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Language, Displacement and Censorship: A Philosophical Analysis of Sigmund Freud's Common-Sense Method of Dream-Interpretation

By

Joseph Henry McLoughlin

Submitted to Fulfil the Requirement for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Dublin, Trinity College

2001

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Summary

This thesis is a contribution to the tradition in philosophy of psychoanalysis in analytic philosophy of viewing Sigmund Freud's method of interpretation as an extension of common-sense psychology. The thesis addresses the topic of dream-interpretation, which Freud considered of fundamental importance for psychoanalysis, and argues that it is an extension of common-sense psychology according to a pattern of practical reasoning. In this respect, it challenges the received opinion in this field of the philosophy of psychoanalysis which views Freud's method as an extension of common-sense psychology according to the pattern of wishful thinking. In order to establish its case, the thesis proceeds by first examining the method of interpretation that Freud developed in the period leading up to his publication of The Interpretation of Dreams. For it is this method that he claims to have applied in the field of dream-interpretation. It is argued that Freud's method consisted in the application of common-sense psychology to hysterical symptoms and initially relied on the presence of the symptom as a criterion by which the inaccuracy of an interpretation could be judged. Then, with his famous paper of 1896 "The Aetiology of Hysteria", Freud rejected this criterion in favour of the criterion of common-sense psychological coherency alone. This shift away from using the behaviour of the symptom as a criterion of the inaccuracy of an interpretation meant that Freud was free to employ his method as a method of dreaminterpretation without requiring a therapeutic corollary. In the second chapter, the recent tradition in the philosophy of psychoanalysis that has evolved as a response to Peter Alexander's 1962 objection to treating psychoanalytic interpretation as a form of commonsense psychology is discussed. It is explained how, in the light of Alexander's argument that a pattern of practical reasoning is inappropriate to the kind of behaviour studied by psychoanalysis, this tradition has responded by construing the common-sense pattern found in psychoanalytic interpretation to be not that of practical reasoning but wishful thinking. It is suggested that Alexander's objection can be deflated if symptomatic behaviour is taken as a form of speech in a broad sense rather than action. As a form of speech, such strange behaviour is a way of saying something as, for example, representational forms of dance are a way of saying something. This, it is pointed out, corresponds to Freud's very broad conception of speech, which in turn tallies with Freud's claim, having applied the method of interpretation to dreams, that what is taken as the dream for purposes of interpretation is

what the dreamer says. That is, that what counts as the dream for purposes of interpretation is the dream as recounted by the interpretee, not the dream as experienced by him. What the dreamer recounts to the interpreter we refer to as the 'dream-report', and it is treated as a form of 'saying one thing by saying another'. The dream-report is in this way treated as an instance of saying something in a very oblique or roundabout way, according to a pattern of practical reasoning. It is acknowledged that this kind of analysis of the dream-report leads to sprawling patterns of practical reasoning, and pointed out that this is the feature of interpretation that corresponds to Freud's concept of 'displacement' in interpretation, which he attributed to the influence of censorship. It is argued that the influence of censorship constitutes a plausible motive why someone would say one thing by saying another in such an indirect way, and this constitutes a rationale for why the dream-report is such oblique or roundabout speech. Consequently, the topic of discussion in chapter three is censorship. Freud's understanding of censorship in terms of concealing the meaning of the dream-report from oneself is explicated and rejected on the ground that the evidence he appeals to is insufficient. It is pointed out that this misguided understanding of censorship results in Freud understanding it in terms of different agencies in the mind. It is suggested that Freud took the initial wrong step of viewing the evidence in terms of concealing the meaning from oneself in virtue of his conception of intelligibility. Rejecting this conception of intelligibility, a positive view of the censorship that does not involve a divided mind is put forward based on a distinction between concealing from and concealing in relation to. Given that the thesis constitutes an argument that a linguistic interpretation of Freud's method is the best way of treating it as an extension of common-sense psychology, chapter four closes the thesis by looking Freud's own theory of language. It has two main aspects: a theory of meaning in terms of the association of word-presentations and object-presentations, and a developmental theory of meaning. The conclusion is drawn that the theory of meaning in terms of presentations does not bear on interpretation in so far as it is a common-sense psychological approach to language, though it is at the core of his conception of intelligibility and thus bears on the censorship. The developmental aspects of Freud's theory of language allow us to analysis his approach to symbolism in dream-interpretation, and it is argued that it is another case in which his theoretical position does not bear on his interpretative practice.

Introduction to Language, Displacement and Censorship: A Philosophical Analysis of Freud's Common-Sense Method of Dream-Interpretation.

In recent times, a tradition has emerged in analytic philosophy of treating psychoanalytic interpretation, with specific reference to Freudian interpretation, as a form of common-sense psychology. In this philosophical tradition, it is considered that Freud's innovation consisted in extending common-sense psychology in a radically new way. The aim of this thesis is to argue that Freud's method of dream-interpretation indeed constitutes an extension of common-sense psychology, though not in the way understood in the philosophical tradition so far. The task is clearly exegetical, and our basic approach has been to consider the solving of problems the best form of exegesis. That is to say, our exegesis proceeds by attempting to solve the main problems attached to treating Freudian interpretation as a form of commonsense psychology. It moves forward by explicating solutions that, although they have not heretofore received attention in the philosophical literature and were not explicitly articulated by Freud himself and often obscured by his broader interests, are all to be found in Freud's work. The first obstacle to overcome is the prima facie requirement of a corollary to the removal of symptoms. The task is to establish that the method that Freud applied in dream-interpretation consisted in the application of common-sense psychology, and that although he re-deployed it from his work in the treatment of the psycho-neuroses, principally hysteria, it did not require a therapeutic corollary. Following this, the most important objection to treating Freudian interpretation as a form of common-sense psychology is addressed. This is an objection advanced by Peter Alexander in his 1962 article in Mind on the basis of the difficulty in applying a rational pattern of action to psycho-neurotic symptoms. It is suggested that the best response to this objection is to emphasis the linguistic perspectives in Freud's work on interpretation, and to treat psychoneurotic symptoms according to Freud's broad understanding of the notion of speech. As regards dream-interpretation, It is argued that Freud's method consists in dealing with the report given by the interpretee when asked to recount his dream by treating it as extremely roundabout, or oblique, speech. Interpretation proceeds, it is argued, by attributing motives for this roundabout manner of speaking in an everyday, common-sense psychological way.

In a nutshell, the dream-interpretee is treated as 'saying one thing by saying another thing', reflected in Freud's concept of 'displacement' in interpretation, which suggests the presence of censorship as the motive for the roundaboutness. The third problem is that the notion of censorship appears to suggest mental division in which there is a second mind as intelligent if not more so than the person themselves. In passing, it should be noted that this problem is not whether there might be irrational or 'primitive' agencies in the mind. Rather, it is that the notion of censorship appears to oblige a highly intelligent second mind that executes the censorship. This is a problem because it amounts to a non-explanatory reduplication of the first mind. Our solution is to offer a one-mind view of censorship that treats the censorship as a medium of communication in difficult circumstances, rather than a mechanism of suppression. This solution makes no reference to the further issue of whether or not there might be agencies in the mind that are of lesser intelligence than the person himself. The contribution this thesis makes is to the tradition in analytic philosophy of psychoanalysis of reading Freud's method of interpretation as an extension of common-sense psychology. This thesis offers a reading of Freud's method as an extension of common-sense psychology as a form of linguistic interpretation following a common-sense practical-reasoning pattern. As such, this thesis is an alternative to the received view in analytic philosophy of psychoanalysis in which Freud's method of interpretation, in so far as it is understood as an extension of common-sense psychology, is treated in terms of the pattern of wishful thinking driven by the imagination.

The first chapter shows how Freud's work before he published *The Interpretation of Dreams* led him to a common-sense psychological method of interpreting hysterical symptoms in terms of individuating the pathogen as a memory that rendered the symptoms intelligible by the lights of common-sense psychology. As a consequence, a therapeutic corollary with the removal of psycho-neurotic symptoms was not required for dream-interpretation. To this end, the first chapter details Freud's claim that hypnotic experiments showed the etiology of hysteria to involve a pathogenic memory. It traces his modification of Josef Breuer's cathartic method for the individuation of pathogenic memories through the insisting, and urging techniques inspired by Hippolyte Bernheim's Latent Memory hypnotic experiment up to his paper of 1896, "The Aetiology of Hysteria." The point made is that up

to this point Freud had used the behaviour of the symptom to guide the accuracy of his interpretations from *Studies On Hysteria*. Freud took the persistence of the symptom as his 'compass' telling him that the pathogenic memory had not been individuated; once the symptom disappeared, he did not take this to individuate positively the symptom. Rather, he individuated the symptom by means of common-sense psychological attributions of motive, which with the absence of the symptom he was no longer obliged to recognise as inaccurate. With "The Aetiology of Hysteria", it is argued, a decisive shift occurs. Freud no longer used the persistence of the symptom as a criterion of the inaccuracy of the interpretation. Instead, he relied solely on common-sense psychological criteria applied in a holistic way to all of the material under analysis in order to judge that an interpretation was accurate. With common-sense psychology overtaking the behaviour of the symptom as a guide the accuracy of interpretation we argued that Freud was free to apply his method to what the patients told him of their dreams without the need to find a therapeutic corollary, contrary to Adolf Grünbaum's analysis. Grünbuam's assessment of the criteria of a correct interpretation generally, in terms of the famous 'Tally Argument', is called into question.

The second chapter shows how dream-interpretation is an exercise in linguistic interpretation, consisting in interpreting the account given by the interpretee when he is asked to give an account of his dream, or 'dream-report.' It is argued that it is carried out according to a pattern of practical reasoning. The basic idea is that, with the dream-report, the interpretee is engaged in *saying one thing by saying something else*, the dream-report is a very indirect, roundabout or oblique way of saying something. In this way, a response is suggested to Peter Alexander's seminal criticism to treating psychoanalytic interpretation as common-sense psychological because, on his view, if we attempt to make it fit a pattern of practical reasoning it leads to attributing beliefs that could not be accept as common-sensically rational. Our account, in response to Alexander's criticism, takes an alternative route to a recent tradition in the philosophy of psychoanalysis that includes Richard Wolheim, James Hopkins, Sebastian Gardner and Marcia Cavell. This tradition treats psychoanalytic interpretation as a form of common-sense psychology along the lines of daydreaming or wishful thinking, rather than practical reasoning, in order to avoid Alexander's criticism. A detailed analysis of the interpretation of the dream of Irma's

Injection is given to bring the practical reason patterns to light in contrast to the Wolheiminspired tradition. The patterns which come to light, on this kind of approach, are seen to be unwieldy and sprawling. This, it is suggested, corresponds to Freud's notion of 'displacement' in interpretation. Such displacement can be understood to correspond to the obliqueness in the speech under interpretation, and such obliqueness or roundaboutness can be understood as motivated—can be given a rationale—if we introduce another of Freud's key concepts, censorship. This leads us to suppose that there is censorship exerting its influence, and this is why the 'saying' is so indirect and roundabout.

The third chapter addresses the concept of the censorship. The dream-report of the Uncle with the Yellow Beard is analysed in detail, for it is the interpretation in which Freud introduces the concept of the censorship. We explicate how Freud interprets this dreamreport as an instance of concealing the meaning from himself. By means of a discussion of his interpretation of incongruous elements, and of resistance to its interpretation, we conclude that Freud had insufficient evidence to conclude that the interpretation amounted to concealing the meaning from himself. Nonetheless, we acknowledge that this is what he in fact concluded. In turn, he explained what he saw as concealing from oneself in partitive terms of agencies in the mind. He put this partitive explanation forward in virtue of a parallel with the phenomenon of censorship in society. We consider the different models of censorship proposed by Freud, the auto-censorship model and the ministry of censorship model. We conclude that the one he favours from an interpretative, though not theoretical, point of view, is the model of a second mind that censors itself, or as we say engages in auto-censorship. Sebastian Gardner claims that the concept of a separate agency that executes the censorship results from a form of pseudo-explanation, and implies a second mind. This criticism of the second mind as the executor of the censorship is consequently discussed. Our discussion leads us to agree with Gardner that the second mind is untenable as the executor of the censorship, so that if the censorship is a feasible concept it must not imply a second mind. We argue that there is a way to avoid this implication by not making the initial assumption that the meaning of the dream-report is clear or 'transparent' to the interpretee despite the interpretee's denials. If we take this step, there is no obligation to describe the interpretee as concealing the meaning of the dream-report from himself and,

given that concealing the meaning from oneself is not supposed to occur, no need to invoke agencies to explain it—so to speak. It is suggested that the reason why Freud took this path was his conception of intelligibility in terms of impressions and ideas before the mind. This conception of intelligibility of the dream-report will later be explicated in more detail in chapter four in terms of Freud's theory of meaning, in the terminology of 'presentations' before the mind. Rejecting this conception of intelligibility, a positive, one-mind view of the auto-censorship is put forward that rests on a distinction between concealing from and concealing in relation to. We argue that the interpretee speaks in a coy way, in which he conceals what he is saying not from the interpreter but in relation to the interpreter in order to express himself in an oblique way. The censorship, we contend, is in fact a medium of communication in difficult circumstances; much in the same way as jokes are. This is a parallel that Freud was in fact always quick to draw; although he does not seem to have appreciated the distinction that is here drawn. The interpretee is not aware of speaking in a coy way; and there is no reason to think that he should be aware that he is speaking in this way once the transparency of the mental is not assumed. Rejecting the notion that the dream-report is despite appearances clear to the interpretee shows us that interpretation is the medium of knowledge of the meaning of one's own dream-reports, contrary to Freud's insistence that the meaning must already be clear to some part of the mind. This leads us to suggest that Marcia Cavell's claim that Freud rejects the transparency of the mental, though we agree with it for the most part, requires qualification. Freud de facto rejects it in the interpretation of the dream-report of Irma's Injection, but assumes it in the interpretation of the dream-report of the Uncle with the Yellow Beard that he uses to introduce and explain the censorship.

Given that our analysis of interpretation is of a linguistic kind, the fourth chapter deals with Freud's own theory of language. It consists in two chief parts, the first is his theory of meaning in terms of the correspondence between words and objects by means of the mental intermediaries of 'presentations', or revivals of perceptions, in the mind. The second part addresses Freud's developmental analysis of language, in which he holds that—as we call them—'parasitic' forms of meaning in language grow on top of the original correspondence between words and objects. The original class of objects to which a word applies widens, as

V

occurs in the case of sexual meanings and symbols, and this is the first kind of parasitic meaning. A distinction between meaning and use may also evolve. Use gives rise to what we refer to as the second kind of parasitic meanings. It is meaning in a looser sense than a direct correspondence to an object, in which the expression of thought can develop in more and more sophisticated ways. It is in the context of this later kind of meaning that grammar and abstract meanings develop. Our analysis shows that Freud's theory of meaning in terms of object-presentations is indifferent to his common-sense analysis of language in interpretation, though it is at the core of his conception of intelligibility which bore so heavily on his understanding of the censorship, as discussed in chapter three. This compels us to once again offer qualified support for Marcia Cavell. In so far as, that is, in her book The Psychoanalytic Mind she argues that Freud's philosophical commitment to mental intermediaries does not bear on his method of interpretation, which instead has far more in common with modern philosophical thought on the subject of interpretation. The analysis in terms of the widening of the class of objects to which a word applies gives us an opportunity to analyse Freud's approach to symbolism. The symbolic relation, we argue, is the similarity between objects on the basis of which this original widening took place, though it is a similarity that speakers of language are not now in a position to appreciate. It is pointed out however that an appreciation of this original similarity is not required for the employment of the concept of symbolism in interpretation. All that is required is knowledge of the correspondence itself rather than the similarity in virtue of which it holds. This analysis, it is argued, is what allows Freud to take a very pragmatic approach to the use of symbols in interpretation. He relies not on a theoretical justification but on the pragmatic one that symbols are found in so many areas of human activity and are pervasive in our everyday understanding of language. Our conclusion, then, prompts us to criticise Agnes Petocz's recent account of symbolism in her book, Freud, Symbolism and Psychoanalysis in which she argues that an appreciation of the original similarity in virtue of which the symbolic relation holds is required for the employment of symbols in interpretation.

This thesis attributes a great degree of importance to Freud's paper of 1896, "The Actiology of Hysteria." It might be thought, given that Freud changed his mind about the etiology contained in it, that he must have changed his mind about the method of interpretation contained therein as well. If this were true, it would obviously be wrong to grant it such importance in an analysis of his method of dream-interpretation that he first presented in his book, The Interpretation of Dreams, in 1900. "The Aetiology of Hysteria" is generally regarded as being little more than Freud's declaration of a theory on the etiology of the psycho-neuroses that he was soon to reject, the so-called 'Seduction Theory'. This was the theory that the symptoms of the psycho-neuroses of hysteria and obsessional neurosis could be traced back to a real event in infancy. In the case of hysteria it was a sexual experience in infancy in which the interpretee had played a passive role; in obsessional neurosis a sexual experience in infancy in which the interpretee had played an active role. Freud famously changed his position on this etiology in a letter to his friend Wilhelm Fliess of the 21st of September 1897. In this later, among other reasons for the fact that "I no longer believe in my *neurotica*"¹, he had begun to consider that the scenes that his patients recounted to him in the light of which their symptoms became intelligible were phantasies. He says, for example: classic

It seems once again arguable that only later experiences give the impetus to fantasies, which [then] hark back to childhood, and with this factor a hereditary disposition regains a sphere of influence from which I had made it my task to dislodge it—in the interest of illuminating neurosis.²

What Freud changed his mind about was the status of the content of the memories of infantile scenes that he had individuated and the etiology this new state of affairs permitted, *not* the way in which he arrives at those scenes *whatever* the ultimate status of their content. As is argued in the thesis, in "The Aetiology of Hysteria" he advocates individuating the scenes by means of common-sense psychology in a holistic manner according to a genealogical tree pattern justified by its coherency, a coherency illustrated in the jig-saw puzzle analogy. All of these features figure prominently in his approach to dream-

¹ The Complete Letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess 1887-1904, translated and edited by Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985, p 264.

² Masson, 1985, p. 265

interpretation. The common-sense psychological approach and the genealogical tree pattern in particular we explicate from the interpretation of the dream-report of Irma's Injection. The jig-saw puzzle analogy was later re-invoked in "Remarks on the Theory and Practice of Dream-Interpretation" in 1923, and the view that coherency is the standard of justification of interpretation was to be repeated in many other works, such as "Constructions in Analysis" in 1937. In short, Freud's acceptance of phantasy indicated that he was prepared to accept a broader assessment of what his method of interpretation came up with, rather than a change in that method itself. Furthermore, though it requires a thesis to itself for full discussion, it is arguable to what extent Freud really did reject the 'Seduction Theory' given his comment in the case-history From the History of an Infantile Neurosis, or the 'Wolf Man', in 1918. In that case-history, there is much discussion of the status of the scene from infancy to which the interpretation leads, as to whether it is a phantasy or a real memory. In the course of this long, inconclusive discussion Freud makes the comment that "The old trauma theory of the neuroses, which was after all built up upon impressions gained from psychoanalytic practice, had suddenly come to the fore once more."³ These issues, while well worth pursuing, are put aside simply because the analysis of dream-interpretation contained in the thesis runs out of space before it gets to them.

The chief difficulty in analysing any specific aspect of Freud's work is dealing with the interdisciplinary ambition that pervades almost every topic he discusses. The interdisciplinary nature of his work generally has been brought to light by Patricia Kitcher in her book *Freud's Dream*, and by Frank Sulloway in *Freud Biologist of the Mind*. Typically, Freud writes in such a way as to run together many areas of interest to him, often with the help of an analogy that combines aspects from all of these different areas, such as the analogy of the 'pictographic script.' A critique of the rhetorical moves by which Freud attempts to carry forward his interdisciplinary project would, however, require another whole thesis for adequate discussion and it is not our primary concern. Our concern is to analyse one of those aspects, interpretation in the strictly linguistic sense, rather than the way in which it is often obscured by the interdisciplinary ambition that permeates Freud's

³Sigmund Freud, *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, translated and edited by James Strachey *et al*, London, Hogarth Press, 1953, Volume XVII, page 95.

writing. Freud considers himself to be dealing with the meaning of dreams, though the notion of 'meaning' for him has a very wide significance that goes far beyond linguistic meaning. The range of topics discussed in his book *The Interpretation of Dreams*, for example, is very wide. It includes the ontogenetic and phylogenetic biological processes that he considers give rise to dreaming, the experience of dreaming while asleep, the relation of environmental stimuli to dreaming, the ontogentic and phylogenetic psychological processes that he considers are active in dreaming, and the language with which the interpretee relates his dream to the interpreter. It is the sense of 'meaning' in this last, narrower area of interest to Freud that is the topic of our analysis. Our approach to discussing quotes from Freud's texts has been to downplay the interdisciplinary turn of phrase that he invariably uses and to concentrate on whatever is of direct relevance to a linguistic analysis of interpretation. As a further consequence of this approach, the hyphenated term 'dream-interpretation' is deliberately employed to connote that the object of Freud's method of interpretation is a linguistic phenomenon.

Our approach is to work as much as possible on Freud's interpretations-given that giving repeated examples is his chosen method of explaining what his method of interpretation consists in-and what he says about interpretation. This thesis impinges on Freud's psychological theories only in so far as they are considered to cast light on his method of interpretation; his early understanding of the etiology of hysteria, for this reason, is discussed. Generally speaking, the aim is to analyse the method of interpretation with which Freud came up with evidence on which to build his theories, not with the theories themselves. For this reason many well-known Freudian topics do not receive discussion. For example, neither the libido theory, nor Freud's theories of sexuality, nor the scientific evaluation of Freud's theories is discussed. In the same vein, Freud's metapsychology is not the object of inquiry and is consequently not dealt with in any detail. For example, the division of the mind into different agencies is discussed only to the extent that it bears on the employment of the notion of censorship in interpretation; the notion of repression is passed over in favour of concentrating on the interpretative notion of the censorship. The topic of wish-fulfilment is also far more quickly expedited than in the body of Freud's work. In short, as will become quickly evident, the view of Freudian interpretation as a conservative

extension of common-sense psychology expounded in this thesis implies that it is not laden by Freud's biological, psychological and metapsychological theories.

References to *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, London, Hogarth, 1953, translated and edited by James Strachey *et al* are given in Roman and Arabic for volume and page respectively in footnotes in the body of the text. The dream-reports chiefly discussed are the following: Irma's Injection (IV, 107); Uncle with the Yellow Beard (IV, 137); Little Karl in his Coffin (IV, 152); Three Theatre Tickets for 1 Florin 50 Kreuzers (XV, 155). Lastly, in chapter one, footnotes have been employed to a greater extent than in the remaining chapters. The intention behind this was to capture the rapid progression of Freud's thought in the decade leading up to the publication of *The Interpretation of Dreams*, rather than dwelling on particular issues to a great extent. To avoid obstructing a straightforward exposition of this progression, therefore, several of these issues have been relegated to footnotes.

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I – The Emergence of Freud's Interpretation of the Symptoms of Hysteria in Common-Sense Psychological Terms Prior to *The Interpretation of Dreams*.

In this chapter, our aim is to show how Freud took his cue from Josef Breuer's psychological method for the treatment of hysteria and, after a long series of revisions, came up with the method of pathogen-individuation that he claimed to have re-deployed in the field of dreaminterpretation. Independently of the evidence from Breuer's method for individuating and treating hysterical symptoms, Freud considered the general pathogenic role of psychological factors in the determination of hysterical illness to have been established by parallel with hypnotic experiments. The experiments in question were characteristic respectively of Jean-Martin Charcot at the Salpêtrière Hospital in Paris and Hippolyte Bernheim at the school of hypnotism in Nancy, both of whom Freud visited. He considered these experiments, in so far as they jointly showed how an idea could determine hysterical symptoms over time, to have shown the general pathology of hysteria to involve the mnemic idea-the memory-of a certain event among the determinants of the symptoms. Taking hypnotic experiments as models of hysterical illness allowed Freud to take a pragmatic approach to Breuer's method, and so nothing exclusively depended on Breuer's method for the establishment of the general etiology of hysteria. Freud began his investigations into hysteria by using it as a means of pathogen-individuation, but once he began to encounter disappointments in its use he was quick to substitute other methods for it to achieve the same end. Freud's contribution to the collaborative Studies On Hysteria thus saw him modifying Breuer's method as a means of pathogen-individuation in numerous ways; removing hypnosis, laying his hands on the patient's forehead, insisting that the patient remember, free association, questioning and the interpretation of the patient's motivation in common-sense psychological terms. In conjunction with introduction of common-sense psychology, Freud began to use of the behaviour of the hysterical symptom, in terms of its persistence, as a criterion in the individuation of the pathogenic memory. A decisive change of view regarding the behaviour of the symptom occurs, however, in Freud's famous paper of 1896, "The Aetiology of Hysteria." By the time of this paper, Freud's method had indeed already become commonsense psychological to a large degree, but the important shift which it contained was that it marked the end of his use of the behaviour of the symptom in the criterion of individuation of the pathogenic memory. Rather, individuation now took place through the satisfaction of

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the common-sense standards of 'necessary traumatic force' and 'suitability as a determinant', the satisfaction of which was now regarded by Freud as a necessary condition of therapeutic success. The advantage in this reading is that, by no longer relying on the behaviour of the symptom, Freud's application of his method in the field of dream-interpretation could take place without the requirement of a therapeutic corollary. That is to say, it could take place without the need to find a 'cure' for dreams to match the role of cure in the field of the psycho-neuroses in order to individuate the meaning of the dream. On the basis of this shift in Freud's thinking, we contend that Adolf Grünbaum's objection to Freud's application of his method to dreams based on the requirement of a therapeutic corollary fails. In this way, one of the major obstacles to treating dream-interpretation in a purely common-sense psychological way is removed.

1. Breuer's Method

1.1 Josef Breuer's Important Case of Anna O.

Freud's interest in hysteria was inspired by the findings of etiological analysis and treatment in one particular case conducted by his colleague and co-author of *Studies On Hysteria*, Josef Breuer. The case in question is the first case history in that work, the case of Anna O. She was a young woman who had fallen ill after a particularly stressful time spent looking after her seriously ill father. Her illness began to manifest itself through a combination of symptoms including anaemia, general weakness, avoidance of food and a nervous cough. It was, in fact, this last symptom that prompted her family to ask for Breuer's assistance. This period preceding his taking-on the case Breuer regarded as the first phase of her illness. The second phase, in Breuer's chronology, begins with the patient's taking to her bed in December 1880, and it is in this phase that his general treatment begins. Breuer refers to this period, which lasted until the following April, as the "manifest illness." She developed several symptoms "in rapid succession"² which he goes on to refer to as "hysterical phenomena."³ These symptoms included paresis or partial paralysis with retention of sensation in her neck muscles, paralysis with varying degrees of severity in her

- ¹ II, 22.
- ² II, 23.

³ II, 34. Passim thereafter. The whole case is referred to as a "hysterical illness" (II, 41).

extremities, headaches, and a squint. She also suffered linguistic problems-"disturbances of speech"⁴—that began in this second stage of the illness, in which she lost "her command of grammar and syntax"⁵ and could communicate only by means of various foreign languages mashed together, though she could still understand her native German. The symptoms initially eased following Breuer's involvement but a relapse occurring after the death of her father marked the beginning of the third phase of the illness, which was the period in which she began to manifest somnambulistic states. Breuer says that this phase of the illness began with a "period of persisting somnambulism, subsequently alternating with more normal states."6 In this third phase, she spoke only in English and could no longer understand German. She also had difficulties in recognising people, and Breuer was the only person whom she was cable of recognising in a normal way. The fourth and final stage of the illness, as it is recounted in the published version of the case, is taken up with the therapeutic procedure by which Breuer claims to have conclusively removed all of Anna O.'s symptoms.⁷ Breuer's method of treatment known as the 'cathartic method', or often referred to by Freud simply as 'Breuer's method', was a generalisation of the claimed successful treatment in this case.

1.2 Breuer's Approach to the Case of Anna O.

The treatment in question proceeded by exploiting a particular feature of the case, one that started off from Anna O.'s "habitual day-dreaming."⁸ As the illness progressed, this day-dreaming transformed itself into an "hallucinatory absence"⁹ and, in turn, into a "double

⁴ II, 35.

⁵ II, 25.

⁶ II, 22.

⁷ It seems that Anna O. was not in fact cured. Henri Ellenberger's paper, "The Story of "Anna. O": A Critical Review with New Data" (*Journal of the History of the Behavioural Sciences*, 1972, Vol. 8, pp. 267-279) suggests that the outcome of case was not recounted with total accuracy in the *Studies On Hysteria*. The evidence for this claim in part consists in some of Freud's later reported comments, though the substantial part of Ellenberger's evidence is documentary from the Sanitorium Bellevue where, instead of being cured as recorded in the official case history, she was transferred. Case notes, which appear to have been written by Breuer, and follow up notes written by another doctor indicate that her symptoms including the linguistic problems persisted. Our analysis of the importance of the hypnotic models that follows below suggests a reason why Freud may not have been overly concerned with the lack of therapeutic success achieved by Breuer as regards the etiology of hysteria they jointly posited. That is, the justification of the etiology was not *dependent* on success in this or any case. It was instead dependent on the models from hypnotism.

⁹ Ibid.

conscience."¹⁰ The difference between the absence and double conscience appeared to consist in a degree of organisation, the latter being a more highly organised manifestation of the former. For Breuer says with regard to what he refers to as the 'distinct states of consciousness' that Anna O. manifested that "These comprised the existence of a second state of consciousness which first emerged as a temporary absence and later became organized into a 'double conscience."¹¹ With regard to this state of affairs, Breuer states that "It is remarkable how completely the earliest manifestations of her illness in its beginnings already exhibited its main characteristics, which afterwards remained unchanged for almost two years."12 Among these main characteristics was in fact a pattern of daily disruption to the patient's mental states in terms of the absences and the double conscience, or condition seconde. Each day, the patient's mental states, over the course of the day, would lose the characteristic of being organised in a unitary fashion. The intermittent absences gradually developed into a more highly organised secondary organisation in the course of the day, a double conscience, which would fully manifest itself in an evening state of auto-hypnosis; Breuer refers to "the mounting-up and intensification of her absences into her auto-hypnosis in the evening."¹³ The absences would develop into her fully blown condition seconde in the evening: "her absences (that is to say, the emergence of her condition seconde) always became more frequent as the day advanced and took entire possession by evening."¹⁴ This pattern of fluctuation in her mental states was a constant feature of the illness. It "remained constant through the whole eighteen months during which she was under observation."¹⁵ In her evening state Anna O. would recount hallucinations by which she had been troubled during her daytime absences. She would experience an easing of the torment concerned with these hallucinations once she gave expression to them in the state of hypnosis each evening. She would, that is, experience "the products of her imagination as psychical stimuli and the easing and removal of her state of stimulation when she gave utterance to them in hypnosis."¹⁶ She was, it appeared, in her condition seconde providing herself with a means of auto-treatment by which to assuage the fright experienced in connection with the daytime

¹⁰ Ibid.

- ¹¹ Ibid.
- ¹² Ibid.
- ¹³ II, 29.
- ¹⁴ II, 32. ¹⁵ II, 29.

hallucinations. It appeared to Breuer that she was using a kind of verbal treatment on herself each evening, to dispel the memories of the products of her imagination from earlier in the day.

A major step in the course of the treatment occurred when she applied this process of auto-treatment no longer merely to the daytime products of her imagination-the experiences in the daytime *absences*—but also to her symptoms. The auto-treatment bore on symptoms when she began to relate more distant experiences. For in her condition seconde she was by now living in the past; she was living in the corresponding day 365 days previous to the actual day. Commenting on the difference between her alternating states in this fourth stage of the illness, Breuer says "now, however, they differed further in that in the first she lived, like the rest of us, in the winter of 1881-82, whereas in the second she lived in the winter of 1880-81...." Now they had to "talk off ... the vexations of 1881"17, and her memory went back to a "third group of separate disturbances"¹⁸ from between July and December 1880. When she uttered the memory of certain of these experiences, certain of her symptoms disappeared. For example, the particular symptom of hydrophobia disappeared after she managed to recount during her evening state the disgust she had once experienced after seeing a dog drink from a glass used by humans. The most prominent example is that she relieved herself of her linguistic difficulties once she managed to remember an hallucination that had frightened her so much that at the time of its occurrence she could not speak, but could only think of a child's prayer in English. By giving utterance to memories that were ostensibly of the period during which she had nursed her father, Breuer claimed that she used this "talking cure"—as she described it herself—to get rid of all her chronic symptoms. Breuer's intervention consisted principally in leading her memory back by questioning in strict reverse-chronological order while she was in this state. By removing all of the symptoms in this manner, Breuer tells us, a cure was obtained for the whole illness. He says, "In this way too, the whole illness was brought to a close."¹⁹ It was on this basis of the disappearance of a particular symptom following the leading-back in her auto-hypnosis to

¹⁶ II, 29. ¹⁷ II, 34.

18 Ibid.

¹⁹ II, 40.

the recounting of a certain event that led Breuer to think that that event had in fact given rise to that symptom.²⁰ Breuer says: elation to this and the second declaration to the second declaration of the second declaration

Each individual symptom in this complicated case was taken separately in hand; all the occasions on which it had appeared were described in reverse order, starting before the time when the patient became bed-ridden and going back to the event which had led to its first appearance. When this had been described the symptom was permanently removed.²¹

Breuer was hypothesising that the disappearance of a symptom S after the uttering of the memory of an event U showed that it was the content of the uttered memory U which had originally given rise to the symptom S. In this way, he was pinpointing the events that had given rise to the symptoms. This is implicit when he says, "In the case of this patient the hysterical phenomenon disappeared after the event *which gave rise to it* was reproduced in hypnosis."²² It might appear from this that he was asserting that the disappearance of the symptom was sufficient to individuate positively the utterance of the memory of the pathogenic event: $\sim S \rightarrow U$. But this is not the case. Rather, Breuer recognised that such an unhesitating inference was not warranted because there was a danger of suggestion, the possibility of which he had in fact been quick to recognise. In the case of Anna O., Breuer

²⁰ The cause of symptoms recognised as hysterical in this period of the late nineteenth century was up for grabs. In his paper, "On the Disappearance of Hysteria: A Study in the Clinical Deconstruction of a Diagnosis" Isis, September 1993, No. 84, pp. 496-526, Mark S. Micale draws attention to the fact that at the end of the nineteenth century there was no agreement on the cause or etiology of hysteria. The only way, indeed, of identifying a case as one of hysteria was through its symptomatology. Micale says: "Confronted, then, with the perpetual "problem of the missing lesion," as it was called, Charcot and his contemporaries had to "define" hysteria in a purely symptomatological fashion, through the totality of its external clinical signs, which they believed could be grouped into symptom clusters and then into discrete disease categories" (p.503). Even the range of its symptomatology was extremely difficult to discern in virtue of its "aping" (p. 504) of other illnesses, in particular epilepsy, and Charcot "applied the hybrid diagnostic label "hystero-epilepsy" to a large number of patients-an unsatisfactory term and concept that he abandoned in later years." (p. 505) Breuer's, and subsequently Freud's, grappling with the problem of the etiology of hysteria was simply one attempt among many to get to grips with a symptomatology in a field where there was no agreement about the cause and disagreement even about the symptoms that should be classed as hysterical. Unfortunately, we do not have the space to enter into a discussion of this issue; our goal is simply to explicate the method that enabled Freud to explain the phenomena that he treated as hysterical symptoms and whether there is an obstacle to employing it in dream-interpretation. The question of whether the cases were truly hysterical, or whether hysteria ever existed in truth as a nosological entity, we put to one side. The issue of the reality or otherwise of hysteria is discussed in the following works Henri Ellenberger, The Discovery of the Unconscious, London, Fontana Press, 1994, pp. 141-145; Richard Webster, Why Freud Was Wrong: Sin, Science and Psychoanalysis, London, Harper Collins, 1995, pp. 52-70.

²¹ II, 35.

²² Ibid. (Emphasis added)

acknowledges there was a danger that the recounted scenes were not genuine, and possibly the effect of suggestion. With relation to this problem, he acknowledged that the danger of suggestion occurring between himself and the patient could not be discounted merely on the basis of the disappearance of the symptom. He says with regard to the authenticity of the recounted scenes that "As regards the symptoms disappearing after being "talked away", I cannot use this as evidence, it may very well be explained by suggestion."23 By saying this, it seems that Breuer appreciated also that he could not take the mere disappearance of the symptom alone as means of identifying the pathogenic memory. In other words, that suggestion may have borne not only on the content of the memory that was uttered in conjunction with the disappearance of the symptom, but also on the fact that it had disappeared in conjunction with the symptom. Bluntly, he would seem to have understood that it bore on the apparent link between the utterance and the disappearance. Breuer, in response to this problem, tried to eliminate the possibility that suggestion could have taken place in his handling of the case.²⁴ In doing so, he would seem to be relying on more than symptom removal to individuate the pathogenic memory. In the paper that he jointly wrote with Freud, "Preliminary Communication", the danger of suggestion is again acknowledged. In that paper, it is discounted on the basis of separate symptom removal rather than merely the good character of the patient. However, it too indicates that they were not relying on the disappearance of the symptom alone to individuate the pathogenic memory. Discounting suggestion, then, his reasoning led him to diagnose the cause of her illness in terms of a number of experiences undergone while nursing her father. While referring to the "psychical events involved in the period of incubation of the illness"²⁵ during the patient's nursing of her father. Breuer says: "it was they that had produced the whole of the hysterical phenomenon and when they were brought to verbal utterance the symptoms disappeared."26

²⁶ Ibid.

²³ II, 43.

²⁴ The various ways in which Breuer considers himself justified in discounting the possibility of suggestion are listed by him in *Studies On Hysteria*. They include the good character of the patient, confirmation by others of events recounted and so forth. Indeed, as the case-history opens, he makes reference to the patient's strong character and what he considers to be a lack of suggestibility. He says, "She had great poetic and imaginative gifts, which were under the control of a sharp and critical common-sense. Owing to this latter quality, she was *completely unsuggestible*; she was only influenced by arguments, never by mere assertions" (II, 21).

The more considered view of the etiology that Breuer and Freud together put forward in "Preliminary Communication" lays the emphasis explicitly on the unuttered memory of the (traumatic) event as the pathogen, not simply the event itself, as Breuer tended to express himself in the case of Anna O.²⁷ They pithily sum up this etiology with the phrase that "hysterics suffer mainly from reminiscences"²⁸, and illustrate this distinction that the pathogen is the memory rather than the event itself by the analogy of the pathogen as a "foreign body"²⁹ rather than an 'agent provocateur':

But the causal relation between the determining psychical trauma and the hysterical phenomenon is not of a kind implying that the trauma merely acts like an *agent provocateur* in releasing the symptom, which thereafter leads an independent existence. We must presume rather that the psychical trauma – or more precisely the memory of the trauma – acts like a foreign body which long after its entry must continue to be regarded as an agent that is still at work; and we find the evidence for this in a highly remarkable phenomenon which at the same time lends an important *practical* interest to our findings.³⁰

A memory of an event, of course, persists from that event rather than ending with it. So taking the memory instead of the mere experience as a pathogen in hysteria means that the psychological aspect of the etiology is one that persists over time like a 'foreign body' rather than one that simply occurred and was done with like the act of an 'agent provocateur'. The "evidence" they put forward in this instance for this assertion of the etiology in terms of memories is based on the conjunction of the disappearance of a symptom and the recounting of a memory. They continue:

For we found, to our great surprise at first, that each individual hysterical symptom immediately and permanently disappeared when we had succeeded in bringing clearly to light the memory of the event by which it was provoked and in arousing the accompanying affect, and when the patient had described that event in the greatest possible detail and had put the affect into words.³¹

Freud commented that the findings in Breuer's case of Anna O. could be generalised to many cases:

²⁷ The event considered to have given rise to the symptom is generally described in Freud's work as 'traumatic.' However, in this early period at least, the event was not individuated by means of its content, traumatic or otherwise, but in virtue of the behaviour of the symptom.

²⁸ II, 7. (Emphasis omitted) Hereafter, as joint authors Breuer and Freud are referred to as 'Breuer/Freud'.

²⁹ II, 6.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid. (Breuer/Freud's Emphasis)

I began, with Breuer's constant cooperation, to make close observations on a fairly large number of hysterical patients and to examine them from this point of view; and I found that that the behaviour of this first patient had in fact been typical and that the inferences which were justified by that case could be carried over to a considerable number of hysterical patients, if not them all.³²

This statement represents an initial optimism on Freud's part that was very soon to be disappointed in his attempts to apply Breuer's method generally. As we presently investigate, by responding to the various problems he encountered with Breuer's method, Freud was led to develop his own method of dealing with hysterical symptoms by understanding them in terms of motivation by the standards of common-sense psychology.

Let us pause for a moment to consider the import of Breuer's method, and to gain an overview of the development on the successive phases of Freud's thought that we are about to follow through the period that we designate 'Freud's Compass' up to his paper "The Aetiology of Hysteria." The characteristic that we focus on below in this development is the relationship between therapeutic success, in the form of symptom removal, and commonsense psychology in the method of individuating the pathogenic memory. Breuer's method, as the starting point in his development, meant that Freud was committed to individuating the pathogenic memory on the basis of the disappearance of the symptom; not unhesitatingly, but with the qualification that suggestion as an alternative explanation of the symptom could be discounted. They hypothesised that Breuer's method worked by removing one of the necessary conditions of the persistence of hysterical symptoms, and that this was the memory of a certain event in a non-uttered state. In fact, what Freud would do was to accept the import of the status of the non-uttered state of the memory as a necessary condition that did not warrant the positive identification of a particular memory as the pathogenic memory. He recognised that something extra was required for positive identification, and commonsense psychology was what he took to fill this gap. In the period of Freud's Compass, discussed in more detail below, he accepted that the necessary condition status of the nonuttered state of the memory simply meant that as long as the symptom persisted the memory had not been individuated. Once the symptom disappeared, it was not this fact of the mere disappearance that picked out the memory. Rather, once the symptom disappeared, the positive identification was warranted to the degree that the uttered memory rendered the symptom intelligible in terms of common-sense psychological motivation. Eventually, Freud moved even further away from Breuer and dropped the behaviour of the symptom completely from the criteria of individuation. In "The Aetiology of Hysteria", he shifted his ground to rely completely on common-sense psychology to individuate the pathogenic memory; furthermore, in that paper he explicitly warned against using the disappearance of the symptom as a criterion of individuation of the pathogenic memory. In 1891-1896 period, as he moves away from Breuer's method, we have a distinct progression towards a common-sense psychological method of interpretation in Freud's thought. It is a progression reflected in his comment, "There had been differences of opinion between us at quite an early stage...I, on the other hand, was inclined to suspect the interplay of forces and the operation of interpretation and purposes such as are to be observed in normal life."³³ It breaks down into three conceptual phases:

Phase One: Breuer's method: "Preliminary Communication." Under the influence of Anna O., Freud and Breuer, with the qualification of discounting suggestion on the basis of separate symptom removal, take the disappearance of the symptom to indicate the utterance of the pathogenic memory. This does *not* amount to using the disappearance of the symptom *alone* as the criterion of individuation of the utterance of the pathogenic memory; also, common-sense psychology is not used to individuate the utterance of the pathogenic memory.

Phase Two: Freud's Compass. Freud relies on the persistence of the symptom to tell him the pathogenic memory has not been individuated; once the symptom disappears, positive individuation of the pathogenic memory takes place in virtue of the degree of common-sense psychological coherency the memory provides for the symptom and material of the case. In this phase, Freud still requires the actual utterance of the pathogenic memory for a positive individuation, though he is disposed to predict the pathogenic memory before it is uttered.

³² III, 30.

³³ XX, 22-23. The hump balance of the hump b

Phase Three: "The Aetiology of Hysteria." Freud relies solely on common-sense psychology to individuate the pathogenic memory. Furthermore, he no longer requires the actual utterance of the pathogenic memory in order to individuate the pathogenic memory.³⁴

The decision to treat the non-uttered state of the memory in the case of Anna O. as a necessary condition in the etiology of hysteria, and Freud's eagerness to generalise from that case, seems to have been very heavily influenced by his interest in hypnotism. For, arguing by analogy, he considered hypnotic experiments to have shown a non-uttered memory to be part of the etiology of hysteria. Let us now examine that aspect of Freud's though before we move on to follow the progression of phases and show how his 'compass', and thereby his common-sense psychological approach, evolved out of his disappointment with Breuer's method.

2. Freud's Appeal to Hypnotic Experiments to Establish the Etiology of Hysteria

In the same period as the publication of "Preliminary Communication", Freud was very interested in the field of hypnotism. This interest seems to have originated in his trip to Paris where he came under the influence of Jean-Martin Charcot. By extrapolating from Charcot's explanation of traumatic hysteria, Freud thought he had found an explanation of common-hysteria, or hysteria in which there had not been a great shock to the patient. According to Freud's interpretation of the experiments, the etiology of hysteria involves (a) a psychological entity, an idea, and (b) the persistence of the idea over time to determine

³⁴ Around the period of the publication of this paper, Freud also interpreted the symptoms of obsessional neurosis in a common-sense psychological way in terms of self-reproaches. For example, in his 1896 paper "Further remarks on the Neuro-Psychoses of Defence" he says: "The nature of obsessional neurosis can be expressed in a simple formula. Obsessional ideas are invariably transformed *self-reproaches* which have reemerged from *repression* and which always relate to some sexual act that was performed with pleasure in *childhood*" (III, 169 – Freud's Emphasis). Obsessional neurosis is also discussed along with hysteria in "The Aetiology of Hysteria" (1896). It also receives discussion in "The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence"(1894), "Obsessions and Phobias" (1895) and "Heredity and the Aetiology of the Neuroses" (1896). However, hysteria remained Freud's chief concern up to *The Interpretation of Dreams* published in 1900, culminating in *the Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria*, or 'Dora', case-history which he viewed as closely related to his book on dream-interpretation. Indeed, in the prefatory remarks of that case-history he states that he had originally intended to entitle it 'Dreams and Hysteria'. This case-history was written in 1901, just after the publication of *The Interpretation of Dreams*, though not published until 1905.

action.³⁵ The fact that the idea persists over time means that it constitutes a memory, which would allow us to rephrase the epigram regarding the pathology of hysteria as 'experimental subjects suffer from memories of the hypnotist's command.' In Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, retrospectively referring to the case of Anna O., Freud says "The explanation of this fact would be a most awkward business, were it not that the way is pointed by experiences and experiments in hypnotism."³⁶ In his obituary of Charcot, Freud indeed had written: "The step he took assured him for all time, too, the fame of having been the first to explain hysteria."37 There are two parts to the explanation. The first is Charcot's simulation of the symptoms of traumatic hysteria in a subject under hypnosis by a verbal suggestion, or slight physical tap. The second, an experiment favoured by Bernheim, consisted in the determination of the subject's actions over time after the hypnotic state-post-hypnotic suggestion-again by the simple verbal command of the hypnotist.

2.1 Charcot's Simulation of the Symptoms of Traumatic Hysteria

The first strand of Freud's justification for the pathology of common hysteria took its cue from the simulation of hysterical symptoms put forward by Charcot as a model of the etiology of traumatic hysteria.³⁸ Contemporaneously with the publication of "Preliminary

³⁷ III, 22.

³⁵ This addresses the case of chronic hysteria, though there was no important difference between it and acute hysteria, as regards the etiological analysis or treatment. Breuer's method can also be used to individuate and treat latent memories which provoke hysterical attacks of an acute nature: "Our observations have often thought us that a memory of this kind which had hitherto provoked attacks, ceases to be able to do so after the process of reaction and associative correction have been applied to it under hypnosis" (II, 15). That is, the method is ineffective while an hysterical attack is taking place, though it is held to be effective against the latent memory which is the cause of the attack, once the attack has passed: "Moreover, during the productive stage of an acute hysteria our procedure cannot prevent the phenomena which have been so laboriously removed from being at once replaced by fresh ones. But once this acute stage is past, any residues which may be left in the form of chronic symptoms or attacks are often removed, and permanently so, by our method, because it is a radical one." (II, 17). ³⁶ XI, 19.

³⁸ 'Traumatic hysteria' was a phrase used to designate the occurrence of hysterical symptoms, such as paralyses, following a severe shock, such as a fall. It was typical in men who engaged in manual work. The presumption at the time was that the accident had caused some lesion in the brain, though typically no lesion could be found post-mortem. Charcot established that there was no lesion, that such disorders were functional and through his experimental simulation of the same symptoms in hypnosis claimed that the etiology involved a psychological component. The psychological component was that, in virtue of receiving the said idea in a hypnoid state, an idea was imbued with determinative power with regard to symptoms. For discussion, see Derek Forrest, The Evolution of Hypnotism, Black Ace Books, Forfar, Scotland, 1999, pp. 253-261; Ellenberger 1994, pp. 89-91; A.R.G. Owen, Hysteria, Hypnosis and Healing: The Work of J-M. Charcot, New York, 1971. Charcot, however, was unwilling to go so far as to say that traumatic hysteria therefore had a psychological etiology, as Freud himself indicates in his writings on Charcot.

Communication, Freud gave a lecture on the etiology of hysteria, reprinted in Standard Edition entitled "On the Psychical Mechanism of Hysterical Phenomena: A Lecture."³⁹ He begins the paper by telling us in a footnote that this lecture was delivered to the Vienna Medical Club on January 11, 1893. In the text itself, he tells us that he is "giving you a report on a work the first part of which has already been published in the Zentralblatt für Neurologie under the names of Josef Breuer and myself."40 Unlike "Preliminary Communication", however, the emphasis is now quite clearly an experiment in hypnotism as a model for the study of hysteria. This model consisted in simulating the symptoms of traumatic hysteria by means of suggestion under hypnosis. Freud says with reference to Charcot, "While he was engaged in the study of hysterical paralyses arising after traumas, he had the idea of artificially reproducing those paralyses, which he had earlier differentiated with care from organic ones."41 In order to conduct the experiment, a somnambulistic state of hypnosis would be induced in the patient. Freud says, "For this purpose he made use of hysterical patients whom he put into a state of somnambulism by hypnotizing them."42 By making a comparison between the cause of the simulated symptom and the cause of the naturally occurring symptom, Charcot offered an explanation of traumatic hysteria on the basis of like-effect-therefore-like-cause: an idea received in a psychological state of a kind similar to hypnosis. The comparison went as follows. The patient in the somnambulistic state would receive a light blow on the arm while receiving a verbal suggestion from Charcot that her arm was paralysed. This combination of the tap and the verbal suggestion would result in a paralysis typical of a traumatic hysteria resulting from a far greater physical shock. Freud also says that the same effect could be produced completely by verbal suggestion, without the tap. He says, "The blow may also be replaced by a direct verbal suggestion: 'Look! Your arm is paralysed!' In this case too the paralysis exhibits the same characteristics."43 This resulted in the same symptoms as were typically in evidence in cases of traumatic hysteria. Freud was of the view that it was necessary to interpolate an idea into the chain of determinants to explain the difference in force between the effect of the physical shock in

³⁹ The editors of Standard Edition tell us that the German original is headed with words that attributes the paper to both Freud and Breuer, but that is in reality "a shorthand report of a lecture delivered by Freud and revised by him" (III, 26). ⁴⁰ III, 27.

⁴¹ III, 22.

⁴² Ibid.

naturally occurring cases, and the tap and/or the instruction in simulated cases. He appealed to the principle of like-effect-therefore-like-cause. He says:

If the trauma in the one case can be replaced in the other case by a verbal suggestion, it is plausible to suppose that an idea of this kind was responsible for the development of the paralysis in the case of the spontaneous traumatic paralysis as well.⁴⁴

In this way, Freud construed the like-cause in the traumatic case as the *idea* of fright at the time of the original traumatic event as the cause of hysteria, rather than simply the event itself. Referring to this analysis by analogy of traumatic hysteria, Freud wrote of Charcot:

He succeeded in proving, by an unbroken chain of argument, that these paralyses were the result of ideas which had dominated the patient's brain at moments of a special disposition. in this way, the mechanism of a hysterical phenomenon was explained for the first time.⁴⁵

Expressing the importance of this experiment in establishing the etiology of hysteria expressed in "Preliminary Communication", Freud writes:

But when, some ten years later, Breuer and I published our 'Preliminary Communication' on the psychical mechanism of hysterical phenomena, we were completely under the spell of Charcot's researches. We regarded the pathogenic experiences of our patients as psychical traumas whose influence on hysterical paralyses had been established by Charcot; and Breuer's hypothesis of hypnoid states was itself nothing but a reflection of the fact that Charcot had reproduced those traumatic paralyses artificially under hypnosis.⁴⁶

Freud tells us that there had been some difficulty in understanding how such a model could also apply to cases of common hysteria in which, of course, there did not appear to have been a single great trauma. In the case of Anna O., it appeared that a case had been found of an example of common hysteria—but it did not conform to Charcot's model for traumatic hysteria. The difference being that instead of one great event as in traumatic hysteria there seemed to be a series of events, or as Freud puts it "a series of affective impressions - a whole story of suffering."⁴⁷ Freud decided to treat the single trauma and the series of traumas as functionally equivalent in terms of the model. In "Preliminary

⁴³ III, 28. ⁴⁴ III, 28-29.

⁴⁵ III, 22.

- ⁴⁶ XI, 21.
- ⁴⁷ III, 31.

Communication", Breuer/Freud say it may be a case of "the memory either of a single major trauma (which we find *par excellence* in what is called traumatic hysteria) or a series of interconnected part-traumas (such as underlie common-hysteria)."⁴⁸ In Freud's lecture under discussion here, cases of common hysteria—of which he discusses the case of Anna O.—are placed in the context of Charcot's investigations in the following way:

We have learnt in this manner that, to put it roughly, there is an affectively coloured experience behind most, if not all, phenomena of hysteria ... if you will allow me to equate this affectively coloured experience with the major traumatic experience underlying traumatic hysteria, I can at once formulate the first thesis at which we have arrived: 'There is a complete analogy between traumatic paralysis and common, non-traumatic hysteria', ⁴⁹

Given this, Charcot's model is extended to include common-hysteria. Freud says: "The first thing that follows from all this, then, is that the pattern of traumatic hysteria, as it was laid down by Charcot for hysterical paralyses, applies quite generally to all hysterical phenomena, or at least to the great majority of them."⁵⁰

2.2 The Post-Hypnotic Suggestion Experiment

The second strand in Freud's pathology of common hysteria concerned the determination of the hysterical symptoms over time. The fact that the cause of common hysteria had been established as an *idea* did not entail that it was an idea that persisted as a memory, or a 'foreign body'. Charcot's simulation-experiment, that is to say, did not establish that it was a memory rather than a mere experience or *agent provocateur* that was of etiological significance. It still remained to be explained how the idea persisted as a memory to determine the symptom and how the non-uttered state of the memory featured in the etiology. A further hypnotic experiment, the Post-Hypnotic Suggestion (P.H.S.) experiment, and a further argument from analogy provided this explanation. In the P.H.S experiment, the hypnotist would hypnotise the subject and, while the subject was in the state of hypnosis, instruct him to execute a certain action at a certain time in the future. The subject would then emerge from the state of hypnosis and, at the appointed later time execute the instructed

⁴⁸ II, 14.

⁴⁹ III, 30-31.

action in a compulsive manner, in complete ignorance of the determining factors of his action, including the hypnotist's command. Thus, as Freud recounts the experiment, he takes it to have established the determining role of an idea that persists: the memory of the hypnotist's command. He writes:

The real stimulus to action being the order of the physician, it is hard not to concede that the idea of the physician's order became active too. Yet this last idea did not come to consciousness, as did its outcome, the idea of the action; it remained unconscious, and so it was *active and unconscious* at the same time.⁵¹

Freud saw a point of similarity between the latency of the memory of the hypnotist's command and the non-uttered state of the memory, both of which he was disposed to view as "unconscious." Thus, the parallel was easily drawn between the idea of the hypnotist's command determining the action and the 'psychically traumatic' idea determining the hysterical symptoms, as demanded by the notion of the "foreign body" in contrast to the *agent provocateur*. Freud concludes that "This phenomenon affords an admirable example of the influences which the unconscious state may exercise over the conscious one; moreover, it provides a pattern upon which we may account for the phenomenon of hysteria"⁵²

The fact that the idea persists in the form of a memory and determines the symptom leads Freud to say that it is an idea that is 'active' and 'unconscious' at the same time. Freud's interpretation of the experiment, in particular the conception of causality which appears to underlie the description of the memory of the command as active and unconscious at the moment it executes its effect, has been criticised by Donald Levy.⁵³ Our concern in the present context is not whether or not Freud was right, but simply that he took the experiment as evidence for his etiology of hysteria. That is to say, what is important for the parallel is the fact that the determinant is taken to be a latent memory, not whether the description of that latent memory as 'active and unconscious' at the same time is justified. But this is extra speculation on Freud's part. The basic datum is that, the latent memory is a factor in the

⁵⁰ III, 31.

⁵¹ XII, 261.

⁵² XI, 19.

⁵³ Donald Levy, *Freud Among the Philosophers*, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1996. See pp. 57-64.

determination of the behaviour. The foreign body/*agent provocateur* analogy (1) refers to the distinction between the (a) experience and (b) memory as determining the symptom. It also serves to illustrate (2) Freud's conviction that the mnemic idea operates in terms of "direct causation"⁵⁴ and the idea of the order being active and unconscious at the same time. But (1) does not oblige us to accept (2). Indeed, it is (2) that Levy criticises. He takes issue with Freud's claim that "The real stimulus to action being the order of the physician, it is hard not to concede that the idea of the physician's order became active too." Levy's point is that it is a mistake to think that the idea of the physician's order must become active—and he also indeed disputes that it holds water as an empirical claim—simply because the order of the physician is the real stimulus. To think so, Levy argues, is to commit oneself to a dubious notion of causality regarding the influence of memory on behaviour. On that view, it is held that the particular memory that is the determinant of an instance of behaviour must operate by giving rise to a casual intermediary that is contiguous with its effect, and that this causal intermediary must also resemble the real stimulus.

However, putting aside the issue of whether or not Freud was misguided regarding the notion of causality implicit in his reading of the experiment, the lesson he took from the hypnotic experiments went as follows. Firstly, the psychological interpretation of Charcot's simulation of the symptoms of traumatic hysteria under hypnosis offered an analogy for the pathogen of common-hysteria as a psychological entity: an idea. The P.H.S experiment showed in turn that the pathogenic idea, by analogy with the hypnotist's command, could be understood as more than having initially determined the symptom in the manner of an agent provocateur who sets a chain of events in motion. It could also be viewed as a latent memory or "foreign body" whose persistence over time determines the presence of the symptom. In Breuer's method, bringing the pathogenic memory to utterance for therapeutic purposes also amounted to individuating it, and there was no parallel for this in the two experiments discussed above. The advantage that apparently lay in Breuer's method was that it allowed individuating the pathogen. Breuer/Freud concluded the "Preliminary Communication" by making the general suggestion that the pattern of mental causation they are following has

⁵⁴ III, 35.

been exemplified in Charcot's experiment: "If by uncovering the psychical mechanism of hysterical phenomena we have taken a step forward along the path first traced so successfully by Charcot...."⁵⁵ The *extra* steps taken by them along this road lay in the individuation of the *specific* pathogenic memory, in terms of bringing it to utterance. From hypnotism, then, Freud had learnt to view the pathogen in hysteria as an idea, in turn as a memory, then in Breuer's method he came across a means of individuating it to the aim of therapy. Freud now set out on a very pragmatic course of revising and re-revising the means of individuating the pathogenic memory.

3. Freud's Compass: Individuation of the Pathogenic Memory By Means of the Persistence of the Symptom as a Guide to Attributions of Motive

Following our digression into Freud's inquiries in hypnotism, let us now return to the progression of his thought as he encountered various disappointments in the use of Breuer's method.

