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**DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL AND MORAL SCIENCE,
UNIVERSITY OF DUBLIN, TRINITY COLLEGE**

**INFINITE EMOTION;
Matte Blanco's Bi-Logic
in Psychoanalytic Context**

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In fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctorate in Philosophy by
Research at the School of Mental and Moral Science, University of Dublin,
Trinity College.

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Declaration

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Summary

This thesis attempts to outline and assess Matte Blanco's theory of bi-logic, and place it in psychoanalytic context using comparative analysis. Bi-logic is studied in relation to Freud, Klein and Bion. These particular psychoanalysts were selected because of their strong position in the history of psychoanalysis and their influence on psychoanalytic thinking.

In the Preface there is a short introduction to the world of bi-logic including a literary review of bi-logical writings. The first chapter offers an outline of bi-logic. Bi-logical notions *symmetrical and asymmetrical mode of being, principles of generalisation and symmetry* and *the stratified structure* are explained. In the second chapter some of the main concepts are discussed from a philosophical perspective. Especially the notions *mathematical* and *metaphysical infinite* are examined. The following three chapters place bi-logic theoretically in psychoanalytic context of three important psychoanalysts. Chapter three deals with Freud, chapter four with Klein and chapter five with Bion. Chapters six to eight offer a bi-logical reading of three case histories from the psychoanalysts discussed in previous chapters.

In conclusion it is stated that bi-logic is a useful addition to psychoanalysis. Bi-logic doesn't work independently but needs other psychoanalytic frameworks to be used together with. It is found that Matte Blanco has moved further away from Freud than he realized, and is in some ways even contradictory to Freud's theories, especially to Freud's theory of affects or emotions. It is suggested that bi-logic is closer to Klein than Matte Blanco believed, and that with Bion it would be possible to enrich the bi-

logical view of the psyche. Bi-logic is essentially logic of emotions .The aim of bi-logic is to provide an asymmetric filter, a de-infinitezation in situations where the infinite has invaded the conscious. This is the most valuable perspective bi-logic has to offer.

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Abbreviations

A complete list of all sources used will be found at the end of this work.

The following abbreviations are used in the text and notes:

U.I.S. *The Unconscious as Infinite Sets* by Ignacio Matte Blanco,

Duckworth 1975

T.F.B. *Thinking, Feeling and Being* by Ignacio Matte Blanco,

Routledge 1988

S.E. *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Writings of*

Sigmund Freud,

24 volumes, ed. by James Strachey et al.

The Hogart Press and the Institute of Psychoanalysis, London 1953-

74.

the number in bold refers to volume and

the number in ordinary type refers to page number,

e.g. *S.E.*, **XIV**, 187 refers to volume 14, page 187.

P.F.L. The Penguin Freud Library, Penguin Books 1991

the number in bold refers to volume and

the number in ordinary type refers to page number,

e.g. *P.F.L.*, **4**, 186 refers to volume 4, page 186.

K, 1 Melanie Klein, Love, Guilt and Reparation and Other Works 1921-1945,

Vintage 1998

K, 2 Melanie Klein, Envy and Gratitude and Other Works 1946-1963,

Vintage 1997

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Preface

What Is Bi-Logic?;

Introduction and Literature Review

Ignacio Matte Blanco is not a well known psychoanalytic writer. His influence has not been widely spread and he isn't regularly read or studied in the psychoanalytic community. Outside this community virtually no-one has heard of him. Matte Blanco lived in Chile, England, The United States and Italy, and mainly in these countries there is a small number of people who spend time with Matte Blanco and try to understand the clinical and theoretical significance of bi-logic.

When *The Unconscious as Infinite Sets* was first published, it didn't raise much interest in the psychoanalytic community. In the early 1980's a few people, most of whom who knew Matte Blanco personally, started to get excited about the new ideas the book offered. Margaret Arden (UK), Gerald Wooster (UK) and Eric Rayner (UK) began meeting in Eric Rayner's house in London to study and discuss the book. Eric called them "The Three Musketeers" which was quite appropriate considering their task of trying together to battle through the difficulties Matte Blanco's "Essay" offered. As the interest towards bi-logic grew, so did the variety of backgrounds of people involving themselves in the study. The three psychoanalysts were soon joined

by the mathematician Ian Mordant (UK), Anglican priest Rodney Bomford (UK), and logician and psychotherapist Ross Skelton (Ireland). Claudio Duran (Can) was also active in setting up the group. Matte Blanco himself visited these meetings occasionally. From the gatherings of this small number of people London Bi-logic Group began slowly to take shape.

London Bi-logic Group meets twice a year to discuss bi-logic and its implications.ⁱ There have been psychoanalysts and psychotherapists from many different traditions, philosophers, psychologists, psychiatrists, linguists, artists, mathematicians, logicians, counsellors, prison workers and teachers giving papers and studying the meaning and scope of bi-logic. Also many nationalities have been represented: English, Irish, Italian, French, American, Chilean, Finnish and Swedish. The contributions of Alejandro Reyes (UK/ Chile), Paulina Reyes (UK/ Chile), Richard Carvalho (UK), Alessandra Ginzburg (Italy), Laurie Ryavec (USA), Klaus Fink (Germany), Carmen Fink (Germany), Michel Sanchez-Cardenas (France) and Maxine Sacks (UK) deserve to be noted especially. As the group grew, a need for a bigger and more open venue was needed. The first International Bi-logic Conference was held in Los Angeles in 1998. Since then international conferences have been held every second year: London 2000, New York 2002, Rome 2004, Santiago de Chile 2006 and Helsinki 2008.ⁱⁱ These places reflect bi-logical activity around the world. Many of the London group have been active internationally but there have also been those who have contributed to the study and understanding of bi-logic (internationally or at local level) mainly or partly outside the London group – James Grotstein and Carole Morgan (USA), Pietro Bria and Riccardo Lombardi (Italy), Eleonora Casaula and Jaime Coloma

(Chile), Claudio Duran (Canada), Ignacio Gerber (Brazil) and Timo Niemi and Marita Niemi (Finland).

The first book on bi-logic was written by Eric Rayner. *Unconscious Logic* was published in 1995 and it offered an easier way for the beginner to enter the world of bi-logic. Rayner explains the basic bi-logical concepts using examples and clinical material and opens a discussion for the scope of bi-logical connections and applications. Rayner had already written together with David Tuckett an excellent introduction to Matte Blanco's second book *Thinking, Feeling and Being* which was published in 1988. *Journal of Melanie Klein and Object Relations* dedicated two volumes to Matte Blanco 1997 and 1998ⁱⁱⁱ. The first part dealt with clinical aspects of bi-logic and the second part with the theory. Only recently Alessandra Ginzburg and Riccardo Lombardi published a collection of Articles in Italian *L'Emozione come esperienza infinita (Emotion as an Infinite Experience: Matte Blanco and Contemporary Psychoanalysis)*^{iv}.

There has been little purely theoretically oriented writing in bi-logic. Most bi-logical literature can be divided into two broad categories: clinical and cultural. Both categories offer rich and varied applications of bi-logic. However, this division is artificial, since most articles would have theoretical, clinical and cultural aspects to them. Some more dedicated writers, like Ginzburg and Ryavec, have developed Matte Blanco's ideas and it is possible to see their bi-logical thinking growing over the years. Bi-logical writing has enriched understanding into Matte Blanco's thinking and especially into the uses of bi-logic and thus widened the field of bi-logic. At the same time there

hasn't been much dialogue between the writers. Some of the writers do refer to each other's texts and concepts, mainly to point out similarities with their own discussion and argumentation. In seminars and conferences divergencies between bi-logicians do come up but there has been very little disagreement or argumentation in the written form among the writers. Neither has there been any sign of some type of "post-bi-logic" emerging, like there has for example with Lacan (e.g. Kristeva) and Bion (e.g. Ferrari).

Clinical and Theoretical Contributions

There have been a large number of clinical contributions to bi-logic. Sometimes case fragments are used to illustrate bi-logic but more often the writers themselves have found invaluable help from bi-logic with their clinical work with patients and they have wanted to share this experience with others.

Alessandra Ginzburg has written on a wide range of bi-logical topics. Her papers include both clinical and cultural contributions and generally deal with some of the more complex theoretic aspects of bi-logic as well. For example Ginzburg's paper 'The Bi-Logical Stratified Structure: When Cats are Panthers'^v helps the reader towards a better understanding of the stratified structure using the case of Silvia. Silvia has a difficulty of separating from her family to find her own, independent life due to her family's inability to let her go. Silvia's situation can be seen in a dream which is bi-logically analyzed^{vi}. Ginzburg also discusses isomorphism^{vii} and time^{viii} among many of her contributions.

Laurie Ryavec^{ix} is another prominent bi-logical writer. Her contributions are many both in clinical and cultural exploration of bi-logic.

She has written papers for example on the notion of the excluded middle^x, transference^{xi} and the difference between disruptive bi-logical and non-disruptive bi-modal thinking^{xii}. She has also written a very moving paper about a dying patient^{xiii} and how understanding bi-logic gave a different perspective to the analyst and the patient in this very sensitive process of letting go. In her article on the lap^{xiv} Ryavec shows us how through symmetrization mother's lap, part of the environment, unfolds into part of the child's mind creating a transitional area between symmetrical fusion and asymmetrical separation. She links this space where mother's translating/unfolding function operates with Winnicott's transitional space and Stern's concept of schemas-of-being-with.

Ross Skelton has also written about the transitional space in his fascinating paper on MacNeice, Matte Blanco and Lacan^{xv}. Skelton draws out the use of littoral in MacNeice's poetry and discusses this area between sea and shore in relation to symmetry and asymmetry drawing on similarities with unity and separation with mother. Wooster, Hutchinson and Evans^{xvi} present two examples of psychotherapy where the early play states between mother and baby show already signs of subject-object differentiation in a paper which aims to illustrate bi-logic in relation to birth.

Klaus Fink has written many articles with clinical implications of bi-logic. His topics include trauma, transference and identification. One particularly interesting paper deals with time^{xvii}. A patient remains in an almost unchanged state for years in analysis. Not only is his analysis somehow "fixed" but also the phase he is in his life and even his appearance remains uncannily same over the years. Finally the analyst finds a break-through with

bi-logic following which the patient seems to “grow” the years rapidly and reach his age – and the end of the very long analysis – in a very short time. Fink realized that it was time itself that had not been worked through in the analysis, and by bringing asymmetry into the patient’s world by interpreting the symmetries to do with time, a change started to take place.

Richard Carvalho also writes about bi-logic and time in a paper where he talks about a patient who is afraid of destroying time^{xviii}. At the same conference Ginzberg delivered a paper where she discusses symmetrical time and symmetrized time^{xix}. In all the cases presented in these papers, the bi-logical interpretations and working through of patient’s experience of time has been crucial to recovery. Time has also been the subject of interest for Eleonora Casaula who discusses the very sensitive issues of aging and plastic surgery in “The Time in the Body or the Body of Our Time”^{xx}

Riccardo Lombardi has combined Matte Blanco and Ferrari to understand primitive mental states, affects and body^{xxi}. Ferrari offers a fertile ground for understanding our relationship to our bodies. In his view our *primary* experience is the subjective sensations from within our physical being before the “birth” of the mind. Ferrari calls this the Concrete Original Object (COO). This can be contrasted for example with Klein, who places the *relationship to the breast* as the central primitive experience, and with Bion, who places the *internalized relationship to mother’s function* as the central primitive experience. For Ferrari the bodily experience itself, for example of hunger, pain or pleasure is at the basis of our being. Combining Ferrari’s model to bi-logic has enriched psychoanalytic understanding of the body. Timo Niemi’s article on somatisation of trauma^{xxii} offers a clinical, bi-logic

view of experiencing something in the body and working through that in the analysis. This article, originally presented at the International Bi-logic Conference in Chile in 2006 was later re-worked into a new version with Lombardi to combine Lombardi's understanding of Ferrari with Niemi's clinical insights. Niemi has also written about bi-logic and depression in "Black Back"^{xxiii}.

Another link to bodily experiences has been offered by Carole Morgan who discusses a case where sexuality is the central theme of the analysis^{xxiv} Pihla Alava's and Marita Niemi's article "Bi-Logical Approach to Skin Ego"^{xxv} deals with Anzieu's concept of skin ego. Skin ego is the area in psyche which differentiates, filters, protects and allows the flow of information between inner and outer world, and it can be understood bi-logically through containing bags of asymmetry with more or less symmetrical contents. Marita Niemi has also written about the slow process of finding the right words within analytic setting^{xxvi}. Reyes, Reyes and Skelton have explored the effects and treatment of trauma from bi-logical perspective^{xxvii}.

There is a small number of articles that have a more theoretical aim. The theoretically oriented work often deals with a highly selected area, for example Ross Skelton's critique of Matte Blanco's use of certain logical concept^{xxviii}. Margaret Arden has written about infinite sets and double binds combining bi-logic the work of Bateson^{xxix}. Ian Mordant has brought in the term 'primary processor' which he discusses for example in relation to attachment^{xxx}. Maxine Sacks' important contribution compares bi-logic with cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) and especially with Beck's Cognitive Distortions^{xxxi}.

Cultural Contributions

Laurie Ryavec's articles on the poetry of Emily Dickinson^{xxxii}, paintings by Leonardo da Vinci^{xxxiii} and O'Neill's *Long Day's Journey Into Night*^{xxxiv} are just some examples of the cultural dimension of bi-logical writings.^{xxxv} Ryavec has the rare ability to combine academically high standard writing with the gift to move people emotionally with her words. On many occasions she has brought her audience to tears – a truly bi-logic experience.

Ross Skelton has written about the Northern Irish poet, Louis MacNeice^{xxxvi} (as already mentioned) and given us a way to appreciate MacNeice's words in a new way. Tom Cousineau has presented a bi-logical reading of Beckett's seminal play *Waiting for Godot*^{xxxvii}. The same play has been referred to in this text in connection to Bion's case on the Imaginary Twin.

Carmen Fink^{xxxviii} and Sandra Brown^{xxxix} have written on bi-logical applications to music. Fink reminds us that we do not talk in words alone, and she talks about music as one of the vehicles of the unconscious (like language is a vehicle of the conscious). Brown considers music as a bi-logic structure and suggests a link to Ferrari's "vertical" relationship to one's body. Brown presents case material where people who have impaired capacity for speech – for example in autism or due to brain tumor – can find connection to themselves and the world through elements of music; rhythm, pulse and so on. She also discusses the emergence of infinite through music. The infinity of affects and emotions, which can feel terrifying, can be contained in small

doses in music, rendering the infinite more tolerable.

Jose Luis Villalba has brought his understanding of aesthetics to the service of bi-logic for example in his article on cinema and emotions^{xl}.

Villalba shows Matte Blanco's model can be applied to how emotions (which are bi-logical structures) which are aroused by film. David Fincher's film *Fight Club* has been the subject of Juhani Lindell's paper which also combines Lacan's concept of 'phallic signifier' with bi-logic^{xli}. Joan Maw has discussed linguistics and bi-logic in "Symmetry and Asymmetry in Language"^{xlii}. Beatriz Priel discusses Borges's fiction from a bi-logical perspective^{xliii} and Ginzburg Proust and Kafka^{xliv}. Ginzburg also brings out some bi-logical aspects of Poe's story about William Wilson and Stevensons Jekyll and Hyde^{xlv}. These are just some examples of bi-logical explorations to the cultural terrain.

Rodney Bomford^{xlvi} brings out similarities between bi-logic and religion in his book *The Symmetry of God*. He draws out the metaphysical aspects of bi-logic and argues interestingly for example about how the deeper levels of symmetrical being are very close to the Christian notion of God. Bomford compares Matte Blanco's strata to levels of religious discourse. Ethical decisions in religious discourse is like asymmetric factual assertions (stratum 1), devotional level like similes (stratum 2), mythical discourse operates on the same level as metaphor and symbolism (stratum 3), doctrinal discourse at the level of sheer contradictions (stratum 4) and mystical discourse at the level of silence (stratum 5). Bomford also talks about symmetry as necessary in the creation of anything new.

James Grotstein, who has a strong interest in bi-logic and refers to

Matte Blanco in many of his writings, continues Bomford's discussion on human psychology and spirituality in *Who Is the Dreamer Who Dreams the Dream?*^{xlvii} In the book Grotstein talks about infinitization and deity and links experience of God very closely to the unconscious; we can't get any closer to experience of God than we do with unconscious.

Carole Morgan's paper on Bi-Logic and Buddhism^{xlviii} discusses some different religious aspects from a clinical perspective. Wider ranging cultural aspects have been elaborately explored by Ian Mordant in his book *The Symmetries of September 11th*^{xlix} where Mordant discusses the present day world situation in light of bi-logic.

Matte Blanco's Bi-Logic in Psychoanalytical Context

I felt that while bi-logical writing grew there was still a place for a larger volume placing Matte Blanco's bi-logic systematically in a wider psychoanalytic context. That is the aim of this work.

Bi-logic refers to the theoretical framework invented by Matte Blanco by combining Freud's theory of the dynamic unconscious and the set theory of mathematical logic, as best presented in *The Unconscious as Infinite Sets* (1975). It is an unusual marriage of two worlds wide apart. People who are sparked by an interest in bi-logic are easily frightened or put off by one or other aspect of the system. Many psychoanalysts and psychotherapists are made uncomfortable at the mere mention of *logic*, and people with background in logic or mathematics do not generally tend to be overly enthusiastic about *psychoanalysis* which is felt to be something vague and unscientific - often even a bit uncomfortable. This is great pity. While I do not

feel that bi-logic has much to offer to mathematical logic, I certainly feel it has a lot to offer to psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic therapy.

This thesis attempts to understand and evaluate Matte Blanco's bi-logic mainly by placing it in a larger psychoanalytic framework. There is a general description of the theory in chapter one where the theory of bi-logic is first outlined. Some main bi-logical concepts are studied and explained. In chapter two some philosophical dimensions are discussed to help the reader to understand some of the roots of bi-logic in Western thinking. The notion of the 'infinite', as it is used by Matte Blanco, is looked at from a philosophical perspective. The notions of mathematical and metaphysical infinite are highly relevant to bi-logic. They are discussed in relation to bi-logic mainly chronologically from the perspective of history of philosophy. With a theory which uses philosophical notions as its unspoken background, it is important to acquaint oneself with these notions to better understand and appreciate where Matte Blanco leads us. In later chapters these philosophical notions will become necessary, especially when we discuss Bion's thoughts about Truth. I hope the brief introduction of philosophical notions will also open up a possibility for the reader to continue studying bi-logic also as a philosophical system.

Chapters three, four and five bi-logic is studied in relation to other psychoanalytic systems and they offer theoretical discussion and comparison to Freud, Klein and Bion. Freud, Klein and Bion were selected because of their central position and strong influence in history of psychoanalysis. They are also theoretically the closest psychoanalysts to Matte Blanco. Bi-logic is

deeply rooted in both Freud and Klein, and Bion wrote about the same subject matter, namely thinking and feeling, around the same time but using a different logical system. Matte Blanco regarded his theory as a development from Freud's early phase. The symmetrical mode arises from the unrepressed unconscious and the interplay between the two modes has its roots in Freud's primary process dream work.

In chapter three we take a close look at Freud's characteristics of the unconscious from a bi-logical perspective. The emphasis is changing from the unconscious-conscious split and repression in Freud's work to a more holistic view of the mind with different levels of operation in Matte Blanco. Even though there is a shift of emphasis and terminology, in most parts Freud and Matte Blanco are in harmony with each other. There is however, one significant difference between the two, something Matte Blanco himself never even mentions. The core difference between Freud and Matte Blanco lies between their *theories of emotion*. Matte Blanco's theory of emotions is not only different from but contradictory to Freud's very clear theory of emotions. Possibly the reason why Matte Blanco ignored this significant difference is that Freud's clinical material points towards an intuition very different from his rather limited theoretical formulations. As it is, the contradiction is there and in my view Matte Blanco's theory of emotions is not only a definite improvement from Freud but also more in line with the true spirit of psychoanalysis. The bi-logical view of emotions also offers a tool for the clinician that at present cannot be found elsewhere in psychoanalysis because bi-logic addresses the *infinite aspect of emotion*.

In *Thinking, Feeling and Being* (1988) Matte Blanco acknowledges Klein's influence on his work but in he didn't quite seem to accept how Kleinian his theoretical roots really were. There is a discomfort in Matte Blanco's writings about Klein, no matter how appreciative his words might be. Reading Matte Blanco one cannot avoid the feeling that at least one of the reasons why he wanted so desperately to "return to Freud" was in order to escape from Klein. Matte Blanco always maintained that he was an independent within the British tradition – which is just another way to say that he was not a Kleinian. These speculations are not central to the thesis but might help the reader to understand why Matte Blanco preferred Freud even when Klein's theory of emotions would have offered him a lot more fruitful ground to develop his own views. Bi-logic is actually so Kleinian that it almost seems to be the logic of the unconscious phantasy.

In chapter five we discuss the similarities and differences of the theoretical frameworks of Matte Blanco and Bion. Bion's central psychoanalytic concepts are discussed in relation to Matte Blanco. After focusing on the strengths of bi-logic in earlier chapters, with Bion we can also begin to see the limitations of Matte Blanco's system. It is seen, for example, that Matte Blanco's translating function would benefit a lot from Bion's richer concept of alpha-function.

In the three chapters following; six, seven and eight I give a bi-logical readings of case histories by Freud, Klein and Bion. Bi-logic can be applied to *any* case study, and these three serve as an example of how it can be done. Their aim is to bring bi-logic alive, to give the highly theoretical concepts

some clinical “flesh”, and help the reader to think bi-logically when encountering life in or out of a consulting room. Freud's case of Schreber was selected mainly because Matte Blanco discusses it himself. Matte Blanco used the Schreber case to illustrate aspects of bi-logic. We can see how Schreber’s symptoms are a defence against over-powering emotions. Schreber tries to “dilute” emotions by splitting them but fails because divisions are just duplications of the same relationship. Because Schreber uses psychotic mechanisms instead of healthy translating function, his emotions do not transform into tamed emotions but remain burning and persecutory. With bi-logic we can see how the levels of depth and magnitude of emotion can be translated into some bearable emotional experience. Other case studies might have been more beneficial in some ways, but I felt that we should begin with Matte Blanco's own writings.

John is one of Klein’s earlier cases, sometimes over-shadowed by the more famous cases like ‘Dick’ in “The Importance of Symbol-Formation in the Development of the Ego”¹ written just a year before. In “A Contribution to the Theory of Intellectual Inhibition”^{li} Klein tells us of a little boy who has difficulty in remembering the English meanings of certain French words. Klein has already shown us how John’s denial of his own aggression is at the bottom of his selected learning difficulties. Bi-logical reading of the material has two aims: firstly, it illustrates in an extremely detailed way how bi-logic can be used to understand clinical material, and secondly, bi-logic gives us a more general and applicable way to approach the infinitude of emotions in clinical setting. Klein's case of John was chosen because it offered

an excellent opportunity for a detailed study of clinical material. John's unconscious phantasies seemed to beckon a bi-logical viewpoint. Because of the extreme attention to detail, the text might be slow and even difficult to read at times. At the same time I hope the reader will find the step by step introduction to the use of bi-logic helpful.

In chapter eight we will see how in Bion's case of 'Imaginary Twin' symmetrisation is used as a way to erase delineations between people. Schreber used splitting of the object as a defence against strong emotion, Bion's case uses *splitting of the subject* to reach the same aim. The patient cannot tolerate emotional reality at all – not that of others as separate beings from himself neither the inner reality of his own emotions. Hegelian dialectic is used as a background from which Bion and Matte Blanco emerge. Bion's case histories are all concise and difficult to grasp. I felt the 'Imaginary twin' offered one way into Bion's thinking. Because of the intensity of Bion's writings a detailed bi-logical study did not seem the best option. Instead bi-logic is used here more loosely - also as a bridge to other writers and ideas.

My conclusions are that Matte Blanco's view of *emotion* and *infinite* as aspects of the human psyche - and his bi-logical system in general - can offer a valuable addition to psychoanalysis. Bi-logic provides an interesting middle ground between Freud and Klein, as well as a fresh viewpoint to psychoanalytic and psychotherapeutic practice. However bi-logic does not stand on its own and requires other theoretical frameworks to work with. It is suggested that Klein and Bion offer a fertile ground in which bi-logic can most

beneficially operate. Bi-logic is first and foremost *logic of emotion*.

Chapter 1

The Logic of Emotions;

Life and Ideas of Ignacio Matte Blanco

The Life of Matte Blanco

*And I, infinitesimal being,
drunk with the great starry
void,
likeness, image of
mystery,
felt myself a pure part
of the abyss,
I wheeled with the stars,
My heart broke loose on the wind.
(From 'Poetry' by Pablo Neruda)*

Passion and precision shine throughout the writings of Matte Blanco. It is a rare combination; the fire and excitement is joined by an almost obsessional attention to detail. Every new thought is presented with a sense of wonder and openness, accompanied by meticulous argumentation. This unusual union of unbound emotionality and logical reasoning so prominent in Matte Blanco's style of writing is also the core of his theoretical contributions. It reflects his life as much as his work.

Ignacio Matte Blanco was born in Santiago, Chile on October 3rd 1908. The economic-political climate in Chile at the time was relatively stable by South American standards. The country had won its independence from Spain almost a century earlier, and the blooming mineral industry of the northern parts of the country combined with the fertile farming lands of the

south ensured Chile a strong position in the world market. In the first third of the century Chile's population, especially in and around its major cities Santiago and Valparaiso, grew phenomenally as a result of the increasing industry. Even though the labor movement was beginning to flourish, the great majority of the population remained poor and illiterate. The small upper class minority was in an extremely privileged position.

Matte Blanco was born the younger son of an old, well-known aristocratic family. His father was a land-owner, and the family's roots – on both his father's and his mother's side – were filled with important historical figures. It was not unusual for upper class parents to send their children to study in Europe, and when Ignacio became interested in psychiatry and psychoanalysis he was persuaded by his father to study in England. Matte Blanco had graduated in medicine from the University of Chile in Santiago and become an associate professor in physiology at the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile in 1930. While still in Chile he had begun analysis with Chile's first psychoanalyst, Dr. Fernando Allende Navarro. Matte Blanco became a research fellow in physiology at the University College London in 1933, and trained as a neuropsychiatrist at the Institute of Psychiatry. With his medical qualifications Matte Blanco's route towards psychoanalysis was not unlike Freud's. While studying at the Institute of Psychiatry Matte Blanco also trained at the Institute of Psychoanalysis.

The 1930's was a particularly vibrant period at the Institute of Psychoanalysis. Matte Blanco's teachers included Ernest Jones, John Rickman, Ella Sharpe, Susan Isaacs, Joan Riviere, and of course Melanie Klein herself. He was supervised by Anna Freud and Melitta Schmideberg

(Melanie Klein's daughter), as well as Helen Sheehan-Dare and James Strachey. Matte Blanco's training analyst was Walter Schmideberg, who was married to Klein's daughter Melitta. Walter Schmideberg was a Viennese of the classical school – this might partially explain Matte Blanco's strong interest in Freud in this predominantly Kleinian atmosphere. Matte Blanco became a member of the British Psychoanalytic Society in 1938. He considered himself as an Independent within the British tradition. During the period at the Institute Matte met John Bowlby and Paula Heimann and established a lifelong friendship with both.

In the 1930's Matte Blanco became familiar also with mathematical logic. He was particularly interested in Russell and Whitehead's *Principia Mathematica* (1910) which deals with the set theory and attempts to discover the (logical) foundations of mathematics. Matte's interest in mathematics continued after he moved to the States in 1940. He worked at the John Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore, at the Duke University in North Carolina and at the Neurological Institute of the New York Medical Center. But more importantly Matte Blanco was a member of Courant's seminars that met on a weekly basis in the Department of Mathematics at the Columbia University. It was from Courant that he learned about multidimensionality. As well as attending the seminars, Matte studied *What is Mathematics?* By Courant and Robbins, a book he refers to frequently in his writings. During this period he married his first wife with whom he had a daughter. They divorced some years later.

In 1944 Matte returned to Chile where he spent the next twenty-two years in the Chair of Psychiatry at the University of Chile. The wide and

impressive range of his achievements extends from facilitating and broadening developments in research to the planning of new, much-modelled clinics for psychotic patients. His dynamic and energetic presence seems to have functioned as a catalyst for many reforms in the psychiatric and psychoanalytic fields around him.

The psychoanalytic study group founded by Matte Blanco was to become the Chilean Psychoanalytic Association, and it was recognized as a member of the IPA in 1949. While living in Chile Matte Blanco analysed, taught and supervised many of the younger generation analysts who formed something of a following in bi-logic. He was in a difficult position of being a leader-figure in multiple ways to many of his analysands. Perhaps an explanation for eventually overcoming what Jordan-Moore in an obituary to Matte Blanco calls "unbridled filial rivalries"^{lii}, and for gaining affection and respects despite the strict and disciplined nature of his leadership, can be seen in Matte's encouragement of authenticity. On the other hand, the demand for undogmatic authenticity from such a strong personality must have seemed to some a difficult one to follow. It was in Chile that Matte Blanco began to formulate his ideas, and published his first two books, *Lo Psíquico y la Naturaleza Humana. Hacia un Planteamiento Experimental* (1954) and *Estudios de Psicología Dinámica* (1955). These books (especially the first) are the beginning of the development of thought which led to the writing of *The Unconscious as Infinite Sets* (1975) and *Thinking, Feeling and Being* (1988).

Not long after the divorce from his first wife Matte Blanco married his second wife, Luciana Bon de Matte with whom he had six children – the realization of the big family he had always dreamed of. The family moved to

Italy in 1966, where both Matte and his wife – a Kleinian trained analyst – worked and practiced. Ignacio Matte Blanco died in Rome on January 11th 1995, after nearly five years of suffering because of an incapacitating brain damage, the result of an accident that left his memory and mental powers permanently impaired. The clinical and theoretical significance of his work is only beginning to become apparent.

The Two Modes of Being

Matte Blanco's vision of man is that of an ultimately divided being simultaneously existing on two planes and experiencing in two modes. The two modes are fundamentally divided, but also always necessarily united, so that every living moment is twofold. The *asymmetrical mode of being* is characterized by its capacity to use asymmetrical relations which are the basis of Aristotelian logic. Things are divided, individuated and separated. Time, space and causality are felt to exist. Because of the tendency to see the world in terms of *many* (rather than one), Matte Blanco also calls this the *heterogeneous mode*. The *symmetrical mode of being*, on the other hand, sees or experiences the world as undivided, infinite and at the same time spaceless / timeless *and* multidimensional. Part and whole are seen as equal, and normal laws of logic do not appear to exist. Matte Blanco also calls this the 'indivisible' or *homogeneous mode*.

If the symmetrical-asymmetrical divide is envisaged, there is first and foremost a total split between the two modes. What is symmetrical cannot be asymmetrical and vice versa. At the same time the two modes are unavoidably bound together. Events, however, do not consist of even amounts of symmetry

and asymmetry. A discussion about weather between two people waiting at a bus stop, for example, would probably consist of relatively larger amounts of *asymmetrical thinking*. An apparently irrational emotional outburst would probably consist of relatively larger amounts of symmetrical thinking. In the 'lower' regions of the mind, thinking is more symmetrical than in the 'higher' regions. The 'deeper' we go (into the unconscious), the more symmetrical our thinking becomes, until we reach a state of total oneness where there is no distinction between subject and object, class and its elements, good and bad, etc. Properly speaking this cannot be called 'thinking', we are dealing with states of 'feeling', and ultimately there is only 'being'. Conversely, the 'higher' we reach, the more asymmetrical our thinking. Thoughts and concepts are increasingly differentiated, and the highest levels of asymmetrical thinking consist of logic and mathematics.

Matte Blanco uses the polar opposites of darkness-light and warmth-cold to metaphorically illustrate the experience of different levels of symmetry and asymmetry. Matte Blanco plays with the images of 'darkness of ignorance' and 'light of understanding', and 'warmth of emotion' and 'coldness of logic'. The more symmetry there is proportionately, the darker and warmer our 'feeling' of the event is. Conversely, the bigger the proportion of asymmetry, the brighter and colder our 'understanding'. These metaphors only work from the asymmetrical point of view. For example, what looks like total darkness from the conscious asymmetrical perspective, can be total light for the symmetrical mode. To our asymmetrical, limited ability (the seeing of) total light is so blinding that we experience it as darkness: "when light becomes so vivid as to be dazzling, it amounts to total darkness"^{liii} "viewed

from the inside, love (or any other basic emotion) is not a darkness or a dim light, but, on the contrary, a light which is so immensely strong that it is dazzling to the point of blinding”^{liv}.

The metaphor of total light is linked to Matte Blanco’s idea that *emotion is perfect knowledge*, emotion has an infinite dimension. The symmetrical mode of being experiences the world as an undivided totality. At any given moment all actual and possible events are experienced as one all-embracing event. To put it differently: what from our conscious asymmetrical viewpoint looks like a collection of a large (even infinitely large) quantity of separate events, from the point of view of our unconscious symmetrical mode is one big undivided total event. Furthermore, this undivided event also includes all potential (past and future) events as well as what to our asymmetrical viewpoint looks like the ‘actual’ event or events.

A section of a short story by Borges serves as an example of the relationship between the symmetrical and asymmetrical modes of being. The story is titled ‘The Aleph’. The Aleph of the story is a point in space which contains all other points. It is situated in the cellar of a poet who has used the Aleph as a means of constructing a poem whose function is to give a detailed description of the planet. The Aleph is described as “the only place on earth where all places are – seen from every angle, each standing clear, without any confusion or blending”^{lv}. When the narrator suggests to the poet that the cellar is too dark, the poet answers: “If all the places in the universe are in the Aleph, then all stars, all lamps, all sources of light are in it, too.”^{lvi} When focusing on the Aleph “Total darkness, total immobility, and a certain ocular adjustment will also be necessary”^{lvii}.

The poet brings the narrator into the cellar to show him the Aleph, and this is how the experience is related:

”Then I saw the Aleph.

I arrive now at the ineffable core of my story. And here begins my despair as a writer. All language is a set of symbols whose use among its speakers assumes a shared past. How, then can I translate into words the limitless Aleph, which my floundering mind can scarcely encompass? Mystics, faced with the same problem, fall back on symbols: to signify the godhead, one Persian speaks of a bird that somehow is all birds; Alanus de Insulis, of a sphere whose center is everywhere and circumference is nowhere; Ezekiel, of a four-faced angel who at one and the same time moves east and west, north and south. (Not in vain do I recall these inconceivable analogies; they all bear some relation to Aleph.) Perhaps the gods might grant me a similar metaphor, but then this account would become contaminated by literature, by fiction. Really, *what I want to do is impossible, for any listing of an endless series is doomed to be infinitesimal*. In that single gigantic instance I saw millions of acts both delightful and awful; not one of them amazed me more than the fact that all of them occupied the same point in space, without overlapping or transparency. *What my eyes beheld was simultaneous, but what I shall now write down will be successive*. Nonetheless, I’ll try to recollect what I can.”^{lviii}

The narrator then goes on to list some of what he saw in the Aleph:

”Each thing (a mirror’s face let us say) was infinite things, since I distinctly saw it from every angle of the universe. I saw the teeming sea; I saw daybreak and nightfall; I saw the multitudes of America; I saw a silvery cobweb in the center of a black pyramid; I saw a splintered labyrinth (it was London); I saw,

close up, unending eyes watching themselves in me as in a mirror; I saw all the mirrors on earth and none of them reflected me;...^{lix}

The narrator ends the long list of things with:

”I saw the circulation of my own blood; I saw the coupling of love and the modification of death; I saw the Aleph from every point and angle, and in the Aleph I saw the earth and in the earth the Aleph and in the Aleph the earth; I saw my own face and my own bowels; I saw your face; and I felt dizzy and wept, for my eyes had seen that secret and conjectured object whose name is common to all men but which no man has looked upon – the unimaginable universe.

I felt infinite wonder, infinite pity.”^{lx}

Borges’s narrator’s experience of the Aleph would be like a simultaneous experience of the co-existence of the symmetrical and asymmetrical modes of being. The symmetrical, all-containing Aleph is suddenly seen with asymmetrical, dividing eyes. The result is the feeling that language fails since it can only produce an infinitely long list to describe something that is experienced all at once. This is what emotion is like, according to Matte Blanco. It has an infinite dimension of knowing everything at once, perfect knowledge, and a finite dimension of experiencing world in small ‘bits’, one thing at a time, moment following the other. In the process emotional knowledge becomes conscious awareness of sequences and events but our conscious is limited and we can never *consciously* experience the perfect emotional knowledge since: “...*listing of an endless series is doomed to be infinitesimal*”. This same division can be found in the notions of

metaphysical and mathematical infinities which will be discussed in chapter two. The idea of infinite emotion is central to bi-logic.

The division into symmetrical and asymmetrical modes is based on Freud's unconscious-conscious distinction as it appears in *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900) and in a short paper 'The Unconscious' (1915). The symmetrical mode is always unconscious, but the asymmetrical mode can be both unconscious and conscious. The reason for the *unconsciousness* of the symmetrical mode of being, according to Matte Blanco, is the inability of the consciousness to contain the symmetrical way of experiencing: "*The quality of being unconscious is not inherent in or essentially inevitable to symmetrical being. It is, instead, a consequence of the nature of consciousness, which cannot contain within itself the symmetrical being.*"^{lxi} This is so because the symmetrical mode is infinite and our consciousness finite. Consciousness (claims Matte Blanco), by its nature, can only focus on one thing at a time. It divides and differentiates, and is only able to perceive the world in a limited way. Because of this the symmetrical mode in all its infinity, all-embracingness and multi-dimensionality is literally *too much* for the limited capacities of consciousness to take in at any one time. Matte Blanco compares consciousness to a two-dimensional painting of a jug which cannot contain real three-dimensional water because it lacks the dimensions necessary for the task. In the same way our less than perfect consciousness lacks the dimensions necessary to contain the symmetrical mode of being.

