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The Secret Life of Political Parties
A Comparative Study of Candidate Selection in African Democracies

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

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Summary

Every political party has three lives: a public life, a private life and a secret life. Publicly, parties campaign for office and, if elected, form governments. Privately, parties attract funding, formulate policy positions and announce candidacies. These first two lives are formal, strictly regulated and transparent affairs. Secretly, however, partisans lead a third, underground life: donations are solicited covertly, faction bosses scratch and manoeuvre for position; malcontents hatch plots to topple leaders; and subversives scheme against the constitutional order. This dissertation is about single part of the secret life of political parties. Our research question is: how do political parties, competing in divided societies, select parliamentary candidates, and does variation in such selection mechanisms influence the demography of parliamentary parties and the cohesion of political parties.

A closer understanding of how African political parties select candidates is of both theoretical and empirical importance. First, we contribute to the literature on democratic representation in new democracies. New African democracies tend to have a dominant political party, surrounded by a fragmented opposition (Van de Walle 2003; Lindberg 2006). In countries where a single political party dominates the electoral terrain, the selection of candidates is often tantamount to their election. By looking at how political parties select their candidates, we develop a clearer picture of the mechanisms which influence citizen representation in new democracies.

Second, we contribute to the literature on political parties and party systems in new democracies. According to this body of literature, variation in candidate selection procedures influences the stability of political parties (Weiner 1967). Stable political parties form an integral part of an institutionalised party system, which is a cornerstone of a stable democracy (Mainwaring 1999). By looking at how parties select parliamentary candidates, we develop a closer understanding of the conditions which lead to party system institutionalisation.

Third, we develop our understanding of variation in the consequences of electoral system design. There is, according to Grofman (2004: xiii) 'a greater recognition that electoral rules that appear identical may differ significantly in their consequences when we look below the surface to consider [inter alia] candidate nomination procedures'. By looking at how political parties mediate the incentives offered by electoral systems, we develop a more fine-grained theoretical understanding of the causal mechanisms which link electoral design with political consequences, such as the cohesion of parties and the composition of parliament.

Finally, we generate useful empirical information on an important, but inaccessible, function of political parties. This is the first comparative study of candidate selection in Africa. The generation of this new information has intrinsic value, but it also allows us to refine and develop our general understanding of candidate selection and its consequences.

The unit of analysis of this study is the political party. We select four political parties that competed in the 2004 parliamentary elections in South Africa and Namibia to form the core of a comparative historical case study. In order to reconstruct the process of candidate selection in each party, we rely heavily on a series of in-depth semi-structured interviews with participants in the selection process of each political party. We also make limited use of a survey of a candidate survey, and party documentation on the selection of candidates.

We find, first, that the four political parties used a broad variety of mechanisms to select their parliamentary candidates. The selection mechanism of the ruling party in South Africa is a complex and highly formal procedure. A dual selection mechanism allows for both competitive involvement from party members at the regional level, and a strong measure of elite control at the national level. In Namibia's ruling party, in contrast, the party rulebook restricts popular involvement in selection of parliamentary candidates and the president plays an important role. In South Africa's largest opposition party, the selection of parliamentary candidates is highly inclusive: provincial structures, effectively, choose candidate though the party president has limited control over the process. In Namibia's largest opposition party, a camarilla of senior party leader selected parliamentary candidates. Existing analytical frameworks are sufficient to describe variation in the process in our four cases.

We find reasonably strong evidence to suggest that variation in selection mechanisms influences both the demographic composition of parliamentary parties and the stability of political parties. In the African National Congress, a carefully-designed balance between popular competition and national level control led to stable factional competition and a demographically representative parliamentary party. In Swapo, we find that an exclusive selection process, dominated by the party president, led to a reasonably representative parliamentary party, but was achieved at the cost of party cohesion. In the Democratic Alliance, an inclusive process dampened factional tension within the party, while in the Congress of Democrats, a highly exclusive process undermined critically the cohesion of the party. These findings provide strong confirmation of the explanatory value of existing theories linking variation in the process of candidate selection to the demographic composition of parliamentary parties and the cohesion of political parties.

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I have accumulated quite a few debts during my time as a graduate student at Trinity College. The heaviest of these is owed to the people, both partisan and non-partisan alike, who gave generously of their time to share their experience of the process of candidate selection in African political parties. During the course of successive field trips to southern Africa, I also counted on the assistance of library staff and faculty members at the Universities of Cape Town, Namibia and Botswana.

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I dedicate this work to the memory of my mother.

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Introduction

1.1 Representative Democracy in Divided Societies

At the beginning of the 1990s, political upheaval changed the face of government in sub-Saharan Africa. The edifice of one-party and military regimes, long hollowed out by economic malaise, collapsed in the face of popular protest (Bratton and van de Walle 1997). In tropical Africa, many authoritarian leaders – Soyinka's 'Toad Kings' – succumbed, no longer able to maintain control over the state apparatus, or to continue to supply the clientelist networks that had supported their rule since independence in the 1960s. Further south, the announcement of the imminent release of Nelson Mandela and the unbanning of the African National Congress in February 1990 set in chain a series of events that would lead to the end of apartheid and the full extension of the electoral franchise. Across Africa the impact of these pressures for a democratic opening was deeply felt. By 2000, multi-party elections in thirty-nine out of the forty-eight African countries had produced legislatures with two parties or more (van de Walle 2002: 67). The 'third wave' of democratisation had reached African shores (Huntington 1991).[1]

There is a curious similarity between the first and second periods of democratisation that took place in Africa in the 1960s and 1990s, respectively. Both episodes occurred with lightning speed, suffered early and dramatic reverses, and provoked a flurry of scholarly interest in democratic political institutions at work in 'divided' societies (for example, Lewis 1965; Zolberg 1966; Price 1967; Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Reynolds 1999).[2] Then, as now, scholars were concerned that social diversity would not be well managed by democratic institutions. Plurality, according to W. Arthur Lewis (1965: 66), 'is the principal political problem of most of the new states created in the twentieth century'. Lewis was concerned that a plural society could not support a political system which transformed fixed political cleavages into a set of permanent 'winners' and 'losers' (see also Lijphart 1977; Sandbrook 2000). According to this camp, majoritarian or 'ordinary' democracy – as Nelson Mandela called it – would collapse when forced to confront the deeply entrenched societal divisions that characterise non-Western countries (Reilly 2001).

[1] The view that African elites have embraced democracy is by no means universally accepted. In 1991, Joseph wrote of a democratic 'miracle' that seemed to be occurring in Africa. In 1999, he was considerably less enthusiastic, lamenting the 'virtual democracies' that political leaders had constructed. Pessimists would argue that the process of democratisation is more accurately labeled 'political change' (Ake 1996; Joseph 1999; Chabal and Daloz 1999). We take the 'glass half-full' approach and use the terminology of democratisation.

[2] By 'divided', we follow Horowitz (2002: 18) to indicate societies in which 'ethnic group identities have a high degree of salience, exceeding that accorded to alternative identities – including supra-ethnic, territorial, ideological, and class-based alternatives – and in which levels of antipathy between ethnic groups are high'.

Clearly, political liberalisation presents a problem for the 'engineers' of the democratic project: what configuration of political institutions would promote democratisation in societies divided by cleavages of language, religion, race or ethnicity? Solutions to this conundrum tended to focus on the design of 'macro' political institutions and emphasised the manipulative opportunities offered by electoral systems (Lijphart 1977; Horowitz 1991; Sartori 1994; Reilly and Reynolds 1999). One particularly influential approach suggested that mechanisms for elite 'power-sharing' were vital if divided societies were to consolidate their nascent democracies. Central to this 'consociational' approach was the prescription for a proportional electoral system that would give each group a degree of political representation which reflected their support throughout the country.[3] According to Arend Lijphart, a champion of this approach, the 'beauty' of proportional representation (PR) was that it dealt with all groups in a 'completely equal and evenhanded fashion' (2006: 46). Norris (2006: 210) outlines the 'core argument' of the consociational approach, according to which:

> 'PR 1) produces a more proportional [electoral] outcome; 2) this outcome facilitates the entry of smaller parties into parliament; 3) this entry includes the election of ethnic minority parties; and, in turn, 4) these elections produce greater diffuse support for the political system among ethnic minority populations.'

Yet what of countries where political parties have *not* emerged 'organically from deep-seated divisions in society' (Field and Siavelis 2008: 360)? Much of the theoretical relationship linking power-sharing institutions with democratic stability is predicated on studies of 'consensus' democracy in Western Europe (Andeweg 2000). In this region, the empirical correlation between PR and stable democracy is plain to see, but the advanced and industrialised 'old' democracies of this region are divided by multiple cleavages, which have (by definition) sufficient organisational expression to support coherent political parties. In Africa's new 'electoral democracies', however, it is rarely (if ever) the case that each politicised group can support a discrete political party. In the twelve African countries that have conformed to minimal standards of electoral democracy in the past twenty years,[4] half of these contain a 'dominant' political party irrespective of the degree of social diversity

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[3] Consociational arrangements have, according to Reilly (2001: 20), four mechanisms to allow elite power sharing: 'grand coalition governments in which all significant [politicised] groups are represented; proportional representation of different groups in the distribution of legislative seats and in the civil service; segmental autonomy via federalism or similar devices; and a power of veto over key decision by minority groups.'

[4] These twelve 'electoral' democracies include: Benin, <u>Botswana</u>, Cape Verde, Ghana, <u>Lesotho</u>, Malawi, Mauritius, <u>Mozambique</u>, <u>Namibia</u>, São Tomé and Príncipe, <u>Seychelles</u> and <u>South Africa</u> ('dominant' party systems are underlined).

(Bogaards 2004).[5] Within these six countries – all located in southern Africa – it appears, moreover, that dominant parties are here to stay. With the exception of Lesotho, opposition parties in southern Africa are more marginal today (in terms of vote share) than at the onset of the 'third wave' of democratization (van de Walle 2003).

1.2 Political Representation and the Secret Life of Political Parties

The presence of a single dominant political party, surrounded by small opposition parties, complicates the causal relationship linking proportional electoral systems and the representation of politicised groups. If each politicised group in a divided society does not support a political party, proportional institutional arrangements will not lead automatically to demographically proportional parliaments. Where a single dominant party holds sway in a divided society, it follows that the integrative role of the dominant party will determine, in large part, the demography of parliament. Neither is it entirely evident that closed-list PR will encourage, as consociationalists expect, 'the formation and maintenance of strong and cohesive parties' (Lijphart 2006: 47). In dominant party systems – where a single party sits high in the electoral saddle for an extended period of time – *internal* mechanisms of representation within dominant parties can leave an indelible mark on both the demography of parliamentary parties and the cohesion of political parties.

The question, then, becomes: how can we undercover the mechanisms which lead to varying degrees of party cohesion and representativity? The answer, we contend, is to look beneath the exterior of the party machine at how political parties perform a vital function in the life of parties, namely candidate selection. Over a hundred years ago, Ostrogorski (1970 [1902]) argued that the distribution of power within a political party is heavily dependent on methods of candidate selection. Schattschneider (1970 [1942]: 62), in a similar vein, asserted that 'the nature of the nominating procedure determines the nature of the party; he who can make the nominations is the owner of the party'. In a relatively more recent contribution to the literature on candidate selection, Ranney (1981: 103), too, affirmed the received wisdom that candidate selection is a decisive weapon in the armoury of any aspiring party boss, 'for what is at stake in such a struggle, as the opposing sides well know, is nothing less than

[5] Unsurprisingly, 'dominant' party systems tend to elude easy definition. Parsimonious definitions look simply at the vote or seat share gained by the party with pretensions to dominance, while more expansive definitions include temporal criteria and a concern for the cohesiveness of the opposition (see Bogaards 2004 for a fuller discussion). For instance, Sartori (1976) argues that where a party has won over 50% of parliamentary seats on three consecutive occasions it can be considered dominant, while van de Walle and Butler (1999) consider a party's performance over a single election but set the bar of inclusion higher at 60% of seats. Blondel (1968) weighs a party's dominance over a twenty-year period and considers a party dominant only if it attracts twice the vote share of the nearest opposition party. We consider systems to be 'dominant' when one party wins an absolute majority of seats in parliament over at least three consecutive elections and captures the presidency (Sartori 1976).

control over the core of what the party stands for and does'.[6] We are making a case, in other words, to explore the secret life of political parties. Our research question, in this vein, is: how do political parties in divided democracies select parliamentary candidates, and does variation in such selection mechanisms influence the demography of parliamentary parties and the cohesion of political parties.

Candidate Selection and the Demography of Parliamentary Parties

The selection of candidates has been acknowledged as a 'key stage' (Gallagher 1988a: 2), and even the 'most important stage' (Czudnowski 1975: 219), in the recruitment of political leaders. Norris and Lovenduski (1995: 1) underline how political parties act as a filter, allowing only a minority of aspirant pass through the 'eye of the needle' into the highest offices of state. Kirchheimer (1966: 198) considers candidate selection to be the most important function of the present-day 'catch-all' party. Jupp (1968: 58) goes further still, asserting that picking candidates, to all intents and purposes, is the only thing a party does. Gallagher (1988a: 1) underlines the importance of the filtering role played by party selectors by arguing that 'the quality of the candidates selected determines the quality of the deputies elected, of the resultant parliament, often of the members of government, and to some extent of a country's policies'.

In order to examine how political parties determine the demographic contours of their parliamentary parties, we first look to who decides within the party. The site of the 'selectorates' within (or even outside) the party organisation can have a decisive bearing on the body of candidates that form a parliamentary party (Gallagher 1988b: 236-245; Field and Siavelis 2008). An inclusive selectorate, which allows participation from lower echelons of the party structure, rarely produces a balanced parliamentary party (Rahat 2007). An exclusive selectorate, on the other hand, presents the party leader or a camarilla of senior partisans with the power to choose a carefully sculpted body of parliamentarians. Under List-PR, there are a myriad of ways in which political parties could select candidates. The identity of the selectorate – and the precise nature of their demands – can leave an indelible mark on the demographic outline of parliamentary parties.

Candidate Selection and the Cohesion of Political Parties

The selection of parliamentary candidates can, in addition, have a heavy influence on the cohesion of political parties. In regions such as southern Africa, where ruling parties sit high

[6] Gallagher (1988b: 277) argues that although control over selection cannot be easily equated with 'notions like ownership', control over selection procedures can provide a valuable insight into the distribution of power within political parties.

in the electoral saddle, the cohesion of dominant parties is, as Pempel (1990: 32) concedes, 'far more an art than it is an inevitability.' Duverger (1964: 312), in this vein, considers dominant parties to be inherently unstable: 'it [the dominant party] wears itself out in office, it loses its vigour, its arteries harden. It would be possible to show that every domination bears within itself the seeds of its own destruction.' Other, even less optimistic accounts, also bear the touch of Thanatos, presaging death and doom: Pempel (1990) refers obliquely to the dysfunctional nature of these 'uncommon' democracies, while Giliomee and Simkins (1999) refer to the 'awkward embrace' of dominant parties and democratic accountability.[7]

On the opposing side, a smaller group have argued that there is a 'third way' in which a dominant political party can provide both broad-based and stable representation to competing social groups. India provides us with the keenest lesson in successful democratic consolidation in a postcolonial environment. Aside from the pivotal role that federal institutions and a modified electoral system have played, analysts agree that the 'dominance' of the Indian National Congress has, in fact, been instrumental to the consolidation process (Kothari 1964; Weiner 1967; Lijphart 1996). The key contribution of Congress to the process of democratic consolidation, according to this line of thought, lies in its ability to act as a 'broadly representative party' of major group interests in society (Lijphart 1996). Yet how did Congress manage to play this 'consociational' role? What configuration of internal institutional mechanisms provided Congress with the ability to balance competing ethnic and religious groups, while retaining the structural integrity of a political party in charge of a large country? To address these questions, the Indian experience tells us that we should seek the low door in the wall of what Gallagher and Marsh (1988) term the 'secret garden' of politics: the internal competition for parliamentary candidacy. The suggestion by Kothari (1964) that competition within the environs of the dominant party can act as an equivalent to competition between political parties marks an important contribution to our understanding of how democracies survive, but is also of marked importance on a continent where dominant parties are not in the least 'uncommon'.

[7] The rationale behind such pessimism is straightforward: the legitimacy of representative government rests on the claim that leaders respond to the wishes of their people (Dahl 1971). This responsiveness, in turn, is achieved through a 'chain' of delegation and accountability that links the governor to the governed (Mitchell 2000). Like any contract, the terms are specific – tenure is limited to a fixed time-period; the portfolio of services is clearly outlined, as are the powers of the incumbent and the rewards of office. But if incumbents do not face a credible threat to their survival – an alternative to which unhappy citizens can turn – what mechanism can retain their responsiveness to the popular will?

1.3 Contribution to the Literature

As the first comparative study of candidate selection in African parties, we are disabled by the complete absence of any kind of analytical framework that has been tried-and-tested in the African context. We have little choice, then, but to turn to other world regions for an appropriate outline of how, in theory, parties might select candidates, and whether such variation might be expected to produce a discernable impact on the cohesion and representivity of political parties. Accordingly, we draw directly on two discrete bodies of literature. First, we use the mostly European literature to help us reconstruct how political parties select candidates and to examine how selection mechanisms influence the demography of parliamentary parties. Second, we turn to the mostly Indian literature to help us develop concrete expectations of how variation in the design of candidate selection systems influences how groups of ambitious partisans – from loosely-organised tendencies to fully-fledged factions – compete for parliamentary candidacy within political parties, and whether variation in the competitive mechanism affects the stability of political parties. Following Mainwaring (1999: 15), we make a direct contribution to the body of work which holds that political parties in new democracies are 'key actors in determining how democracy works, and why it sometimes fails.' Within this sub-field, then, we contribute to – and rely heavily on – the candidate selection literature from both developed and developing world countries.

We also contribute to the small but growing body of literature on 'ethnic politics' in new, divided democracies. In the early section of this study, when we specify which groups are likely to form factions within our political parties, we draw on work by Scarritt and Mozaffar (1999; 2003) and Posner (2004), which define and identify ethnic groups in Africa. The main, descriptive and explanatory intent of this dissertation, however, is quite different to these studies. In their first piece, Scarritt and Mozaffar (1999: 83) seek simply to 'specify potential ethnopolitical cleavages and actual ethnopolitical groups … [to] facilitate cross-country comparison.' In their later work, Scarritt, Mozaffar (and Galaich) apply their earlier specification of ethnic groups to test whether the reductive effect of majoritarian electoral systems is, as predicted, contingent on social diversity (Mozaffar *et al.* 2003; Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994; Neto and Cox 1997).[8] The principal explanatory purpose of Posner (2004)

[8] The principal findings of this article – that majoritarian electoral systems in Africa, *pace* Neto and Cox 1997, do not reduce the effective number of parties – have been revised substantially. In a replication piece, Brambor *et al.* (2006) point to methodological weaknesses in the Mozaffar *et al.* (2003) that lead the latter group to make unfounded claims about the contingent effect of electoral systems in Africa. Though the critique devastates the claim that there is something 'exceptional' about the effect of electoral systems in Africa, the centrepiece of the Mozaffar et al. work – namely, the operationalisation of a constructivist understanding of ethnicity – remains untainted.

is to evaluate whether economic growth is contingent on ethnic diversity. In our study, we are not interested in either party system fragmentation or the relationship between democracy and development; instead, we are interested in the effect of internal party selection mechanisms. To that end, we make a contribution to the ethnic politics literature by applying the sophisticated theoretical understanding of ethnic group composition to our cases.

We also contribute, indirectly, to the broader study of political representation in African democracies. The literature on transitions to democracy in Africa is quite extensive (see Gibson 2002 for an excellent review), but it is also generally concerned with the broader structural and contingent causes of the collapse of authoritarian regimes in the early 1990s.[9] Though this period forms the backdrop of our study, the analytical framework of such works is of little use to our investigation. Simply, we are not trying to explain the onset of political liberalisation in African autocracies. Instead, our study contributes to the growing body of scholarship that explores how ordinary African citizens are represented in fledgling democratic institutions, and whether variation in such institutional arrangement produces tangibly different outcomes (see, for instance, van de Walle and Butler 1999; van de Walle 2003; Mozaffar and Scarritt 2005; Barkan *et al.* 2006; Lindberg 2007).

1.4 Inside African Political Parties

Students of the political party have long lamented the difficulties associated with researching this most impenetrable of organisations. There can be little doubt that political parties, according to Eldersveld (1981: 407), are 'complex institutions and processes, and as such they are difficult to understand'. First, internal party procedures are often highly opaque, particularly in the case of candidate selection. Duverger (1964: 354) once noted that 'parties do not like the odours of the electoral kitchen to spread to the outside world'. In Africa, where some political parties were once movements of liberation, this problem is particularly acute. Reformed liberation movements are often characterised by tightly-knit and historically secretive decision-making procedures (Hyden 2006). This possible recalcitrance on the part of politicians threatens to hamper efforts to reconstruct accurately the process of selection. Indeed, Duverger (1964: xviii) opined that 'the organisation of parties depends essentially on unwritten practice and habit' and the party 'old guard' rarely divulge party secrets to the 'uninitiated'.[10]

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[9] For an excellent overview of the transitions literature, see Bratton and van de Walle (1997: 19–61).

[10] This, unfortunately, is also more than likely to be true. During an interview one member of the ANC's upper echelon when pressed upon the veracity of a point remarked, with more than a hint of irony, that he was loath to 'dissimulate to a scholar'.

Second, selection procedures in political parties are quite likely to contain a significant element of informality, which might lead the 'uninitiated' into making erroneous conclusions based on a narrow interpretation of formal party rules. Czudnowski (1975: 220) warned that with the exception of the party primary, 'important [party] decisions are made informally by groups of individuals, and ratification is more often a procedural formality'. In a similar vein, Gallagher (1988a: 5) indicates that studies of candidate selection 'must go far beyond, while not ignoring, examination of what party constitutions say'. An early student of African political parties (Zolberg 1966: 11) summarised the problem succinctly, and his caution is worth repeating in its entirety:

> 'It is always difficult to move from discussing the formal constitution of a political party to a realistic account of how it works; this difficulty is increased in countries (like those in Africa) in which the formal constitution of the party is derived from foreign models and is silent about vital factors in party formation and activity which are derived from the social and cultural environment of Africa.'

Third, the sub-area of candidate selection suffers from a relative glut of theoretical accounts of selection procedures and their implications, and a paucity of cross-country and cross-party analyses of the subject, a feature that Hazan and Rahat (2006: 109) describe as the 'Achilles heel of any attempt to make further progress'. In particular, there are considerable costs associated with subjecting existing theoretical accounts to rigorous empirical validation. Again, this drawback affects students of African parties disproportionately. The theoretical accounts that have been developed rely principally on Western experience (Gallagher 1988a; Norris *et. al.* 1997; Hazan 2002). Empirical explorations of African parties if left rudderless risk being blown off course.

We have decided to study the process, and consequences, of candidate selection procedures within African political parties by means of a combination of a loose comparative method of political inquiry and a strongly historical case-study approach, partly by default and partly by design. Unfortunately, little in-depth research has been conducted on candidate selection in sub-Saharan Africa. There is one notable exception to this (Ohman 2004), but in general, the literature that exists on this subject has only referred to candidate selection in the context of a wider concern with party organisation (Holm and Molutsi 1989; Lodge 1999; Mulenga and Kasonde 2001; Molomo 2003). In the absence of detailed comparable data it seems as though a large superficial study of candidate selection in Africa might raise more questions than it answers. Ohman (2004: 9) concurs, stating that 'until more data becomes available from more African selection processes, the way forward seems to be to focus more closely on fewer parties.' Norris (2006: 94), in a recent review of political recruitment,

voiced a similar recommendation that analysis of formal rules 'needs to be supplemented by a labour-intensive program mixing participant observation, qualitative interviews, and/or survey-based studies'.

However, there are also at least two good reasons to study candidate selection through in-depth case-studies, in addition to the lack of data. First, the comparative case-study approach describes the 'real-world' context in which candidate selection occurs with greater accuracy than the statistical method. As already discussed, there is ample reason to believe that the process of candidate selection is rarely a mirror-image of party rules. Second, as a partially 'hypothesis-generating' case study this dissertation can develop theoretical generalisations, where few currently exist, that can be subsequently tested.

1.5 The Structure of the Study

In the next chapter, we present the theoretical chapter which outlines the analytical framework of the dissertation. We review two bodies of literature: the mostly European works that describe the range of procedures used by political parties to select parliamentary candidates; and the mostly Indian literature that predicts how variation in selection procedures might influence the cohesion of political parties. The fundamental challenge of this chapter (like all literature reviews) is to identify a body of work which is sufficiently coherent to structure our descriptive and explanatory investigation. Our investigation, however, suffers from a potentially debilitating handicap: as little or nothing is known of candidate selection in Africa, the importation of theoretical expectations from other world regions, we risk stretching' existing theory beyond its carrying capacity (Sartori 1984; Collier and Levitsky 1997). To an extent, this problem is illusory: there is no good reason to expect African political parties to use selection mechanisms which cannot be described using the language of European, Indian or indeed Latin American researchers. Our research method, in addition, should allow us the opportunity to test whether existing descriptions of selection procedures capture the reality of African selection experiences.

That is not to say, of course, that this study does not face a 'stretching' problem: in our attempt to explain whether varying selection mechanisms influence party cohesion, it might well be the case that the fundamental premises of the existing literature – that parties, for instance, campaign along programmatic lines – do not hold in the African context. Were we wholly reliant on the European literature to predict how variation in selection mechanisms influences the cohesion of African political parties, this might be a serious problem. In our study, however, we turn to the Indian context which, arguably, is quite comparable to the

African context – both regions are relatively recent converts to the practice of representative democracy; equally marked by the colonial adventure; divided according to ascriptively-defined groups; and contain gross economic disparities. The theoretical premises which underpin the Indian literature, then, should travel without too much difficulty to the African environment.

In Chapter 3, we discuss in more detail the data and methodology of this study. We outline the criteria which determine case selection: we are interested, as we shall see, in national-based political parties competing in electoral democracies. We select cases, in addition, which increase our capacity to test expectations that different selection mechanisms produce tangibly different degrees of party cohesion and representivity. We discuss the different sources of data which allow us to describe and analyse selection mechanisms – principally party documentation and semi-structured interviews with key party actors – and consider how our findings can be applied beyond our immediate case studies.

In Chapter 4, we identify the factions (based, primarily) along ethnic lines that structure political competition inside African political parties. It is the interests of these factions, we suspect, which must be accommodated if parties are to remain cohesive. We review the literature which outlines why African countries contain a marked ethnic dimension, before moving to an in-depth study of the factions in each of our political parties. In Chapter 5, we continue with a more detailed description of the organisational and linkage function of our political parties, using a revised typology of political parties to structure the analysis.

In Chapter 6, examine how each of our cases selected their parliamentary candidates. We reconstruct the process of selection according to its centralisation, inclusivity, and formality. In Chapter 7, we test whether the body of theory from the Indian cases can explain variation in the stability of Namibian and South African parties. In Chapter 8, we summarise the main conclusions that can be reached concerning the process and consequences of variation in legislative candidate selection procedures in Namibia and South Africa, and attempt to draw tentative generalisations beyond these immediate countries. We summarise the original contribution made to the discipline of political science, and outline areas that may be suitable for future research.

Candidate Selection and Party Cohesion in African Democracies

2.1 Introduction

In representative democracies, competition for elective office has taken a peculiar, yet practically ubiquitous form: ambitious individuals vying for state power pool their resources, banding together to 'win more of what they seek, more often and over a longer time period' (Aldrich 1995: 28). Competition between such collectives – political parties, as we know them – is the cornerstone of democracy (Sartori 1965). The prospect that a vengeful electorate will punish obtuse representatives from one collective with replacement by a rival collective compels government responsiveness to the 'popular will' (Bueno de Mesquita 2003). Without this competitive dimension, democracy is said not to exist. Within political parties, however, a similar level of openness is not a defining attribute of a democratic system. 'Democracy on a large scale,' Sartori continues to argue in *Democratic Theory*, is not 'the sum of many little democracies' (1965: 124). Political parties, then, need not be internally democratic in order for democracy to deserve the name; some authors, indeed, have argued that an 'iron law of oligarchy' governs the internal affairs of political parties, making political parties inherently undemocratic (Michels 1959 [1915]).

In this chapter we undertake two tasks. First, we look at the different ways in which political parties select parliamentary candidates. In Africa, we might expect parties to have universally low levels of openness in how candidates are selected. Africa, after all, is not renowned for her commitment to competitive elections. It is a continent, we also recall, where in the years between independence and the end of the Cold War, only five countries maintained some semblance of multiparty competition. Yet, as we shall highlight (based on a cursory overview of African selection mechanisms), some political parties have open systems, allowing party members to participate in, and compete for, party candidacy. Other parties, in contrast, have closed systems where existing elites – sometimes even the party leader acting alone – guard jealously internal 'pathways to power'. Second, we explore how the degree of internal party democracy might affect the cohesion of political parties in new, 'divided' democracies. In this section, we draw on the experience of the Indian party system – arguably, a more comparable case – to see how variation in selection mechanisms might influence levels of party stability.

2.2 The Process of Candidate Selection

The selection of parliamentary candidates is part of a wider process of political recruitment, which refers to 'the process through which individuals are inducted into active political roles' (Czudnowski 1975: 156). Although the deeper, (sometimes) psychological subject of why, and how, candidates first became involved in politics came up repeatedly in interviews, we are interested in:

> 'the predominately extralegal process by which a political party decides which of the persons legally eligible to hold an elective public office will be designated on the ballot and in elections communication as its recommended and supported candidate or list of candidates' (Ranney 1981: 75).

In this section, we describe the variety of ways in which political parties can determine parliamentary candidacy. We produce – based on existing work – an analytical framework suitable to examine the selection process in our four political parties Specifically, we look at the *locus* (or loci) of the selection decision in party structures; candidate *characteristics* considered helpful, or even necessary, by party selectorates; and the degree of *inclusiveness* at this site of decision-making (Gallagher 1988a: 4). We also look, in passing, at whether selection decisions are taken by popular vote, or appointment (Hazan and Rahat 2006: 113), and the *formality* of the process, understood as the extent to which elites follow their own rules and procedures (Norris 1995).

The 'Locus' of Selection

The degree of centralisation in the process of choosing candidates has received most attention in the literature, and is arguably the most important. Selection processes tend to exhibit a high degree of variation and the 'locus of effective control', to use Gallagher's terminology (1988a: 4), can range from selection by the party leader alone to selection by a ballot of all registered voters and, indeed, by the general electorate. A schema by Bille (2001: 367) marks out six discrete categories:

1. The national party organs completely control the selection of candidates;
2. The subnational party organs propose candidates, but the national party organs make the final decision;
3. The national party organs provide a list of names from which the subnational party organs can select the final list;

4. The subnational party organs decide, subject to the approval of the national party organs, including the right to add or delete names according to a variety of stipulated qualifications;
5. The subnational party organs completely control the process and make the final decision;
6. Candidates are selected by membership ballot.

This categorisation, however, has little to say about the variation in involvement that might take place at the national level. We also use a measure develop by Hazan and Rahat (2006:112):

Figure 2.1: The Locus of Selection



The evidence from Bille's study in developed countries has indicated that the distribution of parties along this scale is roughly unimodal, with a peak at the fourth and fifth categories, and reasonably symmetric.[1] Ranney (1981: 82–3) and Gallagher (1988b: 245) also find that the most usual type of procedure commonly demonstrates that selection is by 'constituency party agencies, under some form of supervision by national or regional agencies, and the next most common is selection by national agencies after consideration of suggestions made by constituency and regional agencies'.

In Africa, preliminary information seems to indicate that variation in African parties is both extensive and significantly different to experiences of candidate selection in the Western world. Experiences range from Botswana where parliamentary candidates are chosen in primary elections, where every card-carrying member has the right to vote, to the National Democratic Congress (Ghana) which favours a highly centralised system of candidate selection. In a broad survey of candidate selection in African countries Ohman (2004) has found that selection of parliamentary candidates is generally either highly decentralised with selection at local level by a ballot of party members or through a

[1] The skew to the left might be evidence of poorly constructed categories. A possible revision might eliminate the third category on the basis that there appears to be little substantive difference between it and the fourth category. This revision would be supported by the dearth of observations in the third category (only 3% of the total number of observations).

constituency-level delegate conference; or highly centralised with selection by the party leadership subject to confirmation by lower levels of the party. Surprisingly, there are few parties which, according to Ohman (2004) select candidates at a regional level or at local level with confirmation by other party agencies. This, in itself, is puzzling. Table 2.1 illustrates this distribution of processes among thirty-three parties in seventeen countries.[2]

Table 2.1: Centralisation of Selection Practices among African Political Parties

Degree of Centralisation (Bille)	African Parties		Western Parties	
	n	% (of parties)	n	% (of parties)
1 (Highly Centralised)	1	3	3	3.5
2	9	27	10	11.5
3	3	9	1	1
4	2	6	23	26.5
5	8	4	34	39
6 (Highly Decentralised)	10	30	16	18
Total	33	100	87	100

Source: Ohman (2004).

The Bille (2001) system of classification, though certainly useful, is somewhat limited in its capacity to pick up variation in centralised systems where different actors and bodies are all involved at the same level of the party organisation. In practice, selection mechanisms can be mixed. Hazan and Rahat (2001: 300) point out that, depending on the method:

> '*Different* potential candidates face different restrictions; or different candidates are selected by different selectorates, in different locations, or according to different nominations systems...the *same* candidates [can also] have to face more than one selectorate during the same process.'

Nonetheless, we rely primarily on a straightforward continuum of centralisation (ranging from general electorate to party leader) to describe the locus of selection.

The Inclusiveness of the Selectorate

Beyond the degree of centralisation of selection procedures, we also look at the extent to which individuals can participate in at different stages of the process. The degree of participation in the process matters: it is important to know how many people are involved during the selection process. For example, if candidates are selected at a constituency level delegate conference it might be easy to conclude that a high degree of participation exists. However, if conferences are poorly attended or dominated by a specific group the candidate selected will differ significantly. The 'locus' of selection, also, can be found beyond the

[2] It is also quite likely that this data underestimates the number of parties that use centralized mechanisms. Ohman has only examined thirty-three parties in Africa, most of which are large parties. Newer parties tend to use more centralised methods of candidate selection (Rakner & Svasand, 2003: 63)

trunk of the political party. Hazan and Rahat (2006: 112), drawing on to Lijphart's distinction between territorial and functional decentralisation (1984), point to ancillary groups linked to political parties that can also have an input in the selection of candidates.

In Africa, where civil society (considered in Western terms) is weak, we would at first glance not expect a great deal of extra-partisan involvement (Kasfir 1996; Manning 2005). That said, some of Africa's former liberation movements, particularly in the Great Lakes region, seem to allow a great deal of at least nominal ancillary involvement in party decisions (Devlin and Elgie 2008). Increasingly, too, foreign donors underline the importance of 'balanced' parliaments in the developing world, though balance is usually considered almost exclusively in terms of gender. Could we then also include foreign donors as parties to decisions taken over selection of parliamentary candidates? In dominant parties, too, we would expect to see a greater degree of involvement from beyond the party proper. In sum, we should not restrict our investigation to the primary organs of political parties. In all likelihood, outside groups might well have a bearing on the internal decisions taken by political parties. This effect would be greatest among opposition parties in states without direct party funding.

Nonetheless, our principal complaint with the Bille system concerns its restricted capacity to describe variation *within* tiers of the party organisation, particularly the involvement of social groups that are affiliated with the party. It seems, to an extent, designed to describe the selection process in Single-Member Plurality systems, and ill-suited to the task of describing the nuance of the selection process under electoral systems which, it is thought, produce more centralised selection processes like Closed-List PR (Czudnowski 1975: 221). There is also an implicit assumption that parties are 'unitary actors', devoid of factional affiliation. This is not an outrageous assumption to make, but we have good reason to believe that at least two of our parties are heavily factionalised and we are, consequently, concerned closely with their participation in the selection process. Consequently, we modify a description of the 'inclusiveness' (or degree of participation) of the selectorate that is based on Rahat and Hazan (2006: 112).

Figure 2.2: The Inclusiveness of the Selectorate



Characteristics of a 'Good' Candidate

It is, for ease of analysis, convenient to categorise the characteristics, or qualities, of a 'good' parliamentarian under two broad headings. Conventionally, these two headings have been labelled as competing theories of representation, usually known as the 'descriptive' and 'substantive' (or delegative) schools of representation (Randall 2006). Pitkin, in an attempt to delimit the extended reach of the 'descriptive' theory, argues it [descriptive representation] has 'nothing to do with acting; rather it is about the representative's characteristics, on what he *is* or is *like*, on being something rather than doing something' (1967: 61, emphasis in original). 'Good' candidates, it is supposed, 'stand for' electors in assemblies that 'should be an exact portrait, in miniature, of the people at large, as it should think, feel, reason and act like them' (John Adams, cited in McLean 1971: 193). Gallagher, in a review of the European selection experience, uses a similar category of 'objective' traits to describe such characteristics as age, family, gender, group affiliation, locality, race, religion and social status (1988a: 6–7).

We need to be careful, however, about the characteristics which fall under this heading. A broad definition of 'descriptive' representation sets a trap for political engineers who, like the cartographer, seek to fashion an elected assembly that retains the same proportions as the society it 'stands for'. 'The nation', as Pitkin (1967: 87) points out, 'is not like a geographic area to be mapped – solidly there, more or less, unchanging, certainly not changed by the map-making process'. Individuals, contrary to a 'primordial' view of identity, can have multiple identities that are not 'hard wired' into the individual's consciousness, but that are instead 'fluid and situation bound' (Posner 2005: 11). This malleability of identity – the source, incidentally, of political leaders' ability to mobilise *selectively* social groups (Patterson 1975; Young 1976; Bates 1983; Posner 2005) – renders impossible the creation of an assembly that is an 'exact portrait, in miniature, of the people at large'. If we are to escape the sharpest teeth of the 'primordial' trap (discussed in Chapter 5), it seems more appropriate to define 'descriptive' identity according to reasonably non-malleable, *ascriptive* attributes, such as race, language, ethnicity, tribe, or caste (Chandra 2004; Posner 2005).

In divided democracies, we expect such ascriptive characteristics as race and ethnicity to be highly important to selectorates. In societies with deep-seated communal divisions there is evidence to suggest that ascriptive characteristics such as ethnic background, religious affiliation, caste or race become all-important to the selection process *irrespective* of party type (Gallagher 1988: 252). Gallagher cites the case of the Alliance Party in Northern Ireland, which 'made a point' of selecting both Catholic and Protestant candidates

to demonstrate its impartiality, while narrow Unionist and Nationalist parties also privileged group characteristics (Gallagher 1988b: 255). Further afield in the countries of the (socially diverse) Asia-Pacific region, Reilly (2006: 132) discusses a number of measures that parties are required, by law, to take to promote national-based parties, including in some cases the requirement for parties 'to take account of regional, ethnic and religious balance when putting candidates forward for election'. In elections to the Thai Senate, for instance, parties have been required by law to represent regions equally on candidate lists since the early 1980s. In Indonesia, which faced a severe threat from 'centrifugal' pressures, the President is required to take a running-mate, under the assumption that a Javanese contender will team up with a partner from an outer island. In Africa, indeed, this increased scope for political parties to balance lists with broad representation of diverse social groups is seen as a selling-point for (closed-list) PR electoral systems (Sisk and Reynolds 1998). Crucially, as the authors point out, this balance is contingent on many factors, including candidate selection strategies. In our parties, no less, we would expect to see an attempt to balance competing communal elites within party structures.

Beyond 'descriptive' theories of representation, there is also a 'substantive' or 'delegative' account of representation, which helps structure expectations of how selectorates will nominate parliamentary candidates. Substantive theories imagine electors to 'act for' the interests of electors. This view's predictions of 'good' characteristics are similar to Gallagher's cluster of 'subjective' characteristics, which lists qualities such as effective communication skills, organisational experience, a strong track record of party loyalty, and ideological orthodoxy (1988: 6–7). These are all qualities, or skills, that allow representatives to act in the best interests of their electors.

In one important respect, however, the value of these two 'theories' is limited. Neither tells us very much about the *conditions* under which we would expect an elector to prioritise one characteristic (such as age, gender or ethnic affiliation) over another characteristic (such as education, loyalty or political experience), or, indeed, whether variation in such preferences might influence, among other things, the stability of political parties. (Such theories, perhaps, are more accurately described as taxonomic of individual characteristics that might be considered desirable in a democratic representative.) This, of course, is a big question – beyond the scope of this dissertation – but we can look at a single important aspect of the broader subject: the type of decision the selectorate are required to make according to electoral law, and whether this influences the type of candidate considered desirable by the selectorate.

There is some variation in the precise structure of the ballot under List PR electoral systems: some lists are 'preferential', allowing voters a say in the ordering of candidates that a party send to parliament; other lists are 'closed', leaving the nomination and ordering of candidates to the parties themselves (Gallagher and Mitchell 2005: 10–11). South Africa and Namibia both use this latter system. The most significant difference between the two systems is that, in Namibia, there is a single nationwide district, while in South Africa there are nine provincial districts and a single nationwide district. This list of candidates, or 'slate' as it is sometimes called, forms a central plank in parties' election campaign. The process itself is followed closely in the media, de-selection of prominent members is front-line news, and rumours abound of 'dirty tricks' in the fraught campaign. Beyond its primary function – the registration of a list of individuals who, if eligible, take party seats in parliament – the list serves as an important information 'short-cut', signalling to voters important information about the nature of the political party. Voters never have 'perfect' information about the track-record of parliamentary candidates, yet are required to make a difficult evaluation of the suitability of competing candidates. In order to reduce the complexity of this decision to manageable proportions, voters, it is supposed, use information 'short-cuts' to help figure out which candidate, or party, provides them with their desired end. Just as in countries where competition is based on programmatic competition, voters often use ideology to skirt the costs of acquiring detailed information about party policy positions (Downs 1957), voters in non-programmatic systems also search for a package of readily available information to determine which candidate, or slate of candidates, offers the greatest electoral mileage.[3] In this sense, the importance of the electoral list to African parties is probably equivalent to the importance of lists in all Closed-List PR systems.

The electoral list, then, can be used as an instrument to craft an electoral message. The construction of a party list – in contrast to the independent nomination of a series of constituency representatives – also offers political parties a prime opportunity to 'balance the ticket'. Such an approach is, according to Gallagher (1988b: 253), 'an obviously rational strategy' that allows parties to appease internal factions or groups within the party, while appealing to a broad range of voters. This balancing act is complex, and there are quite a few factors that political parties have prioritised. The most common of these include geographic location, interest group affiliation, and demographic characteristics (Gallagher 1988b: 253–5). Of course, given the importance of the electoral list as a signal of party intentions, it is

[3] Quite a few authors, from Downs (1957) to Posner (2005) have placed an explanatory premium on the supply of information that the electorate use as a shortcut to structure electoral choice. See, for instance, Ferejohn and Kuklinski (1990); Popkin (1991); Grofman (1993); Hinich and Munger (1994); Lupia and McCubbins (1998).

not always the case that we would expect political parties to try to maximise their appeal. Some parties seek to appeal to narrow communal or sectional interests and tailor their message accordingly. In Africa, we would expect to see 'elite-based charismatic parties' construct lists that are quite narrow in scope, reflecting the limited reach of the party itself.

In our 'programmatic' parties, therefore, we would also expect to see parties prioritise the 'electability' of candidates. If the predictions of rational choice intuitionalism are correct – that parties seek to maximise votes by picking 'standard bearers' – we should expect to see, all other things being equal, political parties choosing a wide range of candidates. Aside from communal concerns, it would also be unsurprising were parties to choose women – assuming that parties expected female voters to reward this type of strategy. There also seems, in recent decades, to be a marked emphasis on demographic representativity in parliaments across the world. There is increasing evidence that, once elected, women will not only stand as a symbolic or descriptive agent of women, but also act in their best interests (Mansbridge 1999; Tremblay 1998). Increased gender balance within representative structure is a constant feature of the development debate, driven by international development agencies, non-governmental organisations, national governments, and international organisations (Norris 2004: 180–1). Combined with a closer interest by the 'donor community' in gender parity, and a finer appreciation for the role that political parties play in the social bias of parliamentary bodies, it would not be all that surprising to see more parties trying to balance their lists through increased gender representation, specifically through the instrument of the gender quota, which requires parties to nominate a fixed proportion of female candidates (Norris 2006 confirms more women in PR list).

Participation, Voting Rules and the Formality of the Process

Hazan and Rahat (2006: 113), reasonably, distinguish between mechanisms where the selectorate a) cast ballots to determine parliamentary candidacy, and b) present officially the voting results and mechanisms which appoint candidates without use of a voting system. (If the party leader takes the decision, the distinction does not apply.) Within political parties, voting mechanisms can run the gamut of electoral variation from majoritarian to proportional systems. Parties, it is important to say, need not use the same voting system as is used in national elections. Design of a candidate selection system can, in theory at least, be just as conscious (or unconscious) as design of national electoral systems. We do not intend to review the (voluminous) literature on the consequences of electoral system design (for an overview, see Gallagher *et al*. 2005: Chapter 11); but needless to say, variation in the type of

voting procedure can have an important bearing on the outcome of the selection process. (We deal with the implications for party stability later in this chapter.)

As far as appointment of candidates is concerned, we are interested primarily in the use of party quotas for, usually, descriptively-defined categories of candidate. In our case studies, which all inhabit new democracies, it will be unavoidable to speak of the 'founding moment' of parties. In all cases, we discuss issues of the design of selection systems with the people involved intimately in their construction. Like in electoral studies, our attempt to distinguish cause from effect can be impeded by the endogeneity of events that follow closely on each other. If we find that a political party has many female parliamentarians, is that to say it is a consequence of its constitutionally-mandated 'gender quota', or because there were many influential women in senior party structures at the inception of the party? These methodological caveats notwithstanding, the degree of social bias in parliaments can, particularly in the case of gender equality, be traced back to the internal selection mechanisms of political parties (Caul 1999). An important part of any selection process is the extent to which free competition in parties is bounded by party rules that seek to shape the parliamentary caucus of a party.

The final variable, suggested by Norris (1997) concerns the extent to which the process of candidate selection is formalised. Do parties choose their candidates according to standardised, rule-governed and explicitly binding procedures, or is selection more a question of adherence to implicit norms? From both an empirical and theoretical perspective, an examination of party rules and procedures governing the selection of candidates is a logical point of departure for this investigation. There are a couple of good reasons that justify this position. First, as Katz and Mair have argued (1992: 6–7), 'formalized structures, rules, and procedures constitute one of the principal ways in which the internal struggles of parties are channelled, constrained, and even pre-empted'. Second, rules directing the selection process provide a general indication of the wider political currents that flow through a party's structure. Any change in the balance of power is likely to be reflected in a change in the party rules. Indeed, control over rule-making itself can often prove divisive. Taken together, the literature suggests a full telling of what has been dubbed the 'official story' of a party should be first recounted before a more in-depth investigation into the process of candidate selection can begin.

2.3 Theories of Candidate Selection and Party Cohesion

Political parties, then, can choose candidates in a variety of ways, and are likely to prioritise a variety of qualities among parliamentarians. But does variation in the selection mechanism matter? Does variation in the process of candidate selection influence the stability of political parties? In this section we undertake a number of tasks. First, we define what we mean by stability in political parties. Second, we review the literature (based on the experience of 'old' democracies) that describes the relationship between candidate selection and party stability to provide a clearer picture of how we might expect to see variation in selection procedures impinge on party stability. Third, we outline a theory – based, largely on the experience of Indian political parties – of how variation in the process of candidate selection might influence the stability of political parties in new, divided democracies.

Candidate Selection and Party Cohesion in 'Old' Democracies

Political parties are, by their nature, unstable. The source of this instability, we recall from our definition of party 'linkages', can be better understood by reference to the 'social choice' and 'collective action' functions that give rise to representative democracy's seemingly irresistible demand for political parties. Social choice theorists, on one hand, point to the logical impossibility of combining a diverse range of values, concerns and interests in a democratic country (Arrow 1951). Though 'partisan institutions' provide a partial solution – and, in the case of legislatures, through the 'induced' structure provided by a committee system, or central authority (McKelvey 1976; Schofield 1984) – potentially destabilising differences still remain 'at some fundamental and enduring level' (Aldrich 1995: 23). The collective action problem, too, hints at the underlying instability of political parties. The decision for a group of office-seekers to unite under a common label, nominating candidates to run for elective office, is (as we discussed in Chapter 4) the defining attribute of a political party. Though lacking the devoutness of the religious faithful, or the fickleness of the high-street consumer, the loyalty of ambitious office-seekers cannot be guaranteed. Ambitious candidates – the 'first and most important actors in the political party' (Aldrich 1995: 20) – join parties that provide them with a 'path to power'; their loyalty, in turn, is conditional on the prospect of election. Rival parties, independent candidacy, or indeed exit from political life can, at times, present an alluring alternative to unhappy partisans.

Stability, however, is quite a vague term. When we say stability, we mean 'cohesion'. The latter, according to Ozbudun (1970: 305), can be defined as 'the extent to which…group

members can be observed to work together for the group's goals'. In this sense, Ozbudun continues to argue, party cohesion is different to party discipline.[4] A disciplined political party contains 'followers who regularly accept and act upon the commands of the leader or leaders', as well as a leadership that can compel such responsiveness from followers. Cohesion and discipline, as Bowler et al. (1999: 5) argue, are closely related: when we observe a parliamentary party voting as a bloc or acting in unison, this could be viewed as a cohesive party (with members who agree with each other), a disciplined party (with members induced to act in concert), or both a cohesive and disciplined party. In this study, we are not interested in the degree of party discipline across each of our cases. Party discipline in all our cases is extremely high. In both the ANC and Swapo, it is very uncommon for party MPs to defy instructions of the whip.[5] Instead, we focus on party cohesion. A party that experiences a (negative) change in its cohesion suffers from a high level of resignations, defections, splits and, in the worst case, the breakdown or collapse of the party as a whole.[6]

Within the small (and heavily theoretical) literature on candidate selection and its consequences, there is also a dearth of well-established empirical propositions concerning the impact on selections mechanisms and party cohesion. In a recent review of the literature on candidate selection, Field and Siavelis (2008: 624) note that 'most research [has] focused on (de)centralisation and the inclusiveness of the selectorate'. A good deal of the work on the *consequences* of selection processes, as a result, looks at the implications of increased 'democratisation' – better described, perhaps, as 'decentralisation' – of selection procedures (Bille 2001; Hopkin 2001; Katz 2001; Pennings and Hazan 2001; Rahat and Hazan 2006; Scarrow *et al.* 2001). Both Duverger (1964: 364) and Pennings and Hazan (2001: 267), for instance, claim that the primary system encourages the development of internal factions and rivalries between groups and leaders. Both of these works, however, focus on the relationship between decentralised selection mechanisms and stability with high levels of participation by party members. Bowler et al. (1999: 8–9), conversely, argue strongly

[4] In one sense, our decision to focus on electoral party cohesion – as apposed to legislative party discipline – is unfortunate: there is a much larger literature dealing with the determinants of party discipline in national legislatures (see, for instance, Bowler *et al.* 1999). In studies of African parties, however, we would not expect to see much variation in the levels of legislative indiscipline among parliamentary parties (Salih 2006; van de Walle 2003: 310).

[5] There are some important, if isolated, exceptions (see, for instance, Feinstein 2007: Chapter 13). In general, however, the ANC leadership seems to exert strong control over the parliamentary party (Lodge 1999: 20-1).

[6] We need to be careful, of course, with such a 'dependent variable' as it seems (at first glance) closely related to our primary 'independent variable' – the centralisation of the selection process. Are incohesive parties in transitional polities more likely to choose decentralised system? Is our putative 'cause' (the locus of candidate selection) driven, in fact, by our supposed 'effect' (a lack of party cohesion)? It certainly might be the case, but we expect the relationship to be less endogenous than, say, the corresponding relationship between electoral systems and social diversity (see Benoit 2006 for an excellent discussion).

(though without systematically testing) that centralised selection mechanisms lead to high level of party loyalty. The general thrust of the argument is that centralised selection mechanisms should lead to a more cohesive parliamentary party (Gallagher 1988a: 15), though the precise relationship is ambiguous. Evidence from Western democracies, indeed, seems to support Ozbudun's conclusion (1970: 339) that 'central control of candidate selection is not a crucial, nor even a necessary, condition of party cohesion.' Considered, perhaps, from a different angle Gallagher (1988b: 271), notes that 'it may not matter much … *which* party agency selects candidates, but it does matter that *some* party agency selects them' (emphasis in original).

In his review of the literature, Field and Siavelis (2008: 626) argue that the relationship between candidate selection and party stability 'has yet to be confirmed outside the Western European context of institutionalised and disciplined parties', but he also questions (in an echo of our concerns of theoretical stretching) the extent to which the Western literature can be applied to new, 'transitional' democracies. Political uncertainty, differences in the organisation of political parties, and the complexity of new electoral arrangements are all viewed as impediments to the validity of Western propositions. At this point, then, we turn away from the Western literature on candidate selection to the Indian literature that contains explicit, and well formulated, theoretical accounts of how variation in selection procedures influences the stability of political parties.

Candidate Selection and Party Cohesion in 'New' Democracies

A 'divided' democracy, according to Reilly (2006: 4), is a term used to describe a (democratic) country which is both 'ethnically diverse *and* where ethnicity is a politically salient cleavage around which interests are organised for political purposes'. Such countries, as we pointed out in the ntroduction, face a stern test: 'free institutions', according to J. S. Mill (1975 [1861]: 230), 'are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities'. In response to the difficulty of building democracy in a divided society, institutional 'architects' point to the palliative properties of constitutionally-defined structures (such as electoral systems). Within this institutional edifice, however, little heed is paid to intermediate institutions such as political parties that link 'macro' institutional design to political outcomes. What role do political parties play in the grander scheme of things? Can parties – particularly where there are very few – act to integrate diverse elites, providing in turn, a stable vehicle of political representation?

This question has been asked before of the Indian National Congress, which seemed to constitute an important component of India's 'working' democracy. The answer,

according to an early observer, lay with Congress's ability to institutionalise a stable, predictable system of internal factional competition, which acted as an effective equivalent to electoral alternation. This balancing act was achieved, in part, through the 'selection of party candidates for the general elections' (Kothari 1964: 1163-4). Selection of candidates *within* Congress came to 'provide the chief competitive mechanism of the Indian system' (Kothari 1964: 1163). Congress, in other words, was able to work out a system that allowed it to integrate effectively competing elites from different social groups. Competition inside Congress, otherwise stated, allowed for the 'muting' of factional groups which, in turn, allowed Congress to become a party of 'consensus'. In Africa, though little work has been done on the internal politics of political parties, it seems reasonable to speculate that a comparable dynamic could be at work.

Corroborating evidence, however, is thin on the ground. There are few countries that manage to combine single party dominance with firm commitment to liberal ideals. Botswana, like India, is a deviant case but if we remove 'control' democracies from the sample, precious few remain (Lustick 1979). Nonetheless, the relationship between competitive selection mechanisms and *party stability*, distinct from democratic performance, seems to hold even in cases of hegemonic dominant parties. In the case of Mexico's PRI, for instance, Langston (2006: 61) discusses the competitive procedures developed by the party which led to 'losers in nomination and appointment battles accepting their defeat without leaving the party' which, in turn, allowed parties to stave off 'elite ruptures'. Maintaining dominant party status – in any system – within diverse societies requires parties to develop mechanisms to accommodate their competing internal elites.

Before we look in more detail to the lessons of the Indian case, however, we argue for a closer reading of the *intentions* of party elites at the time of the design of selection systems. Political parties are, after all, 'endogenous' institutions – their 'basis lies in the actions of ambitious politicians who created and maintain them (Aldrich 1995: 19). It is reasonable, obvious even, that an important clue to the consequences of the selection process can be divined in the manner of their 'founding'. 'Often', as Gerring (2004: 348) reminds us, 'the connections between a putative cause and its effect are rendered visible once one has examined the motivations of the actors involved.' We would also expect the design of selection systems – in contrast to their electoral counterparts – to depend to a greater extent on elite decisions. It is supposed that, hypothetically, variation in selection procedures can be explained by reference to legal stipulations; the territorial organisation of the state; legislative-executive relations; the electoral system; political culture; and party type (Epsein 1967: 201-32; Gallagher 1988a: 8–12; Field and Siavelis 2008). These propositions,

however, provide us with relatively little predictive power over the type of selection system that parties choose. (Of all the hypothesised determinants of selection procedures, only territorial organisation and party size seem to matter (Lundell 2004), though Gallagher (1988b: 257) cautions with respect to the former that the 'relationship is not clear cut'.) Party elites, it would seem, have quite a lot of leeway in the design of candidate selection systems. [7]

Chandra (2004) develops the early body of theory, arguing that for any given partisan who, above all else, desires to win elected office (and is indifferent to the choice of which party to join), the expected probability of winning office through any given party is the product of two independent probabilities: (1) the probability of that party winning an election in the long term, which influences the number of offices available, and (2) the probability of their gaining a position in the party organisation senior enough to guarantee elective candidacy. Chandra restates this in the format of the following equation:

$$\mathbf{EP(Office) = P(Win)*P(Org)}$$

Where **EP(Office)** represents the expected probability of gaining office in the long-term, **P(Win)** the probability of the party winning office in the long term, and **P(Org)** the probability that the partisan secures an electable position within the party organisation. **P(Org)** is a vital statistic for all partisans: if it is high, incumbents face stiff competition for their positions from the 'Young Turks' of the party. If it is low, the tenure of party incumbents is relatively secure and tells party newcomers their prospects of career advancement in the party are restricted. The **P(Win)** statistic, however, is no less vital: it follows that when **P(Org)** is high, incumbents are just as likely to defect from the party, as they are to stay.

