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Bosnian Post-Refugee Transnationalism: A Case Study

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A dissertation submitted to the Department of Sociology at Trinity College, University of Dublin, in fulfilment of the requirements for the award of Doctor of Philosophy

October 2012
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Abstract

This thesis presents a sociological case study of Bosnian migrants in Ireland who are involved in post-refugee transnationalism. The focus of the thesis is on a group of programme refugees who arrived in Ireland two decades ago but who, despite being given Irish citizenship, and despite being able to return to Bosnia, do not wish to fully commit to either country. Instead they divide their time between Bosnia and Ireland; generally they spend their summers in Bosnia and the rest of the year in Ireland. This thesis explored this current Bosnian migratory pattern which I termed 'Bosnian post-refugee transnationalism'. In particular, I critically examine the relationship between Bosnian migrations and the policies and politics of the two states they migrate between. I argue that both states are racial states and that both states operate biopolitical regimes of govermentality, which clash with Bosnian everyday experiences and needs. I name these regimes Irish interculturalism and post-Dayton Bosnia. I argue that both regimes are characterised by essentialist understandings of ethnicity and both states homogenise their populations. Most importantly, both states are places that Bosnian migrants examined in this thesis do not want to live in permanently. I argue that politics of racialisation and policies of homogenisation endorsed by both states push Bosnians to engage in Bosnian post-refugee transnationalism. Hence, I conceptualise Bosnian post-refugee transnationalism as an enforced condition. However, while its origins are enforced, I argue that the non-committal, complicated and evolving space they have forged for themselves between the two countries, is not a negative space but rather an opportune space – a 'space of possibility'.
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Introduction

That really bothers me. If we are talking about the Irish people, as soon as you start talking to them, immediately they ask ‘when are you going back to your own country?’ Immediately they ask. When are you going back to your own country? I am not staying with them, I am not living in their house! I am not a refugee anymore! I have citizenship. I have a passport. I have their [Irish] citizenship! (Interview XIII)

This is the response I got from a Bosnian woman migrant in Ireland. In our interview she described her life in the country and told me about the negative aspects of her experience. I start this thesis with this quote for two reasons. Firstly, it is interesting that this Bosnian woman understands her citizenship as both hers and not hers. On the one hand, she claims that she is part of the Irish nation in her own right by affirming her ownership of an Irish passport and by stating her independent living arrangements. On the other hand, she distances herself from the citizenship that her new passport bestows upon her by stating that what she has is ‘theirs’. While she has her new status, that status is not hers. This small linguistic point is illuminative of the larger experience of Bosnian post-refugee transnationalism explored in this thesis, where ‘having’ does not necessarily mean ‘being’ and where new ways of being are developed with regard to new experiences and new statuses.

Secondly, during the process of reading and analysing this interview, there was one sentence that kept lingering in my mind and made me reflect upon my own understanding of the research I was undertaking. She said, ‘I am not a refugee anymore!’ From the beginning of my research, I had understood my study as an investigation of Bosnian refugees’ experiences a number of years after their initial migration, in particular, their annual summer migrations between Ireland and Bosnia. While I was open to exploring these migrations, I was not open to moving away from an understanding of Bosnians outside of their ‘refugeeness’. Even if I knew – and I did, since I had conducted research on the Bosnian population before – that all of the people I interviewed had Irish citizenship, I still considered them as refugees. The
Bosnian woman exclaiming irritably that she was not a refugee anymore, even if not directly to me, rang alarm bells concerning my own misconceptions.

Suddenly, it became both obvious and necessary to rethink my study. If Bosnian migrants in Ireland did not think of themselves as refugees anymore, then neither should I. My study should incorporate the fact that time had passed since their arrival in Ireland as refugees, and that they had been conferred with citizenship status in the meantime. Hence my study is about Irish citizens, not Bosnian refugees. Yet they were not citizens in the same way as Irish-born people, or even not in the same way as other citizens, not Irish born. Their pathway to that status was characterised by their refugee initiation, and, as this thesis shows, the fact that they were initially accepted by Ireland as programme refugees still marks their experiences. In order to incorporate that comprehension into my research, I decided to conceptualise their experiences as post-refugee experiences. The 'post' gave me an element of temporality to think with, to alert me to the changed nature of their actual status. ‘Refugee’ enabled me to carry through the on-going influence of the past on their present states. While overall I understand their experiences as post-refugee, during the course of this thesis I also use the term ‘Bosnian migrants’. This is used interchangeably in order not to overburden the process of discussion and to stress that underneath this particularistic background, Bosnians are currently one of many global migratory populations.

The thesis focuses on Bosnian migrants who entered the Republic of Ireland in 1992 as programme refugees and who were, from the moment of their arrival, the recipients of a lengthy reception and resettlement programme. This programme was coordinated by the Irish government and its main objective was the long-term successful integration of Bosnian refugees in Ireland. However, despite the fact that two decades have elapsed since their arrival, Bosnians do not feel fully part of Irish society; instead they feel racialised and marginalised within it (Halilovic-Pastuovic, 2007a). Yet, rather than repatriating back to Bosnia, they have chosen to divide their time between the two countries; they spend most of the year in Ireland but during the summer months they migrate to Bosnia with their families.

1 These processes of marginalisation and racialisation are also discussed in my master’s thesis (Halilovic-Pastuovic, 2003).
This thesis interrogates the specificities of these Bosnian post-refugee migrations between Ireland and Bosnia, which Bosnian post-refugee transnationalism consists of. The aim of the thesis is to explore why Bosnian migrants are involved in these transnational activities, and in particular, to understand whether these migrations are a response to the politics of ethnicity enacted by the two nation states they migrate between. The broader question is whether forced migration may lead to enforced transnationalism.

In Chapter 2 I provide a detailed discussion of the development of the thesis and the methodology used. It is important to stress here, however, why I chose to focus on the ethnic rather than the structural dimensions (such as economic factors) of their post-refugee transnationalism.

In relation to Ireland – and I knew this from my previous research regarding Bosnian women in Ireland (Halilovic-Pastuovic, 2007) – the concept of ethnicity featured prominently in the reception and resettlement programme targeted at Bosnian migrants. From admission to the Cherry Orchard Reception Centre, where Bosnians were initially housed en masse, through the development of the Bosnian Community Development Project, essentialist notions of culture and ethnicity penetrated the programme. In relation to Bosnia, the issue of ethnicity has been deeply embedded both in the 1990s conflict and in the post-conflict post-Dayton times. Not only has the conflict itself been largely understood as colliding along ‘ethnic lines’, invoking primordial notions of belonging, but also the emergence of the a post-conflict Bosnia, under the shadow of the Dayton agreement, has been characterised by further ethnic reification. Finally, my pilot interviews conducted in Sarajevo at the beginning of the study, where Bosnians kept talking about ethnic clustering in a changed Bosnia, further confirmed the need to investigate the ethnicity angle of Bosnian post-refugee transnationalism.

In order to develop an understanding of Bosnian post-refugee migrations, I apply three main theoretical lenses: theories of transnationalism, Goldberg’s (2002) racial state theory, and Foucault’s notion of biopolitics and his concept of governmentality. Theories of transnationalism facilitated my understanding by helping me to situate...
Bosnian migratory experiences as ‘grounded’ between two states, Bosnia and Ireland. Goldberg’s racial state theory enabled me to capture the influence of the state, and the involvement of the state in a politics of homogenisation and racialisation, as practiced by both states, Bosnia and Ireland. Foucault’s theorisations of biopolitics and governmentality made it possible for me to further capture the workings of processes of homogenisation and racialisation in two different state settings.

As mentioned above, I mobilise this cluster of theories in relation to two nation states, Bosnia and Ireland. I position Bosnian transnationalism as grounded (Smith and Guamizo, 1998) between these two racial states. While I theorise both states as racial states, I argue that they operate via two different biopolitical regimes of governmentality. In Ireland, the biopolitical regime of governmentality is Irish interculturalism, through which ethnic homogenisation and community building is exercised and orchestrated by the state. The Bosnian biopolitical regime of governmentality, enabled by the Dayton Agreement, is responsible for the currently divided society of post-Dayton Bosnia – plagued by ethnic reification, the politicisation of nationalism and increased religiosity. Both states operate a politics of racialisation and homogenisation, albeit in biopolitically specific ways. Overall, I argue that the heterogeneity of the Bosnian migrants’ experiences does not fit into and does not work with these regimes of governmentality. I also argue that their post-refugee transnationalism, enacted through their summer migrations, reflects their reactions to both racial states. Not fitting into either, they feel forced to divide their time between the two, forging, as I argue following Morokvasic (2004), ‘a space of possibility’. This ‘space of possibility’, discussed in the Chapter 7, while originating out of necessity, and while contested and complex in its own way, provides them with an arena for building new connections and new futures.

While I discuss two different regimes of governmentality in this thesis, it is important to state that this is not a comparative study. The aim of this thesis was not to compare two nation states but rather to follow and understand the Bosnian migratory experiences. The fact that this led me to two biopolitical regimes of governmentality is the outcome rather than the aim of the study. Furthermore, I discuss the two regimes of governmentality in a different fashion. The part of the thesis that discusses Ireland (Chapters 3 and 4) locates Bosnian experiences within the broader context of
the Irish response to refugees and explores the workings of Ireland’s interculturalism. The section of the thesis dealing with Bosnia (Chapters 5 and 6) takes a different, more historical, approach. Since the changes that have occurred in post-Dayton Bosnia can be attributed to the Dayton Agreement, I trace the pre-Dayton era to tell an alternative story of Bosnia to the one most often presented with regard to the conflict.

I also wish to emphasise that this thesis presents a case study of a particular population. This population consists of Bosnian refugees arriving to Ireland in the cohort of 1992 – and their friends and relations, some of whom arrived slightly later – who entered Ireland as invited programme refugees and were on the receiving end of a reception and resettlement programme. Hence, while theoretical and other insights can be gained from this study, I do not generalise beyond this cohort.

Finally, I want to account for my ‘lumping together’ discussions of ethnicity and processes of racialisation. While originally applied to the ‘racialisation of thought’ during colonial times, primarily by Fanon (1967), and while initially related to the supposed inferiority of black, colonised and non-white people, currently racialisation is no longer simply a black and white issue (Lentin, 2008). Even though Miles (1989) had already extended the understanding of the concept past biological characteristics, current understandings of xeno-racism have strengthened the notion that racialisation goes beyond somatic characterisations only. As Ambalavaner Sivanandan, Director of the Institute of Race Relations, argues:

[xeno-racism] is a racism that is not just directed at those with darker skins, from the former colonial territories, but at the newer categories of the displaced, the dispossessed and the uprooted, who are beating at Western Europe’s doors, the Europe that helped to displace them in the first place. It is a racism, that is, that cannot be colour-coded, directed as it is at poor whites as well, and is therefore passed off as xenophobia, a “natural” fear of strangers. But in the way it denigrates and reifies people before segregating and/or expelling them, it is a xenophobia that bears all the marks of the old racism. It is racism in substance, but “xeno” in form. It is a racism that is meted out to impoverished strangers even if they are white. It is xeno-racism. (Sivanandan, in Fekete, 2001:1)
Hence, the process of racialisation in the age of xeno-racism constructs as inferior those white, impoverished, and as in the case of this thesis, exiled, refugees. Actually, it could be argued that the Bosnian migrants discussed here have been racialised in a number of ways. They were racialised globally, particularly at the beginning of the 1990s, as refugees. They are at present racialised within the two regimes of governmentality – Irish interculturalism and the current segregated Bosnia. Finally, a further process of racialisation is ongoing in relation to the policies and politics introduced by the Dayton Agreement. Some, such as Essed and Goldberg (2002), have argued that the concept of racialisation has been overused and that it is too vague as an analytical tool (Goldberg, 2002). Essed (1991) has proposed a parallel and analogous process of ethnicisation to be used alongside racialisation. Lewis and Phoenix (2004) also question if ethnicisation should be used when ethnicity as cultural or national difference is invoked instead of race. However, they argue that ethnicisation works in the same way as racialisation, since it focuses on processes of marking differences between people on the basis of assumptions about human physical or cultural variations and the meanings of these variations. On the other hand, Murji and Solomos (2005) warn against the premature usage of the term ‘ethnicistion’ as the relationship between racialisation and ethnicisation, and indeed ‘culturalisation’ has not been explored systematically. Also, Collins et al. (2002) point out that racialisation, rather than ethnicisation, should be used as it provides a stronger sense of institutional involvement and racism. I follow Collins et al. and employ the concept of racialisation, rather than ethnicisation, to link Bosnian post-refugee experiences to the two racial states, since the Bosnian experiences that this thesis discusses are associated with the institutions of the state. During the course of the thesis, however, I discuss their ethnic, or more aptly, ethnicised experiences.

This thesis is developed in the following manner:

Chapter 1 presents the theoretical background. Here I trace my theoretical developments from broader frameworks to narrower concepts which are relevant to this study. I situate Bosnian post-refugee annual migrations within international migration patterns, linking them with the theories of transnationalism and, following

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2 This, of course, is in addition to current ‘Islamophobia’ where racialised discourse causes paranoia and fear of the ‘Muslim terrorist’ (Lentin, 2008).
3 This thesis deals with two regimes of governmentality only.
Smith and Guarnizo (1998), situating it as ‘grounded’ between two states, Ireland and Bosnia. I discuss the issue of forced migration and set up the reasoning required to question if forced migration can lead to enforced transnationalism. I link this question to the theorisation of states as racial states, associating the possible enforced transnationalism with the policies and politics of states. I present Goldberg’s racial state theory as the main theory of the thesis, conceptualising both Ireland and Bosnia as racial states. Finally, I reflect upon Foucault’s concepts of biopolitics and governmentality, introducing them as investigative tools for my analysis of the inner workings of the racial states of Ireland and Bosnia.

Chapter 2 presents the methodological background to the thesis. I discuss epistemological issues as well as the problems encountered along the way and describe the data used to constitute the research. I recount my journey within the process of research, reflecting upon the usefulness of multi-sited ethnography and insider-outsider perspective, and discuss finding the pathway alongside grounded theory in dealing with what Miles (1979) calls the ‘attractive nuisance of qualitative data’.

In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 I discuss the Bosnian experiences with regard to the racial state of Ireland. Chapter 3 positions Bosnian refugee transnationalism in relation to the Irish reception and resettlement programme. After a brief historical overview of Ireland’s response to programme refugees, it presents the details of the reception and resettlement programme itself, and discusses Irish interculturalism. Chapter 4 builds on Chapter 3 and interrogates Irish interculturalism through a discussion of Bosnian experiences. The chapter describes a multiplicity of Bosnian experiences, arguing that their heterogeneity cannot be confined by Irish interculturalism. This chapter also argues that there is no such a thing as a ‘Bosnian community’ in Ireland. In short, Chapter 4 presents the modus operandi of the biopolitical regime of governmentality that is Irish interculturalism.

Chapters 5 and 6 relate to the racial state of post-Dayton Bosnia. Similarly to the relationship between Chapter 3 and 4, Chapter 5 presents the pillars upon which Chapter 6 is built. Chapter 5 takes a historical route and traces the ethnic developments in the Bosnian region from medieval times to pre-Dayton Bosnian in order to argue that the current ethnically divided post-Dayton Bosnia in not a result of the ‘ancient ethnic hatreds’ narrative as often stipulated. The chapter traces the origins of nationalisms in the region to the 19th Century only as a response to the larger wave
of romantic nationalism in Europe, rather than the local ethnic hatred sentiment, that Bosnian ethnic divisions developed. The chapter also follows ethnic developments during the times of the two Yugoslavias, highlighting once again the complexity of local politics and the lack of organic primordial ethnic hatreds. Chapter 6 argues that despite the historical legacy presented in Chapter 5, ethnic divisions have been taken as given by the makers of the Dayton Agreement, divisions that were consequently institutionalised and constitutionalised in Bosnia. The chapter argues that the biopolitical regime of governmentality in Bosnia is based upon ethnopolitics, and that consequently the present-day racial state of Bosnia is a segregated society abundant with ethnic reification, politicisation of nationalism and increased religiosity.

Chapter 7 makes a small detour from the previous chapters and looks into what actually happens in the transnational space that Bosnian migrants occupy outside the two regimes of governmentality. It looks into the links Bosnians are making outside the two states, examining their contested space of diasporic affiliations and interconnections. It considers the ways Bosnians are diasporicised back in Bosnia and the ways resentment works between those who stayed and those who left, creating further divisions, but also new associations that are currently in formation. The chapter suggests that these complexities can be viewed as Bosnians forging for themselves a 'space of possibility' (Morokvasic, 2004), displaying Bosnian agency within two regimes of governmentality. Chapter 7 is not, however, a concluding chapter, but rather presents data I collected 'accidentally' along the way, while adhering to understanding sociology as an 'art of listening' (Back, 2007). The concluding remarks are presented in the Epilogue at the end of the thesis.
Chapter 1

Bosnian post-refugee transnationalism: the theoretical context

Introduction

As pointed out in the introduction, this thesis concerns a cohort of Bosnian programme refugees who arrived to Ireland following the outbreak of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia and who are currently engaged in post-refugee transnationalism characterised by their lack of commitment to a permanent stay in Ireland as well as their refusal to permanently return to Bosnia. Instead, Bosnian migrants divide their time between the two countries, spending most of the year in Ireland but returning to Bosnia during the summer months. My thesis theorises this post-refugee development as enforced transnationalism where two different biopolitical regimes of governmentality, those of Ireland and Bosnia, among other things, are held responsible for these transnational activities. In order to develop this argument in the later parts of this thesis this chapter presents some theoretical background to the elements that guided my understanding and conceptualisation of Bosnian post-refugee transnational phenomena.

The first part of the chapter locates Bosnian transnationalism within a broader field of international migratory patterns and theories of transnationalism. It discusses notions of deteritorialisation and unboundedness and posits ‘grounded transnationalism’ (Smith and Guarnizo, 1998) as fertile ground on which to situate Bosnian post-refugee experiences. The second section of the chapter highlights the fact that Bosnian transnationalism originated from the ethnic conflict and forced migration, and explores Al-Ali et al. (2001) proposition that in certain cases transnationalism can be enforced. The third section of the chapter introduces Goldberg’s (2002) theory of the racial state in order to provide the link between ‘grounding transnationalism’ and understanding its enforced nature. The final section looks at Foucault’s concepts of biopolitics and governmentality in order to introduce further theoretical element this thesis relies upon in understanding Bosnian post-refugee transnationalism.
Grounding Bosnian transnationalism

International migration became a key issue in international politics at the beginning of the 1990s (Castles, 2002). The breakdown of bi-polar power relations that characterised the period of the Cold War, in particular, has contributed to new population flows. The policies and politics that different governments have adopted since to deal with population movements from East to West and South to North have featured different measures for curtailing and controlling these movements. But despite restrictive reactions endorsed by states in dealing with incoming migrants, neither the movements themselves nor their effects on both sending and receiving countries have quietened down. Rather, the cross-border activities of the past two decades, under the conditions of globalisation, have both intensified in numbers and complexified in motion, resulting in the widely accepted recognition that migration is one of the key forces of social transformation in the contemporary world (Castles, 2002).

In the past decade, the emerging field of transnational studies has presented ‘transnationalism’ as a useful conceptual tool for dealing with the twin forces of mass migration and electronic mediation (Appadurai, 1996), which characterise the current period of globalisation. Born out of a workshop in 1990, led by anthropologists Nina Glick-Schiller, Cristina Blanz-Szanton and Linda Basch, the concept aimed to elucidate the ‘processes by which immigrants and refugees forge and maintain multi-stranded social relations that link together their places of origin and places of settlement’ (Basch et al., 1994:7). This followed the observation that an increasing number of people are able to live dual lives where ‘participants are often bilingual, move easily between two cultures, frequently maintain homes in two countries, and pursue economic, political and cultural interests that require presence in both’ (Portes, 1997:812).

Migration is considered one of the defining global issues of the early 21st Century, since more people are on the move today than at any other point in human history. There are now about 192 million people living outside their place of birth (IOM, 2012) [http://www.iom.int/jahia/jahia/about-migration/lang/en - last accessed 6.09.2012]
The celebratory subversive nature of transnationalist and cosmopolitanist models of dual existence have been challenged within the academic discourses (Smith and Guarnizo, 1998), and I will come back to these issues later on. In conjunction with an understanding that transnationalism by no means presents either a new or single most important astral migratory pattern, it is important to recognise its conceptual strength. The provisions of transnationalism fundamentally confront the primary belonging to one nation inherent to both the policy of multiculturalism and the politics of diaspora. In short, the concept of transnationalism can provide an adequate framework for the interpretation of contemporary migratory movements — exuberated by technological advances in travel and communication — as well as patterns of belonging to and between different societies.

It is important to acknowledge, however, that rather than being a single theory there are ‘degrees of entanglement in national/transnational orders’ (Clifford, 1998). The scope of academic work that has emerged over the past years with regard to transnational activities has been vast, leading to a not uncommon problem where the concept is fraught with inconsistencies in meanings and usage. Furthermore, its swift movement across the different disciplinary boundaries of anthropology, sociology, political science and geography has added to its increasing conceptual ambiguity.

In trying to disentangle the discursive ambiguity of the concept, Nolin (2006) proposes differentiating between two streams of typologies with regard to transnationalism, identified by Glick Schiller (1997) and Mahler (1998) respectively. Glick Schiller identifies the currents of transnationalism branded as transnational cultural studies, transnational migration studies and transnational communities studies. Within the stream of transnational cultural studies, the concepts of unboundedness (Basch et al. 1994), postnation/transnation (Appadurai, 1996) and cultural hybridity (Bhabha, 1994) are explored in largely abstract theoretical terms. By contrast, transnational migration studies, being grounded in empirical research, focuses on more tangible effects of population movement and ‘double consciousness’ (Du Bois, 1903; Basch et al., 1992a; Mahler 1995; Smith and Guarnizzo 1998). Finally, transnational communities studies focuses on transnational households and communities and transnational social relations (Goldring, 1998; Levitt, 1998; Portes 1996a, 1996b; Smith, R. C. 1998).
Mahler (1998) delineates the field of transnational studies between transnationalism from below and transnationalism as transmigration. According to Mahler, transnationalism from below is generated by grassroots politics and social movements that resist and disrupt the workings of transnationalism from above represented by structural elites, processes and international bodies that influence the reconfiguration of global capital such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank or the nation state. Transnationalism as transmigration focuses, on the other hand, on the migratory process itself and the impact it has on the communities concerned.

Portes (2001) adds another layer to the theorisation of transnationalism by distinguishing between international, multinational and transnational scopes of activities. He applies the concept of ‘international’ to activities and programmes conducted by states and nationally-based institutions where the interest of the activity remains nationally bounded, examples being consulates or exchange programmes organised by particular universities. The term ‘multinational’, on the other hand, refers to activities whose purpose transcends borders of a single nation state, such as the United Nations, marketing activities of global corporations and activities of the Catholic Church or other global religions operating in multiple international locations. Finally, ‘transnational’ activities would be those conducted by non-institutional actors, whether organised groups or networks of individuals, which take place across national borders. Non-governmental organisations for monitoring human rights globally and boycotts organised by grassroots activists in ‘first world’ countries to compel multinationals to improve labour practices in the ‘third world’ would be examples of such transnational type of the activity.

In relation to the above, Smith and Guarnizo argue that despite the diversity of currents within the field study of transnationalism, there is a ‘peculiar cultural bent’ and ‘postmodern discursive flavour’ to the whole field that can be traced back to the discipline of cultural studies, its forbearer (Smith and Guarnizo, 1998:4). In responding to this, they question the totalising emancipatory character which is discursively present across many approaches. Indeed, cultural hybridity, multi-positional identities and border-crossings by marginal ‘others’ are often viewed as conscious and successful efforts by ordinary people to escape control and domination from above. In order words, their activities are often being constructed as oppositional
to state hegemony. While understanding that transnational practices, as ‘counter narratives of the nation’ can and do ‘disturb those ideological manoeuvres through which imagined communities are given essentialist identities’ (Bhabha, 1990), Smith and Guarnizo remind us of the ‘enduring asymmetries of domination, inequality, racism, sexism, class conflict, and uneven development in which transnational practices are embedded’ (Smith and Guarnizo 1998:6). As I discuss in this thesis, current post-refugee Bosnian transnationalism, continues to be contingent upon the circumstances in both Ireland and Bosnia, where inequalities have reverberated into their current transnational phase.

In warning us against a celebratory vision with regard to the dialectic of domination and resistance within transnational studies, Smith and Guarnizo try to go beyond the deceptive local-global binary present within a significant segments of transnational research, re-focusing their analytical lens on different thematics relating to transnationalism from below, including political organisation of transnational space, transnational networks, identity politics and grounding of transnationalism. In acknowledging that political organisation and mobilisation take place on many different levels along the spectrum of the ‘global governance agenda’, through multinational corporations and international organisations, to the ‘survival strategies’ of migrants themselves, Smith and Guarnizo challenge the proposal of an emergence of a new period of weakened nationalism, a ‘post-national global cultural economy’ (Appadurai, 1996). Instead, they argue that within the global neoliberal contextual space of a ‘new world order’, states are re-inventing their own role by creating ‘deterritorialised’ nation state formations (Basch et al., 1994) through incorporating their citizens abroad into both national markets and national polity at home.

The passage of dual citizenships laws is perhaps the most obvious example of transnational belonging. However, while states make allowances for certain forms of multi-national attachment, they also create conditions regarding the categories of migrant that can avail of these ‘services’. For example, while the loyalty of certain highly skilled migrants may be desired by both ‘home’ and ‘receiving’ county on economic grounds, refugees can often find themselves in the opposite position, not wanted by either. Within the deterritorialised notions of nation states, borders remain curiously impermeable for some. Therefore, ‘political elites ruling nation states do not
just react to but actually act to constitute the scope and meanings of transnationalism within their territories’ (Smith and Guarnizo, 1998:10, my emphasis). Here questions could be asked not only concerning who gets awarded a bi-focal position, but whether the bi-focality of dual nationals puts them in a doubly empowered or doubly marginalised position.

In challenging these notions of deterritorialisation and unboundedness, Smith and Guarnizo (1998) call for an understanding of transnational actions as grounded. They call for an image of transnational migrants, viewed as ‘deterrioralised, free-floating, “neither here nor there” people’ to be reconceptualised by focusing on the locality of transnationality, since ‘transnational practices while connecting collectivities located in more than one national territory, are embedded in specific social relations established between specific people, situated in unequivocal localities, at historically determined times’ (Smith and Guarnizo, 1998:11).

Therefore, when discussing Bosnian post-refugee transnationalism we have to situate it, ground it, within the two societies that Bosnian migrants currently live in and between. On the one hand there is Ireland, into whose intercultural industry these migrants were inserted from the beginning, and where they feel racialised and socially marginalised but economically empowered in most cases. On the other hand there is a ‘not like it used to be’ post-Dayton Bosnia, characterised by ethnic reification and clustering, as well as religious revival. Local policies and politics, as well as the economic and social climates of both societies have influenced and continue to impact on Bosnian transnational practices. In other words, their transnational experiences are grounded in relation to specific social conditions of both Bosnia and Ireland. ⁵ The following chapters provide detailed analysis of these conditions.

Additionally, the fact that the Bosnian population movement was forced needs to be incorporated into the conceptualisation of Bosnian transnationalism. In agreeing with Nolin (2006), who argues that there is a different dynamic of ‘ruptures and sutures’ within processes of refugee movements which separates them from other kinds of

⁵ It is important to note that, while Bosnian post-refugee transnationalism currently plays itself out between the two states of Bosnia and Ireland, grounding transnationalism in many other circumstances could involve more than just two states.
migration, and in acknowledging that this dynamic would underpin the post-refugee futures of certain refugee populations, I want to suggest that forced migration may lead to enforced transnationalism (Al-Ali et al., 2001). Therefore, Bosnian post-refugee transnationalism needs to be conceptualised not only as grounded in relation to the two nation states it is entangled in. It also needs to be conceptualised with regard to it being a product of forced migration. I elaborate on this point below.

**From forced migration to enforced transnationalism**

In recent years there has been an intense interest in refugee issues, particularly among politicians and media in ‘the West’, leading to what Stedman and Tanner (2003) call ‘the pattern of refugee manipulation’. Indeed, the recent falling figures of refugee applications have been viewed by a majority of European states as a successful strategy in delivering a neo-liberal dream of prosperity and peace. As Bauman (1990) observed some time ago, this may not be surprising considering the modern system of nation-states where the nation is perceived as the natural place of belonging. While identity and culture are viewed as stable only ‘at home’, refugees, viewed as ‘people out of place’ become an ‘aberration of neat national category, an anomaly in need of normalisation and control’ (Eastmond, 1998:178). Interestingly, despite the concern for refugee matters there is a lack of systematic work on forced migration, ‘a huge gap between ill-informed and often highly charged official discourses of the refugee’ and research and analysis carried out as ‘the basis for a considered approach to refugee issues’ (Marfleet, 2006:7). Furthermore, even within the field of Refugee Studies, which has grown over the past two decades, the attempts to consider forced migration on a global scale have been scarce, and since the pioneering work of Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo (1989) there has been little analysis of refugee issues in international and transnational contexts with few notable exceptions (Al-Al et al., 2001; Canada Refugee Studies 2007).

One of the reasons for the lack of research on refugee transnationalism is that migrant transnationalism has typically been associated with voluntary migrants due to its conceptual reliance on mobility and regular circulatory connections between the host society and the point of origin. Despite the initial migratory pattern of fleeing home, refugees have often been viewed as a relatively ‘immobile’ category of migrants due
to the lack of financial resources, social networks and the inability to ‘go back’ until stability has been restored. Also, for some time within the field of transnational studies the focus has been on movement of persons rather than other transnational activities such as sending remittances or transnational communication, which possibly more aptly epitomises refugee transnational behaviour, in the beginning of the refugee process in particular. Additionally, while the human consequences of forced migration, on the personal, social, economic, cultural and political level, would differ from situation to situation, under the conceptual framework of the term ‘refugee experience’, which has been widely used within the field of refugee studies (Ager, 1999), a few discrete phases have been identified, namely, pre-flight, flight, temporary settlement and resettlement or repatriation (Desjarlais et al., 1995).

Notably, this rigid nomenclature does not allow for a transnational option in the refugee experience.

Although the policies of ‘managing’ forced migration, particularly in the European context, vary slightly from one state to another, for most of them the refugee cycle is perceived as having an end, either through repatriation home or through integration into the host society.

Not only have the responses to the refugee experience been bipolar in their repatriation versus resettlement attitude, but repatriation has been, and arguably continues to be, the preferred option. The 1990s were identified as the decade of repatriation (Collyer, 2006) and different strategies for post-conflict return have been tested, such as the UN Development Program’s TOKTEN (Transfer of Knowledge through Ex-patriate Nationals) and the IOM’s MIDA (Migration for Development in Africa). The case of Bosnia represents the largest repatriation movement in Europe since the Second World War (Koser and Black, 1999). It has to be noted, however,

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5 It has been noted that even when the period of temporary protection became prolonged, certain states would still refuse the resettlement option to people in limbo. For example, more than six million of the almost ten million refugees in the world in 2003 had been displaced for more than five years, a period of displacement described by UNHCR as ‘protracted’, yet no long-term solution was offered to them towards resettlement. This actuality has been described and criticised as ‘warehousing’ of refugees (Collyer, 2006:98).

6 http://www.toktenlebanon.org/

7 http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/mida-africa/
that there is a slight change in policy on the horizon where resettlement is beginning to be more seriously considered as a durable option to the refugee question.9

Consequentially, the research that was carried out regarding refugee movements at the ‘end of the cycle’ centred around issues of integration in the host society or re-integration back ‘home’. It was not until the Ninth Conference of the International Association for the Study of Forced Migration, held in Sao Paulo, Brazil in January 2005, that the significance of transnational perspectives with regard to forced migration was acknowledged and added as a third durable solution – aside from repatriation and resettlement – to the refugee question.

As stated above, there is a big difference between refugee transnationalism and other transnationalisms. The main and the most obvious distinction between refugee and other population movements is that refugees do not want to go, rather they are forced to leave, often with little notice.10 As Marfleet argues, refugees are ‘produced by a complex of factors: economic, political, social, cultural and environmental. Their lives are shaped by formal political and legal structures, and by both official and popular ideas of nation and nationalism, citizen and alien, ‘race’ and ethnicity’ (Marfleet, 2006:7). They are people outside the borders of their own countries unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of their own government. Becoming ‘refugees’ transforms their movement into a political and legal category framed by international discourses.

When discussing forced migration it might be useful to make a distinction, following Kuntz, between anticipatory refugee movements and acute refugee movements. In anticipatory refugee movements, refugees have time to prepare to leave their homeland and migrate before the situation prevents their departure. In contrast, acute refugee movements arise from sudden political changes or military activity, and under these conditions refugees often have no time to prepare for departure (Kuntz, 1973). In relation to acute refugee movements, refugees often have no foresight with regard

9The EU Commission has included proposals to significantly extend the limited resettlement programmes that currently operate in a few EU Member States (Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: ‘On the managed entry into the EU of persons in need of international protection and the enhancement of the protection capacity of the regions of origin ("improving Access to a Durable Solution"), Brussels, European Union, COM, 2004, 410 final, 4 June 2004).

10I acknowledge that ‘force’ is a problematic term and that there is a level of force present in other migrations too, however, not as poignantly as in refugee movements.
to the choice of the host country. In relation to Bosnian refugees, European states that responded to the UNHCR's call for help in relation to the Yugoslav crisis used a quota system in relation to refugee acceptance. The Bosnians who arrived to Ireland as programme refugees came from a refugee centre in Austria, following a visit from an Irish government representative, after the 200-person quota was decided for Ireland.

The factors mentioned above point towards a need to conceive refugee transnationalism as having a different dynamic to other transnationalisms. In her analysis of Guatemalan refugees in Canada, Nolin (2006) argues that refugee transnationalism incorporates a conceptual shift from a focus on 'connections' to 'ruptures and sutures' in attachments and the sense of belonging. It also offers a 'possibility to grapple, in a critically analytical way, with the entanglements of refugee actions and narrations as well as with government declarations and policy changes' (Nolin, 2006:182). One significant element of this course of ruptures and sutures that characterises refugee transnationalism is the initial rupture, a 'critical juncture', a dislocation point after which contextual certainty comes into question. This is particularly relevant for those refugees participating in acute refugee movements. While acknowledging that dislocation is an intrinsic part of every movement, and while recognising that a series of internal and external changes accompanies any population movement, the volume and rapidity of external change with regard to political and social circumstances in the country of embarkation marks the initial stages of refugee transnationalism as different to other types of transnational migration. Nolin (2006:142) notes the 'key moment of disengagement from the inclusive "we" to an "us" and "them" dynamic', as identified by Guatemalan exiles. Some identified the moment of departure or the point of stepping across the national border as the illuminating moment. Others found that only when they were requesting political asylum at the border of the host country did the reality hit. Bosnian refugees that I spoke to also identified this moment of initial rupture as significant to their migratory experiences. For example, one interviewee said:

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11. A programme refugee means a person to whom leave to enter and remain in the State for temporary protection or resettlement as part of a group of persons has been given by the Government (Refugee Act, 1996).
12. I discuss this in detail in later chapters.
To the last minute I was saying “I am not going anywhere” ... no, no, no ... but when it started, you had to go...my husband went...I went too...I did not know what to think then...when we arrived here...I just thought that this is the end...the end of everything...the end of the world. (Interview V)

It is important to stress this initial ‘critical juncture’ point as peculiar to refugee transnationalism. Refugee transnationalism originates in forced migration and as such its dynamic is different to other transnationalisms. However, it is not only the initial stage that differs. The subsequent migratory movements – being located, on the one hand, within the social and political upheavals that characterise conflict and post-conflict societies they left, and on the other, within different reception policies of host societies – are characterised by ruptures and sutures. While people engaged in voluntary migration may occupy a transnational field via the frequency of their movements and related connections brought on by these, forced migrants lick their wounds through each and every rupture and suture of their on-going movements between the place they left and place they live in now, since ultimately, they do not or could not live in either.

The Bosnian post-refugee transnationalism that this thesis describes suggests that their on-going summer migrations represent a certain strategy of resistance, or rather negotiation – what I theorise later as a ‘space of possibility’ – to the conditions of both states, Ireland and Bosnia, that they live in and between.

Therefore, it could be argued that forced migration may lead to enforced transnationalism, as Al-Ali et al. suggested (2001). Nadje Al-Ali, Richard Black and Khalid Koser explored limitations of the concept of transnationalism through the examination of two empirical case studies of communities characterised by emerging transnational practices, Bosnian refugees in the UK and the Netherlands, and Eritrean refugees in the UK and Germany. In stressing the importance of historical context, as well as the interconnections of social, political and institutional factors, they focused on receiving and sending nation states and their impact on refugee transnationalism, arguing that:

...more attention should be given to the nuances and variations between and within states of both receiving and sending countries. This angle is not to be
mistaken with ‘transnationalism from above’ but refers to the legal, social, political and economic context in which ‘transnationalism from below’ might be more or less likely to occur. What also needs to be emphasised is that nationalism in all its forms, ranging from more subtle versions to fierce nationalist struggles, often goes side by side with transnationalism, and might even be a reaction to it. (Al-Ali et al., 2001:588)

In this approach Al-Ali et al. followed Ong, who stipulates that the nation state ‘along with its juridical-legislative systems, bureaucratic apparatuses, economic entities, modes of governmentality, and war-making capacities – continues to define, discipline, control and regulate all kinds of populations, whether in movement, or in residence.’ (Ong, 1999:15)

In relation to their case studies of Bosnian and Eritrean refugees, Al-Ali et al. argued that ‘state policy, the context of flight, historical antecedents’, and/or ‘the dominance of the particular ideological, moral or cultural positions’ can combine to push transnational activities a certain way’ (2001:595). They added that ‘there are various reasons to suggest that ‘enforced transnationalism’ may be more prevalent in situations of forced migration’ (Ibid., p.596) and that ‘it is important that such a concept is not narrowly understood as involving a state forcing its will on a diaspora population, requiring it to participate in home-orientated activities […] or enforced transnationalism from above to be contrasted with voluntary transnationalism from below’ (Ibid.,p.595). Rather it is a realisation that activities, policies and politics of the nation state at the particular historical point have an impact, and can contribute, to the development of transnational activities.

Understood as such, the notion of enforced transnationalism is particularly useful in conceptualisations of forced migrations originating from ethnic conflicts where there are rapid socio-political changes occurring in the society of origin and involuntary movement to the host society, and where transnationalism is a consequence of the process of racialisation occurring in both societies.

In order to understand Bosnian post-refugee transnationalism as enforced, in subsequent chapters, this thesis explores two nation states that influence Bosnian migrants’ transnationalism, Bosnia and Ireland. I argue that both of these nation states are racial states, since they both operate, albeit in a different manner, politics of
ethnicity, which have a direct impact on Bosnian post-refugee transnationalism. This argument is built on Goldberg's (2002) development of racial state theory which I outline below.

**States as racial states**

While producing a comprehensive philosophical archaeology of racial conceptualisation, commencing with Hobbes and moving forward to Rousseau, Kant, Marx, Hegel, Mill and others, and through exploring the work of post-war European intellectuals such as Zygmunt Bauman and Michel Foucault, as well as expanding on the work of racial state pioneers Eric Voegelin and Michael Omi and Howard Winant, David Theo Goldberg developed a comprehensive theory of modern nation states as racial states where race and state are intrinsically interconnected and defined through each other.

Prior to Goldberg's intervention, theoretical literature on state formation had not dealt with the racial dimensions of the modern state. Similarly, theoretical literature on race and racism had not included the implication of the state in racial formations and exclusions. As Goldberg notes, there were micro-studies focused empirically on the racial experiences of particular states such as South Africa (Magubane, 1996; Posel, 1991); studies focused on state implication in policies regarding race in the United States or the United Kingdom; and a considerable amount of work on the use of state apparatuses, such as the law, to advance racially configured projects. Critical feminist theory and critical race theory in particular, served the latter work (MacKinnon, 1989; Brown, 1995; Burleigh and Wipperman 1991; Solomos and Back, 1996). While pioneering initiatives, such as Eric Voegelin’s book *Race and State* (1933/1997), and Omi and Winant’s *Racial Formation in the United States* (1995), were a welcome aberration on the otherwise theoretically barren landscape connecting race theory and state theory, according to Goldberg (2002) they still reduced the relational scope and presumed the conceptual discreetness between the concept of race and the concept of state. It is precisely this discreetness and conceptual distance that Goldberg challenges in his theory of racial states, where he argues for the co-articulation of race and the modern state. In his seminal book, *The Racial State* he argues that:
...race is integral to the emergence, development, and transformations (conceptually, philosophically, materially) of the modern nation state. Race marks and orders the modern nation-state, and so state projects, more or less from its point of conceptual and institutional emergence. The apparatuses and technologies employed by modern states have served variously to fashion, modify, and reify the terms of racial expression, as well as racist exclusions and subjugation. (Goldberg, 2002:4)

Goldberg develops his argument by concerning himself with the issue of homogeneity and the ways in which it has been taken axiologically to outdo the perceived threat of heterogeneity. He rests his argument on the notion that modern states are intimately involved in the reproduction of national identities and national populations through the articulation of race, gender and class.

Goldberg's theorisation was based on the premise that homogeneity needs to be viewed as heterogeneity in denial (2002:16). By giving elaborate examples of what he calls 'the tale of two cities', London and Amsterdam, Goldberg introduces us to his theorisation by showing how both cities displayed a heterogeneous mix of population long before this became a problem.

He notes that English courts employed black trumpeters as early as 1507 (Fryer, 1984, in Goldberg, 2002:19). Later black slaves, sailors and students were common in London, in addition to other flows such as those of Irish, Ashkenazi Jews, Germans, Dutch and Portuguese. The fact that the population of greater London, totalling 200,000 in 1600, rose to 575,000 by the end of that century (Josipovici, 1993) further points to the increased heterogeneity of the population.13

With regard to the Dutch capital, the situation is similar. The Dutch were a product of immigration from very early on. Flemish and Huguenots fleeing religious intolerance, Sephardic Jews chased from Spain and Portugal’s Catholic terror, as well as Ashkenazi Jews running away from Eastern European intolerance; they had all settled there (Goldberg, 2002:18). After 1610, when the Dutch started acquiring colonies,

13 One century later the population of the metropolis had reached just under one million, as recorded in the census of 1801.
more diversification followed, resulting in the fact that in the 18th Century 20 per cent of those arrested in Amsterdam were of foreign background (Schama, 1997).

By highlighting the presence of heterogeneity from very early on with regard to these two cities, Goldberg shows that despite its increased presence in more recent times, heterogeneity was present long before it became a cause for concern. This happened at a particular point in time coinciding with the creation of the modern nation state. It became a cause for concern at the time when multi-ethnic empires were being transformed into modern nation states. At that time, territory was to become non-transferable, borders were in greater need of centralised modes of administration and populations within them necessitated greater surveillance and what G. F. Leckie – in his case with regard to the British population – calls ‘uniform spirit’ and ‘homogenous character’ (Leckie, 1808, in Goldberg, 2002:16).

This perceived-as-necessary project of homogenisation lies at the heart of Goldberg’s theorisation of the entwined nature of race and state. As he explains:

...modern states, especially in their national articulation, ordered themselves not as heterogeneous spaces but in particular as racially and culturally homogenous ones. [...] The restriction in the recognisability of heterogeneity, political and theoretical, is tied up with deep seated presumptions about the modern state. The mis-recognition here is deeply related to the thick ways in which modern state formation has been racially fashioned, with the ways in which modern states have predicated themselves on racial differentiation, and on state promoted and prompted, racist exclusion and exploitation. (Goldberg, 2002:16)

Furthermore, this project of homogenisation was of racial character and expressive of the ordering nature of modernity (Bauman, 2004). Race was imposed upon what was suddenly seen as ‘threat of heterogeneity’.

A prevailing problematic of modernity, representative as last in that strand of modernism elaborated through the 19th Century positivity of science, has concerned control of both natural and social conditions. [...] Heterogeneity may be read as a challenge or threat, opportunity or potential problem. For modernity generally, and in the 19th century in particular, heterogeneity was

14 Later on the author elaborates on his argument in relation to a number of cities and states.
interpreted very much in the latter vein, taken to inject into the safety and stability of the known, predictable, and controllable worlds elements of the unknown, the unpredictable, the uncontrollable. (Goldberg, 2002:23)

Race was used to deal with this threat of heterogeneity, to account for it, to know it and to control it.

...so to begin with, in modernity what is invested with racial meaning, what becomes increasingly racially conceived, is the threat, the external, the unknown, the outside. [...] But paradoxically, once racially configured with modernity that threat becomes magnified, especially fraught, because in being named racially in a sense it is named as threat. In being so named the threat is reified, rendered real, realised. Race, especially as scientifically understood, appears then to inject control (or at least to claim it), to furnish comprehension (and perhaps comprehensibility) where it otherwise is clearly absent, or to re-establish determination in the face of threatened indeterminacy. The racial conception of the state becomes the real apparatus, the projects, the institutions for managing this threat, for keeping it out or ultimately containing it – but also (and again paradoxically) for keeping it going. (Goldberg, 2002:24)

Goldberg notes that this threat of heterogeneity becomes even more prominent in the wake of the abolition of slavery in the first half of 19th Century, when former slaves became freer to move. It also coincided with the theoretical shift from mono- to polygenism, where races were seen as separate species and their mating was seen as unnatural (Nott, 1843). ‘Mixed race’ or ‘hybrid’ offspring were seen as products of miscegenation, and, as their numbers increased following the colonial migrations of the 18th and 19th Centuries, they presented a challenge to polygenetic presumptions. After some revisions, and in the wake of Darwin, scientific hybridity failed, and the slow shift began from strictly scientific technologies of race and racism towards more culturalist articulations (Goldberg, 2002:25). As Goldberg states ‘the prevalence of eugenics in the first few decades of the 20th Century may be considered accordingly the tail end of ‘pure’ racial science, scientific racism’s more or less last spree’ (Goldberg, 2002:26).
This, however, was not the end of racist expressions, as biologically driven racism was not eradicated but replaced with culturally driven racism. The concept of hybridity still continued to represent a threat to white, European-based purity, power and privilege. Since white people were seen as superior intellectually and culturally to those who were non-white, the mixing of those who were non-white with white, would, according to white supremacists, ultimately lead to the degeneration, to the pollution and dilution of white supremacy. As Goldberg states, ‘Precisely at the moment we find greater likelihood of de facto heterogeneity among and between population groups, however conceived or defined, the greater the denial through racial fixity and reification.’ (Goldberg, 2002:28)

This is the crucial juncture. It is at the moment of modern state formation that the fact of heterogeneity and the concept of hybridity become a cause for concern. Hence race becomes a signifier of the other, the strange, the outside. It becomes the opposite of the homogenous population within the modern nation state where state is understood as ‘institutionalisation of homogenisation’ by Goldberg. As he argues:

> It bears pointing out here the inherently homogenising logic of institutions. In their dominant logical form, institutions are predicated principally on instituting, operating, and (re)producing homogeneity. If the state minimally is a collection of institutions, manifesting and (re) ordering itself necessarily in and through the logic of such institutional arrangement […] then one could say that the state inherently is the institutionalisation of homogeneity […] This homogenising logic is internal to administration and governmentality. To run counter to it, even in an administrative capacity is to run counter to the administrative or govern-mental logic. The state – and nation state especially, where nation here becomes the cultural reproduction of hegemonic consensus to state administrative mandates – is all about institutionally reproductive homogenisation. (Goldberg, 2002:30)

This is precisely how, according to Goldberg, state and race are intertwined and inseparable from one another. The state with its homogenising logic becomes the

15 For discussion regarding this shift towards cultural racism, see Wright (1998). On the history of the discourse of culturalism in the post-Second World War period see Lentin (2005) and on culturalisation of politics, see Zizek (2008).
main vehicle for racial categorisations and divisions. The state is in and of itself a racial state. Race and state are both modern phenomena and historically interlinked. Goldberg posits that all modern states are racial states, albeit each in its own specificity, not only because of their passive denial of the inherent heterogeneity of the populations they en-border, but because of their active role in constructing and naturalising the above-discussed homogeneity. It is the idea of race\textsuperscript{16} that was deeply embedded in the development of the modern state and that has strengthened the advancement of nationalism (Lentin, 2008). The traces of the idea, albeit in different discursive manifestations, are still present today.

Goldberg stresses the inherently contradictory and internally fractured nature of the state consisting ‘not only of agencies and bureaucracies, legislatures and courts, but also of norms and principles, individuals and institutions’ (Goldberg, 2002:7). However, he argues that it is possible to define the nation state as a more or less coherent entity in two related ways: as state projects ‘underpinned and rationalised by a self-represented history as state memory’, and as state power(s). It is precisely the power that the state has, or that the state is, which enables the state to define and carry out projects and to authorise official narrations of historical memory. The state has ‘a power to define the terms of its representations and to exercise itself and those over whom the authority is claimed in light of these terms’ (Goldberg, 2002:8). By using different techniques of governance such as constitutions, border control, policy making and the law, modern states exercise their power to categorise, and exclude or include in racially ordered terms.

It needs to be stated that Goldberg does not propagate the ‘power theory of the state’ where the state and power are two separate forms existing independently of one another, power being used by the state. Rather he proposes that:

\begin{quote}
The state acquires its specificity as a state by virtue of being constituted in and through powers (a range of powers) which the state at once embodies. [...] The state thus conceived is a state of power the existence and elaboration of which is a necessary condition, one might say, of the possibility of invoking the power(s) of the state. (Goldberg, 2002:9)
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{16} Eric Voegelin (1933) distinguishes between the concept of race and the idea of race. He sees the concept of race as a scientific concept composed of a set of false notions with no basis in provable scientific fact. The idea of race on the other hand, refers to a well ordered system of political dogmas.
There are further two important issues which need to be highlighted with regard to Goldberg’s theorisation of the racial state.

Firstly, it is not the racial state but racial states that he argues for. Each state has a different trajectory of its racial developments. In his book *The Threat of Race*, where he reflects on racial neoliberalism, Goldberg discusses examples of Racial Palestinianisation, Racial Europeanisation, Racial Latinamericanisation, arguing that it is not possible to offer a homogenising theory of the racial state, but rather racial states are embedded in historical context and geographical locations, among other things. He discusses particular examples of the states and areas, in what he terms ‘mappings’, suggesting regional models of racial configurations ‘rather than ideal types’, ‘each one with its own material and intellectual history, its prior conditions and typical modes of articulation’ (Goldberg, 2009:66). These regional models map and show the perennial nature of race-state connection, despite its travels through space and time. As such, Goldberg manages to overcome the often-present academic preoccupation between the universal and the particular – in this case the racial state and racial states – by arguing for the validity of what he terms ‘general but open-ended theory’, where:

> The theory would have to account for historical alterations and discontinuities in the modes of racial formation, in the disparate phenomena commonly expressed in racial terms as well as in those expressions properly considered racist.[...]

Moreover, architectural safeguards against the theoretical imperative to closure must be built into this framework so that it will be open to identifying and theorizing continuities or new additions to transforming racialized discourse, as well as discontinuities and aberrant expressions. (Goldberg, 1993:41)

Secondly, the idea of the racial state is often difficult to digest. Opponents of the concept have voiced their concern regarding its reductive nature and expressed their worry at the overarching impact it is proposing, particularly when society today is often described as ‘post-racial’ and where the president of one of the most powerful nation states can be black. They have often argued that race is not relevant anymore and that racial state theory can only apply to Nazi Germany or South Africa’s
Apartheid state. The process of racialisation that racial states utilise in order to enact the imperative of homogeneity – whether it is for dominant state ethnicity(s) or the others present within the state’s borders – needs to be understood beyond the black and white issue. Some time ago, Miles defined racialisation as a ‘process of categorisation, a representational process of defining an Other (usually, but not exclusively) somatically’ (1989:75, my emphasis). Arguably today, while race is by no means absent, this process centres largely on culture and ethnicity. The imperative of homogeneity is often enacted via the politics of ethnicity.

In this thesis I argue that both states, Bosnia and Ireland, in which Bosnian post-refugee transnationalism is grounded, are racial states. However, they are racial in their own specific ways. They operate politics of racialisations via different biopolitical regimes of governmentalties which I will discuss in the following chapters. In the last part of this chapter I discuss briefly Foucault’s concepts of biopolitics and governmentality, which this thesis utilises in order to interrogate the racial states of Bosnia and Ireland.

Foucault’s concepts of biopolitics and governmentality

The issue of power threads through the entire body of work by Michel Foucault. Whether discussed as a relation rather than a ‘thing’, whether highlighted for its productive rather than solely repressive nature, whether interrogated at the most micro levels of social relations and negated as exclusively located in the government and the state but rather exercised throughout the social body in a strategic manner, the notion of power is omnipresent in his thinking and theorisations of society. Sometimes it is discussed straightforwardly in relation to its disciplinary or pastoral properties, other times it is problematised in a complex manner along the axis of its relationship to knowledge, discursive practice, ethics, reason and truth. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to engage fully with the vast, illuminating and insightful work that Foucault left with regard to his genealogy of power. The two concepts, however, that this thesis

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17 Personal communication and response to some of the conference papers that I have presented. Also for an argument against Ireland being racial state see Fanning (2007). For more general discussion and criticism regarding The Threat of Race see Patterns of Prejudice (2010) Vol.44/1.
does employ in order to understand and theorise the operations of the racial states of Bosnia and Ireland are the interrelated concepts of biopolitics and governmentality.

