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FINANCE AND THE GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND,

1660-85

IN 2 VOLUMES

Volume II

by Seán Egan

Submitted for the degree of PhD to the
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Chapter VII

IRISH FINANCES UNDER ESSEX AND RANEILAGH.

1672-75: A STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL

Section 1 - The Chief Political Events, 1672-75

Section 2 - The Revenue Farms and the Economy, 1672-75
The years 1672-75 are a complex maze of problems and difficulties, which are given some coherence by three factors. In the first place, the terminal date coincides with the end of Ranelagh's undertaking and his assumption of the office of vice-treasurer, while the farm of the Irish revenue, headed by the Forths, was replaced with one led by Shaen. Secondly, these years mark the struggle between Essex in Ireland and Ranelagh at Court for the direction of Irish affairs against the background of a king, forced by financial necessity, to postpone his elaborate, though nebulous, plans: adapting Ireland's role in these changing conditions was a major source of conflict, for Essex and Ranelagh had differing views of Ireland's future. Thirdly, Essex returned to England in July 1675 and was concerned with revenue matters until the end of that year, by which time Ranelagh's councils on Ireland's place in royal schemes had finally triumphed over Essex's. The further struggle between Ranelagh and Essex in 1676-77 was a postscript to Essex's defeat and was fought within the context of new Irish schemes, which makes December 1675 a natural breaking point in our view of Ireland in the 1670s.

In order to give coherence to the treatment of these years, the chapter will be divided into two parts. In the first and major section the changing relationship between Essex and Ranelagh, and the struggle to see which view prevailed of how Ireland should be governed and used, will be elucidated. In the second part we will examine the struggle by the Forths to obtain control of the Irish revenue farm in 1674 and at its re-letting in 1675. We will also examine how the revenue performed in these years. This will both reinforce and re-emphasise the main political events and financial shifts described in the first section.
In this first section, we will examine Ranelagh's relations with Essex, as the future vice-treasurer's and the lord lieutenant's views on Ireland's future role increasingly diverged. It will be shown that the collapse of the Dover policy highlighted differences in attitude between Essex and Ranelagh. Whilst Essex moved increasingly towards a government of Ireland, freed from adverse English interference, Ranelagh tried to persuade Charles to use Irish resources to strengthen the crown in England. Thus, we will see that subventions were paid to Charles out of the Irish treasury in these years, grants were made to courtiers and the Irish army put to English uses. The attacks on Ranelagh by Essex, rival financiers and Irish privy councillors bear witness to Ranelagh's power, and the increasing intensity of these attacks by the viceroy reflect the erosion of his influence as the vice-treasurer's grew. By 1675 we will see Ranelagh had finally wrested complete control of Irish affairs from the viceroy.

Although Irish money and arms played a significant part in the king's efforts to follow through his Dover policy in 1672-73, Ireland remained peripheral to his thinking. Ireland's future depended on the Dutch war — a quick French victory and rich English spoils from Dutch prizes. — It was in this context that Essex's meteoric rise to the lord lieutenancy took place in

1. CSPD, 1672:p 90, Rawdon to Conway, 28 May 1672.
April 1672. 1 Essex was one of those court opponents, like Halifax, who Charles brought into his privy council in April and May 1672 so as to widen the base of support for his government and policy. 2 Essex, as we have seen at the close of the last chapter, was to be the proponent of Charles's pro-catholic policy in Ireland. Although a great whig champion, he was a supporter of liberty of conscience, and his secret instructions, countersigned by Clifford, asked him to tolerate the catholic clergy and laity and "make diligent inquiry what are the prepared ways to give satisfaction to all our subjects in that our kingdom in the point of liberty of conscience ..." 3 The shift to a pro-catholic policy was underlined by the dismissal of Orrery on Essex's arrival in Dublin after Orrery had complained about Talbot, a catholic, receiving a troop of horse, and this was quickly followed by the re-opening of the commission into inspecting land titles which threatened the protestant gentry. 4

However, pro-catholic measures were of only secondary importance in Irish policy. At the forefront was the treasury and the army, both of which Ranelagh showed could be used to aid Charles's Dover policy. With regard to the army eight companies had been dispatched to England in February 1672, followed by four more in May 1672, which totalled 1,000 troops paid for by the Irish treasury. 5

1. DNB, vol iii, p 922.
2. PRO PC2/63: fol 117 & 121, 17 Apr & 3 May 1672; Browning, Life of Danby, (Glasgow, 1951), vol i, p 90.
3. AD Ms 21505: fol 29, King to Essex, 12 July 1672.
4. AD Ms 28085: fol 17, Discouragement of Protestant Interest, 1671 & 72; AD Ms 28085: fol 19, Discouragement of Protestant Interest, 1671 & 72; AD Ms 28085: fol 21-3, King to Commissioners Inspecting Irish Titles, 17 Jan 1673; PRO PC2/64: fo 1 & fol 61, 11 Apr 1673 & 21 July 1673; CSPD, 1672: pp 269-70, Arlington to Orrery, 22 June 1672; Stowe Ms 213: fol 3, Essex to Orrery, 6 Aug 1672; Lynch, Roger Boyle, Earl of Orrery, (Knoxville 1965), pp 139-41 & 163-4.
5. MacLysaght, Calendar of Orrery Papers, p 103, Ranelagh to Orrery, 1 June 1672; AD Ms 28085: fol 17, Discouragement of Protestant Interest, 1671-2; CSPD, 1671-2: p 134, King to Berkeley, 13 Feb 1672; CSPD, 1671-2: p 189, Ranelagh to Williamson, 9 Mar 1672.
Upon his arrival in Ireland Essex was persuaded to part with twelve more companies, which seriously depleted Irish defences, but brought the total of Irish troops in England to 1,900. Thus, Ranelagh supplied Charles with 1,900 troops at no additional cost to the crown as the Irish treasury paid for them. Ranelagh made it his first priority to ensure that these troops were well paid and even gained a respite in paying the army in Ireland on the basis of the strain of these payments.

Whilst Essex dealt with the problem of keeping Ireland quiescent and well-defended, Ranelagh proved an invaluable support to the crown. The war went badly, the king's gamble failed, but Irish troops were well paid and a source of royal support. When Charles was forced to fall back on parliament's aid the Irish troops could no longer remain: in fact, Charles was compelled to reverse his policies of 1672/3 and accept the Test Acts, ultimately taking up Danby's policy of courting the Anglicans in parliament in the hope of obtaining supplies. Ranelagh tried to save some of these troops for the king, but by May 1674 they had all either been returned to Ireland or disbanded as part of Irish retrenchments of £10,300 pa.

In terms of the Irish treasury and Ranelagh's financial usefulness to the crown, Danby's rise to the treasury in England was

1. AD Ms 28085:fol 43, Regiments in England, 7 1673; CSPD. 1672: p 433, King to Essex, 1 Aug 1672; Stowe Ms 200:fol 144, Coventry to Essex, 17 Aug 1672; Hastings, p 380, Conway to Rawdon, 10 Aug 1672.
2. Stowe Ms 200:fol 321, Ranelagh to Essex, 16 Oct 1672; Stowe Ms 200:fol 323, King to Essex, 22 Oct 1672; Stowe Ms 201:fol 213, Arlington to Essex, 1 Mar 1673; Stowe Ms 201:fol 301, King to Essex, 29 Mar 1673; Stowe Ms 202:fol 60-1, King to Essex, 3 May 1673; Stowe Ms 202:fol 66, Ranelagh to Essex, 24 May 1673.
4. AD Ms 28085:fol 43, Regiments in England, 7 1673; Stowe Ms 203:fol 263, Arlington to Essex, 13 Dec 1673; Stowe Ms 204:fol 110, Ranelagh to Essex, 26 Jan 1674; Stowe Ms 205:fol 57-8, Ranelagh
the most significant effect of the failure of Charles's Dover policy. Ranelagh and Conway were his closest advisers and he reinforced the king's and Ranelagh's view that "Ireland must now maintain itself, and no longer be any charge to England".¹

Under Danby's guidance Charles's pursuit of financial and political independence took a new direction, trying to goad money out of France by courting parliament, and toying with turning on France, in return for parliamentary subsidies.² In between parliamentary sessions Danby concentrated on retrenching royal expenditure to decrease reliance on parliament.³ Ireland must, therefore, at the very least maintain itself, but Ranelagh showed that Ireland could positively aid the crown's financial plight. This was the more significant as by 1675, in spite of Danby's efforts, the treasury was empty and parliament had to be called for supplies.⁴ This meant that Ranelagh's plans to use Irish surpluses to increase the army in 1674/5 had to be shelved as an English parliament would never tolerate it, and led to Danby/Ranelagh's plans to divert Irish funds to the English treasury systematically and to keep the farmers' £60,000 advance in England.⁵

Between 1671-75 Ireland, chiefly through Ranelagh's direction, proved a useful supplement to the crown's income in England.

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¹ Browning, op cit., vol 1, pp 98-102; Stowe Ms 202: fol 97, Ranelagh to Essex, 3 June 1673.
² Stowe Ms 203: fol 194, Conway to Essex, 23 Nov 1673; Stowe Ms 203: fol 299, Conway to Essex, 20 Dec 1673; Stowe Ms 203: fol 325, Conway to Essex, 30 Dec 1673; Browning, op cit., pp 151-2, 160-73.
⁴ Ibid., pp 235-7; Browning, op cit., vol 1, pp 146-65; Stowe Ms 207: fol 72-3, Harbord to Essex, 19 Jan 1675; Stowe Ms 208: fol 109, Harbord to Essex, 24 June 1675.
⁵ Stowe Ms 207: fol 64, Ranelagh to Essex, 16 Jan 1675; AD Ms 28085: fol 115, Model Establishment, 7 Jan 1675; Stowe Ms 215: fol 224, Essex to Coventry, 22 Dec 1675.
As we have seen in the previous chapter, Charles received £48,000 secretly from Ranelagh, and a £10,000 loan from Bucknall was paid for by Ireland and several large payments were made to individuals. However, the £80,000 Charles hoped to receive at the close of Ranelagh's undertaking was lost by Charles due to Essex's fastidiousness and it was discounted against the farmers' and others' defalcations, which cannot have pleased the king.\(^1\) By the farm's patent of abatement, the farmers also paid Charles £10,000 pa secretly.\(^2\) Therefore, between 1669 and 1675 Charles received some £118,000 from Ireland as a result of all these payments.\(^3\) The cost to Ireland was far greater, though. There was interest on the £10,000 lent by Bucknall, the cost of maintaining 1,900 troops in England, plus private grants on the establishment (usually on the sea regiment fund) and £3,300 on the sign manual fund used for private gifts.\(^4\) We should not forget either the abatement of £41,000 worth of defalcations allowed to Ranelagh's partners.\(^5\) All in all, the king profited greatly from Ireland in these years and Ranelagh and Danby promised greater riches from 1676 onwards.

We can see, therefore, why Ranelagh was such a major figure in Irish and crown affairs during these years. He maintained this influence because he supplied Charles with funds and troops for his policies

1. Stowe Ms 205:fol 88, Conway to Essex, 2 May 1674; Stowe Ms 214:fol 149-51, Essex to Ranelagh, 6 May 1674; Stowe Ms 213:fol 184-5, Essex to Arlington, 25 Apr 1673. See below also.
2. Stowe Ms 204:fol 237, Harbord to Essex, 25 Feb 1674.
3. i.e. £48,000 from Ranelagh in 1671-2; £70,000 secretly from the farmers. This excludes £10,000 lent by Bucknall to Ranelagh and repaid by the Irish treasury.
5. Carte Ms 52:fol 555-60, Muschamp's Observations, Jan 1673.
and also through fictitious funds, such as the sea-regiment fund, he enabled Charles to make gifts to his supporters which he could not otherwise afford. It was Ranelagh's control of the treasury, through his undertaking, which was the source of his power. His ability to authorise the payment of grants magnified his influence with Charles and his courtiers. At this stage we will therefore evaluate Ranelagh's control of the undertaking so as to understand better the events of 1672-75.

The running of the undertaking was a complex problem for Ranelagh, who found it necessary to protect his project's interest by being continually present at court. On the ground, in Dublin, the commissioners had physical control of the undertaking, but Ranelagh did his best to minimise their freedom of action without his direction. The undertaking comprised chiefly those Irish financiers and merchants who had controlled the revenue farms up to 1668 and who had now been excluded by the new, predominantly London-based farm. They had contacts, former servants and friends throughout Ireland, and as a result Ranelagh had little difficulty in appointing a set of faithful collectors. His own experience in Irish government and his contacts there were, no doubt, useful also. Ranelagh chose all the collectors. Champante, a close friend of Ranelagh, was appointed receiver general and later became deputy vice-treasurer, and Roger Jones was their solicitor and acted as Ranelagh's special agent in Ireland, fully trusted with his master's business. What is remarkable is the

1. CSPD. 1673-5: pp 163-6, Charges Against Ranelagh, Feb 1674.
2. Jones, Humble Proposals of ... (London, 1673), pp 5-6; Stowe Ms 201: fol 122-4, King to Essex, 31 Jan 1673.
degree of control Ranelagh exercised over the whole network of collectors locally and centrally, which enabled him to compound systematically for soldiers' and pensioners' arrears.1 Locally, Ranelagh probably achieved this through patronage. Centrally, Champante was a vital figure, willing to ride roughshod over the partnership's wishes in order to fulfill Ranelagh's instructions, acting "rather like a master than a servant".2 The commission's quorum was three and the partnership divided into three parts, each of which had to have at least one representative to fulfill the requirements for a forum.3 Rather than protecting everyone's interest, though, it enabled Ranelagh, Sir Alexander Bence and Kingdon to dominate the undertaking, even in the face of Dashwood's determined opposition.4 All correspondence passed through Stepney's hands, who seems to have been Ranelagh's loyal supporter.5 Little correspondence survives but what does is illuminating. Ranelagh was, for example, quite sure of the partnership's priorities in fulfilling the undertaking,

"for my maxim is, whilst the king is our friend we are and shall be safe, let our enemies be never so many or malicious, and therefore in all things we must both please and humour him".6

2. AD Ms 4761:fol 25, Gross Survey of the Revenue, Jan 1681.
4. AD Ms 4761:fol 25, Gross Survey of the Revenue, Jan 1681.
5. Carte Ms 218:fol 85, Aungier to Ormond, 28 June 1673; AD Ms 4761:fol 25, Gross Survey of the Revenue, Jan 1681.
Thus Ranelagh went to extraordinary lengths to keep the Irish troops in England well paid, borrowing in London to pay them in November 1672. In 1673 he had to go to similar lengths, partly because he feared the ill-payment of these troops might be brought up in parliament by Ormond. In matters, such as how to deal with the lord lieutenant and the farmers, Ranelagh gave the commissioners advice. He also advised them on which payments to make, pressing for installments of Burlington's debt, payment of pensions to Buckingham, Rooth and Savage, a payment to Orrery and a discharge of a debt of his uncle, Robert Boyle. The payment of the troops in England proved to be Ranelagh's greatest problem, but this was relieved when they were put to sea in 1673. Other troops fared less well, as preferential payments were made to those companies who complained little or were under the command of friends of Ranelagh. Ranelagh was also able to increase his influence by supporting the payment of some letters and not others and those which were passed probably made some payment to him. By August 1673 the sea regiment fund was severely over-charged, but it was clear that this was in fact to the commissioners' advantage as it would allow them to compound with pensioners.

1. Carte Ms 70:fol 425, Ranelagh to Treasury Commissioners, 10 Nov 1672.
2. Carte Ms 70:fol 428, Ranelagh to Treasury Commissioners, 27 Sept 1673; Carte Ms 70:fol 429, Ranelagh to Treasury Commissioners, 25 Nov 1673.
4. Carte Ms 70:fol 426, Ranelagh to Treasury Commissioners, 19 Nov 1672; MacLysaght, Calendar of Orrery Papers, p 116, Ranelagh to Bence, 7 June 1673.
5. Carte Ms 70:fol 427, Ranelagh to Stepney, 22 Apr 1673.
7. Carte Ms 70:fol 429, Ranelagh to Treasury Commissioners, 27 Sept 1673.
Ranelagh was thus enabled to use the Irish treasury for his own ends, both to augment the crown's and his own income. Essex and Aungier were convinced that Ranelagh used the Irish treasury corruptly, but without proper accounts were unable to prove anything. How much was collected in arrears is unknown, but in Cork alone process was issued for £70,000 worth of debts. It is clear, though, that, through correspondence or his agents in Ireland, Ranelagh kept a firm control of his undertaking. We can only speculate on the degree to which his power and influence would have been circumscribed were it not for his firm grip on the undertaking, but, suffice it to say, that this control was the source of his power and influence. Without that control he would not have become such a valuable royal support, nor would he have withstood the continued attacks and pressure from Essex.

It is against this background of Ranelagh's control of the treasury and the use to which he put it that relations between Essex and Ranelagh and Irish policy in 1672-75 are best understood. In 1672 Ranelagh and Essex are seen both working to the same end, both eager and willing to supply Charles with Irish troops. However, the failure of the Dover policy broke the government's tenuous unity and the aims and desires of various ministers diverged. Essex, in these years, adopted a largely apolitical stance, and he cannot be identified with either the Danby-centred court party, to which Ranelagh belonged, or the opposition. His chief concern was clearly the pursuit of a government which,

2. Carte Ms 70:fol 426, Ranelagh to Treasury Commissioners, 19 Nov 1672.
though forwarding royal protestant policy in Ireland, did not do so at Ireland's expense and at English gain. In this aim he was at odds with Ranelagh and Danby who, largely ignoring the Irish context, used Irish troops, revenues and grants to bolster the crown's English finances.

The difference in views between Ranelagh and the viceroy was most clearly evidenced in their attitudes towards grants generally and the sea regiment fund in particular. The sea regiment and sign manual funds, totalling £17,000 pa, were created in September 1672, upon Essex's arrival in Ireland, by disbanding six troops of horse and ten companies of foot. The lord lieutenant, however, maintained that the sea regiment fund had been created for emergency payments, such as the farmers' defalcations as a result of the war. On the face of it, Ranelagh concurred, but he undermined Essex's plans to use it to pay for convoys for merchant shipping or to buy arms for Ireland, by obtaining a series of private grants on it. Only when Essex complained to the king that a pension for Mrs Perkins would open the floodgates did Charles, at last, agree only to use the fund for repairs to Kinsale and to buy arms. This shift in policy by the king was, however, the result of complaints by Muschamp against the undertaking, closely followed by attacks on it in parliament.

1. AD Me 28085: fol 17, Discouragement of Protestant Interest, 1671-2; Stowe Ms 200: fol 84, King to Berkeley, 19 July 1672; Carte Ms 66: fol 348, Establishment, 1672; Stowe Ms 200: fol 212, King to Essex, 7 Sept 1672; CSPD, 1673-5: p 164, Charges Against Ranelagh, Feb 1674.
5. Carte Ms 52: fol 555-60, Muschamp's Observations, Jan 1673. CSPD.
achieved the grant of Phoenix Park to Lady Cleveland, which was an affront to Essex. Although Essex managed to have the grant changed to one of concealed lands instead, Cleveland still obtained an Irish grant. Clearly, therefore, Essex and Ranelagh had entirely different views on how Irish funds should be used to forward crown policy. The changing relations between Essex and Ranelagh between 1672 and 1675 reflect the balance in the power struggle over the direction of Irish affairs between the pair and in some ways mirror the shifting fortunes of Charles's Dover policy.

Whilst Essex was, at first, conciliatory and patient with the undertaking as Charles's Dover policy collapsed and Essex's and Ranelagh's views on Irish policy in revenue matters began to diverge.

Upon arriving in Ireland the lord lieutenant discovered that the revenue was his greatest problem. There were no funds for transporting the twelve companies to England and this was only achieved by means of an advance from the farmers. The revenue commissioners immediately petitioned Essex about their dispute with the farmers over defalcations for the present war. They requested that Sir John Temple take on the judicial powers of the vice-treasurer so as to clear several outstanding cases in the exchequer and generally did their best to keep on good terms with the viceroy. Ranelagh also petitioned Essex for support for the undertaking.

1. Stowe Ms 213: fol 146-67 passim; Stowe Ms 201: fol 303, Godolphin to Essex, 29 Mar 1673; CSPD, 1671-2: p 34, Williamson's Notes, Dec 1671; CSPD, 1673: p 128, Essex to Arlington, 12 Apr 1673.
3. Stowe Ms 213: fol 45, Essex to Ranelagh, 19 Sept 1672; Stowe Ms 213: fol 69, Essex to Ranelagh, 7 Dec 1672; see below.
At this stage, the viceroy attempted to steer an impartial course, trying to sort out the defalcations dispute fairly.\(^1\) He also made it clear that he intended to exercise a rigorous oversight of the revenue, interpreting his instructions on the revenue more positively than his predecessors.\(^2\) Accordingly, he became the first lord lieutenant to transmit his concordatum accounts, taking particular care over which payments he allowed on the fund, and he pressed for an increase in law officers' salaries and an end to private grants.\(^3\) Clifford was so impressed by his financial acumen as to fear him as a rival for the white staff, and in 1675 it was possible to excite Danby's paranoia with similar fears of Essex's abilities and ambition.\(^4\)

The transition of control of the revenue was only finally completed in 1673 when Aungier gave up the vice-treasury — (a bargain out of which Charles received 2,000 guineas).\(^5\) In October 1673 Sir John Temple, at last, received the ministerial powers of vice-treasurer.\(^6\) In every other way, however, the undertaking seemed to go less smoothly. Ranelagh's enemies began to circulate rumours that the undertaking was about to collapse on the basis of delays in payment, thereby creating a crisis by undermining the undertakers' credit. Colonel Fitzpatrick and William Muschamp,

4. Shaw, 'Introduction' to CTB 1672-5, p XVI; Stowe Ms 208:fol 48, Harbord to Essex, 12 June 1675.
5. CSPD, 1672:p 653, Aungier to Williamson, 24 Sept 1672; CSPD, 1672-3:pp 616-17, Aungier's Release, 26 Feb 1673; Stowe Ms 202:fol 235-6, Ranelagh to Essex, 26 July 1673.
6. CSPD, 1673:p 586, King to Essex, 18 Oct 1673.
who both desired to supplant Ranelagh, were the sources of these stories. Arriving in London in November 1672, Muschamp spent two months preparing his 'observations', which were grounded on the murky facts surrounding the undertaking's creation, and averred its corruption and inevitable failure. Muschamp's complaints were thrown out by the privy council in March 1673, but Ranelagh felt it necessary to cover himself by informing Essex to punish his partners if they were guilty of 'some indiscretions'.

Muschamp's attack more or less coincided with Essex's own complaint to the king against Ranelagh in March 1673. This marked a turning-point in their relations, clearly demonstrating their conflicting views on Irish policy. The background to the complaint was that Essex felt that Ranelagh pressed the farmers too hard for payment and that this might cause the farm to collapse. The farmers claimed defalcations on account of the war and had stopped making payments to the treasury in pursuit of this claim. This stop prevented Ranelagh from commencing to pay the twelve months arrears and seriously jeopardised current payments. Essex sided with the farmers, believing that their claim was justifiable and he was dissatisfied with the accounts that the undertakers produced. Ranelagh did not doubt the equity of the farmers' claim, but his chief concern was that it prevented him from fulfilling his

1. CSPD, 1672-3:pp 86-7, FitzPatrick to Arlington, 26 Oct 1672; CSPD, 1672-3:pp 134, FitzPatrick to Arlington, 7 Nov 1672.
2. Carte Ms 52:fol 555-60, Muschamp's Observations, Jan 1673; Stowe Ms 201:fol 56, Ranelagh to Essex, 14 Jan 1673.
3. Stowe Ms 201:fol 56, Ranelagh to Essex, 14 Jan 1673; Stowe Ms 201:fol 141, Ranelagh to Essex, 4 Feb 1673; CSPD, 1673:pp 20, Warrant, 7 Mar 1673.
5. CSPD, 1672-3:pp 30-1, Ranelagh to Conway, 8 Oct 1672; Stowe Ms 213:fol 35-6, Essex to Shaftesbury, 14 Sept 1672.
7. Stowe Ms 213:fol 35-6, Essex to Shaftesbury, 14 Sept 1672.
covenants, and he was angered that the farmers profited from the money they detained by applying it to trading ventures.¹

In December 1672 it was agreed that the farmers would be allowed £12,000 defalcations and to withdraw £29,000 of their £70,000 advance, the latter by installments. However, they continued to detain £21,500, which severely jeopardised Ranelagh's payments, and in May 1673 he had to obtain a respite of the March 1673 quarter's pay to the army.² Ranelagh only finally managed to receive the detained money by placing a caveat on the decision to allow defalcations to the farmers, which angered Essex.³

It was in the middle of these arguments that Essex wrote in complaint of Ranelagh, implicitly siding with the farmers.⁴ Ranelagh was outraged at Essex's attitude, in failing to realise that the detention of £21,500 in time of war and shortage of coin must have made it extremely hard to meet ordinary or extraordinary payments or to raise credit.⁵ The reasons for Essex's complaint, in fact, ran deeper than disputes over the revenue. Ranelagh had requested that Sir James Cuffe be removed from a commission investigating the army's arrears, warning Essex menacingly "that I could easily procure the king's positive order to lay him aside."⁶ The viceroy

2. Stowe Ms 201: fol 215, Ranelagh to Essex, 1 Mar 1673; Stowe Ms 201: fol 393, Ranelagh to Essex, 27 Apr 1673; Stowe Ms 202: fol 9, King to Essex, 3 May 1673; Stowe Ms 202: fol 29, Arlington to Essex, 10 May 1673; Stowe Ms 202: fol 66, Ranelagh to Essex, 24 May 1673.
5. AD Ms 28085: fol 25, Account of Irish Farm, 24 June 1673; Stowe Ms 202: fol 122-3, Ranelagh to Essex, 14 June 1673.
viewed this as a usurpation of his powers and it emphasised his belief that Ranelagh intended to make himself the effective chief governor of Ireland. Moreover, he suspected that Ranelagh intended to discount the farmers’ defalcations against the twelve months arrears which would be a great injustice to the army.1 It was in this vein that Essex’s complaint was made. Although outraged, Ranelagh took a conciliatory line, denying Essex’s allegations and promising not to place any defalcations on the twelve months arrears.2

The viceroy was now convinced that the undertaking was bound to fail.3 He also warned Ranelagh that he intended to keep him to his covenants in paying the army.4 Delays over the granting of the farmers’ defalcations and the failure of the undertakers to produce acceptable accounts caused the lord lieutenant to ask for an inquiry into it.5 Ranelagh agreed to this, partly to assuage the viceroy and partly critics at court, but the letter procured only took account of payments and not receipts, and Essex, inspite of prolonged efforts, failed to have it replaced.6 Thus Essex won an inquiry into Ranelagh’s accounts, but Ranelagh had ensured it would be ineffective. Only with regard to complaints against the use to which the sea regiment was put did Ranelagh react to

3. Carte Ms 218:fol 70, Aungier to Ormond, 15 June 1673; Carte Ms 218:fol 76-8, Aungier to Ormond, 19 July 1673; Stowe Ms 213: fol 238, Essex to Coventry, 5 July 1673.
4. Stowe Ms 213:fol 221, Essex to Ranelagh, 14 June 1673; Stowe Ms 213:fol 211, Essex to Ranelagh, 31 May 1673.
criticism by agreeing it should be used for emergency payments.\(^1\)

Essex's complaints and the farmers' criticisms coincided with the attacks on Ranelagh in parliament. On the one hand, these were useful grievances with which the commons could attack the government and its Dover policy as it had been revealed to them; but Essex's and Ormond's complicity in these assaults was certainly implicit in that they were led by Irish privy councillors — lords Arran, Aungier, FitzHarding and O'Brien.\(^2\) By this implicit criticism of prevailing policy Essex secured his political future and reputation, for he was not thrown out with Arlington and Buckingham in 1674, even though he had supported pro-catholic policies: he was seen as a champion of protestantism. Attacks on Ranelagh made no progress, especially when he responded so quickly to a royal order to ensure that the Irish troops in England were paid.\(^3\)

In brief, Essex had in his first year as lord lieutenant, drifted towards apparent support of the revenue farmers against the undertaking, and into open conflict with Ranelagh. Although Ranelagh was a vital financial support, the collapse of Charles's Dover policy circumscribed his direction of Irish affairs, strengthening Essex's position, particularly as the latter's attacks on Ranelagh coincided with parliament's.

1. Stowe Ms 213:fol 270-87 passim; Stowe Ms 203:fol 8, Bridgeman to Essex, 6 Sept 1673.
3. Stowe Ms 201:fol 301, King to Essex, 29 Mar 1673.
Until December 1673 an uneasy peace existed between the viceroy and the undertaking. Assisted by the former vice-treasurer, Aungier, Essex investigated the undertaking. A computation of its accounts to September 1673 delivered in December 1673, showed a debt of £116,904. However, this took no account of Ranelagh's overpayments, nor the great services he had rendered Charles in the war. Furthermore, £45,819 of the twelve months arrears was included and its payment had been deferred. Also, it was hardly fair to include the Michaelmas pay which, due to days of grace, would be delayed until November 1673. All in all, therefore, £92,500 of the £117,000 debt could be fairly discounted. In addition to this, Essex had firm evidence from spying on Gorges and Shaen (whom he wrongly believed to be Ranelagh's agents) that either the farm or the undertaking was shortly to be resigned. The viceroy felt compelled to warn Charles of his fears about these schemes and about Ranelagh's huge debt which he could not foresee could be paid. In fact, Essex's letter of complaint prevented Ranelagh from forwarding a scheme for a management of the revenue which he had placed

2. Carte Ms 52: fol 502, Ranelagh's Payments to 29 Sept 1673, Dec 1673; Furthermore, Aungier took no account of the farmers' 30 days grace and Ranelagh's 30 days grace, which allowed payments to be 60 days in arrear without being overdue.
3. Stowe Ms 213: fol 371-2, Essex to Arlington, 30 Dec 1673; Stowe Ms 214: fol 9, Essex to Ranelagh, 10 Jan 1674.
4. Stowe Ms 213: fol 359, Essex to King, 1 Dec 1673; Stowe Ms 213: fol 360-1, Essex to Arlington, 2 Dec 1673.
before the king.\(^1\) Shaen's and the Forths intrigues over control of the farm continued, however.\(^2\) (See section (2) of this chapter.)

Ranelagh was furious with the viceroy's complaint and, through Conway, threatened Essex that he was too high in royal favour to be dislodged—a point which was emphasised by the granting to him of the governorship of Athlone in March 1674.\(^3\) In the short term, Roger Jones and other commissioners calmed Essex's fears with some well-timed diplomacy at Dublin Castle.\(^4\) The viceroy's impatience only increased in early 1674 as he tried to untangle the threads of Shaen's and Gorges's revenue intrigues, in which he wrongly believed Ranelagh to be still involved. From London Essex's secretary, Harbord, insisted that the viceroy should demand a full investigation into the revenue and reiterate his fears about the undertaking.\(^5\) The lord lieutenant hesitated, partly because he had wrongly accused Ranelagh of causing delay in a payment for ordnance and partly because he knew that Ranelagh supported Essex's continuation as viceroy in preference to his rival, Ormond.\(^6\)

The lord lieutenant transmitted his apprehensions in a series of stingig letters. He warned Arlington that Ranelagh was in arrear,

1. See AD Ms 28085: fol 115-21, Ranelagh's Memorial on Irish Revenue, early (?) 1674.
3. Stowe Ms 203: fol 255 & 299, Conway to Essex, 13 & 30 Dec 1673; Stowe Ms 204: fol 304, King to Essex, 20 Mar 1674.
4. CSPD, 1673-5: pp 55-6, Jones to Conway, 11 Dec 1673.
5. Stowe Ms 204: fol 110, Ranelagh to Essex, 26 Jan 1674; Stowe Ms 204: fol 333-4, Harbord to Essex, 24 Mar 1674.
6. Stowe Ms 204: fol 203, Ranelagh to Essex, 24 Feb 1674; Stowe Ms 214: fol 34-7 passim; Stowe Ms 204: fol 345 & 351-2, Harbord to Essex, 25 & 31 Mar 1674; Stowe Ms 204: fol 359, Arlington to Essex, 31 Mar 1674.
his credit overstretched and that the undertaking would shortly be bankrupted.\(^1\) He claimed that both himself and Harbord had fully supported the undertaking and that, if properly managed, it would have succeeded. The main plank of his criticism was that there were no proper accounts and that Ranelagh had the advantage of being constantly at court to present his viewpoint.\(^2\) Trying to handle affairs diplomatically, Essex also complained to Danby, but the latter was unimpressed when he realised that Essex had given Arlington two weeks prior notice of the criticisms.\(^3\) Furthermore, by interfering with the Dublin mail Ranelagh received early notice of the contents of Essex's letters.\(^4\) Ranelagh was very angry at what he saw as an underhand attack, arriving just after he had fended off a fresh assault on the undertaking in parliament.\(^5\)

To send home his point, Essex dispatched Cuffe to the court with an account of the losses the king might incur as a result of Ranelagh's covenants.\(^6\) In Dublin the undertaking's accounts to July 1672 were passed in April 1674, but with exceptions, adding to the irresistible pressure on Ranelagh to submit to an investigation of the undertaking.\(^7\) Yet again Essex expressed the fear that Ranelagh might offset his defalcations against the soldiers'
arrears, and Ranelagh felt obliged to make an apologetic reply to the lord lieutenant, blaming his delays on royal overpayments, farmers' defalcations, maintaining troops in England and the war.¹ There was no side-stepping an inquiry, which Essex had now made inevitable, and this had full royal support.² However, the letter which finally arrived yet again made no mention of an account of receipts, only payments, and it was accompanied by an order that all revenue matters should be dealt with by Danby, not Arlington.³

In response to this pressure Ranelagh began to alter his tactics, attempting to undermine Essex's faith in Harbord and to move closer to the viceroy.⁴ This was partly because Essex's attack had weakened Ranelagh's credit, but, more plausibly, because he preferred Essex to his likely successor, Ormond.⁵ From boasting on 28 April 1674 that "£80,000, it may be, will be more valued than my lord of Essex", he took a more conciliatory tack.⁶ Doubtless under Ranelagh's orders, the commissioners in Dublin began to co-operate with the viceroy and the king's £80,000, inspite of Ranelagh's boasts, was earmarked for defalcations.⁷ The lord lieutenant, distrusting Ranelagh's conciliatory approach, wrote again to Danby reiterating his reasons for complaint.⁸ Furthermore, the lord

1. Stowe Ms 205:fol 57-8, Ranelagh to Essex, 21 Apr 1674.
2. Stowe Ms 205:fol 100, Arlington to Essex, 9 May 1674.
3. CSPD, 1673-5, pp 231-5, Ranelagh to Conway, 26 Apr 1674; Stowe Ms 205:fol 77-8, King to Essex, 23 Apr 1674.
4. Stowe Ms 205:fol 26, Harbord to Essex, 7 Apr 1674.
5. Stowe Ms 205:fol 90, Harbord to Essex, 2 May 1674.
6. CSPD, 1673-5, p 232, Ranelagh to Conway, 28 Apr 1674.
7. Stowe Ms 214:fol 144-5, Essex to Arlington, 2 May 1674; Stowe Ms 205:fol 88, Conway to Essex, 2 May 1674; Stowe Ms 214:fol 149-51, Essex to Ranelagh, 6 May 1674.
8. Stowe Ms 214:fol 152, Essex to Danby, 6 May 1674.
lieutenant ignored Conway’s efforts to draw him into Danby’s cabal by a mixture of veiled threats and reasoning, and proceeded to further discountenance Ranelagh by refusing to allow him to resign the exchequer to his own nominee.¹

At this juncture, therefore, the lord lieutenant was able to put considerable pressure on Ranelagh, leaving the initiative in alliance-seeking to the new vice-treasurer (he was promoted to this post on 4 June 1674 - a further mark of royal favour despite Essex’s attacks).² Ranelagh could only deny peculation, persuading his partners to present Essex with an optimistic forecast of the undertaking, and try to assure the lord lieutenant that their accounts would eventually uncover £40,000 of overpayments to the king.³ Essex, though, remained in no doubt that he should avoid being drawn into the Danby/Ranelagh cabal, and that Ranelagh was his greatest enemy.⁴

"A most dextrous man and always ready at hand to propose things for his own advantage, and get orders signed accordingly and dispatched to me, there being no man upon the place equally knowing in the affairs of this kingdom, I am still forced to dispute against things after they are passed ... but then for such matters are as of moment to his majesty’s needs (sic) I am necessitated ... to make some guess of what is probably to be offered, and endeavour a little before hand to prevent it; this I confess is a dangerous course especially with so slippery a gentleman as I take my lord Ranelagh to be ..." ²

The dispute between Essex and Ranelagh in 1674, although marking a new low in their relations, also illustrated that Ranelagh was

1. Stowe Ms 205:fol 141, Conway to Essex, 19 May 1674; Stowe Ms 205:fol 179, Conway to Essex, 2 June 1674; Stowe Ms 214:fol 159, Essex to Conway, 9 May 1674.
2. Liber Munerum Publicorum, vol 1, pt II, p 46.
3. Stowe Ms 205:fol 165-6, Ranelagh to Essex, 27 May 1674; Stowe Ms 205:fol 115, Ranelagh to Essex, 12 May 1674; Stowe Ms 205:fol 90, Harbord to Essex, 2 May 1674.
4. Stowe Ms 205:fol 248, Conway to Essex, 15 June 1674; Stowe Ms 214:fol 177, Essex to Capel, 19 May 1674; Stowe Ms 214:fol 194, Essex to Arlington, 8 June 1674.
5. Stowe Ms 214:fol 140, Essex to Harbord, 25 Apr 1674.
far from in the ascendant. In the matter of private payments
Ranelagh was forced to bend to Essex's and parliament's pressure,
using the sea regiment fund for emergency payments only after
August 1673 and disbanding it altogether in June 1674.\(^1\) Likewise,
Ranelagh had had to capitulate to an inquiry into the under-
taking's payments and Essex's intervention had prevented Ranelagh
from forwarding his revenue management scheme in 1674.\(^2\) That
Ranelagh survived these attacks illustrated his great influence,
but, that he had to bend to Essex's criticisms bore testimony
also to Essex's continued power and influence.

By June 1674 Ranelagh's conciliatory approach had ensured a
superficial reconciliation between himself and the lord lieuten-
ant.\(^3\) This was necessary because, for private and public reasons,
Ranelagh wished to go to Ireland in the late summer of 1674.
The viceroy's inquiries into the undertaking necessitated his
presence there as did new complaints about the oppression of the
people by Ranelagh's officers.\(^4\) However, the most compelling of
all reasons was that the viceroy had begun investigations into
the payment of the army's arrears, which threatened the commis-
ioners' plans to compound for them at large profits.\(^5\)

Ranelagh arrived in Dublin in the summer of 1674 with letters of
recommendation from the king, secret instructions for a northern

1. Stowe Ms 202: fol 321, Ranelagh to Essex, 25 Aug 1673; Stowe Ms
   208: fol 244, King to Essex, 14 June 1674.
2. Stowe Ms 205: fol 77-8, King to Essex, 23 Apr 1674; AD Ms 28085:
   fol 115-21, Ranelagh's Memorial on the Irish Revenue, early
   (?) 1674.
3. Stowe Ms 205: fol 179, Conway to Essex, 2 June 1674.
5. Stowe Ms 214: fol 148, Essex to King, 6 May 1674; Stowe Ms 214:
   fol 205-8, Essex to Capel, 13 June 1674.
expedition and a new set of instructions on private grants, which he implied were also secret.\(^1\) The latter instruction was not secret, but, momentarily, it signalled a closer understanding between the viceroy and vice-treasurer. Whilst in Dublin Ranelagh agreed to a severe retrenchment in the postal service and procured a troop of horse for Essex as a friendly gesture.\(^2\) At court intrigue continued unabated with Berkeley pressing for the lord lieutenancy. Capel and Harbord organised meetings of Essex's allies to counteract attacks and it was feared that Conway, Ranelagh and Danby were conspiring to ruin Essex over the farmers' accounts.\(^3\) Essex's fastidiousness over not allowing the farmers' defalcations until he received the farmers' accounts had delayed privy purse payments to the king.\(^4\) He first called for these accounts in November 1673 and the farmers did not finally comply until December 1674.\(^5\)

Ranelagh returned to England in December 1674 with instructions from Essex about several schemes on the future management of the revenue and the calling of an Irish parliament to place before

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1. Stowe Ms 205:fol 370, Danby to Essex, 30 July 1674; Stowe Ms 215:fol 115-16, Essex to Coventry, 29 Apr 1675; Stowe Ms 215:fol 117, Essex to Harbord, 29 Apr 1675.
the king. The main plank Ranelagh chose to emphasise was the proposed parliament, over which Essex was most cautious. Nevertheless, a parliament would take 5-6 months preparation and, knowing that Charles would probably require to summon an English session for supplies, the viceroy doubted that an Irish parliament could be fitted in, even though it was desirable before the Irish farms were re-let. Fearing Ranelagh’s motives, Essex attempted to reinforce their new rapprochement and he complimented both Ranelagh and Danby on their handling of the revenue. However, Ranelagh was still attempting to work with Essex. Inspite of Harbord’s fears he did not attempt to re-let the farms secretly, but instead quashed several Irish grants Charles had made in his absence. His main concentration was on a scheme, which greatly interested York and Charles, to increase the Irish army by 4,000 men to 10,000. Not only that, he had suggested that the Tangiers garrison could be maintained on the Irish establishment for £32,000 pa which would benefit Irish trade, and would be equivalent of a £32,000 pa subvention to the king. Thus, no progress was made on Essex’s revenue proposals, as all discussions concentrated on Ranelagh’s latest projects. In the

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1. Stowe Ms 214:fol 328-33, Ranelagh’s Instructions, 30 Nov 1674; Stowe Ms 214:fol 325-6, Essex to Danby, 30 Nov 1674.
2. Stowe Ms 214:fol 334-5, Essex to Harbord, 30 Nov 1674.
5. Stowe Ms 206:fol 298 & 308, Harbord to Essex, 15 & 22 Dec 1674; Stowe Ms 206:fol 321-2, Harbord to Essex, 24 Dec 1674; Stowe Ms 207:fol 9, Ranelagh to Essex, 9 Jan 1675.
7. AD Ms 28085:fol 113, Ranelagh’s Model of Establishment, ? Jan 1675.
8. Stowe Ms 207:fol 64 & 78, Harbord to Essex, 16 & 23 Jan 1675; Stowe Ms 207:fol 44 & 64, Ranelagh to Essex, 12 & 16 Jan 1675.
event, Charles's need to call an English parliament to supplement his funds in 1675 precluded the obviously threatening and suspicious augmenting of the Irish army, and persuaded Charles to accept money, rather than troops, from 1676 onwards as Ireland's contribution to his efforts to free himself from all constraints on policy.