Clearly, parties must somehow convince *both* groups of elites they have a high probability of promotion with the party organisation. In other words, partisans – in *all* types of political parties – are faced with a collective action problem. In divided democracies, the electoral success of political parties (with a national focus) is predicated on their ability to balance politicised groups within party structures. While this strategy is rational for the party as a whole, however, it is not necessarily rational for individual partisans who might well laud the incorporation of party elites within general party structures, but fight their own corner to avoid such a threat to their political survival. Chandra, following the track of Weiner's argument, suggests that successful parties skirt the problem by:

[7] There is also, as Gallagher *et al.* (2006: 323) point out, considerable variation in systems between parties in the same country, which indicates the difficulty of saying with any kind of certainty what determines how parties select candidates.

'tying the individual interests of office-seeking elites within the party to the incorporation of new elites from the outside. The introduction of competitive rules for intraparty advancement provides one such mechanism. Competitive rules of intraparty advancement induce elites incorporation by forcing those elites already entrenched in the party apparatus to recruit new elites if they are to safeguard their own positions. At the same time they prevent the displacement of old elites by creating a system of alternation, so that those displaced have a stable expectation of returning. Party elites where posts are allocated through competition, therefore, permit elite incorporation into a party with even a low probability of winning. A centralised internal structure, on the other hand, prevents elite incorporation by divorcing the incentives for those elites already entrenched within the party organisation from the recruitment of new ones. Party organisations where posts are allotted through centralised coordination, therefore, are closed to new entrants even though they have a high probability of winning the election' (Chandra 2004: 102).

There are, then, two principles that political parties, particularly dominant parties, must follow if they are to manage internal factional competition. First, parties must develop internal mechanisms to balance the ambitions of factional elites. Second, parties must be able to select candidates that represent the 'politicised' cleavages within society. The selection process – viewed as a 'system' that can either increase or decrease conflict between factional groupings – is conditioned, first, by the intentions of its institutional designers. The most important determinants of stable factional competition within parties, however, would seem to rest on the degree of inclusivity and centralisation (understood as both territorial and functional) outlined earlier in the chapter by Hazan and Rahat (2006).

2.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, we sought to fulfil two tasks. First, we outlined how, in general, candidate selection procedures vary, describing commonly-used schemata that have been successfully applied in other world regions. Second, we discussed how variation in selection mechanisms influenced the cohesion of Indian political parties. Parties, according to this literature, remain stable if they develop internal selection mechanisms which provide competing groups inside the party with prospect of winning party office. Exclusive mechanisms, which facilitate the hoarding of office by incumbents, undermine party cohesion by forcing disgruntled groups to seek "exit" from the party. Competitive mechanisms, which allow for the prospect of alternation within the party, on the other hand, mean that partisans choose "voice" and remain loyal to the party. In the second section of this dissertation, we apply our theoretical insights to African cases. In the next chapter, we describe the data and methodology which provide the empirical centrepiece of the study.

Research Design

3.1 Introduction

This dissertation is about how African political parties select parliamentary candidates, and whether variation in selection procedures influences the cohesion of political parties and the demography of parliamentary parties. The primary, descriptive task (reconstructing how parties select candidates) is both complicated and time-consuming, but it is methodologically straightforward. The basic challenge is to gather enough primary evidence – party documentation and first-hand accounts of selection processes –to paint an accurate picture of how parties select candidates. The secondary, explanatory task is less straightforward: if we are to estimate the influence of candidate selection procedures on the composition and cohesion of parties, we must be able to isolate selection procedures from other confounding variables. This second task, which requires choosing parties that allow us to test our theory, requires careful case selection. In this chapter, then, we outline a research strategy to reconstruct a complicated internal feature of party decision-making, while evaluating whether variation in such procedures produces any tangible effects.

This chapter has four sections. First, we discuss in a little detail the logic of comparison, which provides the methodological bedrock of our approach. This study, like most comparative case studies, relies heavily on a combination of intra-case and cross-case analysis (George and Bennett 2005). Second, we outline how we chose our countries and cases (the unit of analysis is the political party, competing in an electoral democracy). Sensible case selection, as we shall see, provides us with an opportunity to control for confounding variables, but we also can select cases to increase the capacity of our cases to test theoretical expectations. Third, we outline the sources of data – in particular, semi-structured elite interviews with party actors – which provide the empirical core of this investigation. Finally, we look at the 'external validity' of this study, exploring how the findings of this investigation might be applied elsewhere.

3.2 Case Studies and the Comparative Method

The field of comparative politics is wide-ranging, ancient and central to political studies, a point its champions are fond of underlining (Eckstein 1963). This should come as no surprise: in the absence of laboratory conditions, political studies' scientific credentials are based to a

significant extent on its ability to compare, either explicitly or implicitly. As Harold Lasswell (1968: 3) points out, the scientific approach is 'unavoidably comparative'. Comparativists, indeed, are concerned with some of the 'bigger questions' in political science: why do some countries become democratic, while others adopt authoritarian forms of government (Moore 1966); why do democratising elites choose to relinquish power in the first instance (Rueschmeyer *et al.* 1992); and what makes democracy endure once it has been established (Lipset 1957). Although this dissertation is concerned solely with political parties that inhabit a fairly obscure part of the world at a specific point in time, we too hope to produce an insight into a 'big' question: can democracy work in divided societies.

Although grand in scope, as a method of establishing general empirical propositions the comparative method is a 'basic, and basically simple' approach (Lijphart 1971: 682). The point of the comparative method is, in essence, to provide empirical generalisations (Ragin: 1996: 749). This dissertation relies on a comparative cases study, based on Mill's 'most similar systems' approach. We have adopted this approach for two reasons. First, a case study allows us to provide a clear account of *how*, specifically, a cause (candidate selection procedures) leads to an effect (party cohesion and demographic profile). This basic reconstructive task is the most commonly-cited attribute of the case study; King *et al.* (1994: 34), in this vein, argue that 'description has a central role in all explanation, and it is fundamentally important in and of itself'. Gerring (2004: 347), too, argues that '*What?* And *How?* Questions are easier to answer' using case study analysis.

In the study of candidate selection – an obscure and relatively inaccessible subject – we are concerned first with such 'what' and 'how' questions. As Shugart (2005: 45) points out, 'we simply know too little at this stage about [the] empirical effects [of list PR on the intraparty dimension] to provide meaningful answers to many of the trade-offs confronting electoral reformers who may seek our advice.' To the extent that a body of literature has developed in this area, the concern has been with the impact on the 'personal vote' between citizens and their representatives (Shugart 2005), and the socio-demographic characteristics of parliamentary parties (Norris 2006). The methodological implications are clear: given the relatively dearth of basic information – not to mention hard-and-fast theory – about political parties and electoral systems in Africa, the most appropriate research design should involve, in the first instance, the

intensive study of a small number of units with the intention of understanding a larger class of similar units.[1]

Case studies, however, can also help explain political outcomes. 'Small-*n* researchers', in this regard, have an excellent opportunity to develop sophisticated theoretical accounts by unearthing 'causal mechanisms' that link putative cause to effect (Bennett and Elman 2006: 458). This contribution of case studies to theoretical development is rarely disputed (even if its centrality is not fully appreciated).[2] The claim, on the other hand, that case studies can help explain something is much more contentious. The nub of the problem is that intensive studies of single units tend to contain many variables which might explain an outcome, but only a single case in which to explore its true cause – what Lijphart (1971) refers to as the problem of 'many variables, few cases'. Consider, for instance, an apprentice chef who struggles to explain why some recipes work out, while others do not. There are many competing variables – quality of ingredients; type of equipment; timing and individual skill; and so on – which might account for a well-made dish. But if the novice has only one chance to try a new recipe, it is very difficult to know which combination of variables contributed to an excellent, or disastrous, result. The optimal approach, of course, is for the chef to 'experiment', trying the same recipe while carefully varying the approach.

The experimental approach, as we know, is the most accurate way to test theory, though its results are difficult to export beyond the subjects of the original experiment (McDermott 2002). Practically, however, the experimental approach is rarely possible. The most well-received approach to building valid and reliable causal inference, in the absence of laboratory conditions, has relied on increasing the number of cases. This 'large-*n*' approach relies on identifying a number of independent variables which might, in theory, account for a single dependent variable. The researcher can then estimate, using statistical techniques, the degree of correlation between independent and dependent variables. Inference, in other words, is based on probabilistic associations among variables. This approach, however, contains a trade-off: increasing the number of observations (from, for argument's sake, one chef to a thousand) renders it impossible to observe the set of steps that each chef takes when transforming a recipe into a dish.

[1] This formula of words draws heavily on an existing, and suitable, definition of the case study method (Gerring 2004: 342).

[2] A 'good' theory, according to van Evera (1997: Chapter 1), provides a parsimonious and satisfying explanation for important, and sometimes puzzling, political phenomena. See Gerring (2004) and George and Bennett (2005) for discussion of the debate over the explanatory potential of the case study,

The critique of case studies – most forcefully expressed by King *et al* (1994) – assumes that a closer understanding of the steps which link cause to effect yield no explanatory insights. This position, we argue, is mistaken: consider, again, the chef in his kitchen. Even though there may be many variables which could account for a well-made or awful dish, the staggered nature of the process, and the key role of timing, makes it quite straightforward for the chef to identify the point where a recipe collapses. Mistakes in the kitchen produce an immediate, and discernible, effect: milk curdles, pastry burns, and lumps appear! The chef, in effect, can observe at each stage of the cooking process the implications of each variable. Case study researchers, too, can evaluate the relative explanatory influence of competing variables at different stages of a process. In the language of qualitative methodologists, case study researchers use process-tracing and congruence procedures to test theoretical explanations using a single case (George and Bennett 2005).

In this dissertation, then, we rely heavily on intra-case analysis to test whether, as predicted, variation in candidate selection procedures influences the composition of parliamentary parties and the cohesion of political parties. Our capacity to explain, however, also relies on cross-case analysis. We select a range of political parties – using the methodological framework of the 'most similar systems' design. The basic principle of this research strategy is to choose cases that are similar to each other in all respects except the variables being studied (Mill [1861] 1975; Hopkin 2002). In our case, this means choosing cases that have varying types of candidate selection system, but that inhabit political systems which are as similar to each other as possible. The systemic determinants of selection procedures across parties depend, in the main, on the territorial organisation of countries and nature of the electoral system, though other issues such as party ideology can play a part (Gallagher 1988a). In our case selection, then, we will be primarily concerned to select cases in countries that are similar in this regard. In the next section, we outline how we select our cases. We perform two tasks: first, we outline which countries we chose – the systemic context of candidate selection, after all, influences heavily the process and its consequences; second, we detail which political parties are selected for analysis.

3.3 Case Selection

The institutional context, as we have just argued, leaves a marked impression on the functions performed by political parties. In this sense, then, we need to examine parties that inhabit a

similar institutional environment. Given that we are interested in how parties function, we are most concerned to choose a context where democracy operates in as comparable manner as possible. Mindful, too, that the theoretical framework – developed in Chapter 2 – is from established democracies, we intend to select parties from similarly democratic countries. Identifying, accurately, levels of democracy in African countries, however, is not as straightforward as might appear: it is no mean intellectual feat to define democracy without provoking howls of protest from one quarter or another. In the democratisation literature, democracy tends to be defined in Western liberal terms (Pinkney 1993). Often, entry to the 'liberal' democratic club requires a system of government with extensive meaningful participation and competition between individuals and groups, stringent adherence to civil and political liberties, a vibrant civil society and media, strong and well-funded opposition parties, as well as some prospect – if not actual experience of – alternation in office (Diamond *et al.* 1990). Others apply a standard that is a little less exacting – 'modest' popular self-government through representative parliaments, periodic free and fair elections, freedom of expression and association, and full suffrage (Rueschmeyer *et al.* 1992). To make matters worse, there is alongside this theoretical ambiguity surrounding the meaning of democracy, general confusion about what actually passes for democratic politics in sub-Saharan Africa.[3]

We view democracy as a procedure, intended primarily as an instrument for reaching decisions or 'that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote' (Schumpeter 1942: 269). This is a rather 'minimalist' version of democracy, though if the core of democracy involves self-government (as the meaning of the word would suggest) then we can reduce the concept to this assertion without losing too much sleep. In fact, democracy understood as a method of contestation for control of government represents the dominant approach in democratic theory (Schumpeter 1942; Dahl 1971; Sartori 1975). The alternative view of democracy tends to include under its rubric all imaginable blessings from equality and accountability straight through to dignity, security and rationality, and is of little analytical use (Przeworski *et al.* 2000: 14).

Understood in this minimal way, we consider the essential dimensions of democracy to include opposition (organised competition, or 'contestation', through periodic, free and fair

[3] It seems as though every Africanist worth his salt must devise a label to describe a diminished subtype of the democratic ideal. Collier and Levitsky (1995) counted 550 variations when conducting a review of the literature on democratisation. Our favourites include 'limited' (Archer 1995), 'restricted' (Wiseman 1989), 'protected' (Loveman 1994) and 'tutelary' (Przeworski 1988).

elections) and participation (the right of all adults to vote and contest elections) (Dahl 1971: 2-3).[4] Following Diamond (1999) we use the label 'electoral democracy' to categorise this type of regime. In order to demonstrate which countries can be considered democratic, and which countries can be considered autocratic, we borrow from Freedom House's (2004) classification of electoral democracies, which contains four characteristics:

1. A competitive, multiparty political system;
2. Universal adult suffrage for all citizens (with exceptions for restrictions that states may legitimately place on citizens as sanctions for criminal offences);
3. Regularly contested elections conducted in conditions of ballot secrecy, reasonable ballot security, and in the absence of massive voter fraud that yields results that are unrepresentative of the public will;
4. Significant public access of major political parties to the electorate through the media and through generally open political campaigning.

Arguably, the Freedom House measure is a little crude and takes little account of more sophisticated measures of democratic completeness, such as the extent to which the executive is constrained). We also include, then, measures of democracy from the Polity IV project as a type of 'robustness' check.

Democracy in Africa

We argue that if countries meet these criteria of democracy, the legal and electoral environment is sufficient to allow political entrepreneurs to launch political parties, its members to select a leadership and establish an organisational infrastructure, for party representatives to campaign for support, and finally for the party to take office if elected.[5] In 2004, based on Freedom House and Polity IV measures (in brackets[6]), the universe of countries in Africa that fulfilled these

[4] We recognise that a third latent component, that of civil liberty, is implicit in Dahl's conception of polyarchy. However, due to a paucity of cross-national quantitative data particularly in Africa, it is impossible to operationalise this measure in our study.

[5] Of course, we cannot be sure that ruling parties would agree to surrender office if they happened to lose an election. Although some prominent theorists (Huntington 1991; Przeworski *et al.* 2000) argue that alternation in office is an irreplaceable component of any definition of democracy, we do not agree. After all, alternation in office did not occur in Sweden, Japan and Italy for decades but this did not have any implications for the possibility of alternation. Besides, if we were to adapt the dictum of entering by the narrow gate (Huntington's 'two-turnover test'), our number of potential entrants would be reduced to one: Mauritius (Bogaards 2008).

[6] According to the Polity IV project, the regimes of the world can be measures on a scale ranging from –10 to +10. Countries that rink between –10 to –6 can be termed 'autocracies'; countries between –5 to +5 can be called 'anocracies'; and countries from +6 to +10 can be defined as democracies. Polity IV did not classify 'micro-

criteria included: Benin (+6), Botswana (+9), Cape Verde (N/A), Ghana (+8), Kenya (+8), Lesotho (+8), Madagascar (+7), Malawi (+6), Mali (+6), Mauritius (N/A), Mozambique (+6), Namibia (+6), Niger (+6), São Tomé and Príncipe (N/A), Senegal (+8), Seychelles (N/A), and South Africa (+9). Sierra Leone (+5) and Nigeria (+4) were ranked by Freedom House as electoral democracies, but as 'anocracies' by Polity IV.

Had this dissertation been written fifteen years ago, there would have been scant need to justify the inclusion of one set of democratic (whether liberal or electoral) countries over another: in 1989, out of a total of forty-eight African countries, only five held regular multi-party elections to high office. Between 1990 and 2003, in contrast, forty-four countries held elections.[7] In fact, of these 'new' democracies many have held three or more elections since the early 1990s with interruption in the electoral cycle occurring in fifteen of these countries (Lindberg 2006). While it is undoubtedly the case that some of these elections were less than free and fair (Madagascar), it is nonetheless the case that political competition in Africa today contains a serious electoral dimension in which political parties and their candidates mobilise the electorate and appeal for broad-based popular support at periodic intervals (Bratton and Mattes 2001). Of our seventeen 'electoral' democracies, the majority (50%) have held either two or three elections. Only four countries have held more than four elections; alternation in office has occurred, or partially occurred, in three of these countries (Senegal, Mauritius, Madagascar).

Table 3.1: Number of Elections in Africa's 'Electoral' Democracies (July 1, 2003)

1 Election	2 Elections	3 Elections	4+ Elections
Lesotho	Malawi	Cape Verde	Benin
Niger	Mozambique	Ghana	Botswana (6)
	South Africa	Kenya	Madagascar (5)
		Namibia	Mali
		São Tomé and Príncipe	Mauritius (7)
		Seychelles	Senegal (6)

states'. See systemicpeace.org.polity for more details.

[7] By late 2003, only the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Rwanda and Eritrea had had no experience of elections in the 'third wave' time period.

Source: Lindberg (2006: 15).

Democracy in Southern Africa

We have decided to study candidate selection in *southern* African countries for a number of reasons. First, from a practical perspective we intend on examining political parties in countries where English is an official language. While this may limit the generalisability of any inferences we make learn, it is nonetheless unavoidable. Given the centrality of interviews and surveys to the task of reconstructing the selection process, it is necessary that we can interact effectively with candidates. Of Africa's seventeen 'electoral' democracies, eight have English as an official language (Lesotho, Malawi, South Africa, Ghana, Kenya, Namibia, Seychelles and Botswana). Of these ten countries, five are located in Southern Africa, one in West Africa (Ghana), one in East Africa (Kenya), and the archipelago of islands known as the Seychelles is located north-east of Madagascar in the Indian Ocean.

It is, we argue, quite appropriate to restrict inclusion to countries that are located in the same geographic area. Lijphart (1971: 685) points out that the trouble with the comparative method revolves, to a large extent, around the issue of 'many variables, small number of cases'. By focusing on countries that inhabit a single geographic area, a number of 'natural' controls are introduced, particularly on historical and socio-economic lines. There is also an additional, more practical, element to this decision to select neighbouring countries for analysis: our resources were limited and given the number of interviews we wished to conduct, we felt it more 'do-able' to choose countries that were close to each other and, hence, accessible on a limited budget. This decision to choose countries that were geographically proximate left us with a pool of five potential countries: Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia and South Africa. Again, a practical decision drove our decision to reduce the number ofcountries. We excluded Malawi and Lesotho because, of all five countries, Malawi and Lesotho had the most limited exposure to multiparty democratic practice. Botswana and Namibia were quite similar to each other in respect of basic attributes: both have small populations (1.8 and 1.6 million people, respectively); both have virtually identical levels of human development, occupying 125th and 131st positions on the UN Human Development Index, respectively (2003 ranking), both have similar economic systems (low levels of debt, high levels of growth, low levels of inflation, reasonably similar levels of GDP per capita, high concentration of natural resources, low black market premiums), and both shared English – as already mentioned – as an official language. Botswana, however, differs to

almost all her neighbours in one key respect: she made a transition to democracy in the 1960s, during the 'second wave' of democratisation. We are interested in the internal features of political parties that produce a stabilising, or destabilising, effect on parties. A key confounding variable that might influence regime and, in turn, party stability, is the temporal context. Botswana, for a significant period of the Cold War period, was surrounded by hostile states controlled by white minorities. It is arguable that the external threat to Botswana induced a degree of internal stability that would not be felt by liberation movements turned political parties in the 'third wave' of democratisation. As a consequence, we exclude Botswana from the study.[8]

South Africa and Namibia, on the other hand, share a number of crucial features, though Polity rank South Africa as a virtually fully consolidated democracy, while Namibia is considered less than fully democratic. Their similarities, we believe, outweigh their differences. Namibia (formerly South West Africa) had been under South African control since the end of the First World War until independence in 1989. The doctrine of apartheid was applied to South West Africa with the same zeal as it was in South Africa. The Namibian economy relies heavily on the presence of a white 'settler' class, just like neighbouring South Africa, and both countries have striven to deal with acute inequality. In terms of their shared history of apartheid, South Africa and Namibia offer promising subjects for comparison. The legal and electoral environment, in addition, is also broadly similar in each country.[9] In South Africa and Namibia, eligible citizens seeking election to the lower house of the legislature must be a member of a political party. In order to register as a political party and contest elections in South Africa, all that is required is submission to the electoral commission of a party name and label, a list of

[8] This decision was taken with some reluctance. In late 2004 we spent fiveweeks in Botswana gathering data on the selection procedures of the two largest political parties – the Botswana Democratic Party and the Botswana National Front. We also interviewed a number of party officials to secure future interview access, carried out research in the newspaper archives of the University of Botswana, and took classes in Botswana history and politics. During this first field-trip, we also discovered that Botswana presented a particular challenge to the foreign-based researcher – the country is among the least densely populated and MPs seem to spend very little time in the capital, Gaborone. Distances between constituencies are vast, though much of the population is based on the fertile South-East, and travel is expensive.

[9] The internal organisation of political parties is rarely subject to statutory interference. While there are very few countries where candidate selection is regulated by law, the existence of such provisions leave an indelible mark on the outcome of selection processes (Gallagher 1988a: 257). Examples of legal provisions range from simple requirements concerning nomination deposits, deadlines for filings, and the number of electors who must sign nomination papers (Erickson, 1997: 34) to more stringent obligations such as the stipulation under Finnish law that a person supported by at least fifteen members of a party branch must be placed on the list for the party primary. Across the Atlantic, there is a marked 'antipathy towards oligarchy' which is reflected in the lengths that individual states have gone to in order to regulate internal party competition (Epstein 1980: 215). In Africa as in Europe, there is a pattern of nominal state involvement where parties must fulfil certain criteria in order to register as a political party and contest elections, but little involvement in what are seen as party political matters (Ohman 2004: 27-28). The idea that a political party might be considered a 'public utility' is alien.

candidates with postal addresses supplied, an undertaking to uphold the Electoral 'Code of Conduct', and a deposit.[10] Beyond these requirements parties are allowed to select candidates in whatever way they see fit. Namibia, which also operates a closed-list PR electoral system, has similar stipulations, as well as the provision that political party membership not be restricted on the grounds of sex, race, colour, ethnicity, religion or social or economic status. In addition, the Namibia constitution states that 'a political party ... shall be free to choose in its own discretion which persons to nominate as members of the National Assembly'.[11] Crucially, however, the milieu of each liberation movement and opposition grouping was, in broad outline, identical: both the ANC and SWAPO fought the same adversary and both achieved full democracy, and statehood in the case of Namibia, in the 'third wave' period.

Namibia and South Africa also have an almost identical electoral system. This is an important point. The functions performed by political parties – including their candidate selection procedures – cannot be fully understood outside their electoral environment. However, the reverse is also true, particularly where voters vote for parties, not candidates. One of the most well-researched questions in political science concerns the relationship between the type of electoral system and the number of electoral and legislative parties in a country (Duverger 1964; Taagepera and Shugart 1989; Cox 1997). In comparison to the knowledge that has been amassed in this area, less is known about the relationship between the electoral system and internal organisation of political parties. In this vein, Czudnowski (1975: 221) argues that 'party selection seems to be closely related to the electoral system'. In particular, many authors have speculated that the type of electoral system used in a country might well influence the nature of candidate selection procedures used inside political parties, particularly the degree of centralisation of the selection procedure (Czudnowski 1975; Epstein 1980; Lundell 2004).

Political Parties in South Africa and Namibia

In this dissertation, the basic unit of analysis is the political party. The explanatory component of this project, then, is based on analysis of candidate selection procedures and its consequences within and across political parties. We have also chosen to study selection procedures over a very short period of time: the elections of 2004 and their aftermath. Though concentration on a single point in time is somewhat restrictive – we can say little or nothing about party stability in the late 1990s or, indeed, in the year following the resignation of Thabo Mbeki – close

[10] Electoral Act, 1998.Chapter 3, Part 3. *Republic of South Africa.*

[11] Electoral Act 1992, 39(3), *Republic of Namibia.* Constitution of Namibia, Schedule 4.

observation of party politics over a short time period allows us to control for potentially confounding variables. If we are trying to establish a link between selection procedures and party cohesion, for instance, we need to rule out other possible influences such as ideological shifts, changes in provincial government formations, internal party elections, and so on. If we focus on a relatively longer period of time, it becomes much harder to distinguish the relative importance of candidate selection procedures on party cohesion. By focusing on a short period of time, in contrast, we limit the potentially confounding influence of alternative variables. The 2004 elections, in addition, were practical to study: the successful candidates were relatively easily accessible and events were fresh in the minds of participants.

At the beginning of 2004 there were ten registered parties in Namibia and a hundred and ten in South Africa. However, it is clear that many of these organisations could be considered political parties in name only. We wish to examine parties with, at the very least, parliamentary representation. The reason for this is that candidate selection is arguably not a core feature of parties that do not realistically struggle for a seat. Furthermore, we do not want to study parties that are essentially electoral vehicles for prominent personalities, and the literature would suggest that parties of this nature abound in sub-Saharan Africa (Rakner & Svasand, 2004: 51). On the other hand, the high degree of social diversity and permissive electoral systems in South Africa and Namibia[12] suggest that we would expect there to be quite a high number of parties with parliamentary representation, making the task of identifying parties for inclusion more difficult. However, given limited resources we prefer to commit what statisticians term a Type I error – erring on the side of caution by potentially excluding parties that have a claim to be included. As a result this project will only study parties that have demonstrated a significant degree of electoral support at the national level prior to the 2004 elections. By significant electoral support we mean South African and Namibian political parties that received 5% of the vote in at least three-quarters of all regions.

The electoral terrain in neighbouring Namibia is quite cluttered, though the South West Africa People's Organisation Party dominate parliamentary elections. In the 1999 elections to the lower house of the Namibian parliament, there was an 'effective' number of 1.7 parties. The smallest group to register as a political party, Monitor Action Group, gained parliamentary representation with just over 3,500 votes, while the country's largest political party, Swapo, attracted over 400,000 votes. Only three parties managed to poll over 5% of the national vote –

[12] According to one measure of ethnic fractionalisation, Namibia and South Africa number among the most ethnically diverse societies in Africa (Mozaffar *et al.* 2003).

Swapo (76%), the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (9.4%) and the Congress of Democrats (9.9%). While SWAPO gathered significant electoral support in all thirteen of Namibia's provinces, the DTA and CoD managed to achieve over 5% of the popular vote in ten out of thirteen provinces. However, even though these three parties can all be considered national parties, we only include the CoD and Swapo in our study. Prior to the 2003 elections, the DTA suffered a series of splits in its support base that undermined its claim as a political party with national support. In 2003, a group called the Republican Party split from the DTA and registered as a political party with the Directorate of Elections. Much of the RP's support is drawn from the 'previously advantaged' white community in Namibia and is led by the Henk Mudge, son of founder and former Chairman of the DTA, Dirk Mudge (The Namibian Economist, August 22 2003). In January 2004, two members of Namibia's upper house of parliament and four regional councillors defected from the DTA to join breakaway faction National Unity Democratic Organisation, which had registered as a political party in late 2003. The core of support for this group is, ostensibly at least, centred on the Herero people who live mostly in the Omaheke and Khomas regions (Hopwood 2004a: 51–2). In local elections held in May 2004, the DTA emerged with control of one town council where previously it had controlled nine town councils throughout the country. In regional by-elections held in 2004, the DTA also lost the Aminuis, Okakarara, Omatako and Tsumkwe seats which it had previously held. We made the decision to exclude the DTA for practical purposes. We did not really have the resources to include three Namibian political parties in the study, and given the apparent disintegration of the DTA as a national party, we felt that it would be more straightforward to locate members, activists and candidates of the Congress of Democrats who still maintained a national and parliamentary presence. Consequently; we restrict our analysis to the ruling party, Swapo, and the official opposition, the Congress of Democrats.

In the South African elections of 1999, there was an 'effective' number of 2.2 parties in the lower house of the national assembly, although a total of thirteen parties won seats in the national assembly. The smallest party, The Azanian People's Organisation, sent one representative to Cape Town with just over 27,000 votes, while the largest party – the African National Congress – entered the National Assembly with a parliamentary caucus of 266 members and received in excess of 10 million votes.[13] Only four parties managed to attract over

[13] The 'effective' number of parties is a standardised measure developed by Laakso and Taagepara (1979) to describe the degree of fractionalisation a party system. For example, if a parliament has five 'effective' parties this would imply that there are five parties of equal size in the chamber.

5% of the national vote – The African National Congress (70%), the Democratic Party (12%), the New National Party (7%) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (7%). According to our criteria we would have included only the ANC and DP in this study. The IFP cannot be considered a national party (87% of its support is concentrated within one of South Africa's nine provinces – KwaZulu-Natal). Likewise, support for the New National Party was concentrated in two provinces, Northern Cape and Western Cape (57%); median support in the remaining seven provinces was 3%. The ANC and DP are, in contrast, well represented throughout the country: the median percentage of the popular vote awarded to the ANC in the nine provinces was 73%. The equivalent statistic for the DA was 6%. It attracted over 5% of the popular vote in all but two provinces – Northern and North West. However, in 2000 the New National Party merged with the Democratic Party to form the Democratic Alliance. As a result, we will include the African National Congress and the Democratic Alliance in this study.

If we consider Mill's most similar systems method, we can see clearly that our choice of parties also enhances our capacity to test our theoretical expectations. The most similar systems design, we recall, recommends selecting cases that are similar in all other respects, except that which we wish to explain, and what we suspect accounts for this outcome. In other words, we wish to include parties that have different sorts of candidate selection procedures and that have exhibited varying degrees of cohesion. As we chose our cases in early 2005, we were able to select according to the value of the dependent variable (party cohesion or demographic profile of the parliamentary party). Instead, we looked closely at the primary independent variable: the centralisation of candidate selection procedures. Though we knew relatively little of candidate selection at the time, press reports offered a superficial understanding of how parties chose candidates. Swapo-Party, we could see, has an extraordinarily centralised system, while the ANC had quite a complicated system, that (on paper at least) involved a great deal of involvement from the party branches in each province. The Democratic Alliance, too, seemed to have a process that was built on provincial line; we had no reliable information on the Congress of Democrats. Based on this variation, nonetheless, we selected these cases for inclusion in our examination of candidate selection procedures and its consequences.

Generalising Beyond South Africa and Namibia

We have chosen, then, four cases from South Africa and Namibia. The reason we have chosen these countries rests, primarily, on their status as English-speaking, geographically contiguous,

electoral democracies. We have chosen cases (bear in mind that the unit of analysis is the political party) within these countries because they each can claim to be national-based parties; these parties, in addition, vary considerably in how they select parliamentary candidates. (Variation in the independent variables facilitates a determinate comparative case study.) There is, of course, some difficulty taking analytical insights gleaned from western Europe or India – this is the main reason we were concerned to select African electoral democracies – but there is an equal difficulty applying, in turn, insights gained from South Africa or Namibia. To a great extent, this is a problem faced by every small-*n* researcher: (comparative) case studies face a trade-off between internal and external validity. In other words, we underline the power of our intra- and cross-case analysis to identify and test causal mechanisms, while recognising the limitations of generalising beyond our immediate cases.

Can anything of interest to a student of party politics be learned from a comparative case study of South African and Namibian political parties? We believe so, though the lessons must be applied with caution. A couple of points are worth bearing in mind. First, in divided democracies, all party leaders (with aspirations to develop national-based political parties) must handle the challenge of ethnic divisions. This problem of ethnic balancing applies to Zambian or Kenyan party elites, just as it does to South African or Namibian party elites. We could also argue that it is just as difficult, *ceteris paribus*, for South Africans or Namibians to manage ethnic divisions as it is for their African counterparts but, of course, all things are not equal between these countries. Considered alongside other African countries, South Africa is often considered a case apart. In our study, the essential point is that ethnic identity in South Africa matters less than it does elsewhere. This may seem counterintuitive – South Africa under the Nationalist Party institutionalised the importance of race – but it is nonetheless the case that European-style industrialisation produced a class cleavage to South African society which cuts across, and undermines, the salience of ethnicity. South African party elites, then, do not face such a pressing task as do Namibians, or Kenyans or Rwandans for that matter.

The Namibian case, in contrast, is more similar to other 'black' African countries. Though the country cannot be described accurately as 'neo-patrimonial', Namibia nonetheless shares some of the key characteristics of such states: power is wielded disproportionately from the office of the president (Kaakunga 2002: 32), the economy is based primarily on revenue accrued from the sale of natural resources (World Bank 2004); and the relationship between party elites and supporters has marked clientelistic overtones. Unlike South Africa, too, Namibia

is a predominantly agrarian society, where the interests of its inhabitants are tied to the land (Barkan 1995). In such societies, ethnicity matters a great deal because location overlaps with ethnic markers. In the next chapter, we discuss in more detail the social underpinning of South African and Namibian political parties. In Chapter 5, we look at how parties differ to each other. Given that the literature on candidate selection points to party type as an important intervening variable in studies of candidate selection procedures and their consequences, we argue that a systematic method of understanding how our findings can be exported requires a typology of African political parties. We perform this task in chapter 5.

To summarise, then, we argue that our findings cannot be applied accurately beyond South Africa and Namibia without first considering two factors: first, whether the structural requisites of electoral democracy apply and; second, whether party type is comparable. That is, lessons from South Africa have no relevance to countries such as Togo and lessons from densely-organised programmatic political parties have no relevance to loosely-organised clientelistic parties. These caveats appear debilitating, but it is worth bearing in mind that such restrictions apply to all small-*n* studies; the value of the comparative case study, after all, is found in its ability to identify and test (with some accuracy) case-specific causal mechanisms. As we shall see in the Chapter 6 and 7, our findings with respect to how parties select candidates resonate with parties in other world regions. But the central aim of this dissertation is not to develop hypotheses which can be applied elsewhere; accordingly, we do not concern ourselves greatly with the subject of external validity, other than to comment that our findings might travel, depending on the type of democracy and party involved.

3.4 Data (Interviews, Surveys and Party Documentation)

In this section, we describe the data which form the empirical core of the dissertation. Like many organisations, political parties tend to be reluctant to divulge information to outsiders. This can hardly be surprising: political parties tend to be organised along strict hierarchical lines and airing of oligarchical tendencies within the party does little to enhance the democratic appeal of the party among the general public. Furthermore, the exigencies of internal party politics might make for uncomfortable reading if exposed. Within African political parties the subject of candidate selection can be just as controversial as among their Western counterparts. In Botswana, party primary elections for the ruling party produced, according to one newspaper, the 'mother of all wars' with campaigns for party candidacies often descending into vicious

campaigns characterised by 'innuendo and outright character assassination' (Mmegi Dec 5, 2003). Indeed, such was the interest generated by the contest that in one constituency almost as many ballots were cast in the BDP party primary as for the BDP candidate in the general election.[14]

The traditional of secrecy that unites liberation movements in southern Africa – brought about in part by the sheer necessity of waging a protracted armed campaign against a ruthless enemy – is closely connected to a further obstacle that our research design must confront: the informality of decision-making with political parties. This difficulty is not unknown to students of political parties (Duverger 1964; Czudnowski 1975; Gallagher and Marsh 1988). It is likely that the informality of decision-making in African political parties exceeds that of their Western counterparts, if the informality of African macro-political institutions is any guide (Bratton and van de Walle 1997). This difficulty has some serious implications for our research in both Namibia and South Africa. In both countries, the 'list process' takes place over a series of many months with involvement of almost every tier of the party structure (particularly in the case of the ANC). Trying to determine who controls nomination is complicated by the difficulty of tracing the process of selection from, for example, the initial nomination of regional and national list candidates in all ANC branches to confirmation of these nominees by regional and national list committees. During this long drawn out process the likelihood of informal influence being brought to bear is not only possible, but quite likely, given the stakes involved.

The study of African politics and internal party procedures hold one feature, at least, in common: both areas suffer from a debilitating lack of data with which to test theory. The study of the recent wave of democratisation in Africa – or the process of political transformation as pessimists would present it – has suffered most grievously from this scarcity of data (Lindberg 2006). Indeed, according to Chabal (1998: 300) this dearth of good data coupled with the reluctance of theorists to engage in rigorous comparative research has produced a 'dialogue of the deaf' among students of African politics. Gibson (2002: 214) makes a case for research based on 'clearer theoretical premises, as well as crisper conceptualisations of causes and effects, more precise hypotheses about the relationship between them, and greater efforts towards their rigorous measurement'. In order for research on political change in Africa to deal with more generalisable theory, reliable empirical work must first be carried out.

[14] There were three aspirant candidates seeking nomination to represent the party in Mahalapye East who attracted 3636 votes, 343 votes less ballots than were cast for the winner of the primary in the general election.

The need for reliable empirical data is particularly acute in the sub-area of internal party politics both in developed and underdeveloped regions of the world. As Hazan and Rahat (2006) argue, there is an imbalance between the number of theoretical accounts of selection procedures and their implications, and the availability of cross-country and cross-party analyses of the subject. Most theoretical accounts of both causes and consequences of candidate selection procedures are rarely tested rigorously, and recent interest in the field has centred on the 'democratisation' of selection methods. In order for knowledge in the field to accumulate, there is a clear need for 'thicker' description of how candidates are selected by their parties. The challenge for students of candidate selection procedures, Hazan and Rahat argue in a review of the literature, is to engage in 'cross-party and cross-national empirical studies of the political consequences of candidate selection methods' (2006: 109, 107).

What sort of data should we try to collect? Traditionally, research in political studies has been conducted according to two somewhat distinct methodologies: the quantitative approach and the qualitative approach. The former, it is supposed, is defined by its positivist outlook: preference for 'nomothetic' studies, concentration on description and explanation, and deductive generation of empirically-testable hypotheses. The latter method, in contrast, has been described as epistemologically non-positivist and dedicated to understanding inductively the *meaning* of human behaviour through a concentration on fewer cases (Read and Marsh 2002). Although epistemologically we are firmly in the positivist camp, we seek to describe and explain the consequences of variation in the processes of candidate selection using predominantly qualitative data and techniques. This approach, in the present circumstances, is unavoidable: coupled with the secrecy, informality and complexity of selection processes in African political parties, there has been almost no in-depth research on candidate selection in Africa to date. Consequently, we have little real idea of whether the series of hypotheses and expectations that form the research agenda into candidate selection in European parties is all that appropriate to the study of African parties. Following the warning of Collier and Levitsky (1997), based on Sartori (1984), not to stretch theory, we decided to devote the majority of our resources to the location and interviewing of key participants in the selection process in each of our four political parties.[15]

[15] Ohman (2004) has conducted a study of candidate selection in Ghanaian political parties, but on the whole the literature that deals with African political parties has only referred to candidate selection in the passing (Holm and Molutsi 1989; Lodge 1999; Mulenga and Kasonde 2001; Molomo 2003).

The value of reliable, cross-party information on the demographic and behavioural characteristics of candidates is undoubted. Indeed, one of the most interesting extended studies of candidate selection and its consequences in a single country (though involving more than a single case) involved a survey of parliamentary candidates (see the Norris and Lovenduski 1995 study of candidate selection and its consequences in the United Kingdom). To that end, we asked questions in our interviews that would produce a candidate survey applicable to the South African and Namibian experience of selection (see Appendix C). Because research in the area of African party politics was scarce, it would have been highly problematic to produce a parliamentary questionnaire without first conducting interviews with members of parliament to determine the most relevant questions to pose, and the most likely range of answers to expect.[16] For example, we would not have expected members of parliament to consider selection processes in the ANC to be 'too democratic', especially considering that closed-list PR is generally thought to grant the party leadership extensive control over membership of the parliamentary caucus (Gouws and Mitchell 2005). If this response category had not been included in the parliamentary survey, important variation in candidates' view of the selection process might well have been lost. In this sense our use of qualitative research methods (semi-structured elite interviews) complemented the planned quantitative component (candidate surveys) of the study.[17]

Our approach also departs from the traditional anchoring in fixed ontological and epistemological positions. Although we are primarily concerned with *describing* the differing procedures of candidate selection and *explaining* their outcomes, if consequential, we do not deny the importance of interpretation and meaning associated with human behaviour. For example, some questions in the parliamentary survey deal with the political values, policy preferences and legislative roles of MPs. While a mass of summary data collected from postal surveys would certainly have shed some light on South Africa's relations with neighbouring Zimbabwe, or MPs views on the most appropriate response to the HIV epidemic, lengthy interviews with a range of MPs aid a more in-depth understanding of the motivations behind these policy positions. Likewise, it would have been extraordinarily difficult to persuade candidates to record their experience of selection (in its entirety) on a survey questionnaire and

[16] The basic template for the parliamentary survey was based on similar studies in Western Europe and the antipodes.

[17] We also were fortunate to observe an annual meeting of an ANC branch in the Western Cape where candidates for the 2006 local elections were to be nominated. Although not directly related to the process of selection for the 2004 parliamentary elections, the experience was nonetheless informative.

post it to Dublin. In order to reconstruct the process of selection, there was no satisfactory substitute for interviews with participants. Nor would it have been possible to understand what senior party members consider to be a 'good' member of parliament without asking the question in person, and then recording their responses with time allowed for elaboration or clarification if necessary. In fact, it is probably not an understatement to suggest that a strictly deductive approach would have been impossible in the case of this study. Given the relatively impoverished state of the literature on African political parties, it would have been highly problematic to deduce the preferences of African political elites without some prior exploration of the parties involved.

Interview Data

Selection processes, as we shall see, are fraught affairs and neither we nor, in all likelihood, any of the participants are likely to ever know the full truth of how the process unfolded. To discover the whole truth of the selection process in each of our parties, we would have needed to speak with ordinary branch members, party office-bearers, activists, party donors, successful and unsuccessful candidates, members of affiliates and associated groups, and senior party figures in government (in the case of the two ruling parties). In both our countries, furthermore, we could have needed to conduct interviews with such individuals in regional as well as national structures. This was also conducted across an area about half the size of the European Union. The regional dimension was particularly important in South Africa, where the selection process in both parties was significantly decentralised. Even in Namibia, the regional structures of parties play a role. Clearly, any attempt to have reconstructed comprehensively the 'real story' of the 2004 selection process was tempered by practical, mostly logistical and financial, restraints. Importantly, too, we would have had to persuade each interviewee to disclose the truth about the selection process to a stranger.[18] Interview data, we might add, is also somewhat unreliable. Contemporary accounts of past events are 'indispensable', according to AC Grayling, but we must remember 'the human propensity to embellish, dramatise, enlarge a share, minimise a responsibility, write with bias, distort the facts whether deliberately or unconsciously, 'spin' the events, or tell outright lies'.[19] In short, it is probably impossible to reconstruct the full truth of the 2004 selection process in each of our parties.

[18] It is also worth recalling that the author is a white male, conducting interviews in post-apartheid societies. Inevitably, perhaps, a good deal of latent antagonism (or false camaraderie) might have existed between interviewer and subject.

[19] AC Grayling in *The Financial Times*, September 27, 2008.

The bulk of interview research into South African and Namibian political parties took place during the second fieldtrip between October and December 2005, approximately twelve months after successful party candidates first took their seats in parliament. Most, although not all, of the fieldwork took place in Cape Town and Windhoek – seat of each country's national legislature. During this time we scheduled interviews with some of the 'key' political participants in the selection process including, successful and unsuccessful candidates, party officials and members, as well as senior members of each party's upper echelons. The key participants in each party's selection process depended, of course, on the precise configuration of procedures in each party. In Swapo, for instance, it would have been ideal to have spoken to the party president, Sam Nujoma; in 2004, he selected ten of the seventy-two parliamentary candidates, all of whom were placed in 'safe' list positions. But, unsurprisingly, Dr Nujoma was unable to spare the time for an interview. The quality of interviews also varied: our first series of interviews were conducted with members of the ANC. Our final set of interviewees were members of the Congress of Democrats. Though we had studied how to conduct a 'good' interview (see, for instance, Burnham *et al.* 2004), the practical experience of conducting six weeks of intensive interviewing meant that the CoD interviews were of a higher quality. We used a digital MP3 device to record some of our interviews. As a rule, we used the recorder for high-level interviewees. Our experience was that seasoned politicians were just as unlikely to say something unintended off-tape, as they were on-tape. Senior politicians, in addition, were much more comfortable with the recorder and less likely to be hesitant or nervous during the interview. In all recorded interviews, we asked the permission of the interviewee to record the conversation. There were no instances when our request was turned down. Sometimes the subject asked for an interview to be conducted in confidence and on a couple of occasions interviewees asked to turn the machine off.

We selected interviewees according to their involvement in the 2004 selection process in each political party. In the case of the ANC, for instance, we tried to speak with members of the Congress of South African Trade Unions, the South African Communist Party, regional and executive branches of party executives, and backbenchers from each of the country's provinces. As we outlined, a comprehensive interview schedule would have been impractical. In order to make the process more manageable, but also to retain some coherence, we decided to focus on two areas of the selection process. First, we concentrated on reconstructing the national level process as access to national-level politicians was easiest in Cape Town and Windhoek, though

we also made trips to other cities. Second, we decided to select a significant number of interviewees that had experience of a process in a single region. In South Africa, we interviewed a reasonably large number of people that participated in the selection process in the Western Cape. In Namibia, we interviewed participants in the Khomas region. A full list of interviewees can be found in Appendix A.

Survey Data

In spite of the logistical difficulties, we also made a concerted effort to generate survey data on parliamentary candidates in South Africa and Namibia. We visited each of the countries on two occasions during the lifetime of this study. The first fieldtrip was organised between September and January 2004. The second trip took place between October and December 2005. During this first trip we made some initial contact with party officials to attempt to secure future access for interviews and surveys. To that end, we wrote and met with party officials in each of our four cases.[20] In each case we offered the party access to summary results of the survey and future access to research findings as an incentive to cooperate. In order to convince party officials of the *bona fides* of the research, we sought research affiliation with well-recognised national universities in each of our countries and brought a letter of affiliation from the Department of Political Science, Trinity College, Dublin.[21]

In South Africa, the Chief Whip of the Democratic Alliance agreed to write to members of the DA parliamentary party to instruct members to complete the survey. The repsonse rate was high in relative terms (34%), but low in absolute terms (n=17). The ANC, despite persistent attempts to secure agreement from both the offices of the Secretary-General and Chief Whip, refused to endorse the survey. Nonetheless, we left copies of the survey 'package' (letter of introduction, a copy of the survey questionnaire, and a stamped and addressed envelope to return the completed questionnaire) in the pigeon-holes of each of the ANC members of the National Assembly. Of the 268 MPs, we received responses from 22, which is low in both relative and absolute terms. In Namibia, all efforts to convince the Secretary General of the ruling party to assist were fruitless. The Chief Whip could not be located on either of the research trips. The Secretary-General of the Congress of Democrats was very helpful, but given the perilous state of

[20] At this stage of the process, we had also intended on including two cases from Botswana in the study. We secured agreement for a candidate survey from the Secretary-General of the opposition party, the Botswana National Front. The Botswana Democratic Party refused access.

[21] We were affiliated to the University of Botswana, the University of Namibia and Cape Town University, in Botswana, Namibia and South Africa, respectively.

the party organisation, was unable to supply contact details for any of the party's candidates, in spite of a 'thorough search' of the party files. Part of the problem with the party files, according to Mr. Gertze, could be traced back to two successive break-ins where computers containing detailed electronic information on the party organisation had been stolen (Interview with Gertwe).[22]

The survey questionnaire was based on a range of candidate surveys including the Australian Candidate Survey, 2001[23]; British Candidate Survey 1992[24]; Dutch Candidate Survey, 2002[25]; German Candidate Survey[26]; the New Zealand Candidate 1999[27]; a survey of local election candidates in Ireland[28]; and a pilot survey of the Kenyan parliament[29]. We also borrowed from the World Values Survey and Afrobarometer Survey Series to allow for comparison with wider groups of individuals, such as ordinary citizens and party members.[30] The candidate surveys used in South Africa can be found in Appendix C. Though this exercise was, ultimately, a failure – with the exception of the DA a risible number of parliamentarians completed the questionnaire – we did construct a survey that might be used as a template in studies of candidate selection in other southern African countries.

Party Documentation

Finally, we also tried to gather as much of the official party material that provided a written account of how political parties should choose parliamentary candidates. In this regard, we found a good deal of variation in the extent to which parties had produced firm guidelines for the selection process. In the ANC we relied heavily on a document called 'Through the Eye of the Needle', which was produced by the steering committee of the ANC in 2001. It was published in *Umrabulo* and is included in the handbook given to each member of the ANC. The

[22] In an attempt to circumvent this problem, we made contact with a research group – the Institute for Public Policy Research – to see whether existing survey work existed, or was planned for the near future. As it happened, the IPPR had been planning a full candidate survey of parties with parliamentary representation. The absolite number of response to the IPPR survey, however, were even worse than our South African attempt. Of the seventy-two candidates questioned, only twelve responded.

[23] Carried out by Rachel Gibson and Ian McAllister at the Australian National University, David Gow at the University of Queensland, Clive Bean at the Queensland University of Technology.

[24] Carried out by Joni Lovenduski and Andrew Geddes at Loughborough University, and Pippa Norris and Catriona Levy at Edinburgh University.

[25] Carried out by Holli A. Semetko, Jeffrey A. Karp and Susan A. Banducci at the University of Amsterdam.

[26] Carried out by Hermann Schmitt and Andreas Wuest at the University of Mannheim.

[27] Carried out by Peter Aimer and Raymond Miller at the University of Auckland, and Jack Vowles, Susan Banducci and Jeffrey Karp at the University of Waikato.

[28] Carried out by Liam Weeks at Trinity College Dublin.

[29] Carried out by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and Transparency International Kenya.

[30] We are grateful to Prof. Michael Marsh for putting us in touch with Mr. Christian Keulder of the IPPR.

Democratic Alliance also produced detailed guidelines for the selection of party candidates.[31] In the reconstruction of the selection process in Namibia we relied on the 'Swapo Party Procedures for Elections', which was available as a roughly printed version in the Katatura party headquarters. The Congress of Democrats did not have a written guide to elections, though some mention is made in the party handbook of the broad principles selection.

3.5 Conclusion

In sum, we have decided to study candidate selection in four political parties that contested the 2004 parliamentary elections in South Africa and Namibia. We selected these four cases for two reasons. First, South Africa and Namibia – more than any other electoral democracies in Africa – can be reliably compared and studied with limited resources. Both countries, crucially, have a virtually identical electoral system. Second, all of our four cases are national-based political parties that offer useful variation in how they select parliamentary candidates. This variation, as the most similar systems method suggests, allows us greater leverage when testing theory. In order to reconstruct the process of candidate selection, and evaluate whether variation in selection mechanisms influences party cohesion and the composition of the parliamentary party, we rely heavily on semi-structured interviews with key participants. We also use official party records to establish the 'official' story of candidate selection, as well as some survey data for the South African cases. In the next two chapters, we look in more detail at each of our cases. In Chapter 4, we examine the factions within each of our parties – particularly in our 'dominant' parties – that structure competition for parliamentary candidacy. In Chapter 5, we provide a side-by-side description of each of our cases, using a revised typology of political parties (Diamond and Günther 2003).

[31] The document is also available in electronic format.

Cleavages, Parties and Factions in African Democracies

4.1 Introduction

In Africa's divided societies, party systems – *pace* consociational expectations – have not evolved along ethnic lines. More often than not, in fact, a dominant political party has emerged, surrounded by a host of smaller parties (Bogaards 2004). Narrow, ethnicity-based parties, as it happens, are a rarity in African politics (Erdmann 2004). Yet, is that to say that African political parties do not contain divisions modelled along ethnic or other societal fault-lines? In this chapter, we specify the cleavages that structure political competition in our four political parties. We surmise, first, that 'parties emerge organically from deep-seated divisions within society' (Field and Siavelis 2008: 360); and, second, that where societies contain more than a single cleavage, parties *within* political parties (factions) emerge to represent such latent (un-particised) cleavages. The selection of parliamentary candidates, in turn, becomes a contest between these competing factional groupings.

The specification of (ethnic) cleavages has a long pedigree in the social sciences. The foundational work, outlined in the late 1960s by Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, takes a structural view of political competition. Even though structural approaches to political analysis can be faulted as overly deterministic, we take this literature as our point of departure in our discussion of how political cleavages emerged in Africa since the demise of the colonial project. We move, next, to the literature on African ethnic groups which (in an equally structural vein) has sought to specify and identify the 'ethnopolitical' groups that exist in Africa (Scarritt and Mozaffar 1999; Posner 2004). These two bodies of literature, we argue, complement each other strongly. The value of the former is that it explains clearly why ethnicity – and not a different set of cleavages – became predominant in Africa. The value of the latter body, which takes for granted the primacy of the ethnic dimension to African politics – is based on a clear outline of how ethnic cleavages can be understood and treated by comparativists. Second, we define in precise terms what we mean by political parties and their factions, before turning to an in-depth historical review of how cleavages, parties, and factions have evolved in South Africa and Namibia.

4.2 Political Cleavages in Africa

We begin our analysis of how parties and factions form in Africa with an account of how political cleavages emerge, drawing on the insights of Lipset and Rokkan (1967). The basic premise of this approach is that the citizens (and subjects) that inhabit modern democracies are separated from each other along a series of fault lines in society. The nature of these fundamental lines of division can vary dramatically: in some countries the social-structural characteristics of the population are relatively homogenous, while in other countries cleavages can be both numerous and cross-cutting (Gallagher *et al.* 2006). Although a party system emerges as a function of societal diversity, political parties do not emerge automatically to articulate the preferences of each of these cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Only some cleavages become politicised, fewer still become particised (Cox 1997). First, individuals must be distinguishable from each other by 'social-structural conditions such as occupation, status, religion or ethnicity' (Gallagher *et al.* 2005: 264). Second, individuals must be aware of their commonality. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, if a discrete group of individuals (who are conscious of their common identity) are to find representation by a political party, that group must have some kind of organisational infrastructure to express group interests.

The theory of Lipset and Rokkan (1967), however, is based on a comparative study of Western Europe. According to their account, seismic social change in these countries, subsumed under the rubric of early national development and industrial revolution, gave rise to four lines of cleavage: centre-periphery, state-church, land-industry and owner-worker. The party systems of Western Europe, in turn, developed from these fundamental cleavages. Turning this theoretical account of party formation to our own use, it is important to underline that party formation has been contingent on processes of social change that were specific to the European environment. In Africa, the process of societal transformation has been radically different, and we would not expect to see cleavages form in a similar manner. With the exception of South Africa, the process of industrialisation has not unfolded in Africa. Consequently, 'class is still not a salient cleavage in most African countries' (Bienen and Herbst 1996: 26). Nor has conflict in society been based on tension between the 'unwashed majority' and 'Throne, Altar and Nobility', as Stendhal described political conflict in early 19th Century France (1953 [1830]: 388–9). Instead, tropical Africa in the 1960s witnessed nationalist sentiment giving rise to widespread conflict between indigenes and an occupying power.

The colonial interlude, though brief, 'totally reordered political space, societal hierarchies and cleavages' (Young 1994: 83).[32] Against all expectations the colonial project was wound up with almost unseemly haste. The decision by colonial powers to depart the African stage was not taken lightly – the British, in particular, had expended consider resources in quelling armed insurgencies in the colonies, and almost all powers had begun to increase, though incrementally, investment in the colonies (Nugent 2004). While there are quite a few factors that contributed to decolonialisation in Africa, which we need not rehearse, there is one overriding factor: the projected costs of maintaining (or, indeed, instituting) European hegemony in the face of increased African resistance (Curtin *et al.* 1975: 514). Crucially, then, European powers ceded power because they calculated the *actual* gains of continued occupation were outweighed by the *projected* costs of contested occupation. Against a backdrop of mounting criticism of the legitimacy of the 'civilising mission' at home, and facing an altered balance of power on the international stage, French, Belgian and British colonial territories were ceded in an 'historical flash' (Nugent 2004: 23). In 1960 – the so-called 'year of African independence' – a 'wind of change' ushered in no less than eighteen new states.

It would be unkind to question the sacrifice of Africa's first generation of liberators, yet the manner and timing of decolonialisation left a heavy imprint on the organisational vehicles of the nationalist movement. Instead of acting as a link between citizen and state, African movements served primarily, and almost exclusively, to prepare the (urban) political elite for the assumption of power. In some countries it took less than a decade for small political elites to form political parties and contest elections, after which they took control of government (Salih 2003: 2). As such, the role played by African political parties differed considerably from the more socially-grounded political parties of Europe. African nationalist movements – in all cases save, perhaps, Botswana (Acemoglu *et al.* 2001) – failed to project their organisational reach beyond the capital. Zolberg (1966: 34–5) summarises succinctly the state of nationalist politics in the 1950s and 1960s:

> 'It is difficult to believe on the basis of evidence available, that under existing circumstances the capacity of these [nationalist] movements for 'mobilisation' extended much beyond intermittent electioneering and the collection of more tangible support in the form of party dues from a tiny fraction of the population. Although their ambition was often to extend tentacles throughout society, they were creatures with a relatively large head in the capital and rudimentary limbs.'

[32] Nor was this lost on leaders of African nationalist movements: according to the manifesto of the Belgian-Congolese elite, written in 1956, 'In the history of the Congo, the last eighty years have been more important than the millenniums which have preceded them' (cited in Herbst 2000: 29).

