in acquiring poisons and gasses. Abdullah al-Araqi characterized the relationship he forged with Iraqi officials as successful."[33]

The picture of the Iraqi threat being painted was clear, that there was a clear risk of a link between Saddam Hussein's regime and Al-Qaeda and given the track records of both, the civilised world simply could not stand idly by and allow this potential danger to become a reality. In his concluding remarks, Powell reasserts this position and determination of the US to take action:

> "The United States will not and cannot run that risk for the American people. Leaving Saddam Hussein in possession of weapons of mass destruction for a few more months or years is not an option, not in a post-September 11 world."[34]

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[31] Secretary of State Colin Powell "Remarks to the United Nations Security Council" 05/02/2003, available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iraq/2003/iraq-030205-powell-un-17300pf.htm accessed 26/10/08
[32] Ibid.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid.

The concerns raised by the weapons inspectors report about unresolved issues in relation to Iraqi compliance solidified the case for the US[35], although disagreement remained at the international level. Two elements of the UN debate are worth emphasising. Although internally debates in the administration reflected widely divergent views of the efficacy of pursuing the UN route,[36] the decision to go down the UN route at least at first reflected a very real concern for the perception of the US in the world, that unilateral action would only add to the 'misunderstanding' of the US that had lead to 9/11. The second point is that even though the UN route was ultimately unsuccessful in building a broad consensus for action, it did construct the Iraq situation as a global security issue in a way that may not have been possible at the domestic level. Thus it can be seen, at least in part, as part of the securitizing move to convince the domestic audience that the threat was indeed 'grave and gathering.' A final additional point is that although UN level action didn't come about, the US did successfully motivate a 'coalition of the willing'[37] to support its effort. As the letter calling for the UN Security council to 'face up to its responsibilities' signed by the leaders of 8 European countries including the UK, Czech Republic and Spain argued, mirroring the US case for war:

> "We Europeans have since reiterated our backing for Resolution 1441...The combination of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism is a threat of incalculable consequences...Europe has no quarrel with the Iraqi people...We cannot allow a dictator to systematically violate these Resolutions. If they are not complied with, the Security Council will lose its credibility and world peace will suffer as a result"[38]

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[35] Mark Agnew "Iraqi Weapons Inspections: The mirage of support" in *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies* Vol 9 No 4, 2007 p.9

[36] See for example Bob Woodward *Plan of Attack* Simon & Schuster, New York, 2004 p.174-6

[37] See CNN "Bush: Join 'coalition of the willing'", 20/11/02, available at http://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/europe/11/20/prague.bush.nato/ accessed 29/10/08

[38] Jose Maria Aznar, Jose Manuel Duarao Barroso, Silvio Berluscone, Tony Blair, Vaclav Havel, Peter Medgyessy, Leszek Miller & Anders Fogh "Text Stresses value of transatlantic bon" *The Irish Times* 31/01/2003 available at http://www.ireland.com/newspaper/world/2003/0131/2741252135FR31LETTER.html accessed 22/01/04

Even if the 'coalition' can be considered window dressing on what was essentially a unilateral action, the fact that such window-dressing was considered necessary points toward the need for the administration to maintain the image of the American 'Self' as a world leader, and as operating on the side of good in the ongoing conflict.

At the domestic level, the case for conflict was made in stark terms. Appearing on CNN's Late Edition in September 2002, then National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice warned:

"We don't want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud."[39]

Likewise, Vice President Cheney argued:

> "It's important for us...to remember that the world has changed...what we found on September 11th is that the danger now is an attack that's launched from within the United States itself...you have to completely recalibrate your thinking in terms of how you deal with that...Saddam Hussein...There's a pattern and a track record there that one has to be concerned about...increasingly we believe that the United States may well become the target of those activities [weapons development]"[40]

What's reflected here in Dick Cheney's response is an attempt to redefine, given what the discourse of the 'War on Terror' constructs as 'known', how security threats are measured. As Cheney once reportedly put it, it's the 1% doctrine – if there's a 1% chance of an attack emanating from a particular source then the administration had an obligation to deal with that threat as if it were a certainty.[41] This again is not to argue that the 1% doctrine was believed by the administration, this may or may not have been the case, but it certainly was the basis on which they articulated the security threat posed by Saddam's Iraq. Cheney in the same interview goes on to reassert the

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[39] Condoleezza Rice as quoted in "Top Bush Officials push case against Saddam" 08/09/02 available at http://archives.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/09/08/iraq.debate/ accessed 29/10/08

[40] Dick Cheney in an interview with Tim Russert, NBC 'Meet the press', 08/09/02 available at http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/meet.htm accessed 27/10/08

[41] Ron Suskind "Personality, Ideology and Bush's Terror Wars" in *New York Times* 20/06/06 available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/20/books/20kaku.html accessed 28/10/08

same generalised conception of the enemy that is evident throughout the discourse of the 'War on Terror':

> "and it would be a mistake for us to assume that capturing Bin Laden or not capturing Bin Laden automatically sort of wraps up the 'War on Terror'. It won't"[42]

He goes on in the interview to discuss the links between Al-Qaeda, 9/11 and Iraq. The point he argues is a revealing one – it is not that Saddam Hussein was responsible in anyway for the attacks but rather that he represents a similar kind of enemy and the risk of Al-Qaeda acquiring WMD via a rogue state such as Iraq was unacceptable in the post-9/11 security environment as envisaged by the administration:

> "I want to separate out 9/11, from the other relationships between Iraq and the al-Qaeda organization. But there is a pattern of relationships going back many years"[43]

And later in the same interview:

> "The fact of the matter is, if you look at Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda organization, on the one hand, and Saddam Hussein on the other, while they come from different perspectives...they have the same objective: to drive the United States out of the Middle East, to strike the United States, if at all possible"[44]

The effect of these and other statements was to raise the prominence of the Iraqi security threat and to firmly link the issue of disarming Iraq to the broader context of the 'War on Terror'.

In his State of the Union address in January 2003, President Bush used the opportunity to single out Iraq as a particularly grave threat in the context of the 'War on Terror' and the aforementioned nexus of rogue states, terrorists and WMD's:

> "Before September the 11th, many in the world believed that Saddam Hussein could be contained. But chemical agents, lethal viruses and shadowy terrorist networks are not easily contained. Imagine those 19 hijackers with other weapons and other plans -- this time armed by Saddam Hussein. It would take one vial, one canister, one crate slipped into this country to bring a day of horror

[42] Cheney, NBC interview, 08/09/02 op.cit
[43] Ibid.
[44] Ibid.

> like none we have ever known. We will do everything in our power to make sure that that day never comes. Some have said we must not act until the threat is imminent. Since when have terrorists and tyrants announced their intentions, politely putting us on notice before they strike? If this threat is permitted to fully and suddenly emerge, all actions, all words, and all recriminations would come too late. Trusting in the sanity and restraint of Saddam Hussein is not a strategy, and it is not an option."[45]

The securitizing move can be seen as follows, after 9/11 (a theme picked up by Cheney) the calculus of risk has changed: we cannot afford to wait for an 'imminent' threat as 'evil' states will take advantage of our naivety.[46] The only way to deal with such an adversary is violence. Finally, as with the conflict in Afghanistan President Bush is at pains to make the distinction between the people of Iraq and Hussein's regime:

> "And tonight I have a message for the brave and oppressed people of Iraq: Your enemy is not surrounding your country -- your enemy is ruling your country. And the day he and his regime are removed from power will be the day of your liberation"[47]

Not only is he making the distinction between the 'brave and oppressed' Iraqis and their brutal ruler, he is also constructing any action against Saddam as a liberation, in turn implying the actor who takes such action will be a liberator. By contrast, Iran and North Korea - the other two prongs of the 'Axis of Evil'- are not discussed in anything near as stark terms. Iraq is discussed in several paragraphs and a total of 1260 words whereas Iran and North Korea get 213 between them. The tone is also a major contrast, in Iran the US "supports their [the Iranians] aspirations to live in freedom" and in North Korea:

> "America is working with the countries of the region -- South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia -- to find a peaceful solution, and to show the North Korean government that nuclear weapons will bring only isolation, economic stagnation, and continued hardship. The North Korean regime will find respect

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[45] President George W. Bush "State of the Union address" 28/01/03 available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html, accessed 04/09/09
[46] Ibid.
[47] Ibid.

in the world and revival for its people only when it turns away from its nuclear ambitions."[48]

The interesting aspect of these examples is that by a number of measures North Korea (actually having nuclear weapons) and Iran (being a vocal opponent of both the US and Israel) both could have been argued to present a greater security threat to the US and its interests, however only Iraq was constructed in terms that shifted the issue into the realm of a 'grave and gathering' danger.

Similarly, Secretary Rumsfeld set out the terms of the threat in a prepared statement to the House and Senate Armed Services Committee. He began by invoking the memory of 9/11:

> "Today, I want to discuss the task of preventing even more devastating attacks that could kill not thousands, but potentially tens of thousands of our fellow citizens.
> As we meet, state sponsors of terror across the world are working to develop and acquire weapons of mass destruction. As we speak, chemists, biologists, and nuclear scientists are toiling in weapons labs and underground bunkers, working to give the world's most dangerous dictators weapons of unprecedented power and lethality."[49]

In the second part of this statement, he constructs the link between 'state sponsors of terror' and 'dangerous dictators' and the risk that WMD technology would be passed from these 'dangerous dictators' to their terrorist allies. He goes on to specifically identify Hussein's regime as the key concern.

> "Another question that has been asked is this: The Administration argues Saddam Hussein poses a grave and growing danger. Where is the "smoking gun?"...the last thing we want is a smoking gun. A gun smokes after it has been fired. The goal must be to stop Saddam Hussein before he fires a weapon of mass destruction against our people. ...But the question raises an issue that it is useful to discuss about the kind of evidence we consider to be appropriate to act in the 21st century...But in the age of WMD, the objective is not to protect the "rights" of dictators like Saddam Hussein it is to protect the lives of our citizens. And when there is that risk, and we are trying to defend against the closed

[48] Ibid.
[49] Secretary Donald Rumsfeld "Prepared testimony to the House and Senate Armed Services Committee" 18/09/02, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=283 accessed 17/09/09

> societies and shadowy networks that threaten us in the 21st century, expecting to find that standard of evidence, from thousands of miles away, and to do so before such a weapon has been used, is ***not realistic...any who insist on perfect evidence are back in the 20th century and still thinking in pre-9/11 terms.*** On September 11th, we were awakened to the fact that America is now vulnerable to unprecedented destruction. That awareness ought to be sufficient to change the way we think about our security, how we defend our country and the type of certainty and evidence we consider appropriate."

This is strong language indeed; not only does Saddam Hussein's regime present an existential threat to the people of the United States but those who argue against the necessity of taking action are 'not realistic' and living in a pre-9/11 past that is no longer relevant. If we think of this in terms of 'interpellation', this rhetorical construction hails us to adopt the administration's view of the Iraqi threat. Few people wish to think of themselves as unrealistic, even in someone else's terms, and fewer still would reject the proposition that 9/11 represented a shift in the security situation for the US.

The language of the final ultimatum delivered publicly by President Bush in March 2003 echoes strongly with the similar set of statements made in the run up to the Afghan intervention:

> "But America's cause is always larger than America's security. We also stand for the advance of freedom and opportunity and hope. The lives and freedom of the Iraqi people matter little to Saddam Hussein, but they matter greatly to us."[50]

The President draws a clear contrast between the United States and Saddam, but also between Saddam and his people. For the US the fight is for the liberty and security of others as well as itself. He then goes on to highlight the effectiveness of intervention and the importance of liberty in the post-war Iraq:

> "There was a time when many said that the cultures of Japan and Germany were incapable of sustaining democratic values. They were wrong. Some say the same of Iraq today. They, too, are mistaken. The nation of Iraq -- with its proud

[50] President Bush "President's Radio Address" 01/03/03 available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030301.html, accessed 26/10/08

> heritage, abundant resources and skilled and educated people -- is fully capable of moving toward democracy and living in freedom."[51]

He then turns to address the role of the United States:

> "Yet the security of our nation and the hopes of millions depend on us, and Americans do not turn away from duties because they are hard. We have met great tests in other times, and we will meet the tests of our time."[52]

Here he is evoking memories of past struggles and touching on the theme of America's destiny to be a leader in the world. Before turning to address the requirements for immediate action:

> "The regime has a history of reckless aggression in the Middle East. It has a deep hatred of America and our friends. And it has aided, trained and harbored terrorists, including operatives of al Qaeda. The danger is clear: using chemical, biological or, one day, nuclear weapons, obtained with the help of Iraq, the terrorists could fulfill their stated ambitions and kill thousands or hundreds of thousands of innocent people in our country, or any other. ***The United States and other nations did nothing to deserve or invite this threat***. But we will do everything to defeat it. Instead of drifting along toward tragedy, we will set a course toward safety. Before the day of horror can come, before it is too late to act, this danger will be removed."[53]

Here, the emphasis is on the need and drive for decisive and effective action but also the nature of the conflict is re-emphasised – the US and it's allies did nothing to deserve this threat but they will act swiftly and decisively to deal with it.

> "The cause of peace requires all free nations to recognize new and undeniable realities. In the 20th century, some chose to appease murderous dictators, whose threats were allowed to grow into genocide and global war. In this century, when evil men plot chemical, biological and nuclear terror, a policy of appeasement could bring destruction of a kind never before seen on this earth. Terrorists and terror states do not reveal these threats with fair notice, in formal declarations -- and responding to such enemies only after they have struck first is not self-defense, it is suicide. The security of the world requires disarming Saddam Hussein now."[54]

The eschatological nature of the conflict is clear; the scale of potential destruction is unimaginable. Because of the dangerous and unpredictable nature of the 'Other',

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[51] Ibid.
[52] Ibid.
[53] President Bush "President Says Saddam Hussein Must leave Iraq within 48hours" 17/03/03 available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030317-7.html accessed 23/10/08
[54] Ibid.

because of their demonstrated disregard for human life, negotiation or prevarication is tantamount to self-destruction. The only option in such a situation is the one announced 48 hours later, the beginning of military action against Iraq:

> "My fellow citizens, at this hour, American and coalition forces are in the early stages of military operations to disarm Iraq, to free its people and to defend the world from grave danger. On my orders, coalition forces have begun striking selected targets of military importance to undermine Saddam Hussein's ability to wage war...In this conflict, America faces an enemy who has no regard for conventions of war or rules of morality...Now that conflict has come, the only way to limit its duration is to apply decisive force. And I assure you, this will not be a campaign of half measures, and we will accept no outcome but victory...We will pass through this time of peril and carry on the work of peace. We will defend our freedom. We will bring freedom to others and we will prevail."[55]

The next section of the thesis deals with the two audiences defined as particularly relevant to the discourse of the 'War on Terror' – Congress whose formal approval was required, and the people without whose moral support a successful campaign would be difficult in a democratic society. We then turn to look briefly at the shifts in the practice of security that interacted with the rhetorical constructions outlined above and made the particular intervention in Iraq possible. The following section then deals with the invasion itself and, to a limited degree, the aftermath. The central point is that intervention in this case was constructed as the only viable option through the construction of Saddam Hussein as a radical 'Other', whose very nature presented an existential threat to the US 'Self'. This made the practice of intervention possible by creating the conditions in which such action appeared legitimate and practical, if not inevitable.

Securitizing Succeeds – Audience responses in Congress and the General Public

In the previous chapter, it was noted that both Congress and the General public were already in favour of military responses when the administration made their

[55] President Bush "President Bush Addresses the Nation" 19/03/03 available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030319-17.html accessed 20/10/08

securitizing moves, this was certainly not the case in relation to the build up to the war in Iraq. In September 2002, support for the President had slipped to 65%, albeit still remarkably high, however responses to questions on Iraq and associated issues were more mixed. Terrorism remained a high priority with 52% claiming it to be the main issue facing the United States. On Iraq, 68% approved the use of military force by the US to remove Saddam Hussein but 58% believed that the UN should be given more time to get weapons inspectors into Iraq. When the question was put in terms of whether the US should attack Iraq only if Iraq attacks first or if the US think Iraq might attack, 18% supported the former with 28% supporting the latter, with the remainder either undecided or not answering.[56] These figures however relate to the beginning of the serious ratcheting up of the Iraqi threat in the US. Successful securitization would be better shown by later polls in February and March 2003, just before and contemporaneous with the time of the invasion. In February though, the figure for those who approved of the use of force by the US to remove Saddam had actually fallen to 65%, while the number that supported giving the UN more time was now at 60%.[57] In March the figures had shifted again with 62% favouring the removal of Saddam by US military force, and 61% in favour of more time for the UN.[58] The figures suggest then, that although a clear majority identified Saddam Hussein as a threat, (suggesting a successful securitization in terms of definition) this clear majority did not necessarily transfer into clear support for military action in March 2003. This relative lack of support is remarkable given the positive press coverage

[56] See CBS News Monthly Poll, September 2002 available via ICPRS available at http://dx.doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR03705 accessed 06/09/09
[57] See CBS News Monthly Poll, February 2003 available via ICPRS available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR03745 accessed 06/09/09
[58] See CBS News Monthly Poll, March 2003 available via ICPRS available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR03754 accessed 06/09/09

that accompanied the administration's arguments on the Iraq issue.[59] However, even so, the above 60% approval rate of the removal of Saddam does suggest that in broad terms the securitization move was successful in not just identifying a threat but also in the course of action proposed even if the timing of that action was disputed.

A similar story can be told of the reactions in Congress to the administration's securitizing move in relation to Iraq. A clear majority approved of the use of force, while a significant minority opposed it. Unlike the Afghan situation in September 2001, consensus did not exist on what to do about the perceived threat from Saddam and Iraq. As early as June 2002, Representative Jackson-Lee was arguing:

> "The House passed H.J. Res. 75[60] by a vote of 392-12, which said that Iraq's refusal to readmit U.N. inspectors is a material breach of its international obligations and a mounting threat to peace and security. The resolution did not explicity authorize U.S. military action...I believe we have no consensus on an invasion of Iraq and I am requesting a full review by Congress of the Administration's move against Iraq now--and where it will lead us"[61]

Thus, Iraq was viewed as a security concern but not necessarily as necessitating a military response. The administration's securitizing move was, then, partially successful by mid-2002, Iraq was accepted as a security threat but they yet had to convince Congress that given that Iraq was a security threat, military action was warranted.

Republican Representative McInnis of Colorado argued on September 9th in a manner that typified the approach of those who approved the passing of a motion authorising the US to use force:

> "what is the biggest export of this country that no other country can match? In fact, cumulatively, if you put all the history of the countries together in the

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[59] For example the *New York Times* decided to apologise for its coverage of the build up to the Iraq war in 2004 because it did not do enough to question claims put forward by the administration in relation to the nature of the Iraqi threat. See The Editors "The Times and Iraq" *New York Times* 26/05/2004

[60] The resolution had been passed in December 2001.

[61] Representative Jackson-Lee, TX, "Not all lawmakers back plan on Iraq" House of Representatives, 17/06/02, available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?r107:43:./temp/~r107bTzjYg:: accessed 17/09/09

> world, they do not even come close to exporting what the United States of America exports as its biggest item. What is that item? It is freedom…Keep in mind that Iraq and the al Qaeda are comrades in arms. These people have one very strong common bond: they want to see the destruction of every man, woman and child, and keep in mind, child, kindergartners, of America. And when they are done with America, they will want to see the destruction of every man, woman and child in Canada. And when they are done with Canada, they will want to see it in France, and they will want to see it in the United Kingdom. They will want to see it wherever they can get it. These people are mad people, but they are smart and they are intelligent. That is obvious by the strike they carried out against the United States. This is a cancer we are dealing with. The people that speak like this, that carry out these acts, they are the equivalent of a horrible, fast-moving malignant cancer."[62]

The threat from Iraq is constructed as akin to a disease that will spread, infect and destroy not just America but other free countries. Again the interpellation at play leads the listener to contrast America and freedom with the mad, destructiveness of Al-Qaeda and Iraq who are 'comrades in arms' and reminding us that they attacked us before. He goes on to dismiss those who fail to recognise the nature of the threat as akin to the cancer patient who is told amputation can save him, but refuses to agree because the limb currently causes no pain, this echoes Rumsfeld's formulation of the difference between the pre and post 9/11 security calculus. This form of rhetoric is common among those who argue in favour of military action with a recurrent linking of Saddam, Al-Qaeda and 9/11 and the re-invoking of American identity as the defender of freedom.[63] Conversely those who opposed the resolution in Senate debates argued that not enough had been done to convince them that the war in Iraq was linked to the 'War on Terror' and even that the war would prove counter-productive:

> "without a better case for an al-Qaida connection to Saddam Hussein, this proposed invasion must stand on its own merit--not on some notion that those

[62] Representative McInnis "The Iraqi Situation" 09/09/02, available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/C?r107:./temp/~r107MRunEg accessed 17/09/09

[63] See for example the contributions by Senator Snowe "The Iraq Resolution" 09/10/02, available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/C?r107:./temp/~r107uGhqOs accessed 17/09/09; Senator Hutchison "Authorization of the Use of United States Armed Forces against Iraq" 09/10/02 available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/C?r107:./temp/~r107Mb9otf accessed 17/09/09

who question this invasion don't thoroughly condemn and want to see the destruction of the perpetrators of 9/11 and similar terrorist attacks on the United States."[64]

"Why squander the goodwill we had in the world? Why squander this unity? If September 11 taught us anything, it is that protecting our security involves much more than military might. It involves cooperation with other nations to break up terrorist rings, dry up the sources of funding, and address the conditions of ignorance and despair that create breeding grounds for terrorists. We are far more likely to achieve these goals by working with other nations than by going it alone."[65]

The point of raising opposing voices is that this opposition was much stronger in relation to Iraq than it had been in Afghanistan. The resolutions eventually passed, in the Senate by 77 votes to 23 and in the House by 296-133. Although less complete in its success than the securitization of Afghanistan, the Bush administration's securitizing move convinced virtually all of Congress that Saddam posed a threat and a significant majority that this threat warranted military action. Disagreements did exist but as cited above these were largely expressed in terms consistent with the articulations of identity in the broader discourse of the 'War on Terror' but disagreed with the proposed actions.

The Iraq invasion in Practice

As discussed in the previous chapter, the US military was undergoing a period of institutional and strategic reform. This process had a particular focus on upgrading the technological capabilities of the military while reducing the dependence on man power or 'boot on the ground'. In September 2002, at roughly the same time as the administration began to make the Iraq case in earnest at the UN, the Bush administration released *The National Security Strategy*. The President's preamble to the strategy ends with the following exhortation:

"Freedom is the non-negotiable demand of human dignity; the birthright of every person – in every civilisation. Throughout history, freedom has been

[64] Senator Feingold, ibid.
[65] Senator Leahy, ibid.

> threatened by war and terror; it has been challenged by the clashing of wills of powerful states and the evil designs of tyrants; and it has been tested by widespread poverty and disease. Today, humanity holds in its hands the opportunity to further freedom's triumph over all these foes. The United States welcomes our responsibility to lead in this great mission."[66]

In a nutshell, we have a summary of the discourse of the 'War on Terror'. On the one side we have evil and tyrannical enemies of freedom, on the other we have a universal model of mankind, lead by the United States. However, it is the practical side of the strategy that interests us here. In particular in chapters III and V, which focus on strengthening alliances to defeat global terrorism and dealing with the threat of WMD respectively,[67] we find the following:

> "The United States of America is fighting a war against terrorists of global reach. The enemy is not a single political regime or person or religion or ideology. The enemy is terrorism – premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents."[68]

This statement of the nature of the terrorist threat is significant, in that it is a clear statement of the generalised nature of the terrorist foe. Al-Qaeda are discussed in this section of the document but the focus is not limited to them. The strategy notes the apparent success in Afghanistan but stresses that the 'War on Terror' will continue both through continued efforts to disrupt and destroy terrorist organisations and attempts to win the 'war of ideas'.[69] It also stresses the need for international cooperation and the willingness of the US to support the counter-terrorist efforts of other states where required and where appropriate. In doing so:

> "we [the United States] are forging new, productive international relationships and redefining existing ones in ways that meet the challenges of the twenty-first century"[70]

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[66] President Bush *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* 2002, p.vi
[67] Ibid. p.vii
[68] Ibid. p.5
[69] Ibid. p.5-6
[70] Ibid. p.7

The 'Coalition of the Willing' that supported the US in Iraq was just one such example of this flexible approach to multilateralism, others such as the FATF, and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) targeted quieter aspects of the 'War on Terror'.[71] However, it was the unilateral rather than the multilateral aspects of the new security strategy that caused the most interest and debate, and indeed is most relevant to the conduct of the Iraq campaign, Rogue states, WMD and Terrorism – the idea of Pre-emptive war.

> "The gravest danger to freedom lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. When the spread of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons, along with ballistic missile technology – when that occurs, even weak states and small groups could attain a catastrophic power to strike great nations. Our enemies have declared this very intention, and have been caught seeking these terrible weapons. They want the capability to blackmail us, or to harm us, or to harm our friends – and we will oppose them with all our power."[72]

The strategy goes on to highlight the changed strategic understanding in relation to WMD, contrasting the post-Cold War and the Cold War worlds, arguing that the full extent of this transformed security situation only became apparent:

> "Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past...We cannot let our enemies strike first"[73]

The logic of the administration's thinking is clear, whereas previously deterrence and the threat of overwhelming response was sufficient to reduce drastically the likelihood of attack with WMD, the current world security situation required different logics and different standards of judgement:

> "The United States has long maintained the option of pre-emptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the

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[71] See Yee-Kuang Heng & Kenneth McDonagh *Risk, Global Governance and Security* Routledge, 2009 for further discussion of these quieter aspects of the War on Terror.
[72] President Bush as quoted in *The National Security Strategy* 2002, p.13
[73] Ibid. p.15

time and place of the enemy's attacks. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act pre-emptively"[74]

At the level of security doctrine then, the logic for the Iraq invasion was clear – here was a country which had a track record of both the development and use of WMD, it was by most reasonable standards anti-American and anti-Western, albeit for secular rather than religious reasons. The suspicion that Iraq was developing WMD and the potential that it would cooperate with international terrorists was by the criteria outlined above provided a necessary pre-condition for pre-emptive action to take place. Furthermore it was precisely this formulation of the strategic calculus that was used by the administration to justify the need for military action in Iraq.

The Invasion and Aftermath

The invasion of Iraq effectively began in two stages. The first shots fired in anger were fired on March 20th 2003, when CIA intelligence led US forces to believe that Saddam Hussein was in a complex of buildings known as Doura Farms, a decision was taken to attempt to 'decapitate the regime', the complex was attacked but as it transpired Saddam was not injured or killed, and likely was not at that location.[75] The following day the invasion began in earnest, following the plans mentioned above and included in appendix IV. Approximately 145,000 Coalition troops were directly engaged in the conflict, a force much smaller than the one used in the war to remove Iraq from Kuwait some 13 years earlier.[76] The practice of the Iraq war then was a combination of light manoeuvrable ground forces and high tech precision weaponry. In response to a question about the effectiveness of 'shock and awe', the use of high tech weaponry, Secretary Rumsfeld argued the following:

"while it has to be a terribly unpleasant circumstance, will have an opportunity to see the precision with which we're going about this task, and that the targets

[74] Ibid. p.15
[75] See Ricks *Fiasco* op.cit. p.116
[76] Ibid. p.117

> are military targets, and that we -- this is not an attack on the Iraqi people, it's not an attack on the country of Iraq. It's an attack on that regime that has refused to disarm peacefully."[77]

Again we see the clear separation between the regime and Iraqi people in terms of the targets of the military campaign. The Iraq war strategy was built firmly on the belief that the combination of light forces and high-tech weaponry envisaged in the planning of 'Operation Iraqi Freedom' (OIF).[78] As the head of CENTCom, General Tommy Franks, noted:

> "This will be a campaign unlike any other in history"[79]

The article goes on to report that Franks emphasised the combined role of high tech weaponry and light forces and that "the outcome is not in doubt."[80] The article further notes that:

> "The campaign features pinpoint bombing and missile strikes courtesy of laser- or global positioning system-guided munitions, [Brig. General] Brooks explained, and "an unprecedented combined arms penetration deep into Iraq." He said ground-distance gains made thus far have been achieved in a quarter of the time it took to make similar gains during the 1991 Gulf War"[81]

Indeed, in general this first phase of the campaign proceeded exceptionally well with few casualties for the coalition forces and little sign of the 'quagmire' that so many had predicted from the outside. By April 9th 2003, Baghdad was in the hands of the coalition forces, roughly three weeks after the invasion began.[82] Before turning to the administration's response to the rapid capitulation of Iraq's conventional military

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[77] Secretary Rumsfeld "DoD News Briefing" 22/03/03, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2074 accessed 30/10/08

[78] Ari Fleischer, then White House Press Secretary, referred to the mission as 'Operation Iraqi liberation' in a press conference on 24/03/03, critics of the administration were not slow to point out that the resultant acronym spelt out an other possible reason for the Iraq war – O.I.L. See Ari Fleischer "Press Briefing" 24/03/03 available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030324-4.html accessed 30/10/08

[79] As quoted in Gerry Gilmore "Franks: Iraq Campaign is unlike any other in history" 22/03/03, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=29252 accessed 20/04/2006

[80] Ibid.

[81] Ibid.

[82] Ahmed S. Hashim "The Sunni Insurgency in Iraq" *MEI Perspective* 15/08/2003 available at http://www.mideasti.org/articles/doc89.html accessed 19/04/2006

forces, one implication of the practice of the war is worth noting. The shift to an emphasis on light and interoperable units within the military also created an opening for a dramatic increase in the numbers of private contractors carrying out tasks, particularly logistics and support but also in some cases security functions. One estimate puts the number of private contractors at some where between 1 in 6 and 1 in 10 of the personnel deployed by the US. In other words, one of the largest contingents of the 'Coalition of the Willing' were private contractors.[83]

In recognising the fall of Baghdad, President Bush outlined the nature of the victory:

> "Over the last several days, the world has watched as the regime of Saddam Hussein began passing into history. We will always remember the first images of a nation released from decades of tyranny and fear... As Saddam's regime of fear is brought to an end, the people of Iraq are revealing the true hopes they have always held. It should surprise no one that Iraqis, like all people, resent oppression and welcome their own freedom. ***It should surprise no one that in every nation and every culture, the human heart desires the same good things: dignity, liberty, and a chance to build a better life.*** As people throughout Iraq celebrate the arrival of freedom, America celebrates with them. ***We know that freedom is the gift of God to all mankind, and we rejoice when others can share it.***"[84] [my emphasis]

Again the President is reiterating the nature of the identities at play in the conflict, the universal desire for freedom – a gift from God. Likewise the missionary aspect of American exceptionalism is apparent in this formulation, the United States is delivering God's gift to the Iraqis, delivering freedom to the Iraqi people. The furore over an American flag being placed on a statue of Saddam on 09/04/03, just before it was toppled reflects this desire to emphasise the US role as liberator rather than occupier in OIF.[85]

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[83] See Deborah D Avant "Contracting for Services in U.S. military operations" *PSOnline* July 2007, pp.457-459

[84] President Bush "Operation Iraqi Freedom" 12/04/03 available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/04/20030412.html accessed 20/05/06

[85] "Saddam Statue toppled in Central Baghdad" 09/04/03 available at http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/04/09/sprj.irq.statue/ accessed 21/05/06

By May, the Iraqi forces had melted away to such an extent that it allowed for President Bush to engage in an audacious set-piece address to announce the formal end of combat operations. Arriving on the aircraft carrier, USS Abraham Lincoln, in a military aircraft and disembarking in a jumpsuit. The President then gave the following address on the flight deck in front of a banner entitled "Mission Accomplished":

> "my fellow Americans: Major combat operations in Iraq have ended. In the battle of Iraq, the United States and our allies have prevailed...Operation Iraqi Freedom was carried out with a combination of precision and speed and boldness the enemy did not expect, and the world had not seen before...***For a hundred of years of war...Military power was used to end a regime by breaking a nation. Today, we have the greater power to free a nation by breaking a dangerous and aggressive regime. With new tactics and precision weapons, we can achieve military objectives without directing violence against civilians***. No device of man can remove the tragedy from war; yet it is a great moral advance when the guilty have far more to fear from war than the innocent."[86] [my emphasis]

The contrast between the past and present use of military power is particularly relevant, the utility of the new high-tech and flexible military in allowing the US to pursue regime change while apparently minimising civilian deaths presented an alluring view of the role such interventions might play in the future. Although subsequently when levels of violence in Iraq began to rise in the years that followed the administration distanced itself from the 'Mission Accomplished' message of this address, at the time the expectations appeared to be almost exactly in line with the pre-war force planning projections. According to one report on May 7th, Secretary Rumsfeld was briefed by senior officers on plans to drawdown US force levels in Iraq to just 30,000 by September 2003.[87] In his address President Bush reiterates the relationship between the Iraq war and the 'War on Terror':

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[86] President Bush "President Bush announces Major Combat Operations in Iraq have ended" 01/05/03 available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030501-15.html accessed 22/05/06

[87] See Ahmed S Hashim "The Sunni Insurgency" op.cit

> "The battle of Iraq is one victory in a 'War on Terror' that began on September the 11, 2001 -- and still goes on. That terrible morning, 19 evil men -- the shock troops of a hateful ideology -- gave America and the civilized world a glimpse of their ambitions. They imagined, in the words of one terrorist, that September the 11th would be the "beginning of the end of America." By seeking to turn our cities into killing fields, terrorists and their allies believed that they could destroy this nation's resolve, and force our retreat from the world. They have failed."[88]

He also reiterates the universal nature of the appeal of American values,drawing a direct analogy between American and Universal values:

> "Our commitment to liberty is America's tradition -- declared at our founding; affirmed in Franklin Roosevelt's Four Freedoms; asserted in the Truman Doctrine and in Ronald Reagan's challenge to an evil empire. We are committed to freedom in Afghanistan, in Iraq, and in a peaceful Palestine. The advance of freedom is the surest strategy to undermine the appeal of terror in the world. Where freedom takes hold, hatred gives way to hope. When freedom takes hold, men and women turn to the peaceful pursuit of a better life. American values and American interests lead in the same direction: We stand for human liberty."[89]

He goes on in closing the speech to invoke the almost sacred nature of the campaign, echoing the images of a divine mission previously highlighted:

> "Those we lost were last seen on duty. Their final act on this Earth was to fight a great evil and bring liberty to others. All of you -- all in this generation of our military -- have taken up the highest calling of history. You're defending your country, and protecting the innocent from harm. And wherever you go, you carry a message of hope -- a message that is ancient and ever new. In the words of the prophet Isaiah, "To the captives, 'come out,' -- and to those in darkness, 'be free.'"[90]

So we have an image of an America on a mission to realise the universal freedom of mankind, armed with the military tools to achieve these ends and if the practice of the Iraq war had ended there, we would have probably seen the continuation of interventionary practices in the other members of the 'Axis of evil'. However, two significant absences are notable in the President's address: WMD and Saddam Hussein.

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[88] President Bush, 01/05/03 op.cit.
[89] Ibid.
[90] Ibid.

The issue of WMD has been one of the most contentiously debated aspects of OIF. Many are sceptical of the US claims that Saddam was either engaged in, or possessed, significant weapons stockpile, a situation not helped by controversies over 'dodgy dossiers' in the UK, where a decade old academic thesis was plagiarised by Whitehall officials in producing a report on Iraqi weapons programmes.[91] However it does appear to be the case that 'worst-case scenario' assumptions that drove their analysis were informed by the fear of WMD. For example the land based military plan for OIF, COBRA II, was based on the assumption that Iraq both possessed and would use battlefield WMD.

> "The Iraqi Ministry of Defense will use WMD early but not often. The probability for their use of WMD increases exponentially as Saddam Hussein senses the imminent collapse of his regime."[92]

In practical terms this meant that the US military were planning their strategy on the assumption that WMD were a real risk, even to the extent, as Ricks notes, that weapons bunkers were left untouched by Coalition forces as they moved into Iraq.[93] The result was an ample supply of weapons for any would be insurgency. It's difficult to believe that the administration would have risked the strategic objectives of the mission in order to save face in public. Military plans are not after all in the public domain at the time of conflict. The subsequent realisation that no such weapons existed was as much a surprise to US military planners as to it was to the American public. Any doubts about the intelligence prior to the invasion were disregarded, arguably, because of the framing of the struggle against terrorism in Manichean terms throughout 2002 and 2003. In other words it is possible that the strategic calculus was genuinely transformed by 9/11 to something approaching the mooted 1% doctrine.

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[91] "Dodgy Dossier mocked in Sundays" BBC, 09/02/03, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/2741737.stm accessed 30/10/08
[92] Oplan COBRA II as quoted in Thomas E Ricks *Fiasco* op. cit., p.145-6
[93] Ibid., p.146

The other notable absentee from the President's speech was Saddam Hussein himself. Responding to a question on the matter in July 2003, President Bush answered:

> "I don't know how close we are to getting Saddam Hussein. You know -- it's closer than we were yesterday, I guess. All I know is we're on the hunt. It's like if you had asked me right before we got his sons how close we were to get his sons, I'd say, I don't know, but we're on the hunt."[94]

The continued failure to capture Saddam dogged the administration through the summer of 2003 particularly as the level of violence in Iraq began to creep back up as the months passed. However Saddam's continued presence in the Iraqi theatre also allowed the administration to explain away the persistent violence as being the work of delusional regime loyalists, or dead-enders as they were variously called.[95] When the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, L. Paul Bremer, announced "Ladies and gentlemen, we got him"[96] in December 2003, it was expected that this would mark a turning point in the growing insurgency. As President Bush noted in his statement:

> "The capture of this man was crucial to the rise of a free Iraq. It marks the end of the road for him, and for all who bullied and killed in his name. For the Baathist holdouts largely responsible for the current violence, there will be no return to the corrupt power and privilege they once held"[97]

The capture of Saddam though would prove to be just one among a series of mooted turning points in the growing level of insurgent violence in Iraq. In the period that followed the capture, attacks against coalition forces continued apace, reaching their

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[94] President Bush "President Bush discusses top priorities for the US" 30/07/03, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/07/20030730-1.html accessed 05/09/04

[95] See for example "Rumsfeld blames Iraq problems on 'pockets of dead-enders'", *USA Today*, 18/06/03 available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2003-06-18-rumsfeld_x.htm accessed 30/10/08

[96] L. Paul Bremer "Ambassadors Briefing from Baghdad" 14/12/2003, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2805 accessed 06/09/04

[97] President Bush "President Bush addresses the Nation on the capture of Saddam Hussein" 14/12/04 available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031214-3.html accessed 06/09/04

peak in mid-2007.[98] Throughout this period, the administration continued to reiterate its commitment to seeing through the mission setting up a series of turning-points in the Iraq conflict that would finally see the end of the rising insurgency[99]. After the capture of Saddam, the focus of the ongoing operations in Iraq switched to targeting foreign fighters and Al-Qaeda in Iraq as the main drivers of conflict, even to the extent that his hampered the war effort. One critical account of the war effort argued:

> "The doctrinal fetish of counter-terrorism substitutes for and frustrates counter-insurgency efforts. The killing on 7 June in a US air raid of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi...whose singular significance as terrorist kingpin had been inflated since before the invasion of Iraq underscores rather than relieves the urgency of a political resolution. Conventional fighting takes two primary forms: chasing and killing foreign fighters as if they constituted the heart of the *Sunni* insurgency and seeking battles like Fallujah as if any would be decisive. Where battles don't exist, assaults on civilian populations, often provoked by insurgents, are misconceived as battles."[100]

At the time of the killing of Zarqawi President Bush noted:

> "Zarqawi is dead, but the difficult and necessary mission in Iraq continues. We can expect the terrorists and insurgents to carry on without him. We can expect the sectarian violence to continue. Yet the ideology of terror has lost one of its most visible and aggressive leaders. Zarqawi's death is a severe blow to al Qaeda. It's a victory in the global 'War on Terror', and it is an opportunity for Iraq's new government to turn the tide of this struggle."[101]

The course of the post-invasion Iraq conflict has spawned a wealth of detailed critiques of the US occupation[102] and detailed analysis of these is beyond the scope of this thesis although a number of comments will be made in the concluding chapter. A number of events have been held up as 'turning points' in the conflict: the transfer of sovereignty back to an Iraqi government, the negotiation and writing of a new

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[98] See "The Road to the Surge" *Washington Post* 2008 available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/war-within/surgechart.html accessed 30/10/08

[99] See Appendix III

[100] Sidney Blumenthal "The Bush way of war" *Open Democracy* 14/06/06 available at http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy/bush_war_3641.jsp accessed 15/06/06

[101] President Bush "Statement by the President on Death of Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi" 08/06/06 available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/06/20060608.html 08/06/06

[102] See for example – Thomas Ricks,op.cit,; Michael R Gordon & Bernard E. Trainor *COBRA II: The inside story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq* Pantheon, New York, 2006; Rajiv Chandrasekaran *Imperial Life in the The Emerald City: Inside Iraq's Green Zone* Vintage, New York, 2007; and Bob Woodward *State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III* Simon & Schuster, New York, 2007

constitution and the holding of democratic elections in Iraq. Each of these events were held up as reinforcing the initial construction of the Iraq war, as being an attempt to further the cause of freedom and thereby strike against the anti-freedom 'Other' of the generalised enemy 'Terror.'

Conclusion

When Condoleezza Rice was testifying before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Against the United States, she outlined the logic of the ''War on Terror'' as follows:

> "We are confronting that nexus between terror and weapons of mass destruction...The defeat of terror and the success of freedom in those nations [Iraq and Afghanistan] will serve the interests of our Nation and inspire hope and encourage reform throughout the greater Middle East. In the aftermath of September 11th, those were the right choices for America to make – the only choices that can ensure the safety of our Nation in the decades to come."[103]

The linking of freedom and security and terror and rogue states is a cornerstone of the discourse of the 'War on Terror'. In order to understand how the Iraq war was made possible we need to examine these articulations of security by the Bush administration and how they appealed to the broader 'security imaginary' of the United States. In the aftermath of the most devastating attacks on US soil in that country's history, the administration articulated that it was operating in a security environment which had been radically transformed. An administration that had initially wished to focus on domestic policy, education in particular, re-inscribed itself as the vanguard of the latest in a long line of eschatological conflicts in US history through the discursive construction of the terrorist threat as conflict between a rational, good, American and universal 'Self' against an irrational, pathological, evil 'Other'. In this sense, the 9/11 attacks acted as an enabling factor or catalyst for the articulation of a different policy

[103] Condoleezza Rice, "Opening Remarks to Commission on Terrorist Attacks" 08/04/04; available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/04/20040408.html accessed 04/09/04

direction for the Bush administration. This is not to say that the attacks were used cynically, but rather that by constructing the attacks in the Manichean terms they did, armed interventions in Afghanistan and later Iraq were made possible. As President Bush noted:

> "These inseparable priorities – fighting and winning the 'War on Terror' and promoting freedom as the alternative to tyranny and despair – have now guided American policy for more than 4 years...Our national security strategy is founded upon two pillars: the first pillar is promoting freedom, justice and human dignity...the second pillar is confronting the challenges of our time by leading a growing community of democracies...Yet history has shown that only when we do our part will others do theirs. America must continue to lead"[104]

Furthermore, this response at both the rhetorical and practical level, was in line with longstanding traditions in US Foreign Policy. Richard Crockatt suggests there is a paradox in the manner that the US preaches universalist values but uses them in the service of national interests.[105] The argument here is that this is not a paradox, but rather the logical outcome of a nation built on a nationalism that lays claim to universal values as its core identity. As mentioned in Chapter 1, Anderson notes that nations as 'imagined communities' are imagined as limited but in the US case there is always a tendency to extend the 'imagined community' toward those outside its physical boundaries. This can allow the justification of radical and violent practices to deal with the 'Other' when this 'Other' is constructed as being so radically different that it is seen as a polar opposite to the universal US 'Self'. In the 'War on Terror' both Al-Qaeda and the Ba'athists in Iraq found themselves on the receiving end of the practices associated with such an 'Othering'.

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[104] President George Bush *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* March 2006 , p. i-ii.
[105] See Richard Crockatt *After 9/11* Routledge, Abingdon 2007, passim

Chapter 8 – Conclusions

This thesis set out to answer the question 'How were the US military interventions in the 'War on Terror' possible?' This final chapter will first seek to summarise the main arguments developed over the preceding chapters and draw to together the central conclusion that the military interventions were made possible through the strategic use of discourse to securitize terrorism in a manner that built on pre-existing identity narratives that made the interventions appear to be an appropriate and legitimate action to take in the 'War on Terror'. We will then turn to discuss some of the limitations to the research, before turning to discuss the implications for these findings for future research on this and similar topics.

Summary and Main Findings

The thesis began by highlighting the puzzle of the relationship between the 9/11 attacks and the two subsequent large-scale conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. In order to address this puzzle it was proposed that a Discourse Theory approach that built on a combination of Copenhagen School and post-positivist theories was put forward as the most appropriate means of answering the question outlined. The first half of the thesis was used to outline in detail the theoretical approach adopted and how it related to existing attempts in the literature to either understand or explain the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The second half of the thesis then turned to apply this theoretical approach to the cases in hand. It began with a discussion of the historical relationship between intervention, expansion and discourses of identity, particularly exceptionalism, in the US before turning to explore in detail the cases in hand. Two key findings of this thesis are worth highlighting before drawing the conclusions on the individual parts of the thesis. The first is that talk matters, the construction of the post-9/11 security threat does allow us to understand how the interventions in

Afghanistan and Iraq were made possible. Without these constructions, it is difficult to see how the interventions could have been justified. If the 9/11 attacks had not been framed in the manner they were by the Bush administration then the practice of the 'War on Terror' would have been different. This, to reiterate the point, is not to say that the constructions of identity and difference in the discourse of the 'War on Terror' caused these interventions, but rather to argue that they were necessary conditions for making them possible. This point will be expanded in the summary of Chapters 6 and 7 below. The second key finding, which will be elaborated below, is the relationship between Identity, US nationalism and Foreign Policy practice. One of the criticisms of approaches that focus on identity in international relations is the tendency of such approaches to focus upon radical 'Othering' in identity formation, rather it is argued that identity formation can take many forms with many different degrees of differentiation.[1] Although in terms of incorporating identity into analyses of international relations more generally I am sympathetic to this view, this thesis suggests that US national identity when expressed in exceptionalist terms is premised on a process of racical 'Othering.' Chapters 5, 6 & 7 serve to highlight some of the difficulties such a radical 'Othering' engenders in terms of legitimating relatively high levels of violence against the radical 'Other.' We will return to some of the implications of this finding below.

First we will turn to a summary of the thesis' main arguments. As mentioned above, we began by questioning the apparently straightforward link between the attacks on September 11th and the 'War on Terror' that followed. Following Walker, this thesis set out to examine how the following questions were answered:

[1] See Lene Hansen, op cit., 2006, Chapter 3 for discussion

> "Was this a proper war? Or was it just a crime? If it was a war, precisely what states were at war with each other? If it was a crime, precisely who was it a crime against – America? Humanity? Modernity? Liberalism?"[2]

In order to address this question, we examined in Chapter 2 a number of approaches to the question how the 'War on Terror' was possible. We began with a discussion of how intervention, the use of military force against another state in order to change the domestic political order, is possible in international relations in general terms. In legal and, arguably, normative terms there is a strong presumption against the violation of sovereignty although it was acknowledged that this norm come under some pressure in the 1990's.[3] However, where intervention is defined in security terms then any analysis that seeks to understand how such acts are possible must engage with the tradition of political realism. However, realist accounts were found wanting in terms of their ability to explain the sufficient conditions for intervention,[4] or particularly with regards Iraq, the reason for intervention at all.[5] We then turned to examine the 'drunk uncle' of international relations to see if cognitive approaches to Foreign Policy analysis could provide further understanding into how the interventions in Iraq were made possible. It was argued that such approaches give inadequate attention to the social aspects of interpretation and rely on psychological information that is not readily available to researchers. Instead it was argued that if interpretation is important to understanding how decisions are made then an approach that addresses the construction of meaning at the social level would be more promising.

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[2] RBJ Walker "War, Terror, Judgement" in Bulent Gokay & RBJ Walker (eds) *11 September 2001: War, Terror and Judgement* Frank Cass Publishers, London 2003 P69

[3] For examples see Simon Chesterman *Just War or Just Peace?: Humanitarian Intervention and International Law* Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001, Michael Ignatieff *Virtual War* Vintage, London 1999, Nicholas Wheeler *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society* 2000, and Francis Abiew *The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention* Springer, Amsterdam 2000.

[4] See Hinnebusch, op cit, 2007, p. 209-10

[5] See for example Daniel Byman "Five Bad Options for Iraq" Vol 47, No 1, 2005, pp.7-32; John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt "The Israel Lobby" *London Review of Books* 23/03/2006 available online at http://www.lrb.co.uk/v28/n06/print/mear01_.html accessed 20/11/2007; John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt "An Unneccessary War" *Foreign Policy* No 134 (Jan-Feb 2003), pp50-59

We turned then to a discussion first of critical constructivist and post-positivist approaches to the 'War on Terror' and then Copenhagen School. From the critical constructivist side of the debate we saw how the focus on narratives of identity could help us understand how the Bush administration legitimated and justified its Foreign Policy goals in the 'War on Terror'. For some authors, Campbell and Faludi for example, this role played by identity was quasi-causal, for others, Jackson for example, identity narratives are used strategically to mobilise groups around political goals.[6] This thesis focused on this 'how identity discourse makes possible' approach. In Copenhagen School accounts of the 'War on Terror' the focus rested more on how the administration articulated the nature of the threat in terms of a 'securitizing speech-act'. The strength of such approaches is that it dispenses with attention to 'true motivations' as in the FPA approach and instead focuses on the process of securitizing a particular issue through the strategic use of speech.[7] However caveats were raised in relation to this approach in terms of the under-theorisation of audiences and how and why these audiences might be convinced by speech acts. It was suggested that a theory that brought together securitization with identity narratives would be the best way forward in terms of understanding how particular securitizing acts were successful in particular contexts.

Chapter 3 set out to build this theoretical frame through a discussion of the relationship between security, identity and discourse. This chapter argued that the Copenhagen School theory of securitization is a useful starting point for examining how problems can be framed in a manner that makes possible military or other security responses. It is further argued that in order for a securitizing move to prove successful we need to pay attention to the social and discursive context in which the

[6] See Campbell, op.cit., 1992 & 1998; Faludi, op.cit., 2007; & Jackson, op. cit. 2005
[7] Bryn Hughes "Securitizing Iraq: The Bush Administration's Social construction of Security" in *Global Change, Peace and Security* Vol 19 No 2, 2007 p.87

move is made, identifying the relevant audiences for a securitizing move and establishing how and why they might be convinced. The key here was the appeal of securitizing moves to group security places discourses of national identity at the heart of understanding how these moves may be successful In relation to the discourse of the 'War on Terror' the relevant audiences can be seen as the United States public who may grant the moral authority or legitimacy for military action to the state and the Congress who have the institutional position of granting formal authority. In general terms then, following Krebs and Lobasz, it was argued that although multiple interpretations and narratives that imply different policy outcomes are indeed possible, the success of a particular rhetorical strategy is based on the confluence of discursive traditions or resources, the institutional positions of the speakers, and the historical context.[8] Therefore in order to answer the question how were the US interventions in the 'War on Terror' possible, we need to examine the historical contexts as well as the discursive or cultural resources that were available to policy makers to draw upon in order to construct 9/11 and the 'War on Terror'. Thus the remaining substantive chapters would include a historical account of American exceptionalism and intervention and Foreign Policy before turning to examine in more detail the discourse of the 'War on Terror' itself. We then turned to look at more practical matters in terms of how the research on the discourse of the 'War on Terror' would be carried out focussing on how a Copenhagen School approach focussing on the grammar of security could be supplemented and extended by paying attention to not just threat construction but also the appeals to narratives of identity through the process Weldes identified as 'articulation' and 'interpellation'.[9]

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[8] See for discussion Ronald R Krebs and Jennifer K Lobasz "Fixing the Meaning of 9/11: Hegemony, Coercion, and the Road to War in Iraq" in *Security Studies* Vol 16 No 3, 2007, pp.409-451

[9] Weldes, op. cit., 1999, p13 & p230

This thesis set out to argue that the discourse of the 'War on Terror' was successful because it was able to present a convincing narrative of both the events and the response that was congruent with pre-existing understandings of the United States role in the world. Chapter 5 chapter then aimed to examine the sedimented discursive understandings of the US' role in the world that would render intelligible such contemporary calls to action when articulated in those terms. Although this thesis does not argue that such sedimented narratives act as determining structures it does argue, following Weldes, that such narratives do act to constrain contemporary agents through structuring a state's 'security imaginary.' In this case it was posited that the security imaginary was defined in terms of American national identity, particularly its exceptionalist form. In particular this chapter was interested in what role the cultural understanding of the US as being exceptional has played in the discourse of American nationalism and Foreign Policy. Through an examination of the expansion into the American West, the Cold War, the first 'War on Terror' and the post-Cold War era it was concluded that the linking of exceptionalism and insecurity creates a powerful template for legitimating action in US political discourse and that the model of American exceptionalism explored in this chapter, that located an American 'Self' by separating itself and contrasting itself with an atavistic and savage 'Other', features prominently in the post 9/11 discourse.

The war in Afghanistan got underway in a matter of weeks after the 9/11 attacks. As a known base of Al-Qaeda and the last known whereabouts of Osama Bin Laden the country appears at face value an unproblematic target. However as the case study showed, the conflict required some degree of perception and interpretation in order to connect the dots between the acts of the nineteen hijackers and Afghanistan.

Furthermore we noted that in the rhetoric at the time the Bush administration constructed the conflict in broad terms:

> "Our war on terror begins with Al-Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group with global reach has been found, stopped and defeated."[10]

The effect of this was to ensure that the 'War on Terror' would not only legitimate action against Bin Laden and the Taliban but rather all those groups, states and individuals who fell under the concept of 'terror'. Furthermore, on the part of the US the missionary aspect of the war was clear:

> "The course of this conflict is not yet known, yet its outcome is certain. Freedom and fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at war, and we know that God is not neutral between them."[11]

As well as formulating the 'War on Terror' in generalised terms, the administration was careful to distinguish between the Taliban and Al Qaeda and the Afghan people in general. Articulating the US forces as liberators in a manner that echoed with the historical discourse of US involvement abroad. By the end of November though, US forces had driven the Taliban out of all of the major cities and the Afghan campaign began to recede into the background of the 'War on Terror'. Critically the administration maintained the idea of the 'War on Terror' as being targeted against a more general threat called terror, against evil in general rather than Bin Laden per se. As discussed in the theoretical chapters, successful securitization requires an appeal to a collective sense of security. Furthermore, this collective appeal would be 'articulated' in terms that built upon the cultural resources of the US particularly in terms of American exceptionalism. We examined the Manichean division between 'Us' and 'Them' in the discourse of the 'War on Terror', the term 'evil-doers'

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[10] President Bush, 20/09/01 op. cit.
[11] Ibid.

becoming commonplace in referring to the generic terrorist threat. The only response to a pathologically violent enemy is violence. And there is the second key point on the identity axis, not only was a stark contrast drawn between the civilised world and barbarian terrorists but the latter designation was not restricted to mean those either directly responsible for the 9/11 attacks or linked to Al-Qaeda. Instead the emphasis was on a generalised enemy called terror.

This idea of a more general enemy was crucial to the linking of Iraq to the 'War on Terror' examined in Chapter Seven. Here we explored the construction of the Iraqi threat, in particular the focus on WMD and the possibility that these weapons could find their way into the hands of terrorists. The common thread uniting Al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein being their hatred of the US and the values that it stands for. As with the Afghan campaign the initial battle was easily won, with less than six weeks passing between the start of hostilities and the (in)famous speech on the USS Abraham Lincoln, where President Bush highlighted the utility and effectiveness in force in the name of liberty:

> "For a hundred of years of war...Military power was used to end a regime by breaking a nation. Today, we have the greater power to free a nation by breaking a dangerous and aggressive regime. With new tactics and precision weapons, we can achieve military objectives without directing violence against civilians. No device of man can remove the tragedy from war; yet it is a great moral advance when the guilty have far more to fear from war than the innocent."[12]

However, as with the Afghan campaign, the formal end of hostilities did not signal a transition to a lasting peace. In fact violence levels in Iraq continued to rise until the middle of 2008, when an increase in troop numbers (albeit not to the levels required in the pre-9/11 plans) under General David Petraeus successfully started to bring the

[12] President Bush "President Bush announces Major Combat Operations in Iraq have ended" 01/05/03 available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030501-15.html accessed 22/05/06

level of violence down.[13] The intervention in Iraq was made possible by the construction of the threat posed by Saddam in terms that linked Iraq effectively to the threat of global terrorism which in turn was constructed in terms of fundamental existential threat to the American way of life. This was not to argue that this was the sole reason for the intervention in Iraq. Other motivations certainly played a role in guiding the administration's hand, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to determine what those motivations were but this thesis will argue that the ability to effectively securitize Iraq and thereby make possible the US intervention against that state was dependent on the linking of the Iraqi threat to the broader discourse of the 'War on Terror'. The linking of freedom and security and terror and rogue states was shown to be a cornerstone of the discourse of the 'War on Terror'. It was argued that in order to understand how the Iraq war was made possible we needed to examine these articulations of security by the Bush administration and how they appealed to the broader 'security imaginary' of the United States.

How then, to return to the original research question, were the US military interventions in the 'War on Terror' possible? This thesis has argued that the attacks on 9/11 were not in themselves self-evident and automatic causes of the 'War on Terror' that followed. Rather we needed to examine the discursive construction of the 'War on Terror' in terms of the securitization of terrorism as a threat not just to the United States' material interests but more importantly to its way of life, its identity by the Bush administration. These claims to identity could only be understood in the context of longer standing, identity narratives that made up the cultural resources through which the administration could articulate these threats. Thus, the discourse of the 'War on Terror' constructed the 9/11 attacks as a security threat to the US in terms

[13] For a balanced account of the effectiveness of the surge see Lt General Raymond T Odierno "The surge in Iraq: One year on" 13/03/08, The Heritage Lecture available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/hl1068.cfm accessed 30/10/08

of an atavistic, evil threat under the term 'terror' or 'terrorism' that sought to destroy the United States because of the things it stood for, namely, freedom, liberty, democracy. Furthermore, parallels were drawn between the contemporary terror threat and previous evil 'Others' that had posed risks for the US in the past. Thus the success of the articulation of the need to intervene militarily in Afghanistan first and later Iraq, was based on the degree to which the Bush administration was able to construct a plausible narrative that constructed the American 'Self' and the enemy 'Other' in a manner that echoed with sedimented narratives of 'Self' and 'Other' in American political and cultural discourse. In other words it was not simply the articulation of Afghanistan and Iraq as threats that made the interventions possible but their articulation as threats at the level of collective identity.

Caveats and Limitations

One obvious caveat that can be raised against the argument proposed here, is to what extent are the interpretations proposed in the analysis accurate? Any approach that bases itself on the importance of meaning as a socially constituted phenomenon leaves itself open to the charge of misrepresentation either by accident or design. How do we know that the articulation of identity outlined in the preceding chapters did in fact take the form of a radical 'Othering' process? Two responses can be made in defence of this thesis in this regard. The first, already raised in Chapter 4, is that an analysis of discourse that relies on publicly available texts is a transparent approach. The texts presented in this thesis are available in their unedited and full form in the public domain. Therefore interpretations of these texts are open to contestation based on alternative readings of these texts, but furthermore a fair examination of both the texts included in the analysis and the further texts analysed but excluded to avoid repetition and save space would, I argue, reveal that the representations of these texts

in this thesis is accurate insofar as it does not involve any misrepresentation, deliberate or otherwise. That is to say, that the analysis only makes claims on the nature of the identity articulated that are consistent with the content and internal logic of the texts examined. This in turn leads to the second defence, that is that the argument in this thesis is based on an account of American identity that is similar to those used in other accounts of the 'War on Terror' that focus on discourse and identity.[14] Thus it can be defended on the basis of plausibility, even though it is acknowledged that alternative interpretations are indeed possible. This relatively high level of consensus gives some degree of external validation to the interpretation proposed in this thesis.

