Terms and Conditions of Use of Digitised Theses from Trinity College Library Dublin

Copyright statement

All material supplied by Trinity College Library is protected by copyright (under the Copyright and Related Rights Act, 2000 as amended) and other relevant Intellectual Property Rights. By accessing and using a Digitised Thesis from Trinity College Library you acknowledge that all Intellectual Property Rights in any Works supplied are the sole and exclusive property of the copyright and/or other IPR holder. Specific copyright holders may not be explicitly identified. Use of materials from other sources within a thesis should not be construed as a claim over them.

A non-exclusive, non-transferable licence is hereby granted to those using or reproducing, in whole or in part, the material for valid purposes, providing the copyright owners are acknowledged using the normal conventions. Where specific permission to use material is required, this is identified and such permission must be sought from the copyright holder or agency cited.

Liability statement

By using a Digitised Thesis, I accept that Trinity College Dublin bears no legal responsibility for the accuracy, legality or comprehensiveness of materials contained within the thesis, and that Trinity College Dublin accepts no liability for indirect, consequential, or incidental, damages or losses arising from use of the thesis for whatever reason. Information located in a thesis may be subject to specific use constraints, details of which may not be explicitly described. It is the responsibility of potential and actual users to be aware of such constraints and to abide by them. By making use of material from a digitised thesis, you accept these copyright and disclaimer provisions. Where it is brought to the attention of Trinity College Library that there may be a breach of copyright or other restraint, it is the policy to withdraw or take down access to a thesis while the issue is being resolved.

Access Agreement

By using a Digitised Thesis from Trinity College Library you are bound by the following Terms & Conditions. Please read them carefully.

I have read and I understand the following statement: All material supplied via a Digitised Thesis from Trinity College Library is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights, and duplication or sale of all or part of any of a thesis is not permitted, except that material may be duplicated by you for your research use or for educational purposes in electronic or print form providing the copyright owners are acknowledged using the normal conventions. You must obtain permission for any other use. Electronic or print copies may not be offered, whether for sale or otherwise to anyone. This copy has been supplied on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement.
A CROSS-LINGUISTIC AND CROSS-CULTURAL INVESTIGATION OF IRISH AND CZECH CHILDREN’S ACCOUNTS OF SOCIALLY-CONSTRUCTED EMOTIONS

Petra Houdková

Directed and Supervised by Dr. Jean Quigley

Thesis submitted to Trinity College Dublin for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Psychology, Faculty of Arts

October 2002
I declare that this work has not been submitted as an exercise for a degree at this or any other University and that it is entirely my own work.

I agree that the Library may lend or copy this thesis upon request.
A Cross-linguistic and Cross-cultural Investigation of Irish and Czech Children’s Accounts of Socially-constructed Emotions

This is an examination of the linguistic and cultural forces observable in the way in which Czech and Irish primary school children (aged 7 to 11) talk about socially reflexive emotions. More specifically, this study focuses on talk about the feelings of empathy, shame and guilt. The discourse investigated here is based on picture story narratives as well as on the children’s definitions of the emotions and their accounts of their personal experiences of them. At a grammatical level, the analysis is concerned with the self-reflexive structures (verbs and pronouns) available to the speakers of Czech and English. The subsequent semantic and thematic analysis looks at the emotion lexicon and its application by each group, and considers the possible conceptual implications. Situated against a broader cultural context, this study describes the idiosyncrasies encoded in each of the two grammatical systems, together with specific emotion terms and locutions and interprets their possible effects on the expression of speaker and non-speaker subjectivity, as found in Czech and Irish children’s interpretation of social knowledge.
I would like to thank Dr. Quigley for her invaluable support and help with this project. I am also grateful to the teachers and children of Scoil San Treasa, Mount Merrion and Základní škola Strossmayerovo náměstí, Praha 7.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**Volume I**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTRODUCTION</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 <strong>Can Language Speak for Psychology?</strong></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Discursive and Cultural Approach</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Discursive Psychology and Emotions</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 Psychological Discourse</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 Summary</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 <strong>Can Words Testify for Linguistic Relativity?</strong></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Within-language Relativity</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Summary</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 <strong>The Socially Constructed Self that Speaks</strong></td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 Agentivity, Implicit Causality and Emotions</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 Speaking as Perspective</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3 Summary</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 <strong>Language as Parasite</strong></td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1 The Grammatical World</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2 Linguistic Evolution</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3 Linguistic Magnetic Field</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4 Summary</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 <strong>Child Psychologists?</strong></td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1 Theory of Mind Research</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2 Summary</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 <strong>Narrativised World</strong></td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1 Grammaticised Focus</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2 Development of Narrative Abilities</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3 Picture Story Narratives</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4 Narratives and Emotions</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5 Summary</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 <strong>Czech Language and Society</strong></td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**DESIGN**

<p>| 8 <strong>Outline of Present Research</strong> | 51 |
| 8.1 Summary of Research Aims | 54 |
| 9 <strong>The Present Study: A Cross-cultural and Cross-linguistic Investigation of Irish and Czech Children’s Accounts of Socially-constructed Emotions</strong> | 55 |
| 9.1 Design | 55 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>Participants</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>Materials</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>Procedure</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>Transcription and Coding</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>Formal Assessment</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**RESULTS I**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Self-referent Systems: Anaphora and Reflexivity</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>Co-reference in English: Empathic versus Reflexive Self</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>Reflexivity and Viewpoint</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>Cross-linguistic View of Reflexivity</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>Reflexivity from a Developmental Perspective</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>The Use of Self-referent Structures in Irish Children’s Emotion Discourse: Reflexive Pronouns</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>General Description of Data</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>Self-referencing and Emotions</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>Self-referencing and Cognition</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>Self-referencing and Physical Action</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>The Empathic Quality of Self</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Self-referent Marking in Czech</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>Czech Verbs</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>Czech Reflexives</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>The Use of Self-referent Structures in Czech Children’s Emotion Discourse: Reflexive Pronouns</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>Reflexive Pronoun ‘sebe’</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>Summary of Some General Points of Comparison</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>The Use of Self-referent Structures in Czech Children’s Emotion Discourse: Reflexive Verbs</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>Overview of Grammatical Categorisation</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>Optional Self-referent Verbs</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>Obligatory Self-referent Verbs</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>Constructed Self-referent Verbs</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>False Starts</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>Passive or Object-linked Instances of Self-referents</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**RESULTS II**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Cultural Determinants of Emotions</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>Emotional Development in Children</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
15.2 Empathy: Feeling the Feelings of Others 174
15.3 Guilt and Shame: Surviving in Society 178
15.4 Emotions and Language 185
15.5 Summary 199

16 Lexical and Semantic Analysis: Empathy, Shame and Guilt
Accounts of Irish and Czech Children 201
16.1 Treatment of the Data 202
16.2 Lexical Types and Frequencies: An Overview 204
16.3 The Quality of Emotion Statements 207
16.4 The Emerging Themes 209
16.5 After Prompts: Diversity of Perspective, Family Pride and a Heavy Heart 235
16.6 Summary 240

17 Children’s Personal Accounts of Socially Reflexive Emotions 243
17.1 You can’t always get what you want, sometimes your best friend gets it 243
17.2 Feeling Sad and Happy for Others 249
17.3 Defining the Emotions 254
17.4 Gender Differences 265
17.5 Summary 266

CONCLUSION 269

REFERENCES 277

Volume II

APPENDICES

A Formal Assessment Measures 1
A Selection of ‘Strange Stories’ from Happé’s Advanced ToM Test 2
Czech Translation of ‘Strange Stories’ 4
Czech Translation of Selected Items from Carrow-Woolfolk’s CASL Test 6

B Picture Stories 10

C Transcription Symbols & Transcriptions 11
Irish Children’s Transcripts 13
Czech Children’s Transcripts 286
INTRODUCTION

How much or how little does the language we speak and the culture we are part of influence what we think and what we feel? An anecdote might serve as an appropriate illustration of the focus of this study.

A friend of mine, a native English speaker, spent several years living in Prague where she met her Czech husband. She is fluent in Czech and still uses the language on a daily basis. Although familiar with the declension system of Czech nouns, which she applies correctly and consistently throughout her speech, she refuses to decline her husband’s name. The added suffixes used for declension change the familiar Tomáš to Tomáši, Tomáše, Tomášovi and Tomášem.

To native Czech speakers such grammatical adjustments appear insignificant, so natural and automatic that they mostly go unnoticed. They are a mere surface feature of their language. To my Irish friend this change is somewhat more profound. In its grammatical variations, the name of her husband turns into a word which to her has no emotional (or indeed any other) association. Although she adopted the language as a means of communication, she resists subscribing to its structures at a conceptual level: at the level where sense is brought to life and identities are created.
Can Language Speak for Psychology?

1.1 Discursive and Cultural Approach
1.2 Discursive Psychology and Emotions
1.3 Psychological Discourse
1.4 Summary

1.1 Discursive and Cultural Approach

"Language is a light which illuminates certain aspects of reality, while leaving other aspects in darkness. Frequently, it is also a source of optical illusions, making us see forms and colours which appear to be features of the reality, whereas in fact they are born out of an interplay between this reality and the light itself." (Wierzbicka, 1995, p. 18)

As Miller pointed out, "we already know far more about language than we understand" (1990, p. 7). While it is relatively easy to monitor acquisition trends of particular linguistic forms or specific speech impairments, the hidden powers that language holds over our inner lives as well as our existence as social beings continue to intrigue and haunt theorists all over the world.

As a theoretical framework for this study, I would like to join the ‘cultural psychology’ movement represented, for example, by Jerome Bruner or Rom Harré, and associated with names such as Vygotsky and Wittgenstein¹, which leads away from the study of the ‘clockworks’ of the individual mind, towards the view of a socially and culturally constructed Self. The investigation of cognition within this approach is firmly rooted in the context of ‘meaning making’ (Bruner, 1990, p. 2). As such, this framework relies on language not only as a medium, but primarily as a key to, and a product of, the human representation of the world. The metaphor for the cultural and social conception of language as ‘prosthetic device’, which allows the speaker to

¹ See Quigley (2000) for a comprehensive coverage of this topic.
convert his own cognitive processes into an interpersonal exchange (Rommetveit, 1998, p. 357), captures the very essence of this link.

So characterised, language structures cannot be studied outside the context of communication. The underlining assumption is that the study of discourse practices and language structures used by speakers of various cultures to refer to their experiences in the world will reveal the identities of their socially constructed Selves. In addition, the process of emergence of such identities from each particular and very specific linguistic, as well as cultural environment, will be uncovered.

On a more concrete level, Ricoeur (e.g., 1981) draws attention to the need to move away from language as a 'system' towards its function within discourse. Language as a system can only be discussed in terms of abstraction. Discourse, on the other hand, is always concrete with specific purposes, goals and protagonists. It is in this context that Hollway proposed discursive analysis to be conducted through a 'positioning triad', consisting of the story line, the evaluative stance of the speakers (largely determined by the rules of a particular social, cultural and linguistic community), and the social acts they engage in (in Harré & Gillett, 1994, p. 156).

As Edwards puts it in his account of the role of discursive psychology, "the challenge...is to provide an analysis of emotion categories, and other kinds of psychological descriptions, that is founded in the conceptual analysis of language in use, and the empirical study of how people talk within cultural settings." (1999, p. 288).

Although the main theoretical claims of this study are closely tied to specific grammatical structures and lexical items, the investigation is very firmly anchored within the discursive purpose of the speakers of two distinctly diverse languages. Bamberg’s (1997a) view of grammar as "social know-how relevant for the construction of social meaning" (p. 333), where grammatical structures are employed by the speaker to represent specific 'discursive
purpose', is highly relevant here. The speakers’ immediate discursive purpose is to describe and define particular socially reflexive emotions, and is in turn profoundly influenced by larger social and cultural forces involved in the construction of such concepts. It is from this perspective that the observations made here will be discussed, contrasted and compared. In adopting such a focus, I hope to avoid the danger of ‘aboutism’, which threatens discursive psychology concerned exclusively with ‘what can be said’ about our inner experience, instead of conceiving of this experience in terms of its development within a social context (Peréz Campos et al., 1999, p. 297).

I will not attempt to reiterate the growing significance of discursive psychology during what has been termed the ‘second cognitive revolution’, and which has been captured in detail by Harré (e.g., 1992, 2002), Bruner (1990) and others. Instead I feel it appropriate to follow Vygotsky’s (e.g., 1987) lead and depart from the point of belief that each cultural community possesses a heritage consisting of many diverse structures and forms, language being one of them.

Within the broader discursive framework, there are other theoretical directions in terms of which this study could be described. Apart from social and linguistic constructivist claims, which will be outlined in detail later, it is somewhat tempting to use the label ‘developmental’ in the current context. However, this term is slightly misleading here, as the focus is not on the order or process of acquisition of linguistic abilities or forms. Instead, Budwig’s (1995a, p. 23) view of development as a ‘perspective adopted toward data’ is assumed. In other words, the concern lies with the use of particular forms at a specific point of development, rather than their change over time.

In this respect, the current framework is probably best characterised in terms of a ‘functional’ approach to child language, as defined by Budwig. Functional approaches in general share the belief that language has evolved and is learned by individuals for the purposes of communication, and as such it has to be studied against a background of particular communicative
purposes and situations. Its main function is to provide a tangible structure through which meaning can be encoded and communicated (Budwig, 1995a, p. 4).

At a more specific level, this study could be defined in terms of a ‘sociocultural’ functional framework, concerned with the interplay between language and a relevant culture. In Budwig’s own definition of the main assumptions behind this approach, “the use of particular linguistic devices can be related to speaker’s attempts to achieve particular social goals” (1995a, p. 7).

It should also be noted at this point that while the most prominent view held by the functional researchers of child language is that “functions guide form” (Budwig, 1995a, p.14), the current study makes no claims in terms of function-form order of acquisition. Instead of adopting a causal viewpoint, I would like to follow Gerhardt, Savaris and others (in Budwig, 1995a), and examine the interplay between particular grammatical structures and their discursive use as observable in children’s language.

1.2 Discursive Psychology and Emotions

"Emotion categories are not graspable merely as individual feelings or expressions, and nor is their discursive deployment reducible to a kind of detached, cognitive sense-marking.” (Edwards, 1999, p. 279)

In the Private Language Argument, Wittgenstein (1953) contemplates the linguistic references to inner feelings and experiences which cannot be learned through their link to examples in the outside world. It is suggested that our internal emotion lexicon is based on spontaneous expressions of fear, pain, happiness and other feelings which develop through the child’s social and psychological growth into their linguistically refined forms. During this process, for example, the physical expressions of happiness, such as laughter, can be accompanied or replaced by the word ‘happy’, which itself becomes
part of the experience. However, unlike with external objects, the word and the feeling are not independent of each other. As linguistic representations of objects can be incorrect, the word *happy* does not ‘describe’ the feeling. Instead it constitutes a part of it, which in the manner of physical manifestations of emotions cannot be omitted from the experience (Harre, 2002, p. 146). As such, the study of the language people choose to verbalise their emotional experiences clearly constitutes a unique source of information about the experiences themselves.

Pragmatically speaking, discursive psychology of emotions is concerned not only with the way in which emotional states are discussed, but also with the use of specific emotion terms in connection to personal experiences and social events (Edwards, 1997, p. 170). As part of their everyday lives and communication with others, speakers develop an extensive range of psychological terminology which should not be viewed by psychologists as ‘pre-scientific’ or ‘inadequate’. It should rather be used by researchers as a tool for exploration of the human mind, in all senses of the word, including the physical (Edwards, 1999, p. 272). Edwards argued that such concepts of inner lives reflected in discourse do not need to be examined in terms of their capturing the ‘true’ workings of the mind. Instead these representations need to be taken as the subject of our investigations. In addition, their irregularities represent an important and interesting part of their make up.

Most cross-cultural studies of emotion language rely heavily on lexical comparisons. A more detailed account of the existing knowledge based on this topic will be given later. For the moment the discussion will be limited to a broad introduction to the role of language in the expression and conception of emotions, focusing again on the issue of the appropriateness of discourse context.

The nature of the link between language and emotions has been well captured by the following study. Rommetveit & Hundeide (Rommetveit, 1998) working with a group of Norwegian speakers found that very young children
can approximate the meaning of highly emotionally charged words such as ‘sincerity’ and ‘democracy’ as being positive, while ‘corruption’ and ‘crime’ as having a negative connotation. The authors argue that the emotive relevance of such terms is communicated to the children through the prosody displayed in the adult discourse. As such, prosody represents a more honest and direct link to emotions than lexicon and so allows the emotive content of intellectually alien expressions to be communicated to the child (p. 363). The aspect of this finding that is most important here, the exact mechanisms involved aside, is that children’s socially relevant emotion knowledge is to a large extent influenced by the medium of language, which facilitates access to the shared experience of particular emotions.

Edwards defines emotions as being “conceived to be natural bodily experiences and expressions, older than language, irrational and subjective, unconscious rather than deliberate, genuine rather than artificial, feelings rather than thoughts” (1999, p. 273). Discursive Psychology, however, is not concerned with such divisions. It focuses on the expression of emotions and what motivates it (Edwards, 1999). In this spirit, I will not join the emotion versus cognition debate. Instead, Bamberg’s and Reilly’s (1996) model of language and emotions as “interdependent and mutually constituting each other” (p. 330) is adopted here.

By focusing on children’s constructions of emotion discourse and concepts I hope to gain an insight into the linguistic and conceptual representations in motion. This reference to movement aims to encapsulate the process of the establishment of such representations within the individual mind, as it is actively renewed through an interaction with social and linguistic environment. In other words, it is believed that children’s perspective on and expression of emotions (socially constructed emotions in particular) offer a rich source of observations about our formation as social animals, captured by, and reflected in, human languages. As already noted, rather than aiming to investigate a specific stage of this development, the current study attempts to describe this process from the viewpoint of children of a particular age at
which most of the fundamental foundations of social existence have been laid, but explicit forms may not have been yet fully mastered.

1.3 Psychological Discourse

"As we have come to see it the task of psychology is to produce a discourse about human thinking, feeling and acting that has certain attributes, those of the kinds of discourse we are accustomed to call 'the sciences'." (Harré, 2002, 153)

As Harré points out, when establishing an empirical science we first need to identify the 'beings' we are dealing with. The next step is characterised by basic 'classifications' and 'hierarchies' which, with time, evolve into more complex, philosophically defined 'ontologies' (p. 162). Of course the 'branch' of psychological hierarchy in question here is the 'discursive' one which, together with the 'material'\(^2\) branch, emerged from the Second Cognitive Revolution.

The focus of this newly defined psychological discourse is, as Quigley puts it, to "break down the individual-social, internal-external dichotomy to set the mind up as intrinsically social" (2000, p. 6). The role attributed to language is crucial in this process. Its purpose is no longer just descriptive, instead it is now perceived as having a 'formative function', constituting part of the social reality it represents (Quigley, 2000, p. 6).

The problems that have always been associated with the philosophy of discursive psychology as a method can be described as genetically related to its most attractive feature, i.e., the possibility of multiple layers of focus without binding contextual limitations. Referring specifically to discursive accounts of emotions, Gee identifies custom made aims, as well as the array of diverse 'personal, social, institutional and cultural goals, interests and

---

\(^2\) This division provides the framework for the Soul, Person, Organism and Molecular ontological branches, put forward by Harré (2002) and based on Wittgenstein's 'grammars'. As Harré puts it "neither branch of the dual ontology can colonize the other. Human beings in the molecular ontology are machines with no moral attributes. Brains in the person ontology are tools for use in tasks set discursively" (p. 163). Harré proposes 'hybrid psychology' which would create a way of "relating the brain and nervous system to the discursive acts of the conversational model of cognition" (p. 165) as well as eliminating the S or Soul grammar from its concern.
perspectives’ that such accounts have to fulfil, as one of their chronic shortcomings (1999, p. 306).

If psychology really is composed of a ‘cluster of narrations’ as Harre (2002, p.162) suggests, it should be within its ethos to embrace such forces as partially constitutive of the subject matter itself. The consensus reached in relevant literature seems to have settled on the following. A constant awareness of any biases inherent within the subjects that are being scrutinised which may influence the choice of the methods and measures applied, and which may partially or fully inspire the interpretation of the data, should not be conceived of as limiting. Instead such forces form part of the reality for which they attempt to account.

1.4 Summary

The application of a discursive approach to the subject of this study can be seen as an attempt to create a link between psychology and linguistics, where grammatical structures and language itself constitute the basis for this connection (Quigley, 2000). Language is not treated as a mere symbolic outlet of cognition. It is conceptualised as a meaningful representational system, mirroring not only the external reality it is employed to represent but also the psychological, cultural, social and discursive context from which such representations arise.

In addition, the current study can be perceived as consistent with the sociocultural functional approach to child language, as described by Budwig (1995a). It examines the use of specific grammatical and lexical forms in two languages, reflecting two specific social and cultural backgrounds as represented in the discourse of primary school children.
Can Words Testify for Linguistic Relativity?

2.1 Within-language Relativity
2.2 Summary

"The language or languages that we learn in childhood are not neutral coding systems of an objective reality. Rather, each one is a subjective orientation to the world of human experience, and this orientation affects the ways in which we think while we are speaking." (Slobin, 1996, p. 91)

The idea of a close link between language and cognition is clearly relevant to the issue of the development of socially constructed emotion concepts. This section will review the main points of this debate, as well as outlining a broad theoretical stance for the chapters to follow.

It is almost customary now to open any discussion on this topic with a reference to linguistic relativity, or the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, as it has been named after its first articulators. Like many others (e.g., Gumperz & Levinson, 1996) I also think the claim of linguistic determinism (i.e., the language we speak determines what we think) to be unjustified and theoretically unsustainable. A wealth of psychological research led to a general discarding of this notion. Some aspects of the original hypothesis, however, proved somewhat more resilient to scientific scrutiny. As a result, the related, less deterministic, more subtle, and as considered by many, more plausible suggestion of linguistic relativity (i.e., cognitive concepts vary in accordance with variations in linguistic forms) has since the 1950's continued to generate extensive and largely inconclusive debates.

It has also been suggested (e.g., Lucy, 1992) that Sapir's and Whorf's original claims should be interpreted along the lines of grammars of particular languages shaping the forms of cognition readily accessible to the speaker, as opposed to the deterministic thesis commonly attributed to them. As Harré

---

3 See e.g., Inchaurralde (1998) for an interesting treatment of this topic.
points out, such conceptualisation of the thought-language relation can be seen as Wittgensteinian in principle, as it resembles Wittgenstein’s concept of ‘grammar’ frames through which thoughts are constructed (2002, p. 145).

The idea of cognition influenced by language stands in the opposing corner to the ‘universalist’ trends that have been associated with linguists as well as cognitive psychologists over the past 25 years (Holtgraves, 2002, p. 158). In universalist terms, language is perceived as a ‘surface structure’ (although exceptionally varied), incapable of penetrating the concepts created by the deeper-level cognition. Not disputing the point that languages are unlikely to ‘dramatically’ influence speakers’ cognition (Pinker, 1994, p. 58), with growing research into this area it is becoming increasingly clear that we cannot simply overlook the effects language exerts on verbally encoded concepts.

Although the development of linguistic abilities is to a large extent governed by universal ‘biological and cognitive’ factors, the use of any particular language requires from its speakers’ an organised system of ‘semantic distinctions’, which are not directly linked to the events in the physical sphere (Slobin, 1990, p. 236). Using language to account for any experience therefore means adopting a certain perspective. In Slobin’s powerful projection, “experiences are filtered through language into verbalised events” (1998, p. 2).

The long line of mostly lexically confined cross-linguistic investigations of the relationship between language and thought had in recent years been enriched by the re-conceptualisation of this link. This direction of theorising is often represented by Slobin’s term (e.g., 1991, 1996, 1998) ‘thinking for speaking’, or as Berman and Slobin describe it, the “filtering of experience for the purposes of talking about it” (1993, p. 12). Slobin suggests that instead of looking at language in terms of exerting influence on the way we think, we should conceive of it in terms of children’s acquisition of a particular way of

---

4 See e.g., Edwards (1997) for a review of ‘colour’ and other studies.
cognition in order to use the language structures available to them within their native language.

Although departing from a different perspective, this notion is not dissimilar to Deacon's (1997) thesis that our brains have evolved in order to accommodate the use of language. Deacon, however, does not stop at this claim. He proposes that languages themselves also adapt, specifically to children's ability to learn, communicate and socially interact. Since biological evolution is relatively slow, languages facilitate this 'co-evolution' much more than the human brain does. This also explains why, despite a varying degree of alterations, the underlying structures of most languages share a level of commonality. The reason why children seem to possess the ability to "guess the rules of syntax" is that languages adapt to incorporate in their design the "most frequently guessed patterns" (p. 122). I will consider this notion of linguistic evolution in more detail in Chapter 4.

Returning to Slobin's claim of linguistically filtered experience, empirical investigations of this theory examine and compare the rhetorical systems as well as temporal and spatial descriptions produced by native speakers in a variety of languages (e.g., German, Spanish and Hebrew). It is argued that through verbalisation of the events presented to them in the form of a picture story, the child speakers of different languages 'experience' these events differently (1996, p. 88)^.

Results of an unrelated study comparing American and Korean children's acquisition of first words point in the same direction. Gopnik and Choi (1998, reported by Azar, 1998) found that while English speakers learned more nouns as their first words, the Korean children learned more verbs, a pattern consistent with the pronounced emphasis that Korean in comparison to English puts on verbs. Astonishingly, these linguistic differences between the two groups carried through to the children's ability to categorise objects and

^ Weist, Lyytinen, Wysocka & Atanassova (1997) also found some evidence of this phenomenon in their study of linguistic and conceptual development of time and space in American, Finish and Polish pre-schoolers.
to perform on tool-use tasks. The children mastered the related tasks within some weeks after learning the verb relevant to tool use, or after increasing their vocabulary in terms of noun acquisition. Consistent with the linguistic trends the Korean children continued to perform better on the tool-use tasks while the American children were repeatedly more successful at sorting objects.

Similar studies suggest that although speakers of different languages may well be found to share the same general cognitive concepts, a closer examination will reveal that the ‘thinking’ they use in order to speak reflects the differences in focus and organisation of their attention required for linguistic expression in each particular language. In other words, ‘thinking for speaking’ involves focusing on those characteristics of objects and events that “(a) fit some conceptualisation of the event, and (b) are readily encodable in the language” (Slobin, 1996, p. 76). For reasons I will illustrate here, I believe the cognitive capacity required for the conceptualisation of socially constructed emotions to be one such characteristic, accessible to specific language markers.

2.1 Within-language Relativity

Instances in which a speaker of a particular language is provided with multiple ways of talking about the same thing constitute one of the arguments of the current criticisms of the notion of linguistic (as well as cultural) relativity. For example, Kay (1996) claims that specific cultures and languages equip their members and speakers with a selection of options intended to be used as “tools for making sense of the world” as opposed to a comprehensive model of the world. As well as having lexical and grammatical alternatives, “people never have to employ all of their culture at once” (p. 110).

In response it could be argued here that it is not the hypothetical range of options speakers have that constitutes the real issue. Instead it is the choices they continue to make between those options, and the context in which such
choices are made. Any irregular uses and the reasons for them can also reveal language and culture specific trends (Edwards, 1997). It is therefore the case that concrete answers to such challenges lie within the discursive analysis of specific issues. As such, a part of the investigation of the language-thought parallel can be re-formulated as a within language issue.

Holtgraves (2002) summarises the research pointing to the ‘use’ of language, rather than language structures themselves, as affecting cognition. Similar conclusions are typically based on studies of the effects of verbal labels on memory, storytelling and decision-making. Such a vantage point for the investigation of cultural and linguistic variations has been shown by many to be a valid one. For example, Wakabayashi & Fernald (2000) found dramatic differences between empathically charged narratives told by Japanese and American mothers. While the American mothers concentrated on continuity and problem solution, the Japanese mothers directed their children towards expressions of empathy with the characters in the story. The authors of the study interpreted these findings in terms of dramatic differences in the “ways of being in the world”, as opposed to surface manifestations of culture-specific systems (p. 761).

To extend this point even further, Ochs and Schieffelin (1995) propose a unique view of grammatical development, which is firmly embedded in the context of every particular culture. The suggested ‘language socialisation perspective’ provides a model for the development of grammatical structures focusing on the culturally determined circumstances of their acquisition and use by children. The central notion of this theory states that social organisation and beliefs define the appropriateness of use or non-use of certain grammatical forms. The frequency of their occurrence in children’s language, as well as the developmental framework for their acquisition, is therefore seen as independent of the levels of exposure to such items.

Ochs and Schieffelin use ethnographic studies to illustrate that the mastery of grammatical forms, although not directly linked to a specific socio-cultural
context, can be dramatically influenced by the system of language use within a particular culture. For example, the Kaluli imperative ‘say like that’, *elema* constitutes a part of the adult’s lexicon during everyday communication with the child, yet it is used by a very small proportion of young children. The discursive and social purpose of this expression is reserved for older children or adults. Although familiar with the form, younger children do not acquire its use until socially appropriate (Schieffelin in Ochs and Schieffelin, 1995).

The effects of similar instances of ‘conversational pragmatics’ on cognition have been mostly neglected by researchers of linguistic relativity (Holtgraves, 2002), despite their apparent commonality. Another often cited example can be found in speakers of languages that grammatically encode relationships between people with respect to their social status (such as e.g., German). It is likely that speakers of such languages are more aware of the existence of social divisions than, for example, English speakers who are not exposed to similar linguistic categorisation (Holtgraves, 2002). In addition, grammatical distinctions like these create unique social interaction and practices. For example, in Czech, it is customary to formally announce the switch from the formal to the informal code of address by the sentence “*Budeme si tykat?*”, translated as something like “Will we use the informal form from now on?”, where ‘*tykat*’, containing the informal expression of the pronoun ‘you’, *ty* also has a formal counterpart ‘*vy*’, ‘*vykat*’. Social rules (although less and less rigidly adhered to) dictate that an older person, a woman or an individual with a higher rank or status, first approach their counterparts with the proposal of ‘*tykat*’. The occasion of the code-switch is marked by a handshake, in some cases even a shared drink, and has a profound effect on the grammatical and conceptual coding of future interactions. Quite clearly, such a ritual has not only social but also emotional connotations, as it formally marks a transition in the relationship.

---

6 Czech also belongs to this linguistic group. In Czech, ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ address is grammatically coded in the form of a distinction in 2nd person of personal pronouns, as well as in their verbal suffixes. The formal structure is expressed through plural forms.
2.2 Summary

Cross-linguistic research continues to reveal subtle differences in linguistic practices around the world. These differences operate on many levels, ranging from discursive to lexical to grammatical variations, uncovering a fundamental link which exists between the acquisition of such forms and their application in a particular cultural context.

This study examines the possibility that specific grammatical structures and lexical items, as they appear in the discourse of children speaking two different languages, may inherently represent a somewhat unique way of interpersonal cognition observable within each society. The descriptive data emerging is therefore interpreted in the appropriate language- and culture-specific contexts, with attention to possible linguistically or culturally motivated distinctions in focus of each of the two groups.
The Socially Constructed Self that Speaks

3.1 Agentivity, Implicit Causality and Emotions
3.2 Speaking as Perspective
3.3 Summary

One of the most influential descriptions of the development of the human mind as a socially and culturally defined process is commonly attributed to Vygotsky (1978). In this view, children's mental growth is characterised by two crucial components. In the first place it is communication and relationships, which form part of a specific social order. On a broader scale, this development is defined by the historical and cultural representations inherent within each society. Rather than just passively adopting this knowledge, however, the growing child is involved in its active and selective 'appropriation'.

While theoretically sound, the interplay between culturally based beliefs and practices, historical and social forces, and discursive and linguistic patterns, is certainly not an explicit one. As Schieffelin and Ochs (1996, p. 252) suggest, it is the investigation of these intricate links that distinguishes 'language socialisation' from studies of language acquisition. They define most culture-specific variations in communicative behaviour in terms of the "extent to which it is preferred or expected" (p. 257) within a particular social context. The culturally appropriate way to deal with 'unintelligibility' of the other participant in the discourse is only one of many examples which illustrate this claim (p. 258).

On the other end of the spectrum, Slobin (1990) characterised his approach to language development as 'cross-linguistic' rather than 'cross-cultural' (p. 233), based on the assumption that language systems operate separately from the larger cultural context. Such narrow focus of investigation has been criticised (e.g., Nicolopoulou, 1997) for its conscious attempts to exclude thematically motivated analysis. As Nicolopoulou notes, however, cross-
cultural differences continue to emerge in Slobin’s studies despite their omission from the design, so highlighting the importance of this issue.

The social constructivist account of the central position of language in the human creation of the *Self*, as outlined by Budwig (e.g., 1995b, 2000), provides a natural continuation to the topic of the interplay between thought and language. The most relevant aspect of the social constructivist approach to language as ‘action’ rather than just as a representation tool for already existing reality claims that grammatical systems of languages provide their speakers with multiple ways of representing own *Self* and the *Selves* of others, as part of their discourse. Although an interaction between cultural forces and grammatical choices encoded in particular languages is acknowledged by this approach, linguistic structures are seen as crucial to the construction of *Self*. Such conceptualisation marks the shift from ‘language as method’ in the hands of psychologists to ‘language as mechanism’ operating in the child’s creation of *Self* and the subjectivity of others (Budwig, 1995b, p. 3).

It is with the onset of language that a child learns to see the *Self* from the outside through ‘grammatical empathising’ with the position of others. The idea of the *Self* is therefore closely linked to the grammatical systems of self-structuring within any given language (Budwig, 1995b).

> “On a narrative account, the self is to be construed not as a prelinguistic given that merely employs language, much as we might employ a tool, but rather as a product of language – what might be called the *implied subject* of self-referring utterances.” (Kerby in Budwig, 1995b, p. 5)

To illustrate this point, Budwig (1995b) conducted a variation analysis (i.e., variations within statements referring to the same concept, occurring due to linguistic or/and social factors) of ‘self-indexing’ in American and German children and their caregivers. Dramatic differences in the trends found across the two language groups were reported as a result of this study. To note only

---

7 Bamberg, Budwig and Kaplan (1991) describe in detail the acquisition of personal pronouns by English speaking children, in the context of referring to *Self*, while Budwig (1989) deals with the issue of prototypical agentivity within the same context.
some of them, the German 2- to 3-year-olds did not produce ‘error-like’ pronominal forms in an inappropriate context as was commonly found in the American children. In addition, the German child-speakers were more concerned with marking the differences between own agentivity and that of others early on in their self-referent development. The American and German caregivers’ references to Self and to others also showed marked distinctions. As Budwig acknowledges, possible explanations for the reported differences could lie not only in the diversity of linguistic structures available to the two groups but also in distinct culturally determined communicative purposes.

In light of similar studies, language in its specific forms can be seen as one of the forces constituting the social as well as the personal identity of members of particular cultural communities, through capturing and subsequent systematic and constant reproduction of their values and beliefs. This approach represents what Bamberg terms ‘linguistic-constructionism’, inspired by ‘social-constructionism’ with the added focus on the role of language in the human socialisation process (1997b, p. 337).

The constructivist approach to child development can be compared to Piaget’s account of cognitive development, where the child is described as organising knowledge and adapting to new demands (Bamberg, 1997b). In terms of linguistics, what is achieved is not knowledge as such, nor it is based in the ‘mind’ itself. Rather it is ‘experience’ and ‘self’ that rise through linguistic structures within the acts of communication taking place in a particular cultural context. In this view people make sense of their lives and the world around them through linguistic behaviour, which also limits their ability to create their existence on an individual basis (pp. 85-84). As such, language is seen from a broader perspective (outside its linguistic structures) in terms of its power to “construct a moral order within which self and others are situated” (p. 87).
3.1 Agentivity, Implicit Causality and Emotions

The investigation of the role assigned to discourse protagonists through grammatical means represents yet another aspect of variations in the linguistic expression of subjective viewpoint and perspective. Slobin (1994) defines the 'degree of agency' within the context of a narrative as the "construal of the entire event: its dynamic and motivational loading, the extent of its consequences, etc." (p. 345, original italics). The level of agency is determined through the selection of verbs as well as through the positioning of information in main or subordinate clauses.

Agentivity is one of the earliest concepts grammatically encoded by children across languages (Slobin in Budwig, 1995a). Although Slobin's focus lies primarily in descriptions of events against a temporal and spatial background, this developmental timing also points to the significance of agentivity encoding grammatical structures in relation to the emerging interpersonal concepts, such as social emotions. Clearly, emotion discourse is governed by the same general grammatical rules as other types of discourse. However, in terms of agentivity, a number of specific linguistic structures hold a significant position in the context of emotion discourse.

Most emotion terms across languages are transitive in nature – an 'experiencer' (subject) feels an emotion, which results from a specific 'stimulus' in the form of a direct object (Maratsos, Katis & Margheri, 1999). A typical example of such construct would be e.g., 'Lucy loves cats.' Schlesinger showed that experiencers are perceived as more in control of an emotionally charged event when they are grammatically represented in the position of the subject, rather than that of a direct object. For example 'Lucy', when she, 'likes dogs', is perceived by the listener as being more in control than she would be as part of the sentence 'Dogs disgust Lucy' (in Maratsos et al., 1999, p. 53-54). Schlesinger explained this phenomenon in terms of the 'Semantic Assimilation Theory' which suggests that once encoded in terms of a 'grammatical category', the components of the sentence adopt the
'grammatical colouring' of the 'modal semantics of the category'. More specifically, subjects become 'agents' while direct objects are assigned the role of 'patienthood' (p. 54).

The resulting grammar-specific semantic effect is likely to have an influence on the conceptualisation of emotional states (Maratsos, Katis & Margheri, 1999). Although the most common model of agentivity in simple transitive emotion constructions observable across languages is the experiencer-stimulus, there are a number of exceptions. For example, in the expression of 'liking' and 'missing' in Italian and in Greek, the object that is being missed or liked is ascribed a more agentive role than the 'doer'. This is achieved by the dative case in Italian, and by genitive in Greek. As a result, the approximate English translation of 'John likes Mary' would be 'Mary pleases to-John' (Maratsos et al., 1999, p. 55), a structure that is also characteristic of similar Czech forms.

However, research on implicit causality, reviewed by Holtgraves (2002), suggests that the perception of events as encoded by grammatical constructions may be more complex. Specifically, some verbs are perceived by the speakers as characterised by higher levels of causality than others (based on Fillmore's 'arguments of action', 1968, pp. 1-88). It has been shown that in sentences like 'Ann helped Barb' and 'Ann hated Barb', subjects assign the causality to Ann in the former, and to Barb in the latter case, even though Ann is in the position of the subject, while Barb plays the role of the object in both instances. Holtgraves (2002, p.163) speculates that this difference can be explained in terms of 'action' versus 'state' nature of verbs, which positions this distinction outside the scope of grammatical influence. This phenomenon has been described by the 'linguistic category model', which apart from verb typology also operates along the abstract-concrete, most and least revealing, most and least verifiable, and other levels (Semin and Fiedler in Holtgraves, 2002, pp. 164-166).

---

8 Maratsos et al. failed to capture any differences in the degree of control ascribed to the experiencer by Italian and Greek subjects in comparison to English speakers, possibly due to their methodology, which did not take into account the discursive context of the utterances used.
There are also more direct explanations of implicit causality which could be seen as consistent with the notion of language influencing thought. Such explanations centre around the proposal that language leads the speaker to bypass the original ‘nonlinguistic’ concepts involved in causal cognition, while imposing its own system (Holtgraves, 2002). According to the ‘lexical hypothesis’ (first proposed and then rejected by Brown and Fish, 1983, in Holgraves, 2002, p. 167), “interpersonal verbs have associated with them dispositional terms referencing the sentence subject, object or both”. For example, the dispositional terms for the verbs help and like are helpful and likeable (p. 167). The agentive coding of such terms copies the agentivity of the corresponding verbs, while generally reflecting the preference for the position likely to be seen as ‘causally responsible’. As a result, it could be argued that the way we perceive causality is influenced by the nature of our lexicon (Holtgraves, 2002).

The opposing ‘covariation hypothesis’ (Rudolph & Forsterling, 1997) or the ‘salience hypothesis’ (Kasof and Lee, 1993) dismiss similar claims, and instead concentrate on the semantic qualities of the verb (including the agent-patient distinction), resulting from cognitive processes of causality (in Holtgraves, 2002).

### 3.2 Speaking as Perspective

As already mentioned, the treatment of the relationship between language, emotions and cognition proposed in this study, was largely inspired by the view that what we represent through language is by no means an objective picture of reality. Instead what we say reflects directly our own conception of events, as well as our subjective focus and our evaluation of them (e.g., Bamberg, 1991a, 1997; Slobin, 1991, 1994, 1996, 1998). The speaker is not a chance observer or an independent reporter of the events he or she takes upon him/herself to describe. Through words and more subtle linguistic devices speakers paint a picture of reality for which they can be held

---

accountable. A speaker cannot decline the invitation to adopt a perspective once he decides to speak.

In Bamberg’s (1997a) words, “assumptions about the world, what happened and why it happened, are inferred from the way the speaker designed the emotions and motivations of the actors” (p. 335). More specifically, the link between the speaker and the listener, i.e., language, serves the function of a ‘regulator’ of the events that the actors (to use a common metaphor) portray on the stage of the speaker’s “psychological ‘reality’” (p. 335). It is not only what is being conveyed that is significant, however. The reasons for which it is important to the speaker to verbalise his messages are also crucial. These two elements are tied together by the linguistic tools utilised. But as Bamberg warns, this is not to say that the way in which the speaker positions him/herself in regards to the events and to the listener should be perceived as other than mechanical choice of a particular linguistic device, as this choice is not always conscious (pp. 337-338). Therefore it should be noted at this level that the variety of ‘perspective-forming’ linguistic structures readily available to speakers of particular languages gain the distinct relevance to the cross-linguistic differences in viewpoint adopted by the speakers.

Another important element constituting a particular perspective is the moral stance assumed by the speaker in his/her accounts of emotional and other experiences. As Bamberg (1997a) suggests, this will occur regardless of the speaker’s focus (on the self, others, or generalised scenarios), as “constructions of a textual reality are always co-constructed in concert with a local moral order for the purpose of ‘becoming understood’” (p. 317).

It was for this reason that the socially reflexive emotions of shame, guilt and empathy were selected for investigation, as they also are closely associated with issues of moral and interpersonal development. As such, the mastery of these concepts and their linguistic representations offers an investigative opportunity in terms of a socially and culturally loaded discourse, where language structures operate as a ‘key’ to the code of social practices shared by
the speakers. In other words, I believe the topic of interpersonal emotions, as discussed by children, to have the potential of uncovering deep-rooted concepts, beliefs and practices, specific to each of the cultural groups under examination. Moreover, in light of the debate presented so far, such culture-specific conceptualisations of empathy motivated social relationships are likely to be both represented in, as well as co-constructed by, language.

3.3 Summary

Many theorists have argued for the view of a ‘social being’ as emergent from the representation of the world through language. This being, as seen by Nelson, is a product of both ‘Piagetian individual construction’ and ‘Vygotsky’s social construction’, which both rise against the background of the social and cultural reality already inhabited by the child and his/her community (in Marková, 1999, p. 255).

The culture in which speakers live is apparent from the grammatical system of their language. Each language contains a large number of expressions which can only exist as part of a culture-specific context. As such, they do not simply capture objects existing in the world, but their meaning is highly idiosyncratic and culturally constructed (Goddard, 1998).

In the current study, the subjective concept of the Self is seen as partially emergent from specific grammatical structures available to the speaker. The speaker’s conception of others and their representation in the world is similarly influenced by grammar. In addition, speaking means adopting a ‘grammaticised’ perspective.

Departing from a corresponding social- and linguistic-constructivist framework, as proposed by Budwig (e.g., 1995b) and Bamberg (e.g., 1997b)\textsuperscript{10}, self-referent structures (i.e., reflexive verbs and pronouns, defined in more detail later) and their use are in this study believed to be representative

\textsuperscript{10} Bamberg (1997a) speaks of ‘linguistic constructionist’ position.
of linguistically and socially created subjectivity. The term 'subjectivity' is used to describe the speaker as well as non-speaker perspective or viewpoint communicated within discourse. In addition, and with respect to the context examined here, this label is applied to signify that the adopted grammaticised perspective holds an added emotive relevance (e.g., where the self-referent is used to communicate an empathic link between two protagonists).
4

Language as Parasite?

4.1 The Grammatical World
4.2 Linguistic Evolution
4.3 Linguistic Magnetic Field
4.4 Summary

Although far from being complete, it can perhaps be assumed at this point that a general outline of the importance of language for our representation of the world as well as for the formation of our inner lives has been drawn here. What remains to be seen are the possible mechanisms through which the human world is linguistically moulded.

4.1 The Grammatical World

As Karmiloff and Karmiloff-Smith (2001) point out, acquisition of grammar is no longer an issue related only to children well over the age of one. Instead new findings continue to reveal an early awareness of grammatical forms (measured, for example, by the head-turning technique) which occurs much earlier than the child's own production of grammatical constructs.

The theoretical approaches dealing with children’s abilities to learn grammatical structures remain as diverse as ever, ranging from the structural approach inspired by the Chomskyan concept of ‘Universal Grammar’ through the bootstrapping approaches (prosodic/phonological, syntactic and semantic bootstrapping associated, for example, with Steven Pinker), to sociopragmatic theories pioneered by Jerome Bruner, cognitive approaches based on Piaget’s general theory of cognitive development, processing approaches (e.g., Slobin’s ‘Operating Principles Approach’ or Bates and MacWhinney’s ‘Competition Model’) to the construction-based approaches represented, for example, by Elena Lieven or Michael Tomasello (see Karmiloff and Karmiloff-Smith, 2001 for a comprehensive review).
What clearly separates these theories is the level of significance they ascribe to environment and social interaction in the process of grammar acquisition. Based on this distinction, we will enter the discussion at the level of the *sociopragmatic approaches* which suggest that children ‘infer’ grammatical forms such as agentivity by projecting them onto interpersonal interactions they witness. Although such conceptualisation of language learning acknowledges the crucial role of social context, these theories do not provide an account of specific mechanisms through which children in many diverse social and linguistic environments master numerous grammatical structures (Karmiloff & Karmiloff-Smith, 2001, p. 119).

We need to turn to the *processing accounts* of grammatical learning to obtain a more specific model. One of the most important characteristics of Slobin’s (1996/1985) concept of ‘basic child grammar’ is that it leads away from theories based on adult grammatical use in order to account for children’s interpretation of grammatical systems (Karmiloff & Karmiloff-Smith, 2001). One of the specific linguistic structures examined by Slobin is that of word order. Here he proposes prototypical representations of everyday scenes onto which sentences are mapped. In this respect, the perspective that the speaker adopts in relation to the events described, determines the word order. As languages do not share the same options in emphasising certain aspects of reality through word order, this mechanism leads to cross-linguistic differences. In addition, Slobin describes two main types of linguistic operating principles which deal with perceptual focus and storage of important grammatical structures, and which can be divided into numerous other principles. All of these principles are language specific and as such capture the distinct tasks that children face in learning to represent the world through the grammatical means provided by their native language. They operate alongside general cognitive processes.

The focus on specific examples and concrete structures, as opposed to abstract rules, differentiates the *construction-based model* from the processing approach (Karmiloff and Karmiloff-Smith, 2001). It also provides the most
direct contrast to the view that grammar may be innately encoded. The construction-based model proposes that children are equipped with general 'sociocognitive' (as well as language-specific) processes which enable them to efficiently and gradually convert the very specific and concrete examples of linguistic and non-linguistic input into an abstracted representation of grammar. The emphasis of this model is on children's knowledge of specific grammatical structures and items of vocabulary. Moreover, they are believed to learn full syntactic constructions as 'linguistic gestalts' rather than learning how to grammatically combine individual words in order to produce utterances. Such structures are then stored and used as models for generating own sentences (pp. 139-140). The progress from concrete to abstract is described as very gradual, supported by every new structure that the child encounters.

Within the same framework Michael Tomasello argues for an 'item-based' language acquisition which could be expressed with the aid of a 'usage-based model' (2000, p. 156). He writes:

"...children imitatively learn concrete linguistic expressions from the language they hear around them, and then – using their general cognitive and social-cognitive skills – categorize, schematize and creatively combine these individually learned expressions and structures to reach adult linguistic competence" (Tomasello, 2000, p. 156).

More specifically, Tomasello proposes the 'Verb Island' hypothesis according to which each of the verbs that young children learn creates its own "island of organization in an otherwise unorganized language system" (2000, p.157). This account deals with children's grammar in terms of thought processes and communicative purposes involved rather than attempting to describe it in relation to adult use of grammatical forms. It highlights the importance of 'cultural learning' through imitation-i.e., the child does not attempt to copy the form of the utterance alone, he/she also tries to replicate its discursive function- without underestimating the level of creativity with which children
use the concrete as well as abstract linguistic constructs (pp. 161-162). As Tomasello notes, evidence exists to identify this process as universal.

4.2 Linguistic Evolution

In an astounding re-conceptualisation of a tedious debate, Deacon argued that instead of following Chomsky’s lead in searching for the answers to language acquisition in the brain of the speakers, researchers should turn to language itself and examine the following clues. Much of syntactic and grammatical rules are acquired by children through ‘trial-and-error learning’. The proportion of correct selections, however, dramatically overshadows the number of wrong choices. Based on this and other observations, Deacon proposes the view that languages have evolved to accommodate their speakers. In other words, “children’s minds need not innately embody language structures, if languages embody the predispositions of children’s minds!” (1997, p. 109). Languages have to constantly adjust to the abilities and communicative needs of their child speakers, as it is through them that they are ‘reproduced’ and passed onto the next generations. The evolution of any language, Deacon argues, is a thousand times faster than the biological evolution of the brain. As such, languages need to be studied within the metaphorical context of a socio-cultural evolution of an organism.

As opposed to proclaiming the relationship between humans and the newly constructed language organism to be parasitic, Deacon suggests a more symbiotic concept since “modern humans need the language parasite in order to flourish and reproduce, just as much as it needs humans to reproduce” (1997, pp. 112-113).

This theory offers a complementary view for the linguistic relativity polemic presented here. Language cannot exist outside its social relevance, nor can it survive without its biological hosts. Languages of distant communities evolving from the same form will gradually produce dramatic lexical as well as structural differences, until they eventually become ‘reproductively
incompatible’. On a physical level, this conceptual divide will result in separate localisations within the neurons of bilingual speakers. This has been demonstrated in the cases of stroke or electrical stimulation of specific neurons in the brains of bilingual speakers which affected only one of the languages. Deacon argues that such physiological separation exists to avoid interference which would occur between the two linguistic systems if they occupied the same neural networks. Therefore instead of viewing common grammatical universals as “frozen evolutionary accidents” residing in the brain, Deacon conceives of them as developing independently in each language, due to “universal biases in the selection processes affecting language transmission” (pp. 114-116).

4.3 Linguistic Magnetic Field

If only the ‘fittest’ language structures survive, to continue with Deacon’s metaphor, is their struggle limited to competing for the closest biological fit to the brain of the human child? In other words, is the biological predisposition of the human brain to language acquisition really void of any social and cultural context? Recent evidence suggests that social climate, as well as linguistic and conversational practices, can alter the neurological patterns of the brain.