The proposed Irish parliament was dropped, no doubt chiefly because it would attack Ranelagh, its erstwhile champion, and his undertaking. To assuage Essex, Danby, nonetheless, privately sent for recommended bills, expressing the view that a parliament ought to meet before the farms were re-let. At the same time Ranelagh and Danby procured Essex a grant of £13,000, which the vice-treasurer hoped he could use as leverage to persuade the viceroy to pass his accounts.

In the months from June 1674 to early 1675 there had been a subtle, though decisive, shift in the balance of power between Ranelagh and Essex. Superficial reconciliation with the viceroy and careful diplomacy during his stay in Dublin meant that Ranelagh returned to the court with a package of ideas for Ireland's future which were grounded in fact and which were seemingly supported by the lord lieutenant. Of course, Ranelagh's schemes went further than any he had agreed with Essex and strengthened his influence at court, clearly demonstrating his understanding

1. Stowe Ms 207:fol 72-3, Harbord to Essex, 19 Jan 1675; Stowe Ms 207:fol 64 & 80-1, Ranelagh to Essex, 16 & 23 Jan 1675.
2. Stowe Ms 207:fol 106-7, Danby to Essex, 28 Jan 1675.
of royal desires. Essex had agreed to methods for improving the Irish revenue and Ranelagh had the skill to suggest using them in a way that appealed to Charles, but not to the lord lieutenant.

Much of Ranelagh's success in early 1675 was as a result of his finally finding a price for Harbord. In December 1673 when initially trying to draw Essex into their cabal, Conway had warned Essex not to appoint Harbord as secretary, but the viceroy refused to listen insisting that he would keep to the "plain way". However, by 1675 Harbord was clearly not representing the viceroy's views properly at court because he was in Ranelagh's and Danby's pay. Likewise, Forbes, Essex's chief military adviser, was by now an ally of Ranelagh.

The ascendancy Ranelagh now enjoyed in Irish affairs was beyond question. In January 1675, for example, he procured an order for levying £30,000 from restored roman catholics, which, though it might lead to troubles in Ireland, would do much to benefit the undertaking. He opposed Danby's offer of £20,000 pa defalcations for the farmers, refusing bribes from the Forths to gain his compliance. Nevertheless, Essex was capable of annoying, if not controlling, his subordinate, and Coventry held up Ranelagh's

1. Stowe Ms 203:fol 186 & 209, Conway to Essex, 18 & 29 Nov 1673; Stowe Ms 204:fol 255, Conway to Essex, 13 Dec 1673; Stowe Ms 213:fol 352-3, Essex to Coventry, 29 Nov 1673; Stowe Ms 213:fol 374-5, Essex to Conway, 30 Dec 1673.
2. Stowe Ms 206:fol 245, Harbord to Essex, 28 Nov 1674; Carte Ms 38:fol 279, Southwell to Ormond, 27 Feb 1675.
4. PRO PC2/64:fol 350, 22 Jan 1675.
5. Stowe Ms 207:fol 112, Harbord to Essex, 30 Jan 1675.
grant of Athlone in February 1675. Control of the Irish revenue and future plans for it were totally in Ranelagh's hands. He proposed to make all contingency payments out of the concordatum fund; and that the pension list should be separated from the civil list and only be paid when the civil and martial establishments were completely met. Essex's views that £10,000 pa for pensions was too high and that contingencies should be paid for by the casual revenue were simply ignored.

The turning point for Essex was the bitter row in council over the 'secret' instructions on grants which took place in April 1675. By these instructions Coventry, the secretary of state, had been excluded from his part in countersigning grants - only those with Danby's signature were to be paid. This was a usurpation of the secretary of state's role and Coventry suspected Essex's complicity in it, especially as he only discovered it through his agent Colonel Vernon. The 'secret' instructions were revoked in April 1675, but had severely damaged relations with Essex's close ally, Coventry.

The viceroy thus determined to come to court. He wished to discuss concealed lands and a parliament with Charles, but most of all he desired clear instructions on the future management of the

1. Carte Ms 38: fol 254, Lane to Ormond, 9 Feb 1675; Carte Ms 38: fol 258, Lane to Ormond, 13 Feb 1675.
2. Stowe Ms 207: fol 272, Ranelagh to Essex, 30 Mar 1675.
5. Stowe Ms 215: fol 159, Essex to Capel, 5 June 1675.
revenue and to disentangle the truth about Ranelagh's accounts."
Moreover, Essex wished to have some say in the officers who would
be appointed collectors after 1676, as he feared that Ranelagh
would fill all the places with his henchmen. Conway, doubtless
at Ranelagh's instigation, told Essex that the king was opposed
to the trip, but, in fact, Charles was keen to discuss the re-
letting of the farms with him. Ranelagh did not openly oppose
the journey, but did so behind the scenes, pushing Conway forward
as a possible deputy or lord justice - the first step in grooming
him for the position of chief governor as an alternative successor
to Essex instead of Ormond. Conway, Ranelagh and Danby all put
great pressure on the king not to agree to the journey. Danby
was particularly worried that Essex was aiming at becoming lord
treasurer.

Essex's proposed trip was supposed to be a secret but when Essex's
secretary, Godolphin, arrived in London to forward the secret
plan the news of it had preceded him by several days. Uncertainty
over the situation was exacerbated by Charles's and Danby's pre-
occupation with worries about managing the English parliamentary
session, which meant no decision could be taken as to Essex's

1. Stowe Ms 215:fol 134-5, Essex to King, 22 May 1675; Stowe Ms
215:fol 137, Essex to Danby, 22 May 1675; Stowe Ms 215:fol 144,
Essex to Godolphin, 29 May 1675; Stowe Ms 215:fol 157, Essex to
Godolphin, 5 June 1675.
2. Stowe Ms 208:fol 424 & 434, Lords Justices to Essex, 13 & 19
Dec 1675; Stowe Ms 215:fol 144, Essex to Godolphin, 29 May 1675.
3. Stowe Ms 208:fol 3, Conway to Essex, 1 June 1675; Ormonde NS III.
p 371 & p 372, Ormond to Coventry, 22 & 31 July 1675; Stowe Ms
208:fol 1-2, Capel to Essex, 1 June 1675.
4. Stowe Ms 208:fol 1-2, Capel to Essex, 1 June 1675; Stowe Ms 208:
fol 17, Godolphin to Essex, 5 June 1675.
5. Stowe Ms 207:fol 443, Godolphin to Essex, 29 May 1675; Stowe Ms
208:fol 48, Harbord to Essex, 12 June 1675.
6. Stowe Ms 208:fol 38 & 53, Godolphin to Essex, 8 & 12 June 1675;
Stowe Ms 208:fol 48, Harbord to Essex, 12 June 1675.
7. Stowe Ms 208:fol 5, Danby to Essex, 1 June 1675; Stowe Ms 208:
fol 9, Coventry to Essex, 1 June 1675.
Journey and this only fuelled rumours of his fall.  

The viceroy elected to forward his journey by trying to reach an even closer understanding with Danby and Ranelagh. Essex's political naivety and isolation were soon illustrated when he discovered that Conway, one of his confidantes, had been betraying his correspondence to Ranelagh. These events caused the lord lieutenant, who had earlier been so angry at Harbord's advice to break with Ranelagh, to follow that course.

Ranelagh requested to bring in his accounts to June 1675. Essex now realised that Ranelagh intended to present his accounts up to midsummer 1675 as a ploy, whereby the vice-treasurer could claim that 4 1/2 years of accounts had been passed and that only six months remained. These six months were the vital ones as they included the army's arrears, the £80,000 payment to the king and other debts, which would decide if the undertaking had failed or not. Thus, Essex reiterated his fears to the vice-treasurer, but Ranelagh denied these and responded, via Conway, with the veiled threat that Ranelagh was higher in favour than the viceroy.

In case Essex's journey could not be prevented the vice-treasurer

1. Stowe Ms 208;fol 19, Harbord to Essex, 5 June 1675; Stowe Ms 208;fol 23-4, Capel to Essex, 5 June 1675.
2. Stowe Ms 207;fol 356-7, Harbord to Essex, 27 Apr 1675; Stowe Ms 207;fol 368, Harbord to Essex, 4 May 1675.
3. Stowe Ms 215;fol 128, Essex to Conway, 11 May 1675; Stowe Ms 215;fol 146-7, Essex to Conway, 1 June 1675; Stowe Ms 215;fol 148, Essex to Ranelagh, 1 June 1675; Stowe Ms 208;fol 40, Conway to Essex, 12 June 1675.
4. Stowe Ms 215;fol 183, Essex to Harbord, 19 June 1675.
5. Stowe Ms 207;fol 423, Harbord to Essex, 22 May 1675; Stowe Ms 208;fol 75, Ranelagh to Essex, 19 June 1675; Stowe Ms 208;fol 77-8, King to Essex, 18 June 1675; Stowe Ms 208;fol 53, Godolphin to Essex, 12 June 1675; Stowe Ms 215;fol 181-2, Essex to Coventry, 19 June 1675.
6. Stowe Ms 215;fol 148, Essex to Ranelagh, 1 June 1675; Stowe Ms 207;fol 425-7, Ranelagh to Essex, 22 May 1675; Stowe Ms 207;fol 428, Conway to Essex, 22 May 1675.
prepared his defences. Using the guise of anonymity he penned some 'observations' on the farmers' accounts which severely reflected on the lord lieutenant, and, even though Essex was able to deny their imputations, it cast doubt on his integrity and competence.\(^1\) However, the manoeuvre that came closest to preventing the journey was forwarded by Henry Capel (Essex's brother) and Harbord, whereby, an order was made that Essex could not leave Dublin until he had prepared for a parliament which would take several months. Capel and Harbord had by these means hoped to obtain a parliament, not prevent the journey.\(^2\)

In spite of all these intrigues, Coventry had the order reversed and Essex finally arrived at court in July 1675.\(^3\) The stay of a few months duration lasted almost a year. Essex became caught up in the intricacies of court business, involving himself in more than just Irish affairs. His instructions were clarified, but his decision to join no factions left him politically isolated.\(^4\) In the lords he appeared with several opposition peers in certain votes, but Charles's faith in him was unshaken and Ranelagh dropped a woolly plan to impeach him.\(^5\) The preparations and setting up of the new Irish farm took until the summer of 1676 and, for this reason particularly, Essex could not extricate

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1. Stowe Ms 208:fol 67-8, Exceptions to Farmers Accounts, 15 June 1675; Stowe Ms 208:fol 141, Godolphin to Essex, 3 July 1675; Stowe Ms 208:fol 145-6, Ranelagh to Essex, 3 July 1675; Stowe Ms 215:fol 194, Essex to Ranelagh, 26 June 1675.
2. Stowe Ms 208:fol 44, Coventry to Essex, 12 June 1675; Stowe Ms 208:fol 46, King to Essex, 12 June 1675; Stowe Ms 215:fol 166, Essex to Godolphin, 12 June 1675.
3. Stowe Ms 215:fol 166-98 passim; Stowe Ms 208:fol 90-133 passim.
4. Stowe Ms 208:fol 283-4, King to Essex, 26 Sept 1675; PRO PC2/64: fol 514, 22 Sept 1675.
5. AD Ms 18730; Anglesey's Diary, 4 Nov 1675; Carte Ms 72:fol 292-3, Untitled Paper, 20 Nov 1675; Stowe Ms 208:fol 362, Carlingford to Essex, 30 Oct 1675; Stowe Ms 208:fol 374, Carlingford to Essex, 6 Nov 1675.
himself from the court. Difficulties in settling the establish­
ment exacerbated this and so did efforts, which Essex blocked, to
call a parliament in 1676.¹

Essex's main difficulty was in maintaining a large degree of
influence in Irish affairs. The grant of Athlone was finally
passed for Ranelagh, indicating continued royal favour, but the
question of his undertaking was not really debated in 1675, but
waited until 1676 when it was discussed in a quickly changing
Irish financial context.² In late 1675 Irish financial matters
were discussed by a committee of three - Danby, Essex and
Ranelagh.³ It was impossible for the viceroy to oppose Ranelagh's
and Danby's plans to use the advance of the farm in England or to
demonstrate that it was not his policy.⁴ Accordingly, in November
1675, it was decided to strike out the words "to be paid in
Ireland" with reference to the new farmers' advance.⁵ The money
was to be paid in England and Essex was powerless to prevent it.⁶

This marked the beginning of a new policy of diverting large
quantities of Irish money into the king's privy purse - the final
triumph for Ranelagh over Essex. Privy purse payments had been
made before but nothing as systematic as Ranelagh and Danby
now intended. In addition to the advance, the king would receive

¹ Stowe Ms 215;fol 220, Essex to Granard, 7 Dec 1675; Stowe Ms
215;fol 221, Essex to Lords Justices, 18 Dec 1675.
² Stowe Ms 215;fol 218, Essex to Lords Justices, 4 Dec 1675.
³ Stowe Ms 215;fol 224, Essex to Coventry, 22 Dec 1675.
⁴ Stowe Ms 215;fol 224, Essex to Coventry, 22 Dec 1675.
⁵ CTB 1672-5, p 348, 20 Nov 1675.
⁶ Stowe Ms 215;fol 224, Essex to Coventry, 22 Dec 1675.
£20,000 pa into the privy purse.  

Essex's high-minded plan to use the £60,000 advance to meet Ranelagh's defalcations demonstrated that Essex was out of touch with the king's desires and the undertaking's purpose.  

Danby turned increasingly against Essex which was the direct consequence of the lord lieutenant's split with Conway, for Conway could have secured the lord treasurer's friendship for him.  

Essex derived some satisfaction in financial matters, however, by supporting the king's choice for the new farmers, whom Ranelagh and Danby had opposed.

There is no question that Ranelagh had wrested the direction of Irish affairs from Essex by 1675. He had achieved the ambition Essex believed him to harbour, namely to become effective chief governor.  

His first ambition was to be vice-treasurer of Ireland which he achieved in 1674. He also desired to become a gentleman of the bed-chamber, an earl and an English privy councillor - ambitions he was to fulfill over a long career.  

His influence and power at court were increased by his ability to finance the king and friendships with courtiers. This he was the more easily able to do by compounding with pensioners and the soldiery for their payments.  

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1. PRO PC2/65:fol 141-9, Establishment, 10 Mar 1676.  
8. See next chapter. Stowe Ms 215:fol 293, Essex to Arlington, 23 Sept 1673; Carte Ms 38:fol 238, Lane to Ormond, 23 Jan 1675.  

(34)
Ranelagh's position as a royal financial support ensured his supremacy in Irish affairs up until the undertaking's close in December 1675, and enabled him to possess an access to the king which was the envy of Coventry and Essex who were at the height of their powers—Ranelagh was allowed to see Charles alone in his bedchamber to discuss Irish matters in a way denied to several of Charles's chief ministers.¹ Ranelagh's ascendancy was therefore assured up to December 1675, but his continued influence was dependent on fresh factors, to be outlined in the next chapter, which ensured that he remained the most influential and important figure in Irish affairs throughout the 1670s.

(2) The Revenue Farms and the Economy, 1672-75

In this section we will look at the attempts made by rival financiers to gain control of the Irish revenue farm, but the chief interest here will be how the Forths obtained the revenue farm in 1674. As we shall see, the Forths were more interested in financial rather than political gain from control of this farm. This section will also examine the re-letting of the Irish revenue farm in 1675, the performance of the economy and the payment of the army. All of these reflect the conditions in which Ranelagh's schemes and his control of the Irish treasury through the undertaking operated. The well-being of the economy and the corrupt profits made at the army's expense all helped Ranelagh to shape and finance Irish policies which the crown desired, and to achieve his ascendancy in Irish affairs.

¹ Stowe Ms 216: fol 118-20, Essex to Capel, 1 Aug 1676.
In December 1675 Shaen, Muschamp and Gorges were involved in negotiations with the Forths to buy out all the Irish farm partnership - a scheme with which Ranelagh would have no truck.\(^1\) The original plan was to buy in the farm and manage it at a certain rate in the pound.\(^2\) Although claiming this would not interfere with the undertaking, it was obviously aimed at breaking it and engrossing all power in matters of Irish finance in the proposers' hands. Their new scheme offered Charles £30,000 pa more than he currently enjoyed.\(^3\) The Forths would pay Bucknall and the other London partners £51,000 for the advance money they still held, plus another £90,000 to buy out all their shares.\(^4\)

Whilst Shaen, Muschamp and Gorges aimed at aggrandizing themselves both financially and politically by the scheme, the Forths' and Bucknall's motives were more complicated. The Forths were heavily indebted, due to excessive and unsuccessful investment in English iron works, and needed the increased liquidity that a fuller control of the Irish farm would give them to save themselves from bankruptcy.\(^5\) Bucknall had fallen into royal

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1. Stowe Ms 213:fol 371-2, Essex to Arlington, 30 Dec 1673; Stowe Ms 204:fol 110, Ranelagh to Essex, 26 Jan 1674; Stowe Ms 204:fol 188, Harbord to Essex, 13 Feb 1674.
2. Carte Ms 70:fol 430, Ranelagh to Treasury Commissioners, 29 Dec 1673.
5. CSPD, 1677-78: p 520, Williamson's Notes, 21 Dec 1677.
disfavor. In 1671 the king had abandoned a farm of the English customs to Bucknall at a very late stage when the great financier tried to pressurize the crown into further concessions, forcing Charles to manage the customs himself. Moreover, he felt that Bucknall was gaining a stranglehold on crown finances which he became keen to break. Thus in June 1673 Bucknall was surprisingly defeated in the auction for the excise farm in England by Colvert and Vincent. Bucknall countered royal displeasure by refusing to pay Charles his £10,000 pa into the privy purse.

In return for allowing the Forths to buy Bucknall and his London partners out, the king had been promised (by the Forths) that they would pay him £15,000 owed by Bucknall in privy purse payments and £10,000 pa for the next two years. Once the king was hooked the Forths abandoned the Shaen scheme, preferring to keep the farm in their two pairs of hands alone. The scheme went ahead without any major hitches with strong royal support, in spite of Ranelagh's disapproval and the fact that Essex was kept totally ignorant. After a little wrangling over the security the agreement was finally sealed on 26 May 1674, giving the Forths total control and ownership of the Irish farm, keeping all the old covenants and promising to pay Charles all

2. CSPD, 1673: p 332, Orrery to Conway, 2 June 1673.
4. Stowe Ms 204: fol 271, Harbord to Essex, 3 Mar 1674; Stowe Ms 204: fol 333-4, Harbord to Essex, 24 Mar 1674; Stowe Ms 214: fol 83, Essex to Harbord, 10 Mar 1674; Stowe Ms 214: fol 116-7, Essex to Ranelagh, 14 Apr 1674.
his privy purse arrears and future payments. 1 Essex judiciously refused to concern himself with the matter, turning his attentions instead to his great attack on the undertaking. 2

In throwing over Sheen, Muschamp and Gore, the Forths had decided to opt for keeping the farm rather than a system of management. Full control of the farm for two years was attractive to them on account of their financial problems, but if Irish money and profits were to save them from bankruptcy they would need these advantages over a longer period of time. Thus, they asked for a five year extension of the farm at £220,000 pa with £20,000 pa into the privy purse. 2 Charles was tempted by this offer, especially when they added the inducement of a £100,000 advance. 4 By May 1674 three groups were making bids for the Irish revenue, led by Sheen, Morrice and the Forths, but the crown would not let the revenue to farm again until it knew its true value. 5 Ranelagh had already ditched his own proposals for a general management of the revenue, awaiting a more opportune time. 6

The future of the Irish revenue hung fire whilst Essex awaited the farmers' accounts. He was, however, in no doubt that farming was the best method for the king's profit. 7 Like Ormond, though, he was opposed to another undertaking, such as Ranelagh's,

1. CTB 1672-5, pp 241 & 244, 9 & 26 May 1674; AD Ms 28085:fol 13, Forths' Security, April ? 1674.
2. Stowe Ms 204:fol 345, Harbord to Essex, 28 Mar 1674.
7. Stowe Ms 214:fol 325-6, Essex to Danby, 30 Nov 1674.
being superimposed on the farm. When Ranelagh returned from Ireland in December 1674, Shaen and the Forths renewed competition for the Irish farm even though Essex had not yet received or passed the farmers' accounts. However, neither Danby, Ranelagh nor Essex wished to rush into a new farm and no early bargains were made. Charles made it clear that he believed farming to be the best method for collecting the Irish revenue and promised that this time he would not be swayed by privy purse offers.

The letting of the farm and decisions over the future management of the revenue in Ireland were to be left to Danby, Essex and Ranelagh. The bids were slow in coming forward, partly no doubt because the Forths verged on bankruptcy in their efforts to pay off Bucknall and partners and had been forced to resort to sub-farming, and were preparing to transmit large amounts of Irish money to England to pay these and other debts. Ranelagh made strenuous efforts to try to prove that the Forths had transmitted £50,000 in specie to London, but Essex believed their denials. He was more inclined to think they used Irish money only to finance their trade and that this was the cause of delays in payment to Ranelagh, not because they actually drew the money permanently out of Ireland. The farm auction

1. Coventry Ms 19: fol 9, Ormond to Coventry, 13 Jan 1675.
3. Stowe Ms 207: fol 106-7, 28 Jan 1675; Stowe Ms 214: fol 361, Essex to Danby, 29 Dec 1674; Stowe Ms 207: fol 80-1, Ranelagh to Essex, 23 Jan 1675.
4. Stowe Ms 207: fol 80-1, Ranelagh to Essex, 23 Jan 1675.
5. Stowe Ms 207: fol 152-3, Ranelagh to Essex, 13 Feb 1675.
7. Stowe Ms 215: fol 64, Essex to Ranelagh, 17 Mar 1675.
was delayed until after the English parliament was in recess, and Essex favoured a meeting of the Irish parliament before its letting.\textsuperscript{1} The king was keen to discuss the whole matter with his viceroy, especially as Ranelagh cast aspersions on the farmers' accounts, claiming they underestimated the revenue's true value.\textsuperscript{2} Moreover, the lord lieutenant felt that he alone understood the Irish revenue as well as Ranelagh and that only he could prevent the vice-treasurer from totally dominating its future settlement.\textsuperscript{3}

In general, once the king had declared his support for a farm of the Irish revenue, debate as to whether it was the best method died out. However, it is worthwhile noting that Eustace and Temple both expressed reservations and in 1674 Ranelagh had suggested a management scheme.\textsuperscript{4}

New proposals for farming were received in August 1675 and 4 September set aside to hear them.\textsuperscript{5} The bidding was between two groups. Firstly, the Forths who proposed a farm with the same covenants as before at £220,000 pa. No doubt they made privy purse offers to Charles also, but he was reluctant to choose them as they would, probably, attempt to bury substantial debts in the new agreement, and it was by now widely known that they needed Irish money to avoid bankruptcy.\textsuperscript{6} Furthermore, it

\begin{itemize}
\item 1. Stowe Ms 207:fol 356-7, Harbord to Essex, 27 Apr 1675; Stowe Ms 215:fol 39, Essex to Danby, 16 Feb 1675.
\item 2. Stowe Ms 207:fol 416, Harbord to Essex, 18 May 1675; Stowe Ms 208:fol 67-8, Exceptions to Farmers' Account, 15 June 1675.
\item 3. Stowe Ms 215:fol 138-40, Essex to Coventry, 21 May 1675.
\item 4. Stowe Ms 208:fol 391, Temple to Essex, 16 Nov 1675; Stowe Ms 208:fol 219, Eustace to Essex, 14 Aug 1675.
\item 5. Stowe Ms 208:fol 203-5, Ranelagh to Essex, 4 Aug 1675.
\item 6. CSPD, 1677-78:p 520, Williamson's Notes, 21 Dec 1677.
\end{itemize}
was difficult to compel them to fulfill secret clauses, such as those for privy purse payments, which effectively handed them an additional lever in financial negotiations with the crown. The other group was headed by George Pitts and John Babor, and numbered in it Shaen and Petty. They proposed a management of the Irish revenue along the lines of Shaen's 1674 plan, taking no profit except their poundage at 3/- in every pound. It was a clever plan, but for a king in financial difficulties it lacked the same guarantees of payment which were part of any farm agreement, not to mention a large cash advance. September was passed trying to work out a compromise agreement between the treasury and the Babor/Pitt plan.¹ Any agreement was short-lived, though, for in an extraordinary scene Pitt and Babor accused Danby of taking bribes. They withdrew from the agreement and were replaced by Hill and Ryder, and the agreement to a general farm to run from 26 December 1675 to 25 December 1682 concluded with Shaen, Petty and Muschamp at its head.² £60,000 was to be advanced on a rent of £240,000 pa payable in equal monthly installments of £20,000.

Essex and Temple congratulated themselves on the bargain which they believed to be a good one, although they had merely gone along with it, for it was the king who had made it. Danby and Ranelagh were opposed to the new farm, probably because Shaen

¹. CTB 1672-75, pp 329-33 (11 Sept 1675) & p 333 (14/26 Sept 1675); Stowe Ms 215:fol 205, Essex to Boyle, 11 Sept 1675.
was not their man and also because Essex hastened to make him his friend.¹

Ranelagh concentrated on how Charles could best make use of his increased Irish revenue and the advance money.² The usual delays in procuring the advance money followed along with rumours that the farm would not continue.³ £20,000 was finally advanced in December 1675. Whilst these delays continued, however, the king reneged on his promise to Essex to pay the advance in Ireland and to reserve it to cover any of Ranelagh's debts, and a new clause was inserted, allowing the king to call on a further £20,000 advance, if ever he needed it, over and above the £60,000.⁴ There was no question now that the advance was to be put to English uses and Essex could do nothing to prevent it, for Ranelagh's advice on how to use Irish money was that most palatable to the king and it ensured the vice-treasurer's supremacy in Irish matters.⁵ By Christmas 1675 the new farm seemed set to begin its work, no one anticipating the difficulties which were to follow in 1676 and which are dealt with in the next chapter.

It is all but impossible to estimate the true value of the Irish economy in these years or to calculate with any precision the payments made by the treasury. Ranelagh never gave in a proper

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² AD Ms 28085:fol 75-77, Ranelagh's Proposals on New Farm, ? late 1675.
³ Stowe Ms 208:fol 391, Temple to Essex, 16 Nov 1675; Stowe Ms 208:Temple to Essex, 21 Dec 1675.
⁴ CTB 1672-75, p 333 (14/26 Sept 1675), p 348 (20 Nov 1675), p 354 (10 Dec 1675), pp 853-5 (28 Nov 1675); Stowe Ms 215: fol 210, Essex to Lords Justices, 26 Oct 1675; Stowe Ms 208: fol 422, King to Essex, 10 Dec 1675; Stowe Ms 215:fol 217, Essex to Temple, 23 Nov 1675.
⁵ Stowe Ms 215:fol 224, Essex to Coventry, 22 Dec 1675.
account and those of the farmers were incomplete. The farmers' accounts were entangled in the whole question of their claim for defalcations and Ranelagh's 'observations' severely impugned them as a reliable source.\(^1\) The situation over accounts was complicated further in the autumn of 1675 by a fierce dispute between the farmers and Ranelagh. The farmers detained £66,500 to pay off £41,000 of their advance and the rest to cover defalcations.\(^2\) The farmers refused to answer any of the commissioners' assignments, detaining all their rents in the hope of defalcations, and the government was only able to induce them to release £3,000 for a northern expedition with the greatest difficulty.\(^3\) In London, though, Ranelagh and the Forths struck a bargain whereby the first £30,000 of the new advance money would be paid to them in return for which they would release £30,000 in Dublin.\(^4\) Ranelagh ordered his partners to make up a final account, which they did not do, and to dismiss all their former employees, except their Dublin clerks, their solicitor Roger Jones, and those that they decided to place in the new commission for collecting arrears.\(^5\)

The Forths' major preoccupation in 1675 and in their accounts was to prove what great losers they had been by the Irish farm.

Even in the years affected by the war and taking into account the secret privy purse payments their real loss was only about £13,000.\(^6\)

1. See above and Stowe Ms 208:fol 67-8, Exceptions to Farmers' Accounts, 15 June 1675.
2. Stowe Ms 208:fol 301, Farmers' Commissioners to Lords Justices, 25 Sept 1675.
4. Stowe Ms 208:fol 434-460 passim; Stowe Ms 215:fol 218-20 passim; CTB 1672-75, pp 349-60 passim.
5. Carte Ms 70:fol 431, Ranelagh et al to Treasury Commissioners, 7 Dec 1675.
6. AD Ms 28085:fol 79, State of Farmers' Losses, Dec 1675; (43)
In 1674 they had to buy out their partners and pay Charles privy purse arrears, which no doubt ate into their profits, but if 1674 and 1675 were as good years as 1672 or 1676 they would still have gained about £10,000 pa clear profit. The Forths' gain was in being able to apply Irish money to their various English projects and this was the major reason for delays in payment to the treasury. By 1675 it was well known that the brothers faced bankruptcy, due to a disastrous adventure in English iron works, and they hoped to recoup their losses by burying them in the Irish farm, thereby saving their fortunes. Furthermore, their increased bid for the farm in 1675 is also suggestive that they gained more from the Irish farm than they pretended.

The Irish economy expanded healthily in 1670 and 1671 with receipts rising to over £260,000 pa. The Dutch war of 1672-74 showed how vulnerable Ireland was to the effects of foreign war and how dependent it had become on European markets. In July 1672 quit-rent arrears threatened the undertaking's survival. By the autumn of 1672 there was a desperate shortage of specie and the farmers' stop of payments for defalcations caused Ranelagh's payments to the army to go into arrear. 1672 and 1673 were critical years for the economy with net receipts for the customs falling from £90,549 in 1671 to £54,407 and £63,583 in 1672 and 1673.

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3. OSPP, 1667-71, Williamson's Notes, 21 Dec 1677; Stowe Ms 215:fol 64, Essex to Ranelagh, 17 Mar 1675.
4. AD Ms 28085:fol 91, Forths' Proposals, May 1674; Carte Ms 52:fol 523, Farmers' Accounts, 1668-73, Dec 1674.
5. CSPD, 1672:p 306, King to Barons of Exchequer, 2 July 1672.
respectively. In 1673 the excise total fell below the record 1672 level and may have dropped further in 1674 when there were bad harvests, although the farmers requested no defalcations, which suggests otherwise. The total revenue in 1672 (£240,000), which must mark the lowest point in these years, illustrates how buoyant the Irish economy was.

As we have seen, throughout 1673 Aungier produced accounts which suggested Ranelagh had made vast illegal profits and that he had misappropriated about £92,000 and owed the civil and martial lists about £117,000. Inspite of these claims, and Essex's complaints about the exactions of Ranelagh's officers, Ireland's economy survived in a remarkably healthy state. All in all, judging by Ranelagh's alleged payments, he overpaid some £70,000 and only failed to clear his debts because Charles obliged him to make some extraordinary payments and because of various defalcations for quitrents, defalcations to the farmers and the sums the farmers detained. His accounts, however, are notoriously untrustworthy and Essex and Ormond estimated him to owe the king around £100,000.

The amount Ranelagh actually made in payments, including compositions which we cannot accurately estimate, may be disputed, but clearly the charge exceeded the discharge. If we allow Ranelagh

3. Carte Ms 52:fol 500-01, Ranelagh's Payments to 29 Sept 1673, Dec 1673.
4. Carte Ms 52:fol 553, Payments to Years Value, July 1673; Carte Ms 52:fol 523, Farmers' Accounts, 1668-73, Dec 1674.
his claims to the farmers' defalcations, to quitrent defalcations, overpayments and money stopped by the Forths, totalling over £100,000 (i.e. allowing him his maximum claim), we arrive at some resolution of the problem. Charles avoided having this clear debt of £76,000 owed by Ranelagh (the other £24,000 making it up to £100,000 was lent by the king to Ranelagh) placed back on the crown by refusing to pardon the undertaking for it, for he was not so obliged, as the undertakers were tied by their covenants. He did, however, later pardon Ranelagh for the debt, thereby saddling the rest of the partnership with what was really Ireland's national debt caused by the Dutch war:¹

It is clear, judging by the payments Ranelagh made from 1673 to 1675, that the Irish economy recovered quickly from the war as huge sums were paid out, the establishment largely met and many debts repaid. However, of the £113,050 said to have been paid to the army for its twelve months arrears, perhaps only £50,000 to £60,000 was paid and the rest went into the undertakers' pockets in compositions.² The fact that the establishment was fully paid up to September 1675 (although we cannot be sure of the level of compositions) suggests that the treasury was well managed in these years, at least compared to former managements, and, furthermore, indicates that the war, though disruptive, did not have the profound consequences of the previous Dutch war: all of which bears testimony to the economy's resilience and well-being. There is no reason not to believe that the revenue receipts rose in 1674 and 1675 towards the 1671 and 1676 levels and by my estimates (tentative,

¹. AD Ms 18022:fol 51, Receipts & Payments, 1670-75, ? 1677.
². AD Ms 18022:fol 51, Receipts & Payments, 1670-75, ? 1677; see next chapter.
as they are, putative totals for 1674 and 1675 would be £250,000 and £270,000. The benefits to the crown, of course, would still only be £205,000 pa and in 1675 the farmers detained a large sum.

The economy in these years, therefore, survived well inspite of the effects of the Dutch war. All the evidence points to two principal conclusions. Firstly, that Ireland could clearly play a useful role in augmenting crown finances in England: this had been achieved, after all, despite adverse conditions in 1672-75. Secondly, that both a farm of the revenue and of the treasury severely complicated government finances and made predictions about the future of the economy uncertain. However, several revenue farmers, undertakers, courtiers and the crown had gained from this and, as we shall now see below, once again the Irish army was the only real loser.

The regularity with which the army was paid, it has been shown, was a good indication of the well-being and efficiency of the treasury and the economy. The payment of the army was a vital part of the undertaking, making up as it did the majority of the arrears and current payments. As long as troops were in England Ranelagh ensured that at least these were promptly and well paid. The troops in Ireland, in general, seem to have been well paid. Although Essex complained about the condition of his army, he was able to re-quarter his army at short notice, suggesting that the

1. Based on farmers' accounts in Carte Ms 52:fol 512-23, 1666-73 and AD Ms 18022:fol 52, 1676-82; Carte Ms 53:fol 601-2, 1676-82.
army had few debts to pay off in their old quarters. The northern expedition in 1674 was well paid, thanks possibly to Ranelagh's personal attendance on it. Profound difficulties over army pay first arose over the June 1675 quarter, caused by the farmers' stop in September 1675, but Champante cleared most of this quarter eventually. There were also difficulties over the Michaelmas 1675 quarter due to the farmers' stop. However, the December 1675 pay was denied to the army completely because Ranelagh said he had overpaid the lists and due to the farmers' stop. No doubt, Ranelagh hoped that delays in payments would induce the soldiers to compound for their current pay and that he, as full vice-treasurer after Christmas 1675, might capitalize on it.

The undertakers certainly profited on the twelve months arrears, after Charles allowed them until Christmas 1675, instead of Christmas 1673, to pay them off. There were long delays before these payments began, whilst Ranelagh's agents worked out the best way to profit from them. Essex feared that Ranelagh would offset defalcations against these arrears, but, in fact, the vice-treasurer hoped to make huge profits by illegally compounding for them. Most of these arrears were compounded for at 7/-.

1. CSPD, 1673: p 189, Essex to Arlington, 29 Apr 1673.
4. Stowe Ms 208: fol 440, Boyle to Essex, 23 Dec 1675; Stowe Ms 208: fol 446, Lords Justices to Essex, 25 Dec 1675; Stowe Ms 215: fol 219, Essex to Granard, 4 Dec 1675; Stowe Ms 215: fol 19, Essex to Lords Justices, 7 Dec 1675.
5. Stowe Ms 200: fol 381, Ranelagh to Essex, 23 Nov 1672; Stowe Ms 200: fol 389-90, King to Essex, 26 Nov 1672; CSPD, 1672-3: pp 584-5, Proclamation, 18 Feb 1673.
6. Stowe Ms 202: fol 122-3, Ranelagh to Essex, 14 June 1673; Stowe Ms 203: fol 177-8, Ranelagh to Essex, 11 Nov 1673.
7. CSPD, 1673: p 179, Essex to Arlington, 26 Apr 1673; Stowe Ms 213: fol 221, Essex to Ranelagh, 14 June 1673; Stowe Ms 214: fol 140, 25 Apr 1674. (43)
in the pound, but some lucky regiments, like the royal regiment, received 10/- in the pound.\(^1\) The undertakers used agents so as to cover their tracks, but in Dublin Bodurda and Stepney, both revenue commissioners, compounded directly with the regiment of guards.\(^2\) Rumours that the undertaking might collapse aided the undertakers in persuading the soldiery to compound and the officers, remembering the harsh treatment meted out to them in Berkeley's time, dared not complain.\(^3\) The treasury commissioners compounded for the soldiers' debentures, but discounted them in the treasury at their full value, not the compounded rate. By these means the partnership hoped to clear about £80,000, but their eventual profit on the twelve months arrear was about £60,000.\(^4\)

Essex's investigations into these shady dealings severely hampered the undertakers' illegal transactions and deeply angered Ranelagh.\(^5\) Knowledge of this corruption was so widespread as to be basis for attacks on Ranelagh in parliament in 1674.\(^6\) Eventually, Ranelagh was allowed until December 1676 to clear the twelve months arrears, allowing him more time to compound for them.\(^7\) The ten months arrears, despite Ranelagh's promise to clear them soon, were never paid and faded into oblivion.\(^8\)

2. Stowe Ms 214:fol 153-4, Essex to Harbord, 6 May 1674; Carte Ms 52:fol 604, Extract on Compositions, 23 Nov 1675.
4. See next chapter also.
5. Stowe Ms 214:fol 160, Essex to Capel, 9 May 1674; Stowe Ms 205:fol 88, Conway to Essex, 2 May 1674.
7. Stowe Ms 208:fol 415-16, King to Essex, 7 Dec 1675.
In absolute terms, the Irish army was abominably treated from 1672-75. Ranelagh demonstrated it could be used to the crown's benefit and rewarded it by swindling it out of arrears. However, as we have seen, in relation to its previous payment, the Irish army had fared better under Ranelagh. Undoubtedly, this bears witness to the economy's strength, for, excepting the Irish troops in England, the army was the last creditor that the undertaking wished to pay. But, it also tells us something of the undertakers' skill, for they used payments to troops by compositions to boost their own profits and to finance the crown's needs. The financial and economic framework underpinning the chief events in Irish political affairs from 1672-75 clearly emphasised Ireland's financial importance to the crown in these years. In the context of an improving economy Ranelagh had shown he could use the Irish army both to bolster royal policy and to finance his own and the crown's schemes. Whilst ensuring that he won his struggle with Essex for the direction of Irish affairs, Ranelagh never relaxed control of his undertaking, which was the source of his power. Rival financiers concentrated their efforts on gaining control of the revenue farm, but Ranelagh ensured that his grasp on the treasury was never weakened. Allied to Danby and in tune with Charles's thinking, his position was strengthened even though Essex attempted to ally with the farmers against him.

The years 1672 to 1675 established Ranelagh as the leading figure in Irish affairs. His influence and advice rapidly eclipsed that of the lord lieutenant's as he showed a remarkable ability to adapt to the king's changing needs. The principles of fair and straight government, which guided Essex's
behaviour, were out of place in a context within which the monarch felt compelled to resort to subterfuge and intrigue in pursuit of his nebulous aims. Ranelagh was better suited as a royal adviser in these circumstances and proved his usefulness to the crown in these years. His achievement should not be underestimated even if gained on the back of immense corruption. He supplied the king with vast privy purse payments at a time when the crown was facing bankruptcy. He supplied Charles with nearly two thousand Irish troops for the war's duration. Furthermore, his control of the treasury allowed Charles to make some grants to his supporters on the Irish establishment when he could not afford to do so in England. Finally, Ranelagh had kept the Irish establishments better paid than ever before. He was a ruthless, efficient and corrupt officer. By means of his undertaking he took responsibility for Ireland's national debt away from the crown, placing it on a group of individuals who, though managing to pay off much of that debt, then found themselves responsible for the new debts created by the war of 1672-74. With such a record of loyal and useful service, it is no wonder that Ranelagh was the foremost figure in Irish affairs by 1675.
Chapter VIII

RANELAGH'S VICE-TREASURERSHIP, 1676-82

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The timespan of this chapter covers the period from 26 December 1675, when Ranelagh took up full office as vice-treasurer, to his final suspension from that post in March 1682. His dominance in Irish affairs reached its height during these years, but a series of events seriously weakened this ascendancy from 1679 to 1682. Although his loss of the vice-treasurership marked his exit from Irish affairs it in no way represented a decline in royal favour, rather, as we shall see, in the circumstances surrounding the event, it was his final triumph over his enemies. The relationship between the crown, the Irish government and Irish treasury was never more complex than in these years. In order to elucidate this coherently this chapter will be divided into two sections. The first deals with the years 1676-79, when Ranelagh's power was at its zenith until the fall of Danby in 1679 and the accession of opposition lords to the government, leading to a decline in Ranelagh's influence. The second part of this chapter covers the uncertain years of 1679-82, when Charles had to survive the gravest crisis of his reign. Both Irish and English politics were in flux during these years until, at last, by 1682 Charles had regained the upper hand and could pursue his own policies. Against the background of two quite distinctive periods in restoration politics, Ranelagh, on the one hand, and the treasury, albeit with varying personnel in control, on the other, dominated Irish affairs. In this light both Essex's and Ormond's viceregalities will be reassessed and the dominance of Ranelagh and the English treasury evaluated.
In this first section we will trace the events leading up to Essex's replacement by Ormond as lord lieutenant in 1677 and the part that Ranelagh and Danby played in this. It will be seen that Essex no longer had control over Irish policy as this had passed to Ranelagh and Danby. Likewise, the first two years of Ormond's lord lieutenantship from 1677-79 will be shown to be dominated by Ranelagh, Danby and events in Whitehall.

