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RICOEUR'S ETHICS OF THE PERSON, COMPLEMENTED BY AQUINAS'S ANALOGY, DEVELOPED AS AN INTERCULTURAL HERMENEUTIC.

AMY DAUGHTON
DECLARATION

I declare that this thesis has not been submitted as an exercise for a degree at this or any other university and it is entirely my own work.

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Amy Daughton
SUMMARY

This summary is intended to provide a succinct overview of the methods used and the major findings of this thesis. I will begin by presenting my methodology before indicating the final conclusions of this work.

The primary intellectual dialogue noted in the title, between Paul Ricoeur and Thomas Aquinas, is a largely new endeavour. I am using Aquinas’s understanding of the difficulty of speaking of God to think about the particular problem of intercultural encounters in the context of Ricoeur’s ethics. While there has been dialogue more broadly between philosophy and theology in the light of Ricoeur’s work, the specific contribution of Aquinas on analogical language has not been developed. I therefore respond to Ricoeur’s own commentary on analogy in four broad stages. Firstly, by reconstructing the important context of the concept of the person and the ethical framework of self, other, and just institution, which Ricoeur builds upon that concept. Secondly, by reconstructing Ricoeur’s direct work on Aquinas and juxtaposing it with the contribution of other modern commentators, providing an alternative view. Thirdly, I map the changing view of Ricoeur on the usefulness of analogical language as a theological response to the biblical text, and in terms of his work on historiography. Fourthly and finally, I place this analysis in the context of Ricoeur’s writing on intercultural encounters.

There are three important methodological concerns to draw out of this overview. The first is my use of commentators on Ricoeur, the second, is my use of commentators on Aquinas, and the third is how Ricoeur’s and Aquinas’s own methodologies suit my overall approach of detour and return through theological resources.

Firstly, the commentators I have used to analyse Ricoeur include theologians, philosophers, historiographer, ethicists and exegetes. This reflects his engagement with many discourses. What I have therefore done in order to handle this complexity of comment is to engage with the work of commentators individually. Where the response to a specific part of Ricoeur’s work has already formed coherent groups, I have provided this analysis, but Ricoeur studies is a growing field, covering many disciplines, and cannot often be structured in this way. At each point where I reference a useful scholar, I have therefore introduced their intellectual context directly. I would emphasise those scholar
through whom Ricoeur himself constructed a detour such as Axel Honneth, Thomas Aquinas, the historiographer Hayden White, who I also reconstruct in order to clarify the debate as it appears in Ricoeur’s work. I have also provided alternative frameworks that highlight the valuable aspects of Ricoeur’s thinking, such as the debate I reconstruct from Haker’s comparison of Ricoeur’s concept of the self, and that of post-Structuralism.

Commentary on Aquinas is a particularly complex question. I have limited my use of Aquinas’s vast work to his work on analogical language, but even within this question there are diverging views. Ricoeur presents a view of Aquinas’s use of analogical language that emphasises an ontological reading. I find a contrasting and valuable approach in a broadly Anglo-American tradition that emphasises its linguistic role, represented by Herbert McCabe (the translator of the relevant parts of the *Summa Theologiae*), David Burrell, Ralph McInerny. However, to this I also add the continental voices of Walter Kasper and Wolfhart Pannenberg. It is the synthesis of theological traditions that I am able to construct between these views that presents a valuable alternative to Ricoeur’s approach through French philosophical commentary.

Thirdly then, Ricoeur’s own methodology is especially appropriate for research in cross-cultural communication. Ricoeur stands firmly in the European continental tradition yet also engages closely with the Anglo-American analytical tradition. Contributing to one discipline by detouring through another is highly distinctive of Ricoeur and in this way already represents an intercultural sensibility. I conclude with Ricoeur’s point that one can only consider another tradition from a stance in one’s own and in this way, Aquinas’s particular viewpoint is well suited to a consideration of intercultural encounters.

Finally, I provide a brief note on the conclusions of my thesis. I argue that Aquinas’s analogical language provides a way of emphasising Ricoeur’s themes of identity and difference, in the context of ethically striving to live with and for others, in just institutions. This is an alternative to a false objective comparison between cultures, instead recognising the influence of one’s own language and tradition on the self. Ultimately, Ricoeur’s models for intercultural communication of translation, memory exchange, and forgiveness, are more richly understood in terms of the ‘analogizing transfer’, in imagination and sympathy, to the narrative of the other, and to the other culture.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis was undertaken firstly through a Postgraduate Research Scholarship at the Department of Religions and Theology at Trinity College Dublin. In the latter stages I have been supported as a Government of Ireland Scholar through the support of the Irish Research Council for Humanities and Social Sciences. Without this recognition and financial support by both my institution and the IRCHSS it would have been impossible for this research to go forward and I am sensible of its significance in the current difficult time for academic funding. I particularly thank my department and the wider School of Religions, Theology and Ecumenics for their role in this. I also benefitted from a Postgraduate Fellowship with the Long Room Hub within TCD, where I was able to develop resources for ethics on many related themes.

I am profoundly grateful to my supervisor Maureen Junker-Kenny for her thoughtful, generous and unstinting support. Without her encouragement, wisdom and scholarly judgement this thesis would not have been completed. I hope that my own development as a researcher continues in the light of her example of intellectual rigor and integrity.

I am also grateful to Con Casey, of the Milltown Institute for our meetings on Aquinas and analogical language. This gave me a strong footing to pursue the work in its current form. Indeed, throughout this research process I have appreciated the generosity of my senior academic colleagues in their willingness to discuss their own thoughts and experiences. I want to particularly acknowledge Gaëlle Fiasse, Hille Haker, Marianne Moyaert, George Taylor. Each of these scholars helped me to identify important aspects of my research that have impacted on the final thesis.

The intellectual context of my work has been shaped by the support of my academic colleagues within the department as well. I want to mention in particular Tony McNamara and Cathriona Russell whose impact on my thinking should not be underestimated and I have greatly valued their collegiality and friendship throughout my four years in Dublin.

In addition the Paris discussion group of Jason, Lidia, Jason, Claire, Audrey, and Murray has provided a valuable camaraderie for the various challenges of postgraduate research.

Finally, during the writing of this thesis I have been, on a daily basis, encouraged, cheered and fortified by my parents, Moira and Bernard, my brother Anthony, and my dear friend Alexis. They are the foundation of the following work.
RICŒUR’S ETHICS OF THE PERSON, COMPLEMENTED BY AQUINAS’S ANALOGY, DEVELOPED AS AN INTERCULTURAL HERMENEUTIC.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY
INTRODUCTION

Irish society is increasingly culturally diverse. Immigration brings people of different cultures alongside each other and previously local value systems now confront each other in a globalised world. In such a world it is critical that individuals and communities understand the dynamics of these encounters – with the other person, the other culture, the other history. This thesis is about how human agents in new contexts of proximity, reconstruct their identities, memories and by implication future relationships. These reflections are foundational to the question of communication across cultural, religious and linguistic divides.

In the following thesis I intend to consider the work of the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur on the ethics of self and other. This is rooted in Ricoeur’s philosophical anthropology of the person as being-in-the-world, one who speaks, who acts, who narrates, and imputes action to themselves. This self is always already encountering the other in a number of important ways - through the cultural milieu, through attestation of the self, as a summons to ethical behaviour. This provides a basis for approaching intercultural communication for Ricoeur. His work on various discourses contribute to this, historiography, biblical interpretation, inter-religious dialogue. I will reconstruct all of these topics through Ricoeur’s work in order to provide a view on his conclusions for intercultural communication.

His work on intercultural issues can be seen throughout his work, which may be methodologically characterised by detour and return: through the work of seminal scholars in different disciplines, through different traditions, and indeed, through the other. In this way Ricoeur has been engaged with the intercultural encounter throughout his philosophical life.

I want to supply an additional hermeneutical understanding of intercultural encounters by detouring through the theological resources of analogical language. Specifically, the work of the medieval Scholastic theologian Thomas Aquinas who used analogy as a way to express the tension of sameness and difference in creaturely speech about God. It is this
tension between identity and alterity that is at the heart of the intercultural encounter: seeking to understand the other and respond ethically in the future. I will employ modern commentators on Aquinas’s use of analogy in order to underline the capacity for discernment that it expresses. Moreover, analogical language represents a particular viewpoint within Christian theology - Ricoeur argues that this is the only way one can approach the intercultural or interreligious encounter: through one’s own tradition.

I will now outline the steps I will work through to discuss these ideas. I will begin in Chapter One, with Ricoeur’s concept of the self. I will outline Ricoeur’s work on this by beginning with his early work on narrative as a way of understanding events in time as expressed in Time and Narrative, rooted in contributions of Augustine’s Confessions and Aristotle’s Poetics (1.1.). I will build on this with Ricoeur’s changing focus on narrative as constitutive of identity (1.2), understood in terms of sameness (idem) and selfhood (ipse), in Oneself as Another (1.3). It is this which already displays this concept of the self as entangled with the other. This is presented as an alternative between Cartesian egocentric confidence and a Nietzschean rejection of the person. Ricoeur’s understanding is of a ‘wounded cogito’, who speaks, acts, narrates, and imputes action. I will therefore conclude with presenting an alternative view in contemporary ethics, the post-Structuralist self which is understood in the different term of sovereignty (1.4). This approach conceives of the self as potentially manipulable by the other, but Ricoeur’s alternative is ultimately more persuasive.

In Chapter Two I present the ethical framework Ricoeur builds on his concept of the self. Ricoeur proposes that the ethical striving for existence in the self is to live well, with and for others, in just institutions (2.1). Ricoeur approaches this relationship by reconstructing it in terms of the ethical aim of living well, the deontological test of the moral norm, and

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4. P. Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, tr. K. Blamey (Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1992)

the role of practical wisdom for moral judgement in situation. I move then to Ricoeur’s later work where he revisits the ethical relationship between self and other in terms of the concept of recognition (1.2). I will reconstruct his work in *The Course of Recognition* which culminates in mutual recognition, in the sense of compromise and the sense of the gift. This provides a way of returning to the concept of the self and the other that takes account of the concrete encounter in the light of the clarified ethical theory. I will conclude this chapter by turning from the ethical relationship between the self and the other in general, to the specific encounter of persons in different cultures (1.3).

It is here that introduce the possibility of using analogy as a way of thinking through the issues of identity and alterity between cultures. To support this it is important that I return to Ricoeur’s early work in *The Rule of Metaphor* (3.1). In this text Ricoeur analyses Aquinas’s use of analogy, which Ricoeur considers to be rooted in an ultimately onto-theological framework. I then turn to use alternative, theological commentators on Aquinas as a different way of understanding how analogy may be used (3.2).

In Chapter Four I am able to turn to Ricoeur’s own changing view of analogy in relation to his work on biblical interpretation in ‘Naming God’ and *Thinking Biblically* (4.1). These texts emphasise the polyphonic nature of the biblical texts. In this context, Ricoeur can approach theological commentary on those texts with more of a view to appreciating them as responses to the text. It is here that Aquinas’s use of analogical language returns in a more nuanced form than the linguistic philosophy project of *The Rule of Metaphor*. Ricoeur turns to actually use concepts of analogy in historiography (4.2), initially outlined in *Time and Narrative* and confirmed in his later *Memory, History, Forgetting*: historical

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8 In particular I will present an Anglo-American response using David Burrell, Herbert McCabe, and Ralph McInerny. Continental analysis will include Walter Kasper and Wolfhart Pannenberg. This provides an alternative to the French philosophical response on which Ricoeur primarily relies. This will primarily refer to questions 12 and 13 of the Prima Pars of T. Aquinas, *Summa Theologica: Latin text and English translation, introductions, notes, appendices and glossaries*, vol. 3, ed. and tr. H. McCabe (London, Blackfriars/Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1964).


narrative is formed through ongoing ways of thinking about the events in question. Those lenses are the Same, the Other, the Analogous. I form the link between the biblical interpretations and historiography through a consideration on the concept of testimony, as a form of intersubjective responsibility.

Chapter Five makes the final turn to direct commentary on intercultural encounter in Ricoeur's work on translation\(^\text{11}\) (4.1), and other models of social cohesion in the context of Europe, the model of memory exchange and forgiveness\(^\text{12}\) (4.2). This allows an approach both in terms of sameness and identity, but also with a view to the need to consider future ethical action between cultures. I reconstruct this in the light of the role Ricoeur gives to analogy as established in Chapter Four, but also in a comparison with his work on the phenomenology of religion as an 'analogizing transfer'\(^\text{13}\). I conclude the chapter and my overall project by considering the general question of how philosophy and theology interact in Ricoeur’s work and the impact this has made on theology (4.3). I will then make my final points on the usefulness of analogical language for thinking about intercultural encounters (4.4).

It is ultimately my view that analogical language allows a way of thinking about intercultural encounters that re-emphasises the primary themes Ricoeur has established in his ethics of the self and the other. Analogy itself is a way of expressing sameness and difference simultaneously as a response to the other. It provides a particular cultural response of discernment from within the Jewish and Christian traditions of thought. What I will ultimately emphasise is the status of analogy as an expression of human freedom, that must continually be returned to in order to pursue the diversity of intercultural plurality. This will achieve a highly detailed reconstruction of Ricoeur that embeds the question of interculturality within his wider ethics and philosophy anthropology; an alternative reading of Aquinas that can add to the richness of Ricoeur’s approach and use of the concept; and ultimately intercultural hermeneutics that responds to the identities,


memories and potential future relationships of the culturally distinct other. As I will emphasise throughout this thesis, it is this hermeneutical response to the other that will be ‘the great task of generations to come’¹⁴.

In this chapter, I will reconstruct Ricoeur's concept of the self, including the significance of the self's personhood and identity Ricoeur's overall work. I will briefly introduce these themes before outlining my steps in the following four sections.

In this thesis I will argue that any account of identity needs to properly incorporate the relationship between the individual and other people, both other individual persons close to her, and the wider collection of anonymous persons she knows only indirectly. Moreover, I will argue that to reconstruct the factors operative in these encounters, both within and outside cultural groups, it is the dual structure of personhood that needs to be established, *ipse* and *idem*, in Ricoeur's terms. I will therefore clarify and analyse the understanding of the self and the nature and scope of the self's encounter with the other, as it has been reconstructed by French phenomenologist Paul Ricoeur. In this approach, the other may be the other one knows, the parent, the friend, the colleague, or the unknown other to whom one has not spoken, but encounters through shared institutions, in their many forms. The sheer variety of different types of encounter that the opaque name 'other' conceals must be met with precision in term of the capacity of the self in acting with respect to that encounter. It is only then that both the levels of the personal encounter as such and the prior symbolic mediations by cultures and systems become available. Ricoeur's handling of self, other, and institution acknowledges this complexity and thus avoids both a merely personalist account of the I-Thou encounter to the exclusion of the role of cultural and societal- mediations, and an objectivising reading that gives no account of the self's reflexivity.
Ricoeur’s theory of the person is largely laid out in the published collection of his 1986 Gifford Lectures, formed into *Oneself as Another*. Indeed ‘in the last few years, Ricoeur has repeatedly stressed the value of his 1990 *Soi-même comme un autre* as *summa* of his overall production’. However, I want to emphasise that many of the resources this work uses have their origin in the earlier trilogy of *Time and Narrative*. It is in this text that Ricoeur begins to marshal the resources of narrative that will play a key role in the turn from anthropology to ethics. By creating an intersection between Augustine and Aristotle, Ricoeur established structures that clarified precisely what is happening in a written or oral narrative. This elucidation would be strongly echoed in *Oneself as Another* when Ricoeur turns to the problematics of identity under an ethical perspective. *Oneself as Another* inscribes these ideas into a structured combination of the Aristotelian and the Kantian approaches to ethics. Ricoeur’s works build on each other, each in turn taking a new problematic in the light of the achievements of the previous text. In the light of this progression, Domenico Jervolino, in an excellent overview of Ricoeur’s work, noted that Ricoeur ‘often declared himself to be interested more in the breaks than the continuities in his philosophical development and has even theorised a polysemy of philosophical reflection’. However, Jervolino has emphasised a thread of continuity through Ricoeur’s work on the theme of the *homme capable*, which I want to follow. Jervolino describes even Ricoeur’s work on narrative ‘not as a “philosophy of language” so much as a “philosophy through language”’. Thus, narrative and language are of interest in their function for pursuits in a larger anthropological framework. In this first chapter, I am using a largely chronological approach to Ricoeur’s treatment of the human person in his later

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1 P. Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, tr. K. Blamey (Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1992), which are the published version of his Gifford lectures in 1986. However, the two final lectures of the Gifford series were published separately as ‘Le soi dans le miroir des Écritures’ and ‘le soi mandaté’ in order to avoid any ‘ontotheological amalgamations’ (*Oneself as Another*, p. 24) that would mar the philosophical coherence of the ten studies making up the collection. Ricoeur adapted each and while not yet translated, they are published with another essay in *Amour et Justice* (Paris, Editions du Seuil, Points-Essais, 2008). An English version of the final lecture can be found as ‘The Summoned Self’ pp. 262-278 in P. Ricoeur, M. Wallace (ed.) *Figuring the Sacred* (Minneapolis, Augsburg Fortress Press, 1995).


work, beginning with *Time and Narrative*, in order to lay the groundwork of vocabulary and structure for my later investigation of the analyses of subjectivity and intersubjectivity in *Oneself as Another*.

I shall begin in section one of this chapter by treating Ricoeur's use of Augustine and Aristotle in *Time and Narrative* as an access to the question of personhood by developing a coherent expression of events in time. In section two this coherence contributes to an understanding of person by providing a solution to the problematics of personal identity. This will include a brief explanation of the way Ricoeur includes the contributions of Structuralism while going beyond them, in order to emphasise the role of narrative identity in articulating the self. This reconstruction reveals the significance for Ricoeur of the other in the consideration of the personhood of the self. In section three therefore I turn to concentrate on *Oneself as Another*. Finally, in section four I will favourably contrast Ricoeur's approach to the self to that of a group named as post-Structuralists, following the overview provided by Hille Haker. My response to this contrast is to point to the consistency of Ricoeur's approach to the self from his early work, *The Voluntary and the Involuntary*, to his later work on autonomy. In Chapter Two I will eventually turn to the ethical theory which Ricoeur builds on his concept of the self.

1.1. PERSONHOOD UNDER THE ASPECT OF NARRATIVITY IN *TIME AND NARRATIVE*

What *Time and Narrative* will eventually contribute to Ricoeur's conception of the person is the role of narrative in recognising the significance of the temporality of persons. The person acts, is subject to events, conceives of their personal history, encounters others and attributes actions. Understanding this is necessarily within an articulation of time. Narration provides this. Narrative itself, will reveal certain characteristics of the relationship between persons, impacting on the self-identity of an individual. I will deal with narrative as such in the section immediately following, for now I will concentrate a specific treatment of Augustine and Aristotle in *Time and Narrative.*
Augustine’s *distentio* and Aristotle’s *emplotment* as mutual support

*Time and Narrative* opens with a consideration of Augustine and Aristotle as Ricoeur engages with their work on ideas of temporal dissonance and narrative coherence. Both thinkers have an extensive series of works, so I will give a brief overview of the context of Ricoeur’s use of their work in his own as a whole. When dealing with narrative Ricoeur constantly returns to the images of Greek tragedy so it is no surprise that it is Aristotle’s *Poetics*⁶ that Ricoeur uses here. Aristotle’s construction of ethics provides a significant contribution to Ricoeur’s later conceptualization of personal identity, constituting the teleological thrust Ricoeur required to consider the role of the good life. Whenever Ricoeur handles teleological approaches to ethics, it is Aristotle to whom he refers⁷. I outline this ethical discourse when I turn to *Oneself as Another* later in this chapter. In the case of *Time and Narrative*, as I will reconstruct below, Ricoeur concentrates on Aristotle’s *Poetics* and his theory of drama as a way of bringing together events and character into a coherent whole, through emplotment.

Augustine’s work has appeared as an influence in Ricoeur’s work at various points. Isabelle Bochet has published extensively in French on Augustinian hermeneutics, including how Augustine approaches time⁸. She is therefore particularly well placed to comment on Ricoeur’s use of Augustine. She has located the beginning of Ricoeur’s engagement with Augustine in 1960 when he began writing on the question of evil⁹. However, much of Ricoeur’s work from this point used Augustine’s meditations on time and memory, referring to Augustine’s *Confessions* in *Memory, History, Forgetting*¹⁰, and

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also separately discussing Augustine’s *De Trinitate* contribution to the same discourse. Ricoeur’s stance on Augustine’s approach to memory is one of admiration and Augustine plays a significant part in his argumentation, which Bochet suggests ‘will not surprise’.

She points to Ricoeur’s earlier analysis of Augustine on memory. ‘In this respect, Augustine is still, for me, the undisputed master, in spite of certain insights by Husserl and Heidegger’. Augustine’s own corpus was not solely focused on this problematic but constitutes a varied exploration of early Christian doctrine and spiritual life. When discussing memory, Augustine focuses on the difficulty of forming ideas in the mind that are not present, and situates this discourse in the context of the fragmentary nature of memory, named as *distentio animi*.

I will now turn to reconstructing the intersection Ricoeur forms between Augustine and Aristotle. Ricoeur begins his analysis of the capacities of the self with the problematic in Augustine of Hippo’s *Confessions* of defining past, present, and future. Augustine’s own tendency is toward spatial terminology, asking ‘For if times past and to come be, I want to know where they be’. This tendency resolves in an image of a mind itself facing three ways, accessing the temporal qualities of a space no longer resided in or of a thing not yet seen. As Ricoeur puts it when considering Augustine,

‘We are in fact prepared to consider as existing, not the past or the future as such, but the temporal qualities that can exist in the present, without the things of which we speak, when we recount them or predict them, still existing or already existing’.

The movement is of present to the not-present, made present. The mind recalling the past thing to itself, or considering the future possibility is perhaps an extension ‘of the mind

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12 I. BOCHET, *Augustin dans la pensee de Paul Ricoeur*, p. 41, ‘qui n’a pas de quoi surprendre’.


15 AUGUSTINE, *Confessions*, Book 11, §18, emphasis mine.

itself moving between things present and not present. Yet this extension results in a further tension – where the active intentio of calling up a past time must handle past time, only available as a passive sign or image in the mind itself. It is not present. Augustine calls this discordance within the activity of the mind distentio animi, and the dialectic between intentio and distentio is the continuing activity of a mind within created time.

I would like to highlight two characteristics of Augustine’s approach to distentio animi. Firstly, there is a reflexivity here that will have later resonance for the theory of personhood (1.2.). Secondly, (and more importantly), this discordance must be seen in the light of the further tension between created time and eternity. I will now examine this point more fully. Here is Ricoeur’s analysis of that contrast.

‘Its first function is to place all speculation about time within the horizon of a limiting idea that forces us to think at once about time and about what is other than time. The second function is to intensify the experience of distentio on an existential level. The third function is to call upon this experience to surpass itself by moving in the direction of eternity, and hence to display an internal hierarchy in opposition to our fascination with the representation of rectilinear time’.

Without dwelling on a complex question of time and metaphysics not relevant to the concerns of this chapter, I do note certain things from this analysis. For Augustine, concordance which will be found in the heavenly reward is always ‘other’ than created time; within time, by its nature, distentio remains an ‘existential burden’. However, while it remains unresolved, the availability of eternity in salvation history – a continuance of the same heightened discordance – allows intentio to remain as a positive anchor in the dialectic, as ‘the hope of the last things’. The tension between the finite human and her offered infinite future is ‘a secret sorrow, with hope’ because ‘what I do know of myself I know by Thy shining upon me; and what I know not of myself, so long I know not it until my darkness be made as the noon-day [Is. 58] by Thy countenance’. Here, Ricoeur emphasises that human finitude is coupled with an essentially positive space for activity

17 AUGUSTINE, Confessions, 11 §26
18 Ibid., throughout book 10.
19 P. RICOEUR, Time and Narrative I, p. 22.
20 Ibid., p. 31.
21 Ibid., p. 27.
22 AUGUSTINE, Confessions, 10, § 5, 6.
and fulfillment. While humans remain finite, even in Augustine’s emphatically concupiscent anthropology, that finitude contains both fallibility and hope. Humans act capably despite a fallible nature; *intentio* in dialectic with *distentio*, by the grace of God. In sorrow, *distentio* still remains.

In a contrasting analysis, Bochet argues that *intentio* ‘appears [in *Confessions*, book XI] only three times and is only explicitly juxtaposed with *distentio* at one point, near the end of the book’

However, in my view while the word itself may appear rarely, by relying only on this fact Bochet plays down a significant characteristic of Augustine’s approach. Ricoeur is rightly emphasising Augustine’s sorrowful emphasis on man’s finitude, which is a constant lament throughout *Confessions*. ‘The absence of eternity is not simply a limit that is thought, but a lack that is felt at the heart of temporal existence’

Indeed, even while Bochet prefers to render the conflict in *Confessions* as ‘the tension between multiplicity and unity,’ she agrees that Augustine eventually returns to locate the conflict in ‘the constitution of finite being’. As an answer to the existential discordance Ricoeur observes in the *distentio/intentio* of Augustine’s temporal figures, he turns from his analysis of Augustine to Aristotle’s *Poetics*. I will do so here also.

While Ricoeur presented Augustine’s understanding of the self’s memory of events in time as a tension between intentio and distentio, characteristics of a finite being, he sees in Aristotle a different understanding of events recalled. Ricoeur chooses to reconstruct Aristotle not on memory as such, but on poetics. In contrast with the tension that remained for Augustine’s understanding of the person in time, Aristotle has ‘[discerned] in the poetic act *par excellence* – the composing of the tragic poem – the triumph of concordance over

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23 I want to note here that Augustine’s approach to finitude and infinity is somewhat more hierarchical than Ricoeur’s. It is a complex question to which I cannot do justice here, but succinctly the very nature of infinity is God himself and the finite and fallen world is brought out of fallibility and finitude both, through redemption, to infinity. Thus finitude and fallibility are much closer together than Ricoeur will later render them. It is important that the absolute distinction between the two for Ricoeur be noted here, even while Augustine refrains from it.


27 Ibid., ‘mais elle renvoie à la constitution de l’être fini’.
discordance"\(^{28}\). The poet is the ‘maker of plots'\(^{29}\) and his emplotment (*mise en intrigue*) reorganises the relationship between character and events in time. Yet even this valuable reorganisation could easily collapse into mere structural precision or unrelated fiction, rather than what Ricoeur regards as the broader possibilities of narrative. In my view, it is less often emphasised that it is Ricoeur’s use of Augustine that allows him to properly broaden Aristotle’s point regarding tragic drama to narrative as such. I argue that on one hand for Augustine, discordance describes the human person always seeking concordance of memory. On the other hand, Aristotle’s poetics respond to events fictively. As the concordance of events in time the temporality of Aristotle’s narrative can be anchored to the historical ‘real’\(^{30}\), by reference to Augustine’s personal approach. The concrete individual’s need for concordance was resolved by Augustine in the similarly concrete salvation history that points the human person toward God’s infinity. It is this link to the historical narrative and the ‘real’ need that drives it that displays most clearly the intersection Ricoeur constructs between Augustine and Aristotle. He concludes, ‘The question of the relationship between time and narrative culminates in this dialectic between aporetics and a poetics’\(^{31}\). As Bochet observes ‘the poetics of narrative can respond, at least in part, to the aporia of time. One can ask whether the reading of *Confessions* which articulates the account of the life of Augustine, did not contribute to the form of Ricoeur’s assumption’\(^{32}\). As Ricoeur begins his solution, ‘time becomes human to the extent that it is articulated through a narrative mode, and *narrative attains its full meaning when it becomes a condition of temporal existence*’\(^{33}\).

Ricoeur can now resolve the horizontal continuance of the character in time with the vertical entry of events and other characters, discordance formed into concordance. Significantly, this is not a simple process of organisation by an author of her subjects,

\(^{28}\) P. RICOEUR, *Time and Narrative* I, p. 31.

\(^{29}\) ARISTOTLE, *The Poetics*, 51b27.

\(^{30}\) In particular see ‘The Reality of the Past’ in *Time and Narrative* III, pp. 142-157.


\(^{32}\) I. BOCHET, *Augustin dans la pensée de Paul Ricoeur*, p. 49, ‘La poétique du récit peut répondre, au moins pour une part, à l’aporétique de la temporalité. On peut se demander si la lecture des Confessions, dans lesquelles l’analyse du temps s’articule au récit de la vie d’Augustin, n’a pas contribué à donner forme à cette hypothèse de Ricoeur’.

\(^{33}\) P. RICOEUR, *Time and Narrative* I, p. 52, emphasis mine.
seeking to tell a sensible story, but is a dialectic process available to both fiction and history. For example, in the case of historical narrative, the process is anchored by the historical events, so while there is a seeking of the ‘real’, multiple stories must still be handled. I introduce the historical example in order to underline, as Augustine’s distentio also does, the complexity of the narrative activity that draws this multiplicity together. That kind of activity is identified by Ricoeur, using Aristotle’s vocabulary, as mimesis. Ricoeur, through Augustine, observes Aristotle forming coherence by the complex activity of mimesis in the space of narrative.

**Aristotle’s mimesis displays narrative mediating events in time**

I will now outline the interpretation of Aristotle’s mimesis Ricoeur constructs. Mimesis is not representation, or imitation, but a dialectic activity of three simultaneous, ongoing levels. Crucially, Ricoeur characterises it positively as a circle, ‘an endless spiral that would carry the meditation past the same point a number of times’. The first movement, mimesis₁ is ‘prefiguration in praxis’, framing the space in which the plot occurs. Mimetic activity moves the plot from its prefigurations by appropriating the resources of previous symbols, establishing creative networks of conceptual action. Thus by the nature of the space it opens, the first level gives the possibility of emplotment to the activity of the second level, mimesis₂. That second level mediates the plot’s discordances and moves the plot between the two availabilities of the first and the third levels. The third level, mimesis₃, is the cathartic working out of this dynamic in the work’s reception. Yet that third level is not separate, but instead the ‘experience of the spectator must first be

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34 P. RICOEUR, *Time and Narrative* III, p. 145.

35 Aristotle’s mimesis is sharply distinct from Plato’s use to indicate an imitative participatory relationship between idea, thing, and art, running along lines of ‘attraction and affinity’ D. BURRELL, *Analogy and Philosophical Language* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1973), p. 54.


constructed in the work. Here too is the work refigured in the light of the mediating activity of the second from the first level of the activity.

In contrast to the always-postponed concordance in Augustine's *distentio animi*, in Aristotle's epic is conceived as a concordance which is not merely chronologic, but causally logical – where there is succession. This is a positive, substantive formation. Significantly, it, too, can retain discordance within its own dialectic between vertical and horizontal planes. It is not the case that life is chaotic, while narrative is not; our temporal experience is not 'unformed' to the exclusion of any coherence, and similarly 'emplotment is never the simple triumph of "order"'. This is as a counter-part, not a mirror of Augustine's difficulties, and is crucial for recognising the dialectic movement of mimesis. ‘So long as we place the consonance on the side of the narrative and the dissonance on the side of the temporality in a unilateral fashion, as the argument suggests, we miss the properly dialectical character of their relationship’. Time and narrative are themselves in dialectic then, and the activity of mimesis continually reappropriates and reinterprets this relationship. ‘Thus the hermeneutic circle of narrative and time never stops being reborn from the circle that the stages of mimesis form’. Similarly those mimetic stages are continually and simultaneously ongoing; they are in dialectic.

As a dialectic, instead of tearing asunder, discordance within the work results in a tragic concordance with internal tensions that are only appropriate to the narrative whole. ‘And since the pleasure the poet is to provide, is that which comes from pity and fear through an imitation, clearly this effect must be embodied by the plot’. The mimetic activity of the whole work, the emplotment, mediates all of the heterogeneous factors into a coherent whole; events into plot; temporal characteristics into synthesis; indeed, any number of

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38 P. RICOEUR, *Time and Narrative* I, p. 48, for the overview of the triple activity of mimesis see pp. 45-76.

39 'The theory of a mimesis composed of three elements assumes that one can say that as soon as praxis is understood as such, it is narratively or prenarratively structured, and that the act of reception of stories demands in turn an activity which can be identified as mimesis', H. HAKER, 'Narrative and Moral Identity', p. 141.

40 P. RICOEUR, *Time and Narrative* I, p. 73.

41 Ibid., p. 72.

42 Ibid., p. 76.

different objects; 'agents; goals; means; interactions; circumstances; unexpected results'.

It results in a concordant discordance and thus the solution to these paradoxes is the poetic act itself.

In my opinion, there is, in Ricoeur’s work, a further step from the "grasping together" of Aristotle’s poetic act to explicitly incorporate the role of autonomous reason in modern thought. In the third book of *Time and Narrative* Ricoeur is emphatic on describing the nature of grasping together as an activity of judgement. ‘I cannot overemphasize the kinship between this “grasping together” power of the configurational act and what Kant says about the operation of judging’. As I noted, the dialectic nature of the mimetic function is such that the consideration of prefiguration and the open space of refiguration are also subject to this same operation of judgement. Configuration necessarily includes each level of mimesis; configuration is not arbitrary but responds to prefiguration, and is never isolated from the new shape of refiguration. In mimetic activity this tripartite structure is always present, such is the nature of the internal dialectic. This will be an important characteristic for distinguishing Ricoeur from other philosophical analysts of narrative, as I will show below.

**Narrative prefiguration in Augustine’s temporality as an answer to misreadings of *Time and Narrative*.**

There are a variety of treatments regarding when and where narrative becomes a tool of epistemology. I will concentrate on the response by structuralist analysts of historiography on the question of narrative. Structuralist thinking tends to divide the event and the narrative about the event, leaving narrative as a purely structural tool and undermining its meaning. Ricoeur’s position strengthens the continuity, which is a very significant conclusion. This is firstly because Dietmar Mieth, the German theological ethicist identifies Ricoeur’s contribution ‘about the reception of structuralism in hermeneutics’ as


of important benefit for theology. Ricoeur clarifies a philosophical position on the structuralist approach to narrative in particular that allows him, and other thinkers to go beyond what structuralism achieves. I will deal with this point below. Secondly, my analysis of Ricoeur in reply to the criticisms and support of this discipline will reveal the turn to the problematic of identity that leads me further into Ricoeur’s ethical theory of personhood. I will contrast my analysis of Ricoeur’s position with David Carr, a philosopher working on the phenomenology of history. Carr is positive regarding Ricoeur’s use and understanding of the continuity between events and their narration, but in my view when Ricoeur moves on to the question of narrative, he identifies narrative as constitutive of the self. The consequent understanding of narrative and agency becomes the basis for Ricoeur’s development of his concept of the acting self, who narrates. This will be explored in terms of narrative identity in the following section, and in its implications for ethics in Chapter Two.

David Carr describes narrative as operating as historical, and as fictional, as a reflection of events as they happen or might have happened. There is continuity between narrative and action. Therefore fictional narratives can still reveal truth about life, and both fiction and historical narratives represent a variety of goals. For example, ‘histories may be inaccurate and some stories invraisemblable, but nothing in principle prevents such narratives from succeeding at their aim. Indeed, we take certain exemplary cases to have succeeded brilliantly’ 48. However, Carr’s discussion on precisely this characteristic of narrative noted, ‘the study of narrative has become a meeting ground and battle ground of the disciplines’ 49. This area became important for the philosophical debates of the English-speaking world during the latter half of the twentieth century 50. Carr collects the more negative approaches together, describing their owners as ‘a strong coalition of


50 Ricoeur’s Time and Narrative was translated into English over the period 1984-7. The publishing of the original Temps et Récit began in 1983 and so were fed by and continued to impact on the English-speaking debate. Thinkers who began to establish their own systematic approaches to narrative within that debate include A. MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (London, Duckworth, 1981), C. Taylor, Sources of the Self (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989).
philosophers, literary theorists, and historians\textsuperscript{51} who declare his outline of the role of narrative above as

‘mistaken and naïve. Real events simply do not hang together in a narrative way, and if we treat them as if they did we are being untrue to life... in virtue of its very form, any narrative account will present us with a distorted picture of the events it relates\textsuperscript{52}.

Among such skeptics, Carr identifies Louis O. Mink, Hayden White and Frank Kermode\textsuperscript{53}. He criticises these figures for divorcing the narrative and the real, and ‘for Ricoeur’, who quotes each of these theorists, ‘narrative structure is as separate from the “real world” as it for the other authors\textsuperscript{54}. Even while acknowledging that Ricoeur’s use of narrative is positive and creative, Carr concludes that Ricoeur’s concept is still divorced from the reality of events. I will briefly expand on the views of these thinkers with respect to what Carr describes as the “discontinuity” between narrative and events, and ultimately argue that Ricoeur does not represent such a view. Indeed, I will argue that Ricoeur and Carr actually come to very similar conclusions regarding how narrative shapes thought, including reflexive consideration of the self.

At this time, Hayden White was writing to reject an epistemological basis for narrative\textsuperscript{55}. He agreed with its capacity to make sense of that which is chaotic, including all human activity; historical events are rendered coherent in this way. By the very nature of that lack of structure in human action, any structure applied will necessarily be divorced from the lived reality. There are any number of forms that one might use to recall a past series of...

\textsuperscript{51} D. CARR, ‘Narrative and the Real World’, p. 117.

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{53} Ricoeur uses these thinkers in his route toward the Augustinian/Aristotelian reconstruction of narrative mediating events in time. Carr is correct to consider them sceptics on the question of how close narrative is to those events - White in particular will be shown to be very negative on the subject, approaching narrative as purely structural. Ricoeur, by contrast, will show that narrative mediation brings one to new understandings of events. Narrative as structure is part of these, so Carr’s “sceptics” are made to contribute by Ricoeur’s detour through their arguments. This will become increasingly important when I turn to history-writing as refiguration in Ricoeur’s later works.

\textsuperscript{54} D. CARR, ‘Narrative and the Real World’, p. 120.

\textsuperscript{55} See H. WHITE, ‘The Structure of Historical Narrative’, pp. 5-19, in CLIO 1 (Fort Wayne, Indiana University-Purdue University, 1972), and ‘Interpretation in History’, pp. 281-314 in New Literary History 4- On Interpretation (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973).
events, and the reliance on narrative is 'purely conventional'. This discontinuity recalls the earlier influential view of Roland Barthes; art can never be representative of life, because art allows of no 'static'. Frank Kermode agreed with White, though emphasising that the narrative convention was perfectly acceptable provided one always maintains the awareness that it is 'fictive'. Any other consciousness will cause the story to descend into the merely arbitrary.

I noted above the need to recall Augustine's role in Ricoeur's solution (1.1.1.), which will allow me to highlight the tension of dissonance in human events. Kermode's work here highlights a related aspect, that narratives are not always seamless solutions to chaos; Kermode also discusses the 'obscure' nature of narrative; it can sometimes 'aim not at illumination but obscurity and dissimulation'. In these cases narratives take on roles that are not allied with telling history as such. Kermode points toward the parables of Jesus as stories that are not to be taken at face value. He gives an example, 'The saying of Jesus that nothing that enters a man from outside can defile him is called by Mark a parable; it is not especially dark, but dark enough to call for an explanation'. This only serves to underline Kermode's warning that narrative is inherently 'fictive', carrying a particular communication and always 'requiring explanation'. Failing to grasp this with respect to historical narrative would undermine the temporal quality to which emplotment provides narrative coherence.

Carr maintains that there is continuity between events and narration, and any reading short of continuity does not properly acknowledge the role of narrative. Carr therefore argues


60 P. RICOEUR, Time and Narrative I, p. 75.


that Ricoeur is employing a "discontinuity" approach in his reference to Augustine's discordance of time. Ricoeur indicates that experience has a pre-narrative structure\(^63\) – it prefigures even though it is not itself a configured narrative, it is a 'story not yet told'.\(^64\) Carr characterises Ricoeur's prefigured state as one of 'constitutional disarray'\(^65\) which Ricoeur himself recognises, and makes coherent through the activity of emplotment. 'The ideas of beginning, middle, and end are not taken from experience: they are not traits of real action but effects of poetic ordering'\(^66\), which Carr argues leaves narrative in Ricoeur as essentially a linguistic endeavour, and disconnected from events.

To an extent the separation of narrative and life is a function of an emphasis on the vantage point from which one tells a story - it is this which provides "beginning" and "end". Louis Mink’s oft-quoted ‘stories are not lived but told’\(^67\) is intended to clarify that the true meaning of narrated events are the result of a trajectory applied at a later date. Ricoeur introduces Mink as an ally 'who put the whole weight of its intelligibility on the connection as such established between the events, or on the judicatory act of "grasping together"'.\(^68\) Mink's remark that 'only in the story is it America which Columbus discovers, and only in the story is the kingdom lost for want of a nail'\(^69\) merely underlines the status of narrative as an interpretive object, which Carr finds an artificial stance.

I find Carr’s approach here to contain some useful remarks on the role of narrative, but his analysis of Ricoeur is strangely misapplied, and ongoing work by both clarifies this. Carr’s ultimate conclusion in 1986 is that narrating is ‘a viewpoint inherent in action itself’\(^70\). This is to say that ‘in this sense the narrative activity I am referring to is practical before it becomes cognitive or aesthetic in history or fiction’\(^71\) such that it is actually

\(^63\) As noted above in n. 40, quoting Haker's 'Narrative and Moral Identity', p. 141.

\(^64\) P. RICOEUR, Time and Narrative I, p. 74.

\(^65\) D. CARR, 'Narrative and the Real World', p. 119.


\(^67\) L. O. MINK, 'History and Fiction as Modes of Comprehension,' p. 557.

\(^68\) P. RICOEUR, Time and Narrative I, p. 41.

\(^69\) L. O. MINK, 'History and Fiction as Modes of Comprehension,' pp. 557/8.

\(^70\) D. CARR, 'Narrative and the Real World', p. 126.

\(^71\) Ibid.
'constitutive...of the self which acts and experiences'. I argue that it is precisely in the constitution of the self that Ricoeur locates narrative, and that narrative and events are much more closely engaged for him than Carr represents them.

According to Carr, discontinuity is a view 'shared by structuralists and non-structuralists alike'. Contrary to this, I argue that narrative as essentially separate from real life is a specifically structuralist argument, which Ricoeur has criticised. Of the writers mentioned above, I identify Barthes and White as firmly in this camp. Ricoeur objects explicitly to an exclusively structuralist approach to narrative characterising such an approach to a text as 'treating it as a worldless and authorless object; in this case, we explain the terms of its internal relations, its structure'. This stance does not fully characterise how narrative interacts with reality, nor does it allow narrative as an object of interpretation. The emphasis Ricoeur gives to his point that structuralists exclude narrative as an interpretive object - which already excludes Mink, and Kermode from a 'structuralist' framework. Such an approach would be perfectly valid, Ricoeur argues, but it is void of interpretation, which is what allows the text to be a moving form of communication - 'language speaks, that is, shows, makes present, brings into being'. Where structure is highlighted to the exclusion of interpretation, it fails to be reflective, and becomes instead that 'which orders but which does not think itself'. Ricoeur suggests that if structuralism is the only lens through which language is understood it excludes

'the act of speaking, not only as an individual performance but as the free creation of new expressions. History is also excluded, for history is more than the passage from one state

72 D. CARR, 'Narrative and the Real World', p. 126.

73 Ibid., p. 118.

74 Ricoeur strengthens his opposition to White's approach as an exclusive understanding of historiography in his later work Memory, History, Forgetting, pp. 256-7.


76 It is worth noting here that there are those working in narrative identity who do recognise beginnings and endings in lived experience both obvious and less noticeable - MacIntyre's After Virtue is Carr's example: 'stories are lived before they are told' p. 197.

77 P. RICOEUR, The Conflict of Interpretations, p. 265.

78 P. RICOEUR, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, p. 152.

79 P. RICOEUR, The Conflict of Interpretations, p. 40.
of a system to another: it is the process whereby human beings produce themselves and their culture through the production of their language\textsuperscript{80}.

Ricoeur’s understanding of narrative acknowledges the structural understanding of events in time, and appropriates it with an interpretive act. The reader interprets in order to ‘discern meaning’\textsuperscript{81}, to discover new ways of speaking, thinking, and acting and thus this necessarily includes self-understanding as a component refiguring the narrative. That the discovery of new ways of speaking is a refiguration of the narrative I will now argue, and would not be available under a purely discontinuous understanding of narrative.

I note here that Carr does acknowledge that narrative is an interpretive object for Ricoeur, though still arguing that it becomes so only after Ricoeur applies it to his ‘constitutional disarray’\textsuperscript{82} of human action. However, I do not think that at this stage Carr is fairly representing the implications of narrative as interpretation in Ricoeur’s broader theme. Narrative is introduced in \textit{Time and Narrative} as a tool to handle Augustine’s tension in the temporal person: of how to conceive of the non-being of time that is not present in a personal account, where ‘language appears itself as a mode of being in being’\textsuperscript{83}.

To clarify this, I turn to Louis Mink, as used by Ricoeur. While White’s approach at the time of Ricoeur’s writing tended toward the negative in stressing the unreliability of such narratives, Mink maintains that these are not ‘imperfect substitutions for more sophisticated forms of explanation and understanding, nor are they the unreflective first steps along the road which leads toward the goal of scientific or philosophical knowledge’\textsuperscript{84}. Rather, the understanding that narratives make available is a primary act of mind\textsuperscript{85}. It is a positive, creative undertaking - Ricoeur says that this casting of a narrative upon a series of events in history is already a kind of universalisation. ‘To make

\textsuperscript{80} J. B. THOMPSON, ‘Editor’s Introduction’ in P. RICOEUR, \textit{Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences}, p. 9.

\textsuperscript{81} P. RICOEUR, \textit{The Conflict of Interpretations}, p. 264.

\textsuperscript{82} D. CARR, ‘Narrative and the Real World’, p. 119.

\textsuperscript{83} P. RICOEUR, \textit{The Conflict of Interpretations}, p. 265.

\textsuperscript{84} L. O. MINK, ‘History and Fiction as modes of comprehension’, p. 557.

\textsuperscript{85} This is a phrase Mink inherits from Barbara Hardy. See B. HARDY, ‘Towards a Poetics of Fiction: An Approach Through Narrative’, pp. 5-14 in \textit{Novel} 2 (Durham; NC, Duke University Press, 1968). Hardy is also a figure used by Carr, which underlines how close Carr’s position is to that of those he identifies as ‘discontinuous’.
up a plot is already to make the intelligible spring from the accidental, the universal from
the singular, the necessary or the probable from the episodic. This does not constitute a
fictionalising of events, or of applying connections where there are none, but a way of
drawing connections out such that new meaning can be found from them. This is
emphatically a mimetic process; meaning is given to a text by virtue of its confrontation by
the reader with the reader’s life world. Ricoeur is concerned here with continuing to
make available the resources of refiguration. Yet mimetically, for refiguration, there must
already have been prefiguration in the actions themselves, then configured in narrative.

In a later discussion between Carr and Ricoeur, in 1991, Ricoeur makes precisely this
point. When Carr suggests that the coherence of emplotment is simply the activity of
living already ongoing, Ricoeur responds that

‘The question asked by David Carr is absolutely central to me...I think that my suggestion
of a triple mimesis constitutes an attempt to address this difficulty. If, according to
Mimesis I, every narrative configuration has a kind of retroactive reference, it is because
life itself is an inchoate narrative.

Further, in an analysis after this point, actually by White, identifies precisely this
characteristic as a similarity between Carr and Ricoeur. Carr is correct that White’s earlier
concern, following Barthes, had been to distinguish between historical discourse and the
“mythic”, which was fictional and therefore not available for scientific analysis, rendering
it dangerously primitive. White’s work at this point was indeed close to Barthes’
structuralist stance of discontinuity. However, Robert Doran has remarked that ‘though
White sometimes calls himself a “structuralist,” this nomenclature is somewhat misleading
when applied to White’s work and on this point, White changed his position, in response

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86 P. Ricoeur, Time and Narrative I, p. 41.
87 P. Ricoeur, Time and Narrative II, p. 160.
and Interpretation, p. 180.
Doran locates White’s abandonment of structuralist ideas in his work as occurring after the publication of
Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth Century Europe (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1973). If this is so Carr, writing in 1986, is not as fully engaged with White’s historical
theory as he is Ricoeur’s. Doran makes this remark in ibid., p. xxii.
to both Carr and Ricoeur. Significantly, in 1996, when White discussed Carr’s stance on the role of narrative, he placed him in the same tradition as Ricoeur.

‘In line with Paul Ricoeur’s work on narrative, Carr argues that human agents prefigure their actions as narrative trajectories, such that the outcome of a given action is at least intended to be linked to its inauguration in the way that the ending of a story is linked to its beginning... I am inclined to credit Carr’s account of the cognitive authority of narrative representations of historical reality’.

White has here changed his own stance to one which allows for ‘figural truth’ in narrative, though he still remains engaged with some concepts of structuralist thought by continuing to ‘distinguish between a narratological mode of thought and speech, on the one side, and the various techniques of narrative, such as characterisation, thematization, and emplotment, on the other’. Crucially, however, White characterises Carr’s approach to continuity as actually being in the tradition of Ricoeur, identifying Ricoeur’s use of narrative as prefigurative of human action.

It is because of this that White is able to change his stance and ultimately conclude that there is ‘figural truth’; he came to agree with Ricoeur’s conclusion that language, including historical language, with their unique symbolic worlds, itself is always already ‘an instrument of mediation between human consciousness and the world it occupies’. Language and narration are able to provide us with new ways of interpreting the world and

90 H. White ‘Storytelling: Historical and Ideological’ pp. 273-292 in H. White, R. Doran (ed.) The Fiction of Narrative: Essays on History, Literature, and Theory 1957-2007 (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010) pp. 281/2 - this essay was originally published in 1996. In Chapter Four I will return to Ricoeur’s analysis of Hayden White’s approach as a necessary part of representing historical events, specifically through the application of analogical thinking. Here my emphasis is on clarifying the way in which narrative can contribute to the representation of human agency in Ricoeur’s concept of personhood.


92 Ibid.

93 Haker puts this in the opposite way: ‘the prefiguration of narrative in praxis’ (‘Narrative and Moral Identity’, p. 141). However, she continues ‘in this respect therefore, prefiguration means that structural elements which are already present in praxis recur in the story, and that the praxis is quasi-narratively or prenarratively structured by means of significance... literature is distinguishable in its distance from significant reality, but not removable’ (ibid). As Ricoeur would later identify White’s position, events will inevitably be “narrativised”. Haker’s position on this differs from White’s by not reconstructing this as a problem.

94 Haker clarifies these symbolic structures, saying that ‘language consists of a complex of symbols which constructs the context of all actions. Symbols structure and introduce value judgements which with reference to actions take on an ethical quality’. (‘Narrative and Moral Identity’, p. 141).

our history. Speaking of texts, Ricoeur suggests that interpretation of narratives ‘culminates in the self-interpretation of a subject who thenceforth understands himself better, understands himself differently, or simply begins to understand himself’\textsuperscript{96}. Narration, by persons, mediates those events, but could not do so without already being prefigured by persons in the action. Thus, ‘time becomes human to the extent that it is articulated through a narrative mode, and narrative attains its full meaning when it becomes a condition of temporal existence’\textsuperscript{97}.

I do want to acknowledge that Ricoeur is still employing a certain structuralist position on the role of narrative as a representative but configured construction, but this is not discontinuity, but an acknowledgement of the complexity of the role of narrative. Moreover, it is \textit{in addition} to his view on narrative as an interpretive medium, which relies on a dialectically mimetic relationship between narrative and time. \textit{Time and Narrative} is firmly in dialogue with structuralist writers, some more “discontinuous” than others. These engagements display Ricoeur’s position that the configured nature of narrative is dialectically mediating the action it describes, and thus is neither artificial nor arbitrary. I will show later that Ricoeur does turn to White’s tropological approach to writing history, which is influenced by some structuralist ideas, but Ricoeur does not take on an exclusively structuralist approach, rejecting Barthes’ stance that narrative is merely a formal way of organising activity, and instead presents narrative as dialectically mediatory of events in time. ‘Narrativity constitutes in this way an immanent structure of action’\textsuperscript{98}, which is how events are recounted.

To provide an example of the mediatory role of language, and of narrative as prefigured in action, I return to Ricoeur’s use of Augustine. Moving toward what could be rendered as a phenomenology of time, Ricoeur links narrative strongly with experience. In narrative reconstruction of past or future, past and future “really exist”; by considering past and future, Augustine suggests that we make them present\textsuperscript{99}. Augustine describes this as a kind

\textsuperscript{96} P. RICOEUR, \textit{Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences}, p. 158.

\textsuperscript{97} P. RICOEUR, \textit{Time and Narrative} I, p. 52.


of threefold present, which Ricoeur articulates as a past that is made present by memory, a present that is present by our attention to it, and a future made present by expectation. \textit{Intentio}, considering the past and the future remains in tension with the \textit{distentio animi} of their non-presence. Time's ontological non-being is not overcome, but held in tension. Ricoeur's contribution here is to identify that tension as a fruitful one. Commenting on this question between Carr and Ricoeur, Peter Kemp identified Augustine's threefold present as 'a question of the way in which daily \textit{praxis} orders, relatively to one another... Since that time, one has been able to recount one's life starting from the present of the present, like Augustine'\textsuperscript{100}. As I pointed out before, that narrative does not cause the relationship between past-present-future as a threefold present, rather that threefold present is already narratively charged, and emplotment renders precisely that in a way that derives further meaning from \textit{distentio/intentio} than the merely episodic.

For Augustine, it is crucial for his message of Christian life that he be able to communicate an historical narrative that is anchored in reality. Indeed, the particular historical story in Augustine’s autobiographical \textit{Confessions} (his own story, Monica’s, Christ’s) can be salvific and saturates Augustine’s more philosophical contemplations. Bochet notes that Ricoeur acknowledges the contribution of the personal narrative of \textit{Confessions} I-IX, ‘he certainly mentions, in a note, the interest of the question and confirms it saying that he will ultimately return to it’\textsuperscript{101} in a particular framework. Bochet argues that he fails to make much of this, ‘he does not return to the question’\textsuperscript{102} in the framework mentioned, and perhaps Carr finds an ally in Bochet here. Carr himself suggests that ‘rather than describing discordance at the level of experience, is Augustine not contrasting the

\textsuperscript{100} T. P. KEMP 'Toward a Narrative Ethics: a bridge between ethics and the narrative reflection of Paul Ricoeur' pp. 65-88 in T. P. KEMP, D. M. RASMUSSEN (eds.) \textit{The Narrative Path}, pp. 70-71. Peter Kemp works primarily in hermeneutics and has written extensively on narrative in Ricoeur. Kemp was beginning to write on the ethical role of narrative for Ricoeur before Ricoeur had published systematically on this point in \textit{Oneself as Another}; I therefore do not quote Kemp’s ethical reflections on Ricoeur, but his focus on narrative will be of particular use throughout this section. Even the later collection D. E. KLEMM, W. SCHWEIKER (eds) \textit{Meanings in Texts and Actions Questioning Paul Ricoeur} (London, University Press of Virginia, 1993) is subject to this problem. In his review of this collection David Pellauer notes ‘these will be important texts for anyone working on ethics in light of Ricoeur’s philosophy, but they must be complemented by what Ricoeur has to say in his recently published Gifford lectures, \textit{Oneself as Another}... But such has always been one of the difficulties in coming to terms with Ricoeur’s multifaceted and multivolume work’ - D. PELLAUER, ‘Review’, pp. 145-7 in \textit{The Journal of Religion} 75 (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1995) p. 147.

\textsuperscript{101} I. BOCHET, \textit{Augustin dans la pensée de Paul Ricoeur}, p. 50, ‘il mentionne certes, dans une note, l'intérêt de la question et annonce même qu'il y reviendra ultérieurement’, referring to P. ROCHEUR, \textit{Time and Narrative I}, p. 22n26.

\textsuperscript{102} Ibid., ‘\textit{P. Ricoeur ne revient pas sur la question dans le cadre}’. 34
comprehension of experience with the incomprehension of theory. Essentially, Carr identifies the aporia in Augustine's experience of time as theoretical, rather than practical. Carr does this because his notion of experienced time has no discordance, thus allowing narrative to be a perfect mirror. Ricoeur responds by suggesting that 'human experience...seeks a meaning: but this is an ill-wrought history, a history eaten away by discordances'. Narrative is not an exact mirror of experience, because experience itself is not seamless. Instead, in *distentio animi*, the agent must recall the past to the present in order to tell it, and call to the future in order to describe what it might be. This practice is, by the addition of Aristotle's poetic concepts, emplotment, and it is indeed transformative, but I argue that this does not constitute discontinuity with the discordant experience. Instead 'in short, the narrative is constituted by the plot which transforms the paradigmatic order of daily action into the syntactic order of literature or history'. While at this stage narrative as a tool remains under the sign of its entry as an operation to face the challenge of communicating events in time, it could not have entered as such if events in time did not already prefigure narrative, albeit by a deliberate response to the *distentio* of memory. That finite experience in time continually recalls narration to be engaged with refiguration, drawing new meaning. Ultimately Ricoeur's use of mimetic narrative as an emplotment of the *distentio* in Augustine is a far more complicated operation that Carr's reading implies. Augustine's self is already reflexive and the narration of time is a dialectic operation. Indeed, regarding that complex 'dynamic operativity', Ricoeur wonders

'consequently, if the circularity between prefiguration, configuration and refiguration may facilitate my escape from the dilemma which will surround me, and the terms amongst which I am constrained to choose: history is either a distortion of life, or it represents life'.

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103 D. CARR, 'Discussion: Ricoeur on Narrative', p. 172.

104 I owe this insight to Kemp who discusses Carr's reliance on Husserl for his construction of time as duration rather than Augustine's *distentio*. See 'Toward a Narrative Ethics: a bridge between ethics and the narrative reflection of Paul Ricoeur', p. 71.


106 T. P. KEMP 'Toward a Narrative Ethics: a bridge between ethics and the narrative reflection of Paul Ricoeur', p. 70. This is a particularly apposite description by Kemp, which make it all the more confusing that he ultimately sees Carr's expression of narrative as constitutive of the self as 'a useful corrective' (p. 73) to Ricoeur, when I find it already present. This is explained by Kemp's overarching project to embed all ethical discourse in a narrative space. Kemp requires every emphasis on narrative in order to further support his own stance on this, though he will find more support as Ricoeur turns to his explicitly ethical discussion on the subject in *Oneself as Another*.

Ricoeur himself notes that by concentrating on the epistemological characteristics of an historical event he has suspended its ontological role to be examined toward the end of the trilogy. Both the realness of the historical event and the truth provided by purely fictional narrative require the same refiguring activity to receive their significance: their meaning to the life-world of the reader. What narrative provides, by its role as a mimetic activity, is the opportunity to see events in new ways. This is not to detach the possible narratives from the truth of the events, their facticity, but rather to make available refigurations of that truth for later observers. Reaching the objective truth is a kind of myth in itself, which will be further discussed in Chapter Four, but narrative allows new forms of meaning to be made coherent and accessible to the reader, both for history and fiction. Yet as the ontological element returns when Ricoeur turns to handle “reality” and “truth”, so, too, does the ethical charge. As this problematic extends so too will the interdependency of time and narrative, in parallel.

I ultimately agree with Carr that discontinuity between events and narrative is not an accurate representation of the role of narrative in life. However, I am not convinced that Ricoeur’s detours, through Kermode, Mink and White, represent such a stance. I argue that it is Ricoeur’s approach to narrative as mimitically interpretive which means that it must already be inchoate in events, but with work left to do in order to refigure those events. The refiguration of a narrative provides the possibility of new understandings, always with reference to the events or persons which the narrative identifies. Ricoeur has repeatedly expressed the practical need for refiguration. It is this which allows him to argue that following the structuralist approach of discontinuity with events, to the exclusion of other approaches, remains inappropriate.

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108 This is characteristic of Ricoeur’s approach to ontology throughout his major works. In this thesis reconstructions of Ricoeur will frequently take us to the ‘threshold’ of ontology (Memory, History, Forgetting, p. 280). This will become most important as I examine Ricoeur’s approach to analogy in Chapter Three.

109 Ricoeur’s approach to this point, involving White, also engaged with ‘analogical’ vocabulary, and is dealt with separately in Chapter Four: ‘Ricoeur’s changing view of analogy as a tool of language’, below. It is not necessary to engage with it here in order to make my point that narrative is not a simple organisation of chaos for Ricoeur, but prefigured and refigured in action. Here, I only note that this very complexity will also impact on the ontological status of the subject of narration. This discussion was already available to Carr in the form of Temps et récit, tom. 3.

110 A particularly good example of the practical need for refiguration of identity can be found on Ricoeur’s article on Europe, ‘Reflections on a new ethos for Europe’ tr. E. Brennan, pp. 3-13 in Philosophy and Social Criticism 21 (Sage, Thousand Oaks; CA, 1995). The significance of refiguration to many of Ricoeur’s works is dealt with in Chapter Four beginning with a discussion of testimony.
I want to conclude by pointing out that Carr's misreading of Ricoeur is a curious one because it is the same concern that moves both Ricoeur and Carr on this question. Ricoeur makes the turn from considering narrative as an expression of temporality to approaching it as the necessary tool for self-description of the human person, just as Carr does. In this way *Time and Narrative* has contributed to Ricoeur's understanding of the person. The phenomenological question of activity in time lead Ricoeur to prioritise narrative, identifying its mediatory role. When Ricoeur turns to consider the human person as one who acts, narrative, prefigurative of action, is thus prepared to take on a significant role. Moreover, when Ricoeur's problematic itself changes to that of identity, the interdependency of time and narrative is made much clearer with respect to lived experience.

A series of points have been achieved in my reconstruction of the various debates in this section. To summarise, I have shown that Ricoeur's intersection of Augustine and Aristotle has emphasised the role of narrative in articulating one's understanding of events in time. The Augustine influence is felt in the *distentio* that characterises the finitude within which the *intentio* of narration occurs. The debate with structuralism, in particular White, emphasises that Ricoeur does not dismiss the contribution of structural or tropological analyses of narrative, but accepts them provided they are not the only approach. It is on this ground that I reject Carr's concern that Ricoeur goes too far into his detour through structuralism. I conclude that Ricoeur goes beyond Structuralism by understanding narrative as inchoate in action. There is prefiguration and refiguration of narrative in human activity. This means that the *distentio/intentio* of narrative understood in the meeting of Aquinas and Augustine can also be shown in Ricoeur's response to Structuralism. In my view, *distentio*, the awareness of finitude, reemerges here to emphasise the practical nature of Ricoeur's emphasis on refiguration - the self must seek to continually understand events in new ways. This is done through the *intentio* of narrating in new ways, placing narration in relation to agency and therefore ethics.

Showing Ricoeur using narrative in this way reinforces my point that Ricoeur is just as concerned as Carr with the dangers of positing a disconnect between events in time and their narration. I have therefore established a platform for the new context of Ricoeur's
clarification of the human person below. I will therefore turn to this debate, concluding that Ricoeur shares Carr’s concerns regarding an exclusively discontinuous relationship between events and narrative. This is already indicated by Ricoeur in *Time and Narrative* and is more significant in his later works where the narrative in question is related to the identity of the person. Following Ricoeur’s continuation on this subject, I will now consider narrative in the explicit context of a philosophical anthropological consideration of identity, as distinct from social sciences.

1.2. THE EFFORT TO NARRATE AS A MEDIUM OF CREATING IDENTITY

I will now outline the immediate use of narrative in that new problematic. Maria Villela-Petit has very neatly summarised that the idea of narrative identity arises

‘out of the very narrative answer given by Ricoeur’s work to the philosophical challenge represented by the question of time itself. If there is such a thing as a story, it is because there are people who act and suffer. In other words, story telling makes it be that there is someone who can be referred to when we ask: ‘Who has done this?’, ‘Who has behaved in this way?’, or ‘To whom did such a thing happen?’”

Such questions were initially introduced by Ricoeur in the ‘Conclusion’ of *Time and Narrative*, but the development of the idea of identity into a theory of selfhood is to be found in *Oneself as Another*, where narrative continues to play an important role. I will begin by highlighting how Ricoeur shows narrative to be relevant to personal identity, initially and move on to the ethical charge that he identifies in this question. As I work through Ricoeur’s progression in *Oneself as Another* and subsequent works in this section and the next I will reference the analyses of various ethicists who provide insights to Ricoeur’s arguments. These commentators are not all within the same discipline. I will note here in particular those whose contributions I have found particularly valuable for this reconstruction: the theological ethicist Hiller Haker who works on the role of narrative in Ricoeur’s ethics; the philosopher Pamela Sue Anderson who seeks to combine analytic and continental feminist philosophy of religion and has written on the contribution Ricoeur’s concept of the self can make to feminist ethics; the political philosopher, Bernard

Dauenhauer, who reconstructs Ricoeur’s philosophy anthropology to discuss political ethics; John Wall, working in theological ethics, who discusses Ricoeur in terms of developing the dimension of creativity as necessary for moral thinking. My analysis of these commentators will mark out the landscape of the current debate on Ricoeur’s ethics of self and other.

My intent in using these theorists is to identify some areas of accurate reception of the complexity in Ricoeur’s ethics. Each of these thinkers uses Ricoeur within their own work in different ways, but this is not my focus. I intend to solely use their analyses of Oneself as Another and its supportive texts in Ricoeur’s oeuvre in order to work out aspects of his work. These figures will also be valuable allies in the fourth section when I turn to an overview of the reception of Ricoeur’s work and begin to combat some of the mistaken analyses and challenges to be faced.

Identity in time: idem/ipse

I emphasised above that Ricoeur’s work in Time and Narrative is intended as an intersection of the two disciplines implied in the title, indeed Ricoeur identified a dialectic relationship between the two. Ricoeur describes his work in this trilogy as ‘a long journey through historical narrative and fictional narrative’. His final conclusion was that the point where these two types not only intersect but ‘fuse’ into the same site is actually the life-story. I will now indicate some of the aspects of this argument, in order to clarify the role of narrative in Ricoeur’s philosophical anthropology as it relates to the striving person, seeking to understand herself and create meaning.

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112 Dauenhauer is of particular use because when writing his most significant contribution to Ricoeur Studies, Paul Ricoeur: The Promise and Risk of Politics, he conducted a series of interviews with Ricoeur, which he acknowledges helped form the book. He also relies strongly on the then unpublished version of ‘Autonomy and Vulnerability’ which I will use below, originally ‘Autonomie et vulnerabilite’ (Séance inaugurate du Séminaire de l’IHE, November 6, 1995), first published in La philosophie dans la cite: Homage a Helene Ackermans (Publication des facultés universitaires Saint-Louis, 1997).

113 P. RICOEUR, ‘Narrative Identity’, pp. 188-199 in D. WOOD (ed.) On Paul Ricoeur: Narrative and Interpretation, p. 188.

114 This is particularly understood in contrast to more abstract concepts of the person such as structuralism which emphasises only patterns of behaviour without considering the motivations outside these structures, which do not constitute the structures themselves. I will deal below with the post-Structuralist challenge identified by Haker. Ricoeur himself engages with the analytical view of Derek Parfit individualist approach - see ‘The Self and Narrative Identity’, pp. 140-168, Sixth Study, Oneself as Another.
The individual person has her own narrative; 'the person of whom we are speaking and the agent on whom the action depends have a history'\textsuperscript{115}. Just as a character in a narrative, she encounters ‘agents, goals, means, interactions, circumstances, unexpected results'\textsuperscript{116}. She is able to describe herself in time, with respect to the narrative she has made cohere while acknowledging the discordant reality of events in her life. Similarly, when an outsider observes her life it is made more coherent by its familiarity in the narrative structure it uses. By the life-story, the other person is rendered more intelligible. Her identity is shaped partly by the action mediated by the narrative. In a fictional narrative for example, 'the narrative constructs the identity of the character, what can be called his or her narrative identity, in constructing that of the story told. It is the identity of the story that makes the identity of the character'\textsuperscript{117}. For the human person this form of narrative is also emplotted by Ricoeur's same tripartite structure of mimesis which I outlined above. I want to again emphasise here the roles of prefiguration and refiguration. The other person is rendered more intelligible by narrative, by her 'narrative identity'\textsuperscript{118} but narrative is intelligible by virtue of its shared formal models and its references.

Ricoeur uses the vocabulary of fellow-phenomenologist Wilhelm Schapp to articulate prefiguration of the life story. Schapp wrote during a debate amongst German theorists regarding continuity between narrative and the action it described\textsuperscript{119}. Schapp wrote of the 'entangled'\textsuperscript{120} nature of our experience with stories already making up its background. In the earlier text \textit{Time and Narrative} I, Ricoeur is careful to emphasise that entanglement within the structure of mimetic activity – it is symbolically always already present for us and thus our activity in the world is already caught up with others' narratives before self-narration begins. Haker's analysis of Schapp emphasises this.

\textsuperscript{115} P. RICOEUR, \textit{Oneself as Another}, p. 113.

\textsuperscript{116} P. RICOEUR, \textit{Time and Narrative} I, p. 65.

\textsuperscript{117} P. RICOEUR, \textit{Oneself as Another}, p. 147-8.

\textsuperscript{118} P. RICOEUR, 'Narrative Identity'.

\textsuperscript{119} Here is an overview of the German-speaking support for a continuity between narrative and experience is taken directly from Carr's own article of 1986: W. SCHAPP, \textit{In Geschichten Verstrickt} (Wiesbaden, B. Heymann, 1979); H. LÜBBE, \textit{Bewusstsein in Geschichten} (Freiburg, Rombach, 1972); K. STIERLE, "Erfahrung und narrative Form" in J. KOCCA, T. NIPPERDEY (eds.), \textit{Theorie und Erzählung in der Geschichte} (Munich, Deutscher Taschenbuch-Verlag, 1979).


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'Life story or history - the word is the same in German, Geschichte - reveals itself in this context as an ambiguous notion, which on the one hand denotes the historical event and on the other the telling or articulation of these events in the form of a narrated story'\(^{121}\).

This means that the entanglement of a person's story 'refers to the action, experience and praxis of persons'\(^{122}\) both in every-day encounters and through fictional storytelling.

Ricoeur's interest in the fact that 'the principal consequence of this existential analysis of human beings as “entangled in stories” is that narrating is a secondary process, that of “the story’s becoming known” (das Bekanntwerden der Geschichte)'\(^{123}\). In Haker's terms, "Self-concepts are articulated in the way in which life stories are articulated. A person's identity can therefore not be properly understood without reference to his or her life story"\(^{124}\). Prefiguration is not an isolated activity, but is an activity already informed not by a generalised context, but by the stories told in its cultural surroundings.

"Interlocutors are present not only to one another, but also to the situation, the surroundings and the circumstantial milieu of discourse. It is in relation to this circumstantial milieu that discourse is fully meaningful; the return to reality is ultimately a return to this reality... "around", if we may say so, the instance of discourse itself"\(^{125}\).

Indeed, the second volume of Time and Narrative would be dedicated to proving "the aporetic character of any pure phenomenology of time"\(^ {126}\). Any experienced time is instead always in the light of what has gone before and what may come next. As Ricoeur echoes Schapp, ‘far from constituting a secondary complication, [this] must be taken as the principal experience in such matters’\(^ {127}\). While there is still a divorce between narrative and “real” experience it is an aporia that has begun to be bridged before one even acknowledges it. This entanglement will become critical for Ricoeur’s theory of personhood (1.2.3.).

\(^{121}\) H. Haker, ‘Narrative and Moral Identity’, p. 142.

\(^{122}\) Ibid.


\(^{125}\) P. Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, p. 148.

\(^{126}\) P. Ricoeur, Time and Narrative I, p. 84.

\(^{127}\) P. Ricoeur, The Course of Recognition, p. 104.
I did acknowledge above that Carr is correct in his analysis of Ricoeur’s understanding of the story as not a perfect representation of events. Ricoeur does not stop with this analysis but instead describes narrative as a meaningful interpretation of action. It is with personal accounts of one’s own history that continuity between event and retelling begins to take on an ethical dimension, as will be shown more fully below. The narrative of a person requires an acknowledgement of ascription; this story is “mine”, or it is “yours”. Ricoeur notes that it is ‘the epistemological status of autobiography that seems to confirm [the] intuition’\(^{128}\) that the self is the site of fusion between history and fiction. It is within a narrative that the person appears and it is ‘the person shares the condition of dynamic identity peculiar to the story recounted’\(^{129}\).

I will add here Haker’s emphasis of Ricoeur’s debt to Schapp’s view that ‘entangled in stories’ is ‘the a priori structure of every act of perception and understanding, but also as the prerequisite for feelings and acts of will’\(^{130}\). She goes on to explain that ‘understanding oneself for Schapp, means understanding one’s story and one’s “self-entanglement” in it’ and as a corollary, understanding others demands ‘understanding them in their own stories of self-entanglement, understanding these as “other’s stories”’\(^{131}\). In this way ‘self-knowledge is an interpretation’\(^{132}\), akin to Kant’s ‘judgement’, requiring a reflexive move of ordering.

I will briefly explain Haker’s analysis here. The identification of a story as belonging to the self is a basic operation of reflexivity that Ricoeur makes the basis of his concept of the person. To explain this he turns to uses Kant’s term of apperception - the “I think” accompanying all intuitions/acts - in relation to the story as “mine”, and not able to be substituted for an other’s.

“In order to avoid slipping into subjectivist idealism, the “I think” must be divested of any psychological resonance, all the more so of any autobiographical resonance. It must

\(^{128}\) P. Ricoeur, ‘Narrative Identity’, p. 188.

\(^{129}\) P. Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, p. 147.

\(^{130}\) H. Haker, ‘Narrative and Moral Identity’, p. 138. I will return to this implication of evaluation through narrative in (1.2.2.)


\(^{132}\) P. Ricoeur, ‘Narrative Identity’, p. 188.
become the Kantian "I think," which the transcendental deduction states must be able to accompany all my acts"\textsuperscript{133}.

Apperception of mineness by the self is a condition of the person\textsuperscript{134} as Ricoeur conceives her. This reflexivity is borne out by Ricoeur’s distinguishing references within the self is again by the two understandings of the term identity with respect to time – \textit{idem} (sameness/\textit{Gleichheit}) and \textit{ipse} (selfhood/\textit{Selbst}). Narrative identity is now expressed as genuinely personal, belonging to a human person, and thus ‘the dialectic of discordant concordance belonging to the character must now be inscribed within the dialectic of sameness and selfhood’\textsuperscript{135}. This dialectic is at the heart of Ricoeur’s philosophical anthropology and I now turn to consider the unfolding of \textit{idem}/\textit{ipse} in Ricoeur’s central work on the subject, \textit{Oneself as Another}. It will be with this work that I unfold the subject-oriented stages of ethics that follow from such a conception of reflexive identity (c.f. 2.1).

It is in \textit{Oneself as Another} that Ricoeur examines the reflexive self, using a consideration of the hermeneutics of action. ‘I will consider the speaker, agent, character of narration, subject of moral imputation’\textsuperscript{136}. Under these capacities of the human person, one who can speak, act, narrate, and impute action, Ricoeur identifies \textit{idem} as those aspects of the self that are understood as continuous, while \textit{ipse} denotes the center of initiative. The two are tied to each other in a dialectic relationship in order to make their shared constitution of personal identity coherent and recognizable. Briefly, dialectic is between the sameness of what is measurable in identity, and selfhood, denoting agency in the sense of ownership of one’s action. Theological ethicist John Wall has summarised this structure between given and chosen aspects of the person by identifying ‘my desires and habits: they are first involuntarily present in one’s dispositions, upbringing, and social and historical circumstances: but they are also my desires and habits since I appropriate and shape them as my own particular identity’\textsuperscript{137}. In this latter sense personal identity also names the self

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{133} P. RICOEUR, \textit{Oneself as Another}, p. 11.
\item \textsuperscript{134} This is a move which is enriched by Ricoeur ‘s consideration of the “polarised” approaches to self/other relations epitomised in Husserl and Levinas. Ricoeur begins to consider these two in the final study of \textit{Oneself as Another} - ‘What Ontology in View?’, and concludes his later \textit{The Course of Recognition} with a brief mediation of the same.
\item \textsuperscript{135} P. RICOEUR, \textit{Oneself as Another}, p. 148.
\item \textsuperscript{136} Ibid., p. 7.
\end{itemize}
that moves away and returns to the person it consistently promises to be. A story recounted can synthesise the disparate, character and plot, standing for the effort to provide a coherent narrative and it is by that narrative that the concrete, historical self can begin to shape its own identity, to own its own actions, to promise its own self-constancy. It is a dynamic that requires further explanation – it would be a mistake to reduce this complex of activity and transcendental condition of possibility to a straight-forward binary relationship between idem and ipse.

To conclude this section, Ricoeur introduces the relationship by identifying the problematic of how to express a person’s permanence in time, describing this as ‘a privileged place of confrontation between idem/ipse'. I will now reconstruct in a more detailed fashion what has been a very brief overview of a relationship crucial for ethical self-ownership.

Narrative identity as a dialectic of idem/ipse aspects

Idem refers to sameness and crucially, rather than a single static object of meaning, this ‘is a concept of relation and a relation of relations’. By this Ricoeur means that “sameness” already indicates a complexity of meaning that manifests in four kind of same-identity, held in relation to each other ‘in order to indicate the eminent place that permanence in time holds there.” It also reveals the subtlety of idem-identity; the word sameness gives an impression of invariable nature, when in fact idem-identity is a place of uncertainty.

Uncertainty of sameness manifests under the four problematics mentioned above. Identity is not a static object. Ricoeur finds this expressed best by ‘bizarre cases which reshape the assertion of identity in the form of a question’. Ricoeur references the difficult questions that certain narrative tropes of science fiction and literary fiction indicate: science fiction sometimes supplies ‘puzzling cases’ such as the movement of a consciousness from one human body to another, identical human body, or the duplication

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138 P. RICOEUR, Oneself as Another, p. 115.
139 Ibid., p. 116.
140 Ibid.
141 Ibid., p. 139.
142 Ibid., pp. 130-136.
of a person, including his memories. 'Ricoeur correctly criticizes science fiction’s attempt to render contingent the corporal and terrestrial condition which the hermeneutical tradition takes to be insurmountable'\textsuperscript{143}. Ricoeur’s theory of the person takes account of the kinds of questions science fiction renders as solely cognitive: which person is still “me”? While certainly not a question one encounters in the everyday, these puzzling cases are used by Ricoeur to indicate some possible constancies for which identity as sameness needs to account. I will now outline the four dimensions of constancy.