How, then, should we characterise the division between subject populations in African territories, and their colonial masters, that gave rise to the nationalist movements of the 1960s? In short, we should not characterise it as a cleavage at all. It is true that a distinct social-structural characteristic defined the mass of Africans – they were, to a man, colonial subjects (or, with few exceptions, second-class citizens in parts of La Francophonie) – and they were conscious of this status. But African nationalist movements did not have an organisational *nature*, which, according to Lipset and Rokkan (1967), is a necessary attribute of a cleavage. Instead, as Sartori points out, African nationalist movements had 'mass *momentum*' (1976: 226 [emphasis in original]). In spite of their organisational weakness, however, nationalist movements evolved into political parties (loosely defined) and, in many African states, metamorphosed into a constituent element of the one-party state. These 'parties', in addition, have proved to be highly durable and in many, though not all cases, have survived to the present day. This is puzzling – generally, a mass organisational structure is viewed as a prerequisite if party structures are to 'acquire value and stability' or, at the very least, to achieve some measure of longevity (Selznick 1957: 17). The answer can be found by focusing on an almost ubiquitous, but latent, *ethnic* cleavage in African politics, which is concealed beneath the illusory nationalist cleavage that gave rise to nationalist political parties.

The literature on African political parties is replete with allusions to a deeper, more impermeable, *ethnic* cleavage that undergirds political alliances in Africa. Kwame Appiah (1992: 162) – an astute commentator – notes that:

> 'if the history of metropolitan Europe in the last century and a half has been a struggle to establish statehood for nationalities, Europe left African at independence with states looking for nations. Once the moment of cohesion against the British was over (a moment whose meaning was greatest for those of us – often in the cities – who had had most experience of the colonizers), the symbolic register of national unity was faced with the reality of our differences.'

That there is an ethnic 'reality' to African politics seems incontrovertible: just under a quarter of all citizens in eighteen African countries view themselves in ethnic terms (Afrobarometer 2002). That ethnicity is, in part at least, 'constructed' seems equally incontrovertible, and the ethnic 'falsehood' may be a dangerous thing, but as Appiah points out it is not entirely useless (Appiah 1992: 175–7). It is, moreover, the usefulness of ethnic identity, real or imagined, that helps explain its enduring relevance in African politics: ethnic identity provides an in-built limit to the size of winning coalitions (Fearon 1999), readily-identifiable ethnic identity markers provide mobilizational advantages to party elites (Bates 1983; Chandra 2004), co-ethnics share common

language and kinship ties aiding party formation (Horowitz 1985), and ethnic categorisation has, historically, yielded high administrative dividends, as colonial rulers first discovered (Laitin 1986; Mamdani 1996).

The 'reality of our differences', however, should not be reduced to the ethnic dimension alone. In truth, the ethnic cleavage is more accurately termed an 'ethnoregional' cleavage, which according to Appiah, has been 'central across the Anglophone-Francophone imperial divide' (1992: 165). The importance of the regional feature of ethnic party support is crucial. Indeed, quite a few authors have pointed out that regional identity often overlaps with, or even supersedes, ethnic identity as the primary partisan cleavage in the politics of specific cases (see Nugent 2001 on Ghana; Kaspin 1995 on Malawi; Azavedo 1995 on Cameroon; Cartwright 1970 and Barrows 1976 on Sierra Leone; Campbell 1999 on Tanzania). In simple occupational terms, the vast majority of African citizens earn a living from the land, and their individual welfare, especially in poorer societies, is tied to the fortunes of their immediate locale and wider region. Consequently, many people do not define their identity according to what they do. Instead, they use the markers of region and ethnicity, which often overlap, to distinguish themselves from each other (Barkan 1995). Patronage too is easiest to deliver along regional lines and elites can use corresponding ethnic markers as an efficient discrimination device. It is also worth noting that ethnic groups in Africa are among the most geographically-concentrated in the world, which would lead to natural overlapping of ethnic and regional cleavages (Scarritt and McMillan 1993).

Crucially, however, if the ethnoregional cleavage is to deserve the title, it must have organisational expression. Drawing on our review of the African state – developed in Chapter 2 – we argue that ethnic groups (constituted either as discrete ethnic parties, or factions within multi-ethnic parties) can rely on strong *informal* organisations to support ethnic groups. Ethnic groups are generally concentrated geographically and, indeed, African groups are among the most highly-concentrated in the world (Scarritt and McMillan 1993). There is clear evidence from both economics and political sociology that geographically concentrated groups are better placed to organize collectively in the pursuit of common interests.[33] The spatial distribution of

[33] The idea that patterns of group settlement affect how groups pursue collectively desirable outcomes is hardly novel, nor is appreciation of its importance confined to a single discipline: students of economics seeking to explain government decisions to erect import barriers (Busch and Reinhardt 1999), or the willingness of firms to cooperate to make party campaign contributions (Mizruchi and Koenig 1991), have underlined the importance of the geographic concentration of industry. Political scientists have also underlined the value of geographic concentration as an important explanatory variable. Toft discovered that the physical distribution of ethnic groups had an important bearing on their capacity to 'wage a successful war for independence' (2003: 23); while Herbst (2000) pointed to the difficulty of consolidating state structures in sparsely populated territories. Even Rousseau,

ethnic groupings matters: in areas with concentrated numbers of ethnic followers, resource-poor political entrepreneurs are able to duck the demands of building stable nationwide party structures by falling back on the dense social networks, ties of kinship, and common identity of an ethnic stronghold. Candidates surrounded by friends and family can rely on personal campaigning to enhance electoral appeal: party activity in ethnic population nodes bypasses the logistical clot presented by poor transportation infrastructure: the handicap of financial scarcity is partially offset by the effectiveness of manpower deployed locally in door-to-door appeals, and the canvassing of small gatherings of people at prayer and at work. In the age of the 'continuous campaign', parties situated in areas with concentrated ethnic support are better placed to attract and maintain support on a regular basis, not just at election-time. In the absence of formal organizational structures, partisans in close physical proximity to each other find it easier to organize campaigns and maintain linkages between leaders and activists. And, crucially, in a continent characterized by low population density, partisans appealing to geographically concentrated populations are faced with lower information costs – an important consideration given the low subscription to print and electronic media outlets among the African citizenry.

Ethnicity, then, is the predominant political cleavage in Africa. But what do we mean by ethnicity, and can we distinguish among different levels of ethnic association both within and across countries? Early definitions of ethnicity tended to cleave to the 'umbrella' concept, which is best developed by Horowitz (1985: 53); ethnicity, according to this view, 'easily embraces groups differentiated by color, language, and religion; it covers 'tribes,' 'races,' 'nationalities,' and 'castes''. In the quantitative (comparative) literature, too, there was little disagreement among scholars, who based their specification of ethnic groups around such fixed, 'primordial' categories (see, for instance, the Atlas Narodov Mira in Bruk and Apenchenko 1993; Alesina et al. 2003; Fearon 2003). The root definition of ethnicity, which structures each of these studies, was based on the idea that ethnic, religious, or tribal (and sometimes caste) categories had a common ancestral mythology. Though this position makes some intuitive sense, it is also overly simplistic: it ignores, in particular, the idea that identities can sharpen, become dull, and even disappear over time; and that identity can be constructed – depending on opportunity and circumstance (It also avoids the view that identities can be multiple and overlapping.) This

writing in the late 18th century, argued that 'the force of the people ... operates only when concentrated; it evaporates and disappears with extension' (Rousseau, quoted in Toft 2003: 34).

latter, constructivist, understanding of ethnicity guides later more sophisticated definitions of ethnicity (Chandra 2004, 2006; Posner 2005).

In this dissertation, we define ethnicity in constructivist terms. Specifically, we follow Chandra (2006: 400) to define ethnic identity as 'a subset of identity categories in which eligibility for membership is determined by descent-based attributes.' This constructivist understanding of ethnicity is further elaborated by Scarritt and Mozaffar (1999) and Mozaffar et al. (2003: 382). According to the authors:

> 'The logic of constructivism turns on the notion that individuals have multiple ethnic identities that are constructed in the course of social, economic, and political interactions. This malleability of ethnic identities derives (a) from the multiplicity of objective ethnic markers (language, religion, race, caste, "tribe," territory, etc.) that may be invoked to define and distinguish ethnic groups, (b) from the relative complexity of these markers that may foster intragroup divisions combined with intergroup differences (e.g., sectarian divisions in a religion, "tribal" differences among same language speakers, or subjects of the same kingdom), and (c) from temporal changes in the relevance of these composite markers and their components in defining and distinguishing ethnic groups as well as in the politicization of resulting intergroup and intragroup cleavages (Chandra 2001, 7–8; Laitin and Posner 2001, 13–16).'

The great value of the constructivist understanding of ethnicity, of course, is that we identify meaningful political groups, rather than groups that may have cultural differences, but that are indistinct in political terms.

In a further development to the burgeoning literature on ethnic politics in the developing world, Posner (2004) refined existing ways of estimating the political effect of ethnic fragmentation. The problem with previous measures, including the ethnopolitical dataset developed by Scarritt and Mozaffar (1999; 2003), is that while each ethnic group – at each appropriate level of aggregation – may be identified accurately by Scarritt and Mozaffar, this degree of fragmentation may not necessarily inform the particular problem being studies. For instance, Botswana may not contain a national dichotomy (such as exists in Sudan between North and South), but the country nonetheless has a 'middle level of aggregation' between Tswana and Kalanga, as well as a 'lower level of aggregation' among the Batswana. If, however, we are interested in explaining something quite specific like electoral behaviour in the south-east, the national level distinction between Tswana and Kalanga is unimportant. There is, in other words, a potential 'mismatch' between measure and mechanism (Posner 2004: 852–3), and we need to be careful to specify the appropriate cleavages given the context of the study. In this dissertation, we draw on the constructivist understanding of ethnicity, discussed most

coherently by Scarritt and Mozaffar (1999; 2003), Posner (2004), and Chandra (2006). In section 4.4 and 4.5, we use this definition – and its operationalisation (Scarritt and Mozaffar 1999) – to identify the politically salient ethnic cleavages that mark political competition in Africa, but we also look in some detail at the history of our cases to specify the relevant cleavages that underpin competition in each of our parties.

To summarise, cleavages in the former colonies of Africa have formed along radically different lines to European countries. In the latter, class, in particular, formed an important point of partisan mobilisation. In South Africa, as we shall see, the difference is not as marked; during the late 19th and early 20th century, rapid industrialisation also took place in South Africa. Based on a reading of the social cleavages literature, we can look for a reasonably similar form of group formation process in South Africa as was found in Europe. Can the same be said of Namibia? While it is tempting to view a modified version of a 'centre-periphery' cleavage as the primary source of party formation in Africa, this would be mistaken. Nationalist vehicles certainly emerged in Africa, but beneath the veneer of anti-colonial sentiment, lay a more durable ethnic, or ethnoregional, cleavage, replete with organisational expression of an *informal* nature. But this gets us only half-way to a closer understanding of how groups *within* African political parties might compete for parliamentary candidacy. Our next section completes the journey by looking at parties and 'parties within parties' (factions) form to compete for power.

4.3 Political Parties and Factions in Africa

Analysts of party formation have been warned to guard against the 'sociological prejudice … that the activities of parties are the product of the 'demands' of social groups, and that, more generally, parties themselves are nothing more than manifestations of social divisions in society' (Panebianco 1988: 3–4). We accept this charge of sociological reductionism: partisans can influence society too, as Bates (1983) argued of 'ethnic entrepreneurs' in Africa. Nevertheless, in spite of its difficult explaining party system change, cleavage analysis is still both used and useful as a point of departure (see for instance, Inglehart 1997 or Kitschelt 1994). But, while we might now have a reasonably clear idea of the lines along which parties form, we are still faced with the difficulty of defining, precisely, the essential attributes of parties and factions.

Early attempts at a definition of political parties were hampered by the reluctance of political leaders and commentators to treat with political parties. The rancour evoked by the 'spirit' of faction, as parties were often called, was widely evident. In the newly independent

United States, George Washington warned of parties' 'baneful effects' and threat to popular government in his Farewell Address. Alexis De Tocqueville (1969 Vol. I, II, 2: 178), an early chronicler of the 19th century Western state, decried parties as 'a political evil inherent to free government'. David Hume (cited in Sartori 1976: 55) – one of the Scottish Enlightenment's most prominent members – was equally reluctant to lend credence to the role of party: Hume thought parties to be on occasion 'subversive' and a weed-like 'infection' of Parliament. This reluctance on the part of early political theorists to grasp the nettle of political parties, or as White (2005: 7) remarks – to 'sharpen their thinking about political parties' – produced a degree of confusion that has endured ever since. The popular impression of political parties, which tended to be negative, was at the centre of the definitional ambiguity of what a party is.

If political parties have, over time, become a little more respectable, the same cannot always be said of factions. The latter, almost without fail, are described using such adjectives as 'dysfunctional' and 'pathological' (see, for instance, Gillespie et al. 1995: 2). In addition to being 'dirty and wicked', Sartori (2005 [1976]: 25) also thought these odious creatures to be useless, arguing that factions (or 'fractions' as he preferred) are ephemeral in representative democracy. This position, however, seems unsupportable. In some countries, such as Uruguay and Colombia, factions seem every bit as important as parties and, indeed, can present distinct candidates for election to parliament (Morgenstern 2003: 237), while in Japan factions have an important input into the selection of the party leadership (Cox and Rosenbluth 1993) and policy outcomes (McCubbins and Thies 1997). In Europe, intra-party dynamics seem to leave a lasting impression on the politics of coalition formation (Laver and Shepsle 1996) and in countries making a transition to democracy, factions have been important actors (Gillespie et al. 1995). Factions are functional, as are political parties.

Political parties, and by extension factions, also elude facile definition because they straddle the divide between state and non-state spheres of political activity. On one hand, political parties nominate candidates for election to some of the highest offices in democracies (as do factions, as we have seen, in some countries). These individuals – who were once lowly, if ambitious, party members – perform constitutionally-defined functions, receive a state salary and pension, and in some cases are remembered as great *states*men. On the other hand, the vast majority of party members have little involvement with state structures and join political parties for diverse reasons, ranging from attachment to an ideology to the simple desire for the company of 'like-minded' individuals (Ware 1996: 64). Given the wide range of activities performed by

parties, and to a lesser extent factions, it is no easy task to offer a precise delimitation of their scope.

This is particularly the case in Africa where political parties often predate democratic government by many years. In South Africa, the African National Congress was formed a full eighty-two years before party candidates were nominated to compete for elective office in free and fair elections. During this time ANC members and activists performed a range of tasks that would bear little relation to the activities of their counterparts in Western political parties, or as it happens, in the political parties of many neighbouring countries. In fact, the experience of political parties has varied considerably across the African continent. European colonial powers were reluctant to cede control of their territories to their erstwhile subjects, while in southern Africa the obstinacy of white minority regimes delayed the 'normalisation' of politics south of the Zambezi. As a consequence, it is often difficult to determine what distinguishes a political party from a movement, faction, army, or interest group. Until recently political parties in Uganda were effectively banned. Yet, the groups of individuals that organised the legislative and executive branches of government were card-carrying members of an organisation that aggregated and articulated a wide-range of opinion, mobilized the population, and endowed the regime with legitimacy. What organisation pulls the strings in Uganda, if not political parties? In the Democratic Republic of Congo 2,900 candidates contested the 2006 parliamentary elections. Voters could hardly manage to vote, finding it difficult to stuff the 6-page ballot into the box. It is difficult to imagine that more than a handful of these parties could be regarded as 'real' political parties, even though some might regard them as such having presented candidates for election under a common label (Epstein 1980: 9). Furthermore, many political parties are not regarded as such because they do not hold any appeal beyond their ethnically, or regionally, defined areas – although it is hard to see how a political party operating in a country the size of Western Europe (DRC) could be anything other than regional.

Indeed, in Africa the definitional problem is both substantial and pressing. In the past, groups seeking state power – particularly in southern Africa – did not confine themselves to constitutional means alone and as broad-based movements of national liberation assumed a 'big-tent' character. As a consequence, the groups that seized power, many of whom are still in power, have much in common with the political movement and differ significantly from the sleek electoral machine of European politics in both size and function.[34] On one hand, then, it is

[34] Although this definitional problem is noticeably acute in Africa, it is by no means confined to Africa alone. The pre-eminent political party in the Republic of Ireland, 'Fianna Fáil', has frustrated attempts at a categorical

patently clear that the movements-cum-parties do not represent a discrete social cleavage. In countries with such social diversity, it is sometimes presented as 'puzzling' to see such low party system fragmentation (Mozaffar and Scarritt 2005) but this could be a simple corollary of the difficulty associated with counting parties. That said, it remains difficult to identify correctly whether 'parties within parties' have formed. On the other hand, equally, it is tempting to disregard the presence of many of the smaller parties as inconsequential. It is just as difficult to define a faction within a party, as it is to determine whether a small party is just that, or merely a loosely organized group of 'like-minded' individuals. Monitor Action Group in Namibia is a case in point – it has parliamentary representation and party structures, a party label and policy positions on certain issues, but is generally regarded as a 'vehicle for the ideas of its Chairperson, Kosie Pretorius' (Hopwood 2004a). Political parties that are hardly worthy of the name abound on the Africa continent. A casual observer of African politics could not but take note of the great supply of parties 'formulating comprehensive issues and presenting candidates in elections' (Lasswell and Kaplan 1950: 170–1) and would be forgiven for imagining that all of these groupings are considered by political scientists to be political parties. However, this is not the case. Few would consider Patricia de Lille's Independent Democrats to be a political party in any meaningful sense. According to one former MP, 'the Independent Democrats 'didn't have any policies … there was no economic policy, no policy on justice … it was about Patricia … personality driven' (Interview with Burgess).

Alan Ware (1996: 2), among others, compares the task of defining a political party to that of describing an elephant: difficult only when addressing an audience that has never before encountered such a creature. It is not sufficient to define political parties as groups of individuals that 'act in concert in the competitive struggle for political power' (Schumpeter 1942: 283) or that organise in an 'attempt to get power' (Schattschneider 1970 [1942]: 35). There have been many movements across southern Africa – from the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) to the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) – that have fulfilled these criteria in their struggle to wrestle control of the state from the hands of colonial administrators or white minorities, but bear little relation to what we know as a political party. Nor is it appropriate to reduce a party to a body of 'organized opinion' (Disraeli quoted in Duverger 1964: vii) or even 'a body of men united for promoting by their joint endeavours the national

definition. The similarities between Fianna Fáil and African political parties may have escaped the attention of mainstream political science; however, they have not eluded the notice of all parties. A senior minister in Zimbabwe's ruling party 'ZANU-PF' requested formal assistance from Fianna Fáil Minister Dr. Michael Woods with efforts to modernise ZANU-PF party structures (Copy of letter of request in possession of author).

interest upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed' (Burke quoted in Bredvold and Ross 1961: 134). The former does little justice to the decision-making exigencies of representative democracy; the latter sets a normative standard that distorts our understanding of politicians' behaviour once in office. Many of the organisations that would measure up to this yardstick are little more than loose groupings of political notables which, as LaPalombara and Weiner (1966: 7) correctly pointed out, have much more in common with the loose groupings of nobles seen in late 18th century France, or even the factions of the Roman Republic.

Clearly, then, political parties are difficult to define, not least because of the great variation in political parties at different times and places around the globe. Maurice Duverger (1964) in one of the first attempts to provide a general theory of parties never attempted to supply a thorough definition of the term 'political party' precisely because he feared such a definition might not carry beyond the confines of single region (Sartori 1976: 67). Defining complex social phenomena, particularly those that change depending on their time and place, can be tricky. It is not easy to define a party without recourse to its electoral function, even though political parties have certainly existed that do not select candidates for 'election to a legislature' (Riggs 1970: 51). Similarly, many have tended to conflate what a party is with what a party does. The sands of intellectual fashion also shift, rendering normative definitions defunct.[35]

Factions too are difficult to define. Like the state and political parties, 'more or less formally structured groups' within parties have performed a great range of activities, ranging from management of party image and strategy, to dissemination of information on party policy positions, structuring of leadership contests, and management of distribution of state-based patronage (Belloni and Beller 1978: 5; Gillespie et al. 1995: 3). What then will be considered a political party for the purpose of this study? We define, minimally, a party in terms of both its organisation, but also acknowledge the importance of the party's, and faction's, representational function. As we will discuss in Chapter 5, political parties form and endure in response to two political problems: the first a 'collective action' problem; the second a 'social choice' problem (Aldrich 1995). The former problem is concerned with resource-pooling between candidates and

[35] This confusion over what a party *is* has been compounded by a strong tradition of scholarly engagement with what a party *should* be, which seems related at least indirectly to the 'strength' of the electoral system (Schattschneider 1970 [1942]; Ranney 1975). The 'responsible parties' thesis makes the case for a party system based on two major parties that seek election to office on foot of a clearly defined policy programme. Faced with a choice between incumbent and opposition, voters can simultaneously hold their leaders to account while issuing a clear mandate for government. This model of political parties placed a premium on ideological unity among party members, an engaged party body that provides direction in policy matters, and the strong possibility of alternation in office. The willingness of this view of party systems to view alternative systems as verging on pathological is unhelpful.

the difficulty voters have of choosing between alternative candidates at election time. When grouped together in political parties, office-seekers attract public attention to their collective and individual candidacies while providing voters with an information short-cut that makes electoral choice simpler. This collaborative effort among office-seekers is facilitated by an organisational infrastructure, particularly a rules-based candidate selection process.

Attempts by scholars to define factions reach a strikingly similar conclusion. Set against factions, tendencies are said to be 'momentary constellations of internal groupings' (Belloni and Beller 1978: 11). Rose agrees, defining tendencies as a 'stable set of attitudes rather than a stable set of politicians', distinct from factions, which are 'self-consciously organised bod[ies], with a measure of cohesion and discipline thus retaining' (1964: 37). Factions, in this view, have an expressed ideology, an established leadership structure, technical expertise and communications infrastructure, and they are self-conscious, just like political parties. We would, however, add one important addendum to the definition of faction: given the nature of political competition in the Africa state, it is important not just to consider the formal nature of organisation, but to also examine the informal dimension of organisation, which can be just as durable as the formal strain.

While we define party and faction in terms of their organisation, we also stress the importance of how organised groups represent citizens. In like vein, Janda (and later Ware 1996: 5), both recognise that political parties are more than 'an institution that (a) seeks influence in a state, often by attempting to occupy positions in government.' Janda also argues that parties '(b) usually consists of more than a single interest in the society and to some degree attempts to aggregate interests' (1980: 5). Burke, too, makes the point that the behaviour of partisans is influenced by some common goal, or idea, or perspective; his time-worn definition, we recall, speaks of men united in pursuit of 'some particular principle'. Parties, then, are more than organisational husks (even 'personalist' parties). There is, in addition, a good practical reason to stress the importance of the representational role of parties: African parties are, almost universally, organisationally-thin and, as such, cannot be 'characterised primarily by their anatomy', as Duverger had expected (1964: xv). As units of analysis, furthermore, we need to distinguish more clearly between parties if we are to say anything meaningful. As we shall see in our review of party typologies, existing models of parties (that focus on organisation alone) provide us with almost no purchase over the variation that exists in African political parties. When we expand the definition to include a representational role – as many authors suggest we

should – an attendant typology (such as that of Gunther and Diamond) categorises parties with greater success.

So, we define both parties and factions in organisational terms. The difference, of course, is that parties nominate candidates independently for election. This organisational approach is common in the literature. According to LaPalombara and Weiner (1966: 6), a political party is not just a group that seeks to capture and control the exercise of political power, but a group that also displays 'continuity in organisation'; a 'manifest and presumably permanent organisation at the local level'; and finally has some degree of concern for a popular mandate, implying that a party must have enduring support that transcends allegiance to a dominant personality within that party, and that a political party is first and foremost an 'organisation'. Janda also argues that a party is primarily an organisation and that while such organisations that go by the name of a political party can perform a variety of functions all political parties must aspire to place its representatives in government positions if they are to deserve the name (1980). Indeed, the organisational function is necessary to transform political labels into political parties. All teams of office-seekers that band together at election time and present candidates for election have been styled political parties; however, in order for a political party to endure over time, the competing ambitions of career-minded politicians must be satisfied. To this end, a legitimate rules-based method of separating successful candidates from aspirant candidates is necessary (assuming demand for a place on the party slate exceeds supply). This key function of the political party cannot be achieved without some kind of organisational structure.

4.4 Cleavages in South Africa and Namibia

In Section 4.2, we discussed how ethnicity has become the predominant political cleavage in Africa. We provided a clear historical explanation for the political salience of ethnicity, before looking at the comparative literature that seeks to define and operationalise ethnicity as a variable suitable for large-*n* analysis. The identification of ethnic groups in the quantitative-oriented literature, however, is based simply on an (apparently) extensive trawl of the secondary literature that discusses ethnic politics in Africa, as well as a close regard for the Minorities at Risk dataset and Black Africa Handbook series (Scarritt and Mozaffar 1999: 86–9). This is a strong approach, but the basic problem identified by Posner (2004: 852–3) still remains: assuming that all salient cleavages are identified, how do we know which specific identiies are relevant to the analytical problem at hand. In other words, how do we know which ethnic

identities matter in each of our four parties in Namibia and South Africa? Our approach is to combine the insights of the comparativists literature with a case-specific historical analysis of cleavages with each of our political parties. In this section, we begin by tracing the development of political cleavages in South Africa and Namibia (using, as a platform, the work of Scarritt and Mozaffar (1999); in the following section (4.5), we look inside each political party to paint a more detailed portrait of the factions which, we expect, compete for parliamentary candidacy.

Since the end of the Second World War, the primary or dominant faultline in South African and Namibian society has been based on conflict between peoples of European descent and peoples of non-European descent; that is to say, the primary source of conflict has been racial. While racial segregation certainly predates the rise of the Nationalist Party (NP) in South Africa[36], the electoral triumph of the Afrikaner-dominated NP marks the beginning of institutionalised racial segregation in South Africa (and by extension in Namibia, which was under full South African control[37]). The word 'apartheid' – loosely translated as 'separateness' in Afrikaans – was first used in South Africa in the early 1940s (Guelke 2005: 3).[38] Originally, the term 'apartheid' did not seem to have the universally pejorative connotation that it holds today; religious leaders, for instance, seem to have associated the word with a 'utopian vision of separate people, each with their own mission' (Giliomee 2003: 463). Nevertheless, the introduction of apartheid, following electoral victory for the Nationalist Party in 1948, marked a turning point in African history.[39] The colour of one's skin became the primary determinant of the course one's life was to take. Each person was registered according to their race (Population Registration Act 1950); inter-racial marriage was banned (Prohibition of Mexied Marriages Act 1949), as was sexual intercourse between whites and other races (Immorality Act 1950); blacks

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[36] While the Nationalist Party is commonly referred to as such, from the 1943 election onwards they are more accurately called the *Herenigde Nasionale Party (HNP)*. We will use the more commonly employed nomenclature, the Nationalist Party (NP).

[37] Following the defeat of Imperial Germany in the First World War, South Africa was made the mandatory power of South West Africa (Namibia) under a 'Class-C Mandate', which in effect gave South Africa full administrative and legislative control over the territory (Hyam 1972: 31).

[38] The first recorded instance of the use of the word 'apartheid' is in the Afrikaans daily newspaper *Die Burger*, on March 26 1843.

[39] It is not entirely apparent whether the Nationalist Party won the decisive 1948 election (they were never to cede power subsequently) by virtue of racial appeal alone. Part of the appeal of the NP, at least, lies in their championing of national independence, the Afrikaner business class and Afrikaans culture. Like other dominant parties (including the ANC), the Nationalist Party became identified with the resurrection of an entire *volk* – in the case of the Afrikaners, according to philosopher Martin Walser, a 'people on the wrong side of history.' This shared history of repression, and the common ground between members of Africa's 'white tribe' and the black majority was underlined by (Afrikaner) members of the ANC who had once belonged to the NNP (Interview with Johnson, Interview with Gaum, Interview with Beukman). On the other hand, a MP of the DA viewed the most important commonality between the NNP and the ANC to be view that the role of the state as a vehicle of patronage delivery to favoured communities (Interview with Robinson).

were forbidden to reside permanently outside their 'reserves', and black families already living in urban areas were resettled (Group Areas Act 1950); and provision was made for separate education curricula (Bantu Education Act 1952). All of these measures were supported by a battery of security legislation to monitor and enforce compliance, if necessary, and to suppress any opposition to racial segregation. Gradually, all areas of life – from the bus-stop one used by commuters to the food rations received by prisoners – became determined by the ascriptive marker of race.

It is not all that surprising, then, that liberation movements in South Africa and Namibia adapted a 'big tent' character. The primary goal of these two organisations was centred on the achievement of 'ordinary' democracy and, while both organisations had a Marxist-Leninist bent, no section of society was banned from joining. This inclusive character of the ANC and SWAPO is worth underlining – both organisations laid the seed of future dominance by successfully assuming the mantle of leadership of the diverse anti-apartheid movements. This inclusive nature of the organisations (more pronounced in the ANC), incidentally, stood in stark contrast to the pan-African rhetoric of liberation movements in other African countries.[40] Yet, can we categorise race as a political cleavage in South Africa? Following a line similar to our argument on the 'centre-periphery' cleavage in tropical Africa, we argue to the contrary, though with an important caveat. With the exception of Zimbabwe,[41] the other settler colonies in southern Africa that contained significant white populations did not remain in the newly independent countries. In South Africa, Afrikaans-speakers – the 'white tribe of Africa' – and, to a lesser extent, English-speakers, viewed themselves as South Africans. However, like other nationalist movements in Africa, the Nationalist Party existed mostly on the fumes of state-based patronage (Giliomee 2005). Their collapse in the decade following independence reflects, to some extent, their organisational weakness. Nevertheless, the question of race is still (quite

[40] There were some exceptions to the general support for the multi-racial principles embodied in the ANC's 'Freedom Charter'. For instance, the Pan African Congress, which sought inspiration from the first wave of African independence leaders such as Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah, were momentarily popular following the massacre at Sharpeville in 1960. It is perhaps a little easy in hindsight to deny the potential for popular appeal held by the PAC, or perhaps the Black Consciousness movement. In his autobiography Nelson Mandela (1994: 352–361) outlined the general support for the PAC during his travels throughout the continent – and as far afield as London – in the early 60s. Such was the concern of the authorities with respect to the PAC that their leader, Robert Sobukwe – the man who had played such a prominent role in the 'Defiance' campaign in 1960 – was held on Robben Island in solitary confinement until his premature death from lung cancer in February 1978.

[41] Zimbabwe, unlike South Africa, choose a form of democratic settlement that gave whites a separate voter roll and reserved seats in parliament. Therefore, parties that had traditionally represented the white community remained active. Black liberation movements, in turn, were under no compunction to begin a process of integration of white elites.

obviously) important in South Africa. We will discuss its importance at greater length in Chapter 6, when we explore attitudes of party selectorates.

While the ANC and SWAPO might have spearheaded the anti-apartheid campaign, there is an important organisational difference between these movements, and indeed between these movements and the nationalist movements of the 1960s. The ANC, unlike other movements, has a mass-based character (we develop this point in Chapter 5), but this character – absent in other African nationalist movements – can be attributed to structural causes. It is something of a popular myth that the formal structures of the ANC, in particular, directed opposition to apartheid. Like the leadership of SWAPO, the ANC hierarchy (both were based for extended periods in Lusaka, Zambia) spent much of their time moulding international opinion and trying to direct the 'armed struggle' of their military wings, PLAN and Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), respectively. In the wake of the Soweto uprising of June 1976 much of the 'coal-face' opposition to the apartheid state was formed around trade union and civic organisations.

In Namibia, the brief period of sustained resistance to South African rule – prompted by the ruling of the International Court of Justice that South Africa's presence in Namibia was illegal – occurred between 1970 and 1974. Again, there are strong parallels between the dynamics of opposition to apartheid in both countries with strong input from the body of students and workers, particularly migrant workers (Dobell 1998: 40–2). Unlike in South Africa, however, internal resistance to Namibia was effectively suppressed in this time-period and never really resurfaced with the same level of intensity. Broadly, the weakness of labour in Namibia can be traced to the nature of their economy, which is based on primary, rather than secondary production. The South African experience stands in stark contrast to Namibia where, in the former case, the 1980s ushered in a period of sustained domestic protest. The 'total' strategy of state President P.W. Botha was developed in response to the partial collapse of state authority – legitimate or otherwise – in the country's black townships, and it is within the townships and union halls that a significant section of the future leadership of the tripartite alliance (ANC-SACP-COSATU) first cut their teeth. The measures of political liberalisation initiated in the 1980s – including the removal of some of the more draconian apartheid laws and the introduction of what Lijphart (1994: 227) described as 'sham consociationalism' in the form of a tricameral parliament – only served to concentrate the efforts of the increasingly well-organised domestic, i.e. non-ANC, opposition to the state.

The emergence of the trade union movement as the most effective organised opposition to the state did not occur by accident. The demise of apartheid is bound up with the internal workings of South Africa's advanced industrial economy. Unlike other African economies, which tend to be agricultural, subsistence, and rural-based, the South African economy was both diversified and integrated with strong manufacturing and services sectors. The restriction of land available to non-urban blacks meant the rapid growth in the number of people moving to the cities (illegally) in search of employment. Meanwhile, the requirement for skilled labour to man South Africa's growing economy exceeded the supply of white workers. The logical solution to this economic conundrum was the provision of education and training to the black urban classes in order to facilitate their inclusion within the South African economy. This social diversification of the black urban classes, however, was not matched by a corresponding change in the political institutions which managed black political participation. The consequences of this level of dissonance between social and political change, in South Africa as elsewhere (Huntington 1968), was extensive domestic conflict.

If Barrington Moore (1966) had transitions to democracy in mind when he coined the almost axiomatic proposition, 'no bourgeois, no democracy', he was not entirely correct. The existence of a middle-class may well be crucial to the long-term prospects of democratic consolidation, but countries that seek to extend popular control over government need not have a middle-class. In fact, throughout Africa – from the mines of the Zambian Copperbelt to the floors of the Senegalese textile factories – the urban working class has been the most frequent proponent 'of the full extension of democratic rights' (Rueschemeyer *et al.* 1992: 14). In South Africa, the transformation of the class structure sowed the seeds for the future disintegration of a racial state. According to Good (2002: 174), the black urban population grew from 2.2 million in 1951 to 5.6 million by 1980, the number of black students in secondary schools increased from 34,983 in 1955 to 318,568 in 1975, and the number of university students (the pamphleteers of township unrest) rose from 800 in 1960 to 20,000 in 1983. The number of black workers employed in manufacturing increased from 308,000 in 1960 to 781,000 in 1980 and by 1980 the number of unskilled workers in the Johannesburg areas accounted for less than half of all unskilled labour. In short, an urbanised African working class had formed.

From the mid-70s onwards, trade unions spearheaded challenges to the state and marked a move away from the ANC's reliance on an external armed assault to the state. Under the Congress of South African Trade Unions, formed in the mid-1980s, trade unions demanded

increased legal rights and mobilised the combined strength of their affiliates' workforces to push for political change through mass industrial action. By 1986, the South African regime was in dire straits – the value of the currency had plummeted, investors had fled, and international criticism had reached deafening levels (Giliomee 1998). The gradual marginalisation of whites within the South African population across *all* provinces and the near bankruptcy of the state, furthermore, led the Afrikaner political elite to the conclusion that a deal of some sort needed to be done (Interview with van Niekerk, November 8, 2005). For the first time, the monolith of the Afrikaner establishment began to show signs of internal discord. Slowly, informal talks were opened between sections of the Afrikaner 'intellectual' community and the leadership of the ANC. Sparks (1995) documents in some detail the growing trust between both sides that began at Mells Park House – a stately home owned by a mining company, Consolidated Gold Fields – and concluded with the signing of constitutional agreement in 1993 between chief negotiators (and trade unionist) Cyril Ramaphosa and Roelf Meyer in 1993.

According to Jeremy Seekings, historian of the United Democratic Front – the umbrella organisation of civic organisations that played such a prominent role in the *denouement* of apartheid – the opening of talks between the government and the ANC in exile and prison (through Thabo Mbeki and Nelson Mandela, respectively), led directly to the sidelining and eventual demobilisation of the UDF. According to Good, the pre-eminence of the ANC can also be attributed to their heavy financial clout; he estimates the ANC had an annual budget of $50m to $100m in the early 90s (2002: 180). In contrast to the demise of the UDF, however, the enduring relevance of COSATU remained a feature of South African politics. By 1990, union density of the non-agricultural workforce had reached 46.3% (just over 2.7 million members). By 1993, this had risen to 59% (or just under 3 million). According to Webster and Adler (1999: 351), the labour movement was the 'best organised and single most powerful constituency' in South Africa and capable of 'reaching and enforcing agreements with capital and labour'.

Nevertheless, in spite of the reliance of the ANC on the trade union movement to implement 'rolling mass action' during the process of negotiation (and during election to mobilise the electorate), the ANC emerged as the dominant actor in the anti-regime coalition. There were, of course, many additional factors that led to ANC dominance among anti-apartheid groups: the relatively swift period of transition, the favourable terms won by the ANC at the negotiating table, and the strong hand played by the ANC during the four-year period between the unbanning of the ANC and the first full elections. It is, in addition, hard to overestimate the

role played by the ANC's talismanic figure, Nelson Mandela. When multiparty elections under a full franchise were first held in South Africa in April 1994, there was an in-built identification among significant sections of the electorate with Mr Mandela. Strategists in the upper echelons of the ANC recognized the advantages associated with the electorates' identification with the liberation icon. Some of their support for a closed-list PR electoral system was based on the desirability of a uniform ballot paper where voters had little more to do than mark a box next to a photograph of the liberation hero and the name of the African National Congress (Interview with Asmal). However, the strategic and tactical skill of Mandela were also of pivotal importance for the ANC, particularly in the early months of 1993 when the assassination of SACP leader, Chris Hani, threatened popular unrest.

In South Africa, there is also an ethnopolitical divide – though it matters less given the greater importance of class than in other African countries. We do not differ greatly to Mozaffar and Scarritt in their specification of South African ethnopolitical groups. As we have argued at the beginning of this section, the primary historical cleavage in South Africa is racial: Scarritt and Mozaffar agree, pointing to the national dichotomy between 'Africans' and 'Whites' as the basic political division within the country. At the middle-level of aggregation, there are two other groups: Asians and Coloureds. Within the white racial category, there are two further politically relevant groups: Afrikaans-speakers and English-speakers. Within the Africans, Scarritt and Mozaffar locate nine groups: Zulu, Xhosa, South Sotho, North Sotho, Swazi, Tsonga, Tswana, Venda, and Ndebele. We locate five groups, though the difference is mostly due to competing definitions of language. (For instance, we define the north and south Sotho as a single group.) The difference, however, is relatively trivial – at least compared to our disagreement over the specification of Namibian ethnopolitical groups.

In spite of their common experience of apartheid, the Namibia case differs quite significantly to the South African experience. The locus of struggle against apartheid in Namibia lay outside the country, north of the Kunene river in Angola where the South African Defence Force fought against PLAN fighters, backed by Angolan and Cuban troops. Within the country, a second front was only partially opened by organised labour and the Council of Churches in Namibia. Unlike in South Africa, the apartheid regime did not face sustained domestic protest in Namibia and it was international events – specifically the decline of Soviet interest in the region and the military stalemate between South African and Cuban forces in Angola – that paved the way for the withdrawal of South African forces from what was then called South West Africa.

In effect, Swapo achieved independence from colonial rule in much the same manner as other countries in Africa – by international fiat. Unlike in South Africa, where the Nationalist Party had been forced to make a key strategic u-turn in February 1990 by dint of sustained organised opposition, the apartheid coloniser in Namibia had merely accepted tactical defeat in what they perceived as an expendable buffer zone.

Domestic opposition to South African rule was comparatively weak in Namibia. Two points are worth noting. First, in Namibia the white community, consisting of (relatively) recently-arrived settlers of German and Boer stock, was much smaller than in South Africa. Consequently, the South Africans attempted to defuse support for SWAPO by negotiating (in time-honoured fashion) an internal settlement between whites and acquiescent ethnic groups within the country. In other words, the South Africans – just like their French and British counterparts – tried to lower the costs of hegemonic expansion through politicisation, and later cooptation, of traditional ethnic authorities. In response to an internal settlement that offered a truncated form of self-rule to Namibians, mooted in the 1970s, these diverse ethnic groups banded together to form the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, named after the venue for negotiations of the proposed settlement. Second, as we already mentioned, opposition to apartheid in Namibia did not have any strong domestic anchoring, with the partial exception offered by religious organisations. The absence of organised labour – crucial to the success of the ANC – removed in the Namibian case the potential saliency of class-based resistance.

So, the ethnoregional cleavage came to matter in Namibia for quite familiar reasons. In the first place, ethnic groups in Namibia are among the most geographically concentrated in Africa. This can be attributed, in part, to apartheid policy which ordained a territorial partition between 'white' areas and native 'homelands'. In Namibia, almost 40% of the national territory was contained in these homelands, compared with 13% in South Africa. Like in South Africa, populations were systematically deported from designated white areas to their new reserves and these new administrative areas were granted limited powers of self-government. Unlike in South Africa, however, internal migration was limited because of restricted employment opportunities. Namibians travelled to South Africa in search of employment, like other groups in southern Africa. As a consequence, the rather artificial geographic clustering of ethnic groups remained relatively intact, leaving ethnoregionalism as a latent political cleavage.

There are five major indigenous 'ethnic' groups in Namibia, denoted by the percentage of the population that speak the corresponding language as their 'mother-tongue': Ovambo (49%),

Nama/Damara (13%), Herero (10.5%), Caprivi (5%), Kavango (8%).[42] A further 11% of the population speak Afrikaans, though this encompasses white settlers of both German and South African stock, as well as some indigenous groups. The experience of the Ovambo group stands in sharp contrast to other Namibian groups. The Nama and Herero were the victim of German genocide in the early years of the 20th Century. Those who survived saw their social system disintegrate and their economies stagnate. Their proximity to the South African border hastened their inclusion into the migrant labour system and they began to use Afrikaans in large numbers. They also had more extensive, and earlier, experience of missionary-provided education, and they migrated in greater number to townships on the outskirts of industrial areas. Ethnic groups in the northern third of the country, in stark contrast, had a more limited experience of colonialism. The Ovambo, Caprivi and Kavango peoples were not forcibly displaced, and there was little serious conflict with colonial authorities. The structures of traditional leadership remained intact and native languages remained as the *lingua franca* (Leys and Saul 1995).

This regional division continued to be salient in the apartheid years. Conflict from the mid-70s onwards was located in the northern third of the country in what was termed the 'police zone' which was, more or less, coterminous with the northern-third of the country. From 1974 onwards, the South African Defence Force took direct control over security in this region. The area existed under a state of martial law with strict curfews, a ban on political association and competition, as well as a constant threat of violence. Consequently, when independent civil organisations – trade unions, student organisations, and the churches – began to voice opposition to apartheid, they did so in the south. Northerners, faced with fewer outlets to voice discontent, were more likely to cross the border into Angola (after 1974) to join the militant wing of the liberation movement. Therefore, in Namibia, there is an important ethnoregional cleavage, which separates the three northern ethnic groups from the rest of the country, though they are dominated by the populous Ovambo speakers. In electoral terms, this divide structures voting in the electoral districts which encompass the former 'Ovamboland'.[43] There is, however, a significant 'tribal' cleavage within the Ovambo. Core support group between two large is divided between two 'tribal' groupings: on one hand, there is faction based on Ndonga-speakers, located in the three regions of Oshana, Oshikoto and Omusati; while on the other, there is the smaller group of Kwanyama-speakers, located in the Ohangwena region.

[42] Based on data from Afrobarometer survey series.

[43] The 'Four Os', as the districts of Ohangwena, Omusati, Oshana and Oshikoto are called, are uniformly populated by Ovambo speakers. Just under 40% of the country's population live in these areas and Swapo receive, on average, 97% of the vote. (See Table 8.3 for details.)

Our depiction of each ethnopolitical group in Namibia is practically identical to Scarritt and Mozaffar (1999: 103), but we differ in one crucial regard: we specify a further division within the Ovambo at the 'lower level of aggregation', while the Scarritt and Mozaffar do not. This difference is probably readily explained: the sources that Scarritt and Mozaffar use are narrow and, in the main, based on pre-independence politics (see Scarritt and Mozaffar 1999: fn. 62). In more recent literature, such as Hopwood (2004a), Dobell (1998), as well as the seminal text on Namibian politics (Leys and Saul 1995) – in addition to quarterly and annual Economist Intelligence Unit reports – we find frequent mention of a political salient cleavage between Kwanyama-speakers and Ndonga-speakers that is politically relevant.

4.5 Political Parties and their Factions in South Africa and Namibia

Finally, we consider how factions of partisans have emerged within our four cases. In dominant political parties, descended from broad-based liberation movements, we would expect to see quite a few distinct groups with these parties. Using the preceding theoretical section as a guide, we outline how groups organise within our parties and establish more accurately the important groups that seek influence in the contest for parliamentary candidacy.

The African National Congress

The dominance of the ANC is, sometimes, taken for granted, yet on the eve of their unbanning, it was by no means evident that the ANC would emerge as the party of choice for the vast majority of black South Africans. Soon after his release from prison, Nelson Mandela was quick to point to the range of diversity within the party.

> 'The ANC has never been a political party. It was formed as a parliament of the African people. Right from the start, up to now, the ANC is a coalition, if you want, of people of various political affiliations. Some will support free enterprise, others socialism. Some are conservatives, others are liberals. We are united solely by our determination to oppose racial oppression. That is the only thing that unites us… (Mandela, cited in *The Washington Post* 26 June, 1990).'

It was never a forgone conclusion that the ANC would be able to unite the various constituent elements in the anti-apartheid struggle. The 'organisational rebirth' of the ANC was predicated on the successful merging of the three key constituencies: the exiled leadership based on Lusaka, the internal trade union and community-based movements; and the small but influential group of newly-released Robben-islanders, based around Nelson Mandela (Ottaway

1993: 60). In the end, the negotiations which led to the 'tripartite alliance' jettisoned the loosely-organised civics movement of the UDF, which was persuaded to go into 'voluntary liquidation' in 1991 (Dube 2000: 106). Though there is a multitude of diverse opinions and tendencies with the ANC, as Mandela underlines, the single defining cleavage within the party rests on the division between what another senior ANC figure describes as the 'the trade unions and the SACP, with their Marxist, socialist influence [and] the instinct towards African nationalism' (Kasrils, cited in Calland 2006: 127).

In addition to left-wing groups organised groups within the ANC, we can also identify other, less coherently organised factions and tendencies within the ANC. An important tendency, particularly in the first decade of independence, revolved around members who had been in exile and those who had remained inside South Africa. Neither of these groupings have organisational expression and there is considerable overlap with other groups inside the ANC, though self-identification as an 'exile' or 'inzile' is reportedly strong. In addition to these groups, the ANC also contains gender and youth associations. Based on the Women's and Youth Leagues, youth and gender are potent lines of division in societies where gender inequality and issues such as education and unemployment pose serious problems to political stability. We would expect to see these groups play an active part in lobbying for increased representation of their members of electoral lists.

Beyond the fundamental class and ideology-based divisions within the ANC, the organisation has always been dogged by regional and ethnic divisions. According to Hadland and Rantao (1999: 30-3), quite a few factions in the ANC, understood loosely, were formed, and even 'factions within factions' emerged while the ANC was in exile. Like in Namibia an important divergence took place between the organisation in exile, and community and labour-based organisations inside South Africa. Unlike Namibia, however, this division did not overlap with an ethnic and regional division, rendering it less potent. These regional divisions, based only partly on underlying ethnic divisions, have been buttressed since the introduction of a limited form of federalism in 1994. The most important provinces within ANC structures – in terms of the size of the party membership and electorate – are generally seen as Eastern Cape, KwaZuluNatal and Gauteng, though not necessarily in that order. Within regions, too, some divisions based on land and ethnicity. In Limpopo, for instance, Lodge (2003: 39) reports that competition is structured around former the homelands of Venda and Lebowa. In the Western

Cape, where we conduct the closest study of the list process, the division is based firmly on racial lines between 'Africanist' supporters of Mcebisi Skwatscha and those of Ibrahim Rasool.

The trade union movement and the South African Communist Party (SACP), however, are by far the most important internal groupings within the ANC. The SACP is, according to Calland (2006: 39), 'essentially a faction within the liberation movement'. SACP members are card-carrying and fully-paid up adherents to a political party that has chosen, for strategic reasons, to ally itself formally with the African National Congress. This does not reduce the organisational coherency of the SACP in any way, even if it reduces their independence. The SACP membership numbers about 30,000. This body, in addition, consists of highly-prized and active partisans. According to one ANC figure 'without [the communists], we [the ANC] would fall apart. They work hard and are very committed ... without their energy many of the structures would fall apart' (Calland 2006: 141). The trade union movement, too, is formally organised. In 2003, the umbrella organisation of diverse trade unions included over one-third of workers in the private sector outside of domestic labour and agriculture, and two-thirds of public sector workers. The union claims to have 1.5 million members, sixty-four full-time staff positions and an organisational infrastructure which stretches across the country.[44]

Of course, relations between each of the three components of the alliance extend beyond mere formal contact. There is a significant overlap between membership bases and one might even speak of a near symbiotic link between the SACP and ANC at leadership level.[45] The ANC relies heavily on the organisational coherence of COSATU, while the role placed by the SACP as the 'perceived intellectual and organisational vanguard of the liberation movement in exile and the conduit for the financial and other support emanating from the Soviet Union and other East bloc countries' was absolutely crucial (Good 2002: 97). Practically, however, the overlapping memberships of these ideologically-based organisations matter a great deal. In Namibia, as we shall see, overlapping regional and ethnic identity provides a formidable point of factional mobilisation. In South Africa, in contrast, the existence of cross-cutting pressures reduces the salience of ethnicity by pushing alternative cleavages into play.

[44] See COSATU's monthly periodical *The Shopsteward*, Vol. 12, No. 4.

[45] According to the Deputy Secretary-General of the SACP figure, SACP members are 'almost universally' ANC members (Interview with Cronin).

Democratic Alliance

The DA is, in one respect at least, quite similar to the ANC: it, too, is a form of alliance between disparate groupings. The DA was formed in 2000 as a merger of the New National Party (the rump of the former ruling Nationalist Party), the Democratic Party and the Federal Alliance. This uneasy status of the DA is not without parallel. In Israel, Hazan describes Likud as 'at best a joint parliamentary faction loosely representing three independent parties rather than a single cohesive party'. Although there were three components of the Democratic Alliance at the outset, the New National Party and Democratic Party comprised the most electorally significant sections, while the Federal Alliance was very much the junior party within the merger.[46] The social basis of each segment is quite different. In 1994, the National Party attracted four million votes. Half of its support came from whites, 14% from blacks, 7% from Asians, and 30% from coloureds who lived overwhelmingly in the Western and Northern Cape provinces. This vote collapsed after 1994 from 3.9 million to 1 million in 1999. According to Nijzink (2006: 61), the party's policy of 'constructive cooperation' didn't work although two former MPs argued that 'the rationale for an Afrikaner party' disappeared with the advent of multiparty democracy (interview with Gaum, Interview with Beukman). The DP, on the other hand, was supported by white urban middle-class voters and the party pursued an aggressive policy of parliamentary opposition (Nijzink 2006). The stark difference between the two parties was apparent from the outset, which made merger problematic (Interviews with DA officials and MPs). According to Giliomee (2005: 16–7), 'the DA struggled to fuse the NNP and DP as component parts. The NNP was a party of mainly lower middle and working class Afrikaner and coloured people … the DP, by contrast, tended to be based on a middle class that subscribed to liberal individualism. Most of its representatives were English-speaking'. Though there are policy and strategy disagreements within the party, the central factional division is between former members of the NNP and the DP.

Swapo

Factional groupings within Swapo have not developed organically. Just as common socio-structural points of commonality became politicised by specific political processes, so to did latent sources of division within Swapo become 'activated' by stimuli external to the

46 In the 1999 national elections, the Federal Alliance received 0.54% of the vote, while the Democratic Party and New National Party garnered 9.56% and 6.87%, respectively

organisation. The most important of these divisions is the north-south ethnoregional division, based on those living under martial law, and those where political freedoms were stronger. Within southern Namibia, particularly in Walvis Bay and Windhoek, internal mobilisation proceeded at a reasonable pace from the 1970s onwards (though to a much lesser extent than in South Africa). Recruits were young and comparatively well-educated, many having secondary and even tertiary education. Swapo structures outside Namibia, in contrast, were dominated by the northern figures than had emanated from the OPO. The organisation was heavily centralised, deeply resistant to popular input from below, and violently repressive of dissent. Indeed, in each of Swapo military bases (in Tanzania, Zambia and Angola) thousands of activists were detained, tortured and killed by internal Swapo security (Leys and Saul 1995: Chapter 3).[47]

Detainees, however, were not selected randomly. During the massive repression of internal dissent in Angola in the late 1970s, 'anti-southern' feeling among the leadership seems to have been prevalent, triggered by an increase in the number of (better educated) southern recruits to Swapo since the introduction of conscription in 1980, and the 'main victims' were from the south (Leys and Saul 1995: 53). Indeed, Swapo's dismal performance in the 1989 elections in the southern party of the country is attributed, to a large extent, to this factor. Within Swapo, analysts point to a marked 'Ovambo-centric tilt' (see Leys and Saul 1995: 42 for discussion). The movement, indeed, developed first from the Ovambo People's Organisation, established in Cape Town in the 1950s to promote the interests of Ovambo migrant labourers (Interview with Hishoono). To the extent that other groups were involved in the struggle, smaller groups were marginalized over time. Caprivi elites cooperated within SWAPO structures until 1980, when Swapo Vice-President Mishake Muyongo withdrew from the party citing ethnic victimisation, and proceeded to form the Caprivi African National Union (Leys and Saul 1995: 42). More recently, key Kavango elites departed from Swapo to help join the Congress of Democrats (Interview with Shixwameni).

This northern-southern division also overlaps, to an important extent, with an 'external-internal' division. Like in South Africa, opposition to apartheid was also carried out by organised social formations. Unlike in South Africa, however, there was a regional skew in the location of these formation. In Namibia, key leaders of the trade union movement and student organisation came from the southern part of the country. This division, however, is less salient today than during the first years of independence. It formed, at the time, an important point of

[47] Importantly, presidency was supported by the security apparatus of host countries. Both Zambian and Tanzanian security forces intervened to protect the leadership from what they saw as a threat to the organisation.

unification among the group that broke from Swapo just before the 1999 elections to form the Congress of Democrats. According to prominent a politician who quit Swapo at this time – echoed by a good number of his colleagues – his decision to leave was caused by 'a lack of democratic space' in Swapo (Interview with Shixwameni).

Both ethnic and regional aspects of the division matter a great deal in providing potential for 'faction' status. First, as a senior Swapo figure concedes, ethnic identity matters, if for nothing else than the 'closeness' is provides (Interview with Angula). Ethnic markers broadcast costless information to citizens that allows for a short-cut between party and supporter. Ndonga and Kwanyama names are, as a rule, readily distinguishable from each other and provide costless information to citizens about tribal background. Second, the regional dimension provides co-ethnics with a source of informal organisation that is based, largely, on the infrastructure of traditional authority. This informal infrastructure provides a solid basis of social mobilisation.[48] The legitimacy of traditional authority is strong: just under one-in-three Namibians, in 2002, voiced either 'approval' or 'strong approval' of the suggestion that the country be ruled by chiefs or elders (Afrobarometer Survey Data 2002).[49] If faced with a problem, ordinary citizens are also more likely to contact their traditional leader, compared to government or party officials or representatives. The scale of contact between citizen and traditional leader is surprising: 16% of respondents claimed to have contact 'a few times' or 'often' a traditional leader to discuss their views or seek help with a problem. This stands in stark contrast to the proportion of people who contact a 'political party official' (6%); local government representative (8%); a national parliamentarian (2%), or a regional government representative (11%).

Congress of Democrats

The Congress of Democrats (CoD) was formed in March 1999, just 8 months before Namibia's third consecutive set of competitive national elections. The party was launched, primarily, by a collection of former Swapo members who had become disillusioned with the former liberation movement's avowedly centrist economic policies, refusal to acknowledge the past abuse of prisoners in Swapo camps in Angola, growing levels of corruption in government, involvement

[48] See, for instance an allegation by local government councillor and anonymous media sources that traditional authorities provide wholesale support for Ohagwena faction (*The Namibian* November 21, 2007 and June 4, 2008).

[49] The Afrobarometer is a series of cross-national representative surveys of African electorates in eighteen African countries. These data relate to the 2002 survey of

in the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo, President Nujoma's desire to run for a third term in office, and the alleged increased level of control of the party by Ovambo-speakers (Interviews with senior party figures; Lodge 1999). In particular, the primary cause of the break from Swapo is attributed to the ruling party's 'failure to transform itself from a secretive and exiled armed nationalist movement into a mass-based governing party' (CoD activist, cited in Bauer 2001). The senior members of CoD are, in many cases, individuals with strong 'struggle' credentials and are drawn from all parts of the country, yet there is a strong 'southern' contingent.

The party leadership, according to Lodge (1999: 203–4), has a distinct middle-class and professional basis with organised support strongest among students. There are some prominent former SWANU politicians (a small anti-apartheid group), most notably the party's vice-president. Within the Congress of Democrats, too, we would also expect ethnoregional divisions to play a role. According to interviewees, there is a strong Damara contingent, especially among the Women Democrats and, indeed, some of the public see Cod as a 'Damara party'. The party president, however, is an Ovambo as are some of his key supporters. Another party notable is a prominent Kavango. The party organisation, according to party officials, is strongest in Khomas, Hardap, Karas and Erongo (all located in the south of the country).