3.1 'Leading Back' Under Hypnosis

Breuer's method as evidenced in the case of Anna O. required some obvious modification if it were ever to be suitable for general application. An important modification to the method was immediately suggested by Breuer/Freud in the "Preliminary Communication" regarding the feature of auto-hypnotism. The bringing to utterance of the latent pathogenic memory in the case of Anna O. had been carried out initially by the patient herself by means of auto-hypnosis, then by Breuer who exploited her auto-hypnoses in order to encourage her to follow her memories back. However, this particular feature of the case was not generalisable as part of a method. Breuer himself already had recognised this problem in his case study: "It would only be possible to discover the state of affairs in other patients by means of some such procedure as was provided in the case of Anna O. by her autohypnoses."⁵⁶ In the general application of Breuer's method, Breuer/Freud chose hypnosis induced by the physician as a means to induce a somnambulistic state in the patient in which her memory could be lead back to the point at which she would utter the pathogenic memory.

⁵⁵ II, 17. ⁵⁶ II, 44. For example, in "Preliminary Communication", they say "As a rule it is necessary to hypnotize the patient and to arouse his memories under hypnosis of the time at which the symptom made its first appearance."⁵⁷ Once the state of hypnosis had been induced, then the 'leading back' would take the form of questioning the patient about the first appearance of her symptoms. They say, "The patients must be put under hypnosis and then questioned as to the origin of some particular symptom - as to when it first appeared and what they remembered in that connection."58 Breuer and Freud were in this way making the first change to the means of individuation of pathogenic memories. Rather than hope to be in a position to exploit further fortuitous instances of auto-hypnoses, it was more practical to induce a state of hypnosis in the patient and then, with the patient in this state of hypnosis, question her as to the first appearance of the symptom. Once the patient recounted the memory of an experience that was followed by the disappearance of a particular symptom, they regarded that memory as the pathogen. In this way, they continued to avail of the therapeutic effect of the "talking cure" in order to 'spot' the pathogenic memory, but by replacing in a modular way the feature of auto-hypnosis with hypnosis induced by the physician. As far as Freud was concerned, however, this solution to the problem of finding a generalisable replacement for auto-hypnotism was not conclusive. It led to its own problems, as we shall now see, and effectively became the motor of change in Freud's thinking in this period by requiring further and further solutions.

3.2 Freud's Difficulties with Hypnotism

The element of hypnotism induced by the physician in the first revision of Breuer's method led Freud to encounter a serious problem. To an important degree, first of all, Freud's own personal failure as a hypnotist played a role in his decision to modify further, and independently of Breuer, Breuer's method. He openly refers to the deficiencies in his own skill as a hypnotist in his attempts to induce somnambulism as required by Breuer's method. He says:

When in 1889, I visited the Nancy clinics, I heard Dr Liébault, the *doyen* of hypnotism, say: 'If only we had the means of putting every patient into a state of somnambulism, hypnotic therapy would be the most

⁵⁷ II, 3.

powerful of all.' In Bernheim's clinic it almost seemed as though such an art really existed and as though it might be possible to learn it from Bernheim. But as soon as I tried to practise this art on my own patients, I discovered that my powers at least were subject to severe limits, and that if somnambulism were not brought about in a patient at the first three attempts I had no means of inducing it.⁵⁹

Freud's own difficulty with hypnotism, however, was due to more than the subjective reason of his own lack of prowess. There was a more serious difficulty in so far as what Breuer/Freud used hypnotism for was to induce a somnambulistic state in the patient, akin to the condition seconde witnessed in the case of Anna O. In the context of this requirement it appeared that Freud's own difficulty in inducing the state of hypnosis was an instance of a general feature of hypnosis. For, Breuer/Freud intended Breuer's method to be a general method, a method that would have been universally applicable for the treatment of hysteria. Yet, the tool of hypnotism itself did not seem to admit of universal employment for the treatment of hysteria, if its aim was considered to be that of inducing a somnambulistic state. The problem was not confined only to hysterical subjects. In the general population as well as in hysterical patients there was a range both of subjects who were hypnotizable and of the degree to which they were hypnotizable. Somnambulism in general could be induced only in a minority of cases. This did not matter for cures executed through imperative suggestion, such as carried out by the school of Nancy in which the symptom was 'commanded' by the physician not to reappear, and which could be successful in various degrees of hypnosis. It posed, however, a serious problem to generalising Breuer's method given that the role of utterance in the cure required the somnambulistic state for the arousal of latent memories. As a consequence, if somnambulism was not attainable in a generally anyway, there was little point in maintaining the means of trying to achieve such a state, namely hypnotism.

Freud also addresses the possibility that he might restrict the use of the Breuer's method to patients in the somnambulistic state, and not attempt to generalise it. In this regard, he states that he had begun to lose faith in the therapeutic success of Breuer's method, even if it *could* have been restricted to somnambulistic patients:

⁵⁸ III, 30. ⁵⁹ II, 108. I have become altogether sceptical about the value of hypnosis in facilitating cathartic treatments, since I have experienced instances in which during deep somnambulism there has been absolute therapeutic recalcitrance, where in other respects the patient has been perfectly obedient.⁶⁰

That is to say, Freud was beginning to lose faith in the *somnambulistic* state itself as a reliable means to the arousal of memories. As an illustration of this point, Freud cites the example of a patient on whom he had used Breuer's method and, in a state of somnambulism, asked "her to tell me what emotion had preceded the onset of her illness."⁶¹ She recounted the death of a young relative of hers, and Freud says, "This piece of information, however, produced no alteration in the whatever in her condition"⁶², contrary to what he had expected. In this particular case, Freud drops the use of Breuer's method and simply proposes to the patient in her normal state that something else had actually happened, and he gives us to understand that this approach had been partially successful though he could not pursue the case.

In this way, Freud began questioning the value of hypnotism, because it could not reliably induce the somnambulistic state, and then questioning the value of the somnambulistic state itself as a good means of arousal of the pathogenic memories presumed to be present. Breuer's method required the attainment of somnambulism; but Freud himself had discovered evidence that undermined the value of somnambulism in arousing memories. A question that is appropriate to ask is why did Freud continue to think that the memories *could* be aroused beyond the somnambulistic state at all? Why did he not drop the memory arousal component of Breuer's method completely as soon as difficulties the inducing of somnambulism became apparent, and effectively drop Breuer's method itself? For if the memories could no longer be aroused, and by doing so make the symptoms disappear, what evidence could Breuer's method have provided for an etiology of hysteria at all? Freud, it is true, had been very impressed with the discovery of Breuer's in the case of Anna O., to the extent that he was convinced that Breuer had discovered universal mental features. He writes, "The state of things which he had discovered seemed to me to be of so fundamental a nature that that I could not believe it could fail to be present in a single case of hysteria if it

⁶⁰ II, 284-285.

⁶¹ II, 100.

⁶² Ibid.

had been proved to occur in a single one.³⁶³ However, given that he accepted the Anna O. case as evidence for the etiology only in virtue of the fact that it instantiated the model form hypnotism, it seems fair to say that he maintained the etiology on the basis of the hypnotic experiments.

He explains the difficult position in which his decision to modify Breuer's method in such a way as to dispense with hypnosis for the purpose of questioning the patient left him. In *Studies On Hysteria*, he tells us that he had "needed hypnosis to extend their memory in order to find the pathogenic recollections which were not present in their ordinary consciousness."⁶⁴ He stresses that without hypnosis the means by which Breuer's method leads to the individuation of *pathogenic* memories by "the awakening of forgotten memories"⁶⁵ might be unusable. It seemed extremely doubtful as to whether Breuer's method could achieve its aim without inducing somnambulism, for it seemed that only in the somnambulistic state could the required extension of the patient's memory be achieved:

But in doing without somnambulism I might be depriving myself of a precondition without which the cathartic method seemed unusable. For that method clearly rested on the patients in their changed state of consciousness having access to memories and being able to recognise connections which appeared not to be present in their normal state of consciousness. If the somnambulistic extension of memory were absent there could also be no possibility of establishing any determining causes which the patient could present to the physician as something unknown to him (the patient).⁶⁶

Freud formulated his dilemma in the following formulaic manner: "The problem was, however, how to by-pass hypnosis and yet obtain the pathogenic recollections."⁶⁷ As part of this project, Hippolyte Bernheim's Latent Memory experiment offered Freud an alternative means of arousing latent memories.

⁶³ XX, 21.
⁶⁴ II, 267.
⁶⁵ II, 108.
⁶⁶ II, 109.
⁶⁷ II, 268.

3.3 Freud's Reliance on Bernheim's Latent Memory Experiment

In several sources, Freud refers to the following experiment of Hippolyte Bernheim's with regard to latent memory as having proved of value. Freud describes it in the case of Lucy R... He says,

I was saved from this new embarrassment by remembering that I had myself seen Bernheim producing evidence that the memories of events during somnambulism are only *apparently* forgotten in the waking state and can be revived by a mild word of command and a pressure with the hand intended to indicate a different state of consciousness. He had, for instance, given a woman in a state of somnambulism a negative hallucination to the effect that he was no longer present, and had then endeavoured to draw her attention to himself in a great variety of ways, including some of a decidedly aggressive kind. He did not succeed. After she had been woken up he asked her to tell him what he had done to her while she thought he was not there. She replied in surprise that she knew nothing of it. But he did not accept this. He insisted that she could remember everything and laid his hand on her forehead to help her to recall it. And lo and behold! She ended by describing everything that she had ostensibly not perceived during her somnambulism and ostensibly not remembered in her waking state.⁶⁸

Freud, it is noteworthy, emphasises the somnambulism of the subject in the experiment, and in this respect it offered a parallel with the somnambulism in hysterical patients while using Breuer's method. At the beginning of the case of Lucy R. in *Studies On Hysteria*, he tells us how this experiment offered him a means of retrieving pathogenic memories without hypnosis:

This astonishing and instructive experiment served as my model. I decided to start from the assumption that my patients knew everything that was of any pathogenic significance and that it was only a question of obliging them to communicate it.⁶⁹

Freud fails to mention that Bernheim had *himself* applied the same experiment to hysterics, and with apparent success. In fact, Bernheim used this experiment as a means of differential diagnosis. That is, as a means of distinguishing between hysterics and epileptics, in the face of the problem that hysterical symptoms often imitated epileptic ones and were known as 'epileptoid.'⁷⁰ If the memory of what had occurred during an apparently epileptic attack

⁶⁸ II, 109.

⁶⁹ II, 110.

⁷⁰ See Hippolyte Bernheim, Hypnotisme, Suggestion, Psychothérapie (1891). published by Fayard (1995), pp. 280-281.

could be evoked, then Bernheim knew that the attack had been hysterically epileptoid rather than epileptic. The importance of Bernheim's experiment for Freud, however, lay in the example it appeared to give that a special state of consciousness-a condition seconde-was not required for the arousal of latent memories, nor was a special technique required. That is, it was not necessary to induce a somnambulistic state to gain access to what the patient had been aware of in a somnambulistic state. To all intents and purposes, the somnambulistic state could be by-passed in the retrieval of memories. While it is true that in Bernheim's experiment the subject was initially put into a somnambulistic state and through the influence of the hypnotist underwent certain experiences, the somnambulistic state played no role in the recall of those experiences. It simply served as a means of implanting verifiable memories in the mind of the subject-thus issues of individuation were not a practical problem in the experimental setting-which could then be aroused non-somnambulistically, with the patient in the normal state of consciousness. The fact of the somnambulistic origin of the memories was, therefore, strictly incidental to their arousal, it was merely a convenient means of creating an experimental situation for the arousal of latent memories that were accessible in a somnambulistic state without inducing once again the somnambulistic state.

Freud set about taking Bernheim's experiment as his guide not only for the *theoretical* confirmation of the retrievability of apparently irretrievable memories that it suggested, but also in terms of the *practical* methods used to retrieve the pathogenic memories. He tells us how he set about treating his patients by following Bernheim's example in the experiment: "I proceeded as follows. I placed my hand on the patient's forehead or took her head between my hands and said 'you will think of it under the pressure of my hand.²⁰⁷¹ Freud varied his approach by exhorting, insisting that the patient remember the memories in question, aided perhaps by the trick of placing a hand on the patient's forehead. Freud's practical attitude was that latent memories had to be aroused to effect therapy and that he would use whatever he could to achieve his ends. Thus, within the context of these methods he would pragmatically jump from one to another he considered to have a greater chance of success. Sometimes he would order the patient to lie down, sometimes he would call for concentration and so forth. These

⁷¹ II, 110. an eve that is caper for deleter

methods he referred to as tricks for taking the patient's 'ego' unawares. There was, clearly, nothing intrinsically valuable about any of these methods. For example, Freud, referring to his 'pressure technique' states: "I am of course aware that a pressure on the forehead like this could be replaced by any other signal or by some other exercise of psychical influence on the patient."⁷² As one of these tricks, the technique of free association emerged in the case of Emmy Von N. by her letting her mind wander as she recounted her memories to Freud. Clearly, then, these methods were not exclusive of further possible developments. The culmination of Freud's jumping from one to the other of these "tricks" was to take a step *further* than Bernheim and engage in a conversation with the patient and arouse the pathogenic memory by questioning the patient in the normal state.

but the particulation 3.4 The Emergence of Common-Sense Psychology

Bernheim's Latent Memory experiment had shown in principle that latent memories could be retrieved by means of the 'tricks', and given that the pathogen for hysteria was a latent memory it could be taken as evidence in principle that the pathogens could be retrieved. However, outside the experimental situation how could Freud identify the pathogenic memory amongst the various memories that he was arousing. That is, nothing but a crude lesson about individuation of the pathogen followed from Bernheim's experiment. In the clinical situation, unlike the experimental situation, Freud did not have the benefit of stipulating the memory to be induced to utterance, and then using the earlier stipulation as a criterion for the correct individuation of the memory. An important part of his solution was to view the symptom in relation to the patient's recounting of memories aroused by the conversation in the terms of common-sense psychology. Having relied on experiments in hypnotism to establish the etiology, and to have provided a means of arousing the pathogenic memories. Freud was now taking the all-important step of introducing common-sense psychology as part of the means of individuating the pathogenic memory. As we will presently see, this aspect blossomed to amount by itself to his method. For the time being, let us continue to follow his progression from his first introduction of common-sense psychology, and by follow the menores back as Breact had in the case of Anna (1 in her asks

⁷² II, 270-271. Freud also says, "The procedure by pressure is no more than a trick for temporarily taking unawares an ego that is eager for defence" (II, 278).

In those cases of the *Studies On Hysteria* in which he moves beyond hypnotism and uses questions as part of a conversation to arouse memories, it quickly becomes evident that Freud is judging the material that he arouses by means of the Bernheim-inspired approach in a common-sense psychological way. What comes to the fore in the case, for example, of Elisabeth Von R. is a mixture of common-sense psychological analysis with the Bernheimean methods, as evidenced in the comment that in her case that if "by a question or by pressure upon her head I called up a memory...."73 Common-sense psychology informed Freud's questions that accompanied his insisting and urging. In fact, by means of his common-sense psychological analysis Freud allowed himself to predict where the treatment was heading and this lay at the root of his questioning, guiding it. In one instance, for example, he says: "It had inevitably become clear to me long since what all this was about; but the patient, deep in her bitter sweet memories, seemed not to notice the end to which she was steering....⁷⁷⁴ So by using Bernheim's methods in conjunction with questioning, it seemed that Freud was able to arrive at the memory of a scene that could in the light of the patient's motives render her symptoms understandable as a reaction to that scene. The case of Elisabeth Von R. was another example. In that case, the symptom of pains in her legs was understood by Freud as a memory of standing beside her sister's death-bed and thinking of her sister's husband as free to marry again. However, a problem loomed up on the horizon for the use of this approach.

In his new common-sense questioning approach, unfortunately, the problem of individuation was complicated by a phenomenon that Freud characterised as the problem of 'resistance'. The patients did not respond very readily to his questions; Elisabeth Von R., for one, was not keen to admit what had crossed her mind regarding her sister's husband as her sister lay dying. This difficulty was general, and it meant that it was very difficult to arrive at the pathogenic memory by means of questioning. Freud, in one instance, tells us of the "resistance with which she had repeatedly met the reproduction of the scenes...."75 The trade-off in terms of resistance for the freedom from hypnotism was plain; Freud could not straightforwardly follow the memories back as Breuer had in the case of Anna O. in her auto-

 ⁷³ II, 148. (Emphasis added)
 ⁷⁴ II, 156.

⁷⁵ II, 157.

hypnoses, or as in induced somnambulism. Now, his common-sense probing was faced with the patient's unwillingness to answer his questions, or communicate to him the content of the memories that may have been aroused. Initially confronted with this problem, Freud defined the work of the therapist in a Bernheimean way as an attempt to arouse the latent memories by force:

The task of the therapist, therefore, lies in overcoming by his psychical work this resistance to association. He does this in the first place by 'insisting', by making use of psychical compulsion to direct the patient's association to the ideational traces of which he is in search. His efforts, however, are not exhausted by this, but as I shall show, they take on other forms in the course of an analysis and call in other psychical forces to assist them.⁷⁶

He tells us that he had to insist in order to overcome this kind of unwillingness to remember that manifested itself in his patients. The insistence, he tells us "involved effort on my part" and "the situation led me at once to the theory that *by means of my psychical work I had to overcome a psychical force in the patient's which was opposed to the pathogenic ideas becoming conscious (being remembered).*"⁷⁷

The way chosen by Freud of getting around the patient's unwillingness was to interpret the fluctuations and inconsistencies in the patient's story according to the standards of common-sense psychological motivation. The basis of this approach was to use the principle of demanding adequate common-sense psychological motivation from the interpretee in order to individuate parts of what they had recounted as resistance. The starting point for this approach is that the patient must not be treated as 'just crazy' owing to some neurophysiological dysfunction. Making this point, Freud says:

In carrying out this work we must of course keep free from the theoretical prejudice that we are dealing with the abnormal brains of '*dégénérés*' and '*dèséquilibrés*', who are at liberty, owing to a stigma, to throw overboard the common psychological laws that govern the connection of ideas and in whom one chance idea may become exaggeratedly intense for no motive and another may remain indestructible for no psychological reason.⁷⁸

⁷⁶ II, 270. ⁷⁷ II, 268. ⁷⁸ II, 294. A consequence of this is that the interpreter must not accept motives that would in an everyday context normally be considered feeble:

But if we examine with a critical eye the account that the patient has given us without much trouble or resistance, we shall quite infallibly discover gaps and imperfections in it. At one point the train of thought will be visibly interrupted and patched up by the patient as best he may, with a turn of speech or an inadequate explanation, at another point we come upon a motive which would have to be described as a feeble one in a normal person.⁷⁹

This approach was based on his assumption that the standards of motivation attributed to normal individuals must also be attributed to hysterics. He says:

For we may make the same demands for logical connection and sufficient motivation in a train of thought, even if it extends into the unconscious from an hysterical patient, as we should from a normal individual. It is not within the power of a neurosis to relax these relations.⁸⁰

The presence of gaps and imperfections as the patient ostensibly complies with the interpreter's request to answer his questions is then identified by applying common-sense psychology, given that a train of thought cannot *but* measure up to the standards of common-sense psychology.

Secondly, apart from the individuation of these gaps, if there is a gap, Freud fills it in by means of common-sense psychology. That is to say, Freud infers that there must be a *reason* for it, a reason that is explicable in terms of common-sense psychology. Just as, that is to say, in everyday life strange behaviour is explained not by assuming that the person in question is crazy, but that they have some undisclosed motive for their actions. For example, Freud says:

If the chains of ideas in neurotic and particularly in hysterical patients produce a different impression, if in them the relative intensity of different ideas seems inexplicable by psychological determinants alone, we have already found out the reason for this and can attribute it to *the existence of hidden unconscious motives*. We may thus suspect the presence of such secret motives wherever a breach of this kind in a train of thought is apparent or when the force ascribed by the patient to his motives goes far beyond the normal.

Thirdly, Freud holds that this common-sense psychological approach is justified by the coherency in the patient's behaviour that it leads the interpreter to discern. He tells us that "experience shows that the contrary is true of hysteria"⁸² and success is achieved once the data constituted by the patients account has, by the positing of unconscious motives where necessary, been fitted together in a manner appropriate to the 'common psychological laws'. He says:

Once we have discovered the concealed motives, which have often remained unconscious, and have taken them into account, nothing that is puzzling or contrary to rule remains in hysterical connections of thought, any more than in normal ones.⁸³

3.5 Freud's Compass

Freud was not however using common-sense psychological criteria such as coherency of explanation, or 'fit', *alone* as a means of judging that the pathogen had been individuated. The criteria by which one could *tell* that the pathogenic memory had been individuated still included—for the time being at least—the behaviour of the symptom. That is, while the common-sense interpretations served to rationalize the symptoms by showing them as motivated in the light of the hidden memory of a traumatic event, such a rationalization *could not be correct while the symptom persisted*.⁸⁴ Immediate symptom removal, as we note, was obstructed by resistance on the part of the patient, which Freud handled like so: the persistence of the symptom was taken by Freud as a sign that the scene that would lie at the bottom of the correct rationalization had not *yet* been uttered. For example, in the case of Lucy R, the hysterical symptoms include strange smells experienced by the patient despite an

⁸¹ II, 293.

⁸² II, 294.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ The sense of 'rationalization' intended here is that of Donald Davidson's. Davidson says, "What is the relation between a reason and an action when the reason explains the action by giving the agent's reason for doing what he did? We may call such explanations *rationalizations*, and say that the reason *rationalizes* the action. ...A reason rationalizes an action only if it leads us to see something the agent saw, or thought he saw, in his action—some feature, consequence, or aspect of the action the agent wanted, desired, prized, held dear, thought dutiful, beneficial obligatory or agreeable." "Actions, Reasons, and Causes", in *Essays on Actions and*

organic loss of the sense of smell. Freud focuses his interpretation upon the smell of burnt pudding, and pursues in this symptom in the patient's recounting to a scene firstly where she had been playing with children. The symptom of the smell of burnt pudding then is replaced by the smell of cigar smoke. This leads back to a scene with the chief accountant of the family in which there had been cigar smoke and her employer had shouted at the chief accountant not to kiss the children. This scene in turn led to a scene where an old lady had visited the children and kissed them upon leaving. After she had gone, the employer had directed his fury at Lucy R because she had let the children be kissed. So we might say that the smell of burnt pudding has stuck in her memory because it reminds her of the scene with the cigar smoke, which in turn reminds her of the scene in which her employer had shouted at her. Why should that scene be so important? If she had been in love with her employer, it would mean that he had crushed her hopes. It had thus been painful and accordingly stuck in her memory. In this way, common-sense psychology is used to infer this pathogenic scene, and it is kept on the right track so to speak by the persistence of the symptom at each step of the way indicating that we have not yet reached the pathogenic memory by means of the rationalization. With the disappearance of the symptom at the end of the case, we are no longer obliged to recognise our rationalization as definitely incomplete. The rationalization then provides positive grounds for thinking that it is correct or, more precisely, that the pathogenic memory of the traumatic scene has been individuated. Freud says of this case in his discussion, "I am tempted to regard it as a model instance of one particular type of hysteria, namely the form of this illness which can be acquired even by a person of sound heredity, as a result of appropriate experiences."85 Let us now examine in more detail how the persistence of the symptom guided Freud in his rendering the symptom intelligible, or Freud's Compass.

Freud tells us that, while making inferences of a common-sense psychological nature to individuate the pathogenic memory, he used the persistence of the symptom as his 'compass.' It was an instrument that guided him in his attempt to reach the pathogenic scene by the attribution of hidden motives to the patient. This is explicitly stated in the case of

Events, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1980, p. 3 (The emphasis is Davidson's, and his spelling is followed above). ⁸⁵ II, 122.

Elisabeth Von R. with regard to the symptom of the pains in her legs. Freud says, "her painful legs began to 'join in the conversation' during our analyses."⁸⁶ The 'conversation' in question leads back to a scene where she had stood beside her sister's death-bed and thought of her sister's husband that he was free and so she could now become his wife. This thought that had occurred to her was repugnant, on Freud's inference, to her "whole moral being."⁸⁷ Since that moment, her legs had become painful because they served as a reminder of the 'standing beside the bed' that had featured in the death-bed scene. Freud says of the way he dealt with the pains in this 'conversation' with his 'compass':

I came in time to use such pains as a compass to guide me; if she stopped talking but admitted that she still had a pain, I knew that she had not told me everything, and insisted on her continuing her story till the pain had been talked away.⁸⁸

The fact that criteria of individuation of the pathogenic memory in Freud's thought had changed from Breuer's method, in virtue of the growing role of common-sense psychological attributions to the patient, becomes evident at this juncture. In the case of Anna O., what Breuer had discovered was the conjunction of the utterance U with the removal of the symptom S, or ~ S. The etiology put forward in "Preliminary Communication", influenced by the hypnotic experiments, pointed to the non-uttered memory as a necessary condition of the symptom rather than a sufficient one, that is to say, ~ U is a necessary condition of S. In other words, \sim (\sim U) $\rightarrow \sim$ S. By dropping the double negation, we have U $\rightarrow \sim$ S, the successful case of treatment. By modus tolens, this becomes $\sim \sim S \rightarrow \sim U$. Again, by dropping the double negation, we have $S \rightarrow -U$. That is, the presence of the symptom implies that the utterance of the pathogenic memory has not occurred. In the passage of text quoted above in which he makes the analogy with a compass, we find that this is the interpretative rule that Freud is using to individuate the pathogenic memory. It is this that Freud refers to as his 'compass': the presence of the symptom, S implying that not everything has been told, or ~ U. Expanding on his point, Freud in this vein says, "A picture which refuses to disappear is one which still calls for consideration, a thought that cannot be dismissed is one that needs to

⁸⁶ II, 148.

⁸⁷ II, 157.

⁸⁸ II, 148.

be pursued further."⁸⁹ That is, if a thought continues, it implies that the memory has not been uttered, or the presence of the symptom implies that the utterance has not been made. It should be noted that this formulation does not mean that it can be inferred once the symptom disappears that the correct utterance has been made, which would be ~ $S \rightarrow U$. Rather, it simply asserts that once the symptom persists then the right utterance has not been made. This more conservative formulation leaves room for the conjunction of an interpretation and the accidental retrieval of the pathogenic memory. That is, it allows the interpretation offered of the symptoms by the interpreter in the manner of Freud's Compass to be completely wide of the mark, but to perhaps remind the interpretee of something connected with the pathogenic scene. In such a case, with the disappearance of the symptom, it would seem to the interpreter that the interpretation was correct. However, the disappearance of the symptom is not due to the interpretation, but to the utterance of the memory. So, the possibility that the interpreter could be misled in this way cannot be excluded. Overall, let us sum up by saying that the interpretation has the status of an inference to the best explanation once the symptom disappears, but the disappearance of the symptom is not due to it. As a consequence, a correct interpretation is not a necessary condition of the disappearance of the symptom.

4. Pathogen-Individuation by Common-Sense Psychology: "The Aetiology of Hysteria"

In general terms, Freud's article of 1896, "The Aetiology of Hysteria", constitutes a major shift in his method of pathogen-individuation. It is no longer the case that the absence of therapeutic success in terms of symptom removal is relied on in the clinical setting as a criterion in the individuation of the pathogenic memory. Rather, in this paper therapeutic success cannot be achieved without an accurate interpretation—an accurate interpretation is thus a necessary though not a sufficient condition of symptom removal.⁹⁰ Accordingly, an

⁸⁹ II, 296.

⁹⁰ This is to state Freud's case a little more starkly than he does. For he talks about therapeutic 'gain' and therapeutic 'evidence' rather than outright therapeutic success in terms of symptom removal. The point could fussily be made that to say the fulfilment of the two interpretative criteria under discussion is a necessary condition of therapeutic success is not the same as saying that a complete correct interpretation is a necessary condition of therapeutic success in terms of symptom removal. Strictly speaking, maybe not, but it seems implicit—why else would Freud put so much weight on it with the jig-saw puzzle argument and describe the network of inferences and associations illustrated by the jigsaw as indispensable?

accurate interpretation will not automatically result in the removal of symptoms because an interpretation may well be correct while the symptom persists. This means that, unlike the use of Freud's Compass, the absence of therapeutic success cannot be taken as a sign that the interpretation is inaccurate.

4.1 Freud's Rejection of the Behaviour of the Symptom as a Guide to Interpretation

Whereas previously Freud had held with the 'compass' that the presence of the symptom indicated that the interpretation was not accurate, this is no longer the case. The diminished role which symptom removal plays in his new approach is indicated when Freud refers to therapeutic evidence in a number of cases, yet he is nonetheless sanguine about the accuracy of interpretation in those cases where it is lacking, and presumably the symptoms persist. In fact, he puts therapeutic 'evidence' forward as an additional criterion, that he does not particularly want to stress. He says, "Without wishing to lay special stress on the point, I will add that in a number of cases therapeutic evidence of the genuineness of the infantile scenes can also be brought forward."91 Therapeutic success is discussed in terms of its necessary conditions, which happen also to be the necessary conditions of an accurate interpretation. He says, "Tracing a hysterical symptom back to a traumatic scene assists our understanding only if the scene satisfies two conditions."92 That is, the interpretation is inaccurate in so far as it fails to satisfy both of the two new interpretative criteria of suitability as a determinant and necessary traumatic force. Also, as a consequence in such cases therapeutic success-or as he more weakly says 'gain'— is impossible:

When our procedure leads, as in the cases described above, to findings which are insufficient as an explanation both in respect of their suitability as determinants and to their traumatic effectiveness, we also fail to secure any therapeutic gain; the patient retains his symptoms unaltered.⁹³

But if these two interpretative conditions are also necessary conditions of therapeutic success, and if therapeutic success is taken to mean symptom removal, then shouldn't a similarity with Breuer's method regarding using symptom-removal as a guide follow anyway independently of Freud's apparent sanguinity regarding alternative grounds for individuating

- ⁹¹ III, 206. ⁹² III, 193.

⁹³ III, 195.

the pathogenic memory? In the new case, then, we have the satisfaction of the interpretative criteria I as a necessary condition of the removal of the symptom S. That is, we have I as a necessary condition of ~ S, or ~ I \rightarrow ~ (~S). This in turn allows us to infer ~ I \rightarrow S, by dropping the double negation. Once again, this allows us to infer $\sim S \rightarrow \sim \sim I$, or $\sim S \rightarrow I$. In other words, if the symptom is removed, we can infer that the interpretation is correct. That is, an instance of symptom removal indicates the satisfaction of the interpretative criteria, though the interpretation may be correct while the symptom remains. But this would be to simply continue to use symptom removal as a guide to the individuation of the pathogenic memory, even though the logic is different to the case of Freud's Compass. Now it is that the disappearance of the symptom positively tells us that the interpretation is correct, whereas in the case of Freud's Compass the persistence of the symptom told us that the pathogenic memory had not yet been uttered. Nonetheless, in each case, we depend on the behaviour of the symptom to guide us in our search for the pathogen. Yet, in "The Aetiology of Hysteria" Freud's sanguinity indicates that we know when the interpretative criteria are satisfied somehow independently of symptom removal. He then in fact explicitly warns us against drawing this parallel with Breuer's method. For, referring to later scenes that appear to satisfy the two interpretative criteria, and are backed up by symptom removal Freud states:

You might suppose that the rare instances in which the analysis is able to trace the symptom back direct to a traumatic scene that is thoroughly suitable as a determinant and possess traumatic force, and is able, by thus tracing it back, at the same time to remove it (in the way described in Breuer's case history of Anna O.) – you might suppose that such instances must, after all, constitute powerful objections to the general validity of the proposition I have just put forward.⁹⁴

This is an acknowledgement on Freud's part of the fact that his own position, in terms of $\sim S \rightarrow I$, like Breuer's method seems to be still relying on the behaviour of the symptom to individuate the pathogenic memory:

I must assure you that I have the best grounds for assuming that even in such instances there exists a chain of operative memories which stretches far back behind the first traumatic scene, *even though* the reproduction of the latter alone may have the result of removing the symptom.⁹⁵

⁹⁴ III, 197. ⁹⁵ Ibid. Freud goes on to refer to just the kind of cases in which we might be tempted to treat the disappearance of the symptom as an indication that the interpretation was correct: "In the former cases, we are not, I believe, secure against relapses."⁹⁶ He is warning us against making the above inference because he calls into question the permanence, and thus the veracity, of symptom removal.

With his warning, Freud seems to acknowledge that it is reasonable that we should accept symptom removal as a guide to the individuation of the pathogen. However, what Freud implies is that there is some further reason that counts against the making of inferences based on the behaviour of the symptom. This holds equally whether you take the reasoning of his 'compass' or the reasoning implicit in his claim regarding the standing of his two new criteria as necessary conditions because each of them relies on the permanent removal of the symptom in one way or another. In "The Aetiology of Hysteria", that is to say, Freud no longer believes that symptom removal can be relied upon; it very often only seems to occur, and it seems to occur because of the problem of suggestion. If inferences based on the removal of the symptom are not reliable, then if you still believe in the etiological role of traumatic memories-as Freud does from Charcot's and Bernheim's experiments-you are going to need some other way to pick them out. Freud seems to have thought methods relying on symptom-removal didn't work because they amounted to a symptomatic approach that was contaminated by suggestion. He appears to have thought he would go for a *causal* treatment that would not be reliant upon mere symptom disappearance to individuate the pathogenic memory, but nonetheless once it pinpointed the cause then some therapeutic success in terms of symptom removal would be expected to follow. Indeed, Freud coyly does not equate therapeutic success with symptom removal in this paper. This line of thought seems to be what he has in mind with the reference to where-circumstances-permitted therapeutic success: that he achieved therapeutic success that bore on the symptoms without using the symptoms as a guide to the accuracy of his interpretation. He says:

If you submit my assertion that the aetiology of hysteria lies in sexual life to the strictest examination, you will find that it is supported by the fact that in some eighteen cases of hysteria I have been able to discover

⁹⁶ III, 206.

this connection in every single symptom, and, where the circumstances allowed, to confirm it by therapeutic success.⁹⁷

In Freud's view, one never could be sure of the status of symptom S because of suggestion. Accordingly, there was no point in basing inferences upon S. So, to circumvent this difficulty, Freud thought he would come up with a new way of individuating the pathogenic memory that operated not by addressing the symptoms in terms of their removal. He decided to put the emphasis on making sense of them, rather than on removing them, in the hope that by making sense of them their removal would indirectly follow. In order for the two interpretative criteria to be sufficient for individuation of the pathogenic memory, their mere fulfilment is no guarantee that a pathogenic memory-an infantile scene-has been individuated. Rather, as we shall presently see, Freud's answer was to say that they must be applied holistically, and this criterion is articulated by the jig-saw puzzle precisely with regard to the genuineness of the scenes. This context would seem to indicate that the problem of suggestion weighed upon Freud's mind as he made the shift from his Compass, in which the behaviour of the symptom played a role, to his jig-saw puzzle approach in which it played no role. This, of course, dovetails with Freud's many attempts to use the overall coherency of an interpretation as grounds against the influence of suggestion, which he first uses incidentally in the Studies On Hysteria.

4.2 The Common-Sense Nature of the Two Necessary Criteria of Correct Interpretation

It clear that both of the interpretative critreia are straightforwardly common-sensical from the examples, rather than a "verbal explanation"⁹⁸, with which Freud prefers to articulate them. They are, furthermore, informed by experiences. That is, they are two criteria for the justification or otherwise of a reaction *to an event*. In the example of hysterical vomiting, a suitable cause—"we have been able to understand its *causation*"⁹⁹—is "an experience which *justifiably produced a high amount of disgust*—for instance, the sight of a decomposing dead body."¹⁰⁰ This symptom of vomiting would possess suitability as a determinant as a reaction to such an experience. While an experience that would not be appropriate to the symptom of

- ⁹⁷ III, 199.
- ⁹⁸ III, 193.
- ⁹⁹ III, 194.
- 100 Ibid.

vomiting would be if "the analysis shows us that the vomiting comes from a great fright, e.g. from a railway accident."¹⁰¹ In this case, while the necessary traumatic force would appear to be present, the suitability as a determinant is lacking. As an example of the other kind of "insufficient explanation"¹⁰², Freud illustrates the notion of traumatic force by means of an example that would not be in proportion to it to it: "eating a fruit which had partly gone bad. Here, it is true, the vomiting *is* determined by disgust, but we cannot understand how, in this instance, the disgust could have become so powerful as to be perpetuated in a hysterical symptom: the experience lacks traumatic force."¹⁰³ From his use of these examples in his explanation of the criteria, it would seem that Freud expects us to recognise straightaway the kind of appropriateness or intelligibility involved; this is a sign that he is presuming an acquaintance on the part of the reader with it through common-sense psychology. In turn, this points to the common-sense nature of these interpretative criteria. In fact, at the end of "The Aetiology of Hysteria", Freud presents a common-sense psychological example to explain his approach. He says:

You will remember the mental 'sensitiveness' which is so frequent among hysterical patients and which leads them to react to the least sign of being deprecated as tough they had received a deadly insult. What would you feel, now, if you were to observe this high degree of readiness to feel hurt on the slightest occasion, if you came across it between two normal people, a husband and wife, perhaps? You would certainly infer that the conjugal scene you had witnessed was not solely the result of this latest trifling occasion, but that inflammable material had been building up for a long time and that the whole heap of it had been set alight by the final provocation.¹⁰⁴

Freud ask the reader to "carry this line of thinking over on to hysterical patients" in order to understand how "The reaction of hysterics is only apparently exaggerated; it is bound to appear exaggerated to us because we only know a small part of the motives from which it arises."¹⁰⁵

¹⁰¹ III, 194.
¹⁰² Ibid.
¹⁰³ Ibid.
¹⁰⁴ III, 217.
¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

It would seem, then, that the discovery of the infantile sexual scenes is arrived at by means of more and more common-sense inferences about the material obtained by the memory-arousal techniques, of which free association is the one chiefly dealt with in "The Aetiology of Hysteria." Freud attempts to understand infantile scenes in so far as he understands them to be suitable determinants, possessing the necessary traumatic force, of the adult symptom. Thus, he is applying common-sense psychology in a developmental manner to explain the motivational effect of infantile experiences upon the adult hysteric. It is by proceeding according to the common-sense criteria that the sexual, and indeed infantile, scenes are reached by the interpreter. This is the substantive conclusion to this process: "Whatever case and whatever symptom we take as our point of departure, *in the end we infallibly come to the field of sexual experience*."¹⁰⁶ Freud says that he pushes on past the "first-discovered scene"¹⁰⁷ that comes to light—if it is "unsatisfactory"¹⁰⁸, as he implies generally it invariably is—he tells the patient "that behind it there must be hidden a more significant, earlier, experience."¹⁰⁹ By proceeding in this manner, he arrives "in every instance"¹¹⁰ at the recollecting of scenes of the required "character."¹¹¹

4.3 The Criterion of a Correct Interpretation: The Common-Sense Criteria Holistically Applied

It is the above criteria that Freud uses as he sets about "tracing an hysterical symptom back to a traumatic scene."¹¹² The satisfaction of these two criteria is not sufficient to individuate the pathogenic memory, as he points out in connection with what he regards as merely 'occasioning traumas'. With regard to these scenes, he says:

¹⁰⁶ III, 199.

¹⁰⁷ III, 195.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ III, 195-196.

¹¹⁰ III, 196.

¹¹¹ Ibid. In the course of his discussion of what he acknowledges is a fictional example of hysterical vomiting, Freud allows the two criteria to be satisfied by the combinination of two different memories. This would seem to be a poor example by which to illustrate his method for several reasons. It allows the criteria to be satisfied in a stipulative manner; it is acknowledged as fictitious and does not correspond to Freud's practice *except* in cases of phantasy; it is not compatible with the jig-saw puzzle analogy advanced in the same paper in which *one* piece fits all of the puzzle together. It is probably the first bearing of his view of phantasy in terms of compound memories bearing on his approach to interpretation, but he does not pursue this topic in this paper. This paper is indeed generally recognised as Freud's last espousal of his belief in the reality of the infantile scenes before he began to view them in terms of phantasy. However, this view of his on the combination of memories resurfaces in the case of 'the Wolf Man' as his explanation of phantasy.

Either the scene to which we are led by analysis and in which the symptom first appeared seems to us unsuited for determining the symptom, in that its content bears no relation to the nature of the symptom; or the allegedly traumatic experience, though it *does* have a relation to the symptom, proves to be an impression which is normally innocuous and incapable as a rule of producing any effect; or, lastly, the 'traumatic scene' leaves us in the lurch in both respects, appearing at once innocuous and unrelated to the character of the hysterical symptom¹¹³

The two criteria must be applied on the basis of integrating all of the data of the *whole* case history rather than simply one, or a certain amount, of symptoms or aspects of the patient's behaviour such as in the case of these occasioning trauma. This becomes evident with the jig-saw puzzle analogy, which Freud puts forward as the major part of his defence of the reality of the infantile scenes. As part of his defence of their reality, Freud articulates the grounds on which the interpreter is sure of the correct individuation of a scene. He illustrates the way in which the interpretative criteria act fit together *all* of the data provided by the patient's recounting and association in conversation. By application to all of the data, they lead to a scene in the light of which all of the data are intelligible. Freud's claim is that these key scenes are invariably infantile scenes:

But another and stronger proof of this is furnished by the relationships of the infantile scenes to the content of the whole of the rest of the case history. It is exactly like putting together a child's picture puzzle: after many attempts we become absolutely certain in the end which piece belongs in the empty gap; for only that one piece fills out the picture and at the same time allows its irregular edges to be fitted into the edges of the other pieces in such a manner as to leave no free space and to entail no overlapping.¹¹⁴

That is to say, the 'pieces' of memories are fitted together in such a way that all of them cohere, in the manner of a jig-saw puzzle. They are fitted together by the two common-sense psychological interpretative criteria, holistically applied, and this invariably leads to infantile scenes as the piece that fills the last remaining gap in the puzzle. Freud tells us that "the contents of the individual scenes turn out to be indispensable supplements to the associative and logical framework of the neurosis, whose insertion makes its course of development for

¹¹² III, 193.

¹¹³ III, 194.

¹¹⁴ III, 205.

the first time evident, or even, as we might say, self-evident.¹¹⁵ The reference to "logical framework of the neurosis"¹¹⁶ in this paper would seem to be Freud's way of referring to the earlier-referred to "common psychological laws" by which the hidden motives are uncovered and ensure that "nothing that is puzzling or contrary to rule remains in hysterical connections of thought.¹¹⁷

Freud's discussion of the employment of free association, the memory-arousal technique of letting one's mind wander that he had come across in the case of Emmy Von N. is subject to a caveat. He makes the following comment in his analysis of directing the patient's attention to the "associative thread"¹¹⁸ that connects "the two memories—the one that has been discovered and the one that has still to be discovered"¹¹⁹ in his pursuit, discussed above, of a memory with the correct "character."¹²⁰ He says:

I purposely leave out of this discussion the question of what the category is to which the association between the two memories belong, (whether it is an association by simultaneity, or by causal connections or by similarity of content), and of what psychological character is to be attributed to the various 'memories' (conscious or unconscious).¹²¹

Freud presents a further analogy, the genealogical tree analogy, to show us how association is employed in the individuation of the pathogenic memory. He outlines an obvious problem in following the patient's memories back in association, the apparent arbitrariness of the procedure:

We must rather ask ourselves: where shall we get to if we follow the chains of associated memories which the analysis has uncovered? How far do they extend? Do they come anywhere to a natural end? Do they perhaps lead to experiences which are in some way alike, either in their content or the time of life at which they occur, so that we may discern in these universally similar factors the aetiology of hysteria of which we are in search?¹²²

¹¹⁵ III, 205.
¹¹⁶ Ibid.
¹¹⁷ II, 294.
¹¹⁸ III, 196.
¹¹⁹ Ibid.
¹²⁰ Ibid.
¹²¹ III, 196. ft.
¹²² III, 197-198.

He also draws our attention to the complexities to which the following-back can lead, that not only do the chains appear arbitrary, but they begin to run into one another:

If we take a case which presents several symptoms, we arrive by means of the analysis, starting from each symptom, at a series of experiences the memories of which are linked together in association. To begin with, the chains memories lead backwards separately from one another; but, as I have said, they ramify...Indeed, a comparison with the genealogical tree of a family whose members have also intermarried is not at all a bad one.¹²³

The chains of associations ramify, leading to "nodal points"¹²⁴, in which experiences belong to memories relating to different symptoms. However, they separate again. If they are pursued, it is found that the chains lead to a nodal point of a different kind, which provides a single perspective from which all of the material under interpretation becomes intelligible. In these nodal points "the separate associative chains converge"¹²⁵, and "we find experiences from which two or more symptoms have proceeded; one chain has attached itself to one detail of the scene, the second chain to another detail."¹²⁶ It is thus by following the associations to a scene that offers a holistic perspective on the material that association serves to individuate the pathogen in the context of the whole case, of all of the members and their intermarriages.

5. The Possibility of Applying the Interpretative Method to Dream-Interpretation.

5.1 Grünbaum's Objection to Freud's Use of his Method for Dream-Interpretation

If Freud had held that symptom removal was an indispensable criterion for the individuation of the pathogenic memory, then certain problems would have arisen for his application of his method of interpretation to dreams. If interpretation in the field of the psycho-neuroses had continued to depend on the removal of symptoms, then it is inescapable that the same methods used in treating the dream like a symptom would have required the removal of *something* as a parallel to the removal of the symptom. If they were to have a criterion for their accurate application, that is to say, it would have involved the disappearance, in some form, of dreams. Our claim of the occurrence of a shift in Freud's

¹²³ III, 198.
¹²⁴ Ibid.
¹²⁵ III, 199.
¹²⁶ Ibid.

method with "The Aetiology of Hysteria" avoids this difficulty. The shift to the application of the two interpretative criteria in an holistic manner, with the decision that symptom removal is not a reliable guide to the accuracy of an interpretation, relieves us of it. It means that the issue of a therapeutic corollary in order to arrive at the correct interpretation of a dream does not even arise. However, it is nonetheless instructive to consider this issue in the light of Adolf Grünbaum's criticism of Freud's application of the method of interpretation to dreams.

So let us consider the problem that might be understood to occur with the following declaration of Freud's. He says, "It was in the course of these psychoneurotic studies that I came upon dream-interpretation ... It was then only a short step to treating the dream itself as a symptom and to applying to dreams the same method of interpretation that had been worked out for symptoms."¹²⁷ The discussion of Freud's theory of dreams put forward by Grünbaum in his book Validations in the Clinical Theory of Psychoanalysis brings up some of the difficulties that apparently surround this claim. Grünbaum's account addresses the possible justification of this application of the interpretative method to dreams, based on a theoretical assimilation of dreams and symptoms inspired by this comment of Freud's. This theoretical assimilation amounts to providing a theory of the determinants of dreaming, in virtue of assimilating dreams to neurotic symptoms and adopting the theory of the determinants of neurotic symptoms. The falsification of this to-all-intents-and-purposes theory of dreaming thus questions the initial theoretical assimilation, and without the theoretical assimilation it does not seem that there can be any other justification for applying the same method of interpretation to dreams. Given such an eventuality, Freud's short step would be blocked.¹²⁸

Grünbaum sets out to show that an observationally false claim follows logically from the dream-theory resulting from adopting the theory of the determinants of neurotic symptoms, and thus undermine the initial assimilation. That observationally false claim is that patients

¹²⁷ V, 100-101.

¹²⁸ Grünbaum is right to demand a justification for the application of Freud's method of interpretation to dreams. Here, we dispute not this demand, but the particular casting of it in therapeutic terms. Our proposal,

whose dreams have been successfully interpreted undergo a reduction in dreaming-the equivalent to the removal of the symptom. The falsity of this claim in Grünbaum's view constitutes a disconfirmation of the theory that-on Grünbaum's reading of the theory of the determinants of neurotic symptoms-holds that repressed infantile wishes are a necessary condition for the formation of dreams. The theory is disconfirmed because one of the necessary conditions for the formation of dreams according to Grünbaum's reading of Freud's theory—infantile wishes in a state of repression—is removed by psychoanalytic interpretation yet there is no diminution in the dreaming experienced by dream-interpretees in psychoanalytic treatment. So it seems that either repressed infantile wishes are not one of the necessary conditions for dream-formation, or they are but free association is not capable of individuating them. So either the dream-theory is wrong or at the very least Freud's interpretative method employing free association fails generally as a means of identifying infantile wishes by "lifting etiologic repressions."¹²⁹ When it comes to dreams, Grünbaum's point is that, given the 'falsity' of the parallel dream-theory, Freud has no grounds for assimilating dreams to symptoms, and thus no grounds for applying his method to dreams in the first place. However, implicit in Grünbaum's account is, just as the only standing justification for Freud's method of interpretation in the case of neurosis is long-term therapeutic success, so by parallel the only justification for the application to dreams can be long-term dream reduction. It is this claim that the justification of Freud's method of interpretation in the case of the psycho-neuroses is therapeutic success, in the form of symptom-removal, that we will now call into question.

5.2 Grünbaum's Tally Argument.

This brings us to assess the standards of justification as Grünbaum understands them for the interpretation of the psycho-neuroses. Grünbaum builds his 'Tally Argument' on what he takes to be Freud's claim that 'correct insight' is necessary for therapeutic success. Grünbaum addresses the issue of veridical insight in the following way. He expresses the

beginning from our next chapter, is to propose the move is justified because both symptoms and dreams—or as we specify, the dream-report—are linguistic phenomena.

¹²⁹ Adolf Grünbaum, Validations in the Clinical Theory of Psychoanalysis, Madison, Conneticut, International Universities Press, p.373.

'Tally Argument' as starting from what he calls Freud's "necessary condition thesis"¹³⁰, or 'NCT', and views it as a means of justifying psychoanalytic theory generally. On this line of thinking, if the theory on which an interpretation is based is shown to be true by means of the Tally Argument, then an individual interpretation may inherit its justification from the truth of the general theory even without availing of direct signs of confirmation in the individual case.

Grünbaum says that the Tally Argument begins from the application of the following two premises, the conjunction of which constitute the NCT, in individual cases. The first is that "Only the psychoanalytic method of interpretation and treatment can yield or mediate to the patient correct insight into the unconscious pathogens of his psychoneuroses."¹³¹ The second is that "the analysand's correct insight into the etiology of his affliction and into the unconscious dynamics of is character is, in turn, causally necessary for the therapeutic conquest of his neurosis."¹³² Once Freud was in a position to assert that there were patients who had emerged cured from psychoanalytic treatment, Grünbaum claims that Freud was able to infer two conclusions regarding those same patients, or as he says "any and all patients P who emerged cured from their analysis." These are:

Conclusion 1. The psychoanalytic interpretations of the hidden causes of P's behaviour given to him by his analyst are indeed correct, and thus-as Freud put it-these interpretations "tally with what is real" in P. Conclusion 2. Only analytic treatment could have wrought the conquest of P's psychoneurosis.¹³³

That is, once therapeutic success occurs in a particular case, then Freud can infer that all the necessary conditions for therapeutic success have been fulfilled; including ex hypothesi the provision of correct insight. Also, given that ex hypothesi only psychoanalytic treatment could have provided this required correct insight, he can infer that only psychoanalytic treatment could have led to the successful treatment. This application of the Tally Argument to individual cases of cured emergence from therapy according to Grünbaum allows Freud

¹³⁰ Adolf Grünbaum, The Foundations of Psychoanalysis, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1984, p. 140. With reference to the two conclusions that we go on to present above, Grünbaum says "In view of Freud's use of the phrase "Tally with what is real", I have used the label "Tally Argument" for the argument whose two premises and two conclusions I have just stated" p, 140. Grünbaum, 1984, p. 139

¹³² Ibid.

the following "intermediate contention." That is, Grünbaum says it allows Freud to justify the claim that "actual durable therapeutic success guarantees not only that the pertinent analytic interpretations ring true or credible to the analysand but also that they are indeed veridical, or at least quite close to the mark."134

The importance of the Tally Argument, however, lies not in the inference that interpretations in individual cases are veridical-that is merely the "intermediate contention"—but in the *sum* of individual cases: in collective success. Grünbaum says:

Freud then relies on this bold intermediate contention to conclude nothing less than the following: collectively, the successful outcomes of analyses do constitute cogent evidence for all that general psychoanalytic theory tells us about the influences of the unconscious dynamics of the mind on our lives. In short, psychoanalytic treatment successes as a whole vouch for the truth of the Freudian theory of personality, including its specific etiologies of the psychoneuroses and even its general theory of psychosexual development.135

The intermediate contention is that individual applications of psychoanalytic theory in interpretation have been shown to be veridical. Grünbaum's point is that if there is a sum of individual applications of psychoanalytic theory that have been shown to be veridical, then this collective result vouches for the general truth of psychoanalytic theory that has been applied in each instance. If a 'therapeutic monopoly' on the part of psychoanalysis turns out to be the case in practice, then it is reasonable to treat the fact of this collective success as evidence that points to the general truth of psychoanalytic theory.

The Tally Argument, were it successful, would have the following advantages indicated by Grünbaum. For he further claims, "In short, if psychoanalytic treatment does have the therapeutic monopoly entailed by the 'Tally Argument', then it can warrantedly take credit for the recoveries of its patients without statistical comparisons with the results from untreated control groups, or from controls treated by rival modalities."136 Furthermore, the

¹³³ Grünbaum, 1984, p. 140 134 Ibid.

¹³⁵ Grünbaum, 1984, p. 141

¹³⁶ Grünbaum, 1984, p. 142

following justification of Freud's *methods*—i.e. the method of interpretation—is inherited from the truth of the theory on the basis of the collective success: "As a further corollary, the psychoanalytic probing of the unconscious is vindicated as a method of etiologic investigation by its therapeutic achievements."¹³⁷ In short, the success of the Tally Argument in virtue of a therapeutic monopoly would means that Freud does not require these more scientific forms of confirmation of his theories and methods. Ultimately, Grünbaum feels that by the lights of the Tally Argument, psychoanalysis does not measure up. For he claims that it has no therapeutic monopoly when compared to other forms of treatment; without the justification of the Tally Argument, it requires testing in these scientific ways.

5.3 Criticism of Grünbaum

Our criticism of Grünbaum is not to haggle about whether or not psychoanalysis maintains a therapeutic monopoly over other forms of treatment, but to point out that Freud simply did not rely on therapeutic success as a means of justifying his interpretations. Grünbaum dates Freud's belief in the NCT that forms part of the Tally Argument from the start of his modifications to Breuer's method or, as this period is described above, the episode of Freud's Compass. Grünbaum says, for example,

Once Freud had replaced hypnosis by free association in the psychoanalytic method of treatment and investigation, the moral he drew from the cathartic method was that any genuine therapeutic gain attained by his patients *requires* insight into the actual pathogens of their affliction. Hence, the durable achievement of substantial therapeutic progress could be held to betoken the correctness of the etiology inferred by means of the psychoanalytic method of inquiry.¹³⁸

However, the Tally Argument misses the mark regarding this episode of Freud's thought for the following reasons. It is, firstly, of capital importance to note that simply as a criterion of justification, the Tally Argument is compatible with the reliability of Freud's method of individuation of the pathogen, *and* the absence of therapeutic success, in any *particular* case. That is to say, the Tally Argument leaves open the possibility of resistance or suchlike despite the correct individuation of the pathogen or dream meaning without a therapeutic

¹³⁷ Grünbaum, 1984, p. 141

¹³⁸ Grünbaum, 1984, p. 132

corollary in any one or small number of cases, as long as the therapeutic monopoly is maintained overall. Put simply, the Tally Argument says that if therapeutic success is to occur in any particular case, then veridical insight into the genesis of the symptom must occur. It does not say that if there is no therapeutic success then there is no veridical insight.¹³⁹ However, in the period of Freud's Compass, Freud holds that a pathogenic memory cannot have been individuated without therapeutic success-while, that is, the symptom remains. In fact, the absence of therapeutic success is a criterion for judging that an attempted individuation in the clinical setting of the particular pathogenic memory is incorrect. It cannot then even in principle be the case that a pathogen can be considered as having been individuated while there is no therapeutic success. This is Freud's view of therapeutic success in his early work, prior to "The Aetiology of Hysteria." In this period, if Freud had used therapeutic success as a criterion in the manner suggested by Grünbaum -namely the Tally Argument-then he could not have taken it as a point of method that the pathogenic memory had not been individuated while the symptom persisted. As we have said, the persistence of the symptom was his guide or 'compass' telling him that the memory had not yet been individuated; in other words, that his interpretation was not correct. Here, then, we may dispute Grünbaum's reading of the interpretative role of therapy in the early Freud, for it is a reading that does by contrast allow for the correctness of an interpretation while the symptom remains. It is a result of his neglecting a fundamental principle of Freud's approach to interpretation; namely, Freud held that there must be in every case direct criteria of the accuracy of an interpretation in the clinical setting, which any interpretation would have to satisfy. Up to "The Aetiology of Hysteria", this role was played by Freud's Compass together with common-sense psychology. With "The Aetiology of Hysteria", therapeutic success was relegated to the role of indirect criterion of the symptom-to-pathogenic-memory

¹³⁹ Regarding this question of the two ways of approaching this question of veridical insight, the following discussion is important. The difference between these two propositions is acknowledged and debated by Donald Levy and Edward Erwin. Levy accuses Grünbaum of slipping between the following two propositions in his exposition of Freud: (A) Therapeutic success results only if true interpretations have been offered and (B) True interpretations have been offered and (B) True interpretations have been offered only if therapeutic success results. Levy makes his case in his book, *Freud among the Philosophers* (Yale University Press, New Haven and London, England, 1996.) and in his earlier article, "Grünbaum's Freud" *Inquiry*, 31, 1988 pp. 193-215. Erwin defends Grünbaum in his article, "Psychoanalysis: Past, Present and Future", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. LVII, No. 3, September 1997. See also Alan Esterson, "Grünbaum's Tally Argument" *History of the Human Sciences* Vol. 9 No. 1 pp. 43-57 and David Sachs, "In Fairness to Freud" *Philosophical Review*, Vol. XCVIII, no. 3, July 1989, pp. 349-378.

relation with its place as a direct criterion taken by the coherency of common-sense psychology. Grünbaum's analysis would have been appropriate, even to "The Aetiology of Hysteria", if Freud had continued to rely on symptom removal to ground his inferences. But as our discussion above shows, Freud by then no longer relied on symptom-removal, and thus therapeutic success no longer played any essential role—not even collectively in terms of a therapeutic monopoly—in the individuation of the pathogen.

With "The Aetiology of Hysteria" as regards criteria other than therapeutic success that may be found in Freud's work, Grünbaum does not accept that interpretation could be a reliable means of pathogen identification without therapeutic success underwritten by the Tally Argument. He dismisses instances where Freud appears to have criteria for interpretation other than therapeutic success along the following lines. He says, "True, in his account of the Irma specimen dream, Freud offered a non-therapeutic argument for the use of free association as a method of dream-interpretation. But as I have shown (Foundations ch.5), there his case is one of mere salesmanship."¹⁴⁰ However, this is to minimise the thrust of Freud's argument in "The Aetiology of Hysteria." Most importantly, that he warned us against drawing any inferences on the basis of the necessary condition status of his two interpretative conditions because he no longer viewed symptom removal as reliable, and that he gave primary importance to the common-sense psychological criteria mentioned therein. For these reasons, the most straightforward reading of Freud is that with "The Aetiology of Hysteria" he put forward a direct, non-therapeutic criterion of successful interpretation. Thus, Freud had methods available to him that he could apply to phenomena that did not prima facie appear capable of 'cure', such as dreams. To repeat, one of the most important aspects of the shift in "The Aetiology of Hysteria" is that Freud stops accepting symptom removal as without question genuine. He stopped treating what appeared to be symptom disappearance as bona fide amounting to symptom removal, most likely because he was alert to the danger of suggestion. His hope was to stop addressing the symptoms directly, and attempt to directly address the root cause of the illness. Accordingly, he warns us against subscribing to Breuer's ethos of relying on symptom-removal even if apparent success is encountered in terms of symptom removal, in favour of the jig-saw puzzle style common-

¹⁴⁰ Adolf Grünbaum, Letter to the Editor, New York Review of Books, Vol. XLI, Number 14, August 11, 1994.

sense psychological analysis of the whole case. That move opened up the way for him to apply himself to dream-interpretation without the burden of a therapeutic corollary.