The first task of identity is numerical – is this the same “one” thing that was identified before? Quantitatively, rather than any multiple, it is ‘one and the same’\textsuperscript{144}. The second task is one of resemblance. From quantity at the first level this is now a qualitative distinction. People ‘recognise one another principally by [our] individual features’\textsuperscript{145}. When two objects are extremely similar, ‘one compares the individual present to the material marks held to be the irrecusable traces of his earlier presence in the places at issue’\textsuperscript{146}. The example Ricoeur gives is of confrontations on identity in the trial of accused war-criminals, who deny that they are the men in question\textsuperscript{147}. This is a cognitive question. By its nature, Ricoeur notes, evoking Descartes’ \textit{Meditations}, when one recognises someone, one is moving out of doubt. ‘The recourse to recognition...already appears as appropriate to discourse situations that bring to light the weakness of human understanding as summed up in the threat of error’\textsuperscript{148}. There is a particular danger here with respect to time. Time can cause alterations in appearance such that uncertainty still results. Indeed as Ricoeur developed a philosophy of recognition as such, saying that recognition ‘encompasses the figures of both rejection and welcome’\textsuperscript{149}. Ricoeur emphasised these


\textsuperscript{144} P. RICOEUR, \textit{Oneself as Another}, p. 116.

\textsuperscript{145} P. RICOEUR, \textit{The Course of Recognition}, pp. 65-66.

\textsuperscript{146} P. RICOEUR, \textit{Oneself as Another}, p. 117.

\textsuperscript{147} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{148} P. RICOEUR, \textit{The Course of Recognition}, p. 30.

\textsuperscript{149} Ibid.
nuances to establish recognition as equally indicating the grasping of identification and as an acceptance of a truth, in the face of possible error.\textsuperscript{150}

The third task of identity is the question of 'uninterrupted continuity'\textsuperscript{151} over time. Development can be mapped over a period of time for any given object. For example, 'we speak of a man or a woman - I am not saying of a person - as a simple token of their species... between the first and the last stage of development of what we consider to be the same individual'\textsuperscript{152}. What is available is the same continuity in development to which all things are subject relative to their species. Here time displays change and difference.

This is a consideration answered by the fourth task of identification, by applying a principle, beneath continuity and similitude, of permanence in time. In practical terms this is 'the permanence of the genetic code of a biologic individual; what remains here is the organization of a combinatorial system'\textsuperscript{153}. Permanence in time is here 'the invariable structure of a tool'\textsuperscript{154}, rather than an event inserted into continuity over time, and so has the status of the "numerical" integral self. Here Ricoeur is following Immanuel Kant's alteration of substance from an ontological to a transcendental category, and so conceived 'as the condition of the possibility of change as happening to something which does not change... at least not in the moment of attributing the accident to the substance'\textsuperscript{155}.

I will briefly refer here to the viewpoint of David Rasmussen, a social philosopher and commentator on Foucault who has written suggesting that Ricoeur's narrative unity of the self successfully retrieves the concept of subjectivity. He has clarified this point by arguing that any philosophy of language only identifies the idem-identity of a person - it is this concrete person who has spoken - and that Ricoeur's new construction of the person as ipse/idem allows 'the self to be accounted for over time, not only in terms of its identity

\textsuperscript{150} Ricoeur's exemplar for this phenomenon is the final volume of Proust's \textit{À la recherche du temps perdu} which he references throughout \textit{Oneself as Another} and then later \textit{The Course of Recognition}. M. PROUST, \textit{Time Regained}, trs. A. MAYOR, T. KILMARTIN, REV. D. J. ENRIGHt (New York, Modern Library, 1993).

\textsuperscript{151} P. RICOEUR, \textit{Oneself as Another}, p. 117.

\textsuperscript{152} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{153} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{154} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{155} Ibid., p. 118.
but also in terms of its transformation. With this in mind, I will summarise the implications of Ricoeur’s fourfold problematic of idem-identity. Identity of sameness is constituted by invariants and by a principle of not altering in the face of alteration, thus establishing the individual as continuously numerically identical – this is the same “one” as before. It is necessary to find a form of this permanence in time with respect to the identity of self. *Idem* identity provides the permanence of a blueprint and Ricoeur requires a form with which one is able to reply reliably to the question “Who am I?”. ‘When we speak of ourselves, we in fact have available to us two models of permanence in time which can be summed up in two expressions that are at once descriptive and emblematic: character and *keeping one’s word*.

Character and keeping one’s word are situated at the extremes of movement of the dialectic of *idem* and *ipse*. It is character, a site of overlap, that ‘adds self identity to the identity of the same’. Already much earlier in his work, Ricoeur identified character as totally involuntary, or as an ‘unchangeable field of motivation’, as a given ‘set of lasting dispositions by which a person is recognised’. In fact, in these dispositions are both traits of givenness, and those acquired in time. However, it is through the ‘immutable nature of character’ that ‘we accede to values and to the use of our powers’. However, what is crucial is the element of appropriation: Self-identity is in the recognition of the ‘I am, the very one to which I must consent’. This is where one takes ownership of one’s own perspective, even while acknowledging its limits. Again, this is not a static notion of personal identity, permanent, but best expressed by its narrativisation. This is because that finite perspective is firstly, the product of ‘habit’, which is both ‘being formed’ and ‘already acquired’. The latter tends to ‘cover the innovation that proceeded it, even to...”

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157 P. RICOEUR, *Oneself as Another*, p. 118.

158 Ibid., p. 119.

159 Ibid. p. 119n4 – referring to P. RICOEUR, *Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and the Involuntary*, tr. E. V. Kohák. (Chicago, Northwestern University Press, 1966), which I will handle later in this chapter.

160 Ibid., p. 121.

161 Ibid., p. 119.

162 Ibid., p. 119n4.

163 Ibid., p. 121.
the point of abolishing’\textsuperscript{164} it. Thus, even character is not simply a given but something that has to be owned. This is \textit{ipse} which ‘announces itself as \textit{idem}\textsuperscript{165}.

Bernard Dauenhauer couches this insight in terms of choice of self. ‘Character... amounts to a kind of taking possession of one’s own capabilities and opportunities by a self-affirmation that I can be what I choose to be’\textsuperscript{166}. Thus, permanence of self that is the consistency of personal identity contains an element of loyalty: the choice to identify oneself by these “givens”, to appropriate them to the self. “Loyalty” makes the turn to the other model for permanence in time: keeping one’s word.

Fidelity is displayed here not by remaining loyal to the received content of a community, but by consistently identifying oneself by appropriating consistent characteristics. Its presence in the activity of the promising-self in the space of permanence of same stresses the spontaneous, owning, choosing capacity. The moral need to choose to keep one’s word over time necessitates a distinction between \textit{ipse}/\textit{idem}. Keeping one’s word is done in the face of the true possibility of failing to do. It requires a spontaneous choice and Ricoeur continues to emphasise this. I conclude then that it is irreducible to a permanence of same, as in many virtue-ethical reformulations of ethics that highlight “character” as the goal to achieve\textsuperscript{167}. Instead the same is rendered permanent at this pole; the spontaneity of self is what enables taking a stance to this “given,” permanent heritage. Thus, even when \textit{ipse} announces itself as \textit{idem}, sameness and selfness do not collapse into each other. Instead this highlights the different activity that each undertakes with respect to permanence in time. Even as they remain in dialectical communication, they remain anchored by the space of their different roles highlighted in the activity of keeping one’s word. The self promises, while the role of other is in challenging the self to find out about its constancy by keeping its word to the other.

\textsuperscript{164} P. Ricoeur, \textit{Oneself as Another}, p. 121.

\textsuperscript{165} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{167} A good example would be A. MacIntyre, \textit{After Virtue}, already mentioned above.
Both character and the activity of promising represent permanence with respect to time. Hille Haker explains this move to understanding identity in terms of narrative in this way. ‘One must distinguish between objective time, for example, a person’s lifetime and the historical events which occurred during it, and subjective time, which not only refers to the personal events and experiences of a life but also its subjectively experienced duration’. Ricoeur is able to therefore both quantitatively identifying objects, including humans, and answer qualitative questions regarding personhood - who am I?

I identify this analysis as the move Ricoeur makes from narrative as a solution to the problematic of objective versus subjective time, to narrative as establishing personal identity in smaller texts following Time and Narrative, culminating in Oneself as Another. As I previously noted, personal identity is introduced in the complex shared space of history and fiction. Self narrative is the position where the two came together coherently, a synthesis of the heterogeneous, subjective and objective time. Thus, Haker argues, ‘the temporal form of personal identity is lived and experienced life history’.

Narrative, then, is intended to describe personal identity. However, Ricoeur presents this description as a dialectic between the two forms of identity in time, idem and ipse. The role Ricoeur gives to narrative in this dialectic is not to be solely descriptive of either idem or ipse identity. In fact narrative takes on a mediatory function between the two permanences of idem and ipse, in order to answer such questions posed by the inevitable particularity of identity. Narrative makes ‘the difference between the two meanings of permanence in time evident, by varying the relation between them’. This complexity can be easily misread. Richard Kearney, for example, agrees that ‘the identity of this “who” is a narrative identity,’ but continues ‘This is what Ricoeur terms ipse-self’. In fact, idem and ipse cannot be divided in this way but constitute a prior familiarity in the spontaneous choice of ipse to appropriate the idem. Narrative identity is not only a description of the activity of the ipse-identity of the person. To be sure, ipse, by continuing


169 Ibid.

170 P. Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, p. 144.

to choose the character begun in *idem*, provides the move from what to who. ‘Keeping one’s word expresses a self-constancy, which cannot be inscribed, as character was, within the dimension of something in general, but solely within the dimension of “who?”’\(^{172}\). So as an example, Ricoeur begins by situating character primarily in *idem*-sameness. I argue that in Ricoeur’s narrative identity character cannot be ignored in narrative construction, it is an embedded part of the “who”. The *ipse* appropriates the *idem* to establish identity.

So *idem* and *ipse* are both crucial for establishing the different kinds of permanence in time that will allow us to continue to recognise the person. Ricoeur describes the narrative mediation between the two as a ‘contribution to the constitution of the self’\(^{173}\). Recognition requires the continued narrative and the transcendental capacity of the prior familiarity with oneself which allows it to form that narrative. In fact, initially Ricoeur introduced this explicitly reflexive framework in order to defend the value of conceiving identity in terms of narrative\(^{174}\), in the context of the Anglo-American analytical debates of the time. With this in mind, I want to examine how grasping *idem*/ipse in terms of narrative allows the explication of the role of the other and the community and its symbolic resources in personal identity.

Ricoeur’s structure of personhood is in the face of, and with the contribution of, the other. I will conclude this section by showing that in Ricoeur’s framework the role of the other is not a functional one, but provides a challenge to the self to realise its self-constancy.

**Narrative is made possible as a solution by the role of the other**

As I have traced in the first section of this chapter, Ricoeur’s theory of narrative is a synthesis of the heterogeneous, of character and plot. That heterogeneity takes on a particular role in the problematic of personhood which requires the configuration of personal identity over time. Here, I want to synthesise how narrative designed to handle events in time does this in reference to personal identity in spite of the experience of the

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\(^{172}\) P. RICOEUR, *Oneself as Another*, p. 123.

\(^{173}\) Ibid., p. 114.

\(^{174}\) Ibid.
aporia of time. David Carr, referencing Husserl, describes the theory of the experience of time as a 'conceptual [claim] that we cannot even experience anything as happening, as present except against the background of what it succeeds and what we anticipate will succeed it'\textsuperscript{175}. I agree to the statement that narrative is interconnected with its surrounding time and space - but again want to emphasise the Augustinian articulation of the experience of this as \textit{distentio}. The person makes sense of the present\textsuperscript{176} by the light of its two entry points of past and future, but has to do so by a deliberate activity, in \textit{mimesis}. The idea of an infinite series of events is confronted with the idea of a beginning of a story. That story can be traced back to human freedom as the capacity to begin, to initiate a new series of action.

This results in the aporias of time - of concordance and discordance acknowledged in \textit{Time and Narrative} III, when considering how to write history. Narrative cannot ever completely overcome this aporia, but is the poetic reply, now rendered in the context of philosophical anthropology.

'by granting to the character an initiative - that is, the power to begin a series of events, without this beginning, a beginning of time - and on the hand by assigning to the narrative as such the power of determining the beginning, the middle and the end of an action'\textsuperscript{177}.

I want to recall here how Ricoeur suggests narration begins. It is a mimetic activity, which forms a space where a fictional narrative opens when it is connected to activity in the world by virtue of recognised symbolic complexes. Narrative established the meaning of action as mediated and thus 'always already articulated'\textsuperscript{178} prefiguratively, yet also 'decipherable from it by other actors in the social interplay'\textsuperscript{179}, and this is refiguration. The value of narrative is in its capacity to mediate \textit{idem/ipse} which 'is attest to primarily by the imaginative variations to which the narrative submits this identity'\textsuperscript{180}. The self narrative is always available to be understood in new ways, in the light of new events, to

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[D. CARR] \textit{Narrative and the Real World}, p. 121.
\item[I am invoking here Augustine’s threefold present, of past, present and future, all made present in the mind.]
\item[P. RICOEUR, \textit{Oneself as Another}, p. 147.]
\item[P. RICOEUR, \textit{Narrative Identity}, p. 198.]
\item[P. RICOEUR, \textit{Time and Narrative} I, p. 57.]
\item[P. RICOEUR, \textit{Oneself as Another}, p. 164.]
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
be newly refigured. Thus the crucial implication of a self that narratively interprets its own identity is this:

'The refiguration of the narrative confirms this aspect of self-knowledge which goes far beyond the narrative domain, namely, that the self does not know itself immediately, but only indirectly by the detour of the cultural signs of all sorts which are articulated on the symbolic mediations which always already articulate action and, among them, the narratives of everyday life'\textsuperscript{181}.

What narrative configuration by the self then achieves is it allows the self to understand itself as initiating something new, of its own accord and spontaneity. It is by narrative that this quality is mediated on the concrete level and the understanding of personhood is as 'always already articulated'\textsuperscript{182}. This is so even while one begins to outline a narrative of the \textit{ipse/ideum} of the person from a position of a free capable actor. So the cultural milieu is already part of the identity the self is constructing – indeed it provides many of the basic tools for the initiative of the self - even language is not only rules but also an 'accumulation of things said before'\textsuperscript{183}.

I want to emphasise two points here. The first, as explicated above, is that narrative shows that 'the person, understood as a character in a story, is not an entity distinct from his or her “experience”. Quite the opposite: the person shared the condition of dynamic identity peculiar to the story recounted'\textsuperscript{184}. The second is a referral to the 'entangled'\textsuperscript{185} nature of those events in narratives that had already gone before. My analysis of the shift of this structure into the arena of self-knowledge is that it further clarifies the relationships involved. What this means is that for the self to tell its own stories, it must have already encountered the symbol systems and narratives around it. Indeed, the constitution of the self includes these narratives - these are the 'acquired identifications'\textsuperscript{186} formed by habit in

\textsuperscript{181} P. Ricoeur, 'Narrative Identity,' p. 198, emphasis mine.

\textsuperscript{182} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{183} P. Ricoeur, 'Approaching the Human Person', tr. D. Kidd, pp. 45-54 in Ethical Perspectives 6 (Leuven, Peeters, 1999), p. 50.

\textsuperscript{184} P. Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, p. 147.

\textsuperscript{185} W. Schapp's use of \textit{Verstrickt} in his In Geschichten Verstrickt, 'verstrickt'.

\textsuperscript{186} P. Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, p. 121
the *idem*. The character of the person includes "the immutable nature of character as finite, unchosen perspective through which we accede to values"\(^\text{187}\), but it also has a

'set of *acquired identifications* by which the other enters into the composition of the same. To a large extent, in fact, the identity of a person or a community is made up of these identifications with values, norms, ideals, models, and heroes, in which the person or the community recognizes itself"\(^\text{188}\).

These are the "things said before", the stories, tropes, heroic characters and so forth: both cultural myths and practices, semantic resources, and historical or contemporary individuals. The mediation of these older narratives is by those narratives being told around us. Taking my two points together, the self is configured, narratively, because of its encounter with others. The self's identity comes to be understood through the encounter with the other, covering elements as distinct as symbolic worlds and concrete individuals. The role of the other, as community and as humanity, will now take on a role of particular significance.

It is the introduction of the other that allows me to turn in my analysis to deal explicitly with the ethical implications of Ricoeur's structure of the self. Peter Kemp, who has always sought to identify narrative as a 'necessary condition'\(^\text{189}\) for ethics, emphasises that stories are not simply forced on the self in Ricoeur's ethics\(^\text{190}\), but present a challenge. These stories constitute a call to the self which Ricoeur correspondingly renders as 'the summoned subject'\(^\text{191}\). It is then 'the responsibility of the self to listen to and obey the narrative voice'\(^\text{192}\). The relationship between the self and the other is immediately ethically charged. This is 'the distinction between ascribing an action to an agent as its

\(^{187}\) P. RICOEUR, *Oneself as Another*, p. 119.

\(^{188}\) Ibid., p. 121.


\(^{190}\) This is a point to which I will return in more detail under 1.4. - 'The post-Structuralist loss of sovereignty or Ricoeur's concept of fragile attestation'.

\(^{191}\) P. KEMP, 'Narrative Ethics and Moral Law in Ricoeur', p. 45. This summons to ethical action is not limited to biblical texts, although Ricoeur explores this as a particular example of a general point - see P RICOEUR, 'The Summoned Self' in P. RICOEUR, M. WALLACE (ed.) *Figuring the Sacred*, the separated conclusion of Ricoeur's Gifford Lectures.

\(^{192}\) Ibid., p. 44.
causes and imputing it to the agent as praiseworthy or blameworthy". It is Dauenhauer again who clarifies this, ‘the crucial feature of the ethical dimension of this dialectic is that it displays the ethical import of an agent’s confrontation with another who needs him or her’. Thus, ‘self-constancy consists not of a proud, rigid, insistence on a self-consistent adherence to the particular character... taken on as one’s own’; Villela-Petit agrees,

‘My self-engagement in keeping my word makes it possible for another to trust me, which at the same time assures me of my own internal consistency, of my own identity. The result is not some sort of sticking to oneself by dint of stiffness or inflexibility but rather what is meant by being reliable, responsible’.

This responsibility is a ‘steadfast open attentiveness to the specific and often changing needs that the other has”. Already the relationship to the other, necessary for the construction of the narrative identity of the self is being coloured by the ethical implications. I will therefore turn immediately to reconstruct how Ricoeur approaches the personhood of the other as crucial for clarifying the personhood of the self, and vice versa.

1.3. THE PERSONHOOD OF THE OTHER IN ONESelf AS ANOTHER

What I have established already is that in Ricoeur’s framework the presence of the other supplies the stories through which the self’s narrative identity is formed. The self is thus able to use narrative to mediate between idem and ipse identity and construct a coherent presentation of herself. However, Kemp’s characteristic of these stories as a ‘call’ is crucial to understanding the relationship between the self and the other. The question of who is “calling” and who might “answer” reveals that firstly, the other takes on a crucial evaluative role as a summoner, and therefore as audience and judge of the response to that summons. Secondly, that this encounter opens the explicit acknowledgement of the other as another person, the care for whom makes the turn to the ethical charge in narrative identity.

193 B. DAUENHAUER, The Promise and Risk of Politics, p. 112.

194 M. VILLELA-PETIT, ‘Narrative Identity and Ipseity by Paul Ricoeur from Ricoeur’s Time and Narrative to Oneself as Another’.

195 Ibid., p. 125.
The other as the one who summons and responds

I closed the previous section by re-emphasising that narrative is prefigurative of action. The impact of this understanding is that the concrete self does not emerge from a vacuum. Yet this is not the extent of the involvement of the other. The encounter with others’ narratives is not a neutral encounter with a set of tools one then chooses to use or not. Very early in his handling of narrative Ricoeur identified that ‘beyond or beneath the self-understanding of a society there is an opaque kernel which cannot be reduced to empirical norms or laws’196. This “kernel” is seen in its working out in the overarching choices and judgement of the society; it is renewed not explicated. The self and others in a community recognise themselves in shared symbolic networks, stories of founding events, and values197. These narratives provide the model for the ‘good life’ that shapes the striving for existence of the self. It is in these stories and tropes that what the community and the other value emerge. ‘Recognising oneself in contributes to recognising oneself by’198; in the mediation of these cultural narrative judgements being made by those around us as to what constitutes a “good” story is “this” identified as a worthwhile life about which to tell a story. Thus it is in reference to praxis, ‘an interpretation of the whole symbolic network’199 by others and the community, that the identity of the self, narratively conceived, is to be evaluated. Dauenhauer, speaking of the way a society’s history impacts on their present choices argues that ‘a political society’s collective memory, therefore, significantly affects how its individual citizens understand themselves not as only as citizens but also as persons. It affects how they believe they ought to live their lives’200.

That the self handles “things said before” in its configuration, including the valued symbolic self-understandings of a society, reveals that there will be a judgement by the other of how the self chooses to present herself. To clarify, in her encounters with the other, the self interprets herself through ‘identifications with values, norms, ideals, models

196 P. RICOEUR ‘Myth as the Bearer of Possible Worlds,’ pp. 117-125 in R. KEARNEY, The Owl of Minerva, p. 117.


198 P. RICOEUR, Oneself as Another, p. 121.

199 Ibid.

200 B. DAUENHAUER, The Promise and Risk of Politics, p. 129.
and heroes". Further, Ricoeur argues that 'the identification with heroic figures clearly displays this otherness assumed as one's own, but this is already latent in the identification with values which make us place a "cause" above our own survival. An element of loyalty is thus incorporated into character. The other who summons the self to this fidelity is thus able to just whether in her striving for the good life does she keep her promises? Anderson has argued that without being 'in relation to the other... it is impossible to maintain an evaluative concept of self-hood as temporally embodied and socially embedded. Ricoeur gives the reason for this by arguing that 'self-interpretation is neither simple nor direct; it takes the roundabout way of the ethical assessment of our actions.'

This requires explanation:

Despite the possibility of radical change, it is in the self that a

'voice says "Everything is possible, but not everything is beneficial (understanding here, to others, and to yourself)," [and so] a mutual discord is sounded. It is this discord that the act of promising transforms into a fragile concordance: "I can try anything" to be sure, but "Here is where I stand!"'

It is this promise that allows action to be imputed to the self and thus be judged both by oneself and by the other: the self declares herself to others. Haker has analysed this point, noting that actions have goals and that these continuing activities must remain consistent with respect to declared identity. 'My sense of self-esteem is not... called into question by every evaluation, but rather particularly by those which concern the core of my identity.' The capacity for promising establishes self-esteem, the initiative to promise as the other

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201 P. Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, p. 121.

202 Ibid.


204 P. Ricoeur, 'The Human Being as the Subject of Philosophy', p. 99.

205 P. Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, p. 167-8.

206 H. Haker 'Narrative and Moral Identity in the Work of Paul Ricoeur', p. 147.
summons it. Moreover, self-respect comes with choosing to keep that promise made to the other\textsuperscript{207}. It is in the consciousness of her choice that the self renders herself imputable.

Then the self is judged by others and herself, in relation to her consistency – is the self “loyal”, can she be held accountable? In this way, ‘imputability may provide the threshold to the triadic structure of the ethical’\textsuperscript{208} in the good life. Ricoeur describes the implications of the confrontation with evaluation of others in this way:

‘The enlargement of our concept of selfhood resulting from this indirect process of evaluation applied to action is tremendous...I suggest that we call self-esteem the interpretation of ourselves mediated by the ethical evaluation of our actions. Self-esteem is itself an evaluation process indirectly applied to ourselves as selves’\textsuperscript{209}.

The fidelity of maintaining personal integrity is the space in which this turn is made: promises are not merely a question of consistency, but instead ‘promises pledge fidelity to the promisee rather than announce the promiser’s determination to be consistent with himself or herself’\textsuperscript{210}. Anderson has even criticised Ricoeur for not making ‘promise-keeping’\textsuperscript{211} a more explicit part of the ethical turn in the face of the other, rather than promise-making. Self-esteem is to be ‘understood as the reflexive movement of the wish for the good life’\textsuperscript{212}, and it is by the capacity for promising, amongst the other capacities of the self, that ‘the self is to be declared worthy of esteem’\textsuperscript{213}. Thus ‘It is therefore the sense of self-esteem which moves the concern with the good life into the area of ethics’\textsuperscript{214}. Having acknowledged the ethical dimensions of personal identity in relation to the goals of an individual’s striving for the good life, the content of that ethical aim requires explication. Again it is in the figure of the other that this unfolding comes:

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item These concepts of self-esteem and self-respect are explored more thoroughly in 2.1. on Ricoeur’s ethical theory.
\item P. Ricoeur, ‘Ethics and Human Capability - A Response’ pp. 279-290 in J. Wall et al., Paul Ricoeur and Contemporary Moral Thought, p. 280. I will return to ethics explicitly triadic structure in 2.1, making the link to the concept of the person here explicit.
\item P. Ricoeur, ‘The human being as the subject of philosophy’ p. 99.
\item B. Dauenhauer, The Promise and Risk of Politics. p. 129.
\item P. Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, p. 192.
\item Ibid., p. 181.
\item H. Haker, ‘Narrative and Moral Identity in the work of Paul Ricoeur’, p. 147.
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\end{footnotesize}
'If self-esteem does indeed draw its initial meaning from the reflexive movement through which the evaluation of certain actions, judged to be good are carried back to the author of these actions, this meaning remains abstract as long as it lacks the dialogic structure which is introduced by the reference to others'.

This dynamic of judgement in light of the effect of action on others and what Haker characterises as its shifting of the entire problematic of identity onto the plane of ethics, reveal to the fullest extent the role of the other in self-narration. I will summarise this in three points. Firstly, at the level of his theory of mimesis, there is the mediation of tropes, archetypes, inarticulated norms, prefigured symbolically in society itself. There is also the more direct appearance of other people as characters in the story of the self. The self draws in those others surrounding its narrative with the specific goal of making that synthesis coherent. As other people influence a person's development, that person also uses those others in her self-understanding, identifying others as constitutive of her narrative. So, too, are the received images of her predecessors' narratives and so on. Secondly, the other acts as a summons to the self to declare herself with her narrative identity. The self faces what is valued in the narratives of others around her and then narrates for herself, declaring in response - 'Here I am!'. Thirdly and lastly, the other is present as one who summons and then observes and judges the response: It is the expectation of the other that the self be reliable. This is possible by the self's initiative in promising, and in keeping reliably self-constant. This has opened out the ethical transition. Yet, 'reflexivity seems indeed to carry with it the danger of turning in upon oneself, of closing up'.

The other as another self.

Ricoeur shows that closing the discussion on the three summarised points above is inappropriate: to even begin telling the story, the self has to have identified a second person; the "you" to whom initiatives and stories are addressed. A character certainly, but also an audience who considers the response of the self to the summons of that narrative of

215 P. RICOEUR, Oneself as Another, p. 171.
216 Ibid., p. 180.
the good life. Yet describing the other as an audience should not imply only passivity. The presentation of the self to the other is spontaneous, but demands a response. The other, having the capacity to evoke a response from the self, is another self:

‘Even the grammatical second person ... would not be a person if I did not suspect, in addressing me, it realises that it is capable of designating itself as that which addresses itself to me and thus turns out to be capable of the self-esteem defined by intentionality and initiative’

The status of personhood in the other appears as a pre-condition to the story of the self. Rather than simply an other with a set of narrative tools available for the self to use, the other is also a person with the capacity to speak, act, narrate and impute action to themselves. Capable of this reflexivity, the other is co-constitutive of the self who narrates, who speaks and acts. It is the ‘mediation of the other [that is] required along the route from capacity to realization’.

That tacit acknowledgement of the possibility of the concrete, historical other as something more than a cipher, places the other in the very structure of speech. In his overview of Ricoeur’s work, David Pellauer has very usefully expressed this new role of the other in terms of speech. Speech acts require personal pronouns: Who spoke? So the self has ‘a capacity to designate oneself as the agent to whom the acts are ascribed’. Pellauer has noted that Ricoeur begins with the speech-act theory argument that the very need for personal pronouns implies other figures.

This is an instance of Ricoeur using a particular theory from analytic philosophy to go so far and then going further with his own understanding. Speech-act theory regarding grammatical differences does provide Ricoeur with a prompt to identifying other figures. However, it is his own emphasis on the “who?” question which goes further than speech-act theory which is purely structural, not ethical. Ricoeur’s ‘who’ returns the discussion to a philosophy of reflection. In the face of the other as another self, self-attestation becomes the ‘means by which agents take responsibility for their actions’. Yet attestation is


218 P. RICOEUR, Oneself as Another, p. 181.


220 Ibid., p. 99.
reflexive, it is not presented in any objectifying way. The self is therefore precarious and may be viewed with suspicion - speech-act theory does not ask about the self and does not have these problems. Ricoeur calls this fragile self the ‘wounded cogitio’.

However, Ricoeur argues that the other summons a promise from the self, who consciously takes the initiative to respond, making herself available for imputation. The other responds, relying on the self and thus seeks recognition as a self - a ‘genuine other to whom the same attribution can be made’ as Pellauer concludes.

The capacity for imputation shows the danger of a self-narrative. The expectation of the other as another self is already present, such that one speaks hoping for the possibility of dialogue - a response to the quest for recognition present in attestation between self and other. The beginning of that dialogue, where the other, too, hopes for that self that addresses her, is a fulfillment of the hope realized in speech and a fulfillment of the potential of narrative to tangle with the other, rather than ‘turning in upon oneself’. This reciprocal dialogue, to remain with speech, is the beginning of the fulfillment of the hope of both the self and other, now able to recognise in each other each another self - with the same capacities to speak, act and impute action in his or her own identity. To regress from that point is damaging not only to the other as such, but also to the fulfillment that was achieved with that response. Then the future of that dialogue would also be placed in jeopardy. This is the demand of responsibility opened by the other as another self.

The danger of instrumentalising the other here is in making the other relative to the self, relevant only as the listener to self-narration. This represents damage to the full identity of that other and encloses the danger of ego-centric conceptions of the good life. Ricoeur’s reflective wounded cogito requires an ongoing request for recognition - rejection is always a possibility. This is broadened from self and other when Ricoeur argues that ‘the same

221 This is a phrase which initially emerged from Ricoeur’s work on Freud, referenced here: P. Ricoeur, The Conflict of Interpretations, p. 243. It became a key phrase for Ricoeur’s philosophical anthropology. For example, ‘Wounded Cogito - towards a hermeneutics of the “I am”’ was the original title of Lecture VIII of Ricoeur’s Gifford Lectures. See http://www.fondsricoeur.fr/photo/gifford%20lecture%201986.pdf


223 P. RICOEUR, Oneself as Another, p. 181.

224 In The Course of Recognition, reconstructed by me in 2.2, Ricoeur explores the other danger - that of the ‘bad infinity’ of constantly seeking recognition without end.
holds for the person conceived as a third person — he or she — who is not merely the person about whom I speak, but the person capable of becoming a narrative model or a moral model.\textsuperscript{225}

Ignoring these shared capacities in others is a refusal of the personhood of others, but by the reciprocal role the other plays in the constitution of the self, it is also a refusal of the self. Crucially, it is care for others that ‘authorizes us to say that I cannot myself have self-esteem unless I esteem others as myself’\textsuperscript{226}. The self and the other are equally capable of reflexive esteem and recognizing it in others: ‘the esteem of the other as a oneself and the esteem of oneself as an other’\textsuperscript{227}. It is the encounter with the other self that confirms the ethical and the moral self.

This final role for the other self leads to a question that will help me to locate Ricoeur’s concept of the self in opposition to another contemporary approach to philosophical anthropology. Hille Haker has pointed to a collection of thinkers she names post-Structuralist\textsuperscript{228} who also acknowledge the significance of the other for self-identity. However, these thinkers consider the other to shape the self to the extent that the self can no longer be considered ‘sovereign’ or self-determined. Ricoeur, by contrast, considers the self to be autonomous, although Ricoeur’s conception of autonomy also requires explanation.

The issue of autonomy is very closely related to the identity of the self that I have discussed above. It is narrative identity that will reveal the complex relationship between self and other that leads Ricoeur to pair autonomy with vulnerability. In an article on the pairing he stated that ‘narrative identity is something claimed, like a mark of power. And

\textsuperscript{225} P. RICOEUR, ‘Approaching the Human Person’, p. 46.

\textsuperscript{226} P. RICOEUR, Oneself as Another, p. 181.

\textsuperscript{227} Ibid., p. 194.

\textsuperscript{228} I intend to follow the comparative analysis by the theological ethicist Hille Haker on this question. “Post-Structuralist” is the term she gives to the thinkers in question: Foucault, Lévinas, and Judith Butler. H. HAKER, ‘The Fragility of the Moral Self’, pp. 359-380 in the Harvard Theological Review 97 (Boston, Harvard University Press, 2004). In conversation Haker has noted that this is a translation from German; her comparison /reconstruction of the ethical and the moral levels of identity in the approaches of J. Habermas, A. Honneth, Ch. Taylor, H. Krämer and P. Ricoeur can be found in greater detail in Moralische Identität. Literarische Lebensgeschichten als Medium ethischer Reflexion (Tübingen, Francke, 1999).
it also declares itself as a kind of attestation. But it is also a term for impotence through the admission of all signs of vulnerability that threaten any such narrative identity’.

I want to make a direct contrast between Ricoeur’s approach and that of “post-Structuralism” in order to explore this question of the autonomy of the moral, narrative self. Haker presents both sides and the following section will therefore be guided by her work. This will be an important section, as it engages with a significant potential critique of Ricoeur’s work. I will explain why it may be rejected and by doing so further clarify the encounter with the other is at the centre of Ricoeur’s ethics. This will be significant for my later exploration of Ricoeur’s intercultural hermeneutics in the encounter with the other of another culture. My reconstruction of his work currently remains on the anthropological level. On that level the post-Structuralist challenge on the structures of selfhood must be answered before I can turn to Ricoeur’s ethical theory in Chapter Two.

1.4. THE POST-STRUCTURALIST LOSS OF SOVEREIGNTY OR RICOEUR’S CONCEPT OF FRAGILE ATTESTATION

A central characteristic of the self that Ricoeur has developed, and that I have here reconstructed, is that it is reflexive. The self recognizes itself by narrating herself through the other, and by promising self-constancy in the face of the other. The post-Structuralist approach however, queries whether the self can genuinely be said to have a self-identity, even before self-constancy is in question, because it is so strongly informed by the other, perhaps even to the point of manipulation. I will therefore firstly consider the post-Structuralist ‘challenge’. I will concentrate on this major concern: that the other in her role as initiator, contributor, audience and judge of self-narrated attestation, forces the self into a particular identity.

In my view Ricoeur approaches the relationship between the self and the other as a source of enrichment, rather than a threat. I will therefore secondly turn to respond to the post-Structuralist position by highlighting certain characteristics of the self that are to be found

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in two examples of Ricoeur’s works related to philosophical anthropology. The first is the very early phenomenological work *Freedom and Nature: The voluntary and the involuntary*\(^{230}\). The second is his 1995 speech ‘Autonomy and Vulnerability’, published under the same name in 1997; this article is from the period when Ricoeur was turning from the ethics developed from his philosophical anthropology in *Oneself as Another* to consider its ethico-juridical applications. The development of Ricoeur’s concept of the self is sometimes characterised as a broad shift in emphasis from the fallible to the capable man. I will reconstruct Ricoeur’s early consideration of the self here as consistent with his later understanding of the self as one who narrates and imputes. A simplifying interpretation of a reversal in the development of Ricoeur’s conception of the self from fallible to capable is not appropriate.

Finally I will turn to Haker’s solution to the question of the self. Her critique of the relationship between self and other in Ricoeur and in the post-Structuralists leads her to the solution conceiving of narrative as ‘an ethical practice in and of itself, a medium of and for ethical reflection, with respect to responsibility’\(^{231}\). Even the narrative mediation of *idem* and *ipse* identity, attesting to the self in the face of the other, also relying on the narratives told by others, must be conceived as an ethical task. I will reconstruct the steps of this argument.

Throughout these three sections, Haker’s presentation of the question, Ricoeur’s response and Haker’s final analysis, I will include examples of the broad trends within recent commentary, and identify some of the insights and problems within these trends through the use of particular examples. Many of these commentators I have already presented above and contextualised regarding their own interests. Before I turn to the three sections therefore I will briefly contextualise these scholars by placing them in three broad groups in response to Ricoeur’s concept of the self.

The first group is those who argue that the self is primarily passive and is shaped by the other and her environment. Here I locate the post-Structuralists, with Foucault particularly

\(^{230}\) P. RICOEUR, *Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and the Involuntary* (Chicago, Northwestern University Press, 1966). The French text is titled *Le Volontaire et l’involontaire, Philosophie de la volonté*. For clarity therefore I will refer to this text from now on as *The Voluntary and The Involuntary*.

in mind. Additional commentators on this point include Judith Butler, and on Ricoeur, Helen Buss, who is primarily interested in the impact of Ricoeur’s concept of self on feminist capabilities. This argument is ultimately about power relations and may therefore be conceived as a concern with concrete relationships. In my view this group is ultimately concerned with a loss of sovereignty. The second group is made up of those who do acknowledge potential problems in the concrete relationships between self and other but acknowledge the value of the concept of the self as Ricoeur presents it. Anderson seeks to protect the concrete self. Haker presents the ethical concern of narrative as an equal protection of both self and other. I consider this group to best represent Ricoeur’s own concerns regarding the ethics of the self and other relationship. In the third group I place those commentators who also view Ricoeur’s approach positively, but emphasise his concern for the encounter between the self and the other as potentially damaging for the other. Bernard Dauenhauer will be of particular use here again, representing the concerns of political ethics with conceiving the self. I will also return to Domencio Jervolino’s overview of Ricoeur’s homme capable. Both the second and the third group in some way support Ricoeur’s distinctive approach to fragile attestation.

Ultimately, I will conclude that the self in Ricoeur is reached in an analysis that cannot be reduced to the kind of power-based approach used in post-structuralism, and that on the concrete level Maker’s concerns are fully answered by Ricoeur. Together these three sections will eventually lead me to the ethical theory Ricoeur constructs with his conception of the self in Chapter Two. In relation to this view I will return to my closing point of the section above, which is Ricoeur’s own concern with instrumentalising the other.

**Haker’s articulation of the post-Structuralist challenges of Foucault and Butler.**

I have reconstructed the relationship between the self and the other as one of mutual dependence, or evocation. The presence of the other allows the self to reflexively identify herself, narratively, but also calls the self to an ethical identity. Thus it is here, in the encounter with the expectations of the other, that the self is called to moral responsibility. In this way the other enables the self to express her personhood, but also reveals the reflexive capacities of personhood in the other as well.
However, Haker has become increasingly convinced that properly rendering this inter-dependency is a challenge where Ricoeur could do more, particularly when it comes to the role of others in the construction of the self. She does this by drawing a careful comparative study of, amongst others, Ricoeur, Foucault and Judith Butler. She also references Emmanuel Levinas as an interlocutor in identifying her own solution. This genealogical approach itself deserves far more detailed examination on its own merits than the following provides, but for the purposes of this chapter what I want to draw out from the article is Haker’s critique of an approach to the self where her capacity for self-determination might be lost on the concrete level in the inter-subjectivity of the self’s construction.

Outlining Judith Butler’s view, Haker writes that ‘The other inscribes “herself” into the self long before the addressed self is able to respond in a self-reflective way’\(^{232}\). Aesthetically, narrative constructs the self’s experience and Haker argues that the givenness of this biography is even present in one’s name. This passivity is shown in narrative where ‘agency and non-agency’\(^{233}\) are held in tension with each other: the self acts, but events happen to the self. The self then also has the capacity for reception. Yet the tension remains. I will turn to its impact on interpreting Ricoeur specifically as I will now reconstruct Haker’s analysis.

Foucault characterises the construction of the self, reliant on the audience that is the other, as a public practice. It is therefore, in his reading, inevitably already non-subjective. Haker describes his view of ‘self-constitution as the impregnation of the self by many and diverse forms of social norms and moral authority’\(^{234}\). As Butler would later do, Foucault understood identity as the ‘social derivation of the individual’, and also like Butler emphasised ‘the overriding power of the discourse in self-constitution’\(^{235}\). What this means is that the discourse itself overtakes any construction by the self, the other is thus


\(^{233}\) Ibid., p. 380.

\(^{234}\) Ibid., p. 359.

\(^{235}\) Ibid., p. 360.
shaping the self. Yet that power relation is a hidden one such 'that the moral relation of the self and the other remains vague'\textsuperscript{236}.

It is with Butler, who follows Foucault in the above outline, that Haker makes explicit the one-sided concern that the post-structuralist reading presents. Butler argues that 'the other inscribes "herself" into the self long before the addressed self is able to respond in a self-reflective way'\textsuperscript{237}. There is an ongoing shaping of personal identity through the discourse. Butler argues that this leads to patterns of problematic identity politics; her particular concern is with patriarchal gender imbalances.

The result of this confusion of self-identity means that any moral decision made by the self is the result of an obscured givenness. This is a question of practical incapacities. I point here to Helen Buss, who has emphasised what such incapability means in practice to a person, very much in the vein of Butler. In conversation with Buss on this point, Ricoeur has written that incapacities do include 'the interference of outside powers capable of diminishing, hindering, or preventing our use of our abilities'\textsuperscript{238}. Ricoeur acknowledges the sometimes damaging impact of the other on the self.

However, Buss interprets this to mean that the impact of other persons can leave the self incapable, not only of particular actions, but of self-esteem at all. 'I cannot ask a "Who am I?" question, only a "How can I become a person?" question'\textsuperscript{239} precisely because I am disempowered. This is the implication of the post-structuralist understanding of the non-sovereign self. Yet what Buss has done here is conflate concrete instances of speech, action, narration and imputation, in this case, damaging ones, with the receptivity and agency that are discovered in a general reflection on personhood. Buss asks 'how can there exist a way of being that makes me an "I" who then comes capable of self-esteem, and who can then esteem another?'\textsuperscript{240}. Buss is thus asking whether there is a way out of

\begin{thebibliography}{10}
\bibitem{236} H. HAKER 'The Fragility of the Moral Self', p. 360.
\bibitem{237} Ibid., p. 364.
\bibitem{239} H. M. BUSS 'Antigone, Psyche and the Ethics of Female Selfhood', p. 71.
\bibitem{240} Ibid., p. 72.
\end{thebibliography}
any power imbalance. If such an imbalance was implied in the conditions of personhood put forward in Ricoeur’s investigation combining concepts from philosophy of reflection and from phenomenology, this would be a significant blow to his conception of the self. However, Buss’s analysis treats problems on the concrete level, and within a specific approach, the tradition of Foucault. Mark Wallace describes this tradition very helpfully as a collection of ‘some anticogito thinkers (for example, Michel Foucault) [who] contend that insofar as there is no entitative core self, then the subject is nothing other than the sum total of the discourses practiced by its particular culture’. Thus because Buss identifies her contemporary society as still significantly patriarchal, women do not have the tools for self-narration and are ‘not at a mature point of self-development’. In Buss’s view a concrete power imbalance has shaped the conception of the person, and so Ricoeur’s conception of the self and other as inter-dependent is nothing but damaging.

It is owing to this confusion of categories that I find Buss’s representation of Ricoeur’s conception of the self genuinely problematic. By contrast, Haker distinguishes between general and particular contextual analyses in relation to the self. Her ultimate concern is that an absence of sovereignty, as it is named by the post-Structuralists, could render the self unable to make genuinely moral choices. I will ultimately argue that in Ricoeur’s concept of the self there is no such loss of sovereignty in the sense of the capability for self-determination.

I do consider Haker’s approach particularly worthwhile however, because she considers both Butler’s and Ricoeur’s conclusions and asks whether either of them alone is satisfying. Of Butler she asks ‘is this position of acknowledging the violence accompanying self-constitution, and thus the paradoxical structure of subjectivation sufficient for understanding the moral self?’ When it comes to Ricoeur, Haker is concerned that he is not taking seriously the way the other can impact on what the self

241 M. I. WALLACE ‘The Irony of Selfhood in Paul Ricoeur’s Hermeneutic Philosophy’ pp. 161-71 in A. WIERCINSKI, Between Suspicion and Sympathy, p. 163. Wallace’s theological PhD thesis was supervised by Paul Ricoeur at the University of Chicago, and usually works with Ricoeur’s texts on religion. We are indebted to Wallace for the editing of Ricoeur’s collection Figuring the Sacred which draws together such texts. In terms of Wallace’s remark here, Ricoeur also named Nietzsche as anticogito in Oneself as Another, p. 11.


considers worthwhile and subsequently seeks to identify in his or her personal narrative. I agree that it is clear in Ricoeur’s *Oneself as Another* the role of the other in supplying the ‘values, norms, ideals, models and heroes’ before which the self declares herself does indeed take a significant role in self-narration. As I reconstructed in section 2 of this chapter above, the cultural milieu is already part of the identity the self is constructing. Indeed it is the cultural milieu which provides many of the basic tools; even language is not only rules but also an ‘accumulation of things said before’. The mediation of these older narratives is by those narratives being told around us, so there are already judgements made by those around us as to what constitutes a “good” story, or at least, an attractive one. I repeat the quotation used above ‘the identification with heroic figures clearly displays this otherness assumed as our own, but this is already latent with the identification with values’.

To be sure, the loyalty that this particular quotation describes could be alarming in its discussion of otherness ‘assumed as our own’; it might indicate genuine self-effacement. The self is dependent on the other for its actualisation to an ethical and a moral response. John Wall puts it in terms of the nature of personhood as Ricoeur’s conceives it: ‘interpreting selves are the kind of beings for whom selfhood is insufficient without the mediation of otherness’. The narrating self interprets the continuity or change of the present self in relation to the past. Haker, however, points to Butler again who ‘denies this authority to the self and, correspondingly, denies the sovereignty of narrative unity’.

Haker is using Butler as one pole in a debate and does not agree with her position entirely. However, in using Butler, Haker reveals that her own concern in the constitution of the self differs from Ricoeur’s. She is primarily concerned with the fragility of the self who is called to act morally; the fragility that Ricoeur and Haker acknowledge is on the concrete level. The ‘incapacities’ with which Butler and Buss are so concerned are practical, but are presented as the only conditions under which the self acts. Haker rejects this elevation of a

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244 P. Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, p. 121.
246 P. Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, p. 121, emphasis mine.
247 J. Wall, ‘Beyond the Good and the Right’, p. 59
concrete power relation to a transcendental level of analysis, but remains concerned that Ricoeur does not do 'justice to the radical nature of the actual non-sovereignty of the self'\(^{249}\), in concrete terms. I will return to Haker's consideration of this concern but will now more directly contrast Ricoeur's conception of the self with that of post-Structuralism.

**Looking back from ‘Autonomy and Vulnerability’ to The Voluntary and The Involuntary**

It is in ‘Autonomy and Vulnerability’ that Ricoeur makes explicit the link between this new question and the above reconstruction of the link between narrative and identity. In his view ‘it is difficult to speak of autonomy without also talking about identity’\(^{250}\). This is to do with the self's reflexive capacities - the reflexive capacity of the self to so distanciate herself can be seen in the interpretive nature of narration. I will therefore begin by responding to post-Structuralist position with a brief point on narrative identity.

It is Haker who presents Ricoeur on narrative particularly well and as I work through my reconstruction of Ricoeur on autonomy I will draw in Haker's analysis of his position as well. Writing on narrative identity Haker describes that identity as being 'won through and in conflict with the identities others ascribe to us'\(^{251}\). Crucially, her reconstruction of Ricoeur's concept of narrative identity is an active self-determination. This is consistent with Ricoeur's presentation of self-narration as a practice. Haker is acknowledging the difficulties of the encounter with the other but is also emphasising the genuine dialogical nature of self-narration. It is a necessarily interpretive practice.

Crucially, the other is similarly interpretive and shaped by the self. This inter-dependency is constitutive of the self, rather than a later response after the self has already lost her sovereignty to reigning discourses of power. Thus, in Ricoeur's conception, otherness enables the self to make precisely the moral choices with which Haker is concerned. Self and other are *co-constitutive* in this way. Dauenhauer, concerned with the political realm, recognises symbolic mediations and the role of the other as conditions of the possibility of


\(^{250}\) P. RICOEUR, 'Autonomy and Vulnerability', p. 78.

\(^{251}\) H. HAKER, 'Narrative and Moral Identity in the work of Paul Ricoeur,' p. 136.
the concrete self in Ricoeur’s conception of the person: For example, ‘actions are imputable precisely because we can submit them to the requirements of a symbolic order, an order of meanings’\textsuperscript{252}. The extension of this point is that ‘making full sense of an action requires us to consider its ethical impact’\textsuperscript{253}. It is in answer to this that the self takes on responsibility; the other reveals the capacity of the self for imputation\textsuperscript{254}. This capacity still belongs to the self. The self is still able to distanciate itself from the structures of his or her society and make rational judgements as to their moral content. This is in direct contrast to Foucault and Butler, who negate this capacity in the self as if the self were empty and ready to be shaped.

I have been employing the commentary of Dauenhauer to argue against Butler and it is worth my noting now that his analysis prioritises the protection not of the self against the other, but the other against the self. Similarly, John Wall has identified that on the concrete level, ‘selves are inherently prone to the instrumentalization of others by the sheer fact of pursuing a narrative unity of life’\textsuperscript{255}. Wall’s point here is that by seeking a coherent narrative, the self may manipulate the other to fit the narrative. This is consistent with Ricoeur’s own stated concerns\textsuperscript{256}. Both Ricoeur and Wall recognise attestation as a condition of the self in action - there is no loss of a capability for self-determination that might render the self morally vague.

However, in this reconstruction of the concept of the narrating self, its reflexivity might appear to be taken for granted as impervious to damage. In fact the reflexive “I can” of the self is a capacity and is subject to concrete or practical problems. Considering the political implications Bernard Dauenhauer agrees with this analysis: It is ‘the ensemble of an

\textsuperscript{252} B. DAUENHAUER, \textit{Paul Ricoeur: The Promise and Risk of Politics}, p. 119.

\textsuperscript{253} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{254} I will return to Dauenhauer’s allusion to the evaluation of action, as part of Ricoeur’s expansion of the self-other relationship to include the institution. I consider this development at the beginning of Chapter Two.

\textsuperscript{255} J. WALL, ‘Beyond the Good and the Right’, p. 53.

\textsuperscript{256} In his final book \textit{The Course of Recognition}, Ricoeur wrote of the subjective priority of the self, that one cannot ‘forget the originary asymmetry in the relationship between the self and others, which even the experience of [peace] does not manage to abolish. Forgetting this asymmetry, thanks to the success of analyses of mutual recognition, would constitute the ultimate misrecognition at the very heart of actual experiences of recognition’, p. 261. Even when the self refrains from manipulating the other in her self-narrative, she cannot forget that this is a possibility, or this is itself a failure to recognise the other. I will fully reconstruct Ricoeur’s understanding of the significance for “recognition” between self and other in 2.2.
agent's capabilities and incapabilities [that] constitute his or her fragility or vulnerability.257

This possible inability for morally conscious action Haker terms the 'Fragility of the Moral Self'258. In Haker's view any discourse that constructs the narration of the self should already be considered as morally engaged. However, she also judges that the experience of the self this provides is paradoxical. Although the self maybe narrating herself, her subjective experience of this is as participation 'in a socially and psychically mediated discourse that displaces its individuality and its particularity... a discourse that expels the individuality of the self from the discourse at the very moment of its constitution... there is no unmediated access to an inner self or to a bodily self259. The subjectivity of the experience is removed as it is experienced. What Haker underlines here is the interdependency of self and other as each narrates themselves, both concretely in terms of narrative content, and in terms of attestation of personhood.

It is here that I am indebted to Anderson's work on autonomy. She represents Ricoeur's self is autonomous but that 'autonomy as a moral capacity is bound up with interdependence, or the “interpersonal” rather than independence260. Anderson takes this inter-dependency as the crucial basis for Ricoeur's autonomy, so his reclamation of the Kantian principle of a freedom within conditions that are given, includes, going beyond Kant, a phenomenological attention to embodiment. Anderson puts it best when she says 'crucially, [Ricoeur's] reclamation conceives autonomy as inseparable from the embodiment, the concrete otherness, and the vulnerabilities constituting the many dimensions of everyday life that, nonetheless, can together aim at a harmonious vision of the good261.'

258 Ibid.
261 Ibid., p. 27, emphasis mine. Harmony remains an aim, as Anderson articulates; Ricoeur emphasises the tension, aporia and paradox of freedom within givenness. This is one the reasons that fits narrative as a suitable mediation.
In this way Ricoeur acknowledges the concrete limits faced by the self when engaging with other persons, but argues for an autonomous self within the limits of this givenness. Anderson is arguing that Ricoeur recognises the givenness of the bodily self, and the givenness of the self in a particular historical and social context. Yet he still argues for an autonomy within these limits - these limits are understood as universal to the conception of the human person. The self is capable of recognising, acknowledging and distanciating herself in relation to such givenness. The self might choose to take on the priorities of her particular culture, or reject them.

I will now reconstruct two of Ricoeur’s texts on this point. I will begin with the later ‘Autonomy and Vulnerability’ as dealing most directly with autonomy as it impacts on the sovereignty of the moral self. I will then connect this text with the early The Voluntary and The Involuntary. I want to present Ricoeur’s work on the self as continually returning to the question of the givenness of the self.

‘Autonomy and Vulnerability’

In this collection, entitled in English Reflections on the Just, Ricoeur is concerned with questions of ethical and judicial import. In a previous study on the subject of rights, Ricoeur began to bring his philosophical anthropology into judicial questions. He now continues to investigate that subject in terms of its autonomy. Juridically speaking autonomy is an important presupposition. However, this is not equal to self-sovereignty and requires a more nuanced explanation: ‘Autonomy is indeed the prerogative of the subject of rights, but it is vulnerability that makes autonomy remain a condition of possibility that juridical practice turns into a task. Because as a hypothesis human beings are autonomous, they must become so.'

Crucially autonomy is not only assumed but must be fulfilled through labour. This paradox is important for understanding the relationship Ricoeur draws between autonomy and vulnerability as a part of the human condition. They are not just in opposition but 'go

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262 P. Ricoeur, ‘Who is the Subject of Rights?’ pp. 1-10 in P. Ricoeur, The Just.

263 P. Ricoeur, ‘Autonomy and Vulnerability’, p. 72. I noted above that this is the published English version of Ricoeur’s presentation at Sémence inaugurale du Séminaire de l'IHEJ, November 6, 1995. It was first published in French in 1997.
together: the autonomy in question is that of a fragile, vulnerable being. And this fragility would be something pathological if we were not called on to become autonomous, because we are already so in some way\(^{264}\). This is a distinction between a fundamental characteristic and an historical set of circumstances, argues Ricoeur. The self is fundamentally autonomous, it has ‘capacities, power, strength’\(^{265}\) to do something and this is expressed in many different abilities. However, there are “historical” challenges that impact on these abilities and so there are ‘correlative modes of incapacity that make up the basis of fragility’\(^{266}\). This is evident in the most basic of our abilities, suggests Ricoeur: ‘It is first as a speaking subject that our mastery appears to be threatened and always limited’\(^{267}\).

The attempt to assert one’s ability to “do something” in this context is therefore a practical answer to fragility - a fragile attestation of the self. Yet this ‘practical conviction’\(^{268}\) is ‘confirmed only through being exercised and through the approbation others grant to it’\(^{269}\).

Here Ricoeur is returning to the role of the other in developing the narrating self, who learns to identify ‘with heroes, emblematic characters, models, and teachers and also precepts, norms whose field extends from traditional customs to utopian paradigms, which emanating from the social imaginary, re-model our private imaginations’\(^{270}\). However, not only does the other, in the shape of a cultural social imaginary, provide tools for narrating, it is the audience for that narration and thus the other impacts on self-esteem. Ricoeur continues ‘I shall call self-esteem the ethical form that clothes this claim to singularity’\(^{271}\).

Ongoing inability is therefore not a fundamental inequality - the reflexive capacity to declare I can is always present. Instead Ricoeur calls the negative impact of the other on the self a ‘perverse cultural effect’; ‘people do not simply lack power, they are deprived of

\(^{264}\) P. RICOEUR, ‘Autonomy and Vulnerability’, p. 73.

\(^{265}\) Ibid., p. 74.

\(^{266}\) Ibid., p. 75.

\(^{267}\) Ibid., p. 76.

\(^{268}\) Ibid., p. 75.

\(^{269}\) Ibid.

\(^{270}\) Ibid., p. 81.

\(^{271}\) Ibid.
it". Thus far Ricoeur is describing the situation that could be presented by Butler and
Buss, where an overwhelming cultural viewpoint genuinely prevents an individual from
having confidence in their own abilities. However, at the existential or fundamental level,
Ricoeur conceives of cultural resources as empowering agency; that symbols can be
oppressive and have to be debated in an ongoing conflict of interpretations that not mean
that they only constitute power relations of subjugation. They impact on identity, but do
not preclude our capacity to newly narrate that identity. So while autonomy is to act in
vulnerability, Ricoeur is able to turn to his solution of pedagogy.

This pedagogical project partly foreshadows Haker’s consideration of narrative care for the
other (1.4.3.). Ricoeur intends the question of education to respond to many kinds of
encounter with this other: ‘To learn how to tell the same story in another way, how to allow
our story to be told by others, how to submit the narrative of a life to a historian’s critique,
are all practices applicable to the paradox of autonomy and fragility’\(^273\). Not only does the
content of narrative need to be learned from what is always already narrated, but the
discourse must encompass how this may be renewed and transformed. The word Ricoeur
uses is to ‘negotiate’\(^274\) our identity.

It is in this confrontation with the other that Ricoeur applies his philosophical anthropology
to ethico-juridical questions. The self has the capacity to impute action, the ‘capacity to be
taken as responsible’\(^275\). This is where autonomy is genuinely claimed, moving from
horizon to task. It is under responsibility that vulnerability is therefore made less
precarious. He finds pedagogical support in what he calls the ‘symbolic order’: ‘an
injunction, but also as counsel, advice, shared customs, founding narratives, the edifying
lives of heroes of the moral life, the praise of moral sentiments’\(^276\).

It is in this rich symbolic order that Ricoeur identifies three characteristics which may help
handle the fragility of the self. The first is the question of the symbolic order in “signs” of

\(^{272}\) P. RICOEUR, ‘Autonomy and Vulnerability’, p. 77.

\(^{273}\) Ibid., p. 80.

\(^{274}\) Ibid., p. 82.

\(^{275}\) Ibid., p. 83.

\(^{276}\) Ibid., p. 84.
recognition - the symbolic order must be understood to be a ‘communalization of moral experience’\textsuperscript{277}. Recognition is ‘something to be shared’\textsuperscript{278} and this allows Ricoeur to talk about our moral responsibility to those excluded from that order - those whose capacity for speech is damaged. The second is Thomas Nagel’s conception of ‘impartiality, which he defines as the capacity to take two points of view’\textsuperscript{279}. Here Ricoeur begins to return the fundamental reflexive self, subject to historical vulnerability, but able to make a distanciating move to consider the role of the other in that fragile symbolic order and the fragile self. This also emphasises Ricoeur’s turning point of recognising responsibility in that for impartiality, each viewpoint is of equal worth. This leads him to the third point, placed firmly on the juridical level, of ‘just distance between singular points of view against the backdrop of a shared understanding’\textsuperscript{280}. Understanding particular actions as inscribed within shared symbolic order allows a return of multiple viewpoints, and possibly multiple foundations for identity. The question of the authority of the other is thus brought down to a question of mediative practice.

Altogether, this is Ricoeur’s non-speculative solution to the paradox of autonomy/vulnerability. The fundamental self is not damaged, but requires practical responses to the refusal of recognition by the other. Ricoeur provides a narrative based pedagogy and there are many commentators who have taken this up strongly. Haker is one example below. Autonomy is left within vulnerability - a fragile attestation - not opposed to it as in the post-Structuralist concept of the non-sovereign self.

The original context of Ricoeur’s remarks on this subject is significant - before the Institut des hautes études sur la justice. His conclusion is important for the setting of this presentation. Imputability cannot be assumed by the judicial system of a person who has not been made of the symbolic order. The failure of self-determination that the post-Structuralists describe as a lack of sovereignty would imply a denial of the social bond with the individual such that the self in question could not even take moral ownership of their own actions. This would be a radical inability. Ricoeur’s view is of a self whose

\textsuperscript{277} P. RICOEUR, ‘Autonomy and Vulnerability’, p. 88.

\textsuperscript{278} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{279} Ibid. - A reformulation of the capacity to rise to the level of Kant’s Categorical Imperative

\textsuperscript{280} Ibid., p. 89.
condition is reflexive, and thus is capable of undertaking mediatory practice in order to bring her own autonomy to fulfilment in capable action, even in the face of her own vulnerability. Thus the exclusively power-based analyses from Foucault, Butler and Buss are rejected as an incomplete analysis of the conditions of personhood, not because they do not constitute an important factor in historical constitutions and denials of identity.

*The Voluntary and The Involuntary*

This text began Ricoeur's work on what he named 'philosophy of the will'. David Pellauer suggests that 'in it Ricoeur presents... the reciprocity of the voluntary and the involuntary in human existence'\(^{281}\). This, he continues 'makes freedom meaningful' by placing it in the context of human action, a 'lived subjectivity'\(^{282}\). The book was intended as the first part of a trilogy on the will. The second part was completed as *Fallible Man* and *The Symbolism of Evil*. The final part was to provide a 'poetics of the will', or as Wall puts it 'the possibility of the will's ultimate reconciliation with itself'\(^{283}\) in the face of the two difficulties of fallibility and evil. This final part was never written in a systematic form, although commentators have pointing to various parts of Ricoeur's work as presenting such a 'poetics'.

However, in the first part of the planned trilogy, *The Voluntary and the Involuntary*, Ricoeur can already be seen rejecting the straightforward expression of the self as sovereign or non-sovereign. For the contribution of *The Voluntary and The Involuntary* to my response to post-Structuralist concept of the self, the question of identity remains crucial. In my reconstruction of Ricoeur's consideration of how to identify the person the key criterion was continuity. In *ipse* identity this was understood in terms of promising, already introducing the moral identity of the self. In *idem* identity Ricoeur's example was character. I will concentrate on Ricoeur's discussion of character in *Freedom and Nature*, which emphasised its givenness. This might appear to place it in tension with the self's capacity for self-determination.

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282 Ibid., p. 25.

The self is ‘not a pure act of self-positing; it lives on what it receives and on a dialogue with the conditions in which it itself is rooted’\(^{284}\). The encounter with the other identifies character in the self, and sometimes supplies part of its acquired content. Those others can, indirectly ‘make me assume responsibility for the idea the other forms of me – when it is flattering. In seeking to live up to the other’s opinion, I become a slave of the image which he gives me of myself’\(^{285}\). This is a more positive picture of the manipulation than that which the gender theorist Butler presents; to live up to an image may seem on the surface as a good thing. However, Ricoeur’s concern here is the effacing of the self’s capacities by the other’s assumptions and so does not leave the self as merely a passive recipient of its own character. His continuing concern with respect to personhood is to maintain what Dauenhauer describes as ‘initiative’\(^{286}\).

This distinction is in Ricoeur’s earliest work, *Freedom and Nature* where he begins with a coherent, willing self. The self is coherent owing to character, which is ‘what permits us to recognise him, to identify him in time and space’\(^{287}\). Not only are the historical circumstances of the self given, so, too, is part of the content of self-identity. Character ‘cannot be reabsorbed into the voluntary’\(^{288}\), it remains involuntary.

However, I also describe Ricoeur’s concept of the self here as willing because the character of the self is also chosen. ‘Common sense... does not in the least doubt that my character does not adhere to me so closely that I could not oppose it’\(^{289}\). Despite the involuntary in the self, that self is assertive and can distanciate herself from that givenness. Indeed, ‘to think of my character consistently as an object is already to deliver myself from it as subject: it is I who thinks it, it is I who wills to be an object comprehensible within laws’\(^{290}\). By the same capacity can the self distanciate itself from descriptions by others. John Wall has written considering how the teleology of Ricoeur’s concept of self identity is


\(^{285}\) Ibid., p. 365.


\(^{288}\) Ibid., p. 364.

\(^{289}\) Ibid., pp. 365-366.

\(^{290}\) Ibid., p. 365.
supplemented by deontology\textsuperscript{291}, a point to which I will return. He finds it a crucial capacity of the self to construct its identity in this way: ‘Phenomenologically speaking, the self mediates the voluntary and the involuntary in the concrete intentionality of the will, and hermeneutically speaking it mediates its background and its encounter with texts in meaning’\textsuperscript{292}.

I want to highlight the appearance of these ideas of distanciation and spontaneity in order to underline the importance Ricoeur places on the significance of the person’s autonomy at this very early point in his work, even when handling the involuntary aspects of the person. I have already indicated Pamela Sue Anderson’s contribution to this point: ‘autonomy as a moral capacity is bound up with interdependence’\textsuperscript{293}. Commenting on the later phase since \textit{Time and Narrative}, Haker correctly emphasises the non-totalising nature of narrative identity - being dependent on narrative means ‘as a moral self, questioning moral convictions and visions of the “other” from the point of view of the self as sameness’\textsuperscript{294}. In the face of finitude, narrative must be constantly constructed by the self\textsuperscript{295}; character must be continually chosen. There are scholars, such as Alasdair MacIntyre, who prioritise ‘the unity of the person’\textsuperscript{296} such that it leads (not by design) to a totality and to the exclusion of nuanced personhood. Ricoeur’s priority is different and it is Haker again who provides an insight on this point: ‘Unlike, for example, Alasdair MacIntyre, who has also proposed a concept of narrative identity, Ricoeur is much less concerned with restoring, or only postulating, a unified identity. For Ricoeur, literary narratives in particular become a medium for both exploring and jeopardizing that unity’\textsuperscript{297}.

I agree with Haker on this point. Mimetic creativity is not a static figure, holding a person together. Rather it is a retelling, each time, of the who of a person. The emphasis here is

\textsuperscript{291} J. WALL, ‘Beyond the Good and the Right’. Deontology in dialogue with teleology is a crucial characteristic of the ethical theory Ricoeur builds on his philosophical anthropology and with which I open Chapter Two.

\textsuperscript{292} Ibid., p. 55.

\textsuperscript{293} P. S. ANDERSON, ‘Ricoeur’s Reclamation of Autonomy’, p. 17.

\textsuperscript{294} H. HAKER ‘The Fragility of the Moral Self’, p. 379.

\textsuperscript{295} Distanciation is first emphasised by Ricoeur in relation to hermeneutics. It is a function of interpretation, which is ongoing: P. RICOEUR, \textit{Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences}, p. 131.

\textsuperscript{296} A. MACINTYRE, \textit{After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory}, p. 203.

not on unity, but rather integrity. Essentially, the appropriation by a self of her own characteristics, and the descriptions of the self by the other, are refigured by the self into her own narrative. The fidelity to one’s articulated selfhood that the human capacity of imputation provides as a possibility is fulfilled in that choice to return to the person the self has consistently promised to be. ‘I sense, without being able to articulate it correctly that my character in its changeless aspects is only my freedom’s mode of being'. That is in the face of the other to be sure, but not as her determined counterpart. Instead, the self promises to the other, in order to continue to be recognisable as his or her self. The self does not make this promise because the other is the one who has already supplied that self with his or her identity; it is a spontaneous act of freedom.

Dauenhauer characterises this as ‘initiative’ - ‘initiative, then, is a primitive datum that we come to recognise through dialectical reflection'. Again, the capacities of the other are co-constituted by the self and ‘each agent’s initiative promptly gets entangled with the initiatives of other agents’. It is at this point that dialogues regarding responsibility that is always already required begin. I recall that it is the encounter with the other that reveals the person as one who imputes action to herself and thus reveals her own sense of responsibility. Yet that responsibility, dependent on initiative, is already present in the self; it is revealed by the other. Dauenhauer argues that the self has autonomy because it is responsible, a responsibility founded in the encounter with the other, and the other’s demand for a promise. Autonomy is both horizon and task; and it is on this anthropological basis that Ricoeur can also speak of a summoned self.

Articulating this in the context of Oneself as Another and the subsequent examination of of autonomy and vulnerability allows me to express freedom as involving the given nature of character and physicality in idem, and the free, promise-making, spontaneity of ipse, and the inchoate dynamic between the two. The self is never structurally without its capacity

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298 Considering this kind of reappropriation in terms of ‘refiguration’ explicitly is my reading of The Involuntary and The Involuntary in the light of Ricoeur’s later work. I argue that such a way of thinking is rooted in Ricoeur’s earlier work, though he did not use this vocabulary to articulate it.


300 B. DAUENHAUER, Paul Ricoeur: The Promise and Risk of Politics, p. 115.

301 Ibid., p. 116.

302 c.f. Chapter Four, 4.1 for the summoned self in the context of biblical polysemy.
for free, reasoning, reflective self-articulation. Ricoeur thus conceives of human capacity as an originary power or striving. He chooses a way of thinking of the human person as already oriented toward sociability by the always already present other, in direct contrast to naturalistic, and nihilistic systems of thought\(^{303}\). Those systems which do begin with power-relations are essentially already politicized, and some are based on a biologist interpretation of human life in terms of survival, instead of in terms of a quest for recognition. John Hobbes is a case in point, discussing rights in terms which Ricoeur describes as vitalist and ultimately underpinned 'by nothing other than the calculation provoked by the fear of a violent death'\(^{304}\).

To conclude this section, I agree with Dauenhauer's emphasis on the imputation of responsibility to the self by the self, as revealed in the enabling challenge and expectation of the other. Ricoeur, in contrast with the post-Structuralists sees the encounter with the other as enriching not threatening. Social relationships, when unjust, can indeed result in extreme outcomes, but reflexivity is a condition of concrete human capabilities and in this way is not subject to alteration by limitations on the plane of practical activity. Haker's concern is an important one - but in the light of Ricoeur's analysis it is a concern which ought to be resituated. As she states 'morality, says Ricoeur, demands overcoming factual asymmetry, which is the signature of power relations, in favour of normative symmetry'\(^{305}\). Undoubtedly, articulation of the self can be subject to profound attacks along the line of power relations between persons and institutions. This results in the original human experience of finding oneself facing an "ought"; though 'what we are first aware of is injustice: "Unjust! What injustice!" we cry'\(^{306}\). Ricoeur, echoing Kant\(^{307}\), characterises this experience as 'indignation, that is, our rejection of indignities inflicted on others'\(^{308}\). Such


\(^{304}\) P. Ricoeur, *The Course of Recognition*, p. 165, which also echoes Haker's distinction between her proposed ethical reaction to death as responsibility of care, against death as a prompt toward exclusively power-based theories.

\(^{305}\) H. Haker, 'Fragility of the Moral Self' p. 361.

\(^{306}\) P. Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, p. 198.


\(^{308}\) P. Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, p. 221.
an experience forms morality, intended to restrict attacks on the person by the continual test of one's maxims by the norm of non-instrumentalisation.

Still, Haker is correct that instrumentalising the self can affect the fulfillment of the capacities of the self, Ricoeur has acknowledged this danger himself[^9] in the way autonomy can only be understood within vulnerability. Thus the human intuition is to prevent a violent encounter, and it is the originary indignation, answered by the obligation to others, and theirs to the self, that support the self and the other in the face of these attacks. Haker's insight here in her proposal of narrative care as a solution to concrete failures to protect the self or the other will therefore be my next and final section.

My final conclusion to this section is that even the early phenomenology of personhood that *Freedom and Nature* describes provides a clear contrast to the post-structuralist, non-sovereign self. The self here has initiative, which is co-constitutive both with and for the other, in response to her summons. This emphasises points one and two of my own conclusions which introduced Ricoeur's own responses; that reflexivity of the self is a condition of autonomous action, and is mirrored by the recognition of responsibility of one person for all persons. Yet the contrast with Foucault and Butler which Haker provides is useful for teasing out more clearly the implications of Ricoeur's approach. Haker's own response is of particular value as well and I will now turn to her position between post-Structuralism and Ricoeur.

**Haker's solution to the problems posed in Ricoeur's analysis: narrative care for the other**

Narrative, for Haker, is the opportunity to explore the danger of ignoring either self or other and return attention to the fragility of the moral self. This is where if the self is manipulated by the other, its very capacity for moral choices is under threat. As noted, Haker describes identity as 'won through and in conflict with identities others ascribe to us'[^10]. She continues 'this begins with the simple fact that persons speak about themselves and in doing so make use of a language convention which has been taken over from their


primary significant others". Already in this earlier paper she was concerned with the encounter with the concrete other and its moral implications, including the other’s influence. Her sophisticated approach in ‘Fragility’ identifies narrative itself as the way in which that encounter can be undertaken morally. This includes recognising those areas of potentially morally damaging activity on the part of the other.

‘What is expressed in the medium of narrative is the impossibility of overcoming the tension between speaking and keeping silent, between agency and non-agency (by way of passivity of suffering, between being oneself and another, between fragility and sovereignty, between forgetting and memory, and finally between life and death’.

The difference of Haker’s position from the post-Structuralist non-sovereign self is made all the clearer. The previously passive, non-agent is rendered more complex. There is ambiguity in the power of the other to shape the self. Thus the other might contribute to the self but, like Ricoeur, Haker places this activity under the sign of responsibility. Narratives become ‘reminders of the specific responsibility to remember historical violence and injustice’.

The contribution of the other as another self is a conscious moral activity. Rather than removing the subjectivity of the self, the other thus calls the self to consider how to morally narrate for the future other. This clarifies that Haker does not go so far as to make power relations the exhaustive expression of the activity between persons; this is a stance which draws her closer to Ricoeur. The self is non-sovereign, but has its autonomy within its vulnerability; it stands between agency and non-agency. Thus in its fragility the self is called to responsible self-narration in the face of the other. This is underlined by Haker’s earlier explanation of passivity and activity as ambiguous. She turns to fictional narrative to provide tools for expressing this complexity. ‘This tension and ambiguity of moral agency is articulated in literary works, it can only be addressed in the self-reflectivity of the moral self’.

313 Ibid., p. 379.
314 Ibid., p. 377.
The ultimate passivity that the activity of the self must contend with is the ultimate "given": death. This is an insight Haker takes from Emmanuel Levinas: "The death of the other who dies affects me in my very identity as a responsible 'me' [moi]; it affects me in my non substantial identity, which is not the simple coherence of various acts of identification, but is made up of an ineffable responsibility". Haker’s proposal that the answer to the tension between self and other is in facing his shared limit: the self is called to ‘care for the death of the other’. Asymmetry with the other is always relevant, it is the limit of the relationship, but may be confronted: ‘the promise to care is a “protest,” a resistance against death, so is mourning itself also a resistance to giving in to mortality, finitude, and death’. Haker is not discussing some general “rage against the dying of the light”, but rather is identifying “the distinction between the unavoidable death of the other and the avoidable, violent death of the other [becoming] pivotal for and in ethical judgment". I recall again my point above regarding the originary experience of indignation; responsibility of care is then learned. The historical examples of such violence is given through the narratives told. This shifts the role of narrative from providing a personal teleology to a tool for handling the concrete difficulties of sovereignty between persons. Ethical narrative is thus neither spontaneous nor neutral. Haker considers this most clearly shown in memory narratives, which are testimonies. Such narratives are ‘first of all, the normative claim not to forget. Such a claim can only be situated historically’. Haker continues to emphasise the genuine moral demand to answer the problems facing the self and the other in the concrete, in the light of the historical real. Maria Villela-Petit agrees,

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317 Ricoeur’s own solution requires the introduction of theological categories, a continuing ‘gift’ that must constantly attempt to bridge the asymmetry. This is shown below.

318 Ibid., p. 375.

319 Ibid., p. 376.

320 Ibid.
in other words, narratives encode, and so preserve, the memory of what deserves to be remembered or, on the contrary, of what was so awful and ignominious in the lives of human beings that forgetfulness would be like a second death for the victims.

Haker’s insight here is of narrative as a space of tension regarding the precise nature of the relationship between the self and other. She criticises the simplistic use of a narrative in constructing an assumedly sovereign self, and instead highlights the resources of narrative to be used in more complex moral ways to allow the self to articulate injustice against the other, and recognising injustice against itself and thus protect its moral autonomy by beginning to more fully grasp her own agency. This also represents a moral demand on the other for the protection of the self. Asymmetry is in the vulnerability of the self and will not be overcome, but has a defence in Haker’s solution.

I will now discuss how Haker’s approach impacts on Ricoeur’s, as Haker herself describes it. Her use of Foucault and Butler’s post-structuralist effacing of sovereignty provides a route to clarifying Ricoeur’s conception of the self and the other with respect to the tension between passivity and activity. Haker notes that ‘Ricoeur’s ethical self is, therefore, not identical with the subject of care for the self in the Foucauldian sense, although the two share a close relation to aesthetic existence’. Ricoeur’s self, as will be expressed more fully below, is immediately assertive of its own capacities, drawn teleologically toward a relationship with others. Morality enters this directed construction of relationships in order to ‘overcome factual asymmetry, which is the signature of power relations, in favor of normative symmetry’. Ultimately, Haker argues that:

‘the question remains whether he does justice to the radical nature of the actual non-sovereignty of the self in his concept of ethical and moral identity, and whether he does not ignore the necessity of going beyond teleology and the concept of the unified self in search of a reference point for identity’.

Haker remains concerned with presenting the ambiguities of the self and with recognising its real fragility as necessary for pursuing moral agency.

321 M. VILLELA-PETIT, ‘Narrative Identity and Ipseity by Paul Ricoeur from Ricoeur’s Time and Narrative to Oneself as Another’.


