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Family, Religion, and Identity in the Pakistani Diaspora: A Case Study of Young Pakistani Men in Dublin and Boston

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A dissertation submitted to the Department of Sociology at Trinity College, in fulfillment of the requirements for the award of Doctor of Philosophy

September 2014
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ABSTRACT

In recent years, Western countries have received Pakistanis as religious fanatics and detrimental to national as well as international safety and politics. Pakistani communities in diaspora have, in turn, received negative attention for controversies surrounding religious activities and a noted lack of integration into host societies. In Ireland and the US, Pakistanis are faced with different challenges due to the migration histories of Pakistanis into these countries, the role of religion in Irish and American societies, and how ideas of the ‘nation’ have affected individual migrant lives. While the Pakistani diaspora is well researched as one of the largest diasporic communities in the world, little is known about these populations in Dublin and Boston. This study fills the gap in literature by examining the experiences of young Pakistani men through their engagement with family, religion, and identity. In comparing the experiences of young Pakistani men in Dublin and Boston, this study explores the heterogeneity of the Pakistani diaspora, an issue that has been largely overlooked in diaspora studies.

This study looks at how young Pakistani men between the ages of 18 and 35 position themselves in relation to ethnicity, religion, and nationality. By examining the lived experiences of first- and second-generation Pakistani Muslim as well as non-Muslim men, the thesis considers migrant generational differences, the impact of religious affiliations, as well as the development of individual identities in the Irish and American contexts. The study draws upon diaspora theory, specifically the concepts of boundary maintenance, homeland, and cultural borderland, to look at how these men negotiate the native and host cultures. To investigate the heterogeneity of the Pakistani diaspora, the research design sampled individuals from different sub-ethnic groups, religions, sexualities, and socioeconomic backgrounds. A series of semi-structured interviews, focus groups, and participant observation notes were used to account for the individuals’ lived experiences.

An analysis of the lived experiences of young Pakistani men in Dublin and Boston offers a rich comparison because of national differences between Ireland and the US. Ireland is considered a new host migrant country because it has only recently opened its borders to waves of migration. The influx of non-white minority groups combined with the recent economic crisis inflicting Ireland affects young Pakistani men who are Othered because of their skin colour and occupations. The dynamics between religion, specifically Catholicism, and the Irish State have also changed in recent decades leading to a rise in secularism and new perceptions of Irish identity. Comparatively, the US is an old host migrant country with a long history of receiving migrants, whose presence have influenced the separation of Church and State and broadened notions of American identity. While young Pakistani men in Dublin are targeted for being ‘Pakis’, the participants in Boston are alienated for being Muslim and are perceived as a ‘threat’ to national security, issues which bring to question the credibility of American pluralism. In considering how young Pakistani men negotiate their various identities in relation to ethnicity, religion, and nationality, the thesis contributes to sociological studies on diaspora, ethnicity, identity, as well as cross-national comparative studies and furthers our understanding of different lived experiences in the Pakistani diaspora.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would first like to thank my supervisor, Dr. Daniel Faas, for his dedication in the development of this dissertation. He demonstrated steadfast commitment and invaluable organizational skills throughout my four years at Trinity College Dublin. I would also like to thank Dr. Ronit Lentin for helping me develop my conceptual and theoretical framework and challenging me to think unconventionally.

I would also like to thank the Graduate Studies Office at Trinity College for helping fund my participation in various academic conferences. These conferences included the European Sociological Association Conference (Geneva, 2011), the Witherspoon Institute at Princeton University (New Jersey, 2011), and the Annual International Conference on Sociology at Athens Institute for Education and Research (Greece, 2012), all of which helped me develop my research design and theoretical ideas.

I am also extremely grateful to Melony Bethala for her expertise and companionship throughout the last two years of this study.

Finally, the completion of this dissertation would not have been possible without my family. My mother and father have always supported me in all my endeavors, while my sister has always been a role model to me. I dedicate this dissertation to them.

Craig Considine
Dublin
September 2014
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CHAPTER 1:
INTRODUCING PAKISTANIS IN IRELAND AND THE UNITED STATES

The aim of this study is to shed light upon the lived experiences of young first- and second-generation Pakistani Muslim and non-Muslim men in diaspora. More specifically, I explore the roles that family, religion, and identity play in shaping the lives of young Pakistani men in the Republic of Ireland (henceforth Ireland) and Boston, Massachusetts (United States; henceforth US). Pakistani communities in these two cities are diverse in terms of their ethnic, religious, sectarian, linguistic, and socio-economic backgrounds. In applying a comparative cross-national research design, this study examines the heterogeneity of the Pakistani diaspora and provides insight into the diverse experiences of Pakistani communities living in Irish and American societies, a topic which has hitherto received insufficient consideration in the academic literature.

In recent years, Pakistanis living in Dublin and Boston have received attention in politics, academic research, and the media for several reasons, including their cultural backgrounds, Muslim beliefs and practices, experiences of racism, and level of integration into Irish and American societies. This study aims to examine these issues by using a multiple research case study and deploying qualitative data collection tools, such as semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions. Ireland and the US offer a rich cross-national comparison for looking at how young Pakistani Muslim and non-Muslim men negotiate their experiences of family, religion, and identity in diaspora. Pakistanis are a new ethnic group to Ireland, a population that has significantly increased in recent years. In the Irish context, Pakistanis are a relatively young group, and they make up the largest sub-group within the Muslim population. As Ireland is a predominantly white, Catholic country, Pakistanis challenge older, racialised notions of Irish identity. Pakistanis have also fallen victim to racism and discrimination, particularly in Dublin, following the recent economic collapse in Ireland. In the United States, Pakistanis make up one of the largest ethnic minority groups, a population which also has significantly increased in recent years. Pakistanis are the seventh largest ethnic minority in the US, and within the Muslim population, they are the single
Introducing Pakistanis in Ireland and the US

largest group. Since 9/11, the backlash against Muslims has focused significantly on young Pakistani men, who are perceived to be ‘terrorists’ and ‘threats’ to national security. Despite this backlash, the separation of Church and State in America allows for Pakistani Muslims to identify with American pluralist principles. In exploring the lived experiences of young Pakistani men in diaspora, Ireland and the US provide a unique cross-national comparative study due to the combination of these varying aspects of their societies that have significantly impacted the lives of young first- and second- generation Pakistani men. The migration histories of Ireland and the US, the role of religion in these societies, differing conceptualisations of nationality, and contemporary social relations between Pakistanis and non-Pakistanis in Ireland and the US provide an engaging context for comparing the experiences of young Pakistani men living in Dublin and Boston.

Over the last twenty years, Ireland has undergone significant changes in relation to the social composition of its population. Ireland has recently shifted from being a country of emigration to one of immigration¹ (Feldman, 2006: 10). It was not until the 1990s, as Montgomery (2013) notes, that Ireland began to see growing levels of immigration, so much so that Ireland is now considered to be ‘multicultural’ (ibid.: 434). Before this wave of migration, Ireland was a relatively homogenous country in which over 90 per cent of the population was not only born in the country, but they were also white, Catholic, and English-speaking (Inglis, 2009: 4). The US, on the other hand, is a country with a long history of mass immigration and incorporating various minority groups (Moore, 2011). The foreign born population of the US rose rapidly from the mid-19th century through the early decades of the 20th century – commonly known as the ‘age of mass migration’ - in which Irish, Italian, and Eastern European migrants settled in the US (Hirschman, 2014: 70). The US experienced another mass wave of migration, referred to as the ‘post-1965 immigration wave’, in which Latin Americans and Asians were the predominant migrant groups (ibid.: 72). Ireland and the US, therefore, have different historical experiences in dealing with migrant

¹ In 2009, however, emigration once again overtook immigration for the first time since 1995 (Gray, 2013). Overall, emigration rose by nearly 17 per cent between 2010 and 2011, with Irish nationals accounting for 53 per cent of those leaving (ibid.: 20).
Introducing Pakistanis in Ireland and the US

communities, which ultimately shape how young Pakistani men in Dublin and Boston experience diaspora and how they position themselves in relation to Ireland and the US.

In addition to their migration histories, Ireland and the US serve as a compelling comparison because of the roles that ethnicity and religion have played throughout Irish and American histories. By focusing on ethnicity and religion in the context of young Pakistani Muslim and non-Muslim men, I am able to examine how Pakistanis negotiate their ethnicity and religious background, as well as compare the social landscapes in which they live in Dublin and Boston. As I discuss in Chapter 2, Ireland has often been described as having an ethnic nation (Honohan and Rougier, 2010; Mac Éinri and White, 2008), meaning that national group membership is based upon ethnic and racial features and a certain ancestral legacy in Ireland. Belonging to the Irish nation is seen as problematic for young Pakistani men considering that Ireland’s population has been historically white and that Ireland has a non-secular tradition, in which Catholicism has been generally regarded as the ‘official religion’ of the Irish people. Girvin (1993) reflects this description in stating that Ireland has been characterised by a strong relationship between Church and State, between Catholicism and Irish identity, and between public institutions and social norms (ibid.: 382). Ireland’s Catholic ethos is most evident in the Irish Constitution of 1937, in which Catholicism was given a ‘special position’ among other religions in Ireland. The important role that Catholicism played in the creation of Ireland is also evidenced in the preamble of the Irish Constitution, which states:

> In the Name of the Most Holy Trinity, from Whom is all authority and to Whom, as our final end, all actions both of men and States must be referred,
> We, the people of Eire,

[^2]Article 44.1 of the Irish Constitution was changed with the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment of the Constitution Act in 1972, which removed the special position of the Catholic Church. Article 44.1 nevertheless retains an explicit monotheistic tone, as it states, ‘The State acknowledges that the homage of public worship is due to Almighty God. It shall hold His Name in reverence, and shall respect and honour religion’.
Humbly acknowledging all our obligations to our Divine Lord, Jesus Christ, Who sustained our fathers through centuries of trial...

(Irish Constitution, 1999)

The Catholic Church was also given significant influence over health services, education, as well as the construction of social norms and values in Irish society. Nevertheless, the Irish Constitution guarantees religious freedom and the right to assemble peaceably. Article 44.2 of the Irish Constitution provides ‘freedom of conscience and the free profession and practice of religion’ and adds that the State ‘guarantees not to endow any religion’ (Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, 2011: 1). This Article suggests that my participants, regardless of their faiths, are able to practice their religion without prejudice in Dublin.

From the 1960s onwards, however, Irish society has witnessed a gradual shift from a non-secular to a secular society, as pointed out by Inglis (1987):

Rapid economic modernization and urbanization along with changes in media and technology [has] led to a value change towards more individual and liberal values. The expansion of the welfare state has also removed the Church’s previously helpful monopoly in health, education and other areas of social welfare and caused the previously held cohesion and unity of the Catholic Church in Ireland to fragment and decline (ibid. 380).

While Ireland may still be described as a ‘Catholic country’ in terms of the number of Catholics living in the country (Central Statistics Office, 2012a: 42), Skuce (2006: 8) claims that religious pluralism is now ‘a fact of life’ in modern-day Ireland. According to Cassidy (2002), ‘there is no doubting the evidence of a growth in the secularisation of Irish society’ (ibid.: 40). The latest Irish Census confirms that there has been a fourfold increase in people with no religion between the years 1991 and 2011 (Sheehan, 2012), figures which suggest that the ‘homogenous discourse’ of the Irish nation as a Catholic nation has slowly eroded in favour of a ‘modern inclusive Irishness’ (Storm, 2011: 80). In light of the increasing diversity of Irish society, Joppke (2012) suggests that religion is the critical integration issue in Ireland; Muslims, he argues, pose a challenge to the
dominant Catholic religion (ibid.: 4). In Chapters 5 and 7, I discuss these issues by turning to how the Muslim and non-Muslim participants in Dublin practice their religion and how they position themselves towards Irish identity.

Comparatively, the US has been described as having a civic nation in which national membership consists of partaking in democratic institutions and citizenship rights, regardless of ethnic, racial, or religious backgrounds. Ireland’s non-secular founding contrasts with that of the US because the secular US Constitution separates Church and State. The First Amendment to the Constitution states that ‘Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof’ (Cornell University Law School, 2014). Similarly, Article Six of the Constitution provides that ‘no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States’ (ibid.). As a result, the US government does not officially align itself with any particular religious tradition, as Sullivan (2009) discusses:

[The US] government has no comprehensive stance toward or relationship with religious organizations. And religion formally understands itself to be about something different. Religion and government are understood to operate in different registers. There is little memory or legacy of the former intermingling of religious and political administration, as there is in most places (ibid.: 1182).

In comparison to Ireland’s ‘official’ Catholic religion, the US has been described as having a civil religion, which advocates for a non-denominational culture in which there is a separation of Church and State. According to Ferrari (2010), the religious plurality of American society ‘pushes to enlarge the borders of the American civil religion’, but added, ‘this enlargement is bound to dilute its content’ (ibid.: 757). In Chapter’s 5 and 7, I examine how Pakistani Muslim and non-Muslim men position themselves in relation to the perceived role which religion should play in Irish and American societies.

While the US may also be described as a Christian country because of its majority Christian population (Pew Research, 2007), there are hundreds of different
Christian denominations in the country, whereas Ireland is still predominantly Catholic. The US has a much longer historical experience than Ireland in dealing with religious diversity and incorporating minority religious groups, such as Jews, Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus, Sikhs, and Zoroastrians (Boisi Center, 2013: 1). The following table provides a summary of how Ireland and the US compare with one another in relation to several areas of interest, including migration history, role of religion throughout their respective histories, notions of Irish and American nationhood, and a breakdown of their religious communities:

Table 1.1: The Irish and American context

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Common theme</th>
<th>Ireland</th>
<th>US</th>
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<tr>
<td>Migration history</td>
<td>New host migrant country</td>
<td>Old host migrant country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of religion in history</td>
<td>Historically non-secular, increasingly secular</td>
<td>Historically secular, separation of Church and State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationhood</td>
<td>Ethnic nation</td>
<td>Civic nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predominant religious</td>
<td>Roman Catholic (84%), Church of Ireland (3%), Orthodox Christian (1%),</td>
<td>Protestant (48%), Catholic (22%), Judaism (2.2), Mormon (2%), Islam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>communities</td>
<td>Methodist (.15), Islam (1%), Presbyterian (.5%), Hindu (2%), Jewish (.04%)</td>
<td>(.5), Buddhism (.4%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Central Statistics Office (2012b); Pew Research (2012)

The ethnic and religious foundations of the Irish and American nations suggests that ethnicity and religion ultimately play a role in how young Pakistani men engage with the social, cultural, and political environments of Dublin and Boston. In the next section, I provide a historical overview and general background of Pakistanis in Ireland and the US in order to further my comparison between Pakistani populations in Dublin and Boston.

History and Overview of Pakistanis in Ireland and the US

Despite the common perception that Pakistanis are new arrivals to Ireland, South Asian Muslims started to migrate to the country as far back as the 19th century.
Introducing Pakistanis in Ireland and the US

Ibrahim (2010) indicates that the first South Asian, Mir Aulad Ali, moved to Ireland in the mid- to late 19th century (ibid.: 153). Ali, a Muslim scholar and professor of Arabic and Hindustani at Trinity College Dublin, arrived in Ireland around 1861. Research carried out by Kennedy (2010) and Mac Con Iomaire (2006), and documentation provided by the Irish Times (1939), notes that a small number of South Asian Muslims operated restaurants in Dublin during the early- to mid-20th century.

The first significant wave of Pakistanis migrated to Ireland from the United Kingdom (UK), particularly England, in the early 1950s. The majority of Pakistanis who arrived in the UK came from small landholder families and biraderis that had deep roots in their village societies in northern and central areas of Pakistan (Shaw, 2006: 210). Many of these migrants entered into low-skilled jobs in northern industrial British cities, but some also enrolled as university students and worked as doctors (ibid.). Because of the UK’s ailing post-World War II economy, Pakistanis started migrating to Ireland for better entrepreneurial opportunities. Most Pakistanis arrived to Irish cities, such as Dublin and Limerick, in order to set up small business niches including grocery stores, halal trades, restaurants, fabric shops, and market stalls. One of the more prominent Pakistanis in Irish history, businessman Sher Mohammad Rafique, built a mosque in 1987 in the small town of Ballyhaunis, which remains one of the only purpose-built mosques in Ireland outside of Dublin (Scharbrodt and Sakaranaho, 2011: 476). The second wave of Pakistani migration to Ireland occurred because of the Celtic Tiger economy beginning in the mid-1990s. Many of these migrants are young men who have taken up jobs in Ireland’s high-tech

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3 The term ‘South Asian’ refers to migrants from the countries of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka.
4 Biraderi is a context-dependent designation in Pakistani society of a co-resident set of kin and family affinities which may be stretched to include absent members (Akhtar, 2013).
5 Halal is an Arabic term meaning ‘lawful’ or ‘permitted’. In reference to food, it is the dietary standard, as prescribed in the Qur’an (Islamic Council of Victoria, 2014). The opposite of halal is haram, which means ‘unlawful’ or ‘prohibited’ (ibid).
6 Sher Mohammad Rafique is the former own of a local halal meat factor (Scharbrodt and Sakaranaho, 2011: 476).
7 ‘Celtic Tiger’ is a popular term used among Irish people to describe the period between 1994-2000, when the Republic of Ireland achieved the highest economic growth rates in its history (Kirby, 2004). The term itself derived from the success of the ‘East Asian Tigers', implying that ‘the intense economic and social change of the period merited being seen as a case of significant developmental success’ (ibid.: 302).
Introducing Pakistanis in Ireland and the US

industry or enrolled in various universities across the country. The participants in this study comprise of first-generation migrants from the Celtic Tiger era, as well as second-generation respondents whose parents were part of the initial wave during the 1950s.

Like in Ireland, South Asians have lived in the US since the 19\textsuperscript{th} century. During the 1890s, as Moore (2011) notes, Punjabi men from rural military and farming backgrounds in India settled in the agricultural sector of California (ibid.: 1655). This initial wave of South Asian migration\(^8\) to the US ended in 1924 when Congress passed the Johnson-Reed Immigration Act, which limited the number of migrants allowed entry into the US and completely excluded immigrants from Asia (United States Department of State, 2014). A second wave of Pakistani migration to the US began in 1965 after Congress passed the Immigration Nationality Act (INA), which granted residency to migrants from Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Eastern Europe, Latin America, and the Caribbean countries (Peek, 2005). This wave of migration differed greatly from the previous wave in the US and the initial Pakistani population in Ireland. Pakistanis who arrived after the INA were largely educated, professional, and skilled migrants (Curtis, 2009). Many had already obtained a third-level degree or postgraduate degree in Pakistan, while others migrated for the sole purpose of obtaining a higher professional or vocational degree (Moore, 2011: 1655). As Bagai (1972) highlights, some of these Pakistanis later turned out to be major contributors in science and technology in the US. Unlike the first Irish Pakistani migrants who held small businesses, these migrants in the US were employed as physicians, engineers, and financial advisors. As such, they became financially well-off with household incomes well above the US median income\(^9\) (Moore, 2011: 1655). The last wave of Pakistani migration to the US began in the late 1980s and early 1990s with the introduction of the ‘Green Card’\(^{10}\) system (Dadi, 2006). Many of these

\(^8\) Khorana (1993) suggests that the first South Asian migrants in the US migrated to seek their fortunes and to escape the tyranny, repression, and unfair taxation of British colonial rule (ibid.: 394). Bagai (1972: 28) adds that a severe drought in Punjab, which lasted from 1898 to 1902, may have contributed to the migration of South Asians to California.

\(^9\) Kugelman (2012) draws on data from the 2010 US Census and notes that the median household income of Pakistani-American families is nearly $63,000.

\(^{10}\) A Green Card is the official card issued by the US Immigration Service (USCIS) to foreign nationals granting them permanent residency in the US. A Green Card allows an individual to live in the US (H1 Base, 2014).
migrants were relatives of Pakistanis who came to the US because of the ‘family reunification’ clause of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (Gupta, 1999). They tended to be employed in lower paying industries such as operating small convenient stores, working in the service sector, and driving taxis in large cities (Dadi, 2006).

Overview of Pakistanis in Dublin/Ireland and Boston/US

According to the 2011 Irish Census, the Pakistani population of Ireland is approximately 6,847 (Central Statistics Office, 2012a: 7). In 2006, the Pakistani population of Ireland was roughly 4,998, meaning that this community increased by 37 per cent between 2006 and 2011 (ibid.: 89). Approximately three-fourths of the Pakistani population in Ireland lives in Dublin or its suburbs, making the total number of Pakistanis in this city around 5,000. Other cities in Ireland with significant Pakistani populations include Limerick, Cork, Galway, and Waterford (ibid.: 40). Among Ireland’s Muslim population, Pakistanis are the largest non-Irish ethnicity within this group (Central Statistics Office, 2012b). In relation to other minority groups in Ireland, Pakistanis have a higher-than-average proportion of its population classified as ‘higher professional’ (Central Statistics Office, 2012a). In addition to being financially stable, the Irish Pakistani population is relatively young. The Central Statistics Office states that roughly 25 per cent of this population is between the ages of 0 and 14, with 13 per cent between the ages of 15 and 24 (ibid.: 90). Another 42 per cent of Pakistanis in Ireland are between the ages of 25 and 34. Of the 4,489 Pakistani males in the country (ibid.: 84), roughly 43 per cent are single, while 54 per cent are married (ibid.: 37). The participants in this study fall between the ages of 18 and 35, a range that I discuss in more detail in Chapter 3.

The overwhelming majority of Pakistanis in Ireland associate themselves with Islam (ibid.: 105). However, few studies have shed light upon the heterogeneity of the Muslim population in Ireland. One of the aims of this study is to fill the gap in literature by examining the various experiences among members of different Islamic sects. In his historical overview of Islam in Ireland, Flynn (2006) notes that Pakistani Muslims in Ireland identity with various stands of ‘South Asian
Introducing Pakistanis in Ireland and the US

Islam", including Deobandism and Barelvisim. While Flynn provided details about the Pakistani Muslim population, he used a documentary analysis rather than a variety of data collection tools, which are deployed in this study and discussed in Chapter 3. The Blackpitts prayer room in south Dublin is popular among Deobandis, while Anwar Al Madina mosque is popular among Barelvis. The success of these two Sunni Muslim communities reflects, as Flynn (2006) argues, the emergence of a growing South Asian Muslim population in Dublin, as well as Pakistanis’ desire to form religious circles which reflect their particular Islamic traditions (ibid.: 226). Pakistani Muslims in Dublin also worship at the Islamic Cultural Centre of Ireland in Clonskeagh, which is currently Ireland’s largest mosque, and the Islamic Centre on South Circular Road, which is commonly referred to as ‘Dublin mosque’. The Islamic Foundation of Ireland, the oldest Irish Muslim organisation in the country, is also based at the Islamic Centre.

Dublin is also home to a Pakistani Shia community, which has a large population in Milltown, an affluent Dublin neighbourhood that includes the Ahlul Bayt Islamic Centre. According to Scharbrodt (2011), the Pakistan Shias of Dublin are

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11 According to Robinson (2000: 59), Deobandis lay emphasis on the importance of Islamic law (sharia) and Islamic scholars (ulema), who have offices for issuing religious rulings (fatawas) concerning sharia. Deobandi ulema tend to argue that visiting Sufi shrines or graves of religious saints is *bida* and not in conformity with ‘Islamic principles’ (Behuria, 2008: 61). Barelvisim is a school of Islamic thought and practice that nominally traces its roots to the writings of Ahmed Raza Khan Barelvi. In broader terms, it represents a segment of Islam that embraces popular mystical devotion and is closely associated – though not synonymous – with adherence to Sufi brotherhoods and ritual participation at Sufi shrines. Although no reliable figures are available, and although Pakistanis tend not to self-identify as ‘Barelvi’ (preferring the generic Sunni label *Ahl-e Sunnat Wal Jamaat*), the school is widely believed to represent the majority of the Pakistani population, with particular concentration in Punjab and Sindh provinces (White, 2012: 182).

12 Blackpitts has courted controversy in Irish media on account of some of its more ‘reactionary members’, who have also come under the Irish state’s security surveillance (Flynn, 2006: 226).

13 Throughout this dissertation, I use Deobandism and Salafism interchangeably because they are generally considered to be similar strands of Islamic thought because of their more rigid religious orientations, as well as their opposition to Sufi practices, including reverence for prophet Muhammad and invoking favours from deceased Muslims at shrines.

14 There are two major sects within the global Muslim population: Sunnis and Shias. Sunnis compose of 87-90 per cent, while Shias make up about 10-13 per cent (Pew Research, 2009). The major difference between these groups is related to the succession of Islamic rulers, or *caliphs*, following the death of prophet Muhammad. Sunnis believed that the caliph should be awarded based upon merit, whereas Shias believe that the line of *caliphs* should have gone to Muhammad’s descendants (Jeffrey, 1976).

15 The mission of the Islamic Cultural Centre of Ireland is ‘to preserve and promote an Islamic identity in Dublin’s multicultural environment’ (Islamic Cultural Centre of Ireland, 2014).

16 According to the IFI website, it has been ‘the official representative of Muslims in Ireland’ since its inception in 1959 by Muslim migrant students (Islamic Foundation of Ireland).
largely professionals or higher professionals, exhibit a strong Pakistani cultural lifestyle, and express a 'moderate Islam' (ibid.: 520). Another Shia centre, Azakhanaa-e-Zahrain based in the Stadium Business Park in Blanchardstown, has been described as a meeting place that is welcoming to Pakistani migrants (Scharbrodt and Sakaranaho, 2011: 476). A sect of Shia Islam, the Dawoodi Bohras, has a small community at Anjuman-e-Burhani (Anjuman-e-Burhani, 2014), a mosque located on the outskirts of the city. In addition to this Shia community, Dublin has a small population of Pakistani Ahmadi Muslims, who are part of 'a dynamic, fast growing international revival [Sunni] movement within Islam' (Ahmadiyya Muslim Association Ireland, 2014). Ahmadi Muslims first started arriving in Ireland during the early 1970s, with the Ahmadiyya Muslim Association Ireland being formally registered in 1992 (ibid.). According to its website, the Ahmadiyya Muslim Association of Ireland (2014) 'works hard in promoting [the] true peaceful message of Islam through its interfaith peace works and conferences it organizes every year in Dublin and Galway' (ibid.). In September 2014, the Ahmadiyya Muslim community of Galway opened the first Ahmadi mosque in the country (Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat International, 2014).

The religious heterogeneity of Pakistanis has been overlooked in much of the academic literature regarding the Pakistani diaspora. In Ireland, there is limited information available in relation to the non-Muslim Pakistani population. The 2011 Irish Census (Central Statistics Office, 2012a) showed that in addition to their Islamic backgrounds, Pakistanis in Ireland associate themselves with Catholicism, Anglicanism (Church of Ireland), Presbyterianism, and other Christian religions (ibid.: 105). The 2011 Irish Census also highlighted that Pakistanis in Ireland identified themselves as belonging to 'Other stated religions' as well as 'No religion'. This study seeks to fill the gap in knowledge by shedding light upon the lived experiences of Muslim as well as non-Muslim Pakistani men.

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17 The Ahmadiyya community, a Muslim group of roughly four million adherents in Pakistan, has always considered itself as belonging to the Muslim Ummah, or larger 'community of Muslims' (Khan, 2003: 218). However, their belief in the Promised Messiah, the reformer that the prophet Muhammad foretold, means that Ahmadis have fundamental differences with many Muslims, who see prophet Muhammad as the last Abrahamic prophet (ibid.). This doctrine is deemed 'unIslamic' by non-Ahmadi Muslims, and therefore many Muslims see Ahmadis as outside of the boundary of Islam.
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in Dublin, in order to account for the heterogeneity of the Pakistani population of Ireland.

Young Pakistani men in Dublin have been recorded as facing racism and discrimination, including suffering from physical and verbal abuse (Hosford, 2014; Irish Independent, 2013; O’Brien, 2012; O’Carroll, 2013; O’Connor, 2012; Tuite, 2013). These developments reflect Fanning et al. (2011) who stated that ‘[v]arious surveys have documented disconcerting levels of racism in Irish society’ (ibid.: 9). Building on Fanning et al., Lynch (2010) highlights that the severity of racist incidents in Ireland is getting worse. While Irish media outlets have noted Pakistanis’ experiences of racism and discrimination, there is a gap in the academic literature as it concerns the reasons for and individual consequences of these attacks. This study attempts to bridge the gap in knowledge in Chapter 6 by focusing on the experiences with racism and racial discriminations among young Pakistani men in Dublin and Boston.

Irish media outlets have also reported that young Pakistani men are at the centre of sham marriages in Ireland. The Irish Times (2010) describes young Pakistani men as wanting to entice young European women with large sums of money to marry so that they can gain access to European citizenship (see also Irish Independent, 2010). In response to these allegations, the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service and the Garda created ‘Operation Charity’ to curb sham marriages and undocumented migration from Pakistan to Ireland. The Irish government has also recently deployed biometric technology to monitor Pakistani visa applications (Irish Times, 2011). Such incidents suggest that young Pakistani men in Dublin face racial profiling as well as institutional discrimination because of their ethnicity and perceived migration statuses. Moreover, Pakistanis in Dublin have reportedly faced difficulty in gaining temporary work visas for Irish residency and pathways to naturalisation for Irish citizenship. Mudiwa (2012) reports that up to 93 per cent of Pakistani doctors believe that the Irish

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18 Thomas (2006) describes a ‘sham marriage’ as ‘an illegal practice whereby an alien marries a citizen for the sole purpose of gaining citizenship’ (ibid.: 201).

19 The Garda, or An Garda Síochána in the Irish language, is the national police service of Ireland (An Garda Síochána, 2014).

20 According to Tjaden and Becker (2013), migrants in Ireland are far less likely to be granted citizenship from the Irish government in comparison to other European countries.
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government takes a discriminatory approach in handling their applications for naturalisation, with most experiencing processing delays. According to the Association of Pakistani Physicians and Surgeons of Ireland (ibid.), the Department of Justice and Equality has only belatedly started issuing visas to Pakistani doctors. The Association of Pakistani Physicians and Surgeons of Ireland claims that the Irish government issues visas more rapidly to non-Pakistani doctors, which signals a degree of institutional discrimination towards Pakistani migrants.

In contrast, the Pakistani population of the US is much larger than the population in Ireland. According to the 2010 US Census, there are approximately 370,000 Pakistanis living in the country (Asian American Federation, 2012: 1), a population that is roughly 66 times larger than the Pakistani population in Ireland\(^{21}\). Since the previous 2000 US Census, the Pakistani population has increased from roughly 153,000 individuals to its present population, marking a 137 per cent increase in ten years (ibid.). Between 2000 and 2010, the Pakistani population of the US doubled, making it the second largest percentage increase among ‘Asian Americans'\(^{22}\) (Pew Research Center, 2014a). The Migration Policy Institute (2014: 2) shows that 65 per cent of Pakistanis in the US were born outside of the country and 57 per cent became naturalised citizens. In Boston, approximately 20 per cent of the Pakistani population was born in the US and 20 per cent became naturalised citizens (Watanabe et al., 2004). The other 60 per cent of Pakistanis in Boston are not American citizens (Pew Research Center, 2014a). The majority of Pakistanis in the US reside in major metropolitan cities such as New York, Houston, Chicago, Washington DC, and Dallas.

Pakistanis are the seventh largest ethnic minority group in the US. Among the Muslim American population, they are the single largest contingent within this religious grouping (Pew Research Center, 2014a). Like their counterparts in

\(^{21}\) The US Census Bureau estimation did not include the Pakistani population living in institutions, college dormitories, and other group quarters, meaning that the population is likely significantly higher.

\(^{22}\) The Pew Research Center (2014a) describes ‘Asian Americans’ as ‘a distinctive group’ and one that is ‘by no means a monolith’ (ibid.). This group is composed of migrants or their descendants from dozens of countries in the Far East, Southeast Asian, and the Indian subcontinent, ‘each with a unique history, culture, language and pathway to America’ (ibid.).
Ireland, a large number of Pakistanis in the US are considered 'higher professionals' with above average household incomes (Moore, 2011). According to the Pew Research Center (2014a), the medium household income among Pakistani families in the US is nearly $63,000 versus $51,369 average for all Americans. In terms of their occupations, approximately 45 per cent of Pakistanis in the US are employed in management and professional jobs. Educational attainments levels are, on average, higher in the Pakistani population than the general US population, as Pakistanis are more than twice as likely to hold advanced degrees in relation to non-Pakistanis (Migration Policy Institute, 2014: 1). Pakistanis in the US have also established numerous, well-funded, and professionally managed organisations throughout the country, which range from business networks, advocacy groups, philanthropic entities, and organisations that contribute to economic and human development in Pakistan (Migration Policy Institute, 2014: 1-2). The emergence of these outlets suggests that the Pakistani American community is well-organised as well as socially and politically active.

As in the case of Dublin, the Pakistani population of Boston is far from monolithic (Watanabe et al., 2004). Since the 1970s, Pakistani Muslims have established various places of worship in Boston and its suburbs to account for the religious heterogeneity of the population. Pakistani Muslims worship in various mosques in the Boston area including the Islamic Society of Boston Cultural Center (Roxbury), the Islamic Center of Boston (Wayland), the Islamic Center of New England (Quincy), and the Islamic Society of Boston (Cambridge). The Boston area is home to a Pakistani Sufi Muslim community, the Bawa Muhaiyadden Fellowship, which was founded by a Sufi mystic from Sri Lanka. This small community has met regularly in Cambridge since 1979 (Curtis, 2009: 90). In the early 1970s, the Sufi Order International of Greater Boston Constellation of Light was also created. Some of its devotees today follow the spiritual teachings of Pakistani Sufis23.

23 These Sufi Muslims include Hafeezrat Inayat Khan, Pir Villayat Inayat Khan, and Pir Zia Inayat Khan.
Pakistani Shia Muslims have also established Islamic centres in the Boston suburbs, including the Nizari Ismaili Center\(^{24}\), which was created to serve the burgeoning Shia community in the metropolitan area, and the Islamic Masumeen Center of New England in Hopkinton, in order to provide for the growing Jafari community\(^{25}\). Another sect of Shia Islam, the Dawoodi Bohras, has a presence in Boston, including a mosque, Anjuman-e-Fazi, in North Billerica. This Dawoodi Bohra community consists mostly of Pakistani and Indian professionals and students from the surrounding universities. One of the oldest Pakistani Muslim communities in Boston is that of the Ahmadiyya\(^{26}\), which has a mosque, Baitun Nasir, in the suburb of Sharon. According to the Pluralism Project\(^{27}\), the Ahmadi community in Boston has had difficulty\(^{28}\) making connections with other local Muslim groups due to the contentious places of Ahmadis in the global Muslim community (Pluralism Project, 2014a). Furthermore, it is important to also recognise the non-Muslim Pakistani population in Boston, who are also represented in this study. Boston is home to Pakistanis who associate with the Zoroastrian Association of the Greater Boston Area, the Boston Baha’i Center\(^{29}\), and the South Asian Fellowship, a sect of Christianity (South Asian Christian Fellowship, 2014). There are also Pakistanis in the Boston area who do not identify with any organised religion.

Pakistani communities around the US and Boston have courted controversy in recent years for their alleged links to ‘terrorism’. After 9/11, Congress enacted ‘anti-terrorism’ laws, which had a significant impact on Pakistanis. In 2002, the Department of Homeland Security enforced the National Entry-Exit Registration

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\(^{24}\) Ismaili Muslims are part of the Shia branch of Islam. The majority of those in North America ‘trace their ethnic roots to the Indo-Pakistani sub-continent, where Ismailism has had a long and checkered history, dating back to the ninth century’ (Ross-Sheriff and Nanji, 1991: 101).

\(^{25}\) Jafaris are the largest sect of Shia Islam (Curtis, 2009: 90).

\(^{26}\) The Pluralism Project (2014a) states that the Boston Chapter of the Ahmadiyya Muslim community is a diverse population serving about 180 worshippers, composed of a diverse group of ethnicities, but the majority are of South Asian and African American descent.

\(^{27}\) Based out of Harvard University, the Pluralism Project seeks to ‘help Americans engage with the realities of religious diversity through research, outreach, and the active dissemination of resources’ (Pluralism Project, 2014b.)

\(^{28}\) The unorthodox Islamic views of Muhammad being the last legislative prophet to be sent by God rather than the final prophet has led to Ahmadis being defined as heretics (Balzani, 2010: 294).

\(^{29}\) A monotheistic religion, the Baha’i faith aims to be ‘endowed with a system of law, precept, and institutions capable of bringing into existence a global commonwealth ordered by principles of social justice’ (Baha’i World Centre, 1993: 107).
Introducing Pakistanis in Ireland and the US

System (NSEERS), in conjuncture with the US Patriot Act\(^{30}\). The NSEERS stipulated that every male Pakistani visa holder aged 16 or older had to undergo a ‘special registration’ with the Bureau of Immigration and Customs enforcement (Anand and Schreiber, 2012). Dadi (2006) claims that NSEERS measures led to an exodus of thousands of Pakistanis in the US (ibid.: 60). Because of the NSEERS, there has been a significant reduction in the number of Pakistanis traveling to the US on non-immigrant visas. In 2002, Congress also enacted the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act, which reduced the number of visitor visas to the US from Pakistan (Moore, 2011: 1669). These legislative acts suggest that Pakistanis are suspicious and unwelcomed migrants to the US, an issue that I shed further light upon in Chapters 6 and 7.

Since 9/11, Pakistanis in the US have faced surveillance, deportations, detentions, and arrests as part of the ‘War on Terror’\(^{31}\). Powell (2003) reports that approximately 15,000 Pakistanis in ‘Little Pakistan’, New York City fled to Canada, Europe, or Pakistan because of discrimination. Powell added that Pakistanis in the US complain of a sense of being watched, wiretapped, and monitored by the US government. In terms of deportations, the Office of the Inspector General reviewed the cases of 762 detained residents of the US and found that the largest number of those in custody were Pakistani, which doubled the number of those from other countries (Burki, 2003). In Boston, Logan International Airport has been reported as being a magnet for racial profiling of Pakistanis, who are more likely to be stopped, searched and questioned for ‘suspicious behaviour’ (Schmidt and Lichtblau, 2012).

\(^{30}\) Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the US Congress ‘moved with tremendous alacrity to authorize new powers for the federal government to prevent future terrorism’ (McCarthy, 2002: 435). The most comprehensive new effort is the Uniting and Strengthening American by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act ("USA Patriot Act") of 2001. ‘The legislation grants additional wiretapping and surveillance authority to federal law enforcement, removes barriers between law enforcement and intelligence agencies, adds financial disclosure and reporting requirements to combat terrorist funding, and gives greater authority to the Attorney General to detain and deport aliens suspected of having terrorist ties’ (ibid.: 435).

\(^{31}\) In the aftermath of the attacks of 9/11, the US government advanced a ‘War on Terror’ to justify security policies at home and military intervention abroad. Lewis and Reese (2009) describe the term ‘War on Terror’ as ‘a rhetorical device for marshaling resources and defining the terms of debate’, leading to the term becoming ‘a powerful ideological frame’ (ibid.: 85).
Pakistanis in the US have also reported suffering from marginalisation, verbal abuse, job discrimination, and media denigration (Dadi, 2006), as well as a dramatic increase in hate crime attacks since 9/11 (Maira, 2009: 267). Media representations have depicted Pakistanis in highly politicised and violent ways, which inevitably contributes to the reproduction of violent stereotypes of Pakistanis. In Boston, Pakistani men have recently been in the news for their arrests and deportations following investigations into their so-called links to ‘terrorists’. Abel (2010) reported that Pakistanis in the Boston area fear being ‘singled out’ as the ‘enemy’ of the nation and perceived by other Americans to be ‘terrorists’. The following table provides a summary of the major similarities and differences between the Pakistani populations of Ireland and the US, and more specifically with Pakistani communities in Dublin and Boston:

Table 1.2: Pakistanis in the Irish and American context

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Common theme</th>
<th>Ireland</th>
<th>US</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Size of Pakistani population</td>
<td>Approximately 6,847</td>
<td>Approximately 370,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of Pakistani population in Dublin and Boston</td>
<td>Approximately 5,000</td>
<td>Approximately 5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location of largest Pakistani communities</td>
<td>Dublin, Limerick, Cork, Galway, and Waterford</td>
<td>New York City, Houston, Dallas, and Los Angeles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrival of first wave of Pakistanis</td>
<td>Early 1950s, from the UK and rural Pakistan, mostly uneducated and unskilled</td>
<td>Mid-1960s, from urban centres such as Karachi and Lahore, mostly educated and skilled</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the table notes, the Pakistani population in the US is much larger than the Pakistani population in Ireland. However, in Dublin and Boston, there is roughly the same number of Pakistanis living in these two cities. The majority of Pakistanis living in Ireland and the US live in major urban centres. In terms of their migration histories, there are significant differences between the
communities under research. The first main wave of Pakistanis to migrate to Dublin came from the UK. This population was mostly uneducated, unskilled, and migrated from rural areas in Eastern Punjab. In comparison, the first main wave of Pakistanis to migrate to Boston came from educated and skilled backgrounds in Pakistan's urban centres, such as Karachi and Lahore. The religious communities that make up the Pakistani populations in Dublin and Boston are relatively similar. However, as I discuss in Chapter 5, Pakistanis in Dublin relate to other strands of South Asian Islam than their counterparts in Boston. In the next section, I provide an overview of the various studies that have documented the experiences of Pakistanis in Ireland and the US.

Research on Pakistanis in Ireland and the US

The existing literature on minority communities in Ireland has increased in recent years. The majority of these studies have examined Nigerian (Kómoláfé, 2002; McFayden (ed.), 2008; McIvor, 2008; White, 2009), Polish (Johns, 2013; Krings et al., 2013; Smith, 2013; Turner et al., 2009), and Chinese (O'Leary and Li, 2008; Wang and O'Riain, 2006; Yau, 2007) communities in Ireland. This study is one of the first to focus specifically on the experiences of family, religion, and identity among Pakistani Muslims and non-Muslims in Ireland. Khan's (2005) case study on working-class Pakistani migrants in Dublin found that Pakistanis face significant challenges with racism and discrimination in the workplace and in Irish society in general (ibid.: 819). She claims that white Irish employers and supervisors are invariably 'racist' in their language towards Pakistanis and do not like to interact with them inside or outside of the workplace. However, the study did not examine the experiences of Pakistanis in relation to the ethnic nation and how this concept affects the lives of non-white and non-Catholic individuals and groups in Ireland. While Khan's study focuses on the experiences of first-generation and unskilled migrants, this study broadens the perspective by including the experiences of first-generation skilled migrants, most of whom work as higher professionals, as well as second-generation Pakistanis who were born and raised in Dublin. One of the other studies to focus on Pakistanis in Dublin was carried out by Scharbrodt (2011), who focused on the experiences of the Shia community and some of its Pakistani members. He argued that the self-
representation of Pakistani Shias as ‘moderate Muslims’ in the Irish context makes them ‘a minority within a minority’ or ‘the other within the other’ of the larger Muslim population (ibid.: 528-529). While Scharbrodt’s research provides insight into a particular Pakistani Muslim population, it did not provide information on the Othering of non-Muslims, a topic that I return to in Chapters 6 and 7.

Because of the lack of resources available on Pakistanis in Ireland, I broadened my literature review to encompass studies that focused on minority groups and the larger Muslim community. Mac an Ghaill (2002) observes that despite opening itself up to migrants from around the world during the Celtic Tiger, Ireland remains a ‘closed society’ and one in which the racialisation of minority groups is commonplace (ibid.: 100). Countering Mac an Ghaill, the National Consultative Committee on Racism and Interculturalism (2007) argues that the history of Muslims in Ireland has been a largely positive experience, which suggests that Muslims have successfully integrated into Irish society without losing their distinct ethnic or religious identities. While the National Consultative Committee on Racism and Interculturalism offers insight into the overall experiences of Muslims in Ireland, it did not examine the intraethnic or intrareligious dynamics of Pakistanis in Dublin and how young Pakistani men relate to individuals and groups outside of the immediate ‘Pakistani community’.

In comparison to Ireland, there have been considerably more studies based on the experiences of family, religion, and identity among Pakistanis in the US. One of the first studies to focus on this population was carried out by Malik (1993), who concentrated on the history and socio-cultural context of the Pakistani community in Rochester, New York. He found that Pakistani Muslims in Rochester have maintained Muslim identities through the construction of mosques, and thus they have contributed to the ‘melting pot’ of American society. Malik’s study, however, used interviews and questionnaires as its data collection tools and did not focus specifically on the main research themes of family, religion, and

32 Hirschman (1983) states that ‘the “melting pot” became the symbol of the liberal and radical visions of American society. In a sense, it was a political symbol used to strengthen and legitimize the ideology of America as a land of opportunity where race, religion, and national origin should not be barriers to social mobility’ (ibid.: 398).
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identity, all of which are covered in Chapters 4, 5, and 7. His research also did not give considerable attention to experiences of Othering, an area that I focus on in Chapters 6 and 7.

Another study conducted by Najam (2006) explored the history and demography of Pakistanis across the US and how they manage multiple allegiances to Pakistan and the US through remittances and transnational political and cultural activities. Najam’s methodology was based primarily on a nationwide survey rather than more qualitative data collection methods, which may extract rich information about the family, religion, and identity backgrounds of young Pakistani Muslim and non-Muslim men. It is also worth noting that Najam focused on transnationalism between Pakistan and the US, whereas this study is also concerned with the lived experiences of young Pakistani men within the Irish and American social, cultural, and political contexts.

Recent studies on Pakistanis in the US have focused on post-9/11 experiences and how young Pakistani Muslims position themselves in relation to religion and nationality. Ghaffar-Kucher’s (2009) study on working class Pakistani Muslim migrant youth in New York City claimed that these migrants have engaged in ‘religification’ because of the ascription and co-option of their Muslim identities, ‘which trumps all other forms of categorization, such as race and ethnicity’ (ibid: 164). While Ghaffar-Kucher offered insight into the impact that 9/11 had on the experiences of Pakistani Muslims in New York City, she based her sample on the lives of working-class migrants and youth, whereas I focus mainly on middle-class first- and second-generation Pakistani Muslim and non-Muslims, as well as young Pakistani men. Similarly to Ghaffar-Kucher, Ewing and Hoyler (2008) focused on South Asian Muslim youth, arguing that these individuals have become more self-consciously religious after the events of 9/11. However, they also argue that these youth, some of which were of Pakistani descent, do not abandon their American identities or sense of belonging to the US. As a result, Ewing and Hoyler draw on Ong (1999) and argue that South Asian Muslim youth develop a strategy of ‘flexible citizenship’ that balances religious and national obligations. Stover (2011) reached similar conclusions as Ewing and Hoyler in her study on middle to upper-middle class professional Pakistani men and women in
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Silicon Valley, California. She argues that these Pakistanis ‘market’ themselves as business developers and secular pluralists, all while retaining their Muslim identities. Stover also notes that young Pakistanis in Silicon Valley identify themselves as being targeted by Americans for being potential ‘terrorists’.

Maira’s (2004) study on South Asian Muslim youth is one of the few academic studies to focus on the experiences of Pakistani Muslims in Boston. Based on qualitative research, she concludes that Pakistani Muslim youth have a heightened sense of fear and vulnerability because of racial profiling, anti-Muslim backlash due to the events of 9/11, and concerns about not belonging to American culture or society in general (ibid.: 220). While Maira’s study offers insight into the continuing impact which 9/11 has on the experiences of Pakistanis in the US, it does not delve deeply into the roles which the migrant culture, particularly the values of izzat and sharm, play in the experiences of young Pakistanis in Boston, issues which are discussed in Chapters 2, 4, and 7.

This study is also informed by the lived experiences of Pakistanis living in the UK. Studies carried out on British Pakistanis have focused on how they position themselves in relation to their ethnic, religious, and national identities. Werbner (2013) found that British Pakistanis in Manchester negotiate their identities ‘in spaces they themselves have constructed materially, symbolically and imaginatively’ (ibid.: 409). She also claims that depending upon the situation, British Pakistanis fuse these identities to create hybrid identities, a concept which I discuss in Chapter 2 and elaborate upon throughout Chapters 4 through 7. Like Manchester, the city of Bradford also has a large Pakistani population. Alam and Husband (2006), who focused on young second-generation British Pakistani men in Bradford, revealed that these men renegotiate their position towards the family because Pakistan is no longer ‘the axis of their identity’ (ibid.: 4). While Alam and Husband’s participants do not deny transnational links to Pakistan, they do renegotiate their connection in relation to other elements of their hybrid identities (ibid.). Din (2006) also researched young British Pakistanis in Bradford and concluded that British culture is not alien to young second-generation Pakistani men, but one that is their own, meaning that they have created new ways of expressing British identity (ibid.: 117). In terms of his first-generation
participants, Din notes that Pakistani men have a ‘continued connection with [Pakistan] which is strong in sending remittances, contacts with relatives and the building of family houses’ (ibid.: 34). Issues pertaining to the transmission of Pakistani culture and the role of family structure and family values are discussed in detail in Chapters 4 and 7.

The literature on Pakistanis living in the UK has typically focused on religious belief and practice and how young Pakistanis negotiate their Muslim identities. IN Bradford, Din (2006) found that Islam is the main perceived mark of identity among young Pakistanis and that they use Islam as a way of negotiating their cultural orientations (ibid.: 131). According to Jacobsen (1998), young second-generation British Pakistani Muslims in London use Islam as a source of moral guidance and discipline, which provides them with direction on how to behave and interact inside and outside of Pakistani communities. In addition to these Muslim identities, Werbner (2005) claims that British Pakistani Muslims should not be treated as having a singular, Islamic identity because this monolithic lens overlooks the valorization and dimensions of a complex cluster of their individual identities. Her emphasis on heterogeneity is one of the key points made throughout this dissertation.