A second limitation relates to what role the non-discursive played in facilitating the articulation of threat within the discourse of the 'War on Terror'. Would the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan have been possible without the attacks on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon on September 11th 2001? This criticism has also been raised in terms of the Copenhagen School's concept of securitisation. Bill McSweeney has argued that

> "A critical difference appears, however, when we consider that the perception and fear of threats to security can, in principle, be checked by observing and evaluating the facts external to the subject."[15]

In other words, claims to securitization can be objectively dismissed as not being credible if the facts do not support the speech-act. Balzacq makes a similar point in relation to what he terms a "sensitive external context."[16] In relation to the question at hand, the argument could be made that both Afghanistan and Iraq were successfully

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[14] See for example Jackson, op. cit., 2005; Krebs and Lobasz, op. cit., 2007; Holland, op. cit., 2009; Dirk Nabers "Filling the void of Meaning: Identity Construction in U.S. Foreign Policy after September 11, 2001" in *Foreign Policy Analysis* Vol 5 No. 2, 2009 pp.191-214

[15] Bill McSweeney "Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School" in Review of International Studies 1996, Vol 22 No 1, p.87

[16] Thierry Balzacq, op. cit., 2005 p.193

securitised because they presented credible threats to the security of the United States or in the case of the latter that other interests gave impetus to the road to war and that the rhetoric of justification was merely epiphenomenal. The thesis has already conceded that interests other than those articulated may have played a role in making possible the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, but that the constructions of identity played a further role in legitimating particular courses of action. For example, had the Bush administration articulated its desire to invade Iraq in terms of a desire to control resources or a father-son revenge fantasy, it would not have successfully mobilised the US Congress or its people to lend such an operation either moral or formal support. However this does not fully resolve the relationship between material events and discourses of security, and this relationship requires more scrutiny than this thesis has been able to give it. Fierke has suggested that the relationship between identity and interests is more complex than a simple causal relationship in one or other direction would allow,[17] and I would contend that something similar holds true for the relationship between security events and the discourses that define them which calls for further research.

Finally, a third limitation on this thesis relates to the lack of attention to culture and identity beyond political elites. It has been contended that the articulations of identity by the Bush administration resonated with the broader culture self-understanding of the American public. This is not to say that this is the only kind of American identity discourse or that it was entirely successful in pinning down or defining what being an American means, but that it broadly is in line with previous articulations of identity or what a 'common sense' understanding of being American might be. However, the evidence mooted to support this point was focussed solely on

[17] Fierke, op. cit., 2007, p.81

public opinion data and one secondary account of ordinary American's responses to the 9/11 attacks.[18] This is recognised to be totally inadequate in this regard and further research is called for on popular culture to fully understand this aspect of the security-identity dynamic. As Milliken notes:

> "explaining the production of common sense appears best served by empirical study that examines 'mundane' cultural knowledge in specific contexts, and asks what resources it actually provides"[19]

Accounts of identity and security in International Relations are often guilty of focussing not just on processes of radical 'Othering', as Hansen has noted,[20] but also, due to practical constraints on research and, perhaps, a desire to do 'proper international relations' research, of focussing on the state as the main agent and author of identity narratives. This thesis is also guilty of this fault. Although I would argue that studies that focus on official discourses, such as this one, do still have their place in understanding how certain state practices are made possible, more work needs to be done in the popular cultural vein.

Future Research and implications

This thesis has sought to contribute to a growing body of literature on the role of culture and identity in security policy and practice. In particular it has sought to bring together aspects of the Copenhagen School approach with more critical post-positivist approaches. In doing so it locates itself within debates on discourse, culture, identity and securitization.[21] As noted above, a number of limitations to this approach have been noted and are suggestive of areas of further research. The first relates to the role of what might be termed 'security events' in enabling or constraining political

[18] See Holland, op. cit., 2009
[19] Milliken, op. cit., 1999, p239-40
[20] See Hansen, op. cit., 2006, Chapter 3
[21] See for example Milliken, op.cit., 1999; McDonald, op.cit, 2008; Balzacq, op.cit. 2005; and in relation to 9/11 and the 'War on Terror', Holland, op. cit. 2009; Krebs & Lobasz, op.cit., 2007; and Ronald Krebs & Patrick Thaddeus Jackson "Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The power of political Rhetoric" in *European Journal of International Relations* Vol 13 No 1, 2007, pp.35-66

actors in constructing security discourses. In particular, given the relatively larger amount of dissent evident in relation to the war in Iraq, some degree of attention needs to be given to the role that time plays in allowing actors to resist discursive interpretations. In the immediate aftermath of a crisis, dissent may be difficult but due to the instability of discourse it may be possible that as time passes greater scope becomes available for unsettling previously hegemonic interpretations. In recent work, Holland and separately Dirk Nabers have suggested the idea of the 'void' and 'crisis' as possible ways of thinking about the relationship between events like 9/11 and the discourses of security that follow albeit both are operating from different theoretical points of departure.[22] However further work is clearly required in order to tease out what are the kinds of criteria that can be used to judge what constitutes a crisis within a particular discursive milieu and are the factors that lead us to recognise an event as crisis limited by either discursive or other material conditions. Such research would have to be based on a much broader understanding of what is relevant in the construction of a security culture along the lines suggested by Milliken above and would necessitate further theoretical work on the relationship between the material reality, i.e. large scale loss of life, of security events and the interpretative process through which these are mediated into political discourse and action. One possibility here would be a comparative study examining the divergent responses in Spain to the Madrid bombings, in the UK to the London bombings and in the US to 9/11. Were the differences reducible to divergent security cultures, to different strategic responses or to the visual nature and symbolism of the events themselves?

A second avenue for further research would be to use the theoretical insights of this thesis to examine a different area. Accounts of culture, identity and security

[22] See Holland, op.cit., 2009 and Dirk Nabers "Filling the void of meaning: Identity construction in U.S. Foreign Policy after September 11, 2001" in *Foreign Policy Analysis* Vol 5 No 2, 2009, pp.191-214

have tended to focus upon either established states e.g. the US, Britain, France and Germany[23] or the disintegration of states e.g. Yugoslavia.[24] However there is also a growing literature on security identities at the European level.[25] The European case would provide an interesting opportunity to explore the limits of the concept of 'security imaginary', can appeals to the collective be successful at a supranational level? And if so, what level of collective appeal is necessary – elites, Europe? One could reasonably presume that due to the inter-state nature of the European Union that appeals to identity could not be formulated in terms of radical Otherness, an interesting question to pursue would be does this in turn limit the types of security practices that the EU can render legitimate?

Epilogue: Whither Iraq, Afghanistan and the USA?

Since January 2002, the Taliban have regrouped to a certain extent and the US and NATO forces have been engaged in significant engagements over the past seven years. The ongoing difficulties in Afghanistan have led some to conclude that the military approach cannot be the sole solution. A recent RAND report argues

> "the U.S. approach to countering al Qa'ida has focused far too much on the use of military force. Instead, policing and intelligence should be the backbone of U.S. efforts" [26]

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[23] See for example Campbell, op. cit, 1992 & 1998; Larssen, op. cit, 1998

[24] See Hansen, op. cit., 2006; David Campbell *National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity, and Justice in Bosnia* University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 1998; & Rory Keane *Reconstituting Sovereignty: Post Dayton Bosnia Uncovered* Ashgate, Aldershot 2002

[25] See for example Ole Waever "European Security Identities" in *Journal of Common Market Studies* Vol 34 No1, 1996; Sten Rynning "The European Union: Towards a Strategic Culture?" in *Security Dialogue* Vol 34 No 4, 2003; Thomas Diez "Europe's other and the return of geopolitics" in *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* Vol 17 No 2, 2004; and in relation to the 'War on Terror', Stahl, op. cit,. 2006; See also the recent special issue of *International Politics* Vol 46 No 4, 2009 particularly Daniel C Thomas "Explaining the negotiation of EU foreign policy: Normative Institutions and alternative approaches" pp.339-357; & Jeffrey Lewis "EU policy on Iraq: the collapse and reconstruction of consensus-based foreign policy" pp.432-450

[26] As quoted by Paul Rogers "The thirty-years war, revisited" 04/08/08, available at http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/conflicts/global_security/the-thirty-year-war-revisited accessed 30/10/08

The ongoing difficulties have even led some to suggest that negotiations with the Taliban may be the best way forward, something unthinkable in the past 6 years.[27] However for such an event to come to pass, a fundamental shift would have to occur in the Bush administration's thinking about the 'War on Terror'. While there was some possibility of an opening for such change with the change of administration in 2009, but President Obama has yet to express an interest in pursuing a negotiated solution in Afghanistan.[28] The options available to change the tactics would be either to admit defeat or to radically reframe the conflict. The path of least resistance would appear to be an increase in the military presence although if a 'surge' fails to bring about a decisive shift in momentum then a more radical change may occur. The net effect though of the ongoing violence in Afghanistan is that it has taken some of the shine off the early rapid achievements, however the conflict has failed to generate anything close to the amount of debate or rancour as did our other case, Iraq.

However the practicality of fighting the war in Iraq was not the main problem that confronted the Bush administration. Despite successfully overseeing a transition to a democratically elected government, the international perception of the US has been badly damaged as a result of the perceptions of unilateralism in the administration's approach to the conflict.[29] The other major issue with the conflict was the ongoing controversy over the US treatment of prisoners in the 'War on Terror'. Having already created the legally ambiguous category of 'enemy combatant' to deal with high risk individuals captured in Afghanistan, and with Guantanamo Bay

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[27] See for example Reuters "Petreaus [the General credited with bringing progress in Iraq] see value in talking to Taliban" 08/10/08, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSTRE497AIT20081008 accessed 30/10/08

[28] Both candidates campaigned for an increase in troop levels in Afghanistan, with Obama looking to transfer forces from Iraq to the Afghan theatre whereas McCain is considering calling for additional NATO back up. See "The Candidates on Afghanistan" Council on Foreign Relations, 24/10/08 available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/14753/ accessed 30/10/08

[29] For example large protests were held across the globe in February 2003. See CNN "Antiwar protests sweep the globe" 19/01/03 available at http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/01/18/sproject.irq.demos/ accessed 30/10/08

already becoming something of a cause celébre around the world, the Abu Ghraib controversy added to growing disillusionment with the 'War on Terror' at home and abroad. As Richard Crockatt has noted:

> "The claim to be standing for freedom similarly looks questionable in the light of the open-ended detention of prisoners without trial [at] Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib"[30]

In contrast to Afghanistan, the Iraq war has been much more divisive at domestic political level in the United States and in the 2008 presidential election the two candidates for the White House had diametrically opposed views of the way forward with McCain arguing for finishing the mission and Obama looking to draw down US forces in the country as quickly as possible.[31]

This brings us to the United States. One of the criticisms of identity based approaches to Foreign Policy and security practices is the tendency to focus on the state level and thereby such studies tend to be complicit in reproducing and reaffirming the discourses of identity they set out to critique. Although this study has indeed had such a focus the intent was not to legitimate or condone the policies of the Bush administration. As the record of violence and death in Afghanistan and Iraq attests, the interventions that were made possible through the articulation of the post-9/11 threat in terms of a good 'Self' and evil 'Other' have proven immensely costly to the United States in terms of lives, treasure and reputation, not to mention the even greater costs inflicted on the people of Iraq and Afghanistan. The argument that identity narratives played a role in making these interventions possible is not meant as an absolution for the political actors who actively constructed these narratives. As argued at the beginning, discourses regulate meaning in a manner that is analogous to the way grammar regulates normal language – it structures how we may say

[30] Richard Crockatt, 2007, op.cit p.184
[31] See Council on Foreign Relations "The Candidates on Iraq" 29/09/08 available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/14761/ accessed 30/10/08

something but not what we actually say. President Bush was misspeaking when he said:

> "Our enemies are innovative and resourceful and so are we. They never stop thinking about new ways to harm our country and our people, and neither do we."[32]

However, in the manner in which his 'War on Terror' has impacted on the United States, there was more truth in the statement than was ever intended.

[32] President Bush "President Signs Defense Bill" 05/08/04 available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040805-3.html accessed 19/09/09

Appendix I: Selection of Full texts of key documents analysed

For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary

September 11, 2001

Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation

En Español

View the President's Remarks View the President's Remarks
Listen to the President's Remarks

8:30 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Good evening. Today, our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist acts. The victims were in airplanes, or in their offices; secretaries, businessmen and women, military and federal workers; moms and dads, friends and neighbors. Thousands of lives were suddenly ended by evil, despicable acts of terror.

The pictures of airplanes flying into buildings, fires burning, huge structures collapsing, have filled us with disbelief, terrible sadness, and a quiet, unyielding anger. These acts of mass murder were intended to frighten our nation into chaos and retreat. But they have failed; our country is strong.

A great people has been moved to defend a great nation. Terrorist attacks can shake the foundations of our biggest buildings, but they cannot touch the foundation of America. These acts shattered steel, but they cannot dent the steel of American resolve.

America was targeted for attack because we're the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world. And no one will keep that light from shining.

Today, our nation saw evil, the very worst of human nature. And we responded with the best of America -- with the daring of our rescue workers, with the caring for strangers and neighbors who came to give blood and help in any way they could.

Immediately following the first attack, I implemented our government's emergency response plans. Our military is powerful, and it's prepared. Our emergency teams are working in New York City and Washington, D.C. to help with local rescue efforts.

Our first priority is to get help to those who have been injured, and to take every precaution to protect our citizens at home and around the world from further attacks.

The functions of our government continue without interruption. Federal agencies in Washington which had to be evacuated today are reopening for essential personnel tonight, and will be open for business tomorrow. Our financial institutions remain strong, and the American economy will be open for business, as well.

The search is underway for those who are behind these evil acts. I've directed the full resources of our intelligence and law enforcement communities to find those responsible and

to bring them to justice. We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them.

I appreciate so very much the members of Congress who have joined me in strongly condemning these attacks. And on behalf of the American people, I thank the many world leaders who have called to offer their condolences and assistance.

America and our friends and allies join with all those who want peace and security in the world, and we stand together to win the war against terrorism. Tonight, I ask for your prayers for all those who grieve, for the children whose worlds have been shattered, for all whose sense of safety and security has been threatened. And I pray they will be comforted by a power greater than any of us, spoken through the ages in Psalm 23: "Even though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death, I fear no evil, for You are with me."

This is a day when all Americans from every walk of life unite in our resolve for justice and peace. America has stood down enemies before, and we will do so this time. None of us will ever forget this day. Yet, we go forward to defend freedom and all that is good and just in our world.

Thank you. Good night, and God bless America.

END 8:35 P.M. EDT

Return to this article at:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html

For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary

September 20, 2001

Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People

United States Capitol
Washington, D.C.

View the President's Remarks
Listen to the President's Remarks

En Español

9:00 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Speaker, Mr. President Pro Tempore, members of Congress, and fellow Americans:

In the normal course of events, Presidents come to this chamber to report on the state of the Union. Tonight, no such report is needed. It has already been delivered by the American people.

We have seen it in the courage of passengers, who rushed terrorists to save others on the ground -- passengers like an exceptional man named Todd Beamer. And would you please help me to welcome his wife, Lisa Beamer, here tonight. (Applause.)

We have seen the state of our Union in the endurance of rescuers, working past exhaustion. We have seen the unfurling of flags, the lighting of candles, the giving of blood, the saying of prayers -- in English, Hebrew, and Arabic. We have seen the decency of a loving and giving people who have made the grief of strangers their own.

My fellow citizens, for the last nine days, the entire world has seen for itself the state of our Union -- and it is strong. (Applause.)

Tonight we are a country awakened to danger and called to defend freedom. Our grief has turned to anger, and anger to resolution. Whether we bring our enemies to justice, or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done. (Applause.)

I thank the Congress for its leadership at such an important time. All of America was touched on the evening of the tragedy to see Republicans and Democrats joined together on the steps of this Capitol, singing "God Bless America." And you did more than sing; you acted, by delivering $40 billion to rebuild our communities and meet the needs of our military.

Speaker Hastert, Minority Leader Gephardt, Majority Leader Daschle and Senator Lott, I thank you for your friendship, for your leadership and for your service to our country. (Applause.)

And on behalf of the American people, I thank the world for its outpouring of support. America will never forget the sounds of our National Anthem playing at Buckingham Palace, on the streets of Paris, and at Berlin's Brandenburg Gate.

We will not forget South Korean children gathering to pray outside our embassy in Seoul, or the prayers of sympathy offered at a mosque in Cairo. We will not forget moments of silence and days of mourning in Australia and Africa and Latin America.

Nor will we forget the citizens of 80 other nations who died with our own: dozens of Pakistanis; more than 130 Israelis; more than 250 citizens of India; men and women from El Salvador, Iran, Mexico and Japan; and hundreds of British citizens. America has no truer friend than Great Britain. (Applause.) Once again, we are joined together in a great cause -- so honored the British Prime Minister has crossed an ocean to show his unity of purpose with America. Thank you for coming, friend. (Applause.)

On September the 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country. Americans have known wars -- but for the past 136 years, they have been wars on foreign soil, except for one Sunday in 1941. Americans have known the casualties of war -- but not at the center of a great city on a peaceful morning. Americans have known surprise attacks -- but never before on thousands of civilians. All of this was brought upon us in a single day -- and night fell on a different world, a world where freedom itself is under attack.

Americans have many questions tonight. Americans are asking: Who attacked our country? The evidence we have gathered all points to a collection of loosely affiliated terrorist organizations known as al Qaeda. They are the same murderers indicted for bombing American embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, and responsible for bombing the USS Cole.

Al Qaeda is to terror what the mafia is to crime. But its goal is not making money; its goal is remaking the world -- and imposing its radical beliefs on people everywhere.

The terrorists practice a fringe form of Islamic extremism that has been rejected by Muslim scholars and the vast majority of Muslim clerics -- a fringe movement that perverts the peaceful teachings of Islam. The terrorists' directive commands them to kill Christians and Jews, to kill all Americans, and make no distinction among military and civilians, including women and children.

This group and its leader -- a person named Osama bin Laden -- are linked to many other organizations in different countries, including the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. There are thousands of these terrorists in more than 60 countries. They are recruited from their own nations and neighborhoods and brought to camps in places like Afghanistan, where they are trained in the tactics of terror. They are

sent back to their homes or sent to hide in countries around the world to plot evil and destruction.

The leadership of al Qaeda has great influence in Afghanistan and supports the Taliban regime in controlling most of that country. In Afghanistan, we see al Qaeda's vision for the world.

Afghanistan's people have been brutalized -- many are starving and many have fled. Women are not allowed to attend school. You can be jailed for owning a television. Religion can be practiced only as their leaders dictate. A man can be jailed in Afghanistan if his beard is not long enough.

The United States respects the people of Afghanistan -- after all, we are currently its largest source of humanitarian aid -- but we condemn the Taliban regime. (Applause.) It is not only repressing its own people, it is threatening people everywhere by sponsoring and sheltering and supplying terrorists. By aiding and abetting murder, the Taliban regime is committing murder.

And tonight, the United States of America makes the following demands on the Taliban: Deliver to United States authorities all the leaders of al Qaeda who hide in your land. (Applause.) Release all foreign nationals, including American citizens, you have unjustly imprisoned. Protect foreign journalists, diplomats and aid workers in your country. Close immediately and permanently every terrorist training camp in Afghanistan, and hand over every terrorist, and every person in their support structure, to appropriate authorities. (Applause.) Give the United States full access to terrorist training camps, so we can make sure they are no longer operating.

These demands are not open to negotiation or discussion. (Applause.) The Taliban must act, and act immediately. They will hand over the terrorists, or they will share in their fate.

I also want to speak tonight directly to Muslims throughout the world. We respect your faith. It's practiced freely by many millions of Americans, and by millions more in countries that America counts as friends. Its teachings are good and peaceful, and those who commit evil in the name of Allah blaspheme the name of Allah. (Applause.) The terrorists are traitors to their own faith, trying, in effect, to hijack Islam itself. The enemy of America is not our many Muslim friends; it is not our many Arab friends. Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists, and every government that supports them. (Applause.)

Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated. (Applause.)

Americans are asking, why do they hate us? They hate what we see right here in this chamber -- a democratically elected government. Their leaders are self-appointed. They hate our freedoms -- our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other.

They want to overthrow existing governments in many Muslim countries, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. They want to drive Israel out of the Middle East. They want to drive Christians and Jews out of vast regions of Asia and Africa.

These terrorists kill not merely to end lives, but to disrupt and end a way of life. With every atrocity, they hope that America grows fearful, retreating from the world and forsaking our friends. They stand against us, because we stand in their way.

We are not deceived by their pretenses to piety. We have seen their kind before. They are the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century. By sacrificing human life to serve their radical visions -- by abandoning every value except the will to power -- they follow

in the path of fascism, and Nazism, and totalitarianism. And they will follow that path all the way, to where it ends: in history's unmarked grave of discarded lies. (Applause.)

Americans are asking: How will we fight and win this war? We will direct every resource at our command -- every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war -- to the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror network.

This war will not be like the war against Iraq a decade ago, with a decisive liberation of territory and a swift conclusion. It will not look like the air war above Kosovo two years ago, where no ground troops were used and not a single American was lost in combat.

Our response involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes. Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen. It may include dramatic strikes, visible on TV, and covert operations, secret even in success. We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, drive them from place to place, until there is no refuge or no rest. And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. (Applause.) From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.

Our nation has been put on notice: We are not immune from attack. We will take defensive measures against terrorism to protect Americans. Today, dozens of federal departments and agencies, as well as state and local governments, have responsibilities affecting homeland security. These efforts must be coordinated at the highest level. So tonight I announce the creation of a Cabinet-level position reporting directly to me -- the Office of Homeland Security.

And tonight I also announce a distinguished American to lead this effort, to strengthen American security: a military veteran, an effective governor, a true patriot, a trusted friend -- Pennsylvania's Tom Ridge. (Applause.) He will lead, oversee and coordinate a comprehensive national strategy to safeguard our country against terrorism, and respond to any attacks that may come.

These measures are essential. But the only way to defeat terrorism as a threat to our way of life is to stop it, eliminate it, and destroy it where it grows. (Applause.)

Many will be involved in this effort, from FBI agents to intelligence operatives to the reservists we have called to active duty. All deserve our thanks, and all have our prayers. And tonight, a few miles from the damaged Pentagon, I have a message for our military: Be ready. I've called the Armed Forces to alert, and there is a reason. The hour is coming when America will act, and you will make us proud. (Applause.)

This is not, however, just America's fight. And what is at stake is not just America's freedom. This is the world's fight. This is civilization's fight. This is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom.

We ask every nation to join us. We will ask, and we will need, the help of police forces, intelligence services, and banking systems around the world. The United States is grateful that many nations and many international organizations have already responded -- with sympathy and with support. Nations from Latin America, to Asia, to Africa, to Europe, to the Islamic world. Perhaps the NATO Charter reflects best the attitude of the world: An attack on one is an attack on all.

The civilized world is rallying to America's side. They understand that if this terror goes unpunished, their own cities, their own citizens may be next. Terror, unanswered, can not

only bring down buildings, it can threaten the stability of legitimate governments. And you know what -- we're not going to allow it. (Applause.)

Americans are asking: What is expected of us? I ask you to live your lives, and hug your children. I know many citizens have fears tonight, and I ask you to be calm and resolute, even in the face of a continuing threat.

I ask you to uphold the values of America, and remember why so many have come here. We are in a fight for our principles, and our first responsibility is to live by them. No one should be singled out for unfair treatment or unkind words because of their ethnic background or religious faith. (Applause.)

I ask you to continue to support the victims of this tragedy with your contributions. Those who want to give can go to a central source of information, libertyunites.org, to find the names of groups providing direct help in New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia.

The thousands of FBI agents who are now at work in this investigation may need your cooperation, and I ask you to give it.

I ask for your patience, with the delays and inconveniences that may accompany tighter security; and for your patience in what will be a long struggle.

I ask your continued participation and confidence in the American economy. Terrorists attacked a symbol of American prosperity. They did not touch its source. America is successful because of the hard work, and creativity, and enterprise of our people. These were the true strengths of our economy before September 11th, and they are our strengths today. (Applause.)

And, finally, please continue praying for the victims of terror and their families, for those in uniform, and for our great country. Prayer has comforted us in sorrow, and will help strengthen us for the journey ahead.

Tonight I thank my fellow Americans for what you have already done and for what you will do. And ladies and gentlemen of the Congress, I thank you, their representatives, for what you have already done and for what we will do together.

Tonight, we face new and sudden national challenges. We will come together to improve air safety, to dramatically expand the number of air marshals on domestic flights, and take new measures to prevent hijacking. We will come together to promote stability and keep our airlines flying, with direct assistance during this emergency. (Applause.)

We will come together to give law enforcement the additional tools it needs to track down terror here at home. (Applause.) We will come together to strengthen our intelligence capabilities to know the plans of terrorists before they act, and find them before they strike. (Applause.)

We will come together to take active steps that strengthen America's economy, and put our people back to work.

Tonight we welcome two leaders who embody the extraordinary spirit of all New Yorkers: Governor George Pataki, and Mayor Rudolph Giuliani. (Applause.) As a symbol of America's resolve, my administration will work with Congress, and these two leaders, to show the world that we will rebuild New York City. (Applause.)

After all that has just passed -- all the lives taken, and all the possibilities and hopes that died with them -- it is natural to wonder if America's future is one of fear. Some speak of an age of terror. I know there are struggles ahead, and dangers to face. But this country will define our

times, not be defined by them. As long as the United States of America is determined and strong, this will not be an age of terror; this will be an age of liberty, here and across the world. (Applause.)

Great harm has been done to us. We have suffered great loss. And in our grief and anger we have found our mission and our moment. Freedom and fear are at war. The advance of human freedom -- the great achievement of our time, and the great hope of every time -- now depends on us. Our nation -- this generation -- will lift a dark threat of violence from our people and our future. We will rally the world to this cause by our efforts, by our courage. We will not tire, we will not falter, and we will not fail. (Applause.)

It is my hope that in the months and years ahead, life will return almost to normal. We'll go back to our lives and routines, and that is good. Even grief recedes with time and grace. But our resolve must not pass. Each of us will remember what happened that day, and to whom it happened. We'll remember the moment the news came -- where we were and what we were doing. Some will remember an image of a fire, or a story of rescue. Some will carry memories of a face and a voice gone forever.

And I will carry this: It is the police shield of a man named George Howard, who died at the World Trade Center trying to save others. It was given to me by his mom, Arlene, as a proud memorial to her son. This is my reminder of lives that ended, and a task that does not end. (Applause.)

I will not forget this wound to our country or those who inflicted it. I will not yield; I will not rest; I will not relent in waging this struggle for freedom and security for the American people.

The course of this conflict is not known, yet its outcome is certain. Freedom and fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at war, and we know that God is not neutral between them. (Applause.)

Fellow citizens, we'll meet violence with patient justice -- assured of the rightness of our cause, and confident of the victories to come. In all that lies before us, may God grant us wisdom, and may He watch over the United States of America.

Thank you. (Applause.)

END 9:41 P.M. EDT

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For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
January 29, 2002

President Delivers State of the Union Address

The President's State of the Union Address
The United States Capitol
Washington, D.C.

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En Español

9:15 P.M. EST

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much. Mr. Speaker, Vice President Cheney, members of Congress, distinguished guests, fellow citizens: As we gather tonight, our nation is at war, our economy is in recession, and the civilized world faces unprecedented dangers. Yet the state of our Union has never been stronger. (Applause.)

We last met in an hour of shock and suffering. In four short months, our nation has comforted the victims, begun to rebuild New York and the Pentagon, rallied a great coalition, captured, arrested, and rid the world of thousands of terrorists, destroyed Afghanistan's terrorist training camps, saved a people from starvation, and freed a country from brutal oppression. (Applause.)

The American flag flies again over our embassy in Kabul. Terrorists who once occupied Afghanistan now occupy cells at Guantanamo Bay. (Applause.) And terrorist leaders who urged followers to sacrifice their lives are running for their own. (Applause.)

America and Afghanistan are now allies against terror. We'll be partners in rebuilding that country. And this evening we welcome the distinguished interim leader of a liberated Afghanistan: Chairman Hamid Karzai. (Applause.)

The last time we met in this chamber, the mothers and daughters of Afghanistan were captives in their own homes, forbidden from working or going to school. Today women are free, and are part of Afghanistan's new government. And we welcome the new Minister of Women's Affairs, Doctor Sima Samar. (Applause.)

Our progress is a tribute to the spirit of the Afghan people, to the resolve of our coalition, and to the might of the United States military. (Applause.) When I called our troops into action, I did so with complete confidence in their courage and skill. And tonight, thanks to them, we are winning the war on terror. (Applause.) The man and women of our Armed Forces have delivered a message now clear to every enemy of the United States: Even 7,000 miles away, across oceans and continents, on mountaintops and in caves -- you will not escape the justice of this nation. (Applause.)

For many Americans, these four months have brought sorrow, and pain that will never completely go away. Every day a retired firefighter returns to Ground Zero, to feel closer to his two sons who died there. At a memorial in New York, a little boy left his football with a note for his lost father: Dear Daddy, please take this to heaven. I don't want to play football until I can play with you again some day.

Last month, at the grave of her husband, Michael, a CIA officer and Marine who died in Mazur-e-Sharif, Shannon Spann said these words of farewell: "Semper Fi, my love." Shannon is with us tonight. (Applause.)

Shannon, I assure you and all who have lost a loved one that our cause is just, and our country will never forget the debt we owe Michael and all who gave their lives for freedom.

Our cause is just, and it continues. Our discoveries in Afghanistan confirmed our worst fears, and showed us the true scope of the task ahead. We have seen the depth of our enemies' hatred in videos, where they laugh about the loss of innocent life. And the depth of their hatred is equaled by the madness of the destruction they design. We have found diagrams of American nuclear power plants and public water facilities, detailed instructions for making

chemical weapons, surveillance maps of American cities, and thorough descriptions of landmarks in America and throughout the world.

What we have found in Afghanistan confirms that, far from ending there, our war against terror is only beginning. Most of the 19 men who hijacked planes on September the 11th were trained in Afghanistan's camps, and so were tens of thousands of others. Thousands of dangerous killers, schooled in the methods of murder, often supported by outlaw regimes, are now spread throughout the world like ticking time bombs, set to go off without warning.

Thanks to the work of our law enforcement officials and coalition partners, hundreds of terrorists have been arrested. Yet, tens of thousands of trained terrorists are still at large. These enemies view the entire world as a battlefield, and we must pursue them wherever they are. (Applause.) So long as training camps operate, so long as nations harbor terrorists, freedom is at risk. And America and our allies must not, and will not, allow it. (Applause.)

Our nation will continue to be steadfast and patient and persistent in the pursuit of two great objectives. First, we will shut down terrorist camps, disrupt terrorist plans, and bring terrorists to justice. And, second, we must prevent the terrorists and regimes who seek chemical, biological or nuclear weapons from threatening the United States and the world. (Applause.)

Our military has put the terror training camps of Afghanistan out of business, yet camps still exist in at least a dozen countries. A terrorist underworld -- including groups like Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, Jaish-i-Mohammed -- operates in remote jungles and deserts, and hides in the centers of large cities.

While the most visible military action is in Afghanistan, America is acting elsewhere. We now have troops in the Philippines, helping to train that country's armed forces to go after terrorist cells that have executed an American, and still hold hostages. Our soldiers, working with the Bosnian government, seized terrorists who were plotting to bomb our embassy. Our Navy is patrolling the coast of Africa to block the shipment of weapons and the establishment of terrorist camps in Somalia.

My hope is that all nations will heed our call, and eliminate the terrorist parasites who threaten their countries and our own. Many nations are acting forcefully. Pakistan is now cracking down on terror, and I admire the strong leadership of President Musharraf. (Applause.)

But some governments will be timid in the face of terror. And make no mistake about it: If they do not act, America will. (Applause.)

Our second goal is to prevent regimes that sponsor terror from threatening America or our friends and allies with weapons of mass destruction. Some of these regimes have been pretty quiet since September the 11th. But we know their true nature. North Korea is a regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, while starving its citizens.

Iran aggressively pursues these weapons and exports terror, while an unelected few repress the Iranian people's hope for freedom.

Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror. The Iraqi regime has plotted to develop anthrax, and nerve gas, and nuclear weapons for over a decade. This is a regime that has already used poison gas to murder thousands of its own citizens -- leaving the bodies of mothers huddled over their dead children. This is a regime that agreed to international inspections -- then kicked out the inspectors. This is a regime that has something to hide from the civilized world.

States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to

match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic.

We will work closely with our coalition to deny terrorists and their state sponsors the materials, technology, and expertise to make and deliver weapons of mass destruction. We will develop and deploy effective missile defenses to protect America and our allies from sudden attack. (Applause.) And all nations should know: America will do what is necessary to ensure our nation's security.

We'll be deliberate, yet time is not on our side. I will not wait on events, while dangers gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons. (Applause.)

Our war on terror is well begun, but it is only begun. This campaign may not be finished on our watch -- yet it must be and it will be waged on our watch.

We can't stop short. If we stop now -- leaving terror camps intact and terror states unchecked -- our sense of security would be false and temporary. History has called America and our allies to action, and it is both our responsibility and our privilege to fight freedom's fight. (Applause.)

Our first priority must always be the security of our nation, and that will be reflected in the budget I send to Congress. My budget supports three great goals for America: We will win this war; we'll protect our homeland; and we will revive our economy.

September the 11th brought out the best in America, and the best in this Congress. And I join the American people in applauding your unity and resolve. (Applause.) Now Americans deserve to have this same spirit directed toward addressing problems here at home. I'm a proud member of my party -- yet as we act to win the war, protect our people, and create jobs in America, we must act, first and foremost, not as Republicans, not as Democrats, but as Americans. (Applause.)

It costs a lot to fight this war. We have spent more than a billion dollars a month -- over $30 million a day -- and we must be prepared for future operations. Afghanistan proved that expensive precision weapons defeat the enemy and spare innocent lives, and we need more of them. We need to replace aging aircraft and make our military more agile, to put our troops anywhere in the world quickly and safely. Our men and women in uniform deserve the best weapons, the best equipment, the best training -- and they also deserve another pay raise. (Applause.)

My budget includes the largest increase in defense spending in two decades -- because while the price of freedom and security is high, it is never too high. Whatever it costs to defend our country, we will pay. (Applause.)

The next priority of my budget is to do everything possible to protect our citizens and strengthen our nation against the ongoing threat of another attack. Time and distance from the events of September the 11th will not make us safer unless we act on its lessons. America is no longer protected by vast oceans. We are protected from attack only by vigorous action abroad, and increased vigilance at home.

My budget nearly doubles funding for a sustained strategy of homeland security, focused on four key areas: bioterrorism, emergency response, airport and border security, and improved intelligence. We will develop vaccines to fight anthrax and other deadly diseases. We'll increase funding to help states and communities train and equip our heroic police and firefighters. (Applause.) We will improve intelligence collection and sharing, expand patrols at our borders, strengthen the security of air travel, and use technology to track the arrivals and departures of visitors to the United States. (Applause.)

Homeland security will make America not only stronger, but, in many ways, better. Knowledge gained from bioterrorism research will improve public health. Stronger police and fire departments will mean safer neighborhoods. Stricter border enforcement will help combat illegal drugs. (Applause.) And as government works to better secure our homeland, America will continue to depend on the eyes and ears of alert citizens.

A few days before Christmas, an airline flight attendant spotted a passenger lighting a match. The crew and passengers quickly subdued the man, who had been trained by al Qaeda and was armed with explosives. The people on that plane were alert and, as a result, likely saved nearly 200 lives. And tonight we welcome and thank flight attendants Hermis Moutardier and Christina Jones. (Applause.)

Once we have funded our national security and our homeland security, the final great priority of my budget is economic security for the American people. (Applause.) To achieve these great national objectives -- to win the war, protect the homeland, and revitalize our economy -- our budget will run a deficit that will be small and short-term, so long as Congress restrains spending and acts in a fiscally responsible manner. (Applause.) We have clear priorities and we must act at home with the same purpose and resolve we have shown overseas: We'll prevail in the war, and we will defeat this recession. (Applause.)

Americans who have lost their jobs need our help and I support extending unemployment benefits and direct assistance for health care coverage. (Applause.) Yet, American workers want more than unemployment checks -- they want a steady paycheck. (Applause.) When America works, America prospers, so my economic security plan can be summed up in one word: jobs. (Applause.)

Good jobs begin with good schools, and here we've made a fine start. (Applause.) Republicans and Democrats worked together to achieve historic education reform so that no child is left behind. I was proud to work with members of both parties: Chairman John Boehner and Congressman George Miller. (Applause.) Senator Judd Gregg. (Applause.) And I was so proud of our work, I even had nice things to say about my friend, Ted Kennedy. (Laughter and applause.) I know the folks at the Crawford coffee shop couldn't believe I'd say such a thing -- (laughter) -- but our work on this bill shows what is possible if we set aside posturing and focus on results. (Applause.)

There is more to do. We need to prepare our children to read and succeed in school with improved Head Start and early childhood development programs. (Applause.) We must upgrade our teacher colleges and teacher training and launch a major recruiting drive with a great goal for America: a quality teacher in every classroom. (Applause.)

Good jobs also depend on reliable and affordable energy. This Congress must act to encourage conservation, promote technology, build infrastructure, and it must act to increase energy production at home so America is less dependent on foreign oil. (Applause.)

Good jobs depend on expanded trade. Selling into new markets creates new jobs, so I ask Congress to finally approve trade promotion authority. (Applause.) On these two key issues, trade and energy, the House of Representatives has acted to create jobs, and I urge the Senate to pass this legislation. (Applause.)

Good jobs depend on sound tax policy. (Applause.) Last year, some in this hall thought my tax relief plan was too small; some thought it was too big. (Applause.) But when the checks arrived in the mail, most Americans thought tax relief was just about right. (Applause.) Congress listened to the people and responded by reducing tax rates, doubling the child credit, and ending the death tax. For the sake of long-term growth and to help Americans plan for the future, let's make these tax cuts permanent. (Applause.)

The way out of this recession, the way to create jobs, is to grow the economy by encouraging investment in factories and equipment, and by speeding up tax relief so people have more

money to spend. For the sake of American workers, let's pass a stimulus package. (Applause.)

Good jobs must be the aim of welfare reform. As we reauthorize these important reforms, we must always remember the goal is to reduce dependency on government and offer every American the dignity of a job. (Applause.)

Americans know economic security can vanish in an instant without health security. I ask Congress to join me this year to enact a patients' bill of rights -- (applause) -- to give uninsured workers credits to help buy health coverage -- (applause) -- to approve an historic increase in the spending for veterans' health -- (applause) -- and to give seniors a sound and modern Medicare system that includes coverage for prescription drugs. (Applause.)

A good job should lead to security in retirement. I ask Congress to enact new safeguards for 401K and pension plans. (Applause.) Employees who have worked hard and saved all their lives should not have to risk losing everything if their company fails. (Applause.) Through stricter accounting standards and tougher disclosure requirements, corporate America must be made more accountable to employees and shareholders and held to the highest standards of conduct. (Applause.)

Retirement security also depends upon keeping the commitments of Social Security, and we will. We must make Social Security financially stable and allow personal retirement accounts for younger workers who choose them. (Applause.)

Members, you and I will work together in the months ahead on other issues: productive farm policy -- (applause) -- a cleaner environment -- (applause) -- broader home ownership, especially among minorities -- (applause) -- and ways to encourage the good work of charities and faith-based groups. (Applause.) I ask you to join me on these important domestic issues in the same spirit of cooperation we've applied to our war against terrorism. (Applause.)

During these last few months, I've been humbled and privileged to see the true character of this country in a time of testing. Our enemies believed America was weak and materialistic, that we would splinter in fear and selfishness. They were as wrong as they are evil. (Applause.)

The American people have responded magnificently, with courage and compassion, strength and resolve. As I have met the heroes, hugged the families, and looked into the tired faces of rescuers, I have stood in awe of the American people.

And I hope you will join me -- I hope you will join me in expressing thanks to one American for the strength and calm and comfort she brings to our nation in crisis, our First Lady, Laura Bush. (Applause.)

None of us would ever wish the evil that was done on September the 11th. Yet after America was attacked, it was as if our entire country looked into a mirror and saw our better selves. We were reminded that we are citizens, with obligations to each other, to our country, and to history. We began to think less of the goods we can accumulate, and more about the good we can do.

For too long our culture has said, "If it feels good, do it." Now America is embracing a new ethic and a new creed: "Let's roll." (Applause.) In the sacrifice of soldiers, the fierce brotherhood of firefighters, and the bravery and generosity of ordinary citizens, we have glimpsed what a new culture of responsibility could look like. We want to be a nation that serves goals larger than self. We've been offered a unique opportunity, and we must not let this moment pass. (Applause.)

My call tonight is for every American to commit at least two years -- 4,000 hours over the rest of your lifetime -- to the service of your neighbors and your nation. (Applause.) Many are

already serving, and I thank you. If you aren't sure how to help, I've got a good place to start. To sustain and extend the best that has emerged in America, I invite you to join the new USA Freedom Corps. The Freedom Corps will focus on three areas of need: responding in case of crisis at home; rebuilding our communities; and extending American compassion throughout the world.

One purpose of the USA Freedom Corps will be homeland security. America needs retired doctors and nurses who can be mobilized in major emergencies; volunteers to help police and fire departments; transportation and utility workers well-trained in spotting danger.

Our country also needs citizens working to rebuild our communities. We need mentors to love children, especially children whose parents are in prison. And we need more talented teachers in troubled schools. USA Freedom Corps will expand and improve the good efforts of AmeriCorps and Senior Corps to recruit more than 200,000 new volunteers.

And America needs citizens to extend the compassion of our country to every part of the world. So we will renew the promise of the Peace Corps, double its volunteers over the next five years -- (applause) -- and ask it to join a new effort to encourage development and education and opportunity in the Islamic world. (Applause.)

This time of adversity offers a unique moment of opportunity -- a moment we must seize to change our culture. Through the gathering momentum of millions of acts of service and decency and kindness, I know we can overcome evil with greater good. (Applause.) And we have a great opportunity during this time of war to lead the world toward the values that will bring lasting peace.

All fathers and mothers, in all societies, want their children to be educated, and live free from poverty and violence. No people on Earth yearn to be oppressed, or aspire to servitude, or eagerly await the midnight knock of the secret police.

If anyone doubts this, let them look to Afghanistan, where the Islamic "street" greeted the fall of tyranny with song and celebration. Let the skeptics look to Islam's own rich history, with its centuries of learning, and tolerance and progress. America will lead by defending liberty and justice because they are right and true and unchanging for all people everywhere. (Applause.)

No nation owns these aspirations, and no nation is exempt from them. We have no intention of imposing our culture. But America will always stand firm for the non-negotiable demands of human dignity: the rule of law; limits on the power of the state; respect for women; private property; free speech; equal justice; and religious tolerance. (Applause.)

America will take the side of brave men and women who advocate these values around the world, including the Islamic world, because we have a greater objective than eliminating threats and containing resentment. We seek a just and peaceful world beyond the war on terror.

In this moment of opportunity, a common danger is erasing old rivalries. America is working with Russia and China and India, in ways we have never before, to achieve peace and prosperity. In every region, free markets and free trade and free societies are proving their power to lift lives. Together with friends and allies from Europe to Asia, and Africa to Latin America, we will demonstrate that the forces of terror cannot stop the momentum of freedom. (Applause.)

The last time I spoke here, I expressed the hope that life would return to normal. In some ways, it has. In others, it never will. Those of us who have lived through these challenging times have been changed by them. We've come to know truths that we will never question: evil is real, and it must be opposed. (Applause.) Beyond all differences of race or creed, we are one country, mourning together and facing danger together. Deep in the

American character, there is honor, and it is stronger than cynicism. And many have discovered again that even in tragedy -- especially in tragedy -- God is near. (Applause.)

In a single instant, we realized that this will be a decisive decade in the history of liberty, that we've been called to a unique role in human events. Rarely has the world faced a choice more clear or consequential.

Our enemies send other people's children on missions of suicide and murder. They embrace tyranny and death as a cause and a creed. We stand for a different choice, made long ago, on the day of our founding. We affirm it again today. We choose freedom and the dignity of every life. (Applause.)

Steadfast in our purpose, we now press on. We have known freedom's price. We have shown freedom's power. And in this great conflict, my fellow Americans, we will see freedom's victory.

Thank you all. May God bless. (Applause.)

END 10:03 P.M. EST

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For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
September 12, 2002

President's Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly

Remarks by the President in Address to the United Nations General Assembly
New York, New York

- Fact Sheet: U.S. Rejoins UNESCO
- A Decade of Deception and Defiance
- en Español



10:39 A.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Secretary General, Mr. President, distinguished delegates, and ladies and gentlemen: We meet one year and one day after a terrorist attack brought grief to my country, and brought grief to many citizens of our world. Yesterday, we remembered the innocent lives taken that terrible morning. Today, we turn to the urgent duty of protecting other lives, without illusion and without fear.

We've accomplished much in the last year -- in Afghanistan and beyond. We have much yet to do -- in Afghanistan and beyond. Many nations represented here have joined in the fight against global terror, and the people of the United States are grateful.

The United Nations was born in the hope that survived a world war -- the hope of a world moving toward justice, escaping old patterns of conflict and fear.

The founding members resolved that the peace of the world must never again be destroyed by the will and wickedness of any man. We created the United Nations Security Council, so that, unlike the League of Nations, our deliberations would be more than talk, our resolutions would be more than wishes. After generations of deceitful dictators and broken treaties and squandered lives, we dedicated ourselves to standards of human dignity shared by all, and to a system of security defended by all.

Today, these standards, and this security, are challenged. Our commitment to human dignity is challenged by persistent poverty and raging disease. The suffering is great, and our responsibilities are clear. The United States is joining with the world to supply aid where it reaches people and lifts up lives, to extend trade and the prosperity it brings, and to bring medical care where it is desperately needed.

As a symbol of our commitment to human dignity, the United States will return to UNESCO. (Applause.) This organization has been reformed and America will participate fully in its mission to advance human rights and tolerance and learning.

Our common security is challenged by regional conflicts -- ethnic and religious strife that is ancient, but not inevitable. In the Middle East, there can be no peace for either side without freedom for both sides. America stands committed to an independent and democratic Palestine, living side by side with Israel in peace and security. Like all other people, Palestinians deserve a government that serves their interests and listens to their voices. My nation will continue to encourage all parties to step up to their responsibilities as we seek a just and comprehensive settlement to the conflict.

Above all, our principles and our security are challenged today by outlaw groups and regimes that accept no law of morality and have no limit to their violent ambitions. In the attacks on America a year ago, we saw the destructive intentions of our enemies. This threat hides within many nations, including my own. In cells and camps, terrorists are plotting further destruction, and building new bases for their war against civilization. And our greatest fear is that terrorists will find a shortcut to their mad ambitions when an outlaw regime supplies them with the technologies to kill on a massive scale.

In one place -- in one regime -- we find all these dangers, in their most lethal and aggressive forms, exactly the kind of aggressive threat the United Nations was born to confront.

Twelve years ago, Iraq invaded Kuwait without provocation. And the regime's forces were poised to continue their march to seize other countries and their resources. Had Saddam Hussein been appeased instead of stopped, he would have endangered the peace and stability of the world. Yet this aggression was stopped -- by the might of coalition forces and the will of the United Nations.

To suspend hostilities, to spare himself, Iraq's dictator accepted a series of commitments. The terms were clear, to him and to all. And he agreed to prove he is complying with every one of those obligations.

He has proven instead only his contempt for the United Nations, and for all his pledges. By breaking every pledge -- by his deceptions, and by his cruelties -- Saddam Hussein has made the case against himself.

In 1991, Security Council Resolution 688 demanded that the Iraqi regime cease at once the repression of its own people, including the systematic repression of minorities -- which the Council said, threatened international peace and security in the region. This demand goes ignored.

Last year, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights found that Iraq continues to commit extremely grave violations of human rights, and that the regime's repression is all pervasive. Tens of thousands of political opponents and ordinary citizens have been subjected to arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, summary execution, and torture by beating and burning, electric shock, starvation, mutilation, and rape. Wives are tortured in front of their husbands, children in the presence of their parents -- and all of these horrors concealed from the world by the apparatus of a totalitarian state.

In 1991, the U.N. Security Council, through Resolutions 686 and 687, demanded that Iraq return all prisoners from Kuwait and other lands. Iraq's regime agreed. It broke its promise. Last year the Secretary General's high-level coordinator for this issue reported that Kuwait, Saudi, Indian, Syrian, Lebanese, Iranian, Egyptian, Bahraini, and Omani nationals remain unaccounted for -- more than 600 people. One American pilot is among them.

In 1991, the U.N. Security Council, through Resolution 687, demanded that Iraq renounce all involvement with terrorism, and permit no terrorist organizations to operate in Iraq. Iraq's regime agreed. It broke this promise. In violation of Security Council Resolution 1373, Iraq continues to shelter and support terrorist organizations that direct violence against Iran, Israel, and Western governments. Iraqi dissidents abroad are targeted for murder. In 1993, Iraq attempted to assassinate the Emir of Kuwait and a former American President. Iraq's government openly praised the attacks of September the 11th. And al Qaeda terrorists escaped from Afghanistan and are known to be in Iraq.

In 1991, the Iraqi regime agreed to destroy and stop developing all weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles, and to prove to the world it has done so by complying with rigorous inspections. Iraq has broken every aspect of this fundamental pledge.

From 1991 to 1995, the Iraqi regime said it had no biological weapons. After a senior official in its weapons program defected and exposed this lie, the regime admitted to producing tens of thousands of liters of anthrax and other deadly biological agents for use with Scud warheads, aerial bombs, and aircraft spray tanks. U.N. inspectors believe Iraq has produced two to four

times the amount of biological agents it declared, and has failed to account for more than three metric tons of material that could be used to produce biological weapons. Right now, Iraq is expanding and improving facilities that were used for the production of biological weapons.

United Nations' inspections also revealed that Iraq likely maintains stockpiles of VX, mustard and other chemical agents, and that the regime is rebuilding and expanding facilities capable of producing chemical weapons.

And in 1995, after four years of deception, Iraq finally admitted it had a crash nuclear weapons program prior to the Gulf War. We know now, were it not for that war, the regime in Iraq would likely have possessed a nuclear weapon no later than 1993.

Today, Iraq continues to withhold important information about its nuclear program -- weapons design, procurement logs, experiment data, an accounting of nuclear materials and documentation of foreign assistance. Iraq employs capable nuclear scientists and technicians. It retains physical infrastructure needed to build a nuclear weapon. Iraq has made several attempts to buy high-strength aluminum tubes used to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon. Should Iraq acquire fissile material, it would be able to build a nuclear weapon within a year. And Iraq's state-controlled media has reported numerous meetings between Saddam Hussein and his nuclear scientists, leaving little doubt about his continued appetite for these weapons.

Iraq also possesses a force of Scud-type missiles with ranges beyond the 150 kilometers permitted by the U.N. Work at testing and production facilities shows that Iraq is building more long-range missiles that it can inflict mass death throughout the region.

In 1990, after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the world imposed economic sanctions on Iraq. Those sanctions were maintained after the war to compel the regime's compliance with Security Council resolutions. In time, Iraq was allowed to use oil revenues to buy food. Saddam Hussein has subverted this program, working around the sanctions to buy missile technology and military materials. He blames the suffering of Iraq's people on the United Nations, even as he uses his oil wealth to build lavish palaces for himself, and to buy arms for his country. By refusing to comply with his own agreements, he bears full guilt for the hunger and misery of innocent Iraqi citizens.

In 1991, Iraq promised U.N. inspectors immediate and unrestricted access to verify Iraq's commitment to rid itself of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles. Iraq broke this promise, spending seven years deceiving, evading, and harassing U.N. inspectors before ceasing cooperation entirely. Just months after the 1991 cease-fire, the Security Council twice renewed its demand that the Iraqi regime cooperate fully with inspectors, condemning Iraq's serious violations of its obligations. The Security Council again renewed that demand in 1994, and twice more in 1996, deploring Iraq's clear violations of its obligations. The Security Council renewed its demand three more times in 1997, citing flagrant violations; and three more times in 1998, calling Iraq's

behavior totally unacceptable. And in 1999, the demand was renewed yet again.

As we meet today, it's been almost four years since the last U.N. inspectors set foot in Iraq, four years for the Iraqi regime to plan, and to build, and to test behind the cloak of secrecy.

We know that Saddam Hussein pursued weapons of mass murder even when inspectors were in his country. Are we to assume that he stopped when they left? The history, the logic, and the facts lead to one conclusion: Saddam Hussein's regime is a grave and gathering danger. To suggest otherwise is to hope against the evidence. To assume this regime's good faith is to bet the lives of millions and the peace of the world in a reckless gamble. And this is a risk we must not take.

Delegates to the General Assembly, we have been more than patient. We've tried sanctions. We've tried the carrot of oil for food, and the stick of coalition military strikes. But Saddam Hussein has defied all these efforts and continues to develop weapons of mass destruction. The first time we may be completely certain he has a -- nuclear weapons is when, God forbids, he uses one. We owe it to all our citizens to do everything in our power to prevent that day from coming.

The conduct of the Iraqi regime is a threat to the authority of the United Nations, and a threat to peace. Iraq has answered a decade of U.N. demands with a decade of defiance. All the world now faces a test, and the United Nations a difficult and defining moment. Are Security Council resolutions to be honored and enforced, or cast aside without consequence? Will the United Nations serve the purpose of its founding, or will it be irrelevant?

The United States helped found the United Nations. We want the United Nations to be effective, and respectful, and successful. We want the resolutions of the world's most important multilateral body to be enforced. And right now those resolutions are being unilaterally subverted by the Iraqi regime. Our partnership of nations can meet the test before us, by making clear what we now expect of the Iraqi regime.

If the Iraqi regime wishes peace, it will immediately and unconditionally forswear, disclose, and remove or destroy all weapons of mass destruction, long-range missiles, and all related material.

If the Iraqi regime wishes peace, it will immediately end all support for terrorism and act to suppress it, as all states are required to do by U.N. Security Council resolutions.

If the Iraqi regime wishes peace, it will cease persecution of its civilian population, including Shi'a, Sunnis, Kurds, Turkomans, and others, again as required by Security Council resolutions.

If the Iraqi regime wishes peace, it will release or account for all Gulf War personnel whose fate is still unknown. It will return the remains of any who are deceased, return stolen property, accept liability for losses resulting from the invasion of Kuwait, and fully cooperate with international efforts to resolve these issues, as required by Security Council resolutions.

If the Iraqi regime wishes peace, it will immediately end all illicit trade outside the oil-for-food program. It will accept U.N. administration of funds from that program, to ensure that the money is used fairly and promptly for the benefit of the Iraqi people.

If all these steps are taken, it will signal a new openness and accountability in Iraq. And it could open the prospect of the United Nations helping to build a government that represents all Iraqis -- a government based on respect for human rights, economic liberty, and internationally supervised elections.

The United States has no quarrel with the Iraqi people; they've suffered too long in silent captivity. Liberty for the Iraqi people is a great moral cause, and a great strategic goal. The people of Iraq deserve it; the security of all nations requires it. Free societies do not intimidate through cruelty and conquest, and open societies do not threaten the world with mass murder. The United States supports political and economic liberty in a unified Iraq.

We can harbor no illusions -- and that's important today to remember. Saddam Hussein attacked Iran in 1980 and Kuwait in 1990. He's fired ballistic missiles at Iran and Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Israel. His regime once ordered the killing of every person between the ages of 15 and 70 in certain Kurdish villages in northern Iraq. He has gassed many Iranians, and 40 Iraqi villages.

My nation will work with the U.N. Security Council to meet our common challenge. If Iraq's regime defies us again, the world must move deliberately, decisively to hold Iraq to account. We will work with the U.N. Security Council for the necessary resolutions. But the purposes of the United States should not be doubted. The Security Council resolutions will be enforced -- the just demands of peace and security will be met -- or action will be unavoidable. And a regime that has lost its legitimacy will also lose its power.

Events can turn in one of two ways: If we fail to act in the face of danger, the people of Iraq will continue to live in brutal submission. The regime will have new power to bully and dominate and conquer its neighbors, condemning the Middle East to more years of bloodshed and fear. The regime will remain unstable -- the region will remain unstable, with little hope of freedom, and isolated from the progress of our times. With every step the Iraqi regime takes toward gaining and deploying the most terrible weapons, our own options to confront that regime will narrow. And if an emboldened regime were to supply these weapons to terrorist allies, then the attacks of September the 11th would be a prelude to far greater horrors.

If we meet our responsibilities, if we overcome this danger, we can arrive at a very different future. The people of Iraq can shake off their captivity. They can one day join a democratic Afghanistan and a democratic Palestine, inspiring reforms throughout the Muslim world. These nations can show by their example that honest government, and respect for women, and the great Islamic tradition of learning can triumph in the Middle East and beyond. And we will show that the promise of the United Nations can be fulfilled in our time.

Neither of these outcomes is certain. Both have been set before us. We must choose between a world of fear and a world of progress. We cannot stand by and do nothing while dangers gather. We must stand up for our security, and for the permanent rights and the hopes of mankind. By heritage and by choice, the United States of America will make that stand. And, delegates to the United Nations, you have the power to make that stand, as well.

Thank you very much. (Applause.)

END 11:04 A.M. EDT

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For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
March 19, 2003

President Bush Addresses the Nation

The Oval Office

en Español



10:16 P.M. EST

THE PRESIDENT: My fellow citizens, at this hour, American and coalition forces are in the early stages of military operations to disarm Iraq, to free its people and to defend the world from grave danger.

On my orders, coalition forces have begun striking selected targets of military importance to undermine Saddam Hussein's ability to wage war. These are opening stages of what will be a broad and concerted campaign. More than 35 countries are giving crucial support -- from the use of naval and air bases, to help with intelligence and logistics, to the deployment of combat units. Every nation in this coalition has chosen to bear the duty and share the honor of serving in our common defense.



To all the men and women of the United States Armed Forces now in the Middle East, the peace of a troubled

world and the hopes of an oppressed people now depend on you. That trust is well placed.

The enemies you confront will come to know your skill and bravery. The people you liberate will witness the honorable and decent spirit of the American military. In this conflict, America faces an enemy who has no regard for conventions of war or rules of morality. Saddam Hussein has placed Iraqi troops and equipment in civilian areas, attempting to use innocent men, women and children as shields for his own military -- a final atrocity against his people.

I want Americans and all the world to know that coalition forces will make every effort to spare innocent civilians from harm. A campaign on the harsh terrain of a nation as large as California could be longer and more difficult than some predict. And helping Iraqis achieve a united, stable and free country will require our sustained commitment.

We come to Iraq with respect for its citizens, for their great civilization and for the religious faiths they practice. We have no ambition in Iraq, except to remove a threat and restore control of that country to its own people.

I know that the families of our military are praying that all those who serve will return safely and soon. Millions of Americans are praying with you for the safety of your loved ones and for the protection of the innocent. For your sacrifice, you have the gratitude and respect of the American people. And you can know that our forces will be coming home as soon as their work is done.

Our nation enters this conflict reluctantly -- yet, our purpose is sure. The people of the United States and our friends and allies will not live at the mercy of an outlaw regime that threatens the peace with weapons of mass murder. We will meet that threat now, with our Army, Air Force, Navy, Coast Guard and Marines, so that we do not have to meet it later with armies of fire fighters and police and doctors on the streets of our cities.

Now that conflict has come, the only way to limit its duration is to apply decisive force. And I assure you, this will not be a campaign of half measures, and we will accept no outcome but victory.

My fellow citizens, the dangers to our country and the world will be overcome. We will pass through this time of peril and carry on the work of peace. We will defend our freedom. We will bring freedom to others and we will prevail.



May God bless our country and all who defend her.