Kuhl, Tsao, Liu, Zhang and de Boer (2001) describe three learning strategies recently and unexpectedly identified in infants as a result of exposure to a specific language – ‘pattern perception’, ‘statistical learning’ and a “‘warping’ of perception’ (p. 137-138). Children at the end of their first year of life therefore possess a vast amount of information about their native language. For example, very young infants detect not only phonetic patterns but also more general prosodic patterns of the language spoken around them before and after birth. They also exhibit the ability to consider the ‘statistical properties’ of what is fast becoming their native language in order to identify potential words. The proposed way in which languages warp infants’ perception deserves to be discussed in more detail.
Patricia Kuhl suggests that young children develop ‘mental maps’, which are set in place through the exposure to a particular language, are culture-specific and, once established, are very difficult to reverse. Such mental and ‘perceptual’ maps serve as a model of the transfer of language- and culture-specific information, which together form a ‘perceptual filter’. It is through this filter that the world is perceived by the members of the same community (1998, pp. 297-298).

More specifically, Kuhl argues that the perception of language sounds is not consistent across cultures. It does not represent the stimulus as occurring in the outside world but instead it reflects the way the mind conceives of it. Even though speakers have no difficulties in differentiating phonetic sounds in their own language, they struggle at the same level with unfamiliar language systems. Kuhl’s examples include the difficulties Japanese speakers have in differentiating between r and l (Miyawaki et al.) or American speakers’ difficulties with the Spanish sounds of b and p (Abramson & Lisker in Kuhl, 1998).

Similar alterations of the capacity to discriminate between sounds take place very early in life. Infants during their first months can be seen as ‘citizens of the world’ as they show the ability to differentiate between the phonetic sounds across all languages. By the age of one year, however, this ability is lost, giving way to a newfound ‘language-specific’ knowledge (Kuhl, 1998, p. 299). The ‘neural commitment’ to the structure of a particular language alters our abilities to learn other languages once the mapping has been completed (Kuhl et al., 2001, p. 161). This notion is consistent with neurological evidence which shows that adults who learned a second language later in life utilise separate regions of their brain to speak each of the two languages, while bilinguals processing the two languages they learned simultaneously in their childhood, activate overlapping regions of their brain (Hämaläinen, Hari, Ilmoniemi, et al., 1993 in Kuhl, et al. 2001, p. 164).
The representational models stored in the infant’s memory include not only the ‘auditory’ and ‘visual speech’ the child witnesses but also the ‘motor’ activities associated with language (i.e., the movements of the face), which the infant observes and attempts to copy (p. 300). This mechanism has been described by Kuhl as the ‘Native Language Magnet Theory’, which transforms young children from the position of ‘universal language listeners and speakers’, producing universal cooing sounds to specific language users. Due to ‘magnet effects’ (i.e., similar sounds are drawn towards the prototype of their category), certain differences in sound perception are reduced while others are enhanced, resulting in the shift in the original perimeters of the perceptual space. The perceptual space is therefore reorganised in order to accommodate the language specific ‘magnet placement’ (p. 312).

The level of detail captured by this model, coupled with the empirical evidence, provides a compelling argument for what appears to be early physical coding of linguistic relativity. An obvious example that comes to mind of the diverse ways in which languages carve the ‘phonological world’ is the interpretation of animal sounds and other onomatopoeic words that adult speakers ‘impose’ on children. For instance, it would appear that while the barking of dogs in English speaking countries could be transcribed as ‘woof woof’, Czech dogs’ barks sound more like ‘haf haf’. Similarly, to Czech speakers cows ‘bů’ and sheep ‘bé’, while the same animals sound to English speakers as producing ‘moo’ and ‘baa’ phonological units. In Czech the use of double ‘o’ is illegal, also ‘w’ is pronounced as ‘v’, as in ‘very’. This makes it impossible (improbable at the least) for dogs to make a ‘woofing’ sound.

Cross-linguistic examples from the onomatopoeic domain are numerous. To attract the attention of a cat, for instances, a Czech speaker would make a ‘čiči’ sound. It may be difficult for English speakers to imagine why this particular sound would appeal to any cat, unless it was trained to respond to it. The point I am trying to make is that linguistic projection of specific phonological systems on speakers’ representation of sounds in the outside
world could be interpreted as yet another level at which our understanding of the world diverts from that of speakers of other languages.

As Kuhl et al. (2001) suggest, linguistically based observations can be interpreted in a wider cultural context, such as the communicative purpose of motherese. Recent evidence shows that exaggerated acoustic differences characteristic of infant-directed speech lead to easier differentiation between words, providing the infants with the ‘critical acoustic parameters’ and ‘prototypical phonetic units’ of their native language. On the side of the adult speaker, motherese represent an unconscious adaptation of their speech to the needs of the listener (pp. 154-155).

4.4 Summary

Quite obviously, the conception of the language-thought relationship advocated here contrasts sharply with the ‘nativist model’ (Chomsky, e.g., 1969; Fodor), which places the ability to acquire language in a neurological domain, not only separate from other cognitive functions but also independent of any social context (MacWhinney, 1998).

Children embark on their linguistic journey from a ‘pre-grammatical’ and ‘structure-independent’ starting point (Berman, 1993, p. 257). The development towards restriction which follows takes place on phonological (from cooing to language specific sounds), syntactic (e.g., ‘question formation’ from changes in intonation to grammatically structured queries) as well as lexical (‘word-formation’, e.g., ‘innovation’) levels (pp. 257-258).

A unique view of the evolution of linguistic forms in synchrony with language acquisition trends has been discussed in this section. Neurological and

---

11 It should be noted, however, that such language socialisation practices are far from being universal (see e.g., Ochs and Schieffelin, 1995 for a review of this topic).

12 In the context of cross-linguistic differences Chomsky speaks of innate ‘parameters’ (e.g., the ‘null-subject’ parameter) the setting of which differentiates one language from another (e.g., subjects of sentences do/do not have to be marked). Through exposure to a particular language, a child will learn to set the parameters in correspondence with the appropriate linguistic structures (in Karmiloff and Karmiloff-Smith, 2001, pp. 107-108).
Experimental evidence which suggests that children are at an early age 'programmed' by their exposure to sounds of a specific language to develop a limited range of focus has also been presented. To once again borrow Deacon's metaphor of language as a parasite, these two models could be linked together in terms of a particular language 'organism' invading the child host at the earliest opportunity to adapt its linguistic predisposition to own specific characteristics. Although probably slightly too colourful in this form, similar conceptions of the relationship between the mind and language move us another step closer to the claim that people's experience of the world bears the marks of their native language.
Child Psychologists?

5.1 Theory of Mind Research
5.1.1 Theory of Mind across Cultures
5.1.2 The Role of Language in the Development of Theory of Mind
5.1.3 Advanced Theory of Mind
5.1.4 Theory of Mind and Emotion Knowledge
5.2 Summary

5.1 Theory of Mind Research

The concept of 'Theory of Mind' captures the developing ability “to attribute mental states, such as beliefs, desires and intentions, to oneself and other people” (Hale & Tager-Flusberg, 2000, p. 391). Although this capacity to understand and anticipate behaviour begins to develop in infancy (see, for example, Astington and Gopnik, 1991), the age of four is typically identified as the point at which the final move towards a 'representational' understanding of the mind takes place (p. 391). The mind is no longer seen as an exact reflection of the outside world. Rather its own contribution to the perception of the world is uncovered. Piaget (1926, 1929) was one of the first to devote extensive attention to children’s development of the conception of the mind (in Butterworth, 1991; or Astington & Gopnik, 1991). At present, this area attracts a growing number of researchers.

Although generally accepted, the theory of the Theory of Mind has been criticised by some (e.g., Hobson, 1991), who propose that children’s knowledge of the human mind is acquired through “experience of affectively charged interpersonal relations” (p. 44) and does not show any characteristics of a ‘theory’ as such. Others maintain that similar knowledge includes “causal-explanatory understanding of how the world informs the mind and

13 Wimmer and Perner conducted one of the first studies into this topic in 1983. The ‘false belief’ experimental design was based on Premack and Woodruff’s (1978) claim that chimpanzee has a ‘theory of mind’, i.e., can anticipate human behaviour due to the ability to ‘attribute mental states’ (in Astington & Jenkins, 1995).
mind guides behaviour", therefore structurally very much resembling a theory (e.g., Gopnik & Wellman, 1991, p. 66).

As cognitive development itself does not constitute the main focus of this study, I will not take a stance on this issue. Instead the link between conceptual abilities and their linguistic expression will be highlighted, based on, for example, Tomasello’s (2000) suggestion of the gradual progression from concrete examples to more abstract constructions and their creative combined use throughout linguistic development. The term ‘Theory of Mind’ will be used here as a useful reference to the children’s ability to relate to the thoughts and feelings of others. In this context, the concept is briefly reviewed below.

One of the earliest and most frequently used methods for testing children’s understanding of the mind is the ‘false belief task’ originally designed by Wimmer & Perner in 1983. Commonly, 3-year-olds continue to fail this task, while most 4-year-olds succeed at it. This pattern has been attributed to the fact that 3-year-olds simply do not understand how others can believe something that the child knows is not true. The fascinating revelation, however, is that such understanding does not merely reflect the general acquisition pattern which emerges at the age of four. Instead, every individual child develops this ability at around the same age (Astington & Gopnik, 1991). In addition, this developmental trend appears to be universal.

5.1.1 Theory of Mind across Cultures

Many studies of this type conducted with children from Western societies repeatedly show that by the age of five, children demonstrate the ability to adopt the perspective of another person, while many 3-year-olds still struggle with this concept (Harris, 1995). By studying children of the pygmy Baka people, Avis and Harris (1991) showed this developmental trend to be worldwide, extending to children in a ‘preliterate’ culture, and therefore not linked to the Western life style, education or language systems. Such findings point
to an inner predisposition to the ability to relate to the point of view of others which can be disrupted as is the case with autistic children (Harris, 1995).

As Harris notes, the effects of cultural influences on the acceleration of this capacity are not yet known. We could perhaps speculate that cultural differences in this development, which reflect a particular linguistic, social and cultural context (as suggested by e.g., Bruner, 1990), are once again likely to appear through investigations of subtle and more specific issues.

It has been argued in this context that current Theory of Mind research neglects one important dimension (Karasawa, 1995). The Western view of emotions and cognition locates thoughts and feelings inside individual minds. This, however, is not a concept shared by all cultures. For example, in Japan, feelings are perceived as a general ‘atmosphere’ evoked by a specific social situation (Kimua in Karasawa, 1995, p. 393). This belief is also coded linguistically, as the Japanese word referring to ‘mood’, kibun, marks one’s portion (bun) of this common atmosphere (ki). Driven by such notions, the appropriate Theory of Mind would therefore deal with a more ‘interpersonal’ and ‘intersubjective’ perspective, as captured by the concern with the social communication and involvement of multiple minds (p. 393).

5.1.2 The Role of Language in the Development of Theory of Mind

Gopnik and Meltzoff (in Karmiloff & Karmiloff-Smith, 2001, pp. 99-100) argued that children only verbalise events, such as ‘recurrence’ (expressed through the pivot ‘more’) or ‘disappearance’ (expressed through the pivot ‘gone’), once they have cognitively mastered the concept. However, as we will see, this relationship can also be reversed.

There can be no doubt that the dramatic cognitive developments associated with the onset of Theory of Mind are closely related to language acquisition. This statement finds support in studies conducted by Happé (1995), Astington
and Jenkins (1999) and numerous others (reviewed in Hale & Tager-Flusberg, 2000).

The most compelling evidence of the correlation between linguistic abilities and Theory of Mind skills is based on *sentential complements* which have been shown as crucial for the child’s ability to arrive at a representational understanding of the mind (Hale and Tager-Flusberg, 2000). More specifically, de Villier (2000) suggests that sentential complements linked to verbs of communication and verbs of mental states enable the verbalisation of the disparities between the inner interpretation of events and the events themselves. In other words, the syntactic representation of sentential complements, as well as their semantic implications, provide a legal expression of untruthful statements. In this context, the linguistic mastery of complements was found to predict performance on Theory of Mind tests, but not vice versa.

As Hale and Tager-Flusberg (2000, p. 397) put it, “...language does not simply reflect or communicate our thinking of others’ beliefs, desires and intentions but rather the structural knowledge of specific language constructions actually fosters the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others”.

### 5.1.3 Advanced Theory of Mind

Most of the Theory of Mind research deals with what has been termed ‘first-order’ tasks (e.g., “Sally thinks it is x, when really it is y”), or ‘second-order’ false belief tasks (e.g., “Sally thinks Mary thinks x, but both Sally and Mary are wrong”), as described by Baron-Cohen, O’Riordan, Stone, Jones & Plaisted (1999, p. 407). It has been established that while 4-year-olds are capable of correctly answering first-order false belief tasks, it is not until the age of six that children succeed at the second-order false belief task (e.g., Perner & Wimmer or Tager-Flusberg, reviewed in Baron-Cohen et al., 1999). It is likely, however, that the development in understanding own mind as well
as minds of others does not end at the age of six. Advanced Theory of Mind tests have therefore been developed to test older groups (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999).

For example, in order to further explore the cognitive deficits of high-functioning autistic individuals, Francesca Happé (1994) has created the ‘Strange Stories’ test, aimed at investigating the understanding of concepts such as sarcasm, lie, double bluff and others. 14 Baron-Cohen et al. (1999) have constructed another test which assesses the ability to identify faux pas in 9- to 11-year-olds. By applying this measure, Baron-Cohen et al. revealed that this ability, although common in a group of normally functioning children, was impaired in their Asperger Syndrome and High-functioning autism group. Other studies targeted, for example, 5- to 7-year-olds’ ability to distinguish between the mental states behind irony as opposed to a white lie (Winner & Leekam, 1991).

Children’s understanding of the mind is very closely connected to their comprehension of emotional states and their expression, which in turn forms part of the growing social competence (Dunn, 1995a). For instance, 3-year-olds’ anticipation of possible false belief has been shown as related to a set of ‘intentionally’ based social competence items focused on the understanding of the mental states of others, while it was not linked to another set of unrelated items (Lalonde & Chandler, 1995). The authors of this study also uncovered a possible causal relationship between the children’s ‘social expectations’ fulfilled by others, the availability of linguistic tools to capture them, and the children’s early conception of the mental states of those around them (p. 183). Dunn (1995b, p.187) has shown emotion awareness at 40 months to be predictive of positive social experiences, understanding of multiple emotions and ‘moral sensibility’ in pre-school. An early understanding of the thoughts of others, however, was linked to negative early evaluation of school and ‘sensitivity’ to criticism by teachers (p. 187). Similarly, Astington & Jenkins

14 See Happé (1994, 1997) for a review of her theory postulating that a ‘deficit in central coherence’ constitutes a more characteristic feature of autism than the failure to ascribe mental states to others (1994, p. 146).
(1995) linked the ability to relate to the minds of others, found in 3- to 5-year-olds, to their willingness to share roles during play, while their emotional understanding (measured by empathy peer assessment) was unrelated. Such findings clearly point to the important distinction between purely cognitive and emotive aspects of Theory of Mind understanding in children.

5.1.4 Theory of Mind and Emotion Knowledge

Research into emotional development has uncovered the possibility that young children may not be able to differentiate between inner feelings and their external manifestations or expressions. Wellman (1995) describes such 'situationist' (p. 290) emotion knowledge in terms of specific events (e.g., getting presents) resulting in appropriate emotions (feeling happy). Similarly conceptualised emotions lack the dimension of subjectivity until they are replaced by 'mentalistic' (p. 291) understanding at the age of five or six, when the distinction between an actual emotion and its physical manifestation is drawn.

Moreover, 6-year-olds generally understand that they are capable of changing their own feelings by avoiding or adjusting the situation. Their coping strategies in this respect, however, are still quite limited and mostly rely on 'cognitive avoidance' of the event in question. Children who have reached the age of ten have a much broader range of coping strategies, as they are capable of evaluating the situation from a different perspective (Terwogt & Stegge, 1995).

As I will show in detail in later chapters, the relevant theories of emotional development are informed by the influence of culture and socialisation. Many (e.g. Bruner, 1990; Vygotsky, 1978) argue for the existence of a 'special social-cognitive' capacity, which enables the creation of implements such as science, language or mathematics, as well as culture-specific 'systems of meaning and interpretation' (Wellman, 1995, p. 390). As such, each culture is
thought to have developed its own specific understanding of human emotions, which may show considerable variations across the board.

This is where Wellman (1995) situates his radical hypothesis, which suggests that the emotion knowledge of young children is perhaps much more similar across cultures and languages than the concepts of emotions held by adults. It is with systematic exposure to particular social practices that these early similarities in the knowledge about mind begin to take a more 'ethnocentric' form. The manifestations of distinctions in such conceptualisations, encoded in language through lexical as well as structural means, may also be seen as not available to the understanding of young children.

5.2 Summary

It would seem at this point, that the theorising unravelling here may have come a full circle, from the language and culture specific to universal, from socially constructed to biological and back. The development of emotional and interpersonal knowledge in children constitutes yet another element of human psychological reality, shaped by all of the wider areas listed above. The final topic that remains to be discussed, perhaps holds the potential to bring all of these perspectives together, so that they form a balanced background to the current study.
The Narrativised World

6.1 Grammaticised Focus
6.2 Development of Narrative Abilities
6.3 Picture Story Narratives
6.4 Narratives and Emotions
6.5 Summary

Narratives not only reflect the culture to which they refer, they also help to create it (Freeman, 1997). Moreover, it is through narratives that particular moments in history are captured and communicated to others in a different time or space, while those future others introduce their own ‘historically constituted prejudice’ to the interpretation of the narrativised events (Gadamer in Freeman, 1997, p. 174). This is possible because folk psychology (i.e., culturally motivated mental organisation of the world) does not structure knowledge and experience around concepts, instead it deals with them in the form of narratives. Such organisation is apparent from an early age when children begin to express an interest in others, as part of which they attempt to describe the actions of those around them (Bruner, 1990).

This interest therefore forms the first step towards a narrative structure of experience. The tendency to include what is captivating and unusual, and leave out the rest, constitutes the second necessary achievement, followed by perspective taking and the mastery of temporal grammatical structures. Bruner suggests that it is the human drive towards the narrative structuring of experience that singles out specific linguistic systems as crucial in terms of early language acquisition.

The ability to relay our personal and emotional experiences to others, described by Rimé as ‘referential communication’, allows us not only to evaluate and analyse our emotions, but also to re-experience them through sharing them with other members of the community (1995, p. 475). In the process of being made available to others, individual experiences become a part of the ‘collective social knowledge’. As Rimé speculates, if this
mechanism operated systematically and consistently, the emotion experience available to every member of the group would be enormous. Rime's study suggests that to a limited extent this may be the case, as it showed that people who experience both positive and negative emotions tend to engage in 'social sharing behaviour', which in turn leads to a more comprehensive collective social knowledge (p. 475).

Once again, the question of the role of language and discourse in this process claims a prominent position, as the particular structure of the verbalised experiences is likely to have an impact on the nature of such collective knowledge. In other words, the language through which emotionally charged events are narrated is seen here as having a dramatic influence on the emotion concepts that are generated on a broad, socially reflexive scale.

6.1 Grammaticised Focus

In relation to shared narratives, the investigation of grammatical structures can be placed within the relevant context of the interplay between the speaker's intended message, and the listener's interpretation of it (Bamberg, 1991a). Bamberg, Budwig & Kaplan (e.g., 1991), Berman and Slobin (1994), as well as Slobin (e.g., 1990) have engaged in much research exploring specific issues of children's narrative abilities in a cross-linguistic context.

As a theoretical framework for their studies of picture book narratives, Berman & Slobin (1994) modified the linguistic relativity theory, limiting its application to the cognitive activity involved in the 'construction of the linguistic message' (p. 612). As part of this model, they have described what has been termed 'grammatically-induced channelling of attention' (p. 619). Specifically it is suggested that "a rich repertoire of grammaticized notions leads the child to explore the corresponding semantic/pragmatic domain" (p. 620).
Paradoxically, Berman and Slobin arrived at one of the most significant findings reported here, having hypothesised that the opposite would be the case. The differences in the narratives of five language groups (produced in response to an identical picture story) occurred contrary to Berman’s and Slobin’s expectation that all of the children would attempt to convey the same ‘semantic notions’ regardless of the grammatical forms available to them in their native language. To their surprise, the majority of the speakers of each of the five languages had closely followed the grammatical markings of their native language. For example, it was expected that the German- and Hebrew-speaking children would ‘compensate’ for the aspectual distinctions not encoded in their languages, perhaps with the help of lexical means. However, no such compensations were found (Berman & Slobin, 1994, p. 641).

“Where a language lacks a grammatical device for marking a certain distinction, such as durativity or locative path, speakers can talk about these notions, but typically choose not to. We found almost no evidence for the mechanism of compensation — seeking to express a distinction which may be readily available in the grammar of some other language(s), but which would require some form of circumlocution in one’s native tongue.” (Berman, 1993, p. 252, original emphasis)

I will now explore this theory of ‘grammaticised focus’ in more detail, with reference to a variety of narrative-related topics.

**6.2 Development of Narrative Abilities**

Becoming a speaker (or indeed a narrator) of any particular language involves knowledge of what to include and what to leave out from the communication with the listener, taking into account his or her inference abilities. This is a very complex process, which continues to develop well into a speaker’s teenage years (Berman & Slobin, 1994).

Slobin (1990) found that the narratives of children as young as three show clearly identifiable distinctions in the grammatical structures (tense and aspect forms) specific to their native language. In addition, 3-year-olds already fully
follow the most readily accessible grammatical forms of their language, which
direct them to a particular way of verbally structuring their experience. They
do not show any tendencies towards simplification of existing complex
linguistic structures nor do they attempt to complicate the simple ones.
Instead they shape the form of the narrative in accordance with the available
grammatical mechanisms (Slobin, 1994). Moreover, structures, which are
relatively easy to use and which are perceived by the speakers as highly
expressive of a particular purpose within the language, may develop at a
higher rate to facilitate a particular narrative function (Berman, 1993; Berman
& Slobin, 1994). This is another argument for a functional approach to
language acquisition, where the interaction between specific language forms
and their purpose within the discourse is seen as crucial.

The most important aspect of the process of linguistic communication, as
defined by Berman and Slobin, is familiarity with all available ‘linguistic’ as
well as ‘rhetorical’ means of language. This knowledge has to be utilised
through the simultaneous employment of all of these systems, while
monitoring the listener’s ‘current state of knowledge’ and the past and present
information flow, as well as planning the future discourse. The structure of
the narrative as such is therefore based on the ‘theory of the listener’ (p. 609).
Exaggerated use of specific forms or the non-inclusion of relevant
information, which can be found in young speakers, suggest that the
‘representation of the listener’ is not fully in place (p. 609).

6.3 Picture Story Narratives

Although occasionally criticised for the lack of authenticity of the discourse it
generates, the elicitation technique of picture story narratives provides a
unique opportunity for high levels of comparability of cross-linguistic data.
However, that is not the only advantage accruing to this method, as it can also
be applied to investigations of grammatical structures involved in perspective
taking.
As Bamberg & Reilly found, picture stories led the narrators in their studies towards a “somewhat involved third-person perspective”. None of the narrators chose to present the story from a first person perspective through a grammatical identification with the main character, nor did any of them opt to completely separate themselves as narrators from the inner worlds of the characters they represented. The resulting rise of a unique narrative perspective is best expressed by the following lengthy quote.

“The perspective from which the story and content are organised is through the ‘mind’ of the protagonist. Actually to be more precise, in the process of story formation, children learn how to choose linguistic forms that instruct the recipient to take a similar perspective; and in this process the mind of the third-person character becomes ‘visible’. As a consequence of this process, something like a protagonist is called into existence. Again, these units do not pre-exist outside or prior to the narrative or the interactive situation. Rather, they emerge within the interaction as part of the narrator-audience involvement.” (Bamberg & Reilly, 1996, p. 337, original emphasis)

6.4 Narratives and Emotions

Research suggests that references to emotions made within a narrative structure may potentially play an important role in the organisation of the narrative. Broadly speaking, younger children (around the age of four) use emotional terms to navigate along one situation taking place from the perspective of one character. At the age of nine, “children begin to tie together emotions, motivations, and story events from a more global perspective, orienting their listeners more clearly to the narrative whole” (Bamberg, 1997a, p. 314).

Young narrators (3- to 6-years of age) in their early phase of narrative ability approach the story as a unit. Their linguistic abilities, however, let them down and the individual scenes of the narrative are typically disjointed, while ‘paralinguistic affective expressions’ are used to compensate for this lack of
cohesion. Emotion references appear very frequently within this age group. It is not until the age of about six that first evaluative stances in respect of emotional and mental states occur, although at this stage, such references do not represent the narrator’s viewpoint for the story in its entirety. Instead such comments are localised to the effects of a particular event on the character’s inner state. As a result, a narrator of this age is not driven by the quality of the story in its full form. Rather the characters’ perception of the events, and their behaviour resulting from their evaluation of them form the focal point. It is at the final stage of narrative development that mental and emotional states are assessed from a more ‘global’ point of view, as well as being integrated into a coherent story line (Bamberg and Reilly, 1996, pp. 333-335; Bamberg, 1994).

Bamberg (1991b, 1994, 1997a) shares the following observations which are based on children’s picture story narratives. In his view, the strategy of ascribing emotions to the characters in the story had two aims in respect to the listener. As well as interrupting the story line with the narrators’ evaluation of the described situation, references to emotional states also helped to ensure the smoothness of the narrative by joining individual sequences together. As such, Bamberg argues, instances of descriptions of inner states organise, link together and justify the events within the narrative, so informing the listener about the perspective of the speaker.

In addition, some references to emotional states (e.g., ‘surprise’ or ‘scare’) proved to signal a particular viewpoint which the narrator imposes on the listener. In this context, references to inner states can be seen as “rhetorical devices that orient an audience toward a perspective from which characters are orchestrated in relationship to one another” (Bamberg and Reilly, 1996, pp. 314-315). Berman and Slobin’s (e.g., 1994) studies also view the linguistic organisation of the narrative components at various levels as leading to a particular point of view from which the events are portrayed to the listener, including the ‘foreground and background’ structuring (p. 7).
Although highly relevant to the current debate, it is important to keep in mind that the above studies did not aim at eliciting emotion narratives as such. As well as the pictorial material not reflecting the topic of emotions, no conceptual or thematically based analysis focusing on the children's understanding and representation of emotions was conducted. Any attempts to derive linguistic or other information about the children's conceptualisation of mental states would therefore be unjustified.

6.5 Summary

The present study will follow Bruner and Feldman (1996) in using the narrative technique not to examine how narratives are produced or structured, but rather to see what can they reveal about the speakers' conceptions of the world they inhabit. In addition, specific grammatical systems employed within the narratives will be investigated, as they are believed to be partially constitutive of such conceptualisation.

The grammatical coding of subjectivity in two languages will be examined in terms of creating a particular focus for accounts of socially constructed emotions. For this purpose, thematically relevant picture stories were designed with the view of eliciting children's discourse on the topic of guilt, shame and empathy.
Czech Language and Society

"Cizí jazyk nenabízí pouze jiná slova, ale jiný svět!" (J. Vrba in Plachetka, 1999, p. 125)
"Foreign language does not only offer different words but also a different world!"

Czech language creates together with Slovak, Polish and Serbian the western group of Slavic languages. It is also related to the east Slavic group, which consists of Ukrainian, Belorussian and Russian, as well as to the southern Slavic group including Bulgarian, Macedonian, Slovene, southern Serbian and Croatian. As such, Czech belongs to the eastern group of Indo-European languages.

During the period between the 9th and the 16th century, the structures of the language became independent of some of the features common to Slavic languages, as well as gaining additional declensions, and highlighting the use of verbal aspect. Some of the Czech linguistic structures point to the influence of Latin and more recently to that of German, which during the Habsburg Empire led to a temporary stagnation of the use of Czech for literary and other formal purposes (Holub & Lyer, 1968, pp. 7-14). Czech marks grammatical case, number and person for nouns and distinguishes between perfective and imperfective verbal aspect.

The second half of the 20th century brought many dramatic changes to the Czech society, the last of which was the 'Velvet revolution' in November 1989. This event marked the end of the socialist system and was soon followed by the split of the country into two – the Czech and the Slovak Republics. The introduction of the market economy, as well as the new political and social systems, meant many profound changes in the everyday lives of the Czechs.
It is relevant to mention here that the Czech children participating in this study were born in the early stages of this transformation and have been shaped by the culture of a society which is in the process of re-inventing itself, not only in a political and socio-economic, but also in a personal sense.
Outline of Present Research

8.1 Summary of Research Aims

“Cultural psychology is an interpretative discipline. Its strategies are hermeneutical rather than causal or correlational.” (Bruner, 2000, p. 205, original emphasis)

In its most general outline, this study deals with the expression of socially motivated emotions of empathy, shame and guilt by Czech and Irish primary school children. Children’s discourse on this topic, generated with the help of picture story narratives, provided the material for cross-linguistically and cross-culturally motivated analysis. The main aim is to describe the role that particular structures within each of the two languages play in the children’s conception of specific socially reflexive emotions. This is attempted through observations made at a grammatical and subsequently semantic and thematic level of examination.

What I hope to achieve are two culturally and linguistically independent accounts, each at the point of fusion of three dimensions at which the notion of interpersonal self is constructed. The first dimension refers to the grammatical representation of others co-created through reflexive linguistic structures. Such structures are rigidly embedded within the language through historical and cultural forces and as such represent the ‘hardware’ of the speakers’ linguistic expression. The way in which the speakers chose to employ such tools defines the next intermediate dimension. This level is represented by, what I have and will refer to as, ‘subjectivity’, i.e., emotionally loaded grammaticised expression of a viewpoint. It is the level of formation of a particular perspective, with the aid of self-referent structures and lexical items representing an empathic understanding of an emotionally charged context. The final dimension epitomises the demonstration of

---

15 By ‘interpersonal’ I mean the conception of personal Self in relation to the Selves of others.
cognitive and social skills necessary for relating to the thoughts and feelings of others. None of these dimensions are seen as independent of cultural forces and it is this belief that allows the culture-specific 'amalgamates' to be compared and contrasted against each other.

At the highest level of detail, the grammatical analysis focuses on a particular linguistic form, which although present in both languages, is employed by each of the two linguistic systems with great variations in its function as well as degrees of frequency. More specifically, it is the role of self-referent or reflexive structures in the expression of speaker and non-speaker subjectivity, and the resulting viewpoint that are investigated and compared.

While reflexive forms take the shape of personal pronouns in English (as they do in Czech), Czech expresses reflexivity most frequently through verbal structures. Moreover, reflexive verbs constitute one of the most commonly used features of the language. It is this marked difference in the grammatical systems of the two languages that motivated me to speculate in terms of possible effects of such linguistic forms and the frequency of their use on the speakers' perception and expression of subjectivity. My prediction in this respect centres around the idea that grammatically coded means of frequent reference to the 'multipersonal' Self could be seen as signalling the tendency towards an enhancement in the expression of not only speaker, but more importantly non-speaker subjectivity, as well as empathically based emotions. In other words, I hypothesise that through reflexive grammatical structures, the language creates a subjective focus which can be detected in the speakers' conceptualisation of emotion concepts. Of course it is not merely the existence of such structures but the high levels of its utilisation by the speakers that could potentially create such reflexive 'focal effect'. Based on this assumption, the discourse of the Czech speakers in this sample could be expected to reflect this grammatically conceived point of convergence on a lexical, semantic and conceptual level.
It is from this point that the investigation is brought to the level of semantic and lexical analysis, which is further grounded in the context of the two distinct cultures and societies. I explore the grammatical structures specifically involved in emotion discourse, i.e., the significance of the verb ‘to feel’ and the form of related expressions in both languages. The analysis of emotion lexicon, relevant themes and metaphorical expressions arising from the two groups of emotion narratives constitutes the main topic of this part of the study. In addition, the data from the narrativised stories is also supplemented by the children’s definitions and accounts of own emotional experiences.

In keeping with the theoretical backbone outlined above, this study continues to strive towards a wider perspective. The emotion concepts of the two language groups are therefore contrasted on a series of hierarchically organised levels of analysis, ranging from the grammatically coded focus to lexical and thematic expressions of socially reflexive emotion knowledge. The intended goal is a cross-cultural picture of a particular moment in the development of some aspects of empathic understanding of others, composed of all the relevant pieces of information. Rather than making dramatic claims, I aim to conduct an investigation of potential differences in the developing conceptions of social emotions in two cultures, which although geographically not too far apart, equip their children with distinct ways of perceiving the world around them. While these differences are mostly the product of historical, political and social forces, they also include one of the most crucial components of human identity – the language that we speak.

The dearth of comparative studies dealing with any aspects of Czech and Irish culture or the languages spoken in the two countries reinforces my belief that this study has the potential of a unique cross-linguistic and cross-cultural observational account of the diverse conceptions of interpersonal cognition, as reflected in the languages of two European societies.
8.1 Summary of Research Aims

- To compare and contrast picture story narratives of Czech and Irish children, with a particular focus on their accounts of socially reflexive emotions of guilt, shame and empathy.

- On a grammatical level, to examine the role that self-referent structures in Czech and in English play in the construction of subjective focus, with respect to the emotions mentioned above.

- On lexical, semantic and thematic levels, to put together a picture of the Czech and Irish children’s conceptions of empathy, guilt and shame, while examining their definitions and personal experiences of those emotions.

- Overall, to achieve a culturally and socially grounded perspective, composed of several levels of analysis brought together to create a descriptive cross-linguistic account of expression and conceptualisation of social emotions in children.
The Present Study: A Cross-cultural and Cross-linguistic Investigation of Irish and Czech Children’s Accounts of Socially-constructed Emotions

9.1 Design

The observations presented in this study have been derived from cross-cultural and cross-linguistic examination of the conceptions and verbal expressions of specific socially reflexive emotions in Czech and Irish primary school children. The mode of investigation was to elicit narratives which were followed by an informal discourse. The analysis of the wealth of the linguistic data so obtained was conducted on two hierarchically sequenced levels. A detailed grammatical analysis of self-referent structures employed in Czech and English emotion narratives constitutes the basic level of this study which is supported by broader lexical and semantic analysis dealing with specific terms used by the children to talk about guilt, shame, and empathy. The outcome of these analyses is further organised and discussed in terms of emergent themes.

9.2 Participants
Up to the age of five, children have difficulties in producing structured narratives, either spontaneously or in response to most elicitation techniques, including picture stories. A more comprehensive sense of a story line and sequence does not occur in school children until later on in their development (Berman, 1988). By the age of nine, most children can be considered to be ‘proficient native speakers’ (Berman & Slobin, 1994). This study focuses on a group of children, the youngest of which was at the time of testing little over seven. The oldest child in the group of ninety was eleven years old. There were several reasons for selecting this age group, the most important of which are outlined below.

As part of the first layer of the investigation I had hoped to examine the use of the distinct self-referent systems used by speakers who, although competent enough to produce a coherent narrative, may allow me to witness the consolidation of such subjective linguistic expressions, through occasional non-adherence to established grammatical rules. In other words, ideal participants for this study would exhibit two somewhat conflicting characteristics. They would possess the capacity to produce semantically and lexically rich and interesting material using the appropriate grammatical forms. But they would also make grammatical and conceptual errors which this study would be capable of capturing, and which would hopefully provide an insight into the children’s understanding of the subject at hand (i.e., empathic emotions). This idea pervades all levels of the current research. My interest in the semantic and lexical level was in exploring the wider socio-cultural context, as part of which such linguistic forms developed, and the distinctive qualities of the emotion concepts they are used to construct and represent. It was again the sufficient and yet incomplete nature of children’s understanding of emotion terms that was of particular interest here. Based on developmental research it was envisaged that the seven to eleven age group would provide such discursive material.

Another matter for consideration was the fact that Czech children do not start their formal education until the age of 6, although most of them visit pre-
school or kindergarten. The opportunity for social experience leading to the formation of socially generated emotions constituted another important aspect in the selection of the most appropriate age group for this investigation. Quite clearly, attempting to match the two groups on similar culture-specific variables would appear as not only the most futile of notions but also one that directly contradicts the theories and beliefs projected in this study. My intentions in this respect were therefore limited to engaging children who are accustomed to interacting with others and who would in turn produce interesting material based on their social experience.

It had originally been the plan to further sub-divide the groups according to their age, obtaining perhaps two or three divisions within each language group. As the analysis progressed, however, it became apparent that the data did not naturally lend itself to such categorisation. I also began to feel that by doing so I would perhaps allow the developmental aspects of this study to gain an unintended proportion, as the aim was not to document developmental trends across the two populations. Rather the focus was on the language available to, and used by, children of similar age with the purpose of describing particular mental states, the understanding of which has been derived from their cultural background.

All children included in this study were developing normally and had no special educational, physical- or mental health needs.

9.2.1 Irish Cohort

Children from a mixed gender primary school located in a middle-class area of Dublin participated in this study. All of the children in this group are monolingual English speakers, although most of them would have some experience or possess a basic knowledge of other languages, Gaelic in particular.
The group consisted of 45 children (24 boys and 21 girls). At the time of the narrative session, the age of the youngest child was 7;3 and the age of the oldest 9;7. The mean age of this cohort was 8;6. Three of the children had no siblings, 15 had one sibling and 27 of them had two or more siblings.

9.2.2 Czech Cohort

The Czech primary school from which this group was drawn is located in a residential area, near the Prague city center, which has no specific socio-economic status. All of the children are monolingual Czech speakers with limited exposure to other languages.

Seventeen of the 45 children included in this group are boys and 28 of them are girls. The age of the youngest child in the group was at the time of testing 7;3, and the oldest 11;1. Although there was only one child who had reached the age of 11 included in this study, the mean age of the Czech group was slightly higher at 9;3 than that of the Irish group. Seventeen of the children had no siblings, 25 of them had one, and 3 had two or more siblings.

Five additional data sets obtained from other children (3 Irish and 2 Czech) were not included. Two Irish and one Czech child were not available for further testing after the initial session. One other child did not meet the standard set by the Comprehensive Assessment of Language tests and his narrative was therefore left out of the final data corpus. In the course of an informal chat with one of the Czech children it transpired that she was in fact a bilingual Croatian-Czech speaker, who in addition spends prolonged periods of time visiting her father in Croatia. A decision was therefore made not to include her in the study as she had obviously been exposed not only to another language but also to another culture.

---

16 This is an important factor, as Dunn (1998) showed young western children’s interaction with their siblings to be associated with an enhanced understanding of emotions and mental states of others early on in the development. This trend continued into middle-childhood.
9.2.3 Researcher

As any discourse, including the production of narratives, constitutes an interaction between the speaker and the listener, it is perhaps relevant to mention the researcher’s background at this point.

Although I was born and brought up in the Czech Republic, and my native language is Czech, I have spent the last 12 years living in Ireland where I have also obtained third level education. I left Prague age 17 but I maintain a constant contact not only with my family and friends but also with the cultural, political and social development of the country, as well as with the Czech language which I still use on a daily basis. To the best of my knowledge, neither of the two language groups showed any hesitancy or lack of comprehension as a result of my linguistic abilities.

In terms of any inherent bias on my part (presumably towards the Czech way of life, although I am no longer sure), it has become customary within discursive and cultural psychology to acknowledge the researcher’s interpretative role as an inherent part of the design. As Pérez Campos, Ramos and Bernal well formulated, in language and discourse in general, “decontextualisation is itself contextualised” (1999, p. 299). I will not only keep this point in mind during the linguistic analysis of the data but I will also extend this observation to the rest of the investigation and wherever possible an attempt will be made to translate my presumed bias into a supplementary although a somewhat contaminated perspective.

9.3 Materials

9.3.1 Picture Stories

In the process of designing this study, the first task was the choice of a method that could be employed to elicit emotion narratives. In this context, picture
stories are often used to facilitate the production of emotion language (e.g., Garner, Jones, Gaddy & Rennie, 1997). In addition, children’s developing linguistic abilities have been linked to ‘picture-reading practices’ (Liddell, 1997).

As picture stories enable the comparison of identical material by different language speakers, their use seemed like the obvious choice. Because any differences occurring consistently between the two language groups cannot be seen as residing in the pictures, they can only be traced to the speakers. If speakers of one language continue to focus on specific aspects of the pictures, it is safe to assume that “those aspects attract the attention of speakers in the course of constructing a verbalised expression of their perceptions” (Bamberg & Reilly, 1996, p. 337).

The use of narrative for eliciting a large portion of the data was further justified by the fact that narrative constitutes the most common form of human communication. For example, Miller (1982) found that young children are on average exposed to seven narratives per hour (in Bruner, 1997). As this linguistic form plays a significant role in our everyday lives, its use can be seen as an ideal investigative method.

Although inspired by the cross-linguistic tradition of the now legendary ‘Frog, where are you’ studies, one dramatic alteration to the standard design was made in this study. This was done in an attempt to enrich the data consisting of the linguistic expression of the events as conveyed by the speaker through the eyes of the protagonist by an intended, socially emotive context of the material. This move was not intended to exchange the linguistic focus inherent in Slobin’s and Bamberg’s studies for that of the narrated topic. Rather it was hoped that this would introduce a semantic dimension to the study, which could be used to anchor the linguistic functions within a particular conceptual and cultural context.
In constructing the picture stories, the focus was on creating a situation of an emotional interaction between two or more characters. In addition, Bamberg observed that the use of a “multiple character story requires the narrator to simultaneously co-ordinate two agentive perspectives” (Bamberg, 1987, p. 43), a notion which is highly relevant to the study of the role of self-referent structures in speaker and non-speaker subjectivity.

Equipped with this knowledge, I designed two picture stories. The first of the two, entitled ‘The Cat Story’ describes the theft of a kitten which is missed by its owner. The thief watches the distress of the other character as he searches for his cat. While he is presumably debating whether or not he should return the cat, the antagonist is caught. The last picture shows him returning the cat to its crying owner, while the parents watch. The aim of this story line was to elicit discourse relevant to the issues of guilt and subsequent shame.

The second story, ‘The Move’ deals with the issue of loneliness in one of the characters who, after moving with her parents into a new house, goes to school in a new neighborhood. The reactions of the other children to her apparent difficulties with ‘fitting in’, it was hoped, would lead to empathic evaluations and comments. The end of the story, where one of the children calls for the lonely girl to come and play, and where in the last picture they are portrayed as playing together on the street, was aimed at obtaining explanations regarding the motivation behind empathically driven behavior.

When composing the two stories, an attempt was made to avoid stereotypical ‘literary’ situations. Instead it was endeavored to portray events which would be, in some shape or form, relevant to the personal experiences of both the Czech and the Irish children. A decision was also made to create one male and one female main character.

As Harris (1998) found, children are predisposed to becoming captivated by imaginary worlds. They demonstrate signs of emotions corresponding to those experienced by the characters occupying such fictional worlds.
great care was taken to ensure that the pictures were relevant and conceptually and emotionally easy to access for both of the groups, it was also important to avoid eliminating or reducing the background details essential for capturing and maximising the children’s imagination.

Both stories described as narratives and including a detail of each particular picture were accompanied by a very rough sketch. A professional artist, specialising in illustrating children’s books, was commissioned to produce the drawings.

The completed picture stories were tested on a group of 12 children (4 Czech and 8 Irish) within the relevant age group. Based on their narratives, small changes were made to the pictures (e.g., the positioning of the thought bubbles) after which the artist supplied their final version. The two separate A3 sheets were laminated for easier manipulation and durability. Both of the picture stories can be seen in Appendix B.

9.3.2 Formal Measures

To ensure a measure of comparability in relation to two groups of children, in terms of their verbal and cognitive competence, two standardised tests were included in the design. The Supralinguistic and Pragmatic tests used, constitute a part of the Comprehensive Assessment of Spoken Language test (Carrow-Woolfolk, 1999). The selection of Francesca Happé’s ‘Strange Stories’ was included to assess the levels of the Theory of Mind (ToM) development.

Comprehensive Assessment of Spoken Language

Research into the available tests of language acquisition designed for the specified age group was conducted and as a result the Supralinguistic and Pragmatic tests from the battery of Elizabeth Carrow-Woolfolk’s (1999)
Comprehensive Assessment of Spoken Language (CASL) were selected as the most relevant. The theoretical framework for this test battery is based on the ‘Integrative Language Theory’ (Carrow-Woolfolk, 1999, p. 9) which combines the linguistic, cognitive and pragmatic dimensions of language use to create a comprehensive measure of the ability to verbally communicate. The test was designed to provide an evaluation of oral linguistic comprehension, expression and retrieval in individuals aged between 3 and 21. As such, the battery is aimed at assessing the language abilities necessary for literacy and normal functioning within social environments. It was important in terms of the current study to ensure that the linguistic and communicative abilities of all the children included could be placed within the norm. In addition, the extent of the children’s awareness of social emotions is also closely tied in with their communicative skills (e.g., Harris, 1995; Edwards, 1997 and others).

CASL targets four categories of which two, the Supralinguistic and the Pragmatic Tests categories, were selected. Specifically, two core and one supplementary component – the Nonliteral Language, Inference and the Pragmatic Judgement tests were chosen, as they could provide a solid measure for establishing the children’s discursive competence. Each of these components is briefly outlined below.

The **Nonliteral Language Test** assesses the ability to derive hidden meaning from figurative speech, indirect requests and sarcasm, and tests the understanding that spoken utterance cannot always be interpreted literally (p. 59). For example, the child is presented with a verbal label such as:

Mom came into Trevor’s room and asked, “When did the tornado come through?”
What did she mean? (Item 7)

He or she is then required to provide an answer which would suggest the awareness of the non-literal idea of an untidy room as opposed to an actual tornado.
The Inference Test assesses the “use of previously acquired world knowledge to derive meaning from inferences” (p. 62) with the use of items such as, for example, this one:

Mr. Black and his 6-year-old daughter both grabbed a fistful of marbles. Mr. Black had more marbles in his hand than his daughter did. Why? (Item 8)

In order to produce a correct answer, a child in the 9 to 10 age group, at which this particular item is aimed, is required to make a reference to the difference in the size of each of the two hands.

The Pragmatic Judgement Test assesses pragmatic linguistic skills in terms of evaluation of suitability of language used in a particular situation, or its production (e.g., expressing emotions, initiating a verbal exchange or navigating through social situations) (p. 65). Below is an example of an item from the test directed at the 8 to 9 age group. The correct answer involves a communicatively and socially appropriate request for help.

Jason needs help carrying his books and football equipment to school. Tell me how he could ask his brother to help him. (Item 14).

'Strange Stories' Advanced ToM test

Children’s ability to relate to the thoughts and emotions of others constitutes one of the main requirements of this study. It is only once this ability has been established that its specific mechanisms and culturally and linguistically determined idiosyncrasies can be examined.

Most Theory of Mind tests address this understanding in the 4 to 6 age group. As Baron-Cohen, O’Riordan, Stone, Jones and Plaisted (1999) point out, however, the comprehension of more complex concepts, such as sarcasm, irony or faux pas, does not develop until around the age of eight. This suggests the need for Advanced Theory of Mind Tests which would assess further developments in children’s understanding of the possible disparities between the speaker’s and the listener’s states of mind, as well as the potential
of an emotional effect that certain statements can have on the listener (p. 408). The ‘Strange Stories’ test developed by Francesca Happé (1994), originally designed to assess individuals with Asperger syndrome or high-functioning autism, in comparison to normally developing children and adults, is one of the very few available tests addressing the issue of Advanced Theory of Mind.

A selection of eight of Happé’s ‘Strange Stories’ were chosen to test the children’s ability to detect sarcasm, white lie, lie, double bluff, persuasion, pretence, appearance/reality, and contrary emotions. One ‘physical story’, not involving a cognitive state, was also included to ensure the reliability of the method. Each of the short vignettes was followed by a ‘comprehension’ question, i.e., ‘was it true what X said?’ and a ‘justification’ question, i.e., ‘why did X say that?’ (Happe, 1994).

As no Czech language equivalent for either of the tests was available, the relevant items were translated. A group of Czech speakers with a good knowledge of English were consulted in order to verify the translations and the texts were reviewed in the light of their suggestions.

In order to make some of the items more culture- and language-specific, small alterations were made. For example, the names of the characters in the vignettes of both of the tests were changed to make them more relevant to the children’s experience. Similarly, the word picnic, which does not exist in Czech (although it is gradually being introduced into the language) included in Strange Story no. 3 has been replaced by the word výlet, ‘trip’ with a specific reference to ‘eating a packed lunch’ made later. One small change was also made in the English version of the language assessment test in an attempt to make it more relevant to Hibernian English. The term ‘cookie’, which appears in item 5 of the Nonliteral Language test for the age 10 group, was replaced by the word ‘biscuit’.

The Czech language version of both tests can be found in Appendix A.

17 See Appendix A.
9.4 Procedure

The data presented here was collected over a period of six months. First from the school in Dublin, and some months later, from the school in The Czech Republic. Once I had obtained the necessary permission I had arranged for an opportunity to introduce myself to the children and I have explained to them that I needed their help with my work. Most of the children were very enthusiastic and competed with each other over who would participate first. In each of the schools either a library or a classroom which was not being occupied were made available for the sessions. A Sony cassette-corder WM-F2041, used for recording, was placed on the table. Each child was seen individually on two separate occasions during school hours. The sessions lasted about 30-40 minutes each, and the teachers decided the order in which the children would come to see me. It was ensured that the children did not miss on my account any activities they enjoyed (e.g., rehearsals for the school play or swimming), which could negatively affect their attitude towards the task.

9.4.1 Narrative sessions

The children were given the following instructions which were read out to them in their native language:

I have two picture stories here and it looks like there should be some words to go with them, but all the words are missing from the pictures. So I would like you first to look at all the pictures and then to tell me the stories one by one and fill in the empty bubbles. I am especially interested in what the feelings of the people in the two stories might be. I can’t write fast enough so I am going to tape this, if you don’t mind, because I don’t want to forget the stories that you tell me.

Most of the children were very excited at the prospect of being recorded and asked if they could listen to the tape afterwards. None of them appeared nervous to a degree which could inhibit his or her performance on the task. The order in which the two stories were presented to the child was alternated,
to avoid any possible priming or other effects\textsuperscript{18}. Once the initial narrative throughout which I have limited my input to encouragement to continue was completed, I asked the child if it would be possible to talk about some of the pictures a little more. I then proceeded to prompt the child with questions such as ‘what did you say was happening here?’ or ‘how do you think this little boy feels here?’ and so a second narrative, informed by the previous knowledge of the story, was obtained. At this point, the children also had some time to evaluate the events. I have decided to use this technique, as opposed to that of an exposure to the story prior to the narrative, as I was interested in the on-line decisions made about the emotionally charged situations presented in the two stories, as well as in the evaluations informed by the knowledge of the plot.

Up to this point in the sessions, great care was taken not to mention any of the target emotion words (i.e., guilty, ashamed, etc.) to avoid contaminating the children’s vocabulary. I then proceeded with an informal interview in the course of which the children were asked to provide definitions of the emotions relevant to each particular story, as well as their own examples and experiences of similar feelings and situations. The Move story was in addition followed by a discussion of hypothetical scenario which the children were presented with. As I discovered during the pilot study, providing the children with a similar example helped to facilitate their discourse on the topic of empathy which otherwise proved to be quite difficult to access.

Imagine that you really wanted a puppy and your best friend really wanted a puppy too. And then one day he/she would get a puppy and you would not. How would you feel about it?

I felt the use of verbal as opposed to pictorial stimuli to be justified here, as the narratives elicited with the help of non-verbal material were already obtained. This part of the session was designed to explore the semantic and pragmatic constructions of the emotion concepts held by the children. A set of

\textsuperscript{18} In some cases a priming effect was noted where a reference to jealousylazivist was made in relation to the ‘Puppy question’ following the narratives of the Move story, which was aimed at eliciting empathy discourse. This word was then used by some of the children in frame one of the Cat story. As jealousy was not one of the target emotions, this was not perceived as a major problem.
Czech and English standardised questions centered around the emotion concepts of guilt, shame and empathy were used for this purpose. They included questions such as ‘what does it mean to feel ashamed?’, ‘co to znamená stydět se?’, ‘have you ever felt sorry for anybody?’, ‘bylo ti někdy někoho líto?’ and others. Where appropriate, I followed the children’s lead and continued with further prompts. The language-specific differences arising in the emotion terms used in this section were not seen as inappropriate to the design. They were embraced as part of the idiosyncrasies investigated by this study and they are discussed in detail in the chapters dealing with semantic analysis.