We have seen in the previous chapter that Essex's and Ranelagh's views on Ireland's future role in the crown's overall strategy were diametrically opposed. From 1676 onwards, now that their views were declared to one another, Essex and Ranelagh drifted further apart leading ultimately, and almost inevitably, to open conflict. The viceroy doggedly challenged Ranelagh's efforts not only to control Irish revenue policy but, by his position at court, to make the lord lieutenantcy a subservient office to the vice-treasury. Their relations were further strained and complicated by Essex's attempts to wind up the undertaking and to take its accounts, by which means he intended to expose Ranelagh's corruption and to drive him from office. Thus Essex attempted to use the very undertaking which had brought Ranelagh to power to destroy him.

Any hopes of a reconciliation between Essex and Ranelagh were quickly dashed in January 1676 when the viceroy refused to discharge Ranelagh for the £80,000 due to the king, £6,000 for Colonel Lane's daughters and £4,000 for the customs of Derry on account of £90,000 worth of known defalcations and overpayments.
The lord lieutenant would not give a discharge until either Ranelagh's full accounts were presented or the king positively ordered it.\(^1\) This pleased neither Danby nor the king who desired Ranelagh to have a full release. The viceroy also alienated himself from the king by successfully opposing Danby's and Ranelagh's most audacious plans for using Irish money in England.\(^2\) He was anxious that all £60,000 of the farmers' advance should be used in Ireland as he believed the undertaking had left many debts.\(^3\) However, Danby was at last able to force him to accept his revised scheme for the advance money. The first £30,000 was paid to the Forths in London, £10,000 went to buy Irish arms and the remainder (£20,000) for the king's own use in England.\(^4\) Essex also reluctantly agreed to a permanent £20,000 pa privy purse payment to the king being placed on the Irish establishment.\(^5\) The new Irish establishment totalled £202,000, and the farm rent was £240,000 pa, and Danby, with royal approval, planned to divert all of this surplus into the English treasury.\(^6\) Indeed, Ranelagh estimated that with the farmers' additional advance of £20,000 expected in October 1676, and after paying for Irish ordnance, for Windsor and for buying back Portsmouth's pawned jewels, the king would still have £36,683 for his further use in England.\(^7\)
Even if Ranelagh's schemes were overly optimistic there was no way that Essex's views would have been preferred, and his advice was largely ignored, although he had gained £10,000 for Irish arms.¹ The first £60,000 was finally advanced in May 1676 and the farmers given their patent: the other £20,000 never materialised.² The £30,000 was paid to the Forths in two equal installments and £30,000 paid up by their collectors in Ireland by assignments.³

Ranelagh received two marks of royal favour in the teeth of Essex's opposition in early 1676. The first of these was the acceptance of Ranelagh's petition to continue collecting his arrears until 25 December 1677.⁴ The second was Charles's agreement to loan Ranelagh and his partners £24,000 on the understanding that Ranelagh had in fact overpaid £114,000 by his contract, and the £24,000 was to make up the difference between the £90,000 to be discharged and the total £114,000.⁵

The use to which this £24,000 loan was put was to be the source of an irreconcilable rift between the viceroy and the vice-treasurer. In theory this loan was to come out of the advance, but, in fact, it was taken out of the farmers' annual rent, and notionally, at least, from the £36,000 surplus. The £24,000 was

Ireland, 1676.

1. Stowe Ms 209:fol 205, Capel to Essex, 2 May 1676; Stowe Ms 209:fol 209, Orrery to Essex, 6 May 1676.
2. Stowe Ms 209:fol 218, Danby to Essex, 13 May 1676.
3. Stowe Ms 209:fol 8, Essex to Lords Justices, 28 Jan 1676; Stowe Ms 209:fol 53, Lords Justices to Essex, 8 Feb 1676; Stowe Ms 209:fol 82, Granard to Essex, 26 Feb 1676; Stowe Ms 209:fol 299, Ranelagh to Essex, 29 May 1676.
5. Stowe Ms 209:fol 162, King to Essex, 26 Mar 1676.
to be applied to the army's December 1675 pay and not current payments, and in consequence this seriously weakened the revenue's ability to meet current payments in 1676. Furthermore, the delay in the farmers receiving their patent delayed the £24,000 loan to Ranelagh.

The viceroy was so concerned about army pay in 1676 because during the undertaking responsibility for paying the army had rested solely with the contractors, but after the contract's termination it became Essex's task to issue the warrants, and Ranelagh was only the intermediary officer who put them into effect. The lord lieutenant, therefore, resumed ultimate responsibility for the punctuality and quality of army payments. This concern was reinforced by the realisation that the army was a vital tool of the crown and it was the viceroy's main duty to keep that army compliant and operational. However, the state of army payments he inherited from the undertaking was alarming. On his return to Ireland in May 1676, some of the June 1675 assignments were insolvent, much of the September 1675 quarter unpaid and there was no sign of December 1675 wages. Thus, Essex frantically pressed Ranelagh to clear these quarters' pay. Ranelagh was slow in swearing security for the £24,000 which angered the viceroy and delayed its payment. Once the Forths began to release

1. Stowe Ms 209:fol 162, King to Essex, 26 Mar 1676; Egerton Ms 2327:fol 53-9, Ranelagh to Danby, 18 Jan 1677.
2. Stowe Ms 209:fol 218, Danby to Essex, 13 May 1676.
3. Stowe Ms 216:fol 35-6, Essex to Danby, 13 May 1676; Stowe Ms 216:fol 39, Essex to Danby, 20 May 1676.
4. Stowe Ms 216:fol 46, Essex to Ranelagh, 27 May 1676.
5. Stowe Ms 209:fol 262, Ranelagh to Essex, 20 May 1676; Stowe Ms 209:fol 279, Jones to Essex, 23 May 1676; Stowe Ms 209:fol 287, Hayes to Essex, 27 May 1676; Stowe Ms 209:fol 289, Harbord to Essex, 27 May 1676; Stowe Ms 209:fol 295, Capel to Essex, 27 May 1676; Stowe Ms 216:fol 24, Essex to Coventry, 13 May 1676; Stowe Ms 209:fol 316, Ranelagh to Essex, 3 June 1676.
their £30,000 in assignments, the June and September 1675 quarters began to be cleared.¹ Ranelagh also had to borrow £10,000 in London so that £12,295 of funds, being held by the treasurer of the navy as security for an earlier loan to Ranelagh, could be released to help pay off these quarters.²

The effects of this delay on the army were alarming and prevented Essex from redeploying it.³ Effectively, it stopped the vice-roy from issuing the Lady Day 1676 quarter, as the soldiery would then compound for their other quarters for fear of losing all.⁴ The army was 8 – 9 months in arrear, receiving its twelve months arrears at only 1/3rd rate, and, in Essex's view, it was in its worst state since 1660 and the only bright spot was that it was not complaining.⁵

The vice-treasurer remained dilatory in his efforts to swear security for the £24,000 loan, inspite of Essex's complaints, and the reason for this tardiness soon became apparent.⁶ Renewed unrest in Scotland necessitated a fresh northern expedition, which the lord lieutenant proposed could be paid for out of the £20,000 still to be advanced by the farmers.⁷ Charles, however, agreed to Ranelagh's scheme for payment by which he claimed he could pay

1. Stowe Ms 209:fol 295, Capel to Essex, 27 May 1676; Stowe Ms 209: fol 314, Danby to Essex, 3 June 1676; Stowe Ms 209:fol 316, Ranelagh to Essex, 3 June 1676; Stowe Ms 216:fol 35-6, Essex to Danby, 13 May 1676.
2. Stowe Ms 209:fol 316, Ranelagh to Essex, 3 June 1676; Stowe Ms 209:fol 375, Ranelagh to Essex, 27 June 1676.
4. Stowe Ms 216:fol 47, Essex to Capel, 30 May 1676.
5. Stowe Ms 216:fol 52-4, Essex to Coventry, 4 June 1676; Stowe Ms 216:fol 66-7, Essex to Coventry, 18 June 1676.
6. Stowe Ms 209:fol 299, Ranelagh to Essex, 29 May 1676; Stowe Ms 209:fol 303, Thynne to Essex, 30 May 1676.
7. Stowe Ms 216:fol 65, Essex to King, 17 June 1676.
both the December 1675 quarter and for the northern expedition by mid-August, and still keep the £20,000 for the king's use in England.¹ This he achieved by instructing Champante, the deputy vice-treasurer, only to pay the Christmas quarter to those troops chosen for the expedition out of the £24,000. This was a usurpation of Essex's office as only the chief governor should choose which units should be paid and was in contravention of the terms of the £24,000 loan.² Furthermore, this method of payment, had not Essex intervened, would have provoked mutinies in Derry and Galway, where only those chosen for the expedition would have been paid and the garrison left with nothing.³ Essex's bitter complaint about this usurpation of his office met with a limp reception: the king supported the method of payment Ranelagh had chosen and merely expressed the belief that Ranelagh could sort it out; nor did he order Champante to be reprimanded.⁴

The lord lieutenant was unimpressed by Ranelagh's disingenuous denials over this matter. In fact, the whole incident marked a turning point in their relations. Charles had sided with Ranelagh, confirming his ascendancy. Essex as a result never again communicated with his subordinate, making reconciliation impossible and conflict inevitable. He despaired "to find the spirit

1. Stowe Ms 210:fol 85-6, Coventry to Essex, 25 July 1676.
2. Stowe Ms 216:fol 87-8, Essex to Coventry, 15 July 1676; Stowe Ms 216:fol 89, Essex to Danby, 15 July 1676; Stowe Ms 216:fol 90-1, Essex to Ranelagh, 15 July 1676.
3. Stowe Ms 216:fol 123, Essex to Coventry, 1 Aug 1676; Stowe Ms 216:fol 125-6, Essex to Coventry, 3 Aug 1676; Stowe Ms 216:fol 127-30, Narrative of Army Payments, 3 Aug 1676; Stowe Ms 216:fol 131-2, Army's Christmas 1675 Pay, 3 Aug 1676.
4. Stowe Ms 210:fol 69, Coventry to Essex, 22 July 1676; Stowe Ms 210:fol 85-6, Coventry to Essex, 25 July 1676; Stowe Ms 210:fol 131, Coventry to Essex, 8 Aug 1676.
of the government so extinguished in those that sit at the helm."¹ Nonetheless, he believed it was his duty to represent the truth to the king.² Moreover, he recognised that, although Ranelagh had only attained the relatively low office of vice-treasurer, his influence with the king was second only to Danby's, and that he had an access to the king denied to the viceroy, Coventry and other leading ministers.³

At his leisure Ranelagh made a full reply to Essex's complaints, particularly his allusions to alleged compositions which the vice-treasurer totally denied.⁴ The viceroy replied in full, suggesting to the king that Ranelagh should throw himself on the monarch's mercy.⁵ However, the lord lieutenant's credit with the king must have been fast running out due to his attacks on Ranelagh.⁶

By now though, Essex felt obliged to issue the Lady Day warrants even if the 1675 quarters were not all paid.⁷ A small mutiny in Drogheda and worries about economic stagnation, due to the collectors holding large sums of money, forced Essex to take this course.⁸ His chief concern was that if Ranelagh and Champante kept the army constantly 6 - 9 months in arrears, that they would

2. Stowe Ms 216:fol 116, Essex to Capel, 29 July 1676.
3. Stowe Ms 216:fol 118-20, Essex to Capel, 1 Aug 1676.
4. Stowe Ms 210:fol 182, Thynne to Essex, 19 Aug 1676; Stowe Ms 210:fol 190, Thynne to Essex, 23 Aug 1676; Stowe Ms 210:fol 192-3, Ranelagh to King, 22 Aug 1676; Stowe Ms 210:fol 197-8, Coventry to Essex, 26 Aug 1676.
5. Stowe Ms 216:fol 174, Essex to King, 8 Sept 1676; Stowe Ms 216:fol 175-3, Essex's Defence, 9 Sept 1676.
7. Stowe Ms 216:fol 92, Essex to Capel, 15 July 1676.
8. Stowe Ms 216:fol 147, Essex to Coventry, 15 Aug 1676; Stowe Ms 216:fol 106, Essex to Capel, 15 July 1676.
compound for current arrears and make about £12,000 pa.¹ Essex was able to pay the Lady Day quarter in mid-August 1676 because the farmers advanced £16,000 rent in return for Essex petitioning for the remittal of the outstanding £20,000 advance.² This upset Ranelagh's schemes for this advance money. More importantly, though, Essex's close relations with the farmers was another source of conflict between viceroy and vice-treasurer. Essex had supported the Shaen farm, in the face of Ranelagh's opposition and was always extremely protective towards it, fearing that if it collapsed the management would fall into Ranelagh's corrupt hands.²

In his determination to represent the truth to Charles and to uncover Ranelagh's corruption, Essex realised he would need to make detailed investigation into army pay.⁴ The king had already ordered an investigation into the whole question of compositions and Essex saw this as his chance to impugn the vice-treasurer.⁵ Simultaneously, Essex pursued the matter of how the £24,000 loan had been used, claiming it had not all been assigned and causing Ranelagh to promise to send over funds to cover insolvent assignments.⁶ Essex was convinced that the vice-treasurer was involved in a plot not only to make huge illegal

2. Stowe Ms 216:fol 104-5, Essex to Coventry, 25 July 1676; Stowe Ms 216:fol 106, Essex to Capel, 25 July 1676; Stowe Ms 216:fol 117, Essex to Coventry, 29 July 1676; Stowe Ms 216:fol 121-2, Farmers' Payments, 1 Aug 1676; Stowe Ms 216:fol 123, Essex to Coventry, 1 Aug 1676; Stowe Ms 216:fol 133-4, Essex to Coventry, 5 Aug 1676.
5. Stowe Ms 210:fol 197-8, Coventry to Essex, 26 Apr 1676.
6. Stowe Ms 210:fol 221, Thynne to Essex, 9 Sept 1676; Stowe Ms 216:fol 159-60, Essex to Coventry, 29 Aug 1676.
profits but to undermine the army's confidence in the lord lieutenant and make it totally dependent on the vice-treasurer.¹
Once Essex began his investigations in earnest he found a ready ally in Ormond.² His brother, Sir Henry Capel, and Coventry were trusted with putting his case at court, furnished with evidence from Dublin.³

These investigations into the December 1675 pay and the payment of the twelve months arrears were held simultaneously. They took place in September 1676 whilst the king was at Newmarket and it was planned to use these against Ranelagh on his return.⁴ Arrears to the civil list were uncovered at the same time.⁵ By October, Arlington, had been won over and believed that Ranelagh was totally impugned.⁶ There were delays, however, in collecting evidence about compositions as Ranelagh's agents covered their tracks well, so in order to make up for this, the viceroy made preliminary estimates of the arrears on Ranelagh's undertaking, computing these at about £100,000.⁷

Ranelagh took great exception to these investigations, ensuring that those who refused to co-operate were rewarded by preferential payments.⁸ Through Conway, he was kept posted on the progress.

1. Stowe Ms 216:fol 159-60, Essex to Coventry, 29 Aug 1676.
2. Stowe Ms 210:fol 201, Longford to Essex, 26 Aug 1676.
4. Stowe Ms 210:fol 249, Coventry to Essex, 26 Sept 1676; Stowe Ms 216:fol 208-9, Essex to Coventry, 19 Sept 1676.
5. Stowe Ms 216:fol 196-8, Essex to Capel, 8 Sept 1676; Stowe Ms 216:fol 199, Essex to Coventry, 12 Sept 1676; Stowe Ms 216:fol 200-04, Essex to Coventry, 12 Sept 1676; CSPD, 1676-77: pp 332-3, Rawdon to Conway, 20 Sept 1676.
6. Stowe Ms 216:fol 213, Essex to Thynne, 23 Sept 1676; Stowe Ms 210:fol 278, Thynne to Essex, 7 Oct 1676.
7. Stowe Ms 216:fol 222-4, Sums gained by Ranelagh, Oct 1676; Stowe Ms 216:fol 224-5, Sums to be answered by Dec 1675, Oct 1676; Stowe Ms 216:fol 221, Essex to Capel, 7 Oct 1676; Stowe Ms 216:fol 227-8, Payment of Army Arrears, Oct 1676.
of these investigations and advised officers on how to respond. In the investigation on December pay Essex received replies from 37 companies, 27 of which had been given insolvent or unacceptable assignments. Not even all the northern expedition had, in fact, received their December 1675 pay.

As to compositions on the twelve months arrears, the undertakers had used agents to cover their tracks. Of the £77,000 alleged to have been paid, most had been compounded for at 7/- in the pound. The compositions were made by the commissioners clerks or Ranelagh's collectors, the full amount entered in the treasury and the soldiers given assignments. These were often insolvent and, for example, Granard's troop received eight insolvent assignments in succession and were unpaid ten of their twelve months arrears. Those who compounded with the least fuss and Ranelagh's friends were given preference in payment and others obtained nothing. Doubtless, the agents made handsome profits before anything reached their master's hands, but in Dublin the commissioners themselves compounded with the regiment of guards. The regiment of guards received varying amounts ranging from 5/- to 15/- in the pound. It was also revealed that before going to England in 1672, Lord Tyrone's regiment had compounded for its arrears at 7/- in the pound. This report on the

3. Coventry Ms 24:fol 173, Payments to Northern Expedition, 9 Sept 1676.
4. Stowe Ms 210:fol 219, Orrery to Essex, 5 Sept 1676; Stowe Ms 216:fol 221, Essex to Capel, 7 Oct 1676. See Stowe Ms 216:fol 221, Essex to Capel, 7 Oct 1676; Stowe Ms 216:fol 224-5, Sums to be answered by Dec 1675, Oct 1676; Stowe Ms 216:fol 227-8, Payment of Army Arrears, Oct 1676; Stowe Ms 216:fol 274-5, Compositions on 12 Months Arrears, 8 Nov 1676. (63)
compositions and other papers was a very impressive indictment.¹

The full report on compositions was not completed until November 1676 when Arran brought it to court.² This "thundering representation" was designed to be the culmination of the past two months' work.³ Before it reached London, however, proceedings against Ranelagh, despite of Coventry's, Ormond's and Arlington's efforts, were grinding to a halt.⁴ This reflected the king's probable attitude, but was also because the council preferred to stay judgement until Ranelagh's accounts, which were expected soon, could be presented.⁵ Furthermore, everyone was more concerned with anticipating problems in the forthcoming parliamentary session.⁶ Finally, in November Ranelagh fell dangerously ill, causing Charles to stop all attacks on the vice-treasurer until he was well enough to defend himself.⁷ As the issue hung fire, much of the impact of the evidence was inevitably lost. Charles reiterated his resolution not to hear complaints against the vice-treasurer until he was recovered.⁸ On the positive side, though, it would allow Essex time to estimate the deficit on Ranelagh's accounts and add this to his complaints.²

1. Stowe Ms 216:fol 243; Essex to Coventry, 4 Nov 1676; Stowe Ms 216:fol 259-60; 12 Months Arrears, 3 May 1673; Stowe Ms 216:fol 264; Payments to 12 Months Arrears, Oct 1676; Stowe Ms 216:fol 274-5; Compositions on 12 Months Arrears, 8 Nov 1676.
2. Stowe Ms 216:fol 243; Essex to Coventry, 4 Nov 1676.
3. CSPD, 1676-7: p 433; Ranelagh to Conway, 25 Nov 1676.
4. Stowe Ms 210:fol 313; Thynne to Essex, 4 Nov 1676.
5. Stowe Ms 210:fol 315; Coventry to Essex, 7 Nov 1676.
6. Stowe Ms 210:fol 315; Coventry to Essex, 7 Nov 1676.
7. Stowe Ms 210:fol 349; Coventry to Essex, 26 Nov 1676; CSPD, 1676-7: pp 401-2; Ranelagh to Conway, 4 Nov 1676; CSPD, 1676-77: p 426; Ranelagh to Conway, 14 Nov 1676; CSPD, 1676-77: p 433; Ranelagh to Conway, 25 Nov 1676.
8. Stowe Ms 216:fol 360; Thynne to Essex, 2 Dec 1676; Stowe Ms 210:fol 364; Thynne to Essex, 9 Dec 1676.
9. Stowe Ms 210:fol 360; Thynne to Essex, 2 Dec 1676.
Working from his sick bed, Ranelagh sent Bodurda to Dublin to try to contradict the Irish privy council's sworn testimony and to prepare a report which Ranelagh could use in the bedchamber to win Charles over. ¹ The viceroy now knew for certain that there was a private agreement between the king and Ranelagh that the crown would discharge the vice-treasurer for any failings on account of the undertaking. ² Thus, all Essex could achieve by his investigations would have been to expose Ranelagh's villainy and to force him into retirement as he would be spared prosecution. By these means, if the English privy council could be won over, he might have weakened Danby's control of the king. Such a course was impossible, though, for Danby was more vital than ever in English politics and Ranelagh too crucial to the crown's Irish financial schemes. So long as Ranelagh remained ill the storms against him abated, and he only gained as the momentum of the Irish government's case subsided. ³ From his sick bed he supplied Danby with counter-arguments. ⁴ In February 1677, for example, he plausibly countered the claim by Essex and Orrery that the Kinsale mutiny was caused by a delay in the December 1675 quarter, by pointing out that they were more likely to be complaining about their seven months of current arrears for which the lord lieutenant must bear responsibility. ⁵

¹ Stowe Ms 216;fol 297, Essex to Capel, 11 Dec 1676.
² Stowe Ms 216;fol 302, Essex to Coventry, 16 Dec 1676.
³ Stowe Ms 211;fol 5, Thynne to Essex, 6 Jan 1677; Stowe Ms 217; Fol 7, Essex to Arran, 11 Jan 1677; Carte Ms 242;fol 294, Cuffe to Ormond, 20 Jan 1677.
⁴ Stowe Ms 211;fol 110, Orrery to Essex, 13 Feb 1677.
⁵ Egerton Ms 327;fol 62, Ranelagh to Danby, 16 Feb 1677.

(65)
The viceroy's continued complaints about the army's poverty and the injustice of Ranelagh still collecting arrears yet paying nothing out proved counter-productive. Ranelagh's reply was to begin compounding for the December quarter at 10/- in the pound. As far as current pay was concerned, the army remained 6 - 9 months in arrear, caused chiefly by the £24,000 lent to Ranelagh out of the current rent. The September 1676 pay, for example, could not begin to be issued until February 1677. Essex was well aware of what Ranelagh might gain financially from this situation. In his commissioners for collecting arrears from the undertaking he had reliable agents, through whom he could compound for both the twelve months arrears and current arrears. So long as this network of agents continued, he could hope to make up to £12,000 pa from compounding for current arrears - "The Lord Ranelagh, now vice-treasurer, is well furnished with instruments for such broking bargains as any man ever was ..." In June 1677 the army remained six months in arrear with no hope of any improvement in the speed of payment.

In the face of such corruption, especially in compositions and insolvent assignments, Essex felt unable to pass the undertaking's

1. Stowe Ms 217: fol 30, Essex to Danby, 3 Feb 1677; Stowe Ms 217: fol 37, Essex to Wyche, 6 Feb 1677.
accounts. These were a persistent problem. There were complex issues involved, such as Ranelagh's claims to interest on overpayments if debtors demanded it for his tardy payments.

On this and other matters Essex reserved judgement until he received the full accounts. Essex had been awaiting these since August 1676 when he estimated they would reveal a debt of £80,000. He had even attempted, through Orrery, Bodurda and Roger Jones, to compromise with Ranelagh on these. He had offered Ranelagh total immunity if he came over to sort them out, but Ranelagh was not interested in the deal. The viceroy petitioned for Ranelagh to be prosecuted in England and Ireland for his debts, for a prosecution in Dublin would be ineffectual as Ranelagh had so much sway at court and the undertakers had insubstantial Irish assets. The vice-treasurer withstood this pressure for as long as possible, promising that he would produce accounts soon. The viceroy's response to these delays was to produce estimates of arrears of £100,000 which caused John Bence, the only undertaker of any substance in Ireland, to flee the country. To forestall any further embarrassing estimates

Ranelagh petitioned to take his accounts until September 1676.
This petition, the English government's preoccupation with the parliament and Ranelagh's illness all reduced the pressure on the vice-treasurer.¹

The viceroy was confident that the accounts would reveal a £100,000 debt, but was anxious that he would be absent from court and therefore unable to explain them to the council, as only he understood them as well as Ranelagh.² Delays on these accounts took the momentum out of Essex's complaints and by December 1676 he had made all the guesses he could and now he awaited the full accounts which he knew would probably lead to Ranelagh's discharge.³ Wyche, the viceroy's secretary, circulated evidence amongst the council pending Ranelagh's recovery.⁴ Danby, however, steadfastly stood by his henchman alleging the accounts would show that the king was indebted to Ranelagh.⁵ Arlington and Capel began to fear that the issue of the accounts would lead to Essex's downfall and they asked him to find a new fund to pay off Ranelagh's debt: but the viceroy countered that there was no fund and if Ranelagh had not been corrupt and incompetent there would be no debt owing to the king.⁶

In 1677 Ranelagh began to counter-attack, requesting to have his accounts taken in Dublin with all objections in writing and then

1. Stowe Ms 210: fol 315, Coventry to Essex, 7 Nov 1676; Stowe Ms 210: fol 313, Thynne to Essex, 4 Nov 1676.
2. Stowe Ms 216: fol 271-2, Essex to Coventry, 11 Nov 1676; Stowe Ms 216: fol 274-5, Compositions on 12 Months Arrears, 8 Nov 1676; Stowe Ms 216: fol 295, Essex to Capel, 18 Nov 1676.
3. Stowe Ms 216: fol 295-6, Essex to Thynne, 16 Dec 1676; Stowe Ms 216: fol 302, Essex to Coventry, 16 Dec 1676; Stowe Ms 216: fol 310, Essex to Capel, 23 Dec 1676; Stowe Ms 210: fol 360, Thynne to Essex, 2 Dec 1676; Stowe Ms 210: fol 400, Thynne to Essex, 16 Dec 1676.
4. Stowe Ms 211: fol 15, Coventry to Essex, 9 Jan 1677.
5. Stowe Ms 211: fol 37, Coventry to Essex, 20 Jan 1677.
6. Stowe Ms 210: fol 402-3, Capel to Essex, 16 Dec 1676; Stowe Ms 217: fol 9, Essex to Capel, 13 Jan 1677.
transmitted to Danby, but there was no avoiding that the vice-
roy would have to approve them first. 1 Essex's objections to
this petition arrived too late to prevent it being granted. 2
Furthermore, Ranelagh reminded Danby that Essex, in contravention
of royal orders, had not been communicating revenue matters to
the lord treasurer, but to the secretary of state, and he asked
Danby to assert his jurisdiction in this matter and protect him
from Essex's attacks. 3 In Dublin, Bodurda tried the old trick of
persuading the viceroy to take six monthly accounts to no avail. 4
The full accounts were promised for 28 February 1677 and Essex
was concerned about how he would pass them, if he did not know
which arrears were outstanding or what judgement to make about
arrears for which illegal compositions had been made. 5 However,
Essex should have noted the significance of the mark of royal
favour bestowed on Ranelagh at this time: the decision to pay the
old debt of £6,076 to the ordnance in England out of the surplus
for the year ending 1676. 6 Moreover, the king displayed his own
sympathies to Wyche by ignoring Essex's claim that Ranelagh
was attempting to subvert the army and cause it to mutiny and
suggesting that the viceroy take the accounts six monthly, which he
refused to do. 7

1. Stowe Ms 211: fol 95, Wyche to Essex, 6 Feb 1677; Stowe Ms 211:
   fol 87, Ranelagh to King, 4 Feb 1677; Ormonde MS IV, p 14,
   Arran to Ormond, 4 Sept 1676; Stowe Ms 211: fol 124, King to
   Essex, 16 Feb 1677; CSPD, 1676-77: p 557, Ranelagh to Williamson,
   15 Feb 1677.
2. Stowe Ms 211: fol 48-9, Essex to Wyche, 12 Feb 1677; Stowe Ms
   211: fol 139, Wyche to Essex, 20 Feb 1677.
3. Egerton Ms 3327: fol 64-5, Ranelagh to Danby, 25 Feb 1677.
5. Stowe Ms 217: fol 51-2, Essex to Coventry, 15 Feb 1677.
6. Egerton Ms 3327: fol 53, Ranelagh to Danby, 18 Jan 1677; CSPD,
   1676-77: p 507, Ranelagh to Bertie, 13 Jan 1677; Stowe Ms 217:
   fol 46, Essex to Wyche, 10 Feb 1677; Stowe Ms 211: fol 99,
   Wyche to Essex, 18 Feb 1677; Stowe Ms 211: fol 156, Wyche to
   Essex, 27 Feb 1677.
7. Stowe Ms 211: fol 133, Wyche to Essex, 17 Feb 1677; Stowe Ms
   212: fol 67, Essex to Capel, 24 Feb 1677; Stowe Ms 217: fol 74,
   Essex to Wyche, 24 Feb 1677.
To drive his point home Essex prepared a powerful 'narrative' of the history of Ranelagh's accounts with three unanswerable questions appended, for Coventry to deliver at council.¹

The ground had been prepared at council by Ormond and Coventry, pressing Ranelagh about insolvent assignments, alleged compositions and the December pay, now that he was recovered.² The 'narrative' was ruined by two clever devices. The packet boat, run by Deane, one of the undertakers, stole away from Dublin giving Ranelagh early notice of the 'narrative' s contents and, when it was read at council, Lauderdale engaged the king in conversation and after a feeble resistance by Ormond, the council discussed its main concern, parliament.³

At this juncture Essex washed his hands of the matter, saying he would pass the insufficient accounts he had received if so requested.⁴ He ordered Capel and Coventry to desist in their complaints as he now believed to continue was pointless and could lead to his dismissal.⁵ At court, however, Essex's attack was swept along by its own momentum - Coventry intended to present the 'narrative' to Charles again and he urged Essex to resist Ranelagh's petition to continue collecting arrears after Christmas 1677.⁶ Even so, Essex's pressure over the accounts had

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¹ Stowe Ms 217: fol 92-5, Essex to Villianson, 3 Mar 1677; Stowe Ms 217: fol 96, Essex to Wyche, 6 Mar 1677; Stowe Ms 217: fol 104, Questions for Ranelagh, 6 Mar 1677.
² Stowe Ms 211: fol 172, Wyche to Essex, 6 Mar 1677.
⁴ Stowe Ms 217: fol 124, Essex to Wyche, 27 Mar 1677; Stowe Ms 217: fol 125-6, Essex to Dunby, 31 Mar 1677; Stowe Ms 217: fol 129-30, Essex to Capel, 3 Apr 1677.
⁵ Stowe Ms 217: fol 120-1, Essex to Capel, 24 Mar 1677.
⁶ Stowe Ms 211: fol 224-5, Capel to Essex, 24 Mar 1677; Stowe Ms 211: fol 228-9, Wyche to Essex, 24 Mar 1677.
already gone too far. Questions over compositions and the corrupt dealings of the undertaking came too close to the king and several courtiers, for if the truth were revealed it would soon be seen how Charles and others had profited from Ireland. Perhaps Charles might have resisted this pressure, but he was certainly unwilling to expose the vice-treasurer's full accounts since Christmas 1675 which Essex desired. The commission to take the vice-treasurer's accounts was issued in March 1677 and the viceroy would doubtless insist on every item being recorded.¹ With the king facing a difficult parliament in England this would have been particularly explosive and a gift for the opposition, for Portsmouth's jewels were being bought out of pawn with the king's privy purse money and Ranelagh was busy securing the advance on the excise farm of the northern counties of England for the same purpose.² Both the king and Ranelagh agreed that "it will be no ways convenient I should produce the particulars of that payment before the commissioners of my accounts in Ireland", as over £3,000 had been spent redeeming the jewels.³ Moreover, Essex was trying to persuade the farmers to pay the privy purse money directly to the king which was a usurpation of Ranelagh's and Danby's powers, which enraged both men.⁴ The viceroy's refusal to work with Danby and Ranelagh inevitably led to his downfall. He had continued to hold out the hope that

2. Egerton Ms 3327: fol 48-9, Ranelagh to Danby, 19 Dec 1676; Egerton Ms 3327: fol 51, Ranelagh to Danby, 13 Jan 1677.
3. AD Ms 28083: fol 102, Ranelagh to Danby, 15 Apr 1677; AD Ms 28085: fol 148, Account of Privy Purse Money, 1676; Rawlinson Ms A238: fol 34, Account of Privy Purse Money, 1676.
4. AD Ms 28052: fol 102, Ranelagh to Danby, 15 Apr 1677.
the £20,000 pa privy purse money would only be a short-term measure, desiring to use the money in Ireland. Such a view was in direct conflict with Danby's and Ranelagh's schemes and royal inclinations. Coupled with his attitude towards the accounts it ensured his dismissal. When Granard left for court in March 1677 Essex had to ask his brother to spy on him. Furthermore, his opposition to Ranelagh's petition to continue collecting his arrears was bound to be ill-received at court and important privy councillors, such as Boyle, privately dissented from him on this matter.

It seems clear that Charles resolved that Essex must be dismissed and only then turned to the matter of his successor. A more compliant viceroy, able to work with Danby and Ranelagh was required. Conway was Danby's choice, intending to make him deputy in Dublin with Monmouth as lord lieutenant. The king was reluctant, as Conway was too much Danby's pawn and to promote his bastard would be an affront to York. Ormond and York rushed off to Newmarket, procuring Ormond's appointment there thanks to York's influence. Ormond succeeded for several reasons. Most importantly, he had learned that Danby and Ranelagh were to be worked with and not against. When Ranelagh

3. CSPD, 1677-8, p 53, Ranelagh to Williamson, 24 Mar 1677; Stowe Ms 217: fol 139, Essex to Wyche, 21 Apr 1677; Stowe Ms 217: fol 151, Essex to Wyche, 5 May 1677; Stowe Ms 217: fol 152-7, Report on Ranelagh's petition, 26 Apr 1677; Stowe Ms 211: fol 224-5, Capel to Essex, 24 Mar 1677; Ormonde MS IV, p 26, Boyle to Ormond, 5 May 1677; Carte Ms 243: fol 300, Cuffe to Ormond, 21 Apr 1677.
4. Stowe Ms 211: fol 136, Wyche to Essex, 10 Mar 1677; Stowe Ms 217: fol 157, Essex to Capel, 17 Apr 1677; Stowe Ms 211: fol 274, Wyche to Essex, 14 Apr 1676; Stowe Ms 211: fol 278, Harbord to Essex, 14 Apr 1677.
5. Stowe Ms 211: fol 295-7, Capel to Essex, 16 Apr 1677.
6. Harleian Ms 7056:no folios, Ormond's Notes; Stowe Ms 211: fol 299, Thynne to Essex, 17 Apr 1677; Stowe Ms 211: fol 302, Wyche to Essex, 17 Apr 1677; Stowe Ms 211: fol 316-21, Capel to
had disparaged the duke's lord lieutenancy in 1675 Charles had
pressed him very hard not to debate the matter further at council.
Ormond ignored the king's pleas and the duke failed to obtain
the inquiry he required in May 1676, the king pardoned all
sides and politically isolated Ormond. As the lessons of this
isolation came home in 1676/77 Ormond became less enthusiastic in his
attacks on Ranelagh. This was because he achieved a political
accommodation with Danby, whereby he guaranteed the support of
some MPs for the crown's policies in parliament. In return
for this Ormond clearly hoped to regain the lord lieutenancy and
ultimately, it could be argued, that the fact that he supplied
Charles with more supporters than Conway in the 1677
parliament, swung the succession in his favour.

One vital pre-condition of his promotion had been that he must
reconcile with Ranelagh and allow Danby and Ranelagh to run the
treasury as they pleased. With this he complied, although
Ranelagh was disappointed because Conway had explicitly espoused
the view that the Irish treasury was totally subordinate to the
lord treasurer. Ranelagh, inspite of the guaranteed reconciliation, was unhappy, for he felt the Ormond family was over-
mighty and over-wealthy and "How good a manager of private and
public money he hath been is notorious and so is his fitness to be

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500 ff; PRO PC2/63: for 125 (13 Feb 1676) & fol 211-26 (12 May
1676); Stowe Ms 209: fol 236, Orrery to Essex, 13 May 1676;
Stowe Ms 203: fol 216, Coventry to Essex, 13 May 1676; CSPD,
1676-7: p 1, Notes by Williamson, 1 Mar 1676.

2. Browning, Life of Danby, (Glasgow, 1951) pp 199 & 204-5;
Stowe Ms 209: fol 297; Thynne to Essex, 27 May 1676; Stowe Ms
211: fol 77-8, Capel to Essex, 3 Feb 1677.

3. CSPD, 1676-7: p 459, Danby to Conway, 20 Dec 1676; CSPD, 1676-7:
p 439, Danby to Conway, 1 Jan 1677; Egerton Ms 3332: fol 73,
Conway to Danby, 20 Feb 1677.

4. Ormonde MS IV, p 23, Boyle to Ormond, 23 Apr 1677; Carte Ms 50:
fol 247; Ormond to ?, 27 Apr 1677; Egerton Ms 3327: fol 53,
Ranelagh to Danby, 18 Jan 1677.

5. Ormonde MS IV, p 23, Boyle to Ormond, 28 Apr 1677; Stowe Ms
a general since he ran away with an army of 16,000 men ... etc.

For his part Essex seemed relieved to lose the office and happy that Ormond, and not Conway, had succeeded him. His last months in office until August 1677 were marred by the Brabazon scandal, but Ranelagh did not play a part in this as Airy has suggested. Rather fatuously Danby offered Essex an alliance on his return to England, but, after his experiences as viceroy, he soon became a committed opposition lord and Ranelagh's chief persecutor.

Ormond's compliancy in Irish treasury matters and the domination of these affairs by Ranelagh and Danby were illustrated in the months preceding the new lord lieutenant's departure to Dublin in August 1677. Ormond very quickly showed how compliant he would be and that he would pass all Irish accounts without asking any embarrassing questions. In 1676 the revenue farmers had forfeited £8,000 of interest on the advance to Charles for slow payment of their rent in April 1677, inspite of Essex's protests. In an attempt to make this increase permanent the privy purse allowance was raised in August 1677, with Ormond's agreement, to £27,000 pa. This increase never went directly to Charles, but to courtiers for pensions.

1. AD Ms 28085: fol 158, Ranelagh to Danby, Apr 1677; Stowe Ms 211: fol 304, Wyche to Essex, 20 Apr 1677; Stowe Ms 211: fol 316-21, Capel to Essex, 21 Apr 1677; Stowe Ms 211: fol 322, Talbot to Essex, 21 Apr 1677.
2. Stowe Ms 217: fol 140, Essex to King, 23 Apr 1677; Stowe Ms 217: fol 142, Essex to Capel, 28 Apr 1677; Stowe Ms 217: fol 141, Essex to Ormond, 28 Apr 1677; CSPD, 1677-78: p 111, Rawdon to Conway, 5 May 1677; CSPD, 1677-78: p 202, Rawdon to Conway, 19 June 1677.
3. In DLHist, vol iii, p 923; Stowe Ms 217: fol 169-80 passim; & Stowe Ms 212: fol 185-207 passim.
4. Stowe Ms 212: fol 156-7, Capel to Essex, 2 June 1677; Stowe Ms 217: fol 179-90, 19 May 1677.
5. Ormonde & IV, p 23, Boyle to Ormond, 28 Apr 1677; Carte Ms 23: fol 247, Ormond to ?, 27 Apr 1677.
6. Stowe Ms 211: fol 282, King to Essex, 16 Apr 1677.
7. Rawlinson Ms A236: fol 129, Ormond to Boyle et al, 27 Aug 1677; AD Ms 28085: fol 154-5, Ranelagh to Danby, 18 Feb 1678; Stowe Ms 212: fol 336, Wyche to Essex, 29 Aug 1677.
Before leaving for Ireland in August 1677 the new viceroy had several discussions and meetings with Ranelagh and Danby, in all of which he was overruled and dictated to by the pair of allies.1 Ormonde had vague ideas about an Irish parliament to augment the Irish revenue, but discussions centred more on clarifying his instructions, which were similar to Essex's.2 Danby's and Ranelagh's efforts to bypass the signett office in Irish revenue letters were firmly quashed, but in the matter of the Irish surplus the treasurer triumphed.2 Ranelagh computed a surplus of £31,000 in 1677 on the Irish revenue, and Essex's objections, which showed there was no surplus, were thrown out. The putative surplus was, however, divided between Ranelagh's debt to the ordnance (£6,076), the lord lieutenant's equipage (£3,000), repairs to Kinsale (£10,000), and ships and vessels for Ireland (£12,000).4

Essex's constant warnings about the state of army payments did have its effect on Ormond. The new viceroy, although leaving financial matters to Ranelagh, saw the care of the army as his chief concern, and he was mindful of Essex's warning, "that an empty treasury makes a rich vice-treasurer, but then 'tis certain, it also makes an useless army".5 Thus, Essex's warnings about the state of the revenue caused Ormond to abandon plans to raise 14 new companies for the army, by which Ranelagh had felt

1. Ormonde MS IV, pp 28-9, Ormond to Temple, 9 June 1677.
2. CSPD, 1677-78: p 217, Ranelagh to Conway, 30 June 1677; Stowe Ms 211:fol 110, Orrery to Essex, 13 Feb 1677; PRO PC2/66: fol 33, 1 Aug 1677.
4. AD Ms 28085:fol 149, Ranelagh to Ormond, June 1677; Stowe Ms 211:fol 172, Wyche to Essex, 6 Mar 1677; Stowe Ms 211:fol 196, Wyche to Essex, 10 Mar 1677; Dublin PRO WYCHE:no 152, Ormond's Proposals, July 1677; Stowe Ms 217:fol 201, Essex to Ormond, 26 June 1677; Stowe Ms 212:fol 291, Wyche to Essex, 28 July 1677; AD Ms 28085:fol 165-6, Draft of King to Essex, June 1677.
threatened, as it had interested the king, and the vice-treasurer had feared it would be populated with allies of the Ormond family. However, in an effort to clear current arrears, Ormond was willing to consider the clearance of this arrear by imprest payments. Ormond had supported such a scheme in March/April 1677, headed by Champante and Granard, which Essex had dismissed.