6. Conclusion

Our intention in this chapter was to prepare the ground for our discussion of Freud's method of dream-interpretation as a form of interpretation that is common-sense psychological in kind. To this end it was necessary to establish that Freud's method of interpretation of psycho-neurotic, principally hysterical, symptoms which he decided to use in dream-interpretation did not rely on symptom removal as a criterion of accurate interpretation. For, as Grünbaum rightly points out, there is no corollary to symptom-removal in the field of dream-interpretation. If the method used in dream-interpretation required a therapeutic corollary to underwrite its accuracy, then there would simply be no guide to its accuracy. Our analysis followed the development of Freud's method of interpretation out of Breuer's method, through his modifications of it in his attempt to find an adequate memoryarousal substitute for the hypnotic state. His development, as we saw, took a decisive shift in his 1896 paper, "The Aetiology of Hysteria", with his rejection of symptom-removal in favour of the 'jig-saw puzzle' criterion of the accuracy of an interpretation. Once this step had been taken, common-sense psychology alone served as the guide to the accuracy of interpretations. Accordingly, there was no obstacle on the basis of a therapeutic corollary in the way of Freud employing his method in dream-interpretation.

Our discussion, as acknowledged in the introduction, has not addressed another major twist in Freud's thought in this early period, his rejection of the 'Seduction Theory'. That is, when he came to believe that his method of interpretation did not individuate memories of pathogenic scenes but rather phantasies of scenes with a sexual content. Our intention in this chapter, however, was to establish that Freud's method of interpretation consisted in the application of common-sense psychology to hysterical, or more generally psycho-neurotic, symptoms. It was not to address topics *internal* to a common-sense psychological analysis such as whether or not the scenes so individuated were real or made sense of the symptoms even though those scenes were imaginary. Furthermore, the principal dream-interpretations

in The Interpretations of Dreams lead to what Freud regards as real scenes. These are the disagreement with his colleague Otto to which Freud relates his interpretation of the dreamreport of Irma's Injection, and the visit of his friend to which he relates the discussion of censorship in the interpretation of the dream-report of the Uncle with the Yellow Beard. While it is true that in the case of the former interpretation Freud does not pursue the interpretation back to events in infancy, he does so with regard to the latter. When he returns to discuss this interpretation, after having initially discussed it in relation to censorship, he traces the ambition of his that it uncovers back to an event in early childhood that he gives us to understand had actually taken place. In the broader context of Freud's work on dreaminterpretation later on, the interpretation of the dream-report of the wolves in the case study of 'the Wolf Man', and the interpretation of the second dream-report in the case study of 'Dora' re-ignite the phantasy versus reality debate. Those interpretations lead back as Freud understands them, to real scenes, though it is true that there is much complicated discussion of this very point in the case of 'the Wolf Man'. However, even in that case when he is minded to view the scene from infancy as a phantasy it is in terms of a compound of memories of real scenes that Freud considers traceable. From this evidence, we may say that the question of phantasy and reality in interpretation is one that remained open even after Freud had applied his methods to dream-interpretation, though tracing the interpretation back to a real scene in some form or other remained part of his method of interpretation. It is a very interesting topic inside the context of a common-sense approach to interpretation, though unfortunately we will not have space to address it. Instead, we will concentrate on more fundamental aspects of interpretation-specifically, how it is of a linguistic nature and the presuppositions of censorship that this requires. Let us now move onto to analyse in detail how Freud applied his common-sense psychological method of interpretation in the field of dream-interpretation.

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the are II - Freud's Common-Sense Interpretation of 'The Language of Dreams'

The decade leading up to the publication of The Interpretation of Dreams saw Freud's researches infused with a strong common-sense psychological flavour. Once he began to modify Breuer's method to his own ends, from and including Studies On Hysteria onwards, Freud's approach involved various methods of memory arousal in place of hypnosis-of which free association was but one-to arouse the patient's memories surrounding the outbreak of the symptoms. In the course of this ongoing series of modifications, by mixing these various methods of memory-arousal with a common-sense psychological approach, Freud was able to make sense of the symptoms of the patient's illness. He did this by attributing motives for the symptoms in the light of the memory of a traumatic scene. He did not, though, rely on this kind of intelligibility alone to tell him that his interpretations were correct. Instead, Freud took the behaviour of the symptom to bear on the attributions of motive that he used in the individuation of the pathogenic memory on the basis that the persistence of the symptom meant that the pathogenic memory had not yet been uttered. Freud referred to this as his compass in the interpretation of the symptoms, which guided the course of his common-sense psychological attributions. However, as he developed his interpretative method further, in particular with "The Aetiology of Hysteria", Freud came to individuate the pathogenic scene in a different way. In short, the pathogenic scene was now individuated by means of providing a rationale for the symptoms according to commonsense psychological standards, without relying on or trusting to the behaviour of the symptom. Without a doubt, therapeutic success in the broad sense remained the overall goal of Freud's treatment of his patients. The difference consisted in the conviction that it was now to be achieved by discovering the memory of a scene that constituted a rationale holistically for the symptoms. This rationale consisted in the memory in question being appropriate to motives that satisfy the common-sense psychological criteria of 'suitability as a determinant' and 'necessary traumatic force' for the symptom. The scene individuated in this way reliably went back beyond the occasion of the outbreak of the symptoms; Freud in fact claimed that it invariably went back to infancy. No longer, then, was tracking the behaviour of the symptom the means of discovering the pathogenic scene. Instead, discovering the pathogenic scene-invariably one dating from infancy-by the evaluation of the aroused memories in the light of the two common-sense criteria became the means to influence the symptoms generally. For our analysis of dream-interpretation, treating the symptom in terms of common-sense psychology in this way is one of the points of reference in Freud's early thought. For, it has the advantage of opening up a vista of an application of the same method in the field of dream-interpretation while obviating the need for a therapeutic corollary. Yet, having established that the method Freud considered himself to be using in dream-interpretation is common-sense psychological does not amount to establishing that he was justified in interpreting hysterical, or psycho-neurotic, symptoms in this way. There is *prima facie* a very serious difficulty in the way of treating symptoms in this common-sense psychological way, as we will now address.

1. Psychoanalytic Interpretation as the Interpretation of Oblique Speech

1.1 Alexander's Objection to Treating Psychoanalytic Interpretation as a Form of Common-Sense Psychology

A famous objection to treating psychoanalysis as a form of common-sense psychology has been articulated by Peter Alexander. The essence of Alexander's argument is that such a move would involve the attribution of a very queer belief at some point in the motivation of the patient, and this would defeat the very purpose of taking psychoanalytic interpretation to be a form of common-sense psychology. Alexander's analysis, in his classic paper, "Rational Behaviour and Psychoanalytic Explanation" covers a number of points, but the key issue of the queer belief concerns the very coherency of treating seriously hysterical, or more generally psycho-neurotic, symptoms in a common-sense way. Alexander takes as his point of departure what he acknowledges is a rough similarity between psychoanalytic explanations of behaviour and everyday accounts of behaviour. Opening his discussion, he says: "Recently, however, I have heard it said that... psychoanalysis has revealed that our behaviour is more rational than we usually suppose it to be."¹⁴¹He explains what this notion means, namely that "The behaviour which we usually call "irrational" can be shown to be based on reasons that can be unearthed by psychoanalysis."¹⁴² In everyday life, however, he

¹⁴¹ Peter Alexander, "Rational Behaviour and Psychoanalytic Explanation", *Mind*, July 1962, p. 326.

¹⁴² Alexander, p. 327

points out that to say that someone did something for a reason is normally to say that he acted for a *good* reason, not any reason at all. Alexander says, "What makes a given piece of behaviour rational in a given situation is that there are good reasons for behaving thus; what makes A's behaviour rational is that he behaved in the way he did for those good reasons."¹⁴³ He contends that we would not allow that A's behaviour was rational if it was for a bad reason. The notion of a good reason requires qualification, for everyday life is not black-and-white enough to divide reasons into opposing camps of 'good' and 'bad' reasons: "Thus we must add to the first suggestion that the reason was a good reason. But this is still inadequate since any reason *for* doing x cannot be a very bad reason and a reason for doing x may be good without being sufficient."¹⁴⁴ More specifically, then, Alexander's point is that the agent must act for a *sufficient* reason; that is, one that all things considered beats its competitor reasons. He says,

In order for x to be rational I must have sufficient reasons for doing x, that is a reason or collection of reasons which is strong enough to stand even after weighing the important reasons for and against doing xa piece of behaviour was rational if it was done for reasons which constitute a sufficient reason.¹⁴⁵

If the reason is sufficient, and therefore ahead of its competitors, this amounts to it being the case that it will *most likely* lead to a successful outcome. He says:

A piece of behaviour was rational if it was done for reasons which constitute a sufficient reason, that is, if it was likely to achieve what was intended and unlikely to lead to other consequences whose undesirability outweighs the desirability of what it was intended to achieve.¹⁴⁶

With regard to the psychoanalytic case, then, the value of the parallel consists in the degree to which psychoanalysis can unearth sufficient reasons. He says, "This is to draw an analogy between psychoanalytic explanations and certain ordinary explanations of behaviour in terms of reasons for it. The value of this analogy depends on the extent to which the good reasons

¹⁴³ Alexander, p. 329

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid. (Alexander's Emphasis)

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

for "irrational" behaviour are like the good reasons for rational behaviour."¹⁴⁷ But a sufficient reason, Alexander intends to show us, is what a psychoanalytic interpretation of behaviour cannot credit to the agent. He sets out to achieve this by showing us that the reasons unearthed by it simply do not strike us as likely to achieve the end in question through the actions they are cited as motivating. The purported reasons in cases of irrational behaviour could not be said to be like everyday, good reasons. He says:

A more detailed examination will show that the reasons adduced in psychoanalytic explanations are very unlike what we would normally regard as good reasons and consequently that the behaviour in question is rational only in a new and unfamiliar sense.¹⁴⁸

Alexander makes his point with several examples, of which a man lunging at a lamppost with his umbrella is one. A psychoanalytic interpretation might construe this behaviour in Oedipal terms as motivated by the desire, or wish, to kill his father. Alexander says "A sufficient reason is such that we can see that it could have been a reason for this particular behaviour and, I think, that we can conceive of ourselves as behaving thus with this reason in mind. We demand appropriateness."¹⁴⁹ But this relation of appropriateness appears to be lacking between the wish to kill his father and the action of lunging at the lamppost. Alexander continues, "I doubt if the typical Freudian explanation can satisfy this condition."¹⁵⁰ If such reasons, such as a desire or wish to kill his father were conscious to the man in the example, "he would see them as inadequate."¹⁵¹ Alexander points out, "Now if my wish to kill my father were conscious, it would be obvious to me that it was not adequately satisfied by my lunging at lamp-posts."¹⁵² At some point in the psychoanalytic case, that is, if it is to be a form of common-sense psychology then the agent must believe that the symptom is a way of achieving something. The agent must manifest the strange behaviour in the belief that by doing so he is achieving something-in this case, the aim of killing his father. Lunging at the lamppost with an umbrella as a means of killing one's father involves a very queer belief if we take it literally. In practical reason terms, to anticipate the

 ¹⁴⁷ Alexander, pp. 335-336
 ¹⁴⁸ Alexander, p. 336
 ¹⁴⁹ Alexander, p. 338

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

terms of our discussion below a little, the interpretation of the man's action would go as follows. The patient desires to kill his father, believes that if he lunges at the lamppost with his umbrella then he is killing his father, and accordingly desires to lunge at the lamppost with an umbrella. He then lunges at the lamppost because of this desire. The queer belief is that if he lunges at a lamppost with an umbrella, then he kills his father. It is *this* belief that fails to measure up to Alexander's standard of sufficiency, and thus means that the man's reason is unlike a good reason.

Alexander concludes by warning us against viewing psychoanalytic explanations—by which he means interpretations of irrational behaviour—as having anything in common with ordinary explanations of behaviour; and counselling us not to be taken in by the surface similarity. He intones:

There is an apparent analogy between psychoanalytic explanations of irrational behaviour and ordinary explanations of rational behaviour. But the analogy can be pushed so little that it seems more of a hindrance than a help to use "explanation" and "reason" as if these words were used in the same senses in the two contexts.¹⁵³

Given, then, that we cannot say that the agent acted for a good reason, we are not in a position to say that the agent's behaviour was governed by any reason at all, unless we have a non-'everyday' or non-'common-sense' conception of reason in mind.

Common-sense interpretations of the symptom are possible in a certain way, however, even given Alexander's objection. Consider the following example that broadens the context of Alexander's example and renders the behaviour rational. In this case, the specific belief required to explain the behaviour according to the rational pattern would not strike us as queer, it is instead the general situation that is out-of-the-ordinary just as, indeed, the personal situations of many of Freud's patients was out-of-the-ordinary. For example, imagine that the father of the man in Alexander's example was being held hostage by kidnappers. The man was carrying a suitcase full of money on his way to a meeting point to

¹⁵² Alexander, p. 339

¹⁵³ Alexander, p. 341

secure his father's release from kidnappers, and decided to stop on the way and fence with the lamppost thus missing the appointment, thus insuring that the kidnappers would kill his father. That this was the best or 'sufficient' way of achieving the killing of his father would have been decided by the particular contingencies of the moment. For example, the patient wanted to hide his intent from the rest of his family, or from the police, so that he would not be blamed for the death of his father, and so pretended to be crazy. This kind of queer belief, which turns out not to be so queer after all once the facts have been unearthed, is the kind of thing that detective stories from Sherlock Holmes to Inspector Columbo are constructed upon. The symptom is simply an instrument albeit crude for achieving the death of his father. given certain contingencies. If we view the symptom in only this way, then Alexander's objection has no force. But of course Freud does not want to view the hysterical or neurotic symptom as a crude instrument-he considers this kind of behaviour to be what he calls the 'gain from illness'. This is the use of feigned sickness as an instrument in one's relations with others. Rather, he wants to take it that there is a discriminating link between the symptom and its origin, which governs the operation of the motives in between. The particular discrimination required by Freud, the tertium comparationis required to view the scene with the lamppost as some kind of intentional behaviour motivated by an oedipal memory-plausibly involving the belief that by lunging at the lamppost with an umbrella he is killing his father—is missing.¹⁵⁴ So, our dilemma goes as follows; if on the one hand we accept queer beliefs as a crude instrument, maintaining the rational pattern of common-sense psychology then we lose the sophisticated discriminating aspect claimed for the symptom. If on the other hand we accept that the symptom has symbolic value in order to capture the allegedly high degree of discrimination in the symptom then we lose the application of common-sense psychology because of the queer belief. We lose it, more precisely, as far as the standard pattern of rational action in common-sense psychology is concerned. Our target is to find a way of maintaining the standard pattern of rational action characteristic of common-sense psychology while at the same time capturing the sophisticated degree of

¹⁵⁴ That is to say, in the example the lunging-at-the-lamppost would be explained by the interpreter by attributing to the interprete the belief that he is killing his father. This belief could in turn be understood as a reaction to the memory of an oedipal scene from infancy, or as the expression of oedipal phantasies that themselves originated from events in infancy. Alexander's objection would, by disallowing the initial interpretation of the lunging, nip such broader, developmental explanations in the bud.

discrimination involved in Freud's notion of the 'symbolic.' But first, let us look at an alternative philosophical response to the one that we will propose to Alexander's objection.

1.2 Philosophical Responses in Terms of the Imagination to Alexander's Objection

Some philosophers are content to lose the standard pattern of rational action by focussing instead on a different aspect of common-sense psychology, wishful thinking. The approach originates in a tradition of the philosophy of psychoanalysis initiated by Richard Wolheim, and articulated at length by James Hopkins. Broadly speaking, Hopkins' approach goes as follows. He addresses the problem posed by Alexander in his introduction to Philosophical Essays on Freud in terms of understanding him to hold the "assumption that the symptomatic action should be explained by the agent's desire to kill his father together with some such belief as, that lunging at lampposts would be a way of doing so."155 He takes note of Alexander's point as follows: "Alexander's point would be that the belief that lunging at lampposts is a way of killing one's father would not be credible as a conscious belief, and so cannot serve as a constituent reason in the ordinary sense...."¹⁵⁶ He goes on to point out difficulties, amongst which Alexander's is prominent: The first is that indicated by Alexander.

Even if the desire to be linked to a wish-fulfilling representation is clear, and it seems reasonable to suppose that the representation is caused by the desire, still the belief required to explain the representation in accord with the pattern used to explain actions by reasons seems scarcely comprehensible or coherent.¹⁵⁷

In a footnote, remarking on the suggestion that this possibly shows the unconscious to be illogical, Hopkins says that such an illogicality would be "simply the result of the imposition of an inappropriate pattern of explanation."¹⁵⁸ In the main text he goes on, "These considerations both suggest that we should not describe wish-fulfilment on the pattern of rational action, but rather as an activity of the imagination."159 His solution is elaborated in connection with Freud's interpretation of the dream of Irma's Injection in a number of

¹⁵⁵"Introduction: Philosophy and Psychoanalysis" in R. Wolheim and J. Hopkins (eds.) Philosophical Essays on Freud, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982, p. xxiii. 156 Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ Hopkins, 1982, p. xxiv 158 Ibid.

papers, and at length in "Psychoanalytic and Scientific Reasoning." It revolves around the key notion of the *pacification* of a desire; wishful imagining is a special kind of pacification that does not involve a belief that one's desire has been satisfied. In short, it is a by-passing of the input of external reality in the quelling of a desire. In order to show the way in which wishful imagining deviates from the standard pattern of rational action, Hopkins takes as his point of departure the following pattern of successful action of someone getting a drink:

- (1) P [There is a drink within A's reach]
- (2) A sees that P [that there is a drink within A's reach]
- (3) A forms the belief that P [that there is a drink within A's reach]
- (4) A forms the belief that if Q then R [that if she moves her hand in a certain way then she will get a drink]
- (5) A desires that R [that she get a drink]
- (6) A desires that Q [that she moves her hand in that way]
- (7) Q [A moves her hand in that way]
- (8) R [A gets a drink]¹⁶⁰

This pattern of successful action, in Hopkins' view, is made up of a number of component patterns: (i) well-founded belief, (ii) practical reason, and (iii) the satisfaction of desire. He schematizes each of these in the following way:

- (i) **B**: $P \rightarrow [causes] \rightarrow A$ bels that P (cf. (1) and (3) above).
- (ii) PR: A desires that P & A bels that if Q then P -- [causes] --> A des that Q (cf. (4) to (6) above).
- (iii) **D**: A desires that $P [causes] \rightarrow P$ (cf. (5) and (8) above).¹⁶¹

The last of these schemata indicating the satisfaction of the desire leads on to the quelling of the desire, for the time being until the next glass of water at least. That is, the *result* of successful action is that the desire for a glass of water is satisfied, and the satisfaction entails

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

James Hopkins, "Psychoanalytic and Scientific Reasoning", *The British Journal of Psychotherapy*, October 1996. p. 89; See also his "Wittgenstein, Interpretation and the Foundations of Psychoanalysis" in *New Formations: Special Issue on Psychoanalysis and Culture*, Autumn 1995, pp. 54-73.
 Hopkins, 1996, p. 90

that the desire is quelled, or as Hopkins puts it, 'pacified'. The pacification of the desire is caused by a belief on A's part that the desire has in fact been satisfied. So the belief that what A desires has in fact occurred needs to be inserted in to the schemata, and Hopkins presents this as follows:

(iv) D^* : A des that P — [causes] \rightarrow P — [causes] \rightarrow A bel that P — [causes] \rightarrow A's des that P is pacified.¹⁶²

Hopkins says of this last schema that "This pattern D* represents, as it were, the life-cycle of a single desire in successful intentional action."¹⁶³ This is the normal case of the operation of a desire. Hopkins contends that this form of pacification is short-circuited in the case of wishful imagining, and the input of reality via belief is left out. This gives us what he calls the schema **wff**, and it is the pacification of a desire not through the belief that something has occurred in reality but by means of the imagination:

(v) wff: A des (wish) that P — [causes] —> A b-reps that P — [causes] —> A's desire that P is pacified.¹⁶⁴

He goes on to account for the material in Freud's interpretation of the dream of Irma's injection through repeated applications of this pattern, and claims this amounts to repeated instances of inference to the best explanation. This is nonetheless a common-sense psychological approach to the interpretation because he also sees this pattern as already present in common-sense psychology. He says, for example, in reference to Freud's 'anchovies' dream:

We are aware in many other cases that our response to a desire or wish that P is in one way or another to imagine, suppose or make believe that P (or something related to P) is the case. We know that people day dream in this way regularly, and often more or less deliberately; and such episodes of imagining may give pleasure, and seem partly to pacify the desires which they represent as fulfilled. The same applies to the

¹⁶² Hopkins, 1996, p. 92
 ¹⁶³ Ibid.
 ¹⁶⁴ Hopkins, 1996, p. 98

kind of make-believe found in children's play, or again to the suspension of disbelief or imaginative immersion involved in the theatre, cinema, video games, and the like.¹⁶⁵

It will be our contention that the material dealt with in dream-interpretation can be accounted for without going so far as to introduce this new pattern, wff, characteristic of wishful thinking. Instead, the material can be dealt with by extending one of the patterns already found in what Hopkins regards as the successful case of rational action. The particular pattern involved in the successful case above, and which we contend can be applied to the interpretation of the dream of Irma's injection, is the **PR** pattern of Hopkins' point (ii). Before we do that, however, let us investigate how Hopkins' position receives the endorsement of both Sebastian Gardner and Marcia Cavell.

Sebastian Gardner adopts a similar account to Hopkins in his section on "the conceptual structure of wish-fulfilment."¹⁶⁶ Indeed, he tells us that "the conception of wish-fulfilment at the core" of his discussion is that of Hopkins' *Introduction*.¹⁶⁷ In his articulation of the notion, Gardner too focuses on a kind of short-circuiting in the pattern of rational action. With regard to the example getting a drink of water, inspired by Freud's anchovy dream, he tells us that in the normal case the following occurs:

(4) *fulfilment* of the motivational state (intake of water)
(4') *satisfaction* of the desire (water is drunk)

This leads to a "subjective event" which is the pacification noted by Hopkins:

(5*) the experiential registration of satisfaction, which puts the feeling of need in abeyance, and terminates the subject's action-disposition to fulfil the goal set by its motivational state.¹⁶⁸

Gardner tells us that "Now, in wish-fulfilment—as when Freud's dream of drinking water 'allays' his anchovy-induced thirst—the rational sequence is modified by the absence of (4) and (4'). And yet (5*) occurs, despite the fact that the goal set by the motivational sate has

¹⁶⁷ Gardner, p. 266 (Endnote to p. 125)

¹⁶⁵ Hopkins, 1996, pp. 96-97

 ¹⁶⁶ Sebastian Gardner, Irrationality and the Philosophy of Psychoanalysis, Cambridge, Cambridge University
 ¹⁶⁷ Press, 1993.
 ¹⁶⁷ On the Philosophy of Psychoanalysis, Cambridge, Cambridge University

not really been achieved."169 What Gardner suggests is that the role of the belief that the relevant action has been performed, and the belief that the desire is satisfied-which he refers to respectively as (5) and (5')—is played by a wish-fulfilling representation. He says:

What may be supposed is that, in wish-fulfilment, a sensory experience takes over the causal role of these beliefs: the role of (5) and (5') is played directly by the wish-fulfilling representation. The simplest assumption is that, in wish-fulfilment, the experiential registration in (5*) is a direct effect of a sensory experience, and that, once it has been produced, the cessation of trying and temporary abevance of the action-disposition follow, as in the rational sequence.¹⁷⁰

In articulating the logical difference between rational satisfaction and wish-fulfilment. Gardner goes so far as to say: "Conversely, in rational satisfaction there is no analogue of the wish-fulfilling representation: actions are not representations. So whereas in rational satisfaction there are two logically distinct components, in wish-fulfilment there is only one."171 In the former, Gardner holds, a distinction can be drawn between the conditions of its satisfaction and the action that realises the conditions of satisfaction, but that this distinction cannot be made in the latter case. He concludes by saying: "Psychoanalytic wishes are necessarily engaged in the process of wish-fulfilment, a psychological cycle which leads directly to the formation of an immediately satisfying mental representation of the wish's object; which is not true of ordinary, conscious wishes."¹⁷² That Gardner intends this notion of the conceptual structure of a wish to be applied in interpretation is evident from the discussion that leads to its clarification. In that discussion of wish-fulfilment, discussing instinctual demands, he says "For example, Freud's dream of Irma's injection involves a wish that concerns Freud's patient Irma, and his medical colleague Otto: a wish 'that I was not responsible for the persistence of Irma's pains, but that Otto was."¹⁷³ This is already an interpretation of what Freud says, for Freud says it is the "conclusion"¹⁷⁴ of the dream that he was not responsible but that Otto was. That we can without problem substitute

¹⁶⁸ Gardner, p. 125

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid. It has to be said that this seems rather an extreme claim to make so baldly. Conventionalised forms of dance, or mime, for example are actions and yet they also represent. They might plausibly be considered to belong to Freud's 'language of gestures', of which more below.

¹⁷¹ Gardner, p. 126 172 Ibid.

¹⁷³ Gardner, pp. 122-123 (Endnote omitted)

'wish' for 'conclusion' shows that Gardner intends his analysis to be applicable in interpretation. In fact, he uses the contrast between the structure of wish-fulfilment that he accepts against the pattern of rational action to explain some curious features of Freud's 'Dora' case history. He says, "wish-fulfilment allows for a frequent concurrence of 'contradictory' meanings in the objects of psychoanalytic interpretation – in sharp contrast with the sense that we uncover in the interpretation of speech and rational behaviour."¹⁷⁵ In essentials, then, he is agreeing with Hopkins' point of view that the pattern of practical reasoning would be an inappropriate form of explanation when it comes to psychoanalytic interpretation in particular.

Marcia Cavell discusses a favourite example of Hopkins', the table-cloth lady from *Introductory Lectures* in the context of discussing Alexander's objection. The table-cloth lady had married a man a lot older than herself, and he turned out impotent on their wedding night. So as not to feel ashamed in front of the housemaid, he spilt a bottle of red ink on the sheets; unfortunately, it fell in an inappropriate place that was unlikely to fool the housemaid. The woman later suffered from an obsessional symptom that consisted in running into another room, standing beside a table covered by a table-cloth on which there was a stain, and ringing the bell for the housemaid to send her on a trivial errand. Freud interprets the later symptom in terms of the husband's impotence on the wedding night. Cavell says of it that

...the fact that explanations like the one above cannot be accommodated to some variation of the practical syllogism might seem a good reason from rejecting them out of hand as explanations of action. In a way I think this is right: so-called symptomatic acts are not actions *per se*, though they resemble them. We might begin by thinking of the acting out of phantasy, not on the pattern of action but of imagination or quasi-imaginative activity.¹⁷⁶

In a footnote to this passage she makes explicit reference to Hopkins' work, in particular his introduction to *Philosophical Essays*. In her book *The Psychoanalytic Mind* she quotes Freud referring to the case of the table-cloth lady. She says, "Freud writes: "So the obsessional

¹⁷⁴ IV, 118.

¹⁷⁵ Gardner, p. 124

¹⁷⁶ Marcia Cavell, "Metaphor, Dreamwork and Irrationality" in Ernest LePore (ed.) *Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1986, p. 498.

action was saying: 'No, it's not true. He had no need to feel ashamed in front of the housemaid; he was not impotent.' It represented this wish, in the manner of the dream, as fulfilled in the present-day action."¹⁷⁷ Any attempt to explicate this in terms of reasons would lead, she feels, to beliefs that are "fundamentally odd"¹⁷⁸—the queer beliefs as referred-to above—which points to "some needed qualifications in the reason explanation model."¹⁷⁹ Later, the common ground she shares with Hopkins becomes apparent when she quotes a passage from Freud of which she says "The passage just looked at makes clear that Freud thinks of 'phantasy' as an extension of the folk-psychological model concept of daydreaming."¹⁸⁰ In fact, this is the conclusion she comes to in the analysis that leads from her opening claim in the same chapter. She says:

Freud's originality as an interpreter does not lie in his charting of a new mental terrain, but the ingenuity with which he applied a familiar explanatory model: where common-sense understanding often fails in the face of seemingly incoherent utterances and behaviour different from one's own, Freud assumes that given the right circumstances, 'nonsense' reveals sense; an apparently idle and free-floating idea discloses a recognizable attitude like belief or desire; an action which is puzzlingly contrary to the agent's conscious reasons shows its motivation in reasons that are unconscious¹⁸¹

The reasons that are *like* belief and desire are the kinds of wish-fulfilments suggested by Wolheim, Hopkins and Gardner, which—it is claimed—succeed where the run-of-the-mill common-sense understanding in terms of belief and desire fails.

We wish to propose a more conservative approach that, while firmly common-sensical, is an alternative to this tradition stemming from Wolheim that views wishful imagining as the key to Freud's practice of interpretation. Our approach is one that adheres to one term of a contrast that Cavell earlier in her book draws, both terms of which she recognises are present in Freud's writings. The contrast she draws is between a detective-hunting-for-arational-motive aspect to Freud's work and wishful imagining; the latter she considers to

¹⁷⁷ Marcia Cavell, *The Psychoanalytic Mind* Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England, Harvard University Press, 1993, p. 178.
¹⁷⁸ Cavell, 1993, p. 179
¹⁷⁹ Ibid.
¹⁸⁰ Cavell, 1993, p. 187
¹⁸¹ Cavell. 1993, p. 177

have the advantage of allowing a re-interpretation of the mechanical language found in Freud. She says:

But this is true: sometimes thoughts follow each other in ways that are simultaneously causal and rational, as when the wish to build a bird-cage leads me to look for appropriate materials, or when the thoughts that all men are mortal and that Socrates is a man prompt the thought that Socrates is mortal. The first is paradigmatic of practical reasoning, the second of syllogistic. It is just such connections that Freud was a master sleuth at detecting, beneath a play of surface non sequiturs. Yet, without question the mind has other ways of working as well which are, by contrast with the ones just mentioned, mechanical or quasi-mechanical...¹⁸²

Our contention is that, to explicate what occurs in interpretation, it is enough to invoke 'Freud the Master Sleuth' as he deals with ostensible *non sequiturs* in a "syllogistic" way that conforms to the pattern of rational action found in common-sense psychology. This kind of approach is one that reconciles the literal application of common-sense psychology in terms of practical reasoning with the fine discrimination that Freud believes to hold between the symptom and the pathogenic memory. The symbolic strand prominent in the work of the early Freud, we suggest, serves in fact as a defence of the common-sense strand against this objection from Alexander in the sufficiently discriminating way that Freud requires. The key lies in understanding the connection between the symptom and that which it symbolises to mean a linguistic connection. For linguistic phenomena are interpretable according to the practical reasoning pattern of common-sense psychology.

1.3 Alexander's Objection Resolved: The Broadly Symbolic Connection as a Linguistic Connection

Dating right from "Preliminary Communication" is the recognition by Freud that the link between the symptom and the pathogenic memory is very often, though he does not claim exclusively, a 'symbolic' one. For example, Breuer/Freud assert the following:

In other cases the connection is not so simple. It consists only in what might be called a 'symbolic' relation between the precipitating cause and the pathological phenomenon - a relation such as healthy people form

¹⁸² Cavell, 1993, p. 171

in dreams. For instance, a neuralgia may follow upon mental pain or vomiting upon a feeling of moral disgust. We have studied patients who use the most copious use of this sort of symbolization.¹⁸³

As is obvious from even a cursory look at Studies On Hysteria, the case of Frau Cäcilie M., discussed in another case history, is a case in which such symbolization prominently features. But the presence of 'symbolization' is present throughout the early period, from "Preliminary Communication" on. For example, there is the symptom of the pains in the legs discussed in relation to the 'compass' period in Freud's approach to interpretation in the case of Elisabeth Von R. The presence of this notion suggests a certain restriction on the way in which the symptom could be judged by common-sense psychological standards. To claim, for example, that the patient manifested the symptoms in order not to talk about the pathogenic scene thus benefiting from the instrumental value of the symptom is not discriminating enough to satisfy this 'symbolic requirement'. After all, if the symbol were an instrument that the patient used in such a way, not only is it not discriminating, it would be efficient even if it had absolutely nothing to do with the pathogenic scene. This, again, is the kind of behaviour to which Freud is referring with his notion of the gain from illness. If I want to avoid going to a wedding, for example, I may feign a headache. I feign the headache in order to avoid going to the wedding; so my action is perfectly understandable and coherent in terms of common-sense psychology. There is no symbolic link between weddings and headaches. Likewise, I could have simply disappeared on the morning of the wedding, pretended to be stuck in traffic, stuck in a strike at the airport and so forth. In other words, in order for the symptom to have instrumental value it does not have to have the slightest thing in common with the symbolic value. What the symbolic value adds to the symptom is greater discrimination, it establishes some kind of special link between the symptom and the event. This special link would appear to be linguistic in nature. Regarding the explanation of Anna O.'s symptom of having only English at her command during the illness in terms of the mere contiguity of her being able only to think of a prayer in English and her traumatic hallucination of the snakes, Freud makes for instance the following comment. It regards a linguistic kind of explanation. He says:

The determination of a symptom by the psychical trauma is not so transparent in every instance. There is often only what may be described as a 'symbolic' relation between the determining cause and the hysterical symptom. This is especially true of pains. Thus one patient [ft. to Frau Cäcilie M.] suffered from piercing pains between her eyebrows. The reason was that once when she was a child her grandmother had given her an enquiring 'piercing' look. The same patient suffered for a time from violent pains in her right heel, for which there was no explanation. These pains, it turned out, were connected with an idea that occurred to the patient when she made her first appearance in society. She was overcome with fear that she might not 'find herself on a right footing'. Symbolizations of this kind were employed by many patients for a whole number of so-called neuralgias and pains. *It is as though there were an intention to express the mental state by means of a physical one; and linguistic usage affords a bridge by which this can be effected.*¹⁸⁴

According to this analysis, then, in the former example taken from "Preliminary Communication" of the link between vomiting and moral disgust the patient is saying 'something makes me sick', while in the case of the neuralgia the patient is saying 'something causes me great pain.' It might require a moment of reflection to understand this as linguistic, but the point becomes clearer if we consider the following evidence.

Freud never tired of drawing a comparison between the interpretation of psycho-neurotic symptoms, and indeed, dreams in terms of translating from one language to another. For example, in "The Claims of Psychoanalysis to Scientific Interest', he tells us that what he means by language is speech even beyond verbal utterance; he means instead a broader category which encompasses writing and the 'speech of gesture':

I shall no doubt be overstepping common linguistic usage in postulating an interest in psychoanalysis on the part of philologists, that is of experts in *speech*. For in what follows 'speech' must be understood to not merely to mean the expression of thought in words but to include the speech of gesture and every other method, such, for instance, as writing, by which mental activity can be expressed. That being so, it may be pointed out that the interpretations made by psychoanalysis are first and foremost translations from an alien method of expression into the one which is familiar to us. When we interpret a dream we are simply translating a particular thought content (the latent dream-thoughts) from the 'language of dreams' into our waking speech.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸⁴ III, 33. (Emphasis added) ¹⁸⁵ XIII, 176. In fact, in this work he moves on to indicate several different kinds of speech; he goes on to give an example of how the different media of speech include the behavioural, a 'gesture language', in which the hysteric expresses something by vomiting. He says:

The language of dreams may be looked upon as the method by which the unconscious expresses itself. But the unconscious speaks more than one dialect. According to the different psychological conditions governing and distinguishing the various forms of neurosis, we find regular modifications in the way in which unconscious mental impulses are expressed. While the gesture language of hysteria agrees on the whole with the picture language of dreams and visions, etc. the thought language of obsessional neurosis and of the paraphrenias (dementia praecox and paranoia) exhibits special idiomatic peculiarities which, in a number of instances, we have been able to understand and interrelate. For instance, what a hysteric expresses by vomiting an obsessional will express by painstaking measures against infection..., "186

This view of interpretation in psychoanalysis broadly speaking as a method of interpretation of queer linguistic forms is on our view the best explication of what Freud means by the 'symbolic' connection. For, the difficulty pointed out by Alexander can be avoided by taking the object of interpretation as a linguistic entity: the symptom of lunging at the lamppost with an umbrella as an instance of 'gesture language.' That is, A wants to *say* that he kills his father, A believes that if he lunges at the lamppost then he is saying-in-gestures that he is killing his father, therefore A wants to lunge at the lamppost. After all, Freud himself states that the table-cloth lady is *saying* something with her strange behaviour: "So the obsessional action was *saying*: 'No, it's not true. He had no need to feel ashamed in front of the housemaid; he was not impotent."¹⁸⁷ As regards the application of the method of interpretation to dreams, this means that we must concentrate on the *language* with which the dreamer attempts to *recount* his dream. Our contention is that the dream as related by the interprete is related in order to *say* something in a peculiar way. Freud makes the following claim in *The Interpretation of Dreams* in order to interpret dreams as he had interpreted psycho-neurotic symptoms. He says that his patients *told* him their dreams:

It was in the course of these psychoanalytic studies that I came upon dream-interpretation. My patients were pledged to communicate to me every idea or thought that occurred to them in connection with some particular subject; amongst other things they told me their dreams and so taught me that a dream can be inserted into the psychical chain that has to be traced backwards in the memory from a pathological idea. It

¹⁸⁶ XIII, 177-178.

was then only a short step to treating the dream itself as a symptom and to applying to dreams the method of interpretation that had been worked out for symptoms.¹⁸⁸

In this passage, Freud says that he took a step from coming upon dream-interpretation in terms of what his patients *told* him to treating dream-interpretation as if it dealt *directly* with the dream. Yet, What Freud had available to interpret was—as he says here—precisely what his patients told him, and this was the subject matter of dream-*interpretation*. It would be an equivocation to jump from there to viewing the 'dream itself' as the object of interpretation. As we presently investigate, Freud returned to this point in *Introductory Lectures*, and stated that we must take as the dream what the interpretee tells the interpreter. This kind of linguistic perspective on dream-interpretation is not so surprising when we consider the other areas of interest to Freud at the time of *The Interpretation of Dreams*. In *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life*, he set out to interpret the linguistic phenomenon of slips of the tongue, slips of the pen and, in another book, jokes. In *Autobiographical Study*, he went on to remind us that:

My book Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious was a side-issue directly derived from The Interpretation of Dreams. The only friend of mine who was at that time interested in my work remarked to me that my interpretations of dreams often impressed him as being like jokes.¹⁸⁹

Let's now move on to the specific case of dream-interpretation in more detail in this linguistic vein.

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¹⁸⁷ XVI, 263. (Emphasis added)
¹⁸⁸ IV, 100-101.
¹⁸⁹ XX, 65.

eiven by the 2. Dream-Interpretation as the Interpretation of Oblique Speech

2.1 The Object of Our Research in Interpretation: The Dream-Report.

Let us begin to articulate our linguistic approach to dream-interpretation with a question that points to a fundamental perplexity on Freud's part. What is it that actually gets interpreted in so-called dream-interpretation? Freud says, "In investigating dreams one is not even sure of the object of one's research."¹⁹⁰ Why is one not sure of the object of research, or as we say interpretation, even though Freud uses the broader term 'investigation'? For one, as Freud tells us, because amongst other things a dream is a subjective experience during sleep, and access to this experience in order to interpret it is menaced by weaknesses of memory on the part of the interpretee. There are great difficulties, Freud recognises, in establishing criteria for the accurate recall of this 'dream-experience', as we will refer to it. The interpreter simply does not have access to the dream as directly experienced, but at most only as reported by the interpretee after its occurrence. The interpreter, when the interpretee is another person, is obliged to accept the account of the dream-experience as the only medium of access to it. In trusting to the interpretee's account, he is also trusting in the reliability of the interpretee's memory; when the interpreter and interpretee is one and the same person it is implicit that he is not exempt from the same unreliability of memory. The interpretee may not even be capable of recalling it at all, and dreams are commonly recognised as notoriously difficult to remember. Freud expresses this problem as follows:

A delusion, for instance, meets one squarely and with definite outlines. 'I am the Emperor of China', says the patient straight out. But dreams? As a rule no account at all can be given of them. If anyone gives an account of a dream, has he any guarantee that his account has been correct, or that he may not, on the contrary, have altered his account in the course of giving it and have been obliged to invent some addition to it to make up for the indistinctness of his recollections? Most dreams cannot be remembered at all and are forgotten except for small fragments.¹⁹¹

Freud treats the probability of alterations and additions as so serious to the extent that it precludes any account of the dream-experience. In other words, he takes this problem to mean that the interpreter has no grounds for trusting—no way of telling—that the account

¹⁹⁰ XV, 84.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

given by the interpretee is actually an account of the dream-experience. No account, then, of the dream-experience would appear to be possible even though this is the only medium through which the interpreter could address the dream-experience. Freud's solution is the following: "We can help to overcome the defect of uncertainty in remembering dreams if we decide that whatever the dreamer tells us must count as his dream, without regard to what he may have forgotten or have altered in recalling it."¹⁹² In other words, what is to count as the dream for purposes of interpretation is not the experience itself, nor an account of the dream. For this would imply that the interpreter has some way of checking the accuracy of it as an 'account of', and the problem arises precisely because this is not possible. What the dream is, for purposes of interpretation, is the account given by the dreamer with no claims of correspondence to the dream-experience, because such a notion of 'correspondence' is not at all trustworthy. According to Freud, it is simply what the dreamer tells him that must count as his dream. So, if we accept this, the assumption of Freud's is that we must interpret an account related to a dream. This relation is a loose relation, the most we seem able to say is that it consists in what the interpretee tells the interpreter in response to being asked to give an account of the dream-experience-without regard for whether or not it really is an account of the dream-experience. We shall refer to this verbal response to the interpreter's demand for an account of the dream-experience as the 'dream-report.' The object of research, then, would seem to be not the dream as a subjective-experience, and not even an account of that experience, but the account given regardless of its correspondence to the dream-experience: the 'dream-report'.¹⁹³ This explanation of the object of research as the dream-report is also consonant with Freud's use of the method of association. He typically presents the text of the dream-report, and proceeds to interpret each of the elements of the text in conjunction with the associations provided by the patient in relation to it. In this way,

¹⁹² XV, 85.

¹⁹³ What is here referred to as the dream-report would be referred to by Freud as the 'manifest content' of the dream, or 'manifest dream-content'. However, the difficulty in adopting this terminology is that Freud sometimes uses it to refer to what the dreamer tells him, and sometimes uses it to refer to the dream-experience. The term 'dream-report' has, as discussed above, the advantage of meaning exclusively the first of these possibilities. Freud's ambiguity on this point can be seen when he says "We will describe what the dream (sic.) actually tells us as the *manifest dream-content*, and the concealed material, which we hope to reach by pursuing the ideas that occur to the dreamer, as the *latent dream-thoughts*" (XV, 120 Freud's Emphasis). Here, he appears to by-pass the interpretee by not saying that it is the dreamer who tells him, instead supposing that he has direct access to the dream-experience. It is the dream *itself* that tells him. The latent dream-thoughts, or latent content, are the meaning of the dream-report given that it is the meaning of the dream-report that the interpreter hopes to reach by pursuing the ideas that occur to the dream-report given that it is the meaning of the dream-report that the interpreter hopes to reach by pursuing the ideas that occur to the dream-report given that it is the meaning of the dream-report that the interpreter hopes to reach by pursuing the ideas that occur to the dream-report to the dreamer.

the associations together with the dream-report constitute the object of interpretation in practice, for they are interpreted together with the elements of the dream-report. So, 'the' object of research understood to be the dream-report is really *an* object of interpretation, it is not *the* object of interpretation. In other words, it gets interpreted but it is not *all* that gets interpreted. The dream-report gets interpreted *together* with the associations, which are always associations to the dream-report. They are not associations to the dream-experience; Freud typically alights on an element of the dream-report and asks the interprete to associate to it, and the associations are what the patient says in response to being asked to obey the fundamental rule of analysis. Freud describes this rule in terms of letting one's mind wander:

We pledge him to obey the *fundamental rule* of analysis, which is henceforward to govern his behaviour towards us. He is to tell us not only what he can say intentionally and willingly, what will give him relief like a confession, but everything else as well that his self-observation yields him, everything that comes into his head, even if it is disagreeable for him to say it, even if it seems to him *unimportant* or actually *nonsensical*. If he can succeed after this injunction in putting his self-criticism out of action, he will present us with a mass of material – thoughts, ideas, recollections – which are already subject to the influence of the unconscious...¹⁹⁴

The interpretee in so far as he obeys this fundamental rule must *tell* the interpreter everything that comes into his head. The interpreter cannot check that the fundamental rule is being obeyed, he must take as the associations that which the patient says regardless of whether it is a genuine account of what comes into his head.

Dream-interpretation therefore deals with a *linguistic* phenomenon: the dream-report, and associations. Marcia Cavell, for one, recognises the distinction we wish to capture at the beginning of chapter two of her book. She says, in a passage clearly influenced by H. P. Grice's seminal paper "Meaning", that:

Let's begin with Freud's first systematic exploration of the unconscious, *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900), noting that interpretation is a form of explanation appropriate only to texts or doings or utterances that are meaningful, meaningful not only to an interpreter but also to the creature who is their author. Wet streets, thunder, a sore throat, a suspicious-looking rash are meaningful to us. So in a different sense are the

¹⁹⁴ XXIII, 174.

words of a parrot. But since in none of these cases is there an agent who might mean something by them, interpretation is not in order.¹⁹⁵

Throughout The Interpretation of Dreams and the discussion of dreams in his work more broadly, Freud wavers between addressing interpretable phenomena of this kind and phenomena where there is no agent. This latter group includes the subjective visual experience of dreaming itself, or the psychological and biological processes that give rise to the experience of dreaming. Of course, one could use the term 'meaning' in a looser sense applied to these phenomena, but that would be to deviate from the literal meaning of Die Traumdeutung. To translate this phrase as 'The Interpretation of Dreams', while correct, is to specify a far narrower field of inquiry than the book itself ranges over. Yet Freud himself seems to deviate from regarding 'Die Traumdeutung' in a literal way. In his explication of what interpretation means, for example, at one point he employs the notion of 'meaning'. He says, "for 'interpreting a dream implies assigning a 'meaning' to it - that is, replacing it by something which fits into the chain of our mental acts as a link having a validity and importance equal to the rest."¹⁹⁶ What seems to occur in Freud's approach to interpretation, however, are many equivocations on this notion of 'meaning' involved in interpretation. That is, he runs many senses of meaning together, just in the way that H. P. Grice¹⁹⁷ generally and Cavell after him in the specifically Freudian context, warn us not to do. Of course, there is good reason to think that this was not just an oversight on Freud's part, but that it was a rhetorical expression of his hope that a future interdisciplinary science would link up all of these various kinds of meaning.¹⁹⁸ After all, Freud attempts to give a total explanation of dreams, not merely an account of interpretation or the meaning in the narrow sense. He wishes to provide a unified account of biological, phenomenological, psychological and linguistic phenomena involved in the topic of dreaming. To this ambitious end, in the light of his claim that dreams have a 'meaning', he often blurs just the kind of distinction made by Grice and Cavell. An important part of our approach is to distil Freud's

¹⁹⁵ Cavell, 1993, p. 44

¹⁹⁶ IV, 96.

¹⁹⁷ For different senses of 'meaning', see H. P. Grice, "Meaning" in *Philosophical Review*, Vol. 66, pp.377-88, reprinted in P.F. Strawson (ed.), *Philosophical Logic*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1967.

¹⁹⁸ See for example, Patricia Kitcher, *Freud's Dream*, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England, M.I.T. Press, 1992. In her interdisciplinary account, Kitcher does not address Freud's equivocation on the notion of meaning. The importance of her analysis for our purposes is that it provides a rationale for such an equivocation.

discussion of interpretation from the constantly shifting contexts that are ambiguous between the various topics related to dreaming. We approach the matter on the presupposition that a biological process is not interpretable, a phenomenological state is not interpretable, nor are psychological states interpretable. What are interpretable, instead, are utterances and behaviour *by means of* positing psychological states; by attributing, that is to say, beliefs and desires as motives for the spoken or written dream-report. What Freud actually interprets, after all, are linguistic and behavioural phenomena despite the ambiguity surrounding the notion of meaning. Cavell goes on to make this point later in her book, laying the emphasis just as Freud—at times—does on the notion of speech:

In their attempt to clarify some very basic questions about interpretation, philosophers tend to focus on less problematic cases. This may make their accounts lopsided. Yet the psychoanalyst, faced with speech that is somehow displaced or distorted is apt to neglect the background against which disfigured speech can be recognized as a form of *speech*, that is, as communicating mental content. A man complains of the nuisance created by "miracled birds," which he says are composed of the "the fore-courts of heaven." A woman says that someone is making a hubbub in her stomach. Finding out what they mean comes with tracing lines of sense to other of their utterances that are less puzzling. Freud's genius was to show how, by making adjustments in a familiar model of interpretation, we can fit it to behaviour we had thought unintelligible.¹⁹⁹

Norman Malcolm is another philosopher who recognises that Freud's general approach to *dreams* differed from his approach to dream-*interpretation*. The latter Malcolm holds to be compatible with his own analysis of dreaming, which disallows the intelligibility of statements pertaining to the experience of the dream. He concludes instead that the dream is nothing more than the "telling"²⁰⁰ of the dream. Quoting the comment from *Introductory Lectures* that the object of research must be taken to be what the interprete says, Malcolm points us towards this very distinction as it pertains to interpretation in Freud's work. He says, "What he is saying, in effect, is that if one tries to conceive of a dream as a process or occurrence quite independent of the dream report, to which the latter may or may not correspond, then psychoanalytic practice has nothing to do with such a conception."²⁰¹ Putting aside the issue of his peculiar analysis of dreaming itself, we may say that Malcolm is rightly emphasising the bifurcation between interpretation and Freud's general

²⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁹⁹ Cavell, 1993, p. 88 (Cavell's Emphasis)

Norman Malcolm, *Dreaming*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1959, p. 122.

investigation into dreams, and right to hold that interpretation is concerned with the 'telling' of the dream, that is say, the dream-report.

2.2 Division of the Dream-Report into Dream-Elements at the Discretion of the Interpreter

What gets interpreted, then, is what the interpretee says as the dream-report, not as a whole however but broken into parts, which we will refer to as 'dream-elements.' The patient utters the words that constitute the dream-report, and the dream-elements are constituted in some way from these words. But how, exactly are they so constituted? Usually the dream-report as uttered by the interpretee does not make sense; the sense is instead presumed "hidden". The job of the interpreter is to give sense to the whole dreamreport by means of making sense of the dream-elements. As Freud tells us in Introductory Lectures: "Interpreting means finding a hidden sense in something."202 So what, then, is a 'dream-element'? Well, we can say that it is a part of the dream-report that gets interpreted. But what kind of part? Given that the dream-report is a linguistic phenomenon, we might say that a dream-element must correspond either to a word, a phrase, a sentence or a passage. To everyday linguistic units, that is. For example, in the interpretation of the dream-report of Irma's Injection, Freud takes a word as a dream-element element: Dysentery. He also takes a sentence as a dream-element: A portion of the skin on the left shoulder was infiltrated. He also treats a passage in the same way: I took her to the window to look down her throat. She showed some recalcitrance, like women with false teeth. I thought to myself that really there was no need for her to do that. In the dream of the Coal in the Stalls, furthermore, a phrase that is part of a sentence is treated as a dream-element: ... it would be so long. The same thing occurs in the interpretation of the dream of Irma's injection, in which Dysentery and No matter are further examples of how passages are initially taken as dream-elements, and then some of the words that make them up are taken as dream-elements. In short, there is no strict correspondence between the linguistic parts of the dream-report and the dream-elements of the dream-report. That is to say, the dreamelements do not correspond to the linguistic parts in the sense that the dream-elements are not identified with individual words, though a dream-element may be a word. The same holds for the phrases, sentences and passages that all together comprise the dream-report.

Rather, what gets interpreted are the dream-elements of the dream-report, but the dreamelements cannot be treated as equivalent to any one of the kinds of linguistic unit uttered by the patient, of which the dream-report is comprised. The selection of any linguistic unit as an element is dependent only on the interpreter's discretion. It might seem strange that the notion of a dream element does not seem to be identifiable with any linguistic unit even though it is a part of the dream report and the linguistic units are themselves part of the dream-report. Freud's approach is rather that he has no grounds for stipulating beforehand what constitutes a priori a dream-element, so he allows the individuation of the elements to go hand in hand with the progress of the interpretation. In other words, what defines an 'element' is not decided by a 'bottom-up' approach, which would mirror the linguistic units of the dream-report, but is rather decided from the 'top-down' in terms of the emerging sense given to the dream-report. Or to put the same point in another way, an element is decided upon by the overall process of interpretation, which involves selecting parts of the dream-report as a unit of interpretation and then considering them in the context of the evolving interpretation. We are therefore ultimately dealing with the interpreter's discretion, or what Freud refers to in the following terms:

If instead of the interpreter's arbitrary choice you would speak of his skill, his experience and his understanding, I should agree with you. We cannot, of course, do without a personal factor of that kind, especially in the more difficult problems of dream-interpretation... What in other ways gives an impression of arbitrariness – in for instance the interpretation of symbols – is done away with by the fact that as a rule the interconnection between the dream-thoughts, or the connection between the dream and the dreamer's life, or the whole psychical situation in which the dream occurs, selects a single one from among the possible determinations and dismisses the rest as unserviceable.²⁰³

2.3 Freud's Instruction to Self-Observe: The Ratiocinative Activity in Self-Observation

If the object of interpretation is speech, interpretable according to the pattern of practical reasoning found in common-sense psychology, then it means that interpretation should proceed according to a practical reasoning pattern. This implies that interpretation is a ratiocinative activity. Now, the example by which Freud attempts to teach us his method of dream-interpretation, the famous interpretation of the dream-report of Irma's injection,

²⁰³ XV, 229.

prima facie poses some problems in this regard. There are certain features of the preface to the interpretation, and indeed in the course of the interpretation itself, that obscure its ratiocinative nature. These features would in fact appear to prevent treating interpretation as an reasoning of any sort. In order to proceed with our account, we need to nip this problem in the bud. So, let us preface *our* reading of Freud's interpretation with a word or two about the way in which Freud prefaces *his* interpretation of the dream-report of Irma's injection. His preface assumes that the meaning of the dream-report is not transparent—is not clear—to the interpretee, Freud himself in this case. It counsels us in the best way to arrive at the meaning of the dream-report—a meaning which it is assumed to possess—despite this lack of transparency. Freud appears to be offering us something that lies outside Reason, as he exhorts us to 'self-observe'. He says:

In reflection there is one more psychical activity at work than in the most attentive self-observation, and this is shown amongst other things in the tense looks and wrinkled forehead of a person pursuing his reflections as compared with the restful expression of a self-observer. In both cases attention must be concentrated, but the man who is reflecting is also exercising his *critical* faculty; this leads him to reject some of the ideas that occur to him after perceiving them, to cut short others without following the trains of thought which they would open up to him, and to behave in such a way towards still others that they may never become conscious at all and are accordingly suppressed before being perceived. The self-observer on the other hand need only take the trouble to suppress his critical faculty. If he succeeds in doing that, innumerable ideas come into his consciousness of which he could otherwise never have got hold. The material which is in this way freshly obtained for his self-perception makes it possible to interpret both his pathological ideas and his dream-structures.²⁰⁴

Yet, the ratiocinative nature of Freud's method of discovering the meaning slowly becomes evident as the interpretation progresses, though this is obscured by this distinction with which Freud prefaces the interpretation between self-*observing* and self-*reflecting*. Freud does quote Schiller's comment that Reason "relaxes its watch upon the gates, and the ideas rush in pell-mell, and only then does it look them through and examine them in mass."²⁰⁵ But he does not lay any weight at all in any explicit way on this sorting duty of Reason in self-observation. In fact, this problem is reflected in the interpretation of one particular dream-element. It is *Dr M. was pale, had a clean-shaven chin and walked with a limp*. In his

²⁰⁴ IV, 101-102.

prefatory remarks to the interpretation, Freud lays great emphasis on the importance of selfobservation against the notion of self-reflection. Yet, in the text of the interpretation following this element in Standard Edition, Freud would appear to briefly stop selfobserving, and reflect on what association has produced. He says, "There must, I reflected, have been some reason for my fusing into one the two figures in the dream."206 Our first thought, of course, in resolving this doubt is to consider the possibility of translator's error. "I reflected" is, in fact, Strachey's interpolation, which does not occur in the German: "Es muß einen Grund haben, daß ich die beiden Personen im Traume zu einer einzigen verschmelze." 207 It would indeed be strange to find Freud stopping every so often to reflect given that his introduction of his method contains the prefatory distinction between selfobserving and self-reflecting. He says, "I have noticed in my psychoanalytical work that the whole frame of mind of a man who is reflecting is totally different from that of a man who is observing his own psychical processes."208 Given this explicit warning to us that interpretation requires the exclusion of a state of self-reflection in favour of a state of selfobservation, the situation appears particularly puzzling. It is surely not conducive to the establishment of a state of self-observation that one stop-start one's way through the interpretation in terms of alternating attempts at self-observation followed by self-reflection. It would be strange, then, if Freud were to stop his chain of association in accordance with the fundamental rule of analysis, and begin to posit reflectively explanations of thoughts that occurred to him-'the rejection of a certain suggestion' in this instance. Is it the case then that Freud is immediately undermining his prefatory comments that appear to counsel a nonratiocinative state of self-observation as the method he employs by stopping and starting to reflect every so often according to the many instances of 'If-then' form that crop up in the interpretation?

Indeed, as we shall presently articulate, these if-then instances actually cohere to form a pattern of inferences along the lines of a genealogical tree. How can such *evidence* of

²⁰⁵ IV, 103.

²⁰⁶ IV, 112.