While the question of biopower is inseparable from his work on the history of sexuality, Foucault’s concept of biopolitics was first introduced in his lectures at the Collège de France titled *Society Must Be Defended*, where he retraces the genesis of what he calls ‘power’s hold over life’ the emergence of which he saw as a ‘major mutation, undoubtedly one of the most important in the history of human societies’ (Senellart, 2007:369).

In his lecture of 17 March 1976, he returns to the classical theory of sovereignty in order to discuss how in the 19th Century the biological came under state control, what he terms ‘State control of the biological’ (Foucault, 2003:240), where the right of life and death was one of the main attributes of sovereignty, in the sense that the sovereign, at its most basic, can either have people put to death or let them live. Foucault notes the paradoxical nature of this right. Not only does the subject not exist as either dead or alive – he is rather neutral – until the sovereign grants him one right or the other, but there is also an imbalanced nature to the rights as the sovereign cannot grant life in the same way as it can execute death, hence at the very essence the right to life and death is really the right to kill.

However, Foucault draws two insightful conclusions from this theoretical paradox. Firstly, he points out that these rights have relocated life and death from ‘natural or immediate phenomena which are primal or radical’, relatively outside the field of power, to a position where they fall within the field of power (Ibid., p.240). Secondly, since there is an asymmetry between the rights, and the right of life and death is really a right to kill, rather than having ‘the right of life and death’, the sovereign has ‘the right to take life or let live’ (Ibid., p.241). This second point is of greater importance as it leads Foucault into the observation that in the 19th Century the sovereign right changed from ‘the right to take life or let live’ to ‘the right to make live and let die’. As he explains:

...one of the greatest transformations the political right underwent in the nineteenth century was precisely that, I wouldn’t say exactly that sovereignty’s old right – to take life or let live – was replaced, but it came to
be complimented by a new right which does not erase the old right but which
does penetrate it, permeate it. This is the right, or rather precisely the opposite
right. It is the power to “make” live and “let” die. The right of sovereignty was
the right to take life or let live. And then this new right is established: the right
to make live and let die. (Ibid., p.241)

In essence the transformation concerns the shift of the passive and active in the
exercise of power: previously the sovereign had a right to actively kill its subject or
passively let the subject live, while since the 19th Century, the right of sovereignty has
become one to actively make its subject live or passively let it die.

Foucault traces this transformation at the level of mechanisms, techniques, and
technologies of power. He notes that during the course of 17th and 18th Centuries there
was an emergence of technologies of power that were centred on the body and on
disciplining that individual body. They concentrated on the surveillance, hierarchies,
inspections, bookkeeping and records, described by Foucault as disciplinary
technology of labour. An individual body was controlled by these measures. In the
second half of 18th Century, a new technology of power emerges that is not
disciplinary to the individual body. It does not exclude disciplinary elements in their
totality; rather it integrates and modifies them. This new technology is less concerned
with the individual bodies. Instead, it focuses on the man-as-living-being, man-as-
species, to the extent that it encapsulates the subjects as the mass they form, what
Foucault terms the ‘multiplicity of men’, or ‘population’.

…the new technology that is being established is addressed to a multiplicity of
men, not to the extent that they are nothing more than their individual bodies,
but to the extent that they form, on the contrary, a global mass that is affected
by overall process characteristic of birth, death, production, illness, and so on
[...] After the anatomo-politics of the human body established in the course of
eighteenth century, we have, at the end of that century, the emergence of
something that is no longer an anatomo-politics of human body, but what I
would call a “biopolitics” of the human race. (Ibid., p.243)

Foucault gives examples of the development of a natalist policy and the increased
interest in the form, nature, duration and intensity of illnesses prevalent in a
population to highlight this transformation to biopolitics. While prior to the shift,
fertility, morbidity, and the like were problems to be dealt with on an individual level,
the biopolitical shift made them problems of the multiplicity of men. Biopolitics uses phenomena that are unpredictable in themselves or on an individual level but which 'at the collective level display constants that are easy, or at least possible, to establish' (Ibid., p.246). Medicine was developed with the main function of providing public hygiene. Also charities and insurances were developed to deal with the people of old age and those incapacitated, as well as safety measures against accidents. Furthermore, human relationship with the environment was made into a biopolitical urban problem. These are just some of the starting points of the biopolitical shift. More elaborate versions developed over time and with regard to an increasing number of issues, but all of these biopolitical interventions were aimed at the population rather than an individual body.

The theory of right basically knew only the individual and society: the contracting individual and the social body constituted by voluntary or implicit contract among individuals. Disciplines, for their part, dealt with individuals and their bodies in practical terms [...]. Biopolitics deals with the population, with the population as political problem, as a problem that is at once scientific and political, as a biological problem and as power's problem. [...] biopolitics emerges at this time. (Ibid., p.245)

Furthermore, Foucault argues that this new technology of power introduces new mechanisms of implementation that were different from those disciplinary mechanisms mentioned above. These mechanisms included forecasting and statistical estimation, the main purpose of which was to regularise. As he argues:

And their purpose [of biopolitical mechanisms] is not to modify any given phenomena as such, or to modify any given individual insofar as he is an individual, but, essentially, to intervene at the level at which these general phenomena are determined, to intervene at the level of their generality. The mortality rate has to be modified or lowered; life expectancy has to be increased; the birth rate has to be stimulated. And most important of all, regulatory mechanisms must be established to establish an equilibrium, maintain an average, establish a sort of homeostasis, and compensate for variations within this general population, and it aleatory field. In a word, security mechanisms have to be installed around the random element inherent in a population of living beings so as to optimise a state of life. [...] taking
control of life and the biological processes of man-as-species and of ensuring that they are not disciplined, but regularised. (Ibid., p.247)

It is this regulatory element of biopower that concerns this thesis. As I posit in the previous section, following Goldberg, each racial state takes an active part in constructing and naturalising the homogeneity of its population. It does so by categorising its man-as-species into different racial and ethnic categories, simultaneously administering them and their relation to the state, or, in the case of this thesis, states of belonging. The racial states operate on a biopolitical level to bring about homogeneity. They do so via different regimes of governmentality. Foucault introduced the term 'governmentality' for the first time in his forth lecture of the 1978 series *Security, Territory, Population*. The lectures mark the opening of a new sequence of his teaching at the Collège de France. However, they build upon his previous work concerning the study of the mechanisms that had existed from the end of the 19th Century in order to 'defend society'. When theorising the shift of disciplinary power towards biopolitics, the aim of which was to establish a homeostasis of the population, he notes that the intention of this new technology of power was not only to create equilibrium, but also to protect 'the security of the whole from internal dangers' (Foucault, 2003:249).

In his 1978 lectures, Foucault contrasts this technology of security with technologies of security that the sovereign used until the classical age in order to ensure the safety of his territory. He positions his theorisation between 'territory' and 'population', investigating how the situation changed from the sovereignty of the territory to the regulation of the population and what transformations happened on the level of governmental practice that have allowed for this conversion. He based his investigation mainly on the examination of the history of technologies of security. It was his analysis of the apparatuses of security relative to the population that led Foucault to accentuate the concept of government (Senellart, 2007). In problematising the concept, Foucault moves from postulating the government firstly in its original meaning as 'public authority' and 'exercise of sovereignty', to 'an art of exercising power in the form of the economy', building on the concept of economic government, finally arriving at an understanding of it as closely related to questions of the state. As he notes:
Is it possible to place the modern state in a general technology of power that would have assured its mutations, its development, and its functioning? Can we talk of something like a “governmentality” that would be to the state what techniques of segregation were to psychiatry, what techniques of discipline were to the penal system, and what biopolitics was to medical institutions? (Foucault, 1972:17)

It is at this juncture that his investigation of the history of technologies of security falls into the background and he turns towards the presentation of the genealogy of the modern state.

It is important to note that Foucault’s perspective of governmentality is not a break in his work regarding the earlier analysis of power but, as Senellart states:

... is inserted within the space opened up by the problem of bio-power. So it would not be accurate to claim that from this time the concept of “government” replaces that of “power”, as if the latter now belonged to an outmoded problematic. The shift from “power” to “government” carried out in 1978 lectures does not result from the methodological framework being called in question, but from its extension to a new object, the state, which did not have a place in the analysis of the disciplines. (Senellart, 2007:382)

Foucault coins the term ‘governmentality’ as a guideline for his analysis of historical reconstructions in the period stretching from Ancient Greece to modern neo-liberalist systems. According to Lemke (2000), it is during those reconstructions that Foucault develops the importance of the link between governing (‘gouverner’) and modes of thought (‘mentalité’) indicating that studies of technologies of power require an analysis of the political rationalities underpinning them.

The concept of governmentality, Lemke (2000) notes, was viewed as one of the most important in the work of Foucault, what Allen (1991) sees as a ‘key notion’ and Keenan (1982) as a ‘deranging term’. Lemke also argues that it played a decisive role in his analysis of power in the following ways:

‘It offers a view on power beyond a perspective that centres either on consensus or on violence; it links technologies of self with technologies of domination, the continuation of the subject to the formation of the state; finally it helps to differentiate between power and domination. (Lemke, 2000:3)
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to go into deeper discussions of these individual aspects. However, it is important to highlight the effect the first aspect had on the concept of governmentality. By negating the simplification involved in focusing on the juridical-discursive model of power, and by wrestling instead with war and struggle, returning at times to law and consensus, Foucault developed an understanding that power is about governing the forms of self-government, structuring and shaping the field of the possible actions of subjects. Thus, he defines governmentality as ‘a strategic field of power relations in their mobility, transformability, and reversibility’ within which “conduct of conduct” is established’ (Senellart, 2007:389).

Governmentality describes the ways in which populations are administered within the context of the state. In particular, it investigates the techniques and procedures by which the possible field of action for subjects is created and/or the conduct of the conduct is governed. This thesis utilises the concept of governmentality in order to investigate how two different racial states, Bosnia and Ireland, regularise their populations and operationalise their biopolitical projects of homogenisation.

Conclusion

This chapter provides a background to my conceptualisations of Bosnian post-refugee transnationalism. It presents a configuration of theories that after a long review of literature, and backward-and-forward journeys between the field and reading, provided the lens through which Bosnian post-refugee transnational phenomena could be understood. Smith and Guarnizo’s (1998) theorisations of transnationalism as grounded provided me with a way to connect with the fact that Bosnian migrants I spoke to, and spent time with, were not deterritorialised, free floating ‘suspended in air’ types of migrants. They were instead bounded by the two passports – Bosnian and Irish – they held, and by the policies and politics of the two nation states whose doors these two passports held open for them. Al-Ali’s (2001) notion of enforced transnationalism gave me tools to think about and theorise the impact of origins of Bosnian movements, namely their forced nature and initial and on-going connection to the society in conflict. Goldberg’s (2002) theory of the racial state was crucial in providing me with the voice to highlight the role that a state has in managing and
controlling populations in a racialised manner. Goldberg’s discussion of the issue of homogeneity was particularly helpful in illuminating the workings of both states, Bosnia and Ireland, who both, in their specific ways tried to homogenise Bosnian migrants into ethnic communities and populations. Finally, Foucault’s notions of biopower and governmentality provided fine tuning in understanding the techniques and rationalities of both states.

The rest of the thesis merges the insights gained from this cluster of theories in order to argue that Bosnian post-refugee transnationalism is an enforced condition, enforced by two particular biopolitical regimes of governmentality of Bosnia and Ireland. Before that, however, in the next chapter I reflect on my methodological and epistemological pathway during this research.
Chapter 2

‘Plotting with our own soul’ – methodological reflections and epistemological considerations

Introduction

Telling the story always takes the form of plotting. Even when we truly want to remember an event from the past, exactly-as-it-happened, we fall into the trap of the worst kind – we end up plotting with our own soul. [...] Memory is not a firmly closed tin which we can open when needed to find exactly the same content: it changes the past by giving it the present state, experience and emotion. That’s why every story from the past (and every moment is already past; the curse of the time is exactly that, that very rarely do we manage to catch and live through the moment in its present fullness, without the baggage from the past and insecurity of the future), every talk about anything, needs to be taken with caution ... and treated as a mixture of lies (told not on purpose), a little bit of true forgetfulness, egoistic additions of the person telling the story and a little bit of true honesty [...] all mixed up as a café crème where, instead of sugar, the plotting with our own soul is added. (Jovanovic, 2007:1)

That’s how it started. After months of negotiation with the literature related (and unrelated) to the topic, and months spent in the field, talking, interviewing, collecting, observing and generally hanging about, I was left sitting next to two piles of papers, an blank computer screen and an intention to write my methodological reflections on the journey undertaken for the purpose of this research. One pile of papers consisted of interview transcriptions, newspaper cuttings, pages and pages of printed out fieldnotes, scribbled pieces of paper with thoughts, reflections and ideas – all written over, under and across, highlighted and messy. Another pile was a compilation of academic writings on ‘methodology’, other people’s ponderings, wonderings and insights related to the issues such as knowledge, truth, validity, representability and other relevant themes for sociological research.

Three years into my PhD process and it seemed I had more questions than answers. I may have gained quite an insight into the ‘workings’ of Bosnian post-refugee
transnationalism, but the issues presented above were still gripping me. What kind of knowledge am I formulating here? Whose kind of knowledge? What about the whole issue of truth? The problem of the ability and/or wish to generalise? And the related puzzle of validity?

The blank computer screen was still in front of me when the corner of my eye caught the title of the book that I was reading at the time. It was a recently published book, written by a philosopher from Belgrade, Marija Jovanovic. It was called Plotting with Our Own Soul. Suddenly it struck me. I have known for a while that there is no uncovering of the ‘absolute’ truth in the research process, and the constructed nature of experience, memory and storytelling has been part of my research experience to date. I have also known that I, as a researcher, have a role to play in the formulation and construction of the knowledge gained from those experiences, memories and storytelling; particularly considering my background as being one of ‘them’ – but also not being.

What I did not know was how to understand and write out that complexity. The notion of ‘plotting with our own soul’ suddenly seemed to offer me the tools necessary to dig in into dealing with the entanglement of the subjectivities of both researcher and researched, when negotiating the knowledge production process.

The aim of this chapter is to untangle, as much as possible, the plotting of my own soul, and in doing so reflect upon the methodological and epistemological issues and problems encountered during this research, where methodology is understood ‘as “work in progress” rather than an abstract and ossified set of technological prescriptions’ (Dey, 2004:92).

This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part tells the story of my own journey during the process of this research as embedded in methodological considerations. The second part focuses in more detail upon some practicalities related to data gathering and analysis of the gathered data. The third part discusses the issues that were of great relevance with regard to my research project, namely the usefulness of multi-sited ethnography and the insider perspective, as well as problems encountered along the research process, in particular with regard to gatekeeping.
Creating some kind of order out of chaos

The underlying premise of this chapter is the acknowledgement that 'the way we as researchers understand the world, generate our research questions, define the important social categories we make use of, construct the field and define the context of relevance for our research are inextricably interlinked' (Grünenberg, 2006:29). In trying to disentangle the 'plotting of my own soul', I follow Grünenberg and subscribe to Donna Haraway's (1991) call for 'embodied objectivity', what she describes as 'situated knowledge', where 'the politics and epistemologies of location, positioning, and situating' are conditions for rational knowledge claims. As such, this chapter is an exercise in re-tracing the pathway of my own journey, and my own positionality, in order to locate the specific view from 'somewhere' (Haraway, 1991) – as opposed to a totalising, relativist view from 'nowhere' – from which this project came into existence.

The departure point of my PhD research project goes back to a meeting with my supervisor during the time I was collecting data for my master's thesis. That thesis dealt with the integration of Bosnian refugee women in Ireland. I remember clearly my frustration at the time with the interviews I was conducting with Bosnian women about their lives in Ireland. While I was interested in their experiences in Ireland they kept talking about their summer visits to Bosnia, about the food they make, about how times have changed there. 'I am not getting any data,' I said to my supervisor, '...all they talk about is Bosnia, not Ireland, it is just bad.' 'There is no such a thing as bad data,' she responded. It took me some time then I admit, but I know now what she meant.

While conducting research with Bosnian women for my master's thesis, I discovered a phenomenon, present in the Bosnian community in Ireland, of regular annual summer migrations home. These journeys are undertaken by most Bosnian people in Ireland, and they are the focus of my present doctoral project. In other words, my journey started upon the discovery of their journeys, and has consequently gained shape as a case study of Bosnian post-refugee transnationalism.
When I started my investigation of Bosnian annual summer migrations I did not conceive of my research strategy as a case study in the sense that a particular case was chosen in order to provide an insight into the issue or to redraw a generalisation. I did not start with trying to understand the process of post-refugee transnationalism and searched for a particular example, in this instance Bosnian summer migrations, to play a supporting role and facilitate my understanding of the issue. Rather, I was aware of the process of summer migrations being developed among the Bosnian post-refugee community in Ireland, and I wanted to delve deeper into understanding that process.

Stakes (2005), predictably, states that case study research is neither new, nor essentially qualitative, nor necessarily a methodological choice. Rather there are different ways of studying the case, such as analytically, holistically, hermeneutically, organically, culturally or by mixed methods – the focus being on the case instead of the method used. Hence the case study is both ‘the process of inquiry about the case and the product of that inquiry’ (Ibid., p.444).

My case study was both a choice of a method, but also, and primarily, a choice of what is to be studied, for what Yin (2003) calls ‘exploratory purpose’. In trying to explore the reasons for their participation in these transnational activities, the intrinsic case study, as a research strategy, provided me with the tools needed to engage with my research questions, as well as with my case as a unit of analysis. My aim was to gain a better understanding of the particular case of Bosnian post-refugee transnationalism. Therefore, the purpose of my research was not theory building through the process of generalisation, but rather knowledge acquisition, where the fact ‘that knowledge cannot be formally generalised does not mean that it cannot enter into the collective process of knowledge accumulation in a given field or in a society’

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18 In the beginning, as a matter of fact, I wanted to extend my understanding and conduct a comparative analysis of Bosnian summer migrations in relation to three different countries, Ireland, Sweden and Croatia, but temporal and financial reasons did not allow for such an extension. Had that been possible, this research could have ended up being a multiple case study.

19 In his discussion of case study as a research strategy for investigating contemporary phenomena within real life context, Yin (2003) distinguishes between exploratory, descriptive and explanatory case studies. His clarification does not imply clear boundaries between the strategies – they are large overlaps among them – rather, he points out to a purpose for which the research in undertaken; namely exploratory, descriptive or explanatory.
(Flyvbjerg, 2004:424). My understanding of knowledge production hence rested upon Geertz’s (1973/2003) observation that ‘small facts speak to the larger issues’. 

Foreshadowed problems – finding a path

I started collecting my data in summer 2005 after spending some months reading about theories of transnationalism, refugee studies and the racial state. I agree with Malinowski when he states:

Good training in theory, and acquaintance with its latest results, it’s not identical with being burdened with “preconceived ideas”. [...] Preconceived ideas are pernicious in any scientific work, but foreshadowed problems are the main endowment of a scientific thinker, and these problems are first revealed to the observer by his theoretical studies’. (Malinovski, in Stakes, 2005:461, original emphasis)

While my aim was not to hypothesise with regard to the theories read, my theoretical engagement provided me with the first guidelines of my research. I was guided by the review of the literature towards the insight that there is a gap in the field of transnational studies regarding refugee and post-refugee populations. Apart from a few notable exceptions (Al-Ali et al., 2001; Nolin, 2006), the literature on transnationalism deals largely with other types of migrants. From my previous research I was aware that the Bosnian ‘community’ in Ireland was largely constructed and managed from above. I also knew of their reluctance to return to Bosnia despite their holding dual citizenship (by the time of my research) and being free to make a living in either state. My foreshadowed problems seemed to centre, therefore, on grounding their summer migrations within this multi-sited space of their transnational activities and this required multi-sited ethnography (Marcus, 1995; Voigt-Graf, 2004).

With that in mind, I went in the summer of 2006 on a research trip to Bosnia, in order to open up my exploration process to the field of lived reality and to conduct pilot interviews with Bosnian migrants, who were living in Ireland, while they were on

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20 I deal with multi-sited ethnography in more detail in the third section of this chapter.
their summer trips to Bosnia. The first time I went to Bosnia I stayed for just over two weeks. I interviewed people in Sarajevo and Tuzla. Access to people was not a problem this time as I knew Bosnian people in Ireland from my previous study and was able to get hold of a few telephone numbers before my departure. While the number of people willing to meet was smaller than expected – I had ten telephone numbers, but only four were able to meet – the interviews conducted were of great importance in guiding my future research questions, particularly in relation to post-Dayton Bosnia and the changes that have occurred there in the past fifteen years. While in Sarajevo, I also spoke to representatives of the International Organisation for Migration and UNHCR about refugee return, and checked the main university library for the latest research on the issue. The IOM informed me that they had handled only one case of refugee return from Ireland (personal communication, Sarajevo, summer, 2006), while the UNHCR representative stated that they had not dealt with refugee return since the closure of the property restitution process.

What became apparent after my first year of browsing the literature in Ireland and my first research trip to Bosnia was that officially ‘all was well’. According to official Irish reports, the Bosnian community was well established in Ireland (Department of Social, Community and Family Affairs, 2002) and according to the IOM and UNCHR offices in Bosnia, there had been no significant return of Bosnian programme refugees from Ireland to Bosnia. Therefore, with regard to the information provided it would seem that Bosnian programme refugees in Ireland had been successfully integrated into Irish society. What these official documents and returnee statistics masked was the phenomenon of the transnational existences that Bosnian migrants were engaged in.

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21 The Refugee Agency in Ireland notes eight successful returns.

22 This is a process of returning property to those who left Bosnia during the conflict and whose property was occupied by those who stayed, usually of the opposite ethnicity. It is interesting to note that both organisations were reluctant to speak, or provide me with any documentation, about any issue that deals with ethnicity, despite the fact that the Dayton agreement (under whose auspice both organisations function) was established in order to end the ethnic conflict. It was through the interviews with my respondents that I first found out about ethnic migrations in post-Dayton Bosnia between the Federation and Republika Srpska.

23 Interestingly, there is a problem with refugee return statistics, particularly in relation to the property restitution process. People who availed of official help with property restitution were counted as returned refugees. Yet many have either not returned permanently (but rather temporarily just to get their property back), or sold their regained property and migrated elsewhere in Bosnia (where it is safe for them to live with regard to their ethnicity). Therefore, the accuracy of the ‘refugee return’ as a measurement of improvement and normalisation of post-Dayton Bosnian is questionable.
The nature of evidence, grounded theory and standpoint methodology

In her eloquent and insightful discussion of the nature of evidence in feminist enquiry, in particular with regard to the analysis of texts, Hawkesworth (2006) points out the complexity and multifaceted nature of evidence. She also notes that evidence is accredited within particular theoretical frameworks, and therefore knowing how particular theories structure perception and construct relevant evidence is crucial for validity claims.

Qualitative researchers have often suggested the simultaneous nature and continuation of the process involving research design, data collection and data analysis (Burgess, 1984a; Habenstein, 1970). While Wiseman states that ‘constant interplay of data gathering and analysis is at the heart of qualitative research’ (1974:317), Bryman and Burgess note that ‘sometimes, analysis seems to begin more or less immediately on entering the field’ (1994:218).

In agreeing with the insights above, my data collection and my data analysis were interwoven into each other. The insights from my pilot interviews and two weeks spent in Bosnia in the summer of 2006 enabled me to identify several emergent themes that seemed to be taking shape within my field of inquiry. These themes took me back to Bosnia in the summer of 2007, where I spent two months in Sarajevo interviewing Bosnian migrants, collecting documents on the Dayton agreement and newspapers cuttings relating to the themes discussed in my interviews. This time also saw me participating in the conference organised by the World Forum of Bosnian Diaspora (of which the Bosnian diaspora in Ireland was a member)24 and generally ‘being there’ (Geertz, in Seale, 2004). Upon my return to Ireland, I conducted another set of interviews with Bosnian migrants in Ireland and spent the rest of 2007 and the first six months of 2008 having regular meetings with Bosnian people involved in the running of the Bosnian Community Development Project in Dublin.

Therefore, to a large extent my research was informed by the grounded theory approach where there was a continuation of the process between data gathering and

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24 I only became aware of the existence of the World Forum of Bosnian Diaspora while conducting my field work in 2006. I have subsequently attended another conference organised by the Forum, in the Spring of 2007.
data analysis with ‘each informing and focusing the other throughout the process’ (Charmaz, 2005:508). However, this ‘continuation’ did not present itself in a neat chronologically linear order. When reflecting upon his own doctoral research, Dey (2004) describes his data collection and analysis as ‘interwoven in a seamless dialectic’. He states:

In a tidy world, the stages of this process would have been clearly demarcated: first sample, then analysis; then next sample, and further analysis, and so on [...] In practice, the boundaries merged and blurred, so that it was impossible to disentangle the precise points where data collection stopped and data analysis began. (2004:84)

My own project proceeded along the same lines. I found myself analysing my collected notes almost from the first written page. Also, often while conducting interviews, I would already in my mind relate the current answers to my previous collected data and negotiate further questions with those insights in mind. This process of ‘seamless dialectic’ between data collection and data analysis was particularly acute while I was in Bosnia in the summer of 2007 and while attending conferences on the Bosnian diaspora in the company of my key informants. The line between my observations and my interview conversations was blurred. Through ‘reflective rationalisation’ (May, 2001) throughout my data gathering I was continually interpreting and applying the new knowledge, hence analysing. For example, while ‘strolling’ (Bauman, 1992) past numerous newly erected mosques in Sarajevo, I could not help but think back to my interviews where people had discussed the problem of religiosity in post-Dayton Bosnia, and raising this in further interviews. Whyte illuminates this issue when he discusses the link between the observation and the interview within the ethnographic field. He states that:

Observation guides us to some of the important questions we want to ask the respondent, and interviewing helps us to interpret the significance of what we are observing. (1984:96)

So not only were the lines between the process of data gathering and data analysis blurred, but also the lines between different types of methods used. I will discuss this in more detail with regard to the problem of triangulation in the next part.
Returning to grounded theory, I wish to restate that my research was informed by a
grounded theory approach rather than led by it in a prescriptive manner. Indeed, there
is no such thing as grounded theory as a single unified methodology with clear
definitions and clear specifications. Rather there are different interpretations of
grounded theory stemming from early works by Glaser and Strauss (1967), or the
versions according to Glaser (1978) and Strauss (1987), among others (Charmaz,
1990; Kools et al., 1996). In addition, there have been recent moves by critics of older
versions of grounded theory to shift away from its underlying positivistic cast,
particularly with regard to its assumptions of an external but discernible world,
unbiased observer and discovered theory. In relation to this, Charmaz (1990, 2000a,
2003b) and Charmaz and Mitchell (2001) call for a constructivist grounded theory,
where grounded theory guidelines are adopted without objectivist, positivist
assumptions of its earlier formations, and where the emphasis is on the studied
phenomenon rather than the methods of studying it. This means, according to
Charmaz:

...giving close attention to empirical realities, and our collected renderings of
them – and locating oneself in these realities. It does not assume that data
simply awaits discovery in an external world, or that methodological
procedures will correct limited views of the studied world. [...] Instead, what
observers see and hear depends upon their interpretative frames, biographies,
and interests, as well as the research context, their relationships with research
participants, concrete field experiences, and modes of generating and
recording empirical materials. [...] Similarly, our conceptual categories arise
through our interpretations of data rather than emanating from them ...
(Charmaz, 2005:509)

Thus I have entered the field knowingly and willingly ‘biased’. As mentioned above, I
was aware of the constructed nature of the Bosnian ‘community’ in Ireland as well as
the ‘under-construction’ nature of post-Dayton Bosnia. Informed by the race critical
theory and racial state theory, my aim was to problematise the role ethnicity plays in
Bosnian post-refugee transnationalism. In other words, my epistemological

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25 For example, Seale (1999) calls for the retention of grounded theory but without its adherence to a 'naïve realist
epistemology', Bryant (2002) proposes re-grounding of grounded theory in an epistemology that takes recent
methodological developments into account, while Clarke (2003) aims to integrate postmodern sensibilities within
grounded theory.
underpinnings had edges of standpoint methodology (Harding, 2003) where my research engagement was intertwined with political interest in interrogating the interplay of ethnicity with regard to both nation states – Bosnia and Ireland – between which Bosnian post-refugee transnationalism was enacted.

While standpoint theory, as a critique of the relations between knowledge and power, dates back to the Marxian 'standpoint of the proletariat' (Lukas, 1923/1971; Jameson, 1988), and while the echoes of the themes related to the standpoint logic of inquiry penetrate the sociology of knowledge, political philosophy and the philosophy of science and epistemology, I follow Patricia Hill Collins (1997) in understanding it as a prescription for the research practice. While my research was nowhere near being participation action research, nor having sufficiently delved into the problematic of power relations between researcher and the researched, I was nevertheless influenced by the need to bring the ‘context of discovery’ into the heart of the discussion of the research process. In recognising that ‘some kinds of interests, values and politics advance the growth of knowledge’ (Harding, 2003:302), the insights from the standpoint methodology enabled me to tease out my political concerns as a useful tool for my research process, and relate the same to both my data gathering and data analysis.

In summary, the insights from both grounded theory26 and standpoint methodology enabled me to negotiate my research process, acknowledge my positionality within it, and led me towards the nature of the evidence sought, to which I now turn.

The thick and thin of my research journey – an attractive nuisance of qualitative data, theoretical sampling and the process of triangulation through ‘the art of listening’

My research has been shaped by three main sources of evidence: documents, interviews and participant observation. However, as the previous sections have pointed out there were neither clear boundaries between these different sources of evidence nor were they the only sources of my insights into the phenomenon of

26 Indeed, Byrman and Burgess (1994) question the employment of grounded theory in its entirety by researchers despite the frequent citations of its usage, while Richards and Richards write that grounded theory mostly serves qualitative research as a general indicator of the desirability of making theory from data, rather than a guide to a method for handling data (Richards and Richards, 1994).
Bosnian post-refugee transnationalism. During my three years of researching Bosnian migration, I encountered people and settings that have been of great help in furthering my understanding of the phenomena under study, but which would not easily fit into the three main sources of evidence.

For instance, while conducting interviews in Sarajevo in the summer of 2007, I stayed with a returnee-refugee Bosnian family for two months. Sharing meals, afternoon coffees and day-to-day living arrangements with the family provided me with insights into living in post-Dayton Bosnia which would have been hard to achieve through the rather limited interview process. The family I stayed with owned a small guesthouse and there were always people passing by and the discussions, particularly with regard to the political conditions of post-Dayton Bosnia, were very helpful in informing my understanding of why it can be hard for Bosnians to permanently return 'home'. While this nature of evidence cannot be directly linked to participant observation, since the people in whose daily activities I participated were not directly involved in transnational activities between Bosnia and Ireland, the intimate encounters with daily life in Sarajevo provided me with tacit knowledge that was very helpful for the subsequent interviews I conducted in Ireland upon my return.

Additionally, during my stay in Bosnia in the summer of 2007 I conducted interviews with two members of the presidential cabinet, Mr Nebojsa Radmanovic representative of the Serbian ethnicity, and Dr Haris Silajdzic representative of the Bosnian Muslims. While interviews with the members of the presidential cabinet were not part of my research plan, when the opportunity arose in Sarajevo to have a contact meeting with Mr Radmanovic I conducted the interview, and with his help spoke to Dr Silajdzic as well. The interviews were very illuminating as a background to my later interviews conducted with Bosnian migrants and also as an addition to newspaper articles I had collected in Sarajevo.

27 At present, as stipulated by the Dayton Agreement, the Presidential Cabinet in Bosnia consists of three presidents, each representing one of the three main ethnic populations in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Dr Haris Silajdzic, representing the Bosniak population, and Mr Zeljko Komsic, representing the Croatian population, are elected from the Federation part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while Mr Nebojsa Radmanovic, representing the Serbian population, is elected by the Republika Srpska part of the country. Together they serve a four-year term but every eight months the president with the most votes is elected 'president of the presidency'. Interestingly, while the Dayton Agreement aims to provide maximum equality between the three main constituent peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina, by default it prevents members of other ethnicities from reaching the status of president.
Apart from that, my participation in two conferences of the World Forum of the Bosnian Diaspora, first without and later with Bosnian representatives from Ireland, further embedded my understanding of Bosnian post-refugee transnationalism. Therefore, after three years researching Bosnian transnationalism, I had accumulated what Miles (1979) describes as ‘an attractive nuisance’ of qualitative data. In addition to the interviews with Bosnian migrants and documents related to the integration process of Bosnians in Ireland, as well as documents related to post-Dayton Bosnia, I had my own notes on the workings of the Bosnian Community Development Project. I also had communication notes gained through participation in two conferences of the World Forum of the Bosnian Diaspora, interviews with two members of the Bosnian presidential cabinet, as well as insights, comments, conversations and observations that I ‘collected’ along the way of moving within the circles of Bosnian post-refugee transnationalism that have all shaped my understanding of the migration activities under study.

In line with my leaning towards certain aspects of grounded theory, I adhered to the principle of theoretical sampling where the successive sites and sources of data collection were selected flexibly in relation to my extending and refining of the themes that were emerging in the field. For example, although the primary focus of my research was the transnational activities of Bosnian migrants, while in contact with the Bosnian Community Development Project in Ireland, I became aware of their links with the World Forum of the Bosnian Diaspora. This observation led me to travel with the Bosnian Community Development Project’s members to a conference in Sarajevo where I learnt about the diasporic element of Bosnian post-refugee transnationalism. Additionally, while interviewing Bosnian migrants in Sarajevo and being there during the summer, I became aware of the way Bosnian people viewed the month of August as the month when ‘the diaspora comes back’ and had consequently collected newspaper reports during the month of August related to the Bosnian diaspora.

In essence, my aim was to gather as much as possible of ‘circumstantial evidence’ (Appadurai, 1988) and sample theoretically relevant and stimulating settings, rather than to generalise from the representative samples of the population (Dey, 2004). While understanding the interwoven nature of data collection and data analysis, as
well as intermingling different evidence collected, in the next sections I reflect upon my three main sources of evidence.

*Interviews – organised and unorganised talk*

During the time of my fieldwork I carried out 15 in-depth semi-structured interviews with Bosnian migrants who live in Ireland but are engaged in annual migrations home during the summer months. Background information related to the interview participants can be found in the Appendix 1. Some of the interviews were conducted in Ireland and some in Bosnia and Herzegovina. All were conducted in the local language. The formal interviews, the ones that were recorded, lasted from one to four hours. However, I also gained many insights from non-formal discussion in both countries, Ireland and Bosnia.

In her reflections on her experiences of interviewing governmental officials for a study of Gypsies and aspects of governmental policy, Okely (1994) points out that free flowing conversations and dialogues occurred while she was in the field, so that the number of people encountered amounted to several hundred. Therefore, she argues that when analysing qualitative data involving participation in the field, the number of interviewed people is not an adequate guide to the amount and nature of information collected, since the number of ‘informants’ is much bigger than the number of interview respondents. In my own research this was particularly evident during my stay in Sarajevo, when I spent time talking to Bosnian migrants outside the formal interview situations, as well as with their friends and friends of friends of refugees – participating in what Reinharz (1997) calls ‘sidewalk interviewing’.

In addition, the interviews that were actually recorded varied depending on different contexts. Some of the interviews were conducted in the office of the Bosnian Community Development Project and others in the houses of migrants themselves. Those conducted in the offices of Bosnian Community Development Project were most structured time-wise. They were organised by my key informant who was running the Project and he offered to arrange for some Bosnian migrants to come over during lunch hour to be interviewed by me. While this was a great help, as it was difficult for me to get to talk to young people, and also to men not provided by my
snowballing sample, it also meant that I had limited time for the interviews. I had followed two threads in reaching my interview respondents; firstly by snowballing from the interviews conducted for my master’s thesis, and secondly through having interviews organised by the Bosnian Community Development Project. Apart from the fact that the interview time was shorter, I found that the interviews in the Bosnian Community Project forced me to be more straightforward with my research questions. While in other settings the talk would start to build more naturally from the onset of the meeting, the organisational setting of the office space, as well as the dynamics of the interaction, provided for a more official meeting. I reflect upon the role of gatekeeper/key informant in more depth in last part of this chapter.

The interviews conducted in migrants’ houses were much longer and less structured. Davies (1999) points out that in the ethnographic interview setting a dyadic interaction of interview-respondent is often interrupted by other people present and hence it is essential that these be noted as part of the interview context. In all but one interview setting involving me visiting Bosnian migrants in their own homes, other family members or friends were present. Sometimes only partners would be present, other times the whole family was there. Despite the different degrees of others engaging with the interview process, ranging from occasional comments to full involvement, Davies argues that ‘by such informal mechanisms traditional one-on-one ethnographic interviews are not uncommonly converted into a form of group interview’ (1999:104). There were varying degrees of involvement of others in my interview settings. For example, in one situation the woman of the household spoke to me while the rest of the family sat behind providing occasional comments; on another occasion I spoke to a couple who were both engaged in the conversation. In yet another interview setting I spoke to a woman while her friend, whom I had interviewed previously, was also present and expanded upon some questions from our previous interview.

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28 The main reason for interviews being organised by the Bosnian Community Development Project was that the Project was not allowed to give telephone numbers or addresses of Bosnian migrant without their permission so I could not have been the first point of contact.

29 She also observed that when interviewing couples together there are patterns of domination present in their own interaction which can be very informative for the ethnographer (Davies, 1999). While beyond the focus of my present research, I have noted different dynamics in the conversations with my female interviewees depending on whether their partner was present or not.
Therefore, not only was the line between the organised and unorganised talk blurred, but in some interviews there was no clear distinction between one-to-one and group talk. As such, my interview settings varied from the very official and organised presidential interviews, through semi-formal conversations in the Bosnian Community Development Project, to quite informal home talks with Bosnian migrants often involving other people and Bosnian food and coffee.

As expected, the power relations in the interactions varied within different settings. Fairclough (1989) argues that the interview must be understood at three levels: the level of discourse produced, which is the text itself; the level of interaction, which mainly concerns the processes of production and interpretation of meaning that happen during the interview process; and finally the level of context. In understanding that these levels are not fully separable but rather affected by one another in different ways in different settings with regard to the level of interaction, he argues against the presumption of equality of the participants within the interview context.

In relation to my own interviews, the power relations within interactions shifted greatly from one setting to another. During the presidential interviews the expertise on the subject was clearly pronounced as belonging to the presidents, to the extent that I was on one occasion challenged with regard to my own data, as the extract below shows.

\[Maja:]~~People have told me, people here in Sarajevo, the reasons behind their leaving. They said that they were not treated the same, that they could not get...certain documentation...I cannot name names but they could not get through the bureaucracy as it is at present and that is why they left...\]

\[Dr Silajdzic:]~That is not true.\]

\[Maja:]~... they said that their children were treated differently in schools, they were getting lower grades...I am just telling you, from the position of someone who came over here what I see, what I hear, what I write...\]

Needless to say, following the encounter I did not feel in a position to push the issues relating to that particular question further, and moved the interview towards the next topic. I was in the presidential offices in Sarajevo, where a certain amount of time was
allocated for my interview and the meeting had the aura of a favour granted, thus the power to push certain issues further was not on my side.

In a different setting, in a Bosnian household in Dublin, the women I interviewed clearly stated to me that she felt very happy that she could talk about the discrimination her family had been experiencing in the neighbourhood. On this occasion I was viewed as having an expertise in the field of migration and integration of ethnic minorities and she felt empowered to contribute to that knowledge. Discussing interviewing female gang members, Miller and Glassner state that the experience of being listened to and taken seriously by a researcher possessing high social status can be experienced as both empowering and reflexively enlightening and, as such, is not necessarily a barrier to communication (1997).

Although during the process of production and interpretation of meaning in the interview context the balance of power and equality shifted between, as well as within, different settings, I nonetheless agree with Holstein and Gubrium that in the interview process both parties are ‘necessarily and unavoidably active. Each is involved in meaning-making work. Meaning is not merely elicited by apt questioning nor simply transported through respondent replies; it is actively and communicatively assembled in the interview encounter’ (1995:4).

In the next section I reflect upon two other sources of evidence, namely participant observation and the documents collected.

*Varying degrees of participant observation and studying documents as agents*

In a similar way to my interviews being guided conversations – where although a persistent line of inquiry was pursued, the actual stream of questions was fluid rather than rigid (Rubin and Rubin, 1995) – my field presence was multi-sited and flexible. In common with Denzin’s (1989) definition of ethnography as ‘a curious blending of methodological techniques,’ which includes ‘some amount of genuinely social interaction in the field with the subjects of the study, some direct observation of relevant events, some formal and a great deal of informal interviewing’ as well as

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30 I only managed to speak to the second president after the first president introduced my research to him and asked if he would speak to me as well.
‘open-endedness in the direction the study takes’, my role as an ethnographer changed depending on the context of my sampling setting. In some sites my role involved more observation, in others more participation.

For example, while spending time with representatives from the Bosnian Community Development Project in Sarajevo, I participated with them in a conference of the World Forum of the Bosnian Diaspora. I attended the speeches and workshops and afterhours discussions. Also my regular attendance at the offices of the Bosnian Community Development Project in Dublin involved extensive discussions with workers there, as well as with members of the Bosnian community in Ireland, about politics and policies in Bosnia and Ireland, where my opinion was often asked for. On the other end of the spectrum, while conducting the interviews with Bosnian migrants in Sarajevo and Tuzla in the summers of 2006 and 2007, I did not get much chance to participate in migrants’ daily lives. Part of the reason was that some migrants’ homes were quite far away from where I was staying, but the main reason was that their lives there revolved around their friends and family and they were not involved in any organised activities in Bosnia. The only people who were involved were the officers from the Bosnian Community Development Project, mentioned above. However, during the course of my study I was in Bosnia on a number of occasions and in the summer of 2007 I spent two months living in Sarajevo, observing the changes in post-Dayton Bosnia. As mentioned in the previous section, the issues raised in the interviews with Bosnian migrant became visible to me while strolling around the streets of Sarajevo. For example, I observed numerous mosques being erected and religion seeping into the city centre though new areas being designated as *vakuf*[^31] – where the people’s behaviour is guided by the rules of Islam – and the increasing number of women veiled or wearing a burqa. Therefore, while not participating directly in their daily activities in Bosnia, I was observing their surroundings and participating in the ‘totality of experience’ (Okely, 1994).

Yin defines participant observation as a special mode of observation in which a researcher is not merely a passive observer but rather assumes ‘a variety of roles

[^31]: While *vakuf* means any charitable donation, generally in the shape of money or property that a person (*vakif*) donates to Allah; its purpose is for everybody’s use. In this instance I refer to the city areas where the rules of the mosque apply.
within a case study situation and may actually participate in the events being studied’ (2003:93). While agreeing with Yin that the researcher’s role as a participant observer will vary during the field stay, my ethnographic experience went beyond the dichotomy of observer and participant observer and was rather characterised by varying degrees of participant observation. In some settings my participatory role was more pronounced than in others; in certain settings my observations did not entail direct but rather indirect participation – as in the case of my summer stay in Sarajevo – and in other situations the roles merged into one another, as during my conference attendance of the World Forum of Bosnian Diaspora.

The final main sources of evidence in my research were documents collected in both Ireland and Bosnia. In Ireland the documents concerned were related to the Bosnian Community Development Project and the agencies that the Project worked with, such as the Refugee Agency and the Department of Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs. The documents included administrative documents such as proposals, progress reports and other internal records, as well as written reports of the events and minutes of the meetings, dealing mainly with integration related issues regarding the Bosnian community in Ireland.

In Bosnia I collected documents relating to the Dayton agreement and its implementation mainly from the government offices and websites. I also collected documentation from UNHCR and IOM in Sarajevo, representatives of which I also spoke to. The documents related to the conditions of return to post-Dayton Bosnia, property restitution processes and also returnee statistics. While in Sarajevo in the summer of 2007 I collected, over two months, newspaper articles related to the newly developing religiosity in Bosnia, the politicisation of ethnicity and diaspora related issues, as these were the three main themes that were becoming transparent from my interviews and observations at the time. I collected articles from one of two main daily Bosnian newspapers, Oslobodjenje. It was chosen for its longevity establishment as well as its claim to independence of opinion. The other daily

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32 Oslobodenje (Liberation) is one of the most popular daily newspapers in Sarajevo. It was founded in 1943 and its political allegiance is left and liberal. It is owned by the Sarajevo Tobacco Factory and the Sarajevo Beer Factory.
paper, *Dnevni Avaz*, was generally considered overtly religious in its promotion of Islam.

Apart from the documents directly related to the integration of Bosnian migrants in Ireland and issues related to the conditions of post-Dayton Bosnia, I collected documentation relating to the Bosnian diaspora more generally through two main websites, the website of the Bosnian Institute in the UK and the website of The World Forum of Bosnian Diaspora.

The documentation emerged from both primary sources, which came into existence in the period under research, and secondary sources, which are interpretations of the events based on the primary sources (Bell, 1993).

It is important to note than in selecting documents as evidence I was aware that I had mediated, rather than direct, access to the evidence under investigation. The evidence I was using had already been produced, ‘[had] already become “fixed” in some material form’ which I, as the observer, had to ‘read’ (Scott, 1990:4). The materials under consideration contained intentional messages where ‘the containment of the text is the primary purpose of the physical medium’ (Ibid., p.13).

Prior argues that the task of the social scientist in collecting ‘facts about society’ should involve ‘removing the dust jackets of the documentary material that he or she encounters, and asking a number of simple questions, namely: How exactly, and by whom was this document assembled? Who was intended to read it, and for what purpose?’ (2004:380). As she points out, documents ‘serve as active agents in schemes of human interaction – agents to be recruited, manipulated, scorned or hidden’ (Ibid., p.388).

Conceiving documents as agents has underpinned my analysis of their contents.

In understating that the analysis was not a distinct phase of my project, as discussed above, but rather research design, data collection and data analysis were simultaneous.

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33 *Dnevni Avaz* (Daily Voice) was founded in 1995 by Fahrudin Radonic with financial aid from the SDA (Bosniak National Party). The paper claims its political allegiance to be centre-right. The newspaper is often viewed as Pro-Bosniak as reflected by the sales; in the Bosnian federation Avaz holds 62% of the market, while in the Serbian part of Bosnia it hold only 18%.

and continuous processes (Bryman and Burgess, 1994), the final part of my analysis proceeded as follows.

Richards and Richards (1994) discuss two kinds of coding: coding for retrieval of text segments and open coding for theory generation, building on Strauss and Corbin’s definition of open coding as ‘the process of breaking down, examining, comparing, conceptualising and categorising data’ (1990:61). At the initial stages of my research I used open coding, particularly in relation to the pilot interviews, allowing for themes to emerge from the text. At later stages, retrieval of the text segments was a more pronounced method of analysis, in relation to both interviews and documents collected.

During the course of my project I did, as the discussion above shows, triangulate the data through three main sources of evidence, semi-structured interviews, varying degrees of participant observation and documents collected.

While arguing for the usage of many different types of evidence as a source of strength in the case study research, Yin (2003) distinguishes between ‘convergence of evidence’ triangulation and ‘non-convergence of evidence’ triangulation. In ‘convergence of evidence’ triangulation, the phenomena of the case study have been supported by more than a single source of evidence, while in a ‘non-convergence’ triangulation multiple sources of evidence are analysed separately and the conclusions are compared to one another. My case study of Bosnian post-refugee transnationalism has been supported by ‘convergence of evidence’ data triangulation.

However, my data triangulation was not preconceived as a methodological response to criticism of ethnography as being subjective – in not being guided by structure that would ensure another researcher producing similar data – and susceptible to bias. Rather it was used to ensure that my findings were not idiosyncratic (Hammersley, 1998) and to increase the amount of detail about the topic (Denzin, 1989). In other words, the triangulation of data was not used as a guarantee of validity but as a way of getting a ‘thick description’ (Geertz, 1973) of the phenomenon under study.

35 The concept of ‘triangulation’ was introduced into the social sciences by Campbell and Fiske (1959) as a procedure for establishing the convergent and discriminant validity of measures through the application of a
In trying to get a thick description of the field, I became committed to Les Back’s understanding of sociology as the ‘art of listening’. As he states, ‘thick descriptions of life are always interpretative and do not merely attempt to mirror a simple obdurate reality. They are selective and discerning but also require imagination and creativity’ (2007:21). Furthermore, Back points out that ‘sociological attention involves a mode of thought that works within and through a democracy of senses’ (Ibid., p.25). My data triangulation was born out of listening and talking to Bosnian migrants involved in transnational activities, of walking down the streets of Sarajevo and ‘Bosnian’ neighbourhoods in Dublin, of hearing mosque calls and smelling the burek, and letting each one of those paths take me back and forward to my theoretical ideas until the ‘vocabulary for its explication’ was found.

Multi-sited ethnography, the insider-outsider perspective and the issue of gatekeeping

Social anthropology was formerly associated with the study of non-Western societies mainly by Westerners and empirical sociological work was concerned mainly with Western societies of which the sociologist was a member (Okely, 1994). While the historically divisive association of sociology with Western societies and anthropology with non-Western societies is no longer used, or appropriate, the notion of ‘field’ can still carry a connotation of a researcher, equipped with academic training, going away to study removed populations or phenomena. Even if the field itself may not be far removed from the home ground – what Auge (1995) in his discussion of anthropology and supermodernity terms ‘the anthropology of near’ – the field can still be implied as a bounded entity into which the researcher enters to collect the data and then exits to return home when the data collection is finalised. Although physical presence and participant observation are necessary parts of ethnographic fieldwork, and as Hastrup and Hervik argue ‘ethnographic fieldwork must be experienced as performed rather than just communicated in dialogue’ (1994a:3), this raises the multitrait-multimethod matrix, and by Webb et al. (1966) who argued that the validity of propositions can be enhanced by using a variety of methods. Denzin (1998) later expanded the concept.

36 The term has been criticised by Back for its attempt ‘to make the commonplace ethnographically exotic’ (Back, 2007:9).
question of how the contours of the fieldwork are shaped when the field is ‘at home’ and the ‘home’ is not in one place? It is to these two issues that I now turn.

Multi-sited ethnography, fieldwork and the field

The Bosnian migrant population in Ireland, which was the focus of my research, is engaged in transnational activities on an annual basis between Ireland and Bosnia. Therefore, there are two ‘homes’ in their migrant lives.

Since the mid-1980s, and often associated with the wave of intellectual thought labelled ‘postmodern’, the mode of ethnographic research moves out from single sites and local situations of traditional ethnographic research in order to examine the circulation of meanings, objects and identities in diffuse time and space. The strategies this ‘mobile ethnography’ relies on ‘literally following connections, associations and putative relationships’ (Marcus, 1995:97) across different sites within which they develop and change. This follows the recognition that if the object under study is ultimately mobile and multiply situated, then the ethnography of such phenomena should be multi-sited. As Marcus argues, ‘multi-sited ethnographies define their objects of study through several different modes or techniques. These techniques might be understood as practices of construction through (pre-planned or opportunistic) movement [...] of tracing within different settings [...] a complex cultural phenomenon’ (1995:106). In his paper on the emergence of multi-sited ethnography, Marcus (1995) distinguishes between six multi-sited procedures, as follows: ‘follow the people’, ‘follow the thing’, ‘follow the metaphor’, ‘follow the plot, story or allegory’, ‘follow the life or biography’ and ‘follow the conflict’. Within the ‘follow the people’ technique the procedure is quite simply to follow and stay with the movements of a particular group of initial subjects in order to gain an ethnographic insight. However, multi-sited ethnography goes beyond simply doing research in different sites – it is about engagement with circulation and mobility as a cultural formation in the absence of singular models ‘such as “the world system” or “capitalism”’ (Ibid., p.87).

37 It is important to state that the idea of multi-sited ethnography is not entirely new. As Hannerz (2003) points out, it was the pioneer of intensive anthropological fieldwork, Malinowski, who was already going multilocally when he followed the Trobrianders along the Kula ring. However, it was George Marcus that propagated the idea most consistently in the last 20 years of the 20th Century.
Since research on migrant transnationalism cannot be conducted in fixed places (Voigt-Graf, 2004; Amit, 2000), my own research required multi-sited ethnography. Therefore, my fieldwork followed Bosnian migrant lives. Some interviews were conducted in Ireland, some in Bosnia, and apart from travelling to Bosnia on more than one occasion, I spent two further months in Bosnia in the summer of 2007 when the Bosnian migrants from Ireland were there. It was helpful to conduct interviews in both locations as certain issues would come up that if the interviews had been in other locations would not become transparent. For example, while I was talking to people in their homes in Bosnia they would naturally, without me asking questions, start talking about their surroundings with regard to ethnicity. In other words, they would inform me of their neighbourhood being Serb, Croat, Muslim or mixed, and talk about property exchanges that they had undertaken in order to better fit into ethnically segregated post-Dayton Bosnia. Similarly, during the interviews in Ireland, the talk was about neighbours and fitting into neighbourhoods there. This multi-sited ethnography therefore allows for geography and interrelated proximity of experience to be brought into the fieldwork.

