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Globalisation, Christian Churches and Ecumenism

Christian Gheorghiu

A thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
to the Department of Sociology,
University of Dublin, Trinity College

September 2006
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Christian Gheorghiu

September 2006
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Summary

This dissertation offers an exploration into the multidimensional processes of globalisation in conjunction with the ecumenical movement. It investigates how combinations of ecumenical events and practices reveal various global meanings when investigated through the methods of historical sociology.

In Part One, the theoretical framework reports on the writings of well-known sociologists of globalisation and religion. As the relationship between global transformations and ecumenical changes remained under-explored, this thesis critically evaluates how the growth of modern ecumenism may contribute to the creation of global consciousness. It also investigates if processes of glocalisation include the accommodation of global ecumenical conditions to localised settings.

In Part Two, particular attention is given to three Christian Church traditions engaged in their ecumenical journey. Firstly, it situates Protestant ecumenism in relation to emerging global trends. This rapprochement was facilitated especially by networks of prominent intellectuals. It then focuses on Christian Orthodox Churches and their politico-historical controversies surrounding ecumenical dialogue. The hegemonic role of nation-state institutions is salient. Lastly, in a context of global interdependency, the Roman Catholic Church emerges in the ecumenical arena after the Second Vatican Council. This helps shifting parochial positions to an increasingly perceptible cosmopolitan outlook.

In Conclusion, ecclesiastical structures in dialogue and their global dynamics may generate new forms of community which also require innovative interpretative methodologies.
Part One

Chapter 1: Introduction

Research questions

This thesis explores the relationship between globalisation and ecumenism. Globalisation is seen here as a multidimensional phenomenon (Robertson, 1992) with a complex history that has produced new configurations of similarity and difference that challenge sociological research (Holton, 1998). While ecumenism may be understood in the perspective of theological development, in this study we look at ecumenical encounters between some Christian traditions within a broader context that includes various aspects of globalisation (Waters, 2001). From a multidisciplinary perspective, this research critically examines how complex cosmopolitan networks of the 20th century globalised milieu and the cultural boundaries of the West are increasingly permeated by religious pluralism (Robertson, 1992; Nederveen Pieterse, 2004). In this process, debates on ecumenism have moved beyond the moral philosophy of Western Christian universalism, generating a cosmopolitan perspective with emphasis on plurality, and by encompassing the world beyond Europe. Ecumenism may be portrayed as a powerful and dynamic force that has extended across the globe spreading the message of progress and unity that calls for an ideal type of society; however it may also be seen as a discourse that has come to cover positions not always in harmony. The scope of ecumenism, in short, has limitations as well as strengths.

I am interested to understand why various Christian Churches’ traditions search for dialogue, ‘in an attempt to discover common principles and commitments and with a view to unification’ (Waters, 2001: 189). Is the growth of ecumenical endeavour part of the same process as the creation of ‘global consciousness’ (Robertson, 1992)? This study investigates whether ecumenism is an example of a globalising movement as distinct from an amalgam of various local, national or regional movements (Urry, 2003). It explores the sociological coherence and plausibility of multiple source of Christian ecumenism through a mixture of analytical and empirical enquiries.
More specific questions await research. Why did the ecumenical movement emerge in institutional form at the beginning of the 20th century? The discussion will take into consideration Protestant, Orthodox and Roman Catholic perspectives, including interaction between key political, religious and social institutions. Why did Christian Orthodoxy become involved in a movement initiated by Protestantism while the Roman Catholic Church maintained reservations for a lengthy period? Rather than one single ecumenical movement we may think instead in terms of multiple ecumenisms, each with a distinctive coherence and agenda, challenging both Eurocentricity and theories of imperial authority over mechanisms of discursive religious integration.

What are the implications of ecumenism for theories of globalisation including religious movements (Beckford, 2000) and how shall we understand the nature and causes of this social change? As the ecumenical movement developed in a world permeated by change, marked by deep historical conflicts and social divisions, pursuing these questions involves a comparative perspective. Whereas most contemporary theorists of globalisation deal with the transnational market economy as the prime globalising force, Beckford (2000, 2004) argues that sociological research on religious movements should not be underestimated. For him ‘globalization is a process which is far from being clear in its outlines, constant in its progression or uniform in its effects’ (Beckford, 2000: 170). Methodological innovation is imperative as ‘social scientific understanding of social movements or religious movements needs to break away from rigid, outdated conceptualizations’ (Beckford, 2000: 169) which fail to identify, understand and assess the particularities of religion in global conditions (Beckford, 2003).

In the global field (Robertson, 1992) some religious institutions are engaged in crossing cultural boundaries and network forming by displaying ecumenical tendencies, while others participate in a worldwide resurgence of religious fundamentalism involving boundary maintenance. Relevant examples of the former are institutions concerned with world order which involve ecumenical projects of justice and peace, such as the World Council of Churches (WCC), while among the latter according to Robertson are ‘the anti-global movement within American fundamentalism, the Unification Church, the Green movement, certain strands of the Latin American liberation-theological movement, and
tendencies within radical Islam’ (ibid.: 71). For example, it was in the United States where the sectarian divide between Catholicism and Protestant radical evangelical tendencies led to the development of the first modern fundamentalist movement, which involved ‘strong semi-Messianic utopian stances focussed on the political arena’ (Eisenstadt, 1999: 150).

A major aim of this thesis is to develop frameworks and methodologies for understanding and articulating the requirements for emerging religious collaboration around ecclesiastical diversity/heterogeneity in the context of global interdependencies (Urry, 2003). This task is a complex one. For while religious organisations and ecumenical institutions participate in and are affected by globalisation, often voicing universal aspirations, they often operate locally either within nation-states or particular cultural configurations, that are less than global in scope. This study also investigates the structure and dynamics of globalisation within the context of institutional Christian environments. Until recently, sociological research using these insights proceeded along separate paths within global studies and religious discourses, however a new assessment sensitive to complexity enables these crucial insights to be combined. These insights attempt to provide answers to the above questions and develop theories associated with ecclesiastical structures in dialogue and their global dynamics in the ecumenical movement while trying to identify social conditions which unite/divide communities.

This research also tests the coherence of Robertson’s (1992) hypothesis, whereby global actors are constrained to conceptualise the world in relation to specific ideas in a complex milieu where universalism and particularism inter-penetrate. Robertson maintains that globalisation is not a new phenomenon, but that it has accelerated in the 20th century through growing worldwide interconnectedness (Urry, 2003). The world as a single place and ‘global-human condition’ are becoming increasingly legitimised discourses within the public domain, therefore, phenomena of cultural/religious relativisation in the global field cannot be underestimated. In Chapter 3 I explore if processes of ‘glocalisation’ (Robertson, 1992) also include the accommodation of global politico-religious influences to localised conditions.
Sociology has generally neglected the area of enquiry that links globalisation with the ecumenical movement although it is claimed that Christian dialogue becomes important for the sociology of religio-social movements (Beyer, 1994, 2004). While studies regarding the sociology of globalisation typically centre on political economy, communications or cultural change, many of Robertson’s starting points are largely focused on the sociological interpretation of religion (Holton, 2002).

I have become increasingly conscious of the extent to which ‘religion’ became during the nineteenth century, but particularly in the first quarter of the twentieth century, a categorical mode for the ‘ordering’ of national societies and the relations between them. In that sense ‘religion’ was and is an aspect of international relations. This is but one example of the ways in which, to a considerable degree, my interests in religion and globalization converged. Another, in fact an older interest, derives from the apparent simultaneity of ‘fundamentalisms’ and of church/state and religion/politics conflations and tensions across much of the globe in the late 1970s and early 1980s. This cluster of issues, just like the issue of the diffusion of religion as a category, appeared to require a definitely global focus on the world as a whole (Robertson, 1992: 2).

I begin this study of global ecumenism by taking up an under-explored question in the research programme proposed by Robertson’s periodisation of globalisation. Robertson takes into account the profound history of globality, particularly in relation to the spread of world religions, but reserves the notion of globalisation for later periods, starting in the early 15th century, considering that what changes over time is ‘the scope and depth of consciousness of the world as a single place’ (ibid.: 183). In his view, contemporary globalisation involves reflexive connotations of the global human condition (Waters, 2001). Robertson’s (1992) analysis of globalisation, sometimes criticised for neglect of economic and political issues (Holton, 1998), is nonetheless useful because it provides a way into examining the relationship between disembodied global cultural ideas and values, and the concrete experiences of global actors at all stages, including within the religious arena.
The main difficulty researching ecumenism is in facing the complex problem of distinguishing between varieties of religious traditions and identities, which in different historical contexts fluctuate in their openness and inclusivity. In Chapter 2 I investigate if ecumenism, a socio-historical movement of individuals and groups, has directly sought to bring about practical global religious reforms and a broad spectrum of socio-political transformation. This is accomplished through a long-run historical sociology of ecumenism which is more than a mere collection of events, discourses and historical facts. We encounter multiple ecumenisms with different agendas which require comparative analysis. These combinations of ecumenical events and practices need exploration within a context of global-local linkages. However, limited common principles are insufficient in providing a basis for a renewed world order. Global consciousness does not necessarily imply global consensus. In Chapter 3 I enquire if the existence of a global consciousness also involves the advancement of an ecumenical awareness. Global religious consciousness need not take ecumenical form. For example, a range of global religious movements confess forms of ideological fundamentalism (Beckford, 2000) incompatible with ecumenical dialogue, while some forms of Islam articulate socio-politically extremist discourses (Barber, 1996).

**Ecumenical journey**

This research is influenced by my personal location in ecumenical matters and interaction with various religious bodies and traditions. My ecumenical journey started in the City of London while ministering for St George’s Romanian Orthodox Parish. I became particularly aware of diversity and reconciliation on Saturday 24th April 1993, when an IRA terrorist lorry bomb exploded in Bishopsgate, City of London, devastating St Ethelburga’s Church and much of the surrounding area. The church survived the Great Fire of 1666 and the Blitz, but became a victim of an IRA bomb. This event reminded me paradoxically of Ceauşescu’s Romania, where, as an undergraduate student of Christian Orthodox theology, I endured his atheistic policy of deliberate demolition of church buildings.

These events raised the possibility that both religious and ethno-nationalist discourses have a potential for generating conflict detrimental to processes of
social integration and harmonisation of various norms and values. I found it strange to associate terrorism with Irishness and Catholicism, as some people did. This challenged my framework of assumptions. I started to pay attention to issues of ethnicity and Christian faith from a wider perspective. I understood that history is more than a passage of events whose sequence is sometimes selectively memorised, yet the past has continuing relevance for the present. I believed that by personally uncovering the principles that govern the Catholic community in Great Britain, I could gain a more focused understanding of the dynamics of religious development and ecumenical dialogue. In order to gain 'technical knowledge' and 'scientific grounding', that autumn I registered with the Missionary Institute London and pursued rigorous Catholic theological training for the next two years as an undergraduate student.

Later on, as an ordained minister, while serving the Orthodox Church in Cyprus, Greece, Palestine/Israel and Sinai-Egypt, I became ever more aware of some complex aspects of social life that shape our actions as individuals in various communities. Migration has given me the opportunity to observe misunderstandings and social rejection that Christians encountered within inter-faith encounters at times between each other or in relation to Judaism or Islam. Also changes in my social status in countries I resided, shaped significantly my sociological understanding. While I try to be free of ideological bias and hence neutral and objective, the discourse which I shall try to articulate remains '— like anyone else's — partial, selective, and culture bound' (Holton, 1998: 20); as it could also be argued that social inquiry is inevitably ideological in the sense that it may include hidden preconceived notions.

While trying to abandon some of my own prejudices, in this journey of discovery, I asked myself if the use of words could move people in conversation, beyond simple interaction, to a place where new meanings may be uncovered. Was it ever possible that ecumenical religious actors dialogically engaged in the global religious field, may move speech beyond competitive/aggressive exchange, to a level where participants perform together creatively? As I believed that the historical diversity in interpretations is to be celebrated, I became particularly interested in investigating social and moral solidarity that keeps Christian
Churches successfully integrated into social groups regulated by common principles and ethical values.

This dialogue, I suggest, should be thoroughly researched, if sociology is to be able to analyse productively the social, cultural and religious divisions and conflicts that continue to pervade the contemporary world. Underlying the challenges vis-à-vis the inability of Eucharistic fellowship among various Protestant, Orthodox and Roman Catholic churches today, I understood that essential exploration of these traditions should not be ignored. Thus, on my ecumenical journey, defining the specific nature of Christian fellowship and its concrete socio-political implications, I undertook interdisciplinary postgraduate studies at Trinity College Dublin in the areas of ecumenism, ethnicity and race. That broad curriculum opened further sociological research questions regarding the relationship between globalisation and ecumenism.

St Ethelburga’s Church was restored to life as a Centre for Reconciliation and Peace fostering London-wide relations between the Abrahamic faiths Judaism, Christianity and Islam with an ambitious research and development programme that includes salient global religious issues. This particular product of ecumenical synergy is evidence of collective action whereby separate religious traditions engage in concerted commitment to strengthen and defend their reconciliatory agenda. For this renewed community, the social world does not merely comprise separate religious bodies but also structures and resources, languages and discourses relevant for conflict resolution and global ecumenism (St Ethelburga’s Centre for Reconciliation and Peace, 2006).

**Dissertation structure**

This section describes the design of the research study. The thesis consists of two sections. Part One (Chapters 1-3) presents the methodology and sociological theories relevant to ecumenism and globalisation. This section attempts to disentangle various uses and meanings of the term ecumenism and to clarify its relationship with the ideas of globalisation. Part Two (Chapters 4-7) provides selected empirical discussions of various trends within Christianity linked to the question of ecumenism. This section presents an empirical investigation of the
idea of multiple ecumenisms using historical data starting with the 1910 World Missionary Conference. It presents a range of Church structures in their ecumenical pilgrimage. A brief guide to the chapters is as follows.

Chapter 1 sets forth the research questions, issues of methodology and modes of historical sociology, within which the study is set. It locates the thesis outline, the author’s personal ecumenical journey as well as the multi-disciplinary context of the research. The use of interpretive and comparative methods is crucial. Particular positions of various authors of ecumenical texts are hermeneutically examined in relation to their historical context. Comparative research enhances understanding of specific arrangements that exist within each religious tradition. This examination requires comparison of social processes between various Church traditions across different types of society in order to discover contrasts and similarities which are historically representative for the modern ecumenical movement. The libraries of Trinity College and Irish School of Ecumenics provided biographical records about various ecumenists and accounts in relation to ecumenical events and documents. This investigation requires chiefly the methods employed by historical sociology. Following historically-informed comparisons, there is evidence to suggest that Western Christian rapprochement emerged from interaction between missions which followed the colonial enterprise.

Chapter 2 examines the general problematic and the socio-historical development of the Hellenistic concept of oikumenē. In the first millennium, the Ecumenical Council became an institution that acquired legitimacy within the Roman/Byzantine Empire. This was however succeeded by a long phase of ecclesiastical divisions based on politico-theological arguments. Renewed ecumenical dialogue in the modern period then became a means of rapprochement and a trend towards global integration. This led to a movement which in the 20th century became institutionalised and which developed its own science and discourse, namely ecumenics. Not however without controversy: ecumenism has been criticised for being restrained to an elitist circle as well as for perpetuating patriarchal values. Further polemics are generated by denominationalist tendencies and fear of identity loss, which continue to remain obstacles in the endeavour for reconciliation and unity.
In Chapter 3 the iterative research process expands to issues of globalisation that discuss not only pluralism and organised religious dialogue, but also other associated social trends in a wider perspective. Although cultural-religious exchange accompanied trade flows for hundreds of years, in the 20th century globalising phenomena accelerated the worldwide spread of Western ideas. ‘The existence of world religions and the trade networks of the medieval era encourage a greater sensitivity to the idea that globalization is a process which has a long history’ (Held et al, 2003: 13). Understanding the changing nature of ecumenism in a global perspective is complemented by an awareness of transformation in socio-political institutions. This sociological investigation is limited to three main contributors to the globalisation debate, namely Roland Robertson (1992), Peter Beyer (1994) and James Beckford (2000).

The four chapters in Part II provide examples of sociological enquiries on globalisation and ecumenism based on the historical evidence from the 20th century. The empirical studies address the research questions outlined at the outset. To present significant sociological research in three chapters while debating three Christian trends is an exercise in both selection and compression. However, in discussing changing religious and ecumenical consciousness, it is necessary to look beyond the established church traditions and beyond European societies, even if ‘the template of modernization, secularisation and the contradictions of capitalism was applied to religion in non-Western countries’ (Beckford, 2000: 166). For this reason together with Robertson (1992) and Holton (1998), I argue that more rigorous sociological insight is acquired from historical-comparative analysis.

Chapter 4 takes us directly into the Protestant ecumenism and globalisation debate. The Edinburgh 1910 World Missionary Conference is particularly an important global moment – a major reference point in institutional modern ecumenism (Weber, 1966). As an interpretative analyst, I locate this Conference within a specific social and historical context. At the outset the discussion is largely descriptive. However, as the argument unfolds, it moves en route towards a complex explanatory perspective. This Chapter takes a detailed look into the list of relevant participants mainly Anglo-American and Western European, and
investigates its historical particularity. Key elements arise regarding Christian mission and globalisation in the context of colonialism and European expansion. This Conference, it is argued, became a key moment in the early development of global ecumenism.

In later years, the organisers developed this Conference into the International Missionary Council with its own publication *International Review of Mission*. Key participants such as Mott, Brent, Oldham, Azariah, Gairdner became future influential actors in the global ecumenical field. The ecumenical movement received much support from students and young intellectuals. ‘The view of the intellectual as the educated person, in the generic as well as the gendered sense, with a social mission emerged with full force in the twentieth century’ (Eyreman, 1994: 50). In 1911 the World Student Christian Federation (WSCF) met in Constantinople. Considering the new Christian *rapprochement*, Tatlow (1933) writes in an ethnographic fashion on cosmopolitanism and urbanisation. These global moments fall within the period labelled by Robertson (1992: 59) as the ‘take-off phase of globalisation’ (1870s – 1920s). This period is characterised by the emergence of global communication but also by the arrival of the first major global conflagration.

In Chapter 5 particular attention is paid to Christian Orthodox ecumenism, including themes such as ecumenical national organisations and survival policies under the Communist regime. I evaluate the Patriarch of Constantinople’s Encyclicals of 1902 and 1920. Also, the 1917 October Revolution and post World War I socio-political context had a special effect on the Orthodox Church and its future ecumenical projects. How did the local/national churches endure atheism and what was the relationship between Christian Orthodoxy and communism? What survival policies were adopted vis-à-vis Marxism and secularisation?

In 1948 most Eastern Bloc Churches rejected WCC participation. The emergence of the two superpower blocs and the beginning of the Cold War brought also an Orthodox anti-ecumenical perspective. In Eastern Europe, political management based on dictatorship and totalitarianism had dramatic consequences on indigenous/traditional religious values, leading to regionalism and isolation.
However, in New Delhi in 1961, four autocephalous churches joined the WCC. According to Robertson (1992: 59), the context of globalisation is the ‘struggle-for-hegemony phase’ (1920s – late 1960s), characterised by conflict between states for power and leadership in the world.

Chapter 6 investigates the Roman Catholic Church’s historical background and reaction to ecumenism prior to the Second Vatican Council. However, the Catholic agenda after the Second Vatican Council played a crucial role in evaluating an innovative relationship with ‘the other’. *Unitatis Redintegratio – Decree on Ecumenism* issued by Pope Paul VI on 21 November 1964 was ‘revolutionary’ (Evdokimov, 1965). This document activated the process of the removal of the anathema on the Orthodox Churches, while also opening bilateral ecumenical dialogue with various churches.

I answer a series of questions regarding the structure of the Roman Catholic Church by researching political involvement in global institutional ecumenism. How far is the Roman Church bringing awareness of global responsibilities and how much is it promoting tolerance, religious pluralism and dialogue in the context of rapid social change of late modernity? Beside issues of theological relevance, the Vatican has also considered the socio-political implications and economic justice by producing critiques of both communist and capitalist rival blocs, active players in the same global system (Aron, 1966). As the Roman Catholic Church is trying to develop an alternative understanding of the international order in the post World War II era, the context of globalisation according to Robertson (1992: 59) is considered the Uncertainty Phase (1960s – 1990s). This period is characterised by a new awareness of global civic ethical concerns and the end of the Cold War. We witness strengthening of local nationalism correlated with increasing globalisation of social interaction. At this stage I build further on Robertson’s (1992) perspective and investigate global moments of great historical significance such as the visits of Pope John Paul II to some Orthodox Churches in the last decade of the 20th century.

As a new contribution to knowledge, this thesis undertakes a complex assignment; namely the elaboration of a sociology of ecumenism through analysis of Protestant, Orthodox and Roman Catholic trends in the global religious field. The
aim is to understand better how religious groups globally debate, conflict and organise themselves around a variety of ecumenical meanings. This does not mean that religious movements or churches that are not considered in this debate are irrelevant. A more comprehensive research is simply outside the scope of this study and probably too extensive for a doctoral thesis.

In the end, on the basis of the case studies selected, the conclusion reflects on how much globalisation processes have shaped the ecumenical movement. Socio-religious coexistence in a globalised ecumenical context and being subjected to rapprochement principles may well generate 'new expressions of community' (Delanty, 2004: 149) which require enhanced sociological scrutiny.

Setting the scene: from colonial Christian mission to rapprochement

As a consequence of mercantile colonialism and European political expansion, since the 15th and 16th centuries, Christians increasingly encountered other belief systems, in some cases religious traditions much older than their own. Secular discovery and religious mission had a major impact not only on indigenous peoples but also on European civilisation. Western Christians (Catholic and Protestant alike) began to find themselves in an increasingly pluralistic civilisational environment. While some responded at the beginning by reasserting Christian superiority, centuries later some would become interested in inter-faith experiences and inter-religious dialogue. Undoubtedly, Christianity saw in mercantilist expansion a possibility for evangelism.

Merchants have played a large part in the diffusion of civilization, not only by taking goods and tools from cities into camps and villages, but by introducing fresh skills and new ideas, including religious ideas and practices that excite curiosity, enquiry and imitation. Indian Christians have reason to be aware of this because of the close connection between the earliest Indian Christian communities and Syrian merchants trading between the Near and the Far East, between the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf on one side and Malabar, Ceylon and Mylapore on the other, and also because of the role of commerce in all modern relationships between India.
and the West since the Portuguese arrived, with the Dutch and the English at their heels (Every, 1980: 18).

Most colonial structures of empire were established by military supremacy, and ‘the mobilizing capacity of religion was coupled with the capacity to extend military power and cultural influence’ (Held et al, 2003: 332). Alongside military power, other forms of command and maintenance were implemented including co-option of local rulers (e.g. India), and ideological control. Trailing military conquest or trade routes opened by merchants, Christian missionaries projected their gospel message across the world.

In the explorers’ wake Christian priests sailed to baptise the new born worlds. From Prince Henry, who first planned Guinea as a Christian dependency of Portugal, to Albuquerque, who sailed for India not only to capture the spice trade but to wrest the Holy Places from Islam, a twin desire – slaves and salvation, gain and grace – had driven men eastwards. As the new islands and continents were slowly differentiated, so too were the roles of merchant and missionary (Cronin, 1999: 13).

There was exclusivity in the area of religion when rituals of European traditions were generalised. Societies without similar forms of religious rituals as those of Western Europe were considered primitive and heathen. Thus, modern Christianity (as opposed to the Orthodox and African forms of pre-capitalist Christianity) is bound up with the cultures and ethical values of Western Europe, the region from which militant forms of capital accumulation spread across the planet (Smith, 1981).

As global economic expansion and Empire developed, Western Churches professed world mission. Just as the expanding Western Empires, the institutional Churches’ assignment was also enlarging its boundaries; and just as empires assumed a civilisational role, similarly the Church believed in its duty of conversion of the newly acquired subjects in a paternalistic fashion. ‘Christianity then came to be associated with cultural superiority and civilisation while the non-Christian world was seen as uncivilised and barbarian’ (Delanty, 1995: 27). This strong association between mission and colonialism must be taken into account, as
at times there was physical exchange of resources and benefit from protectorate measures.

The missionary appeared in the wake of the colonialist, merchant, or soldier. He profited from the routes opened by the colonialist, from the zones of security created by him. He borrowed his boats. He established his posts in the proximity of administrative and commercial centres. Thus a *de facto* solidarity was established between colonization and mission. It is necessary to emphasize that this solidarity was not consciously desired by mission (Mehl, 1970: 166).

Additionally, evangelism was perceived in a twofold manner: as one of the best methods of establishing tacit agreements with local populations and slave domestication, a task incumbent on some lay Christians exercising power. Sometimes, liberated slaves were used as free labour for various ‘charitable’ duties within missions (Clarke, 1980). Thus, we recognise the pivotal parts played by missionaries in propagating Christian ideas that were contributing to domination. The concept of salvation encouraged colonised peoples to accept and endure domination and deprivation in the hope of liberation in the afterlife, thus cultivating a mainly passive rather than rebellious posture. This is not to imply that the missionaries or their commissioning churches were intentionally engaged in conspiracy; however as agents of a particular system of values, they were guided by the idea of a civilising mission to uplift heathen peoples and ‘save’ them through faith in Jesus Christ. Thus, Christian institutions took full advantage of the fact that in the Bible particular missionary methodology is not specified.

A related critical aspect of religion’s systemic fate centres on the historical results of globalization itself. As long as Westerners could conceive the process as more or less the expansion of their particular culture, the carriers of the Christian religious system were able to respecify the religious function as an indispensable part of the project. Hence the tremendous worldwide missionary effort (Beyer, 1994: 103).
Director of Centre of African Studies from Copenhagen University, Holger Bernt Hansen has written a case study on Church-State relationships in Uganda during the period 1890 – 1925. As is well known ‘the competition between European powers for possessions in Africa – the so-called ‘scramble for Africa’ – became more and more perceptible in the interior of East Africa with the British, the Germans and the Belgians actively entering the stage’ (Hansen, 1984: 14). The notion of European civilisational superiority constituted an important ideological basis for colonialism by industrial nations, and Christian churches became the main vehicles for this ideology. For example, the belief was propagated that the character and behaviour of Africans could only be improved through their contact with their European masters. Slavery was understood as a channel to salvation because it would introduce the ‘Dark Continent’ to Christianity and civilisation (Hammond and Jablow, 1977). Christian missionaries introduced Western education and healthcare into indigenous societies. This may be interpreted as a transfer of resources from the churches of the North to the churches of the South (Hansen, 1984). However, colonialism, partly responsible for the hardship of what we now call the ‘Third World’, justified itself also by the conviction that Christendom had a duty to impose the ‘true’ civilisation and religion – these being regarded as a unity – upon the indigenous peoples. Thus, the missionary enterprise of the 19th and early 20th centuries occupied a significant place in the expansion of Western societies from Europe and North America into Asia, Africa and Latin America by attempting to make the Western church a worldwide community.

Said (1994) and Friesen (1996) argue that this ought to be seen as an embarrassment for the Christian Western missionaries who held ‘paternalistic’ and ‘colonial’ perspectives. The church tried to become Imperium Christianum and globally rejuvenate the secular idea of the Roman universal empire. In return for this legitimation, the evangelical effort received material and political assistance from the imperial power and its historical legacy.

To colonize meant at first the identification – indeed, the creation – of interests; these could be commercial, communicational, religious, military, cultural. With regard to Islam and the Islamic territories, for example, Britain felt that it had legitimate interests, as a Christian power, to
safeguard. A complex apparatus for tending these interests developed. Such early organizations as the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge (1698) and the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts (1701) were succeeded and later abetted by the Baptist Missionary Society (1792), the Church Missionary Society (1799), the British and Foreign Bible Society (1804), the London Society for Promoting Christianity Among the Jews (1808). These missions “openly joined the expansion of Europe” (Said, 1994: 100).

It is also arguable that inter-religious dialogue emerged in large measure from the initiative of different Christian churches operating in colonial context. ‘Inter-religious dialogue thus has historical roots in earlier colonial and missionary activities and events [...] linked to strongly established patriarchal structures and androcentric modes of thought’ (King, 1998: 40). African communities, with their own religions and established instruments of social order, responded in a variety of ways to this external agent of change. Although Christian missions, as separate entities, often cooperated with and benefited from colonialism, and were in positions of power and privilege in ways more significant than they probably recognised, some were also in tension with colonial policies and administrations. It is arguable that ‘the missionary movement of the nineteenth century and the ecumenical movement of the twentieth, however, had common roots. Both were in their origins, expressions of northwest European and Anglo-American desires to reduce the world in the name of Christ to the faith and culture of the superior West’ (Marty, 1986: 237). By advocating justice and human rights, some become ‘defenders and spokesmen for the [African] people’ (Afigbo, 1980: 187). Following this rationale, the missionary/ecumenical enterprise may be understood as a project that aspires to ‘one single worldwide community’ (Holton, 1998: 40, original emphasis). Western missionaries of the imperialist era have commonly been stereotyped or inadequately interpreted with respect to their understanding and evaluation of their work in non-Western societies (Friesen, 1996).

Europe, originally a concept describing geographical regions, has been unified by a common cultural legacy – Christianity, ‘which found its focus of hostility in Islam’ (Delanty, 1995: 30). In his socio-historical analysis of Europeanism, Delanty (1995) finds a strong association with medieval Christendom, a religious
catalyst for groups separated by linguistic and ethnic traditions. He believes that without the hostile image generated by Islam, the Christian West would have been unable to attain a single culture capable of unifying the diversity within the European society.

With the limits of Europe being set by the Muslim advance, Christianity had effectively become the territorial religion of medieval Europe. Christ was Europeanised and the crucifixion, after the tenth century, became the universal symbol of European mastery. To be a Christian was to be no longer merely a Roman or an imitator of Rome but to be a member of the universal Christian polity, the *oeicumene* (Delanty, 1995: 28).

Delanty (1995) argues that, throughout history, under the symbols of the crucifix and the crescent, the conflict between Christianity and Islam was fundamental in the development of a Eurocentric world-view. Church documents permeate the conviction of a ‘Christian’ Europe bringing high-standard values to ‘non-civilised’ peoples and from the time of the crusades this was also always a justification for fighting against Islam. At the 1910 Edinburgh World Missionary Conference there was an absolute conviction that Christianity was necessary for the salvation of all humanity and that it was essential to spread by all means possible. Until then, churches found expression for this objective in its alliance with the mercantile colonial enterprise. Beside evangelisation, the Church channelled on behalf of the colonialists the notion of European cultural superiority as a particularly important ideology (Friesen, 1996). However, processes of boundary maintenance, whereby some cultural groups attempt to differentiate themselves from other socio-religious groups, generated controversies.

The study of European socio-historical context is relevant for multiple reasons. It is here where the ‘great schism’ between Rome and Constantinople occurred after years of gradual erosion of doctrinal and institutional unity, creating later the Catholic/Orthodox division which reinforced ‘the age-old cultural differences between Helenistic East and Roman West’ (Niebuhr, [1929] 1975: 114). Centuries later, when the Reformation arose, Western Christianity had already a historical precedent of mistrust and lack of dialogue in expressing the freedom of faith, leading to further ecclesiastical disengagement. On the other hand, it was
also Western Europe of the 20th century where institutional reconciliation aimed to bring unity through further ecumenical cooperation. Tension and conflicts between major Christian divisions, whether Protestant, Roman Catholic or Orthodox* have profound repercussions to the present day, against the ideals of a tolerant ‘cosmopolitan model of democracy’ (Held, 1995: 106).

Writing after the 1961 New Delhi WCC General Assembly, Mehl argues that: ‘It is in the West that Christianity maintains its directive centres, the centres where decisions of universal import are worked out: Geneva and Rome. The Western perspective in Christian reflection remains predominant. Christian values start with the West in seeking to become universalised and to adapt to a profound transformation of the world’ (Mehl, 1970: 211). After the Fall of Constantinople in 1453 – and under the influence of the extraordinary successes of the Western Europe in the sphere of cultural, political and economic development – Eastern Christianity became less prominent. It was only with great difficulty and after many years of turmoil that the Orthodox were able to return to their own roots after the gradual collapse of the Ottoman Empire.

I take this empirical frame of reference further, arguing that we must go back at least to the end of the fourth century, when the cultural economic and religious world of Europe included, in a stable fashion, both Eastern and Western Christendom. If we really wish to go back to a situation that parallels what we are likely to see in the not distant future, we must return even behind the reforms of Diocletian to the third century. Indeed, not for seventeen hundred years has it been possible to contemplate an integrated Europe that would include, without substantial political division, both its Eastern and Western halves.

This Chapter briefly introduced the main research questions, the methodology of hermeneutics and the socio-historical perspective employed in documentary research. The questions take into account the author’s ecumenical journey while mapping his reflexive thoughts vis-à-vis dialogue and awareness of pluralism in a

* The title ‘Orthodox Church’ signifies that branch of Christendom which historically had its main areas of strength in Eastern Europe, in the former Byzantine empire, the Balkans and Russia who are in full communion with and recognise the honorary primacy of the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople, and who are themselves recognised by him. Other titles for this branch of Christendom include: ‘the Greek Church’, ‘the Greco-Russian Church’, ‘the Orthodox Catholic Church’, ‘the Eastern Orthodox Church’, or ‘the Holy Orthodox Church’.

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global religious landscape. There are various advantages derived from the integrative perspective of multidisciplinary analysis. At both a macro and micro level, this thesis employs Weberian historical-comparative methodology. This Chapter argues that a dense network of cross-referencing and shared textual formats create a powerful methodology.

The next two chapters extend the conceptual and theoretical framework of the study, looking first at ecumenism, and then globalisation.

**Historical Sociology and the Weberian perspective on religion**

Where does this study fit in relation to the relevant sociological literature and how far is this research moving beyond what is already known? This research project has an inter-disciplinary perspective: the framework is sociological, more specifically linked to historical sociology (Abrams, 1982). There are a number of associations that may be made between history and sociology in order to adequately state the kinds of problems that may be addressed.

Historical sociology has a distinct existence as a subdivision of sociology. It appears that ‘historical sociology has been seen by many as a subset rather than a core feature of the discipline, on a par with industrial, political and other such specialisms (Holton, 2003: 27, original emphases). For Holton this consignment of historical sociology to a sub-set of sociology is at odds with Weber’s approach to sociology as ‘inherently historical in the questions it set out to address’ and in the overall intellectual approach it requires. Weber’s sense of the importance of historical and comparative inquiry within sociology is underestimated, as most often historical sociology is described only as a methodological approach, as though historical inquiry is only a method analogous to ethnography or survey research.

In one of the most celebrated of historical-sociological encounters, Weber took issue with aspects of the Marxist tradition on his analysis of religion. For Weber, Marxism, in some of its cruder manifestations took religion as an epiphenomenon of more fundamental materialist forces. The problem with this is not that material issues are unimportant, but rather the one-sided approach of economic
determinism to social analysis that was implied. By rejecting the adequacy of an exclusivist materialist conception of history Weber argued that ideas, values and beliefs combined in social practices have a major impact on social transformation (Weber, [1949] 1968).

Weber certainly devoted a lot of attention to ideas, particularly systems of religious ideas, and he was especially concerned with the impact of religious ideas on the economy. In *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1904-05/1958), he was concerned with Protestantism, mainly as a system of ideas, and its impact on the rise of another system of ideas, the “spirit of capitalism,” and ultimately on a capitalist economic system. Weber had a similar interest in other world religions, looking at how their nature might have obstructed the development of capitalism in their respective societies. On the basis of this kind of work, some scholars came to the conclusion that Weber developed his ideas in opposition to Marx (Ritzer and Goodman, 2004: 28-9).

Early modern European capitalism was different in kind than earlier forms of capitalism, and its character was influenced by ideas associated with Protestantism, as well as by other factors. Through systematic study, Weber did not want to set up a one-sided idealist consideration, but was rather interested in a multidimensional approach to causal analysis (Sadri, 1992) and complex interplay of actors/actions which could potentially involve both materialist and idealist elements as the problem in hand warranted (Alexander, 1983; Kalberg, 1997). While there is common ground between Marx and Weber in the analysis of capitalist rationality and wage-labour, Weber’s multi-dimensional method allowed him to identify Protestant ascetic rationalism, bureaucratic structures and organisational techniques driving modernity towards an ‘iron cage’ rather than social emancipation.

The grounds for Weber’s critique were epistemological, in the sense that history had no knowable mission, and methodological, in that social life was constituted through the multiplicity of interests, both material and symbolic (Holton, 2003: 31).
Weber argued that the discipline of history particularises by revealing singular or unique phenomena, while sociology generalises in articulating justifying theories relevant to categories of phenomena. This approach is similar to the nomothetic-idiographic distinction. Thus, a generalising enquiry seeks nomothetic knowledge—universalised, law-like statements applying generally across a class of people, situations, events, or phenomena, while historically particular questions search for idiographic knowledge—local circumstances, case-based criteria and specific propositions.

Sociology seeks to formulate type concepts and generalised uniformities of empirical processes. This distinguishes it from history, which is oriented to the causal analysis and explanation of individual actions, structures, and personalities possessing cultural significance (Weber, [1921] 1968: 19).

Weber also advanced general intellectual questions concerning historical explanation by analysing the problems of objectivity in relation to value orientation (Outhwaite, 1975). His major theoretical point is that ideas, under certain circumstances, can influence social action and channel material interest in particular directions, and in so doing can contribute to modification in the material context of life. Weber argues that it is our historical interest based on an intellectual investigation that determines the cultural significance of the happenings of the past. Production and evaluation of ideas imply a considerable independence from both State officials and bureaucratic system. The sociological study of unfamiliar cultures thus has to contend with the problems similar to those besetting historical investigations. Explanatory understanding requires grasping the motivation for human behaviour by placing the action in some intelligible, inclusive context of meaning (Alexander, 1983). Weber argued that action is both open to and requires interpretation in terms of the subjective meaning that actors attach to that action. This interpretation is as relevant to ideas of the world as a single-space, as to ideas of rationality and the work ethic.

To facilitate the conversion of “objective” into “historical” causation, Weber devised and used the categories of “objective possibility” and “adequate causation”. They modify the historical interest of the
investigator as it delves into the past in order to discern and significantly arrange an array of facts and concepts that are “significant” from his point of view. In this manner the “value relevant interest” of the investigator is converted into a scientific tool for recreating a scientific image of the past (Sadri, 1992: 23-4).

For Weber, the historian’s explanations rest not on the fullest possible enumeration of all pertinent circumstances but on the establishment of an interpretative connection between those elements of an event which are significant for historical continuity, and particular determinative happenings. As intellectual disciplines are increasingly diverse, while attempting to categorise social sciences there is an inevitable risk of exaggerating differences rather than acknowledging similarities. Thus, ‘sociology must be carried on in continuous conversation with both history and philosophy or lose its proper object of inquiry’ (Berger and Luckmann, 1991: 211).

Similarly Abrams (1982) argues that history and sociology are and always have been related, therefore disagreement about their relationship to each other is merely a matter of institutional arrangements rather than one of intellectual substance. The two disciplines have the potential to be integrated ‘as a single unified programme of analysis’ (Abrams, 1982: xviii). History and sociology construct an enduring interdisciplinary association (Burke, 1980) because the former will provide empirical complexities of time and the latter a structured theoretical analysis. The harmonisation of socio-historical discourses (Weber, 1971) enriches social analysis and is particularly relevant to research involving issues of globalisation and ecumenism.

The sociology of religion seeks to understand religion in its varied expressions as a social institution, as cross-cultural practices, and as a pattern of beliefs and activities that shape these expressions (Beyer, 2004). Religions are multi-dimensional, manifesting themselves in a variety of areas of life. Studies of sociology of religion have enjoyed a distinguished tradition. For example the studies of Ferdinand Tönnies (1887) Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, Max Weber (1904-5) The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Ernst Troeltsch (1911) The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches and Émile Durkheim (1915) The
Elementary Forms of the Religious Life are lively areas of academic enterprise, focusing on topics such as religious movements and organisations. These dominant theoretical perspectives convey an unmistakable religious imprint analysing the complex relationships between religion and gender, culture and politics, globalisation and social change. Sociologists of religion are characterised by a wide range of religious beliefs, as well as nonbelief, embracing a variety of theoretical and methodological orientations. ‘Among sociologists there are persons who consider themselves “religious,” others who are “antireligious,” and still others who are largely indifferent to religion’ (Yinger, 1969: 139).

A significant section of Weber’s work is devoted to the analysis of the relationship between religion and society in a worldwide manner (Kalberg, 1997). The significance of Weber’s sociology of religion is methodological as well as substantive. ‘Weber developed his theories in the context of a large number of comparative historical studies of the West, China, India, and many other regions of the world’ (Ritzer and Goodman, 2004: 31). This is relevant in the study of globalisation and ecumenism because it is possible to compare different religious traditions within ecumenism, and identify comparisons and contrasts in their developmental consequences. At the same time, Weber’s study is in a sense pre-global because it does not consider global inter-connections between religions in any systematic sense. Rather they are each studied more or less separately.

Weber’s (1971) approach to the social consequences of religious forms emphasised variation. Religion can help to cause change or impede it; it might be used to support the status quo or to oppose it. Luckmann (1967) argues that the primary function of religion is to give personal meaning to life. Religion as a source of personal meaning and fulfilment survives much more widely and with greater vitality than institutional religion (Roberts, 1990). This does however produce an anti-institutional bias should the sociological approach to globalisation and the ecumenical movement include institutions as well as issues of meaning. Within Robertson’s (1992) ‘global field’ these analyses extend from religious movements as the expressive forms of localised cultures to religions as expressions of the global human condition – of which ecumenism may be seen as one form.
While it may be argued that the responsibility for making theological evaluations belongs mainly to theologians, who interpret values and practices in a faith context, the stance of sociologists may be to offer alternative analytical insights.

The *objective* validity of all empirical knowledge rests exclusively upon the ordering of the given reality according to categories which are *subjective* in a specific sense, namely, in that they present the *presuppositions* of our knowledge and are based on the presupposition of the *value* of those *truths* which empirical knowledge alone is able to give us. The means available to our science offer nothing to those persons to whom this truth is of no value (Weber, [1949] 1968: 110, original emphases).

Churches, as distinct from sects or cults, tend to be established on a hierarchical basis and to have a priesthood or set of authorised office holders. They are culturally accepted and broadly supportive of the surrounding societal institutions by professing socio-cultural and ideological inclusiveness. In the pioneering historical study *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches*, Troeltsch ([1911] 1931) concluded that, besides the extreme social ideas of the Christian sectarians and the Christian mystics, there were only two main historical church teachings about social order. Firstly, the social philosophy of medieval Catholicism, in the era before the commercial revolution, based on the institutions of family, guild and class, on personal relations of authority and reverence, and on the old solidarities involved in being bound to the soil or linked to some ancient family. Secondly, the social philosophy of ascetic Protestantism, resulting from a kind of Free Church pietistic Calvinism, inwardly related to utilitarianism and rationalism, which glorified work as a vocation and developed links with political democracy and liberalism. This was able to neutralise the ethically ‘dangerous ideas’ of modern life (in utilitarianism and liberalism) by religious ideas of individual and communal responsibility of serving Christ globally.

Troeltsch’s analysis opened the way for a new approach to Christian social thinking, combining the Christian ethical concern for justice and community with the insights of scientific social enquiry. He was the first major Protestant theologian and church historian to wrestle with the question of religious pluralism.
He shifted from his earlier judgement on the absolute superiority of Christianity among religions to a later view that Christianity was superior only in Western culture, and that with other cultures, other higher religions could make a similar claim. However, being critical of the Christian moral idealism that prevailed at the end of the 19th century, he writes:

Nowhere does there exist an absolute Christian ethic, which only awaits discovery; all that we can do is to learn to control the world-situation in its successive phases just as the earlier Christian ethic did in its own way. There is no absolute ethical transformation of material nature or of human nature; all that does exist is a constant wrestling with the problems which they raise. Thus the Christian ethic of the present day and of the future will also only be an adjustment to the world-situation, and it will only desire to achieve that which is practically possible. [...] Only doctrinaire idealists or religious fanatics can fail to recognise these facts (Troeltsch, [1911] 1931: 1013).

Any attempt in applying the above principles to modern societies requires a hermeneutics of suspicion because the present situation is increasingly complex. Growing realisation of cultural and social diversity, a process encouraged by globalisation (Holton, 2000), demonstrated to many that the monolithic Corpus Christianum and its attendant privileges had become problematic. While analysing Weber’s sociology of religion, sociologist Ahmad Sadri argues that sometimes ‘Christianity carried the anti-intellectualism of the Jewish prophets to its extreme’ (1992: 62). As the Early Church had the ability to restrain free intellectual movements (e.g. Gnosticism) through dogmas and canonical regulations enforced throughout Byzantium, later on, in its historical development, institutional Christianity received imperial support for most of the time until the challenges of the Enlightenment. Even if the Enlightenment was characterised by the belief that people could comprehend the Universe by means of reason, applying scientific/empirical methodology (Hervieu-Léger, 2004), the challenges of secularisation did not however prevent strong linkages between Christianity and processes of 19th century imperialism and colonial control (Mommsen, 1990). By the 20th century, Christianity was becoming more rather than less diverse.
Christianity, which originated as an Oriental religion, and which has many non-Western adherents, largely through colonization processes, cannot claim to be a primordially Western religion, while different versions of Christianity lead in quite different social and political directions, from fundamentalism to global community-building (Holton, 1998: 175).

Worldwide, in the 21st century, Christianity encounters new challenges. For some churches, which never had a share in the authority of Western Christendom, a ‘return’ to an integrated Christian commonwealth remains problematic. However, previously isolationist policies are reconsidered and the need of change in the light of the present global socio-political climate appears an imperative. Kallistos Ware, Orthodox bishop and academic in Oxford argues that:

Now that the Orthodox Churches in former Communist lands find themselves in a pluralist situation – and now that the Church of Greece has to confront an ever-increasing secularisation – western experience will surely help the Orthodox to tackle the problems of Christian life within a post-Constantinian industrialized society. We have everything to gain by continuing to talk to each other (Ware, 1997).

Within a milieu of acknowledged plurality and changing global religious landscape, the ecumenical movement took on a new meaning, namely the pursuit of visible unity or union of Churches of different traditions or denominations through dialogue. To this development we could bring Robertson’s identification of the ‘global-human’ condition whereby ‘in one way or another, civilisations and, more tangibly, societies (even individuals) are being constrained to frame their particular modes, negative or positive, of global involvement’ (1992: 132). The characteristic of this unity is relevant for Christians who think in terms of the affirmation of the fundamental immanent/transcendent relation: that is of the oneness of God and his creation.
Research design and methodology

At macrolevel, this historical enquiry focuses on broad issues that have to do with social institutions (Mills, 2000) and with religious trends within the 20th century in particular socio-political contexts. Like Mills, I try scrupulously to inter-connect the multiple dimensions of the social, personal, and historical. 'Byzantine and Europe, classical China and ancient Rome, the city of Los Angeles and the empire of ancient Peru – all the worlds men have known now lie before us, open to our scrutiny' (Mills, 2000: 132).

This study involves an interpretative structure which implicitly includes some standpoint on the attribution of meaning to history. It is closely related to the classical theological method of hermeneutics which was subsequently employed 'in the social and natural sciences as well as humanities' (Fenn, 2004: 368). Hermeneutics is interested in revealing the meaning of things, sometimes hidden and concealed in a text. It recognises that it will never fully uncover all denotations. For Bryman hermeneutics

[…] is more or less synonymous with Weber’s notion of Verstehen. The central idea behind hermeneutics is that the analyst of a text must seek to bring out the meanings of a text from the perspective of its author. This will entail attention to the social and historical context within which the text was produced. An approach to the analysis of texts like qualitative content analysis can be hermeneutic when it is sensitive to the context within which texts were produced. Hermeneutics is seen by its modern advocates as a strategy that has potential in relation both to texts as documents and to social actions and other non-documentary phenomena (Bryman, 2001: 382-3).

Weber’s recommendation that sociology requires the concept of Verstehen to be effective in analysing the social world is build on the idea that the social world is symbolically pre-structured and that social ‘objects’ are embedded in complexities of meaning to which the social scientist has essentially a similar type of access as everyone else (How, 2003). However, because the Christian Church is not monolithic, interpretive methods need to be combined with historically-informed
comparisons. Using the comparative method, this investigation limits itself to empirical issues that arise in connection with processes of consultation and cooperation between actors from Protestant, Orthodox and Catholic traditions separated by various doctrinal and institutional factors. These church traditions encompass the globe and their discourse on various theological and non-doctrinal issues involves interaction in the global field. Consequently the main difference between Weber’s comparative method and the one used here is that Weber remained within an endogenous framework while this dissertation uses a global one. While he took each religion as largely self-contained, this dissertation compares traditions within a global context.

The research questions, dealing with ‘multiple realities’, are largely historical, relating to attitudes, consciousness and behaviour of individuals and specific organisations. In order to interpret the sources examined, I employ a similar diversity of materials as historians relying upon knowledge of past/present conditions. There remains nonetheless a problem of selection of relevant data, and this is not made easier by information overload.

In view of the difference and contradictoriness of religious ideas and practices, an accumulation of encyclopaedic knowledge is not enough. That can be found in any of the numerous collections of sources – not to mention the flood of specialist literature. In connection with religion, too, we suffer more than ever from an excess of information: the problem is not the collection of material, but the way it is assimilated and interpreted. Here – and for me in this respect Max Weber, the founder of the sociology of religion, is the model – to achieve our task what we need is the power of an integral view, an eye to the essentials and a differentiated judgement. Often we need not so much a mirror, which reflects everything, as a magnifying glass, which can concentrate our gaze (Küng, 1991: 130).

This kind of approach necessarily involves many kinds of data including documentary texts of various kinds. Given the large amount of documentation generated, it is necessary to maintain discipline by selecting what is deemed relevant, as documents constitute a heterogeneous set of sources of data. The use of documents that became ‘monuments to the past’ (May, 2001: 177) may
generate ‘methodological advantage’ only if the researcher in the enquiry process is questioning the familiar. At the ecumenical table the participants arrive with their own discourses identifiable with their particular traditions. The ecumenical texts become vehicles of traditional/denominational discourses and their historical transmission of ecclesial identity may be understood ecumenically in a global framework. Communication with the ‘other’ has the potential of generating open-ended religious/cultural exchange whereby aspects of unity are possible.

Ask questions of all data, primary and secondary sources. Do not assume that anything about data is “natural,” inevitable, or even true. To be sure, a datum has a physical presence: One may touch the page, picture, tombstone, or microfiche one has located. But that physical truth may be radically different from the interpretative truth needed to assess the application or test a theory (Tuchman, 1998: 256).

In a similar perspective, Cambridge historian Gillian Evans (1996) developed an ‘ecumenical methodology’ through a coherent use of interdenominational documents by suggesting a comparative analysis regarding the reception of ecumenical documents in particular circumstances. Obtaining multiple viewpoints of an event or document may explain a broader reaction of various actors. This leads to a better understanding of the ecumenical texts or recorded events.

Despite being limited to historical methodology, Evans argues that in order to bring a meaning to ecumenical investigation, reflexivity becomes a *sine qua non* requirement. The researcher’s interpretation of documents is an explicit part of knowledge production. Consequently, the subjectivities are to be taken into account as reflections and impressions become also ‘data in their own right’ (Atkinson and Coffey, 1997: 47). Critical reflective social science helps to limit intrusion of bias into document analysis while preserving sensitivity to what is being said in the data. In her analytical strategy, Evans also argues for a ‘safe’ distancing that will verify assumptions against incoming data. She maintains that an attitude of healthy scepticism is indispensable if objectivity is to be maintained.
There is also the question of shifts of prejudice over time. That is especially the problem for an ecumenical historiography, which must be sharply alert to the divisive and the potentially unitive alike. We have to try to stand away from, as well as within, a given set of assumptions. [...] Dealing with historically generated bias, in which there is huge vested interest in partners in conversation, also requires skills in which ecumenical historical scholarship is as yet not very far developed (Evans, 1996: 141-2).

For her, reflexivity signals the process of self-reflection on one’s biases, theoretical predispositions and preferences. Thus, reflexivity is held to be an important procedure for establishing the validity of accounts of phenomena encountered in documents. Reflection requires free, open communication as well as the material conditions that permit this kind of communication to determine how our meanings, practices, and values may be ideologically frozen or distorted. In this case, critical data analysis involves a variety of procedures that facilitate working back and forth between texts and ideas. This inquiry includes processes of organisation, selection and description, drawing conclusions, as well as certification of interpretations.

Few participant members of the movement studied in this dissertation are still alive; therefore interviews with live respondents are largely impossible. However, historical materials produced by participants have survived. I investigate the purposes and procedures by which such materials were produced in the first place by seeking to discover the social-historical forces that caused changes in institutional orientations and personal dispositions. In trying to structure a distinctive ‘documentary reality’ (Atkinson and Coffey, 1997), two methodological presuppositions have therefore been adopted. The first is that ‘ahistorical methods’ including conventional survey and questionnaire techniques are not the most appropriate (Burke, 1980). The second is that in order to find a coherent answer to our research questions, church documentary sources deriving from Protestant, Orthodox and Roman Catholic traditions are the most salient types of evidence to be investigated. As to be credible, and avoid error and distortion, document authenticity is an important criterion. This investigation requires a wide range of historically oriented knowledge.
The researcher must, in the first place, have a thoroughly adequate grasp of contemporary sociological theory and research methods. He must be entirely objective in his handling of the data of religion; yet he must be strongly interested in the material and deeply acquainted with it (Yinger, 1969: 139).