4.6 Conclusion

Just as the introduction of a fully-fledged welfare state in post-war Europe produced a new middle class that was, in most respects, indistinguishable from old middle classes, so too did sustained economic development in (white) South Africa produce a widening of skilled manual workers, white collar workers and civil servants. This process, however, has not been replicated in other African states which, by and large, are poorer today than at independence. Therefore, this study of candidate selection in African political parties includes parties which make for strange bedfellows. On one hand, South Africa has two political parties which, although idiosyncratic in their own interminable manner, closely resemble political parties in Europe. On the other hand, Namibian political parties are modelled much more closely in the tropical African fashion, complete with dominant 'hegemonic' party and fragmented 'ethnic' opposition. In Chapter 5, we consider how these parties fit within an existing typology of political parties. Prior to this, we outline a suitable strategy to research these groups.

A Typology of Political Parties

5.1 Introduction

The purpose of this dissertation is to describe how four political parties in South Africa and Namibia select parliamentary candidates, and to explain whether variation in the manner of candidate selection affects the representivity of parliamentary parties and the stability of political parties. These two objectives are joined at the hip: as a dissertation in the social science tradition, the basic descriptive task precedes any causal attempt (King *et al.* 1994: 34). Our method, as we outlined in earlier chapters, is comparative, but to compare meaningfully across our cases, we need to establish the equivalence of our cases (Gerring 2001: 174). In the first section of this chapter, we describe how a (modified) typology of political parties presents a suitable point of departure for our classification of African political parties (based on Günther and Diamond 2003). In the second section of the chapter, we provide a straightforward side-by side description of each of parties according to the density of their party organisation and the nature of the relationship between party and supporter. This chapter, however, also has a more fundamental purpose. Without giving the game away entirely, we argue that existing classifications of the 'congress' or 'consociational' party (which, supposedly, abound in Africa) are theoretically under-specified. In Chapter 7, we present an argument that variation in the competitiveness of intraparty selection mechanisms presents us with further defining attribute of political parties. This attribute, furthermore, captures nicely the essential meaning of what is presented as the 'congress' or 'consociational' party.

5.2 A (Revised) Typology of Political Parties

There is no universally-employed classification of political parties, just as there is no unified theory of political parties. In many respects, the task of categorising parties is an impossible task. It is hard enough to place 'under the knife' the anatomy of a living creature; dissecting with precision this creature, which is in a rapid state of flux, is harder still. In spite of this obstacle, classifications of parties are not in short supply. Such classificatory schemes differ in one major respect: some conceive deductively of how parties differ to each other (for instance, Günther and Diamond 2003; Wolinetz 2002); others note, inductively, the empirical attributes of parties and categorise parties according to the extent to which they 'cluster' (for instance, Katz and

Mair 1995; Krouwel 2006). Many, if not most, typologies use a combination of these deductive and inductive approaches to arrive at discrete (and sometimes mildly dissatisfying *ad hoc*) categories of party (for instance, Duverger 1964; Epstein 1980; Panebianco 1988). All typologies, according to Krouwel (2006: 249-50) have their faults: some are too abstract, lacking conceptual clarity, others are not mutually exclusive or entirely exhaustive, while others still lack empirical indicators to allow sort real-world cases.

The task of fitting African cases within existing typologies of political parties is a fraught affair. It may well be the case that, given the complexity (though not uniqueness) of African historical experience, existing categorisations of political parties – tried and tested in the European environment – do not distinguish with any kind of accuracy among different African parties. A response to this classificatory problem, in this regard at least, has been to develop Africa-specific typologies which seek to capture the essence of African parties. The first-cut at an Africa-specific typology by Van de Walle and Butler (1999) focuses on the criteria of time and access to state resources, but has been faulted for being overly *ad hoc* (Erdmann 2004). A later impromptu attempt by Gyimah-Boadi (2007: 24–5) to distinguish among parties according to their historic role – as a ruling party or opposition – seems equally deficient, although it does, nonetheless, represent an important dimension of party life. In general, however, the few existing typologies of Africa are, according to Erdmann (2004), insufficiently related to existing theoretical work to be of real use. This has serious implications for our investigation: if African parties do not fit within existing typologies, we run the risk of being analytically unsighted in future chapters. To deal with this 'stretching' problem – to skirt the 'Cape Horn of political scientists at sea' (Sartori 1976: 223) – we fit our parties to an existing (but modified) typology of political parties.

Mindful, then, of the demands of a genuinely comparative approach, we draw on an existing scheme of classification – developed by Günther and Diamond (2003) – that is based on *theoretical* rather than *empirical* dimensions. In the context of our investigation, this provides the Günther and Diamond typology with a comparative advantage over other classifications of parties: by avoiding an explicitly European derivation, we sidestep somewhat the danger of theoretical 'stretching'. The Günther and Diamond typology, based on three classificatory dimensions, might also be regarded as overly complex. Again, however, we argue this can be turned to our advantage: by looking beyond organisational criteria (which doesn't distinguish many African political parties from each other), we can differentiate more accurately between

each of our cases. This increased degree of differentiation, in turn, will allow us to relate the experience of our cases to other African cases, and of course to non-African cases.

According to the Günther and Diamond typology, parties can be separated according to the density of the party organisation; the nature of the relationship between party and supporter; and the adherence of the 'party' towards pluralistic competition. Günther and Diamond prioritise the organisational criterion, which refers to the 'thickness' of a party's formal organisational structure. They distinguish between, on one hand, parties with large infrastructures and complex relationships with secondary organisation and, on the other hand, parties that are resource-poor and rely heavily on face-to-face communication. The second criterion involves the type of programmatic commitment made by the party. Some parties are driven by ideological concerns and couch electoral appeals in the language of a specific political philosophy. Other parties claim to be pragmatic parties and declare an interest in the welfare of the citizenry, while some parties are more specific still and define their constituents in purely ethnic, religious or geographic terms. The final criterion refers to the 'strategy and behavioural norms' of a party – essentially, the extent to which parties are tolerant of adversity within the democratic system. Günther and Diamond's typology of fifteen species of party (nested within five genera), and categorised according to a temporal dimension, is represented in Figure 5.1.

Before we fit our parties to the Günther and Diamond typology, we make two revisions to the categories derived from the organisational categorisation. Our first modification deals with the anomalous classification of 'ethnicity-based' political parties as a discrete genus. The defining feature of parties in this genus, according to Günther and Diamond, is their 'promot[ion of] the interests of a particular ethnic group, or coalition of groups' (2003: 183). The first species within this genus, known as the 'ethnic' party, is viewed by Günther and Diamond (and indeed by most party scholars) as pathological (see, for instance, Dahl 1971; Horowitz 1985; Lijphart 1977; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972). Ethnic parties do not advance a policy programme; instead they seek to 'use existing state structures to channel benefits towards their particularistically defined electoral clientele'. Ethnic entrepreneurs 'explicitly seek to draw boundaries between ethnic 'friends' and 'foes'' and are prone to be dominated by a single charismatic leader. The purely ethnic party, in other words, is seen as a champion of an exclusively-defined ethnic category, to the detriment of other categories. Classic examples of the ethnic party, cited by Günther and Diamond, include the South African Inkatha Freedom Party and the Nigerian Northern People's

Figure 5.1: The Günther and Diamond (2003) Typology of Parties



Congress (2003: 183). The 'congress' species, on the other hand, is viewed in much less pejorative terms. The latter species is, essentially, a 'coalition, alliance or federation of ethnic parties or political machines' (Günther and Diamond 2003: 184). Interestingly, Günther and Diamond describe the 'congress' species of party as 'consociational' in nature, implying some form of institutionalised system of accommodation between cooperating ethnic leaders. Of all their species, Günther and Diamond are most sparse in their treatment of the congress variety of ethnicity-based party. At first glance, parties such as the Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya's KANU and, perhaps, and the South African ANC all fit into this category (Scarritt and Mozaffar 2002; Erdmann 2004; Chandra and Metz 2002; Reddy 2005).

We certainly do not deny the existence of political parties that appeal exclusively to a specific ethnic category; but if *organisation* (distinct from 'focus of representation') is the primary typological criterion, it is not entirely apparent why 'ethnicity-based' parties constitute a separate genus. The tendency to categorise such parties as a category apart reflects the enduring relevance of 'ethnic' parties, particularly in Africa, but also increasingly in Latin America, and across diverse settings – both dictatorial and democratic – in Europe (van Cott 2003).[1] Given the importance of ethnicity as a source of political mobilisation, the willingness of Günther and Diamond to classify two party species (and, indeed, a party genus) in ethnic terms is understandable, but it is a mistake. After all, the characteristic which 'most distinguishes ['ethnicity-based' parties]', according to the authors, 'is their goals and strategies' (2003: 183) If we are to follow this line of argument, applying consistently the Günther and Diamond criterion, 'ethnicity-based' parties should constitute a distinct species *within* a party genus that best describes their organisational format? Our question, then, becomes: which party genus is best suited to include the ethnicity-based parties; our answer is: the 'elite-based' category.

The organisational structure of the elite-based party is 'minimal', according to Günther and Diamond, and revolves around existing elites within a specific geographic area. Contact between the party leadership and party supporters is based primarily upon interpersonal networks and there are few formal structures that mediate ties between strata of party adherents. The basic unit of the elite-based party is regional – which hints at the agrarian base of these parties – and if national-

[1] This enduring appeal of the ethnic party seems puzzling: we have turned away from an understanding of ethnicity as primordial (Geertz 1973; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972) towards one which sees ethnic as 'constructed', open to leader manipulation and dependent on context (Olzak 1992; Laitin 1998; Chandra 2004, Posner 2005). One reason for the 'exceptional salience' of ethnicity, which is referred to consistently in the literature (Chandra 2004; Posner 2005; Birnir 2007), deals with the permanence of ethnic markers. As we discussed in Chapter 4, 'low information' democracies, such as Namibia, provide an environment where ethnic markers provide a ready source of information for the voting public.

level party structure exists, they involve an alliance among these regional elites (2003: 175–6). The elite-based party as described by Günther and Diamond, resembles in all but name the 'cadre' party of Duverger (1964), the 'caucus' party of Ostrogorski (1902) and Wolinetz (2002), and the 'Honoratiorenpartei' of Weber (cited in Erdmann 2004: 67). There are two species of elite-based party – 'traditional local notable party' and the 'clientelistic party'. The former, a relic of early-to-mid 19th century Europe, was a feature of limited-franchise democracies, where a winning electoral strategy did not require mass mobilisation. The latter, Günther and Diamond argue, evolved from the 'traditional local notable' party as a consequence of the extension of the franchise and the demands of electoral competition in modernising societies. The organisation of the 'elite-based' party is identical to the 'ethnicity-based' party. Both types of party have minimal bureaucratic infrastructure (compared to the mass-based party); both are based on 'particularistic networks of personal exchange and support' and both involve a fundamental structural imbalance between party elites and followers (2003: 171). Considered anew, this slightly revised genus of elite-based parties is presented in Figure 5.2.

Figure 5.2: A Revised Elite-based Genus of Parties



This revision, which seems to have produced some strange bedfellows within the elite-based party category, hints at a deeper problem in the Günther and Diamond typology: the conceptual ambiguity of the second classificatory criterion. A typology should aim to produce classes which are both exhaustive (capable of 'housing' each example of a political party) and mutually exclusive (with one correct category for each party).[2] The second classificatory criterion in the Günther and Diamond typology, however, attempts to separate parties that appeal to a specific identity. If we are to accept the 'constructivist' argument that identities are multiple, overlapping and dependent on context, we can see that the ascriptively-defined categories (such as ethnicity or

[2] For further details on how to the principles of a good typology, see Bailey (1992) and Elman (2005).

religion), presented by Günther and Diamond in their 'programmatic' listing, are not mutually exclusive of each other. Posner (2007: 1305) provides a nice demonstration of this problem with an example from Nigeria:

> 'if a voter is a Muslim Yoruba from Ibadan, does she vote for her fellow Muslim, who may be Hausa? The fellow Yoruba, who may come from Oyo? Or the fellow Ibadan resident, who may be Christian?' In other words, how do you identify one's group?'

The answer, according to Posner, lies in the boundaries of political competition and group size. In Africa, Posner (2005; 2007) finds strong evidence to suggest that where countries have multi-dimensional ethnic cleavages (ethnic and tribal, for instance), parties and voters will vote along tribal lines in one-party states, but along ethnic lines in multi-party democracies. Ultimately, voters 'play' the identity (out of a repertoire of more than one) that places them in the strongest position to give one of their 'own' a chance at winning office. Africans, according to this view, do not consider their 'ethnic' identity as a rigidly defined category; rather, it contains many sub-divisions (and, indeed, can be situated within overarching groups), depending on circumstance.

The categorisation of political parties according to whether they are 'ethnic' or 'multi-ethnic', moreover, is empirically quite unhelpful. It is not splitting hairs to argue that even the classic 'ethnic' party – comprising, almost inevitably, more than one sub-ethnic category – is also 'congress-like' in nature (Chandra 2004). There are, indeed, many examples of this pattern to ethnic politics in Africa. In Kenya, for instance, the Kalenjin 'ethnic' group is often referred to in press reports according to the acronym KAMATUSA, which stands for the amalgamation of its constituent tribal components (Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana, Samburu). The Luhya contain sixteen different subdivisions and there are several Kikuyi clans in both Northern and Southern Kikuyu-speaking districts (Posner 2005: 261). In Somalia and Botswana, which are usually described as ethnically homogenous, there is a strong 'clan' dimension to political competition (Acemoglu *et al.* 2001). In Namibia, as we noted in Chapter 4, the Ovambo contain two important (and geographically-concentrated) tribal divisions, the Kwanyama and Ndonga.. Even in South Africa, authors sometimes refer to the division between Sotho and non-Sotho speakers.

Günther and Diamond, then, try to set (fixed) boundaries between distinct analytical categories using reference points which, by their nature, overlap with each other. The authors have, to borrow the terminology of Collier and Levitsky (1997: 430), tried to increase 'analytic differentiation' at the expense of 'conceptual validity'. It is not our contention that all of the

Figure 5.3: A Reconfigured Understanding of Party 'Linkage'



categories produced are invalid, but it seems as though the authors have (in the application of the second dimension of the typology) resorted an *empirical* method of sorting cases which draws heavily on existing *taxonomical* accounts of party types. This is inconsistent with the aim of producing a deductive typology that is universal in intent. To deal with this inconsistency, we return to the 'root' concept of 'linkage' in an attempt to place the typology on firmer conceptual ground. We move 'up the ladder of generality', drawing on a rigid conceptual understanding of variation in the nature of party-supporter linkages. This technique is presented in Figure 5.3.

Kitschelt (2000), in his analysis of 'linkage', argues that the 'grounds on which politicians are accountable and responsive to their citizens' can be broken into three discrete categories of 'charismatic', 'clientelistic' and 'programmatic' bonds (Kitschelt 2000: 845). The distinction between these categories is based on an explicitly theoretical account of the twin tasks faced by political parties (Aldrich 1995). Parties, if they are to be functional rather than simply institutional vehicles, must solve (or at least tackle) a collective action and a social choice problem. Successful solution of the collective action problem involves partisans forming a 'team' which, to be viable, requires some kind of balancing of competing personal ambitions. Once banded together, however, individual politicians are faced with the task of aggregating successfully their diverse preferences over how decisions should be made. Successful solution of the social choice problem requires politicians to develop a stable set of preference rankings (a political program). Based on whether parties solve the collective action problem, the social choice problem, or both of these problems, the linkage between parties and their supporters can, in turn, be categorised as charismatic (no solution to either problem), clientelistic (a solution to the collective action problem), or programmatic (a solution to both problems). These changes are presented in Figure 5.4.

Figure 5.4: A Revised Typology of Political Parties



Our revised typology of political parties, then, has four party genera and twelve party species (with three species for each genus). With the notable exception of the radically revised ethnicity and elite-based genera, no great damage is done to the Günther and Diamond typology. The movement, mass-based and electoralist parties all remain, fundamentally, the same as before even if their categories lack the same level of analytical differentiation. This trading of analytic differentiation for conceptual validity is, of course, the negative consequence of our 'up the ladder' revision. Differences between European parties that were illustrated in sharp relief, have now been collapsed into somewhat similar categories. This trade-off, nonetheless, is essential to this study. By re-setting the typology, we allow for the systematic description of each of our cases according to a theoretically-sound understanding of the political party. This typology, furthermore, is capable of including African cases.

Substituting the Kitschelt classification of species for the original Günther and Diamond classification, we see immediately that, hypothetically, there is a new party species: the 'programmatic' elite-based party (see figure 5.4). In an organisational respect, this party is similar to Günther and Diamond's 'clientelistic' party, which 'consists of a coterie of notables'. Support for these notables is based on 'hierarchical chains of interpersonal relationships of a quasi-feudal variety, in which relatively durable patterns of loyalty are linked with the exchange of services and obligations' (Günther and Diamond 2003: 176). The first clause of this sentence outlines a defining attribute of the elite-based party, but the second clause bears no relation to

the organisational definition. Parties may well be weakly-organised with a heavy reliance on personal interaction among closely-knit networks of supporters, but that does not necessarily imply they promise to deliver 'specific material advantages to a politician's electoral supporters' (Kitschelt 2000: 846). There is, probably, no great mystery behind the absence of the 'programmatic' party from typologies of African parties. This species of party, after all, is rarely encountered in Africa; its lifespan, moreover, seems disproportionately short and its survival faces persistent threat. 'Programmatic' elite-based parties – such as, for instance, the Zambian Lima party (Burnell 2001) – run against the grain of Africa's 'politics of affection', which priorities reciprocal, personalised exchanges (Hyden 2006).

5.3 Categorising Political Parties in South Africa and Namibia

In this section, our purpose is to assess the 'goodness of fit' of our four South African and Namibian parties to our revised typology. We focus, first, on the nature of the 'formal organisation of the party'. In the second section, we turn to Günther and Diamond's second criterion, the 'nature of the party's programmatic commitments'. We exclude, for reasons of space, any consideration of whether our cases are 'tolerant and pluralistic or proto-hegemonic in its objectives and behavioural style' (2003: 171).

Party 'Genus' I: The Mass-based Party

Günther and Diamond's most populous party genus, the 'mass-based' party, is modelled along the lines of Duverger's 'externally-created' mass party (1964). These 'parties of the excluded', with their large base of dues-paying members, permanent party infrastructure, and extensive network of ancillary associations, place a heavy emphasis on ideology (Katz 1996: 118). 'Believers', as Panebianco (1988: 264) puts it, are central to the organised attempt to project a particular view of the world on society. An organised attempt to alter society through seizure of state power, however, can be pursued in a totalitarian fashion, and it is this feature which marks Duverger's cell-based 'devotee' party and Neumann's party of 'total integration' from the branch-based 'mass party' and party of 'social integration', respectively (Duverger 1964; Neumann 1956). Günther and Diamond make a similar distinction within the mass-based party genus, introducing three species of 'proto-hegemonic' party – the fundamentalist, ultra-nationalist, and Leninist parties. The second set of mass party species within Günther and Diamond's typology – termed class-mass, denominational, and pluralist-nationalist parties – are

seen as tolerant parties committed to political pluralism within the constitutional order, but with distinct ideologies.

Blessed, perhaps, with the benefit of hindsight it has become commonplace to describe the mass-based party as a typically European construct. During the first flurry of scholarly interest in African political parties, however, it was simply assumed that political parties would fit into a Western mould, but the 'mass party', scholars soon discovered, simply did not exist in Africa (Wallerstein 1966; Bienen 1967). In fact, the period of resistance to colonial rule had not produced such sophisticated party machinery as seen in Europe. Instead, the political movements that had swept charismatic figures to power in Africa were, almost universally, spectral affairs dominated by urban-based educated elites (Geertz 1963; Coleman and Rosberg 1966). Ill-prepared for the advent of parliamentary democracy, Africans were left with a parody of the mass-based party. Although there are some partial exceptions such as Tanzania's CCM, on the whole African parties are shadowy entities with weak organisational infrastructures and, almost invariably, rarely have stable fee-paying mass memberships, reliable sources of non-state funding, the logistical competence of salaried professional staffs, or the support and loyalty of elected representatives (van de Walle and Butler 1999; Randall and Svåsand 2002b; Bratton and van de Walle 1997). This organisational weakness persists to the present day. Recent research commissioned by the IDEA, based on 200 parties in fifteen countries, found that '75% of the political parties investigated had no offices at the polling station level and 62% had no district or provincial coordinating offices' (Nordlund and Salih 2007: 81).[1]

This case of mistaken identity, according to Sartori (1976: 227), can be partly attributed to the euphoria that greeted the end of the African colonial period, 'a mass or mobilisational *momentum* [had] been mistaken for a mass or mobilisational *nature* of parties.' The organisational 'thinness' of this first generation of parties can, as Günther and Diamond suggest, be attributed largely to the founding context of African parties, which can leave a 'lasting imprint on the nature of the party's organisation for decades to come' (2003: 173). As we argued in Chapter 4 and 5, the experience of decolonialisation in the countries of 'black' Africa that achieved statehood in the 1960s did not require highly-organised opposition: the colonial apparatus was minimal, there were few powerful and well organised domestic groups opposed to the process of decolonialisation and the treasuries of the colonial metropolis were exhausted

[1] Continue (from Chapter 2) the analogy of the Irish case, at the time of Irish independence the Irish nationalist organisation, Sinn Fein, could count on 112,080 members organised around 1354 clubs, demonstrating the organisational difference in kind between Irish and African nationalist parties (Lee 1989: 40).

following the Second World War. The movements that emerged to mobilise opposition to colonial rule might have masqueraded as mass-based parties, but there was never any compunction for parties to transcend the ephemeral appeal of charismatic leadership. Sartori is correct to point to the willingness of early observers to believe the bombast of African leaders, a point Erdman (2004: 64) is swift to underline, but the mistaken identification of the mass party across the continent in the 1960s can also be attributed to the tendency of ruling parties to fold party into state, making the anatomy of the ruling *party* (as distinct from the state) all that much harder to dissect.[2]

The chimera of the mass-based party, however, does not seem to apply south of the Limpopo in democratic South Africa. Given what we know about the relatively 'modern' structure of South African society and the travails of the transition from apartheid to ordinary democracy, this is not all that surprising. Faced with a resolute and well-resourced apartheid state intent on maintaining racial hierarchy, the African National Congress was required to develop an organisational framework sufficient to meet the exigencies of successful collective action. It is this *organisational* quality (summarised in Section 4.5.1) that separates earlier liberation movements such as Kenneth Kaunda's UNIP or Hastings Banda's BCP from the more sophisticated ANC. In this sense, at least, the ANC has much in common with Günther and Diamond's 'class-mass' species of mass-based party based typically in Europe. Both were formed during periods of restricted franchise, both piggybacked on the infrastructure of the trade union movement, and both faced equally obdurate state elites intent on restricting popular control of government.

In an organisational sense, the ANC has made a successful transition from political movement to political party. The organisational framework of the ANC-in-exile had rested on 15,000 cadres and was largely concerned with the execution of guerrilla warfare. By 1991 the ANC had established a network of membership branches across the country that encompassed 500,000 members (Lodge 2003: 20). The membership of the ANC, though lower than in the early 1990s, is still healthy and has been increasing steadily since 1997 (see Table 5.1). The territorial penetration of the ANC – considered to be the proportion of ANC branches 'in good standing' in

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[2] Zambia, one of the few countries in Africa to retain civilian-led government, provides a prime example of this tendency. During the 2nd Republic, an increasing number of party positions were created that duplicated existing state positions leading to episodic crises of dual legitimacy. This 'upsurge of party positions and the development of a huge UNIP bureaucracy', however, proved unsustainable as the country plunged into economic crisis and state coffers ran dry (Momba 2003: 42).

Table 5.1: Party Membership of the ANC (by province)

Province	2004/05	2002	1997
Eastern Cape	70,651	89,167	44,684
Free State	38,331	33,115	40,184
Gauteng	58,223	52,764	42,824
KwaZulu Natal	75,035	53,531	64,998
Limpopo	56,474	44,107	68,560
Mpumalanga	48,239	48,588	38,044
North West	39,006	41,388	35,800
Northern Cape	21,608	24,390	19,894
Western Cape	33,141	29,796	30,790
Total	**440,708**	**416,846**	**385,778**

Source: ANC National General Council Organisational Report, 2005

Table 5.2: Territorial Penetration of ANC Infrastructure

Province	Braches in Good Standing	% of Wards in each Province	Membership
Eastern Cape	241	40%	70,651
Free State	238	82%	38,331
Gauteng	206	46%	58,223
KwaZulu Natal	530	70%	75,035
Limpopo	401	85%	56,474
Mpumalanga	302	75%	48,239
North West	282	73%	39,006
Northern Cape	110	67%	21,608
Western Cape	254	77%	33,141
Total	**2,564**	**66%**	**440,708**

Source: ANC National General Council Organisational Report, 2005

each electoral ward – also indicates that the ANC infrastructure is of 'mass-based party' calibre (See Table 5.2) This is not to say, however, that the organisational transition from movement to party has been seamless. The ANC may have plenty of branches in each province – with the interesting exception of the home province of ANC President Mbeki – but the report of the secretary-general sheds some doubt on the vitality of branch life, concluding that:

> 'The picture of our branches is very uneven. In general, across all provinces, the best-organised branches are in the minority, with the vast majority functioning according to the basic minimum of constitutional requirements.'[1]

The ANC also has a significant degree of centralised bureaucracy to direct party activities. Since the introduction of majority rule, the ANC has invested heavily in their internal party organization. ANC headquarters in Luthuli House – one of two office blocks owned by the ANC in Johannesburg's central business district – boasts a large professional and active staff (c. 400). Senior party members are 'deployed' to party structures to maintain internal party efficiency, and party structures from branch level upwards through regional and provincial level are consulted regularly on policy issues, as well as playing a regular, if marginal, role in the choice of leadership of all tiers of government (Lodge 2004). Popular involvement in the organisation, then, may have declined since the heady days of the mid-1990s, but it is fair to say the ANC organisation is still in good health.[2]

The party is also, overwhelmingly and in sharp contrast to other African parties, programmatic in orientation.[3] Unlike in many other African parties, there are sustained and serious debates over questions of policy. Unlike in Namibia, for instance, where policy debates within parties tend to be muted, the ANC organisation facilitates, at least, demands for significant levels of policy discussions and elections are dominated by substantive issues, such as local government reform, the quality of public services (Lodge 2004: 100). According to Butler (2005: 723), the aggregative function of the party is a defining element,

[1] Source: www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/ngcouncils/2005/org_report.html. Last visited on September 14, 2008.
[2] Though it is perhaps too soon to say, there are also indications that the ANC might be moving towards an 'electoralist' form of organisation. The ANC's traditional reliance on the trade union movement – most apparent at election time where even a full seven years after unbanning, the 'ANC party machine', according to the Economist (27 September 1997), relied[d] on slickly organised COSATU branches to get out the vote' – seems to be decreasing. In 2000, it was reported President Mbeki discussed the advantages of a 'much smaller, less bureaucratic party which could make and implement policies faster', that would be wound up and down according to the electoral cycle (Lodge 2004: 161). Calland (2006), too, notes that in 2004 'The ANC shifted a good deal towards a 'modern day pure-party campaign strategy, using the party leaders imbizos and roadshows, and the media as their channel of communication to the wider electorate rather than the mass rallies and house-to-house visits of yesteryear.'
[3] Though the ANC is, in essence, a programmatic party, there is – perhaps inevitably in such a divided society – considerable pressure from party supporters to use the party as a vehicle to deliver state-based patronage (Calland 2006: 129-30).

arguing that 'the ANC has successfully filtered, prioritised and reconciled demands [of competing internal groups]'.

Party 'Genera' II and III: The Electoralist and Movement Party

It is something of a cliché in the social sciences to note that 'the only constant is change', but this really is worth underlining in any attempt to classify an entity that has man at its root. Parties, understood as mass-based organisations, are a product of the extension of the franchise, which is a decidedly modern phenomenon. Mass-based parties, which we shall discuss presently in much more detail, have in many cases evolved to reflect the societies they inhabit. There is a feeling that mass-based party although already in decline became a type of touchstone, symbolic perhaps of a golden-age of post-war prosperity. As organic entities, however, many mass-based parties have evolved. The structural source of this transformation probably has much to do with the increased social mobility between classes that followed the period of economic expansion and full extension of the welfare state in the post-war period (Krouwel 2006: 256). As the (overwhelmingly left-wing) mass-based party slowly realised its historic mission, it began to wither away [sic]. In its stead emerged the electoralist party which, in organisational terms, is a stream-lined machine that is bent towards winning elections. All of the extra-electoral activities of the mass party – from social event-management to newspaper publishing – have been jettisoned and the remaining activities are carried out by an increasingly professional staff, often acting with professional assistance. Within this ideal-type genus there are three ideal-type species that share these organisational characteristics, but differ along Günther and Diamond's second and third dimensions.

First, there is the 'catch-all' party, which has a malleable ideological position, dominant national-level party leader, and fascination with attractive candidates. It is pluralistic and tolerant of ideological diversity and seeks to position itself at that point along the ideological spectrum where it can perform the part of least-objectionable electoral choice to maximise vote-share. Examples of the catch-all party include Britain's Labour Party since Tony Blair, Spain's Partido Popular and, perhaps, Taiwan's Kuomintang. Second, Günther and Diamond posit the 'programmatic' party which is organisationally-thin but with a less eclectic ideological nature. Given its more fixed ideological position, the programmatic party resembles still some of the attributes of the mass-based party, such as links with ancillary organisations. Examples of this breed of party include the British Conservative Party under Thatcher, the Civic Democratic Party of Vaclav Klaus and the Democratic Progressive Party of Taiwan. The third electoralist party is the 'personalistic' party which serves as a vehicle

for the party leader – usually an incumbent or national figure of renown – to win an election. Electoral appeal is based on the personal charisma of leader. Examples of this party include Mr. Berlusconi's Forza Italia, Thaksin Shinawatra's Thai Rak Thai Party, and the organisations formed to support the election campaign of Fernando Collor de Mello of Brazil (Günther and Diamond 2003: 185–8).

The Democratic Alliance is difficult to categorise, as it is little more than a recent merger between three political parties (though it is dominated by the New National Party and the Democratic Party). The DP was by far the most organized component within the DA, but its support was concentrated most heavily in to the 'white liberal suburbs of Cape Town, Johannesburg and Durban' (Reynolds 2004: 442). Descended from the Progressive Party opposition of Helen Suzman, the DP section had a small (but nicely formed) branch structure as well as a vibrant and well-resourced membership. The party at branch-level, according to one MP, 'organised activities, raised funds, met once a month, and went out [canvassing] not just at election-time'. The NNP, in contrast, 'didn't really have branches' and, arguably, relied heavily on state patronage to maintain support (Giliomee 2005: 1). The party, in addition, was heavily in debt; according to Leon (2008: 545), the NNP had an overdraft of approximately six million rand (Euro 472,029) at the time of the party merger. The DP, in contrast, had a steady supply of funding (Calland 2006: 173). The NNP, according to a former MP, was 'more a_Westminster-style party', in the sense that organisationally the party was oriented towards its role in parliament. The mass-base of the party, was 'very weak' with considerably less emphasis on mass participation. Thus, there was a marked imbalance between the DP and NNP in terms of organisational coherency. Nonetheless, in spite of the party's heavily factionalised structure and internal variation in organisational coherence, the party is essentially programmatic in orientation. There is no evidence that the party appeals for support on a clientelistic basis and it contains a detailed policy programme which forms the central plank in all elections since merger in 2000 (Cherrry and Southall 2001).

A second party genus introduced by Günther and Diamond, the 'movement' type of party, has a 'postmodern' tinge, and 'straddles the conceptual space between 'party' and 'movement'' and (2003: 188). The two species in this genus both have fluid organisational structures but differ significantly to each other along the ideological dimension. The 'left-libertarian' species, based on the work of Kitschelt, is characterised by 'loose networks of grass-roots support with little formal structure, hierarchy and central control' (1989: 66). This species is marked by (somewhat nebulous) libertarian 'post-materialist' beliefs that, broadly-speaking, emphasise social cohesion, participatory decision-making, and environmental decay. The German Greens are a good example of parties of this nature. The

second species in this genus, the post-industrial extreme right party, emphasise 'order, tradition, identity and security', but share with their left-leaning counterparts an antipathy for 'party'. Unlike supporters of left-libertarian parties, adherents of the right-wing species bow to the principle of leadership and dispute the legitimacy of the modern welfare state (Günther and Diamond 2003: 189). Parties that conform to this characterisation include the French Front National and Austrian Freedom Party. There are, as far as we are aware, no such parties in Africa.

Party 'Genus' IV: The Elite-based Party

There are three 'species' of party within the revised elite-based party genus. We do not intend to fit all of the parties discussed by Günther and Diamond into the revised categories of the elite-based party. The revision is theoretically coherent and, as such, can stand alone in abstract form. The purpose of this section, we recall, is simply to see if we can fit our four African cases to our revised version of a universal typology of political parties. To review, there are three types of elite-based party: the 'charismatic', 'clientelistic' and 'programmatic' party (see Figure 5.3). The 'charismatic' elite-based party corresponds, in some respects, to Günther and Diamond's description of the 'ethnic' party. The correlation, however, is less than perfect and there is some variation among 'ethnic' parties that is not captured by the Günther and Diamond typology. The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), on one hand, is described as a textbook example of an 'ethnic' party and, in all key respects, it conforms to our description of the 'charismatic' elite-based party. The IFP, according to Calland (2006: 179), 'exists as a support vehicle for [party founder and leader] Buthelezi ... virtually everything starts and ends with him'. A former IFP MP, Gavin Woods, traces the decline in IFP popularity to the dominance of its leader, arguing that 'strong leadership-driven parties will often fail if such parties' identity lack moral and policy substance' (Woods, cited in Calland 2006: 180). Other ethnic parties, however, have managed to deal with Aldrich's collective action problem and balance successfully the competing ambitions of different politicians, though they are no less 'ethnic' in terms of their support base. The second party in this genus, the 'clientelistic' elite-based party, might also be heavily dependent on an ethnoregional support base but, crucially, the party is not dominated by the presence of a single leader. Parties of this nature, in some cases evolved from 'charismatic' parties, are more durable. Most of Africa's long-standing political parties, seem to fall into this category (Erdmann 2004). Finally, we have a 'new' species of party suggested by our revision – the 'programmatic' elite-based party.

In Namibia, the Congress of Democrats fits the 'programmatic' categorisation quite well. Though the party has a party headquarters in Windhoek with a full-time Secretary-General and three-four administration staff, the party does not seem have any formal organisation outside the capital. This weak capacity is illustrated succinctly by the inability of the party organisation to absorb a 'flurry' of applications for party membership throughout the party's early years. Interviews with past Secretaries-General as well as the Chief Administrator of the Congress of Democrats (CoD) in 2005 reveal how the party consistently struggled to develop a party organisation in the regions. The 'sudden and immediate weight' of contesting national elections precipitated 'almost a total collapse [in internal party structures]' caused mainly by financial constraints, administrative inexperience, and the difficulties associated with developing regional structures (Interview with Gertze). Ideologically, the CoD see themselves as a party modelled from a social democratic mould, in the same tradition as the Swedish Social Democratic Party and played a prominent role in parliament during their first term, proposing private members' bills.[4]

The third party in this newly-configured elite-based category, the 'clientelistic' elite-based party, bears a strong relationship with parties such as Zambia's UNIP, Côte d'Ivoire's CDI or Kenya's KANU. It may seems anachronistic to attempt to resuscitate a type of party that was in its prime during the early years of 20th Century Europe, but there are distinct parallels. With the exception of South Africa, the majority of African citizens live in precisely the sort of environment that gave rise to 'clientelistic' parties in the first instance – 'rural, premodern societies: under conditions of geographical isolation from a dominant centre of government coupled with low levels of functional literacy and poorly developed transport and communications media' (Günther and Diamond 2003: 176). In both cases, the elite of each species of party composed 'a confederation of notables (either traditional or of the newly emerging liberal-professional or economic elite), each with his own geographically, functionally or personalistically based support' (2003: 176). Moreover, like these creatures of 20th Century Europe, the clientelistic basis of both forms of party contributed, ultimately, to their demise (Hopkin 2006; Bratton and van de Walle 1997).

Swapo, too, seems to conform to this category of clientelistic 'elite-based' party. Leys and Saul explore the history of the party, pointing to the early rise of Sam Nujoma as the 'Headman' of the party, surrounded by the 'movement's notables' who guaranteed his survival. Indeed, the atmosphere of the movement as a whole, according to a senior figure, was 'a bit like a club' (Peter Katkavivi, cited in Leys and Saul 1995: 43). From the 1960s

[4] One indication of the influence of the Swedes is the colours of the CoD emblem (blue and yellow), which are the same as the Swedish national flag.

onwards, the organisation seems to have been directed towards an external diplomatic function, 'whose primary resources were not those inside the country … but the financial, moral, material and diplomatic support offered by eternal allies (Dobell 2000: 37). The external focus of Swapo is crucial to an understanding of how the organisation has developed. Leys and Saul (1995: 86) argue that:

> 'The ultimate result inside Namibia of Swapo's adoption of a military-diplomatic strategy was thus a real demobilisation [of domestic structures]. The /Ai//Gams Conference, initiated by the Secretary-General of the Council of Churches in Namibian in 1986 to concert opposition to the 'Transitional Government of National Unity', received at most half-hearted support from Swapo and collapsed. Even some of Swapo's most loyal internal activists, members of the Windhoek Branch executive, agreed that Swapo inside Namibia became 'weak' … the party was allowed to fall into a 'pathetic situation', which the efforts of the Windhoek branch could not compensate for. Some branches were active – Walvis Bay, Swakop[mund], Tsumeb, Gibeon – but a small area'. Even Mariental, which had been one of the stronger branches in the hay-day of the late 1970s, was completely dormant by the late 1980s.'

Dobell argues that after launch of Swapo as a political party, 'further opening of party structures would be controlled' and that the 'hierarchical' nature of the party would be reinforced over time. Indeed, her analysis of the election of the party leadership confirms this top-heavy, 'overtly exclusionary' orientation of the party: Elites, simply, have not been willing to democratise control over party structures. The picture that emerged of the Swapo leadership bears a striking analogy to political elites that inhabit rentier states: shorn of the need to develop an acquiescent support base, leadership structures become progressively disconnected from popular constituencies and develop a rapacious logic of their own. Crucially, the skein of organised opposition in apartheid South Africa did not exist in occupied Namibia. Shorn of ancillary groups, which underpin mass-based parties, Swapo never really had a mass nature

In common with other African nationalist movements, Swapo has a weak base and relies heavily on patronage gleaned from access to office. Perhaps just as importantly, there is also a widespread perception that Swapo use access to state resources to transfer benefits to northern supporters.[5] Bauer (2001: 45–6) talks of the 'atrophying' of the already 'rudimentary' party apparatus, evidenced by widespread non-payment of membership dues by, among others, elected officials, the financial crises of party-administered commercial venture; poor attendance at party rallies; and minimal party input into policy formulation. The core of the classificatory problem, however, is methodological: as we alluded to earlier, the willingness of meretricious party elites in post-colonial Africa to turn the resources of the

[5] See, for instance, the statement made by UDF leader, Chief Justus //Garoeb, in parliament that 'It is therefore proper that Namibia now comes back to all the people of Namibia and that all Namibians south of Oshivelo regain not only their pride and dignity, but their rightful share of the national resources.' *The Namibian*, April 16 2004.

state to their own end makes it difficult to observe whether parties have a mass-based nature that exists *independently* of the state.[6] We follow common sense, and the historical record of comparable countries, and situate Swapo within the elite-based genus.

5.4 Conclusion

The study of African parties suffers from a debilitating lacuna: the absence of a typology that allows separation of parties into distinct categories. The purpose of this chapter, then, has been to provide a classificatory framework that is capable of distinguishing among different types of African political parties. Existing frameworks, often based on organisation criteria, are of limited application in Africa which tends to contain parties with a weak organisational structure (Randall and Svåsand 2002b; Bratton and van de Walle 1997). This limited travelling capacity is, in all likelihood, a function of the deeper structural differences between African and European states. Our South African cases, unsurprisingly, fit within the party genera of the typology that were left reasonably untouched by our revisions to the Günther and Diamond typology. The difficulty with classification of Namibian parties, on the other hand, stemmed from the inadequacy of the classification of parties based on 'ethnicity'. We argued that a consistent application of the logic behind the Günther and Diamond typology implied parties such as the Congress of Democrats and Swapo were, in organisational terms, better considered as elite-based parties. Our second revision, using constructivist logic, moved away from the use of party 'identity' as a suitable classificatory criterion. Rather than including 'ethnicity' as a sort of *deus ex machina* solution to the problem of categorising elite-based African parties, we introduced a more theoretically satisfying account of the relationship between voters and their representatives, based on a more fundamental three-way distinction between different forms of 'linkage' (Kitschelt 2000). This alternative classificatory approach provided mutually-exclusive categories – a necessary component of any typology (Bailey 1992: 5; Gerring 2001: 121) – while retaining

[6] In other African countries, this process of conflation did not happen by accident. African ruling elites intended to embark on what Hyden termed a 'centralising-revolutionary' project that required penetration of the state by a vanguard party. There were also other more mundane considerations at work, as Hyden also points out, notably the quotidian threat to political survival faced by new African elites inhabiting weakly-legitimised states (2006: 28-30). The inflation of state and party positions – used as patronage to reward loyal supporters – led to an illusory 'massification' of ruling party structures. Zambia and Tanzania are both prime examples of this trend where gradually the duplication of existing state positions at the party level led, in the Zambian case at least, to episodic crises of dual legitimacy (see chapters on Zambia and Tanzania by Momba and Mihyo, respectively, in Salih 2003). From an organisational perspective, this fusion of party with state has had an ironic outcome in modern-day democratic Africa – the weakening of former ruling parties. Weaned on state resources for decades, when multiparty elections were re-introduced in the 1990s, parties such as UNIP suffered a haemorrhaging of party cadres and almost total organisational collapse. In spite of (and indeed perhaps because of), 25 years of one-party rule, UNIP were reduced to the status of a regional party with support only in Eastern Province when the MMD swept to power on a wave of discontent (Momba 2003: 42).

the original classificatory intent of Günther and Diamond, which sought to describe the relationship between party elite and supporter.

The revision of an existing typology of parties is of both direct and indirect value to this investigation of candidate selection in four African parties. First, and most obviously, we now have a clear conceptual schema of party types that is capable of 'travelling' to the African environment. This allows us to describe systematically the different types of party in this study. In Chapters 6 and 7, when we describe the selection process and evaluate its impact, respectively, we can return to this categorisation of parties to situate how variation in candidate selection mechanisms builds a clear picture of what parties do. Essentially, we will argue in Chapter 7 that the degree of inclusiveness of candidate selection mechanisms constitutes a defining feature of parties, which in turn allows us to identify the 'congress' or 'consociational' party within the existing set of party types. Second, the typology has allowed us to identify and describe, among others, a sort of 'aspen' party – the programmatic elite-based party – that seems to live a tremulous existence, but is fundamental to the prospects of democratic consolidation. The tendency, previously, to treat such parties as an oddity is replaced by a firmer appreciation of the anatomy of such parties. By developing a typology sufficiently fine-grained to detect this party, we provide (as typologies should) a 'foundation for [future] explanation' (Bailey 1992: 15).

Candidate Selection in Four African Political Parties

6.1 Introduction

In this chapter we describe how four South African and Namibian political parties selected their candidates to represent each party in the 2004 parliamentary election. In the first section of the chapter, we outline the rules and regulations which governed candidate selection in each party. The 'official story' of selection, as it has been called (Katz and Mair 1992), is based largely on the written rules and procedures outlined by parties in their constitutions and other party documents. Second, we reconstruct the 'real story' of candidate selection drawing, primarily, on interview data gathered from a range of individuals who took part in the 2004 selection process. In each section, we outline how selection took place according to three principal criteria: the location(s) of the 'selectorate' within the party organization; the 'inclusivity' of the selectorate at each location; and the qualities considered important by the party selectorate(s). Later in the chapter, we situate the South African and Namibian experience within the broader literature on candidate selection. Throughout the chapter, we standardize the terms we use to describe the role of each organisational unit of the party (see Appendix B).

6.2 The 'Official Story' of Candidate Selection

The selection of parliamentary candidates in South Africa and Namibia is not subject to any statutory regulation, beyond some straightforward demands that parliamentarians (i.e. all successful candidates) must not have a criminal record or be financially insolvent. In all other respects, political parties can choose candidates in any way they see fit. In South Africa, elections were held in April 2004. In Namibia, elections were held in November 2004. Political parties were required to submit lists of candidates to the electoral commission approximately six-to-eight weeks prior to the elections._

In anticipation of the April 2004 elections to the National Assembly, the ANC 'list process' began in July 2003 with nomination of candidates by party branches, and concluded in February 2004 with finalisation of the list of 400 candidates by the party national executive and submission of the list to the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC). Inside the ANC, would-be members of the National Assembly could pursue nomination in two ways: on one hand, via one of eleven 'provincial' lists (200 names); on the other, by way of a single 'national' list (200 names). Each provincial list of candidates was rank-ordered at an elected assembly of branch-level delegates (90%) and affiliate delegates (10%). The

national-level list was also to be submitted for election to an assembly of elected party delegates, in the same proportion as provincial colleges. The party national executive signs off on both lists. In order to qualify for candidacy, aspirant candidates within the ANC were required to have paid their membership dues and demonstrated a 'track record of commitment' to the movement; no criminal record (with the exception of political crimes before April 1994), and no history of corruption, ill-discipline or any other breach of the ANC Code of Conduct. Unlike other political parties in this study, the key parameters of a 'balanced' list are laid out in a comprehensive manner in a couple of key party documents, in addition to explicit mention in the party constitution. In a document entitled, 'Through the Eye of the Neeedle', the ANC lists gender, age, geographic representivity, and continuity as core criteria of a balanced list. Throughout the party constitution, including the preamble, the ANC aspire to a 'united, non-racial, non-sexist and democratic South Africa' (Preamble; Rule 2.2; Rule 3.1). The organisation outlines a commitment to 'cultural, linguistic and religious diversity' (Rule 2.5) and in its 'composition and functioning [to] be … against any form of tribalistic exclusivism or ethnic chauvinism' (Rule 3.4). The only hard-and-fast rule that the ANC have with respect to the qualities of the candidates, however, is that every third candidate on both sets of lists is female.

In the Democratic Alliance, the major opposition party in South Africa, there is no national-level selection process. Each provincial structure within the DA (with some limited intervention by the party president) selects candidates in isolation from all other provinces. In contrast to all of our other parties, then, the DA constitution 'provide[s] for provincial lists only'. The DA, we recall, represented a recent merger between three independent political parties. In the local elections held in 2000, seats had been allocated according to the strength of each of the parties in the 1999 elections. Each party, in turn, had decided internally how to allocate their seats. In preparation for the 2004 election, however, the DA decided to 'move beyond componency', as it was called (Interview with Selfe). Detailed selection procedures (the most detailed, indeed, of any party in our study) stipulated that candidates 'must be chosen by an electoral college' where a minimum of 50% of delegates are taken from branch level structures. In some of the larger provinces with significant DA support, a number of smaller regional electoral colleges were chosen – in the Western Cape, for instance, three regional electoral colleges were to meet in anticipation of the 2004 elections. Importantly, the number of delegates that each region would send to provincial colleges was tied to levels of DA electoral support. At the electoral colleges (held in each province or region), an executive committee was to be elected, which would direct the proceedings. Each committee was to have ten to eighteen members, of whom 50% at least needed to be branch-level

delegates. The role of the selection committee was to evaluate the suitability of aspirant candidates and make recommendation to the elected college. Electoral colleges were then to vote for their preferred candidates using a proportional electoral system (PR-STV). After lists were constructed, the party leader was entitled to nominate the third, seventh, fourteenth and twenty-first and so on, candidate on the list of each province. The DA 'rules of selection' make scant reference to the qualities of a balanced parliamentary party, other than passing reference to 'ethnic balance', although guidelines to committees instruct that assessors must consider internal party evaluations of candidates. Each candidate, like in the ANC, was required to conform to the legal criteria of electoral candidacy. Party youth and women's wings played no formal role in the selection process.[1]

In Namibia, the Swapo selection process differed significantly to the ANC selection process, in spite of their shared history. In Swapo, the selection process, on paper, is heavily centralised with only limited involvement from sub-national party organs and party affiliates. The list process within Swapo took place, essentially, at a national electoral college of party delegates. Some of the delegates and aspirant candidates were chosen by (branch-based) provincial party structures, party wings and party affiliates; but the majority of candidates were sitting MPs and members of the party national executive. According to the rulebook, delegates to the national electoral college were to vote for their preferred candidates, but the party steering committee was to sign off on the rank-ordering of the electoral list, which left some ambiguity of the precise role the electoral college was supposed to play. The party president, in addition, had the right to place ten candidates from the third to the twelfth position on the electoral list. (The party Secretary-General and Deputy Secretary-General were to be ranked first and second, respectively.) Candidacy requirements were similar to the ANC: according to the Swapo election guidelines, any candidate that seeks nomination to the National Assembly must be a 'loyal, committed, reliable, capable, and suitable' member of Swapo in 'good standing' (paid-up and registered). Aspirant candidates, in addition, had to be financially solvent and have no criminal record. From start to finish, the process took less than three months.

The process of candidate selection in the Congress of Democrats differed to all other parties. Parameters of selection were only loosely established in the party constitution and, unlike in the other three parties, there was no tailor-made document outlining how candidates would be chosen. There was, in addition, very little mention made of candidate

[1] Given the logistical difficulty of reconstructing the selection process in each region, we only examine the selection process in the Western Cape. Although this approach is regrettably narrow, we felt that a thorough reconstruction of the selection process in the DA's electoral heartland would have yielded a higher analytical dividend than a more superficial study of all nine provincial processes.

selection in the constitution except in relation to the role of the national party structures. According to the constitution, delegates from the national conference were to 'deliberate on and endorse the party list for the purpose of national parliamentary and other elections (Article 11.7). Before this body was to be presented with the list, however, the party constitution stipulated that the national executive of the party was to meet to appoint a committee, of 'not fewer than five and not more than nine persons for the selection and adoption of candidates for the National Parliament. The NEC [party national executive] shall draw up regulations for the procedures to be followed in such a selection' (Article 15.12). This involvement of a list committee was, on paper, very similar to the practice in the ANC but, importantly, the national executive did not draw up any guidelines.

The degree of centralisation of each party (according to the description outlined in Chapter 2) is presented in Table 6.1:

Table 6.1: The 'Locus of Selection' in Four African Parties ('Official Story')

Degree of Centralisation (Bille)	Parties
1 (Highly Centralised)	Swapo; Congress of Democrats
2	ANC National List
3	
4	ANC Provincial Lists; Democratic Alliance
5	
6 (Highly Decentralised)	
Total	

Though the categories represent ideal types of centralisation, we can still fit our parties fairly easily to the classification of centralisation developed by Bille (2001: 367). The two Namibian parties are, on paper, the most centralised of parties, while the two South African parties display more variation. We have broken the ANC list into two separate components – the provincial lists and national list. The characterisation of selection presented in Table 6.1, however, is somewhat crude: specifically, it says very little about the degree of inclusion at each 'locus' of selection; and the different levels of involvement of the party leader. Accordingly, we draw on a further measures of inclusion mentioned in Chapter 2. Figure 6.1 provides some further detail on how we could consider the role of party leader and whether selectorates are nominated or consist of elected party delegates. Figure 6.2 provides greater detail on the 'inclusiveness' of the selectorate at each 'locus' of selection. In describing the level of inclusion, of course, we are faced with a problem: party constitutions say very little about the extent to which internal party groups are represented in selection procedures. To the extent that they are described, we fit them to a scale based on the measure of inclusiveness developed by Hazan and Rahat (2006: 112):

Figure 6.1: The Locus of Selection

General Electorate   Party Members   Selected Party Agency   Nominating Committee   Party Leader

Inclusive   Exclusive

Democratic Alliance
ANC National and Provincial List
Congress of Democrats
Swapo

Figure 6.2: The Inclusiveness of the Selectorate

All groups   One group

Inclusive   Exclusive

Democratic Alliance
Congress of Democrats

ANC National and Provincial

Swapo

6.3 The 'Real Story' of Selection Dimension I: The Locus and Inclusivity of the Selectorate

In this section, we reconstruct the selection of parliamentary candidates in each of our parties according to what actually happened in the 2004 selection process. We evaluate the extent to which the 'real story' of selection differed to the 'official story'. In our reconstruction of each selection process, we examine, first, how centralised the selection process, beginning with the involvement of the lowest party organ (the branch), moving upwards describing the involvement of each tier of the party organisation (regional, provincial, national structures and so on). We also look at the involvement of sectional groups, such as trade union movement and party affiliates, if any. In the second section (6.5), we turn to the qualities that were sought by the party selectorate(s). In each of these two sections, we describe – if relevant and to the extent possible – whether votes were cast to separate aspirant candidates into successful candidates.

ANC: The Provincial Lists of Candidates

The ANC list process began at branch level in July 2003. Every member of the ANC, in each branch throughout the country, had the right to participate in, and compete for, parliamentary candidacy. Nomination by branch members of parliamentary candidates took place at a specially convened meeting, or at the 'Branch General Meeting'. Before a branch can decide on candidates, a quorum of members must be present (50% + 1). The procedure used is quite simple: as each person (meetings also permit entry to non-members) enter the room, a branch official checks membership cards against the list of members. Party members in good standing are noted as present and before the meeting is convened a count is conducted to see whether the requisite number of members is present. Names are then voted on and if a majority support nomination of that individual, their name is included on the list. Branches are not required to nominate a set number of candidates for each list. The process, in practice, was highly formalised. The party national executive sent a senior party figure to each province to oversee the list process. We have no data that describe levels of attendance at these meetings across branches, though all party figures and officials asserted that virtually all active branches (that is, with at least 100 members) in the Western Cape held annual general meetings to nominate parliamentary candidates, although branches 'sometimes' did not reach a quorum and were required to convene additional meetings.

In November 2005, we visited an Annual General Meeting of an ANC branch in Clanwilliam, West Coast Region in the Western Cape province, along with the 'local' MP.

Observation of the meeting was instructive: when we arrived at the venue, it was deserted but following a short trip to the local township, where the MP contacted local organisers, a reasonably large number of people were encouraged to attend. The meeting had been convened to nominate candidates for the (second order) Local Authority elections of 2006.[1] At the Clanwilliam meeting, though there were sixty-three people in the room, the branch chairperson ruled that a quorum had not been reached (only thirteen of the branch's one hundred and six members were present) and the proposed schedule of events was cancelled. This particular meeting was the fifth attempt by the branch to hold the required meeting. This incident, though possibly isolated, would suggest fading interest by the ANC rank-and-file in the quotidian affairs of party life but it also indicates the extent to which the party rules are respected and applied within the organisation, even in second-order elections. We also interviewed four ordinary branch members from separate branches in the Western Cape who confirmed strict compliance with party rules at annual general meetings.

Once branches have nominated candidates, these lists are forwarded to regional and provincial structures. To proceed to the next stage of selection, a candidate must receive nomination from no fewer than five branches in the region. Of the candidates we spoke to – both successful and unsuccessful – none pointed to this stage as a significant hurdle to 'serious' candidates (Interview with Wittering). In addition to this direct input onto the list process, however, branches also exerted a more powerful, though indirect, influence through participation at provincial electoral colleges which determined the names and raking of all candidates on the provincial lists. The number of branch delegates that attend list conferences was determined by the size of branch membership. Unless conferred 'special recognition' by the provincial party leadership, an ANC branch must have at least one hundred members to be considered 'in good standing'. If a branch meets this requirement, it is entitled to send two delegates to the provincial electoral college. For every additional fifty members, they are entitled to an extra delegate. No branch can send more than five delegates. Participation – in at least a nominal sense – by South Africans, then, in the ANC list process is quite substantial – just under one in a hundred citizens were members (in good standing) of the ANC in 2003.

The nomination process at branch-level lasted just under three months, closing in September 2003. At this stage, the lists of aspirant candidates were made public in order to provide ANC members with an opportunity to raise objections about specific candidates. Objections to aspirant candidates were considered by a committee appointed by the party provincial leadership. This 'list committee' adjudicated on the applicability of all candidates. The criteria by which ANC members, at this early stage, are considered unfit to stand centre

[1]Maxwell Moss topped the provincial list in the Western Cape province.

on formal candidacy requirements: the absence of criminal record, history of corruption or ill discipline, breaches of the ANC code of conduct or non-payment of membership dues (ANC 2003: 2). Following initial screening of the lists by each list committee, and voluntary withdrawal of candidacy by nominees, a second draft list was prepared for presentation at the provincial electoral colleges where delegates met to rank-order by ballot all candidates (Interview with Gabru).

Following short delays in some provinces, all provincial electoral colleges were held in late October 2003. Like the process at lower levels, the provincial electoral college is conducted strictly according to the party rulebook. A Provincial List Coordinator was in charge of the process and a deployee from the party's executive committee oversaw proceedings. Delegates from party branches constituted at least 90% of the assembled delegates. The party affiliates contributed the remaining 10%. List coordinators checked names nominated by branches to ensure they were properly accredited. Before conferences opened, list committees provided a formal report to delegates and delegates were given an opportunity to raise concerns or discuss the report. All in all, the process seemed to unfold more or less as the rulebook indicated. Delegates to provincial electoral colleges rank-ordered candidates using a variant of the 'approval' voting system. The format of elections at provincial electoral colleges was simple enough. Elections were held by secret ballot and delegates were asked to vote for a set number of candidates from a list of candidates (often quite a long list. with sometimes over a hundred names, depending on the province). In each province, an estimation was made by the list committees about the number of votes each delegate could cast – usually twice the number of delegates required to be elected. For instance in the Western Cape (WC) the list committee thought it likely that approximately ten candidates would be sent to parliament from the WC provincial list, so twenty candidates were selected at the Western Cape electoral colleges. Following registration each delegate was given an appropriate number of votes – in the form of small yellow stickers – and all stickers were equally weighted (Interview with Magau).