It is important to state, however, that multi-sited fieldwork does not claim to have an ethnographic grasp of the entire field within the chosen research topic. Rather it is a selection of sites from among many which potentially could be included in order to highlight the issue under research. Additionally, in a world where ethnography is increasingly becoming the ‘art of possible’ (Hannerz, 2003), due to financial, temporal and other restrictions being imposed on the researcher’s ability to spend prolonged time periods in the field, multi-sited ethnography allows for the sampling of different ethnographic contexts while still adhering to the project conditions.

Finally, and somewhat problematically, the notion of immersion in the ‘field’ during the fieldwork implies that there is an ethnographic field that exists out there awaiting discovery. Both Dossa (1997) and Caputo (2000) point out that despite the on-going critical resistance in anthropology to view the world as made up of discrete places, there is ‘continued existence of spatialised notion of the “field”, as a site of the research involving physical displacement to a geographically distant place in order to pursue extended face-to-face encounters with “others”’ (Caputo, 2000: 19).
So not only is the field often presumed to be outside, away from ‘home’, an outlook that according to Caputo (2000) still clings to a colonial view of the world, but it can also still be construed as a self-contained entity in a bounded location.

My fieldwork experiences challenged both assumptions. Firstly, both sites of my multi-sited ethnography were to a varying degree home: Ireland, my current home and Bosnia as one of my previous homes. Therefore, going away to do the fieldwork was also returning home. While I had not lived in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1994, I had grown up there, knew the local language and was familiar with its cultural characteristics.

Secondly, there was no separation between my fieldwork in Ireland and fieldwork in Bosnia. In following Bosnian migrants’ transnational activities I was participating in a ‘field’ that went beyond either country. It was the very interconnections between the two places that was central to the space of Bosnian migrant transnationalism and that made up the fluidity of my fieldwork.

As a long-standing critic of ‘exoticist bias in anthropological orthodoxies which artificially position “field” versus “home”,’ Okely has strongly argued for ‘the importance of autobiographical reflexivity as an integral element of ethnographic fieldwork’ (Okely, in Amit, 2000:5). Following Okely, Amit argues that the idea of fieldwork where the ethnographer is expected to break from his/her usual involvement in order to immerse himself/herself in the ‘field of others’ is an oxymoron. Rather, the ethnographic field is a construction that ‘involves efforts to accommodate and interweave sets of relationships and engagements developed in one context with those arising in another’ (2000:6).

The ‘field’ in my own ethnographic experience kept changing boundaries through my participation in different sites of Bosnian post-refugee transnationalism, providing for what Strauss (2000:163) describes as ‘following threads and trails of people, publications and practices’ that together hold a story, and what Marcus and Fischer (1986) call ‘messy, qualitative experience’. Led by the epistemological underpinnings of a grounded theory approach, as expressed through a theoretical sampling technique, the ‘field’ of my fieldwork was a set of interconnecting locations;
conceptual and relational opportunities and resources; and professional and personal relationships in an overlapping context, which cannot readily or usefully be compartmentalised.

In returning to Okely's call for a need for autobiographical reflexivity in ethnographic work, I am aware of biographical, intellectual and political issues that have shaped my fieldwork encounter with the 'world in motion' (Rapport, 2000) of Bosnian post-refugee transnationalism. One of the issues is my 'insider-outsider' position with regard to the population under study and it is to that issue that I now turn.

The 'You know' effect and shared history as a way out of the insider-outsider debate

From the beginning of my research with Bosnian migrants in Ireland, the issue of my positioning as an insider to the Bosnian community has remained. It was often mentioned in relation to the access to the population under study, it was viewed as a rich position with regard to the nature of data I could possibly collect, and it did prove to be helpful during the actual active part of my fieldwork process.38

Most often this insider position was linked to my being from there, my 'Bosnianess'. Yet it was a role I could never fully participate in. Partly this was because some Bosnians did not perceive me as 'truly Bosnian', since I have a Croatian accent in the local language. Although I am the daughter of a mixed Croatian-Bosnian marriage, I grew up in Croatia. The main reason I felt uneasy in my Bosnian role was that I did not consider myself in such ethnic terms. I was born in Bosnia when Bosnia was still part of the former Yugoslavia and grew up to think of myself as Yugoslav, meaning multicultural and non-nationalistic. I had already been living abroad when the Yugoslav conflict broke out, and in my absence my red Yugoslav passport turned into a blue Croatian one. Therefore, not only was my identity being changed without my presence, acknowledgment or approval, but my living abroad was adding to this and increasingly removing me from the Balkans. Additionally, I did not come to Ireland from Bosnia like the Bosnian refugees in my study did. I came to Ireland from the UK, after five years of living in London, pursuing my studies. I did not feel part of the

38 I follow Lal (1996) in understanding the academy as just another field location and of writing as a continuation of 'fieldwork', rather than a separate phase of a research project. Also, I do not make a distinction between active and passive parts of my project. What I mean when I use the words 'active parts' is the times when I was in actual active ongoing communication with Bosnian migrants, whether in Ireland or in Bosnia.
Croatian or Bosnian community in Ireland. My identification leaned towards multipositionality and fluidity of life experiences and had grown further and further away from ethnic identification as time passed. Therefore, on the one hand there was my reluctance to identify as a Bosnian insider with regard to my research. On the other hand, there were instances where my background was beneficial for my study. Knowing the local language helped immensely,\(^\text{39}\) as was the fact that I was actually born in Bosnia. The initial access was made much easier because of that and almost all interviews proceeded in a much more relaxed manner after the respondents were made aware of the fact that I was one of ‘them’ – that I was from Bosnia, no matter how loosely.

In her insightful reflection on her time as a live-in researcher in a kibbutz, Reinharz (1997) discusses the need for a variety of selves in the field, and the interrelated need to sometimes down-play certain aspects of one’s identity in order to gain a more favourable position within the setting. In particular, she refers to her downplaying her being American while talking to the *mazkir*, the Kibbutz head, because of his disdain for the United States. During my fieldwork I have found myself in a similar position. I did to an extent play up my Bosnianness in order to get closer to my respondents. While, as discussed above, I neither felt very Bosnian, nor did ethnicity in general feature highly in my self-identification, I nonetheless found it impossible to incorporate my own reluctance towards ethnic identification into the context of the fieldwork without turning the interview situations into self-defensive monologues.

Additionally, I was up-playing and down-playing a variety of other selves that became transparent in different contexts during the fieldwork. In some situations my gender became a more dominant self – and hence it would be up-played – in some it was my academic position, while in others age became the most binding identification. The lack of religiousness was the self I had to down-play most often. While negotiating these different roles, selves in the field, my insider-outsider status was being negotiated too. In some settings my insider status was more closely related to the age and the experience of growing up in the socialist former Yugoslavia than

\(^{39}\) With regard to language and translation in ethnographic research, Finnegan (1992) argues that amongst the things that sometimes cannot be translated are humour, puns, multi-level meaning and culturally specific allusions. Therefore the speaker of the local language would be better equipped to deal with those in the ethnographic encounter.
anything else related to the Bosnian migrant population under study. In some situations, paradoxically enough, my outsider status was most pronounced when I was participating in the field the most. For example, during the conference workshops of the World Forum of the Bosnian Diaspora and also the entertainment evenings that followed the discussions, my position as outsider was most pronounced.

Kirin Narayan argues that other factors, such as gender, class, sexual orientation or duration of contact may ‘outweigh the cultural identity we associate with insider or outsider status’ (Narayan, 1993:236), and that identity is too complicated to exist as one or the other, since two halves cannot adequately account for the complexity of identifications in the field. In arguing against the bifurcation of insider-outsider status, she proposes, following Rosaldo (1989), that every researcher in the field exhibits ‘multiplex subjectivity’ with many cross-cutting identifications, pointing out that ‘which facet of our subjectivity we choose or are forced to accept as a defining identity can change, depending on the context and the prevailing vectors of power’ (Ibid., p.676).

In addition, Jayati Lal states that ‘in the actual practice of research [...] one is faced with the need to constantly negotiate between the positions of insider and outsider, rather than being fixedly assigned one or the other subject position’ (1996:193). While my field experience was characterised by continuous interplay of varieties of selves and interrelated negotiations of these roles with regard to their insider-outsider status, there was a regular occurrence, in different settings of my ethnographic encounter, of the ‘you know’ effect. In other words, during my communication with Bosnian migrant often at a certain point during the talk the story would be interrupted with words such as ‘you know’, ‘as you would know’, ‘you know, I don’t need to explain’. What these phrases regularly related to were the times prior to the breakup of the former Yugoslavia.

De Vault (1990) suggests that researchers must be alert to the ways in which sections of speech, such as hesitations and restarts, or parts of the dialogue that do not make for a good quote may nevertheless provide a very important guide to what participants are trying to say. While reading through my interviews and different field notes, it

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40 For an extended overview of the insider-outsider debate, see Labaree (2002).
became apparent that most, if not all, of my respondents viewed me as if not an insider, then as someone who would be capable of understanding certain aspects of their lives because of my background.

In discussing reflexivity and voice, Reinharz emphasises Dan Rose’s point where he suggests that sociologists should learn how they are perceived, and focus on ‘the “unnamed space” where “our” study of “them” meets and clashes with “their” study of “us”’ (1997:4).

With regard to the Bosnian migrants in my research, I was perceived as someone who would understand what life used to be like before the break-up of the former Yugoslavia. I was perceived as somebody who had shared history in common with them and that this needed no explaining. The ‘you know’ confirmation phrase was enough to establish the connection. Therefore, rather than being an insider to the Bosnianess in my research population, whatever that may entail, my insider-outsider position shifted and was negotiated with regard to the many selves I had in the field. However, having lived in the former Yugoslavia, I had shared a history with them which provided for a bond in our communication. Yet despite this bond sometimes it was hard to gain access. In the last section of this chapter I briefly reflect on the issue of the gatekeeper.

‘Where the coffee was’: Gatekeeping the way into being the key informant

Access to the Bosnian community in Ireland should have been relatively easy. There was an established Bosnian Community Development Project that had offices in Dublin. It was through the same office that I had gotten in touch with Bosnians for my previous research. This time, however, different staff members were in charge or running the Project. The woman I had been in touch with previously, the co-ordinator of the Bosnian Community Development Project, was no longer employed there and the two people running the Project at the time of the current research had previously been part of the management team, as Information Officer and Community Development Officer respectively. They were the only employees at the Project at the time of my research, meaning that the number of staff had decreased from twelve to two in the time between the two periods of contact.
These officers at the Bosnian Community Development Project were my initial point of contact and clearly the relationship between us had changed over the years; the first few meetings between me and the staff were not very successful. I cannot say that they were reluctant to help me but they did not go out of their way to accommodate my inquiries. Rather they provided information in a manner that could be described as minimal and official. Each time I went to the Project I would be given only official documentation and was spoken to at the front desk only. Three years later I would be making my own way into the back part where the coffee was.

In discussing the issue of gatekeeping, Fielding points out that ‘the gatekeeper will be interested in what your research can do to help – or harm – the organisation’ (2002:150).

While the reasons behind the cold reception I was getting in the Bosnian Community Development Project were not apparent at the beginning of my research, later it was revealed to me that the Project felt slightly used by all the students coming in ‘doing research on Bosnians in Ireland’. I was told that over a number of years there had been so many students from different universities who wanted to talk to Bosnian migrants that the Project was by this point running out of people who were willing to participate. Also there was a new policy that did not allow the Project to hand out personal information, such as telephone numbers and addresses, held on Bosnians living in Ireland. Now the Project officers had to contact people themselves, introduce them to the research being conducted and ask migrants if they would like to be part of it. Although not overtly stated, I got a sense that this was too much work and that the Bosnian Project did not see any benefits from it. It seemed that the officers felt jaded by the numbers of undergraduate researchers wishing to study Bosnians in Ireland.

While the lack of open communication was difficult to negotiate in the beginning, the real issue turned out to be access to Bosnian migrants in Ireland. I kept going to the Project in order to gain the first few telephone numbers but was asked to ‘come back next week’ time and time again. After a good few frustrating weeks, I went to the Project one afternoon just before closing time, since I knew that it was the time when they were least busy. I put my cards on the table, explained my research in detail and told them that I needed to get in touch with Bosnian migrants and that it was my
intention to interview them in both countries. As I was talking, the conversation changed from me justifying my need to gain access to a general discussion about Bosnia, Ireland and the migrants themselves. That conversation was the turning point in my relationship with the Bosnian Community Development Project. From then on the staff at the Project became my key informants providing me not only with access to Bosnian migrants in both Bosnia and Ireland but with much information about the Bosnian community in Ireland as well as the conditions in post-Dayton Bosnia, particularly with regard to the political domain. The culmination of the communication was a trip to Sarajevo, in an observer capacity, with the staff of the Project, in order to attend the conference of the World Forum of the Bosnian Diaspora.

Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to show the methodological and epistemological pathways and junctions I took during my negotiations of the research process, in order to provide the background to this thesis. The chapter demonstrates the usefulness of choosing multi-sited ethnography, discusses the insider-outsider perspective and the nature of evidence, and generally traces the problems encountered as well as insights gained during the research. Mainly its aim was to de-plot the plotting of my soul in order to reflect on my journey of searching to understand Bosnian post-refugee transnationalism. The fruits of that journey are discussed in the rest of this thesis.
Chapter 3

The racial state(s) they are in I: Ireland

Introduction

In understanding Bosnian post-refugee transnationalism as grounded between two racial states within which their transnational activities are performed, the focus of this chapter is the state of Ireland and the Bosnian experiences in Ireland. The chapter traces a group of Bosnian programme refugees who, having been invited by the Irish Government, arrived in Ireland in 1992 and subsequently underwent lengthy reception and resettlement programmes; the main aim of these programmes was the integration of Bosnian refugees into Irish society. The chapter situates the Bosnian reception and resettlement programme within the broader framework of Irish interculturalism and contextualises it with regard to the community development deployed by the Irish Government as a mode of governance. The chapter argues for the constructed nature of the Bosnian ‘community’ in Ireland and points out the fragmented, rather than cohesive, nature of the Bosnian experience.

The chapter is divided into four parts. The first part briefly locates the Bosnian refugees in Ireland in relation to the other European countries that have received Bosnian programme refugees, stating that, on a comparative level, Ireland’s approach to Bosnian refugees was among the most tolerant in the EU at the time. The second part presents an historical overview of the way the Irish state dealt with the previous groups of programme refugees. The third part tells the Bosnian story in Ireland. By tracing the development of the reception and resettlement programme, designed by state agents in order to integrate Bosnians into Irish society, it follows Bosnian migrants from their arrival in the country to the present day. The fourth part positions the development of the Bosnian reception and resettlement programme within the policy and politics of Irish interculturalism. It contains a short overview of definitional ambiguities related to the concepts of pluralism, multiculturalism and interculturalism and discusses the specificities of Irish interculturalism.
Bosnian refugees in context: the new category of temporary protection and the issue of burden-sharing with regard to refugee admission

The conflict in the former Yugoslavia resulted in over three million displaced people. Regarding the large number of displaced people this conflict needs to be contextualised as a significant mass population movement in recent history. The number of people fleeing the republics of the former Yugoslavia prompted the UNHCR, in July of 1992, to call for a response to a crisis which is 'comprehensive and humanitarian' (ECRE, 1993). While different countries responded in different ways to the UNHCR request, most European countries offered protection to Yugoslav refugees and Bosnian refugees in particular.

Below is a table of responses to the Yugoslav crisis by a number of European states.41

Table 3.1 European response to the Yugoslav conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Host country</th>
<th>Type of protection</th>
<th>Figures for granted statuses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>'exceptional leave to remain' where tourist visas were extended while it was considered unsafe for refugees to return</td>
<td>68,000 people from former Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>temporary humanitarian 'displaced persons status'</td>
<td>5,855 people from Bosnia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>'temporary residence permit' for those who do not enter via asylum procedure</td>
<td>58 people from former Yugoslavia (415 applied through asylum procedure in 1994 and 1995 respectively)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>'temporary refugee status' offered to people from</td>
<td>38 people from former Yugoslavia recognised as</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

41 The figures were taken from ECRE (European Council for Refugees and Exiles) reports as quoted in Kelly et al. (1997). Sometimes it was not possible to get separate figures for different nationalities from former Yugoslavia. Even when I could access numbers of refugees registered as Bosnian, it was still not clear which part of the country they had arrived from. Also, these are not definite but registered figures, hence there may be many more refugees who have resettled in different countries through unofficial channels. For example, France estimates that up to 20,000 people from former Yugoslavia arrived in France since the conflict outside of the temporary protection framework.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Temporary Protection/Residence Permit</th>
<th>Refugees (a further 2,335, mostly from Bosnia benefited from temporary protection)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>'temporary protection'</td>
<td>17,600 people from former Yugoslavia (6,280 of those were to people from Bosnia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>'temporary residence permit'</td>
<td>2,872 mainly from Bosnia and Kosovo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>'temporary permission to stay' (Autorisation Provisoire de Séjour APS allows for renewable visas to be issued as long as the conflict continues)</td>
<td>7,613 people from former Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>'duldung' tolerated status and 'Aufenthaltstitel' temporary residence permits</td>
<td>350,000 people from former Yugoslavia (270,000 were to people from Bosnia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>'temporary protection' if requested as differentiated from regular asylum procedure</td>
<td>131 people from former Yugoslavia were granted refugee status and further 4,425 received temporary protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>'temporary protection'</td>
<td>59,130 people from former Yugoslavia were granted protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>under a temporary protection scheme 'temporary residence permit' was given</td>
<td>22,040 people from former Yugoslavia were granted protection (16,146 of those were from Bosnia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>collective protection was granted to people from former Yugoslavia in a shape of 'temporary residence permit'</td>
<td>11,850 from Bosnia were granted status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>'temporary protection'</td>
<td>1,626 Bosnia granted status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>'permanent residence permits' in 1993 and 1994 followed by 'temporary permits' in 1995</td>
<td>48,500 people from Bosnia were issued with permanent residence permits and further 2,380 were granted temporary status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>'temporary residence permits' in addition to the usual asylum procedure</td>
<td>4,790 people from former Yugoslavia were recognised as refugees and a further 20,457 received</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As the table shows, the largest number of refugees went to Germany, Italy and Austria. This is not surprising considering the proximity of these countries to the republics of former Yugoslavia. With regard to Germany, there was a pre-existing labour migration pathway between Yugoslavia and Germany, which acted as a contributing factor in relation to the number of people fleeing there. Also quite a large number of people went to Nordic countries, Sweden in particular.

While European states differed in their particular reaction relating to the status of displaced people coming to their territories, most of them shared a common thread of ‘temporality’ in their responses, where the main condition relating to the nature of the assistance given was the continuation of the conflict. Once the conflict was over the refugees were supposed to return home.

In relation to the plea to the international community to join the efforts in finding the solution to the refugee crises sparked by the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, Ogata\(^\text{42}\) states, ‘What does protection mean in such situations? It means not only the right to seek asylum from persecution, it also means the right of return for all those who so desire, and above all, it means the right to be allowed to remain in one’s home in safety and dignity, regardless of one’s ethnic, national or religious origin’ (1992:2). Highlighting the right to return as the human rights issue, and the desire for return as the ultimate objective of the UNHCR protection and assistance programme, in her speech at the International Meeting on Humanitarian Aid for Victims of the Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia, Ogata stresses the need for temporary protection as a way of dealing with large numbers of people leaving former Yugoslavia. She states: ‘In line with their responsibilities towards asylum seekers, all States, within or outside the

\(^{42}\) Sadako Ogata served as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees from 1991 until 2001.
region, should provide temporary protection to persons fleeing former Yugoslavia and who are in need of such protection’ (1992:3). Appelquist argues that ‘this speech served finally to legitimise this form of protection as a possible and preferable solution as far as a European response was concerned’ (2000:95).

The issue of temporary protection is interesting for two reasons. Firstly, the category of temporary protection was not used previously in the refugee discourse. It was precisely in the response to the mass movement of refugees from the former Yugoslavia that this new category, of ‘temporary protection’ was introduced (Kelly et al., 1997). The UNHCR felt that the number of people fleeing the conflict was too large to process each claim individually and that a different kind of response was required. It was the introduction of this new approach that prompted most European states to change their asylum legislation and pass decrees and special laws have introduced the category of temporary protection. Prior to 1992 and the mass movement of Yugoslav refugees, temporary protection had been perceived as an intermediate step towards a durable resettlement either in the country of entry or in a third country. In the case of former Yugoslavia there was no such perspective as the only plan seriously considered by most states was to return refugees to their countries of origin as soon as possible (Kjaerum, in Kelly et al., 1997:28).

Secondly, it has been argued that since the sole purpose of the temporary protection is to return refugees home as soon as the situation permitted, in effect it prevented displaced individuals from entering the asylum adjudication system altogether (Appelqvist, 2000). Kelly et al. point out that concerns were expressed that ‘temporary protection may in practice entail the withholding of refugee status and exclusion from an integration programme [...] More generally, there is a risk of setting a precedent creating second-class refugees’ (1997:28). In relation to the UK, Joly argues that granting an ‘exceptional leave to remain’ status on humanitarian grounds to asylum applications is ‘being used as a means of enabling refugees to be settled

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43 While in some countries (Bulgaria and Greece) there were no changes in asylum legislation as a result of the Yugoslav crisis, people from former Yugoslavia were allowed temporary protection if they requested it. The UK was the only country where there were no legislative changes made but rather a pre-existing category of exceptional leave to remain, that was of a temporary nature, was applied to the incoming refugees (Kelly et al., 1997).
without the rights and in worse conditions than if they were granted refugee status' (1992:18).

Therefore, while on the one hand the introduction of the category of temporary protection proved helpful in getting European states to respond to the mass movement of Yugoslav refugees, on the other hand it could be argued that it was used as ‘an opportunity or excuse to restrict refugees rights’ (Hathaway, in Kelly et al., 1997:29).

In addition to the introduction of temporary protection in the refugee discourse, the Steering Group representing EU states decided that there should be ‘burden-sharing’ among the European community with regard to the admissions of refugees from the region of former Yugoslavia. The call for burden-sharing was voiced by Germany at the International Meeting on Humanitarian Aid mentioned above, and was prompted by the large numbers of people arriving. It was subsequently incorporated into the agenda of the UNHCR and developed into a policy where some states were accepting refugees on a quota basis from other receiving countries (Ogata, 1992).

Although initiated as a response to the disproportionate numbers of people from former Yugoslavia fleeing to nearby countries, Germany in particular, the conflation of the Yugoslav refugee movement with a ‘burden that needs to be shared’ further contributed to the perception of Yugoslav refugees as second-class and in need of only temporary protection. Eastmond argues in relation to nationalist discourses and the construction of difference with regard to Bosnian Muslim refugees, that in Sweden refugees, viewed as ‘people out of place’, became ‘an aberration of neat national categories, an anomaly in need of normalisation and control’ (1998:178). This may not be surprising considering the predominant conceptual order of modern nation states where nation is perceived to be the ‘natural’ place of belonging (Bauman, 1990) and identity and culture are viewed as stable only at ‘home’.

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44 At that stage Germany had already given temporary asylum to 200,000 former residents of Yugoslavia (Kamm, 1992).
45 The issue of burden-sharing was further developed into a harmonised policy between EU states resulting in the ‘Resolution on burden-sharing with regard to the admission and residence of displaced persons on a temporary basis’ (25 September 1995).
Therefore, with regard to the response by the UNHCR and the European community to the Yugoslav crisis two conflicting discourses operated: one emphasised the need for humanitarianism and solidarity among the countries in offering protection to the displaced people; the other highlighted the need for control, the temporary nature of protection and the eventual need to return these burdensome refugees home.

In response to the call to share the burden of Yugoslav refugees, the Irish Government invited 200 refugees to Ireland (ECRE, 1992). The Bosnians who arrived in Ireland came from a refugee centre in Austria, following a visit from an Irish Government representative. Ireland, unlike most of the countries presented above, was receptive with regard to the invited refugees in perceiving them as a long-term commitment and tailoring the assistance given according to that commitment. Before focusing in more detail on the reception and resettlement of Bosnian programme refugees in Ireland, I briefly present, in the next section, an overview of the way the Irish state has dealt with previous groups of programme refugees.

**Historical overview of the previous experiences of programme refugees in Ireland: 1956 to 2009**

Since joining the UN in 1955, as part of the co-ordinated responses by the UNHCR to refugee crises worldwide Ireland has admitted a number of programme refugees from different countries. The response with regard to refugees taken by government has varied over time but can be largely divided into three different phases.

The first phase, lasting from 1995 until 1999, involved taking relatively large groups of refugees when crises rose. Under this scheme the Government of Ireland took 530 refugees from Hungary in 1956, 120 refugees from Chile in 1973, 803 refugees from Vietnam between 1979 and 2000, 26 refugees from Iran in 1985, 1,341 refugees from

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46 Sweden was another example of a liberal approach to Bosnian refugees. In June 1993, the Government of Sweden decided that outstanding asylum applications from the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina would be handled generously and almost all the applications were given permanent residence permit. The number of permits given amounted to 48,500 (Kelly et al., 1997). See Appelquist (2000) for a detailed discussion of Sweden’s response.

The second phase lasted from 1999 until 2005 and rather than taking larger groups of refugees from one place, it was decided that Ireland's response to the UNHCR would be to take ten cases a year from different backgrounds. This most often involved ten families. The annual number of refugees taken would vary between 35 and 42 people, and in 2000 most people came from Afghanistan. In 2001, 2002 and 2003 most refugees were Congolese or of Iranian Kurdish origin, while for the years 2003 and 2004, 44 refugees arrived from Chechnya. The year 2004 saw 11 Ethiopian and ten Somali programme refugees settle in Ireland.

The third phase was initiated in 2005, when the decision was made that instead of ten cases a year Ireland would accept up to 200 individual refugees from different countries annually. This phase is still in operation today and since 2005 Ireland has accepted 226 Iranian Kurds, 97 Burmese and 71 Sudanese refugees, plus a small number of people from other countries such as Cuba and the D.R. Congo. By far the largest group admitted to Ireland at one time consisted of 180 Iranian Kurds who were accepted into Ireland from Jordan under the resettlement programme in 2006.

Similar to Bosnian refugees, the previous groups of programme refugees arriving in Ireland underwent government-led reception and resettlement programmes. Below I briefly refer to some of the most significant groups.

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47 It is noticeable that the intake of refugees from some countries continued over a number of years. This is due to different decisions of government to allow further refugees from the same background to enter Ireland through, for example, the Family Reunification Scheme.

48 The written analysis of Iranian Kurds' resettlement programme was not available at the time of my research. In January 2009, Iranian Kurds were still in the orientation centre and their dispersal to Counties Carlow and Monaghan was being organised by the Refugee Integration Agency and Development Board (personal communication, 23 January 2009).

49 I do not in my project discuss the experiences of individual programme refugees admitted to Ireland under the governmental reception and resettlement programme. This is mostly due to the fact that my project focuses on group experiences of programme refugees. However, it was also very difficult to gain information about these individuals and their families. Apart from mainly statistical information that was available through the official government channels, published or unpublished analysis, particularly of qualitative nature, was not available in relation to the programme refugees in phase two and three.
Hungarian programme refugees

The Hungarians were the first group of programme refugees accepted into Ireland under the UN resettlement scheme. In response to the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956, 530 individuals were brought into the country in the same year. The refugees were placed in an old army camp in County Clare and the Department of Defence was established as the principal government actor in dealing with the refugees. Under the authority of the Department of Defence, an ad hoc resettlement committee was created that included the Irish Red Cross charged with administering to the refugees’ needs (Ward, 1998).

It is interesting to note that there was nationwide support for the admission of Hungarian refugees. This was mostly attributed to Catholic solidarity. As Fanning points out, Catholic sermons in Ireland at the time, often reprinted in the local newspapers, referred to the plight of anti-communist Catholic martyrs in Hungary (2002:88). Partly due to this perceived compatibility between the Irish and the Hungarians, and also owing to the fact that the Irish Government viewed Hungarian refugees as settling in Ireland permanently, they were expected to become absorbed into the local population. However, for both sides the Hungarian experience turned out to be largely unsuccessful. Less than two years after their arrival, all but 60 refugees left Ireland for a second resettlement elsewhere. Some Hungarians literally disappeared from the camp and are believed to have secretly travelled to the UK. A small group of refugees returned to Hungary but the majority availed of the Canadian Catholic Church resettlement scheme and moved to Canada (Ward, 1998).

The misunderstanding between the Hungarian refugees and the Irish Government was understood to be the underlying reason for the difficulties that emerged in handling Hungarian resettlement in Ireland (Ibid., 1998). While the refugees themselves

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50 This legacy would continue for decades to come until the establishment, in 1991, of the Refugee Agency under the aegis of the Department of Foreign Affairs (The Refugee Agency, 1999/00).

51 It is important to note, however, that the aforementioned compatibility was predetermined rather than organic in character. Prior to their arrival an Interdepartmental Conference on Hungarian Refugees was held where the Department of Justice stressed that only those refugees who were ‘suitable on grounds of race and religion, to ensure assimilation’ would be accepted to Ireland (Ward, 1996:136).
viewed Ireland as a temporary stage in their further resettlement elsewhere, the Irish Government thought otherwise. However, regardless of the above miscommunication, the provisions in the Knocknalisheen army camp, where they were housed, were thought to be inadequate, resulting in the Hungarians organising a hunger strike in April 1957 (Fanning, 2002:91).

Not only were the conditions in the camp itself unhealthy, the refugees felt that there were living in partial confinement, and effectively no resettlement programme existed beyond basic accommodation, food and pocket money (Ward, 1998). As Fanning (2002:90) notes, the restrictions on the movement of refugees were imposed from the outset and were combined with authoritarian management practices by both state departments in charge of the refugees and voluntary agencies responsible for their reception and accommodation.

In short, the Hungarian experience in Ireland was characterised by a policy of confinement and control by the Department of Defence. Additionally, while there was some financial support for the refugees, the government privatised its responsibility into the hands of the Irish Red Cross. However, the key problem according to Ward was the absence of domestic legislation and the state’s related unwillingness to provide adequate accommodation, work and schooling for the refugees (1996:140).

**Chilean programme refugees**

The second group of programme refugees to reach Ireland was 120 Chilean refugees who arrived in 1973 and 1974. The Chileans fled the military coup of 1973 that overthrew President Allende’s socialist regime.

While the admission of Chilean refugees was yet again organised in response to the UN resettlement scheme, their acceptance was initiated by the Irish Catholic Church and two Irish returning missionary priests in particular, Rev. Joe O’Donoghue and Rev. Jim Roche (Cooney, 1973). The reception and resettlement of refugees was privately sponsored by an ad hoc group of individuals who, in response to the request

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53 Both priests were involved in missionary work in Chile prior to the coup and had to leave after the junta took power.
by the Minister for Foreign Affairs Dr Garret Fitzgerald, set up the Committee for Chilean Refugees in Ireland. The committee provided direct support to the refugees for about two years. The refugees were housed in local authority housing in Shannon, Galway and Waterford and a certain number of training places was made available for them through AnCo, the Industrial Training Authority, mainly involving metal work (Fanning, 2002). John Feeney, the chairman of the Committee, stated that the committee had received excellent responses from religious orders, including the Franciscan order, who had provided crash courses in English at Gormonston, Co. Meath, as well as from businesses and various individuals (Cooney, 1973:10).

After two years, the Committee pulled out of giving assistance to Chilean refugees in order to encourage their independence and autonomy (Ward, 1998). However, securing employment remained difficult for most Chileans and when, in the late 1980s, the Chilean Government announced that many of those who had fled the coup were welcome back to Chile, most Chileans left Ireland to return home.

Vietnamese programme refugees

The third group of programme refugees to arrive to Ireland was 212 ‘boat people’ from Vietnam in 1979. They were taken from Hong Kong and Malaysia, mostly in response to lobbying by private citizens and church organisations for Ireland to participate in the UNHCR programme. In addition to lobbying, Ireland was for the first time the holder of the Presidency of the European Commission and felt pressure to set an example by taking in the refugees, particularly considering the fact that it had refused to participate in similar UNHCR operations on several previous occasions (Ward, 1998).

As previously, the reception and the resettlement of refugees was mostly handled by the voluntary sector and the Catholic Church. As with the Chilean case, the Vietnamese Refugee Resettlement Committee was established under the authority of the Department of Defence and some financial assistance was provided for their language and vocational training under VEC, and for AnCO schemes. After the

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53 Apart from the fact that only two out of the initial 212 Vietnamese refugees had any knowledge of English, the ongoing problem with the acquisition of the host language was attributed to two things. McGovern (1990) argues
initial period in reception centres, mostly in private church premises and the private
wing of the a Dublin hospital, the families were dispersed to local authority housing
around Ireland to 'strong provincial areas' as opposed to urban housing estates as it
was perceived that the latter lacked the strength of community necessary for
integration to happen (McGovern, 1990). However, once housed, the resettlement
policy was not accompanied by any further measures to ensure successful integration.
Vietnamese children were placed in mainstream classes with no special support,
resulting in children suffering disproportionate educational failure (Nolan, 1997).
Many dropped out of school after leaving primary education.

In 1985, the Vietnamese Refugee Resettlement Committee was incorporated into the
Refugee Resettlement Committee founded that year by the Department of Foreign
Affairs. At the time it became clear that Vietnamese programme refugees had
significant difficulties in resettling in Irish society. Apart from the Vietnamese
children's educational problems, the low levels of English language proficiency
among Vietnamese adults proved to be an on-going issue. The lack of command of
English emerged in subsequent years as a main variable in explaining difficulties
encountered by the Vietnamese in finding jobs and completing vocational training
(Ward, 1998). This resulted in the fact that in 1989 only 25 per cent of the Vietnamese
population were economically self-reliant. Most were dependant on the state for
economic survival and 40 per cent had precarious livelihoods (Ward, 1998).
However, despite the on-going problems with their integration, many Vietnamese
adapted their skills and were determined to be productive and independent of state
benefits. They found their niche in the fast-food business and while they encountered
some problems in acquiring and maintaining licences to trade, many businesses
survived. According to the 1995 Refugee Resettlement Committee Annual Report, out
of 534 Vietnamese people in Ireland 106 were owners or employees in fast-food
businesses.

that poor language skills were a direct result of inadequate language instruction by untrained teachers at the
beginning of the resettlement process. Additionally, Fanning (2002) points out that despite the fact that the
Department of Education introduced a pilot scheme, in 1982, to teach English as a second language, some of the
refugees did not manage to avail of the scheme until 1988.
54 Vocational Education Committee.
55 By the early 1980s, the majority of Vietnamese had re-emigrated to Dublin and were living in rented
accommodation in the poorest housing estates (Maguire, 2005).
At present there are over 1,500 Vietnamese people living in Ireland (Maguire, 2005) and the Vietnamese community is well established (Refugee Agency, 1995; UNHCR, 2004) with its own Chinese Vietnamese Association.

The Bahá’ís

The next group of programme refugees to be accepted to Ireland were 26 Iranian Bahá’ís fleeing religious persecution in 1985. Again, the decision to accept the Bahá’is resulted from persistent lobbying by domestic groups, in particular the National Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís of the Republic of Ireland (Ward, 1998). While this particular group was much smaller than the previous groups of programme refugees, and in spite of the fact that the government did not provide any resettlement programme apart from paying for their flights to Ireland, the Bahá’i integration into the Irish society was much smoother. The problems that characterised other groups of programme refugees such as unemployment and language acquisition difficulties were generally absent from the Bahá’i experience in Ireland. This is partly due to the high level of professional qualifications that most refugees had when they arrived, which not only meant that they had transferable skills, but it also conferred them a status in the local communities. Mostly, however, the unproblematic nature of their integration was due to two interrelated factors. Firstly, their reception and resettlement was solely organised by the National Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís of Ireland. The assembly not only provided all the services, such as airport reception, assistance in finding employment and English language classes, but it also carried on closely monitoring and nurturing the group’s integration in Ireland. Secondly, the Bahá’i refugees’ entry into Irish society was mediated by a network of religious organisations which embraced and validated their culture, language and religious differences and smoothened their pathway into wider Irish society. In September 1990, all of the Bahá’ís took up Irish citizenship (Ward, 1998).

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56 The refugees did have access to social welfare, education and public housing, as well as a right to Irish citizenship after a certain amount of time in line with the previous groups of programme refugees. (Fanning, 2002).

57 For example, it ensured that while the families were kept together the total number was still dispersed into the local communities (Ward, 1998).
At present the Bahá’í are well settled within their own community. In 1998 they celebrated fifty years of the Dublin Local Bahá’í Assembly with the presence of the Irish President Mary McAleese.  

Apart from the above-mentioned groups and the Bosnian programme refugees that I discuss in the next section, in 1999 and 2000, in response to the conflict in the Kosovo province of former Yugoslavia, the Government of Ireland took 1,063 Kosovo refugees. The Kosovars were not granted full refugee status but rather leave to remain status which incorporated the right to work and entitled them to training and support but excluded them from an automatic right to family reunification. A system of reception and the resettlement programme were organised and carried out by the Refugee Agency and included dispersed accommodation in a hostel in Baltinglass, the army barracks in Kildare, and accommodation centres in Waterford and Cork (O’Donnell, 1999). Furthermore, the Refugee Agency was involved in coordinating the efforts of local groups, schools and health boards in order to plan for the integration of Kosovars into the local communities (Fanning, 2002). In this respect the resettlement programme contrasted to the experiences of the Chileans or the Vietnamese where state involvement in integration strategies was minimal. However, while legally the Kosovars were entitled to stay in Ireland as long as they wished, by August 1999 the Voluntary Repatriation Programme had been set up for Kosovo refugees whereby a small repatriation grant was given to those who wished to return home. One-hundred-and-twenty Kosovars availed of the scheme and initially two groups left Ireland in August 1999 (DFA, 1999). By 2001, 956 Kosovars were repatriated back to Kosovo leaving only 144 people when the Kosovo Programme ended in June 2001 (RIA, 2009). This suggests that, contrary to the previous groups, Kosovo refugees were viewed by the government agencies as being in need of temporary protection only.

As the previous sections show, the Irish response to programme refugees over the past five decades was reluctant, piecemeal and lacking in long-term strategic planning.

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58 www.bahai.ie
59 The figure includes the initial intake and persons admitted under the family reunification scheme (RIA, 2009).
60 They were not identified as programme refugees in the same way as the previous groups discussed although there were some overlapping experiences.
61 The Refugee Agency was established by the Government in 1991 under the aegis of the Department of Foreign Affairs to coordinate arrangements for the admission, reception and resettlement of programme refugees (Refugee Agency, 1999/00).
Furthermore, each group of new arrivals was greeted with an on-going contradictory set of operations. On the one hand, most programme refugees\(^6^2\) were allowed and expected to settle permanently in Ireland and some form of support was provided in order to ease their way into integration. On the other hand, the support provided was largely uncoordinated by government agencies, generally left to the voluntary sector, including ad hoc, often religious committees, and centred upon providing minimal and unimaginative\(^6^3\) language and vocational training. In short, Ireland was tiptoeing between fulfilling its obligations under its UN membership and participating in the UNHCR refugee resettlement scheme and letting its obligations towards the received refugees slip into the hands of civil society. This *laissez faire* policy (Ward, 1998) did not change until the difficulties of Vietnamese refugees entering the labour market forced an evaluation of government responses. The response to the Bosnian programme refugees was the first comprehensive and coherent approach taken by the state. It is to the Bosnian experience that I now turn.

**Bosnian programme refugees in Ireland: the reception and resettlement process**

*Initial reception and the Cherry Orchard debate*

The first group of 178 Bosnian refugees arrived in Ireland on 2 September 1992 following a government decision in July of that year to accept a quota of 200 Bosnian programme refugees. From then until 2000, under different government decisions, of which Family Reunification Scheme and Medical Evacuees were but two, further groups of Bosnians arrived. The table below provides the profile of the arrival patterns of Bosnian refugees.

Table 3.2 Profile of arrival patterns of Bosnian Refugees to Ireland\(^6^4\)

\(^6^2\) Apart from the Kosovo refugees.

\(^6^3\) For example, very little notice was given to the background experiences of the programme refugees in their country of origin with regard to their skills, knowledge and qualifications. Rather than incorporating those into the integration pattern in the host society, as the Baha’i Assembly did in relation to the Baha’i refugees, the language and vocational training was most often not tailored to refugee needs but was rather a symbolic and uniformed response by the government.

\(^6^4\) The figures were taken from the Reception and Integration Agency at the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform website. There were no figures available after 2000, as it was in March of that year that the official reception and resettlement programme for Bosnian programme refugees ended. However, the Refugee Agency, which later became the Reception and Integration Agency, informally stayed in touch with Bosnian refugees until 2004 (personal communications, 23 January 2009).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>New Intake</th>
<th>Family reunification</th>
<th>Births</th>
<th>Deaths</th>
<th>Repatriation</th>
<th>Departed to a 3rd country</th>
<th>Total in Ireland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>177</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>374</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
<td>807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>908</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,170</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>886</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Upon their arrival, all Bosnians were admitted to the Cherry Orchard Reception Centre, a former nurses’ home refurbished by the Eastern Health Board and managed by a committee consisting of representatives from the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of Health and Children, the Eastern Health Board and the Refugee Agency (Refugee Agency, 1998:12). Cherry Orchard was not the first housing choice examined by the Heath Board in preparation for the Bosnian arrival. The Civil Defence premises at Firmount House, near Kildare, and the former Reconciliation Centre, at Glencree in Wicklow, were also examined but neither was found to be appropriate. This is not surprising since, for example, Firmount House was a former sanatorium converted into a nuclear-war command post where the ground floor windows were totally blocked allowing no light inside (O’Loughlin, 1992). According to the former resettlement officer involved in the Bosnian Project, Cherry Orchard was finally chosen because it ‘best suited the needs ...it had the ideal size and formation to meet the needs of the group that was coming in ... individual rooms, canteen, meeting rooms ... all of those things that they needed and it was ideally located right at the edge of the city’ (personal communication, 23. January 2009).^5^

^5^ Ironically Cherry Orchard looks directly onto Wheatfield Prison where rejected asylum seekers were being held at the time.
Cherry Orchard had a GP and nurse service available at the centre; a dental service was provided nearby; a community welfare officer undertook clinics on a regular basis and social welfare was organised at the local office.

On arrival at the centre, each family was allocated rooms on the basis of the family’s needs. Individuals and families were provided with food and laundry facilities, were assisted in claiming their social welfare entitlements, enrolling children in school and receiving English language training. However, some social welfare benefits were withheld from the refugees towards meeting the costs of these provisions (Refugee Agency, 1995). Also ‘a comprehensive social, cultural and educational programme was provided at the centre to assist the refugees to familiarise themselves with Irish life’ (Refugee Agency, 1998:29). This included training for day-to-day living such as working out the Irish telephone system, as well as teaching the refugees how to access services including banks, post offices and social welfare. Some more general talks were also organised. For example, speakers were brought in to talk about child care in the Irish context (personal communication, 6 January 2009). Thus the centre offered the new arrivals ‘the opportunity to settle down and to become familiar with their new country in a safe environment, among the supportive community of their own people with a shared culture before moving to independent living’ (Refugee Agency, 1998:29, my emphasis).

The reception centre was designed as a short-term stay facility before individuals and families were re-housed by the Resettlement Team set up by the Refugee Agency. In implementing the resettlement programme, the Refugee Agency generally followed an 18-month programme whose aim was to enable refugees to lead independent lives in Ireland after that time period. The programme was divided into three stages (Refugee Agency, 1999/00).

The first stage, which lasted three to four months, involved intense work in ensuring placement in private rented accommodation, entry to language training and inclusion

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66 This method of providing support was largely borrowed from the ‘contract’ model that has been developing in the Scandinavian countries, where there is a contract between the refugee and the government, involving the government providing a tailored package of language and vocational training for a refugee, within a fixed time frame (usually 18 months), in return for the refugee agreeing to participate in the integration process (O’Neill, 2001).
in primary and post-primary education. The resettlement team of the Refugee Agency visited the refugees' homes at this stage in order to observe how people were doing in their new environment. As pointed out by the Refugee Agency, a ‘hands on’ approach was taken during this first phase (Ibid., p.7). The second stage involved promoting independence and encouraging individuals to undertake tasks within Irish society by themselves. However, the resettlement officer was still available every morning for consultation if difficulties arose. The final stage involved revision of the cases on a one-to-one basis and families and individuals were visited at home to identify problems that had so far not been transparent. While there were no official follow ups with regard to the individual families after 18 months, the Refugee Agency maintained a regular clinic available for refugees in case a need arose.

In terms of resettlement, most refugees were resettled within the greater Dublin area in small clusters of Bosnian families who knew each other from their time in Cherry Orchard. Refugees did not have a choice with regard to the area of resettlement. Also, the clusters of Bosnian families they ended up living in proximity to were chosen by the Refugee Agency rather than requested by themselves. The areas chosen were mostly in suburban areas of Dublin 15 and 24. While they were some movements between different areas, most Bosnian refugees are still based in Dublin 15 (47%), in places such as Blanchardstown, Castleknock, Mulhuddart and Ongar. Some are in Swords (10%) and Tallaght (19%), and a small number are based in Dublin's inner city (16%) and other places outside the greater Dublin area (8%) (BCDP, 2007).

All Bosnians and their relatives were admitted to Ireland on the basis that they could remain in Ireland as long as they wished and they would become eligible to apply for Irish citizenship after three years of residence. Even before acquiring Irish citizenship, as programme refugees, Bosnians were entitled to take up employment and to receive health, education, social welfare, housing and other public services on

67 As explained to me by one member of the Refugee Agency who was dealing with the Bosnian refugees at the time, family clusters were chosen on the basis of friendliness. The staff in Cherry Orchard observed the Bosnian families while there and chose to resettle families who were most communicative and friendly towards each other together (personal communication, 23 January 2009).

68 The decision to allow Bosnians to apply for citizenship after three years of residence was an ad hoc decision made in the speech by the Minister of Foreign Affairs David Andrews, and confirmed three years later by the Minister of Justice, Nora Owen (personal communication, 23 January 2009).
the same basis as Irish nationals, in line with the regular entitlements of programme refugees (Refugee Agency, 1998:12).

The underlying premise of the Bosnian reception and resettlement process was the expectation that Bosnians were ‘here to stay’. In discussing the experiences of programme refugees in Ireland between 1994 and 2000 O’Neill\(^69\) (2001) points out that their reception phase was organised as an initial stage of the broader integration process and that refugee populations need to be viewed as ‘ethnic minorities of tomorrow’.

While Ireland’s liberal approach towards the Bosnian refugees was quite progressive considering the more hostile agenda observed more widely in Europe, discussed in the first section of this chapter, the circumstances of its implementation were characterised by, among other things, a politics of homogenisation and control.\(^70\) Not only was Cherry Orchard a highly organised facility for managing Bosnian refugees from the moment of their arrival, but the integration process involved the establishment of the Bosnian Community Development Project, as part of the further management of the Bosnian population in Ireland.

**The Bosnian Community Development Project**

The Bosnian Community Development Project was established in 1995 by the Refugee Agency, the Irish Refugee Council and the Irish Refugee Trust. For the first year of its existence, the Project was funded by the FÁS\(^71\) Community Employment Scheme. From 1995 to 1998, the main funding came from the European Union under the Integra Employment Scheme. In April 1998, when the European funding ran out, the Bosnian Community Development Project was accepted into the Community Development Programme which was run at the time by the Department of Social.

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\(^69\) John O’Neill was Chief Executive of the Refugee Agency, Department of Foreign Affairs, from 1994-2000, and the Chairperson of the Management Committee of the Bosnian Community Development Project.

\(^70\) I discuss the biopolitical aspect of the Bosnian reception and resettlement programme in detail in the next chapter.

\(^71\) The National Training and Employment Authority.

\(^72\) Integra was the Employment Initiative, supported by the European Social Fund via the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment, whose central aim was combating social exclusion, discrimination and racism through integrated, locally based and participative approaches [www.iol.ie/employment/integra](http://www.iol.ie/employment/integra) - last accessed 06.09.2012
Community and Family Affairs. The Bosnian Project was the first refugee group to receive this funding (BCDP, 1998a).\(^7\) The Community Development Programme funding is reviewed every three years and at the time of writing the Project was still part of the programme and funded by the Department of Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs as part of the National Development Plan 2007-2013 (personal communication, 4 February 2009).\(^7\)

The Bosnian Community Development Project was established in order to develop 'the infrastructure which would facilitate the Bosnian community in their efforts to play an active role in the cultural, social and economic life of the wider community while also maintaining their unique culture and identity' (BCDP, 1998a:5). The establishment followed the realisation that the Cherry Orchard reception programme and subsequent housing policy had not produced the results the government was hoping for.\(^7\) It was found that Bosnians were not able to access training or jobs in Ireland. This was largely caused by persistent problems with the lack of English language skills. Also, due to the government housing policy of dispersal, it was felt that there was no real community focus or centre of activity for Bosnians in Ireland. The development of a Community Resource Centre was therefore needed in order to enable Bosnians to 'develop their own resources and become empowered' (Ibid., p.5).

When the Project was first established, the approach taken was that the community should be involved in all stages of the decision making process.\(^7\) In order to satisfy such an approach all the members of the Bosnian community in Ireland were contacted and a survey of the adult population at the time was carried out. This involved designing the questionnaire with the help from the Adult Education Department of St. Patrick’s College, Maynooth (Ibid., p.7). The questionnaires were completed by December 1995 and interim results were used as the initial impetus for the community activities of the Bosnian Community Development Project. The services identified as necessary included, among others, a provision of an information

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\(^7\) The Bosnian Community Development Project remains the only refugee group that is part of the Community Development Programme in Ireland.

\(^7\) The Community Development Unit which runs the Community Development Programme moved from being part of the Department of Social, Community and Family Affairs to being part of the Department of Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs.

\(^7\) This realisation was reached by a group consisting of the members of the Refugee Agency, the Department of Education and Access Ireland. Subsequently, the same group formed the management committee of the Bosnian Community Development Project.

\(^7\) The Bosnian community's participation in the decision making process proved to be more complex than initially contemplated. I discuss this complexity in the next chapter.
newsletter (29%), an advice/drop in centre (24%) and regular meetings with other Bosnians (14%).

While during the first six months of the existence of the Bosnian Community Development Project the contact with the Bosnian community was limited, from the third quarter of 1996 it was noted that community involvement had started to grow. Over the next few years, the Bosnian Community Development Project was involved in a number of exercises undertaken in order to strengthen the participation of the Bosnian population in the Project and in order to have the Bosnian community’s voice heard in Ireland.

In December 1998, the Bosnian Project purchased the premises at 40 Pearse Street in Dublin city centre which became its official drop-in centre. In 2008, the drop-in centre handled 2,549 cases (BCDP, 2009). In order to promote Bosnian culture within broader Irish society, the Information Officer and Community Development Officer of the Bosnian Project visited a number of secondary schools in Ireland informing the students about Bosnian culture and history. RTÉ, BBC and TV3 broadcast television interviews with the Information Officer at the time. Also between 1996 and 1998, the Bosnian Project was involved in producing a Bosnian radio programme in cooperation with two radio stations, NEAR FM in Coolock and West to East Coast, based in the Senior College Ballyfermot (BCDP, 1998b). In addition, starting in 1996, the magazine *The Future* was published every second month with a print run of 350 copies. The magazine included information about the Bosnian Project’s activities, news from Bosnia and information about visas and travel. The magazine was also published in English in a slightly different format which included material highlighting Bosnian history and traditions.

The years between 1996 and 2000 were the most active of the Project. An art group was started in 1998 which aimed to organise regular exhibitions of artworks by Bosnian adults and children and ‘promote integration in a visual way that would be accessible to both cultures’ (Ibid., p.). In 1996, work with the elderly began following

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77 The cases relate to the number of individuals and/or families who have contacted the Bosnian Community Development Project in order to assist them with: i) the translations of documents, ii) accessing social welfare and health board, iii) getting help with visa/naturalisation process, and/or iv) getting in touch with the Bosnian embassy.
the finding that they were the most isolated sub group of the Bosnian population in Ireland due to the language barrier. The work involved regular visits to their homes as well as the organisation of social activities, such as day trips to places of various historical and cultural interest. Also, a chess club was established in 1997 and regular Bosnian evenings were organised where various guests and Bosnian musicians performed.

Finally, in March 1998, the Zena Project was established within the Bosnian Community Development Project, in cooperation with the Refugee Agency, based on the observation that considerably fewer women than men were taking up the opportunities provided by government organisations with regard to education and training. The aim of the Zena Project was to empower Bosnian refugee women to better integrate into Irish society. Furthermore, the Project hoped to build links between Bosnian women and other community groups in local Dublin areas. The long-term aim of the Zena Project was to function ‘across ethnic divide, creating transversal coalitions across ethnicities, where gender could become a unifying factor’ (Halilovic-Pastuovic, 2007:56).

The Project initially undertook a small-scale survey into the social background, education and work history of Bosnian women in Dublin to identify their needs with regard to integration as well as their perceptions of the barriers to achieving it. The survey was conducted with the support from the Women’s Education Initiative, funded by the Department of Education and Science, and a report of the findings was written by a Bosnian woman member of the Zena Project and published in 1999. The report recommended, among other things, the need to provide local, flexible English classes with built-in child care provisions, recognition of previous educational and professional qualifications, as well as the development of appropriate strategies that would allow Bosnian women to enter employment in Ireland (Sultan-Prnjavorac, 1999).