Our asymmetrical (conscious) mode of being deals with the indivisible mode by dividing it into smaller and smaller units. The conscious level cannot experience the world in its totality. Instead we experience the world little bit at

a time – there is an apple on the table, it is red and round; it is warm in this room; there are sounds coming from the hall; I feel happy but slightly irritated; my parents are alive; I wish good things for my child; the post-war situation can still be felt in the politics; etc. At any given moment any of us can give a long list of things or events that exist or are going on at that particular moment. If everything that we are aware of, everything that we experience at any one moment was listed, the list would be *infinitely long*. At the unconscious, symmetrical level, on the other hand, *we are aware of everything at once, we experience everything simultaneously*. We split the experience to make sense (sensible) of what looks like a chaotic mess to the asymmetrical mode of being. The first split could be said to be the split between good and evil, heaven and hell, love and hate, life and death. On one side there is something like good-heaven-love-life and on the other side something like evil-hell-hate-death.

Generalisation and Symmetrization

Matte Blanco believed that Freud had somehow lost himself in his later writings. The brilliant insight into the workings of the unconscious doesn't sit well with the topographical model of id, ego and super-ego which seems almost to do away with the unconscious altogether. Matte Blanco also recognised that Freud himself wasn't comfortable with the discrepancies between the old and the new system, but apart from acknowledging the discomfort there was little Freud could or did do about it. In the *Interpretation of Dreams* (1900) Freud most famously writes about the unconscious, but the

text Matte Blanco often favours is a shorter account written by Freud some fifteen years after the publication of the book on dreams. This paper from 1915 is titled simply 'The Unconscious'. In it Freud enlists and describes the five characteristics of the unconscious that Matte was particularly impressed with: "*exemption from mutual contradiction, primary process [=displacement and condensation]..., timelessness and replacement of external by psychical reality*"^{lxii}.^{lxiii}

Matte Blanco's big step is to move the emphasis back to the 'old' Unconscious. He recognised that the unconscious (the 'Realm of the *Illogical*') follows *specific* rules of logic, even though these rules are not the rules of ordinary logic. This in itself is nothing new. Freud himself was aware of the unconscious being governed by *some* laws. (This can be said to be the starting point of psychoanalysis.) The illogical isn't after all completely devoid of logic. Matte Blanco's contribution is to demonstrate the logic of the unconscious, the actual 'reasoning' behind unconscious thinking, and also the ultimate incompatibility between the unconscious and conscious. Matte Blanco discovered and formulated two simple principles which help to explain and understand the unconscious. He called these the *Principle of Generalisation* and the *Principle of Symmetry*. The characteristics of the unconscious (Freud's five and many more detailed by Matte Blanco) can be explained by the use of these principles. The topographical models become unnecessary, and furthermore, the energy model which has long troubled and burdened psychoanalysis can now be replaced by an epistemological one. The central question is that of *knowledge*, not of (displaced) energies.

The Principle of Generalisation

The first of the principles is the Principle of Generalisation. Matte Blanco postulates that *the unconscious does not recognise individuals, only classes*. When encountering individuals – or 'real objects' – the (unconscious) mind has a tendency to classify them by concentrating on the common element(s). *A table*, for example, belongs to a *class (or set) of tables*. Each class in its turn is treated as a sub-class of a more general class - the *class of tables* is a sub-class of *manmade objects* which in turn is a sub-class of *inanimate objects*, etc.

The common, defining element of a class is called a *propositional function*. Propositional functions are open sentences. They do not say anything *about* anything; they define a characteristic or quality which is the uniting factor of dispersed elements. Matte Blanco cites Russell in using 'x is hurt' as an example of a propositional function^{lxiv}. 'X is hurt' is not an empirical statement; it does not tell us anything about the world. Only when the variable 'x' is given a constant value, say 'John', does the sentence become an assertion capable of truth or falsity. Because classes are collections of *single* entities (or values) which have something in common, they are called *one-place* or *unipositional* propositional functions.

Matte Blanco formulates the principle of generalisation as follows:

"The system Ucs. treats an individual thing (person, object, concept) as if it were a member or element of a set or class which contains other members; it treats this class as a subclass of a more general class, and this more general class as a subclass or subset of a still more general class, and so on."^{lxv} While inevitably all objects belong to a number of classes, the unconscious places

emphasis on some aspects (or propositional functions) while ignoring other aspects. As a result the unconscious is filled with favouritism, prejudice and unequal accentuations.

The Principle of Symmetry

Relation is an underlying concept in Matte Blanco's thinking. In the sentence 'Mary is the mother of Paul', *being a mother* defines the relation between Mary and Paul. Similarly, in the sentences 'Breast is a part of a woman' and 'Penis is a part of a man' the relation is *being a part* (of something). Because relations are collections of pairs which have a common element, they are called *two-place* or *bipositional* propositional functions. There are different types of relations. The types relevant for bi-logic are *symmetrical*, *asymmetrical* and *non-symmetrical*.

In *symmetrical relation* the converse of the relation is identical to it. The converse of 'Dublin is *near* Wicklow', for example is 'Wicklow is *near* Dublin', and the converse of 'Tim is *the cousin* of Helen' is 'Helen is *the cousin* of Tim'. The turning around of the relation does not alter the relation itself. Terms like 'equal', 'sibling', 'the same as', 'different' and 'beside' designate a symmetrical relationship. The type of relation whose converse is incompatible with the original is called *asymmetrical*. For example, the converse of 'Mary is *the mother* of Paul' is 'Paul is *the son* of Mary'. Likewise, the sentence 'The breast *is a part* of a woman' has the converse 'Woman *has* a breast (as part of her)'. Other examples of asymmetrical relations include 'under', 'better', 'smaller', 'before', and 'child'. *Non-symmetrical* relations are ambiguous because the converse is not known from

the relation alone. Thus, 'x is the *brother* of y' can have as a converse either 'y is the *brother* of x' or 'y is the *sister* of x' depending on the context (the gender of 'y'). Other non-symmetrical relations include 'external', 'enemy', 'sister' and 'beloved'.

Matte Blanco realised that the *unconscious has the tendency to treat all relations as if they were symmetrical*. This is called *symmetrization*.

Symmetrization has huge consequences that are perhaps most visible in schizophrenic thinking, but can also be seen in normal everyday situations. Think of even the simplest symmetrizations. If Paul starts to treat the converse of 'Mary is the mother of Paul' as its (literal) identical, i.e. 'Paul is the mother of Mary', he would be most likely classified as a schizophrenic. In more subtle or disguised expressions the same symmetrization might appear as Paul's 'mothering' behaviour towards his mother, or maybe just as a general tendency to 'mother' people.

Matte Blanco defines the principle of symmetry the following way:

"The system Ucs. treats the converse of any relation as identical with the relation. In other words, it treats asymmetrical relations as if they were symmetrical."^{lxvi}

There are several direct consequences of this principle. The first one mentioned by Matte Blanco is the *lack of succession*, and (by implication) the *absence of time*. In ordinary logic the converse of (asymmetrical) 'before' is 'after', but due to symmetrization the converse of 'before' is 'before'. As a result of the application of the principle of symmetry the converse of '(event) y follows after (event) x' is '(event) x follows after (event) y'.^{lxvii} When 'before' can be identical to 'after' (or even to 'at the same time'), there is no

distinction between moments, and time can't be thought in those areas of the unconscious where symmetrization reigns. It is easy to see that *absence of space* is another consequence of lack of succession. If symmetrization is applied to spatial co-ordinates, space cannot be thought in (the symmetrized areas of) the unconscious. For example, in normal logic '(point) z is after (point) w' has the converse '(point) w is before (point) z'. As a result of the application of the principle of symmetry the converse of '(point) z is after (point) w' is '(point) w is after (point) z'.

Part – whole equation is the second consequence of the principle of symmetry mentioned by Matte Blanco. As mentioned earlier, after symmetrization 'x is part of y' has the converse 'y is part of x'. Part and whole become identical. The part – whole equation is one of Freud's findings, developed by Klein, and thus quite familiar to psychoanalysis. There are several other consequences of symmetrization (and generalisation), some of which will be discussed later. The part – whole equation is, for the development of Matte Blanco's theory, the most important one. Matte Blanco asked the question: '*When is part equal to whole in mathematics?*' He answered, after Dedekind: '*When part and whole are infinite sets*'.

Acid of Symmetrization

Sets are collections of objects, and according to Matte Blanco, the unconscious knows only sets (the principle of generalisation). The objects, or elements, of any set are individual and different from each other except regarding their membership of the set. At this point it is probably better to talk about *classes* instead of sets. The difference is that whereas sets are

collections of objects, defined only by the common element of belonging to the set, *classes are collections of objects defined by a propositional function*. If we think in terms of sets, our thinking is limited by the rather concrete (real or potential) existence of the objects in question. Thinking in terms of classes, on the other hand, makes it possible to think more abstractly.

The earlier example of 'x is hurt' serves to illustrate the point. We can define a class by this propositional function, and the common thing between the elements is that they *all fulfil the condition 'x is hurt'*. If the same collection of objects was seen as a set, we would need to enlist all those elements that could replace the 'x' (the variable) of the propositional function, but we would not have the help of the propositional function binding the elements together. Why is the difference between sets and classes relevant to bi-logic? If the unconscious knew *sets* instead of *classes*, the unconscious would be capable of differentiating between several individual elements that make the set in question. According to Matte Blanco this is not possible, because the unconscious is not always capable of knowing individuals. It seems then more in line with bi-logic to say that the unconscious knows *propositional functions* which define classes. The unconscious does not know all the different *variables* that can replace 'x' in 'x is hurt'. The unconscious knows 'hurt' or 'hurting'. In the same way the unconscious does not know all the separate red things or all mothers, it knows *redness* or *motherness*. This has been referred to as *predicate thinking*.

If we now turn back to symmetrization, we can see how Matte Blanco arrived at the conclusion that the unconscious does not know individuals but only classes. We have already seen some of the consequences of

symmetrization; lack of succession and part – whole identity. When the relationship between two events or points or things is symmetrized, as a result there is a confusion of identities, and ultimately the events or points or things in question *become same*. They cease to be *similar* to each other (in some ways), and become *identical* and *inter-changeable* with each other *in every way*. If we think, for example, of the relationship 'is bigger than', normally we should have two things whose sizes differ. If the relationship is symmetrized, *both things are bigger than each other – they have become the same*. This, of course, defies ordinary logic, and it could be said that we are dealing with anti-logic; symmetrization destroys logic.

What happens when symmetrization has a free hand within a class or a set? Matte Blanco uses the metaphor of acid – symmetrization works like acid on relationships and logic, and leaves behind a mass of sameness, "in the midst of the structure of simply bivalent or Aristotelian logic the principle of symmetry makes its appearance at certain points and, like a powerful acid, dissolves all logic within its reach, that is, in the territory where it is applied. But the rest of the logical structure remains intact."^{lxviii} We can also think of jam-making. In the process all individual berries are mashed, and the result is the sameness of jam. *Within* a class all logic is destroyed, but the propositional functions *contain* the symmetrized set.

The Stratified Structure

Matte Blanco doesn't believe that the mind has a clear-cut division into unconscious and conscious but rather that the mind comprises of different levels which softly fall into each other as the proportion of symmetry and

asymmetry vary. He delineates five strata of the mind. The first two strata correspond roughly to the Conscious and Pre-conscious in Freud's first topography. The deeper strata from three to five reside mainly where Freud's Unconscious is or happens. Matte Blanco describes the stratified structure in chapter 2 of *Thinking, Feeling and Being*. The first stratum is of "conscious and well-limited objects"^{lxix}. It includes highly asymmetrical conceptions and perceptions. Differences are focused on, but when connections and relations are made based on the differences and/or similarities, there is a move towards the second stratum. The second stratum is marked by the appearance of "more or less conscious" emotions and the recognition of similarities. The similarities, however, are quite reasonable and delimited. Matte Blanco gives the example of feeling that "this person is like a tiger" without feeling that the person in fact *is* a tiger. In the third stratum greater symmetrizations begin to take place. The third stratum seems in many ways the most psychoanalytically relevant one. Matte Blanco himself places Klein's writings largely in the third stratum, but we can also place a lot of Freud here. Equivalences become identities, and each element of a class comes to carry all the properties and potentialities of the other elements in the class. In addition emotion and intensity tend to infinite values. Matte Blanco places timelessness in the third stratum. The fourth stratum consists of more comprehensive classes and wider symmetrizations. There is not much aggression, aggression requiring delimiting asymmetries. Matte Blanco sees the serenity of some schizophrenics belonging to this stratum, and he also places absence of contradiction and identity of psychical with external reality in the fourth stratum. The fifth stratum or the deepest strata is the "mathematical limit:

indivisibility^{“lxx}. Thinking becomes impossible when classes become so wide as to erase all differences.

Alessandra Ginzburg discusses Matte Blanco's notion of the *stratified structure* in 'The Bi-logical Stratified Structure: When Cats are Panthers'^{lxxi}. In this paper Ginzburg presents us with a clinical example of 'Silvia'. Silvia is described as a "bright and extremely sensitive person"^{lxxii}. The reason for Silvia's request for therapy is briefly stated by Ginzburg as "an episode of acute confusion and panic that took place during a long period of separation from her family for reasons of study"^{lxxiii}. Silvia's confused states appear to be connected to her family's, especially her mother's, experience of any growth/separation on Silvia's part as an attack against the unity of the family. This is symbolically exemplified by the mother in real life cutting the claws of Silvia's cat she had been looking after while Silvia was away. The mother had explained this to be "a necessary precaution ... to be able to keep the cat at home given the damage she kept making with her sharp claws"^{lxxiv}. Silvia feels completely identified with the cat, but there is a split between *feeling* and *thinking*: "Silvia can *feel* the punishment of the cat as if she herself had been punished, although at a more superficial level she maintains the possibility to *think* of herself as an entity different from an animal."^{lxxv} Ginzburg describes this using Matte Blanco's terminology as a *short circuit* or *contamination* between different strata. Ginzburg writes about Silvia: "What happened in the emotion area produced what Matte Blanco defines as a 'contamination' between the different strata in which the equilibrium that usually allows two different experiences, such as the heterogeneity based on differences and the indivisibility centered on equality, to be present at the

same time has momentarily been lost.^{“lxxvi}.

Silvia starts to dream about cats. In one of her dreams “*She and her family were laid siege to by panthers that made a real mess and ate people*”^{“lxxvii}. The cat has become several panthers; the “set is still that of felines, but the infinitization of her anger turns a harmless animal into a killer beast”^{“lxxviii}, or several killer beasts. Here the thinking-feeling of the third stratum has contaminated or infiltrated the more superficial strata.

After Ginzburg’s interventions in Silvia’s case, at the end of the first year of analysis, Silvia is able to say/ feel: ““Now I know that emotions are like waves, they come and go, and then come back again.””^{“lxxix} In other words, the siege of infinities has ended.

Infinitization of Emotion

Matte Blanco writes fondly about being in love. Chapter 22 of *The Unconscious as Infinite Sets* deals with *thinking or establishment of relations* in emotion. Matte Blanco discusses the type of thinking that takes place in emotion – thinking that includes generalisation, maximisation and irradiation. He starts the chapter with examples of fear, discouragement, sadness and anger. But the first example is of being in love.

”A young man is in *love* with a beautiful girl. She may have dreamy eyes. For him these are not simply a concrete thing, but also evoke a sense of unlimited beauty, of inexhaustible goodness; they are the embodiment of many more or less obscure longings, and so is her every feature. To be near her is to enter a universe filled with promises, which he may not know very well but which are potentially there and which her presence

begins to unfold. A man who does not obscurely feel an ideal beauty in the girl he loves but only limits himself to verifying some pleasant characteristics of hers, is a man who does not know or has forgotten what love is.”^{lxxx}

Most of us know what it feels like to be in love. In an instant the loved one becomes the most wonderful creature ever to have existed. Their body is no longer that of a mere mortal, their thoughts infinitely pure, and their love eternal in its tenderness. Without these experiences of magnificence the romantic relationship would be little more than a disappointment. The experience of being in love is a prime example of infinitization in Matte Blanco's theory. But why does he not shiver with dislike and discomfort in the face of the obvious exaggerations and pure silliness of being in love?

It is precisely as emotional beings that, according to Matte Blanco, we leap towards infinities. The unconscious treats individuals as members of infinite sets (the principle of generalisation) and as identical to the set (the principle of symmetry). When we relate emotionally to somebody or something, we at the same time relate to all the infinite sets the individual is a member of; ”for the symmetrical unconscious... the maximum, infinite magnitude is the only one that counts”^{lxxxi}. When it is the question of being in love, the love that ”envelopes” the object of attraction becomes infinite. The young boy who is in love with the beautiful girl sees in the girl all possible attractions of beauty, a maximum degree of beauty and all beautiful girls – she is the *personification* or *embodiment* of beauty. Especially in love infinitization seems to be an essential part of the emotion. Matte Blanco writes:

”If we coin a phrase which blatantly denies or contradicts all the above properties (of love transcending time and space) we may become more aware of how much these are an integral part of the emotion of love. Such a phrase might run as follows: 'My love for you lasts only a limited period of time and exists only as long as I am near you. I love you for certain limited qualities that attract me to you.' Surely no-one would think that this is what is actually felt by somebody who is in love. Nor would anyone expect a sympathetic response from the loved one if he stated his feelings in such a way!”^{lxxxii}

There are two types of infinitization in bi-logic. Firstly, an individual can become to represent a (unbounded) *set which extends infinitely*. Secondly, any individual can become to represent a (bounded or limited) *set with infinite elements*. Matte Blanco calls these two types of infinitization *extensive* and *intensive infinite sets*. These correspond loosely to increasable infinities and infinitesimals respectively.

Examples of extensive infinite sets include schizophrenic cosmic fantasies and all-invading emotions (like being in love). Bria's example of fear of dark places is an instance of an extensive infinite set:

”...the darkness that envelopes the place of fear (as in a narrow lift), not only overcomes other characteristics of the lift, but also becomes infinite. It is no longer that specific darkness, in that specific place, in that time and with all other characteristics that make it bearable. It becomes the absolute and infinite darkness of the class, and as such, is for the patient a coherent source of ”nameless dread!”^{lxxxiii}

Intensive infinite sets, on the other hand, are always linked with

concrete objects or situations which carry with them (or 'behind' them) an immense amount of feeling. Matte Blanco uses an example of a young man who became quite obsessed with a delay in receiving a wedding present from his co-workers^{lxxxiv}. It had been agreed that instead of buying a present, the people at work would collect money and give the money to him so he could choose himself what to do with it. After a few weeks nothing had happened, and the young man decided after brooding over the incident that if the present was not given to him within a day or two, he would definitely reject it to show his feelings.

After some free associations by the patient Matte Blanco was able to make the following comment:

”He felt that the whole behaviour of the group... indicated that their attitude towards him was not friendly but was, on the contrary, one of rejection. This would be the result of his having, in various ways, affirmed himself in front of the others, and having tried to get a position of prestige. Rejection meant, in this context, withdrawal of love and implicit disapproval of his self-assertions, which was felt to be something bad and aggressive. As a consequence of his behaviour, the delay in the collection and what he felt to be the smallness of the sum to be given by each one of his companions, was the expression of feelings of hostility and total isolation from his colleagues. This aroused intense feelings of abandonment and guilt. He felt as though his loneliness was identical to the loss of all rights to existence, in fact to non-existence; and that the feelings of guilt *deliberately* provoked by his companions amounted to their trying to make him feel as though he were completely bad, the summum of badness and aggression.”^{lxxxv}

We can see that a lot of emotion was 'concentrated' in the wedding present situation; "beneath apparently circumscribed thoughts and feelings there was a looming suggestion of an infinite set"^{lxxxvi}. Matte Blanco uses the metaphor of an emissary. A relatively unimportant individual person (or in this example, situation) is sent to represent the infinite power of the set. As a result of a good interpretation (and the following working-through of the situation), the individual becomes less important, and ceases to carry with it the power of the set.

For Matte Blanco emotions always have an infinite dimension. Infinity manifests itself in many ways at the conscious or visible level. When the two modes and the different levels of the mind (the stratified structure) exist harmoniously and all is well, the depth of emotion can be felt and tolerated. (Matte Blanco occasionally calls this bi-modality.) This is the case for example in the feeling of being in love. But sometimes there is a disruption and problems arise with experiencing emotions, like for example in the wedding present situation above. Infinite emotion bursts into our experience in the "wrong" way. Matte Blanco writes that *the action of psychoanalytic therapy "consists of divesting a given situation, individual or thing, from the infinite attributes implicit in the class", "...the effect of the therapy consists of annulling the invasion of such (infinite) processes (of the deeper levels) into the surface", and "analytic therapy succeeds... in so far as it severs the direct influence or invasion of 'symmetrical logic' in preconscious or conscious grasp of reality."*^{lxxxvii} He gives two examples of possible successful consequences of analytic therapy: "for the agoraphobic the street ceases to be the place of various dangers of infinite magnitude; for an impotent the woman

no longer represents the supreme being who is submitting the little child to a severe examination of his sexual capacity; and/or the meeting point with a ruthless father full of hate, who will annihilate him.”^{lxxxviii}

Chapter 2

The Infinite in Philosophy;

Philosophical Origins of the Notion of

Infinite as Used by Matte Blanco

The concept of infinite is central to bi-logic and in chapter two we will locate bi-logic in philosophical context. The opposition of mathematical and metaphysical infinities is examined in particular. Understanding different infinities and their relation to each other helps the reader to grasp Matte Blanco's theory of emotion. Philosophical dimension will be relevant again in chapter five which compares bi-logic to Bion's thinking.

The term bi-logic refers to the simultaneous use of two types of logic, asymmetrical and symmetrical. The asymmetrical logic has to do with difference, division, continuity and separation. The symmetrical logic has to do with sameness, undividedness, wholeness and fusion. No-one familiar with philosophy can avoid associating this with the phenomena-noumena distinction. There are, however, some crucial differences between the asymmetrical-symmetrical-distinction and the phenomena-noumena-distinction. (i) Matte Blanco's division is a description of the *mind*; he is not describing the world 'out there'. In other words, Matte Blanco is not giving a metaphysical description of the world. (ii) Matte Blanco is talking about the way we know, about the *apparatus for knowing something*, anything at all. Bi-logic is (among other things) about the *subject* of knowledge. In that sense it is

an epistemological theory. The phenomena-noumena-distinction is (mainly) about our *object* of knowledge, about that which we know something about; in that sense it belongs metaphysics. (There is, of course, an epistemological dimension to the noumena-phenomena-distinction in Kant.) At the same time the metaphysical and epistemological descriptions carry similarities that are worth studying.

Richard Rorty when visiting Trinity College Dublin in spring 1998 remarked that all philosophy moves between the beautiful and the sublime. He was referring to the distinction used by Burke and Kant among others. Beautiful referred to something limited, finite, possible to experience – often to do with man-made things. Sublime, on the other hand, referred to something infinite, awesome, beyond experience, and had usually to do with nature. Even though Rorty's own pragmatism defended almost exclusively the beautiful over the sublime, it was in his view only in *the tension created by the two poles that philosophy could exist*. Many possible paths are opened with Rorty's words, Plato's appearance-reality-, Kant's already mentioned phenomena-noumena-, and Nietzsche's Apolline-Dionysiac -distinction, just to mention a few. We could also add Matte Blanco's finite-infinite or asymmetrical-symmetrical to the list. But what *kind* of infinite is Matte Blanco talking about, and what *kind* of infinite-finite relationship takes place in his theory?

In the philosophy of the infinite the most significant distinction is made between *mathematical* and *metaphysical* infinities. The main difference between the two types of infinite is that the mathematical infinite is infinitely

increasable, and the metaphysical infinite contains everything in existence. It can easily be seen that this rough formulation corresponds closely to Matte Blanco's asymmetrical and symmetrical modes. The asymmetrical mode of being lists separate, individual items (potentially) endlessly, whereas the symmetrical mode of being contains everything – "in a 'mysterious' way", Matte often adds. The symmetrical mode is One, the asymmetrical many. The deepest level of the symmetrical mode is also sometimes compared to God, and the prototype of the metaphysical infinite is God. Until Cantor (and especially in the Middle Ages) the only officially acceptable type of infinite was the metaphysical infinite (or God).

The mathematical and metaphysical infinities are often regarded as opposites. The promoters of the infinite tend to promote only one and claim the absurdity of the other. Matte Blanco's system embraces both, and in a way that sets the two types of infinite not in opposition with each other, but as *mirror images* of each other. The mirror that reflects the images is the *translating function*. The translating function transforms the formless infinite – the symmetrical mode – into something specific. It is also a translation of the infinite, symmetrized set into a (endless) series of things, in other words, a translation of the metaphysical infinite into a mathematical one^{lxxxix}. This belief in the co-existence of the metaphysical and mathematical infinities is not unique to Matte Blanco. Kant was the first philosopher to build a system where both types of infinite co-existed harmoniously. But also Cantor, the 'inventor of the infinite', incorporated both types of infinite in his system.

The One behind Plurality – 'Infinite' in Ancient Greek Thought

We now leave this path for a while, and start elsewhere in the story of the infinite, in its chronological beginning in the Western thought. The burning question in the Ancient Greece was 'What is the world made of?'. There were many varied answers from 'water' to 'fire'. One inevitable answer, by Anaximander of Miletus (c. 610 BC – c. 546 BC), was *to apeiron* which has been often been translated as 'without limits' (*peras* meaning 'limit' or 'bound'). *To apeiron* was some kind of primal substance that contained everything that exists. From this ever-moving, neutral primal mass the primary opposites, hot and cold, wet and dry, started to separate out. These (and other) opposites were in constant strife with each other, but would eventually return to *to apeiron* where they would lose their identity once more and become part of the divine source of all things. We can see how Matte Blanco's stratified structure bears resemblance to Anaximander's thought; from the oneness of the deepest level, opposites are born when ascending to higher levels. Level three, especially, contains opposites of love and hate, good and bad, etc. There has to be enough asymmetry for these distinctions to take place. This is also where the Kleinian strife finds its home. When Anaximander's *to apeiron* finds its *peras*, strife can begin to exist.

For the Greeks matter or the stuff that everything was made of was imbued with spirit. The Pythagoreans went a step further than Anaximander by believing that the Universe as a whole was a living creature. Pythagoreans were not inspired by scientific curiosity alone, they were also a religious brotherhood with many obscure believes and practices.^{xc} The Universe was infinite (we could add 'metaphysically infinite'), and undivided One. Men, on

the other hand were many and finite, except for the soul which awaited for the demise of the body so it could return to the universal spirit. A defining feature of the Pythagorean Universe was an *inherent order* which was a numerical organisation within the nature of sound. Order also suggested beauty and harmony. The Pythagorean Universe was not some chaotic, unlimited, primal mass, but a harmonious, well-ordered whole. The harmony of the Universe was achieved by the imposition of limit (*peras*) on the unlimited (*apeiron*) to make the limited (*peperasmemon*). It is not too far-fetched to suggest that in the language of bi-logic the same could be said by: '...the imposition of asymmetry on symmetry to make bi-modal'. The emphasis for the Pythagoreans, like for Matte Blanco, is not one end or other (limited-asymmetry or unlimited-symmetry), but the co-existence of the two.

Two more pre-Socratic philosophers need to be mentioned before moving to Plato – Heraclitus and Parmenides. Heraclitus attacked the Pythagorean belief in harmony by claiming that *strife* and *conflict* were the essence of life which in itself was in constant movement or *flux*. The Pythagorean harmony seemed like death to Heraclitus, who believed that any harmony of the opposites had to be an unwilling harmony. Heraclitus believed that anything in existence existed by the destruction of something else. For the reader familiar with psychoanalysis this will bring in mind the Kleinian unconscious that is by no means a harmonious place. The relevance to Matte Blanco's thinking will become clear after we look at Parmenides whose thinking was in many ways the exact opposite of Heraclitus'. For Parmenides all movement was impossible, and the reality was a single, unchanging, motionless One. In his 'Preface' to *U.I.S.* Matte mentions Parmenides, and

points to the similarity of Parmenides' One and the symmetrical mode of being. He emphasises, though, that that is only one part of the story. We must think of man in terms of two co-existing modes, "a homogeneous, indivisible mode and a heterogeneous dividing one"^{xc1}. We can now return to Heraclitus. His view of the world is quite close to Matte's asymmetrical mode. Instead of comparing bi-logic to just Parmenides or Heraclitus, we could look at bi-logic as a combination and co-existence of the Parmenidean (symmetrical mode) and Heraclitean (asymmetrical mode) worldviews. For Matte the two contrary, opposite views are really two sides of the same coin – a return to the Pythagoreans perhaps.

When discussing emotion in relation to infinite sets Matte Blanco quotes Plato's *Symposium*: "Because the right road of love, be it that it is guided by itself, be it that it is guided by somebody else, is to begin by the inferior beauties and to raise itself to the supreme beauty, passing, so to speak, through all the degrees of the scale from one beautiful body to two, from two to all others, from the beautiful occupations to the beautiful sciences until from science to science one arrives at the science par excellence, which is no other than the science of the beautiful itself, and one concludes by knowing it as it is in itself."^{xcii} Matte Blanco refers to the similarity of the process of abstraction in the quote from Plato to the process of abstraction that takes place with the recession to deeper levels of symmetrization. "These remarks are reminiscent of the replacement of the individual by the propositional function which defines the class to which he is seen to belong."^{xciii}

Let's take a closer look at the similarities between Plato's thinking and bi-logic. Perhaps the most famous aspect of Plato's philosophy is his theory of

Forms or Ideas. The Forms are abstractions of things that can be perceived, but for Plato, the reality resides in the Forms, not in the appearances. The world of Forms is inhabited by eternal, perfect prototypes of the natural world (the world of appearances). It is easy to see the influence of Parmenides and Heraclitus on Plato's thinking. Plato believed that if reality was like Heraclitus had described it, there could be no knowledge. How could we have knowledge of something that was one thing one minute but something entirely different the next? To have true knowledge there had to be a world as unchanging as Parmenides' One. This is the world of Forms. At the same time Plato didn't go as far as Parmenides in denying the world of appearances totally. The world of appearances (i.e. that which we experience through our senses) is a shadowy copy, a bad imitation of the world of Forms.

Matte Blanco's infinite sets are similar to Plato's forms. Even though Matte didn't make the claim that the 'world' of infinite sets was somehow 'more real' than the world of asymmetrical^{xciv}, differentiated experiences, there are many connections to be seen. We have already seen how Plato's Forms and Matte Blanco's infinite sets are *abstractions* of experiences. There is also an element of *timelessness* and *unchangingness* about both the Forms and the infinite sets. Consider, for example, the Form of Mother, and the infinite set of 'motherness'. In Plato's system the Form of Mother would somehow manifest itself in each of the mothers we encounter in the world of appearances. None of the (actual, phenomenal) mothers is real for Plato; they are all poor imitations of Mother. Similarly, the set of 'motherness' can be seen to manifest itself in each and every of our experiences of mothers or mothering. This manifestation of an abstraction (formed sometime earlier in

life) can and does bear the marks of timelessness. (One is tempted to add: ‘especially in case of mental illnesses’. But it is important to remember that in bi-logic the same logical processes take place whether we are ill or not. It is not the question of different types of logic, but rather of *misplacement* of symmetries or asymmetries.)

Aristotle added a philosophically important aspect to the story of the infinite, the differentiation between *actual* and *potential* infinities. He rejected Plato’s appearance-reality distinction, and thus the only meaningful question for him was whether anything *in nature* was infinite. He began to think about the infinite in temporal terms, and saw the actual infinite as that which is given in totality *in some point of time* (metaphysical infinite), and the potential infinite as that which is given *over time*, it is never fully present but continues endlessly (mathematical infinite). For Aristotle the actual infinite was a contradictory concept – if something was given or presented over time, it could not be given or presented in any particular point of time. The only true infinite was the *untraversable*, the potential infinite. “The infinite turns out to be the contrary of what it is said to be. It is not what has no part outside it that is infinite, but what always has some part outside it.” In terms of bi-logic Aristotle considered only the asymmetrical aspect of the infinite. From an Aristotelian viewpoint it would be a contradiction to claim a *simultaneous* existence of symmetrical and asymmetrical modes of being.

Infinite God and Seeds of Eternity – the Middle Ages and the Rationalists

In the Middle Ages a curious twist of things emerged with Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas was hugely influenced by Aristotle, and his theory of the

infinite is in parts very similar to Aristotle's. But at the same time a totally opposite belief in the infinite came forth. Only the metaphysical infinite, God, was acceptable. Any talk of other types of infinite was considered incoherent and false. Aquinas agreed with Aristotle's claim that phenomenally – Aquinas would say 'in creation' – nothing is metaphysically infinite, because to be (metaphysically) infinite means being self-sufficient, and in creation nothing is self-sufficient. For the same reason there could be no actual infinite anywhere in creation. On the other hand Aquinas was happy with Aristotle's potential infinite, since it did not violate his commitment to the Christian God. The Catholic God Aquinas needed to preserve is perfect and self-sufficient but also all-knowing. He is the 'Truth', and He created the world from nothing. It is precisely Aquinas's belief in a metaphysically infinite God that is in opposition to Aristotle's thinking, but is also bi-logically interesting.

There has been some discussion about bi-logic and God^{xcv}. Certainly a similarity can be seen between the symmetrical mode of being that expresses itself in asymmetry, and the infinite God who creates the finite world. Augustine's belief that in *knowing* the totality of things God makes it finite has a particularly bi-logical feel to it contrasting the 'perfect knowledge' of the symmetrical mode with the limited but 'actual' cognitive aspects of the asymmetrical mode. This similarity can perhaps be considered natural, because Matte Blanco was a church-going Catholic, and this must have influenced his thinking. There are, however, two important differences between Matte's bi-logic and Catholic theology. Firstly, Matte's symmetrical mode is *not intentional*, unlike God. Here Matte's symmetrical mode differs also from the Freudian unconscious. There is nothing in the symmetrical mode

that pushes it forward towards asymmetry. There is no drive or instinct or energy. (Matte was, in fact, opposed to the energy-model.) The structural aspect of the symmetry-asymmetry-distinction is intrinsic, according to Matte Blanco. At the same time there is no *intrinsic* will or motive that sets the wheel moving. It appears that, if anything, it is the clash with the external world that creates the tension necessary for asymmetrization. From this clash rises the need for the asymmetrical mode to divide and differentiate (the symmetrical) and for the symmetrical mode to classify and symmetrize (the asymmetrical). Secondly, the symmetrical mode by itself is no *truer* than the asymmetrical mode, whereas the Catholic God is believed to be the 'Truth' and his creation an imperfect aspect or part of this Truth. Here is an interesting detail in Matte's thinking. The symmetrical mode is a way of knowing everything at once; it is a form of 'perfect knowledge'. At the same time, this 'perfect knowledge' is not preferable or more true than the 'bit-by-bit'-knowledge of the asymmetrical mode. Neither of the two types of knowing can nor does exist by themselves. The knowledge that is created by the constant co-existence of the two types of being creates the only truth we have.

With two of the three famous rationalists, Spinoza and Leibniz, we have a similarity to another peculiarity in Matte Blanco's view of the infinite-finite-relationship: the identity of a part with the whole. In psychoanalytic thinking the part-whole-equation is a fairly normal or typical part of unconscious thinking; a penis equals a man, a breast equals a woman, and a sail equals a boat, just to mention a few examples. Similarly, in a famous dream of Freud's, the dream of 'Irma's injection', *puffiness* in Irma equals a

particular woman (not Irma) who at one time had been puffy^{xvii}. In bi-logic any individual thing is a part of an unconscious infinite set. Thus the part-whole-equation in bi-logic means that any 'part' is identical to an infinite set, and since infinite sets are parts of more inclusive sets – and ultimately the all-including oneness – any particular, individual thing is equal to the deepest level of the symmetrical mode; the metaphysical infinite. Irma's puffiness in Freud's dream is, in bi-logical terms, equal to the class of all puffy women (of which the particular woman the puffiness signified is a member of); it is also equal to the class of all women, then the class of all humans etc., until it is identical with the deepest, all-inclusive level of the symmetrical mode of being.

With the rationalists the big question concerned the nature of *substance*. Substance or being is the primal stuff, (perhaps) an attribute of God, of that which everything is made of. The quest of the rationalists is not unlike that of the first pre-Socratic philosophers. The question was not only about *what* substance was, but also about *how many* substances there were in existence. Spinoza's answer is 'one', and Leibniz's 'an infinite amount'. Spinoza's one substance is a pantheistic God. The whole nature, everything in existence is this one substance. Here in Spinoza's metaphysics we find a part-whole-identity of the kind just referred to in relation to bi-logic, but in reverse. If (Spinoza's) God is an all-inclusive oneness, and if, also, everything is part of God, then every particular 'part' of God must be identical to God. In bi-logical terms we would say: if the deepest level of the symmetrical mode of being is an all-inclusive oneness, and if, also, everything is part of the deepest level of the symmetrical mode of being, then every particular 'part' of the

deepest level of the symmetrical mode must be identical to the deepest level of the symmetrical mode. In normal logic we would be dealing with a paradox, but in bi-logic which is about *thinking* (and not metaphysics) we are dealing with a way the (unconscious) mind understands itself and the world.

Leibniz's *monads* offer another point of similarity with Matte Blanco. For Leibniz, monads are individual, co-existing units that have no causal relation with each other. Each monad is a substance that carries with it all that it will ever be. Each monad is also a perpetual living mirror of the universe. We are reminded of Borges' Aleph. There are two connection points to bi-logic here. Firstly, every infinite set is like Leibniz's monad; it contains within itself Matte's version of the metaphysical infinite. Secondly, every asymmetrical thought contains not only the infinite set/sets it represents but the 'set of all sets' as well. Ultimately, theoretically, these may seem to come down to the same thing. Clinically there is a difference. Infinite sets are always unconscious. Asymmetrical thoughts can be conscious. Another bi-logically interesting thought from Leibniz is that of the 'possible worlds'. God created the best of all possible worlds, but other less perfect worlds are conceivable. The best of all possible worlds contains as much existence as possible with the greatest degree of perfection. This would be like a person in whom as many asymmetrical relations exist as possible *in existence* with the strongest possible presence of all levels of the stratified structure, and the strongest possible magnitude of perfection.