323 Ibid.

324 Ibid.
I agree with Haker that it is important to emphasize the fragility of the self. I particularly value Haker’s turn to consider the responsibility of the self implied by the vulnerability of personal identity. Moreover, the tensions between self and other should be articulated, and that this can be done narratively without conceiving of narrative as a totalising tool.

**Conclusion**

To conclude this chapter, I find, consolidated in Haker’s analysis, the key points with which I want to conclude my reconstruction of Ricoeur’s philosophical anthropology and concept of the self. I will therefore draw in these points as I summarise what has been established at each stage of this chapter.

I began with *Time and Narrative* where Ricoeur introduced narrative as a mimetic tool, following the work of Aristotle. As mimesis, narrative was able to bring coherence to the discordant experience of time with which Augustine battled. This discordance was the difficulty in considering memory, present experience and future expectation at once, and in the light of the life outside time in God’s infinity (1.1.1.). Narrative mediates events in time (1.1.2).

There are two kinds of narrative, fictional and historical narrative. Ricoeur used some structuralist ideas in order to express the relationship between the narrative and historical events. Narrative is a mimetic, mediatory activity, inchoate in the temporality of history. I related “Augustine’s *distentio* and Aristotle’s *emplotment* by emphasising the prefiguration of narrative in action and the refiguring capacity of those who read, or hear it, able to represent those events in new ways (1.1.3.). In this way, narrative expresses multiple readings simultaneously. Narrative requires interpretation.

It is the link to time that returns Ricoeur to the personal narrative, prefigured in Augustine’s *Confessions*. Turning to consider the problematic of identity within philosophical anthropology, in *Oneself as Another*, Ricoeur argued for two ways of understanding identity in time (1.2.1.). The self is both the sameness/ *idem* of character, and the selfhood/ *ipse* of initiative in promising. The self can use narrative to mediate this
dialectic to form a narrative identity (1.2.2.). In this way the self is a self-interpreting subject.

However, Ricoeur argues that the self is always already surrounded by others and their narratives. It is in entanglement with these other stories that means the other is an active precondition of the narrating self (1.2.3.). The reflexive self identifies itself through narrative, but not in a Cartesian sense of undisputed, confident self-ownership. Rather the self, presenting itself, is invited and answered in a number of ways by the other “who summons, as audience, and judge’ (1.3.1). It is others who invite and provide the narratives already extant with which the self engages in order to tell her story. It is others who respond to that narrative, confirming the capacities of the self, and her esteem in her own capacities. Yet, one of those capacities in the imputation of action, and thus the self structurally begins her relationship with the other with responsibility, from her own moral initiative. This is emphasised through Ricoeur’s aspects of the self - *idem* and *ipse*. The latter gives continuity of identity through promising. Fidelity to this continuity in time is performed in the face of the other.

Ultimately, the other and the self are co-constitutive of each other in this way because it is in this exchange that the other is recognised by the self as another self (1.3.2.). This charges Ricoeur’s whole project as an ethical endeavour. Before being able to turn to the ethical theory which Ricoeur would build on this entanglement of self and other in Chapter Two, I needed to consider an alternative concept of the self. This concept was a post-Structuralist self that could be shaped by the other to the extent that the self lost the capacity for self-determination, or in the vocabulary of this tradition her sovereignty (1.4.1.). On this point *Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and The Involuntary* prefigures the self-esteem to which Ricoeur’s ethics constantly returned in *Oneself as Another* and became so crucial for the question of autonomy. From Ricoeur’s early work, the question of the self’s autonomy within unchosen factors, givenness, finitude and alienation was under consideration (1.4.2.). However, this is not the same as the post-Structuralist loss of sovereignty but is Ricoeur’s understanding of the self as a fragile attestation. To be sure however, this remains subject to concrete difficulties.
Haker argued that a moral understanding of narrative could solve imbalances between self and other on a concrete level by emphasising care for the other (1.4.3.). Narrative remains a praxis, ongoing, constantly corrected. It is the active, moral self that engages with this process\(^{325}\). This is already being revealed in Ricoeur’s solution to the phenomenological question of same/self in time. There is consistency of character to be found in sameness, but there is also continuity of self found in self-constancy, in promise-keeping. Here the self consistently returns to the self it has promised to be and this necessarily includes its moral identity in the light of asymmetry between self and other. I argue that this asymmetry is in the sense that, ultimately, the epistemological and moral core is in the self, not the other.

To summarise the endpoint of this chapter, that self, autonomous and vulnerable, is called to a moral responsibility and in this sense Haker and Ricoeur agree. This opens the moral dimension of the encounter between self and other, summoning everyone to the protection of the person. The role of the other reveals the moral capacities of the self, even while the self reveals those capacities in the other. The autonomous, vulnerable self is thus striving for her own existence and aware of the moral responsibilities that this includes. To these ethical and moral considerations I now turn in Chapter Two.

\(^{325}\) Ricoeur does note the need to handle those power relations that appear after the originary autonomy of the self, in contrast to naturalistic approaches. Ricoeur uses the system set out in Hobbes’s *Leviathan* as an example of this, dealt with in Chapter Two.
In this chapter I turn from Ricoeur’s philosophical anthropology to a detailed reconstruction of his ethical theory. This theory remains anchored in the self’s relationship to others, both personally and in relation to the institutions which mediate the encounters and provide structures and historically shaped social frameworks. My purpose in developing Ricoeur’s ethics is to establish the multiple aspects of which Ricoeur conceives of how the self is oriented and should act toward the other. The first text to be treated is in his explicit ethical theory, named his ‘little ethics’, making up studies seven through nine in *Oneself as Another*. The second is in *The Course of Recognition*, his text outlining the ‘rule-governed polysemy’ of the term recognition as a way of exploring the self-other relationship. Ricoeur develops this into an ethics of recognition, in my view, building on the same inter-dependency of self and other begun in Ricoeur’s philosophical anthropology and consolidated in his ‘little ethics’. In the third section of this chapter I intend to begin to explore some of the issues related to the encounter with the other across cultures. Ricoeur touches on aspects of this issue, most notably in his work on translation, but there are important implications in his ethical theory as it reflects his philosophical anthropology. I will briefly outline now what I intend to establish in each of these sections.

Firstly, given the inter-dependence of self and other clarified in chapter one, Ricoeur proposes an approach to ethics that he argues intuitively responds to the originary reflexive structure of self-esteem. The self esteems herself in her own agency. Viewing the other as another self, as reconstructed in chapter one, thus already requires an esteem of the other that operates ethically as solicitude. This suggestion of a self that is always already in a relationship of solicitude to the other is the crucial basis for Ricoeur’s ethics and makes

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³ Ibid., p. 2.
clear how his ethical theory builds on from his conception of the self. The final move of ethics is to consider the other who the self does not immediately confront, the "anonymous other". This is made manifest by Ricoeur in his consideration of the institution as a third party to self-other relationships which go beyond the known other and the community. Thus Ricoeur’s ethics are drawn by a expressed as ‘aiming at the “good life” with and for others, in just institutions’. This draws solicitude into the wish to fulfill a sense of justice. Ricoeur always seeks to establish his theory through dialogue and so turns from Aristotle’s teleology to Kant’s deontology; he shows how the two approaches can be systematically combined and can be interpreted as bridgeable even on their own terms: virtue and good will. In this way Ricoeur opens his ethics into the moral test. The practical creativity phronesis responds to the corresponding tensions. These steps are what I will spend the first section of this chapter reconstructing.

Secondly, I want to continue to emphasise the roots of this tripartite ethical theory in the conception of the self. Ricoeur’s final monograph *The Course of Recognition* adds an important examination of the significance of the vocabulary under which the self and the other encounter each other. It is foreshadowed by one of Ricoeur’s final remarks in *Oneself as Another*, where he names recognition as ‘a structure of the self reflecting on the movement that carries self esteem toward solicitude and solicitude toward justice’. The second section of this chapter will therefore concentrate on Ricoeur’s examination of the concept of recognition and how it can contribute to the understanding of the self in the realm of ethics. In particular Ricoeur’s detour through Axel Honneth’s reclamation of Hegel’s concept of recognition, *Anerkennung*, will allow me to consider how recognition of the other is significant for ongoing social discourses.

Thirdly and finally, I will then draw the discussion of this chapter to a particular example of social discourse that is a current and ongoing question: that of intercultural

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4 P. Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, p. 172.

5 Ibid., p. 296.


communication. It is my view the contribution of Ricoeur on intercultural hermeneutics cannot be overstated. Among contemporary theorists Ricoeur constructs a unique combination of anthropology (1.3) and hermeneutics of classical texts of cultural encounters that shaped European self-understanding (4.1). Of particular significance is the way Ricoeur reviews other modern authors in an effort to respond to the insights of various domains, and contribute to social and political ethics. It is true that Ricoeur never approached the question of intercultural communication with an extensive systematic view, but his work on hermeneutics, on the ethics of self, other and institution demands that the question of doing justice to the other of another culture be considered significant. In the final section therefore I will explore the contribution of Ricoeur’s work to intercultural hermeneutics as a presupposition of ethics. Finally I will outline the work of my subsequent chapters on how Ricoeur contributes to intercultural hermeneutics himself and identifying some resources that may support this project.

2.1. ETHICS, MORALS AND PRACTICAL WISDOM

I introduced Ricoeur’s ethical theory above as unfolding the ethical aim of the good life in three dimensions - the self, the other and the institution which also addresses the needs of the anonymous other. However, it is significant that even this aim has already led me to mention the significance of the moral norm and the role of *phronesis* in solving ongoing tensions between teleology and deontology. This is the tripartite structure which Ricoeur gives to his ethical theory. The most significant characteristic of Ricoeur’s ethical theory is his attempt to marry traditionally distinct approaches to ethical questions - Aristotle’s virtue oriented life, and Kant’s emphasis on moral obligation, and to a lesser extent Hegel’s ethos-oriented *Sittlichkeit*. Ricoeur constructs a constant movement between an understanding of the goal of the good life coupled with a recognition of the importance of testing that aim in terms of the moral norm. This allows Ricoeur to render the responsibility implied in his ethical aim in terms of a universalising test. Practical wisdom is then required for resolving the clash of principle, and respect for persons in their singularity, that can emerge from and result in differing responsibilities and conflicts of

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duties. I therefore turn to reconstruct the ethical aim, the moral norm, and the practical wisdom of Ricoeur’s ethical theory.

The ethical aim of living well

My title here is the ethical aim into which Ricoeur transforms his anthropology of striving for existence in *Oneself as Another*. He suggests the trajectory of the person as spontaneously ‘aiming to live the good life, with and for others, in just institutions’⁹. In so positing, Ricoeur is reflecting the teleological charge given to the agency of the self in light of the mediation by the other, and argues that ‘this triad will now assist us in reconstructing a richer idea of the person’¹⁰, and it is on this basis that I will examine it. The concept of the good life has already been discussed under the heading in Chapter One ‘The other as the one who summons and responds’ (1.3). My reconstruction in this section explored the idea that the good life, how to live well, is already culturally prefigured in how the self seeks to narrate herself. In a later article Ricoeur exhaustively listed the resources in question; it is with the other that we learn to value ‘heroes, emblematic characters, models, and teachers and also precepts, norms whose field extends from traditional customs to utopian paradigms, which emanating from the social imaginary, re-model our private imaginations’¹¹. Ricoeur’s previous work on the mimetic nature of interpretation remains significant: it is undertaken through the mimetic formations of prefiguration, configuration and refiguration. This is an indication of the sociality of the ethical discourse altogether. When it comes to ethical practice the shared nature of a cultural background remains significant. Ricoeur points to MacIntyre’s insight on this point:

‘practices, we observe following MacIntyre, are cooperative activities whose constitutive rules are developed socially... This cooperative and traditional character of practices does not exclude controversy... [which] would not occur if the practitioners did not share a common culture that contained a rather lasting agreement on the criteria defining levels of success and degrees of excellence’¹².

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⁹ P. RICOEUR, *Oneself as Another*, p. 172.


¹² P. RICOEUR, *Oneself as Another*, p. 176.
It is by these social resources that the content of the good life is worked out. However, Ricoeur acknowledges the significance of 'heterogenous traditions, which themselves are reinvigorated and driven by their unkept promises'\. This point on the value of pluralist cultures will be where I conclude this chapter, but to explain in terms of the self within Ricoeur's ethical theory, it is the other as another self reemerges in the judgement on how the self acts on her intentions for the good life. This is again a question of the other holding the promise of the self to remain constant to her self-narrative, promising of being imputable. This necessarily includes an ethical significance as I discussed above and thus the consistency of the self's originary wish of living well is already an attestation in the sight of the other. Self-attestation tells the other that the self may be counted on. In this analysis the presence of the other as another self thus again returns Ricoeur to the responsibility that is necessarily part of that aim of the good life.

Ricoeur himself has already explicitly added that 'living well', must necessarily include 'with and for others, in just institutions'. Here, 'with and for others' follows from the above explanation of reciprocal esteem. 'In just institutions' requires a further step, which distinguishes Ricoeur from the merely inter-subjective construction of ethics, by introducing the role of the anonymous other. I will examine both of these in turn.

'With and for others' is the second component of Ricoeur's ethical aim and one which he 'designates by the beautiful name of solicitude'. To reconstruct this I turn again to Anderson, who has sought to emphasise the inter-dependency of persons. 'To explain solicitude, he refers to the "benevolent spontaneity" that is necessary for self-esteem and unfolds the dialogic dimension of beings who act and suffer'. Ricoeur adds however that 'the reflexivity from which self-esteem proceeds remains abstract, in the sense that it does not mark the difference between me and you'. The dialogic setting of attestation is resolved in, as Ricoeur articulates it, 'the esteem of the other as a oneself and the esteem of

13 P. RICOEUR, 'The Paradox of Authority' pp. 91-105 in Reflections on the Just, p. 105
14 Ibid., p. 180.
16 P. RICOEUR, Oneself as Another, p. 181.
oneself as an other"\textsuperscript{17}. What is required then is an acknowledgement of the particularity of persons, which Ricoeur roots in the ethical intuition of solicitude.

The best model Ricoeur can recommend for making this esteem of the other particular is friendship, rather than based on the capacities that are the conditions of the self. He follows Aristotle in this\textsuperscript{18}. Ricoeur argues that this model allows a shift from a merely reciprocal \textit{quid pro quo} to a mutuality of solicitude. There are commentators who have objected to the androcentric approach by Greek sources. Helen Buss has objected on these grounds, but more significantly sought to include relationships that remain reciprocal\textsuperscript{19}. Ricoeur has responded to this by arguing that using this model he has moved to consider the universal capacities of the human person that ‘surpass both sexual roles’\textsuperscript{20}, rather than continuing the Greek model.

I will return to the point on inclusive language, but will argue that the argument to include reciprocal friendships misses the point of Ricoeur’s turn to solicitude. Ricoeur’s purpose here is therefore to introduce the ‘non-substitutability’\textsuperscript{21} of the person as the basis for solicitude. The other in this model is a particular other. Reciprocal relationships of utility and pleasure do not present this crucial quality. If the purpose of a friendship is what the friendship produces for each person, then the specific individuals involved can be interchangeable provided the product is still received. Ricoeur underlines this when he refers to Michel de Montaigne’s essay \textit{On Friendship} to emphasise the need to recognise particularity. In this essay Montaigne (1533-1592) speaks of his own personal friendship with Étienne de la Boëtie who was also a political philosopher. In this essay, Montaigne declares that the depth of their friendship was rooted in the simple fact ‘Because it was

\textsuperscript{17} P. Ricoeur, \textit{Oneself as Another}, p. 194.


\textsuperscript{19} H. M. Buss, ‘Antigone, Psyche and the Ethics of Female Selfhood – A Feminist Conversation with Paul Ricoeur’s Theories of Self-Making in Oneself as Another’ pp. 64-79 in \textsc{Wall et al.} (eds.) \textit{Paul Ricoeur and Contemporary Moral Thought}, p. 74. Buss’s concern for the feminine self I have already argued is misplaced (1.4).


\textsuperscript{21} P. Ricoeur, \textit{Oneself as Another}, p. 193.
him. Because it was me'\textsuperscript{22}. Developing the same point in \textit{Oneself as Another}, Ricoeur is employing the Greek model of friendship which places reciprocal relationships outside the bounds of the best kind of friendship. Particular mutual esteem 'has its own requirements... According to the idea of mutuality, each loves the other \textit{as being the man he is}'\textsuperscript{23}. There is nothing utilitarian to be found in this model. Moreover, employing Aristotle's vocabulary Ricoeur is able to argue that 'this "as being" (as being what the other is) averts any subsequent egoistic learning: it is constitutive of mutuality\textsuperscript{24}.

Thus the dialogic inter-dependency that is shown in Ricoeur's earlier configuration of the capacities of both self and other is now found on the ethical plane. In fact, this shows the theory of personhood to be not merely a description that should subsequently be treated ethically, but a structure which itself introduces the ethical call embedded in the conditions of being a self. In this way Anderson is right to emphasise the other may act and suffer. Mutuality is a choice, taken at the risk of equal friendship being refused, and refusing the 'non-substitutability' of the other. Ricoeur argues that

'despite this certain danger, my thesis is that solicitude is not something added on to self-esteem from outside but that it unfolds the dialogic dimension of self-esteem... such that self-esteem and solicitude cannot be experienced or reflected on one without the other'\textsuperscript{25}.

The self is called by her own self-esteem to be solicitous of the other. So, reciprocally one can reverse roles, being a speaker or a listener in turn, the ethical response requires the recognition of the particular other as herself and non-substitutable: 'I do not eliminate the distinction between here and there, even when I place myself in the place of the other in imagination and in sympathy'\textsuperscript{26}. This is the product of spontaneous solicitude. It is solicitude that 'adds the dimension of value, whereby each person is \textit{irreplaceable} in our affection and our esteem'\textsuperscript{27}.


\textsuperscript{23} P. \textsc{Ricoeur}, \textit{Oneself as Another}, p. 183, quoting \textsc{Aristotle}, \textit{Nichomachean Ethics}, 8.3.1156a18-19.

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., p. 183.

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., p. 180.

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., p. 193.

\textsuperscript{27} Ibid.
I end here by emphasising the spontaneous character of solicitude in the self. Within the context of Ricoeur’s project, rejecting the possibility of that mutuality by ignoring the personhood of the other, is a refusal of the ethical trajectory. That ethical aim is part of the constitution of the self, but is spontaneously chosen each time.

However, not all relationships with the other are personal friendships, and when this is the case, solicitude is replaced by an equally originary sense of justice. It is here that Ricoeur involves the concept of ‘in just institutions’. David Rasmussen, as I noted above more usually encountered as a commentator on liberalism, has emphasised the success of Ricoeur’s concept of the self in retrieving a valuable understanding of subjectivity. He is interested in highlighting how that particularity which marks the relationship between self and other under solicitude brings one to an understanding of justice in social institutions.

The third person, he suggests, is ‘both a linguistic and an institutional claim’\(^{28}\). I used David Pellauer in Chapter One (1.4) to refer to the demands of ‘modern action theory’. He insisted on the genuine selfhood of the other because any attempt to ascribe action to oneself required the possibility of another self to whom it could also be ascribed. This linguistic second person is expanded on by Rasmussen here to also demand the third person. Crucially, however, Ricoeur does not name that third as another particular self but opens out the context of action to include the personhood of the anonymous other. Ricoeur argues that

‘the fact that the aim of living well in a way encompasses the sense of justice is implied in the very notion of the other. The other is also other than the “you”. Correlatively, justice extends further than face to face encounters’\(^{29}\).

This extension includes encounters with structures, acquired practices, historical patterns of systems of education, and various specialist disciplines such as economics and law\(^{30}\). What the institution comprises then is the entry of the third person into the dyadic relationship between self and other. It is here that justice includes relationships not

\(^{28}\) D. RASMUSSEN, ‘Justice and Interpretation’ pp. 531-8, in A. WIERCINSKI (ed.) *Between Suspicion and Sympathy*, p. 536.

\(^{29}\) P. RICOEUR, *Oneself as Another*, p. 194.

\(^{30}\) I will return to this point regarding different domains in my reconstruction of *The Course of Recognition*, when Ricoeur returns to it.
‘contained in solicitude’\textsuperscript{31}. Thus, each individual is recognised as another self because ‘the you becomes the everyone’\textsuperscript{32}. Rasmussen has argued that ‘it is in this concrete hermeneutic way that the question of universality is presented, because the subject of rights is “everyone”’\textsuperscript{33}. This point from political philosophy shows how the institution mediates the encounter with the anonymous other, in this case rights as a protection of selves at a universal scope. The significance of the anonymous other is established here, but as Rasmussen is emphasising, this is not merely an insight from linguistics but a point about the structures by which that anonymous other is present in society. Ricoeur names this structure the just institution.

That institution also provides the context for the obligation to the other, whether it is a personal encounter or the obligation to create just institutions for current and future others. So while any moral decision ‘always involves more than one person’\textsuperscript{34}, the institution provides something additional to the interpersonal. This ‘third party’\textsuperscript{35} allows Ricoeur to construct an ethics of plurality, rooted in equality. ‘Equality...is to life in institutions, what solicitude is to interpersonal relations’\textsuperscript{36}. The “institution”, reflecting this, indicates ‘the structure of living together as this belongs to an historical community’\textsuperscript{37}. Those institutions render themselves as culturally shaped life forms and so ‘have the basic function of providing a temporal framework for human action’\textsuperscript{38}. This includes how persons distinguish each other, all as equals, but still in continuing non-substitutability, taking account ‘of genuine otherness at the root of the plurality of persons’. It is this quality of non-substitutability which Ricoeur argues means that ‘the sense of justice takes nothing away from solicitude; the sense of justice presupposes it, to the extent that it holds persons to be irreplaceable’\textsuperscript{39}. Yet it is in the institution that equality is simultaneously

\textsuperscript{31} P. RICOEUR, \textit{Oneself as Another}, p. 194.

\textsuperscript{32} D. RASMUSSEN, ‘Justice and Interpretation’ p. 536.

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., p. 538.


\textsuperscript{35} P. RICOEUR, \textit{Oneself as Another}, p. 195.

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., p. 202.

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., p. 194.


articulated for all persons, regardless of personal relationships. Thus plurality leads Ricoeur to the intuitive sense that all (non-substitutable) persons are to be considered as equal to the self and so protected. Thus Ricoeur adds unity to plurality. This is rooted in the sense of justice, that is again identified as spontaneous by Ricoeur, and is coupled with what he, with Hannah Arendt, describes as the desire to live together, or the social bond.

The desire to live together is a condition for the ethical aim as Ricoeur structures it ‘living well, with and for others, in just institutions’, and is most significant for just institutions. Ricoeur argues that the fact of political domination may hide this originary character of the human condition. However, rather than destroying the original ethical aim to live well together, domination instead covers it over. ‘Is it because peoples, enslaved for millennia to a principle of domination transcending their will to live together, do not know that they are sovereign, not by reason of any imaginary contract, but by virtue of the will to live together that they have forgotten’. The desire to live together is so foundational that I will point to where it returns throughout Ricoeur’s “little ethics” as a basis for the discussion of the moral norm, and the practice of *phronesis*. It is often covered over by political discourse, and ‘this is why it is perhaps reasonable to give to this common initiative, this desire to live together the status of something forgotten’. Following Hannah Arendt Ricoeur distinguishes power from domination, which ‘exists only to the extent that - and only so long as - the desire to live and act together subsists in a historical community’. Thus, the ethical aim implying life together ‘in just institutions’ is the basis on which Ricoeur judges political structures and social philosophical proposals.

A useful point to emphasise here for my overall project of intercultural hermeneutics is that Ricoeur continues to underline the genuine plurality of the ethical aim he is describing. It is ‘the idea of plurality [that] suggests the extension of inter-human relations to all those who are left outside of the face-to-face encounter of an “I” and a “you” and remain third

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40 Here I am using Kantian terms, which Ricoeur primarily employs in ‘The Self and the Moral Norm’, particularly citing Kant’s *Critique of Practical Reason*. e.g. see P. RICOEUR, *Oneself as Another*, pp. 222-225.

41 Ibid., p. 239.


44 P. RICOEUR, *Oneself as Another*, p. 256.
parties. Plurality is 'the condition' and the ethical response, driven by the originary desire to live together, is that of 'action in concert'. In this way does Ricoeur spell out his ethical aim with regard to just institutions in a participative democracy.

It is also here that Ricoeur is able to pivot from ethical theory of action into concrete action. 'Including the third party... must be spread out over a span of time. It is from the institution, precisely, that power receives this temporal dimension.' It is in the temporal nature of action that seeks always to include the other more justly that the deontological test of the moral norm will open. Before I turn to this I will briefly return to Ricoeur's concept of the self in terms of what he has achieved with his 'ethical aim of the good life'.

I argue that Ricoeur has not only structured a way of conceiving ethics, but has succeeded in further developing his philosophical anthropology. The self here esteems itself such that it will pursue the good life, solicitous in its recognition of others as the same as herself and particular in themselves, and carries a sense of justice such that even the anonymous other is recognized as an equal reflexive self. The ethical aim of the good life in its triadic structure is structured by the appropriate attitudes to the persons involved – the self, the other, and the anonymous other, with self-esteem, solicitude, and the sense of justice. Throughout the ethical aim is anchored in self-esteem, established in the attestation by the self that is at the heart of recognising one's own responsibility to the other. Here I can employ Haker's insight that 'personal identity is practical identity, in the sense of a self-originated "striving for the good life, with others, in just institutions"'.

For ethics then a threat at any level is a threat to all levels. 'In this sense, self-esteem assumes its complete sense only at the end of the itinerary of meaning traced out by the three components of the ethical aim.'

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45 P. Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, p. 195.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
49 P. Ricoeur, 'Narrative Identity', p. 172.
It is here, after establishing the basic benevolence and expectation of persons that the need to pass to the moral, deontological level arises. The ethical aim will have particular moral limits, a moral principle that prevents instrumentalisation as the ‘first moral structuring of interaction’\textsuperscript{50}, tested in the tripartite relationship of self, other and institution.

**The deontological test of the moral norm**

What has remained a consistent stance through my outline of Ricoeur’s structure of personhood, and the establishment of the ethical aim is that the instrumentalisation of the person is to be prevented. My consideration of the ethical aim closed above on the need to include the other, as another self, in order to pursue the ‘fullest aim of the true life’\textsuperscript{51}. For Ricoeur however asymmetry between self and other can give rise to an imbalance that favours the priority of the self. Therefore, the call to responsibility, manifests most immediately for Ricoeur in the duty to protect the other. Anderson has analysed his stance in this way: ‘While autonomy in its strong, moral sense implies responsible judgement, Ricoeur stresses that this also necessarily involves autonomy in the spheres of reciprocity and of justice, rendering its political sense’\textsuperscript{52}. I will now explore the presentation of this moral obligation in Ricoeur’s theory, with a particular emphasis on its role as a test. This will include Ricoeur’s use of Kant’s moral imperative and the Golden Rule and the connection he draws between those and the ethical aim.

Ricoeur’s focus moves from the teleological good life to moral principle because the danger of instrumentalising human persons is not just a hypothetical scenario: ‘Why move from teleology to deontology?... I suggest a basic and massive answer: there is morality, in the sense of moral obligation, because there is violence’\textsuperscript{53}. It is precisely because offences against the person are committed that rules are required to ensure protection against such offences. As I will be emphasising throughout this section, the moral activity of the self


\textsuperscript{51} P. RICOEUR, *Oneself as Another*, p. 195.


\textsuperscript{53} P. RICOEUR, ‘The Teleological and Deontological Structures of Action’, p. 106.
retains the quality of spontaneity introduced on the ethical plane: Ricoeur acknowledges that the impetus for protecting the person is in our already moral reaction to violence. In such cases the self responds with indignation. Such ‘feelings have to do with dignity, a kind of immediate recognition of the dignity of a moral subject’54. It is here that Ricoeur turns from Aristotle to Kant, employing the latter’s moral principle that using a person as a means is an indignity, and that therefore persons are to be considered as ends in themselves. This will remain Ricoeur’s central moral guideline, alongside his discussion of the Golden Rule.

In Ricoeur’s view this imperative for Kant was actually a ‘sudden introduction’55. This is primarily because Kant did not prioritise, as Ricoeur has done, a foundation in the plurality of persons. Ricoeur argues that Kant worked instead from the idea of a united humanity, where each is autonomous in action. ‘Everything in Kant’s argumentation aims at giving priority to the continuity, assured by the idea of humanity, with the principle of autonomy, at the expense of the unavowed discontinuity that marks the sudden introduction of the idea of an end in itself and of persons as ends in themselves’56. I point to this not to engage in an analysis of Kant, but rather to clarify the role that Ricoeur insists that his ethical aim, rooted in his philosophical anthropology, must continue to take. It is still in the triadic ethical structure of the good life that the principle of morality is formed. John Wall is similarly concerned with approaching the concept of the person as an end in itself to be a question of the concept of the self. He describes it as ‘a transition from how selves as such are perceived’57; Using Ricoeur’s terms the move is from esteem to respect, ‘for each self as possessing its own narrative otherness’58. I will now examine that turn and the moral principle Ricoeur subsequently tests in his framework of personal identity in the good life, living well, with and for others, in just institutions.

55 P. RICOEUR, Oneself as Another, p. 222.
56 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
Ricoeur describes the discourse that forms practical paradigmatic rules of behaviour as the 'sieve of the norm'\(^{59}\). The "categorical" rejection of indignity in behaviour to the human person must be formed into 'secondary formulations'. In this way Ricoeur interprets the different formulations of the Categorical Imperative as relating to: "the self", the second formulation "the other", and the third formulation, "political commitment"\(^{60}\). Thus self-esteem and wish for the good life become paralleled by 'obligation', solicitude is paralleled with the norm, and the 'sense of justice' with 'the principle of justice'\(^{61}\). Fred Dallmayr, a political philosopher often writing on the opportunities of dialogues between politics and philosophy, has commented that 'like solicitude, justice occupies a kind of midpoint: namely between interpersonal care and the externality of legal constraints'\(^{62}\). Rather than an affective reason for protecting the other, solicitude and the sense of justice are rendered by identifying moral obligations. Focusing on Arendt's concept of the wish to "live together" in solicitude and justice, it remains present as the driving ethical aim. Ricoeur's primary interest in considering the test of the moral norm - a question of justice - is with the good rather than with the legal. It is worth noting Ricoeur's acknowledgement of the multiple meanings of justice:

"The just, it seems to me, faces in two directions: toward the good, with respect to which it marks the extension of interpersonal relationships to institutions; and toward the legal, the judicial system conferring upon the law coherence and the right of constraint"\(^{63}\).

Ricoeur's parallels these three intuitions of self-esteem, solicitude, and the sense of justice, with principles. I argued above (1.4) that Ricoeur had identified the condition and task of these intuitions on the moral level to be that of autonomy. Following Haker and Anderson I established Ricoeur's position on autonomy as linked to vulnerability: an owning of one's moral agency within one's own fragility - and in corollary, as Haker showed us, a recognition of the fragility of others.

\(^{59}\) P. Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, p. 170.

\(^{60}\) P. Ricoeur, 'Ethics and Human Capability', p. 287.

\(^{61}\) P. Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, p. 227.


\(^{63}\) P. Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, p. 197, emphasis Ricoeur's.
I now emphasise the task of autonomy for Ricoeur: ‘autonomy governs the three spheres; the idea of the person as end in himself is held to be the dialogic expression of autonomy, and the contract is its equivalent on the plane of institutions’\textsuperscript{64}. Thus, having autonomy as a task includes the protection and enabling of the autonomy of others. This requires that the moral action not limit the actions of others - a ‘minimal ethic’\textsuperscript{65}. More positively, the other is respected as an end in herself. In this way Ricoeur returns to the Kantian basis of equality of autonomous persons as non-substitutable; their singularity appears when the plurality of persons as ends in themselves is taken seriously. This all coalesces as “respect for the human person” as the universalisable formal moral norm. This norm can redirect any ethical aim that might damage its own foundations of autonomy, the person as end, and the sphere of social institutions. This is ultimately all targeted at protecting the human person, in all three ethical spheres, of the self, the other, and the institution.

Thus, even if benevolence remains the basis, as Ricoeur reads Kant’s idea of the good will, it needs self-critique and testing through the Categorical Imperative. He changes the protection of the person from being the result of benevolence in ethical sphere, to being the result of respect in the moral sphere. As Haker puts it ‘even at the point at which I lose an emotional reason to encounter another person with goodwill, I am morally obliged to respect him or her as a person’\textsuperscript{66}. This necessitates a move away from the solely interpersonal paralleling which the same extension by the sense of justice on the ethical. Again it is the institutional level which mediates the extension to the person as such; Haker suggests that the principle of justice ‘is grounded on a level which transcends the individual’\textsuperscript{67}.

However, it is important that respect remains as an accompaniment to benevolence. The moral norm does not operate in isolation from the ethical aim. Ricoeur emphasises this to show that the rule of respect for the person does not spring from a ‘heterogeneous moral

\textsuperscript{64} P. RICOEUR, \textit{Oneself as Another}, p. 238.


\textsuperscript{66} H. HAKER, ‘Narrative and Moral Identity in the work of Paul Ricoeur’, p. 149.

\textsuperscript{67} Ibid.
principle in relation to the autonomy of the self". It is not an external construction, but as I have argued above, springs from the autonomous, yet vulnerable structure of the person. Therefore "the deontological viewpoint is founded thrice over on a principle that provides its own legitimation: autonomy in the first sphere, the positing of the person as an end in himself in the second, and the social contract in the third". This is a continuing expression of respect for the self as one who may self-attest, in all three different areas of ethical relationships. Indeed, morality's "existence can only be attested to". Such dialogic and social expressions are already shown by the co-constitution of the self and the other (1.3). In the separate publication of one of the final Gifford lectures that followed Ricoeur's "little ethics" Ricoeur emphasised this dialogical call to responsibility: His ethical theory builds on "the self described in a hermeneutics of the "I am", which in its broad outlines is already a self in relation, and, in this way, a self in the position of a respondent."

Indeed, it is the tensions that results from persons 'in relation' to each other that create the need for forming explicit moral obligations. The extreme example of this is of "the presupposition of an initial dissymmetry that places one in the position of agent and the other in that of patient". This is the 'fragility of the moral self' with which Haker was concerned: activity is always faced with undergoing, or suffering. David Pellauer has suggested that this is the tension at the 'heart of selfhood' and that it is emphasised by Ricoeur's rejection of the positing cogito in favour of the 'who' of fragile attestation. Pellauer continues:

'From this will follow a revised notion of what counts as a moral argument. It will be a form of argument that will include a place for an appeal to convictions, that is, to what is expressed through attestation. The result will be a moral philosophy that is itself characterized by the kinds of fragility that constitute selfhood."

68 P. Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, p. 218.
69 Ibid., p. 238.
70 Ibid.
72 P. Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, p. 219.
74 Ibid., p. 106.
It is to this which 'morality replies'\textsuperscript{75} with the 'norm of reciprocity'\textsuperscript{76}. It is for this reason that Ricoeur turns to the Golden Rule, and in particular, Hillel's famous reformulation of it: 'do not do unto others as you would not have done unto you'. Again, Ricoeur returns to Kant's concern for equality: thus the principle of justice is rendered as 'the rule which equalizes agent and patient in the process of interaction'\textsuperscript{77}. The other is best protected by the acknowledgement of the self's attestation of her own capacity to keep promises in the face of fragility, rendering that protection reciprocal.

I have noted that for Ricoeur this dissymmetry is already present in the configuration of the self. Similarly I have emphasised the already dialogical nature of that conception of the self, and this is reflected in the ethical aims which are paralleled by the moral principles Ricoeur forms. In the configuration of the self is also solicitude for the other and on the moral level the prompt to protect the other: Ricoeur argues that solicitude

'as the mutual exchange of self-esteems, is affirmative through and through. This affirmation which can well be termed original, is the hidden soul of the prohibition. It is what, ultimately, arms our indignation, that is our rejection of indignities inflicted on others'\textsuperscript{78}.

This is the affectivity of imputability, where these values are morally felt, accepted and promised to be upheld by the self. The implication of this, for Pellauer, is that 'this suggests that there is an ethical dimension always implicit in and bordering on human action'\textsuperscript{79}. Solicitude 'implies a subject who puts himself or herself under the rule of the norm'\textsuperscript{80}. It is the voluntary choice of the self to make herself subject to the norm. That rule sets a kind of limit on behaviour, a minimum level of respect toward the other that is owed to her as a person; to never use a person as a means. Martha Nussbaum, who has always prioritised the teleological in ethical discourse makes a valid point when she argues that 'the deontological level never attains a complete independence from the level of the

\begin{thebibliography}{100}
\bibitem{75} P. Ricoeur, \textit{Oneself as Another}, p. 221.
\bibitem{76} Ibid., p. 219.
\bibitem{77} P. Ricoeur, \textit{The Teleological and Deontological Structures of Action}, p. 108.
\bibitem{78} P. Ricoeur, \textit{Oneself as Another}, p. 221.
\bibitem{80} P. Ricoeur, 'Ethics and Human Capability', p. 286.
\end{thebibliography}
good". In addition, Ricoeur shows how both Aristotle and Kant can be understood in terms of the opposite approach and reconciled in a staged sequence of steps. The call to be just then is not only a concrete way of ensuring justice through the third party institutions; instead ‘justice enters morality on the same level as the wish for a good life for oneself. It is in the first instance an object of teleological wishing – optative before it is imperative. Thus those rules which have been formed into moral norms and principles of justice, are motivated by solicitude and a sense of justice. For example, Ricoeur points out that ‘the so-called Golden Mean of Aristotle is a kind of preimperative in the teleological ethic’ and the good will in Kant corresponds to striving for living well.

John Wall has emphasised the innovation of an approach to ethical theory that seeks to combine the good and the right. He underlines therefore that for Ricoeur the deontological “right” is best described as ‘not as a law, nor even as a procedure, but principally as a test’ and acts as a corrective of the “good life”. This is why Ricoeur uses the model of Hillel’s reconstruction of the Golden Rule of the Gospels as a negative - do not do unto others as you would not have done unto you.

It is therefore important to consider that Ricoeur’s move from teleology to deontology is not a one-way step. Even Peter Kemp, who also emphasises the teleological, necessarily narrative conception of ethics, has argued that it is ‘Ricoeur’s idea that the imperative of the Golden Rule precedes the narrative being related’. Ricoeur has suggested that one is even guided to certain narratives by ‘the affinity of certain narratives with the Golden Rule that gives them their moral force’. It is this which ‘preserves the non-narrative specificity of the commandment which prohibits violence’.

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82 Ibid.
84 J. Wall, ‘Beyond the Good and the Right’, p. 54.
85 T. P. Kemp ‘Toward a Narrative Ethics: a bridge between ethics and the narrative reflection of Paul Ricoeur’, p. 66.
The ethical and the moral must therefore inform each other. Ricoeur constructs their relationship in this way: '(1) the primacy of ethics over morality, (2) the necessity for the ethical aim to pass through the sieve of the norm, and (3) the legitimacy of recourse by the norm to the aim whenever the norm leads to impasses in practice'. Here he expands on ‘the sieve of the norm’. Beyond individual conscience, it can be specified in the concrete discourses of a society, marked as the interaction of self, other and institutions.

It is Pellauer who has explicitly emphasised the diversity of this ‘sieve’ - it involves political discourse, but also the contributions of religious discourse, historians, various civic groups. Practical morality, he argues, is dialogical. This is certainly evident from the great variety of subjects with which Ricoeur dealt during the period after *Oneself as Another*. He wrote extensively on practical ethico-juridical concerns, as I already noted (1.4 - ‘Autonomy and Vulnerability’), in particular contributing to discussions of capabilities and rights. However he also wrote on issues of biblical hermeneutics - a source of morality (c.f. 4.1. - ‘Testimony as polysemic speaking of God’); historiography and its contribution to ethics and justice (c.f. 4.2 - ‘Historical refiguration as an exploration of the otherness of history’); political questions of utopia, tolerance and interculturality (which I mention below, 2.1, 2.3.), and in this list I only touch on some of the very broad themes. All this goes to underline the plurality of the discourses that contribute to discussions about moral norms relevant for practical and political action.

However, the sieve of the norm ‘should appear as only an intermediary level, the level of testing programs, projects, maxims, as Kant has it’. Even while moral norms and the principle of justice allow persons to navigate the ethical aim in a general sense, their application must be undertaken for specific practical dilemmas. At no point should there be expectations that the ‘sieve of the norm’ is a harmonious process resulting in clear uncompromised consensus. Indeed, how ‘respect for the human person’ is manifested in

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88 P. Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, p. 170.

89 It is here that he sees the significance of Jürgen Habermas’s and Karl-Otto Apel’s ethics of discussion in the public realm. This, like Éric Weil, ‘makes a global opposition between violence and discourse’, P. Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, p. 221. See also pp. 280-2 for Ricoeur’s reconstruction of Habermas and Apel on this point.


action is a continuous process of judgement. For this reason Maureen Junker-Kenny provides the analysis that Ricoeur

‘already interprets Kant’s ethics in favour of such a double orientation of deontology: towards the good will as its basis [living well], and towards fields of application as expressed in the different formulations of the Categorical Imperative that point toward the self, the other, and to political commitment’⁹².

In this way the moral norm already links back to living well and forward to the practical considerations of what a political commitment may mean. I noted above the fragility of political dialogue and Ricoeur therefore begins the third part of his ethical theory by describing how handling moral and ethical conflicts is an operation of practical wisdom: *phronesis*. I now turn to examine this as the culmination of ethics, morals and moral judgement in situation.

**The crucial role of practical wisdom**

I argue that Ricoeur sees practical wisdom as a wholly necessary part of his ethical theory. Indeed in a later article Ricoeur laments that ‘my chapter devoted to practical wisdom still looks like an appendix, and it should become the crucial chapter’⁹³. He views it as the decisive sphere of mediation of the teleological and the deontological aspects that need to be worked out in different spheres. Ricoeur’s work on medical ethics, juridical issues and the ethics of memory provides examples of this. Séverine Deneulin, working primarily in development theory, has argued that *phronesis* ‘is to have the last word in decision making’⁹⁴ because it at this point that the ‘necessary thickening’⁹⁵ of ethics is developed in order to identify the best argument. In fact all three levels of his ethics are necessary. For example, in the same article Ricoeur notes that one could start ‘from the middle as it

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⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 27.
were, with the 'formalization of common moral experience', going backwards to foundational and forwards to applied ethics. Practical wisdom is the part of Ricoeur's ethical theory which responds to the particular needs of ethics in the polity.

However, Deneulin brings me to an important note regarding Ricoeur's use of practical wisdom: that it is 'an ethics of practical wisdom'. He points back to the 'grounding of ethics' in the good life. This places practical wisdom in relation to the ethical trajectory of living well, with and for others, in just institutions. However, practical wisdom is introduced for those conflictual moments where the ethical aim is challenged by the moral norm, shaped in dialogue. What must be retained is the moral norm of universal and particular respect for the other encountered both personally and through the institution. Ricoeur's use of practical wisdom needs to be a delicate mediation between ethics and morals. More specifically, Ricoeur will conclude with a 'subtle dialectic': 'The articulations that we never cease to reinforce between deontology and teleology finds its highest - and most fragile - expression' in judgement in situation. This is because practical wisdom seeks to find a position that acknowledges 'the requirement of universality and the recognition of the contextual limitations affecting it'.

What I will emphasise in this section is the dialectic at which Ricoeur is aiming, but more significantly the necessarily dialogical context it mediates. The question of plurality will prove both a backdrop to the movement between ethics, morals and the crucial tool for the development of moral judgement in situation. I will also employ John Wall's analysis as I outline how phronesis operates. I want to introduce Wall's approach here because Wall constitutes one of the most significant contributions to applications of Ricoeur in contemporary ethics. Wall approaches his own project on Moral Creativity as a contribution to and understanding of the moral capacities of the person. Creativity is central for his understanding of practical ethics - and therefore takes on a significance for

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97 Ibid., p. 285.

98 Ibid., emphasis mine.

99 Ibid.

100 P. RICOEUR, Oneself as Another, p. 287.

101 Ibid., p. 288.
the role of practical wisdom as well. This approach along the lines of creativity will be a useful herald for some of the issues I introduce in the final section of this chapter as I turn to consider the ethics of intercultural discourse.

I will now turn to reconstruct Ricoeur’s use of practical wisdom. Wall begins his analysis by establishing the dual Greek roots of the concept *phronesis*, which is translated as practical wisdom. The first is the philosophical root, Aristotle. This is where Ricoeur will begin when he turns to build his concept of *phronesis*. As Wall emphasises, Aristotle made a clear distinction between the ethically useful *phronesis* and the practically useful *poiēsis*. This distinction

'separates practical wisdom (*phronēsis*) as acting well in society from poetics (*poiēsis*) as making objects (such as chairs and buildings) or imitating actions (as far as poems and stories). Ethics is about internal human goods like courage and justice; poetics is about external goods like crafts and plays'\(^\text{102}\).

Wall argues that Ricoeur also employs the second root of *phronesis*, what he describes as the 'nonphilosophical' tragedy. This Ricoeur uses as a poetic beginning in Sophocles’s *Antigone* in order to 'restore to conflict'\(^\text{103}\) a central and concrete position for establishing moral judgements. This is an interesting analysis, but ultimately Ricoeur’s use of *phronesis* is to emphasise the move away from 'tragic *phronein*’ in *Antigone* to praxis, carrying ‘moral formalism back into the thick of ethics'\(^\text{104}\), as I will now reconstruct.

Ricoeur develops a typology of conflict as the background for practical wisdom. The structural conflict appears when Ricoeur argues that ‘any morality of obligation... produces conflictual situations where practical wisdom has no recourse... other than to return to the initial intuition of ethics’\(^\text{105}\). That is the aim of the good life, living well, with and for others, in just institutions, and is marked by the intuitions of self-esteem, solicitude, and the sense of justice. These were understood by Ricoeur as parallels for the duties recognised on the moral level - therefore Ricoeur’s return to the ethical intuition ‘is not to

\(^{102}\) J. WALL, *Moral Creativity*, p. 5.

\(^{103}\) P. RICOEUR, *Oneself as Another*, p. 241.

\(^{104}\) Ibid., p. 249.

\(^{105}\) Ibid., p. 240.
be taken to mean that the morality of obligation has been disavowed. Rather, one returns to ethics in order to test the particularity that may lead to an obscuring of the universal imperative to respect the other. This tension between particular and universal will continue throughout Ricoeur’s ninth study and his response is in ‘reawakening the resources of singularity inherent in the aim of the true life’. The conflict between ethics and morals is already being heralded as a genuinely productive one.

However, this apparently positive opportunity for further refining moral judgement begins with Ricoeur’s emphasis on what Wall calls the ‘poetic’ Greek root for *phronēsis*. Ricoeur turns again to the symbolic resource of narrative using it as a model for how *phronēsis* unfolds. I noted above that ‘telling a story is deploying an imaginary space for thought experiments in which moral judgement operates in a hypothetical mode’. Dallmayr has complained that *phronēsis* enters Ricoeur’s ethics as a kind of ‘deus ex machina’, easily resolving all the issues, but Ricoeur begins by using Sophocles’s *Antigone* as a kind of warning of ‘the hubris of practical reason itself’. The play deals with the conflict between Antigone and Creon. Antigone provided certain funereal rituals for her dead brother, following family duty, but against the legal command of Creon, the leader of her city. The play deals with the tragic outcome of this conflict. Both Antigone and Creon are implacable in holding to their judgement regarding the right action. These totalising judgements refuse any possibility of argument, ‘totally discordant’.

Ricoeur recalls that Steiner considers the constant return of conflicts to be the ‘agonistic ground of human experience’. In Ricoeur’s terms ‘here we touch upon the enigmatic point of the conversion of plurality into hostility’. This ‘tragic wellspring of action’ shown in *Antigone* indicates ‘something unique about the unavoidable nature of conflict in moral

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106 P. Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, p. 240.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid., p. 170.
111 Ibid., p. 242
113 P. Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, p. 243.
life". However, for Ricoeur the ancient plays, in their mythical and festive foundations, present 'mysterious depths of motivations that no analysis of moral intention can plumb'. This is the nature of the 'nonphilosophical character of tragedy'. The symbolic narrative must remain part of the mythical catharsis. Instead, Ricoeur argues that the chorus's 'appeal to “deliberate well” (euboulia) stubbornly winds through the play, as though “thinking justly” were the answer sought to “suffering this terror [pathein to deinon]”' (I. 96). Yet the play itself provides no answer - Antigone commits suicide and in response Creon also kills himself - and 'confronting disaster, the elders of the chorus will simply oscillate from one side to the other'.

Ricoeur considers the "solution" provided by tragic wisdom not to be the exhortation to think justly, as such. Rather:

'tragedy, after having disoriented the gaze, condemns the person of praxis to reorient action, at his or her own risk, in the sense of a practical wisdom in situation that best responds to tragic wisdom. This response, deferred by the festive contemplation of the spectacle, makes conviction the haven beyond catharsis'.

What Ricoeur proposes in response to the aporia of tragic wisdom - the fiction of the 'intractable, nonnegotiable' conflict - is the key term, conviction. This recalls to the attention of the reader the nature of the ethical ground, rooted in a shared development of self-esteem, solicitude and the sense of justice, made universal principles in the shared test of the norm. Ricoeur is underlining what will become the crucial characteristic of practical wisdom: the conviction which arises in a social context but can also be upheld against it. This is why Ricoeur argues that 'only a recourse to the ethical ground against which morality stands out can give rise to the wisdom of judgement in situation'. It is useful in

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114 P. Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, p. 243.
115 Ibid., p. 242.
116 Ibid.
117 Ibid., pp. 246-7
118 Ibid., p. 246.
119 Ibid., p. 247.
120 Ibid., p. 248.
121 Ibid., p. 249.
those ‘tragic’ situations where, while there are no good solutions, there could be worse solutions.

I will reconstruct the typology of conflict Ricoeur identifies in his three spheres of ethical action - the institution, the question of respect for the other, and the ever returning question of autonomy. Each will conclude with an emphasis on a dialogically structured solution. Yet at the same time, the final exhortation of tragic wisdom should not find the self ‘oscillating’ between sides; instead practical wisdom is found in the dialectic between these convictions and the arguments they prompt. Wall has suggested that the Aristotelian use of phronesis already indicates this mediatory role. Speaking of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Wall identifies two kinds of use: ‘the first definition points to the human capacity to deliberate about the human good as an end in itself... the second definition points instead to the capacity for deliberating well about the means to the good’¹²². What Ricoeur will display is a step beyond this, however, and ultimately will identify multiple ways of considering morality in terms of reaching its practical goal in phronesis.

I will begin, as Ricoeur does in his chapter on practical wisdom, with the institution. Ricoeur’s intention is this:

‘not to add a political philosophy to moral philosophy but to determine the new features of selfhood corresponding to political practice, the conflicts belonging to this practice have served as a backdrop to the conflicts produced by formalism itself on the interpersonal plane between the norm and the most singularizing solicitude’¹²³.

Therefore Ricoeur reverses his usual movement through the ethical aim of the good life to begin with the institution because this immediately brings the discussion on to the level of political practice. It is also worth noting that Ricoeur is intending to reject any attempt to

¹²² J. WALL, *Moral Creativity*, p. 63. Wall also identifies contemporary followers of these two ways of considering phronesis: Joseph Dunne emphasises practical wisdom regarding ends, while communitarian thinkers such as MacIntyre and Hauerwas prioritise means, in the sense of practices or virtues. See pp. 63-67. I would refer to Martha Nussbaum, who I will later use to briefly critique Ricoeur’s use of phronesis. She employs alternative narratives (in this case the Indian epic *Mahabharata*) to underline tragic conflict as an ethical horizon; this gives a further, non-Western example of conflict over ends.

¹²³ P. RICOEUR, *Oneself as Another*, p. 250.
establish a third agency as representative of institutional activity. Again, Ricoeur’s focus is the concept of the self in ethical theory.

He therefore concentrates on conflicts within the institution occurring from the ‘gap between domination and power’. Again, I have already invoked this discussion in response to questions of fragility and autonomy, drawing these political conflicts down to the agencies involved. To briefly reiterate the impact of this distinction on the institution level, the appropriate idea of power employed in order to live together is hidden by domination: ‘power is forgotten as the origin of the political agency and is covered over by the hierarchical structures of domination between the governing and the governed’. Ricoeur considers the institutional context of these conflicts to present the particular political conflicts - ‘the set of organized practices relating to the distribution of political power, better termed domination’. This is where Wall considers the tragic to return to the question of *phronesis*, where the ever present threat of domination demands a ‘deeply tragic sense of attunement to vulnerability and finitude’.

Ricoeur considers vulnerability as a question of distribution manifesting in three kinds of praxis - the discussion of an order of priority ‘among the competing demands of... spheres of justice’, the debate on the ‘ends of “good” government’, the legitimation of that government. These discussions become more and more long term and fundamental to the operation of political praxis in the institution. However, the kinds of response Ricoeur gives to the conflicts consistently emphasises the context of plurality and the necessity of a hermeneutical response. There are multiple spheres of justice that inherently present a discussion regarding their relative participation in political power. Under the question of

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124 Ricoeur is here referring to his analysis of Hegel’s use of *Sittlichkeit* as the concrete morality that trumps the more principled, abstract *Moralität*. For Hegel *Sittlichkeit* is best expressed in the state and applies a third hierarchical prior agency to that state (see Ricoeur’s notes, *Oneself as Another*, pp. 250-256). Ricoeur’s interest remains in ‘the universal self, the plurality of persons, and the institutional *environment*’ (*Oneself as Another*, p. 250, emphasis mine). I do not intend to reconstruct Ricoeur’s argument against Hegel here, but merely direct attention back to the roots of Ricoeur’s ethical theory in his concept of the self.

125 Ibid., p. 257.

126 Ibid., p. 256.

127 Ibid., p. 257.


129 P. RICOEUR, *Oneself as Another*, p. 257.

130 Ibid., p. 258.
the ethical aim of a government even the language employed is subject to a necessarily hermeneutical response: first, the terms involved each 'has an insurmountable plurality of sense; second, the plurality of ends of “good” government is perhaps irreducible". The plurality beneath the final question of governmental legitimacy is not of forms of government but instead the reasons with which those forms are defended: ‘These are the very reasons that are constitutive of wanting to live together' and so are as plural as any ethical discourse.

What is most significant for the purposes of clarifying the role of practical wisdom is the plurality inherent in the response to these questions, in the movement between conviction and argumentation. For example, on the question of spheres of justice Ricoeur considers it a genuine good that

‘in a society that is ever more complex, conflicts will not diminish in number and in seriousness but will multiply and deepen... [because] it is the expression of the fact that the public good cannot be decided in a scientific or dogmatic manner".

Similarly ‘the plurality of ends of “good” government... cannot serve all values at once" but this directs the discussion toward ‘a new example of political judgement in situation, where *euboulia* [deliberating well] has no other support that in the conviction of the constituting parties and, finally, their sense of justice-the virtue of institutions-in the movement of “historical” choice'. What this means is that it is the grounding of an argument in personal conviction rendered specific to the situation, in the light of the ethical intuition still directed toward living well, with and for others, in just institutions. Even the apparently endless question of legitimacy 'has nothing better to offer... than the memory and the intersection in the public space of the appearance of the traditions that make room for tolerance and pluralism, not out of concessions to external pressures, but out of inner convictions'.

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131 P. RICOEUR, *Oneself as Another*, p. 259.
132 Ibid., p. 261.
133 Ibid., p. 258.
134 Ibid., p. 259.
135 Ibid., p. 260.
136 Ibid., p. 261.
What Ricoeur is underlining here with his response of practical wisdom are three things. Firstly, that the practice of the ethical intuition that, by argumentation, develops into a personal conviction, which in dialectic constantly returns to its grounding in that ethical intuition. Secondly, the nature of that dialectic is necessarily dialogical, in its response to the plurality of both the convictions and the argumentation that forms them. In this way does Ricoeur’s concept of self reject the idea of ‘one-sidedness of the moral principles’. Thirdly, this underlines a tension between the universal duty to protect the other and the particular historical circumstances in which that intuition is realised. Ricoeur’s final answer to the question of governmental legitimacy was to call ‘to mind all the beginnings and all the rebeginnings, and all the traditions that have been sedimented upon them’. These are the resources of ethical argumentation and it becomes clear how practical wisdom - where the self is intent on finding specific responses to the call to moral judgement in situation - is necessarily returned to that narratively grounded ethical aim.

These three points become clear in Ricoeur’s approach to the other two levels of praxis - that of respect for the other, and autonomy of the self. The question of respect for the other is consistently returned to the respect for the individual above that of the universal in the shape of humanity or the moral law: ‘practical wisdom may consist in giving priority to the respect for persons, in the name of solicitude that is addressed to persons in their irreplaceable singularity’. Again the moral pursuit of respect is dialectically prompted by the ethical intuition of solicitude, while facing a tension between the universal and the particular. The dialogical nature of the ethical response is revealed here in Ricoeur’s specific example of false promises - ‘is it not actually personal integrity that is at stake in the so-called duties toward others? Is it not oneself that one despises in giving a false oath?’ Ricoeur is here emphasising not just the dialogical context of developing practical wisdom but the reciprocity of the Golden Rule behind promising. He points to Gabriel Marcel to develop this ‘It is to the other that I wish to be faithful. To this fidelity, Gabriel Marcel gives the beautiful name of disponibilité (availability, disponibilité).’

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137 P. Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, p. 249.
138 Ibid., p. 261.
139 Ibid., p. 262.
140 Ibid., p. 265.
141 Ibid., p. 268
I choose to emphasise the concept of availability because this too underlines the dialogical nature of respect for the other, turning back as respect for oneself. While 'practical wisdom consists in inventing conduct that will best satisfy the exception required by solicitude'\(^\text{142}\) - that is, ethically prioritising the irreplaceable other - that ethical intuition of solicitude is itself already rooted in self-esteem. Prioritising the other is already the result of a dialectic developed between self and other: 'one can say that it is to solicitude, concerned with the otherness of persons... that respect refers'\(^\text{143}\). This manifests itself as requiring a dialogue with others regarding ethical practice: 'moral judgement in situation is all the less arbitrary as the decision maker - whether or not in the position of legislator - has taken the counsel of men and women reputed to be the most competent and wisest'\(^\text{144}\). On the level of practical wisdom therefore, the ethical argument in dialectic with the moral conviction becomes 'critical solicitude'\(^\text{145}\).

Ricoeur argues that this is where 'morality itself... refers back to the most original ethical affirmation'\(^\text{146}\) - that of autonomy, which allows for the mediation of 'the practical wisdom of moral judgement'. However, Ricoeur notes that there are still 'marks of receptiveness, passivity and powerlessness'\(^\text{147}\) shown by the connection to the previous stages of reciprocity with the other and the sphere of justice. He therefore continues: 'By showing that an autonomy that is of a piece with the rule of justice and the rule of reciprocity can no longer be a self-sufficient autonomy'\(^\text{148}\). At each level of the ethical aim then, does the necessarily plural dialogue emerge: In the same way does the institution, representing the anonymous other, rely on the ethical intuition of the sense of justice, developed from solicitude and self-esteem. 'It is through public debate, friendly discussion, and shared convictions that moral judgement in situation is formed'\(^\text{149}\). What Ricoeur is arguing is that this social context should help to develop a critical view on ethical praxis in terms of

\(^{142}\) P. RICOEUR, Oneself as Another, p. 269.

\(^{143}\) Ibid., p. 273.

\(^{144}\) Ibid.

\(^{145}\) Ibid.

\(^{146}\) Ibid., pp. 273-4.

\(^{147}\) Ibid., p. 275

\(^{148}\) Ibid., p. 275.

\(^{149}\) Ibid., pp. 290-1.
autonomy, not as atomistic independence, but in the context of the social bond that plays a role at all three levels.

In answer to this difficulty Ricoeur employs Kant’s definition of Enlightenment as an exit from self-induced tutelage (Unmuendigkeit). ‘This state of tutelage consists in allowing oneself to be under the guidance of others in such a way that one’s own judgement depends on the judgement of others’\textsuperscript{150}. Ricoeur adds nuance to this by arguing that while supporting the need to be responsible for one’s own judgments, it is appropriate to add the need to listen to others. He argues that ‘Kant did not take into account the fact that this assumption of responsibility goes hand-in-hand with the rule of reciprocity of justice’\textsuperscript{151}. In this way autonomy is placed within plurality and it is therefore in the context of otherness that Ricoeur seeks to ‘reinforce Kant’s exhortation in \textit{What is the Enlightenment?}: \textit{Sapere aude!} Dare to learn, taste, savor for yourself!’\textsuperscript{152}. The arguments of the other inform the development of decision making by the self.

Ricoeur goes on to suggest that other bases for decision-making, different perspectives, different spheres of justice, different cultural narratives underpinning the ethical aim, these are all crucial for developing the critical role that argumentation itself must play. Wall puts this in terms of ‘opening oneself to the potentially new social imagination that may arise through substantive dialogue with the social convictions of others’\textsuperscript{153}. This is a question of making available (\textit{disponibilîte}\textsuperscript{154}) the very argumentation that one uses to develop conventions into convictions then available to critique; it is a question of re-establishing the ethical intuition in company with the test of the moral norm, as contributed by the other. Ricoeur describes the process as a mediation of language games:

‘Why must argumentation accept the mediation of other language games and assume a corrective role with respect to their potential for argumentation? Precisely because argumentation is not simply posited as the antagonist of tradition and convention, but as

\textsuperscript{150} P. RICOEUR, \textit{Oneself as Another}, p. 275.

\textsuperscript{151} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{152} Ibid., p. 276.

\textsuperscript{153} J. WALL, \textit{Moral Creativity}, p. 153.

\textsuperscript{154} Ricoeur is using this ‘beautiful name’ taken from Gabriel Marcel, which he discusses more fully in ‘Entre éthique et ontologie, la disponibilîte’ pp. 68-78 in P. RICOEUR, \textit{Lectures II: La contrée des philosophes} (Paris, Seuil, 1999).
the critical agency operating at the heart of convictions, argumentation assuming the task not of eliminating but of carrying them to the level of "considered convictions," in what Rawls calls a *reflective equilibrium*\textsuperscript{155}.

In this way Ricoeur makes the tension of autonomy with vulnerability, of passivity with agency all the clearer as part of practical wisdom. 'In contrast to this state [of tutelage], autonomy assumes its strong sense, namely the responsibility for one's own judgment'\textsuperscript{156}. This emphasises that Ricoeur concludes his entire ethical theory of ethical aim, moral norm and practical wisdom with the human capacity for imputation: the capacity for claiming actions for oneself and accepting the consequences. At the same time however, the practice of practical wisdom is enriched by the other.

Ricoeur expresses this in two ways. The first is in reference to symbolic resources: by 'recognising one's own indebtedness with respect that which has made one what one is, is to hold oneself responsible'\textsuperscript{157}. The second by acknowledging that 'responsibility in the present assumes that the responsibility of the consequences to come... are integrated in this... present'\textsuperscript{158}. In the light of these conclusions, the narrative identity of self that provides the foundation for Ricoeur's ethical theory becomes all the more appropriate. Imputing action to oneself is done by recognising and clarifying through the ethics of argumentation the context and bases that have helped to develop one's ethical aim, and the context for the sieve of the norm. This includes the narratives of the past, the factual presence of damaging conflicts to which practical wisdom must seek to respond in the future. The "tragic" here appears again from Steiner's 'agonistic ground of human experience'\textsuperscript{159}.

There are debts to the past here, both to how the self was formed and to how the other has historically been treated. This is where Ricoeur's reformulation of conflict as between universalism and contextualism resolves into an ethics of argumentation - an argument between the culturally subsistent ethic and the universal duty to the person. 'These

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\textsuperscript{155} P. RICOEUR, *Oneself as Another*, p. 288.

\textsuperscript{156} Ibid., p. 275.

\textsuperscript{157} Ibid., p. 295.

\textsuperscript{158} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{159} Ibid., p. 243.
arguments converge toward a confrontation between the universalist claim attached to the rules claiming to belong to the principle of morality and the recognition of positive values belonging to the historical and communitarian contexts of the realization of those same rules.\(^{160}\)

This is joined by an awareness not only of the past and one’s debt to it, but the ongoing obligation to the future. Wall describes the goal of moral creativity in this way. ‘Moral creativity involves precisely transforming the historical world: making a new world that at once remains this existing world but also, and at the same time, is something more than previously imagined’\(^{161}\). That ‘more’ for Wall is an ‘ever more inclusive meaning’\(^{162}\). This is emphasised when one considers the practical outcomes with which \textit{phronesis} is concerned; it is practical wisdom that draws back the ethicist to consider the experience of morality \textit{in time}, for the self, and for the other. Deneulin has suggested that \textit{phronesis} is ‘a particular form of practical rationality that is guided by some knowledge of what is good within the particular situation’\(^{163}\). I appreciate her use of the term rationality as indicating the critical function that \textit{phronesis} must fulfill, albeit in a specific cultural context. Thus, the debt to one’s context, past, and society is important, but at the same time that ethical intuition remains for Ricoeur part of the concept of the self: ‘although totally dependent on the socio-historical context in which action takes places, \textit{phronesis} has to include such a pre-conception of the good’\(^{164}\). Rooting practical ethical dilemmas in terms of what has happened and what should happen underscores the fact that Ricoeur’s ethical theory of aim, moral norm and practical wisdom is built deliberately within and upon his concept of the self. Indeed, Wall goes so far as to characterise the operation of practical wisdom, having established a dialogue with the social imaginary of others, ultimately requiring ‘a strange, unsettling and apparently endless detour of radical narrative self-

\(^{160}\) P. RICOEUR, \textit{Oneself as Another}, p. 274.

\(^{161}\) J. WALL, \textit{Moral Creativity}, p. 10.

\(^{162}\) Ibid., p. 75, c.f. Honneth’s understanding of the struggle for recognition continually developing a more inclusive recognition of the other (2.2).

\(^{163}\) S. DENEULIN, ‘Necessary Thickening’, p. 41.

\(^{164}\) Ibid.
transformation\textsuperscript{165}. This implies that the dialectic of practical wisdom requires a new understanding of the self in relation to the other.

It is for this reason that I turn to one of Ricoeur’s final texts which further investigates the question of how the other should be treated in the light of the structures of the self. Ricoeur has already begun as he closes the study on phronesis. When considering his final figures of imputation and responsibility in the context of the concept of the self and the other as a dialectic relationship, Ricoeur names the structure of this activity, ‘recognition’.

‘Recognition is a structure of the self reflecting on the movement that carries self-esteem toward solicitude toward justice. Recognition introduces the dyad and plurality in the very constitution of the self. Reciprocity in friendship and proportional equality in justice, when they are reflected in self-consciousness, make self-esteem a figure of recognition’\textsuperscript{166}.

I will continue to develop the themes of plurality and dialogue, of narrative cultural bases for ethical aims, and the universal duty to respect the other and just institution that I have begun in this chapter and I will therefore turn to consider Ricoeur’s final monograph, The Course of Recognition.

\textbf{2.2. A RETURN TO THE STRUCTURES OF THE SELF - THE COURSE OF RECOGNITION}

The Course of Recognition is the key text where Ricoeur outlines most fully the move from a merely reciprocal understanding of recognition of persons to mutuality. He does this by considering the plurality of the use of the word “recognition” in philosophical thought. I reiterate the remark from the conclusion of this text which I used above\textsuperscript{167}. Ricoeur argues that one cannot

‘forget the originary asymmetry in the relationship between the self and others, which even the experience of [peace] does not manage to abolish. Forgetting this asymmetry, thanks to the success of analyses of mutual recognition, would constitute the ultimate misrecognition at the very heart of actual experiences of recognition’\textsuperscript{168}.

\textsuperscript{165} J. \textsc{Wall}, \textit{Moral Creativity}, p. 53.

\textsuperscript{166} P. \textsc{Ricoeur}, \textit{Oneself as Another}, p. 296.

\textsuperscript{167} c.f. Chapter One, n 251.

\textsuperscript{168} P. \textsc{Ricoeur}, \textit{The Course of Recognition}, p. 261.
For the ethics of recognition therefore Ricoeur’s structural concern about misrecognition enters in order to protect the other, and equally the integrity of the self. This follows from the work established in *Oneself as Another* where all three levels, but especially the consideration of moral judgement in situation established the genuinely dialogical nature of ethical action. I will emphasise this in my reconstruction of the stages of *The Course of Recognition*, looking first at reciprocal recognition, secondly at mutual recognition, including the detour through the work of Axel Honneth which establishes a useful concrete context for acts of recognition, and thirdly at Ricoeur’s hermeneutic of mutuality in the gift.

**Reciprocal Recognition**

The first kind of recognition that Ricoeur introduces is simply as identification - ‘to identify is to distinguish. The one is not the other’. However, this opens out on to an ethically charged level when Ricoeur argues that meaning starts with the self, and specifically, his or her self-attested capability for action. I have indicated throughout the preceding chapter that attestation ends in the capacity for imputation. Pellauer has put it in terms of self-attestation as the ‘means by which agents take responsibility for their actions’.

Ricoeur is exploring the link to recognition; he identifies self-recognition as semantically close to attestation. Ricoeur is careful to emphasise the ancient nature of attestation as self-reflection; again he turns to the Greek Homeric and tragic tradition. Characters of Greek literature are understood as centres of agency – even though the insights of philosophy of reflection are missing for them. These characters cause things to happen, and recognise responsibility inherent in such actions. This is so even in those tragic examples of Ulysses’s vengeance narrative, or Oedipus, who describes events as ‘against my will [akôn]’. Regardless of the character’s willingness, responsibility remains an issue to address and necessarily displays a certain self-reflection. While ‘it will be up to the philosopher [Aristotle] to articulate the question of intention as a distinct problem’, personal initiative remains. Self-recognition is thus ‘of the capacities each person has the

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171 Ibid., p. 72.
certitude and the confidence of being able to exercise\textsuperscript{172} and ultimately to impute to oneself in terms of concrete action.

This attestation of being able to make things happen, the ‘I can’ displays the self, confident. It is important to recall that the other is referred to in relation to the attestation of the self, as an audience, to whom the self also acts as an audience. Therefore Ricoeur observes that two grammars are needed here, one for the capacities of action themselves, and another for ‘the object side of the experiences considered’\textsuperscript{173} – reflexive and hermeneutic. So on one hand, the beginning of recognition is ‘found in the unfolding of the figures of the “I can”, which together make up the portrait of the capable human being, its own space of meaning’\textsuperscript{174}. On the other, the counterpart of confidence is suspicion ‘which can only be refuted by a reassurance of the same epistemic tenor as the contested certitude’\textsuperscript{175}. This moves the ‘hesitation’ seen in recognition as identification - is this the same person - ‘to an existential status thanks to which the other is likely to affect the same’\textsuperscript{176}. This is a dialogue, on the level of human action, which requires the other, the presence of alterity, to be engaged with the origin of attestation. The other responds to the confident self-assertion of capability, positively or negatively and as another self calls the self to responsibility.

Ricoeur describes this situation by recasting the ‘hesitation’\textsuperscript{177}, which prompts recognition on the cognitive level, as anticipation: ‘Recognition of responsibility, whose outline we have caught sight of in epic and tragedy, finds its guiding concept in decision. It was what was named anticipation in the definition of virtue cited earlier [Nichomachean Ethics]’\textsuperscript{178}. The spontaneity of \textit{ipseity} has a loyalty operating under a sign of fidelity. ‘The proud assertion “I will do it” expresses in language the risky posture of \textit{ipseity}, as self-constancy

\textsuperscript{172} P. RICOEUR, \textit{The Course of Recognition}, p. 151.

\textsuperscript{173} Ibid. p. 93.

\textsuperscript{174} Ibid., p. 151.

\textsuperscript{175} Ibid., p. 91.

\textsuperscript{176} Ibid., p. 151.

\textsuperscript{177} Ibid., p. 35.

\textsuperscript{178} Ibid., p. 83.
that goes beyond mere sameness\textsuperscript{179}; "I will do it", doing what one declares one will do and so acting with constancy, with and for others. That firm undertaking is the service of the good life, bound by the moral rules that demand that a person be recognised as an end not a means. Detouring through the cognitive understanding of the word in Descartes, where the other must be recognised as that individual, Ricoeur is now rendering recognition in the light of his ethical, intersubjective approach. On this level, the other is also a non-substitutable figure - recognition of the other must be of universal capacities and of particular identity. Yet this recognition has a beginning - of the other, by the self, leading to reciprocity if the other responds, and the self continues. This is Ricoeur’s ‘originary asymmetry’ that is now apparent both at the cognitive, and the ethical level.

I emphasise here that Ricoeur does not introduce reciprocity as a satisfying solution. Recognition is not the forced response to a demand which is the mechanism of reciprocity. Instead the response must be mutually offered; it is not automatic. There is a continuing tension of needing a response that must remain free. I recall here Ricoeur’s use of Marcel’s disponibilité. So the key is in the secondary response of the self to the other, who has already provided the audience to originary self-attestation: a reciprocal response. The self may recognise the other, but the other must receive\textsuperscript{180} that recognition and choose to respond.

The incomplete solution that reciprocity represents highlights the need to protect both persons in any narrative exchange - if the other chooses to respond, she can also refuse to respond. It is here that Ricoeur fulfills the potential of his brief remark in the Ninth Study of Oneself as Another, where he indicates the need to place imputability and responsibility under the banner of ‘recognition... a structure of the self reflecting on the movement that carries self esteem toward solicitude and solicitude toward justice’\textsuperscript{181}. Recognition as an activity already derives a trajectory from the desire in the self ‘to live well, with and for others, in just institutions’\textsuperscript{182}.

\textsuperscript{179} P. RICOEUR, The Course of Recognition, p. 103.

\textsuperscript{180} This is precisely the word Ricoeur chooses, echoing Marcel Mauss, as I show below.

\textsuperscript{181} P. RICOEUR, Oneself as Another, p. 296.

\textsuperscript{182} Ibid., p. 172.
Therefore, what is desired is a reliably returning recognition that is freely offered by the other and by the self, despite the risk. This prevents the reciprocal level from collapsing into the damagingly utilitarian. The next step was alluded to by Ricoeur in *Oneself as Another*, before he recast the discussion under the sign of recognition, in his discussion of friendship in Aristotle; that of ‘mutuality [where] each loves the other as being the man he is’\(^{183}\). The possibility that one can move to mutual recognition from reciprocity is the result of Ricoeur’s philosophical anthropology.

In relation to recognition, Ricoeur clarifies his philosophical anthropology as one of two types. The alternative is Hobbes’s naturalistic approach resulting in an anthropology of basic antagonism. Hobbes becomes relevant as later scholars, seeking an anthropology permitting relations of positive encounter, turn to him as an example of misrecognition\(^ {184}\). Hobbes attempted to explain how the State can be formed most rationally. From his presuppositions that the state of nature is as a ‘war of all against all’, all humans are wolves against each other and self preservation is the only moral value. Humans act in order to preserve themselves. Hobbes’s solution to this original antagonism is the equal subjugation of all agents to one Sovereign, creating laws that inhibit rights across the state, specifically in order to prevent the denial of recognition: ‘to lay down a man’s right to anything is to divest himself of the liberty of hindering another of the benefit of his own right to the same’\(^ {185}\).

While Ricoeur recognises that Hobbes is conducting a ‘search for peace’\(^ {186}\), it is one prompted by fear not morals. The contract of giving up rights which should shift the agents involved from merely reciprocal to mutual recognition is not a genuine covenant, but ‘para-ethical’, imitating moral laws, and potentially even contradicting the ‘natural’ fear that is the basis of all Hobbes’s human motivation. Mutual recognition must have a

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\(^{184}\) P. RICOEUR, *The Course of Recognition*, p. 159.


substantive, and positive, notion of alterity, which Hobbes removed when he chose antagonism rather than solicitude. No peace is possible.

Ricoeur seeks to provide morally normative relationships as more accurately descriptive of the human person than Hobbes’ power-based naturalism. It is precisely at that point that Ricoeur seeks to remove power as an exhaustive category for understanding the co-constitution of persons, and moves from mere reciprocity to mutual recognition.

Developing his alternative to the power analysis marking Hobbes, Ricoeur engaged with the theory of the fine Hegelian commentator, Axel Honneth who, using Hegel, provides a concept of recognition-based inter-subjectivity. This is a ‘thought-event’ that answers Ricoeur’s specific concerns with an exploration of the various protections formed by the deontological level. It is Ricoeur’s use of Hegel and of Honneth that expresses the need for both symbolic and practical recognition.

I also emphasise Honneth’s contribution because part of his published work on this question is a dialogue with Nancy Fraser on the question of justice as redistribution versus recognition. Honneth argues for the need for recognition to involve more than the purely distributive, regarding it as a question of orientation toward the other. John Wall’s work on creativity is primarily targeted at a similar increase in ‘inclusivity’ and the two provide an interesting parallel. Honneth’s stance also continues Ricoeur’s drawing of a frontier between his concept of self and Hobbes’ naturalism. It also recalls Ricoeur’s position that conflicts as factually present and can be typologized. Honneth, partly following Hegel, argues that these conflicts are the route to improved recognition of the other.

188 Ibid., p. 152.
189 J. WALL, Moral Creativity, p. 75.
190 Fraser’s rejects conceiving of justice as beyond the distributive, identifying the distributive as the most immediately pressing issue - both as injustice and as a cause of injustice. While I will argue with Honneth for an inclusion of other issues, Fraser already presents a morality-based argument.
The influence of Axel Honneth's *The Struggle for Recognition*

Ricoeur immediately introduces his use of Honneth in a section titled 'Hegel at Jena: *Anerkennung*'. Honneth's project in *The Struggle for Recognition* is to rehabilitate the early work of Hegel at Jena in order to recast use of his model of recognition in the context of contemporary discussions on recognition. It is a 'systematic reactualization'\(^1\). Ricoeur presents this work as an answer to 'whether a political order can be founded on a moral exigency that is as originary as the fear of violent death and the rational calculation that this opposes to vanity'\(^2\). Ricoeur presents Honneth's analysis explicitly as a 'theory [which] is meant to serve as a rejoinder to Hobbes'\(^3\). Honneth uses Hegel because he 'ensures the link between self-reflection and orientation toward the other'\(^4\), shifting the project of recognition from disregard to consideration, and begins to derive particular historical forms of recognition. This last step Honneth emphasises in particular. Hegel's historical forms provide a characterisation of social activity with respect to three spheres, marriage, society, state. These spheres present an ongoing process of expansion regarding persons recognised and the forms in which and for which they are recognised. Honneth names them principles of law, and Ricoeur describes them as 'affective, juridical and social recognition'\(^5\).