END 10:20 P.M. EST

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For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
May 1, 2003

President Bush Announces Major Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended

Remarks by the President from the USS Abraham Lincoln
At Sea Off the Coast of San Diego, California

Video (Real) Video (Real)
Audio
En Español

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you all very much. Admiral Kelly, Captain Card, officers and sailors of the USS Abraham Lincoln, my fellow Americans: Major combat operations in Iraq have ended. In the battle of Iraq, the United States and our allies have prevailed. (Applause.) And now our coalition is engaged in securing and reconstructing that country.

In this battle, we have fought for the cause of liberty, and for the peace of the world. Our nation and our coalition are proud of this accomplishment -- yet, it is you, the members of the United States military, who achieved it. Your courage, your willingness to face danger for your country and for each other, made this day possible. Because of you, our nation is more secure. Because of you, the tyrant has fallen, and Iraq is free. (Applause.)

Operation Iraqi Freedom was carried out with a combination of precision and speed and boldness the enemy did not expect, and the world had not seen before. From distant bases or ships at sea, we sent planes and missiles that could destroy an enemy division, or strike a single bunker. Marines and soldiers charged to Baghdad across 350 miles of hostile ground, in one of the swiftest advances of heavy arms in history. You have shown the world the skill and the might of the American Armed Forces.

This nation thanks all the members of our coalition who joined in a noble cause. We thank the Armed Forces of the United Kingdom, Australia, and Poland, who shared in the hardships of war. We thank all the citizens of Iraq who welcomed our troops and joined in the liberation of their own country. And tonight, I have a special word for Secretary Rumsfeld, for General Franks, and for all the men and women who wear the uniform of the United States: America is grateful for a job well done. (Applause.)

The character of our military through history -- the daring of Normandy, the fierce courage of Iwo Jima, the decency and idealism that turned enemies into allies -- is fully present in this

generation. When Iraqi civilians looked into the faces of our servicemen and women, they saw strength and kindness and goodwill. When I look at the members of the United States military, I see the best of our country, and I'm honored to be your Commander-in-Chief. (Applause.)

In the images of falling statues, we have witnessed the arrival of a new era. For a hundred of years of war, culminating in the nuclear age, military technology was designed and deployed to inflict casualties on an ever-growing scale. In defeating Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, Allied forces destroyed entire cities, while enemy leaders who started the conflict were safe until the final days. Military power was used to end a regime by breaking a nation.

Today, we have the greater power to free a nation by breaking a dangerous and aggressive regime. With new tactics and precision weapons, we can achieve military objectives without directing violence against civilians. No device of man can remove the tragedy from war; yet it is a great moral advance when the guilty have far more to fear from war than the innocent. (Applause.)

In the images of celebrating Iraqis, we have also seen the ageless appeal of human freedom. Decades of lies and intimidation could not make the Iraqi people love their oppressors or desire their own enslavement. Men and women in every culture need liberty like they need food and water and air. Everywhere that freedom arrives, humanity rejoices; and everywhere that freedom stirs, let tyrants fear. (Applause.)

We have difficult work to do in Iraq. We're bringing order to parts of that country that remain dangerous. We're pursuing and finding leaders of the old regime, who will be held to account for their crimes. We've begun the search for hidden chemical and biological weapons and already know of hundreds of sites that will be investigated. We're helping to rebuild Iraq, where the dictator built palaces for himself, instead of hospitals and schools. And we will stand with the new leaders of Iraq as they establish a government of, by, and for the Iraqi people. (Applause.)

The transition from dictatorship to democracy will take time, but it is worth every effort. Our coalition will stay until our work is done. Then we will leave, and we will leave behind a free Iraq. (Applause.)

The battle of Iraq is one victory in a war on terror that began on September the 11, 2001 -- and still goes on. That terrible morning, 19 evil men -- the shock troops of a hateful ideology -- gave America and the civilized world a glimpse of their ambitions. They imagined, in the words of one terrorist, that September the 11th would be the "beginning of the end of America." By seeking to turn our cities into killing fields, terrorists and their allies believed that they could destroy this nation's resolve, and force our retreat from the world. They have failed. (Applause.)

In the battle of Afghanistan, we destroyed the Taliban, many terrorists, and the camps where they trained. We continue to help the Afghan people lay roads, restore hospitals, and educate all of their children. Yet we also have dangerous work to complete. As I speak, a Special Operations task force, led by the 82nd Airborne, is on the trail of the terrorists and those who seek to undermine the free government of Afghanistan. America and our coalition will finish what we have begun. (Applause.)

From Pakistan to the Philippines to the Horn of Africa, we are hunting down al Qaeda killers. Nineteen months ago, I pledged that the terrorists would not escape the patient justice of the United States. And as of tonight, nearly one-half of al Qaeda's senior operatives have been captured or killed. (Applause.)

The liberation of Iraq is a crucial advance in the campaign against terror. We've removed an ally of al Qaeda, and cut off a source of terrorist funding. And this much is certain: No terrorist network will gain weapons of mass destruction from the Iraqi regime, because the regime is no more. (Applause.)

In these 19 months that changed the world, our actions have been focused and deliberate and proportionate to the offense. We have not forgotten the victims of September the 11th -- the last phone calls, the cold murder of children, the searches in the rubble. With those attacks, the terrorists and their supporters declared war on the United States. And war is what they got. (Applause.)

Our war against terror is proceeding according to principles that I have made clear to all: Any person involved in committing or planning terrorist attacks against the American people becomes an enemy of this country, and a target of American justice. (Applause.)

Any person, organization, or government that supports, protects, or harbors terrorists is complicit in the murder of the innocent, and equally guilty of terrorist crimes.

Any outlaw regime that has ties to terrorist groups and seeks or possesses weapons of mass destruction is a grave danger to the civilized world -- and will be confronted. (Applause.)

And anyone in the world, including the Arab world, who works and sacrifices for freedom has a loyal friend in the United States of
America. (Applause.)

Our commitment to liberty is America's tradition -- declared at our founding; **Click here** for a USS Abraham Lincoln photo essay.
affirmed in Franklin Roosevelt's Four Freedoms; asserted in the Truman Doctrine and in Ronald Reagan's challenge to an evil empire. We are committed to freedom in Afghanistan, in Iraq, and in a peaceful Palestine. The advance of freedom is the surest strategy to undermine the appeal of terror in the world. Where freedom takes hold, hatred gives way to hope. When freedom takes hold, men and women turn to the peaceful pursuit of a better life. American values and American interests lead in the same direction: We stand for human liberty. (Applause.)

The United States upholds these principles of security and freedom in many ways -- with all the tools of diplomacy, law enforcement, intelligence, and finance. We're working with a broad coalition of nations that understand the threat and our shared responsibility to meet it. The use of force has been -- and remains -- our last resort. Yet all can know, friend and foe alike, that our nation has a mission: We will answer threats to our security, and we will defend the peace. (Applause.)

Our mission continues. Al Qaeda is wounded, not destroyed. The scattered cells of the terrorist network still operate in many nations, and we know from daily intelligence that they continue to plot against free people. The proliferation of deadly weapons remains a serious danger. The enemies of freedom are not idle, and neither are we. Our government has taken unprecedented measures to defend the homeland. And we will continue to hunt down the enemy before he can strike. (Applause.)

The war on terror is not over; yet it is not endless. We do not know the day of final victory, but we have seen the turning of the tide. No act of the terrorists will change our purpose, or weaken our resolve, or alter their fate. Their cause is lost. Free nations will press on to victory. (Applause.)

Other nations in history have fought in foreign lands and remained to occupy and exploit. Americans, following a battle, want nothing more than to return home. And that is your direction tonight. (Applause.) After service in the Afghan -- and Iraqi theaters of war -- after 100,000 miles, on the longest carrier deployment in recent history, you are homeward bound. (Applause.) Some of you will see new family members for the first time -- 150 babies were born while their fathers were on the Lincoln. Your families are proud of you, and your nation will welcome you. (Applause.)

We are mindful, as well, that some good men and women are not making the journey home. One of those who fell, Corporal Jason Mileo, spoke to his parents five days before his death. Jason's father said, "He called us from the center of Baghdad, not to brag, but to tell us he loved us. Our son was a soldier."

Every name, every life is a loss to our military, to our nation, and to the loved ones who grieve. There's no homecoming for these families. Yet we pray, in God's time, their reunion will come.

Those we lost were last seen on duty. Their final act on this Earth was to fight a great evil and bring liberty to others. All of you -- all in this generation of our military -- have taken up the highest calling of history. You're defending your country, and protecting the innocent from harm. And wherever you go, you carry a message of hope -- a message that is ancient and ever new. In the words of the prophet Isaiah, "To the captives, 'come out,' -- and to those in darkness, 'be free.'"

Thank you for serving our country and our cause. May God bless you all, and may God continue to bless America. (Applause.)

END 6:27 P.M. PDT

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http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030501-15.html

Appendix II – Additional Documents for Chapter 6

For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
September 24, 2001

Letter to Congress on American Campaign Against Terrorism

Text of a Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate
September 24, 2001

Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)

On the morning of September 11, 2001, terrorists hijacked four U.S. commercial airliners. These terrorists coldly murdered thousands of innocent people on those airliners and on the ground, and deliberately destroyed the towers of the World Trade Center and surrounding buildings and a portion of the Pentagon.

In response to these attacks on our territory, our citizens, and our way of life, I ordered the deployment of various combat-equipped and combat support forces to a number of foreign nations in the Central and Pacific Command areas of operations. In the future, as we act to prevent and deter terrorism, I may find it necessary to order additional forces into these and other areas of the world, including into foreign nations where U.S. Armed Forces are already located.

I have taken these actions pursuant to my constitutional authority to conduct U.S. foreign relations and as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive. It is not now possible to predict the scope and duration of these deployments, and the actions necessary to counter the terrorist threat to the United States. It is likely that the American campaign against terrorism will be a lengthy one.

I am providing this report as part of my efforts to keep the Congress informed, consistent with the War Powers Resolution and Senate Joint Resolution 23, which I signed on September 18, 2001. As you know, officials of my Administration and I have been regularly communicating with the leadership and other Members of Congress about the actions we are taking to respond to the threat of terrorism and we will continue to do so. I appreciate the continuing support of the Congress, including its passage of Senate Joint Resolution 23, in this action to protect the security of the United States of America and its citizens, civilian and military, here and abroad.

Sincerely,

GEORGE W. BUSH

# # #

Return to this article at:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010924-17.html

For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
September 29, 2001

Radio Address of the President to the Nation

THE PRESIDENT: Good morning. I want to report to you on the progress being made on many fronts in our war against terrorism. This is a different kind of war, which we will wage aggressively and methodically to disrupt and destroy terrorist activity.

Listen to the President's Remarks

En Español

In recent days, many members of our military have left their homes and families and begun moving into a place for missions to come. Thousands of Reservists have been called to active duty. Soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines and Coast Guardmen are being deployed to points around the globe, ready to answer when their country calls. Our military families have accepted many hardships, and our nation is grateful for their willing service.

The men and women of the Armed Forces are united in their dedication to freedom and they will make us proud in the struggle against terrorism.

International cooperation is gaining momentum. This week, I met with the Prime Ministers of two of America's closest friends: Canada and Japan. Other countries, from Russia to Indonesia, are giving strong support as the war against terrorism moves forward. America is grateful to the nations that have cut off diplomatic ties with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which is sheltering terrorists.

The United States respects the people of Afghanistan and we are their largest provider of humanitarian aid. But we condemn the Taliban, and welcome the support of other nations in isolating that regime.

We have also launched a strike against the financial foundation of the global terror network. Our goal is to deny terrorists the money they need to carry our their plans. We began by identifying 27 terrorist organizations, terrorist leaders and foreign businesses and charities that support or front for terrorism.

We froze whatever assets they had here in the United States, and we blocked them from doing business with people, companies or banks in our country. Many governments and financial institutions around the world are joining in this effort to starve terrorists of funding.

This week I visited the headquarters at the FBI and the CIA. Their agents and analysts have been on the case around the clock, uncovering and pursuing the enemy. In the long campaign ahead, they will need our continued support, and every necessary tool to do their work.

I'm asking Congress for new law enforcement authority, to better track the communications of terrorists, and to detain suspected terrorists until the moment they are deported. I will also seek more funding and better technology for our country's intelligence community.

This week, we also took strong steps to improve security on planes and in airports, and to restore confidence in air travel. We're providing airlines with federal grants to make cockpits more secure through measures including fortified doors and stronger locks. And we're dramatically increasing the number of federal air marshals on our planes.

Americans will have the confidence of knowing that fully equipped officers of the law are flying with them in far greater numbers. I'm also working with Congress to put federal law enforcement in charge of all bag and passenger screening at our airports. Standards will be tougher and enforced by highly trained professionals who know exactly what they're looking for. To enhance safety immediately, I've asked governors to place National Guardsmen at security checkpoints in airports.

As all these actions make clear, our war on terror will be much broader than the battlefields and beachheads of the past. This war will be fought wherever terrorists hide, or

run, or plan. Some victories will be won outside of public view, in tragedies avoided and threats eliminated. Other victories will be clear to all.

Our weapons are military and diplomatic, financial and legal. And in this struggle, our greatest advantages are the patience and resolve of the American people.

We did not seek this conflict, but we will win it. America will act deliberately and decisively, and the cause of freedom will prevail. Thank you for listening.

END

Return to this article at:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010929.html

For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
October 17, 2001

President Rallies Troops at Travis Air Force Base

Remarks by the President to Military Personnel
Travis Air Force Base
California

View the President's Remarks View the President's Remarks
Listen to the President's Remarks

1:30 P.M. PDT

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you all very much. I appreciate such a warm welcome. I'm about to cross the Pacific on my favorite Air Force airplane. (Applause.) And there's really only one place to leave from -- that's called the Gateway to the Pacific. (Applause.) Thank you for your hospitality. I can't tell you how proud I am to be with the men and women who wear the uniform of the great United States of America. (Applause.)

I want to thank the Air Force and the Army and the Navy troops who are here. I'm also proud to be with the husbands and wives and sons and daughters -- (applause.) And to the families of those of you whose mom or dad or husband or wife have been deployed, I want you to know that they're on a noble mission. The cause is just, and we will win. (Applause.)

I want to thank "Lone Star" Lefforge for the introduction. (Applause.) My fellow Texan. (Applause.) There may be a few other Texans here, as well. (Applause.) I want to thank General Becker and Colonel Rubeor, as well, for your hospitality. Thank you, Colonel. Thank you, General, very much.

And I want to thank the Air Force Band of the Golden West. Thank you all for your entertainment. (Applause.) I want to thank the state and local officials who have come today. I'm honored that you took time out of your day.

The planes to the left and right of where we stand here represent the unmatched air power of the United States. (Applause.) But that's not our real strength. Our real strength are the people who fly them, and who maintain them, the people who make the military go. (Applause.) The real strength of this proud nation are the men and women who wear the uniform. That's the real strength of this country. (Applause.)

You're among the first to be deployed in America's new war against terror and against evil, and I want you to know, America is proud -- proud of your deeds, proud of your talents, proud of your service to our country.

I'm told that one of the pilots here, a fellow named Randy, was asked if anyone at Travis had personal connections to any of the victims of the attacks on September the 11th. And here's what he said: I think we all do; they're all Americans. (Applause.) When you strike one American, you strike us all. (Applause.)

The victims of September 11th were innocent, and this nation will never forget them. The men and women who murdered them were instruments of evil, and they have died in vain. This nation is strong. This nation is united. This nation is resolved. This nation will defeat terror wherever we find it across the globe. (Applause.)

And not only will we find the terrorists, we will enforce the doctrine that says if you harbor a terrorist, you're a terrorist. (Applause.) If you feed a terrorist, if you fund a terrorist, you're a terrorist. And this great, proud nation of free men and women will hold you just as responsible for the actions that take place on American soil. (Applause.)

And that's what's happening in Afghanistan. I gave the people in Afghanistan a choice. I said to the Taliban, turn them over, destroy the camps, free people you're unjustly holding. I said, you've got time to do it. But they didn't listen. They didn't respond, and now they're paying a price. (Applause.) They are learning that anyone who strikes America will hear from our military, and they're not going to like what they hear. (Applause.) In choosing their enemy, the evildoers and those who harbor them have chosen their fate.

We don't quarrel with the innocent folks of Afghanistan; they're not our enemy. Nor is any religion the enemy of the United States of America. The evil ones have tried to hijack a religion to justify their murder. But I want to assure the people of the world that our military fights not against Muslims or fights not against the Islam religion; we fight against evil people. We fight against people who believe that they can harm the United States of America. We fight against people who have no country, no ideology; they're motivated by hate.

And make no mistake about it; this great nation will do what it takes to win. We are determined. We are patient. We are steadfast. We are resolved. We will not tire and we will not fail. (Applause.)

And we're making progress. We're making progress. The terrorist camps are being destroyed. The enemy's air force and air defenses are being demolished. We're paving the way for friendly troops on the ground to slowly, but surely, tighten the net to bring them to justice.

I can't tell you how proud as Commander-in-Chief I am to know that we've got a great United States military backing our nation. (Applause.) A Commander-in-Chief must know he can count on the skill and resolve of our military. And from Secretary Rumsfeld to General Myers to the good troops of this base, I have all the confidence in the world that our military will fulfill its mission. (Applause.)

And you must have confidence in this, my commitment: that for the mission that lies ahead, our military, the men and women who wear our uniform, will have everything you need to win -- (applause) -- every resource, every weapon, every means to assure full victory for the United States and our allies and our friends in the cause of freedom. (Applause.)

There is no question that we're inflicting pain upon the Taliban government. There is also no question that we're a compassionate nation; at the same time we do so, we're dropping airlifts of food and medicine, so the innocent citizens of that country can survive the brutal winter.

As I walked up, I saw some of the schoolchildren here holding dollar bills. We've got schoolchildren all across the country out raising a dollar to send to the children of Afghanistan. We've got boys and girls from all religions and all walks of life who have heard the call to love a neighbor just as they'd like to be loved themselves.

The evildoers have struck our nation, but out of evil comes good. We are a good, kind-hearted, decent people, and we're showing the world just that in our compassion and our resolve. (Applause.)

And one thing I fully understand is that when American forces answer the call of duty, they count on their families for support and encouragement. Every deployment brings uncertainty and, I know, every deployment brings worry and concern. Our military is made up of brave men and women, and brave families, as well.

Recently, a four-year-old son of a cargo specialist said good-bye to his Dad here at Travis. And according to his Mom, the boy has been telling the neighbors that "Daddy is saving the world." (Applause.)

The boy is right. The boy is right. The future of the world is at stake. Freedom is at stake. But I want to tell that boy his Daddy has got plenty of help. There are a lot of people like his Daddy fighting this war. We fight it overseas and we fight it at home, as well.

We must be steadfast. We must be resolved. We must not let the terrorists cause our nation to stop traveling, to stop buying, to stop living ordinary lives. We can be alert and we will be alert, but we must show them that they cannot terrorize the greatest nation on the face of the Earth. And we won't. We will not be terrorized, we will not be cowed.

We've got a homeland security that's strong. I want to tell the moms and dads here that we're doing everything we can to find them and disrupt them and stop them, if they happen to try to strike on American soil. We're strong at home. We're active at home. But make no mistake about it; the best homeland defense is to find them and bring them to justice -- and that's exactly what our nation will do. (Applause.)

Now that they got the plane fueled up, I'm heading over to China. Of course, we'll talk about economics and trade. But the main thing that will be on my mind is to continue to rally the world against terrorists; is to remind people that it happened to us, sure, but it could happen to them, as well; is to remind them that evil knows no borders, no boundaries, and to remind them that we must take a stand; that those of us who have been given the responsibility of high office must not shirk from our duty; that now is the time to claim freedom for future generations.

The people have struck us. They've tested our mettle and tested our character. But they are going to find that this nation understands we've reached a pivotal moment in history, where we will plant our flag on the ground -- a flag that stands for freedom -- and say to anybody who wants to harm us or our friends or allies, you will pay a serious price, because we're a nation that is strong and resolved and united. (Applause.)

You all are here to serve your country, and your country is grateful. You have confidence in America. But make no mistake about it; America has confidence in you.

Thank you all for such a warm greeting. May God bless -- (applause) -- may God bless the men and women who wear our uniform. May God protect this great land. And may God bless America. Thank you all very much. (Applause.)

END

1:39 P.M. PDT

For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
October 23, 2001

President Says Terrorists Won't Change American Way of Life

Remarks by the President in Photo Opportunity with Members of Congress
The Cabinet Room

4:48 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: It's been my honor to brief key members of the Senate and the House on our trip to the Far East. It was a very successful trip, in that we were able to have an honest dialogue about the need to fight terror.

And the 21 nations -- 20 other nations represented there agreed with our country, and they appreciate our determination to fight and win the war against terror. They understand that an attack on America could have been an attack on them. And the cooperation was very strong and very evident and I am most grateful.

And I am most grateful for the opportunity to share with the members of the House and the Senate this essential -- and I want to, first, thank Chairman Biden and Chairman Hyde and the other members here for standing solidly with the administration to formulate and conduct a foreign policy that's in the best interest of our country.

It is oftentimes said that when it comes to foreign policy, partisanship stops, and that's exactly what has happened here at this table. I've had a lot of discussions with both Chairmen up to now and I will continue having discussions with the leaders of the House and the Senate, because whether you're Republican or Democrat, we all want to win this war.

I'd be glad to answer a couple of questions.

Q Sir, is the White House under attack now? The latest anthrax case?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, there is no question that evildoers are continuing to try to harm America and Americans. Today, at a remote facility, we detected some anthrax. And just like at the Congress, our government is responding very quickly.

We're working hard to find out who is doing this and bring them to justice. We're also working to develop measures necessary to protect American citizens and postal workers. All of us around this table grieve when we hear the fact that a citizen has lost a life. Two postal workers passed away and our hearts are with their families, our prayers are with their loved ones. And the evil ones continue.

Q Is there any way, sir, that whatever contaminated that machine, whether it be a letter or a package, got into the West Wing? Or has all mail been cut off to prevent that from happening?

THE PRESIDENT: Ron, we're making sure that the West Wing, the White House is safe. Let me put it this way, I'm confident when I come to work tomorrow that I'll be safe.

Q Mr. President, have you or the Vice President been tested for anthrax? And what is your sense of this latest development, sir? For the most part, these attacks have been aimed at prominent people and prominent places. Is it your sense that the real purpose here is to sow fear and confusion in the American public?

THE PRESIDENT: First of all, I don't have anthrax. It's hard for Americans to imagine how evil the people are who are doing this. We're having to adjust our thinking. We're a kind nation, we're a compassionate nation, we're a nation of strong values and we value life. And we're learning people in this world want to terrorize our country by trying to take life.

They won't succeed. This country is too strong to allow terrorists to affect the lives of our citizens. I understand people are concerned, and they should be. But they need to know our government is doing everything we possibly can to protect the lives of our citizens -- everything. We're waging an aggressive campaign overseas to bring al Qaeda to justice.

Today, I've -- in working with the Postmaster General -- got our OMB to allocate $175 million for immediate relief, immediate safety at post offices around the country. This is what he requested, he thinks this is what is necessary to assure the post office employees that they will be as safe as possible. And we're going to spend that money.

Our health care workers are working around the clock to help people in need and I will tell you that I think not only are they doing a good job, I think they probably saved a lot of lives by their quick action. And I'm proud of how quickly and how hard they're working.

The object of terrorism is to try to force us to change our way of life, is to force us to retreat, is to force us to be what we're not. And that's -- they're going to fail. They're simply going to fail. I want to assure my fellow Americans that our determination -- I say "our," I'm talking about Republicans and Democrats here in Washington -- has never been stronger to succeed in bringing terrorists to justice, protecting our homeland. Because what we do today will affect our children and grandchildren. This is our calling. This is the time for us to act in a bold way, and we are doing just that.

Q Mr. President, are you now operating on the assumption that the September 11th attacks and the anthrax attacks, anthrax letters, are linked? And if I may shift gears for a second and ask about your meeting with Foreign Minister Peres. Would an Israeli failure to withdraw from the Palestinian areas make it harder to keep Arab states in the international anti-terrorism --

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I told Shimon Peres that, first of all, our country and the people of our country are saddened by the fact that a Cabinet Minister was assassinated. It's just unacceptable behavior. I also told him that we continue to call upon Chairman Arafat to do everything he can to bring the killer to justice. It's very important that he arrest the person who did this, or those who did this act, and continue to arrest those who would disrupt and harm Israeli citizens. He must -- he must show the resolve necessary to bring peace to the region.

And, finally, I did express our concern about troops in Palestinian territory, and I would hope the Israelis would move their troops as quickly as possible.

Q Did you get any satisfaction?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, he's a very thoughtful man. He's a friend, a friend of America's, and I listened very carefully.

Your first question was?

Q The link between September 11th and --

THE PRESIDENT: Well, we don't have any hard evidence. But there's no question that anybody who would mail anthrax with the attempt to harm American citizens is a terrorist. And there's no question that al Qaeda is a terrorist organization. So it wouldn't put it past me that there -- you know, it wouldn't surprise me that they're involved with it. But I have no direct evidence.

I do know that this country is strong enough to endure, to endure the evil ones. And we're making great progress on the ground in Afghanistan, and we'll bring the al Qaeda to justice and we'll -- we're doing everything we can to find out who mailed these letters.

Stretch.

Q Mr. President, have you been tested for anthrax?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't have anthrax.

Q So you've been tested, sir?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't have it.

END 4:56 P.M. EDT

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For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
November 19, 2001

President Discusses War, Humanitarian Efforts

Remarks by the President In Photo Opportunity with the Cabinet
The Cabinet Room

View the President's Remarks View the President's Remarks
The U.S. Commitment to the Afghan People

Listen to the President's Remarks
View the President's Remarks View the President's Remarks

4:12 P.M. EST

THE PRESIDENT: We just had a very productive Cabinet meeting. We discussed a variety of subjects, spent a fair amount of time on the war and the progress we're making in Afghanistan. We have made great progress there, but there's still a lot of work to do. And the degree of difficulty is increasing as we work hard to achieve our objectives, not the least of which is to bring the al Qaeda to justice.

They're running and they're trying to hide, and we're in pursuit. And we will stay the course until we bring them to justice. The American people must know it may take longer than some anticipate. They also need to know that we're a very patient group.

Secondly, we've been briefed by Andrew Natsios of the USAID about the humanitarian aid mission. And that, too, is a tough mission. There are millions of Afghans who were starving prior to September the 11th as a result of drought. Obviously, to complicate matters, there has been a war in that land. And yet, this good nation is doing everything we can to move enormous amounts of food into the areas where people are likely to starve.

I'm talking about thousands of tons, metric tons of food. There are over 2,000 trucks now in place that are able to move more freely now that the Northern Alliance and our military have liberated the northern part of Afghanistan where the starvation is most likely to occur.

And so we've had a great discussion. And I'm proud of the way our Cabinet has been performing during these very difficult periods.

I'd be glad to answer a few questions. John, have you got one?

Q Mr. President, your Secretary of State a little while ago said that he would use U.S. influence to try to bring the two sides together and forge a Middle East peace. Wouldn't it be swifter, sir, if you used the power of your office to do it personally, by meeting with these individuals? And at what point would you do that?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, John, first of all, this administration has been working the Middle East ever since we came into office. I've been on the phone with the Prime Minister of Israel, our longtime friend, a lot, as has the Secretary of State. We've been dealing with the Europeans; all kinds of people are interested in the Middle East, reminding them that it takes willing parties, it takes -- people must say that they want to work for peace.

And so our objective is to convince both parties to make a conscious decision to come to the peace table. And when they do so, we're more than willing to help. But first things first; is to convince the parties that peace is necessary.

It also is important for us to remind Mr. Arafat that in order for the peace discussions to begin, that the level of violence must substantially be reduced. And so we're working hard with not only the Palestinians, but as well as with others who have an interest in the area to work to reduce violence, so that peace discussions can begin in relative security.

Our mind is, of course, on the war in Afghanistan, but it hasn't diverted our attention away from the need to work hard to bring peace to the Middle East. And we would hope to be able to do so.

Q Mr. President, there have been reports out of Afghanistan that the U.S. military knows or thinks they know where bin Laden might be. Does that mean --

THE PRESIDENT: I certainly hope so.

Q Does that mean the fellow to your left knows? And how soon might America see bin Laden --

THE PRESIDENT: Listen, if our military knew where Mr. bin Laden was, he would be brought to justice. We're hunting him down. He runs and he hides. But as we've said repeatedly, the noose is beginning to narrow, the net is getting tighter. But this is a difficult assignment. Things happened very quickly in Afghanistan recently, as -- went to show that our strategy was a well-thought-out strategy. But the objective is yet to be achieved, and we're not leaving until we do achieve the objective.

And the Secretary of Defense and General Tommy Franks, who is doing a magnificent job, understand the objective. We talk about it every single morning. And we will achieve the objective. But I've told the American people right from the get-go of this effort, it may take a month, it may take a year, or however long it takes, we'll succeed.

Q Sir, what can you do personally to jump-start negotiations further on an economic stimulus package? And do you still need one?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think we need an economic stimulus package. I've said so from the beginning. I'll be meeting a week from tomorrow with the leadership of the Senate and the House, and urge the senators to bring a bill to the floor and to get it into conference, so we can resolve whatever differences there may be.

There was a period of time when people said we'd never get an airline security bill. And after a lot of hours of hard work, we got a good bill, which I signed today. And I hope I'll be able to sign an economic stimulus package -- I think I will be able to do so. But it's going to require

the senators to come together and move a bill, and then we can reconcile the differences with the House version.

Q Mr. President, you just said the noose is getting tighter. Without compromising the search, do you have evidence you're getting closer to bin Laden?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, it's going to be hard for me to tell you that without compromising the search, except I can point to the map of Afghanistan where more and more territory are now in friendly hands. And the people of Afghanistan understand what al Qaeda and the Taliban government have meant to their ordinary lives. Women are treated lower than low. There's no respect for human life. There's jubilation in the cities that we have liberated. And the sooner al Qaeda is brought to justice, the sooner Afghanistan will return to normal. People understand that.

And so we've got -- let me put it to you this way -- the more territory we gain, the more success there is on the ground, the more people we've got looking to help us in our mission. The Secretary of Defense is doing everything he can, as are our military, to bring these people to justice, and we will.

MR. DICKENS: Thank you all. Lights. Thank you all.

THE PRESIDENT: Go ahead, Terry.

Q On the subject of justice, what do you say to the members of Congress and people in law schools and civil liberties --

THE PRESIDENT: On what subject?

Q On justice, that your order establishing military --

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

Q -- to try terrorists, they argue represents a retreat or an abandonment of traditional American principles.

THE PRESIDENT: I say it's the absolute right thing to do. And it is -- to set up the option to use a military tribunal in the time of war makes a lot of sense. We're fighting a war, Terry, against the most evil kinds of people. And I need to have that extraordinary option at my fingertips. I ought to be able to have that option available should we ever bring one of these al Qaeda members in alive. It's our national interests, it's our national security interests we have a military tribunal available. It is in the interests of the safety of potential jurors that we have a military tribunal.

These are extraordinary times. And I would remind those who don't understand the decision I made that Franklin Roosevelt made the same decision in World War II. Those were extraordinary times, as well.

This government will do everything we can to defend the American people within the confines of our Constitution. And that's exactly how we're proceeding. And so, to the critics, I say, I made the absolute right decision.

MR. DICKENS: Thank you all.

THE PRESIDENT: (Turning toward Secretary Rumsfeld) -- Do you know where al Qaeda is? (Laughter.)

END 4:21 P.M. EST

Return to this article at:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011119-12.html

For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
December 28, 2001

President, General Franks Discuss War Effort

Remarks by the President and General Tommy Franks in Press Availability with the Press Travel Pool
The Prairie Chapel Ranch
Crawford, Texas

View the President's Remarks View the President's Remarks Listen to the President's Remarks View the President's Remarks View the President's Remarks

9:58 A.M. CST

THE PRESIDENT: Good morning. As you can see, I've invited a guest to come to the ranch. Tommy Franks is no stranger to Texas. After all, he was raised in Midland, Texas. And I'm looking forward to taking him over to the house here in a minute to say hello to Laura. Both of them went to Midland Lee High School, at about the same time.

But Tommy has just come back from the Afghan theater. He gave me a full briefing on what he saw and what he heard. We just got off of a teleconference with the national security team, to discuss his trip and to discuss what's taking place in Afghanistan.

I want to thank you for coming, Tommy. I am real proud of the military, and I'm proud of the commander. Tommy has done everything we've asked. He is fulfilling the mission with patience and discipline and success. He's a down-to-earth, no-nonsense guy. Precisely the kind of man we need to lead a complex mission such as this.

You know, a couple of months ago, a lot of people said that this administration and our military really weren't sure what we were doing. But I had confidence all along. And the reason why I did -- confidence in the success of what we set out to do -- was because I had a chance to be briefed by Tommy Franks on the strategy and on the plan, and on how we were going to use our United States military. And he hasn't let us down. The country needs to be proud of the military, and one reason that I'm so pleased to welcome Tommy, is to be able to say that out loud in Tommy's presence.

So I'm going to have Tommy say a few words, and then we'll be glad to answer a couple of questions.

GENERAL FRANKS: Thank you, Mr. President. As the President said, my wife and I recently have had an opportunity to be with a bunch of great young people -- soldiers and sailors, airmen, Marines -- in the front-line states around Afghanistan and in Afghanistan, and Kandahar and at Camp Rhino and up in Kabul. We had a chance to meet with these young people who are doing the work for the nation.

We also had a chance to attend the installation ceremony in Afghanistan, where we saw Mr. Karzai and members of that team form an interim government in Afghanistan, where for the first time in decades, more than 26 million people will have an opportunity to have their way represented in that government.

And the combination of seeing these great young people and seeing this momentous event just filled me with a desire to be able to brief the President on what's going on over there in the theater, on what our people are doing, how they feel about what they're doing.

And so, Mr. President, thanks very much for having me out here in Crawford.

THE PRESIDENT: You bet.

Scott.

Q Mr. President, what's your reaction to the new bin Laden tape this week? And do you fear he's now alluded the manhunt? Also, are you concerned that if military tribunals require a unanimous verdict for the death penalty, some terrorists could avoid execution?

THE PRESIDENT: Let me start with the first of your three questions. Which was what? I've already forgotten.

Q What's your reaction to the bin Laden tape. Are you afraid he's alluded the manhunt.

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, the tape, yes. I didn't watch it all. I saw snippets of it on TV. You know, it's -- who knows when it was made. Secondly, he is not escaping us. This is a guy who, three months ago, was in control of a county. Now he's maybe in control of a cave. He's on the run.

Listen, a while ago I said to the American people, our objective is more than bin Laden. But one of the things for certain is we're going to get him running and keep him running, and bring him to justice. And that's what's happening. He's on the run, if he's running at all.

So we don't know whether he's in a cave with the door shut, or a cave with the door open -- we just don't know. There's all kinds of reports and all kinds of speculation. But one thing we know is that he's not in charge of Afghanistan anymore. He's not in charge of the -- he's not the parasite that invaded the host, the Taliban. We know that for certain. And we also know that we're on the hunt, and he knows that we're on the hunt. And I like our position better than his.

In terms of whether or not the tribunals will be able to render the justice necessary, that -- I spoke to the Secretary of Defense today about the story in the newspaper. Evidently, somebody in our government wanted to show off to his family, or her family, in between Christmas and New Year's by leaking information in the press that he or she thought would be helpful to the government. The truth of the matter is the Secretary of Defense hadn't even seen the report that was on the front page of America's newspapers.

So my answer to your question, Scott, is I know that the leaked report is preliminary, that they're still in discussions about how best to bring justice. But one thing is for certain, that whatever the procedures are for the military tribunals, our system will be more fair than the system of bin Laden and the Taliban. That is for certain. The prisoners that we capture will be given a heck of a lot better chance in court than those citizens of ours who were in the World Trade Center or in the Pentagon were given by Mr. bin Laden.

David. Good to see you.

Q Good to see you.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.

Q Can you say with confidence now that Osama bin Laden in no longer in a position to mastermind another terrorist attack against the United States or our allies? And related to

that, you talked about 2002 being a year of war. What can you say to prepare the American people for what that vision is, what they need to be prepared for, as compared to what they've seen in Afghanistan?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I hope 2002 is a year of peace. But I am also realistic, and I know full well that bin Laden and his cronies would like to harm America again, bin Laden and his cronies would like to harm our allies. How do I know that? I receive intelligence reports on a daily basis that indicates that that's his desires. And therefore, the United States must be vigilant, must make sure we continue to focus on our homeland security measures, must disrupt, must use our intelligence-gathering network to prevent the enemy from attacking.

And so, while I hope 2002 is a year of peace, I'm realistic. As to whether or not bin Laden is in control of some network, who knows? The thing we're certain about is that he's on the run, that he's hiding in caves, if hiding at all. And the other thing I'm certain about is we will bring him to justice. I don't know whether it's going to be tomorrow, but Tommy will tell you that I haven't said, Tommy, get him tomorrow. I said, just get him. And we will. We will bring him to justice.

We don't know, David, whether or not he's given any orders to any of his soldiers, but we take nothing for granted. And so our country still remains on alert, and we're actively looking for anybody who would harm America.

The shoe bomber was a case in point, where the country has been on alert. A stewardess on an American Airlines flight -- or a flight attendant on an American Airlines flight was vigilant, saw something amiss, and responded. It's an indication that the culture of America has shifted to one of alertness. And I'm grateful for the flight attendant's response, as I'm sure the passengers on that airplane. But we've got to be aware that there are still enemies to the country. And our government is responding accordingly.

Q Mr. President, do you think that India and Pakistan are sliding toward war?

THE PRESIDENT: One of the things that we discussed today in the national security conference, and I discussed yesterday with members of my national security team, was the India and Pakistan issue. Colin Powell has spoke to both sides today, urging restraint, urging calm. I was pleased to -- I'm pleased to note that President Musharraf has announced the arrest of 50 extreme terrorists -- extremists or terrorists. And I hope India takes note of that, that the President is responding forcefully and actively to bring those who would harm others to justice.

The war on terror is not just an American war on terrorists, it's a civilized government war on terror that we're talking about here. But my government and my administration is working actively to bring some calm in the region, to hopefully convince both sides to stop the escalation of force. And as I say, I'm pleased that President Musharraf is responding to the Indian requests to round up those who would do harm to others and incarcerate them, which he did.

Q Are you making any calls yourself, sir?

THE PRESIDENT: Not yet. I will if need be. As a matter of fact, I have been making calls recently to leaders in our own hemisphere. I spoke to the Presidents of Mexico and Uruguay, Chile and Brazil about the Argentinean situation. I made it clear to those governments that we want to work with them, to work together to make sure that the Argentineans understand that we will support a plan that sustains economic growth. We're willing to offer technical assistance through the IMF; that our government is aware of what's taking place and that we're fully engaged in the issue.

Q Mr. President, some say that the events of 2001 have changed you, while others say that you're the same person you always were --

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

Q Who's right? Or is it fair to say there's some truth in both arguments?

THE PRESIDENT: Talk to my wife. (Laughter.) I don't know. I don't spend a lot of time looking in the mirror. Except when I comb my hair. And -- listen, I'll give you a hint. I liked coming to the ranch before September the 11th; I like coming to the ranch after September the 11th.

Q -- the war for a moment. Have you had any contact with Ken Lay or other Enron officials in the last six weeks --

THE PRESIDENT: No.

Q -- and do you think that there is something the government should do to help Enron --

THE PRESIDENT: I have had no contact with Enron officials in the last six weeks. Do I think the government ought to help what now?

Q Help Enron or do something to help prevent some of these employees from losing their life savings.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think the life savings issue is something we need to look into. I think it's very important to understand what took place. The government will be looking into this. I mean, the SEC will be looking into matters, Congress appears to be looking into matters. There will be a lot of government inquiry into Enron and what took place there.

I'm deeply concerned about the citizens of Houston who worked for Enron who lost life savings. It's very troubling to read the stories about those who locked up Enron stock -- had their Enron stock locked up in their 401K plans, and then saw their savings dissipate. I think it's very important for us to fully understand the why's of Enron. And there will be plenty of investigations.

Q Sir, will you make recess appointments --

THE PRESIDENT: Thinking about it. I don't know yet. I'm right now focused on the military operations in Afghanistan and giving Tommy a tour of my ranch. But I, at the appropriate time, will take a good, hard look at recess appointments.

I'm disappointed that a lot of my appointments were stalled in the United States Senate, weren't given a hearing. This Scalia man got out of committee, but never given a vote on the floor of the Senate. He's a good fellow, he ought to be approved. But I'll take a good, hard look at all the options available to me.

Q Mr. President, is there a timetable in your mind for withdrawing U.S. troops from Afghanistan? Or as long as bin Laden is still on the run, do you imagine them being there indefinitely?

THE PRESIDENT: I imagine us being there for quite a long period of time. But my timetable is going to be set by Tommy Franks. Tommy is in charge of the military operations; he's in charge of the military. I'll let Tommy speak for himself, but I will tell you this -- we won't be making political decisions about what to do with our military.

I gave Tommy a mission; it was a well-defined mission. And Tommy is in charge of getting that mission done, and when Tommy says, "Mission complete, Mr. President," that's when we start moving troops out. But until he says that, I am -- I will make the case to the American people that we're doing the right thing.

Q What's your definition of the mission being complete in Afghanistan, sir?

THE PRESIDENT: In Afghanistan? Well, Taliban gone, the country secure, the country stable, that al Qaeda cells rounded up, Taliban fighters brought to justice. The over 6,000 troops, prisoners being held -- prisoners of war being held by our allies interrogated, finger-printing. I mean, there's a lot to do. And the American people just must understand when I said that we need to be patient, that I meant it. And we're going to be there for a while. And I don't know the exact moment when we leave, David, but it's not until this mission is complete.

The world must know that this administration will not blink in the face of danger, and will not tire when it comes to completing the missions that we said we would do. The world will learn that when the United States is harmed, we will follow through. The world will see that when we put a coalition together that says, "join us," I mean it. And when I ask others to participate, I mean it. And in order to lead the coalition, we must show that we will complete the mission. And part of that mission is, as Tommy will tell you, is to make sure that Afghanistan is a stable country.

And he's got a lot to say on that if you want him to talk about it. Okay, bring the man to the Mike.

Q General Franks, could you talk about how you took evasive action when you were fired upon the other day? There was a report yesterday that your helicopter was fired upon.

Q You should get right to that, sir, after you do the first question. (Laughter.)

GENERAL FRANKS: Let me take that -- let me take your question first. As we look around, today we have more than 50 nations involved in this coalition effort, and around Afghanistan, providing support and so forth. We have 26 nations represented at our headquarters down in Tampa, Florida. We have 16 nations represented on the ground or in the air or at sea around Afghanistan.

And it's interesting that over the past 10 days, the numbers I've just described have grown rather than shrinking. I think the view is that Afghanistan is a part of a global effort against terrorism, that we'll stay in Afghanistan as long as it takes to do what the President has said. We will do away with the Taliban, and that has been done. We now have a legitimate interim government in Kabul.

We will destroy the al Qaeda terrorist network inside Afghanistan. We will take care of the screening and the work that needs to be done with all these detainees -- finger-printing, DNA work, photography, screening, interrogation. We'll determine which ones need to be brought out and need to be handled in some form of legal process.

How long will that take? I think the President said it immediately after the 11th of September, and I think many of us have said it about every day since then: It will take as long as it takes.

Interesting to me, the fact that these young people standing at Kandahar Airport a few nights ago, in the middle of the night, watching the USO show, showed me absolutely no desire to leave their mission at all. And so, I think it's best for all of us to recognize that we will not be hurried, we will not be pressed into doing something that does not represent our national objectives. And we will take as long as it takes.

And a very short answer to the business of the helicopter -- I have been told since I took that helicopter ride that someone took a shot at the helicopter. I didn't see it when it happened, and I believe it may have happened, but then again, this is Afghanistan and we have pockets of Taliban still in that country. And that's one of the reasons that we're going to stay there until we have mopped all that up.

Q Mr. President --

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. It's your big day, Scott, two questions.

Q A one-part question this time, I promise.

THE PRESIDENT: Four questions, excuse me. (Laughter.)

Q Would you prefer to see bin Laden captured and questioned about the attacks and possible future attacks?

THE PRESIDENT: You know, dead or alive is fine with me.

Q Mr. President, you mentioned Argentina and you talked about you support more technical assistance from the IMF for them. Would you support more money for Argentina from the IMF, or has the well kind of run dry there?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, it depends upon what Argentina decides to do. The key for Argentina is to get her fiscal house in order, get monetary policy in order, and to develop a plan that will show sustained economic vitality and economic growth. But it's up to Argentina on how to develop the plan. As you know, there's been an interim government in place, there will be elections in a couple of months. And the point we've made to the Argentinean government, as well as to our friends in the region, is that we will be willing to help them develop the plan, if they ask for technical advice. It will all be done through the IMF.

But the first order of business is for the Argentineans to develop a plan to show us how they're going to get their house in order. They've got a lot of work to do, but -- and all of us that are concerned about Argentina are willing to work together to get the job done. There was near unanimity on my phone calls to the other leaders in the region that -- of the course of action that I just laid out.

Q Have you decided that anybody should be subjected to a military tribunal?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, Americans shouldn't, as you know. I mean, I excluded any Americans.

Q Of the prisoners, have you decided that any one --

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, have I made any decisions yet? Not at all, not yet, Dave. We're still -- I still want to make sure that the -- I still want to see what the Secretary of Defense recommends as to how to proceed. He has -- as I said, he hasn't seen the now famous document that some American decided to leak.

I don't know why people do that. I guess either to make you feel good, and-or to make themselves feel good. But, nevertheless, it was not very helpful. And as the Secretary of Defense said, he hasn't even seen the document yet. But they're working through, and we're working through, as you know, all the other types of cases that have come forward. I mean, as Tommy said, there's a lot of people to be questioned, and there's also a lot of decisions to be made as to how to run these folks through our system. And we're just not quite there yet. We've got time.

Q What about Walker?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, same situation. We've got time. And Walker is well-berthed on a U.S. warship. It's a heck of a lot more comfortable on that ship than he was in the basement of that prison. When he decided -- when he was captured, Walker made a terrible decision, and our system is such that he'll have proper justice. But he's working with the enemy, and we'll see how the courts deal with that.

Q Sir, were you upset that that Secret Service agent was kept off that plane? Because you have been saying this --

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I was. I talked to the man this morning. I told him how proud I was that he was by my side. He's here on the ranch, and he's guarding me. And, of course, I was. We'll let the facts -- they're going to get the facts out. There's an inquiry going on as to specifically what took place. But if he was treated that way because of his ethnicity, that will make me madder than heck.

Q There are increasing news reports that bin Laden escaped to Pakistan --

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, yeah? Well, sorry to interrupt your question, but if you'd asked me the question yesterday, you would have said there's increasing news reports that he's dead, and the day before, that he's hiding in a cave. In other words, there's increasing speculation about bin Laden. But what one shouldn't speculate on is if he's alive, he's on the run. And you don't need to worry about whether or not we're going to get him, because we are. And it's just a matter of time.

I mean, I've read reports where he died his hair red. That's not going to stop us from finding him.

Q But what assurances have you gotten from President Musharraf that if that is the case, that he'll find him and turn him --

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I appreciate that. President Musharraf has been very helpful. Tommy has visited with him, I visited with him, the Secretary of Defense has visited with him. And he said he will help in all matters. And we believe he'll help with Mr. bin Laden, too, if, in fact, he happens to be in Pakistan. Who knows where he is. But one thing is for certain; he's on the losing side of a rout. And the other thing for certain is we're not going to stop until we get him and all those murderers that are associated with him.

And who knows how many we've gotten to date, because we're gathering evidence. We don't know whether some of those people are in those caves. And Tommy did a fine job of shutting them down. They may still be locked up in there. And as you know, we're sending troops up in that region to take a look at some of the caves to find out what's in there. And we're going to have to dig some of them out.

But as time will go on, we will know more and more about how successful we've been. The point is, is that we are going to be there for a while. I'm patient. The commander on the ground is executing the plan, and the American people are in strong support of what's taking place.

Listen, thank you all for being here today. It's great to see you. Welcome back to Prairie Chapel Ranch, and maybe we'll get you back out here before the New Year's. If not, happy New Year. Thank you.

Q What are you doing for New Year's?

THE PRESIDENT: Probably going to bed early. (Laughter.)_

Q What are you doing with your days here?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I'm up -- I was up this morning at 5:00 a.m., spent a little quality time with the First Lady. And I just finished my book, Theodore Rex, by Edmund Morris, which is a fabulous book on Teddy Roosevelt. I recommend people reading it. I am going to -- I would have gotten up and run three or four miles this morning, which I'll probably do that this afternoon. I'm going to take Tommy around to show him parts of the ranch. But if Tommy

weren't here, I'd be working down there, a little chain-saw work, clearing some brush, burning some brush.

We're making great progress in one of our -- one of the bottom areas that was heretofore relatively inaccessible. One of these days I'll take you down there. It's a beautiful place. It's a bodark grove -- bodark tree is a native tree, real hard wood that grows these giant green, kind of apple-looking things. But I'll spend time doing that.

And then this afternoon -- it gets dark here about 5:30 p.m., and so I'll probably watch a little University of Texas football tonight.

Q What about the tree you planted yesterday?

THE PRESIDENT: Tree plant, very good. My senior staff gave me a beautiful oak, 10-inch oak. And we planted her right outside the house. I haven't written my thank-you note yet, so I'll give them a verbal -- thanks for the tree. It is a beauty. And we planted about -- I think we planted so far about 35 trees, live oaks and cedar elms here. And it's going to be a beautiful sight for when these trees -- when they take off.

Did a little fishing yesterday, by the way. Not very successful. The water is cold, the fish are at the bottom. They're not biting very much. But just the fact that I was able to fish was a nice treat.

Thank you all.

END 10:23 A.M. CST

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Appendix III – Additional Documents for Chapter 7

For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
September 24, 2002

President Urges Congress to Pass Iraq Resolution Promptly

Remarks by the President in Photo Opportunity with the Cabinet
The Cabinet Room

A Decade of Deception and Defiance



11:00 A.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Thanks for coming. We just had a very productive Cabinet meeting. We realize there's little time left in -- before the Senate and the House goes home, but we're optimistic a lot can get done before now and then. Congress must act now to pass a resolution which will hold Saddam Hussein to account for a decade of defiance.

It's time to get a homeland security bill done, one which will allow this President and this administration, and future Presidents -- give us the tools necessary to protect the homeland. And we're working as hard as we can with Phil Gramm and Zell Miller to get this bill moving. It's a good bill. It's a bill that both Republicans and Democrats can and should support.

My message, of course, is that, to the senators up here that are more interested in special interests, you better pay attention to the overall interests of protecting the American people.

We can get budget going. I need a defense bill. The Senate needs to get, and the House needs to get, their differences reconciled and get a defense bill to my desk before they go home. That's a very important signal to send. And at the same time, since there is no budget in the Senate, they've got to be mindful of over-spending. Very important for those up there who keep talking about budget -- balanced budget, and all that, to not over-spend. If they're truly that concerned about the deficit, then one way they can help is to be fiscally sound with the people's money.

We talked about the need to get pension reform and an energy bill, terrorism insurance. There's time to get all this done, and we look forward to working with the members of Congress to get it done.

I'll answer a couple of questions, starting with Fournier of the AP.

Q Thank you, Mr. President. Can I have your reaction to two recent assessments on the situation in Iraq? First, Tony Blair said today that Saddam has tried to acquire significant quantities of uranium and can quickly deploy chemical and biological weapons. But there seems to be little new information in the dossier. Secondly, former Vice President Al Gore --

THE PRESIDENT: He explained why.

Q Pardon me, sir?

THE PRESIDENT: Explained why he didn't put new information -- to protect sources. Go ahead.

Q If you could explain why, I'd appreciate it. And secondly, Vice President Al Gore --

THE PRESIDENT: That's right, I forgot our different roles. (Laughter.)

Q I couldn't even get on the ballot. (Laughter.)

THE PRESIDENT: Did that have something to do with the background check? (Laughter.)

Q When I have something on that, I'll let you know, sir. (Laughter.)

The Vice President yesterday said that you've managed to replace the world's sympathy on Iraq with fear, anxiety and uncertainty. And you're using the issue to steer attention away from the inability to get Osama bin Laden.

THE PRESIDENT: I'm confident a lot of Democrats here in Washington, D.C. will understand that Saddam is a true threat to America. And I look forward to working with them to get a strong resolution passed.

Prime Minister Blair, first of all, is a very strong leader, and I admire his willingness to tell the truth and to lead. Secondly, he has -- continues to make the case, like we make the case, that Saddam Hussein is a threat to peace; that for 11 years he has deceived the world. For 11 years, he's ignored the United Nations, and for 11 years he has stockpiled weapons. And we shouldn't deceive ourselves about this man. He has poisoned his people before. He has poisoned his neighborhood. He is willing to use weapons of mass destruction. And the Prime Minister continues to make the case, and so will I.

And I again call for the United Nations to pass a strong resolution holding this man to account. And if they're unable to do so, the United States and our friends will act, because we believe in peace; we want to keep the peace. We don't trust this man -- and that's what the Blair report showed today.

The reason why it wasn't specific is because -- I understand why -- he's not going to reveal sources and methods of collection of sensitive information. Those sources and methods may be -- will be used later on, I'm confident, as we gather more information about how this man has deceived the world.

Holland.

Q Sir, do you want to specifically respond, please, to Al Gore, instead of just generally about Democrats? What did you think about his --

THE PRESIDENT: About his response -- I mean, there's a lot of Democrats in Washington, D.C. who understand that Saddam Hussein is a true threat, and that we must hold him to account. And I believe you'll see, as we work to get a strong resolution out of the Congress, that a lot of Democrats are willing to take the lead when it comes to keeping the peace.

Q Sir, Arab leaders are warning the terrorism coalition and your efforts in Iraq are at risk because of the Arafat siege. Why didn't U.S. support last night's U.N. resolution, and what can you say to get to Israel to end the siege?

THE PRESIDENT: What we do support is this, Steve -- and our abstention should have sent a message that we hope that all parties stay on the path to peace. And I laid out what the path to peace -- what the path to peace was here at the -- in the Rose Garden: First of all, we all have got to fight terror. But as we fight terror, particularly in the Middle East, they've got to build the institution necessary for a Palestinian state to emerge; that we've got to promote the leadership that is willing to condemn terror and, at the same time, work toward the embetterment of the lives of the Palestinian people. There are a lot of suffering people there and we've got to help end the suffering.

And I thought the actions Israelis take -- Israelis took were not helpful in terms of the establishment and development of the institutions necessary for a Palestinian state to emerge. We will continue to work with all parties in the region, Israel and everybody else who wants to fight off terror, we'll do that.

In order for there to be peace we must battle terror. But at the same time, we must have a hopeful response. And the most hopeful response of all for the Palestinian people is for -- to work for a state to emerge. And that is possible; I believe strongly it can happen. I believe it's -- I believe in peace in the Middle East. And I would urge all governments to work toward that peace.

And we're making progress, and that's what's important for the world to know. We're making progress on the security front, we're making progress on the political reform front. We're making progress to make it clear that if there is to be a peaceful settlement, that the Palestinians must be given the opportunity to bring forth leadership which is willing to work toward peace. And it was not helpful what happened recently.

Dick.

Q Mr. President, we haven't asked you about the economy in quite some time. Consumer confidence numbers out today -- not real good. Later this month, lots of Americans are going to receive their 401(k) statements, many of them probably cringing about what they're going to see in there. Do you feel like the economy is on the right track, that the stock market can mount any kind of a recovery in coming months? And if you are optimistic, what are your reasons for your optimism?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Well, I'm optimistic because, one, I'm optimistic about America in general. I mean, the American people are resilient, they're strong, we've got the best workers in the world, inflation is down, interest rates are low. So when you combine the productivity of the American people with low interest rates and low inflation, those are the ingredients for growth.

But there's more to do. That's why we need a terrorism insurance bill. We need to get our hard-hats working again. We need to make the tax cuts permanent so that entrepreneurs and small businesses have got certainty in the tax code. We need to make sure Congress doesn't over-spend. If Congress over-spends, it will send a chilling signal to markets. And so there are things that Congress and the administration can do, working together to make sure people work.

But I'm an optimist. I'm optimistic because this is America -- that's what makes me optimistic. The entrepreneurial spirit is strong. And we're really good at a lot of things we do. But, no question that, you know, that things changed, I mean, from the boon days. The market started to decline in March of 2000 -- that's when it peaked. The sellers outnumbered the buyers starting in March of 2000.

And then in the summer of 2000, the economy began to slow down, people began to see a serious slowdown. And then we came into office and we had three quarters of negative growth. That's called a recession. And we're dealing with it. We're dealing with a sound -- a fiscal policies, starting with letting people have more of their own money. See, the tax cut was actually necessary, a necessary part of economic recovery. And there are some up here in Washington, D.C. who would like to raise the taxes on the people. And that's just -- that's bad economics, that's bad policy. People up here want to stop the reduction in income taxes to the American people. That's bad policy in the face of an economic slowdown.

So you bet I'm optimistic. But I understand we've got a lot of work to do. And we will. We will continue to work hard to make sure that people can find work.

Thank you, all.

END 11:09 A.M. EDT

Return to this article at:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020924-1.html

For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
October 21, 2002

President Discusses Foreign Policy Matters with NATO Secretary
Remarks by the President and NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson in Photo Opportunity
The Oval Office

3:35 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: It's my honor to welcome Lord Robertson back to the Oval Office. I think we've met, gosh, five -- four or five times since I've been the President. I've enjoyed every meeting. He does a great job at NATO. NATO is an incredibly important part of U.S. foreign policy. I appreciate the alliance.

We are mainly discussing issues that we will confront and/or deal with in Prague, including NATO expansion. He's soliciting the views of the administration. I told him that we would give him a definite answer about our views on expansion in a couple of weeks, and that timetable seemed satisfactory with him.

But, Lord Robertson, welcome back. I appreciate you being here. Thanks for your strong leadership.

LORD ROBERTSON: I'm delighted to be again in the Oval Office, Mr. President.

And the President has shown, not just by meetings with me, but in every other way possible his and his administration's commitment to NATO and to the strength of this trans-Atlantic alliance that has bound together these democratic and freedom-loving states over all of the years.

We're now a month to the day away from the Prague Summit, probably the most important summit meeting in NATO's history, a transformation summit where NATO has to transform itself to deal with the threats and the challenges of the 21st century. And I believe we will have a good package on new members, a robust enlargement, new capabilities to deal with terrorism and to deal with the other challenges and nightmares that we may face ahead in the future, and new relationships with Russia, with Ukraine, with our partner countries, building the world's largest permanent alliance and one on which the world can rely on.

THE PRESIDENT: Three questions. Fournier.

Q Sir, is North Korea an imminent threat to the United States and what consequences, if any, will it face for hiding its nuclear program from you?

THE PRESIDENT: One, we had a bit of troubling news when we discovered the fact that, contrary to what we had been led to believe, that they were enriching uranium with the idea of developing a nuclear weapon. I say troubling news, obviously, because we felt like they had given their word they weren't going to do this.

I view this as an opportunity to work with our friends in the region and work with other countries in the region to ally against proliferation of serious weapons and to convince Kim Chong-il that he must disarm. To this end, I'm going to be talking to Jiang Zemin at Crawford. I look forward to a good discussion with the President of China about how we can work together to take our relationship to a new level in dealing with the true threats of the 21st century.

I will see the leaders of Japan and South Korea and Russia the next day, in Mexico. I intend to make this an important topic of our discussions. This is a chance for people who love freedom and peace to work together to deal with a -- to deal with an emerging threat. I believe we can deal with this threat peacefully, particularly if we work together. So this is an opportunity to work together.

Q They're not an imminent threat, though?

THE PRESIDENT: You know, that's an operative word. We view this very seriously. It is a troubling discovery, and it's a discovery that we intend to work with our friends to deal with. I believe we can do it peacefully. I look forward to working with people to encourage them that we must convince Kim Chong-il to disarm for the sake of peace. And the people who have got the most at stake, of course, in this posture are the people who are his neighbors.