The recommendations from the survey were never implemented as the Zena Project was closed in 2001 due to lack of funding. The Zena Project was not the only part of

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78 While lack of funding is given as a official reason for closing down the project, it has been made known to me, by a person who was involved in the project at the time, that the funding for the continuation of the project was
the larger Bosnian Community Development Project that ceased to exist. From 2001 onwards, several activities which had been initiated during the mid-1990s were no longer operating at the same level of intensity or no longer operating at all. This was mostly due to funding having been decreasing steadily from the 1990s. By 2008, there were only two people employed by the Project and that year their wage was reduced by ten per cent. After the basic costs of running the drop-in centre were covered, the Project had no funds left for organising any of previously-mentioned community activities (personal communication, 11 June, 2009).

In addition to low funding there had been a change in the work orientation within the Bosnian Project over the past decade on three levels. Firstly, as the conditions in Bosnia stabilised consequent to the Dayton agreement, Bosnians started travelling back to Bosnia from Ireland on an annual basis. In the beginning these trips were organised by the individuals and/or families themselves. However, as more and more Bosnians were going back regularly every summer, the Bosnian Project got involved in organising charter flights for these summer migrations. This activity became one of the main objectives of the Bosnian Project from 2005 onwards (BCDP, 2005). Secondly, up to 2005 the Bosnian Project dealt with citizens from Bosnia only. Since 2005, however, the target group expanded to include other groups from former Yugoslavia such as Croats, Serbs and Macedonians (BCDP, 2005/06). At present the activities of the Bosnian Project are inclusive of all ethnicities from the territory of former Yugoslavia (personal communication, 19 June, 2009). Thirdly, since the establishment of the BiH World Diaspora Association in Sarajevo in 2002, the Bosnian Project was involved in the developments of the Association and participated in its six Congresses organised to date, creating links between the Bosnian community in Ireland and Bosnian communities elsewhere. This external involvement with the Bosnian diaspora in other countries, as well as the organisation of summer migrations to Bosnia was not initially welcomed by the Refugee and Integration Agency in available, however, the management committee decided that the project was not doing what was expected and it was better to close it down. 79

79 2005 was the first year during which the need for organising charter flights to Bosnia was highlighted as one of the main objectives of the Bosnian Community Development Project. However, the project had been involved in organising flights since the year 2000 (BCDP, 2005).
charge of the Project (personal communication, 11 June, 2009), and some members of state bodies still strongly object to the Bosnian Project’s involvement in Bosnian summer migrations (personal communication, 4 February 2009).

The future of the Bosnian Project is ambiguous. While the funding should be available under the National Development Plan until 2013, it is uncertain that financial support will last after that year. Considering the nature of Irish intercultural policy, where the focus is on community development and integration in Ireland, the latest developments of the Bosnian Project, characterised by greater ethnic inclusion and building up of transnational linkages with home as well as worldwide, may clash with the ethos required for state support. In the last section of this chapter, after a brief section on definitional issues, I discuss the nature of Irish interculturalism.

Irish interculturalism: ambiguities, inconsistencies and a community development approach

Pluralism, multiculturalism and interculturalism — definitional issues

The concept of ‘interculturalism’ is most closely related to the concepts of pluralism and multiculturalism. Pluralism is the oldest of the three and it has been in use for a long time. For example, geographical research has recognised the existence of ethnically diverse plural societies long before the current preoccupation with multiculturalism (Tunbridge, 2008) and quarters of tolerance for exotic minorities were institutionalised in the European Middle Ages and earlier (Vance, 1977). Ashworth, Graham and Tunbridge (2007) examine pluralism with regard to its cultural heritage and have visualised five identifiable conditions along the spectrum of plural scenarios, namely assimilation, the melting pot, the core-plus model, the pillar model and the salad bowl/multiculturalism.

In the assimilation scenario the minority identity is not acknowledged other than during the process of absorption into the mainstream society whereby the minority

80 For example, Ottoman Islamic Law institutionalised a pact of protection for the non-Islamic subject of the state, collectively known as dhimmi, where in return for their loyalty to the empire, expressed though paying of the jizya tax, they were guaranteed protection and freedom of religion and worship. The millet system of Ottoman Empire has been perceived as an early example of pre-modern religious pluralism (Sachedina, 2001).
heritage is discouraged and/or suppressed in order for assimilation to happen. Non acceptance of minority languages is often cited as an example of minority identity suppression (Tunbridge, 2007). In the melting pot scenario the assimilation process also happens but not in relation to a pre-existing mainstream identity, rather the focus is on evolving composite future identity distinct from the original ingredients. The minority heritages are accepted during the generational melting process, and to a certain extent beyond that point, but in a subordinated adjectival role of hyphenated identities. The unequivocal loyalty to national heritage values becomes pivotal to minority heritage. The United States is the ideological springboard and the classic example of such a scenario.

In contrast to the melting pot model, in the case of a core-plus model minority identities are at least tolerated and at best positively accepted by the state, sometimes to the extent of being accorded some form of formal recognition. The Sámi population of northern Scandinavia fits such a model. Interestingly, Gardner (2004) argues that Britain is hovering on a core-plus condition despite its official multicultural rhetoric.

The pillar model rests upon the assumption of mutual coexistence of two or more separate pillars of heritage. The Netherlands has been pointed out as a classic example of the pillar model where there is historically a compromise between the Protestant north and the Catholic south (Tunbridge, 2007). Belgium is a similar case with the mutual concurrence of Flemish, Walloon and German pillars of heritage. Most pillar societies, however, are to be found in Africa where ethnically misfit colonial boundaries created states of discordant tribal heritages.

Finally, the salad bowl scenario contemplates a coreless society made up of diverse elements which retain their distinctive identities and distinctive heritages that are in the most liberal extreme collectively celebrated. This is the plural context that identifies itself most closely in relation to multiculturalism. Canada, Australia and New Zealand are understood to be prime examples of such a scenario but most Western societies are assumed to be evolving in such a direction (Ibid., 2007).\footnote{It is important to note that these models are not clear cut. Not only are there many overlaps between different scenarios, particularly with regard to temporal contexts, but there are inconsistencies within the models themselves. For example, with regard to the melting pot model it assumes the initial cohort of diversity that will in time melt into the pivotal national identity. In practice, open entry and absorption of new values cannot continue}

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summary, pluralism can be regarded as a timeless human condition in which a traditionally narrow conception of plurality has produced a spectrum of policy responses. Multiculturalism has often been loosely equated with pluralism but despite some overlaps the terms are not synonymous.

Multiculturalism emerged as a means of managing the cultural diversity that rose from the large-scale immigration into Western societies in the wake of decolonisation and the waves of labour migration. The aim of European multiculturalism, which emerged in the 1960s and 1970s, was not based on the idea of bringing about wider changes in society. Rather, often generous, the multicultural ideology acted as a mask for political pragmatism where culture was seen as a separate sphere of division that must be managed. In a way similar to how secularism protected religion by giving it a sheltered space outside the public domain in an earlier period of modernity, through the management of cultural diversity via the established structures of society, multiculturalism aimed to protect national identity from the ‘others’ within and outside the nation.

Multicultural social regimes were being constructed which ‘sought to make virtue out of necessity in the promotion of equality of esteem’ (Tunbridge, 2007) as prescribed by Charles Taylor’s ‘politics of recognition’ (1994).

Over the past decades, multiculturalism has become an overworked term both in academic literature and popular parlance resulting in a diminishing linkage to any clearly identifiable meaning. Many theorists have wrestled with the ambiguity of the term either through describing several different varieties of multiculturalism (Hall, 2000; Wieviorka, 1998a; Delanty, 2003; Kymlicka 2007) or through examining its inherent paradoxical relation with regard to the nation state (Balibar, 1988; Hesse,

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82 Delany (2003) argues that the biggest problem with Western multiculturalism lies in the fact that its policies have produced division between cultural and social spheres.

83 Taylor argues that the politics of multiculturalism are about a demand for recognition by minority and subaltern groups. His thesis is based upon the assumption that our identity is partly shaped by the recognition of our own understanding of who we are, or the absence of that recognition. In addition, non-recognition or mis-recognition are forms of oppression. Since mis-recognition can be so oppressive ‘real’ recognition is not just courtesy, but a vital human need that is owed to people. The challenge, according to Taylor, is how to preserve the politics of universality that most Western nation states endorse while dealing with the incoming politics of particularity (Taylor, 1994).
1999; Back et al., 2002, Goldberg, 2004). Hall (2000) makes a useful distinction between ‘multicultural’ and ‘multiculturalism’, where multicultural stands for social characteristics and problems of governance posed by any society in which different communities live together, while multiculturalism refers to strategies and policies of control adopted to govern and manage the problem of diversity and multiplicity. Similarly, Goldberg (1994) observes that while multicultural may relate to many different articulations, ideas and practices, the formal singularity of ‘-ism’ reduces it to a fixed condition of ideology of political correctness. He distinguishes between descriptive multiculturalism and normative multiculturalism84 arguing that ‘the multicultural’ has been caught between the two understandings, descriptive and prescriptive. However, Goldberg (2004) argues that the multicultural, normative as well as descriptive, is no more than provisional, for even in an ideological context, it cannot replace the cloning theory of nation states,85 since the space of the multicultural is about ‘politics of space’. Multiculturalism is born out ‘of expediency, appropriated by fashion, fraught with conflict potential, and ultimately undermined by definitional ambiguity’ (Tunbridge, 2007).

Interculturalism is a concept that suffers similar incertitude. In his theorisation of varieties of multiculturalism, Delanty (2003) distinguishes between traditional multiculturalisms, modern multiculturalisms and post-multiculturalisms. Traditional multiculturalisms are, somewhat paradoxically, about non-acceptance and negation of cultural difference. Monoculturalism, French republican multiculturalism and liberal multiculturalism of the American melting pot model are examples of a refusal to recognise cultural difference. In contrast to traditional multiculturalisms, modern multiculturalisms share a recognition of the reality of cultural diversity and the need for policy to accommodate that diversity. Canadian communitarian multiculturalism, British liberal communitarian multiculturalism and interculturalism are proposed by Delanty as proponents of modern multiculturalism. Finally, rather than seek to further the equality of all groups in society in order to create common political community,

84 Descriptive multiculturalism describes the increasing heterogeneity in most post-1945 societies as a result of global political economic changes and increased migration following the demise of colonial regimes. Normative multiculturalism insists on cultural diversity and proliferation of values at the expense of the ideas of national cohesion and unified norms (Goldberg, 2004).
85 By ‘cloning theory’ of nation states he refers to a deep seated presumption that a nation consists of homogenous, self-reproducing population groups. Therefore, replication of cultural as much as biological is the ground of nation making (Goldberg, 2004).
post-multiculturalisms move towards difference itself as a goal to be achieved. In this case, radical multiculturalism proposes privileging marginal groups over dominant ones, critical multiculturalism calls for engagement with differences within the different groups themselves, while transnational multiculturalism emphasises the need for flexible and multiple citizenships.

Interculturalism is therefore understood as a more recent soft kind of modern multiculturalism that seeks to promote cultural difference as a positive virtue (Watson, 2000). It is expressed through programmes of cultural awareness and its aim is to encourage tolerance and knowledge of 'other cultures'. However, despite the interaction and cooperation between cultures being overtly advertised in order to construct better community relations, interculturalism, in common to both multiculturalism and pluralism, still recognises difference in largely homogenous cultural terms. Hence, the problem of categorisation remains constant.

The concept of interculturalism, like the concept of multiculturalism, rests upon the assumption of society consisting of diverse cultural spheres in need of recognition, management and ultimately control. It does not, like multiculturalism, question either the origins of such categorisations or the power relations within which the recognitions are being negotiated. The concept of interculturalism, unlike the concept of multiculturalism, emphasises the need for interaction and change of the majority population's negative attitude towards minorities. However, in doing so it not only continues to mask the aforementioned issues of categorisation and power, but it also perceives the problem of racialisation and racism as a majority-minority problem, thus removing the blame from the institutions and constitutions of the state. I discuss these issues in direct relation to the Bosnian reception and resettlement process in the next chapter. In the last section of this chapter I look briefly at the particularities of Irish interculturalism.

Interculturalism in Ireland

Interculturalism is in currency when talking about the accommodation of groups perceived to be ethnic minorities in Ireland. Coined in response to the demographic changes in Irish society since the beginning of the 1990s, the concept was borrowed
from studies of international intercultural education as a synthesis of multicultural and anti-racist education approaches, and, in the quest for equality, moulded into widespread usage as a policy of dealing with ethnic diversity in Ireland. A state agency established to address racism in Irish society, the National Consultative Committee on Racism and Interculturalism defines interculturalism as ‘essentially about interaction, understanding and respect. It is about ensuring that cultural diversity is acknowledged and catered for. It is about inclusion for minority ethnic groups by design and planning, not as a default or add-on. It [...] acknowledges that people should have freedom to keep alive, enhance and share their cultural heritage’ (NCCRI, 2003:5). The NCCRI adds that interculturalism ‘suggests the acceptance not only of the principles of equality of rights, values and abilities but also the development of policy to promote interaction, collaboration and exchange with people of different cultures, ethnicities or religions living in the same territory [...] It is an approach that sees difference as something positive that can enrich a society and recognises racism as an issue that needs to be tackled in order to create a more inclusive society’ (2001:6).

The concept of interculturalism replaced earlier concepts of assimilation and multiculturalism as governing policy principles for dealing with diversity in Ireland, and in conjunction with the term ‘integration’ has become the predominant term used to describe the ethos behind state initiatives dealing with different types of migrants.

While the term has been broadly used as a policy response to increased immigration to Ireland over the past decade and a half, both its practical implications and definitional context remain somewhat ambiguous.

For example, Fanning (2002) in his theorisation of multiculturalism, evaluated as a state response to the inequalities encountered by the ethnic minorities, envisages a

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86 The term was adopted from the policy statements of the European Commission and it was initially applied to the education policy in Ireland before being extended to other areas (Farrell and Watt, 2001).

87 1997 was designated European Year Against Racism by the European Council of Ministers and member states. In response, in 1998 the National Consultative Committee on Racism and Interculturalism was created in Ireland. The Committee was comprised of government and non-government bodies and was established by the Department of Equality and Law Reform in order to ensure that the needs of minority ethnic groups would become mainstream concerns of the government and anti-racism and positive inclusion a focus of governmental policy (NCCRI, 2009). It was closed in December 2008 due to government budget cuts.

88 It is broadly agreed (MacLaughlin, 1994) that economic growth during the 1990s transformed Ireland from a country of net-emigration to one of net-immigration. 1996 was identified as a ‘migration turning point’ (Ruhs, 2005). Since the recession, however, emigration has returned (CSO, 2011, see also Smyth, 2011)
number of multicultural possibilities, ranging from overt assimilation, where minorities are pathologised as deviant and culturally inferior to the dominant culture and their assimilation is viewed as a solution to the problems of the inequalities they face, to stronger multiculturalism where there is a more robust emphasis on racism as a cause of structural inequalities. Along this spectrum Fanning places Irish interculturalism as weak multiculturalism. He argues that despite some acknowledgement of racism as a problem in Irish society, the inequalities are explained as resulting from the lack of ethnic sensitivity and cultural understanding rather than from structural causes. While there are some initiatives targeted at the dominant community with regard to cultural understanding, ultimately the onus is placed on migrants and ethnic minorities to conform to the values of the majority population. Behind the smokescreen of diversity celebrations evident in the promotions of multicultural festivals and similar diversity gatherings, assimilationist assumptions continue to persist and are at present most clearly visible with regards to English language requirements for all incoming migrants (McDonald, 2008) and mass citizenship ceremonies (Taylor, 2012). Therefore, while the discourse of Irish interculturalism warns of a need to focus on racism and power with regard to inequalities of ethnic minorities, these warnings are not translated into government action.

In addition to the gap between what ought to be ‘interculturally’ done and what is actually being done with regard to integration of ethnic minorities, Gray (2006) points to the persistence of nationalist practices of belonging in the management of immigration in Ireland. While theorising Irish approaches to integration as influenced by the integration policies of countries with longer experience of immigration, EU policy and the specificity of the Irish experience of emigration, she stresses the ongoing relevance of the assumption of a territorialised nation state with a national community at its axis. In linking the Irish intercultural approach to a broader issue of governmentality, Gray reminds us that through the development of programmes for supporting and integrating migrants the government not only creates categories of populations and processes in need of governance, but it assumes both a priori immigrant exclusion and a posteriori need for immigrant integration.
In other words, underpinning the policy of interculturalism in Ireland is the protectionist agenda of Irish nationalism and nationalist way of belonging. Indeed, as Lentin and McVeigh (2006: 178) point out, where there is a ‘refusal to name and address state racism, ideologies of interculturalism and integration actually become racist themselves, functioning to protect the operation of state racism’. The policies of Irish interculturalism go uneasily with the ethnocentric national agenda. On the one hand, the Report of the Interdepartmental Working Group on the Integration of Refugees in Ireland (DJELR, 1999) defines integration as a two-way process where certain duties and obligations are placed on both the refugees and the host society in order for integration to happen, and the Office of the Minister for Integration (2008) stresses that integration policy will be a two-way street for those migrants who reside in Ireland. On the other hand, the state refuses to outlaw the wearing of Catholic religious symbols such as (Catholic) crucifixes and ashes for the Garda Síochána reserve force on duty while banning turbans worn by Sikh volunteers (O’Toole, 2007) and allows schools to prohibit the hijab in class (Lentin, 2012). It could be argued that while there has been some progress regarding the recognition of migrants’ rights in Ireland, particularly in relation to education, labour force participation and voting capabilities (DJELR, 1999; Office of the Minister for Integration, 2008), this recognition comes with a price tag of cultural assimilation despite the intercultural rhetoric of protecting cultural identities.

Finally, in addition to the ambiguity of its meaning and the contradictory character of Irish interculturalism with regard to the gap between rhetoric and implementations, Lentin and Titley (2011) posit Irish interculturalism within the broader ‘crisis of multiculturalism’ currently circulating within European communicative space. In their insightful discussion of what Bodemann and Yurdakul (2006) term the ‘retreat of multiculturalism in Europe’, they argue that present-day Europe is infused with a narrative of shared crisis where multiculturalism is seen as a failed social experiment of the past five decades that has created parallel communities and within them ghettoised breeding grounds for fanatic fundamentalism. The ‘crisis of multiculturalism’ is blamed primarily on perceived irreconcilable differences between

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89 The Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform (1999:9) defines integration as ‘the ability to participate to the extent that a person needs and wishes in all the major components of society, without having to relinquish his or her own cultural identity’. Yet, as the turban and hijab examples show, in practice, there is a line to where cultural identity can be taken, which, when overstepped, threatens the cohesiveness of national identity.
the Muslim other and the common values variously coded as national, European, liberal and/or universal (Lentin and Titley, 2011) and reiterated through the constant circulation of ‘stories from elsewhere’ brought forward by the presence of the Islamic other. In their eloquent reflection on the work of Michel De Certeau (1986) regarding the power of recitation in the production of social truths, Lentin and Titley show the contribution of processes of narrativisation and repetition to the current ‘crisis of multiculturalism’. Furthermore, in applying their theorisation to Ireland, they demonstrates that the same narratives from elsewhere have penetrated Irish interculturalism and taken on a teleological dimension predicting the ultimate fall of the multicultural logic and asking for the protection of national identity via a ‘golden thread of shared values’.  

In summary, Irish interculturalism, as a medley of the politics of recognition (Taylor, 1994) and intercultural training, is underpinned by i) an ambiguity of meaning; ii) inconsistencies between prescription and administration; and iii) an enmeshment into a narrative of the larger European ‘crisis’ of wrestling with diversity.

While the uncertainty of definition and inconsistent way of administration may characterise multiculturalisms/interculturalisms elsewhere, reliance on community formation as an artefact of rule is quite specific to Irish interculturalism, as argued by Gray (2006).

**Conclusion**

Irish interculturalism, with particular reference to Bosnians in Ireland, is further discussed in the next chapter, where I argue that the Bosnian reception and resettlement programme, being part of Irish intercultural policy, failed to achieve the integration of Bosnian migrants into Irish society it sought. I argue that the reliance of Irish interculturalism on community formation and community development, which is standard to its integration policy, constructed rather than nourished the Bosnian community in Ireland in a homogenised and essentialist manner. This has trapped Bosnian migrants in an uneven relationship with the state where, while they were, as

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90 Titley uses examples such as the murder of Theo van Gogh in the Netherlands and terrorist attacks in London and Madrid to show how the policy of multiculturalism was blamed for these atrocities. 

91 The notion of the ‘golden thread of shared values’ was used by Gordon Brown to describe a need to reach back to the core set of social norms that define Britishness in the present multicultural ‘crisis’ (Brown, 2004).
programme refugees, accepted into Ireland to stay, they were accepted into a particular biopolitical regime of governmentality that is Irish interculturalism.

In the next chapter I critique Irish interculturalism as a particular biopolitical regime of governmentality based upon ethnic homogenisation, cultural essentialism and community construction. I argue that this regime, operated by the racial state of Ireland, did not account for the diversity of Bosnian migrants and the complexity of their experiences, and as such has contributed to the enforcement of their transnationalism.
Chapter 4

The racial state(s) they are in I: The biopolitics of Irish interculturalism

Introduction

As shown in the previous chapter, the reception and resettlement programme organised by the Irish state for Bosnian migrants was the first comprehensive and coherent approach taken by the state in dealing with groups of programme refugees. Before the Bosnian programme, state responses to invited programme refugees were hesitant, piecemeal, largely left to the voluntary sector and lacking in clear policy. The Bosnian programme, on the other hand, was characterised by clearly laid out plans and procedures, the main aim of these being the long-term integration of Bosnian refugees into the mosaic of ethnic minorities in Ireland. However, despite the government’s intention for integration featuring prominently in the Bosnian reception and resettlement programme, the desired goal was not achieved as planned and Bosnian post-refugee transnationalism is the current outcome of the resettlement process.

Using my ethnographic data, this chapter argues that the planned-for integration in Ireland was not achieved due to the biopolitics of Irish interculturalism characterised by ethnic homogenisation and enforced community building. This biopolitical regime of governmentality failed to acknowledge the heterogeneity of the Bosnian population in Ireland and the lack of community sentiment.

The chapter starts by exploring the diversity of the Bosnian population in Ireland and contrasts this with its perceived, and catered for, homogeneity, arguing that constructing ‘the Bosnians’ as a homogeneous community is a specific technology of governmentality enacted by the Irish state. It moves on to discuss the problematics of community building, arguing that there is no such a thing as ‘the Bosnian community in Ireland’. The chapter moves into discussion of two transnational activities the Bosnian Community Development Project is involved in, namely Bosnian summer migrations and the project’s involvement with other people from former Yugoslavia,
arguing that these activities further illustrate the fragmented nature of the Bosnian experience in Ireland. The last part of the chapter theorises Bosnian community in Ireland as a contingent community and examines the formal discourse of empowerment that is attached to reliance on community in Irish interculturalism. This section points out the disparity between discourse and practice and argues that pastoral power plays a part in the Irish biopolitical regime of governmentality. In short, this chapter presents an empirical example of the *modus operandi* of the biopolitical regime of governmentality that is Irish interculturalism.

**The heterogeneity of the Bosnian population in Ireland**

*Ethnicity, religion, citizenship, nationality – ‘narodi’ and ‘narodnosti’*

When talking about the refugee populations coming from Bosnia and Herzegovina one needs to be aware of the extraordinary ethnic mixture of that particular republic when it was still part of the former Yugoslavia. Apart from Bosnian Orthodox and Bosnian Catholics, who might or might not think of themselves respectively as ‘Serbs’ or ‘Croats’, there were Bosnian Muslims whose religious practice varied greatly, from regular practitioners to people with more secular orientation. There were also minorities of Jews, Germans, Hungarians and Roma populations who were also in themselves heterogeneous.

Bosnia and Herzegovina had no one major ethnic group. One third of the population was Orthodox and one-sixth was of a Catholic background. The largest population group was made up of Bosnian Muslims, who accounted for just under half the population and were viewed as indigenous to Bosnia (Cookburn, 1999). Also the Yugoslav census of 1961 facilitated a new identification option ‘Muslim in the ethnic sense’, while the 1971 census developed this official identity one step further by proposing the category of ‘Muslim in the sense of the nation’ (Mrdjen, 2002). Those acts conferred an official status to the category of ‘Muslim’ that prior to the 1961 census was not accepted as an identification option.

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92 Bosnian Orthodox and Bosnian Catholic populations were, in the light of the Yugoslav ideology of containing nationalism, perceived as having their homeland in Serbia and Croatia respectively.

93 After the conflict when Bosnia and Herzegovina became an independent republic this identification was further transformed into ‘Bosnjak’.

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It is also important to note that in the Yugoslav multiethnic and socialist federal state, of which pre-conflict Bosnia was a part, the nationality question was understood and manipulated differently than in most Western European states. While in most Western European states nationality and citizenship largely overlap and nationality refers to the relationship a person has to a particular state, in the multiethnic socialist state of Bosnia national identity was different from and additional to citizenship. Thus in pre-conflict Bosnia everyone had Yugoslav citizenship but no one had Yugoslav nationality (Bringa, 1995). For state administrative purposes ‘Yugoslav’ was never an option for nationality but it could be entered in the ‘undeclared’ category. Hence, those people who did not identify with any of the nationalities, namely narodi or narodnosti, recognized within the former Yugoslavia, but held Yugoslav citizenship had the option to identify as ‘Yugoslav’ under ‘undeclared’.

While it was never recognised in its original meaning in the official census discourse, the further category of ‘Bosanac’ existed and still exists in Bosnian self-identifications. It mostly refers to the post-World War II generations for whom being Bosnian meant ‘growing up in the multicultural and multireligious environment, an environment where cultural pluralism was intrinsic to the social order’, and where ‘dealing with cultural difference was part of people’s most immediate experience of social life outside the confines of their home, and it was therefore an essential part of their identity’ (Bringa, 1995: 83).

Therefore, when the issue of personal identification of people coming from Bosnia and Herzegovina is taken into account, the picture is quite complex and the diversity very pronounced. Not only was their nationality separated from their citizenship and their ethnic identifications intertwined with religious sentiments, but also an unofficial identification of ‘Bosanac’ existed that sprawled over nationality and citizenship as

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94 Key concepts within the Yugoslav state’s nationalities’ policy were narodi and narodnosti. While the former was often translated in Western literature as ‘nation’ and latter as ‘ethnicity’, this translation does not convey the accurate meaning in the original usage of the terms (Shanin, 1989; Bringa, 1995). Narodi were the main constituent ethnicities of the six former republics of Yugoslavia, namely Slovenians, Croats, Serbs, Muslims (after 1961), Macedonians and Montenegrians. Narodnosti included other state recognized minority groups living of the territory of former Yugoslavia whether they were groups who nationally belong to other states, such as Albanians, or those ethnic groups that were officially stateless such as the Roma population.

95 The census of 1971 allows for the category of Bosanac but it defines it as regional rather than national belonging that fits the category of the undeclared.
well as ethnicity and religion. In effect, it was an identification of allegiance to
diversity itself. \(^6\) As some of my respondents described it:

Bosanac is the person that is born in Bosnia and Herzegovina and feels like a
part of that state … I cannot say that I am a Muslim, I cannot say that I am a
Serb, I am half-half, you understand? But in reality I am Bosanac. I am not
one or the other, I am a mixture … yes, I am not interested in religion.
(Interview II)

When I say Bosnians I think of us all, Muslims, Croats, Gypsies. (Interview V)

This complexity of personal identification was reflected within the Bosnian
population that came into Ireland. A survey conducted by the Refugee Resettlement
Research Project in 1998 found that four per cent of the Bosnian sample identified
themselves as Croat, Slav, Yugoslav or Serb, 39 per cent identified as Muslim, 18 per
cent as Bosnian Muslim, while 37 per cent stated their identity to be Bosnian

The difference between Muslim and Bosnian Muslim is of interest here. In addition to
the multifarious ways in which Bosnians identify personally, and the complex
relationship between ethnicity and religion, there is a subgroup of Bosnian Muslims
who understand their Muslimness as different to the perceived general understanding
of what being Muslim is. As one of my respondents explained:

We are Muslims, but European progressive Muslims … We eat all kind of
food, we don’t separate … the way we lived in Bosnia before the war, we live
now. We changed nothing. \textit{We did not change into Muslims}, we still don’t go
to the mosque, we still did not give up pork. (Interview V)

There are some characteristics of Bosnian Muslimness that my respondent is referring
to in her description. Firstly, when she states that her family did not change into
Muslims she is refereeing to a large segment of the Bosnian populations who were not

\(^6\) For this particular group the return proved to be the most difficult. While those individuals who identified
themselves as Serb, Croat or Muslim could and often did swap properties that they left behind in order to migrate
to the areas that were more accepting of their background, Bosanci people had no country to return to due to the
changes introduced in post-Dayton Bosnia.
religious prior to the conflict but became religious afterwards. Secondly, in calling herself a progressive Muslim, she separates her faith from Orthodox Sunni Islam – Wahhabi – that has been brought to Bosnia from Saudi Arabia during the conflict and that many Bosnians view as too strict, backward and not their type of Islam. Referring to Wahhabis another respondent pointed out:

Those are sects. That is not real Islam, they are not Bosnian Muslims, and the saddest thing is that everyone thinks that all the Muslims are the same ... Bosnian Muslims are not like that at all. (Interview IX)

This attitude is very common in Bosnia. During my stay in Sarajevo, on a number of occasions while out with my Bosnian friends, they pointed out Wahhabis to me and made jokes about their backwardness. Al-Ali has found similar opinions among the Bosnian refugees she interviewed in the UK and the Netherlands:

Several people distanced themselves from the way Muslims from other cultural backgrounds practiced their religion. Over and over again I was told that Bosnian Islam is different from Islam in other parts of the world. “We are European as much as we are Muslim,” was a common remark not only by Bosnian refugees but also by their friends and relatives in Bosnia (2002: 256).

This interwoven relationship between being European and being Muslim, as one characteristic of Bosnian Muslimness, is related to the fact that for many Bosnian Muslims Islam remained largely a ‘framework for ethnic and cultural identity rather than a marker of religious belonging’ (Al-Ali, 2002), a framework that can be traced back to the changes in the Yugoslav census between 1961 and 1971 discussed above. Related to Bosnian ‘European’ Muslimness is the lack of practice of their faith, namely, infrequent, if any, mosque attendance, missing the ritual of five daily prayers, no fasting for Ramadan and the absence of veiling for women. Indeed, Bosnians have been portrayed as ‘wearing their faith lightly’ (Friedman, 2004). As described by one of my respondents:

I mean I will say that I am a Muslim, but I am not really a believer. For example I don’t believe in God. But I was born into a Muslim family, I have a

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97 I deal with the issue of increased religiosity in Chapter 6.  
98 Wahhabis would be clearly distinguishable on the streets of Sarajevo due to their appearance. The men had shaved heads, long beards and wore shin-length trousers, while the women wore burqas.  
99 Additionally, it relates to the reclaiming of their European cultural heritage prior to the Ottoman occupation, as well as to the old Orientalist debates concerning the dichotomous nature of Western versus Eastern belonging (Bakic-Hayden, 1995).
Muslim name you know ... both of my parents are Muslims ... but they never went to the mosque ... I have never been to the mosque either ... (Interview XII)

Therefore, Bosnian Muslimness would often be more about their relationship to other population groups living in Bosnia than about their relationship with the faith. What my respondent is describing above is that because of his personal heritage he expresses himself as a Muslim, not because of his belief in Allah.

In her discussion of Islam and Muslim identity in Bosnia, Bringa (1995) observes that Islam, as a cultural heritage, historical legacy and a set of practices and moral values, binds people together in a community of Bosnian Muslims. However, she points out that the emphasis on ‘Bosnian’ separates them from Serbs or Croats, while the emphasis on Muslim opposes them to Catholic or Orthodox Bosnians. In a similar manner, my respondent, by calling himself a Muslim, states that he is not Serb or Croat or from a mixed marriage but something else. However, he goes further to explain that this identification does not group him as a believer. While in many other contexts a non-believing Muslim could be viewed as something of a paradox this was not the case for the former Yugoslavia. As Mrdjen points out:

On the territory of the former Yugoslavia the concept of Muslim did not cause any misunderstandings or dilemmas. It was accepted that the concept included Muslims of the Slav origin who were capable of being Muslims and atheists in the same time. (2002: 87)

Not all of the Bosnian Muslims were atheists, however. In cases when their Muslimness was related to practicing the faith, the scope of their practice varied greatly, as pointed to above.

*Rural/urban divide*

In addition to ethnic/nationality versus citizenship/religious and non-religious ambiguities and paradoxes in Bosnian identifications and manifold ways these were expressed and described – and brought over to Ireland – other differences featured as important in Bosnia prior to the conflict.
One of the most important sub-divides in Bosnia prior to the conflict was between rural and urban populations. This in turn was interlinked with the cleavage between ‘cultured’ (kulturni) and ‘non-cultured’ (nekulturni) people, where being ‘cultured’ or ‘not-cultured’ referred to a whole set of ideas associated with oppositions such as town versus village, educated versus uneducated, poor versus rich, modern and Western versus backwards and Balkan (Bringa, 1995). In other words, the more urban you were the more progressive and European in outlook you were ‘supposed’ to be (Stefansson, 2007). This rural/urban divide, and the interconnected perception of the strong boundary between the two, was a prominent feature of the Bosnian refugee population that came into Ireland. One respondent who identified herself and her husband as ‘born and bred’ Brčani, in other words urbanites, explained the difficulty of her time in Cherry Orchard as an experience coloured by these differences:

In one place there were 182 people that you never met in your entire life. There were people there who differed in their traditions ... huge social differences ... Lots and lots of people came from rural areas ... it was really difficult to fit in. *It was so difficult to find somebody who you have something in common with ... somebody you can just talk to.* (Interview V)

When describing who was mixing with whom in Ireland, another respondent referred back to Bosnia and explained the difference between those who belonged to the urban centre of Sarajevo, so called raja, and those who did not, so-called papak:

I am proud that I am Sarajlija [from Sarajevo] ... I don’t know, put simply, Sarajevo for me was always the centre of happenings ... for the whole Yugoslavia... Sarajevo had something, something special ... how to explain this? Special mentality ... something you had to go through to understand ... you had to go through it to become raja ... To this day there is raja in

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100 The term nekulturni, while directly translating as ‘non-cultured’ does not exactly mean that these people have no culture. Rather it claims that the culture that they have is not the right kind of culture, it is not the ‘high’ culture of the urban population, but a traditional peasant culture. Furthermore, the term is not to be confused with the second meaning of nekultura in Serbo-Croat which refers to people without manners. While sometimes the second meaning is implied as part of the first the connection is not straightforward.

101 Brčani are people from Breko, a city in northern part of Bosnia and Herzegovina considered one of the urban centers in the country. In the post-Dayton Bosnia, following the Dayton Agreement, the Breko District, of which Breko is the capital city, is an independent unit of local self-government in Bosnia.

102 Raja and papak are the terms used specifically in Sarajevo. In other parts of the country different terms are used for the same distinction.

103 ‘Mentality’ is a word used a lot in Serbo-Croat closely related to ‘mindset’.
Sarajevo, but there are also papci ... Papak is the person that came to Sarajevo from elsewhere and does not want to integrate ... it has nothing to do with arriving as a refugee, or anything to do with religion ... Papak is the person who does not want to become part of the Sarajevo mentality ... and more so, who goes against it ... I guess you can even call it a system, or unwritten rule ... that goes against this urban rule ... that is papak! (Interview II)

This respondent carried on describing at length that unless incoming people changed their attitude they would never be able to become raja, and explained that these differences from ‘back home’ were carried over to Ireland.

While some people perceived the differences between the rural and urban or kulturni and nekulturni as insurmountable, others, like the respondent above, saw a possibility of overcoming them. However, for the majority of my respondents the onus was on the rural population to change, integrate into and accept the urban culture and way of life. None saw the rural culture as something that the urban population should accommodate.

When discussing Bosnian integration in Ireland, two respondents stated that the reasons for the low level of Bosnian integration in Ireland are due to the individuals’ background. Both interviewees had the experience of working in the Bosnian Community Development Project and therefore had regular contact with Bosnians in Ireland. They stated:

Well, 60 per cent of Bosnian people in Ireland, people over 45, 50 years of age are half illiterate because they came from the rural parts of the country [Bosnia] ... they have at most finished primary school ... the concept of integration states that you have to actively participate in all spheres of social life in order to integrate ... our people are not doing that, definitely ... (Interview XV)

There are 2,700 [Bosnian] people in the Republic of Ireland. 1200 have low levels of education ... meaning that their understanding of life is still based on

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104 ‘Incoming people’ refers to the demographic changes that have occurred in post-Dayton Bosnia resulting in many rural people moving into urban areas.
the life that they had in their village in Bosnia and Herzegovina and they cannot have that here. (Interview VIII)

The respondents make a connection between a rural background and low educational levels, as one parameter of *nekultura* [non-cultural] and therefore an inability to integrate. The association of non-culturalism with the populations from rural areas was most apparent when my interviewees spoke about the changes in post-Dayton Bosnia. As a consequence of post conflict migrations, many people from the rural areas of Bosnia were now residing in urban areas. When Bosnians who had fled the country during the conflict came back to post-Dayton Bosnia they were surprised and shocked by the changes that occurred there, including the fact that many rural people had moved into the cities. A significant number of my respondents and most of Sarajevo's *raja*, who I spent time with in Sarajevo, shared this negative opinion of the rural incomers.

*Gender, age, education and regional divisions*

Apart from the complex ethnic and religious identifications, as well as the inherited rural/urban divide, Bosnians in Ireland differ on other grounds too. With regard to gender, the initial cohort of programme refugees that arrived and was accommodated in Cherry Orchard consisted of 106 men and 122 women, women slightly outnumbering men (Quinn, 1995). This proportion carried on until 1998 (O'Regan, 1998) after which the population breakdown with regard to gender was not reported in the annual reports of the Bosnian Community Development Project.

Interestingly, in the same year, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the Zena Project was established to help the integration of Bosnian women into Irish society. The project did a survey and published its results where it recognised gender differences and different needs related to gender within what was perceived as homogenous ‘Bosnian community’. However, despite the project identifying particular gender-related needs and recommending a pathway to achieving them, the Project was closed before those could be implemented for reasons related to the power structures inherent in Irish interculturalism.105

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105 To read more about Zena Project, see Halilovic-Pastuovic (2007).
There are also significant differences among the Bosnian population in Ireland with regard to age. Most of the initial cohort was between the ages of 25 and 44, with 42 people under the age of 25 and one third over the age of 45 (Quinn, 1995). Within this group, those over 50 were considered elderly. While this is an unusually low age with which to categorise someone as elderly, the Bosnian Community Development Project found it appropriate to classify them as such due to the difficulties this group had in finding employment, and the isolation stemming from language barriers (BCDP, 1998b). The elderly was the only age cluster that the Bosnian Project engaged with on a group level. Under the title of ‘Outreach’, the work with the elderly started in 1996 and initially two members of the BCDP were solely dedicated to the scheme. The scheme involved regular weekly visits to the homes of the elderly, organising different activities, such as day trips to places of historical and cultural interest and it provided space in the Bosnian Project for coffee mornings, along with access to Bosnian newspapers, books and intra-community contact. While the work with the elderly group continues, it is on the much smaller scale than before. The ‘Outreach’ scheme has closed and the two remaining members of the Project help the group mainly around assistance with medical translations and passport requirements (BCDP, 2008).

In addition to age and gender differences, Bosnians in Ireland differ depending on the region of Bosnia they came from. This was explained to me by a former Bosnian Community Development Project staff member:

At the moment Bosnian people in Ireland are divided mostly in relation to the regions in Bosnia that they came from ... on one side you have people from Srebrenica, on the other side you have people from Sarajevo, on the third side is the Banja Luka crowed ... then there are people from east Bosnia, from Zvornik and Bjeljina ... (Interview XV)

He further explained that apart from the divisions due to the area of origin, Bosnians are also divided depending on the area that they are residing in Ireland. For example, those living in Dublin 15 or 24 group together, while those from the inner city form a separate group and have almost no contact with the Bosnians from suburbs like Dublin 15 or 24. Interestingly, he also pointed out that regional differences were not always pronounced within the Bosnian population in Ireland. In the beginning, people
felt divided depending on their ethnic and national background but over time that ceased to be of importance and differences mutated into the areas of origin and residence.

Another area of differentiation that was developing at the time of conducting this study was generational differences. There is a considerable number of young Bosnian people within the Bosnian population in Ireland who do not want to actively participate in the Bosnian Project in Ireland and who do not want to associate themselves too much with Bosnia. As pointed out by the same member of the staff:

And then there are the children and Bosnian youth that have, I would not even say integrated, they have assimilated in Ireland. They speak fantastic English ... our language they are slowly forgetting ... if they ever knew it ... basically they hate everything that is connected to Bosnia, they do not want to know anything about the history of Bosnia and Herzegovina ... I know that, I was working with these kids in the summer camp. Some kids simply refused to talk in Bosnian language ... I guessed they felt better speaking in English. (Interview XV)

These generational differences have already led to some problems with the younger generation turning to drug taking and antisocial behavior. There was a worry within the Bosnian Project that these issues may escalate in the future (personal communication, 28.02.2008).

Finally, there are differences regarding educational levels, qualifications and socio-economic groups within the Bosnian population in Ireland that combined with other differences, particularly with the urban/rural divide, produce further groupings and divisions.

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I do not deal with the issue of class in detail in this thesis, the reasons being as follows. Firstly, the discussion of class stratification in socialist societies and subsequent changes that have occurred there since these societies changed from planned into market economy would require a thesis of its own. Secondly, this discussion would need to involve the still relevant controversy of classlessness versus different pathways of class transformation in socialist societies (Parkin, 1969) that takes me away from the main thematic of this thesis. Finally, class issues did not present themselves as a significant theme in my interviews and ethnography. I do, however, acknowledge socio-economic differences as having hierarchical powers and as being division signifiers for the Bosnian population in Ireland.
While all these differences can be discussed in greater detail and are worthy of theorisations of their own, it is important to stress that they were largely ignored by the politics of Irish interculturalism. With the exception of the Zena Project, which tried but failed to deal with the different needs of the Bosnian female population, no other differences within the Bosnian population in Ireland were either publicly acknowledged or catered for. Additional to the fact that the diversity of the Bosnian population in Ireland was ignored by the policies of Irish reception and resettlement processes, there was no space left for the fluctuating nature of this diversity. Largely viewed through the frozen frame of reified ethnicity, the biopolitics of Irish interculturalism homogenised the differences of Bosnian migrants in Ireland and resurrected ethnicity and culture as the perceived glue for cohesion. My argument is that the Bosnian Irish intercultural regime of governmentality created ‘the Bosnian community’ in Ireland, out of Bosnian refugees, via the reception and resettlement programme. I elaborate on this argument in the next section.

The (absence of) a Bosnian community in Ireland

As pointed out in the previous chapter, the Bosnian reception and resettlement programme organised by the Irish state assumed Bosnian refugees as being a part of ‘a community’ from the very beginning and viewed them as a future ethnic minority in Ireland. In his reflections on the Irish experience with programme refugees between 1994 and 2000 O’Neill (2001), the director of the Refugee Agency, acknowledges the special needs that refugee groups have over other incoming migrants, but persists in categorising them as new ethnic minorities that need to be incorporated into Irish multiculturalism. With reference to the definitions of integration proposed by the Department of Justice in its 1999 ‘Integration – A Two Way Process’, he stresses the importance of integrating the refugee groups into Irish society but points out that ‘refugees should not be expected to give up their distinctive cultures and identities to integrate into the new society’ (O’Neill, 2001: 97). He adds that the work of the Refugee Agency, which managed refugee integration, sought to ‘ensure the development of public policy and services which enable refugees to build an independent life in Ireland and which take due account of their distinctive culture and identity’ (O’Neill, 2001: 96). Therefore, a distinct cultural identity was ascribed to the refugee populations from their arrival, and community creation, based on the sanctity
of this ascription, was prescribed as a successful procedure for the inauguration/absorption of refugee communities into Irish interculturalism.

The Bosnian reception and resettlement programme was managed in the same spirit. From the opening of the Cherry Orchard Centre to house Bosnian refugees ‘among the supportive community of their own people’ (Refuge Agency, 1998:29) during the acclimatisation stage of the reception process, through the clustering of Bosnian refugees in certain geographic areas in order to maximise the group’s ‘social and cultural support’ (O’Neill, 2001:99) during the resettlement part of the programme, and ending with the establishment of the Bosnian Community Development Centre, the Bosnians in Ireland were constructed as ‘a community’ by the agents of the state assigned to work on refugee issues. This community orientated regime of governmentality imposed on the Bosnian population in Ireland fitted uneasily with the actual experiences of this particular group.

While most refugees found the Cherry Orchard reception centre acceptable enough when it came to service provision, none of the Bosnian people I spoke to saw the fact of having been there with other Bosnians as important. Most of the people in my interviews who had spent time in the centre considered the English language classes that were provided there as helpful because the language barrier was a real problem for most of the people. Most did not reflect on the fact that they were housed there together with people from their own country as an advantage, but spoke instead about the difficulties they had experienced there and in the latter part of the process of resettlement. One interviewee described her time in Cherry Orchard as difficult. She explains that it was difficult to be living together with people who she did not know and had nothing in common with. In her own words:

In the beginning it was really, really strange. I was surrounded by people I had nothing in common with. People there came from very different backgrounds, they had very different traditions, the social differences were huge … it was so difficult to find someone you had something in common with … but after a while there we did [herself and her husband] … I met some people from Brcko, some people from Sarajevo … you know what I mean? After some time it became transparent who can be with whom, you know … (Interview V)
It became very clear in her interview that she did not want to mix with the people from rural Bosnia and avoided them in the Cherry Orchard Centre and afterwards. She also reflected on the fact that everything was done for them in the Cherry Orchard Centre as being quite problematic. She explains that they did not have many obligations there and she found the lack of independence, indeed, the dependence upon others, difficult:

It is very strange to just walk around. I felt lost. You have no obligations there ... somebody else cooks for you, somebody else brings you things and takes them away, somebody else washes your clothes, somebody else does everything ... everything ... and you feel lost because of it. Up to that point I had a fast life. I worked in the company so I was running around all the time ... run to work, run home, run to do things for the kids, run around as you had visitors coming to your house, run to visit other people ... and suddenly in the Centre all that was taken away. (Interview V)

Being housed by the Refugee Agency meant the Bosnians were unable to lead an independent life for some time to come. The same interviewee explained how hard it had been to adjust to the new house into which they were moved after Cherry Orchard. Firstly, there was a problem with the heating:

We were taken to this house in Swords, it was an old house, 25 years old I think, and it was not in the best state, the carpets were dirty, the furniture was missing but the worst thing was this fireplace ... I did not know what to do with it. The man from Cherry Orchard who drove us there asked if we wanted him to start the fireplace for us. We said yes, so he went somewhere in the shop and came back with this thing that looked like dry compost. So he started the fire with that and left. After he left I did not know what to do with it ... I had no idea how that thing was going to heat up my house. We were so cold ... but at some point in the middle of the night, it was in the early evening of January that we were moved there, we heard this loud noise ... it was everywhere, in the walls, in the attic, downstairs ... we started running around the house to see what is happening and finally we found out that there was a cable next to the fireplace that needs to be connected to the wall ... and then we heard the water pumping ... it took us months to learn how to heat the
house properly ... I never lit a fire in my life, we had central heating in our flat [in Bosnia]... (Interview V)

Apart from the things around the house that her family struggled to understand the workings of, venturing outside was problematic in the beginning too. She explains at length the difficulties they encountered with learning where to go to get their welfare benefits organised and how it took a long time for money to get through. Dealing with the electricity bills and rent caused similar confusion. Finally, possibly the most difficult part was getting to know the workings of the part of Dublin they were housed in. This problem was evident in most of the interviews I conducted. While they were housed in Cherry Orchard Bosnian programme refugees were taken on regular trips to Dublin city centre. With time that meant that most people were familiar with the city itself. However, when they were re-housed they were placed in small groupings in Dublin suburbs they did not know much about. This meant that they had to readjust to the new area of the city. Without proper orientation, people felt lost and confused.

One person described her first shopping trip after being re-housed as an unpleasant affair:

After we were moved into the new house we did not know where the shops were ... or anything, so we decided to go to Dublin city centre to do our food shopping. So we took a bus to the city centre, went into the shops that we knew and got the food and things that we needed ... and we took the bus back to Swords ... this was by the way around February so it was dark quite early ... now I knew that the bus will be passing my house but the bus is going and going and I cannot see my house anywhere. Finally the last bus stop came and the driver turns around to us and asks us to leave the bus. But how can I go out when my house is not here ... so all of us, my husband, and the children and a grandson and another girl Alisa [who was on the shopping trip with them] are trying to think of ways to find our house. But in the meantime we cannot leave the bus. If we leave the bus that is the end, we don't know where we are, we may as well be on another planet. Finally the bus driver realised what was happening and asked us for our address. He was so kind. He drove us straight to our house. Imagine a public bus driving us straight home. We were so happy ... but basically we could not leave the house often. We did not know where we would end up. (Interview IV)
In their descriptions of themselves and their situations, most people I interviewed had neither located themselves as part of the Bosnian community in Ireland nor expressed a wish to be part of one. They were more concerned with day-to-day living and the difficulties of life in their new country. Quite the opposite, some people spoke about the lack of mutual help and the lack of connection between Bosnians in Ireland. One woman took me out on tour of her garden during the interview and pointed out different neighborhoods that surround her house:

There, you see, they\textsuperscript{107} have put people from Kosovo, they are over there ... up there are people from Africa ... I think they are from Africa ... and around us here [she started whispering at this point] are nasi [our people] ... but I will tell you one thing, as far as I can see, those other groups ... they really get on, they really want to help one another ... with us it is the opposite ... nobody wants to help anybody, nobody ... only recently it happened to me that I needed to borrow fifty euro, just fifty for a short while, nobody of our people wanted to help ... nobody ... just like that, they did not care ... (Interview III)

In a similar manner another person, who worked for the Bosnian Community Development Project, pointed to the lack of connection between the Bosnian people in Ireland but explained that this is because of what he described as 'the Bosnian mentality':

There are many divisions between Bosnian people here. But that is to be blamed on the Bosnian mentality too. It seems that there is something in the Bosnian mentality where they would rather see the neighbor's cow dead than alive ... you know what I mean ... there is a certain dose of jealousy there, particularly in those people who did not succeed here ... there is no honesty, there is no solidarity ... you know, on the one hand I can understand that ... it is a fight for survival here. (Interview XV)

One person, when asked about the issue of Bosnian integration in Ireland, said that it was difficult for her to talk about Bosnians in Ireland because she does not know many:

\textsuperscript{107} When she says 'they' she is referring to the Refugee Agency and other government bodies that have participated in the refugee resettlement process.
You know what, I don’t know what will happen here, I cannot tell really ... Bosnians ... I actually don’t know many Bosnians here, I might know one or two families, but I do not spend time with Bosnians here. Sometimes they organise those Bosnian nights in the Project but I do not go, I never went. There are a few women I spend time with but they are not necessarily Bosnian. And of course I have two grown up daughters so I spend time with them. We are like friends really because they are grown up, and one of them is married, so we go out together and you know ... (Interview XIII)

Another person stated that in her opinion there was no such a thing as a unified Bosnian community in Ireland:

Bosnian community in Ireland is not a unified community. There is a Bosnian Community Development Project. That is all we have. There is no Bosnian embassy so whenever we need something done we go to the Project. Do other people here do the same I don’t know ... they all say we know the English language so we don’t need anybody. My English is still no good so I go to the Project. (Interview III)

What became apparent in the interviews was a lack of community cohesion and community sentiment behind the Bosnian Community Development Project. Most viewed the Project as a place where they could get administrative help and legal information with occasional entertainment. They did not feel that the Project fulfilled, or was an expression of, their cultural needs. Therefore, the Project served as a symbol of the Bosnian community in Ireland rather than the articulation of a community association.

As mentioned above, the Bosnian Community Development Project was set up by government agencies dealing with Bosnian reception and resettlement process with the aim of providing a ‘focus for the community’ and ensuring that ‘community links are maintained and developed’ (BCDP, 1998b:4). While certain activities, such as Bosnian evenings and sport-related events proved popular, particularly in the beginning when funding was still available, it is questionable whether community sentiment and cohesion were achieved through these.
For example, Bosnian evenings included Bosnian musicians coming over to perform and Bosnian food and drink. These events were the most popular events organized by the Bosnian Community Development Project and they were generally well attended. According to the Project they had a community turnout rate of 25-35 per cent (BCDP, 1998b). One person I spoke to was particularly fond of these nights:

You see in September the Bosnian evenings start. I love going to them. I have been to every single one that was organised here and they are great. You see, myself and my husband are very friendly and we love to socialise. Every week we go out at least twice, sometimes three times ... the other night we were out until midnight. (Interview V)

However, as she went on to describe her social life in Ireland, it became clear that it was the social aspect of the Bosnian nights that she and her husband enjoyed rather than the fact that it was organised by the Bosnian Project. She explained that she organises a lot of parties and barbeques at home and that her social circle does not consists only of Bosnians. Another family pointed out that it is precisely during the Bosnian nights that it becomes apparent how divided Bosnians in Ireland are:

People [Bosnian] do not get on. Everybody runs away from everybody ... like somebody wants to take your bread out of your mouth! For example at the Bosnian evenings ... We don't go. Every time the Bosnian evening happens there is a fight. Men get drunk and get into a fight. Do you know that guy Salem? He went to the Bosnian evening and he said never again ... he saw a few men get drunk and fight and he decided never to go again. The problem is that it happens every time a Bosnian evening is organised. They get drunk, the Garda arrives ... now I think the Garda has forbidden those nights. (Interview III)

While the Bosnian evenings attracted large numbers, the reasons behind the engagement seem more to do with socializing that boosting up the Bosnian spirit in Ireland. For some interviewees, these evenings were about nostalgia for the times that they had had in Bosnia when Bosnia was still part of the former Yugoslavia. Hence, the sentiment was more related to the past in Bosnia than the future in Ireland.

