The Double-Edged Sword:
The Impact of Religion on the Intensity of Political Conflict

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
DECLARATION

This thesis has not been submitted as an exercise for a degree at any other university. Except where stated, the work described therein was carried out by me alone.

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Signed: _Susanne Pearce_

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Abbreviations

AKEL – Communist Party of Cyprus

BCL – Bougainville Copper Limited

BRA – Bougainville Revolutionary Army

CSI – Christian Solidarity International

IRB – Irish Republican Brotherhood

LRA – Lord's Resistance Army

MFDC – Mouvement des forces democratiques de Casamance

MILF – Moro Islamic Liberation Front

MIM – Muslim Independence Movement

MNLF – Moro National Liberation Front

OLS – Ordinary Least Squares

OLS – Operation Lifeline Sudan

OIC – Organization of Islamic Countries

OXEN – Christian Orthodox Union of Youth

PEON – Pancyprian National Youth Organization

PRIO – International Peace Research Institute

SPLA – Sudanese People's Liberation Army

USCIRF – United States Commission on International Religious Freedom

VHP – Vishwa Hindu Parishad

ZOG – Zionist Occupied Government

Abstract

The seemingly increasing frequency and deadliness of what are often termed religious conflicts have led to a revival of studies attempting to explain the relationship between religion and violence. These studies are generally case studies of a particular conflict or specific person and have not led to the development of a widely accepted theory of religious conflict. This study attempts to address the deficiency in the literature by developing and testing a model using a large number of cases that are simultaneously compared.

There are three characteristics of a religion that contribute a unique influence on the ability of a group in conflict to mobilize, organize and sustain itself throughout a prolonged violent conflict. A religious doctrine provides a metaphysical worldview and a resource of both violent and non-violent traditions that can legitimize and encourage participation in a violent struggle. At the same time, a religious organizational structure is easily grafted onto a movement bringing its leaders, members and communications networks that allow the movement to function efficiently. And finally, the religious diaspora inspire their co-faithful with their own successful rebellions and bring their often vast resources into the conflict by intervening militarily or indirectly supporting their co-faithful and thereby enable the movement to sustain itself throughout the duration of the conflict. Through these three characteristics of religion it is expected that religion leads to more intense conflicts than would be experienced in a conflict that does not involve religion.

This thesis endeavored to evaluate the question of religion's relationship to violence in political conflicts by statistically comparing a large number of cases over a fifty-five year period around the world. A series of correlations tested religion's association with higher intensity conflicts. An ordinal logit regression was used to assess the influence of religious doctrine, organization and diaspora on the intensity of a conflict.

An elaboration on the quantitative results was carried out using a set of illustrative comparative case studies that allowed a more detailed exploration of the dynamics of religion's influence on conflict intensity.

The results were somewhat unanticipated. While in Chapter 4 a chi-square test of association found a weak correlation between religion and conflict intensity, no other associational tests provided support for this expectation. Furthermore, when relevance of religion was included as a control variable, the correlation between religion and conflict intensity diminished below an accepted level of significance. Interestingly, there was no association between the type of religion or monotheistic nature of the religion and conflict intensity.

Chapters 5, 6 and 7 each evaluated one of the three qualities of religion that were hypothesized to cause a higher intensity of religious conflicts. Chapters 5 and 6 found no quantitative support for the expectation that religious doctrine or organizational structure caused a higher conflict intensity. Chapter 7 found support for the expectation that diaspora support in the form of military or weapons increased the intensity, while political support and mediation efforts had no effect on the intensity of the conflict. This thesis concluded that the discrepancy between the expectations derived from the literature and the results of this study point to a flaw in the development of this sub-field of study that has depended too heavily on case studies.

CHAPTER 1: Introduction

"Hindu Rioters Kill 60 Muslims in India."[1]

"Jihad Seethes, and Grows, on Indonesian Islands."[2]

"Catholic Mailman is Slain as Ulster Violence Continues."[3]

"Nigeria Army Said to Massacre Hundreds of Civilians."[4]

A quick glance at the headlines of any major newspaper highlights the significance of religious conflict. The phenomenon does not limit its devastating consequences to one particular religious tradition or one particular culture, society, region or country. Buddhists, Christians, Hindus, Jews, and Muslims in Africa, Asia, Europe, the Middle East and North and South America are all subjected to the intense violence that characterizes religious conflict.

At the time of writing, the potent relationship between religion and conflict is again being brought to the fore by the horrific events of 11 September 2001. In the wake of the attacks, the religious piety of the hijackers has called into question the potential for religion to motivate such destructive violence. The attacks are not unique to this age or to the Islamic religious faith – the Christian Crusades were equally horrific hundreds of years ago. What the attacks highlight, however, is that the secularists in the 1960's who predicted the final elimination of the importance of religion were unequivocally wrong. Religion continues to play a significant role in the politics and lives of individuals despite the advances in science and betterment of individual lives. In fact, conflicts involving religion have increased dramatically in the last sixty years. Scott Appleby notes that

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[1] Celia W. Dugger, 'Hindu Rioters Kill 60 Muslims in India', *New York Times,* Foreign Desk (1 March 2001)
[2] Seth Mydans, 'Jihad Seethes, and Grows, on Indonesian Islands', *New York Times,* Foreign Desk (10 January 2002)
[3] Brian Laveny, 'A Catholic Mailman is Slain as Ulster Violence Continues', *New York Times,* Foreign Desk (13 January 2002)
[4] Norimitsu Onishi, 'Nigeria Army Said to Massacre Hundreds of Civilians', *New York Times,* Foreign Desk (30 October 2001)

between 1945 and 1960, "ethnoreligious concerns drove more than half the world's civil wars," which increased to seventy-five percent between 1960-1990, and still more after the collapse of the Soviet Union.[5]

The attacks, as well as the ongoing violent religious conflicts around the world also highlight the lack of understanding of the phenomenon in the academic arena. Though there are a plethora of case studies that identify common characteristics of religious violence, the literature lacks a coherent theory about the involvement of religion in conflict. The results of the research concerning religious conflict have amounted to a thorough exploration of specific conflicts and an evaluation of a list of characteristics of those conflicts. These characteristics have not been subjected to larger cross-national time-series tests that would provide the informal theories or frameworks with rigorous supporting evidence.

This study bridges the gap between the case studies and larger cross-national tests in the pursuit of a better understanding of the role that religion plays in a conflict. Are religious conflicts more violent or do they last longer than other types of conflicts? Do the religious traditions themselves encourage violence? Do religions have a unique world-view that makes followers more willing to fight to the death? Does the support of a religious organization and the legitimacy it lends a group in conflict exacerbate a conflict? Do religious diasporas involve themselves in conflicts and thereby intensify these conflicts? These are the questions that this study investigates.

To answer these questions, this study will first specify a model by which it is expected that religion causes conflicts to become more intense. There are three characteristics of a religion that contribute a unique influence on the ability of a group in conflict to mobilize, organize and sustain itself throughout a prolonged violent conflict. A religious doctrine provides a metaphysical worldview and a resource of both violent and

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[5] R. Scott Appleby, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation,* (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2000) p 58.

non-violent traditions that can legitimize and encourage participation in a violent struggle. At the same time, a religious organizational structure is easily grafted onto a movement bringing its leaders, members and communications networks that allow the movement to function efficiently. And finally, the religious diaspora inspire their co-faithful with their own successful rebellions and bring their often vast resources into the conflict by intervening militarily or indirectly supporting their co-faithful and thereby enable the movement to sustain itself throughout the duration of the conflict. Through these three characteristics of religion it is expected that religion leads to more intense conflicts than would be experienced in a conflict that does not involve religion.

In order to test this model, this study begins with a quantitative analysis in which 278 conflict phases are compared. The dataset is made up of cases of armed conflict involving a territorial dispute and occurring between 1946 and 2001 collected by the International Peace Research Institute (PRIO) at Uppsala University in Oslo, Norway. In the quantitative comparison of these cases, this study highlights patterns of conflicts involving religion. It is particularly concerned with discerning patterns of the effect of religious doctrine, organization and diaspora on the intensity of a conflict.

The quantitative analysis is limited in its ability to fully explore the dynamics of a particular case, however. Therefore, the quantitative analysis is followed by a set of comparative case studies that illustrate and further explore the nature of the relationship between religion and conflict. A comparison of the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines and the Bougainville Revolutionary Army in Papua New Guinea explores the doctrinal qualities of religion and their role in motivating participation in the conflict. The Catholic Church in Ireland and Orthodox Church in Cyprus are compared to further illustrate the role that a religion's organizational qualities play in intensifying a conflict. And the diaspora involvement in the Sudan and Senegal (Casamance) are compared in regards to their role in sustaining a movement through a prolonged violent conflict.

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By complementing the quantitative analysis with a comparative case study, this study benefits from the strengths of both methods. The quantitative analysis can test the accuracy of the stereotype of religious conflicts by discerning patterns in the past sixty years, while the illustrative cases can elucidate any discrepancies between the quantitative model and the reality of these specific cases. In the end, the results of this study build on previous research in order to fully understand the complex nature of religious conflicts.

Before turning to the model and previous research, however, it is important to note that this study is explicitly concerned only with religion's association with higher levels of violence in conflicts in order to understand why religious conflicts are so associated with violence. This, of course, is not meant to imply that every religion is inherently violent or that religion's only involvement in a conflict is to encourage violence. This research has been entitled *The Double-Edged Sword* in part to reflect religion's association with violence while acknowledging its capacity to be used for peace in a conflict. However this research focuses only on one side of the relationship – religion's association with violence in political conflicts. First knowing how religion enhances the violence of a conflict enables a more comprehensive prescription for how religion can de-escalate conflicts. Thus, this study should be read as only a first step and partial analysis of religion's complete involvement in conflicts.

Defining 'Religious Conflict'

Central to this thesis is the definition of 'religious conflict.' The popular media seem to characterize any conflict between groups of largely different religious identities as a religious conflict, regardless of the issue at the center of the conflict. Within the academic literature on religion and conflict, a primordial perspective supports this view and argues that religion and other identities will always be in tension with each other. Those tensions are temporarily subdued by the institutional structure of the state, however

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when the structure is removed, the tensions again surface though the issue at the center of the conflict or the spark of the conflict may not be religious.

In his quantitative definition of religious conflict, Jonathan Fox used a corresponding measurement based on the identities of the ethnic groups in conflict, rather than the issue at the center of the conflict.[6] In Fox's work, an ethnic conflict is considered 'religious' when eighty percent of the population of the opposing groups differ in their religious identity. I will refer to this as an identity-oriented definition and measurement.

The difficulty with the identity-oriented definition is that it does not account for the relevance of religion to the conflict. Such a definition lumps together both the Bosnian wars and the Falkland Wars between the UK and Argentina, which clearly involve religion to different degrees. Using an identity-oriented definition also raises the issue of the blurred boundaries between religious identities and ethnic or national identities. In many cases the three identities are so intertwined making a differentiation between them and analysis of only one of them virtually impossible. Are the various Yugoslav conflicts between Serbs, Croats and Bosnians or between Orthodox Christians, Catholics and Muslims? Distinguishing between the role of religious identities and the role of ethnic and national identities on the violence in the conflicts is a daunting task particularly if one uses an identity-oriented definition.

An alternative definition focuses on the issues in dispute between two groups, regardless of the identities of the groups. Within the academic literature, the issue-oriented definition is supported by an instrumental perspective which argues that religion is not a source of conflict (as the primordial perspective suggests), but a tool used by either side to legitimize their actions and mobilize support. As such, many instrumentalists would argue that a political conflict based on a religious disagreement is very rare; rather, religion is a

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[6] Jonathan Fox, *Ethnoreligious Conflict Codebook,* <www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/mar/links.html> (June 2002).

secondary factor in the nature of a conflict. I will refer to this as an issue-oriented definition.

There are several difficulties with the issue-oriented definition. First, it is often difficult to ascertain the central issue in a complex web of disputes and propaganda that surround a conflict. The list of issues is seemingly endless and often leaves a specific case belonging to multiple categories. The discrepancies are a result of the varying ways to identify the central issue of a conflict. For instance, a conflict over the sovereignty of a given territory that is claimed by two competing groups would generally be categorized as secessionist because the sovereignty or authority over the area is the primary issue for both sides. It could also be categorized as nationalist if the minority group is a somewhat coherent ethnic group (or claims to be such) and wishes to establish a homeland for their nation. Or if the minority was a coherent economic class wishing to install a government that favors their class, the conflict may best be described as a class conflict.

An additional problem is that there are often many goals for one group and determining which one defines a conflict can be difficult. In Northern Ireland, for instance, Sinn Fein is equally committed to removing British control of Northern Ireland *and* to creating a Marxist state.[7] It would be difficult to determine which goal comes before the other as they are so intertwined in Sinn Fein's ideology. Thus, Sinn Fein and the Northern Ireland conflict could be categorized as either a conflict over territory or as a Marxist conflict.

Furthermore many groups see themselves involved in a conflict of which the other party is unaware. The al-Qaeda movement is an excellent example. In 1996 (long before the United States recognized a war against al-Qaeda and terrorism), Osama bin Laden issued a fatwa (or religious declaration) that described the American actions in the Gulf

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[7] The introduction page of Sinn Fein's website makes clear that union with Ireland is not the sole goal of the party. See Sinn Fein. 'Introduction.' <www.sinnfein.ie> (November 2003). Sinn Fein's President, Gerry Adams, also makes this clear in his book, *Free Ireland: Towards a Lasting Peace* (Niwot (CO): Roberts Rinehart Publishing, 1994).

War as a "clear declaration of war on God, His Messenger and Muslims."[8] Yet the American government saw their actions as defending Kuwait's sovereignty (or more likely defending western access to Kuwait's oil) from a more terrestrial enemy, Saddam Hussein. From bin Laden's perspective, the conflict between the United States and Iraq was religious, while from the American perspective, the conflict was territorial.

For the purposes of this study, the first identity-oriented definition will be used as it provides a more reliable measure of a religious conflict. Much less interpretation and therefore potential bias is involved in comparing the self-described identities of groups in conflict than in determining the 'real' issue that caused or perpetuates a conflict. As mentioned previously, this identity-oriented definition is limited in its ability to take account of the relevance of religion and distinguish between religious, ethnic and national identities. To correct for these limits, a measure of the relevance or religion in the conflict will be used as a control variable. Furthermore, the test of the model relies on specifically 'religious' aspects of the identities of the groups in conflict and thereby allows the isolation of religion's influence in a conflict.

The Model

The frequency and potency of religious conflicts leaves little doubt that religion has some role to play in intensifying a conflict. This study focuses on three qualities of religion as an explanation of why religion intensifies a conflict. In the model that is developed and tested in this study (encapsulated in Diagram 1.1), religious doctrine supplies the motivation, a religious organization grafts in its hierarchal structure, and a religious diaspora provides resources to sustain a movement through a prolonged violent struggle. In each of these unique characteristics, religion has the capacity to escalate and sustain a movement in its violence.

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[8] As cited in Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*, (London: University of California Press, 2000) p 145.

Diagram 1.1: Religion's Influence on the Intensity of a Conflict

		Provide Motivation
Doctrine →	1. Violent Traditions and Myths	- Legitimacy - Sense of Obligation - Greater willingness to die because of guaranteed success.
	2. Cosmic War Mentality	- Greater willingness to die because of rewards - Sense of obligation - Demonized enemy - No compromise

		Provide Org. Structure
Organization →	1. Leaders	- Lend moral legitimacy - Articulate discrimination - Represent community
	2. Members	- Personnel - Established relationships
	3. Communications Network	- Existing hierarchy

		Provide Resources
Diaspora →	1. Military Intervention	- Strengthens one side - International support and scrutiny
	2. Resources in Aid	- Human resources - Material resources - Political pressure
	3. Contagion Effect	- Inspiration

More Intense Conflict

Religious Doctrine

Religious doctrine includes the violent traditions and myths, as well as the metaphysical worldview that are passed through generations of faithful adherents. This doctrine, when referenced by a group's leadership, serves to legitimize a violent strategy. In referencing the doctrine, the leadership creates a group of followers with a greater willingness and sense of obligation to die in the struggle without compromise.

Violent traditions and myths are a central component of all five of the world's major religions. The concept of jihad in Islam which obligates the Muslim to fight against corruption either in oneself or in the world has been much discussed in recent years. Mohammed himself set the precedent by which some Muslims have justified their violent strategies. The sacred historical texts of Christians and Jews also offer myths that are used to justify violence. The Jewish Torah and Christian Old Testament chronicle battle after battle in which God commanded the Israelites to enter and conquer a foreign land. In some cases, they were even commanded by God to kill the women and children and were chastised when they failed to completely obey. The most prominent sacred Hindu text, the Bhagavad Gita, also narrates a significant battle that was encouraged by Krishna. The warrior Arjuna was hesitant about going through with the battle because he was related to the tribes on both sides, but in the Bhagavad Gita account, Krishna implores Arjuna to fight. Violent myths in the Buddhist tradition are less prominent, though the traditions established particularly in Sri Lanka where militaries conquered the island in the name of Buddhism serve as sacred precedents that can legitimize contemporary violence.

There are also non-violent traditions in each religion that are often highlighted by mainstream religious groups. These are rarely referred to during a conflict to justify a violent struggle, however in cases where they are referenced one would expect the reference to decrease the intensity of a conflict.

One way in which these traditions influence the intensity of a conflict is by providing a pattern of behavior for a group in conflict. When the faithful read about their spiritual ancestors who had disagreements with a state or government and reacted with violence, it sets a precedent. Likewise when their spiritual ancestors chose a non-violent strategy, the group can pattern their behavior after these prominent predecessors. Martin Luther King, Jr., for example, noted how Jesus chose to reform the Palestinian state through peaceful means and replicated his behavior by encouraging members of the civil rights movement to use civil disobedience in the face of harsh oppression, rather than turning to bombings, hijackings or guerrilla tactics.

Furthermore, reading the stories about how a deity allowed their ancestors to prevail despite their military weakness gives hope to the faithful who may recognize their uphill struggle. For example, within Judaism and Christianity is the story of the Israelites and the Red Sea. As the event is described in the Bible, Pharaoh released the Israelites from their slavery in Egypt. As the Israelites began their exile, Pharaoh changed his mind and sent his army after them. Pharaoh's army found the Israelites at the Red Sea. Surrounded by the army on one side and the sea on the other, it seemed inevitable that Pharaoh's army would eliminate the Israelites or take them back as slaves. But God intervened on behalf of the Israelites and saved them from what seemed to be sure destruction. The Red Sea parted and allowed the Israelites to cross on dry land.[9] As the Bible states it, "If God is for us, who can be against us."[10] Such examples give even the weakest hope of success.

Religious identities are not unique in their capacity to encourage violence by referencing violent traditions and myths and thus, this alone would not lead one to expect religion to cause a conflict to be more violent. Ethnic identities also have prominent historical traditions that can legitimize a violent strategy. Religious identities, however, are

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[9] 'Exodus', *The Holy Bible*, Authorized King James Version. (Canada: World Bible Publishers). pp 37-67.
[10] 'Romans 8:31', *The Student Bible,* New International Version, (Grand Rapids (MI): Zondervan Bible Publishers), p 992.

unique in that they also provide its believers with a metaphysical context in which one's struggle takes place.

Religion provides those who believe with an explanation of the afterlife. Each religion differs in its conception of what happens at death, however each share an emphasis on the consequences of one's actions in their earthly life. Obedience in the present life is met with rewards and disobedience is often met with punishment. The starkest example of this is the Islamic suicide bombers' belief that in exchange for their lives, they and their families will be guaranteed Allah's favor and the pleasure of seventy virgins for eternity. Many Christian denominations also warn that if members fail to bring in new members, they may not truly be members themselves or they may be denied rewards in the afterlife. In Hinduism and Buddhism, an individual's failure to behave morally affects the next life into which the individual will be reincarnated. This focus on the afterlife adds a dimension to a conflict that would not be present without the involvement of religion and the focus is directly associated with a greater intensity than would otherwise be experienced.

Religious doctrine through its violent traditions and myths and metaphysical worldview legitimizes the use of violence in a conflict by putting one's struggle in both a historical and eternal context that obligates one to obediently participate in the conflict. It also motivates religious faithful to join and continue to the end because of the guarantee of success in the struggle and the guarantee of rewards for one's sacrifice. In this way, religious doctrine is a powerful influence that one would expect to intensify a conflict.

Religious Organization

A religious organization, as well, plays a role in intensifying a conflict. Its leaders, members and communications network enhance a group in conflict by providing an existing organizational structure and personnel to the group that is necessary to sustain a prolonged violent conflict. Though many social organizations could fill this function, religious

organizations are particularly unique in the moral legitimacy they bring with them to the movement. Their endorsement of the movement is especially influential in adding to and directing the movement's membership. Thus, a religious organization plays an important role in organizing the movement and ensuring its efficiency and sustenance throughout a prolonged violent conflict.

When the leadership is supportive of a cause, they are easily co-opted as leaders of a movement. In their role of representing the community, the leaders articulate the concerns of the community and develop a theological framework for understanding the community's history. They repeat for their followers how their current circumstances should be interpreted and prescribe for them the appropriate reaction to those circumstances. Within the white supremacy movement in the United States, for instance, leaders are often co-opted from the Christian Identity churches and describe for their followers how there is a conspiracy by the Jews (who are Satan's descendants) to take over the world and eliminate god's chosen people, the Aryan race. They often refer to the American government as ZOG, or the Zionist Occupied Government. This explains for its followers the erosion of power and status that many whites are experiencing. In order for the Aryan race to survive, those in the white supremacy movement are obligated to stop the Jews using whatever means necessary. If Christian Identity leaders were to remove their support from the movement and use their positions to advocate for racial tolerance and harmony, the movement would lose a piece of the foundation on which they have justified violence against Jews, and thus lose some of its influence.

Though the white supremacy illustration is an extreme example, religious leaders who become leaders in a violent conflict shape the worldviews of its members and thereby bring with them an invaluable resource. Because of the unique moral legitimacy afforded to religious leaders, they hold an unusual degree of influence over their members. Many members join the movement based on the endorsement of their leaders adding personnel to

the movement. Furthermore, these members are highly responsive to their leaders and ensure loyalty and obedience in their activities.

When a formal religious organization explicitly supports a group in conflict, the movement also benefits from the pre-existing communications network that informs, educates and coordinates the activities of a group in conflict. The web of churches, mosques, synagogues and temples within a religious organization provide outlets for disseminating information to members of a movement. It is often in the religious buildings that theological arguments about the legitimacy of a struggle take place. It is here that new members are encouraged to join the movement and reminded of the violent traditions and cosmic war worldview that makes violence necessary.

Not only are grand theories about the legitimacy of a struggle or expected actions propagated through this web, though, information about events are also broadcast through the various religious meeting houses. The practical organizational elements of a group in a conflict are greatly facilitated by grafting in the pre-existing structure of a religious organization. Notices about the opposition's actions or about scheduled actions by the group can be made in these existing meetings where those active in the struggle already gather on a regular basis.

Furthermore, the pre-existing relationships between the clergy of a religious organization allow for a movement to coordinate its activities across a geographical area. When the movement is active in more than one location, activities can be scheduled to coincide to have the greatest impact. These relationships also allow for leaders to transmit information on the most effective and innovative techniques in order to create a more efficient and effective movement that achieves its goals.

Through the organizational structure of religious organizations, a group in conflict is able to benefit from the leaders, members and communications network that strengthens the group and allows them to sustain themselves through a prolonged violent conflict.

Religious organizations are uniquely ideal for this function because of the unusual moral legitimacy they garner and thus the unusual influence they hold over their members.

Religious Diaspora

As with other identities, believers are not confined within the boundaries of one state. For instance, only about eighty percent of the world's Sikhs live in the Indian province of Punjab (their historical homeland), while the remaining twenty percent live in concentrations in Europe and North America.[11] Those outside of a state in conflict and who share a religious identity with one of the participants in the conflict have the potential to become external participants in the conflict. Whether the diaspora simply provide a precedent that serves to inspire, or provides resources such as weapons, personnel or finances, or even intervene to support a group militarily, the external support serves to sustain a group in conflict. Without this sustenance, the group cannot carry on a prolonged violent conflict. As such, the influence of religion on a conflict is not limited to its doctrinal or organizational qualities, but it also influences a conflict by its diaspora qualities.

A group in conflict naturally looks to those in similar situations who came before them to learn how to effectively carry out their struggle and to gain inspiration. Successful revolutions have a 'contagion effect' when others see how an idealistic and often weak revolutionary group overcame their oppressors and took power for themselves. A group may underestimate the costs associated with winning the fight or may overestimate their expected pay-offs from a win, which causes them to decide to initiate their own struggle. The effect of this revision is that a group takes inspiration from the success of their co-faithful.

Not only does a group take inspiration from the success of similar revolutionaries, but they also gain a strategy. In observing the efficiencies and inefficiencies of their

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[11] 'Adherents.com' 16 August 2000. <www.adherents.com> (July 2003).

predecessor, a group can develop a strategy that they believe will ensure their own success. For instance, many fundamentalist Muslims took lessons from the strategy used by Khomeini's revolutionaries in Iran. One technique used by Khomeini's revolutionaries was to hold a protest forty days after the death of protestors as traditional Muslims would publicly mourn forty days after a family member's death. This caused an inevitable cycle of protests as the Iranian police generally opened fire and killed protestors. The technique was part of a successful revolution in which Khomeini succeeded in overthrowing the shah and in creating the first Islamic Republic.

A religious diaspora may also become actively involved in their co-faithful's conflict by providing material resources and political pressure. Because of the affinity between co-faithful around the world, a religious diaspora are naturally concerned for their religious relatives. When their co-faithful are involved in a violent conflict, a religious diaspora often become involved by supplying them with the resources necessary to sustain the conflict. These resources may be in the form of weapons, safe houses, and finances which supplies a practical need of the group in the conflict. It may also take the form of human resources or additional fighters who leave their homeland to fight for their co-religionists. Or a diaspora may indirectly support their co-faithful by pressuring their host states to intervene in the conflict with humanitarian support or pressure on the parties to reconcile the conflict. Furthermore a diaspora may also influence a conflict by encouraging their host state to intervene militarily. In doing so, the third party strengthens one side in the conflict and can raise their expectations for success. An increase in the expectation of success encourages the side not to compromise short of their goal and thereby prolongs a violent conflict.

A diaspora may also decide not to support their co-faithful with resources, political pressure or military intervention, however. They may decide to pressure their co-faithful and their opposition to negotiate and settle the conflict. In such situations, it is logical to

assume that the group in conflict will be more likely to resolve the conflict rather than to continue their fighting.

This model describes how religion serves to increase the intensity of a conflict than would otherwise be experienced in the absence of the involvement of religion. As is elaborated above, the religious doctrine creates a set of followers who are more willing to sacrifice themselves without compromise, a religious organization provides a pre-existing hierarchy that allows a for a more efficient movement, and a religious diaspora sustain a group in conflict with inspiration, resources or even military intervention. Previous research has provided significant support for this model in its pieces through observation of numerous case studies. The following chapter will describe the previous research as it fits within this model.

CHAPTER 2: Theoretical Background

The frequency and destructiveness of acts of violence seemingly motivated by religion in the past few years have again brought attention to the relationship between religion and conflict. This study has developed a model to explain why religion is associated with higher levels of violence. In order to evaluate this model, this study uses a quantitative test complemented by illustrative comparative case studies. Before testing the relationship, however, it is necessary to elaborate on the conclusions of previous research in regards to the relationship between religion and conflict intensity particularly in terms of the model presented in Chapter 1.

Scholarly Contribution

The scholarly research is not short on attempts to explain religious violence spanning several fields of study including psychology, anthropology, sociology, theology, and political science. The research has focused on answering questions about the cause of religious violence or the role of religion in the resolution of conflicts. Many scholars have focused on religion as the primary cause of conflict, however the result might be an overemphasis on its importance that is not supported by empirical evidence. The most potent example is the secularist theories often connected with Marxist perspectives of religion.[12] This group of theories holds that as the world modernizes, religion will become less important in individuals' lives, and thus a less frequent cause of conflict.[13] However as the world has continued to modernize, the frequency of religious conflict has not decreased,

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[12] See David Apter, *Ideology and Discontent,* (New York: Free Press, 1964); Jeffrey R. Seul, ''Ours is the Way of God': Religion, Identity, and Intergroup Conflict', *Journal of Peace Research,* 36 (1999), pp 553-569; Hizkias Assefa, 'Religion in the Sudan: Exacerbating Conflict or Facilitating Reconciliation?' *Bulletin of Peace Proposals,* 21 (1990) pp 255-262.

[13] See Harvey Cox, *The Secular City,* (London: SCM Press, 1965). Otto Maduro countered this view with a modified Marxism that is in line with liberation theology in Latin America in his book, *Religion and Social Conflict* (Orbis Books, 1982).

but has arguably increased.[14] Thus, this group of theories has largely been discredited. Currently, more scholars have emphasized the increasing importance of religion that appears to accompany modernization.[15] The effect of modernization on the importance of religion to individuals (and by extension on religion in conflict) remains questionable as the research continues.

Many theological studies focus on the central principle of peace and harmony in religious traditions as a foundation for preventing or ending conflict.[16] Given the frequency of religious conflict, however, the evidence shows that there are circumstances under which religion can, in fact, provoke rather than resolve conflict. What is increasingly being studied is the dual nature of religious theology in inciting and resolving conflict.[17] This strand of research suggests that the presence of a religious group is not a sufficient cause of conflict (or of peace) and its role as a contributing factor continues to be explored.

Conflict studies often focus on psychological or institutional causes of conflict, relegating religion as an indirect cause.[18] Ted Gurr's theory of relative deprivation is an

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[14] Jonathan Fox, 'Religion and State Failure: An Examination of the Extent and Magnitude of Religious Conflict from 1950 to 1996', *International Political Science Review,* 25 (2004) pp 55-76; Errol A. Henderson, 'Culture or Contiguity: Ethnic Conflict, the Similarity of States, and the Onset of War, 1820-1989', *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* 41 (1997) pp 649-668; Marta Reynal-Querol, 'Ethnicity, Political Systems, and Civil Wars', *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* 46 (2002) pp 29-54; Rudolph J. Rummel, 'Is Collective Violence Correlated with Social Pluralism', *Journal of Peace Research,* 34 (1997) pp 163-175.

[15] For examples of this type of research, see: Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God;* Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order,* (London: Simon and Schuster, 1997); Rodney Stark and William Sims Bainbridge, *The Future of Religion: Secularization, Revival and Cult Formation,* (London: University of California Press, 1985); Daniel H. Levine (ed), *Churches and Politics in Latin America,* (London: Sage Publications, 1980); John H. Kautsky, *The Political Consequences of Modernization,* (London: John Wiley and Sons, 1972); Elie Halevy, *A History of the English People in 1815,* (London: Ark Paperbacks, 1924); Mark Juergensmeyer, *The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State,* (London: University of California Press, 1994); Giles Kepel (translated by Alan Braley), *The Revenge of God: The Resurgence of Islam, Christianity and Judaism in the Modern World,* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994); John R. Hall, Philip D. Schuyler and Sylvaine Trinh, *Apocalypse Observed: Religious Movements and Violence in North America, Europe and Japan,* (London: Routledge, 2000)

[16] See especially Marc Gopin, *Between Eden and Armageddon,* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999)

[17] See Appleby, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred;* Guenter Lewy, *Religion and Revolution,* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974); David C. Rapoport, 'Comparing Militant Fundamentalist Movements and Groups', in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (eds), *Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Polities, Economies, and Militance,* (London: The University of Chicago Press, 1993) pp 429-461.

[18] See Paul R. Brass, *Theft of an Idol: Text and Context in the Representation of Collective Violence,* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); Donald Eugene Smith, *Religion, Politics, and Social Change in the Third World: A Sourcebook,* (London: Collier-MacMillan, 1971); Alan D. Falconer, 'The Role of Religion in Situations of Armed Conflict: The Case of Northern Ireland', *Bulletin of Peace Proposals,* 21 (1990) pp 273-280; Andreas Hasenclever and Volker Rittberger, 'Does Religion Make a Difference?

example of a sociological theory of conflict.[19] Gurr's theory explains conflict in terms of

the satisfaction of expected outcomes for individuals. At its most basic, Gurr's theory

argues that discrimination causes grievances which cause a group to organize to fight the

discriminating party. Jonathan Fox has followed up on Gurr's study and put forward a

model that places the role of religion in the formation of grievances, as well as in causing

increased discrimination and repression.[20] In terms of grievance formation, Fox tested his

hypotheses using the Minorities at Risk dataset and concluded that religious legitimacy has

an influence on grievance formation, however the influence was not consistent.[21] Religious

legitimacy encouraged the development of grievances when religion was not an issue, yet

discouraged the formation of grievances when religion was an issue.

Within the literature on religious conflicts specifically (and more common in the

literature on identity conflicts in general), there is an ongoing debate about the primordial

versus instrumental role of the identities in initiating and/or fueling the conflict. Those who

take a primordial perspective argue that the identities are innately in opposition to each

other and conflicts are only contained through institutional structures. A common reference

is to the divisions in Yugoslavia that began to materialize following Tito's death and

ultimately culminated in the bloody break-up of the state. Tito's regime maintained relative

peace among the various ethnic and religious identities through its suppressive institutions.

After his death when the system underwent reforms, the tenuous balance that kept the peace

disintegrated. Instrumentalists, on the other hand, argue that it was not the removal of the

suppressive structures that caused the disintegration of the state, but that strategic elites used

the ethnic and religious identities to mobilize support for their cause – namely gaining

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Theoretical Approaches to the Impact of Faith on Political Conflict', *Millenium: Journal of International Studies,* 29 (2000) pp 654-659.

[19] Gurr's earliest theory was presented in *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971). He has modified this theory to include elements of organization. The revised theory is presented in *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflict* (Washington (DC): United States Institute of Peace, 1994).

[20] Jonathan Fox,'Towards a Dynamic Theory of Ethno-Religious Conflict', *Nations and Nationalism*, 5 (1999) pp 431-463.

[21] Jonathan Fox, 'The Influence of Religious Legitimacy on Grievance Formation by Ethno-Religious Minorities', *Journal of Peace Research,* 36 (1999) pp 289-307.

access to power for themselves. Though the differing identities may not be created by the elites, they are used as a strategic tool that enables them to gain power and thereby causes or fuels a conflict.

Closely related to the primordial-instrumental debate is the controversy surrounding Samuel Huntington's Clash of Civilizations thesis.[22] According to Huntington, the world system is evolving along civilization fault lines that will increasingly become intense battle lines between civilizations. Huntington identifies these civilizations largely by their religious or ethnic traditions, which has ignited efforts by many to disaggregate civilizational factors to determine the legitimacy of Huntington's thesis.

Errol Henderson, for instance, uses the Correlates of War data to determine the influence of cultural factors on the likelihood of war between 1820 and 1989.[23] Henderson separates the ethnic similarity and religious dissimilarity of the dyads and includes contiguity of the participants in a logistical regression. The results indicate that religious dissimilarity is a major determinant of the likelihood of war – the more religiously similar the dyad the less likely there would be a war, and the less religiously similar the more likely there would be a war. Rudolph Rummel picks up the question of an association between religion and the likelihood of political violence by taking account of the religious pluralism in the state.[24] While Henderson's approach is international, Rummel's is domestic. Rummel, too, finds a relationship between pluralism (dissimilarity in Henderson's study) and political violence, however concludes that other characteristics such as level of development, political stability, age, size and region have a greater influence on the likelihood of violence. Marta Reynal-Querol, too, addresses the question of the likelihood of civilizational conflicts by separating ethnic and religious divisions and evaluating the likelihood of civil war.[25] Her study finds that ethno-religious divisions are more likely than

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22 Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations*
23 Henderson, 'Culture or Contiguity'
24 Rummel, 'Is Collective Violence Correlated with Social Pluralism'
25 Reynal-Querol, 'Ethnicity, Political Systems, and Civil Wars'

ethno-linguistic divisions to lead to a civil war. To explain why all ethno-religiously divided states are not embroiled in a civil war, Reynal-Querol finds that consociational political systems serve to mediate tensions in divided populations.

The quantitative studies testing Huntington's thesis largely agree that religious differences are a contributing factor to the likelihood of conflict, though they disagree on the centrality of these divisions as well as the characterization that these civilizational conflicts are increasing in frequency and will become the fault line for conflicts in the future. These studies have not attempted to characterize the level of violence of civilizational conflicts. Although they have separated out religious identities from other identities and determined their influence on the probability of various forms of violent conflict, they do not provide any insight on the impact these identities have on the *intensity* of violent conflict. Each of these studies as well as the groups of theories summarized previously generally focuses on the cause, likelihood or resolution of conflict. Very little research has directly investigated the consequences on the intensity of a conflict caused by involving religion in a conflict regardless of the reason for its involvement. The underlying assumption is often that religion's involvement is associated with greater violence and longer lasting conflicts in which the annihilation of the other side is each party's goal.

Does a conflict become more intense when religion becomes involved for whatever reason? Does the willingness of pious individuals to sacrifice themselves lead to more deaths in a conflict? Or does the religious world-view that makes compromise with a demonized enemy impossible delay resolution and extend the duration of a conflict? These sorts of questions have not been addressed directly in the academic literature, however, one can infer the influence of religion on an existing conflict (regardless of its cause) from the existing literature. In this study, a model was developed and presented in Chapter 1 which is largely supported in its parts by the existing body of research.

Previous Research

The model used in this study is largely supported by the plethora of case studies that have identified important characteristics of religion in conflict. These case studies have disjointedly addressed the doctrinal, organizational and diaspora influences of religion in conflict.

Doctrinal Studies

In the model presented in Chapter 1, religious doctrine influences a conflict through its violent myths and traditions and metaphysical worldview that serve to legitimize a violent strategy when referenced by a group's leadership. In referencing this doctrine, the leadership creates a group of followers with a greater willingness and sense of obligation to die in the struggle without compromise. The previous research has provided support for this observation and illustrates the nature and consequence of the involvement of religious doctrine in a conflict.

Several case studies have pointed out how the violent traditions legitimized a group and escalated the intensity of a particular conflict. Karen Armstrong's analysis of the Crusades and the modern Middle East brought to light how referencing these myths from the past give meaning to one's current situation. In 1097, the Christian Crusades succeeded in taking control of the holy city, Jerusalem, and many Muslims were forced to flee. The Muslims became refugees in nearby Damascus where Qadi Abu Sa'ad al-Harawi began to mobilize the Muslims to lead a military that would liberate Jerusalem from the Crusaders. According to Armstrong, al-Harawi reached back to Mohammed's example in order to relate the Muslims's current situation to one in which Mohammed, their spiritual leader had previously found himself.

"He [al-Harawi] told them that no Muslim should be ashamed to go into exile. The Prophet Mohammed, God's blessing be upon him, had been the first Muslim refugee when he made the hijra [pilgrimage] from Mecca to Medina, and this migration had been the first step in the jihad [holy war] he had undertaken to regain his homeland and free it from idolatry."[26]

In being reminded of their spiritual ancestor's plight and response, the Muslim refugee's own situation gained meaning and they could pattern their response on that of Mohammed's response hundreds of years earlier. In fact, the refugees were able to mount an offensive and were eventually able to take back the holy city.

In Michael Sells' analysis of Serbian violence – arguably genocide – against the Bosnian Muslims in the early 1990s, he describes how the Christ-killer tradition in Christianity was adapted by the Serbs to hold the Muslims responsible for the martyrdom of Christ and therefore made legitimate targets of retribution. In the Christian tradition, the Sanhedrin (the Jewish political council that ruled Palestine during Jesus' lifetime) pressured Pontius Pilate to execute Jesus by crucifixion for claiming to be the King of Jews. Pilate, unwilling to be held responsible for the religious leader's death, allowed the Jewish public to decide Jesus' fate and they ultimately decided to execute Jesus. Throughout history, Christians have periodically attacked Jews for being responsible for Christ's death. During the Crusades, those Christians who did not join the pilgrimage to Jerusalem did their part in carrying out Pope Urban's proclamation by punishing the local Jews physically for their role in Jesus' death. Again during World War II, Hitler brought the Christ-killer tradition into his notion of Aryan nationalism that legitimized attacks on European Jews. Even currently, there are those who warn that Mel Gibson's release of a new dramatization of

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[26] Karen Armstrong, *Holy War: The Crusades and Their Impact on Today's World*, (New York: Anchor Books, 2001) p 189.

Jesus' death will lead to a new wave of attacks on Jews. The warnings are enough to make it unlikely that a major studio will invest in the film.[27]

Sells' analysis of the Serb-Bosnian conflict identified how the Christ-killer tradition was brought into the conflict and perpetuated the violence. The Serbian Christians were able to graft the tradition into their own national history and thereby hold the Bosnian Muslims responsible for Christ-killing figuratively despite their non-existence at the time of Christ. The historical event in Serb-Bosnian relations that was re-interpreted through the Christ-killer tradition occurred in the 14th century. The Serb army led by Prince Lazar, collided with the Ottoman Turks in Kosovo. Prince Lazar was killed in the battle and the Serbs were subsequently overtaken by the Ottomans. It was Serb writers in the 19th century who "transformed Lazar into an explicit Christ figure, surrounded by a group of disciples, partaking of a Last Supper, and betrayed by a Judas. Lazar's death represents the death of the Serb nation, which will not be resurrected until Lazar is raised from the dead and the descendants of Lazar's killers are purged from the Serbian people. In this story, the Ottoman Turks play the role of the Christ killers. Vuk Brankovic, the Serb who betrays the battle plans to the Ottoman army, becomes the Christ killer within. In the nationalist myth, Vuk Brankovic represents the Slavs who converted to Islam under the Ottomans and any Serb who would live with them or tolerate them."[28]

Holding the Muslims responsible for 'the death of the Serb nation' (though the Serb nation exists to this day) and figuratively attacking Christ in the form of the Serb nation left the ordinary Serbs with little option than to defend themselves against the vicious aggressors. Of course, this Chirst-killer interpretation of the Serb nationalist myth has existed for nearly two hundred years and modern violence against the Muslims was not

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[27] 'Demonstrators protest "Passion"' 28 August 2003. <www.cnn.com> (November 2003). The film was ultimately picked up by Newmarket Films and is expected to be one of the largest grossing films ever. Many observers credit the grassroots publicity that encouraged local churches to ensure the film's success in order to send a message to Hollywood about the viability of Christian films.

[28] Michael Sells, *The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia,* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998) p 31.

widespread until the 1990's. Much of the blame for igniting the violence can be put on Slobodon Milosevic who visited Kosovo in 1989 to commemorate the 600th anniversary of Lazar's death where he reminded the Serbs of the attacks on their identity and the national Christ figure. As the crowd chanted "Kosovo is Serb," Milosevic spoke of the unity of the Serb identity and necessity of going to battle while standing in front of a backdrop of peonies (flowers that symbolize Lazar's blood) an Orthodox cross and the slogan "Only Unity Saves the Serb."[29] The event served to initiate a process of division between the Serbs and Muslims that escalated to violence within a few years.

Religious doctrine, though, is unique from ethnic or nationalist traditions in the eternal perspective that it gives its faithful. Each religion differs in its conception of what happens at death, however each share an emphasis on the consequences of one's actions in their earthly life. Obedience in the present life is met with rewards and disobedience is often met with punishment. This metaphysical perspective further re-enforces members' obligations to fight to avoid punishment and guarantee rewards. Furthermore, the vision of an eternal war between good and evil in which one's current situation is only one battle requires that one's enemy fill the role of evil. No compromise can be made with such a demonized enemy. Thus religion's metaphysical worldview serves to motivate its followers to participate in a violent conflict in order to obediently represent good in one's battle with evil without compromising and thereby ensure eternal rewards.

Bruce Hoffman's comparison of secular and religious terrorism offers an explanation of how a metaphysical worldview increases the level of violence in a conflict. For a religious terrorist, violence is commanded by their deity. Disobedience to this deity or failure to act on his behalf ensures that the terrorist will suffer in eternity and is therefore not an option. The religious terrorists are not swayed by those who tell them that their acts are immoral or wrong because their only intended audience is their deity who they are

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[29] Ibid.

convinced has demanded that they carry out the violence. Furthermore, the religious terrorists are likely to continue their violent strategy despite any concessions their terrestrial opponents may make because they view themselves as being outside a system that is fundamentally flawed. The system can only be corrected by god's actions either directly or vicariously through them. Viewing the world through this lens which only a religion is capable of providing inevitably leads to a more violent and intense conflict as its participants are dedicated to violence despite all consequences and concessions.

Mark Juergensmeyer calls the metaphysical worldview that Hoffman describes a cosmic war perception that he agrees is the heart of religious terrorism. Like Hoffman, Juergensmeyer argues that religion's metaphysical worldview places one's current situation in a greater transcendental context that "relate to metaphysical conflicts between good and evil ... [and] ... transcend human experience."[30] One's actions then become more significant than simply carrying on an earthly tradition. The participants become responsible for their part in the great war between good and evil. Failure to do their part could conceivably result in a triumph of evil over good and lead to their own eternal damnation. Who could reasonably disobey given the magnitude of the consequences of these beliefs?

Juergensmeyer builds on Hoffman's description of the consequence of a metaphysical worldview by adding that for religious terrorists, the world is already at war before they even became involved in the struggle. If there is an ongoing war between good and evil, one (presumably believing they are on the side of good) is threatened by evil and must defend oneself. Violence then becomes further justified as war demands that violence be used. This does not depend on the opposition being aware of the war, of course, as bin Laden's 1996 fatwa illustrates.[31]

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[30] Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God* , p 146.
[31] See page 18-19.

TIME magazine recently released a special issue focused on the Christian belief in an apocalypse. In the apocalypse, the battle between good and evil comes to a head and there is finally one decisive end to the world and all evil. The apocalypse is coming quickly according to many Christians, particularly in the United States, who are keen to see signs of the end of the world in the daily news. As Nancy Gibbs points out, "For evangelical Christians with an interest in prophecy, the headlines always come with asterisks pointing to scriptural footnotes."[32] Believing in an apocalypse does not create an apocalypse, of course, however some Christians are also keen to create the right conditions for the apocalypse. Accordingly, some Christians have burned mosques in Jerusalem in preparation for the final battle. The Japanese cult, Aum Shinrikyo, also believing in an apocalypse, released the deadly sarin gas in the Tokyo subway system in 1995 in order to try to create the image of the end of the world for its followers.

Included in Juergensmeyer's theory of a cosmic war perception is a demonized enemy with whom no compromise can be made. If one views the world in the context of an ongoing battle between good and evil, then one's opposition is purely evil and cannot be trusted in negotiations. There is furthermore no room for compromise as there is no common ground between good and evil on which to meet. In a cosmic war perception with a demonized enemy the only end to the conflict is the total annihilation of one side or the other.

Hizkias Assefa's study of the role of religion in the Sudanese conflict highlights how the cosmic war perception with a demonized enemy causes the conflict to endure a higher intensity than would otherwise be experienced. In the Sudan, the largely Arab Muslim North controls power over the largely African non-Muslim South. A plan to institute Sharia Islamic Law in the entire country, including the non-Muslim areas, reignited a civil war that has engulfed the country for over twenty years. Assefa argues that the lack

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[32] Nancy Gibbs, 'Apocalypse Now', *TIME Magazine,* 1 July 2001. <www.time.com> (November 2003).

of respect for the Southerner's religious identities is a fundamental reason for the continuation of the civil war. As he concludes, "the kind of Muslim fundamentalism that has been in ascendancy in Northern Sudan is anti-thetical to peaceful coexistence with the South unless Southerners give up their religious identity."[33]

Religion's violent traditions and metaphysical worldview serve to legitimize a conflict by creating the historical and transcendent context in which one participates. Followers are mobilized by an obligation to continue the tradition and fight the war against evil so that they can reap the rewards in the afterlife. In this way, the involvement of religion in a conflict serves to intensify the conflict by creating a greater willingness to kill and be killed in the participants.

While all five of the world's major religions have at their disposal these violent traditions and metaphysical worldviews, these are not always referenced in order to legitimize violence. In fact, some experts would argue that religion's non-violent traditions are referenced to encourage peace much more often than religion's violent traditions are referenced to encourage war. Gandhi's non-violent activism based on Hindu principles stands out as a prominent example that supports this view. Several authors have explored this duality in religion in an attempt to explain why religion is sometimes used to support non-violence and other times used to support violence.

Scott Appleby is the most prominent of these authors. Among the factors that Appleby identifies as the most important in the determination to use religion to legitimize violence or peace is the education of the believers. He argues that extremist religious leaders must convince their followers to ignore the religion's teachings of peace in order for the extremist movement to gain widespread support. Such leaders will be unsuccessful, however, if their followers "are well formed spiritually and informed theologically."[34] Appleby calls those who are not "sufficiently grounded in the teachings and practices of

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[33] Assefa, 'Religion in the Sudan', p 258.
[34] Appleby, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred,* p 17.

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their own tradition"[35] followers of a 'folk religion.' These followers are unable "to counter arguments based on scriptures and doctrines carefully chosen for their seeming endorsement of violence or ambivalence about its use"[36] and are ultimately swayed by the arguments of extremist religious leaders. In other words, Appleby argues that without a strong religious education, believers are vulnerable to the teachings of extremists in which violent traditions legitimize the use of violence. Conversely, when believers are properly educated, the violent traditions do not serve to encourage violence.

Determining the proper education of believers, however, is extraordinarily problematic for a social researcher. Who decides if a set of followers are 'well formed spiritually and informed theologically?' Very few people would argue that the al-Qaeda terrorists were not well-versed in Islamic teaching, nor are scholars quick to deny the Christian Crusaders' knowledge of the Bible.

If religious involvement can serve as a proxy for spiritual education, Gary Marx's study of African-Americans in the 1960's provides support for Appleby's argument.[37] Marx uses a 1964 survey of African-Americans to see if militants are more or less involved in their faith. He concludes that "...the greater the religious involvement, whether measured in terms of ritual activity, orthodoxy of religious belief, subjective importance of religion, or the three taken together, the lower the degree of militancy."[38] Jon P. Alston, Charles W. Peek, and C. Ray Wingrove followed up Marx's study with one using a 1969 survey of African-Americans that found comparable results to those of Marx's study.[39] The most significant difference was the Alston, Peek and Wingrove found age, sex, and denominational differences in the degree of militancy not uncovered in Marx's study. Both

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[35] Ibid. Page 17.
[36] Ibid. Page 17.
[37] Gary T. Marx, 'Religion: Opiate or Inspiration of Civil Rights Militancy Among Negroes?' *American Sociological Review,* 32 (1967) pp 64-72. See also Gary T. Marx, *Protest and Prejudice,* (London: Harper and Row Publishers, 1967).
[38] Ibid. Page 72.
[39] Jon P. Alston, Charles W. Peek, and C. Ray Wingrove, 'Religiosity and Black Militancy: A Reappraisal.' *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion,* 11 (1972) pp 252-261.

studies conclude overall that a higher religiosity is related to lower levels of militancy. Religious involvement, however, does not entirely measure what Appleby intended by 'well formed spiritually and informed theologically.' It fails to measure the level of education by measuring only the attendance and involvement of followers.

Marx provides an alternative explanation of the dual nature of religion in conflict. He argues that religion often espouses contradicting values – particularly the value placed on rewards in the afterlife or the value placed on action on behalf of a deity in the present life. When stress is put on the temporal (or this-worldly), the faithful are encouraged to do what they can for social change. On the other hand, if stress is put on the afterlife, adherents feel less of a need to try to change society. Marx's evidence from the 1964 survey of African-Americans seems to support this claim, though more empirical evidence would surely be needed to accept Marx's explanation.