Arshad.

Q Mr. President, can you explain so the boys in Lubbock can understand --

THE PRESIDENT: Crawford or Lubbock?

Q Lubbock or Crawford, both --

THE PRESIDENT: Lubbock is a little more sophisticated than Crawford, Arshad. (Laughter.)

Q Crawford, then.

THE PRESIDENT: Or Scotland, for that matter.

Q Why --

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Arshad.

Q Why you threaten military action against Iraq, but you believe that Korea's nuclear weapons program only merits diplomatic efforts?

THE PRESIDENT: Saddam Hussein is unique, in this sense: he has thumbed his nose at the world for 11 years. The United Nations has passed 16 resolutions to deal with this man, and the resolutions are all aimed at

disarmament, amongst other things. And for 11 years, he said, no, I refuse to disarm.

Now, what makes him even more unique is the fact he's actually gassed his own people. He has used weapons of mass destruction on neighboring countries and he's used weapons of mass destruction on his own citizenry. He wants to have a nuclear weapon. He has made it very clear he hates the United States and, as importantly, he hates friends of ours.

We've tried diplomacy. We're trying it one more time. I believe the free world, if we make up our mind to, can disarm this man peacefully.

But, if not -- if not, there's -- we have the will and the desire, as do other nations, to disarm Saddam. It's up to him to make that decision and it's up to the United Nations. And we'll determine here soon whether the United Nations has got the will, and then it's up to Saddam to make the decision.

Stretch.

Q Mr. President, again, for the good people of Crawford --

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. It's been a big day for Crawford.

Q If you can explain this in a way that they and the rest of us will understand. There is some hints over the weekend, the possibility that taking weapons of mass destruction out of Iraq is our goal, raising the possibility or the implication that he could somehow remain in power.

Can you say authoritatively and declaratively whether you can achieve -- if you can achieve your aims there in a way that leaves him still in office?

THE PRESIDENT: The stated policy of the United States is regime change because, for 11 years, Saddam Hussein has ignored the United Nations and the free world. For 11 years, he has -- he said, look, you passed all these resolutions; I could care less what you passed. And that's why the stated policy of our government, the previous administration and this administration, is regime change -- because we don't believe he is going to change.

However, if he were to meet all the conditions of the United Nations, the conditions that I've described very clearly in terms that everybody can understand, that in itself will signal the regime has changed.

END 3:42 P.M. EDT

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http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021021-8.html

For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
February 26, 2003

President Discusses the Future of Iraq
Washington Hilton Hotel
Washington, D.C.

7:22 P.M. EST



THE PRESIDENT: Thanks for the warm welcome. I'm proud to be with the scholars, and the friends, and the supporters of the American Enterprise Institute. I want to thank you for overlooking my dress code violation. (Laughter.) They were about to stop me at the door, but Irving Kristol said, "I know this guy, let him in." (Laughter.)



Chris, thank you for your very kind introduction, and thank you for your leadership. I see many distinguished guests here tonight -- members of my Cabinet, members of Congress, Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas, and so many respected writers and policy experts. I'm always happy to see your Senior Fellow, Dr. Lynne Cheney. (Applause.) Lynne is a wise and thoughtful commentator on history and culture, and a dear friend to Laura and me. I'm also familiar with the good work of her husband -- (laughter.) You may remember him, the former director of my vice presidential search committee. (Laughter.) Thank God Dick Cheney said yes. (Applause.)

Thanks for fitting me into the program tonight. I know I'm not the featured speaker. I'm just a warm-up act for Allan Meltzer. But I want to congratulate Dr. Meltzer for a lifetime of achievement, and for tonight's well-deserved honor. Congratulations. (Applause.)

At the American Enterprise Institute, some of the finest minds in our nation are at work on some of the greatest challenges to our nation. You do such good work that my administration has borrowed 20 such minds. I want to thank them for their service, but I also want to remind people that for 60 years, AEI scholars have made vital contributions to our country and to our government, and we are grateful for those contributions.

We meet here during a crucial period in the history of our nation, and of the civilized world. Part of that history was written by others; the rest will be written by us. (Applause.) On a September morning, threats that had gathered for years, in secret and far away, led to murder in our country on a massive scale. As a result, we must look at security in a new way, because our country is a battlefield in the first war of the 21st century.

We learned a lesson: The dangers of our time must be confronted actively and forcefully, before we see them again in our skies and in our cities. And we set a goal: we will not allow the triumph of hatred and violence in the affairs of men. (Applause.)

Our coalition of more than 90 countries is pursuing the networks of terror with every tool of law enforcement and with military power. We have arrested, or otherwise dealt with, many key commanders of al Qaeda. (Applause.) Across the world, we are hunting down the killers one by one. We are winning. And we're showing them the definition of American justice. (Applause.) And we are opposing the greatest danger in the war on terror: outlaw regimes arming with weapons of mass destruction.

In Iraq, a dictator is building and hiding weapons that could enable him to dominate the Middle East and intimidate the civilized world -- and we will not allow it. (Applause.) This same tyrant has close ties to terrorist organizations, and could supply them with the terrible means to strike this country -- and America will not permit it. The danger posed by Saddam Hussein and his weapons cannot be ignored or wished away. The danger must be confronted. We hope that the Iraqi regime will meet the demands of the United Nations and disarm, fully and peacefully. If it does not, we are prepared to disarm Iraq by force. Either way, this danger will be removed. (Applause.)

The safety of the American people depends on ending this direct and growing threat. Acting against the danger will also contribute greatly to the long-term safety and stability of our world. The current Iraqi regime has shown the power of tyranny to spread discord and violence in the Middle East. A liberated Iraq can show the power of freedom to transform that vital region, by bringing hope and progress into the lives of millions. America's interests in security, and America's belief in liberty, both lead in the same direction: to a free and peaceful Iraq. (Applause.)

The first to benefit from a free Iraq would be the Iraqi people, themselves. Today they live in scarcity and fear, under a dictator who has brought them nothing but war, and misery, and torture. Their lives and their freedom matter little to Saddam Hussein -- but Iraqi lives and freedom matter greatly to us. (Applause.)

Bringing stability and unity to a free Iraq will not be easy. Yet that is no excuse to leave the Iraqi regime's torture chambers and poison labs in operation. Any future the Iraqi people choose for themselves will be better than the nightmare world that Saddam Hussein has chosen for them. (Applause.)

If we must use force, the United States and our coalition stand ready to help the citizens of a liberated Iraq. We will deliver medicine to the sick, and we are now moving into place nearly 3 million emergency rations to feed the hungry.

We'll make sure that Iraq's 55,000 food distribution sites, operating under the Oil For Food program, are stocked and open as soon as possible. The United States and Great Britain are providing tens of millions of dollars to the U.N.

High Commission on Refugees, and to such groups as the World Food Program and UNICEF, to provide emergency aid to the Iraqi people.

We will also lead in carrying out the urgent and dangerous work of destroying chemical and biological weapons. We will provide security against those who try to spread chaos, or settle scores, or threaten the territorial integrity of Iraq. We will seek to protect Iraq's natural resources from sabotage by a dying regime, and ensure those resources are used for the benefit of the owners -- the Iraqi people. (Applause.)

The United States has no intention of determining the precise form of Iraq's new government. That choice belongs to the Iraqi people. Yet, we will ensure that one brutal dictator is not replaced by another. All Iraqis must have a voice in the new government, and all citizens must have their rights protected. (Applause.)

Rebuilding Iraq will require a sustained commitment from many nations, including our own: we will remain in Iraq as long as necessary, and not a day more. America has made and kept this kind of commitment before -- in the peace that followed a world war. After defeating enemies, we did not leave behind occupying armies, we left constitutions and parliaments. We established an atmosphere of safety, in which responsible, reform-minded local leaders could build lasting institutions of freedom. In societies that once bred fascism and militarism, liberty found a permanent home.

There was a time when many said that the cultures of Japan and Germany were incapable of sustaining democratic values. Well, they were wrong. Some say the same of Iraq today. They are mistaken. (Applause.) The nation of Iraq -- with its proud heritage, abundant resources and skilled and educated people -- is fully capable of moving toward democracy and living in freedom. (Applause.)

The world has a clear interest in the spread of democratic values, because stable and free nations do not breed the ideologies of murder. They encourage the peaceful pursuit of a better life. And there are hopeful signs of a desire for freedom in the Middle East. Arab intellectuals have called on Arab governments to address the "freedom gap" so their peoples can fully share in the progress of our times. Leaders in the region speak of a new Arab charter that champions internal reform, greater politics participation, economic openness, and free trade. And from Morocco to Bahrain and beyond, nations are taking genuine steps toward politics reform. A new regime in Iraq would serve as a dramatic and inspiring example of freedom for other nations in the region. (Applause.)

It is presumptuous and insulting to suggest that a whole region of the world -- or the one-fifth of humanity that is Muslim -- is somehow untouched by the most basic aspirations of life. Human cultures can be vastly different. Yet the human heart desires the same good things, everywhere on Earth. In our desire to be safe from brutal and bullying oppression, human beings are the same. In our desire to care for our children and give them a better life, we are

the same. For these fundamental reasons, freedom and democracy will always and everywhere have greater appeal than the slogans of hatred and the tactics of terror. (Applause.)

Success in Iraq could also begin a new stage for Middle Eastern peace, and set in motion progress towards a truly democratic Palestinian state. (Applause.) The passing of Saddam Hussein's regime will deprive terrorist networks of a wealthy patron that pays for terrorist training, and offers rewards to families of suicide bombers. And other regimes will be given a clear warning that support for terror will not be tolerated. (Applause.)

Without this outside support for terrorism, Palestinians who are working for reform and long for democracy will be in a better position to choose new leaders. (Applause.) True leaders who strive for peace; true leaders who faithfully serve the people. A Palestinian state must be a reformed and peaceful state that abandons forever the use of terror. (Applause.)

For its part, the new government of Israel -- as the terror threat is removed and security improves -- will be expected to support the creation of a viable Palestinian state -- (applause) -- and to work as quickly as possible toward a final status agreement. As progress is made toward peace, settlement activity in the occupied territories must end. (Applause.) And the Arab states will be expected to meet their responsibilities to oppose terrorism, to support the emergence of a peaceful and democratic Palestine, and state clearly they will live in peace with Israel. (Applause.)

The United States and other nations are working on a road map for peace. We are setting out the necessary conditions for progress toward the goal of two states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side in peace and security. It is the commitment of our government -- and my personal commitment -- to implement the road map and to reach that goal. Old patterns of conflict in the Middle East can be broken, if all concerned will let go of bitterness, hatred, and violence, and get on with the serious work of economic development, and political reform, and reconciliation. America will seize every opportunity in pursuit of peace. And the end of the present regime in Iraq would create such an opportunity. (Applause.)

In confronting Iraq, the United States is also showing our commitment to effective international institutions. We are a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. We helped to create the Security Council. We believe in the Security Council -- so much that we want its words to have meaning. (Applause.)

The global threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction cannot be confronted by one nation alone. The world needs today and will need tomorrow international bodies with the authority and the will to stop the spread of terror and chemical and biological and nuclear weapons. A threat to all must be answered by all. High-minded pronouncements against proliferation mean little unless the strongest nations are willing to stand behind them -- and use force if necessary. After all, the United Nations was created, as Winston

Churchill said, to "make sure that the force of right will, in the ultimate issue, be protected by the right of force."

Another resolution is now before the Security Council. If the council responds to Iraq's defiance with more excuses and delays, if all its authority proves to be empty, the United Nations will be severely weakened as a source of stability and order. If the members rise to this moment, then the Council will fulfill its founding purpose.

I've listened carefully, as people and leaders around the world have made known their desire for peace. All of us want peace. The threat to peace does not come from those who seek to enforce the just demands of the civilized world; the threat to peace comes from those who flout those demands. If we have to act, we will act to restrain the violent, and defend the cause of peace. And by acting, we will signal to outlaw regimes that in this new century, the boundaries of civilized behavior will be respected. (Applause.)

Protecting those boundaries carries a cost. If war is forced upon us by Iraq's refusal to disarm, we will meet an enemy who hides his military forces behind civilians, who has terrible weapons, who is capable of any crime. The dangers are real, as our soldiers, and sailors, airmen, and Marines fully understand. Yet, no military has ever been better prepared to meet these challenges.

Members of our Armed Forces also understand why they may be called to fight. They know that retreat before a dictator guarantees even greater sacrifices in the future. They know that America's cause is right and just: liberty for an oppressed people, and security for the American people. And I know something about these men and women who wear our uniform: they will complete every mission they are given with skill, and honor, and courage. (Applause.)

Much is asked of America in this year 2003. The work ahead is demanding. It will be difficult to help freedom take hold in a country that has known three decades of dictatorship, secret police, internal divisions, and war. It will be difficult to cultivate liberty and peace in the Middle East, after so many generations of strife. Yet, the security of our nation and the hope of millions depend on us, and Americans do not turn away from duties because they are hard. We have met great tests in other times, and we will meet the tests of our time. (Applause.)

We go forward with confidence, because we trust in the power of human freedom to change lives and nations. By the resolve and purpose of America, and of our friends and allies, we will make this an age of progress and liberty. Free people will set the course of history, and free people will keep the peace of the world.

Thank you all, very much. (Applause.)

END 7:50 P.M. EST

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For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
April 28, 2003

President Discusses the Future of Iraq

Remarks by the President on Operation Iraqi Freedom
Ford Community and Performing Arts Center
Dearborn, Michigan

en Español

VIDEO Multimedia

President's Remarks
view view
listen

1:46 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you for that warm welcome; I'm glad to be here. I regret that I wasn't here a few weeks ago when the statue came down. (Applause.) I understand you had quite a party. I don't blame you. A lot of the people in the Detroit area had waited years for that great day.

Many Iraqi Americans know the horrors of Saddam Hussein's regime firsthand. You also know the joys of freedom you have found here in America. (Applause.) You are living proof the Iraqi people love freedom and living proof the Iraqi people can flourish in democracy. (Applause.) People who live in Iraq deserve the same freedom that you and I enjoy here in America. (Applause.) And after years of tyranny and torture, that freedom has finally arrived. (Applause.)

I have confidence in the future of a free Iraq. The Iraqi people are fully capable of self-government. Every day Iraqis are moving toward democracy and embracing the responsibilities of active citizenship. Every day life in Iraq improves as coalition troops work to secure unsafe areas and bring food and medical care to those in need.

America pledged to rid Iraq of an oppressive regime, and we kept our word. (Applause.) America now pledges to help Iraqis build a prosperous and peaceful nation, and we will keep our word again. (Applause.)

Mr. Mayor, thanks, I appreciate you greeting me once again here in Dearborn. I appreciate your leadership. If you've got any problems with the garbage or the potholes, call the mayor. (Laughter.)

I want to thank members of the congressional delegation who have joined us today. Thank you all for coming. Michigan is well represented in the halls of the United States Congress. (Applause.) I want to thank the folks from the state government who have joined us today and local governments. I

appreciate so very much the CEOs of the major automobile manufacturing companies who are based here in Detroit who are here: Rick Wagoner, Bill Ford and Deter Zetsche. Thank you all for coming. I look forward to discussing things with you later. (Applause.)

Right before I came in here I had the opportunity to meet with some extraordinary men and women, our fellow Americans who knew the cruelties of the old Iraq. And like me, they believed deeply in the promise of a new Iraq.

I spoke with Najda Egaily, a Sunni Muslim from Basra who moved to the United States five years ago. Najda learned the price of descent in Iraq in 1988, when her brother-in-law was killed after laughing at a joke about Saddam Hussein in a house that was bugged.

In Iraq, Najda says, we could never speak to anyone about Saddam Hussein -- we had to make sure the windows were closed. (Applause.) The windows are now open in Iraq. (Applause.) Najda and her friends will never forget seeing the images of liberation in Baghdad. Here's what she said: we called each other and we were shouting; we never believed that Saddam Hussein would be gone.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: He's gone. (Applause.)

THE PRESIDENT: Like Najda, a lot of Iraqis -- a lot of Iraqis -- feared the dictator, the tyrant would never go away. You're right -- he's gone. (Applause.)

AUDIENCE MEMBERS: USA! USA!

AUDIENCE MEMBER: (Inaudible) back in the (inaudible). (Applause.)

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Because of you, Mr. President, so can you.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: (Inaudible).

THE PRESIDENT: We love free speech in America. (Laughter and applause.)

I talked to Tarik Daoud, a Catholic from Basra who now lives in Bloomfield Hills. (Applause.) When the dictator regime fell, here's what Tariq said, he said: I am more hopeful today than I've been since 1958. We need to take the little children in Iraq and hold their hands and really teach them what freedom is all about. He says: the new generation could really make democracy work.

He's right to be optimistic. From the beginning of this conflict we have seen brave Iraqi citizens taking part in their own liberation. Iraqis have warned our troops about land mines and enemy hideouts and military arsenals.

Earlier this month, Iraqis helped Marines locate the seven American prisoners of war, who were then rescued in Northern Iraq. (Applause.) One courageous Iraqi man gave Marines detailed layouts of a hospital in An Nasiriyah, which led to the rescue of American soldier Jessica Lynch. (Applause.)

Iraqi citizens are now working closely with our troops to restore order to their cities, and improve the life of their nation. In Basra, hundreds of police volunteers have joined with coalition forces to patrol the streets. In Baghdad, more than a thousand citizens are doing joint patrols with coalition troops. And residents are also working with coalition troops to collect unexploded munitions from neighborhoods, and repair the telephone system. People are working to improve the lives of the average citizens in Iraq. (Applause.)

I want you to listen to what an Iraqi engineer said who was working with U.S. Army engineers to restore power to Baghdad. He said: We are very glad to work with the Americans to have power for the facilities. The Americans are working to help us. (Applause.) Iraqi Americans, including some from Michigan, are building bridges between our troops and Iraqi civilians. Members of the free Iraqi forces are serving as translators for our troops, and are delivering humanitarian aid to the citizens.

One of these volunteers, an Iraqi American who fled Saddam Hussein's regime in 1991, recently returned to his homeland with the 101st Airborne Division. A few weeks ago, when he first saw the cheering crowds of Iraqis welcome coalition troops in Hillah he wept. He said people could hardly believe what was happening, and he told them: believe it -- liberation is coming. (Applause.)

Yes, there were some in our country who doubted the Iraqi people wanted freedom, or they just couldn't imagine they would be welcome -- welcoming to a liberating force. They were mistaken, and we know why. The desire for freedom is not the property of one culture, it is the universal hope of human beings in every culture. (Applause.)

Whether you're Sunni or Shia or Kurd or Chaldean or Assyrian or Turkoman or Christian or Jew or Muslim -- (applause) -- no matter what your faith, freedom is God's gift to every person in every nation. (Applause.) As freedom takes hold in Iraq, the Iraqi people will choose their own leaders and their own government. America has no intention of imposing our form of government or our culture. Yet, we will ensure that all Iraqis have a voice in the new government and all citizens have their rights protected. (Applause.)

In the city of An Nasiriyah, where free Iraqis met recently to discuss the political future of their country, they issued a statement beginning with these words: Iraq must be democratic. (Applause.)

AUDIENCE MEMBER: USA! USA! USA! (Applause.)

THE PRESIDENT: That historic declaration expresses the commitment of the Iraqi people and their friends, the American people. The days of repression from any source are over. Iraq will be democratic. (Applause.)

The work of building a new Iraq will take time. That nation is recovering not just from weeks of conflict, but from decades of totalitarian rule.

In a nation where the dictator treated himself to palaces with gold faucets and grand fountains, four out of ten citizens did not even have clean water to drink. While a former regime exported milk, and dates, and corn, and grain for its own profit, more than half a million Iraqi children were malnourished. As Saddam Hussein let more than $200 million worth of medicine and medical supplies sit in warehouses, one in eight Iraqi children were dying before the age of five. And while the dictator spent billions on weapons, including gold-covered AK-47s, nearly a quarter of Iraqi children were born underweight. Saddam Hussein's regime impoverished the Iraqi people in every way.

Today, Iraq has only about half as many hospitals as it had in 1990. Seventy percent of its schools are run-down and over-crowded. A quarter of the Iraqi children are not in a school at all. Under Saddam's regime, the Iraqi people did not have a power system they could depend on. These problems plagued Iraq long before the recent conflict. We're helping the Iraqi people to address these challenges, and we will stand with them as they defeat the dictator's legacy. (Applause.)

Right now, engineers are on the ground working with Iraqi experts to restore power, and fix broken water pipes in Baghdad and other cities. We're working with the International Red Cross, the Red Crescent Societies, the International Medical Corps and other aid agencies to help Iraqi hospitals get safe water and medical supplies and reliable electricity. Our coalition is cooperating with the United Nations to help restart the ration distribution system that provides food at thousands of sites in Iraq. And coalition medical facilities have treated Iraqis from everything from fractures and burns to symptoms of stroke.

One Iraqi man who was given medical help with his wife and sister aboard the U.S. Navy ship Comfort, said: They treat us like family. There are babies in Iraq who are not cared for by their mothers as well as the nurses have cared for us.

Already, we are seeing important progress in Iraq. It wasn't all that long ago that the statue fell, and now we're seeing progress. (Applause.)

Rail lines are reopening, and fire stations are responding to calls. Oil -- Iraqi oil, owned by the Iraqi people -- is flowing again to fuel Iraq's power plants. In Hillah, more than 80 percent of the city has now running water. City residents can buy meats and grains and fruits and vegetables at local shops. The mayor's office, the city council have been reestablished.

In Basra, where more than half of the water treatment facilities were not working before the conflict -- more than half weren't functioning -- water supplies are now reaching 90 percent of the city. The opulent presidential palace in Basra will now serve a new and noble purpose. We've established a water purification unit there, to make hundreds of thousands of liters of clean water available to the residents of the city of Basra. (Applause.)

Day by day, hour by hour, life in Iraq is getting better for the citizens. (Applause.) Yet, much work remains to be done. I have directed Jay Garner and his team to help Iraq achieve specific long-term goals. And they're doing a superb job. Congress recently allocated $2.5 -- nearly $2.5 billion for Iraq's relief and reconstruction. With that money, we are renewing Iraq with the help of experts from inside our government, from private industry, from the international community and, most importantly, from within Iraq. (Applause.)

We are dispatching teams across Iraq to assess the critical needs of the Iraqi people. We're clearing land mines. We're working with Iraqis to recover artifacts, to find the hoodlums who ravished the National Museum of Antiquities in Baghdad. (Applause.) Like many of you here, we deplore the actions of the citizens who ravished that museum. And we will work with the Iraqi citizens to find out who they were and to bring them to justice. (Applause.)

We're working toward an Iraq where, for the first time ever, electrical power is reliable and widely available. One of our goals is to make sure everybody in Iraq has electricity. Already, 17 major power plants in Iraq are functioning. Our engineers are meeting with Iraqi engineers. We're visiting power plants throughout the country, and determining which ones need repair, which ones need to be modernized, and which ones are obsolete, power plant by power plant. More Iraqis are getting the electricity they need.

We're working to make Iraq's drinking water clean and dependable. American and Iraqi water sanitation engineers are inspecting treatment plants across the country to make sure they have enough purification chemicals and power to produce safe water.

We're working to give every Iraqi access to immunizations and emergency treatment, and to give sick children and pregnant women the health care they need. Iraqi doctors and nurses and other medical personnel are now going back to work. Throughout the country, medical specialists from many countries are identifying the needs of Iraqis hospitals, for everything from equipment and repairs to water, to medicines.

We're working to improve Iraqi schools by funding a back to school campaign that will help train and recruit Iraqi teachers, provide supplies and equipment, and bring children across Iraq back into clean and safe schools. (Applause.)

And as we do that, we will make sure that the schools are no longer used as military arsenals and bunkers, and that teachers promote reading, rather than regime propaganda. (Applause.) And because Iraq is now free, economic sanctions are pointless. (Applause.) It is time for the United Nations to lift the sanctions so the Iraqis could use some resources to build their own prosperity. (Applause.)

Like so many generations of immigrants, Iraqi Americans have embraced and enriched this great country, without ever forgetting the land of your birth. Liberation for Iraq has been a long time coming, but you never lost faith. You knew the great sorrow of Iraq. You also knew the great promise of Iraq, and you shared the hope of the Iraqi people.

You and I both know that Iraq can realize those hopes. Iraq can be an example of peace and prosperity and freedom to the entire Middle East. (Applause.) It'll be a hard journey, but at every step of the way, Iraq will have a steady friend in the American people. (Applause.)

May God continue to bless the United States of America, and long live a free Iraq. (Applause.)

END 2:10 P.M. EDT

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Presenter: Ambassador Paul Bremer **June 12, 2003 10:45 AM EDT**

Briefing on Coalition Post-war Reconstruction and Stabilization Efforts

(Video-teleconference briefing from Baghdad, Iraq, on the coalition's post-war reconstruction and stabilization efforts. Participating was Ambassador Paul Bremer, director of the Coalition Provisional Authority.)

Staff: Thank you for joining us today, and a special thanks to Ambassador Paul Bremer, who joins us today from Baghdad. He just finished up a session with the House Armed Services Committee. And he's here today to talk to you about his efforts over the past month since he's arrived in Baghdad and his ongoing efforts into the future.

The ambassador does have a few opening remarks, and then we have 30 minutes for some questions with

him.

So, Mr. Ambassador, if you can hear me, go ahead and get started.

Bremer: Thank you very much. I hear you fine. Do you hear me?

Staff: Yes, we can hear you very well in the briefing room right now.

Bremer: Okay, good. Good morning. Let me say a few words before we get started.

I arrived here almost exactly a month ago. And in those last 30 days, I think we have achieved quite a lot, working with the Iraqi people. We've just begun the process of putting a country together that has been ravaged for 30 years by political tyranny and economic under-investment. It's been an enormous privilege, I must say, to have been able to play a part in this great undertaking, and I am determined that we're going to continue the same pace in progress in the months ahead.

The scars in this country run very deep. The thugs and the torture chambers may be gone, but every day we find new evidence of how bad the regime was that we threw out. And repairing the damage of the last regime, material, human and psychological, is a huge task, and it's a task that is only going to succeed if we have a real partnership with the Iraqi people. I am deeply committed to that kind of a partnership.

We've completed, I think it's fair to say, the first phase of the coalition's efforts towards the reconstitution of Iraq. The focus on that phase was getting basic services delivered, utilities turned on, and providing better law and order for everybody. We've got the water and the power on. In many parts of the country it's actually now above levels of what it was before the war. Here in Baghdad, we are producing 20 hours of electricity a day. The gasoline lines that you've read about have almost disappeared, as have the lines for liquid petroleum gas, which is what's used for cooking.

The second phase of reconstitution, which really begins now, has as its main emphasis restoring economic activity. I want to take a moment and talk about the economy because I think this is where our greatest challenge lies, and we must now create jobs for Iraqis. Unemployment today is a tremendous problem. Our best estimate is that before the war, the unemployment was at about 50 percent -- five-zero percent -- and we think it's substantially higher than that now. So there can be no higher priority now than trying to find a way to create jobs. The chronic underinvestment in infrastructure is going to have to be dealt with, and we're going to have to find ways to get productive activity going, particularly economic activity that creates jobs.

I come back to the question of a partnership with the Iraqi people. We have already begun to work with Iraqi businessmen and women and with officials to find ways to carry out the best economic policy. I had a meeting with a very large group of people in those categories here on Monday night, and I will continue to have consultations with them. I was pleased that the IMF, the World Bank and the UNDP also took part in that meeting on Monday night.

Among the initiatives I've announced was last week I announced a $70 million community action program to help local communities identify areas where they can very quickly get some activity going. On Tuesday, I announced a $100 million emergency construction program, the purpose of which is to try to get the construction industry turning over here. We focused on that industry because we get the most leverage, we get the most jobs per dollar in construction.

The $100 million fund, I might add, is entirely funded from the Iraqi funds that we already have.

We are also trying to encourage trade. Now that the sanctions have been lifted, it's important for Iraq to reenter the world economy. The most obvious example of that is the sale of Iraqi oil, the first sale of Iraqi oil directly into the world market by the Iraqis. The bids went out about five days ago. They have been received yesterday. And I expect they will be opened and announced here in the next 48 hours or so. And that is good news; it means Iraq will have reentered the world petroleum market.

This is all just a beginning. It's quite obvious that we face a major challenge in the economy. It's going to take time and patience, and we are going to be pushing forward as quickly as we can with the restructuring of what is a very sick economy.

I'd be happy to take your questions.

Staff: As you ask your question, if you could identify yourself and your news organization for the ambassador, that would help him.

Go ahead, Bob.

Q: Mr. Ambassador, it's Bob Burns from the Associated Press. I wanted to ask you about the effort to capture or otherwise account for the Iraqis who are on the various most wanted lists, and your assessment of whether most of these people are still in hiding in Iraq or whether they've found have elsewhere.

Staff (In Baghdad.): Guys, if you can hear us, we've lost your audio.

Staff: They've lost our audio.

Ambassador, can you hear me?

Bremer: Yes, I hear you now. And I heard Mr. Burns announce his name, and -- (Audio break.) -- dead.

Staff: All right. Sounds like our mikes might be -- try that mike again, Bob.

Q: Can you hear me now?

Staff: They're not getting your audio.

Bremer: That mike is not working.

Staff: What you're saying, they're not picking up.

Staff: (Off mike.) -- paraphrase the question, and Bob, you tell me if I got it wrong. Bob was asking about the most wanted, and what the progress was on the most wanted and whether or not they had -- your assessment was that -- if they had melted away or left the country. That was the first part of it.

Bremer: We now have more than half of the deck of cards, 55, in custody or have confirmed them as dead. So we're making steady progress. We are picking them up every week, and we will continue to do that. We certainly can't exclude that some of them have gotten out of the country. But I've been encouraged by the number which we've been able to find in the country. And we're certainly going to prosecute that with great vigor.

Staff: Why don't you go ahead and state your question, and state it loudly. We can maybe get it from the overhead mikes while we're waiting for a new mike.

Q: It's Martha Raddatz from ABC News. Ambassador Bremer, can you talk about what sort of organized -- let's try with this mike.

Ambassador Bremer, Martha Raddatz from ABC News. Can you talk about what sort of organized resistance you're seeing in Iraq, how large that resistance is, and who you believe is behind it.

Bremer: Yes. We are certainly seeing some organized resistance, particularly in the area west of Baghdad and the area north of Baghdad. Now, I want to qualify that by saying we do not see signs of central command and control direction in that resistance at this point. That is to say, these are groups that are organized, but they're small; they may be five or six men conducting isolated attacks against our soldiers.

We are clearly on the lookout to see if this evolves into a more organized, more broadly and centrally directed resistance. But for the time being, it appears that these are small groups, usually Ba'athists or Fedayeen Saddam; in some cases they may be officers of the Republican Guard. And we are going to have to continue to deal with them in a military fashion, as we are now doing.

Q: They are small groups of five or six men. Are these small groups of five or six men connected in a larger

way?

Bremer: Well, that's what I meant by saying we don't yet have evidence of central command and control. They look to be groups who have spontaneously come together and are attacking us. They may be colleagues from the Ba'ath movement, they could be several people from the Fedayeen Saddam or from the Republican Guards. But we do not at the moment see evidence of central command control of these groups. I certainly wouldn't exclude it, but we don't have the evidence yet.

Q: There's no evidence that Saddam Hussein is directing any of it?

Bremer: No.

Q: Ambassador, this is Pam Hess with United Press International. Two quick questions. Is Iraq going to be selling its oil under OPEC? And are you -- in your efforts for de-Ba'athification, could you fill us in on how that's going, how far down into the Ba'ath Party you expect to get, what sort of that threshold is when someone becomes acceptable; because as you know, 15 million Ba'athists in the country? And are you planning anything like a truth and reconciliation commission for the Iraqi people?

Bremer: Iraq is selling oil now. The question of whether Iraq will remain a member of OPEC is a decision that we will leave to the Iraqi government. And it will be, certainly, a matter that I will discuss with the interim administration when we establish it next month. But this is a matter, I think, that is best left to the Iraqi people.

We -- I can't remember, what was your second question? I'm sorry.

Q: The Ba'athists.

Bremer: We are going to continue the program of de- Ba'athification. I think our estimate of the number of Ba'ath Party members is somewhat more modest than yours, but it's still a substantial number, probably a couple of million. The Ba'athists who were immediately affected by my de-Ba'athification decree, however, represent a much smaller number, somewhere between 50 and 30,000. Don't -- the fact that the gap is that wide shows how poor our information really is. We're hoping that as we are able to examine documents captured, we'll have a better sense of what the actual numbers are.

We are continuing that process, and I have announced the establishment of an Iraqi de-Ba'athification council, which will be made up of Iraqis, so that they can carry forward in whatever fashion they wish the de-Ba'athification, classifying Ba'athists into various classes, for example, to decide which of them might have to stand criminal trial, which ones might be subject to some civil sanctions, and which ones might be in some fashion reprieved.

I have had preliminary discussions with Iraqi politicians about the question of truth and reconciliation. I think myself this is an area that could productively be explored by the Iraqis. My impression in the conversations I've had so far is that the Iraqis are simply still too -- understandably -- emotionally delighted to be rid of Saddam and the Ba'athists that they may not yet be ready to undertake that step.

Q: Ambassador, this is John Hendron with the Los Angeles Times. I've got two questions. There's a larger number of people in the military, something like 500,000 people, Iraqis, who are out of work now. What happens to them? How many will return to work as soldiers there?

And secondly, if I could ask, have you seen results from nearly tripling the number of troops in Fallujah by adding the 2nd Brigade of the 3rd Infantry Division there?

Bremer: On the demobilized military, the numbers are a little bit hard to be precise about. The order of battle of the conscript part of the army before the war started was 375,000. Frankly, I think most order of battle numbers are probably not very accurate, so we don't really know what the order of battle was. And that, of course, was the order of battle before the war started. We don't know how many of those people were either killed, injured, or deserted or simply faded away during the war. So, it's a little hard to know.

But, it is the case that a substantial number of military people have been put out of work by demobilizing the army. We are approaching that in two ways.

Number one, we are getting ready to start the process of building a new Iraqi army. I expect that we will be --

we have identified training and recruiting sites only this week. We will be starting to clear those sites and clean them up and do the necessary construction. They are using, by the way, former enlisted army men. And so, we'll start building a new Iraqi army here, really, in the next month or so.

Secondly, we believe that these demobilized enlisted men can be very productively used in their private and ministerial security forces to help secure, for example, vital oil installations, electrical power plants, which are today being guarded by American soldiers. If we can hire back and train enlisted men who have some weapon skills already and get them to a high standard, then they can start to take over some of the site security from our soldiers, which then allows our soldiers to more aggressively try to reestablish law and order in Baghdad, for example.

On the question of the deployment of the 2nd Brigade to Fallujah, I think that that project is really only just getting underway. And I think we will see the results in the coming weeks. It's too early to say at this point what the effect will be.

Q: Ambassador, Bret Baier with Fox News Channel. I have two questions, and I'll ask them separately, if I may.

First, you've said that you believe the attacks on U.S. troops are from Ba'ath Party loyalists, Fedayeen Saddam and Iraqi Republican Guards that may have been sticking around. Within the last 24 hours there's been this strike on what CENTCOM calls a terrorist training camp in the West. Any new information about that and possibly that foreign fighters have been involved in attacks on U.S. forces? That's my first question.

Bremer: Well, it's really not appropriate for me to comment on ongoing military operations. We have had in the past some evidence of extremist operations, some of which might be classified as terrorist, in Iraq. We do have clear evidence of some Sunni extremism in the area to the west of Baghdad. Whether that turns out to have been involved in the operation you're talking about is a matter still, I think, to be determined.

And we do have clear evidence of Iranian interference in the affairs of Iraq. Of course, Iran is still -- correctly, in my view -- identified as the world's leading sponsor of terrorism. There was an Ansar al-Islam terrorist camp, as you will remember, at the beginning of the war, in the North. We are very attentive to the possibility of those people flowing back into Iraq, and we'll obviously take the appropriate steps if we get evidence that that's happening.

Q: And the second question, sir, is, you've said many times that a top priority of yours is job creation. Today there was a demonstration in front of the gates of your headquarters, of Iraqis demanding jobs. How do you go about creating jobs? How is that going? And what do you tell these people? How do they go about getting them?

Bremer: The job creation problem can be divided into two phases. The first phase, which we are in now, is to try urgently to get jobs going for regular day laborers and workers and demobilized army personnel and just young people.

That's why our emphasis in the fund I announced on Tuesday was on -- this $100 million fund -- was on construction, because in construction we will create more jobs per dollar spent than in any other area. And we do have a number of construction projects that were stopped before the war which we can start up relatively quickly and therefore begin to soak up some of this unemployment.

But realistically, job creation is going to require a much deeper economic reform. It's going to require us to create a private sector, which can in turn create jobs. And that is going to be a more difficult and longer-term problem.

So I think it's useful to think of these immediate steps we're taking as bridging steps, bridging us towards a more fundamental economic reform that's going to take longer.

Q: Mr. Ambassador, Rick Whittle with the Dallas Morning News. I was wondering if you could tell us what the thresholds for the United States will be of the sort of government that Iraq will be allowed to have, and the sort of economic system they'll be allowed to have. Once the Iraqi people actually form their own government, what role might Islam play in governing the country, and what role might socialism play, given the country's socialist past?

Bremer: Well, questions like the role of Islam are so fundamental to the kind of society that the Iraqis will rebuild that I believe this is a question that needs to be left to the constitutional conference, which will be

convening towards the end of July. We are going to try to make it clear -- we have made it clear that the constitution that Iraq needs to write must be written by Iraqis; it must take into account Iraqi history, its culture, its social experiences. It will not be a constitution dictated by the coalition or by Americans.

Now, the fact is that Iraq has lived under two different constitutions since 1925, both of which established Islam as the state religion, so there's nothing unusual in that. Both of which guaranteed the free -- freedom of worship. Since 1970, when Saddam promulgated his constitution, freedom of worship has been honored more in a breach. But it's possible that they will decide that they want to have a constitution which establishes Islam. We would, of course, be much more comfortable if it also established freedom of religion, and I don't think that will be a problem.

In terms of what kind of economic system they wish to establish, as you point out, the Ba'athist Party was a socialist party. I think it's very hard to imagine any strong support in this country for a return to that economic system, which has left the country really flat on its back, and which does not really provide a model for getting the kind of vibrant private sector which I think most Iraqis now realize is a sine qua non for a stable economy and stable economic growth. So if they choose socialism, that will be their business. My guess is that's not going to happen.

Staff: All right, this side of the room. So let's go ahead with you and then up here to Tony, and we'll take a couple on this side.

Q: Mr. Ambassador, George Edmonson with Cox Newspapers. You've mentioned several times the difficulty of rebuilding the Iraqi economy and the need for patience. How long do you anticipate that the United States would have to maintain a significant presence in Iraq?

Bremer: Well, I get that question a lot. It's a question, among others, my wife tends to ask me about once a week. So, it's always on my mind. My guess is that it's going to be a substantial amount of time, but whether that is measured in months or years will depend on developments. I don't think we should set any artificial deadlines. I think the president has painted it very clearly, as has the secretary, which is we will stay until the job is done and not a day longer, and we won't leave until the job is done.

So, the pacing issue, assuming we establish security throughout the country, which I think we will -- the pacing issue will be how fast the Iraqis can write a constitution, get it ratified by the Iraqi people and then call elections. And we hope to convene a constitutional conference, as I mentioned, within the next four to six weeks. And then, the process of writing the constitution will have to start. And we will see how long it takes.

As for the Iraqis, I have no deadline. If they write it fast, that's fine; I get to go home earlier. If it takes them longer, then we'll just stay here longer. I don't think we should put ourselves in any deadline boxes.

Staff: Tony?

Q: Sir, this is Tony Capaccio with Bloomberg News. Question on troop levels. In order to maintain a viable security situation throughout Iraq, roughly how many troops do you feel will need to be maintained throughout the country? There's about 145,000 U.S. troops right now. Will that roughly be the threshold?

Bremer: You know, I kind of stay away from these games of guessing the right troop strength. I take the position that the troop strength should be determined by the conditions. As conditions improve, we hope we can draw down our forces. If conditions get worse, we're going to not be able to do that.

For the time being, I think we have an adequate force level here. And what I hope is in the months ahead, we see that we are successful in imposing our will on this small group of people who are attacking us and causing us casualties. But we -- our troop levels should be condition-driven. They should not be driven by some artificial deadlines about when we want to take troops out, or some number of troops we ought to have here. I think we've got it about right now, and let's just see what the circumstances dictate.

Q: Mr. Ambassador, Bryan Bender with the Boston Globe. Can you tell us -- can you give your assessment of how much the lawlessness, how much these pockets of resistance, if you want to call them that, are affecting or could affect your job in rebuilding the country?

And as part of that question, can you talk about the big question mark of Saddam Hussein, how that -- his fate being unanswered -- how that might affect your job as well, at least in convincing the Iraqis that is a new day

and this is a new country?

Bremer: Well, on your second question first, I would obviously much prefer that we had clear evidence that Saddam is dead or that we had him alive in our custody. I think it does make a difference, because it allows the Ba'athists to go around in the bazaars and in the villages, as they are doing, saying, "Saddam is alive, and he's going to come back. And we're going to come back." And the effect of that is to make it more difficult for people who are afraid of the Ba'athists -- and that's just about everybody -- it makes it more difficult for them to come forward and cooperate with us, because they are afraid the Ba'athists may return.

We have to show through our de-Ba'athification policy, through our military operations against Ba'athists and through other measures we take that in fact the Ba'athists are finished; they're not coming back. And we have to obviously continue to leave no stone unturned in the search for Saddam.

Q: Hi. It's Patty Davis with CNN. There have been reports of significant psychological stress and pressures on U.S. troops, being that they've gone from fighting a war to trying to stabilize the country, and with these ambush attacks almost daily. Do you see that? And what can the U.S. do to help?

Bremer: Well, let me say, first of all, that I am really full of admiration for the young men and women who fought such a successful war. And I'm full of admiration for how well they have made the transition to what they really weren't trained to do, which is to set up civil administration in villages and town all across this country. It's really quite amazing to go see the guys and women in the 82nd Airborne, one of the great, renowned units in this country -- they have an area. Their area of operation is south of Baghdad. And they're working on restoring hospitals, trying to fix the sewage system, helping set up generators for the hospitals, restoring amusement parks. These are not things that they normally get trained to do, and they're just doing a magnificent job of it.

We are in a transition phase here where, as we do get stability, we will need to transition a lot of those kinds of things away from the military and to the civilian part of the Coalition Provisional Authority. And we're in the process of now trying to bring forward here to Iraq more civilians to help us -- to allow us to relieve the military of these tasks.

So I can't say that the transition from the warfighting to the peacekeeping has produced at least a lot of psychological stress in the men and women I've spoken to. They seem to be doing an excellent job of it. But it is true this is not what they were trained for. And in the long run that has to transition over to civilian leadership.

Q: Ambassador, I'm Carl Osgood. I write for Executive Intelligence Review. I'd like to ask you about something you just made reference to, which is, you know, the hospital situation, the health care situation in the country. Can you say anything about what the conditions are now in the hospitals? Are they beginning to function? What are you doing to try and improve conditions -- the health care conditions, and who do you have working on that?

Bremer: The first thing to remember is that the health care situation in this country probably for the last 20 years has been really substandard -- again, an illustration of what happens when you have a government that spends about a third of its gross domestic product on military and underinvests. And in particular, in the south, in the Shi'a parts of the country, Saddam really used health care and -- he withheld health care and social services as an element of political repression of the Shi'a. I'll give you an example. I visited the main hospital in Basra yesterday, which is a Shi'a city. And it was quite clear that very little money had been spent there over the last 20 years. They're still operating out of a building that was originally built by the British when they were the colonial power here 80 years ago. They do have 24-hour power now, something they did not have before the war. So they've got better power than they had before. But by Western standards the situation in a hospital like that is pretty depressing.

Now, we have done several things. First of all, all 12 hospitals in Baghdad are now up and running. I have had the Army Corps of Engineers go out and examine all of their generators because when we had power outages in Baghdad, it obviously was a severe problem for hospitals, who need regular power, particularly in their operating rooms. We have now examined all those generators and either repaired them where they needed repair or set in train replacing them so that the hospitals in Baghdad will be able to have constant power. We have got a nation-wide program going on, researching the hospital situation throughout the country, and the pharmaceutical situation.

You asked who's doing this. We are doing it. We are also getting NGOs to help us and U.N. agencies to help us. It's an enormous undertaking. I think the health care situation is not, however, the crisis that we thought it might be, and we now seem to have enough pharmaceuticals in the country, though they are not being -- we

are having distributions problems. But it's not the crisis we thought it would be.

Staff: We have about four minutes left. I'm going to go right here and then back on this side of the room, back over to Pam. And that might be our last one, depending on how long your questions are.

Q: Ambassador, this is James Cullum from the Talk Radio News Service. Regarding captured officials on the 55 Most Wanted List, in your estimation, how will they be tried, and how long do you see their detainment without a trial?

Bremer: It's obviously a sensitive question on which I think we need to have responsible Iraqis give us advice. The people of this country suffered tremendously under the regime of these 55 men, and more, and one can, I think, understand that they will want to have some say in what kind of a criminal procedure is established to deal with these people. Whether that will be, as I think many of them hope, an Iraqi tribunal or a mixed Iraqi-international tribunal, these are subjects that, again, once we have an interim administration here, which I expect will happen in the next four to five weeks, it's one of the subjects that we will basically put to them and try to seek their views. And once we have a consensus view on that from the Iraqis, we may be able to start those trials forthwith.

Q: Ambassador, this is Pam Hess from UPI again. Could you please tell us what the structure of the interim government will be; how those people will be selected and what their powers will and will not be?

Bremer: The interim administration, which is responsive to U.N. Security Council Resolution 1483, will have, at least initially, two bodies in it. The first body will be a political council; the second, a constitutional conference. The political council will be made up of some 25 to 30 Iraqis from all walks of life and from the various strands of Iraqi society: men, women, Shi'a, Sunnis, Kurds and Arabs, tribal leaders, Christians, Turkomen, urban people, et cetera, professionals.

That group is the subject of some rather intense consultations that we're undergoing right now with people from all of those walks of life. And I would expect that we will arrive at a list of agreed candidates, as I said, in the next four to six weeks.

The political council's responsibilities will be quite significant right from the start, and they will fall in two areas. First of all, the political council will be encouraged to nominate immediately men and women to become interim ministers in the 20 or so ministries that make up the Iraqi government. The interim ministers will in turn have substantial responsibilities in how those ministries are run.

The second area that the political council will be active in will be in setting up commissions to study longer-range questions that have a major impact on Iraqi society; for example, what to do about educational reform. Ba'athism is very much a part of the curriculum throughout the school system and university system here. How do we get rid of it? What do we do to the textbooks? They will want to look at issues like how to take a census, something that must happen, obviously, before there can be elections next year. And there must be another half-dozen commissions you can think of.

The second body will be a constitutional conference, which will be a broader and more broadly selected group, probably several hundred, who will convene, we hope, also in the next six to seven weeks, and will have the task of drafting the new Iraqi constitution. It will have to organize itself. It will have to select a drafting committee and maybe some subcommittees, and then will undergo a very intense, we hope, intense political dialogue with the people of Iraq on fundamental issues: like whether this will be a presidential system, whether it will be federal; and what federalism will mean; what will be the role of religion. All of these questions will have to be dealt with by that constitutional conference.

Staff: Ambassador, we have come to the end of our time. And I'd like to thank you for taking the time today. I know you spent some time earlier today talking to the House Armed Services Committee members. And we really appreciate the opportunity to have a dialogue with you and help our understanding back here. And we hope that we can do this again soon with you.

Bremer: Thank you. Nice to see you all.

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Presenter: Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III, Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority **August 20, 2003**

Ambassador Bremer Interview with the CBS Early Show

(Interview with Harry Smith, CBS Early Show.)

Q: Paul Bremer is the chief U.S. administrator in Iraq. Ambassador Bremer joins us this morning.

Thanks for joining us, sir.

Bremer: Good morning.

Q: Do you know who did this?

Bremer: No, we don't. Whoever did it was a terrible criminal, taking innocent life, as terrorists always seem to do; in this case, people who came here with no political motive, who were simply here trying to rebuild Iraq and helping the Iraqi people reclaim their country.

Q: Pipeline and water supplies have been sabotaged in the last week. The Jordanian embassy was attacked about two weeks ago; now the United Nations. You had 150,000 American soldiers over there who are targets every day. When will the United States get control of this country?

Bremer: I don't accept the proposition that we're not in control. We certainly have a threat of terrorism. That does not mean chaos. It doesn't mean that we've lost control. It does mean that we have an element of terrorism here, the kind of terrorism we've seen in New York and Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam and Beirut over the years.

It is a terrible war. It's one which was declared on the American people very dramatically on September 11th, and it's a war that we will win. It's not something that we're going to get deterred from by an attack here, bad as it was.

Q: How is it you don't agree with the assessment that things are not in control there?

Bremer: I don't know who makes the assessment that things aren't in control. It's clearly not the view of the coalition here. We have a security problem here. The security problem now has got a terrorist dimension, which is new, but the rest of the security is basically in better shape than it was three months ago when I arrived here.

It is true that we're taking some casualties among the coalition forces, but that's largely coming from a small group of bitter-enders from the former regime, and almost all of it in a very small geographic area. The attacks on the pipelines that you mentioned and on the electricity are basically a different problem. Those are attacks on the Iraqi people, as the acting minister of oil made clear in his press conference on Saturday.

Q: Do you have an anticipation of when you think the streets of Baghdad and the streets of the other major cities in Iraq will be safe, when the power will be on, when day-to-day clean water will be available?

Bremer: Well, the streets of the main cities, including Baghdad, are safe. They're safe today. You can go around them. You find thousands of Iraqis on the streets every day. Right now, if you went downtown, you'd find them walking around. The shops are open. Men and women and their children are there.

It is dangerous after the curfew, obviously, in the late evening. But the country is not a country in chaos. And terrorism doesn't mean chaos. It does mean an outrage against humanity. And it is something we have to deal with, and we will deal with it. But it is simply wrong to extrapolate from these terrorist acts to a conclusion that this country is in chaos. It's simply not true.

Q: Ambassador Bremer, we thank you for your time today. We do appreciate it.

Bremer: Thank you.

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Presenter: Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt, Deputy Director for Operations

December 30, 2003 9:00 AM EST

(Participating was Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt, Deputy Director for Operations and Daniel Senor, Senior CPA Adviser.)

MR. SENOR: Good afternoon. General Kimmitt and I have brief opening statements, and then we'll be happy to take your questions.

Ambassador Bremer returned today from Washington, D.C., after a couple of days of meetings there with administration officials, including a meeting with the president of the United States. The focus of the meetings primarily were on the implementation of the November 15th political agreement reached with the Governing Council, as well as other priorities as we enter this final stage of the reconstruction process on the civilian side, which will involve hand- over of sovereignty to the Iraqi people in six months. There is a lot of work to do over these next few months, and that was the basis of the consultations in Washington.

In addition, Ambassador Bremer and the coalition continue to work very closely with the Ministry of Oil to head off the smuggling and sabotage and black market profiteering, which continue to be among the greatest challenges plaguing the Iraqi oil industry, the Iraqi Oil Ministry and the Iraqi people.

The causes, as we have said before and as the Ministry of Oil has said before, primarily include two elements, one being the increase in demand, almost a quarter-million new cars in Iraq since the fall of the former regime, in part based on the lifting of customs, and also in part there's this new infusion of cash, higher salaries in the economy.

Another cause, the other element here is a problem of supply. We are dealing with antiquated, chronically underinvested-in oil production technology and equipment and infrastructure. This infrastructure is highly susceptible to sabotage, to attacks, and we continue to work with the Ministry of Oil and the security forces to head those off. But that said, it will take time to improve the quality of the infrastructure, to build in the necessary redundancy, and to make it less vulnerable to attacks.

As I said, we are working hard on these problems. And in that regard, we welcome the support of a number of clerics, leading clerics from across the country over the recent days that have issued strong statements, in some case fatwas, against attacks of political sabotage and against another problem which I will speak to, which is that of the black market profiteering. But these sorts of things are attacks against the Iraqi people.

We are also working, as I said, on the security front, on the -- on heading off the oil issues. Two nights ago, coalition forces caught smugglers stealing fuel from a gas station in Samarra, filling a tanker of gasoline from its storage tanks. And then just yesterday, Iraqi police seized another tanker, fuel destined for the black market, on the outskirts of Baghdad. The coalition forces and the Iraqi security forces are stepping up their security at gas stations, at production facilities, at these critical areas

across the country, working together, working side by side, and beginning now to make progress, with these examples I've cited, to address this critical issue.

General Kimmitt.

GEN. KIMMITT: Thank you.

First, on behalf of the coalition, let me start by offering our condolences to the nations of Bulgaria, Poland, Thailand and Iraq for the losses suffered in the wake of the criminal attack in Karbala. This cowardly attack on the citizens of Karbala and the coalition forces serving there to maintain security was heinous and senseless.

Despite this attack, coalition forces in Karbala and throughout Iraq will remain offensively oriented to kill or capture anti- coalition elements and enemies of the Iraqi people, and will provide support to rebuild a free Iraq.

To that end, the coalition conducted 1,639 patrols, 40 offensive operations, 29 raids, and captured 101 anti-coalition suspects in the past 24 hours.

In the northern zone of operations, coalition forces conducted a series of cordon-and-search operations against brigade targets. The first operation took place in southwest Mosul, where initial questioning indicated that this was a possible safe house for terrorist activities. The second operation killed three enemy personnel, and three individuals, including two coalition targets, were detained. Other operations resulted in the capture of three additional targets, including an associate of a ranking high-value target.

In Al Sulimaniyah, coalition forces reopened two bridges outside the city. The rebuilding was a joint Al Sulimaniyah public works and Commanders' Emergency Response-funded effort.

In the north central zone of operations, coalition forces conducted 142 patrols, five raids, and captured 43 individuals. Seven of the patrols were joint operations conducted alongside the Iraqi police, the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps and the border police.

Soldiers discovered a significant weapons cache southeast of Samarra, in a raid targeting a suspected IED manufacturer. The cache consisted of a large number of weapons and bomb-making material, but it also included al Qaeda literature, ceramic body armor and a VHS tape labeled "Sheik of the Muhaddin (sp) Osama bin Laden."

Twenty enemy personnel were captured, including 10 targets, during a raid in Shahab Al Mab (sp). Weapons and ammunition were also seized in that raid.

Ten enemy personnel, including two suspected weapons dealers, were captured during a raid on December 28th. Multiple small arms and explosives were also confiscated.

Eight Sala Adin (sp) imams received the keys to automobiles on December

29th from Civil Affairs soldiers in the 4th Infantry Division, based on a request during Ramadan. The religious leaders wanted a way to travel to the more remote locations in the district to speak with the residents of smaller towns and villages, and the coalition wanted to express their commitment by supporting this request. The cars will allow the imams to spread the message of peace and reconciliation to every Iraqi in the province.

In Baghdad, coalition forces conducted six raids yesterday as part of the continuing Operation Iron Grip. Thirteen enemy personnel were captured.

Of note, on Saturday, Sarhid Ab Sarhid (sp), a former Directorate of Military Intelligence officer suspected of leading a large anti- coalition group in the region and suspected in -- suspected of responsibility for attacks on coalition forces, to include the downing of the DHL jetliner, died at a coalition medical facility from wounds received in a targeted raid on his complex. A significant amount of documents and electronic media were captured in this raid.

Demonstrating a complete disregard for noncombatants, terrorists detonated a booby trap in Baghdad on Sunday, killing one coalition soldier, two Iraqi children, wounding five coalition soldiers and eight Iraqi Civil Defense Corps soldiers. This has been followed again by another attack today, reportedly killing one civilian and wounding several others.

In the western zone of operations, coalition forces captured four enemy personnel in Ar Ramadi yesterday during a cordon-and-search operation. They're suspected of being part of an organization moving foreign fighters and large sums of money in cash through the region.

Civil Affairs soldiers in the 82nd Airborne Division met with local officials in Hazwah (sp) to finalize repair plans for the Sana (sp) Intermediate School.

Civil Affairs soldiers also met with local leaders to initiate renovations on two primary health clinics in Al Jazirah (sp). The primary health clinics will allow local family practitioners more access to the populace.

In the wake of the Karbala bombings, the area of Multinational Division Central-South has been relatively quiet. Working with local police, coalition soldiers captured two enemy personnel yesterday in al Kut, one suspected of being an arms dealer and another of bomb attacks. In the vicinity of Basra, six enemy were detained by coalition forces following a search where both Ba'ath Party uniforms and passports were confiscated in this raid.

Let's turn it over to questions.

MR. SENOR: Yes? Go ahead.

Q Yes. General, could you give us some explanation about roadside bombs, as we have seen some cases recently? What are the general measures that the public can take to avoid to get involved in those attacks? And second, could you just tell me if it's quite easy for someone to plant those bombs without being noticed by the police

in a crowded area like in central Baghdad, that there were two ones in the recent three days?

GEN. KIMMITT: Well, certainly what we do, what we tell our soldiers and we also tell our soldiers to tell the local population, anything that looks out of the ordinary along the roadside, something that doesn't belong there, you should report that immediately, whether it's a bag of trash, whether it's a piece of concrete, whether it's a piece of cinderblock, something that just looks out of place, we tell them to report that so that we can get EOD experts down there to determine if in fact that is just some garbage that was thrown out or in fact an EOD that might have been placed there.

We also run a significant number of IED patrols. On those areas where our units will be transiting on a frequent basis, we will send out patrols ahead of time specifically for the purpose of checking out possible IED locations to try to keep those areas clear.

We also use as much actionable intelligence as possible to go after bomb makers and suspected bomb makers, to go at their homes and their locations to try to catch those bombs before they're put on there.

MR. SENOR: Yes?

Q Tatiana Anderson (sp), CNN. A German publication, along with the L.A. times, are reporting that certain documents obtained indicate that Syria was providing Iraq with weapons even just weeks before the war. Can you shed some light on that?

MR. SENOR: I don't have anything to add to that. I would refer you to the Department of Defense on that particular issue.

Yes?

Q Sara Deep (ph) from the Associated Press. There have also been reports about Saddam speaking about where he's hidden some of his funds, and some of the Council members have said that you told them or they were told about the result of the investigation or his confession during investigation where he actually hid the money. Is that true? And how far has that gone?

MR. SENOR: I'm not in a position to comment on any discussions Saddam Hussein had with members of the Governing Council. I can't characterize them or comment on them.

Yes?

Q General Kimmitt, can you comment a little bit more about Iron Grip and the activity that's been going on in Baghdad in particular? There seems to have been a stepped-up bit of activity in Baghdad over the last week on both sides. I'm curious if you can give us a little bit more detail on what Iron Grip is targeting, if it's fresh intelligence that they're working on. It sounds like there was a significant capture on Saturday. But also, whether you think the activity on the insurgents' side -- there's

been a lot of talk that that was targeted around the Christmas period -- whether you believe that that was indeed sort of a Christmas offensive or something along those lines.

GEN. KIMMITT: Sure. Well, first of all, I will give you part of the answer because tomorrow night General Dempsey will be here providing a very, very comprehensive press conference covering all the operations that he and his unit have been running since the last time he gave the press conference. But rather than preempting him, let me just tell you that there were indications, and have been reported in the press, that we expected a large amount of enemy activity during the Christmas time period, for, as we've said many, many times before, the enemy is going to try to use that as an opportunity, knowing that it's a holiday for some, a religious holiday for others, to try to use that to exploit and come up with some spectacular attacks.

We were able to detect some of those activities. We found a number of weapon systems pointed at different locations and were able to preempt those. There were a series of engagements that happened during Christmas Day, approximately 18 between the hours of 0600 and 0800 on Christmas Day. Fortunately, none of those had any deaths associated with them. And to our knowledge, only one Iraqi civilian was wounded during that time period.

MR. SENOR: Yes?