Additionally, as pointed out previously, while there was some desire expressed by Bosnian refugees to meet other Bosnians, this did not result in development of a strong Bosnian community in Ireland. After a short spurt of activity in the mid-1990s,
the information newsletter ceased to be printed, the summer camps for children were no longer organised, and the focus shifted from events and activities in Ireland to transnational activities.

Three main changes occurred within the Bosnian Community Development Project with regard to its re-orientation from activities in Ireland towards transnational activities. The first relates to the BCDP’s involvement in organising summer migrations to Bosnia, the second to providing services to other groups from former Yugoslavia, and third to its getting involved in the Bosnian Diaspora Association. I discuss the first two changes below. The final change is discussed in detail in Chapter 7.

Summer migrations

It is difficult to pinpoint precisely when Bosnians started their summer migrations. Initially, it was the Refugee Agency that embarked on the idea of Bosnian repatriation to Bosnia. When the situation in Bosnia improved in late 1995, following the signing of the Dayton Agreement, the Refugee Agency organised a voluntary repatriation scheme for Bosnian refugees who wanted to return to Bosnia. The scheme included return flights, small grants to aid resettlement in Bosnia and a right to return to Ireland within six months. In 1998, 14 persons voluntarily repatriated to Bosnia but eight of those exercised their right to return to Ireland (Refugee Agency, 1998). In 1998, the Refugee Agency also noted that this signaled a reduction in the numbers of repatriation considering that 42 persons applied to repatriate in 1997, stating that ‘the great majority now appear to have decided to stay in Ireland’, and adding that the ‘increasing number of Bosnians taking out Irish citizenship is also indicative of a decision to remain’ (Refugee Agency, 1998:14). Based upon these observations the Refugee Agency concluded that:

These developments can be seen as very positive in relation to the general settlement of the community in Ireland as our recent research on the settlement of refugees found a clear link between successful resettlement and a clear decision to stay (Refugee Agency, 1988:14).
This conclusion masks a few issues. The fact that Bosnian refugees are not repatriating back to Bosnia is not necessarily a proof of their long-term commitment to Ireland. Despite deciding to stay in Ireland for the time being, some are hoping to return to Bosnia at a later stage in life or in their old age.\footnote{The Refugee Agency itself noticed that often, despite wanting to stay in Ireland, Bosnian refugees were ‘holding out the prospect of one day returning to Bosnia’ (Refugee Agency, 1998:14).} This is particularly relevant for those who do not have young children in Ireland. As one Bosnian woman explained:

Just the other day I was explaining this to my younger daughter. She is in college now and I just want her to finish her studies and be smart ... but I told her ... Dear, I am not planning to stay here forever ... I have to tell you that I am not planning to stay here forever. I am still here now but when old age comes, as you say, I would like to go to Bosnia, I would like to be there and stay there ... My brother [who lives in Austria at present] will return too when he retires and my sister [who is in America] will move back too and we will be there together. And my daughter tells me “So what? I will be visiting you!” ... And then I told her “So you are going to let me be alone there then ...?” ... I don’t know what will happen but I have to admit I would like to be near them ... I would like them to be close to me ... (Interview XIII)

In fact, she went as far as to try to recruit a Bosnian boyfriend for her younger daughter on one of her summer visits to Bosnia, as her daughter did not want to go with her that year, signaling that she also wanted her family to remain connected to the place and maybe even return there at some point:

I tried to find her Bosnian boyfriend once. Listen to this ... it is a funny story. I was travelling from Makarska [seaside resort on the Croat coast] back to Bosnia one day by bus and on the bus there was this gorgeous boy ... really good looking. And I told him ‘You could be my son in law!’ And he says ‘Why not!’ [she laughs] So I told him ‘Give me your telephone number’ ... and he did ... Listen to what I have done ... So he gave me his number, the number was from Mostar [Bosnian town] so that was great and I went home ... and I told my daughter “Azra look, I brought you a telephone number from a very nice boy” ... and then I praised him, told her that he was really handsome ... and she said “Why are you bringing me telephone numbers from boys?” ... so I said “Shall I call him?” She has that internet thing so she can
talk to him. But she said no. She did not want to call him. So I called him and he asked if she wanted him to call her ... but she did not want that either ... Hopefully next year when we go to Bosnia again she will call him from there ...

(Interview XIII)

Taking up Irish citizenship and deciding to reside in Ireland is indicative neither of their integration nor of the permanence of that decision. Also many of the people I spoke to who had and/or keep having thoughts about returning to Bosnia were not sure if that will happen due to the changes in post-Dayton Bosnia which deter them from returning, as I discuss in the next chapters. Additionally some of my interviewees spoke about the possibility of moving to other countries. This was mostly related to parents wanting to move closer to their adult children who have relocated from Ireland.

The decision about whether to return to Bosnia or not proved most difficult for parents with young children and children who are still in education in Ireland. As explained by one young parent:

Do I think about returning? I have been thinking about returning since the moment I arrived ... I never came here to stay until the end of my life. This is not a country for me ...

Maja: Why?

I don’t know ... It is just not my ... place ... I don’t feel ... Ok, I am integrated into Irish society and I have found my way here, I am ok, I have my flat, my job and everything you know ... all that stands ... but if a nice opportunity arises I would return ... Integration is more than a job and a flat ...that is not ...that is not ... that is not what makes a person satisfied, at least not me. It works for some people ... some people say “I have a nice flat here, I have a good job here, I have good money here, I am never going to return.” Because he has everything here ... for me that is not a priority. I can find that there as well if I return and find a job but ... I have a daughter here ... so it can happen that we stay here ... as she was born here you know ... I have to say to you that a perfect situation for me would be to be able to work here and

109 No parent I spoke to said that they would take their children out of school in Ireland in order to return to Bosnia.
there ... to be able to share my time between the countries ... That would be
great! (Interview II)

Therefore, when the Refugee Agency perceives Bosnians taking up Irish citizenship
and ‘appearing to have decided to remain in Ireland’ as indicative of their success
with the reception and resettlement project and as an indicative of Bosnian integration
in Ireland, they are mistaken in three main ways.

Firstly, as shown above, while people may choose to reside in a particular place in a
particular point in time, even a prolonged period of time, this can happen for a
number of different reasons that could be but are not necessarily connected to their
being integrated into the society they live in. They may choose to stay because their
children are in education, they may choose to stay because they have children who
were born in the host society, they may stay because they found better economic
positions for themselves in Ireland as opposed to Bosnia or because they find the
changed post-Dayton Bosnia a society they do not want to return to. Finally, as is
most often the case, they may choose to stay because of the interconnected mixture of
these and other reasons. Additionally, the decision to stay may not be permanent and
may not even be opposed to a decision to return, but may be about moving on to a
different country altogether.

Secondly, to see Bosnians’ decision to remain in Ireland and take up Irish citizenship
as a sign of integration is misleading. As the last interview extract illustrates there are
different levels of integration that people may achieve. The same person elaborated:

You see, here you will never be ... you know what I mean ... The Irish have
accepted us very well I have to say, particularly in the beginning. Now things
are a bit different ... the attitudes have changed, I don’t know. Well ... there
are good people and bad people in all countries, I cannot generalise and give a
bad name to the whole country ... but I will never feel totally part of Ireland. I
mean I have lived here for 12 years now ... and I am used to it ... I actually
have to admit that I know more about here than about there at this point ... what is happening and how the state is working ... you know ... here I am part
of everything but somehow I belong there more. (Interview II)
Another person, who considered himself very involved in Irish society and was working on issues of Bosnian integration for the Bosnian Community Development Project, stated:

If we are talking about me, I still feel like a foreigner here ... despite the fact that I hold an Irish passport now ... I feel like a foreigner because I cannot say that I have integrated into Irish society ... and that is despite the fact that I am doing this job [integrating Bosnians into Irish society], that I am contributing to the Project this way or another for twelve years now ... I had more contact with Irish people five or six years ago than now.

Maja: Why is that, considering the fact that you, as you stated yourself earlier on, belong to the group of people who have all the predispositions for successful integration ... you are young, you have the language, the job? I think the main difference is people's mentality. For example, I have a neighbour ... Four years ago I bought the house in a small village near Ashbourne ... but we only say “hi” and “bye” at the front gate ... we never visit each other ... they work, we work, what can you do, by the time you get home from work, have a shower and something to eat ... mind you I am isolated from our people too, my first Bosnian neighbour lives 50 km away from me ... that's one of the reasons anyway ... when I was living in the city centre, when I was younger, when I had less obligations I had a better social life and more connections to Irish people, now I do not feel that way ...

(Interview XV)

Not only are there different levels of integration, but during the course of their lifetime the feeling of integration may change for people.

Thirdly and most importantly, taking up Irish citizenship and ‘appearing to have decided to remain in Ireland’ can mask the post-refugee transnationalism that this thesis discusses.

Although most of them are now Irish citizens, 80 per cent of Bosnian people in Ireland are engaged in a form of post-refugee transnationalism characterised by annual summer migrations (personal communication, 25.10.2005). As described by the former employee of the Bosnian Community Development Project:
[Bosnians] go every year ... Because Bosnians who are working, proved themselves to be hardworking. They work day and night, more or less all the time and they don’t take holidays during the year. Most of the Bosnians work in manual jobs as well, so you can make up hours ... by working weekends or double shifts. Lots of women are unemployed, so they go as soon as school finishes. Then the husbands join them there for as long as they can ... For example, my stepfather does not take holidays during the whole year but takes them together in the summer ... They [he and the mother] are there right now, they will stay for a month and the half. They have been doing it for years. (Interview VI)

Interestingly, the Bosnian Project closes for the month of August every year as ‘all Bosnians are gone home for the summer’ (personal communication, 25.10.2005). One interviewee explained the absence of Bosnian people in Ireland during the summer months:

Lots of people are in Bosnia now for two months ... maybe eight to ten weeks ... in September life starts again here (Interview V)

While it is difficult to pinpoint when exactly the Bosnians started to be engaged in their summer migrations to Bosnia, by 2000 the Bosnian Community Development Project became aware of the phenomenon and started being involved in helping with organising flights for these summer migrations. By 2005, the Project was organising and running the flights on an annual basis. As the annual report of the Bosnian Project for 2005 states:

The Bosnian CDP in cooperation with the Irish Tourist Agent “Croatia Tours” organised summer flights to Bosnia. In 2005 it was the first time that we were able to organise the charter flights directly to Sarajevo (in the past five years we organised flights to Bosnia via Dubrovnik, Croatia). It was a great success as we had over 300 people registered for the flights. In enables members of our community to access cheap flights for a longer duration (BCDP, 2005: 8).

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110 A number of Bosnians would be in receipt of welfare in Ireland and therefore are working.
111 All annual reports produced by Bosnian Community Development Project were written in the English language. I did not fix grammatical mistakes, which sometimes occurred, in the reports.
From 2005 onwards, the Bosnian Project showed a clear commitment to be involved in organising these flights on a regular basis by listing it as one of the main objectives in the Working Plan 2005-2006 (BCDP, 2005/6: 8). The commitment continued into the coming years and the last available BCDP Annual Report stated:

In 2008 we were able to organise charter flights directly to Sarajevo. We negotiated with Croatia Tours to give a great discount to those with low income and our senior members. In the year 2008 we had a full flight to Sarajevo, 162 people going for the duration of two months as well as a few smaller groups (Approx. 70 people) to Dubrovnik with organised buses to Sarajevo (BCDP, 2008:12).

While some people choose to make their own travel arrangements for their summer migrations, both the size of the groups who choose to travel through the Bosnian Community Development Project and the strength of the Bosnian Project’s commitment to assist them on their journeys shows the importance of these migrations. Moreover, it shows that the continued connection with Bosnia is of greater importance to Bosnians than building a Bosnian community in Ireland. Finally, it shows that the Bosnian Community Development Project that was initially set up as a space for building a Bosnian community in Ireland became the Bosnians’ main link with Bosnia. By 2008 the Project was actively assisting Bosnian post-refugee transnationalism.

*Other people of former Yugoslavia*

In addition to the Project’s re-orientation towards the Bosnians’ summer migrations, it also started to deal not only with Bosnian people but also with people from other parts of the former Yugoslavia.

For example, the number of cases handled by the Bosnian Community Development Project in 2008 was 2,549 (BCDP, 2008:7). Most cases concerned translations of birth and marriage certificates, medical documentation, visa support and translations for different Irish organisations and government departments such as health boards,

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112 This is the last available breakdown of the cases handled by the project.
county councils, hospitals and social welfare offices. Three hundred and forty-seven cases concerned visas and the naturalisation process, through communication with the visa application office, the naturalisation and citizenship section and status registration branches of the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform, and the Department of Foreign Affairs. Two hundred and ninety-eight cases involved working closely with the Bosnian Embassy in London in dealing with enquiries regarding Bosnian passports, property in Bosnia and changes in Bosnian laws concerning people living abroad. Four hundred and twenty-one cases dealt with authorisations and proxies that were, as the Bosnian Project states ‘a huge part of our daily work as the majority of the people who reside in Ireland had to use them for many reasons considering their property in Bosnia, getting their birth and marriage certificates, voting rights etc.’ (BCDP, 2008:9).

Interestingly, 319 cases concerned cases relating to other people from the former Yugoslavia who were:

...seeking different information about their own Embassies (Croat, Serb, Macedonian etc.) as well as contacts with the Department of Trade and Employment, various Colleges and Universities, CV making and printing services, internet services, satellite TV, newspapers etc. (BCDP, 2008:9).

Two things need to be stressed in relation to the above. Firstly, the breakdown of the services provided by the Project shows a large number of cases handled annually. When taking into account that the Project closes during the month of August the workload becomes even larger, resulting in the Project dealing with approximately 11.5 cases a day. Considering the nature of its work it is noteworthy that the main role of the Bosnian Community Development Project is administrative. It actually seemed to me that the Project functions as a ‘quasi embassy’.

Secondly, and more importantly, the number of cases handled over the years increased significantly from 372 cases in 1998 (BCDP, 1998b:9), to 1,195 in 2005 (BCDP, 2005:5). The 2007 annual report notes 1,741 cases handled and this rose to 2,549 in 2008. While the increase in the number of cases can be partly attributed to the increasing size of the Bosnian population in Ireland, from 2004 onwards the
Bosnian Project’s annual reports note that services were not reserved for Bosnians only but were extended to other people from the former Yugoslavia.

For example, the work-plan paper for 2006 notes that ‘most of the services we provide also include the people from former Yugoslav republics (i.e. Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro, Macedonia and the Region of Kosovo)’ (BCDP, 2005/06:3). The same paper, under the Objectives section, notes that objective number one for the Bosnian Project was:

‘developing a drop in centre where Bosnian people could socialise and organise themselves as well as encourage other ethnic groups to come and be part of it’, other ethnic groups being ‘groups from the former Yugoslavia (Croats, Serbs, Macedonians etc.) who are already coming to our premises’ (BCDP, 2005/06:6).

Likewise, the 2007 Annual Report states:

The information centre started working with other ethnic minority groups in Ireland, such as Croat, Serb, Macedonian, Montenegro and Kosovo. The main reason for this is the similar or same language and culture, as all the new countries named used to be part of the former Yugoslavia. With the help from other groups we can create a new exciting project where we would all benefit including various Government Departments, Health Boards, Social Welfare Offices, FÁS etc. As we mentioned earlier we had 652 requests in 2007 from people from the groups named above and that number is constantly increasing. Also we can proudly say that we are the base centre for all those who need or seek any kind of information we can provide in Ireland as well as a link between Ireland and the countries mentioned above (BCDP, 2007:9, emphasis added).

The Community Development Section added:

The main aim of the community work is to provide the members of the wider Bosnian community and since 2007 communities from former Yugoslav republics (Croatia, Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Kosovo) with the opportunity to fully participate from the beginning in creating, planning and delivering the work that will give us the opportunity to assist the most vulnerable and disadvantaged members of the community in the process of integration into Irish Society (BCDP, 2007:9).
The 2008 Annual Report goes even further in blurring the line between Bosnians in Ireland and people from other former Yugoslav republics. It starts by defining Bosnians in Ireland as a ‘community of interest’ and by including other ethnic minority groups from the former Yugoslavia in their population charts for Ireland. It goes on to state:

In 2008 we have been working with large numbers of people from the former Yugoslavia (Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Kosovo) mostly regarding the same issues as Bosnian people in Ireland. We had a number of meetings with people from other ethnic groups from former Yugoslavia informing them of our plans to further expand our services. They were delighted as they did not have any other organisation providing information and services in their own language. They are scattered all around Ireland with three major groups located in Co. Dublin, Co. Galway and Co. Cork (BCDP, 2008:6).

In the Community Development Section, with regard to the drop-in centre and the library, the report explains:

During 2008 the Bosnian CDP again has updated our library. Currently we have around 150 books in Bosnian, Croat and Serb languages, five different weekly magazines in Bosnian, Serb and Croat languages, which we give out to people for reading. The members of our community donate most of the books we have and we hope to update our library and make it more accessible to all age groups [...] We have 65 DVDs, films in Bosnian, Croat and Serb languages, as well as 85 CDs with different types of music for our users. Our drop in facilities have been used on daily basis and people have been watching satellite TV especially channels from former Yugoslav republics (BCDP, 2008:11).

Additionally, the part of the report that deals with the social and cultural evenings mentions that music evens continue to be organised whose aim is to increase attendances from other ethnic groups of former Yugoslavia to give them the ‘opportunity to rebuild the trust’ that was there before the conflict (BCDP, 2008:12). While the Project’s Annual Reports often describe the people from the former Yugoslavia as ‘other ethnic groups’, the reports also emphasise the connections and
similarity between these people and Bosnian migrants, in particular with regard to language and culture. The reports also show willingness and dedication to continue the collaborations between Bosnians and other people from the former Yugoslavia, via the Bosnian Project, and a loosening of self-description by the Bosnian community in Ireland to 'a community of interest'.

Considering the assertion that Bosnians tend not to feel part of the Bosnian community in Ireland, and the fact that the other minority communities from the former Yugoslavia got involved in the Project – as well as the transnational nature of the Bosnian summer migrations back to Bosnia, and the re-orientation of the Project towards the Bosnian diaspora worldwide\textsuperscript{113} – it is very difficult to perceive Bosnians in Ireland as a coherent entity and indeed a 'community' (even though the term 'community' is used in the reports). Rather it can be argued that the ambiguities presented above point towards the understanding of Bosnians in Ireland as a contingent community. I elaborate on Bosnians as a contingent community in the last section below.

**The Bosnian Community in Ireland – a contingent community**

*Community building – a technique of governmentality*

As discussed in Chapter 1, Foucault’s notion of governmentality pertains at its most fundamental to different ways in which the conduct of individuals and populations is managed by governmental practices. In turn, these practices are embedded in particular discursive rationalities which are implemented on the targeted populations through varied techniques of government or regimes of governmentality. I propose that Irish interculturalism is a regime of governmentality, which among other things produces and targets migrant populations. The core rationality underlying the regime is the concept of integration, understood as an indispensable ingredient of a successful 'multicultural' society, and the basic technique for implementing this recipe has developed over the years into the 'community building' approach. This configuration, a medley of Charles Taylor’s (1994) ‘politics of recognition’, notions of ‘community

\textsuperscript{113} This is discussed in Chapter 7.
relations’ (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992) as imported from the UK and to a lesser
degree the US, and Ireland’s own ‘community rhetoric’ inherited from the troubles in
the North (Bryan, 2006, McVeigh, 2002), produced a reified position for the concept
of community in Irish diversity discourse. In addition, it has introduced conditions
within which community formation became ‘an artifact of rule’ (Gray, 2006) in
Ireland. Therefore, policies of community development and the encouragement of
community associations are central to Irish interculturalism.

This is particularly applicable to the groups of programme refugees in Ireland. As
shown previously, while government approaches to previous groups of programme
refugees may have been piecemeal and lacking in long-term strategic planning,
understanding those groups through the lens of cultural homogeneity was the
perennial line underlying governmental practices towards them. This mindset was
extended to Bosnian refugees and it underpinned the entire reception and resettlement
process. As a first comprehensive approach to programme refugees, it aimed to foster
this perceived cultural homogeneity of Bosnian migrants initially via Cherry Orchard
and later the Bosnian Community Development Project, discussed in this chapter.

In addition to the community development strategy being utilised as an ‘artifact of
rule’ in integrating the Bosnian refugee population into Irish society, the discourse of
empowerment was also present.

*The discourse of empowerment – a mentalité of governmentality*

In discussing the need for developing specialist services for refugees within the
mainstream services for all immigrants, John O’Neill, the former Director of the
Refugee Agency and the Chair of the Bosnian Community Development Project,
points to a need ‘for support for refugee associations to build confidence and self-
sufficiency within the refugee communities to articulate and help meet refugee needs’.
O’Neill adds that ‘from a perspective of promoting refugee self-sufficiency’ due
account needs to be taken of their ‘distinctive identity and culture’, and finishes his
discussion by quoting the Refugee Agency and Eastern Health Board 1998 Research
Report:
The benefits of successful integration will be evident through the increased contribution of refugees in all aspects of this society. Afforded the appropriate support and opportunities, refugees will demonstrate their huge wealth of talent, skills and enthusiasm, culture and energy and will continue to contribute to the social fabric of Ireland – our shared society (O’Neill, 2001: 101).

The Refugee Agency states that the reason for establishing the Cherry Orchard reception centre was to give newly arrived Bosnian refugees an opportunity to settle and get used to their new country in a ‘safe environment, among the supportive community of their own people with a shared culture, before moving to independent living’ (Refugee Agency, 1998:29). Hence, not only was a dependency ascribed to the Bosnian population in Ireland immediately upon arrival, but the supposed healing power of the cultural community sentiment, during the path towards independence, was also prescribed.

Finally, the mission statement of the Bosnian Community Development Project, as seen in Chapter 3, highlights that the reason behind the establishment of the Project was a need to ‘facilitate the Bosnian community in their efforts to play an active role in the […]wider community while maintaining their unique culture and identity’ (BCDP, 1998a: 5). The mission statement adds that ‘the members of the sponsoring group, which is also the management committee, came together as a result of the work of their organisation with the Bosnians who originally settled in Ireland from 1992 onwards’. The management committee of the Bosnian Community Development Project was therefore made up of the staff from the Refugee Agency and other government affiliated bodies such as the Department of Education, and Access Ireland. At the initial stages, the Bosnians themselves were not involved in managing the Project.

The mission statement further claims that the members of the management committee:

114 Access Ireland is a refugee integration organisation, with a particular focus on health issues and social well-being. Current activities include developing cultural mediation services for immigrant groups and implementing a training and integration programme for refugee women http://www.accessireland.ie –last accessed 06.09.2012
...have a strong interest in the potential of the Project to enable the Bosnian community become self-directing and self-reliant. Values which are deemed important include the right of this community to maintain their own identity while also becoming part of Irish society. We feel that Irish people should be able to see the Bosnian community as different but equal in our society, and to respect their unique identity and culture [...] By providing a Community Resource Centre the Project would enable the Bosnian community to develop their own resources and become empowered to help themselves rather than rely on the outside agencies or individuals \(^\text{115}\) (BCDP, 1998a:5).

Yet again it highlights the lack of self-reliance, the need for government assisted empowerment and the right to a unique cultural identity.

It is clear from the extracts above that not only was community development seen as essential to successful integration, in order to accommodate their ‘distinctive identity and culture’, but that this community building also needed government support to overcome the refugees’ lack of confidence and self-sufficiency. While many refugees certainly lack knowledge and opportunity when arriving in their host societies, this is characteristic of many migrants and not exclusive to refugees. This approach is particularly misguided when discussing refugees on a group level. As this chapter demonstrates, the Bosnian population in Ireland is very heterogeneous. To conflate this diversity with a culturally distinct collectivity, ordain it with the language of lack of confidence and self-sufficiency and prescribe its recovery through localised government assisted programmes of ‘community formation’ and empowerment is problematic. Hence, the Bosnian population was constructed as needy – rather than assisted – in addition to being awarded the title of ‘community’ rather than actually being one.

This progression may not be surprising considering that advanced liberal rationality entails ‘localisation’ or movement of government responsibility to a more local level (O’Malley and Palmer, 1996).\(^\text{116}\) This has taken the form of a new emphasis on the

\(^{115}\) This quote was taken from the BCDP’s Application for Community Employment Funding document where on behalf of the Bosnian ‘community’ in Ireland the Refugee Agency applied for further government funding for the Project.

\(^{116}\) However, the state still orchestrates ‘the conduct of conduct’.
language of ‘community’ (Rose, 1996b) and is best exemplified by the proliferation of ‘empowerment’ discourses (Cruikshank, 1994).

This is particularly relevant to refugee populations. As Lippert argues with regard to the Canadian case of refugee resettlement, a liberal subject is assumed to have a capacity for choice and it is precisely this feature that refugees are assumed to lack. Therefore liberal government:

Insists there be devices present to encourage a choosing capacity among those deemed to lack such powers. Refugee resettlement is such a device. It attempts to mediate, over a more or less discrete period, between Canadian citizenry thought to be established and civilized, and the migrating, marginalized refugee (Lippert, 1998:382).

In addition to this liberal rationality, Lippert (1998) argues, there is a distinctive Foucauldian pastoral rationality that operates in refugee resettlement, which seeks to ‘constantly ensure, sustain, and improve the lives of each and every one’ (Foucault, 1988:67). In Lippert’s words:

As the welfare state (but not the State itself) continues to be dismantled, or at least significantly ‘rolled back’, pastoral power is not simply expiring, being entirely replaced by an advanced liberal configuration entailing amongst other processes ‘enterprisation’ and ‘privatisation’. Instead, in refugee resettlement at least, pastoral power can be seen as moving out of the State into the range of mostly religious authorities once again. A pastoral and advanced liberal rationality complement one another in this context. The former targets individuals seeking to install within them capacities that happen to fit with the new demands of advanced liberalism [...] the latter specifies a configuration that primarily through the language of ‘community’ [...] provides a heaven for pastoral power (Lippert, 1998:397).

While Lippert’s work relates to Canada, and the politics of Canadian refugee resettlement, there are parallels to be drawn with Ireland. I suggest that a similar rationality configuration that Lippert describes existed within the Irish resettlement programme for Bosnian refugees.
Firstly, within pastoral power it is the role of the shepherd to be ‘informed of the material needs of each member of the flock and provide for them when necessary’ and, he, the shepherd ‘must know what is going on, what each one of them does’ (Foucault, 1988:69). Hence, the constant monitoring of refugee conduct (Indra, 1988; Winland, 1994; Lippert, 1998). While in the case of Canada this was mostly administered by religious authorities, in Ireland the Refugee Agency was the main custodian of the monitoring process. From the moment of their arrival, through the creation of Cherry Orchard and the Bosnian Community Development Project, the hand of pastoral power was ever present, ensuring the ‘salvation of the flock’ (Foucault, 1988:62). As the report on the integration of refugees by the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform itself states:

> In the absence of a co-ordinated national policy on integration for all refugees, the measures taken by the State to facilitate integration have been fragmented and lacking in co-ordination [...] Undoubtedly the Refugee Agency has been instrumental in the development of a number of important measures for the integration of Programme refugees’ (DJELR, 1999:20).

Secondly, as in the case of the Canadian resettlement project, this ‘salvation’ was channeled via the language of community, providing the space – in accordance with the demands of liberal rationality – for pastoral power to nest. However, there was a big discrepancy between the rhetoric of the Refugee Agency and its actions with regard to Bosnian resettlement project.

**Disparity of discourse and practice**

Despite all the empowerment talk, management and control underpinned the resettlement programme. In 1998, the Refugee Agency stated that:

> As the Bosnian involvement in the management committee continues to increase, the Refugee Agency and other interested organisations and individuals will continue to play a support role but the future Project is very much in the hands of the Bosnian community (BCDP, 1998b:4).

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117 However, before the Bosnian refugee resettlement programme, previous groups of programme refugees were managed mostly by religious organisations, as shown in the previous chapter. The church is still actively involved with other groups of refugees and other types of migrants in Ireland.

118 The report relies heavily on the experience with Bosnian refugee integration in Ireland.
It took a number of years but the Refugee Agency finally delivered the promise of allowing the Bosnian refugees to run the Bosnian Community Development Project by themselves. However, this was only partial. Whereas in 2008 the management committee consisted of seven members who were all Bosnians (BCDP, 2008),\(^{119}\) the organisation itself was funded by the Department of Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs. This meant that the ongoing activities of the Project and its existence depended on government review of their annual reports. It is also important to note that as the involvement of the Refugee Agency lessened so too the funding decreased. As explained to me by one of the two remaining BCDP staff members:

> When we were still run by the Refugee Agency there was a lot of funding. Funding was coming from the EU then … there was a lot of travelling … [he gives me a list of management members here, notably all Irish] … they were all travelling to all of those conferences and things in Europe and they never took BCDP staff … us … with them … we cannot do much with the funding that we are receiving at the moment, the funding is being cut constantly, for example this year we had to cut our wages by 10 per cent … even so, after we pay our two staff, taxes and electricity, heating and telephone bills, there is nothing left … we don’t even have enough money to renovate the outside of our premises (personal communication, 11.06.2009).

While the discourse of empowerment prevailed in theory, in practice less government involvement in the Project meant less material support. Also, when the Refugee Agency established the Bosnian Community Development Project, it was in order to provide the Bosnian migrants with a space where they could ‘voice issues of importance’ (BCDP, 1998a: 5). However, when these ‘issues of importance’ became related to the Bosnians’ summer migrations and connections with the global Bosnian diaspora, the management was not pleased. As explained to me by a same BCDP staff member:

> Ultimately they [the Refugee Agency] are for assimilation … they want to assimilate us … I always found it strange that they were so against the Bosnian Project keeping in contact with Bosnia … to me it is the most normal thing that we Bosnians, as Bosnian diaspora, want to, and are, keeping in

\(^{119}\) Two of whom are employed by the BCDP and working 35 hours a week (BCDP, 2008: 5).
touch with Bosnia ... that is the most normal thing to expect from the diaspora ... also they always wanted us to keep in touch with other migrant organisations here and they never understood why instead we would prefer to keep in touch with Bosnians from other countries ... we want to see how are they doing, how are they getting on in their host societies, what do these societies offer them and how are they finding it there ... after all we are in the same circumstances as them and we want to know how are they getting on ... (personal communication, 11.06.2009).

In relation to the Bosnian Community Development Project organising flights for summer migrations to Bosnia, the management member of the Refugee Agency dealing with the Bosnian Project shared her opinion about the Project:

It lost its way somewhere along the way, it did not seem to meet ... well, it did not end up performing the function that it was supposed to perform ... at the time I was there, on a number of occasions I thought that it was used as a commercial venture by some of the staff there ... you know, there was a travel agency and the flights were being organised from over there [the premises in Pearse street] ... the Project’s function was not to send people home for the summer, its function is to support the Bosnian community in Ireland, its function is to build a community here and to build links between Bosnians and other local communities here, the integration stuff ... (personal communication, 23.01.2009).

It is very clear that rather than empowering Bosnian migrants, the Refugee Agency wanted to manage Bosnian integration in Ireland via the community development pathway. Ultimately, the Agency wanted to create a Bosnian community in Ireland that would fit neatly alongside other ethnic minorities. However, as this chapter shows, Bosnian identifications were too heterogeneous to be molded into an ethnic community, their sentiments lacked the cohesion needed for such a collectivity and their alliances were too diverse and global.

Kelly (2003) studied community associations that have been provided for refugee populations in the UK in the early 1990s. Her study reflected on and tested out the findings by Rex et al. (1987), namely that community associations play an important
role in assisting the adaptation of community members to the host society. Rex et al. found that community associations have four main functions: overcoming isolation; providing material help to community members; defending the interests of community; and promoting the community's culture. Kelly's research focused on a newly-arrived population of Bosnian refugees and five associations set up for them in the UK. She found that some Bosnians conformed to the idea and expectations of these associations and that these people became pivotal in maintaining them. Overall, however, Kelly found that 'rather than being a formal expression of informal community, the associations are a formal construction of an ideal and do not reflect reality of their members' (2003:46). In reality, Kelly found there was no community, or communities, of Bosnians in the UK; there were instead kinship groups, friends and networks. The associations reflected the expectations of the British society rather than the Bosnian reality. She concluded that what did exist was contingent community defined as 'group of people who will, to some extent, conform to the expectations of the host society in order to gain the advantages of a formal community association, whilst the private face of the group remains unconstituted as a community' (Kelly, 2003:36).

I suggest that the Bosnian community in Ireland is a contingent community. While there is no such a thing as Bosnian community in Ireland, some Bosnians have adopted the Bosnian Community Development Project as a venue via which certain information can be obtained, certain interests pursued and certain networks developed.

**Conclusion**

This chapter provided an empirical case for the workings of the Irish biopolitical regime of governmentality with regard to Bosnian migrants. It argued that this regime ignored the diversity of the Bosnian population in Ireland and their multifarious experiences and needs. The chapter also presented the finding of absence of a Bosnian community in Ireland, illustrating the lack of interaction and community sentiment and highlighted summer migrations and interactions and connections between Bosnians and people from other republics of the former Yugoslavia.
Irish interculturalism, as administered to the Bosnian refugee population, is a regime of governmentality resting on the concept of integration and community building, as an ‘artifact of rule’ (Gray, 2006). This reliance on the community is the main technique of governmentality while official ‘discourse of empowerment’ was additional complimentary mentalité of governmentality, developed mainly from pastoral rationality. This has produced, I argue, contingent – rather than assisted real – Bosnian ‘community’ in Ireland. Overall, the nature of Irish interculturalism helps in enforcing Bosnian post-refugee transnationalism.

After exploring the workings of the racial state of Ireland in the past two chapters, in the next two chapters I turn to the racial state of Bosnia, exploring its regime of governmentality.
Chapter 5

The Racial State(s) they are in II: Bosnia

Introduction

The previous two chapters focused on the racial state of Ireland. These discussed the mode of operation of Irish interculturalism, as a particular regime of governmentality, and the way Bosnian programme refugees were processed within this. The focus of the next two chapters is the racial state of post-Dayton Bosnia. This first chapter takes a historical angle in order to trace ethnic developments in Bosnia prior to the 1990s conflict. By showing the long history of ethnic complexities in the region, this chapter argues that the ethnically-divided racial state of post-conflict Bosnia is not a product of ‘ancient ethnic hatreds’ which had brewed for centuries in the Balkans, as the conventional wisdom as well as the international military and political involvements stipulated (Cohen, 1995; Huntington, 1993).

The chapter starts by presenting an overview of the historical legacy of Bosnia from its early stages as a territorial unit until the 19th Century. This section stresses the complexity of ruling systems and the related role of ethnic influences in the region. Here I challenge the conventional understanding of the 1992 Bosnian conflict as based on ‘ancient ethnic hatreds’ by showing both the diversity and the fluctuating nature of ethnic and religious identities in the region, as well as the lack of conflicts based upon these.

The chapter proceeds on the historical route and focuses on the issue of nationalism in the region. It situates its origins and examines the ways in which the matter of nationalist sentiment developed over the centuries and introduces the ‘Yugoslav idea’. Overall, this part situates the developments of the diverse nationalisms in Bosnia and nearby regions within the broader ‘age of nationalism’ in 18th-Century Europe. The final part of the chapter concentrates on the idea of Yugoslavism and traces its developments through two Yugoslav states that existed in the Balkans in the aftermath of the First World War. The discussion of the first Yugoslavia centres on the
emergence of the Yugoslav communist partisans during the Second World War as the opposition to ethnic conflicts that started generating in the region due to the Nazi occupation. The discussion of the second Yugoslavia carries forward the focus on the Yugoslav partisans, and the nature of their rule in the new Yugoslavia in relation to ethnic differences. It emphasises the way nationalism was curtailed by the Yugoslav ideology. While stressing Titoist anti-nationalism strategies, I also point to the paradoxical nature of its ethnic policies.

Throughout, the chapter highlights the subject of religion and the complex interplay of religion and ethnicity in Bosnia. Overall, this chapter presents the historical background of Bosnia and sets the scene for the next chapter where the conditions which characterise the biopolitical regime of governmentality of the current post-Dayton Bosnia are discussed – namely the reification of ethnicity, the politicisation of nationalism and increased religiosity. The chapter presents a snapshot of the ethnic and religious complexity in Bosnia and argues that the racial state of post-conflict Bosnia is largely a product of the policies and politics of the Dayton Agreement. While this chapter is based mainly on historical accounts, it engages in a sociological analysis which aims primarily to provide an alternative understanding of the Bosnian conflict to that centring on ‘ancient ethnic hatreds’.

**The historical legacy and the ‘ancient ethnic hatred’ argument**

In 2008, in response to the Peace Implementation Council’s expressed concern at the lack of progress with regard to the Dayton’s Peace Agreement’s implementation, Kurt Bassuener \(^{120}\) reports:

> For years, Bosnia has been off the international radar, allowing many to assume that it was a situation essentially solved, or at the very least stable. But the events of the recent years have clearly shown that Bosnia is far from the finished project [...] a trajectory towards dysfunction that could lead to breakup and violence is clear. A minor incident could spiral into something more serious. There is a distinct possibility that Bosnia could again become a failed state on the EU doorstep (Bassuener, 2008:29).

\(^{120}\) Kurt Bassuener is a senior associate of the Democritisation Policy Council, a global initiative for accountability in democracy promotion.
In August 2009, the British Shadow Foreign Secretary William Hague warned that ‘Bosnia is on the brink of collapsing back into chaos and violence as its ethnic tensions escalate’ calling for an ‘urgent action to prevent new crisis gripping the Balkans’ and stating that the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina risked becoming ‘Europe’s black hole’ (Morris, 2009:2). Hague added, reflecting upon his recent two-day visit to Bosnia: ‘You would think you were going to a place where the people have moved on and communities have got together 14 years later. But actually the atmosphere is grim’ (Morris, 2009:2).

By reading the statements above it would appear that present-day Bosnia and Herzegovina is on a verge of another ethnic conflict and that something urgently needs to be done about it. It also appears that the statements situate Bosnia as a European project and view the EU as vehicle that needs to orchestrate the prevention of new troubles. I deal with the involvement of the international community in the Bosnian state later in this chapter. However, what is relevant and most striking at this point, is the continued reliance on the discourse of ‘ancient hatred’ when talking about the present-day Bosnia. While not expressed in an explicit manner, the statements rely on the conventional wisdom that the Bosnian conflict of 1992 was an ethnic conflict based upon the age-old hatred between different communities living in Bosnia, and stress the disappointment that the Dayton Peace Agreement, and the consequent international efforts, did not manage to dispense with these incompatibilities.

This is not necessarily unusual. Since the time the conflict took place it has been popular among journalists and politicians in the West to explain its outbreak in terms of tribalism and ancient ethnic hatred (Andjelic, 2003). The academic and pseudo-academic works that looked into the ‘history of hatred’ gave those specific flavours to the region. This is perhaps best illustrated by the work of Lenard Cohen who, in his discussions of Yugoslavia’s disintegration and the Balkan politics in transition, argues that on-going problems and conflicts are largely due to ‘the persistence and intensification of deep seated animosities among the country’s diverse ethnic and religious groups who lived together rather uneasily in the Balkan region for centuries’ (Cohen, 1995:328).
One of the most prominent supporters of the idea that the Balkan region was predetermined for perpetual conflict is Samuel Huntington, the political scientist who sought to find a new basis for divisions after the Cold War split and Francis Fukuyama’s proposition of the ‘end of history’. Huntington developed his famous ‘clash of civilizations’ theory, arguing that the Bosnian conflict fits neatly within its parameters. He described the Bosnian war as a ‘fault line war’ giving a major role to religion in his depiction of the conflict:

The fault lines between the civilizations are replacing the political and ideological boundaries of the Cold War as flash points for crisis and bloodshed. [...] As the ideological division of Europe has disappeared, the cultural division of Europe, between Western Christianity, on the one hand, and Orthodox Christianity and Islam, on the other, has re-emerged. The most significant dividing line in Europe may well be the eastern boundary of Western Christianity in the year 1500 [...] In the Balkans this line, of course, coincides with the historic boundary between the Hapsburg and Ottoman empires. The people to the north and west of this line are Protestant or Catholic; they shared the common experience of European history [...] they are generally economically better off than the people to the east; and they may now look forward to increasing involvement in the common European economy and to the consolidation of democratic political systems. The people to the east and south of this line are Orthodox or Muslim; they historically belong to the Ottoman or Tsarist empires and were only lightly touched by the shaping invents in the rest of Europe; they are generally less advanced economically; they seem much less likely to develop stable democratic systems. The Velvet Curtain of Culture has replaced the Iron Curtain of Ideology as the most significant dividing line in Europe. As the events in Yugoslavia show, it is not only a line of difference; it is also at times a line of bloody conflict (Huntington, 1993:30).

121 In a nutshell his theory proposes that the times when the fundamental sources of conflict were primarily ideological or economic are over. In the future the great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics.

122 Huntington distinguishes between ‘fault line’ conflicts and ‘core line’ conflicts in his theory of intercivilisational conflicts. Fault line conflicts are on the local level and occur between adjacent states belonging to different civilizations or within states that are home to populations belonging to different civilizations. Core line conflicts occur on the global level between the major states of different civilizations.
It could be argued that this kind of reasoning underpinned the entire Western military involvement in the Bosnian conflict. For example, reflecting on the conflict, Patrick Bishop\textsuperscript{123} states:

Folk memories are long, and inability to forget the hatreds of the past has condemned successive generations to perpetuate them [...] The countries that make up the former Yugoslav Federation are split by deep political, religious and ethnic fault lines, left over from the days when the region was divided between rival empires of Turkey and Austria-Hungary (cited in Jovic, 2003:40).

Additionally, General Michael Rose (1998), a commander of the UN forces in Bosnia, in his book inspired by his Bosnian experience – despite pointing to the international media frenzy and the profit gained from the Sarajevo siege as impediments to the peace process – blames hatred and history of violence on the continuation of the conflict in Bosnia. Finally, Andjelic notes that:

...most of the politicians and envoys involved in peace negotiations during the 1990s accepted a necessity to divide the country on the basis of historical animosity of the ethnic groups because there was hardly any other argument to favour this option (2003:4).

Not only do the arguments presented above reduce the complex interplay of many different aspects involved in the disintegration of former Yugoslavia to a simple condition of ethnic hatred, \textsuperscript{124} but in doing so, they ignore two important factors, identified by Andjelic (2003) in his insightful discussion of the Bosnian conflict. \textsuperscript{125}

Firstly, so-called ethnic hatred was not widespread in Bosnian society and does not have its basis in medieval history. There was much more co-existence, mutual tolerance and understanding than suppressed hatred in ‘ancient’ times and conflicts.

\textsuperscript{123} Patrick Bishop has been the \textit{Daily Telegraph} foreign correspondent covering numerous wars and conflicts since 1982.

\textsuperscript{124} In his astute discussion of the withering away of Yugoslavia through the Socialist Party elites’ failure to reach ideological and political consensus between 1974 and 1990, Jovic (2009) provides a critical assessment of eight analytical approaches that have so far been used in explanations for the brake up of former Yugoslavia. These are i) the economic argument; ii) the ancient ethnic hatred argument; iii) the nationalism argument; iv) the cultural argument; v) the international politics argument; vi) the role of personality argument; vii) the fall of empires argument, and viii) the constitutional and institutional reasons argument. Having critically assessed the arguments, Jovic concludes that the elements of all, but not the ancient ethnic hatred one, can be found in the brake up of the Yugoslav state.

\textsuperscript{125} Apart of his scholarly contribution, before his scholarly research Andjelic was involved in a youth movement in Sarajevo during the period of Yugoslav disintegration. Subsequently, he became a popular member of the first generation of critical and satirical voices in the media as a provocative journalist.

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that happened at the time were rarely of ethnic origin as understood today. If anything it was the twentieth century, rather than the medieval period, from which apparently all this hatred originates, which witnessed most ‘ethnic’ confrontations and animosity. Secondly, and related to the first point, by making premature historical back-jumps to ancient periods, ‘the ancient ethnic hatred’ argument ignores the large periods of time when the supposedly different ethnic communities lived together in harmony, and time-freeze the social interconnections that developed in the interim.

For the 47 years of post-World War II Yugoslav unity, generations were raised under the Yugoslav aim of anti-nationalism and mixed marriages increased. For example, from 1953 to 1981 almost all of the territories of Yugoslavia became increasingly heterogeneous,\(^{126}\) in that the percentage of the population that was made up by the majority national group was on the decline (Petrovic, 1987). Accompanying the increase in heterogeneity was an increase in the rates of intermarriage. From the early 1950s through the 1980s mixed marriages increased both in absolute numbers and as a proportion to all marriages throughout most of Yugoslavia; they were particularly common between the Serbs and Croats and, interestingly, between Serbs and Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosnia also had the highest percentage of ‘mixed’ children, 15.9 per cent overall (Bakic-Hayden, 1996).

Bosnia had a particular place within the Yugoslav state. Being originally the most ethnically diverse of all the former Yugoslav republics and as such termed Yugoslavia u malom, meaning a small version of Yugoslavia, it was celebrated for the harmonious co-existence of many different populations. While the coming to power of Yugoslav communism and later socialism may have, by nature of their ideologies, suppressed religious sentiments present within the population, they also created cultural intermixing and fluidity which cannot be erased by some magical return to the mythical ethnic hatred. As Jovic states:

> The hatred to which the supporters of the ethnic hatred argument refer was not ancient. Indeed, it had emerged in the course of the Yugoslav wars of succession, i.e., after the breakup of Yugoslavia. As an explanation of the

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\(^{126}\) The exceptions were two autonomous Serbian provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo.
actual disintegration of Yugoslavia it is as irrelevant as it is inaccurate (Jovic, 2009:19).

Finally, one should not assume cultural homogeneity in the region prior to the Yugoslav unity.

In order to demonstrate the fallacy of attributing the Bosnian conflict to ethnic differences and ancient hatreds, I present below a historical survey of Bosnia from medieval times to the 19th Century, based on secondary sources. The aim of such an overview is to show the complexity of rule in Bosnian history and the complexity of conflicts that happened during those rulings that were not ethnically related. This overview highlights an enormous heterogeneity of ethnic identifications in Bosnia prior to Tito’s Yugoslavia.

Bosnia – the historical legacy

Prior to 1992, Bosnia did not experience independence in its modern history. However, it had existed as a historical unit for centuries. Moreover, the great religions and great powers of the European history: the empires of Rome, Charlemagne, the Ottomans and the Austro-Hungarians, and the faiths of Western Christianity, Eastern Christianity, Judaism and Islam all overlapped there.

Early period

The earliest inhabitants for whom historical details exist are the Illyrians. They were a collection of tribes that covered much of the territory of modern Yugoslavia and Albania. They spoke an Indo-European language related to modern Albanian. The Illyrians were joined by mixed Illyrian-Celtic groupings, the Scordisci in the north east side of Bosnia, and the warring tribe, the Daesitates, in central Bosnia. These were the tribes encountered by Romans when they began to extend their power inland in the second and first century BC. Despite some tribal rebellions against the occupation by the Roman Empire, the last of which was crushed in AD 9, the Illyrian lands came under Roman rule. Christianity was quickly disseminated over the territory, and Latin became widespread in Roman Bosnia. This was due to the fact that it was the only common language for the settlers from many parts of the Empire.
who had come to live in Roman Bosnia. These were mostly from Italy but also from Africa, Spain, Gaul, Germany, Greece, Asia Minor, Syria, Palestine and Egypt (Malcolm, 1994).

From the Third Century onwards, the Germanic tribes of Goths started invading the Roman Balkans, including Bosnia. However, despite significant conquests, including the occupation of Belgrade in the late Fifth Century, the Goths were driven out of the Balkans by the Emperor Justinian in the Sixth Century. It was around this time that Bosnia became part of the Byzantine Empire. Goths were settlers as well as raiders, but they became quickly assimilated and left no significant cultural imprint on the Balkan lands although they stayed for almost three centuries (Malcolm, 1994).

The Goths were not the only tribes that penetrated Bosnian lands during the Roman times. Asiatic Huts, Iranian Alans, Turcik Avars and Slavs appeared in the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Centuries. They entered the region either as allies or as rivals. However, it was the Slavs who predominated in the end. In the late Sixth Century large numbers of Slavs moved down the Balkan Peninsula. They were not only raiders, but colonists and agriculturalists and they established settlements all the way to the southern tip of Greece. By the 620s, the Slav population was well established and two new tribes joined them – the Croats and the Serbs. The Croats were invited to the Balkans by the Byzantine emperor in order to drive out troublesome Avars, and the Serbs, who were not fighting the Avars, but were connected to Croats, entered at the same time (Malcolm, 1994).

While the precise origin of the Croat and Serb tribes is part of an on-going debate, most scholars believe that, either both Serbs and Croats were Slavic tribes with Iranian ruling castes, or that they were originally Iranian tribes that have acquired Slavic subjects (Fine, 1983). Nevertheless, by the early Seventh Century both tribes

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127 Bosnia was originally on the western side of the dividing line between the Western Roman and Eastern Roman Empire.
128 For example, no words in Balkan languages can be shown to have derived from Gothic.
129 Yet interestingly, in November 1942, Bosnian Muslim autonomists who wanted their country to be given autonomy from the Croat fascist state of the time sent a memorandum to Hitler claiming their decadence from Goth tribes and therefore racial superiority over their Slav neighbours. In the memorandum they stated ‘We Bosnians came south to the Balkans in the third century as a Germanic tribe’ (Redzic, 1987:72). Even more interestingly, similar claims were made by the Croat fascist politician Ante Pavelic, in 1941 (Dedijer, 1974).
130 It is clear, therefore, that Serbs and Croats were from the earliest times closely connected and migrated in a tandem.
had established kingdoms in central Europe and from there moved down to the western Balkans. The Serbs settled in the area that corresponds to modern southwestern Serbia and gradually extended into the Herzegovina part of modern Bosnia. The Croats settled in what is now modern Croatia and most of what is today’s Bosnia. While the Croats were originally pagan, early attempts were made by Byzantine Empire to Christianise them. At the same time, Serb-ruled territories gathered together in a form of princedom. Croatia enjoyed a period of power and independence in the early Tenth Century, under King Tomislav, while still part of the Byzantine Empire. Following his death, there was a civil war during which much of the Croat Bosnia was overtaken by the temporarily powerful Serb princedom which agreed to acknowledge the sovereignty of the Byzantine Empire (Fine, 1983).

This was a significant historical moment. It was at this time that Bosnia was first mentioned as an independent territory. In 958, in a politico-geographical handbook written by Byzantine Emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitus, in the section of the handbook devoted to the lands of the Serb prince, he gives his baptism to, among other lands, the territory of Bosona (Malcolm, 1994).

The territory of Bosnia did not stay in the hands of the Serb prince for long. In the 960s it fell again under Croat rule, remaining there for roughly half a century. From then onwards, until the end of the 11th Century, Bosnia was ruled some of the time by a Croat governor and some of the time by a Serb prince.

The end of the 11th Century was a turning point for the western Balkans. In 1102, the Croat lands were overtaken by the Hungary and Hungarian King Koloman was crowned a king of Croatia. Hungarian rule was also extended to Bosnia – to be ruled by a ban. However, due to its remote and impenetrable territory, the ban’s authority became more and more independent as the century progressed leading to Bosnia being virtually free from Hungarian control by the 1180s (Malcolm, 1994).

The question of ethnic identity in this early period of Bosnian history is therefore rather complex. As Malcolm (1994) states:

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131 They are many signs of pagan practices that were carried over into the Christianity and later into Islam in Bosnia. For example, use of mountain tops as places of worship (Hadzijahic, 1990).

132 Thus a relationship was established between the two that would last until 1918.

133 The word borrows from South Slavic ban meaning lord, master, ruler; further borrowing from Turkish and the Avar word bajjan meaning ruler of the horde.
As for the question of whether the inhabitants of Bosnia were really Croat or really Serb in 1180, it cannot be answered for two reasons: first we lack evidence, and secondly, because the question lacks meaning. We can say that the majority of the Bosnian territory was probably occupied by Croats [...] but that is a tribal label which has little or no meaning five centuries later. The Bosnians were generally closer to Croats in their religious and political history; but to apply the modern notion of Croat identity to anyone in this period would be an anachronism. All that one can sensibly say about the ethnic identity of the Bosnians is this: they were Slavs who lived in Bosnia (Malcolm, 1994:12).