Documents can be studied through types of content analysis and quantitatively through the interpretation of texts. This dissertation is more qualitative in approach. Within this terrain, there is a profound debate on the meaning of texts, and the extent to which they can tell us about actors, intentions and past processes of social change. Documents do not speak for themselves but involve the active interpretative judgement of the researcher. This helps to construct their context, meaning and representativeness (Bryman, 2001) while assessing the ecclesiastical evolution over time and key institutional changes. The relevance of these criteria varies to some extent to the kind of document being assessed.

Interpreters, as persons are unique. The morally transformed knowledge, understandings and sensibilities they bring to their creations of meaning are their own. And the products of the interactions between what is brought and the object of study are also unique (Steedman, 1991: 59).

Tim May argues that, when researching historical documentation, one must be aware of the long-standing ambivalence and tension between ‘scientific’ and ‘historicist’ perspectives (May, 2001: 176-8). In order to avoid homogenisation, historically generated data requires comprehensive understanding of the actors and their social dynamics in particular context. A scrupulous examination of ‘factors surrounding the process of its production, as well as the social context’ (May, 2001: 183, original emphases) is strongly advised while engaging in documentary research of this kind.

Documents are originally created for purposes other than sociological research, therefore accepting data without confronting its validity and reliability could generate a biased perspective (Kirk and Miller, 1986). While perfect reliability may be considered theoretically impossible to achieve, social history has
developed processes to check informants’ points of view and patterns identified. The issue is one of whether or not a different researcher would expect to obtain the similar findings in similar conditions. While considering exploratory and descriptive studies, from a similar point of view, a historical sociologist may argue that in documentary research everything must be checked from more than one angle. ‘The analysis of documentary reality must, therefore, look beyond separate texts, and ask how [they] are related’ (Atkinson and Coffey, 1997: 56). Thus, documentary research may generate a dynamic of its own via the path of discovery, while ‘in being intrinsically exploratory, it explicitly departs from certain structures of the hypothetico-deductive model’ (Kirk and Miller, 1986: 17).

At this point historical sociology enters a post-disciplinary phase, one which is not exclusively dominated either by history or by sociology, but is influenced by elements of both, and is situated in the context of a wider and more multidisciplinary field in which sociology is only one player. In terms of method, this has been reflected in a turn from explanation to interpretation as well as the adoption and encouragement of multiple points of view. We consider historical sociology as post-disciplinary precisely because it now provides a series of sensibilities that can be found in varieties of historiographic and sociological practices spread across disciplines. There is also a greater awareness in it of the collapse of a unitary method, especially with the nature of historical explanation (Delanty and Isin, 2003: 5).

At the microlevel, this research focuses more narrowly on particular events or on the life of particular individuals. Applying principles of exegesis to ecumenical statements and reports begins with a comprehensive examination of the record of participants and, wherever possible, the recovery of their experience of ecumenism. We also have to know the historical context, including information and distribution of the documents over time, politico-ecclesiastical influences regarding their reception, shifts in cultural cycle and periodisation of global events. Undoubtedly, to understand one’s question one needs some background in the relevant historical period.
In addition to general questions of epistemology, the ecumenical movement itself developed its own methodology. Ecumenical method (Evans, 1996) may be described as an attempt of the dialogical partners to return together to Bible interpretation and Early Church Tradition in order to restate their faith in new language, which avoids the polemics of the past and is mutually acceptable to all parties concerned. This methodology includes mainly elements held in common, points of disagreement as well as results of ecumenical dialogue and future issues to be investigated. Partners in dialogue may not always find the technical ecumenical vocabulary identical to their own tradition. For this reason, ecumenical dialogue searches primarily for consonance rather than identity of viewpoint. An understanding and acceptance of this method is essential if an appropriate response is desired. Attempts to revise or elucidate a completed document become problematic if the text is not scrutinised by all partners involved (Evans, 1996). Thus, in order to identify the rationale behind the actions, and the choice of behaviour, an analysis of the development of thought within the ecumenical movement on the Church’s socio-political role is also integrated.

Overall, this study is a combination of macrolevel and microlevel historical research. Historical-comparative research, while not nearly as common today as other research methods such as surveys, has a rich and substantial sociological foundation. This method is often expanded when the focus is on multiple societies, cultures and religions. For example, the time and place of meeting are relevant to issues of particularity and distinct historicity. Comparing various reports with different interpretations of the same subject, we may ask why some reviewers have treated topics which others have not felt it necessary to examine. Thus I take in consideration the general nature of textual construction, and its interpretation, by asking questions concerning particularity, as texts are paradigms of communication, just as dialogue is more than a model of conversation. As it is impossible to consider ecumenical conversation in isolation, this may lead us to believe that cross-fertilisation between various Church traditions is possible. Particular writings on a specific subject matter may be seen to influence the future thinking and attitude of ecumenical partners. However, if a common methodology is not agreed between the parties, the final outcome becomes modest (Ducrow, 1981).
Data sources and analysis

In this section I attempt a presentation of data collection and the findings that identify the method of analysis. This research investigates general documentary sources that were not created particularly for the purpose in mind but were formerly gathered with a different intention and are now employed for a subsequent usage. 'This means that, because they have not been created specifically for the purposes of social research, the possibility of a reactive effect can be largely discounted as a limitation on the validity of data' (Bryman, 2001: 370). Most evidence on ecumenism is collected from primary sources – published reports, statements and official documents such as proceedings of key conferences, declarations, agreements, communiqués and speeches. I explore written documents for both content and themes.

This research is limited to sources published in English accessed in the Library of Trinity College, Dublin. It involves archival research and other surviving documentary evidence of personal and institutional religious networks of socio-political Church collaboration as well as studies of the Internet. The resources within the Irish School of Ecumenics were instrumental in considering the feasibility of this project. These unique collections of journals and books in Ireland facilitated my access to various historical materials unavailable elsewhere. I could not research documents held in other libraries abroad or visit ecumenical institutes outside Ireland due to restrictions on my ability to travel while my application for Irish naturalisation was being processed.

Researchers who base their studies on documents make considerable use of secondary data; that is, data which have been collected, and possibly analysed by someone else. I consider secondary data complementary to primary sources, because a broader discussion may confirm, modify or contradict the original findings. This involves searching for new opportunities – re-analysis of books and journal articles written while particular reports were produced generating reverberation in response to their publication. My sociological interpretation is based on the hermeneutic of self-engagement in the process of understanding, by
interrogating Christian traditions in their ecumenical journey. I extract background information by exploring the authors’ political agenda and biases.

I selected archival material that takes into account historical records about important ecumenical themes, events and organisations, and theological publications as well as biographies of prominent personalities in the field of ecumenics. While I focus my study on analysis and interpretation, it is obvious that this research cannot be conducted in isolation from what has already been done. ‘Intertextuality thus alerts us to the fact that organizational and official documents are part of wider systems of distribution and exchange’ (Atkinson and Coffey, 1997: 57). In my ‘intellectual craftsmanship’ (Mills, 2000) the analytical aim is to extract new insights from existing data, and thus sociologically enrich the overall discourse about ecumenism in a global context. Each religious tradition is a system of meaning and discourse. As to understand ecumenical behaviour, the primary interest is developing knowledge by using historical data as evidence. The phase of data collection ends when the ethnographer/historiographer has obtained sufficient quality and quantity of data over the course of multiple exposures to, and interaction with the documents under study.

The evaluation of historical materials is challenging, as sociological analysis must decipher the authors’ biases. The analysis takes into account the representativeness of the documents investigated and how they reflect the interests behind them. Aware that the complete records of various ecumenical events did not survive, the conclusions based on such written evidence could be sometimes tentative. Furthermore, creating meaning needs deep ‘historical knowledge’ (Mills, 2000) as specific vocabulary changes over time. In comparative investigation it is needed to determine whether other documents support similar or contradictory perspectives. However, it is arguable that because of their specificity, historical methods can provide a richer and more fastidious analysis than many other methods.

We recognise that our research project is an interpretative enterprise, because multivocal epistemological issues are encountered, while ‘pluralization requires a new sensitivity to the empirical study of issues’ (Flick, 2002: 2). This Chapter
reveals historiographic research conventions and concludes with a discussion arguing that documentary research and data analysis on mutually interpenetrating phenomena and practices is challenging. This section takes us *en route* towards an enquiry of some theoretical perspectives concerning ecumenicity and globalisation which will be systematically investigated in the following two chapters. It takes into account the historical or traditional views and approaches which make up the totality of the Christian ethos. The analysis of the global *oikoumenē* is not simply a matter of bringing together the existing cultures and nations in their present state of concerns, but also is represented by the Christian features which also link together historical identities and traditions, though not without controversy and conflict.
Chapter 2: Towards a Historical Sociology of Ecumenism

Introduction

This Chapter offers a socio-historical interpretation of Christian ecumenism. This neglected area of sociological enquiry includes relevant analysis of the meanings of ‘ecumenical’ in Western and Eastern perspectives. The development of ecumenical discourses within Christianity may be followed through a study of dialogues between Protestant, Orthodox and Roman Catholic traditions. Is ecumenism an aspect of globalisation or glocalisation (Robertson, 1992)? And if so, is anti-ecumenism or the resistance to rapprochement a manifestation of anti-globalisation?

In our line of argument, ecumenism is best understood in terms of a long-term historical sociology of the Christian churches. This has to take into account the impact of theology and Church organisation, but also the wider political structures and cultural environment. This includes political Empire in the first millennium as well as the new global age in the more recent period. I start by examining major historical issues, and by clarifying the theoretical problem under investigation and how influential scholars have studied it. This procedure follows selective citation and analysis of key texts. Beyond this general approach, there is a specific argument about the key role of Protestantism in ecumenism. However, it is difficult to find specific types of Protestantism within which ecumenism emerges.

This Chapter examines some aspects of the politico-historical conditioning of the ecumenical movement. Protestant rapprochement played an important role in establishing ecumenical dialogue in global religious affairs. However, if distinctive perspectives are necessary for Church integration, there are also limits of acceptable diversity within institutional ecumenism on socio-political issues, which point to condemnation and obstacles. Some consider an ecumenical agenda as unnecessarily divisive and thus detrimental to Church unity. Feminists contend that ecumenism often replicates institutional elitism and patriarchal ideology, while fragmented denominations argue that their parochial creed and identity may
be lost through institutional uniformity and authoritarian decision-making processes.

**Ecumenism: from concept to movement – the politico-historical conditioning**

In classical Greek *oikoc* means ‘house or dwelling (and, by extension, household or family)’ (Brown, 1969: 12-3). The term *oikoc* has come to develop three relevant meanings: economy as the accountable management, production and distribution of goods and services at micro and macro levels, ecology as the structural interconnection of myriad activities that jointly constitute our environment (Cobb, 1992), and ecumenism as the striving for Christian worldwide unity. The latter also promotes a pro-active attitude towards the overall view of the planet as ‘One World’ arguing for responsible engagement between co-existing religions and cultures. For controversial Catholic Swiss theologian and ecumenist Hans Küng,

> Ecumenism should not be limited to the community of the Christian churches; it must include the community of the great religions, if ecumenism – in accordance with the original of *oikumene* – is to refer to the whole “inhabited world” (Küng, 1993: xv, original emphases).

While the Greek word *oikoumenē* [*ἡ οἰκουμένη*] is defined as ‘the whole inhabited world known to a particular civilization’, a complementary meaning claims that *oikoumenē* represents ‘the Greeks and their neighbours regarded in the context of development in human society’ (Trumble and Brown et al., 2002: 1979). Initially *oikoumenē* had a descriptive secular usage conveying a geographical concept. The Septuagint, the most influential Greek version of the Old Testament, confirms this. In Psalm 24: 1, *ἡ οἰκουμένη* means ‘the earth’, while in the New Testament the term is employed when referring to the Roman Empire, the entire universe and the inhabited world (Brown, 1969: 13).

In the Early Church, fragmentation within the company of those who consider themselves followers of Christ is an ancient phenomenon. People who lived in different conditions believed, taught and interpreted the Christian faith diversely, so fragmentation tendencies trace their beginnings to the formative years of
Christianity. Apostle Paul faced separation and competition in Corinth pleading with the Corinthians to put away divisions and maintain unity in the church (I Cor. 1: 10-16). ‘There was dissention, division, and often sheer chaos, as even a quick perusal of Paul’s letters to the church at Corinth makes abundantly clear’ (Brown, 1969: 10). From a Christian perspective, it is in seeing humankind as made in God’s image, that a call for world unity and harmony is desired within the sum of different cultures, nations and peoples. Paradoxically, the variety of theological, social, racial and geographical diversity did not create schism in the New Testament community, and it did not break its organic union, i.e. living together in a common structure or the church as one body. However, the New Testament presents neither an idealised homogeneous church nor a church characterised by schism like those of later centuries. Indeed, we are presented a church of unity in diversity, within which controversies were not missing.

Recognizing the diversity of gifts he [Apostle Paul] resisted the ever-present tendency to find in diversity the excuse of division and he set forth that splendid theory of organic unity which remains for all time the ideal constitution of Christian society (Niebuhr, [1929] 1975: 7).

The Jerusalem Assembly narrated in Acts 15 (circa 50 AD) is considered the primary reference for every Christian council since then. It occurred in a particularly acute moment, in the first century, when the Early Church was faced with difficult questions about the admission of Gentiles into the Christian community without undertaking the Mosaic practice of circumcision. ‘Christianity began as a Jewish sect, and there were those among its original converts who sought to keep it as such, who saw Jewish ethnicity and the inherited cultural tradition of Judaism as prerequisites for admission’ (Wilson, 2003: 15). However, considering the relationship between faith and culture, while maintaining its organic union without imposing uniformity or homogenisation, the Church began a shift from a Jewish to a Hellenistic ethos (Lane, 1993). The phrase ‘it seemed good to the Holy Spirit, and to us’ (Acts 15: 12) demonstrated the unity and cooperation between the work of the Holy Spirit and the Church, whereby the Holy Spirit is speaking through the human agency of the Council. Since then, the key elements constituting a Christian council were: representation
of the whole ecclesial community, assistance of the Holy Spirit, and unanimity in the decisions to be applied within the Church.

The social significance of the above principles should be set within a wider set of social changes. From a politico-religious perspective, the Christian community struggled to become independent from the duties of the Mosaic tradition as well as from Imperial cult (Kee, 1980). Christians were perceived as a counterculture ‘endangering’ the Jewish Jerusalem and the polytheistic Rome, with objectives that ‘turned the world \([\textit{oikoumenē}]\) upside down’ (Acts 17: 6). So, how integral are the historical roots of ecumenism to the Church’s later development within the Mediterranean basin?

We cannot understand either the emergence of Christianity or its success if we do not adopt the broader perspective of encounters between civilisations and particularly between Judaism and Hellenism. It is significant that the period was one of great change. The Greek city-state structures had broken down, new political units had been established and above all there was unprecedented exchange of ideas, intercivilisational communication and exposure to diverse perspectives (Hamilton, 1998: 190-1).

The Greeks used commercial and cultural imperialism as a substitute for direct rule. A collection of city-states, often at odds with each other, Greeks exported their surplus population in the form of colonies, closely modelled on the mother city. These outposts often grew wealthier than the mother-cities and formed a rich powerful archipelago throughout the central and eastern Mediterranean. The Greeks named it \(\textit{oikoumenē}\), as an area of civilisation where Greek norms were paramount. Meanwhile this ecumenical empire was contrasted with what they called ‘chaos’ – the surrounding barbarism and savagery. The Greek \(\textit{oikoumenē}\) was inherited by the Romans and became the basis of their vast Empire, though the Romans, with their passion for uniform law, insisted on transforming the \(\textit{colonia}\) into provinces and thus put together an old-style territorial empire, with all its strengths and weaknesses.
An important issue here is the relationship between Christianity, oikoumenē and political structures and in particular Christianity and the Roman-Byzantine Empire. ‘The Roman Empire provided the institutional context in which first Hellenic culture and then Christianity could percolate into North Africa and Western and Northern Europe’ (Held et al, 2003: 340). Since serious divisions over faith and religious order threatened to divide Church union and the Christian world, some emperors, starting with Constantine the Great, summoned the bishops of the oikoumenē, practically identified with the whole Empire, ‘where the Roman law and imperial power decided the boundaries’ (Crow, 1982: 25). It was only after the gradual conversion of the Roman Empire that the concept of oikoumenē came to be accepted by the Church in the same sense as catholic/universal and orthodox, in opposition to whatever was regarded partial, heretical, schismatic or sectarian.

In the early centuries there were various groups called heretics, those within the church who were held to have departed from orthodoxy, or right belief, by overemphasizing one aspect of the truth, who sometimes left the church or were forced to leave, and others called schismatic, those who actually did break away over issues of faith and established rival churches (Brown, 1969: 11-12, original emphases).

Just as the Empire was a system that extended a single, universally valid rule of law throughout its dominions, so the ecumenical assemblies were the manifestation of a single religious law, a single belief, a particular norm whose frontiers coincided with those of the Empire, the political oikoumenē. This premodern enterprise of Eastern and Western expansion within which ‘globalizing networks were created by great kings and warriors searching for the wealth and honour in fabulous lands, by religious wanderers and pilgrims seeking traces of God in distant realms, and by merchant princes and venturers pursuing profit amidst risk across borders and continents’ (Hopkins, 2002:4), may be referred as projects of mini-globalisation (Robertson, 1992; Holton, 1998). ‘In these respects, world religions unquestionably constitute one of the most powerful and significant forms of the globalization of culture in the premodern era, indeed of all time’ (Held, 2003: 333).
This manifestation of proto-ecumenical ideas began to be attached to movements and institutions. The Roman Empire can be seen as an early example of mini-globalisation, as a politically and culturally diverse region within which religion was part of the social adhesive that held the Empire together. The Roman Empire ‘constituted a bounded set of societies and other units within which individuals lived and conceptualized their lives’ (Waters, 2001: 11). It is arguable that ‘systems of belief that made universal claims and extend across continents’, even if circumscribed to limited geographical discoveries are understood as forms of ‘archaic globalization’ (Hopkins, 2002: 4). It appears that ‘the strategy of expansion was to co-ordinate rather than assimilate [and] distinctive origins were retained not homogenized’ (Hopkins, 2002: 4), while ‘local religious cults were loosely grafted into the Roman Pantheon’ (Held et al, 2003: 335). This developed a cosmopolitan ideology within which hearth gods, local deities and the monotheistic god of Judaeo-Christianity were incorporated within one system of religious governance.

In the case of the first archaic form of globalization, salient institutions include trading diaspora, empires, and religious movements able to generate significant forms of interconnection, and inter-dependence (Holton, 2005: 40, original emphasis).

From the viewpoint of religious evolution, Rome presents itself as a significant example of ‘archaic globalization’ and a vital knot in global networks (Hopkins, 2002). Regarding the political integration within the Roman Empire, in the Latin West, following the political ascendancy of the papacy, the concept of oikoumenē developed a meaning of privileged civilisational belongingness (Delanty, 1995). What came to be thought of as West continued a tradition, since the Hellenistic period, whereby oikoumenē has been used in secular contexts to refer politically to the realm of the Greco-Roman empire or to mark the cultural distinction between the civilised world and the land of the barbarians. Subsequently, widespread ecclesiastical use of the term is linked with the extension of the Christian community across the entire Roman Empire, just as in the Greek environment, ‘the oikoumenē meant the civilized world where Greek culture reigned and held people together’ (Crow, 1982: 25). It is arguable that
Christianity effectively took over the ancient notion of the barbarian and applied it to non-Christians. The new dichotomy would therefore be one of Christians versus barbarians, and the hallmark of civilisation came to be membership of the Christian *oikoumenē*, the ‘civilised’ world’ (Delanty, 1995: 39).

The *oikoumenē* had become the ‘Christian world’, with the double (political and religious) meaning of the ‘Christian empire’ and the ‘whole church’. Even today, the Patriarch of Constantinople is called the *Ecumenical Patriarch*, in honour of Constantinople, which, for many centuries, was the capital city of the *oikoumenē*. For Orthodox Christians, the *ecumenical council* signifies the supreme authority of teaching and decision-making accepted and recognised by the Universal Church consciousness. According to Orthodox theologian and ecumenist Panagiotis Bratsiotis

> The highest in the [Orthodox] Church is, however, the ecumenical council composed of all the bishops which decides all questions concerning faith, liturgy and Church law (Bratsiotis, 1968: 63).

This approach remains prevalent in the Orthodox consciousness as the Eastern Orthodox Church calls itself ‘the church of the seven ecumenical councils’ (Ware, 1997: 18). In Byzantium, the first seven councils, held between 325-787 AD (Zernov, 1961: 90), are also called ‘the councils of the undivided Church’. For the Eastern Church, all councils held after the political, religious and cultural schism of 1054 between Rome and Constantinople do not receive the title *ecumenical* [*oikouμενικός*] because they lost ‘universal ecclesiastical validity’ (Brown, 1969: 15, original emphases).

All [Orthodox Christians] profess that there are seven holy and Ecumenical Councils, and these are the seven pillars of the faith of the Divine Word on which He erected His holy mansion, the Catholic and Ecumenical Church (John II, Metropolitan of Russia (1080-89) quoted in Ware, 1997: 18).
Historically, as soon as a council received the appellative ‘ecumenical’  
[oikouνενικός], its authority became final and its decisions bound everyone everywhere (Lowery, 1985: 54). The Council’s ambit included all matters that had theological and socio-political universal validity within the Empire. This implied a complex process of worldwide testing and appropriation of such pronouncements in the life of the local churches themselves. Both Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic churches recognise the first seven councils as ecumenical, though Catholics also recognise fourteen councils called in later years by the Roman Pontiff, whose authority the Eastern Orthodox regard as extending only over Western Europe, rather than over all Christianity. Since the seventh ecumenical council, the Eastern Orthodox have had what they call Pan-Orthodox councils with representatives of all Eastern Orthodox churches, but they have never claimed that these councils were ecumenical. To be recognised as ecumenical, these councils would require inclusion of Roman Catholic decision-making. Similarly, the Roman Catholic Church also does not recognise the Pan-Orthodox councils.

The organisation and establishment of the ecumenical council developed with the support of the Roman/Byzantine emperor. In relation to its geopolitical reality and the Church/State relationship, the ecumenical councils were more exactly ‘imperial councils’, convoked by the emperor of Constantinople and subsequently enforced as imperial legislation within the whole Empire. ‘They were ad hoc meetings to deal with concrete problems that called for immediate solution’ (Keshishian, 1992: 86). Thus, a legitimate ecumenical council fulfilled precise criteria and presupposed unity in faith. This title was applied to those Councils in which the whole geographical diversity of the Church – East and West – was represented. The ecumenical council came to refer to ‘a synod the decrees of which have found acceptance by the Church in the whole world’ (Percival, [1900] 1977: xi). In this case the meaning of ecumenical signifies universality as ‘something pertaining to the whole church’ (Brown, 1969: 14, original emphases) presenting worldwide doctrinal validity of the ancient councils of the Imperial Church.

Ecumenical council terminology is also used to distinguish councils that are representative of the universal church in contrast to local councils, which have
limited participation and reception. The participatory process required preconditions such as belonging to and involvement in a religious organisation (i.e. local church), as well as being an active member in policy making while contributing to the council procedures. However, reception of conciliar decisions by the local churches was the crucial issue in determining the ecumenical legitimacy of councils.

It is not necessary to make a council ecumenical that the number of bishops present should be large, there were but 325 at Nice, and 150 at I. Constantinople; it is not necessary that it should be assembled with the intention of its being ecumenical, such was not the case with I. Constantinople; it is not necessary that all parts of the world should have been represented or even that the bishops of such parts should have been invited. All that is necessary is that its decrees find ecumenical acceptance afterwards, and its ecumenical character be ecumenically recognized (Percival, [1900] 1977: xi-xii).

In the first millennium, those who did not agree with the official definitions of faith (e.g. the Arians, the Nestorians and the Monophysites) separated themselves from the Catholic/Orthodox Church. They were harshly disciplined by being called ‘heretics’, being excommunicated and anathematised. At the fourth ecumenical council in Chalcedon (451 AD), some non-conformist participants did not agree with certain dogmatical perceptions. Since these non-Chalcedonian Christians were skilful missionaries, their churches spread through Asia and the Middle East – Armenia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Syria and the Malabar Coast of India. The socio-political implications were that the organic unity of the Christian world was shattered through such geographic proliferation. These separated churches are known today as the Oriental Churches. This issue will be further explained in Chapter 5.

Socio-political division has a strong impact on religious unity. The purpose of ecumenism is in addressing divisions and to restore unity. While defining some meanings of oikoumenē, we reviewed some aspects of unity and diversity of the Early Church of the First Millennium in the Roman/Byzantine Empire. Diversity
of opinions in the oikoumenē gave rise to a number of divisions, which required reconciliation through the institution of the ecumenical council.

**Protestant ecumenism and the global Christian Church**

The Moravian historian, Heinz Renkewitz, reports that it was Count Nicolaus Ludwig von Zinzendorf (1700-1760) who first used the term oikoumenē to carry ‘the meaning: the worldwide Christian Church’ (Lewis, 1962: 13). Considered as the ecumenical pioneer ‘it is a fair claim to make for Zinzendorf that he was the first in the modern world to set the word ecumenical in that context’ (Lewis, 1962: 13). His ecumenical endeavour began in 1722, when as a benefactor he built the town of Herrnhut, Saxony in Germany for asylum-seekers from Bohemia and Moravia persecuted for their religious beliefs.

According to Max Weber, ‘Zinzendorf’s variety of Pietism [...] glorified the worker who was true to his calling and was not acquisitive as following the model of the Apostles and so as gifted with the charisma of discipleship’ ([1905] 1996: 193). Dismayed at the Church divisions and determined to unite the different factions in a spiritual peace, he was the first to speak of ecumenism. Through his extensive travel and cosmopolitan living, Zinzendorf trained missionary teams for Europe and the United States, directed to both indigenous peoples and slaves.

Zinzendorf had an exceptional insight into the organic relationship between mission and ecumenism long before the historical moment of the Edinburgh 1910 World Missionary Conference. In the context of the 18th century, the term ecumenical refers to the expression (within history) of the given unity of the Church without being isolated from the missionary and evangelistic context to which it belongs. By contrast, it appears that since the middle of the nineteenth century, the word oikoumenē has been increasingly used in the limited sense of concern for Church unity and renewal.

Although Protestant churches and congregations have a substantial common theological basis and closely related forms of worship they developed a wide range of understandings of ecumenism. Some evangelicals promote a confessing ecumenism congregating believers from among the churches who confess a
particular historical-theological tradition. Protestants following ‘the Lutheran Formula of Concord of the sixteenth century, for example, [describe] the Apostles’, Nicene, and Athanasian Creeds as “the three catholic and ecumenical creeds,” since they are creeds universally accepted as valid by all churches’ (Brown, 1969: 15).

However, for Protestants living in denominational diversity, the ecumenical movement refers to the external relations with churches in a world community, arguing for the wider dialogue of global inter-religious encounter. This involves doctrinal liberalisation, incorporating an acceptance of different churches and various religions (Narchison, 1998).

Roger Mehl (1970) presents an enlightening explanation of the discursive possibilities of *The Sociology of Protestantism*, including the sociology of ecumenism. Pursuing Troeltsch’s fundamental method, Mehl starts with the announcement that Christianity in general, and Protestantism in particular, are established on a specific understanding of the religious object, which organises their entire existence. He then describes the sociological consequences of this specific understanding of Protestant configuration and its relation to the ‘evolution of the global society’ (Mehl, 1970: 192). There is no major attempt at explaining Protestantism in the larger framework of the sociology of religion; rather, his attention is focused on the specificity of Protestant Christianity as it develops in social forms and as it relates to the surrounding society as a movement generator (missions, ecumenism, sects). For Mehl as for Weber, Protestantism, or certain versions of it, was the bearer of specific social innovations. Whereas in Weber’s case this centred on the idea of this worldly-asceticism, and the economic consequence of the idea of life as a vocation, for Mehl, the connection is made between Protestant ecclesiology and ecumenism.

[In its origin the ecumenical movement was more of a Protestant phenomenon because the Protestant churches, from the fact of their ecclesiology, were more disposed than others to attempt the ecumenical adventure (Mehl, 1970: 191).]
Weber and Mehl outline major characteristics displayed by Protestantism and ecumenism. The Protestant consciousness appears comfortable with the existence of many Christian communities, willing to acknowledge churches with their peculiar traditions. We notice the diminution of the value of the doctrine and sacraments in the Church, by emphasising the subjectivity of faith and personal spiritual disposition. Protestants aim at Christian unity, but not at unity of the institutional Church. For the Orthodox, this institutional direction is a positive aspect because it helps uniting Christians of various denominations in mutual association. However, the Roman Catholic universalist doctrine encounters difficulties vis-à-vis this approach.

The genesis of organised ecumenism is to be found in discourses among Christians from diverse traditions but with a strong Protestant emphasis operating in the missionary fields of the late 19th and early 20th century in the European colonial empires. Ecumenism found inspiration in the patristic and scriptural scholarship mainly developed within Western Church denominations. In the ‘Western Hemisphere’ some Christians began to reflect on common social justice and peace issues, being concerned mainly with slavery abolition, racial discrimination, the emancipation of women and workers’ rights (Sowell, 1994). For Protestants the idea of ecumenism must have connection to the principles of freedom as against compulsory universalism.

The polarity of society versus community may also be seen as an expression of the essentially Protestant view of modernity. As is suggested by the work of Max Weber, the ethos cultivated by Protestantism was one that reserved meaning and spirituality for the inner world, seeing in the outer world of the social the signs of degeneration and meaningless. The idea of community was undoubtedly fostered more by this Protestant sensibility than by the Roman Catholic view of modernity in which institutions would play a greater role (Delanty, 2004: 29-30).

Institutional ecumenism emerged in the West, differentiated from other religious movements. It acknowledged the legitimacy of Christian diversity aiming to overcome conflict in mission fields. Within the Protestant tradition, Mehl (1970) argues that ecumenical enterprise looks at the past reality of a united Church,
takes into consideration present socio-geographical diversity, while trying to attain future unity through negotiation. At the local level, ecumenism seeks avoidance of confrontation by identifying disagreements. It tries to find ways of bringing actors in the religious field into a co-operative relationship. At the global level, through institutions such as the WCC, ecumenism wants to address itself to the whole inhabited world being concerned with the re-actualised message of the consciousness of belonging together. It promotes the commitment to global Christian fellowship, discipleship and church unity in all its dimensions.

For more than half a century, the ecumenical movement has penetrated deeper and deeper into the life of all churches, and has led them to seek, by various paths, the unity of the church. This movement takes concrete form in a certain number of institutions, which can both render it effective or paralyse it. We shall have to consider ecumenism both as movement (organized movements as well as the more diffuse aspirations) and as institutions (World Council of Churches, world-wide confessional alliances, Pan-Orthodox Conference, Roman Secretariat for Unity, Second Vatican Council) (Mehl, 1970: 190, original emphases).

Universally, ecumenism aims to advance unity and social cohesiveness, being a phenomenon with worldwide scope or application in the development of inter-church relations. Ecumenism may be metaphorically understood as the people of the whole world living within a common house. Because the purpose of ecumenism is to accommodate all people in one household, it cannot accept division or homelessness. Global ecumenism became accessible to all churches, and no particular church may consider its role as central to this movement. Just as globalisation involves, from one perspective, a ‘repertoire of cultural practices’ (Folton, 1998: 185), similarly ecumenism may be understood as trying to harmonise a repertoire of religious experiences.

We have Ecumenical Councils and Patriarchs, for example, but somehow the word [ecumenical] rarely finds currency in such global spheres as the United Nations and dependent agencies, which have reasonable claims to what it denotes. More rarely still does it emerge as a genuine adjective of human inclusiveness (Cragg, 1968: 194-5).
The ecumenical movement regards itself as having an indivisible character by indicating the awareness of belonging to a world Christian fellowship and revealing a desire for union of all churches. Writing on the eve of Vatican II, French Catholic theologian Bernard Lambert argues that:

[...] the phrase “ecumenical movement” denotes an immense activity undertaken by every Christian communion, which by means of dialogue, co-operation, integration, and individual and institutional union, aims at drawing Christians together and reconciling them, healing their damaged traditions, and, in short, bringing the mystical Body of Christ to its perfect fulfilment (Lambert, 1967: 30).

Ecumenism does not require a neutral territory, independent of one’s basic belief and commitments, in order to begin the dialogue with the ‘other’. Ecumenism implies that only through open dialogue religious actors arrive at a comprehensive understanding of a particular tradition. Thus, a global ethical approach emerged, whereby the rights of every church to have its own ecclesiological doctrine about the ecumenical movement are considered. This includes the rejection of proselytism or interference in the internal affairs of other church organisations (Küng, 1997).

Dialogue participants may have different religious commitments, yet the idea of ecumenism per se as developed by its adherents, has had some measure of success. Methodist ecumenist Wesley Ariarajah from Sri Lanka argues that in ecumenical encounters peoples of other faiths are no longer objects of discussion, but become partners in conversation (Ariarajah, 1998). What underlies this is not that participants believe that their respective religious perspectives are somehow ‘reducible’ to one another, or are subsumable under one umbrella-like religious denomination. A central condition leading to ‘successful’ ecumenism is that those involved accept that there are interests, values, and concerns to be shared among people of different religious, political, and cultural traditions who in various conditions travel beyond local cultures (Albrow, 2004). This may lead to the development of complex relationships between the actors of the global religious
field. Hans Küng, well-known critic of the contemporary practices of papal authority argues that:

[...] today we all face the tremendous ecumenical challenges of the third millennium. In the present [twentieth] century we have been able to make decisive ecumenical progress within Christianity (unfortunately the lifting of excommunications has not yet been achieved, nor has it yet been possible to achieve eucharistic intercommunion, but it is to be hoped that both will be realised under a new pontificate). Once again we must face the challenges of the inter-religious ecumene. In a global society Christians are invited to take shared responsibility with those of other faiths for peace, justice, the preservation of creation and a renewed ethic. The fate of the earth is the concern of all human beings, regardless of the religion or world-view to which they adhere (Küng, 1997: 156, original emphasis).

The novelty of the ecumenical movement consists in the insight that, although there are significant disparities in matters of faith and order between various confessions, individual Christians and church organisations may create contacts, associations and networks which cooperate and learn from each other in order to overcome their disagreements within a local/global framework. This is the self-understanding of the ecumenical spirit initiated by Protestantism which will be elaborated in further depth later in the discussion. For the participants, to be involved in the ecumenical enterprise means being part of the totality of ideas and principles, problems and activities originated and developed by this movement. We now turn to the relationship between organised ecumenism and global developments. One aspect of such organisation is expressly the ecumenical discourse.

**Ecumenical dialogue as a model for discourse**

The various forces driving globalising processes suggest that the creation of a world society is no longer the project of a particular (hegemonic) nation-state but the outcome of social interaction on a global scale of a plurality of actors. It is often falsely assumed that there was a ‘golden age’ when states exercised absolute
control over the movement of people and resources across borders (Holton: 1998: 83). However, while ‘mapping the global condition’ (Robertson, 1992), we perceive nation-states as key elements in the global field alongside notions of humankind, the world system of states and individual selves. From this perspective, the historical churches of Protestant, Orthodox and Catholic adherence may be seen as institutional elements within the global religious field alongside individual selves and states engaging in dialogue at local, national and global level. Within this milieu, the socio-political discourse of ecumenics needs greater attention by sociologists of globalisation and religion.

Presbyterian scholar and ecumenist, John Alexander Mackay (1889 – 1983) who was President of Princeton Theological Seminary between 1936 – 1959 is a useful starting point in investigating the distinctive subject matter of ecumenics. He sets forth a range of ways of looking at the church, above all from a biblical perspective. While analysing the principal functions of the church, he also outlines the relationship of the church to outside bodies, such as society at large, the State, and non-Christian religions. He locates the church in the historical context of cooperative world mission enterprise illustrating the differences that exist between this science and other interrelated fields of study.

The field of discourse of the Science of Ecumenics embraces everything that concerns the nature, functions, relations, and strategy of the Church Universal, when the latter is conceived as a world missionary community. Questions pertaining to the Church’s essence, its mission, its unity, and its relations in the world, which have hitherto been dealt with separately, and have been discussed under diverse designations, will be treated together as constitutive phases of a single discipline (Mackay, 1964: viii).

Theoretically, ecumenics in the sense outlined above is not only a new discipline alongside other theological disciplines. The claim is also that the science of ecumenics goes beyond the particularity of the theological discourse defined by a methodological reflection on a systematic divine revelation. Ecumenics draws its legitimacy from an inter-relational dimension and an integrative purpose for theological study, through researching the theological foundations of unity and diversity, the historic divisions of the churches and the attempts to overcome
them. It investigates methodologies appropriate to peace studies (conflict resolution and reconciliation), and examines the history and character of ecumenical initiatives. In its applied research, it reminds Christians and church organisations of ecumenical studies, insights and initiatives previously undertaken, by developing a constructive critique of the opportunities and challenges raised by the ecumenical agenda. This discipline involves research into various Christian traditions in the areas of doctrinal discussions, textual interpretation, discourse analysis and dialogue on socio-political issues. Thus, ecumenics is the ongoing dialogue between Christian traditions regarding the identity of their belonging to the Universal Church as a process searching for meaningful contextual/historical self-interpretation. For this reason, ontological issues arise in addition to epistemological ones.

Ecumenical praxis may be regarded as a socio-religious assignment by which Christians and institutional churches, troubled by divisions and their detrimental effect on common witness, have come together to work towards visible unity and community renewal. To discern, acknowledge and, where necessary, overcome existing theological, denominational, historical and cultural differences between Christians and their churches is possible only where comprehensive ecumenical education takes place. In this process, learners are active social actors who can derive insights from a multiplicity of sources, not just from within an institutional setting. In the self-understanding of ecumenists, those involved developed the ability of motivating themselves, of having self-control, enthusiasm and above all persistence.

Ecumenism is an experience emphasising lifelong learning from one another and of being constantly challenged by other traditions of worship and thought. It is actively engaging the ecumenical participants to look beyond their circumstance in isolation, so that they may perceive through dialogue the Christian tradition as a whole. The boundaries between institutional churches and the outside world are breaking down not only via cyberspace, but also through mass migration and the development of global media. Thus, by having the educational element at its essence through the science of ecumenics, this movement may possibly be considered emancipatory – as cognitively liberating (Crossley, 2002) from globe-wide contemporary 'politicoreligious fundamentalism' (Robertson, 1992: 174).
On the one hand the emancipatory interest defines the bid to provide an account of the genesis of meanings, values, and practices and how they are reflections of changing social structures. On the other hand, fundamentalism, a position held by various individuals or groups, emphasises infallible interpretation of their Holy Scripture or particular tradition, with the tendency of maintaining a rigidly conservative theological position.

According to Turner ‘fundamentalization actually increases the globalization of the religious debate about identity and commitment’ (1994: 204) while by contrast the ethos of ecumenism is that of creating a tolerant religious gesellschaft. In this sense organised ecumenism is quintessentially a modern movement. Paradoxically, both fundamentalist and ecumenical movements may have a tendency to globalise, though with different consequences for unity and conflict.

By transcending prejudicial barriers, the ecumenical epistemological process has a reconciliatory educational aim. Specific people, institutions or traditions discover the global in the local or the unfamiliar in the context of their own environment. They meet together in ecumenical conferences and organisations referring to the desire of Christian commitment for reconciliation and unity. In this self-awareness process, inter-cultural education seeks to promote the encounter of different traditions and lifestyles. Methodologically, for efficiency purposes, ecumenical education must involve members of diverse traditions. It requires acquaintance with various histories, doctrines, liturgies as well as personal relationships. According to German theologian Werner Simpfendörfer (1982) former secretary of the European Association of Lay Training Centres, enlargement of perspectives through education produces an experience of the wealth by creating history and culture. In the ecumenical framework, both religious and social perspectives are symbiotically analysed:

The faith, hope and love which grow in the seedbed of the oikos, the small household, have to be transplanted to the oikoumene, the wider household. The global vision and the concrete local reality must be brought together. Tension between particularity and universality is the inevitable outcome of this – the world horizon disturbs and destabilizes the parochially minded outlook, parochialism frustrates and hinders the globally oriented
commitment. Yet only in this tension can that learning process be 
developed in which “invasion” is replaced by self-determination, “one way 
streets” by “reciprocity” and structures of dependence by relations of 
partnership (Simpfendörfer, 1982: 53).

If ecumenism has the potential of making the ‘inhabited earth habitable’ 
(Simpfendörfer, 1982: 53), sociologists may envision the ecumenism of the 21st 
century within the growing religious and ethical diversity of belief systems found 
throughout the world, especially in international urban agglomerations which later 
developed into global cities (Albrow, 2004). By developing paradigms of 
interaction, churches networking with other religious traditions become capable of 
dialogue with different religious systems. Global ecumenical discourse involves a 
new understanding of theology within a pluralistic religious world. Küng (1991) 
presents in Global Responsibility: In Search of a New World Ethic a concise inter-
disciplinary synthesis of current social, political, and economic issues. He takes 
up, in a persuasive manner, the argument concerning the significance of ethics and 
dialogical imperative between world religions in the pursuit for world peace.

In this polycentric, transcultural and multireligious world ecumenical 
dialogue between the world religions takes on quite new importance; for 
the sake of its peace this postmodern world needs more than ever the 
global religious understanding without which a political understanding 
will in the last resort no longer be possible (Küng, 1991: 135).

Ethical challenges make the ecumenical discourse increasingly aware of the world 
in which it operates, both in the sense of the reality from which it emerges and of 
the influences it exerts on it. Will the Christian oikoumenē be integrated within 
the global affairs discourse? What happens to specific elements of religious 
teaching and tradition inherited from diverse sources as cultural interconnections 
increasingly reach across the world leading to the development of a ‘global 
ecumene’ (Hannerz, 2004)? A truly religious universalism might be seen as 
possible only through a world ethic agreed between nations that will understand 
the immorality of war generated by their mediocre political leadership. Küng 
(1991), by contrast argues that this world does not need a unitary religion or 
unitary ideology i.e. a set of social, political and moral values, attitudes, outlooks,
and beliefs that shape the social’s group interpretation of its behaviour and its world. He argues rather for some binding basic ideals of mutual respect upon which consensus may be built. The avalanche of dangers forming on the slopes of economic injustice, environmental devastation, and military build-up will not be deferred unless all nations come together to formulate and endorse some kind of shared ethical convictions and guidelines.

This oikoumenē or inhabited world has been conveniently divided for politico-economic reasons into first, second, third and fourth world dimensions. The ecumenical movement understands itself basically in terms of bringing together the four worlds in an attempt to advance their unity as far as Christianity is concerned, into a harmonious global world. This kind of world strengthens cohesion within and between groups (Rosenau, 2003). Such a task will not be accomplished unless the world religions in dialogue make their own contribution. ‘Global responsibility’ must be part of all interreligious conversation and a constitutive element of Christian mission. However, is a global ethic able to generate global freedom by facilitating life and by creating mutual respect and acceptance? In other words, interreligious exchange must take as its most pressing agenda the ethical issues behind human suffering. In 1991, at the time when Küng wrote this book, there were hardly any documents on global ethics from world organisations to which he could refer. Although there were declarations on human rights, above all the 1948 Declaration of the United Nations, pronouncements on human responsibilities were largely ignored; therefore, I consider Küng’s perspective as path breaking, even if his thesis remains open to criticism for its pluralist relativism.

It is useful at this point to refer more systematically to ecumenism and the gemeinschaft/gesellschaft distinction advanced by Ferdinand Tönnies. I propose that there are three options which make use of this distinction in elaborating the relationship between globalisation and ecumenism.

The first option considers that a global ethic modelled by ecumenism may proceed by identifying values and ideas shared by church organisations which ensure discursive coherence regarding the conditions of human development. This approach could be seen as leading to a homogenisation process largely based on
kinship and organic ties, generated by similar moral cohesion often founded on common religious beliefs and emotions in a communitarian setting (gemeinschaft type).

The second option argues that using ecumenical discourse to engage the challenges of globalisation might equally be located within cross-cultural and religious communities and networks based on voluntary rational/pragmatic understanding and public association (gesellschaft type).

[...] Religious Gesellschaften (associations or societies), like any other groups formed for this purposes, exist only in so far as they, viewed from without, take their places among the institutions of a political body or as they represent conceptual elements of a theory; they do not touch upon the religious Gemeinschaft as such (Tönnies cited in Bell and Newby, 1974: 7).

The discussion here can usefully be linked with the more general question of globalisation, by focusing on ideas of movements across borders that create patterns of inter-connection and inter-dependency. Globalisation in this sense can cover politico-economic, as well as religio-cultural phenomena. As global cultural/religious flows have increased in the 20th century (Robertson, 1992; Holton, 1998), it is increasingly difficult to find completely territorialised communities professing only one cultural/religious identity and affiliation.

The geopolitical and ideological East/West frontiers, across which the historical evolution of ecumenism occurred, are becoming fluid through migration, diasporisation, multi-level governance and the development of global media. Even if cultural/religious flows are sometimes hampered by the persistence of national consciousness, globalising phenomena, whose directions are difficult to anticipate, permeate these frontiers by challenging local traditions. Ecumenism confronts the polarised gemeinschaft/gesellschaft conventional understanding of social life with ‘tradition on the one hand, and modernity on the other; mechanical solidarity on the one hand and organic solidarity on the other; Gemeinschaft on one hand and Gesellschaft on the other’ (Lash, 1999: 121). This may apply also
to community interactions in ecumenical context, however a need for inter-relationship in understanding the *gemeinschaft*/*gesellschaft* problematic arises.

In the original sociological understanding, *gemeinschaft* represented the small-scale community based on kinship, integrated parish church type organisation, established on family, friendship and close neighbourhood. This community, almost certainly pre-industrial and rural, nurtured intimate, enduring and yet stratified social relations. Alternatively, *gesellschaft* is a community type whereby interactions become increasingly anonymous and impersonal. In this association, contractual liaison plays an increasing role as a constituent part of an industrialised society. ‘Society, or the structuration of social by the principles of the new *Gesellschaft*, will make modernity possible’ (Lash, 1999: 122). In this relationship aims and associations are voluntarily decided by rational agreements of interest, and consequently this approach leads to a new social structure.

As a third option, I argue that ecumenism may however challenge this dichotomy by combining the focus on religious community *gemeinschaft* with non-fundamentalist dialogues of a *gesellschaft* kind, where churches and individuals may voluntarily choose to join or leave the movement.

The ecumenical dialogue model of discourse requires respect of people’s personal perspectives and acknowledgment that they may sometimes re-evaluate their positions in new circumstances. When necessary, the religious actors may have to go beyond their beliefs towards previously unelaborated values and interests that make a genuine dialogical relationship possible. Trustworthy dialogue, different from polemics or hidden one-sided attempts of conversion, presupposes that the parties involved endeavour to gain knowledge and share information in a new context. American Christian Orthodox ecumenist Gregory Wingenbach argues that:

The term “dialogue” means nothing more nor less than Christian conversation.... Love grows out of knowing one another. Essential, therefore, to dialogue is the fullest possible knowledge and understanding of those with whom we are engaged in conversation.... (Wingenbach, 1987: 143).
There is merit in Waters argument whereby the claims of Christian universalistic principles contain 'a singular and abstract god, a single value-reference for every person in the world, and this god proposed a single set of legal and moral laws' (2001: 163). In this sense, universalism denotes the global scope of monotheistic Christianity (Wilson, 2003). This attitude creates confidence in a constructive response to the ethical challenges that globalisation presents. Christians concerned with the 'spiritual brokenness' of the world may argue that a visible reunited Church is their priority because finally God 'desires all men [and women] to be saved' (1 Tim. 2: 4). Because it has in fact emerged and developed in response to crises, whether in the Greco-Roman world or early 20th century mission, ecumenism can easily give the impression of being motivated not by evangelical, missionary zeal but by mere worldly pragmatism and as a reaction to a crisis situation (Mehl, 1970). This is particularly true at the present time when Christians, nominal as well as committed, became a minority of the world population and as such have to face the challenge of various ideologies, religions, humanism and secularisation (Wingenbach, 1987).

However, the political events between the world wars and especially after the Second World War led to rapid decolonization, the access to independence of Asian and African peoples, and their entrance on to the stage of history. Since the matter involves human masses of great fecundity, Christianity has had to take account of the fact that time is not on its side and that it will find itself in a minority position in the world (Mehl, 1970: 195).

Ecumenism brings a broad field of partnership accessible to all Christians. The claim is that Churches acting together could awake the conscience of a secular society advocating in support of peace, abolition of racial discrimination, eradication of xenophobia and social justice. For ecumenical institutions, common motivation and strategy action to mobilisation is necessary involving 'a long-winded affair whose stages are measured in centuries rather than years, if we are to judge from the slow progress of the ecumenical movement among Christians' (Merle, 1987: 20).
From a different and contrasting angle, Bryan Wilson sees churches developing into factions, their adherents ‘reduced to relatively small, heterodox groups who believe and practice things which are alien to the majority’ and who differ from sects only ‘in lacking the intensity of commitment’ (Wilson, 1966: 223). In this situation the ecumenical model of dialogue could appear to be no more than a desperate effort against ‘dechristianization’ (Mehl, 1970: 193) while trying to retain some evidence of power, as well as a response to the danger of becoming sects. Wilson argues that, in a secularised age, ecumenism is a safety measure strategy that benefits the development of church-like organisations, in order to restore some of their earlier security. By preferring compromise and alliance to extinction, amalgamation of religious organisations may be considered a vulnerability rather than strength.

Unions are proposed as Churches perceive that, faced with the overwhelming secularity of the wider society, different denominations have much in common. Ecumenism, which churchmen tend to see as a response to spiritual forces, may be no more than the reaction of weak organisations to a declining market in which secular agencies compete more effectively for the time, energy, and money of individuals (Wilson, 1990: 119-20).

In dealing with various individual and group dynamics, religious discourse develops constantly within complex situations, but Wilson does not fully explore the complete range of these complexities. He considers the attempt at reconciliation and cooperation between the traditional denominations only from a pragmatic perspective. While the ecumenical spirit brought an acceptance of the institutional basis of the existing denominations, there was a belief that the various denominations should establish common ground and interests rather than found new structures outside the mainstream churches. However, for Wilson, this preference for ecumenical initiatives is indicative of an underlying weakness of contemporary Christianity, rather than a sign of strength and endurance. Furthermore he argues that denominations and groups of different persuasion that once felt confident disputing their doctrinal differences attempt to find strength and support in unity.
For Robertson (1972) churches are playing an active role in the global field, through societal commitment at various levels. Thus, it may be ineffective to profess that churches follow their existence exclusively on the periphery of society or ignorant of social processes. Also the dismissal of religious discourses for being only leisure-time activities is superficial. Past and present controversies generated by religious movements and their socio-political consequences of significant magnitude are self-evident, and therefore should be thoroughly investigated.

Ecumenical unity is not an expansion of homogeneous Christendom; it is a form of existence of the church corresponding to the annihilation of its socio-geographic unity. As the church finds its base less in pre-existent sociological unities, the more will it be obliged to forge a unity which will indeed be its own (Mehl, 1970: 199).

Interconnectedness may not be ignored and for this reason an ecumenical model of dialogue may be seen as an alternative to fundamentalism. This may mean that those involved in and affected by ecumenism may enter into productive dialogue with ‘the other’, by guiding globalising processes in their favour while remaining consistent with respect for specific religious actors and their cultural diversity.

According to theologians Swidler and Mojzes (2000, 174-8), as individuals and communities seek religious communion the condition of dialogue becomes sine qua non. Swidler and Mojzes (2000) have drawn up ten principles of conversation – ‘ground rules’ – for the dialogical process, consistent with common search for religious tolerance. The purpose of interideological dialogue is to change prejudices and advance mutual understanding. Dialogue needs to deal with both extra and intra communitarian realities. Honesty and integrity are main components of the dialogical process and simultaneously all participants must have trust in partnership. Processes of self-identification lead to the elimination of gratuitous assumptions transcending stereotypes. Thus, in order to avoid monologue, as opposite to dialogue, the partners may recognise themselves in their unique status. Following the gain of mutual trust, the dialogical partners in a learning process move from known to unknown. Minimal self-criticism is required, so that one’s tradition may not be perceived as triumphalist. Finally, one
must attempt to live the experience of the others 'from within' because Christian traditions are not merely about doctrines, but also about spirit and heart, involving the whole being.

Swidler and Mojzes (2000) imply that unity attempts must not be thought of as a mere 'return' but rather as 'advancement', because dialogue is about a relationship envisaged towards an open future. In the age of global dialogue, Christians, so the argument goes, cannot live side by side with indifference to the other as though their separation were an unchangeable fact. The move towards global dialogue and search for common values is also Huntington’s (1996) reconciliatory perspective in order to avoid a civilisational clash and cultural confrontation. Huntington writes of 'fault lines' separating civilisations by using the geological metaphor of 'tectonic plates' colliding. For him, civilisations concern a geographical area and they have a 'core state' as a focal point. In fact, he represents civilisations as states writ large; and their relationships are conceived in line with neorealist international relations theories. Thus, we may ask ourselves if dialogue is the only alternative to polarisation.