The same procedure was followed for the second picture story narrative and the session was concluded by asking the children about their favourite books and TV programs. Although very limited in scope, this was done as an attempt to begin to explore some of the possible culture-specific influences on the children’s conception of emotions which could be used as a background for the discussion. Again, the children were more than happy to engage in this discourse.

9.4.2 Standardised Tests Sessions

This part was introduced by thanking the child for the narratives obtained during our last meeting, while commenting on their usefulness and asking for participation in another task which this time consisted of me “telling you little stories and you answering some questions about them”. First the Strange Stories were read out to the child in random order, followed by the Nonliteral Language, Inference and Pragmatic Judgement tests. This session also lasted approximately 30 minutes for each child.

9.5 Transcription and Coding

Transcription of both sets of the audio-narratives and the subsequent discourse was conducted in accordance with the Child Language Data Exchange System
(CHILDES) of transcription and analysis (MacWhiney, 1995, 2001). The system of Codes for the Human Analysis of Transcripts (CHAT) was used to transcribe the material and to code sections of the text, and the narratives were later analysed using the Computerized Language Analysis (CLAN).

The present corpus is currently in preparation for contribution to the CHILDES database.

9.5.1 Analysis

As already mentioned, the analyses conducted as part of this study were situated at two conceptually intertwined levels. Due to the complexities involved in cross-cultural and cross-linguistic designs, the merging of quantitative and qualitative methods appeared to be the most appropriate approach to making sense of the data.

The first level of analysis explores the use of particular self-referent linguistic devices available to Czech and English speakers. More specifically, reflexive verbs and pronouns were drawn from the narratives in order to examine their use by the children, with reference to the emotions of shame, guilt and empathy. In an attempt to make the data more manageable it has been subdivided into Emotional, Cognitive, Moral & Social and Physical Categories, all containing occurrences of the above described self-referent forms. As such, the verbs were further described in terms of their use as ‘obligatory’, ‘optional’, ‘constructed’ and ‘false start’. I will return in detail to the methods of analysis applied here in the relevant chapters on self-referents.

The second level of analysis, the lexico-semantic investigation, was mainly concerned with the comparison of emotion words occurring across the two language groups. This method is also detailed at the beginning of the relevant chapter.
Both types of the analysis outlined above consisted almost entirely of selecting the target linguistic structures (i.e., self-referent forms) and lexical forms (i.e., emotive words) from the transcripts, with the use of CLAN. In addition, the narratives were also considered in terms of emotion related themes which were found to consistently appear in the children's narratives.

The focus of this study lies in the observation and interpretation of possible cross-linguistic and cross-cultural differences linked to a specific abstract concept (i.e., socially-constructed emotions). One of the ways in which this can be achieved is through a qualitative analysis grounded in an examination of concrete instances and specific examples of the linguistic coding of the concept of interest, drawn from the data through repeated consideration of the material. Any descriptive statistics used were therefore employed to complement such qualitative analysis, without stripping the data of its contextual relevance. I will return to the quantitative as well as the qualitative methods of treatment of the data at the beginning of each of the chapters.

9.6 Formal Assessment

As already mentioned, the use of formal language tests and ToM tests was motivated by an attempt to ensure the comparability of the two language groups on issues crucial to this study. However, the aim was not to compare cross-linguistic trends in language and cognitive development, but rather to explore the linguistic forms used by the children in the context of a specific discourse. I will therefore mention the results of the oral language test only in passing, although it is appropriate to comment on some interesting issues emerging from the ToM test, which are very relevant to the topic of this study.

9.6.1 ‘Strange Stories’ ToM Test

To obtain the scores for the children’s responses to the Strange stories, Happé’s (1994) technique was followed and the children’s answers were
scored on two separate scales. The first scale included the comprehension scores and the second referred to the correctness or incorrectness of the reasoning reflected in the justification of the character's statement.

The children in both groups had no major difficulties with the comprehension part of the majority of the items. I will therefore concentrate here on the justification aspect of their responses.

Although the average age of the Czech sample was higher (9;3 versus 8;6), the Czech children performed marginally worse on most items of the Strange Stories test. Such differences are unlikely to be explained simply in terms of varying degrees of ToM development in the two groups. The scores which identified Story 5 and Story 6 as the items most often misinterpreted by both groups support this claim, pointing away from genuine differences in Theory of Mind development. In respect of the double bluff situation described in Story 5, twenty nine (64%) of the Czech and twenty (44%) of the 45 Irish children failed to show evidence of the reasoning required by the test. The second problem story, Story 6, deals with a persuasion technique which is also based on a bluff. Twelve (27%) Czech and eleven (24%) Irish children did not interpret the situation outlined in the story as such.

Perhaps the most interesting scores relate to Story 3 which is concerned with sarcasm. Although this story did not pose a dramatic problem for most of the Irish children (only 6 children, 13%, did not recognise the character's statement as sarcastic), seventeen (38%) of the Czech children failed to read this situation as such. A specific problem related to the translation of this particular item (or indeed other items) of course cannot be ruled out and further investigation is required to establish any real differences that may exists between the two populations.

Story 4, which deals with two separate emotions (i.e., disappointment and empathically motivated happiness) was perhaps the most relevant to this study. Only sixteen (35.5%) of the Czech and twelve (27%) of the Irish
children identified the character as experiencing conflicting feelings in the
initial two comprehension questions, although the majority (91% of Irish and
87% of Czech children) incorporated some evidence of this internal conflict
into their justification answer (e.g., “she is really jealous but doesn’t want to
make her friend sad”).

It was interesting to see that the trends across the two groups showed subtle
differences. Although the scores themselves do not reveal much, the nature of
the responses shows that while the Irish children produced mostly empathic
statements such as ‘she is her best friend, so she is really happy she won even
though she is really sad she didn’t win herself’ or ‘she doesn’t want to hurt
her feelings by looking sad’, a number of Czech children highlighted the
issues of deception, secrecy and jealousy, (e.g., ‘chtěla taky vyhrát, závidí jí a
chtěla utajit, že není ráda’, ‘she too wanted to win, she was jealous and she
wanted to hide that she was not pleased’ a trend somewhat less pronounced
within the Irish sample.

In addition, the last story of the battery generated a similar cross-cultural
variation. While the Irish children’s response to the final question typically
centered around not wanting to hurt his aunt’s feelings, the Czech children’s
justification of the white lie often included the character not wanting to anger
his aunt or even trying to avoid punishment for insulting her hat.

Do Czech children struggle with reading the minds of others? Are they less
able to detect sarcasm? Are they less likely to empathise with others? There
are three possible explanations of the above outlined variations in reasoning.
The first lies in genuine differences in ToM ability present in the two
populations. Such explanation is unlikely, considering the rather limited
extent of the diversity, and has no support within the developmental literature.
The second possible reason points to shortcomings in the design and measures
used, and raises the question of their cross-cultural applicability. I would,
however, like to make a tentative case in favour of yet another eventuality, and
suggest that the above outlined results could be explained in terms of subtle
cultural differences in educational, social, and linguistic practices, which present the children of the two communities with a particularly ‘formatted’ knowledge. As similar trends continue to appear throughout the analysis, I will not abandon this discussion here. Instead it will be resurrected time and time again as part of the chapters that follow.

Returning to the issue at hand, in general, stories 1,2,6,7,8 as well as the Physical story did not pose any problems for either of the groups. Despite the subtle variations in the scores outlined above, the Strange Stories test provided a reasonable assurance of the general comparability of the ToM abilities of the two groups of children included in this study.

9.6.2 Supralinguistic & Pragmatic Tests

The first items of each of the three selected tests within this battery (i.e., Nonliteral Language, Inference, and Pragmatic Judgement tests) was administered at the appropriate, age specified entry within which the basal level was established. As none of the children included in the sample fell below the basel level of their age group, and most continued into higher age groups before establishing the ceiling level, I was satisfied that both of the language groups possessed equal levels of linguistic proficiency.
My goal in this section is not to arrive at an independent definition of anaphora and reflexivity, capturing a unique analytical approach to these concepts. Instead, I would like to move away from detailed models of grammatical structures representing such linguistic properties, towards a more general examination of the effects of their use on a speaker’s subjective and empathic awareness. I will therefore use the term *anaphora* in its most general sense of co-reference between two linguistic expressions. I will also, for the purposes of the following introduction, adopt definitions of more detailed concepts within anaphora, as presented by theorists whose work is discussed here.

It has been suggested by Stephen Levinson that rather than conceiving of anaphora in terms of syntax, it would be more appropriate to examine it in terms of pragmatics. More specifically, the main characteristic of anaphoric constructs lies in their ‘referential dependence’ rather than in simple ‘coreference’ (p. 268). Such referential dependence in most languages operates between pronouns which according to Levinson constitute ideal
candidates for this role, due to their ‘semantic generality’ (p. 268). Anaphoric pronouns themselves are so general (in some languages more than in others) that they lack the ability to refer without the link to another pronoun, containing more semantic information. The Czech reflexive pronoun sebe, which can refer to both singular and plural, as well as all three genders and all persons, is a perfect example. The grammatical information in this context is minimal; rather the anaphoric link operates on a pragmatic level (Levinson, 2001).

Such non-grammatical characterisations of anaphora are of particular relevance to the present discussion. It is the ‘referential dependence’ as well as ‘semantic generality’, which allow the scope for the coding and expression of subjective and empathic issues within linguistic forms, which is postulated here.

To introduce the notion of reflexivity, Kemmer makes connections to Ariel’s ‘Accessibility Theory’ inspired by the concept of referential accessibility. The main point of Accessibility Theory is that “referring expressions are no more than guidelines for retrievals” (Ariel 1988, p. 68). Therefore the “inherent semantics of each type of expression is the very processing procedure by which the referent is accessed” (Kemmer, 1995, p. 55). According to this theory, referents such as complete noun phrases, constitute ‘low accessibility signals’, whereas simple pronouns (including the reflexive self) represent ‘high accessibility markers’.

This linguistic phenomenon can be related to the present discussion in terms of the speaker’s level of awareness and expression of own emotive perception of the situation and the feelings of others. I believe that such awareness is aided by the linguistic mechanisms, such as reflexive marking, which allow for highlighting of certain aspects of subjective vision, as well as acting as a ‘mirror’ through which the speaker can reflect his own emotional understanding and experience onto other protagonists. The linguistic elements involved in the co-referential structures of Czech and English language
systems are very different. It would seem, however, that in both languages these structures function as a powerful tool in terms of establishing, confirming and fast-referencing the viewpoint adopted by the speaker, as I will attempt to illustrate throughout the following chapters.

10.1 Co-reference in English: Emphatic versus Reflexive Self

The group of languages which do not have explicit structures for marking reflexivity includes, apart from Biblical Hebrew, some Austronesian and Papuan languages, a number of Australian languages and many others not yet closely investigated in relation to this phenomenon (Levinson, 2001, pp. 334-335). Similarly to Biblical Hebrew, Old English also belongs to the subgroup of Low West Germanic languages, which do not mark Anaphors.

Visser suggested that even though it was used in Old English, self was not originally employed as a reflexive marker. Instead, it was in some cases added to personal pronouns as means of emphasis. This is not to say, however, that the concept of reflexivity was non-existent, as simple pronouns were used in the place of reflexives (i.e., Visser’s example ‘I washed me’). The self therefore existed in order to highlight the particularity of the thing or person captured by the object and the subject. By the second half of the fifteenth century, the use of simple pronouns has, in reflexive contexts, been gradually replaced by the ‘compound pronouns’, consisting of the simple form followed by self. The reason for this transformation lies, according to Visser, in an attempt to eliminate ambiguity caused by the use of the simple form in its original meaning, as well as in its reflexive sense (1963 in Levinson, 2001, p. 341).

It is this emphatic quality of self, enhancing the link between the speaker/protagonist and his/her self, that is of particular interest to this discussion. Such marking within a language clearly has deep historical roots.

19 In a summary of reports by Faltz (1977), Carden & Stewart (1986), Dixon (1980, 1983) and others.
Levinson (2001) stresses the point that the reflexive uses were born from the emphatic uses. However, the distinction between the two is often examined by contemporary linguists. For example, Kemmer reports on the differences between two general types of the pronominal self forms in English, the ‘emphatic’ self, which she defines as highlighting a particular agent, and the ‘reflexive’ self, which marks the identity of the participant in one clause with that in another. The differences between those two types include the fact that emphatic self is most often adjoined to a noun or a pronoun, while the reflexive self actually constitutes a noun phrase. The emphatic self can exist in subject noun phrases, but reflexive self can only refer to non-subject participants of a clause (Kemmer 1995 p. 55). On a syntactic level, the emphatic self serves an interclausal function, while the reflexive informs about the relation between the participants (Kemmer 1997, p. 66).

Intriguing is Kemmer’s (1995) observation that to fully appreciate the boundaries of the emphatic self, we should consider it in terms of speaker expectations. Generally, empathic self marks the unexpectedness of the referent indicated by self, either in terms of its discourse or syntactic role. We can observe this in the following two examples of the current data[^20], where in both cases the listener’s attention is suddenly diverted away from the main participant to the speaker. This shift is subsequently re-affirmed by the use of the emphatic self.

CHI 30
*SON: like when my sister [//] my big sister fell off a horse
*SON: and I was happy when she got back
*SON: because the horse [//] the pony that she was on was actually quite bold
*INV: uhhuh okay
*SON: and I xxx fell off a horse myself before

CHI 47
*FAY: well I (woul)d feel [/] well I (woul)d feel happy for her
*FAY: I (woul)d feel excited
*FAY: but I still would want one myself and +...

[^20]: See Appendix C for a summary of transcription symbols.
What is particularly captivating, however, is how this tool is used in terms of relating to somebody else's experience. In both cases, the reflexive form is brought in to aid the empathic link with the other protagonist of the story. Moreover, the speakers are not content with the simple use of the nominal pronoun 'I', they feel the need to emphasise the subjectivity of the instance by introducing the reflexive form. Why not use a simple adverb or qualifier (i.e., 'also' or 'too') to make the same point? I would like to suggest that the speakers in the two instances above, and indeed in other cases, use the reflexive form as a strategy through which they bring themselves closer to the subject of their empathy. The referent here serves not only "to the exclusion of others", as Kemmer (1997 p. 57) postulates, but more importantly in this case, to highlight the subjective self of the speaker.

This point is in keeping with Kemmer's argument that self is used to contrast a specific participant with other potential participants, which may have been more likely to be referred to by the speaker at that particular point in the discourse. In addition, the salience of the participants marked by self is enhanced in comparison to those not selected. "Emphatic self is therefore a grammatical device for accessing referents of some degree of prominence in the discourse. " (Kemmer, 1997, p. 61).

10.1.1 Summary

The grammatical analysis of the present data focuses on the issue of relevance of self-referent structures to empathically motivated emotions. At this point, the link is defined in terms of an enhancement in the referent's subjectivity. More specifically, I have illustrated the use of speaker self-referent marking in the context of a 'protagonist shift', which could be interpreted in terms of the speaker's attempts to identify with the protagonist's position. It is suggested that the grammatical emphasis achieved through self-reference is perhaps paralleled by an added emotional awareness.
The speaker's subjectivity is expected to remain implicit in the discourse geared towards the feelings of others. In the emphatic reflexive, however, the speaker finds a tool through which it is possible to empathically relate to the other protagonists. And so the prominence of own subjectivity is not only included and explored within the boundaries of the discourse, but it is also highlighted.

10.2 Reflexivity and Viewpoint

In order to explore grammatical reflexivity in terms of subjectivity enhancement in more detail, I will now turn to the related issue of viewpoint.

10.2.1 Subjectivity

Finegan broadly defines subjectivity as an "expression of self and the representation of a speaker's (or more generally, a locutionary agent's) perspective or point of view in discourse – what has been called a speaker's imprint" (p. 1). This definition of subjectivity in terms of a specific viewpoint encoded in particular discourse, lexical and grammatical structures applies here, as I will not be discussing subjectivity in the purely grammatical sense.

Returning to the view of language as a perspective discussed earlier, Finegan (1995) agrees that in order to linguistically encode concepts and events, speakers and other locutionary agents have to adopt a particular viewpoint, which in turn affects the choice of linguistic forms used. The specific mechanisms involved in such choices, however, are quite subtle. Furthermore, the extent of cultural factors involved in the expression of subjectivity and their projection into the evolution of individual languages still remains to be uncovered. As an extension of this point, Wright (1995, p. 151) postulates that an evolutionary delay is likely to take place between the incorporation of expressions of subjectivity into grammatical structures of languages, and speakers' realisation and use of these mechanisms.
Seen from a slightly different perspective, Elizabeth Traugott assumes that the speakers’ conception of self is impressed on their representation of their experience in the world, which is encoded through language. The resulting definition of subjectification is “the development of a grammatically identifiable expression of speaker belief or speaker attitude to what is said” (Traugott, 1995, p. 32). As such, Traugott conceives of subjectivity as a ‘tool’ used by the speaker to communicate to the listener his/her attitude employed in a particular situation. An example of such an attitude can be empathy with the character of the sentence (Traugott, 1995).

On a more concrete level, Kuno (1987), for example, claims that in colloquial Turkish, reflexive pronouns are ‘empathy expressions’, as are (to even a larger degree) their Japanese equivalents, such as zibun, ‘self’ (Kuno, 1987, p. 261). He also argues for a strong link between empathy and reflexive pronouns that exists in Russian, and presents Yokoyama’s hypothesis according to which “the choice between reflexive and personal possessive pronouns is determined by the degree to which the speaker of an utterance identifies with his inner self in the process of speech performance” (Kuno, 1987, p. 263 – 264), hence linking reflexivisation to the speaker’s separation from his consciousness (pp. 263-264).

Langacker (1990) argues that the discrepancy, which exists between the experiencer and his/her verbalised experience (i.e., the perception of objects, people and events), is profound and as such dramatically reflected in language. In this context, a distinction is drawn between ‘objective’ and ‘subjective construal’. Objectively construed components of the concepts created by the speaker are selected by him/her and expressed through language. When, however, those components are not expressed by the speaker and instead constitute a part of his/her uncommunicated experience, they are ‘subjectively construed’.

This division is, according to Langacker (1990, pp. 6-7), best illustrated in terms of a ‘perceptual metaphor’. At one end of the spectrum lies maximum
objectivity achieved by the individual's perception of a component of 'conception' as 'maximally distinct from him- or herself'. This is something which, when encoded in language, can be observed by others from the same uninvolved point of perception, thus seeing the same as the conceptualiser. This processes can be compared to placing the object that is being conceptualised 'on stage', where it can be observed by everybody from the same proximity. The other end of the spectrum represents the conceptualiser's own experience of the events, perceived very much through his own eyes, and so greatly colouring his linguistic expression of the conception with his own subjectivity. Again applying Langacker's metaphor, this is the equivalent of taking the object 'off-stage' and thus removing it from everybody's awareness. The highest level of subjectivity occurs when the 'conceptualiser' or another part of what Langacker calls the 'ground' (the conceptualiser and accompanying factors of the situation) are at the very core of the expression of the conceptualisation, and yet not encoded by a linguistic declaration. Langacker demonstrates this on the following example: "Vanessa is sitting across the table" (1990, pp. 17-20), where the speaker does not separate him/herself from the listener, or in Kemmer's words, "does not place him or herself on stage with the other participants as a separate, discourse-manipulable entity" (1995, p. 78) but instead neglects his own viewpoint in relation to the reported event.

Based on Langacker's conclusions, Kemmer proposes that the reflexive self within a clause indicates an object that is 'on-stage' - its antecedent. The categories of 'viewing-' and 'logophoric' reflexives discussed in more detail below, could therefore be described in terms of high objectivity, while the viewing emphatics, with their two elements conceptually linked 'off-stage', represent a highly subjective level of construction (Kemmer, 1995).

Within the framework of the 'viewpoint self' (Kemmer, 1995, p.78), the participant (whether explicitly linguistically included or not) represents the viewpoint of the sentence. The subjectivity manifested in the linguistic
expression is therefore that of the participant, in contrast to the speaker or the speaker's objective evaluation of the participant (Zribi-Hertz, 1989).

And finally, to clarify the concept of the viewpoint, Deane presents Delancey's definition of one of the two basic cognitive structures incorporated in his analysis, the definition of viewpoint as "a matter of the perspective from which one views the event" (Deane, 1992, p. 205). In other words, the above as well as the earlier review of this topic suggest that most language researchers and theorists agree on the significance of the link between linguistic structures and a speaker's positioning him/herself in respect to verbalised experience.

10.2.2 The Link

The obvious question at this point is the following: How exactly is a specific viewpoint linguistically encoded? Self-referent structures in general are one of the grammatical candidates.

Deane suggests that anything which helps to mark out the nominal pronoun as representing the relevant viewpoint, facilitates long distance reflexivisation. This leads him onto Kuno's awareness conditioning, which states a very simple but fundamental principal - protagonists have to be aware of their viewpoint in order to express it (Deane, 1992, p. 218).

Kemmer (1995, p. 67) cites Cantrall (1969) as the first to draw the link between reflexive markers in English and the point of view phenomenon by concluding that unlike non-reflexive pronouns, which are generally neutral as to point of view, reflexive pronouns represent a subjective point of view linked to the participant of the sentence. This applies to situations in which reflexive and non-reflexive forms are both acceptable and allowed. More specifically, "ordinary reflexives involve viewpoint only incidentally, as a background relation. By contrast, picture noun and logophoric reflexives employ viewpoint as the only defining condition on reflexivisation, creating
the possibility for long-distance control of reflexives" (Deane, 1992, p. 210). Kemmer suggests that unlike in the ordinary reflexive construction, the link to a viewpoint antecedent is inherent for the picture noun and logophoric reflexives and is an integral part of their definition. The consequence of this link is a "minimal conceptual separation" between the antecedent and the referent (Kemmer 1995, p. 73).

Logophoric reflexives can be defined as "reflexives whose antecedents are subjects of verbs of saying, feeling, and perceiving: that is, of verbs which inherently establish their subjects as viewpoint for the following complement clause" (Deane, 1992, p. 218). Logophoric reflexives and picture noun phrases therefore share the notion of 'representation', whether visual or cognitive. Many viewpoint reflexives are composed of perception- or mental state verbs. Some also involve verbs referring to types of speech activity, which specifically points to the relation between the observer/conceptualiser and the observed/represented (Kemmer, 1997). The use of the reflexive is not conditioned by co-reference alone, but also by the agent being the one who cognitively or perceptually deals with the represented image (Kemmer, 1995).

In addition, Kemmer (1995) outlined an independent category of viewpoint reflexives, where the reflexive markers involve more elaborate cognitive processes and metaphorical understanding. Consider for example the following: "A man of forty feels himself a very different person from what he was at ten" (Kemmer, 1995). This sentence requires an understanding of the concept of emotional experience. The conceptual distance between the experiencer and the co-referent is minimal. In this situation, it is not possible to use a non-co-referent object participant, unless a construction such as 'a man of forty feels that....' is used. This, however, would impose a perspective, where the object and the subject are two distinct entities (Kemmer, 1995, p. 73).

See also Bamberg (1997b, p. 108-109) for an account of perspective taking through German reflexives.
The use of an emphatic \textit{self} with the intention to indicate a viewpoint could be seen as yet another independent category. Zribi-Hertz (1989) suggested that the most important condition in this respect is that the viewpoint adopted in the sentence represents the antecedent as the 'subject of consciousness'. In the viewpoint emphatic reflexives, the previous reference in the discourse has activated the 'viewer antecedent', so it is easily accessible in terms of the 'viewing relation' (Kemmer, 1995, p. 76).

\textbf{10.2.3 Linguistic Empathy}

The notion of grammatically encoded viewpoint is conceptually very close to that of linguistic empathy. Kuno defines linguistic empathy as "the speaker's identification, which may vary in degree, with a person/thing that participates in the event or state that he describes in a sentence" (Kuno, 1987, p. 206). In other words, none of the aspects of the situation linguistically marked (or omitted) within a sentence are accidental. Instead, they reflect the speaker's viewpoint, interest, and focus.

Through his review of the Silverstein Hierarchy and related semantic hierarchies described and documented by Kuno (i.e., scales of definiteness, humanness and agency), which together constitute the above defined concept of empathy, Deane summarises the main principals involved in English reflexivisation. In terms of empathy, a concept closely related to that of a viewpoint, the higher up on these scales an item is located, the easier it is for the speaker to relate to the antecedent. Therefore, antecedents high on these scales constitute ideal targets for reflexivisation (Deane, 1992).

\textbf{10.2.4 Non-speaker Viewpoint}

I have already proposed that there may be some instances where a speaker's self-reference may serve as an empathic tool. In this section I would like to concentrate on non-speaker self-reference and its role in 'interpersonal subjectivity'. Brinton recognises third-person reflexive pronouns, which have
no antecedent in their near proximity within the sentence ('non-anaphoric reflexives'), as a tool available to English speakers for expressing a non-speaker inner viewpoint. Brinton (1995, p. 173) defines non-speaker subjectivity as “the consciousness of a third person, the inner thoughts, feelings, and perceptions of a person other than the speaker.” Non-anaphoric reflexives are illustrated by the following examples.

John told Mary that as for himself, he wouldn’t be invited.  
(Kuno 1987, p.129)  
It is himself that John likes best (Cantrall 1974, p.23)  
(in Brinton, 1995, p. 173)

The main source of examples such as those above is literary discourse, however, sometimes third-person non-anaphoric reflexives also appear in non-literary discourse as an indication of the ‘free indirect style’ technique (Brinton, 1995, p. 174). In such contexts, third-person non-anaphoric reflexives gain an unusual function, through which they modify the indirect discourse as direct representations. This occurs through the speaker’s adopting the viewpoint of the referent, or his/her identification with the referent, and so the events are perceived through the character’s eyes and not those of the reporter (Brinton, 1995). The overriding characteristic, which unites non-anaphoric reflexives in both literary and non-literary discourse, is their subjective quality, as compared to objectively reported reality. As such they represent a tool which “describes facts as if filtered by a subject of consciousness” (Zribi-Hertz, 1989, p. 713).

According to Kuno, while in most cases the exceptional use of third-person reflexives is limited by the co-occurrence of logophoric verbs, first- and second- person reflexives can occur independently of them (Kuno, 1987). However, some exceptions to this rule, such as the following utterance, are also noted (Kuno’s 1976 example, cited in Brinton, 1995, p. 175).

John was worried about what Sheila would do. As for himself, he knew the best plan.

This is how Kuno himself accounts for this form:
“It is not the case that the narrator is reporting, as an observer, on what John knew. The sentence is the direct representation of John’s own point of view, without the narrator’s mediating interpretation...the narrator has identified himself with John, and is putting out what John felt in the raw form” (Kuno 1976, in Brinton 1995, p. 175-176).

This is also an example of empathy in terms of Kuno’s definition above. The ‘empathy constraint’ limiting the use of reflexives, states that the viewpoint of the sentence containing a reflexive must be that of the referent of the reflexive (Kuno, 1987, pp. 156-157). In this respect, the self-referent signals the speaker’s identification with the protagonist through a linguistically defined empathic connection.

Cantrall presents some further examples of third-person reflexives, which he terms ‘irregular reflexives’ (cited in Brinton, 1995, p. 176).

a. They placed their guns in front of {them/themselves}.
b. John smeared oil on {him/himself}.
c. John sees Mary as ill disposed towards {him/himself}.
d. The man that John shaves most often is himself.
e. It is himself that John likes the best.
f. This picture of himself will make John happy.

In all of these examples, the reflexive form indicates “that a thought originating in one mind has been revealed to another mind - not necessarily by speech” (Cantrall in Brinton, 1995, p. 176). When opting for the non-reflexive form in (c), for example, the speaker expresses John’s perception of Mary. However, the reflexive form suggests that John has previously indicated his perception of Mary. So once again we find the use of a reflexive structure to indicate the speaker’s identification or empathy with the character in his sentence, and to communicate the character’s point of view (Cantrall in Brinton, 1995).

It should perhaps be noted here that not all theorists share the view of the explicit connection between reflexivisation and the point of view phenomenon. Caroll (in Brinton, 1995), for example, believes that the representation of a viewpoint by a reflexive is only a by-product and by no means a part of the intended use. However, it has been noted many times
before that we should be wary of labelling any linguistic expression as 'coincidental'. As we will see later, speakers continuously navigate through the choices offered to them by their native language to arrive at an expression which best contributes to their viewpoint. I would therefore like to argue that speakers utilise the linguistic choices involved in constructing a sentence with a reflexive component to intentionally mark their perception of the situation encoded by their speech, as well as to facilitate their empathic link with the participants of their utterances. At a cross-linguistic level, as the variety and availability of self-referent structures differ across linguistic systems, it is likely that speakers of specific languages will arrive at individual choices at particular times.

10.2.5 Long-distance Reflexives

So far I have mostly concentrated on self-referent structures relevant to English. I will discuss reflexivity in Czech in more detail in the following chapters. For the moment, I would, however, like to briefly outline the form used in Czech reflexivisation and its contribution to the current topic of subjectivity.

The 'long-distance' or 'non-clause bound' reflexives can apart from Czech be found, for example, in Latin in the form of *se*, Italian *se*, Dutch *zich*, Icelandic *sig*, Norwegian *seg*, Chinese *ziji*, and Japanese *zibun* (Brinton 1995, p. 181). Brinton summarises the defining characteristics of long-distance reflexives in terms of the following criteria: “they allow an antecedent outside their governing category; they most commonly take the matrix subject as antecedent; they cannot be reciprocals; they are morphologically simple; and they are not in complementary distribution with pronouns” (1995 p. 181).

Brinton further describes the function of long-distance reflexives as 'logophoric', in that they are used to report the cognitive and perceptual subjectivity of the referent and not the speaker. The following overview of terms used by researchers to refer to this third-person form, compiled by
Brinton, gives an idea of the subtlety of this concept: the ‘experiencing self’ (Cohn, 1978), the SELF (Banfield, 1982), the ‘subject of consciousness’ (Zribi-Hertz, 1989), the ‘secondary ego’ (Sigurðsson, 1990), and the SELF or ‘internal protagonist’ (Sells, 1987). Sells defines this form as “one whose mental state or attitude the content of the proposition describes” (1987, p. 455). This form, the SELF is ‘seen from its own point of view’ (Sigurðsson cited in Brinton, 1995). As Sells describes it, “someone outside the sentence (the external speaker) will in some way ‘take the part’ of someone in the sentence, the internal protagonist” (1987, p. 456).

As part of reportive discourse, the speaker adopts the perspective of the SELF - plays the role of the SELF. In situations where reflexives occur as part of non-reportive discourse “subjectivity of the SELF is portrayed without the intermediary of a speaker, without the process of identification between the speaker and SELF required in indirect logophoric contexts” (Brinton 1995, p.187). And so the internal states of the SELF are immediate as opposed to represented by the speaker, resulting in a “higher degree of subjectivity since the consciousness of the SELF is not filtered through the speaker” (Brinton, 1995, p. 187).

**10.2.6 Summary**

In the section above I have attempted to make a case for an empathic connection on the side of the speaker to the viewpoint of the protagonist he or she represents in his utterances, through the use of self-referent structures. This notion has been examined from several angles, including speaker and non-speaker reflexivity, which were both found to be relevant to the issue of linguistic empathy. Logophoric, as well as long-distance reflexive markers, were discussed in terms of their contribution to creating a specific viewpoint. The disparity of reflexive systems across languages was also noted. I would now like to turn to this last issue and continue with a cross-linguistic account of self-referent systems.
10.3 Cross-linguistic View of Reflexivity

Languages which do not mark reflexivity as part of their grammatical structures are relatively uncommon. Reflexive marking exists in most languages where it is used to signal the fact that in terms of semantics, the 'Agent' in the sentence is the same as the 'Patient' (Kemmer, 1993). As an example of such markers, Kemmer gives the sentence "He saw himself" (p. 24). We should however note that one of the phenomena examined here as part of the Czech data - reflexive verbs - is, according to Kemmer, included under the reflexive heading erroneously since such verbs do not mark reflexive situations. Instead, they should be treated separately from reflexivity under the heading of middle markers (Kemmer, 1993, p. 17). Although conceptually such a distinction does not have any impact on the issue at hand, it may be useful to describe this concept as I would like to follow Kemmer's categorisation of self-referent verbs next.

Kemmer defines middle marker as "a language-specific morphosyntactic marker that appears in the expression of some cluster of distinct situation types ... that are hypothesised to be semantically related to one another and to fall within the semantic category of middle voice" (Kemmer, 1993, p. 15). 'Middle-marking languages' then are those languages using a middle marker as a part of their 'middle systems', which Kemmer defines as "the set of form-function mappings in a middle-marking language between the marker(s) of reflexive and middle semantics, and the situation types they express" (Kemmer, 1993, p. 5).

10.3.1 Middle Marking Verbs

What follows is a brief overview of Kemmer's categories of 'middle morphology', based on her division of verbs according to meaning. This is not an exhaustive summary and only types which can be related to Czech are discussed here. First is the category of 'grooming' verbs, which refer to actions such as washing, dressing, brushing one's hair - all of which the
individual performs on him/herself. According to Komárek (2001, p. 209), this category is generally referred to in Czech as ‘vlastní reflexiva’, ‘proper reflexives’. Kemmer’s examples include those from Latin, Hungarian and other languages, but this category can also be illustrated using instances from Czech. The morpheme *se* represents the middle marker, common to all verbs in the following classes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>verb</th>
<th>meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>umýt <em>se</em></td>
<td>to wash self</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>oblék*nout <em>se</em></td>
<td>to dress self</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>oholit <em>se</em></td>
<td>to shave self</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another type of verbs included in Kemmer’s overview are those referring to “moving the body without change in overall position”-‘nontranslational motion’ (Kemmer, 1993, p. 16). Examples from Czech include:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>verb</th>
<th>meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>otočit <em>se</em></td>
<td>to turn self</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>natáhnout <em>se</em></td>
<td>to stretch self</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>uklonit <em>se</em></td>
<td>to bow self</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following category refers to ‘verbs of change of body posture’ (Kemmer, 1993, p. 17), where the morpheme *si* marks the dative case.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>verb</th>
<th>meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>sednout <em>si</em></td>
<td>to sit self down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lehnout <em>si</em></td>
<td>to lie self down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kleknout <em>si</em></td>
<td>to kneel self down</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The ‘indirect middle’ or ‘self-benefactive middle’ is a class of verbs where the executor of the verb is also the one who benefits from the action (p. 17). Although Kemmer’s examples taken from Turkish, Old Norse, Classical Greek and other languages, referring mostly to actions such as ‘acquire’ or ‘receive’ do not have similar counterparts in Czech, examples of some such actions can be found:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>verb</th>
<th>meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>vyžádat <em>si</em></td>
<td>to request for self</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vzít <em>si</em></td>
<td>to take for oneself</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>přát <em>si</em></td>
<td>to wish for self</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
‘Naturally reciprocal events’ verbs refer to situations where “the relationship among two participants is usually or necessarily mutual or reciprocal” (Kemmer, 1993, p. 17).

\begin{itemize}
  \item setkat se to meet
  \item povídat si to converse
  \item obejmout se to embrace
\end{itemize}

It is perhaps slightly more difficult to find examples of what Talmy first termed ‘translation motion’ category (Kemmer, 1993, p. 18), which includes “self induced motion of an animate entity along a path in space”. However, there are some:

\begin{itemize}
  \item projít se to stroll
  \item rozeběhnout se to start running
\end{itemize}

Kemmer argues, that the ‘translational motion’ type verbs are in terms of meaning further removed from reflexives than those in previous categories. The same claim is made about the verbs of ‘emotional middle’, referring to emotional states, occurring in response to an event. Czech examples falling into this category are numerous, although with the increasing level of abstraction of these expressions the link to self becomes difficult to capture through English.

\begin{itemize}
  \item leknout se to get a fright
  \item zlobit se to be angry
  \item bát se to be afraid
  \item radovat se to be pleased/delighted
  \item stydět se to be ashamed
\end{itemize}

Related to the category above is the class of verbs classified by Kemmer as those “denoting speech actions of an emotive type” (p. 18).

\begin{itemize}
  \item stěžovat si to complain
  \item hádat se to argue
\end{itemize}

A similar category, described and documented by Kemmer, could perhaps be termed ‘verbs with moral implications’. This category would include, for instance:
The verbs of Kemmer’s ‘cognitive middle’ refer to ‘mental states and processes’ (p. 19). Examples found in Czech are again quite common.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Czech</th>
<th>English</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>přiznat se</td>
<td>to confess</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vytahovat se</td>
<td>to boast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>myslet si</td>
<td>to think</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>říkat si</td>
<td>to say to oneself</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zajimat se</td>
<td>to be interested</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rozhodnout se</td>
<td>to decide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rozpadnout se</td>
<td>to fall apart</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vypafít se</td>
<td>to evaporate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zastavit se</td>
<td>to come to a stop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>změnit se</td>
<td>to change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dá se říct</td>
<td>it could be said</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to se dělat nemá</td>
<td>that should not be done</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Then there is the ‘spontaneous events’ type, which refers to naturally occurring events (p. 19).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Czech</th>
<th>English</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>rozpadnout se</td>
<td>to fall apart</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vypafít se</td>
<td>to evaporate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zastavit se</td>
<td>to come to a stop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>změnit se</td>
<td>to change</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The final category captures passive constructions where “the participant expressed as the subject of the middle marker verb corresponds thematically to the object of the unmarked root verb – both are Patients.” The Agent, even though existing, is not mentioned (p. 29). Examples from the current data include:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Czech</th>
<th>English</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>dá se říct</td>
<td>it could be said</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to se dělat nemá</td>
<td>that should not be done</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on this categorisation across languages such as German, French, Turkish, and Latin, to mention only a few, it can be concluded that all such concepts are relatively similar. The range of use of the middle marker forms extends from the expected ‘syntactic processes’ (e.g., directly above) to more semantically determined purposes (e.g., the ‘emotive speech action’ or the ‘cognition middle’) with some of these categories falling within the same distance from each end of the spectrum (Kemmer, 1993, p. 20).
What is interesting here are the occurrences of idiosyncratic patterns within middle marking categories. This trend is apparent from within-language analysis of a number of languages (Kemmer, 1993). More specifically, Kemmer highlights the apparent variability in the usage of middle markers within a particular semantic category which exists in some languages. The examples given are from German. However, the same discrepancy can also be found in Czech where the middle marker is present for verbs ‘to sit down’ and ‘lie down’ (sednout si, lehnout si) but not in the semantically related verb ‘to stand up’, vstát.

It is not clear what motivates such differences and whether they are grammatically or conceptually bound. As a result, any conclusions not taking into account a thorough historical investigation of this phenomenon would be incomplete. What can be explored, however, are the effects of the utilisation of such structures on speaker’s expression and conceptualisation of subjectivity in a cross-linguistic context. It is the objective of the current study to explore such idiosyncrasies in Czech and in English, within the particular context of empathically motivated, socially reflexive emotions.

10.3.2 The Category of Options

The relevance of linguistic choices, made by a speaker, to the specific viewpoint of his or her expression has already been discussed in the previous chapters. I would now like to re-introduce this topic at a much greater level of detail. In particular, I will examine this claim in the light of middle marking usage.

The second point Kemmer makes in relation to her analysis of middle marking systems, refers to a level of variation present in the inclusion of a middle mark with the verb, acceptable to some speakers in some languages. This point corresponds quite closely with what I will refer to in this study as the optional category of verbs. An examples of this category is the verb kamarádit, ‘to be friends with’ (present data).
To most speakers, both of the above versions would be acceptable and equal in their logical content. What would perhaps determine preferential use of one form over the other are geographical variations or colloquial usage. In the example above, (a) is given as the correct form in the dictionary. However, the frequency of occurrence of (b) in the sample shows that this option is equally commonly used by native speakers. The verb *koukat* (below) is listed in the dictionary with the middle marker in brackets, i.e., *koukat (se)*, suggesting that the verb is acceptable in its ‘marked’ as well as in what Kemmer refers to as ‘unmarked’ form. The semantic decisions involved in such choices, and their implications in terms of viewpoint, are the focus of this study.

(a) Koukal se na něj.
(b) Koukal na něj.

*he was looking at him*

### 10.3.3 The Category of Deponents

While in the instances discussed above the semantic properties of the verb are not affected by the presence or absence of the middle marker, the following class of verbs is markedly different in this respect. This category involves verbs, which exist in both forms, and which mostly fall into the categories of ‘body care’, ‘nontranslational motion’, ‘change in body posture’, ‘indirect middle’, ‘naturally reciprocal event’, ‘spontaneous event’ and ‘emotion middle’ (Kemmer, 1993, p. 21). In these cases, the inclusion or exclusion of the middle marker alter the meaning of the verb in terms of participants involved. For example, *mytí se* in Czech refers to washing oneself, whereas *mytí* without the reflexive marker could indicate washing somebody else or even an inanimate object. Many examples illustrating this point could be found, even some where the semantic distance between the two forms is larger.
than in the previous instance. Where učit se is translationally equivalent to ‘study/learn’ the absence of the middle marker transforms the meaning into ‘teach’, učit. As Kemmer (1993, p. 21) points out, the unmarked forms are usually transitive.

What is of particular interest to us in this context are the middle-marking (MM) verbs which Kemmer describes as not having an unmarked equivalent. These verbs usually come under the category of ‘emotive speech action’, ‘other speech action’, ‘translational motion’ and ‘cognition middle classes’, and Kemmer (1993, p. 22) refers to them under the heading of ‘deponents’. These forms vary across the ‘middle-marking’ languages, and as the following quote suggests, are often neglected in theoretical accounts.

“Generative syntactic accounts of middle phenomena regard the middle marker as a meaningless marker of syntactic intransitivity, a view which is closely linked to the fact that such accounts focus on cases in which there are both root and MM forms for a given verb, and the root form is transitive while the MM form is intransitive.” (Kemmer, 1993, p. 23)

I cannot but agree with Kemmer’s conclusion that such accounts do not do justice to the complexities and semantic significance of the middle-marking phenomenon across languages. The correspondence of the sort described above represents only one category of the middle-marking system. Phenomena such as ‘deponents’, which are by no means unusual across languages, as well as other exceptions to general rules, point to issues on more semantic then syntactic levels. The need therefore clearly exists to investigate such claims in a cross-linguistic context (Kemmer, 1993, p. 23-24).

10.3.4 Middle-marking Languages

To contrast middle-marking with reflexive marking (RM), Kemmer divides middle-marking languages into several types. The first are ‘one-form middle system’ languages, where the form of the middle marker is identical to that of the reflexive marker. According to Kemmer, this is the most common type
across middle-marking languages and can be observed for example in German or French.

In the second language type both of the forms are similar but not identical. The MM form (a verbal affix) is in such cases shorter than the RM form (nominal/pronominal). Kemmer calls the reflexive form ‘heavy’ (e.g., in the Russian sebja) and the reflexive marker ‘light’ (Russian –ṣja) and suggests that they are related in terms of their evolution within the language. This is the type of middle-marking languages referred to by Kemmer as ‘two-form cognate system’ (1993, p. 25), to which Czech middle structures could be related. I will return to a more detailed discussion of this phenomenon in Czech as part of the introduction to the Czech data.

Another category – ‘two-form non-cognate system’, is characterised by two distinct forms, and a prime example of this group is Turkish. Dutch represents yet another class which lies in between two-form cognate and non-cognate systems since the middle marker form constitutes a part of the reflexive marker. However, all of the latter three categories share the heavy — light distinction.

What is also important to note is Kemmer’s point that the variety of situations in which middle-marking is included in individual languages does not appear to be restricted by the above described differences in formal structures.

On a related point, Kemmer supports Haiman’s finding of the differences in the use of the light and heavy markings in two-form languages, i.e., the use of the light form being significantly more restricted in comparison with the heavy form. More specifically, while the heavy form can be used with transitive verbs resulting in a reflexive structure, the light form is in this respect limited to only some verbs. In some cases, the light form does not produce reflexive meaning when coupled with the reflexive marker, which suggests that the meaning connected to light forms is “essentially non-reflexive” (1993, p. 27). To illustrate this distinction, Kemmer includes Haiman’s example from
Russian, where (a) refers to a person exhausting himself by his own actions while in (b) a person became alerted to events beyond his control. The latter situation is characterised as a "spontaneous event" rather than a reflexive action, thus operating on a different semantic level than the first sentence (Haiman cited in Kemmer, 1993, p. 27).

(a) On utomil sebja
   he exhausted RM
   'He exhausted himself'

(b) on utomil + sja
   he exhausted + MM
   'He grew weary'

In addition, the verbs previously discussed within the MM categories of 'grooming', 'change in body posture' and 'nontraslational motion', appear much more frequently with the light forms rather than the heavy forms – the latter being reserved for specific semantically distinct contexts. This suggests to Kemmer that such instances are in general not semantically motivated.

The relationship between the two structures is perhaps best described by the following quote:

"...since reflexive and middle markers often show synchronic and/or diachronic formal relations, we can conclude that there is a semantic relation between the categories that these markers express. On the other hand, the fact that languages often do make a formal distinction between reflexive and middle-marking also suggests that there is a semantic distinction between the functional correlates of these formal markers which is susceptible to linguistic coding." (Kemmer, 1993, p. 28)

This rather lengthy description of middle-marking structures across languages was included here to make a case for the disparity and complexity of this system, and for the presence of semantic choices inherent in specific grammatical forms. I will not attempt to discuss the generative approaches to middle-marking in this introduction, as their interest lies mainly in drawing syntactic links between unmarked verbs and their corresponding marked correlates. Such analyses focus on accounting for the multitude of MM phenomena represented by a single structure in an individual language (Kemmer, 1993). According to her own evaluation, Kemmer's account of the
MM contrasts with generative literature in that it focuses on the meaning of the diverse uses of the same form, as opposed to its syntactic context. The generative account lends itself to be extended to what Kemmer terms 'detransitivisation analysis' (p. 32) which proposes the MM to be "merely a surface indication of the fact that an argument that would be present in the corresponding transitive construction is absent in the MM construction" (p. 32). For example, according to Babby, the sole task of the Russian -sja is to mark that the transitive verb it represents appears intransitive for the purposes of a particular construction. Since Russian has an independent 'pronominal reflexive marker', sebja, the verbal affix -sja functions only as an extension of the verb (in Kemmer, 1993, p. 32).

Although important differences have been noted\(^2\), the composition of the Czech middle-marking system somewhat resembles that of Russian (i.e., similar application of verbal affixes and pronouns). It may therefore be tempting to generalise the above claim of functionality to Czech. I would like to argue, however, that the verbal affix in Czech has, at least in some cases, a more profound semantic significance of relating the experiencer of an intransitive form of the verb to the experience which is not represented by similar accounts. As I have already noted, the existence of 'optional' verbs provides a strong base for such arguments.

Kemmer makes a similar observation as her main criticism of the generative approach refers to the previously described category of deponents which do not fit into the generative structure. As deponents are quite a common occurrence within and across middle-marking languages, their presence needs to be accounted for, since, as far as Kemmer is concerned, the inclusion into the category of middle systems is not conditioned by the existence of a transitive verb counterpart (1993, p. 33).

\(^{22}\) Havránek (1928) warned that the verbal affix se, which exists in Czech, cannot be treated as equal to the Russian reflexive form sebja. This Czech verbal affix can also be used in instances where in Russian the use of the object form sebja in conjunction with a verb is obligatory. The example Havránek gives is 'vidět se v zrcadle', 'to see oneself in a mirror' (in Komárek, 2001, p. 207).
To explain her semantically driven typology of the middle-marking which speaks against the reduction of this phenomenon to syntactic analysis, Kemmer writes:

"Under the assumptions regarding the close interaction of form and meaning in human languages..., systematic distributional differences between two forms, including an association of the two forms with different semantic contexts, constitute strong arguments for distinct analytical treatment for the two forms. Moreover, the nature of these differences suggests that they require a semantic, rather than syntactic characterisation." (Kemmer, 1993, p. 35)

10.3.5 A Worldwide Referencing System?

Van Hoek argues that as part of the reference point model, the basic components, i.e., 'prominence', 'semantic connectivity' and 'linear order', are given as cognitive and semantic universals. This would mean that any conclusions drawn for English should hold across languages, although of course the specific linguistic constructions involved in referencing in English will not be identical to those in other languages. Even though governed by the same forces, any particular structure "is in part a matter of historical accident" (pp. 228-229). Van Hoek also speculates that one of the cross-linguistic variations will be "positioning of nominals along the accessibility scale", while the other will involve differences in the typology of the relevant linguistic situations" (van Hoek, 1997, pp. 228-229).

The apparent conclusion based on the section above calls for a more cautious approach in regards to universalist claims. For example, the phenomenon of reflexivisation occurs on a much more frequent basis in some languages than in others, as is clearly observable from the overwhelmingly common use of reflexives in Russian as compared to English (Kuno, 1987, p. 264).

On a more specific level, Deane speculates that in comparison with other languages (e.g., Icelandic), English does not warrant the use of reflexive markers as regularly. For example, a simple logophoric context in English fails to create such conditions which are limited only to situations where the
viewpoint is an integral part, such as in case of picture nouns. In contrast, speakers of many languages consider the logophoric link between the speaker and the contents of the clause as sufficient to produce a reflexive structure, without the need to further expound upon the perspective (Kemmer, 1995, p. 72).

10.3.6 Summary

In brief, this section deals with the issue of universality of the self-referent phenomenon discussed in the framework of Kemmer’s (1993) categorisation of middle-marking and reflexive structures across languages. Within this framework, Czech middle-marking is identified as a ‘two-form cognate system’, composed of a ‘heavy’ pronominal form sebe, and a related ‘light’ verbal affix se.

While the technical distinction between middle and reflexive markers is relatively unimportant, the specific circumstances of the use of both of these structures by Czech and English speakers constitute the main focus of this study.

I want to support Kemmer’s claim that “the intralinguistic and cross-linguistic generalisations observable in connection with middle voice systems are directly due to the semantics of middle marker” (1993, p. 23), and argue for the relevance of semantically motivated analysis of self-referent structures.

My main reason for believing that speakers’ choices are in some cases semantically driven is the existence of ‘optional’ referent verbs in Czech which may hold the potential of enhancing the connection between the experiencer and the experience. In addition, and based on the differences within the relevant linguistic structures of Czech and English, I decided to situate this exploration of the role of self-referent structures in the expression and conceptualisation of empathically motivated emotions within a cross-linguistic context. In light of the contrast between the referent systems of the
two languages I expect to uncover some related variations in the employment of these structures which will allow me to speculate as to the possible conceptual implications that such differences may have.

10.4 Reflexivity from a Developmental Perspective

Within the framework of cognitive theory of grammar, Deane (1992) talks about the concept of 'entrenchment', resulting from a number of correct applications of a specific structure. The more a linguistic concept is successfully used by the child, the more 'entrenched' it gets and the easier it becomes in terms of future use. This means that more commonly used and more concrete concepts will be more entrenched than the less frequent and more abstract ones, which is also linked to the ease of retrieval from memory. This connection is based on the number of associations available.

The age of acquisition plays an important role in this respect since early concepts will be more entrenched than those learned at a later age. Based on Piaget's characterisation of early conceptualisations as subject to mainly sensorimotor and egocentric perception of the world, Deane argues that the concepts encoded during the early years will be limited to such categories, therefore exposing concepts immediately tied to the body and its sensations to high entrenchment. More abstract thoughts, which follow in later childhood will be even then used with much lesser frequency, therefore leading to a lesser degree of entrenchment (Deane, 1992, p. 195).