Charles Kimball, like Appleby, has argued that authentic religion does not result in violence and destruction because such actions violate the central tenets of love and peace found in every major religion.[40] Kimball argues that the frequent violence carried out by seemingly religious people is evidence that a religion has been corrupted, as in Appleby's notion of folk religion. According to Kimball, a corrupted religion can be identified by its claim to absolute truth, the blind obedience of its adherents, its description of the perfect life or an 'ideal' time, its belief that the end justifies any means necessary, and by its call for a holy war to defend the faith. When any of these five characteristics exhibit themselves in a religion, the religion is corrupted and violence is an inevitable consequence unless something is done to revive the authentic religion according to Kimball.

Kimball goes to great lengths to argue that corrupted religion is not beyond repair, though. In his view, it is the responsibility of the uncorrupted faithful to take a stand against the distortion of their faith. For example, in response to Islamic extremists' call for jihad

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[40] Charles Kimball, *When Religion Becomes Evil,* (New York: Harper Collins, 2002).

against America, Kimball urges moderate Muslims to remind the extremists of the 'greater jihad' (as labeled by Mohammed) to struggle to do the right thing in everyday life or to point out that the high threshold required to justify violence in Islam has not been reached.

The discussion of the peaceful influences of religion is usually done in a normative sense in which suggestions and arguments about how religion has the capacity and *should* be involved in conflicts in order to bring them to a peaceful end, rather than on how that is the dominant way in which religion is involved in conflicts. On the whole, however, popular conceptions and previous research support the expectation that the involvement of religion in a conflict serves to intensify that conflict in spite of religion's capacity and normative role.

Organization Studies

The model also delineates the impact of religious organizations on the intensity of a conflict. A religious organization's leaders, members and communications network enhance a group in conflict by providing an existing organizational structure and personnel to the group that is necessary to sustain a prolonged violent conflict. The leaders of a religious organization who serve in the leadership of the movement also serve to articulate the complaints while representing the community. Though these functions could be carried out by another community organization, religious organizations are unique in the moral legitimacy they also lend a group in conflict. In this way, religion's influence on a conflict extends beyond its doctrinal qualities.

An organizational structure is essential for a group to mount an effective challenge to their opposition and the internal structure of religious groups is easily transferred to a group in conflict when the religious leadership is supportive of the cause. Doug McAdam's influential study on the black insurgency movement in the United States identified the role that the black churches played in providing the movement with members, leaders and a

communications network.[41] McAdam's study found that the leadership of the insurgency movement drew heavily on clergy and allowed the religious organizational structure to be easily transferred to the movement. When the leaders of the churches also became involved as leaders of the insurgency movement, they brought with them the knowledge of how to run a complex organization, the pre-existing relationships to help run it smoothly and the vast human and material resources of the religious group.

One of the resources available to the group through a religious organization is the membership of the religious organization. McAdam's study found that the most active members of the churches were the most active participants in the insurgency largely because church membership was "redefined to include movement participation as a primary requisite."[42] Even in other cases where the involvement in the two activities was not so closely linked, the churches provided membership by becoming the primary focus of the opposition movement. Peter Palmer carried out a study of the Croatian Catholic Church in the former Yugoslavia and found that the church also brought members to the Croatian nationalist movement despite the fact that membership in the church did not socially necessitate membership in the movement. Rather the "persecuted yet defiant Church" [43] came to be "a symbol of Croatia's suffering" [44] and "a rallying point for disaffected Croatian nationalists."[45] The Catholic Church in Croatia was able to take on this role because it was "the only autonomous institution within Croatia, and the only one which most Croats could regard as being able legitimately to represent the Croatian people."[46]

The moral legitimacy that is unique to a religious organization is a fundamental reason that a religious organization is an effective point of recruitment of a group in

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[41] Doug McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency,* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982).

[42] Ibid. Page 128.

[43] Peter Palmer, 'The Churches and the Conflict in Former Yugoslavia', in K.R. Dark (ed), *Religion and International Relations,* (London: MacMillan Press, 2000) p 87.

[44] Ibid. Page 87.

[45] Ibid. Page 87.

[46] Ibid. Page 87.

conflict. McAdam found that the African-American insurgency movement was able to gain legitimacy by co-opting religious leaders who "served to convey to their natural constituents the importance and legitimacy of the movement, thereby encouraging participation."[47] Religious organizations are unique in the degree to which they can claim a moral superiority and imperative to its members and so deeply influence their actions. In many cases, they are considered to be representatives of god on earth and can persuade members to join and sacrifice for a cause because of this stature in the community of believers.

In his analysis of the Iranian Revolution, Gilles Kepel described the powerful influence that the Shi'ite clergy held over the middle and urban working classes. The most respected ayatollahs were "'sources of imitation' (marja-e taqlid)"[48] within these communities where they "not only indoctrinated the masses but also functioned as agents of social stabilization and containment ... [by] ... bless[ing] the profits of the bazaaris, redistribut[ing] their alms, and educat[ing] the children while fathers and elder brothers went into the city center, seeking work and wages."[49] The mass of the Iranian population were willing followers of their ayatollahs whose tenuous relationship with the state eventually led to an outright revolution. The "entire network of mosques in Iran"[50] was mobilized by the ayatollahs and the Shah of Iran was overthrown with the overwhelming support of the majority of Iranians. In fact an earlier coup attempt organized by the Marxist-Leninist People's Fedayeen that lacked the support of the ayatollahs was unsuccessful because it failed to take root with the wider Iranian society. The mosques allowed the Ayatollah to connect with the Iranian public and thus succeed in the revolution.

Religious groups also provide a communications network that informs, educates and coordinates activities of a group in conflict. Alan Falconer's study of the role of the churches in the Northern Irish conflict found that the religious organizations also held sway

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[47] McAdam, *Political Process,* p 132.
[48] Kepel, Gilles (translated by Anthony F. Roberts), *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam,* (Cambridge (MA): The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002) p 109.
[49] Ibid. Page 109.
[50] Ibid. Page 109.

over the way the conflict was understood by its adherents and in this way served as a communications network that informed and educated their communities.[51] According to Falconer, the churches provided a theological framework in which each community's history was interpreted. They developed 'theologies-in-opposition' that focused the communities' identities and re-enforced the feelings of alienation in the communities. In their role of articulating discrimination and representing the community to outsiders, the religious organizations were able to define and interpret what was important for its faithful. This characteristic that Falconer found among the churches in Northern Ireland further reinforces the unique ability of religious organizations in influencing their members and encouraging participation in a group in conflict.

McAdam's study also demonstrated how the communications network among church leaders served to make the leaders aware of both events and tactics in the movement. One example that he points out is the bus boycotts that were used to protest the segregation of blacks and whites on city buses in the southern United States. The boycott in Montgomery, Alabama organized by Martin Luther King, Jr. was inspired by a similar boycott in Baton Rogue, Louisiana organized by King's friend, Theodore Jemison.[52] With this communications network, a movement has the potential to spread throughout a community and efficiently develop its strategies.

Scott Thomas' analysis of the international dimension of religion demonstrated how religious groups – specifically those supporting dar ul-Islam (literally means 'abode of peace,' but in practice often means 'a unity of Islamic lands') – were able to use their transnational communications network to educate followers efficiently in order to support a violent struggle. In particular, he points out that the Muslim Brotherhood and Ja'amat-I Islami, for instance "finance and distribut[e] … literature and educational materials, …

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[51] Falconer, 'The Role of Religion in Situations of Armed Conflict'
[52] McAdam, *Political Process,* p 137.

creat[e] … Islamic institutes, publication centers, and … hold … seminars and conferences."[53]

It is not clear when a religious group will choose to support the opposition as opposed to the status quo. As an established institution within a society, one would expect that its interest would best be served by retaining the status quo, however, as exhibited in the previous examples, religious organizations are often found in support of opposition groups.

Kevin Neuhouser addresses the question of when a religious organization will support the status quo versus the opposition by evaluating the Brazilian Catholic Church.[54] He argues that the Catholic Church in Brazil began to lose members and attributes this decline to their support of the status quo. The small group of leaders who had been critical of the status quo began to gain legitimacy and was able to assert their influence on the church as a whole. As a result, the church shifted its position from supporting the status quo to opposing the status quo in order to retain or gain membership and insure their survival.

Guenter Lewy also evaluated this question using seventeen cases of revolutions in which religion played a major part either in instigating the revolution or protecting state institutions.[55] He found that both religious doctrine and leadership were major factors in determining the stand the religion took in a conflict. He noted, however, the highly unpredictable nature of leadership as he points out that "…a considerable element of uniqueness that defies explanation, not to mention prediction, will remain."[56] The organizational levels of a religion did not shed any light on the religion's position in a

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[53] Scott Thomas, 'Religion and International Conflict', in K.R. Dark (ed), *Religion and International Relations*,' (London: MacMillan Press, 2000) p 16.
[54] Kevin Neuhouser, 'The Radicalization of the Brazilian Catholic Church in Comparative Perspective', *American Sociological Review*, 54 (1989) pp 233-244.
[55] Lewy, *Religion and Revolution*
[56] Ibid. Page 575.

conflict, although the organizational levels did influence a religion's ability to communicate its values and demands in Lewy's study.

The debate about the reasons a religious group would support the opposition rather than the status quo is outside the scope of this thesis, however. What is at issue is that when a religious group supports one side or another, what consequence does that have on the intensity of a conflict? The previous research largely supports the model of this study in its expectation that the leaders, members and communications network supplied when a group receives formal religious support will serve to increase the intensity of the conflict.

Diaspora Studies

Like a religious doctrine and organization, a religious diaspora also has the capacity to increase the intensity of a conflict. The contagion effect of successful rebellions by religious co-faithful inspire a movement to persevere through the difficulties they face, as well as point to efficient strategies. The human and material resources the diaspora supply and the political pressure they apply in order to benefit their co-faithful all provide for the practical needs of the movement. Furthermore when the diaspora intervene militarily they prolong the duration of the conflict by changing the balance of the two sides involved in the conflict. By inspiring, providing resources and intervening on behalf of co-faithful involved in a conflict, a religious diaspora can cause an increase in the intensity of a conflict.

The contagion effect of the Islamic Revolution of Iran has been much discussed since it was carried out in 1979. Iran became the first Islamic Republic in 1979 when Ayatollah Khomeini forced the Shah into exile. The success of the fundamentalist take-over of the country was largely seen as a victory over a corrupt and Western-dominated monarchy – a success that Khomeini urged for all Islamic countries, both Sunni and Shi'ite. Many Islamic fundamentalists throughout the Middle East and North Africa took Khomeini's advice and followed the example of the Iranian Revolution. "By the end of the

1980s, significant Islamic fundamentalist movements existed in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, Turkey, and in the Arab-populated lands under Israeli control."[57] In fact, in 1990, fundamentalist candidates in Algeria had won a majority in local elections.[58]

Stuart Hill, David Rothchild and Colin Cameron argue that the increased awareness of other movements with their successes and failures is a powerful motivator for other movements. They illustrate this phenomenon with Martin Luther King, Jr.'s Selma March that eventually led to institutionalized protection for the voting rights of African-Americans in the United States. "The apparent effectiveness of this tactic held great appeal to other groups in the United States and in Western Europe who faced similar circumstances."[59] Particularly in Northern Ireland where Catholics were leading a similar civil rights movement "the tactics of Martin Luther King in America had been absorbed"[60] into the Northern Irish Civil Rights Association. Hill, Rothchild and Cameron's study tested this phenomenon statistically using cases of protest in Europe and the United States. They compared the level of protests in a country when there was an upsurge in another country taking into account the availability of televisions in the country. The study concluded that there was a significant contagion effect of protests especially when televisions were widely available to the population.

In the introduction to their edited volume, Lake and Rothchild suggest that the spread of an ethnic conflict can occur in four ways. "First events abroad may change directly the ethnic balance of power at home, disrupting the existing ethnic contract and precipitating violence."[61] Second, the success of co-ethnics abroad at achieving their goals

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[57] James DeFronzo, *Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991) p 266.
[58] Ibid. Page 267.
[59] Stuart Hill, Donald Rothchild and Colin Cameron, 'Tactical Information and the Diffusion of Peaceful Protests', in David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild (eds), *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998) p 64.
[60] Ibid. Page 61.
[61] David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild (eds), *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998) p 25.

may signal the likelihood of success for a group which causes them to make more demands and increases the potential for violence. Third, exposure of the weakness of a ruling class abroad may cause a group to adjust their perception of their own ruling class and embolden them to make offensive moves that escalate a conflict. And finally, "Effective protest or violence abroad may lead groups at home to believe that they too may be able to obtain valued ends through coercion."[62]

Ellingsen also offers a quantitative test of the contagiousness of ethnic or religious intrastate conflicts.[63] By using cases of intrastate conflict between 1979 and 2001, Ellingsen develops a log-linear model that tests whether the likelihood of an intrastate conflict is higher when an ethnic or religious group within the country has cultural ties with a neighboring country that is in the midst of a conflict. Her results suggest that there is strong evidence of conflicts spreading in this way and supports the contagion effect theory.

A diaspora not only sets a precedent in their own situations, but may become actively involved in their co-faithful's conflict by providing material resources and political pressure. Ahmed Rashid recounts, in his description of the Taliban movement, an encounter with the Afghan mujaheddin just after the Soviet retreat in 1989 that highlights the prominence of diaspora resources in Afghanistan.

> *"Suddenly along the road behind me, a truck full of Mujaheddin roared up and stopped. But those on board were not Afghans. Light-coloured Arabs, blue-eyed Central Asians and swarthy Chinese-looking faces peered out from roughly wound turbans and ill-fitting shalwar kameezes. They were swathed in ammunition belts and carried kalashnikovs. Except for one Afghan, who was acting as interpreter and guide, not a single*

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[62] Ibid. Page 26.
[63] Tanja Ellingsen, 'Cultural Kinship and Diffusion and Escalation of Intrastate Conflict', Unpublished paper , 2003, presented at the 2003 International Studies Association Annual Conference (Montreal, Canada).

one of the 30 foreigners spoke Pashtu, Dari or even Urdu. As we waited for the border to open we got talking.

"The group was made up of Filipino Moros, Uzbeks from Soviet Central Asia, Arabs from Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and Uighurs from Xinjiang in China. ... They had come to fight the jihad with the Mujaheddin and to train in weapons, bomb-making and military tactics so they could take the jihad back home."[64]

In the months since the 'War on Terror' has begun, much has been documented and restated about the international character of the al-Qaeda movement, in particular. It is now clear that al-Qaeda serves as a unifier that coordinates on some level the activities of Islamic opposition movements worldwide. Would-be fighters for Islamic movements in the Philippines, Central Asia and North Africa are often sent to conflict areas to train in camps and in actual fighting, in order to return better prepared to fight their own struggles, as Rashid points out in his vignette.

Aside from the impact that this sort of mobilization has had on the stability of the international system, the internationalization of a conflict also has a profound effect on the dynamics of the conflict. The training of extremist Islamists from around the globe in the Afghan conflict (1979-1988), for instance, provided an otherwise negligible opposition (as the ill-equipped Afghans were when compared to the Soviet military machine) with a constant supply of fresh and eager fighters. While the Afghans were able to obtain equipment to supply the fighters from the West (afraid of the spread of Communism), the manpower that ultimately held off the Soviets were mobilized by appealing to a shared religious identity with populations outside of Afghanistan.

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[64] Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*, (London: Yale University Press, 2000) p 128.

Gilles Kepel's analysis of Bosnia's Civil War also indicates the importance of diaspora support, not only in terms of personnel, but also in terms of material resources and finances necessary to sustain a weak movement. The Muslims in Yugoslavia were savagely repressed by the Orthodox Christian Serbs and international attention was turned to the fragmenting former Soviet satellite state in the early 1990s. "A wave of solidarity with their newfound Balkan co-religionists swept over the Muslim world."[65] Many of the Arab Afghans who were trained and experienced in the Afghan jihad moved from Afghanistan to Bosnia to carry on the global jihad. According to Kepel, the Iranians violated a UN arms embargo on Bosnia and sent weapons through Turkey and Croatia. Those weapons were supplemented by "several hundred Guardians of the Revolution (*pasdarans*) sent to train the Bosnian military."[66] Furthermore, Kepel's research indicates that the Iranians were active in indoctrinating the Bosnian Muslims particularly through charitable networks.

The importance of a diaspora is not limited to Islam and the inspiration and material resources it supplies, nor is it limited to the vision of global revolution or jihad among its militants. Cynthia Keppley Mahmood and Bhabani Sen Gupta argue that the Sikh diaspora were central in putting political pressure on external states who then pressured the Indian government to make concessions to the Punjabis. As Mahmood argues: "Diaspora Sikhs have in fact been critical to the movement and have become more so as the success of the counterinsurgency within Punjab becomes firmly established."[67] Gupta goes one step further and states that "the Sikh diaspora in the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom articulated the demand for a Sikh Homeland outside India several years before the demand was echoed by Sikh militants in Punjab."[68] Gupta points out a particular instance

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[65] Kepel, *Jihad,* p 237.
[66] Ibid. Page 247.
[67] Cynthia Keppley Mahmood, *Fighting for Faith and Nation: Dialogues with Sikh Militant,* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996) p 151.
[68] Bhabani Sen Gupta, 'Internationalization of Ethnic Conflict: The Punjab Crisis of the 1980s', in K.M. deSilva and R.J. Mays (eds), *Internationalization of Ethnic Conflict,* (London: Pinter Publishers, 1991) p 52.

in which the Sikh diaspora sought U.S. intervention (in the form of sanctions) in the Punjab conflict.

> *"In June 1989 Khalistani lobbyists scored a success when one of their favourite Congressmen, Wally Hearger (Republican, California), moved a resolution in the House of Representatives proposing that the United States not only freeze its bilateral aid to India but also prevent international financial institutions like the World Bank from extending economic assistance to the Indian union until the Indian government stopped the violation of human rights in Punjab and abandoned its missile development programme."[69]*

The resolution before the U.S. Congress was ultimately unsuccessful, however received a great deal of attention and was rejected by "a margin of a mere eight votes."[70] Without a doubt, the resolution would have never gained any attention or in fact never would have been written had it not been for the efforts of the Sikh diaspora in the United States.

A plethora of religious non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have also been established in the past fifty years that serve to unite and represent religious diaspora. While these organizations are primarily involved in humanitarian missions, they also function as external actors that provide communications networks and external pressure to a conflict. Peter Palmer discusses the importance that these NGO's played in the Serbian conflict in particular. He points out that "Representatives of the World Council of Churches and of the Conference of European Churches … tried to promote ecumenical relations between the

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[69] Ibid. Page 55.
[70] Ibid. Page 55.

Catholic Church in Croatia and the Serbian Orthodox Church …" while "the Vatican encouraged the Church in Croatia to play a constructive role."[71]

Not only has it been observed that a diaspora inspires through their success or sustains a movement through their human and material resources and political pressure, a diaspora can also influence a conflict by encouraging a state to intervene militarily.

Lake and Rothchild argue that intervention in ethnic conflicts is the result of one of four causes. First, ethnic combatants may cross a border to seek safety which can lead to recriminations between the two states. Secondly, a state may make an irredentist claim on a territory belonging to another state that the state may decide to take by force. Third, because of the domestic politics of a state, the political leader may intervene in an external conflict in order to shift attention away from a domestic problem. And finally, a predatory state may see an internal conflict as weakening the state and creating an opportune time for the state to be attacked. According to Lake and Rothchild, "Ethnic ties and antagonisms frequently motivate countries to become involved in ethnic conflicts elsewhere. In this form of 'ethnopolitik,' co-ethnics in one state are propelled by feelings of solidarity with their ethnic kin in a second."[72]

Both Fox and Ellingsen have offered quantitative tests of the existence of intervention on the basis of ethnic or religious affinities. In Ellingsen's study, she developed a log-linear model in which she predicted the likelihood of intervention by an ethnically or religiously similar state. Using this model, Ellingsen tested a set of intrastate conflicts between 1979 and 2001 which found that identity conflicts did not experience a higher level of intervention than other conflicts; rather the intensity of the conflict was a better predictor of intervention. Furthermore, Ellingsen tested the hypothesis "that interveners of intrastate conflicts tend to be ethnic or religious kin's with [sic] the

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[71] Palmer, 'The Churches and the Conflict', p 89.
[72] Lake and Rothchild, *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict,* p 29.

government in conflict they are supporting."[73] Ellingsen's quantitative test however found this not to be the case. Thus Ellingsen's study concludes that ethnicity and religion are not important factors in a state's decision to intervene in an intrastate conflict.

Fox also addressed this question and came to the opposite conclusion that Ellingsen reached. Fox's study was particularly concerned with religious affinities as a cause of intervention and used a dataset of 275 ethnic conflicts between 1990 and 1995 in order to test the hypothesis. Fox's analysis finds that religious conflicts are intervened in more frequently than other types of conflict and that the interveners "are likely to be religiously similar to those minorities on whose behalf they intervene."[74] These results lead Fox to conclude that religious affinities are an important determinant in whether a third party will intervene or not.

Will H. Moore and David R. Davis, as well, have addressed the likelihood of intervention based on ethnic affinities. They argue that ethnic ties operate in the same way as alliances between states. In alliances, states share the same geopolitical preferences and will intervene in a conflict to ensure that those preferences are realized. In the case of ethnic affinities, Moore and Davis "contend that different members of the same minority group will – rightly or wrongly – assume that their kin share similar policy preferences. ... They expect to share policy preferences, and ... they therefore expect to share similar geopolitical preferences."[75] For this reason, a state sharing an ethnic identity with a participant would be expected to intervene in a conflict in order to realize their geopolitical preferences. In Moore and Davis' test of this expectation, they find that "Ethnic alliances

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[73] Ellingsen, 'Cultural Kinship', p 16.
[74] Jonathan Fox, 'Religious Causes of International Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts', *International Politics,* 38 (2001) p 525.
[75] Will H. Moore, and David R. Davis, 'Transnational Ethnic Ties and Foreign Policy' in David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild (eds), *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation.*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001) p 93.

lead to greater dyadic hostility, especially when the disadvantaged group is politically mobilized."[76]

It is hypothesized in the model used in this study that the intervention of a third party that these studies have established will lead to a higher intensity. Patrick Regan has looked specifically at the likelihood that these interventions will in fact lead to longer lasting conflicts.[77] He tests this hypothesis on 150 conflicts between 1945 and 1999, two-thirds of which were intervened by a third party, that these studies have established is more likely in a religious conflict, either as military support for one side or as a peacekeeping intervention. Regan's analysis indicates that military interventions that support one side in the conflict experience a longer duration than those in which there is no unilateral intervention, thus providing support for the model analyzed in this study.

The diaspora influence of religion is becoming an increasingly pertinent aspect of conflicts as globalization speeds the communications networks. With the advent of television, fax machines and especially the internet, events on one side of the world are immediately known on the other side of the world. It is now very rare that a group of people struggle in silence, without the outside world at least able to know their plight with relative ease.

Globalization has not only made it possible for external actors to be aware of a conflict by immediate communications networks, but it has also increased the affinity that the actors have with their co-faithful on the other side of the world. Scott Thomas argues, globalization "has contributed to the formation and consolidation of transnational religious groups with linkages in different countries at the national and subnational levels."[78] He goes on to write that "Globalization promotes closer links between people of similar religions in different countries. It accomplishes through technology what used to be

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[76] Ibid. Page 100.
[77] Patrick M. Regan, 'Third-Party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflicts, *Conflict Resolution*, 46 (2002) pp 55-73.
[78] Thomas, 'Religion and International Conflict', p 6.

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accomplished through the expansion and consolidation of empires, albeit at a slower pace."[79].

Furthermore, globalization has made it possible for the external actors to fight in the conflict by transporting them quickly to the conflict area. While the existence of religious identities that transcend state boundaries is not new, the speed with which religious diaspora become aware of and can become involved in a conflict has increased the importance that these diaspora qualities of religion play in a conflict.

The effect that a diaspora has on the intensity of a conflict is not uniform, however. As illustrated in the Afghan example, the involvement of the diaspora bolstered an otherwise negligible opposition and served to extend the conflict. Had the Afghans been left to fight the Soviets on their own, one could reasonably assume that the conflict would have been quickly over as the Soviets would likely have swept through the country. Likewise, the contagion effect of the Iranian Revolution inspired like-minded opposition groups elsewhere to push on with their struggle in the hopes of their own success. But, as in the Serbian example, the diaspora was a mediating voice that served to press for a resolution, not intensification, of the conflict.

As exhibited by these examples, a diaspora have three options when their fellow believers are in conflict. The diaspora can choose not to become involved as many Muslims did in the Bosnian conflict. They can choose to intervene to push for moderation of their fellow believers in order for a resolution of the conflict as several NGO's did in the Serbian conflict. Or they can intervene to support their fellow believers with resources or inspiration as the mujaheddin did in Afghanistan in the 1980's. What causes a diaspora to act one way and not another is outside the scope of this thesis, however, the impact of their actions on the dynamics of a conflict is a central question concerning this study.

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[79] Ibid. Page 6-7.

The research initiated by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita regarding the expected utility of war sheds some light on what consequences we could expect when third parties become involved in a conflict.[80] Though his research dealt specifically with the initiation of interstate conflict, many of his findings can be extended to intrastate conflict as well as the likelihood of negotiated settlements to existing conflicts. In essence, Bueno de Mesquita argues that a state will initiate a conflict with another state when they perceive a potential victory in which the benefits are greater than the costs of winning. Involved in this decision are calculations of relative power as well as the relative power of potential third parties who may intervene on one side or the other. Additionally, an initiator must consider the costs, such as the material costs and potential deaths, required to win a conflict.

Bueno de Mesquita suggests that his theory can shed light on what one would expect for the duration and intensity of conflicts when a diaspora becomes involved. He deduces that if an initiator expects only small gains and an opponent expects great losses, both parties may opt for settlement. Both parties benefit as opponents give in to avoid greater loss and the initiator succeeds in having its demands met. When a third party intervenes in the conflict each side changes their expectations of success and calculation of the costs required to succeed. Bueno de Mesquita argues that if a third party intervenes to support an opponent (weaker side), the expected utility of an initiator (stronger side) is reduced and settlement becomes the rational decision of an initiator. If the third party intervenes on behalf of the initiator, they will be more confident of their ability to eliminate the opposition quickly and will see it in their interest to continue fighting.

David Mason and Patrick Fett have addressed Bueno de Mesquita's theory in regards to the resolution of civil wars and reached a similar conclusion.[81] They argue that the stronger the government is in relation to the opposition, the higher they will estimate the

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[80] Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, 'An Expected Utility Theory of International Conflict', *American Political Science Review*, 74 (1980) pp 917-931. See also Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, *The War Trap*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981)

[81] T. David Mason and Patrick J. Fett, 'How Civil Wars End', *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 40 (1996) pp 546-568.

probable victory and the more likely they "will reject rebel appeals for negotiations and instead seek a quick victory on the battlefield."[82] Likewise, they argue that when the army is small (and presumably when the opposition is more equal to the government), there is a better chance of settlement because the government has a low probability of winning. Like Bueno de Mesquita, Mason and Fett also deduce that third party intervention does not necessarily lead to an escalation of the conflict but rather "Third parties can work either to enhance the likelihood of a negotiated settlement or prolong the conflict by preventing one side from falling defeat on the battlefield."[83]

For Bueno de Mesquita and Mason and Fett, the determinant of a prolonged violent conflict is not the intervention of third parties except to the extent that third parties alter the balance and expectations of success of the two sides. If the two sides are balanced they will both see it in their interest to settle and prevent a prolonged violent clash. If the two sides are unbalanced, though, the stronger side will expect a quick victory with little cost and will carry on fighting until they eliminate their opponent.

Despite the theoretical research that suggests that third party intervention will only lead to continued fighting if the two sides remain unbalanced, the empirical research repeatedly demonstrates that third party intervention is directly related to a prolonged violent conflict particularly in cross-national, time-series tests of ethnic or religious conflicts.

Conclusion

While the focus of much of the previous research has been on how religion either causes, prevents or resolves conflict, this study focuses on the role the religion plays in intensifying and extending existing conflicts. The model presented in Chapter 1 finds a great deal of support in the previous research of this field. Armstrong's description of the

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[82] Ibid. Page 550.
[83] Ibid. Page 552.

Crusades, Sells' analysis of the Serb-Bosnian conflict, Hoffman and Juergensmeyer's exploration of religious terrorism and Assefa's evaluation of Sudan's civil war all found that religious doctrine plays a role in intensifying political conflicts through the use of violent traditions and cosmic war mentality, however Appleby, Marx and Kimball highlight its normative capacity to de-escalate these conflicts. Previous research also supported the assertion that religious organizations' involvement in a conflict serve to intensify a conflict with their leaders, members and communications networks as found in McAdam's ground-breaking study of the church's association with black militancy in the United States in the 1960s, Palmer's description of the Catholic Church in Croatia, Kepel's analysis of the influence of the Shi'ite clergy in Iran's Revolution, Falconer's evaluation of the churches in Northern Ireland's conflict and Thomas' description of the worldwide network among Islamists supporting Dar ul-Islam. Finally, the diaspora were found to provide military intervention as Mahmood and Gupta found in the Sikh conflict in Punjab, India; Ellingsen determined is likely, given worldwide evidence over a twenty-two year period; and is supported by Moore and Davis' quantitative study of ethnic intervention; resources and aid as Kepel analysis of Bosnia's Civil War and Rashid's description of the Afghan conflict (1980-8) illustrate; and a contagion effect as Hill, Rothchild, Cameron and Lake describe and was found in the Iranian Revolution and in Ellingsen's wider study of ethnic and religious intrastate conflicts that increase the intensity of a conflict.

These theoretical works and case studies have supported the model in its parts, though to date there has been no comprehensive and large scale test of the model comparing the involvement of religion in conflict using many cases over space and time. It is this task which this study endeavors to offer. The following chapter describes the data and methodology used to test the model.

CHAPTER 3: Data and Methodology

According to the model described in Chapter 1, religion is expected to be related to a higher intensity in political conflicts through its doctrinal, organizational, and diaspora qualities. The previous research, too, supports this model. Formally, the expectations of the model can be stated in the following set of hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1:   There is a strong positive relationship between the involvement of religion in a conflict and the intensity of a conflict.

Hypothesis 2: When one or both groups involved in a conflict has a cosmic war world view, the conflict will be more intense than if neither participant has such a world view.

Hypothesis 3:   The appeal to violent religious traditions and symbols in support of violent actions in a conflict will increase the intensity of a conflict.

Hypothesis 4: The appeal to religious traditions and symbols in support of non-violent actions in a conflict will decrease the intensity of a conflict.

Hypothesis 5: Formal support for one or more groups involved in a conflict by a religious organization will increase the intensity of a conflict.

Hypothesis 6:   The supply of weapons, political intervention or military intervention of a religious diaspora will increase the intensity of a conflict.

Hypothesis 7: The involvement of a religious diaspora will decrease the intensity of a conflict if a state or organization dominated by the diaspora intervene to mediate a conflict.

In testing these hypotheses, this study leads to a generalization about the relationship between religion and conflict. The study will draw general conclusions about the mechanisms through which religion influences the intensity of a conflict.

There are a variety of methods by which these hypotheses could be tested. The most frequently used method in studies of religion and conflict is the case study method. By focusing on one case, it is possible to gain insight into the specific dynamics and influences of that case. However, such an analysis arguably cannot provide a test of the relationship between religion and conflict intensity. Although the cases can provide a thick analysis of a case that either supports or refutes the author's expectations, a case study suffers from selection bias in which the selection of one case cannot be representative of all political conflicts and cannot provide a test of the expected relationship of religion and these conflicts. Furthermore, case studies do not permit broad conclusions about the religious influences of conflicts in general, but rather only allows conclusions to be drawn about the specific case evaluated.

Another design which has not been extensively used in religion and conflict research is a quantitative cross-sectional, time-series design in which many cases across time and space are statistically compared in order to detect patterns. The benefit of a quantitative design is its ability to identify patterns of behavior which permit broader generalizations than are possible using a case study method. The corresponding drawback is the lack of depth and understanding of the unique dynamics of each individual conflict.

The strongest argument for using a quantitative approach is the lack of these sorts of tests on the various informal theories and frameworks that have largely been derived from

case studies. It can be argued that these case studies suffer from a dependent variable selection bias whereby they are chosen because they provide support for the author's view, rather than test the author's theory. The case studies, in fact, are often used to illustrate or reinforce what an author has identified as common characteristics of religious violence. Though useful, these studies do not provide a strong foundation on which to build a theory of religion in conflict, nor do they provide an adequate test of existing expectations.

This study takes a quantitative approach while complementing these tests with illustrative case studies. By beginning with a quantitative analysis, broad generalizations regarding the relationship between religion and conflict can be drawn. These generalizations can then be compared to specific cases and further exploration can be made into why these cases do or do not fit the generalizations established in the statistical comparison.

Quantitative Analysis

In the quantitative cross-sectional, time-series analysis, all violent territory conflicts occurring between 1946 and 2001 are used to test the hypotheses in order to determine first if there is a relationship between religion and conflict, and then to further explore the unique qualities of religion that have an impact on a conflict. A territory conflict is defined as "a contested incompatibility that concerns ... territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths."[84] While it would be preferable to use the entire universe of conflicts, limiting the data to only territory conflicts after 1945 allows for a manageable dataset without systematically and significantly skewing the results. A further benefit to limiting the data to territory conflicts is that it allows greater clarity in defining the measurement of

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[84] Havard Strand, Lars Wilhelmsen, Nils Petter Gleditsch, Peter Wallensteen, Margareta Sollenberg, Mikael Eriksson, Halvard Buhaug and Jan Ketil Rod, *Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook,* Version 1.1 (2002) p 2. <www.prio.no/cwp/ArmedConflict> (19 April 2004).

subsequent variables, particularly the 'Religious Conflict' variable, as will be discussed in a subsequent section.

The data include both intra- and interstate conflicts provided that at least one party is a state and there is a territory that is disputed. Such conflicts ranging from the Chechnyan conflict in Russia to the Falkland wars between Argentina and Britain are thus included. Furthermore, the data include conflicts that might generally be classified as 'terrorist' as well as those that would be classified as 'war' thereby including the Omagh bomb in Northern Ireland as a separate conflict phase as well as the Sudanese civil war (1983-present). One might argue that these divergent cases are not comparable and the study should limit itself to one classification or the other because they are essentially different phenomena. While this is a valid argument, these are all instances of political violence and the purpose of this study is to determine the impact of religion on the intensity of *political violence*. Limiting the data to one particular form of this violence, then, would cause the study to fail in its objective.

The data for the quantitative analysis was initially compiled by the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo, Norway (PRIO) in collaboration with Uppsala University and the Norwegian University of Science and Technology. It includes 132 territory conflicts occurring between 1946 and 2001 subdivided into conflict phases for a total of 278 cases. The PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset is preferable to other datasets because of its inclusion of all cases ranging from minor conflicts (with less than 25 deaths) to all-out war (with more than 1,000 deaths). While the Correlates of War (COW) Project is the most widely used data set, it only provides information about state participants in a conflict and is limited to violent conflicts with more than 1,000 battle deaths. Using the COW Project would open the study up to a much greater potential of bias by limiting the variation of the dependent variable.

While the PRIO data offers a unique dataset for testing the relationship between religion and conflict, it is necessary to add additional variables to the study in order to take into account the variables that are unique to the model being tested. In particular, data is collected to take account of whether the conflict is religious, the relevance of religion to the conflict, the religious support of a participant and the religion of the group supporting, the existence of a cosmic war worldview, the reference to violent and non-violent religious traditions, and the extent of the diaspora support for a group in conflict. What follows is a complete description of each variable included in the dataset (both those collected by the PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset and those added for the purposes of this study), as well as a discussion of the validity and reliability of these measures.[85]

- Conflict Name and Phase (Conflict_ID)

    According to PRIO, "An armed conflict is a contested incompatibility that concerns … territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths."[86] The conflicts are broken down into phases when the number of deaths each year changes significantly.

Variables to Identify a Religious Conflict

- Religious Conflict Dummy (Religious_Conflict)

    TABLE 3.1: Distribution of Religious Conflicts

Not Religious Conflicts	67
Religious Conflicts	211
TOTAL	278

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[85] See Appendix 1 for a table of the variables, their descriptions, codings and ratings as well as frequencies.
[86] Strand, et al. *Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook*

To determine if a conflict is religious, a definition similar to that used by Fox in his study of ethno-religious conflicts was used.[87] A conflict is considered religious when 80 percent of the population represented by the group differs in their religious identity from the group with which they are in conflict. The population belonging to a particular faith is determined by the statistics collected by Adherents.com.[88] This website and organization presents a table of the sources (such as the CIA World Factbook and various encyclopedias) that have put together statistics on the religious faith of every state and many territories in the world. The database contains in excess of 41,000 records, often with multiple entries per state or territory. The statistics are well-documented and easily verifiable, thus a trusted source for identifying the religious identity of each state and territory in this study.

In order to code this variable, information was collected regarding the dominant religion of each participant in the conflict. In each case, the religious identity of the participant was identified as the religion followed by over eighty percent of the population. The five major world religions – Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam and Judaism – were used as the broad categories of religion. If none of these religions could claim over eighty percent of the population as followers, the state or territory was labeled as 'mixed.' Additionally, in cases where atheism was the state religion, the state or territory was labeled as 'atheist.'

Because some conflicts exist between denominations of the same religion, the dominant denomination was also noted and compared where available and relevant. Thus a conflict between a territory of eighty percent Sunni and a territory

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[87] Jonathan Fox, *Ethnoreligious Conflict Codebook,* <www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/mar/links.html> (accessed June 2002). It is important to reiterate that an identity-oriented measurement was chosen to categorize religious conflicts. Using this broad measurement, cases where religion may not be a central issue in the conflict are included so that the comprehensive nature of religion in conflict can be evaluated. It should also be noted that in preliminary tests used in the development of this study, altering the definition did not significantly alter the results of the study.

[88] 'Adherents.com' 16 August 2000. <www.adherents.com> (August 2003)

of eighty percent Shi'ite was considered a 'religious conflict.' The denomination was only used in consideration of the categorization of 'religious conflicts.'

In order to determine if the opposing sides differed in religion, each group was categorized using the above categories and then compared. In cases where two states were in conflict, the religion of the two groups was determined by the dominant religion of the two states. In cases where a territory was fighting for greater autonomy or secession from a state, the dominant religion of the ethno-religious group or groups and the religion of the remainder of the state were noted.

'Religious conflicts' were determined by comparing the dominant religion of each group. 'Religious conflicts' were those cases where 1) both groups were categorized as differing religious identities (ie: Buddhist versus Christian), 2) one group was categorized as 'mixed' and the other categorized as one of the five major world religions or as atheist (ie: Mixed versus Islam), and 3) one group was predominantly one denomination and the other was mixed denominations within the same broad religion (ie: Catholic versus Christian).

The reason for including conflicts involving mixed groups and denominational conflicts is related to the way the information was collected. Because the religious identity of a state was determined by the faith which claimed over eighty percent of the population, there is the potential for a dominant religion (with less than eighty percent of the population) to hold power in the state. In such a situation, an ethno-religious group may not feel adequately represented by the government. Their frustration may be explicitly religious if they were not permitted to worship as their tradition requires or their frustration may be political in that they want greater control of their own affairs. Because it is possible that their frustration may be explicitly religious, it would be a mistake to exclude these cases from a definition of 'religious conflict' based on the identity of the parties.

For instance, in Algeria's struggle for independence from France (Conflict Number 1),[89] I first categorized the dominant religion of the Algerian territory (ninety-nine percent Sunni Islamic) and then the dominant religion of the colonizer (ninety percent Catholic Christian), thus the conflict was determined to be Islamic versus Christian. Because one side was categorized as Islamic and the other as Christian, it was determined that this conflict was religious, although religion may not have been a primary issue in the conflict.

Not all cases were so clear cut. Take, for instance, the conflict in Northern Ireland (Case Number 125). On one side are the Protestants and the British government and on the other side are the Catholics. When one takes the dominant religion of the territory of Northern Ireland (sixty-six percent Protestant, thirty-three

TABLE 3.2: Sample Categorization of Religious Conflicts

Conflict ID	Side A	Religion Side A	Side B	Religion Side B	Comparison	Religious Conflict
1 – Algerian Independence	France	90% Catholic	Algeria	99% Sunni	Christian – Islamic	1
6 – Nagorno-Karabakh	Azerbaijan	93% Islam	Nagorno-Karabakh	Mixed (Islam and Christian)	Islam – Mixed	1
27 – Tibet	China	Atheist	Tibet	Mixed (45% Buddhist)	Atheist – Mixed	1
39 – Cyprus	Greek Cypriots	99% Orthodox	Turkish Cypriots	95% Islam	Christian – Islam	1
118 – Basque	Spain	99% Catholic	Basque	Catholic	Catholic – Catholic	0
124 – Kurdistan	Turkey	99% Sunni	Kurdistan	99% Sunni	Sunni – Sunni	0

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[89] Data codings are listed in Appendix 2.

percent Catholic) and the dominant religion of what they view as the colonizer (ninety percent Protestant), the conflict could be classified as Christian versus Christian and thus not 'religious' by the definition used in this study. For this reason, the denomination was taken into consideration. As such, the Northern Ireland conflict would be classified as Protestant versus mixed Christian and thus a 'religious conflict.' A few prominent examples that illustrate how the conflicts were categorized are listed in Table 3.2.

- Relevance of Religion (Relevance)

    Some conflicts that might be defined as 'religious' by the identity-oriented definition may primarily be conflicts over other issues. The 'relevance of religion' variable evaluates the importance of religion relevant to the other issues.

    1 = No difference in the religious identity of the two groups.

    2 = There is a difference of religious identity between the two groups, however the groups are not in close proximity to each other and the identity is not referenced by the groups (ie: colonial struggles).

    3 = There is a difference of religious identity between two groups in close proximity in which a dominated group is fighting for greater autonomy or secession and the religious identity is referenced by one or both groups.

    4 = A religious issue divides two groups of differing religious identities who live in close proximity to each other.

In the chi-square tests of association that use 'relevance' as a control variable of the relationship between religion and conflict intensity, relevance is collapsed down to two categories – high relevance and low relevance. High relevance is assigned to

cases that scored 3 or 4 on the relevance variable, while low relevance is assigned to cases scoring 1 or 2 on the relevance variable.

TABLE 3.3: Distribution of 'Relevance' Variable

	No Relevance	Minimal Relevance	Moderate Relevance	Highly Relevant	TOTAL
Not Religious Conflicts	43	0	24[90]	0	**67**
Religious Conflicts	15	33	163	0	**211**
TOTAL	**58**	**33**	**187**	**0**	**278**

Variables to Measure the Intensity of a Conflict

- Deaths (Deaths)

    The PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset measures the intensity of a conflict by the total number of battle deaths both yearly and throughout the duration of a conflict phase. They use a 3-point ordinal scale to differentiate the intensity of the various conflicts. The scale is as follows:

    1 = Minor Armed Conflict

        "More than 25 battle-related deaths in a year, but less than 1,000 accumulated over the course of the conflict."[91]

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[90] Though it may seem counter-intuitive to have cases of non-religious conflicts in which religion is relevant, these 24 cases are the result of the measurement of religious dissimilarity in this study. A religious conflict is defined by the identities of the two groups in conflict using a high threshold, while relevance takes account the use of religious identity by one or both groups in the conflict. These 24 cases are those in which there was an interdenominational dispute or 80% of the population of one group did not differ from 80% of the population in the other group, but one group in the conflict referred to religious differences of the two groups.

2 = Intermediate Armed Conflict

"More than 25 battle-related deaths in a year and more than 1,000 accumulated over the course of the conflict."[92]

3 = War

"More than 1,000 battle-related deaths in a year."[93]

As PRIO's intensity scale is based solely on the number of deaths in the conflict, it is used in this study as a measure of the level of violence in a conflict (renamed 'Deaths'). This ordinal scale of intensity based on battle deaths is more accurate than collecting data on the actual number of battle-related deaths because of the widely varying figures that exist. For instance, in the conflict surrounding whether the Hyderabad province would join India or Pakistan after independence, reports ranged from 1,800 deaths[94] to 12,000 deaths.[95] Or in the war between Iran

TABLE 3.4: Distribution of 'Deaths' Variable

	Minor Conflict	Intermediate Conflict	War	TOTAL
Not Religious Conflicts	34	13	20	67
Religious Conflicts	88	55	68	211
TOTAL	122	68	88	278

[91] Strand, et al. *Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook*, p 7
[92] Ibid.
[93] Ibid.
[94] Jacob Bercovitch and Richard Jackson, *International Conflict: A Chronological Encyclopedia of Conflicts and Their Management 1945-1995,* (Washington (D.C.): Congressional Quarterly Press, 1997)
[95] James Ciment, *Encyclopedia of Conflict Since World War II,* (Armonk (NY): Sharpe Reference, 2000)

and Iraq in the 1980's, reports of deaths ranged from 400,000[96] to over 1,000,000.[97] Such disparate estimates make an interval measurement of the number of deaths in a conflict virtually useless. Therefore, PRIO's ordinal measure of intensity is used as a measure of violence in place of the actual number of battle deaths.

- Duration (Duration)

    The PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset contains a variable that marks the beginning, ending and duration of a conflict in years. Though, I would prefer a more precise variable that calculates the duration in days (and provides more variation in one of the dependent variables), I used what is available in this regard. Thus, 'duration' will be measured as the total number of years a conflict phase lasted.

- Intensity Index (Intensity and DurScale)

    By combining 'deaths' with 'duration,' an alternative variable that takes into account the duration of a particular level of violence can be created. In order to do this, the 'duration' variable was converted to an ordinal scale and then summed with the 'deaths' variable for each case. Both scales range from 1-3 in order to equally weight both components in the 'intensity index.' The 'deaths' variable (as previously scaled) was added to a 'duration' variable (scaled as follows) creating an intensity variable ranging from 2-6.

    DurScale

        1 = one year

        2 = two to four years

        3 = more than four years

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[96] Heidelberg Institute on International Conflict Research, 'KOSIMO Dataset', <www.hiik.de> (November 2003).
[97] Bercovitch and Jackson, *International Conflict*

TABLE 3.5: Distribution of 'DurScale' Variable

	Short Duration	Moderate Duration	Long Duration	TOTAL
Not Religious Conflicts	35	19	13	**67**
Religious Conflicts	105	69	37	**211**
TOTAL	**140**	**88**	**50**	278

TABLE 3.6: Distribution of 'Intensity' Variable

	Low Intensity	Somewhat Low Intensity	Moderate Intensity	Somewhat High Intensity	High Intensity	TOTAL
Not Religious Conflicts	22	14	15	10	6	67
Religious Conflicts	44	52	72	34	9	**211**
TOTAL	**66**	**66**	**87**	**44**	**15**	**278**

Variables to Measure the Organizational Influence

(for participants in religious conflicts only)

- Religious Support of Internal Participants (OrgSup)

This variable indicates if any of the internal participants had the support of a religious group. It is intended to measure what McAdam and others have shown to be the organizational qualities of religion that influence particular conflicts (see Chapter 2). In order to determine if a group had formal religious support, I

depended on contemporary news articles archived in Lexus-Nexus, as well as on organizational websites and interviews with leading clergy. When the clergy or article made it clear that the organization (ie: Orthodox Church) vocally endorsed the movement, the group was categorized as having formal support from a religious organization. When clergy spoke as individuals, rather than church representatives, the group was classified as not having formal support from a religious organization.

0 = no formal support from religious organization (150 cases)

1 = formal support from a religious organization (17 cases)

- Informal Religious Support of Internal Participants (Informal)

    In some of the cases evaluated there were a significant number of clerics who spoke in support of the movement, however the formal religious organization did not officially express support for the movement. Because the organizational variable is intended to measure the moral leadership of the organization, informal support has the potential of being as important as formal support and is thus included as a control variable in the analysis of Chapter 6. The variable is coded as follows:

0 = no informal support (83 cases)

1 = only informal support (not including formal support) (84 cases)

Variables to Measure the Doctrinal Influence

(for participants in religious conflicts only)

- Existence of Cosmic War Interpretation of Conflict (Cosmic)

    For participants in religious conflicts, I recorded whether or not any of the groups interpreted a conflict in terms of a larger metaphysical spiritual context. Because the focus is on the ability of cosmic war interpretations to mobilize fervent support, recording this variable did not require that I 'get inside the heads' of

participants. Rather, if the group 'advertises' itself as participants in a cosmic war (which is evident in press releases, recorded statements made by group leaders and often news reports about the group), it was recorded as having a cosmic war interpretation. In order to determine a group's score on this variable, I relied on press releases, speeches, interviews, historiographies and contemporary news accounts of the groups and their leaders.

> 0 = no group involved in the conflict interprets the conflict in a cosmic war world view (143 cases)

> 1 = one of more of the groups involved in the conflict interpret the conflict in a cosmic war world view (24 cases)

Because it only takes one group to bring the world view into the conflict, it was not necessary for both groups to have such a world view in order to impact the conflict. Rather, it is only necessary that one group has this world view.

- Reference to Violent and Non-violent Traditions and Symbols (vTrad and nvTrad)

> Because it is believed that references to violent and non-violent traditions and symbols make mobilization easier and provide greater legitimacy, it is the public (and not private) references to them that are important to this study. As with the previous variable, this information was obtained by evaluating press releases and recorded statements of group leaders, as well as by noting any symbols of the groups (flags, shields, etc.).

> *vTrad*

> 0 = No group involved in the conflict references violent religious traditions. (147 cases)

> 1 = One or more groups involved in the conflict reference violent religious traditions. (20 cases)

nvTrad

> 0 = No group involved in the conflict references non-violent religious
>
> traditions. (164 cases)

> 1 = One or more groups involved in the conflict reference non-violent
>
> religious traditions. (3 cases)

Variables to Measure the Religious Diaspora Influence

(for participants in religious conflicts only)

▪ Military Support of One Side (Military)

The KOSIMO dataset overlaps significantly with the PRIO Armed Conflict

Dataset and contains a list of the external participants in each conflict as well as the

type of intervention they made. An external participant was defined as "parties that

become involved during a conflict ... [whose] influence on one of the directly

involved parties was evidently relevant to the course of the conflict."[98]

In order to code this variable, I began by identifying how many external

participants shared a religious identity with the internal participant on whose behalf

they intervened. This was determined by labeling the participants by the religion

that claimed over 80 percent of the population as adherents.[99] Where these labels

were identical, it was determined that the external participant shared a religious

identity with the beneficiary. I then identified how many of these external

participants provided military intervention as coded by KOSIMO.

This variable represents the total number of external participants that

intervened militarily and shared a religious identity with the party on whose side

they intervened.

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[98] Heidelberg Institute on International Conflict Research, 'KOSIMO Dataset'
[99] This is the same method that was used to determine whether the conflict was 'religious.'

0 = no military support (107 cases)

1 = one external participant provided military support (12 cases)

2 = two external participants provided military support (6 cases)

- Weapons Support of One Side (Weapons)

    As with the previous variable, the KOSIMO dataset identified all external participants and their method of intervention. I first determined how many external participants shared a religious identity with the internal participant on whose behalf they intervened in the method used for the previous variable. Following this, I identified the total number of these participants that provided weapons support, which was coded as 'Weapons.'