Instead of promoting the supposedly universal features of one civilization, the requisites for cultural coexistence demand a search for what is common to most civilizations. In a multicivilizational world, the constructive course is to renounce universalism, accept diversity, and seek commonalities (Huntington, 1996: 318).

By aiming at reconciliation and peace, a part of the theology of all major religions, the ecumenical model of dialogue seeks what unites rather than what divides in searching for consensual understanding instead of confrontation. This activity is not only a specific work or training for an educated elite, but it is complementary to one's complex religious identity. Understanding 'the other' with respect for distinctiveness, one has the opportunity of becoming critically aware of previous historic miscalculations and limitations. Thus, 'ecumenical education takes place essentially as an international learning by experience, by a direct encounter and confrontation with situations in a world horizon, with all their shocking and frustrating accompaniments' (Simpfendörfer, 1982: 54). The elements of dialogue may redefine previous religious adversaries who desire
learning and building on insights and observations of others through mutual recognition of difference.

Like any other movement consisting of individuals and groups involved in seeking to accomplish social change, there are also objections from some who try to block or disrupt the processes of rapprochement. Originally ecumenism developed in a non-structured manner objecting to religious division, arguing for a basis of shared understanding and common expectation. Once it became institutionalised, the ecumenical movement developed in organisations with distinctive purpose.

**Criticism and obstacles to the ecumenical movement**

*Institutional elitism and feminism*

Like any other human endeavour, ecumenism has been seen as having flaws and weaknesses. Sometimes, ecumenical discussions generate bitter debates, and have become austere and polemical in quality. A major criticism of ecumenical cooperation is that it is increasingly ‘bureaucratic and scholarly rather than a grass-root movement’ (Greeley, 1972: 247), being accessible only to individuals having an ecclesiastical authority or high social status (Mehl, 1970). ‘There is no reason to suppose that religious organizations are not affected by this process of a shift from “charismatic” to “bureaucratic” leadership – to put the matter in excessively sharp terms (Yinger, 1969: 172). Indeed, the most significant ecumenical and inter-religious events occur in formal setting with appointed representatives from various churches, groups and organisations (Yinger, 1969). The claim that an intellectual elitist circle permanently recruits itself and sustains the ecumenical movement is also often a critique brought by various anti-ecumenist groups. Berger argues that:

The social-psychological type emerging in the leadership of the bureaucratised religious institutions is, naturally, similar to the bureaucratic personality in other institutional contexts – activist, pragmatically oriented, not given to administratively irrelevant reflection, skilled in interpersonal relations, ‘dynamic’ and conservative at the same
time and so forth. The individuals conforming to this type in the different religious institutions speak the same language and, naturally, understand each other’s problems. In other words, the bureaucratisation of the religious institutions lays a social-psychological foundation for ‘ecumenicity’ – an important fact to understand, we would contend (Berger, 1973: 145).

American ecumenist Henry Pitney van Dusen suggested in One Great Ground of Hope (1961) that a danger might arise whereby membership of conferences and meetings is shifting from the age of lonely ‘ecumenical prophets’ to the days of the bureaucrats and official representatives. ‘Policy making is likely to be “delegated upward” – to national and international conventions, composed of those persons most concerned with the problem in hand’ (Yinger, 1969: 179). Weber’s approach is also apposite; as for him charismatic religious leaders’ convictions frequently play a mobilising role in demanding social change. The work of charismatic leaders however is vulnerable to the routinisation of charisma, an example of tendencies whereby ‘the modern world would see the driving out of personalized value-centred relationships in favour of impersonal technocratic modes of organization, symbolised as an Iron Cage’ (Holton, 1998: 168).

Many activists are at various times ‘movement intellectuals’ (Eyerman and Jamison, 1991). Social actions require a spontaneous answer to the new societal issues being crystallised around new exploratory intellectual activities. ‘To be involved in ecumenism means being involved in the totality of ideas, principles, problems, activities and institutions which together account for the origin and development of the ecumenical movement’ (Lambert, 1967: 31). Thus, specialised knowledge is commonly required from the ecumenical negotiation members, sometimes regarded as a ‘new global elite’ (Urry, 2003: 112). ‘The religion of clerics and elites has rarely been identical to that of the mass of the population nor has the community of the faithful been particularly democratic in its regulation of belief and practice’ (Held et al, 2003: 333). In this context, ‘the need for professionals also concerns the administration of movement organisations, which in today’s highly organised societies is ever more intensified’ (Eyerman and Jamison, 1991: 106). This is particularly relevant for
our study. Often, official ecumenical dialogue is criticised, as taking place among an elite ‘estranged’ from the main church organisation; and while the theological discourses become convergent, the life of the respective religious communities remains unchanged by the new rapprochement.

Some feminists perceive ecumenical organisations as ‘gentlemen’s clubs’ and thus when dealing with issues regarding sexism one may notice an ‘ecumenical minefield’. In the West, the topic of sexism in the churches (individual and institutional) and its abolition remains one of the most controversial issues on the agenda of the present ecumenical movement. The discourses regarding gender and sexuality ‘are the defining issues that separate progressives and conservatives, ecclesiastical Left and Right. They are simply not matters on which it is possible to imagine a church member having no opinion’ (Jenkins, 2002: 198-9).

Feminist theologian Ursula King (1998) emphasises the failure of ecumenism to involve women in religious dialogue and representation. King, an active proponent of women’s rights insists that a rigorous analysis of ecumenism must include an understanding of women’s lives and commitment to a culture of equal rights between men and women. She highlights the hierarchical and androcentric character of ecumenism as an extension of an unchallenged traditional Christian theology, patriarchal in its origin. While trying to seek the relevance of the ecumenical dialogue for women, she argues for the restructuring of society on the principles of justice vis-à-vis women’s marginalisation and a new politics of social responsibility in the era of globalisation. By bringing a critique to the prevailing culture, she believes that feminism is necessary for men to become conscious of their dominant role.

In the context of discussing the theological challenges posed by the existence of religious pluralism and by the development of greater contact and dialogue between people of different faiths it is imperative to reckon with the global, cross-cultural dialogue occurring among women worldwide today. But this critical, feminist dialogue of women challenges or potentially even subverts interreligious dialogue as it is conducted at present (King, 1998: 47).
Biblical statements that both male and female are created in the image of God, and that in Christ both are incorporated in one body, the church, form the source of the Christian conviction that men and women are of equivalent worth and have complementary contributions to make within the life of the whole society. Christianity argues for a gendered relationship based on mutuality and reciprocity and not on subordination. ‘There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is neither male nor female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus’ (Gal. 3:28). However, over history, men have in most Christian churches and denominations traditionally retained the leading role in priesthood, liturgy, policy-making and scholarship. Thus, contemporary allegations of sexism in the West (Ruether, 1983) have raised a serious objection to patriarchal theology and ecumenism by touching deeply the matrix of the churches’ existence. The Bible, being itself shaped by patriarchal values, has over three millennia been also interpreted almost exclusively from the male perspective, therefore some feminists consider that female participation in shaping cult and theology was not at the forefront, although the role of women was prominent in the Jesus movement and the Early Church (Moltmann-Wendel, 1982).

We may question whether the ecumenical movement may represent the interest of women without a Women-Church movement, and, also question whether detrimental elements of patriarchy have been sufficiently scrutinised and addressed. Critical feminists like King argue regarding interfaith dialogue that:

At present, feminism remains a missing dimension in interreligious dialogue. If it were to become a truly integral part, this would mean a radical political and theological transformation of all interreligious relations as presently conceived. It might also mean a new birth and fuller disclosure of the powers of the Spirit whose oneness embraces and transcends all differences, as many religions so frequently preach and proclaim, but much less often translate into practice (King, 1998: 52-3).

The Abrahamic religions share more in their common representation of women than they have differences. Reproductive civil rights, such as contraception and abortion, are ‘ecumenically opposed’ not only by Western Christianity (Roman Catholicism and Christian Right) but also by Muslims (in some Islamic states). A
crucial episode here was the International Conference on Population and Development held in Cairo in 1994. There, the Vatican and some Latin American countries joined with Islamic states to prevent abortion being approved as a method of family planning. What is not clear is whether this common ground reflects ecumenical religious ideas, or has broader political and cultural elements (Ryall, 2001). The conclusion of Algerian sociologist and feminist activist Marie-Aimée Hélïe-Lucas, coordinator of the global solidarity network (Moghadam, 2001) of Women Living Under Muslim Laws is that that this ‘new fundamentalism’ is in fact intrinsically a political matter disguised in religious manifestation, a camouflage for deeper infrastructural societal conflicts:

At the global level, the 1994 United Nations International Conference on Population and Development, held in Cairo, gave a formidable example of the unholy alliance between the Vatican and El-Azhar University (the first Islamic University and a source for fatwas [religious opinions]) that tried to stop women’s demands for reproductive rights, contraception and abortion. It quickly became clear that the curtailing of reproductive rights that women had faced in Poland and in the ex-Democratic Republic of Germany were indeed part of a concerted effort toward depriving women in Muslim contexts, and globally, of the same rights (Hélïe-Lucas, 1999: 26).

Finnish academic Elina Vuola interprets the above state of affairs more radically in terms of ‘fundamentalist ecumenism or patriarchal ecumenisms’ (2002: 176, original emphases) whereby institutional religions deliberately help maintain a culture of abuse vis-à-vis human rights, by developing new social fundamentalism’. She argues that if the most conservative factions of the Abrahamic religions associate in public political discourse precisely on matters concerning women’s reproductive ability, this may be understood as an indication of their profound male domination. Undoubtedly, ‘women’s rights feminism challenges patriarchalism’ (Havemann, 2000: 24). However, although in Europe and North America sometimes conservatives have endured defeats on issues of gender and sexuality, they continue to receive strong encouragement from the global South (Jenkins, 2002: 199).
Radical post-Christian feminists accuse the churches of being the ideological initiators and promoters of most, if not all, existent sexist practices. By promoting alternative methodology and hermeneutics, radical feminists may lead to a non-conformist revisioning of what is to be redefined church (Walby, 1997). Global patriarchal violence to women (religious and cross-cultural), and its subsequent social conditions are considered the basic ‘paradigmatic model’ for all accountable world oppression (Daly, 1987). Daly argues for the rewriting of all male dominated religious mythology and ancient history to bring the power of the matriarchal values to the forefront, where they originally were situated. It is however unclear how supporters of the slogan ‘if God is male, then the male is God’ (Daly, 1973: 19) will be able to reconcile their extreme socio-political vision with the aim of a tolerant ecumenism.

For Simmel, ‘the female “sense of justice”, which differs from the male in many perspectives, would create a different law as well’ (1984: 68). This may be read as an inadmissible essentialism, but it may simultaneously be seen as a statement about existing gender-based senses of justice in abusive situations (Nason-Clark, 2003). The dilemma is ‘whether women should emphasize their equality with men, or whether they should emphasize difference’ (Robertson, 1992: 106). Currently, both Roman Catholic and Orthodox churches (Eastern and Oriental) continue to be administered by patriarchal designed hierarchies, unwilling to negotiate their traditional values on gender issues. They categorically deny ordination to women. Church patriarchy and state patriarchy represent a common threat. Thus,

[t]he ability or inability of feminist and sexual identity social movements to institutionalize their values will essentially depend on their relationship to the state, the last resort apparatus of patriarchalism throughout history. However, the extraordinary demands placed upon the state by social movements, attacking institutions of domination at their root, emerge at the very moment when the state seems to be in crisis, brought about by the contradiction between the globalization of its future and the identification of its past (Castells, 1999: 242).
This suggests tension between patriarchal and post-patriarchal values, which find ‘differing emphases within contemporary feminism, another of the most significant new social movements’ (Beyer, 1994: 218). We witness a complex dynamic in which ‘gender politics of difference based on the assertion of individual rights of sexual preference and women’s rights of self-determination’ (Holton, 1998: 6) is a salient contributing factor to the dialectics of global identity formation by generating new essentialisms and fundamentalisms (Robertson, 1992).

**Fear of identity loss**

In analysing ecumenical debates, one must consider the discourse of dialectics that combine the particular/local with the universal/global. For centuries, borders have been drawn not just to prevent people’s migration, but also their ideas and influence. The ecumenical movement is also an object of alarm for a significant number of Christians. Some perceive it as a threat to their religious identity, others as a barrier to their missionary zeal. Much of this opposition may be understood as a trend of rational or particularistic resistance to the institutional globalisation of religion.

Presbyterian former director of the Irish School of Ecumenics, Robin Boyd argues that some Christians ‘think of ecumenism as not merely a threat, but a betrayal’ (Boyd, 1981: 3).

Ecumenism, then, is viewed by people of both sides of the Protestant/Roman Catholic divide as a softening up process, designed either to prepare Protestants for eventual absorption into Rome, or to prepare Catholics for the abandonment of traditional and cherished beliefs and practices (Boyd, 1981: 5-6).

Spirit of ’88 is an Anglican organisation created in 1988 in Britain, opposing the bilateral declarations endorsed by the Anglican Roman Catholic International Commission [ARCIC] Agreed Statements. In one of their controversial letters, *The Monarchy in Peril: Ecumenism and the Throne* (1996), they argue that reconciliation with Rome is both a Church and State infidelity. We observe
nationalistic tendencies and ‘cultural defence’ (Bruce, 1996) emphasising the significance of existing nation-state as the basis for individuals’ sense of socio-political identity by advocating the preservation and strengthening of the national church vis-à-vis the Roman Church. Afraid that religious unity implies uniformity and with a strong sense of national pride, this group believes that only an anti-European and anti-ecumenical perspective would save the ‘Protestant throne’ and British Christian heritage. In this context, the term ‘Protestant’ has more than a negative connotation; it is rather an affirmation of the freedom of faith. This particular religious group placed itself in a socially constructed category whereby discourse holds a central position in the identification process.

For them, confidence in British institutions can be restored only through a radical departure from Papal influences (‘Popish superstitions’) and pro-Maastricht politics ‘derived from Roman Catholic social thinking’. Contemplating at local level ‘ethnic survival and/or dissolution’, this point of view has an extensive historical background initiated ‘with Henry VIII’s reversal of the subordinate and provincial religious position of England as a Papal ‘fief’, and by the subsequent tide of Puritan ethnic nationalism’ (Smith, 1993: 109). Past experiences of oppression become highlighted for creating a separate group identity ‘into a broader story seeking to establish the ancient character of nationhood and its intimate connection with institutions such as monarchy and Christendom’ (Holton, 1998: 143).

For some, making a commitment for unity means having to surrender identity and distinctiveness – and with it maybe authority – to a foreign administration. This produces resistance and withdrawal, as assimilation processes are regarded as suspicious. It is perceived that distinctive group characteristics are surrendered. By trying to cling to their denominational heritage, contemporary Protestant Evangelical groups simply oppose ecumenism, seeing it as ‘disguised absorption’ within the Roman Church. This may be understood as a counterculture to ecumenical movement. For them, socio-political ecumenical issues are overestimated at the expense of evangelism. Thus, principles of complementarity remain problematic.
A tendency has developed to look at Roman Catholicism with new eyes, stressing those beliefs which Rome shares with orthodox Christianity, while ignoring her distinctive teachings which in effect cancel out much which Evangelicals hold dear (Webber, 1982: 4).

Against this however, are two further arguments. The first is that the Roman Church has remained distant from the WCC. One reason for this, according to Mehl (1970: 192) is ‘the nostalgia of the reconstruction of a Christendom of the medieval type’. A second reason for resistance to global ecumenism may have to do with greater insecurity created by globalisation. For ecumenist Paul Crow,

[...] the crisis over Christian unity is due to the spiritual uncertainty that marks Western civilization. Ours is a time of unexcelled achievements and capacities, of wealth, technology and knowledge. But a restless and disillusioned people show that these do not satisfy. It is a time of global commerce, communication and travel, all creating a new interdependence. But international interdependence does not create Christian or human unity. Interdependence creates thousands of new links, but it may also intensify the feelings of loneliness and alienation (Crow, 1982: 20).

On the one hand, some evangelicals criticise the ecumenical movement for institutionally ‘promoting world peace and brotherhood’ rather than the specific teaching of Jesus Christ. It creates a secularised image of the Church leading towards spiritual confusion, instead of spiritual conviction (Webber, 1982). For them, divergent doctrinal perspectives remain the main obstacles to church unity. On the other hand, French Catholic theologian George Tavard (1960), analyst of Protestant and Orthodox ecumenism, argues that,

The Anglican contribution towards ecumenism should be put to a critical test. Even the most severe criticism should recognise, however, that this contribution has been irreplaceable. It has made possible an ecumenism that will not be a Protestant imperialism. It has opened the way to a dialogue with the Catholic Church (Tavard, 1960: 53).
Dedicated ecumenists learn that it is problematical at times to escape pessimistic attitudes and debates over identity crises. Although undeniably Christian unity is a wonderful idea, how could it be developed into reality? How could the essential politico-religious antinomies and traditional antipathies of Anglicanism, Roman Catholicism and Orthodoxy ever be overwhelmed? How could reciprocally exclusive traditions ever be reconciled in organisational and spiritual union? John Mbiti (1969) argues that the situation in Africa is so complex, that he regards the ecumenical movement pessimistically.

In the African context, the ecumenical movement will mean that Christians here, as elsewhere in the world, must shed off their identity as Lutherans, Roman Catholics, Anglicans, Orthodox, or members of independent Churches, in order to put on the full image of united Christendom. The ecumenical movement is destructive, not by annihilating the traditions of the many Church denominations, but by surpassing them so they are no longer the ceiling of ecclesiastical identity but only the tutors in the direction of the full Christian Man. That is the theological goal of the current Christian movement towards unity. African Churches are becoming increasingly aware of the movement, and are probably more ready to plunge into its practical demands than are overseas Churches which have institutionalised their historical differences. At the same time there are Christian groups in Africa that are passionately opposed to ecumenism; and in any case, the average Christian does not understand what it is all about (Mbiti, 1969: 266-7).

Writing on the utopian approach, Mannheim (1991: 174) argues that ‘for the sociologist, “existence” is that which is “concretely effective”, i.e. a functioning social order, which does not simply exist in the imagination of certain individuals but according to which people really act’. Thus, for some, ecumenism may be considered mere wishful thinking and pious aspiration; admirable in endeavour, but unfortunately doomed to failure and hence, a waste of valuable time and energy. They consider Christian unity as an impossible, impractical ideal. Ecumenism becomes an unrealistic, misguided activity, and undeniably precarious insofar as it is bound to lead eventually to disenchantment. They regard as utopian concepts that from their perspective may never be realisable. However,
Mannheim is of the opinion that ‘wishful thinking has always figured in human affairs’ (1991: 184), and ‘even as many efforts are being made, against strong obstacles for “ecumenicalism” within Christendom, the world becomes so thoroughly interactive that the need is clearly for a world ecumenicalism’ (Yinger, 1969: 184).

It is significant that despite relative homogeneity in hierarchical organisational structures, Protestants are not able to unite. Even those from within similar tradition, Presbyterians and Methodists, are trying hard to heal their own divisions. Bryan Turner argues that ‘previous research into national forms of ecumenism has drawn attention to the profound difficulties of securing agreement between churches of the same religion, claiming separate versions of truth’ (1994: 77). If Protestants are unable to unite among themselves, subscribing to the traditional either/or thinking, how would we expect union between Anglicans, Orthodox and Roman Catholics? Most non-Roman Christians may never accept papal primacy or infallibility (Küng, 1994). In Roman Catholic doctrine, the infallibility of the bishop of Rome means the preservation of the judgement from error for the maintenance of the Church in the truth. This indicates that some dogmas remain unchanged as ever, and in ecumenical terms, at the present Rome is both far from Canterbury and Constantinople.

[...] the crisis of the ecumenical movement is fundamentally a reflection of the crisis of the churches. The hesitancies or the lack of firm commitment to full unity are but symptoms of internal conflicts, the faith crises, institutional survival pangs, uncertainties with an alien society within the particular churches – Roman Catholic, Protestant or Orthodox. It is important to acknowledge that the critical state of the ecumenical movement at this moment is an essential part of its life and vitality; Christian unity and ecumenism will always be in such a crisis (Crow, 1982: 21, original emphases).

So, is ecumenism a ‘concrete utopia’ like the idea of the responsible society aiming at peace and justice, participation and sustainability? Even if this project appears unrealistic, its hope is not irrelevant, as it aims to develop an ideal community free from conflict that incorporates a clear set of values and principles
that allow complete satisfaction of the religious actors involved in dialogue. If we consider utopias a set of ideas without a place (τὸ ἴδιο τοῦ) in reality, we have to acknowledge that historically, through revolutionary thinking and social interaction, some utopias became realities. From this perspective it is arguable that the ecumenical project may be considered emancipatory.

Denominationalism

Denominationalism has been portrayed negatively, as the ‘moral failure’ of Christianity (Niebuhr, [1929] 1975), because it severely hampered evangelisation efforts in the mission fields. The purpose of denominationalism is of a similar nature with intense competitiveness and social divisiveness. Church function depended upon the diversity of reinforced denominationalism. Lack of consensus (Roberts, 1990) facilitated division of church and society along ethnic, economic and linguistic lines. It was this compromise that Niebuhr ([1929] 1975) pronounced as the ‘sin of denominationalism’ and ‘unacknowledged hypocrisy’. After the 16th century Reformation, instead of trying to recognise each other’s validity of ‘sacraments’, divided and competing Western communities attempted to acknowledge themselves as ecclesial communities with common aim: service to God and the world. They assumed that this was not a matter of ‘confessional’ agreements, but of a more existential rapprochement to which the whole divided Christendom was invited. For Niebuhr, denominationalism

‘represents the accommodation of Christianity to the caste-system of human society. It carries over into the organization of the Christian principle of brotherhood the prides and prejudices, the privileges and prestige, as well as the humiliations and abasements, the injustices and inequalities of the spacious order of high and low wherein men find the satisfaction of their craving for vainglory. The division of the churches closely follows the division of men into the castes of national, racial, and economic groups (Niebuhr, [1929] 1975: 6).

Churches function in diverse cultural frameworks, social environments and political systems. Accepting diversity and the pluralism of theological methodologies is already component of the Christian Tradition process. Since the
Reformation, denominationalism represents a pattern of religious structuring and variety that appeared mainly in the West under the conditions of religious pluralism, disestablishment, toleration and religious liberty. Denominationalist patterns vary geographically, reflecting the social-cultural landscape, the political configurations, and the religious route taken in each country (Mullin and Richey eds, 1994). However, ecumenism, the very movement expected to discourage sectarian attitudes, since it is designed to promote unity, has immediate consequences.

A curious thing is happening in contemporary Protestantism. Alongside an ecumenical concern for the reunion of Christendom is a growing denominational self-consciousness that threatens to perpetuate the ancient divisions. Whether this is creative or destructive has been a topic of considerable debate [...]. Many Protestants feel that the new emphasis on denominationalism [...] jeopardises ecumenical concern. [...] Another group of Protestants feels that [...] the ecumenical cause will best be served as each denomination holds up for public inspection, discussion, and possible amendment its own particular gifts to ‘the coming great church’ (Brown, 1961: 216).

As ‘ecumenicalism challenges denominationalism and fundamentalism’ (Havemann, 2000: 24), a successful plan in pursuing the unity and universality of the institutional Church would bring divided Christendom of the oikumenē into one faith and one Eucharistic fellowship. The Great Commission launched the Church toward her global mission, so the missionaries worldwide understood that all nations were called to become Christ’s disciples. ‘And this gospel of the kingdom will be preached in all the world [oikumenē] as a witness to all the nations, and then the end will come’ (Matt, 24: 14). Christian hermeneutics and exegesis (Biblical critical discourse analysis) interprets that the mission is addressed to the entire globe. Yet, states legislate for Church – State separation, guarantee religious freedom enveloping the existing religious pluralism in political sanctity.

The future of denominationalism and of its relation to democratic society remains an interesting question. As Greeley (1972: 104) quotes ‘America was a
denominational society before it became a nation. There never has been a formally established church, and there surely never will be’. It is significant that in America, the term reunion, generally used for the recovery and restoration of an originally given unity, is not appropriate. Here, one single institutional Church has never existed, therefore, the word union may be used; to indicate that what is sought is (first-time) unity. The understanding of organic unity – whereby the institutional church is so united that the ultimate loyalty of every member would be given to the whole institution and not to any part of it – has never existed in America. When European Christians emigrated to America, a new form of church developed, shaped by the environment of the new culture and democratic ideals. With this imperial expansion went ecclesiastical enlargement. The Christian unity problematic was posed in a new key, and solutions were to be sought in hitherto untried contexts.

The settlers to the East Coast came from European nations that had long traditions of Church-State establishments. When the first Amendment broke with this tradition it guaranteed both freedom to practice religion and freedom to dissent from religion. Americans then had the civil right to belong to a church, to ignore all churches, or to form a different religious group altogether. Religious freedom was an invitation to disagree, to protest, to regroup for experimentation with new forms of belief and practices. It also allowed churches to be exclusive in membership, excluding persons of different ethnic and racial background, education, income, and social status (Fichter, 1988: 125-6).

English Puritan John Winthorp (1606-1676), one of the first colonisers and founder of the New England, left a trend, which continues to remain embedded in the consciousness of the people of the United States. ‘We shall be as a City upon a Hill’, a phrase of John Winthrop’s from his 1630 sermon challenged fellow Puritans to build ‘a model community’ (Kennedy, 1994) that would serve as an example of how the rest of the world should order its existence. For him, America was an exceptional society following a Judeo-Christian Messianic tradition worthy of imitation by others. Thus, due to unique socio-political and historical conditioning, in America the nature of institutionalised Christianity remains special (Bellah et al, 1996).
America itself had religious meaning to the colonists from the very beginning. The conjunction of the Protestant Reformation and the discovery of the new world made a profound impression on the early colonists. They saw their task of settlement as God-given: an “errand into the wilderness,” an experiment in Christian living, the founding of a “city upon a hill.” Many early settlers were refugees from persecution in England (Bellah et al, 1996: 219-20).

Originally, ‘the colony was to be a refuge for truth, a religious rather than a commercial enterprise’ (Morgan, 1958: 43). Later on, the denomination was the organisational form expressing religious freedom won by independence and guaranteed by the American Constitution’s pledge for the separation of state and church. Since then, it is arguable that the ideas of exceptionalism and religious tolerance remained in American history and culture down to present time.

In view of the arguments against ecclesiastical separation, there are reasons to believe that in the future, ‘a sectarian, or “ghetto”, Christianity can only fail far worse than did the warring, divided church in the encounter with the Renaissance and the Enlightenment’ (Wingenbach, 1987: 151). This is relevant considering that ‘the type of isolation produced by absence of intercommunication through difference in language, customs, sentiments, traditions, and social forms’ (Wirth, [1928] 1969: 287) leads towards a ghettoised physical space and state of mind. In his 1928 landmark study of The Ghetto, Wirth took a term commonly used to describe areas of Jewish settlement and elaborated a history and sociological paradigm which might be successfully conveyed to the Christian context. Thus, Christian life becomes sterile and the ecumenical movement will remain ineffective if ‘problems are settled by rules and laws, not by personal contact and intimate discussion’ (Wirth, [1928] 1969: 282).

Conclusion

In this Chapter we noted how the concept of oikoumenē, initially a Hellenistic idea developed in the Early Church milieu, became a movement of Church unity in Western Europe. Oikoumenē maintained both ecclesiastical and secular
meanings, being associated with the realm of advanced culture and civilisation (Delanty, 1995). In the first millennium, the institution of the ecumenical council, legitimated by imperial political structures achieved a sense of universality. After centuries of divisions and schism, modern ecumenism argued for the delivery of global Christian oneness, searching for models of unity through the means of dialogue which transcend differences of doctrine and socio-political context. The science of ecumenics, established within an advanced educational setting, involved churches in conversation at both micro and macro levels. In the context of new global ethics where Küng (1997) argues that the major religions have a similar ethical core, ecumenism proposed a new *gemeinschaft/gesellschaft* understanding of religious communities and networks. The ecumenical project based on negotiation and consensus-building tries to overcome the *gemeinschaft/gesellschaft* dichotomous institutional perception, by searching for a harmonious co-existence between local and global religious actors.

Christian Churches face societal trends that make them rethink their missionary strategy (Wilson, 1990). It is argued that various traditional agents shaping ecumenical affairs maintain institutional elitism and sexist behaviour, by ignoring the multiplicity and interconnectedness of the forces that maintain gender inequalities through patriarchal structures. There are also objections from groups who fear an imminent identity loss and prefer denominationalism and the *status quo* boundary maintenance considering ecumenical trends as a threat to local religious conditions and a diminution of civil and political rights. They allege that ecumenism is a destructive form of global religious governance leading to a homogenised view that ignores differences, religious toleration and constitutive faith. Thus we notice continuous dynamic in distinguishing between unity on the one hand and uniformity on the other.

Ecumenism, mobilising around specific issues, is nonetheless significant both for sociology of globalisation and sociology of religion. While nationality and citizenship have not lost their significance in the contemporary global system, some Christians view themselves as part of a broader global ecumenical community as well as belonging to specific religious affiliations. Ecumenism sustains local, national, regional and global forms of identity that are linked to a civil society across national boundaries, thus reshaping international/ecclesiastical
politics. However, while an ecumenical approach to religion wants to demonstrate positive contribution to global civil society, there are also various fundamentalist expressions in the global field that disagree with the politics of rapprochement.

The anti-ecumenical trend may be considered close to the anti-globalisation position. While, religious global linkages permeate local settings in search for common conditions, anti-ecumenism advocates for locality and for indigenous cultures. World-spanning ecumenical interests are believed to campaign for a world society with its own culture of dialogue, which brings to many a consciousness different to the traditional/parochial values. As certain religious institutions and interactions become global, for some, ‘ecumenical imperialism’ is believed to displace or change the local status quo. Growing similarities provoke reactions and fear of homogeneity drives the efforts of fundamentalists to reinstate what they consider orthodoxy, by claiming their right to particular religious heritage survival. However religious distinctiveness is itself part of global culture as heterogeneity is integral to globalisation. When world society integrates, churches become conscious in being part of global ecumenical networks, subject to global forces, and governed by dialogical principles.

European Reformation led the Western Church towards major theological fragmentation and political division. However, after centuries of institutional separation, some Protestant individuals aimed for restoration of Church unity through committed ecumenical dialogue and rapprochement. I argue that the Protestant ecumenical revolution may be described as a ‘second Reformation’ designed to re-evaluate reciprocated historical ambiguities and reunite global Christianity through reconciliation, interchurch cooperation and renewal. This is motivated by both internal and external conditions. On the one hand Protestants searched for ideological common understanding in order to restore some kind of doctrinal unity. On the other hand ecclesiastical diversity and institutional pluralism contradicted the unifying universal evangelical message in the mission field. Thus, ecumenism involves not so much global as glocal characteristics. Universality may here be understood as a matter of church adaptability to a variety of local contexts, as well as a matter of transcontextual consensus, based on fidelity to tradition – unity in space and unity in time. In Part Two, the case studies in my selection concretely illustrate this glocal condition.

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Chapter 3: Globalisation and Religion with Particular Reference to Ecumenism

Introduction

In this Chapter I investigate the history and dynamic development of the concept of globalisation with special reference to culture and religion. It is beyond the scope of this section to offer anything like a complete overview of the work of the major social theorists on this topic, let alone a review of the entire literature regarding religious globalisation. In this study, religion is related to debates about global processes (unidimensional versus multidimensional accounts), global dynamics (monocausal versus multicausal), and global culture (homogenising versus heterogenising) (Held et al, 2003). As with the previous chapter, this provides the theoretical background to the empirical argumentation which follows in the second part of the thesis.

Globalisation, besides its rational understanding, has come to be an emotionally charged aspect of public discourse. Globalisation has emerged as one of the key conceptual and theoretical points of discussion in the social sciences. Discourses about globalisation are also strongly normative. For some globalisation implies the promise of a better worldwide civil society, contributing to a new age of peace, harmony and democratisation, for others, it implies either corporate control of the globe or the risk of an American politico-economic hegemony. Religion comes into the debate over globalisation most often through discussions of limits to globalisation, with a focus on fundamentalism and ethno-religious particularisms. However, ecumenism has also arisen as a theme within multidimensional accounts of globalisation processes (Robertson, 1992; Beyer, 1994, Waters, 2001), and may be seen as one of the most salient aspects of religious forms of globalisation.

What functions, meanings and significance have global religious systems or movements in peoples’ lives across the world? This chapter explores the wider structural and institutional context of cultural-religious relations on a global scale focusing on the sociological ideas presented by Robertson (1992), Beyer (1994) and Beckford (2000). Their theories will be scrutinised for their understanding of
the historical relevance of religion in a globalised social milieu. Even if global religious communities are now realisable, religious differences remain relevant, as cultural homogenisation and irreversible global integration are often overrated. This discussion includes questions both about the impact of globalisation on religion, and religion as a globalising force.

Globalisation – historical, complex and dynamic phenomena

The word ‘globe’ originates from the Latin *globus* which means a round body or mass in the shape of a sphere. Its English usage began with the middle of the 16th century and was soon applied to the terrestrial globe, to our world, as ‘it was only the Copernican revolution that could convince humanity that it inhabited a globe’ (Waters, 2001: 7). A new understanding of the planetary setting became religiously challenging, thus shifting to the heliocentric theory had profound consequences regarding both world consciousness and Christian world perception. The age of exploration witnessed the confirmation of the spherical shape of the earth, however, ‘Christianity would have to wait until the military and colonial expansion of Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to acquire a global presence’ (Held et al, 2003: 333). This generated a new appreciation of the world and its essential oneness (Wallerstein, 1979).

In the continuing discussion about globalisation there is no consensus on its precise definition. Nevertheless, despite confusion about the term itself, almost everyone would agree that it has arisen in relation to the increasingly interconnected character of the socio-economic and political processes on this planet (Urry, 2003). Globalisation is ‘a fashionable concept in the social sciences’ (Hirst and Thompson, 1996: 1) and a ‘key word’ (Harvey, 2000: 53) describing how ‘human integration’ (Nederveen Pieterse, 2004: 38) developed as a central reality of our life.

Globalisation presents new challenges to comparative studies. For most social scientists, globalisation implies the removal of some barriers to trade, deregulation of financial markets and capital mobility, and technological revolution in information processing and communication. The growth of supranational agencies and the cross-national activities of governments and NGOs also
constitute a new global focus for sociological analysis. For Urry, sociology must adjust to new patterns of radical mobility to engage successfully with globalisation:

‘Globalization’ debates transform many existing sociological controversies, such as the relative significance of social structure, on the one hand, and human agency, on the other. Investigating the global also dissolves strong dichotomies between human subjects and physical objects, as well as that between the physical sciences and the social sciences. The study of the global disrupts many conventional debates and should not be viewed as merely an extra level or domain that can be ‘added’ to existing sociological analysis that can carry on regardless. ‘Sociology’ will not be able to sustain itself as a specific and coherent discourse focused upon the study of given, bounded or ‘organized’ capitalist societies. It is irreversibly changed (Urry, 2003: 3).

The global paradigm we speak of today is often seen as predominantly politico-economic (Wallerstein, 1974; Harvey, 1989). In this sense, globalisation is a process of intensified activity directed towards the integration of national economies into a single world economy, aiming for increased trade and flows of capital across borders. However, economic globalisation is not only to be confined to contemporary times:

The present highly internationalized economy is not unprecedented: it is one of a number of distinct conjunctures or states of the international economy that have existed since an economy based on modern industrial technology began to be generalized from the 1860s. In some respects, the current international economy is less open and integrated than the regime that prevailed from 1870 to 1914 (Hirst and Thompson, 1996: 2, original emphasis).

Another definition suggests that globalisation refers most commonly to processes in which the global has become the reference point for transactions, while categories such as nation, state and region are thought to have become less significant by comparison (Hirst and Thompson, 1996). Sceptics, like Hirst and
Thompson meanwhile point to a conflation of supra-national processes that challenge nations with inter-national processes that involve nations, or at least the more powerful ones. In addition, economic globalisation, helped by military and technological development, is increasingly ethically contested for implying ‘a profound geographical reorganization of capitalism’ (Harvey, 2000: 57).

Although the Phoenicians, the Venetians and the Vikings had achieved much using human rowers, the distant contacts that they made could not be sustained precisely because of an insufficiently developed economy of energy. Only the multi-masted sailing vessel, the Spanish galleon, the British clipper, or the Chinese junk, could sustain a pattern of global economic colonization. Indeed, only such vessels could carry more people than the number needed to power them and thus move settlers from Europe en masse to the far-flung reaches of the globe (Waters, 2001: 170).

Some oppose ‘globalisation’ when they refer to the economic dimension of globalisation as if this was the only form that globalisation could take (Ellwood, 2001; Hertz, 2001). They argue that the strongly interconnected economic system, networked by many transnational and multinational companies, leads to a growing world trade and increasing importance of financial markets. Such an approach argues that patterns of exclusion on the global scale are systematic and structural and that a new global ethic (Küng, 1991) is necessary to bring about a more inclusive socio-economic order. Consequently, growing mobility of capital may escape national or international control, and, with the help of speculative transactions of electronic monies, worldwide manipulations take place. Thus, globalisation creates ‘winners and losers’ (Holton, 1998) as capital transactions may disadvantage and marginalise some poorer social strata, whereas elitist groups gain through ‘economic miracles’. As economic globalisation appears to be unavoidable, we witness simultaneously interconnectedness and alienation.

Regarding the modern world-system, from a perspective derived from Marx and Polanyi, Wallerstein (1974) argues that core geographical regions control the capitalist world-economy and exploit the remainder of the system. The periphery, consisting of those areas that supply raw materials and labour, is systematically exploited, while the semiperiphery encompasses a set of regions somewhere
between the exploiting and the exploited. For Wallerstein, the economic division of labour in the world is more important than state borders. Thus, we may ask if global institutions are sufficiently accountable and how can meaningful governance come from the private sector? One effect of economic globalisation processes, it is argued, has been to alter the relationship between State authority and the market forces. The State becomes sometimes ineffective in the face of mobile capital, which escapes disadvantageous conditions within national jurisdictions. ‘But while individual states have lost some of their powers, […] geopolitical democratisation has created new opportunities. It became harder for any core power to exercise discipline over others and easier for peripheral powers to insert themselves into the capitalist competitive game’ (Harvey, 2000: 65-6). This leads towards a balance shift between private in opposition to public interests with serious consequences on social welfare and social cohesion.

This kind of globalisation is also believed to be one of the ways in which the authority of the nation state is undermined even if ‘global capital cannot operate without state regulation and state capacities for social reproduction’ (Waters, 2001: 221). However, Braithwaite (2002) argues that one of the intriguing features of the patterning of business regulation is that at the global level, because there is no sovereign, regulation tends to be less punitive and frequently substantially consistent with a restorative and responsive normative framework. The unfortunate thing with many global regulatory challenges, which also include human rights enforcement, is that there are not sufficient resources for close monitoring (Hirst and Thompson, 1996; Braithwaite, 2002). Similarly, Amartya Sen sees this as damaging trust requiring greater regulatory transparency:

In social interactions, individuals deal with one another on the basis of some presumption of what they are being offered and what they can expect to get. In this sense, the society operates on some basic presumption of trust. Transparency guarantees deal with the need for openness that people can expect: the freedom to deal with one another under guarantees of disclosure and lucidity. When that trust is seriously violated, the lives of many people – both direct parties and third parties – may be affected by the lack of openness. Transparency guarantees (including the right to disclosure) can thus be an important category of instrumental freedom.
These guarantees have a clear instrumental role in preventing corruption, financial irresponsibility and underhand dealings (Sen, 2000: 39-40, original emphasis).

How does globalisation relate to Americanisation or Westernisation? Processes of American homogenisation are debated by critics of cultural globalisation as an extension of mass culture that may indiscriminately flatten the variety of local cultures. ‘According to the convergence principle, contemporary globalization is westernization or Americanization writ large, a fulfilment in instalments of the classical imperial and modernization theses (Nederveen Pieterse, 2004: 57). Is such ‘dominance’ necessarily leading to either submission or resistance? McDonald’s corporate strategy of exercising power over both products and employees is a relevant case of the processes of global rationalisation. McDonaldisation, a face of globalisation (sometimes synonymous with Westernisation and modernisation) reflects a new ‘imperial power’ in influencing values over the whole world. It may be argued that ‘at any rate, ‘Westernisation’ is a lumping concept that ignores diverse historical currents’ (Nederveen Pieterse, 2001: 102). Is globalisation a form of imperialism, along with the supposed invasiveness of American culture to be regarded as an equivalent of cultural international aggression?

Much of the outline of what we presently call globalisation such as long-distance trade or cross-border cultural diffusion was historically developed before the emergence of the United States (Robertson, 1992; Holton, 1998; Marks, 2002; Nederveen Pieterse, 2004). Scholars operating within a political economy perspective, who examine the dynamics and power imbalances by drawing on concepts such as Americanisation and the role of global capitalism are apparently prone to a latent determinism with over-emphasis on homogenisation. Based on this argument, it may be considered misleading to propose that globalisation emanated from the United States, despite the fact that some are convinced and argue without reservation that globalisation is ‘unregulated’ Americanisation or successfully enforced pax Americana (Hirst and Thompson, 1996).

Globalization, too, is more than westernisation. To be sure, in many of its forms it can be said to be merely the latest version of Americanization, but
this is inadequate since globalization also entails the worldwide displacement and diffusion of all culture. It is less a process emanating from one origin than a multidirectional web (Delanty, 2000: 83-4).

The Americanisation theory as globalisation is too simplistic to be coherent, because it ignores both the realities of resistance to homogenisation and choice, as well as the persistence of ethno-nationalism in contemporary society. For this reason it is also arguable that ‘the outcome of globalization processes is open-ended and current globalization is as much a process of easternization as of westernisation, as well as of many interstitial influences’ (Nederveen Pieterse, 2004: 57). Tastes, ideas and consumer choice vary and often are not influenced by culture, regions, nationalities and socio-economic status. Not all people around the world necessarily identify themselves with Coca-Cola, McDonalds or other transnational icons. Holton observes ‘global cultural forms emerging that are transnational in form yet far from dominated by global capitalism’ (1998: 161), disagreeing that people will simply become passive consumers of Western or American culture, advertised by multinational corporations and networks, just because it is easily available. For example, as we shall see in the following chapters, a great many times, religious values, parochial views, local practices and certain cultural fundamentalisms fail to succumb to pressures of global processes.

Undoubtedly, processes of rationalisation and standardisation ‘based on efficiency, calculability, predictability and control over both products and labour force’ (168) bring our world closer together. However it remains less clear what cultural processes arise. The globalisation of culture dominated by economic powers, in this case understood as cultural/religious imperialism, has also the potential of making some parts of the world less tolerant to diversity. Paradoxically, while trying to prevent homogenising phenomena, local cultures also become commercialised under the development of tourism.

Americanisation brings with it fragmentation of economy and society as global consumerism becomes dominant, even if ‘English is becoming the lingua franca of the global communication system’ (Waters, 2001: 203). Against this, ‘cultural marketers’ who develop new structures (Hirst and Thompson, 1996) must approach each country individually by taking into account particularities with a
high degree of awareness regarding sometimes-fundamental changes in economic political systems. The cultural consequences of globalisation are complex and ‘there can be no denying that globalization processes have intensified over the past 100 years’ (Holton, 1998: 49). In almost each aspect of human enterprise, including culture and religion, global level interaction is increasingly significant.

**Religion and globalisation**

While the primary political economic emphasis in such debates over globalisation means the connections between globalisation and religion are under-researched, a number of sociologists have provide broad definitions to globalisation that are not dominated by economic or political economic theories (Robertson, 1992; Featherstone, Lash and Robertson (eds), 1995; Holton, 1998, 2000; Nederveen Pieterse, 2000; Beckford, 2000; Waters, 2001). Globalisation may be seen as having cultural dimensions including the generation of diasporas and hybrid cultures as well as the advance of multiculturalism (Kivisto, 2002). Globalisation, through mechanisms such as immigration and cultural diffusion involves new cultural configurations, including hyphenated-identities, acknowledgment of religious pluralism and minorities in unitary states, and new social movements including self-determination. Multiculturalism in countries of high immigration takes a number of forms, some of which tend towards cultural separatism, as in the USA (Delanty, 2004), while others seek inter-cultural co-operation within a liberal-democratic citizenship framework as in Australia (Holton, 1998). The latter celebrates openness and cultural, linguistic, religious diversity in contrast with the assimilationist perspectives whereby a subordinate group effectively has to accept and internalise the values and culture of a dominant group i.e. ‘cultural minority within a larger political entity’ (Holton, 1998: 149). In an epoch of intensified globalisation, cultures and religions may come closer to one another as well as grow in different directions; however, religious integration in some sense rests upon the co-existence of communities and unimpeded movement between them.

Some fear that multiculturalism undermines traditional values giving way to ‘dangerous’ ethnonationalist debates in favour of particular groups. ‘This order is often overlaid with religious associations, which not only reinforce ethnic group
membership, but also add an appeal to transcendent religious principles to the other symbolic gratifications of ethnicity’ (Holton, 1998: 150). Implicitly this could lead towards the development of fundamentalist tendencies of those who believe that multiculturalism could lead to importation of incompatible symbols, cultures and traditions within the indigenous milieu.

This thesis explores the proposition that the global and the local may in certain circumstances be ‘mutually reinforcing rather than necessarily in conflict’ (Holton, 2000: 144). One context within which religious interaction between global and local has taken place is in exchanges and conflict between dominant Western forms of Christianity and non-Western societies. This may seem especially true in the 19th century epoch of Empire where missionary activities for the global West impacted on local religious communities. Here conflict could be widespread. Alternatively different forms of globalising religion might come into contact. As Urry suggests

Islam, Hinduism, ‘born-again’ Christianity and many ‘local’ religions themselves come to develop global characteristics, each seemingly knowledgeable about how each is developing a global visibility and responding to such processes of co-evolution (Urry, 2003: 92).

Increasingly, religious varieties such as Pentecostalism or Jehovah’s Witnesses (Beckford, 2000) demonstrate the relatively unplanned, multifaceted and multidirectional nature of global religious movements. Finally, local that is to say particular elements may come together in co-operative ecumenical movements, an example of global, regional and local reinforcing each other. I argue that in this case, institutional development of Pan-Anglican/Lambeth Conferences or Inter-Orthodox Consultations may be relevant examples (Limouris, 1994). So, within the religious field these processes are complex. Western hegemonic knowledge may suppress local/indigenous perspectives, sometimes generating polarisation, however, this is not the only outcome. New trends of religious fusion are also possible generating global religious forums such as WCC or World Moslem Congress (Waters, 2001: 149).
Globalisation may be perceived as a secularised term for that which encompasses the world vis-à-vis the Christian perception of the world expressed through *oikos* – the world as the common house – the House of God. Following Appadurai (1990), Waters claims that the enlargement of Western Christian ‘sacriscape’ (2001: 187) marked historically the ‘germinal phase’ of the phenomena that encompass globalisation (Robertson, 1992: 58). Globalisation may be also regarded as an extension of modernity throughout the entire world that tried to diminish differences through homogenisation. The assumption was that the Enlightenment ideals of freedom, progress and inclusion were considered universal values ready to be worldwide exported just as ‘Christianity and Judaism have spread their adherence to most corners of the globe’ (Held et al, 2003: 332). However, differences continued and instead of one world reality, the extension of modernity through globalisation produced plural modernities that bear similarities yet remained reflective of local cultures and religions. The local could not keep the global out; nevertheless global principles changed according to local rules and particular arrangements through dynamic relationships (Urry, 2003: 121).

The pursuit of global unity may signify the revival of an ancient Christian dream, as expressed by the Synoptics in the *Great Commission*, however ecumenism remains an ambition whose realisation owes much to the elements and methodology of modernity. Global religious consciousness develops in the 16th and 17th centuries with the ‘expanding scope of the Catholic church’ (Robertson, 1992: 58). Later on, in the 20th century, institutional global ecumenism, through the World Missionary Conference and the WCC created network enterprises (Urry, 2003) of unprecedented effect. Evidence of rapid change taking place in a globalising world need not be regarded as a threat to a Christian worldview or to what is sometimes called ‘the uniqueness of Christianity’. Christian ecumenists may engage in the debate and exploration about the meaning and implications of globalisation in a large, holistic frame of mind, insisting always that their Trinitarian God’s purpose and love is never intended for less than the whole humanity and indeed the whole Cosmos.

The earliest worldwide waves of globalisation are marked by a series of socio-economic and political changes. These changes may be referred to as globalising flows (Urry, 2003) that define phenomena worldwide in scope and application
(Appadurai, 1990). Waters (2001) promotes the thesis that cultural-symbolic globalising phenomena are not necessarily subordinate to economic and political trends. Even as globalising processes driven by free-market neo-liberal economic ideology may be inclined to homogenise the world, it is arguable that they also create a heightened sense of the particular, ‘by recognising the value of cultural niches and local abilities’ (Waters, 2001: 192). In the past, the world experienced what Robertson (1992) calls ‘mini-globalizations’, typically expansion of world religions or empires, today regarded as inter-regional affairs built on alliances and partnerships, which refers to the fact that ‘historic empire formation involved the unification of previously sequestered territories and social entities’ (Robertson, 1992: 54). This initial temporal-historical occurrence may be named as ‘the germinal phase’ of globalisation (Robertson, 1992: 58).

Many times in history there have been explosions in world consciousness, the Greek cosmopolis, the Chinese world kingdom, the Christian ecumene, the late medieval ‘great chain of being’. The present global consciousness can be compared to the cosmic mind of the Renaissance, which was both an ‘age of discovery’ and also created the ‘New Learning’ of modern science (Delanty, 2000: 82).

Globalisation, at any point in time, is shaped by multi-dimensional long-term historical processes (Robertson, 1992; Holton, 1998), but at same time has qualitatively new elements. In the contemporary world these include new information and communication technologies and a new organisational logic, that of networking (Castells, 1996). Since globalisation is not monolithic, inflexible and ‘static’ (Beck, 2002: 49), various factors may redirect or reform values and trends that have accompanied it, specifically those that have come into conflict with significant local traditions and values. These globalising processes exercise pressures for societal change at various levels, and their ‘impact is always mediated by specific, historically situated local institutions’ (Lubeck, 2000: 147). They include the emergence of a global sense of the human condition and the consciousness of the globe as such (Robertson, 1992), in a historical context of cross-border movements of ideas, resources and people, with an increased interdependency between various national societies (Holton, 1998). Globalisation
has resulted in the intensification of cross-border relationships thus strengthening intercultural penetration and interaction.

However, for Papastergiadis (2000), migration control plays a fundamental role in defining the limitation of globalising interactions. ‘Green light for the tourists, red light for the vagabonds’ Bauman’s (1999: 93, original emphasis) assertion, identifies a clear class dichotomy with respect to migration and space accessibility. If ‘tourism is a game’ (Urry, 1990: 100), enjoyed by the privileged, religious traditions also want to play an active part by authenticating the tourist experience through pilgrimages. In this context, religious organisations such as the Pontifical Council for the Pastoral Care of Migrants and Itinerant People for example are at the forefront in promoting the values of a Global Code of Ethics for Tourism, Pilgrimages and Shrines (Pontifical Council for the Pastoral Care of Migrants and Itinerant People, 2005).

This worldwide interdependency among peoples, institutions and nations made globalisation become the standard term for describing the accelerated integration of the world economy facilitated by the technological development of instant long-distance communication, as well as by an increasing political, cultural and religious awareness of the global actors within the global field (Robertson, 1992; Holton, 1998). This complexity of networks (Urry, 2003), including local, national, regional and global ecumenical organisations engage in exchange and international cooperation becoming relevant agents of institution building. It facilitated some national churches in the Orthodox tradition to develop in 1920 the idea of the League of Churches, which will be explored in Chapter 5. We shall also investigate in Chapter 5 why some national Orthodox Churches joined together with Protestants in the WCC in Amsterdam in 1948. From a socio-political perspective, this process resulted in nation-states working towards international agencies, such as the League of Nations established in 1919 under the Treaty of Versailles, which in 1945 was superseded by the United Nations.
An interpretation of Roland Robertson’s analysis of globalisation

Roland Robertson (1992) has been at the forefront of linking the sociology of globalisation with the sociology of religion. At the heart of his examination is the analysis of the principles by which ‘global consciousness’ is structured (8-9). This ‘intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole’ (8) is a process by which the world becomes a single place. This process, and the consciousness of its occurrence, involves individuals, groups, national societies and different institutions in different ways and to a different degree.

Robertson supports a historical pathway arguing that ‘overall processes of globalization (and sometimes deglobalization) are at least as old as the rise of the so-called world religions two thousand and more years ago’ (6-7). It is of considerable interest that conceptions of the world as a whole and of the intrinsic unity of humankind are found in many religions, although, sometimes postmodern critical scepticism may well make us shy away from the universalising vision of such grand narratives.