Highly relevant to the current debate is Deane's example of the distinction between the concepts of I and self. 'I' represents a high level of subjectivity as it only allows for one viewpoint. 'Self', on the other hand, is more objective since it inherently contains more than one point of view and as it can be coupled with personal pronouns referring to others (e.g., herself). Egocentricity is given priority in terms of time of acquisition, leading in turn to a higher level of significance. 'I' is therefore entrenched more than 'self' (Deane, 1992, p. 195).
Specific to the topic of self-referent structures, Deane examines the acquisition of reflexivisation within the framework of the Silverstein Hierarchy, which is described by concepts such as ‘intimacy’, ‘empathy’, ‘agentivity’ and ‘topicality’. In terms of entrenchment, physical concepts, beings and things, occupy the top of the hierarchy, whereas abstract concepts and entities reside on the bottom, with a full range of concepts in between the two extremes. Similarly, human beings are on the top of the agentivity ladder, followed by animals and objects, through to locations and fully abstract concepts. The last, and for our purposes also the most important, is the scale of egocentricity. At the very bottom of the scale we will again find terms referring to abstract concepts which cannot be observed or manipulated, followed by spatial terms which can be used as bases for things and their manipulation. Physical objects, which can be managed and altered, occupy the middle ground. At the top are beings, capable of manipulating their own environment, followed by people. The peak of this hierarchy belongs to the egotistic self, positioned one degree above other selves (Deane, 1992, pp. 200-201).

Deane argues that the Silverstein Hierarchy corresponds directly to the Piagetian stages of development. First is the essentially egocentric sensorimotor stage (birth to 18 months), where any cognitive activity is linked directly to the immediate surroundings and situations. The preoperational stages (2-4, 4-7) are characterised by the movement from egocentricity to self-awareness, coupled with the developing ability for abstraction. Operational stage extends from the age of four until adolescence, being described by a higher level of abstraction and the ability to evaluate own perceptions, as well as cognitively navigate through three-dimensional spatial situations. The final stage in adolescence is characterised by the definite departure from egocentric behaviour to complex abstract and logical thought (Piaget, e.g, 1967, 1970).

Deane links the substages of Piaget’s sensorimotor stage with the concepts below. During substage I and II the child has no need or indeed ability to distinguish between self and others, since his/her activities are driven by
repetitive movements, responses to stimuli and reflexes. After reaching substage III the child begins to learn to manipulate its immediate environment, learning to recognise and interact with those who constitute a part of this environment as independent of, but similar to *self*. By substages IV and V of the sensorimotor stage, the child gains the capacity to plan, which involves the repetition of specific actions in order to reach the same result. Deane argues that this could be seen in terms of anaphoric referencing, in that “anaphoric reference requires memory and a comparison: present experience is identified with something that I experienced elsewhere and at another time…” (p. 227). Stage VI is characterised by the emergence of ‘representational thought’ - the ability to not only distinguish between individuals, but also to recognise types, which includes the understanding of the existence of individuals and objects which one has not yet come across.

**Self vs. Other**
**Participant vs. Nonparticipant**
**Deictic vs. Anaphoric**
**Individual (proper noun) vs. type (common noun)**
(Deane, 1992, p. 226)

Deane’s argument states that the concepts residing at the top of the Silverstein Hierarchy are acquired earlier (and therefore are more cemented through years) than those located at the other end. To apply this framework to the acquisition of reflexives, it would seem that, as Deane points out, the idea of an egocentric *self*, represented by the pronoun *I* is firmly embedded as a linguistic concept from early stages of development. The more intangible and abstract form of *self* – the focus of reflexive and middle-marking structures – is, however, located lower on the scale, since it requires the ability to distinguish between the egocentric *self* (and its relationship to *I* in any given linguistic construction), and the *selves* of others. This concept is also closely related to the Theory of Mind research outlined in the introduction.

This point could perhaps be further expanded to phenomena such as the reflexive verbal affix in Czech, which according to some represents a mere extension of the reflexive pronoun, while others see it as an independent
syntactic unit (this division will be discussed in the introduction to Czech data). I can only speculate that since its use mirrors the understanding of the complexities of the concept of *self*, its acquisition would probably be located at a close distance to the bottom of such a hierarchy.

10. 5 Summary

It would appear that the ability to make linguistic references to others is closely related to the understanding of the concept of *self* in its non-egocentric projection. In this respect, the current conception of linguistic reflexivity as contributing to empathic construction of social emotions captures the relevant aspect of language development. To paraphrase the Theory of Mind claim, the use of grammatical reflexivisation illustrates the child’s understanding of the fact that he/she as well as other protagonists featuring in his/her discourse possess *selves* which represent their beliefs, knowledge and emotions.
The Use of Self-referent Structures in Irish Children’s Emotion Discourse: Reflexive Pronouns

11.1 General Description of Data
11.2 Self-referencing and Emotions
   11.2.1 Feeling Ashamed and Guilty: Whose feelings are they?
   11.2.2 Feeling Bad, Sorry and Sad: For what *myself* has done
   11.2.3 Feeling Happy and Delighted: *Self* as the ‘counter-empathy’ marker
   11.2.4 Feeling ‘Selfish of Oneself’: The error category
11.3 Self-referencing and Cognition
11.4 Self-referencing and Physical Action
11.5 The Empathic Quality of *Self*
11.6 Summary

After the above introduction to the concepts of middle and reflexive marking, while fully accepting Kemmer’s point that middle voice cannot be reduced to reflexivity in terms of its semantic significance and characteristics, I would like to propose a simplified overall category of this grammatical structure. The aim of this concept is to focus on the contextual significance of these constructs, rather than their syntactic and grammatical overtones. I will refer to this semantically defined category as self-referencing.

*Self* in this context is not used as a mark of egocentric expression. Instead its characteristics lie in a wider sense in terms of referring to not only the personal *self* of the speaker or the character (as in the meaning of first person pronouns ‘I’ or ‘me’) but also in terms of the selves of others. Self-referencing can therefore be defined as any instance of a reflexive form or a middle marker as set out by Kemmer and others, which is used to emphasise the subjectivity of the speaker or the protagonists of his/her utterance. More specifically, all forms of the English *self* (myself, himself, ourselves, etc.), as well as all verbs accompanied by the affix *se/si* in Czech, and all forms of the pronoun *sebe*, will be included in the analysis which follows.
11.1 General Description of Data

The overall number of self-referencing instances in the Irish data was 58.\textsuperscript{23} The distribution across the sample of 45 children is illustrated by Table 1 below. Over half of the children (63%) used a self-referent marker at some point during the discourse. In the majority of these cases (47%), the self-reference was used on 1 or 2 occasions, in 4 cases (9%) it occurred 3 or 4 times within the discourse of the individual child, and 3 children (7% of the self-referencing group) used the marker 5 to 8 times. Exactly half of the boys – compared to 76% of the girls - included a self-marker in their narration at least on one occasion.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Self-referents</th>
<th>% of Children</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As previously noted, the transcriptions could be divided into sections of formal narrative guided by the picture stories, and more informal discussion about the children’s own experiences, their opinions and definitions of moral and emotion terms. The self-referent markers could therefore also be divided in terms of these two components (see Table 2). The children used 32 self-referent markers during the picture narratives. \textit{Himself} occurred 24 times, \textit{herself} 7 times, and \textit{yourself} once, as a result of direct speech of one of the characters. In describing their own lives and ideas, the children used 26 self-references, with the predictable \textit{myself} appearing 10 times and \textit{yourself} appearing 12 times, followed by \textit{himself} with the frequency of 3 and themselves, which occurred once.

\textsuperscript{23} This count omits the cases in which the child repeated an utterance involving a self-reference after the investigator (2 instances). Situations where the self-reference had been repeated within the same sentence as a part of the same pragmatic construction, or as a false start, had also been left out of the count (1 instance).
Table 2. Frequency of self-referent types across Irish children's discourse

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Self-referent</th>
<th>Narrative</th>
<th>Free Discourse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>myself</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yourself</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>himself</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>herself</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>themselves</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Irish data were divided into three main semantic categories: **Emotion**, **Cognitive** and **Physical Self-referencing**. All of the categories are rather self-explanatory. For example, the Emotion category contains all instances of self-referencing linked directly to positive and negative emotional states. References to mental processes of any description which involve the *self* constitute the Cognitive category, while self-referencing concerned with physical actions of the body is summarised under the heading of the Physical category. It is important to note here that this categorisation is guided purely on the basis of the above semantic divisions and it may therefore produce groupings inconsistent with those of other theorists. I will begin by describing the Emotion category.

11.2 Self-referencing and Emotions

11.2.1 Feeling Ashamed and Guilty: Whose feelings are they?

The Emotion category could be further subdivided into individual emotions. The emotional states most frequently discussed in terms of relevance to *self* were that of SHAME and GUILT. The children talked about the boy who stole the cat in the Cat story as being ashamed of himself, or being told by others that he should be.
They also gave their own examples of shame and offered their definition of the concept.

CHI 18
*HEA: I feel ashamed of myself because I broke his favourite wineglass.

CHI 49
*ARC: but my brother (i)s always taking my stuff
*ARC: and he should be ashamed of himself

CHI 25
*JES: like when someone probably slaps someone or kicks someone they say +"/ +" you should be ashamed of yourself

CHI 31
*INV: can you think of the word?
*CIR: um feeling ashamed of yourself

It would appear that in the above instances, the self-referencing marker forms a part of the linguistic association of the expression ‘ashamed’. This is not completely uninteresting and I will return to the discussion of such occurrences later. At the current level of analysis, however, similar connections do not hold much meaning. This is clearly observable on the following two excerpts where the term is used without any reference to a particular event or situation, therefore excluding any emotionally significant influences on a semantic level. It could even be argued that the term has been learned through repetition without being fully understood.

CHI 20
*INV: okay do you know the word <ashamed>['"]?
*CLA: I (ha)ve only heard it in um [///] you know when you say <you should be ashamed of yourself> ['"]

CHI 14m
*INV: have you ever heard of being ashamed?
*HUG: # ye(a)h.
*HUG: &th &se <they say> [///] some people say <that (i)s ashamed of yourself> [/] that (i)s ashamed # of yourself (1 instance)

Such lack of comprehension is most apparent in case of Child 14m. What is interesting here, however, is the partial outward orientation employed in the use of an erroneous form of the verb to be (i.e., ‘is’). This formulation exhibits only a very small link to the subjective nature of the concept of being ashamed of oneself as the speaker is clearly more preoccupied with the actual
object of the shameful action, and so says "THAT IS ashamed of yourself", rather than linking the action to the agent by the use of an appropriate verbal form. The utterance is repeated so we can assume that the speaker is not happy with its form. However, even on a second attempt he is unable to correct the discrepancy.

In contrast, the two following examples show a high level of subjective awareness in the case of Child 52m further stressed by the use of an ungrammatical preposition.

CHI 31
*INV: what does that mean? [guilt]
*CIR: um sort of like feeling ashamed of yourself
*CIR: but um you see its like um instead of just feeling ashamed of yourself um other people would as well

Child 31 incorporates the social aspect of the emotion into her definition of guilt. Instead of distinguishing the feelings of shame and guilt by stating that 'other people would also be ashamed of you', she repeats the phrase unsure of how to express the subjectivity of the emotion in terms of others. As a result, she arrives at a construction which captures her emotional understanding of the concept, as well as its relevance to the linguistic self, while leaving her slightly short of the necessary linguistic flexibility.

CHI 52m
*DAI: and <he goes> [/] he goes off and tells his mom
*DAI: and then I go like I kind of feel ashamed FOR myself

Not having quite mastered the phrase 'to be ashamed of oneself', Child 52 nevertheless attempts to convey the message by using a substitute preposition 'for'. In terms of pragmatics, this preposition works quite well in linking the experiencer's self to the emotion. The concept is clearly well understood and so is its link to the subjective self. However, the actual form of the link itself has seemingly not yet been fully acquired through repetition. The same phenomenon can be observed below, where an attempt is made to relate the feeling of disappointment to the subjectivity of shame, by applying the same linguistic formula.
CHI 29m

*INV: do you know when people go like "+/.
*INV: +” you should be ashamed of yourself?
*HAR: yeah
*INV: what do they mean by that?
*HAR: like you should be disappointed of yourself

While the search for the emotion synonym is quite successful, the preposition borrowed from the Investigator’s phrase lets the speaker down. The semantic intention in terms of subjectivity enhancement is nevertheless clear.

CHI 43m

*BRI: ashamed means like um [///]
*BRI: very ashamed of yourself means you are very sad
*BRI: and # um#
*INV: <when did> [///] can you think about an example
*INV: when you might feel ashamed?
*BRI: uh <when I> [///] when someone kicks someone else
*INV: uhhuh
*BRI: I am ashamed of myself

In contrast, Child 43 navigates through the linguistic representations with ease, switching from second to first person forms of the self-referencing marker. He, however, does not seem to fully comprehend the emotion concept involved. While linking his own subjectivity with the event taking place between others, the speaker shows that his idea of the actual emotion is only very limited. What is interesting here is that even in this context, the self-marker fills the role of expressing the level of the speaker’s involvement as perceived by him.

The contradiction apparent in the following example seems puzzling at first.

CHI 15m

*INV: what does it mean to feel ashamed?
*JOH: <like kind of> [///] like you did that by mistake
*JOH: like you are ashamed of yourself.
*INV: you did it by mistake?
*JOH: no he did it on purpose.
*JOH: and he is ashamed of himself.

It could perhaps be speculated that the form ‘yourself’, in this case serving as a projection of ‘myself’, is experienced with a higher degree of subjectivity than that of ‘himsolf’ (i.e., the character in the Cat story). Working on this
assumption, it is easier to explain own wrong doings in terms of a ‘mistake’. There is no need to exercise the same level of sensitivity with a character in a picture story who has established himself as being essentially a villain. Once again, it is argued that the self-referents play an important role in drawing such distinctions in the speaker’s mind.

11.2.2 Feeling Bad, Sorry and Sad: For what Myself has done

Other negative emotions occurring in conjunction with self-referencing include FEELING BAD, SORRY and SAD. Interestingly, the following four examples all describe the feeling of shame, in one case specifically mentioned by the Investigator. In all four of those examples the self-referent is used to emphasise the nominal pronoun. Feeling silly or bad could appear without this enhancer and communicate the same message. Here, however, the speakers use the marker to further empathise with the protagonist.

CHI 25
*INV: and have you ever heard the word <ashamed>"["]?
*INV: yeah ?
*INV: what does it mean, do you know?
*JES: em it means like to be feel silly for himself feel bad for himself that he did it

CHI 39
*INV: when he has to give the cat back in front of everybody?
*INV: how do you think that feels?
*RAC: um he felt very um very bad for himself
*RAC: and the way his mom and dad looked at him

CHI 55m
*DAI: and like you (ha)ve done something bad
*DAI: and <you should be> /[ ] you should be sorry
*DAI: like you should <be> /[// ] feel bad for yourself

CHI 39
*RAC: they (woul)d just say +" /
*RAC: +" you should be ashamed of yourself (repeated after INV)
*INV: yeah what other long words would they say?
*RAC: +" um you should feel very bad for yourself

In contrast, the use of the self-referent in the following example is not optional, instead it is a semantic requirement. ‘Himself’ refers to non-speaker subjectivity, which is crucial for the meaning of the utterance.
11.2.3 Feeling Happy and Delighted: Self as the ‘counter-empathy’ marker

The same principal operates in the following examples, which refer to positive emotional states such as the FEELINGS of HAPPINESS and DELIGHT. The character of the boy not only feels ‘happy’ or ‘delighted’ but the empathic link between the speaker and the character extends beyond this basic level. The boy is experiencing a positive emotional state as a direct consequence of his own action (i.e., stealing the cat), and it is this level of agentivity that perhaps represents the key to the use of the self-referent markers. The speaker is guided by his or her own conviction that stealing the cat was the wrong thing to do. Feeling happy as a result is therefore not an appropriate reaction, and so it becomes necessary to highlight the subjectivity of this emotion in relation to the character. In terms of expression of empathy with the protagonists of the sentence, the self-referencing serves almost the opposite function here, taking on the role of a ‘counter-empathy’ marker.

The examples below also support this claim. Even though both of the speakers here indicated the subjective happiness of the character, they also expressed their hesitation over the appropriateness of it (“he WOULD PROBABLY be happy for himself”) as well as including a clarification of the situation (“because he STOLE the cat”), which is quite elaborate in the second excerpt.
The inward orientation of the anger experienced by the character in the following example is also well expressed by the self-referent. Again, the form is not yet fully consolidated in the memory of the child, so two different prepositions are used. The intended expression of subjectivity has been achieved in both cases.

11.2.4 Feeling ‘Selfish of Oneself’: The Error category

Finally, the errors occurring in connection to self-referencing markers offer an interesting insight into the intentions and perceptions of the speaker. Consider the following extract.

By definition, the term ‘selfish’ refers to the self. There is no real need to intensify the subjectivity of this term. There are two possible explanations for what we see above. The first one could be linked to the proximity (situational
as well as semantic) of the phrase ‘to be ashamed of oneself’, the mentioning of which activates this linguistic construction in the child’s memory. Interestingly, however, this is the same child, which says ‘I kind of feel ashamed FOR myself’ in the example given in the previous section. 24

The second explanation could be placed at a semantic level, drawing once again upon the enhancement of subjectivity attributed to the non-speaker by the speaker. The same strategy is also used in the expression of own subjectivity by Child 22.

**CHI 22**
*INV: imagine if that was you how would you feel?
*GAR: very bad of *myself*

### 11.3 Self-referencing and Cognition

The category of COGNITIVE self-referencing in the Irish sample, contains only two types; ‘to **think** to oneself’ (2 frequencies) and ‘to **say** to oneself’ (5 frequencies). All of these occurrences reflect the character’s evaluation of the situation and different stages of decision making. The role of self-referencing in this context is further developed in the Czech data section.

Below are two examples of cognitive self-referents.

**CHI 45**
*LOR: and he starts to think to **himself** */.
*LOR: */ why should he have the cat?

**CHI 34**
*ADE: she (i)s saying to **herself** */.
*ADE: */ I wish there was someway I could help her

---

24 In terms of ‘intentionality’ of emotional states (described by Harris, 1995, p. 358) both of these prepositions can be seen as equal as both target the *self* as the source of the emotion.
11.4 Self-referencing and Physical Actions

The self-referring instances which could be grouped under the PHYSICAL category were of 3 types of action: ‘to hurt oneself’ (3 frequencies), ‘to introduce oneself’ (1 frequency), and ‘to play by oneself’ (3 frequencies). The self-marking in these cases is required by the pragmatics of these expressions. Without the self-referent the activity would simply cease to be relevant to the referent and instead it would describe actions of other protagonists. For this reason, and because this category is not directly linked to the subject of this study, I will not look at these cases in depth.

11.5 The Emphatic Quality of Self

The Irish sample included 10 instances of grammatically defined self-referents which cannot be categorised in terms of the semantic division attempted above. They do, however, serve a similar emphatic function such as those examined earlier which can provide further evidence for the present theory.

The self-referent used by Child 40 has a very clear function – to emphasise that even though he is capable of empathising with his friend’s joy, his emotions are primarily and quite strongly concerned with his own self.

CHI 40m
*INV: and then he would get the puppy and you wouldn’t
*INV: how would you feel about him?
*STV: I (would) feel happy for him
*INV: would you, yeah?
*STV: yeah
*INV: okay
*INV: would you feel anything else?
*STV: I (would) feel a little bit sad myself
*STV: because I would not have had one // 

Child 44 expresses a similar notion. In her case, however, it comes from the opposite perspective. She also acknowledges her subjective stand, even though on a pragmatic level, the sentence suggests that her emotions, i.e., fear for the others, is stronger that her self-concern.
The last example is perhaps the most intriguing of the three. The speaker begins by explaining why the character in the story should be concerned with another character’s lack of friends in the new neighbourhood. He attempts to justify the needed empathy on the girl’s part but somehow he fails to adopt the character’s perspective. He therefore reverts to another viewpoint, the viewpoint of the listener. This manoeuvre has two advantages. First, it immediately intensifies the listener’s attention but more importantly, it establishes the empathic link directly involving the listener, while completely bypassing the speaker.

11.6 Summary

To talk about emotions, the children in the English speaking group used self-referent structures for three main reasons: to relate the referent to the emotion, to highlight the experiencer’s subjectivity and to highlight the experiencer’s subjectivity for the purposes of own detachment from it. In other words, the reflexive system has been employed in order to mark agentivity, to adopt a perspective and to take an evaluative stance on the actions of others.

The overriding theme is again that of speaker and non-speaker subjectivity enhancement, resulting in varying levels of empathic identification on the side of the speaker, as observable through the linguistic emotion expressions ‘in the making’.

Based on the analysis of the above instances of self-referencing, it can be concluded that the issue of a viewpoint constitutes the most significant
element in all of the examples above. The speaker's inner position in relation
to the events described by his utterances cannot be kept hidden from the
listener. It is present even when the purpose of the statement is to remove the
speakers' personal self from the focal point of attention, such as is evident in
the statement of Child 44 in section 11.5, directly above. The speaker can also
decide to impose on the listener's experiencing self, by directly involving
him/her in his utterance (Child 51m above). The self-referent structure
therefore provides a powerful orientation instrument which serves both the
speaker as well as the listener in their navigation through the emotional, and
more specifically empathic contextual environment.
Self-referent Marking in Czech

12.1 Czech Verbs

Czech is a language with a high level of flexion where relations between the words in a sentence are indicated by grammatical suffixes. This system allows the word order to be quite loose, since individual words are not bound to specific syntactic positions. Such a system leads to dramatic differences between English and Czech which not only occur at a morphological and syntactic level but also affect the content of the text. For example, passive constructions are more common in English, where they can be used to achieve a particular syntactic order, than they are in Czech, where changes in word order can lead to the same means (Dušková, 1997, p. 39).
In terms of aspect, the English continuous tense is often considered to exhibit the closest correspondence to this linguistic phenomenon which exists in Czech. However, the match is not a perfect one since the English continuous forms mark not only an event in progress but also code for the current occurrence of it. In comparison, the application of the Czech imperfective form is wider. It marks repeated and ordinarily occurring actions, as well as those currently taking place. To illustrate this point, Dušková (1997, p. 40) gives the following examples:

The plane was landing.
Letadlo přistávalo.

The plane landed.
Letadlo přistálo.

It often rains here.
Často tady prší.

We drank beer.
Pili jsme pivo.

He drank a glass of beer.
Vypil sklenici piva.

(Dušková, 1997, p. 41)

The most important difference between Czech and English, in terms of aspect, lies in the linguistic levels at which it is encoded. In Czech, the majority of verbs are identified as perfective or imperfective by their morphemic structure. This characteristic is therefore displayed in the form of a lexical unit. In English, the aspectual distinction comes at the level of tense construction, more specifically, it only appears in the form of continuous tense. As a result, basic forms are aspectually unidentifiable, and perfective or imperfective aspect is only apparent from context (Dušková, 1997, p. 41).

We drank beer.
Pili jsme pivo.

He drank a glass of beer.
Vypil sklenici piva.

(Dušková, 1997, p. 41)

Using an interesting example, Dušková also demonstrates how English allows for an ambiguity within its aspectual marking. While in English such ambiguity is resolved through lexical or even syntactic means, in Czech its occurrence is unacceptable in the first place, as the aspect is obligatorily imperfective. Any clarification then comes in the form of a perfective verb.
A. Mr. P. choked a girl once.
B. Choked her to death?
A. No, just choked her.

A. Pan P. jednou rduśil nějakou dívku.
Mr. P. choked a girl once.
B. Zاردousil ji?
choked [perfective]?
A. Ne, jen ji rдousil.
o, just choked [imperfective]

(Dušková, 1997, p. 41, highlights added)

It is clear from similar examples that the treatment of temporal and aspectual concepts by Czech and English is not identical. As such the two systems are likely to produce idiosyncratic variations in the ‘grammatical focus’ of their speakers, as described, for example, by Slobin (e.g., 1991,1994,1996,1998) and others. I will now focus on yet another grammatical distinction separating the two languages, reflexive marking in Czech.

12.2 Czech Reflexives

At a close examination of its grammatical system, it appears that Czech self-referencing operates at two individual levels. First, there is the pronoun sebe, ‘self’ which (unlike in English) as a lexical unit lacks further specification in terms of the protagonist. This reflexive pronoun has no nominal case as it establishes the link to the subject of the sentence, regardless of its grammatical case (Havránek & Jedlička, 1981, p. 89). Its form remains unchanged with respect to number. It does however, vary with the cases of declension, such as in the following example.

Vim to o sobě.
I know it about myself.

The second system uses the verbal affix se or si, which is commonly referred to in Czech literature as reflexive. Despite the obvious inconsistency in the terminology, this division is congruous with one of Kemmer’s (1993) above discussed category of middle marking languages - the two-form cognate system, where the verbal affix constitutes the middle marker and the reflexive pronoun the reflexive marker.
The two self-referencing systems – pronouns and verbs – will for reasons of clarity be treated separately here. I would, however, like to consider the debate currently taking place among Czech linguists over the issue of their independence of each other. According to Oliva (2001, p. 200) the expert opinion on the syntactic status of the reflexive forms se and si is far from being united. It can, however, be narrowed down to two conflicting positions, each represented by a well known figure in Czech linguistics.

One of those views conceives of the se/si affix as a general reflexive particle which does not (with some exemptions) constitute a syntactic unit as such (i.e., cannot be considered a verbal object). This view is represented by Havránek in his 'Genera verbi in Slavonic Languages', published in 1928, where it is suggested that the reflexive component has lost its independent semantic position within the sentence (in Oliva, 2001, p. 200).

Šmilauer (1966) defends the opposite side, with his belief that the reflexives se/si very often hold their position as an object of a sentence, in which case these verbal affixes can be substituted by the forms sebe or sobě (in Oliva, 2001, p. 201).

The main difference therefore lies in the general classification of the status of the reflexive component se/si. According to Havránek’s view, in contemporary Czech se/si do not constitute a full syntactic unit. As a result, this verbal affix cannot be treated as a form of a personal pronoun but its classification has to be limited to an independent morpheme. Šmilauer, on the other hand, proposes that the verbal affix be classified in terms of ‘personal reflexive pronouns’, which constitute a ‘short’ form of the full forms sebe in accusative, and sobě in the dative case (Oliva, 2001, p. 201). Similar distinction between ‘light’ and ‘heavy’ forms can be found in Kemmer’s (1993, p. 27) work which I have already mentioned, although Kemmer’s classification is concerned with the level of reflexivity produced by each of these forms.
Oliva, even though admitting that most experts support the view of *se/si* as the accusative and dative forms of the reflexive pronoun, disputes this classification and takes it upon himself to demonstrate the opposite. On a closer examination of the above views, Oliva draws the following conclusion: if *se/si* are treated as an object of a verb (or in some cases of other syntactic members), then co-reference develops on a syntactic level. The same applies to the full forms *sebe/sobě*. If, however, the verbal affix is treated as a morpheme, the co-reference is created at a morphological level. This is in contrast to the syntactic co-reference occurring in relation to fully syntactic pronouns *sebe/sobě* (Oliva, 2001, p. 205).

Panevová (1999), on the other hand, disagrees with Oliva’s view of *se/si* as a ‘parasemantic’ unit, which only gains its meaning through its union with other units, and where the role of an Actor can only ever be ascribed to the full form of the pronoun, i.e. *sebe/sobě*. For Panevová the *se/sebe* and *si/sobě* distinction is that of ‘positional variations of the same morpheme’ (p. 271).

Komárek (2001, p. 208) enters this debate from yet another angle, by presenting an interesting point put forward by Havránek (1928). Here Havránek suggests that the verbal affix *se* does not have to constitute an accusative form of a verbal object. Instead, what we are faced with is a ‘reflexive verb’, a special reflexive form with a singular purpose.

**12.3 Summary**

The aim of this chapter was to provide a brief outline of the grammatical phenomenon of reflexivity in Czech. I will now attempt to move away from the more specific debate on the origins of the duality of this system which was mentioned above. The main reason for its inclusion here was to demonstrate the apparent opacity of this concept.

As part of this study I would like to investigate the ‘larger than linguistic qualities’ of reflexive structures, as well as the extent to which they are
employed by Czech speakers to explore the subjectivity of the situations they create through language. The categories described below are therefore not based on grammatical or pragmatic distinctions, instead the forms are divided purely according to semantic relevance.

The phenomenon of self-referencing through verbal affix does not exist in English. I will therefore have to largely rely on the exploratory nature of this study as any comparisons and links drawn between self-referencing in the Irish and the Czech sample will have to extend across this cleft. The existence of such a form in one language and its absence in another, however, provide in themselves a fascinating topic. It is indeed the examination of linguistic options available to the speakers in their expression of viewpoint and empathic relations which exist in each of these languages that lie at the core of this study.
The Use of Self-referent Structures in Czech Children’s Emotion Discourse: Reflexive Pronouns

13.1 Reflexive Pronoun ‘sebe’

The total frequency count of all reflexive pronouns appearing in the narratives of the Czech children was 9, with 15.5% of the children using this form. Almost one third of this group produced two, while the rest only one reflexive pronoun. Only two out of the total of nine self-referents were used outside an emotional context.

CHI II
*INV: nebo co bys tak musela udělat aby si se styděla?
or what would you have to have done to feel ashamed?

*VER: ## no tak třeba um pučit si vod někoho něco
well maybe to borrow something from somebody

*VER: mit to u sebe dlouho
have it long <in your possession > (to yourself)

CHI 29m
*PAV: no a tady oni se na sebe koukaj a ona si myslí že jako budou dobrý
kamarádky
and here they are looking at each other and she thinks that they will be good
friends

The following two examples are very similar to what we have already encountered in the English data. The referent function here operates at the most basic level, by relating the experience back to the experiencer. Without the reflexive pronoun, the source of the annoyance and anger could be external to the experiencer.

CHI II
*INV: a (k)dyž ho potom najdou
and then when they find him

*INV: tak jak myslíš že mu je?
how do you think he feels?
We have also already seen examples of the function of the referent as a highlighter. Similarly, Child 13 uses self-reference as an emphatic marker within an idiomatic phrase.

In the example below, the speaker attempts to set up the viewpoint of the characters as opposed to her own, which is perhaps not identical. She describes the loneliness of one of the characters, while the other children continue to play without paying any attention to her. She concludes the setting of the scene by saying “a ta hočička vlastně je smutná”, ‘and so the little girl is actually sad’. The last statement suggests a higher level of empathy with the girl than with the other children. Nevertheless, fulfilling her duty as a narrator, Child 13 sets up the empathic link with those whose actions she is describing in that particular segment of the picture story.

The following two examples illustrate the function of the self-referent pronoun as an enhancer of the experiencer’s subjectivity.
so how do you think that he feels?

*TER: stydi se jako
*TER: uh mysli si <jako že> [/] um uh um <jako že aby> [/] jako <že> [/]
well he thinks that ...
&š že tam těm udělal um bolest a tady těm zase udělal a sobě si udělal radost
that he caused pain to the others and pleased himself

What we can see here is a double self-referent. Sobě, which is the dative case of the reflexive pronoun is used in conjunction with the self-referent verb, ‘please/cheer up oneself’, udělat si radost. The same occurs in the sentence below, where the character pauses ‘to think to himself (perfective form) about himself’ and to critically look back at his own actions. In this case the construct indicates the feelings of remorse which are only implied in the first sentence. There can, however, be no doubt about the character’s preoccupation with the self, in terms of its actions and their effect on the other protagonists of the story. This again illustrates how speakers use the strategy of self-reference to address the listener from a specific point of view, in this case that of the main protagonist.

CHI 30
*INV: jak mysli že mu bylo?
how do you think he felt?
*ADE: tak se asi zamyslel nad sebou
well he probably thought about <over> himself
13.2 Summary of Some General Points of Comparison

Based on the analysis so far, the use of the self-referent pronouns by the Czech group, in comparison to the Irish group, could be characterised by the following points:

➢ The frequency of use was dramatically lower in the Czech group.
➢ As in the Irish sample, the majority of the referent pronouns which did occur could be linked to emotion context.
➢ Most of the main categories of use within emotion discourse appear to correspond to those observed in the Irish group, i.e., added emphasis, statement of agentivity and expression of perspective.
➢ The use of self-referent pronouns to mark an evaluative stand, apparent in the Irish children’s discourse, has not been found in the Czech group.
➢ An additional strategy has been noted, which further highlights the subjectivity of the referent through the combined use of reflexive pronoun and reflexive verb, and which cannot be achieved in English.
The Use of Self-referent Structures in Czech Children’s Emotion Discourse: Reflexive Verbs

14.1 Overview of Grammatical Categorisation
14.1.1 Obligatory Self-referents
14.1.2 Optional Self-referents
14.1.3 Constructed Self-referents
14.1.4 False Start Self-referents

14.2 Optional Self-referent Verbs
14.2.1 Physical Acts with Emotional Undertones
14.2.2 Finding and Hiding for Oneself
14.2.3 Verbs of Affection for Own Benefit
14.2.4 ‘Getting Yourself a Friend’
14.2.5 Subjectivity as an Option?

14.3 Obligatory Self-referent Verbs
14.3.1 Emotion Semantic Category: The voices from behind the meaning
14.3.2 Cognitive Semantic Category: Talking to oneself
14.3.3 Semantic Category of Actions with Moral or Social Implications: Every argument has one side

14.4 Constructed Self-referent Verbs
14.5 False Starts
14.6 Passive or Object-linked Instances of Self-referents
14.7 Summary

In light of the previous section it could be concluded that the use of self-referent or reflexive pronouns in the Czech group was less common than in the Irish group. However, this difference between the two languages is reversed once we include the verbs with self-referent affixes. What follows is a detailed account of the main categories of self-referent verbs found in the discourse of the Czech children. The semantic categorisation is organised on similar bases as the self-referents drawn from the Irish data. In addition, the semantic categories are also described in terms of a grammatical dimension, the main classes of which are outlined below.

14.1 Overview of Grammatical Categorisation

14.1.1 Obligatory Self-referents

In this category, the meaning of the verb in a particular context requires its reflexive form. Without the verbal affix the verb would gain a slightly- or
completely different semantic quality. For example, the verb hráť, to play, which is generally used to refer to activities such as playing a musical instrument or games and sports, acquires a different connotation when linked with the affix si. Hráť si is used to talk about children's play, or activities resembling children's play, such as aimlessly connecting together paper clips while sitting at a desk or tearing up beer mats in a pub. Although this distinction between hráť and hráť si (which could perhaps be compared to that between playing and amusing oneself) may seem quite insignificant, there are very clear semantic boundaries marking out the use of each of these forms. Typically, however, this category would include verbs referring to activities in some way connected to self, such as washing, dressing and grooming oneself where the reflexive affix is necessary to link the verb to the executor of the action.

Furthermore, the self-referent contexts described by the Obligatory verbs are divided into three semantic categories: Emotion, Cognitive, and Actions with Moral/Social Implications. Those obligatory reflexive verbs appearing in the data, which did not come under any of the above headings, were classified as Physical Actions. Due to large volumes of data, and with consideration to its relative remoteness from the topic of the current study, this class was not included here.

14.1.2 Optional Self-referents

This class deals with reflexive verbs the meaning of which would not be dramatically affected by adding or removing their reflexive affix. In this case, the affix can be seen as emphasising the subjective aspect of the action. This can be demonstrated, for example, by the use of the verb najít, to find and its reflexive form najít si. Both of the sentences below are equal in their logical content. In addition, sentence (b) also highlights the speaker's involvement in the process of finding work, and his perceived need and decision to communicate this aspect of the situation to others.
14.1.3 Constructed Self-referents

Here the speaker unusually decides to attach the reflexive affix to a verb which does not typically have a reflexive form. Such a modification marks the relatedness of the verb to the executor of the action. This is a remarkably fluid function of the spoken language, which allows for such adjustments without threatening the listener comprehension. It inserts added subjectivity into the meaning of the verb, while maintaining the objective message of the sentence. For instance, the colloquial form of the verb ‘to cry’, břecet does not normally exist as a self-referent structure. An addition of the self-referent si does not, however, affect the logical meaning of this expression. Instead it acts as its reinforcement.

(a) Nejraději BŘECÍM když jsem sama doma.
   I prefer to cry when I am home alone.
(b) Nejraděj SI BŘECÍM když jsem sama doma.
   I prefer to cry to myself when I am home alone.

14.1.4 False Start Self-referents

The category of False Starts is defined by the use of the self-referent affix sel/si in an incomplete sentence, where the main verb is missing. Such cases were included in the analysis as they hold the potential of revealing the speaker's intentions as to whom the perceived subjective viewpoint should be attributed.

14.2 Optional Self-referent Verbs

I will begin with this category because, by definition, it offers a unique opportunity to access the reasons that speakers may have for choosing a self-referent verb in the context in which there is no grammatical obligation to do so. I will then move onto the Obligatory verbs, concluding this chapter by the
discussion of Constructed and False Start categories, which also promise to be highly informative in terms of speakers' construction of subjectivity.

As already mentioned, the verbs included in the category of Optional self-referents are defined by their variable use in terms of what, in Czech grammar, is referred to as reflexivity. Optional verbs can appear either with or without a self-marker, depending on the context, or indeed the intentions of the speaker. I will borrow two concepts from Kemmer's (1993) middle marking terminology, and use the term 'marked' form to identify verbs accompanied by a self-referent and the term 'unmarked' verb to describe the simple form of the verb, occurring without the reflexive affix. It is important to note that due to the vast frequencies of verbs defined by this category, only verbs used within the context relevant to the subject of this study (i.e., language used to describe mental and emotional states and behaviours linked to them), and which fulfil the criteria for the self-referencing group were included here.

Table 1 represents an overview of the Optional self-referencing verbs used by the Czech children in this sample. Let me briefly consider each of those types in relation to their expression of subjectivity, while examples of their use in the children's narratives are given.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Self-referent verb</th>
<th>Meaning in English</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. vžít si</td>
<td>take</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. držet si</td>
<td>hold</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. nést si</td>
<td>carry</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. najít si</td>
<td>find</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. schovat si</td>
<td>hide</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. chovat si</td>
<td>nurse</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. hladít si</td>
<td>pet/stroke</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. jít si</td>
<td>come</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
14.2.1 Physical Acts with Emotional Undertones

I will start the discussion of the instances summarised in Table 1 with the first three verbs, *vzít si, držet si, nést si*. All of these verbs refer to physical activity, which through the reflexive affix gains an emotional significance. *Vzít* is a perfective form of what loosely corresponds to the meaning of the English ‘to take’ (however, later we will see that this verb has wider idiomatic applications similar to the English ‘to get’), *držet* could be translated as ‘to hold’ and *nést* as ‘to carry’. The reflexive form adds a subjective dimension to each of these verbs by enhancing the agent’s involvement in the process in question.

The little girl in example (a) below is not simply ‘holding’ a doll. She is holding it for her own comfort, or perhaps so that no one can take it away from her. This is dramatically different from holding something for somebody else, or holding, for example, a cup while trying to decide where to put it down. Similarly, the same girl is not only carrying a doll (b) but she brought the doll to the playground with her to keep her company in a strange neighbourhood that she had just moved into.

(a) <tady holčička SI> [//] tady postavila kouli a DRZÍ SI panáčka (CHI 32m nar)
   *here the little girl, here she built a ball and she is holding a doll*
(b) a NESE SI panenku (CHI 32m nar)
   *and she is carrying a doll*

Examples (c) and (d) illustrate the subjective undertone of the reflexive form *vzít si*. The doll in excerpt (c), as well as the friend (d), are both used to serve the agent’s needs, which in sentence (d) is explicitly stated. Having the option of using the unmarked verb, the speaker decided to indicate the subjectivity of the process of bringing a friend or a doll along for one’s comfort and company, by using the self-referencing form, and so expressing the identification with the character. The emotional aspect of the situation is in all of these cases deliberately highlighted by the narrator. The word ‘deliberate’ is justified here by the fact that in all of the cases mentioned so far, the meaning of the sentence would be preserved in terms of its objective message even if the
simple form of the verb had been selected in place of the marked form. The use of the longer and more complex form is therefore unlikely to be coincidental.

(c) a VZALA SI s sebou &panen panenku (CHI 25nar)  
and she brought a doll with her

(d) chtěla SI VZIT a(le)spoň kamarádku když tady má Jenom kluky (CHI 34m)  
she wanted to bring at least a girlfriend since here she only has boys

Excerpt (f) below describes the picture Cat 6, in which one of the characters holds the cat up in his arms, after he has stolen it. But unlike example (e), where the boy took the cat for *himself to keep*, here the speaker comments on the physical act of the boy picking the cat up and holding it in his hands. It should again be noted that both sentences, (f) as well as (e), would express the same pragmatic relations without the affix *se*. By opting for the self-referent form here, however, the speakers emphasised the character's personal involvement in the situation. Without the use of the referent, the sentence (f) would simply describe somebody picking up a cat. With it, the subjectivity is enhanced and the listener is invited not only to speculate about the boy's intentions and the events that might follow, but also to speculate as to what happened prior to this statement.

(e) a tenhle je na stromě a je smutnej že tenhle čten uviděl kočku a VZAL SI ji driv (CHI 24nar)  
and this one is in the tree and he is sad that that one saw the cat and took her first

(f) tady SI jí VZAL do ruky ten # zlej (CHI 8 nar)  
here the bold boy took her into his hand

To illustrate the subtlety of this distinction, consider the English translation of the following sentence:

a ten chlapeček brečel protože SI domu tu kočičku nemoh VZIT (CHI 12m nar)  
and the little boy cried because he couldn't take the kitty home

Or perhaps the translation would be more accurate if it went like this:

*and the little boy cried because he couldn't take the kitty home with him*
But then again, this version would perhaps be more representative of the full Czech meaning:

\[
\text{a ten chlapeček brečel protože SI domu tu kočičku nemoh s sebou VZÍT}
\]

Every translator is painfully aware that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to arrive at an exact translation of any text into another language. What I just tried to demonstrate is that the self-referent form in the Czech sentence above, and in many others, cannot be simply matched by an additional clause in English. Its meaning in many cases escapes through the net of the basic semantic units – words.

The crucial message of the original sentence is not the boy’s inability to take the cat home, maybe to feed it or to give it shelter from bad weather. It was important to the narrator to communicate that the character was upset because he was not allowed to take the cat home for his own pleasure, to play with.

The examples below take this point further still. Here the original meaning of the verb is even more abstracted. In sentences (g) and (h) vzít loses its practical meaning of ‘to physically extract something from somewhere’, and instead stands for a more idiomatic and intangible concept of ‘gaining or keeping something in one’s possession’. Interestingly, in sentence (g) the marked and unmarked forms of the verb co-occur, further illustrating this point. Literally translated, here the boy ‘takes’ the cat and runs away in order to ‘take him’ (keep him).

\[
\begin{align*}
(g) & \quad \text{a <ten> [/] ten VZAL kocoura a utika s nim &a aby SI ho VZAL (CHI 3 nar)} \\
& \quad \text{and this one took the cat and ran with him so that he could take <keep> him}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
(h) & \quad \text{jako je rad že jí má že SI jí může VZÍT (CHI 36)} \\
& \quad \text{he is kind of glad that he has it and that he can take <keep> it}
\end{align*}
\]

14.2.2 Finding and Hiding for Oneself

The following two verbs, \textit{najít si} and \textit{schovat si}, refer to ‘finding’ and ‘hiding’ something for oneself. The examples below are used here to again illustrate the
significance of the self-referent form in terms of subjectivity of these two actions.

In (i) and (j) the boy’s excitement over finding the cat ‘for himself’ is highlighted not only by the use of emotion terms, such as ‘happy’ (i), but also by the use of the affix which indicates his intentions to keep the cat for his own amusement.

(i) ta(d)y ten je šťastnej že SI toho kocoura vlastně ho NAŠEL (CHI 3)
and this one here is happy that he found the cat [for himself]

(j) prišel za maminkou a &z za tetou a řekl jim že SI venku NAŠEL kočku a někdo mu ji ukradl (CHI 2m nar)
he came to his mom and his aunt and told them that he found a cat [for himself] outside and somebody stole it from him

The boy in utterance (k) below, contemplates what to do with the cat that he had just stolen. The narrator’s choice of the marked form schovat si suggests, that through an empathic connection with the character, the narrator is not just concerned about the moral and practical consequences of the search party finding the cat (i.e., the embarrassment of the situation, the possible punishment, etc.). She is also worried about the ‘thief’ losing the cat, so she speaks of hiding it ‘for himself’, as opposed to just hiding it so that nobody could find it.

(k) no a teď je zase takovej že by SI to kočátko měl někde asi SCHOVAT (CHI 11)
and now he is like that he should hide the kitten [for himself] somewhere

14.2.3 Verbs of Affection for Own Benefit

Unlike the lexical items discussed above, the final pair of verbs that I have included in this section, chovat si and hladit si, illustrates the phenomenon of referent subjectivity from the position of high emotional involvement inherent in the verbs themselves.

Utterances (l) and (m) both describe somebody stroking somebody else’s pet. In both instances, it is very clear that the experiencer is stroking the pet for his
own pleasure and not for the benefit of the pet. In excerpt (l) the speaker explains why he would not be jealous if his best friend got a puppy that he himself always wanted. Utterance (m) is given as an explanation for the apparent upset of the boy in the tree, in picture Cat 1. The verb’s original meaning – ‘to stroke’ or ‘to pet’ - is in both cases adapted for the purposes of stating the agent’s subjective reasons for his behaviour. The viewpoint of the other party involved in this exchange, i.e., that of the animal, is understated as a result.

(1) ale třeba bych k němu chodil na návštěvu a tam bych SI ho třeba POHLADIL (CHI 12 nar) but maybe I would go to visit him and there I would maybe pet [for myself] him (the puppy)

(m) protože on SI HLADÍ tu jeho kočičku (CHI 33 nar) because he is petting [for himself] his cat

The same emphatic focus on the perspective of the executor of the action can be observed in utterance (n).

(n) a začal SI ji CHOVAT (CHI 12 nar) and he started to nurse her [the cat]

14.2.4 ‘Getting Yourself a Friend’

This last example, the reflexive verb jit si, is not dissimilar to those above. Here the simple verb to go gains the idiomatic meaning of ‘getting somebody/something’. Once again, however, it is the agent of the sentence whose perspective is explicitly marked here by the referent. In utterance (o) the girl goes to get a friend ‘for herself’. In extract (p) the verb focuses on the subjectivity of a child who came to ask another child to play. The narrators therefore offer not only the subjective view of the main character (i.e., “vona byla ráda”, ‘she was kind of glad’) through the eyes of which the story is told, but more interestingly also that of the second character involved. In terms of Theory of Mind terminology, this could be called the ‘second order referent’, as it is implied by the speaker that ‘the somebody’ who came to ask the main character to play also had her own subjectivity. This character is not employed only to play its role in accordance with the main story line, but it has a life of its own, with its own motivations and subjective reasons for its actions. She
did not only come to play with the new girl (which could have easily been communicated through the simple form of the verb *přijít*). She came to play *for herself* (i.e., *přijít SI*). Maybe she did not have anybody to play with either, maybe she wanted new friends - the interpretation is up to the listener. However, the suggestion that the character did have her own reason is very clearly marked by the speaker through the very explicit choice of the referent form.

(o) třeba spolu kamaráděj nebo SI ŠLA pro kamarádku (CHI 32m)
maybe they are friends or she went to get a friend

(p) no a tady jako teda vona byla ráda že k ní jako SI PŘÍŠEL si s ní někdo hrát (CHI 23)
and here she was kind of glad that somebody came to play with her

14.2.5 Subjectivity as an Option?

All of the above instances of the eight types of Optional self-referents revealed commonalities in their application to establishing the appropriate viewpoint. In order to find the perspective from which to report the event, the speaker has to empathically assess the situation. He or she then sets the scene for the listener, and decides how much voice each of the characters will be given.

As I had hoped to document in this section, reflexive structures represent a very subtle and yet powerful system for achieving those means. It would appear that the main strategy in this respect is the enhancement of subjectivity of the particular experiencer through the eyes of which the listener is invited to follow the events. Moreover, self-referent verbs allow for such a perspective shift, which can be achieved immediately, to be quite localised, even peripheral, as well as unobtrusive to the narrative perspective as a whole.

14.3 Obligatory Self-referent Verbs

The Obligatory category of self-referent verbs captures those instances, where the verbal affix constitutes an inherent part of the verb. Such verbs either do
not have an unmarked equivalent, or the absence of the self-referent dramatically alters their meaning. As already mentioned, the self-referent contexts described here can be divided into three semantic categories: **Emotion, Cognitive, and Actions with Moral/Social Implications.** I will discuss each of those categories in detail next.

### 14.3.1 Emotion Semantic Category: The voices from behind the meaning

In order to present the following analysis in a coherent manner, I have decided to more or less follow the story lines of the two narratives, which can be described in terms of the targeted emotions experienced by the characters. I will therefore consider the segments of the children’s speech accounting for the instances of shame, guilt and empathy separately. In addition, the setting up of the scene to the Cat story (i.e., picture Cat 1) had produced some references to another socially reflexive emotion, *envy*, which I have also included below.

The initial pictures of the Cat story show one of the characters playing with his cat, while the other decides to steal it. The following table summarises the five self-referent verbs used by the Czech children to narrate this part of the story.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Self-referent verb</th>
<th>Meaning in English</th>
<th>Frequencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. oblibit si</td>
<td>to become fond of</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. líbit se</td>
<td>to like</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. mít se</td>
<td>to be lucky</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. smát se</td>
<td>to laugh</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. zděsit se</td>
<td>to get a shock</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first two verbs, *oblibit si* and *líbit se*, both refer to the boy’s emotional attachment to the cat.

---

25 It should be noted that the classification of verbs in terms of the individual emotions is very fluid as its main purpose is to organise the data rather than to produce formal categorisation for the purposes of comparison or generalisation.
This sentence refers to picture Cat1 where one of the boys hides in the tree and watches the other play with a cat. At this point, the way in which the story unfolds is open to interpretation. In this particular case, however, the speaker chooses to build the plot around the fact that the boy in the tree uses the cat to secretly observe and follow the other boy around. In sentence (a) the boy in the tree is concerned that the other boy might ‘become fond of the cat’ or ‘attached to the cat’, že SI jí OBLÍBI. It is interesting that a character who is spying on another character should contemplate whether or not the one he is secretly watching will become emotionally attached to the ‘bait’ he had set for him. Nevertheless, the choice of the reflexive verb OBLÍBIT SI clearly marks the speaker’s identification with the character, through another character’s eyes.

Similarly, in the second type the speaker also uses the verb ‘to become/be fond of’ but in a slightly different capacity. Even though the root of the verb is the same, the form oblíbit si has a perfective connotation. To become fond of somebody is a completed action. To be fond of somebody, or to like somebody - líbila se mu - is an ongoing process. I will return to the consideration of the perfective/imperfective distinction later. What is more important here is the difference in focus in both sentences, indicated by the verbal affix. Where in sentence (a) the boy is the agent - the one ‘doing’ the liking, in sentence (b) the cat is the one pleasing the boy. His involvement is represented by the pronoun in its dative form. Interestingly, this second referent or empathic dimension is not present in a construction of a similar meaning in English. It would therefore seem that in Czech being liked is something that the object of the fondness has to actively participate in. Presumably, English speakers also have to employ a considerable amount of
energy on being thought fondly of. The question is, why are their efforts linguistically acknowledged to a lesser degree than those of people being liked in Czech? And it seems to be a matter of varying degrees. We only have to go one step higher on the strength of expression scale to get to ‘being impressed by somebody’, achieving the same level of agentivity for the object of an English sentence. We will encounter this issue repeatedly throughout the following analysis and I will attempt to deal with it in due course.