    0 = no weapons support (74 cases)

    1 = one external participant provided weapons support (39 cases)

    2 = two external participants provided weapons support (7 cases)

    3 = three external participants provided weapons support (2 cases)

    5 = five external participants provided weapons support (2 cases)

    6 = six external participants provided weapons support (1 case)

- Political Support of One Side (Political)

    As with the previous two variables, the KOSIMO dataset identified all external participants and their method of intervention. To code this variable, the number of external participants sharing a religious identity with their beneficiary was first determined in the same process as with the previous two variables. Then, the total number of external participants sharing a religious identity that provided political support was coded as 'Political.'

0 = no political support (87 cases)

1 = one external participant provided political support (30 cases)

2 = two external participants provided political support (7 cases)

3 = three external participants provided political support (1 case)

- Mediators (Mediators)

The participants who become involved to mediate a conflict are separated out from those who supported one side or the other using a Mediator variable. Each mediator is listed in the original KOSIMO Project data set regardless of the outcome of their mediation. According to the KOSIMO Codebook,

> *"Mediators are intervening parties. They can be private individuals, non-governmental organizations (humanitarian organizations, church groups or the official church), delegations from regional, national or international organizations, UN missions or negotiation teams of one or more states (contact groups). Mediators may not be neutral to the issues involved in the conflict but they have to be impartial and equidistant with respect to the parties. A mediator's goal can be the conclusion of an immediate cease-fire or a treaty. Mediators may simply establish communication channels among parties and facilitate their dialogue or encourage a more constructive dialogue by formulating proposals or compromises for the parties."[100]*

As with the previous variable the total number of mediators sharing a religious identity with either side is recorded using the same measurement to determine the religion of the mediators as was used to determine the "Religious Conflict" variable.

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[100] Heidelberg Institute on International Conflict Research, 'KOSIMO Dataset'

0 = no mediation (92 cases)

1 = one external participant provided mediation (31 cases)

3 = three external participants provided mediation (1 case)

5 = five external participants provided mediation (1 case)

Of the 278 cases of territory conflict available in the original PRIO data, 211 were classified as "religious conflicts" that required further data collection. In order to collect the data necessary for these variables, I read roughly 4,000-5,000 documents ranging from news articles and transcripts in the Lexis-Nexis database, journal articles cited in the Social Science Abstract Index, JSTOR and EBSCO databases, entries in conflict encyclopedias and where available I located group websites through the yahoo search engine and depended on books about specific conflicts or regional hotspots. In eighty-six of the conflict phases, I was unable to locate sufficient documentation on the parties involved in the conflict and classified these cases as 'missing data.' There are however a sufficient number of cases (125 cases) remaining with which to test the hypotheses. Of the cases dropped, there were a disproportionate number of cases involving Christianity and lower intensity conflicts. The tables testing for potential bias of the dropped cases are summed in Table 3.7 and 3.8. Though less than ideal, the final dataset is adequate for the purposes of this study.

TABLE 3.7: Intensity Distribution of Dropped Cases

	% Kept	% Dropped
Low Intensity	17	27
Somewhat Low Intensity	22	28
Moderate Intensity	37	30
Somewhat High Intensity	21	9
High Intensity	3	6
N	125	86
Average Intensity	3.71	3.40
T-value	2.0414	
Probability	0.0425	
Chi-Square	8.6828	
Probability	0.070	
Tau-B	-0.1406	
Probability	0.0252	
Pearson's R	-0.1398	
Probability	0.0425	

TABLE 3.8: Type of Religion Distribution of Dropped Cases

	Buddhist		Christian		Hindu		Islamic		Jewish	
	% Kept	%Dropped	% Kept	%Dropped	% Kept	%Dropped	% Kept	%Dropped	% Kept	%Dropped
Not Religious Conflicts	89	92	50	70	84	83	42	76	95	94
Religious Conflicts	11	8	50	30	16	17	58	24	5	6
N	125	86	125	86	125	86	125	86	125	86
Chi-value	0.3034		**7.8605**		0.0766		1.1120		**0.1060**	
Probability	*0.582*		*0.005*		*0.782*		*0.292*		*0.070*	
Tau-Value	-0.0379		**-0.193**		0.019		0.0726		0.0224	
Probability	*0.5842*		*0.0052*		*0.7839*		*0.2934*		*0.7476*	
Pearson's R	-0.0379		**-0.1930**		0.019		0.0726		0.0224	
Probability	*0.5839*		*0.0049*		*0.7833*		*0.2939*		*0.7462*	

Methodology

By collecting the data for these variables in a large cross-sectional dataset that extends over fifty-five years, the hypotheses set out at the beginning of this chapter can be tested in a unique and insightful way. In this study, a series of correlations and non-linear regressions will be used to statistically test the relationship between religion and the intensity of a conflict. Each hypothesis can be represented by a correlation or non-linear regression equation that will test the relationship expected in the hypothesis. Following is a delineation of each hypothesis, the equation that will be used to test it, and a description of how the equation should be interpreted.

Hypothesis 1:   There is a strong, positive relationship between the involvement of religion in a conflict and the intensity of a conflict.

In order to test this hypothesis, a correlation 1) between the involvement of religion and the number of deaths in a conflict, 2) between the involvement of religion and the duration of a conflict, and 3) between the involvement of religion and the intensity of a conflict will be established. This can be done by comparing tabular distributions of the variables using several different measures of association.

There are multiple statistical tests that would allow a comparison of the intensity of religious conflicts to that of other conflicts. As the lowest level of measurement for the variables is nominal, a nominal test (such as a chi-square test) might seem the most appropriate. It is also possible, however to treat a dichotomous nominal variable as an ordinal variable as the order can be implied. Thus, it is possible to use an ordinal test of association such as (Kendall's Tau-B or the Jonckheere-Terpstra test of ordinal association). Generally an ordinal test would be preferable to a nominal test because it takes advantage of ordering rather than disgarding this information. However there are also circumstances

under which a nominal test would provide a stronger test of the association between the two variables. Specifically, if the relationship does not have a single overall positive or negative trend, but is better described as a curvilinear relationship, the ordinal test will cancel out the opposing trends and exhibit the absence of a single overall trend masking the existence of a relationship. The nominal test, on the other hand, will recognize the relationship.

Furthermore, it is possible to use an interval level test (such as a difference of means t-test or Pearson's r) "by assigning scores to [an ordinal variable's] levels."[101] In the case of the ordinal variable used in this chapter, 'Intensity,' the category labeled 'Low Intensity' is assigned a score of 2, 'Somewhat Low Intensity' is assigned a score of 3, etc. Although a mean of ordinal scores is still subject to some degree of bias due to its lack of precision, the interval level tests allow for a more sophisticated test of the association between religious conflicts and their intensity. Because of the appropriateness and limits of these tests, the results of each are presented and any differences are scrutinized.

The model explained in Chapter 1 and supported by previous research described in Chapter 2 leads us to expect that each of these statistics will demonstrate a strong positive relationship between religion and conflict that would be exhibited by a significantly positive statistic. As will be described further in Chapter 4, the relevance and type of religion are important control variables that should be explored.

The three qualities of religion – doctrine, organization and diaspora – are then separated out to determine if these uniquely religious qualities are related to a higher intensity in conflict. The remaining hypotheses allow for the isolation of these qualities and test of mechanisms by which religion is expected to influence a conflict. A non-linear regression equation is used to test all of the remaining hypotheses. It is important to note

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[101] Alan Agresti and Barbara Finlay, *Statistical Methods for the Social Sciences*, 3rd edition. (Upper Saddle River (NJ): Prentice Hall, 1997) p 282.

that only cases of religious conflict (125 cases) will be used in these tests as the central issue in question is concerning the dynamics of conflicts involving religion.

The ideal and most common quantitative method for testing these hypotheses is the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. In OLS regression, the line that best illustrates and explains the dependent variable (intensity) is determined using a set of independent variables (doctrine, organizational support and diaspora). The best-fit line is then tested to see if it adequately predicts changes in the dependent variable or if there is significant unexplained error in the model. In order to use OLS regression, however, it is assumed that the dependent variable is continuous. In this study, the dependent variable is not continuous as it ranges from 2 to 6 and can only take whole number values. If OLS regression were used in this case, a significant bias in the results is possible leaving the results highly questionable. Rather, in this case, an ordinal logit test is much more appropriate.[102] As Alan Agresti points out "loglinear and logit models directly reflect the actual discrete way the variables are measured."[103]

The equation which will provide insight into the dynamics of religious conflicts is:[104]

$$\text{Intensity} = a + \beta \text{ (Cosmic)} + \beta \text{ (vTrad)} + \beta \text{ (nvTrad)} + \beta \text{ (OrgSup)} + \beta \text{ (Military)} +$$

$$\beta \text{ (Weapons)} + \beta \text{ (Political)} + \beta \text{ (Mediators)} + \beta \text{ (Relevance)} + \beta \text{ (Hinduism)} +$$

$$\beta \text{ (Judaism)} + e$$

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[102] Ordinal logit is preferable to the more common multinomial logit because it uses more efficiently the information available while multinomial logit discards it.

[103] Agresti, *Analysis of Ordinal Categorical Data*, p 150.

[104] See appendix for list a variables, their abbreviations and measurements. In interpreting this equation, the first β indicates the influence of a cosmic war world view, the second β indicates the influence of appeals to violent traditions and symbols, the third β indicates the influence of appeals to non-violent traditions and symbols, the fourth β indicates the influence of support for either side by a religious organization, the fifth β indicates the number of military interventions by the religious diaspora of one side in the conflict; the sixth β indicates the number of religious diaspora states that provided weapons for their co-faithful in the conflict; the seventh β indicates the number of religious diaspora states that provided political or economic support to their co-faithful in the conflict; and the eighth β indicates the influence of the diaspora when intervening to mediate a conflict. The remaining variables (in italics) are included as control variables that researchers have found to be important in determining the intensity of a conflict. In order, they represent: the relevance of religion in a conflict, and the religious tradition involved.

Hypothesis 2: When one or both groups involved in a conflict has a cosmic war world view, the conflict will be more intense than if neither participant had such a world view.

By evaluating the coefficient of the cosmic war world view variable ('Cosmic'), it will be possible to determine if the world view of the groups in conflict impact the intensity of a conflict. The results of the above equation, then, provide insight into the relationship between religion and conflict by elucidating the relationship between a cosmic war world view and the intensity of a conflict. As the model, hypotheses and previous research state, one would expect the coefficient for this variable to be significantly positive. A negative or insignificant coefficient would indicate that there is an inverse or no relationship, respectively, between the cosmic war world view and intensity of a conflict.

Hypothesis 3: The appeal to violent religious traditions and symbols in support of violent actions in a conflict will increase the intensity of an existing conflict.

The above equation also provides insight into the relationship between doctrine and conflict intensity in the value of the coefficient for the violent traditions and symbols variable ('vTrad'). The model and previous research would lead us to expect a significantly positive coefficient for both variables. If, however, the coefficient is insignificant, it would indicate that appeals to violent traditions and symbols have no effect on the violence and duration of a conflict. Additionally, it is possible for the coefficient to take a significantly negative value, which would indicate a strong inverse relationship in which appeals to violent traditions and symbols encouraged shorter, less violent conflicts.

Hypothesis 4: The appeal to religious traditions and symbols in support of non-violent actions in a conflict will decrease the intensity of an existing conflict.

One would expect the coefficient for non-violent traditions and symbols ('nvTrad') to exhibit a significantly negative value if appeals to these traditions in fact decrease the intensity of a conflict. A positive or insignificant coefficient would indicate that intensity was increased by appeals to non-violent traditions or there was no relationship at all, respectively. Thus, one would accept a significantly negative coefficient for the non-violent traditions and symbols variable as support for the above hypothesis.

Hypothesis 5: Formal support for one or more groups involved in a conflict by a religious organization will increase the intensity of an existing conflict.

The model and previous research suggests that organizational support encourages a higher intensity in the conflict through its members, leaders and communications network. If this is true, the variable measuring support by religious organizations ('OrgSup') should have a significantly positive coefficient.

Hypothesis 6: The supply of weapons, political intervention of military intervention of a religious diaspora will increase the intensity of a conflict.

The model in Chapter 1 suggests that the involvement of the diaspora in support of one side in the conflict will increase the intensity by strengthening one side and encouraging them to fight until all their demands are met. If this hypothesis is true, one would expect the coefficients for 'Military,' 'Weapons,' and 'Political' to each be significantly positive.

Hypothesis 7: The involvement of a religious diaspora will decrease the intensity of an existing conflict if they intervene to mediate a conflict.

Furthermore, when an external participant sharing a religious identity with one of the internal participants becomes involved in trying to mediate or resolve the conflict, it is expected that the conflict will decrease in intensity. This would be demonstrated by a significantly negative coefficient for the mediation variable ('Mediators') in the above ordinal logit equation.

Illustrative Comparative Case Study

While the statistics provide a great deal of insight in regards to trends and the observable relationship between the qualities of a religion and intensity of a conflict in a large number of cases, they are limited in their ability to provide a 'thick' description of a particular conflict. To further elucidate the evidence generated by the statistical analysis, it is beneficial to explore a set of comparative case studies to illustrate the causal mechanisms laid out in the model and hypotheses.

Three comparative case studies are used to separately investigate each of the qualities of religion expected to be the source of an increased intensity of religious conflicts – doctrine, organizational structure and diaspora. To explore the influence of the doctrinal qualities of religion (Hypotheses 2-4), I compare the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines and the Bougainville Revolutionary Army in Papau New Guinea. These cases were selected because they share a number of socio-economic and historical similarities yet differ in terms of the use of doctrine by one of the groups involved in the conflict. Both the Abu Sayyaf Group and the Bougainville Revolutionary Army feel their ethnic group has been discriminated against and are fighting for increased autonomy or independence. Both ethnic

groups differ in the religious identity from the remainder of the country. But significantly the two groups differ in their use of religious doctrine to mobilize support for their cause. The Abu Sayyaf Group has frequently made reference to jihad and the obligation of Muslims to fight the corruption of infidels in their homeland. The Bougainville Revolutionary Army, however, has made no mention of their religious identity or religious doctrine to justify their fight and mobilize support. Thus, a comparison of these two groups illustrates the role of religious doctrine in escalating or de-escalating a conflict. In particular, this case study examines the direct relationship between a cosmic war mentality and references to violent traditions to an increase in the intensity of a conflict.

To illustrate the influence of the organizational qualities of religion on the intensity of a conflict, this study compares the Cypriot Enosis Movement (1950-1960) and the Irish Nationalist Movement (1913-1922). Again these cases were selected because they have a great deal in common socio-economically and historically and because the groups involved share a common goal, yet differ in terms of religious organizational support for one of the groups involved in the conflict. Like the Irish Nationalist Movement, the Cypriot Enosis Movement was initially organized to pressure the British to relinquish their control over a colonial territory. Both became movements of independence in which violence was considered a valid strategy. In both cases, the religious identity of the colonized population differed from British religious identity. The difference between the two movements – and their importance to this study – lay in the churches' positions in regards to the movements. In Cyprus, the movement was dominated and led directly from the leadership and hierarchy of the Cypriot Orthodox Church. The movement and the Church were almost indistinguishable at times. In Ireland, though, the Catholic Church took a hands off approach in which they did not actively participate in or support the Nationalist Movement. In some cases, the Church was even active in opposing the movement. The analysis of Ireland was not extended beyond independence when the Church became more openly

supportive of the Nationalist Movement because the conflict then becomes incomparable to the Cypriot conflict as it is essentially different in terms of the issue and goals of the parties involved. In comparing the Cypriot Enosis movement and the Irish Nationalist movement a greater understanding of the direct role the religious organizations play in further escalating the conflict is gained.

To elaborate on the influence of the final quality of religion expected to impact the intensity of a conflict – its diaspora quality – a comparison of Sudan's Civil War (1983-present) and Senegal's Casamance conflict (1982-present) is carried out. These two conflicts make a useful comparison because they are similar in their context and histories yet differ in the involvement of the diaspora. In the Sudan, as in Senegal, the southern population has been disenfranchised by the northern central government dominated by Muslims. In both the Sudanese civil war and Senegal's Casamance conflict, the southern population has chosen to fight for greater autonomy or outright independence. However, the two conflicts differ in the degree of international involvement to support either side. Both Senegal and the Casamancais separatists have received very little international support. On the other hand, the Sudanese government and rebels have both received significant support in the way of inspirational precedents and material resources. By comparing these two cases, a deeper understanding of the nature of religious diaspora support in its relation to conflict intensity is gained.

Taken together these three comparative case studies provide an illustration and further insight into the precise role that religion plays in escalating a conflict. The thickness of this sort of qualitative method enhances the study by complementing the quantitative test and thereby allows for a deeper understanding of the dynamics of the relationship under consideration.

Conclusion

By combining a quantitative test and illustrative case studies, this study maximizes both internal and external validity. The quantitative element, by using numerous cases between 1946 and 2001 around the world, allows for greater external validity and confidence that the results are applicable across the board and not to one specific case. As mentioned previously, this corrects one of the greatest weaknesses of the current body of research in religious conflicts. At the same time, the comparative case studies increase the study's internal validity through a closer analysis of two specific cases in order to ensure that all significant variables have been considered. Using this research design, this thesis explores the nature of the relationship between religion and conflict.

CHAPTER 4: Religion and the Intensity of Conflicts

When one is asked about the relationship between religion and conflict, the immediate response is generally one of apprehension, drawing on images of the Crusades and suicide bombers. As Charles Kimball asserts, "Religious ideologies and commitments are indisputably central factors in the escalation of violence and evil around the world."[105] Mark Juergensmeyer even suggests that for some religious faithful, war is preferred to peace because it "offers the illusion of power."[106] Is this reputation deserved? Are conflicts involving religion really more deadly, longer lasting or more intense than other types of conflicts? These are the questions that concern this chapter as the first hypothesis is tested.

Hypothesis 1:   There is a strong positive relationship between the involvement of religion in a conflict and the intensity of a conflict.

Religious Conflict and Conflict Intensity

As the headlines cited in the opening chapter illustrate, it is a popular stereotype that there is something about religious conflicts that make them more violent. Images of suicide bombers in the Middle East, of pipe bombs and punishment killings in Northern Ireland, of the near-genocide in Southern Sudan, of violent riots over the institution of Sharia Law in North Africa, and of the verge of nuclear war in Kashmir are typical conceptions of religious conflicts – and these are only a few examples from within the last decade alone. Go further into history and almost inconceivable examples spring to mind – the genocide of Jews in the Holocaust and massacre of Muslims in the Crusades. From these and other

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[105] Charles Kimball, *When Religion Becomes Evil,* (New York: HarperCollins, 2002) p 4.
[106] Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*, (London: University of California Press, 2000) p 154.

events, the widespread belief is that combining religion with conflict – either sincerely or manipulatively – escalates a conflict to a greater intensity than would otherwise be present.

As discussed in Chapter 2, the academic literature seems to reach the same conclusion about religious conflicts. Through the use of religious doctrine, organization and diaspora, religion serves to intensify a conflict by generating a well-organized and well-supported organization of followers who are motivated and willing to sacrifice themselves for the cause without compromise. Mark Juergensmeyer and Bruce Hoffman's research suggests that a cosmic war perception developed from a religious theology causes followers to feel obligated to participate and willing to die without compromise in their physical battle in the metaphysical war between good and evil. The violent traditions and myths of religious doctrines legitimize a movement by placing one's current struggle in a historical context thereby providing them with a pattern of behavior and obligating them to continue the tradition as Armstrong and Sells found in their respective case studies. McAdam's ground-breaking study of religious organizational influence in a conflict identified the leaders, members and communications networks central to mobilizing and sustaining a movement involved in a violent confrontation. In particular, Falconer's study of Northern Ireland and Kepel's study of Iran supported McAdam's conclusion that the leaders provided leadership and moral legitimacy to the movement, Palmer's research on the Croatian Catholic Church in Yugoslavia agreed with McAdam that the members provided additional personnel who were responsive to their leaders and Thomas' study found that the communications network enables the movement to function efficiently. Taken together these all sustain a movement throughout a prolonged violent conflict. The contagion effect of a successful revolution can inspire a movement to mobilize their own violent struggle as deFronzo recognized with the Iranian Revolution. The diaspora can also offer human and material resources as Kepel found in Bosnia and Rashid found in Afghanistan, political pressure as the Sikh diaspora did according to Mahmood and Gupta or even intervene

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militarily as Ellingsen, Fox, Hill, Rothchild and Cameron's studies suggest is likely and Regan's study found intensifies a conflict.

The previous research does not unequivocally agree with the assumption that religious conflicts are more intense than other types of conflict, however. A substantial body of research has developed that qualifies the nature of the relationship between religion and the intensity of conflicts. As described more fully in Chapter 2, Scott Appleby has argued that religion can only be used for violence when the faithful are not "well formed spiritually and informed theologically."[107] Charles Kimball agrees that authentic religion is not capable of violence and that religious violence is evidence that a religion has been corrupted. Gary Marx offers an alternative explanation by focusing on the substance of religious theology. He argues that an emphasis in the theology on the importance of action in this world encourages violence, while an emphasis on the afterlife does not.

The discussion of the peaceful influences of religion is usually done in a normative sense in which suggestions and arguments about how religion has the capacity and *should* be involved in conflicts in order to bring them to a peaceful end, rather than on how that is the dominant way in which religion is involved in conflicts. On the whole, however, popular conceptions and most previous research lead us to expect a strong positive relationship between the involvement of religion in a conflict and the intensity of that conflict in spite of its capacity and normative role.

Underpinning the theoretical and case study explanations of how religion serves to intensify a conflict is the assumption that religion is associated with a higher level of violence. This demands justification. Two studies in particular have quantitatively addressed this assumption to test its validity. Philip Roeder approaches the question within the clash of civilizations debate by attempting to determine how much religious division influences the intensity of a conflict. Roeder counts as a civilizational conflict any conflict

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[107] R. Scott Appleby, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence and Reconciliation*, (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2000) p 17.

in which the "dominant religion of the ethnic group belongs to a different civilization than that of the majority of the country's population."[108] Roeder uses a dataset of over 1,000 domestic ethnopolitical conflicts between 1980-99 in part to determine whether these civilizational conflicts are any more intense than other cultural conflicts. Using a logistical model, Roeder concludes that civilizational differences are a significant determinant of both the intensity and increase of intensity in a conflict, thereby supporting the assumption that religious differences are associated with more intense conflicts.

More recently, Fox addresses the question of the intensity of religious conflicts in a quantitative study using the State Failure dataset that includes "1135 conflict years between 1950 and 1996."[109] By using a t-test that compares the average intensity of religious and non-religious conflicts, Fox concludes that religious conflicts are more intense than non-religious conflicts, although he notes the ambiguity of the results. Like this study, Fox relies on an identity-oriented definition, though no effort was made to account for the relevance of religion to a conflict. An earlier study of Fox's testing the role of religious legitimacy on the formation of grievances, however, indicates relevance is an important component in the relationship between religion and conflict.[110]

Quantitative Test

Are the plethora of case studies deviations from the norm or is there a relationship between the involvement of religion and a higher intensity of conflict across the board? The plethora of case studies leaves one with the impression that religious conflicts are inevitably more violent *because* of the involvement of religion, even if normatively religion has the capacity to bring peace rather than violence. Because the case study method has been used

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[108] Philip G. Roeder, 'Clash of Civilizations and Escalation of Domestic Ethnopolitical Conflicts,' *Comparative Political Studies,* 36 (2003) p 516.
[109] Jonathan Fox, 'Religion and State Failure: An Examination of the Extent and Magnitude of Religious Conflict from 1950 to 1996', *International Political Science Review*, 25 (2004) p 55.
[110] Jonathan Fox, 'The Influence of Religious Legitimacy on Grievance Formation by Ethno-Religious Minorities', *Journal of Peace Research*, 36 (1999) pp 289-307.

so widely in this field of study, this thesis will complement previous research by addressing the question in a cross-sectional, time series model that simultaneously compares a large number of cases.

In order to do this, a dataset of 278 cases of territory conflict phases occurring between 1946 and 2001 in all parts of the world are compared statistically. The data (described more fully in Chapter 3) was originally compiled by the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo, Norway (PRIO) in collaboration with Uppsala University and the Norwegian University of Science and Technology. The dataset, however, did not differentiate between religious conflicts and other types of conflict, thus a variable called 'Religious_Conflict' was added in order to permit a comparison.[111]

As described more fully in Chapter 3, there are multiple tests of association that are each beneficial and limited in their own respects. For this analysis, a chi-square, Kendall's Tau-B, Pearson's R and difference of means t-test are all used to determine the relationship between religion and conflict intensity. The results of these statistical tests are summed in Table 4.1. The insignificant tau-value, correlation and difference of means test all indicate that religious conflicts are no more or less intense than any other type of conflicts. These statistics suggest that the stereotypes, common perceptions and the plethora of case studies evaluating the excessive violence of religious conflicts are anomalies that have received disproportionate attention. The only statistic that provides support for Hypothesis 1, the popular stereotypes and great majority of the academic literature is the chi-square statistic. The chi-square value, while indicating a significant relationship between religion and conflict intensity at a ninety percent confidence level, nevertheless demonstrates a weak result and is not the overwhelming proof one might have expected from previous research. In fact, if one were to use another commonly used significance level (ninety-five percent), the results would

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[111] See Chapter 3 for a complete description of the measurement and coding of this variable.

TABLE 4.1: Religious Conflicts and Intensity

	% Not Religious Conflicts	% Religious Conflicts
Low Intensity	33	21
Somewhat Low Intensity	21	25
Moderate Intensity	22	34
Somewhat High Intensity	15	16
High Intensity	9	4
N	67	211
Average Intensity	3.46	3.58
T-value	-0.7328	
Probability	*0.4643*	
Chi-value	**7.7327**	
Probability	***0.102***	
Tau-value	0.0525	
Probability	*0.3354*	
Pearson's R	0.0441	
Probability	*0.4643*	

indicate a lack of relationship between the involvement of religion and conflict intensity. Like Fox's results, the results of this test are far from conclusive.

It is worth noting that there are more cases of religious than non-religious territory conflicts. Although a broad definition of religious conflict is used, this nevertheless indicates that territory conflicts are more often than not divided along religious lines as well as land boundaries. This observation however does not make any pretenses about the importance of religion or religious issues in territory conflicts as the relevance of religion has not been taken into account in the Table 4.1 results.

A closer look at the cell values offers a more detailed description of the nature of this relationship. Over fifty percent (fifty-four percent) of non-religious conflicts had either low or somewhat low intensities while fifty percent of religious conflicts exhibited moderate to somewhat high intensities indicating that religious conflicts are characterized by a slightly higher intensity than non-religious conflicts, as suggested by the significant chi-square value. The distribution, however, does not follow a single trend. Rather, religious conflicts dominate the moderate intensity category, while non-religious conflicts fall to the extremes with either higher or lower intensities. Notice that fifty-four percent of non-religious conflicts fall into the lowest two categories of intensity as compared to only forty-six percent of religious conflicts. The other extreme demonstrates the same: twenty-four percent of non-religious conflicts fall into the two highest categories of intensity as compared to only twenty percent of religious conflicts. On the other hand, in the moderate intensity category are thirty-four percent of religious conflicts and only twenty-two percent of non-religious conflicts. Though one can see the pattern indicated by the chi-square values in the intensity distribution of religious and non-religious conflicts, the evidence is not as overwhelmingly convincing as one might have expected. This confirms the conclusion drawn from the borderline significance of the chi-square value.

Why are the results not as convincing as one would have expected? Although limited to the realm of speculation in this study, one possible explanation is that religious conflicts are only more intense under specific conditions. As Appleby suggested, the education of religious faithful may be an important determinant of the relationship. Or as Marx proposed, the emphasis in the religion placed on the afterlife may be an important component of the relationship. Furthermore, religious identity may only intensify a conflict when it exists in conjunction with discrimination against the religious identity, a meddling international diaspora, a tight community network to organize the faithful or a highly regarded religious hierarchy. Without considering religious conflicts in the context of these

and countless other hypothetical factors, the overall relationship between religion and conflict intensity may appear weak or non-existent when in reality it is contingent on specific conditions.

The incongruence between the Table 4.1 results and expectations may also be due to the broad definition of religious conflict used in this study. As described in Chapter 1, there are two broad categories of definitions, one focusing on the identities of the parties involved and the other on the issues at the heart of the conflict. Each definition comes with its unique limitations. This study took advantage of the broader (and measurably more reliable) definition and determined that the oft-assumed relationship with conflict intensity is weak, at best. There are undoubtedly many cases categorized as 'religious' that will raise an eyebrow and draw valid objection. Would altering the definition, and thus altering the categorization of 'religious conflicts,' alter the results of this study? Ideally, the results would be rigorous enough to withstand minor modifications, however the question here is: does choosing an issue-oriented definition over the identity-oriented definition cause a major modification that alters the results? I will return to this question by incorporating 'relevance' as a control variable.

Religious Conflict and Deaths in a Conflict

It is also interesting to explore whether religious conflicts are more deadly than other conflicts (one of the two components of intensity). Here the question is: Does religion encourage its faithful to give up their lives or not respect the lives of their adversaries? A conflict in which one or both parties does not value their own life (in an earthly sense) or does not consider the other side to be truly human logically leads one to expect the conflict to be more deadly. Religion is one belief system in which disregard for one's own life or for their enemies' lives may develop in the world-view of its adherents.

Every religion provides its followers with an explanation of the afterlife in which actions in this life have both rewards and punishments. The faithful strive to obey God or achieve perfection in order to please God and enjoy the benefits of eternal reward. Thus, when the faithful believe that their God demands that they take part in a violent struggle and even give their lives to the struggle, they are faced with deciding between enduring pain now to reap eternal rewards or disobeying God and guaranteeing eternal punishments – hardly a difficult choice for the religious faithful. From a secular perspective, of course, it would appear that those who are so willing to give up their lives (to a Sikh nation or Palestinian state, for instance) disregard their own lives. When an entire group in conflict shares this worldview in which an obedient death is preferred to a disobedient life, it seems inevitable that the death toll of the conflict will be higher than for other types of conflicts.

Aside from one's view of oneself in a conflict is one's view of the enemy. Whom are you fighting and why? The answer to this question has a significant impact on how much you are willing to give to the struggle. As Karen Armstrong points out:

> *"There are always two sides to a conflict and peace is possible when both sides are prepared to acknowledge this. But once you are fighting for God against his enemies, there can only be one point of view and anything that opposes this becomes monstrous and evil."* [112]

In extreme cases, the enemy can be perceived as not even human. In the theology of the Christian Identity movement in the U.S., for instance, both Jews and blacks are not considered fully human. Adherents to the Christian Identity theology believe that whites descend from the first humans created by God, Adam and Eve, and constitute a superior race. Blacks (referred to as "Mud People"), on the other hand, were formed by God before

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[112] Karen Armstrong, *Holy War: The Crusades and Their Impact on Today's World*, (New York: Anchor Books, 2001) p 118.

Adam and Eve, but were flawed and caused God to make corrections and perfect his creation in the form of Adam and Eve. Christian Identity adherents claim that Jews descend from a result of a union between Eve and Satan (the serpent that tempted Eve in the Garden of Eden) making them part-Satanic and part-human. Given this elaborate explanation of the hierarchy of races in the Christian Identity theology, it is not surprising that its adherents have often used violence against what they consider the sub-human races.[113]

As mentioned before, Juergensmeyer's theory of a cosmic war mentality within some religious groups can also create a mindset that causes a conflict to become more deadly. A cosmic war mentality involves a belief that one is participating in a battle that exists in a metaphysical realm of good versus evil. A faithful combatant with such a worldview is bolstered to stand unwaveringly for good (supported by their deity) and reap the eternal rewards. Inactivity or compromise leads to eternal condemnation. As with those who wish to be martyrs, a cosmic war mentality is logically linked to a higher death toll in a conflict as entire groups submit themselves to fight the good fight to the death, if necessary

There is also an increase in resources – more fighters, more weapons and more deadly weapons – that comes when a sympathetic diaspora become involved. Particularly when a diaspora have immigrated to the West and become successful businessmen – as many Sikhs have, for instance – it, in effect, increases the potential resources for a group in conflict. In the Sikh example, the Sikh diaspora have been a continual source of financial support, weapons, eager fighters and international pressure on the Indian government. The more resources available to a group in conflict, the longer they are able to carry on their struggle increasing the number of deaths over the duration of the conflict. In some cases, the diaspora supply the groups with more deadly and accurate weapons that ensure more deaths with each shot fired.

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[113] It is widely believed that Timothy McVeigh (found guilty of bombing the Murray Federal Building in Oklahoma City) followed Christian Identity teachings, as did Eric Rudolf who is currently on trial for bombs at the 1996 Olympics, two abortion clinics and a gay night club. Furthermore, the Christian Identity theology is often referred to by the Ku Klux Klan and Aryan Nations, among the many white supremist groups in the United States.

In all of these ways, the previous research concludes that religious conflicts are more deadly than other types of conflicts. In order to test this expectation, the average number of deaths in both types of conflicts is compared using a nominal, ordinal and interval test of the 278 cases of territory conflict phases. The results of these tests are displayed in Table 4.2 show that religious conflicts do not have a significantly higher average number of deaths than other conflicts. Why do the statistics not bear out the expected relationship? The most obvious answer is that the relationship does not exist broadly across a large number of cases, though it may be observed in a few anomaly cases. The plethora of case studies may only imply a relationship when in fact the selection of these cases are biased and incapable of observing a widespread relationship.

Another explanation for the divergent results could be related to the methodology used in this study. Methodologically, the number of deaths in a conflict is scaled to a 3-point scale largely because of significant discrepancies in the reported number of deaths for many of the conflicts. A 3-point scale, however, does not allow for a great deal of variation in the dependent variable which in essence raises the threshold that must be reached in order to find a significant difference. If the range for a conflict categorized as '3' is 10,000 and above, it is possible that the average for non-religious conflicts is 10,000 while the average for religious conflicts is 1,000,000. Using the scaled measurement, these associational tests may not identify a significant difference, though clearly religious conflicts should be found to have significantly higher levels of deaths in a conflict.

Unfortunately, the only way to test to see if this is the reason for the discrepancy between the theory and statistical results would be to use the interval level measurement of deaths (the actual number of deaths) or use an expanded ordinal scale (for example, ranging from 1-20), neither of which allow for accuracy or reliability in the measure.

TABLE 4.2: Religious Conflicts and Number of Deaths

	% Not Religious Conflicts	% Religious Conflicts
Low Deaths	51	42
Moderate Deaths	19	26
High Deaths	30	32
N	67	211
Average Deaths	1.79	1.91
T-value	-0.9446	
Probability	*0.3457*	
Chi-value	1.9608	
Probability	*0.375*	
Tau-value	0.0565	
Probability	*0.3209*	
Pearson's R	0.0567	
Probability	*0.3459*	

Furthermore, case studies are also limited in this respect not only in their inability to provide general conclusions, but also in their inability to accurately assess a single case. The number of deaths reported in a given conflict often widely varies depending on the source of the report. The opposition are particularly quick to assert a high casualty rate as it often further legitimizes their movement, while the state is more inclines to deflate the reports in order to brush aside the movement as a weak fringe group. As mentioned previously, the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980's have recorded deaths ranging from 400,000 to over 1,000,000.

Religious Conflict and Duration of a Conflict

The other component of intensity in this study, duration, also presents an interesting question yet to be fully answered in the academic literature: Do religious conflicts last longer than other types of conflicts? Those who answer 'yes' generally point to the intractable demands that religions make on their followers and creates an atmosphere in which compromise is virtually impossible in many circumstances. If one believes they are obligated to be obedient to their deity on pain of punishment or eternal damnation, then they are unlikely to be deterred from their cause in the face of a human opponent, particularly if they believe they will be supported by their God in their cause. They are also unlikely to discuss a compromise with what they believe are agents of evil who cannot be trusted in any agreement.

There is considerable evidence found in previous case studies for this position. Mark Juergensmeyer's analysis of Jewish militants, for instance, describes religious zealots who will continue to use violence "until all Biblical lands [are] redeemed by Jewish occupation and the Arabs [are] gone."[114] In a conflict in which the Arabs also have a legitimate claim and need for the same land, there seems to be no solution and the conflict seems to have no possible end.

An argument can also be made that religious conflicts are not inherently longer lasting than other types of conflicts. In fact, religion may provide the grounds on which the conflict can be shortened. Alongside religious extremists are generally moderates of the same religion who potentially can reason with the extremists on theological premises, thus garnering more legitimacy with the extremists than secular negotiators. One of the recommendations that Marc Gopin made from his study of religious conflicts is that the moderates in a religion should "develop myths and stories, or recover them from tradition, that can replace darker myths of identity that are dependent on the existence of a demonic

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[114] Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God,* p 51.

enemy who defines the contours of the religious world and whose elimination is an ultimate goal."[115] In this way, the religious extremists can be moderated by their own co-faithful in their own terms. At this point, however, it is not clear how much evidence supports this argument or if there needs to be additional qualifications made to the argument.

TABLE 4.3: Religious Conflicts and Duration of Conflict

	% Not Religious Conflicts	% Religious Conflicts
Short Duration	52	50
Moderate Duration	28	33
Long Duration	19	18
N	67	211
Average Intensity	3.07	3.2
T-value	-0.1945	
Probability	0.846	
Chi-value	0.4635	
Probability	0.793	
Tau-value	0.0085	
Probability	0.8824	
Pearson's R	0.0034	
Probability	0.9547	

It is possible using the data available in this study to test the relationship between the duration of a conflict and involvement of religion to see if there is evidence to support either argument. Again, several tests of association comparing the duration distribution of

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[115] Marc Gopin, *Between Eden and Armageddon: The Future of World Religions, Violence and Peacemaking*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) p 205.

religious and other types of conflicts is a useful method for testing this question.[116] The results summed in Table 4.3 indicate that religious conflicts do not have, in fact, a significantly different duration than other types of conflicts.

Before turning to the causal mechanisms of this relationship (the subject of the next three chapters), however, there are several questions about the strength of this relationship that must be addressed.

Controlling for Relevance of Religion to Conflict

As yet, these tests of association between religious conflicts and the intensity, deaths or duration of a conflict have not taken account of the relevance of religion to the conflict. Does the intensity of religious conflicts depend on whether religion is a central or side issue in the conflict? As discussed in Chapter 3, the definition of a religious conflict used in this study does not take into account the issue at the center of the conflict, rather it is determined solely by the identities of the participants in the conflict. As a result, it is important to determine whether the relevance of religion changes the relationship tested in the previous tests.

The 'Relevance' variable evaluates the importance of religion relevant to other issues in the conflict. It takes into account the proximity and awareness of the parties of their religious identity in relation to the other party and particularly takes into account the parties' appeals based on that identity. Including this variable as a control variable evaluates whether the relevance of religion to the conflict changes the relationship observed in the previous tests. To take into account relevance, the relationship between religion and intensity is compared between cases when religion is minimally relevant and cases when religion is moderately relevant to the conflict. If relevance significantly alters the observed

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[116] The variable 'DurScale' is used because using the interval level 'Duration' contains too many categories with not enough cases that greatly skews a chi-square test. 'DurScale' on the other hand, is scaled to ensure the greatest amount of variation without too many categories.

relationship, it suggests that the identity-oriented definition is not only limited, but leads to potentially biased results. The results are presented in Table 4.4.

TABLE 4.4: Intensity and Relevance of Religion to a Conflict[117]

	Low Relevance		High Relevance	
	% Not Rel. Conflicts	%Religious Conflicts	% Not Rel. Conflicts	%Religious Conflicts
Low Intensity	42	23	17	20
Somewhat Low Intensity	21	31	21	23
Moderate Intensity	14	27	38	36
Somewhat High Intensity	12	10	21	18
High Intensity	12	8	4	3
N	43	48	24	163
Average Intensity	3.3	3.5	3.75	3.61
T-value	-0.7179		0.5964	
Probability	0.4747		0.5516	
Chi-value	5.622		0.3629	
Probability	0.229		0.985	
Tau-value	0.1049		-0.0395	
Probability	0.2732		0.5555	
Pearson's R	0.0759		-0.0438	
Probability	0.4747		0.5516	

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[117] Rather than these contingency tables of religion and relevance of religion, one could interact the relevance variable with religious conflict variable by multiplying the two variables and then test the combined variable for a relationship with the intensity variable. Because the contingency tables better illustrate the nature of the relationship, they were chosen for this study. However, I also tested the interacting variable and found similar results.

The results presented in Table 4.4 demonstrate that controlling for relevance alters the initially observed relationship between religion and conflict intensity. Particularly note the change in the chi-value which exhibited a weak association between religion and conflict intensity before controlling for relevance. In cases of low relevance the relationship does not wholly disappear but weakens below an accepted level of significance, whereas in cases of high relevance, the relationship vanishes entirely. Relevance clearly does not have a uniform effect on the two categories of cases. This suggests that relevance is interacting with the religious conflict variable which supports the expectation that relevance is an important element of the relationship between religious conflicts and the intensity of conflicts.

It was expected, though, that the more relevant religion is to a conflict, the more 'religious' the conflict and the more likely it would exhibit a higher intensity. If this were true, one would minimally expect an evident relationship (captured in a significant chi-square value) in cases where religion is highly relevant. The results in Table 4.4 leave no doubt that there is no relationship in these cases.

Interestingly, the results are much closer to being significant for cases when religion is less relevant to the conflict than in cases where religion is more relevant to the conflict. In other words, there is a suggestion that relevance has the opposite effect on the relationship between the involvement of religion and intensity of a conflict than was expected. In other words, the less relevant religion is in a religious conflict, the more likely religious conflicts are related to the intensity of conflicts. The relationship does not display a single positive or negative trend, though, so one cannot say that the less relevant religion is, the more likely a religious conflict will be more intense than a non-religious conflict. The results of the partial table for cases of low relevance, rather, exhibit the same pattern observed for all cases: non-religious conflicts fall at the extremes, while religious conflicts dominate the moderate intensity category.

Another way to address the question about the importance of the relevance of religion to the relationship between religion and conflict intensity is by asking specifically how introducing relevance changes the distribution of cases in Table 4.1. If relevance is unimportant to the analysis, one would expect that the partial tables for both cases of low relevance and cases of high relevance would mirror Table 4.1. On the other hand, if relevance has a systematic effect particularly on religious conflicts, one would expect to see a decrease in low intensity religious conflicts and increase in high intensity religious conflicts when relevance is high.

The distribution of the intensity of religious conflicts changes with the introduction of the relevance of religion though less dramatically than one might expect. Forty-six percent of religious conflicts were in the lowest two categories of intensity that increased by eight percentage points (fifty-four percent of cases) in cases where religion was less relevant and declined by three percentage points (forty-three percent of cases) in cases where religion was more relevant. Thirty-four percent of religious conflicts had a moderate intensity which decreased by seven percentage points (twenty-seven percent of cases) when relevance was low and increased by two percentage points (thirty-six percent of cases) when relevance was high. And finally, twenty percent of religious conflicts fell into the highest two categories of intensity which dropped by two percentage points (eighteen percent of cases) when relevance was low and increased by one percentage points (twenty-one percent of cases) when relevance was high.

This analysis is particularly concerned with the impact of relevance on the intensity of cases of religious conflict as the expectation is that the relevance increases the 'religiousness' of a conflict and thereby increases its intensity. There does seem to be some support for this hypothesis as the percentage of religious conflicts in the two highest intensity categories is three points higher when relevance is high than when relevance is low. Conversely, the percentage of religious conflicts in the two lowest intensity categories

is eleven points lower when relevance is high than when relevance is low. In other words, the higher the relevance the higher the intensity of religious conflicts, and the lower the relevance, the lower the intensity of religious conflicts. The evidence, like the chi-square values, though, is weak and only vaguely indicates the expected relationship.

Both a close examination of the change in distribution of the cell values and an indepth analysis of the change in chi-square values indicate that the relevance variable interacts with the religious conflict variable in relation to the intensity of the conflict. Like Fox's study of grievance formation, this study indicates that the relevance of religion is an indispensable element of the relationship between religion and conflict.

There are two important implications of the Table 4.4 results. First, relying solely on an identity-oriented definition potentially biases any tests of the relationship between religion and conflict intensity. As was demonstrated, leaving relevance out of the analysis indicates a significant, though weak, relationship though the relationship is clearly insignificant when this vital component is included. In order to accurately assess the nature of religion in conflict, one should not rely on a strict identity-oriented definition.

A second implication of this result is that this analysis can only be considered a necessary first step as there are countless other variables that potentially and logically interact with religion to alter the observed relationship. This study is merely concerned with establishing an association between religion and conflict intensity and not on defining a causal relationship between the two variables. Although the analysis found only a weak relationship between religion and conflict intensity, it cannot rule out the reasonable possibility that when the education of believers and their theology or the discrimination against a particular religious identity or countless other potentially interacting variables are accounted for, the relationship will more closely meet expectations derived from the large number of case studies. As yet, there has not developed a list of widely agreed upon interacting variables with the exception of the relevance of religion.

Controlling for Type of Religion Involved

Another question which this data can address is the popular conceptions or stereotypes of the violence of particular religions. There is currently, however, much public discussion about the potential for excessive violence within specific religious traditions suggesting that the result displayed in Table 4.1 that religious conflicts are more intense exists only when a particular religion is involved in the conflict. The implication is that one religion may be more likely to be involved in a higher intensity conflict than another religion. Specfically, the images of an Islamic suicide bomber and a Gandhian peace protestor lead some to believe that the type of religion involved in the conflict is an important control variable when analyzing the intensity of the conflict that has yet to be included in this analysis.

Islam

The daily reports of suicide bombers who justify their atrocities in the veil of Islam leave many readers with the impression that Islam is an innately violent religion. In fact, Islam is often called the "Religion of the Sword." Such a reputation is not unwarranted in the face of a few prominent historical incidences. Mohammed himself used violence to assert the identity and survival of his group in the first few years of the religion's development.[118] Throughout the 1,400 years of its existence, followers of Islam have repeatedly used violence to force converts and assert their domination.

Jonathan Fox addressed this stereotype of Islam in his cross-sectional study of ethnoreligious conflicts.[119] Using 105 cases of current ethnoreligious conflicts, Fox used a mean comparison technique to compare Islam, Christianity and other religions. Contradicting a few prominent historical examples, Fox found that Islamic minority groups were no more conflict prone than any other ethnoreligious minority group. However,

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[118] Chapter 22:40-42. *The Kor'an*, 1st revised edition, (Elmhurst (NY): Tahrike Tarsile Qur'an, 1995)

[119] Jonathan Fox, 'Is Islam More Conflict Prone Than Other Religions? A Cross-Sectional Study of Ethnoreligious Conflict', *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics,* 6 (2000) pp 1-24.

religion seemed to be a more important issue when Islamic minority groups were involved. Fox also found that there was very little difference in the intensity of conflicts involving the different religions. Fox's evidence, in other words, seems to shatter the image of Islam being more violent than other religions.

Much has been highlighted in recent years about Koranic justifications of violence. Jihad is by far the most often cited concept that sanctifies a Muslim's use of violence. Jihad, in a comprehensive sense, means struggle against evil influences. Most often it is used to mean the personal struggle against evil in one's life. Yet jihad also means a struggle or war against infidels. One verse from the Koran states: "Fight those who do not believe in Allah, nor the Last Day."[120] Though it is possible to interpret this as metaphorical (fight them with words to convert them to Islam), Muhammed's own use of violence against the Infidels seems to favor a literal interpretation for some Muslims.

Violence is to be a last resort, however, for the Muslim. It must not be engaged in unless a Muslim is first attacked or unless there is a wrong which can only be corrected by violence. Furthermore, if a reasonable peace offer is made, a Muslim is obliged to accept the offer. Muhammed also laid out explicit rules of war including orders not to kill women or children, not to disfigure the dead and to leave sacred objects untouched.[121] Though violence is clearly permitted in Islamic theology, it is also clearly to be restrained and only used under precise circumstances. Theologically, peace and harmony are also dominant themes in the sacred writings of the Koran. One admonition urges Koranic readers to "turn away evil with that which is better."[122]

In dealing with extremists (of any religious tradition), though, all of the qualifications on the use of violence can become distorted and the literal precedent of legitimized violence can justify any action. Fox's study indicates that Islamic extremists are

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[120] Chapter 9:29. *The Kor'an*
[121] Huston Smith, *The World's Religions: Our Great Wisdom Traditions*, (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1991) p 255.
[122] Chapter 42:37. *The Kor'an*

no different than other extremists in the extent to which they disregard restrictions on violence and appeals for peace. It is reasonable to expect that the results of this study will mirror those of Fox's study. Therefore, I would expect that Islam does not display a significantly higher intensity than any other conflict involving the other religions.

Christianity

Christianity, as well, has a much discussed checkered history in regards to its justification of violence. One of the best known religious wars began in the late 11th century when Pope Urban called on Christians to lead a Crusade to Jerusalem to take the holy city back from the Muslims. When the Crusades finally arrived in Jerusalem in 1099, their massacre of Muslims in that city alone resulted in over 40,000 Muslim deaths in only two days.[123] The Crusades attributed their success as a reward for their piousness and obedience to God.

Based on commonly held interpretations of Christianity's sacred text, the Bible, the Crusaders were surely bolstered in their position. The first half of the Bible chronicles battle after battle in which the Israelites (God's Chosen People) succeeded when they obeyed God and lost when they disobeyed God. In one particularly grisly passage, God commands Moses and the Israelites to attack and kill all the Midianites – including the women and boys – because they had corrupted the Israelites. In fact, the commanders allowed some women and boys to live and were chastised by Moses for disobeying God's orders.

> *"The Lord said to Moses, 'Take vengeance on the Midianites for the Israelites. ...' So Moses said to the people, 'Arm some of your men to go to war against the Midianites and to carry out the Lord's vengeance on them.*

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[123] Armstrong, *Holy War*, p 179.

...' They fought against Midian, as the Lord commanded Moses, and killed

every man. ... The Israelites captured the Midianite women and children

and took all the Midianite herds, flocks and goods as plunder. They burned

all the towns where the Midianites had settled, as well as all their camps.

They took all the plunder and spoils, including the people and animals, and

brought the captives, spoils and plunder to Moses... Moses was angry with

the officers of the army – the commanders of thousands and commanders of

hundreds – who returned from the battle. 'Have you allowed all the women

to live?' he asked them. ... Now kill all the boys. And kill every woman who

has slept with a man, but save for yourselves every girl who has never slept

with a man."[124]

Many current mainstream Christians interpret events such as the massacre of the Midianites as no longer relevant to modern Christians. While they believe such events occurred and believe in the Biblical interpretation of those events, they believe that the events occurred before Jesus lived. They believe Jesus' teachings prioritize love and peace over such violence. Jesus' teachings and the theology of the second half of the Bible is often referred to as the 'New Covenant' that overrides the agreement between God and man in the first half of the Bible. "Love one another"[125] and "Turn the other cheek"[126] are dominant themes within this new covenant.

The debate about whether and when violence is acceptable within Christian theology resulted in the 'Just War Doctrine' in the 4th century (though it is still hotly debated, of course). As Steven Rosen describes, the Just War Doctrine established that "the principle of pacifism is ... an ideal to be worked at, but is, nonetheless, one that must occasionally be

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[124] Numbers 31:1-18, *The Student Bible: New International Version,* (Grand Rapids (MI): Zondervan Bible Publishers, 1988) p 163.
[125] John 15:17, *The Holy Bible: Authorized King James Version*, (Canada: World Bible Publishers, 2002) p 77.
[126] Matthew 5:39, *New American Standard Bible, Reference Edition,* (Chicago: Moody Press, 1973)

sacrificed in the preservation of other values."[127] St. Augustine argued that it was man's evil nature that made war necessary, however argued that the ideal of peace should still be central for Christians. *When* the ideal should be sacrificed is a matter of much debate, however it is generally agreed to be dependent on the "just cause and rightful intent" [128] of proper governing authorities. In other words, it is the responsibility of legitimate authorities – those who are obedient to God – to discern what cause is worthy of the use of violence. This leads to contradicting positions on specific situations, however the important point for this study is that the use of violence can be justified in Christian theology, though with limits.