In the summer of 1677 Ormond supported a similar scheme, but Ranelagh countered this with a proposal, headed by Bridges, Huntingdon and Dawson, to advance £36,563 to meet three months of the army's current arrears, charging the soldiers 12d in the pound. But, more importantly, future army payments would be further delayed whilst £2,000 per mens. was diverted to repay the advance, which would enable Ranelagh to compound for future army payments. By these means Essex estimated that Ranelagh would make £1,000 for every £3,000 so used - a profit of £12,000 over the eighteen months that the advance was being repaid. Essex thought the privy purse, as well as the scheme's financiers, expected its share from the deal. It is interesting to note too that in September 1677, in spite of all supposed guarantees, Ormond found himself £15-16,000 short to pay the six months then due (i.e. three months arrears as covered by Bridges' advance and the three months then due).

* An imprest in this context was an advance of money secured against funds (revenue) which were due or payable in the future.


Nonetheless, Ranelagh, who had opposed Ormond's appointment, was well aware that the reconciliation with Ormond had only been born out of political expediency and that, should Danby's ascendancy ever be shaken, Ormond would try to remove the vice-treasurer. Accordingly, Ranelagh ordered Champante to come to court in August 1677 where he instructed him on how to deal with Ormond, for he had no illusions that the viceroy would not lay traps for Champante, "for, though my Lord of Ormond and I parted with great professions, yet I have more than little reason to believe he will lose no opportunity to destroy me".  

The first eighteen months of Ormond's lord lieutenancy up until Danby's fall were dominated by two major questions which were both related to the revenue. The primary issue was whether or not Charles should call a parliament in Ireland to supplement his income there. A secondary issue, but one which figured greatly in these months, was the dispute between Shaen and Ryder over control of the revenue farm. Although both these issues ran concurrently, we will, for clarity's sake, deal with them separately.

The farm of the great branches of the revenue had been rent by disharmony amongst the farmers and with the treasury. The farmers had not been able to advance the £60,000 until May 1676 and only finally received their patent on 13 May, superseding the government commissioners. Furthermore, Danby refused to release

2. Stowe Ms 209: fol 218, Danby to Essex, 13 May 1676.
the quit rents to them until late in 1676 to try to prise the additional £20,000 advance out of them. Their contract was very similar to that for the 1669-75 farm. Internal disputes caused Petty, one of their major securities, to withdraw from the farm in spring 1676, followed by Gorges and Hanaway. Sheridan and Gourney replaced them and Danby's complaints that they offered insufficient security were waived aside. Complex private articles, allowing for an annual dividend on the profits, were formulated, but the commission secured for the farm's operation was illegal and allowed Shaen to dominate it. William Ryder, who had supplied the greatest part of the advance, was thus excluded from running the farm.

This was the background to a bitter dispute in council in 1677-79 for control of the farm. Danby and Ranelagh used Ryder as their pawn, desiring to make him master of the farm and thus to gain complete control of the Irish revenue. Shaen, on the other hand, as in 1675 when he was granted the farm, was supported by Essex and anyone who opposed Danby and Ranelagh. The struggle in council between Ryder and Shaen in many ways reflected the battle for control of Irish affairs, with Ormond fighting a covert rearguard action against further treasury dominance of Ireland, by thwarting Ryder and supporting Shaen when he could.

3. CTB, 1676-79, pp 27 & 30 (9 & 18 Mar 1676); Hull, The Economic Writings of Sir W. Petty, (Cambridge, 1899), vol i, pp XXVIII-XXIX.
4. Carte Ms 32: fol 105-6, Private Articles of Revenue Farm, 1675/76.
When Ryder first made his complaints against Shaen and the farm's illegal commission, Ormond's chief concern was that any dispute might disrupt army payments or lead to the farm's collapse.¹ Ryder decided to take his case to the treasury chamber, requesting that Thomas Piggot should be allowed a place on the commission (he had no right to one) and complaining that Shaen excluded Ryder from the farm's deliberations.² Shaen was supported here by Essex, and Ryder by Danby and Finch.³ Ryder also revealed that Shaen had bought out the undertakers' shares and was going to lay claim to the £80,000 due to the king by the undertaking.⁴ Such a deal had indeed been struck, but Ranelagh had had no part in it.⁵ This claim was provocative and inadmissable and the king was utterly outraged by it.⁶ Ryder also claimed the farm was over valued by £20,000 pa which undermined the farm's credit.⁷ From Dublin Ormond warned that forcing a new commission on the partnership might cause the farm to break up in disharmony. Ormond was, therefore, ordered to make strict inquiries into the farmers' proceedings, whilst Ranelagh was to attempt to find a new partnership willing to take on the farm at an enhanced rent.⁸

¹ Ormonde NS IV, p 37, Ormond to Coventry, 4 Sept 1677.
² Carte Ms 146; fol 9, Ormond to Coventry, 9 Sept 1677; Carte Ms 213; fol 127, Ranelagh to Ormond, 27 Oct 1677; Carte Ms 39; fol 120, Private Articles of Revenue Farm, 1675/6.
³ PRO PC2/66; fol 164, 21 Nov 1677; CTB, 1676-79, p 479, 19 Nov 1677; Ormonde NS IV, p 67, Treasury Minutes, 23 Nov 1677.
⁴ Carte Ms 218; fol 131, Ranelagh to Ormond, 20 Nov 1677; Ormonde NS IV, p 67, Treasury Minutes, 25 Nov 1677.
⁵ Carte Ms 218; fol 133-4, Ranelagh to Ormond, 29 Dec 1677; Ormonde NS IV, p 307, Southwell to Ormond, 4 Dec 1677.
⁶ Ormonde NS IV, p 77, Orrery to Ormond, 7 Dec 1677; Carte Ms 68; fol 234, Ranelagh to Ormond, 22 Dec 1677.
⁷ Ormonde NS IV, pp 396-7, Southwell to Ormond, 27 Nov 1677.
⁸ CTB, 1676-79; p 495, 21 Dec 1677; Ormonde NS IV, p 98, Arran to Ormond, 23 Jan 1678.
After Christmas 1677 Ryder went further, claiming that Shaen intended to stop all rents until May 1678 and declare the farm bankrupt when he had accumulated a huge sum. At Whitehall it was thought Ormond should seize the farm at once, but his investigations revealed, to Danby's annoyance, that the farm was paying its rent and had cleared a £24,000 profit in its first year. At the treasury board Ryder continued to win through by disclaiming any pretension to the king's £80,000. In November 1677 the king had originally decided to revoke the farm's commission, but in 1678 he modified his instructions, directing Ormond to force the farmers to disclaim all pretensions to the £80,000, to advance the £20,000, to ensure that the king's rent was properly paid and to persuade the farmers to include Piggot in the commission. However, the instructions with which Ryder arrived in Dublin were the November ones, revoking the commission and ordering Ormond to borrow £12,000 on the £20,000 advance for repairs to Kinsale. Clearly the November instructions, which had not been issued, had not been revoked and Ryder had cleverly attempted to take advantage of this. The viceroy elected to hear the case and return it to Whitehall, realising that the orders Ryder had brought with him might destroy the farm.

1. Ormonde NS IV, p 90, Arran to Ormond, 19 Jan 1678; Ormonde NS IV, p 91, Arran to Ormond, 22 Jan 1678; Ormonde NS IV, pp 91-2, Wyche to Ormond, 22 Jan 1678.
2. Ormonde NS IV, pp 91-2, Wyche to Ormond, 22 Jan 1678; Ormonde NS IV, p 94, Wyche to Ormond, 26 Jan 1678; CSPD, 1677-78: p 590, Williamson's Notes, 25 Jan 1678.
3. PRO P22/66: fol 166, 23 Nov 1677; Ormonde NS IV, p 95, Arran to Ormond, 26 Jan 1678; Ormonde NS IV, p 98, Arran to Ormond, 29 Jan 1678; Carte Ms 69: fol 238, Ranelagh to Ormond, 29 Jan 1678; CTE, 1676-72, p 937, 26 Jan 1678; Carte Ms 146: fol 55, Ormond to Coventry, 15 Jan 1678.
4. Ormonde NS IV, p 105, Danby to Ormond, 8 Feb 1678; Carte Ms 218: fol 137, Ranelagh's Notes, 26 Jan 1678; Carte Ms 219: fol 135-6, Ranelagh to Ormond, 9 Feb 1678.
Following a vindictive hearing in Dublin, in which Danby was accused of accepting bribes and from which the only positive result was that the farmers supplied assignments for the work on Kinsale to begin, the viceroy sent the disputants to Whitehall in April 1678, hoping for a final resolution. Shaen indulged in delaying tactics and Ormond was ordered to take care that the farmers did not break the farm,

"and, in order thereunto that care be taken that the commissioners of inspection suffer no money to be paid but on account of the king's rent and the necessary salaries of officers till the whole arrear due to the king be discharged". Shaen steadfastly refused to renounce the claim to the £80,000. Accordingly, Charles reiterated his order that the commissioners of inspection approve every payment made by the farmers - a degree of supervision unheard of in restoration Ireland before that date. Ryder and Heron proposed to take over the farm at the same rent, but just as it was decided to hand over the farm, the news came from Ireland that Shaen and his partners were paying all their rents. The king had no choice but to order a full investigation: the new farm was thus stopped and the old one continued. Such an investigation, Ormond pointed out, would be time consuming, and the crown seemed to have no legal

1. Carte Ms 53: fol 89-90, Ryder's Case, 7 Feb 1678; Carte Ms 53: fol 114, Ryder to Ormond, Feb 1678; Carte Ms 53: fol 53, Ryder to Ormond, 14 Mar 1678; Carte Ms 68: fol 240, Ranelagh to Ormond, 20 Apr 1678; Ormonde NS IV, pp 122-3, Ormond to Arran, 22 Feb 1678; Ormonde NS IV, p 127, Arran to Ormond, 5 Mar 1678; Ormonde NS IV, p 112, Ormond to Arran, 16 Feb 1678; Ormonde NS IV, p 138, Coventry to Ormond, 13 Apr 1678.
2. CSPD, 1678:pp 178-9, King to Ormond, 18 May 1678; CSPD, 1678; p 179, Williamson to Ormond, 13 May 1678; CTB, 1676-72, p 841, 17 May 1678.
3. Rawlinson Ms. 4236: fol 39, Ormond to Danby, 29 May 1678; Carte Ms 218: fol 139, Ranelagh to Ormond, 18 May 1678.
right to seize the farm just because the commission was illegal.¹ He was pleased not to have to side with Ryder's project (the details of which he was ignorant) or the present farmers. His main hope for improving the revenue lay with a parliament, not a re-letting of the farm.²

Danby and Ranelagh thus failed to remove Shaen from the Irish farm and to gain control of it through Ryder. This set back in many ways reflected Danby's declining power as Charles's policies ran into difficulties, parliament became intransigent and the opposition emboldened. The extent of Danby's and Ranelagh's influence on, and direction of, Irish affairs had now reached its limits: this is not to say they were in decline, rather that efforts to increase them further had failed.

Inspite of all Danby's and Ranelagh's pressure, the Shaen farm performed well and its internal struggles did not destroy it, as Ormond feared.² Strict supervision of the farmers' payments, further orders in June 1678 to prevent the farmers drawing off poundage and allowing Champante to accept their assignments led to their rent being punctually and fully paid in 1678.⁴ Calculations about Ireland's surplus had been over-optimistic, but in 1677 and 1678 it coped well with the task of repaying

1. Ormonde NS IV, p 165, Ormond to Danby, 10 July 1673.
2. Ormonde NS IV, p 165, Ormond to Danby, 10 July 1678.
3. Ormonde NS IV, p 232, Wyche to Ormond, 12 Nov 1678; Ormonde NS IV, p 164, Ormond to Danby, 6 July 1678.
4. Carte Ms 57: fol 340, Ormond to Farmers & Champante, 26 June 1678; Carte Ms 53: fol 423, King to Ormond, 17 June 1678.
Hyder's last attempts in 1679 to overthrow Shaen were stopped by Danby's resignation and Ryder quickly accepted defeat and came to a private accommodation with Shaen and his partners. The revenue met the establishment of £202,000 in each of the years between 1676 and 1678, with a considerable surplus beyond the establishment in 1677 and 1678. However, as we have seen, this surplus was accounted for in helping to repay Bridges' loan, repairs to Kinsale and the repayment of other debts. All branches, except due to abatements, the quit-rents, showed an upward trend. We should, perhaps, be a little cautious over these figures because a report prepared by Ormond on the revenue, designed to pre-empt any charges of negligence against him, showed that the office of comptroller-general had become defunct and that no proper checks were made on the farmers' accounts. Having produced the report, Ormond did nothing to redress the situation. Likewise, although he supported the case against the renewal of the cattle acts in 1678, he did very little (realising it was futile) to persuade the court or the English parliament to oppose the renewal.

As was the custom, the new lord lieutenant's first task upon his arrival in Ireland was to make a report on the revenue. Essex

2. Ormonde NS IV, p 327-8, Danby to Ormond, 19 Feb 1679; Ormonde NS IV, pp 332-3, Ormond to Ossory, 23 Feb 1679; Ormonde NS IV, p 338, Ormond to Ossory, 1 Mar 1679; Ormonde NS IV, p 366, Ossory to Ormond, 22 Mar 1679; Ormonde NS IV, p 73, Ormond to Coventry, 30 Apr 1679.
3. Carte Ms 52: fol 601-2, Produce of Shaen Farm, 1676-82.
had already drawn up a memorial on Ireland's finances which showed that during his viceroy's reign no subventions had been required and, by implication, it cast aspersions on his predecessors.¹

Initial investigations revealed there would be no overplus in 1677, but diplomatically Ormond only requested that the surplus be reserved for Irish uses and that Charles should call a parliament to obtain fresh supplies.² A fuller report in October 1677 demonstrated that no surplus would be available until April 1679, but Ormond hesitated as to when would be the best time to deliver a report which contradicted both Danby's calculations and his wishes.³ When it was delivered in October, however, Danby and Ranelagh congratulated him on the paper, using the report to lend weight to the argument that Shaen was misusing the Irish revenue.⁴

The viceroy's view, that the privy purse money was needed in Ireland, was disregarded by Danby, as was his request to prepare for a parliament.⁵ Danby and Ranelagh used Ormond's report to support the case that Shaen was corrupt and incompetent, not to suggest that their calculations, that Ireland could afford at least £20,000 pa for the king, were wrong. In fact, it was difficult for the lord lieutenant to have his voice heard in Irish affairs, for Arran (his chief spokesman) was kept ignorant at Whitehall, and excluded from the treasury chamber where they were transacted.⁶ As the king prepared for

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¹ Stowe Ms 217: fol 257, Memorial on the Revenue, 2 July 1677.
² Carte Ms 146: fol 12, Ormond to Coventry, 15 Sept 1677; Carte Ms 146: fol 15-16, Ormond to Coventry, 25 Sept 1677; Carte Ms 146: fol 12-13, Ormond to Coventry, 19 Sept 1677; Ormonde MS IV, pp 56-57, Ormond to Coventry, 4 Sept 1677.
³ Ormonde MS IV, p 46, Ormond to Orrery, 2 Oct 1677; Dublin PRO 57, Revenue Calculations, 1676-8.
⁴ Ormonde MS IV, pp 55-6, Ormond to King, 24 Oct 1677; Ormonde MS IV, p 57, 27 Oct 1677; Carte Ms 213: fol 129, Ranelagh to Ormond, 10 Nov 1677.
⁵ Ormonde MS IV, pp 55-6, Ormond to King, 24 Oct 1677; Ormonde MS IV, pp 59-60, Orrery to Ormond, 16 Nov 1677.
⁶ Ormonde MS IV, p 87, Arran to Ormond, 15 Jan 1678; Ormonde MS IV, p 9, Arran to Ormond, 25 Jan 1678.
another parliamentary session Danby and Ranelagh were in the ascendant, courting Portsmouth, MPs and the prince of Orange.¹

In 1677 and 1678 Charles was under severe pressure to make war with Louis. His finances were still in crisis and his debt over £2,200,000. By playing a judicious double game he secured an army of 25,000 men, ostensibly for use against France to end the Franco-Dutch war, but he maintained friendly relations with Louis and his subsidy by secret negotiation, at the cost of angering his parliament and rousing their suspicions as to what ends he might employ the army. The way was being laid for the acrimonious struggle between crown and parliament from 1679-1681.² The acquisition of an English army put an end to new schemes of Ranelagh to increase the Irish army by 3,000 men, although York remained interested in it and Ormond supported it so long as it did not overstrain the surplus.³ Ranelagh ensured that the privy purse money continued to be paid promptly, but his schemes to use the £20,000 advance in England were thwarted by Ormond's October 1677 report on the revenue and this was assigned to repairs for Kinsale.⁴

Bearing in mind the poverty of the English treasury, Ormond's bleak report on the Irish revenue and the seeming imminence of a European war, Charles expressed his resolution in February 1678

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1. Ormonde MS IV, p 37, Arran to Ormond, 15 Jan 1678; ibid., p 95, Arran to Ormond, 26 Jan 1678.
3. AD Ms 28035: fol 156, Ranelagh to Danby, 26 Feb 1678; Ormonde MS IV, pp 155-6, Ormond to Arran, 22 June 1678; Ormonde MS IV, p 162, Arran to Ormond, 2 July 1678.
4. AD Ms 28035: fol 154-5, Ranelagh to Danby, 18 Feb 1678; Ormonde MS IV, p 396, Southwell to Ormond, 19 Jan 1678; Ormonde MS IV, p 104, Ormery to Ormond, 3 Feb 1678; Ormonde MS IV, p 195, Danby to Ormond, 8 Feb 1678.

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to summon a parliament in Ireland, but, because of the long process by which Irish parliaments were summoned, the king's decision could not be implemented before October 1673. The Irish government set to work preparing bills, considering many formulae for augmenting crown finances and, in fact, very few potential MPs seemed to grudge Charles his privy purse money. In London a committee, consisting of Danby, Conway, Ranelagh and Essex, recommended that the revenue should be augmented by an additional excise (and therefore permanently) and not by subsidies. The viceroy would, of course, bend to this recommendation but he was angry that Anglesey, Arran, Burlington, Wyche and Coventry had all been excluded from the committee on the Irish parliament—a sure indication that Ranelagh and Danby dominated Irish affairs in Whitehall. In an attempt to redress the situation, Ormond wrote to Danby reiterating the terms of their 1677 'alliance', but Danby was too taken up with English affairs and his intrigues with Ryder to concern himself too much with the Irish parliament.

Ranelagh, fearful that an Irish parliament would attack him, had of course to overcome his own reluctance in the face of the king's enthusiasm and he produced costings for increasing the Irish army. He also made initial attempts to undermine the plan

1. Ormonde NS IV, pp 106-7, Coventry to Ormond, 12-22 Feb 1678; Ormonde NS IV, p 112, Ormond to Arran, 16 Feb 1678; Ogil, op cit., vol ii, pp 550-4.
2. Ormonde NS IV, pp 112-3, Ormond to Coventry, 18 Feb 1678; Ormonde NS IV, p 123, Ormond to Coventry, 1 Mar 1678.
3. Ormonde NS IV, p 107, Coventry to Ormond, 22 Feb 1678.
4. Ormonde NS IV, p 118, Ormond to Arran, 23 Feb 1678.
5. Ormonde NS IV, p 136, Ormond to Danby, 30 Mar 1678.
6. AD MS 29065: fol 156, Ranelagh to Danby, 26 Feb 1678.
for a parliament by suggesting that the additional excise might constrict trade. However, most threatening of all to Ranelagh was that when the king accepted Ormond's advice to call an Irish parliament it was agreed that the undertaking's accounts would have to be passed first, so that the extent of the national debt was revealed and parliament would know how much the country could pay.

Ranelagh had, of course, steadfastly avoided giving in any final accounts and the undertakers had concentrated their efforts on paying off arrears due to their former employees, such as clerks and collectors. When Ormond had become lord lieutenant Ranelagh agreed that the vice-treasury's accounts should be taken in the 'ancient way', but he side-stepped the question of the undertaking's accounts. Upon arriving in Dublin Ormond found no letter for taking the undertaking's accounts and had to obtain a new one. Ormond had himself excluded from this commission so that he did not appear as Ranelagh's judge and inquisitor. He soon realised, though, that without these accounts no certain estimates of the state of the revenue could be made by the government. Furthermore, by 1677 Sir James Hayes had bought out Ranelagh's shares in the undertaking, on the promise that he

1. AD Ms 28935: fol 167-8, Answers to a Letter from Ormond, Feb 1678.
2. Ormonde NS IV, p 133, Ormond to Coventry, 17 Mar 1678.
3. Carte Ms 70: fol 433, Ranelagh to Stepney, 19 Feb 1677.
4. Ormonde NS IV, pp 28-9, Ormond to Temple, 9 June 1677.
5. Carte Ms 146: fol 1, Ormond to Coventry, 28 Aug 1677; Ormonde NS IV, p 38, Coventry to Ormond, 8 Sept 1677; Ormonde NS IV, p 45, Thynne to Ormond, 29 Sept 1677.
would pay off some of Ranelagh's debts, plus that of John Bence and one twelfth of Deane's, thereby obtaining the majority share in the undertaking.¹ By these means he hoped to profit from the outstanding arrears, which were quite substantial, whilst all the original contractors were still liable to the king for debts in the same proportion as by their original contract. In November 1677 Hayes transferred his shares to Shaen, Richbell and Stannion.² Ranelagh did not support this deal, by which Shaen hoped to claim the £80,000 owed by the undertakers to the king and to continue collecting the undertaking's arrears through the farm's collectors.³ This deal enabled Hayes to delay the accounts further, and Ranelagh, under pressure in 1678 to produce these accounts, found himself incapable of persuading Hayes to comply. Ranelagh began to fear that this delay would ruin him, especially as Hayes refused to act without instructions from Shaen, who was still arguing with Danby about the Irish farm.⁴ The delays on the undertaking's accounts, caused by Shaen through Hayes, deepened the rift between Ranelagh and Shaen.⁵

Petitions from impoverished soldiers and Ranelagh's Irish creditors began to reach court in 1678, but the committee appointed to hear these - Conway, Ranelagh and Essex - made no recommendations against the vice-treasurer.⁶ More threatening to him was Charles's

¹ Coventry Ms 24:fol 325-6, Purchase of Ranelagh's Undertaking, ? 1677; Carte Ms 53:fol 195, Ranelagh to Hayes, 29 Nov 1677; Ormonde MS IV, pp 59-61, Orrery to Ormonde, 16 Nov 1677.
² Coventry Ms 24:fol 325-6, Purchase of Ranelagh's Undertaking, ? 1677; Carte Ms 213:fol 153, Ranelagh to Ormond, 29 Dec 1677; Carte Ms 213:fol 150, Temple's Comments, ? Jan 1678.
³ Carte Ms 146:fol 25-6, Ormond to Coventry, 21 Nov 1677; Ormonde MS IV, pp 386-7, Southwell to Ormonde, 27 Nov 1677; ibid., p 387, Southwell to Ormonde, 4 Dec 1677.
⁴ Coventry Ms 146:fol 25-6, Ormond to Coventry, 21 Nov 1677; Carte Ms 70:fol 423, Ranelagh to Stepney, 19 Feb 1677; Carte Ms 70:fol 423, Ranelagh to Stepney, 26 Mar 1678 (corrected from 1677 in Carte's transcript).
⁵ Ormonde MS IV, p 429, Southwell to Ormond, 1 June 1678.
⁶ Carte Ms 213:fol 133, Ranelagh to Ormond, 29 Dec 1677; Ormonde MS IV, p 111, Arran to Ormond, 16 Sept 1678; PRO PC2/66:fol 251
absolute determination to call an Irish parliament so as to prepare Ireland in case of war with France. In order to gain supplies there was to be a general remission of debts which would probably lead to massive defalcations by Ranelagh and the old farmers, and these could not be calculated without the undertaking's accounts. Ranelagh was ordered to bring in his accounts by 20 May 1678 or face prosecution, and Danby's intervention only extended the date to 10 June 1678. Ormond could scarcely hide his delight at receiving such positive orders.

It seemed that Ranelagh genuinely desired to bring in his accounts, but in Dublin Hayes refused to comply. The vice-treasurer's chief concern seemed to be securing immunity from prosecution for his debts. In England Charles was at last receiving grudging, though not fully satisfactory co-operation from his parliament, which relieved him increasingly from the need to court the opposition. It went without saying that his faithful servant, Ranelagh, would soon be saved, especially as he had opposed Shaen's and Hayes's scandalous plan to claim for the farmers' £10,000 pa secret privy purse money from 1670–75 in the undertaking's accounts. Orders to begin Ranelagh's prosecution in both England and Ireland had been issued, but his allies were

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1. Ormonde NS IV, p 133, Ormond to Coventry, 17 Mar 1678.
2. Ormonde NS IV, pp 138–9, Wyche to Ormond, 20 Apr 1678; ibid., p 424, Southwell to Ormond, 20 Apr 1678; PRO PC 2/66:fol 291 (9 Apr 1678), fol 305 (24 Apr 1678), fol 320 (10 May 1678), fol 325 (15 May 1678).
3. Carte MS 146:fol 100, Ormond to Coventry, 25 May 1678; Carte Ms 70:fol 438, Ranelagh to Stepney, 14 May 1678; Ormonde NS IV, p 144–5, Ormond to Burlington, 21 May 1678.
4. Carte Ms 60:fol 242, Ranelagh to Ormond, 27 Apr 1678; Carte Ms 70:fol 435–6, Ranelagh to Stepney, 23 Apr 1678.
5. OGG, op. cit., vol ii, p 554.
6. Carte Ms 70:fol 438, Ranelagh to Stepney, 3 June 1678.
about to counter-attack. There was a growing inclination amongst the council to allow Ranelagh more time and Ormond was ordered to prepare bills for parliament whilst awaiting the accounts.

Supported by the speaker, Seymour, and chancellor, Finch, Danby had the prosecution order revoked. Ranelagh petitioned to give in his accounts in two parts: one with the king which would show Charles greatly in debt to Ranelagh; the second with the subject which would contain Ranelagh's huge arrears. This was opposed by Coventry and Essex, and Ormond was requested to send evidence of compositions and the whole question became buried in a committee. Parliamentary matters delayed decisions, including a carefully planned harangue from Essex, but rumours that these accounts could cost Ranelagh his Irish offices were unfounded. Some accounts were at last presented in Dublin, but they were not a final account as Ranelagh reserved the right to make additions to it. Thus, his claim to stand by these accounts was not a binding promise at all. To cover himself for the future Ranelagh urged Stepney to prosecute the Forths for their balance and to prepare an account of arrears still owing to them, but the prorogation of parliament at the end of July 1678 meant that the pressure over accounts abated.

1. PRO PC2/66: fol 354 (14 June 1678).
2. Ormonde NS IV, pp 150-1, Coventry to Ormond, 18 June 1678.
4. Ormonde NS IV, pp 438-9, Southwell to Ormond, 22 June 1678.
5. ibid., p 155, Arran to Ormond, 22 June 1678; ibid., pp 441-2, Southwell to Ormond, 6 July 1678.
6. ibid., p 158-9, Coventry to Ormond, 29 June 1678; Carte Ms 146: fol 167-2, Ormond to Coventry, 22 June 1678.
In Dublin the commissioners for the undertaking's accounts had, in fact, proceeded with some animosity. They declared that Ranelagh had no entitlement to defalcations and no right to interest or damages. Such decisions went against the prevailing spirit in London, but also divided the Irish judges. When they refused to see Ranelagh's agents, Granard, Massareene and Theophilus Jones withdrew in protest. Ranelagh's objections to these proceedings were to be heard before the Irish committee, but as proceedings ground to a halt, they were not considered until May 1679 in quite another context.

The intricacies of Ranelagh's accounts, therefore, threatened to delay an Irish parliament as it was agreed that these had to be taken before one could meet. This enabled Ranelagh, on the one hand, positively to delay the parliament, and on the other, it increased royal pressure to bring him to account. Whilst Ranelagh was supposed to be making up his accounts, Ormond was ordered to prepare for a parliament as if there were no obstructions to progress. The king, in his resolution to call parliament, had agreed that the Irish surplus should be spent in Ireland, chiefly on reinforcing the army by twenty companies. However, all these plans to reserve the Irish surplus for Irish uses and

1. Coventry Ms 24: fol 295, Ormond to Exchequer, 5 July 1678; Coventry Ms 24: fol 295, Exchequer Baron's to Ormond, 10 July 1678; Ormonde MS IV, pp 444-5, Southwell to Ormond, 10 Aug 1678.
2. Egerton Ms 3371: fol 54, Conway to Denby, 7 Sept 1673.
3. Ormonde MS IV, p 176, Ormond to Coventry, 5 Aug 1678; ibid., p 180, Longford to Ormond, 12 Aug 1678; ibid., p 191, Boyle to Ormond, 26 Aug 1678; ibid., p 197, Longford to Ormond, 14 Sept 1678; PRO PO2/63: Fol 31 & 35 (14 & 16 May 1679).
4. Ormonde MS IV, pp 144-5, Ormond to Burlington, 21 May 1678.
5. Ormonde MS IV, pp 150-1, Coventry to Ormond, 18 June 1678.
6. Ormonde MS IV, pp 150-1, Coventry to Ormond, 18 June 1678.
7. ibid., pp 155-6, Ormond to Arran, 22 June 1678; Carte Ms 118: Fol 179, Resolutions on Ireland, 22 June 1678.
the need to call a parliament were dramatically affected by
the French and Dutch making peace behind Charles's back after
his attempt at mediation, leaving him with a huge debt, a dis­
appointed and suspicious parliament, and an English army of
25,000 men, which he dared not keep yet could not afford to
disband without further English parliamentary supplies. ¹

Ormond, nonetheless, still urged the necessity of an Irish
parliament to repair Ireland's defences and that, if the house
of commons was to be compliant, a bill of confirmation (for the
decrees of the court of claims) must be passed. ² The draft of
the bill had only been approved by the Irish privy council after
bitter debate; it seemed to favour Irish catholics too much,
soldiers and adventurers not enough, and threatened the titles
to all their lands. ³ Dissent over this bill could ruin Ormond's
hopes that parliament would accept an additional excise bill and
raise the revenue to £300,000 pa. ⁴ Conway's arrival in Dublin in
August 1678, however, added weight to Ormond's case for a parlia­
ment, for he believed the additional excise bill could raise up
to an extra £60,000 pa. ⁵ With his English coffers empty the king
was, therefore, drawn more urgently than ever towards the idea
of an Irish parliament. ⁶

1. Ormonde MS IV, p 162, Arran to Ormond, 2 July 1673; ibid.,
pp 162-3, Ormond to Arran, 6 July 1678; Chandaman, op cit.,
225-9.

2. Ormonde MS IV, pp 162-3, Ormond to Arran, 6 July 1678.

3. ibid., pp 162-3, Ormond to Arran, 6 July 1678.

4. ibid., p 167, Ormond to Temple, 12 July 1678; Carte Ms 52:
fol 134, Paper on Excise Bill, 31 July 1678; Ormonde MS IV,
pp 174-5, Ormond to Longford, 2 Aug 1678; ibid., p 175, Ormond to
Danby, 5 Aug 1678.

5. ibid., p 175, Ormond to Danby, 5 Aug 1679; Egerton Ms 3331:
fol 53-4, Conway to Danby, 7 Sept 1678.

6. Ormonde MS IV, pp 190-1, Coventry to Ormond, 13 Aug 1679.
Within this context Ranelagh's resistance to an Irish parliament was futile, especially as his allies Conway and Danby supported the scheme. In consequence he began negotiations with Lord O'Brien and then Plymouth to sell his office for £15,000 and an acquittal from the king for his failings and protection from an Irish parliament. By September 1673 only Plymouth's delay in finding the money prevented the deal going through. By then, however, it looked as though the Irish parliament would be frustrated, which made Ranelagh less keen to sell his place, and the attacks on Danby in November 1673 and his fall in the following March made it impossible for Charles to pardon Ranelagh or promise him a protection.

Furthermore, at the committee of foreign affairs Ranelagh had found an ally against Ormond in Chancellor Finch. Orrery had prepared a list of objections to the bill of confirmation, 'the Apostiles', which he transmitted to court via the Dowager Lady Ranelagh. Ranelagh added his own objections to these and, although they were largely insubstantial, they wrecked the bill and ended the hope of a parliament in Ireland. This was largely as Conway had feared during his visit to Ireland in August 1678.

1. Ormonde MS IV, pp 441-2, Southwell to Ormond, 6 July 1678; ibid., p 452, Southwell to Ormond, 14 Sept 1678; ibid., p 454, Southwell to Ormond, 24 Sept 1678.
3. Ormonde MS IV, pp 197-204, passim; ibid., p 452, Southwell to Ormond, 29 Oct 1678; ibid., p 466, Southwell to Ormond, 14 Sept 1678.
when he expressed reservations about the bill. Shaen added his objections to the additional excise bill also, which further undermined the hopes for an Irish parliament. The lord lieutenant did his best to counter the 'Apostiles' and to persuade Danby of how vital an Irish parliament was to the revenue, but he undermined this appeal by sending over a very optimistic prospect of the revenue which suggested that a parliament was unnecessary.

Events, however, were being swiftly overtaken by further revelations about the Popish plot and Montague's denouncement of Danby in the commons. Most dangerous to Ormond, though, was that efforts to stop the Irish parliament had led to imputations that Ormond was a crypto-catholic, and as the Popish plot broke he feared that the English parliament might investigate him. Moreover, it was known that Ormond's chief advisers were Boyle and FitzPatrick, the former said to be a crypto-catholic and the latter a catholic. Orrery and the presbyterians had been campaigning in Ireland to ensure that a compliant parliament would not meet in Dublin.

1. Egerton Ms 3331:fol 53-4, Conway to Danby, 7 Sept 1678.
2. Ormonde NS IV, p 209, Longford to Ormond, 5 Oct 1678.
3. ibid., pp 204-6, Ormond to Danby, 27 Sept 1678; ibid., p 270, Wyche to Ormond, 10 Dec 1678; ibid., p 221, Wyche to Ormond, 26 Oct 1678.
5. Ormonde NS IV, p 214, Longford to Ormond, 8 Oct 1678; ibid., p 379, Southwell to Ormond, 10 Oct 1678.
6. Egerton Ms 3331:fol 53-4, Conway to Danby, 7 Sept 1678.
7. Ormonde NS IV, p 228, Conway to Ormond, 9 Oct 1678.
Orrery penned a condemnatory letter about Ormond's handling of the Popish plot, which he widely circulated, leading to the final rift between the pair.¹ In Whitehall the viceroy's friends formed a group to protect the lord lieutenant, preparing a narrative of his proceedings since the plot's discovery.²

Faced with impeachment, Danby made all haste possible to placate the English parliament by cashiering the king's English troops, and, desperate to repair royal finances, pinned some hopes on the outcome of the Irish parliament, which he now desired to be called quickly.³ The king also requested that Ormond take twenty of the companies to be disbanded, although Ormond did not know how he could pay for them unless the Irish parliament met.⁴ To some extent in appreciation of the viceroy's dilemma, the king ordered the hastening of an Irish parliament, but his own financial bankruptcy persuaded him to take the more desperate gamble of dissolving the English parliament and calling new elections, which, of necessity, postponed the summoning of an Irish assembly.⁵ Ormond was most disappointed as he believed the Irish assembly would have set a good example to its English counterpart had it met first.⁶

² Ormonde RS IV, p 270, Wyche to Ormond, 10 Dec 1678; ibid., p 667, Southwell to Ormond, 2 Nov 1678.
³ ibid., p 292, Danby to Ormond, 30 Dec 1678.
⁴ ibid., p 298, Coventry to Ormond, 4 Jan 1679; ibid., p 222, Conway to Ormond, 9 Nov 1678.
⁵ ibid., pp 296-7, Coventry to Ormond, 7 Jan 1679; ibid., p 313, Coventry to Ormond, 1 Feb 1679.
⁶ ibid., pp 327-8, Danby to Ormond, 18 Feb 1679; ibid., pp 343-4, Ormond to Conway, 6 Mar 1679.
In London Ossory still forwarded his father's plans for an Irish parliament right up to Danby's fall. He hoped that the Irish parliament would augment the privy purse money and agreed to take the twenty companies on condition that a parliament would meet soon to bear the cost. Ormond felt this reinforcement would encourage a parliament to be generous, but he feared that it might push the army into arrear and suit Ranelagh's corrupt practices. However, Ranelagh, ever a good servant to his master, quickly found the means to pay for this reinforcement, though Ormond had misgivings as it was Dumbarton's regiment that was being shipped and he was a notorious catholic. Clearly Charles and York were securing one regiment both felt they could rely on. Ormond feared it would taint himself further as a crypto-catholic. A year later it was this same regiment which was shipped to Tangiers in September 1680 and paid for out of the Irish treasury. Thus, the Irish surplus was expended in harbouring a loyal regiment for the king in Ireland and then in paying for its Tangiers expedition, until its return in 1683.

These were confused and indecisive times and, as Danby shifted to save his own skin, intrigue not only gripped the court, but a kind of panic as the treasurer, too involved with his own worries,

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1. ibid., pp 328-9, Ossory to Ormond, 22 Feb 1679.
2. ibid., p 344, Ormond to Ossory, 6 Mar 1679.
3. ibid., p 365, Ormond to Ossory, 22 Mar 1679; ibid., p 354, Ormond to Ossory, 8 Mar 1679.
4. ibid., p 354, Ormond to Ossory, 8 Mar 1679; Childs, op cit., pp 213-22; Osg, op cit., vol ii, pp 553-6, & pp 585-9.
5. Ormonde FB, p 329, Sunderland to Ormond, 29 May 1680; ibid., p 415, Ormond to Sunderland, 4 Sept 1680.
6. Chandaman, op cit., pp 330-1 & 127-3, in these estimates of the value of Irish subventions no account is taken of English troops paid for with Irish money.
failed to give the direction to the executive and to the elections which had come to be expected from him, thereby adding to the collapse of court candidates in the February 1679 elections.¹

In this flux and fearful of what parliament might force him to do, Charles stuck hard and fast to all his most loyal supporters. Thus, efforts to remove Ormond from the lord stewardship, which had been underway with royal approval since before Christmas 1679, were ended by the king's intervention, for he now saw the necessity of relying on tried and faithful royalists such as Ormond.² Ormond's unquestioned loyalty to the crown was the major factor in keeping him in power from 1679–81, because Charles, of necessity, had to keep a loyal lord lieutenant in Ireland, for he controlled a vital standing army and thus the king resisted all attempts to place that control in the hands of untrustworthy opposition lords such as Essex and Halifax.

Ormond could be trusted to use that army in defence of the crown; others might use it against the crown. The compliant nature and loyalty of Ormond, which made Charles choose him to succeed Essex in 1677, therefore to be used to good effect.

The election of a hostile English parliament, the crown's weak finances in England, the fall of Danby in March 1679 and domination of a new privy council in April 1679, with opposition lords like Halifax, Essex and Shaftesbury filling key posts, brought an abrupt change of fortunes for several key figures. Chiefly

¹ Browning, op. cit., vol i, pp 312-19.
² Ormonde MS IV, pp 229-30, Ormond to Ossory, 10 Nov 1679; ibid., pp 320-1, Ossory to Ormond, 11 Feb 1679; ibid., pp 323-4, Ormond to Ossory, 14 Feb 1679; ibid., p 328, Ossory to Ormond, 22 Feb 1679.
affected was Ranelagh whose ascendancy in Irish affairs was thus dashed at a stroke by the fall of his patron, Danby. As Charles had begun to bend under great pressure in 1678 Danby's touch had become less sure. This was reflected in the pressure that Ranelagh had to bear over his accounts in 1679, but promised to be nothing compared to what he might anticipate for the future. Danby's fall, therefore, had a sudden and profound effect on Irish affairs. The steady control and direction that Danby and Ranelagh had given Irish affairs in collusion with the crown was gone. New figures stepped into the vacuum left by Danby's fall, but, interestingly, they did not try to remould the crown's policy towards Ireland, they attempted to increase Whitehall and treasury control.

(2) - 1679-82

With regard to Irish affairs, the years from 1679-82 are best understood by viewing them in relation to Ranelagh's struggle to survive Danby's fall and to maintain his influence both at court and in Irish matters. The increasing subservience of the lord lieutenant's office to the English treasury can be best understood in this context, as can the struggle between Ranelagh and Shaen for control of the Irish treasury and revenue. In this section we will therefore look at three distinct threads which, drawn together, should elucidate this complex period of political crisis. In the first place, there is the changing relationship between Ormond and the English treasury; secondly, the winding-up of the undertaking's accounts with all its political ramifications; and, thirdly, the struggle for control of the Irish treasury, and thus the complete direction of Irish affairs, between Ranelagh and Hyde/Shaen. Finally, we will look
at the performance of the revenue and of the revenue farm during these years which will give a deeper perspective to the revenue intrigues of 1679-32.

Danby's fall and the accession of opposition lords into the privy council had profound implications for Ireland's and Ormond's future. Although not an ally of Danby, Ormond was identified with the court interest and an investigation of his conduct since the discovery of the Popish plot was begun. Attempts were made to show that the viceroy was a crypto-catholic and Ranelagh, Portsmouth and others prepared articles of impeachment against him. The lord lieutenant could only deny being a catholic and attack Portsmouth, but could do little else from Ireland. Coventry advised him not to come to court as he was safer in Dublin. In the event, the intriguing cabals meeting at the Dowager Lady Ranelagh's house could not unseat Ormond, for the three chief contenders for the lord lieutenancy (Essex, Halifax and Robartes) nullified each other's endeavours and the danger passed as parliament concerned itself with other matters, such as the first exclusion bill.