The second verb which also appeared twice in the narratives of the same pictures, *mit se*, is an idiomatic expression referring to being lucky or having good fortune, formed by the reflexivisation of the verb ‘to have’, *mit*.

(c) ‘<ten SE MÁ> [*] (CHI 2m)
    he is so lucky

(d) že tenhle tenhle tenhle tenhle tenhleten SE MÁ (CHI 2m)
    that this one thought that that one is lucky

The emphatic aspect of the speaker’s perspective is very strongly represented here by the use of the self-referent form. This is apparent in both of the examples above. Sentence (c) is a direct quotation and sentence (d) is another example of what could also be termed a ‘second order empathy statement’. What is striking about this construct, however, is the inherent jealousy embedded at the core of this idiom. It is difficult to imagine a discursive situation where this phrase would be used without a connotation of envy or jealousy. I would like to argue that it is the self-referent that produces this effect.

If the objective of the statement was to let the other person know that the speaker recognises and wishes to comment on their luck or good fortune, a very direct route in the form of the two following idioms could be taken - *ty máš štěstí*, ‘you are lucky’, or a stronger version of the same *ty máš ale štěstí*, ‘you really are lucky’. These phrases convey this exact ‘nominal’ message. What they do not do, however, is explicitly state how the speaker feels about his friend’s luck. It is left entirely up to the listener to decide whether the speaker is pleased for the other protagonist or whether there are detectable
signs of envy. In contrast, by using the idiom with the reflexive form – *ty se máš* - the author of the utterance does not invite the listener to speculate. It is clear that the speaker is envious of the other person’s good fortune. He very explicitly adopts the other’s viewpoint by using the second person self-referent (i.e., *ty*). The subjective connection has been established and the speaker shows not only empathy and identification with the luck experienced by the other person, but he also expresses envy. This is obviously not to say that this statement eliminates all aspects of being pleased for the other. It merely offers the option of openly expressing one’s envy by adopting the other person’s perspective and essentially saying ‘I wish it was me’. The tool for this perspective shift is the self-referent verb.

The main emotion targeted in the Cat narrative was that of shame. I will therefore skip ahead in the storyline and look at the narratives of the final pictures in which the antagonist is caught and made to return the stolen cat. The table below summarises the self-referent verbs used by the children in connection to the feelings of shame. The most commonly used verbs, which were quite appropriate to the topic, were those describing shame or embarrassment, together with anger and fear.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Self-referent verb</th>
<th>Meaning in English</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. stydět se</td>
<td>to be ashamed/embarrassed</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. bát se</td>
<td>to be scared/frightened</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. zlobit se</td>
<td>to be angry</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. citit se</td>
<td>to feel</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. leknout se</td>
<td>to get a fright</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. zděsit se</td>
<td>to get a shock</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. rozčilit se</td>
<td>to get angry</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. udělat si radost</td>
<td>to please oneself</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. červenat se</td>
<td>to blush</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. potít se</td>
<td>to sweat</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. křenit se</td>
<td>to grimace</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The feelings of *shame* and *embarrassment* can both be described by the same expression in Czech, the reflexive verb *stydět se*. Another expression (i.e., ‘*je mu trapně*’), which is not self-referent also exists to mark more specific
instances of embarrassment as such. I will now concentrate on the self-referent *stydět se* but this semantic distinction will be discussed later. Below are examples of three distinct uses of the self-referent verb.

**STYDÍ SE za to udělal (CHI 9)**
*he feels ashamed for what he has done*

*a STYDĚLI SE ze ten jejich kluk &ji jim ukradl tu kočičku (CHI 28nar)*
*and they felt ashamed that their boy had stolen the little cat from them*

In the first case, the boy himself feels ashamed for stealing the cat, while in the second sentence the parents are ashamed of their son. In both instances, the viewpoint of those who are experiencing the shame is firmly established by the verbal affix.

The third utterance would perhaps more accurately be translated through a reference to embarrassment. Again, the use of the self-referent helps to unite the listener’s empathy with the feelings of the protagonist, or in this case, the speaker herself.

**no # třeba jak jsem měla zpívat před třídou tak jsem SE STYDĚLA (CHI 10)**
*well for example when I was supposed to have sang in front of the class I felt embarrassed*

The same is inherent also in the following example which deals with the physical manifestation of the feelings of shame or embarrassment, blushing. The verbal affix *se* contributes to the increase in linguistic subjectivity of the word ‘blushing’, drawing the listener’s attention inwards, to the feelings associated with this external symptom.

**no že SE začne ČERVENAT (CHI 14)**
*well that he starts blushing*

All of the following expressions, which also appeared in the context of the shameful confrontation depicted in the last two frames of the Cat story, refer to the same emotion experienced in varying degrees of intensity. *Bát se* could be translated as ‘being scared/frightened’, *leknout se* as ‘getting a fright’ or ‘being startled’ and *zděsit se* as ‘getting a big fright or a shock’.

142
In this utterance, the child describes the character's emotional state by using first an adjective ‘vystrašenej’, ‘scared’, followed by a self-referent verb ‘boji se’, ‘is frightened’. The immediacy of the experience is therefore enhanced not only by the imperfective form of the verb, but also by its integral part, the self-referent. It is almost as if the shift from the perspective of the outsider to the character’s viewpoint occurred in the syntactic distance between the objectivity of the adjective and the subjective connotation of the verb.

The self-referent verb zlobit se, ‘to be angry’ obtained the third highest number of frequencies in the shame/embarrassment narrative sequence. Rozčilit se, ‘to become angry/upset’, which also occurred in this section, constitutes a synonym to the perfective form of the same verb (i.e., rozlobit se). Consider the following example.

no já myslím že až kdyby přišel domu že by se tam hrozně na něj ZLOBILI (CHI 25)
well I think that when if he came home that [they] would be terribly angry with him there

This is an example of presenting the viewpoint of characters which are not explicitly included within the utterance. Their involvement is apparent only from the third person plural of the verb. However, their perspective bears the very strong syntactic mark of the self-referent. We can assume that those who are waiting at home to be angry with the boy for stealing the cat are his parents but we cannot know this for sure. What is very clear from this sentence, however, are the subjective feelings of the ‘unspoken’ ones, i.e., they will be very angry.

The next verb, cítit se, marks the individual’s emotional state. It would therefore perhaps be more suitably included in the category dealing with mental states and processes, than in what Kemmer (1993) termed the ‘emotional middle’. However, I would like to use it in this section to make a somewhat symbolic point.
Citit, ‘to feel’, exists in Czech in two forms, one transitive and one self-referent. One can transitively feel pain or odors, or even sense future events.

(A) Cití bolest.

He/she feels pain.

More abstract feelings, however, such as feeling embarrassed, bad, happy, cheated, and so on are usually marked by the verbal affix.

(B) Cití SE podvedený.

He/she feels cheated.

Similar to English, there is also a third option, where the verb to feel is not explicitly mentioned. Instead, the person IS happy, sad, embarrassed or ashamed.

(C) Je šťastný.

He/she is happy.

In addition, some emotions in Czech form this construction in a more complex way. The emotion actively ‘happens’ to the experiencer, like in the following example. Here, the second person singular form occurs in its dative form, while the verb to be refers to the emotion rather than to the protagonist.

(D) Je mu trapně.

<is to him embarrassing>

He is embarrassed.

This brings us to the last system through which emotions can be expressed in Czech which I believe has no equivalent in English. It is the verbalised form in the appropriate person followed by the reflexive affix.

(E) Stydi se.

<Ashamed>

He/she is ashamed.

I would like to postulate that the immediacy created by the absence of the auxiliary verb in the Czech construction demonstrated by the last example has an important value in engaging both the speaker, as well as the listener, in
terms of empathising with the protagonist of the sentence. It could be argued that explicit use of the English pronouns (as opposed to the Czech conjugation system) serves the same function. However, it is difficult to imagine that using the nominal ‘he’ or ‘she’ creates the same feeling of subjectivity as a direct reference to the character’s self which exists in the form of the verbal affix. Along the same lines, the dative form in example (D) possibly provides an added sense of urgency to the feeling, while the link between the emotion and the verb helps to describe the situation in more active terms.

A similar point has repeatedly been made by Wierzbicka (e.g., 1995, p. 39). She argues that ‘intentionality’ of emotions, as captured by grammar, shows great cross-cultural variations. For example, members of the ‘Anglo culture’ traditionally accept that although emotions are not purposeful they can be controlled. Russian society holds the opposite belief, i.e., one should either passively give into emotions or immerse oneself in them as much as possible. Wierzbicka gives the following example of how such conceptual differences are visible in the grammar.

A. On byl grusten
   he-Nom was-Masc. sad-Adj-Masc.
   ‘he was sad’

B. Emu bylo grustno
   to-him (Dat.) it-was (Neuter) sad-Adverb
   ‘he experienced sadness, he couldn’t do anything about it’

C. On grustil
   he-Nom. sad-Verb-Masc.
   ‘he was sad’

(Wierzbicka, 1995, p. 39)

While construction A has a corresponding counterpart in English, B and C do not. Wierzbicka suggests that even though the English ‘he grieved’ could be seen as the translational equivalent of construction C, the difference between the passivity of ‘feeling sad’ and the active role of the experiencer in ‘grieving’ would be lost. While similar ‘active’ constructions are disappearing from English, they form the main lexicon of emotion expressions in Russian.
I believe that similar trends are observable in Czech. Self-referent emotion verbs, however, add yet another dimension to this distinction.

I would now like to move onto the part of the Cat story, as well as the second narrative, the Move story, which were aimed at eliciting discourse on the topic of empathy. As apparent from Table 3, many of the self-referent verbs occurring within the empathy context were the same as those in the narratives dealing with jealousy and shame. Here, I would therefore like to consider the expressions used exclusively in the comments the children made about the feelings of others.

Table 3. The frequencies of self-referent verbs related to feelings of empathy in the Czech children's discourse

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Self-referent verb</th>
<th>Meaning in English</th>
<th>Frequencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. stydět se</td>
<td>to be ashamed/embarrassed</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. bánět se</td>
<td>to be scared</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. radovat se</td>
<td>to be delighted</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. loučit se</td>
<td>to say good-bye</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. styčkat (se)</td>
<td>to miss someone</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. smát se</td>
<td>to laugh</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. libit (se)</td>
<td>to like</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. leknout se</td>
<td>to get a fright</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. trápět se</td>
<td>to worry</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. milí se</td>
<td>to be lucky</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. veselit se</td>
<td>to be jolly</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. usmívat se</td>
<td>to smile</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. starat se</td>
<td>to care</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. snímit se</td>
<td>to reconcile</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. zděsít se</td>
<td>to get a shock</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. cítit se</td>
<td>to feel</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. vyrovnat/srovnat se</td>
<td>to get over something</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. křenit se</td>
<td>to grimace</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. vynahradit si</td>
<td>to make it up to oneself</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. usmířit se</td>
<td>to make up</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. zhročit se</td>
<td>to be shocked</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. zlobit se</td>
<td>to be angry</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. vyčítat si</td>
<td>to blame oneself</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. rozbrčet se</td>
<td>to burst into tears</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. dělat si starostí</td>
<td>to worry</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. mračit se</td>
<td>to frown</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I will first briefly mention verbs type no. 14, 17, and 20 as presented in the table above. The first two types (smířit se, vyrovnat/srovnat se) are synonyms and can be illustrated by the following example.
The function of the referent used in connection with verbs such as ‘to come into terms with’ is to aim the focus inward, at the experiencer. Interestingly, the verb in the next example shares the same root as well as exhibiting similar semantic properties. *Smířit se*, refers to an internal struggle between an individual and his *self*. *Usmířit se*, on the other hand, deals with the harmonising of two independent *selves*. In expressions describing the reconciliation between friends, such as the one below, the viewpoint is extended to both of the participants. The perspective expressed by the referent verb can therefore represent an individual *self*, as well as encompassing multiple *selves* of more than one character.

The following is an extract from one of the children’s interpretations of picture Cat 7. The boy who had stolen the cat is watching the other boy looking for it. Although the verb in question, *starat se*, ‘to take care of somebody’, is largely characteristic of empathic feelings, the thief in this particular context is also potentially experiencing guilt.

The ease with which the viewpoint of the positive character is imposed on the listener in this utterance is striking. First, we are invited to empathise with the thief because of his remorse. Then the speaker switches to an ‘outside view’ of the boy by referring to him as ‘this mean one’. The overriding perspective is then established by the self-referent being linked to the good boy, just so that our attention can be drawn back to the main protagonist of the sentence, who again feels sorry for the positive character. The remorse seems quite spontaneous. Taking care of something or somebody for a long time, which is
described by referring to the character's very self, immediately establishes an empathic link between the character and the listener.

Another example of a self-referent verb, which directly affects not only the experiencer but also others, is the verb loučit se, 'to say good-bye'.

*tady SE LOUCÍ se svým kamarádama* (CHI 20 nar)  
*here she is saying good-bye to her friends*

In this instance, the focus is on the main character, who even though not explicitly referred to, is represented by the 3rd person form of the verb, the pronoun svýma (an instrumental form of what could be translated as 'one’s') and the self-referent verbal affix se. However, consider the following:

*uh tady jak odjíždí a jak SE ROZLOUCÍLI*  
< *here how [she] leaving and how [they] said good-bye*  
*jak pláče že musí někam pryč* (CHI 36 nar)  
*how [she] crying that [she] must somewhere away>*  
*and here is how she is leaving and how they have said good-bye and how she is crying because she has to go away somewhere*

The listener is again led to follow the viewpoint of the main character as she is leaving in the moving truck. Then however, there is an unexpected shift when the friends who are not referred to outside the implicit self-referent are also brought in, so that the listener can briefly identify with their experience of the parting. Without interrupting the flow, the speaker then reverts back to the girl’s crying over having to leave. Once again, we can see the self-referent used to provide a ‘snapshot’ of the perspective of those whose presence is understated by other linguistic means. Their emotional involvement in the situation is momentarily ‘felt’ through the verbal affix.

It seems apparent that in many cases and due to the inherent linguistic processes such as conjugation of verbs, Czech sentences can be perceived as shorter than their English counterparts, which are equal in their logical content. The next example, however, provides an exepption to this rule of the thumb.
The verb in this case does not constitute a straight line between the experiencer (I) and the object of the sentence (you), as it does in English. The experiencer’s perspective is represented here by a single linguistic form, the dative of the pronoun já, ‘I’. The object takes the locative form. Strikingly, however, the agentivity is ascribed to an unidentified entity which is ‘doing the missing’ and surprisingly also has a self. It is clear that this construct has deep historical roots, but we can only speculate in terms of its effects on creating the appropriate empathic viewpoint, as well as in terms of Wierzbicka’s issue of grammatically expressed intentionality of emotions, as outlined above.

14.3.2 Cognitive Semantic Category: Talking to oneself

The following table summarises the self-referent forms characterised by the context of cognitive states and behaviours across both of the narrative stories, as well as across all the socially constructed emotions examined here. The emotion segments of the narratives were collapsed in order to provide a more accessible account of the data.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Self-referent Verb</th>
<th>Meaning in English</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. myslet si</td>
<td>to think to oneself</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. říkat si</td>
<td>to say to oneself</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. divit se</td>
<td>to be surprised</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. znát/sezmámit se</td>
<td>to know/get to know somebody</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. rozhodnout se</td>
<td>to decide</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. uvědomit si</td>
<td>to realise</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. přát si</td>
<td>to wish</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. vzpomenout si</td>
<td>to remember</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. představit is</td>
<td>to imagine</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. nudit se</td>
<td>to be bored</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. všimnout si</td>
<td>to notice</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. dozvědět se</td>
<td>to find out</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. stát se</td>
<td>to become</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. přizpůsobit se</td>
<td>to adapt</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. připadat si</td>
<td>to seem to oneself</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

149
It is apparent from the above table that the most common expressions of cognitive states concentrate on 'communication' with the self. 'Thinking' or 'saying something to oneself' were the most often used constructs in this context.

This English translation mirrors the meaning of the Czech sentence quite closely, with one exception. The verb 'to think' is used by the speaker together with the self-referent affix, 'to think to oneself'. This reflexive function of the self-referent is further stressed by the speaker of the following utterance. The expression "uvnitř SI mysli", 'inside he thinks', can be taken as further evidence of the importance of representation of the character's inner viewpoint, as perceived by the speaker.

This dimension is deliberately not included in the translation of the first example because it does not correspond with what the analysis of the Irish children's data revealed. The verb 'to think' in conjunction with a self-referencing pronoun has in the Irish sample appeared only twice. In both cases, the verb was followed by a direct quote of the character's stream of thought.

It is clear that the Czech and Irish frequencies do not lend themselves to a direct comparison. But once again we are faced with the same question. Why is the subjectivity of one of the most subjective actions possible – thinking – further enhanced in Czech? Or perhaps more interestingly, why is the option of doing the same (which undoubtedly exists in English) not taken up more often by the speakers? Are there linguistic reasons for it? Perhaps, even
though it is difficult to find any obvious ones. Unlike the reflexive verb ćicí si - ‘to say to oneself’ (in contrast to saying something to another person), thinking does not need to be anymore explicitly linked to the thinker.

a ŘÍKAJ SI že jim je to líto že se už bude muset stěhovat a že bude bydlet někde jinde (CHI 23m nar)

and they are saying to themselves that they are sorry that she will have to move and that she will be living somewhere else

In all 76 cases, the Czech children used this form to indicate the direction of a thought process and to enable the listener to follow the character’s emotions, dilemmas and decision making. By bringing the listener to the very source of the character’s viewpoint, the form itself therefore represents a direct empathy device. This is visible in the next example where the speaker felt the need to further emphasise the boundaries that the listener is about to cross, the exclusiveness of the view that is being offered to him, in the form of entering the character’s mind.

tady ta jako SI v duchu ŘÍKA <jak má> [///] že jako se podívá co ji chce (CHI 4 nar)

t here this one is kind of in her mind saying to herself that she will have a look what she wants

I found five references to ‘saying something to oneself’ in the Irish sample, again a number considerably lower than that for the Czech narratives. How does this difference affect the general message communicated by each group? Does the existence and use of the self-referencing option equip the narrators of one language with a better tool to achieve empathic understanding of the characters by taking them a step closer to them? Or is it really a purely grammatical linguistic function redundant in an emotional context? Following the lead of the theorists mentioned in this study (e.g., Budwig, Bamberg, Slobin and others) as well as my own linguistic intuition, I believe that it is more than likely that such systems influence most of the concepts that we are dealing with here, subjectivity and viewpoint amongst them.

Some evidence, which may suggest that English speakers look for a similar enhancement of subjectivity in the expressions considered above can also be found. In her discussion of the apparent shift in certain verbal constructions
towards acquiring discourse particle functions, Traugott (1995) demonstrates her claims on the form *I think*, the use of which is currently evolving beyond the focal verb of the sentence, towards a form relating the 'speaker’s epistemic attitude' (p. 38). This is a shift in favour of indication of the speaker’s perspective at the expense of the original ‘referential’ or ‘objective’ (p. 39) meaning of the clause. Such conclusions could be interpreted as consistent with my own observations, as similar findings suggest that the trend in highlighting the speaker’s perspective also exists in English.

The choice of the perfective over the imperfective form of the verb *myslet si* (i.e., *pomyslet si*) leads us to ask similar questions to those above. It could be speculated here that the reason for the use of this option is perhaps an attempt to accentuate the moment at which the thought has occurred. Its use in the narratives was quite rare, as it only appeared 3 out of 128 times the self-referent verb ‘to think’ was used. This count becomes even more interesting if we consider Delancey’s point in which he differentiates between imperfective and perfective aspect in terms of their effects on the listener’s identification with the participant’s viewpoint. Delancey (in Deane, 1992, p. 206) argues that while the perfective aspect, in our case *pomyslet si*, leads to a more remote view of the event, the imperfective aspect (i.e., *myslet si*) encourages the listener more to identify with the character.

If we briefly consider the same phenomenon in relation to the aspect of the self-referent ‘say to oneself’, *říci si*, we will find that only 13% of the cases involved the perfective aspect of the verb. In one instance, the speaker corrected his use of the perfective form, opting for the logically equivalent imperfective, as if in an attempt not to upset the viewpoint link.

---

26 Diessel and Tomasello (in press, Tomasello, 2000, p. 161) made a similar observation suggesting that the children in their sample used the form *I think* (which was virtually the only form of the verb *to think* that appeared) as an expression of uncertainty.

27 Weist (1986, Berman and Slobin, 1994, p. 3) suggests that Polish speaking children can take an ‘external’ as well as ‘internal’ viewpoint on a situation, through the separate systems of marking aspect and tense in Slavic languages.
Based on these observations, it would seem that the most common self-referent verb relevant to cognition, *myslet si*, provides Czech speakers with an additional degree of subjectivity. Moreover, its use, as well as the use of the second most common verb, *říkat si*, was visibly more common in the Czech, as opposed to the Irish group. Although available to English speakers, this strategy is not utilised to the same extent, perhaps due to a less direct accessibility of the form. Linked also to the perfective and imperfective distinction, it can be concluded that in Czech, these verbs provide a major tool for achieving the desired speaker, as well as non-speaker, perspective.

14.3.3 Semantic Category of Actions with Moral or Social Implications:
Every argument has one side

It is evident from Table 5 that the most common form of this category was the verb *schovat se*, ‘to hide’. This verb refers to a physical action. Its subjective meaning is therefore conditioned by the presence of the verbal affix (i.e., the unmarked form refers to hiding an object or a person external to the referent). For this reason, it is perhaps not the most relevant example in this category. It does, however, demonstrate well the semantic distance between the marked and unmarked forms of the verbs discussed in this section.

*tady je ten zlej kluk a chce SE SCHOVÁVAT aby ho tenhleten neviděl* (CHI 33 nar)
*here is the mean boy a he wants to hide so that this one doesn’t see him*
Table 5. The frequencies of self-referent verbs in the Actions with Moral/Social Implications Category across the Czech children’s discourse

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Self-referent Verb</th>
<th>Meaning in English</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. schovat/skrýt se/ neukazovat se</td>
<td>to hide</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. posmívat/smít se/ dělat si legraci</td>
<td>to mock/ridicule/laugh at; to make fun of somebody</td>
<td>9; 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. omluvit se</td>
<td>to apologise</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. všimnout si</td>
<td>to notice &lt;socially include&gt;</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. nechat si</td>
<td>to keep &lt;not return&gt;</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. bavit se</td>
<td>to talk &lt;socially include&gt;</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. hádat se</td>
<td>to argue</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. nadávat si</td>
<td>to call names</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. zachovat se</td>
<td>to act/treat somebody in a particular way</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. dovolit si</td>
<td>to dare</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. stýkat se</td>
<td>to be in touch</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. ztrapnit se</td>
<td>to embarrass oneself</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. začít si</td>
<td>to start trouble</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. dohodnout se</td>
<td>to agree terms</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. podělit se</td>
<td>to share</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. pomáhat si</td>
<td>to help</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. vychloubat se</td>
<td>to show off</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. sebrat se</td>
<td>to take off &lt;leave&gt;</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the context of socially unacceptable behaviour, three verbs describing such actions were included in the narratives. Posmívat se or smít se, ‘to laugh at, mock or ridicule somebody’ had the second highest frequency count in this category. The other two verbs, začít si and dovolit si are semantically very similar. They both refer to initiating a conflict, either in the sense of being the first to start or to ‘dare’ to take some action against others. In this respect, both of the self-referents appear in their dative form (i.e., si), which in this context reflects their relationship to the agent as opposed to the outward direction of se in the first verb (i.e., smít/posmívat SE).

tady jí je docela dost lito že SE ji POSMÍVAJ (CHI 19m)
here she feels pretty sorry <for her> that they are laughing at her

The speaker here decides to incorporate three independent perspectives into his sentence. The first is that of the girl who watches other children as they are laughing at the new girl at school. This observer is referred to by the dative pronoun jí. The reference to the other character, the sufferer, is not made at this point, it comes as a part of the next clause, taking the form of the
same pronoun. The self-referent verb marking the subjectivity of the other children is also part of the second clause.

\[ \text{já to nechci teda shodit na ní ale ZAČALA SI takže +// (CHI 30)} \]
\[ I \text{ don’t want to dump it all on her but she did start so ...} \]

Child 30 uses this sentence to conclude the description of an argument which took place in public between herself and her friend, causing great embarrassment to them both. The responsibility of the friend for initiating this argument is clearly indicated by the self-referent. To some speakers, its omission would lead to the same logical content, where the verbal affix could perhaps be interchanged for the instrumental form of the nominal pronoun \( it \), as demonstrated below.

\[ \text{Ona s tím ZAČALA.} \]
\[ She \text{ started [with] } it. \]

The intention of the speaker to ascribe what could perhaps be referred to as ‘negative subjectivity’ is therefore quite clear in the original utterance, where the verbal affix represents the perfect strategic device.

What the referents above have in common is that they mark the individual’s part in actions directed at others. The following examples, on the other hand, include verbs of mutual exchange. The first two are \textbf{hádat se} and \textbf{nadávat si}, both referring to arguments and name-calling.

\[ \text{a začaly jsme SI NADÁVAT protože jsme SE HÁDALY (CHI 30)} \]
\[ \text{and we started calling each other names because we were arguing} \]

The next one, \textbf{dohodnout se}, marks reconciliation, while the following three, \textbf{bavit se}, \textbf{všimat si}, and \textbf{stýkat (se)}, express being on good terms with someone or including them into one’s social circle.

\[ \text{aby se tady s tim třeba klukem nemoh(l) kamarádit nebo aby SE NESTÝKALI (CHI 3)} \]
\[ \text{so that maybe he couldn’t be friends with this boy here or so that they couldn’t hang around together} \]
**Podělit se** and **pomáhat si** refer to sharing and helping each other out.

\[
\text{protože lidí SI maj(i) POMÁHAT (CHI 30)} \\
\text{because people should help each other}
\]

In all the instances above, the perspective is equally divided between both of the parties involved in the event. The responsibilities for the action, as well as for its consequences, lie with everybody concerned. Despite this level of broadness in terms of the referents, the internal significance of the event is still preserved with the help of self-referencing. It is through this strategy that the subjective charge of the viewpoint can be maintained while being distributed over more than one protagonist.

Finally, I have left the most interesting example of this section to the end. The following verb concerns socially significant behaviour of the **self**. **Sebrat se**, is a colloquial expression of leaving a place somewhat unexpectedly, even angrily.

\[
\text{protože asi neměla žádný kamarádky tak potom SE SEBRALA a šla (CHI 45m)} \\
\text{because she probably didn't have any friends so then she got up and left}
\]

Here the character decides to literally 'pick herself up' and leave. It is not difficult to see the subjectivity-enhancing role that this expression and its integral part – the self-referent – play in this context. The 3\text{rd} person singular is reflected in the conjugation of the verb ‘to go/leave’ in the past tense (i.e., šla). This form would be sufficient to communicate the practical message of the utterance (i.e., the girl left because she did not have any friends). The self-referent verb is used here to express the mood and the emotional charge of the situation. Its inward directed attention is a crucial component of this particular referent structure.

### 14.4 Constructed Self-referent Verbs
This category, together with that of False Starts is perhaps the most useful in terms of uncovering the speaker’s intentions and mental processes in regards to agentivity, subjectivity, empathy and the construction of a particular viewpoint. What we are dealing with are not linguistically and grammatically perfected constructs. Instead we have the opportunity to see the products of the creativity and conceptual construction of the speakers. I have therefore included some examples of self-referent structures which were specifically developed by the speakers, ‘tailor made’ for the purposes of highlighting a particular perspective. There were 5 occurrences of this phenomenon in all of the Czech narratives, some of them are given below.

"to je úplně jedno <že> [/] že SI BREČÍ (CHI 2m)
it really doesn’t matter that he is crying [to himself]

Interestingly, the speaker uses the added self-referent here to remove his antagonist from any empathy he might be feeling towards the character he had just robbed. Essentially, the message is ‘he is crying to himself’, in other words, ‘it has nothing to do with me’. The viewpoint is shifted onto the crying boy. At the same time, however, we are warned not to empathise with him, since he is somewhat pathetically crying to himself, feeling sorry for himself. Child 2m therefore uses the self-referent to create what I have already referred to as ‘negative subjectivity’. What is also worth noting is the fact that this is not an accidental expression produced randomly while searching for the right words. The same child uses exactly the same construction again during the discussion that follows his narrative about 20 minutes later.

The next example reveals another striking point about the use of added self-referents.

"<jestli> [/] jestli <SI> [/] uh SI NABÍDNE jestli by si s náma nechtěla hrát
if she offers if she wouldn’t like to play with us

Here the character in question watches the other children play. When asked what would they think if they saw her standing there, looking at them, Child 7
produced the quote above. The verb shows the speaker’s dilemma in deciding how to approach the problem. It would perhaps be more appropriate to the situation ‘to ask’ if she could play with them, rather than ‘to offer’. Once opting for the latter, however, the speaker realises that she is failing to represent the character’s position as socially awkward. She is also missing the crucial tool for presenting the event from the viewpoint of the main protagonist. She therefore decides to include the self-referent. Instead of offering her company to the other children, the character somewhat illogically makes this offer to herself. The speaker’s intention, however, is very clear.

\[+"(v\text{z})\text{dyt}^\prime \text{ SI tady bude TRČET cely den doma a nebude si mít s kým hrát (CHI 3 nar)}\]

she will be stuck here at home the whole day and she will not have anybody to play with

The expression of being stuck somewhere without anything to do is not typically classed as self-referent. The spontaneously added verbal affix can therefore be interpreted as an attempt to set the scene in the listener’s mind, where his or her empathy with the character is maximised by its use.

All of these freely constructed forms suggest further evidence of the link between the self-referent forms and speaker perceived subjectivity. As I will show next, the appearance of the reflexive marker without the appropriate root verb leads to similar conclusions.

14.5 False Starts

This category deals with the irregular occurrence of the verbal affix se/si without the presence of the self-referent verb. The total number of all such false starts across all of the narratives was 41. This relatively high frequency was surprising and it was decided to examine some of the cases in more detail. This analysis revealed yet another angle from which the significance of self-referents in understanding the speaker’s expression of own or non-speaker subjectivity could be considered.
In some of these cases, the speaker clearly intends to use the full self-referent form but, for a variety of possible reasons, the sentence remains uncompleted. The verbal affix, however, has already been incorporated into the partial construction of the sentence.

(a) no <ze> [/] uh že SE za něj jako +// (CHI 8)
(b) +" mami já jsem našel kočičku a někdo mi ji ukrad <nebo SE někam &z> [/] # někam utekla (CHI 28 nar)

In utterance (a) the speaker talks about the parents of the boy who stole the cat being ashamed of their son. This is apparent from the “SE za něj”, ‘of him’ segment, which also contains the self-referent affix. In sentence (b) the speaker’s plan is even more apparent, as the boy is described as telling his mom that he found a cat but somebody stole it. The second clause is as follows: <or SELF-REF somewhere [segment ‘z’] somewhere ran away (she)> . Here the speaker almost completes the phrase ‘or she wandered off somewhere’, with the segment ‘z’ being the initial letter of ‘wandered off’. Then she decides to opt for the pragmatically equal ‘run away’, which unlike ‘wander off’ is not a self-referencing verb.

Other uses of ‘lone’ referents indicate a close proximity to self-referencing constructions, where the self-referent is either incorporated too early (c) or the structure of the clause is suddenly changed (d).

(c) <tak SI ji> [/] tak uh za uh šli za maminkou a řekli jestli by SI ji mohli NECHAT (CHI 16 nar)
     <so SELF-REF her> so they went to mom and said if they could keep her [the cat]

(d) protože by SI chtěla aby SI s nima HRÁLA třeba (CHI 17)
     because SELF-REF she would want that she would play with them maybe

The following example is the most interesting, as it does not lend itself to explanations at similar linguistic level such as those above. The first utterance describes how the only girl in the neighbourhood is considering the advantages of having another girl to play with. Even though there is no root self-referent verb included in the sentence, the referent si is not only mentioned once, but is also repeated. As an explanation for this occurrence, I
would like to put forward the speaker's search for an appropriate linguistic tool which would adequately represent the inherent reciprocity. The idea of the newcomer being a girl, and therefore a potential saviour from the unwelcome company of the boys, can be perceived as an exciting and emotional event experienced by one of the characters. But the sentence implies more than that. While thinking about her own benefits, the speaker also engages the character in an empathic (although calculating) analysis of the advantages that their friendship would hold for the new girl. Failing to capture the complex viewpoint of the situation through available linguistic means, the speaker, however unsure, expresses her point through a 'free-floating' self-referent.

no <že> [/] že je holka a že <by SI> [/] by SI to z toho mohly mít užitek s těma klukama (CHI 27)
well that that she is a girl and that <conditional, SELF-REF> <conditional, SELF-REF> they could get something out of it with the boys

All of the instances above can therefore be employed in support of the claim that the intentional use of the self-referent, as well as its use within an incomplete structure, both lead to highlighting of the intended viewpoint.

14.6 Passive or Object-linked Instances of Self-referents

Just before I draw this chapter to conclusion, I would like to very briefly consider one final, and somewhat paradoxical category of self-referent forms, those with no apparent referent.

This category includes examples of passive reflexive verbs. In the children's narratives it was mostly represented by statements which included the verb stát se, 'happen' (10 frequencies), or its imperfective form, dít se (5 frequencies).

a on brčel a vykládal jim co SE STALO (CHI 10 nar)  
and he was crying and telling them what had happened
The second type shares the meaning of information becoming apparent or a problem being solved.

(a) a všechno SE to VYŘEŠILO a vrátili mu ji (CHI 9 nar)
and everything got sorted out and they returned her [the cat] back to him

(b) +" ale ne ted' SE to určité # PROVALÍ [ = ! laughs] že to že jsem ji krádl (CHI 28 nar)
oh no now it will all come out that I stole her [the cat]

(c) no tak (k)dyž uděláš něco špatnýho tak SE to DÁ vopravit no (CHI 38)
well when you do something bad it can be fixed

(d) no asi byl rád že SE to ZJISTILO (CHI 38)
well he was probably glad that it became known

All of these examples have in common the lack of an active agent in respect of the self-referent verb, although even here the viewpoint can be shaped through the self-referent. This is apparent, for instance, in utterance (a) where ‘everything got solved’, or in utterance (c) where ‘things can be fixed’. In both cases, the participant in the sentence is responsible for some adverse action. By suggesting that ‘things were-’ or ‘can be fixed’ the speaker relieves the protagonist of the responsibility of correcting his actions, while preserving the subjective outlook. Things can sort themselves out. The speaker almost plays a trick on the listener’s attention by leaving the ‘repair team’ agentless but not selfless. The same strategy can also be used to mediate the level of blame directed at the protagonist, as illustrated by the extract below.

a to SE DĚLAT nemá (CHI 27)
and that should not be done

14.7 Summary

This chapter provides a rather lengthy treatment of the phenomenon of Czech self-referent verbs. I have used many examples which did not always lend themselves to categorisation in a particularly orderly fashion, perhaps due to the extent of use of self-referent structures across many different contexts. My main aim was to show the strategies through which the speakers apply subjective referents in creating a desired perspective through which the
listener is invited to empathically assess the events presented to him/her. Across all the categories that I have examined, the speakers used referent verbs describing emotions, cognitive and moral states, as well as social interaction, to create a variety of viewpoints. Those viewpoints range from the speaker's own to those of other, sometimes multiple protagonists, as well as the perspective of apparently selfless entities, as I have shown in the last section. The children in this sample used them to convert seemingly physical verbs into comments of internal states, to simultaneously express empathy and envy and to describe emotions without the mediation of a noun or an auxiliary verb. They also used them to 'speak' for the feelings of those characters and protagonists of their stories who were not given any other linguistic expression, as well as to unite the opinions of those who were in dispute. Their main overall purpose, however, remained in highlighting the subjective view of the relevant referents.

The most striking examples of this function appeared in the form of selected or constructed instances, where the speakers modified the available linguistic means for the purposes of making a particular perspective more explicit than is grammatically required.

Some of those strategies are available to English speakers and some are not. What is clear, however, is that the Irish children in this study did not employ the English self-referents to the same extent as the Czech children did, even in cases where they were relevant to producing an emotion narrative from a 3rd person perspective, i.e., thinking or saying to oneself.

What are the implications of such differences on the general conceptualisation by the two groups? Are they observable at any other level of analysis? I will attempt to answer those and other questions in the second part of the analysis, aimed at lexical items and other semantically significant structures of the two languages.
Cultural Determinants of Emotions

15.1 Emotional Development in Children
15.2 Empathy: Feeling the Feelings of Others
  15.2.1 Empathy: A developmental perspective
15.3 Guilt and Shame: Surviving in Society
  15.3.1 Moral Development
  15.3.2 Guilt and Shame: A developmental perspective
  15.3.3 Summary
15.4 Emotions and Language
  15.4.1 Feeling All One Can Say: Bamberg’s study of anger and sadness accounts
  15.4.2 Emotions Speaking for Themselves
  15.4.3 The ‘Self’ that Stands for Others’ Metaphor
15.5 Summary

Many researchers have engaged in attempts to support one or the other side in the debate over culture specificity versus worldwide universality of emotions. Those at one pole (e.g., Ekman) claim emotions are shaped by human evolution and therefore are mostly part of our biological makeup. Others argue, together with Harré, that emotions are constructed through the culture to which we belong. Some believe that even though certain emotions such as happiness, sadness, anger, fear, disgust and surprise are universal, most others are likely to be socially constructed (Stephan, Stephan & de Vargas, 1996). Mesquita & Frijda’s (1992) comprehensive review of all available empirical evidence on the topic concluded that culture based similarities as well as differences exist, and it is therefore likely that the real nature of emotional experience lies somewhere in between the two extreme concepts. Zammuner & Fisher therefore propose that an all-inclusive view of emotions as ‘multicomponential processes’ is necessary and any successful attempt to reveal more about the nature of emotional experiences will focus on a specific aspect of this phenomenon (p. 190). Overall, it has been generally accepted by most researchers that emotions ‘emerge’ from societies and cultures, although they are not ‘exclusively’ their product (Besnier, 1995, p. 221).
It is this view of emotional experience as significantly influenced (although not necessarily pre-determined) by the culture within which children are socialised that I would like to adopt as a framework for the following chapters. In this sense, culture is defined as a “set of shared understandings about the world” (Kövecses, 1995, p. 49). As the discussion of the central role of culture in the human experience of emotions unravels here, the key position that language holds within this concept will also become apparent. As such, language constitutes one of the main determinants enabling us to experience the social world that surrounds us (Hřebíčková, Řehulková, Osecká & Blatný, 1992). In this context (and without joining in the debate on the origins of emotions) I would like to explore the linguistic expression of emotions as a likely candidate for an influential position in our culturally co-constructed emotional lives. As Bamberg (1997a) suggested, the ‘discursive orientation’ perceives our understanding of emotions as a direct outcome of our culture, unlike the cognitive perspective which conceives of them as the point of departure. This study will also consider development as a process of ‘cultural learning’ (p. 334). I would like to begin by briefly introducing the theoretical issues surrounding the relationship between culture and emotions.

Cultures do not only create new emotions, they also re-conceptualise the old ones. As a result, wide variations can be found not only across cultures but also within the same culture at different points in its history. For example, feelings of physical or bodily shame determine the level of clothing required by specific cultures. This will range from almost complete exposure common in some African tribes, to the absolute opposite observable in women’s clothing prescribed in Iran and other Arab countries (Nakonečný, 2000). The mechanism which produces such culture- and society-specific practices has been called the ‘reflexive monitoring of action’ (Peréz Campos, Ramos & Bernal, 1999, p. 299, after Giddens), where individuals closely observe activities in which members of their society engage and attempt to contribute to them so that ‘an instance of a specific social practice’ is created. Similarly, cultures and societies differ with respect to the norms set out for young

---

28 See e.g., Goddard (1998) for an overview of theories of emotions.
children (e.g., the time children are expected to spend without their parents). Disparate practices result in a variety of emotional experiences which serve as the basis for the children’s emotion concepts, thus producing cross-cultural divergence (Harris, 1995a).

Cultural standards exert direct behavioural forces. They also set very specific rules in terms of expression and communication of emotions. One such cultural restriction determines when it is ‘appropriate’ to express certain emotions, such as anger, when similar expressions are unacceptable, and in which situations they need to be ‘standardised’ and adapted through communication tools. Phrases such as ‘it was my pleasure’ rarely reflect an actual emotion. Instead they serve as communicators of culturally appropriate behaviour (Nakonečný, 2002).

Stereotypical gender behaviour is one of the most frequently documented aspects of expression of emotions. For example, many cultures define ‘femininity’ in terms of social emotional competence, while ‘masculinity’ is typically associated with public displays of goal-motivated behaviour. Women are therefore expected to readily offer and accept emotional advice and help, in contrast to men, who are typically perceived as being motivated by external forces, and as being more likely to behave in ways associated with outward oriented emotions, such as aggression-driven anger (Paez & Vergara, 1995, p. 420).

Somewhat symbolically, Stearns & Stearns have suggested that the meaning of the English word *emotion* itself has evolved over time. It developed from a linguistic representation of the behaviour of a disturbed crowd at the beginning of the 18th century, through to marking individual physical feelings by the middle of the 19th century. Similar transitions, during which words used to label behaviour alone grew into labels for the experience of personal feelings, were noted to be quite typical for this period. In addition, the 19th century was characterised by the almost exclusive use of emotion expressions by women (in Harré & Gillett, 1994).
Apart from a shift in meaning, historical studies of emotions also uncovered some terms which are no longer relevant to the contemporary speaker’s emotion vocabulary. As an example, Harré describes two such emotional terms: *accidie* (linked to the neglect of one’s religious duties) and *melancholy* which he associates with the current concept of ‘clinical depression’ (1983, p. 126). Similar changes, Harré argues, do not mean that our present emotional experiences are different. Instead they signal social and moral shifts within the society. What we feel is likely to be very close (if not identical) to what people felt two centuries ago. The way these feelings are labelled, described and communicated to others, however, is profoundly different (Harré & Gillett, 1994). Human emotions can therefore be perceived as not only a physiological, social, linguistic and evolutionary product, but also as a result of all of the above forces coming together in order to create a historical backdrop against which emotions are understood and interpreted. Etymological dictionaries represent a unique opportunity to follow the journey through historical and social changes of the meaning of particular words into their current form (Edwards, 1997).

Tsai & Levenson (1997) conducted a review of ethnographic studies which point to the culturally-constructed notion of emotions. Many such studies compare the perception of socially-motivated emotions such as pride, shame and guilt (e.g., Stipek, 1998 and others) within the contrast of individualistic and collectivistic cultures, typical for, for example, Japan and America. For instance, Stephan, Stephan & de Vargas (1996) based their study on the belief that collectivist cultures cannot perceive the concept of the self as an independent entity, but as a construct produced through the relationship with others. Individualistic cultures, on the other hand, were hypothesised to hold the opposing view of the construction of the self. Others concentrate on similar ‘long-distance’ comparisons of many categories of emotions and emotional expressions (e.g., Tsai & Levenson, 1997; Aune & Aune, 1996; Markham & Wang, 1996). The aspect of these ethnographic studies most relevant to our discussion is represented by, for example, Harré & Gillett

---

29 The individualism-collectivism distinction in the specific context of emotions was studied in detail by e.g., Paez & Vergara (1995).
(1994), who put forward the notion of the existence of certain emotional expressions which cannot be seen as directly translationally equivalent to the ‘Western’ classification of emotions or to the emotion vocabulary of Indo-European languages. They specifically refer to the findings of Catherine Lutz which revealed that the vocabulary of the Micronesian Ifaluk people had no emotion words which could be seen as directly corresponding to the English emotion lexicon, although some similarities exist.  

An example of a lexical item which does not have a direct English translational equivalent, and which I would like to discuss in a little more detail, is the Polish verb ćśnic. As Wierzbicka (in Goddard, 1998, p. 98) suggests, this verb could be translated into English as homesick, missing, longing, pining, or feeling nostalgic, depending on the situation. According to Wierzbicka, the verb ćśnic and the related noun ćśknota reflect the history of the Polish nation. At the end of the 18th century, many of those with profound influence on the language (i.e., prominent writers and intellectuals) found themselves in political exile separating them from the loved ones and their native land. It was during this period that the above words with their very specific semantic qualities began to emerge (Wierzbicka in Goddard, 1998).

The above described instance of a culture specific focus on selected emotional experiences, which logically leads to diversities within emotion lexicons, has been termed ‘focality’. “Focal events are those that imply socially defined and shared concerns: they draw people’s attention, are easily recognised and their definition and interpretation is very obvious and requires little effort.” (Fischer, 1995, p. 457). Such events are also typically important within a particular linguistic community. Similarly, concepts which are not represented by a specific word within a language, are likely not to be perceived as significant by that particular culture. As Wierzbicka (1995) shows with a number of examples, “the absence of a word does not prove the absence of a concept, but the presence of a word does prove the presence of a concept” (p. 19).

---

30 See also Goddard (1998) for an account of Japanese amae and Malay marah.
It will probably not come as a surprise that as another Slavonic language, the Czech lexicon includes an equivalent term *tesknit, stesk*. The related verb *stýskat (si,se)* is reflexive. In conjunction with the dative *si*, it suggests general sadness or nostalgia. The accusative *se*, has the same meaning as the above described Polish *tesnic*. Apart from the common linguistic roots, the Czech people were affected by similar historical events as those taking place in Poland, resulting in similar cultural, and subsequently linguistic effects. It would therefore seem that the terms culture- and language- specificity should in many cases extend beyond modern political divides to broader historically and semantically determined groupings.

Even though some studies investigate more subtle differences in the framework of less diverse cultural communities (e.g., Galati & Sciaky, 1995, Zammuner & Fischer, 1995), more ‘close-range’ explorations of geographically and culturally not so distant societies could provide an additional and valuable insight into the specific mechanisms leading to culturally constructed emotion knowledge. The current study focuses on one such possible aspect of this process - language. More specifically, I examine particular structures and items of Czech and English, languages which exist in the context of two European societies. This design will allow scope for the comparison of two diverse linguistic, cultural and social systems, which due to wider political and economic developments find themselves on a similar course, perhaps for the first time in their existence.

### 15.1 Emotional Development in Children

At a general level, emotional development can be described in terms of an interaction between biological and sociocultural determinants. Psychological and emotional growth of an individual is to a large extent governed by social aspects of his/her surroundings, as most of the inherent emotional reactions (e.g., crying to communicate distress) are directly linked to them. The most fundamental lessons are learned through early emotional experiences taking place within the child’s social environment, first represented by its mother.
This has been demonstrated by many well known studies designed to explore
the issues of attachment and attachment styles (e.g., Bowlby 1969, 1989). The
early interaction is non-verbal and subconscious. As such, however, it sets up
trends and attitudes which make themselves apparent later in life. One of the
phenomena widely discussed in this context is the experience of ‘separation
anxiety’ which occurs within the seventh or eighth month in the child’s life.
Children’s emotions are therefore bound by basic social needs which are
clearly apparent from the newborn’s preference for people over inanimate
objects (Nakonečný, 2000).

Based on their review of developmental research on emotion recognition,
Markham & Wang (1996) postulate that the basic inherent predisposition to
emotional expression and understanding is modified by the variety of
experiences presented to each child through his/her environment. In addition,
they speculate, the emotional range the child learns is dependent on the
linguistic representations of emotions and socialisation mechanisms within
each particular culture. If cultures differ in this respect, children’s emotional
behaviour will mirror this diversity with a cumulative effect created with the
child’s age.

For example, Manstead (1995) demonstrated on a group of 6-11-year-old
English and Italian children that the differences in the expressiveness of
emotions that can be found between the two cultures may play a part in the
children’s mastery of the “appearance-reality distinction”. As Italian culture
supports public expressions of emotions, Italian children – in contrast to
English children - are likely to have fewer opportunities to learn the
techniques of hiding one’s personal feelings. Speculations in terms of
potential related difference in the development of Theory of Mind also seem
justified here.

The mechanisms which ensure that culture-specific knowledge is passed from
generation to generation extend over a wide range. For example, it has been
established by Shatz, Dyer, Wellman, Bromirsky & Hagiwara (2001) that
children's literature has the potential to strongly influence the acquisition of mental- and emotion-state knowledge. The interesting aspect of their findings, however, comes from their investigation of translations of children's books. It showed that in many cases certain aspects of the stories were adjusted through translation in order to make them more appropriate to the target culture. This transformation took place even where there was no 'linguistic' need for such alterations. Instead of providing a broader cross-cultural education, Shatz et al. argue, translations in such instances are used to reaffirm the culture-specific values. It would therefore seem that the socialisation of children in terms of emotions takes place within a not only restricted, but also within a rigidly monitored context.

The effects of socialisation on emotional development can also be observed on a much smaller scale in studies dealing with parental practices. For example, Garner, Jones, Gaddy & Rennie distinguished in their 1997 study between 'emotional expression knowledge - the ability to comprehend and label emotions', 'emotional situation knowledge - the normative reactions to emotionally charged situation' and 'emotional role-taking' which refers to the understanding that the emotional reactions of others do not always correspond to the norm. This last component is crucial for the ability to empathise with others. Garner et al. have shown in their sample of American pre-school children and their low-income mothers that the encouragement of mothers to pay attention to the feelings of others leads to appropriate behaviour of their children in emotional situations. They also found mothers' empathy statements to have a positive effect on the comments their children made about emotional experiences in general. The explanations of the reasons and outcomes of emotions and emotional reactions provided by the mothers were positively correlated to the children's 'emotional role-taking' (p. 48).

According to Papalia & Olds (1992) and many others, the socially motivated emotions of empathy, shame, jealousy, pride, guilt and so on, emerge between the 12th and the 18th month of life. Lewise's model (1946, 1969, in Nakonečný, 2000) of emotional development proposes that the second half of
the second year is marked by the appearance of a 'new cognitive capacity', more specifically by the emergence of 'objective self-awareness'. The child begins to perceive itself as a social being which allows him or her to engage in 'self-referential behaviour', serving as a base for socially conditioned emotions. This ability represents a qualitative shift from the primary emotions to the more sophisticated experience of the self in a social context. The next milestone comes, according to Lewis, between the age of 2 and 3, when the child becomes capable of evaluating his or her behaviour in accordance with internal or external standards. The external standards in this context refer to those imposed by parents, while the internal standards are the formal external ones, internally adopted by the child. In his theory of moral development, Piaget (e.g., 1967) deals with a similar concept of 'autonomous morality'. In Piaget’s view, however, these 'self-conscious evaluative emotions' occur several years later than suggested by Lewis (Nakonečný, 2000).

Studies which show that by the age of 2 a child frequently uses a limited number of emotional terms to describe happiness, sadness, anger and fear, referring both to self and to others, are numerous (e.g., Wellman, Harris, Banerjee & Sinclare, 1995). They also suggest that by the age of 5 vocabulary dramatically increases and the child is capable of conversing about emotions on a more abstract level. Even though children as young as 2 show the capacity to differentiate between feelings and their manifestations (Wellman et al., 1995), it is not until the period between the fourth and the sixth year of life that most children conceive of the idea of deceiving others by showing signs of a different emotion than the one they are experiencing. Studies reviewed by Harris (1995a) suggest that the development of this recognition is universal, with small cultural variations. By the age of eight, 'aesthetic' emotions begin to develop and the child is typically able to judge the social and moral appropriateness of his/her actions prior to carrying them out (Kusák & Dařilek, 2001).