It is the provincial electoral colleges that ANC delegates exert real, though indirect, control over the selection of parliamentary candidates. Delegates from party branches must constitute the overwhelming majority of assembled delegates and if support at this stage is offered to a political figure, it is (in theory) all but impossible to demote this individual at a later stage of the process. In the Western Cape, at least, this expectation seems to be borne out in reality. According to a member of the Provincial leadership in the Western Cape, which elected the list committee, the latter body is 'quite a neutral agency' and 'doesn't intervene too much', except to ensure that every third candidate is female. Broadly, this claim can be supported empirically by comparing the 2003 draft list of Western Cape

provincial candidates before and after intervention by the list committee – the identity of candidates that occupied all safe seats was exactly the same, with minor changes to rank-ordering (on grounds of sex).[2]

There is further indirect evidence which points to the important role played by ordinary ANC members (through branch delegates). The power of delegates to 'punish' unpopular incumbents at list conferences is reflected in electoral turnover, particularly in provincial list nominations where members of provincial governments must retain broad-based party support. In the large province of Gauteng, party rank-and-file endorsed the provincial leadership by returning all members of the province's governing executive council. Delegates to the Free State provincial electoral colleges, in contrast, voted out all but one member of the executive council. The support of delegates, then, at provincial electoral colleges is often necessary if a party member is to win election to the National Assembly – it is, according to a member of the ANC executive committee, 'very difficult to engineer a [candidate's] presence [on the electoral list] if there is not significant ANC branch level support'. Candidates from all factions of the alliance repeated this argument. One senior party member argues that 'if you are popular [among branches], you will get in; if you are more borderline, you might get displaced' but the list committee only intervenes if there's a 'skewed result' (Interview with Jeffries). It is, according to a senior party figure, delegates to these electoral colleges that 'decide what happens in the ANC' (Interview with Gabru).

Before we look at how the national list is constructed, we turn to the involvement of the 'inclusiveness' of the ANC selection process in the construction of provincial lists. On paper, we recall, party affiliates made up 10% of delegates at the nine provincial list conferences. Included among these delegates were some of the major factional groupings within the ANC. Some of these groups are organised within the ANC structure – for instance, the ANC Youth and Women's Leagues – but there is also considerable formal involvement by the ANC affiliates which lie outside the trunk of the ANC organisational structure, specifically the trade union organisation, the Congress of South African Trade Unions and the South African Communist Party. The involvement of COSATU and the SACP in the ANC list process is highly significant for both sides.

From the perspective of the alliance members (COSATU and the SACP), inclusion within the ANC provides extensive formal access to government decision-making that is denied to all other groups in society, including representatives of capital. Inclusion within the ANC electoral list is the centrepiece of this relationship (Interview with Carrim). On paper,

[2] We were unable to conduct this 'before-after' comparison with other lists. Only the Western Cape released the results of its electoral college.

SACP and COSATU involvement is minimal – limited to 10% of delegates – and decreasing (from a 'quota' of 20% of delegates in 1994).[3] SACP members, too, feature more heavily in the early years of democracy – according to an SACP national executive member over sixty members (or just under one-quarter of all ANC MPs) were members of the SACP. This level has certainly dropped in recent years, though it is difficult to evaluate whether the SACP involvement in the list process has decreased. This disproportionately heavy influence of the SACP in the early years was due, in the main, not to any formal agreement between ANC and SACP structures, but rather was achieved 'on the basis of their [SACP MPs] popularity within the ANC' (Interview with Carrim). Nonetheless, there is an informal level of SACP and COSATU involvement in the provincial list processes that is not picked up in the 'official story'. According to senior members of the SACP and COSATU, there is, almost always, a presence by both affiliates on provincial electoral colleges.

It is difficult, then, to categorise precisely the 'inclusiveness' of the ANC selectorate at the provincial level. The degree of inclusiveness at the provincial level has certainly changed since 1994: in the 1990s, 20% of delegates to list conferences were drawn from affiliates. In 2004, this involvement was decreased to 10%. According to a range of sources, competition for a place on the list was also significantly higher in later elections compared to 1994. This can probably be attributed to greater tensions within the Alliance on matters of government policy, and a scramble by self-interested party members to access (and defend) positions of great prestige and considerable financial reward (Interview with Carrim; Feinstein 2007: 81). That is not to say, however, that the provincial list process is becoming more exclusive – there is, as we just noted, an affiliate presence on provincial list committees. We would surmise, however, that the continued prevalence of SACP and COSATU members within the ANC parliamentary body, however, has less to do with the demands of the 'selectorate' and rather more to do with the large numbers of COSATU and SACP members who are also members of the ANC. This influence, in turn, should percolate through delegates to the electoral colleges.

The provincial list process in the ANC, then, happened largely as outlined in the selection guidelines. Affiliate involvement is strong, though mostly as a result of a strong overlap in ANC and affiliate membership, and the effective locus of control lay with an elected assembly of branch-level delegates in each province. The list committee – which also represented a broad cross-section the ANC affiliates, including women's and youth league

[3] In 1994, this 'secondment' of COSATU notables was done at the behest of the ANC who felt there was an insufficient number of well-known activists in the country at the time (Interview with Olifant; Feinstein 2007).

representatives – did not have a decisive influence over the construction of the list in the Western Cape.

ANC: The National List of Candidates

In addition to the selection of 200 'provincial' candidates, the ANC also drafted a list of 200 'national' candidates at a conference in Boksburg on November 21 2003. Approximately 800 people attended the Conference, with 90% of delegates drawn from party branches, and the remaining 10% taken from party affiliates and alliance partners. In 2004, a national 'list committee' appointed by the party national executive guided the national list process. The national list committee contained eight members, including its spokesperson, Mpho Lekgoro. The 2003/04 committee members included: Secretary General, Kgalema Motlanthe; NEC member and Mayor of Johannesburg, Amos Masondo; Women's League Treasurer-General and NEC member, Bertha Gxowa; SACP Central Committee and NEC member, Brian Bunting; Government Minister, SACP Central Committee National Chairperson and NEC member, Charles Nqakula; Government Deputy Minister and NEC member, Lindiwe Sisulu; Youth League Secretary General and NEC member, Fikile Mbalula; and NEC member Ruth Mompati The national list committee was a relatively new body, which was created at the ANC National Conference in Mafikeng in 1997. The list committee comprised, in theory, a body of senior members 'who would not be [personally] interested in the elections' (Interview with Asmal). Their task was to oversee the process and intervene in the process to ensure 'balance' in the overall composition [of the list], but who would also help 'ensure electoral processes do not tear the movement apart' (ANC 2003).

The list committee played the lead role in the drafting of the national list. Prominent ANC members who were close to the members of the list were, by some insider accounts, subjected to intense lobbying by aspirant candidates and their supporters (Feinstein 2007: 81). The role of the list committee, on paper, was to provide a draft list that would be ratified by an assembly of elected delegates, the National List Conference. The format of the national electoral colleges differed significantly to provincial electoral colleges, although the composition of both bodies was, in broad strokes, similar. The national electoral colleges featured delegates from the party national executive, branch-level delegates, delegates from all key affiliates and partners, as well as from the Youth and Women's League. The list of candidates that was presented to delegates, however, was ordered in advance and no vote was taken at any stage on the placement of candidates. The list featured approximately 1,000 names – any candidate that received support from at least three provinces was nominated to the national list. The format of the conference was straightforward: the list was discussed

name-by-name with any objection raised by a delegate considered by the list committee. Of course, it is difficult to see how any objection could have been discussed in any detail – there were approximately 800 delegates and no formalized method for raising an objection. Agreement was quickly reached on the electoral list – all told, the discussion lasted approximately three hours, which according to a participant at the conference was surprisingly quick. This process seemed designed, in part at least, to limit popular intervention in the rank-ordering of candidates and focus control over the list in the hands of the list committee. A senior SACP official rejected this suggestion arguing that 'it wasn't like the ANC leadership brought in people to rubber-stamp the list'. Instead, he found the national list to be broadly representative of different streams in the organisation and, generally, 'very fair, very balanced, and where amendments were made they were made consensually with a lot of give-and-take'. Asked whether a voted-upon list would have looked different to the actual list, Carrim opined that while the ordering might have been slightly different the overall list would have been broadly similar.

The final decision over the national and provincial lists of candidates was made by the ANC national executive. According to one participant at the (three-day) meeting which discussed the list, a good many cases for intervention were made and support for a proposed change to the list needed substantial support from the assembled delegates. Few interviewees, however, were willing to discuss the national list in any great depth. The confidentiality of the meetings is treated, officially, like cabinet confidentiality.[4] This in all probability reflects a bias in the methodology of the project. In spite of our best efforts, we were only able to speak with three members of the national executive committee and a single member of a provincial executive committee. We suspect that the key decisions taken with respect to the ordering of the national list were made informally between leading provincial and national leaders. Even if these four members were willing to disclose fully their experience of the national-level process, we have missed out on a great deal and backroom politicking, conducted away from media scrutiny, would explain the easy passage of the suggested list. This would be in line with how decisions are often taken within the ANC – after all, prior to 2004, only a single president in the organisation's history has contested the position at party elections. Nonetheless, we do not need to know all the ins-and-outs of the construction of the list to argue that compared to the provincial lists, the national list was a good deal more centralised. In the final analysis, no vote was taken by the delegates that attended the national electoral colleges.

[4] While this is the case on paper, in reality the ANC national executive has suffered a persistent stream of leaks, even while the meeting is in session. According to the *Mail and Guardian* (September 18, 2008), all members have their telephones taken from them as they enter the meeting.

But is that to say that only a few actors were involved in the national list process? A decentralised method of selection, as Hazan and Rahat (2006: 112) underline, need not be highly inclusive: a single party notable in each electoral area could choose candidates; conversely, a broad cross-section of the party could choose the candidates at the national level. How inclusive was the ANC selection process at the national level? In 2004, the composition of the national list committee was quite broad, including figures from both party affiliates (Women's and Youth Leagues), as well as from an alliance partner, the South African Communist Party. There was no specific representative from the Congress of South African Trade Unions. The composition of this crucial segment of the ANC 'selectorate', one might argue, reflects a deeper change in the distribution of power with the tripartite alliance – away from the partners and towards the ANC proper. This, however, is not entirely the case: Mr. Motlanthe attended the national list committee as ANC Secretary-General, but he was also a prominent trade unionist. ANC affiliate membership, in addition, contains a high degree of overlap which, as we noted in the case of the provincial list conferences, probably increased COSATU involvement in the process. The prominence of the SACP is also difficult to interpret – it might be argued that their prominence can be attributed, in part at least, to the enduring relevance of the communist critique in a divided society, but it might be the case that senior ANC figures who *happen* to be SACP members were elected in large numbers. According to the Deputy Secretary-General of the SACP, who is also a member of the ANC national executive, the involvement of the SACP in the ANC list process occurs at both an informal and formal level. Formally, the SACP have a 'presence' on the national list committee. Informally, there is a 'sensitivity [among ANC leaders] that there are some senior SACP personalities playing an active role in the ANC list'. The national list process of the ANC, then, is a good deal more centralised and exclusive than the provincial list processes. Unlike the provincial list conference, however, the national list process deviates from the 'official story': the list is determined by a list committee and ratified by an assembly. In each province, on the contrary, the elected delegates vote for their preferred candidate. Inclusion of affiliates in the process, however, is significant: 'the ANC process of selection', according to Cherry and Southall (2006: 88–9), 'entails quite a participatory process whereby party regional and provincial structures conduct their own internal elections to draw up lists of their preferred candidates (although these are subsequently mediated by the ANC central to ensure adequate representation of women and demographic minorities).' The process, more so than any other party in this study, is organizationally complex (including structured and important participation from all party structures), highly formalized and, in the final analysis, more nuanced than critics of

the party might be willing to believe. ANC branches, in theory and practice, exert a strong level of control over provincial lists of candidates and there is little evidence to suggest – in the Western Cape particularly – that the ANC provincial leadership buck the demands of this more decentralised selectorate. The centrality of branch level involvement makes this stage of the process inevitably 'unwieldy and cumbersome' but, according to an otherwise trenchant critic of the centralising tendencies of the ANC, this stage of the list process is also 'profoundly democratic' (Feinstein 2007: 81). ANC leaders, of course may well be able to 'redeploy' MPs once elected, but it is very hard to keep a popular candidate off the party electoral list.

It seems that much of the criticism of the ANC list process is, in fact, aimed primarily at the national level process (see, for instance, Gouws and Mitchell 2005: 366). Kenneth Good – another trenchant critic of South Africa's 'aristocrats of the revolution' – argues that PR-List in South Africa delivers 'profound anti-democratic effects' (1997: 557).[5] This criticism seems misplaced with respect to the provincial road to parliament, but it holds some water if applied to the national route. On paper, the manner in which the provincial and national lists were constructed seems similar in all essential features, but this is not the case. The selection process that nominated candidates to the ANC's national list is different in kind, rather than degree, with significantly less popular involvement from party structures. Delegates to the national list conference did not elect aspirant candidates to the national list. Instead, the national list committee presented a pre-ranked list of candidates to the assembled delegates, which was approved with some modifications.

The Democratic Alliance: A Provincial List of Candidates

Our reconstruction of the DA selection process focuses on the Western Cape. The Western Cape (WC) is not the region that sends the most DA candidates to the National Assembly (Gauteng sent seventeen out of fifty MPs to the NA), but the WC selection process was the easiest, and arguably the most interesting, region to study. The Western Cape sent eleven MPs to the National Assembly – the highest among any party, including the ANC, in this province. In the Western Cape, the Democratic Alliance provincial organisation is divided between three regions – the Eastern, Western, and Metro regions. In the mostly rural Eastern and Western regions, the New National Party were most powerful, while the Metro area (surrounding Cape Town) was dominated by the Democratic Party. Consequently, the

[5] This view is also common among media commentators: see, for instance, *Business Day* October 21, 2005 or *Business Day* September 25, 2003.

Democratic Alliance selection process faced its sternest test in the Western Cape, as the potential for discord was strongest. (We return to this point in Chapter 7.)

The DA list process is highly formalised. First, each aspirant candidate was required to fill out an application form registering their candidacy, which in turn was evaluated by two bodies. The precise identity of these bodies depended on the individual: MPs, for instance, were evaluated by the leader of the parliamentary caucus, councillors by the regional leadership, ordinary members by the branch leadership and so on (Interview with Doman). All candidates, in addition, were interviewed by an interview board elected by each Region's Executive Committee. Members of the regional interview boards varied from region to region, and province to province. In the Metro region, the group comprised people 'who represented different areas and interest groups [in the region]'. The details of each application were also forwarded to a 'sort of probity committee' in national party structures where candidates were checked to ensure they were tax complaint, in good financial standing, and without a criminal record' (Interview with Robinson). The point of this evaluation stage was to 'allow candidates to sell your wares, and they [interviewers] could ask you intensive questions'. According to one participant, however, 'it got abused, in the sense of trying to screen people out on ideological grounds; it was supposed to screen people out on competence grounds' (Interview with Selfe).

Unlike in other provinces, the DA in the Western Cape did not convene regional electoral colleges. In Gauteng, in contrast, there were three separately held electoral colleges and the candidates that emerged from these regional processes 'were slotted into the provincial list in pre-determined order' (Interview with Selfe). In other areas, such as KwaZulu Natal, there was a single provincial electoral college. Clearly then the size of the province, in either geographic terms or size of electoral support, determined the likelihood of the DA holding regional electoral colleges. As we have seen, the party rulebook envisaged that each region would be responsible for selecting a fixed number of delegates to attend the provincial electoral colleges. No more than one hundred delegates and no fewer than forty delegates were to attend a provincial electoral college. The assembled college, in turn, was to elect an executive committee to direct proceedings.

The provincial electoral colleges of the Western Cape was convened in February, 2003. There were sixty delegates to the college – fifteen from both the Eastern and Western regions, and thirty from the Metro region. The number of delegates that attended the college contravened somewhat party guidelines, which stipulated that the number of delegates must be in accordance with the size of party support in the regions. At the time, the Metro region commanded two-thirds of both the DA vote and party membership in the province. As at the

regional stage of the selection process, the provincial electoral college also contained a body to interview aspirant candidates. Unlike at the regional stage, the provincial interview board consisted of 'professional labour recruiters', who were 'used to asking the right questions' (Interview with Selfe). This body allowed each candidate to 'promote their candidacy through a speech' and asked detailed questions of each candidate. The most commonly asked questions, according to one participant, concerned track record, if any, of party activity and 'how much money have you raised for the party' (Interview with Knott). Each interviewee was graded by the panel of interviewers and the marks were displayed to the assembled delegates. After the interview stage, delegates voted for candidates. The election system was complicated. First, each candidate cast a single ballot for their preferred candidate. These ballots were counted and candidates were ranked according to popularity. This provisional list was then divided into 'batches' of seven – from the seven most popular candidate in the first batch, to the seven least popular delegates in the final batch. Delegates then voted once more, casting an ordinal vote to indicate preference. The quota required of a successful candidate was calculated according to the Droop formula. Each batch of candidates was then voted on once again using precisely the same system. According to one participant, the electoral college was 'an ideal system that put candidates through a rigorous process to show their worth' and was, in general, 'very democratic' (Interview with Doman). According to another participant it was 'very fair' and militated against domination by any single grouping (Interview with Swart). According to an unsuccessful candidate, the process 'built legitimacy' by 'giving people the sense of going through the process' (Interview with Caroline).

The provincial list process in the Western Cape, then, took place largely as planned. The system was highly formalised and voting took place at an electoral college of branch-level delegates from each of the province's three regions. There was no formal or informal involvement by party affiliates or social groups in the process.

Swapo: The National List of Candidates

In Swapo, selection of parliamentary candidates to contest the 2004 general elections began at the branch level. The involvement of popular organs of the party is marginal – just over 20% of delegates to the national electoral college are taken from lower levels of the party. Within each of Namibia's thirteen administrative provinces, party members select five delegates at a provincial conference. Two of these delegates appeared as candidates on the ballot paper at the national electoral college. In the 2004 contest, this process began at each party branch.

In each of Namibia's thirteen provinces, the first structured phase of the selection process begins at the level of the district, when delegates from district branches meet to nominate candidates for selection at the provincial conference (Interview with Dinyando).[1] According to one member of a provincial executive, it is common for party structures at district level to nominate three to five delegates to attend the provincial conference (in proportion to the size of membership). Minutes of the meeting at district level are taken and forwarded, to ensure 'the process is transparent' (Interview with Kaiyoma). In the Khomas and Kavango regions an identical process took place – party structures at the district level select delegates to a provincial conference where five delegates, including two aspirant candidates, are selected to attend the national electoral college (Interview with Dinyando, Interview with Kaiyoma). This process seems to be, more or less, exactly the same across Namibia's thirteen provinces.

In 2004, each province sent five delegates to the national conference, two of whom were eligible candidates. In order to select these five individuals, each province held a selection conference. Although the number of people attending each provincial conference is a function of population and Swapo membership, the number seems to rarely exceed ninety people. At the Oshana provincial conference, for instance, there were approximately eighty to ninety party members present to select the province's five national delegates. At the provincial conference, the number of participants is sufficiently small to allow each aspirant candidate to address the wider body of delegates outlining the central planks of their candidacy. The gathered assembly of delegates then debates the merits of each aspirant candidate. The process is both highly formal – party procedures are strictly observed – and highly competitive. The first point of contact that national structures have with provincial candidates occurs at the initial 'screening' stage. Each provincial delegate is reviewed by the party's steering committee and deemed eligible or ineligible. According to one member of the steering committee, it is very rare for candidates to be deemed ineligible. If candidates are considered ineligible, it is generally because they are not members 'in good standing' or have a criminal record (Interview with Nandi-Ndaitwah). According to a member of a provincial executive, 'most of the time it [screening] is a formality' (Interview with Kaiyoma).

[1] There are six to twelve constituencies in each region, depending on the population size.

The national electoral college, convened in early October 2004, comprised one hundred and eight seven delegates drawn from the following party structures, wings and affiliates:[2]

- All members of the Swapo parliamentary caucus of the National Assembly;
- All members of the Swapo national executive;
- Sixty-five regional delegates (each of the thirteen provinces sent five delegates apiece);
- Seven delegates from the Swapo Youth League;
- Ten delegates from the Swapo Women's Council;
- Six delegates from the Swapo Elder's Council; and
- Three delegates from the National Union of Namibian Workers.

Of these one hundred and eight seven delegates, one hundred and nineteen were included within what is known among Swapo cadres as the 'pot' of aspirant candidates. The only delegates that were granted candidacy included the twenty-six provincial delegates (two from each region), as well as all sitting Swapo MPs and national executive members.

The process of selection was time-consuming, lasting according to one MP 'nearly the whole night'. The ballot sheet listed all one hundred and nineteen candidates in alphabetical order. Each delegate was able to cast seventy-two votes – one for each position on the electoral list to be filled. In fact, the manner of voting was more or less identical to provincial list conferences in the ANC – delegates were given a ballot sheet and seventy-two small yellow stickers to place alongside their preferred candidates. (Interview with Dinyando; Interview with Nehova). Delegates were not allowed to cast more than a single vote for any candidate, and delegates did not need to cast all seventy-two votes. In the 2004 national electoral college, one hundred and eight seven delegates delegates cast a total of 7,288 'votes', which indicates that the median delegate placed a sticker beside thirty-nine names, or just over half of their votes.

The voting results in the national electoral college determined the placing of the majority of aspirant candidates on the Swapo electoral list. Unlike other political parties, however, the role of the Swapo leader is quite pronounced in the selection process. In 2004, the president of the party had the right to select ten candidates that were supposed to be placed within the first thirty-

[2] There were fifty-five incumbent Swapo MPs and forty-one members of the party national executive who were not also MPs. We do not list the figures in our outline, as there was considerable overlap between the members of both bodies. The relevant figure, arguable, is the number of participants drawn from outside the national executive, or who were not incumbents.

six positions on the party list (Swapo Procedures for Elections). On paper, this rather unusual provision within Swapo procedures seems to be related directly to the semi-presidential nature of executive-legislative relations in Namibia, where the directly-elected President must appoint his cabinet from among the ranks of the lower house of parliament. 'Swapo Procedures for Elections' stipulates that an objective of the selection process is to acknowledge 'the need for the president of the Republic of Namibia to compose a strong team to constitute cabinet'. The president is not required to select aspirant candidates that attended the electoral congress, but rather can select any party member that would otherwise be eligible according to party rules. Combined with the (state) president's right to nominate six *ex officio* members to the National Assembly, this provides the president with a direct input into the election of over one-fifth of the (popular) chapter of parliament.

The selection process within Swapo, then, took place largely as the 'official story' indicated. The vast majority (80%) of delegates to the national electoral college were either incumbents or individuals drawn from the party national executive. The level of involvement by the trade union group was virtually non-existent (1%), and the number of branch-level delegates was much smaller than in other parties (35%). Women's league, youth league and the elder's council each sent a small number of delegates (12%). The party president, too, had the power to select ten of the top twelve names on the electoral list. The presidential scope for intervention was, as we have seen, much reduced in the 2004 selection process – pared down from automatic placement of the first 30 candidates in 1994 and 1999, to selection in 2004 of ten candidates with ranking of the list carried out by the party steering committee. In 2004, the steering committee ranked the president's ten candidates, contrary to party procedure, between number twenty-one and number thirty-seven on the list (all safe seats). This trend points to a gradual process of devolution of central power within the party from president to the party national executive steering committee, even though the locus of selection remained at the national level.[3]

The Congress of Democrats: The National List of Candidates

In CoD, the selection of candidates began in the branches of party members throughout the country. Like in the ANC, there is a premium placed on the role of the 'grassroots' membership,

[3] Though reports of the balance of power between Swapo president and steering committee are scarce, there are at least three known incidents in the past number of years when senior party figures prevailed over the party president. First, Dr. Nujoma was dissuaded from running for a fourth term as state president (see *The Namibian* April 16, 2004.). Second, the steering committee insisted that there would be an internal party election to determine Nujoma's successor (see *The Namibian* May 7 2004). Finally, the party president could do little to prevent the forced departure of key supporter, Paulus Kapia (*The Namibian* October 28 2005).

which is supposed to exert its influence through the basic unit of organisation, the branch. It is, therefore, not at all surprising that the branch is charged with some responsibility for candidate selection although the level of involvement of each branch is minimal. The executive of each branch delegates a variable number of representatives (in proportion to the size of their membership) to attend 'constituency assemblies' – an annual meeting of all branches within an electoral district. It is at these meetings that candidates for all tiers of election, including National Assembly elections, are nominated. Meetings are quite informal and 'usually take place at someone's house'. It is rare that more than two to three candidates (for election to the National Assembly) are proposed at the 'constituency assembly' (Interview with ordinary party member, Khomas Region; Interview with Mutandere). The role of the branch, however, is quite unimportant beyond the basic hurdle presented to each aspiring candidate to receive support from at least one branch. Unlike in the ANC, where the support of five branches across a province is required, in the CoD the number of nominations that each party member receives from branches across the province makes no difference to the rank-ordering of candidates in the final provincial cut of the electoral list. Once Constituency Assemblies have nominated candidates, the list of nominees is sent to the provincial executive committee in each of Namibia's provinces.[4]

The provincial executive committee is responsible for carrying out the decisions of the provincial conference, which is the highest structure of the CoD in each province. A provincial conference is held at least once a year and attended by branch delegates chosen in proportion to the number of party members in each branch. Delegates are also sent from each region's Women's Organisation (two representatives) and Youth Organisation (two representatives). Each provincial executive contains a Chairperson, Deputy Chairperson, Secretary, Deputy Secretary Treasurer and a maximum of six other members. Each provincial structure deliberates over the list of names received from each constituency assembly and decides on a list of three names that are then sent to the office of the Secretary General, who in turn passes the list to the national list committee.

At this stage of the selection process, the party Constitution is mute with respect to how candidates are selected. The consensus among interviewees is that each of the fifteen provincial executive deliberates and decides on a list of three names who are on each province's list of

[4] Although Namibia is divided into thirteen regions, the CoD have fifteen regional structures. Because of the size of Kunene and Oshikoto, both of these regions are divided into two parts even though party support in these regions is quite small (Interview with Dienda).

candidates. The provincial executive then convenes a provincial electoral college to provide formal ratification of the suggested list, which is then sent to the national structures. According to one MP, the provincial executive does not appear to always 'invite' delegates from all branches and the irregularity produced some friction among members. Part of the problem with the process, according to one senior party official, is that the process was 'a little hectic' with each region and party organ required to send a list of names in a very short time period (Interview with Shixwameni).

It is difficult to assess whether this stage of the selection process winnowed out any aspiring candidates. We tried to uncover the lists of candidates that were sent from each constituency assembly to each provincial executive, in order to compare the list before modification, if any, with the final list that was sent to the national structures. This, unfortunately, was not possible – the lists were simply not to be found.[5] Nevertheless, we can make some tentative statements concerning the importance of the provincial structures as a hurdle for future parliamentarians to jump. First, the CoD did not expect to send more than eleven to twenty members to Parliament (Interview with Shixwameni, Interview with Schimming Chase, Interview with Dienda; Interview with Namises). *All* candidates that appeared in the top twenty positions on the list were drawn from either the party national executive, the parliamentary caucus, party affiliates, and overlap was bound to occur between nominees from regional structures and nominees from other structures. While it is possible that some individuals who had exclusively regional power bases might have been excluded, this is highly unlikely. In interviews with many members of the party steering and detailed searches of newspaper holdings for the six months period before November 2004, as well as the three month period after the election, no mention was made of any senior (or even lowly) party member who failed to appear on the electoral list as a consequence of the selection process at the provincial stage.

As we have already discussed, the national party structures were intended to play a key role in the selection process. Specifically, the list of all nominees was supposed to have been sent to the office of the Chairperson for 'screening'; a final list was to have been sent to the national list committee and this body was to have constructed a fully ordered 'suggested' list to present to the party national conference for ratification. Of course, the 'real story' of the selection process was quite different. First, neither the national conference nor the party national executive played

[5] This was after a search through party records by the office of the Secretary-General in 2005.

any role in the process. According to the Secretary General at the time, an unordered list of names of more than seventy-eight names was presented to the combined provincial and national leaderships. The purpose of this exercise was to allow party figures to object to the inclusion of any candidates on the list. There were no objections. The list was then sent to the national executive for finalisation (rank-ordering) but the national executive did not meet. The task of rank-ordering the list was delegated to the smaller steering committee. At the first meeting of the steering committee, a smaller committee (the national list committee) was appointed to make recommendations on *how* the list would be rank ordered (criteria of ordering) and to propose a suggested list. The list committee comprised five members – the Secretary General, the National Chairperson, a senior party member, and two 'outsiders'. The second meeting of the steering committee, with a list of criteria that would guide the rank-ordering of candidates as well as a suggested electoral list submitted by the national list committee, met on Thursday October 7th, the night before parties were required to submit their electoral list to the Electoral Commission of Namibia.

During this crucial meeting, which lasted for 'hours and hours', two separate lists were proposed – the first by the list committee and the second by the party president.[6] The president's 'list of favourites' was dismissed almost out of hand for a couple of reasons. First, the President's list elevated many relatively unknown party members to high positions and demoted senior members, which undermined the credibility of the proposal in the eyes of many of his colleagues at the meeting. Second, participants argued that as the president had not been 'mandated' to construct a list, it should not be even considered. It seems that this second argument was decisive. It is not entirely apparent what the president was trying to do with his alternative list – one participant and close ally of the President felt the list sent out a message of considerable humility, underlined by the lowly position allotted to the party president.[7] Such was the unorthodox composition of the list that another participant felt the president was 'just trying to be funny [sic]'. The rapid rejection of the president's list indicates that the president's control over the rank-ordering of the list was minimal – in effect his input was about as significant as any other ordinary participant in the steering committee.

The criteria laid out by the national list committee, which formed the basis of the initial list, provided the fundamental guidelines of the rank-ordering process. The national list committee rank-ordered thirty of the candidates and left the remaining names untouched as to

[6] The President was not mandated by any party structure to propose a list.

[7] It is worth noting that the individual in question was in the relatively safe position of eleventh on the list.

rank-order the full list, according to one participant, would have been meaningless. The specific ordering of candidates on the list, however, proved to be unacceptable to some in the steering committee and it prompted sustained debate. While the specific ordering of names changed over the course of discussions, crucially, the criteria which guided the structuring of the initial list remained unchanged. Early in the discussion of the suggested list, an objection to the criteria of selection was made but overruled by a majority of participants. The National Chairperson – who had played a lead role in the drafting of the criteria – felt that his position had been undermined and wished to 'withdraw' from the electoral list. He was persuaded not to and the criteria chosen by the list committee remained in place.

It is, therefore, reasonable to say that the locus of control over the selection process lay firmly at the apex of the CoD's party structures, although not with the president. Effectively, the party steering committee, a body of eighteen senior party leaders, formed the 'selectorate' within the party. The input of both branch and provincial structures was little more than a shade above token – indeed when questioned on the role of the regional structures, the Secretary General (in 2004) felt that while increased inclusion of candidates from the regions would have been desirable, it would have 'compromised on quality [of the parliamentary caucus]' (Interview with Shixwameni). Hence, we can hardly attribute a bias in representation of peripheral party organs to 'demand' from the selectorate. It appears, in contrast, that bias (if any) is attributable to supply-side issues. Within the party steering committee, the key players included the Secretary General and National Chairperson who were primarily responsible for the construction of criteria of selection.

In terms of the centralisation of the selection process, there was significant deviation from the common understanding of how the party was to have chosen its candidates – neither the national conference nor the national executive committee played the role assigned to them by the party constitution. Instead, the 'locus' of control over candidate selection shifted up the chain of command towards the apex of the party. The consequences of this action, however, were to be felt with days – two sitting MPs resigned on the basis that the monopolization of the list process by central party organs was fundamentally 'undemocratic'. The 'real story' of selection that took place in 2004, then, was quite different and bore only a partial relation to the procedures established in the constitution. Final rank-ordering of candidates was performed by the party steering committee and the national conference played no role at all in the process. A national list committee was established, but their function was confined to outlining the criteria

which would guide the rank-ordering of the candidates. Branch and provincial structures were to play a part, although their involvement was never intended to be anything more than nominal. The names that were discussed by the party steering committee for inclusion on the list for the 2004 election (before ordering) were drawn from the following sources: each of the fifteen provincial structures in the party sent three names, both party affiliates sent four names apiece, sitting MPs automatically re-appeared, with the remainder filled from among the ranks of the national executive.

6.4 Who Selects? Four African Parties in Comparative Perspective

It is, at this stage, possible to begin to draw reasonably firm patterns about the centralisation of selection processes in our four African parties. Using the two classifications of the selection mechanism developed by Bille (2001: 367) and Hazan and Rahat (2006: 112), we present the 'real story' of candidate selection in Tables 6.3 and 6.4. Compared alongside the 'official story' (Tables 6.1 and 6.2), two patterns emerge. First, there is no difference – in any party – between the degree of centralisation depicted in the official party guidelines and the real story of selection (Table 6.1).

Table 6.2: The 'Locus of Selection' in Four African Parties ('Real Story')

Degree of Centralisation (Bille)	Parties
1 (Highly Centralised)	Swapo; Congress of Democrats
2	ANC National List
3	
4	ANC Provincial Lists; Democratic Alliance
5	
6 (Highly Decentralised)	
Total	

To some extent, this reflects the inadequacy of the Bille measure to capture a change in the 'locus' of selection, but the differences between the formal and actual version of events was reasonably small. In the Congress of Democrats, for instance, the list was chosen by the eighteen-member steering committee instead of being 'deliberated on and ratified' by an elected assembly. Did this deviation matter? Would the elected assembly, if asked, have chosen a different list? In all probability, it would have depended on the precise role played by the assembly. The ANC national list is ratified by an elected assembly of delegates, but in effect the body had few opportunities to buck the wishes of the selectorate. Had the CoD 'staged' something similar, it is likely that the list would have looked the same. The change (altered

parties are underlined) is captured by the first of the Hazan and Rahat (2006: 112) measures (see Figure 6.3).

Figure 6.3: The Locus of Selection



Second, and in contrast to our first pattern, there is a profound and significant change in the inclusiveness of the selection process when we compare the 'official' with the 'real' story of selection. These changes are apparent across all parties, with the exception of the Democratic Alliance (see Figure 6.4).

Figure 6.4: The Inclusiveness of the Selectorate

Parties also mixed levels of inclusion by sectoral interests. In Swapo, organised labour played a small role by sending delegates to the electoral college. In the ANC, organised labour also sent

delegates to selection conventions and staffed list committees with a labour nominee. In general, however, their influence seems in all likelihood to be strongest as a consequence of the overlap between ANC and COSATU membership.

Some, though not all, of our parties use highly centralised selection methods. The role of the party leader, first, was highest in the South African opposition party, and the Namibian ruling party. Swapo, indeed, present us with the strongest case of centralised intervention from the party leader: in 2004, the party president was directly responsible for the selection of ten out of fifty-five of the party's MPs. In The Democratic Alliance, a programmatic electoralist party, the party president choose the third, seventh, fourteenth and twenty-first (and so on) MP on each provincial list. This power, effectively, allowed Tony Leon to ensure a small coterie of handpicked individuals. In the Congress of Democrats, in contrast, we know the party president played a role that was no different to any other member of the steering committee – he proposed a list, but was overruled by party colleagues.

Significant levels of involvement by the party leader is not unheard of in other democracies. In Mexico, the leader of the Institutional Ruling Party selected all candidates for senate elections (Wuhs 2006: 33). In personalistic movement parties in Europe, too, the party leader plays a key role in the selection of candidates (Gallagher *et al.* 2005). More often, however, a small gathering of party notables played a defining role in the selection of party candidates. In the Congress of Democrats, contrary to the provisions of the party constitution, the steering committee acted as the party selectorate. The locus of selection, then, was very centralised but the make-up of the selectorate was broadly inclusive of all major tendencies in the party. Selection in the CoD offers, perhaps, a perfect example of selection by a camarilla of senior party leaders. In Swapo, too, an elected assembly of senior party figures – the majority either incumbents or members of the national executive – decided who would represent the party.

There are, again, parallels with other parties. 'Informal assemblies', as Rahat (2007: 161) describes such small groups of leaders, are important in other countries. Rahat, in particular, points to the part played by religious leaders in ultra-Orthodox Jewish parties, where selection is by a handful of key leaders. In Croatia, too, the party leader and a non-selected party agency controls candidate selection (Kasapovic, cited in Rahat 2007: 161). Selection in our parties, however, was not quite as centralised or exclusive as these political parties. The experience of our cases, in contrast, seems more open. Evidence from 'emerging' democracies, in contrast,

indicate that selection procedures tend to be quite exclusive, with very little evidence of control over selection by lower tiers of party structures (see Siavelis 2002 on Chile; Kasapovic 2001 on Croatia; Field 2006 on Spain; Moraes 2008 on Uruguay). Evidence from Latin America, in particular, points to highly centralised selection mechanisms among parties. In a study of thirteen 'parties of the left', only one used some form of primary to select candidates (Wuhs 2006). Even in Mexico, a case that is sometimes paraded as an example of greater inclusiveness, parties still retain control over parliamentary seats elected through proportional representation (Field and Siavelis 2008: 622).

That is not to say, however, that all our parties used centralised and exclusive selection mechanisms. In the Democratic Alliance the role of a few key factional leaders in the Western Cape seemed to prove pivotal, but there was extensive involvement by party delegates in the Western Cape. It is difficult to say exactly how much uncertainty was involved in the outcome of the electoral college, but a number of interviewees asserted the ability of factional groupings to marshal effectively the support of their membership and direct it according to a set plan. Nonetheless, this cannot be described as highly centralised selectorate. We know this, if for no other reason than the party leadership have been careful to monitor the validity of membership figures (which determines the number of delegates a branch sends to party conferences and electoral colleges). In the ANC national list process, the role of a number of key factions is pointed to as a pivotal in determining the identity of marginal candidates. Direct evidence sufficient to gauge the exact weight of involvement by the national list committee is unavailable, but we gathered some direct evidence to suggest that some candidates were 'saved' following intervention by the list committee. Interviews with national-level SACP figures also confirmed the importance of the national list committee. We also bracket the role of the ANC national list selectorate as selection by 'nonselected party agency' even though the list is approved formally by a convention of delegates.

Scope for central involvement by the ANC Provincial electoral colleges in each of the eleven provinces seem more restricted, at least in the Western Cape. When we place these types of committee-to-convention system alongside their European counterparts, there are some marked parallels: in each German province a small number of senior party figures in German parties propose a list of suitable candidates, which is then sent to lower echelons of party delegates for approval (Roberts 1988: 94–119). In Norway, as well, a similar process takes place with delegates meeting to adopt or modify a list prepared by a selection committee (Valen *et al.*

2002: 169–215). Half of all the ANC names submitted to the electoral commission represent to a large extent the will of the party delegates. In the Western Cape, at least, party committees at the provincial level were not willing to buck the preferences of the party delegates. Interestingly, the 'official story' – though not the 'real story' – of the CoD selection process looked a lot like the committee-to-convention system.

Above all else, perhaps, we found interesting the wide variation in selection mechanisms used across our four cases. Most countries, according to Rahat (2007: 165) tend to have similar techniques, which can be traced back to a 'dominant national culture' or simply a practice of one party imitating the next. In South Africa, the Democratic Alliance has a decentralised system that still allows the party leader a strong hand in the selection of the parliamentary caucus. The African National Congress, as we have seen, uses two largely separate selection processes that involves differing levels of centralisation. In Namibia, the Swapo selection process is highly centralised with 80% of the electoral college stacked with incumbents or members of the party national executive. The party president, too, is heavily involved in the process with a direct say over nomination of ten members. The Congress of Democrats, finally, was supposed to have done a little like the ANC national list process, though we can only speculate whether the elected delegates would have 'rubber-stamped' the list proposed by the list committee. As it happened, the CoD had arguably the most centralised of all processes – selection by the party steering committee.

6.5 The 'Real Story' of Selection II: The Characteristics of a 'Good' Candidate

A preponderance of the literature looking at candidate selection, as we mentioned in Chapter 2, deals with the centralisation of the selection procedure. A shorter space, usually, is dedicated to the different qualities that selectorates prioritise. To the extent that the characteristics of a 'good' candidate are examined, there seems to be an inclination that the type of characteristic viewed favourably by selectorates is closely related to the inclusiveness of the party selectorate. Rahat (2007: 166), in this vein, argues that 'highly inclusive [decentralised] methods make it hard to present balanced candidate slates that include representation of women, ethnic minorities and other social groups.' In this section, we look at the different priorities set by different selectorates both within and across our four cases in South Africa and Namibia.

ANC: The Provincial Lists of Candidates

The root demand of ANC selectors at the branch level is that MPs, if they wish to be re-nominated, must 'report back to the rank-and-file' and 'work for the ANC on a daily basis' (Interview with Branch Member, Clanwilliam). Successful candidates, according to an unsuccessful candidate, must 'not forget [their] roots...coming back to, and working for, [their] comrades' (Interview with Wittering). In order to ensure widespread support across party branches, aspirant candidates were expected to 'work hard going from branch to branch'. A prominent trade unionist and ANC MP, Daniel Olifant, maintains that contact with branches is essential: 'even if you don't give them good news it's vital just to get back. An MP from the Limpopo region warned that 'one mistake by comrades is that they don't go back and give reports. People are very forgiving but if you don't explain to them and they see you driving a 4*4 and drinking in a hotel not a shebeen and they have no water it can cause problems' (Interview with Maake). According to a prominent national parliamentarian, highly regarded for technocratic ability, it is 'easier [to secure renomination] when you're based in the province'. Working at national structures means member are less 'visible' and less able to attend ANC meetings.

Members, however, do not simply want to consult with their MPs. The majority of MPs underlined a consistent, indeed practically ubiquitous, demand by ANC members (as well as ordinary constituents) that MPs play the role of brokers, mediating between state and citizen. Typically, ANC MPs were asked to intervene to ensure more efficient 'service delivery', or even just to inform constituents of their rights. Branch members are also concerned with the 'struggle' credentials of a candidate: loyalty and sacrifice to the ANC during the apartheid years is strong currency. According to one member, discussions are predictable: 'people nominate a person from the floor and this nomination must be seconded; after this process is done we go through each person's particulars "who is she, what has she done, is she the right person, has she done anything in the past, is she an upstanding person in the community, do people look up to her" (Interview with ANC member). According to another (former) ANC MP 'it seems that for the majority of aspirant candidates, if they are to be placed highly on either electoral list, being 'widely known within ANC branches' is essential (Feinstein 2007: 82).

Debates, then, over the characteristics of a 'good' candiday tended to focus heavily on subjective qualities such as loyalty to the party and a consistent record of constituency service. Debates at the branch general meetings – and among competing delegates at the provincial

conferences – tended, in contrast to debates over the national list, to both take longer and be more hotly disputed by participants (according to our interviewees). Candidates seeking nomination to provincial lists took the demands of their members seriously. A popular sentiment voiced in interviews echoed the fear of an aspirant candidate that 'branch members are quite vocal and willing to punish [with deselection]' (Interview with Holomisa). Among successful provincial candidates, there was a near consensus that it is 'very hard to get on the list without local support'. Desirable qualities fell, mainly, into the subjective category, but branches also sought to return a list one-third of which is female. Other than gender, however, branch members prioritised loyalty to the party, close contact with ANC branch structures, and service to constituents.

ANC: The National List of Candidates

In the eyes of ANC branch members, the debate over who to include on the national list, according to one member, centred on 'how popular the national leadership is'. In this sense, branch nominations acted as a 'barometer' of public opinion, offering a valuable insight into the popularity of national figures in South Africa. For instance, the prominent position of (at the time) disgraced former vice-President Jacob Zuma on the 2004 national-national list suggested his stock remained high among the ANC rank-and-file, while a high placing for (also disgraced) Winnie Madikizela-Mandela indicated consistent grass-roots support. Race seemed to play little role in discussion over the suitability of candidates for the national list. There was some indication that ethnicity mattered, although this is easily confused with pride in the achievements of a 'local son'.

Unlike other political parties in this study, the key parameters of a 'balanced' list are laid out in comprehensive manner in a couple of key party documents, which we discussed earlier in the chapter. According to the coordinator of the national list committee, Mpho Lekgoro, a key aim is a 'balance of experience, gender representation and racial demographics' (*Mail & Guardian* November 21, 2003). In particular, the ANC 'List Process Guidelines' and discussion document, 'Through the Eye of a Needle', outline criteria which describe the broad group characteristics of 'the best cadres to lead transformation' (ANC 2003). In addition to the objective characteristics outlined in the party constitution, the ANC documents underlines the importance of age, membership of ANC affiliates including COSATU, SACP, SANCO, and MDM, and geographic balance, as well as a number of subjective criteria, such as: a 'track

record', technical expertise, political experience, an understanding of ANC policy, regular contact with party members and strong job performance.[8]

The explicit task of the provincial and national list committees was to intervene to ensure that the four hundred names ranked on the ANC electoral list would reflect these principles. Both provincial and national list committees, according to interviewees, intervened most consistently to ensure a third (and indeed every third candidate) of all candidates was female. The provincial list committees, as we have seen, did not seem to intervene too much beyond this dimension, but the same is not true of the national list committee that played a decisive role in the construction, and rank-ordering, of the national list of candidates. Qualities demanded by the national-level selectorate, according to arrange of well-placed interviewees, focused on geographic representivity, technocratic ability, age and gender. Beyond the key criterion of gender, the committee at the national level, it seemed, were more inclined to intervene to 'rescue' candidates that performed a specific function within parliamentary structures. To this extent, then, the committee seemed to see itself as guardian of the ANC commitment to a socially balanced caucus. This principle of intervention is undemocratic, if by democracy we mean the prerogative of people to determine who governs. If, on the other hand, we see democracy less as a method of election and more as the embodiment of political equality, central intervention becomes more readily understandable.

The Democratic Alliance: A Provincial List of Candidates

Unlike the ANC and CoD, the criteria that structured national involvement in the selection process were a little less clear, although 'skills' and 'race' were mentioned consistently as the most important dimensions of a balanced list. In interviews with some senior party members, we detected (at times) an open aversion to the practice of affirmative action, which extended to include the practice of balancing lists according to racial criteria. There was no discernable trace of bias in this position towards members of one ethnic or racial group over another. Rather, members felt that if any serious imbalance arose from popular involvement at lower levels of the party, it was not based on race, but rather ability. This might on our part be a somewhat naïve view of attitudes among the leadership of South Africa's official opposition, which includes figures that served in apartheid governments, but regardless of motivation the preference for intervention to promote racial balance was not held without qualification.

[8] The ANC conducted a review of all elected MPs and MPLs, which 'inform[ed] the nominations and selection process for 2004' (ANC 2003).

Like in other political parties with aspirations to develop support across the country, the DA aspired to structure their party list as a microcosm of society. The democratic dilemma of representation, however, held for the DA as much as for any other party – in the face of serious 'supply-side' shortages of desirable candidates, national-level structures were required to intervene to balance the racial composition of the list. This strategy, as we shall see in Chapter 7, is tricky: bucking popular demand to create a balanced list risks destabilising the party, or as a DA figure said, 'it's hard to send a unifying message in a deeply divided society' (Interview with Selfe).[9] Nevertheless, considerable emphasis was placed on redressing historic inequality through an artificially balanced list and is not simply attributable to a desire to 'enter by the narrow gate'. The strategy of racial representivity was also intended to bring the (earthly) reward of electoral support. The DA, according to Selfe, 'are in the business of expanding [their] support base', implying that if the DA is to develop support among the African electorate, it is in the best interest of the party to place black candidate on prominent places of the party list.

The second criteria used by the national level to 'correct' the list – intervention to promote 'people of merit', as one senior figure put it – is also highly prized among senior DA figures (Interview with Doman). The DA party leader, indeed, cited 'merit, integrity, diversity and commitment to the party' as the key criteria of selection (*Cape Times* February 16 2004). In the case of the DA, 'merit' tends to be equated with candidates who had proven professional or managerial skills, material wealth (or an ability to attract party donations), and a high public profile. The most commonly asked questions, according to one participant in the Western Cape electoral college, concerned a candidate's track record of party activity, if any, and 'how much money have you raised for the party' (Interview with Knott). The chairman of the DA felt a good candidate should be 'articulate, knowledgeable, adaptable, can raise money, can communicate a message, and good with media'. This assessment is echoed in comments made by other party leaders. Doman reefers to the difficulty of attracting to the DA successful businessmen 'who can't afford to waste time on party life … suitable and qualified people don't want to [win nomination] through normal party channels [as it is] difficult for them to get in – they must subscribe members, attend meetings, and so on.' (Interview with Doman). Based on a reading of the party constitution, this position is quite consistent with party principles, which

[9] In the interview, Selfe expanded on this statement, remarking that 'in common with other ethnically divided societies it's sometimes very difficult to do the two things simultaneously … if you are talking about housing for example, the first question on many people minds is: *who* are you providing houses for – are you providing it for black squatters or coloured squatters. Sometimes it is very difficult to fine-tune that message in a way that says we want to provide housing for all people who don't have housing'. Although the two examples bear no immediate relation to each other, the essence of the problem is the same.

tend to underline individual characteristics, limited state intervention and the desirability of what is known (euphemistically?) as an 'Open Opportunity Society' (DA Party Constitution, Chapter 1.2). Taken together, we would expect the leadership to have intervened along the clear criteria of race and ability. Scope for national intervention is fairly considerable: the party leader has the right to place the third, seventh, fourteenth and twenty-first and so on, candidate on each of the eleven provincial lists. In a parliamentary caucus of fifty people, this provided Tony Leon with an opportunity to hand-pick nine candidates.

Swapo: The National List of Candidates

Through interviews with candidates that attended both provincial and national party conferences, it was possible to develop a clearer picture of the qualities that help a candidate pursue a successful nomination. Subjective qualities prioritised by Swapo elites include a high public profile, commitment to community, loyalty to the party, and 'struggle' credentials, although not necessarily in this order. Most MPs' reflections on the characteristics of a 'good' parliamentarian echoed comments made by a senior party member that MPs must be 'effective in their work, understand the issues, and must understand the policies of the party (Interview with Nehova). Many MPs underline political 'maturity' while emphasising the 'profile' of the candidate. To attract support within Swapo, 'people should know you, people nominate you by knowing what you have been doing, based on your contribution as a party cadre' (Interview with Ankama). In addition to these basic characteristics there was also a repeated emphasis on the political virtue of loyalty to the party but less emphasis on the necessity of servicing local constituencies and party organs. In fact, what was most striking about comments made by candidates – successful and unsuccessful – was the scant reference made to Swapo structures. It seemed that fear of de-selection by ordinary Swapo branch members did not really trouble the majority of aspirant candidates seeking re-selection.

This characteristic – the distance of party elites from party structures and membership – summarises succinctly the difference between the ANC and Swapo. In the former, a good section of the (mostly provincial) party elite depends on the organisation for political survival and without party blessing faces a highly uncertain political future. In Swapo, party leaders are relatively unconcerned with party structures and are not held accountable to the party organisation. In this regard, Swapo have more in common with the political parties of tropical Africa's neo-patrimonial political system where parties are seen as a little more than electoral

vehicles that can rarely count on the loyalty of their parliamentary representatives (van de Walle and Butler 1999; Bratton and van de Walle 1997).

Beyond formal criteria for candidacy, Swapo – like all political parties in this study that compete under the rules of List-PR – are (on paper) strongly committed to the principle of a parliamentary caucus that reflects the country's underlying society. There is a written commitment to provincial (ethnic) balance and an unwritten commitment to gender parity and youth (Interviews with Swapo MPs and members of steering committee). Party commitment to 'equitable representation for all the regions' is spelled out in the introduction to Swapo's selection guidelines. The decision that 'inclusivity' would be 'built-in to the [party] structures' was, according to a senior party figure, a conscious party decision to guard against a 'loophole for any communities or ethnic groups to be left out' (Interview with Nehova). The commitment to gender parity and a youthful parliamentary caucus are not as rigidly set as the party's commitment to a regional balance, but there certainly seems to be an unwritten appreciation of the importance of each of these objective characteristics.

The power of the president to place ten candidates on the list is not entirely arbitrary; rather it is tempered by the formal (and informal) understanding that the president considers how his choice might influence the overall balance of the electoral list. In this respect, the role played by the Swapo president has much in common with the role played by the national electoral college within the ANC – both (supposedly) seek to redress any imbalance that might arise from popular selection processes within the party. The key difference between Swapo and the ANC, however, is that the ANC national list committee is broadly representative of all tendencies within the ANC (except, perhaps, the trade union movement), while the Swapo President is the dominant player both inside the ruling party and state structures. Nevertheless, we would expect the upper echelons of the Swapo organisation to exert some control over the party president. After all, Swapo may not be a party that allows popular control over the parliamentary caucus but it does provide party notables – particularly those in the national executive and steering committee – with considerable power over party policy.[10] Consequently, we would not expect the president of Swapo to have acted arbitrarily in his selection of candidates.

According to interviews with senior Swapo figures, the party president is expected to balance the list according to formal criteria laid down by the party. As we have discussed, these

[10] A good indication of the power of party notables within Swapo concerns the controversy after the 1999 election over President Nujoma's clear preference to seek a fourth term as State President. There is anecdotal evidence to suggest that senior party leaders who wished for alternation in office prevailed over the wishes of President Nujoma.

criteria include, most prominently, ethnicity and sex but the President is not restricted to balance the list according to these key criteria. The President, according to a steering committee member, will 'have to take care of other interests like people with disability or people from marginal communities. There are many other things you have to take into account, not only gender [including] whites, the Germans even and the Afrikaaners' (Interview with Angula). Like in most political parties in this study, there was strong approval for the need for positive measures to redress inequality between the sexes in state structures, including parliament. According to a steering committee member and senior member of the Swapo Women's League, there is 'universality about [women]. It is only a question of how to do it [achieve parity]' (Interview with Nandi-Ndaitwah). There was, however, considerable disagreement about the most effective way of increasing the number of female representatives in parliament (and in state structures more generally). The two most widely discussed methods deal with the long-term strategy of increasing the number of women in party structures, and the short-term approach of manipulating the electoral list. Both methods, of course, involve external intervention by the party leadership to increase female participation. Party elites believe, almost unanimously, that an unprompted increase in the number of female candidates is highly unlikely (Interview with Nandi-Ndaitwah).

The approach taken by Swapo towards gender parity avoids central intervention – there is no gender quota in the electoral list. The absence of a gender quota is further indication of the closed nature of the Swapo selection process. It could be said the reluctance by party elites to imposing a quota system can be traced to a concern that competition for a limited number of female seats could create instability within the party. In an interview with a steering committee member, it was pointed out that 'the process of manipulation creates problems ... women against each other, they can be brutal' (Interview with Angula). Instead of a blunter attempt to shape artificially the electoral list through imposition of a gender quota, there is an informal understanding that the President uses his choice of ten candidates to redress any gender imbalance that arises after selection and ranking of the list by the national electoral college and steering committee, respectively. Whether this alternative arrangement is more effective than a quota system is difficult to say – the reluctance of the higher echelons of the party to address under-representation of females through 'a specific electoral arrangement' is, according to the Secretary of the Women's Council (also a member of the steering committee), 'disappointing' while the intervention by the President is simply 'helpful' (Interview with Nandi-Ndaitwah).

On the other hand, a closer reading of the reluctance of the leadership to implement a quota system might reinforce our first impression of the Swapo selection process as careful controlled system of internal promotion guarded jealously by a handful of individuals at the summit of the party organisation where any attempt to decentralise the process is met with veiled anger. This interpretation is, however, probably a little harsh: at a meeting of the steering committee in October 2005, Swapo decided that in future all elected bodies within the party structure must contain as many women as men (Interview with Nandi-Ndaitwah). Nonetheless, the overriding impression of the selection process within Swapo is that of a strongly centralised process with pivotal power exercised by the party colossus, President Sam Nujoma.

If there is any single 'story' worth relating of the list process inside Swapo, it is that selection seems to occur among a relatively small number of senior party leaders. Compared with the ANC, participation from ordinary branch members, and their delegates, is a hair's breadth above nominal and charges made by critics that the selection process is of overly centralised are well-founded. Although we do not have any systematic and reliable information on the composition of the Swapo caucus or the behaviour of individual candidates, we can explore the likely consequences of the party's heavily centralised selection process. Criticism of Swapo can be fierce in the Namibian media – the party has suffered debilitating splits in recent years, criticism over the handling of grievances held by former combatants, and rising concern with the reluctance of (Founding Father of the Namibian Nation and Leader of the Namibian Revolution) President Sam Nujoma to depart the political stage. Observers too have singled out the heavily centralised selection process for criticism. In a report on the behaviour of parliamentarians in the early years of independence, Swapo MPs were judged to be 'in effect representatives not of voters but of the party machine'[11]and 'dependent on its [the party] goodwill for their parliamentary position' (Good 1997: 557).

Congress of Democrats

The degree of centralization and participation of party members, however, only tells us part of the story of how candidates for the 2004 national assembly elections were chosen by the CoD. Gallagher's third criteria – the qualities required by successful candidates – left, perhaps, an indelible mark on the electoral list that was eventually chosen. In interviews with party members, officials, successful and unsuccessful candidates, there was very little disagreement

[11] A Report to Parliament by a Working Party of the National Assembly and the National Council, *Agenda for Change: Consolidating Parliamentary Democracy in Namibia* (Windhoek, July 1995), pp. 32.

about the different subjective qualities of a 'good' member of parliament. Commitment to constituents, loyalty to the party, organisational skills, a high public profile, 'struggle credentials', a forceful character and ability to argue a point were all considered important, although the importance attached by each respondent to each quality varied greatly. In terms of ascriptive, or objective characteristics, interviewees considered provincial background, sex and youth to be particularly important – although as with subjective qualities respondents varied in the importance they attributed to each characteristic. Interestingly, women were not more likely to elevate sex above other characteristics – in fact, one female candidate complained that she resented any insinuation (based on the policy of gender parity in the party) that her position was due to her sex. It seemed, rather, that some of the strongest advocates of gender parity in candidate section procedures were men. This was also the case in Swapo where the President of the party is the strongest champion of equal representation across the sexes.