As with Islamic extremists, of course, those bent on the use of violence often ignore entreaties to limit violence and pursue peace. Rather they refer back to the historical precedents that justify violence. As such, there is no reason to expect Christianity to be any more or less violent than the other religions.

Judaism

Judaism shares much of the sacred texts of Christianity and Islam including the first half of the Bible which chronicles the many battles the Israelites fought on behalf of Yahweh or God. Significantly, however, Jews do not believe in the divinity of Jesus or his teachings (the New Covenant) and thus do not discount the stories of the Israeli battles as no longer relevant. Rather, for most mainstream Jews, the violence of the Bible is a historical record that affirms their identity as "God's Chosen People." Reading of God's grace in rescuing the Jews from inevitable destruction (as in the Red Sea narrative) or in granting an undeserved victory in the face of an insurmountable enemy leaves little doubt that God has a special love for the Jews. The message of these stories is of God's love and the

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[127] Steven J. Rosen, Steven J, 'Kurukshetra in Context: An Analysis of Violence in the Bhagavad Gita', in Steven J. Rosen (ed), *Holy War: Violence and the Bhagavad Gita*, (Hampton (VA): A. Deepak Publishing, 1984) p 23.

[128] Darrell Cole, *When God Says War is Right: The Christian's Perspective on When and How to Fight*, (Colorado Springs: Random House Publishing, 2002) p 5.

uniqueness of the Jewish heritage and not a commandment to massacre any opponent, for most mainstream Jews.

As with any other religious tradition, however, those bent on violence can find justification of their violence in these traditions. Mark Juergensmeyer describes his encounter with the Jewish militant and founder of the Kach party in Israel, Meir Kahane. According to Juergensmeyer, Kahane believed that the way to honor Yahweh was to simultaneously exalt the Jewish nation *and* humiliate its enemies. Violence was considered an integral and legitimate way of humiliating enemies of the Jewish nation.[129] He believed "that Jewish Law allowed for two kinds of just war: obligatory and permissible. The former was required for defense, and the latter was allowed when it seemed prudent for a state to do so."[130] With this vague justification pulled from the sacred texts and traditions of Judaism, militant Jews have carried out violence – that dominate current headlines – against their modern enemies, the Arabs and moderate Jews such as Yitzak Rabin.[131]

Contemporary Judaism does not seem to be any different in regards to the legitimate use of violence theologically or in practice than either Islam or Christianity. All three faiths have prominent traditions of violence that lend themselves to justifying violence, yet all three also have mainstream interpretations of these traditions that put significant limits on the legitimate use of violence. Thus, I would not expect the average intensity of Jewish, Christian or Islamic conflicts to be significantly higher or lower than the average of all religious conflicts.

Hinduism

Hinduism and Buddhism have reputations as being the most tolerant and peaceful of the five major world religions. While the first image that comes to a westerner's mind when

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[129] Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God,* p 55.
[130] Ibid. Page 56.
[131] Rabin was considered a traitor to Judaism by some orthodox Jews, one of which was responsible for his assassination.

mentioning Islam is often the suicide bomber, the immediate image of Hindus and Buddhists is that of meditating monks. Both religions put emphasis on the consequences of actions in this life and the unity of all of humanity. For instance, the concept of Karma in Hinduism states that every action has consequences that determines one's destiny. Whereas Islam, Judaism and Christianity put emphasis on obedience to God, Hinduism and Buddhism put emphasis on perfecting oneself in order to reach nirvana – a blissful state devoid of any struggles or conflicts.

Neither Hinduism nor Buddhism are devoid of violent imagery on which justifications for the use of violence can be built, however. One of the sacred texts of Hinduism, the *Bhagavad Gita*, opens with a description of an ensuing battle.[132] On the one side were the Kauravas and on the other were the Pandavas, cousins of the Kauravas. At stake in the battle was land the Pandavas deemed they were entitled and which the Kauravas refused to hand over to the Pandavas. The *Bhagavad Gita* describes a conversation that took place between the leader of the Pandavas, Arjuna, and the god Krishna just before the battle was to begin. Arjuna was hesitant to go to war because he saw family members on the other side. Krishna, however, implored Arjuna to go to war as his duty as a soldier and in order to protect the Pandava people. Ultimately Arjuna heeded Krishna's advice and successfully led the Pandavas to victory over the Kauravas.

This story has been interpreted in a multitude of ways. One interpretation is that the event is not an actual historical event, but rather an allegory for the internal struggle that individuals face between following their own desires and doing good. Gandhi is one prominent proponent of this sort of interpretation. Another interpretation involves accepting the event as historical, yet limiting its advocacy of violence. Arjuna was a soldier whose duty in society was to protect the innocent. If he had chosen not to battle the Kauravas, he would have failed in his responsibility. From this interpretation, the god

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[132] *Bhagavad Gita.* (Introduction by Alexandre Piatigorsky, Translated by J.A.B. van Buitenen), (Rockport (MA): Element, 1997)

Krishna would not have implored a priest or scholar to join the battle, yet advised Arjuna in this way because of his station in life. Furthermore, Krishna did not advise Arjuna to go to battle until after all reasonable steps at peace had been taken. Thus, in this historical interpretation, something similar to a "Just War Doctrine" was established in Hinduism by which violence could be justified, however only under extreme circumstances.[133]

One prominent example of Hindu violence can be justified on the precedent set in the *Bhagavad Gita* – though reference to the precedent is rarely made explicit. In the city of Ayodhya in northern India is a holy site for both Hindus and Muslims. Hindus believe the site is the birthplace of the god Ram that was immortalized for hundreds of years with a temple. In the 16th century Muslims invaded northern India destroying the temple and replacing it with a mosque (though a platform remained to mark Ram's birthplace). Not until the 1980's did the site generate sustained violence when the Hindu organization Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) began pressing to have the mosque destroyed and replaced with an appropriate Hindu temple. The ongoing clashes between the Muslims and Hindus over the Ayodhya site have not only taken place in courtrooms and voting booths, but have resulted in violent confrontations across northern India killing two thousand people. As Krishna enjoined Arjuna to go to battle to protect the Pandavas, so, too, do many Hindus feel it is necessary and legitimate to use any means necessary to protect their holy site.

Interestingly, Hector Avalos compared the violence in the Bhagavad Gita to that in the Christian Bible in an effort to determine which sacred text was more violent.[134] He found that the Bible recounted significantly more acts of violence than the Bhagavad Gita and the Biblical justication for violence was much more pronounced in the interpretations of the two texts. The *Bhagavad Gita* is generally interpreted as an allegory for humanity's internal struggle or as a historical precedent for the very limited use of violence. The *Bible*,

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[133] Steven J. Rosen, (ed), *Holy War: Violence and the Bhagavad Gita*, (Hampton (VA): A. Deepak Publishing, 2002)

[134] Hector Avalos, 'Violence in the Bible and the Bhagavad Gita', in Steven J. Rosen (ed), *Holy War: Violence and the Bhagavad Gita*, (Hampton (VA): A. Deepak Publishing, 2002) pp 127-144.

on the other hand, is first interpreted as a precedent that justifies violence and only secondarily (if at all) interpreted as an allegory. In other words, the story of Arjuna is first interpreted by Hindus as an example of a soul's struggle, while the story of the destruction of the Midianites is primarily read as a historical event by Jews and Christians.

Because the texts and traditions that justify violence in Hinduism are less prominent and central to the faith, it is reasonable to expect conflicts involving Hinduism to be less intense than the average of other religious conflicts.

Buddhism

Buddhism, being an outgrowth of Hinduism, shares many of the same characteristics. Like Hinduism, the goal in Buddhism is to perfect oneself and achieve a final state of bliss. And like Hinduism, the popular stereotype of Buddhists in the west is one of meditating monks. How one perfects oneself differs in Hinduism and Buddhism and within the different versions of the two religions. For example, in one popular form of Buddhism, Zen Buddhism, the focus is on having realizations about the true nature of existence and not the illusion of human life. In particular, monks spend their time trying to overcome the limits of language in understanding existence. Thus, in many monasteries, time is spent pondering riddles like "If a tree falls in the woods and no one is around, does it make a sound?" in order to lead the monks to a realization about the truth of existence. This is a much different monastic experience than Christian monks whose time is spent memorizing and interpreting sacred texts for practical application.

Yet, as with the other four world religions evaluated here, Buddhism also is not without violent imagery and precedents, though these are much less prominent in Buddhism than in the other four religions. The military conquests of Sri Lanka in the name of Buddhism throughout its long history are the most often cited precedent for the legitimacy of violence. Since the 1980's, the Sinhala Buddhist majority in Sri Lanka have actively

pursued a violent repressive strategy in regards to the Tamil Hindus that seems to contradict the largely peaceful and introspective precepts of Buddhism. In fact, according to Stanley Tambiah, some in the Buddhist religious community have actively supported the harsh policies arguing that the Sinhala language and culture could not survive without a sovereign territory – a territory that was being attacked by Tamil Hindus. They find support in earlier generations of Sinhalese who also used violence to protect their identity.

Buddhism, like the other religions compared here, also has a tradition of limiting the legitimacy of violence. Mark Juergensmeyer lists five qualifications that must be met before a Buddhist resorts to violence, "…something living must have been killed; the killer must have known it was alive; the killer must have intended to kill it; an actual act of killing must have taken place; and the person or animal attacked must, in fact, have died."[135] Thus, even with historical traditions of justified violence by Buddhists, there is also a tradition of limiting its use. As with Hinduism, the texts and traditions that justify violence in Buddhism are much less pronounced than those in Islam, Judaism or Christianity and lead one to expect that conflicts involving Buddhist groups are less intense than others.

Given each religion's theological imperatives and historical precedents on which to draw, it is not unexpected to find situations in which violence is justified using each of these religions. It does seem likely, however, that conflicts involving Hinduism and Buddhism will have a more difficult task of justifying violence in their theology and history. Thus, in the quantitative analysis, it is expected that conflicts involving these two religions display a lower intensity than the other three religions, while conflicts involving Christianity, Islam or Judaism would display an average or higher intensity.

In order to test these expectations about the level of violence in conflicts involving a particular religion, several tests of association are again used to compare the intensity distributions of each religion. In these tests, each religion is taken separately and compared

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[135] Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God,* p 113.

to all others. In other words, conflicts involving Buddhism are compared to conflicts involving Christianity, Hinduism, Judaism and Islam combined to answer the question about the relative violence in conflicts involving Buddhism compared to all others. Again, 278 cases of territory conflict phases (both those categorized as religious and those categorized as non-religious) are used in these tests of association. The results of the tests are summed in Table 4.5.

The results of this test are somewhat surprising. The tests indicate that Buddhist, Christian and Islamic conflicts are no more or less intense than conflicts not involving these religions. The chi-square value indicates that Hindu and Jewish conflicts are more intense than those involving other religions, though it should be noted that there are very few cases involving these two religions. It was expected that Christian and Islamic conflicts would display similar intensities to other religious conflicts, which is consistent with the statistical results. This evidence demonstrates that images of the Islamic suicide bombers and zealot Crusaders are deviations in the nature of conflicts involving either Islam or Christianity.

The association of Hindu conflicts with a higher intensity is unanticipated. Often the first image roused by the mention of Hinduism is that of meditating monks or, in the context of political violence, of Gandhi and the peaceful protests that brought India its independence in 1947. Avalos' analysis of the doctrinal justifications of violence in the two religions leads one to expect Hinduism to be associated with lower intensities. Yet this analysis that considers post-independence India suggests that this popular image needs to be modified. Hinduism displays a significant relationship with higher conflict intensity when subjected to a chi-square test. The result however is potentially biased by limits in the data. There are only a small number of cases involving Hinduism in the dataset and all conflicts are those in which India was a participant with the exception of the Sri Lankan Tamil conflict. It is possible that a characteristic of India other than its religious identity is the

TABLE 4.5: Intensity and Type of Religion

	% Not Buddhist	% Buddhist	% Not Christian	% Christian	% Not Hindu	% Hindu	% Not Islamic	% Islamic	% Not Jewish	% Jewish
Low Intensity	23	30	25	21	26	6	23	25	24	9
Somewhat Low Intensity	24	18	22	27	21	43	25	23	24	9
Moderate Intensity	31	30	31	31	30	37	31	32	30	73
Somewhat High Intensity	16	15	15	18	17	9	15	16	16	9
High Intensity	5	6	7	3	5	6	7	4	6	0
N	245	33	178	100	243	35	137	141	267	11
Average Intensity	3.56	3.48	3.56	3.55	3.54	3.66	3.58	3.52	3.54	3.82
T-value	0.3611		0.0422		-0.5577		0.4208		-0.7642	
Probability	*0.7183*		*0.9664*		*0.5775*		*0.6742*		*0.4454*	
Chi-value	1.2199		3.3244		**13.4210**		1.0400		**9.2996**	
Probability	*0.875*		*0.505*		***0.009***		*0.904*		***0.054***	
Tau-Value	-0.0210		0.0049		0.0293		-0.0178		0.0534	
Probability	*0.7006*		*0.9290*		*0.5918*		*0.7440*		*0.3282*	
Pearson's R	-0.0217		-0.0025		0.0336		-0.0253		0.0460	
Probability	*0.7183*		*0.9664*		*0.5775*		*0.6742*		*0.4454*	

cause of excessive violence, though the data in this study cannot differentiate between the two.

Though in the present context of the festering Middle East conflict the result that Judaism is associated with higher intensity conflicts may no be as unexpected as the Hindu finding, the result of the chi-square test is also potentially biased due to the small number of Jewish conflicts all involving Israel.

This study is limited to the data available to test these hypotheses, however, it is possible to use an alternative method that better accounts for the number of cases and can provide an indication of any biases in the chi-square value due to the number of cases. The chi-square is calculated using the number of cases in each category only to determine the expected frequency for each cell. There is no measure incorporated into the test that takes account of the accuracy of these expected frequencies. Therefore, the test is not sensitive to the varying number of cases and particularly in this study to the low frequency of Hindu or Jewish conflicts. A difference of means t-test corrects for this by comparing the average intensity while taking into the account the standard deviation (that is dependent on the number of cases in the category). The number of cases in a category is thus a determinant of the accuracy of the means. Although the difference of means t-test is potentially biased because it depends on a mean (that is biased for ordinal variables), the test offers another perspective that is not available with the chi-square tests.

In these tests, the average intensity of conflicts involving one religion are compared to the average intensity of all other conflicts. The t-value then represents the difference between the average intensity of conflicts involving one specific religion to the average intensity of conflicts involving all other religions. A positive and significant t-value indicates that the average intensity of conflicts involving that religion is higher than conflicts involving all other religions combined. The results are presented below the chi-square results in Table 4.6.

Clearly the difference of means t-test demonstrates that no one religion is systematically involved in conflicts of a higher or lower intensity than all other religions. Not only are the t-values very near zero for all cases, but also the probability of those values is very far from any accepted level of significance. Taken in combination with the chi-square test results, there is substantial reason to believe that the initially evident relationship between Hinduism, Judaism and higher conflict intensity resulted from a bias due to the limited number of cases of these types of conflicts in the dataset used in this study.

Comparing Monotheistic and Polytheistic Religions

One of the tell-tale signs that a religion has been corrupted and is vulnerable to being used to justify violence is when adherents make absolute truth claims, according to Charles Kimball.[136] When adherents claim to know all the truth about existence and God, there is little room for a diversity of beliefs. For example, exclusivist Christians (as opposed to inclusivists or pluralists) believe that there is only one God – the God of the Bible – and the only way to know God and spend eternity in heaven is to believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God. This discredits both the Jewish and Islamic traditions which claim to believe in the God of the Bible, however do not believe in the divinity of Jesus Christ.

Several authors have noted that monotheistic religions make such absolute truth claims and lend them to more frequently justifying violence in defense or promulgation of those truth claims. Karen Armstrong observed this tendency in her analysis of the 11th century Crusades.

"A pagan like Cyrus believed in many gods and therefore could envisage many solutions and possibilities and this led to tolerance and to religious

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[136] Kimball, *When Religion Becomes Evil*

coexistence. The Jewish monotheists, however, had hitherto been unable to accept the presence of neighboring shrines to gods other than their own.[137]

Regina Schwartz has developed this theory the most.[138] For Schwartz, the collective identity of the Jews found in the Bible is predicated on an exclusion that denies others that identity and obliterates any that threaten that identity. Exclusion is a result of the "biblical myth of scarcity."[139] "Scarcity is encoded in the Bible as a principle of Oneness (one land, one people, one nation) and in monotheistic thinking (one Deity), it becomes a demand of exclusive allegiance that threatens with the violence of exclusion."[140]

There is another side to Biblical monotheism that lends itself to justifying violence – the scarcity of God's favor. Schwartz traces this idea back to the story of the first brothers, Cain and Abel, and the world's first murder.[141] The two brothers brought sacrifices to God presumably to please him, yet God found only Abel's sacrifice as acceptable. Cain became angry and jealous and murdered his brother, Abel. For Schwartz, the important point is that God's favor was in short supply and only one brother was able to garner it. The same idea often leads monotheists to believe that if God is on their side – as evidenced by their success – then he cannot also be on the opposing side. Polytheists, on the other hand, can conceive of some gods supporting them while other gods support the other side.

In order to test the association of higher levels of violence carried out by monotheist groups, several test of association are again used comparing the intensity of monotheistic (Christianity, Islam and Judaism) and polytheistic religions (Hinduism and Buddhism) in the dataset of territory conflict phases between 1946 and 2001. The results are summed in Table 4.6. The evidence does not support Schwartz's argument that monotheistic religions

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[137] Armstrong, *Holy War,* p 16
[138] Regina M. Schartz, *The Curse of Cain: The Violent Legacy of Monotheism,* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1997)
[139] Ibid. Page xi.
[140] Ibid. Page xi.
[141] Recorded in Genesis 4.

TABLE 4.6: Intensity and Involvement of Monotheist Religion

	% Polytheist Religions	% Monotheistic Religions
Low Intensity	21	25
Somewhat Low Intensity	23	24
Moderate Intensity	33	31
Somewhat High Intensity	13	17
High Intensity	10	4
N	70	208
Average Intensity	3.67	3.51
T-value	0.9717	
Probability	0.3321	
Chi-value	4.5119	
Probability	0.341	
Tau-value	-0.0433	
Probability	0.4272	
Pearson's R	-0.0584	
Probability	0.3321	

are involved in significantly more intense conflicts. The intensity of conflicts involving a monotheistic religion is not significantly different than those involving a polytheistic religion.

Why does this evidence not support Schwartz's claim and even the observations of Armstrong and Kimball? One could argue that there is a big difference from believing that you know the truth to going so far as to force everyone to believe the same or using violence to defend your beliefs. There are millions of Christians, Jews and Muslims the world over that truly believe that all those who do not believe as they do are destined to an

eternity in hell, yet they would reject the use of violence to which some of the co-religionists resort.

The Koran, in fact, encourages its readers to "Let there be no compulsion in religion."[142] Furthermore, a threat to the culture of Hindus or Buddhists can lead a group to mount a vicious defense of that culture, regardless of their ability to accept religious diversity within the Hindu or Buddhist theology. It seems that it is not the religion's conception of deity that encourages or discourages violence, but rather the specific contexts in which those religious traditions are referenced or threatened that is related to the violence a society experiences.

Conclusion

This chapter began by asking if the stereotype that religion's involvement in a conflict is related to higher levels of intensity, deadliness and duration has any merit. Based on the statistical analysis of 278 territory conflict phases between 1946 and 2001, the evidence is contradictory. By and large, the various statistical tests indicated no relationship between religion and conflict intensity although the chi-square test suggested a weak relationship. One can say conclusively however that the evidence was statistically weak and contradicts expectations. When the relevance of religion to the conflict is incorporated to address the limits of the identity-oriented definition of a religious conflict used in this study, the relationship between the involvement of religion and conflict intensity weakens below an accepted level of significance. The analysis found that relevance is an important component of the relationship as it interacts with the religious conflict variable. The implication of this result is that studies that are dependent on the identity-oriented definition are potentially biased due to the limits of the definition.

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[142] Chapter 2:257, *The Kor'an*

This chapter also tested the common stereotypes about specific religions and their tendency towards violence by testing the involvement of each religion to all others. The test concluded that Buddhist, Christian and Islamic conflicts were not more or less intense than conflicts involving the other religions, however a chi-square test indicated that both Hindu and Jewish conflicts are more intense than conflicts involving the other religions. It was concluded that this result was likely due to the small number of cases and lack of variation of the Hindu and Jewish conflicts in the dataset.

Finally, this chapter addressed the theory that monotheistic religions are associated with higher levels of violence than polytheistic levels of violence than polytheistic religions and found no support for this theory.

Thus far this study has not attempted to distinguish between religion's influences and those of ethnic or national identities. The remainder of this study will isolate three aspects unique to religion to determine whether they individually or collectively influence the intensity of a conflict. Though the results of this chapter suggest that there is no relationship between religion and conflict, it is possible that the influence of these three qualities cancel out one another. By separating these qualities, this study offers a more in depth exploration of the nature of the relationship between religion and conflict intensity.

CHAPTER 5: The Power of Religious Doctrine

Bougainville Revolutionary Army and the Abu Sayyaf Group

Though Chapter 4 concluded that religious conflicts are no more or less intense, deadly or longer lasting than other types of conflicts, this analysis has yet to isolate the uniquely religious qualities – doctrine, organization and diaspora – that differentiate religious influences from ethnic or national identities.   One of the most widely-held assumptions is that conflicts are more intense when leaders choose to exploit the violence found in every religious doctrine.   As described in Chapter 2, Mark Juergensmeyer developed and illustrated the idea of a cosmic war mentality that is unique to those engaged in violence with a religious context.[143]   The religious terrorists Juergensmeyer evaluated believe themselves to be participants in a metaphysical battle between good and evil in which they are warriors commissioned by and defending their god.   These warriors often see their battle in a historical context.   They are reminded of role models in their faith whose faithfulness and bravery in the battle were rewarded and is to be emulated.   Because a cosmic war mentality and a historical context are powerful motivators for a group carrying out a violent struggle, it leads one to expect that conflicts where these characteristics are present will endure a greater intensity than in conflicts where they are absent.   Furthermore, references to non-violent traditions in the religion have the potential of discouraging violence, thus limiting the intensity experienced.   Formally stated, the hypotheses derived from previous research (outlined more fully in Chapter 2) are as follows:

Hypothesis 2: When one or both groups involved in a conflict has a cosmic war world view, the conflict will be more intense than if neither participant has such a world view.

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[143] Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*, (London: University of California Press, 2000)

Hypothesis 3:   The appeal to violent religious traditions and symbols in support of violent actions in a conflict will increase the intensity of a conflict.

Hypothesis 4: The appeal to religious traditions and symbols in support of non-violent actions in a conflict will decrease the intensity of a conflict.

This chapter will first approach these hypotheses using a quantitative methodology and follow this test with an illustrative comparative case study. As discussed in Chapter 3, a quantitative method comparing a large number of cases across both space and time provides a useful way of testing these hypotheses while complementing previous research. To apply this method in this study, 125 territory conflict phases between 1946 and 2001 are evaluated and compared statistically in order to determine whether the patterns observed follow the expectations of the model in Chapter 1.[144] An illustrative comparison of the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines and the Bougainville Revolutionary Army in Papua New Guinea will follow these quantitative tests in order to illustrate and more comprehensively explore the role that religious doctrine plays in escalating the intensity of violent political conflicts.

Quantitative Test

The ideal and most common quantitative method for testing these hypotheses is the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. In OLS regression, the line that best illustrates and explains the dependent variable (intensity) is determined using a set of independent variables (doctrine, organizational support and diaspora). The best-fit line is then tested to see if it adequately predicts changes in the dependent variable or if there is significant

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[144] See Chapter 3 for a more complete description of the data.

unexplained error in the model. In order to use OLS regression, however, it is assumed that the dependent variable is continuous. In this study, the dependent variable is not continuous as it ranges from 2 to 6 and can only take whole number values. If OLS regression were used in this case, a significant bias in the results is possible leaving the results highly questionable. Rather, in this case, an ordinal logit test is much more appropriate.[145] As Alan Agresti points out "loglinear and logit models directly reflect the actual discrete way the variables are measured."[146]

Interpreting the results of ordinal logit is very similar to interpreting those of OLS regressions. Equations are specified based on theoretical expectations. In this case, the equation is:

$$\text{Intensity} = a + \beta \, (\text{Cosmic}) + \beta \, (\text{vTrad}) + \beta \, (\text{nvTrad}) + \beta \, (\text{OrgSup}) + \beta \, (\text{Military}) +$$
$$\beta \, (\text{Weapons}) + \beta \, (\text{Political}) + \beta \, (\text{Mediators}) + \beta \, (\text{Relevance}) +$$
$$\beta \, (\text{Hinduism}) + \beta \, (\text{Judaism}) + e^{147}$$

If the independent variable influences the dependent variable, it will exhibit a significant coefficient. In other words, if a cosmic war worldview increases the intensity of a conflict, the coefficient of 'Cosmic' will be both positive and significant. Furthermore, a significant pseudo r-squared indicates that the model taken as a whole adequately explains any variation in the dependent variable.

The results of the ordinal logit test are summed in Table 5.1.

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[145] Ordinal logit is preferable to the more common multinomial logit because it uses more efficiently the information available while multinomial logit discards it.

[146] Alan Agresti, *Analysis of Ordinal Categorical Data*, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1984) p 150.

[147] 'Intensity' is the dependent variable that measures the level of violence and duration of a conflict on a 2-6 scale. 'Cosmic' measures the existence of a cosmic war mentality; 'vTrad' indicates references to the violent religious traditions, while 'nvTrad' indicates references to non-violent religious traditions; 'OrgSup' measures whether the group had the formal support of the dominant religious organization; 'Military' is the number of external participants that shared a religious identity with the participant on whose behalf they intervened militarily, while 'Weapons' is the number of external supporters that shared a religious identity with its beneficiary and intervened with weapons support, and 'Political' is the number of external participants that shared a religious identity with their beneficiary and provided political support. 'Mediator' indicates the number of external participants that intervened to mediate the conflict. Finally, 'Relevance', 'Hinduism' and 'Judaism' were included as a control variables based on the results of Chapter 4. See Chapter 3 for a more complete description of each of these variables.

TABLE 5.1: Ordinal Logit Results

		Number of Observations: 125	
		Pseudo R-squared: 0.0415	
		Log Likelihood: -172.46743	
	Coefficient	Standard Error	Probability
Cosmic	0.6569033	1.436194	0.647
vTrad	0.0937142	1.573386	0.953
nvTrad	-0.2941977	1.228104	0.811
OrgSup	0.0032692	0.6338904	0.996
Military	**0.79177**	**0.378835**	**0.037**
Weapons	**0.4030501**	**0.1816502**	**0.026**
Political	0.1039889	0.2981494	0.727
Mediators	-0.1109196	0.2586586	0.668
Relevance	0.3693886	0.4047966	0.361
Hindu	0.0258733	0.4581409	0.955
Jew	-0.7151545	0.924731	0.439
_cut1	-0.2328817	1.193898	
_cut2	0.9820893	1.197567	
_cut3	2.70128	1.219252	
_cut4	5.130344	1.319134	

This chapter is concerned with the first three variables that taken together represent three aspects of the doctrinal influence of religion. In the first two variables ('Cosmic' and 'vTrad'), the positive coefficient would indicate that references to a cosmic war worldview and violent traditions increase the intensity of religious conflicts. In the following variable ('nvTrad'), the negative coefficient would indicate that references non-violent religious traditions decrease the intensity of religious conflicts. However, in all three cases, the

coefficients were not significantly different from zero and cannot confidently be said to be either positive or negative. In other words, none of the three doctrine variables exhibit an influence (either positive or negative) on the intensity of religious conflicts. This evidence contradicts all the expectations outlined in the above hypotheses.

Furthermore, the very low pseudo r-squared suggests that the doctrinal, organizational and diaspora variables included in the model do not explain much of the variation in the intensity of a conflict. Taken together with the controls for relevance of religion and type of religion, the model explains roughly four percent of the variation in conflict intensity. Even by social science standards, this is much too low to give the model as a while support as an explanation of conflict intensity. The goal in this study is to better understand the nature of the relationship between religion and conflict intensity and it does not purport to present a complete explanation of conflict intensity. It is not surprising then that the pseudo r-squared is so low. On can conclude from this evidence that religion (in the three qualities assessed in this study) is not the sole determinant of the intensity of a conflict. To better understand the dynamics of religion's role, one must focus on the coefficients of the independent variables.

The coefficients of the three doctrine variables suggest that doctrine does not significantly increase the intensity of a conflict. One characteristic of the data could cause a significant bias in the results concerning the doctrine variables: multicollinearity. If the independent variables are correlated to each other, then the coefficients may appear to be insignificant when in fact the variables have a significant influence on the dependent variable. In this case, two of the three variables are correlated with each other ('vTrad' and 'Cosmic') and all three are logically correlated.

It is possible to correct for this by combining the three variables into one variable that measures the general use of doctrine in religious conflicts. Thus a new variable, called 'Doctrine', was created by taking the sum of 'Cosmic' and 'vTrad' and subtracting

'nvTrad.' The last variable is subtracted because it is expected to have a negative influence on intensity, while 'Cosmic' and 'vTrad' are expected to have positive influences. The results of the modified ordinal logit test using the combined doctrine variable are summed in Table 5.3.

TABLE 5.2: Correlations of Doctrine Variables

	vTrad	
Cosmic	**0**	**1**
0	98	0
1	2	100
N	110	15
Chi-value	*108.2888*	
Probability	*0.000*	

	nvTrad	
vTrad	**0**	**1**
0	88	100
1	12	0
N	122	3
Chi-value	0.4192	
Probability	*0.517*	

	nvTrad	
Cosmic	**0**	**1**
0	86	100
1	14	0
N	122	3
Chi-value	0.4838	
Probability	*0.487*	

TABLE 5.3: Ordinal Logit Results with Combined Doctrine Variable

	Coefficient	Standard Error	Probability
	Number of Observations: 125		
	Pseudo R-squared: 0.0413		
	Log Likelihood: -172.48937		
Doctrine	0.3796341	0.2583231	0.142
OrgSup	0.0214455	0.5499598	0.969
Military	**0.8009494**	**0.3752062**	**0.033**
Weapons	**0.4042314**	**0.1808916**	**0.025**
Political	0.0950032	0.2841262	0.738
Mediation	-0.1126287	0.256877	0.661
Relevance	0.3704221	0.4002908	0.355
Hindu	0.0184898	0.4560483	0.968
Jew	-0.6137848	0.7506689	0.414
_cut1	-0.2311307	1.18239	
_cut2	0.9823347	1.185829	
_cut3	2.700789	1.208069	
_cut4	5.132921	1.311106	

Correcting for the multicollinearity found in the first test does cause the doctrine variable to exhibit a much higher level of significance, although it still cannot be said with great certainty to differ from zero. Furthermore, the model as a whole does not explain much of the variation in the intensity as demonstrated by the very low pseudo r-squared value. The results of this quantitative test indicate that the use of religious doctrine by groups involved in religious conflicts does not significantly influence the intensity of the conflicts controlling for organizational and diaspora use, as well as relevance and type of religion involved.

Why do these results differ so greatly from the expectations derived from previous research? As mentioned previously, one of the greatest weaknesses in the current literature in this field is the heavy reliance on case studies with no large cross-sectional, time series tests to evaluate the representativenss of the cases selected for study. The divergence of these results from the observations of previous research, then, indicates that the case studies have depended on a few deviant cases that conclude a pattern of behavior that is not applicable across the board. Though one may observe religious doctrine increasing the intensity of the Middle Eastern conflict, for instance, this relationship does not exist in most cases where religious doctrine becomes involved in the conflict.

It is also possible that the previous research and these tests differ because the measurements used in this study are imprecise and unable to fully capture what is meant by 'religious doctrine.' The variables take account of whether or not a group or group leader referenced a cosmic war worldview or the violent or non-violent religious traditions at any point during the conflict phase. Such a measure cannot take account of the use of doctrine below the group level (by individual members or church leaders, for instance) or occurring before the conflict phase.

It is very conceivable that religious doctrine is referenced frequently by group members in their personal interaction with others in their community, although not used by their leaders in public statements. In Northern Ireland, for instance, the leadership of the Nationalist movement does not reference Catholic traditions to support their calls for violence. On the interpersonal level, however, it is not inconceivable that Nationalists appeal to the Catholic heritage and traditions of their fellow Catholics to urge involvement in the movement. Because of the measurement of doctrine used in this study, interpersonal use of doctrine is not taken account.

Also not taken account in the measurement of doctrine is its use by the religious leadership, rather than by the groups' leadership. It is conceivable that doctrinal education

is left to religious institutions by the groups involved in conflict. Rather than concentrating their efforts on indoctrinating their followers, group leaders may act only as tactical leaders who graft in religious leadership to encourage their members. In this sort of scenario, doctrine may be an important influence on the intensity of religious conflicts that is not tested using the measurement developed in this study.

With the data collected in this study it is possible to test on a rudimentary level whether informal support for a group influences the intensity of a conflict. A variable was added to the study, called 'Informal', which measures whether there was informal support by the relevant religious organization in the conflict. If informal support exists, there is the potential that cosmic war worldviews, violent religious traditions and non-violent religious traditions are referenced – and thus part of the conflict – by individuals who do not speak for the group as a whole. If there is no informal support by the religious leadership, it is logical that there is also no use of doctrine occurring on the interpersonal level between adherents of that faith. Thus, the 'Informal' variable serves as a rough proxy for the use of doctrine below the group level and results in the ordinal logit summed in Table 5.4.

As demonstrated in the results, the informal support by religious leaders does not have a significant impact on the intensity of the conflict as indicated by the insignificant coefficient for 'Informal.' Correcting for the informal use also does not significantly change the influence that the doctrine variables ('Cosmic,' 'vTrad,' and 'nvTrad') exhibit on the level of intensity in a conflict. Furthermore, including the informal use of doctrine as an explanatory variable adds only slightly to the explanatory power of the model as a whole and is not an important component to determining the intensity of a conflict.

These results, however, should be accompanied with several caveats. First, no discrimination is made about how widespread the informal support is in the measurement of 'Informal'. In some cases, it was determined that informal support existed because of reports of an outspoken clergy – possibly only one – who supported the group. There are

TABLE 5.4: Ordinal Logit Results Controlling for Informal Use of Doctrine

		Number of Observations: 125	
		Pseudo R-squared: 0.0428	
		Log Likelihood: -172.23387	

	Coefficient	Standard Error	Probability
Cosmic	0.6137862	1.438319	0.670
vTrad	0.0587379	1.573805	0.970
nvTrad	-0.3177666	1.229345	0.796
OrgSup	0.1982933	0.692902	0.775
Military	**0.7996177**	**0.3780711**	**0.034**
Weapons	**0.4285538**	**0.185669**	**0.021**
Political	0.0687394	0.3038037	0.821
Mediators	-0.1370719	0.2621283	0.601
Relevance	0.2969262	0.421361	0.481
Hindu	-0.0749307	0.4814193	0.876
Jew	-0.8256042	0.9399423	0.380
Informal	0.2898237	0.4247305	0.495
_cut1	-0.3108073	1.209276	
_cut2	0.907339	1.211864	
_cut3	2.629465	1.233236	
_cut4	5.061292	1.333035	

other cases that were determined to have informal support in which virtually all clergy supported the group, although no statements of support were made by the religious organization itself. Thus, 'Informal' is extraordinarily broad variable and its usefulness is highly limited.

A second caveat is that its precision as a proxy is also limited. It is intended to determine the extent to which there is religious support below the group level in order to show the *potential* that doctrine is referenced below the group level. It cannot provide any insight into the actual appeals to doctrine below the group level or subsequently the impact that such appeals have on the intensity of a conflict. The above ordinal logit can only indicate that more research should be carried out into the impact of the informal appeals to doctrine and impact on the intensity on religious conflicts. The results of the ordinal logit – as limited as they are – indicate that further research would be fruitless, however. I will follow this up with a qualitative evaluation of the potential of informal use of doctrine in a following comparative case study.

Another explanation of why the original ordinal logit results do not support the expectations of hypotheses 2-4 is that religious doctrine may be relevant only when the group is supported by a religious organization. Take, for instance, the Nationalist movement in Northern Ireland. Many supporters of the Nationalist movement are Catholics, which may seem to make appeals to Catholic doctrine a logical source of rallying further support and inciting followers. The leadership of the movement, however, does not appeal to Catholic doctrine to bolster their support and rarely even identifies themselves or their opponents by their religious identity. One reason for this is that the Catholic Church has not consistently supported the movement. During the late 18th century many Irish Catholics suffered under harsh colonial policies, however the Catholic Church based in Rome chose to align itself with the more powerful colonizers than with its suffering members. The Church even openly opposed grassroots organizations formed to fight for Catholic rights such as the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB). As Tim Pat Coogan quotes one prominent Catholic clergy in reference to the IRB: "'Eternity is not long enough nor

hell hot enough to punish such miscreants.'"[148] Though the Church has at times supported the movement, it is not surprising that their inconsistency has caused the current movement to shy away from direct appeals to Catholics on doctrinal grounds. If the Nationalists appealed to religious doctrine to support their goals and tactics, they would risk being condemned by the Catholic Church on those same doctrinal grounds, thus diminishing the power of their appeal and possibly hurting their cause. Their use of doctrine to support their cause is inhibited by the lack of religious organizational support for their cause.

With the data collected in this study, it is possible to modify the model to test whether doctrinal influences are dependent on organizational support. In order to do this, new variables that measure the interaction of the doctrine variables with organizational support are created by multiplying the value of each doctrine variable by the organizational support variable ('Cosmic_Org' = 'Cosmic'*'OrgSup'; 'vTrad_Org' = 'vTrad'*'OrgSup'; 'nvTrad_Org' = 'nvTrad'*'OrgSup'). Replacing the original doctrine variables with the interacting variables and dropping the organizational support variable results in the ordinal logit summed in Table 5.5.

As the results indicate, the use of doctrine in religious conflicts does not influence the intensity of a conflict even when taking account of the possible interaction between the use of doctrine and organizational support for a group in conflict. This is clear from the insignificant coefficients for the three interacting variables ('cosmic_org,' 'vtrad_org,' and 'nvtrad_org'). As with the previous explanation of why the evidence does not support the hypotheses, this explanation also lacks support.

Although it is not specified in the previous research or the expectations of this study, it is conceivable that the use of doctrine occurs *before* the conflict begins and is not repeated throughout the conflict. Take, for instance, the analogy of a soccer match. In the weeks leading up to an especially important game, the coach likely emphasizes the importance of

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[148] Tim Pat Coogan, *The Troubles: Ireland's Ordeal and the Search for Peace,* (New York: Palgrave, 1996) p 13.

TABLE 5.5: Ordinal Logit Results with Interaction of 'OrgSup' and Doctrine Variables

		Number of Observations: 125
		Pseudo R-squared: 0.0356
		Log Likelihood: -173.52258

	Coefficient	Standard Error	Probability
Cosmic_Org	-0.1271651	0.9962565	0.898
NvTrad_Org	-0.3975675	1.069476	0.710
Military	**0.8177987**	**0.3793628**	**0.031**
Weapons	**0.3971928**	**0.1797938**	**0.027**
Political	0.1607197	0.2850005	0.573
Mediators	-0.0327749	0.2494633	0.895
Relevance	0.490617	0.3964311	0.216
Hindu	0.078657	0.4835054	0.871
Jew	-0.5881604	0.747844	0.432
_cut1	0.0773959	1.171039	
_cut2	1.288152	1.176346	
_cut3	2.994654	1.200759	
_cut4	5.402262	1.305281	

* vTrad_Org was dropped due to collinearity.

winning this match in order for the team to advance in the ranks and possibly even reminds players of how this would please the team's owners. The day of the match the players are subjected to one last pep talk as they physically and emotionally prepare for the game. They likely hear admonitions from the coach that the pride of the organization is dependent on the team's success in this match. The players then rush the field to demonstrate their talents. The encouragement and incitement of the coaches quickly discontinues, though,

being replaced with pleas to pass the ball, move into position or guard against an offside call. It is unlikely that the players have forgotten the importance of the match which the coaches impressed on them minutes before, although the coaches no longer verbalize the importance. In the heat of the match attention is focused on the strategy for winning – the tactical moves necessary to score more points than the other team – rather than on the grander context that makes a win necessary.

It is possible that the use of doctrine in religious conflicts is similar to the coaches' pre-game inspiration in the soccer match analogy. It may be that religious doctrine is important in the early stages of preparing for the conflict, however unspoken when the conflict actually begins. The *reasons* for fighting may fade into the *tactics* of fighting as the conflict intensifies. Though doctrine may not be referenced during the actual conflict, it does not necessarily mean that doctrine is irrelevant to the conflict. Rather, doctrine may be used to establish the context of the conflict which remains in the memories of those who carry out a conflict.

The idea that doctrine is used before an intense conflict and not during the conflict is not inconsistent with previous research, although very little research has been done on the timing of the use of religious doctrine in conflicts. This seems to be a vague area in the research that needs more specification in order to test adequately.

The measure for the use of doctrine used in this study does not take account of the use preceding the conflict, thus missing one of the potentially important ways that religion influences the intensity. Unfortunately the data used in the quantitative analysis does not permit a test of this modification of the theory. In the qualitative analysis a more in depth evaluation of this idea can and will be carried out. The test carried out in the quantitative analysis, however, has established that the use of doctrine *during* a conflict does not influence the intensity of that conflict.

A further explanation for the divergent theory and empirical evidence may be the inability of the doctrinal measure to take account of unspoken motivations or the cultural context underpinning the violence. It is conceivable that the religious doctrine undergirding the use of violence in a conflict is part of a community's belief system which does not need to be verbalized by group leaders. This may be easier to see in other areas of community life. Cheating on spouses, stealing from the neighborhood store, lying on job applications – all are looked down on in most religious communities. When asked why, many will refer back to religious doctrines. Rarely do community leaders give rousing public speeches about the 7th commandment that obliges one to remain faithful to their spouse, rather, it is understood by everyone in the community that cheating is not socially acceptable.

It may be the same for the use of violence in a conflict. It may be ingrained in the community's values that when one feels threatened – particularly if they feel their lifestyle or faith is threatened – violence is the only method that ensures survival of oneself, one's culture and one's god. If this is so widely felt in the community, there is no need to restate the obvious. Group leaders may then choose to focus their energies on organizing rather than justifying a resistance.

A quantitative test of this idea is possible, though not with the data and resources available for this study. Such a test would require a large survey of the communities involved in order to determine the underlying community attitudes and beliefs. In the comparative case study in the latter part of this chapter a more in depth analysis of community values than is possible in a quantitative test will be carried out.

Illustrative Comparative Case Study

What the quantitative test of these hypotheses has found is that the use of doctrine is not related to the level of intensity of a conflict. However, it has also revealed the difficulty of quantitative measures to adequately take account of the theory underlying these

hypotheses. A comparative case study offers a complementary method of evaluating the hypotheses in a more in depth (though less broad) analysis. In this section, a comparison of the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines and the Bougainville Revolutionary Army in Papua New Guinea will be conducted to further flesh out the role that religious doctrine plays in intensifying a conflict. The analysis will be focused on establishing a direct correlation between the use of doctrine and the higher intensity of conflicts by analyzing the types of appeals made by the groups and the effect of those appeals on the groups' members.

Background of Abu Sayyaf Group and Bougainville Revolutionary Army

In the Philippines over the last decade a conflict has emerged in which religious doctrine has been widely used. Although the use of religion has become more pronounced in recent years, the conflict itself can be traced back several hundred years.

The Philippine islands were just a few of the many Southeast Asian islands colonized by the Spanish who introduced Catholicism to the largely Muslim inhabitants. The Spanish, however, never fully gained control of the southern islands. In the northern islands where the Spanish were in control the population began to convert to Catholicism, while the southern islands, outside of Spanish control, remained Muslim thus creating a religiously divided population. The two populations were further divided by diverging socio-economic conditions. As Rajat Ganguly and Ian Macduff describe, the Spanish government

> *"introduced a system of education based on its own values, institutions and interests. Since this contradicted the basic values of the Muslims, they resisted that type of education in order to preserve their culture and history. Consequently, the Spaniards were not able to establish a single school in the*

Muslim areas. This became in the long run the main cause for illiteracy, backwardness and stagnation within the Muslim society. Unlike the Catholic counterparts, professionals such as medical doctors, dentists, lawyers and teachers were practically non-existent in the Muslim communities during the Spanish rule, which further widened the gap between the Catholics and Muslims in the country."[149]

The Spanish gave over control of the islands (though they never fully controlled the southern portion) to the United States after the Spanish-American War in 1898. The Muslim islands fought U.S. control, however were ultimately taken by force and integrated politically with the other Philippine islands. The Americans then began to try to further integrate the islands socially and economically. The American strategy included initiating much needed public works projects such as building roads, hospitals and schools. The Americans also encouraged the more educated and developed northern Filipinos to resettle the southern islands in order to bring their skills to the badly underdeveloped region. It is this resettlement policy that has had the greatest impact on the Muslim areas and has formed the context in which the current conflict emerged.

By the time the Americans began the resettlement policy, the northern and southern Filipinos had been developing rapidly along two divergent paths for over three hundred years leaving them as two very distinct groups with very little in common. The Americans encouraged the wealthier, more skilled and Catholic Filipinos to move to the less developed and Muslim southern islands by providing loans and granting the settlers much larger tracts of land than granted to the Muslim inhabitants. They also brought in large transnational corporations who took control of much of the indigenous land to grow rubber or other raw materials for export. By 1920 the islands' administrations were transferred to imported

[149] Rajat Ganguly and Ian Macduff (eds), *Ethnic Conflict and Secessionism in South and Southeast Asia: Causes, Dynamics, Solutions*, (London: Sage Publications, 2003) p 197.

Catholics leaving the largely Muslim indigenous population "subjugated and ruled by the 'internal' colonial masters, i.e., the Christian Filipinos who had developed their own pattern of leadership and authority incompatible with the realities and the cultural and religious values of the Muslim society."[150]

In the wake of World War II, the Philippines, like many colonies at the time, began to push for their independence. The southern islands made it clear to the Americans, however, that they did not wish to become part of the new Philippine state, rather they desired either autonomy or complete independence. The Americans ignored this request and ultimately granted independence to the Philippines in 1946 with the southern islands included within its borders. The Philippine government continued the settlement policies that the American administration had begun, which continued to exacerbate the divisions between Muslims and Catholics in the southern islands. Immediately after the Philippines gained independence, a movement to pursue independence or autonomy for the southern islands at whatever cost began to develop.

The movement was only loosely organized until the Muslim Independence Movement (MIM) was founded in 1968. The immediate catalyst to MIM's formation was an incident often referred to as the Jabaidah Massacre. The Philippine army had recruited a group of Muslims from the southern islands to lead a covert operation. The Muslims were trained in the Jabaidah Training Camp to cause an insurrection on the nearby Indonesian islands in order to create an opportunity for the Philippines to annex the Indonesian islands. After being trained, however, the group of Muslims refused to carry out their operation and was executed as mutineers. The Muslims of the southern islands were infuriated by the incident. The Philippine government responded by initiating an investigation, however all the officers involved were acquitted of any responsibility. Muslim anger only increased culminating in the formation of MIM to demand complete independence.

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[150] Ibid. Page 199.

Clashes between Muslims and Catholics on the southern islands became increasingly frequent in the years after MIM was formed. In 1971, one anti-Muslim organization led an attack on a mosque that killed over seventy Muslim worshippers. Muslim anger naturally increased, however the Philippine placated MIM by offering some of its leadership significant positions in the government. The leadership took the positions, however this did not settle its members' anger, in fact, the organization was split by those who believed the MIM leaders had sold out to the Philippine government.

One of the MIM members who was most outraged by his leadership's betrayal was Nur Misuari. Misuari was born into an impoverished family but benefited from a scholarship program that allowed him to pursue an education in Manila. As a teacher at the University of the Philippines, Misuari was among the Filipino Muslims who became enraged when the Philippine government's actions in the Jabaidah Massacre came to light. In the wake of the massacre, Misuari began training for a guerilla war, however MIM abandoned the cause and left the movement with no organization. Misuari left MIM with the other dissatisfied members and formed the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in 1971. Like MIM's orginal goal, the MNLF was dedicated to the complete independence of the Muslim southern islands.

In 1972 President Marcos introduced martial law to try to cope with the unprecedented violence promulgated by the MNLF throughout the southern islands. The MNLF responded with four demands that would have to be met before they would end the violence: 1) the Philippine military must be removed from the southern islands, 2) all Muslim lands settled by Catholics must be returned, 3) Islamic law must be implemented on the southern islands and 4) the islands must be granted autonomy. The Philippine government refused the meet the demands and the MNLF likewise refused to end the violence, thus locking the islands in an unending violent test of wills.

The Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) intervened in 1976 on behalf of the Muslims and pressured the Philippine government to negotiate with the MNLF. The parties met in Tripoli, Libya and emerged with an agreement known as the Tripoli Agreement that created an autonomous region for the Muslims. There were still those within the MNLF who were dedicated to complete independence and unwilling to settle for partial autonomy. Not surprisingly, this group split from the MNLF when it became clear that the MNLF leadership were willing to settle with the Philippine government.

The new organization was led by Hashim Salamat, the former Vice Chairman of the MNLF, and took the name of Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Like the MNLF and MIM, the MILF was committed to creating an independent state for the Muslims of the southern Philippines. What sets the MILF apart from the other two organizations is their emphasis on their religious foundations. The MILF not only wanted independence, but set out to base the new state on Islamic principles thereby creating a distinctively Islamic state. Salamat made this desire clear in a letter to the OIC in which he stated: "All Mujahideen under the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) adopt Islam as their way of life. Their ultimate objective in their Jihad is to make supreme the WORD of ALLAH and establish Islam in the Bangsamoro homeland"[151] (emphasis in the original).

After a lull in fighting during the MNLF-Philippine government negotiations, the creation of the MILF again brought violence to the southern islands. Soon the MNLF, too, had rejoined the fight and the islands digressed into a violent chaos. As is the cyclical nature of violent conflicts, the MNLF, MILF and Philippine government again embarked on negotiations in 1996 and agreed on a more autonomous Muslim region. And again those within the MNLF and MILF not satisfied with autonomy moved their membership to the burgeoning Abu Sayyaf Group.

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[151] Thomas M. McKenna, *Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines*, (London: University of California Press, 1998) p 208.

As the MNLF and MILF committed themselves to peace in 1996, the Abu Sayyaf Group committed themselves to violence until the southern islands were granted full independence as an Islamic state. They have routinely relied on kidnappings and beheadings to pressure the Philippine government to release the islands from their control. Meanwhile the Philippine government's position has been to not pay ransoms or negotiate with what they consider criminals. As yet, the government has been unsuccessful in eliminating the Abu Sayyaf Group and the Abu Sayyaf Group has been unsuccessful in gaining an independent Islamic state. The conflict remains at a stand-off.