In general then, the vital survivor and physiologically determined emotions are in early childhood enriched by feelings with a more pronounced social,
cultural and symbolic orientation. The over-expressiveness of emotional states, characteristic for very young children, is replaced by more socially and culturally acceptable manifestations and rituals. It is through this mechanism that the spontaneity of emotional expression is moulded into its more socially appropriate and culturally prescribed concealment and falsification (Nakonečný, 2000). It has been shown, for example, that pre-school children believe that people will do what they want to do even if such action is morally or socially unacceptable. The suggested explanation is that children at this stage of emotional development do not yet understand ethically and socially driven emotions such as embarrassment, pride, guilt or shame (Harris, 1995b).

Although children’s acquisition of culture-specific knowledge, which links together events, emotions, and their expressions has been well documented, the mechanisms for the development of such knowledge through socialisation are not yet understood (Papadopoulou, 1995). Let me briefly explore two theories which deal with this problem in the form of concrete theoretical models.

Harris (1995a, p. 361) argues for a ‘script-based’ model of the acquisition of emotion concepts, where every emotional experience is stored in the child’s memory in the form of a ‘schema’ of the event (i.e., its evaluation, emotional reaction and actions resulting from it). With every subsequent experience of a similar nature, the stable characteristics are reinforced, while those occurring by chance are erased. This model, Harris suggests, is both ‘flexible’ enough to accommodate both the haze surrounding many emotional terms, as well as the young child’s exceptional memory capacity. Incidentally, it is this highly effective memory for the sequence of everyday activities observed in pre-school children (e.g., Nelson in Harris, 1995a) that could be seen as a mechanism for capturing consistently occurring cross-cultural variations in the expression of emotions.

According to Harris, however, this theory grinds to a halt in the face of instances in which the emotional outcome of an event results directly from the
individual’s evaluation of the situation, as can be apparent from several Theory of Mind studies conducted with autistic children (e.g., Tan & Harris, 1991 or Baron-Cohen, 1991). This perhaps suggests that conceptions of emotions as such, develop independently of strong emotional experiences (Harris, 1995a, p. 362-369).

Focusing on a particular aspect of emotional development, Papadopoulou set out to investigate the acquisition of “negative reflexive social emotions” (i.e., embarrassment, guilt and shame), evoked by the reaction of the self to the internalised social norms. The context of this investigation was inspired by Vygotsky’s (e.g., 1978) proposal of the child’s ‘social interaction’ with others in his culture, resulting in the ‘definition’ and ‘regulation’ of his actions, and subsequently in the ‘internalising’ of the appropriate social standards (Papadopoulou, 1995, p. 333)31. Papadopoulou’s basic theory suggests that the adult’s linguistic and conceptual feedback given in response to the child’s actions shapes the emerging cognitive and affective functioning. This process, Papadopoulou argues, occurs through Vygotsky’s interplay between ‘inter’ and ‘intra-psychological’ functioning (Papadopoulou, 1995, p. 335). Inter-psychological functioning reflects social interaction between people and is later internalised to form intra-psychological concepts as part of the child’s growing social cognition. In this process, children acquire culturally specific concepts of emotions through constant contact with other members of the society. Because the small child is not able to participate in experiencing ‘culturally appropriate emotion’ during ‘emotion-eliciting episodes’, the mother’s experience and its manifestations ‘extend’ to include those of her child (p. 336). It is the ability to represent typical scenarios through language that over time enables the emergence of the reflexive social emotions.

Papadopoulou presented his subjects (4-12-year-olds) with vignettes describing embarrassing situations across several age groups. The findings show that young children tend to react by exhibiting ‘non-reflexive’ emotions and request the assistance of others, while suggesting that the actions

31 This idea has inspired much research on the topic of the “zone of proximal development” first described by Vygotsky (Papadopoulou, 1995).
committed were "wrong" or "stupid", should not have been done and evoke emotional reactions in terms of 'sadness' or 'anger'. Older children, on the other hand, responded with the appropriate reflexive social emotions, exhibiting 'intra-psychological' functioning (p. 339-348). As we will see in the following chapter, these findings are highly relevant to the observations made in this study.

To summarise this section, the emotional and social significance of many cultural symbols constitutes the most fundamental basis of learning within the human society. Children are presented with experiences of socially challenging tasks at a very early age. The consequences of their success and failure will always have an emotional component. The importance of the acquisition of socially, and indeed, culturally appropriate behaviour therefore holds an important position in each culture (Nakonečný, 2000). Communication is one of the most efficient and yet elaborately concealed mechanisms of this process.

15.2 Empathy: Feeling the feelings of others

"As one part of the burgeoning intersubjectivity of the early years, empathy is a double-edged sword: it makes young children susceptible to the most noble, and most troubling, of human impulses." (Thompson, 1998, p. 157)

Empathy is one of the most important socially governed emotions. The term 'empathy' refers to identification with the emotional state of another person, co-experiencing of this state, even if only in its weaker form. This ability to relate to not only the emotions, but also to the understanding of a particular event or situation through the eyes of another, is crucial to communication and social interaction (Nakonečný, 2000). It is also measured by the Theory of Mind tests which determine the level of cognitive and social functioning in children.

Some (e.g., Holzkamp in Nakonečný, 2000) explain the individual differences which exist in levels of empathy in terms of learning. In early childhood we
begin to learn how to interpret the emotional expressions of others, so acquiring 'interpretation models' which we can later apply to novel situations. Even though often spontaneous, empathy can therefore also be evoked as a conscious attempt to relate to others.

According to Buda (1985), every definition of empathy has to rest on the claim that people have a very specific ability to penetrate the psychological state of another person with whom they are in an immediate contact. This link enables us to retrieve the content of affects, emotions and thoughts currently experienced by somebody else. Buda too argues that this ability varies in degree from person to person. It can, however, be developed through the correct 'models of empathic behaviour' and 'social sensitivity', exhibited by parents and observed and learned by their children. Children’s maturity in terms of empathy is therefore linked to social competence and the level of personal development (p. 177).

In this context, Buda (1985) makes an interesting observation which suggests that difficult situations in life seem to enhance the individual's ability to empathise with others. People who experience a strenuous life also possess a larger experiential pool on which they can draw in order to relate to the problems of others. Those who live harmonious lives do not have such resources.

15.2.1 Empathy: A developmental perspective

Empathy has been discussed by developmental psychologists within two opposing theoretical frameworks. In the context of the 1960's psychoanalytic and neo-analytic writings, the emotional closeness of the infant to the mother can be understood in terms of an early empathic connection. This claim is based on the young child's sensitivity to the feelings and the moods of its mother (Thompson, 1998). However, most cognitive-developmental theorists, Thompson argues, subscribe to the view that real empathy is outside of the abilities of an infant. This theory, inspired by Piaget's work, emerged in the
1970's, drawing on the claim that primary orientation of an infant is egocentric. A very young child lacks the ability to adopt the roles of others and is therefore incapable of relating to feelings of anybody outside the self (Deutsch & Madle; Shantz, in Thompson, 1998). According to this view, empathy cannot be observed in children until the middle childhood when the child becomes able to differentiate between his own emotional states and those of others. In addition, a child of this age can also identify the cause of other's emotional experience and react to it appropriately (Thompson, 1998).

The 1980's and 1990's witnessed a partial revival of the claims in favour of the early emergence of empathy, in the form of the functionalist emotions theory. This view highlights the relevance of emotions within the social structure into which children are typically included at a very early age. To function as 'social beings', it is crucial for children to learn and understand the emotional signs as a part of the process labelled 'social referencing' (Thompson, 1998, p. 146).

Thompson summarises the evidence which exists for the notion that very young children exhibit 'non-egocentric' interests, as their own well being relies on the moods and emotional states of others. What transpires is the view that the cognitive and emotional mechanisms necessary for empathising with others must be perceived and studied as a part of a complex system. Emotional knowledge requires time and opportunities to observe, experience and interpret emotional states of other members of the group. As such, this process is likely to take place over a prolonged period in child’s development (1998, p. 146).

Thompson outlined the main points in the development of empathy as the following. At the age of 12 months the child begins to understand that the emotions of others are triggered off by certain situations which may also affect the child itself. By learning to read the emotional expressions (facial as well as verbal) of those around, the child is able to gain valuable information. After the age of 2.5, the child becomes able to experience the feelings of 'true
empathy’, contrasted with the ‘emotional resonance’ characteristic of an earlier stage of development. Toddlers exhibit expressions of ‘concerned attention’ as a reaction to negative feelings expressed by others (p. 150). Some studies showed (e.g., Zahn-Waxler and Radke-Yarrow, 1982) that children in their second year of life copy the distress signals they observed in adults, perhaps in an attempt to understand them better. They also search for reasons for the adult’s anxiety and seek the assistance of others. Such empathic reactions, Thompson argues, were quite rare in these studies, and instead of reflecting true empathy, they may simply capture the young child’s efforts to understand the sudden and atypical display of the adult. Nevertheless, the second year represents an important milestone in the development towards the concerned attention to the wellbeing of others (Thompson, 1998).

One of the processes contributing to the emergence of empathy in the child’s second year is the dramatic acceleration of linguistic abilities. The growing capacity to recognise and be aware of self as an independent entity is enhanced by the ability to use the newly discovered tool of language to refer to self. It is also a period of exploration of own emotional states, as well as those of others, and of linking them to external situations and standards through language. Early Theory of Mind cognition is reflected in these linguistic encoded associations between the emotional states, beliefs and desires of others, and events taking place in the outside world (Thompson, 1998). It would therefore seem that the ability to empathise with others is greatly dependent on the capacity to be not only aware of the existence of others in relation to self but also to represent this link through language. For example, soon after the age of 18 months children acquire the use and understanding of the personal pronouns I and you, as well as the related forms my and mine. The latter is only possible through the identification with the perspective of the other speaker from whom the child adopted the statement of possession (Hobson, 1998).
As children grow older, empathy associations become increasingly more intricate. Here also language serves as the key to the emotional experiences of others. This, Thompson (1998) postulates, is also the reason why feelings are so frequently talked about in the families of pre-school children.

Many of the above discussed points suggest that levels of empathy reached and exhibited by children can to a large extent be modified through learning and empathy-enhancing environments. For example, studies reported by Thompson (1998) reveal dramatic individual differences in the empathy behaviour exhibited by young children which were related not only to personality but also to the child rearing techniques applied by their mothers. In this respect it is likely that culture specific forces play an important role in the social development of young children, leading up to their empathic abilities and practices.

15.3 Guilt and Shame: Surviving in Society

"It is only by being held accountable for what we do and for what we mean by what we say, however, that we develop into persons with moral stances of our own." (Rommetveit, 1998, p. 364)

The ability to empathise with the feelings and thoughts of others constitutes one of the basic characteristics of socially constructed emotions in general. This section will briefly outline the nature of two such emotions, guilt and shame, and their gradual emergence resulting from children's development as social beings, before moving on to the more specific issue of the role that language plays in this process.

15.3.1 Moral Development

Like empathy, guilt has also evolved within the cultural development of the human species. Nakonenčný defines it as an emotion triggered off by the failure of an individual to comply with moral norms he had previously adopted
Behavioural moral norms are imposed on children from an early age. This leads to their internalisation and the development of an individual’s moral system represented by the psychoanalytic super-ego. The social relevance of such moral norms exists in terms of regulatory mechanisms reflecting the interests of social units and the functioning of individuals within their boundaries. Their main characteristic lies in the necessary levels of altruism. At this level, consciousness, altruism and individual morality can be conceived of as biologically determined constructions (Nakonečný, 2000). In other words, the feelings of guilt and shame are crucial for individuals’ ability to navigate through the rules of their social groups (Greenwald & Harder, 1998).

Vágnerová (2001) describes moral development in terms of three phases loosely modeled on Piaget’s, Kohlberg’s, Hrabal’s and Heibrinka’s theorising. The first phase is described as ‘preconventional morality’ which is mostly motivated by external standards set by figures of authority. During this stage, the children’s behaviour is governed by its objective results (i.e., praise or punishment) which are interpreted egocentrically. The morality of young children is rigidly set without the capacity to consider internal motivations for behaviour. Even children around the age of seven are, however, able to apply norms with varying degrees of emphasis. For example, stealing from a classmate is considered much less serious than stealing from an individual who represents authority (e.g., teacher). The young child also often has to struggle to reach the required level of self-control in overcoming certain impulses which would result in the breach of social norms (pp. 278-279).

The phase of ‘conventional morality’ is still characterised by the compliance with ‘institutionally’ set rules. However, the need for positive evaluation which reinforces one’s position within the group is greatly enhanced. This is also the time of early ‘internalisation’ of specific standards, partially motivated by the need for positive self-evaluation. The child’s behaviour is at this point occasionally motivated by the ‘morality of conscience’ as opposed to the ‘moral realism’ of earlier years. Egocentric tendencies are less
pronounced and the child begins to focus on ‘fairness’, which often gains fanatical proportions, where inconsistencies in treatment of others cannot be tolerated (e.g., “why can’t I do it when HE can?” reasoning). Such conceptions of morality are typical around the age of 9 (p. 280-282).

The third phase of ‘generalised morality’ comes with the ability to hypothesise. At this stage, norms are no longer accepted automatically. Instead they are scrutinised and evaluated. Authority is often disputed and questioned at this point in the development. This transformation also marks the onset of early adolescence (p. 282-283).

Although moral development in itself does not constitute a main part of this study, the above categorisation will serve as a necessary background for the discussion of the semantic and pragmatic issues uncovered within the children’s discourse. An examination of the linguistically coded concepts of interpersonal relations is expected to not only raise the issue of cross-cultural conceptions of emotion knowledge but also to provide some clues as to how language may contribute to it.

To return to the previous topic, Edwards (1997) suggests that emotional expressions reflect morality not only through their displays but also in cases when they are inappropriately absent. It is also common to describe emotional states, such as fear and jealousy, to explain why we have failed to engage in a particular behaviour (Mischel, in Edwards, 1997, p. 200). As I will show, this point is also highly relevant to the current data.

One aspect of moral norms prescribed to us by society is the relative importance our culture places on conformity and non-conformity associated shame. It has been suggested that societies with individualistic values will exhibit greater levels of tolerance for the non-conformity of their members, where a great need exists to create or re-establish the feeling of ‘social cohesion’. The need for conformity and the shame linked to non-compliance, on the other hand, will be greater (Greenwald & Harder, 1998). Similar
culture-based differences are observable e.g., in rewarding competitive behaviour, which may be considered shameful by other societies (Greenwald & Harder, 1998). Greenwald and Harder argue that such differences are determined by a variety of conditions, including historical, economic and geographic forces, which determine the preference for a particular type of social organisation. As the current study deals with two societies the organisation of which exhibits some differences in these trends (although not as extensive as the individualist-collectivist dimension), certain variations in the children’s representations of these norms can perhaps be expected.

As part of the behaviour within a wide moral, ethical and religious context, the feelings of guilt vary greatly not only on a personal level, but also across ethnic groups and cultural communities. The awareness of some wrongful action typically leads to the feelings of guilt which are experienced by the individual as very invasive and overwhelming. In turn, the intensity of guilt produces physical actions aimed at restoring the inner integrity of the sufferer who also experiences the feeling of personal failure and a reduction in self-esteem and self-worth. Guilt is therefore classified as a ‘self-conscious emotion’, one which affects the individual’s idea of himself (Nakonečný, 2000, p. 266).

In the social context, one of the main motivational factors which allow for identification with the moral and ethical norms is the connection between the feelings of guilt and shame. In this sense, shame is egocentric (Nakonečný, 2000). Unlike guilt, the main trigger for the experience of shame is often not a specific situation but the individual’s evaluation of that situation (Lewis in Nakonečný, 2000). Gilbert (1998) and others discuss shame in terms of “fear of being exposed, scrutinised and judged negatively by others” (p. 4).

The experience of a failure, unacceptable behaviour or incompetence within one’s social surroundings leads to the experience of public shame. Such definition places the feelings of shame in the context of socially evoked emotions. However, an individual can also experience ‘private’ shame, i.e.,
shame for own actions which are dissonant with own moral convictions (Nakonenčný, 2000). In a similar conception, shame can relate to one’s perception of his own self through the eyes of others, his own perception of self or the interaction of both, i.e., the individual’s evaluation of self based on his beliefs about the way he is perceived by others (Gilbert, 1998).

In addition, shame can also be evoked by actions for which the individual is not responsible, such as by actions of members of his family or social group (Gilbert, 1998).

As the feelings of shame are not always experienced within a negative social revelation; i.e., the related feeling of embarrassment is often associated with the reactions to praise, it has been argued that an enhancement in the attention of social surroundings can be seen as the general cause of shame (Izard & Saxton, 1988).

The feelings of humiliation, embarrassment, ridicule and others are also all linked to the experience of shame (Greenwald & Harder, 1998). Miller (1993) argues, that although shame and humiliation are often presented as synonyms for the same emotional expression, important differences exist between them. A humiliating situation requires an interaction between people. What is crucial for the state of humiliation to occur is not the experience of an emotional state but the experience of this state being inflicted on us by somebody who possess such power. Shame, on the other hand, is much more reliant on one’s perception of self.

Generally speaking therefore, the feeling of guilt is closely related to that of shame, although it is distinct from it. The crucial differences lie in the comparatively internal nature of guilt. While shame is the experience of ‘exposure’ by others, guilt is defined by a private regret for something that had a harmful effect on somebody else (Greenwald and Harder, 1998).
In order to avoid increasing levels of anxiety once guilt is experienced, the individual’s actions which may be dangerous to others, and his perception of this behaviour, needs to be altered and subsequently repaired. The feelings of guilt therefore convey a signal which prevents the individual from behaviour harmful to others and to his own position within the group. While shame serves a similar function, it is more relevant in the context of eliminating the social damage caused by the offensive action, where guilt directs the individual to the repair of the actual effects of the behaviour (Greenwald & Harder, 1998). Like guilt, shame is also psychologically unsustainable and offensive to the individual’s view of himself. As can be expected, large cultural variations exist in terms of rituals involved in shame reparation. Commonly, such rituals involve an acknowledgement of one’s offence and an apology (Miller, 1993).

The purpose of this rather detailed introduction into the underlying causes of shame and guilt, and their significance in terms of social functioning, was to aid the exploration of the nature of the Cat story narratives provided by the children. It will become apparent from the following analysis that the distinction between the self-oriented guilt and the more externally motivated feelings of shame plays quite a significant role in the context of these narratives. It is also related to the perspective adopted by the children in telling the story. Moreover, the representation of the guilty character’s internal struggle, as well as the degree of the underlying drive towards the repair mechanism and their culture-specific undertones, will be more visible against the above-presented theoretical framework.

15.3.2 Guilt and Shame: A developmental perspective

From a developmental viewpoint, the first manifestations of guilt and shame occur at the same point of development as those of empathy. Thompson (1998) and others suggest that the emergence of ‘empathy-based guilt’ can be observed as early as in the second year of life. Other ‘self-evaluative’ emotions, such as embarrassment and shame, are also associated with this
period of observing and evaluating own actions in relation to outside norms (p. 155).

Lane and Schwartz (1987) proposed a set of stages of emotional development which somewhat mirror Piaget's cognitive stages. Each individual stage deals with the child's growing understanding of the concepts of (1) bodily sensations, (2) the body in action – feelings as a consequence of the body's activity; (3) individual feelings - e.g., happiness, sadness, and anger; (4) blends of such primary feelings and (5) blends of blends of feelings which constitute even more intricate combinations of emotional experiences. According to this scale, the ability to experience shame would not occur until the 3\textsuperscript{rd}, but more likely during the higher stages.

Gilbert argues that all children will at some point demonstrate their inner capacity to experience the feeling of shame\textsuperscript{32}, although many diverse theories attempt to account for the exact mechanisms by which this feeling is socialised. For example, Self-psychologists, such as Miller, suggest that the preparedness for shame is first activated when the child's needs are not approved of by its environment. In contrast, Cognitive-behaviourists postulate that the feeling of shame can only be experienced as a result of the situation gaining some 'meaning' for the child (Gilbert, 1998).

15.3.3 Summary

This general introduction into the developmental aspects of emotional experience was intended as a platform supporting the more specific aspects of the analysis. Many of the points discussed here have also served as guidelines in deciding on the specific emotions to be investigated in this study, the content of the picture stories used and the age group most likely to produce pragmatically interesting material. Now, however, I would like to move onto

\textsuperscript{32} See Schore (1998) for an interesting overview of the development of shame in which the link between emergence of shame in infancy and the physical maturation of the brain is explored.
the most important topic - the discussion of the relationship between emotions and language.

15.4 Emotions and Language

The number of studies pointing to cross-linguistic variations in emotion terminology is rather large. Harris (1995a), however, warns against any conclusions based solely on the studies of lexicons of different languages. He argues that such lexical differences are limited only to the periphery of the human emotional range therefore not reflecting true conceptual differences. Frijda, Markam, Sato & Wiers (1995) adopt a similar position. They propose that the word 'emotion' with all its translational equivalents was created to refer to "multicompositional sets of phenomena with particular properties" (p. 125), with emotional terms such as 'anger' or the Czech 'hněv' marking specific subcategories. However, the existence of such phenomena is independent of the terminology used to describe them. Even though English does not have a word referring to the "desire to depend upon someone else", such as the Japanese amae, this desire may nevertheless be understood or even experienced by an English speaker (Frijda et al., 1995).

Others (e.g., Zammuner & Frijda, 1994) postulate that it is the existence of a lexicon which makes emotion conceptualisation possible. Once emotional experience has been assigned an emotion term, the emotion itself may become affected in the following ways. The highly 'evaluative' and narrow focused nature of emotion labels may lead to cognitively motivated changes in the experience itself. In the social context, once an emotional experience has been verbalised and named, it becomes easier for it not only to be communicated to others but also to be understood by the experiencer himself. As an extension of this point, the emotion, once verbalised, can also become less desirable and therefore the speaker may perceive the need to adjust it (Fishcher, 1995, p. 458). Bellelli (1995) also supports this view by postulating that encoding an

---

33 For a comprehensive review of this literature see e.g., Russell (1991).
34 This view in principle resembles the theory of 'prototypical emotion concepts' put forward by Fehr & Russell (1984).
emotion in language does not merely result in its ‘categorisation’ but it also aids the individual in the process of making sense of his or her experience. This process cannot take place outside the social and cultural group of the individual, as it is defined by the interaction and communication with others (Bellelli, 1995).

Harris (1995a) uses the example of spatial prepositions in English and in Dutch to illustrate that in order to assert that English and Dutch speakers differ in terms of their understanding of spatial reference, more than lexical differences needs to be uncovered. His starting point in this endeavour is the observation that even the mild version of the Whorfian theory of linguistic relativity (i.e., some linguistic forms may prime, although not necessarily determine certain aspects of cognition) consistently proves difficult to support.

As Harris goes on to say, quite a dramatic difference exists between spatial and emotional knowledge acquired by children. We can assume that the understanding of spatial relations in the world occurs, at least to a certain extent, prior to language, independent of any cultural context. Once the child possesses such a universal ‘conceptual framework’, he/she can apply it to particular distinctions within his native language. The world of emotions, on the other hand, is anything but culture- and society- independent.

This fact alone, however, does not suggest to Harris that the conceptualisation of emotions differs dramatically across societies. In his own words, “listeners or observers could use their knowledge of the relationship between the protagonist and the emotionally-charged situation to arrive at similar conclusions about an emotional state, that from a lexical point of view is specified with greater or lesser detail across languages” (p. 357). As an example Harris constructs the term ‘sangry’, which could mean either ‘sad’ or ‘angry’ with the differentiation between the two emotions dependent solely on the context of the use of the word.
Let me pause at this thought. Is not the lack of existence of such a generic term the very point of this polemic? I have already presented the argument (e.g., Wierzbicka, 1995), that languages create terms for concepts salient to those who use them. The very presence of two different words for anger and sadness simply means that Harris's 'sangry' does not capture the emotional experience that English speakers want to describe. As Wierzbicka (1995) points out, not taking notice of the existing emotion lexicon of a particular culture means turning our backs on the large body of knowledge accumulated by anthropologists and linguists, suggesting a definite relationship between the speakers and their experiences in the world. I identify with this view as one of those that had inspired me to conduct the present study. However, Frijda's et al. (1995) warning against getting carried away by the differences in emotion vocabulary across languages, to the extent of losing sight of the magnitude of the similarities, also needs to be acknowledged.

The ultimate example of the difficulties inherent in the attempts to study the universality of human experience independent of language are the emotion terms themselves. Wierzbicka (1995) suggests that although 'feel' is a 'universal human concept', the English term 'emotion' and what it represents is not. As Wierzbicka (p. 21) notes, there is no word equivalent to the English 'emotion' in the vocabulary of German speakers. To translate this term into German, translators commonly rely on Gefühl, from the verb fühlen, 'to feel', which refers to not only psychological but also physical states. German speaking scientists have adopted the word Emotion from English. The same is true for Russian, Polish and indeed Czech.

Where German, Russian, Polish as well as English deal with the distinction between cognitive and physical feelings in terms of singular-plural mechanisms (i.e., the plural typically referring to psychological states only, with the singular marking both, Wierzbicka, 1995, p. 21), Czech approaches this difference from another angle. The verb citít, 'to feel', relates to two nouns, pocit and cit. The word cit, can be used in the physical context, e.g.,

---

35 See Wierzbicka (1995) for the account of the expressions similar to the English word emotion also in French, Italian and Spanish.
‘nemám cit v pravé ruce’, ‘I do not have any feeling in my right hand’, as well as in the cognitive, e.g., ‘mám cit pro umění’, ‘I have a feeling for <I appreciate> art’. Pocit, on the other hand implies cognitive content, ‘mám pocit, že jsem něco zapomněla’, ‘I have a feeling that I have forgotten something’. Prefixes are typically used in the Czech grammar to indicate perfective aspect of verbs (e.g., pocítit = perfective, citit = imperfective). In this case, I dare to speculate, the prefix is attached to the noun to highlight the cognitive aspect of the experience.

The dramatic differences between the grammatical systems involved in the expression of feelings in Czech and in English were already mentioned here. I will continue to comment on the linguistic options specific to Czech and English speakers in this context throughout the semantic analysis below.

15.4.1 Feeling All One Can Say: Bamberg’s study of anger and sadness accounts

Bamberg argues that theories such as that of ‘natural perception’, which claims that emotions are not learned but physically experienced and consequently linguistically coded on the basis of a small number of categories, cannot fully account for the role that language plays in our conception of emotions. An example of trying to master some emotion terms while learning another language will illustrate that every language structures its emotion reference system in a way that is closer to the native speakers than it is to those trying to acquire the language through another one (Bamberg, 1998). Similarly, Bamberg notes, the theories which propose the existence of a set of ‘cognitive universals’ (e.g., Wierzbicka), referring to a limited set of emotion categories common to all human minds which in turn have an exact equivalent in each language, i.e., ‘semantic universals’, also avoid considering language as an important element in our subjective construction of emotion meaning.

Bamberg is not alone in this quest for a broader perspective. Others have also called for emotions and their manifestations to be theoretically approached as
‘discursive phenomena’, as the products of the individual’s evaluation of the situation and their representation of it as part of a ‘social act’ (Harre & Gillett, 1994, p. 147). In this context, Bamberg (1998) outlines the developmental view of language as that of “participation in (linguistic) practices” (p. 4.), which do not exist independently of the speaker. Instead they constitute an integral part of his or her development as a person.

Bamberg’s (1998) conclusions based on his study of the ‘grammars of anger and sadness’ serve as the ideal starting point for the following discussion of the relationship between emotions and language, seen from a developmental perspective. I would like to consider some of Bamberg’s findings in more detail next.

Bamberg (1998) asked a group of 4- to 10-year-old American children to describe the feelings of sadness and anger. He was surprised to find that for many of the younger children the description of these two emotions were almost identical. This led Bamberg to consider the linguistic constructions used for the accounts of the emotions. The linguistic expression of anger consisted in the children’s accounts in the first person perspective of two ‘discursive purposes’, blame and empathy. To construct an example of a situation which involved anger, the children used the following basic strategies: (a) ‘a highly individuated agent’ (e.g., my sister) and ‘a highly individuated undergoer’ (me); (b) reporting the action as ‘highly transitive’; (c) presenting the I as the ‘recipient’ of the action in the place of the object; and (d) setting the agent in the subject position (p. 4).

I was in the room
and my sister kicked me
and it went right into the rib bone

(Bamberg 1998, p. 4)

These strategies could potentially lead to two consequences. The ‘highly individuated’ portrayal of the target of a somewhat unjustifiable act points the listener in the direction of empathising or even sympathising with the target.
Presenting the other protagonist in the position of a syntactic object makes him a good target for blame. In the account of anger, it is the latter that is emphasised while the ‘discursive purpose’ of obtaining empathy for the object remains out of the main focus (p. 4).

The examples of sadness exhibited a more complex structure. Here, the other protagonist as well as the speaker could be conceived of as the syntactic subject. In the first instance (in contrast to the accounts of anger), the elicitation of blame is avoided by the lack of target-orientated activity (i.e., dying), as well as the reduction of focus on the agentivity of the other protagonist (Bamberg 1998, p. 5).

it was when I was about 5- or 4- years old
my biggest sister got into a car accident
so she died
because of a car accident
and I was really sad for a few weeks

I was in Charlton
and I moved to Worcester
and I couldn’t see my neighbours and their dogs

(Bamberg 1998, p. 5)

These findings are described in terms of varying degrees of grammatical complexity involved in the construction of each of the two emotions. The initial construction of anger is less complex than that of shame but its discursive purposes (i.e., empathy as well as blame) are not. Shame, on the other hand, has two possible construction types, while its discursive purpose is more singular in orientation. In an attempt to create an account of sadness, the older children either concentrated on the other protagonist without an agentive role (and then shifted onto the I), or simply concentrated on the I from the beginning. The younger children, however, struggled with this concept, as they focused on the ‘highly agentive other’ in order to make sense of the situation, which resulted in their accounts of sadness closely resembling those of anger.

The analysis of the children’s definitions of anger and sadness revealed a slightly different trend. The situations of anger described by the children
painted a much less dramatic picture, as eliciting empathy or directing blame at the protagonist was not important. The feelings of sadness were described in terms of ‘something [bad] happening to you’ or ‘you want something, but you can’t have it’ (p. 6). In general, the younger children were able to explain the feelings of sadness and anger without any difficulties.

Intriguingly, these findings suggested to Bamberg that the difficulties the younger part of the sample experienced were not linked to the comprehension of the emotions as such, but to the language devices encoding the discursive purposes necessary for the account of personal experiences. While the ‘highly agentive’ other who plays an important role in blame attribution in accounts of anger is grammatically relatively simple, sadness examples require a more complex approach. In this case, the agentivity of the other protagonist has to be lessened in order to avoid blame associations while creating an empathic link with the listener instead. It is this shift in focus that the younger English-speaking children in Bamberg’s study struggled with. And as the hypothetical scenarios (which do not involve first person accounts) appear linguistically as well as conceptually more complex, it seems apparent that the difficulty lies in the ‘pragmatics’ of language used to elicit the feelings of empathy in the listener as well as to convey the blame associated with the protagonists (Bamberg, 1997a).

It is this aspect of the language system as reflecting specific communicative purposes deeply embedded within its structures that is at the core of the present investigation.

Suggesting that theories which conceive of the separate development of emotion comprehension and language need to be reconsidered, Bamberg (1998) writes: “children’s ability to engage in emotion talk appears to depend primarily on their abilities to co-ordinate lexico-syntactic constructions with the discursive purposes of such talk” (p. 7). Taking this point a step further he also suggests that, to a certain extent, our emotional understanding is constructed through the language we speak. The fundamental role of
agentivity in the construction of sadness and anger by the children in the study described above can serve as a perfect example. In Bamberg’s words, the description of events in terms of ‘who did what to whom’ (p. 7) and why is subjective in terms of the speaker’s perception of the situation. In this sense, our language does not only allow us to understand emotions but it “enables the person to learn how to feel” (p.7).

As the first chapters of this analysis revealed, the current investigation follows a similar line of reasoning. Specifically, the focus lies with the way self-referent structures of two distinctly diverse languages influence the subjective orientation of their speakers. The belief put forward here is that through such linguistic structures we learn to direct our attention, as well as the attention of our listeners, to the perspective relevant within a particular context. In the following chapters I would like to extend the investigation to broader linguistic forms such as lexical items and idiomatic expressions.

15.4.2 Emotions Speaking for Themselves

Zammuner and Fischer (1995) have suggested that the choice of emotion expression often reveals the subject’s perspective on the situation to which he is referring. The example they present is that of an event which may trigger off an array of different emotions while the speaker chooses only one particular aspect of this experience to verbalise. More than being just the ‘simplification discrepancy’ (p. 192), this process reflects the direction of the experiencer’s attention, the importance he attributes to a particular aspect of his experience, as well as its salience in terms of communication with others - bringing us back to a discursive psychology of emotions.

According to Edwards (1997) a discursive approach to emotions with a specific linguistic focus is best represented by Harré’s and Gillett’s social constructionism and to a somewhat lesser degree by Lakoff’s or Wierbicka’s cognitive-semantic models. Both of those approaches share one common characteristic, namely, the idea of cognitive ‘scripts’ or ‘scenarios’ (p. 173),
already mentioned (i.e., emotions can be described and documented through standard sets of events). Similar theories are built on the originally Darwinian notion of physiologically driven and therefore universally widespread set of ‘basic’ emotions, which was adopted by Paul Ekman in the 1990’s. This set includes anger, fear, disgust, sadness and enjoyment (p. 174). However, the appropriateness of the proclamation of these English terms as representative of the ‘universal emotions’ has been criticized by many (e.g., van Brakel, 1993), including Wierzbicka: “to assume that English happens to have lexical labels for ‘universal human emotions’ is an ethnocentric illusion’ (1995, p. 26).

Bamberg (1997a) also introduces two possible views of the relationship between language and emotions. In one, “language and emotions are two concurrent, parallel systems in use, and their relationship exists in that one system (emotions) impacts on the performance of the other (language)” (p. 309). Both of those systems are equally important in the process of communication. The second view suggests contrasting dynamics. Here language serves the function of describing the outside world and its parts, therefore also emotions. Different languages deal with emotions on different levels, with varying degrees of intensity. Language in this view is therefore defined as a “means of making sense of emotions, and as such can be used as a starting point to explore the world of emotions in different languages...” (p. 309). It is this latter view that I would like to use as a framework for the interpretation of the observations resulting from the current study.

Bamberg (1997a) identified the three main approaches to the investigation of emotions through language as Wierzbicka’s ‘universal semantics’ (a view shared also by Goddard, e.g., 1997), Harré’s ‘emotionology’ and his own ‘linguistic-constructionist approach’, which the reader may recall from earlier chapters.

36 Iordanskaja has also conducted an early analysis of language in terms of ‘standardised description of language units’. She believed that an emotion word can be defined in terms of two main components: ‘internal description of the emotional state’ and ‘the reason for its occurrence’. It is the second requirement that makes this theory unsuitable to most theorists as emotions can be experienced in the absence of the experiencer’s awareness of its cause (in Goddard, 1998, p. 89).
Wierzbicka’s approach centers around the idea of ‘semantic metalanguage’ which refers to basic units or ‘conceptual elements’ (e.g., feel, think, good, etc.) shared by all languages. In this sense, emotions as well as other concepts offer themselves for the scrutiny of a ‘language-independent perspective’ (Bamberg, 1997a, p. 310). Once encoded in terms of linguistic concepts, emotions gain a culture specific characteristic and so lose their universality. What follows is an example of the analysis of the culturally and linguistically constructed English term guilt. The concept is broken down into what Wierzbicka argues are universals grounded within a ‘non-contextual’ and ‘culture-free’ framework, shared by the speakers of all languages (Bamberg, 1997a, p. 311). This approach is consistent with the cognitive theory of emotions according to which intellectual awareness comes before feelings (Edwards, 1997). In its defense Wierzbicka (1995, p. 25) writes: “we do not need to try to talk about Ifaluk concepts in Ifaluk. We can use the English version of the “natural semantic metalanguage” (NSM), based on the concepts shared by all human groups”.

\[ X \text{ felt guilty} = \]
\[ X \text{ felt something} \]
sometimes a person thinks something like this:
\[ \begin{align*}
& \quad \text{I did something} \\
& \quad \text{because of this, something bad happened} \\
& \text{because of this, this person feels something bad} \\
& X \text{ felt like this}
\end{align*} \]

(Wierzbicka, 1995 cited in Bamberg, 1997a, p. 311)

The example above represents the scenarios which Edwards describes as “pictures of abstract and universally understandable semantic representations” (1997, p. 176). As Edwards points out, the list of semantic universals somewhat unexpectedly contains the difficult-to-define term feel. As a vocabulary set, the ‘semantic universals’ form an exceptionally poor semantic pool (heavily reliant on the two contrasting poles - good and bad) which would make it quite difficult to identify the emotion stated at the top of each of such scenarios in the absence of similar headings. It is in this context that Edwards refers to this technique as a “Legoland model of the emotions” (1997, p. 176). In addition, Edwards extends his critique to the ‘sub-sets’ of
the 'primitives' which include expressions of grammatical systems, such as tense (p. 177). As Harré illustrated, the interpretation of some of the most crucial components of the semantic universals set, such as the pronoun "I", appear to be language- and culture-specific (Harré, 1993).

But most importantly, as we have already noted, models such as this do not have anything to say about the linguistic choices with which speakers are constantly faced. Bamberg (1997a, 1997c) draws attention to similar issues. He also argues that the mechanisms through which language asserts its influence on the experiencer, transforming his feelings and thoughts into culturally and socially grounded concepts, are not incorporated into Wierzbicka's theorising focusing simply on lexical issues. Both of the theorists therefore agree that a more comprehensive approach is needed to tackle this problem.

"...grammar, if understood correctly, i.e., not as abstract principles of a universalist nature, but as social know-how relevant for the construction of social meaning, plays an integral role in coming to grips with what emotions do and what they are used for in social communicative practices" (Bamberg, 1997a, p. 333).

Moreover, Bamberg argues, the successful use of such linguistic tools in terms of social functioning is closely tied to the particular culture through which the child is being socialised. These structures are already in place, independently of the speaker's cognition. When he or she learns to apply the grammatical structures as part of his or her language acquisition, with them he/she also acquires the inherent perspective (Bamberg, 1997a).

Accepting the valid points that Edwards and Bamberg make, and acknowledging the relevance of Wierzbicka's model, the current analyses are placed not only on the level of semantic and therefore culturally constructed concepts but also at the level of grammatical structures, which are viewed as mediating the expression and conceptualisation of emotions in the two languages. The aim therefore is to examine emotions firmly rooted in the context of a specific culture, lexicon and linguistic structures within not only a cross-linguistic but also a cross-cultural framework.
Another discursive approach to the study of emotions, Harré’s ‘emotionology’, declares itself to be composed of four components which all need to be carefully considered in order to correctly encode any emotion into language: ‘a felt bodily disturbance’, ‘a characteristic display’, ‘the expression of a judgement’, and ‘a particular illocutionary force’. It is the two latter conditions which represent the discursive component crucial to these rules governing the use of emotion words. The term ‘emotionology’ refers to the “ways the people in a particular local culture identify, classify, and recognise emotions” with the aim to generate a ‘theory of emotion’ (Harré & Gillett, 1994, p. 148-150). More specifically, such theories are derived from analyses of the vocabulary and the rules for its use in expression of emotions within a specific linguistic community. Their example, which includes Lutz’s emotionology of the Ifaluk, somewhat resembles Wierzbicka’s system of semantic universals. However, it adds the necessary context of emotions equipped with a specific cultural charge (Bamberg, 1997a).

Harré & Gillett (1994) distinguish between emotion expressions in terms of three categories: moral (e.g., displays of anger or jealousy), aesthetic (e.g., displays of delight or disgust), and prudential (e.g., displays of fear) judgements. These expressions vary greatly from society to society and culture to culture. A perfect example of such world-wide variation is the appropriate expression of grief.

Before I conclude this section, I would like to briefly mention yet another approach to the investigation of the language of emotions, the study of metaphor.

15.4.3 The ‘Self that Stands for Others’ Metaphor

The study of emotions through metaphor is most often associated with the work of George Lakoff, Raymond Gibbs and others. Edwards (1997, p. 188) refers to emotion metaphors as ‘conceptual resources’ and suggests that

---

37 One of the most often cited examples are the anger related metaphors, characterised e.g., by the MIND IS A CONTAINER, ANGER IS HEATED FLUID IN A CONTAINER. See e.g., Lakoff & Johnson (1980), or Gibbs (1992) for a comprehensive outline of this and other related concepts.
through metaphors we are able to express what would otherwise be just thought, taking it one step beyond Lakoff’s, Johnson’s (e.g., 1999) and Gibbs’s (e.g., 1992) focus on the ‘embodied mind’.

Metaphors can be used almost as a ‘pictorial’ illustration of one’s mental state, employing the listener’s imagination. Using the examples of ‘boiling anger’ and other ‘contained heat’ metaphors, Edward’s (1997, p. 189-192) demonstrates that metaphors built on emotions allow different aspects of complimentary meanings (and sometimes even a level of inconsistency) to be constructed and made to fit particular situations. Moreover, he argues that the speaker’s choice amongst the available metaphors for a specific emotion holds in itself important implications for the nature of the message intended for communication. For example, the anger metaphor, ‘biting somebody’s head off’ implies an active and direct orientation, while the speaker who makes a reference to ‘boiling with anger’ clearly aims for a more subjective and inactive description (Edwards, 1999, p. 280).

Let me now return to Lakoff’s and Johnson’s (1999) model of metaphor as the key concept in the conception of our ‘inner lives’, specifically to their ‘Subject-Self Metaphor’. They argue that our multiple Selves are composed of all aspects of our lives and history, i.e., our bodies, social roles, etc. Therefore there is no one specific Subject-Self separation (and no ‘unified notion of our inner lives’, p. 268), instead there are ‘apparently universal experiences’ (p. 268) of our inner lives that we make sense of through metaphors. “These metaphors appear to be unavoidable, to arise naturally from common experience”(p. 268).

It is the universal nature of this process of ‘conceptualising the self’ that is of interest in the context of the current debate. Lakoff and Johnson have identified four types of Subject-Self metaphor based on different aspects of our experience: (1) ‘manipulating objects’; (2) ‘being located in space’; (3) ‘entering into social relations’; and (4) ‘empathic projection’. There is also a fifth category, which is based on the belief that everybody has an ‘Essence’ (p.
While we can have more than one \textit{Self}, only one of those \textit{Selves} corresponds to the Essence, which constitutes part of the subject. While the Subject always represents the ‘person’ in the ‘target domain’ of the metaphor, the \textit{Self} exists in the form of a ‘person’, an ‘object’ or a ‘location’ (p. 269) which is not captured within the Subject.

Even though the philosophical aspect of this theory is outside the scope of the present study, the idea of the \textit{selves} which specialise in engaging in interpersonal contact and relating to the thoughts and feelings of others (i.e., \textit{selves} 3 and 4 above) offers an interesting link to the linguistic self-referencing explored in the previous chapters. It also raises some questions. Is it one of those two \textit{selves} who is highlighted by the self-referents above the others, for a particular purpose, within a particular context? What does it say about the disproportionately higher levels of subjectification of the \textit{self} found in Czech as opposed to English expressions of emotional and cognitive states? And finally, does this phenomenon suggest that Czech speakers are somewhat closer to their ‘social \textit{selves}’, through the mechanisms of constant references to them? Such explanation is unlikely. If the metaphorical conceptualisation of empathy lies in the ability to “project your consciousness into other people, so that you can experience \textit{what} they experience, the \textit{way} they experience it” (p. 309) is that what is achieved by the ‘other self-referents’? Are they in fact a metaphorical tool of empathic awareness of others? Such hypothesising obviously completely ignores the linguistic evolution of the language. It does, however, offer an alternative perspective on the effect (if not purpose) of such linguistic structures and I will return to it at a later stage.

Lakoff and Johnson (1999) first proposed this system as specific to English or to the ‘Western mind’ (p. 284). Although cross-linguistic research into metaphors is relatively limited, there have been some results suggesting that Japanese closely resembles the English system of conceptualisation (Hirose quoted by Lakoff and Johnson). While Lakoff & Kövecses (in Kövecses, 1995) argue that metaphors could be seen as ‘constituting’ the folk conceptions of emotions (e.g., anger), others (e.g., Quinn in Kövecses, 1995,
p. 49) have argued that metaphors only ‘reflect’ what is already encoded in culture.

Lakoff & Johnson (1999) also include the issue of morality as part of their model. They postulate that almost all of our inner morality, such as the concepts of justice, empathy, and so on, are represented by conceptual metaphors which help us to make sense of our experiences. These ‘metaphorical moral concepts’, Lakoff and Johnson argue, are likely to apply cross-culturally, even though the creation of each particular metaphor may vary within a different cultural background. They give an example of moral balance, which could be universally described as a positive state, but in terms of specific states and objects the metaphors will differ from culture to culture.

15.5 Summary

This chapter deals with the concept of culturally-, socially- and linguistically-shaped emotion knowledge. Again the main focus lies on language and its function in the process of development of interpersonal emotions. It is suggested that in order to successfully study this process we need to consider it within a wider discursive context.

Wierzbicka (1995, p. 41) summarises the debate outlined in this introduction as that between the ‘universalists’ and ‘culturalists’. She too concludes that the true representation of the human expression and understanding of emotions lies somewhere in between.

“By affirming the existence of such [lexically encoded across languages] universals, and demonstrating their reality through cross-linguistic investigations, we can defend the old faith in the “psychic unity of humankind” while at the same time helping to protect the psychology, anthropology, and philosophy of ‘emotions’ from the ever-present threat of ethnocentric misconceptions”. (Wierzbicka, 1995, p. 42)
However, as Bamberg (1997c) points out, as the very nature of human communication is 'ethnocentric', it is possible that the best we can do is to learn to “better understand ‘otherness”’ (p. 192).
Lexical and Semantic Analysis:
Empathy, Shame and Guilt Accounts of Irish and Czech Children

16.1 Treatment of the Data
16.1.1 Coding
16.1.2 The ‘Quality Scale’

16.2 Lexical Types and Frequencies: An overview
16.2.1 Empathy: Irish children’s narratives
16.2.2 Empathy: Czech children’s narratives
16.2.3 Guilt and Shame: Irish children’s narratives
16.2.4 Guilt and Shame: Czech children’s narratives

16.3 The Quality of Emotion Statements
16.3.1 Empathy-related Statements: Irish and Czech children
16.3.2 Guilt- and Shame-related Statements: Irish and Czech children

16.4 The Emerging Themes
16.4.1 Empathy Narratives: Some general points of comparison
16.4.2 Empathy Theme I: Dislike, non-acceptance and social pressure
16.4.3 Empathy Theme II: “She must be a nice girl”
16.4.4 Empathy: Possible considerations
16.4.5 Guilt and Shame: General points of comparison
16.4.6 Guilt and Shame Theme I: Feeling versus looking guilty
16.4.7 Guilt and Shame Theme II: Czech antagonist’s remorse
16.4.8 Guilt and Shame Theme III: The right thing to do
16.4.9 Guilt and Shame Theme IV: Justification and Theory of Mind statements
16.4.10 Guilt and Shame: And what did the parents say...?

16.5 After Prompts: Diversity of perspective, family pride and a heavy heart

16.6 Summary

This Chapter deals with the emotion terms produced by the children as part of their narratives. It also explores related idiomatic expressions and themes observable within the discourse of the targeted emotions of empathy, guilt and shame. It is intended as a continuation of the previous grammatical analysis of self-referent structures with the aim of enhancing and supplementing some of the observations about the children’s linguistic concepts of interpersonal relations, as well as the possible conceptual points brought to the surface by the previous chapters. First, I will outline the methodology used in this part of the analysis, followed by a general overview of the resulting categories, moving onto the interpretation and thematic analysis of the results.
16.1 Treatment of the Data

All of the narratives were analysed in terms of emotional states and their physical manifestations mentioned by the children. The overall types of such terms, together with their frequencies for each of the groups, were then counted and their overview can be found in Tables 1 to 4. For example, the word *happy* constitutes one type of emotional state and the frequency of 9 shows that this term (in all its grammatical forms) occurred 9 times within the narratives of one particular group. This methodology was loosely based on Shatz, Dyer, Wellman, Bromirksy & Hagiwara's (2001) study.

Frequency counts were performed separately for each of the two stories. The reason for this division was the exploration of the discourse centered on specific emotions which each of the picture stories was designed to elicit. As the reader may recall, the story entitled 'The Move' was directed primarily at narratives describing the feelings of *empathy*, while the story-line of 'The Cat Story' targets the feelings of *guilt* and *shame* experienced by one of the characters. This division was therefore maintained throughout the following analysis.

16.1.1 Coding

Some important coding decisions had to be made in order to account for the structural differences in both languages. However, the coding system for each linguistic group had to be particularly sensitive as it dealt with issues at the core of the theoretical framework of this study, i.e., the *significance* of such diversities.

Specifically, in relation to the frequency counts, it was necessary to allow for the difference in the construction of expressions of emotional states in Czech

---

38 Expressions sharing the same root were represented by one type. For instance, the Czech word *radost*, 'joy/happiness/gladness' was used as part of three grammatical constructions, i.e., in connection with the verb *být*, 'to be', *mite*, 'to have' and as a verbalised form. This phenomenon was not unique to Czech. The English 'get a fright', 'be frightened' and 'be afraid' constitutes an example of the same treatment of the data.
and in English (described in detail in Chapter 14). As previously noted, the Czech equivalent of the English sentence “he feels terrible” does not necessarily include the verb to feel, although the option exists. The same statement would more typically be expressed through the use of the dative form of the pronoun, i.e., “je mu hrozne”. Similarly, the English “he feels happy” would in Czech be expressed as “je šťastný”, therefore again not including the verb ‘to feel’. Based on this observation, and in order to maintain a level of comparability between the Czech and Irish samples, the decision was made to only include the English verb to feel in the frequency count when it occurred independently of, and not directly followed by, a specific emotion. For example, “the little girl feels upset” counts as one instance, i.e., feel upset represented in the table by upset. When followed by a clause, phrase or an expression not classified as an emotion, feel was counted as an independent unit.

16.1.2 The ‘Quality Scale’

To explore the children’s emotion expressions on an additional, more pragmatic level, a simple scale was designed according to which each narrative was rated. Again, each of the two narratives produced by the children was rated separately.

A score of zero was awarded to narratives which did not include any reference to the targeted emotion. A score of 1 generally marked the description of the emotional state without the use of an explicit emotion term (or in the case of the empathy narratives ‘antipathy’ statements), while the highest score of 2 was awarded for explicit references to the target emotions. These two scales differed slightly for assessment of empathy, shame and guilt statements. The particularities of each of these measures will be outlined in the relevant sections.
To ensure the consistency of these measures, two independent raters (one Czech and one English speaker) were asked to score a sample of the narratives. Their scores were consistent with those of the investigator.

16.2 Lexical Types and Frequencies: An overview

16.2.1 Empathy: Irish children’s narratives

The number of types of emotional states present in the narratives of the Irish children was 25, with an overall frequency count of 146. Over half of the emotion terms (76) were used by girls, with an average number of 3.6 emotion terms per child. Boys scored a count of 70, with an average of 2.9 each. The highest number of emotion terms used by any one particular child within one narrative was 9. Three children did not use any emotion terms while narrating ‘The Move’ picture story. These results are summarised in Table 1 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Frequencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. sad</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. happy</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. cry</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. lonely</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. feel</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. shy</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. miss somebody</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. worried</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. sorry for somebody</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. unhappy/not happy</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. nervous</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. worried about somebody</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. scared</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. upset</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. excited</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. embarrassed</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. anxious</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. sad for somebody</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. jealous</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. pleased</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. afraid</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. delighted</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. happy for somebody</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. concerned about somebody</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. joy</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>146</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
16.2.2 Empathy: Czech children’s narratives

The overall frequency for the Czech sample was 108, distributed over 21 types. The boys used 42 emotion terms, with an average of 2.5 for each child. The girls averaged a lower score of 2.4 frequencies per person, with an overall count of 66. The highest number of emotion terms (10) was used by Child 18m. Nine of the children scored 0 frequencies. Table 2 provides an overview of these frequencies.