Descartes is the best-known of the rationalists for his dictum 'I think therefore I am', and for his philosophy of dualism. For Descartes there are *two* substances, body and mind. This is the view that has been the most influential

in Western thought. Even if we *believe* in the 'psycho-physical unity', we tend to *experience* the world and ourselves in it as split into body and mind. This incompatible existence of belief and experience is in my view present also in Matte Blanco's writings. On the one hand he states that there is only *one whole being*, but on the other hand he writes *as if* there is a mind separate and differentiated from the body. It is not an easy dilemma to escape^{xcvii}.

Empiricists, most notably Locke and Hume believed that all knowledge is derived from sense experience. They didn't believe in the existence of innate ideas – unlike the rationalists. It seems that the 'fashion' of the day moves still between the two poles of theories of knowledge. For example the question whether genes or environment determine mental illness can be seen as a version of the rationalist-empiricist -dilemma

Noumena and Absolute – German Infinities

A big turn in thinking about infinities came with Kant. For the first time in the history of philosophy metaphysical infinite and mathematical infinite were seen as two sides of the same coin. Kant's philosophy is often regarded as an attempt to unite aspects of previously contradictory worlds of rationalism and empiricism. By doing this Kant also managed to unite the two contradictory definitions of the infinite.

Kant's metaphysics is based on the interplay of two ways of experiencing the world, or two ways the world *exists* for us. *Noumena* is the way the world is when it is not perceived, the things-in-themselves. It is an undifferentiated, primordial chaos where time, space and causality have no meaning. *Noumena* is the world as we *don't* see it. What we *do* see

(experience), according to Kant, is *phenomena*. Phenomena is meant to correspond to the picture the empiricists proposed as the world – the world as we (can) see it. We experience things spatially and temporally; there is a succession of events. Things happen *before* or *after* other things, or *at the same time* with them. (In the non-temporal noumena it would be an error to assume that everything happened *at once* or *at the same time* because even thinking in these terms pre-supposes the concept of time.) There is a clear connection to bi-logic already mentioned. The deepest level of symmetrical mode of being is consistent with the noumena. The phenomena is bi-logically a more complex notion, because we need a complex interplay of both modes of being to be able to experience.

Hegel added a Heraclitean slant on Kant; everything is in perpetual movement or process of becoming. All things in existence are parts of the Absolute, a metaphysical infinity which is constantly becoming to know itself. Hegel was an idealist and believed that Mind was the ultimate reality. The road to self-consciousness is long and goes through many stages. Hegel calls this movement 'dialectical'. Original position (thesis) is opposed to by a contrary position, antithesis. These two form a new unity, a synthesis which in its turn becomes a new thesis. We can look at Matte Blanco also from a Hegelian viewpoint; the bi-logical subject is in constant movement. Growing asymmetries increase knowledge. But for Hegel all knowledge is knowledge of the self, the Mind, since there is only one substance in existence and everything is part of the bigger whole. We will return to Hegel in chapters five and eight in relation to Bion.

Cantor added a whole new dimension to the infinite. Cantor is the

creator of the set theory and transfinite numbers. He believed that God had given him the theory of the infinite as a revelation, and that mathematical objects exist as ideas in the Divine intellect. Cantor took seriously not only potential infinite but also actual infinite, which he divides further into mathematical and metaphysical infinities; transfinite numbers which can increase infinitely, and the Absolute which is unincreasable. Cantor believed that every potential infinite implies a corresponding actual infinite.

In this chapter we have briefly studied what kind of “infinite” Matte Blanco uses, and what kind of philosophical roots bi-logic has. This helps the reader towards a better understanding of the infinite-finite dichotomy used by Matte Blanco and thus towards a deeper understanding of bi-logic. In the following chapters I will place bi-logic in psychoanalytic context and study and evaluate bi-logic by comparing it to three different psychoanalytic systems first theoretically and then from a clinical perspective.

Chapter 3

The Problem of Unconscious Emotions;

Matte Blanco and Freud

According to Matte Blanco, Freud's biggest discovery was that the unconscious had a kind of logic in its activities. It was not the same kind of logic used in conscious reasoning but had rules of its own. In this the chapter we will study the relationship between bi-logic and Freud's theories on the workings of the unconscious, the place of the instincts and the nature of affect. There is a big difference especially on how Matte Blanco and Freud view unconscious emotions. For Freud emotions are always conscious. For Matte Blanco *unconscious emotion* is at the centre of his theory. In my view Matte Blanco's view of emotion is an improvement on Freud and gives a new tool for the clinician.

The Unrepressed Unconscious

Freud's unconscious, especially in the early Freud, can be largely seen identical to the *repressed* unconscious. Both the 'descriptive' and the 'dynamic' uses of the term 'unconscious' deal mainly with the repressed.xcviii Repression is a mechanism (the unconscious) mind employs in order to protect itself from harmful/dangerous/difficult/unwanted impulses. It is closely linked to Freud's theory of the instincts.xcix The 'systematic' use of the term unconscious in Freud's second topography allows better for the possibility of unconscious contents which do not belong to the realm of the

repressed. Matte Blanco takes (what he calls) Freud's *unrepressed unconscious* as a starting point in the development of his notion of the *symmetrical mode of being*. In doing so Matte Blanco has needed to diverge from his return to *early* Freud and accept parts of Freud's later theories, which also bring Freud (and Matte Blanco) closer to Klein. Part III of *U.I.S.* is called 'From the Unrepressed Unconscious to the Symmetrical Mode of Being'. In chapter 5 Matte Blanco traces the development of the unrepressed unconscious in Freud's thought. The first references of the unrepressed unconscious refer to censorship - parts of the unconscious which are not repressed but *repressing*.

From 1920 onwards Freud's thinking began to change in many ways. His theory of instincts moved from the first duality of sexual instincts and self-preservative or ego instincts to the second duality of life and death instincts. Freud also developed his second topographical model of the mind. According to the earlier model mind was divided into three systems; Unconscious (Ucs.), Preconscious (Pcs.) and Conscious (Cs.). This early notion of the unconscious is usually regarded as Freud's biggest discovery, and this view is shared by Matte Blanco. It is equally often felt that when Freud introduced his second topography; id, ego and super-ego, something of the original power of the dynamic unconscious was lost. There is a disharmony between the two systems; they don't sit easy with each other, and the agencies of the second topography don't simply replace those of the first. Dream work and primary process thinking don't seem to have a proper home in the second topography. Id was the 'new unconscious' but it contained only instinctual energy. Parts of ego were seen as unconscious as did parts of super-ego. But

primary process thinking wasn't really an ego activity. Lot of the struggles that in the first topography took place between the unconscious and the conscious, at the border of the censorship, now happened in relation to ego and other forces, i.e. id, super-ego and external reality. Ego was at the centre of all this defending itself, compromising and growing. Freud was clearly not totally satisfied with the change himself and continued using aspects of the earlier unconscious alongside the new division.

The bi-logically important aspect of the second topography is that it allows better for the existence of the unconscious which is not repressed. In the first topography the possibility of the unrepressed unconscious was there as part of emergence of the instincts and their cathexes. But the emphasis was strongly on the repressed. Matte Blanco quotes some sections of Freud where he speaks of the unconscious, unrepressed aspects of the *ego*. Here it suffices to present two fragments of citations used by Matte Blanco. The first is from *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*: "...much of the ego is itself unconscious, and notably what we may describe as its nucleus" cv. The second is from *The Ego and the Id*: "...the *Ucs.* does not coincide with the repressed; it is still true that all that is repressed is *Ucs.*, but not all that is *Ucs.* is repressed. A part of the ego, too - and Heaven knows how important a part - may be *Ucs.*, undoubtedly is *Ucs.* ...we find ourselves thus confronted with the necessity of postulating a third *Ucs.*, which is not repressed... Nevertheless we must beware of ignoring this characteristic (of being unconscious), for the property of being conscious or not is in the last resort our one beacon-light in the darkness of depth-psychology." cvi

It might seem natural to concentrate on the id if one wanted to move

away from the repressed aspects of the unconscious. The relationship between the symmetrical and asymmetrical being seems to be quite like the relationship between the id and the ego. Matte Blanco writes: "Symmetrical being is the normal state in man. It is the colossal base from which consciousness or asymmetrical being emerges."cvii If we compare this statement with the idea of id as a 'great reservoir' and with Freud's famous dictum "Where id was, there ego shall be."cviii, it is difficult to see why not simply replace Freud's old terms by Matte Blanco's new terms and develop the theory of bi-logic from there. Matte Blanco does not do this, and we can assume he had two reasons for this.

A) The first is already mentioned, namely Matte Blanco's wish to concentrate on Freud's early, dynamic unconscious which is a lot more than a mere description. The unconscious logic devised by Matte Blanco is in many ways a direct heir to the workings of Freud's dynamic unconscious. This is the aspect Matte Blanco himself wanted to emphasize; this is what he believed to be most important about the relationship between bi-logic and Freud. Matte Blanco writes in great length about Freud's discoveries in the realm of the *other logic*, the logic that is behind the dynamic unconscious processes. For example, Matte Blanco writes in chapter 7 of *T.F.B.*: "Freud made two fundamental discoveries: first, that *the unconscious does not conform to the known logical rules*, among them the principle of contradiction; second, he found and clearly described the various types of 'behaviour' of the unconscious, which he summarized in what he called the special characteristics of the unconscious."cix

B) Secondly, Matte Blanco was not happy with Freud's second

topography, his theory of the instincts and the energy model, and he wanted to move away from them. This is why the 'great reservoir of libido' in the id could not be used as a seed for the concept of the symmetrical mode of being.

The Characteristics of the Unconscious

As part of his "return to earlier Freud" Matte Blanco outlines how the characteristics of the unconscious can be seen as expressions of the two principles of bi-logic; the principle of generalisation and the principle of symmetry.

I The Principle of Generalisation:

"The system Ucs. treats an individual thing (person, object, concept) as if it were a member or element of a set or class which contains other members; it treats this class as a subclass of a more general class, and this more general class as a subclass or subset of a still more general class, and so on." cxi

II The Principle of Symmetry:

"The system Ucs. treats the converse of any relation as identical with the relation. In other words, it treats asymmetrical relations as if they were symmetrical." cxii

In *U.I.S.* Matte Blanco uses Freud's 1915 article 'The Unconscious' where Freud describes the five characteristics as 1. exemption from mutual contradiction, 2. displacement, 3. condensation (2. and 3. are both part of primary process), 4. timelessness and 5. replacement of external by psychical

reality^{cxiii}. In *U.I.S.* Matte Blanco discusses the characteristics in different order.

In *T.F.B.* Matte Blanco brings the discussion about the characteristics of the unconscious a step further. In chapter 1 ('An introduction to Matte Blanco's ideas' by Eric Rayner and David Tuckett^{cxiv}) there are listed eight more characteristics Matte Blanco has found in Freud's writings. (Matte Blanco discusses these himself in chapter 5.)

"The thirteen characteristics of the unconscious functioning... are as follows.

In 'The Unconscious':

- (1) The absence of mutual contradiction and negation (SE 14: 186).
- (2) Displacement (SE 14: 186).
- (3) Condensation (SE 14: 186).
- (4) Timelessness (SE 14: 187).
- (5) The replacement of external by internal reality (SE 14: 187).

In *The Interpretation of Dreams*:

- (6) The co-presence of contradictories (SE 4: 312).
- (7) The alteration between absence and presence of temporal succession (SE 4: 314).
- (8) Logical connection reproduced as simultaneity in time (SE 4: 314).
- (9) Causality and succession (SE 4: 314-16).
- (10) Equivalence-identity and conjunction of alternatives (SE 4: 316, 318).
- (11) Similarity (SE 4: 319-20)
- (12) The co-presence in dreams of thinking and not-thinking (SE 4: 313).
- (13) The profound disorganization of the structure of thinking (SE 4:

In chapter 2 of *T.F.B.* Matte Blanco introduces different types of bi-logical structures and explains the thirteen characteristics in new terms. We will look at these briefly and their use as explanation of the characteristics of the unconscious is only referred to.

Alassi (*alternating asymmetrical/symmetrical* structure reveals a symmetrical link in the course of process of "normal" reasoning which respects the laws of classical logic. Thoughts showing "odd" logic operate within otherwise healthy reasoning. In *Simassi* (*simultaneously asymmetrical/symmetrical*) structure a piece of reality is seen simultaneously from asymmetrical and symmetrical perspective. *Tridim* (*tridimensionalized bi-logical structure*) refers to the process, necessary because of the conceptual limitations of the (conscious) mind, of representing in terms of three or less dimensions realities (persons, beings, things...) which can be conceived of as isomorphic to a space of more than three dimensions. Isomorphic means that there is a one to one correspondence between two sets, and the correspondence preserves the structure of the sets. For example we might have a basket of apples and a basket of oranges. If we can map out an apple for each orange we have isomorphism between the two sets of fruit.^{cxvi} *The epistemological see-saw* is a rapid alternation between the two modes of being. *The molar bi-logical structure* (which is discussed in chapter 7 of *T.F.B.*) can be seen in mental manifestations which at the molecular level appear to be highly asymmetrical but contain some unnoticed asymmetrical slips at a molar level. Finally, there is *The constitutive stratified bi-logical*

structure in which different strata can be distinguished depending on the proportionate relation of symmetrical and asymmetrical thinking. The stratified structure has been discussed in chapter one.

The following is the order the characteristics are discussed in *U.I.S.* In *T.F.B.* Matte Blanco is more faithful to Freud's original order and he also groups the characteristics differently.cxvii

1. Absence of Time (Timelessness)

For Matte Blanco absence of time or timelessness is a direct result of the second principle, the principle of symmetry. If the Ucs. treats the converse of any relation as identical to it and 'before' equals 'after', there is no succession in the unconscious. Succession of moments is necessary for things to be ordered in time. If there is no ordination, there can be no alteration by the passage of time; hence there is no time in the unconscious.

Here Matte Blanco uses a strong expression "asymmetrical relations are barred" where the second principle is dominant, and by the context the reader might get the impression that asymmetrical relations are barred from the whole of unconscious. Elsewhere Matte Blanco makes it clear (as already discussed in ch. 1 of this work) that this is not the case. Asymmetry is needed in the unconscious to make distinctions between sets; symmetrical thinking and asymmetrical thinking always operate hand in hand. In the "higher" regions of the mind the proportion of asymmetry is greater and in the "lower" regions it lessens. What Matte Blanco is trying to do here is to show the possibility and actuality of absence of time in the unconscious as a result of

the second principle. However, he is not trying to claim that *all* of unconscious is ruled by symmetrical thinking alone. For Matte Blanco timelessness is a Simassi structure.cxviii

2. Displacement

Matte Blanco considers displacement as a fundamental characteristic of the unconscious. According to him displacement is at the base of many other unconscious functions, for example sublimation and transferencecxix. These other functions are examples of displacement that differ mainly regarding the circumstances in which they operate. From the bi-logical perspective displacement requires the simultaneous operation of both principles, the principle of generalisation and the principle of symmetry.

The first process of displacement is generalisation, i.e. regarding two distinct things as members of the same class. Matte Blanco uses as an example of displacement a mother and a professor. The mother who feeds belongs to a class of 'women who feed materially', and the professor who teaches belong to a class of 'men who feed mentally'. Both classes are subclasses of a wider class of 'those who feed, either materially or mentally'.

The second process of displacement is symmetrization, i.e. treating two distinct things not only as having something in common (by being members of the same class) but as identical. As a result of symmetrization, within a set all elements become identical in every respect. From this it follows that unconsciously the mother and the professor *are* the same. What appears to the conscious mind as a displacement of an affect or thought from one person to another is to the unconscious an expression of an affect or

thought towards one of the infinitely many possible identical elements. Matte Blanco writes: "*For, if displacement is considered from a logical point of view, nothing is displaced.* The original and the displaced aspects are both treated as identical. Put in another way, we can only (logically) speak of displacement if we view the workings of 'symmetrical logic' from an 'asymmetrical' vantage point."cxx Displacement is a Tridim structure.cxxi

3. Replacement of External by Psychical Reality

Matte Blanco sees the replacement of external by psychical reality as a particular example of displacement. He asks us to consider as examples the identity (as a result of the two principles) between mental cannibalism and real cannibalism or between the emotion described as bursting with rage and a real burstingcxxii. We can take a closer look at the first example. Mental cannibalism and real cannibalism can be seen as members of the set or class 'cannibalism'. As a result of symmetrization both are treated as identical in every respect, and one can be "displaced" for another. From the unconscious perspective nothing is displaced and feelings or emotions (e.g. pleasure, guilt) that belong to one also belong to the other.cxxiii But of course from the conscious perspective there is a big difference whether cannibalism is real or "only" mental. Replacement of external by psychical reality is a Tridim structure.cxxiv

4. Lack of Mutual Contradiction and Condensation

Lack of mutual contradiction and condensation are treated by Freud as two separate characteristics of the unconscious. By lack of mutual

contradiction Freud means that two wishful impulses that seem to us incompatible can exist in the unconscious side by side.cxxv Condensation is a more complicated term. It can mean that dreams are compressedcxxvi - they express a lot of latent material in a very concise form. In a wider sense this means that a dream image can include elements of two or more different things or situations. Condensation can happen by collective figurescxxvii, composite structurescxxviii or verbal meanscxxix.

Matte Blanco discusses these two characteristics together because he believes that there is a close connection between them; condensation is not conceivable without the lack of mutual contradiction. Matte Blanco gives a complicated account of the operations of the principles of generalisation and symmetrization to explain lack of mutual contradiction and condensation, and he discusses the concept of multidimensionality to give an additional account of condensation. One possible explanation, according to Matte Blanco, is that the two incompatible impulses or mutually exclusive concepts are parts of a more general whole. This would suggest the formation of wider classes and symmetrization of the subclasses of these wider classes. Matte Blanco also reminds us of the results of the part-whole equation from the bi-logical perspective, namely that any part can contain all the potentialities of the whole. From this point of view it is understandable that "an element may have more than one meaning or represent more than one person"cxx.

Matte Blanco moves rapidly to an alternative but not conflicting bi-logical explanation of condensation: "The representation of principle II with the help of the concept of a space of more than three dimensions enables us to see that if a whole is conceived as possessing more than three dimensions and

the parts are considered three-dimensional, then it is possible for several parts to occupy the same space.”^{cxxx} By this Matte Blanco means that when dimensions are reduced, elements in the larger dimension are *repeated* and *appear to occupy the same space*. Let’s look at two examples of this. In both examples the dimensions are reduced from three to two.

EXAMPLE 1: If a three-dimensional cube is expressed in two dimensions (as a surface in a drawing) parts of the cube seem to overlap each other. Depending on the angle/perspective of the drawing some or all of the “front” of the cube overlaps some or all of the “back” of the cube. In other words the “front” and the “back” would seem to occupy the same space. If, on the other hand, we draw all the sides of the cube beside each other, all the lines would appear twice and all the points three times. In other words all the lines and points would be repeated.^{cxxxii}

EXAMPLE 2: Exactly the same thing can be seen in any drawing, painting or photograph which aims to represent a visual, three-dimensional reality in two dimensions. In a picture of a glass of wine, the glass and the wine would seem to occupy the same space, even though in the three-dimensional reality this is not so.

In the same way, argues Matte Blanco, we can assume that the unconscious can contain a reality of more than three-dimensions but when entering into the conscious mind, the dimensions need to be “reduced” to three or less for our conscious mind to be able to contain or comprehend the information.^{cxxxiii} Thus in a dream image that which is condensed can in *the unconscious reality* be multidimensional. In order for the unconscious reality to be representable in the conscious mind, the elements need to appear to

overlap or exist in the same location. Lack of mutual contradiction is a Simassi structure and condensation a Tridim structure.cxxxiv

5. Absence of Negation

Absence of negation is not mentioned by Freud as a separate characteristic of the unconscious. He does, however, talk about it in the same paper where he lists the other characteristics.cxxxv Matte Blanco discusses the absence of negation under its own heading because he feels that even if Freud was not explicitly stating that it is a separate characteristic of the unconscious, it can be seen from his writings that there is a difference between absence of negation and absence of mutual contradiction.

Matte Blanco explains his claim by showing that absence of mutual contradiction has to do with conflicting or differing *impulses* which is a question of *action* whereas absence of negation has to do with *logical concepts*. Freud himself does not make a distinction between the two in 'The Unconscious' but in the *New Introductory Lectures* Freud talks about the law of contradiction as one of the logical laws of thought that do not apply in the id.cxxxvi Thus there seem to be two different characteristics, one of which is implied - or maybe even a consequence - of the other. From the bi-logical point of view both - absence of contradiction and absence of negation - can be understood by reference to same unconscious operations. Existence and non-existence are treated as identical: "...in accordance with the principle of symmetry and as a consequence of the principle of generalisation, *p* and not-*p* are identical. This means that something can be and not be at the same time. In other words, the absence of the principle of contradiction is a consequence

of the joint application of the principles of generalisation and symmetry. When both principles are applied ... there is no room for the principle of contradiction. Non-existence is treated as identical to existence. Nothing is negated because that which is negated is included in a vaster whole, and (owing to the principle of symmetry) is identical to that which is affirmed.”cxxxvii

Matte Blanco elaborates on the implications of the bi-logical reading of the absence of negation and absence of contradiction. At a deep level where distinctions between classes are blurred life and death (or being alive and being not-alive) can be treated as identical. From this it follows that “*the whole of the person may be (considered as being) alive and the whole of the person may at the same time be (considered as being) dead*”cxxxviii. At a more superficial level the deeper reality unfolds into two different things: being alive and being dead.cxxxix

When looking at the absence of negation from a bi-logical perspective Matte Blanco infers other interesting considerations. As a result of the operation of the two principles on elements of a class two elements can become identical and any one element can become invested with all the properties of any other element. Thus a negation of something can become filled with everything of that which is being negated: “*not-p becomes invested with all the properties of p, that is, of that which it negates, whatever this that' may be*”cxl (italics in original). By this operation negation itself is negated, “the concept of nothingness does not have a place”cxli because nothingness is filled with being. In other words, *a lack is always a particular lack - a lack of something*.cxlii Absence of negation is a Simassi

6.-13. The Other Characteristics

The other eight characteristics are discussed only shortly in *T.F.B.cxliv*

Co-presence of contradictories is linked to the absence of contradiction through playing with the ideas of presence and absence. It is a Simassi structure. Alternation between absence and presence of temporal succession is an Alassi structure. According to Matte Blanco Logical connection reproduced as simultaneity in time and Causality as succession are more difficult to define as bi-logical structures. There is evidence of symmetrization and asymmetrical thinking, and of a process of going towards increasing symmetry. Matte Blanco concludes that it is a question of symmetrization-confusion and perhaps of "a subtle Simassi"cxlv Equivalence-identity and conjunction of alternatives is a Simassi structure with an "increasing prevalence of the symmetrical component"cxlvi. Similarity - which Matte Blanco calls "the privileged relation"cxlvii - is not a bi-logical structure, but there is a tendency towards identification which contains an "intuition of the indivisible mode"cxlviii. Co-presence of thinking and not-thinking is a Simassi structure with a "gradual 'falling' into the abyss of symmetry-confusion"cxlix. Finally, profound disorganization of the structure of thinking is a Simassi structure with a greater proportion of symmetry, also seen in mental confusion. "If symmetry increases, a moment arrives in which thinking and consciousness disappear."cl

Instincts - Life and Death

For Freud instincts come into contact with the deepest levels of the unconscious mind - the id in the later topography. Instincts belong to the murky area between soma and psyche. They originate in body and waken first in the deep levels of the mind an orientation towards satisfaction or fulfilment. This orientation or urge reaches higher levels of mind through representations which can be verbal, pictorial or affectual.

From 1905 onwards Freud made a distinction between the source, aim and object of the instinct. The source is in biological, bodily stimulus; the aim is to extinguish the tension caused by the stimulus; and the object is what the instinct "uses" or in which the instinct finds its aim, the satisfaction. For example, hunger starts as a bodily need or sensation, it's aim is to satisfy the physical need or lack, and it's object is whatever food is available. Freud's theory of instincts originates in an attempt to describe human sexuality but Freud used the model with other instincts as well, with both the first and the second theory of the instincts. In the first theory sexual instincts are opposed to self-preservative or ego instincts and in the second theory the two (sexual and ego instincts) are grouped together and re-named the life instinct which is opposed to the death instinct.

If Freud believed that instincts originated from the deepest areas of the mind where no clear distinction could be made between body and psyche, and Matte Blanco believed that at the deepest levels of the mind all distinctions disappeared, why did Matte Blanco have a problem with just replacing "id" with "symmetrical mode of being"?

Matte Blanco's problem was caused by the simple thought that *all*

instincts entail asymmetry and at the deepest level there isn't - cannot be - any symmetry. This is why the id, "the great reservoir of libido", cannot be totally the same as the symmetrical mode of being.^{clii} The aim of the instinct is always asymmetrical. It reaches towards a specific goal. For example, "it is not possible to satisfy hunger with symbolical food (such as reading) but only with the precise food required from a biological point of view"^{cliii}. Because of this, the mind needs to have the capacity to differentiate when confronted with instinctual demands; "...the mental activities connected with the direct satisfaction of instinctive needs must necessarily distinguish food from reading, and this implies the use of asymmetrical relations"^{cliv}. From this Matte Blanco infers that instincts do not arise from the deepest levels of the mind but at a more asymmetrical level. "*The biological processes of instinct, therefore, make their first appearance in mental life at an asymmetrical level, that is, at the level which is not the deepest of all.*"^{clv} The first appearance of the instincts Matte Blanco calls 'the lateral insertion of instincts into mental life'^{clvi} and states that in the diagram of mind where Freud places the instincts at the bottom of the egg-shaped figure^{clvii}, the zone of contact between instinct and self is from bi-logical perspective "at the side of the egg-shaped figure"^{clviii} After the insertion instinctive processes are transformed into desires in the mind and are treated like emotions. They are experienced as infinite sets and have both deeper, more symmetrical levels and levels that are more asymmetrical and closer to the surface of the mind.

Matte Blanco's argument is plausible but not totally convincing. Matte Blanco does not spend much time discussing the body or the relationship between soma and psyche. His basic position seems to be that at the deepest

level of the mind where symmetrization is proportionately larger than the use of asymmetry, there are no distinctions, and one of the distinctions that become blurred and finally disappear is that between body and mind. But this is an *epistemological* statement; it describes how we perceive the world (in this case our internal world which is perceived unconsciously), it does not tell us anything about the real state of affairs, about the real relationship between psychological and physiological as it is outside our perception (unconscious or otherwise).^{clix} When stating that instincts are 'laterally inserted' Matte Blanco is making a statement about the nature of the *real* relationship between body and mind. The problem is that if we confuse the epistemological and the ontological, statements like 'at the deepest level there is no differentiation between men and women' or 'breast equals woman' – in other words all statements about bi-logical activities – would need to be taken at their face value; they would need to be treated as *literally true*. It is very important that this distinction is clear all the time.

Let us take a look at some of the other statements Matte Blanco makes about this matter. In *U.I.S.* Matte Blanco calls emotion a "psycho-physical event"^{clx} and writes: "...anything psychological which appears in a man, has a physical substratum"^{clxi} and "emotion... not only leans... on bodily events..., but *in its very nature must be viewed as a psycho-physical phenomenon*"^{clxii} In a chapter on sensation-feeling^{clxiii} Matte Blanco writes: "It seems that there is a continuity of experiences, from the most elementary sensations, passing through the various simple and more 'biological' emotions to the more elevated feelings."^{clxiv} Again, in *T.F.B.*^{clxv}: "The fact that human beings have a body determines in a basic way all their psychological life, *which appears*

as built from bodily and material experiences as a starting point."clxvi Thus the idea of a direct continuation from soma to psyche is not at all alien to Matte Blanco. If we take this as a givenclxvii, it does seem a bit odd to take the view of the instincts Matte Blanco did. It would have seemed more natural to place instincts at the (bodily) base of the psyche.

Matte Blanco was unhappy about the idea of instincts as mental energy. Even if Matte Blanco wished to discard Freud's energy model, he refers to the Plato's distinction of three basic varieties of psychological phenomena; thinking, feeling and *willing or striving*clxviii and talks about *intentional presence* quoting Brentano: "Every psychological phenomenon contains in itself something as object, but each phenomenon contains this object in its own way."clxix Tying this with bi-logic Matte Blanco states: "In both modes of being, symmetrical and asymmetrical, there is... a *psychical movement towards a physical object*"clxx. In *T.F.B.* Matte Blanco actually defends the use of the term 'instinct' and adds that words like 'desire', 'wish' and 'feeling' refer to the same psychoanalytic realities.clxxi

Matte Blanco's view on the death instinct seems to support the idea that also in bi-logic we should look at instincts as somatically originating force which pushes the mind towards developing by compulsory divisions of experiences.clxxii

Freud introduced his second theory of instincts in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*. He had witnessed in patients the compulsion to repeat painful experiences which lead him to believe that there was in us an urge more primitive than the pleasure principle; a force that made us *repeat* the painful

experience instead of *remembering* it. Remembering is a way of mastering a situation. Freud observed how repetition of an emotionally meaningful experience in child's play helped the child to make an experience - especially a painful experience - into a something that could be worked through and remembered. In a famous section Freud describes how an eighteen month old child invented a game with a piece of string and a wooden reel tied to the end of it. The child would throw the string over the edge of his curtained cot and then pull it back again. Until then he had been delighting himself by throwing objects out of his reach expecting someone to bring them back to him. Now he had a way to bring the object back by himself. When throwing the object the little boy would cry 'o-o-o-o' which represented the German word '*fort*' ('gone') and while pulling the object back he would let out a cheerful '*da*' ('there'); *fort-da* (gone-there). This was the child's response to his mother's absence; the mother (the reel) was gone but now he could bring it back! He wasn't a passive sufferer of the situation but took an active part in it. He made an originally unpleasurable situation into a pleasurable game. This, for Freud, was an example of a good, healthy repetition dominated by the pleasure principle.

Freud also encountered different kind of repetition in patients. Patients tend to repeat repressed situations in clinical practice; this is the basis for transference. With the aid of the analyst the painful, repressed material is worked through and can become a memory or a dream which can be assumed to be less unpleasurable than the original experience. But with some people this does not work; "...no lesson has been learnt from the old experience of these activities having led instead only to unpleasure. In spite of that, *they are*

repeated, under pressure of a compulsion."clxxv There is nothing surprising about this when the repetition relates to active behaviour. When the repeated experience is of a *passive* type and gives the subject no pleasure of mastery but only the same painful experience repeated over and over again, there is evidence of an unconscious tendency which does not aim towards decreasing pain and increasing pleasure - a tendency which is *beyond* the pleasure principle; "...there really does exist in the mind a compulsion to repeat which over-rides the pleasure principle"clxxvi

Freud mentions several examples of compulsion to repeat which lead to 'perpetual recurrence of the same thing' or the subject "meets with a repetition of the same fatality"clxxvii; for example, "the man whose friendships all end in betrayal by his friend; ... the lover each of whose love affairs with a woman passes through the same phases and reaches the same conclusion"clxxviii. Why does this *useless* repetition occur?

Freud contemplated that any biological system has a conservative tendency. While there is a thriving towards the new, previously inexperienced/unlived (because of demands from life outside), at the same time there is a counter-tendency pulling the organism back: "...*an instinct is an urge inherent in organic life to restore an earlier state of things* which the living entity has been obliged to abandon under the pressure of external disturbing forces"clxxix. Following from this, it would be contradictory to assume that the ultimate aspiration towards which life travels is something new and unfamiliar. Life must aim towards a familiar condition, "an initial state from which the living entity has at one time or other departed and to which it is striving to return by the circuitous paths along which its

development leads”clxxx. Thus Freud famously states that ”*the aim of all life is death*”clxxxii.

Matte Blanco has written a paper where he discusses Freud’s death instinct from a bi-logical perspective, ‘The four antinomies of the death instinct’ clxxxii. Matte Blanco finds four antinomies that are created by Freud’s theory of the death instinct: 1. ‘life tends to preserve itself’ and ‘life tends to destroy itself’, 2. ‘destruction (of life) is at the service of life’ and ‘life is at the service of the destruction (of life)’, 3. ‘life unfolds in the direction of the movement which characterises it (I.e. the movements of life) and ‘life unfolds in the direction of the extinction (repose) of the movement of life, 4. ‘life’ and ‘negation of life’ or life=death. When Matte Blanco views the first three antinomies ”in the light of the logic of the unconscious”, they are all transformed into the fourth antinomy, I.e. life=death. Matte Blanco’s claims are interesting, but what most concern our present topic are some of the things he writes in this paper. All the quotes are from the paper ‘The four Antinomies...’.

I ”I believe that the concept of the death instinct was Freud’s most significant attempt to study *the relationship which exists between the structure of the logic of the unconscious and the structure of the material world.*”

Here Matte Blanco clearly talks about the real relationship between mind and matter, and he states that Freud’s concept of the death instinct is an attempt to study this real relationship.

II ”...the interaction between the modes is realised on different levels...

At a certain depth then movement is no longer conceivable, so at this level there cannot exist the concept of instinct which implies movement. The distinction between life and death disappears: life = death.”

Matte Blanco states his original position: instincts cannot exist at the deepest level of the mind. He is talking as if we are looking *downwards* towards the depths of our being; first instinct with all its asymmetrical aspects is inserted laterally, somewhere in the *middle* of the stratified structure, and then, when we reach low enough, the distinction disappears. To put it differently: an asymmetrical instinctual demand enters into the psyche, and we are forced to think-feel about it simultaneously at different levels - at all levels - of the psyche. At the relatively 'higher' or more asymmetrical levels we might feel, for example (in case of a wish/instinctual demand emanating from the death instinct) an asymmetric wish to stay in bed all day and thoughts to do with worthlessness and despair. At a 'deeper' level, however, there is no feeling and there is no thinking, because there is no movement, no happening. It is a *state of pure being*, of complete rest and immobility. There are no distinctions - not between life and death nor between any other disparate aspects of existence. Existence equals non-existence, being equals nothingness, life equals death.

III ”The asymmetric mode of being, by its nature, seeks precision, clear delimitations; or, if you prefer, it is characterised by precision. Confronted with the vague imprecision of symmetry it automatically sets in motion a process of definition: it isolates possible implications, separates them and distinguishes them. This is the process of translating or splitting. Confronted with the motionless unit: life-death, it translates, splits this unit into two

opposites: life and death, and introduces movement, a "tending towards". And so by this process, what Freud called the death instinct becomes possible in mind. I must add, however, that by this process the death instinct has not emerged: it has only become possible."

Close to the end of his paper Matte Blanco moves to the relationship between the two modes of being: the symmetrical mode and the asymmetrical mode. As repeatedly stated, the symmetrical mode tends to generalise and symmetrise. Here Matte Blanco focuses on the asymmetrical mode with its tendencies to split and define. Here Matte Blanco also gives one answer to the question 'Why?'. If the instincts don't 'set us in motion', what does? What is the force behind all this psychic activity he describes? The answer can be found in the encounter or confrontation of the two modes of being. The asymmetrical mode is confronted with "the vague imprecision of symmetry", "the motionless unit: life-death", and it "automatically sets in motion a process of definition" and "translates, splits". Thus the motivator is the *internal "communication" between the two modes of being*, the continuous (point of) coming-together of two incompatible perspectives. This is very interesting because Matte Blanco doesn't spend much time with the *motivation* of movement within the psyche, of anything happening at all. Here he states that the point of contact between the two modes is enough – or should be enough – to set psyche into action. We might then assume that a problem at this juncture results in problems in psychic life. The bi-logical readings of all three case histories later in the thesis support this assumption.

We have moved quite a distance from the claim made earlier that

'Matte Blanco's view on the death instinct seems to support the idea that also in bi-logic we should look at instincts as somatically originating force which pushes the mind towards developing by compulsory divisions of experiences'. There have been some ideas that bring us closer to the body, but Matte Blanco's main position seems to have brought us even further from our claim.

We need to look at things differently. Even if Matte Blanco gives us a fascinating answer to the question of internal, psychical activity, he does not deny the effects of the external world - or indeed the effects of the body and the instinctual demands from within. As shown in some of the quotes above, Matte Blanco takes the idea of a person as a psycho-physical whole very seriously. To repeat just one quote: "The fact that human beings have a body determines in a basic way all their psychical life, *which appears as built from bodily and material experiences as a starting point.*"^{clxxxiii} The contradiction here - which was probably not realised by Matte Blanco - is only apparent.

The answer to the dilemma is quite obvious. The "depths of our being", our real being, not just our experiencing, is *both symmetrical and asymmetrical*. The deepest levels of symmetry are a way to experience but it does not describe the real nature of our being. *The body is not only the source of symmetrical thinking-feeling but the source of all mental activity*. Thus we could turn Freud's egg sideways and have the hole or the "place" where body "enters" the mind at the bottom of this lopsided egg - which is exactly where Matte Blanco places the instincts.

Thus in my view it is true to say both that *instincts are laterally inserted* and that *instincts arise from the depths of our being*. Instincts force

the asymmetrical mode to make the first *divisions* and *separations* to the all-encompassing symmetry; hunger forces us to see the world as edible and non-edible, self-preservation makes us to distinguish between safe and dangerous beings and situations etc. At the same time the symmetrical mode *classifies* and *symmetrizes* the asymmetrical divisions. For example, from the symmetrical perspective, the edible and non-edible objects are seen only as edible and non-edible, and they aren't distinguished from each other in any way. Instincts - which are placed somewhere in the messy ground between soma and psyche - set in operation both modes of being, not just the asymmetrical activity upon the symmetrical mode.

Unconscious Emotions

The biggest difference between Matte Blanco and Freud is on the nature of emotion. When Matte Blanco made a conscious decision to return to Freud, especially the Freud of *The Interpretation of Dreams*, his decision can be seen as a reaction to Klein. However, Matte Blanco's theory of emotions is more compatible with Klein's model than with Freud's. In places Matte Blanco's views are contrary to Freud's. Matte Blanco's main clinical source of material comes from schizophrenic patients. Klein was the one to pioneer in psychoanalytic treatment of schizophrenia, whereas Freud's main interest was in neurotic disorders. Klein was also the one to emphasize the importance of emotion. Even though emotions – or affects – were unquestionably important for Freud, he never placed them at the core of the human experience.^{clxxxiv} For Freud affects were conscious representations of instincts. Each instinct

expressed itself in terms of *affects* and *ideas*. The two were not necessarily bound together – the separation of the two was in fact what made repression possible. The focus of Freud's interest was not on the affect itself but on the modifications the instincts needed to undergo in order to gain access to consciousness.