Research Question

This dissertation seeks to answer the following question:

How do family, religion, and identity shape the lived experiences of young first- and second-generation Pakistani Muslim and non-Muslim men in Dublin and Boston?

The question was designed as such for several reasons. The themes of family, religion, and identity have received a significant amount of attention in the literature on Pakistani Muslims in diaspora. However, little is known about how these themes play out in the lives of young Pakistani Muslim and non-Muslim men in Dublin and Boston. This study helps to build on previous studies that explored these themes. The research question incorporates first- and second-
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generation Pakistani men in order to shed light on two populations from different countries. In incorporating these generations, I am able to discuss the lived experiences of Pakistani migrants in Ireland and the US, as well as second-generation participants who were born and raised in Irish and American societies. The question also includes Pakistani non-Muslims in order to shed light on the religious diversity of Pakistanis in diaspora. The comparative element to the research question was included as a means to place the Pakistani diaspora in a cross-national context, an approach that has hitherto received little attention in the academic literature on Pakistanis.

Structure of the Dissertation

Following this introduction, Chapter 2 provides a conceptual and theoretical framework for exploring the lived experiences of young first- and second-generation Pakistani men. The framework draws largely upon diaspora theory and its related concepts of homeland and boundaries. I also give space in this chapter to cultural orientation, Otherness and racism, as well as belonging and identity. Chapter 3 puts forth the research design and methodology for studying the lived experiences of the participants. Chapter 4 focuses on familial experiences, looking primarily at the importance of izzat, sharm, and the transmission of cultural capital. This chapter also focuses on intergenerational conflicts and gender roles within the family as a means to shed light upon the maintenance of Pakistani culture in diaspora. Moreover, it also provides insight into the issue of sexuality within Pakistani families. Chapter 5 examines the religiosities that the Muslim and non-Muslim participants develop in Ireland and the US. Specific attention is given to the affect of religious communities on religiosity as well as the secularism and non-secularism dynamics in Ireland and the US. In building upon familial and religious experiences, Chapter 6 turns to my interviewees’ social interactions inside and outside of the ‘Pakistani community’ and their experiences of Otherness in Dublin and Boston. Chapter 7 focuses on the participants’ senses of belonging and identity construction in relation to the ethnic nation and civic nation, as found in Ireland and the US, as well as the respondents’ positioning towards the idea of a global Muslim community. In Chapter 8, I offer a critical
analysis of the research design and methodology, the conceptual and theoretical framework, and the main findings of this study.
CHAPTER 2:
CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a conceptual and theoretical framework to examine the lived experiences of first- and second-generation Pakistani men in Dublin and Boston. Bochner (1990) refers to lived experience as a process by which individuals negotiate their ‘inner lives’ through social forces and personal improvisations, changes, contradictions, ambiguities, and vulnerabilities (ibid.: 5-6). Ellis and Flaherty (1992) echo Bochner and describe lived experience as ‘[the] move between fluctuating levels of absorption and detachment, managing multiple selves and roles’ (ibid.: 6). To further elucidate upon lived experience, I turn to the concept of positioning, which refers to an individual’s relationship with and orientation to societal forces and social groups of people. Harré and van Langenhove (1999) state that positioning is about people defending, abandoning or entrenching opinions and opportunities that are given to them. In addition to this conceptualisation, McCall and Simmons (1978: 65) note that individuals constantly position themselves towards different characters and roles over the span of their lives. The aim in turning to the concepts of lived experience and positioning is to shed light upon the respondents’ life histories and how they represent themselves in relation to others33.

This conceptual and theoretical framework incorporates multiple perspectives, levels, and assumptions to account for the lived experiences that develop in diaspora. The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section turns to diaspora theory and elaborates upon key diasporic concepts such as homeland, myth of return, and homing-desire. In the second section, I turn to the notion of boundary maintenance in diaspora to explore how the respondents position themselves towards their ethnicity, religion, and nationality. The third section of this chapter turns to the concept of identity, focusing primarily on the

33 Lived experience has been problematized because researchers can never know completely another’s ‘true’ experience (Bruner, 1986: 5). Bruner’s point is poignant in light of my sample because I am not Pakistani, and nor do I share the same ethnic or religious background as most of my participants.
development of ethnic, religious, and national identities in diaspora. In the final section, I summarise the conceptual and theoretical framework and transition to Chapter 3, which outlines my research design and methodology.

**Diaspora and Homeland**

The term *diaspora* comes from the Greek word *diasporá*, which means 'to scatter' and 'to sow' (Nasta, 2002: 7). According to Brah (1996), diaspora can be seen as 'an interpretative frame referencing the economic, political, and cultural dimensions of ... contemporary forms of migrancy [migrant, immigrant, expatriate, refugee, guest worker, exile]'. In addition to this conceptualisation, Brah sees diaspora as a transnational movement of people which 'settle down' and 'put roots elsewhere' (ibid.: 182-183). Despite its early association with Jewish communities, diaspora 'has acquired a widespread use, referring to many forms of dislocation/relocation, including the [voluntary or forced] dispersion of religious and/or ethnic groups from their native countries' (Shah and Iqbal, 2011: 765).

One of the major ideas behind diaspora theory is that diasporic populations are dislocated relative to a place of origin, or a *homeland*, which Brah (1996) describes as a

mythic place of desire in the diasporic imagination. In this sense [the homeland] is a place of no return, even if it is possible to visit the geographical territory that is seen as the place of 'origin'. On the other hand, home is also the lived experience of a locality. Its sounds and smells, its heat and dust, balmy summer evenings ... all this, as mediate by the historically specific everyday of social relations (ibid.: 192).

It is assumed that the homeland will continue to exert its influence on the social relations and cultural orientations of the participants, as argued by Falzon (2003: 664). Cohen (2008) echoes these arguments in claiming that individuals in diaspora retain a collective memory of their 'original homeland', idealise their

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34 Throughout this study, I use the term homeland to refer to Pakistan.
ancestral home, commit themselves to the restoration of the ‘original homeland’, and continue to relate to the homeland (ibid.: 2). In positioning themselves towards and against the homeland, individuals in diaspora experience ongoing or reawakened attachments and loyalty to the migrant culture\(^{35}\), to which they feel they have a connection. As such, some of the participants see the homeland and migrant culture as potential tools that ‘can be activated or deactivated at different stages of the life cycle, as is most expedient’ (Levitt, 2001: 21). Individuals in this study also feel that they have a ‘natural right’ (Shuval, 2000: 48) to return to the homeland because this is the place where their ancestors were born.

While the physical homeland has been treated as one of the main aspects of diaspora theory, Sayyid (2000) further reconceptualises diaspora as a demographic and transnational political and/or religious imaginary, which does not need an actual homeland or migrant culture in order to be considered ‘diasporic’ (ibid.: 41). One diasporic entity that is analysed in this study is the Ummah\(^{36}\), or global Muslim community, which I discuss in light of my participants’ identities in Chapter 7. Employing the Ummah as a type of diaspora shifts us away from the notion of the homeland as the place by which diasporic identities are based, and encourages us to reimagine the notion of belonging in diaspora as ‘a web with no centre’ (Akenson, 1993). The Ummah therefore serves as a counter-hegemonic identity, which opposes the idea of the bounded nation-state and its national identity constructions (Butko, 2004: 41). This study treats the Ummah as a type of diasporic entity because it is implicitly designed as a socio-religious formation capable of overcoming the constructions of national boundaries – ‘the means through which people can imagine and align themselves beyond the nation’ (Ang, 2003: 3). Pakistanis Muslims in diaspora who describe themselves as belonging to the Ummah no longer regard the nation-state as holding power over their identities. Instead of being bound to a homeland such as Pakistan, Ireland, or the US, some Pakistani Muslims in diaspora identify more closely with the Ummah as a deterrioralised transnational community in which

\(^{35}\) Throughout this study, the concept of migrant culture refers to the ‘original culture of a group, consisting of an entire way of life, including language, ideas, beliefs, values, behavioural patterns, and all that migrants bring with them when they arrive in their new country’ (Zhou and Bankston III, 1994: 822; see also Hussain, 2005: 20).

\(^{36}\) Ummah is the term used to refer to the global Muslim community. The term denotes a religious rather than an ethnic connection to a transnational virtual-moral community (Hashem, 2010: 50).
individuals have a sense of ‘ontological un-belongingness’ to ideas and practices rather than to actual places or homelands (Rushdie, 1991: 124).

Diasporic studies have also focused on the myth of return in relation to the homeland. The myth of return suggests that Pakistanis in diaspora treat the homeland as a place of non-return because they have settled and ‘put down roots’ in their new countries; they are not simply residing abroad to save, invest, and eventually return to Pakistan (Anwar, 1979: ix). For some Pakistanis in Ireland and the US, the myth of return survives even when ‘[they] know only too well that return is not likely due to the political and/or economic realities of the homeland or the host country’ (Falzon, 2003: 664). Nonetheless, first-generation participants in this study, as discussed in Chapter 7, still hope to return to the homeland ‘at the end of the day’ (Shuval, 2000: 48). Töloyan (1996) and Brah (1996) represent this sentiment of return with the concept of homing desire, which effectively ‘accentuates the possibilities and desirability of return’ (Gilroy, 1997: 330). For several of the second-generation respondents, the myth of return is replaced with a sense of ‘non-return’ because the individuals do not perceive the homeland and their parents’ culture as their own (Zhou, 1997).

Building on the homing desire, this conceptual and theoretical framework turns to the concept of home-binding. For diasporic populations, the creation of home-binding ‘signifies the development of cultural belonging by exchanging symbolic or material meanings’ (ibid.: 37). The recreation of the homeland culture depends on the ‘reclaiming and reprocessing of habits, objects, names and histories that have been uprooted’ (Ahmed et al., 2004: 9). This process of home-binding leads to double or multiple displacements and in typical cases to a ‘travelling culture’ (Cohen, 2008: 123). To capture the experiences of Pakistanis living away from the homeland, Ballard (1994) introduces the Urdu term desh pardesh, which can be literally translated to mean living ‘at home abroad’ or ‘being towards someplace else’ (Akenson, 1993; Sheffer, 2003). Desh pardesh (with the overlapping meaning ‘home from home’) relates to how Pakistanis in diaspora are coming to

37 Shah (1998) also suggests that desh pardesh is a conceptual tool which may be used to examine how older generation of Pakistanis, but also their offspring, find inspiration in the resources of the migrant culture, particularly their linguistic and religious inheritance (ibid.: 376).
terms with their cultural heritage in new territorially defined spaces (Shah, 1998: 376). Living ‘at home abroad’ reflects the idea that ‘diaspora always leaves a trail of collective memory about another place and time and creates new maps of desires and of attachment’ (Appadurai and Breckenridge, 1989: i).

Diasporic conditions provide the opportunity for individuals to position themselves towards multiple locations and entities, including the homeland, migrant culture, new host society culture, and the ‘new homeland’. As a result, participants of this study develop a *diasporic consciousness*, which Vertovec (1999) describes as a variety of experiences, states of mind, and senses of identity (ibid.: 8). The diasporic consciousness, as described by Winant (2004), is an identity that is both sundered and fused and divided by forces originating both within and outside the self (ibid.: 28). Similarly to Vertovec and Winant, Gilroy (1987; 1994) points out that a diasporic consciousness is a type of duality based upon a decentered attachment, of being simultaneously ‘home away from home’ or ‘here and there’. This ‘decentered attachment’ allows for the emergence of different individual meanings of belonging (Dayal, 1996: 46-47), a concept discussed later in this chapter, and again in Chapter 7.

**Diaspora and Boundary Maintenance**

Following Armstrong (1976: 394-7), Brubaker (2005) argues that boundary maintenance is one of the ‘three core elements that remain widely understood to be constitutive of diaspora’ (ibid.: 5). Boundary maintenance is understood to be ‘a process whereby group solidarity is mobilised and retained, even accepting that there are counter processes of boundary erosion’ (ibid. 5-7). Whether ‘real’ or ‘imagined’, boundaries involve ‘the preservation of a distinctive identity vis-à-vis a host society (or societies)’ (ibid.: 6). Individuals and groups erect boundaries as a means to classify people upon whether or not they exhibit certain traits of the ‘in-group’. According to Barth (1969), boundaries between groups of people

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38 This duality incorporates two distinctively different cultures; that of the host society and that practiced at home (Hussain, 2005).

39 According to Brubaker (2005), the other core elements of diaspora are *dispersion* (either traumatically or voluntarily and generally across state borders) and *homeland orientation* (whether to a real or imagined homeland).
Conceptual and Theoretical Framework

persist despite a flow of personnel across them. In other words, categorical ...
... distinctions [between groups] do not depend on an absence of mobility,
contact and information, but do entail social processes of exclusion and
incorporation whereby discrete categories are maintained despite changing
participation and membership in the course of individual life histories
(ibid.: 9).

In other words, as asserted by Abdelal et al. (2005), boundaries create constitutive
norms that provide ‘formal and informal rules that define group membership’
(ibid.: 3). To be clear, this study recognises that boundaries ‘do not begin or stop
at demarcation lines in space’ and ‘do not represent a fixed point in space or time’
(van Houtum and van Naerssen, 2002: 126). Rather, boundaries are regarded as
symbolising a social practice of spatial differentiation between groups of people.

Pakistanis in diaspora can be seen as using boundaries in order to create a
distinctive ‘community’ that is held together by active solidarity and social
relationships, which cut across nation-state boundaries and link members of a
diaspora into a single ‘transnational community’ (Brubaker, 2005: 7). Some first-
generation participants in this study maintain the migrant culture and deliberately
resist assimilation into the new host society (Armstrong, 1976: 394-5). These
Pakistanis may be seen as living ‘at home abroad’, even as they ‘become fully part
of the host society’ (Amersfoort, 2004: 364). Comparatively, second-generation
participants in this study are, according to Alba (2005), especially prone to
adjusting the boundaries around ethnic, religious, and national identities because
of their intimacy with Irish and American culture40, as well as with the Pakistani
culture of their parents. These second-generation interviewees can be observed as
engaging in boundary erosion through assimilation (Alba and Nee, 1997) because
they are ‘endlessly hybridized and in process’ (Clifford, 1994: 320).

To further delineate upon boundaries and boundary maintenance, Anzaldúa
(1987) deploys the metaphorical concept of cultural borderland to discuss how

40 According to Dion and Dion (1996), American culture emphasises individuality, self-assertion,
autonomy, and equality with parents.
groups of people distinguish between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Anzaldúa describes the cultural borderland as ‘a vague and undetermined place created by the emotional residue of an unnatural boundary’ (ibid.: 3). Following this conceptualisation, Clifford (1997) suggests that the cultural borderland is created by ‘an oppressive national hegemony’ that imparts ‘a sense of being a “people” with historical roots and destinies outside the time/space of the host nation’ (ibid.: 255). Being positioned in the cultural borderland means that the participants of this study are in-between dominant narratives of the migrant culture and the new host society culture. Because the idea of borders and boundaries exclude people from group membership, Anzaldúa (1987) argues that some individuals experience a ‘cultural collision’ or a ‘synergy of two cultures’ if they are not wholly of the majority or of the minority group (ibid.: 79). Turning to Mexican-American women (mestiza) to show how individuals move across ‘cultural boundaries’, Anzaldúa claims that these women live in a state of ‘perpetual transition’ in which different cultural beliefs and values typically conflict, leading to ‘a mental and emotional state of perplexity’ (ibid.: 377). In this way, young Pakistani men in diaspora are seen as having the opportunity to develop a new consciousness in negotiating the migrant culture with the new host society culture.

Boundaries are also perceived by young Pakistani men in diaspora as opportunities to use border thinking, which Mignolo (2011) describes as a type of ‘disassociation’ in which individuals deliberately separate themselves from hegemonic identity narratives because they cultivate exclusive group membership. For Mignolo, border thinking is a product of ‘de-coloniality’ in the sense that individuals ‘de-link’ themselves from territorial and imperial epistemology. More specifically, he treats border thinking and de-linking as ‘the necessary condition for the existence of dewesternizing and decolonial projects’ (ibid.: 277). For my participants, border thinking occurs when they ‘think in exteriority’ of not just the borders of nation-states, ‘but borders of the modern/colonial world, epistemic and

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41 Miles (1993) explains his view of ‘us’ and ‘them’ as ‘simultaneously inclusive and exclusive’ (ibid.: 58). Commenting on Miles’s conceptualisation, Osanami (2006) describes ‘us’ and ‘them’ as ‘a process of differentiating people by certain features, some who possess that certain features are included as us while the ones who do not possess the features are excluded as others’ (ibid.: 7).

42 Bernal (2001) draws on Anzaldúa (1987) to define the mestiza consciousness as ‘the way a student balances, negotiates, and draws from her biculturalism, bilingualism, commitment to communities, and spiritualities in relationship to her education’ (Bernal, 2001: 623).
ontological borders’. In order to de-link from ‘borders’, individuals ‘need to be epistemically disobedient’ (ibid.). Young Pakistani men in diaspora can also be identified as using border thinking in orienting themselves away from Pakistan, Ireland, and the US, and moving their identities closer towards the ‘dewestern’ and ‘decolonial’ concept of the *Ummah*, which neglects the borders of nation-states designed by Western colonial and imperial powers.

Anzaldúa and Mignolo’s ideas of cultural borderland and border thinking relate to the idea that diasporic conditions lead to new ways of self-identification. Young Pakistani men in this study identify themselves as being *in-between* the migrant culture and that of the new host society. Bhabha (1990) heralds this in-between position as the ‘international dimension both within the margins of the nation-state and in the boundaries in-between nations and peoples’ (ibid.: 4). Building upon Bhabha’s analysis of diaspora, Soysal (2000) claimed that diasporic individuals are ‘suspended’ between the homeland and host country, native and foreign lands, and home-bound desires and losses (ibid.: 2-3). In being positioned in-between, young Pakistani men in diaspora are confronted with the opportunity to create new cultural narratives that both evoke and erase the totalising boundaries of the nation-state (Mitchell, 1997: 538). Second-generation Pakistanis in diaspora are particularly prone to being in-between cultures, as noted by Levitt (2009), who states that second-generation individuals in diaspora are situated between a variety of different and often competing generational, ideological, and moral reference points, especially those of their parents and their own positions towards the homeland (ibid.: 1238). In navigating inside and outside of the migrant and host societies, the young Pakistani men in this study mirror the positions taken up by young Pakistani men in the UK in the sense that they are ‘code switchers’ and ‘skilled cultural navigators’. These positions suggest that the participants have a sophisticated capacity to maneuver their way inside and outside of the ethnic colony and host nation (Ballard, 1994: 31).

**Pakistani Ethnic Group Boundaries**

In order to examine how young Pakistani Muslim and non-Muslim men in diaspora position themselves towards Pakistani ethnicity and culture, it is
important to highlight some of the more common features that make up Pakistani culture. The family has been described as the fundamental unit of Pakistani culture. Nath (2005) states that Pakistani families maintain strong kinship ties, emphasise collective rather than individual identities, and stress patriarchy and gender segregation inside and outside of the home. Pakistani men are expected to work outside of the home to earn an income, while Pakistani women are expected to adopt traditional roles as caretakers of children and the home. Pakistani men and women are also expected to uphold family values and honor, or *izzat* in Urdu (Moghadam, 1992; Critelli, 2010). *Izzat* is a complex concept with 'multiple connotations and overlapping meanings, including respect, esteem, dignity, and reputation' (Haeri, 2002: 35). *Izzat* is bound up with issues of family reputation and an individual’s public standing in Pakistani communities and the wider society; it may be maintained through the arranged marriage process in which a family’s reputation depends on the socioeconomic status of the family into which the child marries (Ballard, 1982: 5).

In order to uphold family values and honor, it is imperative for Pakistanis to avoid shame, or *sharm* in Urdu. *Sharm* is tied up with male pride and female behaviour. According to Rushdie (2005), honor-and-shame cultures like those of Pakistan perceive male honor as residing in the sexual probity of women; and the ‘shaming’ of women dishonors all men. In Pakistani societies, honor is male centered and is acted out in public (Haeri, 2002: 35). Pakistani men ‘are expected to be brave, generous, authoritarian, independent, fecund, and protective of their women’ (ibid.: 35-36). In contrast, a Pakistani woman’s honour ‘is perceived culturally to be an inherent condition of her being, namely her purity and chastity’ (ibid.: 36). In the eyes of some Pakistani men, Pakistani women must be seen to behave with modesty, which entails secluding themselves from individual desires and focusing on collective family interests.

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43 Within the household, however, Pakistani women wield much power and influence in the decision-making (University of West Florida, 2010).
44 Appiah (2010) states that the idea of honor among moral philosophers means earning the respect of people whose judgment you care about.
45 Urdu is the national language of Pakistan.
Conceptual and Theoretical Framework

Pakistani culture is also influenced by *biraderis*, or joint or extended family structures. *Biraderi* may be literally translated as ‘wider family’. According to Maan (1992), *biraderis* are ‘brotherhoods’ that create ‘internalized senses of solidarity’ which extend to family members, but are denied to those outside its limits; ‘it is imbued with a sense of [honour]’ (ibid.: 44). *Biraderis* have been described as localised kindred clans or tribes, which help to mediate issues between families, localities, and castes (Werbner, 1999: 27). Werbner (1999) adds that *biraderis* are ‘marriage circles’ that act as the primary vehicle of strategic marriage alliances and class mobility. Pakistanis often marry within their own *biraderi* to those of equal wealth, power, and education (ibid.). Communities in Pakistan typically have many *biraderis* and *sub-biraderis* (Din, 2006). A single *biraderi* may include as many as five hundred families, while others are much smaller. They are particularly prominent in rural areas of Pakistan (Akhtar, 2013). In Chapter 4, I discuss how my participants relate, if at all, to the notion of *biraderi*, and more specifically on how family structures within Pakistan are transmitted to Ireland and the US.

Family relations in the Pakistani diaspora have been marked by intergenerational conflicts, which suggest that the migrant culture is not always maintained when families move abroad. These intergenerational conflicts are typically caused because younger individuals breach traditional family roles, standards of behaviour, friendship choices, and parental expectations (Costigan and Dokis, 2006: 1253). First-generation individuals in diaspora are generally represented ‘as losing their children to a different cultural world’ (Fortier, 2000: 70). In her research in London, Jacobsen (1998: 59) found that first-generation Pakistani parents construct impermeable social boundaries as a means of preserving the migrant culture originating in their homeland. She adds that Pakistani parents expect their children to conform to the norms of the migrant culture, which include family cooperation, family loyalty, and respect for elders (ibid.: 59). First-generation Pakistani parents in the UK, as discussed by Parker-Jenkins (1995), also perceive their children as increasingly materialistic and sexually permissive because of their interactions with Western dance and music, both of which may be perceived by older Pakistanis as outside of the migrant social boundary.
Parents in the Pakistani diaspora also ‘fight to ward off the corrupting influences of the new society’, even as they ‘actively support the acquisition of certain cultural competencies’ (Suárez-Orozco and Suárez-Orozco, 2001: 89). Disputes over love affairs and marriage arrangements between parents and their children have been noted as common challenges to social boundary maintenance in the Pakistani diaspora (Shaw, 2000: 191). Malik (1989) argues that marriage is a vital practice among Pakistanis and that this institution is more than a union between two people, but a structural and financial alliance between two families. Marital happiness is thus not always considered as important as financial stability among Pakistani families. Moreover, Pakistani parents in diaspora encourage their children to pick up certain cultural and linguistic competencies of the new host society, but they also encourage their children to fiercely resist others that they see as a threat to honor or family unity (Suárez-Orozco and Suárez-Orozco, 2001). Some young Pakistani men in this study do not conform to the wishes of their parents and move away from a migrant social boundary by avoiding issues such as arranged marriages, a custom which remains the standard marriage pattern in Pakistan (Nath, 2005: 414).

Generational conflict arises in the Pakistani diaspora because second-generation individuals are exposed to a contrary set of cultural values and expectations that contradict the values of their parents. By balancing the migrant culture and the new host society culture, young Pakistani men in Dublin and Boston absorb different values of family life and social norms than that which is accepted by their parents. Maintaining social boundaries of the migrant culture while at the same time participating successfully in such areas as the labour market and the educational system of the host society is the typical challenge for an emerging diaspora (Amersfoort, 2004: 363). Young second-generation Pakistani men in Oxford were described by Shaw (2000: 7) as negotiating multiple cultural boundaries including those of their parents and grandparents, those of their ‘white’ peers at schools, universities and workplaces, and that of their South Asian peers.

This conceptual and theoretical framework has also considered Vertovec’s (1999) three ways of thinking about diaspora. Vertovec’s first type, diaspora as social
form, refers to forced displacement, alienation, and loss. The second, diaspora as a type of social consciousness, is marked by a dual or paradoxical experience. The focus of this framework is on the third aspect, diaspora as cultural production. Vertovec (1999) describes cultural production as ‘variegated processes of creolisation, back-and-forth transferences, mutual influences, new contestations, negotiations and constant transformations’ (ibid.: 19). Pakistanis in diaspora do not all produce Pakistani culture in the same way because cultures are never fixed or static, but rather they are constantly modified and redefined according to a ‘modern significance’ (Eisenstadt, 1973: 23). For Pakistanis in diaspora, cultural production entails processes of ‘dislocation, transplantation and relocation’ which may be ‘both painful and joyous’ as individuals ‘invent and recreate a local culture and viable community’ (Werbner, 2005: 763). As Pakistani culture is created and recreated abroad, certain aspects of the migrant culture are accumulated and passed on through families over time.

Considering the importance Pakistanis place on the family structure and family values, it becomes necessary to address how the family environment shapes cultural production, such as practices involving childbearing and child development, as well as individuals’ roles within the larger family (Bornstein and Cote, 2006). Bourdieu (1977) offers the term cultural capital in reference to the hereditary assets of families that are transmitted on to future generations. McLaren (1997) defines cultural capital as:

the general cultural background, knowledge, disposition, and skills that are passed on from one generation to another. Cultural capital represents ways of talking, acting, and socializing, as well as language practices, values, and types of dress and behavior (ibid.: 219).

Bourdieu (1986) argues that there are three types of cultural capital: ‘the embodied state, i.e., in the form of long-lasting dispositions of the mind and body; in the objectified state, in the form of cultural goods (pictures, books, dictionaries, instruments, machines, etc.), which are the trace or realisation of theories or critiques of these theories, problematics, etc.; and in the institutionalised state, a form of objectification which must be set apart because ... it confers entirely original properties on the cultural capital which it is presumed to guarantee’ (ibid.: 1986).
Cultural capital is important in light of the experiences of the participants because without linguistic or cultural competence with the new host society culture, Pakistani families are less likely to be socially mobile in comparison to those groups who have familiarity with the dominant social and cultural norms of the new host society (Bourdieu, 1977: 494). Shah et al. (2010) extend Bourdieu’s analysis by suggesting that that the transmission of cultural capital among young Pakistani men in Dublin and Boston reproduces socio-economic advantages and disadvantages and generates social conflict, defensive identity positions, and cultural creativity (ibid.: 1119).

Cultural capital among Pakistanis in diaspora differs across regional, class, gender, and generational circumstances. These differences force us to shift our perception of the Pakistani diaspora as an ‘ethno-cultural fact’ to a diaspora in which individuals and groups demonstrate multiple cultural stances, projects, claims, idioms, and practices (Brubaker, 2005: 13). The notion of segmented diaspora, as developed by Werbner (2013), provides a useful approach for thinking about the heterogeneity of the Pakistani diaspora. She breaks down the notion of a segmented Pakistani diaspora to include:

- the South Asian, with its aesthetic of fun and laughter, of vivid colours and fragrances, of music and dance; the Islamic with its utopian vision of a perfect moral order, and the Pakistani, with its roots in the soil, in family, community and national loyalties, expressed also in competitive sports like cricket. The identities evoked in the narratives – of nation, local community, religion and diaspora – are at times fused, at times kept strictly apart (ibid.: 410).

The academic literature has touched upon several different ‘segments’ within the Pakistani diasporic population. Roy (2012: 111) explores the Punjabi diaspora and its ethno-cultural expression of punjabiyyat, while Ahmad Khan (2011: 3) looks at the British Kashmiri diaspora, with its distinct features of cooperation, self-help support mechanisms, and strong links with their place of origin in Pakistan. As I discuss in Chapter 7, it is also relevant to explore the notion of the Ahmadi
Muslim community representing a type of ‘segmented’ diaspora as suggested by Werbner.

Examining the Pakistani diaspora and how Pakistanis produce culture must also consider the various sub-ethnic groups within the larger population of Pakistan. A sub-ethnic group is understood to be a group possessing some degree of coherence and solidarity composed of people who are aware of having common origins and interests (Cashmore, 2004: 142). Pakistani sub-ethnic groups can be said to have ethnic boundaries that are ‘coterminous with language and region’ (Mullick and Hraba, 2001: 169). In analysing Pakistani ethnicities, Mullick and Hraba (2001) claim that Pakistani society has an ‘ethnic hierarchy’ that involves ‘making discriminations among ethnic out-groups in social distance’ (ibid.: 167). An ethnic hierarchy represents ‘a hierarchical ordering of ethnic groups and suggests that relative position of ethnic groups, including the in-group, is fundamental to people’s larger system of ethnic attitudes’ (ibid.). The ‘Pakistani ethnic hierarchy’ can be examined by looking at Pakistan’s four administrative units, which encompass the country’s four main sub-ethnic groups (see Appendix 8 for a provincial map of Pakistan). Punjab, which has the highest population, is the homeland of the Punjabis, the largest sub-ethnic group among Pakistanis. Punjabis speak mainly the language of Punjabi as well as Saraiki. Punjab is recognised as the educational and industrial centre of Pakistan. As Shaheed (2010) notes, the Punjabi elite have historically wielded power over other sub-ethnic groups in relation to their dominance of the civil and military bureaucracies (ibid.: 853). As a result, Punjabis are typically perceived as having the most influence over Pakistan’s political system (Javaid and Hashmi, 2012: 16). This influence positions them on the top of Pakistan’s ‘ethnic hierarchy’.

Pakistan’s second largest sub-ethnic group, the Sindhis, have a homeland in Sindh, a territory that also stretches from Pakistan into India, a neighbouring country. As such, Sindh has been described as a repository of varied cultural values with a rich history in terms of its unique arts and craft, music and literature, games and sports, all of which have retained their original flavor (Government of

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47 Saraiki is a language generally spoken across South Punjab, southern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, North Sindh, and Eastern Balochistan.
Sindhi, 2014). Sindhi culture is summarised as a genuine love for fellow beings, large heartedness, hospitality, as well as the Sindhi language (ibid.). The Pashtuns, also referred to as Pushtuns, Pathans or Pakhtuns, are Pakistan’s third largest sub-ethnic group. Pashtuns speak the languages of Pushtu and Hindku and are located mainly in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. According to Javaid and Hashmi (2012), Pashtun identity is rooted in race and historical events (ibid.: 6). Mullick and Hraba (2001) add that Pashtun Muslims of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the Muslims of Sindh share ‘a fierce attachment to their traditions and deep antipathy to the central control [of the Punjabi-dominated government]’ (ibid.: 169).

Balochistan, the unit on Pakistan’s western border, is home to the Baloch. Baloch identity is rooted in the territorial homeland and tribal culture as well as dress code and personal up-keeping (Javaid and Hashmi, 2012: 6; Dashti, 2012: 141). According to Dashti (2012), Baloch maintain a social boundary that identifies a ‘perfect Baloch’ (ibid.: 137). He (2012) claims that dignity, pride, patience, endurance, and a deep sense of shame are the guiding principles in the life of a Baloch (ibid.: 137). The Baloch speak the Baloch language48 and share a cultural identity with their co-ethnics in Iran. In present times, Baloch religious identity differs from the religious beliefs and practices from their neighbors. ‘The Baloch are distinct in their attitude towards religious tolerance, having a liberal or secular mindset compared with other neighboring nations’ (ibid.). Redaelli (2003) states that because of the Baloch’s liberal and secular mindset towards religion, non-Baloch Pakistani Muslims perceive them as being ‘bad Muslims’ (ibid.: 21).

Other Pakistanis regard the Baloch as being controversial because of Balochistan’s legacy as an independent tribal union until the nineteenth century (Alamgir, 2012: 34). Balochistan’s alignment with the Pakistani federal government in 1947 ‘was initially based on an agreement that Balochistan would be autonomous and retain authority over land, resources, and political matters while the Pakistani government would oversee currency, foreign relations, and defense’ (ibid.). However, since Balochistan joined Pakistan, ‘the [Pakistani]

48 Alamgir (2012) claims that the Pakistani central government and political elites rigorously exclude the use of the Baloch language in educational curriculum, ridiculing it as ‘primitive’ (ibid.: 35).
central government aimed at control [over the Baloch], leading to violence between Baloch guerillas and the Pakistani army [being] sent into the province to subdue them’ (ibid.). Sub-ethnic identities such as Baloch, as well as Punjabi, Sindhi, and Pashtun, can be at odds with hegemonic narratives of Pakistani culture and Pakistani identity. In the next section, I build on the heterogeneity of Pakistanis by turning to their religious and sectarian, as well as their national affiliations.

Religious and National Group Boundaries

Like the family structure and its values, religious belief and practice are considered moral imperatives within Pakistani communities, and thus are imperative to the production of Pakistani culture (Nath, 2005: 415). Although Islam is the official state religion of Pakistan, there are also minority religious and sectarian groups such as Christians, Hindus, Kalasha, Parsis, Jains, and Sikhs, as well as minority Shia Muslim sects, including Ismailis and Dawoodi Bohras. The following figure provides a national and provincial breakdown of Pakistan’s various religious groups:

**Figure 2.1:** Pakistan’s religious affiliations (approximation)

![Image of a pie chart showing religious affiliations in Pakistan, with the majority being Muslim, and other groups such as Christians, Hindus, and Others in smaller percentages.](https://example.com/pie-chart)

**Source:** Government of Pakistan (2009)
Overall, religious minorities represent approximately four per cent of the total population of Pakistan. Within these minority communities there are socio-economic-based and denominational-based divisions; along with age, ethnic, gender, rural, and urban distinctions. There are also Pakistanis who do not follow any religious tradition. This diversity within Pakistan’s religious communities is transmitted to the Pakistani diaspora which, according to Vertovec (1997), leads to ‘religious diasporic consciousnessess’ (ibid.: 283). His concept points out that the interviewees of this study belong to and identify with a plethora of religious communities rather than a single unified religious population.

Pakistanis in diaspora can be perceived as maintaining religious boundaries around their communities, which ultimately affects the construction of their religious identities. Cohen (2008: 154) suggests that religious communities in diaspora are mobilised around the creation of places of worship and developed through distinct cultural practices, such as forms of dress and food. Pakistanis in diaspora are pressured to renegotiate and adapt their religious beliefs to that of a new cultural setting, a process that exposes them to foreign influences and transforms their religious organisations, practices, and beliefs (Cohen, 2008: 153). As members of particular religions, the participants of this study engage ‘in a [diasporic] process of respatialization as new identities and networks have to be re-engineered a long way from home’ (ibid.: 154).

As outlined in Chapter 1, my respondents come from a range of religious backgrounds; however, the majority of my interviewees associate themselves with Islam. Members of Islamic sects have their own religious identities that are
formed to distinguish members from other Muslim groups. Muslim groups in diaspora can be seen as constructing complex boundaries of language, rituals, and codes of behaviour that create contrasting Muslim identities (ibid.: 145). Young Pakistani Muslim men in this study demarcate boundaries around their social lives because of their perceived Islamic obligations. One of the social activities that the participants deem antithetical to Islamic practices is alcohol consumption, which follows Fletcher and Spracklen (2014), who found that young British Pakistani Muslims see drinking alcohol as being ‘un-Islamic’, meaning that practicing Muslims are unable to participate in activities where it is consumed.

In addition to alcohol consumption being viewed as outside of an Islamic boundary, Yin (2007a) found that young Pakistanis in diaspora see homosexuality as falling outside of the boundary of Islam and use the Qur’an, hadiths, and sharia to justify their anti-homosexuality positions (Bouhdiba, 1998). Jaspal (2012) reverberates Yin and Bouhdiba in noting that Muslims tend to be ‘strictly opposed to Western conceptualisations of homosexuality in the sense of “coming” out as exclusively gay’ (ibid.: 768). The gay Pakistani men in this study resist relations with other Muslims due to the fear of disclosing their sexual identities (Jaspal and Cinnirella, 2012). The social boundaries which Pakistani Muslims maintain because of their religious beliefs and practices alienates some of my participants and leads them to develop a sense of ‘un-belonging’ to Pakistani and Muslim communities. The gay Pakistani Muslims in this study nevertheless see living in diaspora as offering them the opportunity to express their sexuality without institutional persecution.

Like religious communities, nations are complex entities in which group boundaries are continually renegotiated and contested by different individuals and sub-groups within the population (Vadher and Barrett, 2009: 443). The boundaries

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49 Homosexuality is considered to be an offence under Pakistan’s penal code. However, as Pathan (2014) claims, Pakistan has a growing reputation for hosting gay parties, despite its staunchly conservative society.

50 The hadiths are a collection of the accounts of prophet Muhammad’s actions and preaching.

51 Section 377 (Of Unnatural Offences) in Pakistan’s Penal Codes legally criminalises homosexuality. This section states, ‘[w]hoever voluntarily has carnal intercourse against the order of nature with any man, woman, or animal, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than two years nor more than ten years, and shall also be liable to fine’ (Government of Pakistan, 2014: 138).
of nations, as described by Smith (1991; 1998; 2001), include several components such as having ties to the homeland, shared histories, myths of common ancestry, mass public cultures, and cultural traditions and practices. The boundaries of nations thus evoke processes and individual feelings of inclusion and exclusion. Considering the significant differences between Ireland and the US in terms of their migration histories, role of religion in society and politics, as well as historical conceptualisations of Irish and American identity, it is important to analyse how young Pakistani Muslim and non-Muslim men position themselves towards the Irish and American nation.

As noted in Chapter 1, Ireland is a new host immigrant country that has a history of non-secularism. Before the Celtic Tiger, as Inglis (2009) notes, the Irish were a relatively homogenous nation in which over 90 per cent of the population was not only born in Ireland, but also they were white, Catholic, and English-speaking (ibid.: 4). According to Mac Éinrí and White (2008), these features made Ireland an ethnic nation, a concept that is used to define national membership based upon principles of descent, marriage, blood, and soil (Wright et al., 2012: 470). Because my respondents are non-white Irish citizens, they can be seen as challenging the older and more racialised versions of Irish identity (Honohan and Rougier, 2010: 28).

In addition to ethnicity, Catholic teachings and the Catholic Church have played an important role in shaping conceptualisations of the Irish nation, as discussed in Chapter 1. The Irish Constitution and its specifically ‘Irish’ and ‘Catholic’ ethos has historically served as a political, cultural and social model for Ireland (Honohan and Rougier, 2010: 9). In connecting Irish ethnicity and Irish identity with Catholicism, the Irish Constitution insinuates that to be ‘fully Irish’, one must also be Catholic. Although the Irish Constitution does not establish the Catholic Church as the official state church, it does emphasise that Catholicism is the religion of the majority and the foundation for social principles in Irish society. In recent years, however, the Irish state has started to abandon deference to Catholic teachings and the Catholic Church (Inglis, 2007: 49). Irish public life

52 Notwithstanding, the Irish Constitution does provide for freedom of religion and rules out state discrimination against minority religious communities, such as Pakistani Muslims.
and informal interactions among Irish people today are no longer necessarily marked by a Catholic ethos, but by secular values (Flynn, 2006: 22). These developments suggest that young Pakistani men in Dublin live in a society that, in comparison to previous Irish generations, is more secular and inclusive. Ireland’s secular turn is also highlighted by the now defunct National Consultative Committee on Racism and Interculturalism (NCCRI), which articulated that Irish society is now turning towards interculturalism. They describe interculturalism as being about ensuring that cultural diversity is catered for and that minority ethnic groups are included by government design and planning (National Action Plan Against Racism, 2003: 7). Farrell and Watt (2001) mirror the National Action Plan Against Racism and argue that Ireland is increasingly becoming intercultural in the sense that minority communities have a sense of belonging to Ireland and can identify with Irish society, without diminishing their ethnic identity.

While Ireland has been described as an *ethnic nation* with strong links to Catholic teachings and the Catholic Church (Honohan and Rougier, 2010; Mac Éinri and White, 2008), the US has been portrayed as the opposite, a *civic nation*. A civic nation is a nation in which group membership is based upon democratic and egalitarian principles, rather than that of descent, marriage, blood, and soil, as found in an ethnic nation. Unlike an ethnic nation and its exclusivism, ‘anyone can belong to a civic nation provided he or she accepts certain fundamental values and institutions’ (Wright et al., 2012: 471). Eck (2006) suggests that the American civic nation is best understood through *E pluribus unum*, the motto of the seal of the US. *E pluribus unum* means ‘From many, one’ and envisions ‘one people’ with a common civic ‘we’, ‘but not one religion, one faith, one conscience’ (ibid.). Eck adds that *E pluribus unum* does not mean ‘uniformity’ like the Irish ‘homogenous nation’, but rather it suggests the unity of difference among citizens.

While the Irish Constitution gives preference to Catholicism, the First Amendment of the US Constitution states that the US government has no establishment of religion. According to the Boisi Center (2013), the First Amendment of the US Constitution states, ‘Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise therefore, or abridging the freedom of

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53 The First Amendment of the US Constitution states, ‘Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise therefore, or abridging the freedom of
Amendment effectively creates a secular culture and legal system that has led to
the development of a *civil religion*, rather than an official state religion. The civil
religion of the US has been described by Bellah (1967) as ‘a collection of beliefs,
symbols, and rituals with respect to sacred things and institutionalised
collectively’ (ibid.: 8). The beliefs, symbols, and rituals of the civil religion are
understood by Herberg (1974) as an intense faith in education, a dedication to
democracy and the Constitution, a capitalist economic system, and belief in social
mobility (ibid.: 893). The civil religion, as Ferrari (2010) argues, has risen out of
the necessity to create a nucleus of values that are able to create a cohesive group
out of a diverse number of individuals (ibid.: 749). As I explain in Chapter 7, the
interviews and focus groups revealed that the Boston participants perceive the
American civil religion as offering an inclusive path to belonging to the American
nation, whereas the Dublin respondents see their ethnicity as preventing them
from fully belonging to the Irish nation.

Despite the inclusive nature of the First Amendment and civil religion, Eck (2006)
notes that there have been many periods of social and political exclusion
throughout American history. Eck claims that Americans have historically
answered the diversification of the American nation by ‘closing the door’ on
minority groups, which may be interpreted as ‘securing’ the boundary around the
nation in order to make it more difficult for outsiders to enter. Following Eck,
Chomsky (2007) claims that Muslims are the most recent minority group to face
resistance in trying to lay claim to American group membership. Some of the
young Pakistani men in this study perceive themselves to be ‘national outsiders’ -
or worse - ‘enemies of the nation’ (Abu el-Haj, 2007: 285). This sense of
Otherness, as touched upon by Maguire and Cassidy (2009), is particularly
problematic for my second-generation participants who ‘grow up as strangers in
their own country, forever seen as an alien contaminant within the true blood of
the nation-state’ (ibid.: 18).

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speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
government for a redress of grievances’ (Legal Information Institute, 2014).

The Boisi Center for Religion and American Public Life was created at Boston College in 1999.
From the outset, its mission has been ‘to create opportunities where a community of scholars,
policy makers, media, and religious leaders can connect in conversation and scholarly reflection
around issues at the intersection of religion and American public life’ (Boisi Center, 2013).

45
Boundaries around national group membership and national identity have consequences in relation to how young Pakistani men experience racism and discrimination (Vertovec, 1999: 8). Miles (1993) defines racism as the following:

the attribution of social significance (meaning) to particular patterns of phenotypical and/or genetic difference which, along with the characteristic of additional deterministic ascription of real or supposed other characteristics to a group constituted by descent. (ibid.: 350).

Building upon Miles, Cashmore (2004) referred to racism as ‘the dogma that one ethnic group is condemned by nature to congenital inferiority and another group is destined to congenital superiority’ (ibid.: 349). Experiencing racism and discrimination is linked to processes of Othering and contributes to the consolidation of group boundaries by classifying people into sub-groups. According to Sarup (1996), the Other is ‘the one who does not belong to the group, who is not “one of them”’ (ibid.: 7). The foreigner, he argues, is typically the Other in relation to the establishment of the nation-state because the individual does not have the same nationality (ibid.). Otherness is constructed through ‘the comparison, the contrast, the relation between “us” and “them”’ (Hedetoft, 1995: 77). Hedetoft adds:

the image of the Other is invariably predicated on the Self-image, they mutually define each other in an imaginary demarcation of difference within a normative and evaluative continuum, even when both sides of the nexus are not directly and explicitly thematised (ibid.: 77)

These three different forms of representing ‘us’ and ‘them’ is summarised as the exclusivist, the gradualist, and the exotic (ibid.). The exclusivist form includes ‘all sorts of enemy images, whether they relate to situations of war ... [or] hostility to immigrants’ (ibid.: 103). The gradualist form recognises others ‘in relation of proximity or contiguity vis-à-vis “us” – as, in some way, “like us” or even “part of

55 Borders and boundaries are dividing lines set up to define the places that are safe, to distinguish us from them (ibid.); they speak to the need to create pedagogical conditions in which individuals become border crossers in order to understand the Otherness in its own terms (Giroux, 1992: 28).
us" (ibid.: 104). The third form, exotic, depicts Others with symbols of ‘positive, romanticised, sentimental qualities’. Attention is given in this dissertation to all three forms of Otherness.

Othering is also understood to be a form of *racialisation*, which, as Hall (1997) discusses, occurs when a diverse group of people are broken up into distinct groups according to essentialised physical, cultural, or behavioural characteristics (ibid.: 2). Othering is regarded as a form of racialisation because it seeks to fix and naturalise difference between individuals and groups in order to create impervious boundaries between them. Othering has been classified as a form of racism because it represents exclusion, inferiorisation, subordination, and exploitation of individuals and groups (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992: 2). When first-generation Pakistanis face exclusion and discrimination in the new host society, they sometimes identify more strongly with their own ethnic group in order to seek support through kinship and friendship. In doing so, several first-generation participants reproduce Pakistani culture as a source of cohesiveness and solidarity (Hutnik, 1991). For some of the second-generation respondents, their experience with Othering continues despite being economically and culturally integrated into the host society (Morawska, 2011: 1029).

The recent development of *culture talk* surrounding Pakistanis is another reason why my respondents experience Othering. Mamdani (2002) defines culture talk as ‘the predilection to define cultures according to their presumed “essential” characteristics’ (ibid.: 766). Mamdani adds that culture talk ‘tends to think of individuals (from “traditional” cultures) in authentic and original terms, as if their identities are shaped entirely by the supposedly unchanging culture into which they are born’ (ibid.: 767). Culture talk is linked to stereotypes, which refers to a fixed mental impression and an exaggerated belief associated with a category

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56 The terms ‘integrate’ and ‘integration’ refer to an individuals’ ability to ‘accept, redefine, and integrate aspects of himself or herself that may be the characteristics of other cultures and groups’ (Howard-Hamilton and Frazier, 2005: 78). I also refer to Heckman (2005), who provides four ways of examining integration, including: 1) structural integration – refers to the acquisition of political rights and access to institutions such as education and citizenship; 2) cultural integration – refers to behavioural and attitudinal changes in the new host society in a mutual interaction; 3) social integration – refers to friendships and group memberships, and 4) identificational integration – refers to having a sense of belonging to particular ethnic or national groups (ibid.: 15).
In his discussion of stereotypes, Hedetoft (1995) states that they manifest through signs and images that ‘define, represent, condense, and organize meaning’, which in-turn imposes ‘mental and cultural lines of demarcation on reality’ (ibid.: 93). As discussed in Chapter 1, young Pakistani men in Dublin and Boston are stereotyped as radical and uneducated Muslims, but also as wealthy and intelligent migrants, issues that I return to in Chapter 6.

The culture talk surrounding Pakistanis in diaspora has been fuelled by media coverage, which often equates Pakistanis ‘there’ – in Pakistan – with the idea of Pakistanis ‘here’ – in the new host society. In discussing the experiences of young Pakistanis in Silicon Valley, Stover (2011) claims that the conflation of Pakistanis ‘here’ and ‘there’ identifies all Pakistanis as reactionary Muslim fundamentalists who are against ‘modernity’ (ibid.: 1). The culture talk surrounding Pakistanis has also been linked to categorisations of ‘good Muslims’ and ‘bad Muslims’ (Mamdani, 2002). Despite the heterogeneity of the global Muslim population, Nielsen (2007) claims that Westerners have the tendency to view Muslims in dichotomous terms such as ‘moderates’ or ‘liberals’ and ‘conservatives’ and ‘fundamentalists’ (ibid.: 44). Sayyid (2003) argues that this categorisation plays out between Muslims who are not embroiled in politics and fundamentalists who use religion for strategic purposes rather than for sacred contemplation (ibid.: 11). In Chapters 5 and 6, I deploy Mamdani’s ‘culture talk’ to discuss how my first- and second-generation participants make sense of their own Muslim identities and experience racism and discrimination.