Halifax was probably the greatest threat to Ormond's actual office, but Essex, first lord of the treasury, quickly showed that he intended to maintain the treasury's stringent control of

2. ibid., p 1, Ossory to Ormond, 25 Mar 1679; ibid., pp 70-1, Ossory to Ormond, 26 Apr 1679; ibid., p 59, Ormond to Longford, 4 May 1679.
3. ibid., p 86, Ormond to Longford, 4 May 1679.
4. ibid., p 72, Ormond to Coventry, 30 Apr 1679; ibid., pp 73-4, Boyle to Ormond, 30 Apr 1679; ibid., p 89, Ormond to Longford, 4 May 1679; ibid., p 105, Coventry to Ormond, 17 May 1679; ibid., p 114, Ormond to Coventry, 25 May 1679.
5. ibid., p 96, A3 to Ormond, 19 May 1679; Ogil, op cit., vol ii, pp 538 ff.
Irish finances and affairs.\footnote{1} Ormond's attempt to renew his former understanding with Essex was met with stringent directions from the treasury.\footnote{2} The viceroy was upbraided for neglecting to send over his concordatum accounts, told to take measures against the archbishop of Tuam and that the Irish surplus would be spent in Ireland.\footnote{3} He was also ordered to streamline the Irish privy council in a similar manner to recent reforms in its English equivalent, but the king became too involved in English parliamentary matters to put the order into execution.\footnote{4} By mid-1679, therefore, Ormond was totally isolated in Dublin, having accepted that he was safer there than at court.\footnote{5} Moreover, he was worried about how to conduct himself towards the catholics who after all constituted the vast majority of the population. Like Massareene, he was against extreme measures, such as banning them from corporations, as this would have a detrimental effect on Irish trade and the revenue.\footnote{6} He, therefore, decided to arm the protestants, but his enemies even attempted to suggest that this was a suspicious manoeuvre, claiming that the protestants he armed were in sympathy with the Scots rebels.\footnote{7}

Whilst Ormond was under pressure so was his long time enemy, Ranelagh. The tortuous history of the winding-up of Ranelagh's

\footnotetext{1}{Ormonde NS IV, pp 504-5, Southwell to Ormond, 22 Apr 1679; Ormonde NS V, pp 41-2, Wyche to Ormond, 12 Apr 1679; ibid., p 14, Ormond to Ossory, 31 Mar 1679.}
\footnotetext{2}{Ormonde NS V, pp 33-4, Ormond to Essex, 7 Apr 1679.}
\footnotetext{3}{Ormonde NS V, pp 41-2, Wyche to Ormond, 12 Apr 1679.}
\footnotetext{4}{cf Turner, The Privy Council of England, 1603-1784, (Baltimore, 1929), vol i, pp 448-50; P40 F22/68; fol 151, 21 May 1679; Ormonde NS V, pp 108-9, Ormond to Temple, 29 May 1679; ibid., pp 91-2, Temple to Ormond, 10 May 1679; ibid., p 65, Coventry to Ormond, 26 Apr 1679; Ormonde NS IV, pp 504-5, Southwell to Ormond, 22 Apr 1679.}
\footnotetext{5}{Ormonde NS V, p 114, Ormond to Coventry, 25 May 1679.}
\footnotetext{6}{Ibid., pp 99-100, Massareene to Ormond, 13 May 1679.}
\footnotetext{7}{Ibid., pp 99-100, Massareene to Ormond, 13 May 1679; ibid., pp 177-8, Coventry to Ormond, 9 Aug 1679.}
undertaking displays more clearly than any other aspect of the
period the influence of English affairs on Ireland's. The
vicissitudes of the vice-treasurer's undertaking correlate
almost exactly to the growth in power of the opposition and the
king's efforts to be free of it. As Danby's chief henchman, it
is a tribute to Ranelagh's skill, and the king's support for him,
that he survived the repercussions of his great patron's fall.

In February 1679 Ranelagh had been an unsuccessful court cand­
didate in the elections, bearing testimony to his continued
influence with the king.\footnote{1} Faced with an aggrieved parliament, the
crown was likely to sacrifice some of its supporters. That
Ranelagh should number amongst the sacrificed was clearly Ormond's
hope, and Ranelagh had no illusions that the viceroy would support
the opposition in any attacks on the vice-treasurer, "I pretend
to nothing from him but civility and justice, ... we are too
well acquainted to expect friendship".\footnote{2} With Danby's fall,
therefore, the reconciliation of 1677 was ended. The vice­
treasurer only hoped that his accounts would be taken in London,
and not Dublin, where the commissioners of accounts had been so
vicious in July 1678.\footnote{3} In February 1679 Ormond's request for the
accounts had been stopped by the king, but with the accession of
the new privy council in April 1679, even Sir James Hayes, so
long a cause of delay, made efforts to draw up accounts of the
undertaking's debts as the only way to save himself from the
expected onslaught.\footnote{4}

\footnote{1}{Ormonde NS IV, p 317, Myles to Ossory, 4 Feb 1679; CSPD, 1679-
30: p 90, Ranelagh to Conway, 22 Feb 1679.}
\footnote{2}{CSPD, 1679-30: p 90, Ranelagh to Conway, 22 Feb 1679.}
\footnote{3}{CSPD, 1679-30: p 90, Ranelagh to Conway, 22 Feb 1679.}
\footnote{4}{Carte Ms 146: fol 159-60, Ormond to Coventry, 9 Feb 1679;
Ormonde NS IV, p 329, Coventry to Ormond, 15 Feb 1679; Carte
Ms 218: fol 146, Hayes to his brother, 17 Mar 1679; Ogg, op cit.,
vol II, p 589.}
The order that Ranelagh's accounts were to be taken in Ireland was a sign of the times. As expected, Ormond could hardly wait to begin the prosecution. Ranelagh petitioned to be allowed to hasten over to Dublin which may have been a ploy whereby he hoped the council, fearful of his motives, would delay the journey — instead, they sanctioned it. Bowing to pressure, Ranelagh only criticized 14 out of the Irish judge's 34 objections to his accounts and asked for judgements on them. He unsuccessfully attempted to reverse the order for his journey to Ireland, and the lords committee ordered his case to be heard in Dublin and for Ormond to investigate alleged compositions. Ranelagh was, however, far from lost. He still held the promise of a royal pardon for his debts in the undertaking and only political necessity prevented the king from granting it. Moreover, it was noted that Ranelagh had his supporters in council, muted though they were. His accession to the bedchamber in June 1679 was a noteworthy mark of royal favour and likely to win over waiving allies, but, more interestingly, it showed his attachment to a new patron, Sunderland, who with Portsmouth's guidance was fast becoming Charles's chief confidante.

Ranelagh's partners, believing him to be finished, prepared accusations against him, claiming he had embezzled £40,000 by 

1. Ormonde NS IV, p 104, Howard to Ormond, 15 May 1679.
2. Carte Ms 146: fol 132, Ormond to Coventry, 27 May 1679.
5. Ormonde NS IV, pp 118-19, Coventry to Ormond, 31 May 1679; PRO PC2/68: fol 100 (9 June 1679), fol 110 (11 June 1679).
7. Ormonde NS IV, pp 521-2, Southwell to Ormond, 3 June 1679.
8. Ormonde NS IV, pp 521-2, Southwell to Ormond, 3 June 1679; Ormonde NS V, p 123, Howard to Ormond, 5 June 1679. Ranelagh bought the place from Sunderland.

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the undertaking and they desired only to be savers on the accounts. Encouraged by the mark of royal favour, Ranelagh declared that Hayes forced him to sign false accounts, admitted his accounts were not final and that he would go to Ireland forthwith. All of the undertakers were ordered to Ireland within a fortnight and Ormond was particularly keen to prosecute his old adversary. The vice-treasurer began to have misgivings, though, when his partners refused to be bound for the £24,000 lent by the king to Ranelagh, but efforts to reverse the order, by which Ranelagh was to travel to Ireland, failed.

The accounts were transmitted to Dublin on 4 July 1679, but the order to prosecute the undertakers was limited in its scope, as only Ranelagh and Stepney had estates there, and so the rest of the undertakers could remain in England with impunity.

Hayes and Shaen planned to expose Ranelagh's corruption and Longford (formerly Aungier) was angered that Arran failed to disseminate vital evidence against the vice-treasurer in Whitehall. Quite rightly he pointed out that a successful prosecution of Ranelagh was only possible for so long as Ranelagh's allies were in awe of parliament.

The viceroy thus took the opportunity to urge Ranelagh's presence

1. Ormonde NS IV, p 517, Southwell to Ormond, 24 May 1679; ibid., p 524, Southwell to Ormond, 17 June 1679.
2. Ormonde NS IV, p 521-2, Southwell to Ormond, 3 June 1679; ibid., p 527, Southwell to Ormond, 24 June 1679; Ormonde NS V, p 123, Howard to Ormond, 5 June 1679.
4. Ibid., p 113, Ormond to Howard, 24 May 1679; ibid., pp 133-4, Longford to Ormond, 14 June 1679.
7. Ibid., p 169, Longford to Ormond, 29 July 1679; ibid., p 192, Longford to Ormond, 29 Aug 1679; ibid., pp 195-7, Longford to Ormond, 2 Sept 1679.
whilst parliament sat.\textsuperscript{1} Ranelagh's allies seemed to be beginning to fall away and Conway, for example, was unable to accompany him to Ireland.\textsuperscript{2} No one doubted that, even as the commissioners renewed their investigations, Ranelagh's dexterity might yet save him.\textsuperscript{3} Nor should anyone have doubted it, for Ranelagh was delayed by the king's near death in August 1679 whilst he awaited letters of recommendation from the crown, but, most significantly of all, he was one of the few to tend Charles day and night during the crisis.\textsuperscript{4}

Ranelagh arrived in Dublin on 13 September 1679 with new and increased demands for defalcations, which would, if they were allowed, leave him with a debt of £60,000.\textsuperscript{5} He made much of Shaen's and Hayes's trickery and asked for a speedy despatch.\textsuperscript{6} He warned that those who complained against him would be the last paid and he bought Boyle's support by clearing a large proportion of his arrear.\textsuperscript{7}

Before the prosecution made much progress, though, Essex resigned as first lord of the treasury on 17 November 1679, thereby removing Ormond's most ardent supporter of Ranelagh's prosecution

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1. Ibid., p 157, Thyrne to Ormond, 19 July 1679; ibid., p 160, Longford to Arran, 22 July 1679.
6. Ibid., p 205, Boyle to Ormond, 13 Sept 1679.
7. Ibid., p 206, Ormond to Boyle, 17 Sept 1679; ibid., p 211, Boyle to Ormond, 20 Sept 1679; ibid., p 220, Ossory to Ormond, 10 Oct 1679.
from a key position. Ormond demurred, but the opposition was still powerful at court and, although the lord lieutenant had misgivings now (for reasons of political expediency), he must prosecute Ranelagh with full vigour or feel their wrath: this was especially necessary in order to dispel rumours that Ormond's favour had been bought by Ranelagh's promises to keep him lord lieutenant. It was thought Ormond might take the undertaking's accounts separately, that is the one with the king, the one with the subject and the one for the £24,000, which might lead to a reconciliation amongst the warring partnership and that they might pool their resources to compound for the undertaking's debts. Inspite of his doubts, though, Ormond did not take that option and when Ranelagh stuck to his objections and the commissioners to their own, the lord lieutenant and council adjudged Ranelagh's case harshly.

The reconciliation between the undertakers did not take place and Hayes refused to own responsibility for the £24,000, telling Ranelagh,

"It seems my lord as you have played Rex all along in the undertaking when you had but joint power, so you intend to be absolute in carrying things your way when you have no power that I know of to act at all".

With or without the power these were the accounts Ranelagh pressed, but the £24,000 loan was not made part of them and was only an addition appended to it. The pressure on Ranelagh was immense.

1. ibid., p 214, Ormond to Wyche, 26 Sept 1679; ibid., p 216, Boyle to Ormond, 27 Sept 1679; ibid., p 243, Ormond to Fox, 26 Nov 1679; CSPE, 1679-80: p 233, Gwynn to Conway, 18 Nov 1679.
2. Ormonde NS V, p 220, Ossory to Ormond, 10 Oct 1679; ibid., p 223, Ossory to Ormond, 14 Oct 1679.
3. ibid., pp 226-7, Longford to Ormond, 18 Oct 1679; Ormonde NS IV, p 547, Southwell to Ormond, 13 Oct 1679.
6. TCL Ms 672:fol 286, Ranelagh's Accounts, July 1680.
and even Conway seemed to be deserting him, and a misunderstanding between the pair was only sorted out after strenuous dealings.¹

The accounts proved to be very intricate and began to go so badly for the vice-treasurer that he became anxious to leave Ireland.² On top of these setbacks, his much publicised affair with Mistress (Cocky) Wright came to an explosive end just at the time when his illness of 1676-77 recurred with a vengeance.³ With his new patron, Sunderland, appointed secretary of state for the southern department (which dealt with Ireland) in April 1680, efforts were made to allow Ranelagh to return to England on account of his ill-health, although Coventry unsuccessfully opposed this as likely to disorder the taking of his accounts.⁴ The vice-treasurer was expected to return from April onwards, but his illness prevented the journey until August.⁵ As a result, he received increasing requests to meet outstanding payments which were a constant embarrassment to him.⁶

The defalculations allowed to Ranelagh were those calculated by Essex in 1676, amounting to £113,874.⁷ The final account stated that he owed £58,000 to the 1670-75 establishment and for old arrears, plus £17,592 for surcharges after allowing the £113,874 defalculations. In fact, £76,217, not £58,000, was really owing to the old arrears and establishment because of overpayments on

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¹ CSPD, 1679-80:pp 299-300, Ranelagh to Conway, 5 Dec 1679; CSPD, 1679-80:pp 316-17, Ranelagh to Conway, 27 Dec 1679.
² Carte Ms 146:fol 240-1, Ormond to Coventry, 13 Jan 1680; CSPD, 1679-80:pp 378, Ranelagh to Gwynn, 27 Jan 1680; CSPD, 1679-80: p 416, Ranelagh to Conway, 13 Mar 1680.
⁴ PRO POC/60:fol 473, undated, but probably 7 Apr 1680; Ormonde MS V, p 256, Coventry to Ormond, 3 Apr 1680.
⁶ CSPD, 1679-80:pp 537-8, O'Neill to Conway, 3 July 1680.
⁷ Stowe Ms 216:fol 253-5, Sums allowed to Forths, Oct 1676; Stowe Ms 216:fol 257, Sums not allowable to Undertaking, Oct 1676.
the military and civil lists. Ranelagh and his partners were, however, only charged with a total debt of £76,752. The £24,000 lent to Ranelagh was appended as a memorandum, as was the £14,254 balance still outstanding between the Forths and the undertakers which would reduce the debt to about £62,000.\(^1\) Therefore, in July 1680 Ranelagh and his partnership admitted to a heavy debt to the king, but Ormond grudgingly acknowledged that, had it not been for the vice-treasurer's skill, the undertakers would have come off worse.\(^2\) In his appeal against the accounts, Ranelagh pleaded to the law and to the king, asking that he could apply his discharge to whichever part of the accounts he desired and therefore to the £24,000 for which he was mostly responsible, his partners having disowned any part in the loan.\(^3\) Judge Keating believed there was nothing new in his objections and that they were a delaying device.\(^4\) The lord lieutenant wrote to the king to say that he had been fair to Ranelagh and dispatched him with all speed.\(^5\) Ranelagh reached England on 12 August, where he was reunited with 'Cocky', and stayed at Conway's en route to Windsor where the king and York gave him a warm reception, thereby giving the lie to those who believed him "a lost man".\(^6\)

Ranelagh had thus managed to tread through the minefield of English politics in 1679-80, surviving even the taking of his

English politics in 1679-80, surviving even the taking of his

1. TCD Ms 672: fol 285-6, Ranelagh's Accounts, July 1680; Ormond's estimate of the debt (£60,872) is clearly a mistake; Carte Ms 39: fol 156, Sums due from Ranelagh, 6 July 1680.
2. Ormonde Ms V, p 353, Ormond to Burlington, 24 July 1680.
3. Ibid., pp 362-4, Ranelagh's Appeal, 31 July 1680; Carte Ms 53: fol 314-15, Ranelagh to Commissioners, 27 July 1680; Carte Ms 53: fol 293, 31 July 1680.
4. Carte Ms 212: fol 166, Keating to Ormond, 3 Aug 1680; Carte Ms 39: fol 155, Keating to Arran, 14 Aug 1680.
5. Carte Ms 146: fol 253-4, Ormond to King, 28 July 1680.
accounts in Dublin. He had managed this in part through his own skill, but chiefly because he maintained royal support, nourished by his attachment to a new powerful patron, Sunderland.

However, his influence in Irish matters at this time was minimal, but, as we shall now see, so was the lord lieutenant's, as the king and the opposition lords in his government struggled to direct policy. The crown's policy in Ireland became necessarily blurred in these circumstances, although the English treasury never released its ever tightening grip on the decision-making process in Irish matters.

With Ranelagh in decline, Ormond in fear of impeachment and the king not fully trusting his new councillors, Irish policy was indecisive in 1679-80 as no one took a firm lead. The prosecution of Ranelagh, for example, which may have superficially looked like a firm move, was softened by his appointment to the bedchamber. Furthermore, the Irish government was facing financial problems, due to a trough in the customs returns in 1679, which led to the suspension of pension payments in July 1679 and the pressure on the revenue was exacerbated by orders for a northern expedition in the same month. In England Essex instituted a series of retrenchments, dashing Ormond's hopes of a subvention.

He ordered Ormond to tighten up control over the farmers, who were in arrear, and to spend all the Irish surplus in Ireland, but accounting for it more fully than had been the custom.

1. Ormonde NS V, pp 120-1, Ormond to Sunderland, 3 June 1679; ibid., pp 128-9, King to Ormond, 13 June 1679.
2. Ibid., p 143, Coventry to Ormond, 24 June 1679.
3. State Ms 52: vol 172, Topein (sic) to Ormond, 23 Aug 1679; Ormonde NS IV, p 534, Southwell to Ormond, 9 Aug 1679.
with Halifax pressing for the lord lieutenancy and schemes afoot in parliament to impeach Ormond, the real test of his acceptability to the new regime seemed likely to be how severely he dealt with Ranelagh's accounts. Essex and Halifax lost their nerve during Charles's illness in August 1679, recalling York from exile, and by November 1679, with the opposition suspicious of the treasury's success in retrenchments, Essex felt obliged to resign as first lord of the treasury. This removed some of the pressure on Ormond to be too harsh on Ranelagh. Furthermore, complaints that Ranelagh had not been paying up the privy purse money punctually proved unfounded, which served to reiterate his usefulness to the crown. The viceroy was also directed to pass all sums on Ranelagh's accounts as vice-treasurer as the king had approved all of these payments. There was no question that the king still supported Ranelagh, nor that Ormond had done anything to lose the lord lieutenancy and certainly not to Essex or Halifax. In 1679 with no hope of an English subvention and the revenue declining, temporarily as it turned out, Ormond felt the Irish surplus was overstretched in paying Dumbarton's regiment and requested a parliament in Ireland as the only means to secure the country physically and financially.

In the summer of 1679, though, Essex and Halifax were too

1. Ormonde MS IV, p 535, Southwell to Ormond, 20 Aug 1679; ibid., p 536, Southwell to Ormond, 20 Sept 1679; Ormonde MS V, p 152, Ossory to Ormond, 8 July 1679; ibid., p 216, Boyle to Ormond, 27 Sept 1679; ibid., p 220, Ossory to Ormond, 10 Oct 1679.
3. Carte Ms 52:fol 733, Ranelagh to Ormond, 7 Oct 1679; Carte Ms 52:fol 130, Treasury Lords to Ormond, 23 Sept 1679; Carte Ms 52:fol 182, Privy Purse Payments, 1678-9; Carte Ms 52:fol 303, Treasury Lords to Ormond, 21 Feb 1680; Carte Ms 52:fol 395, Treasury Lords to Ormond, 5 Mar 1680; Carte Ms 52:fol 319, Privy Purse Payments, 9 Mar 1680; CSPC, 1679-80, p 266, King to Ormond, 27 Oct 1679.
4. Ormonde MS IV, p 547, Southwell to Ormond, 15 Oct 1679.
5. Ormonde MS V, pp 148-9, Ormond to Essex, 1 July 1679.
involved in other intrigues to give the matter much consideration.\textsuperscript{1} Shaftesbury's extra-parliamentary pressure on the king to accept exclusion delayed its consideration further.\textsuperscript{2} It was not until October 1675 that the Irish bills were considered in Whitehall, where strong anti-catholic legislation was recommended and there was dispute over the bill of confirmation.\textsuperscript{3} Longford rushed over to Dublin in November 1679 to warn Ormond that he feared the same spirit of opposition as infected the English assembly might prevail in the Irish parliament, especially if Essex's influence was taken into account.\textsuperscript{4} Investigations into alleged Irish plots and attacks on Colonel Fitzpatrick, instigated by Essex, underlined this point.\textsuperscript{5}

The continual prorogations of the English parliament made it uncertain as to when an Irish parliament might meet.\textsuperscript{6} The resignation of Coventry and promotion of Sunderland strengthened the king's hand against the opposition, but worried Ormond because of Sunderland's links with Rarelagh and Portsmouth.\textsuperscript{7} In March 1680, Ormond received positive orders to prepare for a parliament in August.\textsuperscript{8} He was told to prepare a bill of confirmation and anti-catholic legislation.\textsuperscript{2}

\begin{footnotes}
\item ibid., p 146; Ossey to Ormond, 28 June 1679; ibid., p 150; Ossey to Ormond, 5 July 1679; ibid., p 160; Ossey to Ormond, 22 July 1679.
\item Osmonde NS IV, pp 558-60, Southwell to Ormond, 13 Nov 1679; \textit{ibid.}, p 567, Southwell to Ormond, 13 Dec 1679.
\item Osmonde NS V, p 231, Coventry to Ormond, 28 Oct 1679; Osmonde NS IV, pp 562-5, Southwell to Ormond, 29 Nov 1679; \textit{ibid.}, pp 564-6, Southwell to Ormond, 6 Dec 1679; \textit{Carte Ms} 29 fol 81, King to Ormond, 1 Dec 1679.
\item Osmonde NS IV, p 561, Southwell to Ormond, 25 Nov 1679.
\item \textit{ibid.}, pp 562-7, Southwell to Ormond, 29 Nov 1679; Osmonde NS V, p 264, Ossey to Ormond, 17 Jan 1680.
\item Osmonde NS IV, p 277, Southwell to Ormond, 27 Jan 1680.
\item Osmonde NS V, pp 271-2, Cwynn to Ormond, 7 Feb 1680; \textit{ibid.}, p 286, Ossey to Ormond, rec'd 6 Mar 1680.
\item \textit{ibid.}, p 286, Cwynn to Ormond, 6 Mar 1680; CSEI, 1679-80, p 422, Masseenee to Conway, 23 Mar 1680.
\item Osmonde NS V, pp 287-8, Cwynn to Ormond, 9 Mar 1680.
\end{footnotes}
Ormond began to have second thoughts about a parliament. He was alarmed by Seymour's plans that all the £50,000 to be raised by the additional excise bill should be diverted to England. Ranelagh himself, still fearing an Irish parliament, quashed this plan, but, at the same time, he represented Ormond as being pro-catholic and undermined the viceroy's confidence in a parliament.\(^1\) Whilst the Irish government prepared new bills and canvassed MPs, it became clear that the opposition, particularly Essex, had been seeking support in Ireland and Ormond knew that it would lead to his downfall if the parliament was troublesome.\(^2\) The viceroy hesitated, convinced also that anti-catholic legislation would ruin Irish trade, but the failure to enact it would lead to his fall and possible impeachment.\(^3\) The weakness of his position and how ineffectual his authority was, can be seen by the investigations into the alleged Irish plots in April and May 1680.

Ormond was not informed of these investigations by FitzGerald (sponsored by Essex) and Hethrington (instigated by Shaftesbury). The packet boats were stopped without any explanation which was an affront to his authority and the secrecy of the affair reflected badly on him. It was a measure of his compliance and subordination that his only complaints were private ones to Ossory.\(^4\)

Nonetheless, Ormond placed his faith in the possibilities of an Irish parliament to increase crown revenue and the army.

Granard was sent to England in August 1680 with a memorial on the

\(^1\) CSPD, 1672-30: p 416, Ranelagh to Conway, 13 Mar 1680; CSPD, 1672-30: pp 299-300, Ranelagh to Conway, 5 Dec 1679.
\(^2\) Ormonde MS IV, p 290, Ossory to Ormond, 15 Mar 1680; ibid., pp 300-01, Ossory to Ormond, 10 Apr 1680.
\(^3\) ibid., p 313, Ormond to Ossory, 1 May 1680.
\(^4\) ibid., pp 299-9, Ormond to Ossory, 10 Apr 1680; ibid., p 302, Ormond to Ossory, 12 Apr 1680; ibid., p 305, Ormond to Ossory, 14 Apr 1680; ibid., p 306, Ormond to Ossory, 19 Apr 1680; ibid., p 312, Ormond to Ossory, 27 Apr 1680; ibid., p 324, Ossory to Ormond, 21 May 1680.
state of the army, requesting that it should be regimented and
reinforced by means of parliamentary funds. As a contingency,
though, he also presented a scheme, based on an 1679 proposal,
whereby the army would be increased to 10,000 men, without a
parliament meeting, but the king was not in favour of it as it
would mean him parting with £10,000 pa privy purse money.

In June 1680 25 bills were transmitted to England, although
Ormond felt the court to be so riven by dispute that it would
be a long time before they were returned. The Irish revenue
farmers at this point added their voices to those opposed to a
parliament, mainly because they feared that it would attack them
and secondly, perhaps, because it might jeopardize their contract
as the economy would be stretched, paying both rents and sub-
sidies. It was rumoured that Shaen would wreck these plans by
exposing the true nature of privy purse payments and by demons-
trating that the revenue could be raised to £300,000 pa without
a parliament. Ormond chose to ignore these rumours, but
Shaftesbury, for example, had made claims in parliament about
Irish funds being diverted to English uses which had won him
support. Shaen destroyed Ormond’s plans for a parliament by
means of two ploys. Firstly, with Essex’s support, he destroyed
credibility in the bill for a £200,000 subsidy by means of a

1. Carte Ms 146: fol 293-4, Ormond to King, 29 July 1680; Carte Ms
146: fol 266-92, Ormond to King, 11 July 1680; CSPD, 1679-80:
pp 539-91, Papers of Ormond, 5 Aug 1680.
2. Ormonde MS V, pp 379-81, Gwynn to Ormond, 14 Aug 1680.
3. Carte Ms 32: fol 143, Irish Bills, 19 June 1680; Ormonde MS V,
pp 319-26, Ormond to Ossory, 16 May 1680; ibid., pp 356-7,
Ormond to Ossory, 16 June 1680.
4. Carte Ms 146: fol 280-1, Ormond to Sunderland, 13 June 1680;
Ormonde MS V, p 339, Gwynn to Ormond, 26 June 1680; ibid.,
pp 350-1, Netterville to Longford, rec’d 19 July 1680.
5. ibid., p 351, Netterville to Longford, rec’d 19 July 1680;
ibid., pp 351-2, Ormond to Longford, 20 July 1680.
CSPD, 1680-1: pp 1-20 passim; Carte Ms 53: fol 251, Minutes of
Irish Committee, 19 Aug 1680; Carte Ms 52: fol 190, Papers to
Arms, 23 Aug 1680; Carte Ms 52: fol 294-99, Shaen’s Papers. (112)
powerful attack in council. The prospect of a parliament receded even further as the council became involved with Plunkett's trial and Ormond was convinced that Shaen had been used by opposition lords to deny the viceroy the benefit of a parliament.¹

Shaen's chief ploy, though, had been to produce a proposal whereby he would raise Ireland's annual revenue to £288,000 pa.² (See below.) The Irish lords bitterly opposed the plan as a cheat and Shaen withdrew it once it had achieved its tactical purpose of preventing a parliament.³ The planned Irish parliament was now wrecked and Ormond had no confidence that the assembly would vote the required funds.⁴ The viceroy was extremely bitter that so much credit was given to Shaen without the Irish government's opinion being sought. This bitterness was increased and Ormond's ability to influence Irish affairs diminished, by Shaen's new proposals for the revenue which were kept a great secret. Both York and Charles continued to support the idea of an Irish parliament, but consideration of Shaen's project for raising the Irish revenue without a parliament laid aside all thoughts of this as Hyde pushed his schemes on.⁵

1. Carte Ms 32: fol 198, Reading to Arran, 12 Sept 1680; Ormonde NS Y, pp 467-8, Ormond to Sir W Temple, 1 Sept 1680.
3. Ormonde NS Y, pp 423-4, Longford to Ormond, 14 Sept 1680; ibid., pp 422-3, Jenkins to Ormond, 14 Sept 1680.
4. ibid., p 417, Ormond to Longford, 6 Sept 1680.
5. ibid., p 417, Ormond to Longford, 6 Sept 1680; ibid., p 418, Longford to Ormond, 7 Sept 1680.

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In fact, Irish affairs in general and the Irish revenue in particular were about to enter upon a new era of debate, projects and intrigue. What was at issue was not Ireland's profitability, or whether the surplus should be spent in England, but how great a subvention Ireland could afford and what form it should take. The continuing struggle between Ranelagh and Hyde/Shaen in these years was over which individuals should direct this policy, not what the principles of that policy should be. From the summer of 1680, arising from Shaen's attempts to prevent an Irish parliament, until the spring of 1682 the most contentious issue concerning Ireland was the contest for control of Ireland's finances and revenue after the termination of the Shaen farm in December 1682. Basically, the contest was between Shaen, supported by the treasury lords, and Ranelagh, whom he intended to usurp as vice-treasurer. The Irish government was kept ignorant of the details of the contest, playing a passive role which reflected its influence on the decision-making process. This was a crucial struggle as Shaen attempted to unseat the vice-treasurer from his office and to win for himself the influence and power that Ranelagh had wielded in Irish affairs up to 1679, but which had been eroded by Danby's fall and then Essex's and Hyde's intervention in Irish matters at the treasury. Real influence in Irish matters was exercised by Hyde, and Shaen, as his chief adviser, hoped to succeed Ranelagh fully as the leading Irish expert at court, crowning his pre-eminence with the vice-treasurer-ship. Ranelagh's influence had declined, but he still required compensation for loss of office and a pardon for the debts of his undertaking; hence he vehemently opposed Hyde/Shaen's plans in the face of opposition from the king and his leading ministers and cowardly indifference from the lord lieutenant. As Southwell
commented, the whole contest was "like a race at Newmarket, one horse the better at this post and then lost at another". ¹

It was in August 1679 that Shaen had first tried to head off plans for a parliament by offering Ormond a new farm contract, based on some proposals of February 1679, at £260,000 pa with a £130,000 advance. This proposal would have been a management based on Shaen's 1675 proposals and would have required the suspension of the vice-treasurer's office and have restored Irish government control of its treasury. These proposals slept until June 1680 when Shaen resurrected them, substantially unaltered, to oppose the plans for an Irish parliament. ² No claims were made on previous farms and Shaen doggedly kept the details of the proposals a secret for as long as possible, even stopping reading them at one stage in council to expand more enigmatically on them from memory. ³ Ignorant of the proposals' details, Ormond judiciously temporised, as the king seemed keen on the plan, and blandly expressed the hope that it would be a successful project. ⁴ However, Shaen felt obliged to increase the rent to £288,000 pa, making many wonder how this would be possible bearing in mind the difficulties he had in paying £240,000 pa. Moreover, when the Irish lords in Whitehall considered the scheme it was full of blanks which persuaded them it

¹ Ormonde MS IV, p 591, Southwell to Ormond, 3 Dec 1681.  
² Carte Ms 52, fol 719, Revenue Proposition, 8 Aug 1679; Carte Ms 52, fol 181, Revenue Proposition, 1660; Ormonde MS V, p 339, Owyn to Ormond, 18 June 1680; ibid., p 418, Longford to Ormond, 7 Sept 1680; Ormonde MS IV, p 324, Casery to Ormond, 15 Feb 1679.  
³ Ormonde MS IV, p 418, Longford to Ormond, 4 Sept 1680; ibid., p 418, Longford to Ormond, 7 Sept 1680; ibid., p 420, Jenkins to Ormond, 11 Sept 1680.  
⁴ ibid., p 422, Longford to Ormond, 12 Sept 1680; ibid., pp 422-3, Ormond to Longford, 13 Sept 1680; Carte Ms 52, fol 202, Vernon to Arran, 14 Sept 1680.
was a cheat, and that, "the truth is he bids for my Lord Ranelagh's employment". Ranelagh was chosen as the Irish lords' chief spokesman against it and he quickly routed the scheme twice in debate, showing it to be inadequate and that it would hardly advance the revenue at all once poundage was subtracted, but the king and Hyde still inclined towards it. The scheme was so attractive to Charles because it supplied £36,000 pa for repairs to Irish fortifications, shipping and arms (a major reason for calling parliament), but the Irish lords were sure the crown would ultimately lose by it. The refusal on Shaen's part to fill in his blanks, leaving it to the king to do so, prefigured the abandonment of the scheme, particularly as it had achieved its purpose of preventing a parliament.

Tactical considerations had not been the motivation behind Hyde's support of the scheme: he genuinely believed it to be, at least, the kernel of a sound proposal. The fact that Shaen had been considering new schemes since 1679 showed his interest in the Irish revenue's future, and his "Gross Survey of the Revenue" in January 1681, apart from disparaging his predecessors and representing the oppression under which the present farm laboured, was very suggestive of great room for improvements in the revenue, if well-managed.

1. Coromond MS V, pp 422-3, Jenkins to Ormond, 14 Sept 1680; ibid., pp 423-4, Longford to Ormond, 14 Sept 1680.
2. Coromond MS V, pp 427-32 passim; Carte Ms 55; fol 327-32, Various Revenue Papers, Aug 1680.
4. Ibid., p 439, Longford to Ormond, 28 Sept 1680.
5. Ibid., pp 472-3, Arran to Ormond, 2 Nov 1680.
6. AD MS 4761; fol 23-3, Shaen's Gross Survey of the Revenue, Jan 1681.
Throughout 1630 Ormond was kept in total ignorance of the details of Shaen's proposals, and he could only guess that they were based on earlier ones.¹ That the governor of Ireland should have been kept in such ignorance about proposals for Ireland's future finances indicates the level of subordination of his office to the treasury, and especially to Hyde. Ormond merely expressed the hope that any increases in revenue would be applied to present defects.² With the viceroy ignorant of what was discussed at the Irish committee, Hyde totally dominated Irish affairs, supported by Shaen's advice.³ Renewed efforts were made via Dowager Lady Ranelagh to attack Ormond in parliament, and the viceroy felt so threatened that he allowed Conway the favour of a request to give Sir George Rawdon's son Rawdon's troop - an honour he had denied to Arran and Granard.⁴

By 1681, though, Charles was preparing his counter-attack and Conway, for example, recommended an Irish parliament to the king to supply him with troops to quell the English opposition.⁵ Conway rose to the secretaryship of state, following Sunderland's dismissal for voting for exclusion, and Ormond was quick to secure his friendship.⁶ Irish letters would now be handled by both

¹. Ormonde MS Y, p 474, Longford to Ormond, 2 Nov 1680; ibid., p 418, Longford to Ormond, 7 Sept 1680.
². ibid., pp 433-4, Ormond to Wyche, 23 Sept 1680.
³. Ormonde MS Y, p 420, Jenkins to Ormond, 11 Sept 1680; ibid., p 433, Jenkins to Ormond, 23 Sept 1680; ibid., Ormond to Longford, 22 Sept 1680; ibid., p 436, Jenkins to Ormond, 22 Sept 1680.
⁴. ibid., p 486, Arran to Ormond, 13 Nov 1680; ibid., p 489, Arran to Ormond, 16 Nov 1680; ibid., p 505, Ormond to Arran, 26 Nov 1680; ibid., pp 523-4, Ormond to Arran, 13 Dec 1680; ibid., p 537, Arran to Ormond, 25 Dec 1680; ibid., p 540, Ormond to Arran, 31 Dec 1680.
⁵. ibid., pp 553-4, Conway to Ormond, 15 Jan 1681.
⁶. ibid., pp 563-2 passim; AQ Ms 20022: fol 236, Conway to Danby, 1 Feb 1681.
secretaries, Jenkins and Conway, but the treasury asserted its total control of Irish revenue matters in February 1681, claiming its right by an order of 31 January 1669 that all financial papers should be transmitted to the treasury.¹ Hyde's ascendancy in Irish affairs was thus confirmed. As we have seen, Shaen's 1680 proposals destroyed the credibility of Ormond's plans for a parliament and opened up to Hyde possibilities for the future use of the Irish revenue, which neither he nor the king could ignore. The collapse of plans for an Irish parliament further undermined the lord lieutenant's power and influence in Irish matters and augured a consequent increase in the treasury's control of Irish affairs. Significantly, it also coincided with the routing of the whigs at Oxford, the fall of Sunderland and rise of Hyde to pre-eminence, which put an end to any royal plans to work with either parliament or the opposition.

Not surprisingly, therefore, in 1681 the king and Hyde reconsidered Shaen's 1680 proposals. In September 1680 Dumbarton's regiment had been sent to Tangiers where it was still paid on the Irish establishment, reminding the 'ring of Ranelagh's mid-1670s plans to pay for the Tangiers establishment with Irish money.² In February 1681, therefore, the king constituted Sir Edward Deering, Daniel Finch and Hyde a committee,

"to treat with whom we thought fit, for the improvement of his revenue in Ireland, and the reducing of the civil list and enlarging the army there, so as the garrison of Tangiers might be both supplied and paid from thence". ²

1. Ormonde NS V, p 363, Gwynn to Ormond, 1 Feb 1681; CSPD, 1680-1: p 166, Treasury Lords to Jenkins, 14 Feb 1681.
2. Ormonde NS V, fol 323, Sunderland to Ormond, 29 May 1680; APC 26066:fol 115, Model of Establishment (by Ranelagh), 1675.

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In their meetings they were advised by Edward Roberts, who had been Dashwood's treacherous commissioner in Ranelagh's undertaking, and Shaen. The Irish government was not consulted, but pointed out the folly of not seeking their expertise and warned that care must be taken if any new proposers turned out to be the present farmers in case they tried to bury their debts in a new agreement.

Three main groups were involved in these shadowy discussions, which, it must be remembered, was not an open auction advertised in 'the Gazette'. Colonel FitzPatrick had carefully prepared a scheme which would offer Charles £240,000 pa, but the viceroy feared it would destroy his last hopes of a parliament. When it was presented at council by Arran it was made to appear as though it was the lord lieutenant's own scheme, and the rent it offered was so low that it was thrown out "en ridicule". This minor fiasco only further damaged Ormond's prestige.

The FitzPatrick scheme stood no chance because the committee was deep in negotiation with two sets of anonymous proposers headed by Shaen and Sheridan. Roberts, it seems, acted as Shaen's agent in these negotiations. In June 1681 when FitzPatrick's scheme was "thrown out the king himself "brought out of his pocket a second proposal". The scheme Charles brought

1. ibid., p 120, Feb 1681.
2. Ormonde NS VI, p 24, Ormond to Arran, 31 Mar 1681; Ormonde NS VI, p 23, Ormond to Arran, 9 Apr 1681.
3. ibid., p 34, Ormond to Arran, 16 Apr 1681; ibid., p 40, Arran to Ormond, 23 Apr 1681; ibid., p 41, Ormond to Arran, 27 Apr 1681.
4. ibid., p 55, Ormond to Arran, 15 May 1681; ibid., p 63, Arran to Ormond, 21 May 1681; ibid., p 75, Arran to Ormond, 4 June 1681; Bond, op cit., pp 127-8, 1 June 1681.
5. Ormonde NS VI, p 62, Arran to Ormond, 14 May 1681.
out was Shaen's, not Sheridan's as Ormond thought. Such confusion was possible because the Irish government was kept completely uninformed about the proposals. The proposals were to be drawn up into the form of a contract and it soon became clear that Ranelagh was not involved as his office would be put into commission.² It was to be a part farm and part management, offering £270,000 pa with an advance of £80,000 of which £60,000 must go to reimburse the present farmers' advance.²

The proposal met with stiff opposition and a section of the lords, headed by Conway, averred it was a "cheat". As a result these negotiations continued in secrecy and Conway and other opponents were excluded.⁴

The Irish government had already made representations against arrears on the farm's payments in June 1681, making many suspicious as to Shaen's motives in wanting to renew his farm.⁵

The Irish government was kept in total ignorance of the details of the scheme and treading carefully Ormond said he only opposed another undertaking like Ranelagh's, which of course it most resembled.⁶ The secrecy of the negotiations made it impossible for the Irish government to comprehend treasury directives and made it impossible for the attorney and solicitor general to...

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1. Ormonde NS VI, p 75, Arran to Ormond, 4 June 1681; ibid., p 95, Ormond to Arran, 20 June 1681; ibid., pp 87-8, Arran to Ormond, 22 June 1681.
2. ibid., p 75, Arran to Ormond, 4 June 1681; Bond, op cit., p 199, 3 June 1681.
3. Ormonde NS VI, p 91, Arran to Ormond, 11 June 1681.
4. ibid., pp 37-2, Arran to Ormond, 22 June 1681; ibid., p 99, Arran to Ormond, 2 July 1681; Bond, op cit., pp 127-8, 1 June 1681.
5. Carte MS 62: fol 265-2, Ormond to Treasury Lords, 27 June 1681; CSPD, 1680-1: p 342, Jenkins to Ormond, 2 July 1681; CSPD, 1680-1: p 345-6, Ormond to Jenkins, 4 July 1681.
6. Ormonde NS VI, pp 98-9, Arran to Ormond, 12 July 1681; Carte MS 62: fol 270-1, Ormond to Treasury Lords, 4 July 1681.

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comment on proposals they had not even seen.  

The lord lieutenant was convinced Shaen would bury a massive debt in the new scheme, but the viceroy was too fearful and cautious to express these doubts to anyone, except his son.  

Ranelagh was the only figure at court to attack the proposals and all his efforts to win Ormond's support — even suggesting that Hyde aimed to overthrow the viceroy — were to no avail.  

Ranelagh opposed the new proposal because the vice-treasury was to be put in commission and he was to receive £15,000 compensation, but a more compelling reason was that simultaneous orders to prosecute him for his debts on the undertaking had been issued and he had not yet obtained his pardon.  