The Abu Sayyaf Group is unique in its ever stronger religious indoctrination and image as a purely religious organization. While it shares the goal of an Islamic state with the MILF, the nature of that goal is somewhat different. The MILF wanted independence and wanted to replace the secular administration with an Islamic administration because of their religious faith. On the other hand, many Abu Sayyaf Group leaders studied in Saudi Arabia, Egypt or Libya and wanted to do their part to unite the Islamic world, so they returned home to fight the jihad in their corner of the world. Although the difference is somewhat subtle, the effect is an even tighter integration of Islamic doctrine with the mission of the Abu Sayyaf Group. I will return to this in a later section when I evaluate the impact that the use of doctrine in the Abu Sayyaf Group has had on the intensity of the conflict.

In the nearby islands of Papua New Guinea another conflict has emerged between two populations that diverged socio-economically during a period of colonization. Papua New Guinea was colonized by the Germans in 1966 as the Europeans divided up their valuable trade assets in Southeast Asia. Soon afterwards, the island of Bougainville was added to the Germany's possession cutting the island's inhabitants off from their ethnic kin living on other islands that fell under British control. In the chaos of World War I and World War II, Papua New Guinea (including Bougainville) changed hands between the

Germans, Australians and Japanese ultimately falling under Australia's jurisdiction after World War II.

Bougainville was spared the forced assimilation that the southern islands of the Philippines endured, but nevertheless, immigration disrupted the native life and culture this time not forced by the colonizers but spurred by the discovery of copper in the 1960s. Australian based companies quickly scoped out the island and drew up plans to develop one of the world's largest mines in the central mountains of Bougainville. The Bougainville Copper Limited (BCL) company was created as a division of one of the Australia's oldest and largest mining firms in order to build and run the mine that became known as the Panguna mine. Robert Young Pelton describes the impact that BCL and the Panguna mine had on the island's inhabitants and culture:

"BCL carved a modern city out of the pristine jungle. More than ten thousand outsiders descended on Arawa [the nearby village] to build the mine. It took almost a decade to complete the infrastructure, including a port and housing in Arawa. ...BCL tore down or relocated entire villages, built roads, and installed an electrical system."[152]

Unlike the inhabitants of the southern islands of the Philippines, the indigenous Bougainvilleans were initially thrilled with the new settlers as they brought an immediate rise in the standard of living for those living near the mine. Many of the locals worked for BCL and were rewarded with improved housing, better roads and the excitement of a new lifestyle. As time went on, however, this overwhelming support for the mine began to erode. The mine had caused a rapid and significant economic chasm to develop between those who worked for BCL and those who did not. While BCL employees received good

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[152] Robert Young Pelton, *The Hunter, the Hammer, and Heaven*, (Guilford (CT): The Lyons Press, 2002) p 227.

salaries, steady employment and company-built houses, those who did not work for BCL remained economically stagnant and increasingly marginalized in their society. The resentment over the increasing inequality began to grow in the early 1970s.

Two economic issues in regards to the mine became increasingly pertinent as dissatisfaction grew. First, the local inhabitants were ill-prepared to negotiate compensation for their land when BCL initially bought the property. As a result, they were grossly undercompensated and became aware of this when the BCL profits were fully disclosed. And secondly, only a small portion of those profits were reinvested on Bougainville. According to Pelton, only $4 Million were reinvested of the over $300 Million a year that was earned by the mine.[153] The employees of BCL became suspicious of the mine's management and began copying documents to establish the mine's exploitation of the island.

Added to the socio-economic division on Bougainville was an increasing concern for the environmental impact that the Panguna mine was having on the island. The mine itself had cleared 24 square kilometers of the lush mountainous jungle outside of Arawa, however its impact exceeded even the massive open pit of the mine. "The mine turned a green mountain full of animals and plants into a hot naked scar on the landscape. Entire rivers changed course and turned green because of the tailings. The exposed ore oxidized and created an acidic leach that turned the fresh water into a vinegarlike poison. The ocean turned brown and sterile from the poisonous runoff."[154]

As early as 1968, the frustration of the Bougainvilleans was palpable and resulted in demands for secession. The government in Papua New Guinea (still under Australian control) refused to grant independence to the island. In 1975, when Papua New Guinea gained its own independence from Australia, Bougainville again demanded the right to be united with its ethnic kin in the Soloman Islands and was again denied its independence.

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[153] Ibid. Page 228.
[154] Ibid. Page 229.

One employee of BCL in the Panguna mine, Francis Ona, realized the negative impact that the mine was having on his native island. Ona was a surveyor for BCL however began working on the cleaning crew at night so that he could investigate the full scale of the operation and photocopy documents. In 1987, Ona became the President of the Panguna Landowners Association and pushed BCL to adequately compensate the native Bougainvilleans for their land, their work in the mine and the destruction of their habitat. BCL's response was less than satisfactory for the Bougainvilleans. In the last meeting between the company and the landowner's association, the company presented evidence that the mine was not responsible for the deteriorating environment on the island. As one of the Bougainvillean leaders, Sam Kauona, recounts:

"The final conclusion was a complete contradiction of the preliminary conclusion and so these conflicting reports made Francis furious. He banged the table with his fist, pointed his finger at the big heavyweights from the company, the provincial government, and the National Government of PNG [Papua New Guinea] and said, 'You are liars. I am going to take this up personally and revolt against the company now.' There was definitely a tense moment. They couldn't say anything. He stormed out from the table and the meeting was concluded with dissatisfaction."[155]

The following day, Francis Ona began recruiting for an armed struggle against BCL and Papua New Guinea. Because of their intimate knowledge of the mine, the group which became known as the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) began by striking at the supplies of power for the mine forcing the mine to cease its operations in 1989. Throughout 1989 the BRA made strategic guerilla attacks mostly in the area surrounding the mine.

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[155] Nzine, 'Interview with Sam Kauona Sirivi', (23 June 2000) <www.nzine.co.nz/features/bville2.html> (26 April 2004).

Papua New Guinea responded by declaring a state of emergency and led an aggressive search for BRA rebels. It is estimated that 1,600 homes were burned and families sent to concentration camps as part of Papua New Guinea's strategy for eliminating the rebels.

By March 1990, Papua New Guinea virtually gave up. All Australians and mine workers were evacuated and the military pulled out of Bougainville. The military commander of BRA, Sam Kauona, signed a peace treaty and formed an interim government. The island was put under a harsh embargo that denied the inhabitants food, fuel and even medicine. Meanwhile, Papua New Guinea tried to arm Bougainvilleans to take out the BRA rebels.

A new administration in Papua New Guinea saw an opportunity to exploit divisions in the rebel army and government and ordered another invasion of the island in April 1991. Again the population was devastated and rounded up in concentration camps. Divisions began to grow within the rebel ranks. For those directly affected by the mine, there was no backing down until the island was permanently free of the outsiders. For those not so harshly impacted by the mine, however, there seemed little reason to continue fighting. By 1994, a new ceasefire was agreed and new interim government was formed from the Bougainvilleans who were willing to settle.

Unfortunately the ceasefire was only temporary and the interim government was only partially effective. In 1996 the house of the spokesman for the rebels was burned and the leader of the interim government was assassinated sparking renewed fighting. An alternative solution was decided in 1997 in which an Australian Truce Monitoring Group would enforce the ceasefire. For the most part this solution has proved viable, though Francis Ona and a small group of rebels continue to threaten any outsiders on the island.

The conflict in Bougainville is somewhat similar to that in the southern islands of the Philippines. In both cases the conflicts developed along socio-economic divisions that

were exacerbated during a period of colonization. In both cases a segment of the population demanded independence in order to be united with what they viewed as their ethnic or religious kin. In both cases the governments in place refused to grant independence and reacted harshly to the rebel groups that formed. Both conflicts have also gone through waves of increasing and decreasing intensity, as well as divisions within the rebel groups.

The conflicts are significantly different in one respect that is of particular concern for this study: the population in the southern islands of the Philippines is divided religiously, ethnically and economically, whereas the population in Bougainville is divided only ethnically and economically. Furthermore the most recently active rebel group in the Philippines, the Abu Sayyaf Group, appeals to Islamic doctrine in the mobilization of its members, whereas the BRA does not rely on such appeals. The focus of this chapter is the comparison of these two different kinds of appeals, particularly in regards to their impact on the intensity of the conflict. As such the following section will begin by illustrating references to a cosmic war mentality and violent religious traditions by the Abu Sayyaf Group and then turn to an analysis of how these appeals enhance the violence and duration of the conflict. Following this analysis is a comparison to the BRA's appeals and the intensity of the Bougainville conflict.

Abu Sayyaf Group

The Abu Sayyaf Group has differentiated itself from the other Muslim separatist groups in the southern Philippines by grounding itself in the wider Dar al-Islam movement that seeks to unite all Muslim lands in one state ruled by Islamic principles. While both the MNLF and MILF considered themselves the representatives of the subjugated Muslim population in the Philippines, the Abu Sayyaf Group has put themselves forward as representatives of the worldwide Islamist movement in their home territory of the Philippines. Though the difference is slight, it has had a pronounced effect on the type of

appeals the Abu Sayyaf Group has used to mobilize support for its movement. Rather than focusing on the need to end discrimination against the Muslims, the Abu Sayyaf Group has appealed to theological and traditional beliefs that necessitate a homeland that is free of all infidels and corrupting influences.

The internal organizational structure of the Abu Sayyaf Group and the important role assigned to clergy in the organization highlight the central place of religious doctrine in their struggle. The ulamas in the southern Philippines not only sanction the group's activities, but have played a role in educating the fighters and even joining them on the frontlines. Most significantly, though, the ulamas serve on a council whose role is to direct the organization through consensus. The Abu Sayyaf Group is led by a Caliph and council of eight religious scholars who make decisions unanimously based on their interpretation of Islamic principles.

In its appeals for support, the Abu Sayyaf Group's leadership make frequent references to the much discussed concept of jihad. For moderate Muslims, jihad has two meanings. The first, which Muhammed referred to as the greater jihad, is a struggle against corruption in oneself. The second, which Muhammed called the lesser jihad, is popularly translated as holy war and is a call on Muslims to physically struggle against corruption in the community or state. Though many mainstream Muslims believe there are significant limitations on the lesser jihad – such as the requisite that one must be attacked before jihad can be carried out – the tradition has frequently been used within Muslim populations to justify violent struggles.

This is the nature of the appeals made by the Abu Sayyaf Group. Jihad is one of the most fundamental justifications given for the need to violently oppose Philippine control of the southern islands. Rustico Guerrero's research of the Abu Sayyaf Group found that it was this idea of jihad that initially inspired the founder and early leader of the Abu Sayyaf

Group, Abubakar Janjalani, to pursue and revive the violent struggle in the southern Philippines.

> *"Janjalani turned to extremism due to Jihad teachings that all deeds are justified in the eyes of Allah as long as they are in pursuit of Islam. He espoused the radical view that a true believer could do all forms of Jihad Fi-Sabilillah (an Arabic term which means a broad and endless struggle for the cause of Allah) to 'defeat the non-Muslims who subjugate the abode of Allah.' In the Islamic indoctrination, it is their belief that Muslim areas are 'part of Allah abode,' therefore, non-believers have no place therein."[156]*

Janjalani, like many of the Abu Sayyaf Group leadership, was influenced greatly by an education program that the government of Egypt established in 1955. In order to encourage a pan-Islamic worldview, Gamel Abdul Nasser offered hundreds of scholarships to Filipino Muslims to study at al-Azhar University in Cairo. Many of the students lived in Egypt for over eight years at a time.[157] As a participant in this program, Janjalani focused his studies on Islamic Law and later moved to Pakistan where he studied jihad and Islamic revolutions. It is believed that Janjalani came into contact with MNLF rebels training in Libya and was further radicalized by his association with the rebels-in-training.

In addition to the radicalization of Filipino Muslims that occurred as a result of the Egyptian scholarship program, there was a further radicalization that occurred as a result of the Soviet-Afghan war in the 1980s. Like many Muslims from around the world, Filipino Muslims responded en masse when the Afghans called for their co-faithful to come to their aid and defend Islam against the invading Soviet Infidels. Filipino Muslims arrived in Pakistan where they were quickly trained with Muslims from Saudi Arabia, Egypt,

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[156] Rustico Guerrero, *Philippines Terrorism and Insurgency: What to do About the Abu Sayyaf Group,* (Quantico (VA): USMC Command and Staff College, 2002) p 15.
[157] McKenna, *Muslim Rulers and Rebels,* p 143-4

Indonesia, Iraq and throughout the Muslim world. They were then sent to the frontlines to hold off the Soviets. When the Soviets withdrew in 1989, the Filipino Muslims returned home with renewed vigor with the expectation that their own fight against their occupiers could be successful. They had also been trained, gained experience and shared techniques with Muslim militants worldwide. It is not surprising then that the Filipino conflict intensified with the advent of a new organization created to continue the Afghan struggle in the Philippines.

For the purposes of this study, the religious training the Filipino Muslims received is especially pertinent. According to the Philippine National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, extremist clerics from the Middle East and South Asia continue to provide "a variety of 'educational services'"[158] including theology classes. Some of the rebels also told McKenna that the local Islamic clerics provided education for the rebels and sometimes joined their ranks in battle. Whether the education was led by foreign or local clerics, it is clear that the Islamic scholars have offered significant training for the movement. Because of the secretive nature of the organization, though, it is difficult to know exactly what is taught in these classes.

From accounts of those who have been able to infiltrate the movement (either by choice or by force), there is evidence that the religious training in the Abu Sayyaf Group focuses on the need for jihad and rewards for martyrs in the afterlife. One hostage, Gracia Burnham, who survived a year with the rebels recently wrote a book about her ordeal in which she recounts insightful conversations with her captors. When questioned, one captor explained to her that he must carry out the jihad for retribution of "all the atrocities against Muslims starting back before the Crusades."[159] Particularly for the offense of non-Muslims

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[158] Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, *Indonesia's Transformation and the Stability of Southeast Asia*, (St. Andrews: Rand Corporation, 2001) p 90.
[159] Gracia Burnham and Dean Merrill, *In the Presence of My Enemies*, (Wheaton (IL): Tyndale House Publishers, 2003) p 150.

ruling a Muslim land, Abu Sayyaf Group members are told they must fight and defend their families, culture and religion.

If they join the fight and die, rebels are taught that they will benefit from divine protection and receive special treatment in paradise. Burnham records one conversation in which one of her captors explained the afterlife to her:

> *"'Eternal destiny? Okay, let me explain for you how Judgement Day is going to be conducted.' Solaiman then proceeded to tell us that everyone will stand facing in one direction, like Muslims do when they start their prayers. Everyone who has ever been born in the entire universe will stand, totally naked, for forty thousand years, waiting for Allah to pronounce his judgement of whether they go to paradise or hell.*

> *"'People will understandably get impatient during this long wait. They will start going to the various prophets. First, to Adam they'll say, "Please go to Allah and tell him to judge us. We can't stand it anymore."*

> *"'But Adam will reply, "I am not worthy."*

> *"'Then they will go to Abraham. He will say that he isn't worthy either.*

> *"'They will go to David, Soloman, and even Jesus. "Please ask Allah to hurry up and judge us now; we can't stand it anymore." Jesus, like the others, will say, "I'm not worthy."*

> *"'So finally they will go to Muhammad, the final prophet.*

> *"'Success at last! Muhammad will intercede with Allah, who will judge humanity, consigning those with good deeds to paradise and condemning those who fall short to hell – **unless they were fallen mujahideen, those who had died in holy war and were thus already rewarded.***

"With this way of thinking, clearly the odds of reaching paradise were slim to none"[160] (emphasis added).

Not only are their chances of reaching paradise slim, but they are also guaranteed an eternity in paradise if they join to fight the jihad and die in that struggle. Success then becomes defined as death in the struggle in order to guarantee rewards in eternity and not in the creation of a homeland for Filipino Muslims.

McKenna found that many Filipino Muslims believe the earthly deterioration of martyrs' bodies is evidence of their heavenly treatment. It is a common belief that a martyr who dies in the jihad does "not smell bad or decompose, even for one entire week."[161] Their corpses emit a pleasant scent of flowers, it is believed. However, when the fighters' obedience to Allah wanes, the dead are no longer considered martyrs and no longer decompose differently from other humans. Thus commitment and constant loyalty to Allah and his representatives on earth in the movement are prerequisites for eternal happiness.

McKenna's experience with the Filipino Muslims also revealed another belief that impacts the fighters' behavior within the rebel group. McKenna found that those who abandoned the movement are believed to be supernaturally punished by Allah. He describes how one well-known and well-respected commander in the MNLF, Disumimba Rashid, fell from Allah's graces after defecting from the movement. "Many misfortunes befell him after he surrendered"[162] to the Philippine government and his life ended in a tragic death. This belief in supernatural punishment in addition to supernatural rewards ensures a loyal regimen of fighters with which to sustain a long struggle against the strong Philippine state.

Although it is well-documented that the Abu Sayyaf Group has its roots in Islamic fundamentalism and its leadership has expressed theological justifications for the need for

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[160] Ibid. Page 152.
[161] McKenna, *Muslim Rulers and Rebels,* p 194.
[162] Ibid. Page 193.

an armed struggle, it is less clear how much this indoctrination has sunken into the lower echelons of the organization. In fact, there is evidence that the rank-and-file members are much less ideologically driven than their initial leaders. Burnham describes how the leaders occasionally held Arabic language classes and lessons in the need for jihad during her captivity to try to educate themselves and convert their hostages. The Abu Sayyaf Group members seemed to adhere to their faith despite the harsh conditions, as well. Burnham recalls how they repeated their prayers at the appointed times during the day and fasted during the holy month of Ramadan.

Despite the seemingly religious behavior of the rebels, though, Burnham's book offers another perspective on the rank-and-file members. She recounts an incident in the first couple of days of her captivity that leads one to question how religiously motivated the Abu Sayyaf Group members are:

"A sober, moon-faced captor named Musab established himself as the Abu Sayyaf's spiritual leader and began conducting Koran studies up in the bow of the boat. Those who attended were soon bored to death with his lengthy orations.

"They had Korans, but only two in the whole group had read the book all the way through. One day, after listening to them read in a distinctly nasal, singsong tone, Martin asked one of the guys, 'What did that say?'

"'Oh, we don't know,' he responded. 'We just learned how to pronounce the words in Arabic, but we don't know what they mean.'

"'Really?'

"'Of course not. We don't know Arabic.'

"I asked, 'Why don't you translate the Koran into Tagalog, then, so you know what you're reading?'

" 'Oh, no, no – then it would be corrupted. The only true Koran is in Arabic.' "[163]

Burnham concluded that only two of her captors had even read and understood the entire Koran. This is not inconsistent with McKenna's experience either. McKenna remarks that "it was striking to note how rarely any of the insurgents, in expressing their motivations for taking up arms or fighting on against great odds, made spontaneous mention of ... Islamic renewal."[164]

Money appears to be a much more powerful motivator for Burnham's kidnappers and more generally for the Abu Sayyaf Group organization. A partial ransom was paid for the release of Burnham and her husband, however, their release was never secured. While still in captivity after the ransom had been paid, Burnham watched as each of her captives received a portion of her ransom to spend as they pleased. Dirk Barreveld also noted the money motivation in his analysis of the Abu Sayyaf Group: "Why did all these kids come to join the rebels? That is what we call the *Robin Hood* effect. The bandits are idealized. Crime pays and in this case it paid a lot."[165] This would seem to be a common and powerful motivator throughout the organization. In fact the Abu Sayyaf Group's membership doubled just after receiving its first large ransom payment that was divided between its members.[166]

Defense of one's culture and way of life was also a very strong motivator for the rebels. In virtually every recorded justification of why a particular rebel joined the Abu

[163] Burnham and Merrill, *In the Presence of My Enemies*, p 73
[164] McKenna, *Muslim Rulers and Rebels,* p 186.
[165] Dirk J. Barreveld, *Terrorism in the Philippines: The Bloody Trail of Abu Sayyaf, Bin Laden's East Asian Connection*, (London: Writer's Club Press, 2001) p 169.
[166] Larry Niksch, *Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation*, (Washington D.C.: Penny Hill Press, Congressional Research Service, 2002) p 3.

Sayyaf Group, a recollection of all the atrocities committed by the Philippine government against the Filipino Muslims is listed. Muslim homes were taken from them and given to Catholics; Muslims were denied the right to educate their children in their heritage and language; Muslims are not held to the strict Sharia Law that some believe is the only way to ensure a peaceful society. The list is long and in many cases it is personal – a rebel's sister may have been killed or their parents' land taken from them. In this way, the motivation for rank-and-file members to fight is not based on grand religious principles of a united land of Islam (Dar al-Islam), but only the defense of their threatened culture which happens to be Islamic.

The central question of concern in this chapter, though, is how do the theological justifications used by the Abu Sayyaf Group impact the intensity of the conflict? Ignoring that there are other motivations for fighting, can one draw a direct correlation between calls for jihad and the increased duration or deadliness of the conflict? Are rebels who believe that martyrdom will be rewarded in the afterlife the catalyst to escalating the intensity of a conflict? The answer to all of these questions is clearly yes.

The promise of rewards if one joins the jihad and dies as a result creates an attitude where the goal is death. When one is willing to sacrifice their life for the cause and has no moral compulsion against killing one's enemy, it becomes logical to kill as many Infidels with one's death as possible. To not kill the enemy when sacrificing oneself is considered failure and puts one's eternal destiny in question. In this environment, more deaths are inevitable.

Furthermore, a call for jihad in this context is a call to participate in violence without compromise. Abu Sayyaf Group members believe that jihad must be carried out until ALL non-Muslims are removed from the Muslim homelands in the southern islands of the Philippines. Until that goal is reached, the struggle will continue and continue violently

creating an atmosphere in which the conflict may never be resolved and in which the rebels will continue to kill.

Statistically across time, the more Islamic the movements have become, the more deaths have resulted in the conflict. In the early days of the secessionist movement when the goal was political autonomy, there were fewer deaths in the struggle as more frustration was vented through political channels. However, as the movement has redefined itself as more fundamentally Islamic particularly in the past decade, there has been an increase in the indiscriminate killing in the conflict.

One can clearly conclude from the case of the Abu Sayyaf Group that the use of religious doctrine is directly related to the higher intensity, more deaths and longer duration of the conflict. Without appeals to jihad or calls for martyrs, the conflict would likely not have escalated in the past decade.

Several issues were raised in the quantitative analysis for which the data available could not provide an adequate test. The case of the Abu Sayyaf Group allows a more indepth exploration of these issues. One issue that arose concerned the potential that the informal use of religious doctrine could exhibit the same influence on the intensity level as the formal use of religious doctrine. Within the Abu Sayyaf Group, the use of religious doctrine occurs at the highest levels with formal support from the Muslim clergy in the southern Philippines. Thus it would be impossible to distinguish between formal and informal use of doctrine in terms of their impact on the level of violence.

One characteristic about the intergroup relations within the Abu Sayyaf Group, however, suggests that informal support may offer the same consequence as formal support in regards to conflict intensity. Within the Abu Sayyaf Group, particularly from Burnham's description, group members seem to be most affected by the influences of those with whom they have direct contact. For members, the organization is very localized creating an in-

group peer pressure that has an impact that far exceeds the dictates from the organization's hierarchy. In this sort of environment, an informal and interpersonal use of religious doctrine to mobilize support has an identical consequence as that theorized about formal support.

Another question raised in the quantitative analysis of this chapter concerned the timing of the use of doctrine in a conflict. The quantitative analysis established that doctrinal appeals during a conflict have no impact on the intensity of the conflict, however, the data could not address whether appeals made before a conflict had an impact. The Abu Sayyaf Group case does present evidence that seems to support the idea that a doctrinal discourse prior to a conflict is replaced with a tactical discourse during the conflict with both resulting in a more intense conflict. Many of the leaders of the Abu Sayyaf Group were part of the education program in which they were indoctrinated in the need for jihad to defend Islam in all parts of the world. It was immediately following this indoctrination that many of the same students left for Afghanistan to put into practice the lessons taught as part of the education program. And it was the same students who returned to the Philippines to bring jihad to their corner of the world. It is clear that the indoctrination they received prior to the conflict is a fundamental reason why the Abu Sayyaf Group was formed and the conflict escalated in the 1990s. McKenna's experience with the rebels also supports this as he observed, "The official ideology of the Muslim separatist movement was not widely disseminated to non-elite Muslim civilians during the armed phase of the rebellion."[167]

It is also clear that the religiosity of the Abu Sayyaf Group has diminished significantly since they embarked on their violent struggle against the Philippines. In recent years, public statements from the organization have concerned the tactics and goals of the organization, rather than justifying their movement. They have routinely taken hostages and then made demands for ransom or issued terms for negotiations. Outside of the group,

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[167] McKenna, *Muslim Rulers and Rebels,* p 191.

very little is said in terms of the religious reasons why the kidnapping or violence was necessary to begin with. This seems to suggest that the quantitative measures of the use of doctrine are potentially based as they did not take account of these nuances.

Finally the quantitative analysis raised a question about the cultural context of the conflict that the data was unable to address. It was suggested that the justification for violence may be so ingrained within the culture that it need not be repeated or verbalized by group leaders. This does not appear to be the case with the Abu Sayyaf Group. Though the need for jihad is accepted by members of the Abu Sayyaf Group, the use of violence is not so widely accepted in the larger context of the Muslim community in the southern Philippines. The existence of the MNLF and MILF who have settled with the Philippine government and denounced the violence of the Abu Sayyaf Group as a violation of the Koran leave little question that violence is not a cultural norm in the conflict. Rather, it would appear that the Abu Sayyaf Group has violated social norms by adopting their strategy of violence.

Bougainville Revolutionary Army

Despite this evidence that appeals to religious doctrine are directly related to the level of violence in the conflict, one might argue that religion is not the true motivator of the conflict and thus cannot be said to be the reason why the conflict was so intense. It can be pointed out that money seems to inspire more Abu Sayyaf Group members than religious piety, or one might point out that the rebels are really fighting to defend their culture rather than to demonstrate obedience to Allah. Although profit is a powerful motivator, it – by itself – does not seem to be the cause of the high intensity of the Philippine conflict. Nor is the desire to defend one's threatened culture the sole reason that the Philippines have endured such a long and deadly fight. A comparison to a conflict in which both these

motivators (profit and defense of culture) makes a useful test of how much of the high intensity can be attributed to the use of religious doctrine by the Abu Sayyaf Group.

The Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) leadership chose a different path for recruiting members to fight the battle for independence from Papua New Guinea. Rather than appealing to religious principles and traditions, the BRA appealed to a sense of fairness and justice for Bougainville. According to Pelton, "Francis [Ona] had simply shown the people documents that convinced them that the mine was not telling them the truth."[168] Feeling exploited by foreigners, the population on Bougainville largely fell behind Ona and the BRA, at least initially. The goal of the BRA became autonomy or independence *because* the foreigners had taken advantage of them. Unlike the conflict in the southern Philippines, the exploitation of Bougainvilleans could be resolved by establishing restitution and guarantees against further exploitation. The conflict in the southern Philippines was not so easily resolved as the Muslims carrying on the fight vowed to continue until non-Muslims are removed from the Muslim homeland – a much less attainable goal.

The difference in the two movements' goals not only impacts the potential of resolving the conflicts but also directly impacts the deadliness of the conflicts. The BRA's desire to better their economic situation does not inspire its members to strive for death in their fight, as was evident in the Abu Sayyaf Group. Rather, membership in BRA has dropped dramatically since the Papua New Guinea government has granted more demands of the rebels. More significantly, the members have yet to return to BRA and rejoin the violent struggle signaling a commitment to peace after their goals were met. In Bougainville, where the rebels are not willing to sacrifice their lives for the cause, the conflict did not experience the same deadliness experienced in the Philippines where a belief in rewards for martyrdom is widespread. The difference in intensity is exacerbated by the religious appeals of the Abu Sayyaf Group.

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[168] Pelton, *The Hunter, the Hammer, and Heaven*, p 233.

The religious appeals used by the Abu Sayyaf Group had a significant impact on both the deadliness and duration of the conflict that would not have been experienced if the Abu Sayyaf Group had relied on appeals to profit or defense of their culture alone. Specifically, the cosmic war mentality re-enforced within the discourse of the organization made the conflict much more difficult to negotiate because of the intractable nature of their demands. And the references to violent traditions such as jihad and martyrdom made the goal for rank-and-file members, death for the cause, rather than gaining independence. These characteristics make religious conflicts unique in their potential for a higher intensity because of religious doctrine.

The comparative analysis of the Abu Sayyaf Group and Bougainville Revolutionary Army supports Hypotheses 2 and 3 demonstrating that a cosmic war mentality and referencing violent religious traditions both increase the intensity of these conflicts. The quantitative test, however, indicates that these cases are anomalies that do not fit the pattern of the involvement of religious doctrine in a conflict.

Conclusion

This chapter has evaluated the impact that religious doctrine has on the intensity of a conflict using a quantitative test complemented by an illustrative comparative case study. A statistical test of 125 conflicts since World War II provided evidence that refutes all three hypotheses under consideration. As a result of this test one cannot say that religious conflicts are more intense because of the involvement of a cosmic war mentality or references to violent religious traditions, nor can one say that appeals to non-violent religious traditions cause a de-escalation of a conflict. Rather, the quantitative analysis concludes that the use of religious doctrine is irrelevant in determining the intensity of a conflict.

A comparison of the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines and the Bougainville Revolutionary Army in Papua New Guinea illustrated the impact that doctrine has on the intensity of conflict. In this comparison, it was observed that religious doctrine was a determinant of the group and group's members use of violence. Although other motivations are undoubtedly present, such as the desire for a profit or defense of one's culture, the comparison with the BRA indicated that appeals to religious doctrine impacted the conflict in ways not experienced when the appeals were absent. Though the cases used to illustrate the dynamics of a conflict in which religious doctrine is used to motivate its faithful support the model and Hypotheses 2 and 3, the quantitative test illustrates that these cases are deviations from a pattern in which religious doctrine does not have a direct influence on the intensity of a conflict.

The following chapters will evaluate the other attributes of religion in a conflict – organization and diaspora – to determine if these additional characteristics unique to religion are associated with a higher intensity conflict.

CHAPTER 6: Religious Organizational Support

Cypriot Enosis and Irish Nationalism

Religious organizations provide one of the most robust support networks available for groups involved in conflict. Not only does their support imply a moral imperative to support the movement's cause (wrapped in doctrinal justifications), but they also come with a pre-existing organizational structure that is necessary to sustain a movement in a violent conflict. As described more fully in Chapter 2, McAdam and others' analysis of specific cases have broken down the organizational influence of religion into the members, leaders and communications network attributes. By providing a movement with these existing and legitimized attributes, it enables the movement to sustain a prolonged violent conflict. This leads to an expectation undergirding Hypothesis 5 that religious organizational support increases the intensity of a conflict.

Hypothesis 5: Formal support for one or more groups involved in a conflict by a religious organization will increase the intensity of a conflict.

As in the previous chapter, a quantitative test combined with an illustrative comparative case study offers the most comprehensive way of evaluating this hypothesis. In the first part of this chapter, 125 religious territory conflicts between 1946 and 2001 are compared quantitatively using an ordinal logit. Following these results, the dynamics of the influence of organizational support on the intensity of the conflict will be explored comparing the cases of the Enosis movement in Cyprus (1950-1960) and the Nationalist movement in Ireland (1913-1922). In combination, these evaluations offer a thorough analysis of the hypothesis that the support of a religious organization increases the intensity of a conflict.

Quantitative Test

An ordinal logit is used to evaluate the influence that religious organizational support has on the level of intensity of a conflict. By including variables that measure the three aspects of religion – doctrine, organizational support and diaspora – as well as controlling for the relevance of religion to a conflict and type of religion involved,[169] one can determine how much relative influence organizational support has on the dependent variable, intensity of a conflict. The result of the ordinal logit using a dataset of 125 religious territory conflicts occurring between 1946 and 2001 is summed in Table 6.1.[170]

The insignificant coefficient for the 'OrgSup' variable indicates that religious organizational support is inconsequential to the level of intensity in a conflict. The results reflect that when a group in conflict has the benefit of support from a religious organization with all the externalities that entails – leaders, members, and communications network – there is no corresponding escalation or de-escalation of the intensity of the conflict. This contradicts the expectation underlying Hypothesis 5 that organizational support increases the intensity of a conflict.

As with the previous hypotheses, the limits of the measurement could cause of some degree of bias in the results. 'OrgSup' is a dichotomous measurement of whether the relevant formal religious organization expressed support for one or more groups involved in the conflict. In some cases, there were large numbers of clergy who expressed support though a formal declaration by the organization was absent, thus qualifying the case as having no formal religious organizational support. It is possible that without formal organizational support a group may have experienced all of the beneficial aspects that the variable was intended to measure – leaders, members, and communications network.

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[169] These variables are described more fully in Chapter 3.
[170] The cases used in the dataset are described more fully in Chapter 3.

TABLE 6.1: Ordinal Logit Results

	Coefficient	Standard Error	Probability
		Number of Observations: 125	
		Pseudo R-squared: 0.0415	
		Log Likelihood: -172.46743	
Cosmic	0.6569033	1.436194	0.647
vTrad	0.0937142	1.573386	0.953
nvTrad	-0.2941977	1.228104	0.811
OrgSup	0.0032692	0.6338904	0.996
Military	**0.79177**	**0.378835**	**0.037**
Weapons	**0.4030501**	**0.1816502**	**0.026**
Political	0.1039889	0.2981494	0.727
Mediators	-0.1109196	0.2586586	0.668
Relevance	0.3693886	0.4047966	0.361
Hindu	0.0258733	0.4581409	0.955
Jew	-0.7151545	0.924731	0.439
_cut1	-0.2328817	1.193898	
_cut2	0.9820893	1.197567	
_cut3	2.70128	1.219252	
_cut4	5.130344	1.319134	

In describing the influence of religious organizations in McAdam's study, he states that the insurgency movement was able to gain legitimacy by co-opting religious leaders who "served to convey to their natural constituents the importance and legitimacy of the movement, thereby encouraging participation. As a result, in most cases, the movement did not require the development of new institutional structures however was able instead simply

to appropriate existing leader/follower relationships in the source of movement goals."[171] It is very possible for the movement to benefit from the support of some religious leaders in the ways described by McAdam without the explicit organizational support.

A specific example of this relationship occurred in my home state of Alabama. In 1999 the Governor proposed a lottery in order to raise the revenue needed to improve the state's schools. The largest religious denomination in the State, the Southern Baptists, did not officially take a stand on the Governor's proposal, but, a highly organized campaign against the lottery took place in many of the state's churches. As the *Birmingham News* reported:

> *"...Alabama churches responded against the lottery with an evangelistic fervor that peaked as Tuesday's referendum approached. They erected anti-lottery signs, made anti-lottery T-shirts, held anti-lottery rallies, hosted prayer vigils and listened to pastors preach anti-lottery sermons. Churches even bought massive advertising, including full-page newspaper ads."[172]*

Many of the local clergy met and decided to insert sermons (or even a series of sermons) into their calendars during the month leading up to the vote. There were even telephone pyramids in which members called five other members to remind them to vote who in turn called five other members. In the end, many of the churches' members turned out to vote and defeated the lottery proposal. Clearly, the anti-lottery movement benefited from the religious organizational support with additional leaders, members and a communications network, although they lacked formal support from the largest denomination in the State.

One way to test to see if informal support provided the same benefits as formal support in regards to the violent conflicts included in the dataset of this study is to expand

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[171] McAdam, Doug, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency,* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982) p 132.

[172] Greg Garrison, 'Lottery Vote Shows Power of Church', *Birmingham News,* 14 October 1999, p 1A.

the organizational support variable to include a third category that includes cases where there was informal support. In other words, I created a separate 'OrgSup_Expanded' variable that measured each case on the following 3-point scale:

0 = no religious organizational support

1 = informal religious organizational support

2 = formal religious organizational support

Replacing the dichotomous variable with the expanded variable allows the ordinal logit to test, in essence, whether the *degree* of organizational support for a group influenced the intensity of the conflict. The results of the modified ordinal logit are summed in Table 6.2. Although the expanded organizational support variable has a greater magnitude than the original variable, it is still insignificant and does not provide any support for Hypothesis 5. As is evident by the insignificant coefficient of the modified organizational support variable, there is not evidence that either informal or formal support impact the intensity of a conflict, rather, organizational support is an irrelevant factor in determining the level and duration of violence in a conflict.

As was mentioned in the previous chapter, the category of 'informal' is extraordinarily broad and does not permit a great deal of specificity in these tests. Although the model developed in this study specified that organizational support would increase the level of intensity by providing leaders, members and communications networks, there is another explanation that has not been fully explored in the literature. It is possible that religious organizations are relevant to the intensity of a conflict to the extent that they provide

TABLE 6.2: Ordinal Logit Results with Expanded 'OrgSup' Variable

		Number of Observations: 125
		Pseudo R-squared: 0.0422
		Log Likelihood: -172.33533

	Coefficient	Standard Error	Probability
Cosmic	0.6481119	1.435764	0.652
vTrad	0.0146181	1.572345	0.993
nvTrad	-0.5048614	1.155392	0.662
OrgSup_Expanded	0.1626459	0.316504	0.607
Military	0.7880302	0.3777353	0.037
Weapons	0.4244788	0.1854123	0.022
Political	0.0933817	0.298331	0.754
Mediators	-0.1130812	0.2563127	0.659
Relevance	0.3352248	0.411475	0.415
Hindu	-0.0353105	0.4743448	0.941
Jew	-0.7623156	0.9287302	0.412
_cut1	-0.2338912	1.193252	
_cut2	0.9827542	1.196868	
_cut3	2.701539	1.219417	
_cut4	5.12932	1.320243	

an indoctrination of their adherents thereby mobilizing members to join the groups. This argument is slightly different than that presented by McAdam who demonstrated members' willingness to follow their leaders without necessarily bringing in religious doctrine. In other words, religious organizational support was no different than support by other organizations with a hierarchy and large following in McAdam's study. Here, however, I am arguing that religious organizations are potentially significant specifically because of

their role in indoctrination. If this is the case, I would not be surprised by the insignificant coefficients of the doctrine and organization variables as they likely interact with one another.

It is possible to test this idea with the data available in this study by creating a new variable in which the use of doctrine and religious organizational support variables interact. To do this, each doctrinal aspect is multiplied by the variable measuring organizational support.[173] The ordinal logit is recomputed and summed in Table 6.3. As the variables accounting for an interaction between religious organizational support and the use of doctrine in a conflict remain insignificant, there is not support for the idea that religious organizations provide an indoctrination that increases the intensity of a conflict, rather, the evidence continues to suggest that neither organizational support nor religious doctrine have any impact on the intensity of a conflict.

Scott Appleby offers an explanation for this observed relationship. Appleby argues that a religious organization can only serve as an indoctrinator of violence if the target audience is not well-formed or spiritually mature. In other words, a religious organization's support in terms of indoctrination is only relevant when the population is largely spiritually ignorant, whereas the previous test evaluates all efforts at indoctrination ignoring the education of the population. Without more data, it is not possible to test Appleby's theory – and even then, a quantitative method would likely be substantially flawed because of the measurement problems described in Chapter 2 – however, his theory will be more closely explored in the following comparative case study.

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[173] The expanded measurement of organizational support that includes a category for 'informal' support is used here in order to take account of as much variation as is available.

TABLE 6.3: Ordinal Logit Results with Interaction of 'OrgSup' and Doctrine Variables

		Number of Observations: 125
		Pseudo R-squared: 0.0356
		Log Likelihood: -173.52258

	Coefficient	Standard Error	Probability
Cosmic_Org	-0.1271651	0.9962565	0.898
NvTrad_Org	-0.3975675	1.069476	0.710
Military	**0.8177987**	**0.3793628**	**0.031**
Weapons	**0.3971928**	**0.1797938**	**0.027**
Political	0.1607197	0.2850005	0.573
Mediators	-0.0327749	0.2494633	0.895
Relevance	0.490617	0.3964311	0.216
Hindu	0.078657	0.4835054	0.871
Jew	-0.5881604	0.747844	0.432
_cut1	0.0773959	1.171039	
_cut2	1.288152	1.176346	
_cut3	2.994654	1.200759	
_cut4	5.402262	1.305281	

* vTrad_Org was dropped due to collinearity.

Illustrative Comparative Case Study

The limits of the quantitative measurements leave several questions unresolved in the analysis of Hypothesis 5. It is useful to delve into these questions with a more indepth comparison of two similar cases, such as the Enosis movement in Cyprus (1950-1960) and Nationalist movement in Ireland (1913-1922). Although these two cases share many of the same characteristics, they differ in respect to religious organizational support. Comparing

the two cases illustrates the relationship between religious organizational support and conflict intensity and permits an exploration of the consequences of these differences particularly in respect to the intensity of the two conflicts. In the comparative case study that follows, I am particularly concerned with where the movement gets their members, leaders and communications networks and whether a sustained movement willing and capable of violence is possible without the support of a religious organization.

Background of Enosis and Nationalist Movements

> *"Most people who think at all about the island of Cyprus will rely on two well-imprinted ideas of it. The first is that of an insular paradise; the birthplace of Aphrodite; the perfect beaches and mountains; the olive groves; the gentle people and the wine-dark sea. The second is that of a 'problem' too long on the international agenda; of an issue somehow incorrigible and insoluble but capable of indefinite relegation."[174]*

It is sad that the beauty of Cyprus has been tainted by decades of political violence. The island's only period of integrated independence lasted a mere fourteen years and many historians are quick to point out that the island's history is one of domination by empire after empire. Yet, the violence that the island has endured over the last forty-seven years has split and devastated the population in a way not seen before in their history.

Before their independence in 1960, Cyprus was dominated by successive empires because of its strategic importance as a military base. The most important of these occupiers for present-day Cyprus were the Byzantines, Ottomans and British. The Byzantine Age came to Cyprus in A.D. 300 although the Mycenaeans had already been arriving on the island for seventeen hundred years. In the nearly nine hundred year stretch

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[174] Christopher Hitchens, *Cyprus*, (New York: Quartet Books, 1984) p 19.

of Byzantine rule, the Mycenaeans were responsible for bringing Orthodox Christianity to the island and leaving their mark on the identities of its inhabitants. Despite later invasions by the Franks and Venetians, the mark left by the Byzantines and largely sustained through the Orthodox Church was never removed or eroded. With the advent of the Ottomans in 1571, a new system of governance was introduced and served to re-enforce Greek Cypriot identity and the Cypriot Church. The Ottoman Empire was organized in a millet system in which a representative of each nationality was responsible to the Sultan for the rule of their nationality. For the Cypriots, the Archbishop of the Cypriot Church was chosen as this representative. It is significant that during Frank, Venetian and Ottoman rule, unsuccessful or meager attempts were made to socialize the inhabitants in the invaders' cultures and identities. Because of this, Greek identity remained dominant and allowed for the development of a movement that aimed to reunite the island with Greece.

It was during Ottoman rule that the primary divisions that affect Cypriot society today began to take shape. Although the island was dominated by a Greek and Orthodox identity, under Ottoman rule, those who converted to Islam were exempt from paying taxes and otherwise received favored treatment. Additionally, Turks began to arrive bringing their religion and Ottoman culture with them. Thus a substantial Turkish and Islamic population took residence on the island intermixed with a distinctly Greek and Orthodox Christian population. These divisions remain today with the Greek Cypriots maintaining the majority and the Turkish Cypriots making up roughly eighteen percent of the population.

After three hundred years under Ottoman rule (in the late 19th century), the British began to show interest in acquiring Cyprus. They hoped control over Cyprus would secure trade routes to the British colony of India. The Ottomans, in fact, agreed to give control of Cyprus to the British in exchange for a promise to support the Ottomans against any attack by Russia. With the signing of these promises in a government office, Cyprus came under

British control in 1878. The arrangement was not intended to be permanent (the British in essence leased the island from the Ottomans), however, during World War I, the British seized the island and it officially became a colony following the war in 1925. The Greek Cypriots were hopeful that their new occupiers would re-unify the island with Greece over time. The British, however, retained control for over eighty years.

During British rule in Cyprus, agitation for union with Greece, called enosis, continued to grow. When another Greek island under British rule, Crete, was granted union with Greece in 1908, the Greek Cypriots' hope grew and they anxiously waited acceptance by both Greece and Britain. Acceptance never came, though calls for enosis continued unabated. In 1950, the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus organized a plebiscite to measure public support for enosis and lend weight to their petitions to the British government. The voting occurred in Orthodox churches where supporters were asked to sign their names to a register to indicate their support. Not surprisingly, the plebiscite indicated that ninety-eight percent of the 'voters' supported enosis. The plebiscite had no effect on the British, though.

In the early 1950s, the leader of the Cypriot Church, Archbishop Makarios III, began to work closely in his pursuit of enosis with a well-known guerilla soldier, Colonel George Grivas. In the years leading up to 1955, Makarios and Grivas methodically planned and initiated a revolution against the British. By March 1955, Makarios finally granted Grivas permission and his blessing to implement the guerilla war against the British. Over the next four years, the rebels held firm to their cause of enosis though the struggle cost hundreds of Cypriot lives.

In the last days of the guerilla war when it became clear that the British resolve to continue fighting for control of Cyprus was waning, the question of how to end the conflict in the best interest of all Cypriots came to the fore. The solution favored by most Greek Cypriots and the Enosis movement who led the struggle against the British was to unify the entire island with Greece. The Turkish minority (eighteen percent of the population)

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however rejected this solution and had the support of Britain and the international community. A second solution was to grant independence to Cyprus under a constitution that adequately represented both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. This solution fell short of the Enosis movement's goal of union with Greece and they vowed to continue their violent struggle until that goal was reached. A final solution being discussed in the late 1950s was partition of the island into Greek and Turkish regions.[175] In effect this would allow enosis for the Greek region and would force the Turkish region to be absorbed into Turkey because it is not economically viable on its own. One of the primary difficulties with partition, however, was a highly intermixed population with shared myths and historical traditions. In the end, Makarios – the representative of the enosis movement – sensed that partition was inevitable if he did not agree to independence. Thus, in 1959, an agreement was reached which outlined independence for Cyprus.

Independence did not end the violence on Cyprus; rather it created new divisions on the island. The Greek Cypriots who desired enosis felt they had been betrayed by Makarios and his end-result of independence. The Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, felt discriminated against in the policies enacted by Makarios. As it were, both parties felt aggrieved by Makarios and carried on a violent struggle to realize their envisaged utopias.

Makarios, as well, was not entirely satisfied by the constitutional arrangement implemented at independence. By late November 1963, Makarios had developed thirteen objections to the constitution and proposed several reforms to the Turkish Cypriots including the removal of the 70:30 quota system in effect to ensure adequate representation of the Turkish Cypriots. In early December 1963, he announced a plan to unilaterally impose several of these reforms bringing on a harsh reaction from the Turks and other parties responsible for designing the constitution. Fighting between the Greek Cypriots who supported Makarios' plan and Turkish Cypriots who felt that it further discriminated

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[175] The partition is also called taksim by the Turkish Cypriots.

against them began by the end of the month. Though the fighting abated with periodic ceasefires and peace negotiations, the violent division between Greek and Turkish Cypriots continued throughout the decade.

Circumstances outside of Cyprus also had a major impact on the violence on the island. In Greece, a military junta had taken the reigns of power through a coup. The junta was pressured by the United States to resolve the Cyprus problem by uniting the island with Greece and allowing several Turkish military bases – a plan that was tantamount to partition by supporters of enosis. This position, as well as concessions the junta made to the Turks left Greek Cypriots feeling abandoned by Greece. The Greek junta likewise began to distrust the Greek Cypriots who they feared may provide a base to the opposition of their autocratic rule. The Greek junta's fears of the Greek Cypriots were so great that they attempted to assassinate Makarios in 1971. Signs of cracks in Makarios' legitimacy seemed to be growing when the country's three bishops "made the belated discovery that it was uncanonical for the head of the Church to be also head of state and called on Makarios to resign"[176] although Makarios dismissed this as junta-organized.

According to Foley and Scobie, two British reporters in Cyprus throughout this period, it "seems unquestionable"[177] that the junta was also behind an attempt to overthrow Makarios led by Grivas. Grivas returned to Cyprus after several years in Greece in 1971 and immediately began reviving "a new irredentist force committed to Enosis."[178] Though the tactics remained the same, Grivas' target was no longer the British, but Makarios and the Cypriot leadership he felt had abandoned the cause of Enosis. Grivas' efforts were largely unsuccessful.

In July 1974, however, the Greek junta launched a coup in Cyprus and successfully removed leadership from Makarios putting Nicos Sampson in his stead. Turkey, "alarmed

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[176] Charles Foley and W.I. Scobie, *The Struggle for Cyprus,* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1975) p 171.
[177] Ibid. Page 170.
[178] Ibid. Page 170.

and angered at what they considered the Greek seizure of the island"[179] five days later launched their own invasion (or intervention in their description) to protect the Turkish Cypriots on the island. Although the Greek junta and Sampson were removed only three days later, the Turks continued to brutally sweep the island ultimately securing control of forty percent of the island. The United Nations finally stepped in to secure peace, however, with Turkish control of the northern forty percent of the country, the Turks had succeeded in creating a de facto partition of the island. This is the way the island remains today. Periodically, flare ups along the partition have occurred, however the United Nations has been very successful in maintaining peace for nearly three decades.

Ireland, as well, has endured decades of civil violence due to ethnic and religious divisions that have developed over the course of its history. The inhabitants of the island in the 16th century were nearly unanimously Christian having been largely converted to Catholicism in the 4th century by St. Patrick who arrived from Scotland. In the 17th century, King James I encouraged English colonists and Scottish planters to settle the northeastern six counties of Ireland leading to the migration of a substantial population to the region. The English and Scots who migrated became the wealthy landowners who later became known as the Protestant Ascendancy. A class distinction between the migrants and original inhabitants had developed. The native Irish (as well as some of the migrants) suffered under the harsh colonial policies of Britain particularly in the late 18th century. The two populations were also divided religiously – many of the English and Scotish migrants were either Anglican or Presbyterian while the native Irish were Catholic. As in the case of Cyprus, these early divisions remained throughout the remainder of Ireland's history and serve as the context of the Nationalist movement.

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[179] Ibid. Page 175.

Although the analysis in this chapter is particularly concerned with the Nationalist movement in the early 20th century, the movement itself was initiated many years before this. Throughout the island there was significant resistance to British control of Ireland as early as the 17th century (at the same time the British arrived). The Protestant planters and Catholic indigenes frequently clashed and carried out massacres of their enemies. One of the battles that continues to be annually memorialized is the Battle of the Boyne. The battle was primarily over who would rule Britain and occurred between James II, a Catholic who had been dethroned by the Protestant William of Orange. William was able to rout James' forces easily, asserting his power in Ireland. Each July Irish Protestants remember their victory with Orange marches and bonfires.

A significant revival of the Nationalist movement developed in the late 18th century and is most associated with the leadership of Theobald Wolfe Tone. Tone was a Protestant and thereby a privileged member of society, yet he recognized the need for the reformation of Irish society. Tone was one of the founders of the United Irishmen, an organization that is often pointed to as being an early nationalist organization in Ireland. Its ideals included a rejection of the British monarchy and a call for complete independence for the entire island. Though Tone was exiled to America in 1796 for his involvement in the United Irishmen, he helped lead a rebellion in 1798 with the help of the French. The 1798 Uprising was an unmitigated disaster as it failed to free Ireland from its British master and resulted in the death or arrest of many of the United Irishmen members.