As the subject of culture talk, young Pakistanis in diaspora experience cultural racism, which Hall (1995) defines as ‘a form of nationalism that associates legitimate national belonging as the pure and essential … culture, heritage and communal identity’ (ibid.: 249). Cultural racism insists on difference that is not natural or biological, but contained in language, religion, tradition, and national origin; for some individuals, the culture of the Other is perceived as a threat to his own social boundary (Wieviorka, 1997: 141-2). Wikan (2002) adds that ‘culture’ functions in a racist manner ‘if it is a model of human we apply only to “them” but not to ourselves and if this model implies a derogatory view of the Other’ (ibid.: 81). Islamophobia is one particular form of cultural racism experienced by
young Pakistani men in diaspora. According to the Runnymede Trust (1997), Islamophobia occurs when individuals treat Islam as unchanging, monolithic, inferior, barbaric, irrational, sexist, primitive, and threatening. Islamophobia has been considered a form of racism even though Muslims are not a ‘race’. Sayyid (2011) argues that Muslims are increasingly racialised not biologically, but through religion, culture, history, and nationalities (ibid.: 4). Because Islamophobia demonstrates hostility towards the Other, it may also be understood as a form of xenophobia, which, as Cashmore (2004) claims, means ‘fear of strangers’ or people who are ‘feared or abhorred as outsiders’ (ibid.: 455). Experiencing Islamophobia and forms of xenophobia leads my participants to feeling that they are strangers, or individuals who are uncertain about whether or not they belong to the ‘us’ or ‘we’ group (Bauman, 1991; Lentin, 2000). Inglis (2009) argues that individuals identify strangers through a process of cognitive mapping in which people gather information and clues to categorise others into discrete groups (ibid.: 3). These clues could be skin colour, accent, and physical expressions, issues that are expanded upon in Chapter 6.

Othering and being positioned as strangers is linked to distinct forms of crisis racism. Balibar (1991) states that crisis racism emerges out of social structures and societal problems, both of which, he argues, are integral parts in shaping national identity. In building upon Balibar, Lentin (2007) argues that crisis racism appears largely as an ‘immigration problem’ in which migrants are blamed for social problems in relation to employment, housing, schooling, health services, and morality. In Chapter 6, I posit that the form of crisis racism inflicting young Pakistani men in Ireland stems from the breakdown of the Celtic Tiger economy and the resulting economic crisis, during which foreign nationals were perceived to be stealing jobs from ‘natives’ of Ireland. I also posit that the form of crisis racism affecting the experiences of young Pakistani men in the US is linked to the events of 9/11 and the subsequent ‘War on Terror’, in which Pakistanis and Muslims in general were labeled as threats to national security. In some instances, crisis racism may result in racist violence, or as Witte (1996) defines it, ‘the (threat of) violence in which victims are “selected” not in their capacities as individuals, but as representatives of imagined minority communities based on phenotypical characteristics, and/or religious, national or cultural origin’ (ibid.:
11). Racist violence encompasses ‘anything on a continuum from verbal aggression and damage to property, through to murder and genocide’ (Bowling and Phillips, 2002: 39). Moreover, young Pakistani men in diaspora also experience institutional racism, which relies on active and pervasive anti-minority group attitudes and practices (Carmichael and Hamilton, 1967). The US government has recently adopted security and surveillance apparatuses, such as state-sponsored spying, phone-tapping, and airport security measures, all of which are central to the experience of racism (Lentin and McVeigh, 2006: 12). Being targeted for ‘flying while brown’ is particularly problematic for the Boston participants, as this form of institutional racism has ‘presumably focused on perceived racial, ethnic, and religious similarities to the [9/11] hijackers’ (Chandrasekhar, 2003: 215). Experiencing the humiliation and degradation of racial profiling leads to a heightened sense of Otherness among some of the participants, as I address in Chapters 6 and 7.

Diaspora and Identity

Identity is a concept closely linked to boundary maintenance because it naturalizes difference between individuals and groups of people by distinguishing ‘us’ from ‘them’. According to Hall (1996), identities are ‘increasingly fragmented and fractured, never singular but multiply constructed across different, often intersecting and antagonistic discourses, practices, and positions’ (ibid.: 3-4). In echoing Hall, Brah (1996) suggests that identities in diaspora cut across and displace national boundaries; they create new senses of belonging and challenge the fixing of identities in relation to a physical location. In crossing in-and-out of group boundaries and by replacing hegemonic narratives of identities, individuals in diaspora ‘are constantly producing and reproducing themselves anew, through transformation and difference’ (Hall, 1990: 235). The young Pakistani men of this study ‘are often obliged to adopt shifting, multiple or hyphenated positions of identification’ (Hall, 2000: 27). In crossing in-and-out of boundaries that demarcate ‘us’ and ‘them’, Hall (2000) claims that diasporic individuals engage with hybridity, a concept which suggests that identities are ‘not defined by essence or purity, but by the recognition of a necessary heterogeneity and diversity; by a concept of “identity” which lives with and through, not despite difference; by
hybridity’ (ibid.: 235). The term hybridity itself emerged from Bhabha’s (1990; 1994) concept of third space, or the intersectionality of diaspora, border, and dis/location. The third space, which is akin to Anzaldúa’s cultural borderland, can be seen as a point of cultural, psychic, political, and economic confluence in which young Pakistani men in diaspora juxtapose, contest, proclaim, and disavow identities (Brah, 1996: 208). Because the third space is a site of complex and ongoing entanglements, some of the participants resist the urge to conform to hegemonic ethnic, religious, and national identities. In experiencing a ‘cultural collision’ (Bhabha, 1994: 58), young Pakistani men in this study fuse two voices and accents, similar to Bhachu’s (1991) description of Pakistanis in diaspora being ‘cultural entrepreneurs’ who have taken up roles as ‘innovators and originators of newer cultural forms’ (ibid.: 402).

In contrast to hybrid identities, which is ‘the very condition of in-betweenness’ and the ‘harmonious merger and fusion [of identities]’ (Ang, 2003: 8), I refer to the notion of liquid identities to shed light on how some individuals in diaspora distance themselves entirely from dominant narratives of ethnic, religious, and national identities. Liquid identities, as discussed by Bauman (2005), are those that exhibit a loose attachment to identity constructions. He argues that those who adopt liquid identities accept disorientation, adapt easily to new environments, tolerate the absence of direction, and desire freedom to defy and neglect boundaries which bind the lifestyles of ‘the locals’ (ibid.: 4-29). Bauman further argues that liquid identities have emerged because modernity has witnessed the dissolution of ‘bonds that interlock individual choices in collective projects and actions’ (Bauman, 2000: 6). This theorization on liquidity echoes Hall (1990) in the sense that identities are fluid, fluctuating, and never complete. Individuals who adopt a liquid identity wish to avoid conforming to dominant narratives of identity and being fixed to territories such as the nation-state (Bauman, 2000: 1-12). Bauman (1998) describes the essence of the liquid life in stating that ‘nothing should be embraced ... nothing should command a commitment ... no needs should be seen as fully satisfied, no desires considered ultimate’ (ibid.: 81). He adds that those living a liquid life worry about ‘the fears of being caught napping, of failing to catch up with fast moving events, of being left behind ... of being saddled with possessions that are no longer desirable’ (ibid.: 2).
The following Venn diagram provides a visual of my conceptual and theoretical approach towards understanding the experiences of young first- and second-generation Pakistani men in Dublin and Boston. The homeland in the left circle represents Pakistan and the migrant culture, while the new host society circle represented on the right accounts for Ireland and the US and Irish/American culture. The middle space of the Venn diagram is the cultural borderland or third space, which is a point of cultural confluence and hybrid space out of which new identities emerge. The area outside of the Venn diagram serves as a means to explain the experiences of young Pakistani men in diaspora who do not describe themselves as belonging to either the migrant culture or new host society culture. I refer to this space as the liquid life because these men want to free themselves from group boundaries and identities.

**Figure 2.2: Cultural borderland and liquid life**

One of the theoretical contributions in this study is the difference between hybrid and liquid identities. The available literature shows that hybrid identities have been linked to Pakistanis in diaspora, but little insight has been given to liquid identities. As the diagram above illustrates, hybrid identities emerge in the cultural borderland/third space because these identities combine characteristics of the migrant culture and new host society culture to create new experiences and forms of identity. On the other hand, I treat liquid identities as being outside of these boundaries. Liquid identities can be seen as those identities that prefer to be
disconnected from the boundaries of both the migrant culture and new host society culture. In some cases, liquid identities develop because individuals do not see themselves as being given access to group membership. In Chapter 7, I show how liquid identities tend to avoid any sense of belonging or identity-attachment.

Identity in diaspora has also been discussed through *belonging*, a concept which determines who is included and excluded from certain populations and locations. Yuval-Davis (2011) considers belonging to be an ‘emotional attachment’ of ‘feeling at home’ (ibid.: 10); thus the cultural connection and positions which my participants adopt towards Pakistan are distinctive aspects of diasporic conditions (Safran, 2004). Belonging emerges through the construction of ‘we-ness’ – those who are included as members of the group – versus the construction of ‘otherness’ – or those who are not considered part of the group (Anthias, 2009: 8). Anthias (2009) adds that belonging is not just about membership, rights, and duties, as in the case of citizenship, but it is also about the social places that resonate with individuals (ibid.: 9). Belonging, therefore, is a ‘feeling of being part of a larger whole and the emotional and social bonds that are related to such places’ (ibid.). Although little is known about the senses of belonging among young Pakistani men in Dublin and Boston, British Pakistanis have been described as having a feeling of belonging to the UK, but of also sensing that white Britons do not yet fully accept that these Pakistanis belong to Britain. Hussain and Bagguely (2005), for example, found that British Pakistanis ‘already feel themselves to be part of the national community at the level of their identities as citizens, but they do not feel themselves to be British in the conventional sense of national identity’ (ibid.: 407). These findings suggest that young Pakistani men in diaspora perceive national identities as having certain connotations, which they are incapable of possessing because of their own ethnicity and religion.

In addition to senses of belonging to national communities, I also give attention in this study to how my participants negotiate their position towards Pakistani ethnicity and Pakistani national identity. According to Werbner (2013), Pakistani identity as ‘a historically produced multiplicity created in response to diasporic and sub-continental movements of Islamification, Empire, modernism and nationalism, and further embedded in religious, regional and linguist traditions’
Conceptual and Theoretical Framework

In other words, Pakistani identity is fissured and has always permitted multiple interpretations, meaning that there ‘is no single [Pakistani identity] that each and every [Pakistani] avows’ (Brah, 1996: 6). Nevertheless, Pakistani identity has been closely linked to religion, specifically Islam. Pakistan was founded as a nation-state for British India’s Muslim population, a historical fact that ‘ensures that Pakistanis are likely to associate being Pakistani with being Muslim’ (Jacobsen, 1998: 10). Shaheed (2010) echoes Jacobsen’s argument in stating, ‘[r]eligion was always conjoined to politics in Pakistan as a state created for Indian Muslims’ (ibid.: 851). As a result, Pakistani identity is often conflated with being Muslim. This conflation is problematic for the non-Muslim participants, who must negotiate identities that have been ascribed to them by the nation-state (Taylor, 1994).

Having been born and raised in Pakistan, the first-generation participants construct identities that are more embedded within values and norms originating from the homeland. On the other hand, the second-generation respondents adopt more mobile and flexible identities because of their linguistic and cultural orientations and due to their being born and raised in Ireland and the US. Rumbaut (1996) argues that the second-generation tends to mimic and identify with the majority culture of the host society in which they were born, and thus resist conforming to the ways of the migrant culture. Rumbaut, however, added that second-generation individuals in diaspora construct adversarial identities because they see themselves as outsiders and culturally disparaged by the wider society. Moreover, he claims that some second-generation individuals develop bicultural identities, or what Bhachu (1991) describes as having ‘two consciousnesses’ (ibid.: 402). In developing bicultural identities, as discussed by Suárez-Orozco and Suárez-Orozco (2011), some of my second-generation participants have hybrid identities in which they formulate ‘new ethnicities’ by fusing the ‘old’ migrant culture with the ‘new’ majority culture (ibid.: 118).

Because of the close links between the creation of Pakistan and Islam as the dominant religion of the nation-state, Muslim identity is an important identity to

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57 Cultural orientation is a term deployed by Ying (1995) to describe minority individual affiliation with the ethnic and ‘majority’ culture.
consider in light of the participants. According to Brubaker (2013), Muslim identity is an increasingly salient and contested category of social, political, and religious practice (ibid.: 2). Like Muslims worldwide, Pakistani Muslims are ‘opening up’ Islam to new competition in terms of which individuals and groups have religious and political authority over Muslims (Dabashi, 2012). The recent development of ‘fundamentalist’ identities has received significant attention in Western countries and elsewhere in the ‘Muslim world’. Studies such as that of Sarwar (1980) claim that young Muslims use Islam as an ‘escape route’ to move between the conflicting migrant culture and the dominant host society culture, which can lead to the formation of fundamentalist identities.

Despite the amount of attention in the academic literature paid to the role of Islam in the Pakistani diaspora, it is worth remembering that the Pakistani diaspora is ‘not a homogenous singular whole’ (Werbner, 2013: 411). To analyse the diverse range of Pakistani religious identities, I refer to the concept of religiosity, which is defined as ‘individual preferences, emotions, beliefs, and actions that refer to an existing (or self-made) religion’ (Stolz, 2009: 346). More specifically, I turn to an eight-dimension model for measuring religiosity as put forth by Glock and Stark (1968):

Figure 2.3: Dimensions of religiosity
Most of the participants in this study have some sort of religious belief, which suggests the extent to which an individual agrees and conforms to the practices and values of a particular religious tradition. Individuals who intensely follow one specific set of religious beliefs may be said to be religious particularists, who tend to associate with members of their own religious group and believe that their specific religious values system offers the best hope for society. The particularist identity is similar to the consequentialist identity, which Glock and Stark describe in light of how an individual’s religious beliefs and practices become an everyday consequence of their behaviour and social activities. Consequentialism suggests that Muslims perceive Islam as offering a complete framework for not only individuals, but also families, governments, and society in general. In contrast to the particularist and consequentialist identities, young Pakistani men in diaspora can simply have a religious identity based upon knowledge. This identity refers to individuals having a familiarity with religious practices and doctrines, but they do not actively participate in everyday religious rituals.

Religious belief is distinct from religious ritualism. Rappaport (1999) defines ritualism as ‘the performance of more or less invariant sequences of formal acts and utterances’ (ibid.: 26-27). This type of religious identity is used in this study to refer to young Pakistani men who not only believe in the doctrines of specific religions, but who also frequently participate in formal religious acts, such as partaking in services and obligations. For some of the participants, adopting ritualistic religious identities by engaging in daily activities such as praying and fasting is challenging because of daily work commitments in Dublin and Boston’s increasingly secular cultures. While some of the respondents participate in religious rituals, they also engage with devotionalism. This type of religious experience involves holding private religious practice in workplaces, universities, and homes. Being devotional, but not practicing religion, suggests that young Pakistani men in Dublin and Boston privatise their position towards religion, rather than making it a public act of worship.

Young Pakistani men in diaspora who adopt devotionalist positions towards religion differ from those individuals who align themselves more closely towards religious communities. This type of religious identity refers to an individual’s
desire to belong to and actively participate in the affairs of specific religious communities. I extend Glock and Stark's dimension of 'community' to include my respondents' positions on religion and its role in the wider Irish and American societies. Specifically, I look at how my interviewees position themselves towards secularism and non-secularism. Wilson (1966) defines secularism 'as a process whereby religious thinking, practices, and institutions lose their significance in society' (ibid.: 14). According to Shiner (1967: 207-260), secularism manifests itself in several areas of society including the decline of religious practice, disappearance of religion in society altogether, and the disengagement of society with religious institutions. Young Pakistani men in diaspora who adopt secular identities restrict religious belief and practice to the private sphere, meaning that religion is a purely individual matter, rather than an act of public participation in religious practice⁵⁸. Participants in this study who prefer a secular religious experience may be seen as having an 'invisible religion', which Berger and Luckmann (1995) describe as a 'modern religiosity' because individuals disassociate themselves with institutional religions and do not overtly practice religion.

In contrast to secularism, non-secularism implies the enhancement of religion in the public sphere, especially in terms of allowing religion to generate moral values and legislation. Non-secularism is related to de-secularisation, a process that effectively reverses secularisation in the sense that individuals desire a return to religion. In other words, non-secularists see religion playing an important public role because it helps to instil morality and safety in society. In following Rashid (2007), I consider the ways in which young Pakistani men in diaspora position themselves towards the role of religion in society because '[t]here seems to be a general consensus that Islamic/Muslim values are incompatible with secular/western values' (ibid.: 255).

Comparatively, some young Pakistani men in Dublin and Boston distance themselves from religious communities and prefer to develop a sense of

⁵⁸ In his study on the experiences of Pakistani youth, Ostberg (2006) argued that increased privatisation of Islamic belief and practice is both a normative and liberal strategy when negotiating Western culture (ibid.: 96).
experientialism outside of religious institutions. Experientialism is understood to be a feeling of having communed with a perceived higher power, which convinces them of his own connection to a supernatural power. Experientialism may be seen in light of the concept of spirituality, which is construed by Underwood and Teresi (2002) as the moment-to-moment experiences of the divine that reflect an individual’s relationship with a higher power (ibid.: 22-33).

In addition to religious identities, this dissertation also considers how young Pakistani men in Dublin and Boston position themselves in relation to Irish and American national identities. According to Montgomery (2013), globalization, increased migration, and mobility across and within borders have challenged the Irish nation state and raised critical questions about citizenship, national communities and belonging, especially in relation to debates regarding the definition of Irishness (ibid.: 434). In relation to new migrants to Ireland, Ni Laoire (2009) claims that Irish identity is a challenging negotiation because of the dualism between native/Irish/white/host community and foreigner/non-white/non-Irish/immigrant newcomer. This dualism creates a sense of Otherness which positions young Pakistani men outside of the boundary of Irishness, even though first-generation participants are Irish citizens and second-generations respondents consider Ireland to be their homeland. My Dublin interviewees are further challenged when negotiating their Irish identities considering that a significant number of Irish people express the view that non-white individuals could never become ‘good Irish’ (Mac Gréil, 1996).

Correspondingly, American identity is formed when people construct symbolic boundaries around perceptions of Americanness. Schildkraut (2007) argues that American identity has four distinct traditions including the ‘liberal’, ‘civic republican’, ‘ethno-cultural’, and ‘incorporationist’ (ibid.: 6). The liberal identity emphasises citizenship rights, freedom of religion, and economic opportunities for all citizens. The civic republican identity focuses on national responsibilities as part of a wider national community, such as participating in voting practices and other citizenship rights. According to Fraga and Segura (2006), it is appropriate to interpret American identity in the civic tradition, which is composed of civil rights, democratic republicanism, a sense of collective fate, and egalitarianism
(ibid.: 280). The ethno-cultural identity opposes liberal, civic republican, and incorporationist identities because it bases American group membership upon the culture of white, English-speaking Protestants of northern European ancestry. Huntington (2004), a proponent of this concept, claims that American identity is based on the ‘American Creed’, which he claims is use of the English language, English culture, individualism, and the Protestant work ethic. Finally, the incorporationist identity maintains that America is a multicultural society that provides people of multiple ethno-racial groups the ability to maintain their migrant culture (Hollinger, 1995: 101). This study seeks to evaluate the saliency of these identities and their boundaries in relation to the experiences of young first- and second-generation Pakistani Muslim and non-Muslim men.

My conceptual and theoretical framework, which focuses diaspora theory and its related concepts, is visualised in the following diagram:

**Figure 2.4: Overview of conceptual and theoretical framework**

At a time of increasing debate about the meanings of Pakistani, Muslim, and Irish/American identities, it is useful to conceptualise Pakistanis in diaspora as negotiating various group boundaries. Although it can be argued that Pakistanis in diaspora are united in their heterogeneity, we have seen in this chapter that Pakistani communities are fragmented and complex and that Pakistanis are
Conceptual and Theoretical Framework

presented with contrasting social and political contexts in Ireland and the US respectively.

Conclusion

To explore the experiences of family, religion, and identity of young first- and second-generation Pakistani Muslim and non-Muslim men in Dublin and Boston, this study draws mainly upon the notion of the Pakistani diaspora being a heterogeneous entity rather than 'a homogenous singular whole' (Werbner, 2013: 411). The review of diasporic concepts such as homeland, migrant culture, *Ummah*, belonging and home-binding, myth of return, homing desire, and boundary maintenance provide a useful starting point into the ways in which young Pakistani men experience diaspora. In light of this conceptual and theoretical framework, young Pakistani Muslim and non-Muslim men in Dublin and Boston negotiate and renegotiate their positions towards their ethnicity, religion, and nationality and confront the idea that these group boundaries are both fixed and porous. The next chapter provides an overview of how this conceptual and theoretical framework was put into practice.
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the research design and methodology that I used to explore the experiences of family, religion, and identity among young first- and second-generation Pakistani Muslim and non-Muslim men in Dublin and Boston. The chapter is divided into five main sections. In the first section, I ground the project in comparative and cross-national research and highlight several advantages and disadvantages of using these tools in a study focused on diaspora theory. I also discuss how effective the case study is in accounting for the heterogeneity of the Pakistani diaspora. In the second section, I break down my sample and explain why I chose to research young Pakistani men between the ages of 18 and 35, as opposed to other generational, ethnic, or religious groups. In this section, I also provide insight into how I gained access to research sites and participants. The third section describes the data collection tools, which include documentary analysis, participant observation, semi-structured interviews, and focus groups. The fourth section provides an overview of how I analysed the data and provides the framework of my coding system.

**Comparative and Cross-National Research**

I used a comparative cross-national research design to analyse the lived experiences of my participants. Kohn (1989) asserts that cross-national research is any research that transcends national boundaries. Taken in this light, a comparative analysis is a systematic examination that contrasts the ways in which structures, cultures, and norms affect the lives of individuals living in different social environments (Bloemraad, 2013: 28). I used the same research methods in examining the Irish and American contexts, which allowed me to compare and contrast these countries in a systematic way (Hantrais and Mangen, 1996: 1). In designing this study, I figured that the comparative approach was necessary to achieve my aim of shedding light on the diversity of the Pakistani diaspora. Researching a diasporic community in multiple countries provides for a more
dynamic analysis in comparison to studying the experiences of a population in one country.

One of the keys to a successful comparative analysis is the assurance that the concepts under examination are translatable across different groups of people and locations. In order to analyse the same case in two or more countries, Pepin (2003) argues that researchers using a comparative analysis must execute conceptual equivalence in the environments under research. Conceptual equivalence addresses how to examine the same social phenomenon in two or more environments in a systematic manner. In this research, I raised the same concepts during my semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions with my participants. These concepts included family, cultural orientation, religious beliefs and practices, social interactions, experiences with racism and racial discrimination, and senses of belonging and identity constructions. While these issues may not be experienced in the same manner among young Pakistani men in Dublin and Boston, they, nevertheless, are topics that have received the most attention in the literature on Pakistanis in diaspora.

In addition to accounting for conceptual equivalence, Pepin (2003) also raises the issue of how researchers using the cross-national design may have 'to grapple with language and communication problems' (ibid.: 5). I did not have any language barriers with my respondents because Ireland and the US are English-speaking countries and all my first-generation participants had either adequate or proficient English language skills, as I discuss in Chapter 4. All of the informal conversations during participant observation, semi-structured interviews, and focus group discussions were held in English and not in Urdu or other Pakistani languages. Most of the second-generation participants spoke English as their first language. Several of the second-generation respondents in Dublin learned to speak Urdu as their first language, but became fluent in English. It is important to note that I did not need a translator during the semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions, or while completing my transcripts. Because the sample consists of largely middle-class migrants and second-generation participants, it may be argued that this study does not account for the experiences of non-English speaking young Pakistani men in Dublin and Boston.
Another key element of comparative research is the study of *anomalies*, or rare individuals, cases and examples, which do not easily compare with others, as discussed by Pepin (2003: 6). Accounting for anomalies among Pakistani populations in Dublin and Boston allowed me to examine how different groups of Pakistanis position themselves towards ethnicity, religion, and nationality. The ‘anomalies’ in this study include two gay men, an Ahmadi Muslim, a Jewish respondent and a Hindu respondent, as well as members of sub-ethnic groups, such as the Baloch and Pashtuns. In accounting for anomalies within the Pakistani populations of Dublin and Boston, I was able to shed light upon how young Pakistani men in diaspora negotiate their ethnic, religious, and national group affiliations and how these individuals interact with members inside and outside of their immediate communities.

Cross-national research plays a pivotal role in promoting the contrasting conditions of two or more societies. Because cross-national comparisons are concerned with the study of particular issues or phenomena in two or more countries, I chose several ‘macro’ concepts (Hantrais and Mangen, 1998) that play a major role in the larger Irish and American societies. These concepts allowed me to compare the experiences of young Pakistani men in diaspora. As discussed in Chapter 1, Ireland and the US offer a rich cross-national comparison because of a combination of several factors including the migration history of Pakistanis to Ireland and the US, the historic role of religion in these societies, differing notions of nationality, and contemporary relations between Pakistanis and non-Pakistanis in these two countries. Ireland, a new host migrant society, is a predominantly white, Catholic country, while the US, an old host migrant society, is more ethnically and religiously heterogeneous. At the state level, Ireland and the US have different constitutional principles, such as a Catholic ethos in the Irish context and the separation of Church and State in the American context. These differences in relation to the role of religion in Ireland and the US ultimately affect how young Pakistani Muslim and non-Muslim men position themselves towards Irish and American identities. Moreover, young Pakistani men living in these two countries have experienced racism and discrimination albeit for particular reasons in relation to the unique crisis racisms that have recently impacted Ireland’s economy and the US’s national security. The combination of
these conflicting phenomena provide an appealing context for comparing the experiences of young first- and second-generation Pakistani Muslim and non-Muslim men living in Dublin and Boston.

Case Study Design

In order to account for the variety of experiences among young Pakistani men in Dublin and Boston, it became important for me to base this comparative cross-national project in a *case study* design, which initiates an ‘empirical enquiry to investigate a contemporary phenomenon in a real-life context’ (Yin, 2003: 13). According to Gobo (2011), a case study denotes research that is embedded in a particular physical and sociocultural context over a certain period of time (ibid.: 16). He adds that case studies use diverse methods and data collection tools, which may include documentary analysis, participant observation, and semi-structured interviews.

Yin (2003) distinguishes between three kinds of case study designs. The *descriptive* case study provides a narrative account of an individual’s lived experience by means of ‘a complete description of a phenomenon within its context’ (ibid.: 5). The *explanatory* case study attempts to reveal existing theories through a ‘cause and effect’ method. The *exploratory* case study generates new theories and helps to determine the feasibility of the research design and methodology. Because of the lack of data and literature available on the Pakistani populations of Dublin and Boston, I chose the exploratory case study. When designing this study, I had to account for the fact that most of the descriptions of the Pakistani communities in these two cities were descriptive, therefore, I thought the exploratory case study design would allow me to develop new theoretical insight in relation to my participants’ experiences with family, religion, and identity.

Despite the benefits of exploratory case studies, there are several potential limitations with this design. One commonly cited issue is that the data has limited external validity because of the small number and nature of the research units (Verschuren, 2003). Because this is a study focused on the experiences of a
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particular diasporic population, it became important for me to sample a wide range of young Pakistani men to ensure that I was not researching individuals from dominant ethnic or religious groups, such as Sunni Muslims or Punjabis. As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, Pakistanis are part of a complex population with divisions based on ethnicity, religion, sect, language, gender, and class. To account for this heterogeneity, I employed a *multiple research* case study design, which allowed me to replicate insight and analyse contrasting situations among different individuals and groups (Yin, 2003). Multiple research cases enriched the data because it allowed me to juxtapose the experiences of Pakistanis from different backgrounds. By implementing this design, I was able to identify Pakistanis living in the *border zones* of hegemonic narratives of ethnic, religious, and national group membership (Rosaldo, 1989: 207).

By using the exploratory and multiple case study design, I was able to ‘open-up’ my study to ideas which I had not considered before starting the official fieldwork phase. Before conducting pilot interviews, which I discuss in more detail later in this chapter, I thought that religion, particularly Islam, would play a dominant role in the lived experiences of young Pakistani men in Dublin and Boston. After carrying out pilot interviews, I realised that these populations were made up of a diverse range of Islamic and non-Islamic affiliations, while some individuals had little or no connection with religion. Nevertheless, one of the limitations of this research design may be said to be researcher bias (Yin, 2003). Ragin (1989) argues that data may be skewed because researchers allow their favourite respondents to inform or shape how the data is analysed and presented (ibid.: ix). To account for researcher bias, I used triangulation\(^5^9\) in order to increase the objectivity of data. It should also be made clear that my analysis from data is not reflective of the entire sample of participants, but rather to the conceptual and theoretical framework, as discussed in Chapter 2. For example, the experiences of the Ahmadi Muslim participant are not necessarily applicable to a Shia Muslim or non-Muslim respondents. My intention was not to compare my participants’ stories with one another, but rather to analyse their individual experiences with

\(^{5^9}\) Triangulation has been defined as the application and combination of multiple data collection tools in order to study the same social phenomenon (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000).
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diaspora theory and its related concepts of homeland, belonging, boundary maintenance, cultural borderland, as well as hybrid and liquid identities.

Access and Sampling

I used different tactics to gain access to participants, because social science researchers should remain flexible in their sampling strategies (Berg, 2009). The methods I used were gatekeepers and what I refer to as personal initiative. Gatekeepers are individuals who have knowledge of the community being researched and the capacity to encourage individuals to participate in the study (Hennink et al., 2011: 92). There are several reasons why gatekeepers can be important tools when conducting fieldwork. Firstly, they provide valuable information about the community under observation, and they can assist in recruitment procedures. Secondly, gatekeepers may be effective advocates of the study, which would add to the researcher’s credentials and perhaps build rapport between the researcher and potential interviewees. Thirdly, it may be local protocol to meet with community leaders before conducting research in particular environments.

Because I am neither Pakistani nor Muslim, I felt that it was necessary for me to use gatekeepers as an initial means of gaining access to research sites, specifically mosques. To gain access to the Blackpitts prayer room in Dublin, I used a gatekeeper who was introduced to me through a former professor in the US. This gatekeeper contacted the imam\(^{60}\) of Blackpitts and explained to him the nature of the study and my credentials as a researcher. On the other hand, I gained access to Anwar Al Medina mosque in Dublin through personal initiative, which entailed visiting the mosque unannounced in order to show potential participants that I was willing and able to take self-action in the pursuit of my research. At Anwar Al Medina, I developed rapport with influential individuals, who allowed me regular access to cultural and religious events.

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\(^{60}\) This Arabic term refers to a Muslim leader of a particular mosque. They typically perform religious rituals, provide spiritual guidance, and act as representatives on behalf of the community.
The gatekeeper in Boston was neither Pakistani nor Muslim, but he was considered an influential figure among the community for his work with the Pakistani Consulate of Boston. This gatekeeper, who I met during a previous research project, provided me with contact numbers and emails of several prominent Pakistan businessmen, doctors, and engineers. Through my initial meetings with these individuals, I was able to gain access to mosques and other cultural organisations. I did not, however, depend on these gatekeepers in either city as a means to locate potential participants for this study. The gatekeepers in both Dublin and Boston were used solely as a means to gain access to mosques and other research sites. I did not rely on gatekeepers too much during fieldwork because gatekeepers can segregate a researcher ‘out’ rather than integrate him ‘into’ communities. Gatekeepers have been known to implement stalling devices and fail to set up procedures that put researchers in contact with potential participants (Arksey and Knight, 1999: 64). Throughout the fieldwork, I maintained the power to select participants. I based the selection on my own evaluation of how potential respondents may enrich the data in light of my research aim of accounting for the heterogeneity of the Pakistani diaspora.

Between the summer of 2010 and the summer of 2012, I initiated contact with Muslim communities, non-Muslim communities, cultural organisations, restaurants, university societies, and businesses, which were identified through Internet searches and social media. I contacted these outlets through email that included an attached document on official Trinity College Dublin stationary, which outlined my research aims, goals, methods, and a short biography that included my personal background and previous research undertaken (see Appendix 1). This method was successful because it allowed Pakistanis to ‘scan’ me and to evaluate whether or not I should be ‘let in’ to their communities. On most occasions, my personal initiative was received successfully and warmly because Pakistanis would often invite me to meet with them for lunch or tea. Rarely was my request ignored or denied. In using personal initiative rather than simply gatekeepers, I demonstrated to potential participants that I had a strong sense of responsibility for my research and that I had the skills to adapt to environments in which Pakistanis and Muslims socialise.
Once I gained access to various research sites in Dublin and Boston, I deployed the snowballing sampling technique to begin identifying relevant participants for this study. Snowballing is ‘a process of making initial contacts with a few relevant people and then gradually building on these contacts and relationships to locate more research relevant participants’ (Bryman, 2008: 184). Snowballing was an appropriate technique for studying the Pakistani diaspora because it helped to locate individuals with ‘special characteristics’ and ‘rare experiences’, (Hennink et al., 2011: 100), which helped to shed light on the diversity of Pakistani communities. This approach allowed me to identify ‘hidden’ populations that would have been difficult to find through other recruitment methods and assisted me in developing a wide chain of acquaintances across different ethnic and religious groups with the Pakistani populations of Dublin and Boston. These acquaintances were used as a means of gaining access to research sites as well as locating potential participants to be interviewed. Once an acquaintance helped me gain access to a specific community, I took the initiative to locate other potential participants who would fit into my theoretical framework and research aims.

Like other sampling techniques, snowballing has its limitations. Arber (1993) argues that the snowball technique contributes to researcher bias because it only locates participants within a specific network of people. He adds that locating respondents in particular networks leads to generalisations of the sample group. To account for these criticisms, Hennink et al. (2011) call on researchers to engage in a screening process for participants before the interview. Screening processes entail a short discussion with participants to examine whether or not they help to achieve the research aims of the study. In screening potential respondents, I looked for ways in which they might contribute to my aim of shedding light on the heterogeneity of the Pakistani diaspora. When screening the respondents, I made sure to avoid extensive background checks because doing so would have been timely and exhaustive mini case studies (Yin, 2003: 13). In addition to adopting a screening process of participants, I also made sure to broaden my sample as much as possible by meeting with young Pakistani men in various environments, including cultural organisations, universities, restaurants, and shops. In reaching out to a wide network of potential respondents, I was able to account for the diversity of Pakistani populations in Dublin and Boston.
The sample size consisted of forty-one individuals, including a relatively balanced number of first- and second-generation respondents. In total, I met with 18 first-generation interviewees and 23 second-generation interviewees. This sample size ensured that the data was not heavily weighted in the experiences of either migrants or native-born interviewees. Overall, I carried out 30 semi-structured interviews and four focus groups. Five out of the seven first-generation semi-structured interviewees in Dublin migrated to Ireland to take up jobs in the Irish high-tech industry, while two of these interviewees arrived for a higher education. Two of the men in this group had recently migrated from the UK and Germany. All of the first-generation participants in Dublin had earned at least a bachelor’s degree from a university in Pakistan or in a Western country. In terms of their ethnicity and religious background, the first-generation respondents in Dublin included Deobandi Muslims, Sufi Muslims, atheists, one Hindu, one Baloch, as well as non-practicing Muslims. Two of the first-generation participants of Focus Group 1 in Dublin (see Appendix 4) participated in the semi-structured interviews, while the other two were Sunni Muslims, a Punjabi, and a Pashtun, respectively. These participants were professional workers in Dublin’s high-tech industry. The first-generation respondents in Focus Group 2 in Dublin (see Appendix 4) included Sunni and Shia Muslims who came from Punjabi and Sindhi backgrounds.

The first-generation sample in Boston had a similar background in terms of employment and educational attainment. All of these first-generation respondents were professionals, with jobs ranging from working in high-tech companies, running successful small businesses, or conducting research in the medical profession. Seven of the eight first-generation semi-structured interviewees in Boston had at least a bachelor’s degree. Two of these participants were in the process of obtaining a doctorate degree, while two others had already earned master’s degrees. Like in Dublin, I accounted for the heterogeneity of the Pakistani community in Boston by interviewing Sufi Muslims, Shia Muslims, Pashtuns, as well as an atheist, Ahmadi Muslim, and two gay men. Focus Group 1 in Boston (see Appendix 5) had two first-generation participants, both of whom took part in the semi-structured interviews. I asked these respondents to partake in this focus group because I considered them both anomalies for their Jewish and
atheist backgrounds. Adding them to a discussion with three second-generation Muslim participants helped to enrich the variety of data and led to an interesting interaction among the selected respondents.

Five out of the six second-generation semi-structured participants in Dublin were born in Ireland\textsuperscript{61}. One of these respondents was born in Pakistan, but migrated to Ireland at a very young age. I consider him second-generation because he does not remember the time he spent in Pakistan. Two of the second-generation semi-structured interviewees in Dublin chose to enter into family businesses instead of attending university. Three more of these participants held master’s degrees and the two others earned bachelor’s degrees. Like the first-generation participants in Dublin, the majority of the parents of the second-generation participants were born in British India, pre-Partition\textsuperscript{62}. In terms of the sample of the two focus groups in Dublin, three second-generation respondents were born in either Ireland or the UK. The sub-ethnic and religious backgrounds of these interviewees included a Kashmiri, a Punjabi, a non-practicing Muslim, a Barelvi Muslim, and a mainstream Sunni Muslim.

All of the second-generation participants in Boston were born in the US. However, three of these nine second-generation semi-structured interview respondents were not born in Boston, but rather other states of the US (see Appendix 3). Like in Dublin, one of these respondents was born in Pakistan but migrated to the US as an infant. All nine of the second-generation semi-structured interviewees in Boston were either obtaining a bachelor’s degree or had previously received one. Three of these second-generation participants were pursuing their doctorates at the time of our interview, while two more had earned master’s degrees. In terms of the second-generation sample of the focus groups, three of the four participants in Focus Group 1 (see Appendix 5) also participated in the semi-structured interviews. The four second-generation interviewees of this

\textsuperscript{61} Michael, a second-generation participant in Dublin, was born in the Netherlands.

\textsuperscript{62} Pre-Partition India refers to a large area of South Asia before the creation of the Indian and Pakistani states in 1947. This area spanned as far west as modern day Balochistan (Pakistan), north as modern day Kashmir, east as modern day Bangladesh, and as south modern day India. The partition lines drawn between India and Pakistan, as highlighted by Purkayastha (2005), were based upon the idea that India and Pakistani would represent Hindu and Muslim populations in these areas.
focus group included a Sunni Muslim of Sindhi background and a Sufi Muslim of Sindhi background. Focus Group 2 in Boston (see Appendix 5) consisted of five young Pakistani men who were all born in the US. The jobs of these participants ranged from being high school and college students to working in professional job occupations. All of these respondents in Focus Group 2 in Boston were practicing Muslims of Punjabi and Sindhi backgrounds.

The age range of the sample spanned from 18 to 35 years at the time of the semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions. The age range of the first-generation participants in Dublin spanned from 25 to 35 years, whereas the age range of the first-generation respondents in Boston spanned from 20 to 35 years. In terms of the second-generation interviewees in Dublin, their age range spanned from 22 to 35 years. The age range of the second-generation participants in Boston spanned from 18 to 30 years.

I chose this age range of 18 to 35 years for several reasons. Erikson (1968/1994) develops an eight-stage theory of identity development in which he identifies the life-period of young adulthood. According to him, young adults experience the ‘intimacy versus isolation conflict’, in which individuals desire acceptance but fear rejection from the Other, a term conceptualised in Chapter 2. Erikson argues that this may lead individuals to isolation and the deliberate effort to distance themselves from the culture of the perceived Other. Building on Erikson, Davidson et al. (2008) refers to young adulthood as a time that individuals engage in extensive identity exploration, which is intensified by new experiences such as living away from home and exposure to different social environments. Similarly, Capps (1997: 5) notes that young adulthood is a time when individuals ‘return to one’s origins, and especially [to] a revisiting of the separation process, in search of grounds for trust and reassurance’. These ideas in relation to young adulthood are pertinent to this study because diaspora theory also engages with the concepts of ‘separation’, ‘new experiences’, and ‘home’. In addition to the theoretical

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63 Erikson’s eight stages of identity development include: basic trust vs. basic mistrust (infancy); autonomy vs. shame and doubt (early childhood); initiative vs. guilt (play age); industry vs. inferiority (school age); identity vs. identity confusion (adolescence); intimacy vs. isolation (young adulthood); generativity vs. stagnation (adulthood); and integrity vs. despair (late adulthood) (as found in Cole Jr., 2009: 541).
justification for choosing to sample young Pakistani men between the ages of 18 and 35, it was pragmatic for me to sample young adults because this age range avoids complex ethical clearances with minors. I did not select participants over the age of 35 because most Pakistanis in Dublin and Boston over this age are first-generation migrants, which means that I would not have been able to account for the experiences of second-generation Pakistanis in diaspora.

**Data Collection Tools**

A variety of data collection tools were used during research because case studies rely on multiple techniques for gathering data (Rossman and Rallis, 2003: 105). The four data collection tools deployed in the study included documentary analysis, participant observation, semi-structured interviews, and focus group discussions. This multi-layered approach to gathering data has been described as *triangulation*, or the use of a combination of methods to explore one set of research questions. Using triangulation allowed me to combine different kinds of data and counteract the potential threat to the credibility and validity of the data (Berg, 2009: 6).

**Documentary Analysis**

Before beginning the fieldwork, I used *documentary analysis* to gather information on the Pakistani populations of Dublin and Boston. According to Atkinson and Coffey (2004), documents are considered a source of data in their own right. The documents that I consulted were either print copies or online texts. The majority of these texts were newspaper articles, but this analysis also including other online media websites, as these are also considered to be ‘documents’ (Finnegan, 2006). I used documentary analysis to engage in *population mapping*, a technique that entailed analysing records in order to gain a better understanding of the demographic makeup of a particular community. I began to map the Pakistani populations of Dublin and Boston during the first year of this study in 2010; the purpose of which was to educate myself on the demographic makeup of these communities before starting fieldwork. Population mapping was a necessary method because of the lack of academic literature
available on the Pakistani populations in Dublin and Boston. In mapping Pakistanis in these cities, I consulted with *The Irish Times* and *The Boston Globe*, two of the most widely read newspapers in Dublin and Boston. These newspapers provided critical insight into the mosques, cultural centres, universities, organisations, neighbourhoods, restaurants, and businesses where Pakistanis pray, live, socialise, and work. In addition to these newspapers, I visited other online websites including those of mosques and cultural organisations in order to further familiarise myself further with these particular Pakistani populations.

Despite the benefits which documentary analysis offered in terms of mapping these populations, there are limitations associated with this data collection tool. Sapsford and Jupp (1996) caution researchers to be careful in analysing documents because documents are always produced and shaped by authors and their sources (ibid.: 145). To account for this limitation, I distinguished between primary and secondary sources. In the research, I followed Mogalakwe (2006) and considered primary documents to be eyewitness accounts produced by people who experienced a particular event in person (ibid.: 222-223). One example of a primary source was a journalist’s observations of his interactions with members of different Pakistani communities and his experience of attending various cultural and religious events. Such primary sources, which depicted individuals’ experiences and opinions, provided me with raw evidence of Pakistanis in Dublin and Boston. I also categorised the websites of mosques, cultural organisations, businesses, and university associations to be primary documents because these websites were created by and for the communities that they represent. I considered secondary documents to be reports produced by people who were not present at specific events related to Pakistanis, but who received eyewitness accounts to compile information (ibid.). In analysing documentary sources, I tried to focus more on primary documents because they are original material that has not been altered by any person.

*Participant Observation*

While documentary analysis provided a necessary overview of the ethnic, cultural, and religious characteristics of the Pakistani populations of Dublin and Boston, it
did not allow me to observe Pakistanis in person. To account for this type of analysis, I engaged in participant observation, a process that entails ‘learning [about communities] through exposure to or involvement in the daily routine and activities of participants’ (Schensul et al., 1999: 91). Gobo (2011) suggests that there are two main elements of participant observation. The first element is to establish a direct relationship with participants, which entailed spending time with Pakistanis in their natural environments and interacting with them in their everyday routines (ibid.: 17). The second element is to learn their various codes in order to understand the meaning of their actions (ibid.). Din (2006) refers to this code as ‘understanding Pakistani etiquette’, which entails familiarizing one’s self with the intricacies of Pakistani culture. I demonstrated Pakistani etiquette by removing my shoes and exchanging salam (greetings) with potential participants in their homes, by first shaking hands with the eldest Pakistani in the setting, and discussing important topics among Pakistanis, such as family and Pakistani current events, among other courtesies (ibid.: 13).

In order to meet Pakistanis in Dublin and Boston, I followed Bolognani (2007) and ‘made myself public’ by spending time in locations where potential participants congregate, such as mosques, cultural centres, universities, restaurants, shops, and particular neighbourhoods where Pakistanis interact (ibid.: 284). The purpose of adopting this multi-sited approach was to ensure that I was not simply observing Pakistanis of specific affiliations, such as Pakistani Muslims or perhaps even Sunni Muslims. While immersed in these environments, I tried to start conversations with people rather than opting for others to approach me. To effectively engage in participant observation, I made an effort to start casual conversations because this tactic allowed me to hear the life stories of potential participants. My goal with these casual conversations was to listen to individual oral narratives and life experiences, at which point I was able to evaluate whether or not the individual may help to achieve my aim of gathering data on the wide range of social backgrounds among Pakistanis in diaspora.

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64 Assalamalaikum, the typical salam greeting, means ‘peace be upon you’ in Arabic. It is the most common greeting among Muslims. A handshake is the most typical greeting in Pakistan, though it is not appropriate for a man to shake hands with or to touch a woman in public (Nath, 2005: 413).
Engaging in participant observation also provided a means to develop a trustworthy image and credible reputation among the participants under evaluation. In the autumn of 2011 and spring of 2012, the imam of the Blackpitts mosque requested that I deliver several short lectures to small Muslim prayer groups. Held after evening prayers, these short lectures lasted about twenty minutes and entailed me sharing some of my research on Islamophobia and relations between Muslims and non-Muslims in Ireland and the US. These lectures gave me the opportunity to interact with young Pakistani men and observe a Deobandi community. It also allowed me to develop rapport with potential participants from this particular Muslim population. The participant observation in Ireland also included taking part in several events at Anwar Al Medina, a Sufi mosque in the north side of Dublin. At Al Medina, I joined several nighttime dhikrs to experience a mystical Islamic tradition and to interact with and make myself known to members of this particular Pakistani community. On several occasions, I joined Pakistanis after dhikr for South Asian food and tea. In May 2013, several leaders of Al Medina requested that I film a short documentary of their annual ‘peace march’ to celebrate the birthday of Muhammad, which Pakistani Muslims refer to as mawlid.

The participant observation also led to further engagements with Pakistani communities. In February 2014, the imam of the A1 Mustafa Islamic Educational and Cultural Centre Ireland invited me to give a speech at their annual mawlid Peace Conference (see Al Mustafa Islamic Educational and Cultural Centre Ireland, 2014). These opportunities were made possible after spending many hours at research sites and building relationships with the Pakistani communities in Dublin. My participant observation, ultimately, provided me with tacit knowledge of the various Pakistani populations in this area. In immersing myself within their environments, I was able to interact closely with young Pakistani men and develop a sense of being a part of Pakistani communities. Participant observation was particularly useful in Dublin because it helped to counteract my ‘outsider’ status as a Catholic American. Demonstrating that I was willing and

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65 Dhikr is the Arabic word for ‘remembrance of God’ (Geels, 1996: 229). During a dhikr, Sufi Muslims engage in a devotional prayer in which short phrases are repeated silently or loudly.

66 The title of this short documentary was called ‘What Studying Muhammad Taught Me About Islam’ (Considine, 2014).
able to partake in Pakistani cultural and religious activities helped me to gain the respect of my participants. Because of the relationships I built during participant observation, I was able to carry out interview and discussions in a comfortable and trustworthy manner, which ultimately led to rich data.

The participant observation in Boston was carried out during the spring and summer months between 2011 and 2013. Conducting the participant observation during these months provided the opportunity to meet with Pakistani Muslims during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan. Several of the mosques that I visited during these periods, including the Islamic Center of Boston and the American Islamic Congress, had weekly iftars and other events in relation to Ramadan. These large gatherings allowed me to interact with different groups of Pakistani Muslims. On several occasions, I assisted the organisers of these events by serving food or arranging furniture around the building. In helping Pakistani Muslims with their religious practices, I was able to develop rapport with these communities and demonstrate to potential participants that I was a reliable person and someone with whom they would be comfortable interacting.

During and after participant observation, I repeatedly made field notes. Field notes provide accounts of at least three categories of observable experiences which include: verbal exchanges between others or between the researcher and others; practices including various routines, actions, and interactions among and between participants; and connections between and among observed exchanges and practices (Berg, 2009: 218). Though I occasionally made field notes during the participant observation, I tended to write down my thoughts immediately after the excursion so that less data was forgotten. Taking field notes immediately after an event lessened the chances of inaccuracies and biases creeping into the study (Foster, 2006: 83). Field notes were important to this research because they allowed me to document what I was observing, my own feelings and emotions as a researcher, as well as potential biases of my observations. They also allowed me to crosscheck data obtained in the documentary analysis. The following table

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67 An iftar is an evening meal to break the daily fast during Ramadan, the holy month of Islam.
specifies the mosques and organisations I visited in Dublin and Boston and provides details about the data gathering process.