The CoD party constitution outlines quite clearly the principles that underpin the party's role as a representative vehicle. Gender parity, non-tribalism, and a commitment to youth are all regarded as key planks of party policy, to be pursued at all levels of party activity, including presumably the selection of parliamentary candidates (Article 2). Of these considerations, gender and non-tribalism are most consistently articulated in the party constitution as core party principles. With respect to gender, it is party policy that electoral lists are rank-ordered according to a 'zebra' formula – that is, every second name on the list is either male or female. This emphasis on gender parity has become reasonably standard across the two major parties in Namibia – in Swapo there is a similar regard for the importance of gender equality among senior members of the party. It is debateable, however, whether this eagerness to include women in positions of authority translates into increased equality across the sexes among the citizenry, or whether candidates with other valuable characteristics who *happen* to be women are promoted by central intervention in the list process.

Alongside the subject of gender, the 'ethnic question' is considered important in CoD. As in South Africa, there is an abiding legacy of divisions based on ethnic lines. Part of the settlement policy of successive apartheid regimes sought to settle ethnic groups in separate geographic areas, which subsumed provincial identity within ethnic identity. In response to this sharpening of the ethnic cleavage it is perhaps unsurprising that many political parties have emerged along ethnic lines. Indeed, it seems to be the case that within the opposition, parties can be classified primarily in terms of ethnic (or non-ethnic) identity. In the case of CoD, however,

it is inaccurate to characterise the party's appeal to the electorate as non-ethnic. Instead, CoD attempt to balance their list through explicit recognition of all major ethnic groups, which is quite different to a strategy where ethnic identity is disregarded as a criteria for ranking on party lists. In Namibia, the extent to which provincial and ethnic cleavages overlap seems to be crucial. In South Africa, where ethnic groups are less concentrated, it is not always the case that provincial balance translates into ethnic balance. In Namibia, in contrast, where (with the exception of Windhoek) it is almost invariably the case that ethnic groups are geographically-concentrated, there is no way to separate the two dimensions. This overlap, in turn, means that there is less flexibility in how parties can handle balance (and imbalance) in their electoral lists. As we shall see, CoD attempted to pursue a 'non-ethnic' policy of representation, but by insisting on a similar level of representation for all regions (regardless of population or membership levels in each region) the party further politicised ethnic affiliation by making it a key determinant of candidate position on the electoral list.

The final objective characteristic that was mentioned by party men and women was youth. It seems the age of candidates also mattered to CoD partisans, including the party 'selectorate', although age would be more accurately viewed as a helpful characteristic of an aspirant candidate – particularly useful if a candidate were also female and from a region with relatively few senior members. In general, there seemed to be an insistence that involvement of the youth in decision-making structures was a good thing, although few interviewees were willing to elaborate at any great length about how, precisely, a more youthful parliamentary caucus would matter. Crucially, the likely elevation of youth above other characteristics seemed improbable given the importance associated with other (subjective) criteria that are positively associated with age, namely seniority, struggle credentials, and a high national profile. The second set of (subjective) criteria that were most consistently pointed to as key components of a 'good' parliamentarian – seniority in the party and the ability to attract electoral support (high profile) – were also considered highly important by both MPs, activists, ordinary branch members and, most importantly although perhaps least surprisingly, by members of the steering committee.

When the electoral list of the CoD was rank-ordered by the sixteen members of the steering committee, the key criteria outlined by the list committee (the small group of five that proposed a set of selection criteria and drafted a 'suggested' electoral list) structures the ranking process. As we have seen, these criteria included seniority, gender, provincial affiliation and youth. The

national list committee insisted that the top five positions on the list should be given to five senior party officials, followed by a concern for the provincial background/ethnicity of candidates. Every second place was to be reserved for a female candidate, although of course it was party policy that the list would be drawn up with male and female candidates interspersed at regular intervals throughout the list. The age of candidates played a role of lesser importance.

In the first cut at an electoral list, the list proposed by the NLC suggested that the first five positions on the list be given to the senior party leadership. There was little or no dispute that the first five places on the list would be allotted to senior figures in the national leadership, with allowance made for an equal number of men and women. The President, Vice President, and National Chairperson provided such a balance, but the male party General Secretary was moved down the list in favour of the General Secretary of the Women Democrats. The second set of five on the electoral list were filled with an eye to provincial (ethnic) balance. The importance of the 'provincial dimension' was underlined by the party's first Secretary General who argued that the electorate shy away from any party that does not include sons (and daughters) of their region. It seems certain that while seniority trumped ethnicity in the first set of five, ethnicity or provincial balance proved more important in the second set of five. Consequently, representatives from the regions of Kavango, Caprivi, Hardap, Karas were placed from sixth to ninth on the list. A white member aspirant candidate was placed tenth to 'demonstrate that we are not lying to the nation in terms of one-nation [policies]' (Interview with Schimming-Chase).

So, did the steering committee construct a list that conformed to the written (and unwritten) expectations of the party? We cannot give an entirely unqualified answer to this question, although it is worthwhile examining whether the four characteristics determined by the party as important in theory, proved important in practice. First, the 'Zebra' policy of equal representation of the sexes was not implemented – of the top ten candidates on the list, only four were female. The Vice President of the party and Rosa Namises would probably have been elected without any positive discrimination on the basis of their sex – both had held the Vice Presidency of the party at one stage or another. The position of Elma Dienda, on the other hand, confirms the importance of the party's Women's League – a phenomenon that resonates in the ANC of neighbouring South Africa. Second, the quality of youth did not help determine inclusion of a single member of the party's list of top-ten candidates. It seems that age – and the seniority that comes with experience – trumped youth in all cases. Women, on the other hand,

seem to have been mollified by the fact that two senior females that eventually won parliamentary seats. Third, it would appear that ethnicity was a very important determinant of the position that aspirant candidates would take on the final list. The final list was rank-ordered in such a way that candidates from all major regions appeared in the top-fifteen places. Of course, the elevation of ethnicity (in a supposedly non-ethnic party) did not take from the importance of seniority. The national list committee, after all, contained senior party men and the sixteen people who participated in the rank-ordering of the list were also senior party members. The five candidates that took seats in parliament number among them five of the most senior elected party officials.

6.6 What do Selectorates Want? Four African Parties in Comparative Perspective

Like most other political parties across the world, our four African parties do not restrict overly the type of candidate that can compete for parliamentary candidacy (Rahat 2007: 158). Swapo and the ANC, on one hand, voiced an explicit expectation that party members are 'loyal', but this is perhaps code for a dedicated period of service which is seen as a standard prerequisite for candidacy in many political parties (Gallagher 1988b: 248; Rahat 2006: 111). In the Democratic Alliance, too, a period of service – particularly in the rump of the Democratic Party contingent of the DA – was seen as crucial. In the Congress of Democrats, in spite of its youth, a viable candidacy requires a national 'profile'. There was also something of an informal expectation that all members of parliament would have a good command of English – the working language of government – but it is certainly not codified (as it is in neighbouring Botswana).

Beyond formal party criteria, which did not demand much beyond the basic statutory requirements of holding parliamentary office, one of the most important (or debilitating) demographic characteristic of an aspirant candidate was their gender. All of our political parties approached gender in a specific way. Swapo choose to avoid the use of a gender quota and relied instead on an informal understanding that the president might use his powers to bring more women into parliament, both through his influence in the selection process and his state prerogative to appoint six *ex officio* members of parliament. This situation, according to Zetterberg (2008: 445) is less than ideal, describing 'women who have been appointed by the leadership will have greater levels of obligation to those who appointed her, resulting in greater

difficulties to pursue [an independent course of action]'. In the ANC, in contrast, the party have a fixed quota that one-in-three candidates is female. In the ANC, crucially, there seemed to be no significant problem with the supply of candidates: in the Western Cape, for instance, there were five candidates elected in the provincial list conference in the top twenty position. Five of these candidates were ranked in the top fifteen places by the elected delegates. The provincial list committee intervened to re-order the list, but on balance only one name was moved from ninth to fifth position to fulfil the one-in-three requirement. In Swapo, in contrast, there did seem to be a 'supply-side' problem. In the (much smaller) party, the Congress of Democrats, gender was prioritised heavily by the party selectorate. It was, indeed, mentioned as a core requirement by the national list committee of the party. Given the small size of the party, the CoD has little difficulty with finding half a dozen female candidates to stack the upper end of the list. The vice president of the party – *not* a member of the women's group – relied on her seniority to achieve her position. Even if no importance was attached to gender, it is highly unlikely that she would not have gained a safe seat. The importance of affiliation (as Secretary-General) to the women's wing of the party seemed crucial to the candidacy of the fourth-placed candidate on the CoD electoral list. In her case, it is unlikely she would have been elected were gender not prioritised. In the DA, in contrast to all other parties, no consideration is given to gender.

The importance attached to gender in three of our four cases is, in comparative perspective, not at all unusual though it is notable that there is no legal quota in South Africa or Namibia. Many countries in both old and new democracies, beginning with Argentina in the early 1990s, have chosen this route (Rahat 2007: 158). Most political parties that have sought to address gender inequality, however, have chosen to implement gender quotas voluntarily. Such is the popularity of the gender quota, in fact, that a reported one hundred and eighty one parties in fifty-eight countries use gender quotas for electoral candidacy (Norris 2004: 198). Is it the case, however, that a gender quota leads to higher numbers of female candidates? It might just as easily be the case that parties with lots of women are more likely to introduce gender quotas in the first place. In our cases, we have evidence to suggest that, artificial 'demand' of a quota system will not always, or necessarily, produce independently the required number of women in parliament. The ANC provincial list committee were allowed to raise women from lower down the list to higher positions; but they were still only able to raise women that made it through the branch and provincial stages of selection. In Swapo, in contrast, a gender quota would have had

no impact, as the proportion of women candidates was too small to satisfy demand. In the CoD, the informal quota that every second person on the list would be female coincided with a high level of female parliamentarians, but only because there were enough senior party figures. Outside the top five candidates, there was insufficient supply of candidates to allow the party selectorate the means to implement the quota. A steady supply of female candidates, then, is more important than a gender quota: in the DA, a steady supply of female candidates meant a quota was unnecessary.

Second, there seems in our cases to be a direct relationship between the 'locus of selection' and the likelihood that gender will be prioritised, but centralised selection systems require leaders who are willing to value gender equality (or, at least, the notion of having lots of women in parliament). In the CoD and Swapo, both parties sent lots of women to parliament – roughly two out of five – though they both achieved this in different ways. Both methods, however, required centralisation: in Swapo, the president's personal intervention; in Cod, selection by a committee that prioritised informally gender equality. In the Democratic Alliance, too, if a supply problem had been present, the president had the power to select women (or, indeed, redress any other type of imbalance he thought existed). The importance of centralisation in our cases conforms largely to the existing expectation that more centralised selectorates facilitate greater gender representation in parliamentary parties (Norris 2006: 104–7; Rahat 2007: 167). This relationship, however, is conditional on the type of selection procedure *and* the behaviour of party elites. As Gouws and Mitchell (2005: 367) argue, 'it is well-known that closed-list systems are the easiest method by which a party can change the demographic composition of its parliamentary party, the party must also of course have the will to do so when structuring its lists.'

The type of party, furthermore, seems to matter a great deal to the likelihood that electoral lists – and, in turn, parliaments – contain more women. In our cases we surmise, though with so few cases we cannot state definitively, that party type limits the capacity of parties to increase the substantive representation of women. In CoD and Swapo (both elite-based parties), the weakness of party structures – central to the ANC's relative success at provincial level – limited the 'supply' of women in parties (interview with senior party figures, CoD and Swapo). In Swapo, women are the hand-picked appointees of the president, and lack any independent power base within the party. In the CoD, as we have seen, women happened to do well at the top of the list, but failed further down the list (beyond position five) to achieve anything even approaching

gender parity in spite of a strong and centralised attempt to push women up the list. At best, then, our elite based parties produced a reasonable number of female parliamentarians that are, in all likelihood, held in thrall to the party president.

In all parties, again, seniority and incumbency mattered a great deal. In Swapo, the majority of the selectorate consist of incumbents or senior party figures. In the ANC, in contrast, the identity of the selectorate at the provincial level did not have anything to do with incumbency; instead, and in direct contrast to Swapo, a full 90% of delegates to the list conferences were branch-based delegates. Incumbency, which confers advantages of name recognition, media attention or greater financial and organisational resources, represents a major advantage to aspirant legislators (Somit *et al.* 1994). We might also surmise that a similar effect is observed in our parties, particularly the clientelistic Swapo party, when incumbent candidates seek renomination. In all our parties, selectorates pointed to the importance of a national or provincial 'profile'. In the DA, senior party legislators did not lobby intensively for reselection. In the CoD, the top five positions were reserved for the party office-bearers. Branch-level involvement in the ANC national list was, in essence, a contest between incumbents.

The value of incumbency is well established in different parties in other regions. Incumbency, according to Gallagher (1988b: 248), is 'the best type of record … in virtually every country for which we have evidence, incumbents stand a far better chance of being selected than any other group or aspirants.' In all our parties, with perhaps the partial exception of the Congress of Democrats, we find the same. In the ANC 'continuity' was seen as a core criterion of intervention by the leadership. In Swapo, incumbent parliamentarians comprised just under a third of all delegates to the national electoral college. Gallagher (1988b: 249) also notes that incumbency can sometimes be a 'handicap', particularly among parties of the left that 'rotate' MPs or parties that seek to impose 'term limits' on their parliamentarians. Interestingly, the SACP – unlike other left-wing – parties are quite happy not to impose restrictions on their members pursuing successive terms as ANC candidates.

Other 'subjective' characteristics, to borrow Gallagher's phrase, such as technocratic ability or the ability to articulate a message were, at times, helpful to aspirant candidates in the ANC and DA. In the ANC, in particular, the national level selectorate prioritised 'skills' when balancing a list. Members who are unable to report regularly to party structures are not necessarily excluded. The recent memoires of a former member of the parliamentary party attributed his re-selection to the value placed on 'technical competence and experience in

parliament' (Feinstein 2007: 82). One of our interviewees, indeed, had very little popular support in his home province; his position in parliament can be related directly to intervention from the national executive. In the Democratic Alliance, too, the party leader handpicked a member of the party based solely on his assessment of the candidate's raw intelligence (Leon 2008: 614).

To summarise so far, we have found that seniority (or incumbency) and gender were among the most important characteristics of aspirant candidates in our four political parties, though they did not determine successful candidacy. Beyond these two features, we also found ethnic and geographic features also ranked highly on selectorates' list of priorities in *all* of our political parties. Most parties consider their electoral chances to be bound up with their ability to present an electoral list that was representative of the politicised divisions in society. The ANC view racial and ethnic balance as a 'red line' area that cannot be compromised. The accommodation of ethnic (or ethnoregional) groups within political parties is a well-established practice in Africa's divided societies. New elites, inhabiting weakly legitimised postcolonial institutions, devised survival strategies premised on careful ethnic balancing in state structures (Rothchild 1996: 7).[12] Inside political parties, too, party leaders were careful to maintain an equilibrium of sorts between competing ethnic groups by distributing party titles on the basis of ethnic identity. In Côte d'Ivoire, for instance, state and party president Houphouët-Boigny, 'has had to play a complex ethnoregional balancing game in managing the forces that keep them in power' (Appiah 1992: 166-7). Within his party, too, Houphouët-Boigny 'practiced a careful policy of including representatives of all the country's regions in his party.

6.7 Conclusion

In this chapter, we have looked at the process of candidate selection in four African political parties. We have found a number of interesting patterns. First, parties did not always select candidates according to the strictures of the party rulebook. Deviation from the 'official story' was found, most often, with respect to the inclusiveness of the selectorate. In the ANC, in particular, we found that the involvement of party affiliates – through placement on important list committees – is considerably greater in reality than on paper. This deviation, we expect,

[12] The basic problem of statecraft in Africa's new democracies, according to Appiah (1992: 164) is that 'the kindom [of Nkrumah] was designed to manage limited goals ... when the post-colonial rulers inherited the apparatus of the colonial state, they inherited the reins of power; few noticed, at first, that they were not attached to a bit.'

influences the cohesion of the ANC. The deviation from formal rules and procedures also re-affirms the conventional wisdom that students of African politics need to avoid a 'blind focus' on the rulebook. Instead, there is a strong case for close empirical research into the informal aspects of party politics (Bienen 1971: 195–214; Lemarchand 1972: 68–90). Institutionalised informality – regular and recurring patterns of behaviour – seems to matter a great deal in African party politics.

Second, we discovered that all party selectorates, with the exception of the Democratic Alliance, are heavily centralised, though there is wide variation in the degree of participation at the 'locus of selection'. In two of our 'units' – the ANC National List and the Congress of Democrats – non-elected committees determined the selection of candidates; in another two of our units – the ANC provincial lists and each of the Democratic Alliance's provinces – electoral colleges voted to determine parliamentary candidacy. In Swapo a group of (mostly) senior national party figures met to decide which of each other should win the right to represent the party in elections to the lower house of parliament.

Third, our selectorates placed a high premium on gender, seniority (sometimes, though not always, overlapping with incumbency) and ethnicity. None of these characteristics alone guaranteed nomination. In the case of ANC, gender only helped provincial candidates in the Western Cape if a candidate was ranked within the first fifteen candidates in the electoral college. In the Congress of Democrats, too, few female candidates made much mileage out of their gender – outside the top-five positions the party was unable to fill its (informal) gender quota. Seniority, in contrast, was a crucial determinant of a successful candidacy. In many respects, perhaps, this is statement of the obvious. Nonetheless, of the branch members of the ANC that we interviewed, all were unwilling to nominate a lowly figure to the national list. In the CoD, all MPs are office-bearers in the party. Finally, ethnicity mattered for all parties.

Yet what effect does variation in the process of candidate selection have on the cohesion of political parties? We turn to this issue in the next chapter.

Candidate Selection and Party Cohesion in Four African Parties

7.1 Introduction

Let us return to the 'big' question at the heart of this investigation: can democracy work in 'divided' societies? In societies that are not 'divided', democracy works, as Hamilton suggested, because polities are large enough, and society is sufficiently complex, to support a skein of 'temporary, shifting interests' (Hamilton in Ball 2003). Democracy survives because none of these groups is large enough to hi-jack mechanisms of majority rule by forming a 'permanent majority'. But what of democracy in 'plural' societies, where group identities overlap and interests are not transitory, nor cleavages cross-cutting? In the late 1960s, an increasingly influential school of thought began commentary on a sub-set of democracies in Western Europe that had managed to combine deep-seated societal divisions with stable, institutional commitment to democratic competition. The trick, it seemed, lay in an elaborate institutional set-up that guaranteed proportional representation of 'politicised' groups in key state structure, limited territorial autonomy for these groups, and a permanent veto by group elites over core government decisions at the national level. This 'consociational' model, champions asserted, is the best (indeed the only) way to allow democracy survive in divided societies.[1]

While a good deal has been written on the relationship between constitutionally-defined institutions and democratic stability, a good deal less has been written on the intervening institutions, specifically political parties, that tie broad 'macro' institutions such as electoral systems with elite behaviour (see Andeweg 2000 for an overview of the consociational literature). Much of the relationship, indeed, is only tenuously established: do proportional electoral systems produce, invariably, cast-iron 'accommodative' incentives to elites? What variables might intervene to condition this relationship? What importance, generally, do the number and type of parties play in divided societies? What importance, specifically, does the presence of a dominant party play in a divided society? In 'divided' countries that contain a single 'dominant' party, the success of democracy rests, primarily, on the degree of elite accommodation *within* the party. In India, analysts have pointed to the 'broadly representative' role of the Indian National Congress as a bulwark against the tide of democratic reversal

[1] Consociational democracy is defined by Lijphart (1969: 216) as 'government by elite cartel designed to turn democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy.' Among a number of institutional permutations that has been engineered to bridge deep societal divisions, the 'federal' solution is popular. In southern Africa, however, there are no federal countries.

(Lijphart 1996). But how, precisely, did Congress manage to play this 'consociational' role and remain stable? What configuration of institutional mechanisms provided Congress with the ability to remain as a coherent political party in charge of a large country, yet incorporate such diverse groups within the ranks of its leadership? In the wider democratic systems, competition between politicised groups is institutionalised. Within political parties, in contrast, no such competitive requirement exists. 'Closed-list systems [including Closed-List PR]', as Shugart (2005: 38) points out, 'are the only family of systems in which there is no role for the electoral rules in allocating seats to candidates.' A great deal of variation in selection systems, then, is possible *inside* parties. What role, exactly, does the 'machine' play?

In this chapter we examine, first, whether the parliamentary representatives of our four parties represent their supporters and, indeed the wider population. We look at the ascriptive characteristics discussed in Chapter 4 (ethnicity and race) which are thought to form the bedrock of political cleavages in divided societies. A narrow focus on such characteristics, however, is insufficient as an outline of the conditions under which some parties manage to remain as cohesive bodies, while others splinter and disintegrate. In the second part of this chapter, we look at competition between different organised groups (factions) within our parties. Based on a body of theory drawn from the Indian context, we evaluate whether variation in the inclusiveness of selection mechanism influences the stability of political parties.

7.2 The Demography of Four African Parliamentary Parties

Electoral systems can influence heavily the demographic composition of parliament. PR electoral systems, generally, are thought to help produce a representative parliament that acts as a type of microcosm of society. The mediating role of political parties, too, is thought to be important. Political parties 'filter' the type of parliamentary candidate that competes for political office (Gallagher 1988a: 2; Pesonen 1968: 348). Norris and Lovenduski (1995: 1), indeed, underline the importance of decisions taken within political parties as a screening process, pointing to the small proportion of politicians who pass through the 'eye of the needle' into the highest offices of state. Parties, to summarise, are thought to make a lasting impression on the composition of parliament. There is a certain dislocation, then, between this body of literature which points to the centrality of political parties as an intervening variable (mediating the relationship between electoral systems and parliamentary representation), and the consociational literature which argues that in divided societies party-list PR ... enables all significant ethnic

groups, including minorities, "to define themselves" into ethnically based parties and thereby gain representation in the parliament in proportion to their numbers in the community as a whole' (Reilly 2006: 28). Consociational theory, in other words, does not take into account the possibility that party systems will not reflect each politicised cleavages in a country.

In South Africa and Namibia – like almost all countries in southern Africa – electoral systems have not led to fractionalised parliaments. On the contrary, dominant parties in this region emerged from liberation movements and have, with few exceptions, increased their share of both popular vote and legislative seats over time. In such countries, then, it seems likely – if the literature on candidate selection in Western Europe is correct – that competition within political parties will give us an invaluable insight into the type of parliamentarian that wins office in such systems. In this section, we look at the demographic characteristics of South African and Namibian legislators, and evaluate how variation in the candidate selection mechanisms have influenced the selection process.

The African National Congress

The major ethnic groups in South Africa, we recall, are based on the ascriptive marker of skin colour. The black community comprises the majority of the South African population (78% of the population), while the white community is much smaller (10%). The coloured community – concentrated in the Western and Northern Capes – comprise just under 9% of the population, while the Indian community – concentrated around Durban in KwaZulu Natal – comprise a little under 3%. There is, however, considerable sub-divisions within the black and white population that tend to be considered in ethnic terms. These sub-divisions based (somewhat crudely) on language are: IsiZulu (23.8%), IsiXhosa (17.6%), Afrikaans (13.3%), Sepedi (9.4%), English (8.2%), Setswana (8.2%), Sesotho (7.9%), Xitsonga (4.4%).[2]

The ANC list process is a mixed process with significant involvement from both provincial and national structures, in addition to involvement from across party affiliates, as we saw in Chapter 6. A high level of attention was paid by the system designers to ensure the selection system would produce a representative parliamentary party. In order to develop a clearer picture of the demography of the ANC parliamentary party, we conducted a survey of that body (see Chapter 3). Given the low response rate to our survey (22 out of 268, or just under 10%), however, we cannot make much more than impressionistic statements about the

[2] These figures are based on the complexion of the country at the time of the census in 2001. Source: Economist Intelligence Unit *South Africa: Annual Report* 2003.

composition of the ANC caucus. In Table 7.1, we present a side-by-side account of how the South African population, ANC electorate and ANC parliamentary caucus compare along a range of demographic indicators. Data is taken from the South African census of 2001, a representative survey of South Africans (Afrobarometer 2002), and our survey of the ANC parliamentary party.

Table 7.1: Demographic Profile of the ANC Parliamentary Party

Language	South Africa (% of population)	Voters who 'feel close' to the ANC	ANC Caucus	
	%	%	n	%
IsiZulu	23.8	14.1	3	14
IsiXhosa	17.6	22.2	3	14
Setswana	8.3	12.1	1	4.5
Sesotho	7.9	11	2	10
Sepedi	9.4	15.4	1	4.5
Afrikaans	13.3	8.6	4	18
English	8.2	3.2	2	9
Other	11.5	13.4	6	28
Total	100	100	22	100

Sources: The population statistics are taken from the Economist Intelligence Unit, South Africa: Annual Report, 2003. The measure of support for the ANC is based on a representative survey of the South African electorate, carried out in 2002 by the Afrobarometer survey series. Respondents were asked 'what political party do you feel close to?'

We have compiled this table with a great deal of scepticism. Even if we had received a great many more responses to our survey, there are severe problems with the interpretation of data based on primordial categorisations of identity. As a matter of convenience, mostly, researchers have often sought to measure the size and distribution of ethnic groups using language as a proxy for ethnicity. In South Africa, as in many other countries such as Burundi and Rwanda, this is highly problematic. The majority of individuals from both Afrikaners and Coloured groups, for instance, speak Afrikaans 'at home'. Indians and the English-speaking whites both speak English and many blacks speak a number of languages. (As do individuals from quite a few other groups.[3] How do we categorise such individuals? Practically, Afrobarometer tried to capture politically relevant ethnicities by asking which groups people felt they belonged to, but results are incompatible with other surveys and many response categories are quite generally not considered political relevant.[4] In the construction of this category of ANC 'sympathisers', we

[3] Helen Zille and John Jeffries – prominent white members of the DA and ANC, respectively – speak a number of European and African languages.

[4] 'Shebeen Queen' might be considered in this bracket (Afrobarometer 1999).

rely on the language of the respondent. Generally, the ambiguity and fluidity among language categories is reflected in the large size of the 'other' category in Table 7.1.

Though we cannot evaluate whether a different type of locus selection influences the demographic composition of the ANC parliamentary caucus, we can make some aggregate-level inferences about the ANC electoral list. First, the ANC parliamentary caucus appears to be highly representative of both the ANC support base (defined as those who feel close to the ANC) and the wider South African population. All major racial and ethnic categories are represented on the ANC list. Interestingly, some groups (English-speakers) seem overrepresented if we compare the ANC voter base with the parliamentary caucus. Other groups, such as isiXhosa-speakers, seem underrepresented. There is also much impressionistic secondary evidence to suggest a high number of white English-speakers among the upper echelons of the ANC (who also in many cases happen to be members of the SACP). The difficulty of using Afriakaans-speakers as a proxy for ethnic group is also noteworthy. Afrikaans-speakers also seem overrepresented, though it is worth bearing in mind that the 'Coloured' group – the majority in the Western Cape – are not definable according to language. The broadly representative nature of the ANC caucus extend beyond ethnic or linguistic features to gender. A full third of the ANC candidates – both successful and unsuccessful – are female, the same proportion as among respondents to our survey.

A standard criticism of the ANC list process is that it represents an example of increasing levels of 'democratic centralism' within the party (see, for instance, McKinley 1996: 65). In our survey, we asked ANC parliamentarians to evaluate the 'openness' of the list process according to desirable levels of influence wielded by each section of the party apparatus, the section of the party that should have the 'final decision' over the rank-ordering of the list, and whether the process was efficient, democratic, complicated and fair. Though we only asked successful members – which renders our 'sample' somewhat biased – the results are of some interest as an, at worst, impressionistic account of the list process from within the ranks of the parliamentary caucus. 33% of respondents felt the national level of the party wielded either too great or far too great an influence over the selection process, while 60% felt their influence was 'about right'. 6% of respondents felt the national level did not have enough influence. Interestingly, 60% of respondents thought the provincial level of the party had 'too great' an influence over the selection process. 40% felt the influence of the provincial level of the party was 'about right'. 60% thought the level of the local level of the party was 'about right', while 27% thought it was

'too great' or 'far too great'. Only 13% thought the influence of local party organisation was 'too little'. Nobody thought it was 'far too little' – even those who thought the role of the national tier of the organisation should be curtailed.

Parliamentarians were also somewhat at odds with each other over who should have the final say over the list: two out of every five respondents thought the leadership should have final decision, while the same number felt the same of the provincial structures. Only one in five thought local party organisation should determine the composition of the electoral list. Almost two-thirds of respondents thought the list process was 'very' democratic. One-third of respondents thought the process 'quite' democratic. A single respondent felt the process was, in fact, 'overly' democratic. Evaluations of the efficiency and level of complication attached to the process were equally enthusiastic: half of respondents thought the process 'quite' efficient and 'not very' complicated, with other respondents distributed two-to-one in positive rather than negative categories.

Based on this somewhat biased kind of evidence – importantly, we have not asked unsuccessful candidate how they evaluated the process – what can we say of the ANC list process? Well, it appears as though successful candidates who responded to our survey have a broadly positive impression of the list process. This impression is reinforced from the twenty-five or so interviews we carried out with ANC activists, parliamentarians, officials and unsuccessful candidates. In general, ANC members have quite a sophisticated understanding of the exigencies of constructing an electorally appealing list in a divided society and, in general, appreciate the need for central intervention. One MP, elected from a provincial list, argued that 'it is one thing what the constitution says, it is another how you give effect to it – the ANC has contributed immensely to making a parliament which is representative of the South African demographic landscape' (Interview with Abram).

The Democratic Alliance

The candidate selection system of the DA, as we discussed in Chapter 6, is highly decentralised. Each province, effectively, has control over the majority of candidates placed on provincial lists. (There is no single national list.) The number of electoral delegates at provincial conferences is related directly to the strength of the party in each region. Seats in parliament, also, are determined according to the degree of popular support in each province. We would expect, in line with the existing work on decentralised selectorates (see Chapter 2), to see a parliamentary

caucus that is quite unrepresentative of the South African society, but that is closer to the DA support base. Of the fifty members of the DA parliamentary party, seventeen responded to the survey. Of the respondents, thirteen were both white and male. Of these thirteen white males, seven were English-speakers and six were Afrikaans-speakers. There was, in addition, a single black MP that responded to the survey (a Setswana-speaker), an Indian male (English-speaker), and a white female (English-speaker). This is reasonably representative of the actual DA parliamentary party, which in 2004 had thirteen women out of a total of fifty and was made up predominately of white members. Below in Table 7.2 we can find a description of some of the demographic characteristics of the DA parliamentary party compared with their support base and the South African citizenry.

Table 7.2: Demographic Profile of the DA Parliamentary Party

Language	South Africa population	Voters who 'feel close' to the DA	ANC Caucus	
	%	%	n	%
IsiZulu	23.8	1		0
IsiXhosa	17.6	1		0
Setswana	8.3	2	1	6
Sesotho	7.9	1		0
Sepedi	9.4	3		0
Afrikaans	13.3	57	6	35
English	8.2	31	9	53
Other	11.5	9		0
Total	100	100	17	100

Sources: The population statistics are taken from the Economist Intelligence Unit, South Africa: Annual Report, 2003. The measure of support for the DA is based on a representative survey of the South African electorate, carried out in 2002 by the Afrobarometer survey series. Respondents were asked 'what political party do you feel close to?'

Unlike the ANC, the 'representivity' of the DA parliamentary party – considered alongside the characteristics of the South African population – is quite low. To what extent did the degree of decentralisation of the selection process influence the characteristics of the caucus? We can provide a partial explanation by looking at the characteristics of the DA support base which, we assume, bear a reasonable resemblance to the party membership. The overwhelming majority of the support for the DA comes from the Coloured and White communities (Habib and Taylor 2001). A supply-side problem clearly influences the type of candidate that is available for selection. Given low levels of black candidates stepping forward for selection, it seems fair to argue that even if the selection process were more centralised, the caucus would not be significantly more representative of South African society. When questioned about the 'sprinkling of Indian and Africans' on the DA list in KwaZulu Natal, a provincial leader of the

DA summarised the problem succinctly: 'look, to be honest with you, we would have preferred to be more representative, but the situation boils down to the number of candidates who made the application' (*Daily News* February 16 2004).

More pointedly, however, we can also ask what influence the party president had over the complexion of the parliamentary party. The party leader of the DA, we recall from Chapter 6, can select the third, seventh, fourteenth, twenty-first (and so on) candidate on each of the nine provincial lists. In his recently-published memoirs, the party leader argued that – in addition to using to his power to appease unhappy partisans – he also used his power to parachute candidates onto each list to balance the overall complexion of the DA electoral list. According to the party leader, '[he] had to have regard for the party's "representativeness" – whether its public face would begin to look a bit more like South Africa, not a combination of the Rand club and Broederbond' (Leon 2008: 615). In this vein, the DA party leader intervened to 'improve [the party's] reach into black and Indian areas' by selecting candidates suggested in some cases by provincial leaderships. Of the fifty DA MPs, the DA party leader was responsible directly for the selection of nine of these candidates. Of these nine candidates, five can be considered as minority candidates. Not all minority groups found representation in the DA in this way – there are some high profile candidates who have achieved senior status on the back of their own efforts within the party – but it seems as though a significant degree of the DA's 'representivity' is due to the intervention of the party leader.

Beyond the racial and ethnic representivity of the DA list, there are also very few female DA parliamentarians. Of his nine selections, the DA leader inserted just one women thus making little significant impact on the (gender) balance of the list. Other preoccupations such as factional conflict and racial representivity, it seems, drove his choices. Can we also say, in like vein to the problem of racial under-representivity, that there is a supply-side problem? We looked down each of the nine provincial lists to gauge the extent of the supply of female candidates. We looked only at the elected seats and then multiplied by three to gauge seats that were 'within range'. For instance, Western Cape sent eleven DA MPs to parliament, so we looked at the proportion of women in the top thirty-three seats. Across all nine provinces, forty-four (28%) such positions were filled by women. Compared with the 26% of female MPs in the parliamentary party, it seems as though there is also a supply-side problem, though it is not as serious for gender as it is for ethnicity or race.

Swapo

The Swapo selection process is not the most centralised process in this study, but it is the most exclusive: of the one hundred and eighty delegates to the national electoral college, only 35% were elected branch-level delegates. 51% of the delegates to the electoral college were either incumbents or members of the party national executive. Of these 187 delegates, we recall from Chapter 6, one hundred and nineteen appeared as candidates on the selection ballot. Of these candidates, 80% were either incumbents or members of the party national executive

It is difficult to predict the 'representivity' of the Swapo caucus. Incumbency, as we will see, mattered though it seemed somewhat conditional on loyalty to party president. In 1999, for instance, President Nujoma insisted on placing his preferred thirty candidates to the top of the list, making it impossible for some incumbents to win re-election. He also, allegedly, used the opportunity to engage in an indirect reshuffle of his cabinet (*The Namibian* October 3 1999). In 2004, the party rulebook stipulated that the party president could choose ten candidates. The decreased control of the party president, then, complicates direct comparison between the 1999 and 2004 selection process. We can, nonetheless, still ask some familiar questions. First, how balanced is the Swapo parliamentary party? Did the party manage to implement its commitment to gender balance and, if so, what kind of selection mechanism produced this balance? Second, did the Swapo parliamentary caucus represent proportionally the different ethnoregional groups in Namibia? Again, what role did different party agencies play in this process.

Of the fifty-five Swapo candidates elected to parliament, sixteen were female (29%). Of their list of seventy-two candidates, twenty-three were female (31%) Of the 119 candidates at the electoral college, thirty were female (25%). There is, then, a reasonably steady supply of female candidates, though much of the credit for this must go to the involvement of the Swapo Women's Council who sent ten female delegates to the electoral college and who lobbied strongly on their behalf (Interview with Nandi-Ndaitwah). If we are to look at the composition of the Swapo parliamentary party from the outside – that is, if we are to ignore the different routes taken by each MP to the assembly – the caucus appears quite balanced (in terms of gender). Of the fifty-five Swapo members, there are sixteen women and a reasonably high number of young members. In ethnic terms, too, the party also appears was quite broadly representative of different ethnic groups in society. Viewed from the inside, however, it becomes apparent that much of the balance in the caucus is achieved through intervention by the president. Of the fifty-five Swapo MPs, as we saw in Chapter 6, the party president can

handpick ten of the successful candidates. Of the sixteen women in the top fifty-five position, six were placed directly by the president into safe positions. Below, Table 7.3 presents the ethnoregional characteristics of the Swapo parliamentary party. We divide the electoral list into three sections: the fourth column shows all Swapo MPs, the second column displays all candidates elected at the electoral college, and the final column shows all unsuccessful candidates.

Table 7.3: Demographic Profile of the Swapo Parliamentary Party

Regions	% of the total electorate	% Support among Swapo Supporters	% of Swapo Caucus	Candidates on Swapo List (top-43)		Candidates on Swapo list (44-72)	
				n	%	n	%
Ohangwena	10.5	15	3.7	2	4.8	10	47.6
Omusati	11.0	16	14.8	5	11.9	0	0
Oshana	8.4	11	13	5	11.9	1	4.8
Oshikoto	7.9	11	14.8	8	19	2	9.5
Caprivi	3.8	5	7.4	3	7.1	0	0
Erongo	7.5	3	9.3	5	11.9	1	4.8
Hardap	4.4	3	3.7	2	4.8	1	4.8
Karas	4.8	3	3.7	1	2.4		0
Kavango	10.2	8	11.1	5	11.9		0
Khomas	16.3	13	3.7	1	2.4	1	4.8
Kunene	3.8	2	5.6	1	2.4	0	0
Omaheke	3.9	3	1.9	1	2.4	2	9.5
Otjozond.	7.4	6	5.6	2	4.8	3	14.3
Other			1.9	1	2.4	0	0
	100	100	100	42	100	21	100

Sources: Both population and electoral support statistics is based on a representative survey of the Namibian electorate, carried out in 2003 by the Afrobarometer survey series.[5] Data on the Swapo candidates was gathered independently. We relied heavily on Hopwood (2004b).

In terms of ethnoregional representation, there is some variation in the extent to which Swapo acts as an integrative vehicle for Namibians. Within the Swapo parliamentary party, almost all ethnoregional groups are represented more or less proportionally with the significant exception of the Ohangwena group. One minority group, the Caprivians, seem somewhat overrepresented in the parliamentary caucus. The role of the party president in the ethnic balancing of the list seems fairly important, though certainly not pivotal. The president included a minority Himba from the Kunene region, but otherwise spread support across ethnic groups. Only one group (from the president's own Omusati region) received disproportionate support.

[5] We were unable to locate demographic data on one of the forty-three in the top part of the list, and we were unable to locate data on six individuals in the lower part of the list.

Instead of rewarding particular ethnic groups, a newspaper report points to 'insiders [who] say the president has favoured loyalty (*The Namibian* October 4 2004). Youth League activists are prominent among the appointees; none of them is considered senior within the ranks of the party. Representatives from the Otjozondupa region performed poorly at the electoral college. Presidential intervention rectified this imbalance slightly.

The most interesting feature of Swapo's integrative role concerns representation of provincial groupings within the Ovambo people. Approximately 50% of support for Swapo (corresponding to circa 40% of the population) is based on the electorate in the four northern Ovambo regions. Swapo MPs that originate from these regions account for just under 45% of the forty-three candidates that won their place on the Swapo electoral list at the electoral college. Out of all Swapo MPs, representatives from these four regions number roughly the same proportion. This is not at all surprising: as we mentioned, Swapo is heavily supported in the northern region of the country and two out of every five Namibians live in this area. If we look, however, across each of these regions, bearing in mind the sub-ethnic split discussed in Chapter 4, we notice a serious imbalance in the Swapo caucus. Candidates from the Ohangwena region (identified as the source of a factional groupings within Swapo in Chapter 4) only sent two members to parliament. Furthermore, both of these candidates were elected competitively in the electoral college. The president decided to ignore this imbalance. The source of this imbalance cannot be attributed to supply side factors. Swapo are heavily supported in the region, which is one of the most populous in the country. Of the top seventy-two candidates in the electoral college, just under 12% are from Ohangwena – more than any other single provincial grouping. If we look, furthermore, at the candidates that lost election at the electoral college, we can see that a high percentage (47.6) were from this particular region. This imbalance, of course, did not happen accidentally. Later in the chapter, we look at factional competition between ethnoregional groups within Swapo.

Congress of Democrats

The effective selection of parliamentary candidates within the Congress of Democrats, as we discussed in Chapter 6, was carried out by the party steering committee. The characteristics of the parliamentary caucus had been considered carefully by a list committee who had made clear recommendations that the party list should balance seniority, ethnicity and gender in the construction of the electoral list (or, at least, in the top twenty or so seats). There was no

involvement from any elected party agency. The process, indeed, contravened existing party rules concerning the selection of candidates. Largely as a consequence of the centralised selection process, the Congress of Democrats managed to produce an exquisitely balanced caucus.

Table 7.4: Demographic Profile of the CoD Parliamentary Party

Regions	electorate	Support among CoD Supporters	% Candidates on CoD list (top-15)	
	%	%	n	%
Ohangwena	10.5	4	1	7.6
Omusati	11.0	6	1	7.6
Oshana	8.4	1	1	7.6
Oshikoto	7.9	2.5	1	7.6
Caprivi	3.8	2.5	1	7.6
Erongo	7.5	20	1	7.6
Hardap	4.4	6	1	7.6
Karas	4.8	5	1	7.6
Kavango	10.2	6	1	7.6
Khomas	16.3	31	1	7.6
Kunene	3.8	5	1	7.6
Omaheke	3.9	2	1	7.6
Otjozond.	7.4	9	1	7.6
Total	100	100	13	100

Sources: Both population and electoral support statistics is based on a representative survey of the Namibian electorate, carried out in 2003 by the Afrobarometer survey series.[6]

The representation of women within the Congress of Democrats parliamentary party is highly even – of the five MPs, two are female. (See Table 7.4, overleaf.) This record of gender balance begins to slip a little as we move down the list. Of the top ten candidates, four are female, and of the top twenty, seven are female. Generally, however, the standing of women within the Congress of Democrats can be attributed to the presence of a few individuals who have been prominent in politics. The balance on the list extends to ethnic representation. In the top thirteen places on the list (the party received 5 seats), there was a candidate from every region. Unlike in Swapo, which managed to strike a balance between support among the electorate, support by Swapo voters, and the number of corresponding Swapo MPs, the list of individuals produced by

[6] We were unable to locate demographic data on one of the forty-three in the top part of the list, and we were unable to locate data on six individuals in the lower part of the list.

the Congress of Democrats did not bear any relation to their electoral support. The vast majority of support for the party was concentrated in two regions, but the party insisted on demonstrating their ethnic neutrality by representing each region equally. We return to the consequences of this choice, and how it interacted with the inclusiveness of the selection process, later in the chapter.

In divided societies, the representation of politicised groups can take on an importance that transcends their demographic support. Some parties represented minority groups evenly (Swapo, for the most part), or even disproportionately (the ANC and CoD), while one party (the DA) performed quite poorly in its attempt to represent minority groups. In each case, the precise selection mechanism influenced heavily the type of parliamentary party. Centralised intervention, for instance, was used universally to produce 'balanced' electoral lists (considered in ethnic and gender terms). The type of centralised intervention, however, also varied, and had varying consequences for the representation of political groups. The Swapo president, for instance, was keen to appoint members from across ethnic lines, but he did not choose members with their own support bases within Swapo. Instead, the president chose in many cases political novices: members, for instance, of the party youth league. Such candidates, the literature suggests, will be heavily indebted to the president.

In the next section, we turn to look at how factional groupings within political parties contested the selection process. We draw on a body of literature developed in the Indian context to evaluate whether variation in the inclusiveness of selection mechanisms can help explain variation in the stability of political parties. We first outline how the design of selection systems – understood as 'conflict systems' – in our four parties framed the outcome of the struggle between factional groupings for parliamentary candidacy at the time of the 2004 elections. Second, we examine whether variation in the selections mechanisms influenced the stability of our four parties. Finally, we place our findings in comparative perspective.

7.3 Candidate Selection Mechanisms as 'Conflict Systems

In Chapter 2, we argued that party elites – at the moment of 'founding' – have a greater degree of choice over different candidate selection systems than electoral systems. We argued, in addition, that if we are to gain a closer understanding of how, precisely, selection mechanisms might influence the stability of political parties, we should try to find out what party elites intended when designing selection systems. 'Intellectual creativity', as Colomer (2004: 5)

argues, can presage the construction of 'new rules and procedures' that can 'reshape actors institutional preferences and political strategies'. In Africa's new democracies, the strategies and calculation of political entrepreneurs to develop 'accommodative' party structures can be of lasting importance, but it cannot be taken for granted; nor can it be attributed reflexively to the type of organisational setting in a party. Political parties are not, as Günther and Diamond (2003) suggest, simply ethnic (exclusive) or congress-like (consociational), as a matter of definition. Parties, we recall, are 'endogenous institutions'; political parties are the creations of their partisans. The experience of the Indian National Congress is instructive: in spite of its strong organisation and an established tradition of consensus, different party leaders had a radically different approach to the distribution of power within party structures. Nehru was a model party democrat who, according to Lijphart (1996: 262), 'unfailingly respected and promoted the internally democratic and federal nature of the Congress party'. Under the stewardship of Gandhi, in contrast, party democracy was stifled and the accommodative nature of the party began to erode, leading ultimately to a split (Kothari 1974). The actions of party elites, in other words, can have a strong bearing on the outcome of partisan processes. In our four cases, then, we look at whether party elites, first, considered different ways of designing selection systems. Second, we examine whether elites gave conscious thought to how variation in the design of selection mechanism would influence factional competition within political parties.

The African National Congress

The design of the ANC selection process was a conscious act[7] and is nested within design of the country's electoral system. Following the unbanning of the ANC in February 1990, there was a steady stream of advice from 'constitutional engineers' to South Africa's major parties. The general consensus among the mostly consociational experts (though not entirely: Donald Horowitz was an important and notable exception), was that South Africa should choose an electoral system that was 'permissive' enough to allow a broad range of parties, each expressing a discrete political viewpoint, in parliament. The aversion to majoritarian and pluralist electoral systems is well-established – there is, according to W. Arthur Lewis (1965: 71), no better way

[7] The close consideration given by the ANC to the design of a new electoral system was not accidental – Prof. Asmal from the outset considered a parliament's electoral system to be 'at the heart of the democratic order'. Indeed, the ANC conducted a comprehensive survey of different electoral systems and their likely consequences and went so far as to convene a special conference (held in Stellenbosch in 1990) to discuss various electoral options.

'to kill the idea of democracy in a plural society [than] to adopt the Anglo-American electoral system of first-past-the-post'. Even Horowitz's preference for the Alternative Vote system (such as is used in elections to the lower house of the Australian legislature) has been criticised on this charge (Lijphart 1991: 96; Gouws and Mitchell 2005: 357). Nonetheless, the ANC's early preference was for just such a majoritarian electoral system (Asmal 1988). Their ultimate decision to plump for the proportional closed-list PR system, then, is sometimes met with confusion. At the time, Lijphart (1994: 229) wrote that 'the ANC's high-minded stance on PR runs completely counter to the conventional wisdom that political parties act on the basis of their narrow partisan self-interest'. There is, perhaps, some truth to this – the ANC were acutely aware of the interdependence of ANC and NP interests (Sparks 2002) – but there was also a healthy dose of self-interest to the decision. Three points are worth considering.

First, the ANC rejected wholesale the idea of an electoral system with geographic constituencies. There were a plethora of (self-interested) reasons for the rejection of a constituency-based electoral system – the ANC wanted a system where voters could essentially 'vote Mandela' and were concerned with the logistical difficulties of demarcating a vast (and sparsely populated) country into small constituencies. This position included the rejection of multi-seat as well as single-seat constituencies. The ANC, fearing foul play, also rejected any electoral system that divided the country into constituencies because 'in the move from a racist colonial regime to a democratic system you had to have an electoral system that would be simple, clear, where there would not be any opportunity for gerrymandering and which would not rely on registration'. Aware that 'all power was in the state', the ANC feared abuse of the system in constituencies controlled by local returning officers and magistrates (Interview with Asmal.)[8]

Second, the ANC were acutely concerned that the new electoral system must be designed to manage competing societal interests in a *divided* society, which meant the new system must translate faithfully electoral support into a proportionate number of parliamentary seats. The new system, argued Prof. Asmal, had to 'lend legitimacy to the new order', which meant 'getting minorities in [Parliament]'.[9] Consequently, the Single-Member Plurality electoral system was rejected by the ANC almost out-of-hand. The rationale of Prof. Asmal – key

[8] Sisk (1993: 87) agrees, citing a straightforward and uncomplicated ballot structure, and the problematic legacy of the Group Areas act as contributing factors to the ANC decision to adapt list-PR.

[9] When Nelson Mandela asked Prof. Asmal to summarise in a single sentence the merits of List-PR, Prof. Asmal quoted former US president Lyndon Johnson (with reference to disaffected Afrikaaners) 'if you know a son of a bitch, you would rather have him inside pissing out, than outside pissing in' (Interview with Asmal).

advocate of PR-List – can certainly be read in this light. Echoing Prof. Arthur Lewis's pronouncement on the same sort of system (SMP) in operation in West Africa in the 1960s, Asmal argued that 'there would have been civil war if you had a system like in Britain where you are given 20–25 percent of the votes and you're given 10% of the seats if you are lucky.' Indeed, during the few volatile months leading up to the April 1994 elections, the ANC were particularly concerned to 'get the [hard-line] Afrikaaners in'. In a crucial meeting with General Constand Viljoen, Nelson Mandela used the proportionality of the electoral system to assure the general that right-wing Afrikaaners would have a 'voice' in the new parliament. The ANC decided, then, that the new electoral system would belong to the broader family of proportional representation. Mattes makes the point that the revised decision of the ANC to support a PR electoral system coincided with rising electoral support for the ANC, which would have rendered the seat bonus accrued under SMP unnecessary. Mattes' argument, however, is most likely a little unkind – narrow political self-interest was probably trumped by a recognition that significant political concessions to South Africa's (economically and militarily) powerful minorities would need to be made if stability in the short-term was to be achieved.

The ANC, however, were also conscious that if parliament were to represent the diverse societal interests of South Africa, much would depend on the nature of the ANC parliamentary caucus. Considered in this light, the ANC had further reason to plump for List-PR – it allowed the party leadership to sculpt a parliamentary caucus that would 'represent the mosaic of traditions in the ANC of non-racialism, non-tribalism, non-sexism'. This diversity, according to Prof. Asmal, could not be ensured if candidates were selected at an exclusively local level. Therefore, from the outset the ANC leadership envisaged a system that made explicit provision for central intervention by the ANC leadership to redress any imbalance that arose from popular input. This, too, is closely related to factional competition. List-PR would facilitate central intervention, but also allow for balancing of non-factional interests. When asked about how much consideration the ANC gave to the selection of candidates when choosing an electoral system, Prof. Asmal was unequivocal, and his response is worth repeating in its entirety:

> 'Let me say quite clearly, what loomed very large in our minds was "how could we get people into parliament that represented the whole breadth of our membership, how will we arrange for this?"... and we said we can not leave it to local processes, because local is not necessarily more democratic and we know that from the constituency system in other countries that local can be demonically abusive and tyrannical.'

It is possible, of course, to find in this statement an attempt to graft an altruistic motive onto a deeply self-interested act. There is a strong suggestion from some quarters that parties gave explicit consideration to candidate selection under closed-list PR before making their final decision. In this vein, Giliomee and Simkins (1999: 16), perhaps a little unkindly, put forward that 'it [closed-list PR] suited the ANC so well that it would have had to invent it if it did not exist'. Reilly and Reynolds (1999: 30) argue that ANC were keen to maintain racial unity by 'blunting' potential ethnic divisions within the black majority, but that they were also eager to 'keep strict control over its elected representatives.' Giliomee (2005: 5) also points to the broad acceptance of closed-list PR by the NP, drawing attention to their enthusiasm for a system that reduced the likelihood of 'revolts against the NP leadership once it had lost control of the negotiations'.

Once again, however, it is possible to see deeper self-interest in the ANC decision. The ANC – acutely aware of the diverse tendencies within the party – considered explicitly the future danger of intra-party conflict. When pressed by Mr. Mandela to explain why the Irish system (PR-STV) was not preferred, Prof. Asmal underlined the potentially divisive intra-party competition for seats that, in his view, had plagued Irish party politics, particular in the ruling party (not, incidentally, because the system was too complicated, as alleged by Giliomee 2005), arguing that:

> 'I knew of the defects because Mr. Mandela asked me, "come on why don't you want the Irish system?" Well I said, "if you want ANC candidates to fight each other in multi-seat constituencies, then have the Irish system." Where there are three-seaters or five-seaters and you are elected on the basis of the average – the number of the voters divided by the number of seats and you get elected on the first count– and then you distribute the surpluses. And then what happens between the elections, all the MPs fight each other from the same party.'

The ANC, then, had in mind the potential impact of an electoral system on internal party conflict. The decision to choose List-PR can be traced, in part, to the desire to avoid this sort of internal party conflict. We could argue that the ANC wanted a proportional system of representation and, in addition, a centralised system of candidate selection in order to provide a strong hand for the ANC leadership – the closed-list variant of PR, it has been argued, is a natural choice for elites in an elite-led transition (Sisk 1995) – but if we look more closely, we can see an appreciation by the ANC elites of the potential for discord inside the ANC provided a compelling case to allow for broad-based internal competition within the party, though with centralised mechanisms for redressing any imbalances caused by a decentralised selectorate. The

ANC, then, seemed quite aware of Duverger's fear that dominance contained 'the seed of their own destruction' (1964: 312). Dominance, as ANC elites understood, rests on the ability of the party to appeal to all major sections in society. The ANC were acutely aware of the demands of developing a type of 'catch-all' appeal to the South African electorate and, as we saw in Chapter 6, much of their balancing of representatives on their list is concerned with maximising electoral appeal. Among the vast majority of ANC members, candidates, and officials, there is an appreciation of the need for intervention. But there was also, as Prof. Asmal revealed, a keen understanding that internal groups needed to compete for parliamentary office – hence the broad tolerance of competition within provinces – but that any outcome of such competition would be monitored at the national level

The Democratic Alliance

The origins of the candidate selection process in the DA are rooted firmly in the history of the merger between the Democratic Party, the New National Party and the Federal Alliance in June 2000. Unlike other parties in this study, the DA is the product of an agreement between three distinct political parties with radically different political traditions, leaders and support bases. In spite of the simple idea that drove unification – 'collaps[ing] inter-opposition rivalry to present a united alliance [against the ANC]' (Interview with Selfe) – the alliance was to prove short-lived. At the heart of the eventual collapse, according to one figure within the party, lay a fundamental 'cultural clash' between its constituent components. There were, however, also other more mundane issues at stake. Both factions in the new 'Democratic Alliance' were intent on consuming the other. According to a senior party representative (and DP faction member), the DP faction were intent on 'incorporating the NNP into the DP without compromising our liberal ideology, brand integrity, organisational culture, and enduring our organisational dominance' (Selfe, cited in Leon 2008: 539).[10] The leader of the DP faction, in turn, 'was confident we could decimate them [the NNP] from within.'[11]

The NNP, as events demonstrated, had precisely the same idea in mind. Struggle for control of the party became reduced to control over voting delegates at party conferences. By June 2001, the NNP had signed up 55,000 new members – two-thirds of whom were from the

[10] This extract is taken from a fifty-four page discussion document called 'Entering Negotiations with the NNP. An Appreciation of the Strategic Landscape: Assessment of the Balance of Forces.' The DP, clearly, gave a good deal of thought to the merger.

[11] This sentiment, according to Leon (2008: 536) also held for much of the party rank-and-file who, according to the former DA leader, thought 'bleeding the Nat support base and pillaging their public representatives was far more agreeable and appetising [compared to building trust between the factions].'

Western Cape. The manipulation of the membership role, however, was 'underwritten by fraud.' An internal party audit of the membership discovered that 20% of the new membership were 'tainted', while 90% of new members in the Northern Cape were either not fully paid-up members, dead, or simply did not exist (Leon 2008: 557–8). According to one former-DP party official, once a membership audit was carried and the full scale of the attempted fraud was realised 'we [the DP] all had to face the fact that we were in bed with the devil'. A senior advisor to the party president (who was later parachuted by the president onto the party list) argued that 'they [the NNP] were trying to take us over' (Coetzee, cited in Calland 2006: 172). A leading Sunday newspaper agreed, arguing that the alliance 'was less a merger … more a hostile takeover' (*Sunday Times* October 14, 2001). When the NNP faction leader and a handful of NNP MPs broke with the DA, the ostensible reason was a rift over a local matter in Cape Town, but the fundamental cause lay in the severe conflict that had developed between the two major sections of the party over the control of the party apparatus.