Klein, on the other hand, started from Freud's later writings on life and death instincts, and based two emotions, envy and gratitude (or love) as the starting point for all human experience. Matte Blanco goes even further. For him emotion, or rather emotion-thinking, *is* the human experience. Matte Blanco – unlike Freud – not only accepts the existence of unconscious emotions but *equates* unconscious with emotion: “...at the deepest levels, where symmetry is in relatively greater proportion, *desires are necessarily unconscious*. Desires are emotions.”^{clxxxv} “...it is becoming increasingly evident to us that *emotion and unconscious are basically the same thing*”^{clxxxvi}. The reason for the *unconsciousness* of the symmetrical mode of being lies, according to Matte Blanco, in the nature of consciousness.^{clxxxvii} The finite consciousness simply cannot contain the infinite symmetrical mode of being. Here Matte Blanco uses the term ‘unconscious’ as an *unrepressed but dynamic unconscious*. Unconscious means something that a) is not conscious (by its nature), b) equals emotion and c) (according to his own definition) has tendency to generalise and symmetrize.

Matte Blanco's way of defining emotional activity is close to Klein's unconscious phantasy, whereas for Freud, especially early Freud, the idea of an unconscious emotion was inconceivable. 'Unconscious phantasy' is a term used by Klein and her followers to denote the primary content of unconscious

mental processes. Splitting, projection, introjection and projective identification are the basic defence mechanisms used by the early ego against its own innate destructiveness. Through these processes the unconscious becomes filled with *affective* objects and part-objects (for example the 'good breast' and the 'bad breast'), as well as the original destructiveness (or envy) and gratitude (or love). For Klein all emotions begin by being unconscious.^{clxxxviii}

Freud's view that emotions are by their very nature necessarily conscious comes across clearly in 'The Unconscious'^{clxxxix}. In chapter 3 of the paper Freud writes regarding the possibility of unconscious emotions:

“...it may happen that an affective or emotional impulse is perceived but misconstrued. Owing to the repression of its proper representative it has been forced to become connected with another idea, and is now regarded by consciousness as the manifestation of that idea. If we restore the true connection, we call the original affective impulse an 'unconscious' one. Yet *its affect was never unconscious*; all that happened was that its *idea* had undergone repression. In general, the use of the terms 'unconscious affect' and 'unconscious emotion' has reference to the vicissitudes undergone, in consequence of repression, by the quantitative factor in the instinctual impulse.”^{cxc}

In other words, it is the *ideational representative* of the instinct that can become unconscious as a result of repression, whereas the *affective representative*, according to Freud, cannot. Affects are *conscious* representations of instincts. But there are certain modifications of affect that can take place as a result of repression. In 'The Unconscious' Freud mentions

three such vicissitudes that are possible: 1) the affect can remain as it is, 2) the affect can be transformed into a qualitatively different one, above all into anxiety, and 3) the affect can be suppressed, i.e. prevented from developing at all. These vicissitudes are already referred to in a paper on 'Repression' and in *The Interpretation of Dreams*^{cxci} Freud discusses affects in dreams using similar distinction.^{cxcii}

When the affect remains the same, it can be displaced onto another object. Freud gives an example of this when discussing homosexuality and paranoia in the case history of Schreber. The homosexual wishful phantasy can be contradicted by a proposition that displaces the object of love: "I don't love him, I love *her*"^{cxciiii}. In the same discussion Freud gives an example of an affect that is turned into a qualitatively different one. For example amorous tendencies can be turned into hostile ones: "I don't love him, I *hate* him"^{cxciiv}. Most commonly affects, according to Freud, are turned into anxiety. Later Freud altered his views on anxiety as can be seen in *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety* (1926). It wasn't any longer the case that anxiety is a result of repression but that repression is a result of anxiety. However, Freud's view that emotions cannot be unconscious remained unaltered.

If repression is truly successful, it will manage to *suppress the affect* before it has had a chance to develop. It is possible that Freud wanted to include somatic symptoms (especially in hysteria) in this group. Instead of experiencing a psychological affect, the patient experiences a physical pain. Freud writes: "...all that corresponds in that system (*Ucs.*) to unconscious affects is a potential beginning which is prevented from developing"^{cxcv}, "there are no unconscious affects as there are unconscious ideas"^{cxcvi}.

If we take seriously the idea of humans as psycho-physical entities, it would seem more consistent to follow down the route Matte Blanco has taken. Whether emotions are conscious or unconscious cannot be *proven* for the same reason the existence of the unconscious itself cannot be proven. In the same way unconscious can be believed to exist by looking at its “products”, unconscious emotion – and especially the *infinite* nature of the unconscious emotion – can be implied by its “products”. I am hoping that the case fragments presented in the thesis and particularly the bi-logical reading of case material will show that Matte Blanco’s view of emotion is a viable one, and also that concentrating on the *infinite* nature of emotion the analyst will have a useful tool for the clinical work.

Freud wrote about the reasoning behind mental phenomena that appeared to be irrational – dreams, symptoms etc. Matte Blanco investigated in closer detail the nature of this unconscious logic. I have shown how Matte Blanco's theory of affects differs radically from Freud's. I will continue the discussion by showing how bi-logic is more compatible with the Kleinian model of emotions which is also based on the view that emotions can be, and to a great extent are, unconscious.

Chapter 4

Life as Embodiment of the Unconscious;

Matte Blanco and Klein

In *Thinking, Feeling and Being* there is a chapter devoted to Klein. In this chapter Matte Blanco talks about the importance Klein's *Psycho-Analysis of Children* had for him, and he acknowledges Klein's influence in his work as equal to Freud's: "it is in the fact of living in the atmosphere created by him [Freud], on the one hand, and by her [Klein], on the other, that I arrived at my present formulation"^{cxvii}. "I now can see and live a synthesis of both with no detriment to either one."^{cxviii} Matte Blanco describes the experience of reading Klein as strongly emotional, fascinating and anxiety-provoking. "Perhaps the comparison with an exuberant, dense, attractive, mysterious, exciting, and frightening tropical jungle conveys something of the experience of getting to know Klein."^{cxix} Towards the end of the chapter, in a 'PostScript: a personal impression of Melanie Klein', after an armful of compliments to Klein - including descriptions of Klein as "charmingly feminine", with a "viscerotonic face" and a "beautiful complexion"- he writes: "Honesty prompts me to add that, though from the beginning of my study of her writings I conceived a great admiration for her, this, however, was far from being free of ambivalence. Now, in my old age, I can see how intense in all senses was the storm that Melanie Klein awakened in me. It took several decades to arrive at a more serene attitude towards her."^{cc}

However, there are still signs of Matte Blanco's ambiguity towards

Klein, and the reader is not left with an impression of Matte's 'serene attitude' towards her. We are, rather, left with the feeling of "going down Niagara Falls", descending with Klein to the "abysses of being"^{ccci}, but surviving, not unharmed or serene but with all the marks of a catastrophic emotional change. While *The Unconscious as Infinite Sets* can be seen as an attempt to separate from Klein by focusing on Freud, *Thinking, Feeling and Being* includes signs of reparation (a tribute to Klein) and growing independence (development of bi-logical concepts).

Infinite in Klein's Writings

Matte Blanco attributes the anxiety experienced when reading Klein to the *level of depth* (in the stratified structure) Klein's writings deal with. Klein's thinking, according to Matte, is concerned with the *third and fourth strata of the mind*. This is where "the indivisible mode is *translated* in terms of heterogenic experiences"^{cccii}, and intensity "tends towards infinite values"^{cciii}. With a special reference to *The Psycho-Analysis of Children* Matte Blanco identifies four characteristics in Klein's writings where the concept of *infinite* is implicit.

a) *Intensity of feeling* - Matte Blanco offers no quotations to support his claim since "the book [*The Psycho-Analysis of Children*] is so much permeated with this idea, that it seems useless to make quotations"^{cciv}. Later in the clinical section we'll be discussing the case of John. In Klein's interpretation of John's symptoms the most obvious feelings are John's aggression and an intense *fear* of his own emotion. Also the transformation of the fish into crabs whose 'numbers were legion' and who 'were as big as

elephants' can be seen as a *representation* of John's intense emotion of aggression/sadism. The intensity of emotion is linked to the infinite, because for Matte Blanco the '*deeper*' we descend towards the invisible infinite, the more intense are our emotions. (Likewise, when ascending 'higher' towards the total asymmetry, our emotions become increasingly 'cooler' and more 'diluted'.)

b) Variety of intense impulses and their corresponding fears - Matte Blanco mentions some of them: "oral cannibalistic, sucking, scooping, emptying, biting, anal sadistic, and so on"^{ccv}, and again refers to the difficulty (or unnecessary) of extracting separate passages from Klein's book which is filled with discussions and descriptions of these impulses. John's "craving" and "compulsive, almost greedy, collection of things"^{ccvi} are examples of intense impulses, as is John's paralysing fear of these impulses.

c) Multiplicity of objects and consequently of dangers. To illustrate these, Matte quotes three comments from Klein, all from the same page: "(I) 'a multitude of persecutors inside its body'; (ii) 'the child's fears of subterranean attacks upon itself on the part of its introjected and external objects become manifold'; (iii) 'Its anxiety spreads out and is distributed over many objects and sources of danger in the outer world, so that it now expects to be attacked by a great number of persecutors.'^{ccvii} In this quotation Matte uses from Klein we can see the defensive function of multiplying or '*spreading out*' of the object that is experienced as infinitely threatening. By distributing 'smaller' amounts of the emotions on many objects the person (usually schizophrenic) phantasies that the emotion is *tamed* and made thus less harmful or dangerous. He makes a further comment that the multiplicity

of objects shows the way thinking translates the indivisible infinite into an endless series of elements “whose counting cannot come to an end”^{ccviii}.

Another way to express the same is to say that the metaphysical infinite is translated into a mathematical infinite by the thinking process; in order to be able to conceptualise the undivided whole, the mind needs to think about it as a (unending) series of divided bits. The ‘multiplicity’ is relevant to (b) and (d) also, since in both (b) and (d) we are dealing with a *variety* of something - impulses and fears; attacks. This suggests the division of a larger symmetrised (infinite) set into its elements.

In John’s dream we can see the ‘multiplicity of dangerous objects’; the crabs are becoming larger in numbers and size; their ‘numbers were legion’ and they were ‘as big as elephants’. Klein’s analysis of the dream deals with (dangerous) penises and faeces - both John’s and his father’s - babies, weapons and animals.

(d) *Variety of the nature of attacks* - Matte Blanco mentions some of these: “biting, scooping, cutting to pieces, pulverizing, blowing up into innumerable pieces, cataclysmic explosions, and so on.”^{ccix} In John’s case many types of attack can be found; “tearing, cutting, burning and wetting of objects” - not only in phantasy but also in reality - as well as killing, dirtying and injuring. The bi-logical significance of the variety of attacks is similar (or even the same) as in (c) - a division of the infinite into separate elements. (For the symmetrical mode there is only *one* attack which the asymmetrical mode ‘sees’ as a *variety* of (different types) of attacks.)

Simassi Bi-Logical Structure

Matte Blanco defines Simassi (Simultaneously asymmetrical/symmetrical) structure as “that in which the same restricted piece of reality *is seen simultaneously* from the point of view of normal or asymmetrical reasoning and from a symmetrical point of view^{ccx}” As an example of Simassi-reasoning he mentions a schizophrenic’s fright upon seeing a door opening. His exclamation: ‘The animals are eating me’ includes a Simassi-structure since on the one hand the schizophrenic was able to asymmetrically distinguish between a door and a dangerous animal. But on the other hand the opening door was symmetrically equated with a dangerous animal, firstly on the basis that the German word for ‘animals’ (*Tieren*) sounds similar to the word for ‘doors’ (*Thüren*), and secondly on the basis that the movement of the door opening is like the movement of a mouth opening. These similarities were seen as identities through symmetrization. In short, a Simassi bi-logical structure occurs when the same object/ piece of reality is *simultaneously* treated asymmetrically and symmetrically.

Matte Blanco gives two detailed instances of a Simassi-structure in Klein’s writing. (Both instances come from a quotation included in an article on projective identification by Luciana Bon de Matte). The quotation from Klein will follow in full with the sections discussed by Matte Blanco underlined. “The phantasied onslaughts on the mother follow two main lines: one is the predominantly oral impulse to suck dry, bite up, scoop out and rob the mother’s body of its good contents ... The other line of attack derives from the anal and urethral impulses and implies expelling dangerous substances (excrements) out of the self and into the mother. **(1)** Together with these

harmful excrements, expelled in hatred, split off parts of the ego are also projected onto the mother or, as I would rather call it, into the mother. These (2) excrements and bad parts of the self are meant not only to injure but also to control and to take possession of the object. In so far as the mother comes to contain the bad parts of the self, she is not felt to be a separate individual but is felt to be *the bad self*.

Much of the hatred against parts of the self is now directed towards the mother. This leads to a particular form of identification which establishes the prototype of an aggressive object-relation. I suggest for these processes the term 'projective identification'.^{ccxi} (Matte Blanco aims to use these particular passages not only to demonstrate that Klein uses a Simassi bi-logical structure, but also to discuss the bi-logic of projective identification.)

(1) The first passage from Klein which Matte discusses has to do with the *projection* of dangerous substances and parts of the ego into the mother. "Together with these harmful excrements, expelled in hatred, split off parts of the ego are also projected... *into* the mother."^{ccxii} The symmetrical aspect of the statement, according to Matte, is the *identity* of psychical and physical, which, he reminds us, is one of the characteristics of the unconscious described by Freud. Matte Blanco mentions the symmetrical identification between *excrements* (which are *physical*) and *parts of the ego* (which are *psychical*); in (asymmetric) reality it is not possible to project 'parts of the ego' *together* with excrement any more than it is possible to project the "square root of -5"^{ccxiii} together with excrement. But we can also note that the whole idea of *projection* - even if it is psychical into psyche - *rests on an identification of psychical and physical*. The psychical is treated *as if* it was

physical - how else could something non-physical be projected in the first place?

However, Matte Blanco emphasises that this is not a question of unscientific confusion on Klein's part, since she talks about *expelling* the excrements and *projecting* the parts of the self. The bi-modality of Klein's discourse remains intact, but the bi-logical aspect of her subject-matter (what the patient feels) is revealed by her use of the term 'together'. The simultaneous *asymmetrical* aspect, according to Matte, can be seen in the assertion of the difference between excrements and parts of the ego. The two are *at the same time* treated *as if* they are same and different.

(2) The second passage discussed by Matte Blanco has to do with *identification* of the mother with what has been projected. The "excrements and bad parts of the self are meant not only to injure but also to control and to take possession of the object. Insofar as the mother comes to contain the bad parts of the self she is not felt to be a separate individual but she is felt to *be* the bad self."^{ccxiv} Here the mother is treated *at the same time* as if she was a *separate individual* and *identical to self*. The mother is treated as separate in so far as the bad aspects of the self can do something *to* the mother (injure, control and take possession of). The mother is treated as identical when she is felt to be the bad self. Thus "on the one hand the bad self and the mother are quite different; on the other hand they are only one thing."^{ccxv}

Matte Blanco also refers to another asymmetrical aspect further in the citation. When Klein writes: "Much of the hatred against parts of the self is now directed towards the mother" she is talking about a purely asymmetrical *process of projection*. This conveniently leads us to the next, and perhaps most

important, aspect of Klein's work Matte discusses, *projective identification*.

Bi-Logical Understanding of Projective Identification

Matte Blanco begins the section on projective identification by noting how the Freudian concept of 'projection' has almost disappeared from psychoanalytic writing and has been replaced by the new concept 'projective identification'. He claims that this "radically new and profound understanding of the mind"^{ccxvi} implicit in projective identification (PI) "points to, and implicitly gives a place to, the indivisible"^{ccxvii}. In her 1952 paper 'The Emotional Life of the Infant' Klein describes projective identification in relation to some aspects of unconscious phantasy: "In these various phantasies, the ego takes possession by projection of an external object - first of all the mother - and *makes it into an extension of the self. The object becomes to some extent a representative of the ego* and these processes are in my view the basis for *identification by projection* or 'projective identification'."^{ccxviii} Matte Blanco traces three distinct steps taken by Klein in the process of projective identification. 1) In the first instance "the object becomes to some extent a representative of the ego". 2) Next the ego "makes it [the object] into an extension of the self". 3) Finally, "identification by projection" takes place.^{ccxix}

The first phase, where the "object becomes to some extent a representative of the ego", Matte Blanco parallels to one of an ambassador representing the president representing the country. He likens 'object' with 'ambassador', 'ego' with 'president', and 'country' (presumably) with 'whole self'. Matte focuses on the qualification 'to some extent' to show that object

and ego are *not identical* even though they might exercise the same function. Furthermore, the word 'becomes' has an asymmetrical connotation. The bi-logically significant aspect of the first phase is that *ego and object are separate* from each other.

In the second phase - when the ego "makes it [the object] into an extension of the self" - the object remains *separate* from the self but the self has "*priority*" over the object. The parallel Matte Blanco uses is of a 'mother country' and its 'colony'. The colony (object) becomes an *extension* of the mother country (self) while *both retain their separate identities*. In this second instance the bi-logically significant point is also the *separateness* of ego and object.

The third phase, "identification by projection" is radically different from the first two in that the *object and the ego have become identical*: "The invader-controller is now the same thing as the invaded; they are identical."^{ccxx} In other words, we need symmetrical thinking to explain the third phase of projective identification, whereas the first and second phases can be adequately explained with asymmetrical thinking.

Matte Blanco mentions the ambiguity regarding Klein's definition of projective identification. "It is not easy to see whether, according to Klein, PI [projective identification] is or is not the result of these processes, or is itself a process or a state."^{ccxxi} Matte Blanco infers a simultaneous existence of asymmetrical and symmetrical activity in projective identification, and for a moment we might think that he is talking about the Simassi-structure. "*Melanie Klein's concept of PI is an attempt at picturing contemporarily two different things which can, however, be grasped clearly only if they are*

definitely treated as being different from one another.^{“ccxxii} He concludes that projective identification is a bi-logical structure. However, he doesn't think that projective identification is a Simassi-structure, “it is not any of the structures already mentioned^{“ccxxiii}.

To demonstrate the bi-logic of projective identification Matte Blanco uses the mathematical notion of a *vector*. ‘Child’ is located at a particular point on the vector, ‘mother’ at another point. When *projection* takes place there is *movement* from one point to another point on the vector, in this instance movement from ‘child’ and ‘mother’. When it is a question of *identification*, the ‘mother’ becomes ‘mother-child’ and the ‘child’ becomes ‘child-mother’. There is no movement from one point to another, since distance has disappeared as a result of symmetrization, and “everything happens within the mother-child-child-mother^{“ccxxiv}. Because there is *at the same time* movement and no movement, projective identification turns out to be a *type* of Simassi-structure after all, a “*symmetrised vector Simassi structure*“. Matte Blanco concludes that “*projective identification as described by Melanie Klein is a bi-logical structure isomorphic to a symmetrised vector, which results in a Simassi bi-logical structure ... a symmetrised vector Simassi structure*^{“ccxxv}.

Matte Blanco's analysis of projective identification attempts to show not only how it is possible to read projective identification through bi-logic, but also the difference between projection and projective identification from the point of view of bi-logic. In projection, it seems, there is movement (for example the movement from ‘child’ to ‘mother’), in projective identification there is and is not movement at the same time (as Matte has shown using

vectors). However, a small inconsistency gets in the way of this conveniently simple explanation. When demonstrating the use of the vector he writes: “Once the *projection* takes place, the mother becomes the bad self of the child^{“ccxxvi} resulting in a ‘mother-child’ identification. So if the mother and the child become identical also as a result of projection (and not only as a result of projective identification), projection, too, can be seen as a symmetrised vector Simassi structure. Matte Blanco tries to show the difference by demonstrating symmetrization in projective identification in *both* directions, from child to mother *and* mother to child. But it would seem adequate to have symmetrization in one direction only for a symmetrised vector Simassi-structure to take place.

It might be possible to get out of this difficult situation and save Matte Blanco’s argument by holding that projection is a *process*, and that in projection there is *no* (symmetrised) identification taking place. (This seems to be Matte Blanco’s general view of projection as referred to earlier in the chapter). This is suggested by the word ‘becomes’ in the quotation (“the mother *becomes* the bad self...“). Possibly what Matte Blanco means is that *identification takes place succeeding projection*, the mother becomes ‘mother-child’. In this case we could both maintain the distinction between projection and projective identification, and see the benefit of bi-logic in distinguishing and explaining the two.

Varieties of Splitting

1) Kleinian Splitting

“It is rather like the man in the Bible. He lived in a wonderful castle in which he collected all sorts of treasures, but this castle was overrun by horrid creatures and vermin, and he was exiled into a little cottage.”^{ccxxvii} This quote is from a sixteen year old schizophrenic girl described by Hanna Segal in her book on Klein. According to Segal the girl is giving a description of her internal world. In the description we can see how the girl’s experience of herself and her internal objects is *split* into the ‘wonderful castle with treasures’ and ‘horrid creature and vermin’.

According to Klein (1946) the infant splits its experience into *good* and *bad*. The first dawning awareness of the breast (mother) which is split into a *good, nourishing, life-giving breast* and a *bad, frustrating, persecuting breast* is the prototype for splitting. Splitting is closely connected with projection and introjection; the original aim is to *take in* and retain the good stuff and to *expel* and annihilate the bad stuff. For example, in John’s case we discussed earlier there is an unconscious attempt to suffocate all the bad stuff by keeping it ‘locked’ in a symmetrised set. There are also several attempts to evacuate the bad stuff by physical action; cutting, burning, kicking etc.. But as the splitting of the ego and its objects is inseparable, John’s locking away of the bad internal objects leads to his own ego being also ‘locked away’, and his development comes to a standstill. Klein writes: “I believe that the ego is incapable of splitting the object - internal and external - without a corresponding split taking place in the ego.”^{ccxxviii} To use John’s case again as

an example, only when the bad stuff is integrated internally does the split within John's ego dissolve adequately for ego development to continue.

Splitting, as well as the fusion of the ego and object in the act of splitting, can also be seen in Segal's interpretation of the schizophrenic girl's comment. "She feels split, there is a part of herself like the castle, full of richness, her ideal objects and their wonderful qualities, and another part poor and verminous. She feels that she has taken in the good things greedily and enviously and in doing so she feels that she has deprived people of all goodness. They have become empty and bad and turned into vermin that persecute her."^{ccxxix} The girl has split her (internal) objects and as a result feels split herself.

Laurie Ryavec has clearly illuminated the bi-logic of splitting in her paper 'Splitting the unconscious: symmetry, asymmetry and the principle of the excluded middle'. Part of her contribution is to describe the depressive position in terms of 'similarities-with-a-difference' and 'differences-with-a-similarity'. She writes: "I use both terms, to emphasize that points of similarity are noted without sliding into an infinity of fusion, and points of difference are recognized without shooting into endless aloneness."^{ccxxx}

Splitting, on the other hand, leads to a polarised system where similarities-with-a-difference and differences-with-a-similarity are destroyed. Ryavec reminds us that "Kleinian splitting of the object involves not simply a division, but the destruction of the middle ground, the ablation of gradations and complexity, of bridges between symmetry and asymmetry."^{ccxxxi}

Furthermore, in the division into infinitely good and infinitely bad objects there is a confusion of self and object, since experience is now (re-)organised

according to a polarised system where the only defining factor is whether the experience is A or not-A.

To return to Segal's example, the girl could view herself *only* in terms of *either* the 'wonderful castle with treasures' *or* 'horrid creatures and vermin'. For her there is no middle ground between the two. In bi-logical terms we can view this from the perspective of *positive and negative infinite sets*, which can be seen to correspond to the classical Kleinian splitting. The unconscious, according to Matte Blanco, does not know individuals but only classes. Furthermore, the unconscious only knows the maximum possible magnitude. The good breast, for example, is not mildly good, but "maximum goodness is attributed to it."^{ccxxxii} Likewise the bad breast (or the absent good breast) is "supremely bad, with all the potentialities of badness."^{ccxxxiii} The unconscious, instead of experiencing any one good or bad object, be it real, potential or symbolic, experiences the whole class of *goodness* or *badness*. "This is just the expression of the replacement of the individual by the class, of the identity between part and whole."^{ccxxxiv} At a deeper level the positive and negative infinite sets can comprise everything else - they can behave like two vertices from which the world must be seen. As a result we have a psyche - or areas of psyche - where the middle ground is destroyed, and the "(symmetrical) unconscious treats everybody as though they were like the 'little girl who had a little curl ... when she was good she was very very good and when she was bad she was horrid'".^{ccxxxv}

Splitting can also be seen to take place in John's dream. There is water, though not the asymmetrical, benevolent waves as in the case of Silvia at the end of the first year of analysis with Ginzburg. The water in John's dream is

something still and dangerous. The crabs are in the water, and the attacks happen in the water. John is *either* on the pier *or* in the water (or both at the same time). This either-or thinking is characteristic of Klein's splitting. There is no sense of 'in-between'. The *littoral* is *missing*.

Ross Skelton talks about the littoral in his paper 'An India Sleeps Below our West; Louis MacNeice, Matte Blanco, Lacan' (1999).. Skelton shows us how for MacNeice the sea that features frequently in his poetry represents the infinite. The sea is the place of no words, a menacing "death sentence"^{ccxxxvi}, the "source of all creatures"^{ccxxxvii}, and Skelton links it with Matte Blanco's symmetrical mode. The *littoral*, which is the region on the shore between high and low tides, is another common feature in MacNeice's poetry. MacNeice ends the poem titled 'Littoral', after proclaiming the mysteriousness of the sea, with the line "Each child his own seashore"^{ccxxxviii}. Skelton sees at one end of this seashore the symmetrised unity with the mother - the infinite, and at the other end the separating language of the father - the finite. The child is caught in-between. For MacNeice this area of in-between seems to have been a constant reminder of the danger of 'falling into sea'. For John there seems to have been no in-between, there is only land or water. Land or pier is the place of asymmetric safety where there is a clear distinction between John and mother who are seen standing side by side in the dream. Water is the place of infinite dangers. Multiplications, symmetrizations and aggressive attacks all take place in the water. By analysing the symmetrizations in John's thinking, John finds an area which is safe for exploration. This area is much like the seashore Skelton has drawn our attention to in MacNeice's poetry, but with the capacity to contain or hold the

situation. The littoral John discovered within is not unlike Winnicott's transitional space.

The littoral can become to represent the potential richness of the different strata. The more flexibility, imagination and movement there is within this space, the less rigid and static are the differentiations between asymmetries and symmetries. In John's case the release of the feared aggressive phantasies opened up worlds of possibilities alongside ego development, the formation of new classes, and enriched phantasy life.

We can look at splitting also from the point of view of *infinite experiences*. Whether the split is into good/bad or all/nothing, it is a question of *infinite, all-embracing experiences*. For example failure, when experienced as a carrier of the infinite set of which it is a representative, can be experienced as a *total failure* (part-whole equation). The only alternative to the total failure would be a lack of failure (all/nothing) or success (good/bad) as can be seen for example in narcissistic people with fragile ego or sense of self. *An essential part of splitting is identification with an infinite set 'behind' it, which 'spills' into consciousness in an all-invading, all-embracing way.*

Thus splitting if viewed from the bi-logical view turns out to be a result of interplay between the symmetrical and asymmetrical. On the one hand the *infinite sets of goodness and badness* are a result of symmetrization, but on the other hand, the *division into two* different sets is an asymmetrical act. Matte Blanco repeatedly emphasises that it is impossible to have pure symmetries or asymmetries in any human expression, "the symmetrical and asymmetrical modes of being are in constant and very complex interaction and ... neither of them appears in isolation."^{ccxxxix} It is a question of different

proportions of symmetry and asymmetry; there is always thinking-feeling or feeling-thinking, never just thinking or feeling.

One way to focus on the interplay between the two modes of being is in terms of the *stratified structure*^{ccxi}. The first stratum consists of the highest degree of asymmetry, the fifth of symmetry. From one to five the classes become wider and symmetrizations increase. The third stratum contains the most intense emotions, “intensity tends to infinite values”^{ccxli}. In the deeper, the fourth and fifth strata the “peace of the depth” increases^{ccxlii}. According to Matte Blanco, in the third stratum “each individual becomes the class, and hence, has all the potentialities of the class or set, up to its highest degree.” He continues with two examples: “If the set is that of angry mothers, then she or any part of her - for instance the breast - will be felt as being immensely dangerous. If it is the class of fathers, the penis will be felt extremely penetrating and, as such, dangerous. The same holds for goodness.”^{ccxliii} It is possible, then, to place Kleinian splitting in the third level of the stratified structure.

In a paper titled ‘The four antinomies of the death instinct’ Matte Blanco names the tendency to asymmetrize the ‘*process of translation or splitting*’. He writes: “Confronted with the vague imprecision of symmetry it [the asymmetrical mode] automatically sets in motion a process of definition: it isolates possible implications, separates them and distinguishes them. This is the *process of translation or splitting*. Confronted with the motionless unit: life-death, it translates, splits this unit into *two opposites*: life and death, and introduces movement, a ‘tending towards’.”^{ccxliv} Here Matte Blanco is linking the *translating function* with *splitting*; the act of drawing out or extracting

asymmetrical relations from the symmetrical mode of being with splitting the undivided into divisions. The prototype of splitting can be seen as the first asymmetrical act, throwing the baby into the necessity of thinking in the paranoid-schizoid position. Matte Blanco also links the tendency to asymmetrise to aggression: “the exercise of asymmetrical activity itself may be viewed as a form of aggression”^{ccxlv}, thus strengthening the connection to the third stratum.

An objection could be raised at this point: this is all very well if we talk about the deeper levels of the *unconscious*, but splitting is usually experienced at a very conscious level. Even in the case of the schizophrenic girl mentioned by Segal there is a *conscious* experience of things being either very good (the wonderful castle) or very bad (horrid creatures and vermin). Matte Blanco writes that the different strata contain each other; “*each stratum is present in a mysterious way in every one of the strata which are nearer to the surface*”^{ccxlv}. This is another way of saying that behind and inside each individual there is an infinite set. When infinite set is not evoked it stays ‘behind’ or ‘beyond’ the individual consciousness. However, sometimes the unconscious deeper strata ‘spill’ into the conscious creating a *bi-logical structure* (as opposed to *bi-modal structure*). This is exactly the case in splitting.

2) Fragmentation

There is also a second type of splitting within the Kleinian framework which is usually ascribed to Bion (1957). Instead of a clear-cut split between the good and the bad there is a *splintering* and disintegration of the ego and

the objects into minute particles. Bion calls these particles 'bizarre objects'. The sadistic fragmentation has its origin in the hatred of reality and awareness and, like the splitting into good and bad, is linked to Klein's paranoid-schizoid position. Segal suggests a term '*third area*'^{ccxlvii} for an attempt by the person to save these bizarre objects in the place where relationships ought to be. To illustrate this she quotes a border-line schizoid patient saying: "I can't get in touch with you. Here is my head on a pillow and there you are in an armchair. But between the top of my head and you there is nothing but horrible bloody mish-mash."^{ccxlviii} Segal continues to describe the 'third area': "The 'mish-mash' was perceived by him as bitten-up, pussy particles of the breast, containing the patient's own urine, faeces and broken-off bits of his teeth. He could preserve something of his 'head', standing for his sanity, and a remote analyst in the armchair, but there was no relation between him and myself."^{ccxlix} The 'bloody mish-mash' is the third area that consists of the bizarre objects that are disintegrated and split off, and operates in the place of the relationship between the analyst and the analysand (or ultimately between mother and child).

The most bi-logically apparent quality about Segal's description is the *sameness* of the 'mish-mash'. At first it seems that all there is this stuff, this 'mish-mash' of confusion between the patient and the analyst, and a dim awareness of the patient and the analyst at each end of it. Within the 'mish-mash' we can see huge symmetrizations. There is no differentiation between self and object, inside and outside (and in-between), phantasy and reality. It is as if *we are looking at an un-translated infinite set* which has invaded the patient's consciousness. In an analysis, however, several elements of the

'mish-mash' can be differentiated: 'particles of the breast', 'patient's urine, faeces and broken-off bits of his teeth', 'the relationship between analyst-mother and the patient-infant'. All these (and possibly other) elements are turned into sameness by the patient, and translated into many by the analyst.

To summarise so far, we can see the classical Kleinian splitting into good and bad as an asymmetrization tending to infinities operational at the third stratum of the mind. Furthermore, the prototype of splitting can be seen as the first asymmetrical act, throwing the baby into the paranoid-schizoid position. The fragmentation of the ego and the object can also be seen in terms of bi-logic - as the invasion of an un-translated, symmetrised infinite set into consciousness.

3) Isomorphism

We can also postulate a third type of splitting from a bi-logical example. Alessandra Ginzburg expands on the notion of *isomorphism* in a biological context in her paper 'Isomorphism: A Transitional Area in the Clinical Experience'. Ginzburg tells us that isomorphism "defines a biunivocal correspondence between two sets in such a way as to preserve the structure of those sets."^{cc1} She mentions as an example of this equalization between analytic and mental treatment, and later on in one of her examples there is an equation between an analytic treatment towards a patient and a veterinary treatment towards a dog. The two sets have a preserved structure (someone caring or curing someone else) and they have become interchangeable.

This is different from the classical Kleinian splitting, because the

experience is not split into its opposites, but into two sets that are essentially the same insofar as they carry the same meaning for the person. This is also very different from fragmentation because distinct elements and order can be perceived. Ginzburg herself distinguishes between isomorphism and sets with “concrete *identity*”^{ccli}, though an isomorphic structure may transform itself at a deeper level into a concrete identity, where the structures (as well as elements) are destroyed. There is, however, a *splitting* in process, perhaps similar to the multiplication we will encounter in Schreber’s defensive division of ‘Flehsig’ to several sub-parts later in the clinical section. In Ginzburg’s example we are confronted with a more sophisticated form of splitting, a duplication of a *structure* of a relationship.

In short it could be said that both the traditional Kleinian splitting of an object and ego into *opposites* and *fragmentation* can be understood biologically. In addition Ginzburg’s *isomorphism* provides another example of splitting. In all three cases the *emotion* is split.

Unconscious Emotion

Our nature, according to Matte Blanco, is grounded in emotion. Our thinking, language, the whole experience of subjectivity and the world arises from the depths of our emotional being. As discussed in the previous section Matte Blanco’s theory is partially incompatible with Freud’s, and one of the differences is the nature of emotion. For Freud emotions – or affects – are always conscious, whereas for Matte Blanco emotions are *equated* with the unconscious: “emotion and unconscious are basically the same thing”^{cclii}.

Klein, unlike Freud, accepted the existence of unconscious affects. As early as

1923 in 'Early Analysis' Klein puts forward a claim that in case of successful repression, anxiety "would really be present unconsciously for a time"^{ccliii}. In her later writings the unconscious has become primarily affectual, since life and death instincts are first experienced or represented as emotions of love-gratitude and hatred-envy at an unconscious level. Thus, on the nature of emotion Matte Blanco's position is closer to Klein's than to Freud's.

It is generally accepted (among Kleinian writers) that Klein's unconscious deals with affects. Juliet Mitchell, for example, writes: "For Klein, what is unconscious is the biological and *affectual* condition of the human being. In essence, by the time of her later writings, the unconscious is equivalent to the instincts: to the life and death drive and their *affects*."^{ccliv} Isaacs, also, refers to the affectual unconscious when she writes: "The earliest [unconscious] phantasies, then, spring from bodily impulses and are interwoven with bodily sensations and *affects*."^{cclv} While the emotional nature of the unconscious has become accepted among the Kleinians, it was never clearly argued or stated as a development or even a difference from Freud. One of the reasons for this could be that (among the followers of Klein) there seems to be an assumption that Freud *did* believe in the existence of unconscious emotions. For example, when talking about the relationship between words and phantasies (or unconscious experiences), Isaacs writes about Freud: "Freud made quite clear, in more than one passage, his own view that words belong to the conscious mind only and not to the *realm of unconscious feelings* and phantasies."^{cclvi}

Klein herself did recognise the theoretical position put forward by Freud regarding emotions. She cites passages from Freud's 'Repression' and

'The Unconscious' where he discusses the topic of unconscious affects and the three possible vicissitudes the affective component of the instinct can undergo. Klein also saw the ambiguity in relation to Freud's theoretical position that springs forward from Freud's clinical intuition. In the passage from 'Early Analysis' Klein refers to this and sides tentatively with the intuitive Freud but only so as not really to argue *against* Freud. On the one hand we have the theoretical Freud arguing against the existence of unconscious emotions, on the other hand the clinical Freud saying that from the point of view of clinical practice it is common to speak about unconscious emotions, and that the affectual representatives of the instincts are more important than the ideational representatives. So by siding with clinical Freud who sees the importance of affects and finds it useful to speak about unconscious emotions Klein comes to take an almost unnoticed stance in a dilemma that often goes unrecognised. From this small move a whole (Kleinian) psychoanalytic framework is developed.

Another reason for the lack of discussion on the topic would be that Klein never makes it an issue herself. When she is writing about unconscious emotions, she does not specify that this is the case. In 'Some Theoretical Conclusions Regarding the Emotional Life of the Infant' (1952), for example, in spite of the title of the paper Klein hardly mentions the word 'emotion'. What she *is* talking about is *unconscious phantasy*. When Klein writes about envy, greed, jealousy, love or any other emotion, she writes about them as part of the unconscious phantasy life of an infant. The *emotional* life of the infant is equated with the (unconscious) *phantasy* life of the infant.