Table 3.1: Summary of participant observation sites in Dublin and Boston

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Blackpitts prayer room</th>
<th>Anwar Al Madina</th>
<th>Islamic Center of Boston</th>
<th>American Islamic Congress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>The Liberties, Dublin</td>
<td>Talbot Street, Dublin city centre</td>
<td>Wayland, Boston suburb</td>
<td>Newbury St., Boston city centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purpose of site</td>
<td>Prayer room</td>
<td>Mosque</td>
<td>Mosque</td>
<td>Cultural organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious orientation</td>
<td>Deobandi</td>
<td>Barelvi</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Secular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic makeup</td>
<td>Pakistanis, Indonesians, Malaysians, North Africans</td>
<td>Pakistanis, South Asians, Africans, Some Arabs</td>
<td>Mostly South Asian</td>
<td>South Asians, Arabs, Non-Muslims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language spoken</td>
<td>Urdu and English</td>
<td>Urdu and English</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The participant observation led to the blurring of my positions as an insider and outsider because some Pakistanis considered me to be an 'honorary member' of their respective communities (Bolognani, 2007: 285). Adler and Adler (1987) identified three ‘membership roles’ that qualitative researchers engage in during observational methods. The first, ‘peripheral member’, refers to a researcher who does not participate in the core activities of group members. The second, an ‘active member’, is a researcher who becomes involved with the central activities of the group without fully committing themselves to the members’ values and goals. The third, ‘complete member’, are researchers who are already members of the group or become fully affiliated during the course of the research. I consider
my membership role to be ‘active’ rather than ‘peripheral’ or ‘complete’ because I engaged in cultural and religious activities with Pakistanis, but did not convert to their religions or wear their South Asian-style clothing. Nevertheless, several Pakistanis with whom I interacted with considered me to be like a brother because of my knowledge of Islam. Speaking of the dangers of closely interacting with participants, Bolognani (2007) states that there is a real danger of getting too close to participants because it can shape how a researcher interprets the data (ibid.: 285). However, there are also positives with having close relationships with participants. Outsiders engaging in participant observation need to be close to individuals in the community to gain access and guarantee the participants’ trust during the interview process.

Semi-structured Interviews

The semi-structured interview was a useful data collection tool for this study because it provided the opportunity to investigate how individuals perceive, describe, feel, judge, remember, make sense of, and talk about their social worlds (Patton, 2002: 104). Wengraf (2001) claims that semi-structured interviews are designed to have a number of interviewer questions prepared in advance but such prepared questions are designed to be sufficiently open that the subsequent questions of the interviewer cannot be planned in advance but must be improvised in a careful and theorized way (ibid.: 5)

The semi-structured interviews had a number of questions that I prepared in advance of the actual interview. These questions were carefully theorised before the interview and were designed to be sufficiently ‘open’ to elicit the experiences of family, religion, and identity among the participants. In total, I carried out thirty semi-structured interviews, fifteen in each city. Of the first-generation interviews, seven were carried out in Dublin and eight conducted in Boston (see Appendix 2 for profile of first-generation participants). Of the second-generation, I had six semi-structured interviews in Dublin and nine in Boston (see Appendix 3 for profile of second-generation participants). While carrying out these interviews, I used an interview guide that allowed me to elicit participants’ emotions and
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opinions (see Appendix 4 for the interview guide). This guide was designed in a simple manner and the questions were easy to understand. The nineteen questions of the guide were ordered in a logical sequence and structured around the main research themes of family, religion, and identity. Despite the logical sequence of the guide, the questions were often raised in a random manner depending on the responses of the participants. On several occasions, the interview guide was put aside to give respondents the freedom to ascribe meaning to their experiences and to let them set the tone of the interview.

The semi-structured interview guide was piloted in the summer of 2011. The purpose for carrying out this pilot phase was to refine the interview guide, begin building rapport with Pakistanis, and assess how difficult it would be to gain insight into their lived experiences. During this period, I met with nine young Pakistanis individually. The research design at this period of the project included young Pakistani women in the sample. In the fall of 2010, I decided to drop young Pakistani women from my sample in order to limit the number of comparisons in the study; Pakistani women’s circumstances would be different from men’s, which would, in addition to the cross-national element, add another aspect to studying Pakistanis in diaspora.

The pilot phase of the interview guide significantly affected the overall content of forthcoming semi-structured interviews. During the pilot phase, I realised that family had an impact on the experiences of first- and second-generation Pakistanis in diaspora. To account for the theme of family, I added several questions on family life and intergenerational dynamics. Before beginning pilot interviews, I was also under the impression that Islam was an important element in the experiences of my respondents. These interviews allowed me to interact with non-practicing Muslims, and I learned that some young Pakistani men are non-Muslim or have no affiliation with religion. These developments encouraged me to widen the semi-structured interview questions in order to account for potential non-Muslim interviewees.

The semi-structured interview guide was finalised in the fall of 2011. The first set of questions (Questions 1-5) was designed to help ‘break the ice’ and to allow the
interviewees to get comfortable with me. These questions mainly pertained to their social lives and their group of friends. The second set of questions (Questions 6-10) explored the participants’ family experiences, particularly in regards to home life, relationships with parents, and orientation towards ‘Pakistani culture’. The third set of questions (Questions 11-14) dealt with the religious experiences of the respondents and the role that religion played in their everyday lives. The fourth set of questions (Questions 15-22) examined the participants’ senses of belonging, especially in light of their ethnicity, religion, and nationality.

The semi-structured interviews lasted anywhere between sixty to ninety minutes. On several occasions, they lasted for up to two hours. I made sure to conduct these interviews in neutral environments, such as libraries or coffee shops, which were non-religious and non-political. The purpose of conducting the semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions in these locations was to keep participants on the same ‘level’, so that one individual or group did not have an advantage and feel more comfortable than others. Holding semi-structured interviews or focus group discussions in a mosque could have led to the conversations having more ‘religious talk’. The neutral locations I chose were also quiet, which guaranteed a high quality of audio recordings.

Before turning on the audio-recorder to begin the semi-structured interviews, I informed participants of my desire for our interview to be more like an informal discussion between friends. This flexible and free-flowing conversational approach helped the participants to feel at ease and comfortable during the interview (Rossman and Rallis, 2003: 181). I also stressed my desire to discover their opinions and behaviours, rather than to confirm or check on whether these opinions and behaviours were in-tune with cultural norms (Denscombe, 1998: 176). I told them that there were no ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ answers to the questions. All of the semi-structured interviews were transcribed verbatim by means of a small audio-recording device. The purpose of transcribing the interviews was to ‘bring the interviews to life again’ (Denscombe, 1998: 130). The transcripts were not treated as factual reflections of the participants’ experiences, but rather an interpretation of them (Denzin, 1991: 68). Transcribing the semi-structured interviews into a text allowed me to reproduce the discourse of the interviews and
discussions – not only of what was said, but also how and why words and phrases were uttered by my participants (Lindlof and Taylor, 2002: 187). Transcribing the interviews also helped to preserve data in a more permanent, retrievable, examinable, and flexible manner (Lapadat, 2000: 24). While my main goal was to complete a verbatim transcript with no changes made to the raw conversation, I also noted my respondents’ verbal and non-verbal idiosyncrasies in order to counteract the fact the transcripts ‘inevitably lose data from the original encounter’ (Cohen et al., 2000: 280).

While semi-structured interviews offer the benefit of gaining insight into personal opinions and behaviours, they have been criticised for a number of reasons. Silverman (2011) questions whether semi-structured interviews are seductive and whether so-called ‘authentic accounts’ of individuals are more like the repetition of familiar ‘cultural tales’. Miller and Glassner (2011: 131) similarly argue that knowledge of what is ‘out there’ in the social world cannot be obtained from an interview. They claim that the interaction between the interviewer and interviewee creates only ‘narrative versions’ of social worlds (ibid.). In light of these criticisms, my aim was not to represent my participants’ accounts as ‘truths’, but rather to have the interviews portray particular interpretations of various social contexts.

Focus Group Discussions

The focus group method, which was used after the semi-structured interviews, was particularly helpful because it allowed me to explore how different kinds of Pakistanis position themselves in relation to family, religion, and identity. According to Morgan (1988), focus groups are a collective form of interviewing which allows for a researcher to interpret group interactions rather than individual interactions (ibid.: 11). In using this form of data, I was able to discover anxieties, ambivalences, and uncertainties that lie behind individuals’ conformity to social norms, as well as provide insight into collective rather than individual interactions and experiences (Watts and Ebutt, 1987: 27). The semi-structured interviews differed from the focus group discussions because they teased out tensions between young Pakistani men of different ethnicities, religions, and nationalities.
(Morgan and Kruegger, 1993: 18). The goal with the focus group discussions was to have the participants interact with one another, rather than interact with me. These discussions echoed Miller and Glassner (2011) and allowed for the revelation ‘of feelings and beliefs that contradict or conflict with “what everyone thinks”, including sentiments that break the dominant feeling rules’ (ibid.: 137).

Because focus groups are less controlled than semi-structured interviews, I equipped myself with a focus group guide that helped to bring the discussion back into focus if the conversation veered away from the main research themes (Morgan, 1988: 18). The focus group guide included pre-fabricated questions which were designed to maximise the flow of reliable information in relation to gaining insight into as wide of a range of experiences as possible (Holstein and Gubrium, 2011: 150). As the leader and facilitator of the focus group, my aim was not for the participants to reach a consensus on the questions or find solutions to the problems raised in the conversation. The aim, instead, was to facilitate the conversation and bring forth new and interesting viewpoints (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009: 150). Instead of using focus groups to explore new research areas, I used them to examine how my participants positioned themselves on specific topics of interest, which arose out of my other data collection tools, such as documentary analysis and semi-structured interviews. This technique allowed me to use focus groups as a means to clarify or further shed light on issues arising out of the other data collection tools.

The questions of the focus group guide were structured in a logical sequence, but they were often raised in a random manner. The first set of questions (Questions 1-3) was designed to allow the participants to introduce themselves and become familiar with one another’s backgrounds. The second set of questions (Questions 4-7) provided the opportunity for respondents to share their experiences as members of Pakistani families. This set of questions also touched upon issues pertaining to Pakistani culture and transnational links to Pakistan. The third set of questions (Questions 8-10) allowed for the interviewees to share their views about religion and their respective religious traditions, if that was applicable. These questions were designed to be broad in order to account for a range of religious beliefs. The fourth set of questions (Questions 11-18) was designed to discuss
participants’ senses of belonging. These questions were not posed to individuals, but rather to the group as a whole. This tactic encouraged members to interact with one another rather than with me, so that I could facilitate the discussion.

In total, I carried out four focus groups; two in Dublin and two in Boston. The samples of the discussions included a range of participants who would help to account for my aim of capturing the ethnic and religious diversity of young Pakistani men in diaspora. In Dublin, one of my focus groups included five participants; two of whom were practicing Muslims, the other three were either non-practicing Muslims or non-Muslim. These respondents were also mixed in terms of being first- and second-generation interviewees. The second focus group in Dublin was carried out in a mosque. This meant, of course, that these participants were Muslim; this sample allowed me to tap into the religious beliefs and values of the respondents. A similar approach to the sampling frame was carried out in Boston. One of these focus groups had five participants; two of whom were first-generation, while the other three were second-generation. This focus group also accounted for the cultural and religious heterogeneity of Pakistanis in diaspora by including one Jewish, one atheist, and three Sunni Muslim participants. The second focus group in Boston consisted of five second-generation participants and was held in a suburban mosque largely attended by ‘liberal’ Pakistanis. This may have affected the data in the sense that these respondents were born and raised in secular societies, rather than a non-secular society such as Pakistan.

Data Analysis

The data analysis of this study had three phases: transcribing interviews, locating themes in transcripts, and developing a coding system to engage in thematic analysis. The first phase occurred in the field (Bogdan and Biklen, 1982). While in the field, I started to transcribe interviews after each meeting with a participant. This technique allowed me to see important issues in relation to my participants’ experiences and allowed me to start developing thematic categories that were relevant to my aim of shedding light on the heterogeneity of the Pakistani diaspora. Transcribing the interviews and discussions ‘in the field’ provided me
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with a ‘feel for the data’ and helped me to discover my respondents’ experiences with all its textures and nuances (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005: 1279). After transcribing, I made note of revealing aspects of each participant and how their individual experiences may shed light on my three main research themes of family, religion, and identity. Once I had several transcripts finished, I made memos about how participants were similar or different in their experiences. This preliminary analysis of the transcripts also informed my future interviews.

Phase two of the data analysis occurred ‘after the field’ and consisted of locating themes across the transcripts (Bogdan and Biklen, 1982). The first step of phase two was to combine all the transcripts into a coding system. I combined all the transcripts into two separate documents - one for Dublin and one for Boston - and I started highlighting reoccurring themes, which helped to shed light upon the different ways of making sense of my main research themes of family, religion, and identity. I juxtaposed that with the memos that I made in phase one. To further analyse the data, I developed a coding system, which represented the process of conceptualising and fragmenting the data (Bryman and Burgess, 1994). Coding systems are beneficial to researchers because they give order, structure, and allow for the interpretation of large amounts of data (Denscombe, 1998) and they helped to link data with theoretical concepts (Charmaz, 2006: 46). Coding helped to reduce all of my data through the process of ‘selecting, focusing, simplifying, abstracting and transforming’ (Miles and Huberman, 1984: 22).

The coding system had three levels of coding (see Appendix 9 for my coding frame). In the first level, the main themes were ‘the role of family, culture and religion’, ‘lived experiences and social interaction’, and ‘identities and senses of belonging’. I went back to the main documents with all the transcripts and I cut and pasted passages relevant to these three themes. Once this was completed, I moved on to the second level of coding in which I located sub-codes of the main research themes previously mentioned. Under the ‘Role of family, culture and religion’, I located sub-themes of ‘family life’, ‘culture’ and ‘religion’. Similarly, for the theme of ‘Lived experiences and social interaction’, I separated the transcripts into ‘experiences of discrimination’, ‘education’, ‘profession’ and so forth. For the theme of ‘Identities and senses of belonging’, I located themes such
as ‘connection to Irish/American culture’, and ‘senses of belonging to Ireland/US’. The third level of coding further broke down the sub-codes and concepts found in my transcripts. This level of coding built on the previous level of codes. For example, under the section titled ‘Family Life’, I separated passages into ‘Childhood’, ‘Importance of family’, etc. This was similarly done for each of the sub-codes.

The following diagram summarises the first two phases and describes the main features of this third and final phase:

Figure 3.1: Overview of data analysis phases

The third and final phase of the data analysis was thematic analysis in order to understand the coding system. According to Braun and Clarke (2006), thematic analysis is a qualitative analytical method for ‘identifying, analysing and reporting
patterns (themes) within data’ (ibid. 79). It also minimally organises and describes data in rich detail. In this phase, I maintained the frame of the coding system, but I separated the sub-themes and concepts by cities and generations. The codes were then compared and contrasted across the cities and generations. This allowed me to identify similarities and differences between Dublin and Boston and between first and second-generation participants. The purpose of the thematic analysis was to start comparing the codes across the cities and generations in order to further develop the theoretical concepts.

By using constant comparison, I was able to easily move back and forth between the Dublin coding system and the Boston coding system. This technique allowed me to compare my participants’ senses of belonging and other aspects of their experiences. From here, I was able to develop arguments from the codes.

Ethical Issues and Reflections

Because of my interest in researching the sensitive subject of personal experiences, several ethical issues arose out of the implementation of my research design. It was essential for me to acquire the participants’ informed consent, which acknowledged their voluntary participation in a study that is free from fraud, deceit, duress, or similar unfair inducement and manipulation (Berg, 2009: 87). Before beginning each interview, I informed the participant of how I would be using the interview in my study, how the interview would be conducted, and what the benefits were for their participation. To further protect each participant from any duress, I assured him of his confidentiality and anonymity. Each participant was given a pseudonym to protect his identity and ensure that his personal stories were untraceable (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009: 72). I left out some of my participants’ personal details including the names of family members and friends, where they were raised, workplaces, universities attended, and neighbourhoods in which they lived, as well as the places of worship if it was applicable to the individual. In order to distinguish the participants by their

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68 In informing my participants about my research prior to the interview, I followed LeCompte and Preissle (1993) who argue that researchers must explain to participants ‘what is being studied, how it is to be done, and what risks and benefits are expected to be’ (ibid.: 108).
pseudonyms, I gave the first-generation respondents popular names from Pakistan. I used popular ‘Irish’ and ‘American’ names for the second-generation interviewees, which reflects the fact that they were mostly born outside of Pakistan and grew up in Ireland and the US.

My physical characteristics and personal background as a white Catholic American may have affected the discourse of the semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions. In following Riessman (1993), interviewees may reveal personal information to certain types of people who share their ethnicity, religion, and nationality (ibid.: 11). My participants’ stories may have taken a different form if someone else was the listener. Din (2006: 10), for example, found that young British Pakistanis in Bradford were comfortable and open to discussing sensitive issues with him because of his own status as an *apna*, or member of the Pakistani community. On the other hand, Haw (1998), a white Christian researcher who explored the educational experiences of Muslims girls, raised the concern of how white power and privilege alters the discourse between researcher and interviewee. Haw, however, stated that ‘we all speak from a particular standpoint, out of particular experience, a particular history, a particular culture and that this is crucial to our subjectivity does not imply that we can only research the familiar’ (ibid.: 26). While my own ethnic background may have altered the responses provided by my participants, this does not negate their significance because the data may have been altered in a different way if I were Pakistani.

Several of the participants stated that it was easier to open-up to non-Pakistanis because they were concerned about being judged by insiders, or people of their own community. An insider is a researcher who has a membership role with the community under research. When a researcher is an insider, interviewees may hide themselves out of fear, self-protection, and guilt (Fay, 1996). According to Adler and Adler (1987), being an insider provides the researcher a certain amount of legitimacy. However, a downside of being an insider is that researchers may find themselves caught between ‘loyalty tugs’ and ‘behavioral claims’ (Brannick and Coghlan, 2007: 70). In comparing the insider and outsider status, Kanuha (2000) claims that insiders who study their own communities oftentimes know ‘too much or [are] too close to the project and may be too similar to those being
studied' (ibid.: 44). On the other hand, researchers who adopt the outsider position have several advantages in carrying out qualitative research. Fay (1996) argues that outsiders have the adequate distance from the participants in order to understand their overlapping, confusing, mixed, and sometimes contradictory motives, desires, and feelings (ibid.: 20). He also claims that outsiders may be better able to appreciate the wider perspective, with its connections, causal patterns, and influences.

Throughout this research, I adopted the positions of insider and outsider, which depended upon the relationship between my own background and my participants’ ages, places of birth, nationalities, and other aspects of their identities. In Boston, I felt that I was often treated as an insider because I shared the same nationality as many of my first- and second-generation participants. However, it should be made clear that being an American citizen does not denote complete sameness between the respondents and me. When I perceived myself to be an outsider in situations, such as those in Dublin mosques, my white Catholic American background did not mean complete difference with my interviewees. Many of the Pakistanis with whom I interacted were comfortable with me because of my Catholic identity. My position as a researcher, therefore, can be understood by conjoining insider and outsider with a hyphen. This hyphen acts as a third space, ‘a space between, a space of paradox, ambiguity, and ambivalence, as well as conjunction and disjunction’ (Dwyer and Buckle, 2009: 60). The hyphen allowed me to use both the insider and outsider position in relation to the participants. The blurring of my position as an insider and outsider suggests that a researcher’s position towards their respondents is a fluid concept and one that is dependent upon social and geographical contexts. The assumption that only an insider can study its own community ignores the innate heterogeneity of our social identities (Fletcher and Spracklen, 2014).

On several occasions during the fieldwork, I felt that some young Pakistani men in Dublin and Boston were suspicious of my intentions as a researcher who was an outsider to their community. In one case, a Pakistani Muslim migrant in Dublin was unsure about whether or not he wanted to conduct a semi-structured interview with me. Later on, I learned from his friend that the individual believed that I
might have been working for the Central Intelligence Agency\(^6\). In Boston, several young Pakistani Muslims were suspicious of my intentions to conduct fieldwork in their mosque because they thought that I was an informant of the Federal Bureau of Investigation\(^7\). These types of suspicions, which I encountered, are likely the result of a ‘climate of Islamophobia’ that has ‘created a general sense of mistrust towards people investigating issues concerning Muslims’ (Bolognani, 2007). When these cases arose, I encouraged my potential participants to read my published material on improving relations between Muslims and non-Muslims, which helped ease their suspicion of me. In some cases, young Pakistani men would send me an email telling me how much they appreciated my effort towards understanding Pakistanis and Islam.

I shall now move on to discuss the family experiences of my first- and second-generation participants in Dublin and Boston.

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\(^6\) The Central Intelligence Agency, or CIA, is an intelligence-gathering agency within the US federal government.

\(^7\) The Federal Bureau of Investigation, or FBI, is also an intelligence-gathering agency within the US federal government. According to its website, one of the main aims of the FBI ‘is to protect and defend the United States against terrorist and foreign intelligence threats’. A report of the Human Rights Watch, as discussed by Valery (2014), states that the FBI has encouraged and funded Muslims in the US to commit terrorist acts.
CHAPTER 4:
FAMILY EXPERIENCES IN THE PAKISTANI DIASPORA

The purpose of this chapter is to explore the roles that the family structure and family values play in the lives of young first- and second-generation Pakistani men in diaspora. In doing so, I examine the internal dynamics of Pakistani families and look at how the migrant culture is maintained or transformed by first- and second-generation Pakistani men in Dublin and Boston. The chapter is divided into six sections. The first section highlights the importance that respondents place on the family unit in relation to other aspects of their lives. The second section looks at the transmission of cultural capital in Pakistani families and how this affects the participants. The following two sections examine issues that cause intergenerational conflict within families, specifically marriage arrangements and alcohol consumption. In the fifth section, I focus on how my participants negotiate gender roles and sexuality within their own families. The final section provides an overview of the findings of this chapter.

Maintenance of ‘Traditional’ Pakistani Values

The family structure and family values remain fundamental elements of Pakistani communities in diaspora. The significance of the family structure became clear in the semi-structured interview with Jabar, a Punjabi from Islamabad who has lived in Dublin for over ten years. He was a soft-spoken, fragile-looking migrant who appeared to be on the verge of having a mental and physical breakdown. When we met for conversations over coffee, I found that his life in Dublin seemed to be an everyday struggle, and his exhaustion was felt particularly during our interview in his small convenient store on the southside of Dublin. Jabar seemed deflated and tired of working so hard to make a living in Ireland. Towards the end of our discussion, he nearly broke into tears when we talked about his inability to acquire Irish citizenship, an issue that I discuss in more detail in Chapter 7. Jabar had been living in Ireland for almost a decade at the time of our interview, but his lack of documentation prevented him from returning to his family in Pakistan. Jabar lives in a small apartment with two of friends’ on the northside of Dublin. The
apartment is run-down and located in an area of the city that is considered to be ‘rough’ and ‘working class’, which suggest that Pakistani migrants in Ireland suffer from poor housing conditions. At the end of our interview, he gave me a hug, thanked me for taking the time to meet with him and listen to his stories, and then he gave me a handful of groceries as an act of gratefulness for meeting him. I left his convenient store thinking that Jabar had never interacted closely with people in Ireland.

Despite being far away from home for an extended period, Jabar is still adamant about preserving ‘traditional’ family values. He provided a statement on the links between Pakistani culture and family, which reflects the experiences of many interviewees:

JABAR: [Pakistani culture] is about family, you trust values. You do the respect of older people ... You call them uncle or auntie. It’s [about] family … Families are well attached to each other. It’s not just about you. It’s about the whole, all of us.

Jabar places emphasis on a collective family orientation rather than an individual orientation, and he maintains a preference for this element of the migrant culture in diaspora. He acknowledges the hierarchical nature of Pakistani families by respecting and honouring elder family members by calling them ‘uncle and auntie’.

Linked to the hierarchical structure of Pakistani families is the notion of *izzat*, an Urdu word that may be translated to mean ‘respect’ or ‘honour’. Nadeem, a first-generation Punjabi in Dublin who spoke in a thick Pakistani accent, stated that he respects his grandparents for their morality and their commitment to Islamic beliefs and practices. Nadeem criticised Ireland and Western countries in general for dismissing *izzat* by having too many nursing homes, which he stated reflects the Irish’ desire ‘to get rid of their parents’. Akbar, a Pashtun from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa who now lives in Boston, echoed Nadeem in stating that Pakistani families emphasise a collective orientation and hierarchical family structure, which he argued is not found in American or Western families. He was particularly critical of how youth in Boston treat their parents:
AKBAR: [American kids] are a little rude with their parents, which is not good. Like, if you do like that in Pakistan, it’s not a good thing. You can’t be disrespectful with your mom and dad because they’re doing a lot of things for you.

Akbar perceived the notion of izzat to be inclusive of extended family members, as well as community elders outside of his biraderi. Jabar’s, Nadeem’s, and Akbar’s comments on family structure and values suggest that some first-generation Pakistani men in Dublin and Boston preserve their Pakistani cultural values which they acquired in Pakistan rather than adopt the norms of Irish and American society.

Like their first-generation counterparts, my second-generation participants also spoke about the important roles which family structures and family values have in shaping their lived experiences in diaspora. Aaron, a 33-year-old Sufi Muslim and native of Limerick, reflected Jabar’s, Nadeem’s, and Akbar’s positions on family by stating:

AARON: At this point in my life, the things that are important to me is my family, my children, my wife, my mother, my brothers, my sisters, my nieces, my nephews ... my cousins in Pakistan ... It’s family to me.

Aaron shows that it is possible for young second-generation Pakistani men in Dublin to maintain the family structure of their biraderis even though they were raised in Ireland. He not only discussed the significance of his immediate family in Ireland, but he also noted the extended family abroad. Aaron’s comment on family structure and values suggests that young second-generation Pakistani men in diaspora do not lose touch with family norms of the migrant culture.

In Boston, most of the second-generation respondents also discussed the importance of family structures and family values. However, the second-generation participants in Boston were more likely than their Irish counterparts to distance themselves from the family structure and family values of the homeland. As I discuss in the forthcoming sections, most of my second-generation participants in Boston placed emphasis on an individual orientation instead of the collective family orientation, meaning that their individual needs and desires took
precedence over the needs and desires of the larger family. The second-generation respondents in Boston were also not as familiar with the concepts of *biraderi*, *izzat*, and *sharm* as their counterparts in Dublin. I attribute this to the different migration histories between the Pakistani communities of Ireland and the US. The parents of the second-generation interviewees in Dublin migrated from rural villages in East Punjab, which tend to have a more conservative orientation and a stronger maintenance of *biraderi* than Pakistani families in urban locations, such as Karachi and Lahore. The parents of the second-generation participants in Dublin were also unskilled and uneducated migrants who inevitably maintained strict behavioural and social parameters around the family dynamic that sustained the migrant culture.

In comparison, the parents of the second-generation interviewees in Boston migrated from urban environments, which do not place as much emphasis on the *biraderi* structure. Most of the parents of second-generation participants in Boston also learned English and obtained an education before migrating to the US, which further contributed to the erosion of the migrant social boundary. The differences in how my second-generation respondents in Dublin and Boston position themselves towards the migrant culture highlights that young Pakistani male populations in diaspora do not necessarily orient themselves towards the migrant culture in the same way. The cultural differences between the second-generation respondents in Dublin and Boston are linked to the migration histories of Pakistanis to Ireland and the US and connected to the backgrounds and experiences of their parents who migrated from Pakistan.

**Transmission of Cultural Capital in the Migration Process**

To further understand the family experiences of young first- and second-generation Pakistani men in Dublin and Boston, it is important to examine the cultural capital which their families had while living in Pakistan and brought with them upon migrating to Ireland and the US. The majority of the first-generation participants in both Dublin and Boston came from educated and middle- to upper-class families, while only a few came from working-class backgrounds. These young Pakistani men, like Sahir, had already acquired cultural capital before
migration. He and I met for dinner on several occasions, during which he was always dressed ‘smartly’ in either a suit or business attire. Sahir told me that he is always clean-shaven because it is not professional to have a beard in the nature of his business in the clothing industry. He could be seen as a ‘modern’ Pakistani living in diaspora, even though he deliberately tries to instill ‘traditional’ Pakistani cultural and Islamic values into his children. When we made plans to meet for, Sahir always asked me to choose a halal restaurant, so that he could eat meat and fulfil his Islamic obligations. While he clearly upholds conservative cultural and religious principles, I consider Sahir a ‘modern’ individual who has successfully balanced various cultural orientations in an urban environment. An example of his ‘modern’ outlook occurred when he told me that his role model was the Quaid-i-Azam, known as Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the Western-educated lawyer and ‘founding father’ of the Pakistani state who is often referred to as a bridge between the ‘Western’ and ‘Muslim’ worlds. In spite of his ability to adopt social norms of the new host society, Sahir still refrains from social activities if he sees them as outside of his ‘Islamic boundary’. Some of his Muslim friends drink alcohol, but he considers this activity to be forbidden. Because of this ‘Islamic orientation’, Sahir commented that he is vocal about telling his Muslim friends to stop drinking. His social life outside of work is centred upon the family and home, and he states that if he is not working, he is spending time with his wife and children.

The following passage from Sahir shows the general family backgrounds of many first-generation participants in this study:

Sahir: I went to private schools [run by Irish nuns] I had my own car when I was in high school, so from that perspective, I had a golden spoon in my mouth ... I was able to integrate [into Irish society] very easily in terms of language, in terms of moving up in society.

Sahir’s cultural capital consisted of language practices and knowledge of Western culture, which were acquired through an English-medium education in a prestigious private school in Lahore. His reference to the ‘golden spoon’ suggests that his family provided him with the cultural background, knowledge, disposition, and skills that would allow him to easily transition into Irish society.
Sahir can be seen as being socially integrated into Irish society in the sense that he has been educated in a Western school system and that he has formed friendships and group memberships by means of the English language.

Like their counterparts in Dublin, first-generation participants in Boston also migrated from Pakistan with cultural capital in the form of English language skills and familiarity with the new host society. Fahad, a Jewish participant, and Yasir, a gay Muslim respondent, were from Karachi and attended Karachi Grammar School, a highly selective institution that is generally reserved for upper class Pakistani families. Both Fahad and Yasir spoke flawless English and were dressed in ‘Western clothing’ such as blue jeans and long-sleeved collared shirts at the time of our interviews. These participants preferred living in the US because they consider American society more politically liberal and socially open in comparison to Pakistan. Nabeel, an atheist who also attended a ‘Western-oriented’ private school in Karachi, told me during our interview in a Boston pub that ‘a large majority of the [Pakistani] population doesn’t get what I had, which is access to one of the top schools, access to coming abroad’. The upper- to middle-class family backgrounds of these respondents provided them not only with English language skills and an education from internationally recognised private schools, but also knowledge of how to communicate, behave, and socialise in a ‘Western environment’. It should be noted that working-class Pakistani migrants in Dublin and Boston might not reflect the cultural capital which middle- to upper-middle class Pakistanis carried over into diaspora. These potential differences suggest that not all Pakistani in diaspora possess the same level of cultural capital, which range from education to language to lifestyle preferences, and ultimately affect how Pakistanis engage with the new host society.

While the first-generation participants in this study arrived in Ireland and the US with similar upbringings in terms of education, language skills, and familiarity with Western culture, the second-generation respondents in Dublin were not given the same English language skills and socioeconomic backgrounds as their counterparts in Boston. The reason for this difference is rooted in the

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71 The *Express Tribune* (2010), a notable Pakistani newspaper, referred to Karachi Grammar School as ‘arguably the city’s most prestigious school’.
socioeconomic circumstances of the second-generation respondents’ parents who migrated from Pakistan. The parents of the second-generation respondents in Dublin were among the first Pakistanis to arrive in Ireland in the 1950s. They were mainly uneducated and unskilled migrants from rural areas of East Punjab. Upon migrating from Pakistan to Ireland, most of these migrants had little cultural capital and thus took up low-paying jobs as manufacturers, butchers, corner shop attendees, and door-to-door sales representatives. Once they settled, some of these Pakistanis opened small businesses such as retail clothing stores and restaurants.

Because of their backgrounds in small Pakistani rural communities, these migrants maintained the ‘homeland’ culture, which valued the biraderi and a tight knit community of people that shared similar languages, foods, and family values in Ireland. The children of these migrants, the second-generation participants, were inevitably shaped by their parents’ circumstances.

When he was growing up in a housing estate in Dublin, Matthew, a Sufi Muslim whose religious experiences I discuss in more detail in Chapter 5, told me that his parents spoke to him in Urdu or Punjabi and hardly ever used English at home. Therefore, he did not have English language skills before entering primary school in Ireland, which left him disadvantaged because he had to learn the English language in school and had nobody to practice English with at home. He stated, ‘I had too many languages going on. I was even finding learning English hard because [my parents] didn’t know how [to speak it]’. Because his mother and father maintained Urdu or Punjabi at home, Matthew appeared to be frustrated with the fact that he had to learn how Irish people communicated, socialised, and behaved on his own. Instead of embarking upon a university education, Matthew decided to enter into his family business because he did not feel comfortable with his English language skills. His parents’ lack of cultural capital inevitably affected his access to structural integration through education, as well as cultural and social integration in terms of communicating and forming friendships with other Irish people.

Like Matthew, Aaron, who was also raised in a housing estate in Dublin, told me during our interview that he grew up in a home that maintained strong ties to Pakistani languages and other elements of the migrant culture such as South Asian
food and arranged marriages. The following passage from our interview highlights this point:

AARON: The mother always gave us the mother tongue ... Pakistani culture inside our house, which is don't speak English, speak Urdu or Punjabi. It's Pakistani food ... We cook Pakistani food to have that tradition. Also to be Pakistani is to have that arranged marriage ... My elder brother got arranged marriage ... My older sister ... she was arranged ... I had an arranged marriage.

Aaron became animated and laughed during the interview when speaking about how strict his parents were in terms of maintaining elements of Pakistani culture. Their actions reflect a lifestyle that can be associated with living 'at home abroad'. Aaron's family experience suggests that not all young second-generation Pakistani men in diaspora neglect the social boundaries imposed upon them by their parents. Aaron's experience of growing up in a Pakistani family that strongly maintained the migrant culture also contributed to his childhood struggle of integrating into the Irish educational system. Like Matthew, he stated that his inadequate English language skills and lack of affinity with Irish culture discouraged him from pursuing a higher degree. Instead, he also took up various jobs in the family business.

Matthew and Aaron’s experiences are related to Bourdieu’s (1977) view that people from underprivileged and lower socioeconomic backgrounds face obstacles in terms of educational attainment, which thus limits their social mobility. While Bourdieu’s point applies to Matthew and Aaron’s situations, it is not representative of all of the second-generation participants in Dublin. Alan, a 35-year old Sunni Muslim, grew up in a housing estate and described his childhood as being ‘working class’. Despite this ‘underprivileged’ background, he still acquired a master’s degree at one of the top ranked universities in Ireland. Alan now lives in a large suburban home on the outskirts of south Dublin. Aidan, a 24-year-old respondent who described his family as having a ‘working class’ background, also earned a bachelor’s degree from a top ranked university in Dublin. Alan and Aidan’s educational achievement reflect Shah et al.’s (2010) argument in the sense that ‘underprivileged’ family backgrounds do not
necessarily relegate minorities to underachievement in education or prevent them from becoming socially mobile (ibid.: 1119).

Unlike their counterparts in Ireland, almost all of the second-generation interviewees in the US not only acquired English language skills from their parents, but also became motivated to pursue a higher education. The reason for this is rooted in the socioeconomic circumstances of their parents who migrated to Boston from middle-to upper-middle class families in urban centres, such as Karachi and Lahore. The parents of the second-generation participants in Boston were part of the first wave of Pakistanis to arrive in the US after the passage of the Immigration and Naturalization Act in 1965. In comparison with the first Pakistanis to arrive in Dublin, these migrants were mainly educated and skilled workers who had received a college education before migration. Upon their arrival in the US, this group of Pakistanis enrolled in American universities or took up jobs as doctors, engineers, and businessmen. Once they were settled and employed in high-paying jobs, many of them moved to the suburbs of Boston. Because of their educational attainment and professional skills, these migrants stressed the pursuit of higher education and familiarity with the new host culture as a way for their children to integrate into American society.

The children of these Pakistani migrants, the second-generation respondents, were shaped by the experiences and values of their parents. These participants grew up in homes that did not stress the maintenance of Pakistani cultural traits as much as their counterpart families in Dublin did. Anthony, a Sunni Muslim and ethnic Punjabi whose parents migrated to Boston in the mid-1960s, noted that he grew up in a ‘modern’ suburban home with an American cultural orientation rather than a Pakistani cultural orientation, as seen in the following passage from our discussion:

ANTHONY: [My family] is modern in dress and speech. We speak English. We dress [in jeans]. We, um, are not resigned to any sort of cultural rituals or religious rituals. Traditional in just like conservative thinking about priorities in one’s life, about the importance of family and career.
In his reference to modern dress, Anthony notes that he does not wear traditional Pakistani clothes, such as the shalwar kameez\textsuperscript{72}, an article of clothing that I saw being worn by more young Pakistani men in Dublin than in Boston. In wearing ‘Western clothing’ rather than shalwar kameez, Anthony adopted the clothing style of many of his non-Pakistani peers, thus representing a form of cultural assimilation. Anthony’s experience growing up in a ‘modern’ home that used English as the first language allowed him to easily integrate into the American educational system. He noted that his parents encouraged him to pursue higher degrees and take up higher-paying jobs in order to maintain the family’s middle- to upper-middle class status\textsuperscript{73}.

Alex, the Ahmadi Muslim participant in Boston, echoes Anthony’s view in stating that he grew up in a ‘modern’ home in which ‘Pakistani culture’ did not take precedence over ‘American culture’. His religious background significantly affected his cultural orientation towards the Pakistani and American culture. Early in our interview, he stated that his parents encouraged him and his siblings to adopt American norms and values. The influence his parents had on his cultural orientation is evident when he told me, ‘I love basketball, football ... I like watching the professional sports, celebrating the 4\textsuperscript{th} of July, Memorial Day, and Thanksgiving’. Alex became a Boy’s Scout at a young age and played various sports growing up, including American football, swimming, as well as track and field. Later in our interview he mentioned ‘there’s nothing wrong with cricket, it’s not forbidden in Islam, but for me I just never got into cricket. I never really played it and I never really watched it and that’s part of the culture’. Because of his busy life as a postgraduate student, Alex does not have a lot of friends, instead, he described having many ‘acquaintances’. He occasionally socialises on weekend nights, but he does not drink, dance, or interact with women because ‘of those [Islamic] guidelines’.

\textsuperscript{72} The shalwar kameez is considered the Pakistani national dress worn by men and women. This dress ‘consists of a long tunic (Kameez) teamed with a wide legged trouser (Shalwar) that skins in at the bottom accompanied by a duppata, which for women is a less stringent alternative to the burqa’ (Ullah, 2010: 382).

\textsuperscript{73} Middle- to upper-middle class is the most common socioeconomic backgrounds of Pakistani families in the US (Maira, 2004: 221).
During our interview, Alex told me that his parents came to the US from Karachi and Lahore in order to pursue master’s degrees, meaning that they had already earned a bachelor’s degree from Pakistani universities and had proficient English language skills before arriving in the US. During our semi-structured interview, I sensed that Alex was making a concerted effort to prove to me that his family was more ‘American’ than ‘Pakistani’. He became excited and repeatedly told me that his parents used English in the home and seldom used Urdu or other Pakistani languages when communicating with their children. As a result, Alex noted that he communicates more easily in English than in Urdu. Because his parents emphasised the importance of learning English as a means of obtaining a higher level of education, Alex had the skills to interact with other Americans and become socially mobile, as well as culturally integrated.

Alongside the middle- to upper-middle class upbringings of the second-generation participants in Boston, two of the nine second-generation respondents in Boston were raised in working-class Pakistani homes. The parents of these interviewees arrived in the 1980s after the first wave of Pakistani migration, beginning in the mid-1960s. The migrants of this period were mainly uneducated and unskilled workers and thus did not have proficient English language skills. They mainly took up ‘blue-collar’ jobs as taxi drivers and small shop owners, and lived largely in urban environments. Henry, a Sunni Muslim and Punjabi whose parents migrated to the US in the late-1980s, noted that his father was the ‘stereotypical Pakistani immigrant’ in the sense that he owned a restaurant, worked in a convenient store, and drove a taxi during various periods of his life in the US. Henry compared his family with other Pakistani families by noting that his family was not as financially well off as those families in Boston that came over during the 1960s. Like most of the second-generation participants in Dublin, Henry was raised in a working class background and in a home that maintained a Pakistani social boundary in relation to learning Urdu and other Pakistani languages before they learned English. However, Henry was encouraged by his parents to achieve the ‘American Dream’, which included a higher education and the ability to be socially mobile. Unlike most of the second-generation participants in Dublin who worked in the family business rather than obtain a higher education, Henry went
on to acquire a bachelor’s and master’s degree, in addition to taking up well-paying jobs in the business and technology sectors in Ireland.

This section on the transmission of cultural capital in the Pakistani diaspora demonstrated that while the overwhelming majority of the first-generation participants had similar cultural backgrounds due to their middle- to upper-middle class family backgrounds in Pakistan, there were significant differences in relation to the transmission of cultural capital between second-generation respondents in Dublin and Boston. These differences are rooted in the migration histories of Pakistanis to Ireland and the US, and more specifically, in the type of communities in which their parents had lived in Pakistan and the type of lifestyle that they tried to maintain in the new host society. The differences between the parents of my second-generation respondents in Dublin and Boston is summarised in the following table:

**Table 4.1: Parental differences between second-generation Pakistanis in Dublin and Boston**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Common theme</th>
<th>Dublin</th>
<th>Boston</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Birthplace of parents</td>
<td>Rural villages in East Punjab</td>
<td>Urban centres such as Karachi, Lahore, Islamabad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation of parents upon arrival to new host society</td>
<td>Small business niches including ethnic grocery stories, halal trades, restaurants, fabric shops, corner shops, and market stalls</td>
<td>Doctors, engineers, and businessmen, as well as graduate and postgraduate students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skills and education of parents</td>
<td>Mostly unskilled and uneducated upon arrival to Ireland</td>
<td>Mostly skilled and educated upon arrival to US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location of parents’ homes</td>
<td>Urban environment in Dublin</td>
<td>Suburban environment in Boston</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language spoken in the home</td>
<td>Urdu and Punjabi</td>
<td>Mostly English, some Urdu and other Pakistani dialects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main cultural orientation in the home</td>
<td>Migrant culture</td>
<td>New host society culture</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The parents of the second-generation interviewees in Dublin came largely from rural areas of Pakistan and were uneducated and unskilled upon their arrival to Ireland. As a result, these parents did not have the cultural capital to transmit to their children in order for them to better integrate structurally, socially, and culturally into Irish and American society. On the other hand, the parents of the second-generation participants in Boston were from urban centres of Pakistan and had previously obtained skills and an education before migrating to the US. The cultural capital that these parents acquired in Pakistan were transmitted to their children, my second-generation participants, who found it easier to integrate in juxtaposition to their peers in Dublin.

Arranged Marriages Versus Matched Marriages

As discussed in Chapter 2, marriage is considered one of the most vital institutions of Pakistan culture (Malik, 1989). Marriage among Pakistanis is often treated as more than simply a union of love between a man and woman, but a financial alliance between two families. As a result, marital happiness is considered less important than financial stability. This section examines how marriage arrangements common in the ‘homeland’ are played out in Pakistani diasporic communities. One of the more common marriage practices in Pakistan is arranged marriage. This setup occurs when parents select marital partners for their children in order for the family to achieve financial stability (Rytter, 2012: 574). However, in diaspora, the arranged marriage tradition comes under pressure, especially in countries like Ireland and the US, in which marriage is treated as a choice based on love (Zaidi and Shuraydi, 2002). Unlike in Pakistan, Irish and American men and women are expected to date, court, fall in love, and then decide on whether or not to get married, with or without parental consent (ibid.: 495).

Although they were born and raised in Pakistan, several of the first-generation respondents in Dublin noted that living in diaspora helps them avoid arranged marriages. Ahmed, an atheist and first-generation participant in Dublin, was adamant about resisting his parents’ influences as well as practicing norms of Pakistani culture in diaspora. He could be seen as being a part of the ‘punk’
culture of Ireland, as evidenced through his style of clothing, choice of music, and circle of friends. Throughout the interview, Ahmed continuously smoked cigarettes, used profanity, and shared stories about how he has always engaged in what he described as ‘insubordinate behaviour’ while living in Pakistan and Ireland. In essence, he portrayed himself as a ‘rebel’ figure. At one point during our interview, he tugged at his leather jacket and told me ‘this is bad ass’ and that his parents would never let him wear leather because they consider that style of clothing to be ‘unIslamic’. Being far away from Pakistan allows Ahmed to thwart his parents’ desire for him to marry a Pakistani woman in their biraderi. He added:

AHMED: ... you wouldn’t believe how many arguments I have gotten in with my parents about [marriage] ... they keep going on about ‘you have to get married’, and I was like ‘why? I don’t feel like [getting married]. I don’t want kids ... I want my freedom!’.

Ahmed’s parents have not responded favourably to his evasion of marriage, because marriage is seen as obligatory within Pakistani communities (Jeffrey, 1976). For Pakistani parents, unmarried and unsettled children between the ages of 18 and 25 may provoke anxiety because the children do not conform to an important tradition. Ahmed told me that he did not care if he brought sharm to the family because his parents have ‘given up [on me]’. Ahmed not only distances himself from his families’ expectations, but, as I discuss in Chapter 7, he also refuses to move back to Pakistan because he does not consider his behaviour and attitude as reflective of most Pakistanis. Nevertheless, he stated that he could never belong to Ireland because this country is not his ‘real homeland’. Ahmed’s condition positions him as living a liquid life because he sees himself as being located outside of the migrant social boundary and the new host society culture.

Nabeel, an atheist participant in Boston, also distanced himself from his parents’ expectations by choosing to marry for love. His decision to date and eventually marry a Hindu American woman has upset his parents because dating is traditionally prohibited and seen as sinful among Pakistani families. Nabeel also raised his eyebrows during the interview and commented on whether his parents were also being discriminatory towards his girlfriend because of her Indian
ethnicity. His relationship with a non-Pakistani and non-Muslim makes him feel ‘a little rebellious’ because he is marrying outside of Islam, his parents’ religion. In this comment, Nabeel positions himself as an outsider to Pakistani culture because he does not consider his behaviour and lifestyle choices as reflective of Pakistani discourses towards marriage. Ahmed and Nabeel’s experiences in ‘rebelling’ against their parents’ expectations in terms of marriage shows that young Pakistani men might become even more defiant of conforming to Pakistani culture while living away from the homeland.

While several of the first-generation participants in Dublin and Boston distanced themselves from their parents’ expectations in terms of marriage, some of the second-generation respondents in Dublin have accepted the marriage expectations of their parents. Four of the six second-generation respondents have entered into transnational arranged marriages at the request of their parents, while one other respondent was debating the idea of an arranged marriage at the time of our interview. These transnational arranged marriages are set up with women from villages in East Punjab, where their parents were born and raised. According to Rytter (2012), some Pakistani families in diaspora set up transnational arranged marriages to continue labour migration between Pakistan and the new host society and to maintain values and identities within the family and biraderi (ibid.: 573).

During our interview, Aidan, who stated that his role models were Tupac Shakur and Malcolm X because of their ‘rebellious nature’, was debating whether to have an arranged marriage. He considered himself ‘Irish’ because he was raised in Ireland, which was evident in his Irish accent, but he did not really consider Pakistani culture to be his own. He positioned himself in-between Irish and Pakistani cultures, as seen in the following passage:

AIDAN: … even now I talk to my parents who are in Pakistan. They said that we have a girl for you and she’s very nice and you should come over [to Pakistan] and have a look … Even now I’m thinking … I’ll go over and have a look … but then at times, I think what if we don’t understand each other? … You know it’s pretty hard … because at the end of the day I do have to get an arranged marriage … otherwise… I’d upset my mother and father. I don’t really want to do that … It’s our culture … Even our generation is coming around to that.
This passage highlights Aidan’s predicament of negotiating his parents’ expectations with his own needs and desires. On the one hand, he is hesitant to marry a Pakistani woman because he believes that there will be a cultural gap\textsuperscript{74} between them. On the other hand, Aidan does not want to challenge izzat or bring sharm to his parents by rejecting their arranged marriage tradition. This conflict of choosing between his parents’ expectations of marriage and his own personal wishes highlights the significance of Pakistani social boundaries even in diaspora.

In feeling that he has to conform to izzat and sharm, Aidan reflects migrant cultural values because family needs take precedence over individual desires.

Comparatively, none of the second-generation participants in Boston had entered into arranged marriages at the time of the semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions. This finding supports Malik (1989), who claims that young Pakistani Americans distance themselves from arranged marriages and prefer ‘marriages of love’. These sentiments were discussed by one of the focus groups in Boston:

CRAIG: What do your parents think about marriage?
SHAWN: Oh man, so much pressure but I refuse to buy into it.
CRAIG: What do you mean by that?
SHAWN: Well, like they want me to be married and be settled already. I’m 28, which is kind of old by Pakistani standards. They’re afraid that I will, like, never get married. Don’t know why it’s such a big deal.
STEVE: My parents put pressure on me to marry too, but they are pretty loose with who they would let me marry.
DAVID: Same here. My older sister has been dating a Christian guy for, like, four years and my parents don’t really care. He’s religious, so they like that.
CRAIG: Have you heard of stories of Pakistanis having arranged marriages?
DERRICK: Haha. This isn’t Pakistan, man!
DAVID: My parents wouldn’t even dare to ask.

The passage highlights the intergenerational dynamics of Pakistani families in Boston and the various ways in which second-generation participants negotiate their positions towards the migrant culture. Shawn’s comments suggest that he prefers to make decisions on his marriage arrangement based upon his own

\textsuperscript{74} In addition to levels of educational attainment, ‘cultural gaps’ are the main reason for tension and conflict in arranged marriages (Werbner, 1999: 29).
individual preferences rather than the family’s preference. His passage highlights how Pakistani parents expect their children to conform to ‘Pakistani norms’, including family cooperation and respect for elders. While Steve faces pressure from his parents to marry, he stated that his parents allow him flexibility in choosing his marriage partner, which suggests that his parents respect the fact that he has a different cultural orientation from them. Derrick and David’s comments were particularly important because they show how young second-generation Pakistani men distance themselves from the homeland and migrant culture. By stating that ‘this isn’t Pakistan’, Derrick suggests that he does not wish to ‘return’ to Pakistan because he does not perceive Pakistani culture as his own. Similarly, David added that his parents ‘wouldn’t even dare to ask’ whether or not he would consider an arranged marriage, a point which highlights how some young second-generation Pakistani men in diaspora do not consider the culture of their parents to be their own.