*Medieval Bosnia – 1180-1463*

The history of medieval Bosnia is characterised by three main rulers. In chronological order they were Ban Kulin, Ban Kotromanic and King Tvrtko. During this time Bosnia expanded to include Hum (Herzegovina) and a large part of the Dalmatian coast. Indeed, during the second half of Tvrtko’s rule Bosnia was the most powerful state within the western Balkans. This was largely due to the prosperity that had been achieved from mining. It started with Ban Kulin’s signing of a commercial treaty with Dubrovnik encouraging its merchants to exploit the rich Bosnian mines, and it carried on throughout the middle ages. First it was copper, silver, gold and lead, but after a while, the greatest source of wealth became silver, and Srebrenica \(^{134}\) became the most important mining town in the whole region west of Serbia.\(^{135}\)

During those high points of prosperity there were intermittent conflicts. At various times during the reigns of the three rulers Bosnia was divided. Mostly it was due to the frequent contests for power between the local noble families. While Bosnia’s social and political system was feudal, it was not a strict form of feudalism. The nobles were independent landowners and rather than having to revert to the king, they themselves had a say with regard to the succession of the crown (Fine, 1983). This led to persistent instability in medieval Bosnian politics.

\(^{134}\) Srebro means silver in Serbo-Croat.

\(^{135}\) By 1422, Bosnia and Serbia together were mining more than a fifth of Europe’s entire production of silver (Malcolm, 1994).
Apart from the rivalry between the local noble families, Hungary, as a dominant neighbouring country, was not giving up on its plan to control Bosnia. There was a constant pressure on the Bosnian bishopric to drive out heresy from the diocese of Bosnia, relating to the low quality of the Bosnian clergy. However, it has been argued that this was just a religious justification for the Hungarian invasion of Bosnia which finally took place in the later 1230s (Malcolm, 1994). The Hungarian army was forced to withdraw in 1241, in order to meet the threat of the Mongol invasion of Hungary, which put Bosnia back into its isolated existence.

While the Serb kingdom developed into a powerful empire during this period, it never tried to invade Bosnia. In fact, the relationship between the rulers of Bosnia and Serbia remained supportive throughout medieval times. For example, Ban Kulin’s sister married the Serb Grand Zupan, who turned Serbia into a great power, and King Tvrtko gave military support to the nobleman Lazar in resurrecting Serbia after the breakup of the empire. In return, King Lazar made King Tvrtko of Bosnia ‘King of Serbia’, but King Tvrtko never exercised his political power (Malcolm, 1994). In fact, the two rulers fought together against the Turkish army in the famous battle of Kosovo in 1389 that for a time slowed down the Ottoman invasion of the region. Religion proved to be a difficult issue to negotiate for the rulers of medieval Bosnia. While Hungary and the Pope wanted to have a tighter hold of the Bosnian church, largely due to the remoteness of the territory, the Bosnian Church took its own turn and fell away from the Catholic Church. It developed into an offshoot of Bogomils, a Bulgarian heretical movement that preached a dualist Manichean theology according to which Satan’s power was almost equal to God (Racki, 1931). The Bosnian Church persisted, despite the Franciscan attempts – following Ban Kotromanic’s approval – to set up a mission in Bosnia, until the Turkish invasion.

In addition to conflicts and political and religious instabilities, in the late 13th and early 14th Centuries, German miners from Hungary and Transylvania, known as

136 As mentioned in the previous section, due to remote terrain, Hungary’s hold on Bosnian rulers was weak.
137 This battle was used as a symbol of Serb patriotism during the breakup of Yugoslavia and was invoked in Slobodan Milosevic’s important Gazimestan speech (MacDonald, 2002).
138 Ban Kotromanic was trying to improve his relations with the Pope at the time.
Saxons, stared to arrive in Bosnia, changing yet again the demographic profile of the country. With the encouragement from both Ban Kotromanic and King Tvrtko, they began to exploit Bosnia’s mineral wealth and made mining settlements wherever there was ore. Some Saxons became important figures in Bosnia. For example, Hans Sasinovic was granted large land holdings and was sent to Dubrovnik several times as a representative of King Tvrtko (Dinic, 1955).

Bosnia under the Ottoman Empire – 1463-1878

In the early summer of 1463, the territory of Bosnia was conquered with great speed by the Turkish army. At the time, the Ottoman Empire was under the reign of Mehmed II and the empire was a highly active military machine. The Sultan had already taken Constantinople, the north of Serbia and Walachia, and was on its way to destroy the Venetian army in Greece, raid Moldavia and Hungary and besiege the island of Rhodes.

The Ottoman military enterprise was designed to supply two things – manpower to fight the wars and money to pay for them. There were two main categories of military forces. On the one hand, there were regular soldiers – such as the janissary and the spahis of the Porte – paid directly by the Ottoman government. On the other hand, there was feudal cavalry consisting of mounted soldiers who performed their military obligations in return for estates. This structure relied on the Ottoman military-feudal system, known as timar where tenure was dependent on military service, the land was the property of the Sultan and the timariot’s heirs had no right of inheritance (Malcolm, 1994). This system was imposed on Bosnia from the outset of the Ottoman conquest.

In addition to the timar system that provided Bosnian cavalry for the Ottoman Empire, the devşirme system was used in Bosnia in order to get a supply of regular janissary soldiers. The devşirme, also called a ‘collection’ system or ‘boy tribute’, consisted of forcefully taking young boys from the peasant Christian families in the Balkans, converting them to Islam and training them as janissary troops or servants of the Sultan. The system stopped operating only in the late 17th Century but by that time
at least 200,000 children from the Balkans had passed through the system (Sugar, 1977).

Though Bosnia was very much shaped by its Ottoman experience and four centuries of Islamic rule undeniably left a legacy in the region, two points are worth making with regard to the religious element of Ottoman Bosnia.

Firstly, being a Muslim was certainly an advantage for anyone in the Ottoman state. However, despite the devşirme system and some mild attempts at conversion, one of the characteristic of Ottoman rule in Bosnia was relative tolerance of non-Islamic groups. The millet system operated where other confessional communities were given rights to exercise their religion, and to separate legal courts where the minorities could rule themselves, as long as they stayed loyal to the Empire. This tolerance drew in some other minorities in Europe at the time. For example, the Jewish community that was expelled from Spain in the 16th Century settled in this region in more significant numbers after the Turks established their millet system (Andjelic, 2003). Thus, although Islam was the favoured religion other religions were tolerated.

Secondly, as Malcolm (1994) points out, the Ottoman Empire, particularly at the time of the Bosnian occupation, was not organised strictly on religious lines. The original distinction was not between Muslims and unbelievers but between Ottomans and raya. Ottomans referred to the entire military and administrative class which people could join if they acquired an Ottoman outlook and behaviour. Raya, meaning flock or herd, referred to the subject people, to all those who exhibited a non-Ottoman culture. Hence, Muslims could be raya too, an example being the Arabs of the Ottoman Empire.140

Therefore, while Bosnia was ruled by Muslims, it was not an Islamic state, since the Ottoman legal system was not dependent on sharia law. Rather, it originated from the will of the Sultan. Also, state policy was not to convert people to Islam, but rather to

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139 For example, peasants who converted to Islam were promised more freedom and more secure forms of tenure (Tomasevic, 1955).
140 Interestingly, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the term raya persisted into modern-day Bosnia and it has transformed its meaning to mean authentic urban population.
keep the country under control and extract money, men and feudal income from it to supply the needs of the Empire (Malcolm, 1994).

Having said that, the Islamicisation of the larger part of the Bosnian population during the Ottoman rule remains one of the most distinctive features of Bosnian history. The tax registers from the period, which recorded property ownership and categorised people by their religion, show that in 1468/9 37,125 households in eastern and central Bosnia were Christian and only 332 were Muslim. By the 1520s, this has increased to 98,095 Christian and 84,675 Muslims households, and by the early 17th Century Muslims had become the absolute majority in the territory of modern Bosnia and Herzegovina (Malcolm, 1994). Since there was no large-scale Muslim immigration into Bosnia in that period the figures represent the conversion of Bosnian Christians to Islam.

In his examination of Bosnian history, Malcolm (1994) rejects the idea that these conversions to Islam were forced. While the Ottoman Empire used oppression against both the Catholic and the Orthodox Church, mainly through the extraction of large taxation driving them out of existence, there was no general policy of coercing individuals into conversion. The main evidence for rejecting the theory of mass coercive Islamicisation, according to Malcolm, is the fact that the process through which Bosnia gained a majority Muslim population took around 150 years. Over a number of generations people made a change of religion, often to preserve their position, or gain a better position within society. This often resulted in situations where the same household consisted of converted individuals, as well as those retaining the 'old' faith, and the whole process seemed to have been quite peaceful.

In support of Malcolm's thesis, Andjelic (2003) points out that during the Ottoman rule, and despite the Empire's favouritism towards the Islamised part, there were no major group grievances along ethnic or religious lines in Bosnia:

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141 While Ottomans did settle some Turkish people in the other parts of Balkans, the tax registers show that this policy was not applied to Bosnia (Malcolm, 1994).
142 However, to a much lesser degree towards the Orthodox Church. This was mainly due to the Ottoman's preference of the Orthodox Church, but also because of it much smaller presence in Bosnia.
143 Yet again the Ottoman tax registers of the time show evidence of this process. Due to the Slav patronymic system there were many entries such as 'Ferhad, son of Ivan', where Ferhad would be a Muslim name and Ivan a Croat one indicating conversion.
When peasants rebelled, they did so because of their position in the society, high taxes and for other similar reasons, not because they were of Christian or Islamic religion. As many rebellions were restricted to smaller regions, they often relied on faith, but this was not the factor that usually inspired the rebellion. It was the position of a social group in its larger environment that determined whether the rule was respected or rebelled against. After the Turkish (Ottoman) conquest in the fifteenth century, Catholic and Orthodox Christians certainly had reasons to dislike the new empire, since it favoured the Islamised part of the population. However they were no conflicts as long as the empire was strong (2003:7).

Indeed, Andjelic (2003) proceeds to note that in comparison to France at the time, where the animosity between Catholics and Protestants was rife, Bosnia was a peaceful and tolerant country for all major religions.

Having presented a brief overview of Bosnian history from the early period to the Ottoman Empire, two things needs to be highlighted in relation to the ancient ethnic hatred argument. Firstly, the argument ignores the ethnic and religious diversity of the region. As seen above, from different tribes in the early stages of history, different migrations in the medieval era, through to the Ottoman Islamicisation of Bosnia, there was a multitude of ethnic and religious identification in the region that cannot be reduced to the trinity of Serb, Croat and Muslim identity. Secondly, while the territory of Bosnia had undergone regular changes of rulers, and while conflicts occurred during those changes, these conflicts were not of ethnic character per se. Rather, they were either i) conflicts against in-migrating tribes; ii) rivalry conflicts between the noble families in contests for power; or iii) peasants rebellions against high taxes or their position in society.

My discussion so far makes it clear that understanding the 1992 Bosnian conflict as based on ‘ancient ethnic hatreds’ is misleading. It was only in the 19th Century that ideas of ethnic alienation and purification began to develop in the region (Andjelic, 144)

144 If anything, the grievances sometimes happened within the religious denomination itself. For example, Islam in Ottoman Bosnia was mostly orthodox and mainstream. The only seriously heterodox movement was that of the Hamzevites, who followed sheikh Hamza Bali Bosnjak. Little remains of his teachings but according to the records it went too far in admitting the elements of Christian theology. The sheikh was executed for heresy in 1573 but his followers continued to exist as a shadowy opposition movement to mainstream Islam throughout the 17th century (Hukic, 1977).
2003). However, in the transition from the Ottoman to the Habsburg Empire another important idea shaped developments in the area – the rise of Yugoslav nationalism – to which I now turn.

**The origins and developments of nationalism in the Bosnian region**

Nationalism in the Bosnian region developed in response to a larger wave of romantic nationalism that spread throughout Europe in the 18th Century following the ideas of Johann Gottfried Herder. Herder, generally acknowledged as the father of romantic nationalism, developed the idea of *Volsksgeist*, or the national spirit. In rejecting the idea of pre-linguistic man, and understanding language as synonymous with thought, and thought as embedded in folklore, Herder argued that nations are embodiments of unique sets of cultural characteristics and people the carriers of unique cultural identities.

The ideas of romantic nationalism only reached Bosnia in the 19th Century. However, rather than producing unity on the Bosnian land, the ideas influenced separation along religious lines and served as a basis for the transformation of religious affiliations into ethnic feelings (Andjelic, 2003). For example, the intrusion of foreign sponsored Christian organisations changed the status of Bosnian Christians whose interests were now being promoted, alongside Muslim interests, by the ‘would be’ protector states; Russia for the Orthodox and Austria-Hungary for the Catholics.

While the international interventions strengthened the religious divisions in Bosnia at the time, it was the local scholars and priests who were the main executors of the transformation of ‘religious affiliation into an ethnic feeling’. For example, Theofil Petranovic, a teacher at the Orthodox school in Sarajevo in the 1860s, formed a group of people and instructed them to go to into the villages and tell the Orthodox peasants

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145 The word itself was coined by Hegel to denote the separate spiritual essences of diverse nations that characterise the present stage of human history.
146 To read more about ideological constructions of nationhood in Central and Eastern Europe, see Herzfeld, 1982; Kamoouh, 1982; Laas, 1988; Verdery, 1990.
147 For example, an Orthodox cathedral was built in Sarajevo and an emissary from Bosnia travelled through Russia with a holy relic to collect donations for the cathedral. Also, a group of Catholic monks from the Rhineland was allowed to build a convent near Banja Luka, and an English Christian organisation funded the opening of a girls’ school in Sarajevo (Malcolm, 1994).
to stop calling themselves *hriscani*, which was the local name for Orthodox, and start calling themselves Serbs (Malcolm, 1994).

In addition to international efforts and local actions, the developments of neighbouring Croat and Serb nationalism influenced the developments of nationalism in Bosnia. In 1849, the Serb intellectual Vuk Karadzic wrote an article in which he claimed the Serb ethnic identity for the people of Bosnia, and the Serb Minister Ilija Grasanin wrote a secret memorandum where he proposed methods for stimulating pro-Serb sentiments in Bosnia (Slijepcevic, 1981). On the Croat side too there were several intellectuals, such as Ante Starcevic and Eugen Kvaternik, who claimed opposite stances in a similar manner. In their opinion most Bosnians were actually Croats.

Hence, in response to the overall spread of romantic nationalism in Europe, the related developments of Croat and Serb nationalism, and the impact that these had on religious affiliations within Bosnia, it was from the 19th Century onwards that Bosnian religious complexities were transformed into ethnicities. From then on the Bosnian population was made up mostly of Croats, Serbs and Muslims (Andjelic, 2003).

The Muslim authorities in Bosnia did not follow these intellectual debates in any great detail, but they were aware that their Catholic and Orthodox neighbours kept a keen eye on Bosnia. The Ottoman Empire was in decline at the time, and before Russia declared war against it negotiations between Russia and Austria were already going on behind the scenes on how they would divide the Balkan lands.

In 1877, Russia declared war on the Ottoman Empire. By early 1878, the Ottoman troops were near the gates of Istanbul, and after re-working the San Stefano Peace Agreement148 at the Congress of Berlin later in the year, one empire replaced another. Thus, in July 1878 Bosnia and Herzegovina was occupied and administered by the Hapsburg Empire.

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148 The San Stefano Peace Agreement created a large Bulgarian state under the influence of Russia and, under the agreement, Bosnia remained part of the Ottoman territory. The aim of the Berlin congress was to redraw the map in order to counterbalance Russian's influence in Europe.
The arrival of Habsburg rule marked a change in the ethnic structure of Bosnia. Large numbers of Muslims left the country and fled to Turkey, either fearing the loss of rights and positions or because they did not want to be ruled by infidels. This resulted in Serbs becoming the largest population group in Bosnia (Bieber, 2006). This structuring of Habsburg Bosnia left those Bosnian Muslims who stayed in Bosnia in a peculiar post-Ottoman millet style system, and as such, resulted in the emergence of the group name ‘Muslim’ and the achievement of religious and cultural autonomy (Bougarei, 2003). This included the appointment of a Reis ul-ulema or head of the Muslim religious community (Malcolm, 1994).

Most Bosnian Muslim leaders were happy to pledge their allegiance to the new Austro-Hungarian authorities and at the same time, via the millet style system, defend their religious identities. However, a small proportion of Bosnia’s Muslim intelligentsia wanted a way out of the religious divisions inherited from the Ottoman Empire and desired integration into European political and cultural modernity. The secular Muslim intelligentsia was divided into pro-Croat and pro-Serb factions but both equally rejected the name ‘Muslim’ and preferred to declare themselves as Croats or Serbs ‘of Islamic faith’ (Bougarei, 2003). This sentiment was welcomed by the Habsburg Governor Benjámin Kállay who directed Bosnian policy between 1883 and 1903. Kállay was aware of the growing Croat and Serb nationalism and his aim was to insulate Bosnia from those nationalistic political movements by developing the idea of Bosnian nationhood as a separate and unifying factor (Kraljacic, 1987).

The term ‘Bosnian’ was previously used by the Turks to refer to all the people living on the territory of Bosnia, but in Serbo-Croat the only people who called themselves Bosnian were Bosnian Muslims. The Catholics referred to themselves as Latinci meaning Latins, or kriscjani and the Orthodox had called themselves Vlasi meaning Vlachs or hriscjani (Imamovic, 1991).

Kállay borrowed from the Turkish understanding of the term and was hoping to extend the term Bosnian to all religious communities on the territory of Bosnia. However, it was essential that the idea would be first taken up by Muslims, as they

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149 The exact number of émigrés is debatable. The Austro-Hungarian authorities’ figures state that between 1883 and 1918 36,625 Muslims left the country. However, these figures refer only to those with official permit to leave. They do not include those who left illegally or those who left in the first four years of occupation, between 1879 and 1883. Some historians claim that up to 300,000 Muslims left Hapsburg Bosnia (Malcolm, 1994).
were the only population with no sponsor nation outside the Bosnian borders, and particularly by the aforementioned Muslim intelligentsia who were already going through a process of identity reflection.

While his ideas achieved some success with cooperative Muslims in Sarajevo, who saw his line of thought as a continuation of a tradition of seeking Bosnian autonomy from the Ottoman Empire, these did not spread through all of Bosnia, nor were the Catholic and the Orthodox populations persuaded by them. By 1908, Croat and Serb nationalism was on the rise and Kállay’s project was doomed to failure (Malcolm, 1994). Nevertheless, Kállay’s aim of developing a religiously inclusive and overarching Bosnian national consciousness is significant as it was the first attempt to link diversifying ethnic identities in the region into an official Bosnian nationhood.

During the rest of the 20th Century, political parties and cultural organisations that emerged in Bosnia were nearly exclusively organised along ethnic and religious lines. In 1910, the Austro-Hungarian Empire promulgated the constitution for Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the new assembly 31 seats were reserved for Serb Orthodox, 24 for Muslims, 16 for Catholics and one for Jews (Bieber, 2006). The constitution gave the three main ‘communities’ collective rights, self-government and a rotation of high office.

However, neither Kállay’s project of the creation of Bosnian consciousness, nor Burian’s allowance for a nationally-organised Bosnian assembly, prepared the Habsburg Empire for the rise of an altogether different nationalism in the area. While both governors tried to control, albeit in diametrically opposite ways, the rise of Serb and Croat nationalism, and the Muslim reaction to it, it was not the individual nationalism of either ethnic group, but rather the South Slav, or Yugoslav, nationalism that ultimately emerged as a rival to the Empire.

The core Yugoslav idea, according to Russinow (2003), dates back almost a century before the first Yugoslavia, and was initially formulated in 1830 by Illyrianist

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150 This was helped by the new Bosnian Governor Baron Burian, who ruled Bosnian from 1903 until 1912.
151 Hence, it can be argued that the Dayton system was not an entirely American invention as it borrowed heavily from the Habsburg rule of Bosnia.
152 Historically, two Yugoslav states existed in the Balkan lands. The first, Yugoslavia, called the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, existed between 1918 and 1941 and was the union of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs. The second
‘awakeners’ in the aforementioned, Herder-influenced, ‘age of nationalism’. The Illyrianist awakeners were mostly Croats, whose main ideologist was Ljudevit Gaj. They held the opinion that South Slavs had the same origin, spoke variants of the same language, and hence were a single nation with a ‘natural right’ to independence and unity in a state of their own.

Southern Slav nationalism or Yugoslavism\(^\text{153}\) is a complex phenomenon and historians argue to this day about the variety of forms, guises and combinations it took in conjunction with other state and nation-building ideas in various times and places (Rusinow, 2003). Its connection with Serb nationalism has been widely debated (Banac, 1984) and some academics went as far as to dispute the very notion that the Yugoslav idea was nationalism per se. For example, Djordevic (1974:14) argues that Croat, Serb and other national movements were nationalisms, but Yugoslavism was an ideology and a ‘rational solution based on ethnic similarities’. He states that ‘the appraisal of their national interests in different historic periods moved the Yugoslavs to accommodate their separate nationalisms to Yugoslavisms’ (Ibid., p.193). With regard to the same point Gross elaborates:

According to most Yugoslavist ideologies, the “spiritual” community of South Slavs could be achieved only by retaining the separate names of Croats, Serbs, Slovenes, and Bulgarians while at the same time harmoniously intermingling their traditions and respecting their respective equality and individuality by nurturing their “tribal” characteristics (1979:12).

While it is impossible, and beyond the scope of this thesis, to dismantle the Yugoslav idea as a narrow set of political rationalities, or to place its developments firmly in the field of either nationalism or ideology,\(^\text{154}\) it is important to highlight the hold that the idea had over the South Slav people for most of the 20\(^{th}\) Century. Whether it was the unification paradigm for the first kingdom of Yugoslavia, or the force behind the partisan resistance movement in World War II that led to the creation of the second

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\(^{153}\) South translates as ju\(g\) in Serbo-Croat.

\(^{154}\) This is to suggest that those two fields are separate and that the ideology is not interconnected with the national movements in a complex way. Indeed, the fact that both Djordevic (1974) and Gross (1979) juxtaposition the two is problematic in itself.
socialist federal state of Yugoslavia, the ideas of unity of South Slavs carried through from 1918 until 1992.

This was particularly relevant with regard to Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was there after all that the first serious expression of the Yugoslav idea resulted in the assassination of the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand on 28 June 1914 which led to the outbreak of World War I. And while historians continue to argue about whether Mlada Bosna (Young Bosnia), the Bosnian revolutionary youth movement of which the main assassin Gavrilo Princip was a member, was a Serb nationalist (Banac, 1984) or a pan-Yugoslav organisation, Gavrilo Princip stated at his trial:

The political union of the Yugoslavs was always before my eyes, and that was my basic idea ... I am a Yugoslav nationalist, aiming for the unification of all Yugoslavs, and I do not care what form of the state, but it must be free from Austria (Dedijer 1967:341).

From the assassination of Franz Ferdinand until the creation of the independent state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, following the 1992 conflict, the Yugoslav idea retained a strong influence despite the different configurations of the Bosnian state.

To further understand the influence of Yugoslav nationalism on the eventual construction of post-Dayton Bosnia as an ethnically based racial state, I now discuss the brief history of the two Yugoslav states.

There twice was a state – two Yugoslavia

The first Yugoslavia

In the first Yugoslavia Bosnia became part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The kingdom was composed of a national council of pro-Yugoslav representatives of all three communities and it was to this council that the Austro-Hungarian administration handed power in 1921, in the aftermath of World War I. The constitution of the new state was centralist and it has been widely accepted that it was to a large degree an extension of the pre-war Serb kingdom (Bieber, 2006). The primary line of confrontation in the first Yugoslavia was between Croats and Serbs. While Croats favoured a federal form of government, the Serbs aimed for domination
of the kingdom. The disagreement led to a shooting of the leader of the strongest Croat party in the parliament by a Serb deputy. Following the ensuing parliamentary crisis, King Aleksandar 155 abolished the constitution and declared a royal dictatorship in 1929. Additionally, he changed the name from the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes into the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. He reorganised the kingdom, eliminating the administrative borders present during the Habsburg Empire into nine banovine or districts where Serbs were generally predominant. The new kingdom of Yugoslavia promoted the Yugoslav idea which sought to incorporate different Slav tribes. However, while this unitary concept aimed to depart conceptually from the Serb dominance of the first years of the first Yugoslavia, effectively Serb domination persisted and confrontations between Croats and the Serbs continued.

The position of Bosnia was affected by the changes of the first Yugoslavia. It was during the period of King Aleksandar’s dictatorship that Bosnia lost its historical, provincial character and was divided, like the rest of Yugoslavia, into larger regions. These regions were named after major rivers in order to eradicate the ethnic character of the territory (Andjelic, 2003), which was viewed as detrimental to the Yugoslav idea. Out of nine districts, the Bosnian land was incorporated into four where most of the governors were Serbs. While Muslims did not receive official recognition in the first Yugoslavia, the main Muslim party, the Yugoslav Muslim Organisation, supported the rulers throughout the course of the kingdom in a belief that it ‘would strengthen the Yugoslav state’ (Donia and Fine, 1994).

Thus, as Bougarel (2003) has observed, the relationship between Bosnian Muslims and the Yugoslav idea can be summarised by a paradox. While Bosnian Muslims hardly contributed to the formulation of the Yugoslav idea – indeed the idea was conceived by Croat Illyricists and developed by Serb nationalists – from the outset they embraced it fully and were probably the last among the Yugoslav nations who sincerely held onto it.

155 King Aleksandar was the first king of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. He came from Karadordevic dynasty, a well established Serb family, and reigned from 1929-1934 until his assassination in Marseilles.

156 Neither did the Macedonians nor the Montenegrians.
The ethnic divisions caused by the policies of the ruling parties and interrelated strong nationalism, in conjunction with a dire economic situation led to the end of the first Yugoslavia. The foreign threat was the final straw that caused disintegration. The first Yugoslavia collapsed in April 1941 following the invasion by Germany and its allies. The disagreements between the Croats and Serbs of the first Yugoslavia were overtaken by Nazi Germany dividing the country. Under this new division Bosnia was annexed to the Independent State of Croatia which was under German and Italian military control but governed by the local fascist movement, the *Ustase*. This development was not welcomed by the Bosnian Muslim population as they were not prepared to support the new Croat fascist government. Not only did the new regime incorporate Muslims as Croats of Islamic faith, but it also suppressed any political opposition, and Serbs and Jews were openly discriminated against.

This led to the widespread resistance to new Croat rulers by two main factions: Communist-led Yugoslav partisans and royalist *Chetniks*. The royalist *Chetniks* were Serbs who oscillated between a desire for Serb-dominated Yugoslavia and a desire for Greater Serbia. However, both groups, the pro-Yugoslav and the pro-Serb, engaged in atrocities against Croats and also against Muslims.

Hence, the Croat and Serb nationalisms, which had been developing in Yugoslavia prior to World War II under different ruling systems, turned into full-blown brutalities following the Nazi occupation and the division of the country. The extreme nationalists of fascist Croatia committed crimes against Serbs; extreme Royalists, left over from the Serb orientated Yugoslav kingdom, committed crimes against Croats and Bosnian Muslims. This led to many Serbs, Croats and Muslims, who wished to resist the Nazi occupation but did not want to engage in ethnic conflict and were supporters of united Yugoslavs, to join the Yugoslav partisans. The communist partisans emerged as the only force opposed to ethnic divisions and hatred and soon became the only serious, and the most dominant, resistance movement in Bosnia and Yugoslavia at large.

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157 In fact, it has been argued that the Second World War in Bosnia and Herzegovina was a three-fold war. As Andjelic states, ‘firstly there was the Axis occupation; secondly there was a civil war between ethnic groups; and thirdly there was the victorious communist revolution’ (2003:16).
It is interesting to note that communists were the third largest party in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, but were banned in 1921 (Donia and Fine, 1994). While banning them weakened the party at the time, it also pushed their actions underground. Two decades of illegal activity, however, prepared the communists for resistance operations in the wartime conditions. Between 1941 and 1945, the partisan communist movement, under the leadership of Josip Broz Tito, overthrew both the Ustasa regime in Croatia and the Chetnik royalist uprising, building the ground for the postwar second Yugoslav state. A majority of partisan warfare occurred in Bosnia (Bassuener, 2008), and the Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ) was established in Bihac in 1942, and Jajce in 1943. The principles of the AVNOJ broke with pre-war Yugoslavia and enshrined the dominant role of the Communist party for the new state.

The second Yugoslavia

The wartime assemblies of AVNOJ gave rise to the post-war Yugoslav state. The post-war Yugoslav state, or second Yugoslavia, inherited the ethnic problems of the first Yugoslavia, and in particular tensions resulting from the atrocities committed during the Second World War. The communist party, as the central force of the new state, dealt with the divisions and instabilities by allowing for self-determination of the nations of Yugoslavia, and by founding a federation on the basis of these. Careful observance of inter-ethnic relations was a constant feature of Yugoslavia, where the equality of all ethnic groups was imposed and preserved.

This was particularly relevant for Bosnia because it was a unique republic in the newly-established Yugoslav system. Unlike other republics, which had one recognised dominant 'nation', Bosnia had no majority population and thus remained multinational. Some leading politicians contested the status of Bosnia as an independent republic and advocated its merging with either, or partition between, Croatia and Serbia (Andjelic, 2003), however, this view was not accepted in the end. Both the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires regarded Bosnia as unified and as a separate entity to Serbia and Croatia and secured peace on that basis. While the first

158 Both towns were part of Bosnia at the time and are at present part of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Yugoslavia broke this rule, and divided Bosnia into separate administrative zones, the second Yugoslavia followed the example of the old empires, abolished partition, and re-established the Habsburg borders.

The reversal to the pre-Yugoslav borders in combination with soft communism created conditions for the economic and cultural development in Bosnia, much needed after the devastation of the Second World War. As Andjelic describes:

Economic development, a significant improvement in the standard of living, security and suppression of any political thought critical of the ruling ideology at its very roots, were major characteristics of the system. On this basis the communists handled ethnic politics. Although it was not transparent, political leaders in Bosnia and Herzegovina were always chosen according to the principle that all three ethnic groups would be represented equally. The politicians, however, never acted as ethnic representatives, but as leaders of the whole Bosnian political nation. This kind of rule secured peaceful, and indeed prosperous, inter-ethnic relations in the country. (2003:19)

Hence, the communist Yugoslav approach to ethnicity put ethnic equality at the forefront of their policies. The approach, developed by the Yugoslav communist leader Tito and the Titoist theorist Edvard Kardelj, was usually described as a policy of ‘brotherhood and unity’.

Tito’s system of ‘brotherhood and unity’ was interesting for a few reasons. Firstly, it managed to negotiate the space of non-alliance within the strict division of the cold war, and it managed to organise the experimental political and economic system of self-management. Secondly, like other socialist systems, the government of former Yugoslavia worked under the principle of social equality. In terms of gender, it meant reproductive rights and social measures that encouraged women to pursue high levels of education, work outside the home and participate in the public political sphere. In terms of national belonging the Yugoslav socialist ideology was a variation of the classic theme of modernisation: because of the homogenising strength of

159 Titoism describes the specific system built in Socialist Yugoslavia and refers to the modification of socialist ideology after Tito’s refusal of the 1948 Resolution of the Cominform where the Communist Party of Yugoslavia declined to accept further dictates from the Soviet Union.
industrialisation, anti-fascism and socialist class solidarity, the national or rather nationalistic element would be alleviated and finally cease to exist.

As socialist rule entailed ideological control over the representation of the past, the horrifying events of the Second World War that could potentially threaten the ethos of ‘brotherhood and unity’, and disrupt interethnic cooperation, were forbidden from mention unless in terms of ‘all victims of fascism’ or ‘all foreign occupiers and domestic traitors’ (Denich, 1994). The Titoist regime saw danger in the nationalist ideologies that had led to the World War II fratricide and continually used accusations of nationalism to stifle ethnic debates.

Somewhat paradoxically through, the very idea of Titoist anti-nationalism was embedded in the ethnic matters. Both Tito and Kardelj were Marxists and viewed the post-1945 Yugoslav state as an anti-statist project. The communist movement they fronted was ‘national in form’ as it promised the liberation of the smaller Yugoslav nations from various forms of oppression by greater nations and their elites. However, in the longer term, the state was to change its character and ultimately be destroyed from within society as an ‘instrument of class exploitation’. The final goal of the socialist revolution was to create a stateless form of social order. The ‘historic task’ of the Yugoslav communists was to:

...transform the contemporary social scene, which bears all the marks of the transition period, into one in which classes and all traces of exploitation and oppression of man by man will disappear [...] to create a society without a state, classes, or parties (‘The Programme of the League of Yugoslav Communists – 1958’, in Jovic, 2003).

For Yugoslav communists, integral Yugoslavism and Pan-Slavism were both just a cover for greater-Serb hegemony and their aim was to defeat social injustice and inequality among the nations by socialist revolution. Both Kardelj, in his 1939 book The Development of the Slovene National Question, and Tito, in his 1942 article ‘The National Question and the Liberation Struggle’, conditioned the existence of any

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160 Tito and Kardelj did differ in their original understanding of the new Yugoslavia. While Kardelj defined post-war Yugoslavia primarily as an ideological project, Tito hesitated to view it through ideology only and added the ethnic element of South Slav unity to his conceptualisation. However, following the acceptance of Kardelj’s concept during the constitutional debate of 1967-74 Yugoslavia was defined primarily as an ideological, not ethnic concept, and Tito’s position was reduced to ‘tolerated exception’ not to be continued by anyone else after his death (Jovic, 2003).
Yugoslavia upon being socialist, meaning just in terms of social and national questions. Their concept of justice followed the definition of justice which fought for the disadvantaged and underprivileged. Thus with regard to the national question it was the smaller Yugoslav nations that needed to be unearthed from their underprivileged position and given the rights and equalities they deserved. The slogan of ‘brotherhood and unity’ expressed this goal in its fullest. Its aim was to unite the Yugoslavs but not through a simplistic form of ethnic category but via a socialist demand for solidarity, equality and fraternity among Yugoslav people.

Thus it may not be surprising that the Yugoslav communist movement gained such wide support at the time. The New Yugoslavia promised an anti-statist heaven to radical communists, gave voice to the smaller nations such as Croatia and Slovenia, as well as recognition to those who had not been recognised in the interwar period, namely Montenegrins, Bosnian Muslims and Macedonians. Additionally, by retention of the prefix ‘Yugoslav’, the new state attracted many Serbs who still savoured the sentiments for the old Serb-dominated pre-war kingdom.

In effect, Titoist Yugoslavia attempted to create what Michael Ignatieff (1993) terms ‘civic nationalism’ where it is law rather than common roots that hold a society together, and where by subscribing to a set of democratic procedures and values, individuals can reconcile their right to shape their own lives with their need to belong to a community. Hence, by the Constitution of 1946 the equality of all people on the territory of Yugoslavia was determined by the law. Moreover, the category of Yugoslav was introduced in the 1950s in order to debase nationalistic primordial ethnic belonging and strengthen the ideological project of the New Yugoslavia. As described by Tito:

The name Yugoslavia is somehow heard less lately while people write and talk mostly of the ‘federation’. We must lay more stress on Yugoslavia. We are Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Macedonians, but all of us together are also Yugoslavs, all of us are citizens of socialist Yugoslavia. In this sense, we must strengthen the sense of belonging to the Yugoslav socialist community of equal nations and nationalities. This is not Yugoslavhood in the unitarist sense that denies the nation or endeavours to diminish its role. We have fought energetically against Yugoslavhood in the unitarist sense and must strive in
the future against every, even the slightest tendency towards unitarism that has inherent in it the hegemony of any nation whatsoever. What I refer to is the need to deepen awareness of belonging to Yugoslavia, of the fact that the strengthening of our Yugoslav community is the concern of all our nations and nationalities and that only if strong can it guarantee them true prosperity (Tito, 1969).

The Yugoslav identity was thus created both as an ideological project of socialism and against the previous concepts of Yugoslavism. The ‘national question’ of the New Yugoslavia was resolved through a politics of balance and compromise and equality of all Yugoslav nations with a long term prohibition of politicisation of nationalism was the characteristic of the state (Jansen, 2005). By 1980, this idea of Yugoslav identity was strongly held by many. Milka Planinc, a Socialist Federal Prime Minister of Yugoslavia from 1982 to 1986, reflected on those times in April of 1998:

We were all, including myself, Yugoslavs, and we did not have, even in our most private thoughts, any idea that Yugoslavia could disintegrate. I remember how shocked I was when it was reported that Vladimir Bakaric, a very experienced politician, said somewhere in Belgium in the mid-1960s that what we were doing was re-structuring Yugoslavia, but that only the future would show how long it would last as a common state. To me, this statement came as a big surprise. I asked myself: ‘How could he say this? Does he really think there could be something else but Yugoslavia?’ We all believed that, in principle, the national question has been resolved, and that misunderstandings we occasionally had would decrease as economic development progressed (Jovic, 2003:167).

Yet, as mentioned previously, the issue of ethnicity remained a strong factor in the Yugoslav state system. While nationalist sentiments remained strongly prohibited by law, and a new Yugoslav identity was promulgated, the very fact that the federation was organised on the basis of national belonging – where the main nations were allocated territorial provinces/republics – caused the unsought for strengthening of national identities over time. This was further assisted by the process of decentralisation, which was introduced by the Constitution of 1974, and which provided the system of power easily abused by the political elites with nationalistic
agendas. In addition, the fact that the system of ‘ethnic keys’ was used for allocating key offices according to the distribution of nations further complicated the already complex national question. Therefore, while the socialist aspect of post-war Yugoslavia demanded justice for all nations, it did so via a complex regime of ethnic representations that ultimately led to ethnic conflict and national uprising rather than the desired for elimination of nationalism.

This paradox of the national question had the gravest repercussions in the case of Bosnia. Being the most diverse republic in the second Yugoslavia it became the most loyal supporter of the ideology behind the Yugoslav identity idea. Andjelic states:

Bosnia was a unique republic in the Yugoslav federation. It was the only one that was not actually a ‘nation state’ for some of the Yugoslav nations, but was a ‘small Yugoslavia’. Great improvements in the conditions of living, industrialisation and the economic development of a once very backward and rural community, created positive popular feelings towards the system and especially towards Tito (Andjelic, 2003:21).

The focus on economic development and the prohibition of nationalism, which the Party-run Yugoslav government had created, strengthened Bosnian unity during the Yugoslav existence. However, by the same token it left the country most unprepared for the early 1990s rise of nationalisms and the consequent Yugoslav disintegration.

**Conclusion**

This chapter presented the historical background of Bosnia. In understanding Bosnian post-refugee transnationalism as grounded between two racial states – Ireland and Bosnia – and consequently two different regimes of governmentality, the goal of the chapter was to present a historical framework out of which the current post-Dayton Bosnian’s biopolitical regime of governmentality developed.

The aim of this chapter was to challenge conventional wisdom that the primary cause of the Bosnian conflict was ‘ancient ethnic hatred’. By delineating the complexities –

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161 For detailed discussions of the contradictory nature of Yugoslav anti-nationalist policies, see Bougarel, 1996; Dyker and Vojvoda, 1996; Ramet, 1992.

162 Each important political and/or business function had to be manned by ethnic representatives of majority ethnicities in each republic.
related to Bosnian history – of ethnic and religious affiliations, the ruling systems that have overshadowed Bosnia, and the geographical and economic positions that Bosnia founds itself in from an early period through to the 18th Century, the chapter showed that while there was some strife in the region, it was either related to clashes between migrating tribes and rivalries between noble families, or associated with peasant rebellions against the systems of rule. It argued that there was no foundational power to the ‘ancient ethnic hatred’ argument. It was only in the 19th Century that nationalistic sentiments emerged in the region and subsequently penetrated the political sphere and domain of governance, ultimately leading to the collapse of the second Yugoslav state.

In the light of this background, in the next chapter I discuss further the regime of governmentality of the racial state of post-Dayton Bosnia and argue that changes that have occurred since the conflict, namely the reification of ethnicity, the politicisation of nationalism and increased religiosity, are consequences of the Dayton Agreement. I also argue that these changes contribute to enforcing Bosnian post-refugee transnationalism.
Chapter 6

The Racial State(s) they are in II: The politicisation of nationalism, ethnic reification and religiosity in post-Dayton Bosnia

Introduction

As the previous chapter shows, the history of Bosnia is not a straightforward story of ancient hatreds unfolding between Serbs, Croats and Bosnians on the Balkan territory. It is not the land where these three ethnicities fought over their unbridgeable differences for centuries only to discover that the fight was futile and a full-blown civil war was the only solution – as most Western media, as well as some theorists argue.

The history of Bosnia is a complex matter, often told differently by different actors who partook in it, or examined it. In the previous chapter I sought to draw attention to the point that the ‘ancient ethnic argument’ is just one such a storyline. As the chapter shows, ethnicity was not really relevant in Bosnia until the 18th Century and the ‘age of nationalism’, and even when it became relevant the struggles that happened in the territory of Bosnia were much more complex than the conventional wisdom relating to the ethnic argument suggests. Yet, as this chapter shows, despite all this complexity, ethnicity has been reified in present-day Bosnia. Furthermore, the ‘ancient ethnic hatred’ argument reared its ugly head and has been institutionalised and constitutionalised via the Dayton Agreement.

The chapter starts with a brief overview of the conflict that took place between 1992 and 1995 in Bosnia and which was ended by the Dayton Agreement. The second section concentrates on an examination of the document itself and emphasises the role of the international community in drafting and implementing the Agreement. This section argues that the Dayton Agreement created post-conflict Bosnia where a reified version of ethnic belonging and the politicisation of nationalism is the heart of the rationality of governmentality. The third section presents examples of both ethnic reification and the politicisation of nationalism, and argues that one of the reasons that the Bosnian migrant population discussed in this thesis chose transnationalism over
permanent return to Bosnia is because it had become an ethnically segregated state. The final part of the chapter highlights the issue of increased religiosity, which has been developing in post-conflict Bosnia in parallel with increased nationalism and ethnic reification, as yet another reason for Bosnian migrants to shy away from permanent return.

The chapter is based mainly on my ethnographic data, but it also relies on historical and documentary analysis to interrogate the racial state of post-Dayton Bosnia and its biopolitical regime of governmentality.

The 1992 Bosnia conflict

'If needed we will build an even more beautiful and even older Dubrovnik.'

In December 1991, Bozidar Vucurevic, Bosnian politician and self-declared Bosnian Serb, commented on the destruction of Dubrovnik from Trebinje with the quote above. The Bosnian town of Trebinje had a substantial JNA army base at the time and from this position it made regular air raids on the Croat city of Dubrovnik. Bozidar Vucurevic was the commander of the attacks, the leader of the Serb Democratic Party and Mayor of Trebinje. Seventeen years later, in 2008, he reflected on his comment at the time by saying, ‘I do not regret having said that. The Croats said that they will build the more beautiful and older bridge in Mostar too’ (Oslobodjenje, 2008). In April 2011, Vucurevic was arrested for war crimes committed during the Yugoslav conflict and he will go down in history as cursed by some and celebrated by others. His quote, on the other hand, will go down in history as an example of the absurdity of the war that shocked the Balkans in the 1990s.

As the previous chapter has shown, the beginning of the conflict in Bosnia in 1992 cannot be explained outside of the larger context of the breakup of socialist Yugoslavia. Bosnia after all was the most diverse republic of the former Yugoslavia and the most unprepared for the coming disintegration. However, there were some recent and not so recent factors that have contributed to the disintegration. For

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example, in the decades after the World War II Bosnia and Herzegovina underwent a rapid industrial revolution and the urban population of Bosnia tripled, from 366,000 to 1,044,000, between 1948 and 1971 (Siercic, 1976). This socio-economic transformation laid the basis for a new Bosnian culture and was expected to integrate the people of the country more closely by increasing the size of cities and towns which had traditionally been the carriers of Bosnian civic unity. However, this official Communist policy had some unpredicted consequences. Instead of the sought-for urbanisation, the ruralisation of cities and towns actually occurred, whereby older civic-minded townspeople were replaced by an influx of former villagers who brought with them a more sectarian orientation, sometimes even from other parts of Yugoslavia (Hoare, 2007). The classic example of this was Radovan Karadzic, leader of the Serb Democratic Party and the Bosnian Serb rebellion of the 1990s, who came to Sarajevo from a village in Northern Montenegro.

The ruralisation of the cities and towns of Bosnia was one contributing factor to the 1990s conflict. The re-emergence of nationalistic movements was another. During the first Bosnian multi-candidate elections for the representative for the Yugoslav Federal Presidency, in June 1989, the first non-Communist parties were registered. One such party was the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) which was to become the principal Muslim nationalist party. As its founding declaration states:

The Party of Democratic Action is a political alliance of citizens of Yugoslavia who belong to the Muslim cultural-historical sphere as well as other citizens of Yugoslavia who accept the programme and goals of the party [...] the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Muslims, both those who live in Bosnia and Herzegovina and those who live outside its borders, represent an autochthonous Bosnian nation [...] who have their own historical name, their ground under their feet, their history, their culture, their religion, their poets and writers; in a word, their past and their future (Hadziomeragic, 1991:77).

While the declaration states that all Yugoslav citizens who feel an alliance with the party are invited to join, the declaration’s primary members were to be Muslims. The SDA’s non-Muslim designation was a form of lip service to a ban on the formation of nationally defined parties during the socialist Yugoslavia. This ban was lifted in June 1990 and this led to a strengthening of the SDA as a Muslim party, and the
formulation of Croat and Serb nationalist counterparts, namely the Croat Democratic Union (HDZ) and Democratic Party of Serbia (SDS) (Hadziomeragic, 1991). On 18 November 1990, the first free elections were won by these three parties which had been organised along ethno-national lines.

All three nationalist parties initially avowed mutual tolerance and coexisted in peace. They recognised each other as the authentic representatives of their respective peoples and felt closer to each other than they did towards the a-national Communists. As Maid Hadiomeragic, one of the founders of SDA stated at the time:

I always prefer a Serb to a non-Serb; a Croat to a non-Croat; because that way I know who he is what he is and I am happy that he is that which he wishes to be. That way I too can presumably be what I want to be and sing and write and publish what I want (Hoare, 2007:344).

Indeed, at the joint pre-election rally of the HDZ, SDS and SDA in Konjic, the venue was decorated with the insignia of all three parties (Andjelic, 2003).

However, this mutual tolerance did not last long. During the following year, Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia declared independence and the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA), together with various Serb paramilitary formations, seized about one third of the Croat territory. Already at this time Serb and Croat presidents, Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo Tudman respectively, contemplated the partition of Bosnia as a possible solution to their territorial aspirations (Bougarel, 2007). The impact of these events was the changing relationship between nationalist parties in power in Bosnia. They began to confront each other more and more violently over the future political fate of the republic. Both HDZ and SDS became increasingly infiltrated by hardliners and more and more nationalist, xenophobic, monolithic and unequivocally subordinate to the regimes in Zagreb and Belgrade (Hoare, 2007). With regard to this outsider subordination the SDA was different. It identified neither with Croatia nor Serbia but remained aligned to Bosnia and Herzegovina. In other ways it was similar to the SDS and HDZ; it became uni-national, non-civic and patriarchal. In 1991, the Socialist Republic of Bosnia was being run by three different groups of anti-Communist dissidents who had experienced a long history of persecution at the hands of the very same state.
In April 1992, the war extended from the surrounding republics of Croatia and Serbia to Bosnia.

As mentioned before, of all the Yugoslav republics Bosnia and Herzegovina held on to the Yugoslav idea the longest. Even faced with Milosevic’s separatist drive,¹⁶⁴ and Croat and Slovenian secessionist response, the Bosnian leadership tried to preserve Yugoslavia. In June 1991, Bosnian President Izetbegovic together with the Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov, proposed a plan for an ‘asymmetrical federation’ where the varying degrees of sovereignty were to be given to the six Yugoslav republics in order to keep the state together. Serbia and Montenegro would form a federal core, Bosnia and Macedonia would act as semi-detached constituent republics and Croatia and Slovenia would be confederally linked sovereign states. Neither Milosevic nor Tudman would discuss this compromise plan (Silber and Little, 1995). Nevertheless, Izetbegovic kept exploring different options for Yugoslavia to stay intact, such as declaring neutrality when the war broke out between Croatia and Serbia and lobbying against the international recognition of Croatia and Slovenia. It was only when international recognition of Croatia and Slovenia proved that Yugoslavia was quite definitely dead that the Bosnian parliament called for a referendum on independence. Sixty-three per cent of the electorate (mostly Croats, Bosnians and Yugoslavs) voted in favour which prompted SDS (Serb Democratic Party) to set up barricades in Sarajevo. On 2 March 1992 thousands of Sarajevo citizens demonstrated on the barricades and former Communists took a lead in organising further demonstrations in favour of peace, indicating a widespread opposition in the capital to war and sectarian chauvinism (Donia, 2006). However, the demonstrations proved futile and as soon as Bosnia was recognised by the international community as an independent state, on 6 April 1992, the Serb forces began their siege of Sarajevo.

¹⁶⁴ At the beginning of the disintegration of former Yugoslavia in 1991 Milosevic’s plan was to unify Bosnian and Croat Serb territories in order to form a new Serb entity (Hoare, 2007).
¹⁶⁵ Alija Izetbegovic was one of the founders of the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) and following the first multi-party elections his party won 33% allowing him to become, alongside Croat and Serb representatives, a member of a multi-ethnic rotating presidency. The Croat party occupied the post of Prime Minister, the Serb party took over the presidency of the Assembly and Alija Izetbegovic became the First President of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The already complex situation became even more complex and the internal Bosnian situation worsened. The army of Republika Srpska confronted the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Croat Defence Council. All three armies had been established in 1992, at the outbreak of conflict, but were by no means equal. The army of Republica Srpska was the strongest as it was supported by the former Yugoslav Army. It was the only army that initially had proper military equipment ready for fighting. The army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was the poorest and welcomed the financial, material and moral support of Muslims in South-East Asia and the Middle East. In fact, foreign Muslim fighters, mujahadeen, were invited by President Izetbegovic to help the Bosnian army. It has been argued that President Izebegovic, seeing that the unification within Yugoslavia could not be sustained, did not want to see Bosnian Muslims left in a land-locked state between its larger neighbours without a strong unitary state where Muslims would dominate (Nation, 2003), hence his need for external support for his plan. However, it has also been argued that the mujahedeen actions in helping the Bosnian Army forever changed the character of both the conflict and what it meant to be Bosnian Muslim (Shrader, 2003).

The influx of Muslim fighters changed the atmosphere in Bosnian towns, in particular in Sarajevo, and tensions developed between the secular city people and the new incoming Muslims. The Muslim leadership started producing fanatical magazines and newspapers and the Reis-ul-Islam, the head of Bosnian Muslims, spoke out against mixed marriages and in favour of installing Islam as a subject to be taught in all public schools (Fine, 2002). As Oluic points out:

> The pre-war cultural world that embraced multi-ethnicity was turned on its head. Public offices, governmental administrations and the army, once multi-ethnic were now permeated with Islamic symbolism and beliefs. This new visible Islam was now all pervasive … (2007:55).

166 The Army of Republika Srpska was established from the offshoot of former Yugoslav army on the territory of what is today Republika Srpska. It was made up of around 80,000 personnel consisting mainly of Serb Orthodox officers and Serb recruits from Bosnia and Herzegovina. It also included various paramilitary units and some Russian and other volunteers. The Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina was a military force established by the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina following the outbreak of the conflict. The Army consisted of a number of paramilitary groups, civil defense groups and former Yugoslav Army soldier. Croat Defense Council was self-proclaimed military unit of Croat Republic of Herzig Bosna (a republic that did not officially exist).
As will be seen later on in the chapter, these religious changes continued into the post-Dayton Bosnia and were not welcomed by the Bosnian migrants in Ireland that this thesis is concerned with. At the time of the conflict they aligned Croats’ coalition with Bosnians against the militarily more powerful Serb force. Croats made clear their intent to create their own state of Herceg-Bosna, centered on Mostar. The complete breakdown of the Croat-Muslim alliance occurred early in 1993, leading to fierce fighting between Muslims and Croats in Herzegovina and Central Bosnia, adding to the overall fighting between Muslims and Serbs in other parts of Bosnia. At the same time, a unique ‘sideshow’ to the larger conflicts outlined above was the internal fighting between Bosnian Muslims in Bihac, Northwest Bosnia. Local strongman and Yugoslav businessman, Fikret Abdic, defected from Izetbegovic’s Muslim government, organised his own Muslim brigades, distinct from those organised by the president, and in his home region he declared an Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia in 1993 (Oluic, 2007).

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to go into further details regarding the Bosnian conflict. It suffices to say that the fighting did not evolve in a straightforward manner; rather it was a multi-faceted and multi-layered combat, often quite chaotic. There were numerous times that the conflict degenerated into a series of confused struggles for local control and collaborations of convenience with no sense of a larger strategic purpose being present (Nation, 2003). Also, the outbreak of fighting between the Croats and Muslims, as well as the Bihac sideshow just mentioned, revealed shifting alliances and associations on a regional level (Burg and Shoup, 1999). On top of all of this there was the international input of mujahedeen fighters and the conflict between those who still believed that socialism was a way forward and those who rejected the past.