Table 2. Emotion terms used in the empathy narratives of the Czech children

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Meaning in English</th>
<th>Frequencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. smutný/smuto</td>
<td>sad</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. být rád/mit radost/radovat se</td>
<td>glad/happy</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. plakat</td>
<td>cry</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. líto něčeho</td>
<td>sorry about something</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. stydět se</td>
<td>embarrassed/shy</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. bát se</td>
<td>afraid</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. líto někoho</td>
<td>sorry for somebody</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. brečet</td>
<td>cry</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. stýskat</td>
<td>miss somebody</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. smá/usmívat se</td>
<td>laugh/smile</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. spokojený</td>
<td>contented</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. mit starost/dělat si starost</td>
<td>worry</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. veselý/veselo</td>
<td>happy</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. nadšený</td>
<td>excited</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. mit o někoho strach</td>
<td>worry about somebody</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. nešťastná</td>
<td>unhappy</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. rozjíšaná</td>
<td>rejoiced</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. cítit</td>
<td>feel</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. hněvat se</td>
<td>angry</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. mračit se</td>
<td>brown</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. slzy</td>
<td>tears</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

16.2.3 Guilt and Shame: Irish children’s narratives

The total number of frequencies within the guilt and shame narratives was 291, distributed across 35 types of emotion expressions. Boys produced 159 and girls 132 of the total frequencies. The average number of emotion terms included by boys was 6.6, while the girls scored 6.3 on the same measure. The highest number of emotion terms for one child was 15. Each of the
children within the Irish sample had incorporated at least 2 emotion terms into their narrative.

Table 3. Emotion terms appearing in the guilt and shame narratives of the Irish cohort

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Frequencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. cry</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. sad</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. happy</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. cross</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. angry</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. worried</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. feel</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. jealous</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. get a fright/be frightened/afraid</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. scared</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. be/say sorry</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. love</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. guilty</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. get a shock/shocked</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. feel sad for somebody</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. feel sorry for somebody</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. unhappy</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. mad at somebody</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. feel bad/not feel good</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. upset</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. get on somebody’s nerves</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. comfort somebody</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. delighted</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. smile</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. make somebody feel bad</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. excited</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. left out</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. hurt somebody’s feelings</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. delighted</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. enjoy</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31. annoyed</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32. feel nice</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33. startled</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34. go ballistic</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35. terrified</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>291</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

16.2.4 Guilt and Shame: Czech children’s narratives

The frequency count for the Czech children’s emotion terms was 232, distributed over 37 types. The girls produced 147 of the overall frequency, with the average of 5.2 terms per person. The boys in the sample scored the average of 5 emotion terms each, accounting for 85 of the overall frequency.
The highest number of emotion terms occurring within the narrative of one particular child was 12. Only one child obtained the lowest score of 1.

Table 4. Emotion terms appearing in the guilt and shame narratives of the Czech cohort

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Meaning in English</th>
<th>Frequencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>brečet/brek/uplakaný</td>
<td>cry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>plakat</td>
<td>cry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>být rád/mít radost/radovat se</td>
<td>glad/happy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>smutný/být smutno</td>
<td>sad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>rozložený/zlobit se</td>
<td>angry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>lito néčeho</td>
<td>sorry about something</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>šťastný</td>
<td>happy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>naštvany</td>
<td>annoyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>lito někoho</td>
<td>sorry for somebody</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>bát se</td>
<td>afraid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>utěšovat</td>
<td>comfort somebody</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>veselý/rozveselit se</td>
<td>cheerful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>mít špatný/žly svědomí</td>
<td>guilty conscience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>závidět</td>
<td>jealous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>leknout se/vylekat se</td>
<td>get a fright</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>mít o někoho strach</td>
<td>worried about somebody</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>křenit se</td>
<td>grimace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>být strašně/nebýt dobře</td>
<td>feel terrible/not feel good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>smát/umívat se</td>
<td>laugh/smile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>omluvit se</td>
<td>apologise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>říkat</td>
<td>whimper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>zhorzít se</td>
<td>appalled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.</td>
<td>vystrašený</td>
<td>frightened</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.</td>
<td>nadšený</td>
<td>excited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.</td>
<td>důvěra</td>
<td>trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.</td>
<td>rozbrojený</td>
<td>stormy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.</td>
<td>mít rád</td>
<td>love</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.</td>
<td>trapný</td>
<td>embarrassing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.</td>
<td>žárlit</td>
<td>jealous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.</td>
<td>zděsít se</td>
<td>alarmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31.</td>
<td>nenadšený</td>
<td>unexcited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32.</td>
<td>rozčleněný</td>
<td>upset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33.</td>
<td>rozrušený</td>
<td>upset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34.</td>
<td>nabrušený</td>
<td>grumpy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35.</td>
<td>mít strach</td>
<td>afraid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36.</td>
<td>brečet radosti</td>
<td>cry with joy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37.</td>
<td>stydět se</td>
<td>ashamed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

16.3 The Quality of Emotion Statements

16.3.1 Empathy-related Statements: Irish and Czech children
Each of the ‘Move’ narratives could score 0, 1 or 2 points on the empathy scale, depending on the quality and level of empathic statements made. A score of 0 indicated an absence of any empathy-related statements in the narrative. A score of 1 was awarded for the statements of negative attention or ‘antipathy’, such as in the following example.

*CHI 30 MOVE 4*
*and she came to a new school where not many people liked her*

Finally, the highest score of 2 was used to indicate positive empathy statements, i.e., statements referring to the wellbeing of another character in the story.

*CHI 44 MOVE7*
*and one day the girl with the pigtails came to the house*  
*(be)cause she felt very sorry for her*

Some of the narratives obtained a score of 1 as well as 2 points to code for the inclusion of empathy as well as antipathy statements. However, the overall counts for each type of the statements were conducted separately.

The final scores derived from the empathy narratives of the two language groups are summarised in Table 5. There were no significant differences noted in the distribution of these scores across gender.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scores</th>
<th>Irish Children</th>
<th>Czech Children</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

16.3.2 Guilt- and Shame-related Statements: Irish and Czech children

A system similar to that applied to the empathy narratives was used to assess the statements of guilt and shame. Each narrative was awarded a score of 0, 1 or 2 for each of the two emotions, the 0-score marking no reference to feelings
of shame or guilt. Statements expressing remorse, embarrassment or shame without using the explicit emotion term were awarded the score of 1. The highest score of 2 points was obtained by children who not only commented on the feelings of guilt or shame experienced by the characters, but also explicitly referred to them, using the appropriate label.

On the guilt scale, the Irish children scored in total 35 zero-point marks, 7 one-point and 3 two-point scores. The scores for narratives dealing with the emotion of shame were 39 zero-, 6 one- and 0 two-point marks. The same scores for the Czech sample were 30 zero-point, 13 one-point and 2 two-point marks for guilt, and 38 zero-, 4 one- and 3 two-point scores for the shame narratives. These results are summarised in Tables 6 and 7 below.

| Table 6. The scores for guilt-related statements made by each group in Cat narratives |
|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Scores | Irish Children | Czech Children |
| 0      | 35             | 30              |
| 1      | 7              | 13              |
| 2      | 3              | 2               |

| Table 7. The scores for shame-related statements made by each group in Cat narratives |
|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Scores | Irish Children | Czech Children |
| 0      | 39             | 30              |
| 1      | 6              | 13              |
| 2      | 0              | 2               |

16.4 The Emerging Themes

Emotion narratives cannot be analysed solely in terms of one-word references to certain experiences and their subjective perceptions. Instead they need to be conceived of as a system of references operational at various levels (Edwards, 1999). In this section I would like to move past the point of analysis of specific linguistic constructions and dedicate this discussion to the examination of the semantic content of the narratives. The analysis of the
lexical items and their frequencies outlined above will be therefore conducted within an appropriate culturally grounded framework.

16.4.1 Empathy Narratives: Some general points of comparison

A close examination of the Empathy tables (Tables 1 and 2) above reveals that in terms of awareness of the feelings of others, the Czech and Irish children included in this study demonstrated many similarities. However, the first and the most obvious comparison of the frequencies shows that the Irish children not only used a noticeably higher number of emotion terms in general, but they also produced a higher number of their types. The statistic revealing quite a sharp contrast in the numbers of children who did not use any emotion terms within their empathy narrative (6.7% Irish compared to 20% Czech) is also consistent with this trend. In addition, the assessment of empathy driven statements and explanations showed that their numbers for the Irish sample were marginally higher.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the most often produced emotion terms were the same for both groups. The emotional states of sadness and happiness were the primary emotions reflected in the Move story, with crying depicted as a physical manifestation of sadness used here to evoke the feelings of empathy. The other emotion terms closely linked to empathy, which were also used by both groups, included feeling sad or sorry for another person and being concerned or worried about somebody else. The proportions of negative and positive feelings mentioned by both groups were equal.

Despite the general similarity between the emotion lexicon appearing in the two cohorts, a difference could be noted in the apparent emphasis that the Czech children put on physical manifestations of emotions. Czech provides its speakers with two synonyms of the English verb 'to cry', brečet and plakat,

\[39\] As noted by Goddard (1998, p. 93-94) in many languages (e.g., German or French) words more translationally equivalent to the English term joy are used in expressions which in English describe the feelings of happiness. The same can be observed in Czech where the word radost (roughly, 'joy') was used by the children in the same context as the English word happy. Goddard argues that happy describes a 'less intense' emotion than e.g., the Italian felice, Russian счастливый, or the Polish szczęśliwy, which correspond more closely to the English joy than happiness.
brečet being the more colloquial of the two, which were both used in the narratives of the Czech children. In addition, another reference was made to tears themselves and one child described one of the characters as frowning.

16.4.2 Empathy Theme I: Dislike, non-acceptance and social pressure

Before attempting to draw more generalised conclusions about the empathy levels detected in the discourse of the two language groups, I would like to first discuss some of the themes emerging from the comments made by the children. One of the most common statements was that of dislike and non-acceptance of the new arrival at the school.

CHI 16m MOVE 4
and there is a new kid in the class um <everyone does (no)t like her> [/]
no one likes her

CHI 24m MOVE 4
okay and then down here the teacher is introducing her to the class
and they do (no)t like her he (i)s trying to throw a piece of paper at her

CHI 30 MOVE 4
and she came to a new school were not many people liked her

The Czech children made similar observations. Interestingly, however, comments of antipathy and rejection were more frequent and varied in their expression.

CHI 16 MOVE 4
no a asi ji tam moc neměli rádi
well they probably didn’t really like her there
že s ní moc nekamarádili
because they were not really friends with her <did not play with her>

CHI 45 MOVE 5
potom tady (j)de za dětma na hřiště
then here she follows the children to the playground
voní ji asi nechtěj
they probably don’t want her

CHI 38 MOVE 3
<a &vo> [/] když přišla do toho novýho města tak s ní tam se asi nikdo nebavil
and when she arrived to the new town nobody was talking to her there

CHI 38 MOVE 5
a ## když šla vodpoledne ven tak s ní nikdo moc nekamarádili
and when she came outside in the afternoon nobody really wanted to be friends with her

211
As is apparent from the examples above, the English statements all use the same expression — that of ‘dislike’. The Czech children’s statements of the same nature employed a considerably larger range of terms, from the purely descriptive ‘nobody wanted to play with her’ to the more abstract ‘nobody wanted to be friends with her’, and ‘nobody liked her’. One of the semantically less sophisticated, although quite revealing statements, included ‘they did not want her there’. The two expressions ‘nevšímát si někoho’ and ‘nebavit se s někým’ are perhaps the most interesting examples of comments of social exclusion used by the Czech children. They both operate on a very basic physical level of ‘not talking to somebody’ and ‘not paying attention to somebody’. Strikingly, no comments suggesting a similar level of conceptualisation appeared in the narratives of the Irish children.

The antipathy statements did not stop with stating the other children’s lack of sympathy with their new schoolmate. The narratives also contained more hostile comments, such as those in the following examples.

CHI 27m MOVE 4
then she went to class and <then> [/] then the people said +”/ +” hi
and <they> [/] they were kind of mean and then the teacher was nice

CHI 28 MOVE 4
and then when she goes to the new school um some of the boys are teasing her probably (be)cause they like been teasing her

CHI 34 MOVE 4
and the teacher is probably saying to her +”/ +” everyone welcome our new student
and there (i)s some people in the class
that are laughing and whispering and <telling> [/] saying mean things about her
The Czech speakers also commented on the children in the school exhibiting a certain level of antisocial behaviour towards the newcomer. Such statements were again more frequent and expressive than those found in the Irish group.

The same trend appeared in the discourse which followed the children’s narratives. Some of the Czech children described the new girl as being an ‘immigrant’, ‘přístěhovalec’, and the other children’s reaction to her arrival as wondering ‘why is she snooping around here’, ‘co sem leze’, and as suggesting to her that she should leave. The Irish characters, on the other hand, appeared to be more welcoming. In the speakers’ interpretation, they focused on the new girl feeling lonely, sad, left out, and having nobody to play with.
Overall it would seem that the classroom visited by the Czech girl was a gloomy and unfriendly place with the children staring, laughing and frowning at her. It is possible that picture MOVE 4 suggests a certain amount of unfriendliness. The boy sitting in the front row, throwing paper in the direction of the girl was indeed commented on by both groups. This, however, does not explain the difference in the description of the scene provided by the Irish and the Czech children, as they were presented with identical picture stories. Suggesting just a very general ‘meanness’ and ‘teasing’, the Irish children did not make it as difficult for the main protagonist as the Czech children did. Noticeably, the Czech speakers were quite explicit in their descriptions of the antagonism encountered by the character. One possible explanation perhaps lies in the level of abstraction adopted by the children. In this context, the Irish group exhibited a somewhat more abstracted approach to the narratives. The Czech children, on the other hand, described ‘what they saw as they saw it’, presenting lower levels of narrative ‘sophistication’.

Moving onto the next sequence of events, however, this contrast becomes more muted. Many Czech statements generated by the prompts described the other character’s attempts to ‘make it easier on the new girl’, to ‘share’ her friendship with her, ‘cheer her up’, and after watching her wander around with nobody to play with, to ‘fix it’. The number of direct empathy statements generated by the prompts such as “why do you think this girl decided to call for her?” were equal for both groups (16).

In addition, one of the Irish children brought up peer pressure issues which were perceived as impairing the character’s ability to engage in an empathic act. The following example was produced in response to the prompts.

CHI 44
and <she would (no)t [ ] she would (no)t want to leave her friends (be)cause she thought that her friends would think +?" oh she (i)s really silly +"going to join up with the new girl because she was barely a day in the new neighborhood and she knew nobody and everyone ignored her and the other girl um +...
it would have made the other girl feel very again ashamed of going with the other girl because they would all laugh at her probably because um they were going to team up with the girl that they ignored and they did (no)l really like her either

Expressions such as ‘she wants to fit in’ also reveal the extent of social awareness present in this age group.

16.4.3 Empathy Theme II: “She must be a nice girl”

A closer look at the positive instances of empathic evaluation of the situation suggests that both of the groups showed similar trends in their infrequent empathic comments, ranging from very explicit to more indirect ones.

CHI 50 MOVE 5
she goes out to the playground and there (i) is another little girl there and she (i) is feeling sorry for her because she does (no)l have any friends by the look on her face like

CHI 44 MOVE 7
and one day the girl with the pigtails came to the house because she felt very sorry for her and the other girl’s mom welcomed her in

CHI 18m MOVE 4
a <tady> [/]/ # tady tý holčičce uh jak sedí v lavici je lito týhle že se jí tyhleti posmívaj and here this girl that is sitting here behind the desk feels sorry for the other one because they are laughing at her

CHI 29m MOVE 4
a tady ona si mysli uh to že by jí to měla ulehčit jak jde do tý školy and here she is thinking that she should make it easier on her coming to the new school protože když já jsem přišel do školy tak taky jako ne mě kdyby se +// because when I came to a new school so it was the same like if... jako by tam byla sama a voni by byli všichni spolu tak by jí bylo smutno like she would be alone there and they would all be together and she would be sad tak vona si říká že když ona tam šla do tý školy tak jí bylo taky dobře že jí tak(h)le dobře přijali so she is saying to herself that when she came there to the new school it was great that they accepted her there so well tak jí to chce taky ulehčit so she wants to make it easier for her too
The last passage offers a perfect opportunity to follow the process of second order identification, leading to the explicit empathy statements. First the speaker suggests the feelings of empathy experienced by the girl sitting in the second row, relating to the unpleasantness of the situation the new girl is in. Subsequently he reveals his own experience as the inspiration for this comment, while proceeding to interpret this personal experience as the motivation behind the character’s actions. This can be interpreted as directly supporting the idea of personal experiences of hardship leading to an enhanced ability to empathise, put forward by Buda (1985). Such an occurrence was not infrequent. When prompted to elaborate on their narratives, many of the children in both groups tended to relate their own experiences with moving to a new school and a neighborhood to their stories, further supporting this point. In addition, the following examples suggest that the level of empathic awareness experienced by the children is not always in proportion to their conceptual or indeed linguistic abilities.

Quite interesting also are the very implicit expressions of empathy which can be seen in the three examples below. Although no direct statements were made about one character empathising with the other, the socially appropriate behaviour has been incorporated into the story. ‘Being usually nice to new people’ cannot be seen in any context other than that of culturally and socially constructed norms.
A conceptual confusion seems to take place in the example below, where the speaker again demonstrates the social awareness necessary for the feelings of empathy. Then, however, he fails to identify the driving force behind the empathic act he describes, briefly suggesting that it has perhaps been motivated by the empathiser’s fondness for the object of her empathy. Later he corrects this statement by deciding that the character “must be a nice girl” to come and play with somebody she doesn’t know.

The Czech children do not seem to make similar general comments. Instead, they appear to be more concerned with practical considerations.
16.4.4 Empathy: Possible considerations

In general, the description and interpretation of the situation by both groups does not show great variation. The differences appear at a more subtle level of perspective taking. While the Irish children frequently adopted the viewpoint of the character experiencing difficulties they can relate to, many of the Czech children identified with the perspective of the other children, who perceive the new character as an unwanted addition to their lives.

It could be argued, and this argument is supported by the children’s personal accounts of their experiences, that Czech children’s exposure to new environments is somewhat more limited than that of the Irish children. This could be seen as consistent with the ‘Western’ way of life, especially relevant to Ireland, where moving in order to find a suitable employment is quite a common occurrence. In contrast, many generations of Czech families often live in a very close proximity, forming relatively enclosed units. Although this trend is currently undergoing a dramatic change, the former political and social boundaries had quite a profound influence on the ability and indeed the need of Czech families to relocate. Despite the changes in the political and economic climate, a social adaptation of such magnitude is likely to extend over a prolonged period of time. It is likely that as a result of similar forces, fewer of the Czech children posses a ‘reference’ to such an experience that they could draw on in order to empathise with the protagonist of the story.

Another possible explanation of this difference could be found in developmental studies of socialisation in the context of family. For example, Cicirelli (1977) has argued that the influence siblings exert on other siblings in terms of socialising forces is often larger than that of their parents. Dunn (1998) found 2-year-olds’ interaction with their siblings related to their increased ability to understand the minds of others, which continued into middle childhood. Others have also linked the levels of understanding of mental states to having older siblings (Perner, Ruffman & Leekham, 1994).
It makes intuitive sense that being surrounded by siblings provides the child with the opportunities necessary for the development of their ability to relate to the feelings of others. In this context, the statistics which show that only 7% of the Irish sample had no siblings, compared to the 37% of the Czech children who were only children, appear to be quite significant. While it was more common for the Czech children to have one sibling (55%) than it was for the Irish sample (33%), this difference was dramatically reversed when two or more siblings were concerned. Sixty percent of the Irish children and only 7% of the Czech children came into this category. So while only a small portion of the Irish children had no siblings, the majority had two or more. This trend was directly reversed in the Czech sample.

A related point that should also be mentioned again is that although most Czech children would visit a play school at an early age, the official school attendance does not begin until the child reaches the age of 6. Such differences, if adequately monitored, could perhaps also be identified as providing the Irish children with an early start to socialisation, and so enhancing the development of their social skills.

It is obviously important to acknowledge that the account of the differences presented here is highly descriptive and speculative in nature. It would also seem that these differences were most apparent in the original narratives and faded away during the discourse which followed. It could therefore be argued, that once the Czech children, assisted by prompts, were led to a deeper evaluation of the events described in the picture story (as well as their personal accounts) they also produced more empathically motivated statements.

Overall it could be concluded that although both of the groups were presented with the same picture-represented scenarios, their interpretation of the situation produced culture-specific accounts. This is consistent with Wierzbicka’s (1995, p. 36) criticism of Spiro’s concept of ‘universal human situations’. For example, unlike Spiro’s choice of emotion words to describe his reaction to the hypothetical situation of the death of a loved one (i.e.,
sadness), Wierzbicka as a native Polish speaker does not include the word *smutek* (the translational equivalent of *sadness*) as the most likely experienced emotion. Instead, she argues, she would describe her emotions using the words *ból*, ‘pain’ or *rozpacz*, ‘despair’. In addition, these nouns would more than likely be enhanced by appropriate adjectives.

This suggests that many emotionally charged situations, which may appear to be identical, are in fact experienced, interpreted and reacted to differently within different cultures. These variations, as many theorists showed, are likely to be reflected within the particular lexicons. The existence of two terms referring to *crying* in Czech, which were both used very frequently within the sample could be seen as consistent with the generally more pronounced inclination of the Czech children to comment on the physical attributes of emotions appearing in the narratives. For example, the Czech children made 5 references to *smiling* or *laughing*, while the Irish children produced none.

16.4.5 Guilt and Shame: General points of comparison

Referring to Tables 3 and 4, the number of emotion words used by the Irish children in their guilt and shame narratives was considerably higher than that produced by the Czech children. The same, however, does not hold for the number of types, where this trend was inverted, pointing to a more varied emotion vocabulary presented by the Czech group.\(^40\) The analysis also revealed that the number of times the Irish children referred to one of the character’s *crying* (120) was higher than the frequency produced by the Czech children (94)\(^41\). References to the boy’s *sadness* held the second most frequent position, with the Irish children exceeding the number of the Czech descriptions of the boy’s sadness by almost half. It would therefore appear that the Irish children devoted more attention to describing the emotional state of the boy who suffered the loss of the cat as opposed to the one who stole it. Again we can note the disparity in the perspectives adopted by each of the

\(^{40}\) Clearly we are not dealing with statistically significant differences here. What makes this difference worth noting, however, is its direction against the trend consistently noted within the two cohorts.

\(^{41}\) The combined count for the two synonyms in Czech (i.e., *brečet* & *plakat*) was used as the baseline for this comparison.
groups. This trend could also be seen as consistent with the empathy counts, where the Irish group scored higher on the empathy statements than the Czech children.

If we consider the direct empathy statements occurring within the Cat narratives, the difference is less pronounced. The Czech children used the expression equivalent in meaning to ‘to feel sorry for somebody’ 5 times, and ‘to worry about somebody’ 2 times. This can be compared to the Irish frequencies of 2 for ‘to feel sorry for somebody’ and 2 for the related ‘to feel sad for somebody’. In addition, one of the Irish children commented on the boy ‘making somebody feel bad’ and ‘hurting somebody’s feelings’, adding 2 more empathy statements to the overall count. Four of the Czech children also commented on the mother comforting or consoling the crying boy, while within the Irish sample the same was noted on only one occasion.

The third most frequent were the predictable references to happiness, and anger consistent across the two groups.

Interestingly, the Irish children used the verb to feel without adding an emotion term on six different occasions. In those cases, the verb was followed by a clause (e.g., ‘he felt like he didn’t know what to do’). There were no occurrences of this phenomenon in Czech, although the option undoubtedly exists (e.g., ‘citil jako že neví co má dělat’).

The above observation poses an exciting question in terms of the role of the more direct, or as Wierzbicka (1995, p. 39) argues, more ‘intentional’ structures enabling emotion expression in Czech, which I have already mentioned (i.e., the dative ‘je mu hrozne’, ‘he feels terrible’). I would like to speculate that expressions which do not require the explicit use of the verb citit, ‘to feel’ in order to comment on an emotional state, ‘predispose’, ‘navigate’ or in a certain sense even ‘train’ the speaker to use the specific emotion term as opposed to its description. Such claim is certainly supported by the number of types produced by the Czech language group.
16.4.6 Guilt and Shame Theme I: Feeling versus looking guilty

In terms of emotion words directly relevant to the feelings of shame and guilt, the Czech children produced 6 different types. In comparison, the Irish children’s narratives contained 3 types. More specifically, each of the groups generated two broad references to ‘feeling bad/terrible’ or ‘not feeling good’ as a result of stealing the cat.

CHI 19m CAT8
a on se na něj jako tak(h)le kouka
_and here he is kind of like looking at him_
a je mu jako ho lito
_and he feels like sorry for him_
a není mu dobře jako
_and he does not feel well_

Three of the Irish children used the term ‘guilty’, which was matched by the Czech mit špatné svědomí, ‘having a guilty conscience’, on two occasions. While the observation that somebody has a guilty conscience clearly refers to an internal state, only one of the three occurrences of the word guilty in the Irish group had the same inward-directed connotation. The other two commented on the external manifestations of the emotion, i.e., ‘looking guilty’.

CHI 34 CAT8
the same another boy standing by the wall
holding the cat and looking guilty

CHI 51m CAT7
and then he sees the boy crying
and he feels guilty that he took it

CHI 12 CAT8
a sed si na ulici a začal brečet
_and then he sat down on the street and started crying_
a pak ten &druhej kluk ten měl zlý svědomí
_and then the second boy he had a bad conscience_

It could be speculated here, that this difference exists purely due to the availability of linguistic devices. In other words, Tomasello’s (e.g., 2000) item-based model of language acquisition could account for the fact that
Czech children's conceptualisation of guilt is linked to the metaphorical expression of 'having bad or guilty conscience', as this is the linguistic form first and most often encountered by the children within this context.

At the same time, this form builds on the metaphor of a somewhat physically graspable 'conscience' which can get dirty or go bad. This process is internalised, however, taking place somewhere within the self; hence presenting a level of abstraction which may perhaps pose a certain challenge for younger children (see e.g., Deane, 1992). The English word guilt, on the other hand, has no such implicit nature and it may therefore be slightly more accessible, as is apparent from the above frequency counts. Even so, it would seem that the metaphorical representation of the emotion works better at the level of relating it to internal feelings, as opposed to bodily manifestations.

16.4.7 Guilt and Shame Theme II: Czech antagonist's remorse

The Irish children mentioned saying sorry 3 times, while only 2 instances of the Czech children's direct reference to apologising were noted. Strikingly, however, in comparison to only one instance of being sorry, appearing in the Irish group, the reference to remorse was made by the Czech children on 10 separate occasions. This count was only partially balanced by the following three remorse statements made by the Irish children, which in addition did not contain the key terms.

CHI 42m CAT 8
and the little boy who stole it is thinking +/-
+" oh what have I done!

CHI 19 CAT 10
and he just feels like +/-
+" I should n(o)t have done that

CHI 37m CAT 8
and he (i)s probably thinking +/-
+" why did I take the cat?
Once again we could attempt to explain this disparity in terms of the differences in linguistic coding of the feelings of remorse apparent in the two languages. The Czech phrase 'je mu to lito', could be translated into English as 'he feels bad, sorry, remorseful, regretful, compassionate, sorrowful'. While the first two options fail in their generality to capture the essence of this phrase, the others appear to be too literary for everyday usage. A Czech speaker, on the other hand, has direct access to a form which captures the negative feelings connected to an unfortunate event for which the experiencer (more often than not) perceives him/herself responsible. All of the Czech statements made in this context contained this construct.

CHI 34m CAT 8
a # tady na něj koukal a už úplně mu to bylo lito že # mu ji vzal
and here he was looking at him and he completely felt sorry/bad/sad that he took her from him

On another occasion, the same phrase was used to describe the sorrow of the boy who had lost the cat, presented from the perspective of the thief.

CHI 11 CAT 7
no a tady si řiká že to asi neměl dělat
and here he is saying to himself that he probably shouldn't have done it
že je to tomu druhýmu lito
that the other one feels bad/sad

To complete the summary of the guilt and shame related statements made by each of the groups, there was also one mention of trust within the Czech sample, and three separate references to embarrassment or shame (i.e., trapný and stydět se). No references were made to either of those emotions by the Irish children. This brings the count of guilt and shame terms to 21 in the Czech sample and 9 in the Irish sample.

Interestingly therefore, the frequencies point to a somewhat heightened awareness of the feelings and expressions of guilt and shame in the Czech children, observable on the lexical and semantic level of their narratives. This inference is supported by the analysis of the guilt and shame related
statements, where on both of those scales, marginally higher numbers of the Irish children scored zero.

16.4.8 Guilt and Shame Theme III: The right thing to do

Another point of comparison offers itself in the form of statements of hesitancy, where the thief, alarmed by the other boy’s reaction, weighs his options and tries to decide what to do with the stolen cat. While 12 such statements were noted in the narratives of the Irish children, the Czech children described the antagonist as experiencing much lower levels of uncertainty with only 5 statements of a similar nature.

CHI 39 CAT8
and then the little boy is wondering um what should he do should he give the cat back or should he keep it

CHI 40m CAT7
and the other boy was hiding behind the tree thinking +"/
+" maybe I should give the cat back

CHI 20 CAT7
tady když ho vidi toho smutnýho tak &ne neví co má dělat asi here when he sees the sad one he probably doesn’t know what to do

CHI 36 CAT8
myslim si že si říká že by mu ji měl vrátit
I think he is saying to himself that he should give her back to him

The following examples illustrate the instances where the thief, despite the other boy’s apparent distress, decides to keep the cat.

CHI 50m CAT8
and the little boy (i)s still wondering should he give the cat back or not and then he says +"/
+"no I won’t [: will not]

CHI 30 CAT7
a tak mu jí chtěl vrátit
so he wanted to give her back to him
ale pak si řekl +"/
but then he said to himself
+" proč on by měl mit nejlepšího přítele a já ne? why should he have a best friend and I shouldn’t?
In two of the three instances of the Czech character’s contemplation of the situation above, he is talking to himself through the use of the reflexive *řikat si*. This shows that despite the outcome of such reflections, the structure which allows the speaker to access the mental process of the character in question is readily available and utilised by the speakers, perhaps providing a more direct route of association, and so leading to a lesser degree of hesitation. The structure itself directs the speaker towards making a commitment which can be seen in the utterances of CHI 30 and CHI 36 above. In English this is matched by the direct speech used by CHI 40m. Where the self-referent structure is not employed (such as in the case of CHI 20), the level of uncertainty is higher.

Although the Irish group produced twice as many negative decision statements (i.e., not returning the cat), the Czech children’s attitude to the thief’s moral dilemma showed a slightly more negative emotional charge.

The Irish antagonist’s interest lies mainly in keeping the cat to himself, and he is only occasionally described as wondering ‘why should he have the cat’. The
most negative comment simply suggests that ‘he does not care’. The Czech thief, on the other hand, appears to be somewhat more malicious.

CHI 2m CAT 8
*ten chlapeček co mu tu kočičku ukrad si řekl +*/
the little boy that stole the kitten from him said to himself
+* no a co?
so what?
+* to je úplně jedno že si brečí
it really doesn’t matter that he is crying
+* ale hlavně že mám já kočičku
the important thing is that I have the kitty

CHI 28 CAT 6
no a <ten kluk> [/]
and the boy, the boy that stole her from him was saying to himself
+* hurá už ji mam [:mám] a von nemá nic!
hurray, now I have it and he has nothing

16.4.9 Guilt and Shame Theme IV: Justification and Theory of Mind statements

The trends described above, apparent in the antagonist’s attitude as portrayed by the two groups, are consistent with the justification provided by the children as the thief’s excuse for his behaviour illustrated below. In general, the Czech children described the boy as not feeling responsible for what he has done and as trying to construct a believable explanation for his actions, in an attempt to remove all negative attention from himself.

CHI 27 CAT 8
*on chce mu tu kočku vrátit ale má ji taky rád
he wants to give the cat back but he loves her too

CHI 8 CAT 9
*a von řiká +*/
and he is saying
+* ne já jí našel
no, I found her
+* a to je moje kočička z domova
that’s my kitty from home

CHI 29m CAT 10
*a von si mysli že je nevinnej
and here he thinks that he is innocent
protože si myslel že to koťátko je třeba jeho
because he thought that maybe the kitten was his
Overall the Irish children show a somewhat more honest, sensitive, and empathically motivated approach.

CHI 39 CAT6
and he started playing with the cat and then he was really happy
but he did (no)t know that the other boy would be so upset

CHI 33 CAT9
and he goes and <confesses> [/] confesses to his mom and dad
that <he> [/] he +...
and like he gets caught while he (i)s trying to put the cat back

CHI 19 CAT7
and then he saw um <the> [/] the boy <that owned> [//] that really owned the cat
coming into the park and sad
and then he (i)s thinking just uh +”/
+” I never knew like he loved his cat that much
+” and I mean I do (no)t think I should have done that

Moreover, the related ‘Theory of Mind’ statements, which capture the thief as he is evaluating the situation through the eyes of the boy he had robbed, point in the same direction. One of the Czech children in particular paints a very dramatic and dark picture of the thief’s mind. Although the speaker specifically refers to the character’s attempts to relate to the other protagonist’s state of mind, no emotive remarks are made in this context.

CHI 8 CAT 7
tady stoji za stromem
here he is standing behind the tree
drží ji v ruce
he is holding her in his hand
a kočička se za ním chce vrátit
and the kitty wants to go back to him
ale nemůže pr(o)če von jí drží pevně
but she can’t because he is holding her tight
a von si mysli +”/
and he is thinking
+” co si ten kluk asi teďka mysli?
what could the boy be thinking now ?
+” kam se mu poděla ta kočka?
where did his cat got to?
a ten chlapeček co byla jeho ta kočička ten pláče
and the little boy who used to own the cat, he is crying
kam se mu ztratila
where did she go

CHI 8 CAT8
a tenhle zlej kluk
and this mean boy
ten pořád za nim chodí a pronásleduje ho +”/
he is always following him and chasing him
Remarkably, apart from the two instances above (produced by the same child), there was only one more mention of the thief’s attempts to relate to the other character in the Czech narratives. As such, only two children made a Theory of Mind observation within this context. In addition, two of those three instances dealt with the character attempting to establish a cognitive link, while only one child produced a reference to an emotive connection.

The Irish children produced one specific reference to the antagonist ‘feeling sorry for’ the crying boy (CHI 15m). Two other children made less direct comments, such as the one below.

Other statements of the Irish children tended to operate more on the level of a moral dilemma and at times appeared somewhat artificial and practised.
When examining the linguistic structures involved in these statements, the role of the self-referent in Czech is again quite clear. The reflexive ‘to think’ is used by both of the children. In case of Child 8, the antagonist ‘thinks to himself’ about what the other boy is ‘thinking to himself’. However, the option of using the reflexive form of the verb ‘to feel’, was not taken up by any of the speakers in this context (i.e., Jak se cítí, ‘How is he feeling to himself’). Instead the non-reflexive Jak mu asi bude, ‘how will he feel’ was used.

The lack of a specific structure directing the English speakers towards making similar comments is also apparent from the excerpts above. For example, Child 12m uses the word remember to describe the Theory of Mind empathic connection.

If it is the case that availability of linguistic structures motivates the particular conceptualisation for which they can be used, why did the Czech speakers not produce more of such statements? The answer could perhaps be found in broader socio-cultural forces which determine general tendencies towards relating to the minds of others. The Irish children, on the other hand, whose propensity in this direction seems to be slightly more pronounced, appear to struggle somewhat with the linguistic coding of this concept. Both of these observations therefore support the need for a broader-than-linguistic framework.

The following few examples illustrate the description of the emotional state of the boy who had stolen the cat and is now watching the other boy’s distress, while hiding with it, as ‘sadness’. It is possibly the case that such comments represent a very basic Theory of Mind process, where instead of producing the appropriate label for the character’s empathy induced guilt, the boy is described in terms of simply mirroring the feelings of sadness that he is witnessing. As all the children who generated such statements made a direct link between the theft of the cat and the boy’s sadness at some point in their narrative, those comments are therefore unlikely to represent an issue of
emotional or moral maturity. Instead they probably result from the children’s inability to supply the relevant linguistic label. This occurrence was more common in the Irish than in the Czech sample. As such it could be interpreted as directly reflecting the higher frequencies of guilt and shame related terms found in the Czech narratives in general.

The representation of the thief as a ‘bad’ or ‘mean’ boy, as indeed ‘zlej’ or ‘zlobivej’ kluk by both groups, supports this claim and illustrates the understanding of the moral implications of the character’s actions. In addition, as has been noted by Bamberg and Reilly (1996), through the use of similar evaluative statements, the narrator expresses his stance in relation to the moral and cultural values portrayed in the narrative.

These observations are to a large extent consistent with the findings reported by Papadopoulou (1995), which describe the younger children’s inability to engage in ‘intra-psychological’ functioning. As a result, the ‘reflexive social
emotions’ are not yet internalised and instead of them the children describe the situation in terms of behavioural manifestations and generic emotion terms such as *sadness*.

Papadopoulou uncovered a discrepancy where the children aged 6, who confidently listed situations when they would experience a particular emotion (e.g., embarrassment) and why, did not produce the corresponding emotion terms until the age of approximately 9. Presumably because this was also the age range of the children in the current study, this occurrence was noted as very common. Over 6.5% of the Irish and 11% of the Czech children spontaneously produced the target emotion terms, in comparison to 15.5% Irish and 30% Czech who described the corresponding emotional state without producing the label.

Based on the younger children’s explanations of their perception of such scenarios, Papadopoulou speculates that their use of ‘non-reflexive’ emotion terms in situations where they would be appropriate is not caused by the inability to produce the required vocabulary alone but also by the differences in their conceptualisation of the situation. Such explanation is clearly a plausible option. However, I have not come across any evidence pointing in this direction. On the contrary, I would like to argue that terms such as ‘kind of sad’ which the Irish children repeatedly used to describe the guilt scenario, suggest their awareness of the inappropriateness of the word *sad* in this instance.

**16.4.10 Guilt and Shame: And what did the parents say…?**

When narrating the last picture of the Cat story, the children’s imagination was typically captured by the emotional state of the boy who had just been caught with the stolen cat, and is forced to return it to its owner, in front of the two sets of parents. Perhaps quite predictably, many of the comments made by both groups focused on the parents’ *anger* and *upset*, the boy’s *surprise* at being caught, and his *fear of punishment*.
In one case, any possibility of a shameful or guilt motivated reaction on the part of the thief was explicitly denied when he was described as ‘being angry and sad’ about being caught.

In general, however, the Irish children portrayed the boy in picture CAT 10 as being apologetic and attempting to rectify the situation.

Even though the Czech narratives also described the offending boy as apologising, they have focused more on the internal emotional impact this scene had on the antagonist.
Another dimension present in the Czech narratives is that of the parents’ perspective in terms of what could be termed ‘secondary shame’. It has been described by Gilbert (1998) as shame felt as a result of the actions of another family member, which is experienced through the association with that person, or through the feeling of being “one of them” (p. 22). This phenomenon was not as readily observable in the Irish children’s narratives.

In addition, the boy is described as experiencing negative emotions as a direct result of his parents’ reaction to his ‘crime’.

The only instance which touches on the possible sense of shame of the thief’s parents (as opposed to their anger over his action), appearing in the Irish narratives, shows a more positive approach to the problem.
Such diverse directions in focus suggest relatively high levels of perceived significance that similar breaches of the moral and social code may have in the Czech society, not only for the offender himself, but also for those associated with him.

16.5 After Prompts: Diversity of perspectives, family pride and a heavy heart

When prompted to elaborate on their initial descriptions of the final scene in the Cat story, the Czech children made 6 additional references to feeling ‘embarrassed’, je mu trapně, and 11 references to ‘shame’, stydět se. Consistent with the above described focus on the shame reflected on the parents and family, the same group also produced 3 more references to the shame the boy had caused to his parents, i.e., ‘to ashamed somebody’, udělat ostudu, 1 reference to humiliating them, zahanbit je, and 1 to giving them a ‘bad reputation’, špatnou pověst. In addition, the boy himself was described as ‘wanting the ground to open up and swallow him’, propadal se hanbou.

In response to prompts such as “how did he feel when he had to give the cat back in front of everybody?”, the Irish children generated 27 references to embarrassment, 3 to shame, 1 to humiliation and 1 to guilt. These additional comments support the initial observations based on the original uninterrupted narratives. The Czech children again concentrated more on the question of the shamefulness of the character’s actions and their implications for the family pride. They spoke of a broken trust and a ruined family reputation, where the Irish children mostly commented on the personal embarrassment suffered by the boy, generally not perceiving the issue as one of shame - neither personal nor shared.

In order to make a point, I could take this difference into extreme and claim that the Czech children’s stories were more serious, with long lasting and deep reaching consequences. The Irish children, on the other hand, tended to view
the situation as one of a temporary and limited embarrassment. Although perhaps not as explicit, such trends can be found in the two sets of narratives analysed here.

Consistent with the empathy related comments described earlier, the Czech characters are typically portrayed in terms of ‘trying to stay in the game’ where anything goes, for as long as possible. The ability to penetrate the mind of others is used to plan the next move. Once ‘the game is up’, however, the damage is perceived as dramatic, internalised and permanent. The line between good and bad seems more defined in the Irish narratives, where the dissonance between a positive character and a negative action is often repaired through an emphatic realisation of its unforeseen effects and an attempt of a rectification.

While the Irish villain in the following extract does have some regrets about what he has done, his innate ‘badness’ means that he is unable to change his behaviour. The Czech thief, on the other hand, (although lexically better equipped) may or may not feel remorseful. The most important issue here is not his moral dilemma, however, but his desire to own a pet, which shines a ray of sensitivity onto his otherwise not very positive profile. There is also the suggestion of ‘účel světí prostředky’, ‘the end justifies the means’ philosophy.

CHI 25
he feels that he should not have done it and he should give it back
but he just does not give it back
because he is too bad to give it back

CHI 16
že mu je třeba ho sice lito <ale &stej> [//] ale že mu &stej stejně tu kočičku ukradne
that he maybe does feel sorry for him but he will steal the kitty from him anyway
no já myslím že mu # vůbec ho není lito toho kluka
well I think that he doesn’t feel sorry for that boy at all
<no tak> [\] # no tak je mu lito ale -: on prostě tu kočičku chce mit protože chce mit
ňáký zvířátko
well he does feel sorry but ... he just wants the cat because he wants to have a pet too

The overwhelming trend arising from the Czech group’s responses to the prompts is towards self-reflection, self-blame, betrayal of a friend, guilty conscience, inward directed anger and inherent ‘meanness’, as well as
towards the view of the self as humiliated and embarrassed. When prompted to talk further about the feelings of the boy hiding with the kitten in CAT 7 and 8, the Irish children described him in terms of remorse he feels for his actions, his awareness that stealing is wrong, his desire to make the other boy feel better and to apologise. The character was also labelled as selfish by one child.

The general conclusion based on the analysis above would perhaps again best be made in terms of the disparity in the perspective of each of the groups, as outlined above. The Czech children’s accounts reveal a more internal and self-involved focus from the point of view of one of the characters, while the Irish children construct the hypothetical scenario on the basis of an external and other-oriented viewpoint. Again, it could be argued that this difference reflects the general atmosphere and cultural norms within the two societies.

As the orientation of the current study is towards uncovering possible cross-cultural differences between the two sets of data, the statement of the overwhelming similarities is probably not made explicit often enough. This is one of the points at which I would like to note that the nature of the conceptual (as opposed to the language-motivated) diversities discussed here is very subtle and exists only as part of the general developmental background.

Strikingly however, these differences in focus are very closely mirrored by the use of the two languages. Although the relevant lexical counts were repeatedly higher for the Irish group, it would seem that their use follows a somewhat more prescribed and learned format. The Czech children, on the other hand, appear to apply their language more loosely, outside the boundaries of the situation specific vocabulary and phrases. I would like to argue that the structures of the Czech language not only readily lend themselves to such usage but perhaps also motivate a less direct, although somewhat deeper, reflexive emotion expression. Consider the following comment made by Child 40m.
CHI 40m

INV: a když viděl jak ji tenhle kluk hledá?
and when he saw this boy looking for her?

jak myslíš že mu bylo?
how do you think he felt?

CHI: hmm <tak SE> /// tak ho ZAtrapilo svědomí
he...he <got> a guilty conscience <his conscience tortured him>

The speaker uses a self-referent marker which is perhaps intended as part of the construction *stydět se*, in this context ‘to feel guilty’. He then changes his mind and decides instead to employ the idiomatic expression suggesting that the character’s conscience ‘turned on him’ or ‘tortured him’. He does not, however, use the imperfective form *trápit*, ‘torture’, because he needs to create an effect of immediacy which this construction would not imply. He therefore modifies the imperfective verb by adding the prefix *za-*, creating a new and, technically speaking, incorrect form of the phrase ‘to be tortured by one’s conscience’. However, in terms of logical and pragmatic content this creation is perfect.

Many other literary, idiomatic and metaphorical expressions can also be found in the narratives of the Czech children. This trend could be linked to general cultural influences (e.g., an emphasis on reading) which will be discussed later. Below are some examples of such utterances.

CHI 3
vlastně si uvědomí co von mu jako způsobil za bolest
well he realises the pain that he had caused him

CHI 19m
no je šťastnej ale tíží ho na srdci jako že jí sebral
well he is happy but <his heart is weighed down> by the fact that he snatched it

These features observable in the Czech children’s language were not specific to the guilt and shame discourse. They were also noted (although in a somewhat lighter tone) when the children were prompted to elaborate on their empathy narratives.

CHI 30
koukala na ní takovým přátelským pohledem
she was looking at her with a <friendly expression>
Interpreted in terms of Lakoff’s and Johnson’s (1999) conceptual metaphor system outlined earlier, it could be argued that the multiple representations of the Self, highlighted in the current data set through the self-referent system in Czech, continues on a semantic level. Perhaps metaphorical language aids the processes of ‘infiltration’ of the other mind, paints a picture which is person- and indeed self-independent, and can therefore be related to own Self as well as to the Selves of others. As such, the awareness of the speaker, as well as the non-speaker Selves represented in the grammatical structures of the language, generates a particular inherent focus which extends to higher linguistic levels, as demonstrated by the Czech speakers in this study.

Edwards (1997) also points to an interesting aspect of emotion metaphors in the context of agentivity and blame attribution. Those described in positive terms such as ‘having a good heart’, mít dobré srdce, or ‘being without oneself with joy’, být radosti bez sebe, are portrayed in a relatively active role as are those who have clearly broken the rules, have been exposed for their sins, and are now ‘falling through the ground with shame’, propadat se hanbou. Here, however, the corresponding English metaphor of the ground opening and swallowing the ashamed individual attributes the agentivity to the ground as opposed to the offender. A Czech speaker who is ‘tortured by his conscience’, trápi ho svědomí, would find him/herself in a similarly passive position. On purely speculative grounds, the last example could be interpreted as attempting to capture the painful inactivity experienced by somebody who is fully aware of his wrong doings and now awaits being caught, while his conscience is ‘eating him up’, žere ho svědomí.
To briefly return to the joy metaphor noted above, both Czech and English describe this feeling as one of the Selves being removed from what we can perhaps see as Lakoff’s and Johnson’s ‘true’ Self. While, once removed, the English Self is positioned beside the remaining Selves, the Czech one ceases to exist. And it is perhaps the idea of the absence of the Self that is meant to illustrate the intensity of the feeling.

I will conclude this section with an incidental observation based on both of the groups producing one reference to the thief’s nerves. As the Czech’s antagonist’s nerves could not withstand the pressure, the Irish thief just becomes irritated by the other boy’s constant crying, again reflecting the more ‘relaxed’ attitude present throughout the Irish narratives.

CHI 51m CAT 8
and <he (i)s> [//] <he xxx> [//] he kept on crying
and he # felt this was getting on his nerves
he had to return the cat
CHI 34m CAT 8
a zase furt Jirka brečí
and again still Jirka is crying
Tomáš už má nervy
Tomáš is beginning to <have nerves>
<a chce ji> [//] a chce mu ho vrátit
and he wants to give it back to him

16.6 Summary

The lexical as well as the thematic analysis of the empathy narratives revealed that the Irish children taking part in this study used a broader range and produced higher frequencies of emotion vocabulary and empathy motivated statements. Overall, the Czech speakers’ comments were characterised by a slightly higher attention to physical manifestations of emotions, a trend which, as was noted, is supported by specific lexical items within the Czech vocabulary. It was also found that while the Irish children generally adopted the perspective of the character in need of empathy, it was not uncommon for the Czech children to relate to the other characters, often through statements of antipathy.
The guilt and shame narratives generated by the Cat story uncovered slightly different aspects of the children’s emotion expression. Although the emotion term frequency count was again higher for the Irish children, this difference was due to the use of a limited number of words. In addition, the number of emotion word types found in the Czech children’s narratives was comparatively higher.

Contrary to the observation based on the empathy narratives, in the guilt and shame context the Irish children focused more on the external signs of these emotions, while the Czech children highlighted the reflexive and remorseful mental processes of the antagonist. An explicit connection was made between specific Czech structures and this disparity in the two perspectives.

Self-referent forms in Czech were not only identified as possibly reducing expressions of hesitation of one of the characters, but they were also recognised as crucial in the context of the group’s Theory of mind statements. In this respect, Irish children were again found to represent the situation in a friendlier and more empathically enhanced tone, while producing more generic emotion terms than the Czech group. Even though two, possibly three pictures depicting the antagonist as evaluating the situation were incorporated into the Cat story, the number of Theory of mind statements produced by both groups was surprisingly low.

While the Czech speakers portrayed the guilty character in terms of a profound emotional impact, not only on himself but also on his family, the Irish group interpreted the situation as a minor embarrassing episode.

Finally, the metaphorical and idiomatic language of the Czech speakers appeared richer and its use was relatively more creative in comparison to the expressions used by the Irish group. Although the empathy motivated statements as well as a positive characterisation of the picture story scenarios was more common for the Irish children, a small proportion of their moral and emotion representations appeared somewhat superficially attained.
None of these differences could be described as significant and possible socio-cultural influences were put forward in order to attempt to account for them.

In the next chapter, these observations will be re-examined in the light of the children's own accounts and experiences of the empathically based emotions addressed by the picture stories. Their definitions and examples of their encounters with similar feelings represent an additional opportunity to access the conceptualisations of socially reflexive emotions and their linguistic expression found in the two culturally and linguistically distinct groups of children.
17

Children’s Personal Accounts of Socially Reflexive Emotions

17.1 You can’t always get what you want, sometimes your best friend gets it instead.
17.1.1 The Czech Children’s Take on ‘The Puppy Dilemma’
17.1.2 The Irish Children’s Take on ‘The Puppy Dilemma’
17.2 Feeling Sad and Happy for Others
17.3 Defining the Emotions
17.3.1 Guilt: Irish children
17.3.2 Shame: Irish children
17.3.3 Differences between Feeling Guilty and Feeling Ashamed
17.3.4 Guilt and Shame: Czech children
17.3.5 Embarrassment
17.4 Gender Differences
17.5 Summary

17.1 You can’t always get what you want, sometimes your best friend gets it instead

As part of the discourse which followed the narratives, the children were asked to describe the feelings they would be likely to experience if their best friend unexpectedly got a puppy that they themselves always wished for. The reactions I received provide an interesting addition to the empathic evaluations (or rather the relative lack of) found in the children’s narratives.