It is important to note that two of the ten second-generation respondents in Boston stated that they would have matched marriages. This marriage practice is a more negotiable setup in comparison with an arranged marriage because the child has more say in whether or not he wants to marry a spouse selected by his parents. Henry, a Sunni Muslim and Sindhi, stated that he will not enter into an arranged marriage, but will consider a matched marriage. He has repeatedly told his parents that he must have the ‘final say’ in regards to his marriage partner. Henry added that it has taken many years to convince his parents that ‘it is okay to marry for love’, which highlights his parents’ preference for maintaining the migrant social boundary in diaspora. The matched marriage setup may be seen as a form of hybridity because it fuses together elements of the migrant culture and the new host society culture. Moreover, while Henry’s parents accepted his decision to marry for love, they added that they would not support him marrying a Punjabi woman. Such a position shows a Pakistani ethnic hierarchy and highlights how first-generation Pakistanis in diaspora carry over inter-ethnic friction from the homeland to the new host society.

75 Zaidi and Shuraydi (2002: 498) note that matched marriages entail a gradual transition away from arranged marriages towards a more Western-oriented approach of an individual choice over a marriage partner.
The matched marriage arrangement was also raised during the interview with Alex, who, as previously discussed, was raised in a ‘modern’ home in the US. Alex renegotiates a Pakistani social boundary because he does not want to enter into a more traditional arranged marriage. While his parents are helping him find an Ahmadi woman to marry, he claimed that the process does not entail parental pressure in terms of which woman he should marry. He differentiates between an arranged marriage and matched marriage in the following passage:

ALEX: A matched marriage means that you’re being introduced, [that] you’re having a facilitated meeting and that I still have complete control over my decision and the woman would have complete control over her decision. Nobody is being forced there. Our international spiritual leader … emphasises the importance of both sides maintaining autonomy and them being able to make their own decisions.

Alex emphasises the importance that individual control and autonomy should play in the marriage process, but he does not entirely dismiss his parents’ opinion in relation to choosing his marriage partner. Like Henry, his preference for a match marriage suggests a hybrid identity that mixes and joins aspects of the migrant culture and the new host society culture.

The data suggests that first-generation participants in Dublin and Boston both maintain as well as renegotiate the norms of their parents’ migrant culture in relation to marriage arrangements. Several first-generation respondents in Dublin and Boston noted that living in diaspora provides them with the ability to distance themselves from family pressure to enter arranged marriages. These interviewees position themselves closer to the new host society culture than the migrant culture in the sense that their individual desires take precedence over collective family desires. In terms of the second-generation, interviewees in Dublin conformed to their parents’ familial expectations by entering into transnational arranged marriages with Pakistani women from their biraderis in East Punjab. On the other hand, second-generation respondents in Boston tended to adopt the ways of the new host society by ‘marrying for love’ rather than enter into arranged marriages. I attribute this to their parents being raised in more liberal Pakistani urban environments and their immersion in Western culture, which places emphasis on individual decision-making in terms of marriage arrangements. A couple of the
second-generation interviewees in Boston positioned themselves as ‘in-between’ the migrant culture and new host society culture by entering into the matched marriage process, which shows that they fuse aspects of Pakistani and American cultures and exhibit hybrid identities. In doing so, these respondents may be said to act as cultural entrepreneurs who join dominant practices of Pakistan and the US.

### Alcohol and Islamic Boundaries

In addition to marriage arrangements, there are other sources of intergenerational conflict among Pakistani families in diaspora. One of the more prevalent issues is alcohol consumption, a social activity which Pakistanis tend to perceive as an ‘immoral Western pastime’ (Ryan, 2010). For Pakistanis in Dublin and Boston, alcohol consumption may be a particularly difficult topic because drinking in Ireland and the US is ‘a normal everyday leisure practice’ which ‘creates a symbolic community of belonging and the exclusion of others who do not use alcohol’ (Fletcher and Spracklen, 2014: 1310). Several first-generation participants refrain from alcohol consumption because of their Islamic beliefs and practices. Sahir, who always wanted to meet with me in halal restaurants, claimed that drinking alcohol is outside of his Islamic belief system. He told me that he fears that his Irish-born children will grow up and consume alcohol, which he argued will lead to other ‘immoral’ activities such as dancing and sex before marriage. Sahir contended that he does not tolerate his children ‘drinking, clubbing, things like that’ because ‘they should know that these [Islamic] values are the values that they need to uphold and respect’. Sahir’s position on alcohol consumption supports the findings of Sarwar (1983), who claims that Pakistani parents in diaspora make an effort to instil their perceived superior cultural values in their children. Sahir expects his children to conform to elements of the migrant culture including family loyalty, izzat, sharm, and adopting Islamic beliefs and practices. In the diaspora, he constructs strict cultural and religious boundaries around his family, which he expects his children to preserve.

One of the two focus group discussions in Dublin showed how young Pakistani men set up social boundaries around their families because of their Islamic beliefs
and practices. The four Muslim participants in this focus group (see Appendix 4) all considered alcohol to be forbidden in Islam:

CRAIG: How would you all describe your social lives? What do you do with your free time?
MATTHEW: I have a few [cigarettes] to relax. Maybe some shisha\(^{76}\) with some friends, hang out at the restaurant, have some tea.
DAWOOD: If I’m not working I’m either at the mosque or near the mosque, like in the shops, having some kebabs.
CRAIG: Zack, how about you?
ZACK: I used to drink but I gave that up. You know we all have moments when you get away from Islam. I was lost but I’m okay now.
CRAIG: Does anybody drink alcohol?
AMIR: No, I would never. Not for us.
MATTHEW: No.
DAWOOD: I don’t even like being around it.
AMIR: That’s a red line in Islam. You can’t drink alcohol. It’s clear. It says it in the Qur’an. Nobody will drink around me.
MATTHEW: Thank God I have never drank alcohol. My parents would have killed me, haha.
DAWOOD: Same here.
ZACK: Same.

This discussion between first- and second-generation participants in Dublin sheds light on the different ways in which young Pakistani men in diaspora negotiate the migrant culture and the culture of the new host society. Matthew maintains a Pakistani social boundary by interacting with other Pakistanis in environments that reproduce the Pakistani culture. Dawood also maintains an element of the homeland by spending his time in mosques. Zack’s comments are particularly poignant because they show how young second-generation Pakistani men in diaspora are in-between cultures and how they may go back-and-forth between immersing themselves in the migrant culture and the culture of the new host society.

The majority of the first-generation Muslim participants in Boston refrain from alcohol consumption because of their Islamic beliefs and practices. However, Nabeel, the atheist who plans on marrying the Indian American woman, frequently visits bars and drinks alcohol with his non-Muslim friends, activities

\(^{76}\) Shisha is a term used to describe ‘water pipe smoking’, ‘a centuries-old tobacco use method that is increasingly becoming a worldwide phenomenon specially among college and university students’ (Selim et al., 2013: 648).
Family Experiences in the Pakistani Diaspora

which he does not partake in while in Pakistan because his parents consider them to be antithetical to their religion. Nabeel summarised his relationship with his parents by stating that ‘it’s honest’ but not in the sense that he shares ‘certain information or things that they may not agree with’. He appears to live two lives, one in Boston in which his individual desires and the new host society culture take precedence, and the other in Pakistan where parents discourage him from drinking practices. Because he acts a certain way ‘here’ in Boston and a different way ‘there’ in Pakistan, he could be described as a code-switcher who changes his behaviour and lifestyle depending on the environment and social context.

Alcohol Consumption Among Second-Generation Participants

In comparison with their first-generation counterparts, the second-generation participants in Dublin and Boston faced more intergenerational conflict over the issue of alcohol consumption. I attribute the cultural difference between migrant parents and my second-generation respondents to the fact that these interviewees were born or spent most of their lives around Irish and American cultures. Wilson (2005: 30) notes that alcohol and drinking practices are important to Irish people as a manifestation of Irish identity. He regards the Irish pub as a venerated institution worldwide and one of the most important elements in the production and reproduction of Irish culture (ibid.: 2). Similarly, the United States Department of Justice (1999) describes alcohol as being ‘an integral part of American life. It is a normal accompaniment to most social events’. Having been raised in societies in which alcohol consumption is an integral element of social activities, several of the second-generation interviewees conform with the findings of Alba (2005) by readjusting the boundaries around their ethnic and religious groups because of their exposure to Irish and American cultural norms.

Several of the second-generation respondents in Dublin discussed their experiences with alcohol consumption and how it led to intergenerational conflicts. Aidan, a Sunni Muslim who was previously noted as debating an arranged marriage, stated that he started drinking alcohol when he was 20-years-old because ‘everyone does it’ in Ireland. He noted that he developed drinking practices because he had nothing else to do for a social life in Dublin. Aidan,
however, has recently stopped consuming alcohol, claiming that drinking ‘is not in [Pakistani] culture or [Islam]’. When I inquired further as to why he stopped drinking alcohol, Aidan appeared disgusted with himself and added that he feared that he would neglect *izzat* and bring *sharm* to his parents and family members. Like his position on negotiating arranged marriage, Aidan’s engagement with alcohol suggests that second-generation Pakistanis in Dublin can be in-between migrant cultural values and new host society cultural values.

Aaron, a 33-year-old Sufi Muslim, also raised the issue of how alcohol consumption led to intergenerational conflict within his family. He told me that he used to consume alcohol ‘back in the day’ and that he never hid this social activity from his parents. Drinking alcohol was a part of the housing estate environment in which he and his family lived during childhood. Like Aidan, however, Aaron came to the realisation that alcohol consumption was ‘forbidden’ in Islam and contradictory to his Muslim family values. He stated, ‘I realized that [drinking alcohol] wasn’t my life ... I didn’t care that I was from a Muslim family’. When I asked Aaron why he stopped consuming alcohol, he noted that it was for his parents’ sake, because his social activities were causing them stress and hardship, adding that his parents perceived him as a child who ‘violated every code that I was raised with’. Aaron also stated that he quit drinking to set a better ‘Islamic example’ for his own young children. Aidan and Aaron’s experiences with alcohol remind us that second-generation Pakistanis in diaspora can adopt a set of cultural practices that fundamentally contradict parental expectations and religious values and that they may also ‘return’ to the norms of the migrant culture as a way to offset ‘negative’ influences of Irish culture.

Second-generation participants in Boston also raised the issue of intergenerational conflict in relation to alcohol consumption. Henry, who was previously discussed in light of his preference for a matched marriage, stated that his drinking practices give him a ‘dual identity’ because ‘I’m not going to tell [my parents] that I was at the pub or I was at the bar drinking’. This ‘dual identity’ suggests that Henry negotiates his social life in terms of his parents’ expectations and his own preferences. Outside of the family, Frank also drinks at bars and nightclubs with friends, but when he is around his parents, he is not permitted to drink or talk
about alcohol. When I asked him why he consumes alcohol, Henry noted that ‘being comfortable in the [drinking] scene’ helps him develop a sense of belonging to Boston. He added that he ‘would never [drink] at home because my parents would get really mad’. One explanation for Henry’s and Frank’s drinking practices is that second-generation Pakistanis in diaspora may adopt the activities of the new host society culture because it helps them ‘integrate’ into society and allows them to develop a strategy for ‘self-preservation’ (Nayak, 2003: 54).

Like marriage, alcohol consumption leads to intergenerational conflict in the Pakistani diaspora. First- and second-generation participants demonstrated how young Pakistani men conform to parental demands as a means to preserve izzat and avoid sharm, but also breach the perceived migrant social boundary by drinking alcohol in order to feel a sense of belonging to Ireland and the US. The majority of the first-generation respondents refrained from alcohol consumption and encouraged their children to conform to parental expectations as a means to live a ‘moral’ life. The second-generation interviewees were more prone to drinking alcohol and thus distance themselves from the control of their parents. However, several of the second-generation participants in Dublin returned to migrant cultural values and norms and ended their alcohol consumption, which I attribute to the tighter knit Pakistani families in comparison to the families of the second-generation respondents in Boston.

**Gender Roles and Sexuality in Pakistani Families**

To further shed light on Pakistani families in diaspora, it is important to consider the participants’ positions in relation to gender roles. Many of the first-generation respondents highlighted the importance of women serving as homemakers in order to maintain the household and care for children. Nadeem, who earlier in this chapter discussed the importance of the hierarchical Pakistani family structure, told me that Pakistani families function more smoothly when men and women adopt ‘traditional’ roles, meaning that men work outside of the home and earn money and women work inside of the home and carry out house chores. In diaspora, Nadeem constructs a conservative approach in relation to women’s roles in the family because he maintains that Pakistani men ‘are normatively assigned
to be wage-earning, decision makers within the household’, while women are meant to be ‘subservient’ and ‘caring assistants’ (Salway, 2007: 826). Wazir, a Deobandi Muslim who lives in Dublin, also reaffirmed a conservative position in terms of gender roles by stressing that women should be confined to the domestic sphere and that their primary concern should be as mothers and caregivers. He is also adamant that his wife, a Muslim convert, wears the \textit{niqab}\footnote{\textit{Niqab} ‘refers to making a hole. In Islamic jurisprudence, it refers to the face veil or garment covering the face and whole body except the eyes’ (Hussain Solihu, 2009: 25).} and always dresses ‘modestly’ in order to preserve his \textit{izzat} because he sees his reputation as being bound up with his wife’s appearance and modesty.

Several first-generation interviewees in Boston gave similar responses to that of Nadeem and Wazir in terms of gender roles in the family. Akbar, who earlier commented on the importance of \textit{izzat} in the family, told me that women do not belong in the workforce because ‘women and men cannot be close together’. In calling for gender segregation, Akbar supported the idea that Pakistani women are expected to be caretakers of the home rather than employees outside of the family environment. He also argued that women should remain in the home because men are not capable of keeping order in the home or watching over children. In stating that ‘women and men cannot be close together’, Akbar resists assimilating into Irish society, which integrates men and women in virtually all social environments. Akbar’s comments support the idea that first-generation Pakistanis in diaspora emphasise a patriarchal culture, which is often defined by traditional social structures and conservative cultural patterns of behaviour (Haw, 1998). He may be seen as living ‘at home abroad’ because he reproduces ‘Pakistani culture’ inside of his home.

Not all of the first-generation interviewees in Dublin and Boston maintained a conservative position in terms of women’s roles inside the family and home. Some of the first-generation participants stated that their wives should have the ability to pursue a career, thus highlighting their preference for conforming to social norms in Ireland and the US. Babar, a Sufi Muslim in Dublin, told me that he is proud of his wife because she earns a high salary and has socially integrated into Irish society by joining various political and cultural organisations. Fahad, a
Jewish participant from Karachi who now lives in Boston, praised American culture for upholding 'equal rights' between men and women, which he argued is not the case in Pakistan. This comment suggests that he would not oppose his wife or other female family members entering into the workforce and engaging with society outside of the home. Similarly, Nabeel, the previously described ‘punk’ or ‘rebel’ participant who enjoys living away from Pakistan, claimed that wives should be given the freedom to pursue a career including the ability to pursue an education. In stating that wives should be able to work outside of the home, Nabeel distances himself from the idea that Pakistani women should be conditioned to perform traditional gender roles within the home from a young age. Life in diaspora allows Babar, Fahad, and Nabeel to distance themselves from the conservative gender roles that they experienced while living in Pakistan. They can be seen as accepting the notion of gender integration and preferring the idea of women taking up jobs in the professional class.

In discussing gender roles and a woman’s position in the family, several of the second-generation participants raised the issue of sexual amorality in Irish and American societies. Several of these participants noted that the sexual objectification of women is a problem in Ireland and the US. Aaron, who had discussed quitting drinking alcohol to maintain izzat, referred to Dublin as a ‘crazy’ city because of the abundance of sexual images in advertisements, which he argued encourages women to be ‘promiscuous’. He suggested that sexually objectifying women is degrading because it diminishes the moral foundations of Irish society, which he linked to how Irish men treated their women. Aaron added that he worries about raising his young daughters in Dublin because they may develop the ‘bad habit’ of ‘wanting to impress’ men by ‘showing them their breasts’. He also referred to the sexual objectification of women in Dublin as not being reflective of the ‘real Ireland’ because Irish Catholic women used to be modest by ‘covering up’ their bodies.

78 Gender roles 'reflect the traditional, prevailing cultural norms in a given place during a specific era. However, these norms are not universal and may not be necessarily healthy. They are individually constructed and differ according to the context and are related to individual experiences' (Aziz and Kamal, 2012: 88).
Ben, a Sunni Muslim in Boston, had similar beliefs to Aaron in that he prefers women to dress modestly by covering their bodies. Of the Boston participants, he is most active in his Muslim community. Ben serves as a religious leader in a local educational setting and a teacher at his mosque. While he said his main identity is Muslim, he spoke passionately about his American identity. For example, Ben told me that he ‘always dresses as an American’. In fact, during our interview, he was dressed in blue jeans, a long-sleeved stylish collared shirt, and sneakers. However, he added that he buys Pakistani clothes for Eid and that he loves when his mom cooks certain Pakistani dishes. Ben’s position towards Pakistani culture does not take precedence over his Islamic orientation. He stated, ‘... to say I’m Pakistani, I have a problem with it’. Ben drew Islamic boundaries around his social life by criticizing kids for smoking pot and doing all sorts of drugs. He added that ‘premarital sex is something from a religion point of view shouldn’t happen’. Ben made specific reference to this Islamic boundary in commenting that ‘people don’t understand that rules and guidelines which originate from religious traditions are there ... to preserve the sanctity of the individual and community life’. In terms of the hierarchy of his identities, Ben could be said to associate first with Islam, second with the US, and third his ethnic background. While he is most familiar with American culture and the homeland, Islam appears to be Ben’s moral compass. Pakistani culture is more of a distant element in terms of his cultural production.

Ben noted a recent experience at a formal graduation ceremony in which a number of young women were ‘dressed provocatively’ in short skirts, adding that he would never allow his young daughter to attend such an event in this type of clothing. Aaron and Ben demonstrate that second-generation Pakistanis in diaspora position themselves away from ‘Western culture’ and closer to their ‘Muslim culture’ because they perceive ‘Western’ sexual expression as immoral and Islam as offering a more moral approach to gender roles (Leonard, 2006). Aaron and Ben attribute this ‘sexual amorality’ as a reflection of the breakdown of Irish and American moral values. These Muslim respondents perceive Islam as a means to protect women and instil moral values into Irish and American families.
The issue of sexuality within Pakistani families and in Irish and American societies was raised during one of the focus group discussions in Dublin. This discussion highlighted the difference in how first- and second-generation Pakistanis in diaspora perceive the role of women in Pakistani families:

CRAIG: What role should women play in a Pakistani family?  
DAWOOD: A woman’s main priority should be with the children. I can’t raise my children all of the time and still work, so my wife takes care of that. My wife also treats herself as a Muslim and instills our Islam to the children.  
CRAIG: In what ways?  
DAWOOD: She teaches my daughter prayer and how to dress.  
HAMAD: My wife does the same, especially with my daughter because this society is crazy for women. They’re half-naked most of the time.  
DAWOOD: But that’s the thing because Muslim women are not meant to show themselves. Muhammad, peace be upon him, told women to cover and be modest, none of the Madonna stuff.  
BRIAN: I agree to some extent, but women shouldn’t have to stick to these rules all of the time. It’s a bit drastic, Islam. I mean a *niqab* is just silly.  
CRAIG: How about you Sohail?  
SOHAIL: It’s a bit different in my family. We are Hindu and no woman in my family covers. We dress Western. My mom wears jeans and once in awhile wears Indian clothes. I don’t really care about it. I think women should be free to dress how they want. This isn’t Pakistan or Saudi Arabia.  
DAWOOD: But what if you had a young girl and she walked out of the house in a short skirt? Would you say anything?  
SOHAIL: I’d sit her down and talk to her but I wouldn’t make her not wear something because I don’t think it’s right.

The discussion highlights how young first- and second-generation Pakistani Muslim and non-Muslim men in diaspora position themselves in relation to women’s roles in the home and the ways in which women dress. Dawood maintained the migrant cultural norms by preferring that his wife covers her body and remains in the home to raise the children while he is employed. Hamad also stressed the importance of Pakistani Muslim women remaining in the home in order to teach children ‘Muslim values’ and to keep women in his family away from the ‘immoral activities’ of Western society. Brian, who was born and raised in Dublin, did not go as far as Dawood and Hamad in terms of upholding a patriarchal culture. While he suggested that Pakistani Muslim women have an important role to play in rearing the religious development of children, he also
distances himself from the migrant culture by preferring a more flexible boundary around his religious commitments. This interaction is relevant in light of my aim of shedding light on the heterogeneity of the Pakistani diaspora because it shows how young first- and second-generation Pakistani men in diaspora differ in their positions towards gender roles in the family and home.

Pakistanis also tend to view sex and sexuality as taboo issues within their families because these topics are considered individual and private affairs that should not be disclosed to family members or other Pakistanis (Hashwani, 2005). In Boston, the semi-structured interviews uncovered two exceptions\(^{79}\), both of which stated that it was difficult to be gay in a Pakistani family. These participants noted that it was especially stressful to reveal their sexual orientations to their parents because not only would their parents disapprove of their gay identity, but they would also perceive it as affecting the family’s honour and standing in the wider Pakistani and Muslim communities.

Humayun, a Sunni Muslim from Karachi, told me that his parents struggle with his gay identity. He was a clean-cut and ‘smart’ looking undergraduate student who, at the time of the interview, was interning for a liberal political organisation in Boston. When I asked him about his social life, he pulled out a *New York Times* from his backpack and told me that reading newspapers is his preferred activity on a weekend night. At several points in our discussion, Humayun jokingly spoke in a ‘Boston accent’, which, he stated, is dropping the ‘R’ sound in his words and replacing it with an ‘AH’ sound. Humayun seemed exasperated when I asked him about his experience as a young Pakistani man living in Boston. He stated that it is a difficult experience, but not because Boston is not accepting of Pakistanis, but that life is generally difficult for Pakistanis due to the violence and extremism in the homeland. In general, Humayun appeared to be somewhat aggravated with various social developments of his life. He suggested that his own background as a gay Pakistani Muslim is particularly problematic among his Muslim peers and that he engages with literature on sexual identity in order to make sense of his

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\(^{79}\) Studying anomalies is another way of shedding light on the internal dynamics of Pakistani families. Anomalies are ‘rare participants’ in relation to the wider population of an ethnic group (Pepin, 2003: 6).
lived experience. In a sarcastic tone, Humayun stated, ‘I’m not going to get an arranged marriage to some woman in Pakistan. That’s definitely not going to happen!’ Humayun argued that his parents’ opposition to his homosexuality stems from their conservative cultural and religious values. Yip (2007a) claims that it is very common for Muslims to view gay identity as incompatible with Islam. Humayun added that his parents quoted the Qur’an to denounce his sexual orientation, which essentially places him outside of their ‘Islamic boundary’ because he does not conform to the hegemonic status that Islam gives to heterosexuality (Yip, 2004). By stating that his parents see him as engaging in ‘unIslamic’ activities, Humayun suggests that he is not recognised by his parents as being a ‘good Muslim’, a term which I return in the next chapter.

Yasir, a Sunni Muslim who has been in the US since 2000, was the second gay participant I interviewed in Boston. He stated that his sexual orientation ‘has been a matter of great concern to [his] parents’. Yasir added, ‘I am always treading on thin ice’ because his parents and family members see his sexual preference as being antithetical to Pakistani culture and Islamic values. For many years, Yasir was reluctant to reveal his gay identity to his parents because he feared that as a gay man he would dishonor them and bring shame to the family. In addition, he worried that his family would be stigmatised and be considered a ‘black sheep’ family by other Pakistanis, who would in-turn perceive the family as losing their izzat. One possible explanation for Yasir’s fear of his stigmatization is that other Pakistanis regard marriage as a union between a man and woman and see homosexuality as bringing sharm to an individual and family.

Conclusion

This chapter shed light on Pakistani families and their internal dynamics as seen through the experiences of young first- and second-generation Pakistani Muslim and non-Muslim men in Dublin and Boston. The data suggests that the family unit remains a pivotal institution in diaspora as it does in Pakistan. The first-generation participants stressed the importance of the hierarchical structure of Pakistani families, which, they argued, should place emphasis on izzat, with particular regard to respecting elders. They extended izzat to members of the biraderi and
elders outside of their immediate communities. In terms of the *biraderi* family structure, the second-generation respondents in Dublin maintained close ties with family in Pakistan, while recreating the migrant culture in terms of food, dress, and close-knit families. In Boston, the second-generation interviewees stressed the importance of family values and family structure, but distanced themselves more from parental expectations than their peers in Dublin. The second-generation participants in Boston were more individually oriented rather than collectively oriented. They were also generally unfamiliar with the concept of *biraderi*, which I attribute to their parents growing up in urban environments where the *biraderi* family structure is not as pronounced as it is in rural areas of Pakistan. Because of their parents’ socialisation into American society as educated and skilled migrants, the second-generation participants in Boston were raised with a Western cultural orientation, which places more emphasis on individual needs and desires over that of family.

The second section of this chapter highlights the importance of cultural capital in shaping the respondents’ upbringings and social mobility in Ireland and the US. Almost all of the first-generation respondents had English language skills and a familiarity with Western social norms because they were educated in schools in Pakistan in which English was the medium language. Some of them were able to attend prestigious schools in Pakistan because of their parents’ middle- to upper-middle class socio-economic backgrounds. Because they arrived in Ireland and the US with English language skills and a general familiarity with Western culture, their transition into Irish and American societies was relatively smooth.

The data also shows a difference in the accumulation of cultural capital between the second-generation participants in Dublin and Boston. This was because the parents of the second-generation respondents in Dublin arrived in Ireland as uneducated and unskilled migrants from rural communities in East Punjab. On the other hand, the parents of the second-generation interviewees in Boston arrived in the US as educated and skilled migrants to obtain higher degrees or take up professional jobs. Second-generation participants in Dublin learned Urdu and other Pakistani languages before learning English, which ultimately affected their level of educational attainment and their social and cultural integration into Irish
society. Comparatively, the parents of the second-generation respondents in Boston used English as the primary language of the home environment, which ultimately helped their children, my interviewees, to integrate into American society. Because of their own educational and professional backgrounds, the parents of the second-generation participants in Boston encouraged their children to pursue an education and take up professional jobs.

Another significant finding in this chapter was that elements of Pakistani culture, in particular with regard to marriage practices, have led to intergenerational conflicts between first- and second-generation participants and their families in diaspora. Several of the first-generation participants face pressure from their parents to enter into arranged marriages, but living in diaspora provides them with the ability to distance themselves from these expectations. The majority of the second-generation respondents in Dublin conformed to their parents’ demands for them to enter into transnational arranged marriages with Pakistani women from their biraderis in East Punjab, which suggests that second-generation interviewees in Dublin have adopted marriage practices because of their parents. On the other hand, none of the second-generation interviewees in Boston have entered into arranged marriages; their marriage arrangements are based on individual desires and ‘love’. However, a couple of these participants engage in matched marriages, a hybrid form of marital practice that fuses elements of the migrant culture and the new host society culture.

This chapter also highlighted that differences in relation to alcohol consumption lead to intergenerational conflicts in Pakistani families in diaspora. Several of the first-generation participants showed concern for their children because they are growing up in societies in which alcohol consumption is a regular social activity. These respondents try to transmit cultural values to their children in order to protect them from the ‘immoral’ Western activity of drinking alcohol. The second-generation participants in this study engaged in alcohol consumption more than their first-generation counterparts. I attribute this to the second-generation respondents having been born and raised in Irish and American societies in which alcohol consumption is a norm in social environments, as well as a means of developing a sense of belonging to Dublin and Boston. Many of the second-
generation interviewees were forced to hide their drinking practices from their parents out of concern that these activities would negatively affect the family’s izzat in the wider Pakistani communities. Several of these respondents demonstrate the ability to be code-switchers in that they act more conservatively at home than they do outside of the home environment with their peers.

The final section of this chapter discussed gender roles within the family as well as issues related to sexuality and sexual orientation, which ultimately affect the internal dynamics of Pakistani families in diaspora. Several of the first-generation participants demonstrated a preference for maintaining migrant cultural boundaries in relation to the position of their wives’ role in the family. These respondents stated that women best serve the family in the home as mothers and caretakers of the family’s needs. However, other first-generation interviewees believed that women have the right to enter into the workforce and pursue an education, which would provide them with the means to socialise outside of the home. The second-generation participants, on the other hand, discussed their concern with the sexual amorality of Irish and American societies, which they believed affect their wives and children. They hoped that upholding religious values, in particular Islamic values, would help to instil moral values in Irish and American societies. This chapter also acknowledges the experiences of anomalies within Pakistani families. My two gay participants in Boston experienced conflict with their parents because their sexual orientation opposes the dominant view among Pakistanis that homosexuality is antithetical to Islamic beliefs and values.

In the next chapter, I turn to my participants’ position on religion and the role that religion plays in shaping their experiences in diaspora.
The objective of this chapter is to examine the role that religion plays in the lives of my participants in Dublin and Boston. More specifically, I explore their positions towards religion in light of Glock and Stark’s (1968) eight-dimension model for measuring religiosity, which was introduced in Chapter 2. The chapter is divided into five sections. The first section looks at the respondents’ commitments to religious practice by focusing on the Muslim interviewees’ positions towards the five pillars of Islam and the non-Muslim participants’ positions towards practicing their own respective religions. The second section highlights the impact that communal activities have on the religious orientations of the participants, specifically that of their families, education, and places of worship as sites of religious socialisation and conflict. In the third section, I consider my interviewees’ positions on secularism and non-secularism. In particular, I provide insight into the concepts of ‘return to religion’ in Ireland and ‘civil religion’ in the US. In the fourth section of this chapter, I focus on the idea of being ‘spiritual, but not religious’, as well as the notion of religious privatisation among young Pakistani men in Ireland and the US. The final section presents the main findings of this study in relation to the development of the respondents’ religiosities in diaspora.

Being a ‘Good Muslim’ and Religious Practice

During the semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions, the first- and second-generation participants often discussed the issue of not having a strong commitment to religious practice in relation to their experiences of living in Dublin and Boston. As noted in Chapter 2, religious practice refers to an individual’s private and public involvement in religious groups, places of worship, prayer, and his observance of other religious obligations (Reitsma et al., 2006: 349). In this section, the terms ‘practice’ and ‘ritual’ are used interchangeably to discuss how my interviewees act upon their positions towards religion. Because the majority of my first- and second-generation participants identified themselves
as Muslims, it is important to discuss the notion of ‘Islamic practice’, which Salleh (2012) describes as dressing modestly, eating halal, reciting traditional prayers, avoiding sexual relationships outside of marriage, engaging in group prayers in mosques, reading the Qur’an, fasting during Ramadan, and pilgrimaging to Mecca (ibid.: 270). In this section, I touch upon these features of Islamic practice.

Although a number of the first- and second-generation respondents identified themselves as Muslims, many of them stated that they do not consider themselves ‘good Muslims’ which they attribute to their lackadaisical commitment to Islamic rituals and the secular environments in Ireland and the US. Nadeem, a Sunni Muslim in Dublin, stated, ‘I am a badly practicing Muslim ... this is what I am unfortunately’. He attributed his ‘bad Islamic practice’ to Dublin being a ‘non-Islamic’ environment because there are not many butcher shops that sell halal meat and because mosques are in inaccessible locations, both issues which make it difficult for him to fulfil his ‘Islamic obligations’. Nadeem also claimed that it is hard for him to be a ‘good Muslim’ in Dublin because of his daily work schedule, which is not conducive to taking breaks in order to fulfill his five-daily-prayer responsibilities. Humayun, who noted that others perceive his gay identity as ‘unIslamic’, as seen in Chapter 4, echoed Nadeem in describing himself as ‘a very bad Muslim’ because ‘I don’t [pray five times per day]. I don’t fast ... I don’t give zakat80 ... It’s nothing like Pakistan. [Islam] is in your face there’. Nadeem and Humayun may be said to evaluate their Islamic practice through the lens of the five pillars of Islam81, or the core of a Muslim’s duty to worship God. Their statements suggest that first-generation respondents find it more difficult to fulfill their ‘Islamic duties’ in secular environments such as Ireland and the US than in non-secular environments such as Pakistan.

80 The literal, or denotative, definition of the word zakat is ‘increase’, as in growth. The word zakat is used by Muslims to refer to alms-giving and charity (Zakat Foundation of America, 2008).
81 The five pillars of Islam are: 1) believing in the ‘Islamic creed’, or attesting that there is only one God and Muhammad is his messenger; 2) praying five times per day; 3) fasting during Ramadan; 4) donating wealth to charity; and 5) making pilgrimage to Mecca, the holiest city in Islam. Esposito (2005) describes these pillars as ‘fundamental acts that provide the unity underlying the rich cultural diversity of Muslim life’ (ibid.: xvi).
Like their first-generation counterparts, several of the second-generation respondents did not consider themselves to be ‘good Muslims’ because their Islamic practice is not reflective of the five pillars. Aaron, who in Chapter 4 stated that he looked to Islam as a ‘moral compass’ in his family, acknowledged, ‘I don’t, though I should, follow the five pillars of Islam. I should read my Qur’an. I should pray. I should go to hajj\(^{82}\). I should give zakat. I’m not the best of Muslims’. Despite his desire to be a better ‘Islamic example’ to his family members, especially his daughters, Aaron describes himself as being lazy in terms of his commitment to the five pillars. Aidan, the Sunni Muslim in Dublin who was debating having an arranged marriage at the time of our interview, reflected Aaron’s experience in stating:

AIDAN: I wouldn’t say I’m a good Muslim ... I’m probably a very bad Muslim. [...] I don’t pray five times a day, which I should ... I do bad things as well. To be a proper Muslim is not easy, especially in this country and even more so in the West. It’s not easy.

Aidan does not find Dublin accommodating in terms of Islamic practice and added that the UK is more accommodating for Muslims because shopping centres and airports have ‘faith rooms’ that allow them to engage in prayer. In suggesting that Irish society should become more publicly religious, Aidan distances himself from a secular orientation, which regards religion as more of a private rather than public affair.

The second-generation participants also had wavering commitments to Islamic practice in Boston, as seen in the following passage from one of the focus group discussions:

CRAIG: How would you explain your religious backgrounds?
DERRICK: Well, I’m not religious at all so I’m out of this one. Haha.
SHAWN: At the moment I don’t practice, so [religion] is not that important. I’m doing work most of the time ... Boston is a like a non-religious society so religion doesn’t really matter at the moment. It would probably mean more if I was in Pakistan.

\(^{82}\)The Arabic word hajj literally means ‘to intend a journey’ (Yusuf, 2010). It is one of the five pillars of Islam and is considered a religious duty for all able-bodied Muslims to perform once in their lives.
BOB: Yeah, I will read [religious texts] every now and then but I’m not practicing either. It’s almost weird to say that you’re religious and that you’re practicing.
CRAIG: Why is it weird?
STEVE: I wouldn’t really say it’s weird, but it’s just not like practical or not easy. Islam is a guide but you don’t really have to practice it to be a Muslim. That’s what I feel.
DAVID: Yeah, I think it’s also part of our culture if you know about the history, like, to be an American is to be whatever religion you want, like you don’t shove religion in other peoples’ faces.
CRAIG: So are there times when you practice more than others?
BOB: I only do it when I’m around the family or like on Ramadan, but seriously, I hardly pay attention to it.

This interaction shows why some of the second-generation participants distance themselves from religious practice. Shawn, a Sunni Muslim, stated that religion is not that important to him because ‘being religious’ is not needed to develop a sense of belonging to Boston. He also positioned himself against the non-secular Pakistani homeland, which he argued was more religious than the US. Bob, an 18-year-old Sunni Muslim, and Steve, a 25-year-old Sufi Muslim, stated that they occasionally engage in religious practices, such as reading religious texts, but they added that partaking in Islamic practices is not even necessary for one to be a Muslim. David’s comment reflects the aforementioned participants in the sense that religion is typically a private matter in the US and that the country is perceived by some Americans to be a pluralist society. David is a Shia Muslim, which suggests that young Sunni and Shia Pakistani men share similar perspectives on secularism and the privatisation of religious belief and practice even though Sunnis and Shias have been historically linked by sectarian rivalry. It is also worth pointing out that Bob raised the issue of community and the important role it plays in how young Pakistani men in diaspora develop their positions towards religious practice.

While the majority of the participants identified themselves as Muslims, several of these young Pakistani men associated themselves with religions other than Islam. As discussed in Chapter 2, these minority religious groups, such as Christians, Sikhs, Hindus, and Jews, must negotiate with the larger Pakistani identity that holds Islamic values, which are outlined in the Constitution of the Republic of
Religious Experiences in the Pakistani Diaspora

Pakistan. Like some of the first- and second-generation Muslim respondents, two non-Muslim interviewees do not engage in their respective religious practices. Sohail, a Hindu participant who does not consider himself to be a ‘real Pakistani’ because of his religious background, told me that his Hindu practices are ‘most of the times on pause’ in Dublin. He added, ‘I wouldn’t be a devout Hindu or anything’, but he does believe in the Hindu concept of karma.

Fahad, a Jewish interviewee in Boston who wanted to see more gender equality in Pakistan, as discussed in Chapter 4, described himself as an ‘atypical Pakistani’ because he does not consider himself to be a Muslim even though he was born into an ‘Islamic family’. He identified himself as a descendent of Bene Israel, a Jewish tribe of ancient Israel, which migrated to South Asia during the medieval period. While he occasionally reads the Torah, the Jewish holy book, Fahad did not consider himself a ‘practicing Jew’ and commented that he never reveals his religious background to Pakistani Muslims, especially in Pakistan, for fear of discrimination. As a postgraduate student living in an area of Boston with a significant Jewish population, he does not partake in Jewish practices, such as fasting on holidays, lighting Sabbath candles, or attending a synagogue for prayer (Pew Research, 2014b). Instead of engaging in public acts of worship and partaking in Jewish rituals in Boston, Fahad stated that his Jewish beliefs are ‘something very personal’. He added, ‘it’s kind of wrong ... for people to do [religion]’ because it is a private affair, which suggests that he favours living in a secular rather than non-secular society. Fahad’s position on religious practice as a predominantly private affair may also be linked to his Jewish background, as he does not want to reveal his religious identity in public because of fear of backlash from other Pakistanis. While he made it clear that he does not practice Judaism, Fahad may be said to be a ‘devotional Jew’ in the sense that he engages in Jewish

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83 Part 1 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan states that ‘Islam shall be the State religion of Pakistan’. In addition, the Preamble of the Constitution describes the country’s character as being a ‘democratic state based on Islamic principles of social justice’.

84 According to Staal (1989), what makes someone a Hindu is not what he believes, but ‘the ritual practices he performs and the rules to which he adheres, in short, what he does’ (ibid.: 389).

85 A belief in karma entails, among other things ‘a focus on long-run consequences, that is, a long-term orientation’ (Kopalle et al., 2010: 251). In essence, karma may be translated into ‘[w]hatever actions are done by an individual in different embodiments, [s]he reaps the fruit of those actions in those very bodies or embodiments (in future existences)’ (Krishan, 1997: 97).

86 According to Parfitt (2003), the Bene Israel is a Jewish community in South Asia.
rituals in the private sphere. In associating himself with Judaism and a ‘non-Pakistani’ ethnic group such as Bene Israel, Fahad positions himself as an outsider to the dominant Pakistan Muslim population.

Fahad’s position in relation to Pakistan as an ‘Islamic State’ is also discussed in one of the focus groups in which he shed light on the experiences of religious minorities in the homeland. As a Jew, Fahad stated that he feels a heightened sense of Otherness in Pakistan, but he does not feel this way in Boston:

CRAIG: Fahad, how did you feel when you came here?
FAHAD: I changed ... Completely, as in everything is different about me.
CRAIG: What do you mean?
FAHAD: Well, like in Pakistan, it generally has to do with your family and your religion. For minorities it’s pretty bad, man. The Christians have it worse.
HENRY: Yeah, that’s true.
FAHAD: The Christians have it even worse. The Zoroastrians and Parsis, they, like, hide, man ... If you’re a minority, it’s bad.
CRAIG: How does that make you guys feel?
IAN: It’s horrible.
ANDREW: Agreed.
FAHAD: But generally [Pakistani] society is ... divided ... like I would walk outside of Boston at three o’clock at night and I would be safe. I can’t even do that at 4pm in my own city in the day ... It’s that bad.

Fahad believed that it is easier for him to be Jewish in the US than it was for him in his native Pakistan. He suggested that American culture is more pluralistic and tolerant in regards to religious practice, whereas Pakistan is more Islamic-centred, thus placing Jews and Christians outside of the Pakistani ‘Islamic nation’. The second-generation participants in this focus group recognised Pakistan as a country that is intolerant of Jews and Christians. In doing so, they insinuated that the US is an easier place to practice religion and that they prefer living in a secular society rather than a religious-based society.

Religion in Family, Schools, and Places of Worship

Religious community refers to an individual’s desire to belong to and actively participate in the rituals of specific religious communities. The concept of community may also be used to explore how certain environments, such as
families, educational settings, and places of worship, shape the religious experiences of the respondents in Dublin and Boston. I see the family, education, and places of worship as sites of religious socialisation and communication networks and devices that reproduce and recreate religious beliefs and values among Pakistanis in diaspora.

Family as a Site of Religious Transmission

As discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, the family is a central institution in Pakistan and the Pakistani diaspora. Pakistani families in Ireland and the US can be seen as sites for the production and reproduction of religious beliefs and practices, which are not simply individually achieved, but rather ascribed through parents and grandparents (Peek, 2005: 223). In this section, I follow Stolz (2009), who argues that individuals ‘learn religion’ by witnessing the religious norms, values, and behaviours of their parents and grandparents (ibid.: 355). Several of the first-generation respondents in Dublin and Boston took action to instil religious values and practices in their children. Sahir, a Sunni Muslim who is both a Pakistani and Irish citizen, spoke about teaching his children how to act as Muslims, as he describes in the following passage:

Sahir: In the morning, [my children] wake up ... they come down[stairs] and they say assalamalaikum, may peace be upon you. It’s a normal thing. Everybody knows that. Now certain families don’t do that ... My son, I teach him everyday in the morning to say [assalamalaikum], to look into my face, and he asks why he has to say that every time he comes home. It’s just the way of greeting somebody ... It’s just small things like that ... I never realised back home in Pakistan ... because I was living in the family that those things were just embedded in me, whereas here I have to really force myself to remember those and to teach the children that.

Sahir’s attempt to teach his children Islamic practices shows that Pakistani parents in diaspora teach religious values to their children if they believe that these values are important and useful to maintain in society (Peek, 2005: 223). Living in a ‘non-Muslim’ environment such as Dublin has heightened Sahir’s awareness of his Islamic obligations because he fears that his children will break away from Islamic beliefs and practices. Sahir worries that if he does not teach his children Islamic beliefs and practices, other Muslims in the wider Islamic community will
perceive him to be a ‘bad Muslim’. He engages in the processes of religious boundary maintenance and Pakistani cultural reproduction by instilling values from the homeland into his family members. Sahir’s indoctrination of Islamic practice reminds us that religiosity is not innate to individuals, rather individuals ‘have to learn “religious content” before they can even become religious’ (Stolz, 2009: 355). These points are important because they show that second-generation individuals in the Pakistani diaspora are influenced by, and sometimes conform to, the religious beliefs and practices of their parents.

Matthew, one of the second-generation participants in Dublin, discussed the important role that his family played in developing his religious orientation. He stated that his parents and grandparents’ religious practices encouraged him to adopt a Barelvi identity. In addition to running the family businesses, he considers himself a Sufi philosopher and poet. Interestingly, he connected his Muslim identity with his Irish identity, calling Ireland ‘a very mystical country … full of mystical fairies, mystical stories’. On several of my visits to his businesses, Matthew often had a collared shirt with small purple flowers covering it, while on other occasions he would be wearing a shalwar kameez. He also frequently discussed contemporary developments in Ireland by referring to figures and events throughout Irish history.

At one point during our discussion, Matthew took out his iPhone and showed me pictures of his self-described ‘pilgrimage’ during which he climbed Croagh Patrick Mountain. He talked about how Saint Patrick, one of the Catholic patron saints of Ireland, ‘purified’ the Irish people in destroying diseases and ridding the land of ‘snakes … inside the heart’. In fusing elements of Pakistani and Irish cultures, he demonstrates a hybrid identity that fuses Sufi and Irish mysticism. More than any other participant in this study, Matthew used Sufi-oriented allegories to explain his own identity, which he wants to pass onto his children who will grow up in Ireland:

Barelvis are concerned with defending the popular South Asian practice of sheikhs and shrines, where Muslim devotees visit to seek the guidance of intercessors (pirs) between themselves and God (Lewis, 1994: 40). They tend to stress less Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) and more independent judgment and reasoning (ijtihad).
MATTHEW: As a child in our house, it was very Sufi, it was never Wahhabi or Deobandi ... always Barelvi. My grandfather, God bless him, and my grandmother, God bless her, every morning I remember being woken up for the fajr ... the salat ... I used to see the dhikr ... [I listened] to them as I was asleep as a child. That may have had an effect spiritually ... For many years ... we still gathered ... to read ... and that ritual is still continued even in our house.

In this passage, Matthew notes that seeing his grandparents engage in religious practice at home encouraged the development of his own Sufi identity. He added that these religious practices continue in his own home now, meaning that he is teaching his children about Sufism. Matthew’s comments highlight the idea that the development of religiosity is significantly influenced by parents and grandparents and that children in Pakistani homes in diaspora are exposed to religious practices and beliefs originating in the homeland.

However, not all Pakistanis in the homeland or in the diaspora identify themselves as ‘religious’. James, an atheist in Boston who often laughed and raised his eyebrows during our conversation about religion, stated that his parents’ ‘non-religious’ orientation influenced the way that he thought about religion. James’s parents did not speak about religion or instil any particular set of religious values when he was growing up. His father, who was born near Karachi, often told James that religion is ‘superstitious’ and used by governments to control citizens. He stated that he is glad that his parents did not teach him about Islam or force him to conform to religious beliefs or partake in religious rituals because this meant that he was not ‘pigeonholed’ into religion. By using the term ‘pigeonholed’, James stresses his preference of being loosely attached to religion and his desire to operate outside of the idea that to be Pakistani also means to be Muslim.

The significant role that the family unit plays in Pakistan and its diaspora has shaped how young first- and second-generation Pakistani men position themselves towards religion. The first-generation Muslim respondents who were born and raised in Pakistan tend to be more concerned with instilling Islamic beliefs and

88 Fajr is an Arabic word that means ‘dawn prayer’. It is the first of the five daily prayers, which are obligatory for all Muslims.
89 Salat is an Arabic term that refers to the practice of daily ritual prayer in Islam. See Haeri (2013) for insight into the private performance of salat prayers among Muslims.
values in their children to counteract the increasingly secular environments of Dublin and Boston. These interviewees attempt to reproduce Pakistani culture around their family and homes in order to disseminate Islamic values. Second-generation participants in Dublin and Boston shared stories of how their parents' Islamic sectarian affiliations have affected their religious practices and beliefs. The fact that these second-generation respondents adopt religious positions of their parents shows that religious beliefs and practices, or abstaining from religion altogether, are passed on to future generations even while in diaspora.

*Madrassas, Christian Schools, and Universities as Sites of Religious Socialisation*

The first- and second-generation participants had a range of educational experiences, including those in madrassas[^90], Christian schools, and secular public schools, all of which influenced the development of their individual religiosities. Education may be described as a site of religious socialisation in that it has the potential to exert a strong influence on religious values, attitudes, and behaviours, especially among young people. Babar, who associated himself with the Barelvi community of Dublin, stated that his father forced him to attend a madrassa in Rawalpindi so that he would become a *hafiz*[^91]. However, after several years in the madrassa, Babar withdrew from the school because it was too focused on religion and he 'wasn't fond of just being a religious person only'. Upon leaving the madrassa, he enrolled in a university in Islamabad to study business and commerce, and he later obtained a postgraduate degree in computer science at a university in England. When asked about why he chose to attend a 'Western-style' university rather than be educated as a *hafiz*, Babar noted:

> BABAR: I wanted to learn both [science and religion] ... You shouldn't just learn the religious and leave the science side or just stick with the

[^90]: Madrassa may be literally translated as 'Islamic school'. In Pakistan, madrassas have recently faced international scrutiny after the events of 9/11 for allegedly promoting 'Islamic extremism'. According to Butt (2012: 387), some scholars understood madrassas as sites of political indoctrination and origins of conservative and violent ideologies. Other scholars such as Rehman (2000) and Rana (2009) presented madrassas as playing peaceful roles in society such as increasing literacy rates, spreading religious morality and human values, discouraging criminality, and maintaining social order.

[^91]: A *hafiz* is the title given to a Muslim student who memorized the *Qur'an* over a two or three year span (Luo, 2006).
science and leave the religious side. No, you have to keep both things together.

In separating himself from an Islamic-based education in Pakistan, Babar distanced himself from the importance of ‘religious schools’ found in the homeland and positioned himself closer to a ‘Western secular education’ in Europe. His comments are interesting because it shows how young Pakistani men in diaspora prefer a balance between secular and non-secular philosophies in their education. In this sense, Babar may be seen to be harmonizing elements of both the migrant culture and new host society culture. His experience also counters the ‘culture talk’ surrounding Pakistanis as being ‘religious fundamentalists’.