It is important to highlight, however, that throughout the fighting, from April of 1992 to December of 1995, the conflict had become increasingly internationalised (Burg and Shoup, 1999; Gow, 1997). There were several attempts by the international community to end the conflict. The Lisbon Cutilheiro Plan which fell apart in March 1992, the Vance-Owen Plan which was rejected by the Serbs in May 1993, and the

167 For in-depth discussions of the Bosnian conflict, see Burg and Shoup, 1999 and Magas and Zanic, 2001. For a historical analysis, see Cohen, 1995; Dyker and Vejvoda, 1996; Glenny, 1996; Owen, 1996; Silber and Little, 1996; Woodward, 1995.
Owen-Stoltenberg Plan rejected by the Muslims in September 1993, are the best known (Oluic, 2007). Apart from these diplomatic efforts, humanitarian aid was provided by the UNHCR and numerous NGOs, and the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was repeatedly extended and increased in manpower from 1,500 troops in 1992 to over 23,000 by 1995 (Nation, 2003). Over 80 UN resolutions were passed on the former Yugoslavia during that time. However, it was not until the increased pressure from the United States and the involvement of NATO and its bombing campaign against Serb positions in autumn 1995, that the conflict was ended. Fighting between the Croats and the Muslims was terminated by the Washington Agreement in 1994. The agreement established the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina based on strictly consociational institutions and divided the territory into ethnically-defined cantons. The outstanding general conflict, in particular between Serbs and Muslims, was ended by another agreement, the Dayton Peace Agreement in December 1995. The Dayton Agreement went further in dividing the territory of Bosnia by making official two distinct entities: the Federation, created mainly for the Croat and Muslim populations, and the Republika Srpska, created for the Serb community (see map below). By doing so it authorised ethnically-segregated Bosnia and formalised the already on-going politicisation of nationalism, ethnic reification and increased religiosity. It formally established the racial state of post-Dayton Bosnia. It is the Dayton Agreement that the next section briefly addresses.

Woodward (1995) argues that these efforts were simply ‘containment with charity’.
The Dayton Agreement

The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, also known as ‘the Dayton Agreement’, is the peace agreement reached in Dayton, Ohio in November 1995, and formally signed in Paris on December 14th of that year. This agreement formally put an end to the messy conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The main participants of the three-week-long conferences in Dayton were the Serb President Slobodan Milosevic, the Croat President Franjo Tudman and the Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic.
The conference was chaired by the American negotiator Richard Holbrooke, with two co-chairmen, the EU Special Representative, Carl Bildt, and the First Deputy Foreign Minister of Russia, Igor Ivanov. A key participant in the US delegation was General Wesley Clark and the UK military representative was Col David Leakey. The full formal agreement was also signed in Paris by the French President, Jacques Chirac, the US President, Bill Clinton, the UK Prime Minister, John Major, the German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl and the Russian Prime Minister, Viktor Chernomyrdin. In other words, the international involvement and input was immense.

The Dayton Peace Agreement is a relatively short document, consisting of eleven articles providing the structural and institutional framework for the reconstruction and reorganisation of post-conflict Bosnia. An additional eleven annexes, where the details of the post-conflict Bosnian Government were laid out, provide various mechanisms promoting democratisation, and set out measures towards the protection of human rights and economic development in the region.

There are two things that are interesting and unique in relation to the Dayton Peace Agreement. Firstly, the Agreement reflected the new post-Cold war interventionist approach for long-term peace keeping, where the international involvement was extended from keeping the warring sides apart to taking a lead in developing long-term political solutions to the region, a process described as democratisation (Chandler, 1999). I elaborate on this point below.

Secondly, this international involvement was built into the Bosnian constitution and was non-negotiable. The new Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina came into being as Annex 4 to the General Framework Agreement – the Dayton Agreement – where all mandates of responsibility were given to the international supervisory bodies. As Article II affirms:

All competent authorities […] shall co-operate with and provide unrestricted access to: any international human rights monitoring mechanisms established for Bosnia and Herzegovina; the supervisory bodies established by any of the international agreements listed in Annex I […] the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia […] and any other organization authorized by the United Nations Security Council. (Dayton Agreement, 1995, Annex 4, II, parag.8)
The preamble posits Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs as constituent peoples and determines that the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina ‘shall continue its legal existence under international law as a state, with its internal structure modified as provided herein’ (Dayton Agreement, 1995, Annex 4.1, parag.1).

Carl Bildt, who became the first UN administrator for the region, described the agreement as ‘by far the most ambitious peace agreement in modern history’ (Bildt, 1996d). It was ‘ambitious’ because, as Chandler argues:

Under the guise of negotiated peace settlement, it sought to create a new political entity which was not a product of popular consensus or popular involvement and was seen by many Bosnians as an external imposition. (1999:43)

The most prominent part of the agreement is linked to the above-mentioned boundary demarcation between two entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska. The agreement has, in effect, created a boundary line within the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina along the ethnic lines popularised by the conflict.

In their insightful examination of Bosnia with regard to what Larner and Walters (2004) term ‘global governmentality’ — referring to the creation of standards and conventions for managing increasingly globalised and interconnected political space — Dahlman and Ó Tuathail (2005) argue that it was the politics of ‘security through separation’ that the Dayton Agreement implemented that have created and authorised ethnic segregation. In their words:

The ethnonationalist vision of “natural security as national security” contradicted the actually existing fabric of everyday life and ordinary domicile security in a functioning multiethnic Bosnia [...] The quest for the security of separation fuelled the violence of ethnic cleansing and the resultant insecurity of displacement. With its recognition of territorial entities created as a result of ethnic cleansing, the Dayton Peace Accords went some way towards legitimizing the ideal of security through separation. While Dayton promised the right to return, it also created a de facto partition of Bosnia dividing what had once been a multiethnic country into ethnonationalist entities … .(2005:577)
The extent of the international involvement in the reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina, via the Dayton Agreement, has extraordinary lead to some authors theorising Bosnia as a ‘neo-colonial protectorate’ rather than viewing it as a sovereign state (Krastev, 2005). Others questioned the legitimacy of the new constitution that came into force without an input of the Bosnian people, either directly through a referendum or plebiscite, or indirectly through their representatives (Yee, 1996). Chossudovsky (1997) focused on Article X of the Constitution which states that ‘no amendment to this Constitution may eliminate or diminish any of the rights referred to in the Article II’ (cited above). He argued that limitations on the constitution being changed by the people posed a fundamental question whether it was a constitution at all under international law.

In effect, as Chandler highlights (1999), Bosnia under Dayton was governed by a network of international community institutions representing the major world powers with NATO, the UN and the OSCE as leading implementing organs. Every annex of the agreement had its area of authority covered by the relevant international body (see table below).

Table 6.1 The Dayton Annexes

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<tr>
<th>Annex</th>
<th>Area of Authority</th>
<th>International Body</th>
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<tr>
<td>1-A</td>
<td>Military Aspects</td>
<td>NATO (IFOR/SFOR)</td>
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<td>1-B</td>
<td>Regional Stabilisation</td>
<td>OSCE</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Inter-Entity Boundary</td>
<td>NATO (IFOR/SFOR)</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Elections</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Constitution</td>
<td>UN High Representative</td>
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<tr>
<td>Article IV</td>
<td>Constitutional Court</td>
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<td>Article VII</td>
<td>Central Bank</td>
<td>IMF</td>
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<td>6 Part B</td>
<td>Human Rights Ombudsman</td>
<td>OSCE</td>
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<td>6 Part c</td>
<td>Human Rights Chamber</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Refugees and Displaced Persons</td>
<td>European Court of Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Commission to Preserve National Monuments</td>
<td>UNESCO</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Commission on Public Corporations</td>
<td>European Bank for Reconstruction and Development</td>
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This unique relationship between a nominally independent sovereign state and the international community initially raised concerns among Western commentators but the problem of the lack of independence in decision making processes by the Bosnian state was quickly ascribed to the specific nature of the Bosnian conflict, mainly the inability of different ethnic groups to construct agreements among themselves. Furthermore, rather than question the lack of Bosnian sovereignty, some legal commentators such as Julie Mertus, a visiting fellow at the Harvard Law School Human Rights Programme, pointed out that the most positive aspect of the Dayton Agreement was that neutrals would play a key role in the new government (Chandler, 1999:34).

This naïve statement regarding the neutrality of the international community and indeed its involvement in the Bosnian conflict may not be surprising considering the new kind of peace-making effective at present where the international community assumes an active role in delivering a peaceful society.

Until the early 1990s, the term ‘democratisation’ was not necessarily used with regard to peacekeeping. Rather it was loosely employed to describe different state processes of transition to democracy, mostly along the lines of Western European or US models, in three successive waves. The first occurred from 1880s to the interwar period of authoritarianism in the 1920s, the second wave involved changes between 1945 and the early 1960s, and the changes that swept Eastern Europe in 1989 are often referred to as the third wave (Huntington, 1991b; Schmitter and Karl, 1991). Since 1990s this democratisation process was to be institutionally delivered by the international community to those entities that are perceived as needing management in their war-to-peace transitions. Indeed, as Darby points out, the term ‘peace process’ has replaced earlier phrases such as ‘conflict mediation’, ‘conflict resolution’ and ‘conflict management’ because ‘the delivery of the peaceful society is a process, a long cycle of activities and policy initiatives over a goodly length of time’ (2001:11). And this
delivery of the peaceful society, at present, is via a process of democratisation and by means of the international community.169

With regard to this process of democratisation, Chandler (1999) alerts us that 'culture is the key'. In his examination of literature regarding the implementation of democracy in post-communist Europe, he points out that many saw these countries as not having a desirable civil society able to take on the cultural values required by Western models of democracy. For example, he quotes Pridham and Lewis who point out that 'the Eastern Europeans are discovering that there is a large, dangerous chasm between grabbing freedom and establishing democracy' (1996:2), while Keitha Fine (1996) states that the lack of history and practice in participatory politics removes the incentive for negotiation from warring groups in the East. For Fine 'ingrained patterns of thought, response, and behaviours' of former communist societies are 'dysfunctional and counterproductive for modern civil society, constituting deep cultural barriers' (Fine, 1996:566). Sztompka goes so far as to develop the concept of 'civilisational competence' in order to describe the alleged inability of post-communist societies to internalise 'certain cultural codes, rules and values' that are needed for 'meaningful action within institutions' (1996: 118). According to these writers, there is a cultural mismatch between Western cultural values, that Western civil societies posses, and the post-communist or transitional societies that express 'pervasive suspicion towards authority, reluctance to get involved in public life, ignorance and neglect of public issues and political apathy' (Sztompka, 1996:119).

In other words, there is a perceived discrepancy between Western liberal culture and Eastern ethnic culture, the latter being unprepared to accept the idea of a civic state were 'ethnic differences were not politically defining and citizens were loyal to ethnic tolerance and multicultural civilization' (Woodward, 1995:233). As Chandler aptly states, it was noted that 'not only were the causes of the conflict located at the level of Bosnian culture, this culture was also held to prevent the parties from being able to resolve the conflict through rational negotiation' (1996:32). Chandler emphasises that nearly all commentators agree that the people of Bosnia would be unable to make

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169 For detailed discussion of the history of peace-keeping and the impact of globalisation on pleasemaking, see Cortright (2008) and Brewer (2010).
democracy work without the international community regulating society, and cites Denitch stating:

Out of that stalemate a new approach to international peacekeeping will have to be developed [...] That may be a significant step forward for a world organization previously paralyzed by great power rivalries and an excessive respect for formal sovereignty. The people of the new post-Yugoslav states now have the dubious privilege of being pioneers of one more noble experiment. (1996: 60)

In his book, *Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton*, Chandler eloquently criticises this ‘noble experiment’ and argues that the whole process of democratisation in Bosnia was less about its impact on the ground and more about the needs of international institutional actors to find new forms of cooperation and new ways of legitimising their international regulatory role. Ultimately, he argues, the dynamic of the Dayton process has been to institutionalise insecurities and disempower Bosnian people.

In following authors such as Chandler, and Dahlman and Ó Tuathail introduced above, I argue that not only are ‘neutrals’ ever neutral, but the whole process of the democratisation of Bosnia rested, and still rests, upon the primordial understandings of ethnicity that has reified, politicised and finally institutionalised ethnic separation. As Robinson and Pobric (2005:237) stress, ‘the Accords have created a series of de facto partitions of Bosnia and Herzegovina into ethno-nationalist entities that both acknowledged and effectively rewarded ethnic cleansing’. Campbell (1999) theorises it as the ‘apartheid logic’ of partition.

This schism along ethnic lines was an inevitable consequence of the Dayton Agreement, helping the creation of present day Bosnia as a racial state – or even racial protectorate – that Bosnian migrants in Ireland do not want to return to permanently. To come back to Denitch, the Bosnian ‘pioneers’, that this thesis concerns, refuse to participate in this ‘noble experiment’. The following two sections discuss the politicisation of nationalism, ethnic reification and increased religiosity as the reasons why.
The politicisation of nationalism and ethnic reification

If we look at the republics from former Yugoslavia Bosnia and Herzegovina is unique, and differs from the other republics by the fact that it has inherited, through the Dayton Agreement and the parts of history, certain 'specificities' that are unfortunately not working for the betterment of this place. One of those specificities is post-conflict, straightforwardly Dayton related Bosnian microcosm, which works as a most dangerous social cancer, and which disrupts consolidation on all levels of life – from everyday happenings to main political processes. We are talking about the new found relationship between majority and minority that has, in practice, become the omnipresent factor and criterion. Not only that, but this specificity has spread like a social metastasis, and it is becoming part of the collective mentality. (Lovrenovic, 2007:167)

This is an extract from the chronicles recorded by Ivan Lovrenovic between 2005 and 2007. Ivan Lovrenovic is a Bosnian writer and journalist who left Sarajevo at the outbreak of the conflict but returned following the Dayton Agreement and as an independent observer has been recording the changes in post-conflict Bosnia ever since. In his essay titled 'Minority Wonderings', where the quotation above is taken from, he describes post-conflict Bosnia as an ethnically-homogenised society organised around a minority-majority dynamic. He stresses the fact that during the whole of modern Bosnian history never has the status and possibility of an individual been so closely related to his/her ethnic belonging. In criticising this development, he traces it back to the international community and its administration, who by coining the term 'minority returnee' not only made the main Bosnian population into a minority in some places in their own country upon their return, but has installed the whole majority-minority relationship as a central relationship in society.

This is how three of my interviewees described the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina at present:

In both entities [Republika Srpska and the Federation]\textsuperscript{170} ... on the whole territory of the state, a very small number of people are concerned with the

\textsuperscript{170} There is also a small district of Brcko which remains an independent municipality.
economy for example. Everybody is concerned with politics, and I mean nationalistic politics and that is it. Everything is about nationalism, everything is divided, everything has to have a representative from the first, second and third nation [naroda] ... starting with sports, culture, arts etc. Everything ... absolutely everything. (Interview XV)

It is the fact that before life was better down there [in Bosnia]. Much better than now ... now it is like a circus. I am thinking ... when I look at the news and hear politicians talking ... it is ... I feel disgusted ... It is very nationalistic ... well, yes ... still, that nationalistic element is still there ... I don’t understand why. (Interview II)

Then it was Yugoslavia, we were all Yugoslavs and that was it. But now, if you go to Banja Luka [Republika Srpska entity] and if you sit down somewhere and ask somebody what do they feel they are, nobody is going to say they belong to the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, nobody, absolutely nobody. Everybody is going to say this is Serbia ... that is their state now, that is their homeland and as long as that way of thinking exists there would be no Bosnia and Herzegovina ... unfortunately. It has gone too deep and too far ... it took roots, I don’t know ... (Interview VIII)

All three interviewees arrived in Ireland at the beginning of the conflict in Bosnia and were travelling back annually to spend the summers there. All three had thought about returning but decided against it. After spending a number of summers there they felt disappointed with the extent of nationalism still present in Bosnia fourteen years after the conflict ended. They kept comparing the Bosnia they left behind when they migrated to the Bosnia of today and were not prepared to return and partake in the nationalistic divisions.

In my own experience, post-Dayton Bosnia was clogged with nationalism. The political system was based solely, as the Dayton Agreement stipulated, on ethnic politics. The daily newspapers were filled with articles either arguing for or against this type of party system, but in spite of this disparity all of them confirm that such a system was in place. And the nationalistic sentiment and ethnic reification were not
only reserved for politics. Miodrag Zivanovic, a philosophy professor in Banja Luka, argues that such a political system penetrated society as a whole producing a fertile ground for what he calls ‘a death of a public intellectual’ in Bosnia. In the interview for the Oslobodjenje newspaper discussing Republika Srpska he states:

...while I have my own reservations with regard to the concept of a public intellectual in general, the reasons behind the quietness of Bosnian intellectuals are the following. The first and most important is conformism. People in certain public positions, such as university lecturers and staff working for different institutes, use silence, and the lack of critical thought with regard to those in power, in order to build profits for themselves (Katana, 2007:6).

After listing a few other reasons, such as the lack of educated youth and the fear of confrontation, Zivanovic concludes that ‘in the country ruled by three one-party systems, the state became a virtual category where the lack of critical thought and unwillingness for open public discussion are a logical epilogue’ (Katana, 2007:6). In the same article, another professor at the University of Banja Luka, Srdan Puhalo, supports this argument by stating:

There are taboos; there are things that cannot be discussed. Like a sacred cow, Republika Srpska cannot be discussed critically. National consensus is seen as all important and anybody who expresses opinions that are in any way different is viewed as a traitor (Katana, 2007:6).

Similar opinions are shared by those writing in relation to other parts of the country. For example, regarding the position of Serbs in post-Dayton Mostar, Mirko Sagolj writes:

Dayton has divided Bosnia into two unnatural parts – Federation and Republika Srpska. That division left no possibility for Serbs from Mostar to either return or stay [...] prior to Tudman and Milosevic’s agreement with regard to the division of the country one third of Mostar’s population were
Serbs. Today nobody knows exactly how many Serbs are in Mostar but it has been noted only between 5 000 and 9 000’ (Sagolj, 2007:7).  

Additionally, following the conflict, 150 sites in Mostar were not returned to the Serbian Orthodox Church while the sites belonging to the Croatian Catholic Church and the Islamic Community were returned (Oslobodenje, 2007).

Possibly the most telling sign of the penetrative power of the principle of ethnic segregation and the discrimination it entails is schooling in Bosnia. In 2007, during my third ethnographic stay in Sarajevo, there were 52 segregated schools in the two neighbouring counties (Lovrenovic, 2007a:36). The policy of segregated schooling was a direct result of ethnic politics. Those counties in the Federation of Bosnia that had unclear relationships between minority and majority populations, and where, consequentially, local power was a partnership between two political parties, introduced the policy of ‘two schools under the one roof’. This literally meant two different ethnically-defined administrations in the same building. For students it meant arriving into the same school yard, but at the ring of the school bell, different ethnicities would go into different classrooms where different curricula would be taught. For teachers it meant the same – at the start of their working day they were separated into different classrooms and different meetings, organised under different administrative staff, and had breaks in different parts of the same building, depending on their ethnic belonging. Defending this approach to schooling, HDZ173 Minister for Education, Culture and Sport at the time, Jage Muse said, ‘if one nation wants to have its own school, that nation has a right to have it, this is not segregation, we are lacking Blacks for segregation’ (Lovrenovic, 2007:34).

The policy of ‘two schools under one roof’ was designed by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe as an urgent but temporary measure to respond to the problem of educating children of minority returnees. As Claude Kiffer, who in 2009 ran the OSCE Education department, said, ‘the policy was supposed to be a temporary solution until a new, countrywide curriculum was adopted. But that never

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171 The last Census of 1991 notes 126,067 people living in Mostar, 1/3 of that were Serbs (Oslobodenje, 2007a). This means that during the conflict number of Serbs in Mostar was reduced from around 42,000 to between 5,000 and 9,000.

172 HDZ (Croat Democratic Union) was a representative part for the Croat population in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
happened and the Stolac model spread throughout the part of the country shared by Bosniaks and Croats’ (Traverse City Record, 2009).

Despite the recent efforts by the international community to introduce reforms to end segregation, and despite the adoption of the resolution on the establishment of multiethnic school departments by the Parliament of Bosnia’s Croat – Bosnian Muslim region in February 2011 (Balkan Insight, 2011), segregation is schools persists. Vedran Zubic, a high school teacher in Sarajevo, sees the separation as a continuation of a wartime nationalistic rhetoric: ‘We have a generation of young, intolerant, ethnically isolated and ethnically overfed pupils who are being used as weapons of nationalist politicians’ (Traverse City Record, 2009). The Bosnian Federal Education Minister agrees, stating that: ‘having the “two schools under one roof” system is a form of apartheid and one of the biggest shames of Bosnian society today’ (Kamber, 2011:2). However, a Bosnian Croat member of the state parliament, Ivo Miro Jovic, disagrees that there is anything wrong with the system. According to Jovic:

The divisions don’t start at school, but at home. We are being raised differently from the day we are born. A man is what he is – he is being raised by his family who instil in him a sense of belonging to his community. That should not insult anyone, just as different curricula for Bosniak and Croat children should not be a problem to anyone (Kamber, 2011:2).

It is beyond the scope of this chapter to go into further details concerning the instances of Bosnian ethnic segregation with regard to education. However, presenting a picture of the present-day segregated Bosnia is important as this is the Bosnia that my respondents do not want to return to and moreover do not recognise or accept. The Bosnians migrants that this thesis is concerned with left Bosnia at the outbreak of the conflict. They grew up in a Bosnia that was part of the Yugoslavia where the multicultural ethos was a fundamental ingredient of social life and where there was no place for ethnic segregation, let alone ethnic reification.

174 Stolac is a southern Bosnian town where the ‘two schools under one roof’ policy was first introduced.
In his theorisation of the collective experience of different pasts in relation to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Jansen (2005) argues that there exists a clear line between ‘that before’ and ‘this now’. This distinction goes beyond the chronological tool used for structuring narration; rather there is a collective event, a turning point, something that happened outside the will and power of Bosnian people, which overshadows individual personal life stories. As Jansen notes, ‘despite the differences within, all the life pathways shared the collective past that was very different from present circumstances’ (2005:13). This ‘that before’ would not simply correspond to the temporal dimension of before the war, it corresponds more to the set of understandings of what being part of Yugoslav times meant.

Most of my respondents found it difficult to adjust to the changed Bosnia they found upon their return, particularly the nationalistic element of it, and kept referring to the time before the conflict as the time when greater cohesion was felt among people. As some of my interviewees described:

I am saying to you. People have changed there. Everybody is trying to trip each other up. Long gone are the times of brotherhood and unity, now brother and sister cannot live together anymore … it is like somebody has thrown poison amongst people. I really do not understand. My sister, for example, lost all her friends. She has a daughter in Germany and stays with her now. She stopped coming to Bosnia completely. (Interview XIV)

Bosnia has gone backwards … it should be different, there should not be … how would you say it … there should not be … people are divided … people are divided now, it is not how it used to be, those times are gone … now it is “I am a Muslim, you are a Serb, he is Croat” … everybody is keeping a distance, keeping a distance from one another. They say he is a Muslim, run away from him … (Interview IX)

Bosnia will never again be Bosnia, not the way it used to be when it was a part of Yugoslavia. Now we have a totally different state. It is divided, you know, people are spending time with their own group more. (Interview IV)
Bosnia is not the same, neither the people, nor the country, everything is different, almost 100 per cent. (Interview VIII)

As previously mentioned, in terms of national belonging the Yugoslav socialist ideology was a variation of the classic theme of modernisation. Indeed, since the Constitution of 1946, the equality of all people in the territory of the former Yugoslavia was determined by the law. Also, the category of Yugoslav was introduced in 1950 to counteract nationalistic primordial belonging, as discussed previously. In other words, the national question of former Yugoslavia was being resolved through a politics of balance and compromise with a long-term prohibition of politicisation of nationalism (Jansen, 2005).[^175]

This is the most significant change in relation to discussions of the differences between 'that before' and 'this now'. The taboo on the politicisation of nationalism has been broken by the politics of the conflict, institutionalised through the international community’s involvement in the conflict, and finally constitutionalised by the Dayton Agreement.

As discussed above, in contemporary Bosnia ‘there is little room for anyone who does not follow a national agenda’ (Friedman, 2004: 84). The ethnically-defined political parties control decision making within the administrative, as well as judicial and economic institutions. All three major ethnic groups have taken steps to maintain cultural distance from each other. Advantage is to be found in alliances with one’s ‘own’ ethnic/national group, and competition against other ethnic groups. If people from another national group manage to return and regain their former land, competing ethnic groups consider that their own power may be compromised. This has been one of the major difficulties for returnees trying to re-establish themselves in areas that are currently occupied by other ethnic groups, so-called ‘minority returnees’. Many minority returnees end up exchanging property and moving to where their own ethnicity is dominant.

[^175]: This is particularly relevant with regard to Bosnia and Herzegovina, as it was the most mixed republic of the six republics of the former Yugoslavia. The last census before the conflict shows that 44% of the population identified themselves as Muslims, 31% as Serbs, 17% as Croats and 8% as Yugoslavs (Filipovic, 1997).
Among my interviewees, more than half swapped their original property for properties in a more appropriate ethnic zone. For example, one Bosnian woman exchanged her land in Srebrenica, which ended up as part of Republika Srpska after the conflict, for an apartment in Sarajevo, which is part of the Federation. She says:

I still go to Srebrenica sometimes ... I mean I am not from Srebrenica town, we are from a village approximately one hour away from the town, but I was married to a man from Srebrenica. These days I go to the village sometimes but there is nothing left there now. I just walk across the land ... Srebrenica used to be a beautiful town ... but we changed into the Federation. The Federation belongs to all people, from Gypsies to everybody, the Federation has all different nationalities, nobody is discriminated against there, Republika Srpska is Serb only, it belongs to them ... (Interview XIV)

She has re-married since moving to Ireland and spends her summers with her new husband, who is also Bosnian, in Sarajevo. She got an apartment in Vogosca, which is a Sarajevo suburb that was occupied by Serb forces during the conflict. After the conflict, the Dayton Accords appointed Vogosca as part of the Federation. Following this appointment, the majority of Serbs left Vogosca and properties there were bought by Bosnian Muslims, many of whom are now living abroad. My interviewee does not plan to return to live permanently in Bosnia. She is hoping to save enough money to buy a small apartment with her husband in Ireland.

Another family was in a similar situation. The couple left Zvornik at the beginning of the conflict and by the time they returned the town had become part of Republika Srpska. They did not want to return to Zvornik but they also did not want to sell their property there for a low price, so they left their house there and bought a flat in Tuzla, which is a town nearby but is a part of the Federation. During the summers, and sometimes during the winters too, as they are both retired, they spend time in Tuzla but every so often they go to their house in Zvornik to clean it up and fix things. As the husband explained:

We are Muslims; we are Muslims and only 200 or 300 Muslims returned to Zvornik, only those who had to go back went back. So when I offer him [a Serb buyer] my house there he offers me 60,000 [Bosnian marks] for my house, which is worth much more. I would prefer if the house goes unused there than to give it to him for that money. You know, that was the house that
I built, I was 27 years old at the time, myself and her [he points towards his wife who is sitting with us], built that house, I cannot just give it away ... But I cannot live there, it is a Serb republic, if that house was in Tuzla I could get 150,000 for it but there ... Anyway, people travel, I have a brother, he is here in another building [in Tuzla]. I have another brother. He is in Sarajevo. And my sister is there too. My wife has a sister in Malom Zvorniku. That is across the River Drina, in Serbia. A sister and brother ... What can I say? Some people sold their houses because the structure of population has changed. In my street [in Zvornik] there are no three people who returned that I know ... my brother did swap his house there for one here [in Tuzla] but he lost out, his house was much better ... (Interview I)

Situations such as these resulted in Bosnia being more ethnically clustered at present than prior to the conflict. King (2004) suggests that as much as 90 per cent of the population in Bosnia now lives in ethnically homogenous entities.

Ethnically-segregated present-day Bosnia is the direct consequence of the racialised policies of the Dayton Agreement, which have legitimised exclusivist projects by conflating ‘ethnic’ and ‘national’ and by producing schisms along ethnic lines (Vulliamy, 1998). The agreement has, in effect, created a boundary line within the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina along ethnic lines popularised by the conflict, and as such, through a politics of ‘security through separation’ (Dahlman and Ó Tuathail, 2005) authorised ethnic segregation. This further led to the reification of ethnicity and interrelated politicisation of nationalism that persists to this day in post conflict Bosnia. Finlay (2011) argues that the central problem with consociational forms governmentality such as the Dayton Accords and the Belfast agreement NI is that they normalise ethnicity seeking to make it useful to government but reducing the space for other ways of being and other forms of politics. Indeed, in reflecting on the impact Dayton Agreement had on the political landscape of Bosnia, Mujkic (2007) describes post-Dayton Bosnia as ‘a democracy of ethnic oligarchies’, where ‘ethnification of the political system’ has created *Ethnopolis* out of the state. As he defines:

\[176\] It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss further consociational models of conflict resolution.
I call a community characterised by the political priority of the ethnic group(s) over the individual that is implemented through democratic self-legislation, and a community characterised by the political priority of the ethnic group’s right to self-determination over the citizen’s right to self-determination where the citizen’s membership in a political community is determined by her or his membership in ethnic community, Ethnopolis. (Mujkic, 2007:116).

The Bosnian migrants that this research concerns do not wish to permanently return to this segregated state.

Post-Dayton Bosnia and the issue of religiosity

In addition to ethnic reification and the politicisation of nationalism, the issue of religion is also of importance. Religiosity in Bosnia has always been difficult to measure. Particularly in the years after the death of Tito, when studies of this kind were being attempted, it was often difficult to ascertain exactly how much of the population was devotionally committed to religion as opposed to being identified nationally through religion.

Bosnia and Herzegovina had no one major religious group. One-third of the population was Orthodox, while one-sixth was of Catholic background, people who were seen as having their ‘homeland’ in Serbia and Croatia respectively. The largest population group was made up of Bosnian Muslims, who accounted for just under half the population, and were viewed as ‘coming from’ nowhere but Bosnia (Cookburn, 1998). And, as stated in Chapter 4, two other identification options were added by the Yugoslav Censuses, in 1961 ‘Muslim in the ethnic sense’ and in 1971 ‘Muslim in the sense of nation’ (Mrdjen, 2002).

Consequently, descriptions of what being Bosnian meant would often intersect religion and ethnicity. Also, as quotes in Chapter 4 have demonstrated in relation to the migrants’ lack of observance, the Bosnians that I spoke to demonstrated quite a secular orientation with regard to their faith. It was during the time of the conflict when ethnic differences were reified in Bosnia that religion was ‘hijacked by radical nationalist or sectarian politicians to increase their own legitimacy’ (Friedman, 2004:84), resulting in what Gordon Bardos (1999) terms the de-secularisation of
Bosnia in post-Dayton times. The largely secular population which yearned for democratisation received, and continues to receive, a steady dose of desecularisation.

This increased religiosity in Bosnia and Herzegovina was initially prompted by Muslim fighters and charity workers who came to the country during the war trying to induce people to follow strict Islamic prescriptions (Al-Ali, 2002). The Wahhabi Muslims who arrived at the time are still present in Bosnia. During my stay in Bosnia in 2007, a large crowd of 3,000 people gathered for the burial of their leader Jusuf Barcic in Tuzla. According to the Resid Hafizovic, a professor at the Faculty of Islamic Studies is Sarajevo, this sect represents a 'potentially deadly virus' for Bosnian Muslims (Kanzleiter, 2007). As Kanzleiter reports:

In Sarajevo, for instance, one sees more and more people who respect the fundamentalists’ prescripts: men with shaved heads and long beards wearing shin-length pants and women covered from head to foot in long black robes. Wahhabi ‘vice squads’ have already been known sometimes to beat young couples whose public display of affection violates the Wahabbis’ strict moral code [...] The attitude of the Bosnian-Muslim leadership has remained ambivalent. On the one hand, it is under pressure from the United States. Whereas the United States quietly supported the import of Mujahedeen to Bosnia in the early 1990s, since the 9/11 attacks it has been pushing for the destruction of the local Islamist scene as part of a broader war on global Jihadist networks [...] On the other hand, the Islamists continue to have a direct line to persons in the leadership (2007:2).

One of my interviewees, a woman originally from Srebrenica who left the city after it was overtaken by the Serb military forces and who lives in Ireland now but travels annually to Bosnia during the summer months, explained the difference between the kind of faith she had before the conflict, when she was growing up in Bosnia, and now. She also describes the connection between veiling and the increased religiosity in present day Bosnia:

There is more religion in Bosnia now. And the religion is different now. It has all started with the Arabs that came during the conflict. I remember when they were in Srebrenica they were giving money to the families who were religious. Then there were these organisations in Sarajevo … I think they started in 1996
... so the women started covering up to show their devotion. It never was like that before. It is Yemen there now ... I grew up with religion ... my first husband was religious, he used to go the mosque straight after work ... but he never ever in his whole life asked me to put on a veil ... same as my mother’s father, who was a *hodza* ... like my father’s father ... they never asked me to put on a veil ... I had it but they never asked me to put in on ... (Interview XIV)

Increased veiling has become a signifier of increased religiosity in post-conflict Bosnia. In her insightful discussion with regard to the issue of veiling in Bosnia, Al-Ali (2002) points out that very few Muslim women used to wear the veil prior to the outbreak of the conflict and it was only during the conflict that many women took up the veil. This became a contentious issue for many refugee women who were not in Bosnia during the war, for not only did they wish to stay secular in their orientation to Islam, but they were also aware of the symbolic nature of the veil for the increased religiosity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As one of my respondents notes:

It was not like that before the war, this is new now ....after the war ... the whole of Bosnia has gone under the burqa. (Interview XI)

Due to the increased religiosity in post-conflict Bosnia, she chose to stay in Ireland and educate her daughters there. However, she takes them to Bosnia every summer and makes sure that they do not forget the language and *Bosansku kulturu* [Bosnian Culture].

Another two interviewees commented on seeing more veiled women on the streets of post-conflict Bosnia and not liking it. They were particularly resentful toward fully covered women:

No, before it was not like that ... it was not the same ... ok some women wore *marame* [veils] but they were older women ... and they were not totally covered. But now there is much more religion in Bosnia ... lots of *ninjas* ... (Interview XI)

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177 *Hodza* is an Islamic leader in Bosnia, the equivalent of a priest in other religions.

178 The veils that were worn in Bosnia prior to the conflict were type of headscarf kept loosely around the head rather than the full face-covering hijab.

179 *Ninja* is a slang word referring to a fully covered Muslim woman since their burqa, being dark and covering the whole body, resembles the outfits of the Japanese ninja warriors.
It was never like that in Bosnia before ... madrasah existed before and those girls who attended them wore a headscarf of course, but now these ninjas, these are sects, this is not real Islam, they are not Bosnian Muslims, and the saddest thing is that everybody thinks that all the Muslims are the same ... Bosnian Muslims are not like that at all. (Interview XIV)

The increased religiosity was not only manifested through the number of women taking up veiling, but it became part of the education system for children. One interviewee stated that one of the reasons for his and his wife’s refusal to permanently return to Bosnia is the mandatory religious education starting in kindergarten:

You see they are introducing vjeronauk [religious education] in the kindergarten ... I have huge problems with that. A five-year-old kid needs to play, not be taught that. (Interview XV)

The increased religiosity can be noticed on the streets of Bosnia too. During my stay in Sarajevo I was surprised by the number of mosques around the city that had been built since the conflict ended. Lots of neighbourhoods which did not have mosques before the conflict have a mosque now. In fact, it was quite uncommon to have mosques in neighbourhoods consisting of socialist style blocks of flats. Now they are commonplace between the buildings. Interestingly, one interviewee, when talking about the increasing number of mosques in the territory of the Bosnian Federation, comments on the increasing number of Orthodox churches in the territory of Republika Srpska:

The biggest problem is that lots of people are investing in building new bogomolje [places of worship], new mosques and churches ... if there is a new mosque in the territory of the Federation, immediately you have someone building a new Orthodox church in the Republika Srpska ... that is the stupid Balkan mentality ... some kind of competition ... everything is divided now (Interview VIII)

180 Madrasah is a traditional school for boys and girls based on study of the Qur’an
181 Vjeronauk does not correspond to the term ‘religious education’ directly. It is made up of two words, vjera which means faith, and nauk meaning the science, translating as the science of the faith. However, the only faith that the child would learn would be the one the child ‘belongs’ to. There would be no vjeronauk teaching the child all four main faiths in Bosnia.
Bosnian Muslim originally from Srebrenica, but who has now moved her reclaimed property from Srebrenica to Sarajevo, explains that the increased religiosity in the region made it uncomfortable for her to return there. Since the interviewee was a Bosnian Muslim and Srebrenica is still territorially Republika Srpska, the Orthodox religion was too much to bear for her to return there.

In discussing the five pillars of Balkan Nationalist-Authoritarianism, Bardos (1999) argues that the de-secularisation of politics and society was an important feature of post-conflict Bosnia. He points out that during the communist period religious organisations were forced out of social life into the background but they re-emerged as an important sources of political legitimacy for nationalist leaders prior to the conflict and consequently, in post-conflict Bosnia, Catholic, Muslim and Orthodox clergy became prominent figures in public life and gained political legitimacy that resulted in the lack of separation between church and state. He gives two examples to support his point. One was of a sheep being ritually slaughtered at the ceremony marking the opening of a new facility for the Sarajevo water works in September 1997. Another is the National Assembly of Republika Srpska, where members were called on to swear an oath of allegiance on a Bible and kiss a cross held by an Orthodox prelate (Bardos, 1999).

During my stay in Bosnia, the Parliament of Bosnia ratified a concordant relating to the position of the Vatican, or rather the Roman Catholic Church, in Bosnia. Zeljko Komsic, a Croat member of the tri-partite Bosnian presidency met, in July 2007, with Cardinal Theodore McCarrick to discuss the concordant, and informed the Cardinal that Bosnia would build a monument for the Pope Ivan Pavle II as well as name the square where the monument will be by the Pope’s name (Oslobodenje, 2007b:6). This prompted the Serb Orthodox Church in Bosnia to draw up a contract with the parliament asking for a similar position, while Reis-ul-ulem Mustafa Ceric Gran Mufti stated:

182 Mentioned earlier in the section.
183 In 2007, Srebrenica tried to gain independence from Republika Srpska but the attempt was unsuccessful.
184 Bardos proposes that regimes in both entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina are based on a structure of power resting on five pillars: i) control of the security and governmental apparatus; ii) control of the economy (and a widespread corruption it engenders); iii) control of the media; iv) ruralisation and v) de-secularisation of society.
You can hear about concordats being signed between the Vatican and Bosnia and the same being discussed with regard to the Orthodox Church. We, the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina, do not have a need to sign any such thing. We are the autochthonous population here. We are the hosts here. We need to be accepted as such. This is our land! (Dizdarevic, 2007:7).

The feature of increased religiosity in the public sphere continues to permeate Bosnian life today. The majority of Bosnian migrants interviewed for this thesis did not want to return to increasingly religious Bosnia.

Conclusion

This chapter focused on the current post-Dayton Bosnian regime of governmentality highlighting that the changed post-Dayton Bosnia is a state which Bosnian migrants do not want to permanently return to. The chapter presented a brief overview of the Bosnian conflict in order to show that while the conflict was a matter of great complexity, involving the larger break-up of the former Yugoslav state, the Dayton Agreement, which officially ended the conflict, reduced that complexity to ethnic matters by dividing the territory of Bosnia into two distinct entities based on ethnicity. By examining the Agreement itself, which reflects the new post-Cold war interventionist approach to peacekeeping, via a process of democratisation, the chapter argued that it was the Agreement that established the racial state of post-conflict Bosnia by institutionalising and constitutionalising ethnic homogenisation and segregation.

This racial state of post-Dayton Bosnia is based on a regime of governmentality characterised by ethnic reification, the politicisation of nationalism and increased religiosity. This changed and segregated racial state of post-conflict Bosnia is not an option for permanent return for Bosnian migrants in Ireland, rather it reinforces and enforces their transnational belonging.

In the next and final chapter I move away from grounded notions of enforced transnationalism and explorations of racial states of Ireland and Bosnia in order to focus on the actual Bosnian experiences of post-refugee transnationalism. I propose their post-refugee transnationalism as a ‘space of possibility’ that Bosnian migrants
have carved out for themselves within the two racial regimes of governmentality that they live in and between.
Chapter 7

Between the racial states of Ireland and Bosnia: Bosnian post-refugee transnationalism, diasporic experiences and the ‘space of possibility’

Introduction

So far the focus of this thesis has been on the racial states of Ireland and Bosnia and the way both of these responded to Bosnian migratory movements, following the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. The first part of the thesis focused on Ireland and Irish intercultural policies. It argued that Irish interculturalism, as a particular regime of governmentality, based on ethnic homogenisation, cultural essentialism and community construction, failed in its aim to integrate the Bosnian population into Irish society. The second part of the thesis discussed the conditions of post-Dayton Bosnia and argued that factors present there, namely the reification of ethnicity, the politicisation of nationalism and increased religiosity, that are the epitome of the current Bosnian, Dayton-induced regime of governmentality, deterred Bosnian migrants from returning permanently.

This last chapter takes a step back from the interrogations of the biopolitical regimes of both states and focuses instead on the transnational space that Bosnian migrants have attained for themselves within and between those regimes. This chapter looks into the diasporic affiliations and interconnections that Bosnians are presently engaged in and argues that it is within these associations and interconnections that they are forging a ‘space of possibility’ (Morokvasic, 2004) for their post-refugee transnational condition.

The chapter discusses the different links that Bosnian migrants are currently constructing on a global scene, their strategic usage of diaspora identifications as well as the way their condition is perceived by the local Bosnian population. The first section of the chapter presents a short overview of the formal institution of the Bosnian Diaspora as it exists at present. The rest of the chapter focuses on the ways
Bosnians engage, problematise, wrestle with and use this institution and the discourses that it produces when negotiating their ‘space of possibility’.

While this thesis does not focus on the Bosnian diaspora in a general sense and while Bosnian ‘diasporism’ – in all its different meanings – did not emerge as the main theme in the interviews with Bosnian migrants in Bosnia and Ireland, the issues related to their diasporic conditions became increasingly present during the research. They lingered on the fringes of conversations. They appeared during my trips to Sarajevo. They were mentioned with positive sentiments by some, with negative emotions by others. Some migrants I spoke to were actively involved in building this Bosnian diasporic world, others used the word without, by their own admission, understanding its meaning. I myself got involved by attendance at two Bosnian diaspora forums and observed Bosnian people from all over the world while they were constructing this new global Bosnian reality. I saw them dance and sing and read poetry in the heart of Sarajevo’s old town. At the same time I heard negative comments being made about them by the local population walking the same streets.

It is important to stress, however, that while this chapter does not use the concept of diaspora in order to theorise the Bosnians’ post-refugee condition and situate their migratory movements and rather uses the concept of diaspora because it is the concept used by Bosnians themselves, the chapter suggests an exploration of Vertovec’s understanding of diaspora for further theorisations of the diaspora practices for the group of Bosnian migrants that this thesis focuses on.

This chapter is about conversations and observations that go beyond and nestle between the relatively neat categories of two racial states discussed in the previous chapters. John Law notes that ‘parts of the world are caught in our ethnographies, our histories and our statistics. But other parts are not, or if they are, this is because they have been distorted into clarity’ (2004: 2). This chapter delves into these cleavages in an attempt to capture some of the issues related to the Bosnian diasporic condition, without trying to distort them into clarity, and presents Bosnians negotiating their current position as what Morokvasic (2004) calls a ‘space of possibility’, discussed in the conclusion. However, this chapter is not a concluding chapter. Bosnian migratory movements keep developing and diversifying and need to be researched further.
Rather this chapter presents a series of concluding snapshots of Bosnians' 'continuous lives' (Grünenberg, 2006).

The Bosnian World Diaspora Association

In Chapter 4 I discussed Bosnian people's summer migrations. I have argued that these migrations symbolise the ambivalent relationship that Bosnians have with their host country, Ireland, as well as their lack of fitting into its intercultural regime. In the same chapter I also showed the Bosnian Community Development Project’s commitment to assisting Bosnians on their journeys by organising charter flights through the Project.

In addition to organising flights for Bosnian summer migrations ‘home’, around the same time, the Bosnian Community Development Project got involved in the Bosnian World Diaspora Association. While there were some contacts between Bosnians in Ireland and Bosnians in other parts of the Europe prior to their involvement with Diaspora Association, these were sporadic and with no particular agenda to follow.

The Bosnian World Diaspora Association (Svjetski Savez Dijaspore BiH) is an umbrella organisation set up for Bosnians and Herzegovinians around the world. It was set in motion in 1999 by Dr Mustafa Karavdic from Australia. Dr Karavdic sent a letter of intention on behalf of the worldwide Bosnian diasporic associations to a number of Bosnian organisations globally. The BIH UK Network accepted the initiation and sent invitations to more than 700 addresses all over the world associated with Bosnian organisations in order to organise the first BIH World Diaspora Congress. A preparatory meeting was held in June 2001 at the BiH Club in Brent, UK, gathering representatives from Australia, Austria, the UK, Denmark, Holland, Switzerland, the USA, Sweden and Ireland. Following the meeting, the First BiH

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185 For example, there were links between BCDP in Dublin and Bosnian Associations in Derby, Luton and Edinburg in the UK and Bosnian Association in Stockholm in Sweden (BCDP, 2005:12)
186 It is important to point out that the name chosen for the Association carries a significant political message. Rather than calling it a Bosnian organisation, which would refer in post-Dayton times to the Federation part of the territory, by calling it the Bosnian and Herzegovinian Association the initiators of the project stated that they do not support post-Dayton divided Bosnia and view Bosnian diaspora as coming from all parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina as it was when it was still part of the former Yugoslavia.
Diaspora Congress was held in Sarajevo on the 25 and 26 of May in 2002 and the BiH World Diaspora Association was established.

Since its formation, the BiH World Diaspora Association has held four congresses in Sarajevo, the most recent in June 2012. During this time, the Association created its Statutes, Declaration and established its headquarters in Birmingham. It highlighted its crucial goal to be:

... the need to exchange information and ideas of interest to the diaspora, coordination and unique approach to solve the issues of interest to the diaspora before the authorities and institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and abroad, to keep the cooperation, then making conditions for the preservation and development of Bosnian culture and tradition in the diaspora and its transfer to younger generations, as well as the development of humanitarian, educational, economic and other types of cooperation with their home country. (www.bihdiaspora.com, 05.02.2010).

The organisation also set the agenda around the main issues that the Bosnian diaspora needs to deal with. These activities include: i) focusing on achieving greater investments from the diaspora for BiH and seeking the protection of investment, tax relief and decrease in administrative obstacles that prevent diaspora investments; ii) final implementation of Annex 7 of the Dayton Agreement for enabling sustainable return; iii) urgent technical modification of the Dayton Agreement which prevents dual citizenship unless a bilateral agreement is signed between the two countries; iv) the change of the present BiH Election Law that bars the diaspora from being a separate electoral district with its representative in the BiH Parliament; v) the establishment of a Ministry for Diaspora and Law on Diaspora in BiH and vi) finding a way of transferring knowledge and experience from the diaspora to Bosnia and Herzegovina.\(^{187}\)

While the scope of activities shown above covers diverse aspects ranging from law and economics to constitutional changes, the work of the Association is clearly

\(^{187}\) Other smaller scale activities were noted, such as the notification of diplomas gained abroad, the production of textbooks for Bosnian supplementary schools and the organisation of TV programmes and international editions of newspapers that target the diaspora (www.bihdiaspora.com, 05.02.2010).
focused on re-creating strong links between the Bosnian diaspora and home for Bosnian migrants. It seeks a coordinated effort to embed the diaspora back into Bosnian political life and to have the diaspora voice heard within it.

The education of the young people growing up abroad is one of the main ways through which the Bosnian World Diaspora Association tries to encourage connections between different Bosnians and the host societies Bosnian young people live in. In fact, during the educational reforms of 2008, and partly due to the lobbying by the Bosnian World Diaspora Association, the question of the education of Bosnian youth living abroad became a Bosnian state issue. According to the Ministry of Civil Affairs for Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is in charge of primary and secondary education:

The embassies of Bosnia and Herzegovina are due to initiate and organise supplementary education, additional to the one host societies are providing for them, for Bosnian youth living abroad. This supplementary education is to be held in their mother tongue and grouped around so called ‘national subjects’. Special agreements are to be signed between Bosnia and the states with Bosnian diaspora presence regarding such supplementary education. Funding for such education will be provided either by the host society, or, where such budget is not available, it will be planned into the budget of the Bosnian state.


The law does not define what exactly ‘national subjects’ are, but it states that the programme will be decided by the special committee to be appointed by the Ministry Council and Agency for Educational Plans and Programmes. Most importantly, the national subjects need to be based on the same core national subjects as those taught in Bosnia.

The only report so far produced on the subject of supplementary education for Bosnian children abroad states that worryingly only 1 per cent of Bosnian children and youth attend Bosnian supplementary education. The report warns against the decrease in supplementary education, stating this kind of education is crucial for the preservation of ‘Bosnian identity’. In the words of the report:

The lack of mother tongue education received can have a long term effect of total assimilation of Bosnian migrant children in the next few generations. It is
crucial that we find a way of preserving mother tongue teaching as the mother tongue is one of the most important factors that contribute to a sense of personal identity. This is most important for the children of migrants. There are international documents and conventions that deal with intercultural dialogue and language competency of migrant children. If we cannot organise supplementary education via Bosnian embassies in the host countries then we must liaise more closely with the relevant organisations in the host countries that are concerned with intercultural dialogue and the right to bilingualism. (Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees, 2008:46)

While only 1 per cent of Bosnian children abroad are involved in supplementary education, this still means that around 5,000 children are undergoing training at present and the figure is likely to increase if the agreements just discussed are to be fully implemented. The countries with the highest rate of Bosnian supplementary education programmes are Germany, the UK, Sweden, Australia, the US, Canada and Austria. It is hard to access clear data on how widespread Bosnian supplementary education in these countries is, as some countries deal with supplementary education on a local level more so than others but the number of schools involved in the programme is generous. Below are a few photographs from Bosnian supplementary schools in Germany, UK and Sweden. It is interesting to note how what is understood as ‘Bosnian identity’ varies from one country to another. In both the UK and Germany the students are dressed in traditional Bosnian dress, worn in Bosnia only for folklore dances, while in Sweden students are dressed in everyday casual clothes for these special celebrations.
Picture 1 – 9th Meeting of Supplementary Education Schools in Great Britain, London
9 June 2007

Picture 2 – Students from the Small Bosnian School in the Multicultural Parade in Frankfurt, 2006
Apart from trying to bring ‘Bosnianness’ to Bosnian second-generation migrants by focusing on youth education abroad, the World Diaspora Association aims to get the migrant Bosnians together and involved in Bosnia, even if they do not return permanently.

Interestingly, the Association does this by returning to a common pre-Dayton understanding of Bosnian identity by discounting the divisions that the Dayton Agreement has created. It requests the ‘affirmation of Bosnian identity as a common identity to all citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina no matter what is their religious or ethnic background’ (www.bihdiaspora.com, 05.02.2010). More straightforwardly, the organisation composed an online statement in 2007 to acknowledge the creation of the Republika Srpska as a ‘genocide state’ and asked Bosnian people to aim for its abolition. As explained in the statement by the Association:

The World Association of Bosnian Diaspora (SSD BiH) welcomes as the positive outcome the decision of the International Court of Justice in Haag (ICJ) to recognise that genocide did happen in Bosnia and Herzegovina and that it was carried out by the Army of Republika Srpska. Therefore SSD BiH
demands that a court rules for Republika Srpska to be abolished. Today’s constitutional and territorial arrangement in Bosnia and Herzegovina is a direct result of the genocide and the continuation of that genocide in the opinion of the SSD BiH. (www.bihdiaspora.com, 28.02.2007)

In fact, the Association was hoping that one day they would hold its Congress in the city of Banja Luka, the main city of Republika Srpska, in order to reunite Bosnian divisions created by the Dayton Agreement (personal communication, 01.06.2008).

The Bosnian Community Development Projects was involved with the work of the Association right from the very beginning. Having been engaged in a conversation with the BiH UK Network before the Association was established, as soon as the notions of the first Bosnian diaspora congress began to emerge, the Bosnian Community Development Project made a commitment to the idea of a worldwide Bosnian diaspora association. It took a few years before, in 2007, members of the Project became part of the management board of the association. As the Project’s Annual Report explained, interestingly under the ‘Community Development Section’:

In May 2007 three representatives from the Bosnian CDP attended a conference in Sarajevo organised by SSD BiH – World Association of Bosnian Diaspora. At the conference delegates from 35 different Countries, from four continents discussed different issues related to various problems of Bosnians around the world (e.g. dual citizenship, education, youth). Also one of the main issues was establishing a new Government Department for Diaspora who would overlook all needs of Bosnians living abroad as well as 1 representative in Bosnian National Assembly who would liaise with SSD BiH and further with all Bosnian people living in other countries. At the conference one of our delegates was nominated in the Voluntary Management Committee of SSD BiH – World Association of Bosnian Diaspora. (BCDP, 2007:13)

The following year, the engagement between the Bosnian Community Development Project and the World Association of Bosnian Diaspora was strengthened further, as another extract from BCDP Annual Report confirms:

In the beginning of June 2008 we attended Annual Conference of the Bosnian World Diaspora organised by the SSD BiH […] The conference was held in
Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Government Parliament Building. Three representatives (two Management Committee members and one staff member) took the active parts in preparing and organising the conference. The representatives from 29 different Countries with 192 delegates and High Official Guests (including the OHR representatives, Bosnian Government and other NGO's) were discussing different issues over the three day period. The media coverage was excellent and our representatives gave number of interviews where we took opportunity to inform people about Ireland and the lives of Bosnians in Ireland. For the second time our representative has been elected into the Voluntary Management Committee of the SSD BiH. Again it was a great opportunity for us to exchange information and experience with other Bosnians living all around the world and establish new contacts (BCDP, 2008:14).