Honneth's premise is this: that if a thinker is to consider social theory, this cannot end with philosophical anthropology. Instead it must be rooted in the ways an identified society organises itself or it will not reach outside its discipline. Honneth's stance is that 'for an approach that aims to reappropriate Hegel's model as a stimulus for a normatively substantive theory of society, a merely speculative foundation is not sufficient'\(^6\). Ultimately Ricoeur considers that 'what keeps Hegel's problematic distant from our own is

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\(^3\) Ibid., p. 186.

\(^4\) Ibid., p. 172 - 'inherited from Fichte', p. 171.


\(^6\) A. Honneth, *The Struggle for Recognition*, p. 68.
the speculative reference, with no empirical counterpart, to identity, totality.\textsuperscript{197} Empirically-related theory must be incorporated to reach the non-speculative - hence Honneth’s engagement with critical theorist Nancy Fraser\textsuperscript{198}, and with the founder of social interactionism, psychologist George Herbert Mead. His engagement here highlights the role of struggle in Hegel, in response to its embodiment in all three spheres, now named love, law, and social esteem, as they are practiced. Seeking to be recognised is identified by both Fraser and Mead as a basic experience for all persons, and elaborated in Hegel in these dimensions and structures of praxis.

I emphasise Honneth’s project because he acknowledges the concrete impact of refusing to recognise the person, and the concrete response of the struggle for recognition, but he also couches this theory in the context of a \textit{normative} theory of society where the goal is the full recognition of the other. In the light of Hegel, Honneth too works with ‘the link between self-reflection and orientation toward the other’.\textsuperscript{199} Ricoeur takes the concrete impact of power relations seriously, but refuses to let them exhaust the structure of philosophical anthropology. It is the particularity of forms of recognition that Ricoeur deliberately turns to Honneth to provide. ‘The three models of recognition provide the speculative structure and the negative sentiments give flesh and blood to the struggle for recognition’.\textsuperscript{200} Honneth follows Hegel directly by identifying love, law and social esteem\textsuperscript{201} as the crucial institutions which mediate recognition. These are chosen as common to the articulated experiences of persons available to us. Yet in dialogue with symbolic interactionism Honneth diverges from Hegel by identifying that, with George Herbert Mead, the goal of mutually recognising societies is the recognition of the individual as an individual and one who is fully free to form his or her identity and realise his or her potential. Indeed, it is Mead that allows Honneth to assume, as Ricoeur articulates the ‘social genesis of an identifying “I”’.\textsuperscript{202}

\textsuperscript{197} P. \textsc{Ricoeur}, \textit{The Course of Recognition}, p. 179. Ricoeur considers the empirical point to reveal a certain emphasis instead on plurality as ‘the unsurpassable reference for the relations of mutuality’ (Ibid., p. 179) which I will return to below (2.3).

\textsuperscript{198} N. \textsc{Fraser}, A. \textsc{Honneth}, \textit{Redistribution or Recognition}?.

\textsuperscript{199} P. \textsc{Ricoeur}, \textit{The Course of Recognition}, p. 172.

\textsuperscript{200} Ibid., p. 188.

\textsuperscript{201} G. W. F. \textsc{Hegel}, \textit{The System of Ethical Life (1802-1803)} and \textit{First Philosophy of Spirit}.

\textsuperscript{202} P. \textsc{Ricoeur}, \textit{The Course of Recognition}, p. 7.
I will briefly outline these three models, their relationship and dynamic in individual and collective personal encounters including the roles of expectation and normative societal influences. They are intended by Honneth to highlight spheres of conflict or struggle that will fuel a more inclusive recognition of the other, both practical and symbolic. This will allow me to highlight the particular characteristics of Honneth’s construction that add to Ricoeur’s teleological trajectory of mutual recognition, with and for others.

**Principle of love**

The three principles are those which the society from which Honneth comes has already articulated. The first principle, love, is to do with the relationships between individuals, within families and close circles. It is characterised by the simultaneous stances of emotional symbiosis and independence. Honneth articulates this point through the example of a child struggling to establish independence from his or her mother, while being reassured that the mother’s love will not disappear as a result. ‘It is in this moment of love, the family and the child that Honneth will discern the first of his three models of recognition, thanks to an extrapolation that will allow for abandoning the absolute speculative point of view’\(^\text{203}\). It is crucial to note regarding this sphere that this kind of recognition requires active approval on the part of the other. It is love that confirms non-substitutability, not merely cognitive identification-recognition. Honneth notes that Hegel uses “solidarity” rather than love, because love itself did not provide a bridge to the second principle of law. Using the vocabulary of love, Honneth argues that ‘an obligation to reciprocity is, to a certain extent built into such relations, an obligation that requires but does not force subjects to recognise one another in a certain way’\(^\text{204}\).

Honneth links positively recognised attestation to the confidence in undertaking independent action under this principle. Ricoeur puts this in terms of ‘The Hegelian formula of “knowing oneself likewise in its other”’\(^\text{205}\). Yet to move outside the individual, personal relationship, to require the positive recognition of capabilities including the


\(^{205}\) P. ROICOEUR, *The Course of Recognition*, p. 189.
anonymous other, does require Honneth’s second principle of law. The requirement, to respond to the gap left by the personal sphere, is of ‘intersubjective social relations that always already guarantee a minimal normative consensus in advance’\textsuperscript{206}. Honneth describes this as an ‘implicit form of legal consciousness’\textsuperscript{207}, so the second principle of law is opened.

*Principle of law*

This second sphere, just as the tension between mother and child, contains its own kind of conflicts. In the legal realm, the struggle for recognition comes when an action of misrecognition, or refusal to recognise occurs. For example, a person retaining property that belongs to another. That retention, Honneth suggests, has nothing to do with the personhood of the other, rather it is an over-emphasis of the self who retains the property. The response of the other, who has indeed been insulted by the action of the self, is crucial. From his or her ‘disappointment of positive expectations’\textsuperscript{208} a conflictual response can insult the self in return. This can damage the status of the self as a person. The intentions of the original insulting self, and the responding threatening other, are different with respect to the personhood of each victim - the other deliberately harming the self, the self doing so to the other inadvertently. The confrontation reveals precisely the need for recognition through the realisation of the shared vulnerability of self and other. From the struggle they can mutually affirm their rights with respect to each other in the light of their encounter. Thus, consistent with Ricoeur, rights follow from the role of attestation of capability before the other. Now ‘the personal autonomy of the individual owes its existence to a particular mode of reciprocal recognition that is incorporated in positive law’\textsuperscript{209}.

The ethical charge of the self-other encounter for Ricoeur was solicitude, but the legal construction by Honneth here allows me to clarify something valuable. Solicitude is

\textsuperscript{206} A. HONNETH, *The Struggle for Recognition*, p. 42.
\textsuperscript{207} A. HONNETH, *The Struggle for Recognition*, p. 43.
\textsuperscript{208} Ibid., p. 44.
\textsuperscript{209} Ibid., p. 108.
'neither an appropriation of the other, nor a self-effacement in favour of the other'^210. The legal sphere allows that to be balanced in practical terms. By describing the practical outcome of this sphere in terms of rights, allows the emphasis of minimum requirements - regardless of the self summoned to ethics by the other, the self remains herself. Indeed, Dallmayr points out that Ricoeur explicitly rejected a Levinasian account of the self because, if the other were solely in charge of what constituted a just description, 'the self is liable to be reduced to a passive recipient of object'^211. This damage to the agency of the self is precisely what Ricoeur seeks to avoid, that Honneth here concretises in rights.

The individual now participates in the ‘universal sphere where the reproduction of social life can occur'^212. There must be a move from the particular; unlike love, legal relationships cannot be exclusive, but available to the anonymous other as well - rights, I recall, are ‘for everyone'^213. I consider Ricoeur’s ethics of recognition, detouring through Honneth, to provide the clearest link between his ethical theory and the concrete demand for recognition from the other. Ricoeur’s final expectation for phronesis renders this a crucial step toward praxis. Concrete struggle demands the reciprocity of legal relationships which are necessary for the development of inclusive institutions. ‘For Hegel, civil society represents an institutional system that results from the accumulation of new forms of the concretization of legal relations'^214. The content of the rights recognised for the other are yet to be completed, but they already operate from the principle that others ought to be recognised and laws established to guarantee a ‘minimum normative consensus’ as to what this constitutes in practice. This content represents a further area of struggle for recognition, to do with realising particular wishes in the context of those equal rights and duties already established by the principle of recognition of others.

Just as law solved a gap left by the personal sphere of love, the emphasis on the anonymous relationship leaves the person as a cipher, rather than a particular individual. I

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211 Ibid., p. 222.
212 A. HONNETH, The Struggle for Recognition, p. 47.
213 P. RICOEUR, The Just, p. 8.
214 A. HONNETH, The Struggle for Recognition, p. 50.
therefore turn to the final sphere, that of social esteem. Indeed Ricoeur finds a ‘principal advantage of framing the juridical with structures that both anticipate and go beyond it’\textsuperscript{215}.

\textit{Principle of social esteem}

A reflection on criminal acts can exemplify the difference between the two principles. ‘Respect for the “will” of the individual person, as it is demanded by the criminal deed, can only be realised completely in a relationship of recognition that, unlike the one based on law, is supported by feelings of social concern’\textsuperscript{216}. So the genuine individuality of a person is not answered by law, but by what is connected to the legal sphere, is the third principle of social esteem. Ricoeur identifies in this model ‘not so much the constitution of the state as the social dimension of politics in the broadest sense’\textsuperscript{217}.

Under social esteem, Honneth emphasises the continued requirement for recognition, but it operates according to the historical particularity of each society. ‘This experience of disrespect, like that of the denial of rights, is bound up with a process of historical change’\textsuperscript{218}. Hegel identified “honour” as a criterion for evaluating the role of a person in society, which is therefore linked to their recognition. Honneth suggests that in contemporary society, with the increased focus on legal equality, these kinds of criteria are more to do with social worth as connected to distribution. If one is more honourable in society, one receives more. However, Honneth argues that the cultural structures by which worth is judged have been profoundly altered by the change since Hegel to an explicitly capitalist system and so substitutes the “achievement principle” for “honour”. The achievement principle essentially presents one’s contribution to society and the reciprocal esteem that results. The “achievement principle” is another field of struggle for Honneth. For example, women have fought to have domestic work recognised as an equal contribution to society, or indeed, fought to have their contribution outside the home be considered capable and valuable. To handle this requires a ‘secondary interpretive

\textsuperscript{215} P. RICOEUR,\textit{ The Course of Recognition}, p. 187.

\textsuperscript{216} A. HONNETH,\textit{ The Struggle for Recognition}, p. 57.

\textsuperscript{217} P. RICOEUR,\textit{ The Course of Recognition}, p. 201.

\textsuperscript{218} A. HONNETH,\textit{ The Struggle for Recognition}, p. 134.
practice’\textsuperscript{219}, which is ongoing in society\textsuperscript{220}. Ricoeur himself emphasises the fact that these interpretive practices are multiple, making the question all the more complex, and again underlining the particular identity of the person.

As stated Honneth’s goal is a ‘social theory with normative content’\textsuperscript{221}, and what is at stake for ‘social esteem begins to be oriented not towards collective traits but toward the capacities developed by the individual’\textsuperscript{222}. Thus he formulates his approach as ‘not just passive tolerance but felt concern for what is individual and particular about the other person’\textsuperscript{223}. By contrast, Fraser wants solely empirical reference points, Honneth seeks to provide a ‘bridge between normative theory and social theory’\textsuperscript{224}. Thus Fraser’s justice is distribution as an empirical issue, while Honneth’s is symbolic by including a just recognition of \textit{identity}, confirmed by empirical experience. Ricoeur argues, in a discussion on justice, that even where ‘we give distribution an amplitude that surpasses the realm of economics’\textsuperscript{225} there remains a concern: ‘the juxtaposition of interests prevents the idea of justice from attaining the level of a true recognition and a solidarity such that each person feels indebted to every other person’\textsuperscript{226}. This is Honneth’s conception of recognition, insisting on both normative and social theory. Thus the other as another self must be recognised in the universal sense, but also as \textit{herself} in the particular. This will have implications for my consideration of multiple cultures below (2.3).

These principles are ‘the basic concepts with which the ethical preconditions for such community-formation are described [and] must be tailored to the normative characteristics of communicative relations’\textsuperscript{227}. The principles work to describe forms of recognition because they occur in society and thus society, as a mediated institution of citizens, has

\textsuperscript{219} A. HONNETH, \textit{The Struggle for Recognition}, p. 126.
\textsuperscript{220} I will return to this point in the final section of this chapter (2.3).
\textsuperscript{221} A. HONNETH, \textit{The Struggle for Recognition}, p. 68.
\textsuperscript{222} Ibid., p. 125.
\textsuperscript{223} Ibid., p. 129.
\textsuperscript{224} Ibid., p. 247.
\textsuperscript{225} P. RICOEUR, ‘Love and Justice’ pp. 315-330 in P. RICOEUR, \textit{Figuring the Sacred}, p. 322
\textsuperscript{226} Ibid., p. 324.
\textsuperscript{227} A. HONNETH, \textit{The Struggle for Recognition}, p. 59.
already agreed on their validity. The society already has normative content in this regard. This is both the result of cultural changes, but also the direct action of struggles for recognition, by groups and individuals. Here Ricoeur’s ongoing dialogue between a cultural subsistent ethics and universal moral law finds a parallel in Honneth’s practical framework. Similarly they share an insistence on the significance of recognising the specificity of the self, in her particularity.

Individuals who do so struggle have forced normative changes in society. ‘Instead of taking the perspective of the existing collective will’ one is forced to ‘take the perspective of an expanded community of rights’\textsuperscript{228}. This is not a simple organic outcome of the progression of society, but the result of an internal conflict. The individual expects recognition. In Ricoeur, and Hegel’s vocabulary the expectation is an ‘intuition of its necessity’\textsuperscript{229} that is already present in self-attestation to the other under each principle of recognition. So, recognition as such is not the result of historical particularity but of a universal moral principle; however, the forms recognition takes in society are the result of historical particularity. The fact that recognition has occurred is the achievement of struggle and the already present intuition that ‘the only way in which individuals are constituted as persons is by learning to refer to themselves, from the perspective of an approving or encouraging other, as beings with certain positive traits and abilities’\textsuperscript{230}. The practical experience of that intuition comes through the deontological structures which shape society and protect the person; it is respect for the person that constitutes recognition in love, law, and social esteem in their various practical forms.

The complex relationship between expectations and the internal normative standards of society is expressed most clearly by Honneth in his dialogue with Nancy Fraser. ‘The demands of social integration can only be understood as referring to the normative principles of a political ethics because, and to the extent that, they are mirrored in the expectations of socially integrated subjects’\textsuperscript{231}. So, yes, ‘feelings of social injustice are

\textsuperscript{228} A. HONNETH, \textit{The Struggle for Recognition}, p. 83.


\textsuperscript{230} Ibid., p. 177.

\textsuperscript{231} A. HONNETH, N. FRASER, \textit{Redistribution or Recognition?}, p. 174.
always shaped by the public discourse and the discourse impacts on those expectations, but that discourse is not arbitrary, but connected to ‘deeper normative principles that determine the linguistic horizon of socio-moral thoughts and feelings in a particular society’. Again, this is not a direct relationship, but two activities, one an intuitive expectation, the other a mediated discourse, operating in the same public space - co-constitutive. Ultimately, while Honneth wishes his spheres of recognition to describe the norms of real, concrete persons, he looks for his explanation for those principles elsewhere. Explicitly, ‘my moral-psychological reflections in fact seek a quasi-transcendental justification of critique in the structures of social reality’. Ricoeur is able to anchor Honneth’s work using his own philosophical anthropology. Ricoeur’s ethics of self-esteem, solicitude, sense of justice, and their deontological limits of reciprocal respect are rendered here in the new vocabulary of concrete and symbolic recognition.

This detour through Honneth, and Hegel, is what Ricoeur uses in his own The Course of Recognition. Honneth begins to marry the empirical with the symbolic, and Ricoeur’s use of him in The Course of Recognition shows the way symbolic and concrete recognition are both demanded by Ricoeur’s ethics. The dominance of the self by the other in post-structuralism remains explicitly problematic firstly in the structure of the person, but secondly also in the explicit rules that govern behaviour between persons under the principles of love, law and social esteem. Ricoeur places recognition as both trajectory or a shared teleological goal, and embedding it as the process of seeking that end.

What Honneth has achieved here is a theory of recognition that involves the three key concepts of Ricoeur’s ethical theory. One, the practical wisdom that the ongoing role of conflict can be brought to a productive and inclusive end. Two, the deontological universal character of recognising the other as another self. Three, the significance of the other’s identity for how that recognition is manifested. That recognition must be of other as the self as the universal subject of rights and in her particular identity, which remains partly culturally subsistent. This applies in particular to how the other evaluates - indeed it is on this point that Ricoeur takes Honneth’s work further than Honneth himself achieves, by


233 Ibid.

234 A. HONNET, N. FRASER, Redistribution or Recognition?, p. 245.
employing the work of Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot\textsuperscript{235}. This next step is best placed under the name of mutual recognition.

**Mutual Recognition as Gift**

The point where Ricoeur seeks to build on Honneth's categories is within the principle of social esteem; Ricoeur does not find the change from 'honour' to 'social esteem' to be explanation enough. What remains problematic is qualifying the secondary interpretive practice which, as already indicated in my discussion above, is inevitably diverse. Ricoeur points to Jean-Marc Ferry's use of 'orders of recognition'\textsuperscript{236}. Taken together, these 'can contribute to the formation of the identity of individuals on the moral and political plane'\textsuperscript{237}. Ricoeur points to only the 'leading paradigms'\textsuperscript{238} or orders: the socioeconomic complex, the sociopolitical complex, the sociocultural complex. Honneth identifies the developments within these discourses as necessary for changing ideas of how to recognise the other person - and again I reiterate the struggle which Honneth sees as the crucial impetus for this. However, it is Ricoeur's interrogation of the question that allows him to identify the first move from reciprocal recognition to mutual recognition\textsuperscript{239}.

Ricoeur begins by noting that the practical ways in which recognition itself is established differ greatly. He turns to the descriptions by Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot of different cities or 'polities' or 'economies of standing' in which persons operate within a shared society. These polities founds respective concepts of worth upon particular principles, significantly they also provide 'an evaluation of the social standing of individuals making some claim on the idea of justice, but one that makes use of diverse


\textsuperscript{237} P. RICOEUR, *The Course of Recognition*, p. 204.

\textsuperscript{238} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{239} It is worth noting here that Ricoeur's use of the term 'mutual recognition' as an expression of persons understanding each other is much earlier then this systematic overview. e.g. P. RICOEUR, 'Universal Civilization and National Cultures' pp. 271-284 in his own *History and Truth*, tr. and 'Introduction' C. A. Kelbley (Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1965), p. 275.
criteria...in relation to a certain type of social success\textsuperscript{240}. For example praxis and discourse structured around industry operate by different rules of recognition than do commercial spaces; they have particular goods. Boltanski and Thévenot suggest six distinct cities: inspired, domestic, civic, industrial, commercial, and opinion (though the term in \textit{On Justification} is ‘fame’). Like Honneth, Boltanski and Thévenot seek to root these models in descriptions of empirical experience already rendered philosophically. For example, the city of inspiration evokes Augustine, ‘as a theoretician who uses the notion of grace’\textsuperscript{241}, Hobbes is seen again in the city of fame\textsuperscript{242}. The term ‘justification’ is based on the dispute that arises in placing these orders of standing in relation to each other. In this way Ricoeur emphasises that the conflicts in question ‘are not violent, but argumentative’\textsuperscript{243}, which he suggests ‘agrees well with our concept of the struggle for recognition’\textsuperscript{244}.

It will not be useful to engage with the specifics of these cities at this stage. What is worth emphasising instead is that Ricoeur agrees that within communities, people constantly operate with multiple different forms of evaluating worth and the activity of handling multiple cities simultaneously is essentially a compromise. I identify this as an example of practical wisdom; thinkers are called to justify their stances in relation to their principles and argue the grounds of their convictions. Ricoeur goes so far as to argue that, regarding the ‘lack of a position overarching these arbitrations... nothing allows social actors to dispense with turning to practical wisdom, which does not separate justice from the correctness of the search, in every situation, for a fitting action’\textsuperscript{245}.

Most significantly however, this discourse is brought to bear on personal identity.

\textsuperscript{240} \textsc{P. Ricoeur}, \textit{The Course of Recognition}, p. 205.

\textsuperscript{241} \textsc{L. Boltanski \& L. Thévenot}, \textit{On Justification}, p. 72. Augustine is also useful by using ‘city’ already as a way of articulating how Christians might seek to live together - Augustine, \textit{City of God} - though questions and ongoing debates on how the City of God relates to earthly life. The use of Augustine therefore already introduces the question.

\textsuperscript{242} Ibid., p. 92, quoting Hobbes’s remark that ‘a commonwealth is contained in the person of a king’ who can take the multiple wills of others into his own will. See T. \textsc{Hobbes}, \textit{On the Citizen}, tr. R. Tuck, M. Silverthorne (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 83.

\textsuperscript{243} \textsc{P. Ricoeur}, \textit{The Course of Recognition}, p. 205.

\textsuperscript{244} Ibid., p. 205.

'On the side of individuals, what corresponds to this is the capacity to recognize oneself as one figure in the passage from one city to another without allowing oneself to get caught up in the oscillation "between disillusioned relativism and the accusation of the pamphleteer"'\textsuperscript{246}.

Here Ricoeur refers to the negative connotation of compromise, as a weakened sense of one's principles. Instead I connect what he proposes as compromise to the dialectic between convictions and the ethics of argumentation. I recall that \textit{phronesis} was the capstone to Ricoeur's ethical theory rooted in his philosophical anthropology - following through the implication of the connections Ricoeur has drawn therefore, what must not be considered as compromised is the founding attestation to the other of self-constancy. Thus, the narrative identity must take account of the movement and flexibility of different orders of standing - and this is done in the context of moral judgement in situation.

Despite the apparent difficulty of handling this conflict Ricoeur's solution is particularly positive. Rather than a forced constancy or a malformed narrative, Ricoeur describes compromise itself as \textit{already} a constructive face of mutual recognition: 'We can take compromise, then, to be the form that clothes mutual recognition in situations of conflict and dispute resulting from the plurality of economies of standing'\textsuperscript{247}. Making a compromise already shows a willingness to recognise the other's value, and moreover, her argumentation that justifies that value, even when it is wholly distinct from the self's. The openness to the other's argument is already part of the solicitude Ricoeur established on the ethical level, and on the moral level his invocation of Marcel's \textit{disponibilité}.

This serves to underline three things. The first is that mutual recognition is not an idealised horizon, but a genuine possibility for discourse to which the self is already oriented. I am going to go on to describe the 'gift' as Ricoeur's transcending form of mutual recognition, but already in the midst of conflict the willingness of both sides 'to live together' shows genuine mutuality. The second is that the way in which the other is recognised sometimes involves a new way of thinking for the self, who must consider thought constructed by someone "from" a different city, or, by extension, from another


language, another culture. This is a point to which I will return (2.3). The third is that the question of recognition - as moral respect for the person - is thus revealed to be not solely about the question of universality. The individual is to be recognised in her particularity. Ricoeur points to 'the contemporary vocabulary of authenticity' as indicating that specific belonging that a person's identity provides in relation to various polities - and also answers the same 'pamphleteer'. Again, this all causes Ricoeur to underline 'the fundamentally “dialogical” character of a demand that assumes a frankly collective dimension. It is collectively, one could say that we demand an individualising recognition'.

However, it is the negative possibilities of this collective demand that prompts Ricoeur to continue in his search for mutual recognition that transcends such problems. Moving away from Honneth, Ricoeur notes that while the struggle for recognition is a key characteristic of human activity, its 'conflictual style, [can] end up as an infinite demand, a kind of “bad infinity”'. So, over against the experience of the struggle for recognition, Ricoeur describes the state of “peace”. The experience of the state of peace is found in 'symbolic mediations as exempt from the juridical as from the commercial order of exchanges'. This allows us to step out of the reciprocal framework of recognition that characterises our constant seeking of the stage of mutual recognition. He reaches this by considering the work of Marcel Mauss on the “gift”.

I prefer Ricoeur's use of the gift in *The Course of Recognition* to his use of mutual friendship from Aristotle in *Oneself as Another*. I noted above the concern of some feminist writers that Ricoeur's sources on this point left friendship as an exclusively male endeavour. Buss cites this as an example of 'the sympathetic fellow traveller's tendency to foreclose feminist exploration of difference by too quick an appeal to our common humanity'. To that end of not 'foreclosing' Anderson sought to rescue Ricoeur's use of

249 Ibid., p. 214.
Antigone\textsuperscript{253} and Nussbaum supplies the suggestion of an alternative myth for the confrontation between convictions\textsuperscript{254}. It is clear from Ricoeur's concern to recognise the particular selfhood of the other that he intends no exclusivity and his shift here to the use of gift, rather than friendship underlines that fact. What Ricoeur does with the concept of gift as an alternative to the 'usual patriarchal sources' to provide a 'different narrative pattern'\textsuperscript{255} for mutuality. In my view it also helps broaden the context for mutual recognition beyond the interpersonal, raising one out of the exclusive particularity of 'because it was he'. The gift allows for specificity beyond the sphere of already connected others.

Mauss suggests that in some contexts the gift is a kind of archaic economics, 'voluntary, disinterested and spontaneous' in theory, but in practice linked with an obligatory response. 'The form usually taken is that of the gift generously offered; but the accompanying behaviour is formal pretence and social deception, while the transaction itself is based on obligation and economic self-interest'\textsuperscript{256}. If one receives a gift, the social context means that one must respond reciprocally. However, Mauss goes on to present the concept of the gift as an idea rich with possibility for removing the sense of obligation. He therefore points more positively toward the priority Maori tradition gives 'not [to] the obligation to give something, nor even that to receive, but that of giving something back in return'\textsuperscript{257}. Mauss, crediting 'the interpretation given by the indigenous people themselves to their practice'\textsuperscript{258}, describes the energy of this obligation and 'the spirit of the thing given'\textsuperscript{259} under the Maori word hau. Hau is chosen to be enacted by the Maori. Mauss's stance here opened a debate with Levi-Strauss on the role of rules in reciprocal exchange, and, indeed, on methodology in social science, between observer-oriented and participation-


\textsuperscript{254} M. C. NUSSBAUM, 'Ricoeur on Tragedy: Teleology, Deontology, Phronesis', and Buss herself suggests a feminist reading of the myth of Psyche. I return to Nussbaum below and outline her alternative myth there as an instance of the enrichening of Ricoeur's ethical theory through the resources of another culture.

\textsuperscript{255} H. M. BUSS, 'Antigone, Psyche and the Ethics of Female Selfhood', p. 77


\textsuperscript{257} P. RICOEUR, \textit{The Course of Recognition}, p. 225.

\textsuperscript{258} Ibid., p. 226.

\textsuperscript{259} M. MAUSS, \textit{The Gift}, p. 7.
oriented analyses. Levi-Strauss contends that by discussing *hau* itself Mauss has obscured the rules which operate in their community on the level of ‘symbolic thought’\textsuperscript{260}.

Both Mauss and Levi-Strauss reduce the discussion to their own discipline - Mauss renders *hau* as an ethnologist, and Levi-Strauss seeks to critique this in ‘his ambition to reduce the social to a universe that could be explained by rules’\textsuperscript{261}. Ricoeur prefers Mauss’s method, taking the Maoris’ intentionality seriously. Acknowledging Claude Lefort as the first to make this criticism of Levi-Strauss, he argues that this critique will allow him to ‘refuse to sacrifice the actor’s own justifications to the constructs of an external observer’\textsuperscript{262}. The alternative to considering intentionality is a mechanism which ‘transforms him into an anonymous agent of a system that surpasses him and one that perpetuates itself as a system only through oscillations’\textsuperscript{263}. The intentionality of gift-giving is obscured by the activity being rendered only in its relevance to the system of reciprocity. Examples of this type of system are a kind of: ‘vicious circle of vengeance (blow for blow)... felt by the actors without their necessarily being able to formulate the rule’\textsuperscript{264}.

Ricoeur’s stance is that even in these circumstances of a systematised activity, ‘we must not lose sight of such concrete gestures as renouncing responding to violence with further violence, or freeing oneself from the grip of the principle’\textsuperscript{265}. This is the echo of the system of sacrifice, a sacrificial offering, which reforms a vicious circle as virtuous, by ‘transfer[ing] all these transactions to a third party, one that is taken as divine in religious systems’\textsuperscript{266}.

The system of sacrificial offering returns Ricoeur to the concept of gift. Yet it is also the construction of sacrifice as an *ut des* social system that turns the ‘sequence of gift and gift in return’ into a paradox. ‘If the first gesture in giving is one of generosity, the second,

\textsuperscript{260} P. Ricoeur, *The Course of Recognition*, p. 226.
\textsuperscript{261} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{262} Ibid., p. 227.
\textsuperscript{263} Ibid., p. 228.
\textsuperscript{264} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{265} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{266} Ibid.
given under the obligation to make some return, annuls the gratuitous nature of the original gift. The same paradox is at work when the self, attesting herself before the other, demands a recognition, that at the same time must remain free. That demand creates a paradoxical system of reciprocal obligatory recognition. Yet, the response of recognition of the other as the image of restitution, is only the next level. It is here that Ricoeur introduces mutuality between persons, rather than a reciprocal exchange that operates by rules ‘above social agents’.

Ricoeur here turns to Marcel Hénaff who resolves this tension by rendering mutual recognition in gift-giving as symbolic. The exchange of gifts is a mutual activity; Hénaff ‘shifts the emphasis from the relation between giver and recipient to seek the key to our enigma in the very mutuality of the exchange “between” protagonists, calling this shared operation mutual recognition. The initial enigma of a force supposed to reside in the object itself is dissipated if we take the thing given and returned as the pledge of and substitute for this process of recognition.”

Hénaff even observes that Mauss was beginning to approach just this idea when he emphasised hau as the energy of the obligation in the gift itself. Describing the Maori concept of the ‘hau of personal property’, Mauss explained that ‘the obligation attached to the gift is not inert. Even when abandoned by the giver, it still forms a part of him’. Hénaff highlights Mauss’s analysis of this: ‘One gives oneself in giving, and if one gives oneself, it is that one owes oneself to others, oneself and one’s property’. Using this approach, Ricoeur is able to argue that mutual recognition can be experienced as a gift, taking both a ceremonial and a practical shape. The gift of the self is where the self voluntarily undertakes the fulfillment of the obligation to recognise the other, taking on the symbolic charge of the “first gift”. Yet the key to avoiding that “bad infinity” of reciprocal recognition, where no recognition is ever enough, is in how that first gift is received.

267 P. Ricoeur, The Course of Recognition, p. 229.
268 Ibid., 232.
270 P. Ricoeur, The Course of Recognition, p. 236.
272 Ibid.
word Ricoeur uses to characterise this is gratitude, the French *reconnaissance*. ‘Gratitude lightens the weight of obligation to give in return and reorients this toward a generosity equal to the one that led to the first gift’\(^{274}\). Recognising the person who has recognised yourself is “another first gift”.

Ricoeur suggests that to grasp this shared mutual exchange in a phenomenology of action, he will continue to refer to a cultural, religious model of that mutuality, such as agape. Agape, characterised by Christian tradition as selfless love, ‘transcends the discrete acts of individuals in the situation of the exchange of gifts’\(^{275}\). Agape allows for the paradox of returning the gift, unnecessarily, with generosity. It describes justness, rather than justice achieved. Phenomenologically, there are ‘two levels, that of actual practices and that of an autonomous circle endowed with self-transcendence’. Gift-giving as recognition of the other is a ‘response to a call in the generosity of the first gift... under the sign of agape’\(^{276}\). David Pellauer emphasises that for Ricoeur this ‘cannot be fully expressed in the transcendent or speculative language of philosophy’\(^{277}\). While it might appear as an exchange, by identifying it under the sign of agape, Ricoeur emphasises its ‘ceremonial character... intended to underscore and protect the festive character’\(^{278}\) that rejects any reduction to obligation.

Yet feasts do not continue indefinitely - the gift suspends the struggle for recognition, it does not resolve it. The gift is an experience of recognition, of a possible future state of peace, but it is not continuous. Recognition of the other still carries its risks. The gift of recognising the other need not be received with gratitude, the self may still be rejected, but it is not a problematic of sovereignty - indeed the free giving of the gift is what has underlined its role throughout this section. Still a rejection is possible, introducing problematic relations again, and similarly, a gift is necessarily a fixed point, rather than continuous and thus the struggle for recognition is not completed with this experience.


\(^{275}\) Ibid., pp. 219-220.

\(^{276}\) Ibid., p. 243.


\(^{278}\) P. Ricoeur, *The Course of Recognition*, p. 244.
Thus Ricoeur instead describes the experience of the gift, symbolic mutual recognition, as sustaining and optative even in its relationship to discord: it is ‘a “clearing” in the forest of perplexities... the gift, apart from its symbolic, indirect, rare, even exceptional character, is inseparable from its burden of potential conflicts, tied to the creative tension between generosity and obligation’.

I emphasise that I am indebted to Ricoeur for his final remarks for clarity and for acknowledgement of what further work is required. ‘The investigation of mutual recognition can be summed up as a struggle against the misrecognition of others at the same time that it is a struggle for recognition of oneself by others’. The recognition of the self was begun in the concerns of ancient narrative. Ricoeur renders that as the originary presentation of the self to herself and so encounters the world as an audience. The opportunity for reciprocity of recognition is thus opened, and it is with Hegel, and Honneth’s work on the Hegelian concept of Anerkennung that the competition between recognition and misrecognition becomes displayed: it is in the three principles of love, law and social esteem, that the experience of misrecognition becomes clarified ‘in the gaining of recognition... where conflict is the soul of the process’. The self becomes recognised by fighting not being recognised and is ethically oriented to an increasing inclusivity.

The involvement of losing and gaining recognition with each other is most clearly observed through the reflection on the gift with which Ricoeur concluded. It is in this ceremonial state of peace that allows Ricoeur to note that recognition could continue outside the moment of truce in mutuality. Where recognition is rendered as something given, a gift, Ricoeur places ‘the complementary idea that this recognition did not recognize itself, to such a degree was it invested in the exchange of gifts that substitute for it even while securing it’. This is the character of recognition as unself-conscious, superabundant, in the economy of the gift.

279 P. Ricoeur, The Course of Recognition, p. 245.
280 Ibid., p. 258.
281 Ibid., p. 259.
282 Ibid.
Yet, even mutual recognition does not efface the asymmetry with which it began. 'The other remains inaccessible in her or her alterity as such... remains unknown in terms of an originary apprehension of the mineness of selfhood'. The self presents herself, but the other can only ever be "appresented". The self must essay a description of the other that is 'at best only analogical for me'.

This final return to asymmetry is characteristic of Ricoeur's philosophical anthropology and his corresponding ethical theory. Ricoeur has constantly returned to this concern in his emphasis of the inter-dependency of the self and the other. This inter-dependency has produced a call to the self to responsibility, and a demand to be recognised from the other. In this way the Ricoeur emphasises the epistemological and moral centre of the self, but overcomes asymmetry in terms of power structures. This underlines his ethical theory and his later examination of recognition as ethics. In my view this lends itself well to the concerns of intercultural communication. It is to this question I now turn, using some of the central conclusions of my preceding chapters to establish the significance of the question for Ricoeur's ethics.

2.3. INTERCULTURAL HERMENEUTICS: RECOGNISING THE OTHER

My purpose in this section is to draw out from Ricoeur's ethical theory and his consideration of recognition why considering cultures as settings and resources for ethical agency is important at all for moral theory. I will make some points following directly from the work I have reconstructed above, but I will also be able to add to these insights using some Ricoeur's smaller articles and indirect remarks on the subject. I am particularly indebted to those scholars who have conducted interviews with Ricoeur leading to fuller articulation on related issues.

I do not propose to provide an in-depth discussion on the definition of culture. As my analysis of Ricoeur's ethical theory will show there are many extant instances of interculturality already indicated. Therefore for my purposes, culture suffices as a sign for the narrative and discursive milieu that is always already present for the self and through

283 P. Ricoeur, The Course of Recognition, p. 260.
284 Ibid., p. 261.
which the self has learned to speak, act, narrate and impute action. This necessarily includes many kinds of discourses. In Ricoeur’s view ‘one cannot reduce any culture to its explicit functions - political, economic and legal etc. No culture is wholly transparent in this way’\textsuperscript{285}. Indeed, Ricoeur speaks of an ‘opaque kernel... constitutive of a culture before it can be expressed and reflected in specific representations or ideas’\textsuperscript{286}.

In fact, Ricoeur’s later essay on the challenges of translation goes further on to reveal the true enormity of any problematising of intercultural dialogue. Ricoeur points to translation as a task for between languages, obviously, but also as a project for discussing interpretations of a whole within a speech community. For example, discussions between the humanities, and the hard sciences effectively require translation - effectively between language games. Thus intercultural dialogue is present outside the traditional categories of nationality, community or language. It is a hidden difficulty within and between many discourses. Ricoeur provides a useful example: philosophical texts are different in their use of particular words, making them carry more complex meanings than the obvious, owing to processes of ‘revival... transformation... refutation’\textsuperscript{287}. These Grundwörter ‘are themselves summaries of long textuality where whole contexts are mirrored, to say nothing of the phenomena of inter-textuality concealed in the actual stamp [la frappe] of the word’\textsuperscript{288}. In this way an individual word presents a whole framework of thought, a way of thinking in fact. I will therefore leave the question of culture as a socially sedimented expression of values and norms; it is a particular historical expression of the ‘desire to live together’, hidden in the discourses and narratives that are produced by its participants. This returns attention to Ricoeur’s assumption behind his ethics of recognition - the presence of plurality. The focus of a discussion on intercultural dialogue therefore becomes a response to this founding empirical experience of otherness.

There are three aspects to work through in this section: philosophical anthropology, ethical theory, and its articulation in terms of recognition. What these parts of Ricoeur’s work

\textsuperscript{285} P. RICOEUR ‘Myth as the Bearer of Possible Worlds,’ pp. 117-125, an interview in R. KEARNEY, The Owl of Minerva, p. 117.

\textsuperscript{286} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{288} Ibid.
lead me to insist upon is that the question of intercultural dialogue is ultimately about discourse between persons, in their cultural and other particularity. I reiterate Ricoeur's objection here to considering the institution as a third agency. The culture I speak of is not a character, or a collective monolith. In this review I identify two major themes. The first theme is the way in which the ethical theory demands the recognition of cultural specificity at each level. My analysis here will be relatively brief, deriving directly from points already established above. The second theme is the way in which this recognition actually benefits the self, and thus the whole ethical system of self, other, and institution. These points largely derive from what Ricoeur has termed the importance of the particularity of the self, or plurality of selves. These themes will run throughout my following examination of the three steps of the ethical theory, ethical aim, moral norm, practical wisdom. I will then close by returning to the question of conflict in relation to intercultural dialogue and consider the problem this leaves Ricoeur.

The significance of culture for the self

I will begin reviewing Ricoeur's philosophical anthropology with the explicit emphasis he gives the culture the self finds itself in to establish narrative identity. Yet all narratives are constructed through the tripartite shape of mimesis: prefiguration, figuration, refiguration. Narrative identity relies on previous ways of narrating. 'It is the identity of the story that makes the identity of the character', the person. Thus Ricoeur has consistently argued that 'to a large extent, in fact, the identity of a person or a community is made of these identifications with values, norms, ideals, models, and heroes'. These things are culturally subsistent. They develop as specific representations of that opaque kernel of a culture. The experience of one's culture informs narrative identity but 'in spite of its

289 It is worth noting that Ricoeur is happy for historians to reconstruct historical narrative by refiguring objects as characters and quotes other works. For example, he points to Braudel's use of the Mediterranean Sea as a changing character to present the historical themes of the region (Time and Narrative I, pp. 161-66). Crucially, this only works if the narrative is acknowledged to be unfinished: "this is the typical case of the "grand narrative," which is indeed... childish... We can imagine such a "grand narrative" all the more so because man, I believe, always needs to place itself in a system of reference. At the same time we must treat these narrations with a deep irony..." (P. Ricoeur in an interview with TAMAS TOTH, 'The Graft, the Residue, and Memory: Two conversations with Paul Ricoeur', pp. 642-669 in A. WIERCINSKI (ed.) Between Suspicion and Sympathy, p. 667). In Memory, History, Forgetting, he is critical of a sociological idea of collective memory as agent.

290 P. Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, p. 147-8.

291 Ibid., p. 121.
intuitive kernel, this experience remains an interpretation’. The cultural influence on the self that contributes to its narrative identity remains subject to refiguration. Rendered as part of narrative identity of *idem/ipse*, the interpretation becomes an interpretation of the self.

This is all familiar from Chapter One. I add to this that the inter-dependent nature of attestation is now rendered by Ricoeur in terms of recognition. Ricoeur’s ‘thesis on this level is that there is a close semantic kinship between attestation and self-recognition, in line with the “recognizing responsibility”’.

This is recognition as identifying oneself and declaring one’s own responsibility and capacity to be counted on. Thus ‘self recognition belongs to the semantic field where it is related to recognition-identification and recognition-Anerkennung’. As I established in Chapter One, self-attestation, now understood as a request for recognition, is answered by the other. The other supplies the cultural resources, acts as an audience, and in its response is ultimately recognised by the other as another self. The dialectic between self and other is fulfilled in recognition.

However, the self interprets, as I just reiterated above, which renders the cultural milieu not as a straightforward given, but instead a production by self and other from given resources. Writing histories, for example, ‘is the process whereby human beings produce themselves and their culture through the production of their language’.

Thus the culture that provides the context for the self is also constantly available for renewal and new ways of thinking about itself. In this way the cultural milieu is also a part of the self’s ownership of her own finitude. To explain this, Wall has usefully summarised this tension by considering ‘my desires and habits: they are first involuntarily present in one’s dispositions, upbringing, and social and historical circumstances: but they are also my desires and habits since I appropriate and shape them as my own particular identity’.

Taken as a collective, ‘humanity finds itself simultaneously created by an already given history, culture, biology, and set of traditions, communities, and social relations, which,

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294 Ibid., p. 92.


296 J. Wall, ‘Beyond the Good and the Right’, p. 49.
nevertheless, it is also capable of creating, in limited ways, into new meaning specifically and singularly for itself\textsuperscript{297}. This meaning finds its first manifestation in ethical theory.

One's culture, as mediated by symbolic networks and practices, classic texts, narratives, values, norms and characters presented through the other and the institution, therefore provides the tools with which to construct a particular understanding of the good life as an ethical aim. The “good life” is culturally subsistent. Thus even ‘ethical solicitude has its origin in some particular historical community’\textsuperscript{298}. Moreover, that the self identifies the good through her own inter-dependency with others, in institutions, indicates that the self is already engaged in a discourse with otherness. Indeed, Dauenhauer identifies the intuition of solicitude for Ricoeur as inherently an ‘intuition of genuine otherness at the root of the plurality of persons’\textsuperscript{299}. The particularity of a given culture directs the self toward a broader acceptance of the other in the good life.

It is the moral norm which then, in Ricoeur’s ethical theory, provides a universalisable concept of duty to the other. However, it is ‘the intuition of genuine otherness at the root of the plurality of persons’ that causes the moral norm shaped in discourse to emphasise the person as non-substitutable. As Dauenhauer puts it, ‘if one focuses exclusively on the unity expressed by the term “humanity.” one would rob persons of the respect due them as diverse, individually distinct persons’\textsuperscript{300}. The other is thus an end in herself and is non-substitutable. There are two important points to make here. Firstly, recognition of the other necessarily includes her specificity, her identity. I emphasised this using Honneth’s theory of recognition above. Recognising the other as her particular self necessarily includes recognition of her culture\textsuperscript{301}. Recognition insists on the non-substitutability of

\textsuperscript{297} J. WALL, Moral Creativity, p. 19.

\textsuperscript{298} B. DAUENHAUER, The Promise and Risk of Politics, p. 167.

\textsuperscript{299} Ibid., p. 167.

\textsuperscript{300} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{301} I reiterate that I do not refer to the broader, more complicated question of recognising her culture as such. Indeed, Honneth considers the possibility that the collective belonging to a culture is so significant that it provides a new horizon for struggles of recognition - the question of collective rights. He notes that there are many kinds of request tied up in the demand for collective recognition and is tied up in ‘the emergence of a whole spectrum of culturally defined communities, extending from “gay communities” to initiatives by the disabled to ethnic minorities’ (N. FRASER, A. HONNETH, Redistribution or Recognition?, p. 162). A good example of an approach to collective recognition is Charles Taylor’s work on multiculturalism in the context of the Quebecois in Canada - see C. TAYLOR, ‘Politics of Recognition’ in C. TAYLOR ETAL., Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition (Princeton; NJ, Princeton University Press, 1994).
the other, necessarily including recognition of the multiple cultural aspects of her particularity, from which the other is able to contribute to society.

Secondly, it is the fact of diversity that prompts recognition for the person as such. Above I highlighted Ricoeur’s approbation of Honneth over Hegel on the grounds that

‘what keeps Hegel’s problematic distant from our own is the speculative reference, with no empirical counterpart, to identity, totality - along with its corollaries: intuition versus conceptuality, indifference versus difference, universality versus particularity. It is this form of ontotheology that prevents human plurality from appearing as the unsurpassable reference for the relations of mutuality, punctuated by violence’.

Ricoeur identifies Hegel’s problem to be ontotheology. This is a term I will examine more closely in Chapter Three in its significance for theories of analogical language. For now however I point out that, unlike Hegel, Honneth is always already working from the fact of plurality. It is this that allows Honneth to emphasise that recognition is ‘intersubjective’. Thus at the root of the ethical intuition of solicitude is the encounter with the other, which in her particularity already displays her ‘genuine otherness’, and by extension the plurality in humanity. This translates on the moral level to respect for the person not only in their universal capacities as a self, but as their particular self. I reiterate that Honneth’s project was directed at the very specific recognition of the identity of the person. This is protected even when the insight is formalised in a culturally subsistent expression of the norm, such as the Golden Rule. The sieve of the norm develops the universal rule into its culturally normative expression.

Under the title of practical wisdom Ricoeur has already indicated the complex relationship between the general thrust of one’s ethical aim, the moral norm and the specific situation of moral judgement. Ricoeur turns to the benefits inherent in the need to fully articulate the argument that can be used to justify one’s considered convictions. It is an ethics of argumentation that he proposes that is simultaneously made necessary by multiple grounds of ethical argument. This critical process is made all the richer for its encounter with those multiple grounds; Ricoeur considered part of the solution of practical wisdom to be rooted in the enriching possibilities of the encounter with the other. I recall here Ricoeur’s analysis of mutual recognition as including compromise in the pursuit of equity; it is part

302 P. RICOEUR, The Course of Recognition, p. 179.
of a process of practical wisdom. Ricoeur implies the intercultural connections of the very idea itself, noting that *phronesis* may be understood alongside the 'prudentia'\(^{303}\) of the Middle Ages. The other provides the opportunity for encountering new ways of considering a problem. *Phronesis* already introduces the first stages of mutual recognition and what this analysis reveals is the value of intercultural dialogue for ethical discourse.

Even amongst the commentators I have employed in this chapter I can point to Nussbaum's use of an alternative narrative to articulate the nature of tragedy beyond what is provided by Ricoeur's use of the Greek *Antigone*. Nussbaum uses the Indian epic *Mahabharata* as an example of divided loyalties and tensions between personal guidelines. Nussbaum employs this particular narrative `because it reveals the structure of the problem very clearly`\(^{304}\) regarding tragic dilemmas. She is using a classical Indian narrative (c. third century BC) to clarify a point drawn on *phronesis*, itself an ancient Greek concept, supplemented by Ricoeur's analysis of Aristotle's good life, Kant's moral imperative, and Hegelian *Sittlichkeit* to form practical wisdom. Nussbaum herself makes a direct comparison with the experiences of officers forming part of the teaching cohort at West Point\(^{305}\).

What this reveals for my purposes is not so much the question of how to establish practical wisdom in tragedy, but the role the other culture can play in that wisdom. The encounter with the narrative of the other culture causes a reflexive move back to consider one's own understanding of ethical dilemmas. This critical *phronesis* is precisely how intercultural dialogue ultimately benefits one's convictions through the enrichment of other views of the world and by an ethical call to better and fuller argumentation.

Ricoeur himself employs this critical reflexivity proposed by intercultural encounters by using Mauss's presentation of the gift. He contrasts this approach with that of Levi-Strauss. Mauss considers the concept of the gift in terms of the culturally specific *hau* and what this can reveal about a philosophy of the gift. Levi-Strauss, by contrast, essentially

\(^{303}\) P. RICOEUR, T. TÖTH, 'The Graft, the Residue, and Memory, p. 659.

\(^{304}\) M. C. NUSSBAUM, 'Ricoeur on Tragedy: Teleology, Deontology, Phronesis', p. 265.

\(^{305}\) Ibid., p. 267.
records cultural particularity without drawing on the possible benefits of that understanding.

This recognition of the originary role of the other should not imply a prioritising of the view of the other. ‘In the progressive order of fulfillment of the moral life, the last word belongs to the convictions which receive the stamp of a specific culture and historical context’\(^{306}\). So the encounter with the other turns the self back to consider her own particular foundation. Intercultural dialogue provides a critical challenge to the culturally subsistent development of each stage of Ricoeur’s ethical theory. This view of practical wisdom actually reveals intercultural dialogue as part of both narration of the good life and the sieve of the norm.

To explain this I turn to Boltanski and Thèvenot. The multiple polities are intellectual frameworks relating to sociological spheres and thus may be read as multiple cultures as amounting to produced ways of thinking - commercial, industrial. One can however benefit from turning to someone from another polity, another cultural way of thinking. The wise person, suggests Ricoeur, is the one who is able to properly handle the ‘back-and-forth movement’\(^{307}\) of multiple spheres, by being able to be above the one-sided requirements of each. He points to Boltanski again when he suggests that ‘in the concrete situations of life it is permissible for each partner to “topple” from one realm to the other’\(^{308}\). Ricoeur puts this in terms of human capacity: that the person has the ‘ability to inhabit several “worlds” through the agency of judgement is finally constitutive of the individual’\(^{309}\).

Again I recall Ricoeur’s parallel between such discourses and the task of translation; this is a project directed toward clarifying one’s own resources\(^{310}\). Phenomenologically, Ricoeur proposes, there can always be a failure to understand. This necessarily introduces


\(^{307}\) P. RICOEUR, The Course of Recognition, p. 282.

\(^{308}\) Ibid, p. 225.


\(^{310}\) P. RICOEUR, On Translation, p. 20.
interpretation. The idea of a straightforward reconstruction, as the alternative, cannot handle the ongoing fluid changes of language and meaning: 'It is always possible to say the same thing in another way'^311, with other words, or reformulating arguments.

Taken together, what does this mean for understanding intercultural dialogue as an object of thought and for ethics? To summarise, the encounter with the other as another self calls the self to responsibility, whilst the other as other enriches the resources the self may use to respond to that call. In this way agency is enacted in response to the dialectic between self and other understood as the product of the conditions of the person and the concrete tools of plurality. This is key for Ricoeur's entire ethics of recognition, calling the self to understood. Culture is inherently part of this plurality, placing at the foundation of Ricoeur's ethics of recognition the resources the acting self may use to fulfill it.

The conflict in intercultural dialogue and a proposed solution

However, I do not want to present the question of multiple cultures as a purely positive experience. David Pellauer presents Ricoeur view of politics in this way: 'political discourse for him is always internally open to contestation'^312. This emerges from humanity's 'insurmountable plurality'^313. For example, Honneth proposes his models of recognition as mirrored by experiences of misrecognition. Such experiences spark confrontation in order to produce wider recognition. Ricoeur turned from this structure on the grounds that it might lead to a 'bad infinity' of quests for recognition: 'The temptation here is a new form of the “unhappy consciousness,” as either an incurable sense of victimization or the indefatigable postulation of unattainable ideals'^314. A political example would be the pursuit for recognition of a collective identity that reaches an

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311 P. RICOEUR, On Translation, p. 25.
313 Ibid., p. 89.
314 P. RICOEUR, The Course of Recognition, p. 218.
'extremist dimension' in nationalism. The fact that one may continue to constantly seek for fuller recognition, regardless of the recognition already achieved indicates that the struggle itself is not an appropriate tool for measuring progress toward mutual recognition. However, it is this experience which provides the setting for ethics.

My analysis of practical wisdom above is presented as a response to the inevitability of conflict: Ricoeur is always careful to pair direct argumentative, or in some cases, violent conflict with the possibility of a creative dialogue. For Honneth this emerges as a characteristic of plurality and for Ricoeur as well: diversity itself leads to disagreement. The cultural encounter immediately introduces the fact of conflict: the self and the other will disagree on the "good", but at the same time Ethics is defined in terms of solicitude and the social bond still exists. I pointed to Wall's analysis of the role of *phronesis* as sometimes presenting a teleological, and sometimes a deontological discussion, as well as tensions between ethics and morals. There is disagreement on both ends and means. It is evident from this that conflict arises through intercultural encounter just as inevitably. Ricoeur 'the insistence on justice and on the political dimension of the inter-human relations holds an even greater and more important place, as we live in a completely fragmented and terribly dangerous world'.

This complex confrontation is what Boltanski and Thévenot have tried to deconstruct by introducing multiple polities as a grounds and contexts for justification of arguments. This is an attempt to explain how such profound disagreement between persons within the context of a shared society emerges. It shows how the individual person moves between diverse kinds of identity in the overall quest for narrative life. This reopens the question of interpretation of the tools used in argumentation. It is Honneth's 'secondary interpretive

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315 In a discussion regarding the conflict in the Baltic States, Ricoeur suggested that violence emerged from a conflict of identities. Indeed he suggests a situation of an 'identity which feels threatened by the other' (P. Ricoeur, 'Universality and the Power of Difference', pp 117-125 in R. Kearney (ed.) Visions of Europe: Challenging Ideas in Dialogue (Dublin, Wolfhound, 1992), p. 119). It was this fragility of identity that led to its reorganisation in terms of nationalist rhetoric that was so characteristic of the conflict. Ricoeur remarks that prior to the conflict he had 'underestimated the capacity of language to reorganise a culture and unify'(ibid). In this instance language gave unity to an identity that reorganised itself in an 'extremist dimension... People must be very unsure to feel threatened by the otherness of the other. I did not realise that people are so unsure when they claim so emphatically to be what they are' (ibid).

316 J. Wall, Moral Creativity, p. 63.

practice'^' 318. In other works Ricoeur would point to Michael Walzer's identification of a 'privileged intermediary level'^' 319 where one finds the community that educates the passions of the individual. There are, of course, certain systems perspective that cannot be reduced to persons and in this way the theory does not provide an answer to the dominance of some segments such as economics and politics over "soft" ones such as education and religion'^' 320. The dialogue between such "cities" is itself an intercultural encounter as will be discussed in Chapter Five (5.1).

Thus there is also conflict regarding the interpretation of expressions of culture'^' 321. I can introduce here disagreement regarding the use of certain narratives by Ricoeur. For example, Anderson, who has been of particular use in providing insight to Ricoeur on autonomy, provides a feminist reading of Antigone. Ricoeur himself prioritises the focus on Antigone as seen 'in particular in the nineteenth century, [by contrast] before Freud gave his preference to Oedipus Rex'^' 322 as an explanation contributing to an understanding of the person. Thus not only is there a question of which narrative to employ as representative of a cultural milieu, but how that narrative is interpreted. The narratives that inform a culture are always subject to refiguration, and thus its role in providing concepts of the good can produce conflict on that question, as well as renewal.

Still I must return to the idea that the opportunity inherent in refiguration is a profoundly positive one. Wall's entire moral project orbits around the fact that it is 'always possible to say something in another way'^' 323. For Wall, the 'poetic dimension of the good is in the end

318 A. Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition, p. 126.


320 In The Course of Recognition, which reconstructs On Justification, Ricoeur himself notes that he will leave 'aside the blind spot of institutional and, more precisely, of political authority, which our emphasis on the social bond leaves aside' (p. 211). Recognition, for which Ricoeur involves Boltanski and Thévenot, is horizontal, 'on the plane of self-esteem' (p. 210), not dealing with the vertical question of authority.

321 I spent the second section of Chapter One indicating the parameters of the debate Ricoeur engaged in with structuralism. Here writing history is indicated by Ricoeur as a productive cultural expression, and is itself therefore constantly subject to an interpretive debate. See also my treatment of history as Same, Other, Analogous in 4.2.

322 P. Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, p. 243.

323 P. Ricoeur, On Translation, p. 25.
not just incidental but primordial\textsuperscript{324}; he considers the persons’s capacity for creativity in morality to have the human condition of plurality itself as an origin.

Even conflict itself can be of use. Aside from the potential infinite demand in Hegel reflected by Honneth, Ricoeur points to the alternative of indifference. Indifference is ‘where we approve of everything, because everything is the same, because everything is equal’\textsuperscript{325}. Conflict sometimes emerges in response to what is intolerable. I recall Ricoeur’s use of the originary response of indignation to abuse of the person. The intolerable therefore reawakens ‘a culture without precise reference points in which tolerance has already swerved into indifference’\textsuperscript{326}.

Ultimately, conflict arises as a category from the conditions of the human person, that of plurality, of narrative identity, of the need for moral judgement in situation. Anderson has put it in these terms:

‘the indirect strategy of interpretation makes us vulnerable to uncertainty, to error, to the violence of misunderstanding or deliberate distortion and corruption; at the same time Ricoeur insists that interpretive reflections are always already ethical (where the possibility of their being unethical is implicit), even before they become critical’\textsuperscript{327}.

This necessarily points the self toward ethical agency, whether as a confrontation of argumentation, an encounter with the cultural resources of the other which are sometimes shared, or experience of indignation on behalf of the other. These include intercultural encounters. ‘It is in the last instance within the individual, even driven by fear, that the destiny of intolerance plays itself out’\textsuperscript{328}. It is with the capacities of the individual with which I intend to stay as I present my final overview of the tensions and creativities of the intercultural encounter and propose a tool for the future.

\textsuperscript{324} J. \textsc{Wall}, \textit{Moral Creativity}, p. 61. It is worth noting that Wall is already placing creativity as a response to the religious account of created, given plurality, which Ricoeur takes up in the myth of Babel in his essays in \textit{On Translation}.

\textsuperscript{325} P. \textsc{Ricoeur}, ‘The Erosion of Tolerance and the Resistance on the Intolerable’, p. 196.

\textsuperscript{326} Ibid., p. 197.

\textsuperscript{327} P. S. \textsc{Anderson}, ‘Ethics within the Limits of Post-Ricoeurian Kantian Hermeneutics’, p. 9.

\textsuperscript{328} P. \textsc{Ricoeur}, ‘The Erosion of Tolerance and the Resistance on the Intolerable’, p. 190.
The problem to which I am returning in this final section is one of instrumentality. I have presented even conflict as a source of beneficial self-transformation, albeit in the context of improving moral sensibility and judgement. I noted in Chapter One John Wall’s concern that ‘selves are inherently prone to the instrumentalization of others by the sheer fact of pursuing a narrative unity of life’. Ricoeur himself closes *The Course of Recognition* by reminding the reader that not even a momentarily transcending mutual recognition allows one to forget the ‘original asymmetry’. At best, he notes, the other may only ever be analogical to me.

What this means is that even in a situation of a practical compromise, of mutual recognition, or of an agapaic gift, when the self speaks of the other, the words are used relative to the self’s experience, rather than the other’s. The self refigures the other, even while speaking of the events in an other’s narrative - indeed the self refigures the insights of the other’s culture, as Mauss does. Similarly, when the other speaks of the self, the words are understood in a particular way by the other before they are applied to the self. For the self to appropriate the other’s meaning, there is a necessary refiguration. Even when the self and the other use the same word to describe an individual, there is the possibility of interpretation. There are built up meanings provided by the shared institution of language as a resource clarified by discourse between self and other. Thus different refigurations of narrative experience are continually formed; ‘imagination is always social imagination’.

On one hand the self must always make itself available to be narrated as well.

‘It is in the context of a discussion on memory as a tool for establishing common histories. We are caught in the stories of the others, so we are protagonists in the stories we are told others, and we have to assume for ourselves the stories that the others tell about us, which have their own founding events, their own intrigues, their own plots’.

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329 J. Wall, ‘Beyond the Good and the Right’, p. 53.
Essentially, 'we have to learn how to vary the stories that we are telling about ourselves'333. Ricoeur rejects this as a kind of relativism, but rather 'an act of reliance on the capacity of others to perceive and to understand things that I do not understand'334.

This is possible through refiguration: Language used to describe, to narrate the self, the other and the institution is used mimetically and I therefore I want to recall here a conclusion of my reconstruction of Time and Narrative. I argued there that narrative can mean multiple things at once in the sense that each narrative is unfinished, always available to refigure, to create a new understanding of the world. The problem with this remains the return to asymmetry. Language is already a shared institution, but the appropriation of words by the self, is reflective of the self's particularity, including the culturally sedimented use of the words. A word, provided by the other, can be used in a refigured way by the self of the self.

On the other hand, the self is also incorporating the other into her own narrative. 'We must be able to spell out the other's culture in our own culture. And our culture in the other’s culture...'335. Yet the self is called to recognise the other, not redescribe her. What Ricoeur argues for is for the self 'to be ready to give the best argument and to allow the other one to give their best argument; it is the justice of truth'336. Yet when the self draws the other into his or her own self-constitution, he or she is already narrating the other, using the always available tools of narrative refiguration. Thus the danger remains of instrumentalisation of the other. Without a return to an awareness of the asymmetry between self and other, the 'genuine otherness' of the other is lost. She becomes a cipher, useful to the self. Perhaps this relationship might attain a certain reciprocal recognition, but the other is not recognised in the fullest sense toward which Honneth and Ricoeur direct the reader.

334 P. RICOEUR, Y. RAYNOVA, 'All that gives us to think: Conversations with Paul Ricoeur', p. 676.
335 P. RICOEUR, T. TÓTH 'The Graft, the Residue, and Memory', p. 651.
336 P. RICOEUR, Y. RAYNOVA, 'All that gives us to think: Conversations with Paul Ricoeur', p. 694.
This becomes all the more difficult in intercultural dialogue. Sometimes the institution of language is shared in culturally sedimented narratives or discourses, and thus self and other share language games, and narration of each other can be undertaken more closely. Yet sometimes it is not the case and so the “gap” between self and other in such an instance lacks some of the resources of an intra-cultural encounter. As I have emphasised above, the conditions of personhood themselves are supported by culturally available resources of self-understanding. Here then, the condition of asymmetry is added to by the concrete difficulties of communication across cultures.

Ricoeur considers handling this difficulty to be a central question of justice. He places his central essay ‘The Paradigm of Translation’ from *On Translation* within the essay collection *Reflections of the Just*, explaining his reasoning in his introduction. He introduces the text as a response to the plurality in politics that may become hostility: ‘situations where understanding is confronted with misunderstanding. This too is the original situation taken into account by every hermeneutic theory. In order to understand, we unendingly interpret our language by means of another version of that language’. This might appear to be only the ever-returning benefit to ethics of ongoing clarification of argumentation. However, Ricoeur continues on the subject of ‘what all this has to do with the just. But we have never stopped speaking of it! To translate is to do justice to a foreign intelligence, to install the just distance from one linguistic whole to another. Your language is as important as mine.’

Here the threat of misrecognition appears from the failure to communicate or the failure to do justice to the other. Significantly Ricoeur adds this point: ‘this threat is more precisely inscribed among the figures of incapacity that affect our capacity to speak and, step-by-step, to say, to recount, up to and including moral imputability’. I therefore want to

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337 Fred Dallmayr has suggested that the particular example of the shared origin myth of Europe already indicates a strangeness or ambivalence. Ricoeur has similarly written on the European question. The myth Dallmayr points to is of Europa, stolen by Zeus from Phoenecia and taken to Crete. This indicates a Near Eastern figure transplanted to the “European” region: “no other continent on earth (to my knowledge) has a similarly intriguing story about its origins; nowhere else is there such an explicit reference to the interlacing of identity and difference, inside and outside, familiarity and strangeness-an interlacing constitutive of the very beginnings of the continent” F. DALLMAYR, *Dialogue Among Civilisations - Some Exemplary Voices* (New York, Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), p. 50.

338 P. RICOEUR, *Reflections on the Just*, p. 27.

339 Ibid., p. 31.

focus on a solution shaped by our capacities for speech as foundational for the other capacities of the self: acting, narrating and imputing action. I want to suggest a solution partly coloured by Wall’s emphasis on creativity, but more significantly shaped by Ricoeur’s own final problematisation of misrecognition: The other as analogical for me.

Conclusion

I argue that what is required is an approach to language itself so that its capacity for refiguration, in relation to its object, is already explicitly articulated. Essentially, language used by the self of the other must indicate sameness and difference, simultaneously. Wiercinski’s title for his edited collection of commentary on Ricoeur, used throughout this chapter, looks all the more appropriate: that of an ‘unstable equilibrium’. What is needed is a tool that allows the self, and indeed the other, to continue to speak and reflect using shared language while recognising the “gap” between them. Here I argue that Ricoeur has already identified how to articulate knowledge of that gap in his reference to the other as analogical to the self. Ricoeur’s own use of translation will remain significant, but I want to present it as a partner to the analogical route and will therefore return to it in the beginning of Chapter Five. For now I want to propose an investigation of the usefulness of the term analogy with respect to the question of ethical behaviour toward the other, and with a particular view to contributing to intercultural hermeneutics.

I argue that the shift that would perform this task most usefully would be to identify language used of the other as being analogically related to that which it seeks to describe, containing both similarity of capacity, and dissimilarity of identity. Analogy is intended to indicate a relationship of similarity and difference, simultaneously. It is by analogy that the self speaks of the other, both close and from another language, another culture, another religion. I therefore turn to consider analogy as a concept for Ricoeur in Chapter Three.
It is Ricoeur who articulates the condition of asymmetry between self and other in terms of an analogical relationship. The self may narrate the other, but this is only analogical to the other as the other narrates herself. Indeed, Ricoeur concludes *The Course of Recognition* remarking that the other is 'at best only analogical for me'. The self is already engaged in an encounter with otherness in terms of her own self-interpretation. I have added that an intercultural encounter between self and other adds concrete difficulties - and opportunities - to this relationship. In my view analogy can also help to articulate the problems of intercultural dialogue. What I propose is analogy as a hermeneutics of speaking about intercultural dialogue. Further, I consider that analogy, as it is expressed within a certain tradition of readings of Thomas Aquinas, is of particular use. In turning to Aquinas, I shall explore the thought forms developed in the Middle Ages to express the human relationship to the otherness of the creator; in using these theological resources, the strengths of a particular background to handle the plural human condition can be made available to current intercultural ethics. The location of analogy within a tradition of reading Aquinas places it in an established framework of argumentation leading to a solution of practical wisdom. Approaching this solution in terms of practical wisdom will be crucial for avoiding a totalised response to the ongoing tensions of intercultural dialogue and the condition of asymmetry: A neutral condition in itself, which can be realized either as solicitude or as domination.

In order to consider the suitability of an Aquinas-based analogy for interpreting intercultural dialogue I intend to first consider how Ricoeur himself handles the question. While Ricoeur does not go further than his remark in *The Course of Recognition* where the other is 'at best only analogical for me', he does discuss analogy in the context of his earlier linguistic based studies in hermeneutics. The most significant instance is in *The Rule of Metaphor* which presents a relatively negative reading of Aquinas. He later brings

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2 Ibid.

what I will argue is more nuance to the question of the utility of analogy in his smaller works on biblical hermeneutics ‘Naming God’\textsuperscript{4} and ‘From Interpretation to Translation’\textsuperscript{5}, and the beginnings of his historiographic work in \textit{Time and Narrative}. I will spend Chapter Four examining these later developments. In Chapter Three I will concentrate on \textit{The Rule of Metaphor} and contemporary articles in order to provide a contrast between Ricoeur’s analysis of Aquinas’s analogy and my own analysis of the same. I will therefore begin by reconstructing Ricoeur, then turn to present an alternative reading of Aquinas through the work of particular thinkers. These thinkers represent a variety of traditions in the sense that they include theologians from the continental and the Anglo-American traditions. It will become clear that traditions of thought on Aquinas follow specific lines of demarkation which I will explain when I present the alternative view.

I will now turn to \textit{The Rule of Metaphor} where Ricoeur ultimately presents Aquinas’s use of analogy as inferior to metaphor, traced back to an over-reliance on an effectively ontotheological framework.

3.1. \textsc{Ricoeur’s early rejection of Aquinas’s analogy: The Rule of Metaphor}

\textit{The Rule of Metaphor} was developed at a time when Ricoeur was concerned with the philosophy of language. His overall interest was in developing what his commentator and translator David Pellauer would call ‘the fullness of language’\textsuperscript{6}. For example, in a collection published in the middle 1970s Ricoeur attempted a philosophy of language that would characterise the use of language ‘at the level of such productions as poems, narratives and essays... of language as a work’\textsuperscript{7}. Here Ricoeur is considering language in terms of discourse, while in \textit{The Rule of Metaphor} he considers the role of metaphor in language and thought in the context of that linguistic philosophy. The moves Ricoeur develops in \textit{Interpretation Theory} are important clarifications of this context because with

\begin{itemize}
\item P. \textsc{Ricoeur}, ‘From Interpretation to Translation’ pp. 331-361 in A. \textsc{LaCocque}, P. \textsc{Ricoeur}, \textit{Thinking Biblically. Exegetical and Hermeneutical Studies}, tr. D. Pellauer (Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1998).
\item P. \textsc{Ricoeur}, \textit{Interpretation Theory: Discourse and a Surplus of Meaning} (Forth Worth TX, Texas Christian University Press, 1976), p. xi. This collection is based on a lecture series given in 1973. These ideas were being articulated by Ricoeur in the same period that The Rule of Metaphor, published as \textit{La métaphore vive} in 1975, was in development.
\end{itemize}
them he ‘offers an account of the unity of human language in view of this diversity of function’\textsuperscript{8}. That unity of discourses will come to be important for how metaphor operates in language and there will be points where \textit{Interpretation Theory} offers a clearer explanation of this.

I will briefly introduce the themes of \textit{The Rule of Metaphor} in order to contextualise the particular study on the ontology of metaphor which is the focus of this section. I will then reconstruct the study by presenting first Ricoeur’s general approach, second, how he views Aquinas’s use of analogy as an ontological theory, third, how linguistics and philosophy should interact as discourses and how this impacts on Ricoeur’s view of metaphor.

Ricoeur examines the concept of metaphor from the perspective of different disciplines concerned with language and discourse through the course of the collection of studies. Beginning with semiotics, where words operate as signs in relation to each other, he initially suggests that metaphor acts as a single-word trope and ‘an extension of the meaning of words’\textsuperscript{9}, replacing one word with another. The key ideas that govern its use are of ‘displacement’ and ‘substitution’\textsuperscript{10}. In terms of the strategic deployment of metaphor Ricoeur recalls Aristotle’s use operating in two areas: rhetoric and poetics. The purpose of metaphor in these two respective instances is firstly to persuade, and secondly to mimetically shape narrative. Ricoeur suggests that this is a static presentation of how metaphor actually works in practice; it ‘fails to explain the production of meaning’\textsuperscript{11}. Instead ‘it is with the sentence, however, that language is directed beyond itself’\textsuperscript{12} and most significantly one can ‘distinguish what is said and about what it is said’\textsuperscript{13}. He identifies the placement of the metaphor in the sentence as crucial for expressing the real tension of metaphor that his thesis in \textit{The Rule of Metaphor} will reveal to be present. Ricoeur remains concerned with the creative potential of certain images for

\textsuperscript{8} P. Ricoeur, \textit{Interpretation Theory} - ‘Preface’, T. Klein, p. vii

\textsuperscript{9} P. Ricoeur, \textit{The Rule of Metaphor}, p. 1

\textsuperscript{10} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., p. 2.

\textsuperscript{12} P. Ricoeur, \textit{Interpretation Theory}, p. 20.

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.
reinterpretation. ‘What is vital, then, is to show how metaphor, which is produced at the level of the statement as a whole, “focuses” on the word’\(^{14}\).

When giving an overview of this process, Ricoeur suggests beginning with pragmatics by describing meaning in terms of use. Walter Kasper, the German systematic theologian, describes this emphasise emerging in linguistics from Wittgenstein’s later work; under this new approach, ‘the meaning of a word or proposition is now seen as residing not in its representation of an object but in its use’\(^{15}\) but rather than dwelling on the distinctions of language games Ricoeur is more interested in how ‘meaning-change’ represents ‘the history of word use’\(^{16}\). Ricoeur is emphasising the flexibility of language, its new substitutions. Still ‘statement-metaphor’\(^{17}\) requires explanation. Ricoeur is ultimately aiming at supplying a clearer philosophical system rather than a context-dependent presentation. To this end he reiterates that his proposed system relies on replacing an understanding of metaphor as ‘resemblance’\(^{18}\) with an emphasis on the ‘tension’\(^{19}\) it brings to bear in each instance.

That tension ultimately leads to the necessity of ‘reinterpretation’\(^{20}\) in attempts to resolve it. Metaphor gives new, additional meaning to a word. ‘This gain in meaning is inseparable from the tension not just in terms of the statement, but also between two interpretations’\(^{21}\). There is the literal interpretation, leading to the expected meaning, the established value of the word. Then, there is the explicitly ‘metaphorical interpretation resulting from the “twist” imposed on these words in order to “make sense” in terms of the statement as a whole’\(^{22}\). It is important that these be held in tension, according to the Ricoeur commentator Jacob Dahl Rendtorff, who has made the ontology of The Rule of

\(^{14}\) P. RICOEUR, The Rule of Metaphor, p. 3.


\(^{16}\) P. RICOEUR, The Rule of Metaphor, p. 3, emphasis mine.

\(^{17}\) Ibid.

\(^{18}\) Ibid.

\(^{19}\) Ibid.

\(^{20}\) Ibid.

\(^{21}\) Ibid., p. 350.

\(^{22}\) Ibid.
Metaphor his particular focus. Rendtorff argues that the transcending role metaphor must be in ‘open play in the tension between ordinary and figurative significance’\(^3\). To consider forming meaning in this way without tension implies connections already established, while Ricoeur seeks to emphasise the innovative role of metaphor.

Ricoeur has previously placed great emphasis on the role of creative symbol and myth, so presenting metaphor as a constant opportunity for re-imagining, places the main thrust of *The Rule of Metaphor* clearly in this same approach. However, the symbol does not provide insight into the specific problem of extended discourse. In commentary David Pellauer describes even a sentence as ‘plurivocal’. At the level of discourse, ‘subjectivity comes into play’\(^4\), and with it, the opportunity for change.

It is this innovation and plurality that prompts Ricoeur to shift from considering the semantic to the hermeneutic. ‘The passage to the hermeneutic point of view corresponds to the change of level that moves from the sentence to discourse properly speaking’\(^5\). Both sense and reference remain crucial to fully explain on this new level:

‘Whereas sense is immanent to the discourse, and objective in the sense of ideal, the reference expresses the movement in which language transcends itself. In other words, the sense correlates the identification function and the predicative function within the sentence, and the reference relates language to the world’\(^6\).

This ‘transcending’ operation of reference when it is metaphor that so refers displays ‘the power to “redescribe” reality’\(^7\). Thus metaphor, in terms of its role in a discourse, gains a strategic, ‘heuristic power’\(^8\). Pellauer continues to make the useful comparison with symbol: ‘metaphors are like symbols in that they contain a surplus of meaning, one that makes use of ambiguity in a productive manner’\(^9\). For example, a metaphor in the arts


\(^7\) P. RICOEUR, *The Rule of Metaphor*, p. 5.

\(^8\) Ibid.

might be equivalent to a model of thought in science, changing the paradigm that serves as the lens of understanding. Again, I can refer to Kasper to articulate one of the significant origins of this way of understanding paradigms of knowledge as successive revolutions. Kasper points to Karl Popper as arguing that 'truth is thus a regulative idea: we can strive for the truth in a process that is open-ended, but we can never reach it'\textsuperscript{30}. Kasper notes that this theory was added to by Kuhn, who expressed it in terms of intellectual revolutions in the paradigmatic conventions which shape the scientific discourse. Thus, even apparently fixed rules such as gravity (Newton) might be reshaped to a new regulative idea (Einstein). However, these "conventions" and paradigms cannot capture a use of language beyond the totality of the world. Critical thinking analyses the subjectivity from whose perspective truth is reconstructed and encounters the distinction between the conditioned world and the unconditioned, such as freedom, relationship to an other as its creator. 'For neither the thinking of K. Popper nor T. S. Kuhn allows the possibility of speaking of 'something that is unconditioned and possesses a definitive ultimacy'\textsuperscript{31}.

Kasper is contemplating such paradigmatic changes in terms of finding theological meaning and ultimately decides that this stage of linguistic philosophical contributions to the question leaves theology meaningless. Kasper will eventually turn to other developments, including the work of Aquinas's analogy, as useful alternatives to reflections on language and truth that leave the thinking subject unexplored.