Q James Hider from The Times. I was down in Karbala after the bombings, and the place is full of Iranian pilgrims. And the police down there say the Iranians don't have visas, they're all illegal pilgrims. They were saying there's actually probably more Iranians there than Iraqis. I was wondering how you expect to stop attacks of this nature if anybody can just wander across the Iranian border -- in the thousands, in fact.

MR. SENOR: We are working -- I can't speak to the specific numbers of Iranians down in Karbala, but I can speak more broadly. We are committed to building up a modern, effective Iraqi security infrastructure that, when we are finished, will number in the range of about approximately 220,000 Iraqi security personnel, which will include a robust border police and customs personnel team.

In the supplemental funds that the U.S. Congress recently appropriated, for security alone, there is over $3 billion dedicated toward training and equipping and arming this very advanced and modern Iraqi security personnel. And we think this will be -- help a great deal in securing these areas of the country where you cite the sorts of problems that you have referenced.

Q But the borders do appear to be completely open at the moment.

MR. SENOR: Well, I think it's a topographical fact of life that these are very porous borders. Iraq has very porous borders. It's an issue we have to contend with. But like I said, by ramping the Iraqi security personnel, ramping up the numbers, giving them effective training, giving them the tools they need, and certainly, in the short term, working alongside coalition forces, we believe we can

address the security problems that are here.

I -- Ambassador Bremer has said for a long time, as has President Bush, that Iraq is now the central front in the war on terror. And this war on terror has two very distinct elements that, unfortunately, often work together: elements of the former regime and foreign fighters, terrorists coming over in this country that are trying to destabilize the situation.

And we believe, working alongside the Iraqis in this stepped-up security personnel infrastructure that we are helping them build and that we are paying for, we can address these problems. But we have to remain focused on it. We have to remain committed to it. We will remain committed to it. It's a tough job.

Yes?

Q Yes. Tom (surname inaudible), ABC News. Following up on that, about the Iraqi security services, concerns are being raised about how fast this is moving along: that it's being pushed ahead too quickly, that proper vetting isn't in place, that corners are being cut. How do you respond to those concerns? And can you also give us an update on the current state of the -- both police services and the Iraqi army?

MR. SENOR: The numbers of Iraqi police today are approximately 70,000. As far as the new Iraqi army is concerned, there are 400 new Iraqi soldiers on duty with the 4th ID. A second battalion of the new Iraqi army is scheduled to graduate next month. Those are the numbers both for police and the new Iraqi army. The goal to get -- with the new Iraqi army is to get in the neighborhood of 35(,000) to 40,000.

As far as the police is concerned, when Ambassador Bremer arrived here in May, there was not a single Iraqi police officer on the streets. As I said, today there is over 7,000, about -- over 70,000 nationwide and about 7,000 in Baghdad alone.

And as far as -- what was your first question? About the vetting?

Q Just -- there's been concerns about vetting, that this being pushed ahead too quickly for them to be really useful; again, that there's vetting problems; that corners are being cut --

MR. SENOR: Sure.

Q -- that basically people are being pushed out there, but they can't do the job or haven't been trained to do the job.

MR. SENOR: Yeah. We have a robust vetting process for all the security forces. Do some individuals slip through the cracks? Absolutely. When they do slip through the cracks and it's brought to our attention or we notice them, we seek to rectify it immediately. I think that is a situation you will find in any security service anywhere in the world. Some people make it in, for various reasons, that probably shouldn't make it in, for various reasons.

I think it's certainly the case when you are rebuilding a -- when you are building a security infrastructure up from scratch. Like I said, when Ambassador Bremer arrived here in May, there wasn't a single police officer on the street. Today there are over 60,000. And that's in approximately six months. So we are moving quickly, but we are committed to a robust vetting process to address the sorts of things you are raising.

I think it's very important, as we have said all along, to get -- and as I said a moment ago, to get these security forces up and running quickly, to help, you know, address the security situation.

When we first arrived here, in the months immediately after, one of the biggest problems of security in Baghdad was violent crime -- robbery, homicide, those sorts of acts. Those numbers are way down, in the neighborhood between 30(,000) and 40,000 in Baghdad, in terms of violent crime.

So having security, having Iraqi security on the streets, doing patrols, making arrests, on the front lines -- on the front lines, a lot of these men are risking their lives every single day; many of them have engaged in very heroic and courageous acts -- is critical to this project.

And now we need to further beef up the Iraqi security personnel to address the two other elements I mentioned earlier: the former regime elements and the foreign terrorists that coming in the border -- coming over the borders.

GEN. KIMMITT: And if I could, I think if you were to query all the commanders on the ground right now that if they'd had a choice of waiting for a longer period to get perfectly formed and trained police forces, ICDC and new Iraqi army, vice (sic) having partially trained but still sufficiently trained forces working alongside with them, providing intelligence, providing translating services, acting as the intermediaries for the military forces out there, so that if you have to go into a mosque, for instance, you don't go in with a coalition soldier, but you go in with an Iraqi soldier; I think, on balance, the commanders would come back and say the decision to not wait until we had the perfect solution was the wise one, the prudent one, and one that's probably saved a significant amount of coalition lives in the process.

MR. SENOR: Yeah. And I would just add to that that we are -- by deploying Iraqis on the front lines of the security situation, we have access, as General Kimmitt said, to individuals who have a deep sense for the rhythm of life, for the language, for the culture, in a way that the coalition forces just do not. It's an invaluable tool in this effort.

Yes, sir?

Q Tom Frank from Newsday. I just wanted to follow up on the police question. I hear some Iraqis saying two things. One is, they want more police, because obviously security is a big concern. Correct me if I'm wrong, but I think the full figure will be 71,000 for the entire country.

MR. SENOR: It's a little higher than that. It's between 75,000 and 80,000, but, yeah.

Q Okay. My paper publishes in New York City, a city of 8 million people with 40,000 police. I'm wondering why so few police? And secondly, I understand a lot of the police now are people who were police when Saddam was in power. I'm wondering if you know about how many of the police are, you know, veterans from the prewar period, and if there's any concern about having those people, because there was some, I guess, pretty widespread corruption in those days. So, the two questions.

MR. SENOR: Sure. Your comparison to New York City isn't entirely applicable because we also have these other security forces at work that would tend to address some of the security issues that occur in New York City. We have the Facilities Protection Service that's protecting the infrastructure of the country. As I said, we have the new Iraqi army, members of which are already being deployed. And we have the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps that are working hand in hand -- approximately -- over 14,000 of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps working hand in hand with the American security forces. So, we have a number of Iraqi security forces deployed doing the work, not just the police force.

To your second question, yes, we are recruiting Iraqis for police training, some of whom who served in former security forces of the former regime and some who are brand new. Those that served in the Iraqi police force go through what we call the TIP (sp) program, which is a transition training police program. It's a program we bring them in and teach them the skills that they didn't learn under the former regime; basic things like policing with basic restrictions for human rights, and professional investigative skills, and the high standards of professionalism operating in a democratic society.

So, we are taking those police who pass the vetting process, who we believe pass our standards on de-Ba'athifciation, giving them the tools and teaching them the skills and the standards that we think is important for policing in a free and democratic society, and putting them to work.

Yes?

Q Tom Lasseter, Knight Ridder. I was wondering whether you can comment about changes or shifts you've seen in anti-coalition insurgency; if you have seen them, what sort of changes you've seen in terms of tactics, organization; and whether those changes, if they do exist, seem to be pinned at all to the capture of Saddam Hussein, and whether post-capture you've gotten a different or better idea of the role that he did or did not play?

GEN. KIMMITT: Let's sort of go back to front on those. Since the capture of Saddam Hussein, we've seen the number of engagements stay relatively the same. Unfortunately, some of those engagements have been a little more deadly, as we saw down in Karbala. I don't think that that has anything to do with the specific capture of Saddam Hussein. We've been on record as saying the capture of Saddam Hussein has provided intelligence which has been helpful in continuing the operations. Yes, the numbers of personnel that we're capturing is about the same that

we've been capturing consistently over the last couple of months, but the quality of captures has gone up a bit.

Do we fully understand where Saddam fit in? We're putting that puzzle together. We don't think, as some have speculated, that he was the central figure managing the entire anti-coalition operation, nor do we believe that he was simply sitting in a hole waiting for somebody to come and capture him.

MR. SENOR: I would just add to that Ambassador Bremer, sort of at a high level here, sees the situation playing out this way: There are the diehards, people like Izzat Ibrahim Al-Douri, who are the diehard former-regime loyalists, who it remains to be seen whether or not their dynamic changes -- our ability to catch them or kill them changes as a result of the Saddam capture.

But there are two other groups that we are beginning to see are now in play as a result of the Saddam capture. Those are sort of the midlevel Ba'athists, midlevel elements tied to the former regime, individuals that were hoping that Saddam would return. They were hoping Saddam would return because they wanted their jobs back at the ministries, they wanted the cars, they wanted the salary back, they wanted, particularly in the Sunni areas between Baghdad and Tikrit, wanted access to the largess that Saddam used to shower that area with. Those folks were hopeful.

Another group of more junior-level Ba'athists are people who weren't tied to the Ba'athist party at all -- to the Ba'ath Party at all but were simply fearful that Saddam would return. The rumors were alive in the shouks, in the markets, that Saddam would return and that these people better be careful, not cooperate with the coalition, the new Iraqi leadership, because if Saddam would return, there would be return to the mass graves and the torture chambers and the rape rooms. And so those folks were just fearful of a Saddam return.

So what we call "the hopefuls" and "the fearfuls." We feel that "the hopefuls" no longer can hope that Saddam will return. They know his days are over. And "the fearfuls" no longer have to fear that he will return. And we believe that opens up a large number of individuals in the geographical area I just described that are now in play.

Yeah?

Q But have you seen a tactical or organizational evolution in the insurgency? And if so, over what sort to time period?

GEN. KIMMITT: Well again, let's remember it's only been two-plus weeks since the capture of Saddam Hussein. But with regards to that, at this point we haven't seen it. We continue to look for it. We continue to watch it, watching how the enemy operates is a daily activity for us, so that we can find out, as he is changing his tactics, we can respond and be proactively engaged against him.

MR. SENOR: Yes?

Q Evan Osnos from the Chicago Tribune. You mentioned that Ambassador

Bremer was discussing the November 15th agreement in Washington. Can you elaborate on that? And specifically, does that mean that the coalition is considering amendments to that agreement to reflect the concerns that have been raised since then, or is that document considered the definitive, final text and nothing more will happen to change that reflecting the concerns of people like Ayatollah Sistani and others?

MR. SENOR: I can't comment on whether or not it will ever change in any degree, any element. I mean, it was a framework. It was a set of principles. Now we're working on setting up the process for implementing those principles. And we are moving forward. The Governing Council has set up several committees to work on the key elements, to work on the implementations, to set up a process for drafting the basic intermittent law, the administrative law. They set up a committee to work on procedures for drafting -- for electing drafters to the constitutional convention. So the Governing Council is in play here working on implementation of November 15th, and so are we. And that's really the focus of the discussions and that was the primary focus of the discussions Ambassador Bremer had back in Washington.

Q To make sure I understand something, does that mean that the discussion now is confined to implementation, or is there also an effort -- to what degree is it important to respond to the concerns of people outside the Governing Council, or is that not considered part of the priority at this point?

MR. SENOR: Ambassador Bremer is committed to implementing the November 15th agreement. All our indications are the Governing Council is equally committed to implementing the November 15th agreement. If they choose to engage with other leaders and individuals within Iraqi society, all the power to them. I mean, you know, this process is something that can be accomplished in a free society. A healthy, vibrant, if not at times controversial, dialogue is a critical component of this process. So we encourage debate. We encourage discussion. There was a town hall meeting held yesterday in Basra, in which the governor of Basra was one of the key participants, where they had a very lively debate about the political process. We hope there will be debates like that all over the country. We expect one in Mosul in the next couple weeks and in other parts of the country. So that is not something we discourage. We encourage that. We hope the Governing Council will be reaching out and having discussions. As far as we're concerned, we are working on implementation of the agreement with the Governing Council.

Yes? Go ahead.

Q What is the scale in terms of the situation of foreign fighters in Iraq? What sort of incidents does the coalition suspect foreign fighters of? And what does the coalition suspect their numbers are, as well?

GEN. KIMMITT; Well, we've said a number of times that we think that the number of foreign fighters is a small minority of the overall enemy that we face here in Iraq, probably on the order of 10 percent, no more. But that could change on a daily basis. What type of activities do we sort of instantly say, "We better look at that one because that might be foreign fighters"? Any time that we see a car bomb, we start saying that probably is not something that was home grown, that that might be from somewhere else. We've seen tactics being used by some of the belligerents,

some of the enemy, that would indicate that they might have had training in other than former-regime element, former Iraqi army. And that's sort of how we say we better take a look at that one a little bit closer.

MR. SENOR: Someone who hasn't asked a question. Go ahead.

Q General, you spoke earlier about intensified activity on both sides around Christmas. Does this extend to New Year? And what special measures, if any, do you have planned for tomorrow?

GEN. KIMMITT: Well, we have not seen it extend, thus far. The last couple of days have been quite -- relatively passive, with the exception of the dreadful attacks of the roadside bombs that we've seen here in the Khaladia (ph) district. I can assure you that our commanders are reviewing the time period, taking the appropriate force-protection measures. And as I said at Christmas time, anybody who would want to take on the coalition during this time period would be well advised to think through that process before he does so.

MR. SENOR: We have time for one more question. So, someone who has not asked one, if there is someone who hasn't asked one. No? All right, go ahead.

Q If I could just follow-up on the Sistani issue -- Peter Spiegel, Financial Times. On the narrow issue of the selection of members of the Transitional National Authority, the Governing Council has set up a committee -- gosh, it was a month ago, I think -- to look at this issue, in which they were supposed to report back, I think, in a week and sort of come back with an idea. Can you give us some insight as to what the debate is going on right now, whether Sistani has given up hope of direct elections? There was some talk about bringing the U.N. in. On that narrow issue of the TNA elections, where are we in terms of the Governing Council debate?

MR. SENOR: I don't want to comment on the Governing Council or their debate. They are 25 people with -- they have their own spokespersons and they have their own individual channels to provide information, so I would refer you to them.

As for the debate over direct elections, when we -- leading up to the November 15th agreement, we realized that the Governing Council -- they came to us and basically said that they had reached an impasse; that they could not move forward on the constitutional process unless there was joint agreement between us and them to allow for direct elections to the constitutional convention. And that was the change we made; we agreed to direct elections in that context. And that has been the discussion, that has been the focus, up to this point, in terms of implementing direct elections for the constitutional convention.

Q But on -- backing up to the TNA itself, there's also been discussion about that, correct?

MR. SENOR: Right. And the Governing Council, as I think you mentioned, wanted to talk to the U.N. about it. General-Secretary (sic) Kofi Annan has spoken; he reported on December 15th to the U.N. about the difficulty or the challenges of direct elections in an environment where there is an accelerated path of sovereignty

along the time line that we have agreed upon with the Governing Council on November 15th. So I would just point you to Kofi Annan's statement on that.

One more. Go ahead.

Q Kofi Annan just asked for a meeting with Iraqis and the CPA. We haven't heard anything from the CPA, whether they're going to be attending or not. Is that going to be an issue of discussion -- direct elections -- and are you going to be attending?

MR. SENOR: My understanding, just from news reports, is that the Governing Council does intend to participate.

Ambassador Bremer and I just arrived from an all-night plane from the United States, so we're just getting settled here. We have no scheduling or travel plans for the next couple weeks. That may change. I know the meeting is very soon. But we have no -- nothing on the schedule right now.

Thanks, everybody.

GEN. KIMMITT: Look forward to seeing you tomorrow night, with General Dempsey's briefing.

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Appendix III – Additional Documents for Chapter 7

For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
September 24, 2002

President Urges Congress to Pass Iraq Resolution Promptly

Remarks by the President in Photo Opportunity with the Cabinet
The Cabinet Room

A Decade of Deception and Defiance



11:00 A.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Thanks for coming. We just had a very productive Cabinet meeting. We realize there's little time left in -- before the Senate and the House goes home, but we're optimistic a lot can get done before now and then. Congress must act now to pass a resolution which will hold Saddam Hussein to account for a decade of defiance.

It's time to get a homeland security bill done, one which will allow this President and this administration, and future Presidents -- give us the tools necessary to protect the homeland. And we're working as hard as we can with Phil Gramm and Zell Miller to get this bill moving. It's a good bill. It's a bill that both Republicans and Democrats can and should support.

My message, of course, is that, to the senators up here that are more interested in special interests, you better pay attention to the overall interests of protecting the American people.

We can get budget going. I need a defense bill. The Senate needs to get, and the House needs to get, their differences reconciled and get a defense bill to my desk before they go home. That's a very important signal to send. And at the same time, since there is no budget in the Senate, they've got to be mindful of over-spending. Very important for those up there who keep talking about budget -- balanced budget, and all that, to not over-spend. If they're truly that concerned about the deficit, then one way they can help is to be fiscally sound with the people's money.

We talked about the need to get pension reform and an energy bill, terrorism insurance. There's time to get all this done, and we look forward to working with the members of Congress to get it done.

I'll answer a couple of questions, starting with Fournier of the AP.

Q Thank you, Mr. President. Can I have your reaction to two recent assessments on the situation in Iraq? First, Tony Blair said today that Saddam has tried to acquire significant quantities of uranium and can quickly deploy chemical and biological weapons. But there seems to be little new information in the dossier. Secondly, former Vice President Al Gore --

THE PRESIDENT: He explained why.

Q Pardon me, sir?

THE PRESIDENT: Explained why he didn't put new information -- to protect sources. Go ahead.

Q If you could explain why, I'd appreciate it. And secondly, Vice President Al Gore --

THE PRESIDENT: That's right, I forgot our different roles. (Laughter.)

Q I couldn't even get on the ballot. (Laughter.)

THE PRESIDENT: Did that have something to do with the background check? (Laughter.)

Q When I have something on that, I'll let you know, sir. (Laughter.)

The Vice President yesterday said that you've managed to replace the world's sympathy on Iraq with fear, anxiety and uncertainty. And you're using the issue to steer attention away from the inability to get Osama bin Laden.

THE PRESIDENT: I'm confident a lot of Democrats here in Washington, D.C. will understand that Saddam is a true threat to America. And I look forward to working with them to get a strong resolution passed.

Prime Minister Blair, first of all, is a very strong leader, and I admire his willingness to tell the truth and to lead. Secondly, he has -- continues to make the case, like we make the case, that Saddam Hussein is a threat to peace; that for 11 years he has deceived the world. For 11 years, he's ignored the United Nations, and for 11 years he has stockpiled weapons. And we shouldn't deceive ourselves about this man. He has poisoned his people before. He has poisoned his neighborhood. He is willing to use weapons of mass destruction. And the Prime Minister continues to make the case, and so will I.

And I again call for the United Nations to pass a strong resolution holding this man to account. And if they're unable to do so, the United States and our friends will act, because we believe in peace; we want to keep the peace. We don't trust this man -- and that's what the Blair report showed today.

The reason why it wasn't specific is because -- I understand why -- he's not going to reveal sources and methods of collection of sensitive information. Those sources and methods may be -- will be used later on, I'm confident, as we gather more information about how this man has deceived the world.

Holland.

Q Sir, do you want to specifically respond, please, to Al Gore, instead of just generally about Democrats? What did you think about his --

THE PRESIDENT: About his response -- I mean, there's a lot of Democrats in Washington, D.C. who understand that Saddam Hussein is a true threat, and that we must hold him to account. And I believe you'll see, as we work to get a strong resolution out of the Congress, that a lot of Democrats are willing to take the lead when it comes to keeping the peace.

Q Sir, Arab leaders are warning the terrorism coalition and your efforts in Iraq are at risk because of the Arafat siege. Why didn't U.S. support last night's U.N. resolution, and what can you say to get to Israel to end the siege?

THE PRESIDENT: What we do support is this, Steve -- and our abstention should have sent a message that we hope that all parties stay on the path to peace. And I laid out what the path to peace -- what the path to peace was here at the -- in the Rose Garden: First of all, we all have got to fight terror. But as we fight terror, particularly in the Middle East, they've got to build the institution necessary for a Palestinian state to emerge; that we've got to promote the leadership that is willing to condemn terror and, at the same time, work toward the embetterment of the lives of the Palestinian people. There are a lot of suffering people there and we've got to help end the suffering.

And I thought the actions Israelis take -- Israelis took were not helpful in terms of the establishment and development of the institutions necessary for a Palestinian state to emerge. We will continue to work with all parties in the region, Israel and everybody else who wants to fight off terror, we'll do that.

In order for there to be peace we must battle terror. But at the same time, we must have a hopeful response. And the most hopeful response of all for the Palestinian people is for -- to work for a state to emerge. And that is possible; I believe strongly it can happen. I believe it's -- I believe in peace in the Middle East. And I would urge all governments to work toward that peace.

And we're making progress, and that's what's important for the world to know. We're making progress on the security front, we're making progress on the political reform front. We're making progress to make it clear that if there is to be a peaceful settlement, that the Palestinians must be given the opportunity to bring forth leadership which is willing to work toward peace. And it was not helpful what happened recently.

Dick.

Q Mr. President, we haven't asked you about the economy in quite some time. Consumer confidence numbers out today -- not real good. Later this month, lots of Americans are going to receive their 401(k) statements, many of them probably cringing about what they're going to see in there. Do you feel like the economy is on the right track, that the stock market can mount any kind of a recovery in coming months? And if you are optimistic, what are your reasons for your optimism?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Well, I'm optimistic because, one, I'm optimistic about America in general. I mean, the American people are resilient, they're strong, we've got the best workers in the world, inflation is down, interest rates are low. So when you combine the productivity of the American people with low interest rates and low inflation, those are the ingredients for growth.

But there's more to do. That's why we need a terrorism insurance bill. We need to get our hard-hats working again. We need to make the tax cuts permanent so that entrepreneurs and small businesses have got certainty in the tax code. We need to make sure Congress doesn't over-spend. If Congress over-spends, it will send a chilling signal to markets. And so there are things that Congress and the administration can do, working together to make sure people work.

But I'm an optimist. I'm optimistic because this is America -- that's what makes me optimistic. The entrepreneurial spirit is strong. And we're really good at a lot of things we do. But, no question that, you know, that things changed, I mean, from the boon days. The market started to decline in March of 2000 -- that's when it peaked. The sellers outnumbered the buyers starting in March of 2000.

And then in the summer of 2000, the economy began to slow down, people began to see a serious slowdown. And then we came into office and we had three quarters of negative growth. That's called a recession. And we're dealing with it. We're dealing with a sound -- a fiscal policies, starting with letting people have more of their own money. See, the tax cut was actually necessary, a necessary part of economic recovery. And there are some up here in Washington, D.C. who would like to raise the taxes on the people. And that's just -- that's bad economics, that's bad policy. People up here want to stop the reduction in income taxes to the American people. That's bad policy in the face of an economic slowdown.

So you bet I'm optimistic. But I understand we've got a lot of work to do. And we will. We will continue to work hard to make sure that people can find work.

Thank you, all.

END 11:09 A.M. EDT

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For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
October 21, 2002

President Discusses Foreign Policy Matters with NATO Secretary
Remarks by the President and NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson in Photo Opportunity
The Oval Office

3:35 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: It's my honor to welcome Lord Robertson back to the Oval Office. I think we've met, gosh, five -- four or five times since I've been the President. I've enjoyed every meeting. He does a great job at NATO. NATO is an incredibly important part of U.S. foreign policy. I appreciate the alliance.

We are mainly discussing issues that we will confront and/or deal with in Prague, including NATO expansion. He's soliciting the views of the administration. I told him that we would give him a definite answer about our views on expansion in a couple of weeks, and that timetable seemed satisfactory with him.

But, Lord Robertson, welcome back. I appreciate you being here. Thanks for your strong leadership.

LORD ROBERTSON: I'm delighted to be again in the Oval Office, Mr. President.

And the President has shown, not just by meetings with me, but in every other way possible his and his administration's commitment to NATO and to the strength of this trans-Atlantic alliance that has bound together these democratic and freedom-loving states over all of the years.

We're now a month to the day away from the Prague Summit, probably the most important summit meeting in NATO's history, a transformation summit where NATO has to transform itself to deal with the threats and the challenges of the 21st century. And I believe we will have a good package on new members, a robust enlargement, new capabilities to deal with terrorism and to deal with the other challenges and nightmares that we may face ahead in the future, and new relationships with Russia, with Ukraine, with our partner countries, building the world's largest permanent alliance and one on which the world can rely on.

THE PRESIDENT: Three questions. Fournier.

Q Sir, is North Korea an imminent threat to the United States and what consequences, if any, will it face for hiding its nuclear program from you?

THE PRESIDENT: One, we had a bit of troubling news when we discovered the fact that, contrary to what we had been led to believe, that they were enriching uranium with the idea of developing a nuclear weapon. I say troubling news, obviously, because we felt like they had given their word they weren't going to do this.

I view this as an opportunity to work with our friends in the region and work with other countries in the region to ally against proliferation of serious weapons and to convince Kim Chong-il that he must disarm. To this end, I'm going to be talking to Jiang Zemin at Crawford. I look forward to a good discussion with the President of China about how we can work together to take our relationship to a new level in dealing with the true threats of the 21st century.

I will see the leaders of Japan and South Korea and Russia the next day, in Mexico. I intend to make this an important topic of our discussions. This is a chance for people who love freedom and peace to work together to deal with a -- to deal with an emerging threat. I believe we can deal with this threat peacefully, particularly if we work together. So this is an opportunity to work together.

Q They're not an imminent threat, though?

THE PRESIDENT: You know, that's an operative word. We view this very seriously. It is a troubling discovery, and it's a discovery that we intend to work with our friends to deal with. I believe we can do it peacefully. I look forward to working with people to encourage them that we must convince Kim Chong-il to disarm for the sake of peace. And the people who have got the most at stake, of course, in this posture are the people who are his neighbors.

Arshad.

Q Mr. President, can you explain so the boys in Lubbock can understand --

THE PRESIDENT: Crawford or Lubbock?

Q Lubbock or Crawford, both --

THE PRESIDENT: Lubbock is a little more sophisticated than Crawford, Arshad. (Laughter.)

Q Crawford, then.

THE PRESIDENT: Or Scotland, for that matter.

Q Why --

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Arshad.

Q Why you threaten military action against Iraq, but you believe that Korea's nuclear weapons program only merits diplomatic efforts?

THE PRESIDENT: Saddam Hussein is unique, in this sense: he has thumbed his nose at the world for 11 years. The United Nations has passed 16 resolutions to deal with this man, and the resolutions are all aimed at

disarmament, amongst other things. And for 11 years, he said, no, I refuse to disarm.

Now, what makes him even more unique is the fact he's actually gassed his own people. He has used weapons of mass destruction on neighboring countries and he's used weapons of mass destruction on his own citizenry. He wants to have a nuclear weapon. He has made it very clear he hates the United States and, as importantly, he hates friends of ours.

We've tried diplomacy. We're trying it one more time. I believe the free world, if we make up our mind to, can disarm this man peacefully.

But, if not -- if not, there's -- we have the will and the desire, as do other nations, to disarm Saddam. It's up to him to make that decision and it's up to the United Nations. And we'll determine here soon whether the United Nations has got the will, and then it's up to Saddam to make the decision.

Stretch.

Q Mr. President, again, for the good people of Crawford --

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. It's been a big day for Crawford.

Q If you can explain this in a way that they and the rest of us will understand. There is some hints over the weekend, the possibility that taking weapons of mass destruction out of Iraq is our goal, raising the possibility or the implication that he could somehow remain in power.

Can you say authoritatively and declaratively whether you can achieve -- if you can achieve your aims there in a way that leaves him still in office?

THE PRESIDENT: The stated policy of the United States is regime change because, for 11 years, Saddam Hussein has ignored the United Nations and the free world. For 11 years, he has -- he said, look, you passed all these resolutions; I could care less what you passed. And that's why the stated policy of our government, the previous administration and this administration, is regime change -- because we don't believe he is going to change.

However, if he were to meet all the conditions of the United Nations, the conditions that I've described very clearly in terms that everybody can understand, that in itself will signal the regime has changed.

END 3:42 P.M. EDT

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For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
February 26, 2003

President Discusses the Future of Iraq
Washington Hilton Hotel
Washington, D.C.

7:22 P.M. EST

THE PRESIDENT: Thanks for the warm welcome. I'm proud to be with the scholars, and the friends, and the supporters of the American Enterprise Institute. I want to thank you for overlooking my dress code violation. (Laughter.) They were about to stop me at the door, but Irving Kristol said, "I know this guy, let him in." (Laughter.)



Chris, thank you for your very kind introduction, and thank you for your leadership. I see many distinguished guests here tonight -- members of my Cabinet, members of Congress, Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas, and so many respected writers and policy experts. I'm always happy to see your Senior Fellow, Dr. Lynne Cheney. (Applause.) Lynne is a wise and thoughtful commentator on history and culture, and a dear friend to Laura and me. I'm also familiar with the good work of her husband -- (laughter.) You may remember him, the former director of my vice presidential search committee. (Laughter.) Thank God Dick Cheney said yes. (Applause.)

Thanks for fitting me into the program tonight. I know I'm not the featured speaker. I'm just a warm-up act for Allan Meltzer. But I want to congratulate Dr. Meltzer for a lifetime of achievement, and for tonight's well-deserved honor. Congratulations. (Applause.)

At the American Enterprise Institute, some of the finest minds in our nation are at work on some of the greatest challenges to our nation. You do such good work that my administration has borrowed 20 such minds. I want to thank them for their service, but I also want to remind people that for 60 years, AEI scholars have made vital contributions to our country and to our government, and we are grateful for those contributions.

We meet here during a crucial period in the history of our nation, and of the civilized world. Part of that history was written by others; the rest will be written by us. (Applause.) On a September morning, threats that had gathered for years, in secret and far away, led to murder in our country on a massive scale. As a result, we must look at security in a new way, because our country is a battlefield in the first war of the 21st century.

We learned a lesson: The dangers of our time must be confronted actively and forcefully, before we see them again in our skies and in our cities. And we set a goal: we will not allow the triumph of hatred and violence in the affairs of men. (Applause.)

Our coalition of more than 90 countries is pursuing the networks of terror with every tool of law enforcement and with military power. We have arrested, or otherwise dealt with, many key commanders of al Qaeda. (Applause.) Across the world, we are hunting down the killers one by one. We are winning. And we're showing them the definition of American justice. (Applause.) And we are opposing the greatest danger in the war on terror: outlaw regimes arming with weapons of mass destruction.

In Iraq, a dictator is building and hiding weapons that could enable him to dominate the Middle East and intimidate the civilized world -- and we will not allow it. (Applause.) This same tyrant has close ties to terrorist organizations, and could supply them with the terrible means to strike this country -- and America will not permit it. The danger posed by Saddam Hussein and his weapons cannot be ignored or wished away. The danger must be confronted. We hope that the Iraqi regime will meet the demands of the United Nations and disarm, fully and peacefully. If it does not, we are prepared to disarm Iraq by force. Either way, this danger will be removed. (Applause.)

The safety of the American people depends on ending this direct and growing threat. Acting against the danger will also contribute greatly to the long-term safety and stability of our world. The current Iraqi regime has shown the power of tyranny to spread discord and violence in the Middle East. A liberated Iraq can show the power of freedom to transform that vital region, by bringing hope and progress into the lives of millions. America's interests in security, and America's belief in liberty, both lead in the same direction: to a free and peaceful Iraq. (Applause.)

The first to benefit from a free Iraq would be the Iraqi people, themselves. Today they live in scarcity and fear, under a dictator who has brought them nothing but war, and misery, and torture. Their lives and their freedom matter little to Saddam Hussein -- but Iraqi lives and freedom matter greatly to us. (Applause.)

Bringing stability and unity to a free Iraq will not be easy. Yet that is no excuse to leave the Iraqi regime's torture chambers and poison labs in operation. Any future the Iraqi people choose for themselves will be better than the nightmare world that Saddam Hussein has chosen for them. (Applause.)

If we must use force, the United States and our coalition stand ready to help the citizens of a liberated Iraq. We will deliver medicine to the sick, and we are now moving into place nearly 3 million emergency rations to feed the hungry.

We'll make sure that Iraq's 55,000 food distribution sites, operating under the Oil For Food program, are stocked and open as soon as possible. The United States and Great Britain are providing tens of millions of dollars to the U.N.

High Commission on Refugees, and to such groups as the World Food Program and UNICEF, to provide emergency aid to the Iraqi people.

We will also lead in carrying out the urgent and dangerous work of destroying chemical and biological weapons. We will provide security against those who try to spread chaos, or settle scores, or threaten the territorial integrity of Iraq. We will seek to protect Iraq's natural resources from sabotage by a dying regime, and ensure those resources are used for the benefit of the owners -- the Iraqi people. (Applause.)

The United States has no intention of determining the precise form of Iraq's new government. That choice belongs to the Iraqi people. Yet, we will ensure that one brutal dictator is not replaced by another. All Iraqis must have a voice in the new government, and all citizens must have their rights protected. (Applause.)

Rebuilding Iraq will require a sustained commitment from many nations, including our own: we will remain in Iraq as long as necessary, and not a day more. America has made and kept this kind of commitment before -- in the peace that followed a world war. After defeating enemies, we did not leave behind occupying armies, we left constitutions and parliaments. We established an atmosphere of safety, in which responsible, reform-minded local leaders could build lasting institutions of freedom. In societies that once bred fascism and militarism, liberty found a permanent home.

There was a time when many said that the cultures of Japan and Germany were incapable of sustaining democratic values. Well, they were wrong. Some say the same of Iraq today. They are mistaken. (Applause.) The nation of Iraq -- with its proud heritage, abundant resources and skilled and educated people -- is fully capable of moving toward democracy and living in freedom. (Applause.)

The world has a clear interest in the spread of democratic values, because stable and free nations do not breed the ideologies of murder. They encourage the peaceful pursuit of a better life. And there are hopeful signs of a desire for freedom in the Middle East. Arab intellectuals have called on Arab governments to address the "freedom gap" so their peoples can fully share in the progress of our times. Leaders in the region speak of a new Arab charter that champions internal reform, greater politics participation, economic openness, and free trade. And from Morocco to Bahrain and beyond, nations are taking genuine steps toward politics reform. A new regime in Iraq would serve as a dramatic and inspiring example of freedom for other nations in the region. (Applause.)

It is presumptuous and insulting to suggest that a whole region of the world -- or the one-fifth of humanity that is Muslim -- is somehow untouched by the most basic aspirations of life. Human cultures can be vastly different. Yet the human heart desires the same good things, everywhere on Earth. In our desire to be safe from brutal and bullying oppression, human beings are the same. In our desire to care for our children and give them a better life, we are

the same. For these fundamental reasons, freedom and democracy will always and everywhere have greater appeal than the slogans of hatred and the tactics of terror. (Applause.)

Success in Iraq could also begin a new stage for Middle Eastern peace, and set in motion progress towards a truly democratic Palestinian state. (Applause.) The passing of Saddam Hussein's regime will deprive terrorist networks of a wealthy patron that pays for terrorist training, and offers rewards to families of suicide bombers. And other regimes will be given a clear warning that support for terror will not be tolerated. (Applause.)

Without this outside support for terrorism, Palestinians who are working for reform and long for democracy will be in a better position to choose new leaders. (Applause.) True leaders who strive for peace; true leaders who faithfully serve the people. A Palestinian state must be a reformed and peaceful state that abandons forever the use of terror. (Applause.)

For its part, the new government of Israel -- as the terror threat is removed and security improves -- will be expected to support the creation of a viable Palestinian state -- (applause) -- and to work as quickly as possible toward a final status agreement. As progress is made toward peace, settlement activity in the occupied territories must end. (Applause.) And the Arab states will be expected to meet their responsibilities to oppose terrorism, to support the emergence of a peaceful and democratic Palestine, and state clearly they will live in peace with Israel. (Applause.)

The United States and other nations are working on a road map for peace. We are setting out the necessary conditions for progress toward the goal of two states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side in peace and security. It is the commitment of our government -- and my personal commitment -- to implement the road map and to reach that goal. Old patterns of conflict in the Middle East can be broken, if all concerned will let go of bitterness, hatred, and violence, and get on with the serious work of economic development, and political reform, and reconciliation. America will seize every opportunity in pursuit of peace. And the end of the present regime in Iraq would create such an opportunity. (Applause.)

In confronting Iraq, the United States is also showing our commitment to effective international institutions. We are a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. We helped to create the Security Council. We believe in the Security Council -- so much that we want its words to have meaning. (Applause.)

The global threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction cannot be confronted by one nation alone. The world needs today and will need tomorrow international bodies with the authority and the will to stop the spread of terror and chemical and biological and nuclear weapons. A threat to all must be answered by all. High-minded pronouncements against proliferation mean little unless the strongest nations are willing to stand behind them -- and use force if necessary. After all, the United Nations was created, as Winston

Churchill said, to "make sure that the force of right will, in the ultimate issue, be protected by the right of force."

Another resolution is now before the Security Council. If the council responds to Iraq's defiance with more excuses and delays, if all its authority proves to be empty, the United Nations will be severely weakened as a source of stability and order. If the members rise to this moment, then the Council will fulfill its founding purpose.

I've listened carefully, as people and leaders around the world have made known their desire for peace. All of us want peace. The threat to peace does not come from those who seek to enforce the just demands of the civilized world; the threat to peace comes from those who flout those demands. If we have to act, we will act to restrain the violent, and defend the cause of peace. And by acting, we will signal to outlaw regimes that in this new century, the boundaries of civilized behavior will be respected. (Applause.)

Protecting those boundaries carries a cost. If war is forced upon us by Iraq's refusal to disarm, we will meet an enemy who hides his military forces behind civilians, who has terrible weapons, who is capable of any crime. The dangers are real, as our soldiers, and sailors, airmen, and Marines fully understand. Yet, no military has ever been better prepared to meet these challenges.

Members of our Armed Forces also understand why they may be called to fight. They know that retreat before a dictator guarantees even greater sacrifices in the future. They know that America's cause is right and just: liberty for an oppressed people, and security for the American people. And I know something about these men and women who wear our uniform: they will complete every mission they are given with skill, and honor, and courage. (Applause.)

Much is asked of America in this year 2003. The work ahead is demanding. It will be difficult to help freedom take hold in a country that has known three decades of dictatorship, secret police, internal divisions, and war. It will be difficult to cultivate liberty and peace in the Middle East, after so many generations of strife. Yet, the security of our nation and the hope of millions depend on us, and Americans do not turn away from duties because they are hard. We have met great tests in other times, and we will meet the tests of our time. (Applause.)

We go forward with confidence, because we trust in the power of human freedom to change lives and nations. By the resolve and purpose of America, and of our friends and allies, we will make this an age of progress and liberty. Free people will set the course of history, and free people will keep the peace of the world.

Thank you all, very much. (Applause.)

END 7:50 P.M. EST

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For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
April 28, 2003

President Discusses the Future of Iraq

Remarks by the President on Operation Iraqi Freedom
Ford Community and Performing Arts Center
Dearborn, Michigan

en Español



1:46 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you for that warm welcome; I'm glad to be here. I regret that I wasn't here a few weeks ago when the statue came down. (Applause.) I understand you had quite a party. I don't blame you. A lot of the people in the Detroit area had waited years for that great day.

Many Iraqi Americans know the horrors of Saddam Hussein's regime firsthand. You also know the joys of freedom you have found here in America. (Applause.) You are living proof the Iraqi people love freedom and living proof the Iraqi people can flourish in democracy. (Applause.) People who live in Iraq deserve the same freedom that you and I enjoy here in America. (Applause.) And after years of tyranny and torture, that freedom has finally arrived. (Applause.)

I have confidence in the future of a free Iraq. The Iraqi people are fully capable of self-government. Every day Iraqis are moving toward democracy and embracing the responsibilities of active citizenship. Every day life in Iraq improves as coalition troops work to secure unsafe areas and bring food and medical care to those in need.

America pledged to rid Iraq of an oppressive regime, and we kept our word. (Applause.) America now pledges to help Iraqis build a prosperous and peaceful nation, and we will keep our word again. (Applause.)

Mr. Mayor, thanks, I appreciate you greeting me once again here in Dearborn. I appreciate your leadership. If you've got any problems with the garbage or the potholes, call the mayor. (Laughter.)

I want to thank members of the congressional delegation who have joined us today. Thank you all for coming. Michigan is well represented in the halls of the United States Congress. (Applause.) I want to thank the folks from the state government who have joined us today and local governments. I

appreciate so very much the CEOs of the major automobile manufacturing companies who are based here in Detroit who are here: Rick Wagoner, Bill Ford and Deter Zetsche. Thank you all for coming. I look forward to discussing things with you later. (Applause.)

Right before I came in here I had the opportunity to meet with some extraordinary men and women, our fellow Americans who knew the cruelties of the old Iraq. And like me, they believed deeply in the promise of a new Iraq.

I spoke with Najda Egaily, a Sunni Muslim from Basra who moved to the United States five years ago. Najda learned the price of descent in Iraq in 1988, when her brother-in-law was killed after laughing at a joke about Saddam Hussein in a house that was bugged.

In Iraq, Najda says, we could never speak to anyone about Saddam Hussein -- we had to make sure the windows were closed. (Applause.) The windows are now open in Iraq. (Applause.) Najda and her friends will never forget seeing the images of liberation in Baghdad. Here's what she said: we called each other and we were shouting; we never believed that Saddam Hussein would be gone.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: He's gone. (Applause.)

THE PRESIDENT: Like Najda, a lot of Iraqis -- a lot of Iraqis -- feared the dictator, the tyrant would never go away. You're right -- he's gone. (Applause.)

AUDIENCE MEMBERS: USA! USA!

AUDIENCE MEMBER: (Inaudible) back in the (inaudible). (Applause.)

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Because of you, Mr. President, so can you.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: (Inaudible).

THE PRESIDENT: We love free speech in America. (Laughter and applause.)

I talked to Tarik Daoud, a Catholic from Basra who now lives in Bloomfield Hills. (Applause.) When the dictator regime fell, here's what Tariq said, he said: I am more hopeful today than I've been since 1958. We need to take the little children in Iraq and hold their hands and really teach them what freedom is all about. He says: the new generation could really make democracy work.

He's right to be optimistic. From the beginning of this conflict we have seen brave Iraqi citizens taking part in their own liberation. Iraqis have warned our troops about land mines and enemy hideouts and military arsenals.

Earlier this month, Iraqis helped Marines locate the seven American prisoners of war, who were then rescued in Northern Iraq. (Applause.) One courageous Iraqi man gave Marines detailed layouts of a hospital in An Nasiriyah, which led to the rescue of American soldier Jessica Lynch. (Applause.)

Iraqi citizens are now working closely with our troops to restore order to their cities, and improve the life of their nation. In Basra, hundreds of police volunteers have joined with coalition forces to patrol the streets. In Baghdad, more than a thousand citizens are doing joint patrols with coalition troops. And residents are also working with coalition troops to collect unexploded munitions from neighborhoods, and repair the telephone system. People are working to improve the lives of the average citizens in Iraq. (Applause.)

I want you to listen to what an Iraqi engineer said who was working with U.S. Army engineers to restore power to Baghdad. He said: We are very glad to work with the Americans to have power for the facilities. The Americans are working to help us. (Applause.) Iraqi Americans, including some from Michigan, are building bridges between our troops and Iraqi civilians. Members of the free Iraqi forces are serving as translators for our troops, and are delivering humanitarian aid to the citizens.

One of these volunteers, an Iraqi American who fled Saddam Hussein's regime in 1991, recently returned to his homeland with the 101st Airborne Division. A few weeks ago, when he first saw the cheering crowds of Iraqis welcome coalition troops in Hillah he wept. He said people could hardly believe what was happening, and he told them: believe it -- liberation is coming. (Applause.)

Yes, there were some in our country who doubted the Iraqi people wanted freedom, or they just couldn't imagine they would be welcome -- welcoming to a liberating force. They were mistaken, and we know why. The desire for freedom is not the property of one culture, it is the universal hope of human beings in every culture. (Applause.)

Whether you're Sunni or Shia or Kurd or Chaldean or Assyrian or Turkoman or Christian or Jew or Muslim -- (applause) -- no matter what your faith, freedom is God's gift to every person in every nation. (Applause.) As freedom takes hold in Iraq, the Iraqi people will choose their own leaders and their own government. America has no intention of imposing our form of government or our culture. Yet, we will ensure that all Iraqis have a voice in the new government and all citizens have their rights protected. (Applause.)

In the city of An Nasiriyah, where free Iraqis met recently to discuss the political future of their country, they issued a statement beginning with these words: Iraq must be democratic. (Applause.)

AUDIENCE MEMBER: USA! USA! USA! (Applause.)

THE PRESIDENT: That historic declaration expresses the commitment of the Iraqi people and their friends, the American people. The days of repression from any source are over. Iraq will be democratic. (Applause.)

The work of building a new Iraq will take time. That nation is recovering not just from weeks of conflict, but from decades of totalitarian rule.

In a nation where the dictator treated himself to palaces with gold faucets and grand fountains, four out of ten citizens did not even have clean water to drink. While a former regime exported milk, and dates, and corn, and grain for its own profit, more than half a million Iraqi children were malnourished. As Saddam Hussein let more than $200 million worth of medicine and medical supplies sit in warehouses, one in eight Iraqi children were dying before the age of five. And while the dictator spent billions on weapons, including gold-covered AK-47s, nearly a quarter of Iraqi children were born underweight. Saddam Hussein's regime impoverished the Iraqi people in every way.

Today, Iraq has only about half as many hospitals as it had in 1990. Seventy percent of its schools are run-down and over-crowded. A quarter of the Iraqi children are not in a school at all. Under Saddam's regime, the Iraqi people did not have a power system they could depend on. These problems plagued Iraq long before the recent conflict. We're helping the Iraqi people to address these challenges, and we will stand with them as they defeat the dictator's legacy. (Applause.)

Right now, engineers are on the ground working with Iraqi experts to restore power, and fix broken water pipes in Baghdad and other cities. We're working with the International Red Cross, the Red Crescent Societies, the International Medical Corps and other aid agencies to help Iraqi hospitals get safe water and medical supplies and reliable electricity. Our coalition is cooperating with the United Nations to help restart the ration distribution system that provides food at thousands of sites in Iraq. And coalition medical facilities have treated Iraqis from everything from fractures and burns to symptoms of stroke.

One Iraqi man who was given medical help with his wife and sister aboard the U.S. Navy ship Comfort, said: They treat us like family. There are babies in Iraq who are not cared for by their mothers as well as the nurses have cared for us.

Already, we are seeing important progress in Iraq. It wasn't all that long ago that the statue fell, and now we're seeing progress. (Applause.)

Rail lines are reopening, and fire stations are responding to calls. Oil -- Iraqi oil, owned by the Iraqi people -- is flowing again to fuel Iraq's power plants. In Hillah, more than 80 percent of the city has now running water. City residents can buy meats and grains and fruits and vegetables at local shops. The mayor's office, the city council have been reestablished.

In Basra, where more than half of the water treatment facilities were not working before the conflict -- more than half weren't functioning -- water supplies are now reaching 90 percent of the city. The opulent presidential palace in Basra will now serve a new and noble purpose. We've established a water purification unit there, to make hundreds of thousands of liters of clean water available to the residents of the city of Basra. (Applause.)

Day by day, hour by hour, life in Iraq is getting better for the citizens. (Applause.) Yet, much work remains to be done. I have directed Jay Garner and his team to help Iraq achieve specific long-term goals. And they're doing a superb job. Congress recently allocated $2.5 -- nearly $2.5 billion for Iraq's relief and reconstruction. With that money, we are renewing Iraq with the help of experts from inside our government, from private industry, from the international community and, most importantly, from within Iraq. (Applause.)

We are dispatching teams across Iraq to assess the critical needs of the Iraqi people. We're clearing land mines. We're working with Iraqis to recover artifacts, to find the hoodlums who ravished the National Museum of Antiquities in Baghdad. (Applause.) Like many of you here, we deplore the actions of the citizens who ravished that museum. And we will work with the Iraqi citizens to find out who they were and to bring them to justice. (Applause.)

We're working toward an Iraq where, for the first time ever, electrical power is reliable and widely available. One of our goals is to make sure everybody in Iraq has electricity. Already, 17 major power plants in Iraq are functioning. Our engineers are meeting with Iraqi engineers. We're visiting power plants throughout the country, and determining which ones need repair, which ones need to be modernized, and which ones are obsolete, power plant by power plant. More Iraqis are getting the electricity they need.

We're working to make Iraq's drinking water clean and dependable. American and Iraqi water sanitation engineers are inspecting treatment plants across the country to make sure they have enough purification chemicals and power to produce safe water.

We're working to give every Iraqi access to immunizations and emergency treatment, and to give sick children and pregnant women the health care they need. Iraqi doctors and nurses and other medical personnel are now going back to work. Throughout the country, medical specialists from many countries are identifying the needs of Iraqis hospitals, for everything from equipment and repairs to water, to medicines.

We're working to improve Iraqi schools by funding a back to school campaign that will help train and recruit Iraqi teachers, provide supplies and equipment, and bring children across Iraq back into clean and safe schools. (Applause.)

And as we do that, we will make sure that the schools are no longer used as military arsenals and bunkers, and that teachers promote reading, rather than regime propaganda. (Applause.) And because Iraq is now free, economic sanctions are pointless. (Applause.) It is time for the United Nations to lift the sanctions so the Iraqis could use some resources to build their own prosperity. (Applause.)

Like so many generations of immigrants, Iraqi Americans have embraced and enriched this great country, without ever forgetting the land of your birth. Liberation for Iraq has been a long time coming, but you never lost faith. You knew the great sorrow of Iraq. You also knew the great promise of Iraq, and you shared the hope of the Iraqi people.

You and I both know that Iraq can realize those hopes. Iraq can be an example of peace and prosperity and freedom to the entire Middle East. (Applause.) It'll be a hard journey, but at every step of the way, Iraq will have a steady friend in the American people. (Applause.)

May God continue to bless the United States of America, and long live a free Iraq. (Applause.)

END 2:10 P.M. EDT

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Presenter: Ambassador Paul Bremer **June 12, 2003 10:45 AM EDT**

Briefing on Coalition Post-war Reconstruction and Stabilization Efforts

(Video-teleconference briefing from Baghdad, Iraq, on the coalition's post-war reconstruction and stabilization efforts. Participating was Ambassador Paul Bremer, director of the Coalition Provisional Authority.)

Staff: Thank you for joining us today, and a special thanks to Ambassador Paul Bremer, who joins us today from Baghdad. He just finished up a session with the House Armed Services Committee. And he's here today to talk to you about his efforts over the past month since he's arrived in Baghdad and his ongoing efforts into the future.

The ambassador does have a few opening remarks, and then we have 30 minutes for some questions with

him.

So, Mr. Ambassador, if you can hear me, go ahead and get started.

Bremer: Thank you very much. I hear you fine. Do you hear me?

Staff: Yes, we can hear you very well in the briefing room right now.

Bremer: Okay, good. Good morning. Let me say a few words before we get started.

I arrived here almost exactly a month ago. And in those last 30 days, I think we have achieved quite a lot, working with the Iraqi people. We've just begun the process of putting a country together that has been ravaged for 30 years by political tyranny and economic under-investment. It's been an enormous privilege, I must say, to have been able to play a part in this great undertaking, and I am determined that we're going to continue the same pace in progress in the months ahead.

The scars in this country run very deep. The thugs and the torture chambers may be gone, but every day we find new evidence of how bad the regime was that we threw out. And repairing the damage of the last regime, material, human and psychological, is a huge task, and it's a task that is only going to succeed if we have a real partnership with the Iraqi people. I am deeply committed to that kind of a partnership.

We've completed, I think it's fair to say, the first phase of the coalition's efforts towards the reconstitution of Iraq. The focus on that phase was getting basic services delivered, utilities turned on, and providing better law and order for everybody. We've got the water and the power on. In many parts of the country it's actually now above levels of what it was before the war. Here in Baghdad, we are producing 20 hours of electricity a day. The gasoline lines that you've read about have almost disappeared, as have the lines for liquid petroleum gas, which is what's used for cooking.

The second phase of reconstitution, which really begins now, has as its main emphasis restoring economic activity. I want to take a moment and talk about the economy because I think this is where our greatest challenge lies, and we must now create jobs for Iraqis. Unemployment today is a tremendous problem. Our best estimate is that before the war, the unemployment was at about 50 percent -- five-zero percent -- and we think it's substantially higher than that now. So there can be no higher priority now than trying to find a way to create jobs. The chronic underinvestment in infrastructure is going to have to be dealt with, and we're going to have to find ways to get productive activity going, particularly economic activity that creates jobs.

I come back to the question of a partnership with the Iraqi people. We have already begun to work with Iraqi businessmen and women and with officials to find ways to carry out the best economic policy. I had a meeting with a very large group of people in those categories here on Monday night, and I will continue to have consultations with them. I was pleased that the IMF, the World Bank and the UNDP also took part in that meeting on Monday night.

Among the initiatives I've announced was last week I announced a $70 million community action program to help local communities identify areas where they can very quickly get some activity going. On Tuesday, I announced a $100 million emergency construction program, the purpose of which is to try to get the construction industry turning over here. We focused on that industry because we get the most leverage, we get the most jobs per dollar in construction.

The $100 million fund, I might add, is entirely funded from the Iraqi funds that we already have.

We are also trying to encourage trade. Now that the sanctions have been lifted, it's important for Iraq to reenter the world economy. The most obvious example of that is the sale of Iraqi oil, the first sale of Iraqi oil directly into the world market by the Iraqis. The bids went out about five days ago. They have been received yesterday. And I expect they will be opened and announced here in the next 48 hours or so. And that is good news; it means Iraq will have reentered the world petroleum market.

This is all just a beginning. It's quite obvious that we face a major challenge in the economy. It's going to take time and patience, and we are going to be pushing forward as quickly as we can with the restructuring of what is a very sick economy.

I'd be happy to take your questions.

Staff: As you ask your question, if you could identify yourself and your news organization for the ambassador, that would help him.

Go ahead, Bob.

Q: Mr. Ambassador, it's Bob Burns from the Associated Press. I wanted to ask you about the effort to capture or otherwise account for the Iraqis who are on the various most wanted lists, and your assessment of whether most of these people are still in hiding in Iraq or whether they've found have elsewhere.

Staff (In Baghdad.): Guys, if you can hear us, we've lost your audio.

Staff: They've lost our audio.

Ambassador, can you hear me?

Bremer: Yes, I hear you now. And I heard Mr. Burns announce his name, and -- (Audio break.) -- dead.

Staff: All right. Sounds like our mikes might be -- try that mike again, Bob.

Q: Can you hear me now?

Staff: They're not getting your audio.

Bremer: That mike is not working.

Staff: What you're saying, they're not picking up.

Staff: (Off mike.) -- paraphrase the question, and Bob, you tell me if I got it wrong. Bob was asking about the most wanted, and what the progress was on the most wanted and whether or not they had -- your assessment was that -- if they had melted away or left the country. That was the first part of it.

Bremer: We now have more than half of the deck of cards, 55, in custody or have confirmed them as dead. So we're making steady progress. We are picking them up every week, and we will continue to do that. We certainly can't exclude that some of them have gotten out of the country. But I've been encouraged by the number which we've been able to find in the country. And we're certainly going to prosecute that with great vigor.

Staff: Why don't you go ahead and state your question, and state it loudly. We can maybe get it from the overhead mikes while we're waiting for a new mike.

Q: It's Martha Raddatz from ABC News. Ambassador Bremer, can you talk about what sort of organized -- let's try with this mike.

Ambassador Bremer, Martha Raddatz from ABC News. Can you talk about what sort of organized resistance you're seeing in Iraq, how large that resistance is, and who you believe is behind it.

Bremer: Yes. We are certainly seeing some organized resistance, particularly in the area west of Baghdad and the area north of Baghdad. Now, I want to qualify that by saying we do not see signs of central command and control direction in that resistance at this point. That is to say, these are groups that are organized, but they're small; they may be five or six men conducting isolated attacks against our soldiers.

We are clearly on the lookout to see if this evolves into a more organized, more broadly and centrally directed resistance. But for the time being, it appears that these are small groups, usually Ba'athists or Fedayeen Saddam; in some cases they may be officers of the Republican Guard. And we are going to have to continue to deal with them in a military fashion, as we are now doing.

Q: They are small groups of five or six men. Are these small groups of five or six men connected in a larger

way?

Bremer: Well, that's what I meant by saying we don't yet have evidence of central command and control. They look to be groups who have spontaneously come together and are attacking us. They may be colleagues from the Ba'ath movement, they could be several people from the Fedayeen Saddam or from the Republican Guards. But we do not at the moment see evidence of central command control of these groups. I certainly wouldn't exclude it, but we don't have the evidence yet.

Q: There's no evidence that Saddam Hussein is directing any of it?

Bremer: No.

Q: Ambassador, this is Pam Hess with United Press International. Two quick questions. Is Iraq going to be selling its oil under OPEC? And are you -- in your efforts for de-Ba'athification, could you fill us in on how that's going, how far down into the Ba'ath Party you expect to get, what sort of that threshold is when someone becomes acceptable; because as you know, 15 million Ba'athists in the country? And are you planning anything like a truth and reconciliation commission for the Iraqi people?

Bremer: Iraq is selling oil now. The question of whether Iraq will remain a member of OPEC is a decision that we will leave to the Iraqi government. And it will be, certainly, a matter that I will discuss with the interim administration when we establish it next month. But this is a matter, I think, that is best left to the Iraqi people.

We -- I can't remember, what was your second question? I'm sorry.

Q: The Ba'athists.

Bremer: We are going to continue the program of de- Ba'athification. I think our estimate of the number of Ba'ath Party members is somewhat more modest than yours, but it's still a substantial number, probably a couple of million. The Ba'athists who were immediately affected by my de-Ba'athification decree, however, represent a much smaller number, somewhere between 50 and 30,000. Don't -- the fact that the gap is that wide shows how poor our information really is. We're hoping that as we are able to examine documents captured, we'll have a better sense of what the actual numbers are.

We are continuing that process, and I have announced the establishment of an Iraqi de-Ba'athification council, which will be made up of Iraqis, so that they can carry forward in whatever fashion they wish the de-Ba'athification, classifying Ba'athists into various classes, for example, to decide which of them might have to stand criminal trial, which ones might be subject to some civil sanctions, and which ones might be in some fashion reprieved.

I have had preliminary discussions with Iraqi politicians about the question of truth and reconciliation. I think myself this is an area that could productively be explored by the Iraqis. My impression in the conversations I've had so far is that the Iraqis are simply still too -- understandably -- emotionally delighted to be rid of Saddam and the Ba'athists that they may not yet be ready to undertake that step.

Q: Ambassador, this is John Hendron with the Los Angeles Times. I've got two questions. There's a larger number of people in the military, something like 500,000 people, Iraqis, who are out of work now. What happens to them? How many will return to work as soldiers there?

And secondly, if I could ask, have you seen results from nearly tripling the number of troops in Fallujah by adding the 2nd Brigade of the 3rd Infantry Division there?

Bremer: On the demobilized military, the numbers are a little bit hard to be precise about. The order of battle of the conscript part of the army before the war started was 375,000. Frankly, I think most order of battle numbers are probably not very accurate, so we don't really know what the order of battle was. And that, of course, was the order of battle before the war started. We don't know how many of those people were either killed, injured, or deserted or simply faded away during the war. So, it's a little hard to know.

But, it is the case that a substantial number of military people have been put out of work by demobilizing the army. We are approaching that in two ways.

Number one, we are getting ready to start the process of building a new Iraqi army. I expect that we will be --

we have identified training and recruiting sites only this week. We will be starting to clear those sites and clean them up and do the necessary construction. They are using, by the way, former enlisted army men. And so, we'll start building a new Iraqi army here, really, in the next month or so.

Secondly, we believe that these demobilized enlisted men can be very productively used in their private and ministerial security forces to help secure, for example, vital oil installations, electrical power plants, which are today being guarded by American soldiers. If we can hire back and train enlisted men who have some weapon skills already and get them to a high standard, then they can start to take over some of the site security from our soldiers, which then allows our soldiers to more aggressively try to reestablish law and order in Baghdad, for example.