The new contract and establishment that went before the king was kept a great secret and when revealed was a shock. All the Irish surplus was to be spent on non-Irish items and Ormond knew that he could not expect a parliament to vote supplies in these circumstances. £53,000 pa was set aside to pay for Tangiers, which Boyle and Ormond felt would destroy the Irish economy because of the drain on specie. All pensions and concordatums would be paid out of what remained in excess of £271,000 pa, which would definitely be paid. In total it was  

1. Carte Ms 22: fol 361, Domville to Temple, 12 July 1631; Ormonde MS VI, pp 92-3, Ormond to Conway, 4 July 1661.  
2. Ormonde MS VI, p 102, Ormond to Arran, 17 July 1661.  
3. ibid., p 102, Nalys to ?, 16 July 1661; ibid., p 107, Boyle to Ormond, 23 July 1661; ibid., p 112, Ormond to Arran, 27 July 1661; ibid., p 120, Arran to Ormond, 6 Aug 1661.  
4. ibid., pp 103-4, Arran to Ormond, 19 July 1661; ibid., p 101, Jenkins to Ormond, 16 July 1661; PRO PC2/69: fol 161, 14 July 1661.  
5. Ormonde MS VI, pp 122-3, Boyle to Ormond, 6 Aug 1661; ibid., p 123, Conway to Ormond, 16 Aug 1661.  
6. ibid., pp 126-7, Boyle to Ormond, 6 Aug 1661.  
7. ibid., pp 135-3, Boyle to Ormond, 24 Aug 1661.
envisioned that £300,000 pa would be raised. 1 

Hyde refused to hear any criticism of proposals which were so beneficial to the English treasury. 2 Resistance was futile and ironically Ranelagh was the only person to send Ormond details of the contract. 2 At the treasury Edward Roberts (as the new undertakers' agent) spoke eloquently for the new undertaking. 4 Ranelagh was formally suspended as vice-treasurer on 27 September 1681, and Taylor replaced him as paymaster-general to the Irish army, as an interim measure to ensure the army's pay did not suffer whilst Ranelagh's accounts were drawn up, after which Shaw would, no doubt, become vice-treasurer. 5 The new bargain was expected to be completed soon and the only delay was on deciding whether to continue paying the Tangiers' troops 13 months a year as had been the custom. 6 Nonetheless, secrecy combined with opposition to the original proposal amongst certain key lords eventually had its effect. Ranelagh's brave attempts to press Charles to think again failed, but at the treasury chamber, Hyde, confident of victory, announced that he would bow to pressure over secrecy and allow the details of the proposal to be seen, as it was after all not his own. 7 Ranelagh and Sheridan joined forces at this point and, having viewed the

1. Ormonde MS VI, pp 198-9, Boyle to Ormond, 24 Aug 1681; ibid., p 145, Longford to Ormond, 3 Sept 1681; Carte Ms 218:fol 208, Topham to Ormond, 16 Aug 1681; Carte Ms 53:fol 400, Payments on New Contract, Sept 1681.
2. Ormonde MS VI, p 141, Arran to Ormond, 27 Aug 1681.
3. Carte Ms 218:fol 214, Ranelagh to Ormond, 3 Sept 1681.
4. Ormonde MS VI, p 146, Arran to Ormond, 3 Sept 1681.
5. ibid., p 166, Ormond to FitzPatrick, 27 Sept 1681; ibid., p 167, Arran to Ormond, 27 Sept 1681.
6. ibid., pp 155-6, Longford to Ormond, 15 Sept 1681; ibid., p 175, Arran to Ormond, 1 Oct 1681.

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detailed proposals, Ranelagh made a powerful harangue against the contract, which must have made Hyde wonder at the wisdom of his decision.1

The debate on the future of Ireland's revenue was about to enter a new stage. Before detailing this new development we must pause to view Ormond's position in these debates up to October 1681, for they eloquently demonstrate the weakness of the lord lieutenancy vis-a-vis the English treasury in Irish affairs. The king had no intention to replace Ormond, but clearly the power of the lord lieutenant was at a nadir.2 The viceroy was affronted that he was kept so ignorant of the revenue proposals, which it had been promised would be communicated to him, but he was so desirous to keep his office that he refused to complain.3 He was angered that he did not know for what ends he was asked to produce accounts, for example.4 He was also incensed with what he considered to be an English idea to raise the revenue to £300,000 pa, although, in fact, he was the first to have suggested the figure in 1678.5 Hyde ignored his complaints about Shaen's partners not having their payments signed by the commissioners of accounts and, not surprisingly, Ormond did not communicate his fears that £53,000 to Tangiers would

1. ibid., p 197, Longford to Ormond, 18 Oct 1681.
2. Ormonde NS VI, p 40, Arran to Ormond, 23 Apr 1681; ibid., p 51, Cooke to Ormonde, 30 Apr 1681.
3. ibid., p 88, Ormond to Arran, 2 July 1681.
4. ibid., p 92, Ormond to Arran, 4 July 1681.
5. Carte Ms 218:fol 176, Ormond to Ranelagh, 23 July 1681; Ormonde NS VI, p 167, Ormond to Temple, 12 July 1678.

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bleed Ireland white. Rather than communicate his doubts to the king he re-emphasised the definition of his role as a compliant cipher of Whitehall by attacking the 'disaffected party' in Munster. Warned that Shaen was the greatest influence on Irish financial matters the old duke showed a remarkable ability to reconcile himself to a man he had earlier denounced - "Let him keep fair quarter and he shall have it."

The transition of the Irish treasury to Taylor's control was delayed, as Champante was dilatory in bringing in his accounts. The viceroy, however, dutifully tried to hasten these, even though he had supervision of these accounts deliberately left out of his patent. At the same time he wisely decided to allow Hyde to decide whether or not the farmers were in arrear, in case he came to an impolitic decision. He remained, however, in total ignorance of the details of the new undertaking and his advice in framing the new establishment was disregarded which was without precedent in the period. All these insults to his person and his office he affected to take with equanimity,

"As to the ignorance I am in of what is designed concerning the revenue ... I am content to continue a stranger to it, and if a new establishment shall accompany a new farm, it will free me from much importunity, if I have not part in it."

1. Ormonde MS VI, pp 138-9, Boyle to Ormond, 24 Aug 1681.
2. ibid., pp 144-5, Longford to Ormond, 3 Sept 1681.
3. ibid., p 165, Arran to Ormond, 24 Sept 1681; ibid., p 179, Ormond to Arran, 3 Oct 1681.
4. ibid., p 166, Ormond to FitzPatrick, 27 Sept 1681.
6. ibid., p 179, Ormond to Arran, 3 Oct 1681.
7. ibid., p 169, Ormond to Longford, 27 Sept 1681; CSPD, 1680-1, pp 448-9, Ormond to Jenkins, 14 Sept 1681.
8. CSPD, 1680-1, pp 448-9, Ormond to Jenkins, 14 Sept 1681.
This was as clear a declaration as one can find of his intention
to remain viceroy under almost any circumstances or conditions.
Throughout this debate Ormond had made it clear that this was
his position, only complaining in private against the new prop-
osal and not even opposing it openly when he discovered it
was not unlike Ranelagh's undertaking.¹ Even Jenkins, the sec-
retary of state, lamented to see the Irish government unconsulted
as such a proposition, so vital to Ireland's future, was debated.²
Instead, Ormond wished Shaen's venture well, refused to back
an alternative proposal in September 1681 and decided to follow
Hyde's directive to keep the establishment a secret so as to
avoid the importunity of courtiers and the complaints of Irishmen.³

Between October 1681 and March 1682 there ensued one of the
bitterest debates the treasury chamber had witnessed over the
future of the Irish revenue. It was a tedious and bitter battle.⁴
Ranelagh's fine rhetoric, supported by Sheridan, was not expected
to overcome the attractions of the Tangiers proposal and Arran
and Ormond both elected not to support Ranelagh's attacks, despite
their misgivings over the scheme.⁵ The lord lieutenant was
horrified when Sheridan and Ranelagh invoked his name in support

1. Ormonde MS VI, p 167, Arran to Ormond, 27 Sept 1681; ibid.,
p 171, Ormond to Arran, 30 Sept 1681; Carte Ms 218; fol 218,
Ormond to Temple, 14 Sept 1681; Carte Ms 68; fol 270-1, Ormond
to Treasury Lords, 4 July 1681.
2. CSPD, 1680-1681, p 384, Ormond to Jenkins, 30 July 1681.
3. Ormonde MS VI, p 171, Ormond to Arran, 30 Sept 1681; ibid.,
p 174, Boyle to Ormond, 1 Oct 1681; ibid., p 181, Arran to
Ormond, 4 Oct 1681; Carte Ms 52; fol 504-5, Brewster to Ormond,
12 Sept 1681.
5. Ormonde MS VI, p 199, Arran to Ormond, 15 Oct 1681; ibid.,
pp 203-4, Longford to Ormond, 18 Oct 1681; ibid., pp 205-6,
Arran to Ormond, 22 Oct 1681.
of their attacks in October 1681. He merely rumbled a little in complaint to Arran and to York that it was wrong for the chief governor to be excluded from these debates. He refused to take sides, though, strenuously denying any alliance with Ranelagh, claiming he could not oppose a proposal he had not seen,

"Whoever knows that I am an utter stranger to the proposals, more than I have of late collected from the index and papers passed betwixt my Lord Ranelagh and the proposers, cannot believe I have declared against things I do not know, but he must at the same time believe me to be a very giddy old fellow and a very silly undutiful ass, if I should think of quitting the government because I do not like a bargain the king makes for his revenue".

Ranelagh's confidence in these debates largely stemmed from the close personal relations he enjoyed with the king, which clearly seem at this time to eclipse the king's other personal, though not political, friendships. Ranelagh's initial thrusts were parried, but he was confident of success and expected to produce counter proposals. He attacked Hyde and Halifax personally, but Hyde requested that Charles delayed judgement until he heard the proposers' answer, for it was thought that Essex had all the answers to Ranelagh's objections and that the suspended vice-treasurer was only being given enough rope to hang himself.

Although Ranelagh's objections of 12 November 1681 were said to

2. ibid., pp 247-8, Arran to Ormond, 3 Dec 1681; ibid., pp 260-1, Ormond to Arran, 13 Dec 1681; Carte MS 118:fol 236, Ormond to York, 14 Dec 1681.
3. Ormonde MS VI, p 277, Ormond to Arran, 24 Dec 1681; ibid., pp 285-6, Ormond to Arran, 7 Jan 1682.
4. ibid., pp 285-6, Ormond to Arran, 7 Jan 1682.
5. ibid., pp 210-11, Longford to Ormond, 29 Oct 1681.
6. ibid., pp 213-4, Longford to Ormond, 29 Oct 1681; ibid., pp 216-7, Arran to Ormond, 1 Nov 1681.
carry no weight, they were delivered eloquently and were really unanswerable.\textsuperscript{1} It took several days for the anonymous proposers to prepare their answers for their agent, Roberts, and Ranelagh tore their computations to pieces, and later in the month Roberts fumbled badly in the face of the vice-treasurer's questioning.\textsuperscript{2} However, the prospect of having eight ships and Tangiers paid for by Ireland weighed heavily with Charles and on 28 November he positively decided to place Tangiers on the Irish establishment no matter what proposals were eventually agreed upon.\textsuperscript{3} Ormond's chief fear now was that Ranelagh would bring in an alternative scheme which would be worse for Ireland than Shaen's.\textsuperscript{4} Most of all, though, the viceroy felt the degradation of his status, that Ranelagh, his old adversary, was the first to supply him with information about the new contract and he accurately remarked "that no government under the crown of England was ever so much slighted and affronted as this has been in this whole affair".\textsuperscript{5}

The suspended vice-treasurer continued to press Charles to reconsider Shaen's project.\textsuperscript{6} He also worked on Hyde, once more trying to invoke Ormond's alleged support.\textsuperscript{7} Nevertheless, as

\textsuperscript{1} Carte Ms 39;fol 503-31, Ranelagh's Objections, Nov 1681; Carte Ms 39;fol 424, Ranelagh to Ormond, 12 Nov 1681; Ormonde NS VI, p 222, Longford to Ormond, 12 Nov 1681; \textit{ibid.}, pp 225-6, Arran to Ormond, 12 Nov 1681.

\textsuperscript{2} Ormonde NS VI, pp 228-41 passim; Carte Ms 39;fol 427, Ranelagh to Ormond, 22 Nov 1681; Carte Ms 39;fol 435, Sheridan to Ormond, 29 Nov 1681; Ormonde NS VI, p 247, Arran to Ormond, 3 Dec 1681; \textit{ibid.}, p 256, Ormond to ?, 12 Dec 1681.

\textsuperscript{3} Carte Ms 39;fol 431, Treasury Minutes, 28 Nov 1681; Carte Ms 39;fol 433, Ranelagh to Ormond, 29 Nov 1681; Carte Ms 39;fol 435, Sheridan to Ormond, 29 Nov 1681.

\textsuperscript{4} Ormonde NS VI, pp 241-2, Longford to Ormond, 29 Nov 1681.

\textsuperscript{5} \textit{Ibid.}, pp 259-40, Ormond to Arran, 27 & 28 Nov 1681.

\textsuperscript{6} \textit{Ibid.}, p 251, Arran to Ormond, 6 Dec 1681.

\textsuperscript{7} \textit{Ibid.}, p 254, Arran to Ormond, 10 Dec 1681.
fast as Ranelagh produced objections the proposers capitulated
to them and thus the king's resolution to accept their proposal
was unshaken. A final decision was to be delayed until Ormond's
report on the farmers' arrears up to 1 May 1681 was received,
but as the proposers offered to begin paying £300,000 pa from
1 May 1682 this waived many doubts. Ormond was still worried
that the new proposers intended to bury the old farm's debts
in the new agreement and that this would damage the Irish economy.
His report on the farmers' arrears claimed they were constantly
£30,000 behind in payments and criticised them for their
arbitrary dealings. The arrival of this report coincided with
Ranelagh's last great attack on the new proposal and smacked of
collusion. The new proposers feeling the pressure, refused to
accept the changes Roberts had conceded and asked the king to
draw up a new contract, and in response to this Ranelagh produced
fresh objections. At this point, on 20 January 1682, Hyde
renewed the prosecution of Ranelagh for his debt from the under-
taking and the vice-treasurer consequently withdrew from the
forefront of the attack, leaving it to Sheridan. The farmers
were still hesitating about clauses for the new agreement and in
answering Ranelagh's last objections.

1. ibid., p 254, Arran to Ormond, 10 Dec 1681; ibid., pp 257–62, & 269–73 passim.
2. ibid., p 273, Arran to Ormond, 21 Dec 1681.
3. ibid., pp 276–8, Ormond to Arran, 24 Dec 1681; ibid., p 279, Arran to Ormond, 24 Dec 1681.
4. ibid., p 284, Arran to Ormond, 31 Dec 1681; ibid., p 284, Arran to Ormond, 3 Jan 1682; ibid., pp 284–5, Ormond to Fitz-
   Patrick, 7 Jan 1682; ibid., pp 269–70, Ormond to Treasury
   Lords, 19 Dec 1681.
5. ibid., pp 288–9, Arran to Ormond, 10 Jan 1682; Carte Ms 32: fol 469, Ranelagh to Ormond, 14 Jan 1682.
6. Ormonde MS VI, pp 296–7, Arran to Ormond, 20 Jan 1682; ibid., p 301, Arran to Ormond, 28 Jan 1682.
7. ibid., p 300, Arran to Ormond, 24 Jan 1682; Carte Ms 32: fol 475, Ranelagh to Ormond, 21 Jan 1682; Carte Ms 32: fol 494–500 passim, Various Revenue Papers, Jan/Feb 1682.
Both Hyde and Charles were by now growing impatient.\(^1\) Conway suggested that the king would be better off calling a parliament to raise the revenue.\(^2\) Sheridan offered counter-proposals based on a rent of £260,000 pa with an extra £110,000 for other clauses.\(^3\) Other proposals for a farm at £288,000 pa were resurrected and the king began to incline towards a management.\(^4\) In fact, Charles was thinking of publicising a general auction in 'the Gazette', in preparation for which Sheridan was asked to make up his own scheme.\(^5\) This had all the signs of a move to press Shaen to come to terms at once and it succeeded. On 21 February 1682 the king agreed to lay aside Sheridan's scheme if Shaen accepted all the amendments, paying £23,000 per mensem from Christmas 1682. There was to be an advance of £150,000, of which £80,000 would reimburse the present farmers and the other £70,000 Ranelagh advised Charles to keep in England.\(^6\)

By the beginning of March 1682 the contract was expected to be accepted and Ranelagh's patent revoked.\(^7\) Ormond declared his support for Shaen's proposal, even though he discovered that Shaen's promise of remitting some of the advance to Ireland was vacuous.\(^8\) On 11 March 1682 at Newmarket Hyde and Ranelagh were reconciled, the vice-treasurer receiving all his fees from the

\(^1\) Ormonde NS VI, p 309, Arran to Ormond, 11 Feb 1682.
\(^2\) Ormonde NS VI, p 307, Conway to Ormond, 4 Feb 1682.
\(^3\) ibid., p 312, Ormond to Arran, 11 Feb 1682; ibid., p 312, Ormond to FitzPatrick, 13 Feb 1682; ibid., pp 220-1, Arran to Ormond, 21 Feb 1682.
\(^4\) ibid., p 314, Ormond to Boyle 16 Feb 1682; Carte Ms 39; fol 501-2, Revenue Proposition, ? 1681/2; CSPD, 1682: pp 88-9, Remarks on Irish Farm, 20 Feb 1682.
\(^5\) CSPD, 1682: pp 89-90, ? to King, ? Feb 1682.
\(^6\) Ormonde NS VI, pp 314-5, Longford to Ormond, 18 Feb 1682; ibid., pp 320-1, Arran to Ormond, 21 Feb 1682; ibid., pp 324-5, Longford to Ormond, 25 Feb 1682.
\(^7\) ibid., pp 331 & 335, Longford to Ormond, 1 & 4 Mar 1682; ibid., p 337, Arran to Ormond, 4 Mar 1682.
\(^8\) ibid., pp 342-3, Longford to Ormond, 14 Mar 1682; ibid., p 347, Longford to Ormond, 16 Mar 1682.
date of his suspension until May 1682, £16,000 compensation for loss of office and a tacit pardon for his debts from the undertaking, "for my Lord Ranelagh is now in a better condition than if he had his vice-treasurer's place". ¹ This was clearly Ranelagh's reward for relenting in his attacks on the new proposals and he was, doubtless, persuaded to take this course by the promise of all he obtained at Newmarket as well as the pressure he was under from his renewed prosecution.² Furthermore, his fierce opposition to the new proposals had ensured that Charles obtained a better bargain and a £70,000 advance on balance which was to be used in England. The former vice-treasurer had earned his reward and, in addition, he was to have the satisfaction later in 1682 of seeing that he had pressed Shaen to make such far-reaching amendments that, in the end, he was unable to go through with the undertaking and fill the vacancy left by Ranelagh as chief Irish financial adviser and expert in Whitehall. (See next chapter.)

Ranelagh had waited a long time for this reward and for this tacit pardon. The fall of Sunderland, although slightly recompensed by Conway's advancement, made this possibility more remote.³ Warrants for Ranelagh's prosecution for his debts in 1681 were only stopped with some difficulty, especially once Hyde was in the ascendant.⁴ Inspite of Ranelagh's influence with

¹ ibid., p 341, Longford to Ormond, 11 Mar 1682; ibid., p 351, Longford to Ormond, 21 Mar 1682.
² ibid., p 301, Arran to Ormond, 28 Jan 1682.
the king, Hyde’s approval for Ranelagh’s tacit pardon was not gained until they had struck a deal by which Shaen’s contract would be unopposed by the vice-treasurer.¹ In October 1682 Ranelagh was further pardoned two pressing debts of £8,000, but his full pardon for all debts was not granted until 29 July 1684 when Sunderland was once again in the ascendant.²

Ranelagh’s final dismissal in 1682 with a pardon and £16,000 compensation marks the end of an era in Irish financial and political history in which he had been at the forefront of the stage. Between 1671 and 1682 he served the English crown well, providing Charles with £60,000 privy purse money by his undertaking and conniving at a further £10,000 pa secretly from the farmers from 1670-75. In 1676 he kept £20,000 of the advance money for Charles’s use in England and from 1676-82 he provided Charles with £20,000 pa privy purse money (a total of £128,000 if we include the farmers’ forfeiture of £8,000 interest in 1676). He also provided an additional £7,000 pa from 1677 onwards to pay for court pensions. He had saved the English treasury money, providing 1,900 troops from 1672-74, and paying for the Scots regiment whilst it was in Ireland and Tangiers at a cost of £20,000 pa. During the undertaking also he had enabled Charles to reward his followers with pensions he could not otherwise afford.

An assessment of Ranelagh’s own financial profit is difficult, because his more infamous peculation as English paymaster general

1. Ormonde NS VI, pp 285-7 passim; ibid., pp 233-4, Arran to Ormond, 19 Nov 1681; ibid., p 351, Longford to Ormond, 21 Mar 1682.
2. Rawlinson Ms A276: fol 135, Treasury Lords to King, 31 Oct 1682; Rawlinson Ms A276: fol 136, King to Ormond, 31 Oct 1682. See next chapter.

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makes it impossible to estimate from his wealth at his death how much of that profit he obtained from Ireland. Certainly many of his collectors made exorbitant profits. How much of the profit finally reached Ranelagh's hands is difficult to assess, but a tentative total would put this as high as £210,000. In all his profit was spectacular, but much of it was spent in court payments, especially in 1671-2, and a high standard of living. The true value of his profit is as inestimable as the suffering of the ordinary soldier from whom it was garnered. However, the financial gains the undertaking and vice-treasurership won for him were far outstripped by the power and influence they enabled him to achieve at court. This is most clearly seen by the fact he survived Danby's fall and that by 1682 his relationship with Charles was closer than ever and, pardoned and compensated for his period in Irish office, he was able to turn the profit and influence he had obtained towards a political career in England.

2. Out of this he would have shared £45,000 worth of fees as vice-treasurer with Champante from 1676-82. The vice-treasurer's fees up to 1675 he would have shared with his partnership in which he had one third share and on this basis he would have received a one third share of an estimated profit for compositions on the twelve months arrears of £60,000. From 1671-82 he may have made up to £60,000 compounding for pensions, (based on 50% compositions although 33% was more likely) and after 1676 £10,000 pa compounding for current army arrears. This totals £210,000 for Ranelagh alone, leaving aside £40,000 his partners gained from the twelve months arrears, and their share of the vice-treasurer's fees from 1670-75.
3. Ranelagh received all £16,000 for himself, but he had not compensated Aungier personally when he obtained the vice-treasury; the undertaking had born this cost.
Finally, in order to give some perspective to the revenue intrigues of 1679-82 some comment should be made on the actual performance of the economy and crown income in these years. It has already been well established that the farmers were very slow in their payments of rent, caused partly by the fact they did not take control of the farm until May 1676 and that the £24,000 lent by the king to Ranelagh came out of their growing rents. Furthermore, if we are to believe Ryder’s allegations, some of the advance was paid out of growing rents and the shares of dissenting partners purchased with the same money. The farmers had until May 1683 to pay up the £60,000 they were short on their 1676 rent. Nonetheless, they remained heavily in arrears, partly due to misuse of their funds, and at the end of the farm were said to be £107,000 in arrear.¹ There was no other reason other than the early delays in payment and their misuse of the farm rents for this arrear. The establishment of 1676 totalled £202,000 leaving a surplus of about £32,000 once their interest (£6,000) was taken from the £240,000 total.² During their tenure of the farm every major branch improved its yield, except the quitrents which fell by about £5,000 pa. In every year the net total came above the establishment of £202,000, even in 1676 when it was only £208,102.³ The overplus could not be sent to England as, when it became available, it was taken up in repaying Bridges’ loan and then the Scots regiment. Clearly, however, the revenue in these years was able to encompass its task.

¹. Carte Ms 54; fol 127-8, Charge of Shaen’s Farm, 1676-82; Carte Ms 54; fol 90, Farmers Arrears, 7 Apr 1682.
². PRO PC2/65; fol 141-9, Establishment, 10 Mar 1676.
³. Carte Ms 53; fol 601-2, Produce of Shaen Farm, 1676-82.

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1679 was a bad year for both customs and inland excise, but a net total of £222,604 allowed the military and civil lists and the Scots regiment to be paid when a stop was put on pensions, thereby saving £10,000. Ireland very easily paid for itself, accruing a surplus in 1680 when the net produce came to £244,681 and evened out in 1681 and 1682 to about £232,000. These figures, in fact, hide an even more marked improvement in the economy which was reflected by the high revenue bids of 1680–82. Gross totals for the years 1677–82 ranged from £298,061 to £285,468, with only one poor year, 1679, when it dipped to £275,804.¹ The farmers might claim their profits had been negligible, but these were surely hidden in the £53,000 pa they very generously claimed for repayments and salaries, of which £36,000 went for salaries, but I am more inclined to accept Williamson's estimate which suggests a profit of up to £20,000 pa was hidden in these figures.² As with other farms, however, the main profit was to be had from being able to use these revenues for financing private enterprise, in which, judging by the persistent delays in payment, they indulged. The main reason for the persistent and consistent improvement in the revenue yield can be put down to the prolonged peace England enjoyed in these years, which enabled Irish merchants to exploit their European markets with full freedom. Another major factor which enabled the farm rent to be increased to

¹ AD Ms 18022:fol 52, Produce of Shaen Farm, 1676–82.
² Carte Ms 53:fol 601–2, Produce of Shaen Farm, 1676–82; CSPD, 1677–78: p 598, Williamson's Notes, 25 Jan 1678.
£240,000 pa in 1676 and to hold to that sum was not increased efficiency on the farmers' part, but the successful judgements the government achieved, whereby the imposition on tobacco was raised to £4, alterations made in liquor measures and other excise judgements, increasing the revenue by £20,000 pa.¹

Thus it was possible for the Shaen partnership to pay £240,000 pa whereas the Forths only gave £215,000 (£10,000 secretly) and the casual revenue yielded around £6,000 for Ranelagh: Ireland's yearly revenue had been raised by £20,000 pa, but this appears to have been the limit to which the government could push such impositions without calling a parliament.²

In 1679 Irish trade suffered badly with the customs falling off by £15,000 compared to the previous year.³ In part this was caused by the decision in May 1679 to renew the expired cattle acts, this time including a ban on Irish butter, for Ireland had begun to export cattle to England in 1679.⁴ Once more Irish merchants had to revert to their old European markets just as some had begun to intervene and move into the profitable English market. A drought in the summer of 1679 exacerbated the situation, hitting the cattle trade in particular, and leading to a stop on all pension payments in July 1679.⁵

By August 1679, due to the slight trade recession caused by the European war, and on account of paying Ryder off his share of

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1. CSPD. 1677-78:p 520, Williamson's Notes, 21 Dec 1677.
2. CSPD. 1677-78:p 520, Williamson's Notes, 21 Dec 1677.
3. Carte Ms 53:fol 601-2, Produce of Shaen Farm, 1676-82.
4. Ormonde NS IV, p 513, Southwell to Ormond, 17 May 1679.
5. CSPD. 1679-80:p 229, Rawdon to Conway, 27 Aug 1679; Ormonde MS V:pp 120-1, Ormond to Sunderland, 3 June 1679; Carte Ms 146: fol 197, Ormond to Coventry, 6 July 1679.
the advance money, the farmers were £50,605 in arrear of rent and
Ormond decided to reissue the order that only the king's rent
and management should be paid and placed an officer to sit with
the farmers in their deliberations. By this stage, Shaen was
mooting his great scheme to take over the complete management
of the Irish revenue now that Danby, his great enemy, had
fallen. The changed political climate in England which saw
the rise of first Essex and then Hyde to be first lord of the
treasury prefigured renewed treasury domination of Irish affairs.
This time Hyde, not Danby, directed matters and his chief ally
in Ranelagh's place was Shaen. Thus Ormond was ordered to ignore
all former disputes and give the farmers full countenance in
April 1680 and pressure began to mount to remove the strictures
under which the farm operated.

By 1680 the temporary trough of 1679 was replaced by a new
high in all branches. Proposed retrenchments and plans to
use some of the privy purse money to repair forts were cast
aside. As we have seen, the lords of the treasury, headed by
Hyde, took an active interest in the Irish revenue and more
particularly the schemes of Shaen. As a prelude to these
negotiations they firmly asserted their ascendancy in Irish
revenue matters, telling Jenkins that all Irish revenue letters
must pass through their hands in order to be valid. By joining

2. Ormonde NS V, pp 178-9, Boyle to Ormond, 6 Aug 1679.
3. Carte Ms 218: fol 158, Ormond to Boyle, 1 Aug 1680.
4. Carte Ms 53: fol 601-2, Produce of Shaen Farm, 1676-82.
5. PRO PC2/69: fol 74, 9 Nov 1680.
6. CSPD, 1680-1: p 166, Treasury Lords to Jenkins, 14 Feb 1681.
with Shaen the treasury lords became the prime movers in the attempt to shift Ranelagh from power. Backed by the treasury lords, and in contravention of earlier restraints, Shaen and his partners began issuing warrants without the inspection of the commissioners. In fact, the viceroy was powerless to stop the farmers and only later discovered that this had been ordered by the king himself, not Hyde. No one had thought it worth their while to inform the lord lieutenant. He knew the farmers were in arrear, only paying up the March quarter that August, and that this would increase until they got in the hearthmoney and quitrents later in the year. However, Ormond hesitated about representing these failings to the king and it was Ranelagh who eventually gave in this account, but Hyde chose not to believe it.

Following Ranelagh's suspension, Shaen's power was further displayed when letters of imprest to pay the army its June quarter were directed to him, not Ranelagh, Taylor or the commissioners of inspection, for he was not a crown official and not responsible to the crown. Ormond meekly expressed the hope that this method would not again be adopted, emphasising it by complaining their rent was at least £30,000 in arrear as it had generally tended to be. The farmers were supposed to answer this charge of being on average £30,000 in arrear before they could receive

2. Carte Ms 218; fol 158, Ormond to Boyle, 1 Aug 1680; Carte Ms 218; fol 180-97 passim, Aug 1681.
4. Ormonde NS VI, pp 133, 153, 159 & 165 passim; Carte Ms 218; fol 200-21 passim, Various Letters, Sept 1681.
5. Ormonde NS VI, pp 269-70, Ormond to Treasury Lords, 19 Dec 1681.
a new grant of the revenue, but this condition appears to have
been waived when they agreed to all the amendments in their
contract.\(^1\) This was a clear manifestation of Hyde's and the
king's support for Shaen and his growing prestige and influence.
Rumours that they were £76,000 in arrear (probably very
accurate) were disregarded and Arran himself, deciding to back
the winner now, denounced Sir Standish Hartstonge's claim they
were £200,000 in arrear which, though fanciful, pointed to the
truth.\(^2\)

At the Irish exchequer Ranelagh's undertaking had disrupted
the traditional method of supervising the revenue. In 1677
the old method of taking the vice-treasurer's accounts, used in
Anglesey's time, was reverted to, but it failed to uncover any
of the corruption of which Ranelagh was accused and in which he
was probably involved.\(^3\) In order to cover themselves Ranelagh
issued Champante with strict instructions on how to deal with
the revenue (something Bellingham does not seem to have received
from Anglesey) and in Champante's papers there is a copy of
'A Constitution of the Exchequer' which would have enabled him
to stick to the official forms and method.\(^4\) Perhaps this was
why their accounts were passed without much comment or criticism.

1. ibid., pp 316-7, Ormond to Arran, 18 Feb 1682.
2. ibid., pp 324-5, Longford to Ormond, 25 Feb 1682.
3. Stowe Ms 211:fol 230, King to Essex, 21 Mar 1677; Ormonde Ms
   IV, pp 28-9, Ormond to Temple, 9 June 1677; ibid., pp 42-3,
   Orrery to Ormond, 17 Sept 1677.
4. Rawlinson Ms A236:fol 99, Ranelagh to Champante, 10 Apr
   1680; Rawlinson Ms A236:fol 115-17, 'A Constitution of the
   Exchequer'; no date.
The payment of the army in these years, 1676–82, was a good indication of the well-being of the economy. Payments to the army between 1676 and 1682 remained in arrear, but without serious complaints. The infamous December 1675 quarter was not cleared, however, until Essex became first lord of the treasury, when Ranelagh quickly paid it, probably by compositions.¹

The strain of repaying Bridges' loan and then of finding the money to pay the Scots regiment during its sojourn in Ireland and expedition to Tangiers pushed the army into further arrears, opening the door to increased corruption and discontent. By the summer of 1681 the army was six months in arrear, but this was also, in part, caused by the fact that the farmers, through incompetence and malpractice, were likewise six months in arrear.² This six months arrear in payment continued right up to the end of Shaen's farm.³

Not surprisingly, therefore, when a new contract was being mooted in 1681, Ormond had many ideas about repairing the defects in the way the army was paid and composed. A new

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1. Ormonde NS V, pp 131-49 passim; Carte Ms 53; fol 336-7, Unpaid December 1675 pay, ? 1679.
2. Ormonde NS VI, p 130, Ormond to Arran, 13 Aug 1681.
3. Ibid., p 278, Ormond to Arran, 24 Dec 1681; Ibid., pp 316-17, Ormond to Arran, 18 Feb 1682.
establishment could be expected soon, but Ormond, quite rightly, grew suspicious, as he was not consulted in his opinion, as time drew on. The king denied plotting to reform the army without telling Ormond, although in the light of later developments there is no reason to suppose he would have consulted the viceroy.¹ The lord lieutenant supported Longford's expensive but sensible ordnance proposal, but there was no place for it, or any of Ormond's ideas once the new contract, and therefore the putative establishment, broke down.²

It would seem, therefore, that the army was no better paid under Ormond than under Essex. Ormond, however, deliberately avoided confrontation on the issue, although there is evidence that Ranelagh's corruption increased through such expedients as Bridges's loan, and the strains of keeping the Scots regiment. On the other hand, political reverses in England weakened Ranelagh's influence and an expedient of the Bridges' type was not tried again, as Essex thought it might be, after the agreement and repayments expired.³ Arguments with his former partners, pressure in Dublin and London over his accounts and the ending of the commission exclusively controlled by himself for collecting arrears probably cut down the room for corruption, but

¹ Ormonde NS VI, p 92, Ormond to Arran, 4 July 1681; ibid., p 272, Jenkins to Ormond, 20 Dec 1681; ibid., p 133, Conway to Ormond, 16 Aug 1681.
² ibid., p 183, Longford to Ormond, 9 Oct 1681; ibid., p 272, Jenkins to Ormond, 20 Dec 1681.
³ Stowe Ms 217: fol 251-3, Essex to Orrery, 11 Aug 1677.
clearly he made sizeable profits. (See above.) The army remained 6 months in arrear, but this was a constant not an increasing arrear, and considering the strains imposed by paying the Scots regiment, bears testimony to a healthy economy. The difficulties encountered in paying the army on time had their origin in the loan of £24,000 to Ranelagh out of the current rent and the long delays Essex felt obliged to make in issuing payments in 1676.

We can see, therefore, that Shaen's Irish revenue proposals were made against the solid background of a relatively well-paid establishment and a thriving economy. The Irish treasury had also been managed in an orderly fashion enabling a smooth transition from one vice-treasurer to whoever or whatever was to succeed him. In terms of the revenue, then, Ireland's future was set fair. The great contest, however, revolved around who should control that destiny. Ironically, Danby's fall had not led to the freeing of the Irish government from English treasury control, but to an increasing subservience to the treasury, successively under Essex and Hyde. In this sense the years 1679-82 are a turning point in the government of Ireland, the more so because Ranelagh, who had attempted to gain from encroachments on the lord lieutenant's power, was removed from the Irish scene, and the English treasury emerged as the complete master of Irish affairs.

By 1682 Ormond was Ireland's governor in name alone and he recognised this fact. Partly, no doubt, in order to come to an understanding with Hyde and Shaen Ormond set out for England
on 3 May 1682. His main reason for the journey was to sort out his grandson, Ossory's, marriage to Arlington's daughter, and he only intended to be gone for two months. In deference to him decisions on the new establishment and Longford's ordnance proposal were deferred until his arrival, but this was a mark of respect, as time was to show, rather than an indication of his having any sway in these deliberations.

The major decision - to keep all the advance money for English uses - had already been made. When in Whitehall, as when in Dublin, Ormond represented an acceptable facade through which Whitehall's policies could be directed - by 1682 he had absolutely no influence on the decision making process.

The years 1682-85 were to see the completion of this process as the English treasury, through its Irish treasury commissioners, tightened its control of Irish affairs.

1. Ormonde NS VI, p 359, Arran to Ormond, 2 May 1682; ibid., p 361, 3 May 1682.
2. ibid., p 316, Ormond to Arlington, 18 Feb 1682; ibid., p 317, Ormond to Arran, 20 Feb 1682; ibid., p 318, Ormond to Arlington, 20 Feb 1682; ibid., p 336, Arran to Ormond, 4 Mar 1682.
3. ibid., p 354, Longford to Ormond, 28 Mar 1682.
4. ibid., p 354, Longford to Ormond, 28 Mar 1682.
Chapter IX

THE FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATION
OF THE REVENUE COMMISSIONERS, 1682-85:
NEW FORMS AND TIGHTER CONTROLS
Following Danby's fall from office and the simultaneous eclipse of Ranelagh, both English and Irish affairs jerked along in a series of confused and directionless shifts, caused by Charles's efforts both to survive and to free himself from the constrictions of parliament and opposition lords. The years 1682-85 were in comparison ones of political and financial stability, freeing the king at last to pursue those nebulous goals to which he had devoted himself intermittently since 1667, except that by 1682 much of his energy and enthusiasm had diminished, and increasingly the vigour and direction came from James, the heir presumptive, supported by both Hyde and Sunderland. These years of the 'Stuart revenge' prepared England to acquiesce in James's accession more easily than he had dared hope and set England on course towards an absolutist dream.¹

In Ireland these years are traditionally seen as ones of peace and prosperity, and that they were, but profound changes were taking place.² In the course of this chapter we will deal with the decision to follow the English pattern and to end the farming of the revenue, and look at the influence of the new revenue commissioners in financial and other matters. In so doing we will reassess Ormond's role in these years, discovering that whilst raised to an English dukedom and seemingly a leader of the 'Stuart revenge', he really became no more than lord lieutenant

in name and Arran, his deputy, a cipher of the treasury. Under Rochester (Hyde) the treasury lords achieved the direction and domination of Irish affairs for which Danby and Kanelagh had striven. Rochester's task was easier, for he inherited a stabilizing financial situation and, after the conflicts of 1672-81, a calm political context in which the crown was growing in strength through the instruments of its 'Stuart revenge' of 1682-85.¹ Ormond's increasing age and attacks of 'gout' also made it easier to supersede him: much of the energy necessary to fight political rivals had been dissipated by age and illness. How cast down the esteemed office of lord lieutenant had become was seen by his removal in favour of Rochester (Hyde), for whom not only was it an 'exile', but a severe diminution in viceregal powers: the conception of Ireland and the lord lieutenancy had changed rapidly since 1639. Finally, in this chapter we will review the economy's performance under management, and also consider the state of the army and future plans for it, as the Irish army was the cornerstone of James's conception of Ireland's role in his future reign.

When Ormond arrived at court in May 1682 he showed no inclination to stay there any longer than was necessary.² This desire was reinforced by the continued ignorance he was kept under as to the new contract, which made him fearful of making practical suggestions.

² Ormonde NS VI, p 412, Ormond to Arran, 1 Aug 1682.
about clauses which should be inserted, in case it was interpreted as obstruction.\(^1\) The new contract was sent to Ireland before Ormond could see it, and the whole process came to a halt whilst the farmers' partners in Ireland considered the terms to which their English partners were tying them.\(^2\) Possibly under pressure from his Irish partners who were not happy at the great concessions made by Shaen, and perhaps now that Ranelagh's acceptance had been bought, Shaen set about reneging on the concessions.

When it was discovered in the farmers' June accounts that £20,000 had been paid to Tangiers out of the current rent, and not from the new advance as Rochester expected, the treasury lords began to suspect Shaen had overbid.\(^3\)

Distrusting Shaen, Ormond instructed his son to find some new bidders for the revenue, but unfortunately Shaen's farm included all the most 'trustworthy' and solvent Irish financiers available and that Deane, who had to seek protection from writs to come to Dublin, should have been wheeled out with an offer was indicative of the lack of real competition.\(^4\) His proposals and his backers were lightweight and Arran suspected his offer of £90,000 pa for the quitrents and £200,000 pa for the rest was an overbid.\(^5\)

Even when he raised his bid in September/October 1682 it was not seriously considered, nor was one from Thompson, who lifted his

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1. Ormonde NS VI, p 365, Ormond to Arran, 16 May 1682; ibid., p 386, Ormond to Boyle, 22 May 1682.
2. ibid., pp 371-2, Arran to Ormond, 28 May 1682; ibid., p 376, Gwynn to Arran, 30 May 1682; ibid., p 377, Ormond to Boyle, 30 May 1682.
3. ibid., p 387, Ormond to Arran, 20 June 1682.
5. Carte Ms 53:fol 744, Deane's Proposal, 9 July 1682; Carte Ms 218:fol 260, Deane's Securities, ? Sept 1682; Ormonde NS VI, p 400, Arran to Ormond, 9 July 1682; ibid., pp 408-9, Arran to Ormond, 29 July 1682.