While Ricoeur does not refer to Popper and Kuhn in this context, his approach to language emphasizes the creative capacity of the subject. He considers the linguistic access to reality in terms of a 'fictional redescription'\textsuperscript{32}, according to Ricoeur, not describing things untruthfully, but heuristically, 'unleashing the power that certain fictions have to redescribe reality'\textsuperscript{33}. I want to recall that Ricoeur introduced his essay on discourse as an object by referencing Plato, who 'had already shown that the problem of the "truth" of isolated words or names must remain undecided because naming does not exhaust the power or the

\textsuperscript{30} W. KASPER, \textit{The God of Jesus Christ}, pp. 88/9.
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., p. 89.
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid.
The "fictional" role of metaphor is similarly not about truth but about the capacity of language to animate thought. It is this operation that will "constitute the principal argument of this hermeneutics of metaphor". Leonard Lawler, writing on the imaginative otherness supplied by metaphor, has put it in these terms: "poetry is created on the basis of discovering new perspectives on the world, new ways of being in the world, new forms of life".

Thus the "fiction" that metaphor represents in terms of its strategic application leads Ricoeur to his final ontological perspective, metaphor as it relates to reality. Metaphor, he suggests, has its "place... its most intimate and ultimate abode... neither in the name, nor the sentence, nor even discourse, but in the copula of the verb "to be"". At one and the same time metaphor signifies a difference and a similarity: an "is not" and an "is like". Should this be satisfyingly established, Ricoeur concludes, "we are allowed to speak of metaphorical truth, but in an equally "tensive" sense of the word "truth"". Pellauer gives the example of Aristotle’s view of plays, which "are actually truer than history because they show us not so much how things are but how they must be". Ricoeur’s introductory renaming of metaphor as tension over resemblance has been shown to be important for semiotics and semantics. However, to finally satisfy himself and his readers on this count, Ricoeur suggests a final philosophical examination of what ontology is "implicit in the theory of metaphorical reference". His response to this final problem is the eighth study of *The Rule of Metaphor* and it is this study which I wish now to examine in close detail.

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35 Ibid.


An analysis of Study 8 presenting the relation of metaphor to ontology

My reason for concentrating on the eighth study is that it is at this point Ricoeur considers how the different kinds of discourse he has considered will interact, and ultimately produce 'interanimation'\textsuperscript{40}. This will be important when I turn to develop language tools for the new context of an ethical hermeneutic of intercultural communication. Moreover, it is during this study that Ricoeur considers previous models of such interaction, and looks at the analogy of being he identifies in Aquinas. I will therefore present Ricoeur's basic premises in this study, then turn to reconstruct his model of Aristotle, to contextualise the reconstruction of Aquinas that follows. It is my view that the reception of Aquinas's analogous use of terms is of interest for intercultural hermeneutics, but that this potential is not recognized in Ricoeur's response. However, to fully understand how Ricoeur responds to Aquinas's use of analogy in the context of Ricoeur's theory of metaphor, it is the philosophical explanation of that theory that must be analysed.

It is important to briefly state Ricoeur's purpose in this study and outline some of the key terms involved in that intention before I turn to examine each step of his process. David Pellauer introduces the caveat that Ricoeur ontology here is a question only of metaphor. More development would be required to think more than metaphor. Pellauer therefore calls it a 'hermeneutic ontology'\textsuperscript{41}. Further development is entirely possible. However, given Ricoeur's clear demarcation of limits, it is important to consider which discourses he is employing. Specifically, clarity is needed in defining them: poetic discourse, and philosophical or speculative discourse.

Ricoeur is clear when he states that 'no philosophy proceeds directly from poetry... nor does any philosophy proceed indirectly from poetry'\textsuperscript{42}. However, Rendtorff notes that 'even through Ricoeur in this line always stresses the fundamental difference between logical reasoning in philosophy and science and the imaginative works of myths, poetry and narratives, this does not prevent him from attributing an ontological function to myth-

\textsuperscript{40} P. RICOEUR, \textit{The Rule of Metaphor}, p. 306.


\textsuperscript{42} P. RICOEUR, \textit{The Rule of Metaphor}, p. 6.
symbolic language. Ricoeur is seeking to explicate an ontology that is implicit in his semantic and hermeneutics presentation of metaphor; 'the discourse that attempts to recover the ontology implicit in the metaphorical statement is a different discourse'. The distinction between these discourses will ultimately limit each of them, even while metaphor supplies the crucial imaginative power for philosophy to continue with its own separate critical process: 'the possibility of speculative discourse lies in the semantic dynamism of metaphorical expression'. Ricoeur's overall project 'is essentially a plea for the plurality of modes of discourse' in relation to metaphor.

When considering Ricoeur's terms it is important to do so in the above context. Philosophical, or speculative, discourse is a very general term. However, Ricoeur is employing it here specifically in the context of conceptualising metaphor. Therefore he is speaking specifically about how philosophy handles metaphor - what is the linguistic philosophical understanding of its operation, and what is its ontological validity. Ricoeur writes of philosophy as speculative discourse that continually attempts to analyse and systematise thinking on concepts beyond what is presently known or articulated. Ricoeur has always considered it important to distinguish philosophical thinking from simply mirroring particular experience. Philosophical or speculative discourse, must consider the presuppositions that permit such an experience, rather than simply reflect the experience. Therefore, the question under view in the eighth study is an explanation of the relevant ontological presuppositions of Ricoeur's understanding of metaphor as separate from the practice of metaphor. These presuppositions are the subject of philosophical or speculative discourse in this context.

This understanding emphasises that philosophical inquiry should not be an isolated discourse, but is an 'interplay of implicit and explicit' that builds on those modes of discourse through which Ricoeur has passed in the previous studies. This 'requires a global decision concerning the collective unity of modes of discourse as modes of use... I

43 J. D. RENDTORFF, 'Paul Ricoeur's Poetic Ontology', p. 381.
46 Ibid. p. 6.
47 Ibid., p. 304.
should like to plead for a plurality of forms and levels of discourse". Not a 'radical heterogeneity' but to 'recognise in principle the discontinuity that answers the autonomy of speculative discourse'. Ricoeur therefore begins deliberately by arguing for that discontinuity; only by doing so can he explicate the interaction by which the ontology is made explicit. Yet ultimately, Ricoeur is seeking a dialectic interaction of modes of discourse, clearly articulated and delineated, with a view to mutual support. It will be by reconstructing and analysing previous models of interrelation between poetic and philosophical discourse that Ricoeur justifies this dialectic. I will therefore begin by examining Ricoeur's analysis of two of these models: Aristotle's 'analogical unity of multiple meanings of being', and the medieval response to that use of analogy typified by Aquinas.

Aristotle’s concept of analogy, Ricoeur argues, 'stems from an initial divergence between speculative and poetic discourse'. There is a plurivocity of meaning when the philosopher considers multiple meanings of being, but this is 'of a different order' than that of 'metaphorical utterance'. The of the philosophical discourse here is exclusively ontological. Aristotle, Ricoeur argues, is explicit in wishing to avoid 'poetical metaphors'. Instead, he is proposing a careful laying out of related categories of thought, not language.

'The ordered equivocalness of being and poetic equivocalness move on radically distinct levels. Philosophical discourse sets itself up as the vigilant watchman overseeing the ordered extensions of meaning; against their background, the unfettered extensions of meaning in poetic discourse spring free.'

Ricoeur considered Aristotle’s project as a failure in the light of the concerns of modernity. This is not a question of a different set of concepts, but that 'modern logicians will be more sensitive than were medieval philosophers to the logical break that interrupts the extension of analogy as it moves from mathematics to metaphysics'. In mathematics, a discourse

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49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid., p. 307.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid., p. 308.
54 Ibid., p. 320.
which ‘guarantees its scientific status’, analogy is formal. It is ‘an equality of relations’. However, from discussing categories of being, Aristotle is moving to consider the question of their inter-relation. Aquinas is seeking a non-scientific expression of a non-generic unity of being. Aristotle makes a change in *Metaphysics* to considering the relation *ad unum*. This is transcendental analogy, an analogy that shapes a hierarchy of principles. The categories which order this analogical extension, Ricoeur argues, ‘come together through analogy’. According to Ricoeur’s analysis, Aristotle’s attempt to establish transcendental resemblance failed when he moved from the formal analogy of relations, forming an analogy of a series of single, hierarchical relationships. ‘The sense of the relation has changed. What is in question is the manner in which the terms themselves relate to one another’ but Aristotle’s new formulation of analogy is only in reference to the dominant term.

However, although transcendental analogy does not resolve the question of a ‘non-generic bond of being’, Ricoeur does not reject Aristotle’s project. He objects to the criticism of Aristotle’s approach as ‘unscientific’. While accepting the syllogism that ‘if science is generic and if the bond of being is non-generic, then the analogical bond of being is not scientific’, he argues that, ‘to say that this resemblance is unscientific solves nothing’. It is not the change of discourse that presents a problem. Therefore, while Aristotle’s attempt at transcendental analogy failed, Ricoeur considers that ‘it is more important to affirm that because it breaks with poetics, this purely transcendental resemblance even today attests by its very failure, to the search that animated it - namely, the search for a relation that is still to be thought otherwise than by science’.

Some commentators have therefore emphasised the aporetic nature of Aristotle’s ontological investigation. Pierre Aubenque has described the final non-resolution as

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56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid., p. 321.
60 Ibid., p. 321.
61 Ibid., p. 321.
'rhapsodic' in its openness to meaning. For Ricoeur this better highlights 'the radical nature of the question, which for lack of a response is thus better exposed as a question'. Aristotle thus provides a precedent, albeit ultimately disappointing in terms of results, for a semantic function to be employed in different modes of discourse. 'By entering the sphere of the problematic of being, analogy at once retains its own conceptual structure and receives a transcendental aspect from the field to which it is applied'. However, Ricoeur considers this an example of how 'there is no direct passage from the semantic functioning of metaphorical expression to the transcendental doctrine of analogy'. Essentially, Aristotle provides 'no place for any transition'. Aristotle's theory of analogy both underlines the need for distinction of discourse, and the call from one discourse to another.

I noted above that Pellauer considered Ricoeur's ontology in the eighth study to be undeveloped regarding a broader hermeneutic ontology than that implied in metaphor. He suggests that 'something like Aristotle's theory of the analogy of being can be helpful in making sense of this idea of a hermeneutic ontology because of the way analogy mediates between, on one side, sheer equivocity, and what, at the other extreme, aims to be purely univocal, essential predication'. Yet Ricoeur rejects Aristotle's theory here in the context of a consideration of how speculative and metaphorical dialogue interacts. The mediation as Aristotle has it renders the discourses indeterminate in the search for firm answers. Ricoeur's rejection of analogy is as of a tradition of speculative discourse. Ricoeur will argue that the medieval philosophical discourse similarly took up analogy as a tool of speculative discourse, understanding Aristotle's new form of analogy as 'a clear intersection' with the scientific proportionality.

63 P. Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor, p. 313
64 Ibid., p. 319.
65 Ibid., p. 304.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid., p. 354.
Again, however, medieval scholarship will represent a valuable precedent for more closely examining the interaction of discourses. Aquinas’s ‘intersection’ of proportions will develop into a clearer distinction between the speculative analogy and the poetic metaphor, even while Ricoeur finds his ontology of language is problematic. I will now examine this step.

**Ricoeur’s analysis of Aquinas’s use of analogy to speak about God’s being**

The introduction of Aquinas’s doctrine of the analogy of being is in terms of a ‘composite discourse’70. While Aristotle moved from one discourse to another, employing effectively poetic resources in speculative discourse, he ultimately left ‘no place for any transition’71. Analogy became an exclusively speculative resource; this is an important context for how Ricoeur views Aquinas’s renewed use of the concept. Ricoeur’s question is whether Aquinas’s project ultimately confuses that transcendental, or philosophical conception of, analogy with metaphor. ‘If it can be shown that the composite discourse of onto-theology allows no confusion with poetic discourse, the way is opened for an examination of figures of intersection’72. For this kind of interaction Ricoeur argues that the discourses must already be understood as distinct. Ricoeur sees this distinction and intersection as necessary to establish the ontology of his theory of metaphor. In my view Aquinas’s approach to the use of analogous terms already presents such a distinction, employing poetic discourse in relation to theological discourse without the horizon of an onto-theological project which Ricoeur identifies as problematic. However, I wish to return to this below after presenting Ricoeur’s final view of a correct interaction of the two modes, so as to use it as a tool of analysis (3.1.3).

For now, Aristotle’s speculative analogy provides the context for Aquinas’s theological project to investigate ways to speak of God without reducing him to human concepts and thus violating his transcendence. Ricoeur suggests that the legacy of this attempt is in the Thomist doctrine of analogy, which displays a clear separation of modes of discourse: ‘Its

71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
express purpose is to establish theological discourse at the level of science and thereby free it completely from the poetic forms of religious discourse, even at the price of severing the science of God from biblical hermeneutics.\textsuperscript{73}

In my later examination of Aquinas it will be important not to identify Aquinas’s work directly with the Thomist approach. Ricoeur does not acknowledge this explicitly, but states that it is ‘the semantic aim of the conceptual enterprise which crystallized in the Scholastic debate’.\textsuperscript{74} The reason he is interested in this debate is its provision of a new split between speculative and poetic discourse, even when they appear most close. Aquinas is therefore brought in by Ricoeur to examine his particular contribution to that split in what Ricoeur concludes is a ‘magnificent exercise of thought’.\textsuperscript{75}

Ricoeur notes that Aquinas’s task is not Aristotle’s. Aquinas is trying to speak of God without drawing him too close to creation, but also without falling silent at his difference. Ricoeur argues that this different challenge required that ‘the very concept of analogy must continuously be redeployed and reshaped into new distinctions’.\textsuperscript{76} Aquinas reconceptualises how analogy operates, but retains it as a resource of speculative discourse. He does this by considering what makes analogy possible as a description of the relationship between God and creatures: ‘the communication of being’\textsuperscript{77} that is presented in the concept of participation. Therefore, Ricoeur examines participation in Aquinas.

Ricoeur considers Aquinas’s early use of participation to express the communication of being from God to creatures to be very close to the Plato’s exemplarism.\textsuperscript{78} Creatures are a kind of imitation of God, who communicates that image in a hierarchical order of descent. What this means is that creatures participate in God to greater or lesser degrees as he

\textsuperscript{73} P. Ricoeur, \textit{The Rule of Metaphor}, p. 322.

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., p. 323.

\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., p. 330.

\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., p. 323.

\textsuperscript{77} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{78} A good example of how one “participates” in the Forms as Plato articulates it can be found in the dialogue \textit{Phaedrus}, where Socrates argues for an increasing participation through contemplation of the most visible Form of beauty.
permits, a kind of relationship between ‘fusion in a single form and radical heterogeneity’\(^79\). There is no need to explain this proposed ontology further because Ricoeur immediately recognises Aquinas’s difficulty here by suggesting that the relation is already too close to univocity. Moreover, Aquinas is yet to account for efficient causation, which ‘founds the communication of being’. The activity of God’s communication is what causes participation, but this also requires conceptualizing as an activity from the human side.

At this point Aquinas begins to test different kinds of analogy, in order, Ricoeur suggests, to think participation in a new way. These two ways are recognisable from Aristotle - proportionalitas, a relation of relations, and proporia, from one to another. However, Aquinas specifies that neither of these operate only in terms of mathematical propositions. Ricoeur notes that proporia demands between its terms ‘determinate distance’ and a ‘strict relationship’\(^80\). This is still too direct for speech about God. Proportionalitas however, can work ‘independent of distance’\(^81\). For example, the intellect is to the soul as sight is to the body. This, Ricoeur remarks, makes it particularly useful for theology so that the infinite distance of the God-creature distinction can be rendered in this way: divine science is to God as human science is to the created. However, ‘the formalism of proportionalitas impoverishes the abundant and complex network formed by participation, causality and analogy’\(^82\).

Neither model works to newly present participation. Ricoeur outlines what is required: it must ‘imply no earlier term and so no univocal attribution of perfection to God and to creatures’\(^83\), yet the relationship to creatures, from infinite to finite must be reconciled’. That relationship must therefore be rendered qualitatively, ‘conceived as a simple dissimilarity, without confusing this idea’\(^84\) with physical or spatial terminology. Ricoeur

\(^80\) Ibid., p. 325.
\(^81\) Ibid.
\(^82\) Ibid.
\(^83\) Ibid.
\(^84\) Ibid.
identifies Aquinas’s solution as conceiving being itself ‘less as form than as act, in the sense of actus essendi’\(^85\).

Causality then is the communication of that act. This allows the effect a similarity with its cause by virtue of the act, but is distinguished from it by that same distinguishable event. ‘It is creative causality, therefore, that establishes between beings and God the bond of participation that makes the relation by analogy ontologically possible’\(^86\).

What kind of analogy can signify this, asks Ricoeur. He identifies two different ways used after the “being as act” insight in the texts that came after De Veritate. The first is of two things to another third - used in De Potentia to explain the relation of quantity and quality to substance\(^87\). The second is of one thing to another, created being to the divine, the ‘primary analogue’\(^88\), used in question 13 of Summa Theologiae\(^89\). In this instance the relation ‘is capable of proceeding from the most eminent to the less excellent, following an asymmetrical order of perfection’\(^90\). This order Ricoeur considers to be the midpoint between equivocal and univocal.

However, when, in Ricoeur’s terms, these ‘two uses of analogy are brought together once again’\(^91\), participation is placed to provide a mirror for analogical naming. ‘Thinking is forced to base the diversity of names and concepts upon an ordering principle inherent in being itself’\(^92\). Ricoeur argues that the cause itself must be rendered analogical because it is in the activity of God that unity and diversity are synthesised. God, as act, shapes the

\(^85\) P. RICOEUR, The Rule of Metaphor, p. 326.

\(^86\) Ibid.

\(^87\) T. AQUINAS, Questiones disputatae de potentia Dei, tr. The English Dominican Fathers (London, Burns, Oates & Washbourne, Ltd, 1932-34), 7, 6. Afterwards referred to as de Potentia.

\(^88\) P. RICOEUR, The Rule of Metaphor, p. 326.


\(^90\) P. RICOEUR, The Rule of Metaphor, p. 326.

\(^91\) Ibid.

\(^92\) Ibid., p. 327.
order, analogically\textsuperscript{93}. This synthesis is then employed for analogical language. So language is not ‘completely dislocated’\textsuperscript{94}, instead ‘Being revives Saying...by means of underlying continuities that provide an analogical extension of its meaning to Saying’\textsuperscript{95}.

Ultimately, this analogised basis for analogy failed to persuade. The advent of Galilean physics meant that causes could no longer be understood as analogical themselves, and the conceptual unity of analogy is rendered inadequate, as it is not ‘capable of encompassing the ordered diversity of the meanings of being’\textsuperscript{96}. Consequently, as with Aristotle, Ricoeur does disdain the project itself. Yet the ‘semantic intention’ of finding an adequate expression of analogy might still be pursued.

I will want to return to this articulation of the doctrine of analogy in Aquinas. In my view Ricoeur’s description of analogy as an exclusively speculative tool is problematic. Recent theological commentary has sought to apply linguistic philosophy in an attempt to view analogous use of language, rather than the ‘\textit{analogia entis}’\textsuperscript{97} with which Ricoeur concludes his analysis\textsuperscript{98}. However, this will be more easily done in the light of Ricoeur’s conclusions regarding appropriate ontology of language and the dialectic of discourses.

What Ricoeur considered a success in Aquinas’s attempt to use analogy as speculative discourse about God was how Aquinas conceived of the relationship to poetic discourse. This is consistent with Ricoeur’s prioritising of a ‘relative pluralism of forms and levels of discourse’\textsuperscript{99}, but with a ‘\textit{discontinuity}’ between them. Aquinas approached analogy,

\textsuperscript{93} Wolfhart Pannenberg has criticised this understanding of analogy as ultimately relying on a univocal meaning of analogy itself. He distinguishes between this approach and that of Thomas Aquinas however. See W. PANNENBERG, ‘Analogy and Doxology’, pp. 211-238 in his own \textit{Basic Questions of Theology}, vol. 1 (London, SCM Press, 1973). I will examine some of Pannenberg’s approach to theories of analogy in the following section (3.2 and 3.3.).

\textsuperscript{94} P. RICOEUR, \textit{The Rule of Metaphor}, p. 327.

\textsuperscript{95} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{96} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{97} Ibid., p. 330.

\textsuperscript{98} In section 3.3 I will examine the difference between some of these approaches to analogy as praxis and what they mean for employing analogy as an interpretive tool of intercultural dialogue. These include Wolfhart Pannenberg who I have already noted and David Bentley Hart, primarily using his work \textit{The Beauty of the Infinite: The Aesthetics of Christian Truth} (Grand Rapids; MI, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2003).

\textsuperscript{99} P. RICOEUR, \textit{The Rule of Metaphor}, p. 304.
Ricoeur argues, without a ‘compromise in any way with poetic discourse’\textsuperscript{100}. Indeed, he articulated a new distinction between analogy and metaphor, that allowed metaphor to be used without losing its poetic character. It is evident that Aquinas must account in some way for his use of metaphor, argues Ricoeur, because of the examples he uses to explicate participation - the fire\textsuperscript{101}, the sun\textsuperscript{102}. However, there is a distinction in how such metaphors are used from how analogy is used. There are two ways to speak proportionally, introduced in \textit{De Veritate}: a transcendental proportionality and a symbolic proportionality\textsuperscript{103}. The former is analogical, the latter metaphorical.

Metaphor is symbolic; this ‘assigns something belonging to what is principally signified to the name attributed to God. Such is the asceticism of denomination requiring the exclusion of poetry’\textsuperscript{104}. This rejection of poetic and metaphorical expression from speculative “denomination” is further explained in \textit{Summa Theologiae} with identifies two orders of priority. The first is of being, ‘a priority according to the thing itself’\textsuperscript{105} which begins with God as creator. This should be considered ‘analogy properly speaking’\textsuperscript{106}. The second is ‘priority according to signification’\textsuperscript{107} which begins with creaturely language. Ricoeur suggests that this alone is metaphor. This gives metaphor a place within analogical language while retaining the crucial difference of predication. The result is a composite mode of speaking, ‘criss-crossing’\textsuperscript{108} between the two. These two ways of speaking of God thereby intersect and ‘this intersection illustrates the union of Aristotelian reason with the \textit{intellectus fidei} in the doctrine of St. Thomas’\textsuperscript{109}. Thus, the two modes of discourse themselves intersect, the ‘speculative verticalizes metaphor, while the poetic dresses

\textsuperscript{100} P. RICOEUR, \textit{The Rule of Metaphor}, pp. 327/8.
\textsuperscript{101} T.AQUINAS, \textit{de potentia}, 7, 6, ad 7.
\textsuperscript{102} T.AQUINAS, \textit{Summa Theologiae}, 1, 13, 5c.
\textsuperscript{104} P. RICOEUR, \textit{The Rule of Metaphor}, p. 328.
\textsuperscript{105} Ibid., p. 329.
\textsuperscript{106} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{107} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{108} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{109} Ibid.
speculative analogy in iconic garb. This is also how biblical narrative is retained, reintroduced as metaphorical discourse.

Rendtorff refers to Paul Henle’s use of “icon” here; Henle was concerned with the comparison which Ricoeur has already thrown off. Henle proposed the use of the word icon as ‘a cluster of significations appealing to human perception that relates to a totality of sentences, words, or ideas’. Rendtorff is correct to emphasise the characteristic of ‘opening’ that the word icon implies. In this case, the analogy is ‘able to open a vocabulary for new signification’. In a useful insight Rendtorff links this back to metaphor as tension, his key analysis of Ricoeur, the necessary ‘clash or shock’ of the word use. Any attempt to redraw metaphor as merely resemblance is helped by the inclusion of the pragmatic context of the icon, religious praxis. This allows Ricoeur to turn back to the value of biblical discourse in its testimonial capacity of speaking of God. For Ricoeur it is a failing of Aquinas’s analogy that he does not also do so, but instead continues in speculative discourse. Rendtorff provides a slightly different criticism when he notes that ‘resemblance and analogy are imprecise terms that cannot possibly contribute to the clarification of the analysis’.

In my view the ‘openness’ of the analogy in question is an appropriate reminder for any analysis of Aquinas as well. I will return to this articulation of the insights of analogy in Aquinas when I contrast other commentary on the subject with Ricoeur’s final overview of philosophical and poetic discourse. For now, and for Ricoeur, Aquinas at least represents a precedent for an interplay between different modes of discourse, despite the failure of that model to fulfill its speculative intention. With this methodology in mind Ricoeur can turn to more closely examine the philosophical discourse of metaphor under the title of ‘The Intersection of Spheres of Discourse’. These spheres are not the ‘radically

113 Ibid.
114 Ibid., p. 391.
115 Ibid.
heterogenous language games of Wittgenstein. Ricoeur will eventually conclude that they interact in dialectic, as I have indicated at various points above, but the steps I analyse below will clarify how this is so.

The Interaction of ‘Spheres of Discourse’

For Ricoeur’s dialectic to operate, poetic discourse must have its own distinct ‘living’ act of discourse to be part of an interaction that will reveal its ontological presuppositions. ‘Only revivifying the semantic aim of metaphorical utterance in this way can recreate the conditions that will permit a confrontation that is itself enlivening between the modes of discourse fully recognised in their difference’. Therefore, Ricoeur begins by examining this.

Metaphor suggests a resemblance, but that similarity in ‘within and in spite of difference’ and as a result metaphor demands speculative clarification. ‘The semantic shock produces a conceptual need’. It is speculative discourse that must respond with its ‘resources of conceptual articulation’. There is a new sense from the productive imagination, but there is also a new reference, and thus metaphor is ‘being-as’, both being and not being, like, but not like. That reference may even be to something hitherto unknown or unexpressed in language. The ontological postulate of reference is a crucial conceptual object for speculative discourse on metaphor.

In the view of Jean Ladrière, whom Ricoeur employs at this point, this is an ‘extension of a dynamism of meaning that can be found in even the simplest utterance’. There are two movements he identifies. ‘One movement aims at determining more rigorously the conceptual traits of reality, while the other aims at making referents appear’. By relating

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118 Ibid., pp. 305/6.
119 Ibid.
120 Ibid., p. 350.
121 Ibid.
122 Ibid., p. 351.
123 Ibid., p. 352.
this dual work to the development of language more generally, Ladrière underlines the 'historicity'\(^2\) of the flexible but particular framework of meanings. 'The sedimented history of assembled meaning can be recovered in a new semantic aim\(^1\)\(^2\)\(^5\).

It is Ricoeur's argument that Ladrière's outline of flexible meaning is carried to its extreme by metaphor which presents a radical instability of meaning. It actually carries two references, what Ricoeur calls a 'split-reference'\(^1\)\(^2\)\(^6\). Veronika Hoffmann provides the useful insight that Ricoeur's conclusion here does not only reject the 'substitution' or 'resemblance' conception of metaphor as I have already articulated, but also rejects any 'interaction or predication theory'. Under this conception of metaphor the metaphorical utterance is a third term mediating between two others which share no resemblance or similarity. The significance of not conceiving of metaphor as a third term is that it marks the assumption of a form of mediation which does not signify a third element, but a movement\(^1\)\(^2\)\(^7\). The semantic innovation of metaphor as it is presented by Ricoeur is thus at the level of reference.

To describe this movement Ricoeur notes the 'directional, vectoral character'\(^1\)\(^2\)\(^8\) of metaphor, in the dynamic instability of meaning as such. That direction is supplied when 'this already constituted meaning is raised from its anchorage in an initial field of reference and cast into the new referential field which it will then work to delineate'\(^1\)\(^2\)\(^9\). What this suggests, for Ricoeur, is that 'the new field is already in some way present'\(^1\)\(^3\)\(^0\), drawing in the new meaning with a 'gravitational pull'\(^1\)\(^3\)\(^1\). Ricoeur concludes that this new field therefore supplies a certain 'ontological vehemence'\(^1\)\(^3\)\(^2\) to the directional nature of


\(^{125}\) Ibid., p. 353.

\(^{126}\) Ibid., p. 297.


\(^{129}\) Ibid., p. 352.

\(^{130}\) Ibid.

\(^{131}\) Ibid., p. 354.

\(^{132}\) Ibid.
metaphorical meaning, that meaning remains 'only a semantic sketch without conceptual determination'\textsuperscript{133}.

However, while Ricoeur will retain the conception of metaphor, and figurative language, as movement, the idea of the 'ontological vehemence' supplied by the new field of reference has been subject to criticism. Ontological reference remains important: the 'problem of relatedness to the real is unavoidable'\textsuperscript{134}. Ricoeur develops a new emphasis on refiguration.

In the \textit{Time and Narrative} trilogy, which continues to consider this point, Ricoeur has come to emphasise narrative as a way of handling the aporias of temporality, which include this referential dimension. It is with narrative that Ricoeur can consider 'making this aporia work for us'\textsuperscript{135}. Rendtorff has argued that because narrative itself is a 'metaphorical redescription of the lifeworld'\textsuperscript{136}, it is ultimately about 'concrete human existence'\textsuperscript{137}. The significance of this shift to narrative is better summarised as a new emphasis on the response of the reader overlaying the ontological reference. It is the reader who refigures the narrative, redescribing the lifeworld to herself.

No longer speaking only of fiction, but also of history, Ricoeur is able to consider the role of interpretation in the tensions between the different kinds of truth-claims these narratives present. He had already begun to consider the role of interpretation in the works contemporaneous with \textit{The Rule of Metaphor} as part of his ongoing investigation into linguistic philosophy. Ontological concerns are still necessary for 'the classical problem of the relation of narrative be it historical or fictional, to reality'\textsuperscript{138}. Pellauer puts it in these terms, that 'just as there is a truth of history as narrated, so too there can be a truth of fiction where this is a truth that operates at the level of extended discourse, not at that of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{133} P. Ricoeur, \textit{The Rule of Metaphor}, p. 354.
\item \textsuperscript{134} P. Ricoeur, \textit{Time and Narrative} III, p. 5.
\item \textsuperscript{135} Ibid., p. 4.
\item \textsuperscript{136} J. D. Rendtorff, 'Paul Ricoeur's Poetic Ontology', p. 381.
\item \textsuperscript{137} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{138} P. Ricoeur, \textit{Time and Narrative} III, p. 100.
\end{itemize}
the sentence’. Here is Ricoeur’s summary of how the ontological understanding of narrative discourse, as the overarching shape of fiction and history:

‘The advantage of an approach that pairs history and fiction to confront the aporias of temporality is that it leads us to reformulate the classical problem of referring to a past that was “real” (as opposed to the “unreal” entities of fiction) in terms of refiguration, and not vice versa. This reformulation is not limited to a change in vocabulary, inasmuch as it marks the subordination of the epistemological dimension of reference to the hermeneutical dimension of reference."

What this means is that the previous ontological reference for metaphor as “being-as” is correlated with “seeing-as”. The “being-as” of fiction, of figurative language has impact by redescribing reality. History writing requires a redescribing of reality too, drawing past events into view. In this way, history can use fiction as a productive tool for the ‘refiguration of time’ with the aim of concretizing past events. This is not a presentation of those events directly, but an imagining, a “seeing-as”. Therefore,

‘the interweaving of history and fiction... belong to an extended theory of reception, within which the act of reading is considered... It is within such an extended theory of reading that the reversal from divergence to convergence occurs in the relation between historical narrative and fictional narrative."

The reader has become the mediator between discourses, where each enriches the other. It is at this point ‘where discovering and inventing are indistinguishable, the point, therefore, where the notion of reference no longer works’. Instead, history and fiction are marked as productive, and must not be limited by a rigidity of reference, but opened to the ongoing refiguration of the reader. Lawler describes this activity of refiguration by underlining its genuinely imaginative production: ‘the movement that the reader or interpreter undergoes, mirrors, or even reactivates the process that the poet underwent in the first place to create the metaphor’. This is a new creative process.

140 P. RICOEUR, *Time and Narrative III*, p. 5.
141 Ibid., p. 101.
142 Ibid., pp. 180/1.
143 Ibid., p. 158
Ricoeur should be defended on this apparent change in viewpoint. The move to seeing-as from being-as is a new perspective rather than a stark correction, and this continues to support Ricoeur's own view as Pellauer presents it: 'philosophical discourse for Ricoeur is always incomplete'\textsuperscript{145}. The move from language as "being-as" to "seeing-as" does not remove the ontology of \textit{The Rule of Metaphor} but merely adds to the ontology of language, and ultimately underlines its dynamic character. Indeed, Rendtorff, in the light of \textit{Time and Narrative} III, has already returned to interpreting \textit{The Rule of Metaphor} in terms of "seeing-as". He understands "seeing-as" as foundational for poetic and metaphoric reference, founded on Ricoeur's 'phenomenology of imagination'\textsuperscript{146}. The refigurative response of the reader becomes the critical tool.

The shift in emphasis is from metaphor in isolation to metaphor in extended, multiple discourses\textsuperscript{147}. In such instances the ongoing question of the "real" remains important. This is already indicated in the eighth study where Ricoeur introduces his consideration of speculative discourse as only possible through the semantic dynamism supplied by the use of figurative language. There are other discourses in which the 'inexhaustible'\textsuperscript{148} nature of figurative language is revealed to be significant. Ricoeur's contributions to biblical hermeneutics, which I discuss below, rely on ever fruitful figurative language. The role of historical consciousness as "standing-for", where the historian uses the resources of fictional and figurative language, itself contributes to the dynamic ontology Ricoeur has in view. What \textit{Time and Narrative} III supplies to this is again its central feature of the interpreter, the refiguring reader. I will deal with this historiographic operation again when I turn to consider analogy as a potential tool for intercultural communication (4.2-3).

Now I turn, with Ricoeur, to consider speculative discourse as possible through the semantic dynamism supplied by poetics. Its purpose is to 'establish the primary notions, the principles that articulate primordially the space of the concept'\textsuperscript{149}. In this sense it is exclusively conceptual, concepts cannot be established except in this mode of discourse.


\textsuperscript{146} J. D. RENDTORFF, 'Paul Ricoeur's Poetic Ontology', p. 395.


\textsuperscript{148} L. LAWLER, 'Live Metaphors and Traces', p. 353.

\textsuperscript{149} P. RICOEUR, \textit{The Rule of Metaphor}, p. 355.
Even when the concept seems to appear later in the process, ‘it is indeed first discourse in the order of grounding’\textsuperscript{150}. So when in response to a metaphor, one attempts to make sense of the meaning, it is done ‘in accordance with the constitute laws of the logical space itself’\textsuperscript{151}, to be established by speculative discourse.

Here then, speculative discourse makes sense of metaphor in ‘being-as’, distinguishing between an object being the same, versus being similar. It is this conceptual clarity that explains ‘the disparity [inadéquation] between illustration and intellection, between exemplification and conceptual apprehension... it is the concept that makes the play of representation possible’\textsuperscript{152}. This renders the image in the metaphor as ‘standing-for’\textsuperscript{153}, which does not lead to ‘apprehending a sense that is one and the same’\textsuperscript{154}, but keeps its conceptually grounded distinctions. This, Ricoeur argues, is where ‘metaphorical discourse encounters its limits’\textsuperscript{155}. In this way, the concept remains distinct from the interplay of ideas created by the metaphorical utterance, but avoids destroying it by deliberately keeping the possibility for the ‘play of representation’\textsuperscript{156}. To explain further, the “tension” of metaphor will never be resolved, so the movement of the metaphorical utterance is kept active, ‘expressed in the very process of interpretation’\textsuperscript{157} which is never exhaustive.

Yet it is also not abandoned to isolation from other discourses: ‘interpretation is the work of concepts’\textsuperscript{158}. Each individual interpretation found from metaphor establishes a conception. While ‘reductive’ in the light of the extreme instability of meaning, this is ‘consistent with the semantic aim of the speculative order’\textsuperscript{159} which is always seeking new

\textsuperscript{150} P. RICOEUR, \textit{The Rule of Metaphor}, p. 355.
\textsuperscript{151} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{152} Ibid., p. 356.
\textsuperscript{153} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{154} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{155} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{156} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{157} Ibid., p. 357.
\textsuperscript{158} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{159} Ibid., p. 358.
mastery of concepts beyond the horizon of what is already understood. Ricoeur does not reject the attempt to seek a new grasp on ideas, but when Pellauer contends that 'philosophical discourse for Ricoeur is always incomplete'\textsuperscript{160} this means that any grasp on the real is never total, and should never be made so. Moreover, Pellauer continued to argue that 'this may explain why [Ricoeur] has so little to say about it, other than to seek to protect it from attempts to reduce philosophy to something other than itself while at the same time not allowing it to overreach itself'\textsuperscript{161}. In fact, this point accurately describes Ricoeur's approach to all particular discourses. In this instance, Ricoeur acknowledges the need to pursue new understandings philosophically, but poetic language cannot be dissolved into this process. Both discourses would be undermined, so the discourses must remain distinct.

Therefore, Ricoeur, proposes, interpretation itself is the composite discourse that he has been seeking to provide as a way of supporting the necessary dialectic between poetic and philosophical discourse. 'On one side, interpretation seeks the clarity of the concept; on the other, it hopes to preserve the dynamism of meaning that the concept holds and pins down'\textsuperscript{162}.

Ricoeur recalls to the reader now that the dialectic of discourses is necessary to allow the exploration of the underlying ontology of metaphor, implicit there, but to be rendered explicit in speculative discourse. Now that the passage from the former to the latter is to be structured by the process of interpretation, Ricoeur is able to turn his focus to the content of that ontology. Ricoeur will ultimately show that ontology to be in something of a state of flux, in dialectic with the ongoing dynamic of metaphorical semantics. Semantics moves from a word with a particular sense to referring to a particular thing, while speculative philosophy 'at the very time' that this occurs 'moves from being to being-said'\textsuperscript{163}. The dialectic relationship will continue, as Ricoeur provides his general


\textsuperscript{161} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{162} P. RICOEUR, \textit{The Rule of Metaphor}, p. 358.

\textsuperscript{163} Ibid., p. 360.
thesis, avoiding any strong system by suggesting that 'the whole of language can be thought, although not known, as the being-said of reality'\textsuperscript{164}.

However, 'semantics can only allege the relation of language to reality but cannot think this relation as such'\textsuperscript{165}. Therefore to pursue this hypothesis a philosophy of language, or meta-language, is necessary because this is where language 'possesses the reflective capacity to place itself at a distance and to consider itself, as such and in its entirety, as related to the totality of what is'\textsuperscript{166}. While speculative discourse provides the necessary reflexivity, metaphor retains the capacity to create new meanings and so supply new perspectives. 'Speculative discourse has its condition of possibility in the semantic dynamism of metaphorical utterance, and that, on the other hand, speculative discourse has its necessity in itself, in putting the resources of conceptual articulation to work'\textsuperscript{167}. As I indicated above, when defining Ricoeur's terms, these two discourses are dialectically engaged. Ricoeur is emphasising the hermeneutics of language that is part of the dynamic semantic aim of metaphor, and the consciousness of that openness that must be articulated and explained by linguistic philosophy.

However, it is because of this very openness that a critical inquiry must be begun. 'The following question has arisen repeatedly: do we know what is meant by world, truth, reality? At the very heart of semantic analysis, this question anticipated the critical moment of speculative discourse'\textsuperscript{168}. Ricoeur considers the split reference of metaphor as an example. The first reference is negated by the second, providing the opportunity for the second reference to 'unfold... governed by the power of redescription belonging to certain heuristic fictions in the manner of scientific models'\textsuperscript{169}. This split-reference has an almost 'disordering effect'\textsuperscript{170}, redescribing reality and offering a new way of thinking.

\textsuperscript{164} P. RICOEUR, \textit{The Rule of Metaphor}, p. 360.

\textsuperscript{165} Ibid., p 359.

\textsuperscript{166} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{167} Ibid., pp. 349/50.

\textsuperscript{168} Ibid., p. 360.

\textsuperscript{169} Ibid., p. 361.

\textsuperscript{170} Ibid.
The previously exhaustive character of a description is precisely what is broken open by redescription. Thus the previous understanding of what was "true" in this case must itself be 'remade'\textsuperscript{171}. Yet this apparent disorder is not arbitrary, instead that description 'remains within the limits of representation by objects'\textsuperscript{172}. What was previously understood is not removed or replaced, but added to, and indeed re-energised by the metaphorical power of the redescription. Similarly 'shaken in turn' are other dialectics related to other modes of discourse: discovering/creating, finding/projecting.

This newness without arbitrariness is a crucial characteristic of the kind of ontology Ricoeur is pursuing here. It is not a substance ontology but is more concerned with the character of the human relationship to the world as a whole, in this case 'our primordial belonging to a world we inhabit'\textsuperscript{173}. It is the split-reference of metaphor that reveals precisely how that inhabiting goes on: 'Poetic discourse brings to language a pre-objective world in which we find ourselves already rooted, but in which we also project our innermost possibilities'\textsuperscript{174}. The question is not longer one of objects but the world in relation to language, that world 'which at once precedes us and receives the imprint of our works'\textsuperscript{175}. That 'at once' is crucial, presenting both what is and is not. Again, represented by the split-reference, it 'signifies the tension characterising metaphorical utterance... carried out ultimately by the copula is'\textsuperscript{176}.

Ricoeur suggests that this ontological paradox could not have been dealt with when he was focused on the semantics of reference earlier in \textit{The Rule of Metaphor}. He needed to pass through the discipline of linguistics to speculative discourse in order to retrieve this

\textsuperscript{171} P. Ricoeur, \textit{The Rule of Metaphor}, p. 361.

\textsuperscript{172} Ibid., p. 362.

\textsuperscript{173} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{174} Ibid., pp. 361/2

\textsuperscript{175} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{176} Ibid.
concept. Earlier Ricoeur rejected Aristotle’s analogical, non-generic categories of being. He now employs Aristotle’s ‘more radical distinction’; a dialectic of actuality and potentiality. In the copula of metaphor, Ricoeur identifies a genuine ‘polysemy of being’, expressed in dialectic - is and is not, actuality and potentiality, the established value of a referring word and the new. Thus ‘the ultimate meaning of the reference of poetic discourse is articulated in speculative discourse’.

It is again Aristotle who helps Ricoeur to present metaphor in terms of this dialectic. Metaphor, Aristotle remarks, ‘represent things in a state of activity’, which Ricoeur renders as ‘signifying things in act’. The vivifying character of living metaphor remains undetermined however, and so Ricoeur seeks to emphasise that it ‘can only be in an exploratory and not in a dogmatic fashion, by questioning instead of asserting, that we can attempt to interpret the formula’. He rejects any anthropomorphic expression that might lead to an ego-centric subreption, but suggests the, already appropriately ‘lively’ phrase, ‘naturally blossoming’. Ricoeur continues to emphasise the exploratory nature of this suggestion; metaphor seeks, in its split-reference, to describe/redescribe ‘a point in our experience where living expression states living existence’.

Metaphorical utterance always has the capacity to contribute to the development of new perspectives. Rendtorff has put it in these terms, ‘metaphor contributes to dynamic ontology by doing the dream work of language at the limits of established conceptual

177 He also rejects Heidegger’s ontology for inappropriately considering the poetics of ontology, rather than the ontology of poetics. At a later stage, Ricoeur notes that this approach ignored ethics, and as Ricoeur himself increasingly placed ontology as the final stage in a process to emphasise its open dynamism, articulating the ethical project placed before it is important. See P. Ricoeur, R. Kearney, ‘Dialogue - The Crisis of Authority’ in R. Kearney, The Owl of Minerva (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2004), pp. 166-7. Although it is worth noting that Ricoeur also rejected Levinas’s ethics without ontology - P. Ricoeur, Tenth Study: ‘What Ontology in View?’ - Oneself as Another, tr. K. Blamey (Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1995)


179 Ibid.

180 Ibid., p. 364

181 Ibid.

182 Ibid., p. 365.
categories'. This is not to imply that poetry does the work of speculative discourse, but simply goes further than speculative discourse can go. As I have continued to emphasise, Ricoeur remains concerned that the discourses involved in this dialectic be kept in distinction; in principle speculative thought can use semantic innovation. Rather, Rendtorff is underlining what the imaginative work of metaphor can do to provide new perspectives on other discourses. Ricoeur argues that 'a procedure like this has nothing scandalous about it as long as speculative thought knows itself to be distinct and responsive because it is thinking'. The vivifying character of metaphor should not be restricted to poetic discourse but carefully and explicitly used wherever a new direction of articulation can be of use. Thus Ricoeur concludes that 'no metaphor is privileged, neither is any forbidden'.

What is crucial about this presentation of the use of metaphor in other discourses is the explicit 'thinking' through of the distinctions in play. So ultimately, as speculative discourse seeks to help conceptualise the operation of language in metaphorical discourse, so too metaphorical discourse rejuvenates the speculative. Here too Ricoeur finds his introductory idea of 'tension'. Poetry 'sketches a “tensional” conception of the truth for thought, gathered by the split-reference into a coherent expression and confronted with the non-resolution of the paradox of the copula in metaphor. This ‘articulates and preserves the experience of belonging’ to the world ‘opened or recovered by poetic discourse’. By employing speculative language about that poetic discourse, one can then distanciate one’s view of that experience of belonging. This is speculative discourse’s ‘highest point of reflection’ that is ultimately returned to poetic discourse through the employment of ‘specific figures of distanciation’ in the interpretive redescription of metaphor.

185 Ibid.
186 Ibid., p. 370.
187 Ibid.
188 Ibid., p. 371.
3.2. RICOEUR'S EMPHASIS ON METAPHOR TO THE NEGLECT OF ANALOGY: SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK

Thus, Ricoeur closes *The Rule of Metaphor* by a final emphasis on metaphor as having split-reference, mediating between two fields of reference, thereby creating semantic innovation. Metaphor provides a new perspective on reality that makes new connections visible. The dynamism of the function of metaphor is analysed by Ricoeur at the ontological level which reiterates precisely that dynamism in positioning metaphor between what is and what is not. Metaphor provides an imaginative way of being in the world. It is with this that Ricoeur closes *The Rule of Metaphor*.

It is apparent from my reconstruction that the possibility of employing Aquinas's understanding of analogy for an epistemology and ethics of understanding the other would not have occurred to Ricoeur. His reading of Aquinas's analogy is of an essentially failed way of speaking philosophically about language in relation to God, while contributing some useful insights to his own account of metaphor. Even the methodological question of using the thought of a thinker of so distinct a period from his own may have troubled him. Writing in a preface to a comparative study of Heidegger and Aquinas by the philosopher Bernard Rioux, Ricoeur notes that 'It is an enterprise full of dangers to compare two doctrines which do not belong to the same period of thought'189. There are issues to contend with regarding differences of context, ways of thinking, purpose of project. However, Ricoeur continues:

'And yet this confrontation deserves to be attempted: because if Saint Thomas and Heidegger are not in dialogue with each other, they are at least able to meet in us, the assembled readers. It is in us that the centuries meet each other, that the thinkers tear themselves out of their singular environments...'190.

Ultimately Ricoeur finds Rioux's work to be value, and I will argue that there is value to be found in employing Aquinas, specifically on analogical language, in the context of Ricoeur's ethics of recognition as a way of understanding intercultural dialogue. This is so because I consider this early presentation on Aquinas by Ricoeur to miss some useful

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190 Ibid.
insights springing from English language commentators. Ricoeur is concerned with protecting the value of the self-communication of God in history. This is very much a priority in the continental reading of Aquinas and I will emphasise its value (4.1.). I want to contrast his critical interpretation of analogy in Aquinas with one found to be more prevalent in the English-speaking tradition of reception, which, as I will argue, responds to the problems he states. Anglo-American tradition particularly in the latter half of the twentieth century offers an alternate and persuasive view.

As I present this alternative reading of analogy in Aquinas I will need to reconstruct three aspects of the thinking involved. First I intend to reconstruct the problem Aquinas is attempting to solve with analogy primarily as it is understood by the Anglo-American tradition, but also by such significant continental theologians as Wolfhart Pannenberg. Here I will consider the departure between this approach and Ricoeur's, which concentrates on an ontological problem. Second, I will reconstruct how the tradition presents Aquinas's solution of analogical language - primarily as a linguistic and significantly limited response. Again this provides an alternative view to Ricoeur’s approach and leads to some useful insights to how analogy might be used. Third, I will turn to consider this question of praxis and how it is handled by these commentators with respect to Ricoeur’s central concern with protecting the centrality of the theological category of revelation, understood as the self-communication of God in history. Here analogy is presented as praxis, supported by revelation in scripture. This final aspect of the tradition will allow me to consider the value of this understanding of analogy for intercultural dialogue.

In terms of the thinkers I intend to employ when tracing these aspects, commentators include Herbert McCabe, an English Dominican responsible for the English translation of the central questions 12 and 13 of *Summa Theologiae* currently in widest use in Aquinas Studies; David Burrell, the seminal American commentator on Aquinas in recent times; Ralph McInerny, an American Medievalist and Dominican who wrote repeatedly on the question of analogy as a linguistic tool in Aquinas. Ricoeur has primarily been influenced

by a French-speaking tradition of commentary on Aquinas and what I now present in the section below provides a contrast to this approach. It is one that I consider more useful in developing the practical response analogy can provide to the other. It is for this reason that I will also employ Pannenberg and Walter Kasper as instances of continental theologians focused on the resources of analogy for how to speak.

In order to keep my approach clear to the reader, I include here a brief summary of the position these thinkers identify for analogical language in Aquinas, which I will be reconstructing more fully in this section. God is presented as beyond the comprehension of his creation, yet only creaturely language is available to speak of him. Therefore, are words used of God univocally, with exactly the same meaning? - Aquinas argues that it cannot be in use univocally because God is not understood by creatures. Moreover, this is so precisely because he is different from them. Are words used equivocally then - with an entirely different sense in each case? If this were so, speech about God would mean precisely nothing, since that which is different in God cannot be approached on its own terms. As I will now discuss, Aquinas chooses a third option, that of analogical language. In analogy, one proceeds from the part known and knows that the extension to the unknown of God does not create knowledge and does not reach what God is in God's self; yet it is still a meaningful way of expressing the difference and the relation of the infinite to the finite, the unconditioned to the conditioned. Analogy provides a response to the difficulty of how to think about the language we already use about God.

I begin therefore with the "problem" Aquinas is trying to solve with analogy. McCabe will be of particular use on this point. The text that is prioritised by this tradition are questions 12 and 13 of the Prima Pars of the *Summa Theologiae*. I will briefly contextualise these questions within the *Summa Theologiae* and so provide the "problem" question 13 aims to solve.

**The problem in questions 12 and 13 of Summa Theologiae**

What the commentators I have named above consistently emphasise is that the problem Aquinas is trying to solve is how to speak of God without denying his infinite difference from our world. Pannenberg goes so far as to suggest that 'in one way or another all
theological efforts are involved in responsibility for this problem'\textsuperscript{192}. This theme lies at the heart of all theological investigations, argues Pannenberg, 'a crucial, if not the most basic question of all theology is the question about the right way to speak of God'\textsuperscript{193}. David Burrell has described Aquinas’s concern on this point to be developing ‘a fruitful account of ways in which creatures may responsibly speak of their creator’\textsuperscript{194}. However, Pannenberg considers what he terms the ‘most pressing consideration’ as the broader question of God’s activity in relation to the world.

‘One’s viewpoint about the place where the reality of God may be encountered: in the constancies of events, or in the problematic character of human existence; in specific experiences in the present, or in things that have happened in history which reach us only through tradition’\textsuperscript{195}.

Such a problem also presupposes two considerations, Pannenberg adds, one, what we mean when we say ‘God’ and two, whether that encounter is direct, alongside the world or indirect, mediated through the world.

To examine Aquinas’s analogy as a question of theological language, therefore it is necessary to investigate these two considerations in Aquinas’s framework. The first - what we mean when we say God, I will argue is already at the heart of the difficulty of language with which Aquinas is grappling and introduces the distinctiveness of this approach in contrast with Ricoeur’s \textit{The Rule of Metaphor}. To explore this I will consider McCabe’s presentation of the significance of a \textit{definitio} for any discourse. The second - regarding how God is encountered - is a question of God’s self-disclosure. I will turn to Burrell’s analysis of Aquinas’s analogy as rejecting any systematic theory of knowledge. It will also be important to point to the way Aquinas characterises the problem of how we know God, immediately prior to his handling of theological language.

McCabe argues that, for Aquinas, what we mean by “God” is actually incoherent. This incoherency of definition is precisely why Aquinas turns to analogical language as a


\textsuperscript{193} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{195} Ibid.
solution. To have a definition of a thing 'is a beginning'\(^{196}\) for discussion only. McCabe points to the way Aquinas articulates our inability to understand God, using the word "conceive" to describe the activity of understanding. This use, McCabe argues, is 'to be taken seriously'\(^{197}\); when the person knows a thing, she recreates it in her mind\(^{198}\). Thus, what is understood is always a definite thing, one thing rather than another.

If there is no grasp on the essence of the thing, explains McCabe, there can be no knowledge of it such that there can be a discussion of it. In order to speak about a thing, the interlocutors must know what it is of which they speak. It is the essence of a thing - what kind of thing it is - that tells us what kind of language is appropriate in speaking of it. That essence of the thing, once articulated, thus shapes discourse about that thing. This is what Aquinas names the "definitio". It is in the definitio that the point of contact between language and things is to be found. McCabe explains this by arguing: 'One cannot complete the job of describing a Language and then pause, turn around to look at the World and add some additional information about the correspondence between the two. Rather the world permeates all of one's definition'\(^{199}\). What this means is that 'to define something, to gives its essence, is not to say what it is like; it is to say what it is' \(^{200}\).

This is quite a different meaning of "definitio" than "definition" in contemporary parlance, where once something is defined, the essence of the thing has been found and the inquiry is complete. Instead, for Aquinas, the definitio, seeing the essence (essentia), is the beginning of the inquiry; it opens up the language game for discourse. McCabe summarises it by using a key term of Wittgenstein's:

\[\text{196 H. McCabe, \textit{God and Evil}, p. 26.}\]
\[\text{197 Ibid., p. 100.}\]
\[\text{198 citation?}\]
\[\text{200 H. McCabe, \textit{God and Evil}, p. 26. McCabe continues his explanation in a particularly useful way and I reproduce it in full here: 'This may be explained as follows. In an intelligent discussion upon any topic the participants may disagree a good deal, but they will ordinarily be in agreement about what it is that they are discussing. Sometimes they lack this fundamental agreement and we say that they are at cross-purposes. Because we do not commonly say what the topic of discussion is, but rather show it by what we say, it dawns upon us that disputants are at cross-purposes. To grasp the essence, what the discussion is about, in the intellectual sphere, is the same sort of thing as to see an object in the sensitive sphere; it is a beginning'.}\]
‘From the point of view of language the definition founds a language game; these and these things may be asserted or denied. From the point of view of things, the essence, what the thing is founds an object of experience; these and these things may or may not be the case.

In the particular case with which Aquinas is concerned, when speaking of God, he is never able to begin this language game because he has no definition available. Aquinas argues that humanity cannot understand his essence, and so the collective resources of language never reach the provision of “definitio”. This is the deep problem of theological language, God’s definitio wholly eludes us. Here is a permanent absence reminding us whenever we do speak of God of the transcendence of that which we are speaking. Aquinas constantly dwells on this point. Even when we are drawn into the mystery of God by grace and revelation ‘we are joined to him as to an unknown’. Remaining without a definitio, there is no grasp on the limitless infinity of God.

Thus what is meant by “God” is the initial point of investigation for McCabe’s analysis; he concludes that what is meant is already a non-univocal concept. This might appear to be a rejection of the introductory considerations identified by Pannenberg. In fact this responds precisely to the reason Pannenberg introduced that question of how God is meant. His concern with clarifying what is meant by God before investigating analogical language is rooted in his observation of thinkers who force analogy to do too much. So far as definitio is concerned then, Pannenberg considers Aquinas’s project with approval; in his notes, Pannenberg outlines those parts of Summa Theologiae which emphasise the unknowability of God. There Aquinas explicitly states that God cannot be understood by his creatures and knowing him requires God’s self-disclosure. Even when considering God’s effects his essence cannot be attained. In Pannenberg’s words, the reality of God ‘exceeds the signification of the name’ used of him. Aquinas’s intentions, Pannenberg

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201 Apart from McCabe, other recent scholarship has dwelt on the intellectual similarities between Aquinas and Wittgenstein. For further reading, including a history of extant comparisons, see J. STOUT, R. MACSWAIN (eds.) Grammar and Grace: reformulations of Aquinas and Wittgenstein (London, SCM Press, 2004).

202 H. MCCABE, God and Evil, p. 183. See also ‘Categories’, p. 88.

203 ST, 1a, 12, 13 ad1 - ‘quasi ignoto conjungamur’.


205 Ibid., p. 222n17.
suggests, seem to be of expressing the infinity, rather than theoretical inferences about God.

'This intention is very closely related to the sacrifice of praise in adoration, for here, too, the stated word is transferred to God’s essence in full consciousness of the fact that it is realized in God in another way that is completely beyond our comprehension’.

What “God” means therefore cannot be exhaustively explored.

However, despite this, Aquinas is still able to speak about God - and do so in a focused way. For example, Aquinas is able to specify certain things about God - Creator, Incarnation, Trinity. How this is possible is partly answered by the second consideration to which I now turn. Pannenberg’s other consideration that lies behind any investigation of analogical language is the role of God’s self-disclosure and how the person encounters it. Specifically, Pannenberg requires an answer as to whether God discloses himself directly or in mediation. Pannenberg argues that the biblical text presents both kinds of encounter, but it is only in the latter, indirect, encounters that the question of how one can speak of God becomes relevant. ‘if the divine reality is not directly experienceable, then it can be spoken of only in an indirect manner, viz., by speaking about whatever worldly being it is through which the reality of God manifests itself’. In such a way of thinking all language about God is indirect because one is speaking of the manifestation, mediated by the world. There is a more complex ‘double indirectness’ Pannenberg suggests, but, ‘the constitutive factor behind the assertion that all speech about God is analogical and involves a transference of meaning is simply the indirectness of the divine disclosure’. Such indirectness means that ‘one speaks of God by speaking about something else, but in such a way that this other being is viewed in its relation to the reality of God’. This leads Pannenberg to the question of whether traits predicated of God in this way ‘belong to the

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206 W. PANNEBERG, ‘Analogy and Doxology’, p. 223. - Pannenberg notes that later Scholastics failed to pursue this intention, considering ‘God himself as analogous to the world of human experience’ (ibid), but has his reservations regarding Aquinas too. I will return to this point in the subsequent sections of this chapter.

207 Ibid., p. 212.

208 Ibid.

209 Ibid., p. 213.

210 Ibid., p. 212.
divine being in and for itself', or if instead they only apply 'within our perspective' since we have only the indirect approach available\textsuperscript{211}.

I introduce Pannenberg's view on this point because Aquinas's approach to God's self-communication is also one of mediation. Aquinas considers knowledge of God to be available in the world as an effect of God's creative activity. He also turns to the resources of scripture and church tradition as the further disclosure of God. Pannenberg suggests that 'all analogizing proceeds from below to above, and begins with some experience of the world. We have already emphasized that according to Thomas it is precisely this point that is the root of the inadequacy of all human knowledge'\textsuperscript{212}. Aquinas can name God as Trinity without fully grasping its reality. However, while ultimately inadequate, Aquinas is still able to consider such knowledge meaningful - there is still discussion on Trinitarian theology. In this sense it is the particular instance of scripture as the revelatory disclosure of God, which, as the continental theologians Pannenberg and Kasper emphasize, happens in history that provides insights which are beyond human reason to discover alone. I will briefly indicate some instances where this is to be seen in Aquinas, by David Burrell's analysis.

Burrell presents this as Aquinas's faith and the factor that places limits on his philosophical inquiry. He argues that if Aquinas relied only on natural reason God would only ever be presented as a cause, not as a creator: 'the First in such a scheme could not adequately be distinguished from the premises which follow from it'\textsuperscript{213}. Similarly, on the Trinity, Aquinas defends it against a basis in natural reason\textsuperscript{214}. Burrell identifies this question of Summa Theologiae as the 'paradigmatic instance of philosophical inquiry being shaped by premises from faith'\textsuperscript{215}. It is here in the revelation of the Trinitarian nature of God that Burrell finds the emphasis on God's character as creator. Burrell argues in this way:

\textsuperscript{211} Any other approach, including that of the fourteenth century scholars Pannenberg calls Christian Scholastics, would eventually be rooted in a univocal concept. For an analysis of this view see M. STRIET, Offenbares Geheimnis. Zur Kritik der negativen Theologie (Regensburg, Pustet, 2003), pp. 98-99nn108-114.

\textsuperscript{212} Ibid., p. 214n3.

\textsuperscript{213} D. BURRELL, 'From Analogy of “Being” to the Analogy of Being', p. 116.

\textsuperscript{214} ST, 1, 32, 1, ad3.

‘Philosophy could lead one, Aquinas thought, to understand that the universe must have been originated, but the prevailing schemes for elucidating that origination has dire consequences for a proper conception of the First as well as for human freedom, so the findings of faith will be required’\(^\text{216}\). What Burrell is arguing here is that while natural reason can bring one to the point of establishing a “first cause”\(^\text{217}\), it is only the revelation of the biblical testimony that discloses its character as God. It is only this revelatory communication in the biblical testimony that brings Christian doctrine - and therefore Aquinas - to consider God in terms of a self-sufficient Trinity - and therefore reveals the completely gratuitous nature of God’s creative activity. This gives a new characterisation of creation itself as a gift, which would be wholly impossible to reach by philosophical means.

In Pannenberg’s terms, in the conclusion of his exploration of analogy as such, revelation is what grounds the ultimacy of analogical speech about God. Revelation is understood here as the ways in which God acts in the world; one of the ways in which this activity is presented is through the testimony of scripture. What is significant about such examples is that they reveal God acting ‘in just that way and not another’. Thus the knowledge that results from this testimony is particular and therefore each example must ‘be supported by the peculiar character of the particular event which is experienced and proclaimed’\(^\text{218}\). They are specific to the historical self-revelation of God, yet the second point draws indicates a certain tension here. That God has acted in particular ways in history allows human attribution of particular characteristics ‘to which he was not bound as to a law’\(^\text{219}\). Pannenberg’s word for this is the ‘provisionality of all speech about God, a provisionality which is grounded in the character of all such speech as analogous transference’\(^\text{220}\). Even the term self-revelation ‘is itself doxologically fashioned and open to the infinity of the freedom of God’ - there is no exhaustive example of revelation; this is always held in


\(^{217}\) For example, *ST*, 1a, 2, 3c - “The third way” - ‘Ergo necesse est ponere aliquid quod est per se necessarium non habens causam sue necessitatis aliunde, sed quod est causa necessitatis alis’.


\(^{219}\) Ibid.

\(^{220}\) Ibid.
abeyance. Pannenberg’s example for this is the ‘differentiated and convincing event’\(^{221}\) that was the history of Jesus in comparison with previous self-revelations. In terms of the ‘characterological picture’ of God, this history provides an unprecedented ultimacy because ‘the metaphorical character of our speech about God, which Jesus also shared when he spoke of God as father, is at the same time taken up by God himself, insofar as he raised Jesus and thus gave his acknowledgment to him’\(^{222}\). God has confirmed ‘the metaphors of our devotional speech about him’ in a metaphorical statement. This both confirms our devotion and continues to suspend ‘final knowledge’ of him as always belonging ‘to the undecided future [which] has already befallen [Jesus]’\(^{223}\). Thus ‘the adoring speech about God himself which is contained in doxology always points ahead to God’s revelation’\(^{224}\).

Pannenberg’s final conclusion is that revelation is what grounds the ultimacy of analogical speech about God, but that this must be tempered by ‘the humility of adoration’\(^{225}\). This avoids any claim to have grasped the truth of God, but the ‘moment of ultimacy... makes it possible to say that even the Old Testament speech about God himself based on his actions, anticipates in its essential content the Christ-event’\(^{226}\).

I want to emphasise that Pannenberg is not presenting his view of Aquinas’s analogy, but how it should be best understood for future praxis. For Pannenberg revelation has taken over the role ‘analogy’ used to play in the ontological reading. ‘Where the old doctrine of analogy asserted a correspondence of the word used to name God with God himself, there stands in our view, the concept of revelation’\(^{227}\). While the ontology behind the doctrine of analogy expressed God as the ground of creation, Pannenberg’s reconstruction reemphasises ‘the biblical conviction that the creation is still underway to its proper

\(^{221}\) W. PANNENBERG, ‘Analogy and Doxology’, p. 234.

\(^{222}\) Ibid., p. 235.

\(^{223}\) Ibid.

\(^{224}\) Ibid., p. 236.

\(^{225}\) Ibid.

\(^{226}\) Ibid., p. 237.

\(^{227}\) Ibid.

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reality... the final end by which God will be definitively revealed"\footnote{228}. Thus, by taking on our metaphorical language about him, in the self-revelation of God in Christ, God 'thereby for the first time gives our words of praise their ultimately valid content'\footnote{229}. For Pannenberg therefore, how our words relate to God - the critical question for the Christian Scholastics - is a question that is always yet to be answered, in the sense that our language is always incomplete. However, he does conclude that in God's confirmation of Jesus Christ's proclamation of him the adequacy of human language, at least that of praise, has been affirmed as ultimately valid.

I have reconstructed this view because I want to argue that by contrast with what Pannenberg calls Christian Scholasticism, Aquinas does take the particularity of the self-disclosure of God seriously. Analogy is his response to that mediated, meaningful knowledge about God. As an example and to explore this further I return to Burrell's view of God as creator in relation to Aquinas's analogy. Burrell's general view of revelation is that it 'introduces a new context for the genre of reasoning'\footnote{230}. What this means is that 'revelation gives direction to reason'\footnote{231}. How the distinctive creative character of God relates to this understanding of analogy as practice is clarified for Burrell by Robert Sokolowski, a Catholic theologian. Sokolowski contends that employing the concept of creator as the crucial idea is distinct to the Christian tradition, recalling that both Jewish and Muslim philosophers were faced with the same difficulty of articulating God in the world\footnote{232}. By emphasising the transcendent difference of God, Sokolowski suggests that 'the "distinction" then becomes a way of gesturing towards what indeed distinguishes those who believe the universe to be freely created by one God from anyone else'\footnote{233} - that God need not have created. His transcendence precludes the necessity of creation and thus renders it gratuitous. Creation adds nothing to God and so there is no possibility of 'any

\footnote{228} W. PANNENBERG, 'Analogy and Doxology', p. 237.
\footnote{229} Ibid.
\footnote{230} D. BURRELL, 'Analogy, Creation and Theological Language', p. 79.
\footnote{231} Ibid.
ordinary brand of "onto-theology" wherein a notion of being can be stretched to include the creator as well as creation\textsuperscript{234}. For Burrell it is the scriptural revelation that God need not have created that distinguishes Aquinas's analogy from the *analogia entis* which Ricoeur rejected\textsuperscript{235}.

Similarly, Kasper considers the role of scriptural language for Aquinas's analogy to be significant. Kasper points specifically to Wisdom 13: 5\textsuperscript{236}, which suggests that 'the beauty and order of the world point beyond the world... the ultimate possibility for thought in this area is thus a realization that we do not know, a *docta ignorantia*\textsuperscript{237}. In Kasper's view this was formally codified by the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215: 'between creator and creature there can be noted no similarity so great that a greater dissimilarity cannot be seen between them'\textsuperscript{238}. Kasper argues that this apparent re-emphasising of via negativa allows Aquinas to later render analogy as something more than simply the mean between univocal and equivocal statements. In the face of God, the revealed creator, analogy 'was forced open in the direction of God, dynamically oriented beyond itself, and directed towards an Ever-Greater'\textsuperscript{239}.

It is with these reconstructions in mind that I argue that analogical language is a response to this self-communicating yet mysterious God. I therefore turn to consider analogy in terms of a solution to the considerations I have just outlined.

**The linguistic response to the epistemological problem of naming God**

\textsuperscript{234} D. BURRELL, 'From Analogy of “Being” to the Analogy of Being', p. 123.

\textsuperscript{235} Burrell refers here to R. SOKOLOWSKI, *The God of Faith and Reason* (Washington D. C., CUA Press, 1995). In this text Sokolowski argues generally that 'the way creation is understood in Christian faith makes the Christian understanding of the divine different from the religious understanding achieved in natural experience and in other religious traditions. The Christian God is different from other gods; because of this, Christianity can preserve both the integrity of reason and the distinctiveness of faith', p. xiii. Sokolowski does refer to Aquinas in order to support his contention see pp. 33-34. This reference is not a thorough reconstruction of Aquinas however and I will therefore continue with Burrell's argument.

\textsuperscript{236} The New Jerusalem translation of this verse makes the link to the topic of analogical language here explicit: 'since through the grandeur and beauty of the creatures we may, by analogy, contemplate their Author'.


\textsuperscript{239} W. KASPER, 'God in human language', p. 96.
The analysis I have presented above agrees that knowledge of God is possible through God’s self-disclosure. This agrees with Aquinas’s presentation of the question in the sense that even revelation is mediated and is never exhaustive. Aquinas places what Pannenberg calls ‘final knowledge’ of God in the experience of the blessed after death. Even this underlines Aquinas’s emphasis on the central necessity of God’s self-disclosure. ‘In order to see, whether with the senses or with the mind, two things are needed; there must be a power of sight and the thing to be seen must come into sight: for we do not see unless the thing is somehow in our sight’. In the instance of the blessed, it is the transformation in the glorified life that affects both aspects - the power to see God and the presence of God within the range of that power. It is self-communication by God. ‘It is an important theme of Question 12 that, when in beatitude, a man understands the essence of God, the mind is not realised by a form which is a likeness of God, but by God himself’.

McDermott clarifies this distinction, ‘when created minds do see God’s substance, the very substance of God himself formed their understanding; but then something more than their nature is needed to predispose them to such sublimity: what we call a light of glory’. In Aquinas’s words ‘the divine essence is united to a created mind so as to be what is actually understood and through its very self making the mind actually understanding’.

Knowledge of God arises through our natural orientation - a given of our createdness - and God’s own self-disclosure. I therefore want to briefly conclude this overview of the difficulty around knowledge of God with a note regarding the self-communication of God in history. For Aquinas, before the experience of the blessed, this self-disclosure is made manifest in sensible signs. These would include God’s coming into history in the Incarnation, to be sure, but also the insights of church tradition, and more universally,


241 ST, 1a, 12, 2c - ‘quod ad visionem tam sensibilem quam intellectualem duo requiruntur, scilicet virtus visiva et unio rei visae cum visu: non enim fit visio in actu nisi per hoc quod res visa quodammodo est in vidente’.

242 H. McCABE, God and Evil. p. 100.

243 T. McDERMOTT, Summa Theologiae: A Concise Translation, p. 27 (ST, 1a, 12, 6).

244 ST, 1a, 12, 2 ad 3 - ‘ita divina essentia unitur intellectui creato, ut intellectum in actu, per seipsam faciens intellectum in actu’ (emphasis mine).

245 ST, 1a, 12, 13.
scripture as revelation. In the final article of question 12 Aquinas considers how, in this life, our understanding of God is shaped by revelation. Aquinas considers revelation to strengthen knowledge - we can have ‘more perfect knowledge’\(^{246}\), by such deliberately sensible signs available to natural reason. However, crucially, while

‘In this life revelation does not tell us what God is and thus joins us to him as an unknown, nevertheless it helps us to know him better in that we are shown more and greater works of his and are taught certain things about him that we could never have known through natural reason, as for instance that he is both three and one’\(^{247}\).

Language must therefore take account of this. This is the background which the commentators Burrell, McNerney, McCabe emphasise. I want to clarify here the difference in analysis from Ricoeur’s. I will briefly present McCabe’s summary and then turn to two points of Burrell’s analysis. The first point is that Aquinas’s “theory” of analogy is no theory at all. The second point is that Aquinas’s analogical language is introduced as a response to the inadequacy of our \textit{definitio}, our knowledge about God. Burrell explicitly rejects the reading that analogy is a way of describing the ontology of the relationship from God to the world. These ideas are related and require further explanation, but I will briefly reconstruct McCabe’s analysis of analogical language first.

McCabe’s summary provides the appropriate context. How can one speak of God when there is no \textit{definitio} that clarifies what is proper to the discourse? I now intend to give a detailed review of question 13. McCabe’s translation and commentary emphasises analogy as a usual way of using language, now placed in a theological context. He argues that in giving an account of analogy for this new problem, Aquinas is first and foremost giving an account of distinctive features of the use of certain highly generalised words in our ordinary language, words like “exists”, “good”, “true”. In referencing such general rules of language, McCabe identifies analogy as having a clear and current role in general language.

\(^{246}\) \textit{ST}, 1a, 12, 13c - ‘\textit{perfectior cognitio}’.

\(^{247}\) \textit{ST}, 1a, 12, 13 ad1 - ‘\textit{divendum quod licet per revelationem gratie in hac vita non cognosamus de Deo quid est et sic ei quasi ignoto conjugamur; tamen plenius ipsum cognosceimus, inquantum plures et excellentiores effectus ejus nobis demonstrantur, et inquantum ei aliqua attribuimus ex revelatione divina, ad quae ratio naturalis non pertingit, ut Deum esse trinum et unum’.
McCabe explains that ‘where X and Y are words with different meanings, the properties of X will not be the same as the properties of Y, and hence a good Y will not necessarily have properties in common with a good X’\textsuperscript{248}. McCabe’s illustration is that a good typewriter may function quietly, but being quiet would not be a property of a good bell. These two objects are not good because we can discover a common characteristic about them that is good, but each are good in their own way. ‘One way of putting this is to say that “good” is a contextually dependent word. In other words, when we say that something is a good X, the sense of the word “good” is not independent of the meaning of “X”\textsuperscript{249}. Similarly, “George exists” says what is said by “George is human”, whereas “Fido exists” says what is said by “Fido is a dog”. Thus we can say that the sense of “exists” is also contextually dependent; it is not independent of the meaning of its subject\textsuperscript{250}. This use of “exists” is not equivocal, however. ‘We could call them analogical. In language too all univocal terms presuppose the non-univocal analogical use of the term being\textsuperscript{251}. What Aquinas is doing therefore is applying the context-dependent meaning of words to something unknown.

This is further supported by Burrell’s analysis to which I now turn. On the first point, that analogy is not a theory, speaking of Aquinas’s remarks on analogy, Burrell argues that ‘numerous efforts to collect them into a systematic account show that it cannot be done\textsuperscript{252}. His own attempt at collecting them emphasises the semantic role above any ontological response and therefore rejecting any formal theory. Instead Burrell argues that Aquinas’s focus was in using analogous terms ‘to develop a fruitful account of ways in which creatures may responsibly speak of their creator\textsuperscript{253}. It is crucial that Burrell describes this ‘account’ as one which identifies multiple possible approaches. Instead, Burrell identifies the work of contemporary ‘speculative grammarians... who had classified diverse ways in which the sacred scriptures employed language, and so developed an art for relating

\textsuperscript{248} H. McCabe, \textit{God and Evil}, p. 53.
\textsuperscript{249} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{250} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{251} T. McDermott, \textit{Summa Theologica: A Concise Translation}, p. 32 (ST, 1a, 13, 5).
\textsuperscript{253} D. Burrell, ‘Analogy’, p. 16.
different senses of the same term as it is put to different use”. Burrell argues that it was precisely this ‘art of recognising and distinguishing among analogous uses which prevented Aquinas from developing a theory of analogy’. Burrell’s contention is that Aquinas had a highly developed sense of the limits of language and instead sought ‘ways of moving from creation to creator, while acknowledging and even underscoring the infinite difference between the two’.

Burrell goes on to argue that Aquinas’s circumspect withdrawal from establishing a formal theory of analogy has been somewhat obscured, owing to the influence of later commentary on the subject by Thomas de Vio, Cardinal Cajetan in the fourteenth century. Burrell presents Cajetan’s reading as an error, an attempt to develop precisely the theory of analogy from which Aquinas drew back. Cajetan concentrated on developing rules for the different types of analogy into “kinds” and the circumstances under which these kinds should be employed. Burrell’s difficulty with this approach is that by explicitly attempting a theory of analogy, Cajetan ‘made it look as though theologians had found a way of extending human language to expound the properties of God’. This ‘theory of knowledge’ was a further step from Aristotle’s use of language, albeit as a syllogistic contribution to ‘reliable knowledge’. A useful comparison is given in a dictionary article on analogy by Olivier Boulnois, a French philosophical theologian, ‘theology is not some kind of pure reasoning on the divine nature, but must rely on tangible manifestations in order to ascend toward the Creator’.

It is this damaging “theory of knowledge” to which Ricoeur objected in The Rule of Metaphor. He was concerned at the resulting categorisation of causes - drawing God’s

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255 D. BURRELL, ‘Analogy’, p. 16, emphasis Burrell’s.

256 Ibid., emphasis mine.

257 Ibid.

258 Ibid., p. 15.

activity into human epistemology. Ricoeur therefore keeps his focus on metaphor, distinct from a formal theory of knowledge. Burrell identifies this distinction between analogy and metaphor as consistent with what was developed in the Middle Ages. He argues that the growing use of this inappropriate theory is evidenced by the medieval tendency to describe analogy as 'proper' in distinction from metaphor. Most significantly for my purposes of contrast with Ricoeur's analysis, Burrell suggests that 'this preoccupation would lead medievals concerned to develop theology as a form of knowledge to contrast analogy with metaphor, more commonly associated with poetic expression'\(^{260}\). I would suggest that this distinction obscures the broader difference between approaches to analogical language in which Aquinas takes a role. Pannenberg identifies 'what is usually regarded as the classic theory of the analogy between God and the world, as it was developed by the Christian Scholasticism of the thirteenth century' which asserts 'that the reality of God as such stands in an analogical relationship to the world, not only in our speech, but also per se. More precisely, the world of creaturely reality is analogous to God'\(^{261}\). Pannenberg distinguishes between this 'classic' approach and Aquinas's\(^{262}\). While Pannenberg and Burrell disagree on when analogy as a theory of knowledge emerged, both reject it and its ontological frameworks in contrast with Ricoeur's reading.

It is this reforming of analogy as a formal epistemology by Cajetan that led to some of the significant debates of later scholarship. In his dictionary article, Burrell confidently declares that 'recent work on analogy concurs that it does not represent a theory nor a metaphysical contention, so much as a fact about language and the way we use language'\(^{263}\). Written in the later 1980s, this remark does not reflect the return of theological scholarship to the question of *analogia entis*, albeit in a form that has proven


\(^{261}\) W. PANNEMBERG, ‘Analogy and Doxology’, p. 213.