On the other hand, Klein talks about a '*porous*' relationship between

the conscious and the unconscious. The 'porousness' of the relationship can be understood to mean that there isn't necessarily any clear demarcation between the two. So when Klein talks about, say, greed, she *could* be talking about either conscious or unconscious greed or indeed both. In the case of very young infants – whom Klein discusses most often – it could even be asked whether there is any sense in asking whether their greed (or any other emotion) is conscious or unconscious. Since for Klein there is no clear differentiation between unconscious and conscious – or primary and secondary processes – it is enough (for her) to state that such and such an emotion (or phantasy) is taking place without specifying whether it is conscious or unconscious. For our present purposes it is enough to say that Klein believed in the existence of unconscious emotions, even if she did not usually specify the unconsciousness of any particular emotion in her writing.

What does it mean to say that 'Klein believed in the existence of unconscious emotions'? We remember Freud defining affect (or emotion) as the *conscious* representative of the instinct. According to Freud when we speak of 'unconscious emotion' we are really talking about the ideational representative of the instinct undergoing repression. What does the term 'unconscious emotion' entail in Kleinian context?

In John's case we will discuss later Klein postulates a fear of *unconscious sadism or hatred* towards the mother which manifests itself in forgetfulness (among other symptoms). In a seminal paper 'The Importance of Symbol-formation in the Development of the Ego' (1930) written around the same time as the paper where she discusses John, Klein presents some details

of the analysis of Dick, a four-year old boy with severe inhibition in ego-development. When Dick came to Klein his speech-development and intellectual capacities were on the level of a child of fifteen to eighteen months. He had hardly any emotional relations to his environment, including his mother and nurse – he was indifferent to their presence or absence. Dick had almost no interests, and he did not play. He had no wish to make himself intelligible, and whether he was being obedient or doing the opposite of what was expected of him, his behaviour lacked affect and understanding. Thus Klein found that the analysis of Dick had to start with the fundamental obstacle of establishing contact with him.

Klein began with Dick's interest in trains, stations, door-handles, doors, and opening and shutting of doors. Through her interpretations of Dick's play with 'Daddy-train', 'Dick-train' and 'Station' (-mummy), and the dark space between the inner and the outer doors Dick ran into several times (dark mummy), there was an appearance of anxiety and dependence in Dick. Dick also soon began to get interested in other toys, and his play-activities became more varied. This enabled the analysis to move forward with beneficial cycle of play and interpretations. In Dick's case the latent (unconscious) anxiety was so great as to prevent almost all phantasy and accompanying manifest activity and emotions. Klein succeeded in making the anxiety manifest by diminishing it in its latent stage (through interpretations), and by gaining access to the unconscious she succeeded in activating the anxiety and other affects.

Thus, in Dick's case, the latent, unconscious emotion in question was *anxiety*. Klein developed her theory of *early anxiety-situations* on the

foundations laid by Freud in *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety* (1926). Here Freud places the emphasis on the *content* of anxiety rather than the transformations of libido (where the affective factor of the instinct is transformed into anxiety). In 'Infantile Anxiety-situations Reflected in a Work of Art and in the Creative Impulse' (1929) Klein claims that the infantile danger-situations described by Freud are modifications of an earlier danger-situation. Freud believes the earliest danger-situation in girls to be the loss of the object (mother), and in boys castration. According to Klein the "earliest anxiety-situation of all"^{cclvii} is engendered by the infant's *sadistic attacks against the mother's body*. This attack is phantasied, unconscious, and includes an attack against the father, represented by the penis inside the mother. The danger experienced is firstly one's own sadism, and secondly the retaliation of equal strength (to the original sadistic attack) by the combined parents who are "extremely cruel and much dreaded assailants"^{cclviii}.

Thus at the very primitive level the term '*unconscious emotion*' in the Kleinian context means firstly, *sadism*, and secondly, *anxiety*. These, according to Klein, are our first emotional experiences. Sadism is an expression of an instinctual impulse and anxiety a reaction to sadism. (John's unconscious fear of his own sadism can easily be seen as this type of anxiety.)

How close is Matte Blanco's description of the symmetrical mode of being to Klein's account of the unconscious (emotional) phantasy life? They both accept the existence of unconscious affects, and they both agree that the unconscious is essentially affectual. Furthermore, when Klein talks about the earliest anxiety-situation, she talks about the objects of anxiety being equated

with each other: "the child's earliest reality is wholly phantastic; he is surrounded with objects of anxiety, and in this respect excrement, organs, objects, things animate and inanimate are *to begin with equivalent to one another*."^{cclix} Similarly, the contents of the mother's body are equated with each other and edible substances: "The child expects to find within the mother (a) the father's penis, (b) excrements, and (c) children, and these things it *equates* with edible substances."^{cclix} This is evidence of symmetrization within infinite sets.

Translated into bi-logic, the first quote from Klein could read something like: Within the infinite set 'objects of anxiety' the elements are identical to each other. From the point of view of the symmetrical mode of being there is only the emotion 'anxiety' and a symmetrised infinite set 'towards which anxiety is experienced'. From an asymmetrical point of view we see several 'objects of anxiety' which include excrement, organs, and objects, things animate and inanimate. To begin with - that is, at the deepest level of the symmetrical mode - these are identical to each other. Subsequently the infinite set *unfolds* or is *translated* into differentiated entities.

The second quote, if translated into bi-logic, could read as follows: The infinite set 'that which the child expects to find within the mother' contains the following elements from an asymmetrical viewpoint: (a) the father's penis, (b) excrement, and (c) children. From the viewpoint of the symmetrical mode of being these elements are symmetrised and identical, and the set 'that which the child expects to find within the mother' is further equated with the set 'edible substances'.

In the first quote Klein talks about 'earliest reality' in which things are

‘to begin with equated to one another’. In ‘The Nature and Function of Phantasy’ Susan Isaacs cites Scott in relation to infant’s earliest experience of sucking: “It is easier for adults to observe actual sucking than to remember or understand what the experience of sucking is to an infant, *for whom there is no dichotomy of body and mind, but a single, undifferentiated experience* of sucking and phantasying. Even those aspects of psychological experience which we later on distinguish as ‘sensation’, ‘feeling’, etc., *cannot in the early days be distinguished and separated*. Sensations, feelings, as such, emerge through development from the *primary whole of experience*, which is that of sucking-sensing-feeling-phantasying. This *total experience becomes gradually differentiated into its various aspects of experience*: bodily movements, sensations, imaginings, knowing and so on.”^{cclxi}

This ‘earliest reality’ or ‘total experience’ in which things are to begin with each other’ and which gradually becomes ‘differentiated into its various aspects of experience’ seems to be the very thing Matte Blanco refers to when he is talking about the “indivisible reality“ or “perfect knowledge”^{cclxii} which can be (consciously) known only through asymmetrical differentiation. We have arrived at a point where the unconscious seems very similar for Klein and Matte Blanco. In both systems we encounter an *emotional undifferentiated reality*. We have also arrived at a point of disagreement between the two, namely the place of instinct.

The unconscious sadism and anxiety Klein found at the basis of Dick’s developmental standstill are *instinctual* in origin. John’s unconscious aggression towards his mother and his fear of this aggression are also instinctual. For Klein this is the deepest level of the psyche. Sadism and

aggression are expressions of an *instinctual* impulse, and anxiety and fear are reactions to sadism and aggression. To put it differently, anxiety is a reaction to a *real experience* of one's anger/ hatred/ aggression which is instinctual in origin.

For Matte Blanco there is a level *deeper* than the instinct. The experience of the instinct seems to link up with a deeper - i.e. more symmetrised - experience of the emotion in question. This deeper level is *infinite* by nature, whereas our *actual* personal experience, even if unconscious, is always asymmetrical and therefore *finite*. Matte Blanco's symmetrical mode of being or indivisible whole is therefore something *more or beyond our personal experience*, and resembles a metaphysical entity.

Body and Instincts

The difference on the place of the instinct is related to Klein's and Matte Blanco's different attitudes towards the body. We now move on to examine these differences closer. Klein places the body in a central position. On the other hand, in Matte Blanco's writings the body is not discussed at any great length. In his theoretical formulations the body is not in any significant position; the bodily, instinctual aspect of the psyche is 'inserted' into an already existing structure.

Unconscious phantasy - a term used by Klein and her followers - denotes unconscious, mental activity that originates from the instinctual impulses of desire and aggression. It underlies all mental processes and activities, including 'reality-thinking'. In the Kleinian view phantasy is the primary content of the unconscious, thus her views on phantasy differ from

those of Freud's. The earliest unconscious phantasies are, however, characterised by the qualities Freud ascribed to the 'primary process'.

According to Klein, babies' first mental experiences are closely connected to their bodily experiences. The two types of experiences are not, to begin with, clearly separated from each other. *Frustration*, for example, is experienced as both bodily and mental frustration, and the first wish-fulfilment (what Freud would call 'hallucination') consists of something like the *physical sensation of a satisfactory feed*. Susan Isaacs writes: "At first, the whole weight of wish and phantasy is borne by sensation and affect. The hungry or longing or distressed infant feels actual sensations in his mouth or his limbs or his viscera, which *mean to him* that certain things are being done to him or that he is doing such and such as he wishes, or fears. He *feels as if* he were doing so and so - e.g. touching or sucking or biting the breast which is actually out of reach. Or he feels as if he were being forcibly and painfully being deprived of the breast, or as if *it* were biting *him*; and this, at first, probably without visual or other plastic images."^{cclxiii} In a footnote on the same page Isaacs quotes Scott talking about there being "no dichotomy of body and mind" for infants; "the adult way of regarding the body and the mind as two separate sorts of experience can certainly not hold true of the infants world"^{cclxiv}.

When the first mental experiences begin to occur, they are *modelled* on the experiences of the body. This is in line with Freud's thinking that all new experiences are modelled on old ones. The young infant knows first only somatic experiences, hunger, pain, satisfaction, etc. When it starts to experience mental (or at least partially mental) experiences, they are

experienced *as if* they were somatic. The first bodily experiences for the baby are *taking in* food and *expelling* faeces. Hunger is experienced as something bad gnawing inside. Taking in food is experienced as getting rid of that 'something bad'. The mental mechanisms of *introjection* and *projection* are based on the model of taking in and expelling. This was already familiar to Freud who wrote about *intellectual* judgement in following way: "Expressed in the language of the oldest - the oral - instinctual impulses, the judgement is: 'I should like to eat this' or 'I should like to spit it out'; and put more generally: 'I should like to take this into myself and keep that out.' That is to say: 'It shall be inside me' or 'it shall be outside me'. ...the original pleasure-ego wants to introject into itself everything that is good and to eject from itself everything that it bad."^{cclxv}

But for Klein it is not only the case that the mind is modelled on the body. The feeling of *undifferentiated experience of physical and mental* continues beyond infancy - our bodies are experienced as our minds, and our minds as our bodies. There is a strong feeling in Klein that ultimately we *are* our bodies. In the least it can be said that in relation to the psyche, the body (or phantasies about the body) retains a strong *representational* role in Klein's writings. The representational role of the body can be seen in the case we will discuss later, in Klein's analysis of John's tidying of the drawer. The fountain-pen John finds in a drawer at home represents John's acknowledgement of the existence of his own penis, and the existence of his own ego. The drawer in the analytic room represents the mother's body and John's own body as well as mental processes and the world. Klein is showing the relationship (in the unconscious phantasy) between objects in the external world, one's own body

and (phantasies) of the mother's body, and mental processes. Mental processes and experiences (phantasies) of the body are closely interwoven, and the phantasies are represented in the relationship to objects in the external world – in this case the fountain-pen and the drawer with its contents.

In Klein the primitive experience of our bodies – and the bodies of our parents, especially the mother – is very raw and direct. The body is strongly *present* in Klein's writing, as something experienced/experiencing, and as something represented. The somatic inheritance of our experiencing psyche is never forgotten for long.

What comes across from Matte Blanco is a very different relationship to the body. The body is not talked about much, and when it is talked about there is a feeling of distance and alienation. We get some sense of this when Matte Blanco writes about sensation-feeling: "...two aspects of sensation-feeling: definition of the stimulus (either external or within the body) and the 'internal' or intimate aspects. The first is actually a perception. It is sensation-feeling utilised as an instrument of knowledge of the external world of the body. ...The first thing that can be said about this intimate aspect of sensation-feeling ...is that it is not a perception, but a *pure sensation-feeling* (imagine a pain, a sensation-feeling of constriction (as in anxiety), a tickling in the heart (as in love), etc.)."^{ccclxvi} Matte Blanco is saying that we can experience our bodies from two perspectives, either as part of the external world we perceive through the senses, (e.g. 'I can see my hand'), or as impulses from within (e.g. 'I can feel a tickling in the heart'). Both perspectives are looking at the body from the viewpoint of an objective observer. The *subjective* experience of the body is contained in the 'pure sensation-feeling', but even then it is as a

separate, mental observer we experience the body.

In this Matte Blanco's emphasis is diametrically opposite to that of Klein's. According to Klein we look at or experience the mind *through the body*, and the two form an inseparable *unity*. According to Matte Blanco the body is experienced *from the point of view of the mind*, and there is an unbridgeable *gap* between the two, and the most noticeable aspect about the body in Matte's writing is its absence. However, as already seen in, Matte Blanco is not a dualist - he believes in the psycho-physical unity. He also holds the position that in some way psyche does originate from the body. But this position which is clearly stated is not discussed much by Matte Blanco.

Linked to their different attitudes towards the body is Klein's and Matte Blanco's different approach towards the *instincts*. For Klein unconscious phantasy is the mental representation of the bodily impulses of desire and aggression. In other words, the life and death instincts are experienced as desire and aggression, and these manifest as unconscious phantasy. For example, in John's case an elaborate phantasy originating from John's (fear of his own) aggression is discovered around the words *poulet* (chicken), *poisson* (fish), and *glace* (ice) that he could not distinguish from each other. Thus, according to Klein, unconscious phantasy *originates* from the instincts.

In Klein's description the mind comes into existence as a result of these bodily impulses (although in her view a rudimentary ego does exist from birth). There is a movement from the bodily experience into the realm of symbols. In John's case the unconscious experience of his body as the source of many dangers is transformed / translated into an elaborate phantasy. In the

introductory remarks to the case of Dick, Klein writes: “Since the child desires to destroy the organs (penis, vagina, breasts) which stand for the objects, he conceives a dread of the latter. This anxiety contributes to make him equate the organs in question with other things; owing to this equation these in their turn become objects of anxiety, and so he is impelled constantly to make other and new equations, which form the basis of his interest in the new objects and of symbolism.”^{ccclxvii} Furthermore, as can be seen in Isaacs citing of Scott, the distinction between body and mind is a developmental, psychological creation that does not exist for the young infant: “...the adult way of regarding the body and the mind as two separate sorts of experience can certainly not hold true of the infant’s world... for whom there is no dichotomy of body and mind.

...Sensations, feelings, as such, emerge through development from the primary whole of experience, which is that of sucking-sensing-feeling-phantasying.”^{ccclxviii} Thus, from the Kleinian perspective mental space develops out of instincts (the body), and the distinction between the two is as much a psychological creation as it is an actual development.

Things are different from the bi-logical perspective. As already discussed earlier Matte Blanco talks about the *lateral insertion of the instinct*. By this he means that since the instincts have asymmetrical elements – hunger, for example, is differentiated from other experiences – they cannot be at the *basis* of the mind which, for Matte Blanco, is *undifferentiated*. He writes: “The biological processes of instinct ... make their first appearance in mental life at an asymmetrical level, that is, at a level which is not the deepest of all. This is what I have called ‘the lateral insertion of instinct into mental life’.”^{ccclxix} It is implied here that mind (or mental life) exists prior to instincts.

If there is an *insertion* of the instinct, there has to be somewhere *into* which the instinct can be inserted. Thus bi-logical (or bi-modal) mind does not originate from the instincts, but is in some way in existence before them. Though *material* (or content) for the psyche is derived from bodily sensations and instinctual impulses, the *structure* of the psyche precedes the content. Therefore at least the *structure* of the mind must exist prior to the moment the body first makes itself felt upon the rudimentary mind. In other words, bi-logic does not originate from the instincts (like Klein's unconscious phantasy^{cclxx}), but is innate; we are born with it.

In 'The Four Antinomies of the Death Instinct' Matte Blanco reads Freud's notion of the death instinct as an intuition (or interpretation) of the translating the indivisible unity where life equals death into a division between life and death. "I believe that the concept of the death instinct was Freud's most significant attempt to study the relationship which exists between the structure of the logic of the unconscious and the structure of the material world."^{cclxxi} Towards the end of the paper Matte refers to one of the standard criticisms against Freud's death instinct, namely that the notion of the death instinct seems to be against our understanding of biology, and since instincts are meant to be rooted in biology, the concept of a death *instinct* is self-contradictory. He reminds us that Freud was "looking for something *beyond the pleasure principle*", and continues "and we may add *beyond biology*"^{cclxxii}. By complimenting Freud for his insight into bi-logic that the notion of death instinct revealed, and by claiming that Freud was looking for something 'beyond biology', Matte Blanco is affirming the implication that bi-logic does extend 'beyond biology'.^{cclxxiii}

As we have seen, there is a difference of attitude between Klein and Matte Blanco towards instincts. However, a special emphasis must be placed on the difference in Klein's and Matte Blanco's views on the *death instinct*. (Though it must be noted that we have just got a glimpse of how the *Freudian* death instinct can be quite *compatible* with bi-logic.) Klein is renowned for the importance she placed on aggression. She based her views on aggression on Freud's death instinct. According to Freud (1920) the death instinct which opposes life instinct or 'Eros' is a constitutional force aiming to return organic life back into an inorganic state. Life itself is the coming together of the two opposing forces of death instinct and Eros. Death instinct often manifests itself as aggression either towards oneself or the external world.

For Klein the instincts are the deepest level of the psyche. The basis for human experience lies in strife, since the ego has to defend itself against the (murderous) attacks of the death instinct. From this battle object-relations and any further development are built. For Matte Blanco the picture is different. At the deepest level of the psyche lies a harmonious oneness, an all-embracing stillness. There is no aggression at this level. Matte Blanco is very clear on this point: "If the 'descent' into the deeper strata of the unconscious continues, a moment comes when the zone of spacelessness-timelessness is reached. *No aggressions are possible there.*"^{cclxxiv} For Matte Blanco, aggression is an asymmetrical activity; it is different from, say affection, it also has a subject (*my* aggression, *your* aggression), and usually an object. So regarding *aggression* Klein and Matte Blanco differ insofar as Klein holds aggression to be at the deepest level of the psyche, and Matte Blanco doesn't.

Not only is aggression asymmetrical, but asymmetrical activity can also be viewed as aggression. Matte Blanco mentions as an example obsessive neurotics who make distinctions and subdistinctions in order to escape from their own aggression., and he draws our attention to the fact that these distinctions may in themselves be aggressive because they “amount to tearing into pieces the object submitted to thinking”^{cclxxv}. However, Matte Blanco does not equate death instinct with aggression. Even though it is clear that *aggression* is not a purely symmetrical activity (and thus not at the deepest level of the psyche), the situation is a bit less clear-cut regarding the *death instinct*.

As already discussed in the previous section, Freud’s notion of the death instinct can be quite compatible with bi-logic. Matte Blanco focuses on a different side of the death instinct than Klein. It could be said that death (or Nirvana) is the *aim* of the death instinct, and aggression is *a means* to this end (among possibly other means). Matte Blanco equates death instinct with its *aim* only, and sees a similarity between the Nirvana and the peacefulness of the symmetrical mode of being. Klein, on the other hand, equates death instinct with its *means* only, and sees a similarity between baby’s aggression towards the mother and the aggression the death instinct uses to bring about destruction and death. Because of this difference of interpreting what the death instinct actually is, the death instinct according to Matte Blanco tends towards the deepest level of the mind, even though aggression was placed a lot ‘higher’ in his system. This can be seen in how Matte writes about the death instinct (in relation to his own system): “Perhaps this is one of the meanings of the death instinct, as expressed in the initial formulation of *Beyond the*

Pleasure Principle: the longing for a state beyond aggression.^{“cclxxvi} In *Thinking, Feeling and Being* he goes a step further: “Then it would not be the death instinct which we come across with but a *desire for the indivisible mode*, which makes itself present in more or less dissimulating ways.^{“cclxxvii} This possibility is dealt with more fully in the ‘Four Antinomies of the Death Instinct’ where Matte refers to Freud’s ‘intuition’ about the death instinct, The death instinct “seems to reveal a certain point where the concept of life blurs into that of death^{“cclxxviii}.

It must be remembered, however, firstly, that for Matte Blanco a deep level is not necessarily a developmentally early level^{cclxxix}, and secondly, that to interpret the deepest level of the psyche *solely* in terms of death (instinct) would be a mistake. In *U.I.S.* Matte puts forward also the thought that the deepest level is similar to *love*: “...hate, as we know it, presupposes movement, that is asymmetry, whereas we can imagine love as being ecstatic, as just being, without happening. *The deep peace of profound symmetry seems more in conformity with the nature of love than with that of hate.*^{“cclxxx} (At the same time, the deepest level is alien to love or hate, if anything, it is more like love-hate, and everything else fused together in an inseparable union.)

To summarise, for Matte Blanco 1) instincts are not the origin of the psyche - the psyche (or mind or mental space) exists at least structurally prior to instincts, 2) the deepest level of the psyche is similar to death instinct, but it is also similar to love, 3) the deepest level is not necessarily a developmentally early level.

Alongside Matte’s belief in the constitutional structure (of bi-logic) which is incompatible with Klein’s biological model of the mind, there is a

belief of this structure's presence in all our mental manifestations. We now move on to discuss mental manifestations as *expressions* of Klein's unconscious phantasy, and the two modes of being. This is also connected to *symbol-formation*.

Expression and Symbol-Formation

In bi-logic the two modes of being are at the same time always separate and inextricably linked. This means that, for Matte Blanco, both symmetrical and asymmetrical mode exist in *every* mental manifestation. He writes: "the mind is structured in such a way that in every one of its direct manifestations we can, if we look for it, detect the activity of its various levels, from the asymmetry seen in conscious thinking to the great proportion of symmetry of the deepest levels."^{ccclxxxi} Matte Blanco, however, makes a distinction between a *manifestation* and a *product*. He says that anything an individual says, writes or *expresses* in any other way can be looked at from both perspectives. We can look at an expression as a product, independent from its producer, in which case its relation to other aspects in the external world, (its truth-value, spatio-temporal context, place in history, etc.) can be studied. But any human expression can also be looked at as a *manifestation* of "what goes on in the individual at the moment of its production or in the period around that moment"^{ccclxxxii}.

A statement of philosophy, for example, has an existence in the 'world of philosophical statements' where it can be studied in relation to other such statements (independently of the state of mind of the philosopher). Thus, for

example, Parmenides' statement about reality being changeless, timeless and motionless can be contrasted and compared with Heraclitus' statement about reality being in eternal flux, or with Pythagoras' statement about universe being a living creature. On the other hand, the very same statement of philosophy can be studied as an *expression* or *manifestation* of an internal (unconscious) state of mind of the philosopher. Parmenides' statement about changelessness, timelessness and motionlessness of reality can be studied as an expression of Parmenides state of mind (independently of the 'world of philosophical statements').

In the case histories Matte Blanco discusses the presence of the symmetrical mode of being can usually be seen when *something goes wrong*, when the symmetrical mode '*invades*' the consciousness. For example, in the case of the 'wedding present situation'^{cclxxxiii} the young man attached an *inappropriate* amount of importance to the delay of receiving a wedding present from his colleagues. In a case material presented to illustrate the simultaneous experience of the individual and the class Matte Blanco shows how even the choice of one's work can be (or is) linked to the workings of the symmetrical mode of being. The case in question is of a young man who at the time of analysis was working for his Sc.D. in geology and geography. His main interest was the region where he was born which he "ferently desired to know ... [and] to write a detailed monograph about"^{cclxxxiv}. He spoke about his interest in the analysis and told the analyst how he had studied the area in great detail using maps, economic surveys, geological researches and other sources of information. He was one of the most informed persons on the subject.

After noting that the analysand was the eldest child of a large family, Matte Blanco says that his “desire for pre-eminence in the knowledge of his home country was a *reflection - or a parallel -* of his desire for pre-eminence with his mother^{“cclxxxv}. The young man’s unconscious desire to be his mother’s favourite and to know all about his mother is *reflected* in his choice of study and his attitude towards research; his wish to know as much as possible about a *symbolical* mother, the province. This happens, according Matte, through the equation of particular objects with the class. He writes: “Whenever an individual refers to a particular primary object or a given symbol that represents it, he is actually including, at other levels, the whole class of objects defined by the propositional function to which he is implicitly referring.“^{cclxxxvi} In this case example a reference to the *symbolical* mother included the *whole class* of mothers. Also in the case of John a symbolical reference to the mother - at first in form of words that were indistinguishable from each other, and then in form of a drawer that could be investigated - included the whole class of mothers. The symmetrical mode exists as the underlying infinite sets behind our actual thinking / feeling about particular (external) objects.

In ‘The Nature and Function of Phantasy’ Susan Isaacs gives examples of *outcomes of unconscious phantasies*. She firstly speaks of different symptoms - feeding difficulties, phobias, hysterical conversion-symptoms, etc. - as expressions of phantasy. She then goes on to list “ordinary bodily characteristics, other than illnesses [as being] determined directly or indirectly by specific phantasies^{“cclxxxvii}. Isaacs mentions “manner and tone of voice in

speaking, bodily posture, gait of walking, mode of handshake, facial expression, handwriting and mannerisms generally^{“cclxxxviii}. She also talks about accident proneness as related to phantasy - “phases of dropping and breaking or losing things, of stumbling and falling, of a tendency to bodily accidents^{“cclxxxix}. Finally, also the broader social expressions are linked to phantasy: “E.g. people’s attitudes to such matters as time and money and possessions, to being late or punctual, to giving or receiving, to leading or following, to being ‘in the limelight’ or content to work among others, and so on and so forth, are always found in analysis to be related to specific sets of varied phantasies.^{“ccxc} The picture emerging from Klein and Isaacs is that we very much *live* our phantasies. It is not the case that there is a (separate) subject who is somehow feeling or expressing the effects of his/her unconscious phantasy. Rather the subject *is* his/her unconscious phantasy. There is nothing more or nothing less to subjectivity, to *being* a subject, than living and being our unconscious phantasies. From bi-logical perspective this could even be stated that *our lives are isomorphic to our unconscious phantasy*.

According to the Kleinian model, our reality-thinking, our relationship to the external world, and ultimately the external world itself are constituted by our (relationship to) internal objects in unconscious phantasy. This view is based on Klein’s theory of symbol-formation and sublimation. In ‘The Importance of Symbol-formation in the Development of the Ego’ Klein refers to Jones’s view that “pleasure-principle makes it possible for two quite different things to be equated because of a similarity marked by pleasure or interest.^{“ccxci} In the same paper she also writes: “symbolism is the foundation

of all sublimation and of every talent, since it is by way of symbolic equation that things, activities and interests become the subject of libidinal phantasies.“

^{ccxcii} This, says Klein, was the conclusion she reached in ‘Early Analysis’.

Klein goes on to say that it is not only libidinal interest (or ‘pleasure principle’) but also anxiety that sets off symbol formation: “Since the child desires to destroy the organs (penis, vagina, breasts) which stand for objects, he conceives a dread of the latter [retaliation]. This anxiety contributes to make him equate the organs in question with other things; owing to this equation these in their turn become objects of anxiety, and so he is impelled constantly to make other and new equations, which form the basis of his interest in the new objects and symbolism.

Thus, *not only does symbolism come to be the foundation of all phantasy and sublimation but, more than that, it is the basis of the subject’s relation to the outside world and to reality in general.* ^{cccxciii}

What Klein is saying here is that:

- a. Symbolism is based on equation through either libidinal interest or anxiety.
- b. When symbolism is based on anxiety (or fear of retaliation) we form symbolisations (symbolic equations) in order to escape our anxiety.
- c. Symbolism is the foundation of unconscious phantasy.
- d. The more active the symbol-formation, the richer the phantasy life and the following sublimations.
- e. Our relation to the outside world is based on symbol-formation.

How can we see this manifested in John’s case? In John’s phantasy objects become equated through fear/anxiety about his own aggression

(mother = melting ice, brother = chicken, etc.). He is trying to escape the anxiety by forming new equations (penis > nice fish > crab > crabs > etc.). This can perhaps be seen best when John's symbol-forming capacities are restored after Klein's interpretation (penis > pen, mother > drawer). When John's symbol-forming capacities were restored, his phantasy life became richer and more alive, as can be seen in his tidying activities. John's relationship to the world also improved – he was able to distinguish between the words, he started tidying and finding things – as a result of the improvement in the symbol-forming capacities.

Klein's unconscious phantasy can be understood in relation to her theory of *transference as a total situation* which differs from (or is a development of) Freud's theory. Freud's theory of transference went through several changes. After the case history of 'Dora' Freud came to see transference as dealing with *specific relationships* which are transferred from the original person - usually the parents or siblings - onto the person of the analyst. For example, in the case history of the 'Rat Man' unconscious feelings towards the father were experienced towards Freud. In 'Remembering, Repeating and Working-through' Freud emphasises the *repetition* of unconscious repressed material, and shows how by working-through the repeated material the patient is gradually able to *remember* instead of repeating. Freud's view on transference repetition culminates in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* where he sees the repetition of unpleasant and painful material originating from the death instinct.

In 'The Origins of Transference' (1952) Klein makes three important

claims. Firstly, she attempts to demonstrate that “*transference originates in the same processes which in the earliest stages determine object relations*”^{ccxciv}.

Here Klein draws from Freud’s ‘repetition compulsion’ which she links to the earliest anxiety situations. In Klein’s view transference is a direct result of symbol-formation, unconscious phantasy and sublimation (or the failure of these), since these are the early processes which determine early object relations.

Secondly, Klein emphasises the importance of analysing negative transference: “the analysis of the negative transference ... is a precondition for analysing the deeper layers of the mind”^{ccxcv}. According to Klein, negative and positive transference are inter-linked because of the close connection between life and death instincts at the base of the psyche. Freud recognised the negative transference but never placed it in such a central position.

Considering Freud’s writings on the death instinct (especially the postulation of an original fusion of the instincts in Freud’s ‘Economic Problem of Masochism’, 1924), Klein’s emphasis on the negative transference seems to be consistent with Freud, but also a development from Freud’s position.

Thirdly, and for the present purposes most importantly, Klein states that “it is essential to think in terms of *total situations* being transferred from the past into the present, as well as of emotions, defences and object-relations”^{ccxcvi}. From a bi-logical point of view it could be said that transference taking place in analysis would be isomorphic to the (original) total situation. This is usually understood in terms of *enactment* or *re-enactment* of unconscious phantasy. For example, to begin with Dick’s transference had very little to do with treating Klein *as if* she was his mother or father. In other

words, the transference of feelings or emotions directed towards a *specific* person (mother, father) onto the person of the analyst hardly took place at all. It was only later that a transference to *the analyst* (as a specific person) took place. Instead Dick *enacted* in play (and in the absence of play) what was going on in his unconscious phantasy at the time. Dick's phantasy of penetrating the mother's body and being inside the mother were shown in his interest in trains, stations, door-handles and doors, and in his play-activity with these objects. It was by interpreting these activities that Dick's developmental standstill was brought to an end.

When Matte Blanco writes of human expressions as manifestations or parallels of internal conscious and unconscious (asymmetrical and symmetrical) activity, he is talking about the same material of which Klein speaks when she places symbol-formation and unconscious phantasy at the 'basis of all sublimation and every talent'. Klein's position can be understood in relation to her theory of transference which differs from Freud. Matte Blanco's position comes closer to Klein than Freud; in Klein's and Matte Blanco's systems there is a stronger sense of the all-embracing presence of the psyche. If so, what is being expressed or manifested? For both Klein and Matte Blanco the answer seems to be 'unconscious emotion', and this is the big departure from Freud.

We have found again the importance of the infinite in bi-logic, and especially the infinite emotion which is the basis of our unconscious being for Matte Blanco. I have shown how Matte Blanco is influenced by Klein, and how bi-logic is more compatible with Klein than with Freud on the question of

affects or emotions. There are several similarities between the two: the less rigid divide between the unconscious and the conscious than in Freud. As seen in the section on unconscious emotion, Klein's and Matte Blanco's view of the mind suggests a gradual change of proportion rather than one clear-cut line between the unconscious and the conscious. Firstly, in Klein's view the relationship between unconscious and conscious is 'porous'. Secondly, when Klein talks about emotion, she doesn't emphasize the unconsciousness or not of the emotion because it is not important to her. Both Klein and Matte Blanco base unconscious emotion in central position in their systems. Also the infinite aspect of emotion which Matte Blanco spends much time discussing is clearly visible in Klein's writings. Matte Blanco has brought to the foreground the infinite emotion and in his system of bi-logic made it central to psychoanalytic thinking.

Is it possible to go any further with the idea of the infinite in psychoanalysis? British psychoanalyst Wilfred Bion has offered an alternative perspective to the infinite. In my view bi-logic – which has in itself gone a long way towards understanding emotions – could benefit from Bion's thinking. Together these two theories which both deal with thinking and feeling, can give us an interesting view of the human mind and a strong tool for clinical use.

Chapter 5

Beyond Bi-Logic?;

Matte Blanco and Bion

Translating into Experience

In *U.I.S.* Matte Blanco devotes only one chapter exclusively to the *translating function* and his treatment leaves the concept in the periphery of the larger theory. In my view the translating function is not only central to bi-logic but at the very heart of psychoanalysis. How does the conscious 'read' the unconscious? Or using Matte Blanco's terminology: how does the asymmetrical contain the symmetrical? The same question, if asked in relation to Bion, could be: how are beta-elements turned into alpha-elements?

With a superficial glance there seems to be a lot in common between Matte Blanco's translating function and Bion's alpha-function. Both transform something *unknowable* into something *knowable*, or maybe even something *infinite* into something *finite*. Both are involved in thinking, feeling and dreaming. Both can be said to operate somewhere in the messy ground between the unconscious and the conscious. Despite these apparent similarities that might lead one to believe translating function and alpha-function to be essentially the *same*, a closer study will show that when put into a larger context, there are also differences. *Translating function* is a fairly specific term used by Matte Blanco to denote the way we experience or understand on the conscious, asymmetrical level the existing unconscious

infinite sets. The homogeneous, indivisible unity where space and time have no meaning is translated into spatio-temporal plurality. Bion's *alpha-function*, on the other hand, refers to a wider entity which is necessary at all levels of mental activity. In *Learning from Experience*ccxcviii Bion first describes alpha-function as a term devoid of meaning, and then goes on to fill it with meanings. Alpha-function transforms the raw sense impressions related to an emotional experience (β -elements) into visual images, auditory patterns etc. (α -elements). Bion uses Kant's term 'things-in-themselves' to describe beta-elements, and one way to look at the translation of beta-elements into alpha-elements is as a translation of noumena into phenomena. Alpha-elements cohere to form a dream, and they are also capable of becoming conscious. Dreaming and unconscious phantasy are, for Bion, products of alpha-function. Furthermore, all thinking, conscious and unconscious, is result of a working alpha-function.

Matte Blanco starts his chapter on the translating function with a clinical example in which he describes part of a session with a male patientccxcix. The session is the first (for the patient) after a ten day break the analyst had needed for the completion of a paper he had been working on. During the session the analysand criticized the Pope for a recent letter in which the Pope had condemned the communists. The patient as a convinced communist felt included among the condemned. The analysand also remarked that he had become aware that the analytical sessions meant nothing to him; they merely alleviated his loneliness since he was able to talk to somebody. The analysand then went on to say how one evening he had missed a seminar at the University he had felt would be boring, and had gone to a strip-tease show

instead. During the show two women had begun to undress and make sexual advances to each other. The patient had felt this to be obscene and he had left the show.

Matte Blanco gives the following interpretation: "The irresponsible and delinquent Pope was myself, who had banished or separated the communists, who represented the patient (as he actually was a communist), from his communion. When he did not go to the University for a seminar but went instead to a strip-tease show, he had at the same time rejected me in the formal role of a university professor and had sought to know me as a mother in the intimacy of undressing. At this moment he remembered that as a child he had peeped at his mother in the act of undressing and had felt very guilty about it.

As to the obscenity of the two women in intimate contact with their nude bodies, I suggested that this had probably evoked the unbearable feelings he must have had when his mother gave birth and suckled his sister. As he knew I had interrupted the sessions because I had to finish some writing, he had taken this as a symbolic pregnancy, giving birth to a child, and enjoying the intimacy with my own child, while at the same time I excluded him from it all. All this corresponded to the experience of the birth of the sister."ccc

How did Matte Blanco arrive at this particular interpretation? By searching for a common thing or theme among the different parts of the session, Matte Blanco felt the *feeling of rejection* to be dominant. The patient's attitude was typical of emotional thinking. Even though the patient himself obviously experienced many different emotions towards the objects, at some level the Pope, the analyst, the University (professor), the two women at

the strip-tease show and the patient's mother were treated by the patient as *identical*. He appeared *angry* towards the Pope, somewhat *indifferent* towards the analyst, *bored* by the University and *disapproving* towards the strippers. But all these emotions were reactions to the feeling of rejection.

The different figures that appeared in the session were all treated as belonging to the *class of rejecting mothers*. But Matte Blanco points out that strictly speaking he himself and the Pope could not belong to this class, their maleness alone excluded them from any class of mothers. So Matte Blanco postulates a wider class of which the class of rejecting mothers and all the figures in the session were subclasses. This wider class (according to Matte Blanco) could be defined as the "*class of all individuals who in any way do something which is either an active rejection or a turning away of the attention from the individual who seeks them*"^{ccci}. Because of the tendency to treat all relations as symmetrical at an unconscious level, the class, all its subclasses, the propositional function defining the class, and the individual are at that level the *same*. In other words, the patient did not make any distinction between the various individuals and the feeling of being rejected. On the unconscious level there is a single experience – that of being rejected – which corresponds to an infinite set. On the conscious level there are *many individual experiences* – anger, indifference, boredom and disapproval. The patient did not consciously experience the class of 'rejectingness' but *different emotions directed towards different individuals*. The underlying unconscious set was translated into a variety of disparate experiences.