Nationalism was again revived in the late 1800s. The British announced a plan in 1886, called Home Rule, that would devolve power to Ireland. Although the Home Rule failed to be approved by the British, it generated widespread support among the Irish Catholics. On the other hand, the Protestants of Ireland feared Home Rule would remove their power and leave them vulnerable to attacks of revenge from the Catholics. With continued pressure, Home Rule was re-introduced two more times in the late 19th and early

20th centuries. To alleviate the Protestants fears, Lloyd George suggested a modification that would allow the six counties with substantial Protestant populations to opt-out of Home Rule. This infuriated many Catholics who were devoted to a united and free Ireland. In 1914, as World War I was looming as a major concern for Britain, Home Rule was passed with an additional bill that delayed its implementation until after the war. This was intended to delay a decision about the northern six counties.

The Catholics of Ireland were split on the acceptance of Home Rule during the war. On the one hand, many Irish had gone to the frontlines to support the British in the war with the hopes of demonstrating their loyalty and ensuring an all-Ireland Home Rule at the end of the war, thus generating further support for Britain from family and friends. On the other hand, many believed the promises made by the British were shams and that the war presented the most opportune moment to attack Britain and gain independence through force.

In 1916, a small militia had decided that they had to act immediately while Britain was distracted by war in order to free Ireland from British rule. On Easter Monday 1916, the militia stormed and occupied key buildings throughout Dublin declaring an independent Republic of Ireland. Although the leaders of the Easter Rising expected the public to join in support, they were sorely disappointed. While the public generally accepted the Rising's goals, they rejected both the tactics and timing. After six days the militia was forced to surrender to the British.

The British reaction to the Rising generated a widespread change of opinion among the Catholics. Sixteen of the leaders of the Easter Rising were executed within days and thousands of citizens were arrested, though many had no involvement in the Rising. This reaction re-enforced the feelings of discrimination and suppression of ordinary Catholics and generated a well-spring of support for the Nationalist movement. In the 1918 elections, in fact, Sinn Fein – the political party representing Nationalist interests and was widely held

responsible for the Easter Rising at the time – won unprecedented support securing over half the seats in the Westminster Parliament. Sinn Fein, however, refused to take their seats in Westminster opting instead to operate in a shadow parliament called Dial Eireann.

In 1920, the British parliament passed the Act of Ireland effectively recognizing the Dail and creating a devolved parliament to represent the northern six counties. Many Catholics were not satisfied with this resolution as it fell short of producing a united and free Ireland. Though the island endured a civil war between 1922 and 1924, the boundaries and status of the partition were to remain virtually unchanged. The issue, however, remains alive with periodic flare-ups between the Nationalist and Unionist communities.

Although the Nationalist movement in Ireland (1913-1922) is different from the Enosis movement in Cyprus (1950-1960), the two movements share a great deal of similarities which make them easily comparable. Both Ireland and Cyprus were former colonies in which the indigenous culture remained dominant, though there were substantial minorities. In both cases, while the indigenous population (Irish Catholics and Greek Cypriots) wanted some form of independence, the minorities (Irish Protestants and Turkish Cypriots) wanted to retain the status quo. As the indigenous population felt deprived of what was due them (freedom from repression in Ireland and union with Greece in Cyprus), they lost hope in the political process and resorted to violence in order to achieve their utopia. In both cases, the indigenous population was marginally successful, however, fell short of reaching their ultimate goal – in Ireland, the Nationalists were successful in gaining independence however only for part of the island and in Cyprus, Greek Cypriots successfully gained independence though fell short of realizing union with Greece.

The conflict in Cyprus is significantly different from that in Ireland in one respect that will serve as the basis of comparison for these two conflicts: the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus was visibly supportive of the Enosis movement during their struggle for

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independence between 1950 and 1960, while the Catholic Church was noticeably absent in the Nationalist movement of Ireland between 1913 and 1922. Comparing these two cases allows for a unique evaluation of the impact the religious organizational support has on the intensity of a conflict. This comparative case study provides an complementary evaluation of Hypothesis 5 that illustrates the quantitative analysis at the beginning of this chapter.

In this chapter I am interested in whether the religious organizational support in Cyprus increased the intensity of the conflict any more than would be expected in a conflict that lacked religious organizational support, such as the conflict in Ireland. As was described in the presentation of the model in Chapter 1, organizational support is important in its capacity to provide members, leaders and a communications network. I will first describe the way the Church provided these services in Cyprus, then look for direct links to the intensity of the conflict.

Cyprus

The Greek Orthodox Church in Cyprus played an enormous role in the Enosis movement during the 1950s. The Church not only provided the leaders, members and communications network, but also lent their resources and organizational structure to the movement. The argument that each of these attributes of religious organizational support uniquely increase the level of intensity in conflict will be evaluated by comparing the Enosis movement (1950-1960) before independence with the Irish Nationalist movement before the creation of the Republic of Ireland (1913-1922).

There is little dispute that the Enosis movement in Cyprus benefited greatly from the leadership of the Cypriot Church. The political culture in Cyprus was such that the religious and political leadership were the same. This characteristic of the system developed throughout the history of the island, beginning during the Byzantine rule when bishops were treated as governors of their territories. Although this tradition eroded

somewhat with the subsequent invaders, the bishop's political role was restored under Ottoman rule. The archbishop became an Ethnarch, or civil administrator responsible for the nation which he represented. It was during Ottoman rule that the church was re-established as the most powerful political institution in Cypriot society. Not only did the Church symbolize Greek and Orthodox identities, but it was also seen as the Greek Cypriots' "protector against mistreatment by local officials."[180] As such, it was respected both by external powers, as well as by the subjects under its control.

When the British began to threaten the church's power during their rule over the island by refusing to recognize the Ethnarch, it is not surprising then that the church became a focusing point for the opposition. It is also not surprising that the opposition pushed for union with Greece given the church's close ties with Greece. One of the most visible leaders of both the church and the Enosis movement was Archbishop Makarios III who ascended to his position as the head of the Cypriot Church in 1950. Makarios' activities in support of the Enosis movement began even before he was selected as Archbishop, as he organized youth movements and a plebiscite to gage support for enosis and continued throughout the duration of the struggle for liberation.

Makarios' activities were initially focused on diplomatic efforts to convey to the British the Greek Cypriots desire to be unified with Greece. Makarios, like many Greek Cypriots, felt that the British would be willing to facilitate the union because they had previously facilitated unions for Crete and Rhodes. It became increasingly clear that the British would not support enosis, so Makarios worked relentlessly for both Greek and United Nations' support. On many occasions, Makarios met with Greek officials imploring them to bring the issue before the UN. Makarios also traveled to the UN hoping to be given an opportunity to plead Cyprus' case for intervention.

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[180] Kyriacos C. Markides, *The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977) p 5.

While pursuing diplomatic channels, Makarios also began to develop a guerilla movement. He began to work closely with the experienced guerilla soldier, George Grivas, to plan and implement a rebellion. It is widely accepted that Makarios was the political leader and Grivas was the military leader in a highly coordinated Enosis movement. There is considerable dispute, however, about how reluctant Makarios was to allow Grivas to use violence and even to put their plan into action. According to an interview Makarios gave to Foley and Scobie, Makarios was only willing to allow violence in instances of self-defense.[181] He advocated a non-violent sabotage strategy that would raise international awareness of the problems in Cyprus. Grivas, however, was adamant that a violent strategy was necessary to get the attention of the British and succeed in attaining enosis.

It would seem that Grivas had convinced Makarios of the need for a violent strategy by 1954 when Stanley Mayes records that:

"Archbishop Makarios told a meeting of the so-called 'National Assembly' that, while 'the nature of our struggle is peaceful', recent events in Egypt showed that 'only through the use of force' [or 'violence' – the Greek word is the same] 'can the British be made to understand'."[182]

Grivas did not initiate the attack on the British until he had received permission and a blessing from Makarios, further indicating Makarios' change of heart. According to Grivas, "on 29 March [1955] the Archbishop sent for Grivas and gave him the necessary permission to start. He also gave him his blessing. 'God with us'…"[183]

Although Makarios was the most visible leader in both the Cypriot Church and the Enosis movement, other church leaders also played significant roles in the struggle for liberation. Makarios' deputy, the Bishop of Kition, was simultaneously the second in

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[181] Foley and Scobie, *The Struggle for Cyprus*, (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1975) p 20.
[182] Stanley Mayes, *Cyprus and Makarios*, (Bath: Pitman Press, 1960) p 29.
[183] Dudley Barker, *Grivas: Portrait of a Terrorist*, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1959) p 93

command of the Enosis movement and one of three bishops under Makarios. His role in both was one of support for Makarios. Another prominent leader in the Enosis movement was Stavos Papagathangelou who was the senior priest of a church in Nicosia as well as the head of one of the two main enosis youth organizations – the Christian Orthodox Union of Youth (OXEN). In addition to these were numerous priests who unofficially supported the movement with fiery orations.

With the greatly overlapping leadership of the Cypriot Church and the Enosis movement, the Church also provided a communications network that allowed both indoctrination to mobilize support and shared tactics and strategies to organize that support. The Cypriot Church was fully aware of the need to get their message out and mobilize wide-spread support. As Stanley Mayes points out:

"If their message was to reach the masses, it must go out from every pulpit in the land. The village priests must be their company commanders, the Bishops their General Staff, and the Archbishop himself their Commander-in-Chief in this Holy War."[184]

Grivas was particularly aware of the need for mass support in order for the guerilla insurgency to be successful. The rebels needed wide-spread support in order to evade capture, as well as for food, shelter, communication and other tactical functions. Without mass support, their rebellion would be short-lived.

When violence did begin in 1955, the priests stepped in to rally support. The Bishop of Kyrenia was particularly outspoken. In one sermon "he declared that it was only the bombs of EOKA that had made the British modify their views on self-determination for

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[184] Mayes, *Cyprus and Makarios*, p 15

Cyprus. He called on the people to give their blood."[185] A few months later "he urged a much more widespread use of violence. 'Isolated incidents,' he said, 'like the throwing of a bomb or the killing of Poullis are not enough.' (Poullis was a police constable murdered while on duty in Nicosia.)"[186] Without a doubt, the church leadership was primary in indoctrinating Cypriots in the moral imperative to fight an armed battle against the British. Makarios, on occasion, even compared the Cypriot struggle to the passion of Christ, who sacrificed himself for the salvation of those that believe.

Even those priests who were not so outspoken about the legitimacy of using violence in their struggle were involved in stoking the flames of public agitation for union with Greece. The Cypriot Church throughout the colony organized a plebiscite in order to gage support for Enosis and lend weight to their negotiations with the British. The plebiscite, however, was not conducted in a manner that would have provided an unbiased measure of support for enosis, rather many observers believe it was an excuse to intimidate those who opposed enosis. On the designated Sunday, Greek Cypriots (not including the Turkish Cypriots) were instructed to go to their church and sign a register of those supporting enosis. Not signing would have ensured ostracization by the community in the very least. What is important to this discussion, however, is the unique benefit that the Church provided for the Enosis movement. It is hard to imagine another community organization with local buildings in every village and the moral legitimacy that would have enabled a similar plebiscite in the absence of the Church.

The church as an organization also played a significant role in the practical communication and needs of the guerilla fighters. The main supply hub and communications center for the guerillas was near the Kykko monastery, the largest of Cyprus' monasteries. The Kykko monastery provided a sacred shelter that was unlikely to be attacked by the British because of both its religious significance and strategic position.

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[185] Ibid. Page 34.
[186] Ibid. Page 34.

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Religiously, the monastery was significant not only as a training facility for the pious, but also because it was built to house an icon of the Virgin Mary painted by St. Luke the Apostle. Strategically it was significant because it was located in the mountainous center of Cyprus providing some protection from the British army. Kykko was not the only church property that was used by the guerilla fighters. As Stanley Mayes recounts, "Churches, monasteries, even cemeteries were used as hiding-places for arms."[187]

Although the church in general made up part of the communications network of the movement, it was not the primary method for communication among the guerillas. George Grivas, who led the guerilla struggle, organized a highly complex system for delivering messages. Messages were not simply given to one runner who delivered them to their recipients. Rather, they meandered through a series of runners handing off their goods at houses of supporters or at coffee shops in supportive villages to the central hub at Kykko Monastery. From the hub, the messages continued through a maze of more links in the communications chain. It often took weeks for messages to get to their intended recipient if they arrived at all.[188]

Most members of the Enosis movement were also members of the Cypriot Church, however the church was not the primary target of recruitment efforts. Grivas had studied meticulously the Communist movement in Greece and found that youth were the most loyal, pliable and risk-accepting segments of the population by which a liberation struggle could courageously and successfully be fought. It was through the youth movements in Cyprus that Grivas developed a guerilla army to liberate Cyprus by both indoctrinating them and training them in weapons and tactics.

There were two youth movements that began intensive indoctrination and training efforts in the years leading up to the guerilla war – Christian Orthodox Union of Youth (OXEN) and Pancyprian National Youth Organization (PEON) – both of which served as

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[187] Ibid. Page 46.
[188] Barker, *Grivas*

breeding grounds for enosis fighters. OXEN and PEON were closely related though slightly different. Both were formed by Makarios in the early 1950s in order to establish a strong youth base for the Enosis movement. OXEN was directly led by the Archbishop and Bishops and included a "slightly more religious background"[189] by providing more in depth religious education as part of its program. PEON was the more militant of the two youth movements. Its primary advisor was Grivas himself who focused on preparing well-trained fighters for the movement. In 1953 PEON was banned and much of its membership was transferred to OXEN. It was from the members of these youth organizations that Grivas selected guerillas to lead and fight in the liberation struggle.

Though neither OXEN nor PEON were official church organizations, both had significant ties to the Church. As mentioned previously, Makarios was the founder of both organizations and continued to have an impact on their development throughout the 1950s. Another leader in the church, Stavos Papagathangelou, became the acting leader of OXEN. However the strongest impact of the church is seen in the initiation rites of the young guerillas recruited from the youth movements. Priests would administer an oath taken by each recruit which began: "I swear in the name of the Holy Trinity that 1) I shall work with all my power for the liberation of Cyprus from the British yoke sacrificing for this even my life."[190] Although Enosis guerillas did not recruit directly from the Orthodox churches, there is a clear association between the church and the organizations from which the movement drew recruits. In this way, the Cypriot Church indirectly provided members to the Enosis movement.

There is substantial evidence that the Church also provided material resources with which to fight for liberation. It is widely accepted that Church funds bought and transported most of the weapons used by the guerillas. According to Mayes, "The great wealth of the Church [estimated at 6.5 million pounds] was drawn upon the finance propaganda, to pay

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[189] Mayes, *Cyprus and Makarios*, p 23.
[190] Barker, *Grivas,* p 91.

for missions abroad and to buy arms. In the early days at least, Grivas used to submit all his expenses to the Archbishop."[191]

However the overriding question is: Did these aspects of organizational support for the Enosis movement directly and uniquely raise the intensity level of the conflict? Or are they unrelated to the intensity or would the intensity have been increased even without the support of the Cypriot Church? An in depth analysis of Cyprus seems to indicate that a violent conflict would have been unlikely without the support of the Cypriot Church for one significant reason: the concept of enosis is unlikely to have even existed.

As was mentioned at the first of this chapter, the history of Cyprus is one of successive invaders each bringing their own influence on the culture and people of the island. The Byzantine period established the Greek Orthodox Church and created a Greek identity for the inhabitants of Cyprus. This was followed by invasions by the Franks, Venetians and Turks, however the Greek identity of Cypriots endured largely through the Church. As Markides explains: "Since French and Italian rule did not destroy the Hellenic-Byzantine culture, the potential for the emergence of Greek nationalism in Cyprus remained."[192] It was during Ottoman rule that the Greek Cypriot identity and the Church became intertwined and institutionalized. It was during this period that the Ethnarch was established that placed the Archbishop of the Cypriot Church as the sole representative of the Cypriot people. Without the Church's role in perpetuating and later representing Greek identity on the island, it is unlikely that union with Greece would be any more popular than the idea of unity with Italy or France.

However, if Greek identity survived and was revived in the 20th century, but the Cypriot Church had decided to take a neutral stance on the issue or if they had supported the status quo of British rule, would the Enosis movement have been organized by any other group in society allowing the movement to gain momentum and ultimately pursue a violent

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[191] Mayes, *Cyprus and Makarios*, p 46.
[192] Markides, *The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic*, p 3

struggle? It is quite possible that in the leadership vacuum, Cypriot Communists might have led the struggle of liberation.

The Communist Party in Cyprus (AKEL) was also opposed to British rule in Cyprus and wanted the island to be annexed as a whole by Greece. AKEL's reason for this was much different than the Enosis movement's reason. The Communists wanted to unite under Greek rule because the Communist parties of Greece and Cyprus were largely united and could consolidate their influence in the two countries. The Communist Party never gained the widespread support of Cypriots as the Enosis movement. It is possible that this lack of support was only because both movements appealed to the same audience – those opposed to British rule – and in the absence of the Enosis movement, the Communists might have monopolized support by those opposed to the British.

However this is all speculation. There is no way to know if the Communist could have successfully pulled together an Enosis movement willing and capable of leading a violent struggle. By looking at a conflict where religious organizational support was absent, it will provide further insight into whether the above scenario is possible. In Ireland, for instance, a similar voice for liberation was voiced though it was forced to organize its members, leaders and communications network without the church's formal assistance. Was the result the same as observed in Cyprus? Did the conflict evolve to the same level of violence or did the lack of religious organizational support prevent this sort of development? In other words, did the Church supply a unique and unmatchable organizational need that could not have been met by another organization?

Ireland

As recounted previously, Ireland endured a similar nationalist struggle in the early 20th century. The movement hoped that the British would devolve power in a Home Rule plan but soon began to believe that the plan was a sham. Unlike in Cyprus, the initial

violent opposition to the British did not last long – a mere six days compared to the four year guerilla war in Cyprus. However the Nationalist movement in Ireland continued to grow and eventually resulted in the de facto partition of the island and creation of the Irish Free State.

So where did the Catholic Church stand throughout the events of the early 20th century in Ireland? As Home Rule developed and seemed a likely outcome just before World War I, most of the Catholic leadership and lay people supported the plan to provide greater autonomy to all of Ireland. In the wake of the Easter Rising when Lloyd George recommended allowing the northern six counties to opt out of Home Rule, the Catholic leadership was adamant against a partitioning of the island. Eighteen bishops joined in signing a petition against George's plan in 1917 sending a clear signal that the Church supported an all-Ireland Home Rule. In this they were united with the population and with the Nationalist movement.

However, Brian Feeney points out that the Church leaders in the North were less supportive of Home Rule – either partial or full Home Rule. In the North, the Catholic Church was surrounded by Protestants who naturally felt threatened by the prospects of reducing their power in the society and possibly inviting reprisals for past atrocities. According to Feeney, "in the north the Church feared that confronting the Protestant majority would lead to disaster. … Its clergy believed that nationalism and support for its political manifestations would only provoke a violent reaction."[193] The Church in the North was not outspoken in their opposition to Home Rule, though they were more cautious about the consequences of adopting Home Rule than their southern counterparts.

Although the Church was largely supportive of an all-Ireland Home Rule, the outbreak of World War I revealed significant divisions in the Church leadership. Several Irish regimens fought with the British army, many believing that their loyalty would be

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[193] Brian Feeney, *Sinn Fein: A Hundred Turbulent Years*, (Dublin: The O'Brien Press, 2002) p 75

rewarded with Home Rule at the end of the war. They argued "that absolute loyalty to the British war effort was the only way to persuade British politicians that Ireland could be trusted with Home Rule."[194] Many priests joined the frontlines valiantly giving peace and consolation to the soldiers or worked relentlessly at home to support the troops and their families. There was, however, a substantial list of Catholic Church leaders – including the Archbishop – who were more skeptical about Britain's promises or who outright opposed the war. When Britain threatened to extend conscription to Ireland in 1918, this opposition grew stronger and more vocal.

The Easter Rising is another event that forced the Church leadership to take a stand on one of the most pressing issues in Ireland at the time. The rising had revived the use of violence and had invoked religious imagery in the justification of that violence. It is significant that no bishop condemned the Rising, though neither did they offer visible support. Like most of the population, the Catholic leadership seemed to agree with the Rising's goal of an all-Ireland Home Rule, however were skeptical at the very least about the methods and timing the Irish Revolutionary Brotherhood (IRB – the militia responsible for the Easter Rising) to achieve that goal. The British government's reaction to the rebels, however, only served to push both public opinion and the Church's attitudes to support the rebels for their martyrdom in standing up for a common Irish goal. Feeney illustrates this shift by pointing out the Archbishop of Cashel's position: "In April 1917 the archbishop refused to allow a Mass to celebrate the first anniversary of the Rising, but in September 1917 he himself said Mass for Thomas Ashe [a leader in the Easter Rising] and in 1918 he voted for Sinn Fein [a burgeoning Nationalist political party]."[195] Still, the Catholic leadership as a whole however did not openly offer unconditional support for the Nationalist movement.

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[194] Ibid. Page 65.
[195] Ibid. Page 93.

In the wake of the Easter Rising, Sinn Fein was revived as a political party representing Nationalist interests and began to garner overwhelming support from the Irish population. The IRB, as well, continued their use of violence (though isolated and sporadically) alongside the political efforts of Sinn Fein. The Catholic leadership's stance on Sinn Fein and the IRB during this time could hardly be described as unified. Despite the chaos caused by Sinn Fein and IRB, and despite pressure to make a stand by the British government, the Catholic leadership again did not initially condemn either the movement or the violence caused by it. In fact, "by the end of 1917 the cumann president [local Sinn Fein officer] was often a local priest."[196] Rather some in the Catholic leadership began to pressure the movement to avoid violence (while simultaneously not condemning it). The Church's position was further complicated when several bishops openly supported Sinn Fein in the 1918 elections. In 1919, the bishops finally made their position clear by issuing a statement condemning Nationalist violence, but then blamed the need for violence on the British.

When the Irish Free State was created in the 1920 Act of Ireland, the Church leadership initially protested the partition that was also created. They vocally and adamantly pushed for an all-Ireland Home Rule, rather than partial Home Rule. Although the highest ranks of the leadership opposed the Act, they did not openly support the violence initiated to reject partition. There were priests, however, who did take their opposition to the extreme of supporting the opposition forces. Again, the Church appears to have been united in the goal of a united Ireland, but divided over how to reach that goal. By 1922, the Church had officially decided to recognize the government created by the Act of Ireland and refuted the violence of the Nationalist movement. Although there were priests who deviated from the Church's official stance, it was clear that the Church as a whole no longer supported either the goal or methods of the Nationalist movement.

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[196] Ibid. Page 93.

The wavering, contradictory and ultimately opposing position of the Church vis-à-vis the Nationalist movement does not seem to directly have impacted the intensity of the conflict. The Church neither hindered nor encouraged violence, nor did it supply any of the organizational needs of the movement – leaders, members, and communications networks – that could have sustained and strengthened the movement in order to endure a prolonged and violent conflict. Rather the movement was able to draw the necessary resources from other sources.

The primary source used for meeting these organizational needs was the Gaelic cultural revival that had been sweeping the country for several decades before World War I. In the late 19th century there were moves along several fronts to restore the pride of Gaelic culture and language. Among the many organizations founded during this time was the Gaelic League, focusing on a revival of language, and the Gaelic Athletic Association, which brought back Gaelic sports such as hurling and Gaelic football. Both of these organizations developed alongside an "Irish literary renaissance"[197] in which the values of Irish traditions and culture were extolled. Out of this cultural revival came some of the Nationalist movements most well-known leaders such as Patrick Pearse.

Patrick Pearse was a poet, playwright and outspoken proponent of the Irish language before joining the IRB in 1914. His hatred of the British existed only to the extent that they had suppressed Irish culture and language almost to the point of extinction. He was also very dedicated in his Catholic faith often comparing the rebels' role in Irish history to that of Christ in redeeming humanity. He is quoted as once saying: "In all due humility and awe, we recognize that of us, as of mankind before Calvary, it may truly be said, 'without the shedding of blood there is no Redemption.'"[198] Although Pearse did not join the IRB until 1914, he quickly rose through the ranks being given responsibility for the Irish

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[197] Tim Pat Coogan, *The Troubles: Ireland's Ordeal and the Search for Peace*, (New York: Palgrave, 2002) p 13

[198] Terry Golway, *For the Cause of Liberty: A Thousand Years of Ireland's Heroes*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001) p 229.

National Volunteers, a militia within the IRB. Pearse was also part of the Military Council which planned and carried out the Easter Rising. It was for his role in the Easter Rising that Pearse was executed in 1916.

Six of the fifteen executed leaders were poets or writers and part of the Gaelic literary revival, however not all of the leadership came from this movement. For instance, the Easter Rising participant and later first President of the Republic of Ireland, Eamon de Valera, was a mathematician who had was born in America. James Connolly, the General Secretary of the Irish Transport and General Workers Union, was also active in the independence movement, though not involved in the Gaelic movement. It is significant that none of the leaders of the early 20th century Nationalist movement were drawn from the Catholic Church. Rather, the leaders were largely drawn from the Gaelic revival (both at home and abroad) and Labour movements.

As McAdam's describes many of the followers of these leaders in the Gaelic cultural revival, Labour unions or in the diaspora were transferred to the Nationalist movement developing on the pre-existing hierarchy. There were also existing members of the IRB before these leaders were co-opted. As with the leaders, the early members were not drawn directly from the Catholic Church. The early recruits in the mid-1800s typically "hailed from Ireland's poor and working classes"[199] because the early leadership "saw the Irish struggle in class as well as patriotic terms."[200]

The Catholic Church would not have made a fruitful place of recruitment for the IRB in the mid-1800s. At the time, the Church was headed by Archbishop Cullen who "was as eager as the government to wipe out secret revolutionary societies."[201] In fact, not only did the IRB not turn to the Church for support in their movement, they also actively argued that priests should not be involved in politics. Although the direct antagonism between the IRB and the Church did not exist to the same extent 50 years later during the

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[199] Ibid. Page 133.
[200] Ibid. Page 133.
[201] Ibid. Page 137.

last Home Rule debate, the residue of these tensions had left an indelible mark on the nature of the IRB and the Nationalist movement.

Explaining the roots of the communications network within the Nationalist movement is more difficult. It is clear that the local associations – the Gaelic League, Gaelic Athletic Association and especially the pubs – served as meeting places where ideas were exchanged. With the exception of the pubs, each of these organizations operated under a national organizational hierarchy making a web that facilitated nationwide communication. However the various associations made for a disorganized national movement. Brian Feeney argues that it was the prisoners released after the Easter Rising that played the largest role in organizing the Nationalist movement.

In the wake of the Easter Rising, the British government interned thousands of suspected Nationalists many of whom were innocent of any seditious behavior against the government. Although most of these prisoners were released by the end of 1916, their time in prison scarred them: they now resented the government, had bonded with others throughout the country, had developed an organizational hierarchy and shared political ideas and tactics. In Feeney's words, "They emerged from prison as members of an organization with a sense of belonging and a sense of purpose."[202] Ironically, if not for the British government's own reaction, a well-developed and organized movement against them may not have been able to develop and threaten them.

However the nationalist movement in Ireland did threaten the British and were ultimately successful in gaining independence – though with partition – for Ireland. Though the Catholic Church had an important role in Irish society, it offered no formal support and only negligible help in organizing the Nationalist movement. The movement was able to gain its necessary leaders, members and communications network through associations outside of the Church thereby sustaining the movement.

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[202] Feeney, *Sinn Fein*, p 61.

Could the Enosis movement have been successfully organized without the Church's support? Absolutely. Not only does the case of the Nationalist movement in Ireland demonstrate that the Church's support is not the fundamental pre-requisite for developing an organized movement, but so does the long list of cases that endure non-religious rebellions. That is not the central question of this chapter, however. The question is: Would the conflict have suffered the same level of intensity without the Church's support of the Enosis movement?

While the result of the Enosis movement and Nationalist movement was largely the same – both gained independence though not on the terms they desired – the process of getting there and especially the level of violence experienced were not the same. In Cyprus, the movement initiated and sustained a four year guerilla war whereas the Nationalist movement in Ireland initiated a revolution that lasted only six days. Though the movement in Ireland became more widespread in the wake of the Easter Rising, the conflict never approximated the intensity of the guerilla war in Cyprus. Did the organizing role of the Church in Cyprus play a role in the higher intensity of the Cypriot conflict?

The evidence from the comparison with the Irish Nationalist movement would seem to suggest that the Church did influence the level of intensity of the conflict. In Ireland, the movement was a virtual collection of movements – the Gaelic cultural revival, Labour, etc. – that lacked a guiding organization or the moral legitimacy that obliged Irish Catholics to join the movement. In Cyprus, on the other hand, the Church occupied the sole legitimacy in leading the Enosis movement. No other organization in Cyprus could have stepped in with the uncontested moral legitimacy with which the Church was able to garner both members and leaders.

Furthermore, the Church in Cyprus was able to finance, furnish and organize the material resources – guns, hide-outs, communications centers – that gave the Enosis

movement the ability to engage the British on a more equal footing. Without the Church's money to buy these weapons, monasteries in which to store and organizational structure in which to command them, the guerilla struggle could not have sustained its four year campaign.

Clearly the Church played a significant organizational role in Cyprus that had a direct impact on the intensity of the conflict. This evidence illustrates Hypothesis 5, however the quantitative result concludes that these are spurious examples that do not fit the pattern. The quantitative test indicate that even though one may witness a relationship between religious organizational support and a higher conflict intensity in Cyprus and Ireland, this relationship does not exist in the great majority of cases.

Before turning to an evaluation of the diaspora effects of religion on the intensity of a conflict, two additional questions were raised in the quantitative analysis that should be evaluated in light of the Enosis movement and Nationalist movement: Does the Church solely play an indoctrinating role and is Appleby's theory that indoctrination occurs only when they are a spiritually ignorant population right? In regards to the first question, the quantitative results and those of the comparative case study are in agreement. It should be quite clear that the Church in Cyprus did not solely play the role of indoctrinator in the conflict, though this was certainly one of its roles. As described, the Archbishop, Bishops and local priests all adamantly professed the duty of all the faithful to join the struggle. However in addition to this, the Church also organized, enrolled leaders and members and sustained the movement through its vast resources.

In regards to the second question, the case of the Enosis movement in Cyprus does not provide any insight. One could argue that Makarios was only able to dominate the population and lead them into a violent struggle for liberation because the population was not spiritually mature. Stanley Mayes seems to suggest that this is the case. "Every political pronouncement of the Archbishop was amplified and relayed by the Bishops and

the parish priests; to the ignorant and undiscerning it was as authentic as the voice of God."[203]   On the other hand, one could also argue that the Enosis movement was a grassroots movement that was only reflected in Makarios' leadership.   As mentioned previously, Appleby's theory presents a substantial difficulty to a social scientist wishing to test it.

Conclusion

This chapter has focused on the influence of religious organizational support on the intensity of political conflicts.   In the quantitative test that statistically compared 125 conflicts between 1946 and 2001, no evidence was found to support Hypothesis 5.   As a result, this study concluded that religious organizational support is inconsequential in terms of its influence on the intensity of the conflict.

The Enosis Movement in Cyprus and Nationalist Movement in Ireland were compared in order to elucidate the dynamics of the relationship between religious organizational support and conflict intensity.   This comparison highlighted the central role of the Cypriot Orthodox Church's support for the Enosis Movement in mobilizing, supporting and motivating members of the insurgency and thereby increasing the intensity of the conflict.   It was concluded that without the Church's legitimacy and vast resources used in support of the Enosis Movement, the guerillas would not have been able to organize or sustain the movement.   Though this conclusion supports Hypothesis 5, the quantitative result demonstrates that these cases are deviations of the observed pattern in which there is no relationship between religious organizational support and a higher intensity in conflict.

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[203] Mayes, *Cyprus and Makarios*, p 24.

CHAPTER 7: Intervention by a Religious Diaspora

Casamance Separatism and Southern Sudanese Autonomy

The final characteristic of religious groups that has led many social scientists to believe that religious conflicts are more intense than other conflicts is religion's diaspora qualities. When a group in conflict makes up a cohesive religious group, not only are appeals to the religious doctrine and organization open to the group, but the group also has access to the co-faithful living outside of the conflict zone. These co-faithful can supplement one side with weapons, political intervention, military intervention and inspiration from their previous successes. This diaspora effect of religion in conflict has been observed repeatedly throughout the world, as Kepel noted in Iran and Bosnia, Rashid found in Afghanistan, Mahmood and Gupta observed in Punjab, and Ellingsen and Fox found statistically in the world. Furthermore, Regan has observed that the military intervention of a religious diaspora (that these authors found was likely) increases the intensity of an ethnic or religious conflict.

As outlined in the model and largely supported by previous research, a religious diaspora sometimes intervene to mediate a conflict, rather than to militarily support their co-faithful. In such cases, one would expect that the intensity of the conflict is decreased as the religious diaspora join in to pressure the two sides to find a resolution to the conflict. The diaspora influence of a religion that increases the intensity of a conflict as described in the model is summed in the following hypotheses.

Hypothesis 6: The supply of weapons, political intervention or military intervention of a religious diaspora will increase the intensity of a conflict.

Hypothesis 7: The involvement of a religious diaspora will decrease the intensity of a conflict if a state or organization dominated by the diaspora intervene to mediate a conflict.

As in the previous two chapters, this study tests these hypotheses quantitatively and is then complemented with an illustrative comparative case study that further explores the nature of the relationship between religious diaspora involvement and the intensity of a conflict. In the quantitative test, 125 territory conflict phases worldwide between 1946 and 2001 are statistically compared. Following this test is a comparative case study of Sudan's Civil War (1983-present) and Senegal's Casamance conflict (1982-present) in order to further illustrate the nature of the impact of the diaspora intervention.

Quantitative Test

An ordinal logit is used to evaluate the influence of a religious diaspora on the intensity of a conflict. By including variables that measure the three aspects of religion – doctrine, organizational support and diaspora – as well as controlling for the relevance of religion to a conflict and type of religion involved, one can determine how much influence a religious diaspora has on the dependent variable, intensity of a conflict.[204] The results of the ordinal logit using a dataset of 125 religious territory conflict phases occurring between 1946 and 2001 are summed in Table 7.1.[205]

One would expect the coefficients for 'Weapons,' 'Political,' and 'Military' to be significantly positive if the intervention by a diaspora to supply weapons, political or military support increases the intensity of the conflict. As is evident in the above ordinal logit, the

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[204] These variables and the methodology used are described more fully in Chapter 3.
[205] A more complete description of the data used is available in Chapter 3.

TABLE 7.1: Ordinal Logit Results

		Number of Observations: 125
		Pseudo R-squared: 0.0415
		Log Likelihood: -172.46743

	Coefficient	Standard Error	Probability
Cosmic	0.6569033	1.436194	0.647
vTrad	0.0937142	1.573386	0.953
nvTrad	-0.2941977	1.228104	0.811
OrgSup	0.0032692	0.6338904	0.996
Military	**0.79177**	**0.378835**	**0.037**
Weapons	**0.4030501**	**0.1816502**	**0.026**
Political	0.1039889	0.2981494	0.727
Mediators	-0.1109196	0.2586586	0.668
Relevance	0.3693886	0.4047966	0.361
Hindu	0.0258733	0.4581409	0.955
Jew	-0.7151545	0.924731	0.439
_cut1	-0.2328817	1.193898	
_cut2	0.9820893	1.197567	
_cut3	2.70128	1.219252	
_cut4	5.130344	1.319134	

results partially support this hypothesis. The significantly positive coefficient for 'Weapons' and 'Military' suggests that when a diaspora provides weapons support or military intervention, the intensity of a religious conflict indeed increases. These results are in agreement with the previous quantitative test by Regan that indicated that third party military intervention is associated with longer lasting conflicts.

Though the military and weapons support are determinants of the higher intensity of a conflict, they do not appear to be significant components for two reasons. First, the magnitude of the coefficients for the 'Military' and 'Weapons' variables are very small (below 1 in each case) suggesting that each additional diaspora state that provides these supports only minimally increases the intensity of the conflict. And secondly, the pseudo r-squared that indicates the proportion of the change in intensity that can be accounted for in the entire model taking in all variables is also very low. Thus, the 'Military' and 'Weapons' variables can only account for a very small portion of the variation in intensity. In other words, there is something else that is driving the higher intensity, though military and weapons support do add to the problem.

The insignificant coefficient for 'Political' indicates that political intervention does not significantly alter the intensity of a conflict. This contradicts the expectation of Hypothesis 6. The variable 'Political' measures the number of states that share a religious identity with a participant on whose behalf they intervene with political or economic support. It was expected in the model developed that any degree of assistance – including political or economic support – strengthens one side in the conflict and alters the participants' expectations of success thereby prolonging the conflict. It may be that this form of intervention does not serve to strengthen the participant as military or weapons support does. This could account for the insignificant coefficient.

The expectation that diaspora involvement in mediating a conflict or pressuring for peace will decrease the violence of a conflict would lead one to expect the coefficient for 'Mediators' to be significantly negative. Although the coefficient is negative it is not significantly different from zero and indicates that there is no support for Hypothesis 7 stating that a diaspora's effort to mediate the conflict lowers the level of violence in a conflict.

This result seems both counter-intuitive and in disagreement with most previous research. This discrepancy may be due to the nature of the measurements. The variable accounts for the total number of external parties (states, alliances or NGOs) that share a religious identity and intervened at some point during the conflict to try to resolve the dispute. The intensity variable also measures the level of intensity over the entire course of the conflict, rather than a given year or month. A comparison of these two measures only allows one to see if mediation at some point is related to the overall intensity, rather than testing if mediation led to a decreased intensity after its introduction. Because the dataset used in this study cannot be broken down to take account of when the mediation occurred and subsequent changes in the conflict's intensity, the comparative case study will provide a more thorough evaluation of this aspect of diaspora intervention.

As introduced in Chapter 2, much of the expected utility of war research has suggested that the decision to continue fighting is dependent on the participants' expectations of success. Third party military intervention only impacts this expectation to the extent that it changes the balance between the two sides. When a third party intervenes on behalf of one side, they increase the military capabilities and resources of that side and alters the balance of the two parties in conflict. If this is true, one would expect the 'Military' variable (that measures the intervention of a third party) to interact with the degree of balance between the two sides in the conflict. In order to test this with the data available, a new variable was created to take account of the balance between the two sides in the conflict (including the external participants). This was calculated by summing the military size for all participants on both sides separately. Where these sizes were proportionately similar, the conflict was coded as being relatively balanced (coded with a '0') and where they were not similar, the conflict was coded as being imbalanced (coded with a '1'). In order for this new variable, 'Balance,' to interact with the 'Military' variable,

TABLE 7.2: Ordinal Logit Results with Interaction of 'Military' and 'Balance'

		Number of Observations: 125
		Pseudo R-squared: 0.04366
		Log Likelihood: -173.3509

	Coefficient	Standard Error	Probability
Cosmic	1.470678	1.430515	0.304
vTrad	-0.7684317	1.552169	0.621
nvTrad	-0.4930255	1.227226	0.688
OrgSup	0.2356306	0.6297143	0.708
Military_Balanced	**0.0108402**	**0.0060432**	**0.073**
Weapons	**0.4086143**	**0.1811399**	**0.024**
Political	0.0666745	0.288081	0.817
Relevance	0.212675	0.3764679	0.572
Hindu	-0.0832984	0.4687468	0.859
Jew	-0.7488105	0.9281321	0.420
_cut1	-0.6902757	1.067014	
_cut2	0.5157006	1.067386	
_cut3	2.225764	1.090396	
_cut4	4.625104	1.194824	

the two values were multiplied and recorded as a 'Military_Bal' variable. By replacing the 'Military' variable with the new 'Military_Bal' variable, the model can take account of the notion that the relative strength of the two sides affect whether military intervention will increase the intensity. The results of this ordinal logit are displayed in Table 7.2..

This modification does not affect the significance of military intervention in the model that was developed in Chapter 1, thus the issue of the balance of the two sides is not

consequential to the involvement of the religious diaspora in the form of military intervention. The value of the coefficient, however, does decrease in its magnitude indicating that the balance of the sides reduces the impact that military intervention has in raising the intensity. This is a minimal change in the results, though, indicating that military intervention by a religious diaspora is a significant influence of religion on the intensity of a conflict regardless of the balance of the two sides.

Illustrative Comparative Case Study

To complement the quantitative tests of Hypotheses 6 and 7, a comparison of the Sudanese Civil War (1983-present) and Casmance Separatism in Senegal (1982-present) is useful. Both Sudan and Senegal are African countries whose central government is dominated by the Muslim majority in the state. There are significant Christian populations in both countries that object to the governance by this Muslim majority. And thus, in both countries, there have been efforts to ensure a greater degree of autonomy or independence of these Christian minorities that have resulted in sustained violent conflicts. These two conflicts make a useful comparison in terms of external religious diaspora intervention because the religious diasporas of the southern Sudanese and the Casamancais have reacted very differently to their co-faithful's struggle for greater autonomy or independence. While Christians around the world have supported their co-faithful in the Sudan with an abundance of material resources, they have largely been ignorant of the plight and uninvolved in support of the Casamancais. By comparing these two conflicts, the relationship between religious diaspora intervention and the intensity of a religious conflict can be better evaluated and explained.

Background of Sudanese Civil War (1983-present) and Casamance Separatism (1982-present)

In 1822, Egypt took over the territory that later became known as the Sudan and initiated a beginning of a division of the population in Sudan that has resulted in an enduring civil war costing millions of lives in the region. At the time, Egypt was ruled under the Ottoman Empire which was organized in a millet system that favored Muslims over non-Muslims in all the territories under its control. Most of those living in southern Sudan were not Muslim and many refused to convert under the Turko-Egyptian rule. This relegated them to the fringes of Sudanese power circles. Though the Egyptians were removed from power a few years later, this pattern of Muslim privileged status in Sudanese society remained as a residue from this period in Sudanese history.[206]

During the Turko-Egyptian era, even the Muslim Africans were upset by the foreign domination of their territory and organized a rebellion in 1882. The rebellion, called the Mahdi Revolution, was organized by a Muslim Sudanese named Muhammed Ahmad who declared himself the Mahdi (the promised one in Islamic tradition who would rid the world of evil). The Mahdi's revolt succeeded in taking control of the province though it technically remained in Egyptian and Ottoman hands. Egypt, along with Britain who had increased their influence in Egypt during the time, fought to regain total control of Sudan in 1898. At their success, the Egyptians and British decided to share control of the province signing a formal agreement in 1936.

Within a decade the Egyptians were demanding that the British relinquish control. Meanwhile the British took steps to prepare Sudan for self rule, independent of both the British and Egyptians. Among the other British reforms, a national assembly made up of Sudanese representatives was created to decide governance issues in Sudan. In 1950, this national assembly adopted a resolution requesting independence from Egypt and Britain.

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[206] Douglas H. Johnson, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars,* (Bloomington (IN): Indiana University Press, 2003)

The Egyptians ignored the request and King Faruk declared himself King of Egypt and Sudan. King Faruk was soon forced to abdicate due to domestic pressures, which brought in a new regime that was more agreeable to independence. In 1953, the British and Egyptians agreed to allow independence after a three year transition period in which stable institutions could be developed.

Thus, in 1956, Sudan became an independent state no longer under the direct control of the British or Egyptians. It was a shaky start to the state, however, that has continued to try to find its footing. In 1955, many southerners in the military mutinied and organized a rebellion. By 1963, the rebellion has escalated to all-out civil war costing the lives of many of the rebels. The rebels called themselves Anyanya meaning 'the venom of the viper' and hoped to secure independence for southern Sudan.

During Sudan's first civil war, Colonel Nimeiri led a coup that successfully took power naming him as President. By 1972, the Anyanya rebels and Nimeiri were able to reach a compromise and signed the Addis Ababa Agreement that ended the civil war. The agreement established a southern regional government that ensured representation and protection of southerners, however it did not bring a permanent end to Sudan's conflict. "The accords secured a degree of peace between the north and south; paradoxically, they also opened a Pandora's box of interethnic disputes in the south .... Without a common enemy in the north, many groups of southerners began to perceive other southern groups as threats."[207] Thus the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement, though it temporarily ended the war, did not resolve the problems facing Sudan. The agreement, rather, established a delicate balance that would again be upset within a decade.

Although Nimeiri was initially very popular and had successfully negotiated peace with the Anyanya rebels in 1972, he had less success with the Sudanese economy and his popularity eroded quickly. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the Sudanese economy

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[207] Khalid Medani, 'Sudan's Human and Political Crisis', *Current History*, May 1993, p 205

deteriorated markedly. Sudan was particularly indebted to its international donors at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. The foreign debt in 1978 was $3 billion and rose to over $8 billion by 1983.[208] Sudan was unable to pay back the loans and was threatening to default on their obligations to the international community. Nimeiri had to face growing public resentment by introducing austerity measures required by the IMF. In order to regain some public support from the Muslim population, Nimeiri introduced Islamic Sharia Law into the country's legal system. As Scott Peterson describes the situation,

"Jaafar el-Nimeiri, the military dictator who signed the original agreement, was becoming increasingly tyrannical and religious. He unilaterally abrogated the cease-fire and, in an even more shocking move, imposed Islamic Sharia law across the country. Thieves in Khartoum began losing hands and legs in gruesome public amputations, and the capital's entire supply of liquor was destroyed – an act led by Nimeiri himself, who drained bottle after bottle of booze into the Nile. A special arena was built in Khobar prison for viewing amputations. So in 1983, the non-Muslim southerners dusted off their weapons and reignited the guerrilla war, in part to oppose this imposition of Islam."[209]

Though he had assured the exemption of southern non-Muslims in the Addis Ababa Agreement, he reneged and required a state-wide application of the law. Furthermore, the southern provinces felt neglected as there was very little investment of the loans in the south. The bulk of the money was spent in the north in areas dominated by the Arab Muslims. Almost immediately, the civil war reignited.

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[208] Ibid Page 205.
[209] Scott Peterson, *Me Against My Brother: At War in Somalia, Sudan, and Rwanda*, (London: Routledge, 2003) p 179

The fight from the south was organized by Colonel John Garang and the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA). The SPLA was founded in 1983 not to call for secession, but to call "for the restoration of democracy and religious freedom and a transformation of the political system that would allow power to be shared equally among all Sudanese."[210] Their tactical and inspirational leader, Garang, had been a member of the Sudanese army and had been militarily trained in Sudan and the United States. Garang used this training to pressure the Sudanese government to make these transformations. Although part of the SPLA's demands was met in 1986 by the return of multiparty democracy, Garang vowed that their fighting would continue until the Sharia legal system was removed.

The government elected in the 1986 elections was soon overthrown in a military coup led by Omar al-Bashir. Al-Bashir avoided international condemnation by attempting some democratic reforms in the early 1990s. By 1996, however, there was great disillusionment with al-Bashir's regime. An Islamic extremist, Hasan al-Turabi, had become speaker of the national assembly and held great sway over al-Bashir's government. One high level American diplomat described al-Turabi in the following:

"This physically slight religious fanatic with university degrees from by France and England never projected evil when he received visitors. He was all smiles and unthreatening as he discoursed on the importance of a pan-Arab reawakening that would reject Western cultural influence. The man we saw essentially as a harmless intellectual was in reality the mastermind of a dangerous web of terrorism and subversion."[211]

With al-Turabi's influence, the Sudanese government further antagonized the southern non-Muslims and increasingly grew unwilling to compromise with the rebels. The

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[210] Ann M. Lesch, 'Sudan: The Torn Country', *Current History*, May 1999, p 219
[211] Herman Cohen, *Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent*, (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 2000) p 85.

conflict seemed to be locked in an unending cycle of dry season advances by the Sudanese government and rainy season counter-offensives by the SPLA rebels. In the process, well over a million Sudanese had lost their lives and the country endured war-made famines that reportedly killed another 250,000 mostly in the south in 1988 alone.[212] Both sides were guilty of human rights abuses as they inhumanely slaughtered entire villages, bombed civilians, and killed captured soldiers. In all, it is estimated that 2 million people have died in the conflict since 1983, a further "4 million have been displaced – one-third the entire population of the south"[213] and there seemed to be no end in sight with al-Bashir's rise to power.

Though the war is generally described as being based on religious differences between the Muslim Arabs and non-Muslim Africans because the most obvious spark to the conflict was the introduction of Sharia Law that agitated the southern non-Muslims to initiate an armed rebellion, there is also an economic explanation to the war. In 1974 and 1979, natural gas and oil respectively were discovered in southern Sudan in areas populated by the non-Muslims. Control of the resources became vital to central government who could exploit the resources to pay back the international debt and generally rejuvenate the state's economy. Thus, the southern autonomy granted in Addis Ababa Agreement was taken back to ensure the central government's cut in the revenue of the natural gas and oil deposits. In this sense, the war was an economic competition for control of scarce resources and not a war over religious freedom for southerners.

Though negotiations occasionally seemed promising, they inevitably faltered as neither side was willing to compromise without first gaining compromises from the other side. Negotiations in 1998 were the most promising. The two sides agreed to allow the southern Sudanese to decide for themselves whether to remain part of Sudan or to secede to found an independent state. The two sides even agreed on what constituted 'southern

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[212] Ibid. Page 60.
[213] Medani, 'Sudan's Human and Political Crisis', p 203

Sudan' and who would be allowed to participate in the poll. The SPLA however would not commit to a ceasefire and neither side would commit to a date for the referendum. So the violence continued, as do the talks of possible peace.

As in the Sudan, the southern region in Senegal is also in rebellion against the central government. The problems in Casamance, however, differ in their origin and in the nature of the rebellion. Casamance is the southern-most province in Senegal and is virtually separated from the remainder of the country in its location, as well as in its ethnic and religious identities. Geographically the province is cut-off from Senegal by Gambia. The population also differs as it is dominated by the Diola tribe (also called the Jola tribe) who are mixed Muslim and Christian (mixed with traditional beliefs) in this largely Muslim country. As in the Sudan, many of Senegal's valuable resources are located in this disputed territory.

During the colonial carve up of Africa in the 19th century, Casamance initially fell under Portuguese control, while the remainder of Senegal was a French colony. However, in the 1860s, the Portuguese slowly relinquished their rule over the area until finally conceding it to the French in return for other land. Thus, the entire area known today as Senegal was first unified under French control in 1866. The Casamance region was part of this union, however "the local people continued to govern themselves through the various spirit shrines and councils of elders. …the highly decentralized and egalitarian societies of the Casamance stood in contrast to centralized polities and hierarchical and caste societies to the north."[214] The divisions between Casamance and the remainder of Senegal are rooted therefore long before independence and the initiation of the separatist campaign.

Independence for Senegal in 1960 and the continued marginalization of the Casamancais, though, was a significant grievance that led to the development of a separatist

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[214] African Research Group, *Research and Analytical Papers: The Casamance Conflict 1982-1999*, (London: UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1999) p 2

movement. Like in the Sudan, the state's valuable resources are located in the disputed territory (oil and gas in southern Sudan and arable land for food production in Casamance), yet the independent central government failed to invest proportional funds in the region. This left the Casamancais, like the southern Sudanese, economically marginalized by the central government. The cultural division was also aggravated by the influx of northern Muslism to the region. "A significant migration of Muslim farmers and petty traders to the Casamance had taken place by the 1980s, where they encroached on Diola land and destroyed forest cover in order to plant groundnuts."[215] Thus, the Casamancais grievances with the central Senegalese government were both economic and cultural.