\(^{262}\) Ibid., p. 213n2.

controversial. I will not consider this more recent return to consider analogia entis, but respond instead directly to Ricoeur’s critique of Aquinas as such a theory.

I now turn therefore to Burrell’s rejection of the ontological reading. It becomes evident by Burrell’s additional analysis of theological scholarship on Aquinas’s analogy that he is not ignoring its ontological significance. He does note that as a characteristic of language, analogy may have ‘metaphysical implications’, but it is not deliberately employed in order to explain the nature of existence. Similarly, in his article ‘From Analogy of “Being” to the Analogy of Being’, Burrell argues that there is an ontological significance for analogy as it was employed by Aquinas. However, he explicitly rejects that this could be ‘any ordinary brand of “onto-theology” wherein a notion of being can be stretched to include the creator as well as creation’. It is in this article that Burrell turns to McInerny prizing his ‘untiring emphasis: analogy is a logical doctrine in Aquinas’. Again, ‘that is not to say, however, that attention to analogue uses of language has no metaphysical payoff; it is simply to note that conflating the two risks harming both’. It is on these grounds that Burrell also rejects the developmental circle describing analogy and ontology together drawn by Ricoeur.

To explain further, Burrell and McInerny identify two “orders” in Aquinas - the real and the logical. These two commentators distinguish between the two orders of ordo essendi and ordo cognoscendi, arguing that it is a conflation of the two that lies at the heart of any ontologised theory of analogy. To explain what these terms mean in Burrell and

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266 The title Burrell gives this article is not immediately helpful in clarifying his overall argument regarding analogy and ontology: ‘From Analogy of “Being” to the Analogy of Being’. This is one of the unfortunate failures of translation from Aquinas’s Latin: some of the equivalences require continuous additional explanation. Burrell is here rejecting what Ricoeur names analogia entis, where being itself is rendered in analogous forms. Burrell prefers analogous speech about an unknown God - it is the unknowness that has implications for metaphysics.


268 Ibid.
McInerny’s analysis, the order of “real”, or of being presents the ontological priority of God and creation. God is ontologically prior to creation. The order of the logical is to do with what we know first. In this order creation is logically prior. For this reason we name God from creation, from scripture, from Tradition. There can be a creaturely response to the ontological priority of God, but what that priority means is not available to us. Indeed, speaking of the order of the real, or of being, Burrell argues that ‘Its apprehension by us, however, will always be inverted’. This means that while ‘there is a parallel between real and logical orders for Aquinas’, the order of being cannot be understood to be the order of knowledge, or therefore how we name.

Walter Kasper also explores this distinction. Most significant, he believes, is that Aquinas does not write about *analogia entis*, a phrase of Cajetan’s, taken up ‘as a principle only in our own century through the work of E. Przywara’. The *analogia nominum* of Aquinas, Kasper believes, indicates a reserve on the part of Aquinas in developing the theory of analogy, although ‘the Franciscan theologians, especially Bonaventure, show even greater reserve than Thomas does; in their view knowledge of God is only possible on the basis of revelation and of the analogy of faith which revelation establishes’. Kasper sides with von Balthasar on this point arguing that analogy of being is required for faith, because it is only ‘the human capacity for being addressed by God’ as presupposition of our existence that permits revelation. Scotus, who Pannenberg applauds for unveiling the central error of analogy as a hidden, forced univocity, is here indicated by Kasper as the thinker who most clearly rejects knowledge of God’s nature based on human reason.

Kasper is taking a particular stance here amongst the different conceptions of analogy, and crucially, amongst the different interpretations of those conceptions. However, he notes that the complexity of these differences are what makes Barth’s binary construction of *analogia entis* versus *analogia fidei* so necessarily ‘relativized’. Barth rejected analogy


270 Ibid.


273 Ibid.
between God and world when he considered it to assume 'an overarching ontological continuity and thus made God cease to be God'\textsuperscript{274}. When Barth was able to conceive of analogy in other terms, he was more positive. This expression is of 'analogia relationis and operationis... that is established by revelation, but is also reflected in creation, which the covenant presupposes as an extrinsic basis'\textsuperscript{275}. This, Kasper argues, is effectively \textit{analogia nominum}, 'based on God's historical action and speaking'\textsuperscript{276}.

This basis means that when we speak of God we must use creaturely language and understand that application as relying on our understanding of creatures as the effects of God's creative activity in history. As McInerney summarises: 'In short, in names analogously common to God and creature, the creature is the \textit{per prius} and the \textit{ratio propria}, since we must make reference to the creaturely meaning to fashion its meaning as applicable to God'\textsuperscript{277}. The fact of God's wisdom is not dependent on man, whilst our use of "wisdom" to speak of him is dependent on understanding the term "a wise man". Thus, 'we want to say that there is an order \textit{per prius et posterius secundum impositionem nominis} that does not express the order \textit{secundum esse}'\textsuperscript{278}. We describe God "last", as it were, even while he is understood to be as ontologically "first"\textsuperscript{279}. For example, 'although God pre-exists all creatures, he was no Lord until such time as there were creatures subject to him; being lord and being subject entail one another and must exist simultaneously'\textsuperscript{280}. So when we seek to describe God analogically as \textit{being} God, there is merely 'a coincidence of \textit{ratio propria} and the ontologically first... there is a dramatic asymmetry between the order of naming and the order of being'\textsuperscript{281}.

McInerney refers to Aquinas's own text: 'therefore, that from the point of view of what the word means it is used primarily of God and derivatively of creatures... But from the point

\textsuperscript{274} W. Kasper, \textit{The God of Jesus Christ}, p. 97.

\textsuperscript{275} Ibid., pp. 97/8.

\textsuperscript{276} Ibid., p. 98.

\textsuperscript{277} R. McInerney, \textit{Aquinas and Analogy}, p. 160.

\textsuperscript{278} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{279} ST, 1, 13, 6c.

\textsuperscript{280} T. McDermott, \textit{Summa Theologiae: A Concise Translation}, p. 33 (ST, 1a, 13, 7)

\textsuperscript{281} R. McInerney, \textit{Aquinas and Analogy}, p. 161.
of view of the use of the word we apply it first to creatures because we know them first. The name of being is said of God in terms of its *per prius* role as cause, yet it is still applied first to creatures on a practical level because it from here, the “effects”, that the meaning of its use is derived. The relationship there is a logical one *per prius et posterius*.

It is when naming is treated as a way of understanding the ontological reality of God that *analogia entis* comes to be used, which McInerny identifies as precisely this kind of conflation. Burrell ties this analysis to his criticism above of Cajetan. Cajetan’s commentary was named ‘*De Nominum Analogia*’, but McInerny’s contention is that ‘although the analogy of names is a logical doctrine Cajetan employs non-logical criteria in distinguishing types of analogy’. These types of analogy include the distinction Ricoeur identified above between analogy of attribution - between two or three terms - and analogy of relationships - between two proportions. Cajetan presents the analogy of relationships, or proportionality, as most appropriate when speaking of God. This presupposes a common ratio. Burrell argues that this approach by Cajetan suggests that the only proper use of analogy ‘demands that the feature in question be possessed *inherently* by each party of which it is predicated, albeit in a proportional manner’. This would imply a shared feature, ultimately destroying the qualitative distinction between God and creation - the fact that to know God at all requires that God communicate himself.

This is why the distinction between naming and being is crucial. The reason it has been obscured is because of the example of analogously speaking of God’s being. Following Cajetan, to speak analogically of God’s being as Aquinas does at various points, that being must be shared in a proportional way between God and creation. In fact, Burrell points to the translation of Aquinas by McDermott: ‘There need not be any feature intrinsic to creator and creature to use the same term of both’. Naming God analogously as “being” or “existing” is not to indicate knowledge of God’s reality. Instead ‘names signify things

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282 ST, 1a, 13, 6 - ‘Unde secundum hoc cidendum est quod quantum ad rem significatam per nomen per prius dicuntur de Deo quam de creaturis... sed quantum ad impositionem nominis per prius a nobis imponuntur creaturis, quas prius cognoscimus’.


285 Ibid. - quoting T. McDermott’s *Concise Translation*
as they are known and not immediately as they exist. God's "being" is named only as being is understood by creatures. This is not a presentation of the order of the real, or of "being". Therefore, McInerny argues that the analogy of being is not a confluence of the two orders in Aquinas, but rather a kind of coincidence. He suggests that Aquinas himself 'would point out that the coincidence of the ordo nominum and ordo nominis is adventitious; this coincidence happens to occur only with some examples of things named analogously. Such a coincidence is accidental and to understand it as anything else to not just misuse the order of naming but also the things named, to damage the distinction between our order of knowledge and the order of being.

The clearest distinction on this point is shown when McInerny points to the use of the phrase 'analogia entis' in Cajetan's commentary on analogical naming. 'Thomas speaks of analogy when it is a question of predicable community, but he does not call the real hierarchy of being an analogy of being.'

What this analysis underlines is the rejection of any approach to analogical language as a way of reaching understanding about God's reality. The way in which we know God is ultimately rooted in his self-disclosure and it is for this reason that Burrell suggests the question of analogy as 'a fine specimen of philosophy serving as handmaid to faith'. In the context of theology, Burrell suggests that Aquinas's analogy gets 'at the heart of doing philosophy, especially of a philosophy which seeks to integrate the Jewish, Christian and Muslim conviction that the universe is freely created by one God. McInerny is concerned with limiting what the philosophy in use allows us to conclude. Otherwise, Burrell suggests, 'we might be tempted to turn philosophy into a proto-theology which could give us an adequate understanding of God - exactly Barth's complaint about

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286 R. McINERNY, Aquinas and Analogy, p. 76.
287 Ibid., p. 162.
288 Ibid., p. 156.
289 Ibid., c.f ST, 1a 1 1c.
290 D. BURRELL, 'From Analogy of “Being” to the Analogy of Being', p. 114.
analogia entis as it had been presented to him. To reiterate Kasper’s point from above, the doctrine of analogy is not one of knowledge, of developing rational content about God or natural theology but a ‘grammar of faith’.

What this means is that an analogous term is not to add to knowledge; in the case of its predication of God what is to be emphasised is the genuine meaningfulness without ascribing limits to its definitio. Whatever term is in use of God, the reality it indicates ‘will outstrip any realization that we come across of it’. For Burrell participation continues to underscore the fact that any perfection of creation is known first, but ultimately flows from God as creator of all. This is what underpins analogy: ‘a properly analogous use of analogous terms demands an awareness that we are functioning as creatures ourselves in a created order whose principles remain unknown to us, yet whose lineaments can be glimpsed from time to time’. The existence of creatures is to exist in relation to the great fact of createdness in the light of God.

This returns my attention to the ongoing significance of God’s self-communication for speech about him. Revelation is again what anchors even the possibility of provisional language as represented by analogy. For Pannenberg, who introduced this consideration, revelation as the ground of analogy transforms it into doxology. With this I want to turn to my final theme in this alternative reading of analogical language: how it is used.

**Modern theological reconstructions of analogy as different types of human action**

McCabe’s commentary on Aquinas has done nothing but constantly emphasise that analogy is exclusively a question of linguistic usage. ‘Analogy is not a way of getting to


294 Ibid., p. 120.
know about God, nor is it a theory of the structure of the universe, it is a comment on our use of certain words."\(^{295}\)

Burrell takes this approach as well, but emphasizes in addition the faculty of judgment and the context of the life forms in which such language is developed. Under the significant title 'Practices to heighten awareness: Langue and Parole', continuing his examination of analogy of being, Burrell is here concerned with the difficulty of keeping the two orders separate in practice especially 'for philosophers whose very trade involves using discourse to articulate what-is by showing the way it must be'.\(^{296}\) Burrell therefore refers to Gilson's insight (though uncited) that analogy is ultimately about the human capacity for judgement. This suggests a useful way to examine McInerny's overall project as well as Burrell's own philosophical theology.

Burrell returns to his emphasis that Aquinas should be understood not as proposing analogy of being or speaking of analogous ideas, but rather of 'terms used analogously'.\(^{297}\) This distinction is crucial and I present Burrell's full analysis here:

'Judgement is indispensible precisely because responsible analogous usage requires that we assess the way in which a term is being used in relation to its primary analogate. Yet such an assessment demands both that we identify the primary analogate as well as grasp how the use in question relates to it, and each of these apperceptions involves judgement. In practice, this come to adducing appropriate examples'.\(^{298}\)

In this article Burrell does not present any of these "appropriate examples" but emphasises instead the role of judgement in using analogical language. This question of judgement Burrell considers to be central for all philosophy, pointing to the work of Pierre Hadot 'to remind us that doing philosophy is ever a matter of the proper exercises'.\(^{300}\) When it comes to considering philosophical theology, Burrell's project, Hadot's phrase is


\(^{296}\) D. Burrell, 'From Analogy of "Being" to the Analogy of Being', p. 120.

\(^{297}\) Ibid., p. 121.

\(^{298}\) Ibid.

\(^{299}\) An obvious beginning would be with scriptural testimony. The significance of this runs through this final section and the first part of Chapter Four.

\(^{300}\) D. Burrell, 'From Analogy of "Being" to the Analogy of Being', p. 121.
‘spiritual exercises’. To approach philosophy as a task of judgement is something of a revolution internal to the character of Aquinas’s project, but makes explicit the link between formulations and practice. Burrell considers this to be an aspect of medieval theology ‘which medievals themselves could not be expected to see, since they were immersed in it the formative character of their particular world of faith’. What Burrell is pointing to here is in the Medieval period the prefigurative culture milieu remains the significant formative context for developing ways of speaking of being in the world. However, this has been articulated only in the face of current plural societies and would not have been expressed during the historical period. Burrell is therefore arguing that the significance of judgement in developing analogical speech for the Medievals is even more interesting for the modern thinker. Working in a plural context, Burrell suggests that ‘forms of life take on the shape of intentional choices’.

This argues for a deliberate taking on of analogical language for theological language from its medieval context as Aquinas’s self-reproducing community. Now Burrell is able to more clearly identify how judgement is a significant part of Aquinas’s own approach to analogical use. Thus in Burrell’s view, when analogy can only ‘signify it imperfectly because creatures represent God imperfectly’ and despite this, Aquinas speaks of God, this is a question of judgement. ‘Our capacity to do just that’, argues Burrell, relies on our judgement for how to use any given word. Burrell points toward Aquinas’s example of wisdom: ‘when we say that a man is wise, we signify his wisdom as something distinct from other things about him - his essence, for example, his powers or his existence. But when we use this word about God we do not intend to signify something distinct from this essence, power or existence’ (ST, 1, 13, 5). This difference of *modus significandi* is the result of judgement.

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303 Ibid., p. 123.

304 Ibid. Here Burrell emphasises the freedom to critically distanciate oneself from one’s culture even more strongly than Ricoeur. Ricoeur identifies the universal intuition of solicitude, but sees this as inevitably shaped by cultural milieu within which the self then has the freedom to act.
Aquinas employs judgement in a practical way in his final naming of God in that question of the *Summa Theologiae*. While God is simple, for humans there are many different ways to think of him - this is presented by the biblical texts. 'The different ways of thinking of him are represented in the difference of subject and predicate; his unity we represent by bringing them together in an affirmative statement' (ST, 1, 13, 12). Burrell points out that it is McCabe's translation as statement that is important here. Aquinas uses the word *compositio*, 'the task he reserves to judgement'*305, which causes Burrell to conclude that for Aquinas *'langue is posterior to parole, to language in use. So it is never enough to identify a subset of terms which are susceptible of analogous usage; one must always display them in use'*306.

I introduced the idea of praxis above using Pannenberg's reference to understanding analogy as doxology. It is in this use of analogy that Pannenberg sees the proper culmination of speech about God begun in the biblical testimony. I will therefore reconstruct Pannenberg's suggestion for how analogy as praxis should be understood and then turn to add the view of analogy in use from Burrell.

Pannenberg begins with biblical testimony where he suggests that God is described using 'words whose meaning is established in other contexts... often with an astonishing abandon and picturesqueness'*307. From speaking of God's deeds, the text will move to his attributes and 'designate God himself', and even in this beginning of this process 'the very idea of a divine act already exhibits such an analogy'*308. However, Pannenberg argues that such expressions are 'characterized by what Schlink has termed a "doxological" structure. They express adoration of God'*309. To re-emphasise, what these statements emphatically do not

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305 D. BURRELL, 'From Analogy of "Being" to theAnalogy of Being', p. 126.
306 Ibid.
307 Ibid.
308 Ibid.
do is ‘provide theoretical definitions for the being of God in the sense of knowing the unknown through the known’ 310.

Pannenberg thus argues that the biblical project is distinct from any ‘enterprise of inferring the attributes of the divine origin from his effects by means of analogy’311. Any attempt at knowing God in such a way requires a ‘common logos’312, accomplishing a transfer of meaning by ‘an analogue’313 of ‘our words to the divine reality’314.

Thus the biblical test is always doxology. In Pannenberg’s analysis any doxological statement would be closer to an ‘equivocation’315, under the Scholastic definitions. When speaking in adoration, the ‘continuity’316 of the general meaning of the words used is irrelevant. Instead, Pannenberg suggests, that yes, ‘we speak of God’s righteousness. But we thereby release this word from the manipulation of our thought, and must learn ever anew from the reality of God what the word “righteousness” properly means’317. Pannenberg often refers to this use of the word as a ‘sacrifice’318, which includes a sacrifice of how the individual might want to direct the meaning of the word. When we speak analogically, the meaning of the word has ‘become mysterious, and this can even have a reflexive, renovating influence upon everyday linguistic usage’319. Thus the analogy is between the ordinary and the theological use of the word: ‘as in the Kantian conception, the analogy exists only in language’320, not between the word and the reality of God it designates. Pannenberg suggests that by understanding the project as adoration and

311 Ibid., p. 216.
312 Ibid.
313 Ibid., p. 217.
314 Ibid., p. 218.
315 Ibid.
316 Ibid., p. 216.
317 Ibid.
318 Ibid.
319 Ibid., p. 217.
sacrifice, it can ‘transcend the scholastic concept of the analogy between God and creatures’\(^{321}\). It is for this reason that Pannenberg suggests that the ‘end-point of the development of Aquinas’ thought on this subject’ as ‘paronymy’\(^{322}\).

Pannenberg concludes that in an understanding of analogy as *analogia entis*, his version of analogy would be understood as equivocation\(^{323}\). In my view Pannenberg is right to reject the dismissal this analysis represents, given his explicit grounding of his doxological analogy in the ultimacy of the self-disclosure of God. To explain, given the genuine mystery of God, the genuine ‘equivocation’ of language to be used of him, there is a ‘heightened urgency to the problem of demonstrating how a specific doxological statement, which cannot be exchanged at will with another, arises out of a specific situation’\(^{324}\). This is a question which led Aquinas to reject equivocal statements as meaningful when speaking about God, considering them essentially interchangeable\(^{325}\). Pannenberg suggests that a deliberate equivocation allows the ‘analogy posited in the statement [to be] transcended in the act of adoration’\(^{326}\). One speaks metaphorically in a particular instance because that instance has ‘some sort of relation to the comparatively original, genuine sense of the word in question’\(^{327}\). This is the reason for choosing to speak metaphorically. ‘The occasion for doxological speech about God is a specific experience of a divine act’\(^{328}\). Analogical language in its doxological character is a meaningful response to the revelation and the mystery of God, always provisional.

I now turn to Kasper to present my final conclusion on how understanding analogy in terms of praxis provides a new way of thinking about intercultural dialogue. I will now reconstruct Kasper’s approach in his book *The God of Jesus Christ*.

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322 Ibid., p. 213n2. - Pannenberg is referring specifically to Aquinas’s *Summa Theologiae* 1a, 13, 6 when he names Aquinas’s end-point.

323 Ibid., p. 218.

324 Ibid.


327 Ibid.

328 Ibid.
‘The path of experience leads us to the threshold of an ultimate mystery which we can experience not directly but only indirectly... Moreover, as soon as we attempt to describe this mystery, our language proves useless’\textsuperscript{329}. Kasper begins by clarifying that any attempt to describe God will fail because he himself is beyond the bounds of our language. The mystical tradition, Kasper notes, is familiar with this problem, but he suggests that there is a particular modern concern that should be acknowledged. This concern is that of ‘modern linguistic philosophy [which] asks: Is it possible to speak at all of the religious dimension?’\textsuperscript{330}. This is a question which has profound implications for the testimony of faithful believers, but also the possibility for theology at all, understood ‘as linguistically communicated rational discourse on the Christian faith’\textsuperscript{331}.

When considering how this question has been tackled, Kasper concentrates on the ‘dramatic development’\textsuperscript{332} within modern linguistic philosophy in the twentieth century. The significance of intercultural relationships is all the more strongly underlined with the philosophies of language Kasper uses in his analysis. According to Kasper it was Wittgenstein, in a critique he formed of his own earlier view in the \textit{Tractatus}\textsuperscript{333}, who provides another alternative in his \textit{Philosophical Investigations}\textsuperscript{334}. Under his approach, ‘the meaning of a word or proposition is now seen as residing not in its representation of an object but in its use’\textsuperscript{335}. He identifies two strands within this theory of meaning as use; he points to the non-cognitive and the cognitive theories. The former suggests that there is no particular cognitive content to a religious word such as “God”, but provides instead an opinion. More specifically, Kasper supplies, the language is used ‘to express an ethical attitude, to explain a commitment, a life-style or a conviction, or to express a certain way

\textsuperscript{329} W. KASPER, \textit{The God of Jesus Christ}, p. 87.

\textsuperscript{330} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{331} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{332} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{334} L. WITTGENSTEIN, \textit{Philosophical Investigations}, tr. G. E. Anseombe (Chichester, Wiley-Blackwells, 2007), originally published after Wittgenstein’s death, in English from his German notes, in 1953.

\textsuperscript{335} W. KASPER, \textit{The God of Jesus Christ}, p. 89.
of viewing reality'\textsuperscript{336}. He considers this stance to represent a certain progress in supplying meaning to religious statements, but still has concerns: 'we must nonetheless ask whether it does justice to the religious use of language'\textsuperscript{337}. The reason Kasper needs to ask this question is because the non-cognitive approach identifies a valuable aspect of religious statements but reduces their meaning to this single aspect. The man praying 'is not simply explicating his moral approach and his view of the world; he is invoking and addressing God'\textsuperscript{338}.

To explicate this Wittgensteinian understanding Kasper turns to I. T. Ramsey whom he identifies as working within cognitive theory. Ramsey suggests a link between religious language and 'disclosure situations'\textsuperscript{339}. These situations are described in terms very close to Pannenberg's expression of religious encounters. Pannenberg describes a 'a moment in which we grasp, by means of a single event, the totality of the reality in which we live and around which our lives circulate'\textsuperscript{340}. Kasper's explanation of Ramsey's description is of a situation where 'a broader and deeper coherence is revealed'\textsuperscript{341}. This is a coherence articulated through 'an interior commitment'\textsuperscript{342} to understanding the experience on the part of the person involved. Kasper notes this as an instance where the cognitive approach used here allows religious language to be evocative, rather than scientifically descriptive, and this shows a non-reductive view of how religious language is used.

Kasper's reconstruction here of the approaches to religious language as a general category by certain linguistic philosophy is of particular use in turning analogical language into a resource for intercultural dialogue. Here religious language is identified as a way of articulating the experience of the subject. Most significantly Kasper will be turning to the cultural particular use of analogy by Aquinas to best handle the 'commitment' to understanding the experience and articulation of that experience of the person.

\textsuperscript{336} W. KASPER, \textit{The God of Jesus Christ}, p. 89.
\textsuperscript{337} Ibid., pp. 89/90.
\textsuperscript{338} Ibid., p. 90.
\textsuperscript{339} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{340} W. PANNENBERG, 'Analogy and Doxology', p. 229.
\textsuperscript{341} W. KASPER, \textit{The God of Jesus Christ}, p. 90.
\textsuperscript{342} Ibid.
The next step in the development Kasper is charting was made, in his view, by J. L. Austin, and by J. R. Searle. The important characteristic of Austin’s approach is the distinction he made ‘between constative and a performative use of language. In the performative use of language, reality is not only observed but accomplished in the speech-act’\textsuperscript{343}. In terms of religious language, Kasper notes, this opens up the dimension of testimony, the non-neutral character of religious speech where ‘speech effects what it says’\textsuperscript{344}. What this means is that the role of historical particularity can now be clarified. It is this which Kasper considers to be the real achievement of the second phase of development of linguistic philosophy begun by Wittgenstein’s later work. Though this achievement is tempered when Kasper points out that ‘theology had long since perceived the tasks and possibilities’\textsuperscript{345} of ‘a historical inter-subjective speech-community’\textsuperscript{346}, owing to the scriptural concern with genre. Language communicates an already present pre-understanding of reality ‘so that in each instance reality “happens” historically in language’\textsuperscript{347}.

Here, like Ricoeur, Kasper recognises the particularity of the person’s being in the world, including how she articulates this reality for her. This particularity, in Ricoeur’s terms, is prefigured and refigured in a historical cultural tradition. In terms of Kasper’s focus here on religious language, what these ‘inter-subjective conditions’\textsuperscript{348} of language allow linguistic philosophy to emphasise is the character of testimony as praxis. To explain, testimony ‘is in the nature of an action and has its place within the community gathered for worship and liturgy, within the practice of proclamation, liturgy and diakonia (service)’\textsuperscript{349}. The way religious language is intended is pivotal for Kasper: ‘its primary purpose is not to

\textsuperscript{343} I recall here Pellauer’s reconstruction of speech-act theory in Ricoeur in order to return the subject - who is speaking. Kasper is emphasising the same thing, implied by the grammatical observations of thinkers such as Searle and Austin.

\textsuperscript{344} W. KASPER, The God of Jesus Christ, p. 90.

\textsuperscript{345} Ibid., p. 91.

\textsuperscript{346} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{347} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{348} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{349} Ibid., p. 92.
instruct but to urge a conversion of life\textsuperscript{350}. What this ultimately means therefore is that the horizon of religious linguistic practice is the possibility of consensus, and a shared community. Kasper, referring to Helmut Peukert's argumentation based on W. Benjamin, argues that there is a 'hope and longing implied in every act of linguistic communication not to end in nothingness'\textsuperscript{351}. This general character of language as hope for universal communication is only answered, Kasper continues, by the reality of a God who saves:

'Every act of linguistic communication is therefore at the same time a question and a pre-apprehension of the living and life-giving God... Religious language therefore not a specialized idiom alongside other kinds of language; rather, it makes explicit the condition for the possibility of all other language'\textsuperscript{352}.

I will conclude with Kasper's view of linguistic practice in terms of testimony once I have presented his introduction of analogy to this framework. He only begins to talk about analogy after he has established how twentieth century linguistic philosophy can contribute to his view of all communication pointing to a need for a religious foundation. He is seeking an effective understanding of analogy to support his purpose of identifying language as the particular expression of reality for the person, trying to mean more. He finds this understanding by using Aquinas, but identifies an early origin in Aristotle, then adapted. For Aristotle, analogy has a mediatory function. It permits the proportional ascription of being\textsuperscript{353}, thus creating 'an indirect discourse that points beyond itself'\textsuperscript{354}. In Aquinas, Kasper argues, we are similarly dealing with a coherent process of mediation that in the end does not close in on itself but is entirely open\textsuperscript{355}.

To explain this further, it is here that analogy begins to support Kasper's argument about religious language: 'language contains a movement to transcendence. Not only can it, but it intends always to say more than what the factual case is'\textsuperscript{356}. To consider this

\textsuperscript{350} W. KASPER, \textit{The God of Jesus Christ}, p. 92.

\textsuperscript{351} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{352} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{354} W. KASPER, \textit{The God of Jesus Christ}, p. 96.

\textsuperscript{355} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{356} Ibid., p. 94.
‘ontological significance of language’, Kasper turns to M. Heidegger. Heidegger’s conception of the human person is as always being oriented toward questions of being itself. ‘Being is concretely present in language, through which reality is at each moment disclosed to us in a particular way’\(^{357}\). Language both obscures and ‘discloses being in new ways, especially the language of myth and creative literature’\(^{358}\). It is in the light of this theory that Kasper turns to hermeneutical thinkers H. Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur. ‘Metaphors and similies do not have for their function simply to depict a set of familiar facts; rather, they offer a new and creative description of reality. In so doing they employ a dialectic of the familiar and the strange’\(^{359}\). This recalls the paradigmatic revolutions articulated by Kuhn, where new ways of thinking may be conveyed. However, this is not only a new idea, but ‘it makes reality speak to us in such a way that at the same time something more than the reality we encounter reaches expression’\(^{360}\). By this Kasper is again seeking to emphasise the hopeful, future-oriented nature of talk about God; in seeking better communication language ‘embodies the pre-apprehension of a total meaning for reality’. Thus, language ‘is at the same time a remembering of an unfulfilled hope of the human race and an anticipation of this hope’\(^{361}\).

The review of positions in the philosophy of language finds its completion in the intention to ‘transform the classical doctrine of analogy into a (salvation)-historical mode of thought’\(^{362}\) about being. So, Aquinas’s *analogia nominum*, though expressed here as distinct from a continuity ontology between God and the world, must still be newly articulated in the light of the modern insight of ‘taking freedom as our point of departure’\(^{363}\). The full expression of Kasper’s argument here is particularly powerful, and appears to begin with the sameness and difference that analogous statements always present in tension:

\(^{357}\) W. KASPER, *The God of Jesus Christ*, p. 93.

\(^{358}\) Ibid.

\(^{359}\) Ibid.

\(^{360}\) Ibid.

\(^{361}\) Ibid.

\(^{362}\) Ibid., p. 98.

\(^{363}\) Ibid.
‘For it can be shown that analogy represents an interpretation of the exercise of freedom. Freedom has its existence in the tension between infinite and finite, absolute and relative. It is possible for us in a free act to distance ourselves from the finite and conditioned, only because we reach beyond it to what is infinite and unconditioned. Only within the horizon of the infinite can we grasp the finite as finite; only in the light of the unconditioned and absolute can we grasp the conditioned as conditioned... there is always present in human freedom and understanding an implicit and latent knowledge of the unconditioned and infinite. We may even say: there is an analogical knowledge\(^3\).''

From this anthropology of human freedom in the polarity of the finite and the infinite Kasper goes on to identify the potential of analogy to disclose beyond the pure facticity of the world... reality’s dimension of futurity... that is more than an extrapolated past and present\(^3\). It is open to be seen in a new way - as are the parables. This conception of reality as open to new possibilities allows believers to discern ‘traces of God’s free revelation’\(^3\) in the world, having listened to the testimony of the Bible. The self-disclosure of God comes first, but analogy allows humans to ‘give expression’\(^3\) to it. Kasper sees analogical language as based on this analogia libertatis, the human capacity to distance oneself from a given context and conceive of reality in new terms, inspired by the imaginative testimony of the Bible.

**Conclusion**

Each of the four modern commentators on analogy reject the analogia entis reading that has been the focus of so much critique, including Ricoeur’s. McCabe identifies it as “use of language”\(^3\). The plurality of meaning in analogy leads Burrell to emphasise the role of judgement in analogical language. I can summarise Burrell’s view of analogy as an ongoing project of continually seeking to express the experience of God, and as he emphasises, always in the finite terms of creation. In an effort to reject a systematic philosophical description of the nature of God on the basis of reason, Pannenberg turns to doxology as the adequate attitude of the faithful. Under this framework, he also names

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\(^3\) W. KASPER, *The God of Jesus Christ*, p. 98.

\(^3\) Ibid., pp. 98-9.

\(^3\) Ibid., p. 99.

\(^3\) Ibid.

Aquinas’s use of analogy as more properly ‘paronymy’\textsuperscript{369}. Kasper recasts both poles of analogy, the world of humans, and God, as not marked by necessity. Understanding God as “absolute freedom” already implies that he can only be ‘recognized... if and when he freely discloses himself to human beings’\textsuperscript{370}.

I now want to argue that Kasper’s final conclusion here recasts analogy as a particular exercise of freedom and it is as an exercise of freedom and understood as a practical endeavour that I identify the clearest link to intercultural dialogue. Thus, the initiative and particular character of acts or traces of revelation are found to be in correspondence to a human person able to understand, decipher, relate and respond to such overtures. In analogy as the exercise of freedom in particularity, I find a parallel with Ricoeur’s early concrete understanding of human freedom within the conditions of finitude. Analogy can become speech about the other, rather than the Other.

As for Pannenberg, analogy is rooted in testimony, and Kasper turns this outward to cast analogy as the free response of the person. I now want to argue that, as Ricoeur’s work continued, analogy became increasingly useful for him in a hermeneutics of intercultural dialogue. He does not however lose the extraordinary richness that he has sought to protect in metaphor. I will begin by remaining in the context of biblical testimony to show his changing view of Aquinas specifically, and then turn to his approach to history-writing as an example of using analogy to speak of the other. This will constitute Chapter Four and beyond that I will turn back to the question of intercultural communication.

\textsuperscript{369} W. PANNENBERG, ‘Analogy and Doxology’, p. 213n2

\textsuperscript{370} W. KASPER, \textit{The God of Jesus Christ}, p. 99.
CHAPTER FOUR
RICOEUR’S CHANGING VIEW OF ANALOGY AS A TOOL OF LANGUAGE

I closed Chapter Three with an examination of analogical language as an exercise of judgement. It has a practical character. I approached this view using thinkers who provided an alternative viewpoint to Ricoeur’s in *The Rule of Metaphor*. In particular this alternative view contributed a critique of Ricoeur’s analysis of analogical language as used by Aquinas. Ricoeur eventually concluded in favour of an ‘ontological vehemence’ of metaphor that explained the relationship between metaphor and reality. What this means is that the innovative meaning of a metaphor is drawn out by its new reference. My view was that Ricoeur’s conclusions here lost the rich resources of analogy as understood through Aquinas’s modern commentators.

In this chapter I intend make the component of judgement in analogy clearer by connecting it to Ricoeur’s concept of testimony. It is this context that Ricoeur’s changing view of “speculative” theology is articulated. Ricoeur introduces testimonies in a biblical context as particular and polyphonic, but attempting to speak of the absolute. He first saw analogy as an attempt at the “universal” level of thinking and rejected it on those grounds. I have argued that analogy is not a “universal” reflection on language as such, but on its particular shape in a historical, existing language.

A useful way of thinking about this can be found in Veronika Hoffman’s emphasis on Ricoeur’s view of religion in terms of comparable languages. One can translate, but still only have one mother tongue; one takes as one’s basis one particular religion. In my view this strengthens an understanding of analogical language as a particular reflection of the Jewish and Christian experience of God, rather than impertinent speculation. This reflects the discerning element of the reader of Scripture, which Ricoeur himself emphasises in his biblical interpretation. It is also consistent with Ricoeur’s approach to religious tradition as a kind of mother tongue from which one must form one’s particular response to others. This viewpoint gives context to Ricoeur’s increasingly nuanced approach to analogical

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language. In particular I will analyse his later work, firstly in biblical interpretation and
secondly on history-writing, as turning toward using analogy as a practical response to the
other, an exercise of freedom that reaches out but respects otherness. Analogy presents the
opportunity for creative refiguration, and for Ricoeur the role of the reader in this process
came to be increasingly significant. This is consistent with his conclusion regarding the
importance of employing non-poetic discourses in order to consider any given perspective
from a distance. Ricoeur will use this approach also when considering the way in which
figurative language operates in biblical texts.

Before I outline the steps of this chapter I will briefly recall Ricoeur’s final conclusion
regarding metaphor - that through its split-reference it provides an imaginative way of
being in the world. However, any individual metaphor does not simply perform this
function in isolation - it should not be understood as a shibboleth, or a hermetic symbol. In
*Interpretation Theory*, Ricoeur characterises the revelatory nature of a metaphor as less
powerful when used as a single instance, than when it is employed within a network of
metaphors each contributing to the scandal of the others. Ricoeur argues that “one”
metaphor, in effect, calls for another and each one stays alive by conserving its power to
evoke the whole network\(^3\). Such a network leads to the capacity of single metaphors to
call up ‘the partial metaphors borrowed from the diverse fields of our experience’\(^4\), and I
see here the foreshadowing of the increased significance of the role of the reader that I will
emphasise throughout this chapter. These multiple, networked metaphors open up a
‘conceptual diversity’ which Ricoeur identifies as ‘an unlimited number of potential
interpretations at a conceptual level’\(^5\). I turn again to Rendtorff’s clarification of this point:
It is figurative language that introduces the conceptual productivity necessary for
speculative discourse - ‘metaphor contributes to dynamic ontology by doing the dream
work of language at the limits of established conceptual categories’\(^6\).

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3 P. Ricoeur, *Interpretation Theory: Discourse and a Surplus of Meaning* (Forth Worth TX, Texas Christian
University Press, 1976), p. 64.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

6 J. D. Rendtorff, ‘Paul Ricoeur’s Poetic Ontology: Metaphor as Tensional Resemblance’ pp. 379-387 in A.
It is here, where figurative language is explicitly taxed with articulating that which is new and other, that I want to introduce Ricoeur’s changing view of analogy. This will include his new analysis of the ontology involved, turning away from his earlier rejection of theories of analogy on such grounds. I have already critiqued his view of *analogia entis* by turning to the resources found in alternative readings of Aquinas. Ricoeur’s own view changes to emphasise the role analogy plays in developing new perspectives of the other. To this end I will begin with Ricoeur’s explicit work on analogy within his examination of figurative language in the context of biblical texts. This emphasises the polysemy of meaning in language through a study on ‘Naming God’. The later text focused on the single verse Exodus 3:14, reconstructing interpretations in systematic or speculative terms of the polysemy of meaning in this verse. Those speculative responses allow Ricoeur to develop a view of translation as interpretation. These studies on biblical interpretation comprise the first part of this chapter. In the second part I turn to clarifying Ricoeur’s concept of testimony in the new context of historiography, before concluding with Ricoeur’s use of analogy as part of the multiple lenses through which the historian must view the past in order to write of it: the Same, the Other, the Analogous.

### 4.1. Testimony as a Polysemic Speaking of God

Ricoeur’s later work on biblical interpretation allowed him to investigate the biblical network of figurative language about God. This approach to figurative language is presented in relation to testimony as a polysemy of ways of naming God. Ricoeur subsequently reconstructed responses to that polysemic testimony, including analogical language, without erasing the distinctions between discourses which he had sought to protect in earlier analyses. I will reconstruct these two points in this section. In this way Ricoeur is therefore able to employ medieval theories of language use and conceptualisation, which will, to a certain extent, rehabilitate the image of Aquinas Ricoeur provided in *The Rule of Metaphor*. I will reconstruct this in the following sections. Clarification on this final point is important because it allows me to underline the value of

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7 To clarify how this relates to Ricoeur’s study of analogy in *The Rule of Metaphor*, I point to his slightly later remarks on the process of biblical interpretation: “to recover a concept of revelation and a concept of reason that, without ever coinciding, can at least enter into a living dialectic and together engender something like an understanding of faith” (P. Ricoeur, *Essays on Biblical Interpretation* (Minneapolis, Fortress Press, 1980), p. 73). In Ricoeur’s methodology the spheres of discourse of faith and speculative philosophy remain distinct.
the alternative views I presented in Chapter Three in order to further support Ricoeur’s later view of analogy. This later view becomes significant in his work on historiography, where Ricoeur is helped by his new articulation of medieval analogical language.

It is in ‘Naming God’ that Ricoeur emphasises the polysemy of meaning in biblical language in its various forms. His study of the question of naming God can be seen as a test case for human thinking at its highest limit, in relation to the absolute that cannot be encompassed in human language, but testified to. His treatment of this limit reflection will also be relevant for how the limits between cultures are accessed: not from an overarching but from a particular perspective of distinct languages and cultures which nevertheless allow for understanding and exchange.

Commenting on his biblical interpretation in the course of a later conference, Ricoeur notes ‘that starting from a biblical text we may see there is a new way of thinking to put to the test’. This approach is shared by the systematic theologian Werner Jeanrond, to whose paper Ricoeur was responding with this comment. I shall use Jeanrond’s analysis of Ricoeur in this section since he approaches the topic in terms of the concept of Christian revelation, but meets Ricoeur on the point of the polysemous text and the significance of the multiple interpretive reflections that follow.

Ricoeur approaches figurative biblical language as ways of naming God. Rather than beginning with via negativa, Ricoeur concentrates instead on the affirmative names used for God throughout the biblical text. The biblical network of metaphors for God is pronounced enough that it is the example Ricoeur uses for illustrating his argument I

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12 Although Jeanrond calls for a closer link between the discourse of faith and reflective dimensions than Ricoeur would himself employ. I will reconstruct Ricoeur’s analysis of the speculative responses to the biblical text below.
highlighted as an introduction to this chapter, that metaphors contribute to each other’s revelatory force. ‘Within the Hebraic tradition God is called King, Father, Husband, Lord, Shepherd and Judge as well as Rock, Fortress, Redeemer, and Suffering Servant’. These he calls root metaphors, which ‘assemble and scatter. They assemble subordinate images together, and they scatter concepts at a higher level’.

Walter Brueggemann has emphasised this plurality of names for God. Brueggemann is an American exegete who has concentrated on the significance of literary forms and the imagination. When considering the biblical text as a whole, he argues that in God ‘we shall find an odd, restless Agent who refuses any formulation of closure, even the classic formulations of the faith’. What Brueggemann is attempting is to argue for is a break with a hegemonic view of God, so as to open up the possibility of a more pluralist approach to religion. This is not an argument with which Ricoeur engages, but like Ricoeur, Brueggemann proposes ‘that it is evident that there are unresolved tensions and unsettled ambiguities in the identity, person and character of God’ as presented in the biblical text. For example, he is both Lord and Suffering Servant, he is both wrathful and forgiving - often changing his stance within the same text - 1 Sam 15:29 ‘God will not recant or have a change of mind, but in vv. 11-35 in the same chapter (with the same verbs) God does have a change of mind’. These are very brief examples from a much more extensive collection, but they bear out Ricoeur’s stance on the importance of the polysemy of names. These tensions are the crux of Brueggemann’s argument for pluralism. Ricoeur has also formed a response to the tensions of these testimonies, and the multiplicity of names for God.

Ricoeur begins by clarifying what kind of discourse his own response provides. He is writing in response to presentations of Christian belief, most clearly represented by the texts of the tradition. Ricoeur characterises these as a discourse of testimony before which

13 P. Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and a Surplus of Meaning, p. 64.
14 Ibid.
16 Ibid., p. 457.
17 Ibid., p. 456.
the believer is a 'listener'. Janet Martin Soskice, a philosophical theologian, has commented on the theme of naming God by particularly emphasising the value of Ricoeur's approach. She notes that he rejects the hubris that is 'the fantasy of self-founding'. Ricoeur’s idea of a listener 'may stand ready to describe the ways they understand what they have heard'. That is the appropriate response to the discourse of testimony, which is how Ricoeur characterises the biblical text. The biblical testimony, Ricoeur suggests, is 'like a musical score that requires execution'; as Brueggemann implies, the text demands an interpretive response. Brueggemann too is a listener, coming to a different interpretation from Ricoeur precisely in the plurality of testimony found in the text. 'Listening excludes founding oneself', Ricoeur argues, and for this reason the polyphonic naming of God in the text is answered by multiple interpretations, a hermeneutic of testimony.

Ricoeur begins his interpretation of that by identifying the biblical testimony as poetic discourse. However, he objects 'to the theory that reduces the referential function to descriptive discourse in order to allow only an emotional function to poetic discourse'. By doing so Ricoeur continues his approach of using Structuralism in order to identify texts, but then moving beyond it by discovering useful meaning where Structuralists do not.

Poetic discourse is not irrational, supplying only emotional resonances; instead it contains sense and reference, but is triply independent of its author, its context, and its initial audience. So the reader is presented with the world of the text, available to imaginative inhabitation by the reader. 'What shows itself is each time the proposing of a world, a


19 P. Ricoeur, 'Naming God', p. 217. I will continue to use this pagination, but it is worth noting that this essay was first published as 'Naming God', tr. D. Pellauer, pp. 215-227 in Union Seminary Quarterly Review 34 (New York, Union Theological Seminar, 1979). The year of publication is significant because it indicates that as soon as four years after the publication of The Rule of Metaphor, Ricoeur returned to consider the ontology behind figurative language, in the particular example of the relationship between God and being.

20 Ibid., p. 219

21 Ibid., p. 224.

22 Ibid.
world wherein I can project my ownmost possibilities. Thus, by inhabiting the world of the text the reader shapes for herself one of ‘our many ways of belonging to the world’. Jeanrond notes with approval Ricoeur’s stance that ‘poetic language transforms our relationships in the world in so far as it allows us to see anew what shows itself to us’. This re-emphasises the testimonial nature of the original text – ‘writing, in its turn, is restored to living speech by means of the various acts of discourse that reactualize the text’. Moreover, notes Soskice, ‘the movement is not complete. It must move from poetics to politics’. She continues by viewing this transfer as ‘an ethical moment for Ricoeur’s understanding which is not something that happens in the head or language alone, but in the world, in our acting.

Nowhere is this clearer than in the forms of the poetic biblical text. The form is an important point for Ricoeur, who suggests that the rhetorical presentation and the content of the text have a ‘mutual accommodation’, presenting a polyphonic naming of God and a similarly conceptual complexity. The forms Ricoeur highlights are narrative, prophecy, prescriptive texts or law, wisdom and hymn, and parable. Shadowing each of these ways of speaking of God are what Ricoeur calls ‘limit expressions’. What is most significant about Ricoeur’s presentation of the different rhetorics employed within the bible is the manner of their interaction, and what this means for the names of God they each present. Here the idea of tension between testimonies returns, not as a contradictory and therefore necessarily pluralist horizon, but as a fruitful dialectic ‘applicatio’ in the discourse and activity of the “listener”.

To begin, Ricoeur interprets God in the narrative context as essentially an Actant. ‘The theology of traditions names God in accord with a historical drama that recounts itself as a

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24 Ibid., p. 222.
26 Ibid., p. 219. It will be in Time and Narrative that Ricoeur explores the significance of this reactualisation in terms of the act of reading, see below.
29 Ibid., p. 228.
narrative of liberation\(^31\). God is acting in events, 'in which the community of interpretation recognizes itself as enrooted'\(^32\). Yet it is the form of prophecy that contributes to an understanding of those events and God's intentions in them. While remembering the narrative, the listener is called to consider the future: 'Prophecy does bear forward toward “the Day of Yahweh,”'\(^33\) in the voice of God. God is presented as the voice of an other I, not immediately present in the prophecy, but doubled through the voice of the prophet, 'in the consciousness of being called and sent'\(^34\). Ricoeur's example is 'The word of the Lord came to me, saying, “Go and proclaim in the hearing of Jerusalem”'\(^35\).

The dialectic between narrative and prophecy thus reveals God's activity and his intentions behind it in the context of a community's history, which in turn contributes to their understanding of their relationship with God. It is from this dialectic that prescriptive texts in turn find their emphasis. The giving of the Law on Sinai is within the founding events of the community, it is enclosed by a narrative; 'in this way the promulgation of the law is organically linked to the narrative of deliverance'\(^36\). Thus, a genuine economy of law is produced when understood in the context of the future actions of God. Under the sign of the Torah, Ricoeur expresses this as an 'apprenticeship'\(^37\), a lived response to the teaching of God, 'It is part of the meaning of this naming that I perceive myself as designated in the second person by God'. Here there are multiple dialectics between narrative and ethics, and ethics and prophecy, emphasised in the New Testament: 'The new law and the new covenant express, if we may put it this way, an ethic based on prophecy. God is then named as the one who says, “a new heart I will give you”'\(^38\).

\(^{31}\) P. RICOEUR, 'Naming God', p. 225.

\(^{32}\) Ibid.

\(^{33}\) Ibid.

\(^{34}\) Ibid.

\(^{35}\) Ibid., referencing Jeremiah 2:2.

\(^{36}\) Ibid., p. 226.

\(^{37}\) Ibid.

\(^{38}\) Ibid., pp. 226/7.
Ricoeur suggests that wisdom literature presents an ‘overflowing of the framework of the covenant’\(^{39}\) of this dialectic economy. Indeed, Ricoeur’s view is that “wisdom” overflows even the idea of genre, scattered as it is within the biblical text as a whole. His reasoning for this is that wisdom and hymnic texts are about responding to ‘the human condition in general. It is directly addressed to the sense and non-sense of existence. It is a struggle for sense in spite of non-sense’\(^{40}\) that are not explained by that economy - ‘how to suffer suffering’\(^{41}\) and ‘hymns of celebration, supplication, and thanksgiving’\(^{42}\). Wisdom helps the reader to find ‘how to’ suffer while making sense of the world. At the other end of the scale the texts of praise that respond to joy allow the reader to reach the point of seeing God as a second person. These texts name God by addressing him, and doing so as the previously seen Actant of narrative, prophecy and law.

It is in the parable, where ‘God is named at the same time the kingdom is named’\(^{43}\). This retains an important distance, an otherness, by explicitly presenting ‘a metaphorical displacement that through the crisis and the denouement of the story recounted obliquely intends the kingdom’\(^{44}\), and so names God. Dialectically, this reopens the economy of law and future action presented by simultaneously naming the kingdom with God, continuing the final eschatological horizon begun in prophecy and defying the coherence of a concluded narrative.


\(^{40}\) Ibid.

\(^{41}\) Ibid.

\(^{42}\) Ibid.

\(^{43}\) Ibid. p. 228.

\(^{44}\) Ibid., p. 229. It is worth noting here that Jeanrond has analysed Ricoeur’s understanding of revelation in these biblical genres in an interesting way. Pointing to Ricoeur’s words, Jeanrond recognises the multiplicity of forms as presenting a ‘polysemic and polyphonic concept of revelation’ itself (Essays on Biblical Interpretation, p. 93). Revelation is not Ricoeur’s interest in ‘Naming God’ but in Jeanrond’s view retains a concept of revelation that is ‘at most, analogical in form’ (Hermeneutics and Revelation’, p. 50). What this means is that the possibility of multiple interpretations springs from Ricoeur’s concept of a God who reveals and conceals: ‘divine revelation is a kind of limit-knowledge because “the one who reveals himself is also the one who conceals himself”. Jeanrond’s analysis of this as already analogical is consistent with my view of analogical language as an incomplete indicator. Ricoeur’s objection has always been that analogy presents a systematic approach and ‘to say that the God who reveals himself is a hidden God is to confess that revelation can never constitute a body of truths which an institution may boast of or take pride in possessing’ (Essays on Biblical Interpretation, p. 93).
This dialectical complexity of narrative, prophecy, ethics, wisdom, and parable is not explained in the text. As usual the reader is necessary to respond to the text as a whole with dialectical labour, bringing it to ‘execution’\textsuperscript{45}. It is the ‘overall functioning of all these genres as the seat of semantic innovation’ to which the reader must respond\textsuperscript{46}. The tensions and complementarity of the different modalities of testimony present a world ready for multiple interpretations by the reader.

However, I mentioned Ricoeur’s careful caveat above, that this overall semantic innovation is paired with limit-expressions. My presentation of parable alludes to this by emphasising the deliberate otherness of metaphor with narrative. The naming of God is in the naming of the kingdom, but that kingdom is receding; it is constantly displaced from being immediately available. ‘There is no parable that does not introduce into the very structure of the plot an implausible characteristic, something insolent, disproportionate; that is something scandalous’\textsuperscript{47}. One is constantly called upon by the text to think more. Thus even the name of God, paired with the kingdom is in ‘recession into infinity’\textsuperscript{48}. This “negative” naming finds its extreme in the naming of God as unnameable at Exodus 3:14. The example of Exodus 3:14 is what leads Ricoeur to a reconstruction of analogy, but as a speculative response to the verse, not as a description of the polysemous testimony that names and unnames God.

The unnameable God presented in this single verse is a concept to which Ricoeur has devoted much concentration. He began his consideration of the different modalities of discourse by arguing that the role of listener ‘requires giving up (dessaissement) the human self in its will to mastery, sufficiency, and autonomy’\textsuperscript{49}. Here I recall Wolfhart Pannenberg’s emphasis on the ‘sacrifice’\textsuperscript{50} in naming God by analogy by prioritising mystery over the mastery of the word. For Ricoeur this breaks open any naming as

\textsuperscript{45} P. Ricoeur, ‘Naming God’, p. 219.

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., p. 232.

\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., p. 229.

\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., p. 228.

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., p. 224.

incomplete. Naming God is thus only possible as an interpretation of experience - the biblical testimony - 'a radically nonspeculative and prephilosophical mode of language'^. Such naming is 'originary'^. As such the reader can use it to contribute to speculative discourse. Yet by employing this originary discourse, theologians and philosophers should recognise a 'letting go of the knowledge of God through the resources of critical philosophy'^ alone. Critical philosophy, as Ricoeur puts, it is directed at conceptualising, and so enclosing, ideas. This is precisely what the unnameable resists. I particularly value this analysis from Soskice:

'The implication of this, it seems to me, is that to name God in this way it is necessary to be in relation - not only in relation to God but in relation to texts and to testimonies and thus to be in relation to other people who write these books and provide these testimonies... We cannot escape from history, from our bodies, from other people'^.

Ricoeur's work here on 'Naming God' remphasises that any philosophical or theological reading must find a way 'to understand oneself in front of the text'^ in the context of the 'innumerable “recontextualisations”'^. I now turn to one of Ricoeur's essays in *Thinking Biblically* written nearly twenty years after 'Naming God'. This example, titled 'From Interpretation to Translation'^, is a response to Exodus 3:14 where he makes precisely this attempt and in doing so returns to the resources of analogical language. He reviews ontological interpretations of this biblical verse in the history of theology, showing how the unnameable 'ehyeh 'ašer 'ehyeh, I am who I am, has kept the tension between ontology and apophatism alive. It is here that his view of analogical language is presented with more nuance.

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51 P. Ricoeur, 'Naming God', p. 224.
52 Ibid., p. 223.
53 Ibid.
54 J. M. Soskice, 'Naming God', p. 86.
55 P. Ricoeur, 'Naming God', p. 234.
56 Ibid., p. 219.
A new view of analogy in *Thinking Biblically*

In *Thinking Biblically*, Ricoeur returns to the idea of analogy as used by Aquinas. The key verse is Exodus 3:14: ‘God said to Moses, “I am who I am”; and He said, “Thus you shall say to the sons of Israel, ‘I AM has sent me to you.’” This verse provides Ricoeur with essentially the ultimate limit-expression of the names of God - his dramatic unnameability. In Soskice’s commentary on Ricoeur, it is the name ‘against all naming’⁵⁸. It is interesting however that the essay in which he concentrates on this point, ‘From Interpretation to Translation’, is intended to complement André LaCocque’s essay on the same verse: ‘The Revelation of Revelations’⁵⁹. LaCocque’s title implies an unparalleled discovery to be found in the text, not a limit-expression. However, as I shall now reconstruct, LaCocque is in agreement with Ricoeur that that discovery is one of dynamic transformation for the reader. I emphasise in my reconstruction two points that Ricoeur makes. The first is Ricoeur’s declared aim to shift focus from the model of interpretation to translation as a necessary response to the text. This model can be seen as a parallel to Ricoeur’s later use of translation as a paradigmatic model for communication across cultures⁶⁰. The second point is to be found in Ricoeur’s examination of the verse by clarifying its philosophical and theological reception where he provides a more complex presentation of the option of analogical language.

With these two points in mind I want to begin by presenting Ricoeur’s initial approach to the verse as inextricably bound up with its reception. Ricoeur’s focus in this particular essay is to draw the link from interpretation to translation. Any attempt to translate, as any attempt to interpret, is confronted with previous reception. ‘Let us draw an initial lesson from these opening remarks. There is no innocent translation; I mean one that could escape the history of reception of our text, a history that itself is immediately a history of


⁵⁹ A. LaCocque, ‘The Revelation of Revelations’ pp. 307-330 in A. LaCocque, P. Ricoeur, *Thinking Biblically*. LaCocque is an biblical exegete who worked in the University of Chicago during the same period as Ricoeur. Much of LaCocque’s work has gone toward emphasising the plural origins of the Hebrew Bible with a view to clarifying the rich history between Judaism, Christianity, and latterly Islam.

interpretation'. It is in the face of this that Ricoeur will employ the method for which he argued in his article of 1979, 'Naming God': 'It is the task of a philosophical hermeneutic to guide us... toward the more originary modalities of language'. However, choosing this approach 'is not equivalent to a criticism of scholarly exegesis. On the contrary, the struggle for another translation, for another interpretation, draws its force from this struggle with a multimillenary tradition'. More precisely, Ricoeur intends to respond to the very 'perplexity' of the text. I characterise Ricoeur's approach here as precisely a philosophical hermeneutic with 'the mediation of the tradition of reading'. The reception of Exodus 3:14 has been emphatically ontological in focus and it is through this history of reading (and translation) that Ricoeur will attempt to reach the world of the text and provide his own interpretation, a translation. He begins therefore with the history of reception of this passage, rather than the figurative nature of the discourse.

Ricoeur begins by seeking to contextualise Exodus 3:14, not in historical terms, but within the modalities of testimony, the names of God, found elsewhere in the biblical text. The contrast is drawn between 'Exodus 3:14 and the group of biblical texts bearing generally on the quest for the Unknown Name, and, on the other hand, those texts that gravitate around the expression “I [am] Yhwh”'. Soskice also makes this link to the Tetragrammaton. ‘Most Jewish commentary, ancient and modern, the consensus of modern biblical criticism urges us to see this name as anchored in the specificity of the Exodus text. “I AM WHO I AM” is a gloss on the Tetragrammaton’. The latter example of naming God is part of a formula - a self-presentation by God, and the recognition by his listeners. By contrast it seems that the Tetragrammaton is rooted in the ‘incognito’ of

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61 P. RICOEUR, ‘From Interpretation to Translation’ pp. 331-361 in A. LACOCQUE, P. RICOEUR, Thinking Biblically, p. 332.
63 P. RICOEUR, ‘From Interpretation to Translation’, p. 332.
64 Ibid.
65 Ricoeur’s later work on translation will establish it as the paradigmatic model for communication across different traditions. This will be crucial for the move to intercultural ethics. I have touched on this in 2.3.
66 P. RICOEUR, ‘From Interpretation to Translation’, p. 332.
68 P. RICOEUR, ‘From Interpretation to Translation’, p. 332.
God. Yet, like Exodus 3:14, it might ‘belong to the semantic field of the same verb traditionally translated by “to be”’\(^{69}\) - hyh.

Exodus 3:14 continues to differ from the expression “I [am] Yhwh”, however, in its character as a ‘grammatical enigma’\(^{70}\). The verse ‘ehyeh ‘ašer ehyeh derives from the root hyh, which loosely indicates the semantic field of being. Yet this doubled use of the verb has no parallel and is accompanied by a third use ‘in the position of a subject in the first-person singular with a vocative value in Exodus 3:14b’ which renders it notoriously difficult to parse.

Ricoeur has begun by acknowledging this problem because it draws out two issues. First, ‘the degree of polysemy we grant to the verb “being”’\(^{71}\), and second, the danger of ontological abstraction. Being is here presented as part of a name, and under a plurivocity of meaning. This is wholly consistent with the kind of dynamic ontology with which Ricoeur concluded *The Rule of Metaphor*. In the context of biblical testimony what this plurivocity itself presents is what Ricoeur calls ‘the opening toward the future and the mark of becoming and dynamism’\(^{72}\).

This dynamism is further explained by the second contextualisation Ricoeur reconstructs, recalling the position of this verse within a call narrative. These narratives generally follow set formulae of call and reluctant answer, with the eventual transformation of the listener into a prophet. Moreover, part of this ‘narrative procedure’ includes the usual ‘Revelation of the Name’\(^{73}\). Ricoeur asks if, just as it breaks open the formula I [am] Yhwh, ‘whether Exodus 3:14 does not overflow the narrative framework of a call narrative’\(^{74}\). Ricoeur characterises this overflowing as presenting a double reading, both minimizing and amplifying the name of God. The enigmatic answer ‘ehyeh ‘ašer ehyeh recalls the readers back to ‘exegetical sobriety’ in a sense, as it constantly calls for

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\(^{69}\) P. Ricoeur, ‘From Interpretation to Translation’, p. 334

\(^{70}\) Ibid., p. 334.

\(^{71}\) Ibid., p. 335.

\(^{72}\) Ibid., p. 334.

\(^{73}\) Ibid., p. 336.

\(^{74}\) Ibid., p. 335.
explanation of the verb use. Yet at the same time, this single name amplifies ‘precisely because this formula exceeds its context, its meaning outruns its function’\textsuperscript{75}. Together, these readings recall the reader to the ‘hermeneutical situation’ of the polysemy of verses on ‘being’. ‘“I am, I was, I shall be” - do not break away from the verb “being,” but rather explore its resources, which would remain unexploited if Hebraic thought, followed by Christian thought, had not itself been transferred in the space of Greek thought’\textsuperscript{76}.

In his commentary Jeanrond makes the link between verse and a speculative response explicit: we are ‘to appreciate the polysemic nature of “to be” in any appropriate translation and related thinking about God’\textsuperscript{77}. It is in this polysemy that Ricoeur pursues translation as interpretation as I will now explain.

The enigma of \textit{hyh} turn Ricoeur’s focus back to ontology, a discourse where he has already recognised the name of God to be ‘originary’\textsuperscript{78}. He has already declared that philosophical reflection on this point must return the listener to the original modality of the language - clarified above as testimony. ‘That God is designated at the same time as the one who communicates through the multiple modalities of discourse just discussed and who also holds back is why the dialectic of the naming of God cannot be transformed into a form of knowledge’\textsuperscript{79}. The name, although invoking the word being, is not already an ontology. Consistent with his stance in \textit{The Rule of Metaphor} Ricoeur argues that ‘there are no specifically philosophical words, but only a philosophical use of words’\textsuperscript{80}. Exodus 3:14, the revelation of revelations, is not providing an ontology as such but declares at once the name and that the name is unnameable.

In Soskice’s terms the verse itself ‘is not a generic statement of who or what God is regardless of place, time and human history but a statement of who God is Moses and for Israel as Moses is addressed. Moses is addressed and finds himself a listener, at the

\textsuperscript{75} P. Ricoeur, ‘From Interpretation to Translation’, p. 337.

\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., p. 337.

\textsuperscript{77} W. Jeanrond, ‘Hermeneutics and Revelation’, p. 51.

\textsuperscript{78} P. Ricoeur, ‘Naming God’, p. 223.

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid., p. 228.

\textsuperscript{80} P. Ricoeur, ‘From Interpretation to Translation’, p. 341.
burning bush'\textsuperscript{81}. What Soskice seeks to underline here is the value of approaching the text as a listener. As theologians an isolated speculative discourse only 'charts a path of a thousand qualifications through the dogmatic wastelands of the past. Instead we should pause to attend more to religion's primary texts, and to those words which are originary\textsuperscript{82}. Ricoeur is respectful of this struggle and in \textit{Thinking Biblically} chooses to map out operative theologies which influence our hearing of the biblical "originary" words. I will show that among these he places analogy - no longer an isolated, speculative, and therefore fruitless, discussion.

It is the enigmatic quality of the name that demands of the reader an ontology that is dynamic, that 'protects the secret of the "in-itself" of God, and this secret, in turn, sends us back to the narrative naming'\textsuperscript{83} in all its polysemy. As a listener before this polysemy Ricoeur therefore considers the ontological implications of the various translations of the grammatical enigma. Each present a new 'recontextualisation' for the particular Mosaic narrative. Unsurprisingly the Greek and Latin translations have concentrated on the implication in \textit{hyh} of "being". The LXX Septuagint translation reads \textit{ego eimi ho on}, relying on the Greek verb \textit{einaei}. The Latin equivalent of \textit{einaei} is \textit{esse}, while the Latin Vulgate reflects the symmetry of the original Hebrew as \textit{sum qui sum}. These later translations of the Hebrew are important because 'translation belongs to the history of reading, itself governed by the "history of effects" - the \textit{Wirkungsgeschichte} - of the words themselves'\textsuperscript{84}. What this means is that how previous readers have interpreted and translated certain phrases will have an impact on how later readers do so as well. Speaking of the LXX Ricoeur argues that while it was ultimately a contingent interpretation, the translation 'nonetheless bears the authority conferred upon it by an intellectual and spiritual fruitfulness whose effects are not yet exhausted'\textsuperscript{85}.

The Greek verse was not attempting the same dialectic Ricoeur finds in the modalities of language where the names of God are found. The Septuagint does not employ the

\textsuperscript{81} J. M. SOSKICE, 'Naming God', p. 81.
\textsuperscript{82} Ibid., p. 78.
\textsuperscript{83} P. RICOEUR, 'Naming God', p. 228.
\textsuperscript{84} P. RICOEUR, 'From Interpretation to Translation', p. 337.
\textsuperscript{85} Ibid., p. 338.
Tetragrammaton and therefore the complexity of the verb *hyh* is not directly in question. Instead, the Greek presents the verse as essentially revealing God’s existence to Moses. Ricoeur considers this to be a new kind of interplay, a ‘subtle intermixing of the Hebraic and the Hellenistic, the fusion between a positive ontology and an ascetic suspension of the Name is announced, under the aegis of the verb *einaiv*86. This new interplay is possible only through the ‘relay point’ of the New Testament. Ricoeur points specifically to Revelation 1:4 as a kind of retranslation of Exodus 3:14, hailing the churches in the name of ‘him who is and who was and who is to come’. The characterisation of this new interplay by Ricoeur is important. He describes it as ‘an encounter that, occurring by choice, became a destiny’87. It presents a deliberate translative interpretation using multiple resources of the Hebraic and Greek traditions. This interpretation, by dwelling on the positive ontology, albeit initially in harmony with Exodus 3:14, focused on the name of God in terms of the question of his being.

However, the pairing of the concepts of God and being in philosophical discourse is something Ricoeur warns is a ‘subtle seduction’88, leading the philosopher to conceptualise where knowledge is not appropriate. As a result this is a pairing that has itself been read in multiple ways, and Ricoeur points out that the conceptualising of God as being itself is an equivocal discourse. There are three particular encounters that he highlights as contributing to the ‘many ways’ in which being is meant: the confrontation between Plato and Aristotle, between Hellenistic and Hebraic thought, and between Hellenistic and Christian thought. Ricoeur chooses to use this multiplicity to emphasise again the original polysemy of the names of God. Even when reduced to a question of ontology, Ricoeur asks, ‘why not assume that Exodus 3:14 was ready from the beginning to add a new region of significance to the rich polysemy of the verb being?’89. New confrontations of meaning are always possible.

I argue that this polysemy, its accompanying tension, and its explicit status as testimony is reflected by two patristic responses to which Ricoeur now turns. He highlights them using

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87 Ibid., p. 340.
89 P. RICOEUR, ‘From Interpretation to Translation’, p. 340.
their most influential thinkers: Pseudo-Dionysius and Augustine, but I want to concentrate on the methods themselves: ‘apophaticism and ontology’. My intention is to highlight again Ricoeur’s stance on analogy in this, the latest of the three texts which deal with the question directly. In particular I will present Ricoeur’s approach to Aquinas on this point.

**Ricoeur’s reconstruction of speculative responses to Exodus 3:14**

There are two points in reconstructing Augustine and Pseudo-Dionysius that Ricoeur wishes to emphasise and these are the points that appear to divide these thinkers from later Medieval theologians. Both Augustine and Pseudo-Dionysius place the biblical text above any speculative philosophy as genuinely revelatory of God’s word. This includes the ‘undiscussable exegetical given’ that is the translation process, but also the expectation that philosophy will naturally agree with Christian revelation. Ultimately neither propose speculative thought as a way of approaching any such revelation alone. While both discuss the being of God, neither consider that to be in any way definable. In this sense these thinkers continue with the thrust of the Exodus 3:14 meaning as Ricoeur has interpreted it.

Pseudo-Dionysius presents this in terms of the apophatic tradition, which dwells on an “unknowing” of God. His word for God’s being is *hyperousia*, another word subject to the “history of effects”. Ricoeur presents it as indicating God ‘beyond essence’, invoking Plato’s phraseology from *Republic* (509b). This is now referred to as *via negativa*, the way by negation, explicitly excluding certain statements about God. In Pseudo-Dionysius’s terms this is ‘walking the heights of those holy places to which the mind can at

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90 P. RICOEUR, ‘From Interpretation to Translation’, p. 342.
91 Ibid., p. 341.
92 Ibid., p. 353.
93 Ibid., p. 342.
least rise... and [then] plunges into the truly mysterious darkness of unknowing". It is evident from this that Ricoeur is correct in saying that 'the via negativa in the end has more affinity with a unitive mysticism than with demonstrative speculation'.

By contrast, Ricoeur presents analogy as via eminenciae, which 'bears witness to a greater perseverance in the service of understanding faith'. This is a way of making possible affirmative statements of God within a very specific context. Using analogy, God 'can be spoken of in affirmative statements, at the horizon of an elevation to the highest point of the most sublime title and attributes encountered along the road of not just rational speculation but also spiritual perfection. This is the approach Augustine pursues. Werner Jeanrond has suggested that this presents a distinct approach with regard to revelation. I bring this here because it supplies a useful contrast with revelation as it understood by the modern commentators of Aquinas discussed in Chapter Three. As Ricoeur turns to consider Aquinas's response later in this section, this will be of use. Jeanrond argues that 'the Augustinian school considers revelation as affecting the entire human being'. Here Augustine uses the revelation of the name of God in Exodus 3:14. His innovation was the continual inscription of this exegesis in an all-encompassing ontology, using both neo-Platonic and Christian spirituality. The ego sum qui sum of Exodus 3:14 can be approached in the ascension of thought, rejecting all abstraction, while God's vere esse remains unknowable. Significantly Ricoeur returns to the point which I emphasised in Chapter Three when speaking of modern interpretations of Aquinas - all this is possible only through the biblical gift of God's self-naming - qui est - versus the speculative investigation - quid est.

95 PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS, 'The Mystical Theology' in The Complete Works, 1001A.
96 P. RICOEUR, 'From Interpretation to Translation', p. 347.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid., 342.
100 P. RICOEUR, 'From Interpretation to Translation', p. 343.
Ricoeur presents the two ways as 'apophaticism and ontology'\textsuperscript{101} and I consider their pairing by Ricoeur to reveal their importance. Ricoeur notes that these two different ways of speaking, 'apophaticism and ontology ran along together side by side from the Patristic period to that of scholasticism'\textsuperscript{102}. However, he argues that it is 'not necessary to overemphasise the opposition of this affirmative and this apophatic theology'\textsuperscript{103}, when in fact the two approaches 'mutually presuppose each other'\textsuperscript{104}. The two approaches remain spiritually distinct. Analogy requires apophaticism to avoid making univocal statements about God's essence, a drawing back from the literal implications of a statement. Similarly apophaticism is 'a kind of overthrown affirmation'\textsuperscript{105}. So the \textit{qui est} of Exodus 3:13 is answered in v. 14 by 'both a name for ignorance, for unknowing - and a name that affirms'\textsuperscript{106}. These two alternatives constitute the Latin approach. In a later conference remark, Ricoeur adds to this analysis by pointing to the historical particularity of this response.

'we are not allowed to isolate completely, let us say, the Hebrew way of thinking from the Greek one. First, because it is part of our fate that the Bible has been translated into Greek and the Greek translation is not a chance event. It is the origin of the fate of European culture that proceeds from the intersection of the Greek world with the Hebrew-Christian world. It is part of our way of understanding ourselves'\textsuperscript{107}.

This emphasis on multiple contributing perspectives will be seen as I continue to reconstruct Ricoeur's own examination of the speculative development after Exodus 3:14. This is 'the hermeneutical circle between the community, the ecclesial community, but all communities of believers, and the relation with their own texts'\textsuperscript{108}. However, Ricoeur's reconstruction of this "history of effects" is now confronted with the twelfth and thirteenth century. 'Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas claimed to raise speculative theology to

\textsuperscript{101}P. RICOEUR, 'From Interpretation to Translation', p. 342.

\textsuperscript{102} Ibid., p. 342.

\textsuperscript{103} Ibid., p. 346.

\textsuperscript{104} Ibid., p. 342.

\textsuperscript{105} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{106} Ibid., p. 347.

\textsuperscript{107} P. RICOEUR, 'Comments after Jeanrond', p. 61.

\textsuperscript{108} Ibid., p. 59.
the rank of science". Jeanrond suggests that 'Thomas Aquinas wished to establish the autonomy of reason and thus stands in a tradition which more and more radically separated philosophy and theology'. Ricoeur's concern has been that there has in fact been a failure of clarity with regard to these disciplines in Aquinas; however, I will now show the development of Ricoeur's response. Indeed Ricoeur himself noted his own development on this question by pointing to 'Thinking Biblically, where I have tried precisely to develop the speculative possibilities of some biblical texts'. Ricoeur's concern here is not to obliterate divine initiative which then sets in motion a history of reception.

He rejects Jeanrond's concerns for his 'somewhat lower regard for systematic theology' by pointing to the work he pursues in Thinking Biblically, which Jeanrond 'had not opportunity to take into account'. For example, in his discussion of the verse Exodus 3:14 he explicitly turns to consider the work of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries in terms of speculative theology. Ricoeur understands analogy as a concentration on affirmation in the light of negation. Yet 'progress in the affirmation of the intelligibility of Being tends to render superfluous the self- affirmation of the Being of God according to Exodus'. As a result speculative thought now provides its own trajectory distinct from the testimony of experience given in the biblical text. This speculative way of organising thought opposes the *quaestio* and its logical order to the *lectio* and its textual order. Most dangerously, this is no longer hermeneutics.

However, here Ricoeur begins to introduce what is positive about Aquinas's approach in particular: In Ricoeur's view the epistemological argument of this philosophical approach is still 'intimately bound' with the history of Exodus 3:14 interpretation. Indeed, I referred to the culmination of Aquinas's study in just this verse (ST, 1a, 13, 12). Moreover, its necessarily Trinitarian discourse returns to the question of the relationship of the One to

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109 P. Ricoeur, 'From Interpretation to Translation', p. 343.

110 W. Jeanrond, 'Hermeneutics and Revelation', p. 43.

111 P. Ricoeur, 'Comments after Jeanrond', p. 58.

112 W. Jeanrond, 'Hermeneutics and Revelation', p. 49.

113 P. Ricoeur, 'Comments after Jeanrond', p. 58.

114 P. Ricoeur, 'From Interpretation to Translation', p. 348.

115 Ibid.
God in his Trinity. So Ricoeur observes how even the *quid est* of the medieval period is 'still driven by the question *qui est*'. It is only Anselm, a much earlier figure (1033-1109), whom Ricoeur criticises for reducing God to a definable essence; this definition constitutes the clearest break with Exodus 3:14. The scholastics, by contrast, retain the 'older dialectic between ontologism (God is Being) and apophatism (God is ineffable)' formed in the interpretation of Exodus 3:14.

It is the continued use of this dialectic in which Aquinas writes, argues Ricoeur: He used the ontology/apophatic dialectic, but he also formed *qui est* as the translation of 'היה *ašer* 'ehyeh. This Aquinas presents as the principal name: 'The one who is' is the most proper name of God because it is the most indeterminate one. As a result, Exodus 3:14 plays 'much more than an ornamental role'. Ricoeur's argument is that Aquinas 'pushed to an extreme the conceptual purification of the *ipsum esse*, to the point of identifying it with the pure Act of Being' as the furthest philosophical thought can claim about God.

Here, Ricoeur is actually invoking an insight by Étienne Gilson on Augustine. I emphasised above the non-abstract nature of the being Augustine contemplates. Gilson describes God's being, as Augustine understands it, as the 'subsisting act of being'. Experiencing that ontological drama Augustine is able to retain the non-abstract nature of the God of Exodus. However, Ricoeur argues that Aquinas reclassifies God's analogical attributes as functions 'of the exigency for meaning proceeding from the pure Act of Being'. In the face of this new unconceptualisable Acting God, Aquinas turns the question to what God is and subsequently pursues speculative ontology. Ricoeur does grant Aquinas a 'theological intention', a certain credal interest, but the *ipsum esse*, the essence itself is the basis of his epistemology; 'as though the question of existence takes

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116 P. RICOEUR, 'From Interpretation to Translation', p. 348.
117 Ibid., p. 349.
118 Ibid., p. 351.
119 Ibid.
120 Ibid.
122 P. RICOEUR, 'From Interpretation to Translation', p. 351.
priority over that of the name. Analogy now appears to Ricoeur as part of Aquinas’s “five ways” of proving the existence of God: If God’s causation is like human causation, then we can know that he exists. Gilson’s analysis of Aquinas’s approach here culminates in Being as the Act of Existing.

I have already presented an extensive series of alternative readings to this “ontologised” analogy in Chapter Three. In particular I rejected the reading that Aquinas’s analogy became a description of being as such. Rather than describing the ordo essendi, analogy describes the ordo cognoscendi. The view which Ricoeur was attributing to Aquinas, Pannenberg and Kasper place with his successors.

However, Ricoeur now acknowledges, as he did not in The Rule of Metaphor, that Aquinas is careful to retain the identification between essence and existence in God, and distinguishes between this view and later commentary. ‘Late scholasticism, followed by modern neoscholasticism, betrayed the identity between Being and pure Act of Existing, splitting essence from existence’. This laid open the late scholastic project to Heidegger’s charge of onto-theology. It is Gilson who defends Aquinas against this, arguing that Heidegger ‘ignores the constant pressure being exercised on ontology by the thought of a One beyond Being, and by Dionysius’s apophaticism, which, we have seen, runs throughout medieval ontology’. This is a step beyond Ricoeur’s analysis of the same question in The Rule of Metaphor. There he described the circularity of language and ontology in Aquinas and presented this as an ultimately onto-theological problem. Here, instead, Ricoeur not only recognises more explicitly the distinction between Aquinas and his late scholastic commentators but he also returns to the biblical resources Aquinas does use. While Exodus 3:14 remains marginalised, Aquinas returns as well to the Tetragrammaton, restored in the Latin translation. Ricoeur describes this as not offering a ‘fusion’, which it is often seen as constituting, also in his own earlier analysis, but as a new

123 P. Ricoeur, ‘From Interpretation to Translation’, p. 352.
125 P. Ricoeur, ‘From Interpretation to Translation’, p. 353.
126 Ibid., p. 356.
'convergence that respects the misalignment between the philosophical and the biblical names'\textsuperscript{127}.