²⁰⁷ Sigmund Freud, *Gesammelte Werke*, Band 2, p.117, Vols. 1- 17 London, Imago, 1942–52. Reprinted by S. Fischer Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1960-. A.A. Brill's translation for example, is: "There must be some reason why I fuse the two persons into one in my dream." Sigmund Freud *The Interpretation of Dreams*, A.A. Brill (trans.) Wordsworth Classics, Ware, England, 1997. p. 25.

inferences, and thus reflection, be reconciled with the exhortation to a state-for it is a state that Freud claims is required-of self-observation exclusive of self-reflection? We might say that it is possible to impose a pattern of apparent inference on the material that follows the wandering of Freud's mind in association, and provides a link between the various associations. In other words, we might say that the material that comes to light merely lends itself to explication in terms of a series of inferences, in terms of the implicit conditional statements that serve to characterise such inferences. But, we might say, Freud is not actually inferring these connections, he is merely passively recognising the appropriateness to each other of the antecedent and the consequent in these statements. And recognising the appropriateness of parts of the material to other parts of the material, we might claim, rather than inferring a link, corresponds better to Freud's prefacing comments. This attempted way-out can be questioned, however. We might well be asked 'What is the character of this so-called recognising? What then can we say? Well, we could maintain that the conscious inferential connotation that Strachey's interpolation of 'reflect' into Freud's attempt to interpret the element Dr M. was pale ... etc. supplies is not warranted, simply because it is not present in the German. Yet, perhaps Strachey's interpolation is nonetheless warranted. For, in that instance, Freud does not explicitly tell us that he is making a hypothesis, but instead uses a sentence of if-then form to convey what drifts into his head. Let us say, then, that there is an implicit conditional statement that could indeed be construed as part of an inference. It indeed reflects recognition of the appropriateness between parts of the material by Freud as the interpretee. Against this line of thinking, however, the following point may be made. The important point from the perspective of Freud's here-supposed recognition, is not that no inferences are carried out at all; but rather that no inferences are carried out that the interpretee-in this case Freud-is aware of trying to make. This formulation shows that Strachey in spirit at least is on to something. In fact, the if-then instances that repeatedly come to light as the interpretation unfolds are evidence to suggest that Freud is latently reflecting despite the fact that he is not aware of any attempt on his part to reflect. In other words, that the maxim that we must only self-observe and not self-reflect could well be construed as a maxim that we must not interfere with the latent reflection that will inevitably go on. This is consistent with Freud's position, even if he does not explicitly come out and

²⁰⁸ IV, 101.

say it. Indeed, the tenor of his prefatory comments about the 'gates of reason' would incline us to think that he views himself as doing something different from ratiocinating. However, as we will see below, his practice presents interpretation as a ratiocinative activity in spite of the fact that his sometimes-explicit pronouncements give the opposite impression.²⁰⁹

This reading is also supported by the dream-report that plays the corresponding role in Freud's short work, *On Dreams*. This is the interpretation of the *Table D'Hôte* dream-report, again dreamt and interpreted by Freud himself. In the shorter work, the discussion concerning the paradigm dream-report that is offered initially seems to count against the view that Freud is using inference *at all*. In his summing up of his interpretation of this dream-report, for example, Freud says:

By following the associations which arose from the separate elements of the dream divorced from their context, I arrived at a number of thoughts and recollections, which I could not fail to recognise as important products of my mental life. This material revealed by the analysis of the dream was intimately connected with the dream's content, yet the connection was of such a kind that I could never have inferred the fresh material from that content. The dream was unemotional, disconnected and unintelligible; but while I was producing the thoughts behind the dream, I was aware of intense and well-founded affective impulses; the thoughts themselves fell at once into logical chains, in which certain central ideas made their appearance more than once.²¹⁰

When Freud says, "I could never have inferred the fresh material from the [dream] content", it might be argued that Freud does not exclude that he could have inferred the connection with the associations and the dream-content together. Yet, in this passage, Freud seems to *contrast* the procedure of association—"By following the associations"—with the making of hypotheses rather than suggest that the two possible aspects—association and inference—are complimentary. So it looks as though he is ruling out the presence of rational activity, characteristic of inference, in the carrying-out of the interpretation. Freud tells us that it was the thoughts *themselves* that fell into logical chains, *he* did *not* impose such a structure on them. In this instance, it seems that Freud holds that letting one's mind wander in free association *alone* can bring intelligible trains of thought to light that can be *recognised*, apparently through self-observation, by the interpretee. We find a further example of this

 ²⁰⁹ This is the kind of apparent ambiguity addressed by Frank Cioffi, and discussed below in section four.
 ²¹⁰ V, 639-640.

kind of approach in The Interpretation of Dreams in the interpretation of the dream-report of the Botanical Monograph in which the ratiocinative pattern also emerges, yet prima facie the interpretation is nothing more than a description of unstructured association. The point is, of course, that letting one's mind wander in free association does not exclude that inferences took place at a non-conscious (if-you-will-'unconscious') level, and that this is how Freud recognises the logical relations in the material. In fact, what all of this goes to show, in the interpretation of Irma's Injection, and Table D'Hôte from On Dreams etc. is precisely the ratiocinative nature of the process that emerges in self-observation. In all of these examples, Freud self-observes as he non-consciously sorts all of the data into "logical" chains. What the text of the interpretation of this dream-report and the interpretation of the dream-report of Irma's Injection amounts to is latent inferential activity, which is misleadingly presented as a "relaxation of the watch upon the gates of Reason."²¹¹ What takes the place of conscious reflection as Freud gives himself over to "self-observation" is, we conclude, latent reflection. The inferential patterns of the text of the Irma dream, which we bring to light presently, bear this out. Coming up with a meaning for the dream-report, in so far as it does not involve any conscious reflection, is akin to another example often pointed out by Freud. The example in question is that of solving an intellectual problem, when one is not aware of the various inferential steps that we suppose have taken place latently. Freud claims that such an activity is an activity of an unconscious state. In discussing the status of consciousness in the late "Some Elementary Lessons in Psycho-Analysis", he says:

We all know what is meant by ideas 'occurring' to one – thoughts that suddenly come into consciousness without one's being aware of the steps that led up to them, though they too, must have been psychical acts. It can even happen that one arrives in this way at the solution to some difficult intellectual problem which has previously for a time baffled one's efforts. All the complicated processes of selection, rejection and decision which occupied the interval were withdrawn from consciousness. We shall not be putting forward any new theory in saying that they were unconscious and perhaps, too, remained so.²¹²

It is our contention that as far as the interpretation of the dream of Irma's objection goes, this is what happens. What *appears* to be self-observation is actually this ratiocinative activity manifesting itself in terms of a series of inferences on Freud's part. These inferences

²¹¹ IV, 103. ²¹² XXIII, 283-284. mesh together to form a tree, thus corresponding to the illustration of the method of interpretation in terms of a genealogical tree put forward by Freud in "The Aetiology of Hysteria." They can in turn be explicated in terms of the practical reason syllogism used in the everyday common-sense analysis of action *and speech*. What takes place in the interpretation of the dream-report of Irmas' Injection, after all, is that as Freud associates in relation to the elements of the dream-report, he expresses the thoughts that come to mind by writing down, generally though not exclusively, sentences. He explicitly tells us how he expresses the associations in written text. With reference to his own ability to free associate, he says, "I myself can do so very completely, by the help of writing down my ideas as they occur to me."²¹³ What Freud is faced with, then, is the interpretation of his own written sentences. And as we earlier noted, he considers writing to be a member of the broad category of speech.

2.4 Saying One Thing by Saying Another: Interpretation as Bringing to Light the Pattern of Rational Action in the Spoken or Written Dream-Report.

Having shown that there are various considerations that point to the fact that we are interpreting speech in dream-interpretation, we will now bring to light how the practical syllogism evident in the interpretation of speech is implicit in the text of the interpretation of the dream-report of Irma's Injection. The practical syllogism, of course, features in the interpretation of action in the following way: A desires an apple, A believes that if she goes to the orchard then she will get an apple. Therefore, A desires to go to the orchard. Schematically represented, it is P, if Q then P, therefore Q. As we earlier saw, it has been disputed by Alexander that this form of explanation is at all applicable as a model of psychoanalytic explanation of behaviour because of the queer belief status that menaces 'if Q then P'. In the example discussed, this was the belief that 'If he lunges at the lamppost, then he kills his father'. Hopkins points out that this pattern of practical reasoning is applicable to the interpretation of speech. He says:

We also apply the same sort of patterned explanation to actions involving speech. Thus consider someone uttering 'The day is warm' because she wants to say that the day is warm. Here we have:

A desires that **P** [that she say that the day is warm]

A believes that if Q then P [that if she utters 'The day is warm' she says that the day is warm]

A desires that Q [that she utters 'The day is warm']²¹⁴

Now, we want to argue that this is essentially the way in which Freud interprets the speech that constitutes the dream-report and the associations, the only difference being one of degree: the pattern gets more and more complicated. Hopkins's analysis of dream-interpretation, as we have seen above, follows from his recognition of the difficulty of applying common-sense psychology straightforwardly as a means of dream-interpretation. He chooses to focus not on the application of the pattern of practical reasoning from common-sense psychology, but instead on the application of a pattern of *wishful thinking*, also present in common-sense psychology. Hopkins views psychoanalytic interpretation as understanding the material of dream-interpretation as a divergence from the normal pattern of the satisfaction of a desire in rational action by a "short-circuiting"²¹⁵ of **D*** above; this short circuiting is driven by the imagination in terms of **wff** as explained above. We, however, wish to argue that the normal pattern of rational action is present in terms of **PR** patterns, and in psychoanalytic interpretation these are *extended* rather than short-circuited in the interpretation of speech.

To achieve this, we need to explicate how the interpretation of the dream-report of Irma's Injection fits into the practical-syllogism pattern when it is considered as the interpretation of speech. In Freud's interpretation of the dream-report of Irma's Injection, there are a number of thematic groups. Three of these have been highlighted for the purposes of exposition. They are: (1) a series of *ad hominem* criticisms by which Freud mocks his colleagues, (2) a series of instances in which Irma's continued illness is credited to factors other than Freud's treatment and (3) a series of self-justifications. In terms of the motives that come to light in the context of the interpretation of the dream-report of Irma's Injection, our general point goes like this. In the course of the interpretation, Freud repeatedly asks himself 'what could be my reason for such-and-such?' And he typically answers, 'Yes, so-and-so would be a reason.' These sometimes-explicit and sometimes-implicit self-

²¹⁴ Hopkins, 1996, p. 90

²¹⁵ Hopkins, 1996, p. 96

questionings on Freud's part-pondering his 'reason' for a dream-element or an association-may be unpacked in terms of speech. In other words, what does it mean to ask oneself what would be a reason for such and such, Q, Q*, Q**? It amounts to asking oneself how could one explain such and such according to the PR syllogism, in roughly the following way. Firstly, working in reverse from that which is said back to the motive, interpretation proceeds by asking, roughly, 'Why do I say Q these mocking things about my colleagues? Maybe I believe that that if I say Q mocking things about my colleagues then I say that P I am not responsible. So maybe I want to say that P I am not responsible.' (What could be my reason for Q? Yes, P would be, if it were the case, a reason for Q)-"Why do I say that Q* Irma's illness is due to other factors? Maybe I believe that by saying Q* that the illness is due to other factors then I am saying that P I am not responsible. So maybe I am again saying that P I am not responsible.' (What could be my reason for Q*? Yes, P, were it the case, would be a reason for Q*)- Why do I make Q** these self-justificatory comments? Maybe I believe that if I make Q** these self-justificatory comments then I am saying that P I am not responsible. So maybe I am saying that P I am not responsible for the third time.' (What could be my reason for Q**? Yes, P, were it the case, would be a reason for Q^{**}). The issue of not being responsible plays the role of the root as a genealogical tree clearly emerges, with P appearing repeatedly in the same role in all three explanations. It is in virtue of P featuring as the root of the tree that the inference is made that therefore P is the case, and accordingly the meaning (or part of it) of the dream-report is that 'I am not responsible'. In this case, we have started from the content of the material that crops up in the dream-report and the chain of association, and worked backwards to the root motive. But it is from the root motive P forward that the pattern of the practical syllogism can be seen. Working backwards to the motive effectively warrants the interpreter in inferring that if the practical-syllogism pattern were present and operating in a forward direction, then it would account for that which is said in the dream-report and associations. This is, in effect, a kind of inference to the best explanation. More specifically, it is inference to the best practicalreason pattern that would, were it the case, explain the utterances that constitute the dreamreport and the association.

Let us now see how the extension of the practical reasoning pattern is present by starting from the root motive going forwards to the dream-report rather than from the utterance and working backwards. Roughly speaking, it goes something like this. Letting 'F' stand for Freud, F desires P to say that he cannot be held responsible. F believes that if Q/Q*/Q** (he says mocking things about others, says the illness due to other factors, justifies himself) then P (he is saying that he cannot be held responsible). Therefore F desires O/O*/O** (he says mocking things about others, says the illness is due to other factors, justifies himself). In the psychoanalytic case, the syllogism seems more complicated not only in virtue of the length of the tree, but also because it leads to a very oblique way of expressing oneself. Putting oneself in Freud's shoes it goes like this: I want to say that I am not responsible, but I do not say straightforwardly that I am not responsible. What I do instead is say that the others are worthy of criticism, thus implying that their views are worthless and so they are in no position to hold me responsible. Again, I say that the illness is organic, thus implying that I cannot be held responsible for its origination. Again, I justify myself, thus implying that I did everything possible to help the patient and could not therefore be held responsible for her failure to recover. In other words, in order to say one thing the interpretee says another, or several others. These deviations from straightforward expression are perfectly in line with practical reasoning. In order to say that I am not responsible, I can rationally try to do this by saying these other things as long as I have a motive for not expressing myself straightforwardly. In order to address these questions, and link them to broader aspects of Freud's approach to dream-interpretation, let us re-deploy with slight alterations the kind of formal structure introduced by Hopkins, and extend it for our own ends for added precision. We could say that the syllogism is extended by the insertion of another variable:

F desires that **P** [that he say that he cannot be held responsible]

F believes that if Q then P [that if he says that his colleagues are worthy of criticism then he is saying that he cannot be held responsible]

F desires that Q [that he say that his colleagues are worthy of criticism]

F believes that if \mathbf{R} then \mathbf{Q} [that if he utters 'my colleagues are worthy of criticism' then he says that his colleagues are worthy of criticism]

F desires that **R** [that he utter 'My colleagues are worthy of criticism']

R [F utters 'My colleagues are worthy of criticism']

Of course, even this is too simple. For, Freud does *not* utter **R** 'my colleagues are worthy of criticism'; he is even more indirect. He utters instead 'do you remember the dysentery incident' or suchlike, if we may paraphrase the group of associations mocking his colleagues for the sake of ease of exposition.²¹⁶ The psychoanalytic pattern, then, looks more like this:

F desires that P [that he say that he cannot be held responsible]

F believes that if Q then P [that if he says his colleagues are worthy of criticism then he says that he cannot be held responsible]

F desires that Q [that he say that his colleagues are worthy of criticism]

F believes that if S then Q [that if he utters 'Do you remember the dysentery incident' then he says that his colleagues are worthy of criticism]

F desires that S [that he utter 'Do you remember the dysentery incident?']

S [F utters 'Do you remember the dysentery incident'] as part of the dream-report and the associations.

The syllogism even in this form is missing something; there has to be a step where he says rather than utters 'do you remember the dysentery incident?' So, the full pattern would go as follows:

F desires that **P** [that he say that he cannot be held responsible]

F believes that if Q then P [that if he says his colleagues are worthy of criticism then he says that he cannot be held responsible]

F desires that Q [that he say that his colleagues are worthy of criticism]

F believes that if T then Q [that if he says do you remember the dysentery incident? then he says that his colleagues are worthy of criticism]

F desires that T [that he say do you remember the dysentery incident?]

F believes that if S then T [that if he utters 'Do you remember the dysentery incident?' then he says do you remember the dysentery incident?]

F desires that S [that he utter 'Do you remember the dysentery incident]

S [F utters 'Do you remember the dysentery incident'] as part of the dream-report and associations.

In carrying out an interpretation, if we start at the utterance that comprises along with other utterances the dream-report and the associations, then we can move from that utterance right back up to the original motive of desiring to say that he cannot be held responsible. To

²¹⁶ In the non-paraphrased version in the section below containing our close reading of the dream-report of the interpretation of Irma's Injection, some of the variables above are given different values.

go in this direction would be to follow the direction of the simpler version with which we began our analysis. In interpretation of the utterance with which the interpreter is presented, he proceeds in this manner. Proceeding in this manner, there is a clear indirectness about the operation of the motives that the interpreter is led to posit in such a pattern. It would be too hasty, on this basis alone however, to claim that there was an *irrationality* about the psychoanalytic version of the practical syllogism, or that it necessitates the invocation of a queer belief at any point. We are not obliged to ask 'Isn't it still irrational despite the attempts of psychoanalysis to make it rational, to say something in such a queer way?'— as Alexander's objection would have it. For we could instead, with perfect rationality, ask 'Why would anyone say something in such a queer way?' Or, 'What good/sufficient reason would someone have for saying something in such a queer way? To account for this increasingly oblique way of expressing oneself, that is, we could simply follow Freud in the following way. We might characterise this obliqueness in the saying of the dream-report and the associations, to use one of Freud's terms, as corresponding to '*displacement*' manifest in the interpretation.

2.5 Displacement-First Discussion

There are two key points to be made as regards displacement: (1) it corresponds to a feature of the everyday use of language and (2) in the everyday case it is a form of saying something in the face of censorship. Freud indicates that there are many different forms of displacement.²¹⁷ He primarily refers, however, to a specific feature of interpretation with the term 'displacement': namely that the meaning of the dream-report to which the interpretation leads is unlike the uninterpreted dream-report. This relation of unlikeliness, the terms at either end of which of which are referred to by Freud also with the term 'allusion', is that the interpretation can lead to something that has apparently nothing in common with the element from which the interpreter started.²¹⁸ In our terms, this is that

²¹⁷ There are several features of the interpretation that Freud refers to as 'displacement' that we do not have space to discuss above. For example, the 'strange-centring' of the interpretation in comparison to the dreamreport, which we do not dwell on above, and 'verbal' displacement. There also seems to be a notion of displacement of medium, which Freud does not discuss in his work but would seem to have been in evidence in our response to Alexander. The basic idea is that rather than saying something in one medium, one says it in a different medium, such as using gestures rather than speech. The table-cloth lady being a case in point.

²¹⁸ It might perhaps be thought that it is the associations that 'lead somewhere'. However, it would be a mistake to think this. The associations simply occur one after another; they can be said to lead anywhere only

what the interpretation reveals the interpretee as saying by means of the dream-report is unlike what the interpretee is saying in the dream-report. This is the obliqueness of expression reflected in the difference between the beginning and the end of the **PR** syllogism. In *Introductory Lectures*, Freud presents this phenomenon as follows:

It manifests itself in two ways: in the first, a latent element is replaced not by a component part of itself but by something more remote – that is, by an allusion; and in the second, the psychical accent is shifted from an important element on to another which is unimportant, so that the dream appears differently centred and strange.²¹⁹

Regarding this feature of 'allusion', Freud makes the point that the phenomenon of interpretation leading to a meaning that is often unrelated in 'subject-matter' to the element from which the interpreter began occurs also in our everyday life, or 'waking thought':

Replacing something by an allusion to it is a process familiar in our waking thought as well, but there is a difference. In waking thought the allusion must be easily intelligible, and the subject must be related in its subject-matter to the genuine thing it stands for.²²⁰

Freud gives the examples of jokes, and says that 'they' make use of this notion of allusion. It would seem more appropriate to say that the *teller* in making the joke makes use of allusion. That is to say, that allusion amounts to what we call oblique speech on the part of the teller; and 'displacement' is a feature of making sense of the joke carried out by the listerner.

Freud says that the dream-report is more extreme in so far as it does not only rely on 'external' connections, but it also relaxes the condition of intelligibility. But intelligibility is not an absolute notion, as the distinction between a good and a bad joke teaches us; bad jokes, for all that they supposedly lack in intelligibility, are still understandable. The range of intelligibility is one that is within the scope of everyday comprehension. We can view the dream-report as a kind of 'bad joke', which may not strike us immediately as intelligible, but whose intelligibility can be unearthed. Freud says:

²¹⁹ XV, 174.

in virtue of being made sense of by the interpretation. This distinction arises in the context of our discussion of Frank Cioffi in section four below.

²²⁰ Ibid.

Jokes, too, often make use of allusion. They drop the precondition of there being an being an association in subject-matter, and replace it by unusual external associations such as similarity of sound, verbal ambiguity and so on. But they retain the condition of intelligibility: a joke would lose all its efficiency if the path back from the allusion to the genuine thing could not be followed easily. The allusions employed for displacement in dreams have set themselves free from both of these restrictions. They are connected with the element they replace by the most external and remote relations and are therefore unintelligible; and when they are undone, their interpretation gives the impression of being a bad joke or of an arbitrary and forced explanation dragged in by the hair of its head. For the dream-censorship only gains if it succeeds in making it impossible to find the path back from the allusion to the genuine thing.²²¹

It as if the dream-report were joke that had its intelligibility weakened to an extreme degree, a bad joke. The reason why it is not instead a good joke, is of course the presence of the censorship. Jokes, of course, are an obvious way of saying something in an indirect, tactful way. Displacement in interpretation, then, as revealing a degree of indirectness in the allusion suggests a parallel between the dream-report and a linguistic phenomenon taken from everyday life, a linguistic phenomenon that is a classic form of saying something in the face of censorship. The dream-report would accordingly appear to be an exaggeration of this everyday linguistic phenomenon, but rather than reject it on those grounds, Freud's response is to *pursue* his interpretation in terms of motives. He wonders what could be the motive for such an exaggeration, and realises that were censorship to make its influence felt there would be such a motive.

Why should such oblique saying occur and require an interpretation involving the concept of displacement to detect it? On an everyday level, in terms of saying one thing by means of another, this is a notion familiar from contexts in which censorship takes place. So, the syllogism represents a common-sense, everyday psychological approach to language which leads quite obviously to the key Freudian concepts of displacement and censorship. As regards Alexander's objection, the illogical step, it might be argued, is in the queer belief that by saying one thing I am saying another. Yet, while such a belief may at times be queer, it is not necessarily queer. That is, this step can be given a rational parallel precisely by comparison with the notion of censorship; it presupposes, of course, that there are

²²¹ XV, 174.

conventions that allow the censored 'writer' to communicate with his target audience, if the step is to be rational. So it might strike us as strange, it does not mean that there is any queer belief required, and this strangeness was the bane of the explanation of the symptom that seemed to stand in the way of rationalizing it in common-sense psychological terms. But with the concept of the censor we can apply the notion of oblique expression in a way that appears to show us how the strangeness of expression was coherently motivated.²²²

2.6 Wish-Fulfilment in Relation to the Dream-Report

The final question, before we pursue our in-depth analysis of the interpretation of the dream of Irma's injection, regards what the interpretee is considered as saying by means of the dream-report at the end of this pattern. That is, why does Freud *say* by means of the dream-report that he is not responsible for Irma's illness when it is not true, or at least he does not think it to be true. An explanation for this would be the following. It is that he says he is not to be held responsible because he *wishes* not to be held responsible. This linguistic approach is reflected in the grammatical categories of the indicative and the optative with which Freud characterises the notion of wish-fulfilment in *On Dreams*. Unfortunately, Freud's references to wish-fulfilment in the context of interpretation are instances of his willful equivocation between interpreting the dream-report and investigating the dream as a phenomenological experience. For example, he says in reference to children's dreams, which he considers particularly perspicuous instances of wish-fulfilment:

Every one of these dreams can be replaced by an optative clause: 'Oh, if only the trip on the lake had lasted longer...' But dreams give us more than such optative clauses. They show us the wish as already fulfilled;

²²² Displacement, together with Condensation, is of course one of the concepts by which Freud describes the mixture of processes that give rise to the dream-experience, the processes he calls collectively 'the dreamwork'. The two concepts in his view refer to two of the modes of operation of the dreamwork. In the course of our analysis, we are clearing focussing on Freud's view that displacement is also a characteristic of interpretations. In this respect, we are disregarding the supposed application of the term to the processes that give rise to the dream-experience on the grounds that it presupposes an inappropriate object of interpretation. As regards the notion of Condensation, from our point of view, this notion could be used to indicate the way in which the interpreter expresses himself in the dream-report, in a very condensed way, so to speak. In this way, the term may be used as more than a concept to refer to the processes that give rise to the dream-experience. Accordingly, the oblique speech of the interprete would manifest a condensation that found its counterpart in the displacement of the interpretation that made sense of that oblique speech. Our discussion concentrates on displacement in so far as our task is to analyse the interpretation of oblique speech, rather than its production.

they represent its fulfilment as real and present; and the material employed in dream-representation consists principally, though not exclusively, of situations and of sensory images, mostly of a visual character.²²³

There is confusion here between the linguistic and the phenomenological aspects of the broad topic of dreaming, probably because Freud hopes that they have something in common. However, to say that a dream as a subjective visual experience can be replaced by an optative clause is like saying that any phenomenological occurrence can be 'replaced' by a grammatical category. Does it make sense to say that my sensations of digestion after dinner could be replaced by a linguistic clause in the subjunctive mood? But what could 'replaced' mean in such a context? Other than, of course, that Freud is running fundamentally different kinds of things together on the strength of not explicating what 'replaced' can amount to. The indicative in this case is the statement 'the trip on the lake lasted longer.' It is not true, but a motive for making this statement can be found if we consider it as the expression of a wish. That allows us to indicate together the false indicative statement and its motive by rephrasing the statement in the shorthand of the optative mood. A virtue of this approach, if we approach the matter in this way, is that the notion of replacement is a linguistic notion that does not span different kinds of logical categories. The same mischievous attitude to the distinction between taking a linguistic approach and considering himself to be dealing with the dream-experience is present at the end of the interpretation of the dream of Irma's injection. It occurs when Freud says, "The dream represented a particular state of affairs as I should have wished it to be. Thus its content was the fulfilment of a wish and its motive was a wish."224 Our point is that the interpretation of the dream of Irma's injection in terms of its motive rather than so-called content fits the extended pattern of the PR syllogism used in the interpretation of speech. Without falling into the trap of thinking that we are interpreting the dream-experience, it comfortably incorporates the notion of a wish as the motive for the saying of something that is not true, or 'representing' a state of affairs that is not the case.

We will now consider in detail how Freud interprets the individual elements of the dream-report of Irma's Injection and accompanying associations in terms of **PR** patterns, on

²²³ V, 647.

²²⁴ IV, 118-119. (Emphasis omitted)

the assumption that they can be extended into the longer pattern. Bear in mind that it is not suggested that a particular thematic group of associations that follows from a particular element should be exclusive of other thematic groups following from the same element in the text of Freud's interpretation. In fact, in the text of the interpretation this is more typically the case, and goes back to the notion of ramification in his original understanding of the genealogical tree analogy. For ease of exposition, however, we approach the elements from the point of view of separate thematic groups of associations. Our approach is to explicate the formal structure that is latent in the interpretation according to the extended **PR** pattern. As Hopkins says, this form of interpretation is accomplished unconsciously in daily life and we very rarely if ever explicate all of the steps involved. It is a form of ratiocinative activity that we indulge in without ever *reflecting* on what we are doing—we just find ourselves doing it. This is true also of Freud. In his case, our task involves individuating from the rambling chain of association in which he appears to let his mind wander, peppered occasionally with what appears to be an inference, this kind of pattern.

Freud provides the following dream-reports

3. Analysis of Freud's Interpretation of the Dream-Report of Irma's Injection

To explicate how the dream-report is interpreted in common-sense terms, let us follow Freud in addressing the paradigm example of the interpretation of the dream of Irma's injection, the 'Analysis of a Specimen Dream.' With this dream-report, Freud tells us he will "demonstrate upon it my method of interpretation."²²⁵ The point is not to establish that Freud is right in holding that a certain mental state or attitude on his part would be reason for certain dream-elements or associations. The point instead is simply to bring to light this inferential pattern. They may well strike one as arbitrary, and a possible justification of them on our part is not offered until they are reformulated in 'saying' terms according to the practical-reasoning pattern at the end of each group. The first step, then, is to bring to light the pattern of the genealogical tree of hypotheses in the material; in attempting to do so we must respect Aristotle's maxim in *Nichomachean Ethics* to ask for only as much precision as the material permits.

3.1 Three Strands of the Interpretation

Freud provides the following dream-report:

Dream of July 23rd-24th 1895

A large hall – numerous guests, whom we were receiving. – Among them was Irma. I at once took her on one side, as though to answer her letter and to reproach her for not having accepted my 'solution' yet. I said to her: 'If you still get pains, it's really only your fault.' She replied: "If you only knew what pains I've got now in my throat and stomach and abdomen – it's choking me.'- I was alarmed and looked at her. She looked pale and puffy. I thought to myself that after all I must be missing some organic trouble. I took her to the window and looked down her throat, and she showed signs of recalcitrance, like women with artificial dentures. I thought to my-self that really there was no need for her to do that. – She then opened her mouth properly and on the right I found a big white patch; at another place I saw extensive whitish grey scabs upon some remarkable curly structures which were evidently modelled on the turbinal bones of the nose. – I at once called in Dr M.., and he repeated the examination and confirmed it....Dr M. looked quite different from usual; he was very pale, he walked with a limp and his chin was clean-shaven....My friend Otto was now standing beside her as well, and my friend Leopold was percussing her through her bodice and saying: 'She has a dull area low down on the left.' He also indicated that a portion of the skin on the left shoulder was infiltrated. (I noticed this, just as he did, in spite of her dress.)...M. said: 'There's no doubt it's an infection, but no matter;

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dysentery will supervene and the toxin will be eliminated.'...We were directly aware, too, of the origin of the infection. Not long before, when she was feeling unwell, my friend Otto had given her an injection of a preparation of propyl, propyls...proprionic acid...trimethylamin (and I saw before me the formula for this printed in heavy type)....Injections of that sort ought not to be made so thoughtlessly....And probably the syringe had not been clean.

(1). Freud's Criticisms of his Colleagues

Element 1.1: My friend Otto was now standing beside the patient and my friend Leopold was examining her and indicated that there was a dull area low down on the left. In brief, in conjunction with associations to the roles of Otto and Leopold in the day-to-day life of the hospital, this element of the manifest content is accounted for as a derogatory contrast between these two colleagues to Otto's detriment. In the day-to-day life at the hospital, scenes "such as the one represented in the dream used often to occur."²²⁶That is to say at more length, Freud associates that "Since they both specialized in the same branch of medicine, it was their fate to be in competition with each other, and comparisons were constantly being drawn between them."227 As he continues to associate Freud says, "the difference between their characters was like that between the bailiff Brasig and his friend Karl: one was distinguished for his quickness, while the other was slow but sure."²²⁸ Freud's associations continue on to include "The dull area low down on the left seemed to me to agree in every detail with one particular case in which Leopold had struck me by his thoroughness."229 A reason for these associations seems evident to Freud, and he puts forward the following hypotheses. He says "If in the dream I was contrasting Otto with the prudent Leopold, I was evidently doing so to the advantage of the latter."²³⁰ Let's say that this indicates the presence of a rough hypothesis, and indicate it as 'hypothesis a.' It goes something like this: Were I making a contrast to the detriment of Otto, then this would provide reason for thinking of dream-elements and associations of the instances of the contrasting styles of Otto and Leopold in which it appears that Otto comes off worse.

²²⁵ IV, 105.
²²⁶ IV, 112.
²²⁷ Ibid.
²²⁸ Ibid.
²²⁹ IV, 113.
²³⁰ IV, 112-113.

Element 1.2: Dr M. said: It's an infection, but no matter. Dysentery will supervene and the toxin will be eliminated. Freud breaks up this element and considers Dysentery as an element on its own. In brief, the associations that follow from the reference to Dysentery lead to Freud considering himself as mocking Dr M. in various ways. At greater length, the interpretation of this element proceeds as follows. Initially, to provide a motive for the first association that "There seemed to be some remote theoretical notion that morbid matter can be eliminated through the bowels", Freud suggests the following hypothesis to account for this association and the element. He says, "Could it be that I was trying to make fun of Dr M.'s fertility in producing far-fetched explanations and making unexpected pathological connections?"²³¹ Let consider that this indicates the presence of another rough hypothesis, and refer to it as hypothesis b. It goes something like this: Were I making fun of Dr M.'s fertility, then it would be a reason for thinking of this element referring to Dr M. and dysentery and the subsequent series of amusing associations in relation to medical diagnoses. The subsequent amusing associations go as follows. Firstly, the association that immediately follows is of a patient of Freud's whose problems with defecating while on a trip to Egypt he believed to have been of a hysterical nature. The local doctor had diagnosed dysentery, but Freud had treated this as diagnosis on the part of an ignoramus: "I suspected that the diagnosis was an error on the part of an ignorant practitioner who had allowed himself to be taken in by the hysteria."²³² As the chain of associations continues, it seems to Freud that "Yes, I thought to myself, I must have been making fun of Dr M. with the consoling prognosis 'dysentery will supervene, etc..'"233 For, with the following associations, it seems to Freud that he thinks of Dr M. as belonging to the same category as the Egyptian doctor. He says: "Yes... for it came back to me that years before, he himself had told an amusing story of a similar kind about another doctor."234 That is, it seems to Freud that Dr M. is in the category of all physicians who are ignorant of hysteria. For, and secondly, Freud recalls a funny story which Dr M. himself used to tell about an ignorant practitioner, who called him in for a consultation over a seriously ill patient. Dr M. pointed out that there was albumen in the patient's urine - a bad sign. Freud tells us, however, that

²³¹ IV, 114.

²³² Ibid.

²³³ IV, 114-115.

²³⁴ IV, 115.

"The other, however, was not in the least put out: '*No matter*', he had said, 'the albumen will soon be eliminated!"²³⁵ (Note that we have here an explanation of another element, 'no matter'). Thirdly, Freud then associates that Dr .M. himself may have been taken in by hysteria: "as though to confirm this a further idea crossed my mind: 'Does Dr M. realize that the symptoms in his patient (Irma's friend) which gave grounds for fearing tuberculosis also have a hysterical basis? Has he spotted this hysteria or has he been taken in by it?"²³⁶ Freud says that this further idea seemed to "confirm" that "this part of the dream was expressing derision at physicians who are ignorant of hysteria."²³⁷ All of these associations mocking the diagnostic ability of doctors are rendered intelligible by **hypothesis b.** Once again—<u>Were I making fun of Dr M.'s ability to produce far-fetched explanations and make unexpected pathological connections, then it would be a reason for the element of dysentery and a lot of the humorous associations.</u>

Element 1.3: Directly aware of the origin of the infection. Freud states that Leopold had discovered it and does not dwell on this element beyond telling us that it is "remarkable."²³⁸ In the manifest content itself, the responsibility is directly placed on Otto's shoulders. This is <u>Element 1.4</u>: When she was feeling unwell, my friend Otto had given her an injection. Freud tells us that this prompts the memory of an incident in which Otto had been called in to give an injection while he had stayed, for a short while, with Irma's family, to someone in a neighbouring hotel. The theme of Otto's responsibility, after the intrusion of some other thematic groups into the interpretation, re-emerges with <u>Element 1.5</u>: Injections of that sort ought not to be made so thoughtlessly. With this element, Freud associates immediately, once again, to Otto. Freud thinks of him in critical terms, both for being careless and for being too easily influenced. He remembers an occasion on which he had thought of Otto in the following terms: "I seemed to remember thinking something of the same kind that afternoon when his words and looks had appeared to show that he was siding against me. It had been some such notion as: 'How easily his thoughts are influenced! How thoughtlessly


²³⁵ Ibid.
 ²³⁶ Ibid.
 ²³⁷ Ibid.
 ²³⁸ Ibid.

he jumps to conclusions!"²³⁹ Freud says that "Here", regarding this element of the manifest content of the dream, "an accusation of thoughtlessness was being made directly against Otto."²⁴⁰ This, implicitly, would seem to indicate the presence of another hypothesis, which we will refer to as **hypothesis c**. It goes something like the following: <u>Were I accusing Otto of thoughtlessness in relation to the giving of injections, then it would provide reason for thinking of the elements and associations in which the responsibility for the infection is placed on Otto's shoulders, and in which he is called in to give an injection. That is, **hypothesis c** provides appropriate reason by the light of which both elements 1.3 and 1.4, and their associations are rendered intelligible. It also constitutes appropriate reason for element 1.5, which amounts to a reprimand to Otto."</u>

Element 1.6: And probably the syringe had not been clean. Freud views this as a criticism of Otto: "This was yet another accusation against Otto, but derived from a different source."²⁴¹ The different source in question appears to be the following. Freud goes on to recount not any direct accusation against Otto, but thoughts of his own conscientiousness. The associations relate to Freud's pride at considering himself never to have caused an infection when he hears of the old patient of his who had contracted phlebitis as a result of a dirty needle while on holiday in the country. It thus seems to Freud that he is again making a comparison to the detriment of Otto, this time between himself and Otto in relation to their respective handling of injections. So, it seems once again that there is a rough hypothesis implicitly present, which we will refer to as **hypothesis d**. We might phrase it as: <u>Were I accusing Otto of not being a conscientious practitioner by comparison with myself, then this would be a reason for my dwelling on my own conscientiousness</u>

What emerges then, from the hypotheses indicated above, is a desire on Freud's part to criticise his colleagues. That becomes evident in so far as while **hypotheses a**, **b**, **c**, **d**, account for dream-elements 1.1 to 1.6, and their associations, what they posit—making a contrast to the detriment of Otto, making fun of Dr M, accusing Otto of thoughtlessness, accusing Otto of not being conscientious—may in turn be accounted for by the hypothesis

²³⁹ IV, 117. ²⁴⁰ Ibid. ²⁴¹ IV, 118 that Freud is criticising his colleagues. So we may introduce the following diagram, in which the pattern of a genealogical tree is clearly beginning to emerge.



Let us show how the explication of any of these hypotheses could take place in saying terms by taking one of them as an example. **Hypothesis a** is: Were I making a contrast to the detriment of Otto in relation to Leopold, it would account for thinking of instances of the contrasting styles of Otto and Leopold in which Otto comes off worse. Working backwards from the utterances, then, we can formulate this **hypothesis a** as follows: Why do I say these elements and associations containing instances of contrasting styles? Maybe it's because I believe that by saying these instances then I am saying that Otto fares badly in comparison to Leopold. So maybe I desire to say that Otto fares badly in comparison to Leopold.

Freud desires that S [that I say 'A dull area low down on the left etc. ...'] Freud believes that if S then R [that if I say 'A dull area low down on the left etc. ...' then I say that Otto fares badly in comparison to Leopold]

Freud desires that R [that I say Otto fares badly in comparison to Leopold]

The second application is then as follows. Why do I desire to say that Otto fares badly in comparison to Leopold? Maybe it is because I believe that if I say that Otto fares badly in comparison to Leopold, then I am saying that my colleagues are worthy of criticism. So maybe I am saying that my colleagues are worthy of criticism. So again, we have:

Freud desires that **R** [that I say that Otto fares badly in comparison to Leopold] Freud believes that if **R** then **Q** [that if I say that Otto fares badly in comparison to Leopold then I say that my colleagues are worthy of criticism] Freud desires that **Q** [that I say my colleagues are worthy of criticism]

Why does he desire to say that his colleagues are worthy of criticism? The answer to this question has not yet come up in the tree of this thematic group, and it awaits Freud's handling of another thematic group before it emerges. Of course, it is no secret, so we will straightaway add it. It is because he believes that if he says that his colleagues are worthy of criticism, then he is saying that he cannot be held responsible. So maybe he is saying that he cannot be held responsible. So, again, we have:

Freud desires that Q [that I say that my colleagues are worthy of criticism]

Freud believes that if Q then P [that if I say my colleagues are worthy of criticism then I say that I cannot be held responsible]

Freud desires that P [that I say I cannot be held responsible]

So, by a number of applications of this pattern we arrive at the overall desire to say that he cannot be held responsible. The utterances are incorporated in the pattern of the **PR** syllogism in the following way, beginning at the root motive and forward to the utterances:

F desires that P [I say that I am not responsible]

F believes that if Q then P [that if I say that my colleagues are worthy of criticism then I say that I cannot be held responsible]

F desires that Q [that I say that my colleagues are worthy of criticism]

F believes that If **R** then **Q** [that if I say that Otto fares badly in comparison to Leopold then I say that my colleagues are worthy of criticism]

F desires that R [that I say Otto fares badly in comparison to Leopold]

F believes that if S then R [that if I say a dull area low down on the left.etc./ the difference between their characters was like the difference between the bailiff Brasig and his friend Karl...etc. then I say that Otto fares badly in comparison to Leopold]²⁴²

F desires that S [that I say a dull area low down on the left...etc./ the difference between their characters was like the difference between the Brasig and his friend Karl...etc.]

F believes that if T then S [that if I utter 'a dull area low down on the left...etc.'/ 'the difference between their characters was like the difference between the bailiff Brasig and his friend Karl...etc.' then I say a dull area low down on the left...etc./the difference between their characters was like the difference between the bailiff Brasig and his friend Karl...etc.]

F desires **T** [that I utter '*a dull area low down on the left*'/ 'the difference between their characters was like the difference between the bailiff Brasig and his friend Karl...etc.']

T [I utter 'a dull area low down on the left...etc.'/ 'the difference between their characters was like the difference between the bailiff Brasig and his friend Karl...etc.']

This pattern can be used for each of the **hypotheses b**, **c**, **d**, that came to our attention in the course of our close reading, just as we have explicated **hypothesis a**. In each case, **P** would play the same role.

(2). Freud's Self-Justifications

Let us now examine the next thematic group: the claim of self-justification. A criticism of others is the first prong, so to speak, of Freud's defence in terms of his desire not to be responsible. The attempt to justify himself is the second prong. In terms of the application of the pattern, **P** remains the same: saying that he cannot be held responsible. But now, instead of **Q** we have **W**. Instead of saying that he cannot be held responsible by saying that **Q** his colleagues are worthy of criticism, he now says that he cannot be held responsible by means of saying **W** that he is justified in his actions. And of course, he says that he is

justified in his actions by saying a number of other things, **X**, **Y** and **Z** that correspondingly lead to utterances of the dream-report and associations. The data runs through the already analysed group that that he interprets as a series of accusations against his colleagues according to the ramification notion in the genealogical tree analogy, but *thematically* forms a series of self-justifications. So, again let us show how the pattern comes to light by first explicating the hypotheses, and then moving onto the 'saying' pattern in **PR** terms.

Element 2.1: *I at once called in Dr M., and he repeated the examination.* This is the element that appears to trigger the series of instances that constitute grounds for accusations against himself. Following what appears to him as the "sufficiently striking"²⁴³ nature of *at once* to deserve particular attention, Freud associates to a "tragic event in my practice."²⁴⁴ The event in question is the occasion on which he "had produced a severe toxic state in a woman patient by repeatedly prescribing what was at that time regarded as a harmless remedy (sulphonal) and had hurriedly turned for assistance and support to my experienced senior colleague."²⁴⁵ It strikes him in a way with which we are now familiar: "It seemed as if I had been collecting all the occasions which I could bring up against myself as evidence of my lack of medical conscientiousness."²⁴⁶ Freud initially says with regard to the element of the calling in of Dr M. that it simply corresponded to the position of Dr M. in their circle. As before then, we may say that this indicates the presence of a hypothesis, which we refer to as **hypothesis f.** It goes something like: <u>Were I considering grounds for accusations against myself on grounds of my medical conscientiousness, then it would be a reason for thinking of calling in of Dr M. and the subsequent associations.</u>

Element 2.2: And probably the syringe had not been clean. As part of the accusation against Otto, Freud associates to his own pride at not having caused "a single infiltration"²⁴⁷ in two years of visits to the old woman to whom he had to visit twice a day in order to

²⁴² This is a difference from the introductory example of ours on page 84. Here, Freud does not utter 'Otto fares badly in comparison to Leopold' in the way we might suppose him to utter 'Do you remember the dysentery incident?' Here, he is even more indirect.

 ²⁴³ IV, 111.
 ²⁴⁴ Ibid.
 ²⁴⁵ Ibid..
 ²⁴⁶ IV, 112.

²⁴⁷ IV, 118.

administer an injection of morphia. He says, "I took constant pains to be sure that the syringe was clean."²⁴⁸ "In short", Freud continues, "I was conscientious."²⁴⁹ There thus seems to be a hypothesis made with Freud's own conscientiousness as reason for thinking about the syringe not being clean. Let us refer to it as **hypothesis g.** It goes something like: Were I viewing myself as conscientious in comparison to Otto, then it would be a reason for dwelling on my own pride, and for thinking of Otto not being so conscientious and using dirty syringes.

Element 2.3: Injections of that sort ought not to be made so thoughtlessly. In relation to this element an association to the friend who had died from a cocaine injection-a recurrent association throughout the interpretation-once more occurs. A thought occurs to Freudthe thought that he had meant the cocaine to be administered not by injection. "As I have said, I had never contemplated the drug being given by injection."²⁵⁰ The initial associations to this element are explained in the context of criticisms of his accusations against Otto, as Freud remembers thinking something like this on the afternoon when it appeared that Otto was siding against him. Also, he says, "Apart from this, this sentence in the dream reminded me once more of my dead friend who had so hastily resorted to cocaine injections." But Freud then acknowledges that "in accusing Otto of thoughtlessness in handling chemical substances I was once more touching upon the story of the unfortunate Mathilde, which gave grounds for the same accusation against myself. Here I was evidently collecting instances of my conscientiousness, but also of the reverse."²⁵¹ As before, this would seem to indicate the presence of a rough hypothesis, which we will call hypothesis h. It goes something like the following: Were I to be weighing up instances of my conscientiousness and its reverse, then it would be a reason for the thinking of the element regarding Otto's carelessness and the associations regarding my dead friend and Mathilde.

Element 2.4: Trimethylamin. This is a dream-element with regard to which Freud says: "So many important subjects converged upon that one word," and recurs in different

²⁴⁸ Ibid.
²⁴⁹ Ibid.
²⁵⁰ IV, 117.
²⁵¹ Ibid.


thematic groups. The explanation given to this element in connection with this thematic group is that it is a reference to Fliess, to whom Freud used to turn to back up his judgement whenever he felt in need of support. Freud says, "Trimethylamin was an allusion not only to the immensely powerful factor of sexuality, but also to a person whose agreement I recalled with satisfaction whenever I felt isolated in my opinions."²⁵² This reason for the element of *Trimethylamin*, then, is that Freud wants support from Fliess. For, thinking of Fliess in terms of a source of support constitutes appropriate reason for thinking about this chemical element, which Fliess had recently introduced in their discussions on the products of sexual metabolism. This is, roughly, **hypothesis i**: Were I looking towards Fleiss for support, it would be a reason for thinking of the dream-element of Trimethylamin that is so closely connected to him.

Element 2.5: When she was feeling unwell, my friend Otto had given her an injection. In association to this element, Freud again dwells on his friend who had poisoned himself with the cocaine injection and he considers that he had not intended the drug to be administered by injection. Initially, Freud thinks of Otto having been called in to give someone in a neighbouring hotel an injection while he had been staying with Irma's family. But the thought of this reminds him of his dead friend, and a self-justification occurs as a straightforward association: "These injections reminded me once more of my unfortunate friend who had poisoned himself with cocaine. I had advised him to use the drug internally only, while morphia was being withdrawn; but he had at once given himself cocaine *injections*."²⁵³ Here he is thinking of instances that constitute grounds for accusations against himself, and this suggests **hypothesis j**: Were I considering grounds for accusation about myself, it would account for this element and these associations.

Then, we can see that a further hypothesis that Freud is attempting to justify himself would provide reason for the weighing up, the looking for support, and so on that is posited by means of the **hypotheses f to j** above which account for the elements and associations. The questions of why Freud thinks of himself as conscientious in regard to Otto, why he collects grounds for accusations against himself, of appealing to authority figures for

252 Ibid.

support, and collecting instances of grounds for accusations against himself, would all be answered by the hypothesis of self-justification. To sum up, in these associations, Freud finds the grounds for accusations against himself very troubling. Their continual appearance is intelligible in the light of the associations of his conscientiousness and his own good intentions with regard to the cocaine injections. He does this by means of the hypothesis of self-justification—that he is weighing up the evidence in order to argue for his conscientiousness, put bluntly. Let us introduce another diagram.



²⁵³ IV, 115.

We can, as before, explicate any of the **hypotheses** f - j that have the form 'were x the case then it would provide a reason for y' in terms of working backward to the root motive and then working forward in terms of saying according to the extended **PR** syllogism. As before, let us take one of the hypotheses to illustrate the patterns. For example, **hypothesis** f: Why do I say I called in Dr M. and the associations in which I do not come out in a good light? Maybe it is because I believe that by saying I called in Dr M. and the associations in which I come out badly then I am saying that I was considering possible grounds (in the sense of weighing up the evidence) for accusations against myself. So maybe I am saying that I am considering possible grounds for accusations against myself. Again, then, we have, starting from Freud's asking himself why he says these elements and associations:

F desires that Y [that I say I called in Dr M. etc.]

F believes that If Y then X [that if I say I called in Dr M. etc. then I am saying that I am considering possible grounds for accusations against myself]

F desires that X [that I say that I am considering possible grounds for accusations against myself]

The second application then comes as follows. Why do I say that I am considering possible grounds for accusations against myself? Maybe I believe that if I say that I am considering possible grounds for accusations against myself then I am saying that I am justified. So maybe I am saying that I am justified. That is:

F desires that X [that I say that I am considering possible grounds for accusations against myself] F believes that if X then W [that if I say that I am considering possible grounds for accusations against myself then I am saying that I am justified]

F desires that W [that I say that I am justified]

Then, in order to arrive once again at **P**. Why do I say that I am justified? Maybe I believe that if I say that I am justified then I am saying that I cannot be held responsible. So, maybe I am saying that I cannot be held responsible:

F desires that W [that I say that I am justified]

F believes that if W then P [that if I say that I am justified then I am saying that I cannot be held responsible] F desires that P [that I say I cannot be held responsible] The application of the **PR** syllogism, with regard to this second thematic group, would apply in the following way right down to the utterances:

F desires that P [that I say that I cannot be held responsible]
F believes that if W then P [that if I say that I am justified]
F desires that W [that I say that I am justified]
F believes that if X then W [that if I say I am considering possible grounds for accusations against myself then I am saying that I am justified]
F desires that X [that I say that I am considering possible grounds for accusations against myself]
F believes that if Y then X [if I say I called in Dr M. etc. then I say that I am considering possible grounds for accusations against myself]
F desires that Y [that I say I called in Dr M. etc.]
F believes that if Z then Y [that if I utter 'I called in Dr M. etc.' then I am saying I called in Dr M. etc.]
F desires that Z [that I utter 'I called in Dr M. etc.']

Z [I utter 'I called in Dr M. etc.']

That **P** is an overall motive can be seen from how **P** remains constant but instead of **Q**, **R**, **S**, **T** we have **W**, **X**, **Y**, **Z**. According to the genealogical tree analogy, **R** and **X** are first cousins, **S** and **Y** second cousins, **T** and **Z** third cousins.

(3). Alternative Causes of Irma's Continued Illness

A further group of elements and associations is interpreted in terms of the possibility that Irma's illness may be due to causes other than those of hysterical origin diagnosed by Freud.

Element 3.1 I reproached Irma for not having accepted my solution; I said: 'if you still get pains, it's your own fault.' Freud initially tells us that he had probably said this to Irma, for he says in the associations that he considered it the patient's responsibility at that time to accept, or not his, diagnosis. "I considered that I was not responsible for whether he accepted the solution or not..." At that time success as a result of his treatment—as Freud here tells us—depended precisely on the patient's acceptance of his diagnosis. He also states that he "noticed that the words which I spoke to Irma in the dream showed that I was especially anxious not to be responsible for the pains which she still had."²⁵⁴ Then he adds

²⁵⁴ IV, 108-109.

that, as he points out, "If they were her fault, they could not be mine."255 " He wonders, "Could it be that the purpose of the dream lay in this direction?"²⁵⁶ With this, it would seem that there is implicitly a hypothesis present, which we will refer to as hypothesis k. It goes as follows: Were I concerned to avoid responsibility for the persistence of Irma's pains, then it would provide a reason for thinking of the associations to the fact that my treatment shifted such responsibility onto the patient's shoulders, for thinking of the dream-element telling Irma that she was to blame, and the words that are so expressive of anxiety in the dream-element. He does not at this very early point in the interpretation assert that a desire to avoid responsibility will in fact provide a motive for most of the material that emerges. He just begins to consider the possibility that a desire to avoid responsibility might turn out to explain other elements and associations.

Element 3.2 I was alarmed at the idea that I had missed an organic illness is treated of by Freud in 'this' direction. He begins the associations by stating that "This, as may well be believed, is a perpetual source of anxiety to a specialist whose practice is limited to neurotic patients and who is in the habit of attributing to hysteria a great number of symptoms which other physicians treat as organic."²⁵⁷ For a moment, it looks as if Freud is going to suggest that it is his alarm at having made a misdiagnosis that is the motive for the wish not to be responsible for Irma's illness. But the chain of association then takes the following twist: "a faint doubt crept into my mind - from where I could not tell - that my alarm was not entirely genuine."258 He points out that "If Irma's pains had an organic basis, once again I could not be held responsible for curing them; my treatment only set out to get rid of hysterical pains."259 For, just as in the case of the patient's unwillingness to accept his explanation, or diagnosis, he would not be responsible were it to be the case that the illness was due to organic factors. He would, however, be faced with the responsibility of a misdiagnosis. But this seems to be a responsibility that Freud is willing to accept, for he goes on: "It occurred to me, in fact, that I was actually wishing that there had been a wrong diagnosis."260 So

²⁵⁵ IV, 109.
 ²⁵⁶ Ibid.
 ²⁵⁷ Ibid.
 ²⁵⁸ Ibid.

- 259 Ibid.
- 260 Ibid.

another hypothesis, hypothesis 1 emerges. We may formulate it in the following terms. Were I wishing that there had been a wrong diagnosis, then this would provide a reason for thinking of my alarm as the dream-element and my doubts as to its genuine nature in the associations. He adds, "for, if so, the blame for my lack of success would also have been got rid of."²⁶¹ That is, it seems that he is prepared to accept the responsibility of the misdiagnosis as the price of not having to accept the responsibility for the failure of his treatment in terms of Irma's continued illness. In turn, a further hypothesis would seem to be emerging which tallies with the interpretation of the previous element, element 3.1. It goes something like, 'were I desiring to avoid responsibility, then this would account for wishing that there had been a wrong diagnosis.'

Element 3.3: I took her to the window to look down her throat. She showed some recalcitrance, like women with false teeth. I thought to myself that really there was no need for her to do that. The associations begin with a recollection of an examination that he had carried out on a governess, who, during the examination had turned out to be something less than the "youthful beauty"²⁶² she had appeared to be at first glance. A series of memories of various medical examinations carried out by Freud then follows. The first of which concerns a woman friend of Irma's of whom Freud had "a very high opinion."²⁶³ He says that he had visited her one evening and found her in a position, by the window, like the one taken up by Irma in the dream. Freud says, "It now occurred to me that for the last few months I had had every reason to suppose that this lady was also a hysteric. Indeed, Irma herself betrayed the fact to me."²⁶⁴ Freud says that he knew of her condition that, "like my Irma of the dream, she suffered from hysterical choking."²⁶⁵ This series of similarities strikes Freud as a comparison, but one in which one figure replaces the other: "so in the dream I had replaced my patient by her friend."²⁶⁶ He associates further regarding this woman, and says, "I now recollected that I had often played with the idea that she too might ask me to relieve her of

²⁶¹ Ibid.
²⁶² Ibid.
²⁶³ IV, 110.
²⁶⁴ Ibid.
²⁶⁵ Ibid.
²⁶⁶ Ibid.


her symptoms."267 However, she did not appear to be an amenable patient: "I myself, however, had thought this unlikely, since she was of a very reserved nature. She was recalcitrant, as was shown in the dream. Another reason was that there was no need for her to do it: she had so far shown herself strong enough to master her condition without outside help."268 She is one of "two other people who would also have been recalcitrant"269 to Freud's treatment, and with whom he feels he is comparing Irma. The other recalcitrant person to whom Freud feels he is comparing Irma is someone whom the features of "pale; puffy; false teeth"270 appeared to fit. This person is Freud's own wife, as he tells us in a footnote. He also tells us in a footnote that he does not pursue these comparisons to the extent to which they might have been pursued, and indeed, he does not pursue the comparison with his wife, beyond telling us that she also would have been recalcitrant. He says, "I had a feeling that the interpretation of this part of the dream was not carried far enough to make it possible to follow the whole of its concealed meaning. If I had pursued my comparison between the three women, it would have taken me far afield."271 So he concentrates on the comparison between Irma and her friend. Freud asks himself, with regard to his conviction that he has been comparing the women, "What could the reason have been for my having exchanged Irma in the dream for her friend?"²⁷² The suggestion he puts forward is that "Perhaps I should have liked to exchange her; either I felt more sympathetic towards her friend or had a higher opinion of her intelligence. For Irma seemed to me foolish because she had not accepted my solution. Her friend would have been wiser. that is to say she would have yielded sooner. She would then have opened her mouth properly and have told me more than Irma."273 So, Freud's reasoning goes as follows and we treat it firstly in terms of hypothesis m-2: 'Were I comparing Irma to her friend, then this would provide reason for my associations in which I dwell on the various similarities with her friend.' In turn, hypothesis m-1 'Were I wishing to exchange her, this would provide reason for comparing them. In turn, were I to think of Irma as foolish, then this would be a reason for wishing to replace, or exchange, Irma by her more-intelligent friend.' In turn

²⁶⁷ Ibid.
²⁶⁸ Ibid.
²⁶⁹ Ibid.
²⁷⁰ Ibid.
²⁷¹ IV, 111. ft.
²⁷² IV, 110.

again, we have hypothesis m: Were I considering Irma foolish, this would (via the other hypotheses) be a reason for the associations in which a comparison appears. Obviously, the conclusion of our analysis of the two previous elements above, 3.1 and 3.2 suggests that were Freud desiring to avoid responsibility, then this would account for thinking of Irma as foolish.

Element 3.4: Trimethylamin. In relation to this element, Freud attributes Irma's continued illness to the chemical substance of the sexual processes, leading to the conclusion that Irma's continued widowhood and accordingly disrupted sexual life was the determining factor in her illness. Freud, of course, could not be held responsible for his patient's failure to find another husband for herself. Specifically then, remembering the conversation with Fliess on the subject of the chemicals produced in sexual metabolism, Freud associates that "Thus this substance led me to sexuality, the factor to which I attributed the greatest importance in the origin of the nervous disorders which it was my aim to cure."274 The import of this, he says, is: "My patient Irma was a young widow: if I wanted to find an excuse for the failure of my treatment in her case, what I could best appeal to would no doubt be the fact of her widowhood, which her friends would be so glad to see changed."275 So, given that Freud holds as part of his theory that the presence or absence of this substance bears on the pathology of hysteria, the ground is laid for hypothesis n to emerge. We may formulate a preliminary hypothesis, n-1 as follows: Were I attributing Irma's illness to her widowhood, this would account for thinking of the dream-element and the associations to the sexual processes. In turn, hypothesis n goes something like: Were I searching for an excuse for my failure, then this would provide reason for thinking of Irma's widowhood. Once again, with the other elements in this group, it seems a short step to make the further inference that searching for an excuse would be accounted for by a desire to avoid responsibility.

²⁷³ IV, 110-111. ²⁷⁴ IV, 116.



Elements and associations

Element 3.1 + associations 'Irma's own fault' Wishing for wrong diagnosis (1) Element 3.2 + associations Wish not to be held responsible Considering Irma foolish (m) Wishing to exchange Irma (m-1) Comparing Irma to her friend - Element 3.3 + (m-2) associations Searching for an excuse (n) Irma's Widowhood (n-1) Element 3.4 + associations. (Additions) Colleagues worthy of criticism - from Fig. One. Self- Justification -from Fig. Two. ²⁷⁵ IV, 116-117.

This tree is not as neatly structured as the ones in the other thematic groups. Obviously, then, there is not a strict replication of the form of the **PR** pattern every time. Most strikingly, the desire not to be responsible, for example, without any intermediate hypotheses accounts for the first element and associations. Nonetheless, let us take one of the hypotheses as an illustration as we have been consistently doing. We have, 'Were I saying that I have an excuse it would be a reason for saying that the illness is due to her widowhood.' This is itself employed to account for the state of affairs posited in 'Were I to say that the illness is due to her widowhood, then it would be a reason for mentioning Trimethylamin.' Freud's inference, implicitly, is that the following pattern lies behind the given element or association. So, working from the utterance backwards to an overall motive and beginning with 'why do I say Trimethylamin?' we have:

F desires that L [that I say Trimethylamin]

F believes that if L then K [that if I say Trimethylamin then I am saying that Irma's illness is due to her widowhood]

F desires that K [that I say that Irma's illness is due to her widowhood]

In turn, Freud then asks himself why do I say that the illness is due to her widowhood? Maybe it is because I believe that if I say that the illness is due to her widowhood then I am saying that I have an excuse. So maybe I am saying that I have an excuse.

F desires that K [that I say that Irma's illness is due to her widowhood]

F believes that if K then J [that if I say that the illness is due to her widowhood then I am saying that I have an excuse]

F desires that J [that I say that I have an excuse]

The next step is to ask himself, why do I say that I have an excuse? Perhaps because I believe that if I say that I have an excuse then I am saying that I am not responsible. So, once again, it looks like I am saying that I am not responsible.