Otherwise stated, the struggle between factions in the DA can be traced back to concern over the 'free-rider' problem associated with Closed-List PR systems. Party elites in vote-rich (but member-poor) areas such as Gauteng were concerned that they would be marginalised at electoral conventions if the number of delegates was determined in proportion to membership. The NNP, according to Leon (former DA leader), considered the problem from a different angle. A 'reverse takeover' would be possible if the NNP were able to increase their membership (in areas such as the Western and Northern Capes) to the stage where voter support (in areas such as KwaZulu Natal or Gautend) became irrelevant in the determining of internal party positions. For an 'electoralist' party, such as the DP, this tactic was potentially ruinous to their prospects of achieving their goals within the merger.

Control over the number of branch-level delegates, then, became a source of severe tension within the DA. This potential for discord was not lost on the DA leadership that remained after the departure of the NNP faction. Indeed, 'a significant swathe of Nats [sic] … remained totally dedicated'. Of the 612 NNP councillors that had joined the DA, 279 remained after the departure of the leadership of the NNP (Leon 2008: 593). The future cohesion of the party unity depended, senior members of the party agreed, on providing mechanisms for internal party competition that minimised factional instability. A solution to the struggle over control of candidate selection, according to senior party figures, needed to be found if the new party was to work. In local elections held in 2000, DA candidates had been chosen informally based on the

strength of each party before the merger. In anticipation of the 2004 general elections, as we have seen, candidates were to be chosen at electoral colleges comprising branch delegates. Following in the wake of the wreckage of the alliance, two senior party figures (Kraai van Niekerk and Helen Zille) traversed the country to test party opinion on the introduction of a nationwide selection process to nominate candidates for the 2004 general election. The two figures found that 'wide variation in personalities and organisation' made introduction of a 'standardised' (i.e. single, nationwide) selection system impossible. This is an interesting discovery and indicates the importance of factionalism to the type of selection process that emerges in new parties (somewhat analogous, perhaps, to the assertion that a polity with many cleavages will choose a PR electoral system).

A particular problem, according to DA figures, was not just the different style that marked each party; the NNP – in stark contrast to the DP – had a very weakly organised network of party organs. They had been unable to fight on even terms with well-supported DP candidates all along and their early response had been to manipulate (allegedly) the selection process. Equally, however, DP figures in the electorally popular areas were unwilling to run the risk of being disproportionately represented (in proportion to their electoral strength). In the Western Cape, for instance, where a full 50% of the DA vote is garnered, the provincial leadership guarded jealously their right to secure commensurate levels of nomination. In effect, provinces were given a clear incentive to develop the support-base of the party and any tendency towards electoral free-riding was discouraged. Each faction was quite happy to decentralise control over the selection of parliamentary candidates. Thus, under the new party rules regions would send delegates to electoral colleges in proportion to their level of electoral support.

The selection system of the DA, then, was a carefully designed 'conflict system' that was created with the problem of factional competition in mind. The new 'rules of the game' had two defining features: first, the system established parameters within which each province would select candidates. This provided an antidote against factional instability as each region (with the exception of the Western Cape) was controlled by one faction or the other. Though much of the source of the original dispute has disappeared – a significant proportion of the NNP had, eventually, left the party – key figures within the DA leadership gave serious consideration to how a new selection process would influence the stability of the political party. Second, any imbalance in the (demographic) characteristics of the caucus caused by such a 'participatory' system would be redressed by limited intervention by the party leader (Interview with van

Niekerk). There was an astute realisation within the DA that a decentralised selectorate would limit the degree of demographic diversity in the parliamentary caucus. To pre-empt this problem, the DA allowed the party leader to select – 'parachute', effectively – hand-picked candidates into the list of each province.

Swapo

Africa's last colony, Namibia, gained independence from South Africa in 1990 and, in the process, drafted a constitution that was among the most liberal in the world (Bauer 2001). The new constitution allowed for a proportional electoral system, a semi-presidential form of government, executive term limits, an upper house of parliament representative of regions, and the entrenchment of the sanctity of private property. Reynolds (1999), looking only at the country's 'parchment institutions', considered Namibia to be a mildly 'consensual' form of democracy (1994). In the early years of independence, at least, this liberal document was matched by an equally liberal spirit. Minority groups were included in government and great effort was made, to the surprise of many observers (much like in Zimbabwe), to eschew seemingly deep-held Marxist principles and to implement policies that would retain the confidence of the business world (Leys and Saul 1995).

Namibia, however, has few of the structural characteristics of most liberal democracies. Levels of development, as we noted in Chapter 4, are low and there are high levels of inequality; the vast majority of wealth is produced by a small, foreign-owned, mining sector. Unlike South Africa, the network of civil society organisations is not densely organised, the labour movement is weak and independent media struggles to remain viable. Democracy, as we know, is rare in a poor country (Przeworski 2000). That is not to suggest that Namibian democracy will inevitably unravel, but in such countries much depends on the commitment of the political elite (Przeworski 1991; Linz and Stepan 1996). In the past decade, a number of incidents hint at the illiberal tendencies of key figures inside the Namibian ruling party. At its 1997 party congress, party members voted overwhelmingly to alter the constitutional bar on President Nujoma seeking a third-term in office. Namibia was brought into two provincial wars of dubious legitimacy, and the security forces involved in allegations of torture during the suppression of a failed secession attempt in Caprivi (von Cranenburgh 2001). The launch of the Congress of Democrats saw a resuscitation of the language of exile politics; the newly-formed group were labelled 'spies and traitors' by senior government ministers (Lodge 1999).

On the surface, it appears puzzling that Swapo agreed to the adoption of a highly proportional electoral system[12], which would present opposition parties with a low hurdle to gaining parliamentary representation.[13] A shallow reading of the case would suggest that Swapo, like their South African counterparts, exhibited either a 'high-minded' commitment to reconciliation and electoral fair-play or a form of enlightened self-interest. The South African case, as we observed, was somewhat surprising: there were good practical (and instrumental) reasons to choose closed-list PR. At least some of this concern could be traced back to the desire on the part of the ANC to allow for a broad cross-section of their membership to gain representation in parliament. The selection mechanism, in turn, was designed to facilitate broad-based popular involvement, while retaining the capacity of the leadership to intervene to secure a balanced caucus. In the Namibian case, however, it seems the choice of this extremely proportional system was expressly *against* the wishes of Swapo who knew that they would fare better under a majoritarian system (Interview with Angula). In Namibia, there was no concern to include the 'mosaic' of internal tendencies and factions within the parliamentary caucus; Swapo wanted First-Past-The-Post because they would sweep the board with such a system.

Nor is it likely the case that Swapo elites did not really realise the implications of diverse electoral design. Often, electoral system choice in Africa is attributed to a general contentment to adopt the system of the departing colonial power (Barkan 2006). There are probably practical reasons for this ambivalence among postcolonial elites: as a rule, nationalist movements faced no real opposition, once colonial elites had departed (Nugent 2004). In Namibia, however, the implications of electoral choice were understood clearly in the upper echelons of the liberation movement at the time of transition. According to a senior Swapo participant in the constitutional negotiations (and current member of the party steering committee), Swapo accepted the 'imposition' of PR as 'part of the give-and-take' of negotiations. In return for this concession, the party was given leeway to design electoral systems for lower-tier elections and concessions on the degree of federalism within the country.

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[12] Using the least squares index of disproportionality, Namibia has an average score of 0.825 over the course of the first four elections to the lower house of parliament. South Africa has an average score of 0.33. Both systems, then, rank among the most proportional in the world (Gallagher 2005c: 621). See http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/staff/michael_gallagher/ElSystems/Docts/ElectionIndices.pdf (Accessed September 12, 2008.)

[13] It is not uncommon for new democracies in divided societies to choose an electoral system carefully – in countries as diverse as Ireland and Zimbabwe, the presence of a significant minority convinced key actors that a non-proportional outcome could undermine regime stability grievously. In the Irish case, it appears the departing British felt PR-STV would allow the minority southern Unionist group fair representation (Gallagher 2005b:512–4), while in Zimbabwe the single-member plurality system was kept although whites had a separate voters' roll.

Indeed, the degree of sophistication of the electoral choice among the Namibian elite is quite impressive. When designing provincial and local authority elections they crafted two different electoral system with specific aims in mind. The provincial council electoral system (single-member plurality) would provide a manufactured majority for SWAPO party, which held a plurality, if not an outright majority, in most regions. The proportional system with large multi-seat constituencies for local elections, on the other hand, would account for the concentration of white voters in metropolitan areas. 'SWAPO' according to our source, 'thought that in urban areas the composition of the population was such that if you allow FPTP, then those in urban areas [whites] for a long time would dominate. So, SWAPO preferred PR for the local authorities. So, it [electoral choice] twists and turns depending on whose interests are being protected.'

Clearly, the Swapo leadership understood how Closed-List PR would influence levels of support for political parties. Considering the degree of thought given by Swapo elites to the detail of constitutional design, it is probably fair to assume that the leadership also considered different ways of selecting candidates. We can be reasonably confident, then, that the choice of a highly centralised method of candidate selection was deliberate. Unlike the ANC, however, little effort was made to devolve control over selection procedures to popularly-elected party structures; no thought was given the balancing of factions within the party. In fact, the selection process in the initial Namibian elections was extraordinarily centralised – acting alone, the president of the party nominated the first thirty members of the Swapo list (Lodge 1999). If a closer understanding of selection procedures opens a window onto a political party's level of internal democracy, Swapo at the dawn of their democracy appear virtually authoritarian. In preparation for the 2004 elections, the selection process remains centralised, though less so than in the early days on independence. The president still has broad powers to intervene, but there is little scope for broad-based involvement from below and there are no mechanism whatsoever to allow for stable factional competition.

The Congress of Democrats

The Congress of Democrats, we recall, 'was formed in great haste' barely eight months before the 1999 national elections. The party constitution, too, was 'drafted in a great hurry'. Senior party figures had engaged a Norwegian constitutional expert, and drew from the comparative experience of other parties (particularly in southern Africa and Scandanavia), to devise a

constitution that represented 'best practice'. Yet such was the disorganisation of the drafting process, that many of the details of the proposed constitution were left on the cutting floor in the party headquarters when the interim constitutional committee met. The constitution, then, was 'not really done deliberately' (Interview with Gertze). What did emerge from the process, however, was a reasonably coherent document that was almost identical to the constitution of the ANC in neighbouring South Africa.

With respect to the candidate selection process, much was left to chance. Unlike in the ANC, the constitution stipulated little in the way of detail; the executive committee was to draw up specific regulations for the selection process, but of course this never happened. Crucially, too, the popularly-elected organ of the party – the Annual National Conference – never met to 'deliberate on and endorse' the list proposed by the National List Committee. In actual fact, the List Committee did little more than articulate the key characteristics of a balanced list (seniority, ethnicity and sex), which formed the point of departure for the National Working Committee cut at a draft of the final electoral list. On paper, we might have expected the 'conflict system' of the CoD list process to operate just as well as the ANC 'conflict system', but this is not quite the case. The ANC, by balancing provincial and national list systems, had allowed for popular participation by party members but retained a measure of central control – and involvement by factional elites – at the committee level of each province, as well as at the national level. The CoD selection system is similar, in theory, to the manner in which the ANC national list is constructed. All senior party figures make it onto the list, and then a small group of representatives from each of the major factional groupings thrash out a list that is commonly acceptable but the intent of the ANC national list is that it complements the provincial process: it provides for ascriptive balance and tempers the 'popular' character of the provincial lists. In the CoD, however, there is no such scope for popular input. Branches and regions were allowed to nominate candidates, certainly, but the rank-ordering of the candidates – the crucial stage of the process in a small party with limited prospects – was carried out within the upper echelons of the party. There was no popular input – no incentive for office-seekers to develop factional support – that, the Indian literature suggests, is vital to the maintenance of inter-factional unity.

7.4 The Cohesion of Four African Political Parties

The African National Congress

The importance of the *inclusive* nature of the ANC list process is seen by the senior figures in the national executive as a vital component of the accommodation of factions within the party. There is some 'reticence' about the ability of the list system to reward candidates with strongly 'subjective' qualities, such as 'cabinet material' but, on balance, this is considered unavoidable. The key concern of senior party figures was that the list process remain 'open' (Interview with Asmal). As we saw in Chapter 6, in our discussion of the ANC selection process, aspirant candidates can be placed on the ANC electoral list through either selection on the list of national candidates, or placement by any of the nine provincial lists. The national list process is comparatively more closed – a committee of nine senior party figures determines it (subject to the approval of the party national executive). The rank-ordering of the list and ratification by the national electoral college is, to all practical intents, something of a formality. The provincial lists, on the other hand, are quite competitive or 'open' processes: elected delegates from each branch in the province meet to determine who appears on the electoral list. Provincial list committees intervene to balance the list according to set criteria, but it is very difficult to appear on a provincial list of candidates without significant backing from the branch-level delegates.

According to our definition (see Chapter 2), the stability of a political party – or the tripartite alliance, in the case of the ANC – is seen in terms of its cohesion. An unstable party, in other words, suffers resignations of high-profile members, or a split by a faction or section of the party. Importantly, however, we need to demonstrate that the potential for such instability exists. It is important to show that our 'dependent variable' (levels of party cohesion) is, in fact, variable. It is possible to argue that such is the emotive bond between the SACP, COSATU and ANC – forged over the years of struggle – that a split after only a decade in office was simply unthinkable. We have evidence to the contrary: while there was certainly an appreciation of the historical value of the alliance and a reluctance to 'consign this mantle to the centre-right by stepping outside the alliance', both SACP and COSATU elites have considered carefully the decision to cede from the alliance (Interview with anonymous party figures). The potential for such a split is higher than one might suppose. According to a representative survey of COSATU members in 2004, 42% of respondents said they would consider, hypothetically, voting for an alternative party, while 38% indicated they, as workers, would consider forming an alternative

party (Cherry and Southall 2006: 93–4). Within the SACP, too, there has also been serious discussion of a split in the Alliance. Interviews with senior party figures confirmed that the matter has been discussed at the highest levels of the party and internal polling had been conducted to gauge levels of electoral support for an independent SACP. The continued loyalty of COSATU and SACP in the run-up to the 2004 election (and in its aftermath) was not guaranteed.

Support for continued COSATU involvement in the ANC remains high and, in fact, grew between 1999 and 2004. In 1999, only 10% of respondents (to a representative survey of COSATU members) felt that the trade union federation should form its own worker's party. By 2004, this figure has decreased to 7%. This is an interesting statistic: media reports and quite a few academics, generally, pointed during this time period to a growing difference of opinion within the tripartite alliance and, as a corollary, the growing likelihood (if not probability) of a class-based split.[14] The difference of opinion seems incontrovertible. But it seems, in fact, that the COSATU leadership and rank-and-file believe that their interests are best served through continued association within the ANC. COSATU seek to influence ANC policy in a range of ways – the establishment of a COSATU parliamentary office has received particular mention (Maree 1998) – but the strongly participatory nature of the ANC selection process also provides COSATU with an avenue to channel their grievances. Though COSATU, at times, voiced concern that the union movement was being marginalized within the alliance (See, for instance, COSATU 2003), the dominant message from the leadership, according to Cherry and Southall (2006: 77) was to 'encourage trade unionists to challenge for elections [inside the ANC] and to encourage ordinary trade unionists to swell the ranks of the ANC'.

The stable and, indeed, increasing levels of support for continued COSATU association with the ANC must be viewed in light of the numerous policy disputes (and disagreements between competing personalities) within the alliance. The stability of the alliance has been undermined in a number of ways – particularly through disagreements over macroeconomic policy – but from the perspective of the cohesiveness of the alliance, a key long-term issue revolves around the possibility of elite rupture within the tripartite alliance, leading to the formation of a new political party

The second key (and, arguably, unhappier) faction within the tripartite alliance, the SACP, also faced a similar set of choices to COSATU. The likelihood of a SACP break from the

[14] See, for instance, Habib and Taylor (2001)

alliance, however, was greater than the chances of COSATU pulling away from the ANC. The SACP, unlike COSATU, is a discrete political party that have chosen to align with the ANC for strategic reasons. As a ready-made political party – complete with all the organs and infrastructure of a political party – the SACP could contest elections at reasonably short notice. They also had quite a few high-profile ANC members with executive and legislative experience at the highest levels of the state. The strategic decision by the SACP to remain within the alliance was quite reversible. According to senior party figures, the SACP consider three options: maintain the status quo, lobby for a formal quota of SACP members on the ANC list or run a completely independent SACP slate of candidates. This choice, according to a member of the party steering committee, is the 'burning issue' in current debates held on the executive committee of the SACP. Interestingly, the SACP leadership have rejected, so far, any thought of running their own slate of candidates in elections. Running as an independent party, according to one figure, is a 'highly risky strategy'. Internal party research suggests, by this account, that support for an independent SACP is unpredictable: according to internal research, support among the electorate for a 'left-wing workers party' varies from 5–18%. This uncertainty gave elites a strong disincentive to stay from the ANC fold. The SACP, in addition, want to avoid at all costs the prospects of going into direct electoral competition with the ANC for the 'core constituency … in the squatter camps' (Interview with Cronin; Interview with Carrim).

The second option – a formal quota of SACP candidates on an ANC list – is the more seriously mooted alternative, most notably suggested by then deputy-president of the ANC, Jacob Zuma. The logic behind this position is that a 'block' of SACP MPs could 'pull the debate to the left and allow the ANC to offer a 'Marxist response to the free-market capitalism of Tony Leon and the DA' (Interview with Cronin, Interview with Carrim). Again, the decision to reject the second option can be traced to rational, self-interested motives. According to Cronin, 'although one can talk of a gentleman's pact between the ANC and the SACP the fact is that … if we were part of the ANC list as a quota, we would end up with far fewer [MPs] than we have got.' Ultimately, the decision of the SACP to retain the status quo rests (by the accounts of our interviewees) on two factors. First, the SACP leadership valued greatly, and took advantage of, the strength of ANC branch-level support for SACP candidates who 'have established themselves as ANC members and have a popular base there'. It is this support, according to a member of the SACP steering committee, that has helped give the SACP approximately seventy-five members of the ANC caucus. The party leadership, furthermore, were 'confident'

that the process of candidate selection within the ANC is sufficiently competitive to allow 'SACP members, as active members of the ANC, [to] be elected … in sufficient numbers not to cause undue concern' (Interview with Carrim). This decentralised nature (or 'openness', to use Asmal's words) of the candidate selection process, then, is directly related to the continued stability (or cohesiveness) of the tripartite alliance. The continued satisfaction of the SACP to retain the status quo, moreover, is bolstered at the upper levels of the selection process by a 'tacit presence' and 'sensitivity [among the ANC leadership] to ensuring that there are some senior SACP personalities playing an active role in ANC list [process]' (Interview with Cronin). The SACP have had demonstrably high levels of success in exerting an informal influence over the selection of candidates – away from the electoral colleges and in the 'smoke-filled' backrooms of the alliance. Another senior leader pointed out that they had 'eight or nine people we thought should be moved to a safe position on the list…with one or two exceptions, we were successful with that.'

The ANC, then, have institutionalised a system of that mediates conflict between the alliance partners and dampens demands by groups within the SACP – notably the Youth League – to begin a staged withdrawal from the alliance. Considered in this light, the stability of the relationship within the alliance conforms to our expectations drawn from the Indian experience. The requirement for contending elites to boost their prospect of advancement within the ANC depended, to a large extent, on their standing at grass-roots level. By allowing SACP members a fair chance to rally support for their candidacy at the grass-roots level, elites felt that their interests were best served within the alliance. It is, according to Cronin, 'difficult to rescue someone from complete oblivion', but given the strong voting bloc provided by the SACP membership within electoral colleges, candidates with a high profile has a fighting chance of securing nomination. Candidates, too, are aware of this and unless they are assured of successful intervention, which tends to be uncertain, build support among ANC membership. To ensure that this grass-roots support filters through, the 'overriding concern' of the SACP is that of 'ensuring the list process is as democratic as possible' (Interview with Cronin). There is possibly an additional reason for the willingness of SACP leaders to trust to the competitive part of the list process: at elections for candidates held at provincial list conferences, the voting system is a type of block vote. This system of voting is, according Gallagher (2005: 593), 'the least proportional of all'. We could speculate (though we have no data to test this conjecture) that the SACP, with 32,000 paid-up members (the vast majority of whom are in the ANC), would act as

a reasonably cohesive voting block (through branch delegates) at provincial list conferences. Indeed, when considered as a proportion of the ANC membership, the SACP block constituted just under 8% of the total ANC membership.

The Democratic Alliance

Even under a carefully designed 'conflict system', the selection of parliamentary candidates in 2004 was a source of some discontent within the Democratic Alliance. According to the leader of the DA, 'nothing more arrested the attention and provoked more backstabbing in the DA than the selection of election candidates [in 2004]. Under our devolved system, it is the moment when party activists exercise real muscle and power, and literally make or break sitting MPs and their aspirant replacements' (Leon 2008: 614). In the Western Cape, however, the potential for instability was higher than in any other province. Both party factions were strongly supported, political intrigue in the Western Cape had led directly to the break-away of the NNP faction leader and section of leaders, and the Western Cape was the only province where the DA could actually hope to win a plurality, if not a majority, of votes.

The 'real' story of the Western Cape selection process did not quite confirm to the official version of events. According to the party rulebook, the number of delegates from each of the regions that were entitled to attend (provincial) electoral colleges should have been determined according to the number of DA voters. In reality, however, the number of delegates that attended the provincial electoral college was determined by negotiations between senior leaders of the DP and NNP factions at a meeting of the party executive committee of the Western Cape. According to interviewees from across the factional groupings, it was agreed (somewhat reluctantly by the Metro faction) that each of the two smaller regions would send fifteen delegates, while the Metro region would send thirty. The imbalance in delegates was a 'point of contention' according to one participant, but justified by a former NNP member as 'fair representation of the membership of the DA in terms of the *old* formations of the DP, NP etc.' (Interview with Swart).

The coordinated decision to provide a fixed number of delegates from each region removed much of the uncertainty associated with the decision taken at the electoral college. By determining, in advance, the number of regional – and hence factional – delegates, the two factions were able to arrive at what a senior party figure described as 'an informal political agreement that not more than a certain proportion of electable candidates would be elected from

each region. In other words, they [the provincial leadership] worked out how many electable candidates each region would get'. The calculation of 'electable' candidate was based on a seat target for the region, which was an over-estimation of party support to ensure the agreement covered elected candidates even in the case that the party performed surprisingly well in the elections. Of the first seventeen candidates to be placed on the list, three each would come from the Eastern and Western regions, while eleven would come from the Metro region. (In the end, the Western Cape sent eleven DA members to the National Assembly.)

Clearly, the selection process in the DA had been designed in such a way to remove as much uncertainty about the outcome as possible. The elaborate evaluation process was more than ritualistic – it was impossible, of course, for the leadership to predict precisely how each delegate would vote in each of the two rounds and there was room for some uncertainty in the process. It is difficult to estimate the extent to which voting within the electoral college mattered but it seems that it might have made some difference to intra-factional ranking of candidates. This was not the case for candidates from the Western and Eastern regions – the identity of the three candidates from both of these region had been decided in advance by the regional leaderships (Interview with faction leaders). Effectively, however, the decisive issue at the electoral college, the number of delegates from each region, had been decided in advance by factional leaders. Although the process was still competitive, factional elites had structured participation so that the outcome was fairly predictable.[15]

In our survey of parliamentarians, we also asked DA MPs to evaluate the selection process. Considering the preferred degree of involvement from each party organ, a majority of MPs (68%) pronounced the involvement of the national level of the party 'just right', but a significant minority (25%) though there was 'too much' or 'far too much' involvement from the centre. This, clearly, is a pointed attack on the role of the party leader who inserted directly nine members out of fifty on the DA electoral list. A strong majority (63%) was also satisfied that the level of involvement from the provinces and the local level of the party was 'about right', while a significant minority, again, were unhappy with the level of involvement of the provincial party structures. In the first case, this minority (25%) felt that the provinces were too involved. Interestingly, a quarter of respondents felt the role of the local party branch to be 'too great' or 'far too great'. This would seem to indicate that the DA pitched the process at about the correct

[15] The fourth highest-placed candidate from the Western Region, for instance, was placed in eighteenth position on the Western Cape electoral list which indicates her strong showing at the electoral college provided some sort of impetus to push her up the list.

level. A more or less equal number of respondents felt that the higher and lower levels of the party intervened too much, while a consistently strong majority of respondents felt the locus of decision lay in the correct place.

The broad acceptance (among our respondents) of the legitimacy of the DA selection process is demonstrated further in the question that probes respondents' attitudes towards the party leadership. A majority of respondents (63%) felt that elected delegates should have control over who appears on the list, with alternative views tapering away more or less evenly to either side. There is strong support however, for the leadership to play a decisive role in the ordering of candidates (25%), though a strong majority feel the elected party delegates should order candidates (63). Few feel that either party voters (6%)or the electorate should order party lists (6%). An overwhelming majority of candidates (between 70–90%) felt the process to be either quite or very fair, democratic and efficient. Under one-in-three felt the process was quite or overly complicated, in spite of the elaborate voting mechanisms at the electoral college.

In spite of the overbearing influence of party factions, the process was not seen by partisans as fundamentally unfair. We interviewed two unsuccessful candidates from the Western Cape that were placed within the top-thirty positions. Though both lamented the factionalism that determined, albeit indirectly, the allocation of seats at the provincial electoral college, neither considered an exit from the party or felt protest was warranted. Both determined to continue working within party (and factional) structures to increase their future prospect of advancement. In some cases, the sting was taken out of electoral failure through the intervention of the party leader. Though part of the role of the leader was, as we will see, to make the party more 'representative', the DA leader aimed to alleviate the potential for instability in this 'vexed and unhappy' [selection] exercise. In his memoirs, the DA party leader lamented that 'some candidates of exceptional merit moved down the list because they were unaligned to a faction.' Others, according to the leader, were 'bumped off the list as a consequence of neglect of constituency.' The DA party leader, then, used his power of intervention to reward 'able' candidates, but he also intervened to place unhappy candidates who had lost out in the competition for places (2008: 614). Of the nine candidates, the DA leader makes explicit reference to at least two that were inserted in electable positions in the interest of 'fairness' (Leon 2008: 615).

Swapo

In the past, the most important line of division with Swapo was centred on a northern-southern/external-internal axis. Factional groupings, as we discussed in Chapter 4, have focused largely on this ethnoregional factor. Over time, however, the degree of ethnic diversity within Swapo party has receded significantly. In its place, a 'tribal' division within the Ovambo group seems to have emerged as an important rallying point for political competition within Swapo. This pattern is not unprecedented: in Zambia, Posner (2005) points to the use by political elites of 'tribal' identity under one-party rule, and 'ethno-linguistic' identity during periods of multi-party rule. The tribal split, in addition, has an important regional dimension. In addition to these ethnic tensions, there are some other smaller less-organised or coherent groups, or tendencies, within Swapo, including the lobbies that promote equality of outcome for gender and youth groups, and a small trade union affiliate. In the following section we look at how the selection process has influenced the strategies and calculations of factional elites, seeking evidence to substantiate – or reject – our suspicion that the centralised and uncompetitive Swapo parliamentary selection process has acted as a destabilising force on the party.

It is worth recalling, briefly, a seminal moment in party politics in Namibia in the first decade of independence: the launch of the Congress of Democrats. Most of the key figures to emerge within the CoD were former, and in some cases, prominent members of Swapo. With the exception of party leader, Ben Ulenga, however, almost all other senior members were individuals from southern (or non-Ovambo) groups. In fact, throughout CoD's short history a perception has grown among some quarters that the party is, essentially, a part of southerners, particularly the Herero ethnic group. According to one prominent member, an important reason for the launch of Swapo was the dominance of the 'super tribe' (Ovambos) within Swapo. Part of the problem, as Chandra (2004) suggests, can be traced back to the highly visible nature of ethnic identity. Ethnic markers, we recall, provide 'costless' information to information-poor citizens. A perception of ethnic bias among the ruling elite is often deduced from the ethnic identity of party leaders and candidates. A fairly standard complaint voiced against Swapo is that, 'Swapo's presidential candidates all came from one ethnic group [which] speaks volumes about Swapo's true colours' (NUDO party leader Riruako, cited in *The Namibian*, May 10 2004). Over time, however, the dominance of northerners (or, to be more precise, the perception of northern dominance), specifically Ovambos, has grown. This feeling that Swapo is a party dominated by northerners seems to have a wide appeal among ordinary citizens: according to a

recent survey of ordinary citizens, four our of every five Ovambo-speakers had either 'a lot' or 'a very great deal' of trust in the ruling party, while the equivalent statistic among other language groups was less than one in three. In the 1999 survey, just four years earlier, over 90% of Ovambos and 48% of other groups held positive views of the government.

Within Swapo, there is a further 'tribal' split among Ovambos, between mostly Kwanyama-speakers living in the Ohangwena region (which is the most populous), and Ndonga-speakers living in the other three Ovambo regions. This tribal split has, according to a member of the party steering committee, had an important effect on the party. 'The Osivambo group', according to this Swapo leader, 'is made up of sub-ethnic groups which have their own chiefs and territorial locations which does play itself out … policy plays little part in competition for party or list position; sometimes … you can lose not because you are not a capable person perhaps you came from the wrong tribe … Interestingly enough, ideology is not playing a big part. Ethnic factors, you know'. Inside Swapo in the run-up to the construction of the 2004 electoral list, an important event – the contest to secure the presidential nomination – provides a clear insight into how battle lines in the party would be drawn for the parliamentary selection battle. The open election of the Swapo party president was unprecedented. Since the end of South African occupation, there had only ever been two contests for a top party position – once in 1991 for the post of secretary-general and a second time in 1997 for the position of vice-president. Swapo, in other words, had little experience with internal democracy and were 'entering uncharted territory' (Hopwood 2004b: 2).

The Swapo national executive met in early April to nominate candidates and determine the procedures used to select the presidential nominee. Delegates were drawn from all sections of the party, but the predominant number were taken from regional and district levels.[16] Voting was by a secret ballot and the 'Alternative Vote' system was used to determine the winner: if a candidate did not receive an outright majority on the first round of voting, the weakest candidate would be eliminated and a second round between the two front runners would determine the winner (Hopwood 2004b: 2). Each of the three candidates were seasoned politicians with strong 'struggle credentials' and ministerial track record. Hifikepunye Pohamba, a former secretary-general and vice-president of the party, was nominated by President Nujoma. Pohamba, indeed, relied heavily on the strong backing of the president; his candidacy, in essence, was defined by

[16] Of the 584 delegates, eighty-three were drawn from the Central Committee: ten from each of the thirteen regional committees; and three from each of the one hundred and two district committees. The remaining sixty-five were taken from the party youth league (15), elder's council (15), women's league (20), and the National Union of Namibian Workers (15).

the support of his patron, to the extent that he was viewed as the President's 'annointed successor' and his 'most loyal lieutenant' (*The Namibian* May 3, 2004; Hopwood 2004b: 1). Hidipo Hamutenya, another party stalwart, also had strong support from sections of the party, particularly in the Ohangwena region among Kwanyama-speakers, and from the National Union of Namibian Workers (Hopwood 2004b: 11). The third candidate, sitting prime minister Nahas Angula, was seen as a 'wild card' entry – popular within the party (in 2002, he topped the poll in internal elections to the national executive[17]), but lacking solid support from a discrete section of the party (Hopwood 2004b: 4). The contest itself took place over the final weekend in May 2004. There was no outright winner on the first round of voting: Pohamba received 213 votes, to Hamutenya's 166, and Angula's 137. On the second round of voting, Pohamba received 341 votes while Hamutenya attracted 167. All – except one – of Angula's supporters had lined up behind Pohamba (*The Namibian*, May 31 2004).

In many respects, this was an ordinary contest. The stakes were high and candidates responded by lobbying furiously for support. The media took an active interest and candidates espoused policy positions in live and recorded interviews. Candidates toured the country, seeking support from local and regional party figures. In some other respects, however, this was not an ordinary contest. First the contest was defined by the 'patron-client' basis of the party structures. Hamutenya's candidacy, ultimately, suffered from the active opposition of the sitting president. Ordinarily, support from the incumbent can be either a blessing or a curse, but in this case the active support of incumbent Sam Nujoma had, according to observers, a decisive impact on the contest. Regional and district-level delegates, held in thrall by patronage-rich senior party bosses, possessed little real independence. From the outset, Nujoma used state visits to tour the country, 'telling delegates who to vote for' (*The Namibian* May 3, 2004; Hopwood 2004a: 4). Four days before the special congress, Hamutenya was summarily dismissed from the government and accused of 'clandestine political activities' by the president (*The Namibian* May 28, 2004). Nujoma supporters, loyal to Pohamba, orchestrated – according to media reports – a concerted 'dirty tricks' campaign to undermine Hamutenya's credibility, while the ruling faction used state resources to support Pohamba. Among other charges, Hamutenya was alleged to have been involved in a plot against the government, to have received money from 'imperialist' foreign donors[18], and to have been responsible for the death of hundreds of PLAN fighters in an

[17] Both Pohamba and Nujoma, as office-bearers, did not need to contest open elections to the Central Committee. Hamutenya ranked eleventh in the election, garnering 352 votes to Angula's 395.

[18] The term 'imperialist' was used consistently to describe Hamutanya, who had been a prominent advocate of investor-friendly policy while in office. In 2003, Hamutenya had been named African personality of the year by a

ill-fated manoeuvre in the dying days of the struggle (*The Namibian* October 28, 2005). At the special congress, a senior party figure later alleged that 'supporters of Hamutenya were intimidated at the congress and remained in hotel rooms whenever they were out of the hall' and that units of the Namibian Defence Forces were deployed as a threat to the Hamutenya faction (Nyamu, cited in *The Namibian* December 14, 2005). Indeed, such was the influence of the campaign led by the Nujoma faction, Hopwood (2004: 229) argues that Pohamba's status as 'anointed successor [was] crucial in securing the presidential nomination'. Sherbourne (2004), too, considers the intervention by Nujoma as a decisive move: by making clear his distaste for Hamutenya, Nujoma raised the spectre of a divided party, with Hamutanya in control of the state presidency, and Nujoma in control of the party machine. It is also significant that Angula was able to deliver his block of support to Nujoma in such a coherent fashion. The relationship between party elite and supporter in a clientelistic party is heavily unbalanced; in Swapo, this might well indicate that elites had made a deal based on promises of future payment (Sherbourne 2004: 3).[19]

Beneath the contest for the party presidency, however, lay a deeper ethnic dimension. The campaign, according to a senior party figure, 'exposed tribal gate-keeping and ethnic entrepreneurship as an accepted, flagrant and unsophisticated tool of political campaigning and mobilisation within Swapo' (Hengari, cited in *The Namibian*, April 4 2008). *Africa Confidential*, a London-based weekly, asserted that Hamutenya relied heavily on the geographically-concentrated support of the Kwanyama to further his presidential ambitions (2003). This appeal to an ethnic category is, in truth, quite effective. All of the candidates short-listed by the Central Committee come from the Swapo heartland in the north; all are Ovambos. These four regions, including both regional and district-level candidates, account for 163 of the total votes, just under a third of all delegates. Hopwood (2004b) might have underestimated 'tribal chatter' in his analysis of elite behaviour within Swapo.

The parliamentary selection battle, then, arrived on the 'coattails' of the presidential contest. Power in the clientelistic elite-based party lay firmly with the president, who seemed content to use his power to influence competition within the party. Factions, in addition, had been formed – on one hand between Nujoma loyalists, supported by middle-of-the-road Angula supporters; and on the other among the Kwanyama-speakers and supporters of Hamutenya. Given the factional composition of the electorate – in addition to the highly majoritarian

subsidiary of the *Financial Times* (Hopwood 2004b: 8).

[19] Mr. Angula was appointed Prime Minister in President Pohamba's first cabinet in 2005.

electoral system used to elect delegates – we expect to see fierce competition between the competing members. In the weeks preceding the electoral convention, similar tactics were deployed against the Hamutenya faction. An e-mail campaign circulated allegations that Hamutenya and key allies had been involved in plot to overthrow the government (*The Namibian* 1 October, 2004). Similar campaign tactics were used at the convention. Crucially, according to one report, a 'blacklist' of 35 Hamutenya supporters was introduced from the podium by party president Sam Nujoma, and later circulated by supporters. Just before the ballot, Nujoma was reported to have warned party delegates of 'imperialists and reactionaries' within the party, alluding to the need for party 'unity' (*The Namibian* 4 October, 2004).

If we consider the system used to elect candidates, the campaign by the Nujoma faction of the party appears quite sophisticated. The delegates, we recall, voted using the highly disproportional block vote system, which allows candidates to cast as many votes as there were candidates. An identified minority – voted against consistently by a large block – could be dealt a severe blow in the contest. The difficulty, of course, is how to signal clearly to your supporters who to vote for, and who not to vote for. The 'bogus list', as it became known, provided this function.

Of the thirty-five names on the 'blacklist', over half were placed outside the top-forty positions. Taking into account the automatic inclusion of party secretary general and deputy secretary general at the top of the Swapo list, and the automatic inclusion of the ten presidential nominees, the top forty positions were considered 'safe'. The casualties were all high-ranking party and state officials who had performed well in the 2002 Swapo central committee elections. Mosé Tjitendero, Speaker of the National Assembly and the Steering committee member who had nominated Hamutenya as presidential candidate at the April meeting of the Central Committee, was ranked forty-eight. Hamutenya himself was placed in forty-fifth position. Kandy Nehova, a former deputy minister, was returned in seventieth position; ministers Helmut Angula, Jesaya Nyamu and Phillemon Malima were elected in forty-seventh, forty-ninth, and fortieth positions, respectively. Minister, and leading women's council delegate, Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah was ranked 41st. Deputy ministers Jeremiah Nambinga, Clara Bothile and Hadino Hishongwa were ranked forty-forth, forty-sixth and fifty-seventh, respectively. The trade union movement also suffered a heavy defeat – no NUNW delegates appeared in the top 60 positions, which indicated, according to a Namibian academic, that the small NUNW

delegation (closely aligned to the Hamutenya faction) had been among the 'biggest losers at the Swapo electoral convention' (Lindake, cited in *The Namibian* October 6, 2008).

The 'winners', on the other hand, were reported to be strong Nujoma loyalists. Within eighteen months of the Swapo electoral convention in October 2004, cracks began to appear in the party. In December 2005, former Minister for Mines Jesaya Nyamu was expelled from the party (or 'excommunicated', to use the term of the party communiqué) for 'incitement of division, violence and factionalism' (Swapo press release, cited in *The Namibian* December 9, 2005). Within six months, he was joined by a number of other senior party figures, including Hamutenya, to launch a new political party, the Rally for Democracy and Progress. There is, according to participants and observers, a direct and causal connection between the presidential and parliamentary selection battles, on one hand, and the split of the Haumutenya/Ohangwena faction from Swapo, on the other. Nyamu, in a press interview shortly after his expulsion, pointed to the selection convention as key factor in this destabilisation process. Nyamu points, interestingly, to the ethnic character of the factional conflict, alleging that the president 'led a group of strategically placed people from the Omusati region with the aim of destroying anyone who questions his leadership - especially the Kwanyamas' (Nyamu, cited in *The Namibian* December 14, 2005). Hamutenya, also, referred to the 'autocratic' nature of Swapo's internal structures (EIU 2006: 14). A prominent academic supports Nyamu's analysis, pointing to the 'authoritarian mindset of the Nujoma faction' (Melber in *The Namibian* November 9, 2007), as does the editor of the country's only privately-owned newspaper daily, who argues that 'the heart of the issue is the autocratic leadership style of Nujoma himself' (Lister in *The Namibian* February 9, 2007). Even one of the individuals on the winning side agreed, when interviewed, that the parliamentary selection process was 'very destabilising ... because many SWAPO leaders did not make it to parliament, people who had led the struggle for a long time and now there are young people who do not even know anything about the struggle who have pushed themselves there'.

The president, in addition to his indirect influence, can also nominate ten party members to appear in electable positions on the party list. In ascriptive terms, as we mentioned in Chapter 6, Nujoma favoured women and youth. In non-ascriptive terms, however, Nujoma seems to have rewarded loyalty. According to a party 'insider', 'those who had dirtied their hands to ensure that Pohamba was elected at the Swapo congress ... appear to form the core of Nujoma's 10' (*The Namibian* October 4, 2008). Thus, we could argue that loyal faction supporters of

Nujuma, who happened to be either female, or young, or both, were rewarded with nomination as a parliamentary candidate. President Nujoma's list of appointees (described in an Economist Intelligence Unit report as 'notorious') are not, however, bit players in Namibian politics (EIU 2005: 14). Uutoni Nujoma, the President's son, was appointed deputy justice minister; Paulus Kapia (leader of Swapo youth wing) was appointed deputy minister for works.[20] The President, however, also used his powers as state president to develop the racial and to some degree, ethnic, representivity of the Swapo parliamentary caucus.

The Congress of Democrats

The major ethnic groups inside the CoD are different to Swapo: on one hand, there are the northern Ovambo-speakers that support party president Ben Ulenga, former deputy secretary-general Rosa Namises and MP Elisabeth Amukugo. On the other hand, there are the individuals who come from smaller non-Ovambo ethnic groupings, such as Kala Gertze, John Lilemba, Kaveri Kavari, and Ignatius Shixwameni. The division between these two groupings cannot be described adequately in simple ethnoregional terms – there is also a strong personal bond within these groups, which is not unimportant – but the natural overlap between ethnicity and regionality in Namibia, combined with the absence of cross-cutting factors such as union membership, meant that an ethnoregional cleavage was likely to form.

The CoD is best considered, according to our revised typology of political parties, an 'elite-based programmatic' party. Interestingly, among those we spoke to within the party, there was no disagreement on policy-related issues. In this regard, at least, the party was 'very united' (Interview with Schimming-Chase). Unlike most political parties in Africa, which tend to appeal for support on the basis of clientelistic appeal, the CoD has a rather genuine electoral stance that seems based on programmatic appeal. The party, for instance, have pushed private member's bills in parliament that seem patently in the public interest (Interview with Gertze).[21] That is not to say, however, that ethnicity does not matter to the party. Indeed, as we noted in Chapter 6, the party and its leaders stipulated clearly – both formally and informally – that the party must balance ethnic groups to achieve a *non*-ethnic (as apposed to multi-ethnic) complexion. In addition to this commitment to ethnic balancing, or non-tribalism as it is sometimes called, there is also a more hard-nosed reason for the CoD leadership's willingness to

[20] On the other hand, given that only fourteen (out of fifty-five) Swapo MPs are not also members of the government, one might argue equally that the appointments were less important than might have appeared at first glance.

[21] Of the two private member's bills adopted by the government, one deals with cycling in urban areas.

prioritise ethnic balance. According to the party vice-president, it was 'crucial' to secure votes. This prioritisation of ethnicity, however, had the (highly ironic) outcome of politicising ethnicity *within* the party.

Like in other parties, it seems good practice to gauge the likely level of unrest within the party before considering the impact of the selection process. We do not wish to overestimate the impact of the candidate selection process on the stability of the Congress of Democrats. While there certainly was 'bad blood' between senior party figures, this was, according to the party vice-president, 'by necessity … whoever is chosen in the first five, the next five would be upset' (Interview with Schimming-Chase). There was also some strategic uncertainty: most MPs estimated that the party would win at least 10-15 seats, but the break-up of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance into its ethnic components had thrown up the prospect that the CoD might be 'outflanked' by 'ethnic' rivals operating exclusively in their ethnic homelands. Competition for a small number of places, then, would produce a 'natural' level of instability.

The elevation of ethnicity over other characteristics – such as regional party support – had quite a negative, if not a disastrous effect on the stability of the party. We could surmise, however, that there was an interactive relationship between the decision to prioritise ethnicity and the locus of selection. In other words, we surmise the prioritisation of ethnicity would not have destabilised the party, but only if elected party delegates had had a significant input into the selection process. The importance of elected delegates – indicated by Chandra (2004) in our review of the literature in Chapter 2 – is crucial. We expect that elites will accept electoral defeat if they have some realisable prospect of winning re-election at a future date. Practically, this requires some kind of electoral mechanism that provides unhappy elites with an avenue to build support. This avenue could present itself in two ways – first, through the active involvement of party members (through elected delegates) in the selection process. Second, through the involvement directly of party voters in the electoral process. We look at the immediate source of conflict within the party – the criteria of selection that determined the list; then, we look at some counterfactual situations: the likely behaviour of candidates if the rules had been different.

The rank-ordering of the list was a fraught affair. One prominent sitting parliamentarian, for instance, was dropped to fifteenth place on the list because she came from the north of the country. According to one of the party's most senior leaders, 'one reason why [she] was not in the top six or seven [was] because she was from the same region Ben [party president] was from

… you could not have sold it to the people because they would basically have said "we don't get any seats in the north"" (Interview with Schimming-Chase). Thus, the well-known and highly capable incumbent was dropped on the night the party steering group met to decide the list (Thursday, October 7th)); she resigned from the party on the following Monday morning citing the 'undemocratic' nature of the party. Another MP – ranked 6th on the list proposed by the NLC – was dropped to eight and also resigned citing the undemocratic nature of the process. The blow to the party was serious: both incumbents were active parliamentarians with strong media profiles that drew strong support in their home regions. A new party with few figures of national importance could not easily afford to lose two such respected figures.

The most interesting questions we should be asking in these cases are, then, counterfactual: would they have resigned if the electoral list had been submitted to a vote at an electoral college? Would they have resigned even if the college had decided to ratify the original decision of the committee? It is, of course, difficult to say – both individuals refused to be interviewed. To circumvent this difficulty, we looked for indirect evidence. We asked MPs to consider how, and why, they would change the candidate selection system in the party. A preponderance of CoD MPs felt that some sort of reform was necessary to allow greater inclusiveness in the process. One MP was 'not happy with the process … [because it produced a list] ... full of people and free-riders who do not deserve to be there'. (This, indeed, was a fairly common refrain among CoD interviewees.) Instead of the current system, this MP suggested a modification: ranking of the list according to party support in each region. This was a fascinating proposal – it was, in effect, exactly the same solution that the Democratic Alliance had used to address their problem in South Africa. By linking the nomination process directly to the level of support each group received among the electorate, the DA (after suffering, of course, an initially disastrous schism) removed the incentive for ambitious partisans to attempt a party 'take-over' from within, but also made nomination an inherently decentralised process.

The identification of this free-riding problem, like in the CoD, was identified by one of the party factions as a debilitating source of unrest. It was also noted among close observers of Namibian politics, which attributed 'CoD's underperformance ... to tensions between the party's leadership and its members (EIU 2007 April). At the next party conference in 2007, one of the party factions proposed to alter the party constitution to make election of delegates to the national conference proportional to vote share in their home region rather than membership (EIU 2007). The party, however, suffered severe unrest as the conference collapsed amid

accusations by one faction that the second faction had manipulated the registration of delegates to include additional 'observers' from the north. This dispute led to a walkout of 150 'concerned group' (about a third of the assembled delegates) and the 'terminal decline' of the party (EIU July 2007).

7.5 Candidate Selection and Party Cohesion in Comparative Perspective

What does the specific experience of candidate selection and party stability in four African parties tell us, then, about the more general relationship between candidate selection and party stability in political parties? The connection between the two variables is well-established: Gallagher (1988b: 272), for instance, argues that in Western Europe candidate selection plays a 'major role' in determining party stability. But what kind of role? This question is difficult to answer, based on existing research. The majority of work has looked at candidate selection and party discipline. Hazan and Rahat (2006: 374), in this vein, argue that 'the more inclusive the candidate selection method, the less cohesive [sic] the party will be, because legislators will face effective, non-party cross pressures'. The most sophisticated body of research looks at candidate selection mechanisms and party cohesion in India. The general thrust of this research suggests that if elites within political parties are to remain committed – if they are to choose 'voice', rather than 'exit' – the selection mechanism must be sufficiently open to allow elites a reasonable chance of winning office.

Is this the case in our four African parties? Can variation in the level of system openness be linked to variation in levels of incohesion? Broadly, we argue the theory helps explain a good deal, though not all, of incohesion in our four cases. In South Africa, the ANC have among the most sophisticated and open selection mechanism of our parties. The provincial list system is highly decentralised – operating effectively at each territorial unit of the country – and allows party members to have a significant input, albeit indirectly, into the selection of party candidates. This, we find, provides factional elites with an avenue to contest internal party elections which figures in any calculation a disgruntled elite makes when deciding whether to quit the party or to stay within its ranks. The provincial lists, we surmise, also allow a strong tendency within the ANC – regional groupings with a weak form of ethnic consciousness – to mobilise effectively. The national list, on the other hand, is conceived to redress any socio-structural imbalances among the parliamentary caucus that arises from the popular input of

(mostly African) support base. The national list system is more centralised, then, but also allows significant formal and informal input from various sections of the party.

Compared to the ANC, Swapo have a heavily centralised system of candidate selection that offers a narrow aperture to the branch-level delegates. Sectional groups such as organised labour, too, are marginalised in the process. The majority of selectors are, in fact, also candidates. This exclusive selectorate, unsurprisingly, elected a body which is quite unrepresentative of both Namibian society and the Swapo party electorate. This feature, intrinsically, undermines the claim of Swapo to represent a broad cross-section of the people who live in a divided society, but more importantly, perhaps, also prevents unsuccessful elites from contesting future elections from independent support bases within the party. In practice, Swapo has suffered a series of splits that can be related directly to the type of exclusive competition for parliamentary candidacy (see Chapter 4).

In the main South African opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, party elites learned from a previous split within the party and fashioned a new system of candidate selection that was purpose-built to manage factional competition. In practice, this system devolved control over a significant section of the party list to elected party delegates in each of the country's provinces. By 'uncoupling' control over provincial lists, this system provided 'firewalls' against factional competition. Where once a member-rich faction had sought to take control of the party at the expense of a voter-rich faction, the new devolved system produced, effectively, a series of miniature provincial parties competing under a common label. The system, as expected, led to a demographically-biased caucus, which was partially mitigated by the active intervention of the party leadership.

In the Congress of Democrats, a section of the party attempted to re-design – in the aftermath of a destabilising selection battle in 2004 – the selection system on a model that was very similar to the Democratic Alliance. For the 2004 elections, the party did not allow any popular input into the selection of candidates. The body which comprised the selectorate was, in effect, the same as the body of aspirant candidates. Though we did not have much direct evidence that the exclusive nature of the selection process destabilised the party, we gathered indirect interview evidence which indicated that much of the discord between party members was related to the lack of clear incentives for party elites to foster a popular support base. This is in line with the expectations of the Indian literature, which argues that unsuccessful elite will remain committed to the party if they have a viable future prospect of winning office. In the

Congress of Democrats, no such route existed. It seems quite ironic to see that the CoD produced – largely as a consequence of their centralised method of selection – a list that was highly representative of the politicised groups in Namibian society. This victory, however, had a pyrrhic quality as it also contributed in no small measure to the decline of the party.

To summarise, then, the literature linking candidate selection mechanisms – based, largely, on Indian experience – helps us explain part of the variation in party stability in South Africa and Namibia at the time of the 2004 elections. Our cases, too, presented quite a stiff 'test' for the theory, which was developed on a continent that bears only a passing resemblance to South Africa and Namibia. In the next section, we return once more to our party typology to see whether this study can help us understand how political parties differ from each other.

7.6 Reconstructing the 'Congress' Species of Political Party

It is time to return to our typology of political parties, so that we can situate a key function of parties, the way in which candidates are selected, into a broader understanding of what parties are and do (in Africa, but also beyond). In Chapter 5, we made a number of revisions to an existing typology of political parties. The principal revision centred on reconfiguring the second classificatory criterion of the typology, which described different relationships between party elite and supporter. We argued that a constructivist understanding of ethnicity, dominant in studies of ethnicity in the field of comparative politics (Chandra 2001: 7), forces us to reconsider the usefulness of categories such as 'ethnic' or 'congress' (multi-ethnic) as defining features of a political party.[22] We revised the Günther and Diamond typology by reverting to a more general (and theoretically satisfying) account of linkage that is based on differences between 'personalistic', 'clientelistic' and 'programmatic' parties.

The decision to move 'up the ladder of abstraction' involved a trade-off between conceptual validity and analytical differentiation. In practical terms, we lost two party types that seem to be prevalent in Africa: the ethnic and, particularly, the congress parties (Erdmann 2004: 72).[23] In their description of the 'congress' party, Günther and Diamond depart from the original classificatory criterion (forms of linkage), to describe a further defining feature of the congress party: 'an electoral appeal to national unity and integration rather than division, to ethnic sharing and coexistence rather than domination and threat.'

[22] A 'useful' criterion provides mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories (Bailey 1992: 5).

[23] Chandra and Metz, in a review of the ethnic nature of political parties across world regions, also conclude that there are many multi-ethnic and few ethnic parties in African countries' (Chandra and Metz 2002: 5).

Figure 7.1: Candidate Selection as a Defining Feature of Political Parties



This concentration on the consociational qualities of the congress party hints at a more precise understanding of the essential quality of the congress party – its capacity to integrate diverse groups 'within the broad tent of its party organisation' (Günther and Diamond 2003: 184–5). The existing literature on congress parties also underlines their consociational qualities. In his review of the success of Indian democracy, Lijphart (1996: 260) discusses the 'broadly representative and inclusive nature of a single, dominant party, the Congress Party.' Crawford Young (1976: 314), also speaking of the Indian case, refers to 'a national political elite [at the summit of a system] who are committed to reconciling differences through bargaining amongst themselves.' Kothari (1964: 1168), in his seminal contribution to the party systems literature, first explained how the party achieved this 'consociational' or 'congress-like' character: 'there has developed over the years a conciliation machinery within the Congress, at various levels and for various tasks, which is almost constantly in operation [and] mediating in factional disputes.' It is this 'consociational machinery', we argue, that provides us with the basis of a third classificatory criterion. In addition to the consociational structure of a party's organisation, the degree of consociational agency can also matter. A range of authors point to the importance of the 'contribution of prudent and constructive leadership in the development of successful power sharing systems' (Lijphart 1996: 262, 1969: 216; Lustick 1997: 94–5; Andeweg 2000).

In this section, we introduce a third classificatory criterion to the typology, based on the inclusiveness of candidate selection mechanisms, that is both conceptually robust and capable of detecting what Günther and Diamond identified as 'ethnic' and 'congress' parties. Figure 7.1 presents the four party types in this study and indicates how each party varied in the management of factional competition for parliamentary candidacy. Of our four parties, the African National Congress has the most complex and multi-tiered candidate selection process which balances strong elite control with significant levels of popular competition for nomination. The ANC parliamentary caucus, consequently, integrates successful diverse factional elites while providing representation to a broad range of South Africa's ethnic minorities. The Democratic Alliance, in contrast, has a more competitive selection process. Control over nomination is devolved, effectively, to provincial-level electoral colleges of party delegates. A measure of central control, however, is included in the system: the party leader can place favoured candidates at staggered intervals on each provincial list. Swapo and the Congress of Democrats, unlike their South African counterparts, have more controlled selection systems. Selection of parliamentary candidates within Swapo took place at a national electoral college of

party delegates, though the inclusion of branch-level delegates was heavily restricted. In the Congress of Democrats, a small group of senior party leaders selected parliamentary candidates.

What can such a variable tell us about the congress-like nature of a political party in a new divided democracy? The degree of factional accommodation within a political party depends on the rules and procedures which govern elite advancement.[1] Yet, inclusive selection mechanisms are not sufficient to produce a consociational party. A consociational party requires inclusive selection mechanisms *and* a supply of diverse elites. The Democratic Alliance, according to Calland (2006: 169), is a 'party of almost identical sociology – the same gender, the same ethnicity, the same schools, the same outlook on life.' The selection mechanisms, then, would never have been able to manufacture a congress-like party from such a narrow base. The ANC, Swapo and the Congress of Democrats, in contrast, had a steady supply of elites from diverse politicised groups in society. The African National Congress, on one hand, was able to integrate successfully diverse elites. In Swapo, on the other hand, a broad supply of elites was heavily filtered by an exclusive selection mechanism and produced a parliamentary party that excluded an important politicised group. Swapo, then, cannot be considered as a congress-like party. The case of the Congress of Democrats, at first glance, appeared to be a good example of a broadly inclusive and accommodative party which, like the ANC, wanted to provide a vehicle for all groups in society. Unlike the ANC, however, the mechanisms for the integration of such groups were inadequate. The consequence, as we have seen, was fairly serious instability within the party.

7.7 Conclusion

Candidate selection is 'one of the best points at which to observe the distribution of power within the party' (Schattschneider 1970 [1942]: 64). In our four African cases, no less, the inclusiveness of the candidate selection process provides us with a clear insight into how power is distributed among competing factional groupings. In our parties, we found clear evidence to suggest that when parties allow partisans a significant input into the selection of party candidates, the cohesion of parties is less likely to be damaged. The trade-off, of course, is that inclusive selection mechanisms are less likely to produce representative political parties. Party

[1] The selection of parliamentary candidates, of course, is not the only area where party elites contest positions of power and privilege. Party elites, for instance, also vie for control of the party leadership but the schema outlined in Figure 6.1 should also describe with reasonable precision variation in such selection mechanisms. In this study, we have concerned ourselves with the selection of parliamentary candidates.

elites – anticipating such problems – designed selection systems accordingly. In the ANC, elites balanced popular input at the provincial stages with strong centralised control over the national list. In the Democratic Alliance, the party leader was given considerable powers to insert appropriate candidates onto the list, though these powers, as it turned out, were only used to partially redress demographic imbalances. Swapo party, too, expected the party president to redress imbalances and, like in the Democratic Alliance, the president used these powers contingently. Low levels of popular input, however, had a negative effect on the cohesion of the party. Highly majoritarian electoral rules within the caucus disadvantaged a party faction, which in turn undermined the cohesion of the party. In the Congress of Democrats, low levels of partisan input into the process contributed to a split in the party ranks, even if the selection process produced the most representative groups of parliamentarians.