However, Ricoeur is presenting here the "history of effects" regarding Exodus 3:14. Aquinas is a part of that history but so, too, is Heidegger's analysis. In Ricoeur's view, Heidegger's division of God and Being is 'perceived by most contemporary thinkers as a new event in thinking that earlier event'\textsuperscript{128}. In response Ricoeur emphasises a new focus emerging among theologians, of subordinating manifestation, ontology, to redemption, ethics. The attempt of speculative ontology to provide a complete explanation must be abandoned. The crucial thinker of this approach is Emmanuel Levinas who opposed Being to ethics. Being is condemned as a 'totalizing experience, thereby missing the initial difference constituted by the appearance of the other person in my field of experience'\textsuperscript{129}. In the wake of this history of reading therefore, Ricoeur summarizes the position of 'a number of Christian theologians' that the 'ambition of thinking must be substituted by the force of testimony and the ethical dimension of Revelation'\textsuperscript{130}.

That Revelation returns thinking to the biblical text and its figurative network. At Sinai, the same place for Exodus 3:14, Ricoeur quotes Levinas interpretation of the giving of the law as 'Sinai: you shall not kill me!'\textsuperscript{131}. It is 'the trace of the God of the Torah which inaugurates my responsibility'\textsuperscript{132}. This has provided some Christian thinkers with the opportunity to reinforce different foundational names for God such as love and gift. These alternatives reinforce the fact that these are only 'the names of God known so far'\textsuperscript{133}.

Ricoeur gives a subtle critique here, outlining the view of 'theologians concerned to preserve a link with philosophy'\textsuperscript{134}, aligning himself somewhat with the model represented

\textsuperscript{127} P. RICOEUR, 'From Interpretation to Translation', p. 353.
\textsuperscript{128} Ibid., p. 356.
\textsuperscript{129} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{130} Ibid., p. 357.
\textsuperscript{131} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{132} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{133} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{134} Ibid., p. 358.
by Aquinas. It is important to note here that Ricoeur views the ‘conjunction’ of theology and philosophy, that he maps through the reception of the text, as unnecessary. It is a particular historical response which requires certain care in handling. However, while this has lost plausibility for our postmetaphysical spirit, without such a connection between theology and philosophy Ricoeur sees the threat of ‘disenculturaiton’, or even ‘irrationalism’. His concern with the ontological response to the central verse of Exodus 3:14 is to reject two extremes. The first, a fusion where the ‘the so-called ontological reading’ emerges from the ‘combined effect of an exegetical misunderstanding... [and] ontological speculation’. This has already been examined.

The second is a total disjunction between philosophical categories and the biblical God of love, which I will now briefly explain. Just as Ricoeur rejects a purely speculative theology based on being, so he also rejects Marion and Levinas’s attempt to found God in love. Ricoeur argues that this would instead require ‘the disjunction of being or not being... hence to a principle of reason over which we would retain mastery’.

Ricoeur’s preferred approach is to acknowledge Exodus 3:14 as inextricably linked with the founding narrative of ethical responsibility. While any theology of love must return to its Hebraic roots, this will return the focus of the reader to the centrality of the declaration “Hear, O Israel, Yhwh our God is alone Yhwh”, anchored by Exodus 3:14, which is itself already part of network of multiple ways of naming God. John is used as an example of moving from the philosophical proposition, ‘God is One’, to the theological one, ‘God is love’. Ricoeur’s proposal to theologians is to elaborate a his theology of love is linked to Exodus and Deuteronomy ‘though the resources of metaphor, dialectic and narrativisation’.

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135 P. RICOEUR, ‘From Interpretation to Translation’, p. 354-5.
136 Ibid., p. 359.
137 Ibid., p. 356.
138 Ibid., pp. 337-8.
139 Ibid., p. 358.
140 Ibid.
In this way Ricoeur has reservations, but does not want to abandon the speculative project of philosophy. Instead he seeks to develop new ways of thinking, 'a new mode of inculturation' that can place the particular response of Judeo-Christian culture in 'a new pact with Western reason, on the level, for example, of the criticism this latter exercises today as regards it own totalizing or foundational claims'. In this way the particular voice of a religion can still speak to universal themes, rather than remaining marginalized.

I want to emphasise three points here from Ricoeur’s conclusions. The first is Ricoeur’s argument that the polysemy of the biblical text leaves a legacy of reception history. This history is itself particular. For example, Ricoeur sees the links between the first and second testaments as the starting point of a monotheistic development, which Greek thinking would not have achieved. Analogy is one such instance of a particular response to Exodus 3:14.

The second is that the hermeneutical response is not exhausted. On this question Ricoeur seeks to protect the ‘sapiential point of this declaration which is unique in its form in the Bible’. There are practical and fruitful responses that can be made. There does not have to be an opposition between exegesis and the ontological history of reception arising from Ex 3:14, especially if the possibility for extending meaning is kept open and biblical testimony is not superseded by it. The verb 'ehyeh still 'proposes a “gap in meaning” that enriches the already broad, albeit culturally limited, polysemy of the Greek verb einai'.

Where being is understood in ‘many ways’, the Hebraic 'ehyeh is recognised as a new hermeneutic. The example given of a convincing interpretation is Hartmut Gese’s ‘I shall show myself in that I shall show myself, as the one who will show myself’.

In Ricoeur’s analysis Aquinas preserves this plurivocity by distinguishing his project from the biblical testimony. As I have argued in Chapter Three, there are readings of Aquinas which prioritise precisely this plurivocal expression of God. In this way Ricoeur

141 P. RICOEUR, ‘From Interpretation to Translation’, p. 352.
142 Ibid., p. 360.
143 Ibid.
144 Ibid., p. 361n48, interpreting ‘ich erweise mich als der ich mich erweisen werde’. The original text is mis-cited, but Ricoeur is referred to H. Gese, ‘Der Name Gottes im Alten Testament’ pp. 75-89 in H. v. STIETENCRON, P. BEYERHAUS (eds.) Der Name Gottes (Dusseldorf, Patmos, 1975).
reconstructs some speculative parts of the history of reception and he defends them against faith expressions such as Marion's, pursuing that polysemic testimony of faith without erasing the distinctions between each discourses.

The third point is understanding translation as itself interpretive. This has already been alluded to above, but to clarify here, the translation of Exodus 3:14 has already prompted multiple ways of thinking about its meaning: 'paraphrases, even commentaries that restore the cultural, spiritual, and theological context of this verse and, in this way, make explicit what [Ricoeur] above called the gap in meaning produced by Exodus 3:14'\(^{145}\). This new understanding of speculative theology means that Ricoeur turned to show, in medieval theories of language use and conceptualization, how the regard for natural reason and for listening to God's self-designation were both honored. It also underlines how one can remain within one’s culture while responding to the other. In the latter part of this chapter and the next I will discuss analogy in terms of a “transfer” from one culture to another.

Altogether what I have achieved in the above section was to show Ricoeur's later interpretation of a key text in the history of reception of the Bible and the shaping of the emerging Western culture by Jewish and Christian monotheism. This interpretation shows him as more sympathetic to what he calls speculative theology - the source, he supposes, of the concept of analogy - when it is understood as a response to a primary text of the faith. He pursued this with regard to analogy as a response to Exodus 3:14 in 'From Interpretation to Translation'. This is always in the context of 'Naming God', which established the testimony of the text as ultimately presenting a polysemy of meaning. Ricoeur, and the reader, stand before that polysemy as listeners and so too before the history of reading in its ultimately translativ, interpretive significance. Analogy is thereby revealed, in Ricoeur's reading, as one way of responding to the ontological history of effects of Exodus 3:14. This is progress from his dismissal of Aquinas’s use of the tool as onto-theological and therefore a failure. He now seems to defend its intention and its nuanced argumentation, on the larger canvas of reappraising the role of the thought tradition engendered by the biblical texts for Western culture. I now turn therefore to the way Ricoeur uses the concept of analogy in a different example of otherness, in a new

\(^{145}\) P. RICOEUR, 'From Interpretation to Translation', p. 361.
problem in historiography. It will prepare the way to the possibility to bridge distinct and heterogeneous entities.

4.2. **HISTORICAL REFIGURATION AS AN EXPLORATION OF THE OTHERNESS OF HISTORY**

The overall thrust of this chapter is examining the ways after *The Rule of Metaphor* Ricoeur may have altered his position on analogical language and eventually come to use it himself. The first part of this has been achieved in the above section and I now turn to Ricoeur’s later work on historiography in order to consider the second. It is in examining the question of representing historical events in *Time and Narrative* III that Ricoeur begins to discuss relying on the resources of an analogous way of thinking. I turn to consider this question because it is the point in Ricoeur’s work where he turns to make use of the idea of analogy himself, rather than analysing it in the contexts of others’ use of it. Specifically, Ricoeur suggests that the historian represents events through three lenses, the Same, the Other and the Analogous. This insight is strongly borne out by Ricoeur’s much later historiographic work in *Memory, History, Forgetting*.

I will first provide a bridge to this topic from the previous section by discussing some of the main themes in relation to the concept of testimony. Secondly, I will turn to Ricoeur’s construction of the relationship between the event and the historical narrative, understood in terms of representation. Thirdly, I will reconstruct the signs under which this representation is to occur: the Same, the Other, the Analogous. I will conclude this chapter with an overview of how analogy may be useful for a “transfer” of meaning in encounters with the other. I will primarily work from *Time and Narrative* III which supplies the systematic presentation of these historiographic lenses. I will however also refer to *Memory, History, Forgetting*, written twenty years later and which supplies some new viewpoints and certainly a stronger familiarity with the discipline of historiography. It is worth noting here explicitly that the lenses proposed in *Time and Narrative* remain Ricoeur’s articulation of the question of writing the history of events.

As I noted above, before I turn to reconstructing the contributions of these texts, there are some themes that will remain significant for this new context. These three ideas underlie
Ricoeur’s work on historiography and are understood again in the light of Ricoeur’s path toward representing historical events. The first is the question of debt, touched on above, the second is the question of the capable person as central for Ricoeur’s understanding of historical narrative, and the third is the way the relating and reading of history benefits our self-understanding. These three ideas are most clearly discussed in a brief presentation of testimony in the new context of historiography. It is distinct from biblical testimony and in terms of writing-history there are many more later remarks from Ricoeur on the subject. I will now use these remarks on testimony to explore the three significant ideas for the following section on historiography: debt, capability, refigured self-understanding.

Testimony as a form of intersubjective responsibility

Ricoeur first discusses what he calls the ‘ordinary notion of testimony’ in contrast to biblical testimony in one of his Essays on Biblical Interpretation. However, much of his work on this concept comes from the period after Oneself as Another, when Ricoeur was focused on questions of history and memory. What does remain consistent is that Ricoeur’s view of testimony outside the biblical context also reckons with a polysemy of meaning. While the Bible attests to an experience of God - what Ricoeur refers to philosophically as a ‘testimony of the absolute’, in historical narrative there is a multiplicity of experiences of events. ‘The past is something that is no longer there but which has been there, which once was there... It is no longer and yet it has been’.

Testimony, as a presentation of historical events, is again also polysemous. Ricoeur points out that ‘a common or identical history cannot be reached’. This might appear to be a blow for the pursuit of historical accuracy; but, as Ricoeur continues, it ‘should not be attempted - because it is a part of life that there are conflicts. The challenge is to bring

147 Ibid., p. 120.
148 P. Ricoeur, ‘Imagination, Testimony and Trust’ pp. 12-17 in R. Kearney, M Dooley, Questioning Ethics: Contemporary Debates in Philosophy (London, Routledge, 1999), p. 15. This discussion took place in Ireland and dwelt on the significance of testimony and multiple histories. This provides a later viewpoint than Time and Narrative, since that conference dates from the beginning of his work on memory and history after Oneself as Another.
149 Ibid., p. 12.
conflicts to the level of discourse'. Ricoeur identifies that the challenge of listening to testimony and testimonies is not to finalise a narrative but rather to approach the level of practical wisdom with which he closed his own account of ethical theory in *Oneself as Another*. Ricoeur again refers to Rawls's term 'reflective equilibrium' in order to indicate the historian's task of bringing additional testimonies and new meanings into balance. The need for the historian's imagination, who discovers and analyses the testimony, is thus found in 'opening up forgotten possibilities, aborted potentialities, repressed endeavours in the supposedly closed past'. It is in exploring the conflict then that a 'history of reading' testimonies is developed which thus enriches the historical project by multiple recounting of the events, and by the backdrop of possibilities and intentions that did not come to pass.

It is therefore as a debt to the past that Ricoeur acknowledges to be the basis for listening to testimony. We must remain faithful, Ricoeur argues, to 'the pastness of the past'. The 'indispensable issue of testimony... is the ultimate link between imagination and memory because the witness says "I was part of the story. I was there"'. Here the testimony is built on the witness's memory but she also 'deploys the capacity of imagination to place the events before our eyes, as if we were there'. Briefly then, a debt is owed to the past precisely because the historical others who created the basis for our current endeavours are no longer present. Pellauer describes this as 'the ontology of our historical condition'. In this sense 'deaths teach us a lesson'. While debt is not limited to a question of responding to loss, the idea of the historian responding to the tomb provides a clear articulation of trying to do justice to the historical other. The only way this can be done in terms of past events is via testimony:

150 P. Ricoeur, 'Imagination, Testimony and Trust', p. 12.


152 P. Ricoeur, 'Imagination, Testimony and Trust' p. 16.

153 Ibid.


155 Ibid., p. 123.

156 Ricoeur eventually rejects Michel de Certeau's overall expression of the debt owed in *The Writing of History* because Certeau writes only in terms of loss. I find his articulation of debt in these terms to be particularly useful, and Ricoeur considers his own conception to be close, but Ricoeur can add to this by pointing to the idea of the summons of the self to ethical behaviour, a debt owed by recognition of one's own responsibility. c.f. 'The Summoned Subject in the School of the Narratives of the Prophetic Vocation' pp. 262-275 in P. Ricoeur, M. Wallace (ed.) *Figuring the Sacred* (Augsburg, Fortress Press, 1995).
'It is only by hearing the testimony that he can believe or not believe in the reality of the facts that the witness reports. Testimony as story is thus found in an intermediary position between a statement made by a person and a belief assumed by another on the faith of the testimony of the first.'\textsuperscript{157}

Methodologically, this allows Ricoeur to move past some of the repetitive discussions of historiography. As Maureen Junker-Kenny has commented, he came to the conclusion ‘that the only way to overcome the well-rehearsed impasses and aporias in the epistemology of history is a critical trust in individual testimony.’\textsuperscript{158}

This remark on belief or trust in a person’s testimony brings me to my second point - the capability of the person that lies behind testimony and a corresponding written history. Testimony is the activity of a capable, remembering person. Jean Greisch has written on this topic by linking testimony to attestation. I noted above that testimony relies on trust. Greisch suggests that the response to testimony is belief, which ‘means credence, rather than opinion.’ The trust involved is therefore the ‘trust that copes with suspicion.’ The question of conflict is not effaced but responded to by the person who in this context attests to her own capability of doing so. Greisch returns to Ricoeur’s philosophical anthropology by recalling that the cogito in question is neither triumphant nor entirely removed.

Ricoeur’s later work in *Memory, History, Forgetting* emphasised this point particularly in relation to a testimony’s public character. He compares it to a trial where ‘several testimonies and several witnesses find themselves confronted with one another,’ and to promise-making: ‘the witness must be capable of answering for what he says before

\textsuperscript{157} P. Ricoeur, ‘The Hermeneutics of testimony’ p. 123. The historian, it should be noted, is not the witness.


\textsuperscript{159} Greisch’s recent work on Ricoeur charts the course of his anthropological thinking between the fallible and the capable man. See J. Greisch, *Fehlbarkeit und Fähigkeit. Die philosophische Anthropologie Paul Ricoeurs* (Münster/Berlin, LIT-Verlag, Dr. W. Hopf, 2009).


\textsuperscript{161} Ibid., p. 86.

\textsuperscript{162} P. Ricoeur, *Memory, History, Forgetting*, p. 165.
whoever asks him to do so\textsuperscript{163}. Most significantly, Ricoeur continues ‘in my vocabulary, it is a question of a competence of the capable human being. The credit granted to the word of others makes the social world a shared intersubjective world\textsuperscript{164}. This is a point that broadens the question of the capability of a person to remember and thereby to act as a witness, and embeds the act of testimony in the social bond. Thus, overall, ‘what confidence in the word of others reinforces is not just the interdependence, but the shared common humanity, of the members of a community\textsuperscript{165}.

However, Ricoeur turns to the question of trust by noting that ‘this question balances both confidence and suspicion\textsuperscript{166}. The appropriate approach is to ‘first, trust the words of others, then doubt if there are good reasons for doing so\textsuperscript{167}. In fact, although Ricoeur has continually emphasised the basis of trust on which testimony must operate, he also queries if we ‘ought... to make fun of the naive realism of testimony? It can be done. But this would be to forget that the seed of criticism is implanted in actual testimony\textsuperscript{168}. Again, there is always the context of opposing testimonies. This also underlines the capability of the historian - and the citizen - to respond critically to testimony. In this way, writing and reading history in response to testimony is also the activity of the capable, imaginative person. Moreover, it also forms an additional debt - the witness who gives a written testimony gives it ‘entrusted in this way to another’s credibility\textsuperscript{169}. The witness relies on the capability of the other.

I therefore return to Greisch’s connection between testimony and attestation. Greisch puts this in terms of Ricoeur’s own conception of the self as one who speaks, acts, narrates and imputes action: ‘the fact of relating (or reading) the history of a person is inseparable from the certainty that the narrative attests to a certain cohesiveness of life\textsuperscript{170}. That life belongs

\textsuperscript{163} P. Ricoeur, \textit{Memory, History, Forgetting}, p. 165.

\textsuperscript{164} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{165} Ibid., p. 166.

\textsuperscript{166} Ibid., p. 162.

\textsuperscript{167} Ibid., p. 165.

\textsuperscript{168} Ibid., p. 278.

\textsuperscript{169} Ibid., p. 497.

\textsuperscript{170} J. Greisch, ‘Testimony to Attestation’, p. 90.
to a particular person and thus reveals the capability of the self in reshaping narrative so as to develop an 'examination of oneself in real life'\textsuperscript{171}. This is borne out by Ricoeur’s work later than Greisch’s article: ‘Attestation is the mode in which the concept of the potentiality-of-being-a-whole'\textsuperscript{172} in one’s finitude is understood.

It is here that I find a link from the capable human person to my third point regarding the benefit to self-understanding, and I therefore provide Ricoeur’s remarks on this in full:

‘It is... possible to consider testimony... in its retrospective forms in everyday life, in the courts or in history, as the correlate of the past of attestation bearing on the potentiality-of-being apprehended in the figure of anticipation. The role of making-possible, assigned to the metacategory of our historical condition, finds the opportunity to be actualized in the correlation between the attestation of the future and the attestation of the past'\textsuperscript{173}.

It is the attestation of the future that indicates to me the final theme of this chapter, clarified here in this section’s examination of testimony, by seeking ever refigured historical narratives in the service of making possible a renewed self-understanding from which actions flow. It is from such histories that Ricoeur considers the grand narratives of a society to be constructed. Ultimately then historical narrative, when appropriated, becomes about imagining oneself in the world in a new way. In this way historians contribute to the pursuit of practical wisdom. In an interview Ricoeur remarked that he viewed this level of history as ‘one of the great plot constructions (affabulations) forming the self-understanding of a nation through its founding narratives’\textsuperscript{174}. Ricoeur also calls this a ‘poetic’ activity, a point that will become important as he considers the tensions involved in representing the past in a written history.

Written history understood as refigurative is most clearly expressed in that chapter of \textit{Time and Narrative} III where Ricoeur employs the concept of analogy. I therefore move immediately now to an examination of the context of that chapter and its role in Ricoeur’s use of analogy. To briefly summarise what has come before, testimony, as an encounter with a witness, an other leaves the historian with a debt, but also a claim to an objectivity

\textsuperscript{171} J. GREISCH, ‘Testimony to Attestation’, p. 90.

\textsuperscript{172} P. RICOEUR, \textit{Memory, History, Forgetting}, p. 362.

\textsuperscript{173} Ibid., p. 362.

\textsuperscript{174} P. RICOEUR, \textit{Critique and Conviction}, p. 85.
that relies on trustworthiness, a re-emphasis of human capability in the critical process of history writing, and a refigurative possibilities in the imaginative polysemy of testimony brought into history. These themes remain significant for *Time and Narrative* and it is to this which I now turn, reconstructing the routes Ricoeur takes to explaining historical representation. I shall subsequently consider this in terms of the Same, the Other, the Analogous, the names Ricoeur gives to the ongoing ways of thinking about the past.

**Writing history as a representation of the past**

Ricoeur stated in the same series of interviews with which I closed the above section that ‘in *Time and Narrative* I am interested in only one problem: to what extent is history a narrative’\(^\text{175}\). He suggested that if his conclusions in the trilogy led him to consider history to be a narrative, ‘it is so in a completely different way from ordinary language, which rests on the direct immediate storytelling of speech: with history, one is dealing with a highly constructed narrative’\(^\text{176}\). It is, so to speak, a second order narrative, responding to testimony. What is significant about the way Ricoeur characterises the third volume in this project is that he considers it to be primarily handling the question of refiguration. He suggest that the role of the reader, is to constantly reinterpret and translate the historical narrative. Historiography is therefore an ongoing process.

This is consistent with my previous discussion of *Time and Narrative* where I outlined its use of Augustine and Aristotle to handle the challenge of personal narrative (1.II.1-3). I want to briefly reintroduce the text here for my new purpose. Ricoeur uses the “grasping together” of mimetic narrative construction to describe the way in which we render events over time. Ricoeur later developed this into a construction of narrative identity, begun in the final essay of the third volume\(^\text{177}\), but worked out systematically in *Oneself as Another*. Narration, mimetic activity, is established in *Time and Narrative* I as a dialectic figuring

\(^{175}\) P. RICOEUR, *Critique and Conviction*, p. 84. Conducted in 1994 and 1995, these interviews supply a useful perspective on Ricoeur’s earlier volumes.

\(^{176}\) Ibid.

\(^{177}\) Writing on narrative identity already appearing in *Time and Narrative*, Ricoeur notes that this was ‘the principal achievement of this work. It is most curious that that expression came to me only in a sort of reflection on the work already completed, whereas in reality it was already at the heart of the book’ (*Critique and Conviction*, p. 89).
events, or the person, between prefigurations, and the space of refiguration open to the future.

The figuration by the narrator moves between discordances of the trajectory of the action and events that impact on that trajectory, forming a coherent plot. That plot is refigured in the complex interaction between text and reader as the latter reconstructs the text as her own resource. The world of the text is co-constituted each time it is read; 'structuration is an oriented activity that is only completed in the spectator or the reader'178. What this means is that, as Ricoeur stated, 'for us, the world is the ensemble of references opened up by the text'179. Indeed, 'the reader rather is enlarged in his capacity of self-projection by receiving a new mode of being from the text itself'180. Yet this self-dispossession is not the conclusion, instead, only the activity of the self, in the light of the text, follows the "arrow" of the sense. By doing so, she refigures the text and 'initiates a new self-understanding'181. It is owing to this that Ricoeur can suggest 'the transformation of one's own experience under the effect of the narrative'182.

Therefore what is at the basis of Ricoeur's conceptualising of the problem of representing past events in a written history, is the context of a polysemy of language and of understanding. Therefore the ultimate problem of historical narrative is the condition that events may always be explained 'in other ways'183. This appears to be so even for those agents who participate in the events under question. It is for this reason that Ricoeur points to the third volume of *Time and Narrative* as identifying 'the ultrasensitive, and ultracontroversial, problem of the movement of language outside of itself and its capacity to redirect, restructure an experience, to produce a new manner of inhabiting the world'184.

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178 P. Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative* 1, p. 48.
180 P. Ricoeur, *Interpretation Theory*, p. 94.
181 Ibid.
182 P. Ricoeur, *Critique and Conviction*, p. 83.
183 To be sure Ricoeur has also placed limits on this polysemy of ways of explaining events. The written text must retain a dialectic between the event and its meaning. "Semantic autonomy of the text which now appears is still governed by [that] dialectic" (*Interpretation Theory*, p. 25). Autonomy should not be misread here as wholly separate, or arbitrarily independent.
184 P. Ricoeur, *Critique and Conviction*, p. 83.
Specifically here he is speaking of distanciation by narrative, but he explicitly connects this transformative refuguration with the conclusions he presented at the end of *The Rule of Metaphor* where ‘when language is reorganized in a creative way by metaphor... we are invited to read our own experience in accordance with the new modalities of language’.

It is in these terms that Ricoeur turns to the problem in *Time and Narrative* III, where he identifies

‘a certain convergence, between, on the one hand, what we have called... standing for exercised by historical knowledge as regards the “real” past and, on the other hand, the function of significance that clothes fictional narrative when reading brings into relation the world the text and the world of the reader’.

It is therefore the curiously straightforward description of the historiographic operation by Leopold von Ranke that inspires Ricoeur’s conceptualising of the problem. Ranke, a significant nineteenth century historian who emphasised the value of primary sources, suggests that written history gives the reader events ‘as they really happened’ - *wie es eigentlich war*. What, Ricoeur considers, can this mean as a way of understanding historiography, given the possibility of explaining events in multiple ways? Ranke’s terms will frame this discussion: the representation of events as they really happened. Ricoeur does value Ranke as the ‘unsurpassed master of this style of history, where the event is held to be singular and unrepeatable’. However, considering historiography as a straightforward representation of those events provides a way of understanding the reconstruction of historical narrative suggests ‘naïveté’.

And yet Ranke does touch on the significance of the event for the historian. A historical narrative is not a complete and exhaustive description of all events, motives, causes, and

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187 P. Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative* III, pp. 150.

188 P. Ricoeur, *Memory, History, Forgetting*, p. 239.

189 Ibid., p. 278. It is worth noting that Ricoeur himself, despite the careful tripartite lens on epistemology of writing history I am about to reconstruct, Rainer Adolphi criticised Ricoeur’s ‘naïve reclaiming of facts’. For this outline and a critique of Adolphi see M. Junker-Kenny, ‘Memory and Forgetting in Paul Ricoeur’s Theory of the Capable Self’.
consequences, rather it is a complex world of interpretation. Yet to be a representation of events it must always be held in relation to the facticity of the event, to which, ultimately, a debt remains. Ranke’s phrase re-emphasises that debt and, as I noted in the section on testimony above, this will remain significant throughout the following section.

For now I will turn to consider the methodology he employs to think through this task. Ricoeur proposes three lenses as successive ways of considering the narration of events in time with a view to acknowledging the indirect relationship between representation and event, and highlights the challenge inherent in this aporia. These lenses are the Same, the Other, and the Analogous.

**The Same, the Other, the Analogous: Standing for the past**

In *Time and Narrative III*, Ricoeur conceives of “history” as “standing-for” the past in terms of historical knowledge of the “real”. However, historical narrative also has ‘the function of significance that clothes fictional narrative when reading brings into relation the world of the text and the world of the reader”.

Thus historical narrative and its availability to be read becomes an activity of distanciated reconstruction. Moreover, it must be understood not as one single refiguration, but in terms of a plurivocity of refigurations. Since this is the case, ‘what does the term “real” mean when applied to the past?’ To reach any understanding of the real, the historian must reach back across the temporal gap to the real historical event. The historian then reconstructs this, but as with biblical narrative Ricoeur identifies a resulting polysemy of narratives as correlating with a polysemy of being, found in the nature of a ‘reconstruction’ - indeed this is the aim of the historian.

In this way Ricoeur turns to historical narrative as “standing-for” historical events. What is available to the historian is not the event, but traces of the event, meaning documents and other such testimonies. The narrative therefore represents the past, and here Ricoeur

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190 P. Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative III*, pp. 142-156.

191 Ibid., p. 142.

192 Ibid.

193 Ibid.
turns to Karl Heussi who emphasises the ‘inexhaustible description’ that this implies. As further explanation Ricoeur remarks on the ‘overwhelming richness’ of conceptions of historical events with ‘multivocality’.

This also leads to the structure Ricoeur proposes for the Same, the Other and the Analogous. Broadly, Ricoeur identifies the names of these signs as inspired by Plato (Same, Other) and Aristotle (Analogous) but they do not indicate separate methodologies nor do these modalities constitute the past itself. Moreover, Ricoeur declares, ‘I am not claiming that the idea of the past is constructed through the interconnections of these three leading kinds’.

Rather, the past itself is considered ‘successively’. Ricoeur suggests that this is how it can be discussed meaningfully. Methodologically then he proposes for the Same, the Other and the Analogous that ‘each of these moments is represented by one or more of the most respectable efforts in the philosophy of history’.

The first two ways of thinking, under the signs of Same and Other try respectively to emphasise the event brought into the present, and the event left in the past. I will begin with the Same. Under this sign Ricoeur suggests, the historian intends a reconstruction that is a de-distanciation, ‘to dull the sting’ of temporal difference. Here the trace is made intelligible by its present appearance; it is a ‘making contemporary’.

In order to be able to render this as a theory, Ricoeur suggests the requirement of the physical nature of the event as divorced from the thought of the event. With this break, the historian has an open

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195 P. Ricoeur, Time and Narrative III, p. 305n2.

196 This should not be directly equated with the conceptual exchange on memory, in Memory, History, Forgetting, between the Platonic ‘The present representation of an absent thing’ in terms of images and the Aristotelian ‘Memory is of the past’ as crucially ‘temporalising’, pp. 7-20. In these pages Ricoeur is considering what he calls the ‘phenomenological’ problem of the relationship between memory and events, and eventually chooses to employ Aristotle’s approach. The question in Time and Narrative III is instead regarding the nature of the historian’s representation. These are slightly different, but related problematics. As I shall emphasise in this section, in Time and Narrative III, and in those parts of Memory, History, Forgetting, where Ricoeur handles the question of epistemology, he refuses to choose between approaches, considering them incomplete in isolation from each other.

197 P. Ricoeur, Time and Narrative III, p. 143.

198 Ibid.

199 Not to be confused with self and other as persons rather than categories.

200 P. Ricoeur, Time and Narrative III, p. 144.
space in which to rethink 'what once was thought'; a rethinking which is ‘numerically identical with the initial thought’

To explain these stages Ricoeur turns to R. G. Collingwood’s explanation of The Idea of History. In terms of distinguishing an intended event that might be called history from a merely natural change, Collingwood emphasises its documentary proof. Ricoeur notes that any resulting change from the physical action remains important, but under the Same, the focus is on the present trace of intentions and motivations. Ricoeur proposes that the next step is ‘the work of the imagination in the interpretation of what is given through the documents’ allowing thought to be “inside” the event. Thus, Ricoeur suggest, ‘we can pass directly to the notion of reenactment as the act of rethinking what was once thought for the first time’. In this way the event is brought to the present, in the sense that the historian re-enacts the intentions inside a past event. In a later discussion Ricoeur points to Raymond Aron who ‘argues that one of the tasks of the historian is to return to the moment of time when the actors did not know what would happen later... exploring the multiplicity of their expectations’.

This is not merely an intuitive leap. Ricoeur is careful to agree with Collingwood’s description of the approach as ‘a self-dependent, self-determining, and self-justifying form of thought’ precisely because this form is critical: it is a ‘long effort of interpretation’. ‘The historian is the judge of his sources and not the reverse; the criterion for judgement is the coherence of his construction’. I recall here my introduction above that emphasised the underlying acceptance of the capabilities of the historian. In this case, the capable man is described by Collingwood as having an ‘a priori imagination’.

201 P. RICOEUR, Time and Narrative III, p. 144.
202 Ibid., p. 145.
203 Ibid.
206 P. RICOEUR, Time and Narrative III, p. 307n11.
207 Ibid., p. 145.
208 R. G. COLLINGWOOD, The Idea of History, p. 241. In ethical terms, I would also refer to John Wall’s project on Moral Creativity that similarly relies on the capacity for imaginative refigurative narrative in the person, which he identifies in the role of practical wisdom. The historian can be seen to be employing critical solicitude here.
terms 'all thinking is critical thinking; the thought which re-enacts past thoughts, therefore, criticizes them in re-enacting them'.

However, this is still not precisely the numerical identity between past event and present re-enactment that the sign of the Same requires. Ricoeur finds this final step in the historical narrative's 'claim for truth'\textsuperscript{209} which forever distinguishes historical from fictional narrative. This 'annuls the temporal distance'\textsuperscript{210}.

The difficulty Ricoeur finds with using the Same as the inexhaustible way of thinking about the past is also in this question of truth. 'We have to say that historians do not know the past at all but only their own thought about the past. But history is not possible unless historians know that they re-enact an act that is not their own'\textsuperscript{211}. While for Collingwood, this method is about what he calls "survival", 'the current possession of past activity'\textsuperscript{212}, in Ricoeur's view it fails to include a proper clarification of the relationship between self and another. The 'opacity that is as much a portion of the original act in the past as it is of the present reflective act'\textsuperscript{213} is not distinguished. Effectively, this actually renders the past event atemporal, concludes Ricoeur, and its survival in the sense of an ongoing remembrance is meaningless for the problematic under consideration: it is no longer an event in time.

However, Ricoeur intends the Same to be merely the first step of successive ways of thinking about the past and turns to the Other. Here Ricoeur reverses the movement under the Same; the historian jumps from his place of understanding to that of the past, intending 'a restoration of temporal distance'\textsuperscript{214}. This theme gives Ricoeur more problems in finding his 'respectable' example. He begins with the \textit{Verstehen} tradition. For this tradition, understanding other people is the best analogue of historical understanding\textsuperscript{215}. The

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{209} P. RICOEUR, \textit{Time and Narrative} III, p. 145. \\
\textsuperscript{210} Ibid., p. 146. \\
\textsuperscript{211} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{212} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{213} Ibid., p. 147. \\
\textsuperscript{214} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{215} Ibid., p. 148.
\end{flushright}
historian acts through a ‘transfer in imagination... on the basis of signs that “express”- that is make external - the intimate experience of the other person”^216 as an alien self. The basis for this is best expressed by Raymond Aron, explained by Ricoeur in his notes on this section: self knowledge is itself already mediated and therefore historical knowledge ‘is revealed to be just as originary”^217 in its own mediated status. Yet considering the historical other as other in this way paradoxically reduces that temporal distance by ‘abolishing the difference between other people today and other people from earlier times... the specific difficulty attached to the survival of the past in the present”^218.

Therefore Ricoeur considers an alternative approach by ‘difference’, one example of which approaches the event as a variant against the broader invariant background of the past. For example, this avenue prioritises ‘proper names (of persons, places, singular events)’ over against concepts (‘war, revolution, crisis’^219). However, here the difference between the singular variant and the invariant background is not critiqued by the historian but only rendered relative to that background. It stays as Other - something about which the historian might be ‘curious [and so] keeps the other at a distance”^220.

This is ultimately not helpful and Ricoeur turns to Michel de Certeau who reminds him of the setting of historical writing itself. This reveals any ‘claim of historians to produce history in a sort of state of sociocultural weightlessness”^221 as false; the historian himself is other. ‘To do history is to make something’ and where it does so in reference to models of variants and invariants it is an appropriate subject, in Ricoeur’s view, to Certeau’s ‘ideological criticism”^222. Certeau is therefore interested in also mapping the models that are used for the constructions of history, and in order to avoid any ideology of the historian as the bearer of truth, history must ‘indicate the differences in the deviations”^223 from


^217 Ibid., p. 308n19.

^218 Ibid.

^219 Ibid., p. 148.

^220 Ibid., p. 148.

^221 Ibid., p. 150.

^222 Ibid.

^223 Ibid.
established models of thought. This, argues Ricoeur, 'preserves a solid anchorage point in
the contemporary epistemology of history'\(^{224}\).

Still, while this provides a more critical view, what Ricoeur finds implied here is that ‘for a
philosophy of history faithful to the idea of difference as a deviation, the past is what is
missing, a “pertinent absence”'\(^{225}\). Thus this account, while a necessary critique, does not
include the “standing-for” in the positive ‘persistence of the past in the present'\(^{226}\). Richard
Kearney provides the analysis that ‘to the extent that it remains ethically
responsible to historical memory' - which is precisely what Ricoeur’s insistence on
“standing-for” requires - ‘imagination refuses to allow reconstruction to become a
reduction of the other to the self; it resists absorbing difference into sameness'\(^{227}\). In his
later work, Ricoeur adds to this analysis, concluding that ‘the assertive vehemence of the
historian’s representation as standing for the past is authorized by nothing other than the
positivity of the “having been” intended across the negativity of the “being no longer”'\(^{228}\).
This indicates the edge of Ricoeur’s enquiry, as a practical interest in the past as a resource
and a motivation for the future but there remains a further articulation of the
epistemological issue to be formed.

Therefore, Ricoeur turns to a third way: the Analogous. Again, this is not proposed as an
isolated method. Instead Ricoeur intends to ‘conjoin their efforts in terms of the teaching
kind that itself associates the Same and the Other'\(^{229}\). “Conjoins” might imply that the
Analogous is just a combination of the Same and the Other as the pinnacle of the
completed process. Ricoeur’s declared motivation for naming this way of thinking
“Analogous” reveals a more complicated status, he seeks to indicate not just the relation to
the Same and the Other, but also the relation of the relations. Ricoeur initially introduced
Analogous to the leading kinds by noting that it was a proportional metaphor in Aristotle

\(^{224}\) P. RICOEUR, *Time and Narrative* III, p. 150.

\(^{225}\) Ibid.

\(^{226}\) Ibid., p. 151.


\(^{229}\) P. RICOEUR, *Time and Narrative* III, p. 151.
and as a result was ‘a resemblance between relations rather than between terms per se’\textsuperscript{230}. More significantly, however, does Ricoeur find in the sign of the Analogous precisely the required connection to the Same and the Other: ‘The Analogous, precisely, is what retains in itself the force of reenactment and of taking a distance to the extent that being-as is both to be and not to be’\textsuperscript{231}, consistently turning the historian’s gaze back to the past and its undelivered hopes.

The reason for this constant reversion to previous conclusions is made an explicit part of the historian’s role in Ricoeur’s later historiographic work \textit{Memory, History, Forgetting}. Here he considers the ongoing perspectives on a written history by all parties. This condition makes a certain demand on the writer of history. The written history is always ‘subjected to an unending process of revision, which makes the writing of history a perpetual rewriting’\textsuperscript{232}. For Ricoeur, the historian must always be open to this critical process.

It is with a refusal to close the process of rewriting that I turn back to the Analogous as presented in \textit{Time and Narrative} where Ricoeur emphasised

‘the analogous to the complex interplay of the Same and the Other, in order to account for the essentially temporalizing function of “standing-for”. In the hunt for what has been, analogy does not operate alone but in connection with identity and otherness’.

It is this which ultimately allows historians to mediate the dialectical movement of the historical event as being both of the past and of the present. Each mediation leaves the thinking about the past as enriched each time. One cannot simply start and end with the Analogous.

Ricoeur’s choice of term is partly to indicate this ongoing dialectic but it also acknowledges the particularity of Aristotle’s use. The Same and the Other are leading kinds in the sense that they had been employed by Plato and provide a history of reading that render many philosophers familiar with the significance of the terms. Plato has no

\textsuperscript{230} P. \textsc{Ricoeur}, \textit{Time and Narrative} III, p. 151.

\textsuperscript{231} Ibid., p. 155.

\textsuperscript{232} P. \textsc{Ricoeur}, \textit{Memory, History, Forgetting}, p. 320.
equivalent for analogy, however, so Ricoeur refers explicitly here to an Aristotelian origin of *analogia* as I noted above, but specifies the use not in *Metaphysics*, but *Rhetoric*. This source leads Ricoeur to investigate a ‘tropological approach’ and this is further specified by his reading of Hayden White. This acknowledges the distanciation within the discourse of historians where the discussion has a ‘double allegiance’ to the past itself, but also to a discourse about models used to refer to the past. Ricoeur puts it in these terms - ‘the problem of re-presentation of the past is posed along with the operation of emplotment’. However, what this means is that the events are already understood in a way prefigurative of narrative, as the explanation of mimesis in volume one clarified. It is, ultimately, a paradoxical approach.

By turning to White’s tropes, therefore, Ricoeur is seeking an appropriately reflective viewpoint on this paradox. As with each of his ‘respectable examples’ it is incomplete alone, perhaps even tendentious. The role of tropology ‘is so broad and so fundamental that it becomes, progressively, equivalent to a cultural critique with a rhetorical slant in every realm where consciousness, in its cultural praxis, begins to reflect critically upon its setting. Every new encoding is, at some deep level, figurative’.

The best word to identify historical narrative in White’s understanding is therefore not model, but icon. This is because while the historical narrative intends to represent the event, the event itself is also acknowledged as absent and therefore can provide no comparison. In Ricoeur’s view therefore, White’s discussion of tropes provides a reflective viewpoint on historical narrative itself and thus reveals a way of thinking about the past: ‘It tells us but one thing: things must have happened as they told in a narrative such as this one’.

By moving through figurative tropes we approach an historical imagination, rather than explanation. As White says, it is “by figuration that the historian virtually constitutes the

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234 Ibid., p. 152.
235 Ibid., p. 310n31.
236 Ibid., p. 153.
subject of the discourse". This work revolves around the "as" of history; with the original absent, historical narratives are explicitly ‘metaphorical statements’. White goes so far as to consider the historical narrative to provide ‘culturally sanctioned meanings’: by moving through linguistic tropes, ‘the reader is pointed toward the sort of figure that likens the narrated events to a narrative form that our culture has made us familiar with’.

Here the "being-as" which Ricoeur considered in metaphor is brought explicitly into language about historical events. Again, each event is a thing which, each time ‘we can explain in other ways’.

However, the danger here is one which White has also identified, as I highlighted in his criticism of the narrative form of history in Chapter One - ‘the risk of wiping out the boundary between fiction and history’. So while White argues that ‘we can only know the actual by contrasting it with or likening it to the imaginable’, Ricoeur remains concerned with ‘tropological arbitrariness’.

There is a further clarification of the difference between Ricoeur’s and White’s analysis of the value of the figurative approach in relation to its dangers. It comes in Memory, History, Forgetting again, which also returns to the overall structure of the Same, the Other, the Analogous, to which I will return below. White is introduced in this book in the context of a chapter on representation by the historian in Part Two on epistemology. White’s concern in cataloguing the rhetorical or verbal representation by the historian is in revealing the permanent ‘roadblocks on the path to the event. It is impossible, he declares, to distinguish between a “factual statement” (singular, existential propositions or arguments), on the one

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238 Ibid., p. 88.


243 H. White, *Tropics of Discourse*, p. 98, emphasis his.

244 P. Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative* III, p. 154.
hand, and narrative reports, on the other\textsuperscript{245}. In Ricoeur’s view, White ‘accepts as unsurpassable a semiological approach that calls into question the soundness of testimony’\textsuperscript{246}. Even the “naïvely realistic” chronicle ultimately becomes narrativised, and for White this is problematic. The result is what White calls ‘competitive narratives’ and Ricoeur highlights White’s contention that ‘no argument can decide among and for which no criterion drawn from factual statements can arbitrate, once the facts are facts of language’\textsuperscript{247}. Truth claims have no referent outside language and are thus indistinguishable from each other and undecidable.

Ricoeur rejects this as actually returning the problem of naive realism to the forefront. The shadow of an impossible to reach, purely factual representation provides the horizon to White’s analysis, with ‘the truth claim coming from somewhere other than discourse’\textsuperscript{248}. There White’s approach alone ‘is only a despairing manner of setting aside any figurative addition to a literal representation’\textsuperscript{249}. By contrast, Ricoeur argues that ‘we are not forbidden an ongoing search for a way to fill the gap between the representative capacity of discourse and what the event demands’\textsuperscript{250}.

In this way Ricoeur’s later work underlines the problematic epistemological assumptions/presuppositions of a tropological approach. He continues to return to the debt owed to past events - thinking of events in terms of tropes ‘must not lead to giving more weight to the verbal force invested in our redescriptions than to the incitations to redescription that arise from the past itself’. Indeed, his rejection of using White in \textit{Memory, History, Forgetting} takes place as a response to the challenge of the “unrepresentable” of the Shoah. In this way he is critical of White in the same way as he critiques a purely semiotic approach, but with added ethical concern in view of the inability to refute denials of the Holocaust, which further underlines the demand of the past itself. The aim must be to reach the event itself with the being-as of historical narrative.

\textsuperscript{245} P. RICOEUR, \textit{Memory, History, Forgetting}, p. 256.

\textsuperscript{246} Ibid., p. 564n76.

\textsuperscript{247} Ibid., p. 256.

\textsuperscript{248} Ibid., p. 257.

\textsuperscript{249} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{250} Ibid., p. 260.
What remains continuous between *Time and Narrative* and *Memory, History, Forgetting* is the importance given to refiguration. In *Time and Narrative*, the metaphor’s polysemy that *The Rule of Metaphor* had emphasized is taken up by ‘refiguration of time by narrative - which is the heir of this metaphorical redescriptions’\(^{251}\). It also, most appropriately for Ricoeur’s discussion of White, ‘alludes to the notion of “figure”, which is the core of any tropology’\(^{252}\).

In this way, as *Time and Narrative* points out, ‘this category of standing-for... is irreducible to the category of reference’\(^{253}\). Indeed, Ricoeur goes on to say, when considering the confrontation between the worlds of the text and the reader, that the category of the real is only acceptable in historiographic terms ‘in the sense that that about which they speak was observable to witnesses in the past’\(^{254}\). Still, what this does is relocate the problem from the real event to the real testimony - ‘in the very fact that it is not observable, whether it be a question of the having-been of events or the having-been of testimony’\(^{255}\).

This irreducibility of history as “standing-for” is only emphasised by Ricoeur’s comments on the subject in *Memory, History, Forgetting*. Ricoeur closes his chapter on representation and the whole epistemological section with a considered renewal of his conclusions from *Time and Narrative* III. Therefore I will present the ultimate conclusion of fruitful refiguration using both texts\(^{256}\).

In *Time and Narrative*, Ricoeur argues that we have not and will never pay our debt to the past – its multiple re-figurations are inexhaustible – ‘the master of the plot [is] a servant of

\(^{251}\) P. RICOEUR, *Time and Narrative* III, p. 155.
\(^{252}\) Ibid.
\(^{253}\) Ibid., p. 157.
\(^{254}\) Ibid., p. 158.
\(^{255}\) Ibid.

\(^{256}\) It is worth noting however that the purpose of *Memory, History, Forgetting* has changed from *Time and Narrative* to a debt that can only be supported within a horizon that allows for forgiveness as a possibility but not as a demand. It is to restore a hope for meaningful agency also to citizens born subsequently. The context is therefore very different.
the memory of past human beings". Yet while ‘the author and reader of a historical text agree that it will deal with situations, events, connections and character who once really existed... The question now posed is whether, how, and to what degree the historian satisfies the expectation and promise conveyed by this contract.

By moving through Same, Other, Analogous, Ricoeur begins to establish a view of history writing as ongoing. As historians, and inheritors of history and current historical agents, we do this multiple times, continually refiguring in the light of the historical facts, in a continuing effort to do justice to them, and those who experienced them. In this way Ricoeur establishes that the "standing-for" the past that historical narrative achieves has a ‘fundamentally dialectic structure... standing-for, we said, means by turns the reduction to the Same, the recognition of Otherness, and the analogizing of apprehension’.

He therefore identifies what historical narrative can do in its fictive sense: ‘a function of revealing and transforming’. The historian’s ‘representation means to be a representation of...’ while in Time and Narrative the category of reference which prompted the lenses of the Same, the Other, and the Analogous becomes all the more useless where ‘discovering and inventing are indistinguishable’. Moving to speak of the unreality of fiction, Ricoeur points out that reading is what mediates refiguration and ‘so replies, mutatis mutandis, to that of the function of standing-for exercised by a historical narrative’.

This is the threshold of a further discussion for Ricoeur in the context of his epistemological project in Memory, History, Forgetting. Indeed, Ricoeur considers that it is at this point that ‘the epistemological discussion thus finds itself carried into the field of what, in the next chapter I shall call interpretation’.

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257. P. Ricoeur, Time and Narrative III, p. 156.
258. P. Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, p. 275.
260. Ibid., p. 158.
262. P. Ricoeur, Time and Narrative III, p. 158.
263. Ibid., p. 159.
However, as I noted, it is also here therefore that Ricoeur reminds the historian of the limits of his role. Literary modes which ‘persuade the reader of the reality, conjunctions, structures, and events set on stage become suspect of abusing the reader’s confidence by abolishing the boundary between persuasion and making believe’\textsuperscript{265}. The response to such a difficulty is a recourse to the ‘good-faith’ in which the historian represents the events. ‘This protest rejoins in an unexpected way Ranke’s peaceable declaration whereby he proposes to report events as they really [\textit{eigentlich}] happened’\textsuperscript{266}.

The critical support for this comes in the historian’s return to his own technical bases which themselves return attention to the ‘testimonial dimension of the document’\textsuperscript{267}. Here I recall my reconstruction of the trust that is the condition of all testimony - which Ricoeur here adds as trust of the self and between persons: ‘we have nothing better than our memory to assure ourselves of the reality of our memories - we have nothing better than testimony and criticism of testimony to accredit the historian’s representation of the past’\textsuperscript{268}. This history stands for the past, relying on this testimony, but if you don’t believe me, ask someone else\textsuperscript{269}. Even in Ranke’s hope of reaching the past as it happened, despite classifying it as ‘naïve’, Ricoeur ultimately reads ‘a claim to trustworthiness’\textsuperscript{270}.

Relevant both for historiography and for social and political ethics is the significance Ricoeur places on the reader and the citizen as an important critical voice. This is supported by the very early conclusions of \textit{Time and Narrative} I where narrative refiguration is the culmination of a process begun in prefiguration, via configuration of events in time. The voices of the readers generate multiple views on the written history.

\textsuperscript{265} P. \textsc{Ricoeur}, \textit{Memory, History, Forgetting}, p. 277.
\textsuperscript{266} Ibid., pp. 277-8.
\textsuperscript{267} Ibid., p. 278.
\textsuperscript{268} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{269} There is a pleasing secondary meaning regarding the social bond of testimony to be found in the phrase of ‘standing for’ in this case. The written history stands for the collected and critiqued testimony of events, and represents the events in support of that tested testimony. The history supports the testimony in this way and the historian effectively “stands for” the witness in the sense of presenting support for her as a trusted witness. There is a further link here to Ricoeur’s comparison and contrast between the historian and the judge (\textit{Memory, History, Forgetting}, pp. 314-332). Here however the historian may revise his view and the standing for of history may be rewritten - yet still the historian begins on the basis of trust.
\textsuperscript{270} P. \textsc{Ricoeur}, \textit{Memory, History, Forgetting}, p. 273.
Therefore the ‘temporal distance separating us from the past is not a dead interval but a transmission that is generative of meaning’\textsuperscript{271}. This presents another ongoing dialectic that Ricoeur names tradition in ‘the exchange between the interpreted past and the interpreting present’\textsuperscript{272}. This is constructive in the moment of reading where ‘the past questions us and calls us into question before we question it or call it into question’\textsuperscript{273}. The summoned reader, once engaged, takes on a critical role. In this sense Ricoeur refers to the reader as a ‘border-crosser’\textsuperscript{274}. What this means is that tradition itself is shaped by the transmission of the past through the present, but similarly the present can critique the past and so itself by a hermeneutics of traditions. Junker-Kenny clarifies this in her analysis that ‘Ricoeur’s hermeneutics insists that there is a “fact” in the sense of an event as distinct from its interpretation, even if our sole access to it may be through previous understandings’\textsuperscript{275}. That interpretation itself therefore requires articulation and self critique. The alternative is a ‘fidelity to the past [that] will be nothing more than a simple folkloric ornamentation. The problem is not simply to repeat the past, but rather to take root in it in order to ceaselessly invent’\textsuperscript{276}. Given this early insight (1961), it is no surprise that Ricoeur is ‘astonished looking back on it not to have been attentive earlier to this role of the reader mediator... given that all Biblical exegesis, but all of classical philology, rests on a history of readings, let us call them “acts of reading”’\textsuperscript{277}.

It is worth noting however that in 1981, during the writing of the trilogy of *Time and Narrative*, Ricoeur was arguing that language is certainly ‘inventive’ yet ‘the erosion of the

\textsuperscript{271} P. Ricoeur, *Memory, History, Forgetting*, p. 221.

\textsuperscript{272} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{273} Ibid., p. 222.

\textsuperscript{274} P. Ricoeur, *Critique and Conviction*, p. 87. Ricoeur notes his indebtedness for this term to Hans-Robert Jauss.


\textsuperscript{277} P. Ricoeur, *Critique and Conviction*, p. 87. The link to *The Rule of Metaphor* is clear here as Ricoeur makes the parallel between readers and speakers as ‘first of all in the situation of being heirs. This condition essentially stems from the language-like [langagièreme] structure of communication in general and of the transmission of past contents in particular... not just the system of *langue* in each natural language, but the things already said, understood, and received’ (P. Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative* III, p. 221). It is also language that mediates innovation as Ricoeur established with metaphor.
everyday... never ceases to obscure'. Genuine multiplicity can be lost. It is through the narrative refuguration of Same, Other, and Analogous, that these multiplicities of meanings of past action become meaningful for the reader. Indeed, it is in narrative that the reference becomes a question again – 'it is dangerous in the best sense' – because multiple meanings become available.

What this leads Ricoeur to is 'a new hermeneutical significance' of the Same, the Other, the Analogous themselves. In the light of the significance of 'being-affected-by-the-past' this means that work under these signs 'taken in isolation... runs the risk of each of its stages of turning into a dream of power exercised by the knowing subject'. This is where Ricoeur himself turns his analysis from mastery of the narrative to serving the past, turning from the acquisition of knowledge regarding the real event, through the category of reference to considering it in terms of 'the sphere of what we have not made'. It is therefore in the light of the debt to the past that Ricoeur makes his final point that 'we submit the idea of tradition itself to the triple filter of reenactment, differentation, and metaphorization'. Here the Same, the Other, and the Analogous are brought in to act as ways of thinking about historiography, as well as the question of the real events of the past. Thus history stands for the past, under the sense of the Same, the Other, and the Analogous.

Thus, Ricoeur has combined his 'analysis of the “such that” from Ranke’s formula “such as it really happened”) and the analysis of the “like” in the last study in [his] The Rule of Metaphor'. The written history may now be spoken of as a 'metaphorical redescription of the past'. The polysemy of meaning that Ricoeur has examined and extolled in the


279 Ibid.

280 P. Ricoeur, Time and Narrative III, p. 228.

281 Ibid.

282 Ibid.

283 Ibid.

284 This also takes Ricoeur further than Kearney’s analysis identifies, which stops short of outlining the structure and reception that allows us to reappropriate without ethical violence to the past other.

285 P. Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, pp. 564-5n80.
seeing-as and being-as of metaphor, combined with Ranke’s emphasis on the real event is
the tension the ‘standing for’ ultimately conceptualises. It is also this tension that calls
Ricoeur to insist that each of us “repeat” our story, to retell our history, is to recollect our
horizon of possibilities in a resolute and responsible manner.”

Writing in reference to this insight in *Memory, History, Forgetting*, Ricoeur admits ‘that
the notions of vis-à-vis and taking the place of or standing for constitute the name of a
problem rather than the name of the solution’¹²⁸⁷. What Ricoeur did achieve in *Time and
Narrative* was a ‘conceptual articulation’¹²⁸⁸ of the aspects of the problem of history as
standing for. In *Memory, History, Forgetting*, he has ‘nothing to change’¹²⁸⁹ regarding his
view of the Same, the Other, and the Analogous. He does note that although it solves
nothing, one can rely on this articulation of the problem as ‘not the fruit of some
improvisation. It has a long lexical and semantic history before historiography.”¹²⁹⁰

To conclude this section, the lenses Ricoeur proposes to articulate the difficulty of
representing the past necessarily include analogical thinking. The problem of writing
history so as to respond to the debt to the past requires an explicit acknowledgement of the
presence and absence of that past. This is only brought together through thinking
analogically. Most crucially that analogical viewpoint only works with continued
reference the Same and the Other, the Analogous alone does not fully describe the tensions.

This articulation of the problem remains the best that Ricoeur can supply even after his
later epistemological investigation with *Memory, History, Forgetting*. I noted above that
the Analogous was named for Aristotle’s rhetorical use of analogy rather than what Ricoeur
viewed as Aquinas’s ontological theory. However, by providing an alternative reading of
Aquinas’s analogy in Chapter Three as a nuanced device to respect the abiding otherness of
God to human concepts, but not withdraw into apophaticism. I find here a link with
Ricoeur’s historiographic discourse.

²⁸⁸ Ibid.
²⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 280.
²⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 565n81.
Together the Same, the Other, and the Analogous provide a way of thinking through the polysemy of meaning in testimony and interpret that testimony to form a written history. Most significantly these ways of thinking are not completed but are intended to provide an opportunity for continuing refiguration. This includes enriching the view of historical events through the critical view of historians and citizens. I have brought the achievements of these two themes together by arguing that this process reemphasises the capability of the human person in the context of the social bond. I have brought the achievements of these two themes together by noting that testimony and the historian’s response, occurs within and confirms the social bond on the basis of trust. Moreover, the capacity of the self to narrate, and by implication to remember, to testify, to critique, and to narrate anew is what founds the ways of thinking in the Same, the Other and the Analogous. The rooting of the use of analogy in the capacities of the self leads me to my final conclusions for this chapter below.

**Outlook on analogy as a “transfer” respectful of the otherness of the other**

It is in Ricoeur’s discourse on the historical past that I find clear relevance for transmissions between contemporary cultures. The final critique that the hermeneutics of traditions provides here of the Same, the Other, and the Analogous is what fits these lenses for the new problematic of ‘mediating transmission’ of the past in to the present, and, crucially, understanding that transmission itself. Thus Ricoeur’s historiography provides a significant use of analogical thinking for my ultimate purpose of developing intercultural hermeneutics.

I noted at the end of Chapter Two that one of the more significant characteristics of intercultural encounters as Ricoeur identified them was the inevitability of conflict. That has remained significant for the plurivocity and polysemy of testimony. To an extent this was a question of the fragility of political discourse, but here I introduce the significance of the histories of enmity. In his work on the European context in particular Ricoeur has identified the legacy of the histories of conflict that is at the heart of, and forms the ethical core of, the ongoing European project. The significance of my conclusions regarding the
refigurative nature of history writing is important here because it is through refiguration that the debt is addressed in attestation of the past and in choosing commitments for working out a shared future. One important way in which this can be understood is through the lenses Ricoeur outlines in *Time and Narrative* that are held together by the Analogous. Another example will be found in Chapter Five in relation to the exchange of religions as an ‘analogical transfer’[^291], as opposed to an approach of comparative religions.

**Conclusion**

In this way Ricoeur’s use of analogy becomes relevant for the development of historical narratives into the context of intercultural ethics as a response to histories of enmity. As a central concept of Ricoeur’s analysis of history writing analogy safeguards the genuine capability of understanding. Moreover, given Ricoeur’s final critique of ideological interests, the historian uses these tools critically while avoiding ideology. Intercultural dialogue may be seen here as similar to reconstructing history by understanding agents in the past. As history is written through listening to testimony, on the basis of trust, through a shared agency, so are those of other cultures to be understood. Ricoeur is hopeful that such understanding is possible, based on the “hospitality” of languages that allows for translation. It is to these final consolidations I turn in Chapter Five.

CHAPTER FIVE
RICOEUR'S MODELS OF INTERCULTURAL ENCOUNTER UNDERSTOOD IN A HERMENEUTICS OF ANALOGY

This chapter is to draw out the conclusions of the themes analysed in the previous four chapters for a social ethical perspective on intercultural hermeneutics which has already been part of Ricoeur's early work. In particular, at the end of Chapter Two I noted that the problem of intercultural dialogue had been handled indirectly by Ricoeur in the model of translation he works out in the late 1990s. In his short collection of essays on the topic Ricoeur considers translation as a way of exploring the difficulties of moving between cultures as well as languages. However, to these challenges he adds the capacity of this process to improve self-understanding and as a consequence, the self's understanding of the other. Most significantly Ricoeur turns to translation as the first of three models for understanding Europe. The models which follow are memory and forgiveness. To these I will add his earlier 1996 article 'The Erosion of Tolerance and the Resistance on the Intolerable' published as part of a UNESCO project, and the very early essay 'Universal Civilisation and National Cultures'. This last essay supplies a surprisingly prescient view on many of the themes of intercultural hermeneutics discussed by liberal, communitarian and hermeneutical ethicists since the late 1980s. To an extent this acts as a bridge from Chapter Four, as it is rooted in a discussion of fidelity to historical narratives. The translation model closes with Ricoeur's reminder of our desire for the other. This is tempered by the article on tolerance as a reminder of the ethical limits that the self must place on her recognition of the other. Moreover, the subsequent European models of memory and forgiveness further emphasise the significance of past intolerable behaviour and place forgiveness in an eschatological horizon.

1 The collection Sur la traduction (Paris, Bayard, 2004) was first published as a collection in 2004, but two of the essays were prepared as public addresses: 'Translation as challenge and source of happiness' (German Historical Institute of Paris, 15 April 1997); 'The Paradigm of Translation' (Faculty of Protestant Theology, October 1998). The latter was first published in Esprit 853 (Paris, 1999). I will refer to the English translation On Translation, tr. E. Brennan (London, Routledge, 2006).


While Ricoeur does not discuss analogical language in the context of the translation project, the connection to a culture’s symbolic resources and to historical narrative and its complex meanings will remain important. Moreover, he does dwell on the incomplete nature of any translation and the way in which improvements are constantly desired, akin to the incomplete nature of history written under the sign of the Analogous as discussed in Chapter Four. This is emphasised by what he develops as the European model of ‘memory’. I will therefore briefly reconstruct Ricoeur’s movements in thinking of translation as a way of understanding other cultures before turning to his article on Europe. I will employ the article on tolerance throughout as a guide to the limits of the project. I will also refer throughout to the more significant commentators on Ricoeur’s intercultural work. Such thinkers are valuable because they develop the implications of Ricoeur’s work into explicit models for further study. For example, Leovino Ma. Garcia, a Filipino philosopher, reconstructs the translation of cultures as genuinely interpretive.

The themes of the previous chapters will also be looked at from a different perspective. The most significant of these will be the continued emphasis on the capable self, in this case pursuing the particular problem of intercultural communication. I will add to this Ricoeur’s broader point regarding the diversity of human existence read positively in the richness of contingent encounters, exemplified by the polysemy of the responses to Exodus 3:14. Yet this still occurs in the context of histories of enmity which demands recognition and, indeed, ongoing promises for the future. These three themes must be explained more fully, but I will do so in the light of Ricoeur’s translation and memory models I will now reconstruct. I will also give a final note on how theology can contribute to Ricoeur’s overall project, before turning to a final overview of analogical thinking of intercultural hermeneutics.

5.1. TRANSLATION IN ITS PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSION

Translation has been a significant aspect of Ricoeur’s work since very early in his career. This is so even in his early phenomenological stage when he was carrying out a translation

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of Edmund Husserl’s Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie while he was imprisoned as a POW during World War II. Ricoeur was thus clearly alive to the difficulties of translating dense and complicated texts in a language saturated by prior histories of thinking. Many of his other works touch on related themes of communication, and I will refer to these as they are made relevant by my reconstruction of his dedicated collection to the role and significance of translation for philosophy, On Translation.

‘The Paradigm of Translation’

Ricoeur begins his collection by setting up some major references for his project, which include Antoine Berman, Sigmund Freud, and George Steiner. What Ricoeur is doing is introducing the particular vocabulary on which he will draw to highlight the processes and difficulties of translating.

As a sign of the many tensions of his project of translation Ricoeur highlights the implications of Antoine Berman’s title, The Test of the Foreign. Where translation must mediate between the reader and the “foreign”, ‘test’ takes on two meanings, that of a difficult ordeal, but also of a probationary period where one’s desire to reach the other through translation is tested.

I will work through Ricoeur’s approach to translation using these two meanings, of ordeal and probation. The desire for the other is foundational for understanding across boundaries so testing the will to always return to seek translation will become most important as I close the discussion and draw the focus back to analogy. For now I will consider the ordeal of translation.

Ricoeur renders the endurance of this ordeal using Walter Benjamin’s idea of the work of translation, combining this with Freud’s vocabulary of the work of remembering and the

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6 A. Berman, The Experience of the Foreign. Culture and Translation in Romantic Germany, tr. S. Heyvaert (New York, State University of New York Press, 1992) - Here l’épreuve is translated as experience, but like Ricoeur, I prefer test as more indicative of the inherent challenges.

work of mourning⁸. These two tasks indicate the duplicity of translation, its paradox. Ricoeur draws in the example of Franz Rosenzweig’s translation of the Hebrew Bible into German to emphasise that it is ‘doubly sanctioned by a vow of faithfulness and a suspicion of betrayal’⁹; faithfulness to two masters: ‘the foreigner in his strangeness, the reader in his desire for appropriation’¹⁰. Thus remembering constitutes what is salvaged from the foreign in the new language, and mourning is the work of maintaining an awareness of the loss that translation also represents. Yet Ricoeur does not suggest that we begin with mourning, but with remembering. It is remembering that allows the translator to attack certain pessimistic and excluding assumptions. First, ‘the view that the mother tongue is sacred, the mother tongue’s nervousness around its own identity’¹¹ is confronted in a productive sense by the new contribution the foreign can make, and second, in its translation attacks the presumption of untranslatability. Indeed, Garcia analyses Ricoeur’s emphasis on betrayal as a rejection of the ‘paralyzing theoretical alternative of “translatable versus untranslatable”’ and a substitution of ‘fidelity versus treason’¹².

Thus the possibility of loss is confronted in the prospect of translation and its process. However, that process is not a smooth one, but, again, an ordeal. Ricoeur suggests that the concerns of both parties are less ‘fantastical’ when one considers the reality of the text, where ‘segments of untranslatability are scattered through the test, making a translation a drama, and the wish for a good translation a wager’¹³. So a translation becomes a speculative attempt at communication, the doing of which confronts the fears of those involved, and only resolves itself in a risk.

The risk is in mis-translating, or losing an unacceptable amount of meaning through translation. Each text has particular dangers in this respect. Poetry must be concerned not only with meaning but with cadence and euphony. I have already noted the particular risks

⁹ P. Ricoeur, On Translation, p. 4.
¹⁰ Ibid., p. 22-3.
¹¹ Ibid., p. 4.
¹³ Ibid., p. 5.
of indicating histories of inter-textuality contained in single instances of the philosophical use of language.

Yet is every risk resolved with a happy translation? Leovino Garcia describes Ricoeur as 'the philosopher of hope who proclaims the superabundance of sense over the abundance of nonsense'\(^{14}\). However, this should not imply that nothing may be lost by translation, which Garcia also notes. Ricoeur is careful to emphasise that the ordeal is not resolved. Instead, it is faced with dissatisfaction with the eventual translation. Ricoeur turns to Berman to clarify: 'On the psychological level the translator is ambivalent. He wants to force the two sides, force his language so that it is filled with incongruity, force the other language so that it is interned [se dé-porter] in his mother tongue'\(^ {15}\).

Therefore Ricoeur suggests that we return to the second of Freud's vocabulary contributions: the work of mourning. In the practice of translation this provides 'a harsh but invaluable corrective'\(^ {16}\); however successful the translation, from the ground of its genuine possibility in the face of fear, there will be no perfect translation. Something will always be lost. 'Mourning is a reconciliation... What is preserved in mourning and lost in melancholia is self-esteem, or the sense of one's self'\(^ {17}\). Mourning is not anguish therefore, but the acceptance of this loss, and an acknowledgement of the implications of the possible but imperfect translation.

Those implications are twofold. Positively, there is a great contribution to self-understanding expressed here, where the mother tongue 'is invited to think of itself as one language amongst others, ultimately to see itself as foreign'\(^ {18}\). Ricoeur noted the practical example of Europe by suggesting that 'meeting other traditional cultures is a serious test and, in a way, totally novel for European culture... [given the] illusion that European

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\(^ {14}\) L. M. GARCIA, 'The Translation-Interpretation of Cultures' p. 73.
\(^ {15}\) P. RICOEUR, On Translation, p. 8.
\(^ {16}\) Ibid.
\(^ {18}\) P. RICOEUR, On Translation, p. 9.
culture was, in fact and by right, a universal culture"^19. Speaking in terms of a confrontation between frameworks of thought Ricoeur described this as ‘a schism of the presumption of truth"^20, where one’s own convictions come under a critical view. In terms of language it might be better expressed as a realisation of the resources of other languages. This demands a new and richer perspective on oneself amongst others. However, on the negative side, Ricoeur is concerned that this could lead one to forgetting or undervaluing one’s own particularity. It is within the context of tolerance that he elaborates this point. While condemning intolerance, Ricoeur identifies a state of tolerance that is itself intolerable. This is reached at precisely the point where difference becomes equally valued and therefore ubiquitous, thus undermining its genuine particularity. In this case ‘we approve of everything, because everything is the same, because everything is equal’^21. The result is ‘indifference’^22. Ricoeur argues that the source of this indifference appears benign, since it only makes conceptual sense as an option within the context of expected tolerance. This process having rendered ‘secretly complicit the authentic and the inauthentic,... transmutes the same into its other’^23.

It is therefore no surprise that even under the question of translation, these two implications of the diversity of language, Ricoeur turns to introduce its ethical role. Similar to Ricoeur’s rejection of ego-centric ethics, one language cannot be prioritised above the other, but is instead one language amongst others, different but equal. Moreover, it is the influence of the other, the confrontation and dialogue with that other language that reveals this to the speaking self. When speaking of traditional cultures, Ricoeur makes a remark that also describes the dangers of translating between languages: that ‘not all have the same capacity for resistance and above all the same capacity for absorption’^24. What this means is that each language, in its particularity, and each linguistic culture, will

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^19 P. Ricoeur, ‘Universal Civilization and National Cultures’ p. 277. Ricoeur continues and explains how a European culture might have been envisaged by situating it in terms of intellectual progress: ‘did not Europe invent history, geography, ethnography, and sociology in their explicit scientific forms?” (ibid.).


^21 Ibid., p. 196.

^22 Ibid.

^23 Ibid., p. 197.

respond differently to the prospect and the activity of translation. It is this specificity that means that the wager of translation is a genuine risk.\(^{25}\)

Yet, this recognition of the other language, and the mother tongue in relation to it should not damage recognition of one’s own particularity - just as it is self-esteem that permits the self to properly respect the other. Rather, Ricoeur continues, it can contain a ‘voluntary affirmation of man’s oneness… The belief that the translation is feasible up to a certain point is the affirmation that the foreigner is a man, the belief, in short, that communication is possible.’\(^{26}\) Most interestingly for my focus in this chapter on intercultural hermeneutics, Ricoeur argues that this is ‘also valid for values and the basic images and symbols which make up the cultural resources of a nation’\(^{27}\).

The tension is solved when Ricoeur identifies a source of successful mediation named linguistic hospitality – the pleasure dwelling in the other’s language, but in order to return the favour, to receive the other into one’s own sphere. It is important that this works in both ways - just as disrespect for the other can lead to damage to self-esteem, since the other is another self. ‘For Ricoeur there is no other way to understand oneself except through the interpretation of the expressions of the self’\(^{28}\) and in translation, ‘or the pursuit of understanding and using a strange language...we break open a new and always wider horizon’\(^{29}\). Ricoeur explains his strategy with this more fully in his article on Europe where linguistic hospitality is expressed as respect for the other’s language, illustrated by Wilhelm von Humboldt’s structure ‘of raising the distinctive spirit of his own language to

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\(^{25}\) A good example of a personal reflection on such circumstances, of a culture dying in the shock of the confrontation with dominant cultural personalities, see C. LÉVI-STRAUSS, Tristes Tropiques (Paris, Union Générale d’Édition, 1955). To be found in translation as Tristes Tropiques, tr. J. Weightman, D. Weightman (New York, Penguin, 2011). It is worth noting that this text begins with the sentence ‘I hate travelling and explorers’, which does situate Lévi-Strauss within his own approach, as discussed in 2.2.3.


\(^{27}\) Ibid.

\(^{28}\) L. M. GARCIA, ‘The Translation-Interpretation of Cultures’, p. 73.

the level of that of the foreign language...It is really a matter of living with the other in order to take that other to one's home as a guest\textsuperscript{30}.

It is the genuine possibility of being hospitable, both as a host and a guest, that allows Ricoeur to underline the 'universal competence' of the speaking self, despite many languages. This 'presupposes that every speaker has the ability to learn and to use languages other than his own\textsuperscript{31}. This is enabled by the already ethical, reflexive anthropology which is the explicit context for all Ricoeur's later work. The speaker is capable of 'placing [language] at a distance, and in this way of treating our own language as one language' amongst the multiplicity\textsuperscript{32}. Translation becomes part of the capable human person, who attests to oneself as such: attestation is the sense of the self which testifies to the "I can"\textsuperscript{33} across linguistic, pragmatic and ethical contexts, where it is coupled with 'the avowal of a certain receptivity'\textsuperscript{34} to the images and symbols of cultural resources through to the expression of cultural values. 'To be a man is to be capable of this projection into another center of perspective'\textsuperscript{35}. For translation, this receptivity is couched as 'hospitality'.

This is an idea which takes on an increasing value when Ricoeur argues that untranslatability is not an\textit{a priori} condition of language. Evidently, translation occurs. Therefore for a hypothetical original or universal language to act as a way of checking a translation it must itself have consensus on its criteria. Without such consensus, or indeed, even any reasonable suggested criteria, Ricoeur argues that as a result, the "original" language leaves much to be desired: it ignores specificities. I will continue to return to this point throughout this chapter.

\textsuperscript{30} P. Ricoeur, 'A new ethos for Europe', p. 5.


\textsuperscript{32} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{33} See P. Ricoeur, \textit{Oneself as Another}, tr. K. Blamey (Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1992) especially the fourth study.

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., p. 213.

\textsuperscript{35} P. Ricoeur, 'Universal Civilization and National Cultures' p. 282.
Moreover, in his turn to consider the myth of Babel, I suggest that for Ricoeur this “original” language is not properly representative of the practical situation of translation. I am here emphasising that Ricoeur introduces his examination of the idea of Babel by describing it as ‘the non-judgemental acknowledgement of an original separation’. It is the separation that constitutes the parameters for future translation, rather than directing us toward the situation prior where only one language was (mythically) spoken. The Babel myth directs our attention toward the fact of the conclusion - diversity in language.

Ricoeur begins his examination of the story by noting that the previous chapter of Genesis concludes with the summary of the settling of the children of Shem, with their ‘languages’ (Genesis, 10:32). Evidently the fact of diverse languages is the context in which the Babel story is told. What the Babel story provides is the originality of that fact, placing it in a primordial landscape, emphasising that, for us, the language of the other is always already present. Moreover, Ricoeur asserts, the myth as it is in Genesis does not make that fact a source of shame. Indeed there is ‘no recrimination, no lamentation’.

Garcia’s comment on Ricoeur’s own distinction here is that is is one ‘by constitution and not by fault’.

When together and speaking the same language, the people were building a great tower. This potential threat to heaven is removed through scattering the people and confounding them with multiple, diverse languages, and so ‘they left off to build the city’. Ricoeur argues that ‘that is a way of saying: this is the way things are’. It is a non-evaluative description of the linguistic situation to be confronted. Babel leaves us ‘how we are, this is how we exist, scattered and confounded and called to what? Well... to translation!’

Thus the attempt to reach the pre-Babel language, in an “original” or “universal” form is not the appropriate solution. Translation does not reach back to a universal language, but Garcia provides a more subtle explanation, that ‘translation is the mediation between the

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39 Ibid., p. 19.
plurality of cultures and the unity of humanity". The existence of an original or universal language is not the emphasis of the myth, but rather the exhortation 'let us translate'. Ultimately, 'translation is inscribed in the long litany of "despite everything"', rendering 'the possibility of translation [as] postulated more fundamentally as an a priori of communication'.

This is underlined when we consider the second way of translating Ricoeur identifies. In the light of always already present multiplicity Ricoeur considers this task of 'hospitable' translation as manifest itself in two situations. There is Berman's "test" where one must transfer meaning from one language to another. This is the obvious situation with which Ricoeur has been dealing with remembrance and mourning. There is another situation, which is the one with which George Steiner is concerned, where one must clarify meaning within one's own linguistic community. It is in this second that the full presence of the "foreign" is understood, where one's resources are even further clarified in the light of the new wager within one's own language. These conversation partners are chosen to exemplify two tasks at opposite ends of the question of multiple languages.

The tension in this kind of translation is rooted in the genuine particularity of any given linguistic construction. Phenomenologically, 'It is always possible to say the same thing in another way', with other words, or reformulated arguments. Ricoeur thus underlines the richness of expression. The idea of a single equivalent is problematic, there is always an interpretive task.

It is here then in multiplicity within a single community, that the fear of the foreign, of misunderstanding, of the untranslatable other, is disclosed by Freud's insight that 'there is something foreign in every other'. The other is not just from a far away culture or language, but can be very close-by within one's own linguistic community. Moreover, the

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40 L. M. GARCIA, 'The Translation-Interpretation of Cultures', p. 80.
41 P. RICOEUR, On Translation, p. 20.
42 Ibid., p. 18.
43 P. RICOEUR, 'A new ethos for Europe', p. 4.
44 P. RICOEUR, On Translation, p. 25.
45 Ibid.
theologian Marianne Moyaert has made the point that ‘intuitively people prefer to look away from their own strangeness’ - a factor in the ‘fragility of each identity which feels threatened by another’. There is always a need to better understand the other person’s intended meaning and to translate it. This is seen in ‘language’s propensity for the enigma, for artifice, for abstruseness, for the secret, in fact for non-communication’. There must be hospitality for other ways of speaking, of thinking, within and without a single language. This practice too ‘breaks open a new and always wider horizon’.