17.1.1 The Czech Children’s Take on ‘The Puppy Dilemma’

Empathic statements, such as ‘I would be happy for her/him’, which were not followed by a ‘BUT’ were relatively uncommon in this group. When they did occur in Czech such sentiments were usually communicated through the expression ‘přát někomu něco’, a phrase loosely corresponding to the meaning of ‘wishing something on/for somebody’.

Most of the comments involved expectations of being able to borrow or share the puppy and play with it, eventually ‘breaking the parents’ and getting one, or trying to save money as quickly as possible to buy one. Frequent statements

243
of the nature of ‘I would want one too’, were perhaps the clearest example of the egocentric focus in the reading of the question that the group presented.

Many of the statements were slightly more guarded, suggesting the awareness of what constitutes an appropriate reaction in a similar situation. In many cases, however, the efforts aimed at producing socially acceptable comments were let down by the language used to express them. One of the most interesting replies from this perspective was perhaps the following one: “Byla bych ráda, že a(le)spon ona ho má.”, ‘I would be glad that at least she has got it’. The use of the evaluative ‘at least’ points to the speaker’s ability to empathise only to the extent of a favourable comparison. It is clearly implied in this statement that the ideal situation would involve the speaker herself getting the pet. The ‘next best thing’ is her close friend getting a puppy that they can both play with.

Other children produced similar statements. For example, “Měl bych trošku radost kdyby to byl dobrej kamarád”, ‘I would be a little bit glad if it was a good friend.’; again suggests that, depending on the ‘profile’ of the friend in question, the speaker would be capable of sharing his excitement. It is again left up to the listener’s interpretation whether this reaction would be motivated by the emotional closeness to the friend or by the potential access to his puppy. Certainly, the linguistic construction used here ‘měl bych radost’, ‘I would be glad’ does not itself suggest any intrinsic link to the other person. Moreover, even if the requirement expressed by the conditional ‘bych’, ‘would’, was fulfilled, the emotion would still be described as only ‘a little one’.

This is perhaps a good place to bring up an interesting point, observable in the examples above. The Czech language offers its speakers several phrases which can be used to express joy or happiness over an event taking place in the outside world. The following two are the most common of those expressions: jsem rád/a or mám radost, the former referring to ‘being glad’ and the latter to ‘having joy’, both using the same key word radost, joy. In addition, many
variations on these two expressions exist, however, if one wishes to convey
his/her feelings of joy as related to another person (i.e., to express empathy), it
is not possible to do so within the same clause. The speaker would not only
have to incorporate another clause into his utterance, he would also have to be
quite specific about the event that triggered his/her empathic reaction. He or
she would perhaps say something like: *jsem moc rád, že jí to tak dobře
dopadlo,* ‘I am so pleased that it worked out so well for her’, or, *mám radost,
že už je doma z nemocnice,* ‘I am glad that he/she is already home from the
hospital.’ Interestingly, the more direct and less specific expression, which is
not conditioned by the presence of another clause – *přát někomu něco,* ‘wish
somebody something’, establishes a somewhat more distant relationship
between the speaker and the object of his empathic expression. For example,
Přeju mu to, literally corresponding to ‘I wish it to him’, does not convey an
emotion as much as a cognitive state of wanting something for somebody, or
commenting on one’s approval of the success and luck experienced by the
other person.

It would therefore seem, and the data analysis confirm this, that the language
does not naturally lead speakers into expressions of positive empathy through
‘pre-packaged’ phrases such as those, which exist in English (e.g., ‘I am happy
/delighted/excited/...for your’. Semantically related constructions in Czech
either grammatically separate the speaker from the subject of his empathic
connection by an additional clause or they remove the emotion word from the
phrase. English speakers therefore seem better equipped by their language for
direct expressions of empathy resulting from positive events, than speakers of
Czech do.

Curiously, such differences do not exist in terms of empathising with
somebody’s misfortune. The expression, *je mi ho/ji lito,* ‘I feel sorry for
him/her’, establishes the link through the verb ‘to be’ followed by the genitive
form of the pronoun, essentially creating the shortest possible experiential
distance between the speaker and the animate object.

245
To return to the original topic, yet another speaker commented that she ‘would not mind’, ‘nevdilo by mi to’, while others claimed that they would somehow have to ‘deal with’, ‘musela bych se s tim srovnat’, or ‘come to terms with’ (ňák bych se s tim vyrovnat’) their best friends’ good fortune. Yet other children evaluated the situation as ‘nebyl bych neštastnějši, ale kamarádil bych s nim dář’, ‘I wouldn’t be the happiest but I would go on being friends with him’; or as ‘žárlila bych, ale přežila bych to’, ‘I would be jealous but I would survive’.

The remaining responses belong to a group which demonstrated an even less optimistic outlook. ‘I would feel terrible...I would feel pain’, ‘bylo by mi hrozně...bolest bych cejtím’; ‘it would be unfair’, ‘bylo by to nespravedlivý’; ‘nebylo by mi dobře...bylo by mi špatně’, ‘I would not feel good...I would feel bad’; were some of the more dramatic comments. Generally, however, most of the negative statements concentrated on the feelings of jealousy and sadness. The presence of structures such as ‘bylo by mi to líto’ or ‘mrzelo by mé to’ (‘I would feel bad/sorry’) in the language could be seen as enhancing the subjectivity of the ‘egocentric’ feelings of the speaker, as the pronoun, appearing in the dative case explicitly marks the speaker as the ‘recipient’ of the emotion. Statements of empathy, on the other hand, are either structurally more complex or emotionally less involved.

17.1.2 The Irish Children’s Take on ‘The Puppy Dilemma’

Being happy for the friend who got a new puppy was quite a common reaction of the Irish children to the hypothetical scenario presented to them. Many suggested that they would be ‘really’ happy, while others speculated that they would be ‘maybe a little happy’ or ‘kind of happy’, or that they ‘would not mind’ or ‘would not be sad’ that they did not get one. Such statements are comparable to those made by the Czech children, outlined above. One of the most frequent responses was ‘I would be happy for her/him and sad for me’ (or “happy plus sad” as one boy put it), pointing to the capacity to separate the
affects related purely to self, from the empathic connection one might have to others. This strategy was slightly less common in the Czech group.

Some children adopted a very philosophical viewpoint.

CHI 45
and it does (no) t really matter
because you can (no) t always get what you want
and maybe someday you might, you know

This mixture of self- and other-oriented feelings was also reflected in reactions such as “I would feel happy for him but it would be hard for me”, “I would still like her but I would feel actually jealous” or “I would just like a puppy but I would not like go and hate him for it”. Other children reasoned in a pattern similar to that emerging from the Czech group, speculating that ‘it wouldn’t really be so bad’ because they could still go and play with the puppy.

As suggested by Bamberg (1997a), children up until about the age of seven find it difficult to create a perspective encompassing two opposing emotions. Bamberg writes: “...the ability to linguistically take different perspectives (for different discursive purposes) on the same “event” is a prerequisite for the construal of this event type called dual or mixed emotions...” (p. 318). Rather than actually experiencing two independent emotional states, this division is ‘conceptual’, resulting from our “linguistic ability to take perspectives”. In other words, our description of the experience in terms of two conflicting states is motivated by the capacity we gain through language, and which enables us to express diverse ‘discursive purposes’ (p. 318).

To apply this claim to the current study, while most of the children were aware of what the ‘correct’ response to the ‘Puppy question’ would be (i.e., the discursive purpose of demonstrating the compliance with social norms) they also volunteered their ‘true’ subjective evaluation of the situation, which is undoubtedly cognitively and emotionally less demanding. The rest of the speakers failed to produce such a dual perspective and opted for only one of
the two conflicting emotions, typically the subjective view of disappointment and sadness.

Some purely negative reactions were also noted within the Irish group, mostly highlighting the speaker's jealousy, sadness, and general 'bad' feelings. Many of such comments were, however, modified by a quantifier, i.e., feeling 'a bit jealous' or 'a bit sad'. The least positive statement produced in this context was the following: "I would feel kind of bad because I wanted a puppy first and he stole my idea and I wouldn't really want to play with him at lunchtimes anymore". It is tempting to speculate here that the phrases 'kind of bad/sad/jealous' or even 'kind of happy', which occurred quite frequently within the empathy discourse, reflect the hesitation to commit to the expression of any one of those particular emotions (perhaps as part of the process of assessing its appropriateness in the context of the social norms), as well as a general trend within the language.

The idea of evaluation and comparison of self on the basis of somebody else's achievement was suggested by two of the Irish children and is illustrated by the example below.

CHI 55m
well I (would) feel <like> [...] like that <he> [...] he was like
that he was like getting all the good stuff
and like we were getting all the bad stuff
and like were worth getting good stuff than him
and like I felt like he would feel like
he (is) like the best
and <he> [...] you (would) feel just kind of left out

An additional dimension was represented by comments such as "I would feel happy for him and maybe he would feel sad for me" or "I would feel happy for the puppy to have a new owner and since she is my best friend I'd know that the owner was very nice", which again confirm the strong tendencies towards the expression of empathy within the Irish sample. The last excerpt unveils the child's conception of empathy as something that requires concentrated and conscious effort to overcome the instinctively egotistic reaction to the situation and which enables one to function as part of a social
The ‘socially processed’ emotion is the acceptable one. This statement perhaps provides a key to the form of the social knowledge possessed by many of the Irish children in this study.

CHI 51m
I would feel maybe a little jealous
and then when I had my cop on
I would feel happy for them

Overall, the responses of the Irish group typically involved the feelings of jealousy as well as happiness for the other person, which tended to be more pronounced than the negative aspect of the situation.

17.2 Feeling Sad and Happy for Others

When asked if they ever felt sad or sorry for anybody, the Czech children most often gave examples from their everyday life, such as empathising with those excluded from games or ridiculed by others for their appearance, their friends who hurt themselves, those punished by their parents or teachers for misbehaving, or children who caused their football or basketball teams to lose the game. Two of the children spoke about feeling sorry for their mothers when their parents have a row. Some of the more unusual stories included feeling sorry for children in an orphanage which one of the girls saw on television the previous day. The reasons she gave for her emotional reaction were explicitly factual, e.g., the children had no parents (while she does), and they were very sad, so she would like to get to know them so they would have more friends. Another little girl spoke of feeling sorry for homeless people on the street.

Staying with the Czech sample, the most common answer to the following question: ‘why should it bother you when these things happen to somebody else?’, simply referred to the child’s relationship with the other person, i.e., ‘because it is my friend/sibling/brother/sister/member of my family’.
Several of the children, however, gave more comprehensive reasons, such as those listed below.

CHI 27
že je to můj brácha a já ho mám ráda
*because it’s my brother and I love him*
CHI 18m
no protože je to třeba můj kamarád a # bolí mě to i za něj
*well maybe because it’s my friend and it <hurts me for him too>*
CHI 20
protože už jsem na tydle věcí citlivá prostě
*because I am just sensitive to these things*
CHI 26
<protože> [/] # protože to musí být [č: být] hrozný # určitě <u něho>
*because...because it must be terrible surely <with him>*
CHI 30
protože si asi dovedu představit jak by to bolelo mě
*because I can kind of imagine how it would hurt me*
CHI 39
protože s ní cítím
*because I <feel with her>*
CHI 40
ne jako protože uh si umím představit že to bolí
*well because I can imagine that it hurts*
CHI 45
vezmu si co kdyby se to stalo mě
*I think like what if it happened to me*

Others expressed frustration over their inability to put their feelings into words by making statements such as “protože to je takový blbý že...jako já nevim jak bych to řekla”, ‘because it is kind of stupid...I don’t know how to explain it’.

The same problem also appeared in the Irish group, where responses similar to “I do (no) t know I just did”, also indicate inadequate means of expression.

In general, these comments can be interpreted in the light of the claim that children learn to empathise with others through their immediate social experiences. It is a well established fact that the sense of membership within a group or family, as defined by many theorists (e.g., Nakonečný, 2000; Thompson, 1989), plays an essential part in the process of children’s socialisation. Evidence of children’s awareness of it is in turn apparent from their discourse.

The examples above show that empathic feelings do not readily lend themselves to linguistic labels, as for most of the children attempting to
explain their feelings for others proved to be quite challenging. Their expressive abilities in terms of the 'language of empathy' could in this sense be seen as not matching their emotional development. As already noted, it is clearly possible to feel sad for somebody without being able to encode the emotion verbally. For example, Child 26 demonstrates this in the utterance above. There can be no doubt about her emotional involvement in the situation. By using the preposition u, 'with', instead of the grammatically appropriate pro, 'for', coupled with the apparent hesitations (marked by #), she reveals that her confidence in terms of verbalising this feeling does not match the intensity of the message she is trying to convey.

The trends emerging from the Irish data, even though similar in many respects (e.g., the examples based on the children's personal experiences with feeling sad or happy for somebody), showed some distinctive patterns. More specifically, an interesting element was found in the Irish children's conception of empathy which has not been noted in the Czech discourse. Some of the Irish children, such as the speakers in the two examples below, communicated their awareness that in order to achieve a complete empathic expression, it is essential to hide one's own conflicting feelings from the other person. This could be interpreted as consistent, not only with the comment of similar nature discussed in the previous section but also, with the heightened sensitivity towards the feelings of others exhibited by the Irish group throughout their discourse.

CHI 36m
INV: can you think about some examples when people might be happy for somebody else?
COR: when they (a)re going to another country for a week
COR: and you really want to go
COR: you just do (no)t tell her
COR: do (no)t ask um +"/
COR: +" can I go?
COR: +" can I go?
COR: just say +"/
COR: +" goodbye
COR: +" and feel happy for them

CHI 39
if you say somebody um is going away
that you really really like
um you (woul)d be really sad
but you might (no)t show it sometimes
because you would (no)t want to make the other people feel sad
that they were going

In contrast, some of the examples given by the Czech children revealed their inability to separate the welfare of another from their own self-related concerns.

CHI 16
INV: když si třeba někdo rozbije koleno, je ti ho líto?
like when somebody scrapes their knee, do you feel sorry for them?

TRA: hmm no protože když je to třeba moje kamarádka tak si nemám s kym potom hrát
well because if it is like my friend then I don’t have anybody to play with

CHI 5
ADE: třeba když moje kamarádka šla ted’ do nemocnice a zlomila si prst
like when my friend went to the hospital recently and broke her finger
ADE: tak mi bylo smutno po ni že tam neni
I felt sad that she wasn’t around

In yet other cases, the initial empathy becomes diverted and self-interest gains the foreground.

CHI 15m
JIR: no třeba dneska v tělocviku když jsme hráli košikovou
well like today in the gym class when we were playing basketball
JIR: a tam jako nedal koš <a bylo mi tak jako> [///] bylo mi ho líto že nedal koš no
and he didn’t score and I felt kind of...I felt sorry for him that he didn’t score
INV: a proč ti to bylo líto když jsi to nebyl ty?
and why did you <feel bad> when it wasn’t you?
JIR: <chtěli aby jako> [///] <abysme to vyhráli> [///] no chtěli jsme to vyhrát
they wanted to win, we wanted to win

While many of the situations and their explanations presented by the Czech children focused on the social aspects of the interaction, some reasoned on a purely practical level.

CHI 43
INV: a proč by ti to bylo líto když by to nebolelo tebe ale ji?
and why would you feel bad if it hurt her and not you?
KRT: protože třeba by mohla ject do nemocnice a mohla by jí to třeba zašivat
because she could go to the hospital and she might need stitches or they could put something on it ...
In the same context, one of the children suggested that his own personal feelings about his friend’s injury can affect the extent of the other person’s pain. He laughed at the idea, however, as soon as he had made the comment.

The Irish group, in comparison, tended to concentrate on the emotional charge of the interaction, which was conveyed mainly through the description of physical characteristics and behaviour of the protagonists.
... and you (would) be smiling at them and you (would) be probably saying +"/
+" xxx I am happy for you
and you (will) be happy for them

An interesting point to note is the way in which Child 12m refers to somebody ‘thinking in their head’. Such a creative use of language essentially marks the need for a subjectivity highlighter which, for some reason, the speaker did not find in a reflexive pronoun. What he attempts instead is a structure which begs comparison with the Czech self-referent verb *myslet si*, ‘to think to oneself’. My speculation here is that due to the relatively low exposure that English speaking children have to reflexive pronouns, the relevant phrase was not retrieved by the child. In his search for a linguistic form which would encompass the emotion point he is trying to make, the speaker produces a construction readily available to speakers of Czech. By this process he is not compensating for the lack of appropriate linguistic expressions in his native language but rather for his own unawareness of what it offers.

Deacon would probably see this as a failure of the language organism to fully and in time inhabit its host. Lakoff and others would interpret it as yet another manifestation of our metaphorical representation of the external world and our inner selves. In terms of the current study, this linguistic improvisation shows that the Irish children’s enhanced tendencies towards relating to the feelings of others could find use for the Czech children’s linguistic devices. Similarly, although equipped with an ideal Theory of mind linguistic implement, it would seem that the Czech children’s socio-cultural skills do not call upon its utilisation comparatively as often.

**17.3 Defining the Emotions**

**17.3.1 Guilt: Irish children**

Guilt was most frequently defined by the Irish children in terms of doing something bad or wrong, breaking the law, being caught by the police, brought to court and subsequently jailed. The definitions therefore mostly focused on
practical and social implications as opposed to the emotional content of the term.

CHI 18
it feels +/-
um I do (not) know what it feels like it (is) just that I know what guilty is
it (is) like when somebody says +”
+” alright I (am) guilty of [of & doing] [of] of murdering Heather or something

CHI 27m
say when <you are> [///] you (have) caught somebody <and> [///] and <they> [///]
<they do (not)> [///] and <they> [///] um the judge said to them +”/
+” are you guilty?
<and they> [///] and <they> [///] he said +”/
+ yes
because they did something bad

CHI 53m
<he> [///] <he is> [///] he gets caught
and he (is) like guilty on the spot

CHI 17m
I think it means like if # um sometimes if they (are) um in if they (are) doing
something wrong and if they (are) over eighteen or something like that they go to
court
and then if they say he is guilty he normally goes to jail

When the above quoted speaker CHI 17m was asked again how would feeling
guilty feel, he suggested that it would feel ‘sad’ because the jailed person
would miss their family. He was not the only one who failed to define guilt
through emotion concepts as the definition based on the example of
committing a criminal act was one of the most frequently used by the Irish
children. The general tendency to explain guilt as existing ‘outside’ of the
potential experiencer was apparent also from other comments, such as the
following:

CHI 23m
um <he> [///] <he is> [///] he is guilty of stealing something
um it feels very shocking for the parents

Similar explanations, heavily reliant on social norms as imposed by authority,
are characteristic of ‘preconventional reasoning’ of the first level of moral
development, as described by Kohlberg (1976). As will become apparent
later, however, such reasoning was less common within the Czech group,
where the issue of formal categorisation of the act and its punishment were
overshadowed by the focus on confrontation. These findings highlight the
topic of cross-cultural appropriateness of the stages of moral judgement raised by many (e.g., Ma & Cheung, 1996). It is perhaps reasonable to assume that similar cultural idiosyncrasies exist in the context of widely applicable larger divisions.

Although the above noted trend of external orientation was overwhelming within the Irish sample, some cases, where the distinction between the subjective experience of the event and the event itself was drawn, were also found.

CHI 26m
they might feel guilty but <they might> [/] they might say that they (a)re innocent
because um they might n(o)t want to go to jail

CHI 44
um say when you (a)re in court
and you (ha)ve been accused of something that you have (no)t done
and you keep saying that +”/”
+” I did (no)t
+” I did (no)t
but you (woul)d still inside feel very guilty

The example immediately above shows an interesting contradiction in the child’s interpretation of the emotion term. She seems to be suggesting that while being tried for something that one has NOT done, one would proclaim own innocence while nevertheless feeling guilty. One possible explanation for this statement is that the feelings of guilt are understood in terms of public humiliation, which would occur regardless of the plea.

In many cases, the offender ‘did not mean to do what he had done’ and his actions were described as a misunderstanding. ‘I shouldn’t have done that’, ‘I wish I had never done that’, and ‘I’m never going to do that again’, feeling like ‘you did the right thing when you gave it back’, as well as denying responsibility for actions which would result in negative consequences, were also common responses in this context.

Although many of the children described a sequence of events resulting in being caught, when asked if the onset of the feeling was dependent on being
caught, most of them asserted that that was not the case. Some also highlighted the social implications of being captured. In most cases, however, those were not stated explicitly. Instead such circumstances were described in terms of ‘everybody knowing what you have done’.

When guilt was outlined in terms of other emotions, feeling sad, silly, stupid, upset, scared and mean were the most frequently occurring ones. Moreover, an awareness of the empathic nature of guilt is apparent from the final remark of the following example.

CHI 55m
so then <he> [/] he just felt real sad that he was (no)t allowed in the tree house
and everyone else was
so he kind of felt left out
and we all felt guilty
and we all felt guilty for him

CHI 25
um it means like to <be> /// feel silly for himself feel bad for himself that he did it
guilty means feel bad for themselves and feel all stupid for himself

The example above demonstrates the effort to direct listener’s attention towards the subjectivity of the feeling which is typically also defined by its empathic aspect. The excessive use of self-referents highlights the self-directed contempt of the experiencer on one level (i.e., feeling stupid/silly/bad for himself), while also pointing to the division within the emotional state of the experiencer who empathically relates to the effects that his action has on others (i.e., feeling bad for themselves). From a stylistic perspective the self-referents seem out of place. Pragmatically, however, they fulfi l a very specific role for which the speaker could not find any other linguistic means. In terms of emotive content, such description of guilt is consistent with its internal focus (as opposed to the more externally oriented nature of shame), outlined by Greenwald and Harder (1998).

Finally, a few of the children admitted not knowing what feeling guilty meant because they had no personal experience of it, again stressing the significance of personal exposure to particular emotion-evoking situations for the process of their internalisation.
17.3.2 Shame: Irish children

The definitions of shame given by the Irish children concentrated mostly on feeling ‘bad’, remorseful, disappointed, sad, ‘like you don’t think you have been very nice’ and ‘you wish you haven’t done it’. There were also some children who included the highly relevant social aspect of shame into their accounts of personal experiences of this feeling.

The point that gets repeatedly emphasised here is the fact that those who feel ashamed as a result of somebody else’s actions do not expect the offender to act in such way in the first place. This perhaps points to an element of unusual and out of character behaviour which comes as a surprise to others, as part of the children’s definition of shame.

In comparison to the serious consequences described by the children as following guilt evoking acts (i.e., court cases, imprisonment, etc.), shame was associated with less severe outcomes, such as ‘being in trouble’ or ‘being grounded’. Unlike the feeling of guilt, however, many children only associated shame with being caught or confronted. This observation is again highly consistent with Greenwald and Harder’s (1998) view of shame as
resulting from the revelation of the act in front of others. To further illustrate this point, one child identified parental feedback as a valuable social experience.

\[\text{CHI 39}\]
they (would) just say "you should be ashamed of yourself"
"um you should feel very bad for yourself"
and you know what you should (not) have done

Similarly to what was already noted in the previous section, there were instances in which the children used additional self-referent pronouns, presumably as part of their attempt to provide a more truthful account of what it means to feel ashamed. This is apparent in the utterances of the children quoted directly above and below.

\[\text{CHI 41}\]
like you mean <ashamed> ?
like really sad for yourself

When confronted with the request to define the emotion term, some children again simply stated that they either did not understand the word or were not able to explain it. There were also some definitions which apart from demonstrating the speaker’s lack of comprehension of the concept of shame, also leave the reader puzzled.

\[\text{CHI 24m}\]
em they might be ashamed <if someone> [/] if someone bashed into their new car if they were listening to the radio and uh it was an L driver

### 17.3.3 Differences between Feeling Guilty and Feeling Ashamed

Differences in the conceptualisation and description of guilt and shame, as offered by the Irish children, are illustrated below. For example, it was not uncommon for the children to reverse the internal and external attributes of the two emotions discussed above, thus demonstrating that the line between them is perhaps not as conceptually well defined in all of the children of this age group.
However, one of the main and most interesting differences that became apparent from the Irish children’s discourse was reflected in the language the children used to talk about guilt and shame. Specifically, the phrase ‘you should be ashamed of yourself’ and its grammatical variations were used as the focal point of many of the definitions of shame. The phrase was on many occasions repeated several times as if the speaker was trying it on, searching for associations and meanings hidden within this formula. In most cases, this repetition proved useful and a definition followed. In others it was apparent, that although familiar with the linguistic form, the child had not yet fully grasped its meaning.

It would appear that the phrase ‘to be ashamed of oneself’ holds the key to the understanding of the meaning of shame. Even when its full form has not yet been acquired (e.g., CHI 14m), it is called upon to provide the necessary starting point from which the concept can be processed. Such conclusion supports Bamberg’s (1997) view of language as a tool for making sense of one’s emotional experience.
comparable conceptual impact. Even though the linguistic forms of ‘feeling guilty’ do readily lend themselves to formulations of definitions and descriptions of personal experiences, these were not uttered by the children with the same frequency as those describing the feelings of shame. The connection between the experience itself and its linguistic representation, it would seem, is less direct. This is perhaps due to a slightly more formal association of the word guilty with items such as court, jail, crime, judge and others, as shown by the children in this study. Despite its presumed inward orientation and due to its representation by the language, guilt was therefore more readily perceived by the English-speaking children in terms of formal external characteristics.

Let me take this line of reasoning a little further to the ‘preparedness’ of another language to conceptualise the same emotions. The Czech children were also asked to define the expression ‘stydět se’. Strikingly, the same phenomenon was observed where some of the children seemed to have used the imperative statement ‘styděť se’, ‘you should be ashamed of yourself’, to conceptually access the emotion itself.

CHI 15m  
'třeba ve škole tady když máme ve třídě tak se stydim  
like in school when we have in the classroom I feel ashamed/embarrassed  
vždycky pani učitelka se někdo &vl &n houpe v nosě a řiká +”/  
the teacher sometimes somebody is picking their nose and says  
+” styd’ se!  
you should be ashamed of yourself

As will become apparent in the next section, a large proportion of the Czech children interpreted the expression ‘stydět se’ in terms of what would be in English labelled as embarrassment, while others discussed it in contexts related to the English feelings of shame. The expression which closely corresponds to the English guilt, ‘pocit viny’ or ‘citit se provinile’ was not spontaneously used by any of the children. In this respect I would like to argue that the reduced coverage of this concept in the Czech children’s discourse (in comparison to their Irish counterparts) was due to the unfamiliarity of this linguistic form, the equivalent of which has not been
detected in the Irish group. This, however, did not completely eliminate the concept of guilt from the discourse, as the same circumstances were in some cases discussed in terms of a more metaphorical form ‘mit špatné svědomí’, ‘to have a guilty/bad conscience’.

17.3.4 Guilt and Shame: Czech children

As noted above, none of the Czech children mentioned the word ‘vina’, ‘guilt’ at any stage of their narratives, nor as part of the subsequent discourse based on the pictures. I have therefore decided not to use this term in an attempt to find out whether it will be included in some of the children’s definitions of the feeling ‘stydět se’. Only one of the children, Child 7, referred to the emotion in question by the term vina. More frequently a different expression, ‘špatné svědomí’, ‘bad conscience’, emerged.

The awareness of the difference between stydět se, ‘feel ashamed/embarrassed’ and mit špatné svědomí, ‘have bad conscience’ was apparent from several statements.

CHI 37
SAN: no že vlastně třeba když teda něco ukrad tak když ho někdo vidí tak jako # well that kind of like when he stole something and somebody sees him he feels ashamed
INV: a (k)dyby ho nikdo neviděl tak by se nestyděl? and if nobody saw him he would not feel ashamed?
SAN: no možná taky ale to už by zase bylo to svědomí well maybe he would but it would really be more the conscience

The Czech children’s definitions of stydět se, ‘feel ashamed/embarrassed’ mostly centred around doing something wrong ‘něco provést/udělat’; fear, ‘bát se’, not meaning to do it ‘nechtit to udělat’ and being punished for it, ‘dostane na zadek’, ‘hubovat’. Some of the children again concentrated on the physical manifestations of the emotion, such as sweating or blushing. There were only two expressions suggesting a more ceremonial conceptualisation. One described the offender as “je mu lito jeho činu”, ‘he is sorry for his act’, while the other refers to a former punishment, “že prostě možná vodpíkaj ňákej trest”, ‘that maybe they will serve some sentence’. The majority
confirmed that the feeling exists independently of being caught. In some cases, similarly to the Irish group, the children associated the feelings defined above with people responsible for the offender as opposed to the offender himself.

The above is the only instance of the word *vina*, ‘guilt’ produced by the group. The expression, which is presumably meant to suggest that the parents are perceived as being responsible for the boy’s actions, was constructed incorrectly, including the use of the wrong preposition. It would appear here, that the frequency with which Czech children hear the relevant linguistic construction is even lower than that of the Irish children’s exposure to the corresponding item. As a result, the concept translationally equivalent to ‘guilt’ was slightly underrepresented in the discourse of the Czech group.

To continue with the account of children’s representations of the emotion terms, some of the Czech children also explicitly defined the feelings of ‘stydět se’ by the social consequences of the offence and the potential punishment or ridicule involved.

The expression, which is presumably meant to suggest that the parents are perceived as being responsible for the boy’s actions, was constructed incorrectly, including the use of the wrong preposition. It would appear here, that the frequency with which Czech children hear the relevant linguistic construction is even lower than that of the Irish children’s exposure to the corresponding item. As a result, the concept translationally equivalent to ‘guilt’ was slightly underrepresented in the discourse of the Czech group.

To continue with the account of children’s representations of the emotion terms, some of the Czech children also explicitly defined the feelings of ‘stydět se’ by the social consequences of the offence and the potential punishment or ridicule involved.

CHI 28
že prostě jako se styděli <že> [/] že toho kluka prostě třeba dobré nevychovali
they felt ashamed that maybe they did not bring up the boy well
že třeba # potom bude až bude velký třeba # lupič nebo tak(h)le
that maybe then he will be a robber or something later when he grows up

CHI 7
no <že > [/] uh že se za něj jako +//
well that they were kind of
že něco proved a je to vina <na ty rodiče>
that he had done something and <it is guilt on the parents>

The above is the only instance of the word *vina*, ‘guilt’ produced by the group.

The expression, which is presumably meant to suggest that the parents are perceived as being responsible for the boy’s actions, was constructed incorrectly, including the use of the wrong preposition. It would appear here, that the frequency with which Czech children hear the relevant linguistic construction is even lower than that of the Irish children’s exposure to the corresponding item. As a result, the concept translationally equivalent to ‘guilt’ was slightly underrepresented in the discourse of the Czech group.

To continue with the account of children’s representations of the emotion terms, some of the Czech children also explicitly defined the feelings of ‘stydět se’ by the social consequences of the offence and the potential punishment or ridicule involved.

CHI 8
třeba bych +/
like if I...
já nevím
I don’t know
+, vzala třeba řáky malýmu dítěti na pišku řáky věc která by byla jeho
like if I took something that belonged to a small child in the sand pit
a potom by tam přišla maminka a +...
and then his mom would come
tak by jsem se hodně styděla
then I would feel really ashamed
coby by mi asi udělala ta maminka
what the mom would do to me
These examples represent a trend unique to the discourse of the Czech group, specifically, the Czech speakers commonly express *fear of confrontation*, which they also associate with the feeling of ‘*stydi se*’. The emotion is therefore not seen as a result of a wrongful action, or as motivated by the fear of punishment alone, but as being confronted by those whose interests were harmed. I can only speculate that this perhaps reflects the general dynamics within the Czech society, the issue of authority in particular.

As was noted in the Irish group, many of the children were unable to define the term. Others used general expressions such as ‘*má takovej divnej pocit*’, ‘he feels kind of strange’. In some cases, the speakers produced unusual descriptions of the emotional state, clearly not content with the more common linguistic options or unable to access them. One girl, for example, described somebody who feels the equivalent of the Czech ‘*stydi se*’ as being ‘*zakrslej*’, which could be captured by the English word ‘dwarfed’. Yet again we see the inventiveness of the Czech children’s use of language. In addition, one is more likely to ‘feel dwarfed’ in comparison to a higher, confrontational authority figure and so the metaphorical expression reflects the culture-specific aspect of the socially reflexive emotion of shame.

17.3.5 Embarrassment

Although *embarrassment* was not one of the emotions originally targeted by the narratives, references to it were made by the children in both groups, on a number of occasions (in the context of the Move story). This emotion was
therefore included in the discussion which followed the initial narratives. The examples of *embarrassment* produced by both of the groups mostly involved socially awkward or challenging situations, such as performing in front of an audience. Neither of the groups showed any difficulties in drawing a conceptual distinction between the situations in which one would experience *embarrassment* and those evoking *shame*.

As discussed above, the Czech children were asked to explain the term *'stydět se'* which could be interpreted in the sense of the English *embarrassment* as well as *shame*. It is perhaps not surprising that as a result, embarrassing scenarios were discussed somewhat more readily than shameful events, as it can be presumed that the children would have less personal experience with the latter.

### 17.4 Gender Differences

Although it is often suggested (e.g., Fisher, 1995) that boys and girls are typically socialised with different emphasis on emotional experiences, as well as the language used to account for them, this study did not uncover any dramatic differences in terms of gender, either across or within the two linguistic groups. Some subtle variations have emerged, however, and I will briefly outline the findings related to this issue next.

An interesting trend has emerged from the analysis of the emotion lexicons of the two groups which revealed that gender differences within the Czech sample were comparatively quite low. For example, during the empathy narratives, the boys used on average 2.5 and the girls 2.4 emotion terms. The analysis of the guilt and shame narratives revealed equal levels of similarity. Here the boys mentioned on average 5 emotion terms compared to the girls’ 5.2. The gender differences were more pronounced within the Irish sample. This was most apparent from the analysis of the empathy discourse, where the girls used 3.6 and the boys 2.9 emotion terms on average.
Although this contrast cannot be described as significant, it was found to be consistent within the groups. The Irish children scored higher averages for their gender than the Czech children on both types of narratives. The most obvious explanation in this context is that Irish children are led to express their emotions more frequently than their Czech counterparts. However, while the empathy scores were almost identical for the Czech boys and girls, the Irish girls' score was on average 0.7 higher than that for the Irish boys. Based on this calculation we can speculate that perhaps a more gender-balanced approach to emotional socialisation exists within the Czech society than it does in Ireland.

Moreover, these results point to an emphasis placed on the empathic expression in the Irish girls, in comparison to not only the Irish boys but also to the Czech children in general. The Irish boys in turn spoke more frequently about shame and guilt, emotions which could be seen as more gender appropriate. Interestingly, both of these patterns were reversed in the Czech sample, again indicating the possibility of a less stereotypical approach to emotion socialisation within Czech culture.

17.5 Summary

Harris (1995a) argued that a line must be drawn between emotional experiences and the conception of emotions. In other words, it is possible to experience certain emotions without understanding their nature or the reasons for them. As such, children are equipped to experience emotions prior to developing the ability to cognitively categorise them, thus laying down foundations for their conceptualisation. This claim has certainly been confirmed by this study, as many of the children manifested an understanding of the emotional experiences described by the picture stories and volunteered relevant examples of similar situations from their own experience, while explicit emotion labels and appropriate definitions were encountered less
frequently. However, the issue of emotional conceptualisation appears to be slightly more complex than that.

This chapter, like those before it, has again touched upon the Irish children’s enhanced tendencies towards empathically constructed accounts, as found in comparison to the discourse of the Czech children included in this study. Here, an additional observation was made, however, which seems to explain this quality in terms of learned ‘empathic strategies’. In other words, the Irish children have cognitively mastered the meaning of concern or happiness for others, but in some cases, and contrary to Harris’s claim, without possessing the emotional maturity to experience it. More specifically, some of the children’s comments lead me to believe that their empathy was ‘produced’ through the strategy of often consciously blocking own subjective interests and emotions, in order to arrive at a socially desirable outcome. There can be no doubt that such strategies can only be acquired through specific socio-cultural forces motivated by the highly valued position of empathy within a particular culture.

This is of course not to say that the Czech children in this sample showed no abilities to relate to the thoughts and emotions of others. That was clearly not the case. In addition, their accounts also showed some evidence of empathic reasoning similar to that of the Irish children. Such processes were, however, significantly less prevalent, partially perhaps due to the lack of a ‘convenient’ expression of positive empathy within the language.

Harris (1995, p. 370) singled out language as one of the mechanisms of conceptualisation of emotional experiences. Although the existence of self-referent structures in Czech grammar did not itself prove to be constitutive of empathically motivated tendencies, the absence of specific lexical items seems to correlate with a particular conceptual focus, most notably in the context of accounts of guilt, provided by the Czech children.
Although it would be tempting to draw dramatic links suggesting that the Czech children do not possess a mental model of what the Irish children understand by the word guilt, such statements, as the children themselves have illustrated, are far from sustainable. The analysis showed that Czech children understand the concept of guilt as well as the Irish children do, but with a difference in focus. The Czech language in its colloquial form directs the speaker away from the formalised discussion of ‘vina’, ‘guilt’, to the more readily accessible linguistic form of ‘stud’, ‘shame’, which can be transformed into the verbal form ‘stydět se’. This direction is reflected in the externally oriented context of the discourse. I have shown that a similar principal operates, although to a lesser degree, in respect of the English phrase ‘to be ashamed of oneself’. Returning to Czech, in the instances where the speaker wishes to draw the distinction between the two concepts, the option of the metaphorical expression of ‘having a guilty conscience’ is utilised. Finally in this context, culturally motivated variation has been noted in the Czech children’s focus on confrontation as one of the main determinants of shame.

I would like to conclude this chapter with some anecdotal evidence of the children’s desire to use language as an interpretive device for emotional experiences, stretching the boundaries of linguistic forms beyond recognition, while arriving at the perfect descriptions of their emotion conceptualisation.
CONCLUSION

"The peculiarities of particular languages come from differences in the kinds of things that different speech communities think it important to talk about and the ways they think it useful to talk about them—along with various historical 'accidents.'" (Tomasello, 2000, p. 62)

Armed with the theoretical background so neatly summarised by Tomasello, I set out to draw a link between what appeared to be a palpable union between grammatically imposed self-referent structures and speakers' propensity towards consideration of the internal processes of the minds of others. The investigation described here touched upon many aspects of this liaison but one thing that can be uttered with absolute certainty is that it has not led to the discovery of a straight line along which this almost flirtatious affiliation between language, emotions and their conceptualisation can be traced.

In both Czech and English, the self-referent structures were evidently and systematically used by the children to enhance the 'air' of subjectivity, either the speaker's own or that of others featuring in the discourse. But not only that, references made to specific selves were also found to have been used as assertions of a viewpoint from which the speaker wished to portray the events, including situations when the speaker's evaluation of them lead him or her to dissociate with the actions or mental processes of the protagonists, serving as a 'counter-empathy' signal to the listener. The latter was found to be specific to the English reflexive pronouns, which also appeared with a higher frequency than the Czech ones did. The commonality with which such structures occurred in both languages, in association with emotion context, implies their general relevance to emotion expression. As the empathic ability to connect with the feelings of others constitutes one of the most important interpersonal skills, it is linguistic designs such as these that help to situate the individual within the context of his or her existence as a social and cultural being.

How should we account for the presence of self-referent verbs in Czech, however, which have no obvious equivalent in purpose or prevalence of use...
available to English speakers? As we have seen, referent verbs possess the unlikely powers to marry diverse viewpoints, subjectivise the objective, conjoin opposites and incorporate multiple subjectivities into one expression. What is protecting them from linguistic extinction, and how do they shape the conceptualisation of related abstractions, such as the socially reflexive emotions of those who grow up in their constant presence? How do English speakers manage without such linguistic devices? It would appear that they do just fine.

Although the Czech children in this study did not show any indication of an enhancement of the capacity for, or predisposition towards, Theory of Mind cognition, or indeed a heightened emotional self-awareness, the self-referent structures proved nonetheless to lie at the grammatical core of such expressions. In comparison, the discourse of the Irish children was consistently characterised by higher numbers of emotion terms. Of course, labelling this strategy as ‘compensation’ is a highly spurious undertaking, even though it can be said, in support, that no other predominantly grammatical and consistently applied structures with a similar subjectivity-inducing function have been observed. In fact, some of the children attempted to produce grammatically subjective forms through ‘ungrammatical’ use of reflexive pronouns, pointing to a linguistic search for a conceptually congruous expression.

Wierzbicka (1995, p. 28) argues that “an emotion concept expressed in one language by means of a word can often be expressed in another language by means of a locution... ANY emotion concept of one language, no matter how unique and culture-specific, can be rendered by means of a paraphrase in other languages”. That may be the case. But what if what we are dealing with are not emotion concepts as such, but an extremely subtle grammatically encoded predisposition to conceptualise in a specific way?

---

42 This, of course, is ‘compensation’ in the purely linguistic context, as suggested by Berman and Slobin (1994, p. 641).
At a linguistically higher level of coding, the discourse of the two groups appeared to reflect idiosyncrasies in the form of specific constructions used to discuss feelings in each of the two languages. Perhaps the most notable one was the ease of expression of negative, in comparison to positive, empathy in Czech. The somewhat more constructive thematic content of the empathy narratives, as well as the related discourse provided by the Irish children, can therefore be seen as resulting from the marked availability of statements of identification with others, linguistically represented in English. In this context I believe that specific, frequently encountered emotion words and phrases equip children with linguistic ‘landmarks’, with the help of which complex, and often privately alien emotions of social significance can be conceptually located. Although present in both groups, the Irish children in particular were found to make use of similar linguistic and cognitive strategies. As Budwig noted, “children attempt to link specific linguistic forms with highly salient conceptual units and communicative goals” (1990, p. 143).

It would appear that the familiarity with, and availability of, specific terminology generate singularity in conceptual focus, hence, for example, the internalisation of the feelings of guilt as defined by the Czech children in terms of ‘dirty conscience’, in contrast to the Irish children’s association with jail sentences and courts. But there were also broader differences in focus which cannot be accounted for by solely linguistic means, so accentuating the necessity of a culturally informed analysis and interpretation.

As noted by Berman and Slobin, children around the age of eight or nine are well capable of producing a grammatically and lexically appropriate narrative constructed around a meaningful story line. The narratives themselves, however, tend to be highly ‘stereotyped’ (1994, p. 187). This was without doubt the case in the present study. The stories told by the children were overwhelmingly uniform, rarely incorporating additional elements or attempting to broaden the basic story line. Subtle cultural differences did not come into view until the context of socially relevant comments had been examined in detail.
The Czech children included in this study (and the following paragraphs will make some generalisations) demonstrated comparatively lower levels of empathic representation of the events taking place in the narrated picture stories. This conclusion is supported by the children's performance on the advanced Theory of Mind test. As the single most pronounced theme, their discourse highlighted issues of authority and confrontation. These observations offset the Irish children's typical expressiveness of empathically driven emotions, depicting the characters featuring in the picture stories as more generous, attentive and caring. Their ability to relate to the thoughts of others was also enhanced in comparison, pointing to somewhat more extensive social and communicative skills, such as the ability to detect sarcasm. These apparent variations could perhaps be accounted for in terms of culture-specific forces operating in each of the two countries.

Irish culture is defined by communal activities, ranging from frequent informal social gatherings to more formal occasions, often prescribed by religious traditions. One of many examples is that of ceremonies surrounding burial which take place in several stages, and are often seen as an opportunity for an extensive family reunion. A similar orientation is also apparent from the Irish children's discourse. As their own empathy examples given in this study, many of the children suggested that they would feel happy for those who got married or had babies. The same conceptualisation of empathy was not noted in the Czech group.

Given its relative geographical remoteness and low population, in Ireland, social skills represent a uniquely valuable asset which is passed from generation to generation and is evident in very young children. 'Friendliness' is one of the main stereotypes used to characterise Irish people and their way of life. In addition, most of the Irish children in this study grew up with a number of siblings which has been explicitly linked to the enhancement of social skills and the ability to relate to other minds, some studies dealing specifically with the context of emotions (e.g., Perner, Ruffman and Leekham, 1994; Lewis et al., 1996 and Dunn, 1991, in Bakhurst and Shanker, 2001).
Rather than focusing on a wider social community, Czech life typically evolves around smaller family units. This is partially determined by a comparatively more urban way of life with a wider range of cultural, political and other forces leading to heightening of tendencies towards individual anonymity. Living in a country located on historical and geographical crossroads of Europe, the message that Czech children receive in terms of social knowledge is perhaps less outwardly oriented and more cautious. Similar messages would also typically be transmitted in regards to the political climate of the second half of last century as well as at many other points of the country’s history.

Another important difference separating the two cultures leads us back to linguistic issues. The Czech language, although not completely unaffected, survived many historical threats of Germanisation and represents one of the most prized cultural possessions, as illustrated by the quotation below. Children are inherently socialised to this awareness. When they were asked as part of this study, many of them declared Czech to be the most enjoyable subject at school.

“Tisíciletá minulost protéká každým: děláme něco velkolepé starého a historického, když mluvíme česky.” — K. Čapek

“Ancient past flows through each of us: we are doing something majestically old and historic when we speak Czech.”

In contrast, the first language of all of the Irish children included in this study is English which due to its relatively recent arrival does not represent the less immediate aspects of Irish culture. In this context, it would therefore be unwise to make conclusions reaching beyond individual ontogeny.

It could be argued perhaps, that the current globalisation trends dramatically reflected in the decrease of unique cultural experiences lessen the significance of similar distinctions. However, the children’s accounts of their favourite books and television programmes encountered in this study suggest that

---

43 Quoted in Plachetka, 1999, p. 125, own translation.
isolated pools of culture-specific sources of Bruner’s narrativised knowledge can still be found.

Most of the Irish children’s television favourites included The Simpsons, Pokemon and Digimone, The South Park, The Rugrats and other cartoons, as well as TV series such as Sabrina The Teenage Witch or Malcom in the Middle. When asked about books, the children most often mentioned Harry Potter (the film version of which was not available at the time of the interview), and various stories by Roald Dahl which were included in the school curriculum. Many of the boys also listed football or wrestling as something they would often watch on television. Only one girl included classic fairytales, such as Cinderella and The Sleeping Beauty in her account.

The Czech children’s choices were quite different. Although a few of them mentioned The Walker Texas Ranger, Xena The Warrior Princess or Disney’s cartoons, which were all newly televised at the time of the interview, the overwhelming majority favoured Czech cartoons and originally Czech or Czech made films, television fairytales and series. The emphasis on reading was also much more pronounced with Betty McDonald and Astrid Lindgren featuring at the top of most children’s lists. Consistent with the previously reported observations on gender differences, the Czech children’s preferences were much more balanced in this respect than those of the Irish children.

An in-depth investigation of the representation of socially reflexive emotions in the above media would undoubtedly yield interesting results. Since such undertaking was beyond the scope of this study I can only speculate that they would be found to mirror the ‘folk wisdom’ of their cultures of origin. In the case of all of the Irish and a few of the Czech children, these messages would be American or even Japanese. It is also likely though, that the emotion and social knowledge reflected in Czech culture is perpetuated in the form of the Czech films, cartoons and TV programs, as well as by the translations of the non-Czech books the children read and the programs they watch, in the manner suggested by Shatz et al. (2001). Through this mechanism Czech
children are likely to be subjected to higher levels of culture-specific influence.

To summarise the above into a coherent point, the children's use of language in their emotion narratives accentuated specific cultural issues, which in turn can be seen as constitutive, at least in some cases, of their linguistically encoded perception of the world. The extensive self-referent system for example, does not seem to make Czech children more empathically inclined than the Irish. It does undeniably represent one of many components of their interpretation of interpersonal relationships, however, whenever they choose to talk about them and whichever aspect of them they are culturally predisposed to focus on.

I have also tried to show that English provides its speakers with a number of relatively easily accessible, pre-arranged grammatical expressions for empathising with others. They are possibly so readily available that their semantic and pragmatic qualities are somewhat trivialised. It is only through the linguistically coincidental union with the focus on interpersonal relationships observable in Irish culture, that these forms in this study gain their full meaning.

This is predominantly a study of language and therefore the final conclusion should bear this mark. I would like to return to the two questions I have posed at the beginning. Can words testify for linguistic relativity? Can language speak for psychology? One of Lewis Caroll's characters in 'Through the Looking-Glass' says:

"When I use a word, it means just what I choose it to mean – neither more nor less."

Although perhaps touching more upon the issue of within-language relativity, the above quote can be perceived as having a cross-linguistic dimension. Do speakers of Czech and English choose their translationally equivalent words to mean the same? Throughout this study we have witnessed cases where words
and phrases, but more readily grammatical structures, provided their speakers with a unique system for linguistically coding interpersonal, as well as individual emotions. This singularity is partially determined by - and this has been the point of interest here - socio-cultural pressures which truly reflect the linguistic needs of a particular community. It also reflects other historical forces which may not hold similar semantic significance. But even in that case, the structures and systems of Czech and English can be seen as directing the speakers’ attention towards particular aspects of the emotion concepts, very much consistent with observations made by Bamberg, Berman, Slobin, Budwig and other theorists.

Can language speak for psychology? Language most certainly cannot speak for itself. It speaks for the experiences, beliefs, intentions, viewpoints and relationships of its speakers. It is part of their social and cultural expression. As such, language is dramatically dependent on those who use it, not only for their ‘collective mind’, but also for its singular representations. In this study I have concentrated on cultural, as opposed to individual, psychology and what has emerged reaffirmed my conviction that language can indeed speak for the joint cognition of its speakers.

“Jazyk jest vědomí národa, jest jeho duch v nejvyšším svém zjevení, jest čarovně mocný svazek, jenž dítě k matce, bratra k bratru, rodinu k rodině víže a je všchny spojuje v národ.” J. Kollár

"Language is the consciousness of the nation, it is its spirit in the highest of its forms, the magically mighty union that ties the child to its mother, a brother to brother, family to family, and joins them all to form a nation."

In terms of what I had anticipated to be the ‘signature expression’ or the ‘tell-tale grammatical form’, to borrow Bruner’s words (1990, p. 123), of trans-linguistic subjectivity, i.e., the system of self-referencing, its close examination has illustrated the complexity of our verbalised existence in the world inhabited by the multiple selves of others interacting with our own personal selves, which are all individually called into action to create a discursive representation of this exchange.

42 Quoted in Plachetka, 1999, p. 125, own translation.
What remains to be acknowledged is the astonishingly vast complexity of the interaction of the linguistic, social and cultural forces touched upon here. Rather than consisting of multiple components of a single concept, which neatly slot together, our social world is composed of a number of parallels. In a metaphorical world, where parallel lines can meet and interact with one another before they go their own separate ways again, the language we use and the culture through which we are socialised run alongside each other, closely intertwined and yet never fully sharing the same path.

My attempt to include all the relevant strands into this investigation does not, by any means, aspire to be exhaustive. I have therefore not aimed at producing indisputable evidence or at strongly identifying with a specific theoretical framework. Instead, I tried to provide the reader with a narrative of my exploration of this topic. One of the most important messages to come out of these observations is the necessity to continue to try and capture a glimpse of our cultural, social, and linguistic distinctiveness, as we watch this illusive being pass us by.

There are many issues which could be expanded upon by further research, especially into the area of socialisation trends, such as sibling interaction or parenting styles.
REFERENCES


285