The Islamic educational system in Pakistan also greatly influenced the religiosity of Fahad, the Jewish respondent in Boston. While growing up in a ‘conservative’ Muslim family from Karachi, his parents forced him to attend a Deobandi madrassa, a school that he found too close-minded and unscientific. Fahad’s experience in the madrassa contributed significantly to his journey towards Judaism. Unlike Babar, who preferred a balance between the secular and non-secular educational systems, Fahad desired a secular education only. He argued that some of his Muslim family members in Pakistan place too much emphasis on theological texts, which he claimed is ‘illogical’ because it does not focus enough on what he called ‘rationality’ and ‘science’. Fahad added that he has ‘always had serious issues with [religious education]’, as he states in this passage:

FAHAD: When I would question people, they would say, ‘No, just follow it’ and I would say, ‘No, I will give you evidence’. There’s a bigger meaning … There’s logic. [Religion] has to make sense … They were like ‘Nope, sorry, not allowed’ and I was like, ‘Why?’. That’s non-sense … They considered me a heretic.

Fahad discontinued his Islamic education in Pakistan in order to pursue a postgraduate degree in information technology, a field that he proclaimed is ‘the future of society and science’. In distancing himself from other Pakistanis and family members who do not see the relevance of a secular education, Fahad positioned himself as being part of the ‘out-group’ in Pakistan. He sees himself as a secular Jew and therefore an ‘atypical’ Pakistani, a concept that I return to in Chapter 7.
Several of the second-generation Muslim participants in Dublin and Boston discussed their experiences of being minority students in Christian schools in Ireland and the US. Aaron, a Sufi Muslim respondent, told me that it was ‘awkward’ being the only Muslim student in a Protestant secondary school in a working class area of Dublin. He shared a story of a teacher ‘bringing him aside’ to the back of the classroom when it came time for the students to engage in Protestant prayers. Aaron’s experience of Othering reflects Darmody (2011) in that non-Christian students in certain Irish schools are given a different status and their cultural capital may not be recognised or appreciated, a development that can result in inequality and potential discrimination between student groups (ibid.: 225). Being a Muslim in a Protestant school created a power dynamic that made ‘integration’ difficult for Aaron, who was perceived by others as an ‘outsider’ of the ‘Irish nation’ by white native Irish students.

Unlike Aaron, Andrew, a non-practicing Sunni Muslim ‘hipster’ whose experiences I shed more light upon in Chapter 7, stated that his status as a minority student in an American Catholic school opened his mind to Christianity and made him realize that religions other than Islam also had value in his life:

ANDREW: [Attending Catholic school] forced me to … read the Bible cover to cover multiple times. After that I would go home and read about Islam and the stories about Islam and I would, like, read the English versions of the Qur’an. So it actually forced me not to just look at one religion growing up. It was, like, to compare and contrast the two things … Doing that made me interested in religion as a whole.

In noting that his Catholic school education ‘forced’ him to think about Christianity, Andrew touches upon Reay et al. (2001) in that the institutional habitus of a school can significantly affect an individual’s relationship with a particular religion. Over the years in Christian school, Andrew learned Catholic prayers and doctrine in classrooms and thus he began to appreciate Catholicism alongside his own beliefs. Andrew not only showed an appreciation for the Catholic faith by calling Jesus his ‘favourite prophet’, but he also engages with Buddhist meditation as a way of relieving stress. Andrew’s educational experiences encouraged him to move away from particularism and
consequentialism, as discussed by Glock and Stark (1968), meaning that he does not perceive Islam to be the only religious source of knowledge in his life.

In addition to their experiences in madrassas in Pakistan and Christian secondary schools in Ireland and the US, second-generation participants were also influenced by university environments, which ultimately affected their religiosities. Hugh, a Sunni Muslim, stated that joining an Islamic student association at university provided him with the constant company of Muslims and easy access to Islamic practices such as prayer and religious celebrations. However, his commitment to Islamic practice wavered upon leaving university, as he noted in the following passage:

HUGH: In college, I was really engaged, but now ... I’ve backed off a little bit. I’m not really practicing. Still believe everything, nothing has changed, I’m just not practicing ... I think I kind of started focusing more on my career, focusing on the other things ... like trying to be successful ... In college it was easy. I always had Muslims around me. I had reminders to always engage.

Hugh’s comment shows that Islamic student associations allow Muslims to develop their religious knowledge and heighten commitment to Islamic practice in a community setting (Michael, 2011: 215). He attributed his weakened Islamic practice to no longer being part of a tight-knit Muslim community which had provided him with group solidarity, social cohesion, and collective identification. Without a readily available group of Muslims to engage with, Hugh focuses instead on his professional career in the high-tech industry and does not actively seek involvement with a Muslim community in Boston. Rather than spending time with Muslims at a mosque, he prefers to talk with non-Muslims about Google’s new inventions and other technological innovations in Silicon Valley. His transition from university life to a professional career shows how the university setting can influence the formation of religious identities, which, like all identities, are ‘never completed’ and typically ‘undecideable’ (Hall, 2000: 226).

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92 Located in California, Silicon Valley refers to an area that is home to roughly 10,000 high-tech companies. Its successful growth over the last 60 years is attributed to waves of technological innovations in terms of electronics, semi-conductors, computer hardware, software, biotechnology, Internet, and more recently clean-tech (Simoudis, 2010).
Religious Experiences in the Pakistani Diaspora

Mosques, Sectarian Rivalries, and Cultural Conflicts

To understand the development of the participants’ positions towards religion, it is also important to discuss the ways in which places of worship provide a context for exploring their religiosities. Mosques, churches, and other places of worship offer a social setting for young Pakistani men to collectively identify with, as well as debate their religious beliefs and values. The majority of the first- and second-generation Muslim participants belong to a range of Islamic communities in Dublin and Boston, a point that highlights the religious diversity of the Pakistani diaspora.

During participant observation, I immersed myself in various mosques associated with particular Islamic sects. The participant observation revealed that participants who attended Blackpitts identify more closely with Deobandism, while the respondents who visited Anwar Al Medina associate more closely with Barelvism. I attribute the transmission of these Islamic sects to Dublin to the Pakistani migration between the UK and Ireland, as discussed in Chapters 1 and 4. Mosques in UK cities such as Oxford have been noted as having tense Deobandi and Barelvi rivalries, which appear to have been carried over during Pakistani migration from British to Irish cities. The interview with Wazir, a self-described Deobandi, highlights the opposition that some Pakistani Muslims have with Barelvis and the Anwar Al Medina community in Dublin, as he stated:

WAZIR: Deobandis are actually against [Barelvis] ... They think that some of the pious people after the prophet, when they came to this world they actually tried to give life to the prophet [Muhammad] ... These people, when they pray, they don’t actually use the word of God. CRAIG: They believe in saints and stuff ... WAZIR: Exactly. The saints ... If you go to their mosque and you see a picture of Medina and those kind of things, like all green and this kind of stuff, and then after you pray, they just try and say something to the Prophet ... you are not allowed to do that when somebody is praying ... Asking God is more important. Believing in God is more important.

Wazir’s comments on Barelvi practices are confirmed by White (2012), who noted that to their critics, Barelvis are:
... syncretics who blend questionable Sufi practices with old Hindu traditions; display a disconcerting devotion to the Prophet Muhammad that borders on shirk\textsuperscript{93}; pay insufficient attention to the early traditions of the ancestors; and seem uninterested in defending the faith from internal and external adversaries’ (ibid.: 182).

The difference between Deobandism and Barelvism, which Wazir discussed, highlights the idea that sectarian conflict originating in Pakistan can be transmitted into the Pakistani diaspora. The Deobandi and Barelvi rift remains unreconciled for several reasons include their separate theological and philosophical traditions, which have congealed over time through their enthusiastic propagation in mosques and madrassas.

On the other end of the Deobandi-Barelvi spectrum, Matthew, a 35-year-old Sufi Muslim who discussed learning Barelvi practices from his grandparents, noted his aversion to Deobandism, suggesting that Muslims who prefer the Blackpitts mosque in Dublin are ‘un-Islamic’ because Deobandis ‘believe that if you listen to music, you should die’. As a Sufi, Matthew regarded music as something that comes from an individual’s heart and speaks to an individual’s soul, thus making it an important aspect of spiritual growth\textsuperscript{94}. Matthew referred to Deobandis as Wahhabis\textsuperscript{95} and claimed that this group is ‘ruining Islam’ by destroying Sufi practices, such as efficacy of pirs, worshipping at the tombs of Muslim saints, and ascribing special qualities to Muhammad. Matthew’s positioning of Deobandis and Muslims who sympathise with them as being ‘unIslamic’ reminds us that Pakistani Muslims in diaspora are Othered by their peers as well as non-Pakistanis and non-Muslims.

\textsuperscript{93} This Arabic term refers to the sin of practicing idolatry or polytheism, or the worshipping of more than one God.

\textsuperscript{94} White (2012) reflects Matthew’s comment in noting that Barelvi Sufis embrace the role of music, dance, and celebration of spiritual saints, generally reject violence, and condemn the austere social ethic of neo-traditionalist Muslim groups (ibid.: 182).

\textsuperscript{95} Blanchard (2008) describes Wahhabis as ‘puritanical Muslims’ who are part of a Sunni Islamic movement that ‘seeks to purify Islam of any innovations or practices that deviate from the seventh-century teachings of prophet Muhammad and his companions’ (ibid.: 1).
A focus group discussion I held with five second-generation Pakistani Muslims in Boston sheds light on the divisions between Muslims and the diversity of the Pakistani diaspora. The following passage highlights how young Pakistani men position themselves towards Islamic sects and identify with certain mosques:

CRAIG: What is the mosque scene like in Boston?
DERRICK: I think it’s more divided than ever. I remember before 9/11 it was just, like, a bunch of Muslims living in Boston, but now it’s like you have all of these different mosques that say different things about Islam. It’s very divided. Like, that’s one reason I don’t really care about Islam that much anymore.
BOB: I agree, like this mosque is super liberal. Women and men pray in the same room. Some women don’t even cover and it’s no big deal. I know other mosques in Boston would be outraged if they even saw a woman in the mosque.
DAVID: I usually don’t come to this mosque, but I like it a lot. If I lived in the area I would come all the time. They accept me even though I’m Shia.
CRAIG: So other mosques wouldn’t accept you?
DAVID: Not if they knew that I was a Shia! The mosques in downtown Boston are straight Sunni. Some even say they’re supported by the [Muslim] Brotherhood and Saudis.
STEVE: Well, the mosque in Roxbury is okay. At least Imam Webb is cool and stuff. He talks about hip-hop and makes things relevant, but some of the Muslims there are backward.
CRAIG: How are they backward?
STEVE: All they care about is Islam.
BOB: There are tons of Somalis there and they’re a bit hardcore.
CRAIG: So you prefer a place less hardcore?
BOB: I want my mosque to be chill and liberal. None of this Salafi stuff.

The focus group discussion suggests that the Pakistani Muslim population of Boston is divided because of sectarianism. Bob, an 18-year-old Sunni Muslim, positioned himself as different from other Pakistani Muslims because of his ‘liberal’ beliefs, which emphasise gender integration rather than gender segregation. David, a 21-year-old Shia Muslim, commented that some Pakistani Muslims in Boston discriminate against Shia Pakistani Muslims, and that he appreciates mosques that deliberately avoid the Sunni-Shia distinction. On the other hand, Steve, a 25-year-old Sufi Muslim, raised the issue of Muslims in Roxbury being ‘backward’ and ‘hardcore’ concerning their interpretation of Islam. In response, Bob distanced himself from Salafism and its so-called conservative religious beliefs and practices. Ultimately, this focus group discussion highlights the idea that young Pakistani Muslim men in Boston lead
lives which reproduce recent culture talk portraying Muslim American men as ‘Muslim fundamentalists’ and ‘Islamic extremists’.

While some of the Muslim participants in Boston distanced themselves from religious institutions because of their sectarian affiliations, the gay Muslim respondents stated that mosques are not tolerant of homosexuality. As a result, these interviewees have not developed a sense of belonging to a Muslim community, arguably because homosexuality is treated as incompatible with Islam (Yip, 2007b). Yasir, a Sunni Muslim, told me that his mosque is not ‘raveningly against homosexuality’, but he added that certain members of the community, including the imam, would object to his sexual preference based on theological grounds. Yasir added that if Muslims in his mosque were aware of his gay identity, they would try to prevent him from partaking in prayers. While his sexual preference has not altered his own devotion to Islamic beliefs and values, Yasir suggested that being a gay Muslim makes it difficult for him to develop a ‘true’ sense of belonging to the mosque he visits because he hide aspects of his identity from community members who oppose homosexuality.

On the other hand, Hugh, who previously commented on becoming ‘less religious’ after leaving the university setting, stated that intergenerational cultural differences lead to friction within his hometown mosque in the US. He does not regularly engage in Islamic practices because he does not like to visit his mosque, which is attended mainly by older Pakistani Muslims. Hugh claimed that he ‘can’t relate to [older Pakistani Muslims]. At like a cultural level, I’m just not there’, a statement which highlights how second-generation Pakistani Muslims in diaspora do not see the migrant culture as being their own. He noted that older Pakistani Muslims perceive him as being ‘unIslamic’ and do not consider him to be ‘fully Muslim’ because he was not born and raised in a ‘Muslim country’. Contrastingly, Hugh perceived the older generation of Pakistani Muslims as not being ‘really American’. He attributed these differences to an ‘age gap’ and the inability of older Pakistani Muslims to integrate into American society, adding that their ‘world is just different’. Hugh’s comments suggest that the parents of second-generation participants in Boston are more embedded within cultural values and
norms originating from the homeland, and that this ‘alien culture’ is why second-generation individuals do not like attending mosques.

Irish Catholic-Ethos Versus American Civil Religion

My participants’ religiosities can also be explored by turning to the question of what role religion should play in Irish and American society. To examine this issue, it is helpful to consider the history of Pakistan and the part that religion has played in shaping Pakistani culture and Pakistani identity. According to Shaheed (2010), Pakistan has a paradoxical history in the sense that the country’s founder, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, envisaged a secular not a theocratic state for Muslims, but in recent history Pakistan has witnessed the formation of ‘politico-religious parties’ committed to the creation of an ‘Islamic state’ (ibid.: 852). The mostly politically motivated usage of Islam in Pakistan peaked in the 1970s and 1980s under Pakistani President Zia-ul-Haq, ‘whose “Islamisation” policies both negated state promises of equality for female and non-Muslim citizens and encouraged society’s most bigoted sections’ (ibid.). In light of Pakistan’s paradoxical history, it is worth assessing how the respondents perceive the role that religion should play in Ireland and the US.

The majority of the first-generation Muslim respondents in Dublin and Boston preferred to live in a secular country rather than a non-secular country. Nadeem, a Sunni Muslim in Dublin, stated that applying the concept of sharia as the basis of a country’s legal system is ‘un-Islamic’ because, according to his interpretation of Islam, Muslims should not enforce their religious beliefs and values on non-Muslims. He argued that every country in the world should be secular to ensure freedom of religion and expression. Nadeem’s interest in secularism suggests that he prefers to live in a society that separates religion from state affairs, rather one that uses Islam as a means to govern. However, Nadeem also preferred Pakistani culture to ‘Western culture’ as discussed in Chapter 4, an interesting point because he perceives Pakistani culture and Islam as two separate entities. Hasan, a Sufi Muslim who echoed Nadeem in his preference for Pakistani culture (Chapter 4), also prefers living in a secular country rather than a non-secular country. He does not want Pakistan to become an ‘Islamic state’ because it would limit the rights of
Religious Experiences in the Pakistani Diaspora

non-Muslims and lead to other minorities to become ‘second-class citizens’. Hasan continued, ‘I want everyone to have religious freedom to do whatever it is that they want to do’. His comments reflect that an individual may be both religious and secular in the sense that he advocates for religious freedom, but not a theocratic, non-secular state. Humayun, one of the gay Sunni Muslims in Boston, reflected Hasan in arguing that Pakistan should ‘drop the “Islamic” in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan’. He would like to see Pakistan become ‘entirely secular’ by installing ‘a Bill of Rights’\(^{96}\), like something in America where you have freedom of speech … and [freedom of] religion is protected\(^{97}\). In this statement, Humayun compares the societies and governments of the homeland with his ‘new home’ in the US. In his denunciation of an ‘Islamic state’, Humayun suggests that he would like to belong to the secular society of the US and not to Pakistan. This position may be linked to his gay identity, which is tolerated more in Boston than it would be if he lived in Pakistan.

Unlike the majority of their first-generation counterparts in Boston, five out of the six second-generation participants called for de-secularisation, or the ‘return to religion’ of Irish society. The participants discussed a desire for religion to play a stronger role in the public sphere as opposed to the current state in Ireland, in which religion is increasingly being relegated to the private sphere. These second-generation respondents correlated the secularisation of Ireland with the increasing immorality of Irish people. Matthew, the Irish Sufi mystic, argued that the Irish are ‘very much losing the religion … They need guidance. They need soul … They either become a sick man, a drunk man, or a pornographic man’. In this passage, he opposes the secularisation of Irish society because he argues that a society without religious authority and religious values is not a moral society. When I asked him how Irish society can be improved, Matthew stated, ‘It’s religion. I’m not asking [anyone] to convert to Islam. All I’m asking is to sit down

\(^{96}\) The Bill of Rights’ is the collective name given to the first ten amendments of the US Constitution. This constitutional document guarantees a number of individual freedoms to American citizens and effectively limits the power of the federal government in terms of legislation.

\(^{97}\) The First Amendment of the Constitution prohibits the US government from making any law respecting an establishment of religion. This is commonly referred to as ‘the separation of Church and State’ clause.
Religious Experiences in the Pakistani Diaspora

and do meditation for Allah\textsuperscript{98}. See the heart. Talk to it’. Matthew supports a movement towards a ‘God-based society’ in which individuals learn moral values and conduct themselves based on religious principles. However, he is not a religious particularist, as defined by Glock and Stark (1968), because he does not believe that Islamic principles, specifically, need to be adopted by Irish people in order to solve the social problems of Ireland.

Two of the six second-generation interviewees in Dublin advocated for the de-secularisation of Ireland through the implementation of sharia. Aidan, a 24-year-old Sunni Muslim, argued that the Irish government should use sharia in order to alleviate poverty, which has emerged from an immoral capitalist economic system. He stated, ‘capitalism is wrong … I see sharia as a much better [way]’. Aidan described capitalism as ‘evil’ because it widens the inequality gap between the ‘have’s’ and ‘have not’s’ of Irish society. By arguing that sharia helps to fight inequality and that capitalism promotes it, he reflects views shared by Çizakça (2011), who states that ‘Muslims are expected to notice income inequalities and act upon them voluntarily by paying zakat, sadaqa\textsuperscript{99}, and establishing waqfs\textsuperscript{100}’. (ibid. 14). Aidan’s comments suggest that he perceives Islam in particular as offering solutions to fighting economic inequalities in Ireland. In light of the religiosity model developed by Glock and Stark (1968), he adopts a particularist mindset in the sense that he sees the adoption of specific Islamic systems and values as the best way to resolve social problems in Ireland.

Like Aidan, Harris, a Deobandi Muslim in Dublin, advocated for the implementation of sharia in order to counteract the negative influences of alcohol consumption and the sexual exploitation of women, both of which he referred to as degrading and immoral activities of Irish society. During our semi-structured interview, Harris frequently used Islamic scripture to justify his opposition to ‘Irish culture’. His advocacy for a non-secular state in which Islam is the only source of legislation and moral direction reflects the concept of ‘Muslim fundamentalist’ as developed by Ruthven (2004), who suggests that these kind of

\textsuperscript{98} Allah is the Arabic term for God.

\textsuperscript{99} Sadaqa is an Arabic term translated to mean ‘voluntary charity’.

\textsuperscript{100} Waqfs is a religious endowment in sharia in which Muslims donate land or cash to religious or charitable purposes.
Muslims aim to eradicate ‘moral corruption’ from society by supplanting secular laws with *sharia* as interpreted through the *Qur’an* and *sunnah*. Harris’s religious identity in light of the *Ummah* as a diasporic concept is discussed in more detail in Chapter 7.

Unlike several of the second-generation Muslim participants in Dublin, none of the second-generation participants in Boston preferred to live in a non-secular society because they valued the idea of civil religion, as developed by Bellah (1967) and Herberg (1974). Ben, a Sunni Muslim, stated that he appreciated the ‘American ideal’ of pluralism and the notion that all religious groups are protected under the American Constitution. He added that the ‘real religion’ of the US is not Christianity, but rather the democratic values of the Constitution, such as freedom of religion and expression. Ben favours a civil religion based on cultural symbols such as American democracy and Constitutional principles rather than a Christian doctrine. Being born and raised in Boston has contributed to Ben’s secular mindset in the sense that he conforms to notions of American society as respectful of all religions, but simultaneously having a ‘non-religious’ identity.

Alex, the Ahmadi Muslim participant who, as noted in Chapter 4, distanced himself from Pakistani culture and the homeland, also welcomed the secular aspect of American society. He valued secularism and the protection that the Constitution provides to persecuted Pakistani religious groups such as Ahmadis. His religious background clearly informs his position in support of secularism, as he demonstrates in the following passage:

ALEX: From the standpoint of the Ahmadi Muslim community, we believe, and I believe, that there should be a separation of Church and State and that the only role religion should play in the State and the government is to just ensure that all religions are respected and that people have the freedom to practice their religion.

Alex effectively advocates for a civil religion by calling for a non-denominational understanding of religion in the US. He suggests that he would like religion to play a positive public role in fostering republican virtues, such as civil rights and citizenship. Despite believing in the separation between Church and State, Alex
maintained that religion should still ‘inform’ American society, ‘but not explicitly in the sense that [Americans] feel that this is a Christian nation or a Muslim nation or any other nation’. As an Ahmadi whose religious group is persecuted in Pakistan, Alex values a flexible boundary around the American nation because this boundary allows for him to identity with the civic nation.

Like Alex, several of the second-generation Muslim respondents were adamant about defending secularism. More specifically, they discussed their opposition to conservative political groups who promote the idea that the US is a ‘Christian country’. Among these interviewees, Andrew criticised the Republican Party for propagating the idea that the US was founded upon ‘Christian values’ and should be considered a ‘Christian country’. He argued, ‘[Republicans are] going completely against what the [founding fathers] once said. People came to this country for this separation [between Church and State]’. Andrew added, ‘religion should be really a personal thing and intimate ... you shouldn’t go around parading it’. In this comment, he supports the privatisation of religion; this differs from the views of several second-generation participants in Dublin who expressed an interest in the de-secularisation of Irish society.

The data presented in this section shows that young first- and second-generation men in Dublin and Boston adopt different positions towards secularism and non-secularism. The majority of my first-generation participants advocated for secularism and for living in a society that does not impose a particular set of religious beliefs and practices on the entire population. By opposing non-secular societies where religion plays a significant role in crafting legislation, these first-

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101 Huntington (2004), as noted by Fraga and Segura (2006), ‘repeatedly asserts the Christian nature of American society and dismisses any concern that such an identity might be problematic for non-Christians’ (ibid.: 282). For Huntington (2004), non-Christians in the US may legitimately see themselves as strangers because they or their ancestors moved to this ‘strange land’ founded and peopled by Christians’ (ibid.: 4).

102 The Tea Party is considered the most conservative branch of the Republican Party. Anthony, a Sunni Muslim and Punjabi, claimed that it is a threat to America’s secular values because it promotes the idea that the US is a ‘Christian country’. He called for the ‘elimination of this kind of thought from politics because ‘it’s very unhealthy in the sense that it’s going against everything the nation was founded upon’. Anthony’s comments are significant because they show his preference for a civil religion rather than an official State-based religion.

103 The term ‘founding fathers’ generally refers to delegates of the Constitutional Convention of 1787, which led to the signing of the US Constitution. The term is also frequently applied to other leading figures of the American War for Independence between the years 1775-1783.
generation respondents claimed that a pluralist society that recognizes the equality of all religious groups is fundamental to a healthy country.

One of the major differences in the data arose out of how second-generation interviewees in Dublin and Boston positioned themselves towards secularism. The second-generation participants in Dublin advocated for a 'return to religion', arguing that Ireland's move away from Catholicism has led to the degradation of Irish society and culture. However, these respondents did not necessarily call for the implementation of *sharia* and other Islamic practices into society, but rather an increase in 'religious orientation'. Their interest in religion demonstrates that the second-generation Muslim respondents in Dublin view religion as the best means to instil morality into society. In contrast, the second-generation interviewees in Boston conformed to the secular notion of American identity. These participants discussed their appreciation for the separation of Church and State and the religious freedom provided to American citizens. In discussing the role that religion should play in American society, some of the second-generation respondents in Boston opposed the idea of the US being an ethnic nation based upon 'Christian values', a topic which I return to in Chapter 7. By criticising the idea of an ethnocentric conceptualisation of American identity, these interviewees demonstrated their preference for living in a civic nation that bases group membership on constitutional principles, such as religious freedom and equality, rather than Christianity or any other religion.

'Spiritual, But Not Religious'

While discussing the role that religion plays in their lives, some of the participants talked about experientialism, a dimension of religiosity developed by Glock and Stark (1968) in which individuals commune with a perceived higher power that convinces them of a connection to the supernatural. These respondents described themselves as being 'spiritual, but not religious'. In Dublin, Ahmed, the 'punk rebel' whose experiences of family were noted in Chapter 4, told me that he has a problem with organised religion because people 'use it as an excuse to do horrible, horrible things to other people'. He does not identify himself with any religion, but Ahmed added that he associates with 'spiritual things', especially
when he is in nature because he is able to think about the ‘truth’ by ‘[contemplating] the mysteries in the world’. Because of his experience outside of religious institutions and religious communities, Ahmed demonstrates a ‘spiritual experientialism’ because his subjective experiences are linked to processes of spiritual transformation that occurs outside of organised religion (Saucier and Skyrzpinska, 2006: 1259). He also demonstrates characteristics of a liquid life in the sense that he prefers transience by not embracing a particular religion or committing himself to a specific set of beliefs.

More so than other first-generation participants in Boston, Hasan struggled to try to uphold Islamic boundaries in his social life as a postgraduate student at a university in Boston. I met Hasan during the month of Ramadan when he was ‘making more of an effort to be a Muslim’. According to him, it is easier to be a Muslim in Pakistan during Ramadan because ‘back home everyone is a Muslim’. He found Boston a difficult environment to practice Islam, especially during Ramadan, because not every Muslim fasts and he witnessed non-Muslims eating, which posed the challenge of temptation for him to break the fast. Other ‘small things’ that made it hard for Hasan to be Muslim in Boston included finding halal food and not hearing the *azzan*. In addition to discussing Islamic practice in Boston, Hasan was also critical of Pakistani communities in the city. He claimed that older Pakistanis ‘only remain in their Pakistani social circle’. He added, ‘like all of their friends are Pakistani, they only hang out with Pakistanis’. Hasan wished that Pakistanis in Boston ‘[wouldn’t] remain in [their] cuckoon’. Nevertheless, as someone who orients himself towards Sufism, Hasan told me that he gives ‘more importance to the spiritual being’ of his Islamic faith rather than his participation in organised religion. He added that he does need to attend a mosque to ‘experience’ God because ‘God is everywhere’.

Like Ahmed, Hasan feels especially connected to the supernatural when he is in nature:

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*104* *Azzan* is the Arabic word for Muslim call to ritual prayer; it is typically made by a *muezzin*, an official Muslim singer, from the tower of a mosque (Oxford Dictionaries, 2015).
HASAN: I love nature. To me that is the most spiritual moment to be in, when I’m away from people, when I’m away from phones, laptops, you know the normal life. When I’m alone in the jungle, the mountains, the deserts. I’m most spiritual there and I feel like praying then.

Hasan may be seen as choosing a secular position on Islamic practice because he prefers the privatisation of religion, noted by Berger et al. (1973: 81). As a Muslim in the US, Hasan appears to associate himself with the broader privatised religious culture of American society and adopts certain features of Islam to make it more consonant with the secular ways of life (Davidman, 1991: 32). His position on secularism is interesting considering that Hasan discussed how he preserves elements of Pakistani culture while in diaspora, a point that was noted in the previous chapter. As someone who prefers to live in a secular rather than non-secular society, yet chooses Pakistani friends, food, and clothing over elements of ‘Western culture’, Hasan appears to pick and choose elements of the migrant society and new host society which are most conducive to his social inclinations and religious beliefs.

Several second-generation interviewees also described themselves as spiritual rather than religious. Alan, a 35-year-old Sunni Muslim in Dublin, argued that religious leaders are too controlling of Islamic practices and that mosques are not places of worship, but rather ‘businesses’ that care too much about money. Nonetheless, he maintained that Islam is important to him because he is able ‘to remain in tact and in-tune with my spiritual side’. In separating himself from Islamic institutions, but retaining a connection to Islamic beliefs and values, Alan suggests that his Muslim identity goes beyond rituals like prayer and physical manifestations, such as having a beard and dressing in ‘Islamic clothing’. Like Hasan, Alan supports the privatisation of his own religious beliefs in an increasingly secular society such as Ireland. By concealing his Islamic practices to the public sphere, he expresses an ‘invisible religion’, which Berger and Luckmann (1995) describe as a ‘modern religiosity’ because of its disassociation with institutionalized religion. Alan’s invisible religion is significant because it shows that he has consciously privatised his religious beliefs and practices, a development suggesting that young Pakistani men in diaspora conform to the secular orientations of countries like Ireland and the US.
Similarly to Alan’s experience, Henry, a Sunni Muslim in Boston, described himself as an ‘unorthodox Muslim’ because he interprets Islam ‘in different contexts than what most Muslims would say … I’m a very spiritual person’. He stated, ‘I wouldn’t say that I follow the [Islamic] doctrine down to the “T”,’ which suggests that Henry considers himself to be different from other Muslims in Boston because he does not regularly practice Islam. Because of his unorthodox beliefs, Henry positions himself as a ‘Muslim by spirit’. While he reads the Qur’an ‘now and then’, Henry also stated, ‘I’m not delving into it … I feel like religion is very much a personal experience’. By not engaging with Islamic scripture, Henry distances himself from knowledge, a dimension of the religiosity model of Glock and Stark (1968) which suggests that an individual needs textually-based religious information in order to strengthen and act upon his religious beliefs.

Conclusion

This chapter provided insight into the development of religiosity among first- and second-generation Muslim and non-Muslim men. The data shows that religion plays different roles in the lives of young Pakistani men in diaspora, a point that demonstrates how the Pakistani diaspora is not a singular, homogenous whole. The chapter focused mainly on the Muslim participants and the ways in which their religious beliefs and practices, particularly in relation to the five pillars of Islam, affect their Islamic religiosity. While the majority of the respondents identified with Islam, many of them do not consider themselves ‘good Muslims’ because they do not engage in salat or zakat. Several of the Dublin interviewees argued that Irish society is not conducive to practicing Islam, which suggests that religious practice is being challenged by Ireland’s non-secular environment. Overall, the second-generation participants in both cities had either wavering commitments to religious practice or described themselves as ‘not really practicing’, which also highlights their everyday secular orientations. The majority of these respondents raised issues of religion being a private matter, having busy work schedules, and religion being ‘irrelevant’ as reasons for not engaging with religious practice. This is important because it shows how the
Religiosities of young Pakistani men in diaspora are shaped by the roles which religion plays in the new host society.

This chapter also shed light on the impact that religious communities have on the religiosities of young Pakistani Muslim and non-Muslim men in Dublin and Boston. Particular focus was given to family, education, and places of worship as sites of religious transmission. First-generation participants were more likely than the second-generation respondents to instil religious values and practices into their children as a means to keep them away from ‘immoral’ activities in ‘Western culture’. Among second-generation interviewees, several of them described how their parents and home environments influenced their religious orientation while growing up in Irish and American societies, especially as it pertained to adopting specific religious beliefs and practices or not adopting religion whatsoever.

The data presented in this chapter also shows that educational environments can have a significant impact on religiosity development. Several of my first-generation participants preferred a secular education rather than a religious-based education, which reflects their interest in living in a more secular-oriented society. For some of the second-generation respondents, attending Christian schools heightened their sense of being an outsider, but it also exposed and reshaped their religiosities with respect to tolerating and even accepting non-Muslim beliefs and practices. The university environment influenced some of the interviewees’ religiosities because Islamic student organisations offered them group solidarity and easy access to religious practices, such as prayer and participation in religious holidays.

Moreover, examining various places of worship as sites of religious conflict shed light on the development of religiosity. In light of the diverse sample of this study, the respondents discussed the divisions within the Pakistani diaspora in light of sectarianism and conflicts between different mosques in Dublin and Boston. Several interviewees in Dublin discussed the Deobandi-Barelvi conflict, an issue that was not raised in the interviews and discussions in Boston, where respondents talked about places of worship in terms of being ‘liberal’ or ‘conservative’.
The majority of the first-generation interviewees preferred living in a secular society in which there was a separation of Church and State, rather than a non-secular society in which religion plays a prominent role in shaping culture and legislation. While these participants advocated for secularism in terms of the separating religion and politics, they did not necessarily believe that religion should have no role to play in instilling moral values among Irish and American people. Additionally, one of the more interesting findings of this study in relation to the secular and non-secular discussion is that second-generation respondents in Dublin preferred the de-secularisation of Irish society. As natives of Ireland, they would be expected to conform to the secularisation, but instead most of these interviewees argued that religion in general, rather than Islam specifically, should be used to instil morality in Irish society and ultimately bring the Irish ‘back to religion’. The second-generation participants in Boston expressed secularist positions in the sense that they preferred a civil religious orientation, which allows for a broader conceptualisation of American identity. Several of the first- and second-generation respondents wanted to distance themselves from religion, arguing that they were ‘spiritual, but not religious’. In describing themselves as such, these interviewees reflected secular positions because of the privatisation of their religious beliefs and practices and their distancing from religious institutions.

In Chapter 6, I turn to the social interactions of young first- and second-generation Pakistani men in order to examine their interactions inside and outside of the ‘Pakistani community’ in Dublin and Boston. I also pay attention to their experiences of racism and discrimination.
CHAPTER 6:
SOCIAL INTERACTIONS AND EXPERIENCES OF RACISM AND DISCRIMINATION IN THE PAKISTANI DIASPORA

In the previous chapter, I discussed the development of my participants’ religiosities. While the chapter provided us with an analysis of how the first- and second-generation respondents engage with religion in the Irish and American context, it did not explore with how the interviewees interact outside of religious environments. The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the participants’ social interactions and experiences of racism and discrimination in Dublin and Boston. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section examines the respondents’ social interactions with other Pakistanis and sheds light on intraethnic group relations within Pakistani communities in Dublin and Boston. This section also addresses the interviewees’ interactions with non-Pakistanis and focuses on the role that workplace and educational environments play in their cultural orientations. In the second section of this chapter, I turn to my interviewees’ experiences of racism and racial discrimination and how they are positioned as Others in Ireland and the US. The third section provides a summary of the key findings of this chapter and transitions into the final data chapter concerning the participants’ senses of belonging and identities.

Relations Inside and Outside of the ‘Pakistani Community’

Many of the first- and second-generation participants distanced themselves from other Pakistanis and preferred to socialise with individuals outside of their Pakistani communities. Babar, a high-tech employee in Dublin, who earlier discussed his desire for gender equality in the homeland and Ireland, shared a typical response from the first-generation respondents:

CRAIG: How often do you interact with Pakistanis? A lot?
BABAR: No, it’s nothing against my community, but I tend to stay away from them. I always had the community around me back home. When I’m in a new place I want to mingle and get used to the new place and people. If you only like to stay in your own community, why are you coming out
then? [For me] it’s completely opposite in so many cases … I have left my options open. Whenever it comes I take it …

Living in Dublin gives Babar the opportunity to interact with individuals outside of Pakistani communities, an option that is not readily available to him in Pakistan. In taking advantage of opportunities to meet non-Pakistanis, Babar reflects Cohen (2008) who states that individuals in diaspora often re-engineer their social networks as they re-settle in the new host society (ibid.: 154). His choice to interact with non-Pakistanis reflects his desire to produce ‘new beginnings’ and ‘new world views’ in Ireland. By loosely attaching himself to Pakistani communities in Dublin, Babar echoes Ryan et al. (2010) in that he challenges the idea that Pakistanis in diaspora tend to stick together in order to retain the migrant cultural norms and ethnic identities (ibid.: 50).

Other first-generation participants distanced themselves from Pakistani communities because of intraethnic group conflicts originating in the homeland. Wazir, the Baloch participant, finds it difficult to interact with other Pakistanis in Dublin because most of them are Punjabi, who he argues discriminate against Baloch and other Pakistani sub-ethnic groups because of provincial rivalries and cultural identities. While he described himself as a Deobandi Muslim, Wazir does not physically appear as a ‘traditional Muslim’ because he was clean-shaven and wore a sweatshirt with blue jeans at the time of our interview. Instead of socialising with Pakistanis, Wazir prefers to have a diverse range of friends of various ethnic backgrounds, meaning that he is not isolated in the migrant culture. He stated in the interview that his diverse range of friends would not have been possible if it were not for his experiences in university, in which he joined a social network that helped him achieve professional success and broadened his mind to think ‘outside’ of Pakistan. When he is not working for a high-tech firm in Dublin, Wazir participates in social justice and anti-racism activities by helping refugees and under privileged people at a local human rights organisation. He showed great enthusiasm for helping non-Pakistanis and non-Muslims during the interview and feels a responsibility to act ‘morally’ to provide an example for other migrants on how to integrate into Irish society.
During our interview, Wazir described an intense verbal confrontation that occurred at a small South Asian restaurant near Blackpitts. While discussing Pakistani history and politics among other Pakistani Muslims, Wazir was attacked by an older Punjabi man, who was critical and antagonistic of Baloch culture and Baloch politics. The Punjabi man verbally attacked him and claimed that Baloch secularism is antithetical to Pakistan’s ‘Islamic identity’ and that Balochistan’s separatist movement from the Pakistani central government, which is dominated by Punjabis, is a threat to Pakistan’s national security. Because he is passionate about defending his Baloch identity, Wazir does not like to interact with non-Baloch Pakistanis, who, he claimed, discriminate against his co-ethnics. His confrontation with the Punjabi man shows how a Baloch, even in diaspora, can be positioned as a ‘non-Pakistani’ by non-Baloch. As I discuss in the following chapter, Wazir does not identify himself as a Pakistani, claiming that this national identity oppresses sub-ethnic identities such as those expressed in Balochistan. His comments are significant because they demonstrate how members of sub-ethnic groups are positioned as Others within the larger Pakistani population and how perceived discrimination influences the ways in which Pakistanis interact with other Pakistanis in diaspora.

While Wazir distances himself from other Pakistanis in Dublin in order to avoid intraethnic conflict, some of the participants avoided other Pakistanis because of religious differences. Nabeel, the atheist participant in Boston who is marrying an Indian American woman does not consider himself to be a member of any ‘Pakistani community’ because he is not Muslim. He commented that he ‘doesn’t see enough [Pakistanis in Boston] disentangling themselves from the idea that being Pakistani doesn’t have to mean being a staunch Muslim’. Rather than retaining ties with other Pakistanis, he stated, ‘I have tried to go out of my way to integrate into [American] culture. That is something that I know not [all Pakistanis] here [do]’. Nabeel perceives the ‘Pakistani community’ in Boston as having a boundary that is demarcated by Islam and a culture that is unwelcoming.

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105 Majeed and Hashmi (2014) claim that since the time of Pakistan’s independence in 1947, the Baloch have been facing different forms of deprivation, such as scant representation in military and civil services of Pakistan, which have been historically dominated by Punjabis. Their underrepresentation in Pakistan’s government has led to Baloch uprisings against the federal government (ibid.: 321). ‘The situation has become a major source to strengthen [the] sense of nationalism among the people of Balochistan’ (ibid.).
to non-Pakistani Muslims. Second-generation participants also raised the issue of sectarianism among Pakistani communities in Dublin and Boston. Matthew, the Sufi who was significantly affected by his parents and grandparents’ religious practices while growing up in Dublin, told me that he does not socialise with Deobandi Muslims because they are not ‘real Muslims’. As discussed in Chapter 2, Ahmadi Muslims are also considered to be outside the boundary of Islam because of their belief in prophets after Muhammad. Alex, the Ahmadi Muslim who had previously discussed his appreciation for the US’s civil religion, hardly interacts with people outside of the Ahmadiyya community because the majority of Pakistanis do not consider Ahmadis to be ‘real Muslims’.

Ahmadi Muslims like Alex position themselves closer to the new host society culture rather than the Pakistani migrant culture because in the homeland, Ahmadi Muslims are positioned outside of the ‘Muslim community’ because they do not regard Muhammad as the final prophet of the Abrahamic tradition. Matthew and Alex’s experiences while growing up in Ireland and the US demonstrates that intrareligious conflict within Pakistani Muslim communities affect the social activities and lifestyle choices of young Pakistani men in diaspora.

The participants also described tension between Pakistani migrants and native-born Pakistanis in Ireland and the US, as seen in the following focus group interaction in Dublin:

CRAIG: So what is it like being Pakistani in Dublin?
MATTHEW: Depends on who you ask!
ZACK: Yeah, like [Matthew] and I were born here so it’s a bit different, we’re Pakistani but we’re also Irish, so like being Pakistani to us is not as important probably to them.
AMIR: Haha, but you still try and act Pakistani!
BASHIR: Haha
AMIR: No matter how much you try you can’t be like us.
MATTHEW: And no matter how much you try you will never be Irish!
AMIR: Haha, guess that’s true.

106Ahmadis in Pakistan have been ‘subject to discrimination in Pakistan for decades, owing in part to the country’s blasphemy laws, which forbid Ahmadis from calling themselves Muslims or proselytizing their faith’ (Uddin, 2011: 48).
107The Abrahamic tradition refers to Judaism, Christianity, and Islam being ‘a family of religions’ (Lubar Institute, 2013). Members of these three religions are popularly referred to as ‘Peoples of the Book’, which underlines the central role scripture plays among their adherents (ibid.).
CRAIG: How do you think Pakistanis from Pakistan and Pakistanis [from Ireland] get along here?
AMIR: It could be worse, but it could be better. Some people just don’t get along. It’s a different culture over [in Pakistan]. Pakistanis here are just a bit different.
ZACK: Yeah, but some of us don’t want to be like you. We have our own culture here.

This focus group discussion provides an example of the dynamics between first- and second-generation Pakistani men in diaspora. Matthew’s comment, ‘depends on who you ask!’, reflects the idea that there ‘is no single [Pakistani identity] that each and every [Pakistani] avows’ (Brah, 1996: 6). Zack positions himself as being both Pakistani and Irish, which shows how his identity is negotiated across different discourses. While Matthew and Zack referred to their identities as being both Pakistani and Irish, the first-generation participants in the group suggested that the second-generation participants are not as ‘Pakistani’ as the first-generation because the second-generation does not possess aspects of the migrant culture. In response to this argument, Zack further distanced himself from Pakistan by stating ‘some of us don’t want to be like you. We have our own culture here’. In this statement, he shows how young Pakistani men exacerbate the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ dichotomy by ‘differentiating people by certain features’ (Miles, 1993: 7). This focus group discussion is important because it highlights how second-generation Pakistanis in diaspora do not consider Pakistani migrants to be part of the ‘in-group’, while first-generation participants do not recognise the second-generation respondents as ‘real Pakistanis’ because they were not born or raised in the homeland.

Intraethnic tension in the Pakistani diaspora can arise in university setting, primarily in Pakistani cultural student organisations as well as Islamic student organisations. Humayun, one of the gay participants who discussed how his homosexuality opposes the norms of the migrant culture, noted that first- and second-generation Pakistanis in his Islamic student organisation in Boston perceive each other differently because of where they were born:

HUMAYUN: Like we know each other and we’re friends … but we are very bad at reaching out to Pakistani Americans who actually grew up in the US. They don’t feel the same connection. It has a lot to do with their
own identity issues, not feeling entirely welcomed and then Pakistanis from Pakistan are not being as welcoming as they could be. So that’s an interesting dynamic. [...] There’s definitely a sense of de-legitimisation of one’s opinion if one wasn’t raised there, so it’s like ‘you think you know Pakistan but you really don’t because you grew up in Michigan’.

Humayun argues that second-generation Pakistanis at his university do not have the same attachments and roots to the homeland as migrants. His comment follows Brubaker (2005) in that young Pakistanis in diaspora maintain ethnic boundaries based upon categorical distinction of where an individual was born (ibid.: 9). In the passage, Humayun also describes an ethnic hierarchy in the Pakistani diaspora. This ethnic hierarchy regards individuals born in Pakistan as being ‘more Pakistani’ than second-generation Pakistanis who were born outside of the homeland. Humayun’s gay identity leads him to feeling that he is different from other Pakistanis around him. He does not see himself as reflective of Pakistani norms and migrant cultural values pertaining to sexuality. Interestingly, he positions second-generation Pakistanis growing up in the US as also not being ‘authentically’ Pakistani because they were not born or raised in the homeland.

*Social Interactions With Non-Pakistanis*

In exploring the respondents’ social interactions, it is also important to consider their behaviour and interactions with individuals outside of the ‘Pakistani community’. In this section, I examine the role that workplace environments and educational settings have on how my interviewees position themselves towards the migrant culture and the new host society culture. Having the opportunity to work and study in Dublin and Boston helped many of the participants integrate into Irish and American societies. Babar, the high-tech employee and first-generation interviewee who had noted an interest in learning about non-Pakistani cultures, recalled a business agreement with an Irish Catholic man in Dublin:

*BABAR:* [An Irish Catholic businessman and I] had two companies and we put it into one deal … Five weeks later he said ‘you’re a religious person and I’m a religious person. You trust God and I trust God. We have the same God. I’m going to offer [you] partnership in my company in good faith and keeping God as a witness’. [To make the deal official] he said we can [go] … to the mosque and the church to thank God … We
went first to [the mosque]. He was with me and he did the ablution. He said it was very refreshing. I said he didn’t have to but he said when I’m with you I will do what you’re doing ... And when I went to church with him ... I prayed out of respect.

Babar’s interaction with this businessman was made possible because of their shared belief in God and the similarities between Islam and Catholicism. Because of this business interaction, Babar was able to develop a positive attitude towards Irish Catholicism, which recognises Irish Catholics as respectful of Islam and tolerant of Muslims. By building an interfaith bridge between Irish Catholicism and Islam, Babar is able to experience religious tolerance and cultural diversity, which he described as helping him develop a positive attitude towards future business success in Ireland. In following Equality Authority (2014), Babar can be seen as having integrated into Irish society because he is able to conduct business in a manner that values other cultures. His interfaith interaction enabled the contribution of different minority groups to business success in a context characterised by non-discrimination and equality (ibid.: 5).

In light of Babar’s positive interfaith experience, one of the focus groups had an interesting exchange concerning positive workplace experiences among the participants in Dublin. During the discussion, first-generation respondents explained the culture of their workplace environments, to which a second-generation interviewee responded favourably:

CRAIG: What is it like working or studying in Dublin?
DAWOOD: Irish people are so nice. Very kind and caring. Thoughtful people ... I’ve been here for like six years and I’ve never had a problem at work.
BRIAN: That’s great to hear. I’d like to think Ireland would be like that. It’s not always that way for brown people.
HAMAD: Dawood is pretty right. Irish people make me feel happy. They’re good people.
SOHAIL: I don’t work but I study. Dublin is a cosmopolitan place so you meet people from everywhere. If I had to choose a city to live in I wouldn’t leave Dublin. There’s no place like it.
BRIAN: Haha, I think you all like Ireland more than I do!

108 For followers of Islam, ablution is a state that is prerequisite to praying. To be in such a state, a person needs to perform certain actions in certain sequence. This is referred to as the ablution process ... [T]he ablution involves cleaning with fresh water certain parts of the body in a certain order (Mokhtiar, 2003: 55).
SOHAIL: Haha.
CRAIG: Dawood, what does your workplace mean to you?
DAWOOD: Well, it's like I can feel good here and safe here ... It makes me feel that I'm part of the culture. Like we're all from somewhere. There are a lot of Irish people, but at the same time we are all from somewhere.

The first-generation participants in this discussion suggested that Dublin was a welcoming city that fosters diversity and a sense of cosmopolitanism. The workplace and university environment helped Dawood and Sohail to develop a sense of belonging to Ireland. In responding to these positive experiences and sentiments, Brian reacted with surprise and insinuated that Irish people discriminate against non-white people. His perception suggests that some second-generation Pakistanis in Dublin may perceive 'native' Irish people as racist or discriminatory towards non-white people, an issue that is given more attention in the next section.

Workplace environments have also helped the first-generation participants in Boston develop a sense of belonging to America's civic culture. Nabeel, who was earlier described as preferring to socialise outside of the 'Pakistani community' of Boston, stated:

NABEEL: [The workplace is] a very collaborative community ... People are from all over the place ... They have done a great job of ensuring that just because I'm not from the US that doesn't meant that I'm different. They treat me the same.

Nabeel's comment reflects the civic culture in that he believes that his workplace environment is tolerant towards minority groups. The diversity of his workplace has helped him develop a sense of belonging to a community that does not lay emphasis on ethnicity or religion in order to have group membership. As a result, Nabeel suggests his preference for living in a civic nation rather than a more ethnically and religiously oriented nation such as Pakistan. He stated, '[I migrated to Boston] because I genuinely enjoy the diversity that [the US] offers', adding that 'even if you gave me the highest paying job [in Pakistan], [I wouldn't take it] until you gave me people who were diverse ... with diverse mindsets ... different religions and different nationalities'. Nabeel's interest in immersing himself in a
society that is ‘color blind’ and ‘religion blind’ suggests a movement towards a mindset that is more reflective of a civic nation rather than an ethnic nation.