Conclusion

8.1 Introduction

One of the most important tasks of democratic engineers, as we argued in the Introduction, concerns the design of political institutions – 'the complex of rules that make up the constitutional structure and party system' (MacIntyre 2003: 4) – that will 'make democracy work', to borrow Putnam's phrase, in socially diverse societies. The observation that social diversity imperils democracy is neither surprising, nor novel: Aristotle in his *Politics* (Everson 1988) and Mill ([1861] 1958) in his *Considerations on Representative Government* both underline the incompatibility of democracy with deep societal cleavages. Even in the United States of America, the framers of the (federal) constitution – and their detractors – recognised the importance of group loyalties in their treatises (Ball 2003: 13). In Africa, where recent constitutional reform has prompted a renewed interest in the importance of macro-institutional design (see, for instance, Reynolds 1999), a great deal of work has concentrated on the relationship between the design of democratic institutions and political stability.

Majoritarian institutions, according to almost all students of constitutional designers, are ill-advised in divided societies. Kedourie (1989 1) argues that the 'principle of majority decision is workable only on condition that majorities are variable, not permanent … the worst effects of the tyranny of the majority are seen when the unalloyed Western model is introduced in countries divided by religion or language or race.' Diamond, too, argues that 'where cleavage groups are sharply defined and group identities (and group insecurities and suspicions) deeply felt, the overriding imperative is to avoid broad and indefinite exclusion from power of any significant group' (Diamond 1999: 104). With few exceptions, then, the 'experts' recommend consociational, or power-sharing, institutions to African elites embarking on a transition to democracy. Bogdanor (1997: 66) considering the track-record of democracy in the developing world, concludes that 'I am not aware of any civil society that has been able to achieve stability without power-sharing.' The verdict in favour of consociational democracy is virtually universal: a new democracy in divided societies should have power-sharing institutions.

Consociational theory, however, assumes that all politicised groups in a divided society are sufficiently independent of each other to act as a line of partisan formation. Political parties, in other words, are thought to emerge organically as a type of 'societal outcrop' (Bartolini and Mair 2001: 333). In southern Africa, where a single Goliath-like party dominates the electoral

terrain, this assumption is rarely valid (Lindberg 2006; van de Walle 2003). Party formation in southern Africa – contingent (as in all countries) on a distinct historical process – has produced systems which have squeezed many politicised groups under the umbrella of a large dominant political party. Proportional electoral systems, then, will not *necessarily* produce parliaments that represent all significant political groups, in spite of faithful mechanical translation of votes into seats. Instead, a third, intervening variable – the dominant political party – conditions the relationship between electoral systems and the representivity of parliament. This peculiarity of party competition in new African democracies, we have argued, presents us with an opportunity to develop our understanding of democratic consolidation in divided societies cy by looking at the integrative role played by political parties in new divided democracies.

8.2 Political Parties and Democratic Representation

Our concern with political parties is shared widely among students of institutional consolidation in new democracies (Mainwaring 1999; Stokes 1999). Democracy may not have been begotten of the political party but, as Dix (1992: 489) reminds us, if representative democracies are to endure, we cannot do without political parties. Representative democracy produces strong, indeed virtually irresistible, incentives for would-be politicians to form parties. 'The only way collective responsibility has ever existed and can exist', as Fiorina (1980: 26) underlines, 'is through the agency of the political party.' Just as political parties are at the centre of political life, so too are they at the heart of political science. When the discipline was still in its infancy, many of the early classic contributions were written on political parties (Ostrogorski 1964 [1902]; Michels 1962 [1911]; Weber 1968 [1922]). This scholarly interest in the political party is well founded: the party is ubiquitous in modern representative democracies with few exceptions.

Among democratic newcomers in Africa – where the stakes of competition are high – this renewed concern with political parties is well-founded: a great deal rides on the ability of political parties to blood newly politicized groups in the arena of constitutional contestation, structure electoral and legislative competition and groom future state leaders (Huntington 1968; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Randall and Svåsand 2002a). In Africa, no less than in Europe, political parties organise the legislative and executive branches of government and, to this end, provide the principal conduit of political recruitment. In parliamentary democracies, it is political parties that elect the head of government, determine membership of key legislative

committees, hold the government to account, sign off on all legislative initiatives, and breed current and future generations of political leaders. Even in presidential democracies, where the head of government is elected directly, his nomination is often the gift of the party machine.[2] In some countries, particularly those where a single party habitually wins power, the political party looms largest.

In this dissertation, we have examined the role of political parties in new democracies from two angles. First, we looked at the work of scholars that have focused on the internal party mechanisms that influence the selection of parliamentary candidates. The focus on candidate selection, we believe, is relatively straightforward to justify: if we accept the definition of a political party as 'any group that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections, candidates for public office' (Sartori, 1976: 64), then it is quite clear that procedures used by political parties to select candidates are not only integral to the function of political parties, but are also pivotal in determining the characteristics of the parliamentary party (Gallagher 1988b: 265–9; Rahat 2007: 158–62). In the first section of Chapter 2, we used this body of literature to provide us with an analytical framework capable of categorising systematically variation in candidate selection mechanisms. In Chapter 6, we used this framework to outline how four African parties selected their candidates. We focused, in particular, on the centralisation and inclusiveness of the selection process, and the qualities sought by party 'selectorates'. In the first section of Chapter 7, we examined how different selection mechanisms influenced the representivity of parliamentary parties.

This, mostly European, body of literature – though perfectly suitable to describe variation in selection procedures – was of limited use in predicting such variation might influence the stability of political parties in new divided democracies. In order to provide a coherent theoretical account of this explanatory relationship, we turned to a body of literature that dealt expressly with the relationship between candidate selection and party cohesion in a new, divided democracy. In India, a series of scholars – concerned with the prospect of democratic reversal in a fragile democracy – explored how variation in selection mechanisms influence party stability (Kothari 1964; Morris-Jones 1964). Political parties with inclusive, competitive procedures for intraparty advancement, other things being equal, were found to be able to absorb new elites while maintaining the loyalty of existing elites. Parties with exclusive, centralised procedures, conversely, were unstable, particularly during periods in opposition, and prone to splits and

[2] This is not always the case. In Uruguayan presidential elections, for example, voters chose between competing party slates, which typically contained more than one candidate (Shugart 2006: 40).

defections (Wiener 1967). In the second section of Chapter 2, we reviewed this literature; in the second section of Chapter 7, we used the theoretical insights of this literature to structure our explanation of variation in the stability of four African parties.

8.3 Political Cleavages and Party Competition in Africa

Both of these theoretical approaches, however, are premised on the accurate identification of the socio-structural divisions which undergird political competition within political parties. A good deal of Chapter 4 looked at how this task has been undertaken and, taking our cue from the sociological literature of Lipset and Rokkan (1967) and constructivist literature of Scarritt and Mozaffar (1999; 2003) and Posner (2004), we searched for *organised* expressions of socio-structural divisions that might form the bedrock of party competition. We found that in South African, there are pressures in society beyond the fissures of race – notably those based on class – that also have influenced party and factional formation. Namibia, on the other hand, is more similar to other African countries north of the Limpopo river. In such neo-patrimonial systems political competition is marked by strong presidentialism, the primacy of the ethnoregional cleavage, and a marked informality to the exercise of power.

Our research strategy was designed with the problem of looking for internal divisions within political parties. Selection of parliamentary candidates was, in all parties, a highly fractious affair: much of the process, indeed, occurred in secret. Under such circumstances, scholars of candidate selection recommend, almost invariably, an approach which involves 'in-depth interviews with all those involved in the process: central party officers, deputies, selected candidates, unsuccessful aspirants, local party elites, ordinary branch members and so on' (Gallagher 1988a: 6). To this end, we undertook two lengthy field trips to South Africa and Namibia. In almost all our cases, we interviewed the key actors who were involved in the selection of parliamentary candidates who represented the four parties in the 2004 elections. We did not manage to interview absolutely everybody who was involved, and the attempt to gather comparative survey data on all successful candidates was only partially successful, but we managed (we believe) to present an accurate account. In Chapter 3, we described in some detail the various (mostly primary) sources that we used to reconstruct the process of candidate selection in our cases.

In Chapter 3, we also explained how this dissertation is situated firmly in the research tradition of comparative politics. Like all such comparative attempts, we were concerned with a

'bigger question': the conditions under which democracy will survive in new divided societies. Our focus was, of course, much narrower. We looked at the integrative role of dominant political parties and their counterparts in the opposition in new divided democracies. Theoretically, we sought to make a contribution to two bodies of literature. First, we wanted to describe how four African parties select their parliamentary candidates. In Chapter 6, accordingly, we spent a great deal of time tracing the selection process from its inception to execution around the 2004 elections. Our approach and contribution in this section of the thesis was (by necessity) descriptive, but this descriptive component provided us with the foundation for an attempt to explain variation in the cohesion of political parties in Chapter 7.

From a methodological perspective, this study is akin to a comparative historical case study of political parties in new African democracies. The comparative approach, as we pointed out in Chapter 3, has some notable drawbacks, including the sometime heroic assumption that cases are equivalent to each other. We also indicated some of the strengths of the small-*n* approach, specifically the ability of a case study to allow the researcher to carefully identify a 'mechanism' which links cause with effect (Gerring 2004; George and Bennett 2004). Equally, case studies allow us to study in more detail the *intentions* of actors, which are central to causal analysis (Taylor 1970). In this way, an in-depth case study helps outline the 'how' and the 'what' of a process but case studies – through 'connecting the dots' – also contribute to the 'why' of an event. In the final empirical chapters of this dissertation, we tried to follow this methodological course – first reconstructing how candidates are selected; second explaining how variation in such processes influence party cohesion.

In addition to the logistical difficulties of gathering evidence from private (and often highly secretive) organisations, we faced a conceptually problematic task of categorising accurately our four African parties. This is a difficulty faced by all students of African political institutions. Hyden (2006: 3), in this vein, remarks that 'compressing African data into preconceived boxes deduced from empirical evidence elsewhere is often problematic'. Ultimately, part of the intent of this dissertation has been to situate the experience of a specific phenomenon (candidate selection in four African parties) within a general class of similar phenomena (candidate selection in all political parties). Knowing what is similar, and dissimilar, requires use of classificatory tools (Bailey 1992). Students of European parties do not need to bother with such conceptual troubles: there are many typologies of political parties that are adequate to capturing the difference among European parties. In Africa, in contrast, existing

universal typologies struggle to capture meaningful differences across African parties (Erdmann 2004).

In Chapter 5, we revised an existing typology of political parties with two aims in mind. First, we needed to describe the type of parties that selected candidates. Even if we had not decided to modify an existing typology of parties (which we did in the first of Chapter 5), we would still have had to describe the type of organisations at the heart of this study (which we did in the second section of Chapter 5). The revised typology, however, added value to the study. We identified, first, a type of aspen political party – the programmatic elite-based party – that is considered essential to the prospect that African democracies survive, but is a fragile entity (Erdmann 2004). Second, our typology allowed us to consider how the integrative role of parties, viewed in terms of how parliamentary candidates are selected, can be related to other aspects of party functions. In this sense, at least we gained a comparative understanding of the place of our four cases within the greater 'universe' of cases. This typology, we also hope, might provide a framework for future comparative research of African political parties

8.4 Findings: Candidate Selection and its Consequences

In this dissertation, we evaluated the candidate selection process and its consequences in four African parties. In the following section, we summarise the principal conclusions of the two empirical chapters in this study, which looked at the process of candidate selection (Chapter 6) and the implications of candidate selection for the representivity of parliamentary parties and the cohesion of political parties (Chapter 7).

The Process of Candidate Selection in Four African Parties

The formality of the selection process varied considerably across our four cases. In both South African parties, the selection of parliamentary candidates was a highly formalised and multi-tiered process. The increased sophistication of the list process mirrors the increasingly professional organisational effort of South African political parties. In the case of the ANC, the complex and changing nature of the tripartite alliance is mirrored in the evolution of the ANC selection procedures, from the 'wonderfully haphazard' process of 1994 to the finely-tuned and formalised process of 2004 (Feinstein 2007: 26). In the Democratic Alliance, too, the use by the party of professional labour recruiters to scrutinise the credentials of aspirant candidates at the Western Cape electoral college hints at a broader trend in South African party politics: an

increased tendency for parties to outsource selected functions to non-party professionals (Webb and Kolodny 2006: 337). In Namibian parties, particularly in the Congress of Democrats, the selection of candidates involved a greater degree of informality. The Congress of Democrats had the least formalised process of selection: there were few established selection conventions, the process was hurried, and actor involvement highly uncertain. In Swapo, there were established conventions and the implementation of the national electoral college's mandate required a reasonably high degree of logistical competence. That is not to say, however, that the process was formalised. In the event, a good deal of underhand (yet highly sophisticated) tactics were used, allegedly, by one faction in their pursuit of power, including a defamatory e-mail campaign and the use of signalling techniques at the electoral convention.

The ANC list process received the lion's share of attention in this thesis, mostly because it determines largely the complexion of the South African national assembly. In spite of the fascination, the ANC list process is not terribly well understood. It is seen among observers as something of a home-truth that the list process is both heavily centralized and used by the party leadership as an instrument to enforce party discipline or reward loyal party members. In a recent examination of South Africa's electoral system, Gouws and Mitchell (2005: 366) describe briefly the ANC list process, pointing to the strong control of party bosses over the selection process, arguing that '[party] leaders determine who the candidates will be and where their names are put on the list'. This summary describes the national list process quite well – a strong measure of branch-level support is required for aspirant candidates to come within range of selection, but ultimately a controlled process, overseen by about sixty senior party figures (from across factional groups) determine who appears on the list. The standard depiction of the ANC list process, however, does not really describe the reality of the nine provincial list processes. Contrary to received wisdom, the ANC list process in each province is quite decentralised. Though it is impossible to determine the precise behind-the-scenes influence of the national-level structures, we have reasonably good evidence from a range of sources which suggests that provincial structures exert decisive control over the lists of provincial candidates. Provincial processes, in addition, are highly inclusive: control over the rank-ordering of these lists, though subject to provincial and national vetting, is largely in the hands of branch-level delegates. Candidates do not appear on provincial lists without significant support from these delegates,

irrespective of how senior party figures may feel. The locus of selection in the ANC, then, is quite varied and not fully captured by existing accounts.[3]

More importantly, perhaps, existing accounts of the ANC list process misconstrue the inclusiveness of the selectorate at each level of selection. Andrew Reynolds (1999: 128), using identical language to Gouws and Mitchell, points to the heavy hand of ANC 'party bosses' in the selection process. If it is true that party bosses decide who appears on part of the electoral list, observers rarely appreciate just how many party bosses are involved in the process and the degree to which the opinions and interests of some party bosses differ from those of other party bosses. More than any other party in this study, the ANC cannot be described as a 'unitary actor'. An account of the ANC list process which pits centre against periphery misunderstands the nature of the alliance. The essence of the process of elite advancement within the ANC, according to a figure on the national executive, is 'horse-trading and bartering' *between* factional elites. Pressure from below certainly matters – particularly in the construction of provincial lists – but our study of the ANC list process has highlighted, above all else, the openness of the process among factional elites.

Can the same be said of the process of candidate selection in Namibia's dominant political party? The process of selection in Swapo was, by far, the most difficult to reconstruct. Since independence, moreover, there has been no academic treatment of the internal politics of the Namibian ruling party. Closer examination of the party's list process gives us a valuable insight into how power is distributed within the party. The Swapo selection process has two notable characteristics: first, the party president had the power to select just under 20% of Swapo's MPs. The remaining candidates, second, were chosen by an extremely narrow elite at the top of the party. Popular input from branch-level structures was confined to a minority of delegates at the national electoral college where Swapo's electoral list was constructed. In this respect, at least, the selection of candidate's conforms to a common assessment of the 'authoritarian tendency' within Swapo party (Leys and Saul 1995: 42; van Cranenburgh 2006: 600).

Candidate selection in the Democratic Alliance involved the most diverse variance in selection mechanisms. The majority of successful DA candidates were chosen by a highly decentralised selectorates, but the role the of party leader was also pivotal. The DA selection

[3] We do not take issue with the second, arguably more serious, allegation that the upper echelons of the ANC use the promise of selection, or the threat of deselection, to rein in errant MPs. We would certainly conjecture that provincial-list MPs behave differently to their national-list counterparts – spending, arguable, more time servicing demands from the party grassroots – but we have no evidence to evaluate comparatively the loyalty of ANC candidates. Such a task was beyond the scope of this study.

process was based on a formal commitment to party provinces that parliamentary seats would be allocated in proportion to each province's share of the national vote (i.e. if 20% of DA voters cast their ballot in Western Cape, an equivalent percentage of DA MPs would be taken from the Western Cape provincial list.). The party leader, however, had the right to insert the third, seventh, fourteenth, twenty-first (and so on) candidate onto each provincial list, which provided the DA leader with a measure of power greater than in the ANC, or indeed in the Congress of Democrats. His (formal) power was not quite as extensive as the Swapo party president, but it was not much less.

In the Congress of Democrats, finally, candidates were chosen by a camarilla of senior party members, though the party president did not play a particularly important role. The process, in addition, was highly exclusive: elected party delegates had absolutely no role in the process, in direct contravention of the party rulebook. The selection process, generally, was highly informal: the party steering committee met within days of the deadline for nominating candidates and the meeting – a fractious, all-night affair – resulted in a list which, as we saw in Chapter 6, was bitterly contested. Generally, however, only the Congress of Democrats – and Swapo, though to a lesser extent – affirmed the theory that 'democracy has an inherent preference for the authoritarian solution of important questions' and that within organisations such as the political party, the dominance of a small minority is all but inevitable (Robert Michels 1959 [1915]: 378, 390).

The Demography of Four African Parliamentary Parties

In our four African political parties, the construction of the electoral list was considered a crucial function of the party that engaged the highest decision-making organs in each of our parties. As in other countries that use List-PR, selectorate(s) in all of our parties saw an opportunity to 'balance the ticket', signalling to voters important information about 'what the party stands for and does'. What did the selectors prioritise in this balancing act? Universally, the selectorate – driven by non-elected committees in the upper echelons of our parties – prioritised objective characteristics of ethnicity, race and gender. In the case of the first two characteristics, this was a fairly predictable strategy: 'the election or appointment of a representative of a minority group,' according to Birch, 'has a significance out of all proportion to the real power he enjoys because he *symbolises* the recognition of the political rights of the group in question' (1971: 21,

emphasis added).[4] In the divided societies of South Africa and Namibia, national-level selectorates were perfectly aware of the symbolic importance of ascriptive features and intervened to include ethnic minorities on the electoral list. Compared with other African parties the prioritisation of ethnicity is a familiar theme. The politics of ethnoregional balancing – what, in Ivory Coast, as Appiah (1992: 170) points out, 'is half-humorously called geopolitics, the politics of geographical regions' – was an important survival strategy for embattled elites inhabiting weak states.

Gender, too, mattered a great deal to the selectorates in each party. Importantly, however, the supply of female candidates seemed to be a crucial determinant of the likelihood that parties would construct lists with a high proportion of female candidates. With respect to the ANC Western Cape provincial list, it is unlikely that significantly less women would have gained representation in the absence of the party rule which stipulates every third candidate on the list should be female. In the ANC the gender quota, instead, seemed to 'lock-in' gender as a characteristic of a balanced parliamentary caucus. In the Congress of Democrats, which had an informal commitment to produce a 'zebra-style' list, an insufficient number of female candidates party politicians meant that seniority and ethnicity trumped gender in the list process.

Generally, though, the locus of selection seemed to influence the demographic balance of each parliamentary party. This is an interesting finding. In general, PR electoral systems are thought to produce higher numbers of female members (Lijphart 1994; Matland 1998; Norris 2004), but we find this is contingent on the type of selection mechanism used by parties. In the Democratic Alliance, decentralised selectorates produced, in spite of a reasonably steady supply of female candidates, a highly disproportional body of parliamentarians. The Congress of Democrats, which had the most centralised selectorate, produced a beautifully balanced body of parliamentarians, even if less than half of the top-twenty were female. In each of our parties, with the possible exception of the ANC, national-level selectorates intervened decisively to increase the number of female and minority candidates. PR might appear to produce parliaments with less social bias, but the intervening actions taken by party selectorates can leave a lasting impression on the type of parliament that emerged.

[4] This is also a form of 'descriptive' representation, although according to Pitkin's typology, it is perhaps better described as a form of 'symbolic' representation. The function of a symbolic representative is to 'represent or embody' (Pitkin 1967: 93). Symbolic representatives are synonymous with constitutional monarchs who, upon accession (and to some extent even before), 'ceases to be a living and acting person, and becomes a magnificent cipher [without] the power of decision' (Barker, cited in Pitkin 1967: 103).

In this regard, the 'inclusionary ethos' of individual party leaders made a great deal of difference to the shape of parliamentary parties (Reynolds 1999: 81). In this regard, the role of the selectorate resonated with a prediction from the European literature that if, among other attributes, party selectors prioritise wealthy over penury; experience over youth; town over countryside; sex over ability; and loyalty over independence, the 'demographic, geographic and ideological dimensions of the party' will, to a large degree, be so defined (Katz 2001: 278). In our four parties, the party leader played a crucial role 'balancing the ticket.'

The Cohesion of Four African Political Parties

Stable dominant party systems require, by definition, a stable dominant party. Such stability, however, is far from guaranteed. Dominance, according to Pempel (1990: 32), is 'an art far more than it is an inevitability.' Dominant political parties are, invariably, alliances of diverse groups; they have 'ties, often formal ones, with many diverse groups and interests that [they] must somehow reconcile, pacify and reward' (Arian and Barnes 1974: 602). A range of explanations has been offered in response to the durability of ANC dominance: a coordinated response to racial dominance; a reliance on state-based patronage (see Friedman 1999: 97-100 for a discussion); and, less plausibly, a 'liberation dividend, opposition weakness and…democratic centralism [within the dominant party]' (Leon 2008: 394). More plausibly, accounts of party dominance in India have focused on the internal organisational challenge to dominant parties to maintain their cohesion. Students of Indian politics have argued that dominant parties who 'maintain the often delicate balance between their varying interests' manage to retain their dominant status (Kochanek 1968: 33ff). Specifically, Chandra (2004) argues – drawing on Kothari (1963 and Weiner (1968) – that competitive rules for intraparty advancement provide a mechanism for party stability.

In this dissertation, we have focused on this single theoretical explanation to see whether it can explain variation in the stability (understood as cohesion) of two dominant, and two opposition, political parties. Our approach, like all theoretical approaches, has been somewhat reductive in this regard. Nonetheless, we find that variation in the design of intraparty selection mechanisms helps explain why Swapo party has suffered a series of debilitating splits after the 2004 elections and why the African National Congress, in contrast, has managed to maintain the cohesion of the tripartite alliance. This, we argue, is an important finding. Few other nationalist movements have managed to make a successful transition from movement to political party.

Groups such as the Muslim League in Pakistan, the United National party in Ceylon, the Nationalist party in Indonesia, and the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League in Burma have all succumbed to a series of debilitating internal ruptures (Weiner 1967: 12). In Africa, too, few dominant parties have managed to act as stable, representative vehicles for diverse social groups while remaining loyal to the principle of multiparty competition. Between decolonialisation in the 1960s and the end of the Cold War, most African nationalist movements veered towards *de jure* one-party dominance (Nugent 2004).

In Chapter 7, we argued that party elites face a trade-off when designing selection systems. On one hand, party elites in divided democracies wanted to balance the electoral list, which requires a degree of central intervention. On the other hand, however, party elites needed to ensure a degree of popular participation in the selection process to provide unsuccessful candidacies with an incentive not to defect. Some parties were able to design and implement selection systems which managed competition between factional elites without risking the cohesion of the political party. The two South African parties, the African National Congress and the Democratic Alliance, were most successful in this regard. (It might also be noted, not unimportantly, that on their first attempt in 2000/01, the Democratic Alliance were singularly unsuccessful in the management of factional competition. At least some of their success at the second attempt can be attributed to the lessons learned by key figures within the party.) The two Namibian parties, on the other hand, got it catastrophically wrong. Both South African political parties used a mixed selection system that balanced central intervention with competitive involvement from elected branch-level delegates, while the Namibian parties, generally, did not allow a sufficient degree of inclusiveness in the selection process. In Swapo, the method of selection also probably mattered a good deal – the party used the 'bloc' vote in the national electoral – and the informal role of the incumbent president left a heavy mark on the process. If the selection system had been more open, we find it difficult to believe – based on comparable behaviour by marginalised elites in the ANC – that the results would have been as catastrophic to the cohesion of the party.

8.5 Conclusion: Areas of Future Research

The comparative study of African political parties is virgin territory. In the Introduction, we spoke of a curious similarity between the surge in interest that accompanied the second and third waves of democratisation on the continent but, compared with the party research agenda in other

new democracies, very little work has been done on Africa (Carbone 2007). Our general approach, we believe, could bear fruit. Existing theory on political parties is rich and, for the most part, empirically varied. Applied to Africa, much can be learned about both the practice of party competition in Africa and the usefulness of existing theory. The dialogue between general and specific that sets the social scientist apart from the historian should, we believe, be developed in Africa. In this concluding section of the dissertation, we point to four areas of future research.

First, studies of African political parties need a stronger emphasis on ground-level empirical research. Much of the nascent research agenda has, to date, been focused on the institutionalisation of party systems (Kuenzi and Lambright 2001; Lindberg 2007; Mozaffar and Scarritt 2005; Bogaards 2008); party system categorization (Bogaards 2004; Giliomee and Simkins 1999; van de Walle and Butler 1999); and the source of party system fragmentation (Lindberg 2005; Mozaffar *et al.* 2003: Brambor *et al.* 2007). Such studies are important – the number of political parties that gain entry to the legislative assembly, for instance, is one of the defining characteristics of any political system – but there is no substitute for reliable empirical data on party function, social basis, organisation structure or linkage.[5]

Second, there is much to be done on the nexus between party and electoral behaviour. The literature on the use of information short-cuts and electoral behaviour is, as we mentioned in Chapter 2, voluminous. In Africa, a clientelistic relationship is thought to be the dominant form of linkage between political elites and citizen, but 'the rigorous operationalisation of linkage mechanisms, particularly clientelism is absent from the comparative politics literature' (Kitschelt 2000: 869). How do parties signal clientelistic intentions? The use of the electoral list might provide one such mechanism. If thought of as information cues, ascriptive characteristics are costless, and in 'patronage' democracies characterised by 'limited information'[6], benefit-seeking electors are more likely to use costless rather than costly cues of information (Chandra 2004).[7] Ethnicity, furthermore, has a set of in-built and costless markers.

[5] Party system fragmentation, it is supposed, can leave laving a lasting impression on practical issues ranging from government formation and cabinet stability (Powell 1982); party system extremism (Cox 1990); macroeconomic outcomes (Roubini and Sachs 1989); and levels of ethnic conflict and political violence (Horowitz 1985; Powell 1982).

[6] Chandra defines a 'patronage democracy' as democratic countries where the state 'monopolises access to jobs and services, *and* in which elected officials have discretion in the implementation of laws allocating the jobs and services at the disposal of the state' (2004: 6). This definition is almost identical to what is viewed in the African literature as 'neo-patrimonial' democracy.

[7] Costless characteristics on an individual's non-ethnic background include 'class, profession, income, place of residence, ideological affiliation, educational background' (Chandra: 2004: 33).

In countries where 'all politicians, whether locally or nationally elected, are expected to act as the spokespeople and torchbearers of their community' (Chabal and Daloz 1999: 99) these ethnic markers – name, dress, speech, features – can tell electors, and selectors, a great deal about how representatives will be likely to behave in the future. Does ethnicity act as a type of shibboleth that allows the electorate to evaluate the credibility of promises made at election time by competing politicians?

Third, our findings suggest a closer examination of the relationship between candidate selection and representative behaviour. Does the route to power influence the behaviour of representatives? It is seen as an intrinsic good that parliament 'should be an exact portrait, in miniature, of the people at large' (Pitkin 1967: 87). The implicit assumption of this (normative) position is that elected members will represent the interests of their 'own' groups: women will act for women, workers will act for workers, and so on. In this dissertation, we were not concerned with the behaviour of individual legislators, but we could surmise that the route to power taken by successful candidates can matter a good deal. If the assumptions of 'principal-agent' theory are valid, a closer understanding of the influence of the party over the selection (and reselection) of party representatives might yield dividends, particularly in dominant party systems where selection virtually guarantees election to parliament. We could also surmise that the behaviour of a party presidential appointee, for instance, might well differ to that of a representative elected by branch-level delegates, *irrespective* of a common gender, age or ethnic background. Ayee (quoted in Salih, 2003: 226) posits that high levels of internal party democracy can play an important role in reining in tyrannical or even over-zealous colleagues. Is this the case? In dominant party systems, can party selectorates hold party leaders responsive to their demands? Can internal party democracy act as an equivalent to inter-party democracy?

Finally, we suggest a more systematic approach to the study of the rise and fall of political parties in Africa. Ruling political parties dominate the electoral terrain in many new African democracies and seem impervious to defeat at the ballot box. The track-record of such Goliath parties in other world regions, however, suggests that that the survival of dominant parties in Africa might be uncertain (Pempel 1990; Giliomee and Simkins 1999). What can account for the continued dominance of such parties? In this dissertation, we found evidence to suggest that factional competition for parliamentary candidacy can undermine or enhance party stability in dominant parties. Further research, in addition, should involve a closer examination of the increased electoral marginalisation of opposition parties in Africa. Programmatic opposition

parties, for instance, are considered to be central to the 'good governance' agenda (van de Walle and Butler 1999: 23). The strange death of the Congress of Democrats suggests that internal factional conflict over leadership succession can ruin an otherwise well-supported party. Recommendations by political scientists of appropriate electoral systems for new democracies are common (see, for instance, Reynolds and Reilly 1997). Advice for party democrats on the design of internal party machinery, on the other hand, is next to non-existent. Under what conditions do political parties manage to 'acquire value and stability'? Why do some parties seem so sturdy, while other parties wither on the vine?

8.5 Postscript: The Formation of the Congress of the People in South Africa

In November 2008, a new political party – the Congress of the People (COPE) – was launched in South Africa. Although participants' accounts vary, it seems likely that the proximate cause of the new party was the unexpected resignation of Thabo Mbeki as President of South Africa. The new party, indeed, numbered among its leadership several high-profile members of ANC national and provincial governments, including Mosiuoa Lekota and Mbhazima Shilowa. The question one must consider, of course, is to what extent did candidate selection mechanisms influence the decision by disgruntled ANC partisans to defect from the party? In this dissertation, we argued that a largely inclusive selection process in the ANC reduced the incentives felt by disgruntled partisans to defect from the tripartite alliance in 2004/2005. Yet, just four years later, the ANC suffered an apparent split in its ranks. Did we get it wrong?

Two points are worth considering. First, we question the extent to which the establishment of the Congress of the People represents a 'split' in the tripartite alliance. After the defection by Lekota and others, all organised groups within the ANC – from the women's and youth leagues to the SACP and COSATU – remained loyal to the candidacy of Jacob Zuma. The alliance, in other words, remained intact. Still, the emergence of COPE is not without a broader national significance. Quite a few voters – just over 1.3 million in total (or 7.4% of the votes) – plumped for COPE in the 2009 parliamentary election. In spite of this moderate level of support, however, the core support of the ANC remained relatively unchanged. At a provincial level, COPE only really made any inroads in a single province: Eastern Cape (307, 437 ballots; 13.3% of the vote). In contrast to COPE's performance in the Eastern Cape, the ANC attracted 69.7% of the vote, compared to 79% in 2004 and 73% in 1999. Across the country, the ANC support declined by under 4%, from 69.7% in 2004 to 65.9% in 2009, though the losses were offset by strong gains in KwaZulu Natal. Overall, the ANC won outright every provincial election (except the Western Cape, which was taken by the Democratic Alliance) and managed to maintain its core share of the vote, which has tended to hover around the two-thirds mark since 1994.

Second, even if we conceded that the ANC suffered a disastrous reduction in party cohesion, there is no way of knowing (just yet) why this happened. It may be that our thesis is wrong, but it may also be that our thesis is correct. Our central theoretical expectation, outlined in Chapter 2 (page 26), held that 'exclusive mechanisms, which facilitate the hoarding of office by incumbents, undermine party cohesion by forcing disgruntled groups to seek "exit" from the party. Competitive mechanisms, which allow for the prospect of alternation within the party, on the other hand, mean that partisans choose "voice" and remain loyal to the party.' It is quite plausible that in the years leading up to the 2008 split, the candidate selection mechanisms within the ANC became significantly more exclusive. This 'hoarding' of power, after all, is precisely what led to the rupture in the Indian Congress Party under Indira Gandhi (Kothari 1974). Such an investigation would be of immense interest.

(Vanity of vanities; all is vanity.)

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Appendix A: List of Interviewees

African National Congress

Name	Position	List (if relevant)	Interview Date
Abram, Salamuddi	Backbencher	PL FS: 8/21	November 9
Asmal, Kader	ANC NEC; Member of Parliamentary Constitutional Committee, SA Parliament 1994-6.	NL: 4	November 23
Beukman, Francois	Defector from NNP (2005)	N/A	November 10
Bonhomme, Trevor	Backbencher, National List (# 140)	NL: 140	October 26
Burgess, Cecil	Defector from ID (2005)	N/A	November 8
Carrim, Yunus Ismail	SACP Politburo and Central Committee Member	NL: 23	November 8
Cronin, Jeremy	Deputy President, SACP; ANC NEC	NL: 29	November 14
Gabru, Yousef	Coordinator, Provincial List Committee, Western Cape	N/A	November 14
Gaum, Andre	Defector from NNP (2005)	N/A	November 10
Hendrickse, Peter	Participant in CODESA talks; Backbencher,	PL EC: 24/38	November 10
Holomisa, Sango	Traditional Leader of Hegebe Clan of Thembuland	PL EC 5/38	November 7

Jeffrey, John	Parliamentary Counsellor to the Deputy President (199962005); ANC KZN PEC.	NL:	November 7
Johnson, Carol	Defector from NNP (2005)	N/A	November 10
Koornhof, Gerhardus	Defector from UDM	NL: 82	November 1
Lottering, Elizabeth	Unsuccessful candidate, PL WC	PL WC : 17/20	November 11
Mabe, Lorato	ANCWL REC NW; COSATU National Gender Committee	NL: 116	October 28
Magau, Ruth	ANCWL Deputy Secretary FS; ANC REC FS	PL FS: 7/21	October 27
Maluleka, Homes	COSATU	PL GAUT: 14/60	October 31
Mkhize, Sipho	ANC PEC Gauteng; ANC REC Port Shepstone,	PL KZN: 8/25	November 9
Moss, Maxwell	ANC REC PEC	PL WC: 1/21	October 28
Ngwenya, Winnie	REC ANCWL, Gauteng	MP since 2005	November 1
Ntuli, Benjamin	Backbencher,	NL: 98	November 1
Olifant, Daniel	COSATU	ANC WC: 4/20	November 11
Ozinsky, Max	Deputy Secretary, ANC PEC WC	N/A	October 27
Pieterse, Randy	COSATU	PL WC: 6/20	November 4
Tinto, Bulelwa	ANCWL PEC WC	PL WC: 5/20	November 22

Two other members of the party national executive who wished to remain anonymous

Democratic Alliance

Name	Position	List (if relevant)	Interview Date
Doman, Willem	Former NNP member	PL WC 7	November 9
Gibson, Douglas	Chief Whip	PL GAUT: 5	November 1
Knott, Caroline	Former DP member; Unsuccessful candidate, WC	PL WC: 30	November 18
Lamoela, Helen	Unsuccessful candidate	PL WC: 40	November 18
Robinson, Denise	Unsuccessful candidate	PL WC: 31	November 22
Selfe, James	Former DP member; Chairperson of DA Federal Council	PL WC: 6	November 9
Swart, Marius	Former member of NNP	PL WC: 10	November 17
van Niekerk, Andre (Kraii)	Former member of NNP	PL WC: 4	November 8

Swapo

Name	Position	List (if relevant)	Interview Date
Amweelo, Moses	Minister of Works, Transport and Communication	29	December 5
Angula, Nahas	Prime Minister; Member of Swapo CC and Politburo	5	December 2
Ankama, Samuel	Backbencher	42	November 28
Dinyando, Raphael	Backbencher; Former member of SWAPO REC, Kavango; former Mayor of rundu	35	December 6
Hishoono, Kanana	Secretary of Swapo Elder's Council	66	
Kaiyamo, Elia	Member of the National Executive, NUNW	43	December 12
Nandi-Ndaitwah, Netumbo	Minister for Women's Affairs and Children; Member of Swapo CC and Politburo	41	December 13
Nehova, Kandy	Chairman of National Council	70	December 13
Smit, Paul	Deputy Minister for	Presidential Nominee	

Three other members of the party national executive who wished to remain anonymous

Congress of Democrats

Name	Position	List (if relevant)	Interview Date
Dienda, Elma	Backbencher; General-Secretary, Women's League, CoD	4	December 7
Gertze, Kala	General-Secretary, CoD	5	December 6
Mutandere, Gerson	Chief Administrative Officer, CoD	11	December 13
Namises, Rosa	Deputy-General Secretary, CoD	9	December 8
Schimming-Chase, Nora	Vice-President, CoD; Chief Whip	2	December 6
Shixwameni, Ignatius	Former Secretary-General	5	December 9
Kaveri, Kavera	Unsuccessful candidate	7	December 14

Two other members of the party national executive who wished to remain anonymous

Appendix B: Formal Organisational Structure of Four African Political Parties

The purpose of this appendix is to provide a standardised set of terms to describe the involvement of each organisational unit of our four parties. The organisational anatomy of each of our parties is, in broad outline, almost identical but the nomenclature differs considerably. If we were to provide a general idea of the formal distribution of power within our parties, we would describe – borrowing the terminology of territorial organisation – the ANC, Swapo and CoD as 'unitary' parties, while the DA is 'federal' in organisation. Unlike the former set of parties, the DA grants 'substantial local autonomy' to provincial structures and repeated reference is made to variation in the exigencies of 'local conditions'.

This basic difference notwithstanding, parties are organised according to national territorial divisions: party branches exist in each electoral district; regions and provinces have elected conferences that nominate periodically an executive to manage the affairs of the party in each given area; and elected national assemblies and executives, in turn, govern national affairs. Generally, the South African party organisations have a higher number of layers – both the ANC and DA have regional structures, in addition to provincial structures. The Democratic Alliance, for instance, exists at the provincial level in all nine provinces of South Africa, but also has three regional structures in the Western Cape. All parties have wings that represent women and youth (and Swapo also have an 'Elders' Council'). The two ruling parties have affiliations with unions of organised labour. The ANC has a formal alliance with another political party, the South African Communist Party.

Sub-National Units of Organisation

In three of our political parties, the branch (or section, as it is called in Swapo) is the 'basic organizational unit' (DA 2003), the 'basic unit of activity for members' (ANC 1997: Article 24.1), the organisational 'fulcrum' of the party (CoD 1999), or 'the basic organ of the party (Swapo 1998: Article 15). Although South Africa is a much larger country than Namibia – in both population and land mass – the branch tends to be organised at the lowest administrative unit of the country. Requirements for a branch to be 'in good standing' (i.e. validly constituted) vary according to each party: from the Congress of Democrats (ten members) to the ANC (100 members). In Swapo, a section comprises fifteen to fifty members, while the Democratic Alliance require a fully-constituted branch to contain twenty-five members. Branch executives, elected periodically at the assemblies of branch

members, play the lead role in day-to-day party affairs and are held responsible by party structures at the next level of the party organisation. Decision taken by assembled delegates and branch executives, if they are to be legitimate, require a quorum (50%+1) of members.[1] This basic structure is repeated at the level of the region (in South Africa) and province (in both countries).

National Conference

The font of power in each party can be traced to an assembly – elected every five years in each of our cases – of delegates drawn predominantly from party branches. In the ANC, for instance, the National Conference is described as the 'supreme ruling and controlling body of the ANC' (ANC Constitution, Rule 9.1); the Federal Congress in the Democratic Alliance is the 'highest authority in respect of all matters in the Party' and the 'supreme policy-making body of the Party' (DA Constitution, Article 5). In Swapo, the Congress is the 'supreme organ of the Party' (Swapo Constitutions, Article V). The purpose of each party's National Conference is essentially identical – to elect the executive committee and party leadership.

National Executive

'Real' power, however, is found in the bodies elected directly, and indirectly, by the national conference: the 'party leadership', the 'executive committee' and the 'steering committee'. The importance of the party leadership, unsurprisingly, is essentially identical across each of our cases. The 'office-bearers', as they are termed, have *ex-officio* status on the executive committee and control key party executive positions. The 'executive committee', also elected directly by the 'national conference' is, almost invariably, a body of approximately sixty to seventy members (depending on the party) and directs party affairs between national conferences. The ANC National Executive Committee (NEC), according to Calland (2006: 118), is the 'formal seat of greatest authority' within the party, though its influence is restricted by the infrequency of its meetings (4-5 times per year) and by its large size. It is a stable body – between the 1997 Mafikeng conference and 2002 Stellenbosch conference, forty-three out of its sixty members were successfully re-elected.[2] In Swapo, the Central

[1] All party constitutions, with the notable exception of the Democratic Alliance, strike a strongly left-leaning and, at times, overtly Leninist tones. The Congress of Democrats constitution – modelled heavily on the ANC document – is a paragon of the style. Each member, for instance, must 'observe discipline', 'combat all anti-CoD propaganda', and 'expose … dishonest acts or behaviour on the side of any CoD member or leader' (CoD 1999: Article 6.2). The branch is responsible for 'political education' of the membership and meets regularly, especially during election times.

[2] In addition to the sixty directly elected members, the NEC also consists of the six party office-bearers, the Chairperson and Secretary of each elected ANC Provincial Executive, the National President and Secretary

Committee (CC) – also described as 'the highest organ of authority' when Congress is not in session – consists of seventy members.[3] The Federal Congress of the Democratic Alliance, too, is the 'highest authority in respect of all matters in the Party' and the 'supreme policy-making body of the Party' (Article 5).

Steering Committee

The day-to-day running of each party, however, is delegated to the 'steering committee' – a group of approximately fifteen individuals who implement the decisions taken at conference and executive level. In the ANC, The 'National Working Committee', as it is called, meets every Monday morning in Luthuli House (ANC headquarters) and is a relatively stable body – eight out of its fifteen members were re-elected in 2002. This basic structure is replicated throughout South Africa in geographically-defined areas that correspond to the eleven provinces and 3,788 local authority areas (Calland 2006: 123-4). In Swapo, the Central Committee elects a small Political Bureau (PB) which is responsible for party policy between meetings of the Central Committee. There are twenty-one elected members in the Political Bureau, including the four office-bearers elected directly by Congress (Article VII). In the Congress of Democrats, there are sixteen members of the party's National Working Committee.

Leadership

In each political party, 'office-bearers' elected at party conferences represent the pinnacle of power (president, deputy president, secretary-general, deputy secretary-general, national chairperson and treasurer). In their selection, interestingly, the parliamentary party plays no role whatsoever. The National Conference – made up predominantly, though to varying degrees, of branch-level delegates – make the crucial decision. In the ANC, 90% of delegates come from branch structures (nominated in proportion to the paid-up membership of party branches in each province). The remaining 10% of the delegate body are taken from among the party leadership at provincial level, Alliance members, the Youth League and the Women's League.

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of the Youth and Women's League, and a maximum of five additional members that may be co-opted by the NEC to 'provide for a balanced representation that reflects the true character of the South African people'. (Rule 11.3)

[3] In Swapo, the 'Central Committee' also contains 6 appointees of the party President, a single elected secretary of each of the 3 party wings, and a single representative of each of the country's 13 regions (Swapo-Party Constitution, Article VI).

Affiliates

All of our parties have an affiliation with groups that are independently constituted. In the case of the two opposition parties, both groups have women's and youth groups. In the case of the DA, neither group have any kind of *ex officio* status. In the ANC and Swapo, on the contrary, the party affiliates have automatic, though varying, representation on each organisational structure in the party. In the ANC, Swapo, and the Congress of Democrats the youth and women's wings, organised labour, and a number other smaller affiliates constitute a small fixed percentage of national and provincial conferences. The youth and women's affiliates, in addition, have representation on the party national executive and steering committee.

Appendix B, Figure 1: Organisational Diagram of Four African Political Parties



Appendix C: Candidate Survey

About when did you first become interested in politics? **19** _____

We are interested in people's reasons for being in politics. How important are the following reasons for your own participation in politics?

please tick one box in each row	**Very Important**	**Fairly Important**	**Not very Important**	**Not at all Important**
Members of my family are active in politics.	☐	☐	☐	☐
Personal friends or acquaintances are active in politics.	☐	☐	☐	☐
A particular political issue prompted me to become involved.	☐	☐	☐	☐
A particular event made me politically active.	☐	☐	☐	☐
Politics helps me make business or professional contacts.	☐	☐	☐	☐
Party work gives me a sense of fulfilling a civic responsibility.	☐	☐	☐	☐
I wanted to have an influence on politics and change things.	☐	☐	☐	☐
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)

Can you tell us what organisations you were involved with and the general role you played in South African politics before 1994?

_______________________________ _______________________________

_______________________________ _______________________________

_______________________________ _______________________________

Can you tell us the 5 most responsible positions you have held since 1994?
(e.g. an elected position in a trade union, political party, business or a government post)

_______________________________ _______________________________

_______________________________ _______________________________

_______________________________ _______________________________

5. In what year did you join the ANC? __________

Are you a member of any party groups or alliances (e.g. Youth League, Women's League, SACP, COSATU *etc.*)

____

7. Since 1994, have you ever belonged to a different political party? If so, can you tell us why you left that party?

No	**Yes**
☐	☐
(1)	(2)

The party was ____________________

Are you a member of any of the organisations or associations listed below? If so, how often have you attended any meetings in the past year?

please tick one box in each row	**Are you a member?**	**How often have you attended meetings in the last year?**				
	Yes	Never	Once or twice a year	Once every few months	At least once per month	At least once per week
Trade union	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Farmers' association	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Employers' or professional association	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Environmental group	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Sports club or association	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Cultural organisation	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Church or religious organisation	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Social club	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Community service group	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)

Other (please specify) ____

B1. Thinking back to the autumn of 2003 before List Conferences were held, can you tell us how you raised support for your nomination?

Informal lobbying of national ANC officials	☐1	Informal lobbying of SACP/COSATU/SANCO officials	☐5
Informal lobbying of provincial and local ANC officials	☐2	Direct appeals to party members	☐6
Party supporters lobbied on my behalf	☐3	I didn't lobby for support	☐7
	☐4	Other*	☐8

Other ____

B2. How long before the List Conferences (2003/04) and the National Election (April 2004) did you begin campaigning?

Please tick one box in each row	**More than 6 months**	**More than 3 months**	**Less than 3 months**	**One month before**	**I didn't campaign**
List conferences	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
National election	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)

B3. Once you began campaigning for the national election of 2004 what **percentage** of your time was spent on the following activities?

Please tick one box in each row	**0%**	**10%**	**20%**	**30%**	**40%**	**50%**	**60%**	**70%**	**80%**	**90%**	**100%**
Door-to-door canvassing	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Distributing leaflets and posters	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Radio and newspaper interviews	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Television interviews	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Fund raising	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Canvassing on the streets	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Attending public meetings	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Meeting with party officials and members	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Helping and encouraging voters to register	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)

B4. What percentage of your time was dedicated to the election campaign at the national, provincial and local levels?

National ☐1 Provincial ☐2 Local ☐3

B5. Approximately how many campaign workers could you count on to work for your campaign on an average day? _______

B6. How old were your campaign workers, on average? ___________

B7. What percentage of your campaign workers in April 2004 **only** help the ANC during that campaigns? _______

B8. What percentage of your campaign team consisted of ...

Paid party workers☐1 Party volunteers☐2 Non-ANC friends, relatives or acquaintances☐3

B9. How much support for your campaign did you receive from your national party organisation in the following areas?

Please tick one box in each row	**A lot**	**Some**	**A little**	**None**
Leaflets, handouts	☐	☐	☐	☐
Funds	☐	☐	☐	☐
Vehicles	☐	☐	☐	☐
General organisation	☐	☐	☐	☐
Visits by your party leader	☐	☐	☐	☐
Visits by other well known politicians	☐	☐	☐	☐
Party workers	☐	☐	☐	☐
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)

Other (please specify) ____

0. For being successful in an election how important is it to balance the party caucus in the following ways?

Please tick one box in each row	Very Important	Fairly Important	Less Important	Not at all Important	Don't Know
Gender	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Age	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Religion	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Ethnicity	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Political opinions	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Professional skills	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)

1. How important do you think the following qualities are for a Member of Parliament?

Please tick one box in each row	Very Important	Fairly important	Not very important	Not at all important	Don't know
Good speaker	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Attractive personality	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Personal appearance	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Stable home life	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Political experience	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Likely to win votes	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Committed to the electorate	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Loyal and disciplined party member	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Well known nationally	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Well known locally	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Well educated	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Knowledgeable about issues	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Experienced party member	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Contributes to ethnically balanced party	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)

12. Still thinking about your party, do you think the influence your national party has over drawing up the party list of candidates is too great, about right, or too little? And what about the influence of the party organisation over the party list at provincial and local level?

Please tick one box in each row	Far too great	Too great	About right	Too little	Far too little	Don't know
National party	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Party at provincial level	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Party at local level	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)

13. Who should make the final decision over …

Please tick one box in each row	Party leadership	Elected party delegates	Party members	Voters
Who is on the party list	☐	☐	☐	☐
The order of candidates on the list	☐	☐	☐	☐
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)

14. In your view was the procedure used in your most recent selection application…

Please tick one box in each row	Overly	Very	Quite	Not Very	Not at all
Democratic	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Efficient	-	☐	☐	☐	☐
Complicated	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Fair	-	☐	☐	☐	☐
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)

15. Did you contribute any of your personal financial resources towards the cost of your own campaign in the April 2004 elections? If so, would you mind indicating what percentage of this cost you paid? ____________

C1. In politics, people sometimes talk about the 'left' and the 'right'. If you can, where would you place yourself on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means the most left and 10 means the most right?

Left					Neutral					Right	Don't know
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	(99)
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

C2. Using the same scale, where would you place each of the following groups or individuals?

	Left					Neutral					Right	Don't know
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	(99)
ANC voters in your Province	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
ANC President	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
DA	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
IFP	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

C3. Do you think the number of immigrants to South Africa nowadays should be…

Increased a lot	Increased a little	Remain as it is	Reduced a little	Reduced a lot	Don't know
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)

C4. Listed below are various areas of government spending. Please show whether you would like to see more or less government spending in each area. Remember that if you say 'more' or 'much more', it might require a tax increase to pay for it.

Please tick a box in each row	Much more	More	Same as now	Less	Much less	Don't know
Protecting the environment	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Health	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Police and law enforcement	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Education	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Military and defence	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Land redistribution	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Poverty reduction	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
HIV/AIDS programmes	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)

C5-10. Which of the following statements is closest to your view: *(please circle A or B)*

A: Since everyone is equal under the law, leaders should not favour their own group or family.

B: Once in office, leaders are obliged to help their home community.

***

A: The government needs to place greater emphasis on re-distributive economic policies if ownership of the economy is to be transformed.

B: Government's focus on 'Black Economic Empowerment' is the best way to redress racial inequalities in the ownership of the economy.

***

A: The government's economic policies have helped most people; only a few have suffered.

B: The government's economic policies have hurt most people and only benefited a few.

***

A: It is better to have free schooling for our children, even if the quality of education is low.

B: It is better to raise educational standards, even if we have to pay school fees.

***

A: In our country, women should have equal rights and receive the same treatment as men.

B: Women have always been subject to traditional laws and customs and should remain so.

***

A: There are many other problems facing this country besides AIDS; even if people are dying in large numbers, the government needs to keep its focus on solving other problems.

B: In order to care effectively for people living with HIV, government must provide Antiretroviral (ARV) drug treatment to all sufferers as a matter of urgency.

11. Which of the **three** following statements is closest to your view? (*please circle A, B or C*)

A: The entire way our society is organized must be changed radically by revolutionary action.

B: Our society must be improved gradually by reforms.

C: Our present society must be defended valiantly against all subversive elements.

12. How well or badly would you say the government is responding to the situation in Zimbabwe?

Very Badly	Fairly Badly	Fairly Well	Very Well
☐ (1)	☐ (2)	☐ (3)	☐ (4)

1. How much contact do you have with the following persons or institutions?

Tick one box in each row	1 x in a week	1 x in a month	1 x in 3 months	1 x in a year	Less often	Never
Ordinary citizens	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Organized groups	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Lobbyists	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Journalists	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Party leaders	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Ministers	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Civil servants	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
MPs from other countries	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)

2. We are interested in the amount of time you spent in the community **outside** of the constituency break allotted by parliament. First, thinking back over the past year, about how many hours per **month** did you usually devote to the following activities?

Tick one box in each row	Less	Up to 5 hours	5 to 10 hours	10 to 20 hours	More than 20 hours
Speaking at public meetings	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Attending local community functions	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Office hours in the constituency	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Party fundraising	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Dealing with people's problems	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Attending party meetings	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Traveling between your community and Cape Town	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Attending meetings not associated with your party	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Informal meetings with the media	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Informal meetings with interest groups	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Attending debates in parliament	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Working in committees	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)

D3. To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

Tick one box in each row	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know
Most MPs are out of touch with the rest of the country	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
The SA government is largely run by a few big interests	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
You can trust the government to do what is right most of the time	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
There should be constituencies for each seat in parliament	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Local and national elections should be held at the same time	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Voting should be compulsory	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)

D4. **<u>During</u>** you constituency break from parliament can you tell how many days per week, on average, you spend in your constituency? ______

D5. In your view, how important are the following parts of an MP's job?

Please tick one box in each row	Very important	Fairly important	Not very important	Not at all important	Don't know
Speaking in Parliament	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Attending local meetings	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Committee work	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Representing regional interests	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Helping with individual problems	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Supporting the party leadership	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Developing party policy	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Voting with the party in parliament	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Being interviewed by the media	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Attending local community functions	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Representing an electorate in parliament	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Working with interest groups	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)

D6. Again thinking back over the past year, as part of your job as MP, about how many requests to help with people's personal problems do you receive in total in an average week? And excluding these requests, about how many other enquires would you receive in an average week?

	People's problems	Other enquires	
Less than 10	☐	☐	(1)
Between 10 and 25	☐	☐	(2)
Between 25 and 50	☐	☐	(3)
Between 50 and 100	☐	☐	(4)
Between 100 and 200	☐	☐	(5)
More than 200	☐	☐	(6)

D7. There are different opinions about whom an MP should represent. What do you think, what is you focus of representation? *(tick one box only)*

My voters in my constituency	All citizens in my constituency	All voters in my party	The South African citizenry at large
☐	☐	☐	☐
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)

D8. In many cases people have different views concerning matters that the National Assembly must decide upon. On which one of the following would you be most inclined to base your decision in such cases?

Tick one box in each row	First choice	Second choice	Third choice
Follow your own judgment	☐	☐	☐
Follow the view of the voters in your constituency	☐	☐	☐
Follow the view of your national party leadership	☐	☐	☐
	(1)	(2)	(3)

Here are some questions about yourself and your background.
Remember that the information you provide is strictly confidential.
It will never be reported or released identifying you personally.

1. Are you … **Male** ☐1 **Female** ☐2

2. In what year were you born? ☐

3. Were you raised in an urban or rural area? **Urban** ☐1 **Rural** ☐2

4. Do you represent an urban or rural area? **Urban** ☐1 **Rural** ☐2

5. Have you ever resided outside of South Africa, if so could you tell us where you lived and for how long? ____________

6. What is your parliamentary constituency ____________ **E7**. Do you live there? **Yes** ☐1 **No** ☐2

8. Which ethnic group do you belong to? ____________

9. Which South African language do you speak most at home? ____________

10. What is your religious belief?

Protestant	Catholic	Other Christian	Muslim	Jewish	Hindu	Other*	None
☐ (1)	☐ (2)	☐ (3)	☐ (4)	☐ (5)	☐ (6)	☐ (7)	☐ (8)

*Other, please specify ____________

11. What is your marital status?

Married	Married, but separated	Divorced	Widowed	Living together	Single
☐ (1)	☐ (2)	☐ (3)	☐ (4)	☐ (5)	☐ (6)

12. What was the highest grade, standard or form you completed?

No formal schooling	Some primary schooling	Primary school completed	Some high school	High school completed	Some university, college	University, college completed	Postgraduate degree	Qualification other than university	Don't know
☐ (1)	☐ (2)	☐ (3)	☐ (4)	☐ (5)	☐ (6)	☐ (7)	☐ (8)	☐ (9)	☐ (10)

13. Which of the following best describes your occupation before you were elected? (more than one answer is possible)

Employer/ Manager	☐1	Farmer*	☐9
Professional (Lawyer, accountant, teacher etc.)	☐2	Farm worker	☐10
Office worker	☐3	Domestic/ Maid	☐11
Skilled manual worker (formal sector)	☐4	Armed services/Police/Security	☐12
Unskilled manual worker (formal sector)	☐5	Student	☐13
Skilled manual worker (informal sector)	☐6	Housewife/ works within the home	☐14
Unskilled manual worker (informal sector)	☐7	Disabled	☐15
Miner	☐8	Never had a job	☐16

If you were a farmer, please indicate how large your farm is ________ (acres)
If you were a manager/employer, can you please indicate how many people you were responsible for ________

14. Besides being a citizen of South Africa which specific group do you believe you belong to first and foremost? ____________

15. Do you know a close friend or relative who has died from HIV/AIDS?
Yes ☐1 **No** ☐2 Would prefer not to answer ☐3

16. Do you think you could spare further time for a short telephone interview sometime over the coming year?
Yes ☐1 **No** ☐2

This is the end of the questionnaire. Please place it in the reply envelope provided.
No stamp is required. Thank you again for your cooperation.