Also, during my own conversations with the staff in the Bosnian Project, the dedication to and support of the Association was apparent. They regularly followed the development of the association, attended meetings in different part of Europe, (held three or four times in between the conferences) and were actively involved in issues affecting the Bosnian diaspora worldwide, in particular the issue of dual citizenship. This became particularly apparent when I followed them to Sarajevo to attend the ‘Days of Diaspora’ conference in 2007.

Therefore, since the establishment of the association, a large part of the work carried out by the Project focused on the Bosnian Diapora Association and through it on building communication with Bosnians in other countries, rather than being solely focused on Ireland. As I have stated in Chapter 4, this orientation towards links abroad rather than encouraging integration in Ireland – in conjunction with summer migrations and services to other groups from former Yugoslavia – was not looked upon favourably by the representatives of the Irish state who were funding and overseeing the running of the Project.

Before further discussing the association itself and the conference I attended in Sarajevo in 2007, I wish to reflect on two other issues associated with the Bosnian diaspora which I became aware of during my stay in Sarajevo, namely understanding
August as diaspora month and the resentment expressed by the local population towards this ‘August diaspora’.

Sarajevo, 2007 – August as Diaspora Month

In 2007, during my stay in Sarajevo, where I was spending my ethnographic summer, speaking to Bosnian migrants who live in Ireland now, I found out about August being the ‘diaspora month’.

The family I was staying with had their house very much in the Sarajevo city centre, just above the main famous part of the Old Town, Bascarsija. Bascarsija is a major tourist attraction in Sarajevo. It is an old Bazaar and historical and cultural centre of Sarajevo. I was spending the whole summer of 2007 there and passed through Bascarsija a few times a day every day. It was pretty much where I lived. Outside the guesthouse where I was staying there was a large car park and the man who worked there as a warden was friendly with the owners of the guesthouse. His nickname was Booty, derived from the fact that he wore heavy boots even in the summer. Every morning as he arrived to work to take over duty from the night porter, he would pop into the guesthouse for a quick coffee served in the foyer. Sometimes he would drink it while talking to the staff, two girls, a receptionist and a chambermaid. Sometimes the owners would be there too, a husband and wife, and they would join in for a coffee and a quick chat. As I was around the place during the mornings, before I went to do my interviews, I started participating in these morning coffees. The conversation would normally roll from politics and the latest country news to local gossip, particularly concerning the Bascarsija area. In that sense there was nothing unusual about those morning exchanges. A few people who knew the area well gossiped about who got drunk the night before in the main square, who was seen with whom and where and what the tourists were doing. What was interesting was that the gossip changed during the month of August. Rather than being directed at local people and tourists, the focus shifted to the ‘diaspora’ population.

I have to say the first time I heard Booty mention the diaspora population, I was surprised. Booty was around 30 years old and had secondary school education but had not been to college. His life revolved around basketball. He watched basketball
whenever he was not working and could tell you about players going back years. I did not expect him to know about diasporas. The very word was not much in use when I was growing up and attending school in the former Yugoslavia. Booty was a bit younger than me but not significantly, and that word was not part of our vocabulary. Even now, when I visit Croatia or other parts of former Yugoslavia, it is not common to hear the word diaspora. Now I know that the month of August in Sarajevo is an exception.

That morning, when he first used the word, Booty arrived to have his coffee early. The car park was already jammed with the cars and he was not happy that he could not have his coffee in peace. I had also noticed myself that there were lots of cars with foreign registrations when I was woken up by the sunrise prayer, *fajr*, the call from the nearby mosque. When I looked through my window and saw the jammed car park I just thought that lots of new tourists must have arrived. It was not tourists, however, or at least not straightforward tourists. As Booty explained during the morning coffee, it was Bosnians who left and were living abroad now visiting for the summer. It was, as he said, ‘the Bosnian diaspora coming back for a month’. This was how I learnt that the month of August was when the diaspora is back.

In his early investigations of ‘home’ and displacement in 2007, Jansen also noted ‘the seasonal influx of Bosnians from the diaspora’ when he described the town of Tuzla during the summer months. As he records:

> In the heat of the summer the atmosphere was very different from the one during my latest visit, in the middle of winter. The tiny traffic-free centre of the sun baked town was buzzing with life, streets were packed, even though most people were simply parading up and down the *korzo*, the outdoor terraces were virtually unable to contain the crowds of people sipping coffee. Later I understood the seasonal character of Tuzla’s vibrancy, as many of the people on the street had been *Tuzlaci* who were now living in Western Europe. They had come for a summer visit and it was possible to pick them out on the basis of their cars and clothing. In many cases, the smaller kids, running

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188 Tuzla is the third-largest city in Bosnia and Herzegovina and currently part of the Federation.

189 *Korzo* translates as a promenade. Each town would have at least one traffic-free street where people can go for evening walks.
around in front of their parents, spoke German, Dutch or Swedish amongst themselves, while the adults stuck to Bosnian’ (Jansen, 2007:194).

I noticed the same thing in Sarajevo in 2007. The streets were busy with Bosnian migrants back for an extended stay, or what Eastmond (2006) aptly refers to as ‘open-ended returns’. They were walking around, talking loudly, buying drinks and coffees. It was visible that they were different. Their cars were newer and bigger than the local cars, their mobile phones were better, their clothes more flashy and their orders in the coffee shops extended beyond the coffee and glass of water that the locals would have.

There are a two points that needs to be made with regard to the notion of the diaspora being back. Firstly, I only use the term ‘diaspora’ as it is the word used by the local population in Bosnia to describe those coming back for the summer months. I did not manage to investigate exactly where the usage of the term comes from. It is possible that the local population started to use the term when the official congresses of the Bosnian Diaspora Association were held in Sarajevo, or when the association was established and the discourse trickled down from those involved in its establishment to the local Bosnian population. Although the origin of the term is uncertain, the term is used widely and in a particular way that is characteristic for Bosnia, as I explain below.

Secondly, I noticed during my stay in Bosnia that most local people had their own perception of the Bosnian diaspora and most often this opinion was infused with negative sentiments. The same insight was picked up by the Bosnian migrants I spoke to. As one of my interviewees explained:

Do I feel like a diaspora down there? [in Bosnia] No, I do not feel like a diaspora. Others feel like I am diaspora. They all think it is easy when you are living in the West. You go and collect the amount of money you need ... However, I must say some of our own people are guilty of this. They go there

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190 In her critique of ‘refugee returnee’ as a clear cut category with regard to Bosnian refugees, Eastmond proposes two, not mutually exclusive, strategies of ‘open-ended return’. In the first category individuals and households return to live in country of origin but maintain strong links with the asylum country, hence becoming ‘transnationals at home’. The second category is comprised of those who return regularly to Bosnia but keep their asylum country as a permanent base (2006). The Bosnians this thesis concerns belong mostly to the second category of open-ended return.

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with five or six thousand Euro which they spend during the summer. They tell local people how great it is to be in the West, how they have got great jobs and how everything is good. But they are not honest ... So they are guilty of the creation of this perception ... but Bosnia and Herzegovina in general and people in Bosnia and Herzegovina have a really bad relationship with the Bosnian diaspora and yet the Bosnian diaspora is the main investor in Bosnia and Herzegovina. You know, and I know this for a fact, there is no bigger investor in Bosnia and Herzegovina than the Bosnian diaspora. It gives more than Europe. (Interview XV)

Another interviewee agrees:

The relationship between us and the people there is strange. There exists that element of jealousy ... which I think is one of the worst personality traits man can have ... they look at us when we arrive there as ... of course, there are people who justify that, there are people who live here [in Ireland] on bread and water and save five, six, seven thousand Euro and then they go down there [Bosnia] and throw that money around, showing off ... so it is normal that people down there, who have no money for bread, look at that and feel disgusted. So the people there get this picture of the diaspora where we have money growing on trees and before we go there in the summer we just harvest what we need off the tree. A large number of people think that way and then they get jealous and say “look at him, he came from abroad, he has this, he has that” ... I am not saying that they do not have problems there and it must be hard for them to see but they do nothing about it ... they just sit in the coffee shops and wait for one of us to pay for their coffee, that is what they do, they are nice to us, but once the diaspora is gone, they slag us behind our backs (Interview VIII)

My second interviewee was a man in his 30s. He had arrived in Ireland with his family as a child and while his parents went to Bosnia regularly over the previous two decades, he had only started going in the previous four years, mainly due to his involvement with the Bosnian Diaspora Association. His experience portrays the complexity of the situation regarding the diaspora month of August. On the one hand, he felt rejected himself as a ‘diaspora person’ while in Bosnia. On the other hand, he understood that some people do boast when they go, so the local perception is

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191 I participated with this interviewee in the ‘Days of Diaspora’ conference where we were given this information.
sometimes justified. He also had his own opinion about the deceitfulness of some people in Bosnia and their lack of initiative to change their own lives.

However, while he felt there were negative sentiments expressed towards him, he still felt that Bosnia had a lot to offer and that Sarajevo is a special town. In his own words:

Sarajevo has always had this special soul, unlike no other town of former Yugoslavia. People from Belgrade and Zagreb came to Sarajevo because the best musicians were here. It also had a special sense of humour that you could not find anywhere else. **Nadrealisti** were from there after all, that type of humour. Sarajevo is a town that, if you are a normal open person, will accept you immediately. That was what Sarajevo was like then, and I believe it is still like that. I was worried that that was destroyed in Sarajevo but it was not. Some small oases of Sarajevo spirit still exist ... that is the only reason I go there. Bosnia as a country does not interest me at all. Absolutely not. It is a country only on paper that has no control over anything. It exists ... but it feels like a general strike has been there for the past 15 years. Nobody is doing anything. (Interview VIII)

He goes on to conclude how, apart from few people that he knows very well, who regard him as a person and as a friend, the rest see his as a member of ‘the diaspora’, coming ‘from the West’.

Apart from the negative reactions by Bosnian locals to those who left, based on perceived material differences, the August month of diaspora unveiled another layer of divisions based this time on observations and understandings of loyalty.

Bosnia is divided between those who stayed and those who left and are now living abroad and are perceived as diaspora. It is interesting that sometimes, and I have noticed that during the many conversations I had in Sarajevo, the ethnicity of those who left became less important than the fact that they did not come back.193

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192 Nadrealisti, translated as Surrealists, was a very popular comedy show that started in Sarajevo in the 1980s and went on until 1991. The shows were based on political satire or humour related to the mentality of people from former Yugoslavia. For example, in one show they try to make Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Serb, who were lifelong friends, get into the fight with one another.

193 This is not always the case. If a conversation is based on when people left and from where exactly, ethnicity often becomes prominent. For example, Macek (2007) and Armakolas (2007) write about widespread opinions amongst Bosnians that ‘the Serbs knew’ what would happen and often left places just before the outbreak of violence.
This was also the case during the August morning coffees in the guesthouse. While initially, during the first days of the diaspora’s arrival, Booty and the rest discussed the material possessions of the newcomers, slowly the conversations assumed a more bitter edge as they turned to the issue of loyalty. The main point of the conversation was not whether the people who had left were Serb or Muslim, rich or poor, but whether they were planning to come back. The family I stayed with had left Bosnia for four years during the conflict to stay in two different Western countries. When they talked about those times they always highlighted the fact that that was a temporary solution because their three children were small at the time. They always stated that they had planned to come back as soon as they could and they prided themselves on having done so. As soon as a basic level of normality had been established in Sarajevo, they came back and started working hard. They managed to remain financially secure throughout their exile and at the time we met their standard of living was not much different from that of a middle class person in other central European cities. Hence, their hesitation and lack of warmth towards the August diaspora was not based on perceived financial incompatibilities or jealousy, as expressed by other locals. Rather it was more related to the idea of loyalty to Bosnia and its people.

In his insightful portrayal of the post-conflict encounter of three former colleagues in Tuzla and himself, where he ‘deploys ethnographic representation in order to evoke rather than analyse’, Jansen (2007) observes this loyalty, or lack of it, when he describes the fight that erupted between two friends (Bosnian non-Muslim Samir and Serb Robi) who both left Bosnia during the conflict and Hasan (Bosnian Muslim) who stayed. While they argue, their ethnic differences move to the background and the grievances that erupt are solely related to the fact that Samir and Robi left the country during the conflict:

Turning to me, she [Jasna, Samir’s wife also present] explained that it was often thought that Bosnians who spent the years abroad had not suffered at all. Those who stayed behind then now often expressed strong resentment and blame towards them. “Where were you when it was the hardest for us?” they

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194 This is particularly unusual considering the fact that the times of conflict are discussed.
asked. That was so ironic, Lejla exclaimed, because they would be out of Bosnia themselves if they had had the slightest opportunity, all of them! (Jansen, 2007:206).

In fact, this phase became such a common catch phrase in post-conflict Bosnia that it was picked by the famous singer, Dino Merlin, and incorporated into one of his songs. The song is a sampled version of Michael Jackson’s song ‘They Don’t Care About Us’ (1996), whose video was shot in a favela in Brazil. In Dino Merlin’s version of the same year lyrics were changed as follows

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\begin{align*}
\text{Jednom kad sve ovo bude juce} & \quad \text{Once when all this becomes yesterday’s news} \\
\text{Kad zora svane, a svanut ce} & \quad \text{When we reach, and we will, new morning dews} \\
\text{Nemoj da ti bol grudi steze} & \quad \text{Don’t be the one at whose pain they will stare} \\
\text{Sto nisi bio tu kad je bilo najteze} & \quad \text{’Cause when it was the hardest, you were not there}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Jednom kad sve ovo dude juce} & \quad \text{Once when all this becomes yesterday’s news} \\
\text{Stavit ces na krilo unuce} & \quad \text{And you have you a grandchild on your lap} \\
\text{loose} & \\
\text{Kad Bosanske zime zasnijeze} & \quad \text{When Bosnian heavy snows do not forbear} \\
\text{Reci, ja sam bio tu} & \quad \text{Say I was there} \\
\text{Kad je bilo najteze} & \quad \text{When it was the hardest} \\
\text{Ja sam bio s Bosnom} & \quad \text{Together with Bosnia, I was there} \\
\text{Kad je bilo najteze} & \quad \text{When it was the hardest}
\end{align*}
\]

It could be argued that this song was a call for better times to come, but also a call to those in exile to come back and help re-build Bosnia. Interestingly, even 18 years after its release, the sentiments towards the songs are strong. After the Dino Merlin’s concert in Zagreb on 22 December 2011, the following comments were left on the comment page

Ok, ok, all on one side. But what a hypocrite you have to be to sing while the conflict is still on-going, from the German studio, “Where were you when it

\[195\text{ My own translation.}\]
was the hardest?"... Oh Dino, you were in Germany, I was there. Thank you. (Haj, 23.12.2011, 8:35) Merlin, traitor from Switzerland ... He was here [Germany] when it was the hardest (Mehemed, 23.12.2011, 9:02)

The complexities involved in diaspora perceptions are multifarious. There are material differences between those who left and those who stayed, ethnic differences reified by the institutionalisation of the Dayton Agreement, as argued in the previous chapter, as well as differences with regard to perceived loyalty to the Bosnian state. However, despite the manifold differences between those who stayed and those who left, the local population, I observed, was largely united in their animosity towards those who had left. This was also confirmed during my attendance of the ‘Days of Diaspora’ conference when Zeijko Komsic \(^{196}\) started his opening speech by stating that it was not right to have so much negative feeling towards the diaspora since every family has somebody abroad.

In her discussion of Bosnian refugees in Denmark, and in particular the public resentment towards ‘the diaspora’, which she also found in Bosnia, Grünenberg (2006) argues that the establishment of the Diaspora Association, and its active adoption of the definition of diaspora, was a way for those abroad to claim and maintain the right to ‘Bosnianness’ in two senses. Firstly, by organising themselves globally they wished to promote a sense of unity and shared ‘culture’ \(^{197}\) with others living abroad. Secondly, there were practical implications to getting organised. One of the projects that Grünenberg highlights, and of which I also became aware in Sarajevo, was political work for the right of the diaspora to retain Bosnian citizenship while acquiring the nationality of their respective countries of residence.

This project started in 2003 and, via different Internet-based petitions, requested the legal right to dual nationality to be included in the Dayton Agreement. The project is still going on and there is a possibility that if the right to dual nationality is not included in the Agreement by 1 January 2013, thousands of Bosnian citizens living

\(^{196}\) Zeijko Komsic is a Bosnian politician who at the time served as a Croat member of the Bosnian presidential cabinet.

\(^{197}\) Often, as I mentioned in the previous chapter, that sense of unity would be more about shared memories relating to the ‘that before’ time of unified former Yugoslavia, than about a distinctive Bosnian ‘culture’.
abroad will lose their Bosnian citizenship (Alic, 2012). The issue is of particular importance as it is heavily implicated in the current Bosnian politics of ethnic reification. If the legal right to dual nationality is not implemented, those who live in countries which do not have bilateral treaties with Bosnia, such as the US, Germany and Austria, will lose their Bosnian citizenship while retaining their current one. According to Dr Siladzic, who was the president of Bosnia representing Muslims at the time I was in Sarajevo, since it was the Serb part of the presidency that was blocking the implementation of dual citizenships, this is a continuation of ethnic cleansing. As he states:

This means that Dayton allows the continuation of ethnic cleansing. Nowhere in the world does a country, especially a small country that lost so many people already, get rid of its citizens [...] Why would somebody who has American citizenship have to lose his Bosnian citizenship, particularly since America does not ask about this other citizenship? Why should we lose people? We are talking here about more than half a million of people. Why would they lose their Bosnian citizenship? I do not see any reason why they should. Unless, of course, this means that we will lose a certain number of Bosnian Muslims (personal communication, Summer, 2007).

I return to this issue in the last section of this chapter. It could be argued here, as Grünenberg (2006) has done, that the Bosnian World Diaspora Association provides Bosnians abroad with the platform from where to fight against these Dayton-induced injustices. Members of the Bosnian Community Development Project who were involved in the Association felt very strongly about the matter and in favour of changing the Dayton Agreement in this regard.

It is also possible that for Bosnian migrants living in Ireland connecting to the global networks of Bosnian populations abroad was strategically significant, for it was not only the local population that had expressed negative opinions towards the August diaspora. The media in Bosnia reacted to the phenomena too. In the next section I focus briefly on these reactions.

198 The treaty was signed with Sweden, Serbia and Croatia (Alic, 2012).
199 Current Bosnian Muslim representative in Bakir Izetbegovic.
Long-neck giraffes, Biba from Malmö and other stories

When I was in Sarajevo, on 3 August 2007, the main Bosnian newspaper ran a two-page article titled ‘Our dear diaspora: My dear Biba from Malmö’. The article starts:

A long time ago giraffes had short necks. Apparently they lived in Macedonia according to the latest fossil evidence found in the place of Stamer near Delcevo. However, some giraffes left Delcevo and went to the diaspora where they climbed onto the green branches of a genetically modified species. They started looking at their original homeland from above. They had a frightening stare that their short necked sisters who stayed at home could not handle. Hence they all died dramatic death and ended up in the mass graves of ruthless evolution. They died because they did not want to believe that the sky prefers those that are not afraid of anyone but God. As a matter of fact they might have died because they never believed in God in the first place (Haver, 2007:28).

Next to this paragraph is a picture of an audience with an imam in front waiving the Bosnian Muslim flag (see below):

A few days prior to the publication of the article, 700 imams gathered in Sarajevo to read Muslim texts and pray for the salvation of Bosnian souls. Their motto was ‘We are here to say we are not afraid of anything but God’. The audience was filled with Bosnian diaspora. It is to those that Haver refers when she speaks of long-necked giraffes that are only afraid of God. She mocks the diaspora’s newly-found religiosity
while at the same time criticising the very roots of it in Bosnia. In her own words:

They [imams] seem to want to say to us and them that this newly found religion is the only seed from which indigenous Bosnians grew. And, unless we identify with this religion, we cannot survive. We are on our land only if we are of our religion. All this was seen before in the example of our white brothers across the big ponds: Indians and Aborigines are not indigenous to the land, indigenous are those who arrived with the new powerful religion and who ploughed their land with swords and guns (Ibid., p.28).

Religion, however, is not the main focus of her critique. In the remainder of the article she reflects on her discussions with her cousin Biba from Malmö. Biba left Sarajevo and is now living in Malmö, Sweden. Biba represents the diaspora and their opinions. Biba thinks Bosnian berries and cakes are the best, not like the genetically modified ones from the West. Biba thinks the Bosnian seaside is a perfect holiday destination and wishes local Bosnians would stop going to the Croatian coast. Most importantly, Biba thinks that local Bosnians should ‘turn to their roots and stop looking at everything that they have as a cheap bargain with no value but rather enjoy what God gave them’. Biba’s cousin Fadila, a local Bosnian woman, the writer of the article, wrestles with Biba’s opinions and concludes that:

Due to the fact that we have necks of different lengths, we are looking at the world from different perspectives. Hence our experiences of our homeland are very different. [...] My dear Biba from Malmö, so is our patriotism. Mine is very different to yours. Mine is non-existent. (Ibid, p. 29)

Fadila Nura Haver’s article actively engages with many issues raised by the ‘month of diaspora’. Unlike those whose negative sentiments precluded further consideration of the issues, Haver’s article grapples with the negative perceptions but it also introspectively reflects upon the local Bosnian position, concluding that it was not only the material conditions, ethnic divisions and perceived loyalties to Bosnia that

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200 Interestingly, Bosnian migrants that this thesis concerns were among those groups of diaspora who did not welcome increased religiosity in Bosnia.

201 Jansen also criticises the current Bosnian practice of simplifying the past, where complexities of religious and other identities are being eroded in the name of simplified versions that fit current divided Bosnia. He calls these practices ‘acts of symbolic violence’ where ‘retrospective national disambiguation of the past’ happens (Jansen, 2007:207).
divide those who left and those who stayed, but also the country’s current experiences – hence, the giraffes with the different necks. Those who left elevate Bosnian food, berries, the seaside etc. above what you get in ‘the West’. They view them as organic products that local Bosnian people should savour and relish. Those who stayed, such as Haver, see a very different picture.

Haver’s was not the only article about the Bosnian diaspora coming back home for a month. Another example is an article in Vikend magazine in mid-August:

It’s summer, it’s nice, everything is cheerful. That is how our large diaspora feels now that they are here visiting their relatives and their old homes. They are spending their holidays in many different ways and in many different places. The diasporic emigrant spirit has hundreds of ways of expressing itself. Money is being spent. Some spend more, some spend less. Muharem Dizdarevic, from Biscani, has spent a lot of money – enough to open a small business here – on his 50th birthday party. He has obviously worked very hard abroad and made a good living since his birthday party offered a number of spit-roasted lambs and hundreds of side dishes to those attending. There was a band and amongst the 300 guests were young Bosnian singers as seen on the photo (Prosic, 2007: 2).

Attached to the article was a picture of one of the tables where a singer from the band sat next to Muharem. Apart from the acknowledgment of the diasporic presence, this article notices somewhat judgmentally and not unlike the local population, the diaspora members’ wealth.

There are other reactions too. Ramo Kolar, a Bosnian writer, journalist and critic in his opinion piece on the diaspora writes:

Last year most of the comments I got, both negative and positive, were in relation to my writing on the diaspora. Some said I underestimated them and humiliated them by my writing. However, others praised my description of their mass summer migration over here as truthful and undistorted. I have to admit, even today I would write the same thing. I would not change anything. And I do not think they have changed. Maybe one more grey hair [...] they are

202 Vikend is the Bosnian version of the word ‘weekend’.
in shorts and sports gear or shoulder strapped T-shirts. They have cameras
hanging around their neck, bags hanging over one shoulder and beer bellies.
Children are shouting all kinds of things and some do not really know how to
speak their mother tongue so they are mixing in words from Swedish, English
and German. They are looking at shop windows, go to Bascarsija, eat cevap
and buy knick-knacks. They take pictures of themselves in front of important
buildings. It is important, most important, many tell me, to pop to Sarajevo,
they may or may not get a chance to go to their home town, but popping to
Sarajevo is crucial.’ (2007:7)

These extracts display an insight into how the Bosnian diaspora is viewed and
understood at home. The Bosnian migrants that this thesis concerns found it difficult
to wrestle with these opinions. Many wished they were not viewed as diaspora, yet the
local population was banding the August visitors together nevertheless. As one
Bosnian migrant said, ‘I feel like I came home and the people there are making me
into the diaspora.’ While it is understandable that many Bosnian migrants felt
uncomfortable with this process of diasporiticisation, it is also important to point out
that some migrants were proud of being viewed as rich and powerful diaspora, in two
different ways. Firstly, in a simple financial sense, those who bought expensive cars
and threw birthday parties like the one described above were most probably eager to
show to the local population that they are doing well. Secondly, those who were
organising themselves as Bosnians on a global level and participating in the World
Diaspora Association were actively setting up the community of the Bosnian
Diaspora. Thyus it was not only the local population who were constructing the
diaspora but the diaspora was self-constructing too. Paradoxically, several Bosnian
migrants I interviewed, who were very opposed to being viewed as diaspora back
home, were also active members of the Bosnian Diasporic Association.

The issues relating to Bosnian diasporic experiences are complex. While the concept
of diaspora itself is a multilayed phenomenon, ‘an ancient word’ (Gilroy, 1994), a
term that back in 1998 Anthias noted was, and arguably still is,203 ‘overused and

203 Despite a number of studies that have surfaced since the inauguaration of Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational
Studies in 1991, where debates over the theoretical, cultural, and historical meanings of the term not only still
proliferate, but are spilling into other journals devoted to ethnic, national and transnational concerns.

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under-theorised', and while the aim of this chapter is not to situate current Bosnian experience within these theorisations, I wish to make one theoretical intervention. Vertovec (1997) outlines three general meanings of diaspora which have emerged in the literature, 'diaspora' as social form, 'diaspora' as consciousness and 'diaspora' as a mode of cultural production.

In the understanding of diaspora as social category the emphasis is placed on an identified group characterised by their relationship despite being dispersed. This conceptualisation has several traits: i) a specific kind of social relationship cemented by special ties to history and geography; ii) conscious maintenance of collective identity; iii) institutionalisation of networks of exchange and communication; iv) maintenance of explicit and implicit ties with the homelands; v) development of solidarity with co-ethnic members; vi) being unable or unwilling to be fully accepted by the 'host society'; vii) tensions of political orientation and viii) economic strategies that represent important forces in international finance and commerce. Finally, Vertovec points out that in all these domains:

diaspora as social category is characterised by 'triadic relationship' (Safran, 1991) among a) globally dispersed yet collectively self-identified ethnic groups, b) the territorial states and contexts where such groups reside, and c) the homeland states and contexts whence they or their forebears came. (1997:279)

In understanding diaspora as a type of consciousness, Vertovec places an emphasis on state of mind and a sense of identity and a particular kind of awareness of centred attachments and multi-locality. He stresses here Hall’s notion (1990) of 'imaginary coherence' where diaspora is comprised of ever-changing representations and Appadurai and Breckenridge's (1989) notion of 'micro-politics of memory' where diasporic groups have memories whose archaeology is fractured and produces a multiplicity of histories, communities and selves, that are 'redefined by the diasporic individuals as a source of adaptive strength' (Ibid., p.282).

The third understanding of diaspora, according to Vertovec (1997), concerns discussions of globalisations in the sense of the worldwide flow of cultural objects, images and meanings resulting in variegated process of creolisation, mutual
influences, new contestations and constant transformations. Here diaspora is described as ‘involving the production and reproduction of transnational social and cultural phenomena’ (Ibid., p.289).

It would be interesting to investigate the Bosnian diasporic experiences in light of these observations and theorisations. On the one hand, there exists a global body, the Bosnian diaspora organisation with its strategic aims and missions. On the other hand, there is a Bosnian population with its diasporic experiences that range from personal experiences to media representations and local understandings and misunderstandings. Both phenomena are interrelated and complexify one another in a number of ways that, while important to pursue further, are beyond the scope of this thesis. The focus of this thesis, as explained in the introduction, is on a particular group of Bosnian programme refugees who arrived to Ireland in 1992. The Bosnian World Diaspora Organisation consists of Bosnians from all over the world and to theorise it further, data beyond the Bosnian experience in Ireland would be needed. Similarly, the aim of this thesis was to look at the reasons why Bosnian migrants in Ireland are involved in post-refugee transnationalism, and not how they negotiate their diasporicism in Bosnia, even if this questions is of great importance too. Having said that, negative perceptions of Bosnian migrants ‘back home’ most certainly have some impact on their decision not to return. However, this would need to be investigated in greater depth. At this juncture, I theorise Bosnian post-refugee transnationalism as discussed in this thesis, as a ‘space of possibility’, the notion I propose in the concluding part of this chapter. But before I do so, I would like to briefly return to the association itself and describe the ‘Days of Diaspora Conference’ organised in Sarajevo in Summer 2007, in which I participated.

The ‘Dani dijaspore’ (Days of Diaspora) conference

In the press conference organised the day before the five-day Days of Diaspora symposium, it was stated that over the following few days the citizens of Bosnia would have a chance to get to know what Bosnian people who live and work abroad were doing and which issues were most important to them. I was already aware of the conference but was not sure exactly what to expect. After a number of negative
comments I heard in relation to the diaspora over the previous few weeks, I was wondering who would be there and what issues would be discussed.

I clearly remember going to the first day of the conference. It was another scorching summer's day and the pavement looked too hot to walk on barefoot. The conference was held in Skenderija, a large cultural and sports centre famous for the fact that the 1984 Winter Olympic Games had been held there, and it took me a while to get there from where I was staying. It was not difficult to find the conference; it was well signposted and there was a group of people standing outside one of the buildings looking like they were part of the event. Inside, I noted, it was not as well attended as I had imagined it would be, perhaps there were around 100 people, but great enthusiasm was going on inside the large room the conference was being hosted in. Interestingly, I noted there were no covered women or overtly religious men in the room. It was slightly shocking to be in a seemingly religion free room, having been surrounded by religious expressions since my arrival in Sarajevo.

The conference was opened with everyone standing for the Bosnian anthem. I remember thinking that the room we were in was very Western looking, a little nondescript, brown and modern. Following the anthem, there was a short video presentation of Bosnian mountains, sea, people and agriculture, basically presenting the Bosnian ‘connection to the land’. Afterwards the conference was officially opened by short speeches by the director of Skenderija Suad Dinga, the President of the World Diaspora Association, Senada Softic-Telalovic, the Minister for Human Rights and Refugees, Safet Halilovic, the Minister for Culture of Sarajevo, the representatives from the inter-religious committee and Fatima Hukic, the President of the NGO ‘Children are the Pillars of the World’.

After a coffee break, President Softic-Telalovic gave the keynote address, praising the work of the association in connecting the Bosnian diaspora across the world. She described the Bosnian diaspora as a new and young diaspora. Nearly 80 per cent of the diaspora was composed of people who had left since 1992 and the Diaspora Association provided them with a space where they can keep their culture alive in different host societies.

The summer before the conference, in an interview with the Danish Bosnian monthly magazine NUR, Senada described how the association works:
The main Board of the Association consists of all member states. Each country has one vote. At present, the seat of the main board is in the UK. The host country of the Board generally allocates five of its members to administrative duties of the Association but the host country still has only one vote. [...] Hence each country has equal power with regard to its voice within the organisation. [...] My most important mission in my two year mandate as president of the Association will be to unite the whole Bosnian and Herzegovinian diaspora from around the world. Even if we cannot reach total unification, at least we will work towards rapprochement. I already spoke to the president of KBSA (the Congress of North American Bosnians) and we hope to work more closely in the future 204 (Gusic, 2006:16).

When talking about unification and rapprochement, the President expresses the mission of the Association as one of uniting the whole Bosnian and Herzegovinian diaspora, yet different opinions exist with regard to who the Bosnian Diaspora Association really represents.

For example, during the 4th Congress of the Association, in Sarajevo in May 2008, two presidents, Haris Silajdžic (the Bosnian Muslim representative) and Zeljko Komšic (the Bosnian-Croat representative) were present at the talks and discussions while Nebojša Ramanović (the Bosnian Serb representative) was not. When I spoke to Mr Radmanovic in August 2007, it became clear that his understanding of who constituted the Bosnian diaspora differed from that of Dr Silajdžic. As he explained:

I will give you a few examples. Recently I was in Brno, in the Czech Republic, for some multilateral presidential gathering, and I had an official meeting with the diaspora there … now, usually I would avoid these meetings as I know, better than most, the differences that exist, and I do not want to use those differences to my political ends … however, there was this group and we had a nice exchange, they all said where they were from and why they left and under which conditions they would return to Bosnia. Altogether it was a very good conversation. Normally, and others have noticed this, these types of meetings end with a conversation about national divisions, discussions about who was responsible for a conflict etc. I think this conversation was fine.

204 Consequently, the Bosnian American Diaspora did contribute to the Association and participated in the Days of Diaspora conference.
because those who organised the meeting made sure that the group of Bosnian migrants was mixed. For me.

I will give you another example. I have a friend; we went to school together. He is a Muslim. He went to Sweden. He told me this story. He was taken to a diasporic club in Sweden. He was from Banja Luka, a multi-ethnic city, and he assumed that the Bosnian diasporic club would be multi-ethnic too. So ... he went inside and said “Good Day!” to everybody there. People started staring at him and one person said “Are you a meteorologist? What Good Day, here we say Merhaba!”... He could not believe it. The club was made up of Muslims only. I am telling you. The same divisions we have here exist abroad too. Serbs are not part of the Bosnian diaspora. You saw for yourself in the Days of Diaspora.

In contrast, Dr Haris Silajdzic negates the suggestion that there are differences or problems with regard to who constitutes the Bosnian diaspora. As he told me in an interview in the Bosnian Parliament in August, 2007:

What you saw at the Days of Diaspora conference is the diaspora from Bosnia and Herzegovina. What is meant is this, all the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina who live abroad are diaspora, it does not matter if they left earlier for economic reasons, or were made to leave recently, they are all diaspora. They are a very important resource for Bosnia and Herzegovina, a very important component. The following fact is very important, outside Bosnia and Herzegovina we have a large number of talented, capable, educated young people who will, directly or indirectly, no matter where they are, help Bosnia and Herzegovina.

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to investigate the differences, ethnic and others, within the Diaspora Association itself. It is interesting to note, however, as evidenced by the answers above, that the presidential chamber does not agree regarding who constitutes the Bosnian diaspora. If, as Dr Silajdzic states, all citizens of Bosnia who live abroad are part of the Bosnian diaspora, why was there no Serbian representatives at the conference. Likewise, if the divisions among diaspora members are so great, who are the people behind the Diaspora Association working for and on whose behalf
are they promoting unification. These questions need further exploration and future research.

Indeed, one of the main issues discussed at the conference relates directly to the points above. That is the association’s request for a Ministry for Diaspora as part of the Bosnian Ministry Council. The association has been trying to establish a ministry for a number of years as it feels that Bosnian migrants need to have a voice and be recognised in Bosnia’s parliament. Without recognition, the work of the association cannot be successful. For example, the Bosnian Council of Ministers refused to fund the Days of Diaspora conference because, according to a spokesperson ‘before the Ministry can open the state’s till, we need to have a law defining the constitutive parts of Bosnian Diaspora and organisations that represent them’ (Omeragic, 2007:7). However, in order to find out who the diaspora really is, a citizenship census would be required for people to express their identification.

This feeds into a larger problem discussed at length at the conference, and that I mentioned earlier in the chapter, that is Article 17 of the Bosnian Constitution relating to Bosnian citizenship. Dr Silajdzic, the President of Bosnia, argued, together with the representatives from the Association, that it is crucial for the Bosnian diaspora to bring about the abolition of Article 17 of the Bosnian Constitution. According to the Constitution, which is Annex 4 of the Dayton Agreement, unless special bilateral agreements are signed between the home and host countries, there can be no possibility of dual citizenship, hence, Bosnian citizenship can be taken away from Bosnian citizens who have taken the citizenship of their host society.

Dr Silajdzic put the changing of Article 17 on the government agenda four times since the first request by the Diaspora Association. On all four occasions, the abolition of Article 17 was vetoed by Republica Srpska whose delegates insisted that a citizenship census should be administered first. Dr Silajdzic argued that the census request presented yet another act in an on-going process of ethnic cleansing engaged in by the Republika Srpska with regard to Bosnian Muslims for years. He argued that the Republika Srpska wants to see who the diaspora really is and once it knows it will act accordingly with regard to Article 17. If the majority of the diasporic population is made up of Bosnian Muslims, Article 17 will be kept so that people cannot get dual citizenship unless agreements are signed. This way, according to Dr Silajdzic,
thousands of Bosnian Muslims would be cleansed out. If they are of Serb origin, Article 17 would be abolished so that the Bosnian Serb diaspora can keep Bosnian citizenship and Bosnian Serbs can be present in larger numbers in the state.

The President of Republica Srpska, Dr Radmanovic, negates this argument by stating:

Dr Silajdzic’s argument is incorrect. Most European countries are happy to sign the agreement regarding dual citizenship with Bosnia and Herzegovina and most have done so already. There are no problems here. There is only one country that Dr Silajdzic has a problem with and that is the US. The US does not want to make an agreement with Bosnia with regard to dual citizenship and yet this is required by the Bosnian Constitution. So this means that those who accept American citizenship cease to be Bosnian citizens. And that is that (personal communication, August, 2007).

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to go into further details regarding the political complexities of the Diaspora Association and its involvement with local Bosnian politics, but it is clear that the political battles are on-going. In 2012, there were still no changes in the Bosnian Constitution with regard to citizenship law and the abolition of Article 17 was still a priority on the agenda of the Bosnian Diasporic Association. 1 January 2013 remains the deadline for amending Bosnia’s citizenship law.

**Conclusion**

As stated in the introduction to this chapter, the aim of the chapter was to present a snapshot of Bosnian migrants’ on-going lives. The aim of the chapter was not to ‘conclude’ the Bosnian transnational experiences by locating them somewhere along the spectrum of the current theoretical engagements regarding the concept of diaspora. The aim of the chapter was instead to show a politically complex, internally heterogeneous and contested global Bosnian Diaspora Association, of which the Bosnian Community Development Project in Ireland is part. The Association, whose mission is the unification of those who do not fit neatly into local Bosnian understandings of ‘Bosnianness’, is trying to act strategically for the benefit of Bosnian citizens abroad. The chapter also aimed to show the implications ‘on the ground’ of what Bosnian post-conflict migrations entailed, namely further divisions
between those who stayed and those who had left, and to highlight the diasporisation that is being performed upon those who left by those who stayed. The purpose of the chapter was to open up and make visible these complex Bosnian experiences without ‘distorting them into clarity’.

While the diverse Bosnian diasporic phenomena need to be investigated further, and although beyond the scope of this dissertation, I argue that Bosnian migrants’ current post-refugee transnationalism is a ‘space of possibility’ for the Bosnian migrants I discuss.

In her theorisation regarding the engendering of ‘post-wall’ migration in Europe, Morokvasic (2004) argues that for migrants from Eastern Europe transnationalism offers ‘a space of possibility’ as a resource, where migrants engage in such movements in order to gain in different parts of their lives. I argue that currently Bosnian migrants in Ireland have engaged in post-refugee transnationalism in order to negotiate the two different biopolitical regimes of governmentality of two different racial states, Ireland and Bosnia. Post-refugee transnationalism offers them a ‘space of possibility’ where they can maintain ties with both places they live in and yet mediate the desirable and undesirable of both places. Whether this ‘space of possibility’ is part of, and in which ways, of larger diasporic phenomena, is for further research to show.
Epilogue: ‘A pebble in the shoe’

In her research entitled ‘Is home where the heart is, or where I hang my hat?’, Kristina Grünenberg (2006), mentioned in the previous chapter, investigated the sense of belonging of Bosnian refugees in Denmark. She interviewed Bosnian migrants at their ‘home’ in their host society and travelled with them back to places where they had come from in Bosnia that once were ‘home’. She explored different ‘homes’ they had and different ways of ‘home-making’ that they were involved in while trying to establish whether ‘home’ was where their heart was or where they hung their hats. Reflecting on her research journey, Grünenberg notes that she had an on-going struggle, which bothered her like a pebble in a shoe, with hats and hearts, since there seemed to exist an a priori separation between the two. The heart is generally regarded as something fixed, a symbol of being and evocative of continuity. The hat, on the other hand, we put on when we go out, when we are moving. Hence, it becomes a symbol of mobility, discontinuity and change. Her research denied this dichotomy, arguing instead for never-ending negotiations between hearts and hats in the Bosnian experiences, and sometimes temporarily even the achievement of a sense of consonance between the two.

While my own research engages actively, albeit in a different way to Grünenberg, with complex phenomena of transnational negotiations and multifarious issues related to change, I had a similar problem, I also had a pebble in my shoe. My pebble was not related to hats and hearts, however, but rather to the matter of ‘conclusion’.

The pebble was not present during the time I was carrying out my multi-sited ethnography. I walked around with no discomfort whatsoever. However, as soon as I started to write up my observations and findings into a sequence of chapters the pebble started bothering me. It bothered me that I had to conclude the research. I felt that my choice of methodology, the very fact that I was going where they were going and listening to and seeing what they were listening to and seeing, enabled me to gain a great insight into the complexity of Bosnian experiences. I felt confident that the configuration of the theoretical acumen I used proved indispensable in illuminating and helping me answer my research questions. Transnational conceptualisations allowed for my participants’ multiple belongings, racial state theory provided the space for the acknowledgement of the racialised effect the states have on their populations, while the concepts of biopolitics and governmentality helped illuminate
how this effect was exercised. I was content that most of what I had learnt about Bosnian post-refugee transnationalism was presented in the chapters I wrote. Furthermore, in the last chapter I presented a small snapshot of further complexities being played out between the two biopolitical regimes of governmentality discussed in this thesis. How could I conclude on that? How could I conclude on lives that are constantly changing, that are constantly developing new ways of being, constantly adjusting and negotiating the desirable and undesirable elements in their conditions?

As I highlighted in Chapter 2, refugee and post-refugee migrations are different in their ‘points of attachments’ (Hall, 1989) to other migrations since they are an ongoing series of ruptures and sutures where continuous disruptions must be overcome. For the first generation of Bosnian migrants discussed in this thesis, the major rupture was the initial point of departure, which was unpredictable, unwanted and conflict induced. They partially sutured that rupture by moving to Ireland, where, despite being marginalised and controlled by the reception and resettlement programme, they had roof over their head and basic provisions unavailable in Bosnia at the time. For some, going back to Bosnia for the first time after the conflict was to be a suturing point in the on-going ruptured feeling of alienation they had felt in Ireland for years, despite the roof and food on the table. Yet unexpectedly, it often produced another rupture since Bosnia was not what it used to be and they realised that they could not return to this changed place. However, they would suture this rupture by going there for the summers and/or selling their properties and moving into more ethnically homogenous zones. Some would suture the multiple ruptures by aligning themselves with Bosnian diasporic associations and through these organisations’ attempts to nurture what they understood their Bosnianness to be – an identity that is slowly disappearing in Bosnia due to the Dayton-induced changes. And this is only the first generation. What about the second generation of Bosnians in Ireland? What kinds of ‘points of attachments’ are they developing?

How can I conclude all this? I thought about not concluding. Conclusions seemed too final. I spoke to my supervisor and she said I need to conclude is some way. I thought about it. I looked into the etymology of the word ‘conclusion’. Originating in the late 14th Century, it means mostly ‘the end’ in speech and writing. This did not help. I thought of it in Serbo-Croat. In Serbo-Croat conclusion translates as zaključak. The word is related to the the word key – ključ means key – so when we conclude we lock
something up. And this was exactly the opposite of what I wanted to do. I wanted to open up the space where Bosnian post-refugee transnationalism becomes visible, not lock it up as some form of a concludable phenomenon. I was wary of fossilising social life.

Then I thought more about the metaphor of a key and realised that they are different actions we can do with a key. We can lock something up but we can unlock too. I started to think about the form of conclusion that can accommodate both, locking up, because ultimately to a certain extent conclusions do, and opening up. After some consideration I chose to write an epilogue as it provides some closure which is needed to finalise the thesis but it also, as in literature or film, can serve to reveal the fates of characters or provide an insight into 'what happens next'.

Hence, what I wish to offer here, in lieu of epilogue, is a summary of my 'intermediate' arguments - by intermediate I mean currently existing between two points of research, one presented here and another for the future - and a glimpse into Bosnian ‘continuous lives’. At the very end I wish to outline some changes that happened during the final write up of this thesis.

At the very beginning of this research, I became aware that in both literature and policy, as Chapter 2 shows, the refugee, and particularly post-refugee transnationalism, was not recognised. Refugees were viewed in light of either integration into the host society, or through the lens of repatriation. Recently however, I reviewed a book titled *Bosnian Diaspora: Integration in Transnational Communities*, by Valenta and Ramet (2011), the first collection of insights with regard to Bosnian transnational connections and attachments. My thesis contributes to this knowledge of making the Bosnian transnational experiences visible and recognisable in sociological research.

However, my thesis goes further than the collected observations of Valenta and Ramet’s (2011). Their collection mostly describes Bosnian migratory patterns and the new identities they are developing along the way of their migrations. In this thesis, and with regard to Bosnian migrants in Ireland, I argue that their post-refugee transnationalism is enforced by two biopolitical regimes of governmentality of two racial states, which both homogenised and essentialised Bosnian migrants. In Ireland this happened via Irish interculturalism which had tried to construct the Bosnian community in Ireland through a controlled reception and resettlement process.
underpinned by policies of community relations and integration. In Bosnia ethnic homogenisation and reification were institutionalised and constitutionalised by the Dayton Agreement. This thesis foregrounds Goldberg’s racial state theory as conceptual framework for understanding Bosnian post-refugee transnationalism and argues that while different techniques may have been used by two different regimes of governmentality, the rationale was the same, to manage a Bosnian population.

Back in 2001, Al-Ali et al., pointed out that theories of transnationalism need to give more attention to variations between receiving and sending states as the social and political developments in those states shape refugees’ strategies and practices. In agreeing with Al-Ali’s call for action, this thesis argues that the politics and policies of both states, Bosnia and Ireland, pushed, or rather enforced, Bosnian migrants to seek out ‘ways of being’ where they can negotiate and accommodate these politics and policies. I argue that summer migrations, and other transnational activities they are involved in, provide them with the evolving ‘space of possibility’, where they can negotiate the changes, ruptures and sutures of everyday life.

There are numerous ‘ways of being’ that Bosnian migrants negotiate, and are involved in, on a daily basis with regard to both countries. Some are related to more material, practical and financial matters, such as organising flights for their summer migrations, maintaining accommodation in two places, remittances and other financial transactions.

Other ‘ways of being’ are related to more personal issues in connection with sentiments, memories and personal histories. While I do not and cannot generalise that what I write below applies to every member of the Bosnian post-refugee population, this thesis has unearthed scenarios which are interconnected with a Bosnian ‘space of possibility’ and can provide an insight into the continuity of Bosnian post-refugee experience.

In the original paper discussing transnationalism as a ‘a space of possibilities’ for migrants from Eastern Europe, Morokvasic (2004) stresses that migrants engage in transnational activities in order to gain, in the case of her study, access to extra income that enables them to maintain a quality of life at home. Morokvasic researched
gendered migration in post-communist societies and explored how women found ways to supplement their family income by engaging in short-term outbursts of work abroad. While Morokvasic focused on what migrants gained, I wish to focus on what they lost and wish to suggest that post-refugee transnationalism provides Bosnian migrants with a ‘space of possibility’ where that which was lost can be re-articulated. ‘That which was lost’ is mostly linked to the country that they lost; ie the former Yugoslavia. This former Yugoslavia had multiethnic marriages and multiethnic schools and there you did not need to ex-change your property so that your children do not get beaten up on the street. In that place my respondents could get a job regardless of their ethnicity and there were no religious obligations put upon them. They had lots of parties and everyone was welcome, as one interviewee explained at length. Different ethnicities, foods, drinks and songs were celebrated, as another kept stressing. Nostalgia for those Yugoslav times was sometimes almost tactile in my interviews. One woman had a picture of Tito on her shelf in her flat and during the interview she got up, brought the picture to the table and told me, while holding the picture, how much better Bosnia was during his time.

I wish to suggest that post-refugee transnationalism provides Bosnian migrants with a space where this nostalgia can be expressed and shared. It was really interesting for me to find out that a few young men from Bosnia who live in Ireland get together every now and then to sing the same songs that they sang in their youth in Sarajevo. I have witnessed one such reunion where these men were re-living their Yugoslav experience with the men who stayed behind in Sarajevo. Songs were sung and jokes were shared and it culminated in one big hug while they were singing. It could be suggested that the whole ‘August as diaspora month’ is an exercise of nostalgia sharing. It became apparent in both my interviews and during my stay in Sarajevo that Yugoslavia is still very much alive for many people, even if territorially the country does not exist anymore.

Furthermore I wish to suggest that the Bosnian Diaspora Association presents a further act of re-articulating that which was lost. As Chapter 7 shows, the aim of the Association is to un-do the ethnic homogenisation that the Dayton Agreement installed in the country and to reconnect migrants who left Bosnia and Herzegovina worldwide irrespective of their ethnic background. As such the Association together
with their congresses and conferences provides Bosnians with a ‘space of possibility’ where they can act un-ethnically, where they can be like they were before the conflict. The role of technology is of great importance here since the internet enables them to connect globally and communicate with one another. Due to this communicative ability, the Association as a ‘space of possibility’ enables migrants to build a ‘voice’ for those made voiceless by the conflict, which can ultimately, if the Ministry for Diaspora is established in Sarajevo, be heard and counted.

While these scenarios, as mentioned above, need further research, I suggest them to be a glimpse into Bosnian post-refugee developments and as such a further illustration of enabling the capacity of post-refugee transnationalism, where the ‘space of possibility’ is an opportune space.

Finally, with regard to changes and ongoing developments, in early 2011 I spoke for the last time with the Department of Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs, the department in charge of the Bosnian Community Development Project in Ireland. I was calling to see if the Project was still active as the last few times I had visited the Project there had been nobody there. I was told that their contract had been reviewed and the decision had been made to cut off the funding for the Project. When I asked what were the reasons for the withdrawal of funding two years before the contract was up for renewal the following conversation took place:

Department’s Official: Well effectively, it has fulfilled its mission. As the aim of the project was to help 1600 Bosnians to integrate into the Irish society, we feel that the objective has been met. The project was on our list to be funded until 2013, but it was a subject to annual review.

Maja: So you closed down the Project?

Department’s Official: No, the Project was not closed down, we just withdrew the funding ... it is up to them to close it down, it is not up to us, it is for them to close it down (personal communication, 08.04.2011, my emphasis).

The blue door of the Bosnian Community Development Project remains closed. The office was still there a year on. The posters of the bridge in Mostar and the famous skiing mountains around Sarajevo are gradually fading. The glue is coming off on one side and it is a matter of time before they fall and get blown away by the wind.
Did the Bosnian officers who run the project manage to attend the 6th Congress of the Bosnian Diaspora Association now that they have no more funding? Are people still managing to get cheap flights to Bosnia without help from the Project? And what is happening to the elderly Serbs, Croats and Bosnians who met there regularly for a coffee and a chat? Are they still meeting, but somewhere else?

I don’t know and I haven’t returned to find out.

My study has timed out, but these questions, engendered by my research, remain unanswered. This is the perennial research dilemma – as researchers move on to the next project, I – the researcher who is embroiled in this project – keep pondering, while the researched keep on going through the transformations of their lives. As my ‘art of listening’ has come to a kind of end, their ‘art of living’ goes on.
Appendix 1

Interviewee Background *

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pseudonym</th>
<th>Known biographical information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interview I</td>
<td>Male, early seventies, from urban background in Bosnia (his wife was present in the interview as well)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview II</td>
<td>Male, mid thirties, musician, from urban part of Bosnia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview III</td>
<td>Female, mid forties, from rural background in Bosnia (her husband and both children were at the interview as well)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview IV</td>
<td>Female, mid fifties, from rural background in Bosnia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview V</td>
<td>Female, mid sixties, of professional background back in Bosnia, unemployed now but involved in charity work, from urban part of Bosnia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview VI</td>
<td>Female, early thirties, grew up in Ireland mostly, professional, employed, high position in one of the Irish banks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview VII</td>
<td>Female, early twenties, grew up in Ireland, in college</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview VIII</td>
<td>Male, early thirties, grew up in Ireland, employed and was involved in Bosnian Community Development Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview IX</td>
<td>Male, late twenties, grew up in Ireland, employed as taxi driver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview X</td>
<td>Female, early thirties, grew up in Ireland, unemployed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview XI</td>
<td>Female, early sixties, of professional background back in Bosnia, self-employed now, she makes and sells Bosnian food and works as a cleaner, from urban part of Bosnia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview XII</td>
<td>Male, early thirties, grew up in Ireland, employed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview XIII</td>
<td>Female, late fifties, of semi rural background in Bosnia, her daughter and one grandchild were at the interview too</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview XIV</td>
<td>Female, late forties, from semi rural background in Bosnia, she made Bosnian lunch for an interview and had her friend there as well</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Interview XV

Male, early thirties, professional, from urban background, employed and was involved in Bosnian Community Development Project

*Two members of the Bosnian presidential cabinet at the time were interviewed as well, Mr Nebojsa Radmanovic and Dr Haris Silajdzic.*
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