Robertson’s understanding of the global field is around four main organising components. His sociology on globalisation attempts to discuss increasing integration and interpenetration along dimensions identified as:

1. National societies/societalisation
2. World system of societies/internationalisation
3. Individuals/individualisation
4. Humankind/humanisation

Globalisation is a continuous process – not an end product – that integrates the world into one comprehensive but internally differentiated unit. Globalisation is a phenomenon of crystallisation of the entire world as a single place, which relates to the emergence of the global human condition and the consciousness of the globe as such. ‘Roland Robertson was the first to take, as an indicator of reflexive world society, the extent to which people are conscious of living in the world as one place’ (Beck, 2002: 88, original emphasis). Whereas Robertson’s (1992)
theories critically examine macro and micro aspects of the global condition, the implications of global field interactions show that national societies and local churches do not disappear. In the take-off period of modern globalisation, interdependency is accentuated. During this time,

 [...] there arose movements which were more specifically concerned with the relationship between the local and the panlocal, one of the most notable being the ecumenical movement which sought to bring the major ‘world’ religious traditions into a coordinated, concultural discourse (Robertson, 1992: 179).

After the Second World War the actors shaped through the ecumenical movement new configurations giving an optimistic sense of development. In 1948, some Churches of the Reformation and of Orthodox tradition came together in the WCC, which came out with ambitious plans for Church unity. Also, the Roman Catholic Church abandoned the fortress mentality that it had assumed until the middle of the 20th century, and, in the Second Vatican Council, embraced ecumenism.

Robertson’s (1992) theories of globalisation produce an indication of a world characterised by various degrees of civilisational interdependence and widespread consciousness thereof (Urry, 2003). Was a global religious resurgence through the ecumenical movement and the return to the sacred influenced by people’s perception of the world as a single place? Robertson refers to ‘globality’ as ‘the circumstance of extensive awareness of the world as a whole, including the species aspect of the latter’ (ibid.: 78-9). He argues that the rise of the West, its impact on the rest of the world, and the reflexive consequences in the development of ‘the global-human condition’ (ibid.: 131-2) is related to the conceptual framework grounded in the gemeinschaft/gesellschaft dichotomy.

Understanding Weber’s typology of social relations as explained by Bryan Turner (1994: 79), the parish Church was originally a gemeinschaft type community, locally based and generally enclosed within a rural environment. However, I argue that, especially in urban settings due to different type of social interactions, the Christian community had its koinonia broken by doctrinal elements as well as
nond doctrinal factors, of a politico-economical nature. This led to a shift towards the gesellschaft type of organisation, where associations were based mainly on pragmatic and political aspirations. Modern ecumenism might therefore be defined as the movement that seeks unity of Christians not so much as collective conversions of a gemeinschaft type, as by the reconciliation of churches within gesellschaft type. Turner (ibid.), for example, regards ecumenism as a religio-social movement of an associational type.

[...] ecumenicalism is a market place of beliefs which is more compatible with globalism, but which still attempts to retain some credibility in terms of truth by acknowledging that there may be variations on truth in the theological market place (Turner, 1994: 92-3).

But have gemeinschaft type elements really been surrendered? Modern ecumenism, as indicated in Chapter 2, emphasises the mutual resolution of differences rather than the radical attempt to induce churches to renounce their particular position. This structure based on networking is only a beginning of a longer healing process, essential for the longer process of nurturing relationships across the denominational divides and the creation of a more inclusive, pluralist and tolerant society, which recognises that various traditions and cultural differences are a source of enrichment. This is the purpose of the WCC.

Robertson (1992) defines ‘an explicitly globe-oriented perspective as one which espouses as a central aspect of its message or policy a concern with the patterning of the entire world’ and, counterfactually, ‘anti-globalism’ as a perspective which seeks to detach from that concern (idem.: 79). Robertson sees four major types of global order. A preliminary global gemeinschaft [type 1] would involve ‘a series of relatively closed societal communities’ (idem.: 78, original emphasis), whereas the modern-day equivalent is the ‘global village’ [type 2] (idem.: 79). Global gesellschaft, in one form then is ‘a series of open societies’ [type 3] (idem.: 79, original emphasis) and the contemporary version, ‘formal, planned world organization’ [type 4] (idem.: 79, original emphasis). It is not immediately clear whether this argument requires that globalisation take either a gemeinschaft or a gesellschaft form. To the extent that this is implied, it rules out a further possibility, that of a reconciliation of the two types.
However, in contrast with Turner and Robertson, I argue that the ecumenical project may prevail over the *gemeinschaft/gesellschaft* dichotomy by offering religious and secular institutions a platform for reconciliation and co-operation within the global church. As indicated in Chapter 2, while there are aspirations for an integrated universal religious community, institutional particularisms and local structures of governance do not disappear. In the meantime national/local ecumenical representatives continuously negotiate the terms of their agreement and co-operation. In short, ecumenism implicates simultaneously both *gemeinschaft* and *gesellschaft* principles of social organisation and diverse categories of interconnection.

Another feature of Robertson’s position is that there is no single exclusivist global centre that governs all places. Robertson ‘never tires of emphasising that globalization always also involves a process of *localization*’ (Beck, 2002: 45 original emphasis). Robertson (1992: 173-4) uses the term *glocalisation* originating from the Japanese *dochakuka* meaning ‘global localisation’ – to indicate the rediscovery and intersection of the local in relation to the global, or the global subject to local conditions. The symbiosis of homogenisation and heterogenisation phenomena is evident in the concept of glocalisation, echoing a complex relationship between the local and the global – situations which ‘are not mutually exclusive’ (Beck, 2002: 48), but ‘interdependent’ (Urry, 2003: 84).

Glocalisation may be understood as the co-presence of both universalising and particularising tendencies consisting of processes whereby the centrifugal forces of localisation or political fragmentation are associated with the centripetal forces of globalisation (Braithwaite, 2002). There are manifestations of local groups becoming increasingly globalised and, conversely, global incursions being localised. In this process, some loyalties are focussed towards localism, sub-national groups and institutions, while some loyalties and interests are being extended to transnational entities. As these centripetal forces emerge, globalisation may fragment national cultures. However, while some groups may embrace what has been seen as the ‘cosmopolitan’ culture of modernity (Holton, 2002), others fight back the intrusion of predominantly Western symbols and images. On the one hand a ‘cosmopolitan’ lifestyle embraces cultural complexity,
on the other hand fundamentalism finds it disturbing, dangerous (Giddens, 1999) by distorting ‘authentic’ values. Such distinctions of course beg questions about the meaning of the key terms cosmopolitanism and fundamentalism.

For Robertson global Christian trends are adapted to local communities so that the global blends with the local. This process does not lead to global homogenisation but to a situation in which cultural forms that originated in the West including ecumenism, diffuse globally, are adapted to local conditions and carry messages about local cultures. Religious organisations and nation states have responded to cultural globalisation in a variety of ways. Cultural globalisation can be seen sometimes as a threat to local religious identities. Various religious bodies resort to a number of strategies for preservation and traditional conservative confinement. While we are aware of the global extension/compression paradox (Urry, 2003), how do ecumenical trends modify the local condition? The local religious situation is not to be taken as an inert, passive phenomenon upon which globalisation plays itself out. Much of the tensions that the ecumenical movement generates grows out of the resistance that the local condition is able to construct vis-à-vis the global. In the period of world polarisation of the Cold War, identified by Robertson (1992: 59) as ‘the struggle-for-hegemony’ the ecumenical enterprise played a distinctive role:

Nevertheless, a world rifted by division and conflict is an unpropitious setting for any effort toward Christian unity on a global scale. Contemporary political tensions have not only spurred Christians to present a more united witness. They have also lifted barriers between Christians of the largest and most influential Orthodox communion, that of Russia, and Christians in China and North Korea on the one hand, and the rest of Christendom. Thus far, heroic determination to preserve ecumenical fellowship has prevented the rising of similar barriers between other Christians on opposite sides of the several “curtains,” in Central Europe and in Asia. But long continuance of the conflict of East and West, and its steady exacerbation, would certainly render that fellowship increasingly difficult (van Dusen, 1961: 98).
The local situation can rarely keep globalising forces out altogether and frequently does not want to. It seems inevitable that change occurs when socio-religious movements intermingle. The local situation may indeed feel overwhelmed by the global. Peter van der Veer argues that awareness of global patterns of development is accompanied by a greater recognition of marked historical, cultural, ethnic, racial and religious differences.

Under conditions of globalization of people, ideas and images are no longer spatially confined in any way, but are increasingly spread across the globe. Transnational religious movements can be found among Hindus, Christians and Jews, as well as Muslims, and they share certain general features in their responses to the governmentality of Western societies, the ordering of the public sphere and of civil society. In principle they carry out alternative, utopian projects through which they want to engage the changing world that confronts them. By no means are these projects always aggressive, intolerant and ‘backward-looking’, although some religious movements do give specific extremist answers to Western hegemony in certain regions of the world (van der Veer, 2002: 107).

Can the ecumenical movement perhaps become one way radiating the encounter between the global and the local, when the two come up against each other? Intercultural encounter is frequently conflictual, while calls for ecumenical dialogue and agreement may often express more hope than reality. ‘The local-global nexus is particularly interesting with regard to new expressions of community’ (Delanty, 2004: 149). The local situations are not powerless; they work out agreements, from syncretic borrowings (Byzantine symphony i.e. historical Greco-Roman Oriental Christian blended elements) to dualistic, sometimes antagonistic sub-systems (e.g. Church-State relationship under various Communist regimes). Accordingly, some of the most salient features in religion and ecumenism can best be described from the vantage point of the local. It appears that neither the global, homogenising forces, nor the local forms of accommodation and resistance can of themselves provide an adequate explanation of these phenomena. Therefore, it is precisely in their interaction that one comes to understand what is happening. This proposition will be explored in more depth in subsequent chapters.
Without denying the economic and political motives behind the Christian missionary enterprise of the past, we may possibly explore the questions of whether the historical experience of worldwide missions undertaken by different Christian churches also contributed to the gradual emergence of a growing global consciousness among people in the West. One of the challenges taken up in this examination is how far ecumenism may reflect a new trend of global collective consciousness (Robertson, 1992: 183) evident among groups from different locations and traditions.

Collective representations are the result of an immense co-operation, which stretches out not only space but into time as well; to make them, a multitude of minds have associated, united and combined their ideas and sentiments; for them, long generations have accumulated their experience and knowledge (Durkheim, [1915] 1971: 16).

The beginning of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century witnessed an emergence of a new critical collective consciousness around the globe grounded in multi-layered consensus and similarity of belief. However, accelerated by globalisation processes, sometimes relationships of reciprocity and mutual dependency between religious organisations come to replace shared beliefs in social consensus, as processes of change produce major social difficulties. These processes may have unsettling consequence on traditional lifestyles, religious beliefs and everyday patterns without substituting for clear new values. Indications of this are to be found among several thinkers of different religious traditions who discern certain patterns and movements towards greater unity in the religious history of humankind.

The 'shift from unawareness and insouciance to the new recognition of our global interdependence [...] in spiritual matters' (Smith, 1981: 43) raises the challenging question of how religious actors in the global field could meaningfully learn from each other in consideration and trust. This educational process certainly includes the possibility of mutual questioning and critique by exploring the specific insights into various religious heritages accumulated by generations. The unsettling conditions of social life generates a feeling of hopelessness whereby
traditional moral standards, which used to be supplied by religion, became largely broken down by secularisation, leaving religious organisations feeling that they start losing meaning.

The missionary Christian discourse may be seen in contradiction with Bauman’s (1999) pessimism, which claims that we are effectively unable to direct events, and so, globalisation inevitably produces a culturally and economically unequal world. For him ‘an integral part of the globalising processes is progressive spatial segregation, separation and exclusion’ (Bauman, 1999: 3). Consequently, non-participant actors in the global game become deprived and degraded. By ignoring the possibility of opportunities and choices brought about by globalisation, he subscribes to passive and defeatist attitudes vis-à-vis global forces. He understands globalisation as a process of non-negotiation and submissiveness of the local, and particularly the kneeling of the nation state in front of a mysterious ‘global law’. Bauman’s position neglects the possibility of glocalisation (Robertson, 1992), as he presents mainly a polarised relationship between privileged elites and disenfranchised groups affected by neo-tribal, fundamentalist tendencies.

For example, member churches can resign from the WCC at any time and indeed have done so (e.g. the Presbyterian Church of Ireland in 1980, the Euro-Asiatic Federation of the Unions of Evangelical Christians-Baptists in 1992, the Georgian Orthodox Church in May 1997). The Bulgarian Orthodox Church withdrew from the WCC in 1998, a move apparently prompted by conservative forces in the church opposed to what they saw as liberal and Protestant dominance in the WCC (Binns, 2003: 227).

Among traditions outside WCC membership are Roman Catholicism, Seventh-day Adventism and the Salvation Army. They belong, however, to some national and/or regional Christian councils. The Salvation Army has fraternal relations as a world confessional body. WCC and Vatican staff cooperate in various ways, a WCC-Roman Catholic Joint Working Group meets yearly and the Vatican names some members to the WCC Faith and Order Commission (World Council of Churches, 2001).
If globalisation ‘is more than a diffusion of Western institutions across the world, in which other cultures are crushed’ (Giddens, 1990: 175), it may be argued that the contemporary dictum ‘think globally: act locally’ is the way in which Christian ecclesiology operates in its organisational development. Christian mission is a glocal assignment accomplished through ‘the myriad of local actors who are enjoined to think about the global consequences of their actions before acting locally’ (Holton, 1998: 18). Globalisation, despite creating ‘winners and losers’, has the potential of enriching as much as undermining the local culture through diversification, syncretism and multiple choices. I define syncretism as a combination of religious ideas and traditions that seem theologically incompatible with one another.

**Peter Beyer: religions as global phenomena**

Peter Beyer is one of the few sociologists of religion to thoroughly examine the relationship between globalisation and religion. For him two criteria are important: privatisation (or individuation) of religion and performance of religion. According to Beyer (1994) globalisation hinders the processes of individualisation and differentiation of social systems, which leave many social communications undetermined and categorised as ‘residual matters’ (105). Differentiation means lack of a unified embracing system, while privatisation of religion has two effects: the levelling down of the importance of the representatives of religion to public influences and privatised decision-making through complementary social roles. Differentiation of social systems produces a number of residual problems or social issues, which cannot be resolved by the systems themselves. Thus, religion fills this vacuum.

Beyer’s understanding of religion begins with the notion of culture as communication, which he derives from Niklas Luhmann. For Luhmann, social systems are not groups of people but the lines of communication between them (ibid.: 33). The specific character of religion as communication is that it is immanent, between people, but its subject is always, symbolically and otherwise, transcendent beyond the world, concerned with managing and giving meaning to the indeterminacy of life. Beyer limits his investigation to ‘systemic religion’, referring to ‘institutionalised, organised, and specialised forms of religion that
generally – but not always – have religious professionals associated with them’ (ibid.: 225).

Beyer’s theories of globalisation engage with the debate whether globalisation is a homogenisation process, or a simple transformation of context in which particularities survive modified by external factors. He argues that both discourses occur simultaneously. Luhmann’s theory is positioned in the development of functional differentiation, in which modernity stimulates a range of sub-systems dealing with particular features of social communication, each with its own internal hypothesis and logic (ibid.: 37). These sub-systems develop sometimes in conflict (Aron, 1966), and may consequently pull in different directions.

Beyer (1994) examines the manner in which globalisation supports new and existing particularities through this systemic complexity. Using the theories of Wallerstein and Luhmann, he investigates the shift from stratified to functionally differentiated structures in early modernity. Through this shift, socio-cultural particularities become more ambiguous, but nevertheless remain important. For Beyer, social particularities are an intrinsic part of globalisation, not simply victims of the process and, in discussing these particularities, all forms of groups are included, including religious ones. He argues that religion’s influence may be seen as a functional subsystem operating in both socio-cultural particular and global contexts. The historical evolution of the concept of religion remains closely linked to the development of European Empires and the dynamics of hegemonic socio-political discourses generated by various national versions of Christianity (Beyer, 2003).

For Beyer (1994), religion and social movements share a relatively marginalised status as compared with the dominant systems of communication, the political or the economic. He does not think religion will become more powerful as a global subsystem, but, as other dominant subsystems have left large areas of social life undetermined, it may certainly increase its influence even if sometimes considered a ‘contested social construction’ (Beyer, 2003: 166). He follows the idea that socio-cultural particularities, religions among them, are more than systems of meaning – they are also bases of power in the global competition for
benefits. Basic dichotomies attending religion are examined beginning with the public and private and extended to pure and applied, liberal and conservative. Despite its political face, religion is conclusively seen to have a Durkheimian public and religious function. The tendencies towards privatisation in both liberal and conservative circles are seen to have public ramifications.

His theories seek to explain how vital is the place of religion in a global culture. They discuss the role of association of religions and ecumenism in debates about a globalised society. He embraces issues connecting First and Third World, including global human rights. He is interested in how religious movements have direct impact on other systems, particularly the political, economic or social. From the point of view of cultural politics, he assesses that world religions are global forces that existed before international politics and which remain an indispensable element in the shaping of global processes.

Beyer's (1994) theoretical arguments are pursued within empirical case studies of conservative and liberal religious movements. He discusses the Christian Right in the United States, the Latin American liberation theological movement, the Iranian Islamic revolution, new religious Zionism in Israel, as well as religious environmentalism – the reaction of religious groups and ecumenical bodies to the degradation of the natural environment.

Since the 1960s, the environment and awareness of the oneness of our planet gradually became part of the agenda of various secular and religious INGOs. Religious leaders became increasingly aware that our global oikos needs inclusive policies and protective legislation which promote sustainability and global ethical initiatives. Their agenda integrated environmental concerns:

Matters like ozone depletion, habitat destruction, waste disposal, global warming, biodiversity, overpopulation, and a host of other problems are now the standard affair of everyone from individual householders to government and business leaders. It has become rather normal to talk and act green (Beyer, 1994: 206).
For example, the current Patriarch of Constantinople, Bartholomew I, organiser of six international symposia on *Religion, Science and the Environment* (2006) earned his world-wide title in the media as the ‘Green Patriarch’ (Chryssavgis, 2003) largely for his efforts in promoting global environmental awareness.

Because major local natural disasters potentially have global implications, the working agenda of religious organisations requires a holistic perspective. It is arguable that the excessive Christian anthropocentric pronunciation in public and private social life led to global imbalances which in recent times were considered environmentally abusive. To this effect, the sixth World Council of Churches Assembly in Vancouver 1983, initiated the programme *Justice Peace and Integrity of Creation* (JPIC) which was also subsequently embraced by some ecclesial communities and networks outside the WCC. This socio-religious *metanoia* (conversion/transformation) may be understood as a global catalyst for what was to become in 1992 the Rio Earth Summit, which, for successful accomplishment of its goals, requires both global eco-justice and eco-spiritual visions and planning (Beyer, 1994). We notice that global ethical cooperation (Küng, 1997) between various religious NGOs and secular State organisations could be successfully ‘enhanced by concern for the environment being seen as an intrinsically global issue’ (Holton, 1998: 48).

Beyer distinguishes between religious movements that defend socio-cultural particularism and those that support change toward a pluralistic world order in which different traditions coexist. Conservative antisystemic movements, such as Islamic fundamentalism, react against global trends that are believed to threaten old identities. In this debate, some Muslims widely criticise Christianity for corrupting itself into a *Western religion*, thus becoming unfaithful to the simple teaching of a Semitic prophet.

The question is especially acute in the case of Islam with its characteristic emphasis on the singleness of life under God as reflection of the singleness of God (Beyer, 1994: 4).

Some Muslims call for popular mobilisation against foreign influences, by using Islamic idioms and symbols believed to be threatened by the processes of
secularisation and modernisation. However, their desired public impact usually remains limited and localised. Liberal movements, such as ecumenism and religious environmentalism, aim to infuse world culture itself with ultimate meanings. These movements try to bring resources for dealing with residual problems that secular systems cannot address. However, by and large they are unlikely to determine the ways secular institutions actually operate. From Beyer's (ibid.) view, we may infer that religious actors and beliefs will be more prominent in discourses about the globe than in the institutions shaping actual global relations.

Furthermore, in the study of religion, globalisation has come to indicate both a set of substantive issues and a change in perspectives on religion. The issues concern the historical role of religious values and institutions in fostering a new global system, the actual religious content of current debates about world order, and the future role of religiously inspired actors as significant players in globalisation. Apart from this emerging agenda, the change in perspective suggests a new way of thinking about religion. It questions notions of secularization as something that affects individual societies. It suggests that seemingly ethnocentric conservatives are also engaged in a global discourse alongside cosmopolitan ecumenists. It undermines attempts to link religion to a cohesive national culture that bolsters solidarity, and perhaps most important, it assigns the sociology of religion the role of interpreting global cultural change.

The effects of globalisation are for Beyer contradictory. On the one hand globalisation provides an arena where diverse phenomena exist side by side. On the other hand globalisation produces a new common context, or metaculture, that diminishes the differences between cultural phenomena. The cultural confrontations also highlight the constructivist nature of cultures, something that nevertheless does not prevent them from providing social identity. To quote Peter Beyer:

The resulting conflict, in this case, is then not so much against rival cultures and identities, although people may formulate it as such, as against the corrosiveness of the system itself. It is a response to, as Rushdie puts it, the mutability of character (Beyer, 1994: 2).
Religion may promote and oppose globalisation simultaneously, since the global system corrodes traditional identities and encourages construction of new identities, or reconstruction of traditional identities. One way that religion promotes globalisation is by opposing it. Roland Robertson also emphasises that globalisation not only stimulates particularism but also different images of globality on the basis of particularism (Beyer 1994: 3, note 1). Globalisation for Robertson is primarily something like a universal selection mechanism of particular identity (Beyer 1994: 26-7). Beyer scrutinizes definitions of religion and the repercussion of theories of global transformations, while working empirically through a series of case studies of world religious phenomena. In developing the analysis of global religious interaction, Beyer explores Robertson’s rather general focus through studies of empirical processes in intersocietal and intercivilisational encounters, whereby ‘globalization is a process that is bringing about a single social world’ (ibid.: 27).

Because there is no common and dominant model to which societies can conform, each society creates its own particular image of global order by promoting, even inventing, its own national image of the good society – in short, its own national identity. The global universal or, more precisely, the global concern about the universal only results from interaction among these images (Beyer, 1994: 28).

Yet there is a paradox in the persistence of conflict between social units within a globalising world that is more becoming a single place, ‘a global metropolis in which things that do not belong together nevertheless live side by side’ (ibid.: 2). Here Beyer successfully introduces the idea of globalisation in religious phenomena with the example of the fatwa, a religious death sentence with global effect, issued by Iranian Muslim leader Ayatollah Khomeini on 14 February 1989 condemning Salman Rushdie for publishing the allegedly ‘blasphemous’ novel *The Satanic Verses* (Husain, 1995: 246). In his fatwa the Ayatollah states that:

I inform the proud Muslim people of the world that the author of the Satanic Verses book, which is against Islam, the Prophet and the Koran,
and all those involved in its publication who are aware of its content are sentenced to death (BBC, 2006).

The emergence of Ayatollah Khomeini in revolutionary Iran, through politico-religious actions, reveals, in the Rushdie case, how local actors can affect the order of global society. The crisis surrounding this particular publication has provoked variable but intense reactions within the Islamic world either against or in response to the West. For Beyer (1994), the swiftness and scope of the incident are expressive of the interdependent character of the contemporary world and religion within it. They became functions of communication technology, which makes rapid interaction possible practically over the entire globe. The advent of the Internet generated an ‘explosion of cyberfatwas in Islam’ available to ordinary Muslims worldwide (Mayer, 2003: 41). Thus, in Beyer’s (1994) assessment, effective communication barriers between radically different and distant socio-cultural factions no longer exist. While ‘the effectiveness of Muslim communications networks was also demonstrated beyond doubt’ (Beckford, 2000: 182) we are reminded that there is no escape from the ‘global metropolis’. For this reason, Beyer (1994) argues that the global system must be the primary unit of analysis, even for phenomena as extremely specific as religions. For Beyer, as for Bauman (1999), globalisation is a question of power, of the course of change and who controls it.

It is necessary to underline the distinction between sociological globalism and moral universalism. The Salman Rushdie affair illustrates problems of relativisation associated with globalisation. Firstly, relativisation of particularistic identities, in our case religions, and secondly, the marginalisation of religion as a mode of social communication in favour of other discourses dominated by politico-economical discourses. Relativisation here refers to processes which position any particular worldview within a range of different worldviews. Claims to universalism or transcendent truth on behalf of one worldview are thereby undermined. For many, this process is experienced as highly threatening. In other words their moral claims to universal reach and salience are denied. The controversial case surrounding the publication of The Satanic Verses is a relevant example of this. Here Muslims, or leaders of a certain segment of Islam, felt that Islamic views were being relativised, by being evaluated from alternative
viewpoints. A *fatwa* (a formal and authoritative decree issued by qualified Islamic theologian-jurist) followed forcing Rushdie into hiding. This particular case may be understood as a divide between two sharply contrasting value systems, whereby the same action is translated as blasphemy in Islam and freedom of speech by Western standards. The cultural sphere is polarised into two competing ideological positions.

The Salman Rushdie affair rather than being trapped within the engagement with Islam, on the contrary, generated a further global debate around the International Parliament of Writers (IPW). Jacques Derrida, Pierre Bourdieu, Edward Said, Jürgen Habermas, Toni Morrison, Vaclav Havel and other writers of ‘world calibre’ became associated at some stage with this institution of which Rushdie became an Honorary President (Amit and Rapport, 2002). In the global ecumene of literature Rushdie had the opportunity to pen *A Declaration of Independence*.

The art of literature requires, as an essential condition, that the writer be free to move between his many countries as he chooses, needing no passport or visa, making what he will of them and of himself. We are miners and jewellers, truthtellers and liars, jesters and commanders, mongrels and bastards, parents and lovers, architects and demolition men. The creative spirit, of its very nature, resists frontiers and limiting points, denies the authority of censors and taboos. For this reason it all too frequently is treated as an enemy by those mighty or petty potentates who resent the power of art to build pictures of the world which quarrel with, or undermine, their own simpler and less open-hearted views. [...] Our Parliament of Writers exists to fight for oppressed writers and against all those who persecute them and their work, and to renew continually the declaration of independence without which writing is impossible; and not only writing, but dreaming; and not only dreaming, but thought; and not only thought, but liberty itself (Rushdie, 1994).

Furthermore, in Strasbourg 1995, the European Parliament, requested by the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe (CLARE) and IPW, adopted a Resolution of the Network of Cities of Asylum, which legitimated the support of municipalities that ascribed to offer protection to threatened and
persecuted writers from intolerant political regimes (International Parliament of Writers, 1995).

However, Delanty (1995) provides another approach to the Rushdie affair. He argues that a new shift in the understanding of values has occurred: from political dichotomous ideologies to a complex civilisational perspective combined with human rights discourse, while the religious component plays a major role within an adversarial framework:

The new hero of the West is no longer Solzhenitsyn, who has been rehabilitated in Russia, but Salman Rushdie, who epitomises the new clash of civilisations. Like the dissidents of the Cold War era who sought their political norms in a freedom supposedly inherent in western capitalism, Rushdie symbolises a similar legitimation of western liberal democracy and many support him as the champion of a liberty that the developed West allegedly stands for (Delanty, 1995: 151).

The present sociological dialogue between religion and globalisation offered by Beyer (1994) has mostly focused on the association between globalisation and the cultural values and ideological orientation of various religious groups (Warburg, 2003). Some religious groups accept the plurality of cultural values, which follows from the increased interaction between the foreign and the local, such as Christian ecumenical movements. However other groups emphasise the differences in outlook and confront non-believers or non-orthodox interpreters in an attempt to prevent various particularisms being eroded by alien cultural-religious practices. Nevertheless, ecumenical relationships cannot rest on one explanation, since they are defined by complex, heterogeneous politico-theological phenomena (Turner, 1972).

James Beckford: religion, globalisation and religious social movements

Beckford (2000), following Robertson (1992), argues that a ‘two-way relationship exists between perceptions of globality and attempts to capture it and elaborate it in particularistic terms’ (Beckford, 2000: 173). Political and cultural/religious impacts of globalisation show that worldwide religious movements give a new
sense of collective identity to religious participants in global debates. With an unprecedented number of religious communities around the world engaged in ecumenical activity on local, regional and global levels, the ecumenical movement looks towards the third millennium of Christian co-existence.

It is no exaggeration to claim that religions have been closely associated with the emergence of most of the world’s empires, the modern world-system of nation states and today’s increasingly globalized social order. Yet, relatively few social scientists have analysed this association closely (Beckford, 2000: 165).

Following Robertson (1992), Beckford (2003) claims that beside the politico-economic aspects of globalisation, religion is a major component within our ‘global circumstance’. Beckford argues that ‘religious movements as diverse as Soka Gakkai, the Unification Church, the Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Mormons and the Baha’is continue to press their case for global status’ (Beckford, 2000: 181). This is due to a variety of factors, including the advancement of technology. Beckford argues that, just as the Protestants used the early printing techniques in order to spread the Bible and its interpretative message, in the same manner would-be global religious movements use the latest information technology in order to gain adherents. In industrialised societies, secularisation practices advanced by the rational knowledge of modernity eroded the moral authority of traditional local churches (Bruce, 1996). Their intellectual authority and status decreased. To put it bluntly: the conventional way of conceiving of the relationships between state and local churches became no longer unquestionable. One of Beckford’s empirical examples is the Watchtower movement of Jehovah Witnesses, who efficiently found a niche in the religious market through advanced managerial skills and superior resources

[...] the Watchtower movement provides a cogent example because it has always asserted (a) the failure or inability of other religious groups to fulfil their duties and (b) its own qualifications for superseding other groups’ partial truths with a would-be universal and exclusive truth. The more global the outreach of the Watchtower movement has become in the course of the twentieth century, the louder has become its claim to have
replaced all other religious bodies which owe their origins to particular times and places rather than to the ‘end time’ and to the transcendence of all national, cultural or ‘racial’ differences (Beckford, 2000: 174).

What remains distinctive about the ecumenical movement in contrast to the socio-religious movements analysed by Beckford (2000) is that ecumenism does not present the element of avid competitiveness as the key of success. The ecumenical movement employs a different methodology. On the one hand, ecumenism is based on inclusiveness and dialogue, continuously reaffirming its unfinished project and ever changing circumstances. It offers a promise of hope without boasting its modest realisations. On the other hand, most socio-religious movements search for universalistic messages of a different nature. Their messages proclaim exclusive institutional membership with proud supremacist connotations, often intolerant to doctrinal diversity. Furthermore, I argue that while ecumenism and some socio-religious movements researched by Beckford (2000) are driven by a range of ideologies, they also have some common features. They challenge institutional structures, traditional ways of thinking, norms and moral codes, by conveying a specific mode of constructing social reality. In order to successfully develop, these religious movements remain strongly dependent on charismatic leadership and attachment to mundane socio-political mobilisations. For example,

By refusing to collaborate in ecumenical ventures and by steadfastly decrying such developments in other groups, the Watch Tower Society has succeeded in retaining a clear-cut identity for itself and in attracting the favourable opinion of some theological conservatives (Beckford, 1975: 93).

Thus, far from being ecumenical in nature, some new religious movements sometimes emerge as deviant global ambitions being led by strange charismatic leaders followed by fanatical adherents. Ecumenism not only increases the reality and awareness of religious interconnectedness across borders, it simultaneously enhances the capacity for individuals to imagine themselves members of a globally inclusive network.
Globalised Islam

As globalisation is a historical rather than a purely contemporary phenomenon (Holton, 1998), Western humanism is not the only globalising moral system. Islam also has had an outreach and influence that transcend regional and national boundaries (Hunt, 2002). At present, regarded in global terms, ‘Islam is the world’s fastest growing religion, accounting for approximately a quarter of the world’s population’ (Lubeck, 2000: 148). Conference participants to the 1910 Edinburgh World Missionary Conference also recognised Islam as a strong competitor with African Christian missions. In view of an efficient missionary strategy, the Conference participants argued that:

Mohammedan traders are finding their way into the remotest parts of the [African] continent, and it is well known that every Mohammedan trader is more or less a Mohammedan missionary. The result of this penetration of the field by these representatives of Islam will be that the Christian missionary enterprise will year by year become more difficult. Animistic faiths crumble quickly before any higher and more dogmatic religion. Either Christianity or Islam will prevail throughout Africa (World Missionary Conference, vol. 1, 1910: 21).

Understanding the politico-cultural development of Islam requires a multi-layered analysis. Islam seeks the establishment in the global field of a new gemeinschaft, by re-establishing its largely traditional ideals. In the meantime, as information technology brings world cultures closer, issues of xenophobia, racial discrimination and religious intolerance also remain a daily reality. Islamic globalisation conveys risks that could bring about not only exclusion and increased socio-economic discrimination, but also ethno-national and religio-cultural divisions. ‘Globalization does not mean harmonious integration, nor that the world is becoming a better place’ (McGuire, 2002: 314). Similarly, Robertson (1995) carefully avoids the assumption of any inevitable advance towards a harmonious, humanistic world, or that conflict will necessarily decrease.

The next section treats Islam as ‘the other’. This is not the only approach to it. Barber’s (1996) radical polarised perspective of Jihad vs. McWorld brings in the
economic dimension, in particular the force of consumer international market in contrast to emerging tribalism and hatred. Regarding spatial and cultural implications of glocal dialectics, there are both centripetal and centrifugal tendencies. In his polemical work on the interplay between *jihad* and McWorld, Barber positions McWorld, as the universe of manufactured needs, mass consumption and communication against *jihad*, as a signifier for the belligerent politics of religious, tribal and other forms of bigotry. Thus, on the one hand, economic, cultural, and ecological forces bind people ever more closely together, and on the other hand we witness intense tribal loyalties, rooted in exclusionary parochial hatreds.

In other words, globalization is bringing the world closer together while varied forms of sociocultural and political differentiation threaten to tear it apart (Croucher, 2004: 3).

Both discourses of *jihad* and McWorld, are antagonistically engaged. However, sometimes they have in common the strategy of undermining democracy and the nation state. A possible world in which ‘the only available identity is that of blood brother or solidarity consumer’ (Barber, 1996: 224) could worry democratic societies. Are the ‘violent fundamentalist disregard for difference and dissent’ or ‘unaccountable global economic power’ (Holton, 1998: 173) the only choices? Is McWorld aiming at dissolving local cultural identities and is *jihad* recreating parochial loyalties by fragmenting the world into tighter and smaller enclosures? Both options appear to be a threat to civil liberties, tolerance and genuine coexistence. To this debate, anthropologist Gordon Mathews (2000) brings a new interpretation. He argues that even if some economic and political conditions are presented as being in conflict, the concept of democracy is constantly reinterpreted for fitting temporary interests through diverse persuasion methods. McWorld’s multiple choice could be interpreted as ‘supplying’ *jihad* as another option within the global ‘cultural supermarket’. However, I would claim that there are also cosmopolitan values that should be positioned in-between this polarised chart.

Robertson argues that alternative forms of globalisation could have occurred, such as Islamisation. That would have had dramatic consequences on the present
global discourse, and in turn an alternative methodology and analytical approach would have been necessary. For him 'it is clear that Islam historically has had a 'globalizing' thrust; but had that potential form of effective globalization succeeded we would now almost certainly comprehend contemporary 'globality' differently. There would be a need for a different kind of model' (Robertson, 1992: 28). Needless to say, the emergence of the ecumenical movement would have been also under different conditions.

Particular historical trajectories within the global field orientate religious actors not only towards the world as a single place, but also in a more immediate and practical sense, to the 'national societies' and broader 'world system' institutions (e.g. Empires) in which they are located. It is these essentially Western points of reference (British, American, German and French) that overshadow the rest of the world, including Islam and even Eastern Orthodox Christianity.

Bernard Lewis (2002) argues that for many centuries Islam was at the vanguard of human achievement as a supreme military force and leader in the arts and sciences. However, the West subsequently overshadowed the Islamic civilisation, through processes of systematic imperial challenge and discursive hegemony. Since many actors in the global field are potential players, Lewis (2002) asserts that socio-political elements including the position of women, secularism, civil society but also the calendar, music and the arts, to name just a few, made the present Western civilisational standard to be more attractive, and thus dominant than its Islamic counterpart. The emphasis on Christian Western culture may be understood as a marginalisation of Islamic values.

From an opposite perspective, Lubeck (2000) maintains that globalisation has enhanced communication and associative prospects for the previously separated and differentiated (Muslim *gemeinschaft* of the) global *umma*. Similarly to the new religious movements (Beckford, 2000), Islam, which had the necessary mobilising resources, has also found a niche in the socio-political environment and religious vacuum by succeeding beyond expectations. Marcel Merle (1987) argues that despite doctrinal divisions between Sh’ites and Sunnis, since the end of the Second World War, Islam has appeared to be not only a catalyst for new
political groupings but also a universal element resisting the expansion of Western values.

This kind of universal community has been reflected in many of the world religions, not just in Christianity. In Islam there is also to be found such an emphasis on community – the umma – as extending beyond the immediate context and embodying a principle of unity (Delany, 2004: 14).

Huntington (1996) argues that an educated Muslim elite comprised of young students, intellectuals and religious scholars (ulama) developed an alternative approach – the Islamic Resurgence – which regards Islam as a global practical substitute to western ideologies. Islamic revival may be understood as contributing to a ‘clash of civilisations’. However behind all these ‘politicocultural movements’ there is a latent globalising trend that the Western world has to objectively acknowledge, since these courses of actions cannot be reversed.

Is Islam heading for a confrontation with those parts of the world that do not share its beliefs? Huntington (1996) has argued that, after the ending of the Cold War, struggles between Western and Islamic views might become part of a worldwide ‘clash of civilisations’. For him, Islam sometimes portrays strong anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist undercurrents, urging for autarkic regimes and pan-Islamism as an alternative to Westernism in all its forms (Husain, 1995).

By strategically seizing the mantle of anti-imperialist nationalism, a discourse formerly controlled exclusively by secular nationalist and leftist movements, Islamism has become the world’s most extensive and militant anti-systemic social movement. Yet, Islam has the advantage of being simultaneously an ethno-nationalist identity as well as a resistance movement to subordination to the dictates of the capitalist world economy (Lubeck, 2000: 163).

According to William H. Swatos the religious resurgence is not an isolated incident, restricted only to a particular location. The religious resurgence trend is
global in scope; and even if considered deviant in character or extremist in nature, this phenomenon represents more than ‘some form of mass delusion’ (Swatos, 2001: 362). The phenomenon of religious fundamentalism, through populist means, aims to legitimate itself through struggle against spiritual corruption while constructing a justifiable enemy mainly in secular, consumerist and ‘decadent’ western values.

The development of theories that portray the world order divided by a cultural fault-line separating western civilisation remains problematic. Polarisation theories, in contrast to homogenisation, exaggerate crisis and conflict. They may be popular because some actors may search for a potential conflict to replace the Cold War. Polarisation theorists commit a major mistake in ignoring the evidence of inter-cultural sharing and exchange. By disregarding the benefits of inter-civilisational interaction, through supremacist attitudes, they surrender to the very tribalistic discourse they criticise. Multicultural societies may not necessarily be condemned to ethnic conflict, in part because inter-religious ethics have the potential of generating new patterns of creative relationships.

For each religion, the global condition has different influences. Religious actors can experience profoundly disruptive effects, tension, conflict and isolation, however they can also intensify collaboration between people in global ecumenism. Thus, Bauman understands globalisation as polarisation driven by societal elitism: ‘a final touch on the disintegration of locally grounded forms of togetherness and shared communal living’ (1999: 21). Alternatively, by advancing a middle-range approach, Robertson is ambivalent in positioning globalisation as positive or negative, leaving it for each of us to understand its ethical implications. Often the stability of global relations depends on choices that are not confined to the realm of rational economic profitability.

More specifically, globalization involves pressure on societies, civilisations and representatives of traditions, including both ‘hidden’ and ‘invented’ traditions, to sift the global-cultural scene for ideas and symbols considered to be relevant to their own identities (Robertson, 1992: 46).
In addition to complexities arising from national differences within global arrangements, there are further complexities arising from ethno-cultural pluralism within national societies and regions. In this thesis, the global ecumenical movement is analysed as ‘a general multidimensional approach to globalization that avoids explanatory reductionism’ (Holton, 1998: 196), while religious pluralism could be understood sociologically as delivering a spiritual message. In a broader sense, ecumenism and religious pluralism is approached sociologically through a study of key events and processes within the global field, while Islam is not to be evaluated in isolation. Beside a rigid textual interpretation (exegesis) of sacred scriptures, the character and impact of fundamentalist doctrines is located within moral and social issues revolving around state-society. The main perception of recent fundamentalist movements has been the perception on the part of both leaders and followers that their secular rulers are performing inadequately and are frequently dishonest. For this reason, religions can sometimes be either linked to conservative movements or else simply characterised by militancy and fanaticism.

Islam is frequently portrayed in conflict with the secularisation processes. Yet, ‘Islam, and not only its ‘fundamentalist’ forms, constitutes a massive – but certainly not homogenous – presence in the contemporary world’ (Robertson, 1992: 185). The fundamental social significance of Islam lies less in fearful and authoritarian answers to new socio-cultural phenomena. Rather Islam engages with a perceived vacuum of meaning in globalising processes. Economic globalisation in particular is insufficient to provide a sense of meaning, including religious meaning, a raison d’être. Entirely secular, rational or materialist explanations do not suffice.

**Conclusion**

Sociology generally ascribes prime importance to economical mechanisms and political structures of globalisation. However, by following Robertson (1992), Beyer (1994) and Beckford (2000), the religious-cultural dimensions can also be seen as significant. The chief aim of this Chapter is to critically understand various theories of what constitutes cultural and religious forms of globalisation and what are their distinctive features.
Underestimated in sociological research, religious movements remain significant players in the global field (Beckford, 2000). We hypothesise here that ecumenism, a distinctive globalising movement, challenges the conventional conceptual dichotomy of *gemeinschaft*/*gesellschaft*, not only by bringing religious actors into local and global dialogue, but also by uniting and trying to integrate association with community. In its drive for dialogue, the ecumenical movement is avoiding ‘extremes of narrowness and of excessive inclusiveness’ (Beckford, 2000: 167, original emphasis). The ecumenical initiatives undertaken by various Christian individuals and churches encompass distinctive features. These enthusiastic yet prudent initiatives propose a mutual socio-historical and theological reassessment aiming at administrative reconciliation and doctrinal unity.

Christianity and Islam profess an unambiguous globalising thrust, therefore *intra* and *extra* faith interactions in various contexts of global arrangements are of utmost interest. This may become a prerequisite for understanding the complexities of global ecumenism. Despite the emergence of the global-human condition and worldwide interdependency (Robertson, 1992), there are also limits to globalisation constructed by the institution of the nation-state and national cultural orientation. However, ‘while some are busy re-erecting political and cultural barriers, others are clearly selecting aspects of globalisation that suit their purposes, even if this also means a considerable element of indigenisation or fusion of global and national or local elements’ (Holton, 1998: 172). These elements in cluster create subsystems pushing sometimes in contradictory directions. What is relevant here is the assessment of how conflicting positions, of Christian or Islamic nature, sometimes develop within socio-political global settings that stress polarisation and dissimilarity (Huntington, 1996), by challenging respect for tolerant values (Barber, 1996).

Robertson (1992), Holton (1998, 2005) and Beckford (2000) argue that historically processes of globalisation pre-date modern societies. Nevertheless, modernity bestowed an additional momentum to globalisation. The above enquiries are an attempt to understand the ways in which the global and the local interact and create new meanings by bringing awareness of empowerment of local
communities in the global context rather than pointing towards specific actors in isolation.

While being distinctive in their research topic, Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 consider various global religious issues as socio-cultural phenomena. The discussion advances a model whereby ecumenico-global discourses complement each other. The issues related to church structures and dialogue, and issues related to globalisation are interconnected. The history of ecumenism is dominated by attempts to resolve differences of view over Christian doctrine and meaning in a global context. These concerns reflect further complex questions about the relationship of the Church within the wider society than those on the conventional ecumenical agendas. In this thesis, globalisation and ecumenism are key terms for describing how humanity experiences a unique increase of *gemeinschaft/gesellschaft* interdependency.

Taken overall we argue that religion has in a number of senses been an aspect of globalisation processes. The ecumenical movement is one aspect of this involvement alongside examples of the globalising effect of fundamentalism. Equally however, religious institutions and discourses may be seen as responses to global economic and political circumstances. These general considerations are nonetheless very abstract.

We now turn in the second part of the dissertation to explore three denominationally centred ecumenical initiatives, identifying the complex ways in which the global and ecumenical *gemeinschaft* and *gesellschaft* inter-relate. These chapters elaborate the argument that ecumenism is not monolithic, and test the usefulness of the idea of glocalisation in understanding global/local suggestions.
According to Robertson, the ‘take-off phase’ phase of globalisation lasted from the 1870s until the mid 1920s. Robertson maintains that in this period we witness the development of a global society generated by initiatives that include ‘international formalization, and attempted implementation of ideas about humanity’ within which the ‘rise of the ecumenical movement’ (1992: 59) was a significant element. Globalisation manifests not only worldwide competition and emergence of ‘capitalist monoculture’ (Tomlison, 2000) but also intensified cooperation through the growing number of international organisations (Held et al, 2003).

A crucial ecumenical moment in this period is the calling in 1910 of the Edinburgh World Missionary Conference. This particular conference was positioned within an interesting phase of globalisation. It occurred not only at the crest of foreign mission expansion, but in a wider sense, in the middle of what has been designated the ‘high imperialist era’ – between 1880s and 1920s (Friesen, 1996: 1). It has been argued that by aiming to promote effective missionary strategies and avoiding missionary competition, this Protestant conference marked the beginning of the modern institutional ecumenical movement (Tavard, 1960; Bea, 1969; Mehl, 1970).

In this Chapter I examine how institutional ecumenism began to develop largely under Protestant evangelical societies from the United States, Germany, Scotland and England (Hopkins, 1979). I notice Nederveen Pieterse’s question here as to whether at the beginning of the 20th century a Protestant ecumenical ‘Atlantic conversation [is] to be extrapolated to planetary scope’ (2004: 2). It was during this period that most parts of the world began to feel the simultaneous impact of the international economy, while long-distance communication between people intensified. So, how much did ecumenism contribute to the establishment of a
global society and what were the short-term and long-term effects of this particular Conference?

As observed in Chapter 1, there are some key factors that historically helped define ecumenism, namely colonial authority, Eurocentrism and Christian mission. The discussion encompasses not only Christian Western but also non-Western religio-cultural expressions of such processes. In so doing, this Chapter moves beyond the stereotyping of Western missionaries by examining intra-faith and inter-faith encounters which led to the development of an organised ecumenical movement and ‘inclusion of a number of non-European societies’ (Holton, 1998: 46) involved in globalising processes. A further function of this Chapter is to empirically explore evidence of Protestant attitudes and their relationship with Robertson’s (1992) periodisation of globalisation.

Christian experiences and practices are dynamic and it is not surprising that ecumenical understanding is continuously under reassessment by participants and observers. Since theological realities and boundaries are socially constructed and reconstructed, ecumenical documents may be regarded as sociocultural products. I take into account the reliability of the surviving documents and the position of various commentators on this Conference. I start by looking at the organisation and conference agenda, and at the membership and attendees in the plenary sessions. Here I distinguish notable figures such as John Raleigh Mott, Joseph Houldsworth Oldham, Charles Henry Brent and Vedanayakam Samuel Azariah who had a decisive impact in the development of the 20th century global ecumenism. I also note enthusiastic Christian student ecumenical support.

Reliability of surviving data

The research in this Chapter is based mainly upon selected records of the 1910 Edinburgh World Missionary Conference. The nine volume documents containing some records of discussions, comments and recommendations from this Conference, are mainly addressed to a Protestant English-speaking audience interested in evangelisation practices. The documents present a vibrant intellectual Christian community trying to comprehend collectively how best to talk about Christian mission by means of improvement in missionary techniques.
and more effective understanding of cultural differences. This opportunity came about by identifying previous problems and ambiguities with respect to missionary strategies, and by recognising that there were cases in which alternative perspectives seemed to work better, from the point of view of Christian mission.

How reliable is the evidence used in researching this Conference? Sometimes, it is difficult to identify particular participants or missionary correspondents who contributed with their comments, suggestions or directives, unless their contribution is specifically mentioned. In the *Report of Commission I*, while the *List of Correspondents* enumerates the names of the collaborators, attribution to detailed comments of individuals is sometimes lacking. This may partly be because of inadequate note-taking though editing is a more likely explanation. At the beginning of the *Presentation and Discussion* section of each Report, the Conference organisers for each Commission indicated that editing was essential.

Considerations of space have made it necessary to abbreviate the speeches made in the Discussion. In doing this, the attempt has been made to preserve everything that sheds fresh light on the subjects considered in the Report. In some instances the speeches have not been well reported, and this has necessitated the omission of certain sentences. It has not been found possible to send the report of the speeches to those who delivered them for their revision (World Missionary Conference, 1910, Vol. 1-8).

These cautionary notes suggest a degree of methodological vigilance is necessary in the interpretation of these findings. Several printed speeches indicate where material has been omitted; however the absence of such omissions may not necessarily mean that only compression has been made. Furthermore, it is not clear if the editors’ sense of what ‘sheds fresh light’ on the subjects discussed commanded general consensus, and to what degree the Conference participants were politically involved or activists ideologically committed (Crossley, 2002: 117). Overall, the nature of the discourse consists of pragmatic issues that had as purpose ‘awakening public interest’ on mission strategies (World Missionary Conference, 1910, Vol. 9: 14).
Membership and attendees

The main organisational contributors to the World Missionary Conference were the missionary movement, the Christian student movement and American/English Anglicanism (Tatlow, 1933; Tavard, 1960). These movements gave this particular conference historical significance through mobilising men and women who became central actors within the global ecumenical movement in the 20th century.

At the beginning of the Conference there were addressed messages of support from King George V, The Imperial German Colonial Office as well as from former US president Theodore Roosevelt (Clements, 1999: 90). Roosevelt considered that this Conference was noteworthy in globally advancing ecumenical ideas, in the hope for universal recognition of Christian values.

Nothing like your proposed Conference has ever hitherto taken place. From many nations, and from many churches, your delegates gather on this great occasion to initiate a movement which I not only hope but believe will be fraught with far-reaching good. For the first time in four centuries Christians of every name come together without renouncing their several convictions, or sacrificing their several principles, to confer as to what common action may be taken in order to make their common Christianity not only known to, but a vital force among the two-thirds of the human race to whom as yet it is hardly even a name (Roosevelt in Gairdner, 1910: 45).

One may argue that the Conference did not fully extend its ecumenical ethos among the churches on Continental Europe. Rather a strong ‘English-speaking world’ perspective prevailed and is no coincidence that the World Missionary Conference happened in the Scottish capital city, itself a regular centre for religious assemblies.

There were also present some missionary societies from Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Holland, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland (World Missionary Conference, 1910, Vol. 9), however, from a geographical perspective,
participants from Continental Europe were in minority. Of the 1,200 delegates, over 80% were from Great Britain and North America. One hundred and seventy were from the European Continent and only 18 came from the rest of the world. It was one of the last moments in history when ‘worldwide Christianity’ would literally mean Christian Europe and North America reaching out to the rest of the world. Few delegates from South Africa, India and Australia attended. Roman Catholics and Orthodox were also absent from the Conference.

One powerful figure, Rev. Ralf Wardlaw Thompson, Secretary of the London Missionary Society acting as member of the British Executive Conference Committee, commented thus on these absences

I long for the time when we shall see another Conference, and when the men of the Greek Church and the Roman Church shall talk things over with us in the service of Christ. The kingdom will not come until every branch can unite together in some common effort of service for the Lord (Thompson in World Missionary Conference, 1910, Vol. 8: 216).

In his descriptive narrative on the Conference, Rev. William Henry Temple Gairdner an Anglican missionary scholar based in Cairo shows ethnographical awareness of the tiny minority of non-Europeans present.

But possibly the most interesting, certainly by far the most significant figures of all, were those of the Oriental and African delegates, yellow, brown, or black in race, that were scattered among the delegates in that World Conference. For not only by their presence but by their frequent contributions to the debates, they gave final proof that the Christian religion is now rooted in all those great countries of the Orient and the South; and not only so, but that it possesses in those countries leaders who, for intellectual ability and all-round competence, were fully worthy of standing beside the men who have been mentioned, even without the traditions of two millenniums of western Christianity at the back of them (Gairdner, 1910: 56-7).
Further light is shed on the lack of direct African and Asian peoples by Mennonite pastor and academic J. Stanley Friesen. He notes that ‘attendance was only by invitation or appointment’ (1996: 136). From the beginning, a preselected agenda discriminated on various grounds against various non-European churches and missionary groups. However, despite this selective participation, he believes that:

Edinburgh 1910 marks the turning point in which leaders from the emerging churches of Asia and Africa have had an increasingly greater voice in mission policy and the globalization of Christianity. This voice has the potential for revealing biases of those in power and increasing the integrity of the Christian witness (Friesen, 1996: 136).

The Conference, in respect of social diversity had certain common features with the Universal Races Congress of 1911, while also being dominated by intellectual elites aiming at ‘transcending localism and parochialism’ (Holton, 2002: 161). Historian John W. Cell argues that

The controlling authorities of missionary bodies began to recognize the need to reexamine their positions. Conferences were held. Both the Edinburgh Conference of 1910 and the Inter-racial Congress held in London in 1911 discussed the church’s relation to the questions of race and culture (Cell, 1976: 59).