F desires that J [that I say that I have an excuse]

F believes that if J then P [that if I say that I have an excuse then I am saying that I am not responsible] F desires that P [that I say that I am not responsible] The **PR** pattern incorporating the utterances and the overall motive of not being held responsible, working from the root motive forwards rather than from the utterance backwards, would go as follows:

F desires that **P** [that I say that I am not responsible]

F believes that if J then P [that if I say that I have an excuse then I am saying that I cannot be held responsible] F desires that J [that I say that I have an excuse]

F believes that if K then J [that if I say that the illness is due to her widowhood then I am saying that I have an excuse]

F desires that K [that I say that the illness is due to her widowhood]

F believes that if L then K [if I say Trimethylamin then I am saying that the illness is due to her widowhood]

F desires that L [that I say Trimethylamin]

F believes that if M then L [that if I utter 'Trimethylaminin' then I say Trimethylamin]

F desires that M [that I utter 'Trimethylamin']

M [I utter 'Trimethylamin']

The explication in terms of 'Were X to be the case, it would explain Y' of the hypotheses that we have listed is articulated by Freud in an explicit manner only at various points in the interpretation. The reason that we have laboured so much over explicating these hypotheses and then showing how they can be formulated in **PR** *terms* is the following. If interpretation is to be an instance of common-sense psychological interpretation of the dream-report, in practical-reason terms, then it must be susceptible to this form of fuller articulation.

3.2 The Meaning of the Dream-Report of Irma's Injection as a Whole

What has emerged from our analysis of the interpretation of the dream-report of Irma's Injection is a pattern that corresponds to the analogy of the genealogical tree that Freud had advocated in "The Aetiology of Hysteria." Read from the utterances up, the diagram forms the genealogical tree leading to one grandparent of the individuals lower down. In fact, for purposes of space, we have presented only some of the tree. For the overall meaning is not merely that Freud is not responsible, but also that Otto is in fact responsible. Also, there are further themes along the way, such as revenge not only on Otto but also on Dr M. So the complete interpretation would require a similar kind of analysis of those elements and

associations that are particularly hostile to Otto. This overarching reason in the interpretation is the wish that not he, but his colleague Otto be responsible for Irma's continued illness. As regards the fact that the mere wish that Otto be responsible should be the more general reason, rather than the apparently more important wish to avoid responsibility for the illness of a patient, we may point out the following. The wish that specifically Otto should be at fault accounts for Freud's desire to avoid responsibility in terms of his desire for revenge on Otto. The interpretation reveals that Freud is not concerned to avoid responsibility for its own sake, for his medical integrity, but in order to enable it to be the case that revenge is extracted on Otto. In this vein, the worries for his own medical integrity are a means of instantiating a comparison to the detriment of Otto. The general reason of the wish to avoid blame by shifting it from himself to Otto in this way accounts for each of the three thematic groups with which we began. That is, if he desired not to be blamed it would be appropriate for him to wish that the illness was due to other factors, or that criticism was misguided, or that he could justify himself. The wish to avoid responsibility expressed in terms of criticism both of the ability of others including Otto, however, is not sufficiently general to explain why Otto in particular should be held responsible. Though it is trivially true that were Otto to be responsible, then Freud could not be, the mere fact of Otto's culpability could not explain the vitriolic and petty nature of many of the accusations against Otto, such as the liquor. The associations in relation to the liquor, into which we shall not go in detail, are also explained along these lines, they constitute a further aspect of the attack on Otto. It thus seems that the accusation against Otto is more general than the wish to avoid responsibility, given that the attack on Otto can explain both the wish to avoid responsibility and the petty, vitriolic nature of the criticisms of Otto. It thus seems that it is the wish that 'not Freud but Otto be responsible' motivated by nasty feelings of revenge, that is more general than the simple wish to avoid responsibility, in virtue of this generality that constitutes the meaning of the dream-report uncovered by the interpretation. For, after he goes on to consider "many of the details of the dream" from the point of view of the wish, he concludes by saving:

It was a noteworthy fact that this material also included some disagreeable memories, which supported my friend Otto's accusation rather than my own vindication. The material was, as one might say, impartial; but nevertheless there was an unmistakable connection between this more extensive group of thoughts which

underlay the dream and the narrower subject of the dream which gave rise to the wish to be innocent of Irma's Illness.²⁷⁶

In other words, it does not seem that Freud is worried, for altruistic reasons, about the matters discussed in the thematic groups. Rather, he is concerned about them in so far as they are means of revenge on Otto.

4. The Standard of Correct Interpretation: Dispositional Coherency of Oblique Speech

4.1 Cioffi's Objection: What Kind of Criterion, 1st or 3rd Person?

On what grounds do we acknowledge that the **PR** patterns revealed by an interpretation amount to a correct interpretation?²⁷⁷ Frank Cioffi, in his paper "Wishes, Symptoms and Actions" takes up the issue of the standard of correct interpretation with regard to Freud's self-interpretations in order to point out an ambiguity that he sees in the criterion by which it is supposed to be known that an interpretation is correct. He takes issue with a claim of Freud's inspired by Bernheim's Latent Memory experiment. He questions Freud's attempt to explain his method of interpretation with the claim that one must *ask* the interpretee for the meaning of the dream, in virtue of the fact that the interpretee 'knows but does not know.' Cioffi asks: "What is the force of "knows but does not know that he knows?"²⁷⁸ He refers to the problem of establishing the import of this claim as the "self-intimation issue", and articulates what he perceives to be the problem with it as follows with an example of Freud's own self-interpretation:

On one occasion (in *The Interpretation of Dreams*) Freud meant to refer to Hannibal's father, Hamilcar Barca, but wrote the name of Hannibal's brother, Hasdrubal, instead. We know that Freud meant to refer to

²⁷⁶ IV, 120.

²⁷⁷ Given Freud's acceptance of the concept of 'over-interpretation'—that more than one interpretation might equally well fit the data— he does not accept that there can be only one correct interpretation. For example, in *Introductory Lectures*, he says, "...one is never certain whether the interpretation one has found for a dream is the only possible one. We run the risk of overlooking a perfectly admissible 'over-interpretation' of the same dream." XV, 228. The most we can ask for are the criteria of *a* correct interpretation, rather than *the* correct interpretation.

²⁷⁸ Frank Cioffi, "Wishes, Symptoms and Actions" in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, supplementary volume 1974, p. 98. This article is partially reprinted in Frank Cioffi, *Freud and the Question of Pseudoscience* Open Court, Chicago and La Salle, Illinois, 1998, pp. 182-198.

Hamilcar Barca and not to Hasdrubal because he tells us so. Freud also maintained that the occurrence of the name of Hannibal's brother instead of that of his father was the fulfilment of an unconscious intention. Do we know this, too, because he tells us so? It has been argued that Freud was mistaken as to his unconscious intention and that the occurrence of the name Hasdrubal was the consummation of an unconscious intention to refer, not to Hannibal's brother, as Freud maintained, but to his brother-in-law predecessor-in-command, also called Hasdrubal. How is this issue to be decided? By self-surveillance? Or by introspection?²⁷⁹

The general difficulty, which Cioffi takes to be compressed into this one controversial instance is that, quite apart from the details of the standard of correct interpretation, it is not clear which kind of criterion of correct interpretation Freud applies. In the interpretations of his own slips and dreams, which play the principal role in his explanation of the method of interpretation, sometimes it seems that Freud as the interpretee knows what the correct interpretation of the slip is by some form of first-person, self-intimating criterion such as introspection. Yet, at other times, Freud himself in dealing with the slips and dreams of others ostensibly judges the material in the same way as the interpretation given in the thirdperson by commentators regarding his own 'Hasdrubal slip'. He judges, that is, according to third-person criteria, such as the overall context of the patient's motives. Cioffi's concern is that Freud does not unambiguously tell us which of these kinds of criteria takes precedence, and the suspicion is that he may be quietly equivocating between the two. In this vein, Cioffi expresses his frustration at the lack of a concise statement of the kind of criterion that underwrites correct interpretation on Freud's part. He says: "Our inability to say on the basis of Freud's own words what his answers to these questions are is the most crucial ambiguity in the theory of interpretation."280 Summing-up his conclusion regarding this aspect of Freud's though, Cioffi says:

Freud characterizes the relation between the subject and the explanations of his symptoms, dreams, errors, etc., incoherently, in some places conferring a self-intimating character on them, and at others withholding it, and that either construction renders his more characteristic claims unassessable if not unintelligible.²⁸¹

²⁷⁹ Cioffi, pp. 98-99
 ²⁸⁰ Cioffi, p. 99
 ²⁸¹ Ibid.

A difficulty of this kind indicated by Cioffi prima facie also characterises Freud's paradigm example, the interpretation of the dream of Irma's injection. Both of the criteria indicated by the 'Hasdrubal' slip could be plausibly viewed as having been applied in that interpretation. There was, after all, the presence of many statements of the form 'if-then', which appeared to mark inferences that Freud was making in order to make sense of the dream-elements and the associations. This is the kind of inference-based approach that is typical of the general approach taken by Freud to the dreams of others, in which the associations invariably do not flow smoothly to an overall reason for the material of the dream. This would tally with the third-person interpretation given by commentators of Freud's 'Hasdrubal' slip. Yet, on the other hand, there are many examples in Freud's interpretations of his own dream-reports in which the meaning apparently pops into his head, as if by introspection, such as in the interpretation of the dream of the Botanical Monograph, or the Table D'Hôte dream. Indeed, the overall meaning appears to pop into his head also in the interpretation of the dream of Irma's injection. For example, Freud announces that he has arrived at an overall meaning for the dream of Irma's Injection with the following words: 1 bads to is in fact the conclusion and provide to the meaning of the

I have now completed the interpretation of the dream. While I was carrying it out I had some difficulty in keeping at bay all the ideas which were bound to be provoked by a comparison between the content of the dream and the concealed thoughts lying behind it. And in the meantime the 'meaning' of the dream was borne in upon me. I became aware of an intention which was carried into effect by the dream and which must have been my motive for dreaming it. The dream fulfilled certain wishes which were started in me by the events of the previous evening (the news given me by Otto and my writing out of the case history). The conclusion of the dream, that is to say, was that I was not responsible for the persistence of Irma's pains, but that Otto was.²⁸²

In this quote, he seems to be telling us that he was not expecting the meaning of the dream, and thus presumably not attempting to infer to it. It bore in upon him in the 'meantime', while his mind was engaged in the many other ideas that had already popped into his head. In fact, Freud *seems* to instantly 'recognise' one particular intention or 'meaning' without explicit regard for the rest of the interpretation, or inferences based on the rest of the material of the interpretation.

4.2 The Distinction of Production versus Assessment of the Associative Material

Can the difficulty of a possible equivocation on the kind of criterion by which an interpretation is held to be correct, as pointed out by Cioffi, be resolved? There is a distinction that should not be overlooked with regard to the supposed equivocation. This is the distinction between the production of material in association in accordance with the 'fundamental rule', and the criterion by which that material is recognised as the solution to any part of the interpretation. In the first place, in accordance with the fundamental rule of analysis, the role of the first-person is to produce material such as memories, ideas, thoughts and so on that are told to the interpreter. The fundamental rule does not feature as a criterion of a correct interpretation, it features as a means for the production of material upon which an interpretation is then made. A problem arises if we let ourselves be led into thinking that the chain of association resulting from following the fundamental rule leads to the meaning of the dream-report as the meaning of the dream. That is, we might fall into thinking that association leads to a meaning already packaged, so to speak, by direct introspection-even though it does lead to what turns out to be the conclusion. However, the question as to whether or not what it leads to is in fact the conclusion and amounts to the meaning of the dream-report is not settled by its mere occurrence in the chain of association. It is settled by considering what this procedure of association produces according to publicly accessible common-sense standards and seeing, by these lights, how much data it provides reason for. In fact, in the interpretations of his own dream-reports in this way Freud is carrying out the project indicated in "The Unconscious", namely applying to oneself the same method by which one judges mental activity to be occurring in other people-by inference: ______

Psychoanalysis demands nothing more than that we should apply this process of inference to ourselves also -a proceeding to which, it is true, we are not constitutionally inclined. If we do this, we must say: all the acts and manifestations which I notice in myself and do not know how to link up with the rest of my mental life must be judged as if they belonged to someone else: they are to be explained by a mental life ascribed to this other person. Furthermore, experience shows that we understand very well how to interpret in other people (that is, how to fit into the chain of their mental events) the same acts which we refuse to acknowledge as being mental in ourselves.²⁸³

²⁸² IV, 118.

²⁸³ XIV, 169-170. Freud goes on, in his paper, to qualify the logic of his analysis. Instead of inferring to a second consciousness, we should make the following kind of inference: "Thus we have grounds for modifying

The import of this is that there is only one criterion for whether or not an interpretation is right-fitting the chain of our mental events together by inference-even though Freud wavers between two different methods of obtaining material to which that criterion may be applied. For in cases where resistance occurs and the associations do not flow smoothly or not at all Freud makes inferences about likely material. These inferences he communicates to the patient in an attempt to spur them into following the fundamental rule. It is easy to confuse the criterion for *judging* the material with the method for *obtaining* it. For, given that we must assume that some criterion is being applied to the material obtained in two different ways, it is easy to slip into thinking there are two criteria. The criterion of correct interpretation is impersonal because it is indifferent in its application to oneself or to someone in the third-person, and it is the standard of common-sense psychological coherency.

This reading is borne out by both the interpretation of the *Table D'Hôte* dream-report and the interpretation of the dream-report of Irma's Injection. As regards the former, if the key quote is considered carefully, there is nothing in it that contradicts the solution that we are putting forward. Freud says, "... I was aware of intense and well-founded affective impulses; the thoughts themselves fell at once into logical chains, in which certain ideas made their appearance more than once."²⁸⁴ In this passage, Freud does not say that he took the mentioned impulses as a criterion of recognition by which he fitted the thoughts into logical chians. And, as we have already discussed, the mere fact that he did not consciously infer in order to arrive at the meaning does not amount to not applying the common-sense psychological criterion in terms of *latent* inferences to these thoughts. That is to say, it does not mean that the thoughts were not in fact latently considered in the light of how much of the material they could render coherent in the third-person manner advocated in "The Unconscious." This passage that appears to indicate selecting the overall meaning in a direct, introspective or more broadly self-intimationist way is actually a passage that describes the production of the material in which it is implicit that this 'conclusion' or 'meaning' is then decided upon by the indirect signs of confirmation. This kind of appeal to

our inference about ourselves and saying that what is proved is not the existence of a second consciousness in us, but the existence of psychical acts which lack consciousness" (XIV, 170). ²⁸⁴ V, 640.

the indirect signs is more obvious in the interpretation of the dream of Irma's injection. Where, after the meaning of the dream-report ostensibly pops into his head, Freud immediately turns to consider how much of the material would be rendered intelligible by the hypothesis that it was indeed the meaning. This would be a futile enterprise if the mere introspective first-person reaction were, beyond simply serving to record their occurrence, also enough to individuate certain thoughts or ideas as the meaning. In short, Freud does not identify self-knowledge with introspection, at least when it comes to the meaning of one's utterances. For example, the "conclusion" that constitutes the meaning of the dream-report of Irma's Injection enters the interpretation when the meaning is 'borne in upon" Freud. This might create the misleading impression that the chain of association itself, without any publicly accessible criterion at all, leads to the meaning of the dream-report. Certainly, the chain of association produces the 'conclusion.' But it does not produce it 'alreadyindividuated-as-the-meaning'; this question is settled by considering the 'conclusion' as appropriate in some way to the material so far interpreted, and in this way infer that it really is the conclusion. Indeed, this is what Freud does; having arrived at what turns out to be the meaning of the dream, the interpretation does not stop. Rather, he considers it in the light of the following. He says:

Otto had in fact annoyed me by his remarks about Irma's incomplete cure, and the dream gave me my revenge by throwing the reproach back on to him. The dream acquitted me of the responsibility for Irma's condition by showing that it was due to other factors – it produced a whole series of reasons.²⁸⁵

Freud does not accept the 'conclusion' as the meaning of the dream as if it had a 'meaningof-dream' label attached to its content, and all that was required for the recognition of it was to produce it by association. What happens, rather, is that when it is produced it is assessed in the context of the reasons that we have been analysing in the course of this chapter in terms of a ratiocinative pattern. Freud considers the material in detail in terms of the capacity this wish has to make sense of the material of the dream, not in terms of a label. He says: "This much leapt to my eyes. But many of the details of the dream also became intelligible to me from the point of view of wish-fulfilment."²⁸⁶ And he proceeds to consider

²⁸⁵ IV, 118.

²⁸⁶ IV, 119.

the material about Otto and the bad liquer, the injection of propyl, the disobedient patient, Dr M., Otto and Leopold and so on. It is the conclusion considered as a hypothesis that has interpretative employment, independently of its production as a 'conclusion', even though it was produced by the procedure of association. Simply as a wish that occurs in the chain of association, it does not yet have interpretative employment. Quite literally, it does not give sense to the material *until* it is considered as a hypothesis by the lights of common-sense psychology.

4.3 The Person Who is Right

The criterion of a correct interpretation, on the strength of our **PR** reading of Irma's Injection and *Table D'Hôte* in the light of "The Unconscious", is therefore impersonal. But of course, this is an in-principle issue. In practice, that criterion must be applied and the chances are that one's attempt to apply a publicly accessible criterion to others will be tend to be more successful than the attempt to apply it to oneself. So, the issue of the person who applies the criterion bears *in practice* on the solution that is accepted in an interpretation. In the philosophical literature on Freud, the difficulty involved in explicating the criterion of a correct interpretation is reflected in a general point made by Wittgenstein in terms of the *person* who applies the criterion. It is that at times Freud seems to be saying that the interpreter is in a position to spot when interpretation is correct, while on other occasions he seems to maintain that it is the interprete who has the final word. The fact that in the paradigm examples of dream-interpretation Freud is both interpreter *and* interprete makes the situation, as we have seen, especially confusing. Wittgenstein characterises the issue in terms of the person who has the right solution, saying:

But this procedure of free association and so on is queer, because Freud never shows how we know where to stop - where is the right solution. Sometimes he says that the right solution, or the right analysis, is the one which satisfies the patient. Sometimes he says that the doctor knows what the right solution or analysis of the dream is whereas the patient doesn't: the doctor can say that the patient is wrong.²⁸⁷

What our discussion reveals, however, is that this is really a question of degree that tends to increase when the interpreter is the person who says it is right, rather than being a case of the

²⁸⁷ Ludwig Wittgenstein, "Conversations on Freud", in Wolheim and Hopkins (eds.), 1982, p.1

interpretee never being able to say when it is right. The interpreter, being more detached than the interpretee from the topics that are emerging, will not let his application of the impersonal third-person criterion be clouded by emotional factors. Or at least he will tend not to-Freud does after all recognise the problem of counter transference from the psychoanalyst towards the interpretee. Of course, the interpretee could in principle recognise the right interpretation in so far as either the interpreter or the interpretee could apply the third-person criterion. There is no in-principle obstacle to either or indeed both of them being right. The decision is taken simply for practical reasons that the interpreter is right. In terms of Freud's self-interpretation, this would mean that the interpretations would most likely have been better if they had been carried out by someone else. But this is simply a practical matter. It doesn't mean that Freud's self-interpretations are necessarily wrong. From our discussion of Cioffi's objection, furthermore, the fact that Freud claims to have discovered a correct interpretation in his own case should not be taken to mean that he is applying a different criterion in his own case much less that he is indulging in introspection. As Cioffi was later to do, Wittgenstein indicates that behind the issue of the person who is the arbiter of the correct interpretation there is the issue of the kind of criterion being applied. He says, for example:

There are various criteria for the right interpretation: e.g, (1) what the analyst says or predicts, on the basis of his previous experiences; (2) what the dreamer is led to by *freier Einfall*. It would be interesting and important if these two generally coincided. But it would be wrong to claim (as Freud seems to) that they *must always* coincide.²⁸⁸

In principle, however, the correctness of an interpretation does not depend on the interpreter or the patient, but it depends on the impersonal criterion of common-sense psychology that both are obliged to use, and so *in principle* they could not *but* coincide. In practice, the issue is obviously more complicated in so far as the issue of the person who is right nonetheless bears on the interpretation even if they are both using the same criterion. It bears on the interpretation, that is, in so far as one or the other of the participants in the attempt to infer to an interpretation allows themselves to be emotionally affected by the material. Usually the interpretee is generally handicapped by the fact of having his judgement clouded by his

²⁸⁸ Wittgenstein, p. 5

greater personal involvement with the material that comes to light in the analytic setting, while the analyst can afford himself a far greater degree of detachment. To deal with this issue any further would require a detailed discussion of the issues of transference and counter-transference, and this would take use to far away from the issue of the criterion of a correct interpretation and let us into the practical problems of the analytic setting. Suffice to say for our purposes that, as Wittgenstein recognises, in practice it is difficult to separate the issue of the criterion being applied from the question of the person who applies it. Once this task is carried out, however, it becomes evident that Freud is not equivocating on the standard of correct interpretation.

4.4 The Standing of the Declared Agreement or Disagreement of the Interpretee

How does the interpreter treat the interpretee's express agreement or disagreement with an interpretation? On our reading, indeed, when the interpreter states his own agreement or disagreement it is something to be interpreted just as any other statement in terms of 'why would he say that?' The interpretee's agreement is not a criterion of the correctness of the interpretation, but something that itself requires interpretation, and therefore the criterion by which it is judged must implicitly lie elsewhere. Freud addresses this issue in "Constructions in Analysis." In that paper, he discusses 'constructions', or the inferences to scenes dating from infancy as material emerges in the analytic setting. By the 'attitude of the patient', as he phrases it, Freud means whether or not the patient is in agreement with the judgement of the accuracy of the constructions put forward by the analyst. He says:

There is no justification for the reproach that we neglect or underestimate the importance of the attitude taken up by those under analysis towards our constructions. We pay attention to them and often derive valuable information from them. But these reactions on the part of the patient are rarely unambiguous and give no opportunity for final judgement.²⁸⁹

In this vein, the straightforward 'Yes' or 'No' of the patient in response to a construction is not regarded as of confirmatory importance. There are a number of instances in this paper where Freud makes it clear that the selection of the right construction is based on indirect

²⁸⁹ XXIII, 265.

signs, and not on the declaration of the patient, whether in agreement or not with the interpreter's solution. He says, regarding the subject of 'Yes':

A plain 'Yes' from a patient is by no means unambiguous. It can indeed signify that he recognizes the correctness of the construction that has been presented to him; but it can also be meaningless, or even deserve to be described as 'hypocritical', since it may be convenient for his resistance to make use of an assent in such circumstances in order to prolong the concealment of a truth that has not been discovered. The 'Yes' has no value unless it is followed by indirect confirmations, unless the patient, immediately after his 'Yes', produces new memories which complete and extend the construction. Only in such an event do we consider that the 'Yes' has dealt completely with the subject under discussion.²⁹⁰

Freud continues on the subject of 'No', in the case of which the straightforward declaration is similarly not acceptable at face value:

A 'No' from a person in analysis is quite as ambiguous as a 'Yes', and is indeed of even less value. In some rare cases it turns out to be the expression of a legitimate dissent. Far more frequently it expresses a resistance which may have been evoked by the subject-matter of the construction that has been put forward but which may just as easily have arisen from some other factor in the analytic situation. Thus, a patient's 'No' is no evidence of the correctness of a construction, though it is perfectly compatible with it.²⁹¹

He concludes by rejecting as a criterion of the accuracy of interpretation what appear to be self-intimationist statements *not* because they could not correspond accurately to the correctness or incorrectness of an interpretation—they could. Rather, Freud does not accept them as a criterion because to accept them as corresponding to the correctness or incorrectness of an interpretation in anything more than an *accidental* way requires the *holistic* evidence of the whole interpretation:

It appears, therefore, that the direct utterances of the patient after he has been offered a construction afford very little evidence upon the question whether we have been right or wrong. It is of all the greater interest that there are indirect forms of confirmation that are in every respect trustworthy.²⁹²

²⁹⁰ XXIII, 262.

²⁹¹ XXIII, 263.

²⁹² Ibid. In virtue of the importance attached to the holistic application of common-sense psychology, "Constructions in Analysis" echoes "The Aetiology of Hysteria".

The "indirect forms", or as he indicated in the interpretation of the dream of Irma's injection the further respects in which the data became intelligible, would appear to completely overrule the response of the patient. They are sufficient to produce a right construction on their own, and they are necessary. A response one way or another by the patient on the other hand is neither necessary nor sufficient for the correctness of an interpretation. This position is reflected in the following passage of Freud's in "Remarks on the Theory and Practice of Dream-Interpretation" with the re-deployment of the jig-saw puzzle analogy, which he had many years earlier of course put forward in "The Aetiology of Hysteria." He says:

What makes him certain in the end is precisely the complication of the problem before him, which is like the solution of a jig-saw puzzle. A coloured picture, pasted upon a thin sheet of wood and fitting exactly in to a wooden frame, is cut into a large number of pieces of the most irregular and crooked shapes. If one succeeds in arranging the confused heap of fragments, each of which bears upon it an unintelligible piece of drawing, so that the picture acquires a meaning, so that there is no gap anywhere in the design and so that the whole fits into the frame—if all these conditions are fulfilled, then one knows that one has solved the puzzle and that there is no alternative solution.²⁹³

It turns out, then, not that a self-intimationist criterion is acceptable but that the whole structure of the interpretation is self-supporting in virtue of the impersonal criterion of the holistic application of third-person common-sense psychology.

4.5 Displacement Revisited in the Light of the Jig-Saw Puzzle Analogy: McIntyre's Dispositional Standard of Correctness in Relation to the Censorship

A fundamental question, however, is provoked by this analogy with a jig-saw puzzle. Rather than fitting smoothly together, in terms of the way in which the pieces of a jig-saw are *well*-placed, what actually occurs in the **PR** pattern of an interpretation is that the pieces do *not* fit together, they are *dis*-placed. The patterns extend in roundabout, sprawling ways, 'fitting together' at a stretch if at all. They are, in fact, more like an *unsuccessful* attempt at a jig-saw solution, in which the person doing the puzzle gives up and accepts a solution in which the pieces are simply jammed together as best as he can manage it. The pieces fit together, but only it would seem in a manner of speaking. The appeal to the analogy with the jig-saw puzzle might indeed give the impression that there is a coherency in the

interpretation, but in fact what the analogy obscures is that prima facie there is a lack, or at least an extreme weakening, of coherency. The question that becomes important, then, is could there be good reason for the interpretee to express himself in an almost-incoherent fashion? The notion of coherency in terms of the overall way the material fits together would appear to be implicit in any successful application of common-sense psychology to it. But by these lights, we are obliged to recognise that it does not fit together in a normal way, so our question undergoes a further refinement in so far as we must ask can the interpretation be justified on the basis that the pieces do not fit together? The notion of coherency of an interpretation, it would seem, is not itself very clear despite Freud's general claim that we are dealing with common-sense psychological explanation, and the impression he gives by employing the jig-saw puzzle analogy that the coherency in question is of a common-sense psychological kind. But this is precisely what is lacking. Why does the PR syllogism strike us as displaced? Precisely because we note that it lacks a certain degree of common-sense psychological coherency. The PR syllogism in terms of saying one thing by means of saying another could be plausibly described as coherent, in common-sense psychological terms, only on the basis that the interpretee has good reason for speaking in what appears to be such a rambling, roundabout fashion. Without this qualification, we would have to say that it is not coherent to say one thing by means of another, that in fact it borders on rambling incoherence of speech. The degree, then, to which we accept an interpretation as coherent will depend on the degree to which saying one thing by saying another is well-motivated, and this leads us to the concept of censorship. The two go hand in hand; that is, the acceptability of an interpretation as 'making sense' will go hand in hand with the presence of censorship. That is, the displacement characteristic of a typical interpretation can 'make sense' only to the degree to which it is warranted in the light of censorship. The question of the correctness of an interpretation, therefore, does not lie simply in the coherency of the holistic application of common-sense psychology to the dream-report and associations, but in its qualified coherency. That is, to the extent that if the censorship were not present, then the dream-report would not be displaced. So, the correctness of an interpretation consists in what the interpretee would say, were certain conditions to realise themselves. Namely, what the interpretee would say were there to be no

²⁹³ XIX, 116.

censorship present. So, the three notions clearly go hand in hand: displacement, the coherency of an interpretation, and censorship. This is a view of the correctness of an interpretation that dovetails with the standard of correct interpretation recognised by Alasdair McIntyre. MacIntyre accepts that the interpretee in psychoanalysis may never actually agree with the analysis de facto, but that this cannot be taken as a sign that the interpretation is not correct. Rather, the standard of correctness is not what the patient does in fact agree to but what he would agree to, if certain conditions were to prevail. MacIntyre says: "But the psychoanalyst means by a correct interpretation of an action an interpretation that the patient would avow if only certain conditions were fulfilled. What these conditions are depends on the character of the patient's disorder and its aetiology."294 This is MacIntyre's attempt to reconcile the notion that the criterion of a correct interpretation is inprinciple the interpretee's avowal in the face of the obvious practical difficulties of such a criterion. He clearly holds that the interpretee's avowal is the criterion of correctness in the following passage, "This acknowledgement by the patient confirms the analyst's interpretation of the motivation of the neurotic behaviour. And unless the patient will in the end avow his intention the analyst's interpretation of his behaviour is held to be mistaken."295 Fairly, however, he recognises the difficulties:

Of course, it is a feature of the psycho-neuroses that the patient will in the short run deny, and often deny vehemently, the analyst's interpretations of his conduct. Sometimes this denial may go on for a very long time. And there are unsuccessful analyses. So that it will not do for the psychoanalyst to make it a necessary criterion of the correctness of an interpretation that the patient should in fact avow the correctness of the interpretation within any particular period of time.²⁹⁶

Our contention is that these avowals constitute instances of the application of the impersonal criterion to oneself. In fact, this is what *Constructions in Analysis* teaches us, and MacIntyre's position is compatible with this way of approaching the issue. The avowals and the denials do not function as a criterion of a correct interpretation; rather, they simply constitute more data that is judged in the light of the real criterion. That criterion, by which the avowals and denials are judged is common-sense psychology holistically applied in an

²⁹⁴ Alasdair MacIntyre, The Unconscious, Bristol, Thoemmes Press, 1997, p. 57.

²⁹⁵ MacIntyre, p. 56

²⁹⁶ MacIntyre, pp. 56-57

impersonal manner according to what the interpretee *would* say, *were* no censorship to occur. In other words, the avowals do not constitute bedrock; they are as free-floating as any other element and must be fitted into the overall picture just like any other element or association in terms of the estimation of the degree to which the censorship has been overcome. Ultimately, then, the standard by which an interpretation is judged is that of impersonal coherency, *whether* in the first or third-person, *whether* in the case of self-interpretation or the interpretation of others, and the viability of the procedure of interpretation depends on what 'coherency' really means. The degree of coherency is a reflection of the degree of displacement, which itself is a reflection of the degree of concept of displacement, but also the fact that Freud takes it as applicable only in the light of censorship. For this further notion gives him a rationale for accepting the feature of displacement as a *bona fide* feature of the interpretation rather than a sign that it is slipping into unintelligibility. Freud explicitly attributes displacement to the activity of the censorship, saying:

But we are already familiar with dream-distortion. We traced it back to the censorship... Dream displacement is one of the chief methods by which that distortion is achieved, *Is fecit cui profuit*. We may assume, then, that dream-displacement comes about through the influence of the same censorship..."²⁹⁷

The viability of a notion of censorship, then, is a fundamental concept for accepting that the roundabout **PR** patterns which interpretation makes of the dream-report really amount to *sense*.

5. Conclusion

Our conclusion, then, is as follows. We began our analysis with two strands of thought in the early Freud that lay behind his short-step from the interpretation of hysterical or psychoneurotic symptoms to dream-interpretation. The two strands in question were the emphasis on common-sense psychological explanation, and the symbolic link between the symptom and the content of the pathogenic memory. We argued that the symbolic link should be

²⁹⁷ IV, 308.

understood as a linguistic link, and suggested that Peter Alexander's objection could be avoided by regarding the symptomatic action as a kind of saving something in gestures. The importance of dream-interpretation, we showed, is that it perspicuously brings these two strands together in an explicitly linguistic context: the interpretation of the dream-report. To interpret the dream-report, one imposes the practical reasoning syllogism of common-sense beliefs and desires on the dream-report and the associations to it by treating them as a kind of saying one thing by means of another. Taking this approach revealed the dream-report to be an oblique form of expression, in which the interpretee says one thing by saying another that appears quite remote from it. This oblique saying, when it is brought to light by interpretation, means that the interpretation is displaced; and we traced the displacement in detail with regard to three strands from the interpretation of the dream of Irma's Injection. The notion of displacement in turn finds a rationale in another important Freudian notion: the censorship. In short, the saying in the dream-report is oblique in order to avoid the censorship-the standard of correct interpretation, we suggested, is understanding in thirdperson common-sense psychological terms what the interpretee would straightforwardly say were no censorship present. In so far as the two original intuitions of Freud's-commonsense psychology and the broadly symbolic link-lead through the analysis in terms of the PR syllogism to his key notions of displacement and censorship, the notion of censorship is presupposed by the whole project of rendering the dream-report intelligible. Accordingly, the censorship is our next topic of discussion. southing the wants to evade the consolition the

Therefore, he desires to express himself obliquely. He behaves that by saying one thing by saying another, then he expresses himself obliquely. Therefore he desires to say one thing by means of another. He believes that in order to say one thing by means of another, he must say X when he means T, and so on, and so on. There is no queer belief in this series of teasons, or the reasons that lead on from it to the final text that he produces. This is unlike the case in the example given by Alexander of the main lunging at a lamppost in the behaf that by doing so he would kill his father. Bluntly, the concept of the censorship is the *tationale* for the notion of displacement; the concept of the censorship requires analysis for

[&]quot;The term 'consorship' is used to indicate the social or possioni phenomic as of consorship with which Freud draws a parallel. 'The consorship' is used to indicate the occurrence of constraining in the saying of the dram report, 'the consor' is used to indicate that the consorship is being attributed so a separate ages, y is the mind.

the degree to which III - The Censorship of the Dream-Report

In chapter two, we came to hold the view that dream-interpretation amounted to treating the dream-report as a form of saving one thing by saving another in a non-theoretical, commonsense psychological, everyday way. Treating the dream-report in this way as a kind of saying meant acknowledging that the kind of saying involved was a very roundabout, oblique kind of saying. This obliqueness in saying seems naturally to correspond to what Freud was referring to as a feature of interpretation by means of the term 'displacement.' It was pointed out that the extent to which it could be accepted that an interpretation was coherent yet at the same time displaced depended on whether or not there could be a reason for the roundabout, oblique saying. Of course, in everyday common-sense terms such saying could be considered unexceptional quite simply if there were a reason for not expressing oneself straightforwardly. Freud too approaches the problem in this kind of way. Presuming such oblique expression to be motivated, he sets out to discover the reason for it. As he shows us with several examples, such as the wartime writer who tailors his work to avoid drawing the attention of the authorities to what he is saying, saying one thing by means of saying another occurs in fields where censorship is prevalent.²⁹⁸ Freud goes so far as to claim that the 'displacement' revealed in interpretation is entirely the result of the influence of such 'censorship'. To take this example of Freud's of the wartime writer, it is not difficult to reconstruct the way he thinks about the censorship. He wants to evade the censorship. He believes that by expressing himself, as we say, obliquely, he will evade the censorship. Therefore, he desires to express himself obliquely. He believes that by saying one thing by saying another, then he expresses himself obliquely. Therefore he desires to say one thing by means of another. He believes that in order to say one thing by means of another, he must say X when he means Y... and so on, and so on. There is no queer belief in this series of reasons, or the reasons that lead on from it to the final text that he produces. This is unlike the case in the example given by Alexander of the man lunging at a lamppost in the belief that by doing so he would kill his father. Bluntly, the concept of the censorship is the rationale for the notion of displacement; the concept of the censorship requires analysis for

²⁹⁸ The term 'censorship' is used to indicate the social or political phenomena of censorship with which Freud draws a parallel. 'The censorship' is used to indicate the occurrence of censorship in the saying of the dream-report; 'the censor' is used to indicate that the censorship is being attributed to a separate agency in the mind.

the degree to which it is viable is the degree to which Freud's whole notion of saying one thing by saying another is viable. If it is not viable, then our linguistic reading of Freud's whole project of interpretation will collapse. In fact, the viability of the concept of the censorship along the lines of the wartime censor has been recently criticised by Sebastian Gardner in his book Irrationality and the Philosophy of Psychoanalysis. Gardner argues that it leads to the positing of a second mind, and this is an undesirable consequence. It is our intention to argue that the infelicitous consequence of the second mind can be avoided without rejecting the notion of the censorship. Our analysis proceeds by unearthing the tenacious attachment to the transparency of the meaning of the dream-report that underlies Freud's discussion of the censorship. This is Freud's assumption that, if the dream-report is to be assumed intelligible, the meaning of the dream-report must despite denials be clear to the interpretee-or as we will say 'transparent'-at the moment the dream-report is uttered.²⁹⁹ It is pointed out be that the unwelcome consequences of a second mind as the executor of the censorship could be avoided if this assumption were dropped. We conclude by offering a positive view of the censorship, inspired by Freud's own analogy with censorship in society, which involves only one mind.

²⁹⁹ Our use of the term 'transparency' is inspired by Marcia Cavell's use of it, of which more at the end of this chapter. We use it to avoid to avoid getting tangled up in questions of the kind of justified belief or knowledge that may be had of the meaning of the dream-report. Freud typically uses 'know', but his understanding of knowledge is in terms of impressions and ideas before the mind. As will become evident below, this often obstructs a discussion of interpretation. Moreover, 'strong belief' very often fits better what Freud is discussing in interpretation in which the kind of certainty characteristic of knowledge is unlikely, particularly given his acceptance of over-interpretation. Transparency is simply meant to capture the common-sense notion of a meaning being clear to the interpretee, however this common-sense notion might be cashed out in terms of belief or knowledge on a philosophical account of it. In our discussion of resistance below, the term 'know' is used for brevity's sake. It should be taken as a synonym for transparency in the sense just explained. The qualification '*de facto*' is used to indicate that transparency of the meaning is assumed despite the interpretee's denial that the meaning is clear to him.

1. The Interpretation of the Dream-Report of the Uncle with the Yellow Beard

Let us begin with the interpretation during which Freud introduces the concept of the censorship. This concept is introduced in the context of the interpretation of the dream-report of the Uncle with the Yellow Beard. The dream-report is short, and goes as follows:

I. . My friend R. was my uncle. – I had a great feeling of affection for him.

II...I saw before me his face, somewhat changed. It was as though it had been drawn out lengthways. A yellow beard that surrounded it stood out especially clearly.

Freud interprets this dream-report in the manner we have already examined in detail in the instance of the dream of Irma's Injection. The interpretation of the form is 'I am saying such-and-such in order to say so-and-so'. In the interpretation of this dream-report, this comes out a little more explicitly. For example, initially in response to the element *R. was my uncle* Freud associates to his Uncle Josef's involvement in an illegal transaction thirty years previously. Continuing to associate, he then tells us that his father used to say that Uncle Josef was a simpleton not a bad man. To account for the element in the light of these associations, Freud suggests the following in a vein that is exactly that of our linguistic approach of saying one thing by means of another. He says, "So that if my friend R. was my uncle Josef, what I was meaning to say was that R. was a simpleton."³⁰⁰ This amounts to the following. Why do I say that my friend R. was my uncle? Maybe it is because I believe that if I say that my friend is my uncle, then I say that he is—like my uncle—a simpleton. So, maybe I am saying that my friend is—like my uncle—a simpleton. This approach also applies to the association of the dream-element of the Galton-like nature of the face that Freud associates to. He says,

The face that I saw in the dream was at once my friend R's and my uncle's. It was like one of Galton's composite photographs. (In order to bring out family likenesses, Galton used to photograph several faces on the same plate.) So there could be no doubt that I really did mean that my friend R. was a simpleton – like my uncle Josef.³⁰¹

³⁰⁰ IV, 138.

Here, then, we have another instance of the same kind of saying on Freud's part. His selfinterpretation unfolds in the following way. Why do I say that the face was at once my friend's and my uncle's in the manner of a Galton-photograph? Maybe it is because I believe that by saying that the face was at once my friend's and my uncle's in the manner of a Galton-photograph then I am saying that they shared the family likeness of being a simpleton. So maybe I am saying that they share the family likeness of being a simpleton. This conclusion, it can be seen, coincides with the conclusion of the interpretation of the element *R. was my uncle*. It is this coincidence that allows Freud to say that there could be no doubt that his friend was a simpleton.

There is a second strand in the interpretation that begins at this juncture. Freud remembers a crime that his friend R. had committed on his bicycle as a child and says, "Could I have had that crime in mind? That would have been making fun of the comparison."³⁰² This leads his thoughts on to another friend of his, N.. With regard to his friend N., we have a different series of inferences although along much the same lines. Freud in association remembers a conversation he had had with this friend a few days earlier, "upon the same subject."³⁰³ "He too," says Freud referring to the recommendation that he had himself also received, "had been recommended for a professorship."³⁰⁴ The conversation had been about an attempted blackmail of N. by a woman, which case N. suspected was nonetheless being used "at the Ministry as an excuse for not appointing me."³⁰⁵ The last that Freud remembers from the conversation is that his friend had concluded by saying, with reference to Freud, "But you have an unblemished character."³⁰⁶ Freud states with regard to these associations: "This told me who the criminal was, and at the same time told me how the dream was to be interpreted."³⁰⁷ These considerations would also apply to the interpretation of the material in relation to R. He says,

³⁰¹ IV, 139.

- ³⁰² Ibid.
- ³⁰³ Ibid.
- ³⁰⁴ Ibid.
- ³⁰⁵ Ibid. ³⁰⁶ Ibid.
- ³⁰⁷ Ibid.

I now saw too why they were represented in this light. If the appointment of my friends R. and N. had been postponed for 'denominational' reasons, my own appointment was also open to doubt; if, however, I could attribute the rejection of my two friends to other reasons, which did not apply to me, my hopes would remain untouched. This was the procedure adopted by my dream: it made one of them, R., into a simpleton and the other, N., into a criminal whereas I was neither one nor the other, thus we no longer had anything in common.³⁰⁸

In other words, to put it informally, Freud's interpretation of this dream-report boils down to the following. 'I say that the rejection of my friends was due to non-denominational reasons in each case in order to say that my own appointment is not in doubt for denominational reasons. Saying these things is a way of saying that my own 'hopes are not untouched', of saying that despite my friends' failure I have a good chance of a professorship despite the denominational considerations, which also apply to me.' The incident from the day before which, according to Freud had sparked off the dream, had been a visit from his friend R. who had reported how he had confronted one of the officials at the ministry of education about 'denominational considerations' applying to professional promotions. Of course, the reality of the situation is that the visit of his friend from the day before and the conversation with his other friend constituted evidence that these denominational considerations would most likely apply to Freud. So why, flying in the face of reality, would Freud say something by means of the dream-report that was not true? That is, say that his hopes for a professorship were untouched in the light of a visit from his friend which seemed to indicate the contrary? The obvious answer is that he wished it to be true, and that was his motive for saying it.

bad been fond of my friend R, and had esseened him for many years, but if 13nd guess up to him and expressed my sentiments in terms approaching the degree of affection I had fait in the dream, dame could be to doubt that he would have been a tomshed.³⁵⁴

2. Freud's Introduction of the Concept of the Censorship in terms of Concealing the Meaning of the Dream-Report from Oneself

The importance of the interpretation of the dream-report of the Uncle with the Yellow Beard lies in the fact that Freud addresses two features, incongruous dream-elements and resistance, on the basis of which he argues that he is concealing the meaning of the dreamreport from himself. On the basis of this notion of concealing from himself he goes on, by parallel with censorship in society, to argue for a separate mental agency as the executor of the censorship. Our analysis will show that the two features in question, incongruity and resistance, do not constitute evidence that Freud is concealing the meaning of the dreamreport from himself. We do not however dispense with the parallel with censorship, even though in the absence of evidence for concealing the meaning from oneself we do not follow Freud in inferring to a second mind. The notion of incongruity will resurface at the very end of the chapter, in fact, when we suggest that it fits into a different, improved one-mind account of concealing that may be drawn from Freud's parallel with censorship. Let us begin with Freud's approach to incongruous elements, before moving on to the question of resistance.

2.1 Freud's Interpretation of Incongruous Elements in the Dream-Report of the Uncle with the Yellow Beard

As regards the concept of the censorship, Freud's discussion takes off from one particular element of the dream-report, *I had a great feeling of affection for him*. Freud puts this element in the context of his relationship with his friend R., telling us that "my affection for him struck me as ungenuine and exaggerated."³⁰⁹ He says:

I had been fond of my friend R. and had esteemed him for many years; but if I had gone up to him and expressed my sentiments in terms approaching the degree of affection I had felt in the dream, there could be no doubt that he would have been astonished.³¹⁰

³⁰⁹ IV, 140. ³¹⁰ Ibid.

Similarly, in the context of his relationship with his uncle, the statement of the feeling of affection is also odd in virtue of the fact that, as he says, "I had naturally never had any feeling of affection for my Uncle Josef."³¹¹ The element I had a great feeling of affection does not seem to fit with regard to either of the people it would appear to apply to in the dream-report. Freud's explanation of this lack of appropriateness is in terms of an attempt on his own part to get himself not to notice something about the meaning of the dream-report. He says, "My dream thoughts had contained a slander against R.; and, in order that I might not notice this, what appeared in the dream was the opposite, a feeling of affection for him."312 He claims, "The affection in the dream did not belong to the latent content, to the thoughts that lay behind the dream; it stood in contradiction to them and was calculated to conceal the true interpretation of the dream. And probably that was precisely its raison d'etre."313 In other words, Freud concludes that the element does not fit because it has been deliberately added into the text of the dream-report for the purposes, it appears, of concealing the meaning of the dream-report from Freud himself. The dream-element under discussion, I had a great feeling of affection for him he considers to be the instrument of this concealment. He says: "If my dream was distorted in this respect from its latent contentand distorted into its opposite-then the affection that was present in this dream served the purpose of this distortion."³¹⁴ Freud views distortion in terms of dissimulation: "In other words, distortion was shown in this case to be deliberate and to be a means of dissimulation."³¹⁵ In his discussion of the censorship in this dream-report, he moves from treating the element I had a great feeling of affection as mere distortion- "Entstellung" ³¹⁶ -to treating this distortion as intended by treating it as dissimulation-"Verstellung"³¹⁷-as far as Strachey's translation goes. Brill's translation has 'distortion' and 'disguise' respectively.³¹⁸ Neither the translation in terms of 'disguise' nor 'dissimulation' goes so far as to entail lying. It is not the case, then, that the dream-report amounts to saying things that are not true with the intention of deceiving, or in an attempt to deceive. For, with this

³¹¹ Ibid.
³¹² IV, 141.
³¹³ Ibid.
³¹⁴ Ibid.
³¹⁵ Ibid.
³¹⁶ Gescammelte Werke, 2 Band, p. 147.
³¹⁷ Ibid.
³¹⁸ Brill (trans.) 1997, p 52

terminology by which Freud introduces the concept of the censor, his point seems to be precisely to exclude the suspicion that he is lying to himself, even though it appears that some kind of deception is occurring. Indeed, there is no reason to treat his saying of *I had a* great feeling of affection for him as a lie. It appears, then, that it is a case of dissimulating with regard to oneself, 'self-dissimulation', we might say. These comments by Freud are rapid-fire and condensed reasoning lies behind them. The most important question is what he does he mean with this notion of self-dissimulating? Freud claims that he is concealing the true interpretation, and by this he seems to mean that he is concealing what he calls the 'slander' against R. from himself. So, 'true interpretation' would appear to mean 'complete'—including the slander —interpretation. The slander in question of course is the saying that R. is a simpleton. The presence of the element *I had a great feeling of affection* for him would appear to be the instrument of concealing the saying of this slander from himself, and in so doing conceal the true, or complete, interpretation from himself.

It is all well and good that Freud should claim that the dream-element under discussion, *I* had a great feeling of affection for him is the instrument of concealing the slander from himself—but what sense can we make of this claim? It could, after all, be objected that this claim of Freud's is an *ad hoc* defence of his own interpretation, which has points to a meaning that appears difficult to reconcile with this dream-element.³¹⁹ One way of assessing the claim is to consider it in the following way. The slander that R is a simpleton might be said to be motivated by a belief that is similar in content to it; namely, the belief that p, R is a simpleton. In turn, the slander might be understood as being kept from Freud's attention by his keeping from his own attention the belief that is its motivation, the said belief p, that R. is a simpleton. The means of doing this could be the dream-element *I had a great feeling of affection for him*, which might be said to suggest the belief that not p which, during the interpretation, he informs us he holds. It would draw Freud's attention to the belief that not p, and away from the belief that p. And if he did not realise that he possessed the belief that p, it most probably would not strike Freud to consider the slander as the meaning of the dream-report. Were this account to be fleshed out, a number of questions would immediately

³¹⁹ For this kind of criticism, see Karl Popper, *Realism and the Aim of Science*, London, Routledge, 1983. pp.163-174.

arise. Such as who has the responsibility for the instrument *I had a great feeling of affection* for him—is it determined directly by one of the beliefs p or not p or are agencies in the mind required? These are the kind of questions that we may for the time being overlook. A more basic point, for now, is that our proposed way of making sense of Freud's claim is the bones of an account in terms of self-deception. In so far, that is to say, as it involves the belief that p, the belief that not p and in some way one of these beliefs, by means of various intermediaries, would appear to promote the other. Let us consider in more detail whether Freud's notion of concealing from himself, as the explanation of incongruity, can really be considered a case of self-deception.

2.2 The Evidence for Concealing the Meaning from Oneself (1): Does the Presence of Incongruity Indicate that the Dream-Report is a Case of Self-Deception?

Discussions of self-deception usually centre on certain logical relations between beliefs. These relations are discussed by several philosophers, including Donald Davidson, Sebastian Gardner and David Pears, all of whom address at different times some of the issues raised by Freud. Davidson tells us that self-deception is "not only to say that someone believes both a certain proposition and its negation, but also to hold that one belief sustains the other." ³²⁰ In the Freudian example, this would mean that one belief regarding his friend was sustaining the other by means of the disguise. Davidson articulates the concept in terms of a comparison between the logical structure of a number of propositions. Firstly, he draws our attention to (1) 'D believes that he is bald' being a "causal condition of the belief which contradicts it"³²¹ such as (2) 'D believes that he is not bald.' This is the relation between belief that P and the belief that not-P, in which the second belief is produced in some way by its contradictory, the first belief. Davidson disallows that the second belief here, D's belief that he is not bald, entails another possibility (4) 'D does not believe that he is bald.' This, he says, would amount to attributing the belief that P and not the belief that P to the person

 ³²⁰ Donald Davidson, "Deception and Division" in John Elster (ed.) *The Multiple Self*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986 p. 79 (Davidson's numbering of the propositions he discusses is followed).
 ³²¹ Ibid.

under interpretation. And he warns, "if we allow this, we will contradict ourselves."322 Davidson reminds us that "It is possible to believe each of two statements without believing the conjunction of the two"³²³, and this is what he takes to happen in self-deception in which (1) and (2) are held at the same time. Gardner's general philosophy of psychoanalysis leaves little room for the concept of the censor, though following Sartre he thinks that it should be analysed in terms of self-deception. He agrees with Davidson regarding the relations between beliefs demanded by self-deception, and defends this same structure of belief in holding Davidson's (1) and (2) as a "consistent attribution."³²⁴ He phrases it like so: "A believes P and A believes not-P" ³²⁵ and says that it is the object of inquiry in self-deception. Like Davidson, he argues against, and distinguishes this from, the following: ""A believes P and A does not believe P." 326 For this would "entail the contradiction: It is the case that A believes p and it is not the case that A believes p." ³²⁷ David Pears meanwhile claims that "Self-deception is an irritating concept."328 He distinguishes four different types of irrationality that may be brought under what he considers the irritatingly loose term 'selfdeception', of which only the limiting case at the top end of the scale is the one commonly recognised as self-deception by philosophers. The other three are as follows. (i) The evidence is equally distributed between the alternatives, in which case the self-deceiver does not suspend belief as he should but he believes that which satisfies his desire. (ii) The evidence favours one belief, but he holds its contradictory. (iii) There is enough evidence to establish logically the falsehood of the belief he holds, but he continues to hold it anyway. He concludes, "Finally, at the top of the scale we have him violating logical necessity in the simplest possible way: he believes that something is not so, and yet he adopts the belief that the very thing is so, if indeed that is possible."³²⁹ We have once again, then, the relation consists in holding the belief that p and also the belief that not p. This is the most extreme

³²² Ibid. He also does not allow what he treats as possibility (3) 'D believes that (he is bald and he is not bald)'. For this, he offers the simple reason that "nothing a person could say or do would count as good enough grounds for the attribution of a straightforwardly and obviously contradictory belief " (p. 80). Freud does not attempt to attribute an obviously contradictory belief, so we will not dwell on this possibility.

³²³ Davidson, p. 80

³²⁴ Gardner, 1993, p. 23 325 Ibid.

³²⁶ Ibid.

³²⁷ Ibid.

³²⁸ David Pears, *Motivated Irrationality*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1984, p. 25.

³²⁹ Pears, p. 29

of what Pears calls "the paradoxes of irrational belief-formation."³³⁰ He sums up, "The limiting case at the top end of the scale happens to exemplify the paradox of self-deception, which catches the attention of philosophers....³³¹

In our case under discussion, of Freud's treatment of the dream-report of the Uncle with the Yellow Beard, how does the philosophical consensus on the belief-relations in selfdeception apply? Does it apply at all? Freud's interpretation, if it were to involve the claim that he believed that his friend was a simpleton and did not believe that his friend was a simpleton, would be rejected as an instance of an incoherent attribution by the interpreter to the interpretee. The interpretee just happens, of course, to be Freud himself in this case. For, it would amount to the self-attribution that 'I believe that my friend is a simpleton and I do not believe that my friend is a simpleton'. This corresponds to the 'A believes P and A does not believe P' indicated by Davidson and Gardner. The only acceptable form would be the following: the claim that he believed his friend was a simpleton and also believed that his friend was not a simpleton. On Davidson's account, for example, both of these beliefs can subsist in different compartments in a compartmentalised mind, and this certainly looks like a Freudian-style answer.³³² But is something like this what Freud is talking about? Prima facie, at least, no. With regard to his friend R., the following is the state of the attitudes that Freud attributes to himself. He simply believed that his friend was not a simpleton, though he wished that he were one, and also did not want to reveal this wish. We have in this case, therefore, the following: the belief that not-p; the wish that p; the desire q. And, according to the interpretation, the dream-report in which this wish was expressed was censored. A latent or 'unconscious' belief that his friend is a simpleton cannot come into any kind of conflict with the consciously acknowledged belief affirmed during the interpretation that he is not one for the following very simple reason. At no point does Freud attribute the belief to himself that his friend 'really' was a simpleton, and so it is not available to 'stand in contradiction' to his acknowledged conscious belief that his friend was not a simpleton.

330 Ibid.

³³¹ Ibid.

³² See Donald Davidson, "Paradoxes of Irrationality" in Wolheim and Hopkins (eds.) 1982, pp. 289-305.

According to our analysis in terms of saying of Freud's interpretation, firstly, what comes to light is the wish that his friend were a simpleton, not a belief that he is one. From the point of view of a comparison with self-deception, it would not make sense to disguise this wish from the conscious belief that his friend was not a simpleton, simply in virtue of the logical relations between the states, such that he believed that not-p and wished that p. For, these kinds of propositional attitudes, a wish and a belief, could not be in contradiction to one another. In fact, the conjunction of a belief that not-P and a wish that P is perfectly coherent: for example, I believe that it is not raining and wish that it were. Freud says: "I was prepared to deny through thick and thin that I really considered that R. was a simpleton and that I really disbelieved N.'s account of the blackmailing affair."333 This is compatible with Freud's wishing that R. was despite everything a simpleton and, indeed, N. a crook. Secondly, if he really believed that his friend was a simpleton, it would not make sense to wish that he were one. Otherwise, it would commit Freud to saying 'R. is a simpleton but I wish that he were one'. Thirdly, in the text of the interpretation, Freud nowhere suggests that he 'really' believed that he held a belief that was the contradictory of his conscious belief. He does, of course, make the following comment regarding the way the interpretation treats his friend R.: Declared because of their simple nature, as are loveable togets. At the very

I still had no idea at all what could be the purpose of this comparison, against which I continued to struggle. It did not go very deep, after all, since my uncle was a criminal, whereas my friend R. bore an unblemished character... except for having been fined for knocking down a boy down with his bicycle. Could I have had that crime in mind? That would have been making fun of the comparison.³³⁴

But this does not entail that he 'really' believed that his friend did not have an unblemished character on the basis of the acknowledged ridiculous incident of the bicycle accident. As we see, he considers the incident of the bicycle accident, and discounts it as evidence against his belief that his friend bore an unblemished character because it makes fun of the comparison. The tone might at a stretch give the impression that Freud believes his friend was a simpleton, but nothing in the passage positively supports it. Freud later says: "When I had completed the interpretation I learnt what it was that I had been struggling against -

³³³ IV, 140.

³³⁴ IV, 139.

namely, the assertion that R. was a simpleton."335 But we should not allow the impression that it gives to fool us into thinking that Freud 'really' believed that his friend had less than an unblemished character. For 'to assert' that his friend was a simpleton-a form of saying-does not amount to believing that his friend was a simpleton. The assertion might have been made for any number of reasons. It might be that he believes him to be one, but just as our analysis of the interpretation reveals it might instead be because he wishes that his friend were a simpleton. So, on the strength of the conceptual and textual evidence, the relation between beliefs required for a case of self-deception is not present in Freud's interpretation. The most we can say is that Freud seems to be distracting his own attention away from the wish in question, because the wish appears simply to be an unpleasant one. The real difficulty, then, posed by the element I had a great feeling of affection for him, and indeed of the association to the bike-theft that seemed to mock the comparison between his Uncle Josef and R., is one of incongruity with the rest of the dream-report and remaining associations. Freud claims that they "stand in contradiction", but any kind of logical contradiction would be too strong. We are really dealing with a case of motivated incongruity, rather than any kind of contradiction. The point is obvious; even simpletons are loveable, often precisely because of their simple nature, as are 'loveable rogues'. At the very least, the concept of affection is not inapplicable in such cases as in this interpretation, and it is not in contradiction to them. It is not the case that if someone is loveable, then they cannot be a fool or a rogue. What about the "slander" to which Freud refers? The 'slander' is the claim that his uncle is a simpleton, but again there is no logical incompatibility between viewing somebody as not very intelligent yet loveable. So, from the example that is provided by Freud it is not a case of one proposition standing in logical contradiction to another, such as 'R is a simpleton' and 'it is not the case that R is a simpleton.' Freud gives the example of politeness, to illustrate the kind of mental activity he takes to manifest itself in the censorship. He says, "The politeness which I practise every day is to a large extent dissimulation of this kind; and when I interpret my dreams for my readers I am obliged to adopt similar distortions."336 This allows room for but does not require contradicting one's own beliefs. One can be polite in various ways: by not mentioning something, by being

³³⁵ IV, 141. ³³⁶ IV, 142.

evasive in response to awkward questions, not insisting on one's point of view and so on. But all of this falls far short of contradicting, or even reneging, one's own beliefs in any way. So, we may conclude that the interpretation does not bring to light a case of selfdeception; Freud describes this interpretation as a case of concealing something from himself, which strongly suggests the structure of self-deception.³³⁷ However, the logical relation between beliefs required for self-deception is not present. Given that self-deception offered a way of understanding Freud's claim regarding incongruous elements that he was concealing the meaning from himself as anything more than *ad hoc*, we conclude that in the absence of further evidence incongruity does not warrant the claim that he is concealing the meaning from himself. Let us now address the further evidence, and see if the phenomenon of resistance can amounts to evidence that Freud, as the interpretee, is concealing the meaning from himself.