According to Matte Blanco we live a two-fold existence. There is a *reality which is given all at once*, a reality which is experienced as a

homogeneous indivisible unity. This is what he calls the *symmetrical mode of being*. Because of the limited nature of our consciousness the undivided reality must remain unconscious. As discussed in chapter one, Matte Blanco himself noted the connection to the philosophy of Parmenides for whom the reality was a single, unchanging substance. The deepest level of the symmetrical mode of being is also like Kant's noumena, the primordial chaos beyond space, time and causality. Consciously we experience a reality divided into different individuals, events and situations. This is Matte's *asymmetrical mode of being*. What unconsciously is *one* is consciously experienced as *many* - the one is *translated* into many. Reversely we could say: *behind every concrete situation and emotion there is an infinite set, and eventually the deepest 'infinite'*.

Matte Blanco describes the translating function in the following words: "it is 'tearing off' from the symmetrical infinities many of the asymmetrical relations potentially implicit in them. But it is a peculiar type of tearing off, because the source remains both distant from asymmetry and untouched by it. The translating function is, paradoxically enough, like a mirror image of something which in itself has no shape and no structure ... but which potentially suggests an infinite number of shapes and structures: it is the creation of a (potentially) infinite number of images of something which by itself is not being capable of being reflected at all. It is a translation into space-time of something which in itself is outside space-time. "cccii

Matte Blanco arrived at this particular interpretation by searching for a *common thing or theme* among different parts of the session, and he felt that

feeling of rejection was the dominant and combining element. Bion talks about the *selected fact*^{cciii} which is a crystallization of coherence in a material which has previously been felt to be fragmented. He emphasizes the epistemological nature of the selected fact; it is the dawning in the mind (of the analyst) that there is a *constant conjunction*^{ccciv} in the observable phenomena. Bion says in connection to *naming* an experience that the meaning of this recognized coherence is unknown to begin with. When scattering of the disparate experiences is prevented by bringing them together with a name, they can start to have meaning.

From Matte Blanco's description of the translating function as the "tearing off" from the symmetrical infinities many of the asymmetrical relations potentially implicit in them" where "the source remains both distant from asymmetry and untouched by it" and "which potentially suggests an infinite number of shapes and structures"^{cccv} we are reminded of Borges' short story mentioned in chapter one. But we must remember that Borges in his novel is talking about the nature of the *world* as seen in/through the imagined Aleph, and his character is thus interested in *ontology*. Matte Blanco and Bion, on the other hand, are talking about how we *experience* the world, and thus their interests would be more *epistemological*.

Matte Blanco's translation of the symmetrical mode of being into the asymmetrical mode of being appears similar to Bion's translation of the beta-elements into alpha-elements. Translation of the noumena (or beta-elements) into phenomena (or alpha-elements) *is* "a translation into space-time of something which in itself is outside space-time". Also the translation of

something which in itself is not capable of being experienced into something that can be experienced is a feature shared by the translation of the symmetrical mode into asymmetrical and beta-elements into alpha-elements. However, Matte Blanco himself would probably not be too happy about the comparison. In an article titled 'Reflecting with Bion' cccvi Matte Blanco repeatedly voices his dissatisfaction with Bion's beta-elements. Beta-elements do not make any sense to Matte Blanco because they are *plural*. This makes them *asymmetrical* from Matte Blanco's perspective. At the same time they are meant to represent the *deepest* possible level - therefore they ought to be *symmetrical*. Matte Blanco's symmetrical mode of being is like Kant's noumena, whereas Bion's beta-elements are like Hegel's pure particulars. We can empathize with Matte Blanco, and it appears that we have reached a *cul de sac* in our attempt to compare the two theories. But this *cul de sac* is only apparent.

That which is translated for Matte Blanco is the *infinite set*. Any set, including the infinite set, is *limited* by its definition or propositional function. In other words, all sets - including infinite sets - are surrounded by asymmetry. This is something Matte Blanco spends a lot of the time exploring in *U.I.S.* For example, a set of mothers is *different* from a set of fathers. Both can be included in a set of parents but as two separate sets they are defined and limited by asymmetry. As such they are like Plato's Forms, abstract realities which possess all the qualities of an object in infinite magnitude. Matte Blanco writes: "...a class, if and where the principle of symmetry rules, can be considered as a 'portion of symmetrical being' surrounded by a layer or skin of asymmetry. As the mind and the unconscious deal with various classes, we

can say that there are as many 'bags' of symmetry surrounded by films of asymmetry as there are classes in our unconscious."cccvii

It is possible to view Bion's beta-elements similar to infinite sets. For Bion a beta-element might be something like an emerging experience of fear. It cannot be called 'fear' or anything else at this stage, and to call it an experience would be precocious. It can even be questioned whether anything corresponding to a beta-element actually exists. Bion says that he has never witnessed or experienced a beta-element, or indeed an alpha-element, but assumes their existence as hypothetical entities.

The similarity between beta-elements and infinite sets lies in their *all-embraciveness*. In *Elements of Psychoanalysis* Bion describes beta-elements (or the grid-category A1) as showing "no differentiation of animate qualities from inanimate, subject from object, moral from scientific"cccviii. This is very much like Matte Blanco's description of the effects of symmetrization on infinite sets, especially at the deepest levels of the mind; stratum four to five in the stratified structure. Thus, at the same time both beta-element and infinite set are all-embracing and they are both limited by what they exclude. Fear, for example, is limited by not being love or jealousy.

Another similarity between beta-elements and infinite sets is the *excess of emotion* ascribed to both. The removal of this excess emotion happens in Bion by the use of alpha-function, by transforming the beta-elements into alpha-elements, or in other words by *modifying* the emotion into something the mind is capable of experiencing. According to Matte Blanco the intensity (or excess) of emotion depends on the infinite set the emotion is linked to. The translating function attempts to deal with the intensity for example by

dispersing the emotions onto several individuals. Matte Blanco calls the result a *tamed emotion*. Elsewhere Matte Blanco writes: “the action of psycho-analytic therapy consists of *divesting* persons, things and circumstances from their symbolic meaning (which leads to the confusion of the individual with the whole class) and *transforming* them, for conscious thinking, into what they really should be, that is, circumscribed entities in which the halo of the class does not interfere with their concrete meaning, by making them appear more than what they actually are. It is, in short, an action of divesting or taking away from the concrete object the infinite set to which it plays a host: a process of discharge.”^{cccix} (But as Eric Rayner points out in *Unconscious Logic*, this does not mean that “...therapists must become acquainted with the logical aspects of infinite sets, rather it suggests that they engage with their patients at a *level of optimal emotionality* that will allow finite and infinite to meet for those mysterious fruitful moments of a quantum leap.”^{cccx})

The essential difference between the two is that while infinite sets are highly structured, beta-elements are not. Infinite sets are formed by the processes Freud included under the term ‘dream work’, or by principles of generalisation and symmetry, using Matte Blanco’s own terminology. Some experience is necessary for the experience of infinite sets. Beta-elements, on the other hand, are raw, inexperienced emotions, or rather *pre-emotions*. They are messy, chaotic, even traumatic, and from this perspective a lot closer to something like what Lacan calls the Real than to anything as neat and tidy as Matte Blanco’s infinite sets.

It is understandable that Matte Blanco should have had difficulties with Bion’s beta-elements. There is nothing in Matte Blanco’s system that

would correspond to that level of rawness and messiness. The deepest level of the symmetrical being is a conflict free existence. Maybe somewhere around the third or fourth stratum of Matte Blanco's structures could be a home for Bion's beta-elements. Matte Blanco felt the 'Kleinian domain' largely to reside at the third stratum, and schizophrenic thinking at the fourth. But Matte Blanco places the emerging emotion on the second stratum, so beta-elements could be seen to reside also at that level. Beta-elements might also be linked to instincts which for Matte Blanco are 'laterally inserted' into the mental life as discussed earlier in the section on Freud. Perhaps the closest similarity between infinite sets and beta-elements is experience of that odd moment when we are almost aware of something infinitely large looming just beyond our reach. For example, when an unfriendly comment is in danger of becoming annihilating, or when tenderness is almost unbearably terrifying.

Even though for Matte Blanco the two levels of experiencing are simultaneous, the symmetrical mode seems to be the *original* which is then *translated* into the asymmetrical. This is similar to the Kleinian idea that the baby's first (undivided) experience is *split* into good and bad. Through Klein's splitting there is another link to Bion. Bion felt that splitting was a necessary part of experiencing. The experience of reality - which to Bion was close or identical to Kant's primordial chaos or things-in-themselves - *had to be split* for it to be experienced at all. Splitting was part of learning; things were divided but then brought together again, not back to the original fusion but ordered anew so that *correlation* was possible. This corresponds to Klein's move from paranoid-schizoid to depressive position. For Bion splitting and integration are aspects of alpha-function.

Matte Blanco has noted the connection when discussing a quote from Money-Kyrle. In the quote Money-Kyrle discusses Bion's idea of the development of concepts. Part of the development is splitting and integration. Matte Blanco writes: "...the process described by Money-Kyrle in the latter part of this quotation, *especially the remarks about the division and combination of concepts*, corresponds to a process of translating symmetrical being into asymmetrical expressions"cccxi. According to Bion development of concepts is not the only time that splitting is used. Matte Blanco's translating function is a fairly localized process, but for Bion splitting is a necessary part of all thinking.

Maybe the biggest difference between translating function and alpha-function can be seen in their relation to Freud. Translating function seems to correspond to Freud's representation in dreams whereas the scope of alpha-function sweeps across most of Freud's thinking.

There are two ways to understand what Freud means by representation (or representability) in dreams. The first and the narrower way comes across from chapter VI, section C of *The Interpretation of Dreams*. If looked at from this angle, representation is part of dream-work, and separate from but equal to condensation and displacement. The work of representation, in this narrower sense, consists of *representing relations and logical connections which have been destroyed by dream-work*. The manifest content of the dream cannot express logical relations, only the subject-matter of dream-thoughts. Logical connection, for example, is expressed by simultaneity in time, as in Raphael's fresco of the School of Athens which represents all philosophers in one group. *Conceptually* they form a group although *physically* (in reality)

they never did. Causation can be expressed by temporal sequence; the dream can be divided into two sections, an introductory dream and a main dream, where the (usually shorter) introductory dream represents the cause and following main dream represents the effect.

The second and wider definition of representability in dreams, which can be found in chapter VI, section D of *The Interpretation of Dreams* and elsewhere in Freud's writings^{cccxi}, merely consists of representing (abstract) thoughts by visual or pictorial images. Representation remains part of dream-work but loses its independent status alongside condensation and displacement. Instead it becomes *part* of them. Freud gives an example reported by Silberer, who had observed how thoughts were transformed into pictures. The thought of "having to revise an uneven passage in an essay" was transformed into an image of "planing a piece of wood"^{cccxi}. In terms of bi-logic we can see a set of 'actions of smoothing something' of which both the thought and the image were elements. Through symmetrization the image could replace the thought, and the infinite set 'actions of smoothing something' was translated into the image of planing a piece of wood.

The second definition is the only one recognised by Laplanche and Pontalis in *The Language of Psychoanalysis*^{cccxi}, and seems to be the generally accepted one.

In relation to Matte Blanco, the first definition of representation in dreams is probably the more relevant one. Logic requires asymmetrical thinking. "Logic requires the realm of the discrete, deals with the realm of the discrete and is part of the realm of the discrete, that is, of things which are distinguishable from one another and separate from one another."^{cccxi} Matte

Blanco interpreted Freud's dream-work in terms of symmetrical thinking. Symmetrical thinking destroys logic; it works like acid on relationships within a set, leaving behind a mass of sameness. Thus Freud's 'representation in dreams', the *representation of relations and logical connections which have been destroyed by dream-work* is very much the same as the translating function which "consists of *expressing symmetrical being in asymmetrical relations*"^{ccccxvi}. Furthermore, Freud writes that the relation most favoured by dream-work is the relation of similarity or 'just as'. The possession of common attributes is represented by unification, either as *identification* or as *composition*. In the process of unification equivalency is replaced by identity. This is what Matte Blanco calls symmetrization.

One way to look at Bion's alpha-function in relation to Freud is by separating the different developmental stages of thinking and the different uses of thoughts that alpha-function operates on and by comparing them to aspects of Freud's theory. Freud's 1911 paper 'Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning' is one of the very few texts Bion refers to in his writings by name, and in this paper we find the Freudian origins of Bion's alpha-function. The main theme of Freud's paper is the distinction between the pleasure principle and the reality principle, and my view is that Bion's alpha-function is a lot closer connected to the workings of a healthy ego dominated by the reality principle than it is to the primary process of the dream work which, according to Freud, is governed by the pleasure principle. Alpha-function is *necessary* for dream-work, *not equal* to it. In Bion's view *pleasure* seems to be closely connected to non-thinking and action, to the *immediate* pleasure. It has to do with *not tolerating* frustration, whereas thinking has to

do with *tolerating* frustration.

Bion likens beta-elements to Freud's motor discharge which "under the dominance of the pleasure principle had served as a means of unburdening the mental apparatus of accretions of stimuli"^{cccxvii}. According to Bion beta-elements are available only for evacuation. Projective identification of beta-elements is a form of evacuation. The prototype for the early alpha-function is the internalisation of the detoxifying and modifying *function* of the mother (or breast) into which the baby has evacuated all its primitive emotions (beta-elements). According to Freud *thinking* is the activity that enables the postponement of action by making it possible for the mental apparatus to tolerate an increased tension of stimulus. Thinking is a result of demands made by reality, and is thus possible only after the introduction of the reality principle. Bion introduced the term 'alpha-function' in a paper titled 'A Theory of Thinking'^{cccxviii}, and alpha-function is essentially about the ability or inability to think.

Alpha-elements, which are the result of the transformation of the beta-elements by alpha-function, are the basic components of thinking. Alpha-elements (unlike beta-elements) are available for dreaming and repression. Thus, for Bion, *some (prior) experience of reality is necessary for dreaming*. According to Bion we dream all the time. The dream (or contact-barrier) differentiates the unconscious from the conscious. Without the constant flow of the dream we would be forced to live in a hazy, confused existence where there is no distinction between the inner and the outer, the unconscious and the conscious. In other words, we would live in the domain of beta-elements or bizarre objects^{cccxix}. This can also be called psychosis.

Bion's theories on the *uses* to which thoughts are put are indebted and closely linked to Freud. *Notation* and *attention*, which for Bion are factors of alpha-function, are mentioned by Freud as adaptations in the psychical apparatus as a result of the demands made by the reality principle. Freud places a huge importance on the reality principle. It is the reality principle that enables us to *remember* instead of *repeating*. In *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920) Freud even writes that the efforts of psychoanalysis "are directed towards producing the toleration of ... unpleasure by an appeal to reality principle"^{ccccx}.

Freud's reality principle seems to be the starting point for Bion's alpha-function. Alpha-function is essentially about thinking, both unconscious and conscious. For Freud dreaming takes place under the dominance of the pleasure principle, for Bion the introduction of the reality principle is necessary for dreaming. In my view Bion's alpha-function only makes sense in light of middle and later Freud; the *unconscious ego* is probably the best overall location for Bion's alpha-function in Freud. Matte Blanco, on the other hand, found Freud's later theories full of contradictions and confusions. He wanted to concentrate on the early Freud, on the Unconscious proper, and he felt that Freud's biggest insights into the Unconscious somehow got lost after *The Interpretation of Dreams*.

It can be seen that Matte Blanco's translating function is limited in its relation to what it does and could represent. Perhaps if Matte Blanco had been more favourable towards later Freud, the translating function could have

developed and flourished into something richer. As it is, Matte Blanco spends very little time discussing the translating function, and in the discussion the translating function itself does not appear to be of great interest to him. It is merely a result of bi-logic. In contrast Bion's alpha-function which at times appears similar to the translating function, is a rich, well-developed concept and very much at the centre of Bion's thinking. I feel that bi-logic would benefit from the richness of Bion's concept.

Container and Contained

As part of his theory of thinking Bion developed the notions *container* and *contained*. The theory was based on the Kleinian model of baby's early interaction with its mother. Klein's *projective identification* was used as a theoretical starting point from which sprang the nodal points of the notions Bion used to describe the development of thoughts and a mind to think them: alpha-function, the idea of a thinking couple, mother's *reverie* and container and contained.

In *Second Thoughts and Learning from Experience* Bion describes how the rudimentary apparatus for thinking is internalised from the early interaction with the mother. Container and contained are part of this process. In *Elements of Psychoanalysis* Bion calls "a dynamic relationship between container and contained" the first element^{cccxxi}. Other elements are *PS-D* or "a) the reaction between... ..paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions, and b) the reaction precipitated by what Poincare described as the discovery of the selected fact"^{cccxxii}, the *passions L, H and K* or love, hate and knowledge, and finally *reason R and idea I*.^{cccxxiii} For Bion love, hate and knowledge are links

between people. Their presence shows that at least two minds are involved in the situation. Knowledge is the most psychoanalytically significant link. Bion stressed on many occasions that K has to do with a process of *getting to know* another person, not with possessions of pieces of knowledge about someone. K is an active (psychoanalytic) relationship in which "x is in a state of getting to know y and y is in a state of getting to be known by x"^{cccxxiv}. Reason R is alpha-function which is in service of the passions, and idea I refers to alpha-elements produced by alpha-function.

Toleration of ambiguity and doubt^{cccxxv} is the condition in which the commensal relationship between the container and contained can flourish and K-link to become active. Things are *alive* between people. The opposite of this, the -K-link is a fixed state of affairs in which one's own and other person's emotional reality is kept afar and any possibility of connection made void by strong defensive measures. -K is "an envious assertion of moral superiority without any morals"^{cccxxvi}, where "an ability to mis-understand is superior to an ability to understand"^{cccxxvii}. Klein's influence can be seen here; paranoid-schizoid position is about certainty: things are known to be *totally and definitely good* or *totally and definitely bad*. Depressive position is about tolerating ambiguity and doubt: things are known to be *somewhat good and somewhat bad at the same time*. This is like moving 'up' Matte Blanco's stratified structure from the wider sets and rough splits of the deeper levels to the richer and more varied experiences of the higher levels.

Bion writes: "Normal development follows if the relationship between infant and breast permits the infant to project a feeling, say, that it is dying

into the mother and to reintroject it after its sojourn in the breast has made it tolerable to the infant psyche. If the projection is not accepted by the mother the infant feels that its feeling it is dying is stripped of such meaning it has. It therefore reintrojects, not a fear of dying made tolerable, but a nameless dread.^{"ccccxxviii} Here mother's breast (or mother) is the container into which the contained (fear of dying) is projected. The baby has an innate expectation that what it has just projected will return in a more tolerable or manageable form. If this happens all is well and the baby will have found an asymmetrical bag or skin for its undifferentiated mash of feelings. From bi-logical perspective an infinite set will have formed; it is infinite because the contained, the "stuff within" is still in a highly undifferentiated state. But because it's a set it also has asymmetrical limits. In this instance the previously unnamable could be called 'a fear of dying' instead of for example 'hunger' or 'need to defecate'. For the baby all these ('fear of death', 'hunger', 'need to defecate') might originally or ultimately mean the same thing but with mother's reverie they are slowly differentiated and find separate meanings. As the baby grows, these big feelings are divided to have more particular, distinct and separate meanings; sets are divided into sub-sets. The big feeling or larger set does not cease to exist. It remains at a deeper level, and the new meanings/sets are drawn from it to build new layers into mind's fabric.

Every now and then, with all of us, some fact or feeling goes undigested or is only partially accepted or assimilated by the person. When something in the world (outside or inside) touches on this undigested bit even slightly, something deeper might be triggered into existence as a result; an eruption of the infinite from the deeper layers of the mind will awaken. The

reaction, the big feeling is out of place, too big, inappropriate for the situation. The loved one turns away, and an unconscious memory of mother leaving will result in a feeling of despair and inappropriate demands towards the real person in front of us. A colleague praises us for a job well done, and via the infinite set of 'needing Daddy's approval' we will be almost eternally grateful and obedient towards the real person in front of us. Matte Blanco's bi-logic gives a fresh perspective to situations of emotional infinity. Finding the finite, asymmetrical boundaries to experiences of unbound, all-consuming emotion can aid in finding a "home" for the infinite emotion and make unbearable situations more bearable.

Sometimes baby is unable to receive the goodness or mother is incapable of reverie and a good container-contained relationship with K-link is surpassed by -K-link filled with envy. "In -K the breast is felt enviously to remove the good or valuable element in the fear of dying and force the worthless residue back into the infant. The infant who started with a fear he was dying ends up by containing a nameless dread."^{ccccxix}

The difference between experience of unmodified emotion and modified emotion can be understood from the bi-logical perspective as the difference between untamed and tamed emotion. An unmodified or untamed emotion is sharp, hot, intolerable. In 'Attacks on Linking' Bion describes a patient who experiences "stabbing attacks from inside"^{ccccxx} as a result of some of the analyst's interpretations. Bion says that even when it would have been reasonable to suppose that the violent blows came from without (since the interpretations were seen to equal blows), they appeared to come from

within. This suggests that it is the *emotion* that the interpretation evokes, rather than the interpretation itself that is experienced as a 'stabbing attack'. The *unexperienced, unmodified or untamed emotion* touched by the interpretation is felt to be too sharp and intense to experience – it attacks from within.

The modified or tamed emotion is an experienced emotion. The strength of the emotion is not measured only by the strength or intensity of the contained, the emotion itself but also by the *strength of the container* of emotion that can take in, modify and not be destroyed by the emotion regardless of its enormity. Thinking and feeling are the result of the internalized relationship between the container and the contained. Bion believes that for a thought to have meaning, it must be linked to an emotional experience. Matte Blanco's symmetrized, infinite set is surrounded by a bag of asymmetry. The infinitized emotion is contained within a thought, a propositional function. The more asymmetry can grow out of the symmetry, the richer is the person's emotional life; it doesn't remain in a static state of extremities but has flexibility and mobility in it. Meaning is generated from this interplay of asymmetrical containers and more or less symmetrical contained.

The Grid

Bion developed a sort of short-hand method for taking notes from psychoanalytic sessions. He used a grid which represented his view of the mind. We'll take a short look at the grid in order to get a concise view of Bion's theory of thinking. The grid also represents Freud's and Klein's

influence on Bion's work.

THE GRID

	Defini- tory Hypo- theses 1	ψ 2	Nota- tion 3	Atten- tion 4	Inquiry 5	Action 6	... n.
A β -elements	A1	A2				A6	
B α -elements	B1	B2	B3	B4	B5	B6	... Bn
C Dream Thoughts Dreams, Myths	C1	C2	C3	C4	C5	C6	... Cn
D Pre-conception	D1	D2	D3	D4	D5	D6	... Dn
E Conception	E1	E2	E3	E4	E5	E6	... En
F Concept	F1	F2	F3	F4	F5	F6	... Fn
G Scientific Deductive System		G2					
H Algebraic Calculus							

The vertical axis of the grid represents the *development* of thoughts and the horizontal axis the *uses* thoughts are put: "different terms in the vertical axis express differences in degrees of sophistication rather than differences in function" or "...terms on the vertical axis vary but all have the same use whereas in the horizontal axis all the terms are the same but the "uses" vary"^{ccccxxi}. Developmental axis is strongly based on Klein, functional axis on Freud. Thoughts have always a developmental and a functional side to

them, in other words both axes need to be considered simultaneously. No place on the grid is “better” than another, there is no “goal” regarding the movement in the mind, no ethical preferences. For example E6 is not necessarily a better or fuller thought than D5. The *content* of the thought can be the same or almost the same regardless of the situation on the grid. For example statement “I am depressed” said by the patient has a very different *meaning* depending on where on the grid it is placed.

Vertical axis is the Bion from “Theory of thinking” and *Learning from Experience*. Bion uses Klein's theories of splitting and projective identification, the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions and symbol formation to postulate how our thinking develops from the concrete to the increasingly abstract levels. We can follow the birth of a thought from its potential or unborn thoughts, beta-elements A to actual alpha-elements B and beyond. In C we find dreaming, unconscious phantasy, myths, stories, narrations. Pre-conception in D is an *expectation*, something unfulfilled or unsaturated. It can be innate, like an expectation to be fed, or learned, like an expectation to be fed something particular. Conception D is a fulfillment or saturation. It represents a *particular* thing, for example a thought of a particular apple. Concept F differs from conception E in that F is more abstract, a *general* thought of apples or “appleness” and is thus closer to Plato’s Forms than to any actual, phenomenal experience. Concept E can be used again as a pre-conception D – after experiencing a fulfillment of eating an apple, a yearning for apple can follow. But concept F cannot be used as a pre-conception because it does not refer to any *particular* experience but is distanced from experience by abstraction. Scientific deductive system G has to

do with forming hypotheses and theories and is moving further into abstraction. Algebraic calculus H is the ultimate level of abstraction – only (mathematical) symbols are used.

The developmental axis resembles Matte Blanco's stratified structure, discussed in Chapter 1. From the deeper levels raw burning emotions/thoughts emerge and develop into tamed emotions and logical thinking. It is not however a one to one match since there are differences already discussed regarding how Bion and Matte Blanco view the development of thoughts.

Horizontal axis represents how thoughts are used. Influence of Freud's "Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning" can be seen clearly. Definitory hypothesis 1 is a realization that something exists, the first appearance of a thought in its most primitive form, an acknowledgement or perception. Ψ (psi) 2 is a negation of 1, a NO. Without the absence of the previously present, thought cannot develop further. Ψ 2 also has a life-denying side to it. It is the place where all felt emotion is a "no-emotion", the "place where present used to be before all time was annihilated"^{cccxixii}. Ψ can be used as a barrier against the unknown and can be seen for example in $-K$ activity; denial, counter-transference, omniscience. Notation 3 includes statements of present and past realizations. They can be abstractions or enlargements of memory. Freud writes about notation: "...whose task it was to lay down the results of this periodical activity of consciousness – a part of what we call *memory*"^{cccxixiii}. Attention 4 includes observation and paying attention to something particular but also the state of attentiveness, reverie. According to Freud attention "meets the sense-impressions half way, instead of waiting their appearance"^{cccxixiv}. Inquiry 5 is more active than attention. Theory based on

previous experiences is used to investigate the unknown. There is a possibility of reaching towards new material with the aid of some old, familiar thoughts. Freud talks about “*impartial passing of judgement*” used to decide whether an idea is “in agreement with reality or not”^{cccxv}. Finally in Bion’s Grid there is action 6. Thinking can reach outside itself, or in Freud’s words: “Motor discharge was now employed in the appropriate alteration of reality; it was converted into *action*”^{cccxvi}. This can mean for example analyst’s statement as an operator. Bion finds that sense of loneliness and isolation can be present at 6, since this is where the analytic couple comes to a point of separation. Each is on their own. A special case is A1 which represents evacuation of beta-elements and has not developed into thinking. It is like Freud’s primitive motor discharge, which “under the dominance of the pleasure principle, had served as a means of unburdening the mental apparatus of accretions of stimuli, and which had carried out this task by sending innervations into the interior of the body (leading to expressive movements and the play of features and to manifestations of affect)”^{cccxvii}. Earlier mentioned stabbing attacks from within belong to A1.

When studying or using the grid, lines and columns must be considered simultaneously. A piece of dream material can be placed in C1, C2, C3, and so on. The meaning of the material varies depending on its situation on the grid. For example patient’s statement “I am depressed” has a very different meaning in D3, where it most likely represents an expectation of depression: “In situations like these I have a tendency to get depressed”, than in E4, where most likely the statement is used to draw the analysts attention to a state of mind that has been previously named as depression. Also the meaning of

analyst's statements varies depending on their place on the grid. If analyst says to the patient "It appears to me that you are depressed" in C2, analyst is probably using the words as an attempt to avoid the patient's mental reality, whereas exactly the same statement in E5 might be used to investigate the unknown behind or beyond the state of mind named "depressed". The grid offers a rich view of the mind in a concise form.

Emotional Experience, Growth and Truth

Truth is a difficult issue for psychoanalysis, not only the question of *what* is the truth about any particular situation but also *why does truth matter*. Different levels of the mind often appear in contradiction with each other. This can be seen in Freud's conscious-unconscious –distinction as well as Matte Blanco's symmetrical-asymmetrical –division in the stratified structure. In Bion's system the dichotomy is not as clear but contradictory thoughts and beliefs exist in his version of the mind as well. In their simplest forms the relevant questions would be: 1) Is the unconscious in some sense more true than the conscious? 2) If there was something that could be called truth, would it be wrong or bad to live with an illusion if life with illusion was easier or more fulfilling?

Let's start by tackling the second question first, since it is very important for Bion. For Bion there are two possible ways to react to any emerging experience and thus two possible roads to take. The main decision is *whether to tolerate frustration or not*. "The choice that matters to the psychoanalyst is one that lies between *procedures designed to evade frustration and those designed to modify it*. That is the critical

decision.^{”cccxxxviii} (“Decision” might seem a strong word but Bion - like Klein and also Freud to an extent - believed that at some level we choose our ways to deal with emotional reality.) This decision determines whether our thinking becomes non-psychotic or psychotic. We all have both non-psychotic or neurotic and psychotic parts to our personality. The non-psychotic part of the personality is based on Freud’s reality principle, tolerates frustration, has a working alpha-function and uses neurotic mechanisms. The psychotic part of the personality is based on Freud’s pleasure principle, doesn’t tolerate frustration, has no working alpha-function and uses psychotic mechanism.

If truth or reality didn’t matter, the psychotic choice would be quite as good - or perhaps even better - than the non-psychotic choice, because any emotionally painful situation would be “dealt with” quickly and efficiently. If emotions didn’t get in way of life, existence would be so much easier. We don’t need much time to reflect on this to see that for some reason the psychotic choice doesn’t work. Bion’s answer is that emotional reality and truth are necessary for mental health: ”...a sense of reality matters to the individual in the way that food, drink, air and excretion of waste products matter. Failure to eat, drink or breathe properly has disastrous consequences for life itself. Failure to use emotional experience produces a comparable disaster in the development of the personality...^{”cccxxxix}, ”...there is a need for awareness of an emotional experience, similar to the need for awareness of concrete objects that is achieved through the sense impressions, because lack of such awareness implies a deprivation of truth and *truth seems to be essential for psychic health.*^{”cccxl}

Bion talks about *growth* of the personality, and this appears in some

ways similar to Matte Blanco's increasing asymmetries or propositional functions. Both Bion and Matte Blanco discuss actualities born from potentialities. Growth, in Bion, is linked to increased complexity, agglomeration and number of alpha-elements (which are what make experiencing possible). Growth has to do with life – and it can also be seen a result of Freud's life instinct. Truth, especially emotional truth, is necessary for growth to take place. Bion links positive growth with 'social-ism' as opposed to narcissism which is linked to negative growth.^{cccxi}

If we can agree with Bion that truth does matter, we are left with our first question – whose truth? If there are different levels in the mind in contradiction or disagreement with each other, the unavoidable question is *which of these levels represents the truth*. Is unconscious material somehow more true than the conscious which has gone through the modifications by the censorship? Or does the compromise of inner and outer in the conscious material represent a fuller – and thus truer – picture than the purely subjective unconscious truth? Perhaps attempts to correlate all the different and even contradictory thoughts, emotions and perspectives form the truest picture.

In chapter one some philosophically relevant aspects of bi-logic were discussed briefly. We will now return to the different types of infinities and the metaphysical positions of Kant and Hegel in order to get closer to understanding Bion's and Matte Blanco's approaches to truth. Matte Blanco's interplay between the modes – symmetrical and asymmetrical – can be looked at from the perspective of the movement between the metaphysical, all-embracing infinite and the mathematical, ever-increasing infinite. As we remember from chapter one, these two types of infinities seemed at first to be

in contradiction with each other. On the one hand if the infinite contained everything actual and potential, it could not grow outside itself, because there was no outside. On the other hand, if the infinite was constantly increasing, it could not contain everything, because there was always something more.

We briefly looked at the solution offered by Kant. The noumena – things-in-themselves, which is Kant’s version of the metaphysical infinite – was translated in the mind into phenomena – the world as experienced by us through the “eye-glasses” of time, space and causality. The two infinities existed side by side, differentiated by *human experience*. This was similar to Matte Blanco’s all-knowing symmetrical mode which was translated into an endless list of asymmetrical instances. Further step from the noumena-phenomena – distinction was made by Hegel whose form of metaphysical infinite contained all but was in a state of becoming to know itself by constantly being fulfilled. For Hegel, the metaphysical and the mathematical infinities were not two sides of the same coin like they were for Kant and Matte Blanco. Rather they were two characteristics or properties of the same infinite existence. Returning to psychoanalysis the correlative difference could be expressed as movement from the split between the unconscious and the conscious or the symmetrical and the asymmetrical to a more integrated view of the mind.

Bion uses the term *O* when talking about the infinite or the ultimate Truth: “I shall use the sign *O* to denote that which is the ultimate reality represented by terms such as ultimate reality, absolute truth, the godhead, the infinite, the thing-in-itself.” “...its existence is conjectured phenomenologically.”^{cccxliv} Bion talks about *O* as an *experience*, and for Bion experience means always *emotional experience*. We can understand *O* as the

ultimate reality of our emotional experience, the noumenal world of our emotional life. According to Bion “experience” (or the seeds of experience) which is outside the scope of our thinking apparatus is transformed into something possible to experience. It seems that we have returned to our original position of unconscious, conscious and the psychic space in-between. However, with Bion – and to an extent also with Matte Blanco – there is a different slant on the picture.

Even though the deepest levels of the unconscious are the base of our experiences, they are not the whole truth. This primitive state of affairs existing outside the scope of our consciousness can best be understood as *a potential* which is growing, forming or being translated into some *actual experience*. If this is the case, it could be thought that the potential, primitive state doesn't really exist at all. It is something that can become existent, it can gain a form, but *in itself it does not exist*. So can something that doesn't even exist be called Truth? Hardly. Our first question “Is the unconscious in some sense more true than the conscious?” seems to have run into difficulties. On one hand the conscious is full of half-truths and compromises; on the other hand the deepest levels of the unconscious are only empty potentials.

Bion's answer to the question is that *Truth can be found in the evolution of O*. When our experience grows from the original emotional potential and maintains its connection to it, we are or live (in) the Truth. There is no other truth. Truth cannot be packaged into facts or bits of knowledge, because the connection to the original experience is severed. For the same reason no *part* of the mind can on its own be thought of as containing the truth more than some other part. Truth is a comprehensive way of being/becoming.

Emotions and thoughts, unconscious and conscious, physical and psychic, inner and outer exist in harmony and movement. This description of the mind is almost identical to Hegel's description of the Absolute. We are reminded of Matte Blanco's view of the symmetrical mode as *perfect knowledge* (as discussed in chapter one), and of his insistence that *neither mode can exist by themselves*.

I have compared some of Bion's notions to bi-logical notions. Many similarities are found but also the differences come to light. I show how bi-logic could benefit from Bion's alpha-function which is a richer and more versatile concept than Matte Blanco's translating function. Other points of similarity are discussed as well. We also get acquainted with other aspects of Bion's theory; the K, L and H links, the "O", its metaphysical connotations, and the relevance of truth on psychic well-being. This section has aimed to show that a) bi-logic offers a unique perspective, b) bi-logic can be used together with other theories, and c) bi-logic would benefit from other theories, in this case from Bion.

Chapter 6

Diluted Emotions;

The Case of Schreber

The famous case of Schreber has been discussed widely in psychoanalytic circles. Freud's analysis concentrating on Schreber's *Memoirs* has been followed by illuminating studies that have penetrated into the actual life and childhood experiences of Schreber. Of these the most notable are Baumeyer's article from 1956 and Niederland's research spanning over two decades from the early 1950's to the publication of *The Schreber Case* in 1974. Robert B. White has also offered an interesting reading of the material contributing to a fuller picture of the case^{cccxlili}.

Daniel Paul Schreber was brought up by a sadistic, authoritative father and a passively accommodating mother. The family had five children, and the upbringing appears to have been slightly tougher on the two boys than the three girls. The older of the boys committed suicide, and the younger, Daniel Paul, became mentally ill in his early forties. In his analysis Freud concentrated on Schreber's repressed homosexual wishes towards his father and brother, which were transformed into delusions. Niederland and others have traced uncanny similarities between Schreber's phantasies about God and his *actual* childhood experiences of his father. White has added a Kleinian flavoured reading emphasising the pre-oedipal attachment to the mother that Schreber was desperately clinging to in order to be saved from the father. These exhaustive analyses of the Schreber family don't leave us wondering

why Schreber got ill, but rather why he did not get ill earlier.

If the material available provides us with a thorough psychoanalytic picture of the case, why do we need another reading? What *new* can bi-logic add to the understanding of Schreber's illness? In Schreber's case we can see how unbearable emotions are dealt with highly defensive measures. These measures can be looked at from a bi-logical point of view, and Matte Blanco himself used the case to illustrate the *short-circuited stratified structure*. Freud placed the emphasis on the genesis of Schreber's phantasy, Matte Blanco on the *structure* of the phantasy. By investigating the structure of Schreber's phantasy bi-logically, we can begin to see the reasoning behind his thinking. Thus bi-logic does not attempt to answer the question *why?* asked previously, but the question *how?*. *How* did Schreber's father become equated with Flechsig, and again with God? *How* did Schreber turn his childhood experiences into a complicated system of solipsistic theology? Answering the question "how" with the aid of bi-logic will give us a better understanding of the unconscious reasoning or logic Schreber based his views on.

The Case

Daniel Paul Schreber was a high-ranking judge who developed a complex system of delusions which started when Schreber was in his early forties. After his second illness (when he was in his early fifties) Schreber wrote *Memoirs of my Nervous Illness* which was published in 1903. Schreber's original reason for writing was to explain to his wife what was going on; to inform her about his religious beliefs. The writings were, to begin with, on scraps of paper and little notebooks. The reason for publishing the

writings in the form of a book was (at least partially) the legal action Schreber took for his discharge from the asylum, and thus for the restitution of his civil rights. *Memoirs* succeeded in convincing the panel, and Schreber was discharged on the 20th of December 1902. Even though the case was widely discussed in the psychiatric circles at the time, it seems to have caught Freud's attention only in the summer of 1910. Freud never met Schreber, and his interpretation of the case is fully based on a reading of the *Memoir*.