Such parallels also have limits in that ecumenism was not a major focus in 1911. While a minor presence at the Inter-racial Congress, the Student Christian Movement, inviting Europeans, Americans and Chinese, was closely involved in the Edinburgh meeting. Thus ‘a good deal of the inner history of the planning of the conference is very closely related to the [Student Christian] Movement, and that should be told’ (Tatlow, 1933: 404). The student enthusiasm and their inquisitiveness in the areas of dialogue and research particularly from an ecumenical perspective became a *sine qua non* ingredient for the future progress of the ecumenical movement. The students’ common aim was to assist in organising churches and congregations in their massive task of witness and service in various cultural, social and religious contexts. Not only that all
stewards assisting the conference were students eager to hear the debates in the Assembly Hall, but also many of them became distinguished participant figures:

The Student [Christian] Movement influence in the conference was considerable. It gave to the conference its chairman, Mr John R. Mott, its secretary, Mr J. H. Oldham, and its historian, the Rev. W. H. Temple Gairdner. Old Student [Christian] Movement members took a considerable share in the debates of the conference, and the reports of the Commissions are full of quotations from memoranda supplied by them. Years after the Conference Dr Temple wrote that ‘Members of the [Student Christian] Movement ought to know that without their movement there never could have been held the Edinburgh Conference, which was the greatest event in the life of the Church for a generation’’ (Tatlow, 1933: 410-11 quoting The Student Movement, vol. xvii. p. 96).

As Wright Mills believes, ‘social science deals with problems of biography, of history, and of their intersections within social structures’ (Mills, 2000: 143). For this reason, I investigate various biographical details of some Conference participants who are believed to hold an important role in social development of ecumenical networks by increasing global mixing of religious cultures.

On 14th June 1910, the World Missionary Conference was called to order at the Assembly Hall of the United Free Church of Scotland in Edinburgh. Around 1,200 delegates from various Protestant communions, missionary boards and societies (Gairdner, 1910; Friesen, 1996) came together with the aim of discussing differences and mutual problems in the context of global mission. The particularity of this Conference may be regarded as a ‘universalization of particularism’ or ‘the global valorization of particular identities’ (Robertson, 1992: 130). This Conference gives a specific public thematisation which advanced the development of global Protestant missionary meanings. Half a century later, on the eve of Vatican II, Roman Catholic French theologian George Tavard (1960), while researching primary sources of Protestant and Orthodox ecumenism, provided an interesting perspective on the assembly of movements that led to the emergence of the 1910 World Missionary Conference. He made a case that even if only Protestant churches attended, ‘it was the first of such
conferences that might be designated as universal in fact and ecumenical in spirit’ (idem.: 95). By about 1910, the Europeanisation of much of the world was complete, with colonial rule (formal or informal) extending over most of the globe. This fact led most Conference participants to appreciate oikumene as being the whole church encompassing its worldwide mission. For this reason Tavard (idem.: 114, original emphasis) claims that ‘in Protestant ecumenism the year 1910 was the most significant in this entire era’.

An additional perspective is formed by Robertson, who claims that ‘ecumenical choice obviously involves the merging of religious organisations; while the cartel choice involves the maintenance of at least a semblance of denominational distinctiveness – in terms of agreements among religious organisations to restrict themselves to certain geographical areas and types of social constituency’ (Robertson, 1972: 212). If the primary concerns of Edinburgh 1910 World Missionary Conference were related to the development of Christian inter-denominational ecumenical relations, it is also arguable that another concern was formation of ‘cartels’ and networks of a Gesellschaft type. This organisational setting could be achieved only through rational/institutional co-operation and rapprochement. As we shall see later in this Chapter, this Conference had multiple implications. These implications concerned immediate world-wide Protestant missionary strategies, as well as increasing awareness of future relations with the Roman Catholic and Orthodox Churches. In this respect, Robertson (1992) underplays the complexity of this ecumenical movement.

A strong feature permeating the documents of 1910 Edinburgh World Missionary Conference is arguably the affirmation of deep convictions of superiority of civilised values that ‘Christian’ Europe brings to the ‘non-civilised’ peoples. These convictions reflect centuries of justification for the struggle against Islam as well as ‘constituting the ‘we’ that were also criteria for exclusion: the tribe, the nation, the chosen people, the believers, the master race, the West and so on’ (Venn, 2000: 198). The Conference considered evangelising the so-called ‘unoccupied sections of the world’ meaning regions unexplored – estimated to include millions who had never heard the Gospel. These were North India, large areas of Africa and parts of South America populated by tribal groups. Mongolia
was especially mentioned for having only one missionary for two and a half million people. The Conference confidently argued vis-à-vis ‘the other’ that:

Christianity claims to be, for all ages and peoples, the all sufficient and only sufficient religion. A moral obligation attaches itself to such claim. If Christianity be the only sufficient religion for all the world, it should be given all the world. Christ’s command also lays upon the Church an obligation for nothing less than a world-wide promulgation of the Gospel (World Missionary Conference, 1910, Vol. 1: 279).

This may suggest that Western missionaries perceived themselves as having Christian doctrinal monopoly by assuming exclusive privileges. It may also explain why the sense of mission developed primarily within European nations involved in empire building, confidently growing to its peak in the ‘high imperialist era’ when most Western European nation states were rushing to acquire colonies. Due to missionaries’ involvement in social services, Christian consciousness spread beyond Christian jurisdiction. However, Hansen (1984) argues that it was impossible to measure the intensity or sincerity of new converts. Since in many colonies the Church was the only prominent force beside the ethnic group leadership, politicians raised in schools with ecclesiastical patronage were largely sympathetic to Christian principles. The net effect was that most churches became influential, even though they remained often insensitive to societal pluralism, tolerance of other cultures or inter-religious dialogue.

It appears that at the beginning of the 20th century the ecumenical movement did not have a theology of plurality. It did not know how to talk about Jesus Christ and witness to what God has done in history except in Christocentric exclusivist terms. It could not make theological sense of other religious experiences and of those who had heard the gospel but had chosen not to become part of the church. The Christological discourse appeared to be more important than defending ecclesiological principles. It was in this period that missionary societies, both Protestant and Catholic, invoked as their ontological rationale the literal interpretation of the Great Commission.
In the 1910 Edinburgh World Missionary Conference the delegates were convinced that processes of Westernisation also brought social deprivation and could produce an immoral life-style. Here is a sample of self-criticism of ‘corrupting influences’, or double Western standards, presented in the *Report of Commission I*:

> It is sad but inevitable fact that as a rule the masses of the non-Christian people, and even many of their leaders, do not discriminate between the genuine Christians who come from western countries, such as missionaries and sincere and worthy Christian laymen in commercial and Government pursuits, and the vicious representatives of the West who go among them.
> It is not strange, therefore, that the following challenge is a typical expression of the opinion of a great multitude of Asiatics and Africans: “You come to us with your religion. You degrade our people with drink. You scorn our religion, in many points like your own, and then you wonder why Christianity makes such slow progress among us. I will tell you: It is because you are not like your Christ” (World Missionary Conference, 1910, Vol. 1: 22-3).

**Organisation and Conference agenda**

The conditions of continued social progress seem bound to the extension of social relations. The emergence of *gesellschaft* type societies and globalising networks led, in some circumstances, towards alternatives to traditional missionary activities. We may ask if the ecumenical movement has also been sustained by ‘heterogeneous motives, intentions, perception of grievance, degrees of commitment, ideological understanding of what is at stake, strategic and tactical ideas, and definitions of ‘satisfactory’ resolution of grievances’ (Beckford, 2000: 168)? Changes in social conceptions of traditional beliefs have consequences for the way society relates to religious values. Christian missionaries consider the world as one interdependent humankind within the global religious field. They give a historical example of how ‘great world religions’ (Held, 2002: 48) have reached global outreach.
From a similar perspective, sociologist of religion Mady Thung (1976) argues that social sciences ought to develop an updated perspective and analysis on mission that may include the future aspirations of the organisations and people concerned. In her study *The Precarious Organisation: Sociological Explorations of the Church’s Mission and Structure*, she provides an outline of the ‘missionary church’ that employs the following criteria:

- It is a church namely, which
  - is not identifying with nationalistic or other mundane interests,
  - is concerned with change in history, which it sees related to God’s work towards final transformation of the world,
  - suggests that the church cooperates in establishing change towards a better world,
  - explicitly recognizes therefore that it has social and political tasks, but also that these have sometimes been fulfilled better by people outside the churches than by those inside, and
  - reformulates evangelism and mission as (a demonstration of) a Christian way of living rather than a propagandistic recruitment of members; a way of living which must be accomplished by the membership in its totality (Thung, 1976: 68).

Aware of worldwide socio-religious change, the Conference organisers conceived this gathering with what may be seen analytically as a globalising purpose. According to American church historian Kenneth Scott Latourette, this Conference surpassed previous ‘national or regional conferences of missionaries’ (1986: 355) by developing into a global institution. This Conference is remembered especially as an event that started worldwide church assistance. Thirty-five years later, Carol Graham, a biographer of the first Indian Anglican Bishop, Azariah of Dornakal (1874-1945) remembers that:

“Edinburgh 1910” was a landmark in the history of Christendom, almost unparalleled in importance, because it marked the beginning of a new era in international and interdenominational Christian co-operation, and the means by which this has been achieved are the [national] Christian Councils, now established in over thirty different countries of which India was one of the first (Graham, 1946: 102).
Rev. W. H. Temple Gairdner, member of the Church Missionary Society, an Anglican priest based in Cairo (Friesen, 1996: 5-6), was invited by the preparatory committee to write participatory impressions on the Conference. His purpose was to present the variety and creativity of discourses of that generation of missionaries and to acknowledge their contribution to this event and their encounter with other religious traditions. As a missionary scholar, Gairdner compiled the historical/interpretative account in one volume entitled 'Edinburgh 1910': An Account and Interpretation of the World Missionary Conference. He revealed the time-space compression he witnessed in his era and the development of the consciousness of the world as a single place. In the introduction to the study he writes that:

For the scientific enquiry (so characteristic of the age), the slow synthesis of which has enabled us to take a right view of our planet in space, is just that which enables us to view it and realise it in itself. If we now can see it as one unit among others, it is this that enables us to see it also as a unit in itself, a single whole. And it is because the world has at last come to be realised as a single whole that the enterprise of carrying the Gospel to all the world is gradually being invested with a new realisableness in the minds of men (Gairdner, 1910: 5).

As we have seen in Chapter 3, the realisation and awareness of the one world perspective and the development of global consciousness are a result of a continuous negotiation between *gemeinschaft* and *gesellschaft* principles of organisation. The Conference organisers maintained that this event was the beginning of reconciliation between various Protestant groups and agreements would be achieved only as a result of dynamic questioning. On a pamphlet published by the organising committee one year in advance it was suggested that:

The possibilities of the Conference are very great, inasmuch as –

1. It would be thoroughly representative of the missionary forces at work throughout the world.
Its aim is to subject the principles and methods of the missionary enterprise to a fresh review, in the light of the new conditions that have arisen in most mission fields (World Missionary Conference, 1909).

Furthermore, for the organisers, the word “Conference” was used to cover not merely the actual meetings in June 1910, but also the preliminary work of enquiry which had already begun (World Missionary Conference, 1909).

According to Latourette (1986) an early international committee meeting in Oxford in July 1908 proposed this event with the rationale of discovering the best methodological strategy plan of action and priorities for the missionary enterprise rather than developing a reflective theoretical theology of mission. Joseph Houldsworth Oldham was selected as secretary, while John Raleigh Mott was appointed Chairman of Committee (Hopkins, 1979). It is worth noting that the participants were mainly from Mission Boards and Missionary Societies and not Churches. This Conference became a cohesive intellectual network providing a shared public identity, representing mainly highly educated leaders of missions, who presented sometimes also an articulate self-critique of the Western-church mission. The organising committee modelled the conference following previous missionary strategies debated at conferences in Madras in 1902 and Shanghai in 1907. They also took advantage of the previous globalising circumstances.

Moreover, only a fortnight before the leaders met at Oxford, had closed the great Pan-Anglican Congress, at which five thousand delegates from every Anglican diocese had met for conference in London: in this case a remarkable propaedeutic had been carried out for the three years that proceeded the Conference, in the shape of a series of numerous short papers, written by acknowledged specialists on the many subjects which were to be taken up at the Conference, and sent seriatim to all those who desired to prepare their mind for the discussions themselves (Gairdner, 1910: 17).

The agenda contained eight themes, and a particular commission was appointed to deal with each of them. Questionnaires were distributed to hundreds of field missionaries in Africa and Asia and the commissions recorded their answers.
Thus, planning two years in advance, the organisers reached agreement that these eight commissions may examine the following research objectives:

1. carrying the gospel to all the Non-Christian World
2. the church in the mission field
3. education in relation to Christianisation of national life
4. the missionary message to non-Christian religions
5. the training of teachers (the preparation of missionaries)
6. the home base of missions
7. missions and governments

From the beginning this Conference had before itself substantial documentation received for evaluation on eight major themes, written by hundreds of worldwide Protestant missionary correspondents. The first report emphasised the worldwide mission of the church. It compiled, centralised and published for large distribution updated detailed quantitative information methodologically gathered regarding world missionary activity in 1910. It was an attempt to present a global account of missionary activity, and ‘to survey the entire world for the discovery of all areas unoccupied by missionary agencies’ (World Missionary Conference, 1910, Vol. 1: 393). As recorded in the Appendix B: Suggestions for a World Survey of Missionary Occupation of the Report of Commission I, at that time, these were considered and proposed as the most advanced systematic/scientific criteria.

The following tables are submitted as a suggestive method of approximating the actual conditions of the mission fields with reference to missionary occupation. The following facts are given:-
(1) Name of district; (2) its area; (3) its population; (4) the missionary force subdivided under the headings of men, wives, other women; (5) population for each missionary (not including wives); (6) main mission stations, their number and names; (7) total number of Christians. It was suggested that additional columns might be added, giving the following items of information of value in judging of the need of a given area: (8)
Native workers; (9) Hindrances; (10) Bible translations; (11) Strategic centres for occupation; (12) Nearest missions and their location (World Missionary Conference, 1910, Vol. 1: 394-5).

The report of the second commission stressed on the development of what subsequently were called the ‘younger’, newly established churches and made unambiguous that a leading purpose of the missionary enterprise was to bring into being self-governing, self-supporting and self-propagating churches in every region. The eighth report was ecumenical in both title and purpose, while the Report of Commission IV, ‘The Missionary Message in Relation to Non-Christian Religions’ reflected a remarkably extensive Protestant survey of missionary attitudes and thinking about non-Christian religions.

**John Raleigh Mott**

The architect and chairperson of the Edinburgh 1910 Conference was lay American Methodist Dr John Raleigh Mott (1865-1955). One of his biographers, C. Howard Hopkins, argues that as a committed ecumenist, Mott was previously national intercollegiate secretary of the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA), which at that time was a strong missionary organisation (Hopkins, 1979). However, Mott participated at the Edinburgh 1910 World Missionary Conference in the capacity of founder and General Secretary of the World Student Christian Federation (WSCF). The WSCF was established in Vadstena Castle, Sweden in August 1895 (Tatlow, 1933; Fisher, 1952; Rouse, 1986) and became in a relatively short time a global organisation incorporating: Africa, Asia-Pacific, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, Middle East, and North America. This background is important because according to American ecumenist Robert S. Bilheimer, program secretary in North America of the WCC, ‘if Dr. Mott had done nothing else, his work in establishing the World’s Student Christian Federation would have been one of the most important single contributions to the modern ecumenical movement’ (Bilheimer cited in Fisher, 1952: 23). Furthermore, ecumenist Robert C. Mackie argues that

The very name World’s Student Christian Federation is suggestive of what Mott was after. ‘World’ had not yet become an adjective, but the global
scale was aimed at. And this was to be a Federation of movements rather than a movement itself (Mackie, 1965: 29).

Another of Mott’s biographers, Galen M. Fisher, writes that besides being an architect of co-operation and unity ‘Dr. Mott has been global in outlook, purposes and strategy’ (Fisher, 1952: 5). Thus, Fisher argues that through his ‘global mindedness’ and his work, Mott was always close to religious integrative world alliances. Mott’s concern for the global extension of Christianity became widely reflected in his intellectual work.

Mott’s absorbing concern for the global extension of Christianity is likewise shown by the titles of his published book, addresses, and papers, whose number are legion. The very first volume from his pen was Strategic Points in the World’s Conquest, 1897. Then followed at intervals of a few years books in which the word “World” forms a part of every title, and several more, which deal with world-wide Christianity, even though “World” does not appear in their titles. An equal number of pamphlets by him, dealing with similar subjects, were issued during the same period. His insatiable ambition to plant the flag of his divine Sovereign on new territories was aptly described by Woodrow Wilson, when, as president of Princeton University, he bestowed the degree of Doctor of Laws on Mott and described him as “a traveller over four continents in search of room for work” (Fisher, 1952: 4).

From this perspective, I argue that the interpretation of ‘global mindedness’ possessed by Mott (Fisher, 1952), may be an example of Robertson’s (1992) articulation of the ‘global consciousness’ principle. Despite the fact that he spoke only the English language (Neill, 1960: 15), ‘Dr. Mott presided over all meetings for discussion with promptitude and precision, with instinctive perception of the guidance required, and with a perfect union of firmness and Christian courtesy, of earnest purpose and timely humour, which won for him alike the deference and the gratitude of the [Conference] members’ (World Missionary Conference, 1910, Vol. 9: 23).
While delivering the Closing Address he proclaimed that ‘we have looked out beyond this whole hall into a situation throughout the non-Christian world absolutely unique in the history of our religion, unique in opportunity unique in danger, unique in responsibility’ (Mott in World Missionary Conference, 1910, Vol. 9: 348). He declared that ‘gathered together from different nations and races and communions’ the delegates arrived to realise their ‘oneness in Christ’ (Mott in World Missionary Conference, 1910, Vol. 9: 347). Indeed, it is arguable that no antecedent gatherings were so widely representative of worldwide Christendom or had included so many nations, races or range of Protestant ecclesiastical convictions. Thus, in 1910, Mott managed to chair a Conference with an integrative global purpose, within which Christian fellowship transcended many barriers. The growing realisation of this fellowship was to remain one of the most significant characteristics of the future ecumenical movement. Mott was also elected chairman of the follow-up 35 members Continuation Committee (World Missionary Conference, 1910, Vol. 9: 134-8) that became the International Missionary Council in 1921.

Edinburgh 1910 was not only the starting point of the modern ecumenical movement, it was also the first of a new type of international church gathering. Indeed it was because it was planned in a particular way that it achieved the results it did. Mott, like St. Paul, was not averse to believing that a particular course might seem good “to the Holy Ghost and to us”! With Oldham as his most efficient and willing ally, Mott put all he had into the Conference. He was determined that it should be an outstanding occasion, and it was (Mackie, 1965: 44).

Beside numerous awards, in 1946, while holding the positions of President World Alliance of Young Men's Christian Associations and Chairman International Missionary Council, John Raleigh Mott was given the Nobel Peace Prize (Fisher, 1952) sharing the distinction with pacifist Emily Greene Balch (Hopkins, 1979: 695-6). Mott’s globally recognised award, originated in the period of take-off into global society (Robertson, 1992: 59; Holton, 1998: 47), was in recognition for the role the YMCA had played in increasing global understanding and for its humanitarian efforts. In Amsterdam 1948, at the age of eighty-three, ‘for his life-
long association with the ecumenical movement’ (Oldham in Hopkins, 1979: 697) he was made Honorary President of the newly emergent WCC.

Now we examine Mott’s ‘right hand’ at the Edinburgh 1910 Conference, Joseph Houldsworth Oldham. The friendship relationship developed between them will play an important role in the development of global ecumenism.

**Joseph Houldsworth Oldham**

On the preface of *Edinburgh 1910*: An Account and Interpretation of the World Missionary Conference, Gairdner dedicates his writing to Joseph Houldsworth Oldham (1874-1969), the executive general secretary of the Conference. Born in Bombay, India, Oldham was a Presbyterian who may be considered ‘one of the greatest ecumenical pioneers of the 20th century’ (Clements, 1999: xiii).

Oldham was a student of Trinity College, Oxford. After a year as the first full-time secretary of the Student Volunteer Missionary Union (SVMU), Oldham sailed for India in 1897 under the Scottish YMCA, to work in Lahore among students and young Indians employed in government offices. In Lahore he married Mary Fraser, daughter of the future governor of Bengal Province. In 1901 he returned to Edinburgh and began theological studies at New College. Between 1904-5 he went to Halle, Germany to study mission with Gustav Werneck.

Oldham was responsible for the overall logistics of the Conference. His successful organisational skills and detailed planning were ingredients of his future ecumenical career (Clements, 1999). Permanently released from the Student Movement secretaryship, he became also the first secretary of the Continuation Committee of the Edinburgh Missionary Conference.

In 1912, Oldham launched the influential periodical *International Review of Mission (IRM)*, which presently is the oldest existing global instrument for sharing on mission practices and thinking. The current editor of this periodical Jacques Matthey (1999) quotes from the editorial of the first 1912 issue, about its specific future focus:
The scope of the Review will be limited to work among non-Christian peoples, and questions that are related more or less directly to the carrying on of that work. This is not because other forms of missionary effort, and other tasks for which the Church is responsible, seem to us to be of less importance and urgency (…) The Review will always be in the fullest sympathy with sincere endeavours every where to bring men and women into vital relations with God in Christ, and with every attempt to make social conditions and institutions reflect more worthily the mind of Christ (Matthey, 1999, 341-2, quoting from *International Review of Missions*, 1912: 9-10).

According to Kenneth Scott Latourette, this journal had global influence in interrelating intellectuals and elites of various religious traditions in productive networks, able to share diverse Christian perspectives on missionary methodologies. It created a forum for debating new opportunities for institutional policies with a global and ecumenical scope.

[…]* The International Review of Missions*, was inaugurated for the discussion on a high intellectual level of problems and issues which concerned the entire world mission of the Church. Its first number appeared in January 1912. The Review immediately took its place as the outstanding supra-confessional international journal in the field of missions. Its wide range of contributors and reviewers, from many lands and differing ecclesiastical and theological traditions, its extensive bibliographies, and its annual surveys of the world mission, covering as they did Roman Catholic as well as Protestant developments, contributed notably to the nourishment of the ecumenical spirit (Latourette, 1986: 363-4).

Oldham became also the general secretary of the International Missionary Council (IMC), an organisation which evolved from the 1910 Edinburgh Conference and its Continuation Committee and was formally constituted in 1921 in Lake Mohonk, New York, USA. The influence of the IMC grew swiftly. It helped to form national Christian councils and conferences of missionary societies in many
parts of the world and it undertook a wide range of activities. These included the study of mission issues, support for training for Christian ministry in local contexts and assisting the churches in grappling with questions of religious and cultural plurality. The IMC united Protestant national missionary councils and councils of churches from Africa, Asia and Latin America in a federation with Protestant councils of missionary agencies in Europe and North America.

In 1928, the IMC organised a conference in Jerusalem. According to William Paton this location had been strategically chosen ‘both by reason of the sacred association with the Holy City, and also because Jerusalem would be conveniently reached from the countries of the Far West and those of the Far East’ (Paton, 1928: 7). As Jerusalem was under British Mandate, the English language was *lingua franca*. The event followed closely the style of the Edinburgh 1910 conference. Mott chaired the plenary sessions, however Oldham was away in Africa (Hopkins, 1979: 659).

Jerusalem 1928 was significant for recognizing secularism as the greatest competitor to Christianity. In contrast to Edinburgh [1910], its concerns were not “with geographical areas, or with the numerical aspect of the missionary enterprise... but with the wide range of human relations – social, industrial, economic, racial, international” Mott pointed out (Hopkins, 1979: 660).

However, even though in Jerusalem there were some Eastern Orthodox Church hierarchs, they were not invited to participate in the Council’s deliberations. Furthermore, the German delegation argued that the Continental Europeans were critically underrepresented in their membership, whereas the Anglo-American missionaries controlled the conference agenda due to their linguistic affinities. For this reason, the Germans argued that this conference professed mainly a bilateral spirit and ethnic alienation rather than promotion of international exchange (Underhill, 1929: 266).

Later on, with the occasion of integration of the International Missionary Council within the WCC in New Delhi general Assembly in 1961 (Clements, 1999: 466-
7), Oldham was elected honorary president of the assembly, ‘as a message of recognition and gratitude’ (Visser’t Hooft, 1962: 139).

According to Keith Clements, President of the Council of European Churches,

It is worth remarking on, that for all the worldwide scope of his thought and activities, Joe Oldham had physically travelled relatively little given that he lived so long. True, there had been some India experiences, his visits to continental Europe and North America, his two African tours and one circumnavigation of the world which briefly included China. But compared with, for example, John Mott’s restless globe-trotting, Oldham’s existence had been markedly desk-bound in London, especially since the mid-1930s. His most important travels had been through reading and personal encounters, and his most adventurous frontier-crossing had been in the worlds of ideas and awareness and personal encounters (Clements, 1999: 461).

On the one hand, as an educator, the interdisciplinary nature of his interests created influential networks which played an important role in the global ecumenical arena. On the other hand, biased to ‘the ideals of Plato’s Republic whose society was to be run by philosophers’ he may be considered an elitist for recruiting in the service of ecumenism only ‘the best minds’ who produced brilliant ideas (Clements, 1999: 473).

**Charles Henry Brent**

Charles Henry Brent (1862-1929), Canadian born Protestant Episcopal bishop assigned to the Philippines and participant in the commission ‘Mission and Governments’, energetically opposed the international opium traffic (Brent in World Missionary Conference, 1910 Vol. 7: 164-5). Previously he presided in 1909 over the opium conference in Shanghai. ‘Bishop Brent of the Philippines, who had some share in drawing international attention to the subject, strongly maintained the absolute sincerity of all the governments – Chinese, British and Dutch – who had manifested a desire to see the traffic checked and stopped, at
loss, in every case to themselves’ (Gairdner, 1910: 170). Later on, in 1923, he represented the United States on the League of Nations Narcotics Committee.

More than anyone else, Bishop Brent of the Episcopal Church of the United States recognised that the unity of the Church would only be conveyed if there was concrete faith agreement. Thus, he was determined to bring together bishops, ecclesiastical leaders and theologians to begin the task of studying church division. He was to become also the main campaigner of this movement of common fellowship, and it took from 1910 to 1927 to set up the first World Conference on Faith and Order held in Lausanne, Switzerland. Participants were Protestants, Anglicans, Orthodox and Free churches.

Thus it was that Edinburgh did have wider historical import for ecumenism than the missionary movement per se. In later life Charles Brent, soon to be a prime mover in the Faith and Order movement, identified a moment of prayer during an Anglican eucharist at Edinburgh as the occasion when he felt a personal call to work for visible unity. For his part, Oldham felt that Brent’s speech announcing that he intended, on his return to America, to take immediate steps to bring into an existence an organ to examine faith and order questions, was the most memorable of all utterances at Edinburgh (Clements, 1999: 98).

Although Pope Pius XI expressed personal friendliness towards this project and gave it his blessing, the Roman Catholic Church declined to become part of it. United under Bishop Brent’s leadership, Faith and Order was the first occasion for the nearly 127 churches represented exchanging their respective positions concerning Christian unity by creating an international/interconfessional continuation committee.

**Vedanayakam Samuel Azariah**

Vedanayakam Samuel Azariah (1874-1945) is an important non-Western Conference participant. He was one of the founders of the Indian Missionary Society of Tinnevely in 1903 (Graham, 1946), and later became a missionary in the territories of the Nizam of Hyderabad, today part of the state of Andhra Pradesh.
Pradesh. After he had held the office of YMCA secretary for South India for 10 years (Hopkins, 1979: 357), he became the first general secretary of the National Missionary Society of India in 1905 (Graham, 1946: 27).

In a provocative address at Edinburgh 1910, he strongly criticised the unequal partnership between Western missionaries and their indigenous colleagues. In an address ‘on themes of East-West relations and co-operation’ (Hopkins, 1979: 357), he challenged western missionaries for their lack of friendship and rebuked their patronising attitude. In a biographical study entitled *In the Shadow of the Mahatma: Bishop V.S. Azariah and the Travails of Christianity in British India*, historian Susan Billington Harper argues that at Edinburgh 1910 Azariah delivered ‘a radically critical speech on the subject of racial relations between missionaries and their foreign converts’ (Harper, 2000: 147). His speech was entitled *The Problem of Co-operation between Foreign and Native Workers*. In the following quote he argues that

> Whatever other[s] may think, I do not myself look to any time in the near future when we in India will not need the western missionary to be our spiritual guides and helpers. Through your inheritance of centuries of Christian life you are able to impart to us many things that we lack. And in this sphere I think the westerner will be for years to come a necessity. It is in this co-operation of joint study at the feet of Christ that we shall realise the oneness of the Body of Christ. The exceeding riches of the glory of Christ can be fully realised not by the Englishman, the American, and the Continental alone, nor by the Japanese, the Chinese, and the Indians by themselves – but by all working together, worshipping together, and learning together the Perfect Image of our Lord and Christ. It is only “with all Saints” that we can “comprehend the love of Christ which passeth knowledge, that we might be filled with all the fullness of God.” This will be possible only from spiritual friendships between the two races. We ought to be willing to learn from one another and to help one another.

Through all the ages to come the Indian Church will rise up in gratitude to attest the heroism and self-denying labours of the missionary body. You have given your goods to feed the poor. You have given your bodies to be

Gairdner also interprets Azariah’s position not necessarily as representative and emancipatory as ‘he [Azariah] pled for a deep readjustment of the personal relation that sometimes existed (he alleged) in India; for a more real co-operation of spirit Western and Eastern, - in one word, for “friendship” (1910: 109, original emphasis). Undoubtedly, the speech delivered by Azariah made a strong impact on the audience. It is believed that Azariah’s ‘plea for friendship from the missionary churches of the West was to prove the longest-remembered address of the entire conference’ (Clements, 1999: 89-90, original emphasis).

Azariah was consecrated bishop of Domakal in 1912, the first Indian to become a bishop of the Anglican Church. During the period of his services, the diocese registered growth in numbers and activities. In 1929 he became chairman of the National Christian Council of India (Graham, 1946: 103), an influential participant in the International Missionary Council, and one of the leaders in the movement which resulted in the Church of South India in 1947. He was present at Faith and Order conference at Lausanne in 1927, Life and Work at Oxford in 1937, and the International Missionary Council at Tambaram in 1938. It is arguable that to a large extent, the Church of South India, formed in 1947, was a fruit of his leadership.

According to Harper (2000) Azariah had a Pan-Asian ecumenical global vision. This was initially cultivated due to his participation in YMCA between 1895 and 1909. His message, proclaiming universal Christian values while being a prelate of the Anglican Church within the governance framework of the British Empire, was at times in contradiction to Gandhi’s ethno-nationalist secessional political views. On one hand Azariah advocated Indian self-evangelisation, and indigenous management in missionary activities. On the other hand he was a major contributor towards building a global consensus in favour of ecumenical cooperation. Unfortunately, it appears that ‘Gandhi privately considered Azariah to be his ‘Enemy Number One’” (Swaminathan in Harper, 2000: 7) because there was little consensus between them regarding issues of socio-political nature.
Analysis of Conference plans for the future

The delegates, gathered in Edinburgh in order to develop a strategic plan for action and priorities for their missionary enterprise, maintained from direct experience that the divisions of churches were an impediment to mission. For them, the credibility of the Church’s witness of reconciliation and message of peace was contradicted by Christian disunity. The nine volume documents are empirical evidence that the Conference ethos reflected a self-critique of Christian mission. This emerged from an elite because, by design, participation was selective. It represented mainly the thinking of Churchmen, missionary historians and strategists, politicians, philanthropists, and talented educators sympathetic to the missionary cause.

Socio-political change is also evident in the Church sense of world mission and international relations. Some missionaries, not always supporters of the architects of empire building, started to negotiate their loyalty to various forms of governance encountered in the field. However, for the Conference participants the realisation of the ‘kingdom of God’ meant first and foremost a new international order developed from the Christianisation of the entire world. In the introduction to the Report of Commission VII, it was argued that:

The variety of Governments under which Missions work makes wide and fruitful generalisations as to their actual and ideal relations difficult to reach. In Japan, e.g., a fully civilised native Government rules over a civilised and yet non-Christian people; in its neighbour, China, the Government is both antiquated in methods and defective in policy, according to European standards, and is therefore to some extent limited in its actions by European influences; in India a foreign Christian Government controls the destinies of 300,000,000 Hindus and Mahommedans; in Mahommedan lands the law of Islam, which, strictly interpreted, absolutely prohibits conversion to Christianity, is applied to various degrees of rigour; in European protectorates over uncivilised regions the amount of control varies infinitely, and Government policy varies with it; and in barbarous lands, still independent, the caprice of the chiefs, checked only by ancient usage and hereditary superstition, modifies...
the relations between them and the missionaries day by day. It follows that the only way in which we can hope to grasp leading principles is by survey of the actual conditions in each great country or group of countries (World Missionary Conference, 1910, Vol. 7: 3).

According to Mills (1956), some elite individuals are role determined, but others are at times role determining. From the above quote we notice that missionaries, as ‘history-makers’, became engaged in a contemporary dynamic relationship which at times could ‘determine not only the role they play but today the roles of millions of other men’ (Mills, 1956: 25). Furthermore, this dynamic demonstrates the prerequisite for negotiation as survival condition in various jurisdictions, as well as flexible attitudes vis-à-vis local leadership. This is characteristic for all situations where Christians have to live in coexistence with dominant non-Christian majorities, like in the Early Church in the Roman Empire, in Byzantium under Muslim Government or in atheist and anti-religious systems like the Soviet Union.

Nevertheless, retrospectively we may argue that, in some measure, religious globalisation became a reality, and for the first time in the history of ecumenism, cultural diversity became acknowledged within a global framework. The most significant organisational development was the immediate creation of a permanent Continuation Committee (World Missionary Conference, 1910, Vol. 9: 134-8); becoming the International Missionary Council in 1921, which later developed an increasingly close relationship with the WCC until it became incorporated into it in the 1961 New Delhi Assembly. Thus, ecumenical institutional continuity is a major result of this Conference.

It was altogether appropriate, indeed inevitable, that the first great world-wide inter-denominational conclave of this [twentieth] century should have been a missionary convention – at Edinburgh in 1910. And that from it as a germinative seed plot should have sprung, directly or indirectly, the major world movements for Christian co-operation, e.g., both of the immediate parents of the World Council of Churches – the World Conference on Faith and Order and the Universal Christian Council for
Life and Work – as well as the International Missionary Council (Van Dusen, 1961: 17).

While considering a more sensitive missionary strategy vis-à-vis non-Christians, some participants did not hesitate to pass negative value judgements on other cultures or religions. This makes us critically observe the paternalistic, at times supremacist, attitude and ethos, structure and design of the 1910 Edinburgh Conference (Friesen, 1996), which certainly did not discourage cultural or indeed, religious bias perspectives. For example, in his address, regarding what he considered ‘primitive races’, Ralph Wardlaw Thompson, foreign secretary of the London Missionary Society, was keen to make anthropological distinctions. If Thompson had a sympathetic view on traditional Churches, on the contrary, while referring to some mission fields, he gave the title of his Assembly address *Among Primitive and Backward Peoples*. This reflects a dominant (post-Victorian) consensus whereby traditional religious systems they encountered were generally condemned.

On the one side are all those races and communities which have definite and organised systems of religion and ethics, usually in association with a distinct religious literature, and often in connection with an ancient civilisation. All these are now in a state of remarkable wakefulness under new intellectual and political influence. On the other side there are the races which we often describe as “primitive,” and which are invariably in a low state of civilisation, without a written language or literature, without any intellectual stimulus, and whose religion is best described as Animistic or as Fetish worship. The only wakefulness and progress which has been manifested among these is due to the work and influence of the missionary (Thompson in World Missionary Conference, 1910, Vol. 9: 265-6).

A few years later, Durkheim, while analysing various forms of religious behaviour in *Elementary Forms of Religious Life* ([1915] 1971: 421), argued that most social institutions are born from within religion. Thus, animism should not be dismissed, instead understood ‘as a complex whole, a product of history and mythology’ ([1915] 1971: 55). For him, the roots of religion lay in the ‘cosmological system of totemism’, where some animals or objects are treated as
sacred. Although these early conceptions of animism and totemism are controversial at present, the terms are still used by some anthropologists for describing specific religious beliefs and/or rituals. On the other hand, the ‘fetish worship,’ is the belief that a lifeless object possesses magical powers. This object may be a natural thing, such as a stone, a feather, a shell, or the claw of an animal, or artificially created, such as carvings in wood. The power of the fetish is thought to derive its effectiveness from one of two sources. In some cases the object is assumed to have a will of its own; in others the source of power comes from the belief that a god dwells within the object itself transforming it into an instrument of his/her desires.

Definitely, for Durkheim ‘primitive’ had a different meaning. ‘All are religions equally, just as all living beings are equally alive, from the most humble plastids up to man. So when we turn to primitive religions it is not with the idea of depreciating religion in general, for these religions are no less respectable than the others’ ([1915] 1971: 3). While Durkheim argued the above from a sociological perspective, contemporary missionaries like Thompson, in order to describe the context of their activity, employed the hegemonic discourse of modernity, stressing the ‘civilising’ Eurocentric values, development of mercantile colonialism and urbanisation, as an overall success story. It reflects intensive politico-economic activity and attempts at regulating the newly formed civil societies, actively integrated through commerce and protected through military centralised border maintenance.

The map of Africa is now like Joseph’s coat of many colours. Portugal, Spain, Britain, France, Germany, have all their spheres of influence and their claims. It is even so all round the world. Wherever there is a strategic position on coast or island which is assumed to be of importance to some world power, political necessity has hoisted a flag and made a naval base. Wherever there is a chance of a market for the commerce of western activity, enterprising firms have their representatives. Regions which within an ordinary lifetime were the home of the nomad wanderer are now peopled, and thriving townships are springing up in lands, the very names of which your fathers did not know. It is truly an amazing

This citation illustrates how the colonial domination of indigenous peoples, the scientific and aesthetic discipline of nature through classificatory schemas, the capitalist appropriation of resources, and the imperialist ordering of the globe under a panoptical regime, all formed part of a massive world historical movement that reached its apogee at the time of this particular Conference. Many missionaries’ impressions from the field have negative characteristics. ‘But of the western mind, it is hardly conceivable how universally life and thought in the pagan world have been darkened by terrors which give idolatry its hold over man’ (World Missionary Conference, 1910, Vol. 2: 211).

About animist religions, their reports included practices of cannibalism, infanticide, frequent murder, and almost continual state of tribal war. In this sense missionaries passed evaluative statements in methodological reflection that raise some fundamental issues of the relationship between indigenous context and normative orientations and Christian commitments of various sorts. Even if the condemnation of indigenous religions occurred, some believed in the cultural continuity and traditional heritage, while simultaneously calling for radical societal change demanded by Christianity.

The 1910 World Missionary Conference also presented some valuable academic initiatives and recommendations. Regarding preparation and training of missionaries, there were suggestions that a basic curriculum was necessary. Gairdner writes that missionaries were expected to have an ‘indispensable minimum’ knowledge in the following areas: the study of comparative religions, the science and history of missions (missiology), sociology, pedagogy and foreign language acquisition (Gairdner, 1910: 228-33).

However, in order to get a clearer understanding of the context, Gairdner gave a contemporary perspective of the incipient revolution in global communication used in service of Christian evangelism as following:
A vision of Earth! Known as a unit in this our day; every day more and more closely and organically knit by the nerves of electric cable and telegraph wire; more richly fed by the arteries and veins of railway-line and steamship ocean-way: one nation in extremest Orient thrilling at the words of some orator at furthest sun-setting, almost as they drop from his lips; so that its inhabitants, for all the differences of tribe and race, become daily more convinced of the unity of their humanity: — one world, waiting, surely for who shall carry to it and place in its empty hands one Faith — the only thing that can ever truly and fundamentally unite it or deeply and truly satisfy it, bringing its one human race into one Catholic Church, through the message of the ‘*One Body and One Spirit, One Lord, one Faith, one Baptism, One God and Father of all, who is overall, and through all, and in all*’ (Gairdner, 1910: 6-7, original emphasis).

Part of the final statement issued in *The Official Message from the Conference to the Members of the Church in Christian Lands* was profoundly radical. It was searching for new methodologies. Understanding that more than theological issues are involved, aware of a dynamic process of social change, the participants declared that:

The old scale and the old ideal were framed in view of a state of the world which has ceased to exist. They are no longer adequate for the new world which is arising out of the ruins of the old. It is not only of the individual or the congregation that this new spirit is demanded. There is an imperative spiritual demand that that national life and influence as a whole be Christianised: so that the entire impact, commercial and political, now of the West upon the East, and now of the stronger races upon the weaker, may confirm, and not impair, the message of a missionary enterprise (Gairdner, 1910: 279).

These statements encapsulate the distinctiveness, complexity and dynamism of social development at the beginning of the 20th century, which mark a break from traditional ways of living. For missionaries in a global context, time and space, the sense of local and distant, the traditional and the strange have taken on new meanings. It appears that the security and parochialism of traditional existence
are increasingly replaced by the options and uncertainties of a modern ethos whose reference point is both global and local. The early 20th century ethos reflects the idea of a new world order supported by technological progress and civilisational advancement (Robertson, 1992).

Short-term effects: further progress of student ecumenism

One year after Edinburgh 1910, the World Student Christian Federation (WSCF) decided to hold its Conference in Constantinople, with the purpose of integrating the Orthodox youth as promoters of ecumenism (Tatlow, 1933: 413-23). The ancient ‘city of Constantine’ captivated the Western participants with its ethos of a multiethnic, multicultural metropolis.

There was no racial centre quite like Constantinople. In Pera, the European quarter, every European language was to be heard. In the streets of Stamboul every Asiatic type might be seen – Persians, Hindus, Arabs, men from Turkestan, Bokhara and Kashgar, Georgians, Caucasi ans and Mongols of every kind. The African was not absent, while Turks, Greeks, Roumanians and Bulgarians abounded. Constantinople was the ecclesiastical centre of both Mohammedan and Orthodox Church world. It was a city of the Sultan, and also, of the Ecumenical Patriarch of the Greek Orthodox Church, the Patriarch of the Armenian Church and the Exarch of the Orthodox Church of Bulgaria (Tatlow, 1933: 417).

Interactions generated by commerce caused common transnational forms of consumption and dynamic processes of cultural exchange, whereby individuals learned to conform to a society’s cohabitant norms and values. This location is particularly significant as for Mott and his delegation, ‘this trip of 1911 was a prime ecumenical venture outside the limits of Anglo-American Protestantism’ (Hopkins, 1979: 371). Constantinople was a microcosm accommodating not just socialisation of an ethnic blend but also religious diversity, where issues of justice and peace were continuously negotiated between the religious communities, and where the mission of the Church was required to be at the forefront. In this global city, culture became generated and facilitated by communication and travel, which in turn accomplished greater interaction between communities. It could be said
that this led to the development of ‘the ideal of societas civilis as an antidote to religious fanaticism’ (Keane, 2003: 193). We may say that in the 1911 Constantinople Conference the participants experienced multicentredness and ‘a cultural pluralism, which, while not turning its back on all that is modern or Western, starts to reconsider the value of tradition, of holistic rather than atomistic thought, and a range of ethnic, nationalist, religious, and indigenous identities’ (Holton, 1998: 171). In their encounter with ‘modern’ Byzantium, the Westerners experienced a new historical reality. Just as the former Byzantine Empire believed that it embraced the oikumenē, the entire civilised world, so too the Church was seeing itself as ecumenical, i.e. reaching to the ends of the earth. However, in this context the ‘ends of the earth’ may also be understood symbolically, since other peoples and their cultures were known to exist beyond the borders of the Empire.

Australian sociologist, Leonie Sandercock (1998), writing about the city in an age of migration, diversity and flux in terms of identity, believes that human living space is to be negotiated through the layers of economics, culture, religion and identity. Those negotiations must recognise the difference in, and draw on, the richness of those layers if the metropolis is to have a future, if it is to move towards what she calls cosmopolis. Writing and drawing her urban examples from a global perspective we may come to an understanding that according to her definition, Tatlow’s (1933) description of 1911 Constantinople can be technically named as cosmopolis:

[...] a construction site of the mind, a city/region in which there is genuine connection with, and respect and space for the cultural Other, and the possibility of working together on matters of common destiny, a recognition of intertwined fates (Sandercock, 1998: 164).

Many in Constantinople were looking for a vision going beyond survival, with insights for a dynamic renewal of church and the urban world. The church can have a key role on the multi-ethnic dimension of the city, often being the only organisation that includes diversity of cultures. Mott was impressed by the sense of communion he encountered in Constantinople:
Successful metropolitan symbiosis makes urban ecumenism a continuous renewed reality. Through engagement of religious congregations and urban neighbourhoods, new opportunities arise in what previously could have been considered a hopeless circumstance. By enlarging the possibility of community and hope through the course of the ecumenical dialogue, the students attempted to move towards a *cosmopolis* habitat. We may ask though if globalisation will make historically distinctive cities uniform or, on the contrary, will it create a mixture of different elements whereby through tradition and innovation together, modern lifestyle and the historical city culture will benefit from one other? Is this phenomenon a benefit for the historical city of the ancient Continent or is cultural globalisation destroying local cultures by diminishing differences and providing opportunities for loss of traditional elements?

Ruth Rouse (WSCF secretary 1905-24) believed that the meeting was momentous because it drew the Eastern Churches for the first time in touch with the emerging ecumenical movement. Its aim was to address matters of faith and the world’s agenda through prayer, Bible study and practical missionary and socio-political involvement without raising any ecclesiological pretensions. For the first time the ecumenical movement linked with representatives from the Balkans, and the whole Near East from Turkey to Egypt (Rouse, 1986: 602). This paved the way for the involvement of the Orthodox churches in wider ecumenical relations. Two hundred forty delegates from thirty-three countries participated including ‘Greeks, Russians, Romanians, Bulgarians, Serbians, Armenians, Syrians, Maronites, and Copts’ (Zernov, 1986: 650-1).
The 1911 WSCF Conference in Constantinople achieved a double purpose: in its external policy it revealed to participants from South-Eastern Europe ‘that a great body of students in all lands believed in God and in the Christian view of the world’ (Tatlow, 1933: 417-8), while internally by attempting to include the Orthodox youth it wanted to change its predominant Protestant ethos. The Conference in Constantinople had a dramatic effect on the World Student Christian Federation by making changes in individual membership requirements, thus becoming a truly inclusive international organisation:

The General Committee puts on record that it is desirable that no student, to whatever branch of the Christian Church he may belong, should be excluded from full membership in any national movements within the Federation if he is prepared to accept the basis of the Federation or whatever equivalent test is approved by the Federation. The committee requests such National Movements as may be affected by this resolution to consider the possibility of making their basis conform to this principle’.

Minutes of the W.S.C.F. General Committee held in Prinkipo and Babek, Constantinople, April 20th to 27th, 1911 (Tatlow, 1933: 419).

Conference participant, Rev. Tissington Tatlow, former postgraduate of Trinity College Dublin at the end of the 19th century, was secretary of the Student Christian Movement of Great Britain and Ireland (1903-29). In The Story of the Student Christian Movement of Great Britain and Ireland (1933) he recounts the impression of the Ecumenical Patriarch Joachim III on the WSCF saying that ‘Many people come to me to talk about reunion, but I do not find the discussion of this topic very profitable, but you come to ask our young men to join your young men in working for the extension of Christ’s Kingdom, and that I think is very good’ (Joachim III Ecumenical Patriarch quoted in Tatlow, 1933: 421).

Contacts with Westerners at the Conference made certain Orthodox ecclesiastics to embrace the aspirations of the ecumenical movement. A notable figure was Dr. Germanos Strinopoulos (1872-1951), at that time Principal of the Orthodox Theological School of Halki, later appointed by the Ecumenical Patriarchate in London as the first Archbishop of Thyateira and Great Britain (1922-51). As prominent organiser of the newly established diocese for Central and Western
Europe, he became a leading representative of Orthodoxy, being the delegate of the Ecumenical Patriarchate to the first and second world conferences on Faith and Order in Lausanne, Switzerland in 1927 and respectively in Edinburgh, Scotland, 1937 (Limouris, 1994).

Among the Orthodox ecclesiastics who attended was Dr. Germanos, the principal of the Orthodox Church Seminary on the Island of Halki in the Sea of Marmora. It was Dr. Germanos’ first contact with the Church of the West. He came later on to the Faith and Order Movement preliminary conference at Geneva in 1920, and when the World Council of Churches was brought into being at Amsterdam 1948, one of the five men appointed presidents was Archbishop Germanos (Fisher, 1952: 28).

The WSCF was both an initiator and continuator of the modern missionary and ecumenical movement. It encouraged and inspired students in the late 19th and early 20th centuries to engage in the work of spreading the gospel by dedicated discipleship through providing a forum to meet and work directly with those of other national and denominational background.

The year [1911] in which the Federation met at Constantinople was a great year for it. It was already a strong international body, being a federation of national Student Christian Movements in North America; Great Britain and Ireland; Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland; France and Italy, Germany; Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland; Australia and New Zealand; India and Ceylon; China and Korea; Japan; and a number of Christian Unions in different countries without national movements, grouped together for admission to the Federation (Tatlow, 1933: 413)

Mission and ecumenism were the federation’s raison d’être serving as the basis and identity in the students’ ecumenical learning process. Its ecumenical vision and commitment emphasised the importance of mutual communication, cooperation and challenge with the mainline institutional churches. Between 1895 – 1910 World Student Christian Federation members, working for unity in the church and in the world, were in most countries, the only Christian organisations run by students and for students in educational establishments, to nurture leaders
for the future ecumenical movement. Thus, we may observe that Christian students significantly helped in generating regional and global networks in the modern ecumenical movement:

The continual coming and going of Student Volunteers at work in Africa, China, Japan and India kept Africa and the Far East before us, while America, the largest Student Christian Movement in the world, poured news and literature upon us. Almost the only country about which we heard little was South America, and even from there cheering little bits of news came from time to time (Tatlow, 1933: 416).

For the students engaged in the ecumenical enterprise this Conference was not only an opportunity for reciprocal understanding, but also common search for uniting principles. Moreover, it supposed that the participants shared something fundamental – a global consciousness (Robertson, 1992) – worldwide in scope and application. And this was not relativistic. The WSCF conferences had a strategy of breaking new ground by meeting in different places. For example, in 1907 the WSCF conference in Tokyo has been claimed to be the first international conference of its kind ever to be held in Japan or in Asia (Hopkins, 1979; Harper, 2000), and the official working languages were Japanese and English. Here, for the first time, the constitution of this organisation was amended ‘to allow affiliated movements to send one woman representative and two men to the general committees’ (Potter and Wieser, 1997: 29).

The Tokyo conference elected Azariah as their vice-president and discussed strategies for evangelisation in Japan, China and India in the face of rising Asian nationalisms and concurrent efforts to revivify the national religions of Buddhism, Confucianism, and ‘Higher Hinduism.’ The conference report took the optimistic view that Asia’s national movements were positive developments attributable to the benefit influence of modern western civilization and to the gradual Christianization of the lands. But the meeting also demonstrated the effects on Asian Christian students of the pan-Asian awakening that had been encouraged by the Japanese military defeat of Russia in 1905 (Harper, 2000: 43).
Promoters of ecumenism Potter and Wieser (1997) argue that with the occasion of the 1911 Constantinople Conference, the WSCF was becoming significantly more interconfessional than earlier when the students belonged only to the churches of the Reformation. This portrays the global Christian message addressed to all students.

When the general committee met after the conference, at Prikopo, there was a long debate on the inclusiveness of membership in the movements. The experience of the Federation over the previous ten years, especially in Central, Eastern and Northern Europe, Russia and India, had shown that students of the Roman Catholic and Orthodox confessions, as well as students with no church attachment, were becoming involved in the life of growing SCMs in the various countries (Potter and Wieser, 1997: 35).

While it recognised that there are legitimate differences among traditions, it also held that this diversity does not extend so far that various groups (national, cultural, religious) are incommensurable with, or irredeemably separated from one another. In short, while ecumenism acknowledged the legitimacy and value of local differences, it aimed at the mutual recognition of global unity without trying to enforce uniformity or homogeneity.

**Long-term effects in relation to Roman Catholicism**

Beside the establishment of the International Missionary Council (Potter and Wieser, 1997: 35), the 1910 Edinburgh World Missionary Conference generated the Faith and Order movement, Bishop Nathan Soderblom’s Life and Work movement, the Malines Conversations and later developments that culminated in the formation of the WCC in Amsterdam 1948. On the other hand, Tavard observes some remote Catholic attempts towards dialogue with Protestants, but these were overshadowed by fears of ‘pan-Christianity’. From a Roman Catholic viewpoint, despite official cautiousness inspired by fears of a vague ‘pan-Christianity’, in the 20th century there had also been isolated moves towards the opening of a dialogue with Protestant Churches. It was not until half a century later however, that visionary Pope John XXIII, elected in 1958, officially
acknowledged the benefits of the ecumenical movement, and ‘unhesitatingly
brought up the ecumenical question before the Catholics’ (Tavard, 1960: vii).