The Mouvement des forces democratiques de Casamance (MFDC) was formed even before independence in 1947 by Emile Badiane. The MFDC did not initially demand its independence from the Senegalese colony, but formed to advocate for Casamance interests. Whether to pressure for more investment in the province or for a more equitable distribution of land, the MFDC worked within the political system to ensure the Casamancais interests were represented. When Senegal gained independence from France in 1960, the MFDC became inactive in the single party state. Many Casamancais also believe the party became inactive because Badiane was promised that the status of Casamance would be reconsidered after Senegal had been independent for 20 years.

After 20 years of independence, the status of Casamance was not reconsidered and the MFDC was revived by Father Augustin Diamacoune Senghor to pressure the Senegalese government to hand over control of the region. In December 1982, the MFDC organized a pro-independence rally in which protestors clashed with police. Senghor was arrested with several other protestors. The protests continued throughout the 1980s and became increasingly violent. Protestors at a December 1983 rally "carried machetes, bows and

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[215] Ibid. Page 4.

arrows, and in some cases, firearms"[216] and clashed with police resulting in at least 29 deaths, many more injuries and 265 arrests.

By 1985, the MFDC developed an armed wing, known as Attika (meaning 'warrior' in the Diola language), to organize an armed resistant to the central government. Attika's activities were easily confused with the actions of armed bandits as one of their tactics has been to attack and kidnap civilians traveling along roads in Casamance. In the early years, Attika was more active in ambushing police and security posts or laying mines.

There have been periodic negotiations with the MFDC, however no agreement has been able to hold and permanently end the clash between Attika and the Senegalese military. Ceasefires in 1991, 1993 and 1995 failed to hold in part because Attika was internally split over the negotiations with the Senegalese government. The Northern Front often signed the ceasefires without the support of the Southern Front who would continue fighting despite an official ceasefire. Thus, the conflict continues. The MFDC and Attika resistance to the central Senegalese government has been much less sustained and intense than that in southern Sudan, though. Its sporadic attacks have resulted in possibly as many as 1,000 deaths in the past 22 years, while the civil war in the Sudan has seen possibly 2 million deaths. Is the difference in the intensity of these two conflicts the result in part of the intervention of the religious diaspora in Sudan and the lack of such intervention in Senegal? Or is there another explanation for the vast difference in intensity? The remainder of this chapter will investigate this question.

Sudan

Throughout the civil war in the Sudan (1983-present) there has been significant international involvement to support both sides, as well as international mediation efforts to end the war. In some cases these interventions have largely been in the form of a contagion

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[216] Ibid. Page 5.

effect, material support or pressure to resolve the conflict, and significantly have not involved military intervention for either side. These interventions, as well, can be argued to have been initiated because of an affinity with the religious identity of either the Arab Muslims or African non-Muslims (often labeled as 'Christian'). Furthermore, these interventions can be directly linked to the extended duration of the civil war. As the introduction of Sharia Law is often blamed for starting the latest civil war in the Sudan, I will begin with why the Sudanese government dominated by the Arab Muslims instituted Sharia Law and with analyzing the impact of international intervention in support of the Sudanese government. Following this is an evaluation of the SPLA's international support and its impact on the intensity, as well as an evaluation of mediation efforts and their impact.

As described previously, Nimeiri's administration introduced Islamic Sharia Law in 1983 in part to garner support during an economically difficult time when Nimeiri was quickly losing support. The act was not arbitrary or without precedent. It was hoped that the move would secure the loyalty of the Muslim Brothers and their lucrative connections with the Arab Gulf states. The Muslim Brothers were devout Islamists who were networked with their fellow fundamentalists especially in Saudi Arabia. In fact, these fundamentalist had been instrumental in garnering Saudi Arabian investment throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Introducing Sharia Law was a definitive statement that the country wanted to be identified as Arab and allied with Arab wealth.

The Islamization of the country, which has continued on through the civil war, was also encouraged by the success of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Al-Bashir later recounted on national radio that Iran's Revolution "'carried hope to Muslims and encouraged us to declare an Islamic revolution in Sudan.'"[217] The declaration of Sharia Law was an outward and progressive act that was hoped would Islamicize the entire population. It was an effort

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[217] Peterson, *Me Against My Brother,* p 184

to re-enact the transformation of Iran's society at home in the Sudan. Without this precedent, the Sudanese government would not have the successful illustration with which to inspire their Muslim population. The move would have been unlikely to garner more support if implemented by Nimeiri, and thus, it would have been unlikely that Nimeiri would have introduced Sharia Law.

Can the introduction of Sharia Law (encouraged by the successful Iranian Revolution's precedent) be held responsible for any degree of increase in the intensity of the conflict? The SPLA had actually been formed three months before Sharia Law was introduced indicating that their grievance was with something other than Sharia Law. Because the introduction of the legal code was not arbitrary and not entirely unexpected, SPLA's grievance may have legitimately been with the Islamicization of the country of which the introduction of Sharia Law was only one manifestation. The SPLA continue to maintain (21 years after beginning the armed resistance) that Sharia Law must be suspended before their arms will be put down permanently. Though their demand for a multiparty democracy has been met, they justify the use of arms on the existence of Sharia Law in the Sudan. Clearly, without the strict legal code, the SPLA would lack a reason for continuing and prolonging the duration of the conflict. At the very least the SPLA would be forced to justify their strategy on another grievance.

The prominence of Sharia Law in prolonging the conflict is further evidenced by the current negotiations. Among other provisions, the Sudanese government has agreed to guarantee the exemption of non-Muslilm from the application of the harsh laws. The promise has been enough to satiate the SPLA and is at least partially a reason that peace is expected in the next year.[218] Thus removing Sharia Law can be partially credited with the end of fighting and likewise partially blamed for the prolonged violence in the civil war.

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[218] 'Sudanese President Says Peace Talks Could Resume Early', 9 November 2003. <www.cnn.com> accessed 17 November 2003.

The Sudanese government has also gained a great deal of material support from their Islamic co-faithful around the world. As from the encouragement of their own successful Islamic Revolution, Iran has supported the Sudanese with uniforms and military assistance. Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, too, have supplied the Sudanese government with badly needed economic assistance by investing in Sudan (though this was suspended when Sudan did not join the coalition against Iraq in 1991). Rueters reported that in the 1970s and 1980s, "Saudi Arabia gave up to $500 million a year in aid to Sudan"[219] in addition to an estimated $400 million a year Sudanese living in Saudi Arabia sent back to their families.

What motivated these religious diaspora states to invest so heavily in Sudan and support the government against the southern rebels? Though it is difficult to conclusively identify their motivatioins, there is clear evidence that Saudi Arabia's investment was made out of a religious affinity with their suffering co-faithful. Kepel notes that much of the early investment was in the form of the Faisal Islamic Bank which is guided by Koranic principles.[220] The bank was directed by the Saudi Prince Faisal al-Saud and allowed wealthy Saudis the opportunity to invest in Sudan. Among other principles, the banks does not charge interest as it is forbidden in the Koran. Thus, Saudi Arabia's investment, though not explicitly religious, was driven by their shared religious identity with the Sudanese. The Saudi Arabian support subsequently included direct military support.

Furthermore, these countries were well aware of the war with the southern non-Muslims and openly made contributions of military assistance to the war effort. As the Middle East is not a neighbor of Sudan, their interest could not have been to use Sudan to eliminate a SPLA threat to destabilize their own states. Nor could the states have hoped for an immediate material repayment from Sudan as the economic crisis was well ingrained and

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[219] Alfred Taban, 'Sudan Rekindles Old Friendship with Saudi Arabia', (2000)
<www.metimes.com/2k/issue2000-8/reg/sudan_rekindles_old.htm> accessed 17 November 2003.
[220] Gilles Kepel (translated by Anthony F. Roberts), *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*, (Cambridge (MA): The Balknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002) p 180.

would take years to overcome. Rather, the states likely invested in the Sudan with the expectation that the development of resources would result in favorable trade and repayment in the long term. It is likely the states had this expectation because of their common commitment with Sudan to create a network of faithful Islamic states.

It is difficult to directly link this religious diaspora assistance for the Sudanese government with the long duration and high casualties of the conflict. A weapon donated by Iran cannot be traced to a particular battle or death of 50 Sudanese. It can be generally assumed, however, that in order to maintain the high intensity, the weapons and other materials had to be supplied from somewhere. If they were not donated to the state, Sudan would have had to purchase them themselves. Given the severe deficit of cash in the country, it would have been especially difficult for the government to sustain that level of intensity for such a prolonged period of time. Thus it is likely, though one cannot say conclusively, that this material support from Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates is partially responsible for the high intensity of the Sudanese conflict.

The SPLA, too, have benefited from an abundance of material support from the Christian religious diaspora. Ethiopia has been one of the most active supporters of the SPLA. The rebels have bases in Ethiopia to which they can flee for safety. "In a string of so-called 'refugee' camps just inside the border, Ethiopians trained guerrillas, gave them a radio transmitter to beam liberation propaganda into Sudan, and air dropped weapons to rebel units inside the south."[221] Ethiopia's support was not out of a sense of affinity with a religious co-faithful, though. Ethiopia's population is a mixture of large Muslim and Christian populations that did not put significant pressure on their government to intervene on behalf of Sudan's non-Muslims. The government, as well, did not act because of their sense of relation to the religious minority in Sudan. Rather, the Ethiopian government supported the rebels "as a counterweight to Sudan's support for Eritrean and Tigrean

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[221] Peterson, *Me Against My Brother,* p 202

separatists"[222] who were threatening the stability of the Ethiopian state. Thus, the Ethiopian support of the SPLA would not be considered intervention by a religious diaspora per se and its impact on the intensity of the conflict is irrelevant to this study.

Uganda, too, was active in supplying bases and weapons to the rebels. Funds from other countries wanting to covertly support the SPLA also found Uganda a useful channel for their funds. Like Ethiopia, the motivation for aiding the rebels was not primarily a concern for their suffering co-faithful (though the Sudanese non-Muslims were suffering and the Ugandans largely shared a religious identity with them), but a strategic decision. The Sudanese government was active in supporting the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) which was attempting to destabilize the Ugandan government. Thus, Uganda supported the SPLA rebels hoping to destabilize the Sudanese government in order to cut off support to the LRA.

The Americans have also been particularly active in support of the SPLA. Most of the support has been informally provided by individual or groups of American citizens. According to a journalist who made several visits to southern Sudan, many of the rebels wore "a discordant collection of T-shirts and rags that often first arrived in bundles of used clothes collected for the 'poor' of Africa at church bake sales in America and Europe."[223] Money has also been collected to support the SPLA and help them buy back their family members from 'slavery'[224] in the north. The United States government as well has provided some financial support largely donated through charities or funneled through Uganda.

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[222] Ibid. Page 202.
[223] Ibid. Page 200.
[224] The use of the term 'slavery' is very controversial in regards to the Sudanese civil war. Women and their young children are allegedly taken by Sudanese military in village raids. There the women are allegedly forced to convert to Islam and marry an Arab. The children meanwhile are allegedly used for housework or more often sent to fight on behalf of the Sudanese military against their own people. Westerners are often told that there are Arab go-betweens that are willing to facilitate the sale of the slaves back to their families, though, the families are often too poor to pay the $25-$50 fee required. Thus, many Americans and Europeans give money in the hopes that these women and children can be returned to their families. The controversial aspect is accusations that this process is fraudulent or the Sudanese military use the process as a money-making venture by repeatedly taking the same slaves. Thus, the term 'slave' is controversial, though often used to describe this aspect of the war.

It is questionable how much of this support is given out of a religious affinity with the rebels. The rebels themselves are not a coherent religious group which makes it difficult to identify their religious diaspora. The southern Sudan is partially Christian and partially a mixture of traditional animist beliefs. Even the Christianity practiced by the SPLA members only distantly resembles the Christianity practiced by Americans. Despite the difficulty of identifying the religious identity of the SPLA, it is generally 'advertised' in the United States as being a Christian minority persecuted by a Muslim Sudanese government.

In this context, many human rights organizations have taken the SPLA's pleas to American churches to request aid for the co-faithful suffering under the harsh Muslims. Money specifically given to buy back slaves has accumulated to millions. In one slave redemption trip, one Christian human rights organization, Christian Solidarity International (CSI), raised over $50,000 alone from teenagers who washed cars – and in one instance, sold their car – and young students who asked for donations in their town.[225] On their website, they request help from such individuals to stand by the suffering Christians.

"Q. What can we do to help CSI in its efforts to liberate slaves in Sudan?

"1. Pray for those who are enslaved, for their release, and their healing of body, mind and spirit; that the Christian faith of all slaves will be strengthened; for the growth of the Church in Sudan despite persecution; and that the Lord will lead others to join CSI in its efforts to liberate slaves.

"2. Give donations for the liberation of slaves and their return to their loved ones; and help cover the costs of food and medicine for families victimized by slave raids.

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[225] 'Curse of Slavery Haunts Sudan', 25 Januaty 1998. <www.CBSNews.com> (13 November 2003).

"3. Join CSI's Anti-Slavery Campaign. As a school or Sunday school class, church youth group or a congregation of believers, you can have an impact on the lives of innocent women and children. CSI needs help as it seeks to free tens of thousands of women and children still enslaved. By helping, we practice our devotion to Christ and our neighbors."[226]

Clearly, some material support is given because of the affinity between American and Sudanese Christians. However, some money is also given simply out of sympathy for the suffering of fellow humans regardless of their national or religious identities. As Cohen explains, "Television reports of emaciated mothers and dying babies stimulated a strong demand from the U.S. public for action."[227]

The American government's aid was much more substantial than the public's aid and it is easier to determine their motivation from written reports. The Assistant Secretary of the State Department's Bureau of African Affairs under President Bush (1989-1993), Herman Cohen, was responsible for American policy in the Sudan and has since written a book that describes American interests and intentions in the country. Not once in his account does Cohen mention the plight of southern Christians as a reason for American involvement during the civil war. It was not sympathy for the suffering of millions that drove administration officials to intervene. It was pressure from the American public, rather, that drove American policy. Repeatedly, this fact comes through in Cohen's account. Just after taking office, Cohen was confronted by the Deputy Secretary of State, Lawrence Eagleburger, with "the steady stream of congressional letters and calls urging action to relieve the suffering"[228] in the Sudan. Cohen further describes the difficulty of

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[226] Christian Solidarity International, 'CSI Slave Liberation Program', <www.csi-int.ch/csi-redemp_prog.htm> (13 November 2003).
[227] Cohen, *Intervening in Africa,* p 60
[228] Ibid. Page 61.

balancing the state's strategic interest in remaining friendly with the Sudanese government and the public's demand that the state intervene on behalf of the rebels.

> *"Sudan's strategic location and our need to keep friendly contacts within the Sudanese military were not contested. But the delivery of lethal equipment with the hope it would not be used in the south against the insurgents was politically unsustainable, given the strong feelings in the United States about the war and the famine."[229]*

Because Cohen identified the public's interest as humanitarian, not religious, he centered policy around ensuring the implementation of the United Nations' humanitarian program, Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), and encouraging a peace process.

In more recent years, American policy has increasingly focused on ensuring religious freedom in Sudan. An independent commission, called the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), was formed in 1998 to evaluate religious freedom around the world. Their inaugural report evaluated only three countries, one of which was the Sudan, and urged intervention in the Sudan in order to ensure the freedom of non-Muslims. They even explored the option of military intervention to facilitate the end of the conflict that has caused so much suffering for the non-Muslims.[230] The policy recommendation of the USCIRF and pressure to instate religious freedom in the Sudan, though, is not explicitly the outgrowth of a religious affinity with the Sudanese Christians. The focus on religious freedom is rather an outgrowth of American commitments to develop democracies around the world, of which religious freedom is an important component.

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[229] Ibid. Page 65.
[230] United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, 'Hearing on Religious Persecution in Sudan,' 15 February 2000. <www.uscirf.gov/hearings/15Feb00/index.php3> (16 November 2003).

Thus the American involvement in the Sudan – both by individual citizens and by the government – can only partially, at best, be said to have occurred out of a religious affinity between American and Sudanese Christians. The government's aid was clearly given only because of public pressure which it discerned as a humanitarian concern and it is unclear how much the public pressure originated out of a religious rather than humanitarian concern. It would require interviews with the donors and those who pressured the administration in order to differentiate between the two motivations. Clearly, though, some of the aid was given because of a religious concern and the question of this study is whether this support affected the intensity of the conflict.

As with the support given to the Sudanese government by its Arab allies, it is difficult to draw a direct connection between the Americans' aid and a longer duration or higher death toll in the conflict. Clearly, though, any financial support was used by the rebels to support their operations which allowed them to sustain their promise to fight against the government until Sharia Law was suspended. Without this support from the Americans, the SPLA would have had to find resources from elsewhere. Given their regional support and the desire of Sudan's neighbors to isolate the country, the SPLA would likely have been able to sustain itself with support like that received by Uganda and Ethiopia. Furthermore, the support that can be attributed to a religious affinity with the American Christians was minimal, at best, and therefore not especially consequential on the operations of the SPLA.

A significant amount of American support – both individual and governmental – was given in the form of humanitarian support, which can be argued to have the same impact as military support. Though the food and clothing donated by the Americans and others was intended for the displaced and destitute in southern Sudan, it was also used by the military to feed their soldiers in southern Sudan. Furthermore, financial loans given by the international community may have been intended to help Sudan develop an

infrastructure for the weak country, however much of Sudan's budget is allocated to support the military. The United States estimates Sudan's defense spending as over seven percent of their Gross National Product (GNP).[231] The American support of Sudan is explicitly humanitarian, though, and less likely to have been given in support of a religious diaspora fighting their oppressors. Even though the humanitarian support may be related to a more intense conflict in the Sudan, it is unlikely to be related to religious diaspora intervention, and therefore irrelevant to this study.

Based on what is known about the international intervention in Sudan's civil war, what can be said about the impact that the religious diaspora has on the intensity of a conflict? From the government's side, many Arab Islamic countries encouraged and materially supported Sudan in their attempts to subdue opposition to the Islamicization of the country and thereby likely sustained the movement against a determined opposition. From the SPLA's side, the Ugandans and Ethiopians were especially active in supporting the rebels materially although their motivation was not a religious affinity and thus cannot be analyzed as religious diaspora support. The Americans also supported the SPLA materially, though their support only partially originated out of a religious affinity with the rebels and the negligible support likely could have been replaced by states in the region with an interest in destabilizing Sudan. Given this evidence, a religious diaspora seems to increase the intensity of the conflict when their support is substantial and cannot be replaced by another source.

The religious diaspora do not always intervene to support one side or the other in the conflict, but sometimes intervene to encourage the two sides to resolve their differences. Britain, for instance, was instrumental in ensuring a ceasefire in 1998, during the height of the famine, that allowed food aid to get to the starving southerners. Kenya, as well, presided over peace talks in 1999 and 2001, though these eventually failed to bring peace.

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[231] United States Library of Congress, *LOC Country Study: Sudan,* 1991 <www.loc.gov> (17 November 2003).

The United States, too, have made several efforts to bring the sides together to talk out their differences. President Jimmy Carter went to the Sudan in 2001 with a United Arab Emirates representative to talk with the parties, though their efforts were fruitless. Furthermore, the United States Congress passed the Sudan Peace Act in 2001 to further pressure the sides to resolve their differences.

Although Britain, Kenya and the United States share a religious identity with the SPLA, their mediation efforts do not appear to be related to this religious affinity between the states. Britain's effort, rather than arising out of a concern for the suppression of their religious faithful, was rooted in their humanitarian concern for the starving Sudanese regardless of their religious identity. The Americans, as well, have shown that their support was explicitly a humanitarian concern with only minimal pressure from individual Christians concerned for their persecuted co-faithful. The Kenyans' interest, on the other hand, was in their own security and development of the region. Furthermore, these efforts have not had a great deal of success in stopping the civil war, rather it has been the regional development organization, IGAD, that has brought the two parties near agreement.

The religious diaspora in the Sudan has had an impact on the intensity of the conflict when their support was substantial and could not be replaced with another source. The clearest impact they had is the Islamic diaspora's material and inspirational support of the Sudanese government. The diaspora support of the southern Christians is more questionable in regards to it religious affinity motivation and likely could have been replaced by other sources. The mediation efforts, as well, have not occurred out of a religious affinity nor have they been successful at shortening or moderating the conflict. It is useful to compare the impact of the diaspora support in the Sudan to the lack of diaspora support in the Casamance separatist movement in Senegal to see the potential of other sources of these resources.

Senegal

The Casamancais of Senegal organized by the MFDC have actively pressed for independence since 1982. Though they have gained some support from Libya, Muaritania, Gambia and Guinea-Bissau, the Camancais have not been supported by their religious diaspora. Likewise, the Senegalese have received only minimal international support that has not significantly effected their behavior in the conflict.

Like the southern Sudanese, the population in Casamance is mixed Muslim and Christian living in a state dominated by Muslims. Unlike the southern Sudanese, though, the Casamancais have not developed an image as a Christian minority that is persecuted by a Muslim controlled government. This difference, rather than being rooted in the actual identities of the populations, is more likely the result of a religious issue at the center of the Sudanese conflict and a western-trained and savvy leadership of the SPLA. Senegal never introduced Sharia Law that agitated their non-Muslim population, thus, in essence, the separatist movement was denied one of the justifications for appealing for help in their violent fight against the central Senegalese government. Furthermore, the MFDC were organized by a Catholic priest who was somewhat less aware of or willing and able to exploit the potential international support from their religious diaspora. Meanwhile, the SPLA was guided by an American-trained soldier who has taken every opportunity to involve the international community – especially the Americans – in the Sudanese conflict. Thus, the Casamancais have not developed a cohesive religious identity from which they have used to appeal to their religious diaspora.

Despite the lack of diaspora support, the MFDC has nevertheless sustained a 22 year violent campaign for independence. They were able to garner the necessary resources without appeals to their religious diaspora. Because the most militant Attika fighters were based in southern Casamance, Guinea-Bissau was often used as a base. Amnesty International reported in June 1999 that Guinea-Bissau was also an important source for

weapons.[232]   It is unlikely that the Guinea-Bissau government was complicit in these supports as the MFDC has been linked to rebels in Guinea-Bissau. Gambia was another source for weapons for the MFDC, though again this does not imply that the Gambian government was the source. It is more likely that Mauritanian or Libyan traders passed weapons along to the MFDC through Gambia. With these bases, the MFDC and Attika have organized and sustain their violent conflict.

The conflict, though, has been limited in its intensity as no more than 1,000 people are estimated to have been killed in its 22 year history. The relevant question for this study is: Would religious diaspora support have caused the conflict to be more intense or would it have shortened the conflict limiting the overall intensity? Another way to ask this question is: How much was Senegal willing to fight in order to retain control of the province? If they were willing to fight against all odds, it is likely that the extra strength the Casamancais would have gained from their religious diaspora would not have shortened the conflict as the central government would not be willing to concede without total defeat. In fact, the extra weapons or other support would likely have meant more deaths during the 22 year conflict, thus raising the conflict's intensity. If Casamance was not so important to Senegal and they only continued fighting because they expected to win, one would expect a stronger MFDC bolstered by their religious diaspora support to lower Senegal's expectation of success, thereby encouraging a negotiation to shorten the conflict and limit the number of deaths.

Both the resources of Casamance and the time which the central Senegalese government has committed to overcoming opposition to their control of the region indicate that Senegal would be willing to continue fighting even if the MFDC were strengthened by religious diaspora support. As described earlier, Casamance is important to Senegal as a 'bread-basket.' The soil is more fertile than that in the remainder of Senegal and serves an

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[232] Amnesty International, *Senegal: Casamance civilians shelled by the Mouvement des forces democratiques de Casamance (MFDC), Democratic Forces of Casamance Movement*, (New York: Amnesty International, 30 June 1999)

important role in food production in the state. Furthermore, Senegal has demonstrated its willingness to fight for Casamance as it has done so for the entire duration of the 22 year conflict. Had the region not been important to the central Senegalese government, they would have been more willing to compromise in the occasional negotiations with the MFDC. This suggests that religious diaspora support would have made a difference to the intensity of the conflict, as presumably the continued fighting with more weapons would have increased the number of deaths throughout the duration of the conflict.

On the government's side, very little international aid was given to support them in the conflict. No weapons, political or military support have been documented for the Senegalese. When the MFDC leader, Father Senghor, fled to Guinea-Bissau in 1993, though, the Guinea-Bissau government kept him under house arrest to prevent his return to Casamance. Other than this meager passive assistance, Senegal has carried out its campaign without intervention by their religious diaspora.

The religious diasporas have furthermore been absent in pressuring both Senegal and the MFDC to negotiate their differences. The negotiations that have occurred have either been initiated by the parties themselves or have been facilitated by Gambia or Guinea-Bissau. As was evident in the Kenyan mediation of the Sudanese conflict, the motivation for intervening is not a religious affinity but a regional concern for stability. In fact, the negotiations have had the same affect as those by the religious diaspora in Sudan in lowering the intensity of the conflict.

At first glance, the holocaust level of violence in the Sudan where the religious diaspora have arguably fueled the conflict and the low-intensity conflict of Casamance independence in Senegal where there is no support from the religious diaspora suggests that the diaspora have a significant impact on the level of violence in the conflict. On further evaluation, the relationship proves to be more complex. In the Sudan, the government's religious diaspora involved itself in the conflict by providing inspiration and material

resources and in doing so raised the intensity of the conflict. However, the SPLA's religious diaspora only negligibly supported the SPLA with finances and material support and therefore did not significantly alter the intensity of the conflict. In the Senegal, where the religious diaspora did not involve themselves in the conflict, intervention would not have shortened the conflict but the injection of more weapons would have caused more deaths. Thus it would seem that the involvement of the diaspora is likely to increase the intensity only when the support is substantial and cannot be replaced by another source.

Further in regards to the likelihood of mediation efforts by a religious diaspora to reduce the intensity of the conflict, the comparison of Sudan's Civil War and Senegal's Casamance conflict has shown that the religious diaspora are inconsequential in their efforts which are often not rooted in a religious affinity to the participants. In the Sudan, Britain, Kenya and the United States have all pressured for peace and facilitated negotiations however in each case, the motivation for intervening was not a religious affinity and their intervention did not successfully shorten or moderate the conflict. In Senegal, as well, there has not been an intervention to mediate the conflict by either side's religious diaspora. Thus, religion does not seem to impact a conflict by providing a religious diaspora who intervene to mediate and thereby reduce the intensity of the conflict.

Conclusion

This comparative case study reinforces and illustrates the results of the quantitative tests in which Hypothesis 6 was partially supported and Hypothesis 7 was refuted. As the model and previous research suggest, military intervention and weapons support does increase the intensity by strengthening one side in the conflict. Political support, however, does not have the same effect, rather, it appears to have no impact on the intensity of a conflict. Mediation efforts, as well, seem to have no effect on the intensity, rather than decreasing the intensity as expected.

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CHAPTER 8: Conclusion

It is not unusual in the post-9/11 America to see documentaries on suicide bombers on the major television networks, in newspapers or in popular magazines. After delineating the terrorist's childhood, their early life forming experiences, their education and their family and friends, the documentaries inevitably turn to the terrorist's devout religious faith to explain why someone would be so willing to kill innocent civilians and even willing to sacrifice themselves for an independent state based on religious principles. The documentaries leave one with the impression that a suicide bomber's logic so defies all earthly experience that the only valid explanation lies in the bomber's religious belief. Some documentaries even leave the viewer thinking that any political conflict supported by a religious belief will ultimately lead to an unending bloodbath that would not happen if religion were not part of the conflict.

These impressions are only further supported by daily reports of violence carried out in the name of religion. The BBC reported that there were sixteen suicide bombs in one month alone (March 2002) in Israel and the Israeli occupied territories.[233] Though these terrorists act in the name of Islam, the world's other major religions are no more immune to being used for violence. Christians in Northern Ireland, Hindus in India, Zionist Jews in Israel, Buddhists in Sri Lanka – the daily news reports leave one to conclude that religious violence is endemic and unsolvable.

The research in this thesis, however, finds that there is no correlation between the involvement of religion and the intensity of a conflict. Whether comparing the superficial religious identities of the groups in conflict or investigating more closely the actual use of religion in the conflict, no evidence was found to support the oft-held assumption that religious conflicts generally, and specifically those in which religious doctrine and

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[233] Tarik Kafala, 'Analysis: Palestinian Suicide Attacks, BBC News, 2 March 2004
<news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3256858> (26 April 2004).

organization, are used to strengthen one side exhibited a greater intensity than any other type of conflict.

The model laid out in this study identified three particular reasons why religion is so associated with initiating and perpetuating violence in a conflict – its doctrinal, organizational and diaspora qualities. Religion is unique in its metaphysical worldview in combination with violent traditions, as well as unique in its pre-existing organizational structure with an overwhelming moral legitimacy that can be grafted into a group in conflict and its international support network of co-religionists willing to contribute and sustain the movement. This study hypothesized that these three characteristics are the causal mechanisms by which religion causes a higher level of intensity and previous research has supported this model.

It was argued that when a movement references a religion's cosmic war worldview or its violent traditions and myths, the movement gains legitimacy and its members are more willing or even feel obligated to join and die in the struggle without compromise. Building on Juergensmeyer's notion of cosmic war mentality, one would expect that the doctrinal focus on the metaphysical war in which the faithful are participants and are either rewarded or punished for their actions causes group members to be more willing to kill or be killed in the earthly conflict leading to a corresponding increase in the intensity of a conflict. Furthermore, the violent traditions and myths of a religion provide a group with a historical legitimacy as Karen Armstrong pointed out with the Crusades and Michael Sells acknowledges in the Bosnian conflict. The reference to these traditions and myths mobilizes support and ensures loyalty through the duration of a long and violent confrontation.

The religious organization as well provides a necessary resource of leaders, members and a communications network with an added moral legitimacy that allows the movement to ensure the loyalty of its members. McAdam's ground-breaking exploration of

the churches in the American Civil Rights Movement in the 1960s illustrated how influential the religious organizational support was for the black militancy movement. Alan Falconer's examination of the Protestant and Catholic churches in Northern Ireland described how the religious organizations also provide a necessary representation of the community to the government, while also forming and verbalizing the framework within which the community's history is interpreted, though Peter Palmer's analysis of the churches in Yugoslavia suggest that this is only possible when the church plays an effective role at educating its followers. Without these resources of the religious organization, a prolonged violent confrontation could not be sustained and is thus an essential role that the religion plays in intensifying the conflict.

Finally, the diaspora is significant in the inspiration, resources and military support they bring to a group in conflict. Scott Thomas' elaboration of the growing affinity between religious faithful and their diaspora as a result of globalization indicates that the potential external support provided by this diaspora is increasingly pertinent to the course and dynamics of the conflict. Ahmed Rashid's account of the Afghan conflict and Gilles Kepel's analysis of the Bosnian conflict describes the significant impact that the external support has in terms of supplying resources and personnel. The religious diaspora are also important in the inspiration they provide as illustrated by the contagion effect of the Iranian Revolution discussed by James DeFronzo. The diaspora has the potential of altering political events and encouraging external states to intervene in a conflict as Cynthia Keppley Mahmood and Bhabani Sen Gupta found in the Punjabi conflict in India and Tanja Ellingsen, Stuart Hill, Donald Rothchild and Colin Cameron, and David Lake and Donald Rothchild's research has suggested that states with similar religious identities are likely to intervene militarily. Furthermore, Patrick Regan has found that the military intervention of an ethnic or religious diaspora increases the intensity of the conflict. The increasingly

involved role that religious diasporas are playing in conflicts involving their co-faithful and the vital resources they bring to the conflict bolsters their co-faithful in the struggle.

This thesis has endeavored to test these expectations derived from previous research using a quantitative methodology complemented by illustrative comparative case studies. In the first instance, a dataset of 278 territory conflict phases originally compiled by the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo, Norway (PRIO) in collaboration with Uppsala University and the Norwegian University of Science and Technology was used. A set of associational tests of this data was used to determine if a relationship between religious conflicts and a higher intensity existed. To determine why the relationship existed, an ordinal logit model was developed to take account of the causal mechanisms – doctrine, organization, and diaspora – described in the model. These quantitative analyses allowed a broad test of the hypotheses that has not been widely used in this sub-field. The previous research – largely made up of case studies – is complemented by the application of a quantitative method that compares a large number of cases across both space and time.

Within this study, the quantitative test was supplemented by a set of illustrative comparative case studies in order to further explore the results of the quantitative test. In these comparisons, two cases were compared to determine the source of the increased intensity and delineate the nature of the role that religion played in the conflict. In doing so, a more accurate picture of the relationship between religion and the intensity of a conflict was developed. Taken together, the two analyses offer a complete evaluation of the role that religion plays in violent conflicts.

Results

Hypothesis 1:   There is a strong positive relationship between the involvement of religion in a conflict and the intensity of a conflict.

The quantitative comparison of the intensity of religious conflicts found only weak evidence supporting this hypothesis and the assumption that religious conflicts are more intense than other types of conflicts. When the relevance of religion to the conflict was incorporated to mediate the limits of the identity-oriented definition of religious conflict used in this study, the relationship between the involvement of religion and the intensity of conflicts diminished below an accepted level of significance. Furthermore, tests were carried out to determine if the type of religion involved or the monotheist beliefs of some religions were related to the intensity of a conflict. The chi-square tests indicated that Hindu and Jewish conflicts were related to more intense conflicts than the other religions, though it was determined that this was likely a result of the small number of cases with little variety of Hindu and Jewish conflicts. The quantitative tests also found no support for the argument that monotheistic religions are associated with higher intensities in conflict than polytheist religions.

Hypothesis 2: When one or both groups involved in a conflict has a cosmic war world view, the conflict will be more intense than if neither participant has such a world view.

Hypothesis 3: The appeal to violent religious traditions and symbols in support of violent actions in a conflict will increase the intensity of a conflict.

Hypothesis 4: The appeal to religious traditions and symbols in support of non-violent actions in a conflict will decrease the intensity of a conflict.

The quantitative analysis refutes all three of the doctrine hypotheses concerning the influence of a cosmic war worldview and violent traditions in increasing the intensity of a

conflict, as well as in the ability of referencing non-violent traditions to decrease the intensity. The results indicated that doctrine was irrelevant to determining the intensity of a conflict. While the illustrative comparative case study of the Abu Sayyaf Group and Bougainville Revolutionary Army clearly show that doctrine was a prime motivation for the higher intensity found in the Filipino conflict, the quantitative analysis demonstrates that these cases are not representative of an overall relationship between the involvement of religious doctrine and the intensity of a conflict. This highlights an overall deficiency in the research of this sub-field that has heavily relied on case studies.

The quantitative test and case studies also pointed out the imprecision of the quantitative measures and highlighted the need for better measures in future studies. The variables were intended to measure the use of cosmic war imagery and references to violent and non-violent traditions by groups involved in the conflict, however were limited in their ability to take account of the timing, source and nature of the appeals. Rather than depending on news articles and second hand interviews of group leaders to determine the existence of a cosmic war worldview or references to violent traditions, a more accurate method of collecting the data might involve systematically interviewing or surveying the leaders with the same questions the study asked of the secondary literature: Is there an undergirding belief that one is fighting pure evil at the command or pleasure of one's god? Do they find support for this cosmic war worldview in the precedents of their religious traditions?

In the context of previous research in this subfield, the lack of conclusive support for the three doctrine hypotheses was unexpected. Case study after case study has pointed to the inevitability of a more intense conflict when the group is undergirded by a cosmic war worldview and encouraged by violent traditions within the religion. From descriptions of the Taliban, the Abu Sayyaf Group, al-Qaeda, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Al Aqsa Martyr's

Brigade, the various white supremacist movements in the United States, etc – the list is long of case studies that establish that religious doctrine is to be blamed for heinous violence.

The discrepancy between the results of this study and the pedigree of research from which it arose suggests a flaw in the development of the literature in this sub-field. The overuse of case studies and the non-existence of cross-sectional, time-series tests have generated conclusions about a relationship based on a few aberrant cases that are not representative of a trend. The sub-field would benefit greatly from more broad tests of a relationship between the involvement of religious doctrine and the intensity of a conflict.

Hypothesis 5: Formal support for one or more groups involved in a conflict by a religious organization will increase the intensity of a conflict.

The quantitative analysis also refutes the organizational hypothesis stating that when a religious organization formally supports a group in conflict there is a corresponding increase in the intensity of the conflict. Rather the quantitative test concluded that religious organizational support is inconsequential in terms of its influence on the intensity of a conflict. Even when modifications were made to the model to take account of the informal support of a religious organization, no evidence was found to support this hypothesis.

The Enosis Movement in Cyprus and Nationalist Movement in Ireland were compared in order to elucidate the dynamics of the relationship between religious organizational support and conflict intensity. The comparison highlighted the central role of the Cypriot Orthodox Church's support for the Enosis Movement in mobilizing, supporting and motivating members of the insurgency and thereby increasing the intensity of the conflict. It was concluded that without the Church's legitimacy and vast resources used in support of the Enosis Movement, the guerillas would not have been able to organize or sustain the movement. Though this conclusion supports Hypothesis 5, the quantitative

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result demonstrates that these cases are deviations from the observed pattern in which there is no relationship between religious organizational support and a higher intensity in conflict.

In terms of the previous research in this sub-field, the results of the test of this hypothesis were again unexpected. Coming on the heels of McAdam's analysis of black militancy and others, one would have expected religious organizational support to be central in intensifying a conflict. As with the doctrine hypotheses, this result suggests a need for more broad tests of the relationship that are less susceptible to bias in their conclusions.

Building on the lessons of this study, one way in which the quantitative test could be strengthened is by separating out the components of the organization variable – leaders, members and communications networks – to fully measure what the variable was intended to measure. In this scenario, one could measure how many religious leaders doubled as movement leaders, what percentage of members were also members of the religious organization and the extent of the communication between leaders with each other and in educating their members. These factors could be coalesced into one measurement of organizational support and analyzed in the ordinal logit model used in this study. Though this degree of precision may not be feasible, it would ensure a more accurate test of the hypothesis.

Hypothesis 6: The supply of weapons, political intervention or military intervention of a religious diaspora will increase the intensity of a conflict.

Hypothesis 7: The involvement of a religious diaspora will decrease the intensity of a conflict if they intervene to mediate a conflict.

Unlike the hypotheses testing the doctrinal and organizational aspects of religion in their relation to the intensity of a conflict, the quantitative tests of Hypothesis 6 partially confirmed the expectations. The quantitative analysis found that religious diaspora support

in the form of weapons or military intervention increase the intensity of a conflict. This impact was minimal, however, as the magnitude of the coefficient of the variables was very small. Support in the form of political intervention, on the other hand, does not increase the intensity. The comparison of the internal participants of the Sudanese Civil War and Senegal's Casamance conflict confirm that material support by a religious diaspora increases the conflict's intensity when it is substantial and cannot be replaced by another source.

In regards to Hypothesis 7, the quantitative results found that there was no support for the hypothesis that religious diaspora involvement in the form of mediation decreases the intensity of a conflict. The comparison of the Sudanese Civil War (1983-present) and Senegal's Casamance conflict (1982-present) confirm that a religious diaspora does not often intervene because of their religious affinity with one of the participants. Rather, the diaspora intervene because of a strategic interest to its own state. Furthermore, the mediation may not often have an impact on the duration and deadliness of a conflict.

In terms of the previous research in this sub-field, these results confirm the bulk of earlier findings. Like the plethora of case studies cited, this study found that the religious diaspora do involve themselves in their co-faithful's conflict. Like Regan, this study also found that when this support was in the form of military intervention, the conflict was indeed more intense.

One may question the unexpected findings of this study because it fundamentally relied on an identity-oriented definition of a 'religious conflict.' As mentioned at the start of this thesis, there are two equally valid yet equally limited definitions of a religious conflict. This study used an identity-oriented definition to test the hypotheses. Alternatively, I could have used an issue-oriented definition. Ideally and theoretically, the choice of definition and measurement would not substantially alter the results, however,

potentially the differing definitions could have produced conflicting results. I have attempted to minimize this potentiality by adding a control variable that accounts for the weakness of the identity-oriented definition. As identified in Chapter 1, the identity-oriented definition is limited in its capacity to take account of the relevance of religion to a conflict, thus relevance was included as a control variable in the quantitative tests. The introduction of 'relevance' in Chapter 4 furthermore found that it is an interacting component vital to understanding the intensity of religious conflicts.

As with any quantitative test of social behavior, this study is limited by its measurements to fully capture the complex characteristics of its variables. The measure intending to capture a group's belief in a cosmic war worldview and justification grounded in the violent and non-violent religious traditions could be strengthened by using more first-hand interviews with those involved in the conflict, as first-hand interviews provide a more accurate portrayal of a group than the second-hand accounts used in this study. The measurement for the doctrine variables captured what was intended, however the data could be strengthened by an alternative data collection technique.

The organization and diaspora variables could be improved by a more nuanced specification that more accurately measures what was intended. The organizational support variable could be separated into the components it was meant to measure – leaders, members and communications networks – rather than allowing official public support to serve as a proxy for these components. Furthermore, the measures of the diaspora influence could be enhanced by accounting for the motivation for the third party's involvement to isolate religious diasporas from ethnic or national diasporas as well as those intervening because of regional security concerns. As described in the conclusions of Chapter 5, 6 and 7, the modifications to the measurements allow for a more accurate evaluation of what is meant by doctrine, organization and diaspora in the model in Chapter 1.

Furthermore, as mentioned in Chapter 4, there were a disproportionate number of Christian and low intensity conflicts that were dropped from the dataset because of a lack of data. Theoretically, this bias in the representativeness of the data could cause a bias in the conclusions that were drawn from the tests that were dependent on the biased data. The likelihood of this is very low, however. The results were clearly not borderline or remotely suggestive of any relationship. It is highly unlikely that correcting for the minimal bias in the representativeness of the dataset would alter the rigorous results and conclusions drawn from the tests.

An alternative research design may also provide a more rigorous test of the model. This study has relied on second-hand reports of the groups involved in order to assess the role of the religious doctrine, organization and diaspora in intensifying a conflict. As mentioned previously, one could carry out a survey of the groups themselves assessing them first-hand (and more consistently than is possible using secondary data) on the same criteria used in this study. One might pose questions to the leadership and their members similar to those asked of the secondary accounts in this study. For instance, they could be asked about their belief in a metaphysical war between good and evil or about the importance of religious organizational and diaspora support for their movement. It would be important to ask multiple questions that measure the three qualities in order to allow an evaluation of the consistency of their answers. By asking open-ended questions, such as how they would describe the conflict in which they are engaged, one would particularly be concerned with picking up on any references to the 'goodness' of one's side and 'evilness' of their opponent, including the dehumanizing of their enemy. Furthermore, one would be interested to note any references made from a sacred text or religious tradition that are used in the context of justifying the group's violent strategy in the face of their specific struggle. In the course of surveying groups in violent conflicts, one can also assess the prominence and importance of the religious organization in providing a hierarchical structure and

communications network as well as the motivation and level of involvement of the religious diaspora in the struggle. The answers to those questions could be coded and quantified and then analyzed in much the same way as the dataset used in this study was analyzed with ordinal logits. The difference of using surveys compared to this study is merely a difference in data collection method. Using first-hand accounts are preferable because it limits the potential distortion of secondary sources.

The logistics of carrying out a first-hand survey of the groups involved in these conflicts, however, may make such a study virtually impossible. As many of these groups are extinct, it would not be feasible to locate the current leaders and members to question them about their motivations and organizational structure and support. One might be able to study contemporary groups, however, shedding some light on the current phenomenon although such a study could not lead to conclusions about the historical relationship between religion and conflict.

Questioning groups that are currently engaged in a violent struggle further poses potential biases to the accuracy of the data obtained. Those involved in an ongoing conflict have a substantial interest in presenting themselves in a way that re-enforces their image as righteous warriors capable of winning, in part to sustain the morale of their group members. In terms of religious organization and diaspora support, in particular, it is reasonable to expect group leaders to greatly inflate their estimation of support. In addition to these data quality issues with a first-hand survey of groups are the practical issues of the financial costs and safety of interlocutors in such a study. The costs involved in traveling to meet with a large number of groups around the world could quickly accumulate to astronomical figures. Even if the money was raised, one has to realistically address the ability to guarantee safety for oneself and any others who assist with the project. These issues alone could hamstring a study before it is even begun.

Another research design that does not suffer these limitations and would provide a more nuanced and accurate assessment of the groups is a 'survey of the experts.' Throughout all of the social sciences are experts who have dedicated their careers to understanding a particular group or set of groups. They have often spent significant periods of time not only interviewing group members and their leaders, but also living among group members to fully understand the dynamics and motivations of the groups. These experts are in a position to provide a more detailed assessment of the use of doctrine and the involvement of a religious organization and diaspora than is possible by merely reading published accounts of the groups.

A survey of these experts could be developed in which they are asked to estimate the importance of religious identity to group leaders and members, the level of belief in a metaphysical battle between good and evil in which they fight to defend their god, the importance of the religious organizational hierarchy in the group's own organizational structure and communications network, and the organization's dependence on their religious diaspora for support. A Likert scale could be used for many of these questions that would ordinally rank the group on each of the questions and could permit a broad comparison of the groups. It would be important that the three qualities be broken down into their components and the questions to be specific and unambivalent in order for the survey to yield useable results. The experts' responses could be aggregated and evaluated in much the same way the data on this study was evaluated using an ordinal logit. However the significant difference between this study and a survey of the experts would be in the level of measurement of the variables (scaled, rather than dichotomous) and the addition of questions that would permit a more accurate measurement of the variables.

The biggest drawback of a survey of the experts would be the inability to guarantee consistency in the experts' assessments. While one expert may argue that the membership largely believes that they act on behalf of their deity, another expert may be more cynical

arguing that the membership largely joins for the economic and social benefits gained from their involvement. Consistency can be increased, though never guaranteed, by ensuring the greatest specificity of the survey questions and by including several experts for each group in the study. Where the experts of a particular group disagree, the average of their responses could be used taking into consideration all the available expertise.

Although an alternative research design could be envisioned in hindsight that provides a more accurate test of the model, the study carried out in this thesis is nevertheless a rigorous test of the model that yielded unexpected results. The results of this study demonstrate that the assumptions and conclusions that pervade the literature do not reflect the observable reality across the board. The quantitative tests refute the assertion that there is any relationship between religious conflicts and a higher intensity or the use of religious doctrine and support of religious organizations and a higher intensity. With the exception of a religious diaspora's military and weapons support, there is no discernable association between the involvement of religion and the intensity of a conflict in the quantitative analysis of this study.

Not only does this indicate that the model presented in this study fails to explain religion's involvement in a conflict, it also points to one of the limits of the case study method. Though previous research largely supported the model in its parts through a plethora of case studies, the results of this study indicate that these were aberrant cases that do not accurately represent religious conflicts generally. The conclusions based on these case studies are not broadly applicable and do not further the field's knowledge about the nature and dynamics of religious conflicts. In this regard this thesis has drawn attention to the need within the field to complement the previous research with broader tests capable of detecting patterns in the large number of cases.