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bid for all the revenue, except the quitrents, from £200,000 pa to £210,000 pa.¹

Certainly Shaen's tricks and manoeuvres had succeeded in preventing any serious rival groups from bidding for the Irish revenue, especially now that Sheridan had given up his efforts. Ormond and Rochester began to suspect that this had been his purpose all along, so that Charles, out of necessity, would have to yield to the terms he demanded, for in July Shaen suddenly asked for four months longer to pay and for the vice-treasurer's fees and offices, so that the king would have no proper check on the undertaking.² He was also vague about how the interest on the advance would be paid and some of the treasury lords began to think that the king might just as easily raise money on the security of the revenue as the contractors.³ Rochester, however, was absolutely outraged, believing he had been duped by Shaen, and he opposed the four months delay or giving Shaen the vice-treasurer's fees and offices.⁴ In consequence, the new contract was set aside, all constraints on the farmers, waived on 1 September 1681, were reinstated, the farmers' accounts called for, an inspection into the collectors' accounts ordered, and finally Ranelagh and Champante temporarily restored to the treasury.⁵ Strict orders were issued that the farmers were only allowed to pay the civil and military lists and to make no other payments.⁶

². Ormonde NS VI, p 407, Ormond to Arran, 29 July 1682.
³. ibid., p 407, Ormond to Arran, 29 July 1682.
⁴. Carte Ms 40:fol 104, Hyde to Ormond, 29 July 1682.
⁵. Ormonde NS VI, pp 410-11, Treasury Lords to Ormond, 1 Aug 1682; ibid., pp 417-18, Arran to Ormond, 8 Aug 1682.
Shaen had, therefore, stretched his credibility to breaking point. The king smelled a rat and Shaen's petition to waive the two contentious issues was dismissed.\(^1\) Ormond began encouraging new revenue bids and dismissed rumours that the king would opt for a management coupled with a parliament.\(^2\) He was right about the parliament, but clearly out of touch with the king's inclination towards management, for a week later the king resolved on that method.\(^3\) A commission of management was to be set up and the establishment to be paid in a new order of preference, viz Ireland, Tangiers, shipping and pensions.\(^4\) Clearly Ormond was surprised by the decision, indicating that even when present at court his real influence on Irish affairs was minimal, for he was still busy encouraging the useless bids of Deane and Thompson.

The circumstances surrounding the crown's decision to resolve positively on a management are remarkably similar to those prevailing in 1671 when, under pressure from Bucknall to make his covenants more favourable, the crown broke free from those constrictions and decided not to let the customs in England to farm.\(^5\) Although an unplanned and ad hoc measure the crown moved inexorably towards the execution of its new resolution. Ranelagh, Ormond and the lords of the treasury set to work on framing a new establishment.\(^6\) The pension list would only be paid if there

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\(^1\) Ormonde NS VI, p 411, Ormond to Arran, 1 Aug 1682.
\(^2\) Ibid., p 411, Ormond to Arran, 1 Aug 1682; Ibid., p 418, Ormond to Arran, 5 Aug 1682; Carte Ms 216;fol 137; Longford to Arran, 8 Aug 1682; Carte Ms 39;fol 643, Treasury Lords to Arran, 1 Aug 1682.
\(^3\) Ormonde NS VI, p 418, Ormond to Arran, 5 Aug 1682.
\(^4\) Ibid., p 418, Ormond to Arran, 5 Aug 1682.
\(^5\) Chandaman, op cit., pp 26 ff.
\(^6\) Ormonde NS VI, p 418, Ormond to Arran, 5 Aug 1682; Carte Ms 216;fol 139, FitzPatrick to Arran, 12 Aug 1682.
was a surplus above £270,000 pa for Ireland, Tangiers and shipping.¹ Ormond's efforts to reward the large entourage that had accompanied him to court with pensions was, therefore, unlikely to bear fruit, especially as in 1682 pensions had to be suspended so as to pay the martial list.²

In Dublin, Arran feared the change to management would require much work because of all the years the revenue had been in farm and that this would be disasterous.³ Management proposals were not a new idea for Ireland. Such schemes had been forwarded by Shaen and Ranelagh from time to time, Sir Francis Brewster in September 1681 and Colonel Richard Lawrence in September 1682.⁴ However, enthusiasm for management was tempered by the conventional wisdom of the day, that farming was a superior method.⁵ Both in London and Dublin great losses were expected from management.⁶ The viceroy lamented that it was too late to find suitable farmers, preferring farming to management, but to continue with the king's resolution was unavoidable, as the only good bids came from combinations in which Shaen had a share and this was unacceptable to the crown.⁷ The king made it clear that the experiment was for one year only, but Boyle, for example,

1. Carte Ms 39: fol 584, Gascoigne to Arran, 12 Aug 1682.
2. Carte Ms 39: fol 645, Treasury Lords to Arran, 8 Aug 1682; Ormonde NS VI, p 419, Ormond to Arran, 10 Aug 1682; ibid., p 377, Ormond to Arran, 30 May 1682.
3. ibid., pp 422-3, Arran to Ormond, 15 Aug 1682; CSPD, 1682; pp 341-2, Arran to Jenkins, 15 Aug 1682.
4. Carte Ms 53: fol 504-5, Brewster to Ormond, 12 Sept 1681; Ormonde NS VI, pp 434-5, Lawrence to Ormond, 2 Sept 1682; Carte Ms 52: fol 502-3, Shaen's Proposals, Jan ? 1674.
7. ibid., p 449, Ormond to Keating, 18 Sept 1682; ibid., pp 456-7, Ormond to Boyle, 2 Oct 1675.
feared that the commissioners would collect so much less revenue that a future farm, auctioned in 1683, would be greatly under-valued. This universal gloom as to the prospects of the commission proved to be quite unfounded.

Confidence in the crown's decision to manage the revenue was further undermined when the names of the new commissioners were revealed. The identity of the five commissioners had been veiled in secrecy and many Irishmen were bitterly disappointed that Ormond was unable to win places on the commission for them. The viceroy was virtually totally excluded from choosing the commissioners. Longford gained his place by Ormond's recommendation, but Longford's influence with Charles was great enough not to need the viceroy's help. Lemuel Kingdon, a London financier and associate of Conway and Ranelagh was also chosen. Robert Bridges was chosen too: he was Ranelagh's friend and a financier who, like Kingdon, had been involved in the periphery of Irish finances. The other two making up the five in the commission were "Mr Strong, a gentleman at present employed in the excise, and Mr Dickenson, one employed in the customs here," - these latter two were very much Rochester's creatures. They received £1,000 pa each and Sir John Ellis was made their secretary with £300 pa and

2. ibid., p 424, Arlington to Ormond, 16 Aug 1682; ibid., p 425, Arran to Ormond, 19 Aug 1682; ibid., p 426, Davys to Ormond, 19 Aug 1682; ibid., p 437, Gwynn to Arran, 5 Sept 1682; Carte Ms 218:fol 256, Meredith to Ormond, 12 Sept 1682; Carte Ms 216:fol 161, FitzPatrick to Arran, 5 Sept 1682; Carte Ms 216:fol 149, Longford to Arran, 19 Aug 1682.
Thompson their clerk with £200 pa. In Dublin there was consterna-
tion at the names chosen, not because they lacked skill, for
they were all specialists in the revenue, but because of their
ignorance of Ireland and obvious dependence on lords other than
Ormond. Lacking all confidence in the commissioners’ ability
to succeed, Boyle and Ormond began to press for a parliament
to make up for the expected deficits in 1683. To his son Ormond
confided that by acts of parliament only the lord lieutenant was
invested with the power to appoint commissioners, not the treasury,
and it demonstrated the weakness of his position and his desire
to keep his office at all costs, that he did not try to assert
these rights, but meekly accepted Rochester’s direction in these
affairs.

Rochester’s efforts to dominate completely the lord lieutenant’s part
in Irish revenue matters by means of the new commission for the
revenue were quashed, however, as Ormond took exception to these
offensive clauses and instructed Arran how to erase them diplo-
matically from the commission when he returned his comments
on it to London. The commission was a very rushed document
because of the need for the new commissioners to take up employ-
ment before the current farm terminated, so that they could observe

2. Ormonde NS VI, p 445, Arran to Ormond, 13 Sept 1682.
3. ibid., pp 456-7, Ormond to Boyle, 2 Oct 1682; ibid., p 464,
Boyle to Ormond, 10 Oct 1682.
4. ibid., pp 440-1, Ormond to Arran, 9 Sept 1682.
5. ibid., pp 430-1, Ormond to Arran, 25 Aug 1682; ibid., p 435,
Arran to Ormond, 2 Sept 1682; ibid., pp 443-4, Ormond to Arran,
12 Sept 1682.
the system in operation. Arran and Temple were consequently forced to re-draft the commission in much haste and it therefore contained several imperfections. Temple's re-draft was, however, accepted by Whitehall after some minor points had been queried and changed. Strong, Bridges and Kingdon left for Ireland in October. They left without either an establishment or a named receiver-general, because pressure of English business prevented the treasury lords from considering these matters. The new commission passed the great seal on 21 November 1682 inspite of efforts by the farmers to block it.

The major apprehension was that the farmers would leave the revenue in severe arrear and that the commissioners might bring over friends and relations to fill places, thereby ousting the farmers' officers, which might further entangle relations with the farmers and their employees, for co-operation was more likely if they re-employed many of the farmers' collectors.

In these circumstances Dickenson and Longford, backed by Rochester, suggested that Arran should seize the farm and all its assets, but the cautious lord deputy resisted this pressure fearing it would play into Shaen's hands and instead he prevaricated until the new commissioners arrived. In fact, the collapse of Shaen's

2. Ibid., p 439, Arran to Ormond, 6 Sept 1682; ibid., p 445, Arran to Ormond, 13 Sept 1682; ibid., pp 446-7, Arran to Ormond, 17 Sept 1682; ibid., pp 447-8, Keating to Ormond, 18 Sept 1682.
3. Carte Ms 54:fol 25-6, Temple to Ormond, 16 Sept 1682; Ormonde NS VI, p 452, Ormond to Boyle, 26 Sept 1682; ibid., pp 455-7, Boyle to Ormond, 18 Oct 1682; ibid., p 475, Keating to Ormond, rec'd 5 Nov 1682; Carte Ms 39:fol 663, Treasury Lords to Arran, 7 Oct 1682.
5. Ibid., pp 470-1, Ormond to Arran, 31 Oct 1682; ibid., p 488, Ormond to Arran, 2 Dec 1682.
7. Ormonde NS VI, pp 447-8, Keating to Ormond, 18 Sept 1682.
8. Ibid., pp 461-2, Arran to Ormond, 10 Oct 1682; ibid., p 462, Ormond to Boyle, 10 Oct 1682; Carte Ms 39:fol 606, Longford
new contract in August 1682 had exposed all the inadequacies of
the farmers' management. The attempt to place £20,000 for
Tangiers on current rents illustrated their untrustworthiness
and Captain Murray's disputation of the solvency of an assign-
ment in July 1682 suggested they were in severe financial
difficulties.¹ The death of Taylor, their receiver-general,
just at this time further complicated their accounts and it was
discovered that the collectors could not pay June assignments
until the October quitrents were received.² Not surprisingly,
the farmers resisted all the government's efforts to bring them
to account and attempted to overturn the restraints the crown
put on them.² As the October quitrents began to come in the farm-
ers claimed a great debt from the king and refused to pay any
of the last six months to the establishment.³ This would leave
the farmers with a clear debt to the crown, allowing for all
defalcations, of £120,000; hence the revenue commissioners
advised an immediate seizure of the farm to secure some of the
quitrents.⁴ In retrospect we can say Arran was foolish not to
follow this advice, but he had good reasons, and we should
remember that he, of all the Dublin executive, trusted Shaen the

¹. Ormonde NS VI, pp 403-4, Farmers to Arran, 22 July 1682.
². Ormonde NS VI, p 415, Arran to Ormond, 6 Aug 1682.
³. ibid., pp 410-11, Treasury Lords to Ormond, 1 Aug 1682; ibid.,
pp 417-8, Arran to Ormond, 8 Aug 1682; ibid., p 420, Boyle to
Ormond, 11 Aug 1682; Carte Ms 54:fol 54, Treasury Lords
Shaen et al, 11 Aug 1682; Carte Ms 39:fol 647, Treasury Lords
to Arran, 12 Aug 1682; Carte Ms 59:fol 649, Treasury Lords to
Arran, 22 Aug 1682.
⁴. Ormonde NS VI, p 455, Arran to Longford, 30 Sept 1682; ibid.,
p 459, Arran to Ormond, 3 Oct 1682.
⁵. ibid., pp 463-4, Ormonde to Arran, 10 Oct 1682; Carte Ms 39:
fol 665, Treasury Lords to Arran, 10 Oct 1682.
least. In the first place, Shaen made it appear that he was, in fact, preparing to pay the September quarter and Arran, therefore, believed this quarter's pay might be lost if he seized the farm, and, anyway, the executive thought they now had sufficient powers to ensure that any money paid out would only go to the civil and military lists.¹ Secondly, he believed that the government had reasonable security in the farmers' £60,000 advance and the £20,000 for repairs to Kinsale, and that a seizure would play into their hands, as their accounts were very uncertain since the constraints on them had been removed, and that they might therefore use the seizure to swindle the king.² Thus, in November 1682, collector Hales was instructed to pay out on assignments for Ossory's pension and for sums to officers of the guards: but the government had failed to appreciate the farmers' intention not to issue another penny.²

By the close of 1682 it was realised the farmers were about £120,000 in debt, that they had no intention of clearing this debt, and that many of the June assignments were insolvent.⁴ A bitter legal battle ensued between the revenue commissioners and the farmers in which the commissioners tried to claim the impost for excise on the farmers' accounts and Shaen tried to discount his debts by claiming the £80,000 due from Kanelagh.⁵

2. Ibid., pp 422–3, Arran to Ormond, 13 Aug 1682; ibid., p 473, Keating to Ormond, rec'd 5 Nov 1682.  
3. Carte Ms 54:fol 78, Treasury Lords to Arran, 27 Nov 1682.  
4. Ormonde NS VI, pp 497–8, Arran to Ormond, 18 Dec 1682; ibid., pp 509–10, Arran to Ormond, 10 Jan 1683; Carte Ms 218:fol 424, Longford to Treasury Lords, 13 Jan 1683; Carte Ms 218:fol 427–8, Kingdon to Ormond, 21 Jan 1683.  
5. Ormonde NS VI, pp 516–29 passim.
On the excise the commissioners were fighting a losing battle, but they took steps to procure orders which ensured that the farmers did not misapply any arrears that they gathered and the collectors were instructed only to pay out their salaries and June assignments.\(^1\) Matters were further entangled by the fact that Shaen's and Champante's accounts failed to tally and the farmers asked to be allowed to change theirs.\(^2\) In April 1683 the farmers' legal debt was finally assessed at £108,000, but Arran's request to seize the farm now, to prevent arrears that were collected from being misapplied, was ignored.\(^3\)

Shaen attempted to make accusations and excuses in Whitehall, whilst in Dublin the farmers were static awaiting Shaen's return, afraid to take action, especially as Muschamp, the leading partner in Ireland, had just died.\(^4\) The commissioners of the revenue were not over-awed by this inertia, however, and in May and June 1683 prosecuted all royal debtors with considerable ferocity. Pressure was applied to make debtors' English estates liable to the Irish exchequer, but this would never prevail and Ranelagh, now excluded from Irish affairs, had to petition the king to stop the renewal of his prosecution, but not before some of his Irish estates had been seized along with Doane's and Stepney's.\(^5\)

1. Ormonde NS VI, p 546, Ormond to Arran, 20 Mar 1683; Carte Ms 54:fol 167, Revenue Commissioners to Arran, 10 Mar 1683; Carte Ms 218:fol 444, Arran to Lords of Treasury, 19 Mar 1683; Carte Ms 40:fol 27, Treasury Lords to Arran, 27 Mar 1683; Ormonde NS VII, p 8, Arran to Ormond, 4 Apr 1683.

2. Ormonde NS VI, p 460, Boyle to Ormond, 7 Oct 1682; ibid., p 471, Arran to Ormond, 1 Nov 1682.

3. Ormonde NS VII, p 8, Arran to Ormond, 4 Apr 1683; Carte Ms 54:fol 90, Farmers' Arrears, 1683; Carte Ms 54:fol 39, Sums demanded by Farmers, ? 1683; Carte Ms 54:fol 167, Revenue Commissioners to Arran, 10 Mar 1683.

4. Ormonde NS VII, pp 13-14, Ormond to Arran, 17 Apr 1683; ibid., p 19, Arran to Treasury Lords, 2 May 1683.

5. ibid., pp 36-7, Arran to Ormond, 1 June 1683; ibid., pp 38-9, Ormond to Arran, 5 June 1683; Rawlinson Ms 238:fol 88, Ranelagh to Champante, 19 May 1683; CSPD, 1683, Jan–June:p 292, Reference of Ranelagh's Petition, 4 June 1683.
Proceedings against the farmers were begun, but only Shaen and Mills had Irish estates and those were not very considerable and Arran was angry that their prosecution had started without consulting him.\footnote{Ormonde NS VII, p 42, Arran to Ormond, 12 June 1683; ibid., p 57, Arran to Ormond, 26 June 1683; Carte Ms 54:fol 197, Law Lords to Treasury Lords, rec'd 29 June 1683; Carte Ms 218: fol 467, Longford to Ormond, 16 June 1683.} The farmers began compounding with merchants for their excise at sale, which the commissioners warned the traders was illegal, as this money was owed to the king and they would, inspite of compositions, be held liable to the king for the full amount.\footnote{Carte Ms 218:fol 467, Longford to Ormond, 16 June 1683.} Stannion, the main farmer left in Ireland, stole away at night, which made Arran urge a seizure once more, but by then it was pointless and too late.\footnote{ibid., p 121, Longford to Arran, 30 Aug 1683; Carte Ms 54: fol 215-16, Commissioners to Treasury Lords, 29 Aug 1683.} The farmers had treated Arran and the whole government disingenuously, leaving only Hill in Ireland, an insubstantial man who had been bought out of the farm but who was still a security for it.\footnote{Carte Ms 54:fol 226, Estimate of Shaen's Profits, no date.}

There can be no doubt that Shaen and his partners made considerable profits from their farm, much of which they obtained from their final debt of £108,000.\footnote{AD Ms 18022:fol 52, Produce of Revenue, 1676-82; Carte Ms 53: fol 601-2, Produce of Revenue, 1676-82; Carte Ms 54:fol 226, Estimate of Shaen's Profits, no date.} They hid much of their yearly profits in their repayments and salaries sections of the accounts, but although it was claimed they made up to £66,000 pa, once they had repaid their advance and interest £40,000 pa seems a more realistic figure.\footnote{Ormonde NS VII, pp 117-18, Arran to Ormond, 27 Aug 1683.} This we may calculate because the £108,000 owed to the king was virtually irrecoverable as most
of their assets were in England and would not be prosecuted for Irish debts; a fact clearly recognised by the government's decision in 1683 and 1684 to pay the soldiers' arrears out of the current revenue. The Shaen farm had been the most profitable of its kind for the partnership involved and the way it ended fulfilled the prognostications of Ryder about Shaen's character and trustworthiness.

General pessimism about the likelihood of a management succeeding, a severely entangled financial situation between the government and the farmers, and a huge current debt to the establishment was the background against which the new commission commenced operations. By their instructions the commissioners, to Arran's relief, removed from the lord deputy the obligation to prepare a state of the revenue, and to this end the commissioners immediately began reviewing the accounts of all farmers, undertakers and vice-treasurers since the restoration.¹ That a new strict efficiency aimed at destroying corruption was coming to Irish finances had been heralded by Longford's dispatches to the court from Holyhead, before he even reached Ireland. Here he discovered a customs fraud in rich silks and named the guilty merchants; at the same time he uncovered the means by which wine avoided prisage in Ireland by travelling via the Isle of Man.²

By mid-December 1682 the commissioners had chosen all the officers they intended to appoint and sent for securities from those chosen

¹ Ormonde NS VI, p 484, Arran to Ormond, 27 Nov 1682; Carte Ms 39:fol 669, Treasury Lords to Arran, 28 Oct 1682.
² Carte Ms 218:fol 270, Longford to Ormond, 12 Nov 1682.
in remote areas and called those near at hand to Dublin to swear it in person.\textsuperscript{1} It seems they worked so hard that they were only free on Sundays.\textsuperscript{2} They easily overcame the farmers' objections to their commission and quickly decided to farm the hearth tax.\textsuperscript{3} This they farmed at the highest rate yet, but they found they had to keep the old rent collectors for the time being as, if they sacked them before their rent rolls were copied, the rolls would have been lost and it would have severely disrupted rent collection; likewise they decided to go cautiously in replacing or chastising customs officers who they believed to have been very lax.\textsuperscript{4} Longford listened to a scheme of the lord Mayor, Sir Humphrey Jervis, to increase the revenue by £15,000 pa by stopping frauds, which, although not accepted, illustrated the new commission's direction and intentions.\textsuperscript{5} They sent an account of the customs for 1682 to the treasury and decided to retrench the posts of general officers who travelled the circuits to see that the collectors did their work, for they had decided to carry out this important duty themselves.\textsuperscript{6}

Inspite of the commissioners' hard work and that they made progress in their dealings with the farmers the prevailing mood remained

\begin{enumerate}
\item Ormonde NS VI, pp 497-8, Arran to Ormond, 18 Dec 1682; Carte Ms 218:fol 408, Longford to Ormond, 31 Dec 1682.
\item Ormonde NS VI, pp 489 & 497-8, Arran to Ormond, 5 & 18 Dec 1682; ibid., p 502, Arran to Ormond, 25 Dec 1682.
\item Carte Ms 218:fol 374-5, Longford to Ormond, 18 Nov 1682.
\item Carte Ms 218:fol 378, Longford to Ormond, 25 Nov 1682.
\item Carte Ms 218:fol 374-5, Longford to Ormond, 18 Nov 1682; Carte Ms 218:fol 378, Longford to Ormond, 25 Nov 1682; Carte Ms 54: fol 80, Jervis to Ormond, 25 Nov 1682.
\item Carte Ms 54:fol 27, Commissioners to Treasury Lords, 30 Dec 1682; Carte Ms 218:fol 408, Longford to Arran, 31 Dec 1682.
\end{enumerate}
one of pessimism.\textsuperscript{1} They uncovered a major fraud \textit{by which the farmers} had been illegally compounding for excise on imported goods, usually payable at sale, so as to take all the revenue into their hands which would \textit{normally} have been paid on these goods between January and June 1683.\textsuperscript{2} Fierce measures, such as breaking into warehouses, were taken to put an end to the fraud. This only multiplied their enemies. As it was, there were many, such as Foxon, who believed they should be on the commission and others were jealous of their £1,000 pa, especially the judges, whose circuit allowances were halved by the new establishment.\textsuperscript{3} Their investigations into former farmers' and vice-treasurers' accounts also increased their enemies.\textsuperscript{4} Furthermore, the commissioners' high hopes seemed quite unjustified with the farmers in such heavy arrear and the Spanish government had recently banned all imported goods, which was a blow to one of Ireland's most lucrative markets.\textsuperscript{5}Inspite of his father's exhortations Arran left the \textit{commissioners to prepare their own state of the revenue, rather than compile one himself.}\textsuperscript{6} He did not see how he could prevent severe arrears accumulating for the army and Tangiers and his calculations were based on the erroneous assumption that the establishment totalled £254,000, when in fact it was £270,000 pa.\textsuperscript{7}

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textit{Carte Ms 54:fol 141}, Ormond to Longford, 16 Jan 1683; \textit{Ormonde NS VI}, pp 516-7, Arran to Ormond, 22 Jan 1683.
\item \textit{Carte Ms 54:fol 94}, Practice of Late Farmers on the Excise, \textit{? 1683}; \textit{Carte Ms 54:fol 6-7}, Commissioners Answers to Proposals, \textit{? 1683}; \textit{Ormonde NS VI}, p 18, Boyle to Ormond, 23 Jan 1683.
\item \textit{Carte Ms 218:fol 408}, Longford to Arran, 31 Dec 1682; \textit{Ormonde NS VI}, p 499, Ormond to Arran, 19 Dec 1682.
\item \textit{Carte Ms 39:fol 679-80}, Revenue Commissioners Instructions, \textit{? Oct/Nov 1682}.
\item \textit{Ormonde NS VI}, p 518, Boyle to Ormond, 23 Jan 1683.
\item \textit{ibid.}, p 506, Ormond to Arran, 2 Jan 1683; \textit{ibid.}, pp 509-10, Arran to Ormond, 10 Jan 1683.
\item \textit{ibid.}, p 506, Ormond to Arran, 2 Jan 1683; \textit{ibid.}, pp 509-10, Arran to Ormond, 10 Jan 1683.
\end{enumerate}
Not surprisingly, therefore, Arran was taken aback when the new establishment at last arrived in March 1683. There were no longer privy purse payments to the king, but just under £70,000 pa was set aside for Tangiers and shipping. Arran and Ormond had pressed for an advance to pay the army its six months current arrears to prevent it from sliding further behind if, as expected, the revenue fell far short of £270,000 in 1683. It was thought that an advance could be borrowed on the security of the quit-rents and perhaps be accompanied by a parliament. Having discovered that no new transmission of bills was necessary and having secured loyal sheriffs, Arran was doubly disappointed to obtain neither the advance nor the parliament. Ormond did not despair of obtaining a parliament, but it was evident that intrigues with and against the Lombard Street bankers over both a farm of the English excise and then the whole English revenue caused such a rupture between the treasury and the bankers, leading to the decision to put the excise into management, that no advance could be gained. In London the lord lieutenant continued to try to win support for an Irish parliament, but found English ministers too concerned about English affairs, and the only succour he could offer was the fact that at least the quit-rents and hearth money due in May would avert disaster for the time.

1. Carte Ms 54; fol 453-63, Establishment, 2 Mar 1683.
2. Ormonde NS VI, pp 530-1, Ormond to Arran, 13 Feb 1683.
3. ibid., pp 535-6, Arran to Ormond, 20 Feb 1683; ibid., pp 538-9, Arran to Ormond, 1 Mar 1683; ibid., p 549, Arran to Ormond, 23 Mar 1683.
4. Chandaman, op cit., pp 71-3; Ormonde NS VI, pp 542-3, Ormond to Arran, 10 Mar 1683; ibid., p 545, Arran to Ormond, 19 Mar 1683; ibid., p 549, Arran to Ormond, 23 Mar 1683.
being. The army was in such a poor condition that Arran had to imprest a further three months pay (making six months in all) but as before, no dates were given for the imprests so that the army did not know if they were for current payments or arrears.

Whilst both Ormond and Arran were dismayed at their own impotence in the face of the treasury lords and their new agents, the commissioners, the Irish privy council, it seems, was disgusted with the new establishment, not just because it made niggardly cuts in creation money and other larger retrenchments, but because they thought that Ormond's presence at court and friendship with Rochester might have prevented them. There was general disappointment that the army would suffer in order to pay Tangiers and Arran believed the revenue would fall at least £15,000 short to meet the establishment, which meant Ireland would bear it, but with difficulty. Moreover, any earlier idea that Ireland would be paid first and that deficiencies in payments to Tangiers would be met by the English treasury, were soon dashed. Both Charles and Rochester expected Ireland to bear the cost of Tangiers fully and to this end Ormond advised advancing three months pay to the garrison in June 1683.

In June 1683 Charles borrowed £16,000 from John Price, the receiver-general, which was to be repaid to him by the collection of the

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1. Ormonde NS VII, pp 3-4, Ormond to Arran, 30 Mar 1683.
2. ibid., p 9, Arran to Ormond, 7 Apr 1683.
3. ibid., p 23, Arran to Ormond, 9 May 1683.
4. ibid., p 23, Arran to Ormond, 9 May 1683.
5. ibid., p 41, Ormond to Arran, 9 June 1683.
former vice-treasurer's fees on payments in Ireland until he had recouped his £16,000 plus 10%. Thus Charles gained a useful Irish subvention at a time when Iceland's finances appeared extremely stretched. John Price had in fact only been appointed receiver-general in April 1683 with a salary of £1,000 pa and Dr Robert Wood and John Bonnel made accountants-general. These appointments had been made after a protracted struggle in which the Irish executive's efforts to make the receiver-general's office something similar to a vice-treasurership had been thwarted, and the new commissioners' powers consequently increased.

In this struggle the diplomatic skills of the new commissioners had not been conspicuous, but their obvious dependence on the English treasury was. Arran was more than a little peeved that the commissioners received all the credit for the king's revised decision not to retrench the judges' circuit money, when he had made the representations against the decision to reduce it. Likewise the commissioners' appeal for increased powers, directed as it was to the treasury and not through the chief governor, demonstrated their lack of tact and dependence on Whitehall. They might meekly claim they were not trying to circumvent the chief governor, but their appeal was for increased powers and clarification of disputed points in their favour, giving them leave to pay and appoint collectors and to direct the revenue

1. Carte Ms 40:fol 47, King to Ormond, 2 June 1683; CSPD, 1683, Jan-June:pp 290-1, King to Ormond, 2 June 1683; CSPD, 1683, July-Sept:pp 193-5, King to Ormond, 23 July 1683.
2. Ormonde NS VII, p 13, King to Ormond, 16 Apr 1683; CSPD, 1683, Jan-June:pp 180-1, King to Ormond, 16 Apr 1683; Carte Ms 54: fol 131, King to Ormond, ? Apr 1683.
3. Ormonde NS VI, p 529, Arran to Ormond, 6 Feb 1683; ibid., p 529, Ormond to Arran, 6 Feb 1683; Carte Ms 54:fol 161, Temple to Ormond, 21 Feb 1683; Carte Ms 40:fol 12, Treasury Lords to Arran, 6 Feb 1683.
4. Ormonde NS VI, pp 535-6, Arran to Ormond, 20 Feb 1683.
almost as they wished or as Whitehall instructed. These increased powers were granted in April 1683.

As the revenue commissioners established and increased their powers, the lord lieutenant's influence on Irish affairs continued to decline. At court he was unable to discover the contents of Shaen's proposals for several weeks. His opposition to plans in 1682 to re-model the Irish army and executive was largely only successful thanks to the collapse of Shaen's schemes and the subsequent confusion into which Irish affairs were thrown.

Although Ormond believed the collapse of Shaen's project indicated that the king had been listening to the wrong advisers, Rochester remained the first minister and Ormond's proposals for new farm bids were ignored. In discussions on the new establishment for Ireland and the powers of the new commission Ormond played a peripheral role, failing, as we have seen, to assert his right to name the commissioners. The viceroy suppressed his opposition to the decision to make retrenchments on the Irish establishment and to manage the Irish revenue.

Ormond's role, therefore, was increasingly a passive one of simply accepting decisions made by others. This he stomached

1. ibid., pp 535-6, Arran to Ormond, 20 Feb 1683; Carte Ms 54: fol 31 & 142-3, Commissioners to Treasury Lords, 15 & 17 Jan 1683; Carte Ms 54:fol 147, Commissioners to Ormond, 21 Jan 1683; Carte Ms 218:fol 440, Longford to Ormond, 20 Feb 1683; Carte Ms 54:fol 161, Temple to Ormond, 27 Feb 1683; Carte Ms 40:fol 21, Treasury Lords to Commissioners, 10 Mar 1683.

2. CSPD, 1683, Jan-June:pp 174-5, King to Ormond, 13 Apr 1683; Ormonde NS VII. p 19, Arran to Treasury Lords, 2 May 1683; ibid., p 21, Kingdon to Arran, 6 May 1683; ibid., p 33, Arran to Ormond, 26 May 1683.

3. Ormonde NS VI. p 365, Ormond to Arran, 16 May 1682; ibid., p 367, Ormond to Arran, 22 May 1682.

4. ibid., p 409, Ormond to Arran, 29 July 1682; ibid., pp 408-9, Arran to Ormond, 29 July 1682.

5. ibid., p 409, Ormond to Boyle, 29 July 1682; ibid., pp 411-12, Ormond to Arran, 1 Aug 1682.

6. ibid., pp 430-1, Ormond to Arran, 25 Aug 1682; ibid., pp 443-4, Ormond to Arran, 12 Sept 1682; ibid., pp 440-1, Ormond to Arran, 9 Sept 1682; Carte Ms 218:fol 398, Ormond to Champante, 19 Dec 1682.

7. Ormonde NS VI. p 418, Ormond to Arran, 8 Aug 1682; ibid., p 449, (162)
more easily because the king had asked him to stay in England in a most obliging manner, and he sweetened the pill further by creating him an English duke and by prosecuting and suspending Anglesey for his reflections on Ormond in his book on the '41 rebellion.¹ So whilst Ormond remained lord lieutenant in name, his real influence over events was ever-diminishing, but additional emoluments and placing him at the nominal head of the commission for regulating new corporations flattered his prestige and ego and gave him the semblance of being more powerful and influential than ever before.² Charles, of course, was using him as a figurehead - the face of dour, loyal anglicanism - as he purged the whigs and prepared the way for James's first successful parliamentary session in 1685.³

Conway's resignation in February 1683 saw the return to favour of Sunderland and the re-emphasis on increased central control and moves towards some kind of absolutist goals.⁴ The viceroy found he had increasingly little to write to his son as all Irish affairs were transacted at the treasury where he was sometimes present, but he had nothing to add to the instructions Rochester issued.⁵ Ormond busied himself with an abortive scheme for a

Ormond to Keating, 18 Sept 1682; ibid., pp 456-7, Ormond to Boyle, 2 Oct 1682; ibid., p 499, Ormond to Arran, 19 Dec 1682.
1. ibid., p 423, Ormond to Arran, 15 Aug 1682; ibid., p 499, Ormond to Arran, 19 Dec 1682; Bagwell, op cit., vol iii, pp 140-2.
4. CSPD, 1683, Jan-June: p 54, Rawdon to Conway, 14 Feb 1683; Kenyon, Life of Sunderland, pp 89-90.
5. Ormonde NS VI, pp 530-1, Ormond to Arran, 13 Feb 1683.
parliament. Arran, at least, was aware of the lord lieutenant's difficulties and of Rochester's plans to govern Ireland in effect through the revenue commissioners, but he found his father's will to resist these efforts quite broken, saying it was the king's prerogative through whom he issued orders.

Encroachments on the viceroy's power by the English treasury and the scope and depth of the commissioners' interference in the government of Ireland was, of course, dependent on their ability to manage the revenue effectively and successfully. Apart from offering the king no security for their performance other than their estates, the commissioners superseded the clerk of first fruits and twentieth parts for gathering clerical taxes, and the sheriffs in the collection of the casual revenue. Moreover, they had the power to farm the hearth tax and inland excise with or without the chief governor's approbation and the lord lieutenant, though he must agree to them and their officers, had no power to make these appointments himself. Although they were nominally responsible to the lord lieutenant, who would be blamed for their failings, they were really responsible to the lords.

1. ibid., pp 530-1, Ormond to Arran, 13 Feb 1683; Ormonde NS VII, pp 3-4, Ormond to Arran, 30 Mar 1683.
2. ibid., pp 39-40, Arran to Duchess of Ormond, 8 June 1683; ibid., pp 50-1, Ormond to Arran, 19 June 1683.
of the treasury alone, and thus treasury domination of Irish finances was at last achieved.¹ There were, in fact, three distinct phases in this process from 1683-5, which we will examine in turn. The first of these, up to the autumn of 1683, was the initial period of control by the revenue commissioners when they stamped their authority and efficiency on Irish finances.

Increased efficiency had been the sincere and undoubted motive for Longford's desire to enlarge the commissioners' powers in February 1683. He envisaged stringent control over the collectors, reducing the 52 revenue districts to a smaller number, proper overseeing of accounts by the accountants-general, and a constant flow of money from the collectors to the receiver-general.² Much of the phenomenal success of the commissioners was a result of putting those plans into execution. Unfortunately the precise details of this process have been lost.³ However, through the Carte Ms it is possible to piece together some of this process, because Longford, Ormond's friend, kept the lord lieutenant informed of their proceedings, although we must be careful with this evidence as, by its nature, it tends to magnify Longford's role. The commissioners wrote less to Ormond than they did to Rochester, who was their real director, under cover of the excuse that they believed he communicated all their letters to the viceroy.⁴

3. The Minute Books of the Irish Treasury Commissioners are preserved in the PRO in London, but the first two books, covering 1683-88, are lost, presumably destroyed or mislaid in the Jacobite wars.
4. Carte Ms 218:fol 438, Commissioners to Ormond, 7 Mar 1683.
By March the commissioners had farmed part of the casual revenue Denny Muschamp at £1,500 pa, an improvement of £600 pa, put the collection of the excise into a regular form (no more compounding for the tax at port, but collecting the whole at sale), payments were being made to the receiver-general's office and moves being made against the smuggling haven of the Isle of Man.¹ The excise seemed to be the most uncertain branch due, in the main to the soldiers being nine months in arrear, so that their credit in the ale houses was exhausted and in consequence not only had trade dropped off, but less beer and other goods were being produced.² In order to avert a major fall in the excise it became imperative to pay the soldiers their arrears and thus the commissioners were able to overcome their reluctance in the end to pay off these arrears, which they originally said were the late farmers' responsibility.² Early estimates of their probable management costs came to about £24,000 pa which was £16,000 short of the expected cost and illustrated at once the positive benefits of management.⁴ In April 1683 Dickenson went on a brief circuit of the countryside and found poverty, severe army arrears and stagnation in the excise. To alleviate this situation it was proposed to let the inland excise to farm for a year to Francis Babe, as by their commission they could farm the hearth

1. Carte Ms 218; fol 438, Commissioners to Ormond, 7 Mar 1683.
2. Carte Ms 218; fol 448, Longford to Ormond, 28 Mar 1683.
3. Carte Ms 218; fol 448, Longford to Ormond, 28 Mar 1683; Ormonde NS VII, p 9, Arran to Ormond, 7 Apr 1683.
4. Carte Ms 218; fol 453, Longford to Ormond, 18 Apr 1683; Ormonde NS VI, pp 509-10, Arran to Ormond, 10 Jan 1683.
tax and inland excise yearly.¹ Proposals for victualling Tangiers were also considered at the same time, hoping to contract it out to Irish merchants, but neither scheme, it would appear, was accepted by the lords of the treasury.²

Both Arran and Ormond were already more than aware of the surprisingly large powers granted to the commissioners and their independence from the viceroy's direction.³ It was, however, the lord deputy, Arran, writing for secrecy's sake to Ormond through the Duchess of Ormond, who complained most vehemently of,

"the haughtiness of the present commissioners ... and I foresee that as soon as my lord lieutenant is out of the government the lords of the treasury intend to make this kingdom no better than a province, for it is evident in my judgement that their purpose for the future is to have their creatures to manage the revenue, independent of the chief governor ... besides they have two in their number so well fitted for such a thing, by name Mr Dickenson and Mr Strong ... for they will neither ask nor take advice, and very unwillingly obey orders from me; the other three behave themselves very well, but they stand in awe of those two." ⁴

Thus we can see that the dominance of Longford and Kingdon in the commission is based on their reputations and the fact that they corresponded with Ormond.

These were prophetic words from Arran, for Ireland's role was becoming increasingly that of an auxiliary arm to the English

¹. Carte Ms 40:fol 210, Agreement with Babe, ? 1683; Carte Ms 54: fol 176, Commissioners to Treasury Lords, 4 Apr 1683.
². Carte Ms 54:fol 176, Commissioners to Treasury Lords, 4 Apr 1683; Carte Ms 54:fol 161-6, passim, Proposals; Carte Ms 54: fol 66, Arran to Treasury Lords, 31 Jan 1683; Carte Ms 218: fol 413, Sowton's Petition, ? 1683.
⁴. Ormonde NS VII, pp 39-40, Arran to Duchess of Ormond, 8 June 1683.
armed forces and English treasury. The surprising factor is Ormond's response to this warning which his son, doubtless with disappointment, was obliged to accept, for Ormond declared it might well be to the benefit of the lord lieutenant to have all care of financial matters taken out of its hands, ignoring the fact, therefore, that control of these finances was the key to real power in Irish (and English) affairs.\(^1\) Ormond busied himself with the scheme to regiment the army, preferring the illusion of power that went with forwarding schemes to increase and re-order the army, ignoring the fact that ultimately these were only made possible because of the strength of Irish finances and that the success of such proposals was dependent on the compliance of those who controlled the purse strings - the real power source.\(^2\)

In the summer of 1683, maybe under Talbot's direction, rumours surfaced that Ireland was ill-governed, that the Butlers appointed friends and relatives to executive posts and army commissions.\(^3\) The loyalty of the administration was called into question by a report that a large number of JPs and militia officers had refused to take the sacrament. Arran ably defended his administration's loyalty, demonstrating that only one JP had failed to take the oath, but inevitably some of the mud stuck.\(^4\) Fears about disloyal elements in the army and local

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1. *ibid.*, pp 50-1, Ormond to Arran, 19 June 1683; *ibid.*, p 57, Arran to Ormond, 26 June 1683.
2. *ibid.*, pp 50-1, Ormond to Arran, 19 June 1683.
3. *ibid.*, pp 61-2, Ormond to Arran, 3 July 1683.
4. *ibid.*, pp 66-7, Arran to Ormond, 9 July 1683; *ibid.*, pp 74-5, Arran to Ormond, 15 July 1683; *ibid.*, pp 96-7, Boyle to Ormond, 8 Aug 1683.
administration undermined plans for a parliament, despite both Boyle's and Arran's claims that the addition of Tangiers to the Irish establishment would be the only reason for an assembly being disloyal, but many now believed (including James and Talbot) that a number of potentially disloyal elements had gained positions in the army and the administration.¹

The commissioners, supported by the lords of the treasury, showed no signs of relaxing their grip on the revenue. In their first six months they paid £100,000 to both lists, thereby scotching schemes, such as Temple's, to sell off troublesome quitrents in order to pay off arrears, which were based on the belief, quickly proving to be erroneous, that Ireland's debts would increase in 1683.² Moreover, Ormond meekly accepted an insulting rebuff from the commissioners when he attempted to influence their choice of collectors by presenting his own list, only to be told that they had been picked already.³

With allies at court the commissioners had no difficulty in having the imposition on tobacco reduced by ½d and the duty on French brandy reduced when they requested it.⁴ Their first half year's account showed a gross produce of £142,155 which,

1. ibid., pp 96-7, Boyle to Ormond, 8 Aug 1683; ibid., pp 98-100, Arran to Ormond, 8 Aug 1683.
2. ibid., pp 46-7, Temple to Ormond, 12 June 1683; CSPD, 1683, Jan-June: pp 315-16, Kingdon to Conway, 13 June 1683.
though not enough to meet the full establishment even if the second half went as well, suggested that the Irish lists would not suffer.¹ Uncertainty over the future of Tangiers and the decision to abandon it in August 1683 finally assured the success of this management and that Ireland's arrears would be cleared and not increased.² Nonetheless, this account belied the fact that there was a severe shortage of specie, due in part to moneys drawn out of Ireland for the king's use in the first six months, and Arran feared it would be used as an excuse to bleed Ireland further.³ Objections were made against the accounts in London, but Dickinson, now nicknamed 'Captain Snarl', made short work of these.⁴ Arran was very impressed with the accounts and, although he believed no accurate prediction of the yearly total could be based on them, he felt that management was proving itself a superior method to farming.⁵

From April to June 1683 Kingdon went on a protracted circuit of Ulster, where he discovered that the revenue was loosely managed, and he made recommendations to the collectors and generally shook them so that he hoped for better results in the future.⁶

In August Longford and Kingdon were dispatched on a major circuit of Munster and Connacht. On their travels they did not confine

¹. Carte Ms 54:fol 199, Revenue Totals, Jan-June 1683; Carte Ms 54:fol 204-8, Customs Revenue, Dec-June 1683; Ormonde NS VII, p 103, Ormond to Temple, 9 Aug 1683.
4. Ibid., pp 111-2, Ormond to Arran, 23 Aug 1683; ibid., pp 113-4, Arran to Ormond, 24 Aug 1683; Carte Ms 54:fol 61, Remarks on Revenue Abstracts, 20 Aug 1683.
6. CSPD, 1683, Jan-June:pp 182-3, Kingdon to Conway, 17 Apr 1683; CSPD, 1683, Jan-June:pp 315-6, Kingdon to Conway, 13 June 1683.
themselves to the business of management alone. At Longford they dealt with their dispute with the Forths, but in Galway intervened in the dispute over the election of the sheriff and recommended Arran to accept their decision. At Limerick they found the sheriff was too much a friend of the former farmers and desired his replacement. As master of the ordnance Longford also used the circuit as an opportunity to prepare a report on the state of the ordnance in Ireland. Thus we can see the commissioners interfered in civil matters when it seemed to affect their interests. Their circuit hastened the collection of arrears sufficiently to enable Arran to pay a further three months to the army earlier than had been expected. At the end of the circuit they were able to prepare a list of the arrears outstanding in 1683 and a detailed account of the collectors' payments up to 29 September 1683. Such a degree of supervision was unprecedented, as were the results, in making the collectors more diligent in their work or face dismissal. The report of this tour shows how diligent Longford and Kingdon were in their work, naming inefficient officers, making resolutions to replace some and deciding that a warning sufficed for others. The most searching criticisms were aimed at officers in Galway, Limerick, Cork and Waterford, that is the major centres of trade.