This overcoming of a risk through hospitality, and achieving new insight, is the paradigmatic model, theoretically, practically, ethically, for other discourses: ‘the ethical aim of translating... is to be an opening, a dialogue, a cross-breeding, a decentering. Translation is a “putting in touch with” or it is nothing’.

Thus Ricoeur suggests that translation as such can serve ‘as a model for other form of hospitality that I think resemble it: confessions, religions, are they not like languages that are foreign to one another, with their lexicon, their grammar, their rhetoric, their stylistics which we must learn in order to make our way into them?’ This is a translation ethos which allows us ‘to extend the spirit of translation to the relationship between cultures themselves’. We ‘enter the process of exchange [Auseinandersetzung]’. Ultimately the wager is returned, via the detour in the other’s language, or culture, or religion, by the

46 M. MOYAERT (Leuven, 2008) I quote here from a conference paper. A fuller and systematic presentation of Moyaert’s work on this point can be found in her own Fragile Identities. Toward a Theology of Interreligious Hospitality (Amsterdam, Rodopi, 2011). I do not intend to use Moyaert’s contributions to the study of Ricoeur extensively because her focus is on inter-religious dialogue and I wish to make a more basic point regarding intercultural communication. Ricoeur’s insight that a religion is ‘like a language’ does allow me to use some of Moyaert’s analysis in relation to the paradigm of translation, and translating memory - P. RICOEUR, Critique and Conviction: Conversations with François Azouvi and Marc de Launay, tr. K. Blamey (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1998), p. 145.


48 P. RICOEUR, On Translation, p. 28.

49 J. E. WILHELM, Herméneutique et traduction, p. 772 – ‘nous ouvrent un horizon nouveau et toujours plus vaste’.

50 A. BERMAN, The Experience of the Foreign, p. 4.


hosting of the other within one's own language, clarifying one's own as well as their resources.

Two aspects of Ricoeur's project continue to cast a shadow over this process. The first is the continuing existence of the "untranslatable," and the second is the second meaning of test, as in probation. The first recurring limit of the "untranslatable" we have seen twice already. The first a priori assumption of untranslatability, which was defeated. The second is in the doing of translation itself, of how equivalent meaning is found without identity. What is crucial to emphasise here is the word which Ricoeur has always drawn in to describe translation: as work. It is in the shock of the "incomparable" meaning that the full significance of translation as work is shown. Translation is not simply a revelation of an equivalence that was always already present, rather it is the construction of equivalence. Whorf and Sapir, whom Ricoeur invoked as proponents of the theoretical impossibility of translation, argued that 'linguistic division imposes a worldview'. The example they used was the difference in thinking about time between Greek, a culture which carries with it the weight of extensive metaphysical consideration, versus Chinese, which has no such worked out philosophy - and no words for it. Yet François Jullien, a specialist in Sinology and working through French, constructed comparables by referring to seasons, occasions and images of organic growth. These comparables had to be made, not discovered. Julien undertook the work of translation, remembering and mourning, to render an imperfect, but constructed translation. This is what Ricoeur elsewhere called 'an effort of plural reading'.

This effort is sometimes hidden where there are long-lasting exchanges. Ricoeur's example here is European integration, where many risks of translation have been taken in the past. These worked despite everything said on the subject of the hidden, or unspeakable above, despite the tension of faithfulness and betrayal. Equivalence appears as already shared when in fact it is actually the achievement of historical translations. Language is 'inventive' yet 'the erosion of the everyday... never ceases to obscure'.

54 P. RICOEUR, On Translation, p. 15.
‘Kinship hides the true nature of equivalence, which is produced by translation rather than presupposed by it’\(^{57}\).

Has the “untranslatable” been finally resolved with the revelation of the construction of equivalences? Ricoeur argues that it has not, and will only, in the work of mourning, continue to recur. Construction of equivalent meaning still leaves a mystery. This construction reveals the final “untranslatable” element by not engaging with tone, savour, rhythm, spacing, silence, metrics and rhyme\(^{58}\). Berman’s moment of the “comparable” is drawn down even further from words to letters, to the very sound. ‘So the literal translation which [Hölderlin] chases relentlessly, is not a word for word translation, but a letter for letter one’\(^{59}\). This insight does not solve the task of translation, but emphasises the “basic” nature of its challenges. ‘The struggle against the constantly recurring translation’\(^{60}\) is an ongoing attempt to translate better.

This image of the continuing struggle returns me to the final aspect of translation as the “test” of the foreign that has travelled alongside my examination of Ricoeur since I began it. The probation of the genuine desire to pursue this struggle is in joining ‘Hölderlin’s relentless chase,’ even to the point of considering translation letter for letter. It is in the continuous struggle that Ricoeur sees the true test of the desire to translate. When the anguish of beginning to translate is not finally resolved but results in continued work ‘stimulated by the dissatisfaction with regard to existing translations’\(^{61}\) which ‘equivalence without identity’\(^{62}\) always produces: despite the risk, one still desires to continue. Thus ‘the capable reader redoes the work of translation’\(^{63}\) displaying her continued desire for more and better understanding, overcoming the fear of the other language, and its threat to identity.

\(^{57}\) P. RICOEUR, *On Translation*, p. 35.

\(^{58}\) Ibid., p. 38.

\(^{59}\) Ibid., p. 39.

\(^{60}\) Ibid.

\(^{61}\) Ibid.

\(^{62}\) Ibid., p. 21.

\(^{63}\) Ibid., p. 7.
By overcoming this fear, the reader, and all who continue to translate, pursue the ethical course of fulfilling their desire to understand the other, and by so doing benefit their own language. ‘What did those people with a passion for translation expect from their desire?... the broadening of the horizon of their own language... the discovery of their own language and of its resources which have been left to lie fallow’64. Thus, by overcoming fear of the other by identifying the desire for understanding that other, Ricoeur returns to the self the benefits of respect for her others. The horizon is broken open, the richness of the language of the self is revealed again and emphasised, all in the face of the continuing limit of the “untranslatable”, the “foreign” that is present in every other. Yet again, ‘the possibility of translation is postulated more fundamentally as an a priori of communication’65.

I already noted above how early Ricoeur began to consider the paradox between partaking in a universal civilisation marked by progress, and the desire to contribute from a culture’s identity. The presumption of translatability, the ‘a priori of communication’, is part of what makes this ‘shift in attitude of mankind’66 possible: national cultures contributing their own resources to a universal humanity. This process also creates new cultural exchanges, which Ricoeur explores in terms of new approaches to the question of European cultural history, identity and resources for a renewal of the culture core of Europe, to which I now turn.

**European identity forged out of translations**

This understanding of translation as a model for intercultural discourse is one of dynamic and productive. Yet, crucially, Ricoeur does not ignore the loss that this model also implies. With this tension emphasised so strongly it is no surprise that it is to translation that Ricoeur turns as his first model for ‘a new ethos for Europe’. Ricoeur describes the difficulties of handling the concept of Europe. As a term it calls into question the complicated and ongoing tension regarding intercultural questions that lie beneath it: how to combine identity and alterity. Claude Geffré, the French Dominican fundamental

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theologian whose work has interacted with Ricoeur’s and who also treats interreligious dialogue, has also written on Europe in terms of its ‘common heritage’. He suggests that ‘we are increasingly aware that the European identity must be more than merely economic or even legal. It is necessarily political. But a political Europe that wants its voice to be heard in the concert of nations is compelled to consider its cultural and spiritual identity’.

I referred in Chapter Two to Fred Dallmayr’s contextualising of the project of European integration within the Greek myth about the origin of the figure Europa. Europa was originally brought to Crete by Zeus from Phoenicia. Dallmayr’s point regarding this apparent Near-Eastern origin is that this origin story makes ‘explicit reference to the interlacing of identity and difference, inside and outside, familiarity and strangeness—an interlacing constitutive of the very beginnings of the continent’. It is in response to this articulation of the origins and challenges of the European project that Ricoeur immediately identifies the opportunities, also implicit in Dallmayr’s view of Europa: Europe displays ‘an irreducible pluralism which it is infinitely desirable to protect’. In Geffré’s terms this is a ‘dual heritage’ of the ‘symbolic cities of Athens and Jerusalem’, but Geffré has a specific focus on the Christian heritage of Europe and Ricoeur’s plurality is already richer than only two symbolic centres.

Ricoeur himself goes further than this indication of a dual origin by arguing that the specific European characteristic is of internal detours such that a self-critique is created. Already five years before this article dedicated to the question of Europe, Ricoeur was interviewed on the themes of universality and difference. He commented that ‘Europe has produced a series of cultural identities, which brought with them their own self-criticism,

69 P. Ricoeur, ‘A new ethos for Europe’, p. 4, a point borne out by Ricoeur’s.
70 C. Geffré, ‘Europe: A Project for the Future’, p. 25.
71 Though it should be noted that Geffré’s ‘strata’ that describe the multiple encounters that formed Europe explicitly emphasise the Jewishness of the Judaic-Christian heritage and the ‘cultural richness of the Islam and the Arab-Muslim civilisation’ as well as ‘the emergence of modern reason in the era of the Enlightenment’ (26).
and I think that this is unique. Even Christianity encompassed its own critique. Here the political fragility noted in Chapters One and Two becomes 'an ability to disclaim and interrogate itself'.

It is precisely this quality which Ricoeur seeks to protect in his warning about the universal understanding of humanity. He suggests a dangerous possible threat toward our national cultures which I consider a significant motivation for the models he will suggest as a way of understanding and acting within the idea of Europe. It is worth quoting this early comment on the paradox between universal civilisation and cultural identity:

The phenomenon of universalization, while being an advancement of mankind... constitutes a sort of subtle destruction, not only of traditional cultures, which might not be an irreparable wrong, but also of what I shall call for the time being the creative nucleus... that nucleus on the basis of which we interpret life, what I shall call in advance the ethical and mythical nucleus of mankind.

The single world civilization of which Ricoeur is speaking may exert 'a sort of attrition or wearing away at the expense of the cultural resources which have made the great civilizations of the past'.

In my view it is with these dangers in mind that thirty years later Ricoeur introduces his models of conceiving the ethos of Europe: translation, the exchange of memory, and forgiveness. Significantly, these models are not providing specific practices for the EU institutions, but are aimed instead at a crucial prior level which he describes as the 'ethical and spiritual activities of individuals... intellectual communities, churches and other religious denominations'. Ricoeur argues that this level, prior to the institution, is one contribution of many to the 'political imagination' that motivates the institutional level and forms its ethos. What will help to characterise these reflections is a remark from the

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74 P. RICOEUR, 'Universal Civilization and National Cultures' p. 276.

75 Ibid.

76 P. RICOEUR, 'A new ethos for Europe', p. 3.

77 Ibid.

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professor of medieval and Arabic philosophy Rémi Brague on Europe’s ‘eccentric’ identity: ‘Europeans arrive at what is specific to and needful for them only by taking the roundabout ways of that which has preceded them and that which is alien to them’.

The first of the models that describe this contribution is the model of translation. I have already reconstructed the many characteristics of this model that makes it so appropriate as a way of thinking about intercultural exchange, but I will briefly recontextualise it in this new consideration of a European ethos. Here it is in particular the fear of the stranger, outlined in On Translation, that Ricoeur deliberate confronts. The real threat to communication is not pluralism understood as fragmentation, but the ‘protective withdrawal’ of linguistic culture into themselves, limiting inter-linguistic and intercultural conversation. The primary themes of Ricoeur’s understanding of translation remain crucial here. It begins with the genuine possibility of translation, the presupposition that ‘languages do not form closed systems which exclude communication’.

The risk that translation faces, however, also remains, and the key word for overcoming this in the context of Europe is ‘courage’. Ricoeur notes more generally that ‘the discovery of the plurality of cultures is never a harmless experience. The disillusioning detachment with respect to our own past, or even self-criticism...[means that] we are threatened with destruction by our own discovery’. The implications of the realisation under the model of translation that one is another amongst others may not turn the individual back to the richness of his particularity, but strike at his fragility. Ricoeur outlines the danger of an aesthetisizing and non-committal historicist conclusion: ‘All meaning and every goal having disappeared, it becomes possible to wander through...

78 R. BRAGUE, Europe, la voie romaine (Paris, Criterion, 1992). I am indebted to Claude Geffré for pointing to this reference in his own ‘Europe: A Project for the Future’, p. 38n3. The English translation is Eccentric Culture: A Theory of Western Civilization, tr. S. Lester (South Bend; IN, St Augustine Press, 2001).


80 Ibid.

81 P. RICOEUR, ‘Universal Civilization and National Cultures’ p. 277, where his main concern regarding Europeans responding to the experience of the diversity of cultures is the historicist threat of relativization and skeptical detachment. He sees the possible consequence, “absolute nihilism in the triumph of comfort “(278) as a threat on a par with “atomic destruction”. His Europe essay 30 years later seeks the renewal of institutions from the energy of the underlying cultural identities shaped in the history of their encounters. For example, speaking of plural languages, Ricoeur suggests that ‘the mere fact that there are different languages is already very disturbing’ (p. 276: mediocre civilization is disturbing) because he views the phenomenon as implying a closed system. Yet even within this essay Ricoeur worked toward the idea that ‘the strangeness of man is never total’ (p. 282).
civilizations as if through vestiges and ruins. The whole of mankind becomes a kind of imaginary museum. The other dangerous response to this fragmentation may effectively be the arrogant appropriation of the other’s language, through domination or conquest.

The alternative is found in the clear ethical stance of hospitality already outlined. Moving beyond translation itself, Ricoeur here proposes that it can be understood as a translative ‘ethos’ of the relationship between cultures themselves, making genuine connections. Garcia argues for this more explicitly, suggesting that ‘translation constitute a paradigm for all exchanges not only from language to another but also from one culture to another culture. Translation opens out on to concrete universals and not to an abstract universal cut off from history. Berman, who was so formative for Ricoeur’s view of translation already describes ‘the ethical aim of translating [as]... an opening, a dialogue, a cross-breeding, a decentering. Translation is a “putting in touch with” or it is nothing. In the concrete one can point to the history of translations as itself making these new concrete encounters possible - the translation of the Bible aiding Ricoeur in his analysis of Babel, the translation of the works of Aristotle in the medieval period enabling a profound shared ground between Jewish, Christian and Muslim thinkers.

Finally, therefore, ‘translation is the best way of demonstrating the universality of language (le langage) in the dispersal of languages (les langues). As I emphasised throughout Chapter Four, already in each individual language, the encounter with polysemy is not solely a challenge but a reassertion of the capability of the person to deal with plurality. It is ‘between the right to universality and the demand of historical difference’ that Ricoeur ultimately identifies the work of the three models of European cohesion. Having dealt

82 P. Ricoeur, ‘Universal Civilization and National Cultures’, p. 278.
84 A. Berman, The Experience of the Foreign, p. 4.
85 I should note here that the translation of the Bible which Ricoeur uses is that completed by André Nathan Chouraqui, an Algerian scholar who is responsible for translations of the Hebrew Bible, the New Testament from Greek, and the Qur’an from Arabic. Chouraqui represents a powerfully creative approach, often inventing new words to better carry the implications of the origin language. For a study on Chouraqui’s approach see the PhD thesis, M. Watson, Translation for Transformation: André Chouraqui and his translation of the Gospels (Dublin, Trinity College Dublin, 2010), unpublished.
87 Ibid.
with the first, translation, which effectively describes inter-linguistic communication, with a view to employing the model for intercultural communication, I turn to the second. This second model of memory exchange and the third of forgiveness provides a new aspect to cultural interchange and I therefore reconstruct it separately.

5.2. OVERCOMING HISTORIES OF ENMITY IN EUROPE

Ricoeur’s second model makes specific an important part of the identities to be communicated in this way: the model of the just use and exchange of memories. Ricoeur finds ‘a good example in the present state of Europe: in some places we could say that there is too much memory, but in other places not enough’\(^{88}\). I will outline this model before concluding by making a comparison to the ‘analogizing transfer’\(^{89}\) Ricoeur wrote of in reference to forming understanding between hermeneutical readings between religions. I will find there a useful connection between the concept of analogy in Ricoeur and his intercultural hermeneutics. I will conclude with a reconstruction of the third and final model forgiveness, with a view to emphasising its link to future human action.

The exchange of memories as a plural reading

I begin by outlining Ricoeur’s model of memory exchanges, in the light of the work already established on translation. It is important to begin with the premise that memory is necessarily narrative. Ricoeur has argued that ‘a society where narrative is dead is one where men are no longer capable of exchanging their experiences, of sharing common experiences’\(^{90}\). Moreover, the difficulties of memory are difficulties of identity. In this way ‘the identity of a group, culture, people, or nation, is not that of an immutable substance, not that of a fixed structure, but rather that of a recounted story’\(^{91}\). That the story be recounted is significant because Ricoeur argues that the events themselves are not immediately accessible and demand plural perspectives. This is consistent with Ricoeur’s

\(^{88}\) P. Ricoeur, ‘Memory and Forgetting’, p. 6.


point regarding the polysemy of testimony and how this contributes to written history, as was discussed above in Chapter Four. However, in this article Ricoeur spells this point out regarding relationships within Europe. Specifically, we may have ‘several stories based on the same events’. Ricoeur continues that ‘this is what happens when we endeavour to take account of other people’s stories’\(^92\), especially if the history is one of conflict.

Ricoeur’s pursuit of the exchange of memory as a contribution to the European ethos is a move to the real history of political conquests, within a nation and beyond it. The way Ricoeur conceives of memory as contributive to identity emphasises the significance of how ‘entangled’ these narratives are. Stories do not grow in isolation, but are rather influenced by the stories of those around us, always already present: ‘I am who I am by birth and heritage’\(^93\). The link to European identity can be made by the reference by Ricoeur to self-identity ‘remains unfinished and open to the possibility of being recounted differently, and also of being recounted by others’\(^94\). This implies a further tension of identity and alterity in the stories that the self tells about herself. The stories of the self are entangled with those of the other. There is both an ‘entanglement of personal incidents’\(^95\) but also a polysemy in narrating these incidents. This is also articulated in the earlier essay on universal civilisation, in terms of what the concept of a universal humanity allows: ‘a shift in the attitude of mankind taken as a whole with regard to its own history’\(^96\). Ricoeur argued that ‘a growing number of men have the awareness of making their history’.

Ricoeur calls this ‘the first difference which calls for transference and hospitality’\(^97\) and as a result he is now couching this ‘entanglement’ in terms of the ethical obligation this represents. I have touched on this in Chapter Four in terms of writing history in response to the debt to the past, both in terms of the story of the other and the contribution that other has made to the present from which the historian writes. In Ricoeur’s terms, having


\(^{94}\) P. RICOEUR, ‘Asserting Personal Capabilities and Pleading for Mutual Recognition’ (Washington D.C., Library of Congress, 2006) this was Ricoeur’s acceptance speech for the Kluge Prize in 2006. A full transcript can be found at http://www.loc.gov/loc/kluge/prize/ricoeur-transcript.html


\(^{96}\) P. RICOEUR, ‘Universal Civilization and National Cultures’, p. 275.

\(^{97}\) Ibid.
translated, there is a 'further step: that of taking responsibility, in imagination and in sympathy for the story of the other, through the life narratives which concern that other'\textsuperscript{98}. Ricoeur broadens this personal encounter through the entangled nature of narration on a European scale, underlining a cultural memory of strife which a European ethos has to honour.

In this way Ricoeur draws in the concept of recognition, long before he submitted that idea to a concluding treatment in his final monograph, \textit{The Course of Recognition} in 2004. He concludes that in intercultural communication in Europe there is 'a genuine task, of a genuine labour, in which we could identify the \textit{Anerkennung} of German Idealism, that is, "recognition" considered in its narrative dimension'\textsuperscript{99}. This point shows the practical political relevance of the recognition owed to the other that I reconstructed in Chapter Two, and indicates the emphasis that Ricoeur places on the ethical significance of the exchange of memories, especially conflicting ones.

The responsibility requires that the self learns to tell the story of the other, 'in imagination and in sympathy'. This is ultimately a kind of revision, that is balanced by the willingness to have one's own story revised, in the entanglement with others. The culture itself must be willing to be 'recounted differently'\textsuperscript{100}. Garcia echoes Ricoeur's insights in his 1961 article when he suggests that 'it is no longer possible to adhere to a tradition without introducing into one's own allegiance a critical consciousness of its relativity with regard to other traditions'\textsuperscript{101}. However, it is again the 'protective withdrawal' that threatens this exchange. While 'the work of memory has to attend to the two poles of translation'\textsuperscript{102}, including the fear of not translating well, Ricoeur suggests that it is

'A rigid and arrogant conception of cultural identity [which] prevents us from perceiving the corollaries of this principle: the possibilities of revising every story which has been

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\textsuperscript{98} P. Ricoeur, 'A new ethos for Europe', pp. 6-7.
\textsuperscript{99} Ibid., p. 7.
\textsuperscript{100} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{101} L. M. Garcia, 'The Translation-Interpretation of Cultures', p. 75.
\textsuperscript{102} Ibid., p. 82.
handed down and of carving out a place for several stories directed towards the same past.  

In *On Translation* Ricoeur also noted that such a withdrawal could also be a fearful response to the stranger.

Ricoeur identifies the resistance against the possibility of revising one's understanding of history, or drawing in the other's understanding of that history to be related specifically to the 'founding events' of a culture. 'The repeated commemoration and celebration of which tend to freeze the history of each cultural group into an identity which is not only immutable but also deliberately and systematically incommunicable.' Moreover, Ricoeur has noted that 'most events to do with the founding of any community are acts and events of violence.' For example, the French Revolution, which includes violent memories within a nation. However, it is not solely as a better response to fear that Ricoeur’s model should be understood but as a process that may turn to help renew each culture.

Cultures are capable of self-renewal - in a way that technological progression cannot - a culture can renew its own narrative in response to the other culture. As early as 1978 Ricoeur has argued that 'just as languages are in principle translatable one into the other, so too myths have a horizon of universality which allows them to be understood by other culture.' These myths, as origin stories, also describe founding events. Ricoeur describes the outcome of this exchange as 'a new ethos is born of the understanding applied to the complex intertwining of new stories which structure and configure the crossroad between memories.' This crossroad is expressed in 'an effort of plural reading.' It is a cultural encounter which enables a culture’s renewal.

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104 Ibid.
108 Ibid.
In an earlier article Ricoeur argues that it ‘is an ethico-political problem because it has to do with the construction of the future’\textsuperscript{109}. Thus the refiguring of memory is not purely about developing an understanding of the past, but ‘an imperative directed toward the future’\textsuperscript{110}. Here refiguring the memory narratives of a culture connects past and future, where ‘tradition means transmission... such a transmission is a living one only if tradition continues to form a partnership with innovation’\textsuperscript{111}. This, he remarks, is ‘an unfathomable riddle’\textsuperscript{112}. Geffré makes the same point:

‘a tradition is alive only if it is still innovative. There is no such thing as historical awareness, that is responsible remembrance, without a compromise between our experience of the past and our expectations based on the ineluctable nature of the present’\textsuperscript{113}.

Indeed, it is Geffré who notes that European history already presents a ‘continuous series of rebirths: a movement of return to the origins for yet another re-appropriation of the past’\textsuperscript{114}.

The crossroad between memories that Ricoeur argues provides a lens for understanding this activity as refiguration in narrative. I noted in Chapter Four, that Ricoeur’s use of the Same, the Other, and the Analogous provided a useful hermeneutic approach to tradition that identified precisely this dialectic\textsuperscript{115}. Indeed, what is significant in reconstructing Ricoeur’s model of memory exchange is how strongly rooted it is already in his early work. Ricoeur opened the question of the exchange ‘at the level of the customs, rules, norms, beliefs and convictions which constitute the identity of a culture’\textsuperscript{116}. Garcia suggests that these are values that be understood in concrete terms, pointing to another early essay by Ricoeur: ‘the “concrete valorizations” that can be apprehended in the attitudes of human beings with regard to others “in work, property, power, temporal

\textsuperscript{109} P. RICOEUR, ‘Memory and Forgetting’, p. 9.

\textsuperscript{110} Ibid., p. 10.

\textsuperscript{111} P. RICOEUR, ‘A new ethos for Europe’, p. 8.

\textsuperscript{112} P. RICOEUR, ‘Universal Civilization and National Cultures’ p. 280.


\textsuperscript{114} Ibid., p. 28

\textsuperscript{115} c.f. 4.2. above.

\textsuperscript{116} P. RICOEUR, ‘A new ethos for Europe’, pp. 5-6.
experience, etc.‘’ 117. Another articulation is that values ‘reside in the concrete attitudes’ 118. What this means is that how persons of the cultures in question behave and how they think about these actions is informed by the underlying symbolic resources informing self-understanding. Memory history shapes action.

Future action is thus made explicitly a response to past action, as indicated in the self-identity of persons in their cultural narratives ‘reinforced by the exchange of cultural memories’ 119. Most significantly, Ricoeur argued that in terms of the exchange of memory, ‘we are witnessing the advance onto the world scene of great human masses who were heretofore silent and downtrodden’ 120. This is a core idea for Ricoeur, that each culture has to renew itself by going back to its previous hopes, which came to pass only partly or not at all. While there is a debt to the past, ‘the burden of expectation’ 121 must be released in order to go on in a revitalised way, through the reinterpretation of the tradition.

There is a connection here with Ricoeur’s biblical interpretation, made explicit by Ricoeur in this expression: ‘the past is a cemetery of promises which have not been kept. It is a matter of bringing them back to life like the dry bones in the valley described in the prophecy of Ezekiel (Ch. 37)’ 122.

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118 P. RICOEUR, ‘Universal Civilization and National Cultures’ p. 279.

119 Ibid.

120 P. RICOEUR, ‘Universal Civilization and National Cultures’ p. 276 - in 1961 this was written in an era of many declarations of independence as many African territories emerged from their post-WWII periods as UN Trust Territories. For example, Ghana was formed on 6th March 1957 from British Togoland and the Gold Coast; French Togoland became the independent country of Togo on 27th April 1960; the Belgian Congo became the République du Congo on June 30th 1960; the French Cameroons became the Republic of Cameroon 1st January 1961, joined by part of former British Cameroon on 1st October 1961. The other part of former British Cameroon became part of Nigeria on 31st May 1961, after Nigeria itself was declared independent on 1st October 1961. Tanganyika was granted independence in the same year, 9th December, becoming Tanzania in 1964. In addition, and unrelated to the UN Trust Territory process, the Algerian War, or the Algerian Revolution, was ongoing from 1954 until 1962.


122 P. RICOEUR, ‘A new ethos for Europe’, pp. 8-9, c.f. ‘Sentinel of Imminence’ pp. 165-86 in A. LACOCQUE, P. RICOEUR, Thinking Biblically. Exegetical and Hermeneutical Studies, tr. D. Pellauer (Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1998). In my view this chapter in Thinking Biblically particularly emphasises the value of considering refiguration as itself a plural process - there is no one correct way to understand a tradition, but plural and exchanging reinterpretations.
This emphasis on future action explain why Ricoeur so strongly emphasises the underlying nature of cultural self-understanding and the need for renewal. While not focused on memory exchange, Ricoeur’s 1961 essay does indicate an example of this in the light of a cultural reappraisal.

‘Among the attitudes which interest us here, the most important are those concerning tradition, change, our behaviour toward our fellow-citizens and foreigners, and more specially the use of available tools... these valorizing attitudes decide upon the meaning of the tools themselves... The very abundance of slave-trading does not by itself constitute a purely technical explanation, because the brute fact of disposing of slaves must in addition be valorized in some way or another. If they did not bother to substitute machines for manpower, it is because the value had not been formulated”.

This is an excellent articulation of subsequent reappraisals of a culture, in the light of the possibilities missed. It also emphasises the need for a new impulse in order to renew, here from the Jewish and Christian priority of liberation, justice and charity. It is important for ethics that the linking of the possibility for action to the prior level of cultural resources be emphasised in this way. Ricoeur argues for conducting ‘our research up to the stable images and the permanent dreams that make up a nation’s cultural resources and which feed its spontaneous judgments and its least elaborated reactions regarding experienced situations’

However, before I turn to consider this final model, I will make a brief comparison with memory exchange as I have reconstructed it above with Ricoeur’s work on the phenomenology of religion in an effort to connect this chapter with my ongoing focus on analogy.

A comparison with Ricoeur’s ‘analogizing transfer’ between religions

Here I want to make a comparison with the work of Ricoeur on the phenomenology of religion. I indicated at the end of Chapter Four that Ricoeur referred to a kind of

123 P. RICOEUR, ‘Universal Civilization and National Cultures’ p. 279.
124 Ibid., p. 280.
‘analogizing transfer’ when seeking to understand religious traditions, rejecting a universal or objective position. It is through this analogizing move that Ricoeur suggests one may understand one’s own tradition as one amongst others. I make a comparison between what Ricoeur proposes in this inter-religious context with the exchange of memories he has established for European integration.

It is in an article on the phenomenology of religion that Ricoeur makes the point that one can never see religious traditions with an objective view: ‘we must renounce the idea of creating a phenomenology of the religious phenomenon taken in its indivisible universality’\(^{125}\). As I noted in Chapter Four, Ricoeur compares religious traditions to languages, but continues that ‘to the linguistic mediation a cultural and historical mediation is added, of which the former is a mere reflection’\(^{126}\). What this means is that the only approach is through a hermeneutic of the texts at the heart of the religion. For example, Ricoeur places himself ‘within the limits of Jewish and Christian Scripture’\(^{127}\). Marianne Moyaert has written on the question of inter-religious dialogue in terms of Ricoeur’s themes of identity and alterity. She emphasises Ricoeur’s explanation of belonging to a religious tradition as ‘an accident transformed in destination through a continuous choice’\(^{128}\). Moyaert suggests that this places religious identity within the ‘involuntary’\(^{129}\).

This necessarily hermeneutical approach means that Ricoeur rejects a comparative study of religion and suggests that to understand that tradition ‘the listener is not being asked to adhere explicitly to the convictions proper to the Jewish or Christian use of the terms Word

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\(^{126}\) P. RICOEUR, ‘Experience and Language in Religious Discourse’, p. 130.

\(^{127}\) Ibid., p. 131.

\(^{128}\) P. RICOEUR, *Vivant jusqu'à la mort*, p. 99.

\(^{129}\) M. MOYAERT (Leuven, 2008), conference paper.
and Scriptures, but to assume them with imagination and with sympathy\textsuperscript{130}. To draw a broader point between religions from this hermeneutical exchange is to undergo 'a process of analogizing transfer'\textsuperscript{131}. This is conducted from one's own stance. To retain the linguistic model, 'to belong to a religious tradition is to belong to a language'\textsuperscript{132} and thus one always translates in relation to one's single mother tongue. Ricoeur continues 'it is not the relative character of religious adherence which stands but rather faith as absolute, not interchangeable, and incomparable'\textsuperscript{133}. The transfer by analogy is therefore not a straightforward comparison from a neutral stance but indicates a simultaneous recognition of sameness and difference. That religion is like mine - it is not radically and totally strange - but in a plurality of religions, there are differences. Moyaert remarks that Ricoeur is aiming at 'the right balance between both proximity and distance, thus aiming at an interconnectedness that is not at the expense of differences'\textsuperscript{134}.

I argue that this is the final proof of the relevance of the category of analogy for intercultural hermeneutics. Moreover, I want to make an important connection here with the models of discourse in Europe Ricoeur builds. When speaking of religious traditions Ricoeur builds on a linguistic mediation between religions with a more complex hermeneutical approach to cultural and historical mediation. Specifically this is to be undertaken with 'imagination and sympathy'. This is exactly the language Ricoeur uses to express how the exchange of memories should be approached. I reiterate: beyond translation there is a 'further step: that of taking responsibility, in imagination and in sympathy for the story of the other, through the life narratives which concern that other'\textsuperscript{135}.

\textsuperscript{130} P. RICOEUR, 'Experience and Language in Religious Discourse', p. 131.

\textsuperscript{131} Ibid., p. 131.

\textsuperscript{132} P. RICOEUR, \textit{Critique and Conviction}, p. 145.

\textsuperscript{133} P. RICOEUR, \textit{Vivant jusqu'à la mort}, p. 102.


\textsuperscript{135} P. RICOEUR, 'A new ethos for Europe', pp. 6-7.
I also emphasised in Chapter Four that reaching a representation of the history of the other in response to testimony, was to be done through the lenses of the Same, the Other and the Analogous. The historian cannot reach the event, nor can the European culture fully understand the other, nor can the religious person fully inhabit another religious tradition while adhering to their own. The religious testimony is particular and polyphonic. Thus, in the same way that one stands within one’s own tradition and sees the other through an ‘analogizing transfer’, the exchange of memories calls one to listen to a history that is not one’s own. I therefore make a direct connection between the analogizing transfer between religions, in imagination and sympathy, and the models of exchange Ricoeur describes for European communication.

I note that the encounter between memory cultures was, for Ricoeur, an inherently productive one, leading to a better self-understanding, critical reappraisal and consideration for the other in the future as a response to failed promises of the past. In this way analogical thinking in intercultural hermeneutics also reflects its theological origin as a way of continually seeking a richer way of articulating God, as the Other. Analogy is itself always an incomplete procedure. I recall then, the highlighting by the exchange of memories of the unfulfilled promises of the past, and turn to the final model in Ricoeur’s Europe article: forgiveness.

**Forgiveness in the face of unfulfilled promises**

In that article, Ricoeur concludes with the third model of forgiveness: I note three key characteristics, that forgiveness springs from a mutual recognition of suffering, that forgiveness as forgetting is to be rejected, and that forgiveness is directed toward the ethical summons of the other in terms of future action.

The need for Ricoeur to conclude his article with his third and final model, forgiveness, is due to the irreversibility of past historical actions. If the conclusion of the model of memory is future action, forgiveness becomes the new model when past actions have not fulfilled the promise to recognise the other. Forgiveness caps the previous two models by
supplying a ‘revision of the past’\textsuperscript{136}, not in the sense of what happened, but in terms of the burden it represents. This is an effort of plural reading, ‘in which we are able to see the most valuable yield of the exchange of memories’\textsuperscript{137}. What is added here is the ‘following complement: that of understanding the suffering of others in the past and in the present’\textsuperscript{138}. Thus is the nature of the plurality found plainly in the account of suffering, as it is both endured and inflicted. ‘The history of Europe is cruel... the litany is without end’\textsuperscript{139}.

Forgiveness is introduced as an unnecessary, free response to the other. This signals continuity with the work pursued under the models of translation and memory: In Ricoeur’s view what prompted the histories of enmity, ‘was the perverse recourse to a narrative identity which is devoid of the important correctives already noted, namely the examination of one’s own stories and the entanglement of our stories with the stories of others’\textsuperscript{140}. On this point therefore, although he does not discuss it in these terms under his models for Europe, Ricoeur also notes that ‘to hear the anger of other people forces us to confront our wrongdoings, which is the first step toward forgiveness’\textsuperscript{141}. Forgiveness as a response, after a betrayal, requires something ‘extra’: according to Ricoeur: ‘Forgiveness falls within the scope of an economy of the gift whose logic of superabundance exceeds the logic of reciprocity’\textsuperscript{142}. Again, there is a clear link both to his earlier work, e.g., in ‘Love and Justice’\textsuperscript{143} and to Ricoeur’s later works The Course of Recognition which charted the logic of the gift so fully, reconstructed in Chapter Two\textsuperscript{144}, and the epilogue of Memory, History, Forgetting, not dealt with in this thesis, but focused entirely on the concept of forgiveness\textsuperscript{145}. In that text again, forgiveness was dealt with as an “extra” to the

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{137} Ibid.
\bibitem{138} Ibid., p. 10.
\bibitem{139} Ibid., p. 9.
\bibitem{140} Ibid., pp. 9-10.
\bibitem{141} P Ricoeur, ‘Imagination, Testimony and Trust’ pp. 12-17 in R. Kearney, M. Dooley (eds.), Questioning Ethics, p. 17. This is discussed more fully in the epilogue to Memory, History, Forgetting.
\bibitem{143} Originally published as Amour et Justice (Tubingen, J. Mohr, 1990)
\bibitem{145} P. Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, pp. 457-506.
\end{thebibliography}

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main theme, only possible to introduce as a kind of “eschatology.” This is in contrast to Arendt’s understanding of forgiveness as another human capability - Ricoeur sees forgiveness as possible only in the sense that it is already there: ‘In the epilogue, the givenness of forgiveness enables subjects to avail of it'\textsuperscript{146}.

In this Europe article forgiveness is not a corrective to justice. Justice is not ignored but must remain the necessary just reciprocal consideration of past actions. What forgiveness can do is instead ‘move it to pity'\textsuperscript{147}. Ricoeur argues that ‘forgiveness is the best way of shattering the debt, and thus of lifting impediments to the practice of justice and recognition’\textsuperscript{148}. It is intended to enable justice, in the light of genuine recognition of the other: Ricoeur elaborates:

‘it is necessary in reality that the peoples of Europe show compassion for each other, imagining - I repeat - the suffering of others just as they are about to call for vengeance for those injuries which have been inflicted upon them in the past’\textsuperscript{149}.

Also, as Sorin Antohi noted during his interview of Ricoeur, this is also ‘the work of mutual recognition... recognition of what the other has loss [sic] in his turn. One must see that the other has lost too, that loss is shared’\textsuperscript{150}. This presents another who has suffered for whom the self is called to show compassion. This link with another person shows that the suffering of the self is not unique and so posits that the one who inflicted the suffering might be forgiven through the same imaginative sympathy.

This is also not a move to forgetfulness. The operation of forgiveness is dependent on seeing ‘the offender attain full understanding of this crimes’\textsuperscript{151} and ‘must be grafted on to the work of memory in the language of narration’\textsuperscript{152}. In this way Ricoeur identifies


\textsuperscript{147} P. RICOEUR, ‘A new ethos for Europe’, p. 10.

\textsuperscript{148} Ibid., p. 12.

\textsuperscript{149} Ibid., p. 11.


\textsuperscript{151} P. RICOEUR, ‘A new ethos for Europe’, p. 10.

\textsuperscript{152} Ibid.
forgiveness as part of the 'poetics of the moral life... the sense of creativity at the level of dynamics of acting and the sense of song and hymn at the level of verbal expression'\textsuperscript{153}. It is therefore no surprise that in terms of the execution of forgiveness, Ricoeur points to particular symbolic actions: 'Willy Brandt kneeling at Warsaw... Václav Havel writing to the President of the Federal Republic of Germany in order to seek forgiveness for the sufferings inflicted upon the Sudeten Germans after the Second World War'\textsuperscript{154}. In a later interview in Budapest, focusing on his later work \textit{Memory, History, Forgetting}, Ricoeur made this additional remark: 'can the logic of excess, which defines forgiveness, penetrate the logic of equivalence that defines justice? The answer is yes, but on matters that can only be symbolical'\textsuperscript{155}. However, these examples not only express the need for symbolic action but also retain the link to the political sphere, indicating 'that a common path may be forged beyond the refusal of mutual recognition'\textsuperscript{156}.

Moreover, just as Ricoeur's work on tolerance noted the genuine possibility of the intolerable which must be confronted, there is also the instance of the unforgiveable. Such an action cannot be tolerated, out of imaginative sympathy with the victims. Ricoeur is concerned with how this might be employed however - when? in what name? He eventually gives a conclusion consistent with the moral norm of \textit{Oneself as Another}. The self is called to refuse to tolerate those actions which create 'indignation'\textsuperscript{157}. For example, in practical terms, speaking of war crimes Ricoeur suggests 'that certain crimes should not be subjects to statutes of limitation...because these crimes themselves have long-lasting effects. Moreover, those guilty of such crimes have time on their side'\textsuperscript{158}.

Ricoeur points in the Europe article to the influence of Hans Jonas's idea of a heuristic of indignation, which seeks out the 'last bastion of a common morality in ruins'\textsuperscript{159}. The intolerable or unforgiveable has a similar affect to forgiveness; As forgiveness cuts through

\textsuperscript{153} P. Ricoeur, 'A new ethos for Europe', p. 10.
\textsuperscript{154} Ibid., p. 11.
\textsuperscript{155} P. Ricoeur, S. Antohi, 'Memory, History, Forgiveness', p. 9.
\textsuperscript{156} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{157} P. Ricoeur, 'The Erosion of Tolerance', p. 197.
\textsuperscript{158} P. Ricoeur, S. Antohi, 'Memory, History, Forgiveness', p. 10.
\textsuperscript{159} P. Ricoeur, 'The Erosion of Tolerance', p. 199.
and inspires the discourse of justice, the intolerable activity inspires indignation such that it ‘breaks the dominant apathy of a society’. Indignation is answered by a recognition of responsibility with regard to the fragile in its multiple forms, deploying itself on the horizon of the planetary environment. Ultimately, the three models of mediation work toward furthering the recognition of this responsibility and its pursuit in action. Ricoeur proposes working ‘between the virtuous anger of indignation and a return to the forgotten roots of our culture’. This is supplied by precisely the models reconstructed above. I noted above that Ricoeur characterised their contribution in terms of an ethos or the political imagination. Here he recasts it as a ‘moral refounding of democracy’ from the intersecting traditions within European history, secular and religious. Ricoeur continues:

‘This re-founding could only be multiple and proceed by crossed heritages. If indignation didn’t result in such a work on oneself, at the end of which our multiple traditions would recognize themselves as cofounders of a same will to live together, these would risk arming the arm of righter-of-wrongs.

Indignation, as discussed in Chapter Two in particular, is a universal moral capacity. In response to this concrete traditions may be able to renew the ‘will to live together’ through renewing and strengthening the social bond rather than a contract founded by selfinterested individuals. In this way the models of European refiguration of translation, exchange of memory, and forgiveness supply the mediation of crossed heritages. By employing these models Ricoeur places the work of intercultural dialogue within Europe in the light of both past and future action, with an acknowledgement of the complexities and the value of capably pursuing understanding of the other within the context of plurality. Most significant is an insight from Jean Greisch who emphasises that by seeking to recount oneself in Europe differently, this is an ongoing change to one’s way of thinking - an interpretation that has genuine possibilities for the future, in one’s own life.

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161 Ibid., p. 199.
162 Ibid., p. 200.
163 Ibid.
164 Ibid.
I return to Ricoeur's early essay on universal and national ties to explore those genuine possibilities. In one sense, a universal civilisation is an expression of a cosmopolitan awareness of the unity of the human race. In his view the positives to be gained from understanding oneself and others in term of a universal civilisation are that 'a sort of mutual recognition of men arises in the midst of all these phenomena. The multiplication of human relationships makes mankind a more and more compact network more and more interdependent'\textsuperscript{166}. This moves into the practical realm - what Honneth discussed in terms of the struggle for recognition as I reconstruct in Chapter Two - when Ricoeur argues that 'universal civilization is good because it represents the availability of elementary possessions to the masses of humanity'\textsuperscript{167}. This is what Ricoeur means in terms of pursuing the universal in order to allow all persons access to the progress it represents. The technical progression, already part of Ricoeur's analysis in 1961, can impact concretely on the recognition of the person.

It is within the context of Ricoeur's understanding of the person in terms of her capacities that the models of a European ethos, translation, exchange of memory, and forgiveness are crucial. The reason for this is what Ricoeur had been emphasising through the 1961 essay, that the change to consider mankind as a unity rather than a collection does impact on its plurality. The Europe example is of particular use in highlighting how this encounter with diversity can be both a danger and an opportunity for self-understanding and critique. The models Ricoeur proposes for emphasising the opportunities, with the tensions that accompany them, make sense as an instance of practical wisdom in the context of intercultural dialogue. They provide a re-articulation - a hermeneutics - of the European civic imagination and in doing so motivate and form the activity of citizens and groups. Having reconstructed the detailed re-articulation, I can now also consolidate the impact these models may have on such activity. They may be best characterised, respectively, as hospitality in translation, exchange and dialogue of memory narratives, and promises of future action in the light of necessary forgiveness. This ultimately consolidates Ricoeur's work on conceiving Europe and the encounter with civilisations as an ethical undertaking through a hermeneutical detour of translation.

\textsuperscript{166} P. \textsc{Ricoeur}, 'Universal Civilization and National Cultures' p. 275.

\textsuperscript{167} Ibid.
This leads me to emphasise again, as I have emphasised throughout this chapter, the way in which these models are rooted in the work already accomplished by Ricoeur at that time; they foreshadowed many of the themes that would become particularly significant in his later work. I will briefly mention some of these connections, before looking in more detail at those related to my reconstruction of Ricoeur’s view on and use of analogy in particular.

The works I have reconstructed in this current chapter only make sense as a labour of practical wisdom in the context of the concept of the human person Ricoeur established in *Oneself as Another*. This itself already relies on the notion of narrative identity, rooted in the work in *Time and Narrative* on how events may be expressed. The human person reflexively owns this narrative identity by their own capacity for narration, where the self is the one who speaks, who acts, who narrates, who imputes action. These capacities extend further in other parts of Ricoeur’s work: the self can interpret narration (*Naming God, Thinking Biblically, and Memory, History, Forgetting*), she can remember and narrate the past (*Memory, History, Forgetting*). These capacities of personhood also lead Ricoeur to an ethical attitude toward others - that one can trust their testimony and still approach the discussion of that testimony with a critical attitude, realising the critical solicitude that I reconstructed in Chapter Two above. This self is already oriented toward the other at the ethical level of striving. This premise underlies the work Ricoeur now proposes under the names of translation, memory exchange, and forgiveness.

Ricoeur posits these models for Europe with no expectation that they may be completed. This is expressed most clearly in his emphasis on stories of the suffering and the eschatological nature of forgiveness. The intercultural encounter will always be ongoing. When speaking of external European encounters, Ricoeur remarked that ‘this encounter with other cultural traditions has been just as great a test for our culture and one from which we have not yet drawn all the consequences’\(^{168}\). The reason that the encounter between Europe and other traditions has been so difficult, he goes on to suggest, is the ‘illusion that European culture was, in fact and by right, a universal culture’\(^{169}\). Ricoeur had in mind particularly the relationships that are still being ‘unfurled’ in the light of narrative about the colonial past. It is in this way that Ricoeur reminds the European of her

\(^{168}\) P. RICOEUR, ‘Universal Civilization and National Cultures’ p. 277.

\(^{169}\) Ibid.
own diversity and a global diversity, that is later expressed in the entanglement of memory narratives. However, I recall, that just as translation tested the desire for the other, it also reveals that desire for the other in the ongoing work to translate - diversity is a positive character of human existence.

It is in the ongoing nature of these models of thinking about and acting toward the other that prompts me to map a particular series of interconnections here in order to return to my argument in Chapters Three and Four regarding the significance of analogical language for Ricoeur's intercultural hermeneutics. The reconstructions I made in Chapter Four were of those aspects of Ricoeur's work where I found his changing view on analogical language, and specifically what may be made of Aquinas's perspective on it. I want to make the connections between these texts - on biblical interpretation and epistemological issues with writing history - and the reconstructions in this chapter above in order to clarify how analogy may contribute to hermeneutics of intercultural encounters. Chapter Three, which discussed modern commentary on Aquinas that provided an alternative to Ricoeur's early, negative view will contribute here to show how the concept of analogy may impact on ethical action. However, before I turn to this final outline it is important for me to discuss more generally the relationship between philosophy and theology in Ricoeur. Specifically, I want to examine the views of Dietmar Mieth and Christof Mandry regarding how Ricoeur has kept these spheres of discourse distinct but still contributed to theology using his philosophical position. This will allow me to contextualise the possible contribution of theological understandings of analogy, while acknowledging how Ricoeur has used and been of benefit to theological discourse during his work.

5.3. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY IN RICOEUR'S WORK

At the close of enquiries into Ricoeur's discussion of the term analogy in different stages and contexts of his work, one question that has been postponed should be treated. I have already noted in Chapter Three the caution with which Ricoeur has handled theology as a discipline; The issue of the use of Ricoeur's work in theology has been addressed by Dietmar Mieth, the German theological ethicist, during a conference discussion with Ricoeur. Mieth outlines his view that theologians need to reflect on the concepts they use, and make them explicit 'you cannot do theology without philosophical control of your
philosophy. If you do theology you always need a philosophy, maybe there is a kind of unknown or traditional philosophy whether you acknowledge it or not". He continues that for theologians to provide checks on both discourses and their use together 'theologians need a philosophical understanding in order to be able to reflect on the methods'. Mieth praises Ricoeur for providing this kind of clarity for theologians, in particular because he uses ordinary language in a methodically reflected philosophical way, unlike other philosophers: 'you cannot create a jargon with Paul Ricoeur'; one must instead carefully reflect on the philosophical basis provided.

Mieth goes on to outline some of the contributions which Ricoeur have given theology in this way. He points to the discussions in the 1970s 'about the reception of structuralism in hermeneutics', which I reconstructed in Chapter One. He continues, Ricoeur 'helped us in the 1980s when narrative theology was on the rise and also with narrative ethics. He gave us a solid philosophical basis for developing this kind of reflection'.

I can add to this reception over five decades by making some brief references to the current response to the relationship between philosophy and theology in the work of Paul Ricoeur. As recently as 2001 Dan Stiver suggested that Ricoeur's philosophy 'is still relatively untapped by theologians'. Stiver attributed this to the difficulty of seeing Ricoeur's work as a coherent whole 'until the emergence of more recent material by him and about him'. It is in the light of this perhaps that means I have been able to employ the work of theologians on Ricoeur throughout this thesis. Regardless, I have pointed to some examples where scholars are using Ricoeur's work to develop their theology. A very


171 Ibid.

172 Ibid.

173 Ibid., p. 207.

174 Ibid.


176 Ibid.

177 The establishment of the FondsRicoeur as a physical centre in Paris may have impacted on the profile of Ricoeur studies and improved the capacity for scholars from different fields to respond to his work.
recent example has come from the American theologian Boyd Blundell who suggests that methodologically, theology itself follows the critical detour and return which Ricoeur employs. Blundell approaches the theological impact of Ricoeur in the context of his concern to take forward questions of the integrity and relevance of theology together. These are broad projects of overview. To the more specific commentators and responses to Ricoeur which I have used throughout I would add an example of how theologians are using aspects of Ricoeur’s work, as exemplified by Mieth, whose remark opened this section.

In domain-specific ethics, where Mieth asks whether Ricoeur’s work on memory of ‘the foundation and on the application of the regulation and the continuity with which we live’ can be used to help clarify a theological ethical response to emerging technologies, such as bioethics. Ricoeur’s response was that ‘theologians have not found the proper level’ to enter the discourse, but agrees that, in particular, ‘re-constructed memory... had an immediate impact in the discussion of bioethics’. Hiller Haker, who I used so extensively as a commentator on Ricoeur in Chapter One, has pursued these ethical issues in the European context in two ways: in terms of striving for identity, and in terms of applied ethics.

Christof Mandry offers an analysis of Ricoeur’s position in his own article on the distinction between philosophy and theology in Ricoeur’s work. Mandry points to Oneself as Another as supplying ‘a phenomenology of self that serves, in a certain way, as a system

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178 B. BLUNDELL, Paul Ricoeur Between Philosophy and Theology: Detour and Return (Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 2010).


180 Ricoeur himself refers to the impact of the memory of Nazi experiments on legal norms in European Conventions on bioethics. Specifically, he indicated that ‘the Germans have a specific role in this situation because of their “wounded memory”’. And before the claims of the experts and also the excesses of those who would claim and try to manipulate humans, you have the sensibility for finding the proper role’ (Ibid., p. 208, P. Ricoeur). There is now the particular challenge is the ‘new generation for which the problem is not the confrontation between the victim and perpetrator but precisely between those who now have the memory of that’ (Ibid.).

181 Ibid., p. 208 (D. Mieth).

182 There are extensive references in German, but I point to a recent English example H. HAKER, ‘Narrative Bioethics’ pp. 353-376 in C. REHMANN-SUTTER, M. DUWELL, D. MIETH (eds.) Bioethics in Cultural Contexts (New York, Springer, 2006).
of coordinates for the self-understanding of the religious subject in faith. Specifically Mandry has in mind the 'structure of call and answer'. This describes self-constancy of the self in the face of the other and what Mandry calls the 'the given institution, let it be called the word, tradition, or scripture, to refer to its complex hermeneutical status, and the self in front of this institution'. The theme of the 'summoned self' originated in the Gifford Lectures, most of which became Oneself as Another. What should be emphasised here is the ethical emphasis of the summons. The promise-maker is held to his word, but in the biblical texts he is also summoned to love his neighbour, in the character of a 'supplication'. Mandry suggests that, in the light of his analysis of the self and the other as in an always already ongoing ethical relationship, the distinction between philosophical and theological analysis should be seen 'as a distinction between the general and the particular'. A religious self-understanding is a concretization of the general anthropological concept of the self that Ricoeur has explored since the 1950s.

In this way philosophy can elucidate the general structure which a person of faith expresses in a particular way, where each faith expresses its core in 'culturally contingent terms'. In fact all such responses are culturally contingent, but Ricoeur is aiming at 'an autonomous philosophical discourse' in terms of argumentation, rather than a culturalist view of philosophy. I want to continue with Mandry's analysis of this and include some brief remarks made by Ricoeur at various points about his own projects.

Mandry forms this conclusion in contrast to Ricoeur's declared intention to pragmatically divide his 'autonomous' philosophy from his writings on biblical texts. Ricoeur has spoken about a deliberate strategy to distinguish his philosophical work from his biblical interpretations 'because I was under the pressure of the atheistic trend of French

183 C. MANDRY, 'The Relationship between Philosophy and Theology in the Recent Work of Paul Ricoeur' pp. 63-77 in M JUNKER-KENNY, P. KENNY (eds.), Memory, Narrativity, Self and the Challenge to Think God, p. 64.

184 Ibid., p. 68.

185 Ibid.


189 An example of this approach would be John Rawls on cosmopolitanism.
philosophy. I had to permanently justify my existence saying that I was not a "crypto-
theologian". However, he goes on to say that there was a distinction in argumentation
in his work from why he pursues that work: 'I am ready to agree that there is a strong
religious motivation even in my philosophical work... surely motivated by religious and
Christian presuppositions that the ego and even the self is not the last word'.

This is not a purely political choice in the specific intellectual climate of these decades in
France, however. Moreover, although also in Oneself as Another Ricoeur may be making
distinctions on particularity, Mandry also notes that when examining his work, Ricoeur had
'a rather negative understanding of theology'. Ricoeur has distinguished between
philosophical methods with regard to faith. In 1974, a year before the publication of The
Rule of Metaphor, Ricoeur wrote an article on religious language. He outlined the
philosophical response to different kinds of religious language and emphasised the
different approaches of his own hermeneutical approach and what he calls speculative
theology. This latter considers second-order theological statements, such as God exists:

'At this level religious discourse is reinterpreted in conceptual terms with the help of
speculative philosophy. A hermeneutical philosophy, on the contrary, will try to get as
close as possible to the most originary expressions of a community of faith, to those
expressions through which the members of this community have interpreted their
experience for the sake of themselves or for others' sake'.

A further remark describing religious discourse that has employed speculative philosophy
shows Ricoeur's evaluation of this approach. The philosopher 'discovers fragments
borrowed from his own discourse and the travesty of this discourse that results from its
authoritarian and opaque use'. In The Rule of Metaphor Ricoeur rejected Aquinas's
view of analogy on just these grounds of a confusion of discourses. Mandry adds that
speculative theology is rendered 'insensitive for the sense of the genuine biblical

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190 P. Ricoeur and questioners - 'Roundtable Discussion', p. 203 (P. Ricoeur).
191 Ibid.
192 C. Mandry, 'The Relationship between Philosophy and Theology', p. 64.
193 P. Ricoeur, 'Philosophy and Religious Language' pp 71-85 in Journal of Religion 54 (Chicago,
194 P. Ricoeur, 'Toward a Hermeneutic of the Idea of Revelation' in his own Essays on Biblical Interpretation
project'\textsuperscript{195}, which Ricoeur prioritises. ‘In consequence, the philosopher’s partner for a debate is not the theologian, but the informed believer interested in understanding himself better’\textsuperscript{196}.

It is certainly evident from Ricoeur’s work during this period, reconstructed in this thesis in Chapter Three, that Ricoeur’s focus was on the central scriptural texts and their interpretation. Even his remarks in the Dublin conference, describing his religious motivation, follow this emphasis: ‘it is not by chance that I was interested in narrative because of the role of narrative in the bible’\textsuperscript{197}.

However, Mieth’s remark is critical of this position, as cutting out theology and focusing on religious expression. I agree with this stance, but have been able to argue in Chapter Four that Ricoeur shifts in his approach to ‘theological statements, in the sense of metaphysical speculative theology’\textsuperscript{198}. I repeat here his remark from the same conference in response to Werner Jeanrond’s paper pointing to ‘Thinking Biblically, where I have tried precisely to develop the speculative possibilities of some biblical texts’\textsuperscript{199}. While Ricoeur’s response to ultimately as a philosopher, he does theology in the reflective task regarding these ‘originary expressions of a faith’.

This is a point made more strongly during a later interview. He argues that ‘the tendency of modern French thought to eclipse the Middle Ages has prevented us from acknowledging certain very rich attempts to think God and being in terms of each other. I no longer consider such conceptual asceticism tenable’\textsuperscript{200}. The door is opened then, not just for the philosophical clarity of Ricoeur’s work to aid theologians in their task of giving account of their faith tradition in relation to contemporary cultural reflection, seeking to contribute on the level of argumentation. Mieth puts it in this way: ‘it is not only theology

\textsuperscript{195} C. MANDRY, ‘The Relationship between Philosophy and Theology’, p. 66.
\textsuperscript{196} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{197} P. RICOEUR and questioners - ‘Roundtable Discussion’ p. 203.
\textsuperscript{198} P. RICOEUR, ‘Philosophy and Religious Language’, p. 73.
\textsuperscript{199} P. RICOEUR, ‘Ricoeur Comments after Jeanrond’s “Hermeneutics and Revelation”’, pp. 58-61 in M JUNKER-KENNY, P. KENNY (eds.), Memory, Narrativity, Self and the Challenge to Think God, p. 58
that checks philosophy within theology, you also need checks on the philosophy employed\(^{201}\).

While Ricoeur does not employ theology as a corrective in the way this implies, since he himself is not a theologian, he does acknowledge himself to be 'more watchful for the intersections'\(^{202}\). Mandry suggests one such in the meeting between love and justice. He reconstructs Ricoeur's connection between philosophy and theology on this point as between justice and love: 'because the commandment of love is part of the cultural deposit, of the convictions of Western society, it does in fact influence the interpretation of justice\(^{203}\). Conviction is principle and particular insight combined, here of a religious origin. This monotheistic origin is made clear when in many texts, including in *The Course of Recognition*, Ricoeur refers to the climax of his examination of gift-giving with the term *agape*\(^{204}\), as the core description of the NT’s understanding of God.

There are other such examples that link to theological discourse before the Christian text, that Ricoeur himself deliberately links with philosophical discourse. Antohi points to forgiveness as one such, 'this is a very difficult problematic to understand for those who lack a theological culture, not simply a moral, ethical or philosophical culture, but at least a kind of theological openness'\(^{205}\). Ricoeur does not answer this immediately, but later in the dialogue returns to the point via his reference to his own 'very frequent allusions to Greek tragedy'\(^{206}\). Ricoeur places forgiveness in the context of the narrative:

'Think of Patroclos, the pain of Hector, and the final reconciliation around Priam and the funeral pyre, when the enemy is finally reconciled with the enemy. There occurs, one could say, a kind of mutual forgiving. The word is not uttered, but it does not matter. There is here a kind of quieting down... Tragedy is a kind of reconciliation'\(^{207}\).

\(^{201}\) P. Ricoeur and questioners - ‘Roundtable Discussion’ p. 207 (D. Mieth).

\(^{202}\) Ibid., p. 203 (P. Ricoeur)

\(^{203}\) C. Mandry, ‘The Relationship between Philosophy and Theology’, p. 75n37.

\(^{204}\) A. Daughton, ‘Ricoeur, Mutual Recognition and Agape: Theological Contributions to Peace’ in *Studying Faith, Practising Peace* (Irish Peace Centres with EU Peace III, 2010).


\(^{206}\) Ibid., p. 21.

\(^{207}\) Ibid.
He continues by insisting that ‘I do not want to mobilize and hold forgiveness captive. There are many synonyms’\(^{208}\). Ricoeur is responding here to Antohi’s concern that forgiveness is not a category available to the non-religious. However, it is clear from his systematic introduction of the topic in *Memory, History, Forgetting* that there is an important and unique contribution to be made from Christian sources. Ricoeur points to the apparent reciprocity of the Golden Rule, but considers the love at the heart of the Gospel to criticise even this; a criticism ‘radicalized: the absolute measure of the gift is the love of one’s enemies’\(^ {209}\). He refers to Luke 6:32-35: ‘If you love only those who love you, what credit is that to you? Even sinners love those who love them... But you must love your enemies and do good; and lend without expecting any return’. Ricoeur remarks that ‘this impossible commandment seems to be the only one to match the height of the spirit of forgiveness’\(^ {210}\). It is clear what impact this has had on Ricoeur’s own expression of the economy of the gift as superabundance: ‘the Gospels do this by giving to the gift a measure of “extravangance” that ordinary acts of generosity can only approach from afar’\(^ {211}\).

4. THE CONTRIBUTION OF ANALOGY TO INTERCULTURAL HERMENEUTICS

I turn then to my final example of analogical language as a possible contribution to Ricoeur’s intercultural hermeneutics reconstructed in this chapter. As I do so, I can identify its possible role in terms of both Ricoeur’s changing view on the value of a systematic theology that is more than first order reflection, and his impact on theology by clarifying concepts for further reflection.

I begin with a remark of Ricoeur’s from a very late interview in 2003:

‘My bottom line is the phenomenology of being able... I believe that the ontology and analogy of action which I am trying to think through plays itself out on the basis of a


\(^{210}\) Ibid., p. 481.

\(^{211}\) Ibid., p. 482.
differentiated phenomenology of “I can speak”, “I can act”, “I can narrate”, and “I can designate myself as imputable”\textsuperscript{212}.

I will briefly analyse this statement. I have noted throughout that Ricoeur’s approach to ontology is to place it at the end of any given study as a way of emphasising the danger of foreclosing on its necessary dynamism. Even where he supplies an ontology of metaphor, it is by underlining metaphor’s being and not-being. The remark above indicates that Ricoeur’s preferred beginning, by contrast, is in a phenomenology of the acting self, speaking, narrating, imputing. It is on this basis that I feel able to pursue a use of analogy that is ultimately about free human judgement.

I use this to introduce the possibility of using analogical language as a way of indicating meaning when not everything is fully understood, where analogy is understood as an activity, a way of judging. In this way analogical language can provide a useful way of discerning and communicating meaning before the ‘threshold of ontology’\textsuperscript{213}. I discussed the way in which this had been emphasised by Wolfhart Pannenberg who proposed analogy as doxology - and so ‘paronymy’. In terms of analogy as judgement, I used David Burrell’s analysis, in the light of Herbert McCabe’s translation of Aquinas’s text. These analyses led me to a view of Aquinas’s use of analogical language as a way of indicating both what is known and the fact of what is not known at once. It is therefore couched as an ongoing endeavour to more richly speak of God. Most significantly I pointed to Walter Kasper who charted the different approaches to religious language in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century before concluding with a view of analogy as an expression of human freedom in the response to a self-disclosing God of revelation. This is \textit{analogia libertatis} to which I found a useful parallel in Ricoeur’s framework for continually thinking through the writing of history. I noted above the connections between the intercultural exchange of memory in Ricoeur’s conception of Europe and this earlier work on the Same, the Other, the Analogous, which remained the best expression of the problem of writing history through \textit{Memory, History, Forgetting}. The self is one who can remember, narrate, interpret and critique. What Ricoeur supplies with his signs of the Same, the Other, and the Analogous is the structure whereby this epistemological question is to be continually worked out.

\textsuperscript{212} P. Ricoeur, R. Kearney, ‘On Life Stories’, pp. 167-8. Jean Greisch has noted, with regret, that the specific capabilities of remembering and forgiving are absent from such summary remarks.

\textsuperscript{213} P. Ricoeur, \textit{Memory, History, Forgetting}, p. 280.
Ricoeur proposed the Analogous as a way of thinking about history in terms of tropes, but expanded its import for historiography by using its legacy as a ‘relation of relations’ to also indicate its constant referral back to the Same and the Other. This is where Ricoeur, by insisting on the ‘autonomous’ status of philosophy clarifies an understanding of analogy for theology in two ways.

The first is a commentary on Aristotle’s use of analogia, which is the source of the Analogous as a ‘relation of relations’. I highlighted above that analogy, as understood by modern commentators on Aquinas - brings both a similarity and a difference of indication. So, too, does the Analogous, but Ricoeur adds that this is not complete on its own. Rather, Ricoeur’s understanding of the Analogous sends back the writer of history to consider again the Same and the Other. In this way, it allows continuous refiguration of history while maintaining a certain connection to the facticity of events. The second is Ricoeur’s own improved response to theology, the response to God’s action, by analysing it in terms of a response to the testimony of the biblical text as I articulated in my reconstruction of his essay on Exodus 3:14.

Aquinas’s analogy is all the more valuable for these reminders to return to a consideration of what it intends to express: sameness - as read in the central texts of the faith - and difference, as expressed in the responses to those testimonies, including speculative theology. In my view this tension was indeed always present in the medieval use of analogy, but as Mieth argued, theology can be clarified and strengthened by philosophical discourse. Moreover, the continuous endeavour of analogical language in theology is a crucial aspect of Pannenberg’s analysis of it - indeed, it is its continuing mission to speak God that prompts Pannenberg to employ it as paronymic doxology. However, put into Ricoeur’s terms, analogical speech about God can be directed back to the testimony of the biblical text as well as to the ‘history of reading’ to be seen in the systematic reflection of theology as part of a fruitful search for meaning.

214 It is worth noting here that amongst the ‘speculative’ theologians in that essay Ricoeur placed Pseudo-Dionysius, who provides an emphatically mystical, difference-emphasising contemplation on the divine names, as he notes himself. The term ‘speculative’ is better replaced with theology’s systematic reflection on the implications of a specific historical tradition of faith.
What this fruitful theological search contributes in turn to Ricoeur’s approach on intercultural issues is a reflection on the origin of the subsequent ‘culturally contingent’ religious articulations of the desire for the other. This Ricoeur assumes to be part of the self’s striving and underpins all three of his models for Europe. The reason I emphasise the particularity of analogy as used by Aquinas and his modern commentators, is because Ricoeur himself has argued that:

‘For the European, in particular, the problem is not to share in a sort of vague belief which would be acceptable to everyone; his task is expressed by Heidegger: ‘We have to go back to our own origins,’ that is, we have to go back to our Greek, Hebrew and Christian origins so as to be worthy participants in the great debate of cultures’.215

Ricoeur has constantly emphasised the significance of the hermeneutics of reading, of constantly refiguring our own resources in the face of the other in order to best speak to that other. The motivation for the ongoing work to discern a better way of speaking of God lends itself to the motivation to speak and understand more fully the language, experience and activity of fellow citizens. Moreover, analogical language does so by a revisiting of part of the Christian tradition, a recontextualising of what is possible for a theologian to do for the encounter with diversity.

Ricoeur brings the tension of sameness and difference to the fore in speaking of intercultural hermeneutics. The Analogous he employed so effectively on the level of historical epistemology takes another form for inter-religious study, that of the ‘analogizing transfer’.216 In my view using analogical language, in its character as discernment, brings to bear the polysemy of testimony in the exchange of memories and the multiple refigurative responses of translation, forgiveness and future action. Ricoeur does not explicitly bring up the ‘analogizing transfer’ as a way of understanding these models, but the similarity of approach ‘by imagination and sympathy’ is to be particularly valued. As I make this connection directly, I am able to reemphasise the themes from his wider oeuvre which I have been connecting throughout this chapter. The nature of Ricoeur’s work on intercultural questions is that it forms part of the work of a variety of his texts which have their own particular aims. Since The Symbolism of Evil Ricoeur has given great attention to the intercultural differences and exchanges between Greek and Roman, and biblical

215 P. RICOEUR, Memory, History, Forgetting, p. 280.

heritages. His exploration of the development of Western self-understanding through his work on memory, on narratives, on ethics and the person all rely on the resources of ongoing cultural encounters. What I have done in this chapter is use Ricoeur's changing way of thinking about analogy as such, and theology in general to identify a way of thinking about his intercultural hermeneutics that supplements those models he has identified: translation, memory exchange, forgiveness. Analogical language is able to provide a way of thinking about the other, situated within a particular cultural tradition: through motivation of desire for the other; through the revitalisation of a Christian history of reading of the bible and of theological interpretations; through the identification of the activity of discernment as part of human freedom; through the constant re-emphasising of the tension between sameness and difference that must be carried in the very meaning of words about the other.

As a final thought, Ricoeur argued for a kind of dual role for individuals from a particular culture in the face of the other: 'only a living culture at once faithful to its origins and ready for creativity on the levels of art, literature, philosophy and spirituality is capable of sustaining the encounter of other cultures', but more significantly 'of giving meaning to that encounter'²¹⁷. Analogical language provides both a revitalised understanding of the tradition and it provides a context of desire for the other per se, and, in Ricoeur's view of the biblical command, an ethical summons. Indeed, many of his commentators have suggested that it is in ethics, in fact, that the different aspects of Ricoeur's work meet: combining the "wounded cogito" with religion 'as a means of engendering ethical consciousness between individuals'²¹⁸. I conclude here then that it is with a view to future action and the reflection on the conditions of its possibility in a phenomenology of being able - that analogy can contribute to the practical wisdom of the approach to and mutual recognition between cultures. Analogical thinking calls the self to continually think through the encounter with the other in her sameness and difference, her universality and her particularity. It then gives the self the tools to respond by seeking to better articulate her encounter with the other, in translation, in memory exchange, in asking for and granting forgiveness, and ultimately seeking to understand better the diversity of persons

²¹⁷ P. RICOEUR, 'Experience and Language in Religious Discourse' p. 131.

²¹⁸ P. RICOEUR and questioners - 'Roundtable Discussion' p. 203 (M. Dooley).
with each attempt, with the 'practical commitment'\textsuperscript{219} of the wager. As Ricoeur concludes his analysis in 1955, 'Human truth lies only in this process in which civilizations confront each other more and more with what is most living and creative in them... each civilization will work out its perception of the world by confronting all others... probably the great task of generations to come'\textsuperscript{220}.

\textsuperscript{219} P. RICOEUR, 'Universal Civilisation and National Cultures', p. 282.

\textsuperscript{220} Ibid., p. 283.
CONCLUSION

What I have intended with this thesis is to provide a consolidation of Ricoeur’s own intercultural hermeneutics, in the light of his work on the self, the ethics of the self and the other, on writing history, and on biblical interpretation. The way I chose to interrogate this topic, was by providing a detour through Thomas Aquinas’s work on analogy as a solution for theological language about God. By considering intercultural hermeneutics in terms of analogy I achieve an understanding of the encounter with another culture, in terms of simultaneous identity and alterity. I will briefly explain this before providing a final overview of the work established in each chapter.

Ricoeur argued that one could not simply inhabit the other’s language or tradition. One could only respond to it in reference to one’s own mother tongue or culture. Therefore a neutral comparison between traditions is not possible. Speaking of religious encounters Ricoeur suggests an ‘analogizing transfer’, that allows one to remain situated within one’s religion while imaginatively and sympathetically considering how one might be situated in another. I find a series of parallels to this stance, firstly, in Ricoeur’s historiography, understood to be always through the lenses of the Same, the Other, the Analogous, secondly, in the encounter between memory cultures, through translation and in the light of forgiveness. I have argued that by constructing a detour through a series of modern commentators on Aquinas, that this analogizing transfer is better understood. Aquinas’s use of analogy is intended to provide a way of speaking of God who cannot be understood. Analogical language therefore indicates some kind of similarity with creaturely meaning but God remains distinct in his divinity. What is emphasised by the commentators I have used is that analogy is therefore a practice that must be ongoing as a way of seeking to better and more richly indicate God.

In the intercultural context this achieves three things. It firstly, analogy itself can be understood in terms of a human response to the other, through the commentary which I reconstructed in Chapter Three (3.2), allowing it to be used in this new context. Secondly, analogy provides an approach to the other in reference to a single tradition of Christian theology in response to the biblical text, in keeping with Ricoeur’s insistence on acknowledging one’s own particularity. Thirdly, analogy as a practice emphasises the need
to constantly attempt to better understand, while also always recalling the tension between sameness and difference between cultures. Fourthly, as a way of understanding the intercultural encounter, analogy can be used as a hermeneutical approach to the models Ricoeur has already established in relation to linguistic and cultural translation, exchange of memories, and the horizon of forgiveness with a view to future action.

It is for this reason that I began this project by reconstructing Ricoeur’s work on ethics, narrative, and historiography. This allowed me to examine the relationship between the self and the other before turning to the particular example of intercultural encounter. In this way I can show that understanding analogy later in terms of human action provides an appropriate hermeneutic for intercultural encounters. I therefore turn to give a final overview of the steps I have taken through this thesis to reach the above conclusions.

As I just argued at the heart of Ricoeur’s approach to intercultural encounters is his concept of the self, which I reconstructed in Chapter One. His understanding of the self rejects the supremely confident Cartesian ego for a ‘wounded cogito’, that must always reflexively attest itself. I emphasised the roots of this idea in Ricoeur’s earlier work on narrative identity (1.2), itself based on his understanding of narrative as an expression of events in time (1.1). By mapping Ricoeur’s concept of the self through narrative already underscores the ‘entanglement’ of the self with the other. Narratives are always already prefigured in action and are told through reference to the stories the self is always already amongst. In fact the relationship between the self and the other is crucial for the identity of the self in other ways.

The reflexive self is already forming her identity in a dialectic between idem and ipse. (1.2) Ricoeur suggests that the nature of a recognisable self was of continuity in time - idem, sameness of the person, such as character, place of birth; ipse, selfhood of the person, which stays reliable to the other through promising. In this way the other becomes crucial as the one who summons the self to reliability in the promise (1.3). This dialectic relationship between self and other also means that the post-Structuralist approach using the concept of sovereignty can be rejected (1.4), consistent with Ricoeur’s work, both early and late.
In Chapter Two I turned to reconstruct the ethical framework of ethical aim, test of the moral norm, and moral judgement in situation (2.1). This is all structured in response to Ricoeur’s identification of striving for the good life as ‘living well, with and for others, in just institutions’. The self and the other are called to live responsibly with each other, whether in a personal encounter or in anonymity as other human persons. I further underline this by turning to reconstruct this ethical relationship through the concept of recognition (2.2). I concluded my examination of Ricoeur concept of the ethics of self and other by turning to specify some intercultural issues.

When the other is understood as a narrative resource, and an ethical summons to the self, the issue of inter-cultural differences becomes important. Where there is no shared cultural milieu, there is an added difficulty in understanding the other. However, the summons to ethical responsibility remains. In this way the self is called to the intercultural encounter, and while I have noted the difficulty of accessing the ‘opaque kernel’ of another culture, it is also an opportunity for self-critique and self-renewal. Still, there is a similarity of capability and a difference of identity between the self and the other in intercultural terms that must be accounted for.

I therefore turned to consider the possibility of doing so through analogy, as I outlined above. In Chapter Three I first presented Ricoeur’s own analysis of Aquinas’s use of analogical language in his early work on linguistic philosophy (3.1), but using modern theological commentators, such as Pannenberg and Kasper, I was able to consider an alternative approach (3.2). This viewpoint emphasised analogy as human activity, seeking to express difference and sameness, and turning to do so more richly each time.

I argued in Chapter Four that these characteristics were part of Ricoeur’s approach to certain disciplines including biblical interpretation and historiography. In examining that biblical interpretation I was able to show that in particular Ricoeur’s response to Aquinas’s use of analogy came to be more nuanced (4.1). By reconstructing his approach to writing history I was able to show that he also began to use related terms to express the tension of indicating identity and alterity, suggesting history should be written through a constant return to the use of the lenses of the Same, the Other and the Analogous (4.2). I linked this to intercultural encounters by noting that there was a consistent question around the
concept of testimony - understood as of the absolute in religious texts and of past events in historical accounts. It is as a response to the personal testimony of the other that intercultural encounters may be understood, whether they be between linguistic cultures, historical narratives, or religious traditions.

This was underlined by my final series of reconstructions in Chapter Five, which indicated the particular intercultural issues of language (5.1), memory and forgiveness (5.2). These were used by Ricoeur as models for indicating a new way of considering the ethos of Europe and as a way of reinvigorating the political imagination of individuals and groups prior to the political institutions. It was in the particular example of inter-religious dialogue that Ricoeur used the phrase 'analogizing transfer' and this allowed me to finally prove the relevance of the category for intercultural hermeneutics. The processes of translation, memory exchange and forgiveness are understood all the better through the emphases developed through commentary on Aquinas's use of analogy (5.4): the particular viewpoint of one's own tradition, analogy as a human response to the other, sameness and difference between self and other, and a constant attempt to understand the other as a way of conceiving of intercultural hermeneutics.

I would also consider the detour through Aquinas to provide a useful critique to Ricoeur's own response to that work. I have provided a final conclusion regarding the general relationship between philosophy and theology in Ricoeur's work (5.3) that emphasises the great renewals of each discipline that can be formed in dialogue. Aquinas's analogical language in particular provides a useful lens for considering Ricoeur's own careful and rigorous intercultural encounters with the work of other disciplines, periods, and traditions. In my view this hermeneutical approach confirms the best of Ricoeur's methods and ethical understanding of the self, the other and the institution, and summons each individual to an imaginative and sympathetic encounter with the other that may culminate in a constructive mutual recognition. I reiterate the final quotation from the thesis, where Ricoeur heralds the intercultural encounter as probably the great task of generations to come''.

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