On the question of the deployment of the 2nd Brigade to Fallujah, I think that that project is really only just getting underway. And I think we will see the results in the coming weeks. It's too early to say at this point what the effect will be.

Q: Ambassador, Bret Baier with Fox News Channel. I have two questions, and I'll ask them separately, if I may.

First, you've said that you believe the attacks on U.S. troops are from Ba'ath Party loyalists, Fedayeen Saddam and Iraqi Republican Guards that may have been sticking around. Within the last 24 hours there's been this strike on what CENTCOM calls a terrorist training camp in the West. Any new information about that and possibly that foreign fighters have been involved in attacks on U.S. forces? That's my first question.

Bremer: Well, it's really not appropriate for me to comment on ongoing military operations. We have had in the past some evidence of extremist operations, some of which might be classified as terrorist, in Iraq. We do have clear evidence of some Sunni extremism in the area to the west of Baghdad. Whether that turns out to have been involved in the operation you're talking about is a matter still, I think, to be determined.

And we do have clear evidence of Iranian interference in the affairs of Iraq. Of course, Iran is still -- correctly, in my view -- identified as the world's leading sponsor of terrorism. There was an Ansar al-Islam terrorist camp, as you will remember, at the beginning of the war, in the North. We are very attentive to the possibility of those people flowing back into Iraq, and we'll obviously take the appropriate steps if we get evidence that that's happening.

Q: And the second question, sir, is, you've said many times that a top priority of yours is job creation. Today there was a demonstration in front of the gates of your headquarters, of Iraqis demanding jobs. How do you go about creating jobs? How is that going? And what do you tell these people? How do they go about getting them?

Bremer: The job creation problem can be divided into two phases. The first phase, which we are in now, is to try urgently to get jobs going for regular day laborers and workers and demobilized army personnel and just young people.

That's why our emphasis in the fund I announced on Tuesday was on -- this $100 million fund -- was on construction, because in construction we will create more jobs per dollar spent than in any other area. And we do have a number of construction projects that were stopped before the war which we can start up relatively quickly and therefore begin to soak up some of this unemployment.

But realistically, job creation is going to require a much deeper economic reform. It's going to require us to create a private sector, which can in turn create jobs. And that is going to be a more difficult and longer-term problem.

So I think it's useful to think of these immediate steps we're taking as bridging steps, bridging us towards a more fundamental economic reform that's going to take longer.

Q: Mr. Ambassador, Rick Whittle with the Dallas Morning News. I was wondering if you could tell us what the thresholds for the United States will be of the sort of government that Iraq will be allowed to have, and the sort of economic system they'll be allowed to have. Once the Iraqi people actually form their own government, what role might Islam play in governing the country, and what role might socialism play, given the country's socialist past?

Bremer: Well, questions like the role of Islam are so fundamental to the kind of society that the Iraqis will rebuild that I believe this is a question that needs to be left to the constitutional conference, which will be

convening towards the end of July. We are going to try to make it clear -- we have made it clear that the constitution that Iraq needs to write must be written by Iraqis; it must take into account Iraqi history, its culture, its social experiences. It will not be a constitution dictated by the coalition or by Americans.

Now, the fact is that Iraq has lived under two different constitutions since 1925, both of which established Islam as the state religion, so there's nothing unusual in that. Both of which guaranteed the free -- freedom of worship. Since 1970, when Saddam promulgated his constitution, freedom of worship has been honored more in a breach. But it's possible that they will decide that they want to have a constitution which establishes Islam. We would, of course, be much more comfortable if it also established freedom of religion, and I don't think that will be a problem.

In terms of what kind of economic system they wish to establish, as you point out, the Ba'athist Party was a socialist party. I think it's very hard to imagine any strong support in this country for a return to that economic system, which has left the country really flat on its back, and which does not really provide a model for getting the kind of vibrant private sector which I think most Iraqis now realize is a sine qua non for a stable economy and stable economic growth. So if they choose socialism, that will be their business. My guess is that's not going to happen.

Staff: All right, this side of the room. So let's go ahead with you and then up here to Tony, and we'll take a couple on this side.

Q: Mr. Ambassador, George Edmonson with Cox Newspapers. You've mentioned several times the difficulty of rebuilding the Iraqi economy and the need for patience. How long do you anticipate that the United States would have to maintain a significant presence in Iraq?

Bremer: Well, I get that question a lot. It's a question, among others, my wife tends to ask me about once a week. So, it's always on my mind. My guess is that it's going to be a substantial amount of time, but whether that is measured in months or years will depend on developments. I don't think we should set any artificial deadlines. I think the president has painted it very clearly, as has the secretary, which is we will stay until the job is done and not a day longer, and we won't leave until the job is done.

So, the pacing issue, assuming we establish security throughout the country, which I think we will -- the pacing issue will be how fast the Iraqis can write a constitution, get it ratified by the Iraqi people and then call elections. And we hope to convene a constitutional conference, as I mentioned, within the next four to six weeks. And then, the process of writing the constitution will have to start. And we will see how long it takes.

As for the Iraqis, I have no deadline. If they write it fast, that's fine; I get to go home earlier. If it takes them longer, then we'll just stay here longer. I don't think we should put ourselves in any deadline boxes.

Staff: Tony?

Q: Sir, this is Tony Capaccio with Bloomberg News. Question on troop levels. In order to maintain a viable security situation throughout Iraq, roughly how many troops do you feel will need to be maintained throughout the country? There's about 145,000 U.S. troops right now. Will that roughly be the threshold?

Bremer: You know, I kind of stay away from these games of guessing the right troop strength. I take the position that the troop strength should be determined by the conditions. As conditions improve, we hope we can draw down our forces. If conditions get worse, we're going to not be able to do that.

For the time being, I think we have an adequate force level here. And what I hope is in the months ahead, we see that we are successful in imposing our will on this small group of people who are attacking us and causing us casualties. But we -- our troop levels should be condition-driven. They should not be driven by some artificial deadlines about when we want to take troops out, or some number of troops we ought to have here. I think we've got it about right now, and let's just see what the circumstances dictate.

Q: Mr. Ambassador, Bryan Bender with the Boston Globe. Can you tell us -- can you give your assessment of how much the lawlessness, how much these pockets of resistance, if you want to call them that, are affecting or could affect your job in rebuilding the country?

And as part of that question, can you talk about the big question mark of Saddam Hussein, how that -- his fate being unanswered -- how that might affect your job as well, at least in convincing the Iraqis that is a new day

and this is a new country?

Bremer: Well, on your second question first, I would obviously much prefer that we had clear evidence that Saddam is dead or that we had him alive in our custody. I think it does make a difference, because it allows the Ba'athists to go around in the bazaars and in the villages, as they are doing, saying, "Saddam is alive, and he's going to come back. And we're going to come back." And the effect of that is to make it more difficult for people who are afraid of the Ba'athists -- and that's just about everybody -- it makes it more difficult for them to come forward and cooperate with us, because they are afraid the Ba'athists may return.

We have to show through our de-Ba'athification policy, through our military operations against Ba'athists and through other measures we take that in fact the Ba'athists are finished; they're not coming back. And we have to obviously continue to leave no stone unturned in the search for Saddam.

Q: Hi. It's Patty Davis with CNN. There have been reports of significant psychological stress and pressures on U.S. troops, being that they've gone from fighting a war to trying to stabilize the country, and with these ambush attacks almost daily. Do you see that? And what can the U.S. do to help?

Bremer: Well, let me say, first of all, that I am really full of admiration for the young men and women who fought such a successful war. And I'm full of admiration for how well they have made the transition to what they really weren't trained to do, which is to set up civil administration in villages and town all across this country. It's really quite amazing to go see the guys and women in the 82nd Airborne, one of the great, renowned units in this country -- they have an area. Their area of operation is south of Baghdad. And they're working on restoring hospitals, trying to fix the sewage system, helping set up generators for the hospitals, restoring amusement parks. These are not things that they normally get trained to do, and they're just doing a magnificent job of it.

We are in a transition phase here where, as we do get stability, we will need to transition a lot of those kinds of things away from the military and to the civilian part of the Coalition Provisional Authority. And we're in the process of now trying to bring forward here to Iraq more civilians to help us -- to allow us to relieve the military of these tasks.

So I can't say that the transition from the warfighting to the peacekeeping has produced at least a lot of psychological stress in the men and women I've spoken to. They seem to be doing an excellent job of it. But it is true this is not what they were trained for. And in the long run that has to transition over to civilian leadership.

Q: Ambassador, I'm Carl Osgood. I write for Executive Intelligence Review. I'd like to ask you about something you just made reference to, which is, you know, the hospital situation, the health care situation in the country. Can you say anything about what the conditions are now in the hospitals? Are they beginning to function? What are you doing to try and improve conditions -- the health care conditions, and who do you have working on that?

Bremer: The first thing to remember is that the health care situation in this country probably for the last 20 years has been really substandard -- again, an illustration of what happens when you have a government that spends about a third of its gross domestic product on military and underinvests. And in particular, in the south, in the Shi'a parts of the country, Saddam really used health care and -- he withheld health care and social services as an element of political repression of the Shi'a. I'll give you an example. I visited the main hospital in Basra yesterday, which is a Shi'a city. And it was quite clear that very little money had been spent there over the last 20 years. They're still operating out of a building that was originally built by the British when they were the colonial power here 80 years ago. They do have 24-hour power now, something they did not have before the war. So they've got better power than they had before. But by Western standards the situation in a hospital like that is pretty depressing.

Now, we have done several things. First of all, all 12 hospitals in Baghdad are now up and running. I have had the Army Corps of Engineers go out and examine all of their generators because when we had power outages in Baghdad, it obviously was a severe problem for hospitals, who need regular power, particularly in their operating rooms. We have now examined all those generators and either repaired them where they needed repair or set in train replacing them so that the hospitals in Baghdad will be able to have constant power. We have got a nation-wide program going on, researching the hospital situation throughout the country, and the pharmaceutical situation.

You asked who's doing this. We are doing it. We are also getting NGOs to help us and U.N. agencies to help us. It's an enormous undertaking. I think the health care situation is not, however, the crisis that we thought it might be, and we now seem to have enough pharmaceuticals in the country, though they are not being -- we

are having distributions problems. But it's not the crisis we thought it would be.

Staff: We have about four minutes left. I'm going to go right here and then back on this side of the room, back over to Pam. And that might be our last one, depending on how long your questions are.

Q: Ambassador, this is James Cullum from the Talk Radio News Service. Regarding captured officials on the 55 Most Wanted List, in your estimation, how will they be tried, and how long do you see their detainment without a trial?

Bremer: It's obviously a sensitive question on which I think we need to have responsible Iraqis give us advice. The people of this country suffered tremendously under the regime of these 55 men, and more, and one can, I think, understand that they will want to have some say in what kind of a criminal procedure is established to deal with these people. Whether that will be, as I think many of them hope, an Iraqi tribunal or a mixed Iraqi-international tribunal, these are subjects that, again, once we have an interim administration here, which I expect will happen in the next four to five weeks, it's one of the subjects that we will basically put to them and try to seek their views. And once we have a consensus view on that from the Iraqis, we may be able to start those trials forthwith.

Q: Ambassador, this is Pam Hess from UPI again. Could you please tell us what the structure of the interim government will be; how those people will be selected and what their powers will and will not be?

Bremer: The interim administration, which is responsive to U.N. Security Council Resolution 1483, will have, at least initially, two bodies in it. The first body will be a political council; the second, a constitutional conference. The political council will be made up of some 25 to 30 Iraqis from all walks of life and from the various strands of Iraqi society: men, women, Shi'a, Sunnis, Kurds and Arabs, tribal leaders, Christians, Turkomen, urban people, et cetera, professionals.

That group is the subject of some rather intense consultations that we're undergoing right now with people from all of those walks of life. And I would expect that we will arrive at a list of agreed candidates, as I said, in the next four to six weeks.

The political council's responsibilities will be quite significant right from the start, and they will fall in two areas. First of all, the political council will be encouraged to nominate immediately men and women to become interim ministers in the 20 or so ministries that make up the Iraqi government. The interim ministers will in turn have substantial responsibilities in how those ministries are run.

The second area that the political council will be active in will be in setting up commissions to study longer-range questions that have a major impact on Iraqi society; for example, what to do about educational reform. Ba'athism is very much a part of the curriculum throughout the school system and university system here. How do we get rid of it? What do we do to the textbooks? They will want to look at issues like how to take a census, something that must happen, obviously, before there can be elections next year. And there must be another half-dozen commissions you can think of.

The second body will be a constitutional conference, which will be a broader and more broadly selected group, probably several hundred, who will convene, we hope, also in the next six to seven weeks, and will have the task of drafting the new Iraqi constitution. It will have to organize itself. It will have to select a drafting committee and maybe some subcommittees, and then will undergo a very intense, we hope, intense political dialogue with the people of Iraq on fundamental issues: like whether this will be a presidential system, whether it will be federal; and what federalism will mean; what will be the role of religion. All of these questions will have to be dealt with by that constitutional conference.

Staff: Ambassador, we have come to the end of our time. And I'd like to thank you for taking the time today. I know you spent some time earlier today talking to the House Armed Services Committee members. And we really appreciate the opportunity to have a dialogue with you and help our understanding back here. And we hope that we can do this again soon with you.

Bremer: Thank you. Nice to see you all.

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Presenter: Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III, Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority **August 20, 2003**

Ambassador Bremer Interview with the CBS Early Show

(Interview with Harry Smith, CBS Early Show.)

Q: Paul Bremer is the chief U.S. administrator in Iraq. Ambassador Bremer joins us this morning.

Thanks for joining us, sir.

Bremer: Good morning.

Q: Do you know who did this?

Bremer: No, we don't. Whoever did it was a terrible criminal, taking innocent life, as terrorists always seem to do; in this case, people who came here with no political motive, who were simply here trying to rebuild Iraq and helping the Iraqi people reclaim their country.

Q: Pipeline and water supplies have been sabotaged in the last week. The Jordanian embassy was attacked about two weeks ago; now the United Nations. You had 150,000 American soldiers over there who are targets every day. When will the United States get control of this country?

Bremer: I don't accept the proposition that we're not in control. We certainly have a threat of terrorism. That does not mean chaos. It doesn't mean that we've lost control. It does mean that we have an element of terrorism here, the kind of terrorism we've seen in New York and Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam and Beirut over the years.

It is a terrible war. It's one which was declared on the American people very dramatically on September 11th, and it's a war that we will win. It's not something that we're going to get deterred from by an attack here, bad as it was.

Q: How is it you don't agree with the assessment that things are not in control there?

Bremer: I don't know who makes the assessment that things aren't in control. It's clearly not the view of the coalition here. We have a security problem here. The security problem now has got a terrorist dimension, which is new, but the rest of the security is basically in better shape than it was three months ago when I arrived here.

It is true that we're taking some casualties among the coalition forces, but that's largely coming from a small group of bitter-enders from the former regime, and almost all of it in a very small geographic area. The attacks on the pipelines that you mentioned and on the electricity are basically a different problem. Those are attacks on the Iraqi people, as the acting minister of oil made clear in his press conference on Saturday.

Q: Do you have an anticipation of when you think the streets of Baghdad and the streets of the other major cities in Iraq will be safe, when the power will be on, when day-to-day clean water will be available?

Bremer: Well, the streets of the main cities, including Baghdad, are safe. They're safe today. You can go around them. You find thousands of Iraqis on the streets every day. Right now, if you went downtown, you'd find them walking around. The shops are open. Men and women and their children are there.

It is dangerous after the curfew, obviously, in the late evening. But the country is not a country in chaos. And terrorism doesn't mean chaos. It does mean an outrage against humanity. And it is something we have to deal with, and we will deal with it. But it is simply wrong to extrapolate from these terrorist acts to a conclusion that this country is in chaos. It's simply not true.

Q: Ambassador Bremer, we thank you for your time today. We do appreciate it.

Bremer: Thank you.

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Presenter: Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt, Deputy Director for Operations

December 30, 2003 9:00 AM EST

(Participating was Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt, Deputy Director for Operations and Daniel Senor, Senior CPA Adviser.)

MR. SENOR: Good afternoon. General Kimmitt and I have brief opening statements, and then we'll be happy to take your questions.

Ambassador Bremer returned today from Washington, D.C., after a couple of days of meetings there with administration officials, including a meeting with the president of the United States. The focus of the meetings primarily were on the implementation of the November 15th political agreement reached with the Governing Council, as well as other priorities as we enter this final stage of the reconstruction process on the civilian side, which will involve hand- over of sovereignty to the Iraqi people in six months. There is a lot of work to do over these next few months, and that was the basis of the consultations in Washington.

In addition, Ambassador Bremer and the coalition continue to work very closely with the Ministry of Oil to head off the smuggling and sabotage and black market profiteering, which continue to be among the greatest challenges plaguing the Iraqi oil industry, the Iraqi Oil Ministry and the Iraqi people.

The causes, as we have said before and as the Ministry of Oil has said before, primarily include two elements, one being the increase in demand, almost a quarter-million new cars in Iraq since the fall of the former regime, in part based on the lifting of customs, and also in part there's this new infusion of cash, higher salaries in the economy.

Another cause, the other element here is a problem of supply. We are dealing with antiquated, chronically underinvested-in oil production technology and equipment and infrastructure. This infrastructure is highly susceptible to sabotage, to attacks, and we continue to work with the Ministry of Oil and the security forces to head those off. But that said, it will take time to improve the quality of the infrastructure, to build in the necessary redundancy, and to make it less vulnerable to attacks.

As I said, we are working hard on these problems. And in that regard, we welcome the support of a number of clerics, leading clerics from across the country over the recent days that have issued strong statements, in some case fatwas, against attacks of political sabotage and against another problem which I will speak to, which is that of the black market profiteering. But these sorts of things are attacks against the Iraqi people.

We are also working, as I said, on the security front, on the -- on heading off the oil issues. Two nights ago, coalition forces caught smugglers stealing fuel from a gas station in Samarra, filling a tanker of gasoline from its storage tanks. And then just yesterday, Iraqi police seized another tanker, fuel destined for the black market, on the outskirts of Baghdad. The coalition forces and the Iraqi security forces are stepping up their security at gas stations, at production facilities, at these critical areas

across the country, working together, working side by side, and beginning now to make progress, with these examples I've cited, to address this critical issue.

General Kimmitt.

GEN. KIMMITT: Thank you.

First, on behalf of the coalition, let me start by offering our condolences to the nations of Bulgaria, Poland, Thailand and Iraq for the losses suffered in the wake of the criminal attack in Karbala. This cowardly attack on the citizens of Karbala and the coalition forces serving there to maintain security was heinous and senseless.

Despite this attack, coalition forces in Karbala and throughout Iraq will remain offensively oriented to kill or capture anti- coalition elements and enemies of the Iraqi people, and will provide support to rebuild a free Iraq.

To that end, the coalition conducted 1,639 patrols, 40 offensive operations, 29 raids, and captured 101 anti-coalition suspects in the past 24 hours.

In the northern zone of operations, coalition forces conducted a series of cordon-and-search operations against brigade targets. The first operation took place in southwest Mosul, where initial questioning indicated that this was a possible safe house for terrorist activities. The second operation killed three enemy personnel, and three individuals, including two coalition targets, were detained. Other operations resulted in the capture of three additional targets, including an associate of a ranking high-value target.

In Al Sulimaniyah, coalition forces reopened two bridges outside the city. The rebuilding was a joint Al Sulimaniyah public works and Commanders' Emergency Response-funded effort.

In the north central zone of operations, coalition forces conducted 142 patrols, five raids, and captured 43 individuals. Seven of the patrols were joint operations conducted alongside the Iraqi police, the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps and the border police.

Soldiers discovered a significant weapons cache southeast of Samarra, in a raid targeting a suspected IED manufacturer. The cache consisted of a large number of weapons and bomb-making material, but it also included al Qaeda literature, ceramic body armor and a VHS tape labeled "Sheik of the Muhaddin (sp) Osama bin Laden."

Twenty enemy personnel were captured, including 10 targets, during a raid in Shahab Al Mab (sp). Weapons and ammunition were also seized in that raid.

Ten enemy personnel, including two suspected weapons dealers, were captured during a raid on December 28th. Multiple small arms and explosives were also confiscated.

Eight Sala Adin (sp) imams received the keys to automobiles on December

29th from Civil Affairs soldiers in the 4th Infantry Division, based on a request during Ramadan. The religious leaders wanted a way to travel to the more remote locations in the district to speak with the residents of smaller towns and villages, and the coalition wanted to express their commitment by supporting this request. The cars will allow the imams to spread the message of peace and reconciliation to every Iraqi in the province.

In Baghdad, coalition forces conducted six raids yesterday as part of the continuing Operation Iron Grip. Thirteen enemy personnel were captured.

Of note, on Saturday, Sarhid Ab Sarhid (sp), a former Directorate of Military Intelligence officer suspected of leading a large anti- coalition group in the region and suspected in -- suspected of responsibility for attacks on coalition forces, to include the downing of the DHL jetliner, died at a coalition medical facility from wounds received in a targeted raid on his complex. A significant amount of documents and electronic media were captured in this raid.

Demonstrating a complete disregard for noncombatants, terrorists detonated a booby trap in Baghdad on Sunday, killing one coalition soldier, two Iraqi children, wounding five coalition soldiers and eight Iraqi Civil Defense Corps soldiers. This has been followed again by another attack today, reportedly killing one civilian and wounding several others.

In the western zone of operations, coalition forces captured four enemy personnel in Ar Ramadi yesterday during a cordon-and-search operation. They're suspected of being part of an organization moving foreign fighters and large sums of money in cash through the region.

Civil Affairs soldiers in the 82nd Airborne Division met with local officials in Hazwah (sp) to finalize repair plans for the Sana (sp) Intermediate School.

Civil Affairs soldiers also met with local leaders to initiate renovations on two primary health clinics in Al Jazirah (sp). The primary health clinics will allow local family practitioners more access to the populace.

In the wake of the Karbala bombings, the area of Multinational Division Central-South has been relatively quiet. Working with local police, coalition soldiers captured two enemy personnel yesterday in al Kut, one suspected of being an arms dealer and another of bomb attacks. In the vicinity of Basra, six enemy were detained by coalition forces following a search where both Ba'ath Party uniforms and passports were confiscated in this raid.

Let's turn it over to questions.

MR. SENOR: Yes? Go ahead.

Q Yes. General, could you give us some explanation about roadside bombs, as we have seen some cases recently? What are the general measures that the public can take to avoid to get involved in those attacks? And second, could you just tell me if it's quite easy for someone to plant those bombs without being noticed by the police

in a crowded area like in central Baghdad, that there were two ones in the recent three days?

GEN. KIMMITT: Well, certainly what we do, what we tell our soldiers and we also tell our soldiers to tell the local population, anything that looks out of the ordinary along the roadside, something that doesn't belong there, you should report that immediately, whether it's a bag of trash, whether it's a piece of concrete, whether it's a piece of cinderblock, something that just looks out of place, we tell them to report that so that we can get EOD experts down there to determine if in fact that is just some garbage that was thrown out or in fact an EOD that might have been placed there.

We also run a significant number of IED patrols. On those areas where our units will be transiting on a frequent basis, we will send out patrols ahead of time specifically for the purpose of checking out possible IED locations to try to keep those areas clear.

We also use as much actionable intelligence as possible to go after bomb makers and suspected bomb makers, to go at their homes and their locations to try to catch those bombs before they're put on there.

MR. SENOR: Yes?

Q Tatiana Anderson (sp), CNN. A German publication, along with the L.A. times, are reporting that certain documents obtained indicate that Syria was providing Iraq with weapons even just weeks before the war. Can you shed some light on that?

MR. SENOR: I don't have anything to add to that. I would refer you to the Department of Defense on that particular issue.

Yes?

Q Sara Deep (ph) from the Associated Press. There have also been reports about Saddam speaking about where he's hidden some of his funds, and some of the Council members have said that you told them or they were told about the result of the investigation or his confession during investigation where he actually hid the money. Is that true? And how far has that gone?

MR. SENOR: I'm not in a position to comment on any discussions Saddam Hussein had with members of the Governing Council. I can't characterize them or comment on them.

Yes?

Q General Kimmitt, can you comment a little bit more about Iron Grip and the activity that's been going on in Baghdad in particular? There seems to have been a stepped-up bit of activity in Baghdad over the last week on both sides. I'm curious if you can give us a little bit more detail on what Iron Grip is targeting, if it's fresh intelligence that they're working on. It sounds like there was a significant capture on Saturday. But also, whether you think the activity on the insurgents' side -- there's

been a lot of talk that that was targeted around the Christmas period -- whether you believe that that was indeed sort of a Christmas offensive or something along those lines.

GEN. KIMMITT: Sure. Well, first of all, I will give you part of the answer because tomorrow night General Dempsey will be here providing a very, very comprehensive press conference covering all the operations that he and his unit have been running since the last time he gave the press conference. But rather than preempting him, let me just tell you that there were indications, and have been reported in the press, that we expected a large amount of enemy activity during the Christmas time period, for, as we've said many, many times before, the enemy is going to try to use that as an opportunity, knowing that it's a holiday for some, a religious holiday for others, to try to use that to exploit and come up with some spectacular attacks.

We were able to detect some of those activities. We found a number of weapon systems pointed at different locations and were able to preempt those. There were a series of engagements that happened during Christmas Day, approximately 18 between the hours of 0600 and 0800 on Christmas Day. Fortunately, none of those had any deaths associated with them. And to our knowledge, only one Iraqi civilian was wounded during that time period.

MR. SENOR: Yes?

Q James Hider from The Times. I was down in Karbala after the bombings, and the place is full of Iranian pilgrims. And the police down there say the Iranians don't have visas, they're all illegal pilgrims. They were saying there's actually probably more Iranians there than Iraqis. I was wondering how you expect to stop attacks of this nature if anybody can just wander across the Iranian border -- in the thousands, in fact.

MR. SENOR: We are working -- I can't speak to the specific numbers of Iranians down in Karbala, but I can speak more broadly. We are committed to building up a modern, effective Iraqi security infrastructure that, when we are finished, will number in the range of about approximately 220,000 Iraqi security personnel, which will include a robust border police and customs personnel team.

In the supplemental funds that the U.S. Congress recently appropriated, for security alone, there is over $3 billion dedicated toward training and equipping and arming this very advanced and modern Iraqi security personnel. And we think this will be -- help a great deal in securing these areas of the country where you cite the sorts of problems that you have referenced.

Q But the borders do appear to be completely open at the moment.

MR. SENOR: Well, I think it's a topographical fact of life that these are very porous borders. Iraq has very porous borders. It's an issue we have to contend with. But like I said, by ramping the Iraqi security personnel, ramping up the numbers, giving them effective training, giving them the tools they need, and certainly, in the short term, working alongside coalition forces, we believe we can

address the security problems that are here.

I -- Ambassador Bremer has said for a long time, as has President Bush, that Iraq is now the central front in the war on terror. And this war on terror has two very distinct elements that, unfortunately, often work together: elements of the former regime and foreign fighters, terrorists coming over in this country that are trying to destabilize the situation.

And we believe, working alongside the Iraqis in this stepped-up security personnel infrastructure that we are helping them build and that we are paying for, we can address these problems. But we have to remain focused on it. We have to remain committed to it. We will remain committed to it. It's a tough job.

Yes?

Q Yes. Tom (surname inaudible), ABC News. Following up on that, about the Iraqi security services, concerns are being raised about how fast this is moving along: that it's being pushed ahead too quickly, that proper vetting isn't in place, that corners are being cut. How do you respond to those concerns? And can you also give us an update on the current state of the -- both police services and the Iraqi army?

MR. SENOR: The numbers of Iraqi police today are approximately 70,000. As far as the new Iraqi army is concerned, there are 400 new Iraqi soldiers on duty with the 4th ID. A second battalion of the new Iraqi army is scheduled to graduate next month. Those are the numbers both for police and the new Iraqi army. The goal to get -- with the new Iraqi army is to get in the neighborhood of 35(,000) to 40,000.

As far as the police is concerned, when Ambassador Bremer arrived here in May, there was not a single Iraqi police officer on the streets. As I said, today there is over 7,000, about -- over 70,000 nationwide and about 7,000 in Baghdad alone.

And as far as -- what was your first question? About the vetting?

Q Just -- there's been concerns about vetting, that this being pushed ahead too quickly for them to be really useful; again, that there's vetting problems; that corners are being cut --

MR. SENOR: Sure.

Q -- that basically people are being pushed out there, but they can't do the job or haven't been trained to do the job.

MR. SENOR: Yeah. We have a robust vetting process for all the security forces. Do some individuals slip through the cracks? Absolutely. When they do slip through the cracks and it's brought to our attention or we notice them, we seek to rectify it immediately. I think that is a situation you will find in any security service anywhere in the world. Some people make it in, for various reasons, that probably shouldn't make it in, for various reasons.

I think it's certainly the case when you are rebuilding a -- when you are building a security infrastructure up from scratch. Like I said, when Ambassador Bremer arrived here in May, there wasn't a single police officer on the street. Today there are over 60,000. And that's in approximately six months. So we are moving quickly, but we are committed to a robust vetting process to address the sorts of things you are raising.

I think it's very important, as we have said all along, to get -- and as I said a moment ago, to get these security forces up and running quickly, to help, you know, address the security situation.

When we first arrived here, in the months immediately after, one of the biggest problems of security in Baghdad was violent crime -- robbery, homicide, those sorts of acts. Those numbers are way down, in the neighborhood between 30(,000) and 40,000 in Baghdad, in terms of violent crime.

So having security, having Iraqi security on the streets, doing patrols, making arrests, on the front lines -- on the front lines, a lot of these men are risking their lives every single day; many of them have engaged in very heroic and courageous acts -- is critical to this project.

And now we need to further beef up the Iraqi security personnel to address the two other elements I mentioned earlier: the former regime elements and the foreign terrorists that coming in the border -- coming over the borders.

GEN. KIMMITT: And if I could, I think if you were to query all the commanders on the ground right now that if they'd had a choice of waiting for a longer period to get perfectly formed and trained police forces, ICDC and new Iraqi army, vice (sic) having partially trained but still sufficiently trained forces working alongside with them, providing intelligence, providing translating services, acting as the intermediaries for the military forces out there, so that if you have to go into a mosque, for instance, you don't go in with a coalition soldier, but you go in with an Iraqi soldier; I think, on balance, the commanders would come back and say the decision to not wait until we had the perfect solution was the wise one, the prudent one, and one that's probably saved a significant amount of coalition lives in the process.

MR. SENOR: Yeah. And I would just add to that that we are -- by deploying Iraqis on the front lines of the security situation, we have access, as General Kimmitt said, to individuals who have a deep sense for the rhythm of life, for the language, for the culture, in a way that the coalition forces just do not. It's an invaluable tool in this effort.

Yes, sir?

Q Tom Frank from Newsday. I just wanted to follow up on the police question. I hear some Iraqis saying two things. One is, they want more police, because obviously security is a big concern. Correct me if I'm wrong, but I think the full figure will be 71,000 for the entire country.

MR. SENOR: It's a little higher than that. It's between 75,000 and 80,000, but, yeah.

Q Okay. My paper publishes in New York City, a city of 8 million people with 40,000 police. I'm wondering why so few police? And secondly, I understand a lot of the police now are people who were police when Saddam was in power. I'm wondering if you know about how many of the police are, you know, veterans from the prewar period, and if there's any concern about having those people, because there was some, I guess, pretty widespread corruption in those days. So, the two questions.

MR. SENOR: Sure. Your comparison to New York City isn't entirely applicable because we also have these other security forces at work that would tend to address some of the security issues that occur in New York City. We have the Facilities Protection Service that's protecting the infrastructure of the country. As I said, we have the new Iraqi army, members of which are already being deployed. And we have the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps that are working hand in hand -- approximately -- over 14,000 of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps working hand in hand with the American security forces. So, we have a number of Iraqi security forces deployed doing the work, not just the police force.

To your second question, yes, we are recruiting Iraqis for police training, some of whom who served in former security forces of the former regime and some who are brand new. Those that served in the Iraqi police force go through what we call the TIP (sp) program, which is a transition training police program. It's a program we bring them in and teach them the skills that they didn't learn under the former regime; basic things like policing with basic restrictions for human rights, and professional investigative skills, and the high standards of professionalism operating in a democratic society.

So, we are taking those police who pass the vetting process, who we believe pass our standards on de-Ba'athifciation, giving them the tools and teaching them the skills and the standards that we think is important for policing in a free and democratic society, and putting them to work.

Yes?

Q Tom Lasseter, Knight Ridder. I was wondering whether you can comment about changes or shifts you've seen in anti-coalition insurgency; if you have seen them, what sort of changes you've seen in terms of tactics, organization; and whether those changes, if they do exist, seem to be pinned at all to the capture of Saddam Hussein, and whether post-capture you've gotten a different or better idea of the role that he did or did not play?

GEN. KIMMITT: Let's sort of go back to front on those. Since the capture of Saddam Hussein, we've seen the number of engagements stay relatively the same. Unfortunately, some of those engagements have been a little more deadly, as we saw down in Karbala. I don't think that that has anything to do with the specific capture of Saddam Hussein. We've been on record as saying the capture of Saddam Hussein has provided intelligence which has been helpful in continuing the operations. Yes, the numbers of personnel that we're capturing is about the same that

we've been capturing consistently over the last couple of months, but the quality of captures has gone up a bit.

Do we fully understand where Saddam fit in? We're putting that puzzle together. We don't think, as some have speculated, that he was the central figure managing the entire anti-coalition operation, nor do we believe that he was simply sitting in a hole waiting for somebody to come and capture him.

MR. SENOR: I would just add to that Ambassador Bremer, sort of at a high level here, sees the situation playing out this way: There are the diehards, people like Izzat Ibrahim Al-Douri, who are the diehard former-regime loyalists, who it remains to be seen whether or not their dynamic changes -- our ability to catch them or kill them changes as a result of the Saddam capture.

But there are two other groups that we are beginning to see are now in play as a result of the Saddam capture. Those are sort of the midlevel Ba'athists, midlevel elements tied to the former regime, individuals that were hoping that Saddam would return. They were hoping Saddam would return because they wanted their jobs back at the ministries, they wanted the cars, they wanted the salary back, they wanted, particularly in the Sunni areas between Baghdad and Tikrit, wanted access to the largess that Saddam used to shower that area with. Those folks were hopeful.

Another group of more junior-level Ba'athists are people who weren't tied to the Ba'athist party at all -- to the Ba'ath Party at all but were simply fearful that Saddam would return. The rumors were alive in the shouks, in the markets, that Saddam would return and that these people better be careful, not cooperate with the coalition, the new Iraqi leadership, because if Saddam would return, there would be return to the mass graves and the torture chambers and the rape rooms. And so those folks were just fearful of a Saddam return.

So what we call "the hopefuls" and "the fearfuls." We feel that "the hopefuls" no longer can hope that Saddam will return. They know his days are over. And "the fearfuls" no longer have to fear that he will return. And we believe that opens up a large number of individuals in the geographical area I just described that are now in play.

Yeah?

Q But have you seen a tactical or organizational evolution in the insurgency? And if so, over what sort to time period?

GEN. KIMMITT: Well again, let's remember it's only been two-plus weeks since the capture of Saddam Hussein. But with regards to that, at this point we haven't seen it. We continue to look for it. We continue to watch it, watching how the enemy operates is a daily activity for us, so that we can find out, as he is changing his tactics, we can respond and be proactively engaged against him.

MR. SENOR: Yes?

Q Evan Osnos from the Chicago Tribune. You mentioned that Ambassador

Bremer was discussing the November 15th agreement in Washington. Can you elaborate on that? And specifically, does that mean that the coalition is considering amendments to that agreement to reflect the concerns that have been raised since then, or is that document considered the definitive, final text and nothing more will happen to change that reflecting the concerns of people like Ayatollah Sistani and others?

MR. SENOR: I can't comment on whether or not it will ever change in any degree, any element. I mean, it was a framework. It was a set of principles. Now we're working on setting up the process for implementing those principles. And we are moving forward. The Governing Council has set up several committees to work on the key elements, to work on the implementations, to set up a process for drafting the basic intermittent law, the administrative law. They set up a committee to work on procedures for drafting -- for electing drafters to the constitutional convention. So the Governing Council is in play here working on implementation of November 15th, and so are we. And that's really the focus of the discussions and that was the primary focus of the discussions Ambassador Bremer had back in Washington.

Q To make sure I understand something, does that mean that the discussion now is confined to implementation, or is there also an effort -- to what degree is it important to respond to the concerns of people outside the Governing Council, or is that not considered part of the priority at this point?

MR. SENOR: Ambassador Bremer is committed to implementing the November 15th agreement. All our indications are the Governing Council is equally committed to implementing the November 15th agreement. If they choose to engage with other leaders and individuals within Iraqi society, all the power to them. I mean, you know, this process is something that can be accomplished in a free society. A healthy, vibrant, if not at times controversial, dialogue is a critical component of this process. So we encourage debate. We encourage discussion. There was a town hall meeting held yesterday in Basra, in which the governor of Basra was one of the key participants, where they had a very lively debate about the political process. We hope there will be debates like that all over the country. We expect one in Mosul in the next couple weeks and in other parts of the country. So that is not something we discourage. We encourage that. We hope the Governing Council will be reaching out and having discussions. As far as we're concerned, we are working on implementation of the agreement with the Governing Council.

Yes? Go ahead.

Q What is the scale in terms of the situation of foreign fighters in Iraq? What sort of incidents does the coalition suspect foreign fighters of? And what does the coalition suspect their numbers are, as well?

GEN. KIMMITT; Well, we've said a number of times that we think that the number of foreign fighters is a small minority of the overall enemy that we face here in Iraq, probably on the order of 10 percent, no more. But that could change on a daily basis. What type of activities do we sort of instantly say, "We better look at that one because that might be foreign fighters"? Any time that we see a car bomb, we start saying that probably is not something that was home grown, that that might be from somewhere else. We've seen tactics being used by some of the belligerents,

some of the enemy, that would indicate that they might have had training in other than former-regime element, former Iraqi army. And that's sort of how we say we better take a look at that one a little bit closer.

MR. SENOR: Someone who hasn't asked a question. Go ahead.

Q General, you spoke earlier about intensified activity on both sides around Christmas. Does this extend to New Year? And what special measures, if any, do you have planned for tomorrow?

GEN. KIMMITT: Well, we have not seen it extend, thus far. The last couple of days have been quite -- relatively passive, with the exception of the dreadful attacks of the roadside bombs that we've seen here in the Khaladia (ph) district. I can assure you that our commanders are reviewing the time period, taking the appropriate force-protection measures. And as I said at Christmas time, anybody who would want to take on the coalition during this time period would be well advised to think through that process before he does so.

MR. SENOR: We have time for one more question. So, someone who has not asked one, if there is someone who hasn't asked one. No? All right, go ahead.

Q If I could just follow-up on the Sistani issue -- Peter Spiegel, Financial Times. On the narrow issue of the selection of members of the Transitional National Authority, the Governing Council has set up a committee -- gosh, it was a month ago, I think -- to look at this issue, in which they were supposed to report back, I think, in a week and sort of come back with an idea. Can you give us some insight as to what the debate is going on right now, whether Sistani has given up hope of direct elections? There was some talk about bringing the U.N. in. On that narrow issue of the TNA elections, where are we in terms of the Governing Council debate?

MR. SENOR: I don't want to comment on the Governing Council or their debate. They are 25 people with -- they have their own spokespersons and they have their own individual channels to provide information, so I would refer you to them.

As for the debate over direct elections, when we -- leading up to the November 15th agreement, we realized that the Governing Council -- they came to us and basically said that they had reached an impasse; that they could not move forward on the constitutional process unless there was joint agreement between us and them to allow for direct elections to the constitutional convention. And that was the change we made; we agreed to direct elections in that context. And that has been the discussion, that has been the focus, up to this point, in terms of implementing direct elections for the constitutional convention.

Q But on -- backing up to the TNA itself, there's also been discussion about that, correct?

MR. SENOR: Right. And the Governing Council, as I think you mentioned, wanted to talk to the U.N. about it. General-Secretary (sic) Kofi Annan has spoken; he reported on December 15th to the U.N. about the difficulty or the challenges of direct elections in an environment where there is an accelerated path of sovereignty

along the time line that we have agreed upon with the Governing Council on November 15th. So I would just point you to Kofi Annan's statement on that.

One more. Go ahead.

Q Kofi Annan just asked for a meeting with Iraqis and the CPA. We haven't heard anything from the CPA, whether they're going to be attending or not. Is that going to be an issue of discussion -- direct elections -- and are you going to be attending?

MR. SENOR: My understanding, just from news reports, is that the Governing Council does intend to participate.

Ambassador Bremer and I just arrived from an all-night plane from the United States, so we're just getting settled here. We have no scheduling or travel plans for the next couple weeks. That may change. I know the meeting is very soon. But we have no -- nothing on the schedule right now.

Thanks, everybody.

GEN. KIMMITT: Look forward to seeing you tomorrow night, with General Dempsey's briefing.

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Appendix IV – POLO STEP Iraq War planning slides

Source: The National Security Archives,
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB214/index.htm accessed 30/10/08

Acronyms Glossary for POLO STEP Iraq War Planning Slides

[These are provided by the National Security Archive and are our best judgment concerning the meanings of acronyms used in the slides]

AA	Active Army
ACP	Advanced Airborne Command Post
ACR	Armored Cavalry Regiment
AD	Armored Division
ADA	Air Defense Artillery
ADA-Air	Air Defense Artillery
AEF	Air Expeditionary Force
AF SOF Det	Air Force Special Operations Forces Detachment
AFB	Air Force Base
AMPHIB	Amphibian
AOR	Area of Responsibility
APS	Army Pre-Positioned Stocks
ARG	Amphibious Ready Group
Avn.	Aviation
BA	Bahrain
BCT	Brigade Combat Team
Bde.	Brigade
BPT	Be Prepared To
C	Crisis
C2	Command and Control
CAOC	Combined Air Operations Center
CAV	Cavalry
CD	Calendar Day
CDO	Commando
CENTCOM	Central Command
CFACC	Combined Forces Air Component Commander
CFC	Combined Forces Command
CFH	Contingency Forward Headquarters


1003V FULL FORCE - FORCE DISPOSITION
Burgas, Bulgaria
• 1 x KC10 Squadron
Mediterranean
• 2 x Carrier Battle Groups
• 6 x FA-18 Squadrons
• 2 x F-14 Squadrons
• 2 x EA-6B Squadrons
•TLAM shooters
•(14 surface combatants)
383K Total Personnel
200K are Reserves
Turkey
Incirlik
• 3 x F15 Squadrons
• 2 x F16 Squadrons
• 2 x KC135 Squadron
• 1 x RAF Tornado Squadron
• 1 x RAF Jaguar Squadron
•Reconnaissance Aircraft
Afyon
• 1.5 x KC135 Squadron
Iskenderun
• Seaport: USAF Ammo
•Sabiha Gokcen
•2 x C130 Squadrons
•Corlu
•1.5 KC135 Squadrons
•Batman
• 2 x A10 Squadrons
• 1 x RAF Harrier Squadron
Diyarbakir
Special Ops Task Force - North
• USA Special Forces Bn (-)
• USAF Special Force Det
• UK SOF Forces
1 x BN RC-12
1 x EA-6B Squadron
4th Infantry Div (-)
North Arabian Gulf
• 3 x Carrier Battle Groups
• 9 x FA-18 Squadrons
• 3 x F-14 Squadrons
• 3 x EA-6B Squadrons
• TLAM shooters
•(21 surface combatants)
• 1 x ARG - MEU
Jordan
Special Ops Task Force - West
• USA Special Forces Bn (-)
H5
•Army Special Ops Aviation
•Al Jafra
• USAF Special Force Det
• SAS Task GRP (UK)
• SAS Task GRP (AUS)
1 x BN RC-12
•Azraq
• 1 x A10 Squadron
• 2 x F16 Squadrons
• .5 RAF Harrier Squadron
• USAF CSAR Assets
KUWAIT
Kuwait
V Corps
• 3rd Infantry Div
• 1st Armor Div
• 101st AAslt Div
• 1st Cavalry Div
• V Corps Artillery
I MEF
• 1st Marine Division(+)
• 3rd Marine Air Wing(+)
• 1st Force Service Support Group (+)
• 1 Marine Expeditionary Unit
• 1 X BN RC-12
Consequence Management
• HQ
Logistics Command
Special Ops Task Force-South
• USA Special Forces Group
• USAF Special Force Detachment
• Naval Special Ops Forces
Ali Al Salem
• Assorted Army and USAF UAVs
• 1 x RAF Tornado Squadron
• . 5 x RAF C130 Squadron
Al Jaberi
• 3 x A/OA-10 Squadrons
• 1 x CSAR Element
Bahrain
Naval CENTCOM HQ
• Maritime Reconnaissance
• Naval Special Warfare
Marine CENTCOM HQ
• 1 x KC130 USMC Squadron
Naval Special Operations Task Force
Command and Control Aircraft (all services) Reconnaissance Aircraft
• 2 x KC135 Squadron
Qatar
• Special Ops HQ
Al Udeid, Qatar
• 4 x F15E Squadrons
• 5 x F16 Squadrons
• 1 x F117 Squadron
• 1 x F14 Squadron
• 1 x CAN F18Squadron
•Doha International
• 2 x C-130 Squadrons
• 0.5 F117 Squadron
UAE
• Reconnaissance Aircraft
• 1 x KC10A Squadrons
Seeb, Oman
• 1 x C130 Squadrons
Thumrait, Oman
• 1 x B1 Squadron
• 2 x RAF Recce Aircraft
Masirah, Oman
Maritime Reconnaissance
Naval Special Warfare
USAF Special Forces Det
Diego Garcia
• 1 x B-52 Squadron
• 1 x KC-135 Squadron
• 1 x B-2 Element
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DECLASSIFY ON: 16 June 2005
ACTION OFFICER: Mr. M.D. Fitzgerald, Civ
Marine
Army
Navy
Air Force
Special Operations

TARK


SECRET // ORCON REL USA/CMFI
Operational Timeline/Force Flow
3rd ID, 4th ID, 1st Mar Div, 1/82, 1/173, 2 x MEU, 16 AA (UK), 3rd CDO BDE (UK)
Projected Total 210,000
Projected Total 230,000
15 Feb 128 K
1 Mar 172 K
Initial Ground Force for G-Day & Key SOF, Maritime, and Air Forces for A-Day
Insurance Force
Pre N-Day Flow in DEPORDs 174/177/36
TPFDD: Provides remaining SOF, MARITIME and Air Forces to initiate A-Day
TPFDD (CFACC sets condition for G-Day)
UK DIV
101st + Support
3rd ACR + Support
1st AD + Support
1st CAV + Support
Remaining TPFDD Flows Forces in Modules
• Extended Combat
• Early Success
• CMO
• Varies by Coalition
Preparation
PHASE I
Shape the Battlespace
PHASE II
Decisive Offensive Operations & Post Hostilities
PHASE III & IV
POTUS Decision
~5 DAYS
~11 DAYS
~5 DAYS
Deploy forces
N-Day
C-Day
A-Day
G-Day
15 Feb
19 Feb
3 Mar
8 Mar
First "Off Ramp"
Second "Off Ramp"
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DECLASSIFY ON: 16 June 2005
ACTION OFFICER: Mr. M.D. Fitzgerald, Civ
N = POTUS Decision
C = Force flow Begins
A = Air Operations Begin
G = Ground Operations Begin
SECRET // ORCON/REL CMFI


Protect
SECRET//ORCON,REL TO USA,CMFI
DECLASSIFIED BY: RADM R.T. Moeller
DECLASSIFY ON: 16 June 2005
ACTION OFFICER: Mr. M.D. Fitzgerald, Civ
1 Division
Fix
SEIZE
N. Oil
SOF
EXPLOIT
Simultaneous
Security and
Stability ops
Suppress
Protect
SOF
EXPLOIT
Isolate
EXPLOIT
Seize
Shock and Awe
Exploit
Gain Control
SEIZE
S. Oil
2 Divisions
Protect
SECRET//ORCON/REL CMFI
17

Phase I - Preparations

OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES

- Secure regional and international support
- Degrade regime in preparation for Phase II
- Establish air bridge and secure LOC's
- Deter / interdict TBM / WMD operations
- Alert, deploy, and posture forces for shaping operations
- Set conditions to neutralize Iraqi forces
- Gain and maintain air, maritime, and space superiority



ENDSTATE

- Air bridge established and SLOCs secured
- CFC forces postured and conditions set for shaping operations
- Regional and international support for operations secured
- OGs prepared for follow-on operations
- Assets in place to suppress TBM's in western Iraq

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ACTION OFFICER: Mr. M.D. Fitzgerald, Civ

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N = POTUS Decision
C = Force flow Begins
A = Air Operations Begin

Phase II - Shape the Battlespace

OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES

- Maintain international and regional support for ops
- Continue to deploy and posture forces for decisive offensive operations
- Disrupt or degrade Iraqi Regime's C2 and security forces
- Deter WMD employment employment, suppress Iraqi TBM/WMD delivery/storage systems
- Disrupt/degrade RGFC C2 and support to regime def
- Seize key terrain/infrastructure
- Disrupt/degrade RA forces and set the conditions for the capitulation of RA forces
- Suppress TBM/WMD production processes and deny access to WMD facilities
- Gain and maintain air, maritime, and space superiority



ENDSTATE

- CFC forces and OG's postured for follow-on operations
- Iraqi regime's C2 and security forces degraded or disrupted
- Iraqi TBM / WMD delivery systems / production facilities degraded or disrupted and enemy access to WMD facilities disrupted or denied
- RGFC C2 disrupted / degraded
- Key terrain and infrastructure seized
- International and regional support for operations maintained

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DECLASSIFY ON: 16 June 2005
ACTION OFFICER: Mr. M.D. Fitzgerald, Civ

~~SECRET//ORCON/REL CMFI~~

N = POTUS Decision
C = Force flow Begins
A = Air Operations Begin


Phase II- Shape the Battlespace
(A-Day to A+4)
5 Days
DECLASSIFIED BY: RADM R.T. Moeller
DECLASSIFY ON: 16 June 2005
ACTION OFFICER: Mr. M.D. Fitzgerald, Civ
US SF
US SF
Coalition SF
200 sorties &
291 TLAMs
available
ISR
100 sorties &
421 TLAMs
available
2xMEU
6

Phase III - Decisive Operations

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DECLASSIFY ON: 16 June 2005
ACTION OFFICER: Mr. M.D. Fitzgerald, Civ

OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES

- Maintain international and regional support
- Neutralize Regime leadership
- Neutralize Iraqi Regime's C2 & security forces
- Neutralize Iraqi TBM / WMD delivery systems
- Control WMD infrastructure
- Defeat or compel capitulation of RGFC and RA
- Ensure territorial integrity of Iraq
- Deploy and posture CFC forces for post-hostility ops
- Set military conditions for provisional/permanent government to assume power
- Gain and maintain air, maritime, and space supremacy



ENDSTATE

- Iraqi Forces defeated or capitulated
- Regime leaders dead, apprehended, or marginalized
- WMD delivery systems and WMD infrastructure destroyed or controlled
- Territorial integrity of Iraq intact
- CFC forces postured for post-hostility operations
- International and regional support for operations maintained
- Military conditions set for provisional/permanent government to assume power

N = POTUS Decision
C = Force flow Begins
A = Air Operations Begin
G = Ground Operations Begin

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
Phase III - Decisive Operations
G-Day to G+124
DECLASSIFIED BY: RADM R.T. Moeller
DECLASSIFY ON: 16 June 2005
ACTION OFFICER: Mr. M.D. Fitzgerald, Civ
US SF
Coalition SF
V
ISR
300 sorties &
421 TLAMs
available
100 sorties &
421 TLAMs
available
2xMEU

Phase IV Actions



- Support the establishment of a stable democratic Iraqi government
  - Establish a secure environment and assist in recovery and reconstruction
  - Support the establishment of Iraqi Self-Defense forces
  - Ensure the territorial integrity of Iraq
  - Transition civil-military activities to international organizations / non-governmental organizations / Iraqi Government
- Ensure WMD capability eliminated
- Gather intelligence; detain terrorists and war criminals; free individuals unjustly detained
- Re-deploy forces

~~SECRET//ORCON/REL CMFI~~

DECLASSIFIED BY: RADM R.T. Moeller
DECLASSIFY ON: 16 June 2005
ACTION OFFICER: Mr. M.D. Fitzgerald, Civ


SECRET // ORCON REL USA/CMFI
Phase IV – Notional Ground Force Composition
Stabilization
Phase IVa
Recovery
Phase IVb
Transition
Phase IVc
2-3 Months
18 - 24 Months
12 - 18 Months
270K
165K
25K
5K
• CJTF- IRAQ
• Component HQs
• Corps HQs
• 5 Divisions
• I MEF
• SOF forces
• CJTF- IRAQ (CFLCC)
• Corps HQs
• 3 to 1 Divisions
• ACR / LCR/ MP/ ENG
• SOF
• Security element
• SOF
• OMC
• Security Assistance Teams
DECLASSIFIED BY: RADM R.T. Moeller
DECLASSIFY ON: 16 June 2005
ACTION OFFICER: Mr. M.D. Fitzgerald, Civ
SECRET // ORCON/REL CMFI

Appendix V: Congressional Voices in the 'War on Terror'

House of Representatives "Authorising use of armed force against those responsible for recent attacks against the United States" 14/09/01.

Available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/C?r107:./temp/~r1077Q2Zhd accessed 16/09/09

Mr. HASTERT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Illinois for yielding time to me. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this resolution, which authorizes the President to use all force necessary to bring to justice those nations, operations, and people responsible for the cowardly act that was perpetrated upon this Nation on September 11, 2001.The Constitution of the United States, the document that protects the freedoms of all Americans, gives the Congress certain responsibilities. Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution says the Congress shall have power to provide for the common defense and the power to declare war. Earlier today, the Congress exercised its responsibility to provide for the common defense by passing the supplemental spending legislation. Now we give the President the congressional authority to use all necessary force to bring to justice those who attacked our Nation. This is the most solemn responsibility that this Congress can undertake. We do not do so gladly or with a bitter sense of revenge. We do so because we must in order to preserve freedom and democracy in this Nation. These are the times that try men's souls. On September 11, we lost thousands of people, with thousands more injured, and with two symbols of the strength and vitality of our democracy, the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, destroyed or badly damaged. A sworn enemy that dares not confront us in the open attacked us in the most cowardly way, by targeting innocent citizens of this great Nation. This enemy operates in the shadows, hates with an unnatural passion, and practices political fanaticism that glorifies violent death and condemns innocent life. For too long, this enemy has been protected and supported and sheltered by rogue nations. The friends of our enemies are also our enemies, and they will bear equal responsibility. We must defend our Nation. We must defeat these enemies once and for all. We must eliminate the scourge of terrorism. This will be the great challenge for our generation. It may take years. It may cost additional lives. It may require greater sacrifices for our citizens. But great challenges have made us stronger in the past. On July 4, 1776, our Founding Fathers decided to challenge tyranny. After we won our freedom, we constructed the world's greatest constitution, and created a stable, thriving democracy. We faced dark days when our Nation was torn asunder in the Civil War, and we came together after that war between the States to become the savior of Europe in the First World War.The empire of Japan deliberately attacked us on December 7, 1941, and we emerged as the greatest defender of the free world. We faced down communism in a painful Cold War and emerged as the world's sole superpower. Now, after this greatest of American tragedies that we have faced here on American soil, we face the greatest of challenges. I am comforted by the work of the President and his team. They are assembling a worldwide coalition of civilized nations. These nations look to the United States for leadership, and they want to join us in this great crusade. We will provide that leadership. We have a job to do in this Congress, and this authorization for the use of force is an important part of that responsibility. I ask my colleagues to vote for this authorization and to join with me in supporting our President, in supporting our Constitution, and in supporting the American way of life.

[...]

Mr. CALLAHAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the authorization for the use of military force. There are no words to describe the anguish we and all Americans feel. Our national spirit has been dampened but not extinguished by the despicable acts of September 11. President Bush has reassured Americans that while those who detest freedom may destroy brick and mortar and even take the lives of innocents, they cannot destroy the American will. We can take comfort and confidence in our national resolve and depend on that to help us overcome this temporary setback. Clearly, we must rally around our President. We must support his efforts and make crystal clear the fact that the American people are united and resolute that we will take a stand against attacks on our sovereignty and that we will avenge this grievous act. It is an American characteristic to unify in times of crisis. It is important to stand behind our President by authorizing the use of military force against those forces of evil. I am comforted to know that this body will pass this use of force resolution, probably unanimously, later today. I am sure that the entire membership of this body joins me in praying for God to guide us and our President.

[...]

Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank our ranking member and my friend for yielding time. Mr. Speaker, I rise today really with a very heavy heart, one that is filled with sorrow for the families and the loved ones who were killed and injured this week. Only the most foolish and the most callous would not understand the grief that has really gripped our people and millions across the world. This unspeakable act on the United States has forced me, however, to rely on my moral compass, my conscience, and my God for direction. September 11 changed the world. Our deepest fears now haunt us. Yet I am convinced that military action will not prevent further acts of international terrorism against the United States. This is a very complex and complicated matter. This resolution will pass, although we all know that the President can wage a war even without it. However difficult this vote may be, some of us must urge the use of restraint. Our country is in a state of mourning. Some of us must say, let us step back for a moment. Let us just pause for a minute and think through the implications of our actions today so that this does not spiral out of control. I have agonized over this vote, but I came to grips with it today and I came to grips with opposing this resolution during the very painful yet very beautiful memorial service. As a member of the clergy so eloquently said, ``As we act, let us not become the evil that we deplore.''

[...]

Mrs. NAPOLITANO. Mr. Speaker, I thank my good friend for yielding time, and I join my colleagues in support of this resolution authorizing the use of military force. Our American public and the free world look to us today for leadership and swift action. We cannot and we will not fail them. The sheer horror of the events that transpired in New York and the Pentagon are unprecedented in our history and they demand strong, decisive and deliberate action. Anything less is an abrogation of our responsibility as congressional leaders and would be interpreted by those who have utter disdain for our country, for our institutions, and for our people as a failure of resolve and the ultimate sign of weakness. Our enemies, whoever and wherever they are, and those who harbor them, must clearly understand that we will never tolerate the acts of terrorism, acts of war, that have been perpetrated upon us and they must understand that there is no escape from American justice. Inaction is capitulation. Of one thing I am certain, we as Americans will never capitulate to terrorism or to any interest that looks to destroy our Nation. There comes a time when action and force become an absolute necessity. The families of those who died in this unspeakable horror, mothers, fathers, children, old and young, deserve to know that they did not die in vain. From this day forward we are a wiser, changed people, stronger, more united, firm in our commitment to our government, our country, our freedom, and to justice. Fear must not be allowed to rule us. God bless America.

US Senate, "A United Response" US Senate, 14/09/01

Available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/C?r107:./temp/~r107zWk850 accessed 16/09/09

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, there is a time to talk and there is a time to act. The Senate today has unanimously acted with force, with resolve, and with unanimity. We spoke for the people of our country about the heinous situation in which we find ourselves, and also about the resolve to keep this from happening again. We have passed a resolution giving the President of the United States our support and authorization for the use of military force against any person or any country that is helping the people who did the despicable acts of September 11. I heard a young woman on television this morning whose brother was lost in one of the World Trade Center Towers. The young woman was asked what she thought the response of the United States should be. She said, ``I don't really want to go to war. I just don't want anyone else to have to suffer what I am suffering today.'' I just want to say to that young woman, and to all of the other families of the victims of September 11, 2001, that it is exactly what we did today that will prevent other people in the future from suffering what she is suffering. If we do not respond with force, we will put American lives in jeopardy, and we will not be doing our job of protecting the people of our country whom we were elected to protect. No one would ever have the United States move before we had absolute evidence about who perpetrated this atrocity, but when we have that evidence, we are going to move.