Schreber comes across as an intelligent, well-read man who was pleasant company and who (most of the time) talked and behaved like the rest of us. He was married to a woman some fifteen years his junior. The marriage did not result in children, and the childlessness was a great source of sorrow to both Schreber and his wife. Schreber's father died when Schreber was only 19. Just before his marriage Schreber, aged 35, also experienced the death of his brother. The father and brother play an important role in Freud's reading of the case.

Among Schreber's many delusional phantasies two have been placed in a central position: the phantasy that he (Daniel Paul) is to be the redeemer of the world, and the phantasy that to do this he must be transformed into a woman - albeit unwillingly - in order to bear God's children. These phantasies are summarised by the Court Judgement: "*He believed that he had a mission to redeem the world and to restore it to its lost state of bliss. This, however, he could only bring about if he were first transformed from a man into a woman.*"cccxliv

Schreber himself believed that he was called to the task of redemption by direct inspiration from God, and the transformation into a woman was just

an unpleasant necessity that resulted from God's wishes. Freud, however, concentrated on the *phantasy of transformation into a woman* as the primary delusion, and the *redeemer phantasy* as a secondary delusion. Freud refers to a thought Schreber had *before* the second illness as an indication of the primacy of the second delusion (that of being transformed into a woman). The thought which occurred to Schreber in a state between sleeping and waking was this: "...after all it really must be very nice to be a woman submitting to the act of copulation" (cccxliv). Soon after the occurrence of the thought Schreber suffered from a bout of sleeplessness followed by the onset of his second illness. It is the course of the second illness that *Memoirs* deals with.

According to Dr. Weber, the Director of the Sonnenstein Asylum where Schreber spent eight years during his second illness, Schreber's pathological ideas "...have formed themselves into a complete system; they are more or less fixed, and seem inaccessible to correction by means of any objective appreciation and judgement of the external facts" (cccxlvi). In other words, Schreber's delusional phantasies have invaded or 'taken over' his better judgement.

One of the central characters in Schreber's delusion is *Flechsigt*, the Director of the Leipzig Psychiatric Clinic where Schreber was admitted during his first illness, and again for a short time at the beginning of his second illness. Schreber believed that Flechsigt was the first and most prominent of his persecutors, a 'soul-murderer'. The character of Flechsigt soon becomes mixed up in Schreber's system of beliefs - his 'theology'.

In Schreber's system God oscillates between the roles of an omnipotent, benevolent being, and a weak, childish persecutor. To begin with,

God is all good and on Schreber's side, and Flechsig is the bad persecutor. However, the character of Flechsig and the character of God soon become fused into 'God Flechsig'. Occasionally they are *at the same time* separate, 'God' and 'Flechsig' and one 'God Flechsig'. At times there is *only* 'God Flechsig', and the characters of Flechsig and God have ceased to exist. Furthermore, Schreber is able - at least partially - to distinguish between Professor Flechsig (the real person) and Flechsig soul (the phantasy formation), even though at times this distinction seems to have disappeared. Flechsig is still the instigator of the plot against Schreber, but God has yielded to Flechsig's seductive influence.

This figure, or a *class of figures*, undergoes many transmutations while its essence remains the same. At one time the soul of the chief attendant of the Lindenhof Asylum, represented by the *von W soul*, is joined to the Flechsig soul. But it is not only additions that take place in the realm of souls; there is also a complex system of 'soul-division'. The Flechsig soul alone had up to sixty sub-divisions, the largest of which were known as the 'upper Flechsig' and the 'middle Flechsig'. Later, after the multiplication of souls had become a 'nuisance', only some of the divisions lasted. The Flechsig soul survived as the 'posterior Flechsig' and the "'Oh well!' Party'. Similarly God was divided into 'anterior realms of God' and 'posterior realms of God', and the posterior realms were further divided into lower and upper God.

What comes across from Schreber's confusing and complex delusional system is *one character or a set of characters* that change shape and number making understanding difficult. We can refer to this ever-changing character as 'God Flechsig' using one of Schreber's own terms.

Bi-Logical Reading of the Material

In *The Unconscious as Infinite Sets* Matte Blanco uses the construction of 'God Flechsig' as an example of an *identity within a class*, and in *Thinking, Feeling and Being* as an example of a *short-circuited stratified structure*, or in other words of fusion of incompatible elements into a new unity. The construction of 'God Flechsig' can also be seen as an instance of *translating function*. The infinite set in question could be defined as 'the class of all male figures to whom Schreber was sexually attracted'. Freud postulates that the original figures of erotic longing were Schreber's father and brother. Other elements of the set mentioned in the case history include God, Flechsig, sun, the chief attendant of the asylum and von W. These elements are also sub-sets; and the characters produced by 'soul-division' can be seen as elements of these sub-sets.

Identity Within a Class

Matte Blanco quotes two short sections from Freud's case history of Schreber. He then comments on Freud's "intuition" regarding the *identity*, instead of equivalence, between elements of the class 'God Flechsig'. For Schreber 'God' and 'Flechsig' belong to the same class, the 'class of fathers'. According to 'normal' symbolic logic, there is an equivalence of the elements regarding the propositional function. In other words, 'God' and 'Flechsig' are equivalent regarding their belonging to the 'class of fathers'. Schreber, instead, treats the elements as *identical* in every respect. Schreber's construction 'God Flechsig' serves as an example of identity within a class. It

is precisely this identity - when spilling into the conscious mind - that is at the heart of mental illness according to bi-logic. "*Schreber's madness consisted in affirming the identity*, not the equivalence existing on account of the fact of their belonging to the same class."cccxlvi

Because of the (unconscious) identity within a class individual limits become blurred. The blurring of distinctions between elements of a class leads to the recognition of *only* classes or propositional functions. The class where distinctions have been blurred, which in the healthy mind would have remained unconscious, has become part of Schreber's conscious mind. The difference between healthy and pathological uses of bi-logic is the *contamination* of the more superficial levels by the deeper levels that takes place only in pathology, the invasion of the conscious mind by a (fixed) infinite set. This does not happen in normal or healthy thinking.

Short-Circuited Stratified Structure

In *Thinking, Feeling and Being* Matte Blanco introduces *bi-logical structures* which are different ways classical and symmetrical logic intertwine with each other. One of these he calls the *constitutive stratified bi-logical structure*cccxlvi; a *gradual* change from the highly asymmetrical, conscious activity to the deeply symmetrical, unconscious state of being. He identifies five levels or *strata* which can be conceived in terms of greater or lesser *generality*:

1. conscious and well-limited objects,
2. more or less conscious emotions,
3. symmetrization of the class,

4. formation of wider classes which are symmetrized,
5. mathematical limit: indivisibilityccccxlix.

This is a major diversion from the Freudian model of the mind which is divided *strictly* into unconscious and conscious.

The stratified structure is different from all other bi-logical structures. Unlike the other bi-logical structures it is so extensive that it contains or embraces the whole psychic life. The stratified structure also includes all other bi-logical structures either as normal relations between the strata or as alterations of the normal relations. The *short-circuited stratified structure* is one of the *alterations* of the normal relations between the different levels. Matte Blanco discusses the short-circuited stratified structure in relation to Schreber, and also calls it the 'Schreber structure'cccc. The Schreber case was not important for Matte Blanco only because he was able to use it as an example of the short-circuited structure, it was through trying to understand Schreber's case that Matte Blanco 'discovered' or became aware of the stratified structure.

Matte Blanco first discusses the possibility that Schreber could represent *Simassi* or 'simultaneously asymmetrical/symmetrical structure'. This hypothesis is soon rejected on grounds that in Schreber's case there is a *fusion* of asymmetry and symmetry into a new unity, whereas in the Simassi structure two parallel but incompatible ways of seeing the same reality exist side by side. Matte Blanco uses as an example the case of a schizophrenic who saw a door opening and exclaimed: 'The animals are eating me'. The patient in question knew that the door was a door - asymmetrical thinking - but *at the same time* conceived it as a dangerous animal - symmetrical thinking.

According to Matte Blanco's reading of Schreber, Schreber *did not know* that Flechsig was *either* Professor Flechsig *or* God, but saw Flechsig *only* as 'God Flechsig'. The construction of 'God Flechsig', a "fusion into a new unity" of symmetrical and asymmetrical (and hence incompatible) aspects, is an instance of the short-circuited stratified structure. There has been a 'short-circuit' between the different strata producing something entirely new. Matte Blanco believes this to be possible only in extremely pathological cases.

There are other examples of the short-circuited stratified structure in Schreber's case, for example the perception of God as a *fusion* of omnipotence and childishness, which shows blatant disregard for the incompatibility of the two characteristics. A belief in two Gods, one omnipotent, one childish, would have been a less pathological possibility to resolve the contradiction, as would have been a belief in a God who alternated between omnipotence and childishness. These beliefs might have been problematic in other respects, but it is only the fusion of the two characteristics into one unity, an 'omnipotent-childish God' that produces an instance of the short-circuited structure.

Translating Function

In addition to the two bi-logical aspects of Schreber's case Matte Blanco mentions himself, we can offer a third one. In Schreber's delusion of 'God Flechsig' we can also see an example of the *translating function* which Matte discusses in chapter 25 of *U.I.S.*. Even though Matte Blanco devotes only one chapter exclusively to the translating function, the translating function is at the very heart of psychoanalysis. It attempts to answer the

question ‘how does the conscious ‘read’ the unconscious?’ Or using Matte Blanco’s own terminology: ‘how does the asymmetrical contain the symmetrical?’ Matte Blanco uses the term *translating function* to denote the way we experience or understand at the conscious, asymmetrical level the existing unconscious infinite sets. The homogeneous, indivisible unity where space and time have no meaning is translated into spatio-temporal plurality. (Translating function has been discussed earlier, mainly in the section where theoretical aspects of bi-logic are compared to Bion’s theory of thinking.)

In Schreber’s case the original infinite set of ‘God Flechsig’ is translated into an unstable number of characters which are *at the same time* distinct from each other *and* fused together. Freud writes: “paranoia resolves once more into their elements the products of the condensations and identifications which are effected in the unconscious. ...All this dividing up of Flechsig and God into a number of persons thus had the same meaning as the splitting of the persecutor into Flechsig and God. *They were all duplications of one and the same important relationship.*“^{ccclii} The divisions and duplications were employed in order to produce a “watering down effect...
...*to prevent the occurrence of unduly powerful impressions*“^{cccliii}.

The account of the ‘watering down effect’ - which Freud credits to Jung - is similar to Matte Blanco’s explanation of the translating function. The *reason* for the translating is to *tame* the emotion - the intensity of the (infinite) emotion is dispersed onto several individuals. In Schreber’s case the individuals were fused back into a unity. This psychotic construction is a good example of an experience (or a representation) of an infinite set. *It needs to be noted that translating function in itself is not a psychotic mechanism, but part*

of our mental make-up. However, the translating function can be used defensively as well as in a healthy way. Combined with the bi-logical *short-circuited stratified structure* Schreber's use of the translating function is highly (psychotically) defensive. *Bi-modal* (as opposed to bi-logical) use of the translating function operates on a healthy manner to produce more asymmetrical knowledge, and to increase our psychical actualities. Schreber's psychotic use of the mechanism could be described as "translating function gone wrong".

Schreber's psychotic formation of 'God Flechsig' can be read as an illustration of bi-logic. At the same time bi-logical reading of Schreber offers us a possibility of understanding *how* Schreber's thinking developed structurally. The inability to deal with the powerful emotions (of attraction and hatred) towards his father lead to *formation of symmetrised, infinite sets by replacing equivalence within the set by identity*. There was a *short-circuit* between the symmetrised set that in a healthier mind would have remained unconscious, and as a result a completely new unity of 'God Flechsig' invaded the consciousness. Furthermore, the infinite set was *divided up*, again as a defence against the powerful (infinite) emotions it carried, and *translated* (as a psychotic defence) into a series of elements which were essentially the same, or duplications of the same relationship.

Had Schreber had the opportunity to undergo analysis, *bi-logically the aim would have been to end the invasion of the consciousness by infinite sets by a (bi-modal) translation of what belongs to the symmetrical mode into asymmetrical knowledge*. On one hand bi-logic can tackle the problem by concentrating on the *logic and structure* of the thoughts. On the other hand it

can lead to the individual historical roots of each unhealthy thought construct by finding the *common thing - propositional function or infinite set* – behind separate manifestations. In other words, *by asking and finding answers for the question “how”, the patient can be helped by taming the dangerously intense, infinite emotions, and at the same time answers for the question “why” will reveal itself.* Bi-logical analysis will help to de-infinitize all-invading emotions into tolerable, tamed emotions

Chapter 7

Infinite Aggression;

The Case of John

Confusion and forgetting are familiar defences against emotion that is experienced as too 'big' or threatening. In her case histories Klein shows us *why* these defences take place and what are the frighteningly unbearable phantasies behind particular confusions and other symptoms. Matte Blanco's bi-logic can be used to understand *how* these defences are structured, and what kind of thinking they are based on.

Unconscious tends to generalise, and treat the world - internal as well as external - as if it was made of groups or sets of objects rather than individuals. Unconscious also has a tendency to selectively ignore differences. Matte Blanco has called the formulations based on these two clinical findings as principles of *generalisation* and *symmetrization*. We can see their effects for example in racist prejudice, when somebody is treated *only* or *primarily* as a representative of their ethnic group (generalisation), and when *all the members of the group are treated as the same* (symmetrization).

In 'A contribution to a Theory of Intellectual Inhibition' Klein discusses the case of John who has suffered from "neurotic symptoms ...character difficulties, and ...intellectual inhibitions"^{cccliv}. We are also told of John's habit of tearing, cutting, burning and wetting objects, especially things he has made himself^{ccclv}. John is a seven-year-old boy who at the time of the sessions recorded by Klein has been in analysis with her for two years. Klein

mentions a younger brother who is “nearly four years old”^{ccclvi}, and an older brother “four years his [John’s] senior”^{ccclvii}. Klein presents material from two consecutive sessions. Analysis of the material in question had a great impact on John, and “led to a remarkable improvement where his intellectual inhibitions were concerned”^{ccclviii}.

Using Matte Blanco’s bi-logic, we can understand how John’s symptoms were brought about by generalisation and symmetrization. John has a *difficulty in distinguishing* between certain words. We find that this is a result of an *unconscious equation* of what the words stood for. *From the point of view of the unconscious there is no difference between the words because they are all members of the same symmetrised infinite set.* A bi-logical reading of the case can give clarity and a new perspective to Klein’s case history. It can also work as an illustration of bi-logic.

Session 1

In the first of the two sessions John tells the analyst that he is *unable to distinguish* between the French words for ‘chicken’, ‘fish’ and ‘ice’ (*poulet, poisson, glace*). Whenever at school he is asked what one of the French words meant he would answer with the English meaning of one of the other words. John is playing in the room while talking, and when relating his associations to the words his play becomes an integral part of the associative process.

When asked about *poulet* John is laying on his back, kicking his legs and drawing. He thought of a fox breaking into a chicken house at four o’clock in the afternoon. John had made a drawing, and while saying: “The fox breaks in and kills a little chicken”^{ccclix}, John cut out something of what

he had drawn. The drawing turned out to be a house of which he had cut off the roof to represent the “way the fox got into the house”^{ccclx}. Following this John saw that he himself was the fox, the chicken was his little brother, and four o’clock in the afternoon the time his mother was usually out of the house.

John’s physical reaction to inquiries about *poisson* was more dramatic. There was a high level of aggression. He “began to kick more violently and to thrust the scissors near his eyes and try to cut his hair”^{ccclxi} so that the analyst had to remove the scissors from him. His verbal answer was that “fried fish was very nice and he liked it”^{ccclxii}. After this John drew a seaplane and a boat.

When asked about ‘ice’ (*glace*) John said: “A big piece of ice is nice and white, and it gets first pink and then red.” “This happens because “it melts” because “the sun shone on it”^{ccclxiii}. There was a lot of anxiety. John cut out the boat and the seaplane from the drawing to see if they would float on water.

John’s rather effortless acceptance/realisation of the underlying meaning of his associations to *poulet* (‘chicken’) results presumably from the work, mentioned by Klein, done previously on the area of John’s aggression towards his younger brother. We can see symmetrizations ‘fox’ = ‘John’, and ‘chicken’ = ‘little brother’. In the first case we can presume the existence of a larger class which can be formulated ‘those who attack’, of which the two (‘fox’ and ‘John’) are elements. In the latter case a larger class could be named ‘those who are attacked’, of which ‘chicken’ and ‘little brother’ can be seen to be elements.

In both instances a part-whole symmetrization results in an unconscious identity between the original object (‘John’, ‘little brother’), the

symbolic meaning ('fox', 'chicken'), and the wider class in question ('those who attack', 'those who are attacked'). Thus through the unconscious, symmetrised sets 'those who attack = fox = John' and 'those who are attacked = chicken = little brother' a displacement from the original to a different object can take place.

In a footnote Klein remarks on an interesting mirroring (symmetrization) of relationships between the brothers. "These tendencies in regard to his younger brother contributed in no small measure towards disturbing in relations with his elder brother, *in whom he presupposed the existence of similar intentions towards himself*."^{ccclxiv} The wider classes can now be seen to contain a new element: 'those who attack = fox = John = *elder brother*', and 'those who are attacked = chicken = little brother = *younger brother*'. What becomes crucial is the *relationship* between the sets. Something ('attack') happens, but because of symmetrization (or multiple symmetrizations) the identities of participants become blurred.

(We can postulate an even wider class which would include both the class of 'those who attack' and 'those who are attacked'. Through symmetrization within this new wider class, which can be called for example 'those somehow involved in an attack', even the distinction between active and passive participants can become obsolete.) In the first session John's excessive anxiety and aggression seem to prevent awareness of further underlying meanings from emerging.

Session 2

The following day John showed more anxiety and related a bad dream

while lying on the table kicking “harder than ever“. “*The fish was a crab. He [John] was standing on a pier at the seaside where he has often been with his mother. He was supposed to kill an enormous crab which came out of the water on to the pier. He shot it with his little gun and killed it with his sword, which was not very efficient. As soon as he killed the crab, he had to kill more and more of them which kept coming out of the water.*”^{ccclxv} He had to kill the crabs in order to “*stop them going into the world, because they would kill the whole world*”^{ccclxvi}.

When the analyst asked about the kicking John answered: “*I am lying on the water and crabs are all around me.*”^{ccclxvii} The drawing of a boat and a seaplane from the previous day represented a wish-fulfilment – they were means of escaping from the crabs cutting and nipping him which was represented by the scissors. When the analyst pointed out that John had been on a pier he answered: “*O yes, but I fell into the water long ago.*”^{ccclxviii}. What the crabs wanted most was to “*get into a joint of meat on the water which looked like a house*“. The crabs had not been inside yet, but there was danger of getting inside by the doors and windows.

Klein’s comments on the dream show the representations that take place in the dream. The scene on the water and the meat-house had to do with the mother’s body, and also John’s own body. The crabs were identified with the father’s penis, John’s penis, and John’s faeces.

When the analyst asked John again about *glace* (‘ice’), he talked about a ‘glass’, and went to the water-tap to drink a glass of water. He said that the water was barley-water which he likes. Then he talked about cut-glass (“glass which had ‘little pieces’ broken out of it”^{ccclxix}), and said that the sun had

spoilt the big block of ice, by shooting at the glass with its heat spoiling all the barley water as well.

While talking John had chosen a yellow pencil and started to make dots on a piece of paper, then punching holes in it, finally shearing the piece of paper to ribbons. Next he cut off the yellow outside of the pencil with a knife. Klein comments: "The yellow pencil stood for the sun, which symbolised his own burning penis and urine. (The word 'sun' stood for himself, the 'son', through verbal association as well.)"^{ccclxx}. In the following paragraph Klein adds that the pencil also represented his father's sadistic penis.

In previous sessions John has burned paper, matchboxes and matches. He has also (at different times) torn pieces of paper and soaked or cut them, and repeatedly broken tumblers in the room. All these objects, according to Klein, represented "his mother's breast or her whole person"^{ccclxxi}. The glass, also, represented the breast, and the barley-water milk. The block of ice and the "meat-house" stood for the mother's body, and the ice turning red "symbolized the blood of the injured mother"^{ccclxxii}.

The resolution to the problem came with John's realisation of the *sameness of the words* he had had difficulty learning. John said: "*I know they are all the same, chicken, ice, glass and crabs.*" ...[This was so] '*Because they are all brown and broken and dead*'"^{ccclxxiii}. Klein comments: "This is why he could not distinguish between these things, *because all were dead*; he killed all the crabs, but the chicken, representing the babies, and the ice and glass representing the mother, were all dirtied and injured, or killed too."^{ccclxxiv}

To summarise, from John's associations and Klein's interpretations to

the dream we can see that the central problem lies with John's difficulty in accepting his aggression towards the mother. The words John could not distinguish were representations of the mother or aspects of the mother. In John's unconscious phantasy the mother - and thus everything representing the mother - had been destroyed. *The words (representing the mother) were all the same* from this point of view.

The second session had started with a wonderfully rich dream. The first instance of symmetrical activity can be seen in the comment where *drawings* of a seaplane and a boat are treated *as if* they were a *real* seaplane and a *real* boat and it was possible to escape in them. The 'scissors' which represented the 'crabs' have become identical with each other through symmetrization within a wider class of (something like) 'nipping and cutting objects'.

Klein's comment on the dream reveals multiple symmetrizations. We will now take a closer look at these symmetrizations and place them under a bi-logic microscope. Points of symmetrical activity are in **bold** type and (sets of) objects are placed inside { }.

Klein starts by saying: The {whole scene on the water} **was** the {inside of his mother} - {the world}. The {meat-house} **represented** {both her body} **and** {his (body)}.

She continues: The {crabs} **stood for** {his father's penis}. The reference to the amount of crabs ("their numbers were legion") suggests a translation of the indivisible infinite into an endless series of elements, which is one of the instances mentioned by Matte Blanco when discussing the

infinite implicit in Klein's writing. The infinite set whose emotional intensity is far too great for the conscious to contain/experience is translated into an *infinite series* of elements^{ccclxxv}. The further reference to their size (the crabs were "as big as elephants") enhances the impression of intensity of emotion relating to the image. Furthermore the {crabs} **represented** not only {his father's penis} but **{also}** {his own faeces}. One of them [the {crabs}] **represented** {his own penis}. He also **identified** {his faeces} **with** {dangerous animals}.

Thus we can identify two wider classes in Klein's interpretation of John's dream. One could be called the {(inside of) the mother}, and the other the {contents of the mother}. The wider classes might also be something as general as {container} and {contained}, of which the rest are sub-classes. The relationship between the two is one of dirtying, injuring, damaging and killing. The class we have named {contained} is less straightforward than the class {container}. In Klein's interpretation of John's material we can see several sub-classes of {contained} that have significant relationships to each other as well as to the wider class {container}. The {contained} means {contained inside the mother}, and we can identify as sub-classes at least the {father's penis}, {father's faeces}, {babies}, {his (John's) own penis}, and {his (John's) own faeces}.

On the one hand all these attack the {container} ({mother's body}), but on the other hand it seems that {his own penis} and {his own faeces} attack and attempt to destroy also the other sub-classes.

What exactly is going on? Klein draws on the motivating force of John's aggressive wishes against the parents. Klein writes: "...it was his

[John's] own sadistic wishes against his copulating parents which *transformed his father's penis and excrements into dangerous animals*, so that his mother and father should destroy one another^{“ccclxxvi”}. Thus the force behind the 'crabs' who were as big as elephants and whose numbers were legion came from John's own sadism. How can this be? Klein continues: "In his imagination John had also attacked his father's penis with his own faeces and *had thus rendered it more dangerous than before*"^{“ccclxxvii”}. In the previous paragraph when discussing the theory of paranoia Klein talks about equating "pieces of stool with the [father's] penis"^{“ccclxxviii”}.

In bi-logical terms the attack (or equation) of 'father's penis' by 'faeces' results in the two classes being identified with each other or included in a wider class. Since the two become identical both classes potentially carry the sum total of each other's aggression (or other affect/emotion). From the point of view of the asymmetrical mode there are individual elements (faeces, penises), but from the point of view of the symmetrical mode there are infinite sets ('faeces', 'penises') which can be understood only through translation into asymmetry. Because of excessive symmetrizations (at the operational level), any of the individuals representing the class can *carry the intensity of emotion of the infinite set* in question.

The resolution of the material came with John's realisation of the *sameness* of the words/objects in question, and the nature of their uniting factor. When John says: 'I know, they are all the same, chicken, ice, glass and crabs.' ... 'Because they are all brown and broken and dead' he is acknowledging the (unconscious) identity of the words he was unable to distinguish, as well as the wider class of which they are all (symmetrised)

elements/sub-classes. The following day John had no difficulty in distinguishing the three French words from each other.

The improvement in John's condition after analysing a *collection of objects which at the unconscious level are indistinguishable from one another* is bi-logically very significant. The translation of an infinite set which has invaded consciousness into clearly differentiated entities holds the key to clearing some of the disturbances in John's ego-development.

The Stratified Structure in John's Dream

To concentrate only on the symmetrizations would give an impression of a rather flat mind, split into two two-dimensional parts which mirror each other almost perfectly. This, however, is not the picture that emerges from Klein's narrative. Neither is it a fitting description of bi-logic.

We have already earlier studied Matte Blanco's *Stratified Structure* in light of Ginzburg's case of Silvia. A similar contamination between different strata, an infiltration of a deeper, more symmetrised level onto consciousness, can be seen taking place also in John's case. When Klein discusses the "elaborate displacements and reversals"^{ccclxxix} of John's defences against his anxiety she is (inadvertently) giving quite a fitting description of an instance of the stratified structure. Klein writes: "At first, what he ate was a nice fried fish. Then it changed into a crab. In the first version about the crab he stood on the pier and tried to keep the crabs from crawling out of the water. It appeared, however, that he actually felt himself to be lying in the water, and there - inside his mother - to be at the mercy of his father. In this version he

still tried to keep hold of the idea that he was preventing the crabs the from getting into the meat-house, but his deepest dread was that the crabs *had* got into it and were destroying it, and his efforts were to drive them out again.^{“ccclxxx} We can see how John’s thinking descends from the relatively asymmetrical associations of ‘nice fried fish’ and ‘a crab’ to increasingly symmetrical ones where contradictions are co-existing; the sets are getting larger and the emotions more intense.

A nice fish - level one. John’s first associations to *poisson* had to do with nice fried fish. There is no intense emotion in this thought itself - though there was a lot in the accompanying actions of kicking and thrusting the scissors in his eyes. John’s thought of a fish is very asymmetrical, well-limited and conscious, and we can see that it belongs to level one in the stratified structure.

A dangerous crab - level two. Then John starts to become more aware of the destructive nature of something. ‘More or less conscious’ emotions belong to level two. The fish has changed into a dangerous crab, and it has grown in size. But it is still just one, and both John and his mother are clearly differentiated. There are no multiplications or symmetrized identities at this level.

Legions of elephant-sized crabs - level three. John’s aggression towards the crab - his killing and shooting it - points towards level three which is the home of strong emotions. When John kills the crab, the crab starts multiplying. There were ‘more and more of them’, their ‘numbers were legion’, and they were ‘as big as elephants’. John’s one act of aggression opens the doors to frightening wildness. His thinking-feeling at this level is

contaminated by heavy symmetrizations and intense aggression.

Beside and inside - level four. The co-existence of contradictions and confusions/ ambiguities between inside and outside show us that level four is also operational in John's dream. John is *on the pier* and *in the water* at the same time. He is standing *beside* the mother, but is also *inside* the mother, etc.. The classes ('container' and 'contained') are also quite comprehensive.

The hypothetical level five. The deepest level (fifth stratum) is a hypothetical, non-observable limit, and we can only assume that somewhere beyond dreaming in John's mind the classes are becoming increasingly inclusive until they finally collapse into one, united infinity.

Thus, in John's dream we can see how the move from one stratum to another is not a simple, single step, but a series of small manoeuvres. Especially the move between levels two and three seems to be a complex process. From the high level of aggression in the dream and the associations we can gather that the third stratum is the most relevant, operational one for John. The infinite set contaminating John's more superficial levels also seems to belong to this level.

Ginzburg notes that the task of the analyst is to "provide a special asymmetric filter"^{ccclxxxi} - not unlike Bion's maternal reverie - so as to "separate the individual from the characteristics of the set in order to cancel the symmetric irruption that cannot agree with the conscious logic"^{ccclxxxii}. Klein's interpretation of John's dream seems to have done just this.

The Following Day (Session 3)

The following day John's ability to investigate the external world in a

way that was *symbolically analogous* to investigating the inside of the mother's body became manifest in a form of wanting to tidy his drawer. He sorted out the contents of the drawer designated to him in the analytic room which he had used for months solely to dump all sorts of stuff into. Later the same day he discovered a long lost fountain-pen in a drawer at home.

According to Klein John had "in a symbolic way looked into his mother's body and restored it, and had also found his penis again"^{ccclxxxiii}. Thus there is an (unconscious) identity between the drawer and the mother's body, as well as the pen and the penis. "But", continues Klein, "the drawer also represented his own body"^{ccclxxxiv}. So the identity now *extends* to include John's body as well as the mother's body and the drawer that represents the two. In the next paragraph Klein extends the set also to include John's mind: "tidying represented making an inspection of *intrapsychic reality*"^{ccclxxxv}.

The relationship in John's case between mother's body, one's own body, (objects in) the external world, and mind/mental space is summed up by Klein as follows: "While the improvement in John's capacity to conceive the condition of the inside of his *mother's body* led to a greater ability to understand and appreciate the outer world, the reduction of his inhibition against really knowing about the inside of his *own* body at the same time led to a deeper understanding and better control over his own mental processes; he could then clear up and bring order into his own mind. The first resulted in a greater capacity to take in knowledge; the second entailed a better ability to work over, organize and correlate the knowledge obtained, and also to give it out again, *i.e.* return it, formulate it or express it - an advance in ego-development."^{ccclxxxvi}

In other words, asymmetric analysis of the dream - in which everything inside the mother was the same as everything else - enabled John to symbolically imagine the inside of his mother's body in the form of examining and tidying the drawer. Because of the equation between the mother's body and the world, this also led to a greater ability for John to think about the external world. On the other hand, the drawer also represented John's own body and his mental space. The tidying thus reflected the newly-found capacity to "bring order into his own mind"^{ccclxxxvii}. The intensity of emotion and the level of depth of John's symmetrised thinking can be seen in the results of Klein's interpretation of the dream. John's sudden rush to examine and tidy his drawer revealed the extent of the reach of the previous inhibition. In the language of bi-logic we could say that several layers of symmetrised identities opened up or unfolded as a result of Klein's translating-interpretation of the infinite set of 'mother's damaged inside'. This made the formation of new classes possible.

As mentioned earlier, Matte Blanco feels that the task of the analyst is to divest a 'contaminated' situation from the misplaced infinite aspects of the class or to sever the 'invasion' of infinite into the conscious. I have shown that this is exactly what Klein did with John and this was the reason why Klein's interpretations were a success.

Chapter 8

Other People's Reality;

The Case of the 'Imaginary Twin'

Bion introduces the patient as someone who had been in psychoanalytic therapy for years without much success and has moved on to psychoanalysis. The patient's childhood appears to have been quite miserable; filled with disease, insanity and death, with disunited parents and only a few friends to play with.^{ccclxxxviii} Later Bion brings in briefly two other patients with similar symptoms. The paper concentrates on one aspect of the case, not on the whole person or the whole treatment.

The Case

In the Imaginary twin the focus is on the patient's inability to tolerate external reality, especially emotional reality of others as separate beings from oneself but also on the inability to tolerate one's own inner, psychic reality. Bion tells us about a man who finds it difficult to have a relationship with the analyst. The patient fears his own hatred and aggression so much that he cannot accept the analyst as a real person who could be a target for these terrifying emotions. As a defence against his own hatred and as a substitute for the real person (the analyst), the patient uses *twinning* in his unconscious life and, as a consequence, in the analytic situation. *Twin* is an unconscious creation, a "person" who is a split off part of the patient himself, a partial duplication or a clone whom the patient can take to be a real person. It's like

make-belief where the patient (in his unconscious playing field) pretends that the twin is someone real.

The twin started to appear in the session first in the form of imaginary conversations. When telling a story, the patient would say for example: "I was thinking of talking to..." or "I just imagined it". There were many people with whom the patient "conversed", e.g. a man of his profession, of similar age, with the same symptoms and similar situation in life; a homosexual brother-in-law; a man with whom the patient played tennis; an unpleasant colleague etc. These people were in the periphery of patient's associations. They were casually mentioned but not focused on by the patient himself.

When the analyst drew the patient's attention to the *form* the associations took and the analyst's role as "a twin of himself [the patient] who supported him [the patient] in a jocular evasion of my [the analyst's] complaints"^{cccclxxxix}, there was a change in the patient.^{cccxc} In the following session the patient reported a dream which had been "terrifying". Bion writes:

"...he was driving in a car and was about to overtake another. He drew level with it and then instead of passing it kept carefully abreast of it. The rival car slowed down and stopped, he himself conforming to its movements. The two cars were thus parked side by side. Thereupon the other driver, a man much the same build as himself, got out, walked round to his door and leaned heavily against it. He was unable to escape as, by parking his car near to the other, he had blocked egress from his door. The figure leered menacingly at him through the window."^{cccxc}

The analyst interpreted that the menacing figure was the analyst and also the imaginary twin which was used to alleviate anxiety. There was a

series of associations after the dream where the patient's twinning-defence can be seen. This is one of them:

"I have a student whose eye has been becoming affected. An eye man said he thought it was an infection. Anyway nothing could be done about it, but her father said he wanted another opinion. So I had to send her to another eye man and now I have got landed with a whole lot of work I don't want to do; she's a nuisance. I have to give a whole series of interviews. The second eye man doesn't think it's much different clinically from what the first eye man says, but he thinks it's worth doing something. The first man didn't think it worth bothering and that is why her father thought him a bit slack I suppose. Anyhow I have to do this now. She must get a blood test done to see if she has syphilis. She could have done it before."^{ccccxii}

Bion discusses the themes of contamination, ocular method of investigation and resultant increased capacity for testing reality and the *mechanism* for testing reality. After repeated interpretations about the twin, the patient slowly begins to treat the analyst as a real person, and it is possible for him to tolerate the presence of the oedipal situation.

Some Bi-Logical Aspects of the Case

If looked at bi-logically, we can see that the patient uses *symmetrization* to destroy the difference between himself and others. Borders between subject and object disappear. The others; the homosexual brother-in-law, an unpleasant colleague, the analyst etc., become the patient's *clones*; they don't exist in their own right. In Schreber's case we saw a similar splitting of the *object* into many copies or clones of the original. Here the *subject* is

divided and multiplied. The mechanism is consistent with the third stratum.

Bion describes the patient as a man with dull, expressionless features who communicates with monosyllabic listlessness. The absence of *visible* aggression is consistent with the fourth stratum. Symmetrization is used as a *defence* against the intolerable truth of other person's reality and aggressive feelings related to this. It is not enough for the patient (in his phantasy) to destroy the other person's reality, he also places the unwanted and feared parts of himself into the twin. Splitting and projection are bi-logical activities^{cccxciii}; the good and bad parts are seen as *infinitely* good and *infinitely* bad, as *symmetrized* sets of goodness and badness. At the same time the splitting itself is an *asymmetrical* act.

The infinite set of twins – where the cloning/equating/symmetrizing activity is dominant – has taken over more superficial levels of the psyche. If the set of twins rested easily in the deeper levels where it belonged, there would be no problem, because closer to the surface there would be enough asymmetry to match with the external reality, and it would be possible to treat individuals as themselves. Now the deeper set has been “pulled” closer to the surface in order to block out the intolerable asymmetrical external reality. The patient's mechanism for testing reality has not been adequate to support growing asymmetrical awareness.

In analysis the patient's *translating function* is strengthened. This helps him to *tame* the previously *untamed* aggression he feared so much. With the stronger bi-modal structure the possibility of tolerating intense emotions becomes easier. Aggression is no longer infinite, and the other person's reality doesn't need to be annihilated. The analyst can be allowed to exist as a person

with an independent emotional existence.

We could also look at the case as an example of the Tridim structure (tridimensionalized bi-logical structure). Matte Blanco writes about the Tridim structure: “When one displaces an aspect of a given person or of oneself on to another person (in case of oneself it is a particular form of displacement called projection), one finds that, on the one hand, the displaced aspect appears as separate, i.e. as being in another individual, and, on the other, it still is the individual-, the displaced aspect is at the same time outside and inside the person”^{”cccxciv}. Bion’s patient projected aspects of himself onto his “twins”. So his “twins” were at the same time separate persons (colleague, friend, analyst etc.) *and* parts of the patient.

Tridim-structure gets its name from Matte Blanco’s idea about multidimensionality of deeper layers of the mind. Thought/emotions need to be made suitable for our limited consciousness. This happens for example when multidimensional contents are represented as three-dimensional – they are tridimensionalized. “Displacement, therefore, takes place when, first, a given individual is split (in at least two individuals), and subsequently one of them is seen as separated from the original person. This suggests that *the individual in question can be conceived as isomorphic to a space of more than three dimensions and is represented in terms of a space of fewer dimensions, with the result that volumes are repeated or multiplied.* ... For this reason we may call this particular type of bi-logical structure by the name of *tridimensionalized or tridimensionalizing structure - in short, Tridim structure.*”^{”cccxcv} Bion’s patient multiplies the twins/clones in a way that is consistent with Matte Blanco’s thinking about the Tridim structure.

Hegelian Reflections

Imaginary Twin brings to mind Beckett's *Waiting for Godot*. The patient's analytic dialogue with himself through the medium of the analyst is much like the world of Estragon and Vladimir. There is similar duplication of the subject and disappearance of separate individuals. Estragon and Vladimir *are* the same, repeating the same babble over and over:

"E: Charming spot. Let's go.