2.3 The Evidence for Concealing the Meaning from Oneself (2): Does Freud's 'Resistance' Indicate that the Meaning of the Dream-Report is Transparent to Him?

Freud tells us that he 'resisted' interpreting the dream-report of the Uncle with the Yellow Beard. Could this constitute evidence that he is concealing the meaning of the dream-report from himself? Freud wants to say that the interpretee conceals the meaning from himself just as he continues to do, under the psychoanalyst's attempts to inform him of it in analysis. Evidence that concealing of the meaning from oneself is occurring comes from the resistance the analyst encounters as he attempts to gain from the interpretee the material by which to arrive at the meaning of the dream-report. However, there is a more fundamental question that must first be addressed. We must first consider if the phenomenon of resistance offers grounds for holding that the meaning of the dream-report is transparent to the interpretee before the question arises whether it offers grounds for holding that the

³³⁷ While it may be true in a loose sense that the feeling of affection may 'stand in contradiction' to some of the thoughts in the dream, this requires a further point of qualification. One element could stand in contradiction to another only if *both* have been interpreted, or seem *prima facie* to stand in contradiction only if *both* have *not* been interpreted. The negative thoughts in the dream are discovered only *after* interpretation; the feeling of affection is described as standing in contradiction *before* it is interpreted. The cases are not, 'on all fours' as Freud would say. To compare like with like we must first interpret the feeling of affection, and having done this we can see that it does not stand in contradiction to the negative attitudes expressed in the dreamreport.

interpretee wilfully keeps herself in ignorance of the meaning. For if resistance does not constitute evidence of the transparency of the meaning to the interpretee, it cannot constitute evidence that the interpretee conceals an already-known meaning from himself.

In his preface to the interpretation, of the dream of the Uncle with the Yellow Beard, Freud had also said that he reproached himself for not interpreting the dream. He says:

I began to reproach myself: "If one of your patients who was interpreting a dream could find nothing better to say than that it was nonsense, you would take him up about it and suspect that the dream had some disagreeable story at the back of it which he wanted to avoid becoming aware of. Treat yourself in the same way. Your opinion that the dream is nonsense only means that you have an internal resistance against interpreting it.³³⁸

The issue of resistance is at the very least apparent evidence of the concealing the meaning from himself that Freud takes to be present as the he proceeds to interpret the dream-report. For it might be argued that the best explanation of resistance in association, of withholding material, is that in such cases the interpretee already knows the meaning of the dream-report. That is, the interpretee would have no motive for resisting unless he did not like the meaning, but in order to not like it he would first of all have to know what he did not like. For the sake of argument, we do not dispute that it is a clinical fact that sometimes people do not want to learn the meaning of the dream-report. But exactly what does the phenomenon of avoiding coming to know the meaning of the dream-report in terms of 'resistance' show? The mere fact of resisting being informed of the meaning is not sufficient evidence that the interpretee already knows it, that it is already transparent despite the fact that he is not conscious of it. For example, if someone does an exam badly, does their unwillingness to check the published list of exam results mean that they already know the exact result? They know something about the result; they know that they did badly, of course, though they do not know the exact result. They can, with perfect rationality, refuse to go and check the published list. Indeed, Freud tells us with regard to the dream of the Uncle with the Yellow Beard that he had not wanted to interpret the dream, because it contained something he was struggling against. This straightforwardly makes sense and, contrary to Freud's tone, it does

³³⁸ IV, 138.

not mean that he knew precisely what it was before the interpretation was carried out. He was perfectly rational in his refusal to interpret it; there is no reason to presume that he resisted interpreting it while he already knew the meaning, that it was already transparent to him somehow in his mind. He merely needed to know something about the meaning of the interpretation in order to avoid interpreting it. He did not need to know the meaning itself.³³⁹ So, as regards the fact of Freud's resistance to interpreting the dream, and his claim that he was acting like his patients, although it may be true, we have no reason simply on that ground to say that he is therefore concealing the meaning from himself. He is rather making sure that he does not learn the meaning in order not to be in a position to conceal it from himself. Similarly, an interpretee might be unwilling to provide the interpreter with material as he tries to get the interpretee to follow certain associations; he could do this in order not to find himself in a position where he might have to conceal the meaning from himself. The interpretee can resist in this way coming to know the meaning, though this does not require the assumption that the meaning of the dream-report is transparent to him. The mere fact of resistance, then, does not imply that the meaning is already transparent to the interpretee. But if resistance does not imply that the meaning is transparent, it cannot imply that the interpretee wilfully keeps himself in ignorance of it. So, while resistance may be wilful, there is nothing to say that one is concealing the meaning from oneself. Freud must have some other reason for holding that the interpretee conceals the meaning from himself. It would seem to be not the mere fact of resistance, which could be easily accounted for by a common-sense example similar to the one we gave. Could it be the way in which the resistance is carried out?

What Freud is really getting at is, perhaps, the following: It is not the phenomenon of resistance *per se* that constitutes evidence for the *de facto* transparency of the dream-report, but a certain feature of resistance. For example, if the resistance were to manifest a degree of *sophistication*, would that not be evidence that the interpretee already knew the meaning? If

³³⁹ The point could be made that to act in such a way goes against one's own better judgement. This is a moot point—it would be the case only if the one needed to know the information for a specific end. It might in turn be objected that the interpretee would be better off if he knew as much as possible about himself—this again is a moot point. The important point is that there is nothing necessarily paradoxical in 'resisting' in the way suggested above, and that the phenomenon of resistance alone does not oblige us to accept that the meaning is already known.

it were such evidence, would it not be very similar to self-deception, in so far as the interpretee would apparently know the precise meaning in order to avoid it in such a discriminating way. That is, another way of looking at the phenomenon of resistance is to begin by saying that it is so sophisticated that it looks to some extent like an instance of selfdeception, as Gardner in his reading of Freud suggests it in fact is. That is, while the interpretee says that he does not know the meaning, there may be indirect signs in virtue of their sophistication that suggest that he does know the meaning. After all, in the long passage that we quote on page 179 from Freud's obituary of Charcot, there occurs the following phrase that would seem to refer to sophisticated behaviour undermining the interpretee's denials. Freud says, "If we keep to our conclusion that a corresponding psychical process must be present, and if nevertheless we believe the patient when he denies it; if we bring together the many indications that the patient is behaving as though he does know about it" (emphasis added). That is, while the interpretee consciously acknowledges that he does not have the belief p, the indirect signs are sophisticated to such a degree that it seems he non-consciously holds the belief p. Gardner says, "On Sartre's view, the particular kind of structure exemplified by resistance is self-deceptive."340 He goes on,

Within analysis, the maintenance of self-ignorance requires increasingly complex and differential responses to the analyst's probings; the promoted states become increasingly numerous until their architecture evidences the rationality of self-deceptive intent. If self-knowledge is the patient's goal, and mental operations which impede it are correctly describable as a means to avoid it, then Sartre's identification of resistance as a form of self-deception is correct: without awareness of the object of defence under a specific description, the patient would betray herself to the analyst.³⁴¹

Gardner's point is that the resistance is carried out in such a discriminatory way that such sophistication constitutes a reliable indirect sign that the interpretee *does* know the meaning. That is, it is not just a case of the interpretee resisting coming to know the meaning in whatever way possible, as in our exam-results example, but a discriminating manipulation of content that in an ongoing *precise* manner blocks the progress of the interpretation offered by the interpreter. It accordingly suggests the meaning is known, otherwise the undesirable material could not be identified so efficiently. But there are two different kinds of

³⁴⁰ Gardner, p.46

sophistication that may be manifest in the resistance, and which must be distinguished. Gardner concentrates on one, but as we will now see, there is another form which also may be sophisticated.

In Introductory Lectures, inspired by his interpretation of Bernheim's Latent Memory experiment, Freud characterises the interpretee as knowing the meaning of the dream-report, but, in virtue of his denials to the interpreter of any knowledge of the meaning, not knowing that he knows the meaning. "For I can assure you that it is quite possible, highly probable indeed, that the dreamer does know what his dream means: only he does not know that he concerned nevertheless knows nothing, as we are proposing to assume of dreamers?"343 In the case of resistance, such as his own case in the interpretation of the dream-report of the Uncle with the Yellow Beard, Freud does not picture the interpretee as lying to the interpreter—as knowing but not telling, or telling something incorrect to the interpreter to deceive him. What the interpreter faces-given that he does not treat the interpretee as lying-is a bona fide case of not knowing the meaning. Now, why construe this as a case of not knowing that he knows the meaning rather than simply accept it at face value? The only evidence for claiming that the interpretee does not know that he knows the meaning of the dream-report is simply that the interpretee does not know it. If, then, this is construed as motivated-as in resistance-does it warrant only that he simply avoids knowing it, K? Or does it warrant the inference that he really knows it and it is this knowledge that he avoids, K*? The extra inference would seem to hinge on the sophistication present in the way in which the interpretee does not know the meaning, which justifies for the jump from K to K*. That is to say, the sophistication in the way in which the interpretee does not know the meaning is taken as evidence that what occurs is not a face-value avoidance of the meaning, but avoidance of the already-possessed knowledge of the meaning of the dream-report. This line of thinking would lead the interpreter to conclude, in turn, that the interpretee must 'really' ('unconsciously') know the meaning of the dream-report. The implicit assumptions would seem to be: (1) that to succeed in simply avoiding knowing the meaning does not

on William James. The Principles of Psychology, Lordon 1981, Vet.

³⁴¹ Ibid. ³⁴² XV, 101. (Freud's Emphasis)

require a great deal of sophistication, so the sophistication that is present should be taken to indicate that the meaning is already known; (2) that resistance can not be constituted simply by K, but requires K*.

It can be clearly seen that the sophistication of the interpretee's resistance does not by itself constitute evidence that the meaning is already known from the following simple examples, of a different kind of resistance that may equally well be highly sophisticated. The sophistication of the interpretee's 'blocking tactics' might lead us to believe that he is concealing the meaning. But reasoning in that way would be to ignore the possibility that the interpretee may be achieving this by tactically disrupting the interpreter's work, rather than by allowing the interpreter's work to proceed and then hiding material from him. In terms of a football analogy, she may defend by pressing in her opponent's half and so prevent her opponent from beginning any moves, rather than sit back with a deep defence and a sweeper to block the opponent's moves once they are already in course. Either defensive tactic will manifest a degree of sophistication in relation to the "analyst's probings." To use a favourite context of Freud's, we could express the same point in terms of a wartime analogy. Rather than a country defend itself against enemy air raids by sending fighters to intercept its opponent's bombers when the raids are in course, it can employ saboteurs to strike preemptively against the enemy air bases. Sabotage requires a degree of sophistication, even a very high degree of sophistication, but it does not require knowledge of the exact pattern of air raids that would be carried out were the sabotage not to occur. It does not, that is, require that knowledge of the enemy air strategy be transparent to the saboteurs. It does not require any precise knowledge of where the interpreter's moves would have led if they had not been nipped in the bud by the interpretee's resistance. The interpreter, however, will of course know where the move would have led, and so might be tempted to think that in order to block it the interpretee must also know this too. Here Pears' reference to the William James 'psychologist's fallacy' would seem appropriate. He quotes James as saying: "The great snare of the psychologist is the confusion of his own standpoint with that of the mental fact about which he is making his report. I shall hereafter call this the "psychologist's fallacy" par excellence."³⁴⁴ It is not, as our example plainly shows, the case that the interpretee needs

³⁴⁴ Pears, p. 82 Taken from William James, *The Principles of Psychology*, London 1981, Vol. 1. P. 196.

to know where the interpreter is going in order to block his progress. Gardner's reading, however, is in terms of one's knowing exactly where the move is heading and then blocking it.

That the meaning of the dream-report is already transparent to the interpretee, then, remains an assumption on Freud's part and is not independently based on the sophistication present in the resistance. The comparison with self-deception is disrupted in so far as, as characterised by Freud, it is not a case of holding contradictory beliefs even taking into account the sophistication in the resistant attitude to the "analyst's probings." For, on our approach, the kind of sophistication is not of the kind suggested by Gardner, and whatever sophistication is present does not oblige us to presume that the meaning of the dream-report is already known, clear or transparent to the interpretee. The conclusion is the same as in the case of 'crude' resistance: 'sophisticated' resistance does not warrant the conclusion that the meaning of the dream-report is transparent to the interpretee, so it consequently cannot warrant the conclusion that the interpretee was concealing the meaning from himself. It is in fact an instance where, rather than resistance providing evidence for self-concealing, transparency is assumed by Freud in his analysis of resistance in order to infer to selfconcealing. The self-concealing must in turn be explained. Consequently, to explain it, Freud is driven to hypothesise that the mind is divided into different agencies according to a number of models of censorship. However, the most that we can say is that resistance amounts to avoiding coming to know the meaning of the dream-report. This is what our discussion of resistance has shown. So far, then, neither incongruity nor resistance has amounted to evidence that the interpretee conceals the meaning from himself. Yet, inspired most probably by his commitment to the transparency of the meaning of the dream-report, Freud continues to hold that he is dealing with a case of concealment from oneself. If the dream-report is meaningful, then it should be clear to the interpretee, Freud assumes; if it is not, the explanation must be that the interpretee is concealing it from himself.³⁴⁵ In this vein, Freud allows himself to offer an explanation for the supposed concealing from oneself that will ultimately lead to a second mind as the explanation of the censorship.

³⁴⁵ We return to this point in section 5.

3. Freud's 'Explanations' of Concealing the Meaning from Oneself: Different Agencies of Censorship

3.1 Why Do Mental Agencies Enter Freud's Discussion of Concealing the Meaning of the Dream-Report from Oneself?

An explanation involving the positing of different mental agencies is Freud's chosen explanation of how an individual conceals the meaning of the dream-report from himself. He offers us the model from society of concealing something from others in the area of censorship in order to explain concealing something from oneself, following his own instruction to treat ourselves as we would another person. His reasoning is that if the individual were composed of different agencies, then it would explain the incongruous material, in much the same terms as censorship in society explains strange expression in public media. It is then a short step to treating one person as constituted like two, or more persons, linked by a relationship of censorship.

3.2 The 'Auto-Censor' Model

There are two principal kinds of the censorship that Freud argues for by analogy with censorship in society, plus a third that we will cover in our discussion of some examples. The first model is in terms of one person who dissimulates in order to avoid conflict with a more powerful person. That is to say, on this model, one agency *auto-censors* in order to avoid conflict with a more powerful agency. The following is Freud's statement of this view of the agencies, in which a devious 'person' behaves in a certain way towards another more powerful 'person':

I will try to seek a social parallel to this internal event of the mind. Where can we find a similar distortion of a psychical act in social life? Only where two persons are concerned, one of whom possesses a certain degree of power which the second is obliged to take into account. In such a case the second person will distort his psychical acts or, as we might say, will dissimulate.³⁴⁶

On this model of censorship, one and the same agency both tries to express something and at the same time is disingenuous, or misleading, with regard to another person. As regards the dream of the Uncle with the Yellow Beard, this would mean that one agency is responsible *both* for saying that his friend R. was a simpleton, *and* the attempt to disguise it with the element *I had a* great *feeling of affection for him*. Freud elaborates the above analogy in terms of political censorship, saying "A similar difficulty confronts the political writer who has disagreeable truths to tell those in authority."³⁴⁷ One person, or agency, *both* attempts to express his political point of view, while auto-censoring by keeping one eye on the standards of the censorship. In other words, one agency wishes to express something without offending the second, so tries to keep the second agency in ignorance of what it is really saying. The actively censoring agency is the same agency that expresses the opinions that are so controversial. It is not the case that the 'ruling authority' understands the material in order and runs its pen through it. No blacking out occurs, rather such a subtle form of expression is used that the ruling agency is not aware of any offence. Regarding the political writer, Freud tells us:

If he presents them undisguised, the authorities will suppress his words – after they have been spoken, if his pronouncement was an oral one, but beforehand, if he had intended to make it in print. A writer must beware of the censorship, and on its account he must soften and distort the expression of his opinion.³⁴⁸

On this auto-censorship model, a point of suppression is *never* reached precisely because the agency that is expressing itself censors itself. Conflict between agencies is avoided because it is anticipated by the expressing agency. The sophistication in this form of censorship may take different means of 'allusion'. Freud says:

According to the strength and sensitiveness of the censorship he finds himself compelled either merely to refrain from certain forms of attack, or to speak in allusions in place of direct references, or he must conceal his objectionable pronouncement beneath some apparently innocent disguise.³⁴⁹

Consonant with the conclusion of our earlier analysis, Freud explicitly warns us that the indirectness, or as we say *obliqueness*, of expression is dependent on the degree of censorship. He says, "The stricter the censorship, the more far-reaching will be the disguise

³⁴⁶ XV, 141-142.
 ³⁴⁷ XV, 142.
 ³⁴⁸ Ibid.

and the more ingenious too may be the means employed for putting the reader on the scent of the true meaning.³⁵⁰ This analysis of the concept, in terms of auto-censoring activity on the part of one agency, entails no literal contradiction between elements and no conflict.

3.3 The 'Ministry of Censorship' Model

It seems that Freud, however, is not quite satisfied with this view that one agency in a divided mind expresses something in the dream-report in a very guarded way, so as not to cause offence to a more powerful agency. He offers us a further explanation of concealing the meaning from oneself in terms of a second model of censorship, and it is one that does seem to involve conflict between different agencies. It arises only with the possibility that one agency might *intervene* in order to censor the productions of another, along the lines of the war-time press censor. Conflict between agencies does not arise at the level of the censorship per se. It arises when we consider censorship as requiring the intervention of one agency on the work of another. That is, one who produces the text and another who takes the text and censors it. The 'ruling' agency, which pursuing Freud's analogy would be some secret 'ministry of censorship', shall we say, acting to shield the docile 'general public'. A soldier at the front, or a troublesome journalist, wishes to bring something to public attention regarding the war effort. The 'ministry of censorship' intervenes, and presents a text with large tracts blackened out to the general public. A prime example of this type of censorship is the Love Services dream-report cast in the press censorship terms, in which the mumbles are akin to the strips of black left by the censor's pen. Freud says:

But what is remarkable and interesting from our point of view is that the dream shows several gaps – gaps not in the dreamer's memory of the dream but in the content of the dream itself. At three points the content was, as it were, extinguished; the speeches in which these gaps occurred were accompanied by a mumble³⁵¹

Freud states that a full psychoanalysis of the old lady who recounted this dream-report was not carried out, but he indicates the way in which the interpretation of the dream would have proceeded:

³⁴⁹ Ibid. ³⁵⁰ Ibid. Nevertheless there are hints on which conclusions can be based (for instance, in the phrase 'love-services'); but above all, the portions of the speeches immediately preceding the mumbles call for the gaps to be filled in and in an unambiguous manner.³⁵²

Freud's interpretation, by which he fills in the gaps, goes in the following way:

If we make the insertions, the content of the phantasy turns out to be that the dreamer is prepared, by way of fulfilling a patriotic duty, to put herself at the disposal of the troops, both officers and other ranks, for the satisfaction of their erotic needs.³⁵³

Freud acknowledges that this does not appear in the dream, but he says that the context calls for such insertions: "Precisely at the point at which the context would call for this admission, the manifest dream contains an indistinct mumble: something has been lost or suppressed."³⁵⁴ That is to say, were the old lady to be declaring herself at the disposal of the troops during the mumbles, then this would allow us to fill in these gaps. Were she at the same time to disguise this declaration, then this would explain the instances of mumbling in the gaps rather than the open declaration of her availability. As Freud says, "You will, I hope, think it plausible to suppose that it was precisely the objectionable nature of these passages that was the motive for their suppression." The hypothesis regarding the old lady's disposition is what gives sense to the dream-report generally, the further hypothesis of a censoring motive in virtue of their objectionable nature accounts for the 'mumbling' feature in particular. This Love Services dream-report is presented as an example of the direct intervention of the 'ministry of censorship' type of censorship. Freud says:

You will, I hope, think it plausible to suppose that it was precisely the objectionable nature of these passages that was the motive for their suppression. Where shall we find a parallel to such an event? You need not look far in these days. Take up any political newspaper and you will find that here and there the text is absent and in its place nothing except the white paper is to be seen. This, as you know, is the work of the press censorship. In these empty spaces there was something that displeased the higher censorship

³⁵¹ XV, 138.
 ³⁵² Ibid.
 ³⁵³ Ibid.
 ³⁵⁴ Ibid.

authorities and for that reason it was removed – a pity, you feel, since no doubt it was the most interesting thing in the paper – the 'best bit'³⁵⁵

This analogy of the work of the 'ministry of censorship' concerns two agencies interacting in the production of the final, published text, and a further agency to which it is presented. So, on this model of censorship, there is a commitment to *three* agencies in the mind.

3.4 The Redundancy of the 'Ministry of Censorship' Model.

Yet, the interpretation of this example of a dream-report, the Love Services dream-report, in so far as it requires the concept of the censorship does not necessitate the positing of a 'ministry of censorship' type agency to perform it. The auto-censoring model could quite effortlessly be used to explain this type of dream-report as well. It simply requires that the auto-censoring expressing agency have a low opinion of the capabilities of discernment of the ruling agency. Accordingly, it would not even bother to indulge in subtle auto-censoring because the docile agency is too stupid to decipher even the crude censorship analogous to the wartime censorship, whether it recognises it as censorship or not. On the auto-censoring model, the ruling agency is passive and liable to offence. The expressing agency goes to great lengths to ensure that this offence does not take place, it auto-censors itself. Yet, it could simply blacken out strips of text if it considered that the agency that must be kept in ignorance is too stupid to, or does not have the means to, fill in the gaps. So, the 'blackenedout' text could be explained in terms of the auto-censoring model, without positing the presence of a 'ministry of censorship' that had the job of intervening in a text produced by another agency. Moreover, it is no concern of the deceiving agency's that the deceived agency realise that censorship has taken place-not even the 'ministry of censorship' has this concern-it is simply of concern that the deceived agency not arrive at the suppressed content. Like the 'ministry of censorship', the auto-censoring agency need not care if the docile agency knows that censoring is going on. It does not have to be interested in hiding the fact that censorship has occurred; similarly, the wartime censor does not care if black tracts appear in the newspaper. All that the deceiving agency need care about is that the deceived agency should not be capable of filling in the gaps; that it should not arrive at the suppressed content. The expressive agency can be blatant in its auto-censorship, it simply

depends on its estimation of the powers of discernment of the deceived agency. After all, if the 'ministry of censorship' does not have any respect for the capacity of the general public to discern what lies behind the black strip, why should the auto-censor be worried if it too uses such a form of censorship? Why should it not then just run the pen through the text itself, instead of employing the further agency of the ministry of censorship?

The point might also be made that the running of a black pen through a text is a very poor form of auto-censorship, because it will most likely raise suspicions if the deceived agency is not completely stupid. With one efficient and one inefficient form of expression to choose from, it would be strange indeed if the less efficient form of expression were to manifest itself. Precisely for the reason that Freud does not treat the conscious agency as over-stupid or over docile, his attraction to the 'ministry of censorship' model of censorship is qualified as far as interpretation goes. In terms of his theoretical position, by contrast, it suits Freud to have a proliferation into three agencies, the writer, the censor, and the general public. The general public being the deceived agency that does not participate in the censorship, which the censoring agency shields from the real meaning of the oblique material. It is clear that Freud's adherence to this analogy fits his early division of the mind into the Preconscious, Unconscious and Conscious.³⁵⁶ It also fits his later theoretical structure of a Super Ego-that mediates between the agency that expresses the unpleasant desires-the Id -and the agency that is shielded from them, the Ego.³⁵⁷ As regards interpretation, however, it is not quite so useful. In other words, the tripartite division of the mind into agencies corresponds to the general evolution of his theoretical position. In dream-interpretation, the picture that Freud himself paints in the practice of interpretation is of one cunning, rational agency who deceives a passive, unsophisticated agency.

the ministry 03.5 Freud's Wavering Between the Different Models of Censorship

A tension between the different models is evident in Freud's writings. The tension is between his attraction to the ministry of censorship model, and his explicit qualification that

³⁵⁶ For Freud's fullest discussion of these agencies and their relations to each other, see his paper "The Unconscious."

³⁵⁷ For extensive discussion of this latter set of agencies, see "The Ego and the Id" and lecture 31 of New Introductory Lectures, "The Dissection of the Psychic Personality."

the censoring activity that bears on the dream-report is very rarely of this sort. For example in *The Interpretation of Dreams*, Freud indicates that censorship can operate in more subtle ways, akin to the way in which the political writer auto-censors, and akin to the circumlocution characteristic of the **PR** analysis of the interpretation of the dream of Irma's injection:

On other occasions the censorship has not gone to work on passages *after* it has already been completed. The author has seen in advance which passages might expect to give rise to objections from the censorship and has on that account toned them down in advance, modified them slightly, or has contented himself with approximations and allusions to what would genuinely have come from his pen. In that case there are no blank spaces in the paper, but circumlocutions and obscurities of expression appearing at certain points will enable you to guess where regard has been paid to the censorship in advance.³⁵⁸

Apparently referring to just this notion of censorship, in *Introductory Lectures* as part of the discussion of the Love-Services dream corresponding to ministry of censorship model, he says that he usually treats the data in terms of the auto-censorship model. He says,

But it is only rarely that this censorship manifests itself so undisguisedly – so naively, one might say – as in this example of the dream of 'love services'. The censorship takes effect much more frequently according to the second method, by producing softenings, approximations and allusions instead of the genuine thing.³⁵⁹

In this vein, he treats a wide range of features that appear far removed from the 'ministry of censorship' model as the product of the censorship. He says, "We should go further, and regard it as a manifestation of the censorship whenever a dream-element is remembered especially faintly, indefinitely doubtfully among other elements that are more clearly constructed."³⁶⁰ So, if the auto-censorship model is *so* prevalent, why should we introduce the 'ministry of censorship' in a seemingly *ad hoc* way to explain the rare dreams such as the Love Services dream-report when it can be explained on the basis of the auto-censoring model anyway? In the case of the Love-Services dream-report, then, it would seem that for theoretical reasons Freud is under the sway of the ostensible *similarity* between the text

³⁵⁸ XV, 139.

³⁵⁹ Ibid.

³⁶⁰ Ibid.

emitted by a press censor and the text of the dream-report. The reason is that it allows him to infer to a homology of agencies in the production of the dream-report in line and his general theory.

Freud presents a summary of his approach, apparently designed not to rule out any of the above possibilities regarding the mechanism of censorship, with an eye to the use to which they might be put in the future. He focuses attention away from the mechanisms, minimising the notion of a little man in the head even though that is precisely the mechanism pointed to by the far more common model of auto-censorship. Preferring to emphasise the practical task of fathoming motives, he says: "The word does not prevent our asking by what purposes this influence is exercised and against what purposes it is directed."361 He shields his position from objections based on the problem of the mechanism by adding the qualification that, as regards the term 'censor', "For the time being it is nothing more than a serviceable term for describing a dynamic relation."³⁶² This seems to be his way of not analysing the degree of plausibility in the application to dream-interpretation of rival concepts of censorship. With this qualification, Freud's overriding concern seems to be a practical one of a psychologist: he does not want questions of mechanism to obstruct us in looking at the kinds of motives involved. He says "But we wanted to inquire what are the purposes which exercise the censorship and against what purposes it is directed."363 He explains, generalising somewhat from the evidence of multiple interpretations, "The purposes which exercise the censorship are those which are acknowledged by the dreamer's waking judgement, those with which he feels himself at one."364 He says,

The purposes *against* which the dream-censorship is directed must be described in the first instance from the point of view of that agency itself. If so, one can only say that they are invariably of a reprehensible nature, repulsive from the ethical, aesthetic and social point of view – matters of which one does not venture to think at all or thinks only with disgust.³⁶⁵

³⁶¹ XV, 140.
³⁶² Ibid.
³⁶³ XV, 141.
³⁶⁴ XV, 142.
³⁶⁵ Ibid.

As far as assessing the method of interpretation, however, *both* the discussion of the concept in terms of the frequency of application of the models proposed and the examples of successful interpretation given by Freud weigh heavily in favour of the auto-censoring position. The auto-censoring agency says things by means of the dream-report that would be regarded as repugnant by the main agency, and uses its intelligence to ensure that the main agency does not become aware of the meaning of the dream-report. Now let us back up this reading of Freud's articulation of the concept of the censorship with two major examples. Our aim in doing so is to show that the employment of the concept of the censorship in examples points invariably towards the auto-censoring model. Apart from the 'Love Services' dream, Freud is not keen to give us other examples of the 'black pen of the ministry of censorship' model.

3.6 The Interpretation of the Dream-Report of Little Karl in his Coffin

Freud uses this interpretation to the end of defending his thesis that all dreams are wishfulfilments but it concerns us here due to the influence of the censorship. In this dreamreport, according to the interpretation the terribleness of the dream-report serves as a disguise for feelings of affection that the dreamer has for an old friend of her sister's, who had as it happened become a professor. It goes as follows:

I saw Karl lying before me dead. He was lying in his little coffin with his hands folded and with candles all around – in fact just like little Otto, whose death was such a blow to me.

In this dream-report the content is of a scene in which one of the interpretee's nephews, Karl, is lying dead in a coffin. The boy, in fact, is still alive. It is his brother, Otto, who has died. The dreamer has great affection for the young Karl and claims that she cannot understand why her dream-report should contain such a terrible scene. Freud tells us that "after reflecting a little, I was able to give her the correct interpretation of the dream, which she afterwards confirmed."³⁶⁶ He continues, "I was able to do so because I was familiar with the whole of the dreamer's history."³⁶⁷ When the interpretee was growing up a friend of her

³⁶⁶ IV, 152. ³⁶⁷ Ibid.

elder sister's had made a "lasting impression on her heart."368 For a while, it had looked as though her sister was set to marry this friend, but in the end it came to nothing. The dreamer "did not succeed, however, in freeing herself from her attachment to her sister's friend."369 In fact, she was enamoured of this friend to a huge extent. Freud says, "Whenever it was announced that the object of her affections, who was by profession a literary man, was to give a lecture anywhere, she was invariably in the audience; and she took every opportunity of seeing him from a distance on neutral ground."³⁷⁰ The day before the dream she had also told Freud that she intended to go to a particular concert because he would be there. Freud says, "That had been on the day before the dream, and the concert was to take place on the day on which she told me the dream."³⁷¹ On top of all this, the patient associates that after Otto's death the old friend in question had come to visit them and she had seen him "once more beside little Otto's coffin.³⁷²"

Given this data about the dreamer's life, Freud is in a position to interpret the scene in the dream-report as one more expression of her long-standing wish to see the old friend at every opportunity. He suggests to her, "If now the other boy were to die, the same thing would happen. You would spend the day with your sister and the Professor would be certain to come to offer his condolences, so that you would see him again under the same conditions as the other time."³⁷³ Taking into account her declared positive feelings for the child, Freud infers that the terribleness of the scene is an attempt to disguise the meaning of the dreamreport. The whole context expressed in the dream-report is a means of disguising her true feelings towards the professor. Freud says: "In order to conceal her wish, she had evidently chosen a situation in which such wishes are usually suppressed, a situation in which one is so much filled with grief that one has no thought of love."³⁷⁴ That is, were the dreamer to wish to see the old friend again, then this would provide a reason for dreaming of Karl in his coffin too. As a form of saying, the dream-report amounts to saying 'I am seeing the old friend again' motivated by the wish to see the old friend again. The element of disguise

³⁶⁸ IV, 153.

- ³⁶⁹ Ibid. ³⁷⁰ Ibid.
- 371 Ibid.
- 372 Ibid.
- 373 Ibid.

consists in the context in which this is said. The terrible nature of the content can be explained as an expression of an attempt to disguise the wish due to motives of shame. The disguising of the wish no more involves two separate agencies than does the political writer's wish to express his point together with his equally conscious and 'undetached/undivided' wish to express it in the most circuitous of ways. Obviously, the construction of this dream-report requires a lot of thought, it is not just a 'ministry of censorship' running-of-the-pen through a prepared text. It is a sophisticated, seamless text with no obvious interruptions, and as such points towards the auto-censorship model. Let us consider a second example, which introduces the third form of censorship.

3.7 The Interpretation of the Dream-Report of the Three Theatre Tickets for 1 fl. 50 kr.

Freud's eagerness to put forward different concepts of censorship is evident in the following example. A third form of activity attributed to the censorship by Freud lies in the extreme displacement of accent, of which he tells us he knows "of no parallel in the operations of the press-censorship."³⁷⁵ As an illustration of this form of censorship Freud refers the reader to the dream-report of Three Theatre Tickets for 1 florin 50. This activity is attributed to the censorship when the dream-report, or so-called manifest content, compared to the so-called latent content or the meaning arrived at by interpretation is "so unlike the latent dream-thoughts that no-one would suspect the presence of the latter behind the former."³⁷⁶ It is by attributing this activity to the censor that Freud explains "the strangeness on account of which the dreamer himself is not inclined to recognise it as his own production."³⁷⁷ The dream-report taken by him as an illustration of this model of censorship goes as follows:

She was at the theatre with her husband. One side of the stalls was completely empty. Her husband told her that Elise L. and her fiancé had wanted to go too, but had only been able to get bad seats – three for 1 florin 50 kreuzers – and of course they could not take those. She thought it would not really have done any harm if they had.

³⁷⁴ IV, 153-154.
³⁷⁵ XV, 139.
³⁷⁶ XV, 140.
³⁷⁷ Ibid.

Freud views the dream-report in the context of an event from the previous day that the interpretee reports in the associations. Her husband had told her that Elise L., "who was approximately her contemporary, had just become engaged."³⁷⁸ Freud holds that "the dream was a reaction to this information."³⁷⁹ He sets about establishing this by initially viewing the dream-report as a response to the events of the previous week as related by the interpretee, as she associates to one side of the stalls being empty. He also lays stress on the temporal aspects of the association as the dreamer relates the event in question. Freud says:

It was an allusion to a real event of the previous week. She had planned to go to a particular play and had therefore bought her tickets *early* – so early that she had had to pay a booking fee. When they got to theatre it turned out that her anxiety was quite uncalled-for, since *one side of the stalls was almost empty*. It would have been early enough if she had bought the tickets on the actual day of the performance. Her husband had kept on teasing her for having been in too much of a *hurry*.³⁸⁰

Next, he explains *the 1 florin 50 kreuzers* element, in which the temporal aspect also features strongly. Freud stresses this aspect in the context of the information that "Her sisterin-law had been given a present of 150 florins by her husband and had been in a great hurry – the silly goose – to rush off to the jewellers' and exchange the money for a piece of jewellery.³⁸¹ The element *three* also features a temporal aspect in its associations, that "She could think of nothing in connection with that, unless we counted the idea that her newlyengaged friend, Elise L., was only three months her junior, though she herself had been a married woman for nearly ten years.³⁸² By focusing on the temporal aspects, Freud gives the following account in terms of her attitude to her early marriage compared to her friend's decision to wait. Freud focuses on all these temporal aspects by stating that they provide the opportunity for a hypothesis, or construction:

We cannot help being struck by the fact that periods of time occur at several points in the information she gave us about the dream, and these provide a common factor between the different parts of the material. She took the theatre tickets too *early*, bought them *over-hurriedly* so that she had to pay more money than

³⁷⁸ XV, 122.
³⁷⁹ Ibid.
³⁸⁰ XV, 123.
³⁸¹ Ibid.
³⁸² Ibid.

was necessary; so too her sister-in-law had been in a *hurry* to take her money to the jewellers and buy some jewellery with it, as though otherwise she would *miss it*. If, in addition to the 'too early' and 'in a hurry' which we have stressed, we take into account the precipitating cause of the dream – the news that her friend, though only three months *her junior*, had nevertheless got an excellent husband – and the criticism of her sister-in-law expressed in the idea that it was *absurd* of her to be in such a hurry, then we find ourselves presented almost spontaneously with the following construction of the latent dream-thoughts....³⁸³

The overarching hypothesis that, if the interpretee were to bear the mental state, would explain the dream and the temporal associations, is the following. It is presented by Freud as if the interpretee had said it. As, that is, a translation into everyday saying: "Really it was absurd of me to be in such a hurry to get married! I can see from Elise's example that I could have got a husband later on too."³⁸⁴ Freud summarises, "We have only discovered that the dream expresses the low value assigned by her to her own husband and her regret at having married so early."³⁸⁵ The main element, Freud tells us, is that of "being in too great a hurry"³⁸⁶ though "nothing of the sort is to be found in the manifest dream."³⁸⁷ Freud points out, and we can see how the point has particular relevance for his discussion of the censorship, that "It seems, therefore, to be possible for what is in fact the main thing, the centre of the unconscious thoughts, to be absent in the manifest dream."³⁸⁸ This is, then, a form of 'displacement' due to the censorship. In this respect of unlikeness between the manifest and latent contents, Freud believes himself to have discovered the third *modus operandi* of the censorship. Freud says, with regard to this third conception of censorship:

I know of no parallel in the operations of the press censorship to a third manner of working by the dream censorship; but I am able to demonstrate it from precisely the one example of a dream which we have analysed so far. You will recall the dream of the 'three bad theatre-tickets for 1 florin 50.³⁸⁹

The explanation he gives is instead in the following terms:

³⁸³ XV, 123-124.
 ³⁸⁴ XV, 124.
 ³⁸⁵ Ibid. (Freud's Emphasis)
 ³⁸⁶ Ibid.
 ³⁸⁷ Ibid.
 ³⁸⁸ Ibid.

As a result of this displacement of accent, this fresh grouping of the elements of the content, the manifest dream has become so unlike the latent dream-thoughts that no one would suspect the presence of the latter behind the former.³⁹⁰

This kind of censorship, then, consists in the degree to which the interpretation of the dreamreport is not similar to the ostensible content of the dream-report. The lack of similarity is attributed to the censorship even though the notion of the censorship is not employed to interpret any particular element of the dream-report or particular association. This third form of censorship, however, while it may not correspond to an obvious analogy in terms of press censorship, is clearly compatible with the auto-censoring model. It reflects a great degree of sophistication in terms of the softenings and allusions. The auto-censor has decided to be particularly evasive in instances like this, and this points to a difference in degree with the standard auto-censorship rather than the introduction of a new kind of censorship. The plausibility of a second mind, to which this model of censorship thus unmistakably points, has been criticised by Sebastian Gardner.

4. Consequences of 'Explaining' the Concealing the Meaning from Oneself: Sebastian Gardner's Criticism of the 'Second Mind'

Sebastian Gardner has recently advanced a view of the philosophy of psychoanalysis that has critical import with regard to the concept of the censorship. He is critical of the censorship in so far as it involves a separate *agency* in the mind that has the job of executing the censorship, thus amounting to partitive explanation. This is a form of explanation that he considers nothing more than a pseudo-explanation, and it has the unwelcome consequence of leading to the attribution of a second mind to the interpretee. This criticism, in the light of our analysis of the censorship is clearly of interest. For, as we have seen, partitive explanation appears to lie behind all of the models of censorship put forward by Freud. Gardner's criticism is directed at the 'ministry of censorship' model, but is applicable also to the auto-censor model in so far as on that model too there is an agency which carries out the censorship in order to keep a further agency in ignorance of the meaning of the dream-

³⁸⁹ XV, 139.

³⁹⁰ XV, 140.

report. Our discussion is intended to put forward a view of the censorship which is at least implicit in Freud's work and which does not involve a conception of the censorship as a second mind. We are dealing therefore with the specific issue of the censorship, and this should not be confused with the broader question of whether there are or are not agencies in the mind or whether the notion of a second mind might have value in areas other than the censorship. Furthermore, we do not address and our discussion offers no opinion on whether Freud might have had reasons other than the censorship for his topography of the mind in terms of the Conscious, the Preconscious and the Unconscious, and later on in his career Ego, Super-Ego and Id. This broader issue, though it would seem to come within the ambit of Gardner's criticism of partitive explanation, is not of concern to our discussion. For our purposes, his criticisms of the second mind in relation to censorship are supported below by some considerations of our own before we move on to propose a solution.

entity is record 4.1 Gardner's Ruling-Out of the Main Agency as the Censor

For the sake of argument, admitting the possibility that there might be diverse agencies in the mind, Gardner addresses the notion of the censorship in the following way. He begins by concentrating on the main agency—the agency in possession of consciousness—the 'Ego' as he refers to it by adopting Freud's later terminology.³⁹¹ He considers whether it could engage in censorship, in the sense of hiding something from *itself*. Gardner approaches this problem in terms of the phenomenon of resistance in the analytic setting. He takes the example of the analysand censoring his utterances in free association in order to hide things from the interpreter, and addresses the possibility of an explanation in partitive terms of such resistance. This kind of explanation would amount to investigating what part of the analysand is executing this censorship in order to resist, or as a means of resistance. Gardner says one is " asking of the analysand who resists, '*what part of themselves* can thus resist?'³⁹², and this part he nominates as 'R'. Referring to Jean-Paul Sartre's historic criticism of psychoanalysis on the grounds of Freud's understanding of the censorship in terms of a separate agency, Gardner says the possibility that the Ego, or main agency, could

³⁹¹ Freud says of the Ego and the Id: "The ego represents what may be called reason and common-sense, in contrast to the id, which contains the passions. All this falls into line with popular distinctions which we are all familiar with; at the same time, however, it is only to be regarded as holding good on the average of 'ideally'" (XIX, 25).

resist may be discounted. He says, "R cannot be a state of the ego, Sartre argues, so long as the ego is 'envisaged as a psychic totality of the facts of consciousness.""³⁹³ Gardner's point is not to do with the phenomenology of consciousness—though in this field the main agency is very often characterised as being in possession of consciousness-but the explanation of conflicting desires in partitive terms. The desires are on the one hand to recover from the psycho-neurotic illness and on the other to hide that which the analyst wishes to discover. Gardner's point is that little progress has been made by introducing partititive explanation once we allow the Ego to engage in censorship in the sense of hiding something from itself, because this division in turn needs to be explained. He says, "If the ego is both colluding, and refusing to co-operate, with the analyst, then it is itself divided, and further partitive discrimination within the ego is called for."394 Continuing, Gardner says: "If the ego resists, then either it is electing to hold back information, or it is being made to do so. But we do not picture the analysand as lying to the analyst, and if the ego is coerced, then some further entity is required to do the coercing."³⁹⁵ The notion of a main agency that hides material from itself was considered in terms of a first approximation to the material discovered in analysis by the early Freud. With reference to one particular symptom, for example, Freud says "the idea in question was forced out of consciousness and out of memory."396 With the maturation of his theories in the development of dream-interpretation, Freud appears to treat the censorship-wherever it occurs in topographical terms-as occurring outside consciousness. However, Gardner's point applies to the main agency, the Ego, independently of whether it is conscious or not of censoring. Gardner's way of putting it is not to focus on the phenomenological problem of being conscious of something in order to push it out of consciousness. Instead, he argues that censorship by the main agency in order to hide material from itself simply instigates a further need for explanation, rather than explaining that which it was introduced to explain. Pears addresses the same point when he says that such a 'solution' simply leads to the problem breaking out again:

³⁹² Gardner, p. 47
 ³⁹³ Gardner, p. 48
 ³⁹⁴ Ibid.
 ³⁹⁵ Ibid.
 ³⁹⁶ II, 269.

Since it is hardly possible for him to accept the conjunction of two contradictory propositions, they must somehow be kept apart in his mind. Freud's theory about the way in which they are kept apart is that the one that gives satisfaction remains in consciousness, while the other one is kept out of consciousness. Sartre's criticism of this is that no such theory can possibly work. His main argument is that the censor, which keeps the unwarranted belief out of consciousness, will be conscious of that very belief and so it will have the additional task of keeping it out of its own consciousness; but if that is the mechanism of repression, the problem of self-deception will break out again within the censor, and so on to infinity³⁹⁷

So we may discount at the outset the notion of the main agency—often characterised as the agency in possession of consciousness— engaging in censorship, in order to hide something from itself. This, of course, is quite different to the model of censorship we discussed earlier, the case of an agency that censors its own productions in order to hide something from *another* agency.

4.2 Gardner's Claim that the Censor Must be a Second Mind

So, having eliminated the possibility of the main agency or Ego keeping something from itself, and disregarding the possibility that the Id on Freud's later topography censors itself, we come to the notion expressed in the ministry of censorship model; the existence of a separate censor mechanism.³⁹⁸ That is, as Gardner puts it, "The part responsible for resistance must serve as a *medium of exchange* between other parts..." ³⁹⁹ He characterises this medium of exchange that executes the censorship as C:

Call this part C. It must have a greater capacity than any other part of the mind for (i) representing the contents of other mental parts and (ii) controlling mental events. These conditions must be met for the following reasons. For C to cause resistance, it must represent the unconscious motive alongside the desire to reject it: R involves representing the motive as 'to be repressed'. Furthermore, the maintenance of the self-ignorance requires more than just excluding the motive from self-consciousness: C must operate the mental levers of self-misrepresentation, which involves having a picture of the mind's differentiation into

Gardner, p. 48

³⁹⁷ Pears, p. 36

³⁹⁸ There are three possibilities discussed: we discount without discussion the Id in the later Freudian topography: "Nor can R be a state of the id's, for simpler reasons. The id is characterised by Sartre as 'blind conatus', making it *ex hypothesi* incapable of rational resistance" (Gardner, p. 48). In terms of the 'ministry of censorship' model, the Id would correspond to the expressing agency—the troops at the front writing their letters home, as it were. The 'medium of exchange' would, on this model, correspond to the ministry of censorship, which runs its black pen through the troops' letters, or newspaper articles, in order to shield the general public.

parts, grasping some representations in consciousness as threatening the revelation of motive, and installing misrepresentations in consciousness as a means to the burial of others. So, C has a grasp of evidential relations and an ability to manipulate representations rationally.⁴⁰⁰

Gardner says that the fulfilment of these last two conditions, which seem necessary if C is by censoring to execute the resistance, would amount to C becoming a second mind. He says:

If C's role requires this much, then R involves having beliefs and desires, and exercising rational capacities. C is therefore a Second Mind. It is in fact just what Freud's iterated argument from analogy first arrived at, before the modulation to 'unconscious mind'. This means that as Sartre says, the truly explanatory item in Freud's theory - the real Second Mind - is not Ucs., but the censor.⁴⁰¹

In this way he shows that what is required for the execution of resistance is nothing less than the existence of a second mind, so that if there were a censoring agency that executed the resistance it would have to be just such a second mind. Gardner, as we now investigate, then puts forward his criticisms of the second mind.

4.3 Gardner's Criticisms of the Second Mind

The problem is that treating the censorship as executed by a separate agency is to all effects and purposes simply to introduce another description of the entire person: "C is a redescription of the person minus his rejected motive, and plus belief bout the existence of that same hidden element."402 That is to say, 'C' is an agency with the 'rejected', or censored, troublesome motive excluded, and with the belief required to monitor that motive in order to exclude or censor it. In other words, C is granted whatever is required to censor the motive without instigating a further need for explanation as occurs when the main agency engages in censorship to hide something from itself. So, the troublesome motive is left in one of the other agencies-the Id-while a belief required to monitor the troublesome motive from the confines of C-to keep it from the remaining agency, the Ego-is granted to C. In short, it is a stipulative solution (when there is a problem of incoherency or infinite

⁴⁰⁰ Gardner, pp. 48-49 ⁴⁰¹ Gardner, p. 49

⁴⁰² Ibid.

regress between beliefs one avoids it by stipulating that the beliefs, or motives, belong to different agencies) and for this reason not a genuine explanation. Furthermore, due to the level of complexity required to monitor the troublesome belief and execute the censorship the stipulated agency must be to a large extent like the whole person. It amounts to a "reduplication of the person at a putatively sub-personal level."⁴⁰³

If we have any doubt that this stipulative approach is nothing more than a nonexplanation, or if it does not strike us as a non-explanation, Gardner shows us how in a noncontroversial rational case it plainly is a non-explanation because it is merely a redescription using 'agency' words. He points out that partitive explanation could be trivially utilised in a case of normal, rational behaviour, and granted this, we have no reason to treat it as adding anything to the analysis in a case of irrational behaviour. He says:

Any rational action of a person's could also be partitively 'explained'. I desire to smoke, believe this to be a cigarette, and light it. Partitive explanation says: there is a part of me that does not have my desire to smoke, but shares all my beliefs, and desires that my desire to smoke be satisfied. It reasons that getting me to light the cigarette will satisfy my desire to smoke, and therefore causes that action.⁴⁰⁴

If it is trivial in the rational case, he claims, it doesn't become any less trivial when employed in the attempted explanation of irrationality. Following this illustration of smoking in a rational case, he says "Clearly, this is harmless partitive explanation, which will always 'succeed', because it is not really explanation at all."⁴⁰⁵ Gardner concludes his analysis with the claim on the basis of his point about reduplication that the attempt to explain resistance by the activity of a censor that is *effectively* nothing more than a second mind leads to a kind of self-contradiction on the part of the interpreter. In so far, that is, as he is bound to end up attributing to the interpretee what is effectively a person while claiming that he is attributing something less than a person as the *explanans*. Gardner sums up his analysis in his overall conclusion with reference to each of the criticisms he makes as follows:

⁴⁰³ Ibid. ⁴⁰⁴ Gardner, pp. 49-50 ...there are two ways—which are complementary, and can be pressed simultaneously—in which the Censor Criticism can be formulated. (i) As a charge of *contradiction* or *logical confusion*: the partitive form of explanation is obliged to view the mental parts that it postulates as both separate and conjoined, in a mind that is both integrated and disintegrated. The Second Mind model must suppose both the relevant mental parts are wholly discrete, and coordinated in the way ordinarily supposed for a single mind. This means describing the person as having both many minds and a single mind. Equally, partitive explanation must view the key mental part that it postulates as simultaneously personal and sub-personal. (ii) As a charge of *triviality* or *redundancy*: the partitive form of explanation is non-explanatory in the rational case, and there is no asymmetry between its application there and to the irrational case.⁴⁰⁶

So, Gardner rejects the notion of the censor as an independent 'mechanism of exchange', and this is the role it plays in the ministry of censorship model. However, this position amounts to a rejection of *any* second-mind view, and carries just as much weight for our view in which there is not a separate 'medium of exchange', but in which the expressing agency is, unlike the troops at the front, intelligent and engages in auto-censoring. In so far as both models of censorship offered by Freud involve a second mind at some point in interpretation, there is no effective difference in the weight of Gardner's criticism between the ministry of censorship model and the auto-censorship model. On grounds of *superfluity*, we have already rejected the separate agency view of censorship, which in Gardner's account corresponds to the mechanism of exchange. Furthermore, we have seen that the auto-censoring view so far amounts to a commitment to a second mind; so the question now is what can be said for the auto-censoring second-mind view in the light of these criticisms of partitive explanation generally. Let us consider the viability of the auto-censoring latent agency under three headings appropriate to a second 'person': *Who is he? How does he operate*? and *Why does he do it*?

4.4 Discussion of Gardner's View

Identity: Who is the auto-censor? Let us take the case of desire, before we address the fact that it is a wish that features in the interpretation. Merely on the basis of incompatible desires, is there any need to posit a separate agency as the executor of the censorship, thus running the gauntlet of Gardner's criticism? In our consideration of the Uncle with the

⁴⁰⁵ Gardner, p. 50

406 Gardner, p. 52

Yellow Beard interpretation, we saw that the auto-censoring agency seemed not to share the desires of the main agency; we may say that in the interpretation it did not replicate the main agency in particular in respect of one important desire regarding Freud's friend, R.. In the interpretation, it seemed to possess a desire alien to Freud himself, even though there was no evidence to consider that it held different beliefs. The second agency could thus be viewed as a reduplication of the main agency-Freud himself- with regard to beliefs though not in terms of desires. There might, that is, exist two agencies composed of exclusively radically different desires that had all or overwhelmingly most of their beliefs in common. The interaction of these beliefs-in-common with the desires of the auto-censoring agency might produce a course of action that the main agency would not instigate or participate in, which the auto-censoring agency ex hypothesi does in the production of the dream-report. It is not simply a question that the reduplication of the main agency should be considered inevitable in virtue of common beliefs; radically different desires might be the characteristic of the second agency and the two agencies might merely have some common topography with regard to beliefs. This picture reflected in the Uncle with the Yellow Beard dream-report warrants asking whether it is acceptable to posit a separate agency when the beliefs are in common, and it is simply a question of radically different desires. For, on this basis that some desires are very unlike other desires the danger is that we could with equal justification posit an agency for each desire and end up stipulating a proliferation of agencies. Also, we must not forget that the most we can say is that certain desires are unlike other desires to varying degrees. To go so far as to describe them as in conflict or 'standing in contradiction' to one another is nothing more than a metaphorical description of how unlike each other they are. For, as Marcia Cavell notes, desire does not pose the same problems of mental division as belief. Desires that appear to 'stand in contradiction' to one another do not oblige a division of the mind. One can guite coherently desire and not desire the same thing depending on the description under which one respectively does so. That is, in virtue of distinct properties of the desired object, one can with a unified mind possess conflicting desires with regard to the same thing. She makes the point:

It should be said first with respect to contradiction that desire doesn't raise the problems belief does. Of course one could not simultaneously do x and not-x, nor consistently have the all-out intentions to do them at the same time. But no logical contradiction is involved in desiring on the one hand that it will rain today

because otherwise I'll have to go on the hike that I'd like to skip, and on the other that it won't because rain would spoil the new coat of paint on the house; or feeling guilty at the thought of wanting to be a better writer than my father, while feeling guilty at the thought of what such a defeat would mean for him. A desire is typically not an all-out sort of thing, but a disposition qualified in various ways—'insofar as x would achieve y I would like to do x', and so on, though such qualifications are often not apparent prior to conscious reflection. Nor is there any contradiction involved in hating and loving the same person at the same time; though I suspect that typically one hates him under one description and loves him under another, or loves her at one moment, hates her at another.⁴⁰⁷

Cavell goes on to add that "What interpretation won't tolerate is the idea that someone believes p and not-p; for to attribute such a 'belief' would deny sense not merely to him but to ourselves."408 However, such a contradictory belief is not what we are dealing with in cases such as the interpretation of the dream of the Uncle with a Yellow Beard. In fact, we are not even dealing with lesser degrees of conflict between beliefs, such as the four lesser degrees of self-deception indicated by David Pears. We are not, that is, dealing with conflicts between beliefs at all. On the basis of Cavell's point, then, we can say that Freud can desire that his friend be a fool in certain respects of his own ambition, but not in other respects. But, of course, in the case of the interpretation of the Uncle with the Yellow Beard we are not even dealing with a conflict between desires. We are dealing with a wish. This means that there is even less warrant for introducing separate agencies to account for wishes 'alien' to the main agency in so far as there is no logical possibility of wishes conflicting with desires or, for that matter, beliefs. They are different kinds of entities, which cannot conflict with desires. Freud could quite coherently desire that his friend were not a simpleton, while wishing that he were one. What the partitive solution in fact amounts to is an expression, or evincing in partitive terms, of Freud's astonishment that he should possess such a wish; he would never have thought of himself as ambitious to that degree. Perhaps what Freud means with regard to his ambition is that if he were ambitious to that degree, then he should have been conscious of it all along. But this is to presuppose the transparency of the mental, a topic that we will return to in our conclusion. Let us say for now that the beliefs and desires and wishes uncovered in the interpretation of the Uncle with the Yellow Beard dream-report do not stand in favour of the presence of a second mind as the

407 Cavell, 1993, pp. 163-164

⁴⁰⁸ Cavell, 1993, p. 164

explanation of the censorship. So far, the evidence counts in favour of *one* mind as executing the censorship and against Freud's introduction of a multiplicity of agencies.

Mechanism: How does the auto-censoring take place? Gardner says that the censor must rationally represent and control mental events, and that this points to a second mind. He then disputes that the notion of a second mind is viable, as we have seen. More precisely, he also disputes that it makes sense to claim that one agency can rationally represent and control mental states in relation to another agency. We will now see that representation and control is possible, though in a way that is not very fruitful for interpretation. Let us begin by asking the following question. If the censored text is the production of a second mind, how then does it effect the censoring? Prima facie, it would appear that there are two preconditions. It needs to monitor the main agency and, at least so far as the commentators have it, it needs to intervene in the main agency. How then does the second mind know which of the parts of the dream-report should be censored? The crudest way would be if it had some direct access to the main agency. This would mean at a minimum that the second mind would represent to itself the contents of the other agency. In the discussion between Pears and Gardner, the focus is on the notion of one agency peering into another. But another possibility is available. That is, the second agency, or as we interchangeably say second mind or autocensoring agency, infers what would displease the main agency. That is, there is indirect representation in so far as the second agency does not have direct access to the attitudes of the first agency but is able to infer those attitudes on the basis of what the first agency does and says. The auto-censoring agency, or second system as it is referred to by Pears, after all, is at least as intelligent as the main agency, or first system. So, pace Gardner, it would not require a 'picture' in any literal sense of the mind's differentiation into parts, an inference would be sufficient. It would not have to grasp "some representations in consciousness as threatening the revelation of the motive."409 It would simply have to estimate what among its own productions would be within the range of intelligence of the main agency. It requires, that is, merely a general estimation of the intelligence of the main agency. It needs to pay detailed attention only to its own productions. In the same way, Professor Moriarty does not have to monitor the various representations in Inspector Lesatrade's mind in order to avoid

⁴⁰⁹ Gardner, p. 49

being caught; he simply needs to know that if his plan is of a certain degree of cunning, Lestrade will not discover it. This requires some notion of the *kind* of thing that Lestrade will fall for, but it does *not* require a precise reconstruction or monitoring of Lestrade's reasoning. In connection with this issue, we may reject a notion of Pears'. Gardner is, for his own reasons, critical of Pears notion regarding what in his terms are the main system 'O' and the sub-system 'S' that 'O is S's environment.' This is the notion that while O looks out on to the world, S looks out onto O. On our view, too, this is wrong. S looks out onto the world just as O does. It is by looking out onto the world that it gathers enough material to gauge what is going on in O. If needs be, and if S's powers of reasoning are up to the job, this will provide enough evidence to track O's contents in detail. But it is not necessary. Gardner's criticism goes as follows:

Pears' proposal does not just mean that whereas the main system happens to be interested in the world (Vronsky), the sub-system happens to be interested in the Psyche (beliefs about Vronsky): for the divergence of interest is itself an explanandum. Pears' claim about 'environment' has to be taken more literally. When so taken, Pear's reply requires a highly problematic notion: that of understanding a second-order representation without understanding what it is a representation of. We are required to suppose that the sub-system can, with full rationality, manipulate representations of Vronsky without understanding who or what Vronsky is. But this is impossible, just as pictures cannot be sorted into landscapes and seascapes by a person who is not sighted. To get semantics, S must take the world as its environment in the same sense as O does.⁴¹⁰

On our view, Gardner is going too far here. The sub-system does not have to manipulate representations at all, it simply has to manipulate speech or behaviour. It can then *leave it up* to the main system to sort out the way it represents these developments internally to itself. Gardner goes on to say:

Should Pears' asymmetry then be restated as 'the sub-system has both the world and the main system as its environment, whereas the main system has only the world? That would be to concede Sartre's point, that S is in fact extra-systematic. (S is really the person in so far as he knows both the world *and* himself.⁴¹¹

⁴¹⁰ Gardner, p. 74

⁴¹¹ Ibid.

The problem seems to result from the way in which Pears presents the problem. He consistently says that a system can become aware of a belief or desire in another system.⁴¹² He also says in drawing a comparison with role psychology that "dominance and manipulation are the *raison d'être* of the sub-system....³⁴¹³ In order to accomplish its goals, he says that "It must be aware of the main system's problems...³⁴¹⁴ Furthermore, it has to "acquire the information without acquiring the elements themselves...³⁴¹⁵ He speaks of the "operations"⁴¹⁶ of the sub-system with regard to the main system. Now, this position is certainly close to that of the auto-censoring agency; it is doing the same job, undoubtedly, as the auto-censoring agency. However, as we have pointed out, it can represent the other system to itself without peering into it. So, there is not a problem of representation—but what about intervention?