Silas McBee, part of the American Executive (Hopkins, 1979: 365), Vice-
Chairman of Commission VIII which dealt with Co-operation and the Promotion of Unity presented a translated private message of ecumenical encouragement from his friend, Roman Catholic bishop Geremia Bonomelli (1831-1914) from Cremona (McBee in World Missionary Conference, 1910, Vol. 8: 218-23; Delaney, 2000). Aware of perception of ‘Utopian optimism’ from the mainstream Catholic Church, Bishop Bonomelli in his letter to the Edinburgh 1910 Conference professed a personal sympathetic attitude by making the following remark:

A Conference of representatives of all the Christian denominations, held with the noble aim of better making known Christ and His Church to consciences which feel and exhibit in practice all the profound and fecund beauty of religious aspirations, is a fact of such importance and significance that it cannot escape the attention of any one who may follow the Conference, however superficially, in what a degree the most profound problems are agitating and revolutionising the modern spirit. This Conference, indeed, proves that religious feeling ever exercises a supreme influence over the entire life of man, and that the religious factor in our day, as throughout all time, stimulates and urges on human activity towards new conquests in the path of civilisation. The progress of science, the various phases of philosophy, the evolution, both of thought and of practical life – these all group themselves round the religions which human history displays and classifies at different epochs. It has been well said that as the prism exhibits the various colours contained in light, so mankind displays the various forms and shades of religion (Bonomelli in World Missionary Conference, 1910, Vol. 8: 221; Gairdner, 1910: 210).

Bonomelli’s letter read by McBee received an enthusiastic reception in the Conference. It is reported that McBee ‘electrified the Conference with a letter that he had obtained from the Roman Catholic Bishop of Cremona, Italy, [...] with the tacit approval of the Vatican’ (Hopkins, 1979: 365). Furthermore,
Gairdner argues that ‘in this letter, when it was read, was recognised a document that might almost have been taken as a charter of the principles for which the Conference and all similar Conferences stood’ (Gairdner, 1910: 201). However, while the letter received an enthusiastic reception among the Edinburgh 1910 Conference members, the Roman Catholic Church remained apathetic regarding ecumenical initiatives (Delaney, 2000).

**Conclusion**

The 1910 Conference was considered ‘as a climax in its time’ (Cragg, 1968: 32) in relation to the globalisation of the Protestant mission. One of the earliest requirements of the ecumenical movement came from a sense of urgency in relation to world mission. ‘Through all the multitudinous, multiform, and vertigated items, there is a single common thread: at virtually every point the conviction and impulses of Christian unity originated within the enterprise of Christian missions’ (Van Dusen, 1961: 16, original emphases). For the Conference participants global Christian mission was an imperative. They aimed at uniting resources and developing a common missionary strategy, by undertaking together the responsibility of spreading the Gospel worldwide. Leaders of various international missionary societies and Christian organisations understood what could be globally (not only locally or regionally) gained by cooperation and sharing of resources. Furthermore, Protestant theologians and Christian students realised that mission and unity were inseparable. This was seen to be of such paramount importance that Conference participants felt they had to transcend, and eventually overcome, the theological and confessional Christian differences which troubled missionary progress outside Europe and United States.

‘Ecumenicity’, however, in the sense of an increasingly friendly collaboration between the different groups engaged in the religious market, is demanded by the pluralistic situation as a whole, not just by the social-psychological affinities of religio-bureaucratic personnel. These affinities ensure, if nothing else that religious rivals are regarded not so much as ‘the enemy’ but as fellows with similar problems (Berger, 1967: 145).
The rise of the ecumenical movement led by some Protestant churches may be considered within the framework of the ‘take-off phase’ of globalisation (Robertson, 1992: 59). In thought, objectives and action it encouraged worldwide Conference participants to emphasise similar moral values. With respect to the ecumenical movement, we notice ‘autonomous individuals’ (Holton, 1998: 46) who developed transnational networks and institutions. Many of their activities are consistent with Robertson’s (1992) idea of a take-off phase in globalisation. In this period we notice the development of two distinct phenomena. Firstly, the emergence of a global gesellschaft whereby Protestant churches maximise their self-interest through a series of collective arrangements, and secondly a Western (public) emphasis on a singular conception of humankind, supported by inclusive institutional socio-political strategies and programmes.

From a pragmatic perspective, for Protestant missionaries there was a general feeling of ‘redundant diversity’ amid the one faith they were trying to share with ‘the other’. It became obvious that doctrinal divisions were an inefficient factor in their approach, discourse and activities, even if perceived only from a cultural point of view. This gave Protestant leaders a sense of responsibility for a dynamic and effective fulfilment of collective missionary strategy. Also, it prompted individuals of diverse Church traditions to transcend historic barriers through consultation, regular and complex planning, and finally for united leadership and action. ‘This focus embraces how religious conviction and the cultural imagination enter into the way in which globalization is understood and the standpoints that individuals and groups take towards it’ (Holton, 1998: 49). In this context, as analysed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, I argue that the traditional understandings of principles of social organisation gemeinschaft/gesellschaft require significant reassessment.

Nonetheless, Edinburgh 1910 World Missionary Conference remained only a pan-Protestant event because representatives from the Roman Catholic or Orthodox churches were not invited (Tavard, 1960: 95; Neill, 1960: 66). This confirms that a unified conception of humankind (Robertson, 1992: 59) was somehow realisable, yet a complex ecumenical cohesion remained challenged by local ethical heterogeneity, contradictory doctrinal/ideological interpretations and different ecclesiology within diverse politico-historical conditions.
The Protestant missionary societies sent delegates to Edinburgh for an elitist summit that would acknowledge the expanding frontiers of their activities. This Conference had the imagination and courage to set up a major North Atlantic cooperation between missionary bodies. Significantly, this Conference is regarded by most researchers of ecumenism as the birthplace of the institutional ecumenical movement. Mission and unity became closely related in the life of future globally integrated institutional ecumenical bodies. Overall, this Chapter helps us understand in what way various Protestant groups in general and Edinburgh 1910 World Missionary Conference in particular broke new ground in establishing the institutional beginning of the ecumenical movement.

Nevertheless, Robertson’s take-off phase of globalisation has its limitations. As denominationalism and religious rivalries continued, it is arguable that the Edinburgh 1910 World Missionary Conference agenda made rather limited ecumenical advances, with ecumenism still not secure on a trajectory of self-sustaining development. For example, Protestant rapprochement was incapable of preventing the global conflict generated by the belligerent nation-states of the First World War. Global awareness only, without political implementation of ecumenical strategies was insufficient in bringing world justice and enhance human security. In some ways, some limits to the take-off phase of globalisation overlap with the limits of the ecumenical movement. We notice strong regional/geographic determinants within which Western European cultural influences, Protestant Christianity and the English language become defining factors in the advancement of globalisation. In terms of chronology, the ecumenical take-off phase was incomplete. It did not apply to the Roman Catholic Church which projected isolationist tendencies. Similarly, the Eastern Orthodox Churches remained generally absorbed by internal ethno-national affairs even if Protestant student ecumenism received open support from the Patriarch of Constantinople.

In the following Chapter we shall investigate how the dialogical principles developed by Western Protestant leadership were received by various Orthodox Church traditions, and what other developments lay behind a revival of ecumenical thinking in Christian Orthodoxy.
Chapter 5: Christian Orthodox Ecumenism

Introduction

In this Chapter we shall examine the forces that encouraged some Orthodox Churches to participate in the ecumenical movement as well as factors that inhibited this trend. We investigate, how within the first half of the 20th century, ecumenical attitudes underwent major transformations due to the complex socio-political developments in Eastern Europe. The two world wars and the Russian Revolution in particular had a serious impact on the ecumenical setting, regionally as well as globally. However, within the Orthodox milieu, the end of the First World War released energies towards a position of rapprochement.

Similarly, following the Second World War, the socio-political environment was dominated by mistrust and suspicion, polarising political systems and Orthodox churches divided by the Iron Curtain. While the Ecumenical Patriarchate had been a constant supporter of the ecumenical movement since the beginning of the 20th century, the same may not be said of the Russian Orthodox Church, which in the period after 1917 had submitted to isolationist policies dictated by the Soviet regime. This suggests that relations between ecclesiastical and secular institutions and political actors need to be taken into account within this analysis.

It is important here to be familiar with the structured model and administration of each national Orthodox Church. It is also important to be aware that the conventional Orthodox position, despite its conservative attitude at times, may not be taken as anti-ecumenical or anti-dialogical per se. Paradoxically, just by being Christian Orthodox, adherents typically claim to serve Christian unity.

Most primary sources used in this Chapter are extracted from two anthologies of documents compiled by the Greek ecumenists Constantin Patelos (1978) *The Orthodox Church in the Ecumenical Movement: Documents and Statements, 1902-1975* and Gennadios Limouris (1994) *Orthodox Visions of Ecumenism: Statements, Messages and Reports on the Ecumenical Movement 1902-1992.* Both authors gather texts in documentary chronicles presenting the Orthodox Churches as contributors to the ecumenical movement at different stages in the
20th century. However, using such sources alone would tend to overestimate Orthodox ecumenical trends, or at least be at risk of doing so.

Constantin Patelos, served with the Faith and Order Secretariat of the WCC between 1974-6 as representative of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. At present, Metropolitan Dr Gennadios Limouris is representative of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in the Executive Committee of Faith and Order of the WCC and Deputy Vice-President of the Conference of European Churches. Both authors collected various Patriarchal Encyclicals, decisions of Pan-Orthodox Conferences, consultations, statements as well as selective academic reflections regarding involvement in ecumenism, which overwhelmingly give a favourable impression of their church.

The documents, translated in English for a wider access, were edited under the auspices of the World Council of Churches. They represent an integral part of ecumenical history and expose the problematic of centuries old theological and socio-political difficulties encountered by the Eastern Orthodox in dialogue with Western traditions and cultures. Yet they give less emphasis to the sets of particular individuals' internal religious networks and their status, than are found in sources dealing with Protestant ecumenism. This gives them a top-down quality that is not methodologically commensurable with the documents discussed in the previous chapter, which embrace both leading individual ecumenists and wider movements of opinion.

**General presentation and administrative organisation**

The Orthodox Churches have been traditionally called Eastern Orthodox because they existed in Eastern Europe, along the coasts of Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East and East Africa. Although this representation has not been substantially altered, certain socio-political changes made Orthodoxy spread worldwide. This worldwide spread was generated mainly by the sizeable number of Russian refugees after the 1917 Russian Revolution, and by the prisoners of the Second World War who remained in the West due to political instability generated by various Eastern European communist and militarist governments.
Today, Christian Orthodoxy does not consider itself Eastern or Western but global, and for many, religious identification takes precedence over allegiance to secular nation states. However, at present, structurally and managerially, the Orthodox Churches are organised in autocephalous and autonomous clusters of Churches (Jenkins, 2002). These include, according to the line of seniority:

a) the four Eastern ancient patriarchates of Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem,

b) the autocephalous Churches of Russia, Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria, Georgia, Cyprus, Greece, Poland, Albania, Czech Lands and Slovakia, and Orthodox Church of America,

c) the autonomous Churches of Mount Sinai, Finland, Japan, Ukraine and Estonia.

I argue that everywhere in the territories to which Christian Orthodox populations have emigrated, new Orthodox diaspora have formed by developing new ecclesial jurisdictions and administration structures linked to the country of emigration. However, the general aim seen in each land is a united local church to which a diversity of Orthodox migrants adhere, embracing their faithful in that particular area, under a single synod of bishops. In many new settings however, such as the United States, they encounter new existential dilemmas regarding tradition, adaptation and change. This also has immediate implications for ecumenical interactions.

For example, Nicolas Zernov, Russian émigré and Spalding Lecturer in Eastern Orthodox Culture at Oxford University between 1947-66, argues that the post World War Two political conditions were not favourable to Orthodox ecumenism:

The overwhelming majority of them [Orthodox Christians] are living under the Communist yoke, their bishops are deprived of freedom, above all in the Soviet Union, and are constrained to speak the language of those who control them. In the free world, on the other hand, as for example in America, the Orthodox are involved in jurisdictional wrangles, while different ethnic groups live in isolation from one another. But an even more serious obstacle to fruitful work in the ecumenical sphere is the
inherent contradiction in their attitude to the Christian West (Zernov, 1983: 67).

Whether this local church idiom ‘autocephalous’ or ‘autonomous’, has some other canonical status is a secondary matter, for the overall Church the vital point is that Orthodoxy regards itself as being intrinsically one. Each national church is structured according to its received historical tradition and each jurisdiction governed on the basis of its own charter. However, in diasporic circumstances, the present jurisdictional multiplicity, lack of consistency and overlap is often seen as harmful to the Orthodox witness, both internally and externally.

Nevertheless, according to Orthodox bishop Kallistos Ware from Oxford, there is evidence of organisational flexibility:

The Orthodox Church is a family of sister churches, decentralized in structure, which means that separated communities can be integrated into Orthodoxy without forfeiting their internal autonomy. Orthodoxy desires unity-in-diversity, not uniformity, not absorption. There is room in the Orthodox Church for many cultural patterns, for many different ways of worship, and even for many systems of outward organization (Ware, 1997: 309-10).

Organisationally each of the Orthodox Churches comply with a synodical system of government, different in details, for example sometimes including laity. While the Churches resolve their internal affairs independently, the most senior position belongs to the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople, who resides in present-day Istanbul, and has the honorary responsibility of coordinating pan-Orthodox affairs. As far as inter-Orthodox relations are concerned, the Church of Constantinople, headed by the Ecumenical Patriarch, plays mainly a politico-organisational role. His role resembles that of the Archbishop of Canterbury in the worldwide Anglican Communion, itself composed of autocephalous churches. Historian Steven Runciman gives a concise and relevant perspective on the Orthodox ecclesiological ethos:
While the Western Church had moved towards papal autocracy and scholastic philosophy, the East clung to older notions. It believed in the charismatic equality of bishops, the upper hierarchy, culminating in the Pentarchy of Patriarchs, being necessary only for administrative and disciplinary purposes. It disliked any move by the Church to exercise political power. It disapproved of attempts to fit theology into some man-made philosophical scheme. Its concept of theology was apophatic; man could not be but ignorant of divine matters except for the revelations provided by the Scriptures, enhanced by the tradition carried down from apostolic times and the comments of the inspired Fathers of the Church; and pronouncements on doctrine could only be made by an Ecumenical Council, by all the bishops of the Church assembling together, when the Holy Spirit would descend, as at Pentecost (Runciman, 1967: 1-2).

In addition to the family of Eastern Orthodox Churches there is another group of Eastern Churches which are known today as Oriental Orthodox Churches. These are: the Armenian Orthodox Church, the Coptic (Egyptian) Orthodox Church, the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, the Indian Orthodox Church and the Syrian Orthodox Church. Oriental Orthodox Churches have many common features with Eastern Orthodox Churches and, although separated since the fifth/sixth centuries, the two families have, especially in the last century, drawn closer ties through mutual agreements which have created real prospects for reunion in the near future.

Starting in the 19th century a number of Orthodox churches underwent an institutional renewal processes. Despite being fundamentally convinced that they are the direct continuation of undivided Christendom, having the true faith and doxology (glorification), some Orthodox hierarchs and theologians had a vision of rapprochement between separated churches, while others, prompted by 'global forces', were seeking ways of reunion initiating the idea of theological encounter and even a universal Christian gathering. It was an opportunity for some Orthodox and other Church traditions to engage in the dialogical process between Eastern and Western Christianity. In the Conversation of a seeker and a believer concerning the truth of the Eastern Greco-Russian Church (1832), Metropolitan of Moscow Philaret had as the main criterion only Christological belief:
Mark you, I do not presume to call false any church, believing that Jesus is Christ. The Christian Church can only be either purely true, confessing the true and saving teaching without [from] the false admixtures and pernicious opinions of men, or not purely true, mixing with the true and saving teaching of faith in Christ [and] the false and pernicious opinions of men (Philaret [1832] cited in Florovsky, 1975: 217-8, original emphases, author’s parentheses).

From a doctrinal perspective, it is significant to take into account that most Eastern Christians believe firmly that there can be only One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church, and that the Orthodox Churches in communion are its authentic representative. Thus, the Orthodox churches consider themselves as repositories of the spiritual treasury of faith, life and tradition of the undivided church. Furthermore, they argue that their vocation is not just to be guardians of a sacred legacy but also to globally expound and share it, making it accessible to all who wish to embrace it.

However, this principle, often emphatically expressed, creates the impression that radical Orthodox theologians are even more exclusive than the Roman Catholic ones, for some refuse sometimes in a triumphalist manner to treat even as Christians those who are not contained within what they deem to be the one true Church of Christ. Their interpretation of the phrase ‘false and pernicious opinions of men’ in the citation above, limits the Church only to those who are in communion with one of the autocephalous Eastern Churches, and according to their judgement, within the realm of grace. Paradoxically then, their apparent globalism is highly exclusive.

In the 20th century, we witness repeated initiatives by the Patriarchate of Constantinople for reconciliation and cooperation.

According to John Binns, Director of the Institute of Orthodox Christian Studies, Cambridge, the institutional commencement of Orthodox participation in the
ecumenical movement may be traced to two of its encyclicals\(^1\) in 1902 and 1920 (Binns, 2002: 225). In his analysis of the Christian Orthodox churches he presents Orthodoxy as a distinctive global movement, however sometimes complemented by conflicting politico-historical national features. For him, these encyclical letters, and other comparable statements from the Ecumenical Patriarchate dealing with Christian unity, have a paramount reputation primarily because of the acknowledgment of the Patriarch of Constantinople as having a ‘primacy of honour’ among all hierarchs of the Orthodox Church. The traditional description of the primacy of the Patriarch of Constantinople is that of *primus inter pares*; but this primacy does not possess an immediate universal jurisdiction outside its own territory, nor the privilege of infallibility (Bratsiotis, 1968: 63-4). The authority of the Patriarch of Constantinople is *ex officio* and safeguards the unity of the entire Orthodox Church. In the Orthodox Church episcopal authority is exercised both locally and ecumenically, but the Primacy of the Ecumenical Patriarchate includes the *ex officio* privilege of exercising power to initiate certain matters at the level of the whole Church. Consequently, this privilege implies that the Ecumenical Patriarch is invested with the highest authority as the centre of the unity of the Church. Thus, subsequent statements from ‘Constantinople’ are particularly significant, being largely perceived both theologically and politically as ‘safe directions’ for the Orthodox engaged in bilateral or multilateral interchurch dialogue. Today, the Ecumenical Patriarchate remains one of the most active centres within the global ecumenical movement (Binns, 2003).

Orthodox ecumenical engagement was believed by Binns (2003) to help solve dilemmas of how to institutionally relate themselves to the rapidly changing world of the 20\(^{th}\) century. These changes were less to do with the problem of mission, the spur to Protestant ecumenism, and more to do in his view with political processes of internationalisation (Robertson, 1992) and regional integration. These processes, driven by an increasingly secularised West, could not be

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\(^1\) An encyclical was originally a circular letter (Greek *enkyclos*) on matters of faith or church discipline, usually from a bishop to some Christian local churches (e.g. 1 Pet.) or to all. From an Orthodox perspective, it became usual for the Eastern Patriarchs to send encyclicals to fellow bishops of ‘sister churches’. From a Catholic viewpoint, by contrast, an encyclical is a formal letter on doctrinal, moral, social or disciplinary matters written for the whole Roman Catholic Church as a means of maintaining unity of faith and ethics. In modern times, both Constantinople and Rome have issued ecumenically significant letters on the restoration of Christian unity and social matters.
avoided. For this reason Orthodox ecumenists searched for dialogical engagement with other Christian groups that did not share a similar cultural background, nevertheless faced similar dilemmas. According to Bulgarian ecumenist Todor Sabev (1996: 9), as early as 1902, Constantinople took the initiative of inviting all Orthodox Churches to renew their contacts with other Christian bodies, including the Church of Rome, the Anglican Church and various Protestant denominations. This is consistent with the argument that ‘globalization is not essentially a Western project’ (Holton: 2005: 53), within which only Western Christendom played a major religious role.

Interactions between the Patriarchate of Constantinople and other Church traditions have become increasingly frequent over the 20th century (Binns, 2003). A Patriarchal and Synodical Encyclical to the sister autocephalous (Orthodox) churches of 12th June 1902, issued by Ecumenical Patriarch Joachim III and a synod of eleven bishops from Constantinople, inaugurated the journey of Orthodoxy towards dynamic inner communion, regional conciliarity and assistance in order to respond better to the imperative need of unity within the universal Church. This encyclical is the first major document in the 20th century urging the autocephalous Orthodox churches to assess their relationships with the Oriental Orthodox as well as with the Western churches. It stated that:

It is, moreover, pleasing to God, and in accordance with the Gospel, to seek the mind of the most holy autocephalous Churches on the subject of our present and future relations with the two great growths of Christianity, viz. the Western Church and the Church of the Protestants. Of course, the union of them and of all who believe in Christ with us in the Orthodox faith is the pious and heart-felt desire of our Church and of all genuine Christians who stand firm in the evangelical doctrine of unity, and is subject of constant prayer and supplication […] (Joachim III Ecumenical Patriarch [1902] cited in Limouris, 1994: 2-3).

This encyclical claimed that unity might be founded on the common ground of faith as well as previously overlooked points of similarity. For the Orthodox, unity required ‘divine grace’ and ardent efforts of all who believe in Christ ‘guided in paths of evangelical love and peace’ (Joachim III Ecumenical Patriarch
[1902] cited in Limouris, 1994: 3). These efforts were considered as an extension of the Early Church prayer for unity recorded in the Johanine tradition (John 17). Fellowship would serve ‘the whole Church’ and show concern for salvation of all humankind (Joachim III Ecumenical Patriarch [1902] cited in Limouris, 1994: 2).

This encyclical urged the Orthodox to strengthen firstly the regional ties within their own tradition and then to be open to other church traditions in their lands. While lamenting proselytism, it expressed the real possibility of discussion with the Old Catholic [Church of Utrecht] and the Anglicans, who had already made dialogue proposals. The letter concluded by calling for research meetings of Orthodox theologians of the various national churches due to some opposition to the Gregorian calendar.

In short, the Ecumenical Patriarch Joachim III and his synod of eleven bishops officially invited all autocephalous Orthodox Churches to convey their attitudes on relations with other Christian bodies. Above all, this Encyclical remains important because it raised the question of theological dialogue with the West. Apparently, this encyclical was received sympathetically by the various national Orthodox churches and stimulated openness towards relationships with Old Catholics, Anglicans and Oriental Orthodox. This is mentioned in a Response to the Reactions of the Local Orthodox Churches issued on 12th May 1904 by the same Ecumenical Patriarch (Joachim III Ecumenical Patriarch [1902] cited in Limouris, 1994: 5-8).

Having greater and better hopes, we ought to pay more attention both to the so-called Old Catholics and to those of the Anglican Church, since they show more respect and regard to the holy Orthodox Church of Christ. Although there are divisions of opinion among the theologians as to the difference between the doctrine of the Old Catholic Church and that of the Apostolic and Catholic Orthodox Church, yet one would not be wrong in saying that of the Christians in the West they are the closest to the Orthodox Church. [...] We also consider those in the Anglican Church who have turned towards the Orthodox Church to be worthy of no least sympathy and feelings of reciprocity; and on not a few occasions they have furnished tokens of their fraternal attitude towards us. It is self-
Orthodox ecumenism recognised that religious belief is not only a transcendent reality, but also about worldly affairs, holding that religious issues concern and concretely affect societal life in general. On this account, Joachim III asked fellow Orthodox leaders to confront worldwide secularisation that ‘strives to make the Church of Christ nothing but a handmaid and instrument of worldly ambitions and political programmes’ (Joachim III Ecumenical Patriarch [1902] cited in Limouris, 1994: 6). From the above we understand that, at the beginning of the 20th century, the project of Orthodox ecumenism rested on the presupposition that it is possible for individuals from disparate groups to recognise together the existence of certain shared pragmatic interests and dominant values and ideas in the face of external challenges. There was awareness that those dominant ideas may be shared locally or regionally, however in order to achieve successful relationships from an ecumenical perspective, the diversity of national, cultural, and religious origins had also to be globally promoted. Within this analytical framework we notice a ‘global patterning’ (Holton, 2005) within which ‘the universalization of the particular’ (Robertson, 1992: 178) becomes increasingly historically representative. Although cultural protectionist tendencies remained salient, there was an appeal that values promoted by ecumenical dialogue are to be accepted by an increasing number of worldwide Churches.

The Ecumenical Patriarchate: initiator of global ecumenism

After the First World War we witness political developments of great importance for the national and international organisation of Orthodoxy. In 1920 the downfall of the Ottoman Empire and the Allies forced Sultan’s Mehmet VI Vahdettin government to sign the Treaty of Sèvres. Their aim was to split Anatolia between British, French, Italian, Greek, Armenian and possibly Kurdish regions, while the Straits and Constantinople were to be demilitarised and placed under international control (Pope and Pope, 1997). Greece, Bulgaria and Romania had already freed themselves from Turkish rule and regained their
independence. By that time, these countries had established their own national Orthodox church with their own hierarchies. It is worth noting that previously, in 1915, the Turks committed genocide against the Armenian Orthodox who had to flee and create diaspora communities. However, in this climate of regional insecurity, while the Armenians were waiting for Russian help, many Russian Orthodox themselves also fled as result of the 1917 Bolshevik revolution.

Historian Alister E. McGrath rhetorically points out that:

The long-term impact of the [Armenian] genocide, however, was to raise dark and difficult questions within the worldwide Christian community. Would the twentieth century mark the beginning of a more sustained attack on Christianity by its rivals? The nineteenth century had witnessed an intellectual attack of unprecedented ferocity upon the ideas of Christianity, especially in Victorian England. Might the twentieth century see a new type of attack, in which the target was the lives, not just the ideas, of Christians? (McGrath, 2002: 5-6).

Aware of this new geo-political context, in January 1920, the Ecumenical Patriarchate issued the Encyclical Unto the Churches of Christ Everywhere. Understanding that military and security measures alone will not resolve a deep malaise in many regions of the world, it launched itself in the wider global religious field. This document called for the establishment of a ‘League of Churches’ Κοινωνία των Εκκλησιῶν for common action and witness. It was seen as a parallel to the establishment of the ‘League of Nations’ Κοινωνία των Εθνών which had taken place in 1919 (Ecumenical Patriarchate cited in Limouris, 1994: 9-11). This document was delivered in Geneva by the future Archbishop Germanos of Thyateira, mentioned in the previous Chapter of this thesis. Heinz Joachim Held, bishop of the Evangelical Church of Germany and former moderator of the WCC central committee argues that Germanos had probably played a major part in the drafting of the encyclical being recognised spokesperson for Eastern Orthodoxy at ecumenical gatherings.

Archbishop Germanos of Thyateira handed over the Encyclical from the Ecumenical Patriarchate to the Swedish Archbishop Nathan Soderblom in the same year at the first consultation in Geneva to prepare for the later
Stockholm conference of 1925. Although it was not possible for the large Russian Orthodox Church in the Soviet Union to join in because of its total isolation and persecution, nevertheless Russian theologians in exile in the West and other Orthodox patriarchates were involved even in early ecumenical discussions (Held, 2003: 295).

This proposal intended that each Christian church would be an equal member within a League and appoint its representatives, as member nations of the League of Nations and then of the United Nations, where voting power did not increase due to status consideration, and equal representation and political stability could be promoted.

The Encyclical “To All the Churches Of Christ” which the Ecumenical Patriarchate sent in 1920 to the other Churches gave a great impulse to the ecumenical movement which came into the open after the First World War. In this encyclical the suggestion was made to form a “league of churches” corresponding to the League of Nations founded at that time in Geneva. This society was to have the purpose of promoting cooperation in practical matters among the Churches (Bratsiotis, 1968: 91).

Thus, from the very beginning, the Orthodox approach to the modern ecumenical movement had been designed as a transnational collaboration. Robertson points out that ‘secular status considerations are frequently used to account for the motivation of church and denomination leaders to engage in ecumenical ventures’ (Robertson, 1972: 140). The Ecumenical Patriarchate argued that only by overcoming their ‘mutual mistrust and bitterness’ and through ‘love […] rekindled and strengthened’, might the churches create a fellowship and rappochement that could move them officially towards collaboration and unity. This would contribute to their vision of one another not ‘as strangers and foreigners, but as relatives, and as being part of the household of Christ and ‘fellow heirs, members of the same body and partakers of the promise of God in Christ (Eph. 3: 6)’ (Ecumenical Patriarchate cited in Limouris, 1994: 10).

Overall, the message from Constantinople was clear:
Finally, it is the duty of the churches which bear the sacred name of Christ not to forget or neglect any longer his [Christ's] new and great commandment of love. Nor should they continue to fall piteously behind the political authorities, who, truly applying the spirit of the Gospel and of the teaching of Christ, have under happy auspices already set-up the so-called League of Nations in order to defend justice and cultivate charity and agreement between the nations (Ecumenical Patriarchate cited in Limouris, 1994: 11).

The Ecumenical Patriarchate became the first church anywhere to appeal publicly for a permanent institution of fellowship and cooperation involving all churches. This initiative was designed to encourage Western churches to abandon proselytism and to form, for common assistance, a League structure similar to the League of Nations. It also recommended different 'practical ways' (Philippou, 1973: 5) for endorsing goodwill, and declared that doctrinal disagreements ought not to stand in the way of joint action. The document conveyed a significant message of departure from the usual cautious Eastern Orthodox attitude towards the West, and showed the desire and readiness among some hierarchs to take the lead in the ecumenical movement towards closer friendship (Zernov, 1986: 654).

At that time, Constantinople understood ecumenism as the relations, dialogue and cooperation of various Christian traditions. This religious *kononvía* (fellowship, communion, council) was intended to study the issues that divided the churches and find unifying ways on matters of justice, peace and charity. Calling for an end to mistrust and proselytism, this document claimed that *rapprochement* could begin, despite doctrinal divergence, by listing topics of possible co-operation and dialogue.

The 1920 encyclical remains a reference point for Orthodox understanding of ecumenism because it recognised that unity cannot be realised simply by overcoming doctrinal differences but also requires inter-church *diakonia* or service (Ecumenical Patriarchate, 1996: 197).

Officially, the Orthodox church has taken the position that ecumenical participation and dialogue on issues of unity are conditioned by two principles which are forged in their present form out of its experience in
the ecumenical movement and on its perspective on the dialectic unity-

division-reunion. One can find these expressed in a series of documents

beginning already in 1920. It is evident from these that the foundations of

Orthodox ecumenical theory and practice are both *doctrinal* and

ecclesiological. On the one hand, an unswerving adherence to the

apostolic witness as the basis for ecclesial unity, and on the other hand,
allegiance to the one visible church called into being by God and

historically present in the Orthodox church (Stephanopoulos, 1992: 20,
original emphases).

Even if this Encyclical has the value of a ‘golden charter’ in Orthodox

ecumenism, from a sceptical moderate perspective Bria, former director of the

WCC Programme Sub-unit on Renewal and Congregational Life argued that:

The 1920 encyclical of the Ecumenical Patriarchate calling for a *koinonia

of churches* in spite of the doctrinal differences between them was a great

impetus to the development of the ecumenical movement, but from the

outset it bore some ambiguities within it (Bria, 1996: 203, original

emphases).

Some assumptions in the encyclical are worthy of note. First, it takes for granted

that ‘the whole body of Christ’ is an assemblage of national churches, some

Orthodox, some not, ‘established’ in some form or another. Despite differences in

doctrine and polity, these churches are assured to share a basic moral teaching and

values. It was also assumed that post World War I, certain shared social problems

were common on their agenda:

Alcoholism, which is increasing daily; the increase of unnecessary luxury

under the pretext of bettering life and enjoying it; the voluptuousness and

lust hardly covered by the cloak of freedom and emancipation of the flesh;

the prevailing unchecked licentiousness and indecency in literature,
painting, the theatre, and in music, under the respectable name of the
development of good taste and cultivation of fine art; the deification of
wealth and the contempt of higher ideals; all those and the like, as they
threaten the very essence of Christian societies are also timely topics
requiring and indeed necessitating common study and cooperation by the Christian churches (Ecumenical Patriarchate cited in Limouris, 1994: 10-11).

Finally, the encyclical encouraged different cooperative efforts – a common calendar, exchange of letters and also educational exchange. Above all, it called for reciprocal respect of the customs and usages common to each church institution which concretely meant an end of Protestant proselytism in Orthodox lands.

Controversy

While the 1920 Encyclical created the opportunity for further exchanges, the traditional Orthodox perspective regarding ecclesiological issues on matters of administration and doctrine did not change much. A number of Orthodox theologians expressed opposing views on ecumenism. Orthodoxy therefore embraces a certain anti-ecumenical trend which is mainly due to a suspicion on the part of some that dialogue necessarily implies a betrayal of the integrity of the Orthodox faith.

Eastern theologians would repeatedly insist that the Orthodox Church is the only true Church, and all other Christian bodies are but “schisms,” i.e. that the unity of Christendom had been essentially broken. This claim of the Orthodox could be variously phrased and qualified, but, in one form or another, it would unfailingly be made on all occasions (Florovsky, 1975: 223-4, original emphasis).

This perspective reveals a consistent concern about homogenising trends. In response to the two encyclicals issued by the Ecumenical Patriarchate, the leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia (ROCOR), also known as The Russian Orthodox Church in Exile felt strongly that the Orthodox Churches compromised the true faith through their participation in the ecumenical movement. According to John Meyendorff Russian theologian and ecumenist, Professor of Dogmatics at St Vladimir’s Orthodox Theological Faculty at Crestwood, New York, for ROCOR ‘ecumenism is neither more nor less than “the
heresy of the 20th century” (Meyendorff, 1996: 220). This dissident group in exile, with its own structure and organisation, set up after the 1917 Communist Revolution, professed sharp criticism of the address of the ecumenical ideology. While reviewing mainly Western literature on the Orthodox tradition and the prospective Church reunion, Binns argues that at present ROCOR leaders feel strongly that the other Orthodox Churches have compromised the true faith through their participation in the ecumenical movement (Binns, 2003: 25).

Known variously as the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia, or the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad, or the Synodal Church, it has remained staunchly conservative, traditional and monarchist, and recognises neither the Moscow Patriarchate, tainted by collaboration with atheist Communism, nor the Ecumenical Patriarchate, because of liturgical and doctrinal innovation (Binns, 2003: 25).

However, as the Russian Orthodox diaspora is fragmented, it is feasible that political change in Russia may also facilitate the end of schism between various groups (Zernov, 1961).

Undoubtedly, the divisions and ambivalence of globalised Christian Orthodoxies makes it difficult to identify a consensual perception on ecumenism. The 1920 encyclical certainly took for granted certain matters, for instance that both Eastern and Western churches upheld the same moral values, and that the Universal Church was meant to be a koinonia of churches. From an ecclesiological perspective, it also took for granted that the Orthodox were the actualisation of the one holy catholic and apostolic Church. However, it recognised that other local churches – even though separated for a variety of reasons – were not wholly separated from church fellowship and that some bonds of close association remained, allowing the possibility of dialogue.

Not all Orthodox Churches would agree with these views. ROCOR interpreted Orthodox claims of being one true church in an exclusive rather than inclusive sense. This means that outside the canonical boundaries of the Orthodox Church as we currently perceive them, there is simply undifferentiated heterodoxy (heretical doctrine). This exclusivist perspective claiming to represent ‘true
Orthodoxy’ or ‘traditional Orthodoxy’ reasoned at great length that this radical approach became an anti-Uniatist movement, against the Union of Brest-Litovsk between Rome and Orthodoxy dating from 1596 (Ware, 1997: 95). Even today, Orthodox theologians have not yet arrived at a shared view regarding the perception of those Christians who are not in communion with themselves. The inherent Orthodox conservativism especially within monastic environments remains widespread.

[Orthodox conservatism] has a legitimate and proper place in the spectrum of Orthodox Church life, and should not be judged too harshly. The need to adapt to new forms of social and Church life demands new reactions, which will develop slowly. One zealot monk spoke of the difficulty of knowing how to react to a non-Orthodox Christian, and of the conflict he felt between his instinctive affection for the guest and his determination not to compromise his Orthodox faith by allowing any accommodation to what is not truly Orthodox (Binns, 2003: 245).

As we have noticed in Chapter 2, it is also necessary to reiterate that in the first millennium the attitude of one school of thought could be presented and accepted as an authoritative pronouncement of the whole Orthodox Church. An example is the position on teaching exposed by the Seven Ecumenical Councils. Later on, Orthodox ecumenists started to search for doctrinal formulas that will solve the contradiction between the belief in one Church and the existence of schisms, heresies and animosity between its members. For example, the Roman Catholic Church’s recognition of sacraments was a clear indication that the sacramental limits of the Church did not coincide with its canonical boundaries, and therefore the work of reconciliation among those who are baptised in the name of the Holy Trinity and believe in the Incarnation of Jesus Christ is real and urgent. These principles made the participation of the Orthodox in ecumenism consonant with their tradition.

Most official statements and publications of Orthodox churches clearly pay tribute to the historic role of the 1920 Encyclical of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Despite sharp criticism from anti-ecumenical Orthodox groups, this Encyclical is mentioned in subsequent documents issued by later Ecumenical Patriarchs. In
1967, Patriarch Athenagoras I referred to the ‘well-known’ encyclical letter on the occasion of his visit to the WCC headquarters:

Our Patriarchate – in the position that it took from the very beginning, in its historic Encyclical of 1920 on the formation of a League of Churches, and in its subsequent collaboration in the Ecumenical Movement – has undoubtedly been, and still is, an ardent preacher of the true ecumenical ideal, and true ecumenical dialogue to foster Christian unity (Athenagoras I, Ecumenical Patriarch cited in Limouris, 1994: 36).

Patriarch Demetrios I, on the event of the fortieth anniversary of the WCC issued a letter from Phanar on 28th July 1988, ‘jubilantly rejoicing over this occasion’ by expressing that the aim of the Synodical Encyclical of 1920, was to form a ‘League of Churches’ through ‘the rapprochement of the churches and confessions around the world through contacts, collaboration and mutual solidarity, with the ultimate goal of realising their unity, under one shepherd, Jesus Christ’. He characterised the Orthodox presence in the WCC as ‘natural’, ‘indispensable’ and ‘useful in many ways’ by assuring that the Patriarchate would assist with ‘its consistent and responsible collaboration in any beneficial and useful work of the Council’ (Demetrios I, Ecumenical Patriarch cited in Limouris, 1994: 131-2).

Overall, the encyclical of 1920 can be appropriately regarded as a milestone of ecumenical vision. For the Orthodox, the 1920’s were the take off phase in global ecumenism, which indicate ‘the gradual re-emergence of the non-Western world in the ongoing development of globalization’ (Holton, 1998: 47). Its significance is both as policy direction henceforth to be esteemed by the Orthodox churches, and as a basis for the wider development of the WCC. In the former case, Greek academic and ecumenist Methodios Fouyas, former Archbishop of Thyateira, points out:

This document is regarded as one of the most significant early records of the Ecumenical Movement and shows that the Patriarchate of Constantinople had never stopped working for the accomplishment of Christ’s will. This Encyclical of the Ecumenical Patriarch was called by
Leo Zander, the Russian theologian and ecumenist, ‘the Golden Charter of Orthodox Ecumenism’ (Fouyas, 1984: 211).

In the Christian East, the Ecumenical Patriarchate signified that, if Christian cooperation will transcend historical cultural frontiers and national boundaries, an approximation to Christian unity might be possible with converging church structures and theological traditions alongside continuing diversity of theological reflection and plurality of life-styles. This memorable document was a source of inspiration for many Orthodox participants in ecumenism in a broad consensus. It was speculated that ‘the formation of the World Council of Churches may well have taken that [1920] Patriarchal and Synodical Encyclical as its pattern’ (Fouyas, 1984: 247).

This document proved that the Ecumenical Patriarchate had the ability of developing proactive global ecumenical perspectives. Their initiative intensified ecumenical institutionalisation. Perhaps the most important reference to the Encyclical comes from Visser ’t Hooft, the first World Council of Churches general secretary (1948-66), who pointed out that:

[…] the Church of Constantinople was among the first in modern history to remind us that world Christendom would be disobedient to the will of its Lord and Saviour if it did not seek to manifest in the world the unity of the people of God and of the body of Christ. With its 1920 Encyclical, Constantinople rang the bell of our assembling (Tsetsis quoting Visser ’t Hooft in Limouris, 1994: 272).

In this sense, the impact of the Encyclical extended beyond the Orthodox Church, to the self-understanding of ecumenism more generally as an evolving movement arising from different stimuli. Again, there is a sense of take-off into self-sustaining development. However, this was only discursive in form, and did not take the form of institution-building that was more permanent within Protestant ecumenism.
Orthodoxy and atheism: the Soviet State and the struggle for survival

Despite the triumphalist tone of those who look back to 1920 as a defining moment for Orthodox ecumenism, there remain secular limits to the capacity of all national churches to take this road. In the Soviet Union and its satellite countries, the building of socialism, prior to the attainment of full communism, became associated after 1917 with the central political and economic State monopoly, nationalising of industry, collectivisation of agriculture and an increasing grip by the communist party not only on politics but also on culture, education, recreation and spiritual life. It is arguable that the dictatorship of the proletariat became the dictatorship of the communist party, at the expense of the whole civil society. State political atheism professed by Marxism-Leninism aimed at ‘liberating humanity’ from exploitation by the imperial throne and the religious altar.

The Bolsheviks regarded religion as being dependent on class relationships and exploitation. With the abolition of capitalism, they argued, religion would wither away. As an institution, the Bolsheviks opposed the Church, but the struggle against religion was secondary to the class struggle. Religious prejudices, it was thought, would disappear with the introduction of socialist planning and the kind of scientific education that goes with it. This would be the long-term tendency. In the short-run after the October revolution, measures had to be taken to combat the religious beliefs and institutions which flourished in Tsarist Russia (Lane, 1978: 458).

The Orthodox Church meanwhile feared compromising the doctrinal truth in relation to the Soviet State. It also faced the problem that pursuit of ecumenism in relationship with others outside the Soviet orbit would be seen as disloyal. This drew the Church into a rather negative conservativism, almost a sort of dogmatic fundamentalism, fighting groups that profess modernity and progress, with arguments which sometimes appeared unconvincing.

Through deployment of various mechanisms of socio-political coercion, this single-party regime deliberately sought to manufacture consensus in favour of a
new small ruling elite by creating organisations of mass regimentation and by monopolising all means of cultural and religious production. In his analysis on Bolshevik attitudes to Christianity, political sociologist David Lane argues that ‘the odds are weighed extremely heavily against the Church’ (1978: 462) despite its servitude and traditional nationalistic support. The State tried to substitute Christianity for the ‘monistic one-dimensionality of the Marxist system’ (Martin, 1978: 80). However, the State could not find a functional equivalent for the Christian eschatological principles.

Historian Edward Acton comments on the complexity of social tensions, arising from ‘the swift development of national consciousness among the [Russian] Empire’s ethnic minorities’ (Acton, 2001: 16). He argues that at the turn of the century only 43 per cent of the population were Great Russians, and the Tsarist government’s overt identification with them and with the Orthodox Church alienated minority nationalities. However, the persecution of the Orthodox Church continued after Lenin’s death in 1924, with the ideological intention of controlling the citizens’ spirituality in a totalitarian fashion through doctrinal enforcement of elimination of ‘the uncertainty factor ‘God’’.

Therefore we witness a new form of government – statist and totalitarian – and in the name of ‘proletarian class interests’, a new bureaucratic ruling elite monopolised power internally and dominated the communist movement internationally from one national centre. The authorities believed that capitalism is intrinsically a class system in which class relations are characterised by conflict maintained through exploitative associations; however we witness the application of a programme of practical reform that simply failed to achieve what its designers sought, by producing unintended and unfortunate consequences.

One aspect of ‘top down’ policy was a focus on Church leadership, appointed with Government permission. This defined the ecumenical nature of the Church’s institutional activity dispensing with grass-roots activity. According to Russian theologian and ecumenist John Meyendorff, ‘since 1917, that is, throughout the entire Soviet period, the Church has either been persecuted or exploited’ (Meyendorff, 1996: 218). This means that the Church was used by the State merely for propagandistic ideological reasons. Until the 1960’s there was, in
particular, a primary focus on the nation. The Russian Church was allowed to maintain diplomatic relations with other churches

[...] more as a result of political pressure (since both the Stalinist government and the Church were keen, for different reasons, to maintain what contact they could with Western Christians) than of commitment to the unity of the Church. Ecumenism turned out to be of vital importance to the Russian Orthodox Church in the huge struggle to survive under an atheist government. The interest which official visitors to the USSR showed in some of the monasteries and institutions of the Church helped them to stay open. In return the Orthodox representatives were required by the Communist authorities to make continued claims for the freedom of the Church, in the face of powerful testimonies to acute persecution from many sources (Binns, 2003: 226).

Wrong (1979), in his analysis on the sociology of power, assesses that both Nazi and Communist regimes employ a similar modus operandi.

Totalitarian regimes may make use of techniques of persuasion and manipulate the mechanism of crowd psychology in order to keep their subjects in a state of constant enthusiastic mobilisation, but their subjects, though powerless, are not socially isolated in the sense of forming a ‘mass’ of footloose, ‘privatised’ anomic persons bereft of social attachments and leadership. For in addition to destroying all groups and subculture, totalitarianism replaces them with its own co-ordinated structure of intermediate groups thoroughly penetrated and controlled from the centre (Wrong, 1979: 176).

Rush and Althoff (1971) researching political socialisation in totalitarian societies found that State ideology became the official perspective encompassing all activities. Seeking to socialise the members of society to varying degrees by using various censorship techniques:

[...] in its rule the totalitarian regime must undermine the process of pre-totalitarian socialisation, ‘re-educate’ the pre-totalitarian generation, and
prepare for the socialisation of the 'new' generation. This was abundantly clear in Nazi Germany and in the USSR (Rush and Althoff, 1971: 55).

The conception of a mass-society emphasises the isolation and powerlessness of the individual citizen from all perspectives: politically, socio-economically, etc. The Soviet Union employed the ideology generated by Marxist beliefs whereby communist revolution was historically inevitable. Proletarian movements, informed by Marxist interpretations of society and history, consign the State to the role of instrument of class power and imagine a time prepared by revolution and socialist governance when the State as an administrator of persons will wither away and be replaced by an institution commissioned solely for the administration of things. They believed that with material abundance and property held only in common, communism should be uncontaminated by the exploitation and class conflict inherent in capitalism.

In the face of such hostility, members of the Orthodox Church tended to take one of two positions. They could either pragmatically embrace the ecumenical project and start networking with various religious organisations within and outside their national jurisdiction, or remain indifferent to associations and dialogue by professing religious triumphalism, yet total submissiveness to State policies.

Some Orthodox Church representatives and theologians have regarded ecumenism only as a pastoral, missionary and educational ministry, avoiding challenges to the State. Ecumenical cooperation could thus be understood, from a pragmatic perspective (Roberts, 1990), as a defensive force vis-à-vis atheism. The official Soviet policy clearly stated that only complete separation of Church and State, absolute exclusion of religion from school, and a large-scale programme of anti-religious propaganda could adequately meet the demands of the communist social change.

Continuing official and dogmatic opposition to religion was vigorously affirmed in January 1964 by a resolution of the Ideological Commission of the Central Committee entitled, 'On Measures for Intensifying the Atheistic Indoctrination of the Population'. An Institute of Scientific Atheism was to be set in the Central Committee’s Academy of Social
Sciences. It would be charged with guiding and coordinating all scientific work in the sphere of atheism carried on by the institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences, higher educational institutions, and institutions of the USSR Ministry of Culture (Inkeles, 1968: 227).

Against this kind of challenge, the pragmatic defensiveness of the Russian Church enabled it to see itself both exclusively Orthodox and as part of what was propagated as the most advanced societal form – communism.

However there were other influences internal to the Russian Church that inhibited a more outward-looking emphasis. Such inhibitions were not only pragmatic. They drew, as Ronald Hill argues on a tradition where ‘particularly following the fall of Constantinople in 1453, [...] Russia saw herself as the ‘Third Rome’, the repository and guardian of Orthodoxy’ (Hill, 1989: 4). From this perspective Russia represented the centre point of the Orthodox tradition not the globe as such. From a similar perspective, Hannah Arendt, while analysing pan-Slavic movements in a context of cultural imperialism argues that historically,

It was not the Czar’s religious function and position in the Greek Church that led Russian Pan-Slavs to the affirmation of the Christian nature of the Russian people, of their being, according to Dostoevski, the “Christopher among the nations” who carry God directly into the affairs of this world. It was because of claims to being “the true divine people of modern times” that the Pan-Slavs abandoned their earlier liberal tendencies and, notwithstanding governmental opposition and occasionally even persecution, became staunch defenders of Holy Russia (Arendt, 1967: 233).

A contradiction of political and historical forces is therefore responsible for the failure to take the second option namely emphasising ecumenism as an instrument for a more dynamic Christian witness in the face of what they see as secularism, inhumanity and atheism. Against this trend, the Orthodox churches in the Soviet Union and its satellite states were fundamentally national bodies extensively subordinated to State institutions and as such were structurally unable to develop as opposition centres despite the 20th century history of ecumenical debate. Such
relations between state and religion, together with the international context in which the WCC was formed, were strongly coloured by the ‘Cold War’ to which attention now turns.

**Orthodoxy, the Cold War and Ecumenical Struggle**

Despite some continuities, such as State control over the Russian Church between the 1920’s and the 1950’s, a new state of affairs began to evolve. After the Second World War political boundaries were changed, and new radical socio-religious developments took place. Orthodox churches also faced a new global ecumenical institution – the WCC formally constituted at its first assembly between 22 August to 4 September 1948 in Amsterdam. The founder members included various Protestant churches (following developments outlined in Chapter 4) and a few Orthodox churches from Constantinople and Greece, while the Roman Catholic position remained reserved (Binns, 2003: 226). We now examine the background of this meeting and complex developments within Orthodoxy over whether to attend.

The establishment of this global institution represented the realisation of substantial ecumenical effort. The idea germinated in 1933 through exploratory meetings of a ‘consultative group’ (Clements, 1999: 280) – in effect a western friendship network constituted of various Protestant religious leaders. As Clements points out this new alliance was ‘bonded by common concerns, shared theological approaches and professional friendship’ (1999: 279). A major contextual development, the Nazi revolution in Germany and the onset of the church struggle around Nazism ‘threw into sharpest possible focus the question of society in relation to totalitarian ideologies, and the relation of church and state’ (1999: 279). Those involved in building a more co-ordinated common ecumenical strategy formed a network.

It was William Adams Brown, veteran leader of Life and Work in the United States, who while visiting Europe in 1933 suggested to William Temple, Archbishop of York, that a meeting of the responsible leaders be held. Accordingly, Temple hosted a gathering of ten people at Bishophrone. Oldham, with William Paton, attended on behalf of the
IMC. Visser ’t Hooft represented the WSCF. Faith and Order, Life and Work, the World Alliance for Promoting International Friendship through the Churches and the YMCA were also represented. It was a completely informal group with no official standing, but can be regarded as the starting point of that search for a common ecumenical instrument, which was to lead to the formation of the World Council of Churches (Clements, 1999: 279-80).

Later on, meeting in Westfield College, London, in 1937 some representatives of the Life and Work and Faith and Order movements decided to set up an inclusive assembly of the willing churches named ‘The World Council of Churches’ (Visser ’t Hooft ed., 1949: 14). This establishment was initially led by a provisional Committee of Fourteen church representatives from the above two movements. A formal decision taken in Utrecht in May 1938 stated the following theological foundation: “The World Council of Churches is a fellowship of Churches which accept our Lord Jesus Christ as God and Saviour” (Clements, 1999: 350). Visser ’t Hooft, the first general secretary of the WCC, argued that:

When after ten years of “provisional” life, the World Council came into official existence at Amsterdam under a constitutional framework, it had already exhibited a vitality that afforded high hopes for its future as the instrument of the churches for common tasks (Visser ’t Hooft ed., 1949: 14).

As expected, the Second World War made religious dialogue and ecumenical cooperation difficult. This could be one of the reasons for the first assembly of the WCC to be entitled Man’s Disorder and God’s Design. The obvious absence of some churches which had accepted the invitation but were not represented at the assembly, especially from Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia, gives grounds to believe that Cold War tensions had already led to communist mistrust to Western European values.

In order to help with dispute resolution processes and reconcile post-war global inequalities and injustices, the WCC had established close links with the UN, particularly with agencies such as International Refugee Organisation (IRO),
International Labour Organisation (ILO) and UNESCO (Visser ’t Hooft ed., 1949). This may be interpreted as the crucial realisation of the 1920 Ecumenical Patriarchate aspiration for establishment and cooperation between the League of Churches and the League of Nations, as ‘many of the ideas of this [1920 encyclical] letter anticipate subsequent developments of the WCC’ (Ware, 1997: 322).