The Senate is speaking today in support of the President to take military action against those who have attacked our country, our people, our way of life, our very freedom. The most important responsibility I believe I have as a Senator is to keep the freedom that so many have died for in past years for our country. We are the beacon of freedom in the world. We are a democracy that has proven that, through our voting capabilities, we can become the strongest nation on Earth. It is freedom that is the foundation of the democracy and our way of life. To make sure we keep the freedom we have known--our mothers, fathers, grandmothers, and grandfathers have known--for our children and grandchildren, we must act decisively when an act of war has been perpetrated on innocent people of our country. As to the act that occurred on September 11--a day we will never forget in our lifetime, nor will our children or grandchildren ever forget--the only way we can respond to that kind of attack on our people and our freedom is to say we will fight, not just today or next month or 2 months from now, but we are in this for the long haul, and we are going to rid the world of the despots who believe they can prey on innocent citizens against freedom-loving people in the world. I am proud of the Senate. I am proud that we did not dillydally around to say, ``I wonder what we ought to do,'' but we are putting our faith in the President of the United States, our military forces, and our leaders who have the decision-making capabilities and the control of the military to act on our behalf and on behalf of the people of our country to assure that this will not happen again, and the force that we use will have the appropriate impact to protect ourselves and our freedom-loving allies wherever they may be in the world. Thank you, Mr. President. I yield the floor.

[...]

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, my mom has an expression: Out of every tragedy, something good will come if you look hard enough. I know the Presiding Officer, if he will forgive this point of personal reference, has had his share of personal tragedy. Everyone in this Chamber has. Some of us have gotten those phone calls that the people in New York are getting from cell phones and/or from a police officer and/or from a morgue. We know there is not a darn thing we can do now for those people except--it is strange the way human nature works, and I know the Presiding Officer knows this--except it is amazing how those people in that circumstance draw strength from the knowledge that other people understand their pain, that other people empathize with them, that other people care about what they are going through. It amazes me that you can draw strength from that. I think what we are doing and the Nation is doing is the right thing. Most important, what we did today should be noted is not likely to occur in any other country in the world, and that is, that we just a few moments ago operated under the rule of law. In all our anger, all our frustration, all our feelings, very bluntly, of hatred that exists now for those who perpetrated the act against us, we did not pell-mell just say: Go do anything, anytime, anyplace, Mr. President; you have to just go. We operated as our Founders, who were not naive people, intended us to operate. We operated under the rule of law. We went to our civil bible, the Constitution, and we said: What does it call for here? What it calls for is the U.S. Congress to meet its constitutional responsibility, to say: Mr. President, we authorize you, in the name of the American people, to take action, and we define the action in generic terms which you can take. We gave the President today, as we should have and as is our responsibility, all the authority he needs to prosecute war against the individuals or countries responsible, without yielding our constitutional right to retain the judgment in the future as to whether or not force against others could, should, or would be used. That is remarkable. I suspect not many people know, other than my distinguished colleague, the Senator from Texas, a former professor, one of the brightest guys with whom I ever worked, unfortunately leaving the Senate at the end of his term; what the leading scholar in the Senate, Senator *Byrd*, knows and what the experienced Senator from Alaska knows. My friend from Oklahoma is the only one in this place who can fully understand, I suspect, along with his Oklahoma colleague, what our friends from New Jersey, New York, Virginia, the District, and Maryland are going through. He understands it. He has internalized it. He knows it. I believe it is fairly remarkable that, in spite of the reasons for the attack on us and our way of life, we adhered to the rule of law; that even in this calamity, we acted with dispatch but under the law, under the Constitution. The resolution provides the President clear authority ``to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons that he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.'' In short, the President is authorized to go after those responsible for the barbaric acts of September 11, 2001 to ensure that those same actors do not engage in additional acts of international terrorism against the United States. The

authority permits the President wide latitude to use force against the broad range of actors who were responsible for the September 11 attacks. If any nation harbored the terrorists while they were in training, that nation may be subject to American military power. If a nation or organization financed the operation, they may be subject to American military power. It does not limit the amount of time that the President may prosecute this action against the parties guilty for the September 11 attacks. We must all understand that the use of force will not be easy or quick. In extending this broad authority to cover those ``planning, authorizing, committing, or aiding the attacks'' it should go without saying, however, that the resolution is directed only at using force abroad to combat acts of international terrorism. The authority granted is focused on those responsible for the attacks of September 11. The President's lawyers originally proposed that the resolved clause also include language authorizing military force to ``deter and pre-empt any future acts of terrorism against the United States.'' Of course, the President has the Constitutional authority to deter terrorism through a broad range of means, including diplomatic measures, economic sanctions, seizing of financial assets, or deployment of forces. The President must also ensure that Executive Branch agencies devote the necessary resources and apply the full measure of the federal criminal laws to deter, prevent and punish terrorism. Further, the President has the authority under the Constitution to use force to pre-empt an imminent attack, including a terrorist attack, against the United States. Rather than purporting to extend these authorities in the resolved clause, the final whereas clause reflects these recognized powers of the President. I suggest what others have said, and that is, the President of the United States has our prayers, he has our good wishes, and he has our commitment under the Constitution now to support him in what action he takes as defined by the authority he has. That is a big deal. It is a big deal. It is worth noting. Lastly, I compliment the President on his patience, on his resolve, and his understanding of the need of certitude because the worst thing we can do, as he is uniting the world, is to act precipitously to meet our instinct for response immediately. I compliment him. I compliment his Secretary of State for the way he is handling this situation. I conclude by saying that I do not see what happened on the 11th as the beginning of the end of our way of life. I see it as the beginning of the end of terrorism as it has been able to be spawned over the last three decades. The world has come face to face with the reality that nation states, no matter what their ideological disposition, are all in jeopardy. We are united in understanding that we cannot allow these networks to be spawned. I thank my colleagues for allowing me to speak at this moment. Again, I compliment them all, Democrat and Republican, in the way we have stood united. I yield the floor.

Pallone, Rep. N.J., H6244 "Congressional Record – House" Oct 3, 2001

Available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/C?r107:./temp/~r1073aosil accessed 17/09/09

Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Speaker, I wanted to spend some time this evening talking about the tragedy at the World Trade Center, the terrorist attack.I do intend to get a little personal with regard to my district, which happens to be very close to New York City. Many of the people who worked in the World Trade Center and who died in the World Trade Center were actually my constituents. I also would like to talk a little bit this evening about some of the things that we are doing in Congress in response to the terrorist attack, some of the things that we have already done legislatively, and where I think we may go or should go over the next few weeks or the next few months in terms of what we do in Congress to respond to that attack. I may or may not be joined by other colleagues this evening so I may not use all the time; but, Mr. Speaker, I wanted to say on a personal note, I visited the World Trade Center with President Bush the Friday after September 11, and it was a very devastating scene at the site, at ground zero. I used to work in New York City in a building known as the Equitable Building. I commuted back and forth to New Jersey, to my district, when I was younger. The Equitable Building is basically a block away from the World Trade Center. If you walk out, you used to be able to see the World Trade Center. Of course, I went to the World Trade Center many times in the course of my work when I worked in downtown Manhattan, so it really was a shock to go to ground zero in Manhattan the Friday after the terrorist attack and to see the devastation. But I have to say that as upset as I was that day in seeing the devastation and the piles of rubble, I was uplifted by so many volunteers that came from my own State and my own district and from all over the country, really, to try to help out, both initially, in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks, and then, of course, in the days and weeks now that follow. They were people who were involved in the rescue operations and in clearing the place. It was really an uplifting experience seeing all those people out there working together. I think when I was standing there on that Friday and the President came by, there were three firemen from Hollywood, Florida, who wanted a chance to shake the President's hand. Of course, I kind of hustled them up so they could shake the President's hand. I really did not have any idea until I got there that day that there

were police and fire and emergency rescue workers that were coming from as far away as Florida. There were probably many from even further away, from other parts of the country, or even from other parts of the world, for all I know. It was really, as I said, an uplifting experience to be able to witness all of that in the face of this tragedy. I wanted to say if I could, Mr. Speaker, that I want my constituents and residents in New Jersey to know how much the people of New York, the leaders in New York, appreciated all the things that New Jersey volunteers did. My district is actually across the water or across what we call the Raritan Bay. One can actually take a ferry from the World Trade Center area and in the course of maybe half an hour, 40 minutes, reach my district on the other side of Sandy Hook and Raritan Bay. What we found in the aftermath of the tragedy is that many of the volunteers from my district were helping ferry people back and forth, as well as supplies back and forth to Manhattan on the ferries that traveled back and forth. Mr. Speaker, we lost probably, in the two counties that I represent, Middlesex and Monmouth Counties, about 200 or so people in the World Trade Center. Needless to say, at this point most of the people have had memorial services and their relatives have reconciled themselves to the fact that their loved ones are not going to return. I have attended many vigils in the district. We also had two forums in the district in the week after September 11. One of them was in Middlesex County and the other was in Monmouth County. The one in Monmouth County, my home county, where there were the larger percentage of the victims, was actually held in Middletown. Middletown is a suburban community where some of the ferries operate. Middletown lost over 30 people, and probably had more victims of the tragedy than any other municipality, other than New York City itself. There was an article, Mr. Speaker, in the Washington Post on September 24 that talked about Middletown and the tragedy and how it impacted the people in Middletown. I do not want to read the whole article because it is very lengthy, but I will include it in the **RECORD**. Mr. Speaker, I will quote a few things from the article. It is rather sad. I know as time goes on we do not want to dwell on the sorrow, but I do think that because Middletown lost so many people, that I would like to read some sections of the article, because I think it says so much about how people suffered and how they responded. A lot of the thoughts that were in this article in the Washington Post were expressed at the forum that I had in Middletown within a week or so after the World Trade Center tragedies. Some of it was actually uplifting. When we had the forum at the VFW in Middletown, some of the women that were part of the Ladies Auxiliary at the Veterans of Foreign Wars there, they helped a lot with the forum; and one of them actually wrote a national prayer which I would like to read. If I could just take a minute to read some of the accounts in the Washington Post, it starts off, ``New Jersey Town Becomes Community of Sorrow. Commuter Haven Took Heavy Hit.'' It is written by Dale Russikoff from the Washington Post, Monday, September 24. It says, ``Middletown, New Jersey. It was the water and the great city just 10 miles across it that drew them here. By train or bus, New York is little more than an hour away, but by far the most romantic commute, an oxymoron in most other towns, is by water. At dawn, people who leave split levels and colonials and ranch homes by the thousands board ferries at Sandy Hook Point, and 45 minutes later look up from laptops and newspapers to see the sun rising behind the majestic Manhattan skyline and the World Trade Center towers, where much of Middletown worked. ``Wall Street money built mansions in places such as Greenwich, Connecticut, and Large Mountain, New York, but in Middletown, New Jersey, as the name implies, they created a suburban ideal for the State's up-and-comers, safe neighborhoods, good schools, strong churches, open spaces, roomy houses with mortgages they didn't choke on. ``So when the Twin Towers fell on September 11, much of Middletown fell with them. The official toll stands at 36, and authorities fear it will reach 50, among the highest, if not the highest, of any town outside New York City. But the aggregate number does not begin to convey the losses.'' Mr. Speaker, it goes on to talk about the grieving residents, my grieving residents. It talks on a little bit about the experiences after the tragedy. It says that more than half of the people who we lost in Middletown ``..... worked for Cantor Fitzgerald,'' and I am quoting again from the Washington Post, the fabulously successful bond brokerage at the top of the World Trade Center Tower 1 that lost 700 employees. ``For a generation, now, Middletown has been a beacon for the young traders of Cantor Fitz. That was the nickname.'' I understand that most of the people that were lost in Cantor Fitzgerald were on the 105th floor, so basically they had no chance to escape. It was where the terrorist plane actually hit, so they did not really have the opportunity to escape. The last thing I wanted to read from this Washington Post article, it was when we had the forum in Middletown the week after the World Trade Center tragedy. As I said, it was at the VFW. I would like, Mr. Speaker, for my colleagues to understand that Middletown is not only a commuter town, but it also has a military base. Earle Naval Weapons Depot is located there and there are several thousand people that work at the Navy weapons depot. There is a lot of loyalty and pride in Middletown over the fact that Earle is based there and that there is a long tradition of the sailors being there and of people working at the base. Middletown is also not very far from Fort Monmouth in Monmouth County, which is an Army base that has about 12,000 employees and is the

communications and electronics command for the Army. So we have in Middletown and in Monmouth County and in my entire district, a strong affinity with the military. It was interesting because when I was at the VFW that night in Middletown, even with so many people having died from that town, and even with the military bases being there and people already getting prepared at the base for a potential war against terrorism, many of the people that showed up, and many of them had fought in World War II and Korea and Vietnam, stressed the fact that they wanted us only to go after the terrorists. They did not want bombing and ground troops to go into Afghanistan or some other places unless it was actually going to mean that we were going to get the terrorists and the people responsible, or the people that harbored. They did not just want us to get involved in an indiscriminate war that might impact innocent people. I was not surprised by that, but I think it needs to be stressed because sometimes in Congress we worry about the nature of our response. This was the last section from the Washington Post that is sort of on point in this article. It says, ``Not all the people of Middletown are comforted by talk of war. Many have children in the military who may soon be in harm's way and several who lost family members in the September 11 attack are horrified to hear Americans calling for people of other countries to die en masse to avenge their loved ones.'' Mr. Speaker, I wanted to read this National prayer that I said was composed by the chaplain, Emma Elberfeld. This was a prayer that was basically handed out that evening at the VFW and it says, ``Lord, we come to you on bended knee, head bowed and our hearts filled to overflowing with so much grief for the many people who have been injured and killed in our National crisis. We ask you, Lord, to give courage and strength to those who so bravely go to their aid. Although their hearts are heavy and filled with sorrow, we ask you, Lord, to give them the endurance needed to help them through this difficult task. ``Please give us the strength, Lord, to get through each difficult and devastating day that faces each of us in our country. Protect and guide our military that are now being called to duty. ``We ask, Lord, please guide our leaders of this great country in their hour of decision. The burden that has been placed on shoulders during this crisis has been overwhelming. We humbly ask that with Your infinite wisdom, You guide them gently to the right decisions. ``Lastly, Lord, we ask that You allow us all to come together as a Nation. Help us stand tall and united so that we might help each other in our hour of need. Amen.'' This is by Emma Elberfeld, chaplain, and Peg Centrella, Americanism chairlady. Mr. Speaker, I wanted to, if I could, spend a little time, in part, this is for my constituents, talking about some of the responses that we have had here in Congress, how we have dealt with the situation and where I think we should go from here. I should mention that next Monday I have scheduled in my district a forum on homeland security, because there has been a lot of concern about what Congress will do to secure things at home. Health concerns, for example, the threat of chemical or biological warfare. Also, I have a forum scheduled the following Sunday, I believe October 14, where we are going to talk and stress tolerance because I should explain that my district is very diverse ethnically. I had a meeting one night in one of the towns that I represent called North Brunswick, which is near New Brunswick where Rutgers University is headquartered. I could count people from 30 different countries of the 40 or so people that came to the forum. They were from such exotic place as Uzbekistan, for example. We have a very high percentage in my district of Asian Americans, of Americans from the Mideast, large Indian populations, South Asian population, Pakistani population, Sri Lanka, and a large Muslim population as well. There has been a great deal of concern about the fact that we need to be tolerant. That we do not want people who happen to look Arab or Pakistani or from Central Asia that they be targeted and somehow they be seen as at fault for the attack on September 11. I will talk a little bit more about that this evening, although I do not intend to go on too much longer. As you know, Mr. Speaker, that we passed in the immediate aftermath of the World Trade Center tragedy, we passed a supplemental appropriations bill, of which I think was $40 billion of which half, about $20 billion, has to go to help the victims and the rescue operations that resulted from the World Trade Center tragedy and the Pentagon attack. I want everyone to understand in my district and in New Jersey that a significant amount of that money will go not only to help victims, but also to help the towns and the fire departments and those that provided rescue operations, because the bill, as you can imagine, is rather extensive. We also, as you know, Mr. Speaker, within a few days after the World Trade Center attack, passed a resolution authorizing the President's use of force. I will say once again and reiterate, as I assume every one of my colleagues feels very strongly, that basically we were authorizing the President to use whatever force was necessary in order to go after these terrorists, to eliminate the terrorist cells and the network, and also to be used against those who harbor or protect or supply the terrorists. I am 100 percent supportive of that, that everything that needs to be done should be done to make sure that they are rooted out and they do not pose a threat again to the United States or to innocent victims here in the United States. As I mentioned, myself and the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. **HOLT**) who also represents parts of Monmouth and Middlesex Counties, we both visited to the two military bases that we share, Earle Naval Weapons Depot as well as Fort Monmouth, and we saw the state of readiness that they are at. Earle is the only ammunition

depot on the Eastern seaboard that has the capacity to take ammunition by rail, if you will, from the heartland of the United States, and then has direct access to the Atlantic Ocean so that that ammunition can then be transported to ships and naval vessels that would have to go to a theater of war in the Atlantic or over in the Persian Gulf. Fort Monmouth is the communications and electronics command for the Army. Anything that involves communications or electronics that is supportive of the war effort against terrorism essentially goes through Fort Monmouth. They do all the research and development under CECOM, Communications and Electronics Command, for the Army, but they are also involved in communications in the field for a soldier that is in place in a theater of war. So one can see how significant these bases are, and myself and Congressman **HOLT** went to visit. We were very much pleased by what we saw in terms of the state of readiness and everybody being so organized to take part in this response to terrorism, and we will continue to do whatever we can to be supportive of those bases. Also, Mr. Speaker, the next week after the World Trade Center attack, we came back to Congress and we passed the airline bailout bill, as I call it, and that was very important for my home State of New Jersey, because although we do not have a major airport in my District, we are not very far from Newark Airport and Continental Airlines. Of course, it is a major depot for them and we do have many people that have been laid off and we have the airlines suffering. So that was an important bill. I did want to say that I think many of my colleagues have pointed out, and particularly last night, we had a special order led by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. **HASTINGS**) where he talked about his displaced workers legislation. I, for one, and I know many of my Democratic colleagues were very concerned that that airline bailout bill did not provide any kind of benefits or help for workers who had been laid off, of which I have many in my District, and we will continue to agitate that the House leadership, the Republican leadership, needs to bring up a displaced workers bill so that those workers who have been laid off in the airline industry or in any industry that has suffered as a result of the World Trade Center tragedies, that those people who have been laid off would get extended health benefits, extended unemployment benefits and other benefits that are necessary for them to feed their families and to keep going and training to get another job if they cannot go back to their position in the airline industry or in the limousine industry. For example, I mentioned limousines, because when I had my forum in Middletown, when I approached the VFW that night after the World Trade Center tragedy to have the forum, I noticed a number of limousines that were parked outside. I said, well, what is this, what are the limousines doing here? Then I walked into the forum and realized that these were limousine operators and drivers who had been laid off or who were making 5 or 10 percent of the trips that they used to make because a lot of it was to the airports or to New York City, and they need help, too. So, even though we did the airline bailout, we need also to look at other industries that have been impacted, and we certainly need to help those displaced workers who have lost their jobs. The other thing that we need to do in the future, and I know the Democrats in particular have been talking about, the form of an economic stimulus package. Obviously, since I am so close to New York City and have a lot of people that work in New York in the securities industry in New York, in the Stock Exchange, we are very concerned about what is happening there and the economy in general, and we need to provide a package that will stimulate the economy and get us out of this slump that we have been in. Of course, I, and I know the Democrats have been stressing the need to provide a stimulus package that just does not help the corporations, or just does not help wealthy people, but also helps the average person so that this money gets back into the economy and is spent and helps stimulate the economy. I wanted to talk a little bit now, if I could, before I end about these two other forums that I do plan to have over the next week or so, the one next Monday on homeland security and the one the following Sunday, I believe, on the issue of tolerance. Within the Democratic Caucus, we have a Homeland Security Task Force that actually is chaired by one of my colleagues, the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. **MENENDEZ**), and they are in the process of putting together a principles and actions on the issue of homeland security. Some people have said to me when I use the term ``homeland security,'' what does that mean? What are you talking about? Basically, when I have had forums in my District, the issues that I put under the rubric of homeland security have come up quite a bit, and there has been a lot of discussion about it, issues such as what would happen in the event of a chemical or biological attack? Is our water supply secure? Are our nuclear plants, which we have some in New Jersey, secure? These are the kinds of things we need to respond to and deal with, obviously, over the next few weeks. In addition, there is the whole issue of security with regard to means of transportation other than airlines. I heard Senator *Biden* from the other body speaking on the Senate floor just a few hours ago about Amtrak and about trains. Obviously in New Jersey, we are in the middle of the northeast corridor for Amtrak, the Metroliner, other high speed trains. One train obviously carries a lot more passengers than an airline does, and yet until September 11, I do not think anybody thought much about the security of a train. In my District, and I am sure it is true all over the country, even to take a Metroliner or a high speed train, you basically walk on with your bags. Nobody checks your bags. If you have a

Metroliner, usually they will check your ticket to see if you have a ticket, but there is not the consciousness that you need to worry about security. Well, we need to. We need to worry about security for all forms of transportation: buses, trains, and other kinds of mass transit. And the other issue that has come up at the forums which fits under this rubric of homeland security, and there are many, but at the forum that I had in Middlesex County, in Edison, New Jersey, a lot of people talked about emergency management concerns and communications. In other words, how we communicate in the event of a terrorist attack. Do we have the ability to provide information? Most people were watching CNN, but there needs to be an emergency system absent CNN to communicate with people. And there was talk about whether that needs to be done at a State level or at the county level. These are the kinds of things that come up under the general category of homeland security, and of course they need to be addressed. Hopefully, we will address them here in the Congress over the next few weeks and the next few months. The last thing I wanted to mention, and I just mentioned having this forum in another week or so on the issue of tolerance, this is very important in my district but I think all over the country because of the diversity of our citizens, and particularly in my district because we have so many citizens that either are Muslim or could look like the stereotype that we have of somebody who comes from the Middle East or South Asia. A lot of my constituents, whether they be Indian, Pakistani, or whatever their religion, have told me they have actually experienced in some cases threats, in some cases slurs, whatever, in the aftermath of the tragedy. We actually had one person, who was from Milltown, Mr. Hassan from Milltown, in my district, who had moved to Texas to set up a small grocery store a few months before September 11. His wife and his family were still in Milltown. He was actually murdered within a few days after the World Trade Center attack. Most of the information we have seems to indicate that it was a hate crime. Of course, they brought his body back to my district, to Milltown, and there was a service at the mosque in South Brunswick. I spoke to his widow on the phone. With all the tragedies that we had in my district and all the people that died at the World Trade Center, I think talking to Mrs. Hassan was the most difficult conversation I have had in the last few weeks, if not in the last few years, because she talked about his patriotism and why he came to the United States; because he wanted to live in a free country, and how he believed in America. He was a capitalist, obviously, in the sense he wanted to open up a small business and be successful. She expressed in such an eloquent way why it was important for us in this country to speak of tolerance and not tag Muslim Americans or Pakistani or Indian Americans as somehow involved in terrorist attacks. That is why I think it is important that we all continue to speak out on the issue of tolerance. I was very impressed with President Bush, and my colleagues know I do not always agree with President Bush on many things, but I was so impressed with the fact that every day, not only on the day of the tragedy, September 11, but on the Thursday after, when I met him at the White House, on the Friday when we went to the World Trade Center, and when he addressed a joint session of Congress the following week, on every one of those occasions and every occasion I have seen him talk about the tragedies of September 11 he would talk about Muslims and how Islam does not preach violence, and that Muslim Americans should not be tagged and should not be treated any differently because of this World Trade Center attack. We need to continue to do that. I have to say I was very impressed that in my district we had a number of vigils that I attended. At every one of the vigils that I have attended since September 11 there was a Muslim religious leader present to say a prayer and to offer condolences. And I think that the people organizing those vigils in my district were going out of their way to make sure that there was a Muslim cleric there saying a prayer, to make the point that Islam does not preach violence, and that the people who are of Muslim descent in the district and around the country should in no way be associated with this terrorist attack. We know, in fact, that many Muslims and people of Mid Eastern or South Asian origin died in the World Trade Center. There were Palestinians, there were Pakistanis, and there were many Indian Americans. And when I went to see the rescue operations, I saw many of those people, either physicians or rescue workers or people involved in voluntary efforts that were from those same groups as well. It is crucial that we continue to preach tolerance. Hopefully, we could even see some progress in some legislative initiatives, such as the hate crimes legislation that would increase penalties for hate crimes. Maybe we can also, in the aftermath of the World Trade Center attacks, pass legislation that would prohibit racial profiling. These are the kinds of things in a positive way that could be done as a positive response to the World Trade Center attacks in order to preach tolerance and to put this Nation on record legislatively even stronger against any kind of racial or ethnic attacks. With that, Mr. Speaker, I wanted to end, if I could this evening, with a letter that was sent to me by one of my constituents from Long Branch, which is my hometown. This was at one of the meetings I held. This was a meeting I held with some Long Branch residents in the aftermath of the World Trade Center attacks. This was sent to me and written by Colleen Rose, who lives at 311 Liberty Street in Long Branch, in my hometown, not far from my congressional office and not far from where I live. She really sums up well the way I feel and the way I think also most of my constituents feel. It is titled,

``To the Terrorists That This Concerns: ``It is obvious from your actions that you wanted me to feel the way you do. Well, I am an American. I have choices. I will not be controlled. ``Where you would have my country and those slain seen as victims, I choose to see them as patriots. Americans are not victims. ``Where your actions would have me feel fear, I choose to feel the courage, strength, and comfort of my countrymen around me. ``Where your actions would have me feel terror, I choose to feel pride in the way the people in the Pittsburgh plane crash fought back and downed the plane in the safest place possible, sparing as many lives as possible. And the way our rescue workers go on heedless of the possible injury to themselves. ``Where your actions would have me feel hopeless, I choose to feel great hope and faith in the overwhelming efforts of a Nation and world doing all that it can to come together as one people. ``Where your actions would have me feel powerless, I choose to feel empowered by my own actions in assisting the recovery in any way that I am able. ``Where you would have us cry tears of sorrow, I choose, and have chosen over the past few days, to cry tears of joy for the two rescue workers who exited the wreckage and were not added to the list of casualties, and for the acts of human kindness being expressed on a global scale. ``Where you have sent fire balls through the sky, I choose to light candles as an expression of spirit and solidarity. ``Where you have attempted to cause chaos, I choose to find stability in simple things, like the gifts of a first grade class sending a thousand peanut butter and jelly sandwiches with Hershey kisses taped to the top to the rescue teams. ``Where you have looked to demoralize us, we have chosen as a people to find a depth of national cohesion I had not thought possible. ``Where you would have me feel hate, I choose to give you none of my emotional energy. You get nothing from me, especially not something as strong and powerful as hate. You will be treated like the cancer you are and cut off of the body of humanity to save the greater whole. I hope that this is done with the medical detachment and accuracy of a surgeon cutting out the bad tissue to preserve what is good. ``Where you would have us overreact to your handiwork to prove to the world that we are evil, I would choose to respond and take out only those who would create such a chaos in the future and on other innocents of our global family. I pray my country feels the same way. ``In short, where you have looked to do us a great disservice, we have chosen to do ourselves a great service. We have chosen to take this as a reminder of what we really are. We have chosen to see each other as people, not as colors or races or creeds or majorities or minorities, but as people `with certain inalienable rights.'. ``We will continue to choose."

Pitts, Rep., H6167 "America's response to terror" House of Representatives, 03/10/2001

Available at: http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query accessed 20/08/09

Mr. PITTS. Mr. Speaker, this great and powerful Nation of ours is about to respond. We will respond mightily. We will respond, not just against the terrorists themselves, but against those who harbor and protect them. The Taliban of Afghanistan is at the very top of the list. As we prepare to deal with them, we have to remember the civilians of that country. We must be careful to minimize the impact on the innocent people of Afghanistan. Mr. Speaker, I am a veteran. I know that sometimes innocent people die in war, but in the case of Afghanistan, perhaps more than any other, we will be at war with the terrorist organizations and with the government that aids and abets them, not with the people. The people of Afghanistan are victims too. They have been brutalized by the Taliban, by the communists who were there before them. They have not known peace for decades. Millions have starved and become refugees. We will need to help those surrounding countries that will be impacted by the refugees. We need to communicate to the people of Afghanistan, reach out to them and let them know that we are their friends, and that once Osama bin Laden and the Taliban are gone, and they will be gone, we want to be a friend and ally to the people of Afghanistan.

Wellstone, Senator "Refugee Crisis in Afghanistan" 01/10/01

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Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I want to talk about an amendment that I hope will be part of the Defense authorization bill. But as long as we are talking about the resolution for a moment, I want to borrow from a piece I just finished writing. I will not go through the whole piece, but that deals with the humanitarian catastrophe that is now taking place in Afghanistan. I think it is relevant to talk about this.You have a situation on the ground that is unimaginable: 4 years of relentless drought, the worst in

3 decades, and the total failure of the Taliban government to administer to the country. Four million people have abandoned their homes in search of food in Pakistan, Iran, and elsewhere. Those left behind now eat meals of locust and animal fodder. This is in Afghanistan. Five million people inside this country are threatened by famine, according to the United Nations. As President Bush made clear, we are waging a campaign against terrorists, not ordinary Afghans--I think that is an important distinction to make--who are some of the poorest and most beleaguered people on the planet and who were actually our allies during the cold war. Any military action by our country must be targeted against those responsible for the terror acts and those harboring them. And we must plan such action to minimize the danger to innocent civilians who are on the edge of starvation. Let me repeat that one more time. Any military action must be targeted against those who are responsible for the terror acts and those who have harbored them. And we must plan such action to minimize the danger to innocent civilians who are on the edge of starvation. And we must be prepared to address any humanitarian consequences of whatever action we take as soon as possible. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a piece that I just finished writing be printed in the **RECORD**. There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the **RECORD,** as follows: U.S. Must Lead Efforts to Prevent Refugee Crisis in Afghanistan (By U.S. Senator Paul Wellstone, Chairman, Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, September 28, 2001) The September 11 attacks in New York and Washington require our country to respond assertively and effectively against international terrorism. As the Administration reviews all its options, it must consider the humanitarian consequences of any military action against terrorist sites in Afghanistan, and take urgent steps now to address them. Even before the world focused on it as a sanctuary for Osama bin Laden and other terrorists, Afghanistan was on the brink of a humanitarian catastrophe, the site of the greatest crisis in hunger and refugee displacement in the world. Now the worsening situation on the ground is almost unimaginable. After four years of relentless drought, the worst in three decades, and the total failure of the Taliban government in administering the country, four million people have abandoned their homes in search of food in Pakistan, Iran, Tajikistan and elsewhere, while those left behind eat meals of locusts and animal fodder. Five million people inside the country are threatened by famine, according to the United Nations. As President Bush made clear, we are waging a campaign against terrorists, not ordinary Afghans, who are some of the poorest and most beleaguered people on the planet and were our allies during the Cold War. Any military action must thus be targeted against those responsible for the terror attacks and those harboring them; planned to minimize the danger to innocent civilians on the edge of starvation; and prepared to address any humanitarian consequences as soon as possible. Since it seems clear that a major international refugee influx will require a massive expansion of existing refugee camps, and creation of new ones, the U.S. and our U.N. Security Council allies should also be thinking now about how to protect those camps, including possibly using a U.N.-sanctioned military force drawn primarily from Arab nations. Osama bin Laden is not a native of Afghanistan, but of Saudi Arabia. Most Afghans do not support bin Laden. Instead, ninety percent of the Afghan people are subsistence farmers struggling simply to grow enough food to stay alive. War widows, orphans, and thousands of others in the cities are dependent upon international aid to survive. Now, anticipating military strikes by the U.S. hundreds of thousands of Afghan civilians are on the move, fleeing the cities for their native villages or for the borders. According to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, nearly 20,000 have gathered at one Pakistani border crossing alone. The U.N. says it is the most tense border point in the world, with thousands of people out in the open, exposed to scorching days and frigid nights. Kandahar, the spiritual seat of the Taliban, is said to be ``half empty.'' Those who are left behind are the most vulnerable--the elderly, orphans, war widows, and the mentally and physically disabled. Inside Afghanistan, the U.N.'s World Food Programme (UNWFP) aid--much of it U.S.-donated wheat--is the sole source of food for millions. After the attacks on September 11th, the UNWFP was forced to pull out. It left two weeks of food stocks to be administered by local U.N. staff, but Taliban officials last Monday broke into the U.N. compound and stole thousands of tons of grain. Under intense international pressure, the UNWFP has announced it will resume shipments of grain to Afghanistan. Yet how it will be distributed is uncertain, as the Taliban has severed contact between international aid groups and their Afghan staffs, and taken over many of their facilities. To get needed aid in, and slow the outflow of Afghan refugees driven by a lack of food at home, the Pakistani government should immediately relax its border restrictions enough to allow the flow of food and other humanitarian aid into Afghanistan, while maintaining border security. There is no easy solution to this building crisis, and yet our government must aggressively seek solutions to the critical needs of Afghan civilians. As one of its most urgent tasks, the United States must do its part to shore up relief operations and help to again get aid flowing to refugees now. We also must prepare for an already critical situation to worsen as Afghanistan heads into its notoriously harsh winter. We must prepare now for huge numbers of refugees and humanitarian problems in the aftermath of military strikes, repositioning in

the region the people and resources needed to deal with it. The U.N. and several privately-funded aid groups are working frantically to set up new camps and bring in supplies and personnel to sites along the border. And yet, developing a stronger response to a massive outflow of Afghans into Pakistan is sure to put pressure on already over-burdened camps, and by extension Pakistani resources and patience. Pakistan is already host to over a million refugees from Afghanistan; 170,000 came as a result of recent drought in Afghanistan. Others fled earlier and have been in Pakistan for years. The United States must do everything it can now to alleviate the suffering of ordinary Afghan civilians. We have agreed to participate in U.N. efforts to raise quickly almost $600 million in aid funds, a number likely to grow. We should be leading that effort, including by contributing substantially. The U.S. and our allies cannot afford to be indifferent to this humanitarian crisis, especially as we seek to build a coalition of moderate Arab and non-Arab Muslims around the globe for our anti-terror efforts. If a humanitarian catastrophe in Afghanistan is attributed to our military operations, it will weaken international support for our fight against terrorism, and may even make the American people more vulnerable in the end.

Jackson-Lee, Rep. TX, "Not all lawmakers back plan on Iraq" House of Representatives, 17/06/02

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Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, as many in this Nation and many around the world, I do not like Saddam Hussein. I do not like him for what he does to the children of his nation, the women of his nation, and the people who are in need in his nation. I do not like what he does with the humanitarian aid, holding it hostage, so those who need medicine and health care, nutrition, those who go hungry, are not served well by his leadership. There is no doubt that he has the capacity and has been engaged in manufacturing weapons of terror and also the kind of chemical warfare that all the world abhors. He is not the kind of leader that any of us would advocate for. But I raise my voice out of concern for the recent announcements over the past weekend, now finding out that these are somewhat old in their pronouncements, that there are those who previously in months past were aware of the thinking of the administration dealing with covert action in Iraq. In fact, there are articles in our newspapers across the Nation suggesting lawmakers back action against Iraq. Let me step aside, Mr. Speaker, and stand outside of that circle and speak for what I believe to be many of those in the United States who will ask the question, are we prepared, and what is the basis of that action? I have already stated that the leader of this nation, the leader of the Iraq nation, that is, is not a person who advocates the values that we believe in. I have already indicated that I believe that the country needs a change in leadership. But in respect to the approach, the question has to be, What is the involvement in oversight of the United States Congress? What are the decisions that will be made with respect to these actions? We well know that, tragically, Saddam Hussein tried to assassinate one of our Presidents, and we cannot tolerate that; and I would not stand for that kind of action or advocate it or allow it to go unpunished. But we also know that there is no indication that he had anything to do with the horrible act of September 11. We also know that his activities can be classified as bumbling. We also realize that if we are to engage in a covert action that may include the killing of this leader out of self-defense, that we may also put this Nation's military personnel in the position of a ground war. It has been suggested that 200,000 men and women would be needed for a ground war in Iraq. We realize that Korea was not successful to the point we wanted. The DMZ still exists between North and South Korea, and there is the tragedy of terrible hunger and devastation going on in North Korea. Though we pay tribute to the men who fought in the Korean War, and we thank them, we still have North and South Korea. We also realize that though we pay tribute to the thousands of young men who lost their lives and those who served in the Vietnam War, we know that Vietnam was not successful to the point we wanted. We also recognize that out of the turmoil of the Cold War, that the Berlin Wall did fall, and it fell because those in Berlin desired it to fall and the people brought it down. I believe we need more oversight and insight into decisions to be made regarding Iraq. I oppose these pronouncements suggesting that the next step is for this Nation to enter into a war. We realize that four prior covert actions involving everything from radio propaganda to paramilitary plots have failed to dislodge the Iraqi leader, just as smart bombs, Cruise Missiles and stiff economic sanctions have failed as well. I believe we need more deliberation. But, most importantly, I am aghast, if you will, at the fact that we are making these pronouncements with what I believe to be little thought. What is the plan? If we have a plan, bring it to the United States Congress. Yes, I understand there is need for the protection of our intelligence sources, and as well that there are decisions that the Commander in Chief has to make. But I am extremely opposed to these kind of war mongering efforts without any facts and without any

substance. It is important to realize that the lives of Americans are on the line. Yes, I am standing toe-to-toe and head-to-head and shoulder-to-shoulder on fighting terrorism in America. I supported the resolution that gave the President the authority to fight terrorism in Afghanistan. I am pleased that Chairman Karzai has recently taken over the leadership of Afghanistan so we will have a head of state to help us fight that war. But it is extremely important, Mr. Speaker, as I close, in light of the tragedy of September 11, in light of the questions about sharing intelligence between the FBI and the CIA, to know whether we are making the right decision of this covert action, whether or not we are putting our young men and women in jeopardy, in harm's way, without any facts and any study and any plan. No, lawmakers in totality are not for this plan, and we need to question it and stand up and be counted and not be afraid of being called unpatriotic, because I believe that that is what democracy is all about, is to ask the questions and get the solutions. Mr. Speaker, amid a growing debate over whether to expand the post-September 11 ``war on terrorism'' to Iraq and amid fears that Iraq could provide weapons of mass destruction expertise to terrorist groups, President Bush has threatened unspecified action against Iraq to prevent its re-emergence as a threat. The House passed H.J. Res. 75 by a vote of 392-12, which said that Iraq's refusal to readmit U.N. inspectors is a material breach of its international obligations and a mounting threat to peace and security. The resolution did not explicity authorize U.S. military action. Amid U.S. threats, Iraq held a meeting with U.N. Secretary General Annan on the restart of inspections. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld suggested that the United States would accept new inspections only if such inspections were unconditional and comprehensive, a standard that some Administration officials believe Iraq will never meet. Several Western and most Arab governments are opposed to a U.S. military campaign against Iraq, a message reinforced by Arab leaders to Vice President *Cheney* on his trip to the Middle East in March. Arab leaders have voiced opposition to an attack on Iraq at the Arab League summit, during which Iraq and Kuwait took some steps to reconcile. Top U.S. military leaders see major risks and difficulties in a large U.S. ground offensive, which could require up to 250,000 U.S. troops, intended to overthrow Saddam and install a new government. President Bush said that he has not decided on whether to authorize a U.S. military offensive against Iraq. The CIA proliferation assessment for Congress repeats U.S. suspicions of Iraqi rebuilding of and research on weapons of mass destruction but presents little hard evidence of such activity. Britain considered releasing in April 2002 a dossier of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction rebuilding but decided not to. The British concluded that its evidence was not sufficiently convincing. There are also allegations of illicit Iraqi imports of conventional military equipment. Iraq has been illicitly obtaining spare parts for fighter jets and helicopters from Belarus, Ukraine, and the former Yugoslavia. Additional reports discuss weapons buys from Ukraine. As international concerns for the plight of the Iraqi people has grown, the United States has found it increasingly difficult to maintain support for international sanctions. The ``oil-for-food'' program has been progressively modified to improve the living standards of Iraqis. The United States has eased its own sanctions to align them with the program. Iraq does not deserve international respect; that I agree with. However, unilateral foreign policy decisions affirmed by some leaders of Congress are not good either. We need full congressional oversight and review, including more voices to be heard, on whether covert action against Iraq would be successful or lead America into action against Iraq with no allies. I believe we have no consensus on an invasion of Iraq and I am requesting a full review by Congress of the Administration's move against Iraq now--and where it will lead us.

McInnis, Rep. "The Iraqi Situation" 09/09/02

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Mr. *McINNIS*. Mr. Speaker, I found the previous speakers' comments interesting. In part their comments were accurate, but I should point out that when we talk about the Kyoto treaty, what they should bring to the attention of the body is that when it was voted on by the United States Senate, the vote was 99-0. 99-0. That was not all Republicans, that was Democrats and Republicans combined in the United States Senate. Not one vote in favor of that so-called treaty. Why? Because that treaty unfairly assaulted the United States of America. Obviously we as elected representatives of this country want to stand in front of this body and stand in front of the American public and commit to do things that are better. We can do a lot more to conserve, everybody in this country, in this world, can do more to conserve and, frankly, conservation right now is going to get us a lot further than my colleague's suggestion that the President of the United States convert his ranch in Texas to solar power. Conservation is the answer right now. In the long run, solar power, in the long run energy from waves, in the long run energy from other sources is what is going to be the answer, but in the short time, sitting here and condemning the United States of America as some people might do or feeling that the United

States of America should hang its head low is wrong. The leading technologies in the world on environmental control, on assisting us with stopping pollution, on making coal cleaner burning and so on, without a doubt the leading technologies in the world are developed by the scientists in the United States of America. There is no other country in the world that has helped more other countries with their environmental problems, assisting them, sending them financial aid, doing anything we can to assist, than the United States of America. The United States of America has nothing to apologize about. The United States of America is committed to do things better. But I for one am tired of seeing foreign country after foreign country after foreign country bash the United States of America. And we see it come to this floor. Some of our colleagues, while well intended, seem to get up here and become apologists for the greatest country in the history of the world. This country, the United States of America, has fought for other countries, has gone overseas more than any other country in the history of the world to fight not for American land but to fight for other people in this world. Who do you think led the battle in Bosnia? Who do you think got communism out of Europe? You can go to example after example after example. It is the United States of America. To see some of my colleagues, or to see people stand up and continually bash the United States and put a spin on it is discouraging. Take a look at Berkeley University. I cannot even imagine. There is an actual debate at Berkeley University on the commemoration for September 11, whether they should allow red, white and blue to be worn. Not a flag, just the colors red, white and blue, whether they should be allowed to be worn on campus because it might offend somebody. The American flag might offend somebody, so maybe we ought to take it down. Come on. Give me a break. Patriotism in this country today is still very strong. This country has got a lot more things going right for it than it does wrong. This country will stand head to head with any other nation, not just existing nations today, but look in the history of the world, and I challenge my colleagues, look in the history of the world to find one nation that has done as much as this Nation has done for the poor people in the world, for hungry people in the world, gone to the defense of many, many nations in the history of the world, educated more people than any other country in the world, educated them to a higher level than any other country in the world. And what is the biggest export of this country that no other country can match? In fact, cumulatively, if you put all the history of the countries together in the world, they do not even come close to exporting what the United States of America exports as its biggest item. What is that item? It is freedom. The United States of America has broken the ice. It has taken the lead. It has put the footprints in the sand for freedom. And we see that some of our citizens for some reason act ashamed of being an American. The beauty of freedom is that they can always move. If the beauty of this country is so bad that you do not think it can be improved or you think that you have to continually criticize this Nation, go somewhere else. I am one of those people that likes to look at the good things that this Nation does. Look what this Nation has done for the world in the development of medicine, in the development of vaccinations, in the fight against cancer. We can go down a list of a thousand different items. You pick the items. And amongst the very top of doing positive things, of doing good things, is the United States of America. Many times, many times the United States of America, when nobody else would stand up, it is the United States of America that ends up standing up. It is the United States of America that is the first one out of the foxhole, and it has not come without cost. Many years ago, remember when the United States put weapons on European soil to stop the Russian Communist machine from moving in? And not all the students, but a bunch of student protests were organized, frankly organized by professionals in Europe; and the European leaders got pretty fragile, and I understand it. They were under a lot of pressure, get American troops off European soil. Americans go home. Americans, you are not welcome. The doctrine of appeasement. Communism is not going to take us. Communism, Americans are trying to over-exaggerate the situation. In fact it went to the state where de Gaulle calls Johnson, gets Johnson on the phone. ``Mr. President,'' he says, ``I want all American troops off European soil.'' And, as the story goes, President Johnson replies to Mr. de Gaulle, ``Mr. de Gaulle, does that include all of the American troops buried beneath your soil?'' America is a great country, but, once again, as we speak today, America will be called to a great task, a task not only brought to light by the events of 1 year ago on September 11, but a task that because of our strength, because of our capability to lead, the United States must answer the call; and it is not a small task, it is a great task, to which we have been called. We have got to go out, and we have got to stop the proliferation amongst terrorists, amongst mad people, of these types of weapons that they are currently right now underneath our noses and in many cases with the knowledge of the world developing. So this evening I really want to focus my comments on our situation with the al Qaeda, and our situation with Iraq. I do not know how many Members saw the headline today, what the al Qaeda said in the last few days, or at least it has now come to our attention. Pay very careful attention. Please, if you are doing something out there, colleagues, put it down. All I want, if you do not listen to anything else I say this evening, if you do not listen or do not remember anything else I say this evening, give me 15 seconds. That is all I am asking you for, 15

seconds. If this does not shake you up, I do not know what will. Give me 15 seconds. This is the quote from the al Qaeda. For those of you colleagues out there, here is your 15 seconds. Take 15 seconds to look at this poster. Let me read it. I was stunned when I saw this; not surprised, but stunned. Let us go through it. This is the al Qaeda, the leadership of the al Qaeda. This is not directed at the U.K.; it is not directed at France. It is directed at the United States of America, and, in turn, when it is focused on the United States of America, to our good friends overseas. And we have many allies overseas, and we have good allies overseas. Do not be mistaken. Just because they are at the door of America's kindergartens today does not mean that they will not be at the door of your kindergartens tomorrow. Look at what this says. This is why I want this 15 seconds: ``We are emerging stronger, and we will hit America. We will hit America's shopping malls, their stadiums and kindergartens. This is our promise. Al Qaeda.'' As I go on with my remarks this evening, I want to build a case for some of my constituents and for some of my colleagues who wonder whether or not we should not just kind of look the other way when it comes to the situation in Iraq. Keep in mind that Iraq and the al Qaeda are comrades in arms. These people have one very strong common bond: they want to see the destruction of every man, woman and child, and keep in mind, child, kindergartners, of America. And when they are done with America, they will want to see the destruction of every man, woman and child in Canada. And when they are done with Canada, they will want to see it in France, and they will want to see it in the United Kingdom. They will want to see it wherever they can get it. These people are mad people, but they are smart and they are intelligent. That is obvious by the strike they carried out against the United States. This is a cancer we are dealing with. The people that speak like this, that carry out these acts, they are the equivalent of a horrible, fast-moving malignant cancer. I spoke recently back in my district, and I said it is kind of like you are walking around and you go to the doctor, and the doctor says, ``We just did an x-ray, and inside your foot, you do not feel it, but inside your foot our x-ray tells us that you have a malignant cancer that is developing and spreading very quickly.'' You say to the doctor, ``Doc, my foot feels fine. I do not feel anything in my foot. I really do not want to face cancer.'' The doctor says, ``Look, in trying to attack this cancer we may very well have to amputate your foot, which means you will never run again. It is going to be a severe interruption in your life. It is going to interrupt your financial status. It is going to have an impact psychologically on you. And the chemotherapy that may be necessary may have to be very aggressive, and it too will interrupt your lifestyle.'' But you say to the doctor, ``Doctor, I do not have any pain in my foot. I did not come in to see you about my foot. You show me this x-ray, but, I don't know, I am not feeling the pain. I am not feeling the pain. I do not know whether I want you to do what you say you have to do with my foot.'' That is what we are dealing with here. We have got people in this country who say out of sight, out of mind. Do not be mistaken, Iraq is not an idle threat sitting out there. It is a very realistic threat that could happen today, it could happen tomorrow, or it could happen 5 years from now. Saddam Hussein, keep in mind, I saw Bill O'Reilly tonight on TV, and Bill O'Reilly on TV was talking about a guy in jail in Texas that had allegedly killed 80 women, the most horrible criminal they have ever seen in their lives. Eighty women. It is a horrible person. All of us gasp at how horrible a person must be that commits these kind of murders. That is a serial killer. We all feel that way. But, for some reason, when I talk to some about Saddam Hussein, when I listen to some of my colleagues, they hold that individual with higher esteem than they do serial killers within our own borders. And keep in mind what Saddam Hussein did. He invaded Kuwait. What did he do in Kuwait? They killed thousands of men, women and children in Kuwait in their invasion. His armies went in without provocation, and the reason his armies went in was to grab that oil in Kuwait. And, once again, the country that I find more and more people apologizing for, or bashing, the United States of America is the one that led to the freedom and the liberation of Kuwait against a murderous tyrant, Saddam Hussein. Keep in mind that it was Saddam Hussein for the first time, I think, and I am not a historian, a professor of history, but it was the first time I think that you had a coordinated assassination effort by the president of a country against the United States President. Saddam Hussein, the evidence is absolutely clear, it was clear to the Clinton administration and it is clear to any law enforcement investigative agency, attempted to assassinate George Bush, Sr.; and it was only by a little luck that that assassination did not come off. So we know that Saddam Hussein has killed thousands and thousands of men, women and children when he invaded Kuwait without provocation. That, standing alone, that standing alone ought to put him at the bottom of your list as far as respect or any kind of justification of why Saddam Hussein is still alive. This guy is a bad guy. He is a malignant cancer out there. But Kuwait, if Kuwait is not enough, then take a look at what he tried to do to the President, our own President of this country, George Bush, Sr. If that is not enough, keep in mind our young men and women that are in the military, that are stationed in Turkey. Every day, almost every day of the week in the no-fly zones as designated by the United Nations, as agreed upon by Iraq, every day Iraq fires missiles at United States or allied aircraft in an attempt to destroy them. These aircraft are not flying out of their territory. They are flying within the territory

designated as a no-fly zone by Iraq in joint agreement with United Nations. And yet for some reason people are reluctant to take out Saddam Hussein. Look at the people within his own country that he gassed. Look at the Kurds. You can list example after example after example of how horribly evil, how malignant Saddam Hussein is and why we have got to do something. We do not have any choice here; at least we do not have any viable choice. I guess we do have a choice. We can pretend that these weapons that they are developing that they would have never used them or will never use them. Frankly, I do not think Saddam Hussein, certainly if he had nuclear weapons today, and we know he has biological weapons, and I am going to read you some information about that here in a few minutes, I really do not think that Saddam would use them against the United States of America today. I think he would use them against Israel, but I do not think he would use them against the United States. He is no fool. He is a smart man. That is what I said earlier. He is a smart man. He knows that if he used them against the United States of America and the United States was able to track down, which we could probably do pretty quickly, as to where those weapons came from, who used them against us, that we have the weapon capability to destroy Iraq within minutes. So he is no fool. He does not want to see the United States of America retaliate with a massive, overwhelming attack that would destroy his country. So do not think that Saddam Hussein will probably use the weapons himself. What he will do with these weapons is he will give them out. He will give them to the people like the al Qaeda, the people that swear that they are not done with America, that they are going after our kindergartens. Notice they do not say they are going after the military; notice they do not say they will engage in open warfare. They are going to go to the shopping malls, to the stadiums, and to the kindergartens. The thing for me in Oklahoma City, what appalled me, the whole thing was horrible, a criminal act, but what was especially embedded in my memory of Oklahoma City was the fact that they had that preschool in there and Timothy McVeigh and his coconspirators, they did not care that there were small children in the Federal building in Oklahoma City. They killed those children without thought. But that number was in the tens and tens. These numbers, if these people continue to develop the weapons and are given the weapons by people like Saddam Hussein, the next time they tally a hit against the kindergarten like we see in Oklahoma City, we will see numbers in the thousands and tens of thousands. New York City was 3,000; the Pentagon was a couple of hundred. Those casualties are stunning casualties, horrible, tragic; but the next time, their goal will be to add another comma to the fatalities, to the ravage that they wield upon the United States of America or upon our allies. Now let me say that this problem of Saddam Hussein is not something that just came up under the Bush administration. I am amazed, frankly. And this is a bipartisan effort that we have to make. But I am amazed at the position that the Democratic party has taken. I am amazed at some of the leading Democrats in the United States Congress, the demands that they are making upon President Bush, the implications that they are making upon the President, that somehow he is some kind of wild Texas cowboy that wants to start a war. I am going to go through what President Bill Clinton, their favorite President, the President most strongly supported by the liberal community, I am going to go through some quotes that President Clinton said several years ago about Saddam Hussein. This is a very serious problem we are dealing with. I have never been more, I guess, in deep thought or sober about a situation than I am about the situation that we face today on the international circuit with the al Qaeda and with Iraq. I am stunned. Obviously, I do not disagree at all that the United States Congress, it is our obligation to be engaged in debate and to be engaged in the public policy, and to be engaged in the declaration of any type of war that this country might engage in. So the comments that I am making are not whether or not we should have public debate in the United States Congress. I think that is good. What I am talking about this evening are how all of a sudden some of the individuals who stood right behind Bill Clinton and urged President Clinton, and these are Democrats, urged President Clinton to take immediate action to adopt a war resolution against Iraq, have done a complete reverse, saying, well, President Bush is going to have to answer a whole bunch of questions. We are not sure. Where is the justification for taking on Iraq? Where 3 or 4 years ago they were standing side by side, shoulder to shoulder, demanding that President Clinton and supporting him: We have to go into Iraq. We have to do something about that. That is not stuff I am just making up. I have it right here. Let us go through it a little. This is probably an appropriate time. Let us look at President Clinton here. President Clinton understood the threat then. Now, I think there has been a little spin put on it. I noticed that the other day the President said, or reported, and the President did not say it to me, I did not hear it from his mouth, but the President said if we were to take on Iraq, Saddam Hussein, that he, the President, that he does possess weapons, and the concern would be that he would use those weapons. If we take that out logically, what we are saying is we should not go against Saddam because he might use these weapons. That is exactly the kind of leverage that Saddam Hussein wants to have with the rest of the world, the doctrine of nonproliferation. And keep in mind, it was the liberals, and I am not trying to assail a particular affiliation, but there is a clear line here as to our ideas and our policies. It was the liberals

that said, look, nonproliferation; let us hope this cancer goes away. Let us pray it away. Let us have peace throughout the world. There are a lot of these countries out there that, unfortunately, no matter how much we pray, and I pray, and prayer is good, but no matter how much we pray, no matter how many hands we offer, no matter what we do, they are determined to wipe us off the face of the Earth. And it is not an idle threat. It was not an idle threat a year ago on September 11, and it will not be an idle threat a year from now. We have to face up to the fact that there is a malignant cancer, no matter how much we pray, and it helps, and no matter how much we hope, no matter how well our neighbor talks to us and says, look, things are going to be all right, and they hold hands and we have lots of hugs and lots of tears and lots of love; people come up and say, we are going to help you, and all of that; that is all good, but the fact is that evil devil of malignant cancer is still in us, and that is the problem we have right here. This kind of thing, this kind of thing right here, ``We are emerging stronger, and we will hit America's shopping malls, stadiums, and kindergartens,'' that is a malignant cancer. We are not going to pray or hope that thought away. The only way we are going to be able to eliminate this threat is we have to take the fight to them. Let us look at Bill Clinton's comments, the former President. I will read them: ``What if Saddam Hussein fails to comply and we fail to act, or we take some ambiguous third route which gives him yet more opportunities to develop his programs of weapons of mass destruction, and continue to press for the release of sanctions, and continue to ignore the solemn commitments that he made? Well, he will conclude that the international community has lost its will. He will then conclude that he can go right on and do more to rebuild an arsenal of devastating destruction.'' That was President Bill Clinton, February 18, 1998, 4 years ago; over 4 years ago; 4 1/2 years ago those were the profound and well-spoken words, and right on point, of President Clinton. Does anybody in these Chambers believe that the capability, the destructive capability, of Saddam Hussein has reduced, has been reduced? Does anybody in here believe, really, truly in their hearts, that this madman has abandoned his weapons of mass destruction, which include chemical warfare and the attempt to get nuclear weapons? We know in our hearts that he has not. We wish it were not true. Again, going to the example, we wish in our heart we did not have the cancer, we wish it was not true, we wish we were having a bad dream, and tomorrow morning we could wake up and it would be a bad dream, but it is reality. We have a commitment. We have a solemn commitment to the American people that we are willing and able to stand up to the great task which sits in front of us, and that great task, of course, is to secure the safety of not only this Nation but our allies, as well. I know we are getting a lot of bashing by our allies, and we have a lot of allies that say, look, do it on your own. This is a dirty job. This is going to require some dirty work. We have some fair-weathered friends out there, but nonetheless, they are friends. They do not want to get their hands dirty. They do not want to get out there in the battlefield. They want the United States to do it. If the United States does it alone and succeeds, we will be criticized for having done it on our own. But the reality of it is, somebody has got to do it. We cannot continue to let this cancer fester, because if we do, they are going to be successful. Knock on wood, and with the blessing of God, they have not hit our kindergarten yet. But Members know that is one of their targets. That is what they have told us. The statement is clear. Let us go through some history here: ``Administration rhetoric could hardly be stronger.'' This is an article, by the way, taken out of the Weekly Standard, the newsletter. ``The President asked the Nation to consider this question.'' This is President Bill Clinton: ``What if Saddam Hussein fails to comply, and we fail to act,'' as I said on the chart that I showed you, and this guy is allowed to continue. This article goes on: ``The President,'' again, referring to President Clinton, ``His warnings are firm. If we fail to respond today, Saddam and all those who would follow in his footsteps will be emboldened tomorrow. The stakes,'' again, Bill Clinton, 4 1/2 years ago on Iraq, ``The stakes could not be higher.'' This is a quote from Bill Clinton: ``Some day, some way, I guarantee you he will use the arsenal.'' That is 4 1/2 years ago, and our President ably and quite accurately recognized the threat. I can tell the Members that several of the leading Democrats, the Democrat leadership, got right behind the President in regard to the statement. Yet those very leaders today are questioning President Bush: He is overreacting, he is overstating, he had better have the evidence to prove all of this. What a 360-degree or a 180-degree turn in the last 4 1/2 years. Let me continue on. Those are not the words of President George W. Bush in September of 2002, but of President Bill Clinton on February 18, 1998. Clinton was speaking at the Pentagon after the Joint Chiefs and other top national security advisors had briefed him on U.S. military readiness. The televised speech followed a month-long buildup of United States troops and equipment in the Persian Gulf, and it won applause from leading Democrats on Capitol Hill. But just 5 days later, Kofi Annan, with the United Nations, struck yet another deal with the Iraqi dictator which once more gave the United Nations inspectors permission to inspect, and Saddam won again. Of course, much has changed since President Clinton gave that speech. The situation has gotten worse. ``Ten months after Saddam accepted Annan's offer, he kicked U.N. inspectors out of Iraq for good. We complained and the United States bombed a little. Then we stopped bombing. Later we stepped up our