In addition to the workplace, educational settings provide first-generation participants with positive experiences that help them develop a sense of belonging to a civic culture. Hasan, who in Chapter 4 commented on how he reproduces Pakistani culture in diaspora, also talked about how his interactions with non-Pakistanis at university provided him with friendships that he would not have made in the homeland. Along with some of his non-Pakistani and non-Muslim friends, Hasan created an international student association in order to foster cross-cultural communication among students from around the world. Through the organisation, Hasan became friends with an Israeli migrant, an individual whose religious and national background Hasan was ‘born and raised hating’ in Pakistan. His Israeli Jewish friend led him to ‘see things about Israel that I’ve never experienced before ... It’s very good that we’re able to do that’. Hasan’s friendship with an Israeli Jew in Boston is significant because his exposure to new cultures and ideas, which are not accepted by many Pakistanis in the homeland, allows him to develop a ‘new world view’ in diaspora.

Out of the thirty semi-structured interviews in Dublin and Boston, only one first-generation participant complained about conditions at his workplace. Nadeem, a recent migrant and Sunni Muslim who works for a high-tech company in Dublin, said that his workplace does not foster positive relationships between ‘native’ Irish and migrants. He stated that he does not have many Irish friends and that he had many more ‘native’ friends when he lived in Germany. Nadeem compared the ways in which the Irish and Germans treat individuals of minority communities, arguing that the Irish ‘do not fully understand Muslims’ and ‘do not accept people with different colours’. He feels that he is Othered in the workplace and that Irish people create ethnic boundaries that separate the native/Irish/white/host community and foreigner/non-white/non-Irish immigrant newcomers. Nadeem’s experience as a first-generation Pakistani migrant relates to the findings of Khan (2005), who concluded that working-class Pakistani migrants believed that they were discriminated against in the workplace.
In terms of their social interactions, several of the second-generation respondents described a lifestyle that fuses the migrant culture and new host society culture. Alan, who was born and raised in a Dublin housing estate and earned a postgraduate degree from an Irish university, mentioned that he has always had two distinct sets of friends, Pakistani Muslims and Irish Catholics. He argued that these two groups are noticeably different because of their common cultural activities. Alan socializes with his Pakistani Muslim friends at homes and South Asian restaurants and communicates with them mainly in Urdu rather than English. Comparatively, with his Irish Catholic friends, he usually socialises with them in pubs where they watch football matches or Irish sporting games. Though he refrains from alcohol consumption for Islamic reasons, Alan noted that he tolerates being around alcohol, which is something he claimed many of his Pakistani Muslim friends would not do. He summarised the relationships he has with these two sets of friends as being ‘totally different’. Second-generation interviewees such as Alan have a variety of experiences, states of mind, and senses of identity, both inside and outside of Pakistani communities. His ability to navigate his way around Pakistani and Irish cultures demonstrates Alan’s skills as a cultural entrepreneur who is able to take on the role of innovator and originator of new cultural forms (Bhachu, 1991: 402). Alan operates in a ‘third space’ by socialising with Irish people in pubs, an institution which is venerated as one of the most important elements in the production and reproduction of Irish culture (Wilson, 2005: 30), yet he also maintains his Pakistani Muslim identity by not consuming alcohol. Alan may be seen as having developed a hybrid identity because he fuses aspects of the migrant culture and new host society culture, a process that produces new meanings in relation to what it means to be Pakistani and Irish.

Some of the second-generation participants feel as though they are being pulled between two competing cultural worlds, evidenced in their interactions with Pakistani culture and Irish culture. Aidan, who in Chapter 4 explained his dilemma with arranged marriage, also stated that he has gone ‘back and forth’ between engaging with alcohol consumption and refraining from it. He argued that being a Pakistani Muslim in Ireland is ‘pretty hard ... because the big socialising activity here is to go out to pubs’. Aidan added, ‘[alcohol consumption
is now] a bit outside of my comfort zone ... That’s why everything I do now is basically with the family’. In stating that the consumption of alcohol is outside of his social ‘comfort zone’, Aidan effectively distances himself from Irish culture and draws a boundary around his social life that is based upon his Pakistani Muslim identity. Similarly, Anthony, a Sunni Muslim postgraduate student in Boston, felt that he was pulled between American culture and his Islamic obligations. While studying as an undergraduate student at university, Anthony noted that he was ‘a little more isolated [from American culture], particularly with other Muslim students’ because they did not engage in alcohol consumption, a common activity in American social life, particularly in the university setting. In recent years, however, he told me that he has ‘opened [himself] up to being [around alcohol] whereas before I wasn’t’. This transition from intolerance to acceptance and willingness to interact in these situations indicates that Anthony reflects Hall (1992), who noted how diasporic individuals can be ‘living in translation’ while negotiating different cultures based upon a given social context (ibid.: 310).

Workplace and educational settings provided the majority of the first-generation participants with the ability to create friendships with non-Pakistanis and develop a sense of belonging to Ireland and the US. Several of the first-generation respondents stated that living in diaspora provides them with experiences that would be impossible to have if they were back in Pakistan, a point which reminds us that life in diaspora can lead individuals towards new beginnings. In terms of the social interactions outside Pakistani communities, many of the second-generation interviewees discussed being pulled between two different cultural worlds because of their perceived obligations to Pakistani culture, Islam, as well as Irish and American cultures. This kind of consciousness emerged for several reasons, including the different relationships between first- and second-generation Pakistanis and the negotiation of social activities such as alcohol consumption. Many of the second-generation participants in Dublin and Boston can be positioned in the third space in the sense that they attempt to balance the norms and values of both the migrant culture and the new host society culture.
Crisis Racism: ‘Pakis’ and ‘Terrorists’

The overwhelming majority of the participants have faced racism and discrimination while living in Ireland and the US. In Dublin, the respondents have been called ‘Paki’ and targeted as being ‘threats’ to Ireland’s economy and culture. Ahmed, the ‘punk atheist’ who had been working in Dublin for nearly ten years at the time of our interview, has been called a ‘Paki’ on several occasions. Irish customers at his workplace have told him, ‘you’re fucking coming here and taking our jobs’. Ahmed added that Irish people have told him that Pakistan is ‘backward’ and that Pakistanis will never be Irish because they do not speak English, to which he once responded by stating, ‘I actually speak seven fucking languages, and English is one!’. It can be said that Ahmed suffers from discrimination because of Ireland’s crisis racism. On this particular occasion, the Irish customer accused Ahmed of ‘coming here and taking our jobs’, which is a reference to Ireland’s economic conditions in the sense that Ahmed was blamed for taking jobs from ‘native’ Irish after the collapse of the Celtic Tiger economy.

In being called ‘Paki’, Ahmed also experienced verbal aggression based upon his representations of outsidersness and cultural origin. Ahmed can be treated as having suffered from cultural racism, a form of discrimination described by Hall (1995) as insisting on difference that is not natural or biological, but rather is contained in language and national origin (ibid.: 249). This kind of racism positions Ahmed as a non-Irish individual, and thus as an outsider who is not part of the Irish nation. By Othering him, Irish customers have suggested that Ahmed’s Pakistani identity is not compatible with Ireland’s national identity, which the customers perceive to be rooted in ‘whiteness’ and cultural norms. To these Irish customers, Pakistan’s cultural practices are not compatible with what is accepted within Ireland. As discussed in Chapter 4, Ahmed also positioned himself as an outsider in relation to Pakistani culture because he opposes family expectations and affiliates himself with atheism and not Islam. In not positioning himself either towards the migrant culture or the new host society culture, Ahmed may be seen as living a liquid life because he does not conform to hegemonic narratives of ethnicity or nationality.
Several first-generation participants in Dublin discussed experiences of discrimination because of their non-white skin colour. Sohail, the non-practicing Hindu participant, stated that Irish people tend to look at him ‘funny’ and tease him because of his brown skin colour, which makes him feel isolated, as if he is ‘always ... one in the crowd of white people’. In discussing his experiences of discrimination, Sohail claimed that Irish people use skin colour as a way to position individuals and groups outside of the Irish nation. Second-generation respondents in Dublin also experienced discrimination because of their skin colour. Aidan, who was debating an arranged marriage and felt that he was being pulled between two different cultural worlds, stated that being called a ‘Paki’ makes him feel like a ‘stranger’ in his own homeland. On several occasions, people have told him to ‘go back to your country’, to which he responds, ‘this is my country’. According to Aidan, ‘[Irish people] just don’t care ... they just say “your skin colour ... you’re brown”’. Although he is a native of Ireland and an Irish citizen, he is racialised and treated as a ‘stranger’ because his skin colour triggers a process characterised by Inglis (2009) as cognitive mapping, in which white Irish people categorise non-white individuals as ‘not Irish’ (ibid.: 3). His experiences with discrimination suggest that some Irish people perceive Irish identity solely through ethnicity.

Interestingly, Babar, who had shared his positive business experience with an Irish Catholic, stated that he does not face racism and discrimination because his skin colour ‘doesn’t look much darker ... [than your] average Irish person ... I’m quite white’. Babar’s light skin colour allows him to pass more easily as a member of the ethnic nation, which may explain why he speaks so positively about his experience in Dublin. In essence, racialisation is the common theme in the experiences of Sohail, Aidan, and Babar, as all three participants discussed the ways in which ‘native’ Irish people Other young Pakistani men and demarcate Irish identity based upon ethnicity.

The participants in Dublin faced more abuse than their counterparts in Boston, with four of the fifteen respondents in Ireland having experienced physical assaults or damage to their personal properties. None of the respondents in Boston reported facing physical abuse or damage to their properties. Jabar, who discussed
his yearning for the homeland in Chapter 4, shared his encounter with violence in Dublin:

JABAR: I was walking [and] one guy came behind me. They start speaking to me, so after that I went to the parking area, like going to cross it. [Then] he attacked me from my back.
CRAIG: What did he do?
JABAR: [He] just like hit me ... and then I [fell] down, so I asked him why they attacked me. He asked me where am I from and he didn’t respond back to me ... [The other guy] came up [and] like hit me. I pushed them back and I ran a little bit, so they followed me again and attacked, so I hit them back.
CRAIG: Did they say any names?
JABAR: No, they didn’t ask me anything ... I told them I’m from Pakistan and that’s why I think they attacked me.
CRAIG: So you think they attacked you because of your skin colour? JABAR: Yeah.

Jabar may be said to have suffered from racist violence because he was targeted not in his capacity as an individual, but as a representative of an outsider community based upon religious/cultural origin. When I asked him if he had reported the incident to the Garda, Jabar stated that he did not because he feared that Irish authorities would deport him, a sentiment that echoes the findings of Lynch (2010) in that migrants in Ireland do not report incidents of racist violence because of fear that Garda will ask about their immigration status. The consequence is that some Pakistani migrants are reluctant to engage with the police because of this. Some Pakistanis in Ireland ‘may be undocumented, but others who are legally resident (but perhaps with a short term status) do not want to bring “unnecessary” attention to themselves’ (ibid.). As a result, they are forced to deal with circumstances such as racist violence without any due process of law.

Second-generation participants such as Aaron also faced violence in Dublin, even as they appear to be ‘Irish’ in their clothing. When Aaron and I first met on the Trinity College Dublin campus, he was wearing a traditional ‘Irish cap’ and a wool sweater, which is an article of clothing typically associated with ‘rural Ireland’. He also spoke with a thick Irish accent that was difficult to interpret. During our discussion, Aaron often spoke about his life through a religious perspective, but in doing so, he stated that he has ‘not always been like this’.
When he was younger, Aaron was mixed up with substance abuse and ‘running with the wrong crowd’, as he described it. He claimed to have had a ‘Muslim reawakening’ when he hit ‘rock bottom’, a state which made him renegotiate his relationship with ‘Irish’ social activities such as drinking alcohol and partying in clubs. Aaron was an active member of a local mosque at the time of our interview. On several occasions, he invited me to the kitchen at the mosque, where I was able to interact with Pakistani Sufi Muslims, who typically spoke Urdu and enjoyed South Asian cuisine. While he demonstrated a strong Pakistani cultural orientation, as examined in Chapter 4, Aaron’s upbringing in Dublin is unmistakable in his accent and how he explains his past. His experiences and background is poignant considering that second-generation Pakistanis in diaspora face racism and discrimination in their native countries.

During our interview, Aaron recalled a story in which he was physically assaulted by a group of young white Irish men. He told me that his attackers ‘are fucked up in the head ... because they have no fucking moral system’. Aaron added, ‘they don’t even know who their mother and father are ... They don’t have the education’. Aaron referred to his attackers as ‘knackers’. This term is used in Ireland to describe individuals of a lower socioeconomic background. After describing the physical assault, Aaron also stated that ‘if [I heard] anybody [call] my daughter [or] my sons, or my nieces [‘Paki’], I’d fuck them up to be honest with you’. Aaron’s experiences highlight that young Pakistani men in Dublin fall victim to, but also promote racist violence in the sense that they ‘select’ individuals of minority communities based upon physical characteristics and cultural origin (Witte, 1996: 11). Aaron racialises his attackers by classifying them into a particular socioeconomic category based upon essentialised cultural and behavioural characteristics. This racialisation is furthered by Aaron’s comment that his attackers ‘don’t have the education’ to know better, which displays a form of cultural racism in the sense that he singles out his attackers.

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109 Irish politician James Dillon first reportedly used the term ‘knacker’ during a Dáil Éireann debate in 1960 (Dáil Éireann, 1960). Dillon referred to ‘knackers’ as people ‘of the most difficult kind and ‘descrepit old beggars’. He also referred to ‘knackers’ as chronic alcoholics and sexual offenders (Dáil Éireann, 1960).
because of their education and language, and not simply because of their biological features.

In contrast to my participants in Dublin who experienced physical assaults because of their ethnic backgrounds and skin colour, my participants in Boston noted that their religious background and ‘Muslim physical features’ triggered their experiences of racism and discrimination. While respondents in Dublin were often called ‘Paki’ in reference to their ethnicity, my first- and second-generation respondents in Boston were often called ‘terrorist’ because of their perceived Muslim identities. First-generation interviewees such as Nabeel, the ‘punk atheist’, and Yasir, a gay Sunni Muslim from Karachi, claimed that Americans are ignorant because they associate all Pakistani with ‘Islamic terrorism’. In addition, Ben, a Sunni Muslim in Boston, discussed his experience of 9/11 in stating that his classmate called him a ‘terrorist’ and asked him, ‘Are you on our side or their side?’ Ben’s classmate positioned him as the enemy even though Ben was born and raised in Boston and spoke highly of American pluralism. Such instances follow Mamadani (2002) in that Pakistanis have been stereotyped as ‘radical Muslims’ and ‘terrorists’ because of the backlash based on 9/11. The conflation with Muslims ‘there’ in Pakistan and Pakistani Muslims living ‘here’ in the US has resulted in people like Ben and other Pakistani Muslims being Othered and positioned as subordinate and inferior to other Americans strictly because of their religious backgrounds.

Several of the participants in Boston voiced a concern for the projection of ‘Muslim stereotypes’. Owen, a 28-year-old student who had a beard at the time of our interview, stated that his life has become ‘more tense’ since the Boston Marathon bombing\(^{110}\) because his beard and brown skin make him look like the ‘stereotypical terrorist’. Because of his ‘Muslim’ physical features, individuals ‘glaze’ with suspicion at Owen, which makes him ‘feel very insignificant, like I’m

\(^{110}\) Kasun (2013) argues that the Boston Marathon bombings in April 2013 ‘created a new kind of discomfort in the United States about “self-radicalized” terrorists, particularly related to Muslims immigrants’ (ibid.: 227). She added that ‘[n]ews media portrayed [the Boston Marathon bombing suspects] as “immigrants” and often showed them as having a struggle between their [ethnic] and US identities’.
the one who did it or something'. Ben also discussed the notion of 'stereotypical terrorist' in stating the following:

BEN: I look like your classic Muslim man with a larger beard and brown [skin]. That’s also something I’ve struggled with. I look like someone people are told [on the television] to avoid and that’s why whenever I encounter someone, whether it be on the street or in the store or whatever, I go beyond just getting what I’m getting at the grocery store, you know like [I] talk to the teller and the cashier or whatnot.

Since 9/11, the culture talk in the US has depicted Pakistanis and Muslims as ‘terrorists’ with beards and dark skin. Ben responds to culture talk by depicting Pakistanis as reactionary Muslim fundamentalists that are against ‘modernity’ (Stover, 2011: 1). In doing so, he opposes the perception that all Pakistanis are from a ‘fundamentalist’ and ‘backward’ country.

The participants in Boston discussed racial profiling more so than their counterparts in Dublin. Humayun, a gay participant, noted that immigration officers at Boston’s Logan International Airport always look at him with suspicion and ask him questions related to the purpose of his travels. These incidents made him feel ‘weird’ and ‘isolated’ because he was ‘interrogated’ by security officers in front of other travelers. Andrew, a non-practicing Sunni Muslim in Boston, stated that he has had over five racial profiling incidents at Logan International Airport in which he was taken aside and asked a set of questions relating to the purpose of his travels. He argued that his ‘Muslim-sounding name’ always poses a problem for him while traveling. In light of these racial profiling cases, Andrew feels angry that Muslims are targeted as ‘threats to national security’ in the US. He stated that racial profiling in airports makes him upset because he feels that his civil rights are being compromised in the name of ‘national security’.

111 In a newspaper article titled ‘Racial profiling controversy still roiling at Logan’, Johnston (2013) discussed how civil libertarians and security officers at Boston’s Logan International Airport dispute findings by the Department of Homeland Security that there was no evidence of airport screeners using racial profiling to improve the results of a program which aims to detect so-called ‘suspicious behaviour’.
According to Chandrasekhar (2003), Humayun and Andrew have been interrogated at airports because of their perceived racial, ethnic, and religious similarities to the [9/11] hijackers (ibid.: 215). These experiences of being targeted for ‘flying while brown’ could be said to challenge their constitutional rights as US citizens and members of the American civic nation. In response to 9/11, the US state enhanced racial profiling tactics by targeting individuals that resembled the 9/11 hijackers. Alex, the Ahmadi Muslim participant, had a particularly traumatic experience of racial profiling while traveling by train within the US, as he describes in the following passage:

ALEX: [I] was [on] an overnight train and I started to get cold. I didn’t have a blanket … So I put the pillow under my shirt thinking it would keep me warmer … So I go to sleep and wake up the next morning … [The driver of the train] said they had a mechanical failure and that they were looking into it … Looking outside the window I see the black SUV’s … So I’m like ‘Oh my God, what is this about?’. I hadn’t done anything wrong. I don’t do anything wrong. My [Ahmadi] community is not doing anything wrong. The FBI has checked us out and they know we’re a peaceful community through and through. They asked all the passengers … to get off the train … They asked me to step on the other side, so I’m like ‘Okay, here we go, what is this?’. There are only two brown people on the entire train. So we were both on one side. Everyone else was on the other side. They cuff us and put us in the back of their car and take us into a local station and question us. Long story short they were worried that there was some like terrorist act on the train. Maybe somebody saw me with something under my shirt … The worst part about it was they cuffed us in front of everyone and put us into the back of the car and then took us to the station. They waited for some FBI agents to come and they asked questions. I was just like this … is a huge misunderstanding.

Alex was afraid that he might be sent to Guantanamo Bay because ‘the US government can do anything to Muslims with the US Patriot Act’. The Patriot Act has been described by Maira (2004) as violating basic constitutional rights of due process and, in effect, sacrificing the liberties of Muslims in the US in exchange for a presumed sense of ‘safety’ for the larger majority (ibid.: 219). Alex’s experience on the train and his reference to the Patriot Act suggests that the American government fosters racial prejudice against minority communities by adopting security and surveillance apparatuses. Carmichael and Hamilton (1967)

112 Guantanamo Bay is a United States naval base in Cuba which holds hundreds of suspected ‘terrorists’ who are awaiting trial on capital charges of terrorism by American military tribunals (Steyn, 2004: 1).
describe these security measures as institutional racism, because the state contradicts the democratic principles of the civic nation.

While Alex appreciated the intense security as ‘a matter of our safety’, he stated that security could have ‘just tapped me on the shoulder and asked me … before like engaging the entire FBI’. In relating this experience on the train, Alex stated, ‘it’s unfortunate that there’s that level of Islamophobia … Like there is that level of fear that people have just because of how people look’. The participants in Boston raised the term Islamophobia more so than their counterparts in Dublin, which may be attributed to the crisis racism that has inflicted the US since 9/11. Alex and other participants’ experiences of racial profiling remind us that young Pakistani men in the US may be treated as objects of fear and suspicion wherever they go.

In summary, nearly all of the participants reported facing racism and discrimination. However, the data demonstrates that young Pakistani men in the Irish and American contexts experience racism and discrimination differently, as the following table highlights:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Common theme</th>
<th>Ireland</th>
<th>US</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marker of racism</td>
<td>Skin colour and ethnic background</td>
<td>‘Muslim features’ and religious background</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial slur</td>
<td>‘Paki’</td>
<td>‘Terrorist’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of crisis racism</td>
<td>Mainly economic-based, linked to collapse of Celtic Tiger and the culture talk of migrants taking jobs from ‘natives’</td>
<td>Mainly national security-based, linked to the events of 9/11 and the culture talk of young Pakistani Muslim men being a threat to American security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forms of racism</td>
<td>Racist violence</td>
<td>Racial profiling and institutional racism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

113 Haz, a second-generation respondent in Boston, also told me that an FBI agent approached him because the organisation thought one of his relatives was being a ‘suspicious Muslim’. Haz stated that his interrogation ‘scared the hell’ out of his parents.
The forms of racism and discrimination outlined in this table are a result of the boundaries that people construct around their communities. As I discuss in the next chapter, the racism and discrimination experienced by young Pakistani men in Ireland can be linked to the notion of Ireland’s ethnic nation, or the idea that Irish identity is connected to particular racial features such as white skin. On the other hand, the experiences of the respondents in Boston may be linked to the US civic nation, in which civic values rather than religion play key roles in shaping American identity.

Conclusion

This chapter explored the social interactions and experiences of racism and discrimination among first- and second-generation Pakistani men in Dublin and Boston. The data presented highlights that the majority of the first- and second-generation participants have an interest in interacting with non-Pakistanis as a means to experience other cultures and better integrate into Irish and American societies. Almost all of the participants claimed that they have faced racism and discrimination while living in Ireland or the US. In Dublin, the respondents were often called ‘Paki’ and they were targeted as being a threat to Ireland’s economy as well as to the ‘purity’ of Irish identity. Many of the interviewees also stated that their non-white skin colour instigated experiences with racism and discrimination in Ireland. Violence also appears to be a more significant problem for young Pakistani men in Dublin than in Boston. Several of the Dublin participants have faced physical abuse or damage to their properties.

In contrast to the respondents in Dublin, who discussed issues of ethnicity and skin colour as producing racism and discrimination, the interviewees in Boston stated that their religious backgrounds and ‘Muslim physical features’ generated their experiences of being Othered. These respondents discussed being called ‘terrorists’ rather than ‘Paki’, as was the case in Dublin. I attribute this difference to the post-9/11 culture talk and crisis racism in the US, which paints Pakistanis and Muslims as threats to national security. The interviewees in Boston also

114 According to Lentin (2000), the term ‘Paki’ in Dublin owes to imports via media and other discourses from the UK and US (ibid.: 15).
discussed experiences of racial profiling more so than their counterparts in Dublin. These findings suggest that my participants in Boston have to contend with institutional racism and Islamophobia, which labels them as potential ‘terrorists’ or ‘Muslim fundamentalists’.

In the next chapter, I turn from the issues of social interaction as well as racism and discrimination to focus on my participants’ senses of belonging to Pakistan, Ireland, and the US. I also provide insight into how my respondents position themselves towards their ethnic, religious, and national identities.
CHAPTER 7:
BELONGING AND IDENTITY IN THE PAKISTANI DIASPORA

The purpose of this chapter is to shed light on how the participants position themselves towards the homeland, the *Ummah*, as well as the Irish ethnic nation and the US civic nation. The chapter is broken down into three main sections. The first section focuses on the respondents’ senses of belonging in relation to the homeland and their attachments to Ireland and the US. In the second section, I turn to how the interviewees position themselves towards ethnic, religious, and national identities. The final section summarises the main findings of this chapter and discusses my participants’ relationships with Pakistan, Ireland, and the US and how these relationships affect their senses of belonging.

**Homing-Desire and ‘Strangers’ in the Homeland**

By looking at the respondents’ relationships with Pakistan, we can see how the homeland shapes the experiences of young Pakistani men in diaspora. Nadeem, who reproduces Pakistani culture in Boston, as addressed in Chapter 4, shared a common response among first-generation participants in relation to their sense of belonging to Pakistan:

CRAIG: Where do you feel like you belong to?
NADEEM: Pakistan! ... I will surely go back! ... You have to go back because this is where you belong. This is where your roots are, so my roots are in Pakistan. It really doesn’t matter where I stay or how long I stay. I have to go back. I will eventually go back.

Nadeem believed that Pakistan is the only country to which he could ever truly belong and thus demonstrates a homing desire while living in Ireland. He criticised his Pakistani friends in Germany for wanting to raise their children to be German, arguing that these Pakistanis ‘pretend that they’re German nationals … [but] they never will be … [Pakistan is] really their home. You’re the king of that place’. By arguing that first-generation Pakistani migrants in diaspora belong *only* to the
homeland and not the new host society, Nadeem refers to the idea that attachment to national identity has underlying ethnic connotations and is linked to place of birth.

Jabar, the participant in Dublin who discussed the importance of izzat in Chapter 4, also felt that he belonged to Pakistan because he has roots in the homeland. He stated, ‘I was born [in Pakistan], my family is there … I spent my childhood in Pakistan … I’m still well attached to it. I wish I could go back’. Jabar also demonstrates a homing desire, but unlike Nadeem, he is not able to return to the homeland because he is an undocumented migrant who would not be allowed to re-enter Ireland if he travelled to Pakistan. Here is how he described the impact that his undocumented status has had on his experience in Dublin:

JABAR: My last twelve years, my best age, I’ve lost it here. I’ve lost my family. I’m not with them, [my] friends, culture, like everything… You can’t buy money with everything … The important thing is … I miss my mother. I ring her everyday … and like the simple question [she asks]… is ‘what’s the story with the visa?”. If I go to Skype [she] will say, ‘where are the papers?’

Jabar’s homing-desire is centred upon his family and friends, who he yearns for while living in Dublin. During the interview, he stated that he does not have a sense of belonging to Ireland because ‘home is where the family is’. Jabar also was adamant about returning to the homeland, but his undocumented migrant status prevents him from doing so, a point which echoes Hall (1996) in that some Pakistanis in diaspora are never literally able to return to places from which they came (ibid.: 10). In following Safran (1991), Jabar’s experience in Ireland reminds us that diasporic conditions may be ‘inconvenient, disruptive, and even traumatic’ for young Pakistani men (ibid.: 91).

While some participants such as Nadeem and Jabar expressed the homing desire, several of my first-generation respondents wanted to put roots down in Ireland, a point which validates the myth of return, as developed by Anwar (1979: ix), and the notion that young Pakistan men have settled into new host countries. Ahmed, the “punk atheist” who does not consider himself to be reflective of Pakistani culture, told me that he does not want to return to the homeland because living in Dublin allows him to be his ‘own man’ who is free from parental pressures. He argued, ‘I don’t
think it would be easy for me to live there … I don’t think I belong there’, adding that his ideas are too liberal for Pakistanis, especially as his ideas pertain to religion. Not only does Ahmed position himself away from Pakistan because of his atheism, but he does not feel that truly belongs in Ireland. He noted:

AHMED: Ireland does feel alien to me personally. It does not feel like my own culture and land, like the earth, like I think I was just born [in Pakistan], so it’s just like in my bones. Your home is your home.

Ahmed’s comment suggests that he does not have a sense of belonging to Pakistan or Ireland. While he considered Pakistan to be his ‘real home’ in the sense that he was born there, he distances himself from his Pakistani roots by not conforming to Pakistan’s ‘Islamic’ foundation. He also wishes to separate himself from his family who is pressuring him to marry a Pakistani Muslim woman from his biraderi, as discussed in Chapter 4. Ahmed does not ‘feel at home’ in either Pakistan or Ireland because, as Yuval-Davis (2011) states, he does not possess the emotional and social bonds that are related to such places. He may be treated as living a liquid life because he has developed ‘a sense of being in self-exile, [of] belonging nowhere’ (Hagedorn, 1990: 79).

The first-generation participants in Boston had similar positions to their counterparts in Dublin in relation to the homeland. Mohammad, a Sunni Muslim who was born and raised in Karachi, shared his homing desire in stating that he yearns for the culture of the homeland. While living in Boston, Mohammad reproduces Pakistani culture by hosting ‘Pakistani-based parties’ in which South Asian clothing is worn and Pakistani food is served. He added that he hardly ever associates with individuals outside of the South Asian community of Boston. Mohammad can be said to exhibit characteristics of desh pardesh, or a sense of living ‘at home abroad’. In positioning himself towards Pakistan, he transmits and reproduces Pakistani culture abroad in order to feel ‘at home’. Mohammad’s homing desire and expression of desh pardesh reflects his hope to return to Pakistan:

MOHAMMAD: Our country has given so much to us … I just feel [a] personal … responsibility to do something, whether it’s politics … changing one person’s life… or maybe opening a school. So many people in Pakistan don’t even get to have their education … Just helping […] Everybody loves
their home. Your home has that emotional and sentimental value that nothing can replace.

Mohammad argued that he has a moral responsibility to return to Pakistan because of his family roots and connection to Pakistani culture; he also aspires to improve living conditions in the homeland. However, not all of the first-generation participants shared Mohammad’s desire to return to Pakistan. In Boston, Mahmud stated that he prefers to live in the US because Americans ‘accept people based on … education and intellect’\(^{115}\), whereas he argued that in Pakistan people are judged based on their ethnicity and religion. Humayun, one of the gay participants, reflected Mahmud’s sentiments in stating that he preferred to live in Boston because American society is more ‘inclusive’:

HUMAYUN: Like in regards to freedom and individual expression and the ability to be yourself, I think America is much more accepting … than other countries like Pakistan, which are very much either ‘you’re a Muslim or not’ … And that’s a problem … I feel very much part of this culture.

Humayun added that he would not return to Pakistan ‘unless in sixty years it is suddenly a much better place than it is right now as far as the security [and] for minorities goes’. His desire to remain in Boston is related to his gay identity, which he stressed is not welcomed in Pakistan because many Pakistanis treat homosexuality as being ‘unIslamic’. In stating that he belongs to American culture because of its inclusivity, Humayun suggested that he prefers to live in a civic nation of the US rather than in Pakistan, which he perceives to be a more exclusive ethnic nation. The different positions taken up by Humayun and other first-generation participants in relation to the homeland demonstrates that diasporic conditions are not experienced or internalised in the same way by all Pakistani migrants, a point which once again reminds us of the heterogeneity of the Pakistani diaspora.

Fahad, the Jewish interviewee, discussed his relationship with Pakistan and how he does not have a sense of belonging to the homeland. He reflected Rushdie (1991) in referring to a sense of ‘un-belongingness’ to Pakistan because of his Jewish identity,

\(^{115}\) Yasir reiterated Mahmud in stating that he prefers to live in Boston because it is ‘definitely more of a thinking and intellectual society’ in comparison to Pakistan.
which he believes conflicts with his Muslim family and most Pakistani Muslims. In
the following passage, Fahad explained his experience in Boston and how it has
shaped his sense of belonging:

FAHAD: For the first time in my life people [in Boston] don’t think I’m
insane ... people back home think I’m crazy because I have these ideas about
... religion and equality, you know, women working along with me. That’s not
how things happen in Pakistan. It’s very patriarchal ... It’s very uncomfortable
for me in Pakistan.

He added that in the US:

FAHAD: You’ve got human rights, you’ve got equality, you’ve got freedom
... You can do what you want ... I don’t think we will ever have that back
home. You say what you want and you can get killed over there.

Living in Boston provides Fahad with the ability to operate in the cultural borderland,
or the point of psychic and cultural confluence in which individuals are able to
juxtapose, contest, proclaim, and disavow identities. By stating that he is a ‘weird’
Pakistani and that he ‘kind of stood out as opposed to other [Pakistani] people’, he
also considers himself an exception to the ‘typical Pakistani’ identity. By operating in
the cultural borderland, he dislocates himself from Pakistan’s patriarchal culture and
Islamic underpinnings and proclaims a new sense of belonging to the US.

Affects of Othering in Pakistan Among Second-generation

The second-generation participants in this study did not share the same types of
connections to the homeland as that of their first-generation counterparts. Many of
these respondents in Dublin and Boston discussed how traveling to the homeland to
visit relatives heightened their sense of belonging to Ireland and the US as well as to
Irish and American culture. Aaron, the participant who wore an Irish cap and
‘traditional’ Irish sweater during our interview, felt like a stranger in Pakistan because
relatives considered his clothing, accent, and physical characteristics as ‘not really
Pakistani’. He sensed that his cousins Othered him because he did not exhibit the
particular traits of the ‘native’ Pakistani culture. In positioning him as a stranger and
outsider to the homeland, Aaron’s relatives suggested that Pakistanis who live in
diaspora are not as authentically Pakistani as ‘natives’ because of their cultural orientation.

Other second-generation respondents in Dublin, such as Alan, positioned themselves closer to Ireland and Irish culture rather than the homeland and Pakistani culture. Alan claimed that Ireland is his homeland because ‘I don’t know any better’. He describes his cultural orientation in the following passage:

ALAN: It’s just that now we’re here in Ireland. We were going to get like Westernized in a way. Like two of my brothers are married to Irish girls ... So we’ve integrated into society, into the culture here. So we have lost that bit of, you know, identity. Even my own kids, I speak English to them, whereas my parents would have spoken in Punjabi or Urdu to me. So from one generation to the next, it’s getting more away from the roots, more and more away from the culture. My kids have never been to Pakistan ... They don’t speak Urdu. I can’t for the life of me think about why they would want to go there for anything. So it’s like they’re Irish. They speak the local languages as well. They speak Gaelic.

In marrying Irish natives, speaking Irish and English rather than Pakistani languages, and orienting themselves more towards Western culture, Alan and his family are producing Irish culture rather than Pakistani culture. The closer he and his family move to Irish culture, the more they distance themselves from the norms of the homeland. Alan and his family members demonstrate characteristics of hybridity because they adopt shifting positions of identification and ‘new ethnicities’ that express heterogeneity and the convergence of different cultural elements.

Like their counterparts in Dublin, the second-generation interviewees in Boston did not develop a strong sense of belonging to Pakistan. This sense of ‘un-belongingness’ is seen in the following interaction during a focus group discussion:

CRAIG: … So how did you guys, the Americans here, feel when you traveled to Pakistan?
ANDREW: Like an outsider. Everyone stares at you. They look at my clothes and wonder what I’ve done with myself.
IAN: Everyone knows you’re the outsider.
FAHAD: It’s the accent.
HENRY: Everybody knows the outsider.
IAN: It’s the accent and I almost get an overwhelming sense that they’re trying to take advantage of me.
ANDREW: Yes, definitely.
IAN: Especially considering I don’t speak the language as well [as you]
Fahad.
ANDREW: I went [to Pakistan], like I have family who live there in like
villages and stuff ... If I tried to walk around the villages and stuff, I almost
got jumped. People yelled and screamed at me. I was just walking around ...
So it was like definitely an intense presence of like ‘I don’t belong here’.
Everyone stares at you funny ... It doesn’t even matter if I’m dressed like
them. It’s just they like look, and they know you’re an American.

The second-generation participants in this focus group discussed why they do not
position themselves closely to the homeland. All of the respondents stated that they
felt like outsiders when they visited Pakistan for reasons that include their different
clothing, accents, and languages. Interestingly, Fahad, the Jewish participant,
confirmed that second-generation interviewees are indeed outsiders in the homeland
because they do not possess the same ‘Pakistani accent’ as those who are from
Pakistan. Another possible explanation in relation to these participants’ sense of
outsiderness is their nationality. Pakistani attitudes towards the US are negative
compared even to responses from other Muslim countries and have become
increasingly negative since 2006 (Delavande and Zafar, 2012: 1). In visiting the
homeland, second-generation Pakistanis may be ‘feared and abhorred’ (Cashmore,
2004: 455). In addition, they may experience anti-Americanism because of
fundamental disagreements about social norms and values in Pakistan and the US
(Huntington, 1997), and due to US foreign policy in the ‘Muslim world’, which also
drives anti-American sentiment (Cole, 2006; Esposito, 2007)

A sense of Otherness was also developed by Owen, a Deobandi in Boston, who stated
that his relatives in Pakistan looked down upon him because he was unable to speak
Urdu and lacked familiarity with ‘[Pakistani] culture and stuff like that’. He added
that being in Pakistan made him feel ‘uncomfortable’ and heightened his awareness of
his American roots, adding that, ‘if I lived [in Pakistan] a long time I would [get the
language and culture], but [the US] is my home. I don’t know anything else’. In this
passage, Owen suggested that he lacks cultural and emotional attachments to the
homeland and therefore does not consider himself as ‘Pakistani’ in comparison to
Pakistanis born and raised in the homeland. Nonetheless, Owen does not reject the
idea of belonging to Pakistan or becoming Pakistani in the future. His comment
Belonging and Identity in the Pakistani Diaspora

echoes Levitt (2001), who states that attachments to the homeland can be activated at different stages of the life cycle, as is most expedient (ibid.: 21).

Traveling to the homeland is not even possible for Alex, the Ahmadi Muslim participant in Boston. He does not travel to Pakistan because Ahmadis are persecuted there¹¹⁶, and he fears that he would be attacked and possibly even murdered. Because of Ahmadi persecution in Pakistan, he stated that he can never belong to the homeland and prefers to live in the US with its ‘freedom, opportunity, safety, peace, and security’. He added, ‘... it’s just refreshing that I can be an Ahmadi Muslim here and that some other Muslim might have a problem with it, but they can’t do anything without consequences’. The treatment of Ahmadis in Pakistan undoubtedly contributes to Alex’s strong connection with the US, which he described as ‘where I belong. I haven’t had any doubts about belonging here’. Comparatively, he perceives Pakistan to be an unwelcoming place and one that he cannot identify with politically, ideologically, or socially (Safran, 1991: 9). He effectively considered Pakistan to be a place of ‘non-return’ because of how Ahmadi Muslims are treated there.

This section has shed light upon the participants’ senses of inclusion and exclusion in relation to the homeland and new host society. The preceding analysis mirrors Anthias (2009) in that it demonstrates how first- and second-generation respondents belong to a range of spaces, places, and locales in diaspora (ibid.: 8). The responses provided by the interviewees suggest that belonging to Pakistan is not simply about feelings, memberships, and responsibilities, but it is a result of formal and informal interactions in the homeland. The first-generation participants had a stronger sense of belonging to Pakistan because they have roots, family, and obligations there. Comparatively, the second-generation respondents in both Dublin and Boston did not have a strong sense of belonging to the homeland, where they were treated as outsiders by relatives because of their unfamiliarity with ‘authentic’ Pakistani culture¹¹⁷.

¹¹⁶ Legislation in Pakistan passed in 1984 ‘effectively criminalized daily life for the Ahmadis and made it impossible for the spiritual head of the community, the [khalifa], to continue to live there’ (Balzani, 2010: 294; see also Gualtieri, 1989)
¹¹⁷ This lack of belonging is not to suggest that second-generation interviewees in Dublin did not have an attachment to the migrant culture, as discussed in Chapter 2.
Belonging and Identity in the Pakistani Diaspora

Negotiating Ethnic, Religious, and National Identities

Throughout the semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions, it became clear that Pakistani identity was a contested issue among the participants. For some of these men, the thought of ‘Pakistani’ was complicated and even confusing. Humayun, one of the gay participants in Boston who developed an affinity for the US civil religion, argued that Pakistani identity ‘has no meaning ... I think it’s just a construct that some guy came up with a few years ago. Pakistan isn’t a thing’. He added:

HUMAYUN: [Pakistani identity] is such a difficult [identity] to embrace these days because you get so many conflicting messages from so many different sides about what is good, what isn’t good, what is okay, who you are, who you’re supposed to be.

Humayun describes Pakistani identity as a concept which is in constant flux and open to a plethora of interpretations. This passage reminds us that identities, especially in diaspora, are increasingly fractured and always negotiated in the face of opposing narratives. This section focuses on the ways in which the young Pakistani men of this study negotiate their identities and how ethnicity and religion, in particular, affect their positions towards Pakistan, Ireland, and the US.

Any conversation about Pakistani identity must take into consideration sub-ethnic identities, such as Punjabi, Sindhi, Pashtun, and Baloch. For Wazir, the Baloch participant in Dublin, Pakistani identity is irrelevant to him because of the Pakistani central government’s ‘oppressive’ policies towards suppressing Baloch culture and independence. He does not identify with or consider himself to be a Pakistani, but rather a Baloch. Speaking with passion and a sense of urgency, Wazir claimed that ‘as a Baloch, we don’t feel [Pakistani]. We aren’t Pakistani or we aren’t Iranian. We aren’t Punjabi!’ In addition to identifying more with the province of Balochistan than Pakistan and Iran, Wazir claimed that the Baloch have a different culture from the dominant ‘Pakistani culture’, as seen in the following passage:

118 The Baloch speak their own language and share a cultural identity with their co-ethnics in Iran. Baloch identity is typically associated with territorial homeland and tribal culture.
WAZIR: [Baloch] have our own dress code … Our marriages are done differently, our language is totally different, a lot of people think we speak Urdu. We are also secular … in the way that we have freedom, music, and a lot of things … We used to have our own flag. We had our own national anthem. We had a king … We don’t talk about religion [in Balochistan]. We talk about our way of living. It’s different.

With this comment, Wazir asserts that there are certain components inside the Baloch social boundary. The boundary of this identity follows Smith (1991, 1998) in that it is demarcated by homeland territory, shared histories, myths of common ancestry, mass public cultures, as well as traditions and practices. By positioning himself closer to the territory of Balochistan and his sub-ethnic Baloch identity, Wazir deploys border thinking (Mignolo, 2011) by thinking outside of hegemonic identity narratives that originate from the Pakistani nation-state.

Other first-generation participants distanced themselves from a Pakistani identity because it has been too closely linked to Islam. Nabeel, who commented in Chapter 6 on how the ‘Pakistani community’ of Boston was ‘too Islamic’, explained that ‘what it means to be Pakistani is not what I would like it to mean’:

NABEEL: I think the sad part is most [Pakistanis] … can’t grasp the idea of being a Pakistani without having some type of religious backbone because doing so somehow kind of defines what being a Pakistani means. For me it doesn’t because I’m almost trying to form this globalised, international perspective of being Pakistani.

Nabeel challenges the perception of Pakistani identity as being inherently linked to Islam. He wishes to incorporate a multicultural perspective of Pakistani identity that is based in a wider South Asian cultural identity, which incorporates a range of ethnic, cultural, and religious groups. Living in diaspora provides Nabeel with the freedom to vocalize his national identity as one that is more inclusive of the South Asian culture as a whole and less overtly ‘Islamic’. In reshaping his relationship to the homeland, Nabeel sees his Pakistani identity as an identity that is not defined by essence or purity, but rather heterogeneity and diversity.

Not all of the first-generation participants in Dublin and Boston distanced themselves from a Pakistani identity. Nadeem, who in Chapter 4 shared his strong feelings
towards maintaining izzat and respect for elders in Irish society, described himself as a ‘really hardcore Pakistani’ and claimed that he owes everything to Pakistani culture and to his parents for raising him with ‘Pakistani values’ such as individual honour and family loyalty. Similarly, Hasan in Boston stated that he is a ‘proud Pakistani’ who does not want to see his homeland become cosmopolitan like Boston. Nadeem and Hasan are two first-generation respondents who possess an orientation towards the homeland rather than the new host society.

One of the focus group discussions in Boston provides interesting insight into how the first- and second-generation participants position themselves towards Pakistan. The following interaction occurred after I asked the respondents how they would define Pakistani identity:

ANDREW: Like, when you’re at home and when you were growing up, you were taught Urdu, you were taught religion stuff, you were taught the culture stuff, but then you spent most of your time outside, your development was outside and speaking with different friends. Since America is such a diverse place, like I really didn’t meet any Pakistanis that weren’t related to me until I was like 15 years old, really. So it’s hard to say that I strongly associate with that part of myself.
CRAIG: Fahad, so you’re actually a Pakistani because of your passport.
FAHAD: Yeah, yeah.
CRAIG: What do you think of all of this?
FAHAD: Well, I don’t have a choice man!
IAN: He was born into it!
HENRY: Yeah, you were just born into it.
FAHAD: If I had a choice, I wouldn’t even comment on that … I don’t have a choice. It is what it is, you have to just live with it, man.

This passage shows how some young first-generation Pakistani men feel that they belong more to the new host society rather than the homeland. Fahad, my Jewish participant, stated that the only reason why he is Pakistani is because he was born into it, which follows Taylor (1994), who suggests that non-Pakistani Muslims must negotiate an identity which has been ascribed to them. As discussed in Chapter 5, Fahad clearly positions himself as an outsider of Pakistani because of his non-Muslim

119 According to Brennan (2001), cosmopolitanism has two distinct significations. On the one hand, it designates ‘an enthusiasm for customary differences, but as ethical or aesthetic material for a unified polychromatic culture – a new singularity born of a blending and merging of multiple local constituents’ (ibid. 76). Brennan added that cosmopolitanism ‘projects a theory of world government and corresponding citizenship (ibid.)
beliefs and practices. Andrew, on the other hand, discussed being in-between cultures, which has led to him developing a shifting position of identification.

Almost all of the second-generation participants in Dublin and Boston distanced themselves from the notion of Pakistani identity. Out of all the participants, Andrew, the urban ‘hipster’\(^{120}\), demonstrated characteristics associated with ‘hip hop’ culture, in that his favorite type of music is rap and that he frequently socializes with friends at the studios of hip hop music producers. Andrew’s choice of clothing at the time of our interview was a backwards New York Yankees baseball cap and a ‘hoody’ sweatshirt, both of which are popular clothing choices among hip hop and rap artists.

In college, Andrew was a member of a fraternity, a social organisation in which young college men join to enhance their social, academic, and professional interests in the context of American culture. Our interview showed how young second-generation Pakistan men in diaspora move away from Pakistani culture as the main source of identity and towards American culture as the primary cultural orientation.

During our semi-structured interview, Andrew stated that he has always been ‘really embarrassed about being Pakistani’, especially during his childhood as he explains in the following passage:

ANDREW: Growing up I didn’t wear the clothes. I didn’t like speaking the language. I didn’t like anything about the culture because the only thing on the media that you saw about being brown was Apu\(^{121}\) on the Simpsons. So I really strayed away from the Muslim identity and the Pakistani identity as a kid. I mean I went home and prayed and knew all that stuff, but in front of my friends I didn’t want to show that part of me. Like if my mom came and she was dressed in Pakistani dress, I’d be like ‘Mom, what are you doing?! Stop doing this to me!’ I grew up in a really American way. I had a really diverse set of friends because there were no other Muslims or Pakistanis for me at my school, so all those years I was friends with mostly white kids.

Andrew can be said to have rejected his Pakistani and Muslim identities because of the negative culture talk surrounding Pakistani Muslims in the wake of 9/11. He

\(^{120}\) Hipster is a term used to refer to a subculture typically associated with ‘white millennials’ living in inner-cities.

\(^{121}\) Vij (2007) argues that Apu, a character in the television program *The Simpsons*, exploits a crude stereotype that insults South Asians living in the US. Vij claims that Apu is the only character to mock a small American minority relatively unknown in the mainstream.
distanced himself from his parents’ Pakistani culture, which he perceived in light of language, values, and behavioural patterns originating in the homeland. By orienting himself closer towards American culture, he instigated intergenerational conflict in his home because he wanted his family to be perceived as American rather than Pakistani Muslim migrants. His desire to distance himself from a Pakistani identity may be attributed to what he called an ‘identity crisis’. Andrew discusses this crisis in light of Changez, the main character of the book *The Reluctant Fundamentalist* (Hamid, 2012):

ANDREW: Part of the identity crisis that [Changez] faces is that he was born in Pakistan … but he comes to America and he holds a lot of American ideals very dear to him. He’s also Pakistani and so with Pakistani people they look at him and they think he’s just a corporate whore … So he’s an American and he’s abandoned them … He goes back to the Americans and in a lot of personal relationships he’s identified with as being brown and being a Muslim … He seemed to be someone who was walking a fine line of not really being allowed to be either one and not even if it was an active decision or not, having just chosen both worlds because you enjoy both worlds. I’m very similar in that regard.

In identifying with Changez’ experience in *The Reluctant Fundamentalist*, Andrew suggested that, to a certain extent, he is alienated from American culture as well as his own Pakistani roots. He sees himself as ‘walking a fine line’ of not really being allowed to be either American or Pakistani because he perceives American identity as having racial connotations and Pakistani identity as having an immediate connection to the norms and values of the homeland. Because he does not identify with either Pakistani or American identities, he experiences what Rushdie (1991) refers to as ‘unbelongingness’ to the homeland and his birth country. He may be positioned as living a liquid life because he sees himself as being outside of the perceived boundaries of the migrant culture and the new host society culture.