APPENDIX 1.1: Variable List for All Territory Conflicts in PRIO Armed Conflcit Dataset (278 Cases)

Abbreviation	Variable Name	Type	Range	Codes
Name	Conflict Name	String		
Conflict_ID	Conflict ID	Numeric (Ordinal)	undefined	Whole numbers indicate conflict number and decimals indicate the phase of the conflict.
Religious_Conflict	Religious Conflict (Identity-Oriented Definition)	Numeric (Nominal)	0-1	0 = not religious conflict (67 cases) 1 = religious conflict (211 cases)
Relevance	Relevance of Religion	Numeric (Ordinal)	1-4	1 = no religious identity differences (58 cases) 2 = religious identities not referenced (33 cases) 3 = religious identities referenced (187 cases) 4 = religious issue at center of conflict (0 cases)
Buddhism	Buddhist Internal Participant	Numeric (Nominal)	0-1	0 = no internal participant is Buddhist (245 cases) 1 = one or more internal participants is Buddhist (33 cases)
Christianity	Christian Internal Participant	Numeric (Nominal)	0-1	0 = no internal participant is Christian (178 cases) 1 = one or more internal participants is Christian (100 cases)
Hinduism	Hindu Internal Participant	Numeric (Nominal)	0-1	0 = no internal participant is Hindu (243 cases) 1 = one or more internal participants is Hindu (35 cases)
Islam	Islamic Internal Participant	Numeric (Nominal)	0-1	0 = no internal participant is Islamic (137 cases) 1 = one or more internal participants is Islamic (141 cases)
Judaism	Jewish Internal Participant	Numeric (Nominal)	0-1	0 = no internal participant is Jewish (267 cases) 1 = one or more internal participants is Jewish (11 cases)
Deaths	Intensity (PRIO)	Numeric (Ordinal)	1-3	1 = minor conflict (122 cases) 2 = intermediate conflict (68 cases) 3 = war (88 cases)
Duration	Duration (Years)	Numeric (Interval)	undefined	
DurScale	Duration Scale	Numeric (Ordinal)	1-3	1 = 1 year (140 cases) 2 = 2-4 years (88 cases) 3 = more than 4 years (50 cases)
Intensity	Intensity Index	Numeric (Ordinal)	2-6	2 = very low intensity (66 cases) 3 = low intensity (66 cases) 4 = moderate intensity (67 cases) 5 = high intensity (44 cases) 6 = very high intensity (15 cases)

APPENDIX 1.2: Variable List for Only Cases of Religious Conflict (211 Cases / 132 with adequate information)

Abbreviation	Variable Name	Type	Range	Codes
Name	Conflict Name	String		
Conflict_ID	Conflict ID	Numeric (Ordinal)	undefined	Whole numbers indicate conflict number and decimals indicate the phase of the conflict.
Deaths	Intensity (PRIO)	Numeric (Ordinal)	1-3	1 = minor conflict (88 cases) 2 = intermediate conflict (55 cases) 3 = war (68 cases)
Duration	Duration (Years)	Numeric (Interval)	undefined	
DurScale	Duration Scale	Numeric (Ordinal)	1-3	1 = 1 year (105 cases) 2 = 2-4 years (69 cases) 3 = more than 4 years (37 cases)
Intensity	Intensity Index	Numeric (Ordinal)	2-6	2 = very low intensity (44 cases) 3 = low intensity (52 cases) 4 = moderate intensity (72 cases) 5 = high intensity (34 cases) 6 = very high intensity (9 cases)
OrgSup	Formal Religious Organizational Support	Numeric (Nominal)	0-1	0 = no formal religious support (150 cases) 1 = formal religious support (17 cases)
OrgSup_Expand	Expanded Organizational Support	Numeric (Ordinal)	0-2	0 = no formal or informal support 1 = informal religious support 2 = formal religious support
Cosmic	Cosmic War World View	Numeric (Nominal)	0-1	0 = no cosmic war world view (143 cases) 1 = cosmic war world view (24 cases)
vTrad	Violent Traditions and Symbols	Numeric (Nominal)	0-1	0 = no use of violent traditions (147 cases) 1 = use of violent traditions (20 cases)
nvTrad	Non-violent Traditions and Symbols	Numeric (Nominal)	0-1	0 = no use of non-violent traditions (164 cases) 1 = use of non-violent traditions (3 cases)
External	Number of External Participants that share a religious identity with a participant in the conflict	Numeric (Ordinal)	undefined	
Mediators	Number of Mediators Sharing a Religious Identity	Numeric (Ordinal)	undefined	
Relevance	Relevance of Religion	Numeric (Ordinal)	1-4	1 = no religious identity differences (15 cases) 2 = religious identities not referenced (33 cases) 3 = religious identities referenced (163 cases) 4 = religious issue at center of conflict (0 cases)
Buddhism	Buddhist Internal Participant	Numeric (Nominal)	0-1	0 = no internal participant is Buddhist (191 cases) 1 = one or more internal participants is Buddhist (20 cases)
Christianity	Christian Internal Participant	Numeric (Nominal)	0-1	0 = no internal participant is Christian (123 cases) 1 = one or more internal participants is Christian (88 cases)
Hinduism	Hindu Internal Participant	Numeric (Nominal)	0-1	0 = no internal participant is Hindu (176 cases) 1 = one or more internal participants is Hindu (35 cases)
Islam	Islamic Internal Participant	Numeric (Nominal)	0-1	0 = no internal participant is Islamic (100 cases) 1 = one or more internal participants is Islamic (111 cases)
Judaism	Jewish Internal Participant	Numeric (Nominal)	0-1	0 = no internal participant is Jewish (200 cases) 1 = one or more internal participants is Jewish (11 cases)
Monotheist	Monotheist religion involved in conflict	Numeric (Nominal)	0-1	0 = polytheistic religion involved (45 cases) 1 = monotheistic religion involved (166 cases)
Informal	Informal Religious Support	Numeric (Nominal)	0-1	0 = no informal support (83 cases) 1 = informal support only (84 cases)
Request	Group in conflict made request for co-faithful to join in support	Numeric (Nominal)	0-1	0 = group made no request (129 cases) 1 = group made public request (29 cases)
Balanced	The sides in a conflict were relatively balanced	Numeric (Nominal)	0-1	0 = balanced (4 cases) 1 = not balanced (47 cases)
Doctrine	*Combination of Cosmic,*	*Numeric*	*-1-2*	*-1 = only use of non-violent doctrine (3 cases)*

	Vtrad and nvTrad	*(Ordinal)*		*0 = no use of doctrine (140 cases)* *1 = limited use of doctrine (4 cases)* *2 = use of doctrine (20 cases)*
Cosmic_Org	*Combination of Cosmic and OrgSup*	*Numeric (Ordinal)*	*0-1*	*0 = no formal use of cosmic war mentality (163 cases)* *1 = formal use of cosmic war mentality (4 cases)*
vTrad_Org	*Combination of vTrad and OrgSup*	*Numeric (Ordinal)*	*0-1*	*0 = no formal use of violent traditions (163 cases)* *1 = formal use of violent traditions (4 cases)*
nvTrad_Org	*Combination of nvTrad and OrgSup*	*Numeric (Ordinal)*	*0-1*	*0 = no formal use of non-violent traditions (164 cases)* *1 = formal use of violent traditions (3 cases)*
External_Req	*Combination of External and Request*	*Numeric (Ordinal)*	*0-*	*0 = 164 cases* *1 = 8 cases* *3 = 2 cases* *4 = 3 cases*
Mediator_Req	*Combination of Mediator and Request*	*Numeric (Ordinal)*	*0-*	*0 = 157 cases* *1 = 13 cases*
External_Bal	*Combination of External and Balanced*	*Numeric (Ordinal)*	*0-1*	*0 = An external state sharing a religious identity with a participant intervened and balanced the two sides in the conflict. (134 cases)* *1 = An external state sharing a religious identity with a participant intervened and the two sides remained unbalanced. (46 cases)*

APPENDIX 2.1: Intensity Data

Conflict ID	Location	Territory Name	Begin	End	Deaths	Duration	DurScale	Intensity
1.1	Algeria	Algeria	1954	1954	1	1	1	2
1.2	Algeria	Algeria	1955	1961	3	7	3	6
1.3	Algeria	Algeria	1962	1962	2	1	1	3
2.1	Algeria - Morocco	Common Border	1963	1963	1	1	1	2
3.1	Angola	Angola	1960	1965	1	6	3	4
3.2	Angola	Angola	1966	1974	2	9	3	5
4.1	Angola	Cabinda	1992	1992	1	1	1	2
4.2	Angola	Cabinda	1994	1994	1	1	1	2
4.3	Angola	Cabinda	1996	1997	1	2	2	3
5.1	Argentina - United Kingdom	Malvinas/Falkland Isl.	1982	1982	3	1	1	4
6.1	Azerbaijan	Nagorno-Karabakh	1992	1993	3	2	2	5
6.2	Azerbaijan	Nagorno-Karabakh	1994	1994	3	1	1	4
7.1	Bangladesh	Chittagong Hill Tracts	1974	1986	1	13	3	4
7.2	Bangladesh	Chittagong Hill Tracts	1987	1992	2	6	3	5
8.1	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Serb	1992	1993	3	2	2	5
8.2	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Serb	1994	1995	2	2	2	4
9.1	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Bihac	1993	1995	1	3	2	3
10.1	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Croat	1993	1993	3	1	1	4
10.2	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Croat	1994	1994	2	1	1	3
11.1	Brunei	North Borneo	1962	1962	1	1	1	2
12.1	Burkina Faso - Mali	Agacher Strip	1985	1985	1	1	1	2
13.1	Burma	Karen	1948	1949	3	2	2	5
13.2	Burma	Karen	1950	1991	2	42	3	5
13.3	Burma	Karen	1992	1992	3	1	1	4
13.4	Burma	Karen	1993	1995	2	3	2	4
14.1	Burma	Arakan	1948	1988	1	41	3	4
14.2	Burma	Arakan	1991	1992	1	2	2	3
14.3	Burma	Arakan	1994	1994	1	1	1	2
15.1	Burma	Mon	1948	1963	1	16	3	4
15.2	Burma	Mon	1990	1990	1	1	1	2
16.1	Burma	Kachin	1949	1949	1	1	1	2
16.2	Burma	Kachin	1961	1975	3	15	3	6
16.3	Burma	Kachin	1976	1992	2	17	3	5

17.1	Burma	Kaya	1957	1957	1	1	1	2
17.2	Burma	Kaya	1992	1992	1	1	1	2
17.3	Burma	Kaya	1996	1996	1	1	1	2
18.1	Burma	Shan	1960	1963	1	4	2	3
18.2	Burma	Shan	1964	1970	3	7	3	6
18.3	Burma	Shan	1976	1988	2	13	3	5
18.4	Burma	Shan	1994	1994	3	1	1	4
18.5	Burma	Shan	1995	1995	2	1	1	3
18.6	Burma	Shan	1997	1999	2	3	2	4
19.1	Cambodia	Cambodia	1946	1953	1	8	3	4
20.1	Cambodia - Thailand	Common Border	1966	1966	1	1	1	2
20.2	Cambodia - Thailand	Common Border	1977	1978	1	2	2	3
21.1	Cambodia - Vietnam	Common Border	1975	1977	1	3	2	3
22.1	Cameroon	Cameroon	1957	1960	1	4	2	3
23.1	Cameroon - Nigeria	Bakassi	1996	1996	1	1	1	2
24.1	Chad - Libya	Aozou strip	1987	1987	3	1	1	4
25.1	Chad - Nigeria	Lake Chad	1983	1983	1	1	1	2
26.1	China	Taiwan	1947	1947	3	1	1	4
27.1	China	Tibet	1950	1950	1	1	1	2
27.2	China	Tibet	1956	1956	3	1	1	4
27.3	China	Tibet	1959	1959	3	1	1	4
28.1	China - Burma	Common Border	1969	1969	1	1	1	2
29.1	China - India	Aksai Chin, Arunachal Pradesh	1962	1962	3	1	1	4
29.2	China - India	Aksai Chin, Arunachal Pradesh	1967	1967	2	1	1	3
30.1	China - Soviet Union	Ussuri river	1969	1969	1	1	1	2
31.1	China - Taiwan	Taiwan strait	1949	1949	3	1	1	4
31.2	China - Taiwan	Taiwan strait	1950	1950	2	1	1	3
31.3	China - Taiwan	Taiwan strait	1952	1953	3	2	2	5
31.4	China - Taiwan	Taiwan strait	1954	1954	3	1	1	4
31.5	China - Taiwan	Taiwan strait	1958	1958	3	1	1	4
32.1	China - Vietnam	Common Border	1978	1978	1	1	1	2
32.2	China - Vietnam	Common Border	1979	1979	3	1	1	4
32.3	China - Vietnam	Common Border	1980	1981	2	2	2	4
32.4	China - Vietnam	Common Border	1983	1984	2	2	2	4
32.5	China - Vietnam	Common Border	1986	1988	2	3	2	4
33.1	Comoros	Anjouan	1997	1997	1	1	1	2

34.1	Congo/Zaire	Katanga	1960	1962	1	3	2	3
35.1	Congo/Zaire	South Kasai	1960	1962	1	3	2	3
36.1	Croatia	Serb	1992	1992	1	1	1	2
36.2	Croatia	Serb	1993	1993	1	1	1	2
36.3	Croatia	Serb	1995	1995	1	1	1	2
37.1	Cyprus	Cyprus	1955	1959	1	5	3	4
38.1	Cyprus	Northern Cyprus	1974	1974	3	1	1	4
39.1	Ecuador - Peru	Cordillera del Condor	1995	1995	1	1	1	2
40.1	Egypt - United Kingdom	Suez	1951	1952	1	2	2	3
41.1	El Salvador - Honduras	Common Border	1969	1969	3	1	1	4
42.1	Eritrea - Ethiopia	Badme	1998	2000	3	3	2	5
43.1	Ethiopia	Eritrea	1962	1967	1	6	3	4
43.2	Ethiopia	Eritrea	1968	1973	2	6	3	5
43.3	Ethiopia	Eritrea	1974	1991	3	18	3	6
44.1	Ethiopia	Ogaden	1975	1976	1	2	2	3
44.2	Ethiopia	Ogaden	1977	1978	3	2	2	5
44.3	Ethiopia	Ogaden	1979	1983	2	5	3	5
44.4	Ethiopia	Ogaden	1996	1996	1	1	1	2
45.1	Ethiopia	Afar	1989	1991	1	3	2	3
45.2	Ethiopia	Afar	1996	1996	1	1	1	2
46.1	Ethiopia	Somali	1996	1997	1	2	2	3
46.2	Ethiopia	Somali	1999	1999	1	1	1	2
47.1	Ethiopia - Somalia	Ogaden	1960	1960	1	1	1	2
47.2	Ethiopia - Somalia	Ogaden	1964	1964	1	1	1	2
47.3	Ethiopia - Somalia	Ogaden	1973	1973	1	1	1	2
47.4	Ethiopia - Somalia	Ogaden	1983	1983	1	1	1	2
47.5	Ethiopia - Somalia	Ogaden	1987	1987	1	1	1	2
48.1	Georgia	Abkhazia	1992	1992	1	1	1	2
48.2	Georgia	Abkhazia	1993	1993	3	1	1	4
49.1	Georgia	South Ossetia	1992	1992	1	1	1	2
50.1	Guinea-Bissau	Guinea-Bissau	1963	1964	1	2	2	3
50.2	Guinea-Bissau	Guinea-Bissau	1965	1973	2	9	3	5
51.1	Honduras - Nicaragua	Common Border	1957	1957	1	1	1	2
52.1	Hyderabad - India	Hyderabad	1948	1948	3	1	1	4
53.1	India	Nagaland	1956	1959	1	4	2	3
53.2	India	Nagaland	1961	1968	1	8	3	4

53.3	India	Nagaland	1989	1997	1	9	3	4
54.1	India	Mizoram	1966	1968	1	3	2	3
55.1	India	Tripura	1978	1988	1	11	3	4
55.2	India	Tripura	1993	1993	1	1	1	2
56.1	India	Manipur	1982	1989	1	8	3	4
56.2	India	Manipur	1991	1994	1	4	2	3
56.3	India	Manipur	1997	2000	1	4	2	3
57.1	India	Punjab/Khalistan	1983	1986	1	4	2	3
57.2	India	Punjab/Khalistan	1987	1987	2	1	1	3
57.3	India	Punjab/Khalistan	1988	1992	3	5	3	6
57.4	India	Punjab/Khalistan	1993	1993	2	1	1	3
58.1	India	Kashmir	1989	1989	1	1	1	2
58.2	India	Kashmir	1990	1993	3	4	2	5
58.3	India	Kashmir	1994	1998	2	5	3	5
59.1	India	Assam	1989	1990	1	2	2	3
59.2	India	Assam	1991	1991	3	1	1	4
61.01	India - Pakistan	Kashmir	1947	1948	3	2	2	5
61.02	India - Pakistan	Kashmir	1964	1964	2	1	1	3
61.03	India - Pakistan	Kashmir	1965	1965	3	1	1	4
61.04	India - Pakistan	Kashmir	1971	1971	3	1	1	4
61.05	India - Pakistan	Kashmir	1984	1984	2	1	1	3
61.06	India - Pakistan	Kashmir	1987	1987	2	1	1	3
61.07	India - Pakistan	Kashmir	1989	1990	2	2	2	4
61.08	India - Pakistan	Kashmir	1992	1992	2	1	1	3
61.09	India - Pakistan	Kashmir	1996	1998	2	3	2	4
61.1	India - Pakistan	Kashmir	1999	1999	3	1	1	4
62.1	Indonesia	Indonesia	1946	1949	1	4	2	3
63.1	Indonesia	South Moluccas	1950	1950	3	1	1	4
64.1	Indonesia	West Papua	1965	1965	1	1	1	2
64.2	Indonesia	West Papua	1976	1978	3	3	2	5
65.1	Indonesia	East Timor	1975	1978	3	4	2	5
65.2	Indonesia	East Timor	1979	1989	2	11	3	5
65.3	Indonesia	East Timor	1992	1992	2	1	1	3
65.4	Indonesia	East Timor	1997	1998	2	2	2	4
66.1	Indonesia	Aceh	1989	1989	1	1	1	2
66.2	Indonesia	Aceh	1990	1990	3	1	1	4
66.3	Indonesia	Aceh	1991	1991	2	1	1	3
67.1	Indonesia - Netherlands	West New Guinea	1962	1962	1	1	1	2
68.1	Iran	Kurdistan	1946	1946	1	1	1	2
68.2	Iran	Kurdistan	1966	1968	2	3	2	4
68.3	Iran	Kurdistan	1979	1980	3	2	2	5
68.4	Iran	Kurdistan	1981	1981	2	1	1	3
68.5	Iran	Kurdistan	1982	1982	3	1	1	4
68.6	Iran	Kurdistan	1983	1988	2	6	3	5
68.7	Iran	Kurdistan	1990	1990	2	1	1	3

68.8	Iran	Kurdistan	1993	1993	2	1	1	3
69.1	Iran	Azerbaijan	1946	1946	1	1	1	2
70.1	Iran	Arabistan	1979	1980	1	2	2	3
71.1	Iran - Iraq	Various	1974	1974	1	1	1	2
71.2	Iran - Iraq	Various	1980	1988	3	9	3	6
72.01	Iraq	Kurdistan	1961	1963	3	3	2	5
72.02	Iraq	Kurdistan	1964	1964	2	1	1	3
72.03	Iraq	Kurdistan	1965	1966	3	2	2	5
72.04	Iraq	Kurdistan	1967	1968	2	2	2	4
72.05	Iraq	Kurdistan	1969	1969	3	1	1	4
72.06	Iraq	Kurdistan	1970	1970	2	1	1	3
72.07	Iraq	Kurdistan	1973	1973	2	1	1	3
72.08	Iraq	Kurdistan	1974	1975	3	2	2	5
72.09	Iraq	Kurdistan	1976	1987	2	12	3	5
72.1	Iraq	Kurdistan	1988	1988	3	1	1	4
72.11	Iraq	Kurdistan	1989	1990	2	2	2	4
72.12	Iraq	Kurdistan	1991	1991	3	1	1	4
72.13	Iraq	Kurdistan	1992	1993	2	2	2	4
73.1	Iraq - Kuwait	Kuwait	1990	1990	1	1	1	2
73.2	Iraq - Kuwait	Kuwait	1991	1991	3	1	1	4
74.1	Israel	Israel	1946	1946	1	1	1	2
75.1	Israel	Palestine	1949	1954	1	6	3	4
75.2	Israel	Palestine	1955	1964	2	10	3	5
76.1	Israel - Egypt	Suez/Sinai	1967	1967	3	1	1	4
76.2	Israel - Egypt	Suez/Sinai	1969	1970	2	2	2	4
76.3	Israel - Egypt	Suez/Sinai	1973	1973	3	1	1	4
77.1	Israel - Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Transjordan	Palestine	1948	1948	3	1	1	4
77.2	Israel - Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Transjordan	Palestine	1949	1949	2	1	1	3
78.1	Israel - Jordan	West Bank	1967	1967	3	1	1	4
79.1	Israel - Syria	Golan Heights	1967	1967	3	1	1	4
79.2	Israel - Syria	Golan Heights	1973	1973	3	1	1	4
80.1	Israel, United Kingdom, France - Egypt	Suez	1956	1956	3	1	1	4
81.1	Kenya	Kenya	1952	1952	1	1	1	2
81.2	Kenya	Kenya	1953	1956	3	4	2	5
82.1	Laos	Laos	1946	1949	1	4	2	3
82.2	Laos	Laos	1950	1953	2	4	2	4
83.1	Laos - Thailand	Common Border	1986	1988	1	3	2	3
84.1	Madagascar	Malagasy	1947	1947	3	1	1	4

85.1	Malaysia	Malaysia	1948	1957	3	10	3	6
86.1	Malaysia	North Borneo	1963	1966	1	4	2	3
87.1	Malaysia - Indonesia	North Borneo	1963	1966	1	4	2	3
88.1	Mali	Air and Azawad	1990	1990	1	1	1	2
88.2	Mali	Air and Azawad	1994	1994	1	1	1	2
89.1	Mauritania	Morocco/Mauritania	1957	1958	1	2	2	3
90.1	Mauritania - Senegal	Common border	1989	1990	1	2	2	3
91.1	Moldova	Dniestr	1992	1992	1	1	1	2
92.1	Morocco	Morocco	1953	1956	1	4	2	3
93.1	Morocco	Western Sahara	1975	1979	3	5	3	6
93.2	Morocco	Western Sahara	1980	1980	3	1	1	4
93.3	Morocco	Western Sahara	1981	1989	2	9	3	5
94.1	Morocco/Spanish territories	Morocco / Spanish territories	1957	1957	1	1	1	2
95.1	Mozambique	Mozambique	1964	1965	1	2	2	3
95.2	Mozambique	Mozambique	1966	1971	2	6	3	5
95.3	Mozambique	Mozambique	1972	1973	3	2	2	5
95.4	Mozambique	Mozambique	1974	1974	2	1	1	3
96.1	Niger	Air and Azawad	1990	1992	1	3	2	3
96.2	Niger	Air and Azawad	1994	1994	1	1	1	2
96.3	Niger	Air and Azawad	1997	1997	1	1	1	2
97.1	Niger	Toubou	1996	1996	1	1	1	2
97.2	Niger	Toubou	1997	1997	1	1	1	2
98.1	Nigeria	Biafra	1967	1970	3	4	2	5
99.1	North Korea - South Korea	Korea	1949	1949	1	1	1	2
99.2	North Korea - South Korea	Korea	1950	1950	3	1	1	4
99.3	North Korea - South Korea	Korea	1951	1953	3	3	2	5
100.1	Oman	Oman	1957	1957	1	1	1	2
101.1	Pakistan	East Pakistan	1971	1971	3	1	1	4
102.1	Pakistan	Baluchistan	1974	1974	3	1	1	4
102.2	Pakistan	Baluchistan	1975	1977	2	3	2	4
103.1	Papua New Guinea	Bougainville	1989	1990	1	2	2	3
103.2	Papua New Guinea	Bougainville	1992	1996	1	5	3	4
104.1	Philippines	Mindanao	1970	1971	1	2	2	3

104.2	Philippines	Mindanao	1972	1977	2	6	3	5
104.3	Philippines	Mindanao	1978	1978	3	1	1	4
104.4	Philippines	Mindanao	1979	1980	2	2	2	4
104.5	Philippines	Mindanao	1981	1981	3	1	1	4
104.6	Philippines	Mindanao	1982	1988	2	7	3	5
104.7	Philippines	Mindanao	1994	1999	2	6	3	5
104.8	Philippines	Mindanao	2000	2000	3	1	1	4
105.1	Puerto Rico	Puerto Rico	1950	1950	1	1	1	2
106.1	Russia	Chechnya	1994	1994	1	1	1	2
106.2	Russia	Chechnya	1995	1996	3	2	2	5
107.1	Russia	Dagestan	1999	1999	1	1	1	2
108.1	Senegal	Casamance	1990	1990	1	1	1	2
108.2	Senegal	Casamance	1992	1993	1	2	2	3
108.3	Senegal	Casamance	1995	1995	1	1	1	2
109.1	South Africa	Namibia	1966	1978	1	13	3	4
109.2	South Africa	Namibia	1979	1979	2	1	1	3
109.3	South Africa	Namibia	1980	1983	3	4	2	5
109.4	South Africa	Namibia	1984	1985	2	2	2	4
109.5	South Africa	Namibia	1986	1988	3	3	2	5
110.1	South Vietnam	South Vietnam	1955	1961	3	7	3	6
110.2	South Vietnam	South Vietnam	1962	1964	3	3	2	5
111.1	South Vietnam - North Vietnam	South Vietnam	1965	1975	3	11	3	6
112.1	Soviet Union	Estonia	1946	1948	2	3	2	4
113.1	Soviet Union	Latvia	1946	1947	2	2	2	4
114.1	Soviet Union	Lithuania	1946	1947	3	2	2	5
114.2	Soviet Union	Lithuania	1948	1948	2	1	1	3
115.1	Soviet Union	Ukraine	1946	1948	3	3	2	5
115.2	Soviet Union	Ukraine	1949	1950	2	2	2	4
116.1	Soviet Union	Nagorno-Karabakh	1990	1991	1	2	2	3
117.1	Soviet Union	Azerbaijan	1990	1990	1	1	1	2
118.1	Spain	Basque	1980	1981	1	2	2	3
118.2	Spain	Basque	1987	1987	1	1	1	2
118.3	Spain	Basque	1991	1992	1	2	2	3
119.1	Sri Lanka	Eelam	1983	1984	1	2	2	3
119.2	Sri Lanka	Eelam	1985	1988	2	4	2	4
119.3	Sri Lanka	Eelam	1989	1993	3	5	3	6
119.4	Sri Lanka	Eelam	1994	1994	2	1	1	3
120.1	Sudan	Southern Sudan	1963	1972	3	10	3	6
120.2	Sudan	Southern Sudan	1983	1992	3	10	3	6
120.3	Sudan	Southern Sudan	1993	1994	2	2	2	4
121.1	Thailand - France	Northern Cambodia	1946	1946	1	1	1	2

122.1	Tunisia	Tunisia	1953	1956	1	4	2	3
123.1	Tunisia - France	Bizerte	1961	1961	3	1	1	4
124.1	Turkey	Kurdistan	1984	1986	1	3	2	3
124.2	Turkey	Kurdistan	1987	1991	2	5	3	5
124.3	Turkey	Kurdistan	1992	1997	3	6	3	6
125.1	United Kingdom	Northern Ireland	1971	1977	1	7	3	4
125.2	United Kingdom	Northern Ireland	1978	1993	2	16	3	5
125.3	United Kingdom	Northern Ireland	1998	1998	2	1	1	3
126.1	United Kingdom - Albania	Korfu Channel	1946	1946	1	1	1	2
127.1	Vietnam	Vietnam	1946	1954	3	9	3	6
128.1	Yemen	South Yemen	1994	1994	3	1	1	4
129.1	Yemen (South)	Aden/South Yemen	1964	1967	1	4	2	3
130.1	Yugoslavia	Slovenia	1991	1991	1	1	1	2
131.1	Yugoslavia	Croatia	1991	1991	3	1	1	4
132.1	Yugoslavia	Kosovo	1998	1998	3	1	1	4
132.2	Yugoslavia	Kosovo	1999	1999	3	1	1	4

APPENDIX 2.2: Religious Identity Variables

Conflict ID	Religious_Conflict	Buddhist	Hindu	Christian	Islam	Jew	Relevance	Monotheistic
1.1	1	0	0	1	1	0	2	1
1.2	1	0	0	1	1	0	2	1
1.3	1	0	0	1	1	0	2	1
2.1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1
3.1	1	0	0	1	0	0	2	1
3.2	1	0	0	1	0	0	2	1
4.1	1	0	0	1	0	0	3	1
4.2	1	0	0	1	0	0	3	1
4.3	1	0	0	1	0	0	3	1
5.1	1	0	0	1	0	0	2	1
6.1	1	0	0	1	1	0	3	1
6.2	1	0	0	1	1	0	3	1
7.1	1	1	0	0	1	0	3	1
7.2	1	1	0	0	1	0	3	1
8.1	1	0	0	1	0	0	3	1
8.2	1	0	0	1	0	0	3	1
9.1	1	0	0	0	1	0	3	1
10.1	1	0	0	1	0	0	3	1
10.2	1	0	0	1	0	0	3	1
11.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
12.1	1	0	0	0	1	0	3	1
13.1	1	1	0	0	0	0	3	0
13.2	1	1	0	0	0	0	3	0
13.3	1	1	0	0	0	0	3	0
13.4	1	1	0	0	0	0	3	0
14.1	1	1	0	0	1	0	3	1
14.2	1	1	0	0	1	0	3	1
14.3	1	1	0	0	1	0	3	1
15.1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
15.2	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
16.1	1	1	0	0	0	0	3	0
16.2	1	1	0	0	0	0	3	0
16.3	1	1	0	0	0	0	3	0
17.1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
17.2	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
17.3	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
18.1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
18.2	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0

18.3	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
18.4	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
18.5	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
18.6	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
19.1	1	1	0	1	0	0	2	1
20.1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
20.2	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
21.1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
22.1	1	0	0	1	0	0	2	1
23.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
24.1	1	0	0	0	1	0	3	1
25.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0
26.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0
27.1	1	1	0	0	0	0	3	0
27.2	1	1	0	0	0	0	3	0
27.3	1	1	0	0	0	0	3	0
28.1	1	1	0	0	0	0	3	0
29.1	1	0	1	0	0	0	3	0
29.2	1	0	1	0	0	0	3	0
30.1	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	0
31.1	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	0
31.2	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	0
31.3	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	0
31.4	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	0
31.5	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	0
32.1	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	0
32.2	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	0
32.3	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	0
32.4	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	0
32.5	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	0
33.1	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1
34.1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1
35.1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1
36.1	1	0	0	1	0	0	3	1
36.2	1	0	0	1	0	0	3	1
36.3	1	0	0	1	0	0	3	1
37.1	1	0	0	1	0	0	2	1
38.1	1	0	0	1	1	0	3	1

39.1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1
40.1	1	0	0	1	1	0	2	1
41.1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1
42.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
43.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
43.2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
43.3	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
44.1	1	0	0	0	1	0	3	1
44.2	1	0	0	0	1	0	3	1
44.3	1	0	0	0	1	0	3	1
44.4	1	0	0	0	1	0	3	1
45.1	1	0	0	0	1	0	3	1
45.2	1	0	0	0	1	0	3	1
46.1	1	0	0	0	1	0	3	1
46.2	1	0	0	0	1	0	3	1
47.1	1	0	0	0	1	0	3	1
47.2	1	0	0	0	1	0	3	1
47.3	1	0	0	0	1	0	3	1
47.4	1	0	0	0	1	0	3	1
47.5	1	0	0	0	1	0	3	1
48.1	1	0	0	1	1	0	3	1
48.2	1	0	0	1	1	0	3	1
49.1	0	0	0	1	0	0	3	1
50.1	1	0	0	1	0	0	2	1
50.2	1	0	0	1	0	0	2	1
51.1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1
52.1	1	0	1	0	0	0	3	0
53.1	1	0	1	1	0	0	3	1
53.2	1	0	1	1	0	0	3	1
53.3	1	0	1	1	0	0	3	1
54.1	1	0	1	1	0	0	3	1
55.1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0
55.2	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0
56.1	1	0	1	0	0	0	3	0
56.2	1	0	1	0	0	0	3	0
56.3	1	0	1	0	0	0	3	0
57.1	1	0	1	0	0	0	3	0
57.2	1	0	1	0	0	0	3	0
57.3	1	0	1	0	0	0	3	0

57.4	1	0	1	0	0	0	3	0
58.1	1	0	1	0	1	0	3	1
58.2	1	0	1	0	1	0	3	1
58.3	1	0	1	0	1	0	3	1
59.1	1	0	1	0	0	0	3	0
59.2	1	0	1	0	0	0	3	0
61.01	1	0	1	0	1	0	3	1
61.02	1	0	1	0	1	0	3	1
61.03	1	0	1	0	1	0	3	1
61.04	1	0	1	0	1	0	3	1
61.05	1	0	1	0	1	0	3	1
61.06	1	0	1	0	1	0	3	1
61.07	1	0	1	0	1	0	3	1
61.08	1	0	1	0	1	0	3	1
61.09	1	0	1	0	1	0	3	1
61.1	1	0	1	0	1	0	3	1
62.1	1	0	0	0	1	0	2	1
63.1	1	0	0	1	1	0	3	1
64.1	1	0	0	0	1	0	3	1
64.2	1	0	0	0	1	0	3	1
65.1	1	0	0	1	1	0	3	1
65.2	1	0	0	1	1	0	3	1
65.3	1	0	0	1	1	0	3	1
65.4	1	0	0	1	1	0	3	1
66.1	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1
66.2	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1
66.3	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1
67.1	1	0	0	0	1	0	2	1
68.1	1	0	0	0	1	0	3	1
68.2	1	0	0	0	1	0	3	1
68.3	1	0	0	0	1	0	3	1
68.4	1	0	0	0	1	0	3	1
68.5	1	0	0	0	1	0	3	1
68.6	1	0	0	0	1	0	3	1
68.7	1	0	0	0	1	0	3	1
68.8	1	0	0	0	1	0	3	1
69.1	0	0	0	0	1	0	3	1
70.1	1	0	0	0	1	0	3	1
71.1	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1
71.2	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1
72.01	0	0	0	0	1	0	3	1
72.02	0	0	0	0	1	0	3	1
72.03	0	0	0	0	1	0	3	1
72.04	0	0	0	0	1	0	3	1

72.05	0	0	0	0	1	0	3	1
72.06	0	0	0	0	1	0	3	1
72.07	0	0	0	0	1	0	3	1
72.08	0	0	0	0	1	0	3	1
72.09	0	0	0	0	1	0	3	1
72.1	0	0	0	0	1	0	3	1
72.11	0	0	0	0	1	0	3	1
72.12	0	0	0	0	1	0	3	1
72.13	0	0	0	0	1	0	3	1
73.1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1
73.2	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1
74.1	1	0	0	1	0	1	3	1
75.1	1	0	0	0	1	1	3	1
75.2	1	0	0	0	1	1	3	1
76.1	1	0	0	0	1	1	3	1
76.2	1	0	0	0	1	1	3	1
76.3	1	0	0	0	1	1	3	1
77.1	1	0	0	0	1	1	3	1
77.2	1	0	0	0	1	1	3	1
78.1	1	0	0	0	1	1	3	1
79.1	1	0	0	0	1	1	3	1
79.2	1	0	0	0	1	1	3	1
80.1	1	0	0	0	1	0	3	1
81.1	1	0	0	1	0	0	2	1
81.2	1	0	0	1	0	0	2	1
82.1	1	0	0	1	0	0	2	1
82.2	1	0	0	1	0	0	2	1
83.1	1	1	0	0	0	0	3	0
84.1	1	0	0	1	0	0	2	1
85.1	1	0	0	1	0	0	2	1
86.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0
87.1	1	0	0	0	1	0	3	1
88.1	1	0	0	0	1	0	3	1
88.2	1	0	0	0	1	0	3	1
89.1	1	0	0	1	1	0	2	1
90.1	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1
91.1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1
92.1	1	0	0	1	1	0	2	1

93.1	0	0	0	0	1	0	3	1
93.2	0	0	0	0	1	0	3	1
93.3	0	0	0	0	1	0	3	1
94.1	1	0	0	1	1	0	2	1
95.1	1	0	0	1	0	0	2	1
95.2	1	0	0	1	0	0	2	1
95.3	1	0	0	1	0	0	2	1
95.4	1	0	0	1	0	0	2	1
96.1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1
96.2	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1
96.3	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1
97.1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1
97.2	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1
98.1	1	0	0	1	0	0	3	1
99.1	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	0
99.2	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	0
99.3	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	0
100.1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1
101.1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1
102.1	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1
102.2	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1
103.1	1	0	0	1	0	0	3	1
103.2	1	0	0	1	0	0	3	1
104.1	1	0	0	1	1	0	3	1
104.2	1	0	0	1	1	0	3	1
104.3	1	0	0	1	1	0	3	1
104.4	1	0	0	1	1	0	3	1
104.5	1	0	0	1	1	0	3	1
104.6	1	0	0	1	1	0	3	1
104.7	1	0	0	1	1	0	3	1
104.8	1	0	0	1	1	0	3	1
105.1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1
106.1	1	0	0	0	1	0	3	1
106.2	1	0	0	0	1	0	3	1
107.1	1	0	0	0	1	0	3	1
108.1	1	0	0	1	1	0	3	1
108.2	1	0	0	1	1	0	3	1
108.3	1	0	0	1	1	0	3	1
109.1	1	0	0	1	0	0	3	1
109.2	1	0	0	1	0	0	3	1
109.3	1	0	0	1	0	0	3	1

109.4	1	0	0	1	0	0	3	1
109.5	1	0	0	1	0	0	3	1
110.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
110.2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
111.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
112.1	1	0	0	1	0	0	3	1
113.1	1	0	0	1	0	0	3	1
114.1	1	0	0	1	0	0	3	1
114.2	1	0	0	1	0	0	3	1
115.1	1	0	0	1	0	0	3	1
115.2	1	0	0	1	0	0	3	1
116.1	0	0	0	1	0	0	3	1
117.1	1	0	0	0	1	0	3	1
118.1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1
118.2	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1
118.3	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1
119.1	1	0	1	0	0	0	3	0
119.2	1	0	1	0	0	0	3	0
119.3	1	0	1	0	0	0	3	0
119.4	1	0	1	0	0	0	3	0
120.1	1	0	0	0	1	0	3	1
120.2	1	0	0	0	1	0	3	1
120.3	1	0	0	0	1	0	3	1
121.1	1	1	0	1	0	0	2	1
122.1	1	0	0	1	1	0	2	1
123.1	1	0	0	1	1	0	2	1
124.1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1
124.2	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1
124.3	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1
125.1	1	0	0	1	0	0	3	1
125.2	1	0	0	1	0	0	3	1
125.3	1	0	0	1	0	0	3	1
126.1	1	0	0	1	0	0	2	1
127.1	1	0	0	1	0	0	2	1
128.1	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1
129.1	1	0	0	1	1	0	2	1
130.1	0	0	0	1	0	0	3	1

131.1	0	0	0	1	0	0	3	1
132.1	1	0	0	1	1	0	3	1
132.2	1	0	0	1	1	0	3	1

APPENDIX 2.3: Doctrine and Organization Variables

Conflict ID	Cosmic	vTrad	nvTrad	OrgSup	OrgSup_Expanded
1.1	99	99	99	99	99
1.2	99	99	99	99	99
1.3	99	99	99	99	99
2.1	99	99	99	99	99
3.1	0	0	0	0	0
3.2	0	0	0	0	0
4.1	0	0	0	0	0
4.2	0	0	0	0	0
4.3	0	0	0	0	0
5.1	0	0	0	0	0
6.1	0	0	0	0	1
6.2	0	0	0	0	1
7.1	0	0	0	0	1
7.2	0	0	0	0	1
8.1	0	0	0	0	1
8.2	0	0	0	0	1
9.1	0	0	0	0	1
10.1	0	0	0	0	1
10.2	0	0	0	0	1
11.1	99	99	99	99	99
12.1	0	0	0	0	0
13.1	0	0	0	0	0
13.2	0	0	0	0	0
13.3	0	0	0	0	0
13.4	0	0	0	0	0
14.1	0	0	0	0	1
14.2	0	0	0	0	1
14.3	0	0	0	0	1
15.1	99	99	99	99	99
15.2	99	99	99	99	99
16.1	99	99	99	99	99
16.2	99	99	99	99	99
16.3	99	99	99	99	99
17.1	99	99	99	99	99
17.2	99	99	99	99	99
17.3	99	99	99	99	99

18.1	99	99	99	99	99
18.2	99	99	99	99	99
18.3	99	99	99	99	99
18.4	99	99	99	99	99
18.5	99	99	99	99	99
18.6	99	99	99	99	99
19.1	0	0	0	0	0
20.1	99	99	99	99	99
20.2	99	99	99	99	99
21.1	99	99	99	99	99
22.1	0	0	0	0	0
23.1	99	99	99	99	99
24.1	0	0	0	0	0
25.1	99	99	99	99	99
26.1	99	99	99	99	99
27.1	0	0	1	1	2
27.2	0	0	1	1	2
27.3	0	0	1	1	2
28.1	99	99	99	99	99
29.1	0	0	0	0	0
29.2	0	0	0	0	0
30.1	0	0	0	0	0
31.1	0	0	0	0	0
31.2	0	0	0	0	0
31.3	0	0	0	0	0
31.4	0	0	0	0	0
31.5	0	0	0	0	0
32.1	0	0	0	0	0
32.2	0	0	0	0	0
32.3	0	0	0	0	0
32.4	0	0	0	0	0
32.5	0	0	0	0	0
33.1	0	0	0	0	1
34.1	99	99	99	99	99
35.1	99	99	99	99	99
36.1	0	0	0	0	1
36.2	0	0	0	0	1
36.3	0	0	0	0	1

37.1	0	0	0	1	2
38.1	0	0	0	1	2
39.1	99	99	99	99	99
40.1	0	0	0	0	1
41.1	0	0	0	0	0
42.1	99	99	99	99	99
43.1	99	99	99	99	99
43.2	99	99	99	99	99
43.3	99	99	99	99	99
44.1	0	0	0	0	0
44.2	0	0	0	0	0
44.3	0	0	0	0	0
44.4	0	0	0	0	0
45.1	99	99	99	99	99
45.2	99	99	99	99	99
46.1	1	1	0	0	1
46.2	1	1	0	0	1
47.1	0	0	0	0	1
47.2	0	0	0	0	1
47.3	0	0	0	0	1
47.4	0	0	0	0	1
47.5	0	0	0	0	1
48.1	0	0	0	0	0
48.2	0	0	0	0	0
49.1	99	99	99	99	99
50.1	0	0	0	0	0
50.2	0	0	0	0	0
51.1	99	99	99	99	99
52.1	0	0	0	0	1
53.1	0	0	0	0	1
53.2	0	0	0	0	1
53.3	0	0	0	0	1
54.1	0	0	0	0	1
55.1	99	99	99	99	99
55.2	99	99	99	99	99
56.1	99	99	99	99	99

56.2	99	99	99	99	99
56.3	99	99	99	99	99
57.1	1	1	0	1	2
57.2	1	1	0	1	2
57.3	1	1	0	1	2
57.4	1	1	0	1	2
58.1	0	0	0	0	1
58.2	0	0	0	0	1
58.3	1	1	0	0	1
59.1	99	99	99	99	99
59.2	99	99	99	99	99
61.01	0	0	0	0	1
61.02	0	0	0	0	1
61.03	0	0	0	0	1
61.04	0	0	0	0	1
61.05	0	0	0	0	1
61.06	0	0	0	0	1
61.07	0	0	0	0	1
61.08	0	0	0	0	1
61.09	0	0	0	0	1
61.1	0	0	0	0	1
62.1	0	0	0	0	1
63.1	0	0	0	0	1
64.1	0	0	0	0	0
64.2	0	0	0	0	0
65.1	0	0	0	0	1
65.2	0	0	0	0	1
65.3	0	0	0	0	1
65.4	0	0	0	0	1
66.1	0	0	0	0	1
66.2	0	0	0	0	1
66.3	0	0	0	0	1
67.1	99	99	99	99	99
68.1	0	0	0	1	2
68.2	0	0	0	1	2
68.3	0	0	0	1	2
68.4	0	0	0	1	2
68.5	0	0	0	1	2
68.6	0	0	0	1	2
68.7	0	0	0	1	2
68.8	0	0	0	1	2
69.1	99	99	99	99	99
70.1	99	99	99	99	99

71.1	99	99	99	99	99
71.2	99	99	99	99	99
72.01	99	99	99	99	99
72.02	99	99	99	99	99
72.03	99	99	99	99	99
72.04	99	99	99	99	99
72.05	99	99	99	99	99
72.06	99	99	99	99	99
72.07	99	99	99	99	99
72.08	99	99	99	99	99
72.09	99	99	99	99	99
72.1	99	99	99	99	99
72.11	99	99	99	99	99
72.12	99	99	99	99	99
72.13	99	99	99	99	99
73.1	99	99	99	99	99
73.2	99	99	99	99	99
74.1	0	0	0	0	1
75.1	1	0	0	0	1
75.2	1	0	0	0	1
76.1	0	0	0	0	1
76.2	0	0	0	0	1
76.3	0	0	0	0	1
77.1	0	0	0	0	1
77.2	0	0	0	0	1
78.1	99	99	99	99	99
79.1	1	0	0	0	1
79.2	1	0	0	0	1
80.1	0	0	0	0	1
81.1	0	0	0	0	0
81.2	0	0	0	0	0
82.1	0	0	0	0	0
82.2	0	0	0	0	0
83.1	0	0	0	0	0
84.1	99	99	99	99	99
85.1	0	0	0	0	0
86.1	99	99	99	99	99
87.1	99	99	99	99	99

88.1	99	99	99	99	99
88.2	99	99	99	99	99
89.1	99	99	99	99	99
90.1	0	0	0	0	0
91.1	99	99	99	99	99
92.1	99	99	99	99	99
93.1	99	99	99	99	99
93.2	99	99	99	99	99
93.3	99	99	99	99	99
94.1	99	99	99	99	99
95.1	0	0	0	0	0
95.2	0	0	0	0	0
95.3	0	0	0	0	0
95.4	0	0	0	0	0
96.1	99	99	99	99	99
96.2	99	99	99	99	99
96.3	99	99	99	99	99
97.1	99	99	99	99	99
97.2	99	99	99	99	99
98.1	0	0	0	0	0
99.1	0	0	0	0	0
99.2	0	0	0	0	0
99.3	0	0	0	0	0
100.1	99	99	99	99	99
101.1	99	99	99	99	99
102.1	99	99	99	99	99
102.2	99	99	99	99	99
103.1	0	0	0	0	0
103.2	0	0	0	0	0
104.1	1	1	0	0	1
104.2	1	1	0	0	1
104.3	1	1	0	0	1
104.4	1	1	0	0	1
104.5	1	1	0	0	1
104.6	1	1	0	0	1
104.7	1	1	0	0	1
104.8	1	1	0	0	1
105.1	99	99	99	99	99

106.1	1	1	0	0	1
106.2	1	1	0	0	1
107.1	99	99	99	99	99
108.1	0	0	0	0	0
108.2	0	0	0	0	0
108.3	0	0	0	0	0
109.1	0	0	0	0	0
109.2	0	0	0	0	0
109.3	0	0	0	0	0
109.4	0	0	0	0	0
109.5	0	0	0	0	0
110.1	99	99	99	99	99
110.2	99	99	99	99	99
111.1	99	99	99	99	99
112.1	99	99	99	99	99
113.1	99	99	99	99	99
114.1	99	99	99	99	99
114.2	99	99	99	99	99
115.1	99	99	99	99	99
115.2	99	99	99	99	99
116.1	99	99	99	99	99
117.1	99	99	99	99	99
118.1	99	99	99	99	99
118.2	99	99	99	99	99
118.3	99	99	99	99	99
119.1	0	0	0	0	1
119.2	0	0	0	0	1
119.3	0	0	0	0	1
119.4	0	0	0	0	1
120.1	1	1	0	0	1
120.2	1	1	0	0	1
120.3	1	1	0	0	1
121.1	99	99	99	99	99
122.1	99	99	99	99	99
123.1	0	0	0	0	0
124.1	99	99	99	99	99
124.2	99	99	99	99	99
124.3	99	99	99	99	99

125.1	0	0	0	0	1
125.2	0	0	0	0	1
125.3	0	0	0	0	1
126.1	0	0	0	0	0
127.1	0	0	0	0	0
128.1	99	99	99	99	99
129.1	99	99	99	99	99
130.1	99	99	99	99	99
131.1	99	99	99	99	99
132.1	0	0	0	0	1
132.2	0	0	0	0	1

APPENDIX 2.4: External Participant Variables

Conflict ID	Military	Resources	Political	Balanced
1.1	0	2	0	1
1.2	0	2	0	1
1.3	0	2	0	1
3.1	0	5	2	99
3.2	0	5	2	99
4.1	0	1	0	99
4.2	0	1	0	99
4.3	0	1	0	99
5.1	0	1	0	1
6.1	0	2	0	1
6.2	0	2	0	1
7.1	0	0	0	99
7.2	0	0	0	99
8.1	0	2	1	1
8.2	0	2	1	1
9.1	0	0	0	99
10.1	0	0	0	1
10.2	0	0	0	1
12.1	0	0	0	99
13.1	0	1	1	99
13.2	0	1	1	99
13.3	0	1	1	99
13.4	0	1	1	99
14.1	0	1	1	99
14.2	0	1	1	99
14.3	0	1	1	99
16.1	0	1	1	99
16.2	0	1	1	99
16.3	0	1	1	99
19.1	99	99	99	99
21.1	99	99	99	99
22.1	0	0	0	99
24.1	1	1	0	99
27.1	0	0	0	99

27.2	0	0	0	99
27.3	0	0	2	99
28.1	99	99	99	99
29.1	0	0	0	99
29.2	99	99	99	99
30.1	0	0	0	99
31.1	99	99	99	99
31.2	99	99	99	99
31.3	0	1	0	99
31.4	0	1	0	99
31.5	99	99	99	99
32.1	0	0	0	99
32.2	0	0	0	99
32.3	0	0	0	99
32.4	0	0	0	99
32.5	0	0	0	99
33.1	0	0	0	99
36.1	99	99	99	1
36.2	1	1	0	1
36.3	99	99	99	1
37.1	1	0	1	1
38.1	1	0	0	1
40.1	0	0	0	99
41.1	0	0	0	99
44.1	99	99	99	99
44.2	99	99	99	99
44.3	1	1	0	99
44.4	0	0	0	99
45.1	99	99	99	99
45.2	99	99	99	99
46.1	99	99	99	99
46.2	99	99	99	99
47.1	0	0	0	99
47.2	0	0	0	99
47.3	99	99	99	99
47.4	99	99	99	99
47.5	99	99	99	99
48.1	0	0	1	99

48.2	0	0	1	99
50.1	0	3	2	99
50.2	0	3	2	99
52.1	0	0	0	99
53.1	0	0	0	99
53.2	0	0	0	99
53.3	99	99	99	99
54.1	0	1	0	99
55.1	99	99	99	99
55.2	99	99	99	99
56.1	99	99	99	99
56.2	99	99	99	99
56.3	99	99	99	99
57.1	0	0	0	99
57.2	0	0	0	99
57.3	0	0	0	99
57.4	0	0	0	99
58.1	99	99	99	99
58.2	99	99	99	99
58.3	99	99	99	99
59.1	0	0	0	99
59.2	0	0	0	99
61.01	2	0	0	99
61.02	0	0	0	99
61.03	1	0	1	99
61.04	99	99	99	99
61.05	99	99	99	99
61.06	99	99	99	99
61.07	0	0	0	99
61.08	0	0	0	99
61.09	0	0	0	99
61.1	0	0	0	99
62.1	0	0	3	99
63.1	0	0	0	99
64.1	0	1	0	1
64.2	0	1	1	1
65.1	0	0	1	0
65.2	0	0	1	0
65.3	0	0	1	0
65.4	0	0	1	0

66.1	99	99	99	99
66.2	99	99	99	99
66.3	99	99	99	99
67.1	99	99	99	99
68.1	0	1	0	99
68.2	99	99	99	99
68.3	0	0	0	99
68.4	0	0	0	99
68.5	0	0	0	99
68.6	0	0	0	99
68.7	99	99	99	99
68.8	99	99	99	99
70.1	99	99	99	99
71.1	99	99	99	1
71.2	0	2	0	1
74.1	0	0	0	1
75.1	99	99	99	99
75.2	99	99	99	99
76.1	99	99	99	99
76.2	99	99	99	99
76.3	1	0	0	99
77.1	0	0	2	1
77.2	0	0	2	1
78.1	99	99	99	99
79.1	1	0	0	1
79.2	1	0	0	1
80.1	99	99	99	99
81.1	0	0	0	99
81.2	0	0	0	99
82.1	99	99	99	99
82.2	99	99	99	99
83.1	1	1	1	99
84.1	0	0	0	99
85.1	0	2	0	99
87.1	99	99	99	99

88.1	99	99	99	1
88.2	99	99	99	1
89.1	99	99	99	99
90.1	0	0	0	99
92.1	0	0	1	99
94.1	1	0	0	99
95.1	2	1	0	1
95.2	2	1	0	1
95.3	2	1	0	1
95.4	2	1	0	1
98.1	0	6	0	1
99.1	99	99	99	99
99.2	99	99	99	99
99.3	99	99	99	99
102.1	0	2	1	1
102.2	0	2	1	1
103.1	99	99	99	99
103.2	99	99	99	99
104.1	0	1	1	1
104.2	0	1	1	1
104.3	0	1	1	1
104.4	0	1	1	1
104.5	0	1	1	1
104.6	0	1	1	1
104.7	0	1	1	1
104.8	0	1	1	1
105.1	99	99	99	99
106.1	0	0	0	99
106.2	0	0	0	99
107.1	99	99	99	99
108.1	0	1	1	99
108.2	0	1	1	99
108.3	0	1	1	99
109.1	0	0	0	99
109.2	0	0	0	99
109.3	0	0	0	99
109.4	0	0	0	99
109.5	0	0	0	99

112.1	99	99	99	99
113.1	99	99	99	99
114.1	99	99	99	99
114.2	99	99	99	99
115.1	99	99	99	99
115.2	99	99	99	99
117.1	99	99	99	99
119.1	0	0	0	99
119.2	0	0	0	99
119.3	1	2	0	99
119.4	1	2	0	99
120.1	2	1	0	1
120.2	99	99	99	1
120.3	99	99	99	1
121.1	99	99	99	99
122.1	0	0	0	99
123.1	0	0	0	99
125.1	0	0	0	99
125.2	0	0	0	99
125.3	0	0	0	99
126.1	0	0	0	99
127.1	99	99	99	99
128.1	0	1	2	1
129.1	1	0	0	99
132.1	0	1	0	1
132.2	0	1	0	1

APPENDIX 3: Case Collection Information Forms

Participant

Participant Name: _____

Challenger / Status Quo

Use of Doctrine

Religious Support: None / Informal / Formal Organizational Declaration

Reference violent traditions and symbols? _____

Reference rewards for martyrs? _____

Reference punishments for disobedience? _____

Mention deity's reaction to violence (audience)? _____

Describe conflict as metaphysical (between good and evil)? _____

Demonize enemy? _____

Diaspora

Request diaspora help? _____

Diaspora size? _____

Number of External Participants with same religious identity? _____
_____

Number of External Participants with different religious identity? _____
_____

Number of Mediators with same religious identity? _____
_____

Number of Mediators with different religious identity? _____
_____

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