Previously, the Consultation of the Heads and Representatives of the Autocephalic Orthodox Churches held in Moscow between 8 to 18 July 1948 refused participation at the first WCC Amsterdam Assembly. However the minutes of this meeting, as well as various documents, confirm a lack of unanimity in the attitude towards ecumenical cooperation.

In 1948 when the World Council was formally constituted, the Moscow Patriarchate condemned it as politically perilous, an instrument of American policy [...] and took up a negative attitude on the question of Anglican orders, which some Orthodox churches had recognized as valid in the years between the wars. Many Roman Catholics, as well as Anglicans and Protestants, regarded these decisions as determined by political pressure (Every, 1980: 12-3).

At this Moscow gathering, Orthodox and Oriental churches met with the patriarchates of Constantinople and Antioch (the latter representing the patriarchate of Alexandria), the representatives of the Orthodox churches in Georgia, Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Albania and Poland, and also representatives from the Armenian church. It was decided not to join within the global ecumenical movement for both doctrinal and political reasons. In practice, the Orthodox Church became a religious community which had the influence, prominence – and willingness – to be used effectively as the tool and ally of State politics (Church Conference of Heads and Representatives of Orthodox Autocephalic Churches [1948] cited in Limouris, 1994: 18-9). An Anglican ecumenist from the British Council of Churches assessed that:

In 1948 a Conference of Orthodox Churches held in Moscow had decided ‘to decline participation in the ecumenical movement in its present form’,
and was very critical of the infant WCC, accusing it of trying to form an ‘ecumenical Church’, of engaging in political and social activity, and of reducing the Christian faith to a point at which it was ‘accessible even to devils’ (Beeson, 1982: 386-7 quoting from Church Conference of Heads and Representatives of Orthodox Autocephalic Churches [1948]).

This event may be described as a temporary halt in the ecumenical movement and rapprochement initiated in 1920 in Constantinople. Furthermore, the policy of the Church of Rome was condemned as ‘anti-Christian, anti-democratic, and anti-national’, the Anglican Sacraments unrecognised, and the ecumenical movement per se discouraged on the justification of its estrangement from the search for dogmatic unity and its concentration on socio-political issues (Zernov, 1986: 666). Following State policy, the language employed had strong Stalinist connotations, advocating a policy of isolationism and suspicion towards both Catholicism and Protestantism. Succumbing to the conspiracy theory the participants affirmed that:

On one hand the Papacy, as the head of the Roman Catholic Church, as though it had lost the sense of saving faith that the gates of hell shall not prevail against the Church of Christ, and anxious to preserve its worldly authority, carried on by means of its political relations with the powerful of this world, is trying to tempt the Orthodox Church into agreement with it. For this purpose the Papacy has set up various kinds of ‘union’ organisations. On the other hand, Protestantism in all its vast diversity and its divisions into sects and cults, having lost faith in the eternity and unshakability of Christ’s ideals, proud in its scorn of the statues of the Apostles and the Early Fathers, is trying to organise a counter-campaign against Popery. Protestantism is trying to win the Orthodox Church as its ally in its conflict, in order to obtain for itself the importance of an influential international force (Church Conference of Heads and Representatives of Orthodox Autocephalic Churches [1948] cited in Limouris, 1994: 18).

Consequently, in 1948, the final Moscow declaration of the Orthodox was as follows:
To inform the ‘World Council of Churches’, in reply to the invitation we have received to participate in the Amsterdam Assembly as members, that all the national Orthodox Churches taking part in the present Conference are obliged to decline participation in the ecumenical movement, in its present form (Church Conference of Heads and Representatives of Orthodox Autocephalic Churches [1948] cited in Limouris, 1994: 19).

Thus, the application of the largest Orthodox churches to WCC membership was delayed by the outbreak of the Cold War and East-West divisions, as well as persistent reservations, misinformation and prejudices.

For the Orthodox Churches in the satellite countries this was almost certainly a real disappointment, because they were now even more strongly attached to the Moscow Patriarchate and subject to its regional influence. However, a month later, at the first WCC Assembly held in Amsterdam some Eastern Orthodox churches as we have noted sent delegates. The Ecumenical Patriarchate, the Church of Greece and the Romanian Orthodox Episcopate in America were represented, ignoring the ‘Moscow recommendations’. These ethno-national church jurisdictions were not under the influence of communist governments in their homeland. This at any rate is the position of George Florovsky, Emeritus Professor of Eastern Church History at Harvard University regarding Church-State relationship and inter-Orthodox Church perspective. Bennett quotes from Florovsky’s 1948 memorandum to the World Council of Churches:

Professor Georges Florovsky writes of the Orthodox churches that while their national character ‘brings them obviously into a closer contact with the life of the people and gives them an opportunity of influencing the current life of the nation’, it ‘circumscribes them in a narrow field of national provincialism’. He says that ‘the churches are estranged one from another, their unity is dangerously obscured, co-operation is rare’. He points out that one reason for this nationalistic emphasis in Orthodoxy is that it was ‘up to recent times the religion of the oppressed minorities in the non-Christian Turkish empire’ (Florovsky cited in Bennett, 1948: 93).
Taken as a whole, the participation of the Orthodox at the first general assembly of the WCC in Amsterdam offers a range of suppositions. On the one hand, we notice that some Orthodox churches in the Western area of influence remain engaged in ecumenical dialogue by joining a global forum of religious cooperation. On the other hand, we observe reactions to ecumenism of various national Orthodox churches politically subordinated to Eastern European regimes beyond the Iron Curtain. These aspects are important as the highest-ranking figure representing the Orthodox delegates, Archbishop Dr Germanos Strinopoulos from London exarch for West and Central Europe and the representative of the Ecumenical Patriarch, in his closing report made a bittersweet comment at the end of Amsterdam conference:

We welcome, nevertheless, this occasion to express the general feeling of the Orthodox delegation that owing to conditions now prevailing in our churches we have not sufficient time for the preparation for this Conference, and therefore we must base ourselves especially upon the consideration of our churches which in due time will express themselves about the World Council of Churches and its aspirations. We regret that owing to the conditions existing in their countries many Orthodox churches were unable to be represented here and we express the hope that in the future this will be made possible (Statement presented to the Assembly on behalf of the Orthodox delegates by Archbishop Germanos in Visser ’t Hooft ed., 1949: 220).

This indicates that the discursive importance of ecumenism within certain Orthodox Churches remained significant, while institutional participation was still hindered by local political exigencies.

**Christian Orthodox participation in the ecumenical movement in the early 1960s**

The major characteristic of the Christian Church throughout the first millennium was a constant effort in maintaining ‘the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace’ (Eph. 4: 3). The legacy of an undivided church had a compelling impact on the Orthodox ecumenical involvement bringing forward old problems and new
challenges. The Orthodox joined the ecumenical movement to witness to the unbroken Tradition and conciliar experience of the ancient church, to search together with other communions for visible unity and renewal. However, while the ecumenical movement in Western Europe recovered relatively quickly after the Second World War, Orthodoxy was split with the Eastern European Orthodox churches remaining totally separated from its activities for more than a decade. The rare and rather reserved contacts with Western churches clearly reflected the isolationist policies of the Communist States.

This state of affairs changed with the third general assembly of the WCC met in New Delhi, India, between 19th November to 5th December 1961. At this point the Orthodox Churches of Eastern Europe came out of the ‘ecumenical winter’ of the Cold War and joined the WCC en bloc. Following the decision of the Moscow Patriarchate to join the WCC, the Orthodox Church of Bulgaria, the Orthodox Church of Romania and the Orthodox Church of Poland were also able to open their official ecumenical relations and join the WCC (Visser 't Hooft ed., 1962: 9-10). Whereas the First Assembly (Amsterdam 1948) had been the time for the churches to come together, and the Second Assembly (Evanston 1954) the time for the churches to remain together, the Third Assembly (New Delhi 1961) and first outside the Western world, was the time for the vision that all churches could be united to become more of a reality. While almost all the founding churches were from the North Atlantic region, from 1961 onwards the WCC became more representative both confessionally and geographically.

It is arguable that Orthodox membership became advantageous because it made the WCC more ‘ecumenical’. By becoming more sympathetic to the diversity of situations in which Christians struggle in their witness to the gospel, it opened towards a global perspective, bypassing the initial pan-Protestant ethos. However, both the Protestant churches and the Orthodox churches had different rationales in joining the Council. I consider that Protestant churches needed the Orthodox churches to join, so the Council would become de facto ‘a global Council’ and not only a Protestant one. In the meantime Orthodoxy became increasingly involved with greater liberalisation in Soviet society, and in official wish to engage with international organisations. In this context Orthodox leaders understood that travelling abroad and attending highly visible ecumenical conferences with global
attendance they would increase international connections and improve their reputation. In addition, the Orthodox churches expected financial support from the Protestants in order to cope with future socio-political changes, while the Protestant churches used the opportunity of financial aid as a prospect to strengthen the relationship between them and the Orthodox churches. This liberalisation was limited. Meyendorff argues that ecumenical networks and activities under Communist regimes remained State controlled. For example,

[...] in the time of the USSR, the Soviet period, ecumenism was practically a state affair. One could not have relations with official institutions such as the World Council of Churches unless one had the “blessing” of the government, most often even instructions from the state. “Ecumenists,” then, were tightly controlled (though this did not prevent them from escaping this control and establishing genuine contact with their fellow Christians) and moreover belonged to that category of the privileged able to travel abroad (those called “outgoers” – vvezzhaiushchii) (Meyendorff, 1996: 220).

Participation by Eastern Orthodox churches was also easier from the 1960s onward, because the WCC became increasingly concerned about issues like racism, liberation, and economic justice, becoming sensitive to the strivings of peoples of ‘the Third World’. The Orthodox churches of Eastern Europe could express concern about such issues running little risk of conflict with the communist authorities back home – and indeed they might benefit by contributing in this way to building up a good image for the socialist states. Surprisingly, representatives from the Russian Orthodox Church and Romanian Orthodox Church were appointed to the new Central Committee. However ‘when speaking in the west in such forums as the World Council of Churches or the Prague Peace Conference, they pretended that all was ‘normal’ in Church-State relations’ (Ware, 1997: 157). Of the same opinion, Hill argues that the Communists used the Orthodox Churches’ participation in international affairs, and particularly in the WCC, in order to promote ‘the government’s line on peace’ (Hill, 1989: 212).

In the minutes from the New Delhi Assembly, dealing with applications for membership from new Churches, the Brazilian Methodist Bishop Joao A do
Amaral publicly enquired what was the relationship between the State and Church in Russia.

Dr. Visser t’ Hooft explained that there were two ways of answering this question: (i) constitutionally there was complete separation of Church and State in Russia although there was in the Russian government a Department on Religious Affairs which existed to facilitate relationships between the Church and the Government; (ii) the *de facto* answer would be that it was extremely difficult to deal with the question because it would seem that there were times when the Church had greater liberty and times when its liberty was greatly restricted (World Council of Churches, 1961: 41).

International ecumenical organisations were therefore becoming more aware that the reality behind the formalities of conferences was not as promising as they were given to understand. If we take into consideration the ecumenical movement and the 1948 Moscow Conference, we may understand that there had been a need for a good deal of groundwork, before there was further development at institutional level. Only in 1961 the USSR professed ‘openness’ in foreign affairs, by allowing the Russian Church to become a full member of WCC.

Orthodox membership has been challenging, for both the WCC and the Orthodox Churches themselves. On one hand, the heterogeneity of the churches participating in the Council, the diverging theological and ecclesiological positions of the interlocutors, and the methodology of dialogue of the WCC required increasing flexibility. On the other hand, ‘the specificity of Orthodox ecclesiology and theology, the Orthodox vision of the world, [and] some historical misgivings the Orthodox have vis-à-vis Western Christendom’ (Tsetsis cited in Limouris, 1994: 273) were the main issues which made the relationship problematical and at times strenuous. The Orthodox participants, in the Section of the Assembly dealing with the unity of the Church, insisted on the distinction between the terms confession, denomination and the church, which is understood as essentially undivided. For them, ‘ecumenism in space’, throughout the inhabited world, could not succeed without ‘ecumenism in time’, the common
Christian history and apostolic tradition. In their contributory text the Orthodox representatives argued that:

For the Orthodox the basic ecumenical problem is that of schism. The Orthodox cannot accept the idea of a ‘parity of denomination’ and cannot visualise Christian Reunion just as an interdenominational adjustment. The unity has been broken and must be recovered. The Orthodox Church is not a confession, one of many. For the Orthodox, The Orthodox Church is just the Church (Third Assembly of the World Council of Churches, New Delhi, India, 1961 cited in Limouris, 1994: 30).

The theological and cultural traditions by which the Orthodox identify their church as ‘the church’ and use other names for Protestant churches, appears to imply for these a lesser degree of churchliness. As there is no mutual recognition between all churches, and considering numerical disadvantage also, this discourse makes some Protestants feel considered second-class Christians, making real ecumenism increasingly difficult.

Significantly, in 1961 both the International Missionary Council (which had emerged from the World Missionary Conference in Edinburgh 1910) and WCC assemblies were held in New Delhi. The missionary movement decided to stay absent when Faith and Order and Life and Work movements came together in 1948 to form the WCC, so that its focused concentration on world mission would not be dissipated by being component of a wider movement. Such were the profound convictions on mission that motivated the early ecumenical endeavours. Integration of the Missionary Council into the WCC was finally approved in 1961, and consequently, a new division (later commission) on world mission and evangelism was created within WCC.

By choosing to hold its third general assembly in New Delhi, the WCC politically encouraged the non-aligned (neutral) ethos as well as the post-colonial socio-economic emancipation in a religiously pluralist environment. It was also an approval on how social action groups within Churches related to the ecumenical movement may put a significant effort into changing various national societies and young democracies for the sake of greater justice. The Eastern European
Orthodox Churches newly represented participated in discussion on Cold War issues. They did not reinforce atheistic communist ideology, however they showed some sympathy for socialistic aspects of the Soviet economy and foreign policy. It is quite clear that the basic motives of the Orthodox churches approaching the WCC were rather political than based on true ecumenical interest. The main task of the Orthodox was, through their foreign relations, to complement the image of State controlled churches. This representation was incomplete without open relations with WCC.

The WCC understood that, regarding the Orthodox tradition, the character of a new church member is cultivated in connection with other socio-political, historical or theological factors. In the delicate political relations with Orthodox member churches in countries with totalitarian, military or atheistic regimes, the WCC has tried to express compassion and solidarity, to remove the burden of oppression and to provide space for church life and witness. Meanwhile, because no country could claim religious homogeneity, the ecumenical dilemma here is, on one hand, the concern for religious liberty and cultural identity and, on the other hand, the pursuit of Christian unity at the local, national and regional level. For this reason in our research ‘[…] the one-time-and-one-locale studies often assume or imply a homogeneity which, if true, very much needs to be taken as a problem. It cannot fruitfully be reduced, as it so often is in current research practice, to a problem of sampling procedure. It cannot be formulated as a problem within the terms of one moment and one locale’ (Mills, 2000: 147, original emphasis).

From a doctrinal perspective, most Orthodox delayed membership until the WCC provided also a satisfactory basic definition of itself. By the 1961 occasion the 1940’s membership requirement had been redefined from a Christological statement to a Trinitarian confession. Drafted largely by Visser ’t Hooft, the new constitutive definition reads:

The World Council of Churches is a fellowship of churches which confess the Lord Jesus Christ as God and Saviour according to the Scriptures and therefore seek to fulfil together their common calling to the glory of the one God, Father Son and Holy Spirit (Visser ’t Hooft, 1962: 152).
The final doxological formula, which locates the Christocentric confession in a Trinitarian setting, makes the starting point acceptable to the Orthodox and adds to the fact of the aspiration to unity. The Assembly decided to conduct the vote on the Basis by written ballot. The result of the ballot announced by the chairman was: 383 in favour, 36 against and 7 abstentions (Visser ’t Hooft, 1962: 159). From the New Delhi WCC assembly onwards, there has been specific interest to call the churches to the goal of visible unity. The report mentions that:

We believe that the unity which is both God’s will and his gift to his Church is being made visible as all in each place who are baptised into Jesus Christ and confess him as Lord and Saviour are brought by the Holy Spirit into one fully committed fellowship, holding the one apostolic faith, preaching the one Gospel, breaking the one bread, joining in common prayer, and having a corporate life reaching out in witness and service to all and who at the same time are united with the whole Christian fellowship in all places and all ages in such wise that ministry and members are accepted by all, and that all can act and speak together as occasion requires for the tasks to which God calls his people (Visser ’t Hooft, 1962: 116).

In June 1960, Pope John XXIII established the Secretariat for Promoting Christian Unity and in December of the same year he received the visit of Archbishop Geoffrey Fisher, the primate of the Anglican Church. The next year the Pope dispatched envoys to Constantinople to greet Ecumenical Patriarch Athenagoras I, and he also exchanged greetings with Patriarch Alexis of Moscow. In contrast to the rather chilly reaction the Roman Church gave the first assembly at Amsterdam (1948), the Pope approved the sending of five official observers to the World Council of Churches assembly in New Delhi (Visser ’t Hooft, 1962: 6, 393). This was the first time that official observers from the Vatican had attended an assembly of the WCC. Immediate impressions after the New Delhi WCC assembly illustrate that a ‘great conversation’ between East and West came into being.
This moment, that officially brought the Orthodox into global ecumenism, may explain the divisions and tensions manifested at some subsequent ecumenical assemblies. The role of the Orthodox became increasingly influential. They brought a firm doctrinal foundation by presenting an analysis, which could reconcile some radical Western Christian interpretations. They were also able to help towards satisfactory conclusions of theological debates by approaching controversial positions from an angle unfamiliar to the West.

The Orthodox presence in the WCC safeguarded the ecumenical movement against the risk of becoming simply a pan-Protestant organisation, by reviving the awareness of a global vocation obscured at times by Church preoccupations with national issues or political rivalry. According to Every (1980), lack of Orthodox participation in ecumenical affairs, would have set an agenda dominated mainly by Protestant Liberalism.

Since ecumenism is a combined effort of drawing closer, the questions posed to Orthodox churches were also addressed to their Protestant partners, with the hope that reviewing and planning further steps together might enhance dialogue. For the WCC, the participation of the Orthodox meant a difficult adjustment to a predominantly Protestant and Western ethos, liturgy, agenda and style of work. In New Delhi the Orthodox made a theologically and historically unique contribution to the ongoing debate on church unity. They were encouraged by the new global Church networks and embarked at home on doctrinal research, a topic regarded almost exclusively controversial by previous Eastern Orthodox scholars. The final message of the Orthodox was firm. In a new socio-political environment, arguing for a ‘recovery of history’, future intentions regarding ecumenism were as follows:

The Orthodox Church is willing to participate in this common work as the witness which had preserved continuously the deposit of apostolic faith and tradition. No static restoration of old forms is anticipated, but rather a dynamic recovery of perennial ethos, which only can secure the true agreement ‘of all ages’. Nor should there be a rigid uniformity, since the
same faith, mysterious in its essence\(^2\) and unfathomable adequately in the formulas of human reason, can be expressed accurately in different manners. The immediate objective of the ecumenical search is, according to the Orthodox understanding, a reintegration of Christian mind, a recovery of apostolic tradition, a fullness of Christian vision and belief, in agreement with all ages (Third Assembly of the World Council of Churches, New Delhi, India, 1961 cited in Limouris, 1994: 31).

The Eastern Orthodox capacity enlarged, by reaching beyond its traditional communities. This may not be interpreted as meaning doctrine or worship pattern changes, which most Orthodox considered as a permanent feature of their tradition, rather we observe a transformed perception of its influence within global Christianity. Eastern Orthodoxy required particular attention in order to understand its internal challenges. It became defensive of its integrity in order to respond to the new challenging factors. While there were no convincing grounds to believe that Eastern Orthodoxy would abandon its traditional loyalty on the part of Greek, Russian, Romanian and other Eastern European communities, a major shift took place. A faith community, once defined only by ethno-national terms, escaped from this stereotyped restricted role by showing the potential of a dynamic alternative and by becoming an active player within the global religious field. However, while undertaking this journey of learning, sometimes there was lack of communication and understanding.

The worst and most dangerous aspect of this question is, however, the fact that the participation of the Orthodox Church in the ecumenical movement – even though officially sponsored – has not been well organized, that there is no real vital interest in this movement, that there has been no

\(^2\) Historically, since the beginning of the Christian era, the Christian people have identified their worship with the mystery of the person of Christ in which they perceive the indestructible unity of His two natures, the divine and the human. Consequently, they call their main acts of worship ‘mysteries’. Western Christendom calls the same actions of worship ‘sacraments’, but both words ‘mystery’ and ‘sacrament’ approach the same person of Jesus Christ who is the source and centre of the worship of all Christian people; his two natures, the human and the divine, have become aspects in which the worshipping Christian community sees the unity of the invisible and visible. In their acts of worship, the Orthodox understand the visible, physical elements as vehicles of invisible grace and the presence of God’s intervention for the salvation of the World. The visible and invisible are interpenetrating elements in the whole Cosmos, and life in its simple approach is a two-levelled reality in which matter and purpose, body and mind are harmoniously intermingled. The human, being a microcosm, or an organism in which the Universe is mirrored, may receive both visible and invisible help.
collective preparation among delegates for dealing seriously with the great problems raised in the different conferences, and, finally, that there is no real contact between the various Orthodox delegations at these ecumenical meetings. We can go further and say that it happens not infrequently that some member Churches have no clear knowledge of what happens at these conferences and what results have come from them (Bratiotis, 1968: 99).

Furthermore, in this period, the Eastern Orthodox understood more than ever that reconciliation and healing through dialogue does not consist of a purely formal peace, a mere coexistence and lack of aggression covering over profound disagreements. Lasting ecumenical reconciliation is inseparable from understanding which strives to secure participation and justice among nations and churches by promoting continuous mutual exchange. In the ecumenical winter of the Cold War, it became evident that reconciliation not founded on principles of true universal justice among the global religious players is threatened with collapse. The Orthodox Churches from communist lands comprehended that ecumenical dialogue served for the reconstruction of the global unity of all Christians. Far from being identical with the Churches’ union itself – the WCC became a forum where Churches clarified both their divergent and convergent perspectives. Indeed, the Eastern Orthodox presence within the WCC never implied the acceptation *per se* of the union of faith and Eucharistic communion with the other church members. However, in a climate of constant State rivalry and conflicting ideologies, this was only an incipient phase of building institutional and personal contacts hoping that future projects for practical cooperation and mutual help may emerge.

**Conclusion**

Evidence analysed in this Chapter indicates Orthodox ecumenism had a number of different characteristics to Protestant ecumenism. In the first phase, Protestant ecumenism grew out of problems of mission in relation to denominational conflict, whereas for Orthodoxy the relations between political autonomy and religious unity were more significant. From an organisational perspective, we notice an Eastern Orthodox attitude of realism and suspicion of top-heavy administration while Protestants incline to subscribe to utopian principles and
remain bureaucratic in their structural characteristics by trying to agree on
difficult associative policies. For Protestants, Edinburgh 1910 is a major
reference point in understanding ecumenism, while the Orthodox consider the
Jerusalem Assembly (circa 50 AD) followed by the Seven Ecumenical Councils
as the model of unity. Thus, from a theological perspective, the Eastern Orthodox
seek unity based on what they perceive as ‘classic’ Christian doctrine emerged
from conciliar tradition and patristic teaching, while their Protestant counterparts
in the ecumenical project seek mainly negotiated inter-institutional agreement
emerging mainly from the Enlightenment assumptions of freedom and principles
of Reformation. In conclusion, this leads us to believe that the Eastern Orthodox
are deliberately grounded in ancient ecumenism and try to remain patient amid
political turmoil, while the Protestant ethos accommodates a more radical
modernist spirit within which alternative authority structures might be easier
considered.

Nevertheless, there is evidence that shifting alliances between nation states
historically influenced both Protestant and Orthodox trends alike in their
networking for rapprochement. Through socio-political change we also notice
sensitive ideological attachment of Churches to various movements e.g.
colonialism or Marxism, often hampered the ecumenical development. Prior to
1961, the Eastern European churches were critical towards WCC, however
afterwards they expressed a more positive and optimistic stance. Instead of
suspicion, its theologians showed interest towards ecumenism, being apparently
proud of their ecumenical relations. However, it is quite clear that this was the
fact only in the case of inter-church organisations. Towards the Vatican, the
prejudice continued to remain deeply rooted despite mutual attempts of
rapprochement. As long as the Uniate question remained a forbidden topic, there
were limited possibilities for a truly positive encounter between the Eastern
Orthodox and the Vatican. Furthermore, due to the deepening of domestic
difficulties and external criticism, the Orthodox were less able to concentrate on
their ecumenical interests and were forced to spend time, energy and resources on
survival and in the meantime continuously defending State policies.

We notice Robertson’s argument (1992: 59) that the ‘take-off phase’ of
globalisation witnessed ‘inclusion of a number of non-European societies in
Robertson argues that this epoch was followed by the ‘struggle for hegemony phase’, between mid-1920s until the late-1960s. In this conflicting period fascist ideology declined, the Allied Forces won, while communists established themselves as a worldwide legal network especially focussing on the newly crystallised Third World countries. Historically, after the Second World War finished, the Cold War began. This meant a socio-political and economic struggle for supremacy between two super-powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, each being the centre of a group of allies. This had worldwide implications, causing the nations not wishing to be involved to form a non-aligned bloc, including nearly independent countries such as Indonesia and India.

Due to the initiatives of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, Orthodox ecumenism makes a discursive take-off in 1920s. However ecumenical advance was significantly diminished by the struggle for hegemony phase of globalisation (Robertson, 1992) within which Moscow’s politico-religious suspicions played a major role.
Chapter 6: Roman Catholic Ecumenism

Introduction

Compared with almost all other churches, the Roman Catholic Church is geographically extended throughout almost every nation of the world. This has been achieved through a complex mixture of proselytising missions and migration, sometimes associated with expansive European Empires. Even though it claims to be unitary and universal, the Roman Church has nonetheless had to contend with a variety of religions and Christian traditions. The specific features of Roman Catholic theology, that above all distinguish it from other theologies, are the particular ways in which it is rooted in the universal church and the manner in which its beliefs are practiced and socialised. Through migration and proselytism only Islam – a ‘growing political presence’ (Robertson, 1992: 51) remains as widely dominant in the global religious field (Barber, 1996). Meanwhile relations with other Christian traditions have witnessed schism, conflict, but more recently a more significant degree of involvement with ecumenism.

In the latter part of the 20th century in particular, intra/inter faith dialogue also became a characteristic feature of Roman Catholic reflection. In this context, Hans Kün, believes that ‘probably, more than any other church, the Catholic Church is a controversial church, subject to extremes of admiration and attack’ (Kün, 2002: 4).

According to Christian tradition, under the persecution of Nero, Apostle Peter was martyred and buried in Rome, the politico-administrative centre of the Roman Empire and eventually the centre of the Roman Church. From the beginning Rome intervened in the life of remote churches within Christian Europe (Holton, 1998), took sides in theological controversies, offered counsel to other bishops on doctrinal and pastoral questions and sent delegates to distant councils within the oikoumenē (Kün, 2002). Until Constantine the Great established the New Rome on the site of Byzantium in the fourth century, the Church of Rome assumed political pre-eminence among all churches. ‘How did the small Jewish-Christian church which began in Palestine become the great church of the whole ‘ecumene’
the whole of the then ‘inhabited earth’, the ecclesia catholica? (Küng, 2002: 23). Historically, the See of Rome came to be regarded as a kind of final court of appeal as well as a focus of unity for the worldwide ecumenical communion of local churches, as Roman law also became a prominent factor in European civilisational development (Anderson, 1974). Especially since the crowning of Charlemagne by Pope Leo III as Emperor of the Romans on Christmas Day in the year 800,

The new idea of Europe was institutionalised in religious institutions and brought about an ideological transformation of Rome into Europe. Following the ascendancy of the papacy, the idea of Rome had been broadened to include Europe with a consequence that a Greek was seen as a non-European and a Roman Christian a European (Delanty, 1995: 39 referencing Ullmann, 1969: 139).

The historical bond between the Roman Church and the Greek Church within the Byzantine Empire came apart through a series of unfortunate and exceedingly complex political and diplomatic manoeuvres. This culminated with the excommunication of Michael Cerularius, Patriarch of Constantinople in 1054 followed by the sack of Constantinople by Western knights in the Fourth Crusade (1202-4). According to Byzantinologist Steven Runciman, ‘of all tragedies of medieval history none was more to be regretted than the schism between the two great Churches of Christendom, the Church of the Latin West and the Church of the Greek and Slavonic East’ (Runciman, 1967: 1). The politico-religious division of Europe began precisely with that gap between Byzantium and the West. And since then, the West called itself European, as if its Eastern counterpart was not a component of the same oikoumenē. ‘The idea of Europe as it became articulated in this period served as a means of alienating the Greek church from the Latin West’ (Delanty, 1995: 28). Consequently, a clearer sense of the West also emerged in the same process.

The incapacity for dialogue between West and East led to a consolidation of misunderstandings and reinforcement of self-portrayed external images. Since then, this European separation remained a multifaceted historical reality. Full inter-continental integration remains for its proponents a task to be fulfilled
through reconciliation and reharmonisation of internal relations following numerous disputes. According to British historian and Byzantinologist George Every 'Rome had become more negative about [ecumenism] since the Reformation, but those Catholics who made a positive approach to the Ecumenical Movement saw the Orthodox in it as speaking for them' (Every, 1980: 9). However, in the last decades of the 20th century, after the Second Vatican Council, and with the beginning of the third millennium, Rome, aware that its dominant ideas are increasingly contested, presented a revival of interest in Christianity at large and the Orthodox East in particular. For them, the modern challenges manifested especially through rationalisation and secularising trends that sustain dechristianising ethics. To profess an identity of resistance and to remain ideologically only a counter movement was no longer convenient. New initiatives were required.

Catholic academic Paul Knitter argues that 'Pope John XXIII [1958-63] was not just opening long-locked windows in the Roman church, he was knocking through walls and indirectly calling for the reconstruction of old models and practices! Part of the general opening of the Catholic church to the modern world was a recognition of other cultures and religions' (Knitter, 1996: 5-6). In Protestant ecumenism we have seen this recognition was developed in the context of challenge to global missionary activity. In Orthodoxy, ecumenism emerged from a revaluation of historic doctrines in the context of political developments including the League of Nations. In Catholicism, we shall argue, ecumenism was a response to challenges of secularisation and dechristianisation recast within new forms of cosmopolitanism. This challenge took place in an increasingly globalised and multicultural setting.

In this Chapter I examine the pro unitate attitude within the Roman Church and its gradual historical development by researching a range of evidence including some papal encyclicals. Also, some documents produced by the United States Orthodox-Catholic Theological Consultation will be examined, especially in connection to pastoral care of mixed marriages. I argue that in a wider context, this is a sign of emerging cosmopolitanism which should not be overlooked.
Given the hierarchical nature of the Roman Catholic Church, much data on ecumenism comes from Papal pronouncements. However, I also identified evidence from networks which were especially relevant, notably networks of French theologians, promoters of *la nouvelle théologie* and facilitators of the spirit of *aggiornamento*.

**Roman Catholic infallibility and anti-ecumenism**

It is important to understand that the specific structure of the Roman Catholic Church has major effects on the daily life of the faithful. Papal pronouncements endorsed by the clerical administration cannot be challenged by the laity, even if matters of disagreement continue to be expressed. According to Canadian sociologist of religion Jean-Guy Vaillancourt, the Roman Church model of management and organisation remains highly centralised and stratified.

The Roman Catholic Church is a structure that has existed over most of the history of western civilization. In fact, to say that it has been instrumental in giving birth to western civilization would not be an exaggeration. The organizational image that still most often comes to mind when reference is made to the Church is that of a pyramidal or monarchical structure. On the top is the pope, the Supreme Pontiff, with his chief assistants and advisers, the cardinals, who also hold the top positions in the Roman Curia. Below the cardinals come the various types of bishops and monsignors: the archbishop and metropolitans, the resident bishops, the vicars and prefects apostolic, abbots and apostolic administrators. Below these august figures are pastors, priests, brothers, and nuns. Finally, at the bottom, in another word practically, is the great mass of the faithful, the laity (Vaillancourt, 1980: 11-12).

Furthermore, as Roman Catholic religious ideology has ‘increasingly become subordinated to organizational imperatives’ (Vaillancourt, 1980: 15), this structural-institutional model of governance also has immediate consequences on the external policies professed in ecumenical relations with various churches. Vaillancourt, following the Weberian tradition, argues that this internal control
sustained by office charisma was transformed into conservative political legitimization.

For example, the 1920 plea of the Ecumenical Patriarchate for establishing a League of Churches was not enthusiastically received by the Roman Catholic Church. Rome rejected engagement in ecumenical dialogue. ‘Mortalium Animos: On Religious Unity’ announced on 6th January 1928 by Pope Pius XI (1922-39) asserted curial instructions against Catholic involvement in any ecumenical consultation. It is arguable that this encyclical was directed against the promoters of ecumenical movement, particularly against Western Protestants who since the 1910 Conference had established organisations such as the International Missionary Council in 1921, Life and Work in 1925 and Faith and Order in 1927. Conservative doctrinal understanding of the terms ‘Christianity’ and ‘catholicity’ made the Roman Pontiff disapprove any attempts of dialogue with non-Catholics (Küng, 2002). The Pope forbade membership in ecumenical assembly, however he claimed ‘to embrace with fatherly affection those children whose unhappy separation from Us We now deplore’ (Pope Pius XI, 1943 [1928]: 22). This warning reinforced the first universally binding Code of Canon Law promulgated by Pope Benedict XV in 1917. The Code of Canon Law established that in debating their belief system with the ‘other’,

Catholics are to avoid disputations or conferences about matters of faith with non-Catholics, especially in public, unless the Holy See, or in case of emergency the Ordinary of the place has given permission (canon 1325, paragraph 3) (Bouscaren, Ellis and Korth, 1963: 745).

What was the rationale for non-participation in ecumenical dialogue and emphasis on strict religious-cultural control? The Roman Catholic hierarchy believed that participation in assemblies with ‘non-Catholics’ would lead to the development of religious networks and alliances beyond parochial outlooks which could potentially foster doctrinal misinterpretation. Ecumenical dialogue, they thought, could easily confirm the speculation that one church or religion is as good as another, that ecumenical gatherings would lead towards negotiations of revealed truths through doctrinal compromise. The Roman Church, a church with a strong sense of identity and universality, wanted to avoid the suspicion that it would be
tacitly accepting some of the contemporary Protestant ecclesiologies. Künig argues that the Roman Church advanced an ethos based on principles traditionally established.

It was the Emperor Theodosius the Great, a strictly orthodox Spaniard (sic!), who at the end of the fourth Christian century decreed a general ban on all pagan cults and sacrificial rites and accused those who broke this law of *lèse-majesté* (*laesa majestas*). That made Christianity now formally the state religion, the Catholic Church the state church, and heresy a crime against the state (Künig, 2002: 45).

Thus, although the Anglican Church did not deny that the Roman Church was a true part of the Catholic Church, the Roman Church denied this status to the Anglicans. It was a strong perception that the very foundations of Catholic principles would become ‘subverted’ by the desire of other Christians to treat the Catholic Church on a par status i.e. as one among many churches. Accordingly, if Catholic hierarchs would allow encouragement or support to the ecumenical movement in both inter-church and inter-faith dialogue, they would support a socio-political ‘erroneous view’ (Pope Pius XI, 1928). For this motive, the Pope warning against participation in ‘pan-Christian’ activities concluded the encyclical by giving his infallible decree on an uncompromising tone:

Thus, Venerable Brethren, it is clear why this Apostolic See has never allowed its subjects to take part in the assemblies of non-Catholics. There is but one way in which the unity of Christians may be fostered, and that is by furthering the return to the one true Church of Christ of those who are separated from it; for from that one true Church they have in the past fallen away. The one Church of Christ is visible to all, and will remain, according to the will of its Author, exactly the same as He instituted it (Pope Pius XI, 1943 [1928]: 20-21).

In this case Rome presents a loving image by expressing concern for her ‘separated’ brethren to return home. The reunion of all Christians was understood as a one-way process i.e. the global return of ‘hetero-Catholics’ or ‘non-Catholics’ within the Roman Church. Roman Catholic formal doctrine articulated that its
organisation was co-extensive with the one church of Christ and therefore would compromise its witness and self-understanding by mixing with others who were ‘not clear’ on the ontology of the ecumenical movement, or its future direction. The Catholic Church had an exclusivist mind-set, ‘by elaborating itself as an administrative apparatus roughly parallel to the surrounding political states, but one whose function was primarily to reproduce religious communication, to guard, transmit, and even expand the ‘deposit of faith’’ (Beyer, 1994: 149).

Because the Roman Church claimed to have preserved the original truth in unbroken continuity and free of inner contradictions, the Holy See did not accept entering into talks with other Christian denominations from analogous positions (Pius XI, 1928).

There are, of course, denominations and churches which seek to retain a rather more clear-cut orthodox stance, even when engaged in ecumenical ventures. (In fact ecumenical consultation may promote the sharpening of doctrinal differences). In this case the emphasis will entail a particularism unconductive to radical theologising. There is obviously a strong group within the Roman Catholic hierarchy committed to this position (Robertson, 1972: 213).

I argue that this ‘strong group’ were mainly the promoters of the nouvelle théologie movement initiated in the late 1930s and early 1940s by the new thinking within the French intellectual tradition. These academic/knowledge networks became policy networks in the 1960s. Some of their ideas became influential, being incorporated into the development of the Second Vatican Council. They tried to suggest a policy of aggiornamento, i.e. adaptation of the Roman church to the new world realities and rapid social change. For Küng, it was Pope John XXIII (1958-63) – ‘the most significant pope of the twentieth century’ who facilitated ‘the way to renewal (aggiornamento), to a proclamation of the gospel in keeping with the time’ (2002: 190). The main architects were French theologians Marie-Dominique Chenu, Yves Congar, Henri de Lubac, Jean Daniélou. Also, other academic theologians such as Hans Küng, Edward Schillebeeckx, Hans Urs von Balthasar, Cardinal Franz König as well as Joseph Ratzinger who in 2005 became Pope Benedict XVI, were supporters of a globally reformed, updated ecclesiastical system.
Initially, the renewal trend advocated by the French theologians was controversial. Their theological hermeneutics brought confusion and anxiety within the traditionalist-conservative group. An early statement of reform published in 1937 by Dominican theologian Marie-Dominique Chenu, *Le Saulchoir: une école de théologie* [*Le Saulchoir: A School of Theology*], was condemned by the Holy Office in 1942 and placed on the *Index of Forbidden Books*. In the same year, another Dominican from Le Saulchoir monastery, Yves Congar, who specialised in ecclesiology and ecumenism, published *Chrétiens désunis* [*Divided Christendom*]. For these ground-breaking, yet unconventional discourses, the French Dominican order was threatened to be dissolved.

According to Catholic theologian Bernard Lonergan, the modernist trend advocating for reform was perceived as threatening the official scholastic tradition (Lonergan, 1988). *Aggiornamento* meant that theological discourses had to articulate the contemporary socio-political change. Simultaneously and complementary to *aggiornamento*, *ressourcement* meant the return to the sources, recovery of the Church’s past and renewed theological-historical interpretation. On the one hand, engagement in dialogue with the movements and thinkers associated with the Enlightenment, modernity and liberalism initiated *rapprochement* with the Protestants. On the other hand, the return to the study of patristic texts opened new possibilities for bilateral conversations with the Eastern Orthodox. The recovery and re-endorsement of the basic Christian truths of the first millennium were paramount factors in the beginning of the East-West reconciliation process which will be analysed later in this Chapter.

For sociologist José Casanova this period produced a clear emergence of globalisation of Catholicism. For him

The Second Vatican Council had to be called precisely in order to ratify officially the process of *aggiornamento* to modernity that was already well under way in Catholic Western Europe. Once convened, however, the Council created a totally unforeseen dynamic of Catholic transformation and globalization’ (Casanova, 1997: 132).
Nevertheless, officially, the Holy See rejected the principles of negotiation between religious actors in the global field by preferring to choose certain anti-modern traditional elements and by elevating itself as the ultimate criteria of orthodoxy. Thus, it is verifiable that ‘the Roman Catholic Church [especially before the Second Vatican Council] used a fairly official model of expected individual religiosity’ (McGuire, 2002: 104). Not all conservatives are necessarily fundamentalist, however, they all share revulsion for some, at times all, elements of modernity. Pronouncements from various conservative groups that seem to be anti-ecumenical reflect a fear of relativisation and compromise of orthodox values. Faith and tradition were their foremost principles.

Historically, as global circumstances change, so does the sense of catholicity (universality) of the Church. The Roman Church had to take into consideration a variety of factors. In the journey from industrialisation to post-industrialisation, globalisation is facilitated by information technology while global competition and capital accumulation are driving forces permeating historical borders and challenging traditional institutions. The social creed of an interdependent ‘open society’ is a new dimension challenging traditional values. A new economic-scientific and civilisation-historical analysis challenges the former approach, as there is evidence of worldwide trends that can no longer be ignored or removed, an attempt of universalisation of cultural values, a transnational rather than an international process. These phenomena created new hierarchies of values and new forms of governance. Furthermore, as Communist ideology lost much of its competitiveness, due to its credibility breakdown in most of the world, global market economic principles replaced the vacuum, faster than democratic values, but also posing further challenges to the Church, as a source of social identity and influence on social action.

One way of illustrating the religious context facing the Church of Rome under the impact of modernity is through the notion of Catholicism. While members of the Church of Rome reflected on ‘catholic’ as a distinctive part of their name, the Orthodox claimed it too, as did some Protestant churches in their self-identification. Indeed, nearly all Christians would assert being part of the ‘Church catholic’ as opposed to the ‘Catholic Church’. Beyer (1990) argues that since the French Revolution, Roman Catholicism was largely involved in a hesitant but
gradual acceptance of modern Western values. Furthermore, since the Enlightenment, rationality and paradigms of scientific thought encouraged examination of religion as a non-transcendent form of human action (Robertson, 1972). Roman Catholic responses manifested themselves in a persistent ‘reactionary’ stand against scientific reason, secularisation and anti-clerical principles of state-building.

Enlightenment, as ‘a civil religion’, was a new secular interpretation of human reality to be understood more as a way of thinking than a movement. However it had a competitive religious dimension in a Durkheimian sense in so far as it evoked commitment and, within an over-all view, expressed a people’s ultimate sense of worth, identity and destiny. In Catholic Europe, the Enlightenment fell foul of a more dogmatic and still influential church and of political regimes that were more inclined to equate political stability with intellectual and religious uniformity (Hampson, 1995).

Where, we may ask, did the Roman Catholic Church get this position of unease vis-a-vis negotiation? Some evidence suggests that this attitude is linked with the political discourse of Romanisation. Historian Antonio Santosuosso defines this as

[...] the assimilation of the conquered nations to Roman culture and political worldview. The conquered became partners in running the empire. It was a selective process that applied directly only to the upper level of subject societies but it trickled down to all classes with benefits for some, negative consequences for others.... Roman supremacy was based on a masterful combination of violence and psychological persuasion – the harshest punishment for those who challenged it, the perception that their power knew no limits and the rewards were given to those who conformed (Santosuosso quoted in Panitch and Gindin, 2004: 8-9).

In this context we also may ask if there are common grounds between Roman Catholic Church polity and totalitarian systems? Kung (2002) identifies the concepts, scope, application and interpretation of infallibility, especially papal
infallibility, as main administrative components intolerant to pluralistic variations. Papal infallibility has long been unacceptable in Protestant and Orthodox quarters and in ecumenical context this has been considered by many as the ultimate barrier to the reunion of Christianity. Furthermore the Jesuit theologian Robert Murray believes that ‘by a still more unfortunate expression, the magisterium was said to enjoy infallibilitas activa and the faithful only infallibilitas passiva, which is only required a short step farther to equate with blind obedience to the magisterium’ (Murray, 1968: 32).

In the late eighteenth and during the nineteenth century, the Roman Church reacted to the destruction of the traditional European alliance of throne and altar by further asserting the independence of the organization, even to the point of sacralizing it in the doctrine of papal infallibility (Beyer, 1994: 136).

Many objections from other Churches stem from a concern that the exercise of infallibility has historically proven to be arbitrary, independent of the rest of the Church, and limited only by certain legal requirements promulgated for the first time by Pope Pius IX in the First Vatican Council (1869-70). Infallibility is perceived by the Protestant Churches as an axiom of ‘cultural imperialism’ and not as conformity to some objective standard supported by historical and ‘empirical evidence’ in the codex juris divini. Indeed, the original Schism between the Orthodox Church and Rome was followed by others, of which the most serious was the breach between the Catholic South and the Protestant North. The religious wars that followed produced additional wounds to the body of Europe, and further advanced inner divisions.

Meanwhile, the Orthodox reprimanded the Roman Church because it historically developed and defined the view of papal infallibility after the East-West separation; thus it precluded the possibility of discussion and decision-making by a strictly ecumenical council in which all apostolic traditions are to be represented. The Orthodox claim that within the Byzantine mosaic framework of Empire structure, the Church was able to educate the ideals of ecumenism. Although invasions and settlements of peoples occurred inside the Empire, and despite the fact that massive displacements and migration of populations from one
region to another were not uncommon, there is no suggestion of major internal ethno-religious conflicts. In my understanding, Byzantium attempted to accommodate most of its peoples by integrating all newcomers or migrants through a policy following a ‘mosaic image’. In their structural management, diversity created, enriched and fulfilled unitary aspirations.

However, this abstract commitment was not always followed through in empirical tolerance. Turner argues that the Ottoman Empire (successor of Byzantium) was not an integrated social system, but ‘a mosaic model or patchwork of tribes, religious minorities, social groups and associations’ (1978: 39). This model of Islamic (urban) governance, generally known as Oriental Despotism – sometimes violent and corrupt, considered the ideological role of religion and ethnicity more significant than social class.

By the sixteenth century the Moslems and the Christians of the Ottoman Empire were alike separated by sectarian differences from their nearest co-religionists beyond its frontiers, with the result that a distinct culture, embracing both, was able to arise within them. Nevertheless, the various races of which the subject populations were composed were not welded into a nation; and this largely for the reason that the ruling class, though to a great extent recruited from the Christian element, on the one hand represented the political domination of Islâm, and on the other was isolated by its constitution from all the ruled of what-ever faith (Gibb and Bowen, Vol. 1, 1950: 159).

On the other hand, if the Roman Pontiff was to assume Christian global leadership, infallibility may not be ignored, as non-recognition attributes anathematisation. Furthermore, being preoccupied also with acquisition of secular authority, the Church of Rome sometimes failed in teaching the peoples within its spiritual jurisdiction the principles of peaceful mutual acceptance, as consequently it became biased. Thus, already in the course of the Middle Ages, some historical accounts mention of the inextinguishable abhorrence between Italians and Germans, and particularly between Franks and Germans – causing conflicts which led to the two major world conflagrations in the 20th century. In our analysis of Catholicism, centralised leadership and Roman ecclesiastical
policies, should not mean treating the church as a monolithic entity. Gramsci’s much-cited views are useful here:

Every religion, [he says] even Catholicism (indeed Catholicism more than any, precisely because of its efforts to retain a “surface” unity and avoid splintering into national churches and social stratifications), is in reality a multiplicity of distinct and often contradictory religions: there is one Catholicism for the peasants, one for the petits-bourgeois and town workers, one for women, and one for intellectuals which is itself variegated and disconnected (Gramsci cited in O’Toole, 1989: xv).

It is arguable then that Catholicism continues to reflect the ethos of an older, medieval type of governance, in which uniting community values continue to prevail over economic, gender or class interests. These characteristics created, both historically and in the 20th century ecumenical context, enmity from other churches, especially of Protestant type. This was a perception that developed after centuries of mistrust between churches. By contrast, as examined in Chapter 4, the Anglican Communion supports a policy of inclusion and acceptance of Christian diversity in an ecumenical setting. Catholic theologian and ecumenist Yves Congar, a major player in the organisation of the Second Vatican Council, gave both a quantitative and qualitative assessment of Anglican perspective on ecumenism, which in his opinion deserves recognition:

There is no other Christian body which is preoccupied with reunion as is Anglicanism. Scarcely a year passes without half a dozen books appearing on the subject, and when it becomes particularly topical the number approaches twelve or fifteen. The problem is an urgent one for Anglicanism. In a way it is inherent in the very structure of the Church of England, which is reformed without being really Protestant and has remained ‘Catholic’ in inspiration and inclination on more than one important point, without being either Roman or papist or scholastic. In point of fact, Anglicanism played an extremely important part in the birth and the first thirty years of the ecumenical movement. This is particularly true of the ‘Faith and Order’ Movement, the problems and methods of which can be said to reflect the whole temperament of Anglicanism itself.
and its task of enlarging areas of agreement between Christian communions in a ‘Catholic’ sense in order to bring them first to intercommunion and then to ‘full communion’ (Congar, 1966: 283).

For Congar, Anglican reminders of the historical causes of Christian divisiveness generates literature and networks formations which focus on church unity beyond polemical disputes. Thus, ecumenical awareness and the spirit of rapprochement generate documents and institutional settings which require committed participation. In the second half of the 20th century, the theological-cultural Anglican interpretation of Catholicity continues to raise attention to Roman Catholic ecumenists. The negotiation between the inclusivist/exclusivist meanings of ‘catholicity’ began to generate debates within the Church at a more sophisticated level.

**Post World War Two shifts in Roman Catholicism**

Since the late 1950s, the Roman Catholic Church tried to become more pluralist in its policies, while the idea of a gulf between world cultures and the damage caused by mistrust between people of different Christian traditions became no longer widely accepted. Hitherto policies of social Catholicism had functioned as forms of protection and isolation from ‘corruptive influences’ in many parts of the world, but other Christian traditions and religions began to acquire ‘global visibility’ (Urry, 2003: 62). The Roman Church’s authority and strategy was put under pressure by new emerging socio-ethical discourses and movements. In modern Catholic social teaching, the concept of globalisation did not appear in any papal encyclical or Conciliar document, even though globalising phenomena began to receive detailed attention from various secular academic disciplines. This may be seen as further elements of the challenge from secularisation and modernity. Yet, the evolution of Church teaching and praxis (content, narrative, practice and doctrine) became influenced by rapid transformations taking place in the secular world.

Robert Nowell (1981), the biographer of Hans Küng, argues that simultaneous global social transformations within the Roman Catholic Church and wider
Christian setting led to a new understanding of the word ‘ecumenical’. Here we can see a detailed account of his contextualised perspective:

For Christians not in communion with Rome there was a happy coincidence between John XXIII’s aims and the new meaning the technical term ‘ecumenical’ had taken on in the non-Catholic world. The [Second Vatican] Council was announced as an ecumenical council, meaning simply a general council representing the Church throughout the inhabited world. But outside the Roman communion the adjective ecumenical had, since the World Missionary Conference held at Edinburgh in 1910 and the coming together of the Life and Work and Faith and Order movements to establish the World Council of Churches in 1948, come to be applied to the striving towards Christian unity that had increasingly marked Christian life in the twentieth century. Consequently, when Pope John XXIII announced the calling of an ‘ecumenical council’ the announcement at once to non-Catholic ears carried overtones of a new and welcome Roman openness to Christian unity even before the Pope explained that this was the compelling motive behind his decision (Nowell, 1981: 83-4).

As Catholic social teaching is not a ‘static’ body of thought, it is regularly required to address newly emerging social, economic, and political phenomena such as globalisation. With the arrival of the papacy of John XXIII in 1958, the Catholic social teaching that informed the global strategy has taken a new, less isolating direction, because he ‘had repudiated the “prophets of gloom” and enabled the Church to confront positively the challenge of modernity’ (Granfield, 1987: 4). As an expert in ecclesiastical history, Owen Chadwick gives a detailed account of Anglican-Catholic relations whereby a noticeable change is to be taken into account:

Pope John XXIII was the first Pope towards whom the hearts of many Protestants warmed. I need not labour the astounding change which he and his Council wrought, almost without expecting it, in the atmosphere of Christendom. In setting up a Council his motive was not Christian unity, but almost at once unity came on the agenda (Chadwick, 1967: 100).
The Roman Church as a whole apparently embarked on a slow journey of transition, however the destination may not be foreseen with any clarity at the moment. For hundreds of years, the Catholic Church successfully advanced worldwide the idea that the ultimate political authority rested with religious representatives of God. The political strategies of medieval secular rulers may have centred on the acquisition of wealth, territory and power, but ‘the Christian world-view transformed the rationale of political action from an earthly to a theological framework; it insisted that the Good lay in submission to God’s will’ (Held, 1992: 81). In practical terms the Church’s location within, and promotion of, ‘two worlds’ meant that there was ‘no alternative’ in medieval Western Europe, no competing ‘political theory’ to Papal theocracy and his anointed Holy Roman Emperor. The integration of Christian Europe came to depend above all on these authorities. Internationally, Europe was conceived as being primarily a Christian society; while its primary political reference was religious doctrine in looking to God for conflict resolution. This perspective was strongly overlaid with assumptions about the universal nature of the global human community.