V: We can't.

E: Why not?

V: We are waiting for Godot.

E: Ah! You're sure it was here?

V: What?

E: that we were to wait.

V: He said by the tree. Do you see any others?

E: What is it?

V: I don't know. A willow.

E: Where are the leaves?

V: It must be dead.

E: No more weeping.

V: Or perhaps it's not the season.

E: Looks to me more like a bush.

V: A shrub.

E: A bush.

V: A - . What are you insinuating? That we've come to the wrong place?

E: He should be here.

V: He didn't say for sure he'd come.

E: And if he doesn't come?

V: We'll come back tomorrow.

E: And then the day after tomorrow.

V: Possibly.

E: And so on.

V: The point is -

E: Until he comes. „cccxcvi

And on and on...

Godot's other couple, Pozzo and Lucky, are also present in the case. Pozzo bullies Lucky into action, Lucky has no will or existence of his own. This is the situation the patient would like have with others - including the analyst.

One of the most famous sections of Hegel's Phenomenology deals with the interaction of two self-consciousnesses in a Master-Slave (or Lordship-Bondage) situation. It is a paradoxical relationship where both parties desire recognition and freedom. The master gains freedom of sorts by forcing the slave to do all the work. But in doing so he becomes dependent on the slave and his freedom is only apparent. At the same time the slave who has no freedom of his own, comes to find freedom over his body in work. They are both tied to each other and the twisted relationship is used by both parties *as a defence against life*.

We are more interested in the struggles of the Master. The master wants to kill, to annihilate the other. This is part of the development of the self-consciousness. Self-consciousness experiences itself essentially as empty having to search for life from the outside. When it discovers it cannot consume Life, it tries to annihilate it. Since all of Life cannot be annihilated, efforts are used to annihilate a representative of Life, another person. The next

step is to realise that killing does not satisfy Desire because Desire is a desire for recognition and ultimately a desire to be desired. The next best thing is to enslave the other since enslavement is an attempt to annihilate life within context of life. It is an attempt to deny the intolerable external, independent reality of the other person. Connection to the Imaginary Twin is self-evident. The patient attempted to make himself into a Master by turning the analyst into a Slave in order to deny and annihilate the independent (emotional) existence of the analyst. How does bi-logic benefit from Hegel's Master-Slave situation?

One of Matte Blanco's weaker points is that because he concentrates on the *structure* of thinking and feeling, he does not talk about the *reasons or motivations* for thinking and feeling. We must look for them from outside bi-logic. Hegel's theory of desire and emerging self-consciousness offers us one model to use as support. Even though Matte Blanco's starting point or basic metaphysical position is in some ways closer to Kant than Hegel (Kant's clear distinction to ever-present noumena and phenomena is closer to M.B. than Hegel's ever-growing Absolute), we can see in the emergence of self-consciousness a parallel to what *happens* according to Matte Blanco. According to Hegel, self-consciousness aims at absolute knowledge. Matte Blanco believes that pure symmetry *is* absolute knowledge. The problem is, we don't really (consciously) *know* it, we *feel* it somewhere deep deep down in the unconscious. Asymmetrically we can get to know small portions of it. If we applied Hegel to bi-logic, we could say that the purpose of existence, the ultimate reason or motivation behind our thoughts, feelings and actions is to *increase asymmetrical awareness to its fullest possible*, in other words, to get

access to the perfect knowledge we know by our intuitive, infinite unconscious also bi-modally. According to Hegel this takes place in small steps that resemble uncannily the developmental stages described by Freud and especially Klein. Hegelian Absolute would have been reached when our conscious, asymmetrical mode knows all that the unconscious, symmetrical mode intuits – when the infinite is grasped fully both mathematically and metaphysically.

Another aspect in the case that can be looked at from Hegelian perspective has to do with Bion's *container* and *contained* in relation to analytic space and interpretation. (Bion developed the terms container and contained later.) About three months into the analysis Bion starts to pay attention to the *rhythm* of the patient's associations. Association-interpretation-association became like a game of table tennis. Nothing really happened. The *reality* or *life* was kept at bay by "stale associations inviting a stale response"^{cccxcvii}.

Bion focused first on the *content* of the patient's speech, but then he drew attention to the *form* of the material; the rhythm and "feeling" of the associations and analyst's reactions to interpretations. Bion writes after describing one of the patient's associations: "This association may be considered as a starting point of an investigation which illuminated two problems: first, the *unconscious material* that it expressed and, second, the *manner in which the patient was able to bring this material into consciousness*."^{cccxcviii} It can easily be seen that the "unconscious material" is the content - or contained - of the association and the "manner in which..." is

the form - or container - for this material. Bion is here *making the form into the new content* or *the container into a new contained*. He is interpreting *how* the patient speaks, not just *what* he speaks. The form of what is said in the sessions and the content of what is said now make a new totality. From two opposing positions (container and contained) something new is born (interpretation within analytic space?). This can be seen as an example of Hegel's dialectic; thesis, antithesis, synthesis. Dialectic is for Hegel an activity that increases the self-consciousness of the Mind/Spirit.

We can understand the relevance of Hegelian dialectic to bi-logic if we look at it through Bion. Container can be seen as an asymmetrical "bag" or skin which differentiates it from all other "bags". Contained is the "stuff" inside the bag, it can be more or less symmetrical. In deeper strata (level four - level three) there is a clear and precise difference between asymmetrical limits and symmetrized contents. "Femaleness" is "distinguished from "maleness", "goodness" from "badness". On the other hand, on the more superficial strata (level two - level one) the "bags" get smaller, everything is separate from everything else. For example, the class of blue pencils consists of a certain number of blue pencils; the girl I see is about 12 years old with long, brown hair, small nose and big feet. The healthy mind, according to Matte Blanco, needs a strong and vital co-existence and *co-action* of symmetrical and asymmetrical aspects and of all levels of the constitutive stratified bi-logical structure. Dialectical, bi-modal movements increase the person's active mental space - actualities are being born from the infinite sea of potentiality.

Chapter 9

Infinite Emotions;

Conclusion

This thesis has been an attempt to evaluate Matte Blanco's model of the mind - bi-logic - by outlining the theory and then by placing it in a larger psychoanalytic framework. We started by taking a look the bi-logical community and some of the bi-logical literature written so far. In chapter one Matte Blanco's life and ideas were introduced. The philosophical roots of the main bi-logical terms were explored in chapter two. In chapter three Matte Blanco's theory was compared to that of Freud, in chapter four to Klein and in chapter five to Bion. Chapters five to eight gave bi-logical readings of case histories by each of the three psychoanalysts discussed earlier.

Matte Blanco developed a fascinating theory. He combined notions from mathematical logic and psychoanalysis to create a fresh way to look at the human mind. We experience the world at the same time in two different modes of being; the asymmetrical mode and the symmetrical mode. Our inner world is a playing field for the interaction of the two modes. Matte Blanco's psyche is not strictly divided into the conscious and the unconscious. Instead there is a gradual sliding into deeper levels of symmetries, which Matte Blanco calls the stratified structure. All levels are present in every one of our actions, thoughts and emotions all the time. Because the deepest symmetries

are infinite, there is a touch of infinite in all our thoughts and emotions. Sometimes these deeper levels are misplaced and it is as if we are “taken over” by the infinite. The task of psychoanalysis, according to Matte Blanco, is to divest the given situation of the invasion of the infinite. Infinite emotions need to be tamed.

There are two types of infinite relevant to bi-logic: the metaphysical and mathematical infinities. Mathematical infinite corresponds to the conscious, asymmetrical mode of being; it is ever-increasing. Metaphysical infinite corresponds roughly to the unconscious, symmetrical mode of being; it contains everything in existence and is similar to the Christian notion of God. Mathematical and metaphysical infinities appear to contradict each other, to cancel each other out – if something contains everything in existence, it can hardly be infinitely increasing. But Matte Blanco, like Kant before him, sees these two types of infinite as mirror images of each other. Because of the limited nature of the conscious, we cannot consciously experience the metaphysical infinite. It needs to be translated into the mathematical infinite. Even though Matte Blanco is talking about infinite emotion as a form of subjective knowledge (epistemology, not ontology) the philosophical origins of his thinking – and the history of infinite in Western thought – can be seen clearly.

Matte Blanco considers bi-logic as a return to Freud, and especially early Freud. He felt that Freud’s biggest discovery was that there are rules or laws governing the unconscious; the irrational does conform to some logic. The five characteristics Freud lists can easily be understood in terms of bi-

logic. At the same time Matte Blanco's concentration on the unrepressed unconscious is a step away from Freud. Even though Matte Blanco tries to ground the symmetrical and asymmetrical modes in Freud's findings, he clearly struggles to find enough support for his claims in Freud's writings. Yes, Freud does talk about aspects of the unconscious that are not repressed. But it is always somewhat unclear what this unrepressed material actually is. Is it part of the *repressing* agency? Is it part of the ego? Perhaps some instinctual realm in the id?

Bi-logic is a structural theory; it concentrates on the ways the mind reasons in emotional situations. One of the weak points of bi-logic is that it doesn't properly address the question of *motivation*. Concentrating on the logic of the unconscious we learn a lot about the workings of the mind; the *how*. But at times we are left baffled as to *why* anything happens at all. The best answer to the problem of motivation bi-logic offers can be found in Matte Blanco's view of the instincts. Even though Matte Blanco opposes the energy model, he feels that the *insertion of the instincts sets in motion movement between symmetrical and asymmetrical modes*. On the one hand there is a movement from the psychical to the physical – this is what Freud calls the *aim* of the instinct. On the other hand the two-way movement between the modes means that whenever the asymmetrical encounters the symmetrical asymmetrizations start to take place and the persons actualities grow. Also when the symmetrical encounters the asymmetrical, generalisations and symmetrizations become alive. The short answer Matte Blanco provides to the question of motivation could be reformulated: the clash of inner needs and

outer reality, as well as the encounter between the two modes results in bi-modal activity.

Matte Blanco doesn't see it himself but his equation of unconscious with emotion is contradictory to Freud's theory of affects or emotions as conscious representatives of the instincts. The unrepressed, emotive, symmetrical unconscious cannot easily be found in Freud. According to Freud affects cannot be unconscious; affects (or emotions) are conscious representatives of the instincts. This is a sheer contradiction to Matte Blanco's view that unconscious is basically the same as emotion. But there is a discrepancy between Freud the theorist and Freud the clinician, and in my view bi-logical insights into the infinite nature of emotion are closer to Freud's clinical intuitions – and thus to the true nature of psychoanalysis.

While bi-logical position adds a new perspective, bi-logic could also benefit from the Kleinian view of the mind - the strong emotions, unconscious phantasy and developmental aspects. The strong presence of the body and the messy area of the psycho-somatic would give bi-logic a stronger grounding in biology and experience. Kleinian position gains from bi-logic a deeper understanding into infinitizations and the possibility to concentrate on the *structure* of the mind, on the *how?*, instead of the emotional contents and causality behind actions and emotions - on the *what?* and the *why?* In my view both types of question are needed. They complement and support each other. Bi-logic can also give Klein a wider view of the mind. Klein focuses on a narrow area, which becomes intensified in her writings. This area corresponds roughly to level three of Matte Blanco's stratified structure. Awareness of other

levels results in a more *realistic* over-all perspective of the person.

One interesting similarity between Matte Blanco and Klein is the view that all human expressions parallel internal activity. Complex, emotional infinite unconscious is not something that “spills” into the conscious in small doses, for example in jokes or slips of the tongue. In Matte Blanco’s and Klein’s view every person is and lives their own personal unconscious. Every word, every action, even the smallest gesture is a living embodiment of one’s infinite, emotional unconscious being.

Bion's debt to Klein has never been questioned. The language and style of writing are very different, but the objects of their interest are quite close to each other, as is the emphasis on *emotion* and *emotional experience*. Bion and Matte Blanco are both interested in the nature and relationship of thoughts and emotions. Bion covers a wider scope of the mind than Klein, and also Freud's views on thinking, especially in the 'Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning' can be found in Bion’s theory of thinking. We have seen the co-presence of Klein and Freud in Bion’s work while studying the grid. Bi-logic benefits Bion not only by giving another point of view but also by offering new understanding into the way emotion and thinking are bound together, and into different levels of the mind. At the same time bi-logic could be much enriched by combining elements of Bion's alpha-function with Matte Blanco's translating function, and by incorporating the concept of *emotional growth* into bi-logic. Bion links emotional growth to Truth which can be found in the evolution of O. In Bion’s system O denotes the infinite and is like the ‘perfect knowledge’ in bi-logic. Both Bion and Matte Blanco see truth as

something comprehensive embracing infinite *and* finite aspects of the psyche.

Bi-logically read case studies aim to show a) how bi-logic can be applied clinically and b) that bi-logic does offer a unique aspect and a useful tool for the clinician. So what *use* is bi-logic to the clinician? The aim of bi-logic is to provide an asymmetric filter, a de-infinity in situations where the infinite has invaded the conscious. From the detailed study of case material we can see that it is precisely by concentrating on the misplaced infinities that relief can be offered to patients. This, in my view, is the most important new perspective bi-logic offers psychoanalysis.

To conclude, bi-logic is a comprehensive psychoanalytic theory which may be able to fill some of the gaps that endure between psychoanalytic systems. The psychoanalytic field continues to be fragmented. Bi-logic can aid the way towards a Hegelian synthesis of different psychoanalytic theories. It offers a level of analytic understanding in which it is possible to accommodate what have seemed to be contradictory positions. Bi-logic shows that there are various levels of emotion which vary regarding the proportions of symmetry and asymmetry. Emotions always have an infinite dimension. There is a different type of infinity in symmetry (metaphysical infinite) and in asymmetry (mathematical infinite) which are like mirror images of each other via the translating function. The relationship between the two modes of being (symmetrical and asymmetrical) can be healthy or unhealthy. With bi-logical interpretations the unhealthy infinitys can be tamed, and the enormity of experience can be made tolerable.

ⁱ The meetings of London Bi-logic group are closed to the public because of the sensitivity of some of the material discussed in the papers.

ⁱⁱ The 2010 conference will take place in London.

ⁱⁱⁱ *Matte Blanco Today I and II (Journal of Melanie Klein and Object Relations*, vol. 15 and 16, 1997 and 1998), ed. E. Rayner, J. Grotstein, A Reyes

^{iv} *L'Emozione come esperienza infinita (Emotion as an Infinite Experience: Matte Blanco and Contemporary Psychoanalysis)*^{iv} edited by Alessandra Ginzburg and Riccardo Lombardi Franco Angeli, Milan, 2007.

^v Ginzburg, 1997

^{vi} Silvia's case is discussed and referred to later on for example in connection to the bi-logical reading of Klein's case of John.

^{viivii} Ginzburg, 2007

^{viii} Ginzburg, 2009

^{ix} Ryavec, 1997

^x Ryavec, 1997

^{xi} Ryavec, 1999

^{xii} Ryavec, 1997

^{xiii} Ryavec, 2006

^{xiv} Ryavec, 2002

^{xv} Skelton, 2000

^{xvi} Wooster et. al., 1990

^{xvii} Fink, K., 1993

^{xviii} Carvalho, 2006

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- ^{xix} Ginzburg, 2006
- ^{xx} Casaula, 2008
- ^{xxi} e.g. Lombardi, 2009
- ^{xxii} Niemi, T. 2008
- ^{xxiii} Niemi, 2004
- ^{xxiv} Morgan, 2008
- ^{xxv} Alava and Niemi, M., 2008
- ^{xxvi} Niemi, 2008
- ^{xxvii} Reyes et. al., 1997
- ^{xxviii} Skelton 1984
- ^{xxix} Arden, 1984
- ^{xxx} Mordant, 2002
- ^{xxxi} Sacks, 2007
- ^{xxxii} Ryavec 2004
- ^{xxxiii} Ryavec, 2006
- ^{xxxiv} Ryavec 2008
- ^{xxxv} There is a list of bi-logical writings at the end of this work.
- ^{xxxvi} e.g. Skelton, 1987
- ^{xxxvii} Cousineau, 2009
- ^{xxxviii} Fink, C., "The Sense of Music and the Unconscious". 1997 (read at the first Bi-Logic Meeting, Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland.)
- ^{xxxix} Brown, "The Bi-logic of Music", in *Proceedings of The IV International Conference Helsinki 29.8.-31.8.2008* (ed. Timo Niemi), Yliopistopaino, Helsinki 2008
- ^{xi} Villalba, 2004
- ^{xii} Lindell, 2008
- ^{xiii} Maw, 1990
- ^{xiiii} Priel, 1994
- ^{xliv} Ginzburg, 2000
- ^{xliv} Ginzburg, 2008

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- xlvi Bomford, 1999
- xlvii Grotsetein, 2007
- xlviii Morgan, 1998
- xlix Mordant, 2002
- ^l in *K*, **1**, 219-235 (1930)
- ^{li} in *K*, **1**, 236-247 (1931)
- ^{lii} Jordan-Moore, 1995
- liii Matte Blanco 1981, 520
- liv *U.I.S.*, 287
- lv Borges, 1945, 23
- lvi *Ibid.*, 24
- lvii *Ibid.*, 25
- lviii *Ibid.*, 26, italics added
- lix *Ibid.*, 27
- lx *Ibid.*, 28
- lxi *U.I.S.*, 287, italics in original
- lxii *S.E.*, **XIV**, 187 (*P.F.L.*, **11**), italics in original
- lxiii These are discussed in more detail in chapter two.
- lxiv *U.I.S.*, 27
- lxv *Ibid.*, 38, italics in original
- lxvi *U.I.S.*, 38, italics in original
- lxvii See *U.I.S.*, 39
- lxviii *U.I.S.*, 54
- lxix *T.F.B.*, 52
- lxx *Ibid.*, 54
- lxxi Ginzburg, 1997
- lxxii Ginzburg 1997, 578
- lxxiii *Ibid.*

lxxiv Ibid., 579

lxxv Ibid., italics in original

lxxvi Ginzburg, 1997, 580

lxxvii Ibid., italics in original

lxxviii Ibid.

lxxix Ibid., 583

lxxx *U.I.S.*, 237-8

lxxxi Ibid., 159

lxxxii Ibid., 184

lxxxiii Bria 1998

lxxxiv *U.I.S.*, 291f

lxxxv Ibid., 291

lxxxvi Ibid., 294

lxxxvii Ibid., 167

lxxxviii Ibid.

^{lxxxix} We will study the translation function closer in chapter 5.

xc Pythagoreans believed in the transmigration of souls, and because of this held the purity of soul to be of utmost importance. From this belief a complicated set of rules was developed. For example one should not eat beans or touch a white cock.

xc *U.I.S.*, xix

xcii Cited in *U.I.S.*, 184-5

xciii *U.I.S.*, 185

^{xciv} We will return to the discussion of truth in chapter four.

^{xcv} see for example Bomford, 1999

xcvi *S.E.*, IV, 110 (*P.F.L.*, 4, 186)

^{xcvii} Lombardi's work on Matte Blanco and Ferrari might offer a way out of the problem. See e.g. Lombardi, 2009

xcviii See for example editor's note in *S.E.*, XII, 258-9 (*P.F.L.*, 11, 48-9) and *S.E.*, XIX, 6-7 (*P.F.L.*, 11, 402-3), and Freud's own discussion *S.E.*, XIV, 172 and *S.E.*, XIX, 60-62 (*P.F.L.*, 11, 174-8). Laplanche and Pontalis also point this out in *The Language of Psychoanalysis*, 474-6, e.g. "Most Freudian texts prior to the second topography assimilate the unconscious and the repressed.", 475.

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- xcix Instincts and their "place" in bi-logic is discussed in the following part C. of this chapter.
- c I will discuss Matte Blanco's moving away from Freud's early formulations in this section. The next section ('Unconscious emotions') will deal with Matte Blanco's partly unwitting moving away from Freud altogether. Matte Blanco's relationship to Klein is discussed in detail in ch. 3.
- ci *U.I.S.* is divided to IX parts and (within these parts) to 38 chapters. Part III includes chapters 4-10.
- cii See *U.I.S.*, 72 where Matte Blanco quotes Freud 1896 and 1915.
- ciii The move to the second theory of instincts was most famously outlined in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920)
- civ In *The Ego and the Id* (1923)
- cv Cited in *U.I.S.*, 72
- cvi Cited in *U.I.S.*, 73
- cvii *U.I.S.*, 101
- cviii In *New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, S.E.*, **XX**, 115, *P.F.L.*, **2**, 112
- cix *T.F.B.*, 63, my italics
- cX In *U.I.S.*, 41-47
- cxI *U.I.S.*, 38
- cxii Ibid.
- cxiii *S.E.*, **XIV**, 186-7 (*P.F.L.*, **11**, 191)
- cxiv Rayner 1988
- cxv *T.F.B.*, 8-9
- cxvi Isomorphism will be discussed in the next chapter which deals with bi-logic and Klein's theories.
- cxvii In *T.F.B.* Absence of contradiction and Negation are grouped together, as are Displacement and Condensation.
- cxviii *T.F.B.*, 61
- cxix *U.I.S.*, 42
- cxX *U.I.S.*, 43
- cxxi *T.F.B.*, 60-61
- cxXii *U.I.S.*, 43
- cxXiii The relationship of affects and Ucs. Will be dealt later in this chapter.
- cxXiv *T.F.B.*, 61
- cxXv *S.E.*, **XIV**, 186 (*P.F.L.*, **11**, 190)
- cxXvi *S.E.*, **IV**, 279 (*P.F.L.*, **4**, 383)
- cxXvii One of best known of Freud's example's is the character of Irma in a dream "Irma's injection". Irma in the dream stood for the real person Irma, an intimate woman friend of Irma's (expressed by the dream-Irma's position by the window), a governess (expressed by false teeth) and Freud's wife (expressed by paleness, puffiness and pains in the abdomen). *S.E.*, **IV**, 107ff (*P.F.L.*, **4**, 182ff)
- cxXviii For example a thing in a dream by one of Freud's patients which was "an intermediate between a bathing-hut at the seaside, an outside closet and an attic in a town house". *S.E.*, **IV**, 325 (*P.F.L.*, **4**, 437)
- cxXix For example the word 'Autodidasker' in one of Freud's dreams. The word could be dismantled to 'Autor' (author), 'Autodidakt' (self-thought) and 'Lasker' and 'LaSalle' (two German politicians who were both of Jewish origin). *S.E.*, **IV**, 299 (*P.F.L.*, **4**, 407)
- cxXx *U.I.S.*, 44

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- cxxxix *U.I.S.*, 44
- cxxxii See *U.I.S.*, 410-411
- cxxxiii Matte Blanco discusses multidimensionality in chapters 32 and 33 of *U.I.S.*
- cxxxiv *T.F.B.*, 60-61
- cxxxv *S.E.*, XIV, 186 (*P.F.L.*, 11, 190)
- cxxxvi See *U.I.S.*, 46 where Matte Blanco quotes Freud and discusses the distinction
- cxxxvii *U.I.S.*, 46, italics in original
- cxxxviii *U.I.S.*, 48, italics in original
- cxxxix This brings us to the interesting question of Freud's later theory of instincts where the division is between life and death instincts.
- cxli *U.I.S.*, 49
- cxlii *U.I.S.*, 50
- cxliii This idea can be linked to Bion's theory of thinking; thoughts come into existence as a result of a lack of something. The prototype of a (first) thought is often 'absence of breast', a negation of a breast which leads to a formation of the concept 'breast'. Absence is always absence of *something*.
- One could also develop similarities between Matte Blanco and Lacan on these lines. Lacan talks about a 'gap' where the subject is located, the gap is full of meaning.
- cxliiii *T.F.B.*, 60
- cxliv *T.F.B.*, 61-62
- cxlv *T.F.B.*, 61
- cxlvi *T.F.B.*, 61
- cxlvii *T.F.B.*, 61
- cxlviii *T.F.B.*, 62
- cxlix *T.F.B.*, 62
- cl *T.F.B.*, 62
- cli *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, S.E.*, XII, *P.F.L.*, 7
- clii It needs to be added that also Matte Blanco's firm belief in the early, "proper" Ucs. caused a problem with accepting the id.
- cliii *U.I.S.*, 280
- cliv *U.I.S.*, 280
- clv *U.I.S.*, 280
- clvi *U.I.S.*, 280
- clvii Here Matte Blanco is probably referring to the diagram in chapter 31. of the *New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, S.E.*, XX, 113, *P.F.L.*, 2, 111. The figure is also used elsewhere by Freud and as such makes its first appearance in *The Ego and the Id, S.E.*, XIX, 24, *P.F.L.*, 11, 363 but the diagram in the *New Introductory Lectures* is an "egg-shaped figure, which is left open at the bottom" (*U.I.S.*, 131) to depict the "place" where instincts come into contact with the mind.
- clviii *U.I.S.*, 131
- clix Here we are treading on a philosophically sensitive ground between reality and perception. Some of this is discussed in chapter 1. We must be aware of the questions *whether there is a reality 'beyond' our experience*, and if there is *whether this reality is in any way knowable to us*, and if it is, *does our perception alter the so called external reality*, and if so, *how is the reality altered by our perception*. Here, for the sake of clarity, I assume that there is a reality that in the least can be differentiated from our experience of it, and even if the question of the possibility of an objective external reality is left unanswered, at least we can presume the existence of a *common reality*. This is not a philosophically strong argument but suffices here for us to move forward. The question of how Matte Blanco's view of the internal reality corresponds to different philosophical positions is a fascinating one and well worth further study, but unfortunately it is one of those many paths that open up in any road of research that need to be excluded from the present work, the main road we are travelling.
- clx *U.I.S.*, 217
- clxi *U.I.S.*, 217
- clxii *U.I.S.*, 218, italics in original
- clxiii *U.I.S.*, ch. 21, 'A Closer Study of Sensation-Feeling', 223ff.

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- clxiv *U.I.S.*, 223
- clxv *T.F.B.*, CH. 6, 'The notion of internal world: problems and hopes', 124ff.
- clxvi *T.F.B.*, 126 (italics in original)
- clxvii This, again, is not a philosophically self-evident position, but we know that Matte Blanco didn't believe in the Cartesian duality of body and mind but on the contrary held the view that we are psycho-physiologically whole, body-mind unities, even if we have two aspects of the whole; psychological and physiological. See e.g. *U.I.S.*, 217-218.
- clxviii *U.I.S.*, 217, my italics
- clxix *U.I.S.*, 286
- clxx *U.I.S.*, 286, my italics
- clxxi *T.F.B.*, 229 n3
- clxxii This would be a simplified version of what can be seen as the view held by Freud, developed by Klein (supported by a wealth of clinical experience) and especially by Bion whose theory of thinking is based on this view.
- clxxiii Both Bion and Lacan believe that *all* new experiences feel at first *unpleasurable*.
- clxxiv *S.E.*, **XVIII**, 14ff (*P.F.L.*, **11**, 283ff)
- clxxv *Ibid.*, 21 (*ibid.*, 292)
- clxxvi *Ibid.*, 22 (*ibid.*, 293)
- clxxvii *Ibid.* (*ibid.*)
- clxxviii *Ibid.*, (*ibid.*, 292)
- clxxix *Ibid.*, 36 (*ibid.*, 308), italics in original
- clxxx *Ibid.*, 38 (*ibid.*, 310)
- clxxxi *Ibid.* (*ibid.*, 311), italics in original
- clxxxii Translated from Italian by Ann Dervitt, Trinity College Dublin. Not published in English.
- clxxxiii *T.F.B.*, 126 (italics in original)
- clxxxiv In *The Language of Psychoanalysis* by Laplanche and Pontalis there is only a short entry for 'affect' and no entry at all for 'emotion'.
- clxxxv *U.I.S.*, 306, italics added
- clxxxvi *Ibid.*, 274, italics added
- clxxxvii This is discussed in more detail in chapter one.
- clxxxviii Klein's theories are discussed in more detail in chapter three.
- clxxxix This is incidentally the paper Matte Blanco quotes heavily when discussing the characteristics of the unconscious. But he does not refer to Freud's views on emotion anywhere in his texts.
- cxc *S.E.*, **XIV**, 177-8 (*P.F.L.*, **11**, 180), the first italics added
- cxci *S.E.*, **V**, 460ff (*P.F.L.*, **4**, 595ff)
- cxcii The distinction is first made in 1894 in a correspondence to Fliess, although there are some differences of expression and content.
- cxci *S.E.*, **XII**, 63 (*P.F.L.*, **9**, 201)
- cxci *Ibid.* (*ibid.*)
- cxcv *S.E.*, **XIV**, 178 (*P.F.L.*, **11**, 180)
- cxcvi *Ibid.* (*ibid.*)

cxcvii *T.F.B.*, 138

cxcviii Ibid., 143

cxcix Ibid., 139

cc Ibid., 165

cci Ibid.

ccii *T.F.B.*, 140, italics in original

cciii Ibid.

cciv *T.F.B.*, 141-2

ccv Ibid.

ccvi *K*, 1, 246

ccvii *T.F.B.*, 142, citing Klein, 1932, 206

ccviii *T.F.B.*, 142

ccix Ibid.

ccx *T.F.B.*, 47

ccxi *T.F.B.*, 320, italics in original

ccxii Cited in *T.F.B.*, 143-4

ccxiii Ibid.

ccxiv Cited in *T.F.B.*, 145, italics added

ccxv Ibid.

ccxvi *T.F.B.*, 146

ccxvii Ibid., 147

ccxviii Cited in *T.F.B.*, 321, italics in original

ccxix *T.F.B.*, 147

ccxx Ibid.

ccxxi Ibid., 148

ccxxii Ibid., italics in original

ccxxiii Ibid., 149

ccxxiv Ibid., 150

ccxxv Ibid., 151, italics in original

ccxxvi Ibid., 149

ccxxvii Segal, 1974, 65, italics added

ccxxviii *K*, 2, 6

ccxxix Segal, 1974, 66

ccxxx Ryavec, 1997, 612

ccxxxi Ibid., 627

ccxxxii *U.I.S.*, 144

ccxxxiii Ibid.

ccxxxiv Ibid.

ccxxxv Ibid., 159

ccxxxvi Skelton, 1999, 11

ccxxxvii Ibid., 6

ccxxxviii Ibid.

ccxxxix *U.I.S.*, 283

ccxl *T.F.B.*, 52-4

ccxli Ibid., 53

ccxlii Ibid., 54

ccxliii Ibid., 53

ccxliv 'Four Antinomies...', 15, italics added

ccxlv *U.I.S.*, 105

ccxlvi *T.F.B.*, 55, italics in original

ccxlvii Segal, 1974, 57

ccxlviii Ibid.

ccxlix Ibid.

cccl Ginzburg, 2001, 1

cccli Ibid., 3

ccclii *U.I.S.*, 274

ccliii *K, 1, 80*

ccliv Mitchell, 1991, 24, italics added

cclv Isaacs in Klein et. al., 1952, 93, italics added

cclvi Ibid., 89-90, italics added

cclvii *K, 1, 213*

cclviii Ibid.

cclix *K, 1, 221*, italics added

cclx Ibid., 219, italics added

cclxi Isaacs (1948) in Klein et.al., 1952, 93-4n, italics added

cclxii *U.I.S.*, 288

cclxiii Isaacs in Klein et.al., 1952, italics in original

cclxiv Ibid., 92n

cclxv In 'Negation' (1925), *P.F.L.*, **11**, 439

cclxvi *U.I.S.*, 259, italics in original

cclxvii *K, 1, 220*

cclxviii Isaacs in Klein et.al., 1952, 91-2n

cclxix *U.I.S.*, 280

cclxx Even though Klein's unconscious phantasy originates from and is closely connected to body, it does have some innate ideas. These ideas are probably best understood through Bion as unconscious expectations or pre-conceptions.

cclxxi 'Four Antinomies...', 6

cclxxii Ibid., 16, italics in original

cclxxiii It can of course be questioned whether anything can ultimately exist 'beyond biology'. The emphasis here is on the bi-logical *structure* which according to Matte Blanco appears to exist prior to experience and especially the experiences originating from the biological instincts and body in general.

cclxxiv *U.I.S.*, 176, italics added

cclxxv *U.I.S.*, 105

cclxxvi *U.I.S.*, 176, italics added

cclxxvii *T.F.B.*, 218, italics added

cclxxviii 'Four Antinomies...', 16

cclxxix *U.I.S.*, 174

cclxxx *Ibid.*, 105, italics added

cclxxxi *U.I.S.*, 161

cclxxxii *Ibid.*, 162

cclxxxiii *Ibid.*, 291-9

cclxxxiv *Ibid.*, 168

cclxxxv *Ibid.*, italics added

cclxxxvi *Ibid.*, 169

cclxxxvii Isaacs in Klein et.al. 1952, 100

cclxxxviii *Ibid.*

^{cclxxxix} *Ibid.*

ccxc *Ibid.*, 101

ccxci *K*, **1**, 220

ccxcii *Ibid.*

ccxciii *Ibid.*, 220-1, italics added

ccxciv *K*, **3**, 53, italics added

ccxcv *Ibid.*

ccxcvi *Ibid.*, 55, italics in original

ccxcvii *U.I.S.*, ch. 25

ccxcviii Bion, 1962, 3

ccxcix *U.I.S.*, 276-7

ccc *Ibid.*, 277

ccci *Ibid.*

cccii *Ibid.*, 301

ccciii A term borrowed from Poincare

ccciv A term borrowed from Hume

cccv *Ibid.*, p.301

cccvi in *Do I Dare Disturb the Universe*, ed. Grotstein

cccvi *U.I.S.*, 104

cccviii Bion, 1963, 26

cccix *U.I.S.*, 185, italics added

ccc *Rayner*, 1995, 123

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- cccxi *U.I.S.*, 281, italics added
- cccxi Freud compares representation in jokes to representation in dreams in *Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious* (1905), and the representability is of the second type. Also in the *Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis* (1916-17) the only type of representability mentioned by Freud is of the second type.
- cccxiii *S.E.*, **V**, 344 (*P.F.L.*, **4**, 460)
- cccxiv Under 'Representability, Considerations of', 389-390
- ccc xv *U.I.S.*,
- ccc xvi *U.I.S.*, ,italics added
- ccc xviii International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, Vol. 43, Parts 4-5, 1962. Also in Bion, *Second Thoughts*, 1967.
- ccc xix *Bizarre objects* are evacuated beta-elements with traces of personality. They are mental possibilities too threatening to experience, "thrown out" with bits of one's self (ego or super-ego) attached. For example a persecutory hallucination of a voice filled with (one's own) hatred could be close to a bizarre object.
- ccc xx *S.E.*, XVIII, 20 (*P.F.L.*, **11**,)
- ccc xxi Bion, 1963, 3
- ccc xxii *Ibid.*
- ccc xxiii This is not an exhaustive list. It seems consistent with Bion's view to assume other elements could be discovered.
- ccc xxiv Bion, 1962, 47
- ccc xxv This is an idea Bion borrowed from Keats.
- ccc xxvi *Ibid.*, 95
- ccc xxvii *Ibid.*
- ccc xxviii Bion, 1967, 116
- ccc xxix Bion 1962, 97
- ccc xxx Bion, 1967, 95
- ccc xxxi Bion 1963, 87.
- ccc xxxii Bion
- ccc xxxiii Freud, *P.F.L.*, **11**, 38
- ccc xxxiv *ibid.*
- ccc xxxv *ibid.*
- ccc xxxvi *ibid.*

ccxxxvii *ibid.*

ccxxxviii Bion, 1962, 29, italics in original

ccxxxix *ibid.*, 42

cccxi *ibid.*, 56

cccxli Bion, 1962, 70

cccxlii Bion, 1970, 26

cccxliii White, R. B. 1961

cccxliv *S.E.*, **XII**, 16 (*P.F.L.*, **9**, 146), italics added

cccxlv *Ibid.*, 13 (*ibid.*, 142)

cccxlvi *Ibid.*, 15 (*ibid.*, 144-5)

cccxlvii *U.I.S.*, 139, italics added

cccxlviii *T.F.B.*, 52

cccclix *Ibid.*, 52-4

ccccli *Ibid.*, 57

ccccli *T.F.B.*, 107

ccccli *S.E.*, **XII**, 50 (*P.F.L.*, **9**, 185), italics added

ccccliii *Ibid.*, note 1 (*ibid.*, note 1), italics added

ccccliv *K*, **1**, 236

cccclv *K*, **1**, 236, 240; *K*, **2**, 169

cccclvi *K*, **1**, 237

cccclvii *K*, **1**, 237n

cccclviii *K*, **1**, 236

cccclix *K*, **1**, 236

cccclx *Ibid.*, 237

cccclxi *Ibid.*

cccclxii *Ibid.*

cccclxiii *Ibid.*

cccclxiv *K*, **1**, 237n, italics added

ccclxv *K*, 1, 237

ccclxvi Ibid.

ccclxvii Ibid.

ccclxviii Ibid.

ccclxix *K*, 1, 239

ccclxx *K*, 1, 240

ccclxxi Ibid.

ccclxxii Ibid.

ccclxxiii Ibid., italics added

ccclxxiv Ibid., italics added

ccclxxv *T.F.B.*, 142

ccclxxvi Ibid., 239

ccclxxvii Ibid.

ccclxxviii Ibid.

ccclxxix *K*, 1, 241

ccclxxx Ibid., italics in original

ccclxxxi Ginzburg 1997, 582

ccclxxxii Ibid.

ccclxxxiii *K*, 1, 242

ccclxxxiv Ibid.

ccclxxxv Ibid., 243, italics added

ccclxxxvi Ibid., 244, italics in original

ccclxxxvii Ibid.

ccclxxxviii In 'Commentary' written 17 years after the case Bion tells us that some of the facts in the case were inaccurate as an attempt to disguise the patient's true identity.

ccclxxxix Bion, 1967, 7-8

cccxc The form of the associations and related matters are discussed a little later

cccxcii Bion, 1967, 8

cccxciii Ibid., 12

cccxciii Splitting, projection and other Kleinian defences are discussed in more detail in chapter three.

cccxciv *T.F.B.*, 48

cccxcv *Ibid.*

^{cccxcvi} Beckett, 1990, 15-16

cccxcvii Bion, 1967, 5

cccxcviii *Ibid.*, 12

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