In terms of the *intervention* of the sub-system in the main system, or the second, autocensoring agency in the main agency, there is a point that is at least implicit in Freud's use of the Post-Hypnotic Suggestion experiment as a model of mental activity.⁴¹⁷ This is that the aims of censorship are often best served by *not* intervening. In this way, the mechanism of intervention need not be a problem for the expressing, auto-censoring agency. In the experiment, what happens is that the subject executes the order of the hypnotist in the face of amazement, and sometimes resistance, on his own part. For example, there is the example of the patient with a dislike of wine, Emmy Von N. in *Studies On Hysteria*, whom Freud hypnotised and instructed to ask for a glass of wine at an appointed time. The action was duly carried out, according to Freud, and the patient requested a glass of wine at the appointed time. In this case, we could take the request to occur on the part of the second agency and the dislike to be characteristic of the main agency. A classic feature of these

⁴¹² See Pears, p. 88

⁴¹³ Pears, p. 89

⁴¹⁴ Ibid.

⁴¹⁵ Pears, p. 90

⁴¹⁶ Pears, p. 89

⁴¹⁷ Freud typically takes this experiment as evidence of unconscious mental activity. However, it is questionable to what degree it is helpful to discuss the issue of mental agencies according to the measure of consciousness. For, in the example of Emmy Von N. asking for a glass of wine under the influence of post-hypnotic suggestion, it seems undeniable that she was conscious of asking for the glass of wine. Similarly, when subjects in this experiment give a spurious explanation of their action, it implies that they are aware of having executed the action. They do not simply deny any awareness of what they have done. It would seem to indicate that whichever agency acts is in possession of consciousness *when* it acts.

experiments is that the subject does not remember the hypnotist's command, so he is in ignorance of the real determinant of the action he performs. However, this ignorance does not prevent hypnotised subjects coming up with a spurious explanation of why they are doing what they do. Now, it would be a mistake to think that they construct the explanation in order to censor from themselves the real determinant of their action-the hypnotist's command—and that there is a censor involved in the complicated treatment of the text of the explanation. Such direct intervention by a censor is not necessary, in fact no direct contact between the agencies is necessary at all. All that is necessary is that the action is executed, and then the executing agency need not intervene to influence the main agency's thinking. It can leave it up to the main agency to create the spurious story in whichever way it wants. In this way, due to a feature of the typical operations of the main agency, and not in virtue of the intervention of the second agency, the real reason for the action is obscured. In other words, as long as the real reason is not manifest in the action-as it is not, indeed, in a displaced or incongruous dream-report-the main agency will by itself come up with a spurious explanation, which amounts to an obscuring of the real reason for any interpreter. For the interpreter would not have the privilege of observing something comparable to the hypnotist giving his command. So, this is *indirect* manipulation by the expressing agency that exploits a perfectly normal feature of the main one. At times, such as in the example of the wine, there is resistance on the part of the main agency; but this is not a sign of conflict directly between agencies, it is rather resistance towards the act itself. What does the patient try to resist? Drinking the wine, and nothing else. Pressed on why she resists drinking the wine, a further spurious explanation will be forthcoming. Overall, there is no need for the second agency to represent directly any belief of, nor promote directly any belief in, the main agency in order to mislead the main agency. Of course, the second agency must have access to speech, and it must have access to behaviour. It has to take control of speech and behaviour, as indeed it does in the Post-Hypnotic Suggestion experiment. When the subject in the experiment is asked regarding the action he has executed 'why did you do that?', or to draw the parallel with the utterance of the dream-report 'why did you say that?', the main agency will supply a spurious explanation.

This picture of the relations between the two agencies might be plausible, and supported by the Freudian canon. Yet, it is one that shows a commitment to two agencies that runs contrary to interpretation. It would make interpretation in terms of the dream-report followed by free association an impossible task. Asking the interpretee what a dream-report or a neurotic symptom meant would simply result in a spurious chain of association, and attempting to piece together gaps in such a spurious story would lead the interpreter completely off the scent. In such a case, the dream-report would be the utterance of the expressing agency, while the associations would correspond to the spurious explanation. On this model, the auto-censorship would be impenetrable. The expressing agency simply says what it says, but there would be no way to interpret it by means of free association. So, the two-agencies model of how auto-censoring could take place is viable, but if accepted it would be impossible to interpret a dream-report in the way that Freud wants. That is to say, making sense of a dream-report through interpreting it together with the associations would be an unwitting increase in sophistication of the censorship. Active, or direct, intervention is not required on this view of the relationship between the two agencies to achieve censorship. The censorship occurs in two parts; firstly, the production of the dream-report, and secondly doing nothing more in order to allow the other agency to come up with spurious explanations. On this model, the ends of censorship would be served by deliberately not intervening. But if this is the reality of the situation, the censorship could not be overcome because Freud insists as a rule that we cannot interpret the dream-report without the associations. Were we to try to go beyond Freud and interpret without the associations, treating the dream-report as analogous to the executed post-hypnotic action, we would be interpreting the dream-report as the production of only one agency. But, on the other hand, if we try to interpret with the associations we will gain access to only one agency, the misled agency. The lesson of the Post-Hypnotic Suggestion hypnotic experiment is that censorship between two agencies is possible, but that interpretation can give us access to only one agency. This model of 'intervention' that Freud gives us shows us that interpretation cannot give us access to the contents of the second agency. If we think that the censorship is a concept appropriate to interpretation, and acknowledge that interpretation allows us to deal with one mind only, then we must recognise that the censorship is a concept applicable to one mind only. Once again, then, the evidence of interpretation points to one mind as

executing the censorship because we simply could not discover anything about a second agency if that second agency executed the censorship.

Motive: Why does the auto-censoring take place? There is still an important question that remains unanswered. What could be the motive for auto-censoring on the part of the second mind towards the main agency? The most obvious answer is that the auto-censoring takes place in order to avoid the occurrence of anxiety in the main agency. After all, Freud tells us that the motives that are censored are those which are particularly repugnant to the main agency. The second agency, it would seem, acts on behalf of the main agency. It is benevolent towards the main agency. What can we say about this proposal? Why should the second agency care if the main agency experiences anxiety or not? If we treat it as altruistic we run into the problem that according to Freud the motives that the main agency is protected from are morally repugnant to the main agency. If we take these motives to characterise the auto-censoring agency, then as discussed earlier it will be of an ethically, aesthetically, and socially "reprehensible nature." So again, the evidence counts in favour of one mind. The reason why the second agency might care so much about the anxiety suffered by the main agency is that it is simply a reduplication of the first agency, as Gardner warns us. It is after all an intelligent unscrupulous agency with its own desires that differ from those of the first agency-why should it let the scruples of the first agency obstruct it in its speech and action? The most plausible explanation, then, is that it expresses itself in such a way in order not to suffer anxiety itself. So, once again, the evidence in terms of motive for the censorship points to one mind, and against separate agencies. Gardner's conclusion must be accepted. The second mind as the executor of the censorship is not a tenable notion. If the notion of the censorship is to be defended, we need to show how the auto-censor does not require a second mind.

why, first of an, does the issue of contenting the meaning of the architecter first oneself arise if—as we argued carlier—there is insufficient evidence for it in the reactive cases of incongruity and resistance in which it is put forward? The short answer is that it arises in virtue of Freud's assumption that the meaning of the dream-report is, is we call a de facto transparent to the interpretee, despite the interpretee's ortensible ignorance of it. In other words, it is a consequence of the acknowledgement on his part that prime facto for

5. The Censorship without Concealing the Meaning from Oneself: The Auto-Censorship without the Transparency of the Mental

Having considered the viability of the second-mind, auto-censoring model of censorship in the light of Gardner's criticisms, we find that we are driven to agree with his conclusion. It is not tenable to claim on the basis of interpretation that there is a second mind that executes the censorship. What is the import of this? The auto-censoring model offered the best hope for making the notion of the censorship of the dream-report viable, and it appeared to lead to a second mind. With the rejection of the second mind, are we compelled to reject the auto-censoring model? And consequently compelled to reject the whole notion of the censorship? If we are, that will call into question the credibility of our whole reading of interpretation, because we recognised that our reading of interpretation presupposed a viable notion of the censorship as a rationale for the displacement that is prominent in the PR reading of interpretation. But another way of looking at these issues is available. There is in fact a way that the notion of auto-censoring means that there is only the first mind involved in censorship, though it requires a fresh perspective on the matter. First of all, let's begin with where Freud went wrong in the philosophical assumption that guided his approach to interpretation. Then, we will move on to exploit an unappreciated consequence of the autocensoring model that allows us to understand the censorship as involving only one mind. Lastly, we will examine the philosophical impact of this new way of appreciating the autocensoring model and find that in spirit, if not to the letter, it corresponds to Marcia Cavell's claim that Freud rejected the transparency of the mental.

5.1 Where Freud Went Astray: 'Concealing the Meaning from Oneself', Due to his Assumption of the Transparency of the Meaning of the Dream-Report

Why, first of all, does the issue of concealing the meaning of the dream-report from oneself arise if—as we argued earlier—there is insufficient evidence for it in the specific cases of incongruity and resistance in which it is put forward? The short answer is that it arises in virtue of Freud's assumption that the meaning of the dream-report is, as we call it, de facto transparent to the interpretee, despite the interpretee's ostensible ignorance of it. In other words, it is a consequence of the acknowledgement on his part that prima facie the

meaning of the dream-report is not clear to the interpretee together with his assumption that in reality it is clear to the interpretee. Freud's reason for this claim seems to be that the dream-report cannot be assumed to be intelligible unless it is somehow clear to the interpretee. This is the assumption that he makes. But why does he make it? The reason seems to lie in his initial assumption of the intelligibility or "sense"⁴¹⁸ of the dream-report as a meaningful utterance. The conception of intelligibility involved in this assumption would appear to be that of the meaningfulness of an utterance as consisting in consciousness on the part of the utterer of a discrete impression or idea that constitutes the meaning of the utterance.⁴¹⁹ In Freud's view, then, if the intelligibility of the dream-report is assumed this amounts to assuming that the interpretee is conscious of an impression or idea that constitutes the meaning of the dream-report. If the interpretee is assumed to be conscious of the meaning, this is one way of saying that it is assumed that the meaning is clear to him; for it would be inconceivable to claim that the interpretee was conscious of it but it was not clear to him. However, in practice, it is not clear to him even though-on this line of thinking-it should be. Why then, given this view of intelligibility, is it not clear to him? Freud's answer is that it is not clear to him because he is concealing the meaning from himself.

In more detail, let us examine the conception of intelligibility involved in the assumption of intelligibility. The conception of intelligibility is one of meaning consisting in the consciousness of discrete impressions and ideas or, as it may be expressed, in having discrete impressions and ideas before one's mind. This is a conception of meaning that we will pursue in particular detail in our fourth chapter. For now, let us simply indicate how it was present in Freud's initial approach to the problem of hysteria, and how he carried it with him when he turned his attention to dream-interpretation. From his early attempts at interpretation it is evident Freud adhered to this conception of the intelligibility of the hysterical symptom as a meaningful action in terms of having an impression or idea before one's mind. For example, even before he published *The Interpretation of Dreams* the

418 XV, 83.

⁴¹⁹ In the terms of Marcia Cavell's analysis that we go on to discuss in chapter four, the point could be expressed by saying that the assumption of transparency is a consequence of Freud's understanding of intelligibility in terms of 'meaning internalism'.

assumption of the intelligibility of hysterical symptoms in terms of having an impression or idea before the mind was present in his work. It was already in evidence with regard to the proposed solution to the problem of hysterical phenomena in his 1893 obituary of Charcot, a solution that takes a common-sense approach yet has this conception of intelligibility implicitly at its core. The excerpt is quite long, but it is relevant to the issue. In the excerpt, Freud articulates at length how he persists in assuming the intelligibility of hysterical symptoms in the face of their apparent unintelligibility:

A quite unbiased observer might have arrived at this conclusion: if I find someone in a state which bears all the signs of a painful affect-weeping, screaming and raging-the conclusion seems probable that a mental process is going on in him of which those physical phenomena are the appropriate expression. A healthy person, if he were asked, would be in a position to say what impression it was that was tormenting him; but the hysteric would answer that he did not know. The problem would at once arise of how it is that a hysterical patient is overcome by an affect about whose cause he asserts that he knows nothing. If we keep to our conclusion that a corresponding psychical process *must* be present, and if nevertheless we believe the patient when he denies it; if we bring together the many indications that the patient is behaving as though he does know about it; and if we enter into the history of the patient's life and find some occasion, some trauma, which would appropriately evoke precisely those expressions of feeling-then everything points to one solution: the patient is in a special state of mind in which all his impressions or his recollections of them are no longer held together by an associative chain, a state of mind in which it is possible for a recollection to express its affect by means of somatic phenomena without the group of the other mental processes, the ego knowing about it or being able to intervene to prevent it. If we had called to mind the familiar psychological difference between sleep and waking, the strangeness of our hypothesis might have seemed less. No one should object that the theory of a splitting of consciousness as a solution to the riddle of hysteria is much too remote to impress an unbiased and untrained observer.⁴²⁰

It seems best to interpret the sense of 'know' in this passage is that of having an idea, or as Freud states an 'impression' or 'recollection', present before the mind. For it is this sense of 'knowing' that Freud uses in his description of Bernheim's Latent Memory experiment that, from our first chapter we are in a position to say, evidently inspired the method in the above passage. The method in question is the insisting and urging that the patient remember that Freud had copied from the experiment in his mission to find a technique to by-pass hypnosis and gain access to what the presumed *condition seconde* was aware of without re-awakening

⁴²⁰ III, 19-20.

the presumed *condition seconde* itself. In his description of that experiment, we saw Freud using the terms 'knowing' and 'not knowing' to mark the distinction between being conscious and not conscious of a discrete memory. The above passage, in which the 'knowing' presumed on the part of the hysteric is explicated in terms of impressions and recollections in a special state of mind, together with the sense of 'know' from the experiment, shows us the nature of Freud's assumption that the symptoms are intelligible. It is that the impression or recollection, as referred to in the passage above, that constitutes the meaning of the hysterical symptoms is before the consciousness, or 'special state of mind', that manifests itself in the *condition seconde*. The symptom is intelligible in virtue of the impression or idea that constitutes its meaning being before, not the *first* consciousness, but the *second* one. So, despite the fact that the so-called normal consciousness with which the interpreter deals has no such idea before itself, the interpreter persists in holding that an idea before the mind is the standard of intelligibility. Accordingly, he assumes that the idea that constitutes the meaning is before a second mind.

It is arguable whether Freud was right to persist in the comparison that is already implicit in the above passage when he came to the topic of dream-interpretation. The comparison in question is between the *condition seconde* as found in cases such as Anna O., the state of hypnosis and the state of sleep in relation to dream-interpretation. In fact, it would seem that there is no guarantee that the idea of which the interpretee was conscious during the dreamexperience in sleep and the idea that would be revealed as the meaning of the dream-report by interpretation would turn out to be the same. Freud in fact addresses this objection in *Introductory Lectures*, and leaves us with the inconclusive response that it is "not precisely fantastic"⁴²¹ to suppose a coincidence. However, the point of our discussion is not to ponder the merits or demerits of Freud's pursuit of the analogy between the *condition seconde*, somnambulistic state in the hypnotic experiment and the experience of dreaming when he came to address the topic of dream-interpretation. Of course, Freud may have had in mind, he may have been impressed or inspired by, his observations of the various kinds of *condition seconde*—but that is not what we are addressing. The point is rather that the very concept of intelligibility manifest in Freud's discussion of the various phenomena he

⁴²¹ XV, 110.

compares to the *condition seconde* is cashed-out in terms of a conception of meaning in terms of impressions and ideas present before the mind. Freud then carried this conception of intelligibility forward into dream-interpretation. Should it turn out that Freud was wrong to insist on the parallels regarding the *condition seconde*—and our general linguistic analysis suggests that he was at least misguided—they still constitute evidence for attributing to him a belief in an impressions-and-ideas-before-the-mind conception of intelligibility when he turns to dream-interpretation. For it is reasonable to consider Freud not to have changed his very conception of intelligibility when it came to interpreting the dream-report. The import of this is that this conception of intelligibility aids us in our analysis by providing a rationale for why he should assume the transparency of the meaning of the dream-report to the interpretee. As we will see in chapter four, it also tallies with Freud's understanding of linguistic meaning generally in terms of ideas, or 'presentations' before the mind.

The presence of the same conception of intelligibility in Freud's approach to dreaminterpretation can be seen from the following. If we fast-forward to *Introductory Lectures* and the discussion specifically of dream-interpretation, we find Freud continuing in the very same vein as in his obituary of Charcot as regards the assumption of intelligibility. In the face of an apparent lack of transparency of the meaning of the dream-report to the interpretee, Freud tells us that we must ask the dreamer for the meaning of the dream-report. He says in the lecture 'The Premises and Technique of Interpretation':

We proceed with our work, accordingly, on the supposition that dreams are psychical phenomena. In that case they are products and utterances of the dreamer's, but utterances which tell us nothing, which we do not understand. Well, what do you do if I make an unintelligible utterance to you? You question me, is that not so? Why should we not do the same thing to the dreamer – *question him as to what his dream means*?⁴²²

Freud's expectation is that the interpretee could reply to such a question on the basis that the meaning of the dream-report is transparent to the interpretee, even in the face of the difficulty that, if we accept the denials as *bona fide*, the meaning is not transparent to the interpretee. The nature of Freud's expectation is evident from the way in which he

422 XV, 100.

characterises this state of affairs by saying that the interpretee knows the meaning, but does not *know* that he knows it. For he goes on:

Since he knows nothing and we know nothing and a third person could know even less, there seems to be no prospect of finding out. If you feel inclined, then, give up the attempt! But if you feel otherwise, you can accompany me further. For I can assure you that it is quite possible, and highly probable indeed, that the dreamer *does* know what his dream means: *only he does not know that he knows it and for that reason thinks that he does not know it.*⁴²³

So as far as Freud is concerned the meaning of the dream-report really must be transparent to the dreamer after all. It is before his mind, as we may rephrase Freud's notion of 'knowing', despite the fact that at the same time it is not before his mind. With his appeal to Bernheim's hypnotic experiment at this point in his discussion in Introductory Lectures, Freud implies that the interpretee is like the somnambulist in the following way. The memory is before the mind of the somnambulist's *condition seconde* and may be accessed by the hypnotist without re-inducing that hypnotic condition simply by insisting and urging. Similarly, the meaning of the dream-report is before the dreamer's condition seconde and may be accessed without re-inducing the condition of sleep simply by asking.⁴²⁴ With regard to that memory of the subject's in the experiment in comparison to the dream-interpretee, Freud says, "It was merely inaccessible to him; he did not know that he knew it and thought that he did not know it. That is to say, the position was exactly the same as what we suspected in our dreamer."425 The meaning of the dream-report is held to be similarly inaccessible. That is to say, the meaning of the dream-report is despite appearances before the mind of the interpretee; it is clear, or transparent to the interpretee. The twist is, of course, that it is before the second mind of the interpretee and concealed in some way from his first one.

⁴²³ XV, 101.

⁴²⁴ So without trying to re-create the dream-experience, Freud wants to gain access to what the subject was aware of in the dream-experience in order to understand the dream-report. So even here it is not the case that interpreting the dream-report involves gaining access to the dream-experience; the dream-experience gets by-passed. Just as, that is, the consciousness belonging to the *condition seconde* gets by-passed. ⁴²⁵ XV, 103.

Summing up Freud's wrong step, then, we may state the following. The assumption of the transparency of the meaning of the dream-report is our way of expressing in philosophical terms the assumption that the meaning of the dream-report is clear to the interpretee. The dream-report is treated as being clear to the interpretee in virtue of Freud's assumption of the consciousness of the meaning of the dream-report, despite appearances to the contrary, on the part of the interpretee. This assumption of consciousness on the part of the interpretee is obliged by Freud's initial assumption of the intelligibility of the dreamreport. For the conception of intelligibility to which he adheres is in terms of meaning as consisting in an impression or idea present before the mind, or consciousness, of the interpretee. Assuming intelligibility, for Freud, in this way amounts to assuming consciousness of the (idea that constitutes the) meaning on the part of the interpretee. The claim that the meaning is clear, or transparent, to the interpretee must then be granted for it would be inconceivable to claim that the interpretee was conscious of the meaning but it was not clear to them. With his conception of intelligibility, in this way Freud was obliged to treat the meaning as transparent. Having assumed the transparency of the meaning of the dream-report, Freud decides to treat the fact that it is not immediately transparent to the interpretee as an instance of concealing the meaning from oneself. Accordingly, it allows him to treat the incongruous elements in the Uncle with the Yellow Beard dream-report as an instance of concealing the meaning from himself. For, if on account of the conception of intelligibility he holds the meaning of the dream-report in theory cannot but be immediately transparent to him and it is not in fact transparent, then this means that something has gone wrong. Once he decides to explain it as intentionally going wrong, as he does when he moves from treating the incongruous element as an instance of dissimulation rather than mere distortion, the next step he takes is to treat it as an instance of concealing the meaning from himself. This notion of concealing the meaning from oneself he articulates with the notion of the censorship. The notion of censorship, as he applies it to the interpretation under discussion, leads him to the notion of agencies in the mind; on this view, the censorship is executed by an agency that is not the main agency, the one in possession of consciousness, but a second agency. We have seen that Freud offers two different models of censorship, the auto-censor and the ministry of censorship, and that the former of these receives most support in his work. Our understanding of the issue, as we will now investigate, concurs

with the auto-censor view except for one important respect: our view is that the autocensoring is carried out by what, in the terms of the debate so far, is the so-called first or main agency. This will become apparent from the following analysis of concealment that, while accepting Freud's analogy with the auto-censor, does not entail that the interpretee is concealing anything from himself.

5.2 The Auto-Censorship not as 'Concealing From' Oneself but as 'Concealing In Relation To' Others

What, to return to the positive thrust of our discussion, if the interpretee is not concealing the meaning from themselves is the nature of the concealing going on? Let's consider a few possibilities, beginning with an extreme case of concealing in order to find our bearings. Ignoring for a second Freud's interpretations of his own dream-reports, the first and more obvious possibility that raises its head with regard to the incongruity of some dreamelements is that the interpretee quite deliberately includes them in the dream-report. The purpose of this would be to conceal the meaning of the dream-report from the interpreter. Let us call this the case of the cynical interpretee; the interpretee straightforwardly sets out to deceive the interpreter as to the meaning of the dream-report. The interpretee might introduce certain elements into the dream-report in order to conceal the meaning from the interpreter. On this view, the interpretee would be quite aware of the meaning of a mischievous dream-report, and edits it to confuse the interpreter. Freud himself tells us in his early papers how unwilling his patients were to disclose information, and how he had to pressurise them into doing so. He had initially understood this resistance in terms of a refusal to remember or communicate memories, but then came to realise that such 'resistance' could be achieved by more cunning methods, which he spotted by means of the 'gaps and imperfections' in the accounts that his patients gave him. The presence of incongruous elements could be treated as an imperfection of this kind. A more cynical interpretee might go so far as to use the whole dream-report as a means of deceiving the interpreter. A dream-report such as the one offered by the patient who was the 'cleverest of all my dreamers' could be understood as just such an instance of cynicism. Freud takes her dream-report to run counter to his thesis that all dreams are wish-fulfilments; and he takes this dream-report meaning to be motivated by her desire to prove his overall analysis of the

case to be wrong. And of course, rather than merely editing a dream-report by the introduction of incongruous elements, she could have quite consciously composed a counter-wish dream-report, or censored her recounting of the dream-report to Freud in order to achieve this aim, and clearly would not therefore be concealing the meaning from herself. This kind of case cannot be ruled out, but the parallel with censorship is not present. For, an important aspect of censorship is missing; in these cases of concealment by cynical interpretees, there is only the attempt to deceive the interpreter, but what is lacking is the aspect of communication that is an essential aspect of censorship. The characteristic aspect of censorship on the auto-censor model, after all, is not *simply* concealment but that it leads to communication that involves concealment as part of the medium.

Now let's consider a second case, the case of the coy interpretee. The analogy with censorship in society indicates the following direction for our discussion of concealment, in terms of a distinction between concealing from and concealing in relation to. The interpretee is not trying to deceive the interpreter at all-in fact he wishes to communicate with the interpreter-but is obliged to communicate in a very oblique way for motives that we designate with the term 'the censorship'. The interpretee is quite aware of what he wants to say in the typical roundabout way, but is not willing to say it openly to the interpreter because of the influence of the censorship. On this view, the interpretee reasons quite straightforwardly according to the practical reasoning pattern as to what would be the best way to say in an oblique way what he wants to say. His disclaimer that the meaning is not transparent to him should not be accepted as bona fide, but itself viewed as an instance of oblique speech as "Constructions in Analysis" encourages one to do. In this case, the meaning of his dream-report would be quite transparent, or as Freud would say 'known', to the interpretee. Yet, by making what is strictly speaking an untrue statement-that he did not 'know' the meaning of the dream-report-it would not be the case that he wished to deceive the interpreter. Accordingly, it would not be right to say that he was going so far as to lie to the interpreter, even though in claiming to be ignorant of the meaning of the dreamreport he was in fact saying something untrue. In a politically repressive society, the political writer cannot acknowledge the meaning of his text to his target audience for fear of running further risks, even should they explicitly ask him. Obviously, he might have a fear

of spies; he might not be certain that he can fully trust his audience; he might suspect that they are likely to indulge in loose talk. Once these kinds of reasons weigh on his mind, the actual physical presence of a censor is not required. Yet, this does not mean that the political writer is lying to his target audience. His intention is not to deceive them, or conceal the meaning of what he has written from them, but to communicate with them or conceal the meaning in relation to them towards the end of communicating with them. The denial of knowledge of the interpretee's part would be a kind of coyness, a kind of coyness that it was the job of the interpreter, or target audience, to fathom. The interpreter, or target audience, must proceed in terms of viewing the interpretee's denials more tendentiously, and refusing to accept them as bona fide. This solution would be straightforwardly common-sensical, and closely parallels Freud's own analogy of censorship in society in terms of the auto-censoring model. Furthermore, it seems to capture what he is getting at in "Constructions in Analysis" when he tells us that the simple 'Yes' or 'No' must never be taken in isolation, but always in the overall context of the material. It is the overall context that decides the way in which declarations of 'knowing' or not 'knowing' the meaning must be taken. In other words, what the analogy of the censorship suggests is an attempt to communicate in circumstances that are not conducive to communication, rather than concealing the meaning from oneself or a refusal or resistance to communicate. Given the difficulty of the circumstances, it in fact shows an eagerness to communicate. The meaning of the dream-report is not transparent for the simple reason that it is a very oblique, or roundabout, form of speech on the part of the coy interpretee. It is, in essence, an expression of the interpretee's coyness, for the intrepretee deliberately speaks in such a way that it is not clear what the meaning is.

Our view is that the model of censorship to which Freud's interpretative practice points is of the kind present in the case of the coy interpretee, with the qualification that there is no awareness on the interpretee's part that he is speaking to the his reader in a coy way. Formulated generally, let us say that there is no awareness on the part of the interpretee that he is saying things very coyly in relation to the interpreter though this is in fact what is taking place. Initially, we must admit, it seems that a parallel to the interpretee/interpreter relationship is not available in Freud's interpretations of his own dream-reports, and for a moment it seems we are obliged accept that, if he is concealing the meaning, he can be

concealing the meaning only from himself. For there would appear to be nobody else around in relation to whom he could be concealing the meaning. Yet, if we take Freud's analogy of the writer seriously it is not hard to discover a parallel in his case to the interpretee/interpreter relationship in the terms of the coy interpretee. For, just as the political writer in Freud's analogy must communicate by means of concealment in relation to his target audience, so too does Freud have a target audience which-it is our contention-he too communicates with in terms of concealment in relation to. He tells us that the meaning of the dream contained a slander against R.-this much is uncontroversial-but then he says, "in order that I might not notice this..." But why take this step? For it could be explained in the following alternative way: Freud is reticent in disclosing his repugnant attitudes towards his friends to the reader. He does at one point explicitly tell us that it is difficult for him to reveal the intimacies of his life to the reader. In his prefatory remarks to the interpretation of the dream of Irma's injection, that is, he says: "But I have other difficulties to overcome, which lie within myself. There is some natural hesitation about revealing so many intimate facts about one's mental life; nor can there be any guarantee against misinterpretation by strangers."426 He says, after all, with regard to "dissimulation" that "The politeness which I practise every day is to a large extent dissimulation of this kind: and when I interpret my dreams for my readers I am obliged to adopt similar distortions."427 But if that is the case as regards the interpretation, then it seems that he is not trying to conceal anything from himself. Rather, he is trying to conceal the meaning in relation to-though not from-the reader with the introduction of the element I had a great feeling of affection for him. The concealing that occurs is not a case of the interpretee concealing the meaning from the interpreter, nor is it a case of Freud concealing the meaning from his public. It appears that, probably influenced by his unwillingness to decide conclusively in favour of one model of censorship, Freud does not grasp the implication of his comparisons with censorship in society. He does not appreciate, it would seem, that his comparison with the political writer draws attention to the phenomenon of concealing things in relation to others. In the vein of the ministry of censorship model, Freud's line of thinking is concerned with concealing from. One conceals

⁴²⁶ IV, 105, may no problem to solve when it turns out that it is not clear to me that have been being

⁴²⁷ IV, 142. (Emphasis added)

the meaning *from* oneself, he thinks, in order to conceal the meaning not *in relation to* but *from* others. However, in Freud's practice with the interpretation of his own dreams, he conceals the meaning of the dream-report *in relation to* the reader in order, most likely, to temper what he is saying and make it more morally acceptable to the reader. Here, running contrary to his theoretical position, we have a practical insight on Freud's part that is the basis for a positive view of the censorship that will fit into our analysis of treating the dream-report as a case of oblique speech.

5.3 The Auto-Censorship without the Transparency of the Mental

An objection to our understanding of Freud's self-interpretation in terms of the covness of the interpretee comes straight to mind: it is that Freud would surely have known, or been aware that he was being coy in relation to his audience. How could he have been coy, it might be suggested, without being aware of what he was doing, unless he was also concealing the fact of his being coy from himself? In such a case, would we not have to introduce mental agencies to explain not only the fact that the meaning of the dream-report is not transparent to him, but also that he was unaware of his own covness of expression? Otherwise, is it not simply arbitrary to move from the coy interpretee to the case of Freud simply by stipulatively removing the factor of the awareness of the meaning? To argue against our view in this way, would be to assume not only the *de facto* transparency of the meaning of the dream-report, but also the *de facto* transparency of the mental generally in so far as 'being coy' is a mental state. The fact that Freud would not, on our reading, immediately 'know' or be aware, of his acting like the coy interpretee is an objection only if the assumption of the *de facto* transparency of the mental generally is made. Our account of what Freud is doing certainly runs contrary to what he thinks he is doing when he relates to the reader the dream-report of the Uncle with the Yellow Beard, and the consequent discussion of the censorship. However, we may accept that Freud is being coy, and that he is not aware of this fact, without positing mental agencies 'to explain' this state of affairs. For, if we do not assume that the mental should be-in virtue of 'really' being transparent despite appearances-transparent to its bearer than there is simply nothing to explain. If we do not, for example, assume that if I am being coy it should be clear to me that I am being coy, then there is simply no problem to solve when it turns out that it is not clear to me that I am being coy. If there is no problem to solve, then we are not obliged to resort to mental agencies to 'solve' it. In short, we may accept that the meaning of the dream-report of the Uncle with the Yellow Beard is not transparent because of Freud's coyness, and we may accept that he is being coy because we do not assume the transparency of the mental. This brings us to a point of agreement with Marcia Cavell, and to go beyond her a little. The transparency thesis she characterises first with specific reference to linguistic meaning: "The Transparency of the Mental: that the meaning of a word or a sign is immediately present, unmediated, and transparent to the mind." ⁴²⁸ She broadens the point to include the mental by saying, "Freud obviously rejects the 'transparency' thesis, the idea that the meaning of one's thoughts or words is fully present and immediately apparent to introspection."429 Our view of interpretation would lead us to agree with Cavell in the same chronological sequence regarding both of these aspects of the transparency of the mental; we, however, would also add mental states and attitudes on the basis of our example of coyness. For, obviously, covness is not a *thought* though it may be a state or an attitude. The implications of Freud's interpretative practice point towards, as the role of coyness indicates, his rejection of the transparency of the mental generally. For, interpretation points to the conclusion that not only is the meaning of the dream-report not transparent to the interpretee, but also to the conclusion that the principal mental state operative in his saying of it is not transparent to him, the dream record

As our general analysis in this chapter has shown, however, Freud's rejection of the transparency of the mental is not as clear-cut as Cavell would have us believe. In very much of his interpretative practice, as we have been explicating, it is of course true that Freud rejects the transparency of the meaning of the dream-report. His interpretative practice in PR terms leads him in a radical direction to propose interpretation as the medium of access to the meaning of the dream-report even for the interpretee, rejecting the transparency of the meaning of the dream-report. Yet, Freud is inconsistent regarding the transparency of the meaning of the dream-report once he begins to reflect on what he is doing in interpretation. The transparency of meaning in fact leads him in the opposite direction. It leads him back to

⁴²⁸ Cavell 1993, p. 17 429 Cavell 1993, p. 18

intelligibility in terms of an impression or idea before the mind, and his attempt to solve the problems this notion gives rise to in virtue of the fact that the meaning is not de facto transparent. The consequences of this, as our analysis has revealed, included the censorship as executed by a second mind. It seems that what Freud cannot envisage in theoretical terms as a general feature of his method of interpretation-though in his interpretative practice in very many particular instances he does so—is dropping the notion of *de facto* transparency while still assuming the intelligibility of the dream-report. In his interpretative practice, the assumption of transparency is dispensed with by holding that the way in which, in the firstperson case such as the interpretation of the dream-report of Irma's Injection, what I say becomes clear to me is precisely by the more *indirect* process of interpretation. Freud does not appreciate that, on the basis of his own interpretation of Irma's injection, he has made a theoretical point with general application that the dream-report may be treated as intelligible yet at the point in time when it is recounted transparent to no one. He does not realise that he himself in that instance shows the intelligibility of the dream-report to consist in the fact that it is transparent-able, to coin a phrase, rather than transparent or 'known' at the moment it is recounted. The originality of his analysis of interpretation, in fact, is that interpretation rather than introspection or the presence of ideas before the mind is the medium by which the meaning of one's utterances becomes clear. Unfortunately, Freud relapses into thinking that the dream-report must somehow be transparent in some immediate pre-interpretative way, somewhere, to someone. This is a mistake on his part reflecting the general dichotomy, which is a principal theme of Cavell's, between his interpretative practice and his theoretical position. In this case, it is his theoretical commitment to the transparency of the mental that drags him back from his common-sense interpretative rejection of it.

5.4 A Positive View of the Censorship

Freud's rejection of the transparency of the mental generally allows our account of the coyness of the interpretee to stand, and points towards a view of the censorship in the following terms. There is one agency, the main or as it is often described 'conscious' agency, which happens to engage in auto-censoring in its dealings with the interpreter, though not necessarily in order to conceal the meaning *from* (though this is possible) but *in relation to* the interpreter. In other words, the intention is not to mislead the interpreter, but

to communicate in a medium that involves concealment. For general motives of prudence, shame or embarrassment the interpretee speaks in an oblique way about certain issues; the influence of these general motives on the saying of the dream-report results in the censorship. The censorship is the manifestation of covness that renders the speech of the dream-report oblique. The fact that he is engaged in auto-censoring is not transparent to the interpretee when he recounts the dream-report, for the assumption that a mental state such as coyness should be clear to the interpretee when he is engaged in it is not made. For both the interpretee and the interpreter, interpretation is the medium of access to the meaning of the dream-report. In turn, it is inferring to the motives for the saying in such an oblique way that is the medium of access to the censorship. Freud shows, through his parallels with politeness and political writing that it is an everyday task to infer to such motives in the common-sense contexts in society in which censorship is pervasive. Censorship of the dream-report in terms of obliqueness and incongruity is simply a common-sense feature of the way in which the interpretee censors the dream-report in so far as it is an everyday medium of saying things to others. The features of obliqueness and incongruity of expression are ways in which people say things in a guarded way to others in everyday life, such as jokes, as the interpretee says them to the interpreter, and as Freud says them to his public. Freud was not misleading himself with the dream-element I had a great feeling of affection for him. He was simply expressing himself in an everyday medium of communication with his public about matters that demanded less than forthright expression. In this case, they were personally sensitive matters, such that "when I interpret my dreams for my readers I am obliged to adopt similar distortions."430 Our rejection of the assumption of the de facto transparency of the meaning of the dream-report in our account of the censorship in this way dovetails with Freud's interpretative practice in the Uncle with the Yellow Beard dreamreport.

This absence of the assumption of the transparency of the meaning of the dream-report to the interpretee governs Freud's practice in the interpretation of the dream-report of Irma's Injection, too. Freud's practice in the interpretation of the dream-report of Irma's Injection is one in which to utter a meaningful dream-report the interpretee is not first assumed to have

⁴³⁰ IV, 142.

the meaning transparent to him, or know what it means in the sense of having an idea before consciousness. We might express the point by saying that the meaning of his own dreamreport is not transparent to the interpretee, even though ex hypothesi the dream-report is meaningful. In this vein, the sense of meaningful implicit in Freud's interpretative practice is one in which it is interpretation that will reveal what the interpretee's dream-report means both to the interpretee and the interpreter. At the beginning of the interpretation, the meaning of the dream-report is not clear to him; the meaning becomes clear to him once he understands how it fits all of the pieces together in the manner of a jig-saw puzzle. His understanding, 'knowledge' or transparency of the meaning is not in terms of the introspection of ideas before the mind, but in terms of the cohering of inferences into a genealogical-tree pattern that constitutes the interpretation. Furthermore, in virtue of featuring displacement, the interpretation of the dream-report of Irma's Injection clearly bears witness to the influence of the censorship; for, displacement, Freud tells us, is due to the presence of the censorship. However, despite this presence of the censorship the interpretation is carried out without any mention in the preface that Freud himself already 'knew' the meaning in the sense of having an idea before his mind. Nor did Freud claim that the meaning was, despite appearances, transparent to him prior to interpretation in some part of his mind, or in relation to a condition seconde. In this respect, his approach to the Irma's Injection dream-report is markedly different to the method advocated in his obituary of Charcot and given the light of day again in the course of Introductory Lectures. The paradigm interpretation of the method of dream-interpretation instead proceeds by means of the implicit assumption that it was enough that the meaning would eventually become transparent at the end of the interpretation. It was not required in order to proceed with the method of interpretation to assume that it de facto was transparent somewhere in the interpretee's mind-or in some mind of the interpretee-at the moment the dream-report was uttered. What motive could it have? The outcome of discussion ander two of these

headings tallied with Gardner's position, and the other heading saw us seknowledge that reasible notion of the censorship of a second mind upon the first mind would be beyond the power of interpretation to discover.

Our positive suggestion was the 6. Conclusion

Our analysis of the censorship took its cue from Freud's interpretation of the Uncle with the Yellow Beard dream-report, in which he introduces the concept of the censorship of the dream-report as a consequence of concealing the meaning from himself. In that interpretation, Freud argues that he is concealing the meaning of the dream-report from himself on the basis of two features, incongruity and resistance. We began by assessing Freud's claim that he was concealing the meaning from himself on the basis of his interpretation of incongruous elements in the dream-report. We considered that the best way to assess this claim was to consider whether incongruity corresponded to self-deception, and concluded that it did not. We then considered whether Freud's claim that he resisted interpreting the dream-report constituted grounds for considering the interpretation amount to concealing the meaning from himself. We again concluded that it was not, and that these phenomena were insufficient as evidence to suggest that Freud was concealing the meaning from himself. Nonetheless, under the impression that he must explain this 'concealing' of the meaning from himself, Freud is driven via a comparison with censorship in society to appeal to a second agency in the mind as the executor of this concealing-from-himself. We then examined the different models of censorship advanced by Freud. Our exegesis showed the principal model of censorship put forward to be that of an intelligent auto-censoring second mind. This view of the censorship we considered in the context of Sebastian Gardner's criticism of partitive explanation, in so far as he claims such explanation leads to the reduplication of the 'first' mind in terms of a 'second' mind that executes the censorship. We recognised the impact of Gardner's criticism in relation to the censorship, and assessed it by asking some basic questions appropriate to the suggestion of a second mind as the executor of the censorship. Who could the second mind be? How could it interact with the first mind? What motive could it have? The outcome of discussion under two of these headings tallied with Gardner's position, and the other heading saw us acknowledge that a feasible notion of the censorship of a second mind upon the first mind would be beyond the power of interpretation to discover.

Our positive suggestion was that the censorship as a second mind could be avoided, while maintaining the notion of the censorship in terms of the auto-censorship advocated by Freud. Our solution is predicated on dispensing with an important part of that which led to the explanation in terms of agencies in the mind: the notion that Freud was concealing the meaning from himself. We argued that making the assumption of the transparency of meaning at a common-sense level was the rationale for Freud's original step of treating the case of the meaning of the dream-report of the Uncle with the Yellow Beard as one of concealing the meaning from himself. The assumption of the transparency of the meaning was made by Freud, we argued, in virtue of his conception of intelligibility: a conception of intelligibility in terms of the meaning of the dream-report as consisting in the presence of ideas before the mind. The view of the censorship to which our rejection of this conception of intelligibility in turn leads us was one in which the censorship is a medium of communication that involves concealment in order to express something to another person, rather than conceal it from oneself. Freud's own analogy with the political writer in fact suggests this. This point we expressed in terms of the distinction between concealing from and concealing in relation to. The advantage of this view is that it allows us to understand auto-censoring as a means of communication on the part of one mind to somebody else, rather than an indication that the mind of the interpretee is concealing the meaning from itself. We characterised the interpretee, in these terms, as being coy by means of the oblique or roundabout saying characteristic of the PR analysis of interpretation. This characterisation we applied to Freud's interpretation of his own dream-report of the Uncle with the Yellow Beard. Without the assumption of the transparency of the mental generally, furthermore, there is no obstacle to treating interpretation as dealing with a coy interpretee, even though Freud does not think of himself as being coy. We recognised that our conclusion, understood as holding generally of Freud's method of interpretation, tallied with the spirit of Marcia Cavell's approach, as expressed in her book The Psychoanalytic Mind in which she claims that Freud rejected the transparency of the mental generally. Now we move on to considering whether Freud's own analysis of language bears on his approach to interpretation, given that our own approach is of a linguistic kind. We will also see that the view of meaning underlying Freud's conception of intelligibility is the basis of his view of language generally.

IV – Interpretation and Freud's Analysis of Language

Given that our analysis of Freud's common-sense psychological approach to interpretation has proceeded in terms of a linguistic analysis, it is appropriate to consider whether Freud's own analysis of language bears in any way on his method of interpretation. In this chapter, his analysis of language is considered from this perspective. Freud's analysis of language falls into two parts: a basic account of the relation of meaning and a developmental account of meaning resting on a distinction between original meaning and parasitic kinds of meaning. The account of the relation of meaning in language that Freud offers is one cast in terms of mental intermediaries, or 'presentations' before the mind that are revivals of perceptions and as such are the conduit for correspondence between words and objects. This conception of meaning in relation to the dream-report we have already seen, in chapter three, to result in the assumption of the transparency of meaning of the dream-report to the interpretee. As a consequence, to explain the absence of the interpretee's awareness of the meaning, Freud was driven to postulate mental agencies with all their attendant problems. In this way, it becomes apparent that Freud's philosophical commitment to meaning in terms of mental intermediaries bears on interpretation in his understanding of the censorship. Marcia Cavell in her book, The Psychoanalytic Mind, takes as her central theme this very issue of whether the philosophical tradition of mental intermediaries, or discrete ideas before the mind, explicit in Freud's metapsychological writings bears on his method of interpretation. Her aspiration in The Psychoanalytic Mind is to detach Freudian interpretation from Freud's adherence to the philosophical tradition of ideas before the mind. She casts light on the traditional nature of Freud's philosophical position and she shows how his method of interpretation does not require such a philosophical position. Her purpose is to show how Freudian interpretation, unlike Freud's metapsychological theory, fits into modern philosophy following Wittgenstein, which has dispensed with mental intermediaries. In short, in her view the 'interpretative' Freud is the 'modern' Freud, while the 'theoretical' Freud is the 'old/traditional' Freud. Our analysis of Freud's theory of meaning will amount to endorsing the Cavellian project, in so far as holding the mental-intermediary account of meaning makes no difference to Freud's analysis of the dream-report in common-sense, everyday terms. However, beyond the trappings of mental intermediaries, there is also the

developmental aspect of Freud's analysis of language to consider. He views meaning in terms of the correspondence of word and object as having been fixed in an original, primal period and then persisting and supporting two parasitic kinds of meaning as language developed. The first of these parasitic kinds of meaning consists in a widening of the class of objects with which the words are in correspondence, a widening driven by a primal perception of similarity. The second consists in a use of language to express thought distinct from meaning in the strict sense of correspondence between word and object. A similar kind of analysis to that given by Cavell can also be given for this developmental side to Freud's account of language. The first of these parasitic kinds of meaning is the essence of Freud's analysis of the nature of symbolism, yet it is not required by his application of symbolism in interpretation, which proceeds on a pragmatic and linguistic basis. The course of our analysis of the genetic relation in symbolism also leads us to criticise in some detail the claim that understanding the nature of symbolism is required in order apply the concept of symbolism in interpretation recently given by Agnes Petocz in her book, Freud, Psychoanalysis and Symbolism. While her analysis of the nature of the symbolic relation is not challenged, it is argued that the application of the concept of symbolism in interpretation does not, and need not, proceed in virtue of understanding the nature of the relation. The only possible way in which his developmental analysis of language could bear on interpretation lies in Freud's hope that philology could cast light on individual original meanings, and the subsequent developments of meanings. Although Freud does not spend much time discussing the possibility or giving any practical examples, philology in this way in principle might support the application of recondite meanings to interpretation in terms of symbolism.

the object, the so-called object-presentation. The accustic element of image of the word presentation is linked to the visual component of the object presentation. This relation of meaning underlies all verbal expression. This is the foundation of all of language, for treat Although some words, such as those expressing logical particles, do not once saw thi

⁰¹ XIX, 237 ⁰³ Geometry Works Band

1. Freud's Basic Theory of Meaning: The Correspondence between 'Presentations' of Words and Objects

Fundamental to Freud's analysis of language is his analysis of mental activity as occurring through the medium of 'presentations'. What is a presentation? It is the revival, or repetition, of a discrete perception before the mind. According to Standard Edition Freud says that "all presentations originate from perceptions and are repetitions of them"⁴³¹; in German, this goes "alle Vorstellungen von Wahrnehmungen stammen, Wiederholungen derselben sind."432 As we will now see, there are two kinds of presentation; wordpresentations composed from discrete 'images', and thing- or object-presentations that are the perceptions of objects, compounded from discrete simpler perceptions. To this extent, then, there are two aspects of the way in which presentations appear before the mind that bear on Freud's analysis language. Uncompounded 'images' that do not imply the presence of an object, and are compounded to make the 'word', in contrast to the uncompounded presentations or 'ideas' which do imply the presence of the external object, and are compounded together to form the idea of that external object. As regards meaning, the story of the link between the two categories goes something like this. There is the object in the external world that is perceived on a certain occasion. This results in a perception of the object in the mind of the speaker, via the compounding of simpler presentations caused by the object. This compound perception may later be recapitulated as an 'object-presentation'. There is also the idea of the word in the mind of the speaker (made up of recapitulations of perceptions of various component parts of the word, or 'images'). Meaning consists in the correspondence, in virtue of association, between the compound presentation amounting to the word and the compound presentation amounting to the recapitulation of the perception of the object, the so-called object-presentation. The acoustic element of image of the wordpresentation is linked to the visual component of the object-presentation. This relation of meaning underlies all verbal expression. This is the foundation of all of language, for Freud. Although some words, such as those expressing logical particles, do not enter into this

431 XIX, 237.

432 Gesammelte Werke, Band 14, p.14

fundamental correspondence in order to possess meaning. Let us now move on to a more detailed analysis.

1.1 The Word-Presentation: A Complex Idea Compounded from Images.

The basic unit of language, in Freud's view, is the word. We find this definition in his pre-psychoanalytic early work on speech disturbances. In the original German, in Zur Auffassung Der Aphasien, Freud says: "Für die Psychologie ist die Einheit der Sprachfunktion das »Wort«, eine komplexe Vorstellung, die sich als zusmmengesetzt aus akustischen, visuellen und kinästhetischen Elementen erweist,"433 In Standard Edition, on the basis of the importance of the discussion of the distinction between word-presentations and object-presentations in "The Unconscious", the editors append the same passage in translation. The appended translated passage reads: "From the point of view of psychology the unit of the function of speech is the 'word'...."⁴³⁴ E. Stengel, in his independent translation, renders this point in the same way. He says, "From the psychological point of view the "word" is the functional unit of speech "435 This fundamental unit for psychology, the 'word', is a compound presentation made up of diverse elements, elements that in fact as we presently note, are images. For example, Stengel translates this as "it is a complex concept constituted of auditory, visual and kinaesthetic elements."436 Likewise, Strachey et al have the following: "a complex presentation, which proves to be a combination put together from auditory, visual and kinaesthetic elements."437 Then, in turn, the characterisation is sharpened as the elements are in turn more specifically characterised in terms of images. That is, in Strachey's translation we are told that the "complex presentation" that is the word can in fact be broken down into the following images, or 'Bild': "Four components of the word-presentation are usually distinguished: 'the soundimage', the visual letter-image', the 'motor speech-image' and the 'motor writingimage."438 Stengel says, "Four constituents of the word concept are usually listed: the "sound-image" or "sound impression", the visual letter image", the "glosso-kinaesthetic and

 ⁴³³ Paul Vogel and Ingeborg Meyer-Palmedo (eds.), Sigmund Freud Zur Auffassung Der Aphasien: Eine Kritische Studie, Frankfurt am Main, Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1992, p117. Hereafter referred to as 'AA'.
 ⁴³⁴ XIV, 210.

⁴³⁵ E. Stengel (Trans.), Sigmund Freud On Aphasia, London Imago, 1953, p. 73.

⁴³⁶ Ibid.

⁴³⁷ XIV, 210.

the cheiro-kinaesthetic images or impressions."439 Stengel wavers between 'image' and 'impression' in his translation, even though the German 'Eindrücke' for impression does not appear, and he thus seems to have interpolated it as we can now see. The original German of this excerpt goes as follows: "Man führt gewönlich vier Bestandteile der Wortvorstellungen an: »das Klangbild«, das »visuelle Buchstabenbild«, das »Sprachbewegungsbild« und das »Schreibbewegungsbild.«"⁴⁴⁰ Strachey's translation would thus appear to be the more reliable. Even though the word-presentation is composed of these diverse images, the acoustic image plays a predominant role as far as meaning is concerned. The importance of the acoustic image, or the acoustic 'Bild', for meaning lies in the fact that it is the image by which the idea of the word is linked to the presentation, or idea, of the object. Through the mechanism of association, that is to say, the acoustic image of the word is linked not with the whole of the object-presentation, but with only a part of it. As part of the explanation of the diagram by which Freud schematizes this connection, Stengel's translation renders him as saying: "The word concept is linked to the concept of the object via the sound image only."441 Strachey presents this as: "The word-presentation is not linked to the objectpresentation by all its constituent elements, but only by its sound-image."442 In the German original, "Die Wortvorstellung ist nicht von allen ihren Bestandteilen, sondern bloß vom Klangbild her mit der Objektvorstellung verknüpft."443 The connection constituted by this link in association to the object-presentation is necessary in order for a word to possess meaning.

1.2 Word-Presentations linked to Object-Presentations

The association between the word-presentation and the object-presentation is the next step in the analysis of meaning. It is an analysis given by Freud in terms of a further kind of presentation lying between the word-presentation and the object that it denotes. The further kind of presentation is an *object*-presentation. This is explicit in all the translations. Strachey says: "A word, however, acquires its meaning by being linked to an 'object-presentation', at

⁴³⁸ Ibid.
⁴³⁹ Stengel, p. 73
⁴⁴⁰ AA, p. 117
⁴⁴¹ Stengel, p. 77
⁴⁴² XIV, 213.
⁴⁴³ AA, p. 121

all events if we restrict ourselves to a consideration of substantives."⁴⁴⁴ In Stengel's translation we have: "However, the word acquires its significance through its association with the "idea (concept) of the object", at least if we restrict ourselves to nouns."⁴⁴⁵ Freud's German has it as follows, "Das Wort erlangt seine Bedeutung durch die Verknüpfung mit der »Objektvorstellung«, wenigstens wenn wir unsere Betrachtung auf Substantiva beschränken."⁴⁴⁶ That is to say, the word—which we have seen to amount to a compound presentation of images—acquires its meaning by being linked through association to the presentation of an object that exists in the external world, an 'object-presentation.' Freud stresses that it is the relation between the word and the object-presentation that he considers symbolic (in other words constitutes the relation of meaning), *not* a relationship between word and object directly. In *Standard Edition* we find:

I use the term 'asymbolia' in a sense other than that in which it has ordinarily been used since Finkelnburg, because the relation between word [presentation] and object-presentation rather than that between object and object-presentation seems to me to deserve to be described as a 'symbolic' one.⁴⁴⁷

Under Strachey's editorship, the relation of meaning is taken implicitly and correctly to hold between word-*presentation* and object presentation, and they have accordingly inserted '-- presentation' in parenthesis. In his translation of this excerpt Stengel has 'asymbolic', instead of symbolic in the last occurrence in this passage, and this would seem to be a mistake to translate the link between the word and the object-presentation as an 'asymbolic' one. For the German text seems to contain explicitly the translation of 'symbolic', thus supporting Strachey's translation: "...weil mir die Beziehung zwischen Wort and Objectvorstellung eher den Namen einer »symbolischen« zu verdienen scheint als die zwischen Objekt and Objektvorstellung."⁴⁴⁸ It would seem, from our analysis above, that Strachey has captured Freud's intent as regards the terms in the relation of meaning, subject to the following minor supplementation. That is, a word is a *compound* presentation while the straightforward use of 'presentation' does not bring this out perspicuously. Apart from

444 XIV, 213.

- 445 Stengel, p. 77
- 446 AA, p. 122
- ⁴⁴⁷ XIV, 214.
- ⁴⁴⁸ AA, p. 123

this, we may agree with Strachev and say that it is the relation not between the word and the thing, but the relation between the word-presentation and the presentation, or we may with equal justification say 'idea', of the thing that constitutes the meaning possessed by the word. In Freud's view, then, meaning is a relation between the word-presentation and the presentation of an object, rather than directly between the word and the object in the external world. Freud describes this relation between word-presentation and thing-presentation-the perception of the object-as one of 'correspondence' ("entsprechenden",449). For example, in his discussion in "A Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of Dreams" of the notion of 'regression' he says: "In this process thoughts are transformed into images, mainly of a visual sort; that is to say, word-presentations are taken back to the thing-presentations that correspond to them."450 In this instance, there is in fact an inconsequential difference in terminology in so far as the German terms are "Wortvorstellungen" and "Sachvorstellungen."⁴⁵¹ As far as the meaning possessed by spoken language, which let us not forget is the object of interpretation, is concerned, we may sum up our analysis so far as follows. Words uttered in the verbal expression of the dream-report are one associative element (the acoustic) of the word-presentations before the mind of the speaker. The relation between the compound word-presentation by means of the association of this acoustic element and the visual element of the object-presentation rather than the object itself, constitutes the relation of meaning. But what is an 'object-presentation', this other term in the relation of meaning? Similar to a word-presentation, it is a compound of various elements. Again, similar to the word-presentation, one element plays a predominant role. In this case, it is the visual element that plays the predominant role. Freud gives the following definition of the elements of the object-presentation:

The object-presentation itself is once again a complex of associations made up of the greatest variety of visual, acoustic, tactile, kinaesthetic and other presentations / Die Objektvorstellung selbst ist wiederum ein Assoziationskomplex aus den verschiedenartigsten visuelle, akustischen, taktilen, kin - |ästhetischen und anderen Vorstellungen.⁴⁵²

451 Gesammelte Werke, Band 10, p. 418

⁴⁴⁹ Gesammelte Werke, Band 10, p.418

⁴⁵⁰ XIV, 228.

⁴⁵² XIV, 213./ AA, p. 122

It is clear here that the object-presentation, just like the word-presentation, is a compound; it is described as a compound or "complex" of further presentations. That is, visual, acoustic, tactile, and kinaesthetic.

1.3 Indirectness of the Link to the External Object

The link between the object-presentation and the object is indirect in the following sense. It might look from the passage from which the above quote is taken as if Freud's view of meaning does not involve external objects in a realist sense, but rather that the object is a mental construct. That is, that the object is not really there but is instead constructed from images. However, this is not the case, Freud's view does involve external objects though not *via* a direct correspondence but instead a revived one. The above passage continues:

Philosophy tells us that an object-presentation consists in nothing more than this – that the appearance of their being a 'thing' to whose various attributes these sense-impressions bear witness is merely due to the fact that, in enumerating the sense-impressions which we have received from an object, we also assume the possibility of their being a large number of further impressions in the same chain of associations (J.S. Mill) / Wir entnehemen der Philosophie, daß der Anschien eines »Dinges«, für dessen verschiedene »Eigenschaften« jene Sinneseindrücke sprechen, nur dadurch zustande kommt, daß wir bei der Aufzählung der Sinneseindrücke, die wir von einem Gegenstande erhalten haben, noch die Möglichkeit einer großen Reihe neuer Eindrücke in derselben Assoziationskette hinzunehmen (J.S. Mill).⁴⁵³

The phrase "these" and the context imply that the term "sense-impressions", which in other works by Freud⁴⁵⁴ has perceptual connotations of an external object that executes the 'impressing', refers back to these various presentations. It would seem, on the one hand, from the term "impression" that the object-presentation is a compound presentation made up of diverse perceptions—or single presentations caused by, impressed upon the senses by—of an external object. In the German the passage in fact features the word for 'impression', "Eindrücke." The term 'sense-impressions' would therefore seem to apply to the compound presentation that constitutes the presentation, or idea, of the object. That is, the compounded various presentations lead the perceiver to believe that there is an external object

⁴⁵³ Ibid./Ibid.

⁴⁵⁴ See "The Mystic Writing Pad" for Freud's most unambiguous statement of this, and his lecture "The Question of a Weltanschauung" in *New Introductory Lectures* for a general realist position.

corresponding to the composition, and the terminology of 'impressions' leads in this direction. Yet, contrary to this notion of an impression the object is described as an "appearance", that is, the *appearance* of a thing to which they—the sense impressions—bear witness. The Millian explication, furthermore, runs against a conclusion that the object is really there. An explication in terms of simple sense-impressions caused by external objects, rather than images that do not imply the actual presence of an external object, is not one that would sit well with Mill's philosophy. For Mill's philosophy attempts to exclude the connotation of the external object in any serious sense, it is merely a mental construction on his view. Here, Freud appears to be leaning in the direction of an analysis of the object-presentation in terms of the permanent possibilities of sensation.⁴⁵⁵ So our question is, does Freud's view of meaning require the external object in a realist sense?

If we turn to *Introductory Lectures*, in the course of a digression in the discussion on the concept of the dreamwork, we find further information that casts light on this matter of Freud's terminology. This occurs in terms of the relation between 'sensory images' and 'sense-impressions', which is articulated more explicitly and is more informative than the use of 'sense impressions' in the passage relating to Mill. This passage gives us an idea of how 'sense impressions' could loosely be used in a context that did not imply the presence of an external object at that particular moment. Freud says,

In the case of the dream-work it is clearly a matter of transforming the latent thoughts which are expressed in words into sensory images (*sinnliche Bilder*), mostly of a visual sort. Now our thoughts originally arose from sensory images (*Sinnesbildern*) of that kind: their first material and their preliminary stages were sense-impressions (*Sinneseindrücke*), or, more properly, mnemic images (*Erinnerungsbilder*) of such impressions. Only later were words attached to them and the words in turn linked up into thoughts. The dream-work thus submits thoughts to a *regressive* treatment and undoes their development; and in the course of the regression everything has to be dropped that had been added as a new acquisition in the course of the development of the mnemic images into thoughts.⁴⁵⁶

 ⁴⁵⁵ See J. S. Mill, An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy (1865) London, England, Routledge and Kegan Paul 1979 pp. 177-187.
 ⁴⁵⁶ XV, 180-181.