enforcement of the no-fly zones. A year after the inspectors were banished, the United Nations created a new toothless inspection regime. The new inspectors inspected nothing." If Saddam Hussein was a major threat in February of 1998 when President Bill Clinton prepared this country for war, and United Nations inspectors were still inside Iraq, it stands to reason that in the absence of those inspectors monitoring this weapons buildup, that Saddam is even a greater threat today. Now, keep in mind the history that we have seen with the Germans, for example, in World War I. The complaints that we see coming out of Iraq, oh, this is the proprietary area of our borders, for protection of our country; we should not be forced to have inspectors in the country; they are picking on poor old me; well, look at the arguments against inspections, although Germany agreed to it after World War I, as compared to what Saddam Hussein. And by the way, he has agreed to all of this. He signed a compact never to have these weapons in the history of his country. But compare that back in history with after World War I, what the Germans did, and what the European response was to the Germans. It was a doctrine of, well, we are picking on him. We really should not be inspecting this country. We really ought to respect their borders. We ought to take them on their word, or make them promise. But U.S., you are exaggerating. What was happening? The Germans were building up their gas munitions. We all know what happened a few years later when the Germans utilized these things. That is what is happening here, and that is what this article says. The quotes that we have been giving, with the exception of this, this is not from 1998, this is very recent, but the quotes were from President Bill Clinton. He recognized the threat in 1998, and so did the Democratic leadership. Why is it that in 2002, the Democratic leadership is pretending as if none of this has occurred? They are making demands upon President Bush that they never made upon President Clinton. I think every President has an obligation to their Nation, and I think they are constitutionally required to justify taking this country into a military action. After all, we are asking our sons and daughters to go in in defense of this country and to take an affirmative action against another country where the probability of loss of life is very high. We ought to meet the highest of standards. But it is my position today, and I think it ought to be Members' positions, that those standards have been met for some time; that right underneath our nose we have a man who has cooperated with people like al Qaeda; a man who invaded another country and killed thousands and thousands of people; a leader, a man who poisoned and gassed his own people; a man who, almost on a daily basis, fires missiles against American and allied aircraft. We know what he is doing. We are meeting the standards that demand that America do something about this. I would hope that our allies come on board. I would hope we get assistance from our allies. We cannot turn a blind eye to a malignant cancer, and we cannot turn a blind eye to Saddam Hussein. You cannot do it. It will always come back to get you, and it will be your kindergartens that will suffer in the future if we do not respond affirmatively today. Now does that mean we send in more inspectors? The only way you should send in more inspectors is on a time basis and those inspectors have unconditional entry into that country and they can go wherever they want in Iraq and do whatever kind of tests are necessary to run to ascertain that these weapons are, in fact, not in existence. I doubt seriously that that will occur. Now, Iraq, by the way, may say, just to stall, they may say, okay, we will agree to it. But a week later you will find that there is a flat tire on the bus, that they are not going to let them go where they need to go. We cannot continue to fool around with this malignant cancer. We have got to sit up to reality. We have got to face reality. We have got to aggressively attack this cancer. Now, I am not a military expert. I do not know what the military strategy should be. But I do know this, diplomatically we have not achieved the goal of concurring the cancer. It is like saying to a patient, I know you have prayed very hard about this. I know you have got a lot of family support in fighting this cancer. I know you have got a lot of hugs. I know that you have changed your diet. But the fact is the malignant cancer is still in your foot and it is aggressively moving up into the rest of your body. You face a very tough decision. It will inconvenience your life. But in the long run, it is the only decision for the preservation of your life that you can make, and that is that you have got to accept the reality that it is there, it is moving and it will kill you. It is the same thing with Iraq. It is there. They are developing and have in their possession weapons of mass destruction and they will kill us. And if they do not attempt to kill us, they will give it to people like the al Qaeda that will carry this out. They do not care about our morality, values and our respect for our children and the preservation of life. That is obvious by their acts of September 11. Let me continue with a few comments. Summing up the Clinton administration argument, Senator *Daschle* said, ``Look, we have exhausted virtually all our diplomatic efforts to get the Iraqis to comply with their own agreements and with international law. Given that, what other option is there but to force them to do so? That is what they are saying. This is the key question. And the answer is we do not have another option. We have to force them to comply and we are doing so militarily." That is from the majority leader, the Democratic majority leader, the president of Senate. All of the sudden that is not what we are hearing today. Let me continue. ``**JOHN KERRY** was equally hawkish. 'If there is not unfettered, unrestricted, unlimited access per the United Nations'

resolution for inspections and UNSCOM cannot in our judgment appropriately perform its functions, then we obviously reserve the rights to press the case internationally and do what we need to do in order to enforce those rights. Saddam Hussein has already used these weapons and has made it clear that he has the intent to continue to try by virtue of his duplicity and secrecy to continue to do so. That is a threat to the stability of the Middle East. It is a threat with respect to the potential of terrorist activities on a global basis. It is a threat even to regions near but not exactly in the Middle East.'" These are comments made by leadership of the Democratic Party in 1998; and yet today when you read the paper, well, we should defer this decision until after the elections, as if Saddam Hussein schedules his development of weapons of mass destruction, he sets them so that they are convenient with our election dates in this country. It amazes me that with these kinds of threats in existence, with the knowledge that we had in 1998 that we know has not changed in 4 1/2 years, in fact, has only increased, that we have hesitancy, that we have hesitancy by some of these very leaders that advocated action in 1998, not to do action in 2002 or to delay it and wait and wait and wait. Maybe the doctrine of appeasement does not work. The fact is we have to deal with it. The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. *Ferguson*). The gentleman will refrain from casting reflections of sitting Members of the Senate. Mr. McINNIS. Let me finish off this article with this quote from President Clinton in 1998: ``We have to defend our future from these predators of the 21st century.'' This is President Clinton I am referring to. Let me repeat my comment. From President Clinton: ``We have to defend our future from these predators of the 21st century.'' To leave the quote for a minute, I absolutely agree 100 percent with what President Clinton was saying here. He was right then and George W. Bush is right today. Continuing: ``We have to defend our future from these predators of the 21st century,'' he argued. ``They will be all the more lethal if we allow them to build arsenals of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and the missiles to deliver them. We simply cannot allow that to happen. There is no more clear example of this threat than Saddam Hussein.'' And as the article says: ``What more do you need to say?'' Now, we have taken some steps and we have taken some bipartisan steps, our missile defense system. The President has made commitment and we, as a Congress, have increased significantly the budgets, our military budgets, our defense mechanisms, but here is our biggest weakness. We have a very large Nation geographically. It is very tough to defend these borders. For example, shipping containers that come in. We cannot inspect even close to the number of shipping containers that come into this Nation every day. It is kind of like having a village in the mountains and from somewhere on the mountain every day you got a sniper, somebody shooting into your village. You cannot possibly put up a wall to stop these bullets from coming in. Every day that goes by the sniper fires another shot into the village. At some point the village has to decide we cannot defend our perimeter. We will have to take the fight to them. We will have to go up on that mountain and find where that sniper is. That is the situation we face here today. We cannot just retract on our borders within the United States, as some of our allies may suggest, that the United States is poking their nose into somebody else's business. Well, it became everybody's business after September 11. And what President Clinton accurately forecasted in 1998 came into place on September 11, 1 year ago. The time of being able to just sit comfortably here and hope that it was not happening out there or enjoying the privilege of the fact that it had not happened within the borders of the United States for a long time, assuming that Pearl Harbor could go into that classification, and it does, those days are gone. We now have to engage in this fight, and we have to engage in this in every way possible. I am not condemning diplomatic pursuit of some peaceful resolution. I am not condemning using prayers if you are trying to fight cancer. I think it is very, very helpful. And I think diplomatic efforts are very, very necessary. And I am not saying that we should not have congressional debate. I think it is constitutionally required. I think it is healthy for this Congress, for the people who have elected us to represent their views to have that type of debate. But what I am saying is we cannot dilly dally around. We cannot any longer afford to ignore the fact that the malignant cancer is out there. We cannot afford to debate the accuracy of the x-ray very long. The x-ray tells us there is cancer. It told us we had cancer 4 years ago when President Clinton very accurately said what he has, what Saddam Hussein had, and what Saddam Hussein, by the way, supplies to the al Qaeda. We know it is there. And it does not do us any good in my opinion to continue to try to pretend it is not happening, to try to pretend that there is some clean way to handle this, that we can call Saddam up on the phone and say, Knock it off. What are you doing? Put those weapons in the closet and quit doing this and live peacefully with the rest of the world. They have no intention of doing anything but destroying as much of the rest of the world as they can. And at the top of their list are our kindergartens. Every mother and father in America should be in a state of absolute dismay and anger today after this quote was released yesterday about targeting kindergartens. These are kindergartens in America, kindergartens in the United States. Some of us knew that, obviously, we think they will target some of these other areas; but for them to come out and say, your kindergartens, that is what we will target in America, that ought to wake everybody up. The time for a debate is rapidly approaching. We should have a resolution on this

floor as quickly as we can get a resolution on this floor. Our allies that belong to the United Nations ought to wake up, a lot of them are; but they need to come to the table too. America does not want to do it alone. America can do it alone, but America wants to be a partner. And I will tell you, our partnership, whether it is France, whether it is Hamburg, Germany, whether it is in Poland, all free-loving countries in the world are under the threat of this cancer of Iraq and the al Qaeda. And we, frankly, despite my criticism today or my expression of dismay by some of the remarks we see coming from our European allies, I do want to take a moment to tell you that as most of you know our European allies have assisted us in many ways with this fight against terrorism. But for some reason, I am a little baffled by the fact that we cannot get them to come over to this side of the line to face the reality of the threat that Iraq has against the world. It is the United States today. Sure, that is their number one target, the United States and Israel. But I can assure our allies it is like the big bad wolf. It is at our door today, but it will be at your door tomorrow. And we have to team up. This partnership has to stay together. This partner, the United States of America, does not want to take Iraq on by itself or take on the war against terrorism. And our partners have come to the table in large part against the war on terrorism. But they are not coming to the table like they ought to be on Iraq. And it is time for this partnership meeting, for us to cut to the chase, to get down to the work that has to be done, and it is dirty work and it is a large task in front of us; but if we do not do it today, we will have let down, in my opinion I do not think it is too strong a word to use the word betrayed, we will have betrayed future generations by knowingly allowing a threat to be built of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, biological weapons, to knowingly let that threat and those weapons be built by a mad man with the kind of commitments they have made to target our kindergartens and we do not take the fight to them. It is inherently a responsibility of those of us in Congress to debate this. I do not argue that, I said that earlier. But as inherently, as strong as the debate is to get that debate completed and to move in a unified fashion as this Congress and as the United States Senate signaled it would with President Clinton in 1998, and the threat has only grown greater. I think it is time for both of these Houses to come together in 2002 and move against the cancer that exists out there as a threat against the borders of this country, and as I have said, against the borders of our allies wherever they might be located throughout the worlds. So I would hope that in the next, I hope in the very immediate future, I know that the President is going to the United Nations this week, I hope our allies in the United Nations and the people of the United Nations understand what a threat this malignancy is out there, understand how unsuccessful we have been to convince through diplomatic efforts, through inspections, through economic sanctions, through no-fly zones, how unsuccessful these efforts have been to get Saddam Hussein to stop proceeding with these weapons, what the ramifications are of these weapons. Do my colleagues think that the al Qaeda, if they would have had nuclear weapons within their hands, do my colleagues think they would have used aircraft on September 11? They would have used nuclear weapons. Do not forget, this country suffered an attack, a chemical attack, anthrax within days of September 11. We got hit with a chemical, with a biological attack against this country. Do my colleagues not think if the al Qaeda did not have that in their hands in sufficient quantities that they would not have used that? They were probably surprised that the World Trade towers collapsed. We know from the video that we have seen, they were elated by the success of their attack, but this only set the base for the al Qaeda. This only sets a base for countries like Iraq. The next attack, they want to make sure those casualties, children, women and men, they want to make sure those casualties are many, many multiples of what September 11, the horror that September 11 brought to this Nation. As I said at the beginning of my remarks, I am trying to think of my history. I have been in Congress 10 years. The horrible fires we suffered in Colorado this year, all of the different things, big issues that I think over these last few years we have dealt with, I cannot think of anything that is of a more of a threat, that has more serious future consequences than the international situation that we face today. Not the economy, not the impeachment several years ago, not the fires. We have got to go after that cancer that has centered itself in Iraq and has spread to al Qaeda and throughout rest of the world. Again, at the conclusion of my remarks this evening, let me repeat what President Bill Clinton said 4 1/2 years ago. President Clinton, ``We have to defend our future from these predators of the 21st century,'' he argued. ``They will be all the more lethal if we allow them to build arsenals of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and the missiles to deliver them. We simply cannot allow that to happen. There is no more clear example of this threat than Saddam Hussein.'' I will wrap up my comments with 15 more seconds. I would ask my colleagues to take 15 seconds and read the poster, and once again, what more of a threat, what more of a warning do we need, do we need as a Nation than exists out there today? If in 1998 what Saddam Hussein did in 1998 was not enough, then was September 11 enough? Then was the acts of aggression against Kuwait enough? Was the assassination against Bush, Senior enough? If that was not enough, if all of that was not enough, this statement

standing alone, this statement standing alone ought to be enough to bring all of us to bear arms to assure the security of this Nation and our friends throughout the world.

US Senate "Authorization of the Use of United States Armed Forces against Iraq" 09/10/02

Available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/C?r107:./temp/~r107Mb9otf accessed 17/09/09

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, many have spent months reviewing the issue on advisability of invading Iraq in the near future, from hearings and meeting on the process and the very important role of Congress to the difficult questions of substance, including foreign policy and military implications. After my own review and carefully listening to hundreds of Wisconsin citizens in person, I spoke on the floor on Thursday, September 26. I indicated my opposition to the original draft use of force authorization by the President. I also used that opportunity to raise some very important questions to which I needed answers before supporting a narrower and more responsible resolution. Now, after many more meetings and reading articles and attending briefings, listening to my colleagues' speeches, and especially listening to the President's speech in Cincinnati on Monday, I still do not believe the President and the administration have adequately answered the critical questions. They have not yet met the important burden to persuade Congress and the American people we should invade Iraq at this time. Both in terms of the justifications for an invasion and in terms of the mission and the plan for the invasion, the administration's arguments do not add up. They do not add up to a coherent basis for a new major war in the middle of our current challenging fight against the terrorism of al-Qaida and related organizations. Therefore, I cannot support the resolution for the use of force before the Senate. My colleagues, my focus today is on the wisdom of this specific resolution, vis-a-vis Iraq, as opposed to discussing the notion of an expanded doctrine of preemption, which the President has articulated on several occasions. However, I associate myself with the concerns eloquently raised by Senator *Kennedy* and Senator *Byrd* and others that this could well represent a disturbing change in our overall foreign and military policy. This includes grave concerns about what such a preemption-plus policy will do to our relationship with our allies, to our national security, and to the cause of world peace in so many regions of the world where such a doctrine could trigger very dangerous actions with very minimal justification. I want to be clear about something. None of this is to say that I don't agree with the President on much of what he has said about the fight against terrorism and even what he has said about Iraq. I agree, post-9/11, we face, as the President said, a long and difficult fight against terrorism. We must be very patient and very vigilant, and we must be ready to act and make some very serious sacrifices. With regard to Iraq, I agree, Iraq presents a genuine threat, especially in the form of weapons of mass destruction, chemical, biological, and potentially nuclear weapons. I agree that Saddam Hussein is exceptionally dangerous and brutal, if not uniquely so, as the President argues. And I support the concept of regime change. Saddam Hussein is one of several despots whom the international community should condemn and isolate with the hope of new leadership in those nations. Yes, I agree; if we do this Iraq invasion, I hope Saddam Hussein will actually be removed from power this time. I agree, we cannot do nothing with regard to Saddam Hussein in Iraq. We must act. We must act with serious purpose and stop the weapons of mass destruction and stop Saddam Hussein. I agree, a return to the inspections regime of the past alone is not a serious, credible policy. I also believe and agree, as important and as preferable as U.N. action and multilateral solutions to this problem are, we cannot give the United Nations the ability to veto our ability to counter this threat to our people. We retain and will always retain the right of self-defense, including self-defense against weapons of mass destruction. When such a threat requiring self-defense would present itself--and I am skeptical that is exactly what we are dealing with here--then we could, if necessary, act alone, including militarily. These are all areas where I agree with the administration. However, I am increasingly troubled by the seemingly shifting justifications for an invasion at this time. My colleagues, I am not suggesting there has to be only one justification for such a dramatic action, but when the administration moves back and forth from one argument to another, it undercuts the credibility of the case and the belief in its urgency. I believe this practice of shifting justifications has much to do with the troubling phenomenon of many Americans questioning the administration's motives in insisting on action at this time. What am I talking about? I am talking about the spectacle of the President and senior administration officials citing a reported connection to al-Qaida one day, weapons of mass destruction the next day, Saddam Hussein's treatment of his own people on another day, and then on some days the issue of Kuwaiti prisoners of war. For some of these, we may well be willing to send some 250,000 Americans into harm's way; for others, frankly, probably not. These litanies of various justifications--whether the original draft resolution discussions or the new White House resolution, or, regrettably throughout the President's speech in Cincinnati--in my view set the bar for an alternative to a U.S. invasion so high I

am afraid it almost locks in--it almost requires--a potentially extreme and reckless solution to these problems. I am especially troubled by these shifting justifications because I and most Americans strongly support the President on the use of force in response to the attacks on September 11, 2001. I voted for S.J. Res. 23--the use of force resolution--to go after al-Qaida and the Taliban and those associated with the tragedies of September 11, and I strongly supported military actions pursuant to S.J. Res. 23. But the relentless attempt to link 9/11 and the issue of Iraq has been disappointing to me for months, culminating in the President's singularly unpersuasive attempt in Cincinnati to intertwine 9/11 and Iraq, to make the American people believe there are no important differences between the perpetrators of 9/11 and Iraq. I believe it is dangerous for the world--and especially dangerous for us--to take the tragedy of 9/11 and the word ``terrorism'' in all their powerful emotion and then too easily apply them to many other situations--situations that surely need our serious attention, but are not necessarily the same as individuals and organizations who have shown a willingness to fly suicide planes into the World Trade Center and into the Pentagon. Let me say the President is right, we have to view the world, the threats, and our own national security in a very different light since 9/11. There are shocking new threats. But it is not helpful to use virtually any strand or extreme rhetoric to suggest the new threat is the same as other preexisting threats. I think common sense tells us they are not the same. They cannot so easily be lumped together as the President sought to do in Cincinnati. I have reviewed the intermittent efforts to suggest a connection of 9/11 and Saddam Hussein, or suggest the possibility such a connection has developed since 9/11. I want to be very clear. In fact, if there was a connection in planning for the 9/11 attacks by Saddam Hussein or his agents and the perpetrators of 9/11 and al-Qaida, I have already voted for military action. I have no objection. But if it is not, if this is premised on some case that has supposedly been made with regard to a subsequent coalition between al-Qaida and the Iraqi government, I think the President has to do better. He has to do better than the shoddy piecing together of flimsy evidence that contradicts the very briefings we have received by various agencies. I am not hearing the same things at the briefings I am hearing from the President's top officials. In fact, on March 11 of this year, Vice President *Cheney*, following a meeting with Tony Blair, raised the possibility of weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of terrorists. He said: We have to be concerned about the potential marriage, if you will, between a terrorist organization like al-Qaida and those who hold or are proliferating knowledge about weapons of mass destruction. In March, there was a potential marriage. Then the Vice President said on September 8, without evidence--and no evidence has been given since that time--that there are: ``Credible but unconfirmed'' intelligence reports that 9/11 ringleader Mohammad Atta met in Prague with senior Iraqi intelligence officials a few months before the 9/11 attacks. We have seen no proof of that. Finally, the Secretary of Defense follows on September 27 of this year, and says: There is ``bulletproof evidence'' of Iraqi links to al-Qaida, including the recent presence of senior al-Qaida members in Baghdad. I don't know where this comes from. This so-called ``potential marriage'' in March is beginning to sound like a 25th wedding anniversary at this point. The facts just aren't there. At least they have not been presented to me in the situations where they should have been presented to me as an elected Member of this body. In other words, the administration appears to use 9/11 and the language of terrorism and the connection to Iraq too loosely--almost like a bootstrap. For example, I heard the President say in Cincinnati that Iraq and al-Qaida both regard us as a common enemy. Of course they do. Who else are we going to attack in the near future on that basis alone? Or do we see an attempt to stretch the notion of harboring terrorists? I agree with the President, if any country is actively harboring and assisting terrorists involved in 9/11, we have to act against them. But I don't think you can bring to the definition of harboring terrorists the simple presence of some al-Qaida members somewhere in Iraq. After all, apparently we have al-Qaida agents active in our country as well. They are present in our Nation as well. How can this be a sufficient basis on its own? Therefore, without a better case for an al-Qaida connection to Saddam Hussein, this proposed invasion must stand on its own merit--not on some notion that those who question this invasion don't thoroughly condemn and want to see the destruction of the perpetrators of 9/11 and similar terrorist attacks on the United States. Invasion of Iraq must stand on its own--not just because it is different than the fight against the perpetrators of 9/11, but because it may not be consistent with and may even be harmful to the top national security issue of this country. And that is the fight against terrorism and the perpetrators of the crimes of 9/11. In fact, I am so pleased to see one of the most eloquent spokesmen on this viewpoint here in the Senate Chamber, Senator *Graham*, who has done a terrific job of trying to point out our top priorities in this area. He said: Our first priority should be the successful completion of the war on terrorism. Today, we Americans are more vulnerable to international terrorist organizations than we are to Saddam Hussein. I ask: Is this war against terrorism going so terribly well when we see the possible explosion of the French tanker in Yemen, when we see the tremendous difficulties in trying to pursue stability in Afghanistan itself, and when we realize we are not certain at all whether Mr. Osama bin Laden is alive

or dead? Will the invasion of Iraq encourage our allies and Islamic friends to help us in the fight against terrorism, or just make them extremely nervous? I met with a group of African Ambassadors the other day in my role as chairman of the Africa Subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee. They told me various people were placing bets on what country would be next after Iraq under this new doctrine the President is putting forward. Will this idea of invading Iraq at this time, on this case, on these merits, help or hurt cooperation in our fight against terrorism, against the known murderers of Americans who are known to be plotting more of the same? I am especially dismayed at the weak response to the potential drain on our military capability and resources in our fight against terrorism, if we go forward with this invasion at this time. The administration likes to quickly say, whenever asked whether we can do this and fight the war against terrorism--they just simply say we can do both. There is no proof. There is no real assurance of this. I find these answers glib, at best. When former Secretary of State Kissinger was asked in this regard, he said: It is not clear to me what measures that are required in the war against terrorism would be interrupted or weakened by the actions that may be imposed on us if it is not possible to do away with the stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq by other means.That is the only explanation the former Secretary of State gave us on this tough question. But let's look at what the current Secretary of State, Colin Powell, said in response to a similar question. He said: So the campaign against terrorism is going in full swing. And I don't see why there is a suggestion that somehow, if we had to undertake this mission, it would be at the expense of the campaign against terrorism. That is all he said. Now, that is a pretty weak reassurance, to me, that such an enormous undertaking will not call into question some of our other military efforts and priorities. What about what we are doing in Bosnia? What about what we are doing in Kosovo? What about all the resources stretching from the Philippines all the way to portions of the former Soviet Union, to the Middle East, to parts of Africa, that are being employed in the fight against terrorism? What about the fact we are using our National Guards and Reserves, many times within our country, to protect our own citizens at public events with regard to the challenge of the fight against terrorism? All of this, and an invasion of Iraq, too? I wonder. As mighty as we are, I wonder if we are not very close to being overextended. Invasion of Iraq in the next few weeks or months could, in fact, be very counterproductive. In fact, it could risk our national security. In any event, I oppose this resolution because of the continuing unanswered questions, including the very important questions about what the mission is here, what the nature of the operation will be, what will happen concerning weapons of mass destruction in Iraq as the attack proceeds and afterward, and what the plan is after the attack is over. In effect, we are being asked to vote on something that is unclear. We do not have the answers to these questions. We are being asked to vote on something that is almost unknowable in terms of the information we have been given. In my judgment, the issue that presents the greatest potential threat to U.S. national security--Iraq's pursuit of weapons of mass destruction--has not been addressed in any comprehensive way by the administration to date. Of course, I know we don't need to know all the details, and we don't have to be given all the details, and we shouldn't be given all the details, but we have to be given some kind of a reasonable explanation. Before we vote on this resolution, we need a credible plan for securing WMD sites and not allowing materials of concern to slip away during some chaotic course of action. I know that is a tall order, but it is a necessary demand. As I said, I agree with the administration when it asserts that returning to the same restricted weapons inspection regime of the recent past is not a credible policy for addressing the WMD problem in Iraq. But there is nothing credible about the ``we will figure that out later'' approach we have heard to date. What if actors competing for power in the post-Hussein world have access to WMD? What if there is chaos in the wake of the regime's fall that provides new opportunities for non-state actors, including terrorist organizations, to bid on the sinister items tucked away in Iraq? Some would say those who do not unquestionably support the administration are failing to provide for our national security. But, I am sure of this: these issues are critical to that security, and I have yet to get any answers. We need an honest assessment of the commitment required of America. If the right way to address this threat is through internationally supported military action in Iraq, and Saddam Hussein's regime falls, we will need to take action to ensure stability in Iraq and to help the country on the road to reconstruction. This could be very costly and time-consuming. It could involve the occupation--the occupation--of a Middle Eastern country. Now, this is not a small matter: the American occupation of a Middle Eastern country. Consider the regional implications of that scenario: the unrest in moderate states, the calls for action against American interests, the difficulty of bringing stability to Iraq so we can extricate ourselves in the midst of regional turmoil. We need much more information about how we propose to proceed so we can weigh the costs and benefits to our national security. In Afghanistan, the Government of President Karzai works under constant threat, and instability plagues the country outside of Kabul. Many Afghan people are waiting for concrete indicators that they have a stake in this new Taliban-free future. The task is daunting, and we only have just begun that task. What demands might be added in a

post-Saddam Iraq? I do believe the American people are willing to bear high costs to pursue a policy that makes sense. But right now, after all of the briefings, after all of the hearings, and after all of the statements, as far as I can tell, the administration apparently intends to wing it when it comes to the day after, or, as others have suggested, the decade after. I think that makes no sense at all. So, Mr. President, I believe to date the administration has failed to answer the key questions to justify the invasion of Iraq at this time. Yes, September 11 raises the emotional stakes and raises legitimate new questions. This makes the President's request understandable, but it does not make it wise. I am concerned the President is pushing us into a mistaken and counterproductive course of action. Instead of, in his words, this action being ``crucial to win the war on terrorism,'' I fear it could have the opposite effect. So this moment--in which we are responsible for assessing the threat before us, the appropriate response, and the potential costs and consequences of military action--this moment is of grave importance. Yet there is something hollow in our efforts. In all of the administration's public statements, its presentations to Congress, and its exhortations for action, Congress is urged to provide this authority and approve the use of our awesome military power in Iraq without knowing much at all about what we intend to do with it. We are about to make one of the weightiest decisions of our time within a context of confused justifications and vague proposals. We are urged to get on board and bring the American people with us, but we do not know where the ship is sailing. On Monday night, the President said in Cincinnati: ``We refuse to live in fear.'' I agree. But let us not overreact or get tricked or get trapped out of fear, either. Mr. President, on the 11th of September, 2001, our country came under attack, and the world suddenly seemed shockingly small and unquestionably dangerous. What followed that horror continued to be frightening and disorienting: anthrax attacks, color-coded threat levels, report after report of terrorist cells seemingly everywhere. In the weeks and months since September 11, Americans have had to contend with these changes and to come to grips with the reality this could happen again and there are forces planning to do us harm, and we cannot unconditionally guarantee our own safety. In this new world, we cannot help but sense the future is uncertain, our world is disordered, unpredictable, up for grabs. So when our leaders propose taking action, Americans do not want to resist. But they are resisting this vague and worrisome proposal. My constituents have voiced their concerns in calls, at town meetings, in letters, and through e-mails or faxes. They are not calling for Congress to bury its head in the sand. They are not naively suggesting Saddam Hussein is somehow misunderstood. But they are asking questions that bear directly on our national security, and they are looking for answers that make sense. They are setting the standard, just as they should do, in a great democracy. Their standard is high. We should work together to develop a policy toward Iraq that meets it. I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.

[...]

Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I have enjoyed this colloquy and would yield further, but I know there are other Senators awaiting their turn to speak. On September 26, I spoke at length in this Chamber about the important issue before us. I voiced my concerns and the concerns of a great many Vermonters--in fact, a great many Americans from whom I have heard. I spoke about the President's plan to send Americans into battle to overthrow Saddam Hussein. Many Senators have also expressed their views on this difficult decision. As I prepared to speak 2 weeks ago, I listened to Senator *Bingaman* urge the administration to seriously consider a proposal for ``coerced inspections.'' After I finished speaking, Senator *Johnson* voiced his support for providing the President with the broad authority he seeks to use military force against Iraq. The opportunity and responsibility to have this debate is one of the cornerstones on which this institution, and indeed this country is built. Some have suggested that expressing misgivings or asking questions about the President's plan to attack Iraq is somehow unpatriotic. Others have tried to make it an election year issue on bumper stickers or in TV advertisements. These attempts are misguided. They are beneath the people who make these attempts and they are beneath the issue. This is an issue of war. An issue of war should be openly debated. That is a great freedom of this Nation. We fought a revolution to have such debates. As I and others have said over and over, declaring war is the single most important responsibility given to Congress. Unfortunately, at times like this, it is a responsibility Congress has often shirked. Too often, Congress has abdicated its responsibility and deferred to the executive branch on such matters. It should not. It should pause and read the Constitution. In the Senate, we have a duty to the Constitution, to our consciences, and to the American people, especially our men and women in uniform, to ask questions, to discuss the benefits, the risks, the costs, to have a thorough debate and then vote to declare war or not. This body, the Senate, is supposed to be the conscience of the Nation. We should fulfill this great responsibility. In my 28 years in the Senate, I can think of many instances when we asked questions and took the time to study the facts. It led to significant improvements in what we have done here. I can

also remember times when Senators in both parties wished they had taken more time to carefully consider the issues before them, to ask the hard questions, or make changes to the legislation, despite the sometimes overwhelming public pressure to pass the first bill that came along. I know following the Constitution is not always politically expedient or popular. The Constitution was not designed to be politically expedient, but following the Constitution is the right course to take. It is what we are sworn to do, and there is no question that having this debate, which really began some months ago, has helped move the administration in the right direction. Today, we are considering a resolution offered by Senator *Lieberman* to authorize the use of force. Article I of the Constitution gives the Congress the sole power to declare war. But instead of exercising this responsibility and voting up or down on a declaration of war, what have we done? We have chosen to delegate this authority and this burden to the executive branch. This resolution, like others before it, does not declare anything. It tells the President: Why don't you decide; we are not going to. This resolution, when you get through the pages of whereas clauses, is nothing more than a blank check. The President can decide when to use military force, how to use it, and for how long. This Vermonter does not sign blank checks. Mr. President, I suppose this resolution is something of an improvement. Back in August the President's advisors insisted that there was not even any need for authorization from Congress to go to war. They said past resolutions sufficed. Others in the administration argued that the United States should attack Iraq preemptively and unilaterally, without bothering to seek the support of the United Nations, even though it is Iraq's violations of U.N. resolutions which is used to justify military action. Eventually, the President listened to those who urged him to change course and he went to the United Nations. He has since come to the Congress. I commended President Bush for doing that. I fully support the efforts of Secretary Powell to negotiate a strong, new Security Council resolution for the return of weapons inspectors to Iraq, backed up with force, if necessary, to overcome Iraqi resistance. Two weeks ago, when the President sent Congress his proposed resolution authorizing the use of force, I said that I hoped his proposal was the beginning of a consultative, bipartisan process to produce a sensible resolution to be acted on at the appropriate time. I also said that I could envision circumstances which would cause me to support sending U.S. Armed Forces to Iraq. But I also made it clear that I could never support the kind of blank check resolution that the President proposed. I was not elected to do that. I commend Senator **DASCHLE**, Senator **HAGEL**, and others who tried hard to work with the administration to craft a bipartisan resolution that we could all support. But while the resolution that we are considering today is an improvement from the version that the President first sent to Congress, it is fundamentally the same. It is still a blank check. I will vote against this resolution for all the reasons I have stated before and the reasons I will explain in detail now. Mr. President, there is no dispute that Saddam Hussein is a menace to his people and to Iraq's neighbors. He is a tyrant and the world would be far better without him. Saddam Hussein has also made no secret of his hatred of the United States, and should he acquire a nuclear weapon and the means to deliver it, he would pose a grave threat to the lives of all Americans, as well as to our closest allies. The question is not whether Saddam Hussein should be disarmed; it is how imminent is this threat and how should we deal with it? Do we go it alone, as some in the administration are eager to do because they see Iraq as their first opportunity to apply the President's strategy of preemptive military force? Do we do that, potentially jeopardizing the support of those nations we need to combat terrorism and further antagonizing Muslim populations who already deeply resent our policies in the Middle East? Or, do we work with other nations to disarm Saddam, using force if other options fail? The resolution now before the Senate leaves the door open to act alone, even absent an imminent threat. It surrenders to the President authority which the Constitution explicitly reserves for the Congress. And As I said 2 weeks ago, it is premature. I have never believed, nor do I think that any Senator believes, that U.S. foreign policy should be hostage to any nation, nor to the United Nations. Ultimately, we must do what we believe is right and necessary to protect our security, whenever it is called for. But going to war alone is rarely the answer. On Monday night, the President spoke about working with the United Nations. He said: To actually work, any new inspections, sanctions, or enforcement mechanisms will have to be very different. America wants the U.N. to be an effective organization that helps keep the peace. That is why we are urging the Security Council to adopt a new resolution setting out tough, immediate requirements. I could not agree more. The President is right. The status quo is unacceptable. Past U.N. resolutions have not worked. Saddam Hussein and other Iraqi officials have lied to the world over and over and over. As the President points out, an effort is underway in the U.N. Security Council--led by the United States--to adopt a strong resolution requiring unconditional, unimpeded access for U.N. weapons inspectors, backed up with force if necessary. That effort is making steady progress. There is wide acceptance that a new resolution is necessary before the inspectors can return to Iraq, and this has put pressure on the other nations, especially Russia and France, to support our position. If successful, it could achieve the goal of disarming Saddam without putting thousands of American and innocent Iraqi lives at risk or spending

tens of billions, or hundreds of billions, of dollars at a time when the U.S. economy is weakening, the Federal deficit is growing, and the retirement savings of America's senior citizens have been decimated. Diplomacy is often tedious. It does not usually make the headlines or the evening news. We certainly know about past diplomatic failures. But history has shown over and over that diplomatic pressure cannot only protect our national interests, it can also enhance the effectiveness of military force when force becomes necessary. The negotiations are at a sensitive stage. By authorizing the use of force today, the Congress will be saying that irrespective of what the Security Council does, we have already decided to go our own way. As Chairman and sometime Ranking Member of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee for over a decade, I have received countless letters from Secretaries of State--from both Democratic and Republican Administrations--urging Congress not to adopt legislation because it would upset ongoing negotiations. Why is this different? Some say the President's hand will be strengthened by Congress passing this resolution. In 1990, when the United States successfully assembled a broad coalition to fight the gulf war, the Congress passed a resolution only after the UN had acted. The world already knows that President Bush is serious about using force against Iraq, and the votes are there in Congress to declare war if diplomatic efforts fail and war becomes unavoidable. More importantly, the resolution now before the Senate goes well beyond what the President said on Monday about working through the United Nations. It would permit the administration to take precipitous, unilateral action without following through at the U.N. Many respected and knowledgeable people--former senior military officers and diplomats among them--have expressed strong reservations about this resolution. They agree that if there is credible evidence that Saddam Hussein is planning to use weapons of mass destruction against the United States or one of our allies, the American people and the Congress would overwhelmingly support the use of American military power to stop him. But they have not seen that evidence, and neither have I. We have heard a lot of bellicose rhetoric, but what are the facts? I am not asking for 100 percent proof, but the administration is asking Congress to make a decision to go to war based on conflicting statements, angry assertions, and assumption based on speculation. This is not the way a great nation goes to war. The administration has also been vague, evasive and contradictory about its plans. Speaking here in Washington, the President and his advisors continue to say this issue is about disarming Saddam Hussein; that he has made no decision to use force. But the President paints a different picture when he is on the campaign trail, where he often talks about regime change. The Vice President said on national television that ``The President's made it clear that the goal of the United States is regime change. He said that on many occasions.'' Proponents of this resolution argue that it does put diplomacy first. They point to section 4, which require the President to determine that further diplomatic or other peaceful means alone will not adequately protect the national security, before he resorts to military force. They say that this ensures that we will act only in a deliberative way, in concert with our allies. But they fail to point out that the resolution permits the President to us unilateral military force if he determines that reliance on diplomacy along. is not likely to lead to enforcement of all relevant United Nations Security Council esolutions regarding Iraq ....." Unfortunately, we have learned that ``not likely'' is a wide open phrase that can be used to justify just about anything. So let us not pretend we are doing something we are not. This resolution permits the President to take whatever military action he wants, whenever he wants, for as long as he wants. It is a blank check. We have the best trained, best equipped Armed Forces in the world, and I know they can defeat Iraq. I hope, as we all do, that if force is used the Iraqi military surrenders quickly. But if we have learned anything from history, it is that wars are unpredictable. They can trigger consequences that none of us would intend or expect. Is it fair to the American people, who have become accustomed to wars waged from 30,000 feet lasting a few weeks with few casualties, that we not discuss what else could happen? We could be involved in urban warfare where large numbers of our troops are killed. And what of the critical issue of rebuilding a post-Saddam Iraq, about which the Administration has said virtually nothing? It is one thing to topple a regime, but it is equally important, and sometimes far more difficult, to rebuild a country to prevent it from becoming engulfed by factional fighting. If these nations cannot successfully rebuild, then they will once again become havens for terrorists. To ensure that does not happen, do we foresee basing thousands of U.S. troops in Iraq after the war, and if so, for how many years? How many billions of dollars will we spend? Are the American people prepared to spend what it will take to rebuild Iraq even when the administration is not budgeting the money that is needed to rebuild Afghanistan, having promised to do so? Do we spend hundreds of billions in Iraq, as the President's Economic Adviser suggested, while not providing at home for homeland defense, drought aid for farmers, education for our young people, and other domestic priorities? Who is going to replace Saddam Hussein? The leading coalition of opposition groups, the Iraqi National Congress, is divided, has questionable support among the Iraqi people, and has made little headway in overthrowing Saddam. While Iraq has a strong civil society, in the chaos of a post-Saddam Iraq another dictator could rise to the top or the country could splinter along ethnic or

religious lines. These are the questions the American people are asking and these are the issues we should be debating. They are difficult issues of war and peace, but the administration, and the proponents of this resolution, would rather leave them for another day. They say: vote now! and let the President decide. Don't give the U.N. time to do its job. Don't worry that the resolution is a blank check. I can count the votes. The Senate will pass this resolution. They will give the President the authority he needs to send United States troops to Iraq. But before the President takes that step, I hope he will consider the questions that have been asked. I hope he considers the concerns raised by former generals, senior diplomats, and intelligence officials in testimony before Congress. I hope he listens to concerns raised privately by some of our military officers. Above all, I hope he will listen to the American people who are urging him to proceed cautiously and not to act alone. Notwithstanding whatever disagreements there may be on our policy toward Iraq, if a decision is made to send troops into battle, there is no question that every Member of Congress will unite behind our President and our Armed Forces. But that time has not yet come. Based on what I know today, I believe in order to solve this problem without potentially creating more terrorists and more enemies, we have to act deliberately and not precipitously. The way the United States responds to the threat posed by Iraq is going to have consequences for our country and for the world for years to come. Authorizing a U.S. attack to overthrow another government while negotiations at the United Nations are ongoing, and before we exhaust other options, could damage our standing in the world as a country that recognizes the importance of international solutions. I am afraid that it would be what the world expects of a superpower that seems increasing disdainful of international opinion or cooperation and collective diplomacy, a superpower that seems more and more inclined to ``go it alone.'' What a dramatic shift from a year ago, when the world was united in its expressions of sympathy toward the United States. A year ago, the world would have welcomed the opportunity to work with us on a wide agenda of common problems. I remember the emotion I felt when I saw ``The Star Spangled Banner'' sung by crowds of people outside Buckingham Palace in London. The leading French newspaper, Le Monde, declared, ``We are all Americans.'' China's Jiang Zemin was one of the first world leaders to call Washington and express sympathy after September 11. Why squander the goodwill we had in the world? Why squander this unity? If September 11 taught us anything, it is that protecting our security involves much more than military might. It involves cooperation with other nations to break up terrorist rings, dry up the sources of funding, and address the conditions of ignorance and despair that create breeding grounds for terrorists. We are far more likely to achieve these goals by working with other nations than by going it alone. I am optimistic that the Administration's efforts at the U.N. will succeed and that the Security Council will adopt a strong resolution. If Saddam Hussein refuses to comply, then force may be justified, and it may be required. But we are a great nation, with a wide range of resources available to us and with the goodwill of most of the world. Let us proceed deliberately, moving as close to our goal as we can by working with our allies and the United Nations, rather than writing a blank check that is premature, and which would continue the trend of abdicating our constitutional authority and our responsibility. Mr. President, that trend started many years ago, and I have gone back and read some of the speeches the Senators have made. For example, and I quote: The resolution now pending is an expression of American unity in this time of crisis. It is a vote of confidence ..... but is not a blank check for policies that might in the future be carried on by the executive branch of the Government without full consultation by the Congress. Do these speeches sound familiar? They were not about Iraq. They were spoken 38 years ago when I was still a prosecutor in Vermont. At the end of that debate, after statements were made that this resolution is not a blank check, and that Congress will always watch what the Executive Branch is doing, the Senate voted on that resolution. Do you know what the vote was? 88 to 2. It passed overwhelmingly. In case everyone does not know what resolution I am talking about, I am talking about the Tonkin Gulf resolution. As we know all too well, the Tonkin Gulf resolution was used by both the Johnson and Nixon administrations as carte blanche to wage war on Vietnam, ultimately involving more than half a million American troops, resulting in the deaths of more than 58,000 Americans. Yet, even the Tonkin Gulf resolution, unlike the one that we are debating today, had a sunset provision. When I came to the Senate, there were a lot of Senators, both Republicans and Democrats, who had voted for the Tonkin Gulf resolution. Every single Senator who ever discussed it with me said what a mistake it was to write that kind of blank check on the assurance that we would continue to watch what went on. I am not suggesting the administration is trying to mislead the Congress about the situation in Iraq, as Congress was misled on the Tonkin Gulf resolution. I am not comparing a possible war in Iraq to the Vietnam war. They are very different countries, with different histories, and with different military capabilities. But the key words in the resolution we are considering today are remarkably similar to the infamous resolution of 38 years ago which so many Senators and so many millions of Americans came to regret. Let us not make that mistake again. Let us

not pass a Tonkin Gulf resolution. Let us not set the history of our great country this way. Let us not make the mistake we made once before. I yield the floor.

Snowe, Senator "The Iraq Resolution" 09/10/02

Available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/C?r107:./temp/~r107uGhqOs accessed 17/09/09;

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I rise to speak today on the resolution before this body concerning the use of force against Iraq. For the third time in 12 years, the Senate is considering a resolution to address a threat posed by Saddam Hussein to America as well as to the global community. As I said on the floor of the House of Representatives when I was a Member of that body in 1991, on behalf of the authorization of what would become Operation Desert Storm: [T]he magnitude of the vote I now face is greater than any other I have or likely will cast. That is true any time we consider whether to potentially place American men and women in harm's way. That is why I approached this particular vote with the deliberation and the solemnity it demands. During that 1991 debate, I concluded Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait ``threatened in infancy a new decade of hope.'' As I said at the time, I voted as I did: ..... not because the military option is inevitable, but in order not to undermine the President's efforts to achieve a peaceful outcome to this crisis--efforts which require that a credible military threat be maintained against a brutal aggressor who only understands the language of force. A credible threat is necessary against a man who has raised one of the world's largest armies, used chemical weapons against his own people, invaded two neighbors and is developing nuclear and biological capabilities. We are hardly dealing with a man of peace in Saddam Hussein. History, regrettably, has a way of repeating itself. Because 7 years later, in 1998, the Senate unanimously passed a resolution which found Iraq in ``material and unacceptable breach of its international obligations'' under previous U.N. resolutions--including Security Council Resolution 687 that set the terms and conditions for the 1991 cease-fire--and urged the President ``to take appropriate action ..... to bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations.'' But compliance, as we know, never followed. Which brings us to today, to the resolution we have before us, and to the two fundamental questions that are being asked here in Washington, in Maine, and throughout America: Why Saddam Hussein? And why now? As to the first question, I have come to the conclusion--based on the facts--that Saddam Hussein's continued, aggressive production of weapons of mass destruction presents a real and immediate global mess, particularly in light of the absence of any U.N.-mandated inspectors over the last 4 years. Indeed, it was just 4 months after Congress passed the 1998 resolution that Hussein drove out the U.N. weapons inspectors. And what were those inspectors leaving behind? A 1999 report by Richard Butler, the chief inspector, UNSCOM, found when they left Iraq, they were unable to account for 360 tons of bulk chemical agent, including 1 1/2 tons of VX nerve agent, 3,000 tons of precursor chemicals, enough growth media to manufacture 25,000 liters of anthrax spores, and 30,000 special munitions for delivering of chemical and biological agents. Today, there is no reason to believe Hussein has ever looked back. As reported in the U.S. intelligence community document made public on October 4, 2002, he has been seeking to revamp and accelerate his nuclear weapons program. The report concluded that if left unchecked, Iraq would ``probably have a nuclear weapon during this decade,'' and that if Hussein could acquire weapons-grade fissile material from abroad ``it could make a nuclear weapon within a year.'' This information is echoed in the September 24, 2002, intelligence dossier released by British Prime Minister Tony Blair--a critical voice and ally in our war on terrorism. That dossier outlines Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs past and present. It finds Hussein, following the departure of U.N. inspectors in 1998, is aggressively pursuing development of a nuclear capability, and is undeniably seeking items needed to enrich uranium, such as fissile material and gas centrifuge components like vacuum pumps and specialized aluminum tubes. Tellingly, the report also documents Iraq's attempts to buy large quantities of uranium from Africa, even though Iraq has no civil nuclear power program. All of this is in breach of U.N. Security Council Resolution 687. Furthermore, the October 4 report states that Iraq is capable of ``quickly producing and weaponizing'' a variety of both chemical and biological agents, including anthrax, ``for delivery by bombs, missiles, aerial sprayers, and covert operatives, including potentially against the U.S. homeland.'' Both reports highlight that Hussein's weapons are hidden in ``highly survivable'' facilities, some of them mobile, and, of course, in further violation of Resolution 687, his unrelenting effort to expand his ballistic missile capabilities beyond 150 kilometers. Finally, the October 4 report found that Iraq has rebuilt missile and biological weapons facilities damaged during U.S. cruise missile strikes in 1998. Iraq has begun renewed production of chemical warfare agents, probably including mustard, sarin, cyclosarin, and VX--all lethal chemical toxins. All of this is in flagrant violation not only of the case-fire resolution, but also 12 other U.S. calls for disarmament over the ensuing 11 years. So it should come as no

surprise that the Security Council would have issued 30 letters of condemnation to Iraq over this last decade alone. Iraq was condemned for failures to cooperate fully and immediately, failures to allow immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access, and failures to fulfill all of its obligations as set out in previous resolutions. The bottom line is, in every instance, he has failed to comply--and the U.N. has failed to enforce. Which brings us to the question of: Why now? What urgency has interjected itself that would necessitate the actions we contemplate today? My answer begins not by citing a single fact or occurrence, but rather by illustrating a new, encroaching threat over the past decade that was foreshadowed by the first attack on American soil since Pearl Harbor--the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center. I believe that was the seminal moment when our enemies of today were introduced to the realm of the possible--as those who would wish our destruction developed and implemented comprehensive strategies to systematically assault Americans and our interests whenever, wherever, and however they could. It also should have been an awakening for America. That is why I spearheaded investigations into the comings and goings of Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, the mastermind of that bombing in 1993, who entered and existed this country five times totally unimpeded. What I found led me to introduce legislation in 1994, requiring information sharing among critical Government agencies, to ensure those on the front lines of securing America would have the resources to keep dangerous aliens from entering the U.S. But there were those who didn't take the threat seriously, and those reforms were quietly altered, and allowed to fade out of law in 1998, and out of the national consciousness. Now, as we peel back the layers through further investigation, we discovered the Sheikh was closely tied to Osama bin Laden and the network we now know as al-Qaida. The point is, over the decade of the 1990s and into the fledgling days of the 21st century, our consciousness was not attuned to the emerging pattern of attacks, and so the pattern continued--from Khobar Towers in 1996, to the 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, to the attack on the USS *Cole* in the fall of 2000, and culminating in the horrific events of September 11, 2001. That terrible day would finally and forever change the way we assess our security and vulnerability, single-handedly adding the term ``homeland Security'' to our national lexicon. It has changed our conception of what constitutes weapons and warfare--and how both may be used against us. To paraphrase Governor Ridge, we are now compelled to come to grips with an enemy who makes no distinction between combatants and noncombatants. The battlefield itself has changed--today, asymmetrical threats accost us in a theater of engagement that includes our own backyard. There is no line of demarcation. Before September 11, we underestimated the threat, and overestimated our security. That is why the Senate and House have been holding joint intelligence hearings, to determine how we can learn from failures of the past. The lapses were so egregious that it prompted our recent vote to authorize an independent commission, to conduct a more far-reaching inquiry into how we could have done better and how we must do better in the future. Because there is no longer any question as to the scope of the threat--and the ability and intent of terrorist groups to bring devastation to our soil. As Secretary Rumsfeld said: We have entered a world in which terrorist movements and terrorist states are developing the capacity to cause unprecedented destruction. Today, our margin of error is notably different. In the 20th century, we were dealing, for the most part, with conventional weapons--weapons that could kill hundreds of thousands of people, generally combatants. In the 21st century, we are dealing with weapons of mass destruction that can kill potentially tens of thousands of people--innocent men, women and children. It is through this prism of the post-September 11 world that we must view an ever emerging convergence of threats over the last 10 years, represented on the one hand by transnational terrorism exemplified by al-Qaida--with cells in more than 30 countries--and on the other by a regime in Iraq that has already developed and deployed horrific weapons of mass destruction. Even as far back as 1991, the United Nations was concerned enough about a potential linkage between terrorists and Saddam Hussein to include in Resolution 687 a requirement that Iraq inform the Security Council: that it will not commit or support any act of international terrorism or allow any organization directed towards commission of such acts to operate within its territory .....Today, we know from Secretary Rumsfeld that ``al-Qaida is operating in Iraq''..... that we have ``accurate and not debatable'' evidence of reportedly the presence of senior members of Al-Qaida in Baghdad, and other associations. Iraq has also reportedly provided safe haven to Abdul Rahman Yasin, one of the FBI's most wanted terrorists, who was a key participant in the first World Trade Center bombing. We also know that Saddam Hussein continues to provide $25,000 rewards to the families of suicide bombers in the Middle East, continues to harbor the Abu Nidal Organization, and continues to harbor the Palestinian Liberation Front. And so the question we really need to ask ourselves is, why is Hussein so single-mindedly and at all costs amassing such huge stores of horrific weapons? We know he has them. We know he has used them before. The question is, will he use them again? The answer is that we don't know for certain. But from all I have been able to ascertain from high-level briefings, the logical conclusion--based on all the evidence, all the broken promises, all the obfuscation. And now the nexus

between Hussein and terrorist groups and individuals--is that we simply can't afford the risk to humanity. Some say we should wait until the threat is imminent. But how will we know when the danger is clear, present and immediate? When people start checking into hospitals? When the toxin shows up in the water supply? When the dirty bomb goes off? Because, in the shadowy world of terrorism, as we have seen, that will already be too late. For these are not weapons that can be easily intercepted or anticipated. They aren't detected by sonar, and they don't show up on radar screens. Therefore, the standard by which we judge the level and immediacy of threat must be calibrated accordingly. In the instance of Iraq, for a terrorist organization that shares Hussein's disdain for America, where better to acquire weapons of mass destruction? And for Saddam Hussein, what better way to deliver these weapons than a terrorist who might smuggle a vial of smallpox in a suitcase or store a canister of sarin gas in a cargo container or launch a drone aircraft or other unmanned aerial vehicle that sprays aerosolized biological agents. In fact, Richard Butler, the former chief U.N. weapons inspector, was asked in an interview on October 8, 2002, ``how easy it would be ..... for the Iraquis to arm a terrorist group, or an individual terrorist, with weapons of mass destruction.'' It would be ``extremely easy,'' Ambassador Butler told the interviewer. ``If they decided to do it, it would be a piece of cake.'' It is true we cannot enter the diabolical mind of Saddam Hussein to know conclusively if and when he may deliver his weapons--or share those weapons with terrorists organizations. But we do have an obligation to make a judgment on which side of the equation we want to err--knowing he has the means and opportunity to strike, and knowing we will put potentially millions at risk should we misread his inclination, miscalculate this timing, or underestimate his capability. And we have been wrong before. According to Secretary Rumsfeld, before Operation Desert Storm, ``these best intelligence estimates were that Iraq was at least 5 to 7 years away from having nuclear weapons. The experts were wrong. When the U.S. got on the ground, it found the Iraquis were probably 6 months to a year away .....'' Just imagine if we were confronted with an Iraq that already had nuclear capability. Today he is procuring his weapons with the $6.6 billion in illict revenue GAO estimates he has gained over the last 4 years through oil smuggling and ``surcharges.'' When you consider that al-Qaida spent merely $500,000 to inflict such horror as we saw in New York, Pennsylvania, and the Pentagon, that equation becomes even more ominous--all the more so as September 11 raised our sense of urgency and illuminated a whole new range of dangerous scenarios that place Hussein's weapons of mass destruction in a very different light. As Henry Kissinger warned the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 26, ``We are only at the beginning of global proliferation,'' and thus we need to ``consider not only the risk of action but the consequences of inaction.'' In context of all we know--we can no longer assure Americans that he can be contained and confined to Iraq. Therefore, I believe the world must disarm Saddam Hussein now, when the development of his capability is imminent--not waiting until it is imminent he is about to strike. In the absence of true strength of enforcement, Hussein will continue to exploit our every weakness through his methodical ``cheat and retreat,'' as he has done systematically and persistently in the past--resulting in more of the old dynamic of U.N. resolutions and economic sanctions, followed by the repeated inability of the U.N. to enforce its own mandates. To change this paradigm, the President has now rightfully come to Congress to seek authorization and support for a resolution ensuring that when he speaks, he does so with the strength of a unified, unequivocal American voice that leaves no ambivalence as to the resoluteness of our position.....no doubt where America stands. Given the gravity of the global implications of Hussein's serial intransigence, there is no substitute for the U.N. enforcing compliance, or for the U.S. working through the U.N. Appropriately, this resolution calls upon the President to use the full weight of this office, first and foremost through his diplomatic means and persuasive power--as well as that of his foreign policy team--to convince the U.N. to impose and enforce unfettered, unrestricted inspections. And as Secretary of State Powell has noted, ``our diplomatic efforts at the United Nations would be helped by a strong Congressional resolution.....'' Furthermore, as many of my colleagues, as well as my constituents, have expressed, the use of force should be the last resort, and under this resolution it is the last resort. The President emphasized in his speech to the Nation that, ``congressional authorization does not mean that military action is imminent or unavoidable.'' I realize there are those who oppose unilateral action should the U.N. fail to act, and accordingly would oppose this resolution granting such Presidential authority. But for those who would ultimately preserve the right to authorize military action--even if we cannot secure a U.N. mandate for enforcement--this resolution is preferable to a two-tiered approach. Why? In my view, by granting military authority to the President in advance, it leaves no question or uncertainty as to the level of our commitment, thereby strengthening the President's ability to secure U.N. implementation of a new and enforceable resolution and potentially places us on a course toward a peaceful disarmament. As always, diplomacy must constitute our first line of defense. But in the event that action becomes necessary to safeguard our national security interests outside the auspices of the United Nations, let there be no mistake--the President must exert

the last full measure of effort in building an international coalition to join us in disarming Saddam Hussein, because this shouldn't have to be a solo endeavor for our nation. Iraq is not just a threat to America. It is a threat to all of humanity. It is not just our interests we are protecting, it is the interests of a new century that must be free from the scourge of global terrorism. And our goals with regard to Saddam Hussein are inseparable from our mission to eradicate terror at its roots. I have come to the regrettable conclusion that if we allow the Iraqi regime to continue developing its horrific capabilities with impunity, we are endangering mankind by sending a corrosive message that the stockpiling of weapons of mass destruction buys immunity from international response. If the United States and its allies offer nothing but disapproving rhetoric or ineffective sanctions as the only price for Iraq's hostility and defiance, then we concede a victory to the tactics of aggression. Rather, if the free nations of the world are to remain the authors of our own destiny, history teaches us that we must never countenance the tyranny of such threats. As Winston Churchill wrote in 1936 of the tyrants building stocks of state-of-the-art weapons of the day: Dictators ride to and fro upon tigers which they dare not dismount. And the tigers are getting hungry. The world can no longer ignore the tiger in Iraq. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a transcript of the ``Today Show'' of October 8, 2002, be printed in the **RECORD.** There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the **RECORD,** as follows: **MATT LAUER** (co-host): As we reported, President Bush laid out his case against Saddam Hussein again in a speech on Monday night in Cincinnati. He talked about Iraq's capability to manufacture weapons of mass destruction. Richard Butler was chief U.N. weapons inspector in Iraq and the last person to oversee an inspection team in Baghdad. Mr. Butler, good morning to you. Mr. **RICHARD BUTLER** (Former U.N. Weapons Inspector): Good morning, Matt. Good to see you. **LAUER**: Good to see you. In his speech last night, the president actually quoted you, saying that Saddam Hussein is, quote, ``addicted to weapons of mass destruction.'' You were last in Iraq in 1998, and before your inspection team was kicked out . . . Mr. **BUTLER**: Mm-hmm. **LAUER**: . . . you said, and I'm quoting a Time magazine article, quote, ``you saw some really disturbing stuff,'' end quote. Be more specific. What did you see that we should be afraid of now? Mr. **BUTLER**: Well, in particular, Matt, one of the substances that the president mentioned last night, in may I say what I thought was an outstanding speech, I think the best he's given, that substance is called VX. It is the most toxic of the chemical warfare agents. And we saw some deeply disturbing evidence that Iraq had made a very significant quantity of VX. I was pleased to see the president refer to that last night. We also saw evidence that they had loaded it into missile warheads. That's the--the difficulty Iraq has always had, is how to weaponize this hideous stuff that they make and they continue to make. And in the case of VX, we saw evidence that they had loaded it into missile warheads for delivery. **LAUER:** Iraq has agreed to let UN weapons inspection teams back into the country with limitations. They will not be allowed to inspect Saddam Hussein's personal palaces. Is that worth anything, in your opinion? Mr. **BUTLER:** No, it's not, Matt. I'm really slightly stunned to think that we are now exactly where we were four years ago. And by the way, it's not palaces, it's presidential sites. The--the parts of Iraq that the Iraqis declared in the past to be of presidential significance measured some 75 square kilometers, you know, 50 square miles, much larger than the eight palaces that Saddam has. The number of buildings is what was really important in those presidential sites. It . . . **LAUER:** What's going on at . . . Mr. **BUTLER:** . . . was 1,100 . . . **LAUER:** . . . those sites . . . Mr. **BUTLER:** . . . buildings. **LAUER:** . . . in our opinion? Mr. **BUTLER:** Well, no, we--we can't know without inspection. But we had excellent intelligence information in the past that weapons were stored there, that materials, with which to make weapons were stored there. Matt, it's always been the same, and it is the same today. The Iraqis say they have no weapons, OK. If they don't, let the inspectors in. And what they have tried to do today, as they did four years ago, is say you can come in up to a point . . . **LAUER:** Right. Mr. **BUTLER:** . . . but not in the places that we say are presidential. That's not good enough. **LAUER:** And real, real quickly, how easy would it be, in your opinion, Mr. Butler, for the Iraqis to arm a terrorist group or an individual terrorist with weapons of mass destruction? Mr. **BUTLER:** Really quickly, Matt? Extremely easy. If they decide to do it, piece of cake. **LAUER:** Richard Butler. Mr. Butler, thanks very much for your time. Mr. **BUTLER:** Thank you. **LAUER:** It's 17 after the hour. Once again, here's Katie. **KATIE COURIC** (co-host): Thanks, Matt. Ms. SNOWE. I yield the floor, and I suggest the absence of a quorum.

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