The emergence of modern society was accompanied by important shifts in patterns of social action. With the advent of Enlightenment, ‘Europe would no longer orientate itself, as in the Renaissance, using antiquity as its model, but rather using autonomous reason, technical progress and ‘the nation’’ (Küng, 2002: 151). The people were moving away from traditional beliefs grounded in superstition, religion and age-old practices. Bringing absolutist authority into examination, through the project and auspices of modernity, meant having to call into question what was obviously understood as sensus fidelium. In traditional societies, religion and established customs largely defined people’s attitudes and values; however modern societies changed by progress and rationalisation of sections of public life produced a different kind of globalising risk (Beck, 1997).

With modernity, or, rather, beginning with the secular narrative of being that started to emerge with it, there appeared a narrative that returned responsibility for destiny to human agency, specifically to the notion of the subject understood as origin of responsibility and free will, able to exercise an unconditioned freedom (Venn, 2000: 82).
How can we explain the functioning of Roman Catholicism in societies and the nature of social change/stability produced? On one hand, *sensus fidelium* was a 'standard' reflection of the community of the faithful, always representing the contemporary social and historical background. It was not essentially the sum total of the spiritual idiosyncrasies of the baptised, rather their manner of affirming the conscience of Church belongingness in response to constantly changing situations. On the other hand, it is also oriented towards any strands of untruth that may permeate certain attitudes, socio-political movements or facile concessions to changing secular values. Gradually, individuals, creatively engaging in rational, instrumental calculations, took into account different system of government, opportunities and future consequences. *Sensus fidelium* is not to be acquired by a majority vote, for there is no element of democracy involved. However if a notable number of faithful speak out for or against a certain opinion or decision, the profound significance of their views may be recognised and their ideas given serious consideration by all those who hold authority or exercise an official teaching role.

Without detaching the Church from traditional ideas about social life, the first positive response to the 1920 appeal of the patriarchate of Constantinople came from Pope John XXIII’s first major encyclical, *Ad Petri Cathedram* of 29th June 1959. Pope John XXIII outlined the ecumenical intentions of the forthcoming Second Vatican Council, with no appeals to previous one-way reunion to the See of Rome but calling for the renewal of the Roman Church as 'an example of truth, unity and love'. It could be seen as unsatisfactory that an official positive answer to the Constantinopolitan appeal came 39 years later. However I argue that this is not a long time considering the bitter debates and lack of communication since the Great Schism of 1054. In an apologetic view an American Roman Catholic theologian believes that:

Catholic ecumenism, as here understood, avoids the oversimplification of extreme positions. It neither canonizes differences by accepting indiscriminate pluralism nor does it seek to obliterate all differences by imposing uniformity. It seeks rather to discern what differences are compatible with the gospel and Catholic unity, and to accept, with
necessary corrections, as much as it can. Catholicism, in this field as in others, works in the tension-filled no-man’s- land in which patient dialogue is required. The practice of such ecumenism is a Catholic imperative because, as Vatican II pointed out, the existing divisions among Christians make it difficult for the Church ‘to express in actual life her full catholicity in all its aspects’ (UR 4) (Dulles, 1985: 82-3).

In 1961, Pope John XXIII issued Encyclical *Mater et Magistra* on social doctrine. He argued for justice regarding property, trade union organisations, rural and urban life, as well as for balance between state regulated activities and the freedom of private individual and group enterprises. For him true prosperity meant not only national wealth but also its just distribution. The encyclical is also noted for its international concerns including the imbalance between wealthy nations and less developed ones, as well as for its call to richer nations to aid the others without attempting political advantage, which could be interpreted as another form of colonialism. In that time of political insecurity, during the Cold War, he argues for ecumenical spirit to replace ‘mutual distrust’.

203. Although this becomes more and more evident each day to individuals and even peoples, men, and especially those with high responsibility in public life, for the most part seem unable to accomplish the two things toward which people aspire. This does not happen because people lack scientific, technical or economic means, but rather because they distrust one other. Indeed, men, and hence States, stand in fear of one another. One country fears lest another is contemplating aggression and lest the other seize an opportunity to put such plans into effect. Accordingly, countries customarily prepare defenses for their cities and homeland, namely armaments to deter other countries from aggression.

204. Consequently, the energies of man and the resources of nature are very widely directed by peoples to destruction rather than to the advantage of the human family, and individual men and entire peoples become so deeply solicitous that they are prevented from undertaking more important roles (John XXIII, Pope cited in Gremillion, 1976: 186-7).
Uncertain socio-political global conditions could not provide a secure basis for the development of a rational, reflexive form of ecumenical dialogue. There were few incentives for developing sophisticated means of ideas exchange, because the Catholic communities (organised in a gemeinschaft model) had only operated within frameworks that emphasised principles of moral consensus and social equilibrium among its members. The Catholic hierarchs believed that only Christian faith reaffirmed people’s adherence to core social values, which in exchange contributed to the maintenance of social cohesion. Furthermore, excessive focus on stability and authoritarian order meant that conflictual perspectives producing divisions became systematically minimised and marginalised.

Thus, even though the Roman church was a worldwide organization, it was at that time not liberally oriented in the sense that it insisted on the exclusive validity of (Roman Catholic) Christianity and saw the source of modern problems in the abandonment of that particularism (Beyer, 1994: 136).

In late modernity societies are ‘increasingly facing problems of multiculturality and polyethnicity’ (Robertson, 1992: 59) and this challenged the Roman Catholic Church on issues of authority, power and relationships of control. New types of interactions created institutions and the renewal of society. According to Beyer (1994), the Roman Church developed social action programmes, which paid greater attention to interaction of its community members and organisational internal structures, while also taking into account the dynamism of external religious and secular agents and new social movements. For example, Solidarity, the Polish trade union movement in the 1980s, is known to have had the full support of the Roman Catholic Church, even if ‘opinions are divided on the question of whether placing Solidarity in a religious frame of meaning provided an adequate basis for the movement’s long-term political strategy’ (Beckford, 2004: 241). The Roman Church became aware of differences between ways of life Catholics in modern societies take to be ‘normal and standard’ and those of other religious or non-religious groups. It understood that although Christians share much in common, there are variations between political configurations,
cultures and societies, sometimes hard to reconcile. Consequently, socio-political secular variations affected relationships between church traditions.

Reconciliation between the East and the West began to emerge with the Joint Catholic-Orthodox Declaration of His Holiness Pope Paul VI and the Ecumenical Patriarch Athenagoras I issued on 7th December 1965 which was read simultaneously in Rome and Istanbul (Constantinople). One day before the official closure of the Second Vatican Council, the mutual excommunications of 1054 were to be declared regrettable, and to be removed from Church memory. However for Christendom, this was a step that has not yet led to the restoration of communion between Rome and Constantinople. As previously stated, in 1054 historical pronouncement of a break of communion with a segment of the universal church had general historical consequences. In such a case, this kind of excommunication affected all the followers and supporters of the bishops or priests specifically excommunicated and anathematised. It is obvious that such an excommunication did not necessarily imply that a simple follower was excluded from the church in direct personal sense. It simply meant that some individuals were excluded from church membership because they were for the time being members of what was considered to be a dissident community. However, in cases of schisms involving no doctrinal issues, the excommunication may be automatically lifted if reconciliation is achieved at the highest hierarchical/institutional level.

The most striking feature of the symbolic construction of the community and its boundaries is its oppositional character. The boundaries are relational rather than absolute; that is they mark community in relation to other communities (Cohen, 2000: 58 original emphases).

This shift in Roman Catholic policy evaluation began in the mid 1960s. The Vatican now re-evaluated the ecumenical movement among those who were historically ‘dissident’ from the Catholic Church. Even though the Roman Catholic Church stood firmly in its ecclesiology of ‘return’, it began to accept the idea of a dialogue-in-fellowship. The challenge offered to the East by the Second Vatican Council did not remain without an answer.
Indeed, the eloquent answer was when Pope Paul VI and the Ecumenical Patriarch Athenagoras embraced in Jerusalem on 5th January 1964. The expression *Sister Churches* was introduced into the dialogue and new stress given to the importance of the common baptism that catholics and orthodox share. This journey witnessed some deeply symbolic expressions of this reality. For this reason Robertson believes that in the global field ' – the Roman Catholic Church – has recently become a particularly effective globe-oriented and politically influential actor across most of the world, claiming mankind to be its major concern' (Robertson, 1992: 81).

In more recent years, one may recall in particular the first pastoral visit Pope John Paul II made to the Orthodox Church in Romania on 7-9 May 1999. He is the first Pope to visit the Orthodox East after the Schism of 1054; therefore this visit has particular significance. On his arrival in Bucharest he declared that:

> It is the first time the divine Providence has offered me the opportunity to make an apostolic visit to a predominantly Orthodox nation and this certainly could not have happened without the willing and fraternal acquiescence of the Holy Synod of the venerable Romanian Orthodox Church and without consent of Your Beatitude [Patriarch Teoctist], with whom tomorrow and on Sunday I will have special long-awaited meetings. At this historic moment, I cannot fail to recall the visit you made to me at the Vatican 10 years ago, showing your firm intention to establish in a free way those friendly ecclesial relations which seemed beneficial to God’s People. I trust that my visit will help heal the wounds inflicted on the relations between our churches in the last 50 years and will open a season of trusting mutual collaboration (Pope John Paul II, 1999: 219).

This historic visit was scrupulously prepared by ecclesiastical diplomacy, overcoming old ‘wounds’. Furthermore, by accepting the invitation of the Romanian Orthodox Patriarchate the Pope legitimated a particular case of European civilisational integration and values harmonisation as a new context of global-human condition permitted (Robertson, 1992).
Thanks to the Christian faith, this country, linked with the memory of Trajan and the Roman world and which by its very name recalls the Roman Empire, but is also marked by Byzantine civilization, down the centuries has become a bridge between the Latin world and Orthodoxy, between Greek civilization and the Slavic peoples (Pope John Paul II, 1999: 220).

These comments may be interpreted as Rome’s recognition and cultural support to the present process of European Union integration. Yet one may understand this statement also as continuation of ‘Eurocentric constructions of world history’ or another ‘ideological celebration of Western culture’ (Holton, 1998: 27), which acknowledges the Orthodox Church in the multidimensional global field (Robertson, 1992), this time as ally rather than contestant. Furthermore, this statement implies that ethno-national religious development is complex and ‘what are taken-for-granted features of everyday life often have very diffuse origins derived or borrowed from many different sources’ (Holton, 1998: 28).

Similarly, the meeting of Pope John Paul II and Archbishop Christodoulou of Athens and All Greece was of special significance. So, too were the words addressed to his brother from Athens:

I wish first of all to express to you the affection and regard of the Church of Rome. Together we share the apostolic faith in Jesus Christ as Lord and Saviour; we have in common the apostolic heritage and the sacramental bond of the Baptism; and therefore we are all members of God’s family, called to serve the one Lord and to proclaim his Gospel to the world. The Second Vatican Council called on Catholics to regard the members of the other Churches “as brothers and sisters” (Unitatis redintegratio, n. 3), and this supernatural bond of brotherhood between the Church of Rome and the Church of Greece is strong and abiding. Certainly, we are burdened by past and present controversies and by enduring misunderstandings. But in a spirit of mutual charity these can and must be overcome, for that is what the Lord asks us. Clearly there is need of a liberating process of purification of memory. For all the occasions past and present, when sons and daughters of the Catholic
Church have sinned by action or omission against their Orthodox brothers and sisters, may the Lord grant us the forgiveness we beg of him (Pope John Paul II, 2001: 62-3).

As this suggests, discourses of religious integration could be viewed as a positive element for the revitalisation of ecumenism, creating an environment more plural, democratic and multicultural. In this sense a revitalised religious globalisation challenges the hegemony of secular culture, which is believed to aim at producing and maintaining a homogenous cultural lifestyle. While searching for spiritual commonalities, I argue that this global trend becomes a new creative platform on which hitherto marginalised, silenced and separated discourses become noticeable in the religious field. For example, the visits of Pope John Paul II to Eastern Orthodox Churches prove that the Roman Catholic Church is reassessing its West-centric ecclesiology by searching for new allies and support. Civilisational distinctiveness is celebrated, while simultaneously, ‘claiming mankind to be its major concern’ (Robertson, 1992: 81), is also high on the agenda.

It may also be arguable that through its recent openness towards the Orthodox East, an intellectual hierarchical elite becomes increasingly aware that global society is itself constituted through a multilayered and multicentred process (Holton, 1998), though the word ‘globalisation’ is not used. In particular the contemporary Roman Catholic Church is increasingly evaluating its development aware of new globalising socio-ethical dimensions (Urry, 2003: 45). For them, globalised ecumenism has not resulted in homogenisation but has developed discourses in a dynamic fashion, giving rise to significant diversity and multipolarity, in a new context and historical reality.

Through the encounter with the Eastern Orthodox we see how the responses to the global can take different forms, bypassing the discourse of re-assertion and denial. Through openness and a restorative dialogue initiative the Roman Church is engaging in a discourse that promotes global and transnational dialogue between particular Churches. In this dynamic the Roman Church discovers that the result of ecumenical negotiations has creative potential for generating cultural and religious renewal. In these particular cases Orthodox responses really matter for the way the global religious dialogue develops, just as a globalising ecumenical
perspective matters for the manner in which local religious groups eventually transform in the process of dialogue. Here I argue that greater global cultural responsiveness can be regarded as a profound process that has shaped the structural framework within which diverse religious reflections interact and develop, in our particular case the Orthodox Church position.

The Eastern schisms happened gradually, through a series of misunderstandings about terms, and they will be healed gradually, as Rome comes to understand that she cannot impose her kind of Latin scholasticism as the only standard whereby orthodoxy can be judged. This involves a new look at theological differences between East and West, as well as those approaches to the incarnation that used to be called Antiochene and Alexandrian, but might better be called Babylonian and Egyptian, or East and West Syrian’ (Every, 1980: 107).

In the meantime, Catholic cultural patterns, as manifested in the explicit conduct of every day affairs, as the implicit construction of symbolic meaning for individuals, has the potential of being extended by globalisation’s impacts and Orthodox indigenous responses. In this connection, Robertson’s (1992) view that globalisation is both an objective process of the compression of the entire world and a subjective process of the intensification of the consciousness of the world as a whole remains useful.

I argue that the Roman Catholic Church experiences an increase in global interdependence (Urry, 2003) along with awareness of that interdependence. This is due to the development of certain ‘global characteristics’ whereby ‘people, cultures, societies, and civilizations previously more or less isolated from one another are now in regular and almost unavoidable contact’ (Beyer, 1994: 2). For this reason engagement in ecumenical dialogue and its essential character is actually the rise and expansion of Catholic consciousness of the global situation and of the world as a religious field in which many actors participate.

Reforming Catholic theologian Yves Congar, argues that the Roman Church since mid 1960s encountered new phenomena whereby it was forced to rethink strategy relating to dialogue, principles of ecumenical work and disposition towards
human understanding. Congar (1966) encapsulates the paradigm shift the Roman Church is facing, at institutional level.

One can begin to realize to how deep a conversion ecumenism calls Christians, including theologians. A conversion is a fresh cross-examination of oneself, an inquiry into one’s whole way of life. Sometimes it is something more, a questioning and a change of the very principles of one’s existence. Ecumenism looks for the form of conversion which consists in this sort of self-interrogation and the refinement of one’s views in contact with others. It does not require any lack of faith or involve any sinister liberalism bordering upon dogmatic scepticism. On the contrary, it demands greater and more exacting faith. It deflects no one from what he professes to hold as absolute since the sovereign ‘absolute’ is common to all in principle. The horizontal movement of dialogue leads each participant back to the vertical trajectory of his principles which he is now called upon to re-examine and to respect more deeply’ (Congar, 1966: 64-5, original emphasis).

The visits Pope John Paul II made to some Orthodox Churches in Eastern Europe may be symbolically interpreted as a restorative gesture about to begin a new era between West-East relations. Paradoxically, we notice a voluntaristic pattern of ecumenical adherence, a beginning of dedication to dialogue risen from social obligation and even a new type of civic commitment. Since the 1990’s, the Roman Catholic Church becomes increasingly aware of the rapid pace of social change and the deepening of global reality. It cannot separate local actions from the larger social settings and networks that extend around the globe. The religious diversity we have become accustomed to seeing in the WCC depends on socio-political ties that link churches and believers around the world. They also reflect large scale processes of social change – processes of religious/cultural nature that have drawn different churches into interrelation with one another.

The Roman Church is opening to dialogue with a broader range of cultures and peoples. These patterns of global dialogues produce new culturally diverse perspectives. Globalisation is changing the way the Roman Catholic Church looks at ecumenism, and also the way the Orthodox look at them. By adopting a
global outlook, the Roman Church became more aware of its connections to other churches. The Roman Church developed also a consciousness of the many problems most Christian churches face at the bridge between the millennia. The global perspective opened the Roman Church to new ecumenical opportunities.

With the fall of Communism in most Eastern European countries, Orthodox Churches are no longer politically isolated from the wider religious community. The Roman Catholic Church also took advantage of this development which meant the end to the system which existed during the Cold War, when countries of the ‘First World’ including Vatican, stood apart from those of the ‘Second World’, behind the ‘Iron Curtain’. The partial collapse of communism has hastened processes of religious globalisation and ecumenical dialogue. Centrally planned ideologies, atheism and cultural control of communist political authorities were ultimately unable to survive in an era of global communication and an integrated religious ecumenical discourse.

For the Roman Catholic Church, the official recognition of the word and concept of ‘globalisation’ is rather late. In 2001, in its Seventh Plenary Session, The Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences considered in its study Globalization Ethical and Institutional Concerns that globalisation appears dynamic, with the great increase in pace, scope and profoundness of change compared with prior systems. For the Pontifical Academy globalisation is not following a single path. Furthermore, religious globalisation is not a unitary element but instead is made up of a number of conflicting and contradictory components. For this motive they cannot propose an old-fashioned extensive theory, or at least not a straightforward, unidirectional grand narrative. Nevertheless, as the Vatican’s discourses are increasingly challenged in the First World by secularising trends, its focus shifted towards the Third World, socio-economically underdeveloped and politically unstable.

**Roman Catholic cosmopolitanisms**

Urry argues that ‘cosmopolitanism has come to develop as a new emergent fluid of global ordering’ (Urry, 2003: 138). Meanwhile, for Delanty, a ‘cosmopolitan community represents a new level of community, allowing cultural, political and
local themes to resonate in a new key and unhindered by the constraints of space and time' (2004: 151). Following Delanty’s argument, if ecumenism is globally organised and based on a world consciousness, as an objective and model, then in what sense does the present Roman Catholic ecumenism point towards a transnational community?

A key question here is whether the Roman Church is renouncing its ‘parochial cosmopolitanism’ by moving towards a new dimension that is liberating intellectual discourse from previous traditionalist styles of thinking. I argue that a shift from ‘parochial cosmopolitanism’ to an incipient form of ‘ecumenical cosmopolitanism’ is slowly noticeable, even if the Roman Church is far from incorporating egalitarian principles in dialogue with Christian Churches worldwide. This is evident in the various forms of inter-faith dialogue discussed above. These may be seen as unprecedented forms of network building, especially in the new vision of openness towards the Christian East. Thus, following Held et al (2005) we may ask, how is Rome seeking to replace the central role of polis inherited from ancient political structures with that of cosmos in which Churches might live in harmony? As we witness forging and strengthening of new alliances, in October 2002, the Patriarch of the Romanian Orthodox Church returned the Pope’s visit to Bucharest. Patriarch Teoctist of Romania, argued while delivering his homily in the Vatican that:

The ecumenical movement for the recovery of Christian unity, for the reconciliation of the Churches separated from one another was, at the start, a movement of penance, of metanoia, of the recognition of Christian responsibility for the two great world wars, which our Churches were not able to prevent and in which a great multitude of Christians of all the historical churches took part (Teoctist, Patriarch of Romania, 2002).

Patriarch Teoctist’s vision emphasises the lack of power and influence of a divided Christendom operating in an increasingly global political environment. ‘The two great world wars’ are an aspect of globalisation which largely portray religious/spiritual failure. For him, in its incipient phase of the ecumenical dialogue, internal contrition is indispensable if solutions are to be found to the harmful conflicts and tensions that cause worldwide societal damage.
Furthermore, he argues that, in a second phase, in face of hostile political marginalisation and secularising trends, the ecumenical project needed to be continued. Taking in consideration that the Communist challenge lost its impetus in most Eastern European countries; the Patriarch suggests that *rapprochement* should be built on doctrinal research and joint social programmes. In order to achieve this new global order, the churches will have to recognise that their local and national interests can only be served by acting collectively in larger groupings. The challenge is to sustain constructive forms of local Christian identity at the same time as participating in larger international groupings and institutions, an alternative to the danger of volatile local conflicts.

Now that the churches of Central and Eastern Europe have more freedom to preach the love of Christ for human beings, our work of reconciliation between churches and the rebuilding of Christian unity must be intensified on the basis of theological dialogue concerning the truth of our common faith, and on the basis of cooperation, in alleviating human suffering, in defence of the holy gift of life and of human dignity, in a world that is fragmented and agitated (Teoctist, Patriarch of Romania, 2002).

In this case study we refer specifically to the attitude towards the Orthodox Church, taking into account the major conceptual transformation undertaken with such intensity in a relative short period of time. It appears that the Catholic Church is trying to overcome the difficulties of enlarging the discourse of openness and inclusivity by extending its discourse of universalism built on a new understanding of cosmopolitanism.

How is the Catholic Church going to overcome cultural exclusivity through engagement in dialogue with the Orthodox East? The answer is complex. Historically, a common geo-political Orthodox perspective was united in combat against the Ottoman Empire. Sometimes the Orthodox blamed the Roman Church of imperialism as exploiting a difficult position in their own interest.

The Crusades did much to antagonize the two culturally distinct civilizations of the East and the West. And when the papacy, shaken by the Great Western Schism, and Byzantium, threatened by the Turks,
finally agreed to hold a union council at Florence, it was too late to create the atmosphere of mutual respect and trust which alone would have permitted an authentic theological dialogue (Meyendorff, 1974: 101).

However, one may not overlook that some hierarchs and intellectuals think that doctrinal differences between Catholicism and Orthodoxy are relatively small, and that removal of the baggage of historical disputes is becoming an urgent matter. Rome is aware of the existence of a large number of people belonging to institutionalised Eastern Churches who cannot be ignored in a globalised context. Catholic cosmopolitanism had to overcome past and present national chauvinist ideas of the European dimension previously discussed in this chapter. It becomes evident that sophistication and refinement are essential qualities when ecclesiastical diplomacy is going to play a major role in Christian integration. The institutional Roman Church purposefully is trying to avoid any recollection of her historical anti-ecumenical role. A major policy shift occurred after the Second Vatican Council. The Roman Church understood that it is highly recommended that the institutional Church gain an ecumenical profile and cast off her ‘infallible’ historical and cultural bonds through doctrinal reinterpretation.

We witness a cultural shift whereby ‘both ideas and practices that have in common the function of providing meaning and identity for social actors and which combine cognitive, expressive, and evaluative elements’ (Holton, 1998: 162) are developing a new connotation. A new meaning of cultural/religious reconciliation as it never happened before leading towards symbiotic relationships. Indeed the new focal point of cultural reality rests on the idea of co-existence. The emergence of a new cosmopolitan culture as the offspring of cultural interaction whereby mutual interpenetration coexists with locally influenced Christian traditions.

In was in the United States, after the Second Vatican Council, that Catholics and Orthodox initiated their first bilateral dialogue in modern history which established joint committees and theological consultations. While the Roman Church began to explore ecumenical horizons in a new organisational climate, on the Greek Orthodox side, this remarkable cooperation was possible due to Archbishop Iakovos Coucouzis who led the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of

It is not surprising that such contact should come first in the United States, a land of immigrants, far from traditional homelands of both Catholicism and Orthodoxy. Despite an obvious disparity in numbers (there are approximately sixty million Catholics in the United States compared to perhaps four million Orthodox), Catholics and Orthodox meet and share the challenges of this pluralistic society on an equal footing. As Archbishop Iakovos reflected in an early meeting of the Consultation, “Here we can conduct the dialogue free of the national pressures which would first have to be overcome in overwhelmingly Catholic countries like Spain or Italy or in a predominantly Orthodox country like Greece” (Borelli and Erickson, 1996: 21).

For the Greek Archbishop, the Diasporic context of being distanced from Europe creates opportunities for reflexivity and dialogue which transcend parochial ethno-nationalisms. This socio-political environment in the New World created opportunities for impartiality and a reconciliatory approach previously unusual to both Church traditions. The American religious landscape is characterised as being ‘pluralistic and constantly evolving, expressed in a kaleidoscopic series of revivals and awakenings rather than a single-state religion that could become ossified’ (Putnam, 2000: 66). Furthermore, pastoral care for mixed Orthodox-Catholic marriages and the spiritual formation of children born from these marriages ‘presents a number of practical and theological problems’ (Borelli and Erickson, 1996: 194). Thus, four successive joint agreements of the Theological Consultation in 1971, 1974, 1978 and 1980 led to the formation in 1986 of a common platform entitled Agreed Statement on Orthodox-Roman Catholic Marriages.

The Roman Church has also become aware that ecumenism is no longer a utopian discourse. Especially through the Internet, ecumenical material is globally
accessible and its drive has the potential of becoming a map of worldwide religious relations. The ecumenical movement increasingly becomes a networked place, which can no longer be ignored. For example the World Council of Churches achieved global ecumenical recognition on issues of environment, justice and peace (Beyer, 1994). Similarly, continental structures such as All Africa Council of Churches, Christian Conference of Asia, Caribbean Conference of Churches, Conference of European Churches, Latin America Council of Churches, Middle East Council of Churches, Pacific Conference of Churches and the National Council of Churches USA, include a variety of Protestant, Anglican and Orthodox faith groups in cooperation. Organising personal and institutional networks, through sharing information, expertise, ideas, resources and responsibilities, facilitates various forms of capacity building. For Putnam 'ecumenical religious organizations' are outward looking networks which generate 'social capital' by bonding various groups and individuals through 'specific reciprocity and mobilizing solidarity' (2000: 22).

This global interconnectedness between national churches is replaced by a 'cosmopolitan society' in which political and cultural boundaries are fluid as people 'increasingly love and marry, as well as shop and work internationally' (Holton, 2002: 155). Diversity is not necessary division. Accelerated exchange of information about cultural and religious practices has resulted in the crystallisation of a new discourse – a culture that is shared by citizens of new globally constructed ecumenical communities in which the Roman Church is becoming an active player.

Simultaneously with this [aggiornamento] process of Vatican centralization and Romanization of Catholicism, however, there has taken place a parallel process of internationalization of the Roman administrative structures and of globalization of Catholicism as a religious regime. The Roman Catholic Church has ceased being a predominantly Roman and European institution. Along with the demographic increase in Catholic population from 100 million in 1900 to 600 million in 1960 and to close to one billion in 1990, there has been a notable displacement of the Catholic population from the Old to the New World and from North to South (Casanova, 1997: 135).
The inter-church documents on mixed marriages provide evidence that ecumenical ideals are continuously used as a medium to communicate local, ethnic, religious and national cultures to a global audience. This could potentially ease tension between proponents of a cosmopolitan lifestyle and proponents of local traditions. Thus ecumenism could be an opportunity to gain access to knowledge and traditions around the world in an unprecedented manner, and a medium that promotes information exchange, cultural interaction, tolerance and understanding towards foreign cultures and traditions, which could generate a real feeling of togetherness.

Here, the ecumenical movement is playing an integral part in cultural interaction and cosmopolitanism and as a maintainer and protector of cultural/religious networks and identities. It is perceived that globalisation of ecumenism carries risks, threats, and disadvantages as well as benefits, advantages, and enlargement of possibilities. Ecumenical culture and cross-border, inter-societal relations represent one of the main thrusts in the global-local nexus. If it is true that ecumenism has facilitated and accelerated cultural and religious interaction, does it also mean that there is an emerging cosmopolitan culture within the Roman Church?

For this reason it is necessary to address the process of socialisation or acquisition of cultural patterns and practices in order to measure the cultural impact of the ecumenical movement and globalisation as well as the intensity of religious transformation. On such basis, ecumenism is certainly affected by globalisation and technological advancement, which have opened new windows to the world: windows through which we can see the aim of unity. The tidal wave of globalisation, cultural interaction and ecumenism facilitated by technological advancement has swept throughout the world transforming the cultures of traditional societies. We are witnessing a global cultural oecumenē – a region of persistent cultural interaction and transformation – in which the Roman Church became an active player. So, is ecumenism a medium of interaction and interpenetration between universalism and particularism? And how far does this global nexus reflect the tension between cultural homogenisation and the creation
of a cosmopolitan perspective and cultural heterogenisation and preservation of distinctive religious identities?

For the Roman Church, by and large religious dialogue through ecclesiastical diplomacy became a complex institution that is being torn – in a global age – between centrifugal and centripetal forces. In the latter circumstance, under the influence of globalisation, ecumenism would facilitate cultural homogenisation and the formation of a global society that dissolves the differences, whilst in the former circumstance, under the influence of ethno-nationalistic fundamental movements and fear of identity loss, works to reject or mitigate the impact of globalisation by protecting and preserving local cultural/religious identities.

In this debate globalisation may be seen as undermining cultural barriers through flows of cultural religious values; however it also triggered new trends of localisation, which aim at preventing religious distinctiveness and diversity. However, assessing the impact of globalisation on the Roman Catholic Church within the cultural domain remains problematic. There are several conflicting theses about the emergence of a global ecumene with a unified culture, cultural/religious polarisation, and cultural hybridisation. Both the Roman Catholic and Orthodox traditions do not recommend marriage outside their traditions, in order to avoid ‘religious indifferentism’. For example the U.S. Roman Catholic - Orthodox Theological Consultation agreed in 1971 that

Each partner should be reminded of the obligation to respect the religious convictions and practice of the other and mutually to support and encourage the other in growing into the fullness of the Christian life (Borelli and Erickson, 1996: 199).

I argue that the proliferation and spread of suprateritoriality (Scholte, 2005) has given Christians unprecedented shared orientation while being influenced by global organisations and symbols. In turn this generates a feeling of the ‘other’, with an intensity and reciprocity unprecedentedly felt. The ecumenical world in late modernity or post modernity requires cultural convergence and the increasing density of communication is leading to a rising interconnection of a larger number of people of various traditions. Exclusivity is not to be considered protected
against external influences, this leading to formation of a global religious environment in continual interaction and negotiation.

Robertson (1992) acknowledges that the cultures of particular societies are an outcome of their interaction with other societies in the global system, and by the same process of interaction between national societies distinctive global culture is partly created (Holton, 1998). Ecumenism is forging connections across Church traditions; however, the Roman Church remains doubtful in participating in global ecumenism. For this reason, the homogenisation thesis (which associates globalisation with Westernisation) is again under scrutiny. The Roman Catholic Church, while expanding its bilateral dialogue with the Eastern Orthodox and various Protestant churches, still refuses to become a full member of the World Council of Churches. There are objections of doctrinal nature, such as infallibility and ecclesiological privileges of internal organisational structure which include centralisation. Also, in the event of a possible participation, achieving a balanced numerical representation should not be underestimated as the Roman Catholics are by far the largest church tradition. These issues continue to be debated within the Joint Working Group, an organisation established in 1965 after the Second Vatican Council as the principal official organisation and link between the Roman Catholic Church/Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity and the World Council of Churches. Even if there are significant Catholic reservations to multilateral dialogue, in 2005 in a communiqué issued by the Joint Working Group simultaneously in Rome and Geneva on its 40 anniversary it was mentioned that:

The task of the Joint Working Group has been one of providing a common witness to the enduring commitment of the two parent bodies to cooperate in pursuing a common ecumenical vision. The Working Group, which was originally intended to be provisional, may not be the only possible alternative to membership of the Roman Catholic Church in the World Council of Churches, but in a historical reality since the Second Vatican Council, it has proved to be an effective expression of the desire of both parties for an ongoing collaboration and partnership (Joint Working Group, 2005).
The Roman Catholic cultural cosmopolitanism is envisaged as the self-presentation of the dominant particular. In this particular circumstance it is the hegemonic sweep at which certain particularities try to dominate the whole scene, to mobilise the technology and to incorporate a variety of more particular identities. In a sense it is another way of controlled cultural expansion, this time expressed in cyberspace through Internet by constantly updating websites. Paradoxically, as Roman Catholics continue to 'rediscover' the Orthodox traditions, they find in their own spirituality, a way into the ancient traditions of spiritual direction different from those that they know today. Thus, besides restoring spiritual networks, globalisation may also lead to new forms of locality (Bauman, 1999: 2).

The Roman Church is aware that its existence in the Christian world is becoming more and more a 'global parish' while at the same time is witnessing a vigorous 'clash of civilisations' (Huntington, 1996), ethno-national and tribal often violent identity claims (Barber, 1996) with religious components, manipulated by powerful leaders. For the Roman Church, the task at hand implies facilitating and supporting common witness, mission, evangelism and church renewal; communication with other ecumenical organisations, but also the application of common service of human need, the breaking down of barriers between people, and the promotion of one human family in justice and peace (Küng, 1997).

Conclusion

While globalising processes facilitate growing pluralist, multi-ethnic and multi-religious societies, it is impossible to ask for Christian unity without responsible socio-political involvement. There is increasing pressure on the institutional Roman Church to take into account the plurality of ecumenical movements and continuous interaction with various faith traditions. As far as the present European context is concerned it is seen as an imperative for mutual strength of the three Christian traditions concerned. These traditions are bound to one another by their geographical origin, by their rich common heritage and experience, by their painful historical rivalries and truth-claims with regard to true adoration of God and moral righteousness of humankind.
However, in spite of all these attractive principles, Christianity still does not have a generally accepted view on the relations between Church and State, Church and Nation and the role of ethnic and cultural identity. The ecumenical movement remains divided and flexible on these issues, just as ‘globalization does not overwhelm nation-states and destroy cultural differences based on ethnicity or some kind of cultural affiliation’ (Holton, 1998: 186). When it comes to theoretical reflection on the complex and intertwined relations of the human and religious forms of community we may summarise that various positions exposed above do not reach agreement. While assessing the globalisation of Catholicism it is noticeable that ‘in the last decades there has been a remarkable increase in transnational Catholic networks and exchanges of all kinds that crisscross nations and world religions, often bypassing Rome’ (Casanova, 1997: 135). However, in the global age of uncertainty (Robertson, 1992), if Christian ecumenism is transnational, based on an inclusive understanding, it may become a stabilising and conflict preventing factor in forging the new world networked society that may guarantee its own international solidarity. This may help foster East-West reconciliatory networks without which the world remains divided.

In this Chapter I argue that the Vatican aggiornamento trend of the 1960s altered radically the traditional Catholic position by engaging with some discourses of the modern secular world. In its temporal dimension, the legitimacy of the modern age entails the acceptance of the principle of historicity, the continuous revelation of God’s plans of salvation in and through history, and thus the church’s obligation to discern the signs of the times. In its spatial dimension this procedure of internal secularisation entails an inner-worldly reorientation. Action on behalf of peace and justice and participation in the transformation of the world (including global ecumenism) became a constitutive dimension of the Roman Catholic Church’s mission. This historicist reorientation led Catholicism to embrace a more progressive view. Considering that traditional Catholicism had been characterised by a negative philosophy of history (including ecumenical engagement), which viewed the modern age as a concatenation of related heresies from Protestantism to atheist communism, this new attitude is remarkable.

This Chapter has a strategic significance focussing both on why Roman Catholicism remained traditionally opposed to ecumenism for most of its
existence, as well as why it had to change its perspective with a new political understanding of global phenomena. There is evidence to suggest that Roman Catholic ecumenism, in a cosmopolitan context of rapid social change, develops forms of social capital and networks (Putnam, 2000) which transcend localism and parochialism (Holton, 2002). The rapprochement initiated by the United States Orthodox-Catholic Theological Consultation generates new forms of ecumenical cosmopolitanism which potentially could overcome old European politico-theological divisions. However refusal to join WCC sets limits to the institutional integration of Catholicism into ecumenical dialogue.
Chapter 7: Concluding Reflections

The purpose of this thesis has been to investigate the association between globalisation and ecumenism. I critically examined how new expressions of communion and rapprochement between various Christian traditions began to institutionally acknowledge their politico-religious coexistence in the global field (Robertson, 1992). Thus, the thesis developed frameworks for understanding emerging religious collaboration around ecclesial diversity in the context of global interdependencies.

In this Chapter we review briefly our sociological exploration on how the historical engagement of ecumenism developed a globalising pattern as distinct from an arrangement of various local, national or regional movements. Historically, Christian churches have been agents of ideas and ethical norms crossing barriers of geography, language and culture. Like any social actors, religious organisations and ecumenical institutions remain affected by globalisation as well as contributing to it. A key part of this complexity (Urry, 2003) is reflected in the creation of various ecumenical institutions that are global in reach but local in relevance and sensitivity. This study is intended as a sociological analysis of interconnections between globalisation and various ecumenical movements.

Chapter 1 argued that various ecumenical values and ideas revealed in this thesis are researched by employing sociological hermeneutics and the Verstehen method. By tracing the history of the ecumenical movement, I revealed how interactions between various Church traditions recorded in documents and historical studies became sources for the further extension of ecumenism. The historical analysis of Protestant, Orthodox and Roman Catholic ecumenisms has been used in an exploratory way to shed light on issues of rapprochement mainly in the period of the 20th century. Use of historical data on ecumenical trends allows sociologists to focus on processes that are largely unknown to most analysts of cultural globalisation (Beckford, 2003). This study is geared, from a methodological point of view, to the analysis of ecumenical engagements that took place within the institutionalised hierarchies (Evans, 1996) of three major Christian trends. The Weberian method of historical analysis helps us bridge the
macro-micro divide between structural arguments about various ecumenical associations and Christian religious trends across various politico-cultural boundaries. Additional research of this type is necessary before further answers about global ecumenism can be detailed.

In Chapter 2 the discussion moved towards the theoretical investigation of the ecumenical movement and its raison d'être. However, if the growth of ecumenical endeavour is part of the same process as the creation of global consciousness (Robertson, 1992), then we also witness regressive anti-ecumenical trends analogous to anti-globalisation movements. In particular, what are perceived to be corrosive and authoritarian forms of globalisation remain contested by anti-ecumenists. The obstacles to ecumenism can not remain underestimated. Dialogue also becomes a new social experience which at times is refuted for various reasons. Ecumenists are accused by some feminist theologians for supporting the status quo of a patriarchal Christianity (King, 1998). For these feminists, traditional forms of Christianity perpetuate conservative cultural biases, which reinforce present structures (Daly, 1973).

Religious conflicts caused by polarising fundamentalist values between denominations continue to generate uncertainties (Barber, 1996). Supporters of denominationalist tendencies dispute the merits of negotiation processes with the scope to unify various Church bodies, considering that local/traditional faithfulness and religious orthodoxies could become diluted within a cosmopolitan global context. Similarly, ethno-nationalist circles with strong territorial agenda imply a betrayal by ecumenical intellectual elites, of their secular loyalties to the institutions of the nation state. Fear of identity loss and fundamentalist reactions (Eisenstadt, 1999) are elements that make associations of global religious actors, especially in institutional form, feel uncomfortable. Turner’s assertion that ‘there seems little possibility of global ecumenism on a fundamentalist basis’ (1994: 77) is significant to this debate.

Furthermore, while some argue that ecumenism is an elitist project of clerical leaders, it is also worth considering that lay people may also have influenced ecumenical engagement through the reception of the arguments concerned. This is somewhat easier to demonstrate for Protestant ecumenism than the other two
traditions. Given the primarily historical focus of this study of comparative ecumenics, research on contemporary networks among lay people has not been developed though this could be done in future work. It might appear reasonable to assume that the emergence of ecumenical conditions would create a basis for some individuals and groups to develop powerful associative networks; however, an unequivocal development of such trends remains doubtful. This is consistent with the idea that ecumenism has been more top-down than bottom-up. At present, in contrast to Wilson’s (1990) assessment, Christians are not ready to renounce their core ecclesial uniqueness in favour of hyphenated identities or corporative style merger, even if they face similar challenges from a variety of global secular discourses which dispute both the Western and Eastern universal structures of religious meaning. Nevertheless, world-wide Christian ecumenical goals support a revitalised religious globalisation challenging secular culture.

While for some ecumenism generates consensus and for others disagreement, it is noticeable that the fears of betraying confessional integrity continue to be salient due to ‘the enormous difficulties that lie in the way of this vision, including the extremely fragile sense of inter-cultural trust and cosmopolitan solidarity in the contemporary world’ (Holton, 2005: 192). On the one hand some Christian leaders continue to seek uniting policy reforms, while on the other hand, the anti-ecumenists point to the difficulties that lie in the way of the ecumenical utopian vision, including the fragile sense of politico-cultural rapprochement and cosmopolitan cohesion. Thus, in the face of separatist and isolationist tendencies, we should neither expect the development of new ecumenical arrangements to be simple manifestations of a progressist trend nor that sustainable ecumenical projects would be conflict-free. While ecumenism may bring hope to many, to some it brings suspicion and mistrust.

In Chapter 3 we witness how in certain historical periods the Protestant, Orthodox and the Roman Catholic churches show a tendency for co-operation, while at certain times their search for unity is less desired. Political factors, we have argued, often play a role here. Thus, much of the evidence in this thesis suggests that there are multidimensional ecumenisms with permeable boundaries moving through a series of transitions.
Glocalisation is a useful concept for understanding the accommodation of global politico-religious influences to localised conditions (Robertson, 1992). This approach defines a world of phenomena that are simultaneously global and local. Ecumenism is particularly relevant in this debate. Local dialogue between various churches can not be entirely dominated by global administrative structures. Meanwhile, the idea of attaining global unity remains a key element for most local church traditions. This supports the institutionalised global which in turn remains receptive to the principle of unity in diversity if harmony is desired. While having a global trend, the ecumenical movement does not necessarily lead towards a hegemonic homogenising condition. Ecumenism does not demand global religious uniformity.

While the ecumenical debate within the global context remains under-explored, evidence from the ecumenisms researched offers a way of testing Robertson’s (1992) arguments about the periodisation of globalisation and enables us to identify significant limits to its accuracy. Nevertheless, global consciousness is especially significant for the accomplishment of the ecumenical project because it ‘carries reflexive connotations’ (ibid.: 183). This consciousness gives the opportunity to create new configurations of meaning in the global field, which are sometimes ambiguous (Beckford, 2000: 180). Thus, with the arrival of modern ecumenism the original understanding of Tönnies’ differentiation between *gemeinschaft* and *gesellschaft* type communities became blurred. An ecumenical setting needs both types of communities simultaneously locally as well as globally. By transcending the dichotomy between *gemeinschaft* and *gesellschaft* type communities, the ecumenical movement hopes to achieve a *koinonia* of harmonised glocal traditions and networks. While ecumenical institutions try to facilitate the restoration of communitarian unity, simultaneously communities necessitate institutional support to mediate their reconciliation. In order to achieve their *gemeinschaft* type of global unity and oneness of faith, the three Christian Churches examined in this thesis require unconditional *gesellschaft* type institutional support from various individuals and networks, both inside and outside their own traditions. In turn these socio-religious phenomena and interactions develop ‘new expressions of community’ (Delanty, 2004: 149) which also need to critically employ new techniques for rigorous sociological analysis.

In search for interpretation of social change in the global religious ecumene,
sociology requires awareness of both cross-national and cross-cultural perspectives (Beyer, 2003, 2004).

While Robertson (1993) has argued that the separation of religion from broader conceptions of culture is largely a problem of modernity, for Beckford (2000: 167) this may be summarised by the idea that ‘the very practice of constructing ‘religion’ as a sociological category is part of a long-term process leading to globalization’. These formulations however are at a very high level of generality as some religious movements have a global stretch, but are far from ecumenical. Through resource mobilisation, their aspiration to acquire global meaning is significant, however, due to their exclusivist trends, the overall political impact remains at times marginal. Religious differences continue to remain relevant, even if global integration is sometimes overrated.

As we already discussed, from a global perspective, ecumenism is a movement sensitive to complex diversities and pluralist discourses. If globalisation is scrutinised in terms of ecumenical discourses, a different representation emerges. In terms of conflict resolution, peace and reconciliation, the ecumenical movement gains credibility mainly when it receives legitimation from socio-political actors (Küng, 1991). In order to develop feasibility, ecumenical advances need both local and worldwide socio-political support from various State structures and nongovernmental organisations.

Occasionally, lack of ecumenical eagerness is a preference due to Church internal arrangements and not to external politico-secular pressures. For some Churches, professing fundamentalist tendencies (Beyer, 1994), ecumenism is being regarded as a movement based on possibly centralised, powerful and dominating ecclesiastical institutions and super-structures, which cannot faithfully represent their interests. They consider themselves alienated by the WCC agenda and consider that faithful preservation of their own heritage and identity is at risk from various heterodox influences. What may be perceived as universalistic values with homogenising tendencies are rejected.

If for Bauman (1999) non-participant actors in the global game remained marginalised and isolated, we noticed that in following their self-centred agenda,
some Church traditions at times independently opt for non-cooperation and separatist actions. Contrary to Bauman’s (ibid.) assertion, this research has shown that local resistance to global trends remained robust when it was claimed that diversification, syncretism and multiple choices weaken traditional identities. Empirical evidence suggests that homogenising forces are not unstoppable (Holton, 2000), even if they successfully use the organisational and technological means provided by global communication (Beckford, 2000).

For Beyer (1994), the sociological dialogue between religion and globalisation has mostly focused on the association between globalisation and ideological orientation of various religious groups. Within an integrative global context, religion is multidimensional. Awareness of semantic differentiations and historical development ‘which points to the possibility of a globally extended institutional system of religion’ (Beyer, 2003: 166) is crucial. He scrupulously analyses some of the politically relevant matters in understanding the profile of religion, ‘very often an operative social category’ (2004: 430), through the perspective of theories of cultural globalisation. Likewise, various degrees of ecumenism differ in intensity and time span. Beyer’s (1994) reflexive analysis of several historical socio-cultural particularisms is significant. For us particular events such as the World Missionary Conference in Edinburgh 1910, the Encyclical of the Ecumenical Patriarch calling for a League of Churches in 1920, the establishment of World Council of Churches in Amsterdam 1948, and the Second Vatican Council are crucial events on the global ecumenical agenda.

For example, powerful religious identities could generate diverging trajectories of Islamic political thought, practices and institutions salient in global cultural disputes. Radical political forces undermining religious flexibilities underline incompatibilities which are emphasised by some as ‘clash of civilisations’ (Huntington, 1996). If some States demand a unifying religious ideology as an integrative part of their structures, the main religious bodies inhabiting that particular State are also tempted to use temporal power to maintain their monopolistic claims. Even if some Islamic or Communist totalitarian States, significant players within a global and regional context, may apparently ‘protect’ the religious institutions of the majority, or undemocratic regimes favour particular religious denominations from various ‘foreign intrusions’, partisan and
protectionist attitudes do little in promoting ecumenical co-operation. There is apprehension between institutional centralisation and the movement for spiritual freedom. We are reminded that there will always be minority pilgrims, individuals or groups, who seek to escape national monopolistic religious bodies if they consider themselves persecuted by having their aspirations denied.

In Part Two I focused on three ecumenical traditions – Protestant, Orthodox and Roman Catholic, and explored how the ecumenical movement is an enterprise within which politico-cultural factors are also important, beside the traditional religious ones. Why did Christian Orthodoxy become involved in a movement largely originated by Protestantism while the Roman Catholic Church retained prolonged reservations? The case studies researched show that, rather than one ecumenical movement we may think instead in terms of multiple ecumenisms, each with distinctive coherence and agenda, challenging both Eurocentric perspectives and traditional conflictive relationships over mechanisms of discursive religious integration.

The gathering of the Edinburgh World Missionary Conference in 1910 indicated the emergence of global Protestant ecumenism. After the First World War and following the development of the League of Nations, the Orthodox Church officially launched itself in the quest for unity. The Roman Catholic Church openly joined this debate only in the 1960's. This chronology suggests that the emergence of a global vision in search for unity for each Church tradition arises in somewhat different social and historical contexts. In this dissertation an attempt was made to clarify the salient context for each of the three case-studies researched.

The substantive findings of this thesis provide several insights into issues of ecumenism in an epoch of fast global socio-political transition. Firstly, the colonial enterprise was a major element in the development of Protestant ecumenism, raising as it did the issue of global cultural diversity in the mission field. The missionaries and Church leaders of Edinburgh World Missionary Conference in 1910 did not believe in a unity imposed by pressure or constraint, but one resulting from a genuine call for harmony, with a progressivist view rather than a nostalgic return to outdated socio-political ideals of a privileged Corpus
*Christianum.* This type of association of ecumenically minded individuals answered the immediate realities of a particularly cohesive civil society with an emergent global consciousness. Nevertheless, when professing excessive missionary enthusiasm, Protestants often neglected indigenous cultures, beliefs and forms of governance. For them, Western civilisational values, even if sometimes they were critically assessed, were considered superior.

Secondly, the Orthodox, considered as non-Western churches, also became participants in ecumenical ventures when the political contexts became favourable i.e. after the emergence of the League of Nations or following the apparent relaxation of oppressive Communist regimes in the early 1960s. We notice that the ecumenical enterprise can be ineffective when State policies interfere with or deny communities religious freedom or rights concerning free association in their jurisdiction. Even if some Eastern European countries had totalitarian regimes which professed atheistic policies, the religion of the majority was used in a disguised way in supporting the state-run ideologies. As the responsibility for Church unity belongs mainly to religious leaders, who always must receive State permission beside ecclesiastical entrustment, this is further adding to ecumenical complexities. Furthermore, persecuted or otherwise Orthodox migrants leaving for Western democracies needed to negotiate their new status as their indigenous *Cuius regio, eius religio* principles could no longer apply. Particularly, the issues of mixed marriages in a diasporic context have to be creatively addressed from an emancipatory socio-religious perspective which gives opportunities to a new cosmopolitan agenda. Especially in the United States, many Orthodox Christians in Diasporic settings encountered complex politico-cultural and religious challenges which required ecumenical participation.

Lastly, the Roman Catholic hierarchy remains largely sceptical vis-à-vis the ecumenical project in evaluating it as an onward or upward progress. This ambivalent or even hostile approach may be linked to its specific administrative structure, authoritative rigidity and peculiar politico-religious agenda. Yet, a significant reformist change could be noticed during and after the Second Vatican Council. Especially in democratic State jurisdictions which are tolerant to religious diversity, we notice a shift of the Roman Curia from a form of parochial cosmopolitanism and isolationist tendencies to a somewhat ecumenical outlook.
The continuing challenge of secularism and the intensifying impact of globalisation may lie behind this. In any case we understand that the ecumenical approach is more limited in scope, to promotion of temporary co-operation between institutions, without specifically aiming to institutional integrative unity.

However, just as the Roman Catholic Church professes various administrative fundamentalisms with imperialistic tendencies, similarly most Orthodox Churches profess support for ethno-nationalistic particularisms while most Protestants remain active defenders of their denominationalist trends. The dissertation examined various ecumenical contexts in which people and Christian churches act under various socio-political circumstances. Is ecumenism part of the same process as creation of ‘global consciousness’ (Robertson, 1992)? The answer is not straightforward because both ecumenism and global consciousness have diverse origins that only partly intersect.

Like globalisation, ecumenism presents challenges and opportunities. Ecumenism explores various solutions to religious integration, which ultimately is global in nature, and can therefore be effectively addressed only through worldwide cooperation and coherent dissemination of ideas. Overall, in the global field, through collaborative engagement, the ecumenical movement is creating in some way an innovative network. Can ethical globalisation be successfully accomplished without the religious dimension brought about by ecumenism? I argue that the churches’ public engagement in society is a sine qua non condition in the dissemination of findings and recommendations for an ethical globalisation. Here, institutional support is indispensable. There are intersecting tendencies which give a unique dynamic to the global religious field. On the one hand, the ecumenical project could enrich global culture as a whole and through consultative mechanisms and fair representation, may transform religious divergences and misunderstandings into peaceful resolutions. On the other hand, excessive bureaucratic tendencies could present the danger of disenchantment of the enthusiastic faithful. Nevertheless, following the principles of various secular organisations, ‘the churches adopt bureaucratic techniques and become accommodated to pragmatic modes of thought’ (Turner, 1972: 238).
I want to suggest that, if supporters of ecumenism do not agree with some discourses promoted by globalisation due to multiple negatives effects, they generally concur that glocalised cosmopolitan values are socially enriching because they provide ‘dispositions of an appropriate cultural reflexivity within emergent global complexities’ (Urry, 2003: 139). Ecumenism, historically sprung from the missionary desire, argues for respect for various forms of cultural pluralism. Yet in the global ecumenical field ‘the historical rise of new forms of religions complexifies the issue rather than just reversing it’ (Beyer, 2004: 429).

Ecumenical principles continuously recommend that religious communities and individuals in their journey of discovery ought to move their aspirations beyond confined parochial structures. However, it could be said that in times of rapid social change and global uncertainties, within the context of negotiation, ecumenists encounter an enigmatic quo vadis. Before achieving any form of unity, ecumenists remain engaged in a journey between the voices of those that promote tolerance, dialogue and understanding and those whose enunciations emphasise the fear of betrayal of various religious orthodoxies, often defended by authoritarian principles and rigid ethical views. ‘In the absence of an agreed global ethics’ (Holton, 2005: 160), all factions remain active players of a distinct kind in the global field.
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