The Gesammelte Werke gives us the translations here in parenthesis.⁴⁵⁷ In this passage the phrase 'mnemic-images of sense-impressions' is used, via the reference to the senseimpressions of the preliminary stages, to explicate the synonym 'sensory-images.' So 'sense-impressions' may be used as synonymous with 'sensory-image' when it is used as shorthand for 'mnemic images' of 'sense impressions.' This use of 'sense-impression' does not therefore imply the presence of the external object, but only that there once had been present the external object.⁴⁵⁸ So it must be that Freud means that word-Vorstellungen are attached to these 'sensory-images', that would of course be 'more properly' formulated as attached to the 'mnemic images' of sense impressions. We may then propose the following rephrasing of the general position so far uncovered. Words are attached to mnemic images (Erinnungsbilder) of 'genuine' sense-impressions (Sinneseindrücke) and it is these mnemic images that amount to 'sensory-images (Sinnesbildern or Sinnliche Bilder) and may loosely be referred to as 'sense-impressions' leaving out the 'mnemic' aspect. The difficulty has arisen only because sometimes Freud uses 'impression' to refer to the mnemic image of the perception and sometimes to the occurrent perception itself. The subtlety is in the stemming from, instead of any putative directly corresponding to, in the notion that all presentations stem from perceptions. The import of this passage, accepting this analysis, is that the relation of meaning is not between the word-presentation and the perception of a thing directly, but between the word-presentation and the thing-presentation as the mnemic image leftover from the perception. This reading would be compatible with Freud's more robust attitude to 'sense-impressions' elsewhere. If we return to "A Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of Dreams" we can bring to light the same interchangeability. It is a passage in which Freud continues the implicit equivalence of the terminology of sensory-image and thing-presentation. More fully, the passage quoted earlier goes as follows:

We have already in *The Interpretation of Dreams* described the way in which the regression of the preconscious day's residues takes place in dream-formation. In this process thoughts are transformed into images (*Bilder*), mainly of a visual sort; that is to say, word-presentations (*Wortvorstellungen*) are taken back to the thing-presentations (*Sachvorstellungen*) which correspond to them....⁴⁵⁹

⁴⁵⁷ Gesammelte Werke, Band 11, p. 183

⁴⁵⁸ This passage provides thus a use of 'sense-impression' consistent with the use of 'image' in the context of word-presentations which does not imply the presence of the external object.
⁴⁵⁹ XIV, 228.

In terms of the analysis of meaning, on the basis of Gesammelte Werke⁴⁶⁰, we may advance the formulation that 'Wortvorstellungen' correspond to 'Sachvorstellungen', or wordpresentations, or ideas, correspond to object-presentations, or ideas. In this passage, the use of the term 'Bilder', or 'images', would seem to be that of the term 'sensory-images'; namely, a complex of presentations that constitutes the object-presentation in its revived mnemic form. For, 'images' would appear to be interchangeable with thing-presentations, and word-presentations are in correspondence with thing-presentations in an 'image' sense. The best explanation of this would, once again, appear to be that Freud wants to put the emphasis on the relation of meaning as holding between the word-presentation and the leftover mnemic image after the act of perception has occurred. That is, so as not to restrict the relation of meaning to those cases in which an object is actually at that moment being perceived. He is implying that there once was such a correspondence to an external object, but its continuation is not required for the relation of meaning. The relation of meaning, we may conclude, is between the word-presentation and the left-over thing- or objectpresentation from the perception of the object. In the terminology of an Empiricist such as John Locke, for example, the point may be made by saying that, in the relation of meaning in language, the word corresponds not to an impression, but to an idea.

Must the there 2. Cavell, Mental Intermediaries, and Interpretation

Marcia Cavell views Freud's work in philosophical terms as being part of what she considers a traditional philosophical view. She articulates this tradition in terms of six points, which we discuss presently. Of these six points, she feels that Freud in his explicit theorising commits himself to two of them. She argues his theory regarding meaning remained in virtue of these two points in the traditional philosophy, which offers the following view of meaning in terms of mental intermediaries:

According to the traditional view, words are meaningful because of their relationships to mental images, or states of mind like wishing or intending, and these are prior to language. The relation between real bricks

⁴⁶⁰ Gesammelte Werke, Band 10, p. 418

and 'brick' is only incidental to meaning; for after all I can talk about bricks though none are around. The word 'brick' refers to the material object via a concept or an image for which 'brick' stands.⁴⁶¹

In his interpretative practice, by contrast, she claims that Freud rejects this view of meaning. In her view, Freud's method of interpretation—unlike his explicit theorising—is an area of his thought where he *implicitly* accepts a modern outlook in philosophy. Freudian *interpretation* has important features in common with Donald Davidson's radical interpretation, in her view, in so far as it does *not* rely—as she understands Freud—on ideas before the mind as mental intermediaries constituting the relation of meaning.

2.1 Cavell's Characterisation of the Traditional Philosophical Outlook

In the course of her scene-setting at the beginning of her book *The Psychoanalytic Mind*, she draws a contrast of which the first term is a philosophical tradition indicated in terms of six key views. This set of views in general she interchangeably refers to as 'First Person' and 'Internalist'. The long passage in which she puts forward these six key views goes as follows:

Descartes... set out some of the assumptions of modern philosophy: (1) The First-Person View: that introspection provides the perspective from which to investigate the nature of the mental. (2) Objects of the Mind: that there is a kind of mental object present to us or before the mind which mediates between the subject, or the knower, and the object known. The mind's knowledge of the external world is through private, internal 'ideas', which when veridical, *represent* reality. (3) The transparency of the Mental: that the meaning of a word or a sign is immediately present, unmediated, and transparent to the mind. This view is usually a corollary of the view that there are Objects of the Mind. (4) Internalism (about meaning): that the content of thought can be severed from any connection with the real world, including other persons; in other words that our ideas might be just as they are though the world be different. Contemporary functionalist and language-of-thought accounts of the mind, for example, hold that thoughts are a kind of inner representation which can be viewed as computational states of the brain. The content of these thoughts is in no way constituted by relations between thought and world. (5) Mind-Body Dualism: that mind and body are two different substances; or that the mind has no necessary dependence on the body. (6) Foundationalism: that certain of our ideas or beliefs or experiences are immune from error, and in being so provide a foundation for the rest.⁴⁶²

⁴⁶¹ Cavell 1993, p. 23

While she takes these points to sum up the key theses of the 'traditional' philosophy, Cavell does not think that Freud holds all of these views: "Freud obviously rejects certain Cartesian assumptions, but he less obviously accepts others."463 She tells us that Freud rejects point (5) concerning mind-body dualism, point (3) concerning the transparency of the mental and point (1) concerning introspection. Cavell is quite right in her assessment of Freud's relation to these three points, with the qualification concerning the transparency of the mental encountered in our discussion of the censorship. Those that she takes him to accept, by contrast, include point (2) concerning the objects of the mind: "But he is tempted by the view I have called Objects of the Mind." 464 He also, she believes, accepts point (4) concerning 'internalism' about meaning: "And he also assumes, like the functionalist and language-of-thought accounts referred to earlier, an internalist view about meaning."465 On the basis of our analysis of Freud's theory of meaning in terms of object-presentations, we may say that she is on the right track as regards both of these points. The objectpresentations, or ideas, are the kinds of thing that she refers to as objects of the mind in so far as they are revived perceptual intermediaries. As far as meaning for Freud is an association between a word-presentation and an object-presentation, rather than the object in the external world, his theory of meaning is clearly 'internalist'. This internalism that Cavell has in mind is, as we can see from point (4), specifically about meaning. It is effectively the Objects of the Mind view specifically applied to an analysis of meaning. While it might be argued that an internalist position is logically possible without the Objects of the Mind, the Objects of the Mind view is to all intents and purposes what internalism amounts to in this discussion. How then, according to Cavell's analysis, is Freud's method of interpretation free of points (2) and (4)? Her strategy is not to explicate the possible ways in which points (2) and (4) might bear on interpretation, and then criticise it. Rather, she shows us how an account of psychoanalytic interpretation can be given which is exclusive of the nature of understanding and the causal relation that go hand in hand with the traditional theory of language generally, of which points (2) and (4) are the cornerstone. In this way, points (2) and (4) are excluded from forming part of Freudian interpretation on her analysis.

462 Cavell 1993, p. 17

464 Ibid.

⁴⁶³ Cavell 1993, p. 18

⁴⁶⁵ Ibid.

2.2 Cavell's Account of Psychoanalytic Interpretation Exclusive of her Points (2) and (4)

So how, then, does she argue that psychoanalytic interpretation points towards Davidsonian interpretation and so does not involve internalism about meaning? There are two clear ways in which the Objects of the Mind view gets excluded, and with it any hope of an internalist account. Firstly, following the philosophical tradition that is antagonistic to the tradition indicated by points (1) - (6) above, she makes the following claim:

An application of these ideas to psychoanalytic practice is the following. What is the psychoanalyst assuming when she uses the patient's free association as a guide to interpretation? Certainly this: that if her patient is following the analytic 'rule' not to censor any of his thoughts, those that are unconscious and repressed will out. But also this: that we come to understand the meaning of any one of a person's sentences or thoughts through discovering its connections to others, thus lighting up the larger network in which it is enmeshed. And this is just the thesis of meaning holism.⁴⁶⁶

On the Objects of the Mind view of language, we come to understand the meaning of a word by having the same idea produced in our mind as the speaker has present in his when he utters that word. It is not a question of discovering connections to other sentences, or other thoughts, at all. Words are used, on that view, in order to produce the same idea in the mind of another that is before one's own mind.⁴⁶⁷ If what Cavell claims in the above quote is the case, the psychoanalytic interpreter is assuming a view of meaning that is evidently not compatible with the analysis of meaning according to the Objects of the Mind view, and thus the internalist view of meaning.

Secondly, this view of Cavell's of psychoanalytic interpretative practice is inconsistent with the Objects of the Mind view in a further respect. In the above passage, "these ideas" that she applies refers to the following notion of a causal relation:

So a first constraint on meaning is a causal relation between mind and external world. A second is that speaker and interpreter share this world, and many beliefs about it. Then there is the constraint of *holism* I talked about earlier.⁴⁶⁸

466 Cavell 1993, p. 32

⁴⁶⁷ See John Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book III, Chapter II, § 8.

In turn, the analysis of causal relations on this view is explicated as running contrary to the Objects of the Mind view. She says:

It is important to notice that the causal relation between world and sentence which Davidson posits is not merely contingent. He does not say that *probably* many of our utterances are caused by events in the outside world, but that such a causal relation—contrary to the internalist's view—somewhere in the system of a person's beliefs is constitutive of meaning itself.⁴⁶⁹

Clearly, even without relying on her explicit statement regarding the internalist view, this is incompatible with the Objects of the Mind analysis of meaning. For the Objects of the Mind view presupposes an entirely different causal relation, a *contingent* causal relation between the objects in the world and mental intermediaries, to which *words* rather than sentences are then associated. (Association itself, of course, is a further contingent relation). This much is implicit from her references to Locke in the context of the relation between 'ideas' and the world:

Furthermore, if we sever in this way the representational content of a mental state from the world it purports to represent, we are apt, like Descartes, to be led to an analysis of perception according to which we do not see trees, smiling faces, real objects in the world, but our *ideas* of these things. For in this way of thinking about the mind, *ideas*, or alternatively, *experiences*, are interposed between mind and world. In the subsequent history of philosophy these ideas are construed as propositions, mental images, or sense-data, depending on whether the philosopher in question is Descartes himself, or Locke after him, a later empiricist, or Brentano, or indeed many contemporary philosophers.⁴⁷⁰

It is the kind of causal relation that we saw Freud to hold, between object and objectpresentation. The contingency of this causal relation to which she feels meaning holism constitutes an alternative becomes explicit in the contrast at the foot of the same page, when she attempts to reconcile the possibility of error with the Davidsonian view. For the Davidsonian view, by not viewing the relation between sentence and object as contingent, might seem to exclude the possibility of error. This special attention granted to the Davidsonian view rests on her assumption that on the Objects of the Mind view there is by

⁴⁶⁸ Cavell 1993, p. 31 (Cavell's Emphasis)

⁴⁶⁹ Cavell 1993, p. 30

⁴⁷⁰ Cavell 1993, pp. 13-14

contrast no difficulty in accounting for error because the relation between word and object on that view is contingent. She says, "A theory of mind must of course acknowledge that perception may go astray in various ways. But the theory can do so while allowing that our beliefs and perceptions are (often) directly about the world and not about some mental intermediary."⁴⁷¹ All in all, then, the philosophical assumptions that she takes to be implicit in interpretation are exclusive of meaning internalism; in other words the Objects of the Mind view in so far as it is applied to an analysis of language.

The common-sense way in which Freud's interpretations, according to our analysis, take place obviously does not require any particular theory of meaning at all. If, as Cavell suggests, the object-presentation theory of meaning can be put in doubt because of the analysis of 'ideas-in-the-head' offered by Wittgenstein, then it does not follow that this also constitutes a criticism of Freud's method of interpretation, simply because he happened to hold such a view of meaning. Quite simply, the everyday, common-sense nature of the interpretations means that they are going to be compatible with whatever the best theory of meaning is at any one time. Cavell's aspiration does not rest here, of course, for as we have seen above she positively suggests that radical interpretation and Freudian interpretation have some features in common, not merely that they are consistent with each other. We, however, are interested in the bearing of the theory of meaning that Freud in fact held on interpretation, rather than the additional task that Cavell has in fact carried out of searching for a theory of meaning that has most in common with Freud's interpretative method. Our conclusion, in this respect, is that it has bearing not in the detail of the interpretations themselves, but on the assumption of Freud's of the transparency of the meaning of the dream-report and consequences for his analysis of the censorship. This traditional conception of meaning at the core of his notion of intelligibility, as we saw in chapter three, was the first step on the road to mental agencies and the problems indicated by Sebastian Gardner. Our suggestion in chapter three was that the assumption should be rejected, and this conclusion is consistent with Cavell's more ambitious project. Cavell believes that interpretation can offer grounds for mental partition, but not in virtue of assuming the transparency of the mental but in terms of the internal coherence of the groups of mental

⁴⁷¹ Cavell 1993, p. 14

states attributed to the interpretee.⁴⁷² Our analysis certainly does not rule out this conception, though having accepted Sebastian Gardner's criticism it *does* rule it out as an explanation of the *censorship*. On our earlier analysis, Freud's notion that the censorship requires a separate agency in the mind was the result of his adherence to meaning internalism. This should not, of course, be taken to mean that the notion of mental division itself is to be dispensed with. However, having warned us of the dangers of meaning internalism, Cavell should not be surprised when its tentacles are seen to have in their grip even ostensibly remote aspects of interpretation such as Freud's explanation of the censorship.

3. Freud's Developmental View of Language

3.1 Freud's Developmental Sketch of Language: From Full Meaning to Use

Freud claims that a "striking feature of the our dream language is its extremely frequent use of symbols which make us able to some extent to translate the content of dreams without reference to the associations of the original dreamer."⁴⁷³ In order to address this issue of symbolism in dream-interpretation, let us first investigate Freud's broad view regarding the phylogenetic development of language. He speculates that language originates from an era in which words have meaning in virtue of a correspondence between the word and an object or activity in the external world, and the object or activity to which a word corresponds is the specific meaning of that word. Freud considers languages from this hypothetical ancient period to have survived to the present day, as evident in his discussion of Chinese, an "extremely ancient language"⁴⁷⁴ and the Hieroglyphic script of Ancient Egyptian, another of "the most ancient languages, language "consists, one might say, solely of the raw material", which Freud holds is "its raw material of objects and activities"⁴⁷⁶, and does not yet have grammatical relations. With reference specifically to Chinese, though the discussion applies

⁴⁷² See Cavell 1993, pp. 193-205

⁴⁷³ XIII, 176-177.

⁴⁷⁴ XV, 230.

⁴⁷⁵ XV, 230.

⁴⁷⁶ Freud says "Thus the language consists, one might say, solely of the raw material, just as our thoughtlanguage is resolved by the dream-work into its raw material" (XV, 231). Equivocating between the language with which the dream is recounted and the underlying processes, he also says "... the dream-work reduces the

to the ancient languages generally, Freud says, "It is even more interesting from our point of view to learn that this language has practically no grammar."417 Yet, such languages are nonetheless "excellent vehicle[s] for the expression of thought."478 In this original period, then, words correspond directly to their 'raw materials' of objects and activities.

Since the original period in which it began on Freud's hypothesis, language has been used in different ways to express thought above and beyond the direct correspondence between words, objects and activities. In the course of discussing several linguistic characteristics of interpretation, for example in The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud makes an explicit distinction between modern abstract use and original concrete meaning:

On the other hand, in other cases, the course of linguistic evolution has made things very easy for dreams. For language has a whole number of words at its command which originally had a pictorial and concrete significance, but are used to-day in a colourless and abstract sense. All that the dream need do is to give these words their former, full meaning or to go back a little way to an earlier phase in their development.⁴⁷⁹

Freud is essentially recognising a distinction between the abstract meaning manifest in the "use" and "full" meaning of the word, which is the correspondence to the 'raw material'. This progressive emphasis on use rather than full meaning, or correspondence, in fact constitutes the increase in sophistication that allows grammar and abstract meanings to develop. This increase in sophistication, however, does not replace the original correspondence. For it is implicit in the hierarchy of meaning in the above quote that Freud evidently feels that the original or full meaning is still present and accessible to interpretation. The modern use is parasitic on the original correspondence, and it is the persistence of the original correspondence that provides-continues to provide-full meaning to our words. Freud holds that we are not, however, aware that our words possess this full meaning; rather, we use language without regard for this very correspondence that is the ground supporting all its kinds of meaning. In this way, modern speakers of language tend to concentrate on the parasitic meaning of use, having forgotten the full meaning. For

content of the dream-thoughts to its raw material of objects and activities" (XV, 177). Not to beat about the bush, it seems reasonable to take Freud as meaning that the raw material of language is objects and activities. ⁴⁷⁷ XV, 231. ⁴⁷⁸ XV, 231.

example, with regard to the content of the dream-report and the meaning that it leads to in interpretation, Freud says:

Here we have a new type of relation between the manifest and latent dream-elements. The former is not so much a distortion of the latter as a representation of it, a plastic, concrete portrayal of it, taking its start from the wording. But precisely on that account it is once more a distortion, for we have long since forgotten from what concrete image the word originated and consequently fail to recognize it when it is replaced by the image.⁴⁸⁰

Freud is implying that the content of the dream-report *would* be recognisable if taken according to its full, rather than parasitic, meaning. As regards abstract words, Freud elsewhere makes the point that their meaning for the most part still includes a correspondence to objects. He says: "You will recall that most abstract words are 'watered-down' concrete ones, and you will for that reason hark back as often as possible to the original concrete meaning of such words."⁴⁸¹ If such 'harking back' is not to simply amount to disregarding what the abstract word means when it is used in a modern context, then it must imply that the original, concrete, full meaning still plays a role in the meaning of the abstract word. Overall, with his distinction between full and implicitly less-than-full meaning, Freud is claiming that different kinds of meaning of differing degrees of importance are present in language. This broad reading of Freud's approach to meaning in language in terms of a developmental hierarchy is particularly fruitful in analysing his approach to symbolism, as we will now investigate.

3.2 The Place of the Symbolic Relation in the Development of Language

Apart from the distinction between meaning and use as demarcating a boundary between full meaning and a parasitic form of meaning, there is also another kind of parasitic meaning in Freud's retrospective speculation. It is this other form of parasitic meaning that casts particular light on the issue of symbolism. Beginning from the original correspondence between words and objects, Freud speculates that there was a widening of the meaning to include different kinds of objects which occurred (a) *through the primal appreciation of*

⁴⁷⁹ V, 407.

⁴⁸⁰ XV, 121.

⁴⁸¹ XV, 175.

similarity between certain objects and activities-for example between weapons and penises, or working and sexual intercourse. Chronologically, this is the first kind of parasitic meaning. Secondly, as we have already indicated, there is the development that leads to a distinction between (b) meaning and use and thought is expressed in new ways by means of changes in use, giving rise to a chronologically second kind of parasitic meaning. In this general development of language, the initial primal language provides a foundation in terms of full meaning that supports the two parasitic forms of meaning. These are the two basic ways in which language develops away from its original foundation; the first of these moves between the original correspondence and a wider class of objects and activities is what Freud is referring to with the notion of 'comparison' which is the essence of symbolism. A fictitious example might serve to cast some light on the distinction that Freud has in mind. Consider the description of fishing as 'farming' on the basis of a rough-and-ready similarity between the activity of a farmer who harvests his crop and the fisherman who trawls the seas for his catch. We could describe the fisherman as farming the seas, and in fact the term 'fishfarming' has entered our vocabulary to refer to the cultivation of fish-stocks in controlled environments, such as salmon, for commercial purposes. As regards the second shift that Freud has in mind, let us consider the following example. Imagine an eccentric chef in a seafood restaurant who playfully indulges in the game of using the verb 'to farm' instead of the verbs appropriate for the preparation of meals, such as ' to prepare', 'to cook', and so on. When he enters the kitchen, he says 'It is time to farm the salmon for lunch', and when it is time to take a break he says, 'let's farm a cup of tea.'482 Of course, from the context, everybody in his company infers what he is getting at. What else could he mean, they might say, given that lunchtime is almost upon us, but 'prepare the salmon' and so on. In Freudian terms, then, what is happening is that the verb 'to farm' has its original or strict meaning in virtue of corresponding via association of presentations to farming activities. On the basis of appreciating the similarity between the two activities it then becomes applied to fishing, and so we have the second term of the 'comparison', or the terms of the symbolic relation. Then, it becomes used in a different way to express a derivative meaning that we can arrive at by inferring what the chef is thinking of, or what his purpose is in his game with words, in the context of the kitchen shortly before lunchtime. That is, in Freud's terms, by fathoming the

⁴⁸² The example is due to Alan Thornbury.

chef's "expression of thought." With time, the verb 'to farm' could become the appropriate verb for culinary activities, and we might even forget its agricultural origin.

This view of the development of language seems to lie behind Freud's appeal to the philologist Hans Sperber's work for the purposes of explaining the nature of the symbolic relation. He says, "A philologist, Hans Sperber of Uppsala, has only recently (1912) attempted to prove that words which originally represented sexual activities have ... undergone an extremely far-reaching change in their meaning."⁴⁸³ This appeal came about as a result of Freud's difficulties in defining what the relation of symbolism amounts to. For, given that he considers the nature of the symbolic relation to consist in a comparison, appreciating it depends on appreciating the aspects in virtue of which the comparison was made. The difficulty in appreciating the comparison Freud expresses by saying that the symbolic relation is 'some kind' of comparison, though the comparison in question is not at all easy to understand. He says:

The essence of this symbolic relation is that it is a comparison, though not a comparison of *any* sort. Special limitations seem to be attached to the comparison, but it is hard to say what these are. Not everything with which we can compare an object or a process appears in dreams as a symbol for it.... With a number of symbols the comparison which underlies them is obvious. But again there are other symbols in regard to which we must ask ourselves where we are to look for the common element, the *tertium comparationis*, of the supposed comparison.⁴⁸⁴

From the fact that the comparisons are constant yet strangely in spite of this constancy we are at a loss to pinpoint the *tertium comparationis*, Freud is lead to suspect that the comparison may be understood in terms of its origins:

These comparisons are not freshly made on each occasion; they lie ready to hand and are complete, once and for all. This is implied by the fact of their agreeing in the case of different individuals – possibly, indeed, agreeing in spite of differences of language. What can be the origin of these symbolic relations? Linguistic usage covers only a small part of them.⁴⁸⁵

⁴⁸³ XIII, 176-177.
⁴⁸⁴ XV, 152.
⁴⁸⁵ XV, 165-166.

Freud elaborates in the direction of a genetic explanation that traces the comparison back to a hypothetical primal, or as he calls it, 'basic language':

One gets an impression that what we are faced with here is an ancient but extinct mode of expression, of which different pieces have survived in different fields. And here I recall the phantasy of an interesting psychotic patient, who imagined a 'basic language' of which all these symbolic relations would be residues.⁴⁸⁶

In terms of this 'basic language', Freud then goes on to propose the comparison that is at the root of the symbolic relation in terms of Sperber's theory on the "origin and development of speech", claiming that it is one between the sexual activity and work of primal man.

Primal man made work acceptable, as it were, by treating it as equivalent and substitute for sexual activity. The words enunciated during work in common thus had two meanings; they denoted sexual acts as well as the working activity equated with them. As time went on, the words became detached from their sexual meaning and fixed to the work. In later generations the same thing happened with new words, which had a sexual meaning and were applied to new forms of work. In this way, a number of verbal roots would have been formed, all of which were of sexual origin and subsequently lost their sexual meaning⁴⁸⁷

By means of reference to Sperber's work, Freud is speculating that the words of the basic language of sexual objects and activities came to have a change in their full meaning according to the first kind of parasitic meaning. This widening in the range of objects to which the word applies was based on similarities perceived in the original period between sexual and non-sexual objects and activities. The words of the 'basic language' *still* correspond to the sexual organs and activities in virtue of the persistence of the original relation of full meaning. However, in virtue of the first kind of parasitic meaning, they have also developed different meanings in terms of the wider class of objects and activities to which they have come to be applied. Reflecting this, Freud says "The symbolic relation would be the residue of an ancient verbal identity; things which were once called by the same name as the genitals would now serve as symbols for them in dreams."

 ⁴⁸⁶ XV, 166. The patient mentioned here is the subject of the case-history *Psychoanalytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides)* or 'Schreber'.
 ⁴⁸⁷ XV, 167.

⁴⁸⁸ XV, 167.

difficult-to-precisely-define 'comparison' in symbolism is the residue in language of a relation, originally established in virtue of similarities that were appreciated by our primal ancestors. Our ignorance of the reason why symbols correspond to a class of objects that includes both sexual and non-sexual objects is evidently due to the fact that we now have a changed appreciation of similarity—a changed conception of what to count as similar.⁴⁸⁹

3.3 Freud's Linguistic Approach to Symbolism in Dream-Interpretation

The above, in brief, is Freud's attempt to explain why the *tertium comparationis* of symbols often escapes us by speculating on the *nature* of the symbolic relation underlying the classical symbols of swords, pens, umbrellas and so forth in terms of a developmental view of meaning in language. However, as regards the *knowledge* of symbolism that the interpreter applies in order to make sense of a dream, is it based on information regarding the origination of symbols in non-conventional comparisons according to the developmental view of language? No. In fact, rather than attempt to explicate the original grounds of the *tertium comparationis*, what Freud does in his examples and accompanying discussion is to turn to various levels of modern *linguistic usage* to come up with this knowledge.⁴⁹⁰ A large part of lecture X in *Introductory Lectures* is in fact taken up with showing how symbols form part of everyday language, and how this casts light on symbolism in interpretation. He says, for example, with regard to the ladder as a sexual symbol, that:

German linguistic usage comes to our help and shows us how the word 'steigen' ['to climb', or 'to mount'] is used in what is par excellence a sexual sense. We say 'den Frauen nachsteigen' ['to run (literally

⁴⁹⁰ Whereas 'use' in the restricted sense of the second form of parasitic meaning does not imply the original correspondence between the word, and an object or activity, linguistic 'usage' by contrast indicates the employment of words according to the first form of parasitic meaning. In the linguistic usage appealed to by Freud, the original correspondence is maintained, though this is not obvious to the speaker, even as the word is applied to the wider class of objects and activities.

⁴⁸⁹ Symbols are being coined down to the present day, on Freud's view. Indeed, from the multiplicity of symbols and the obvious point that primal man did not have umbrellas, pens, etc. it is evident that Freud does not think that a limit was set on the coining of symbols for once and for all in that primal period. In fact, he gives examples such as "The remarkable characteristic of the male organ which enables it to rise up in defiance of the laws of gravity, one of the phenomena of erection, leads to its being represented symbolically by *balloons, flying-machines* and most recently by *Zeppelin airships*" (XV, 155). His general point would appear to be that whenever symbols are formed the *tertium comparationis* is clear, though as time moves on it is forgotten. Accordingly, in the case where there is the greatest span of time, there will be the greatest incomprehension towards the *tertium comparationis* of the symbol; the time between the foundation of language and modern language is this case. On this basis, Freud seems to infer backwards to the conclusion that those symbols which leave us with greatest incomprehension date from the earliest period.

'climb') 'after women'], and 'ein alter Steiger' ['an old rake' (literally 'climber')]. In French, in which the word for steps on a staircase is 'marches', we find a precisely analogous term 'un vieux marcheur'.⁴⁹¹

To the general question of "how we in fact come to know the meaning of these dreamsymbols", Freud's answer is:

My reply is that we learn it from very different sources – from fairy tales and myths, from buffoonery and jokes, from folklore (that is, from knowledge about popular manners and customs, sayings and songs) and from poetic and colloquial linguistic usage.⁴⁹²

Given the presence of symbols in so many fields, Freud points out that it is simply a point of *consistency* not to exclude them from dream-interpretation. He says,

...this symbolism is not peculiar to dreams, but is characteristic of unconscious ideation, in particular among the people, and it is to be found in folklore, and in popular myths, legends, linguistic idioms, proverbial wisdom and current jokes, to a more complete extent than in dreams.⁴⁹³

Continuing this theme of consistency, he says: "The field of symbolism is immensely wide, and dream-symbolism is only a small part of it: indeed, it serves no useful purpose to attack the whole problem from the direction of dreams."⁴⁹⁴

In turn, this knowledge of symbolism applied without inquiring into the perceptual origins of the symbols is acceptable to Freud when it results in the further positive advantage of a radical increase in the degree of coherency of the material under interpretation. That is to say, Freud looks favourably upon taking this consistent attitude to symbols in terms of the practical expediency that it provides for interpretation. For it turns out that there is a beneficial consequence of taking this consistent attitude to the dream-elements, or some of the dream-elements, of the dream-report by taking them as symbols. It results in an *expedition* of the process of interpretation in so far as it can render a dream-report intelligible very quickly. In particular this approach is fruitful when the interpreter comes

⁴⁹¹ XV, 164.

492 XV, 158-159.

- ⁴⁹³ V, 351.
- ⁴⁹⁴ XV, 166.

across those elements that are difficult to interpret and do not lead to associations. By taking this consistent attitude, the practical requirement of making progress is satisfied in a pragmatic way by applying a standard translation of these troublesome elements:

In this way we are tempted to interpret these 'mute' dream-elements ourselves, to set about translating them with our own resources. We are then forced to recognize that whenever we venture in making a replacement of this sort we arrive at a satisfactory sense for the dream, whereas it remains senseless and the chain of thought is interrupted so long as we refrain from intervening in this way. An accumulation of many similar cases eventually gives the necessary certainty to what began as a timid experiment.⁴⁹⁵

Rather, then, than attempt to fathom the interpretee's motives in order to cast light on the meaning of the dream-elements, one must adopt a fixed meaning for the dream-elements. He says, "In this way we obtain constant translations for a number of dream-elements – just as popular 'dream-books' provide them for *everything* that appears in dreams."⁴⁹⁶ In this pragmatic vein, we see Freud speaking as a practically-minded interpreter. He is impressed by the solving of a practical problem in terms of the coherency that symbolism offers. He can furthermore trust that the coherency so achieved is not arbitrary, because these symbols are so pervasive in all aspects of human endeavour—so there is no reason not to allow them in dream interpretation as well.

4. Agnes Petocz's Analysis of Symbolism

In respect of Freud's analysis of symbolism that—while he indeed speculates phylogenetically on its origin—an appreciation of the original *tertium comparationis* is not required in order to employ the concept of symbolism in dream-*interpretation*, it is instructive to take account of Agnes Petocz's analysis of symbolism. She rejects a linguistic analysis of symbolism, in the context of her distinction between conventional and non-conventional forms of symbolism. Contrary to our analysis, she positively *does* think that explicating the notion of the 'original' grounds of the *tertium comparationis* is important for interpretation.

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⁴⁹⁵ XV, 150.

4.1 Petocz's Notion of 'Broad' Symbolism from the Early Freud

Taking her cue from Laplanche and Pontalis's entry under symbolism in *The Language of Psychoanalysis*,⁴⁹⁷ Petocz proceeds in her analysis by drawing a distinction between the socalled broad and narrow explanations of symbolism that she sees in Freud's work. 'Broad' symbolism, or FB symbolism, in her view is the account of the recognition by Freud that the connection between a psycho-neurotic symptom and the content of a pathogenic memory is often based on *some* kind of relation of meaning. Petocz claims that the "groundwork for the FB theory of symbolism was laid in the early years of Freud's work."⁴⁹⁸ As regards the notion of symbolism in hysteria, she says:

The first usage may be subdivided into (i) the concept of a **'mnemic symbol'** in hysteria, and (ii) the process of **'symbolization'** (spelled with a 'z' here to distinguish it as a technical term) in hysteria. The distinction between these two is that 'symbolization', unlike the 'mnemic symbol', is dependent on linguistic (particularly metaphorical) expressions, and is, in a sense, secondary to (and dependent on) the original concept of a mnemic symbol.⁴⁹⁹

Each of these two notions is then subsumed under the more general notion of substitution motivated by defence. She says:

Freud's early work on symbolism, therefore, can be seen to incorporate a hierarchical schema...in which the 'mnemic symbol' and 'symbolization' of hysteria are special cases of the more general process of symbol formation as defensive substitution. Using this schema, it becomes easier to identify certain themes which are important in the FB position on symbolism. ⁵⁰⁰

This general notion of substitution she illustrates with an example taken from Freud's *Project for a Scientific Psychology*, written in the same period as *The Interpretation of Dreams* though not published in Freud's lifetime, in which example she understands displacement to play a key role. By this she means that one thing is taken for another—

⁵⁰⁰ Petocz, p. 45

⁴⁹⁶ Ibid. (Freud's Emphasis)

⁴⁹⁷ See J. LaPlanche and J.-B Pontalis, *The Language of Psychoanalysis*, London, Karnac Books, 1988, pp. 442-445.

⁴⁹⁸ Agnes Petocz, Freud, Psychoanalysis and Symbolism, Cambridge, England, Cambridge University Press 1999 p. 55.

⁴⁹⁹ Petocz, p. 36 (Petocz's Bold)

whether in virtue of temporal contiguity in Freud's earlier work or similarity in the later and amounts to believing one thing to be another thing, the symbol to be the symbolised. This is what she sums up with her section-title "The 'symbol' as a general substitute produced by displacement."⁵⁰¹ She quotes the following example from Freud as an illustration of this broader notion of 'meaning':

For there has been an occurrence which consisted of B+A. A was an incidental circumstance; B was appropriate for producing the lasting effect. The reproduction of the event in memory has now taken a form of such a kind as though A had stepped into B's place. A has become a substitute, a *symbol* for B. Hence the incongruity: A is accompanied by consequences which it does not seem worthy of, which do not fit in with it.⁵⁰²

This broad understanding of the symbol is the essence of what she means with her notion of FB symbolism; she expresses this treatment of it as *substitute* with the formula 'CRS', or 'Conflict-Repression-Substitution', at its core. She says:

Given Freud's frequent interchanging of 'substitution' and 'symbol-formation', the importance of the CRS formula in his theory of symbolism is evident. Freud never abandoned this formula; it was firmly established in these early views, which are unfortunately so often ignored or dismissed, and *it continued to form the core* of the FB position on symbolism.⁵⁰³

4.2 Petocz's Accounting for the 'Narrow' Symbolism of Lecture X of Introductory Lectures In the above way, Petocz explicates the hierarchy in the general process of symbol formation as defensive substitution governing the two special cases, which she indicates as present in Freud's early work. Her aim is to use the broad FB theory pivoting around the CRS formula to account for the classic symbols as a *third* special case of the general process of defensive substitution, following the earlier cases of 'mnemic symbol' and 'symbolization'. To argue, essentially, that construing the CRS formula to have persisted from Freud's early work up to his analysis of the classic symbols offers a better explanation than his explanation in Lecture X of *Introductory Lectures*. She says:

⁵⁰¹ Petocz, p. 40 (Bold omitted)

⁵⁰² Petocz, quoted on pp. 40-41

...the classical Freudian theory *does* allow for an adequately broad conception of symbolism, since it can be shown, using Freud's own writings, that the FN position, minus its conceptually untenable aspects, is simply part of the FB position, and that when the FB position is properly understood, any charges of 'narrowness' can be seen to rest on confusions....⁵⁰⁴

Her aim is to "to illustrate the FB position as able to accommodate the acceptable parts of the FN position...."⁵⁰⁵ Lecture X, on her view, amounts to a phylogenetic *ad hoc* glitch, based on easily discreditable considerations, that has traditionally been taken as the 'real' Freudian theory on symbolism, when it has only served to obscure the merit of Freud's broader theory in regard to the classic symbols.

Narrow symbolism, or FN symbolism, refers to the classic symbols and the standard explanation of them which Freud gives in lecture X of *Introductory Lectures*. By contrast with broad symbolism, it is usually not taken to be a function of conflict, repression and defence. According to Petocz, correctly, there are three particular features held to be characteristic of this class of symbols. The first characteristic that serves to individuate them is that they are "**mute' or 'silent'** – or, rather, the dreamer/patient is silent or mute in the face of them, being unable to produce any 'associations' to them as he or she can to all other elements." ⁵⁰⁶ Secondly, there is the characteristic that the most expedient treatment of these elements is to treat them as possessing a constant meaning; these are symbols that "**have constant meanings**, unlike all other elements."⁵⁰⁷ Thirdly, there is the particular explanation offered by Freud of their constant meanings and part of the reason, at least, why the dreamer cannot come up with any associations to them:

...symbols are phylogenetically inherited, and this explains their constant, universal meanings. Knowledge of symbolic connections and of the meanings of symbols is not acquired by learning, but is part of an unconscious, phylogenetically transmitted 'archaic heritage', a universal code which may be found in dreams, myths, fairy tales, folklore, etc.⁵⁰⁸

⁵⁰³ Petocz, p. 48 (Emphasis added)
⁵⁰⁴ Petocz, pp. 25-26 (Petocz's Emphasis)
⁵⁰⁵ Petocz, p. 26
⁵⁰⁶ Petocz, p. 27 (Petocz's Bold)

⁵⁰⁷ Petocz, p. 28 (Petocz's Bold)

Rejecting this phylogenetic explanation as untenable, she directs her attention to their other two characteristic features inside the terms of her general theory of symbolising in terms of the CRS formula. On the CRS formula, she explains narrow symbols as instances of mistaken beliefs based on the similarity of form or function of objects that originate in much the same infantile ontogenetic circumstances for each individual. This accounts for their universal and constant nature. On the other hand, the reason why the patient is mute with regard to their meaning is simply the same as why the patient is unaware of the meaning of any symptom, not just the narrow symbols. The taking of one thing as another as a case of mistaken identity motivated by defence amounts to holding contradictory beliefs about the objects that are symbols. To resolve this, one belief is removed from consciousness by repression.⁵⁰⁹ This is what she means by claiming that the broader analysis has the Conflict-Repression-Substitution formula at its core, in which symbols generally are 'substitutes' towards which the patient has mistaken beliefs. That is, she understands symbols not as features of or entities in language, but as things in the external world in so far as they are mistaken for other things; in Freudian terms, it would be a case of objects and activities being mistaken for other objects and activities. The relation of symbolism is the belief relation in which one thing is taken for another; a symbol is a symbol in virtue of being mistakenly believed to be another thing. In this, there is simply a case of difference in degree of constancy and universality between the relation of narrow symbolism and the relation of the neurotic symptom as a general substitute as evidenced in the example of A + B above.

with regard to the first class of symbols, of logic, mathematics and tanguage, the life (1) addresses their origin and says that it is converticed, though it is implicit that she is also referring to the interpretation of them. Immediately, she tures her attention to the classic Freudian symbols and addresses not their origin but (2) their interpretation claiming that interpretation of this latter class of symbols is not set by convention. Yet, nonetheless, she acknowledges that those symbols can be used to refer and communicate, and this seems to open up the possibility that interpretation might address a parasitic, conventional form of

⁵⁰⁸ Petocz, p. 28 (Petocz's Bold)

⁵⁰⁹ Petocz does not discuss any of the philosophical problems surrounding the concept of the censorship that is the controversial part of Freud's notion of repression; she simply accepts the notion of repression without discussion.

5. Should Symbols in Interpretation Be Taken in a Conventional or Non-Conventional

communicate "A little further on Sense?" For instance, there can be conscious and

5.1 Petocz's View that Interpretation Must Treat Symbols Non-Conventionally

FN symbols are held by her to constitute a special class of symbols that are *non*-conventional in contrast to the kind of symbols characteristic of normal linguistic representation. The latter are characteristically conventional. She says:

There are two general classes of symbolism: conventional and non-conventional. While there are problems concerning the former, and concerning the relationship between the two, the latter class is the focus of inquiry here, because it contains those symbols (occurring in dreams, myths, art, rituals, folklore, symptoms, etc.) which are controversial and especially in need of explanation.⁵¹⁰

She articulates the consequences for interpretation of this distinction in the following terms:

In the case of, for example, the symbols of logic, mathematics or language, the meanings of the symbols have been established by agreement or convention. In such cases, naturally, what the symbol stands for must be learned, is not generally in dispute, and so is not held to pose interesting psychological questions. But there are other phenomena, which are considered to contain symbols, or deal with them, or be symbolic, or have some kind of symbolic force, in the areas of dreams, art, literature, rituals, myths, fairy tales, folklore, psychopathological symptoms, and so on. Because the interpretation of *these* symbols is *not* set by convention, the explanations of the occurrence, and the meanings of such symbolic phenomena are contentious, and have in fact been investigated, discussed, and disputed at enormous length.⁵¹¹

With regard to the first class of symbols, of logic, mathematics and language, she here (1) addresses their origin and says that it is conventional, though it is implicit that she is also referring to the interpretation of them. Immediately, she turns her attention to the classic Freudian symbols and addresses not their origin but (2) their interpretation claiming that interpretation of this latter class of symbols is not set by convention. Yet, nonetheless, she acknowledges that those symbols *can* be used to refer and communicate, and this seems to open up the possibility that interpretation might address a parasitic, conventional form of meaning. She says, "Non-conventional symbolism differs from language and conventional

⁵¹⁰ Petocz, p. 232

symbolism in that the non-conventional symbol is not used primarily to refer or to communicate.³⁵¹² A little further on, she adds, "For instance, there can be conscious and deliberate employment of non-conventional symbols whose meanings have become known (e.g., a writer of a fairy story may deliberately use the queen to stand for the mother).³⁵¹³ Petocz does, to be fair, at some points consider ways in which searching for the meaning of symbols could be considered in some ways analogous to the interpretation of a text, and thus have a hermeneutic-style aspect. She does not, however, think that there is anything of more consequence than a superficial analogy with hermeneutics. While acknowledging that the conventional symbols of language may have emerged from non-conventional ones, in her view we should nonetheless disregard this evolution when it comes to interpretation and concentrate instead on the non-conventional origin of them. Petocz takes this stand after she addresses the issue of how conventional symbols emerge from non-conventional ones. For example,

As noted in Chapter 1, the consensus of those who speculate about this question is that non-conventional symbols have ontogenetic priority over conventional ones, and that the latter develop from the former via a gradual erosion of affective connections....⁵¹⁴

She concludes, "Nevertheless, whatever the evolutionary relationship between conventional and non-conventional symbolism, the distinction between them is real and important."⁵¹⁵ In chapter one, she says:

...amongst the few speculations which are offered, there seems to be some agreement that the controversial non-conventional symbols enjoy an ontogenetic priority over the conventional symbols, the latter developing from the former via a gradual diminishing of affect coupled with an increasing contribution of conscious, as compared with unconscious processes, although it is not clear how this transition is supposed to occur.⁵¹⁶

⁵¹¹ Petocz, pp. 15-16
⁵¹² Petocz, p. 232
⁵¹³ Ibid.
⁵¹⁴ Petocz., p. 186
⁵¹⁵ Ibid.
⁵¹⁶ Petocz, p. 17

Here, she also concludes: "whatever the relationship between the two classes of symbols, it is clear that the focus of our inquiry here must be on the non-conventional symbols."⁵¹⁷The question, then, is really why it should be accepted that this is so self-evident. The point at issue is which, granting for the sake of argument Petocz's claim that they possess non-conventional and conventional aspects, aspect of the classic symbols is addressed in interpretation. Evidently, she feels that 'communicating' and 'referring' does not fall within the ambit of interpretation. The only effective difference between the two kinds of symbols appears to be that in the classic as opposed to the conventional symbols there is a non-conventional origin. It is presumably this reason why she claims that we are obliged to disregard the conventional, derivative kinds of significance that they possess and concentrate on the non-conventional. While the origins may pose a more 'interesting psychological question' in her view than the interpretation of conventional aspect of these symbols that are addressed in interpretation.

5.2 Discussion of Petocz's View

In view of our analysis of Freud's developmental view of language, even granting the notion of the non-conventional symbol as Petocz characterises it, the first question is why given the non-conventional aspect and the conventional use and reference aspect of symbols, the former aspect should take precedence over the latter. For Freud would appear to think that it is the latter aspect is of more importance from the perspective of interpretation for the following reasons. (A) She takes the non-conventional aspect of the classic symbols, together with the conventional nature of language, to claim that interpretation of symbols must be non-conventional. Yet, as pointed out above, Freud's interpretation of symbols clearly is linguistic, thereby conventional. This suggests that we must reject Petocz's assumption that the symbols in psychoanalytic interpretation must be taken according to their non-conventional aspect. (B) When he inquires into the origin of the meaning of *particular* symbols—as opposed to his phylogenetic speculation on the *general* nature of the symbolic relation—Freud appeals to language to cast light on the *tertium comparationis* in

⁵¹⁷ Petocz, p. 18

order to cast light on the meanings. For example, in Lecture X he says, "And, speaking of wood, it is hard to understand how that material came to represent what is maternal and female. But here comparative philology may come to our help."⁵¹⁸ His explanation is:

Now there is an island in the Atlantic named 'Madeira'. This name was given to it by the Portuguese when they discovered it, because at that time it was covered all over with woods. For in the Portuguese language 'madeira' means 'wood'. You will notice, however, that 'madeira' is only a slightly modified form of the Latin word 'materia', which once more means 'material' in general. But 'materia' is derived from 'mater', 'mother': the material out of which anything is made, as it were, a mother to it. This ancient view of the thing survives, therefore, in the symbolic use of wood for 'woman' or 'mother'.⁵¹⁹

Secondly, Petocz's notion of the non-conventional symbol may itself be called into question, at least in so far as she thinks it captures what Freud understands by the symbol. For it does not seem that Freud understands the symbol to be a non-conventional entity at all. In his terms, her notion would appear to be an equivocation between the origination of the symbol in a non-conventional process, of some primal perception of similarity between external objects and activities, and the kind of thing that a symbol is. For, in terms of the sketch of the phylogenetic development of language, the symbolic relation consists in the widening of the class of objects to and activities, the 'raw material' to which a word applies to encompass work. In this context, the symbol is an extension of the application of an already-existent conventional entity, namely the word. Of course, what inspires the shift in this first form of parasitic meaning is a non-conventional perception of similarity between these external objects and activities; in Petocz's terms, the shift in meaning is determined by the belief in the objective similarity between certain objects and activities. However, to treat this belief as the essence of the symbolic relation would be to confuse the basis on which the first kind of parasitic meaning of the word came about with that parasitic meaning itself. Accordingly, it does not make sense to speak of a non-conventional symbol in the context of Freud's view of the symbols that are interpreted in the dream-report. It would be more precise to speak of the development of words into symbols in virtue of a perception of similarity, a perception of similarity that was not itself conventional. The symbol is, on

⁵¹⁸ XV, 159. ⁵¹⁹ XV, 160. Freud's view, a relic of the early development of language, and thereby a relic of primal convention; it is a 'verbal residue' of the first chronological kind of parasitic meaning. To describe a symbol on this view as non-conventional would amount to describing Freud's 'basic language' as non-linguistic.

Thirdly, Petocz's position may also be criticised for pleading a special case for the interpretation of symbols in terms of their non-conventional origin, even though on Freud's account of language there is a non-conventional common origin in association for both symbols and language generally. For Freud all language starts out in terms of association that governs the correspondence of sounds to objects by the conduit of images of sounds associated to visual ideas of objects. On his view, as revealed by our earlier analysis of Freud's theory of meaning in language, the key role played by association is obvious. Association, in Freud's view, is a relation governed by the non-conventional principles discussed in The Interpretation of Dreams, and briefly referred to in "The Aetiology of Hysteria", of contiguity, succession and similarity. In other words, all language-not just symbolism in the narrow sense-starts out as non-conventional governed by the laws of association, as shown in the object-presentation theory of meaning, and later matures into conventional language. It would therefore be arbitrary to single out symbolism in the narrow sense for exceptional treatment. To argue, that is, because it is most likely that symbols in the narrow sense started off in a non-conventional way that they must continue to reflect that type of meaning, unlike normal, language. There are thus no grounds for inferring that because of this origin, symbols in the narrow sense cannot be interpreted in terms of conventional meaning. For, to argue along these lines would require the parallel that all language should be interpreted in terms of non-conventional meaning, by parallel of nonconventional origin. But this would clearly be too strong; we must presume Freud to recognise the conventional nature of language generally. From the point of view being advanced here, the maturation of one form of meaning into another may be a topic worthy of attention, but it does not bear on interpretation. For, the understanding of speech generally is not dependent on the knowledge of its origins; the understanding of language is not dependent on the understanding of the maturation from non-conventional meaning. So,

given that symbolism in the narrow sense shares the same characteristics, there is no justification in making a special case of the classic, narrow symbols.

The key question in our analysis, from the point of view of interpretation, is how does the interpreter come to know the meaning of any symbol as it appears in a dream-report. This question arises before the further question of the way in which symbols originate arises. The choice of which of these questions takes precedence over the other is our fundamental point of disagreement with Petocz. Approaching the dream-report, on our view, we do not a priori know if the question of the way in which the symbolism originates, in terms of similarity, is going to be important. In fact, as simply an account of the origins of symbols apart from the question of interpretation, Petocz's account appears plausible. It broadly tallies with Freud's account of the origins of language illustrated in terms of the 'farming' example and we do not wish to call that part of her account into question. What we do want to call into question, however, is whether or not she is addressing the right question regarding interpretation. On her view, the way in which we come to know the meaning of any symbol is only in the context of a broader psychological theory, which then allows us to employ the meaning so discovered for the purposes of understanding dreams-for interpretation of the dreamexperience itself. Her approach does not take interpretation from a common-sense psychological perspective as the correct starting-point to analyse the method of dreaminterpretation; rather, it takes the notion of a scientific theory of the dream-experience as a starting point for dream-interpretation. Rather than beginning with making sense of the dream-report in an everyday common-sense psychological way, she begins with a scientific account of symbolism by which she hopes to explain its occurrence in contexts that are often explained by the deployment of common-sense psychology.

interpretative practice. This approach 6. Conclusion in interpretation inspired by Freed s

We began this chapter by asking, given that on our analysis Freud's method of interpretation is a form of linguistic interpretation, whether his own analysis of language bore on interpretation. We began our analysis of language with Freud's basic theory of meaning in terms of object-presentations, or mental intermediaries. We agreed with Marcia Cavell that it did not bear on interpretation in its details, in so far as a common-sense approached to interpreting language presupposed no technical account of meaning. Regarding the censorship as discussed in chapter three, we saw that our earlier contention that a notion of meaning in terms of an impression or idea before the mind was the basis of Freud's understanding of the intelligibility of the dream-report received support from his account of linguistic meaning. For, linguistic meaning on his account consisted in the presence of ideas before the mind, and assuming the intelligibility of the dream-report is to treat it as a linguistic phenomenon that is presumed to possess meaning. Then we looked at the other side of Freud's analysis of language, his developmental analysis taking its cue from full meaning that supports parasitic forms of meaning. The first form of parasitic meaning in terms of the widening of the class of objects to which words correspond to, and the second form of parasitic meaning in terms of use leading to abstract meanings and grammatical relations. We found that the first stage in this development, the widening of the class of objects to which words apply, allowed us to analyse the concept of symbolism. We found that although Freud claims that the symbolic relation consists in a comparison, he does not explicate the similarities in virtue of which the comparison is made. Instead, he merely speculates on the fact of the common origin of the sexual and non-sexual meanings of symbols. However, in fairness to Freud, we pointed out that for purposes of interpretation he does not need to explicate the supposed original tertium comparationis in order to employ the concept symbolism. In fact, in practice, he takes a pragmatic approach to interpretation that does not rely on his developmental analysis of language, but is rather an application of the symbols used in language in virtue of what they mean, not the tertium comparationis by virtue of which they mean it. Just as, then, Freud's theory of meaning in terms of mental intermediaries does not bear on his interpretative practice, neither does his developmental analysis of language bear on his employment of symbolism in his interpretative practice. This approach to symbolism in interpretation inspired by Freud's general view of language led us to disagree with Agnes Petocz's analysis of symbolism in interpretation. For, as we saw, she believes that the nature of the original similarity of the tertium comparationis must be uncovered in order to give a proper account of symbolism in interpretation.

In conclusion, let us address two aspects of Freud's work that prima facie appear of importance for a linguistic approach to interpretation but on reflection turn out to be inconsequential. Firstly, as regards Freud's scattered references to philology, on the other hand, let us point out that most of what he has to say is misguided. The principal work in which he addresses the topic is his paper "The Antithetical Meanings of Primal Words" in which he deals with the work of a German philologist, Karl Abel. Freud considers Abel to have established that ancient languages contained many words that expressed two contrary meanings. Freud lays great weight on this as a justification for his notion of 'representation by opposites' in interpretation. That is, to justify taking certain elements of the dream-report to mean the contrary of what they appear to mean. For example, Freud says, "Contraries may stand for each other in the dream's content and may be represented by the same element."520 The philology of Abel that underlies the justification for this feature of interpretation has been criticised by Emile Benveniste as untrustworthy in virtue of employing unreliable methodology that relies solely on similarity between words from different languages.⁵²¹ In fact, the issue of representation by opposites appears far more relevant to a discussion of the censorship; for, prima facie it would be an excellent means for defeating the censorship. Freud, unfortunately, at no point dwells on this approach to the question of opposites. Frend appears to give it is psychological characterisation

Secondly, as regards Freud's fondness for comparing dream-interpretation to the interpretation of a 'pictographic script' in the manner of interpreting Egyptian hieroglyphs, this appears to be a linguistic issue in interpretation but turns out not to be one. There are many examples of his employment of this analogy, of which the following is but one:

If we reflect that the means of representation in dreams are principally visual images and not words, we shall see that it is even more appropriate to compare dreams with a system of writing than with a language. In fact, the interpretation of dreams is completely analogous to the interpretation of an ancient pictographic script such as Egyptian hieroglyphs.⁵²²

⁵²⁰ XIII, 176.

 ⁵²¹ See Emile Benveniste, (trans.) Mary Elizabeth Meek, *Problems in General Linguistics*, Coral Gables, Florida, University of Miami Press, 1971, pp. 65-75.
 ⁵²² XIII, 177.

Rather than referring to a linguistic aspect of interpretation, the analogy is a consequence of Freud's interdisciplinary-inspired unwillingness to consistently distinguish between the interpretation of the dream-report and the dream-experience. The analogy, it would seem, is meant to establish a connection between all of the aspects of dream-investigation of interest to Freud: the dream-report, the predominantly visual dream-experience and the psychological and biological processes that give rise to dreaming. In short, with the analogy Freud puts forward an ambiguous characterisation of-to use his own phrase-the object of his research. The rhetorical subtlety by which Freud achieves this is to take a feature from each of the areas in question and compound them all together by means of the analogy. From the dream-report he takes the idea of a linguistic medium; from the subjective experience of dreaming he takes the notion of a visual experience construed in terms of looking at pictures in the mind. Quite cleverly, he puts these features together and comes up with the 'pictographic script'. On the basis that a script is the kind of thing that is interpretable, Freud assumes that whatever produces the script can be treated as an agent expressing himself in a medium to which interpretation is appropriate. Accordingly, those processes that give rise to the dream-experience, which he refers to as the dreamwork, are collectively treated as an agent. The dreamwork has both psychological and biological aspects. For example, Freud appears to give it a psychological characterisation when he makes comments such as "... the work which transforms the latent dream into the manifest one is called the *dream-work*."⁵²³ This would appear to be a psychological characterisation in so far as the dreamwork is held to express in the dream-experience, which Freud refers to as the manifest dream in this context, the same thoughts that come to light in interpretation. It does so by "condensing"⁵²⁴ them into the experienced content. This process of condensation is then described as "traceable to some mechanical or economical factor"525, which would appear to put some part of it at the level of the biological determinants of the dream-experience.⁵²⁶ In fact, it is in his introduction to the concept of the dream-work in The Interpretation of Dreams that Freud brings in the analogies of translation from a

⁵²³ XV, 170.(Freud's Emphasis)

⁵²⁴ XV, 172.

⁵²⁵ XV, 173.

⁵²⁶ LaPlanche and Pontalis reflect this dual aspect to the processes of the dreamwork. They describe it as "the whole of the operations which transform the raw materials of the dream – bodily stimuli, day's residues, dream-thoughts – so as to prodyce the manifest dream." LaPlanche and Pontalis, p. 125.

pictographic script and a rebus. The sleight of hand for which he employs the analogy of the pictographic script, therefore, gives the impression that the interpreter is in some way conversing with the underlying processes, or dreamwork, which have produced the dream. There are many instances in which Freud runs together comments one picture-writing with comments on the dreamwork. For example, in Introductory Lectures Freud describes what the interpreter faces as a primitive mode of expression produced by the underlying mechanism of the dream-work: "Let us recall that we have said that the dream-work makes a translation of the dream-thoughts into a primitive mode of expression similar to picturewriting."527 Here we see a script-aspect, a visual/pictorial aspect and an underlyingprocesses-as-interpretable aspect. With this quote, the impression is given that the dreamwork itself is the object of interpretation. However, rather than make a linguistic point, Freud is using the analogy of the pictographic script to express his conviction that there is something in common linking many of the phenomena that are of interest to him in connection with the general topic of dreaming. In this way, the pictographic script analogy is not concerned with a linguistic approach to interpretation, but an interdisciplinary one concerned with the kind of equivocation on the notion of meaning that was pointed out in chapter two.528

Our overall conclusion, then, is that Freud's analysis of language does not bear on his practice of interpretation in any explicit way. At most, it explicitly bears on it in so far as Freud's interest in philology might uncover recondite meanings of words that could then be tried out in interpretation. Indirectly, by contrast, it influenced his conception of intelligibility in turn influencing his understanding of the assumption of the intelligibility of the dream-report. This, as discussed in chapter three issued in his analysis of the censorship in terms of a second mind. This is an indirect consequence of his analysis of language. Ultimately, however, it is of importance in so far as it bears on a concept—the censorship—that is required as a rationale for the roundabout, sprawling patterns of **PR** syllogisms that

527 XV, 229.

⁵²⁸ The above point is concerned with clarifying the status of the analogy of the pictographic script. We might add that Freud's employment of the analogy in this way seems to be a means of carrying forward at least in principle an interdisciplinary project in the face of the practical, contemporary difficulty in reducing psychological phenomena to biological or neurophysiological ones. Freud's acknowledgement of this

resulted from the fundamental claim in this thesis about Freud's method of dreaminterpretation. The claim in question, of course, is that dream-interpretation amounts to treating the account given by the interpretee when asked to relate his dream as a form of saying one thing by saying another.

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University Press, 1896

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