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122 *The Reluctant Fundamentalist* is a book about an alienated Pakistani migrant who tells his life story to an American stranger (Anthony, 2012). Changez, the book’s main character, is ‘a highly educated Pakistani who worked as a financial analyst for a prestigious firm in New York. But after a disastrous love affair and the September 11 attacks, his Western life collapses and he returns disillusioned and alienated to Pakistan’ (ibid.).
The Ummah as a Diasporic Identity

Throughout the semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions, Muslim identity was a disputed issue among participants in Dublin and Boston. Several of the first- and second-generation respondents identified themselves with the *Ummah* in order to transcend their ethnicity and nationality. Humayun, one of the gay participants in Boston, stated, 'I don’t even like the term [Sunni]. I just consider myself a Muslim. That’s it. A Muslim of the *Ummah*.‘ Aidan, who earlier in Chapter 5 discussed how Ireland was not accommodating of Muslim practices, argued that the *Ummah* ‘has too many groups, too many sects’. He described himself ‘as Muslim and that’s it … I don’t want to be Deobandi. I don’t want to be Barelvi [or] Salafi. I just want to be a Muslim in an *Ummah*.‘ Moreover, Aidan argued that divisions within the *Ummah* represent a form of nationalism because they divide people into smaller groups and communities, a process that, he claimed, causes nothing but ‘friction’. By distancing themselves from Muslim sectarian identities, Humayun and Aidan reflect a diasporic connection to transnational ideas such as the *Ummah* rather than to actual territorial places or homelands, such as Pakistan and Ireland. In disassociating from the homeland and new host societies, I argue that they deploy border thinking by delinking themselves from ‘territorial epistemology’ (Mignolo, 2011). These kind of transnational Muslim identities follow Sayyid (2000) in that they transform the idea of diaspora into a global, political, and religious body rather than simply an identity rooted in one particular homeland or nation (ibid.: 41). In doing so, they may be said to exhibit a preference for a liquid life because they do not want to be strongly linked to any ethnicity or nationality.

The *Ummah* was also a preferred diasporic identity for Alex, the Ahmadi Muslim participant in Boston. In his interactions with other Muslims, Alex commented that he did not receive a favourable response from non-Ahmadi Muslims in attempting to join a Muslim student association during his undergraduate years. Because of his strict Islamic beliefs and practices, Alex sees his faith as ‘the driving force much more so than cultural norms or cultural biases, whether Pakistani or American’. In essence, he orients himself towards American culture and Islam more so than Pakistani culture. However, it is also clear that his Islamic identity is more pronounced than his national identity.
Alex identifies himself as an Ahmadi Muslim who belongs to a global Ahmadiyya Muslim community, which he claimed is ‘the only Muslim community that is unified across the world’. The ‘Ahmadi Ummah’ is united through its international spiritual leader, the khalifa, who dictates and provides guidance for Ahmadis worldwide. The Ahmadi Ummah is also unified globally through its spiritual organizational structure, which operates in countries around the world. By identifying himself with a particular transnational Muslim group, Alex shows how religious identities cut across national borders and avoid being fixed with specific territories, such as the US, his country of birth. Alex’s Ahmadi Muslim identity raises the issue of the Ummah being politically segmented as well as fractured along sectarian lines, thus raising the idea of there being specific diasporas within a larger ‘Muslim diaspora’.

Not all of the participants stressed the important role that the Ummah plays in shaping their Muslim identities. In Boston, Anthony told me that he does not relate to or identify with Muslims living in countries outside of the US and that the Ummah is not important to him. He questioned, ‘why is [the Ummah] even an ideal? ... What’s the point of [Muslim] unity?’ Anthony preferred to identify himself as a Muslim American rather than simply a Muslim of the Ummah, as Aidan and Humayun had done. His preference for a religious identity that is linked to national identity can be attributed to his postgraduate studies and occupation, both of which focus on issues pertaining to US foreign policy and national security. I suggest that Anthony follows Fraga and Segura (2006) in that he positions himself towards a civic republican American identity that focuses on national responsibilities and a sense of collective national fate (ibid.: 280). In essence, the interview with Anthony demonstrated that some Pakistani Muslims in diaspora might refuse to accept or conform to the ideal of forming a global Muslim community (Sayyid, 2000: 48-9). He distanced himself from the views quoted by Bowman et al. (2001), who argue that adherents of all religions typically claim that their religion should be unified, unchanging, and timeless (ibid.: 15). In the next section, I turn to how my participants positioned themselves in relation to Irish and American national identities.

The Arabic word khalifa, or ‘caliph’, is generally understood to mean the head of the Ummah. It may also be translated into English as ‘deputy of God’.
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**Ethnic Versus Civic National Identities**

As discussed in Chapter 2, the ethnic nation places emphasis on the principles of descent, marriage, blood, and soil, while the civic nation is based upon democratic and egalitarian principles. Most of the first- and second-generation participants positioned themselves outside of the Irish ethnic nation because of their skin colour and ancestral background. Wazir, the ethnic Baloch and human rights activist in Dublin, claimed he could only be 70 per cent Irish, as seen in the following passage:

WAZIR: [There’s] natural attributes that I can’t change. That’s something I could say ... my colour, my physical appearance because that will never change ... These are the things that can’t change me. Like this one person once asked me, ‘how do you feel? Are you Irish totally?’ and I said ‘no, I can’t feel that’ ... I think it’s in the physical way, you can see [yourself] ... If you look at me I’m not from Ireland, people will say that straight away to you. My family, my ancestors weren’t born and raised here. I’m not Irish. Maybe in a few years I will change my accent or learn Gaelic, but I won’t be Irish at the end of the day.

Wazir’s comment relates to Mac Éinri and White (2008: 14), who see the Irish nation as being an ethnic nation. Wazir perceived Irishness to be defined by natural attributes, such as skin colour and other physical appearances. By positioning himself outside of the Irish nation, he demonstrates that national identities can be exclusive because they associate ‘legitimate identification’ with ‘pure’ and ‘essential’ characteristics such as blood and ancestry (Hall, 1995: 249). Wazir effectively considered himself to be ‘less than fully Irish’ because of his ‘unseemly presence’ of not being white (Lentin, 2002: 233). Because of his skin colour, Wazir feels that he cannot fully belong to the Irish nation, and thus accepts the older and more racialised versions of Irish identity, as highlighted by Honohan and Rougier (2010: 28).

Comparatively, several of the first-generation respondents in Boston connected with American identity because they perceived the US to be a civic nation. Humayun, the gay participant, described American identity as ‘universal come as you are’, meaning that anyone could become American regardless of their ethnicity, religion, and place of birth. Humayun advocated for the civic nation by arguing that ‘the cornerstone [of American identity] ... is very much the American passport ... It’s very much
citizenship’. According to him, ‘it doesn’t matter what your original national origin is. If you’re American now, you’re American ... Case closed!’ In arguing that the foundation of American identity rests with a US passport, Humayun associated with what Schildkraut (2007) described as a liberal American identity that emphasises citizenship rights, freedom, and equality (ibid.: 6). Humayun’s position towards American identity differs from Wazir’s because he believes that citizenship determines one’s sense of belonging to the US, while Wazir felt that one could be an Irish citizen but not belong to the Irish nation because of ethnicity.

Humayun, however, also discussed the influence of the ethnic nation on American society and how some US citizens perceive American identity through ethnocentrism. He stated, ‘in America, you will always be brown, you will always be Muslim, you will always have a funny name, you will always be profiled at airports’. Humayun stressed that some Americans, particularly those of Anglo-Saxon Protestant ancestry, seek to fix and naturalise difference between people in order to create impervious distinctions between them. Although Humayun perceives the US as being a civic nation to which he belongs, he recognises that some Anglo-Saxon Protestant American citizens perceive the US to be an ethnic nation based on skin colour, English culture, and northern European ancestry. In acknowledging that his national identity depends upon the situational context and social environment in which he interacts, Humayun confirms that diasporic identities fluctuate and may alter because of social, cultural, and ethnic difference.

Several of the second-generation participants echoed their first-generation counterparts in positioning themselves as outside of the Irish ethnic nation. Aidan argued that Irish culture and society is not inclusive or interested in incorporating new elements such as Islam or Pakistani culture. Because of this perceived exclusivity, he claimed that Irish people are a ‘very narrow-minded’ group of people. Aidan further distanced himself from Irish identity because Irish people treat him as an outsider, as he explains in the following passage:

AIDAN: [It] gets a bit annoying. [The Irish] won’t believe that I was born here. They will be surprised that I was raised here. They would be surprised that my father was here for so long. I think it’s still like that at the moment.
Aidan’s comment indicates that some Irish people will not accept young Pakistani men as belonging to the Irish nation or demonstrating characteristics of Irish culture. Due to this Othering by ‘native’ Irish people, Aidan perceives himself to be a stranger in his own country. Aaron, the participant with a thick Irish accent who also wore ‘Irish’ clothing, echoed Aidan by arguing that Irish identity is not inclusive in terms of incorporating Islamic beliefs and practices. He wished that Irish people would be more tolerant of the idea that Muslims could be Irish, arguing that the Irish do not welcome mosque-building, which he stressed would ‘bring peace … If we go against each other today, what do you think will come of us? Ireland is still a country to improve!’ Despite feeling Othered because of his Muslim identity, Aaron claimed that he is indeed Irish because ‘you’re Irish [if] you’ve an Irish passport’. However, he added, '[being Irish] is nothing to me … We aren’t looking at the proper passport. The proper passport is the Qur’an'. While he identifies himself as an Irish citizen because of his passport, Aaron did not identify with the Irish nation or Irish identity. By referring to the Qur’an instead of his Irish passport as a means for identification, Aaron positions himself closer to the Ummah than to Ireland. In doing so, he transcends territorial boundaries even while he identifies himself as Irish.

Interestingly, four out of the six second-generation participants in Dublin identified with an ‘old Irish identity’ that encompasses family, religion, and morality. These respondents related the ‘new Irish identity’ with the breakdown of family, the rise of atheism, and immorality. According to Matthew, the Sufi Muslim who identified strongly with Irish mysticism, the ‘new Ireland’ is all about ‘drinking, partying, sex, and drugs’, all of which he does not identify with because of his Muslim beliefs and values. He identified more with the ‘old Ireland’ for moral reasons:

MATTHEW: [In the ‘old Ireland’] there was no such thing as open sex. Sex was a ruthless thing... If you had a baby before marriage, you were basically slanged. As the Prophet Muhammad has said, sex before marriage is [forbidden]. What has happened to Ireland today? Sex is an open market. It’s the fastest selling market. God forbid. It’s ruthless.

Matthew stated that he loves ‘old Ireland’ and that he only identifies himself with this form of Irish identity. While he is fond of the ‘religious history’ of Ireland and its ‘mysticism’, Matthew added that religion is vanishing from the country and that the
Irish are becoming ‘too robotic’ in terms of how they behave and think. His comments suggest that young Pakistani Muslims in Dublin are not happy with how Ireland has started to abandon deference to Catholicism and the Catholic Church (Inglis, 2007: 49). These sentiments suggest that some young Pakistani Muslim men in diaspora distance themselves from national identities because of their associations with secularism. They may be seen as being discouraged with how Irish public life and informal interactions among Irish people today are no longer marked by a Catholic ethos, but by secular values.

The second-generation interviewees in Boston did not position themselves against the ethnic nation as their counterparts did in Dublin. Andrew, the ‘hipster’ participant, distanced himself from the ethnocentric version of American identity. He argued that American identity has ‘very little qualifications … It’s not being like this White Anglo Saxon person’. Andrew may be positioned as opposing an ethno-cultural identity that bases American group membership upon white skin colour and English Protestant culture. When I asked him how he would define American identity, Andrew stated:

ANDREW: I don’t think there’s really a definition of what it means to be American … It’s not being conservative … I think that being an American is subscribing to this idea that you are a unique member of a nation. I am whoever I am and I have access to this collective that I subscribe to be a part of and we share some ideals, [like] the pursuit of happiness and equality.

In this passage, Andrew advocated for the civic nation interpretation of American identity by suggesting that anyone can be a part of a civic culture provided he or she accepts certain fundamental values, such as democracy and equality.

**Conclusion**

This chapter shed light upon the senses of belonging of the first- and second-generation participants in Dublin and Boston. In doing so, it provided insight into how the respondents position themselves towards ethnicity, religion, and nationality. The findings presented in this chapter highlight that young Pakistani men in diaspora are by no means a homogenous group in terms of their senses of belonging and
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experiences of identity. The differences among these participants result from their ethnic and religious backgrounds, as well as the social and political contexts of living in Ireland or the US.

The majority of the first-generation interviewees maintained a closer connection to the homeland than their second-generation counterparts in Dublin and Boston. Many of these participants expressed a homing-desire to return to Pakistan because of their attachment to the homeland, family obligations, and eagerness to improve the country’s living and educational conditions. Notwithstanding, the homing-desire was not expressed by all of my first-generation participants; several of them raised the myth of return by stating that they will not return to the homeland because of their desire to live in more secular countries, such as Ireland and the US. By establishing roots in Ireland and the US and refusing to return to Pakistan because of its persecution of minority groups, several of the first-generation respondents distanced themselves from the homeland and positioned themselves closer to the new host society. The second-generation participants in Dublin and Boston did not share the homing-desire of their first-generation counterparts. These second-generation respondents called Ireland or the US their homelands because these are the countries in which they were born and raised. When they traveled to Pakistan, second-generation interviewees felt as though other Pakistanis perceived them to be strangers because of their accents, dress, and general demeanor. Feeling like strangers in Pakistan heightened their sense of Otherness in the homeland and strengthened their senses of belonging to Ireland and the US.

In terms of their religious identities, many of the first- and second-generation participants in Dublin and Boston negotiated their Muslim identities in relation to the *Ummah*. Several of these respondents preferred to describe themselves as simply ‘Muslims’ rather than identify with Islamic sectarian groups, such as Barelvi or Deobandi. In connecting with the *Ummah*, many of the interviewees preferred to identify with a deterritorialised transnational community to which they had an ontological ‘un-belongingness’ to ideas rather than to geographical places. Nevertheless, several of the first- and second-generation participants distanced themselves from the notion of the *Ummah*, preferring instead to question the purpose and benefit of transnational identities. The Ahmadi participant who identified himself
with the ‘Ahmadi Ummah’ also raised the issue of there being diasporas within a single diaspora, such as the Ummah.

The participants offered different orientations towards Ireland and the US as displayed through their positions towards Irish and American national identities. In Dublin, the respondents distanced themselves from Irish identity because they perceived it as being exclusionary of non-whites. The first- and second-generation interviewees in Dublin positioned themselves as being outside of the ethnic nation due to their skin colour and Pakistani ancestry, which suggests that the participants perceive Irish identity through racialised terms. Comparatively, the first- and second-generation participants in Boston identified more strongly with the American nation because they regarded American national identity as being more inclusive. Although they raised the issue that some Americans describe the American nation as having ethno-cultural connotations, the respondents in Boston interpreted American identity through a civic nation, which defines American group membership based on democratic principles rather than ethnic characteristics.

In the conclusion of this dissertation, I offer a critical analysis of the main findings of my research on the lived experiences of young Pakistani men in Dublin and Boston. I also evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of my research design and methodology and discuss the contributions of this research to the growing body of literature on Pakistanis in Ireland, the US, and in the Pakistani diaspora.
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS

This dissertation has explored the experiences of family, religion, and identity among young first- and second-generation Pakistani Muslim and non-Muslim men in Dublin and Boston. In this chapter, I provide a critical analysis of the research design, conceptual and theoretical framework, and the main findings that emerged from the fieldwork. I have broken the chapter down into three sections. In the first section, I offer an assessment of the main research themes of family, religion, and identity. The second section highlights the contributions made by this study to the body of knowledge on Pakistanis in Ireland and the US, and more broadly to the experiences of Pakistanis in diaspora. The third section of this chapter provides an evaluation of the research design and the conceptual and theoretical framework by examining the methodological approach and the concepts deployed to research Pakistanis in diaspora. In the final section, I offer recommendations into future areas of research in relation to Pakistanis in Ireland and the US, as well as to Pakistanis in diaspora.

Assessment of Main Research Themes

The three main research themes of family, religion, and identity frequently overlapped, which reminds us of the intersectionality of ethnicity, religion, and nationality. In this section, I tease out differences between the first- and second-generation participants and between the sample in Dublin and Boston.

Experiences with Family

First-generation participants in Dublin and Boston both conformed to and resisted familial expectations and, as a result, various norms of Pakistani culture such as izzat, sharm, arranged marriages, and gender roles. Several of these respondents discussed how they treat the older members of their families with respect, an element of Pakistani culture that they claimed to be nonexistent in ‘Western culture’. Some of these first-generation interviewees distanced themselves from
familial expectations by resisting the marriage expectations of their parents and preferring more of an individual rather than collective mindset while living in Dublin and Boston. In comparison to the second-generation interviewees, the first-generation participants tended to be more socially conservative in how they handled social mixing between men and women and gender roles. Some of the respondents noted that they prefer their wives to remain mothers and homemakers and adhere to traditional roles within the family and home. In some cases, the first-generation interviewees also requested that their wives wear the burqa or niqab in public as a means to maintain izzat. Second-generation participants were more likely to tolerate gender mixing because they were born and raised in Irish and American culture, in which gender mixing is a social norm. Several second-generation Muslim respondents, however, maintained self-imposing restraints in relation to their positions towards women. These restraints were usually constructed because of their Islamic beliefs and practices. The family experiences of two first-generation gay Pakistani men were also enlightening because they demarcate perceived boundaries around Pakistani culture and Islam. The gay Pakistani participants I interviewed in Boston discussed the conflicts they encountered with their parents when revealing their sexuality. Both of the respondents spoke about how their parents were unhappy with their revelation because their sexuality opposes the family's honour and Muslim identity, which they suggest perceives homosexuality as sinful and outside the boundary of Islam. Because of their sexuality, these gay interviewees felt ostracized within their own families as well as in the larger Pakistani and Muslim communities.

In considering the cross-national comparison between Ireland and the US, this study found that there were different Pakistani migration histories and trajectories of Pakistani culture, which highlights the importance of acknowledging the Pakistani diaspora as a heterogeneous rather than a homogenous entity. As discussed in Chapter 1 and the beginning of Chapter 4, the first Pakistanis in Ireland were part of a wave of migration that originally settled in the UK during the 1950s. Many of these Pakistanis were from rural, underdeveloped, and more socially conservative areas from East Punjab, and were relatively unskilled and uneducated migrants who sought new business and job opportunities in the UK's recovering post-World War II economy. On the other hand, many of the first
Pakistanis in the US were part of a wave of migration that settled in this country after the passage of the Immigration Naturalization Act of 1965, when the US government passed legislation to open its borders to educated and skilled migrants from ‘developing’ countries. These Pakistanis were largely middle- to upper class urbanites from cities such as Karachi and Lahore, as such their transition to American society was more smooth in comparison to their Irish counterparts. The different family backgrounds of these Pakistani migrants in Dublin and Boston set the stage for the development of these communities. Pakistanis in Dublin tended to settle in urban environments and take up jobs in small business niches including ethnic grocery stores, halal trades, restaurants, fabric shops, corner shops, and market stalls. They also tended to retain biraderi ties by bringing family members to Ireland, largely through transnational arranged marriages, in order to retain links to the homeland. On the other hand, upon their arrival to the US, Pakistanis pursued graduate and postgraduate degrees and were employed in the professional class to work as doctors and engineers, among other jobs. The early Pakistani migrants to the US also moved to the suburbs relatively quickly. Though members of these initial waves of migration to Ireland and the US were not part of the sample frame, their backgrounds still affected the family experiences of the second-generation respondents in this study.

This study highlighted that family structure and family values are central to our understanding of the experiences of young first- and second-generation Pakistani men in diaspora. The participants in Dublin and Boston appeared to be recreating, discarding, and reformulating Pakistani cultural values that originate in the homeland. Second-generation respondents tended to have more conflict with their parents over maintaining izzat and the hierarchical family structure, highlighting that there are forces of tradition that operate in Pakistani households in diaspora. This is due largely to their parents having been born in the homeland and raised in a culture that is not entirely familiar to their children, who were born and raised in Ireland and the US. Conflicts between parents and children arose largely through two mediums: marriage arrangements and alcohol consumption. Half of the second-generation interviewees in Dublin entered into transnational arranged marriages with little resistance to their parents’ expectations, while the others seemed to struggle over negotiating the norms of Irish culture. Comparatively,
none of the second-generation participants in Boston entered into transnational arranged marriages. Even in these cases, respondents in Boston mentioned that their marriage arrangements were more similar to the hybrid matched marriages than to arranged marriages. In terms of their alcohol consumption, second-generation participants in Boston appeared to engage in this activity more frequently than their second-generation counterparts in Dublin. While several second-generation interviewees in Dublin had previous experiences of alcohol consumption and partying, they all quit and argued that Pakistani culture and Islamic values forbid them from engaging in such activities.

In summary, the data regarding family experiences highlights the different roles that Pakistani family structure and family values play in the experiences of young first- and second-generation Pakistani men in Dublin and Boston. The participants in this study both maintained and resisted the Pakistani culture of their parents as it pertains to marriage arrangements, hierarchical family structures, communal rather than individual lifestyles, and gender roles within the family.

Experiences with Religion

The second main research theme of this study centred upon religion, in particular the development of religiosity among the participants. As I discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, and analysed in-depth in Chapter 5, the Pakistani diaspora is religiously heterogeneous. While the majority of the respondents identified themselves as Muslims, there was a great variety in their religiosities, which highlights the idea that religion is not processed or negotiated in the same manner by all young Pakistani men in diaspora. Overall, there was a high degree of religious commitment among the first- and second-generation respondents. However, many interviewees stated that they were not 'practicing' or even 'good' practitioners of their religious systems. This point is raised not as a way to denigrate the participants, but rather to highlight that commitment to religious practice may be significantly challenged in secular societies such as Ireland and the US.

In terms of the development of their religiosities, almost all participants in Dublin and Boston stated that the family plays an influential role in the formation of their
religious beliefs and practices. In the majority of the cases, religious beliefs and practices were often transmitted through families, and respondents subsequently adopted the religion or Islamic sect that their parents follow. In cases where parents were not religious, the interviewees also tended not to be religious. Educational communities were additional settings that played an important role in the development of the participants’ religiosities. The majority of the respondents were in favour of secular education over a more religious-based education such as those in madrassas. For those respondents who were educated in Christian schools, their experiences as non-Christians tended to open-up their minds to non-Islamic beliefs and practices, but the schools also heightened their sense of Otherness as minority students. The third site of religious community, as examined in Chapter 5, was that of places of worship and how these environments provide insight into the religious orientations of the interviewees. In Dublin, the participants discussed tension between the Deobandi and Barelvi mosques and how their relations reflect sectarianism within Pakistani communities in diaspora. This is likely due to the ties that Pakistanis in Dublin have with Pakistanis in the UK, a country in which rivalries and conflicts between Deobandis and Barelvis are well documented (Shaw, 2000; Lewis, 1994). While the Boston respondents did not discuss the Deobandi and Barelvi conflict, they did speak about intra-Muslim conflict in the Muslim community and stated that certain communities maintain a conservative ethos around their places of worship, which ultimately influences their mosque attendance and the formation of their Islamic knowledge.

In terms of the role which religion should play in Irish and American societies, the majority of the first- and second-generation respondents preferred to live in secular rather than non-secular societies. The non-Muslim and gay participants expressed a desire for Pakistani society to have a more inclusive culture and for Pakistanis to become more secular in order to accommodate for Muslim minority groups as well as non-Muslims. In some cases, respondents wanted to see other Pakistani Muslims separate themselves from the hegemonic narrative that being Pakistani also means having to be Muslim. In Boston, several first-generation interviewees discussed their appreciation for the Bill of Rights and the separation of Church and State, which alludes to their desire to belong to a civic culture. In Dublin, the majority of the second-generation participants advocated for a non-
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secular Irish society. Some of these respondents have witnessed Ireland’s gradual move away from the church-state system in which Catholicism and the Catholic Church played a dominant role in maintaining the boundaries of Irish culture and identity. Several of these interviewees in Dublin claimed that the loss of religion in society has lead to the degradation of Irish culture and the loss of morality in Irish society. Second-generation participants in Dublin discussed how they wished to see women in Ireland dress more modestly as a means to instil public morality, and suggested that Islamic practices and values, particularly *sharia*, could help alleviate inequality in Ireland. While these respondents expressed a desire for Ireland to ‘return to religion’, they added that they would be content with Catholicism being the basis for legislation and a reference point for creating moral values.

Such positions in relation to non-secularism were not found among the second-generation interviewees in Boston. The idea of religion playing a stronger role in American society was considered to be outside the realm of American identity by the majority of these participants. They also expressed their belief that the separation of Church and State should be strictly upheld, claiming that the US should never be a ‘Christian nation’ or even ‘Muslim nation’. In several of my semi-structured interviews, the second-generation interviewees in Boston criticised the Republican Party, and its Tea Party branch, as trying to suppress the rights of Muslims by calling for Muslim Americans to embrace the US as a ‘Christian nation’. In rejecting these political ideals, the participants challenged the fixed binary of American identity being based in ethnocentrism. They may be said to prefer a civil religion in the sense that they perceive American identity as being linked to civic principles rather than a specific religious system, such as Christianity or Islam.

Another main finding in the data is that young first- and second-generation Pakistani men in diaspora are privatizing their religious beliefs and practices. This means that they still believe in religion, but they do not read religious scripture, partake in community activities, or seek out guidance of religious authorities when negotiating their religiosity. In Dublin and Boston, some of the first- and second-generation participants distanced themselves from the idea of organised
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religion, arguing that it was too stifling for their individuality and too rigid for their everyday lives. Other respondents put forth the idea that they were spiritual rather than religious, which also points to the privatization of religion as something uniquely experienced by individuals during certain moments in their lives.

In summary, the data shows that young first- and second-generation Pakistani men in diaspora have a range of positions and commitments to religion. The majority of the participants considered themselves religious, but many of them do not find 'practicing' religion conducive to their lifestyles in Dublin and Boston. The majority of the respondents also preferred living in secular rather than non-secular societies, a point that challenges the culture talk surrounding Pakistanis as 'radical Muslims' who are intolerant of 'Western culture'. This data suggests that the culture talk surrounding Pakistanis in diaspora is not necessarily reflective of the actual experiences and sentiments of young first- and second-generation Pakistani men in Dublin and Boston.

Experiences with Racism

The research found that young Pakistani men are exposed to racism and discrimination in Dublin and Boston. Despite these common encounters in diaspora, the data showed that there were significant differences in relation to how and why young Pakistan men face racism and discrimination in these two cities. In Dublin, the participants were often called 'Paki' in a derogatory manner. I attributed the use of this term to the notion of Ireland being an ethnic nation in which skin colour and Pakistani ancestry were used as a means to exclude Pakistanis from Irish group membership and identity. On the other hand, the respondents in Boston were frequently called 'terrorist' and claimed that they were targeted for their religious backgrounds. Many of these interviewees also discussed being racially profiled when travelling because of their 'Muslim backgrounds'. I attributed these experiences to the crisis racism that has enveloped American society since 9/11. This form of racism Others Pakistani Muslims and positions them not only outside the boundary of American group membership, but it also portrays them as potential threats to national security. The
experiences with racism and discrimination among my interviewees in Boston challenges the idea of the US being a civic nation in which group membership and identity is based on democratic principles. The differences in relation to the participants' experiences in Dublin and Boston highlight how Pakistanis in diaspora do not experience racism and discrimination in the same way in diaspora.

Despite experiencing racism and discrimination, the respondents discussed positive experiences in workplaces and educational environments, which helped them gain a sense of belonging to Ireland and the US. In these environments, the first-generation interviewees discussed interacting and developing friendships with non-Pakistanis. In terms of their social interactions, first- and second-generation participants tended to have positive experiences and similar social lives. These findings suggest that the majority of the participants have socially integrated into Irish and American societies.

Experiences with Identity

Some of the first-generation participants developed an identity reflected in desh pardesh, or being 'at home abroad'. In addition to orienting themselves towards Pakistani culture while living in diaspora, these first-generation respondents expressed a homing desire because of their family obligations and motivation to partake in Pakistani politics and education in order to improve the homeland society. However, some of the first-generation interviewees also stated their desire to remain in Ireland and the US rather than return to Pakistan. They argued that Irish and American societies are more inclusive and foster integration among minority communities.

The majority of the second-generation participants stated that they developed a sense of 'un-belongingness' to the homeland. Most of these respondents noted that they lacked emotional attachments to the migrant culture and developed a sense of Otherness while visiting Pakistan. Several of these second-generation interviewees from Dublin and Boston noted that their cousins in Pakistan teased them because of their 'strange' accents and 'funny' clothing, comments that suggest their outsider position in relation to 'authentic' Pakistani culture. Visiting
the homeland for the second-generation participants heightened their sense of belonging to Ireland and the US. On numerous occasions, some second-generation respondents stated that Ireland and the US is the only home that they have ever known and that they could never consider Pakistan to be their ‘real’ homeland.

Most of the second-generation interviewees in Dublin discussed being in-between Pakistani and Irish culture. This sense of in-betweenness is largely due to the influence of their parents’ migrant culture, as transmitted through the home, and the Irish culture outside of the home, in schools, and elsewhere in Irish society. The majority of the second-generation participants in Dublin reproduced the migrant culture, but they have periodically distanced themselves from the Pakistani cultural norms and activities in order to explore Irish culture. The majority of the second-generation participants in Boston appeared to distance themselves more from the migrant culture than their Dublin peers. I attribute this to their different childhoods than their counterparts in Ireland. The second-generation participants in Boston were raised in homes where the English language, education, and individuality were all prevalent aspects of the home-culture, whereas the second-generation respondents in Dublin were raised in homes in which Urdu, family business, and collectivity were stressed among family members. The differences between my second-generation participants in Dublin and Boston shows that these men have different positions towards Pakistani culture and have developed different trajectories in relation to their level of integration into Irish and American society.

Belonging to and identifying with the *Ummah* among the Muslim participants is another key finding in this research. Overall, many of the first- and second-generation Muslim respondents identified themselves as members of the global Muslim community rather than with their ethnic group or nation. Many of these interviewees juxtaposed their sense of belonging and identity with the nation-state and nationalism, concepts that they see as divisive in relation to unity among Muslims. In addition, this research found that young Pakistani men in diaspora belong to and identify with a particular *Ummah*, such as the worldwide Ahmadi community or particular Sufi orders, which highlights the idea of there being diasporas within a diaspora. However, there was not uniformity in terms of how
Conclusions

the participants positioned themselves towards the *Ummah*. Some respondents contested the *Ummah* and described it as an unrealistic ideal, identifying instead with their native countries. Other interviewees questioned the relevance of the *Ummah* outright. The participants who identified themselves with the *Ummah* rather than Pakistan, Ireland, or the US may be described as demonstrating a liquid identity because their group affiliations transcend group boundaries and the borders of nation-states.

The data showed that the interviewees position themselves differently in relation to Irish and American identities. Some of the first- and second-generation participants in Dublin stated that they belong to Ireland because it is their home, but that they will never be ‘fully Irish’ because of their skin colour and Pakistani ancestry. I linked these sentiments to the Irish ethnic nation and its exclusive boundaries in terms of welcoming outsiders into group membership. In comparison to the Irish respondents, several comments from first-generation interviewees in Boston claimed that anybody could belong to the US and identify with American identity, regardless of their ethnicity, religion, or place of birth. These statements highlight the idea that the participants portray American identity as having a more inclusive boundary in terms of welcoming outsiders into group membership. I linked my participants’ comments to the notion of the US having a civic nation in which belonging and identity are based not upon ethnic or religious backgrounds, but rather egalitarian values.

One of the contributions of this research, which I discuss in more detail in the following section, is that it extends the discussion of Pakistani diasporic identities beyond references to hybridity and into the area of liquidity. Some of the participants expressed that they want to be loosely attached, if at all, to hegemonic notions of ethnic, religious, and national identities. These participants did not want to be categorised into or positioned against group boundaries, rather they wanted to be free of identity fixations. Some of the first- and second-generation respondents wanted to belong nowhere, preferring instead to be ‘social nomads’. I described these participants as having liquid identities, which are distinct from hybrid identities in the sense that they do not position themselves towards either the migrant culture or the new host society culture, whereas the hybrid individual
may claim to have a fusion of these identities. This distinction between hybridity and liquidity is important for researchers in considering that some Pakistanis in diaspora do not fit easily into group boundaries and hegemonic identity constructions.

**Contributions of the Study**

One of the main contributions of this study is that it adds knowledge to the body of literature on the Pakistani diaspora in relation to individual experiences with family, religion, and identity. Thus far, there has been little comparative research on Pakistani communities in diaspora. Researching these populations in Dublin and Boston provides insight into the heterogeneity of the Pakistani diaspora as it concerns young Pakistani men’s socio-economic, ethnic, family, religious, and cultural backgrounds. In comparing the experiences of young Pakistani Muslim and non-Muslim men in the Irish and American contexts, this study moves beyond the tendency to homogenise the Pakistani diaspora and to ignore the similarities and differences among and within its various communities.

This study accounts for the diversity of experiences among Pakistanis in diaspora, and in doing so, it demonstrates that however similar all Pakistanis may seem to non-Pakistanis, they actually constitute a far more diverse population than is commonly realized. The main argument in this dissertation is that the experiences of young first- and second-generation Pakistani Muslim and non-Muslim men in Dublin and Boston indicate that the Pakistani diaspora is a heterogeneous diaspora in relation to its components of family, religion, and identity. Though it may be united through its heterogeneity, ‘[t]o understand that [Pakistani] diaspora is to recognise that it is shaped through ... heterogeneity, not a homogenous singular whole’ (Werbner, 2013: 411). Furthermore, this research also contributes to the sociology of religion in relation to Pakistanis in diaspora by examining the experiences of non-Muslims, a population which has been overlooked in the academic literature. This study elaborates on the sociology of religion by expanding the boundaries of diaspora theory to incorporate the concept of the *Ummah*, which deterritorialises the notion of diaspora from the physical homeland and reimagines diaspora as a transnational entity, or a web with no centre. As a
result, this study sheds light upon the idea that young Pakistani Muslim men may prefer to connect themselves with religion and its related universal ideologies rather than to a migrant culture or physical homelands such as Pakistan, Ireland, or the US.

By using the concept of boundary maintenance, the research also contributes to the body of knowledge on the sociology of identity, particularly as it pertains to how Pakistani Muslims, non-Pakistani Muslims, and Irish and Americans position themselves in relation to ethnic, religious, and national group membership. Boundary maintenance is important in light of the experiences of the participants because boundaries distinguish between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and often prevent certain individuals from gaining a sense of belonging to particular groups. However, some of the respondents also positioned themselves outside of the ethnic, religious, and national group boundaries because they did not exhibit ‘essential’ characteristics of the dominant members of these groups. By demonstrating that young Pakistani Muslim and non-Muslim men both conform to and oppose hegemonic narratives of ethnic, religious, and national groups, this study goes beyond the notion of hybrid identities to the idea that diasporic individuals may have liquid identities. As such, they do not desire to belong to any group or relate to any type of hegemonic identity construct.

Moreover, this study furthers our understanding of the migration histories and demographic makeup of the Pakistani populations of Dublin and Boston. More specifically, the research furthers knowledge on young Pakistani men’s experiences of family, religion, and identity, and thus adds to the growing body of literature on Pakistanis communities in Dublin and Boston (see Khan, 2005; Scharbrodt, 2011; Maira, 2004, Maira, 2009). Most of the knowledge available on the experiences of Pakistanis in Dublin and Boston is based on descriptive overviews (see Flynn, 2006; Watanabe et al., 2004; Curtis, 2009) or quantitative analysis (Central Statistics Office, 2012a; 2012b; Irish Integration Centre, 2010; Harvard Pluralism Project, 2014b; United States Census Bureau, 2011). In interviewing young Pakistani Muslim and non-Muslim men of different cultural and religious backgrounds, I have provided a glimpse into their ‘inner worlds’, which the literature and media has largely neglected.
Conclusions

Evaluation of Research Design and Theoretical Framework

The comparative cross-national research design was essential in terms of achieving the aim of exploring the heterogeneity of Pakistani populations in diaspora. As discussed in Chapter 1, there were significant differences over the migration trajectories of Pakistanis to Ireland and the US. The Pakistani communities in these two countries have different origins and exist in contrasting historical, societal, cultural, and political contexts, all of which shape how young first- and second-generation Pakistani men position themselves towards their ethnic, religious, and national identities. The multiple case study research design of this study allowed me to examine the experiences of a wide range of Pakistanis, instead of narrowing the sample to dominant groups such as Sunni Muslims or Punjabis. In examining the lives of Pakistanis from different ethnic, religious, sectarian, and sexual backgrounds, I was able to shed light on the group boundaries that young Pakistani men position themselves against in Dublin and Boston.

Several methodological issues should be discussed in light of how effective the research design and data collection tools were in relation to answering the research question. The aim of shedding light on the heterogeneity of Pakistani communities in diaspora demanded that I sample a diverse range of participants. Because of this aim, it was challenging to find multiple participants of certain groups such as Ahmadi Muslims, Baloch, or gay Pakistanis. As a result, the experiences of the participants should not be reflective of the experiences of all members of these groups.

The data collection tools that I deployed were the most appropriate methods to investigate my participants' perceptions, feelings, judgments, and memories. The semi-structured interview guide provided a systematic approach to eliciting the lived experiences of the respondents, even if I raised issues during the interviews that were not in the original content of the questions. Focus group discussions were also an essential data collection tool because this method allowed me to juxtapose the experiences of young Pakistani men of different backgrounds in a single environment. These discussions provided the opportunity to examine the
experiences of family, religion, and identity of different individuals and to compare and contrast their stories with one another. Alongside these two data collection tools, participant observation provided tacit knowledge of the various communities under research. By immersing myself in the environments in which young Pakistani men live, work, and socialise, I was able to collect first-hand accounts of my participants through exposure to and involvement in their daily routines and activities. While an argument could be made for using quantitative data collection tools, such as questionnaires or surveys, as a means to provide a statistical backdrop to the interviewees' lived experiences, these methods would not have provided me the in-depth insight into my participants' 'inner worlds'.

Diaspora theory was the most helpful starting point in building the conceptual and theoretical framework. Diaspora theory provided a flexible and context-based method for exploring the respondents' experiences in relation to the main research themes of family, religion, and identity. The diasporic sub-themes of intergenerational conflict and orientations towards or away from Pakistani culture helped me better understand the positions my participants adopted in relation to the homeland and new host society. Extending the diasporic framework to include the sub-themes of cultural borderland and boundary maintenance provided me with a means to grasp how my respondents distinguish themselves from other ethnic, religious, and national groups in Dublin and Boston.

In terms of the data analysis, the approach in creating a coding system and using thematic analysis helped to break down, as well as bring to life, the most important aspects of my participants' experiences in relation to the main research themes of family, religion, and identity. The coding system was useful in linking the data with the concepts outlined in the theoretical framework. By identifying abstract concepts and then reducing them further into specific codes, I was able to locate relevant sub-themes such as position towards the homeland, the religiosity dimensions of practice and community, as well as affiliations with ethnic and civic nations. In relation to the thematic analysis, the coding system allowed me to more easily compare and contrast the various patterns and discrepancies across generations, as well as Dublin and Boston.
Areas For Future Research on the Pakistani Diaspora

The sampling frame gives clues to recommendations for further research into Pakistanis in Ireland and the US, and to the Pakistani diaspora in general. As I noted in Chapter 3, the participants in this study were young men between the ages of 18 and 35 years. The narrowing of this sampling frame does not suggest that women, youth, or even elders were not of interest to me in researching Pakistanis in Dublin and Boston. Future research could explore the experiences of these populations in these two cities, or elsewhere in Ireland and the US, in order to compare and contrast their experiences with the conceptual and theoretical framework and findings of this study.

Future research could also consider exploring other segments of the Pakistani communities in Ireland, the US, and throughout the Pakistani diaspora. In particular, I suggest that researchers focus on minority groups within the larger Pakistani population, as well as the gay population. Doing so will provide further insight into how young Pakistani men in diaspora position themselves in relation to ethnic, religious, and national identities. As discussed in the first section of this chapter, the aim of the research is to account for the heterogeneity of the Pakistani diaspora by shedding light upon the experiences of sub-ethnic groups, Islamic sects, non-Muslims, and gay men, all of which enriches our understanding of the diversity of experiences among first- and second-generation Pakistani men in diaspora. Particular attention could be paid to Ahmadis in the Pakistani diaspora, as this population appears to be positioned by many Pakistanis as outsiders to the Pakistan nation-state and Islam in general.

In relation to the methodological approach in studying the experiences of young Pakistani men in Dublin and Boston, or elsewhere in the Pakistani diaspora, future research could use quantitative data collection tools, such as questionnaires or surveys, in order to acquire a larger amount of data and a wider sample of young Pakistani men. Future research could also conduct fieldwork solely in specific Muslim communities, mosques, and other places of worship in order to provide a more in-depth analysis of particular segments of the Pakistani diaspora. Researchers who have interest in carrying out studies on Pakistanis in diaspora
could also conduct more focus groups as a means to juxtapose the experiences, beliefs, and opinions, of a wide range of Pakistanis. Although they are more difficult to organize, focus groups help tease out intraethnic group dynamics and shed light upon the identities that Pakistanis maintain.

Having addressed areas for future research, it is necessary to consider several questions about Pakistani communities in diaspora. In recent years, Pakistanis have witnessed civil wars, sectarian violence, and religious fanaticism, processes that bring into question the position of minority groups in relation to Pakistani identity. These developments within Pakistan ultimately shape the experiences of Pakistanis in diaspora. Pakistanis around the world continue to question the meaning of Pakistani identity, especially in relation to its underlying Islamic connotations. My research found that young first- and second-generation Pakistani Muslim and non-Muslim men in Dublin and Boston had a wide range of positions in relation to Pakistan itself as well as Pakistani culture. For the non-Muslim participants, their challenge was how they positioned themselves towards an ethnicity that they perceive as being overtly Islamic. How the Pakistani government moves forward in the future, especially in relation to its minority communities, will inevitably shape the experiences of Pakistanis in diaspora.

Living in diaspora creates different challenges for young first- and second-generation Pakistani Muslim and non-Muslim men. The participants in this study are living in a moment of transit in Dublin and Boston, where their ethnic, religious, and national backgrounds produce complex experiences of difference and identity. In being insiders and outsiders at various points in their lives, and in experiencing inclusion and exclusion in the wider Irish and American societies, as well as within their ethnic and religious communities, the participants in this study showed creativity in how they recreate, discard, and reformulate ethnic, religious, and national identities in diaspora. In expressing different understandings of Pakistani, Muslim, and Irish or American identities, the respondents in this study remind us that it is difficult to speak of a single Pakistani diasporic experience.

This study has filled the gap in knowledge concerning the experiences of family, religion, and identity among young Pakistani men in Dublin and Boston. Social
Conclusions

Science researchers have so far not focused on this population or addressed these three issues in an in-depth, qualitative manner. The research sheds light upon the various layers of the Pakistani diaspora and contributes insight into the discussion over what it means to be Pakistani, Muslim, Irish, and American. Researching young Pakistani men in a cross-national manner offered a chance to examine the complexities of diasporic conditions and the heterogeneity of the Pakistani diaspora, which has hitherto been overlooked by researchers.


CENTRAL STATISTICS OFFICE (2012a) This is Ireland: Highlights from Census 2011, Part 1, Dublin: Stationary Office.

CENTRAL STATISTICS OFFICE (2012b) Profile 7: Religion, Ethnicity and Irish Travellers, Dublin: Stationary Office.


& L. Barlett (eds.) *Critical Approaches to Comparative Education: Vertical Case Studies from Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and the Americas*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.


Asian American Women Redefine Self, Family, and Community, Walnut Creek: Alta Mira Press.


Appendix 1: Access Letter to Research Sites and Participants

Asalamalaikum/Dear Mr/Mrs __________,

I am writing to enquire whether you might be interested in helping me with my doctoral research based in the Department of Sociology at Trinity College Dublin. My study is exploring the experiences of family, religion, and identity among young Pakistani men in Dublin, Republic of Ireland and Boston, Massachusetts (United States of America).

With your help, I would like to spend time with your community and also conduct interviews and groups discussions with young Pakistani men. I am specifically interested in meeting men between the ages of 18 and 35. Hopefully, I would be able to interview them in order to gain insight into what it is like being Pakistani in this city. If possible, I would also like to participate in your communities’ activities and learn about Pakistani culture through first-hand experiences and interactions. I would be very happy to volunteer and help out with community events.

I am able to explain to you in person the additional details of my own personal background and research. I am an Irish and Italian Catholic American who has been studying Islam and Pakistani culture for the last ten years. I am an experienced researcher of Muslim and Pakistani communities and intend to further this experience by studying these communities in Dublin and Boston. I have also been active in trying to build better understanding between Muslims and Catholics as well as non-Muslim Americans and Muslim Americans. I do hope that you will be able to help me carry out my research.

Feel free to contact me on considic@tcd.ie or on my cell phone at +353 86 849 5484. I have attached my curriculum vitae for your consideration.

Sincerely,
Craig Considine
PhD candidate, Trinity College Dublin
## Appendix 2: Profile of First-Generation Semi-structured Interview Participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pseudonym</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Job</th>
<th>Arrival</th>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Place of birth</th>
<th>Citizenship</th>
<th>Sub-ethnic group</th>
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<td>Punjabi</td>
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<td>Pashtun</td>
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<td>Karachi</td>
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## Appendix 3: Profile of Second-Generation Semi-structured Interview Participants

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<th>Pseudonym</th>
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Appendix 4: Profile of Focus Group Participants in Dublin

### Focus Group 1

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### Focus Group 2

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Appendix 5: Profile of Focus Group Participants in Boston

Focus Group 1

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Focus Group 2

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Appendix 6: Semi-structured Interview Guide

Social Interactions

1. What are some of the things that are important in your life?
2. What do you like to do with your free time?
3. What does your typical weekend night look like?
4. What is life like for you as a Pakistani in Dublin/Boston?
5. Can you tell me a bit about your workplace/university experience?

Familial Experiences

6. Can you tell me a bit about your life at home?
7. How would you describe your relationship with your parents?
8. What role does Pakistani culture play in your life?
9. How strong are your connections to Pakistan?
10. How closely do you follow current events in Pakistan?

Religious Experiences

11. How important is religion to you?
12. What role does religion play in your life?
13. What role should religion play in Irish/American society?
14. What do you think of religious law?

Sense of Belonging and Identity

15. Where do you feel like you belong to?
16. What do you think it means to be Pakistani?
17. What do you think it means to be [a follower of your religion]?
18. What do you think it means to be Irish/American?
19. Have you ever experienced racism or discrimination?
20. How welcoming do you think the Irish/American government is to Pakistanis?
21. If you could change a few things about Dublin/Boston, what would they be?
22. Is there anything you would like to add to our discussion?
Appendix 7: Focus Group Discussion Guide

Social Interactions
1. What do you all like to do with your free time?
2. What is the typical weekend night for a Pakistani man in Dublin/Boston?
3. Can you all tell me a bit about your workplace/university experiences?

Familial Experiences
4. How would you describe your relationship with your parents?
5. What role does Pakistani culture play in your lives?
6. How strong are your connections to Pakistan?
7. How closely do you all follow current events in Pakistan?

Religious Experiences
8. Can you tell me a bit about your religions?
9. How important is religion in your lives?
10. What role do you think religion should play in Irish/American society?

Senses of Belonging and Identities
11. Where do you all feel like you belong to?
12. What do you all think of Pakistani identity?
13. What do you all think it means to be [a follower of your religion]?
14. What do you all think it means to be Irish/American?
15. Have any of you ever experienced racism or discrimination?
16. How welcoming do you all think the Irish/American government is to Pakistanis?
17. If you could change a few things about Dublin/Boston, what would they be?
18. Is there anything you would like to add to our discussion?
Appendix 8: Survey of Pakistan

Appendix 9: Coding Frame

1.0 Role of Family, Culture and Religion
1.1 Family life
1.1.1 Childhood experiences
1.1.2 Importance of family
1.1.3 Conflict with parents
1.1.4 Some conflict with parents
1.1.5 No conflict with parents
1.2 Culture
1.2.1 Weak role of Pakistani culture
1.2.2 Lukewarm role of Pakistani culture
1.2.3 Strong role of Pakistani culture
1.2.4 Marriage
1.3 Religion
1.3.1 Very important
1.3.2 Important
1.3.3 Not important
1.3.4 Wanting to be a better Muslim

2.0 Lived Experiences and Social Interactions
2.1 Experiencing discrimination
2.1.1 Verbal and physical abuse
2.1.2 Suspicious looks
2.1.3 Other stories about discrimination
2.1.4 No verbal or physical abuse
2.2 Educational experiences
2.2.1 University experiences
2.2.2 Student organisations
2.2.3 Secondary school experiences
2.3 Professional experiences
2.3.1 Workplace environments
2.4 Circle of friends
2.4.1 Diversity of friends
2.4.2 Few, if any, friends
2.4.3 Restriction on friends
2.5 Alcohol consumption
2.5.1 Do consume alcohol
2.5.2 Do not consume alcohol
2.5.3 Do not consume alcohol, but used to

3.0 Identities and Senses of Belonging
3.1 Connection to Ireland and the US
3.1.1 Stronger connection to Ireland/US
3.1.2 Weaker connection to Ireland/US
3.2 Senses of belonging to Ireland and the US
3.2.1 Stronger sense of belonging to Ireland/US
3.2.2 Weaker sense of belonging to Ireland/US
3.2.3 No sense of belonging to any country
3.3 Connection with different Islamic discourses
3.3.1 Barelv/Sufi
3.3.2 Deobandi/Salafi
3.3.3 ‘Moderate’
3.3.4 Not affiliated
3.3.5 Non-Muslim

3.4 Belief in interfaith-dialogue
   3.4.1 Strong proponent of interfaith dialogue
   3.4.2 Positive experience of interfaith dialogue

3.5 Criticisms of Ireland and the US
   3.5.1 Stronger proponent
   3.5.2 Weaker proponent
   3.5.3 Positive experiences

3.6 Future plans
   3.6.1 Settle in Dublin and Boston
   3.6.2 Moving away from Ireland/US
   3.6.3 Professional plans