2. Ibid., pp 116-7, Longford to Arran, 24 Aug 1683.
4. Ibid., pp 121-2, Longford to Arran, 30 Aug 1683.
An exact report was made on every single officer for future reference and each was issued with new and positive instructions: there was no doubt that a new efficiency and supervision had taken hold of Irish finances.¹

Inspite of the increasing evidence of their success, moves to end the commission were afoot in Whitehall. Perhaps in an attempt to counter the encroachments on the lord lieutenant's power by the new commissioners and treasury lords Ormond supported a scheme for a part farm, part management.² Deane was at the back of these proposals, offering £310,000 pa and there was another scheme offering £282,000 pa.³ Arran, however, firmly supported the management for financial reasons and his only reservation was that improvements in the revenue would persuade Charles to call for more Irish money into the English treasury.⁴ Dickenson supported the farming of some branches, but his fellow commissioners were emphatically opposed.⁵ However, the evidence of the commissioners' accounts was enough to persuade Ormond and the treasury lords to continue the management for twelve months.⁶ The commissioners vindicated themselves the best way they could, by increasing the produce of the Irish revenue and clearing Ireland's debts with the promise of an overplus for the king's own use.⁷

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3. ibid., pp 130-1, Deane to Ormond, 16 Sept 1683; ibid., p 123, Ormond to Arran, 4 Sept 1683; ibid., p 125, Proposals for Revenue, 8 Sept 1683; Carte Ms 54: fol 103, Management Proposal, ? Sept 1683.
4. Ormonde NS VII, p 122, Arran to Ormond, 3 Sept 1683; ibid., p 125, Arran to Ormond, 8 Sept 1683; ibid., pp 149-50, Arran to Ormond, 14 Oct 1683.
6. ibid., p 149, Ormond to Arran, 13 Oct 1683; Carte Ms 218: fol 499, Longford to Ormond, 26 Oct 1683.
7. Ormonde NS VII, p 154, Ormond to Arran, 27 Oct 1683. (175)
In the late summer of 1683 the treasury's government of Ireland entered into a new phase. As we shall see, two major factors were responsible for this change — the improvements in the Irish revenue and its consequent ability to pay off the army's arrears, and the decision to abandon the garrison in Tangiers in August 1683. Furthermore, it was a time of some uncertainty as at Whitehall Sunderland and Rochester fought to gain control of the direction of both English and Irish affairs.

The future role and composition of the Irish army was of crucial importance in 1633-84. The crown's attitude to Ireland was changing rapidly, as the king came increasingly under his brother's influence. The king was still keen to continue his Irish subventions, but in such a way as not to damage his Irish army.¹ When Dumbarton's regiment returned from Tangiers it was proposed to bring it up to full strength, keep it in England and pay for it on the Irish establishment.² Ireland would not, therefore, make cash payments to the king, but supply a reinforcement to the English army, around which, if ever necessary, Irish troops could be formed into a loyal army for use in any of the kingdoms. The crown's thinking on the function of Ireland and her finances had subtly changed. From providing troops in 1672-74, and supplying cash to the king from 1671-82, the crown had opted to pay for Tangiers with Irish money. Now that Tangiers was abandoned and the king able to create the nucleus of a standing army

¹ ibid., pp 117-8, Arran to Ormond, 17 Aug 1683.
² ibid., p 123, Ormond to Arran, 4 Sept 1683.
partly paid for by Ireland, his view of Ireland and its army changed, for those forces, if properly trained, could be used as a vital adjunct and reinforcement to English troops if either Charles or James had any political difficulties in the future. Hence plans to regiment the Irish army and to use the overplus to increase its strength were countenanced with enthusiasm. The new commissioners proposed paying the Irish army every six weeks, but this would pose administrative problems for the muster-masters, and angered Arran as it was offered to the treasury's consideration before himself. Ormond supported any scheme which would benefit the army and stop Irish money being diverted into the English treasury, although the plan for six weekly payments had to be abandoned as impractical. Once it was definitely decided that Ireland was to pay Dumbarton's regiment in England and a new establishment would be framed all possible efforts were made to prevent the king increasing his Irish subventions.

It must be said that the improvements in efficiency effected by the revenue commissioners made possible the new plans for the Irish army. Whereas in previous years the payment of the army had reflected the economy's well-being, this was not so after 1683 when, as a result of new proposals, the army was given the first priority and less of its wages were dissipated by corrupt

1. ibid., p 156, Ormond to Arran, 1 Nov 1683.
2. ibid., pp 159-60, Ormond to Arran, 17 Nov 1683.
3. ibid., p 162, Arran to Ormond, 22 Nov 1683; Carte Ms 40: fol 176, Treasury Lords to Arran, 20 Nov 1683.
practices. Nonetheless, at the close of 1682 six months were owing to the army and the farmers' arrears had to be assigned to cover insolvent assignments for their June 1682 quarter.¹

Six months pay to the army was issued by means of imprest in 1683, but without stating which months they covered, thereby making it uncertain if they were for current pay in 1683 or the six months arrears for 1682.² By August 1683 there was sufficient cash to pay the army a further three months, but Arran forbore issuing the warrants unless they were assigned to particular months, as the army's morale was being undermined by not knowing for which months they had been paid.² In September 1683 the lords of the treasury agreed that the six months already imprested should be assigned to the farmers' six months army arrears.⁴

Nevertheless, in October 1683 the army still remained six months in arrear: no payments had been made to the June or September 1683 quarters. The revenue commissioners favoured compounding with the army for these arrears and some, such as Temple, suggested that only three months should be cleared and the rest paid off later (or probably never).⁵

The whole financial context was changed overnight, however, by the decision to abandon Tangier - a saving of £68,000 pa to

1. Ormonde NS VI, pp 497–510 passim; Carte Ms 54: fol 169, Arran to Treasury Lords, 10 Feb 1683; CSPD, 1683, Jan–June: p 69; O'Neill to Conway, 20 Feb 1683.
2. Carte Ms 54: fol 150, Treasury Lords to Arran, 23 Jan 1683; Carte Ms 54: fol 155, Arran to Treasury Lords, 6 Feb 1683; Ormonde NS VI, p 529, Arran to Ormond, 6 Feb 1683; ibid., pp 538–9, Arran to Ormond, 1 Mar 1683.
4. Ibid., p 135, Ormond to Arran, 29 Sept 1683; ibid., p 139, Ormond to Arran, 2 Oct 1683; ibid., p 149, Arran to Ormond, 14 Oct 1683; Carte Ms 40: fol 131, Treasury Lords to Arran, 29 Sept 1683; Carte Ms 54: fol 230, Treasury Lords to Arran, 4 Sept 1683.

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Ireland for the garrison and shipping. For quite conflicting reasons the treasury lords and Ormond worked towards the same ends. The decision had been taken to keep Irish money for re-regimenting and augmenting a powerful and loyal Irish army. The new Irish establishment was set at only £230,000 pa, of which £33,000 pa went to England in pay and interest for Dumbarton's regiment. The pension list of £9,000 would only be paid after the civil and military lists had been fully met. If the revenue continued to improve in 1684, as it had done in 1683, there might well be an overplus which would allow Ireland's debts to be cleared and in the future enable the crown to decide on either further subventions or, as James did, to spend the surplus on increasing his army.

In the first year the revenue commissioners achieved a gross produce of £300,279, and after allowances for contingencies, salaries and arrears of payment of £23,727, this was a cash total of £246,000. The critical point was whether or not, after paying a year's money to the army and the executive, the king would call for the overplus or allow it to be applied to the farmers' arrears. After some indecision it was resolved that £82,302 of their payments would be for 1682 arrears, and that the overplus would be used to pay off three of the army's current six

1. Carte Ms 54;fol 290, Establishment, 1 Apr 1684; PRO PC2/70: fol 155-61, Establishment, 19 Mar 1684.
5. Ormonde NS VII, p 166, Temple to Ormond, 8 Dec 1683; ibid., pp 167-8, Arran to Ormond, 11 Dec 1683.
After paying off pensions and the farmers' debts, their official arrear was only £40,000. To have paid fifteen months to the army, the pensions list, the civil list, Dumbarton's regiment and a little to Tangiers in their first year was a great achievement. No doubt, their success had been ensured by the decision to abandon Tangiers and to keep Irish money largely for Irish uses and to strengthen the army, and they were able to give up plans to compound for the army's arrears. Complaints about the shortage of specie and ill-payment of rents from Arran decreased when it was realised the king only desired £33,000 pa out of Ireland for Dumbarton's regiment, but the lord deputy was anxious not to have the establishment set at too high a level in case the revenue for some reason began to fall off. Arrangements to ship the £33,000 pa to England were quickly made with a group of Irish merchants, so that Charles would experience no delays in paying his regiment.

Throughout 1684 the commissioners carried on their work inconspicuously, scrupulously and diligently. For example, in March 1684 when a proclamation was issued regularizing the worth of specie in Ireland by weight, they scrupulously craved allowance of £162 10s which had been caught in their collectors' hand.

4. ibid., p 166, Temple to Ormond, 8 Dec 1683; ibid., pp 191-2, Arran to Ormond, 16 Feb 1684.
5. ibid., pp 191-2, Arran to Ormond, 16 Feb 1684; Carte Ms 40: fol 249, Treasury Lords to Arran, 20 Mar 1684.

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when the specie had been effectively devalued. They expected
the revenue to improve in 1684 especially as, it seems, less
ships were lost at sea than usual that winter, and experienced
English officers had been sent for to help manage the excise.
They used their considerable influence to prevent the re-impos-
iton of the extra 1/2d on tobacco, which they had obtained the
year before, in June 1684 on the grounds that it would ruin both
Irish merchants and customs duties. Their half yearly accounts
showed an increase of £13,000 on the previous year and they
continued to clear Ireland's debts, saving money by compounding
(not corruptly but officially) for some on the civil list.
In August 1684 William Gulliford replaced Dickenson as a commis-
ioner, which was in no way a criticism of Dickenson's ability,
for he was chosen to serve the king in the English revenue.

There is no reason not to believe that the firm direction of
Irish financial matters by the treasury lords and through the
revenue commissioners continued in 1684-85. The revenue yield
increased to £319,000 gross and in cash over £280,000 was either
in the collectors' hands or paid to the receiver-general in that
year. The evidence of the Irish receipts indicates an ever
increasing surplus, which was not called for into England, and

2. Ormonde NS VII, pp 222-23, Arran to Ormond, 16 Apr 1684.
3. Ibid., pp 242-4, Commissioners to Treasury Lords, 6 June 1684;
   Ibid., pp 258-9, Longford to Ormond, 24 July 1684; Carte Ms 54:
   fol 269, Council to Arran, 27 June 1684.
4. Ormonde NS VII, pp 258-9, Longford to Ormond, 24 July 1684;
   Carte Ms 54:fol 269, Council to Arran, 27 June 1684.
5. CSPD, 1684-5:p 118, King to Ormond, 11 Aug 1684.
which was used by James to increase the army's strength. Charles never put into execution any plans he had to use the overplus to increase the Irish army, but clearly this was his intention when he sacked Ormond in 1684, and is the reason why, after Ireland's debts had been cleared, the overplus accumulated and was not at once put to use. From 1685 onwards James carried into fruition the plans laid in 1684 to use Irish money to build up the Irish army, so that by 1688 Irish money was spent on increasing the Irish army or to pay Irish troops in England. The revenue in 1685 maintained its 1684 level, thereby enabling the crown to go on with its schemes, bearing witness to the resilience of the Irish economy and the fine management of the commissioners.

The improvements the commissioners brought to the revenue, their increased efficiency and lack of corruption were all washed away by the tide of a European war, which exposed Ireland's dependence on European markets, and made it impossible for the country to recover in the 1690s, following the dislocations of the Jacobite war. As Cullen has pointed out, the factors which enabled Ireland's economy to expand and prosper from 1660-88, belied the underlying weakness of an economy dependent on the markets of Europe which were so vulnerable to the effects of war, and markets, furthermore, which only gave Irish goods an outlet because of internal European agricultural problems which no longer obtained

once those European wars had ended. Moreover, by that time Ireland's economy, relatively speaking, was in ruins and her own agriculture depressed.

It was against the backdrop of a rapidly improving Irish financial context that plans to re-model and reorganise the Irish army were put into operation. Reforms of the Irish army had been generally discussed throughout Charles's reign and Ormond forwarded several schemes to augment the army to around 10,000 men at a cost of between £38,000 to £59,000 pa, depending on the method adopted.

In July 1682 proposals to re-organise the Irish army into a more effective force were forwarded, but were rejected by Arran as they would reduce the army by 900 men. These proposals remained in circulation for about a year, and, although Ormond's influence ensured that they were laid aside temporarily, he knew that York was keen to model the Irish army on the basis of the English forces - no doubt so that the two could co-operate more easily as one unit - and that he was preparing proposals for adding grenadiers to the Irish regiments, as was the case with the English army. Ormond was well aware, just by viewing the poor state of the horse guard, that a remodelling of the Irish army was long overdue.

2. ibid., chapter II, passim.
3. Carte Ms 54: fol 478-9, Costings for 3 schemes to increase army to 10,000 men, no date.
4. Ormonde NS VI, pp 402-3, Arran to Ormond, 18 July 1682; ibid., p 407, Ormond to Arran, 29 July 1682.
5. Ormonde NS VII, pp 50-1, Ormond to Arran, 19 June 1683.
6. ibid., pp 50-1, Ormond to Arran, 19 June 1683; Ormonde NS VI, p 478, Ormond to Arran, 14 Nov 1682.
The increasing influence of York and Sunderland at court in 1683 made this even more inevitable, and in June 1683 Granard jumped on the bandwagon with a scheme backed by Lord Dartmouth (commander at Tangiers), which turned out to be impracticable. However, the Irish army's importance, both as an arm of the crown and in keeping Ireland quiescent, was seen to good effect in the Irish government's response to the Rye House plot when troops were dispatched quickly to the North to suppress the 'fanatics'.

This threw plans to re-model the Irish army back into the centre of affairs and Granard pressed that now was the time when the king might favourably support the regimenting of the army, even at an increased price.

Arran accordingly produced plans to regiment the army without lessening it, but it would have meant a retrenchment in Dumbarton's regiment. The viceroy tinkered with the details of this scheme, but although Charles was impressed with it, he refused to countenance any alterations to Dumbarton's regiment. If the crown's only objections were that Dumbarton's regiment was being reduced to pay for grenadiers and field officers Arran was confident an acceptable solution could be found. This was achieved without

1. Ormonde NS VII, p 57, Arran to Ormond, 26 June 1683; Kenyon, Stuart England, p 223.
2. Ormonde NS VII, p 59, Granard to Ormond, 30 June 1683; ibid., pp 74-5, Arran to Ormond, 15 July 1683; Carte Ms 40:fol 51, Arran to Army, 29 June 1683; Ogg, op cit., vol II, pp 646-50.
3. Ormonde NS VII, p 59, Granard to Ormond, 30 June 1683.
4. ibid., pp 74-5, Arran to Ormond, 15 July 1683.
5. ibid., pp 85-4, Ormond to Arran, 26 July 1683; ibid., pp 98-100, Arran to Ormond, 8 Aug 1683; ibid., p 102, Ormond to Arran, 9 Aug 1683; ibid., p 106, Ormond to Arran, 16 Aug 1683; ibid., pp 117-18, Arran to Ormond, 27 Aug 1683.
6. ibid., pp 123-4, Ormond to Arran, 4 Sept 1683; ibid., p 129, Arran to Ormond, 11 Sept 1683.
any difficulties once Tangiers was abandoned. With the strain on Ireland's establishment reduced, it would definitely be possible to regiment the army without cashiering any troops.

In the end the project he envisaged would increase the army by 640 men (mainly dragoons and grenadiers) and the whole establishment would not come to more than £229,000 pa.

With minor alterations both Charles and York accepted the latest proposal. £33,000 pa was set aside for the Scots regiment. The overplus was to be spent on ammunition and repairing fortifications. The army would be re-modelled on more efficient lines and would suppress robbers and rebels. The establishment would come into effect from 1 April 1684; in July 1684 the grenadiers would be raised and mustered and the regiments formed and garrisoned. Temple and Ormond were both worried that the overplus had not been appropriated to particular rather than general Irish uses and feared that Charles might yet call for it into England, and Arran was suspicious too.

The lord lieutenant was also concerned that there would be no sizeable overplus for at least two years because of paying the army's arrears, and he felt that the plans Arran urged on him to

1. ibid., p 162, Arran to Ormond, 22 Nov 1683; ibid., p 163, Ormond to Arran, 29 Nov 1683.
2. ibid., pp 165-6, Arran to Ormond, 5 Dec 1683.
3. ibid., pp 167-8, Arran to Ormond, 11 Dec 1683; ibid., p 171, Ormond to Arran, 22 Dec 1683; Carte Ms 40:fol 186, Additions to Establishment, 7 1683.
4. Ormonde NS VII, pp 177-8, Ormond to Arran, 8 Jan 1684.
5. ibid., pp 179-80, Ormond to Arran, 12 Jan 1684; ibid., pp 196-7, Ormond to Arran, 21 Jan 1684; Carte Ms 40:fol 218, Treasury Lords to Arran, 7 Jan 1684; Carte Ms 54:fol 290, Totals of Establishment, 1 Apr 1684; PRO PC2/70:fol 155-61, Establishment, 19 Mar 1684.
6. Ormonde NS VII, pp 178-9, Temple to Ormond, 10 Jan 1684; ibid., pp 196-7, Ormond to Arran, 21 Jan 1684; ibid., pp 202-3, Arran to Ormond, 29 Feb 1684.
propose raising a new regiment of 1,000 troops, were financially insecure.\(^1\) The fire at Dublin Castle persuaded the lord lieutenant that an overplus would be better spent in building a new castle.\(^2\)

The regimenting of the army, inspite of some rumours to the contrary, seems to have gone ahead as planned.\(^3\) The king chose field officers from the list presented by Ormond and sent over by Arran.\(^4\) It appears that on his return to Ireland Ormond left Rochester with a project for reinforcing the Irish army with which the king was too busy to deal.\(^5\) In his report on the state of Ireland, and especially the army, Ormond indicated, to the crown's satisfaction, that the re-modelling had gone well, but Charles and York expressed dissatisfaction with some of the officers, which persuaded the lord lieutenant to dispatch Arran to court with a list of them, but at the same time quite reasonably denying responsibility for their fidelity.\(^6\) Arran arrived to the news of his father's dismissal.\(^7\) The disloyalty of the officers was an excuse, and a weak one too, for Ormond could only find one officer who had ever fought against the crown.\(^8\)

\(^{1}\) ibid., pp 196-7, Ormond to Arran, 21 Jan 1684; ibid., pp 191-2, Arran to Ormond, 16 Feb 1684; ibid., pp 222-3, Arran to Ormond, 16 Apr 1684; Carte Ms 54; fol 478-9, Costs of 3 schemes to raise army to 10,000, no date.


\(^{4}\) ibid., pp 188-9, Ormond to Arran, 12 Feb 1684; ibid., p 216, Ormond to Arran, 27 Mar 1684.

\(^{5}\) ibid., p 274, Rochester to Ormond, 25 Sept 1684.

\(^{6}\) ibid., p 277, Rochester to Ormond, 4 Oct 1684; ibid., p 279, Ormond to Rochester, 14 Oct 1684.

\(^{7}\) ibid., p 280, Rochester to Ormond, 23 Oct 1684; ibid., p 284, Sunderland to Ormond, 13 Nov 1684.

\(^{8}\) ibid., pp 310-11, Ormond to Rochester, 16 Jan 1685; ibid., p 314, Rochester to Ormond, 29 Jan 1685.
Ormond and Arran had succeeded in overseeing the remodelling and regimenting of the army and in clearing all its arrears. Without debts, and with a new organisation, it was prepared for the new and expanded role envisaged for it by James and carried out by Tyrconnell from 1686-89. The Anglican Butlers were out of place in the re-organisations and reformations James had in mind.

Between 1683 and 1684 Irish affairs had moved into a new phase in which the future role of the Irish army was the crucial factor. As we shall see after 1684 once the importance of the Irish army had been established, royal policy under Sunderland's and James's direction began to move along more positive lines. The king's death in 1685 interrupted this process, causing James to revamp his policies, defining them more clearly and more emphatically.

From 1685 onwards Ormond faded increasingly into the background. His grasp of and influence on events is well illustrated by his ignorance in September 1683 of an order to stop process against Anglesey and Ranelagh: no one had bothered to inform him. Once more he told his son that all important Irish matters were transacted by the lords of the treasury and would be communicated by them and he seemed fully to accept this circumscription of his influence.

2. Ormonde NS VII, p 135, Ormond to Arran, 29 Sept 1683.
3. Ibid., p 149, Ormond to Arran, 13 Oct 1683.
Waves of rumour about the possible removal of the lord lieutentant were normal in the coffee-houses of London and Dublin. Hence in September 1683 Sunderland was rumoured as a likely candidate and in April 1684, when a large part of Dublin Castle was burned down, Arran's alleged negligence allowed room for fresh stories and intrigue. In fact, Irish affairs seemed to rest in a foreboding calm in the spring and summer of 1684. Jenkins's resignation as secretary of state and the promotion of Sunderland to senior secretary in April 1684 signalled a protracted struggle at court for control of James's and Charles's ear between Rochester and Sunderland, which pushed Irish affairs into the background. In June Ormond found to his dismay that he would not be allowed to linger in England any longer, but must return to his post that summer. As Ormond set off for Dublin, when he had reached Aylesbury, he received Ranelagh's official pardon, which, though he did not know it at the time, he later realised portended ill for his future. That pardon was finally secured because Sunderland had won his struggle against Rochester who found himself kicked upstairs to the lord presidency of the council and Godolphin was made first lord of the treasury.

The new lord president offered Ormond all assistance in Irish matters in the future, but his 'promotion' not only removed him

1. ibid., p 133, Arran to Ormond, 26 Sept 1683; ibid., p 218, Arran to Ormond, 7 Apr 1684.
2. ibid., pp 221-2, Bridgeman to Arran, 15 Apr 1684.
3. ibid., p 249, Ormond to Arran, 17 June 1684; ibid., p 253, Arran to Ormond, 30 June 1684; ibid., p 254, Ormond to Arran, 3 July 1684.
4. CSPD, 1684-5, p 107, Sunderland to Treasury Lords, 29 July 1684; Carte Ms 69:fol 76, Information on a Life of Ormond (by Southwell), no date.
from the direction of treasury and Irish affairs, but excluded
him from the inner councils of James, Charles and Sunderland.¹
It would seem that Ormond's removal had been decided upon at
the same time, but the king had hesitated about finding a
successor.² The king, it appeared, was dissatisfied with the
loyalty of officers Ormond had appointed in the army.² Both
Sunderland and Rochester attempted to push one another into the
vacancy, thereby removing their chief rival, but Rochester was
already eclipsed and so he was chosen to succeed, and he, above
all others, must have realised how circumscribed the lord lieu-
tenant's powers had become.⁴ Ormond was upset to be removed
so soon after his return. He pledged loyalty and friendship
to Rochester and was allowed to remain in Ireland until the
spring, but his request to keep the appointment a secret was
not adhered to.⁵ Sunderland claimed that Arran had publicised
his removal when the king told him about it and so Ormond had
to endure the mortification of everyone knowing through the
winter of 1684–85 and it also prevented any efforts to make
Charles change his mind.⁶

The rumours as to why Ormond was removed were many and vindictive:

1. Ormonde NS VII, p 266, Rochester to Ormond, 26 Aug 1684; Kenyon,
   Life of Sunderland, p 100.
3. ibid., pp 280–1, Rochester to Ormond, 23 Oct 1684.
5. Ormonde NS VII, pp 282–3, Ormond to Rochester, 3 Nov 1684;
   Ormonde NS VII, pp 283–4, Rochester to Ormond, 11 Nov 1684.
6. ibid., p 284, Sunderland to Ormond, 13 Nov 1684; ibid., pp
   285–6, Ormond to Arran, 19 Nov 1684.
"My age, my sloth, my aversion to Roman Catholics, my negligence in the choice of such as I have recommended to or placed in the king's service, Mr Ellis's (Arran's secretary) corruptions..." ¹ To these must be added those imputed to Arran, most notably his indolence, debauchery and countenance of Ellis.² Yet Ormond became increasingly aware that these were not the real reasons,

"But all this took rise from Colonel Talbot's being the summer before (1684) in Ireland, to visit and survey all things; and on his return 'tis plain a general reformation was intended".²

What precisely the king intended Ormond did not know and he plainly told Rochester that he could not give him any useful information about Ireland, not knowing what the king planned.⁴ Rochester was just as ignorant: he had been chosen as the new and more reliable cipher. He knew no details except that there would be changes in the council, the executive and the army and restraints made on the lord lieutenant's powers, but at whom these changes were aimed or what they were he had not been informed.⁵ Boyle was not one of those aimed at and Charles seemed only to have the kernel of a plan and no particulars, continuing to resolve that he would reduce the council to 30 and remove all soldiers who had ever borne arms against the crown.⁶ To Ormond's profound embarrassment his letter to

1. Ibid., p 295, Ormond to Arran, 10 Dec 1684.
2. Ibid., p 295, Ormond to Arran, 10 Dec 1684.
5. Ibid., p 296, Rochester to Ormond, 13 Dec 1684.
Rochester complaining of the ignorance in which he was kept became public.¹

In the new year Charles, under the direction of James, Talbot and Sunderland, finally decided on the details of his 'general reformation'. Rochester's commission as lord lieutenant removed from him the power to grant commissions in the army, reserving this to the king, which severely undermined the power and prestige of the viceregal office.² Copies of the names of the men in the Irish army who were serving in 1659 were sent over, as was a copy of the members of the privy council which numbered over 60. On the basis of these papers changes were to be made, and Rochester was quite sure that it was not, as Ormond was beginning to suspect, Ranelagh who was behind these moves but others.³ The passing of Rochester's patent and appointment of the catholic Colonels, McCarthy and Talbot, to the command of two Irish regiments left no one in any doubt who directed this policy.⁴

The king's untimely death in February 1685 halted this process.⁵ James's plans were even more grandiose, but now he had total control he would want to re-consider them, and, anyway, his prime control...
concern was ensuring his succession was secure, not unsettling reformations, in early 1685.¹ Rochester returned to power with a vengeance, being made lord treasurer, the post for which he had long yearned, and his early plans were for an increase of the Irish subvention to about £250,000 pa, rather than any proposals for a 'general reformation'.² His brother Clarendon was made viceroy. Ormond easily secured Ireland for James against any possible opposition and he was rewarded by an immediate recall on 23 March 1685, with express orders to be at the coronation on 23 April.³ He was replaced by Boyle and Granard as justices until Clarendon's arrival, but many feared what James's accession would portend for the protestant interest in Ireland.⁴ Charles II's death had only interrupted the 'general reformation' recommended by Talbot and backed by James and Sunderland. Rochester and his brother, Clarendon, whilst they remained in power tried to slow down this process, but never succeeded in turning James from the resolutions he had persuaded his brother to accept in 1684.

It cannot be overemphasised, however, that the change in policy towards the role of the Irish army was made possible due to the efficient and successful financial administration of the revenue commissioners. That they were able to clear the farmers' debts

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2. Ormonde MS VII, p 320, Rochester to Ormond, 17 Feb 1685; ibid., pp 331-2, Ormond to Rochester, 1 Mar 1685.
3. ibid., pp 331-2, Ormond to Rochester, 1 Mar 1685; Carte Ms 40: fol 375, James to Ormond, 23 Mar 1685.
4. Carte Ms 40: fol 381, Tyrell to Ormond, 19 Apr 1685.

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of £109,000 "bears witness to the resilience of the Irish economy. At the close of 1682 this hardly seemed possible, for the new establishment was set at £270,000 pa with £60,000 for Tangiers and shipping and the consensus view was that Ireland would fail to yield that figure by at least £15,000 pa which would increase the national debt.¹ The king's decision to abandon Tangiers and to spend the Irish overplus on increasing the army, repairing fortifications or even building a new viceregal palace changed all that.² The king began to heed the voices that told him if he bled Ireland too much the Irish revenue would collapse and that he should be satisfied without about £270,000 pa, for at that figure since 1677 Ireland had been able to provide a subvention whilst still increasing its revenue yield.³ Additionally, however, we should not forget that Ireland had paid Dumbarton's regiment whilst it was in Tangiers since early 1680, so that Ireland, in fact, bore nearly half the cost of a Tangiers establishment of £42,000 pa, although paying nothing towards shipping to and victualling the garrison set at an additional £26,000 pa.⁴

As we have seen every branch of the Irish economy improved greatly in 1683 and 1684, improvements on the preceding year of 5.1% and 6.3% respectively, although in 1685 the revenue yield did not

¹ Ormonde NS VI, p 499, Ormond to Arran, 19 Dec 1682; ibid., pp 505-6, Guy to Ormond, 2 Jan 1683; ibid., p 506, Ormond to Arran, 2 Jan 1683; ibid., pp 509-10, Arran to Ormond, 10 Jan 1683; Ormonde NS VII, p 23, Arran to Ormond, 9 May 1683.
² ibid., p 135, Ormond to Arran, 29 Sept 1683; ibid., pp 178-9, Temple to Ormond, 10 Jan 1684.
³ ibid., p 117, Ormond to Arran, 25 Aug 1683.
⁴ ibid., pp 38-9, Ormond to Arran, 5 June 1683.
continue to rise but remained static.¹ A surplus of revenue was soon produced and used in Charles's reign to clear all debts quickly and by James to expand his army further.² Attempts were made to prosecute the Porthas and Ranelagh and his partners for debts, but these were nullified when Ranelagh gained his pardon as none of those prosecuted had substantial Irish assets.³ Rochester briefly flirted with the idea of increasing the Irish subvention to England in early 1685, but he was persuaded by the arguments that £33,000 pa was the most Ireland could bear and still keep improving its revenue yield.⁴ The acceptance of this view of what Ireland could afford did much to reinforce the crown's conviction that Irish money could most usefully and effectively serve the royal cause by being spent in Ireland building up that country's army and defences.

From 1682-85 Ireland moved into a new era, one of transition which seemed to bring Charles's nebulous vision of some kind of absolutism closer, and which James was to try to achieve. The foundations for James's policies in Ireland were laid in these years. The lord lieutenancy was subordinated once and for all to Whitehall and control of the army secured in the hands of a loyal servant of the king, not the somewhat suspect Dublin executive and its head. The army was regimented and re-modelled, increasing

1. AD Ms 18022;fol 53, Produce of Revenue, 1683-85.

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It's efficiency and creating the framework for its effective expansion from 1636 onwards.

Ireland's economic condition was made stronger and more resilient than ever before. It was recognised that Irish money spent on an Irish army was more useful to the crown than dissipating the nation's wealth by subventions to England which were, in the final analysis, a drop in the ocean compared to England's income and needs. The revenue commissioners cleared Ireland's debts so that James II could begin his reign in Ireland unencumbered by a national debt, which left him room to forward his absolutist policies there and to expand the army, relieving him of the need, furthermore, to call a parliament to augment his revenue.

Finally, through the revenue commissioners Whitehall, and especially the treasury, was able to direct Irish affairs in the all important financial area with greater superintendence than ever before. The commissioners were efficient and interfering managers and they reported back to the treasury not to the lord lieutenant. Furthermore, five commissioners roaming the countryside and in Dublin ensured a greater supervision of Irish finances than a vice-treasurer in Whitehall with a deputy in Dublin had been able to achieve. It also diminished the Irish executive's ability to conduct and advise on its own affairs. The lord lieutenant's powers were circumscribed and his control of the army lessened and the influential office of vice-treasurer had been abrogated, thereby severely weakening the intermediary power of the Dublin government, so that decisions could be made in Whitehall and at the treasury by English councillors alone without any right of interference from Dublin, whose task was more and more one of simply carrying out Whitehall directives. A new system of

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governing Ireland, with more rigid Whitehall control at the executive and the military level and in financial matters, had been introduced with the minimum of resistance, accepted by a lord lieutenant weakened by advancing years and his own desire to keep all the glory and trappings of his office. Ormond's ineffective, indeed almost non-existent opposition to these changes, was a major factor in this gradual erosion of Ireland's sovereignty and the steady degradation of the kingdom to the status of no more than a colony.
Appendix

IRISH REVENUE RETURNS, 1660-85
Customs and Excise

The customs duties were the most volatile branch of the Irish revenue, sensitive to changes in economic conditions and to government policy. If the ramifications of both of these had a profound effect on England's customs returns, there is no question of their deeper significance for Ireland's commercial sector.\(^1\) Irish needs took a firm second place to English ones, hence the cattle acts and plantation acts struck heavy blows at Ireland in favour of England. Nonetheless, Ireland's exports to some extent grew and diversified in this period on the coat tails of English trade expansion.\(^2\) This growth was deceptive, for Ireland remained heavily dependent on exporting agricultural commodities in which its markets in Europe were slowly becoming self-sufficient.\(^3\)

The produce from this branch may be broadly divided into two parts: the customs and the excise. The former continued to be raised by various proclamations and limited acts of parliament after the restoration. It was settled on the crown in perpetuity on 31 July 1662. The customs duties comprised tunnage and poundage. Poundage was paid on imports and exports at a rate of \(12\)\(^d\) in the pound, the value of goods being set by the book of rates which was appended to the act.\(^4\) Goods made out of imported raw materials were also liable to poundage, even though tax had already been paid on the materials at importation.\(^5\) Tunnage was so called because it was a tax levied per tun on liquids. For example, the tunnage on French wine was £3-10s per

\(^2\) ibid., p 10; Cullen, Economic History of Ireland since 1660, (London 1972), Chapter I, passim.
\(^3\) ibid., chapter I, passim.
\(^5\) ibid., p 420.
tun for Irishmen and progressively less for Spanish or Levantine wine and Rhenish wine. Likewise, there was a graduated scale for foreign oils, heavily favouring that produced by the plantations over the Spanish oil. Aliens or 'foreigners' paid all these taxes at a higher rate than the king's subjects in an attempt to discourage overseas merchants in favour of native (i.e. British) ones. Various harsh penalties were set out for non-compliance with the act which, if strictly followed, ought to have been prohibitive to abuses. Certainly the lack of complaints about smuggling suggests that this was the case. A strict code of conduct for the merchants was appended, particularly their rights in the case of damaged goods. The commissioners had to render their accounts yearly on demand, and no one with an interest in trade was to be appointed a customs official. The excise duty on imported goods was set out in more precise detail in the act for settling the excise and new imposition, enacted on 31 July 1662, and coming into effect retrospectively from 25 December 1661. Prior to this the import duties were collected by proclamation. The tone of this act was more obviously 'mercantilist', including calculated protectionist measures against various luxury goods and some imported cloth. This part was known as the 'foreign excise' and incorporated in the customs organisation: the major area, the inland excise, was quite separate and is dealt with below. The foreign excise was granted in perpetuity also.

1. ibid., pp 420-1.
2. ibid., p 421.
4. ibid., pp 422-3.
5. ibid., p 480.
6. ibid., p 488.
7. ibid., p 365.
9. ibid., p 394.
Since the Irish convention had successfully petitioned for the abandonment of the Irish customs farm, the branch had been overseen by commissioners. The continuation of the 1658-60 farmers as commissioners had been necessary both so as to ensure continuity and also because the state customs collection structure had broken down during the interregnum. Most ports had a customer, who oversaw the administration, a comptroller, who checked the accounts, a searcher, who stopped evasions and independently evaluated imports and exports, tide-waiters who searched vessels also, and various messengers and clerks. All these officers were overseen by the commissioners. When the customs were in farm these officials were continued in their work, although some were replaced by appointees of the farmers', who could displace, though not sack, the incumbents. This ensured a degree of continuity, although friction in localities was no doubt generated by the displacement of one group's appointees by another in 1669 and 1676, but the significance of this would have been small. After 1683 when the revenue commissioners took over they made few changes, preferring to chasten customs officers rather than causing disruption by replacing them. There can be no doubt that the adoption of farming for the customs did much to improve the efficiency of that branch, especially bearing in mind the confusion caused by contradictory royal appointments to the administration of that branch in 1661. Moreover, under the commissioners, from 1660-62, the customs were always in arrears due both to the heavy cost of administering this system in wages and salaries, and because of delays in waiting for excise due at sale. Farming lowered

1. CSPI, 1663-65: pp 259-60, Customs Commissioners to Ormond, 22 Oct 1663.
administrative costs, improved collection and efficiency and left the way open for better government administration of this branch after 1683 when it was once again put under management. Not until this branch was overseen by professional financiers, with a clear view of the kind of administration necessary to ensure the most efficient collection of the customs, was the government able to match the farmers' efficiency and profitability.

Table 1 and graph 1 both clearly illustrate the effect of the Dutch wars of 1665-67 and 1672-74 on the customs returns, causing severe falls during these years in gross returns, although the farmers' payments ensured the net returns recovered relatively quickly. It is worth noting that the second Dutch war had a more severe effect on these returns than the first, thereby emphasising Ireland's increased dependence on the European markets that this war affected. The fall in returns for the year ending 20 March 1670 was caused by the confusion and delays in the Bucknall group taking over their farm. The temporary fall in 1679 is accounted for by the Irish drought in that year and the reimposition of the cattle acts in England. Overall, though, the customs returns showed a steady improvement after 1670 when the Bucknall group took over, although compared with the 1660s there was a sizeable growth, which is indicative of the farmers' thoroughness and efficiency. Gross returns in the 1660s indicate that this branch was largely stagnant until the first Dutch war depressed it and falls in net returns, such as in 1663, were as a result of arrears and inefficiency rather than for any other reason. Under management from the restoration until December 1663 the mean gross returns were £76,601 pa and the mean net returns £50,600 pa, compared to an average gross of £72,925 pa and average net returns of £51,522 pa under Harvey's farm from 1664-69 inclusive. Thus, the farmers yielded a greater average return on a smaller mean

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gross. Under the Forth/Bucknall farm of 1669-75, for which we only have figures up to 1673, the average gross was £90,121 pa and average net £70,959 pa which was a considerable improvement. Likewise under Shaen's farm, although a larger amount was taken for administration costs, the average gross increased to £111,067 pa and the average net to £84,357 pa. Upon return to management, however, not only was the mean gross yield, from 1683-85, increased to £123,664 pa, but management costs were cut, thereby yielding a mean net return of £102,939 pa. Between the 1660-63 and 1683-85 managements of the customs revenue a greater efficiency had clearly come to the collection of that branch. Each of the three successive farms had capitalized on its predecessor's organisation, and in 1683 the revenue commissioners put the farmers' method and efficiency to good effect by incorporating it in their management and even making improvements in supervision and cost-effectiveness.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year Ending</th>
<th>Gross Proceeds</th>
<th>Net Proceeds</th>
<th>Source (unless otherwise stated)</th>
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<td>20.03.61</td>
<td>£ 77,445</td>
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Figures in brackets are estimates.

There were several alternatives for certain figures, but I have opted for the above on the grounds that in my judgement they are closest to an official version of the figures and in some cases are verified by auditors.

1. Carte Ms 52: fol 408, the gross figures here are for one year ending 24 June 1661 and 1662 respectively.
2. These figures are derived by estimating incidents, management, etc. at £22,000 pa which was about average for the time (this is verifiable in 1661 and 1662 - Carte Ms 52: fol 408 & CSPI, 1663-65, p. 287. In 1666 and 1667 these costs were £22,760 and £24,291 respectively - TCD Ms 808: fol 253-6). In 1663 we would expect this to yield a

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£64,000 estimate, not £79,000, but the net proceeds for the year ending 20.3.63 were distorted by an excessive retention of excise due at sale over which the government was to be in dispute with Morris & Dodson for many years to come. Thus, in estimating the gross proceeds, I have used the figures for net customs yield at 24.6.63, which was £57,024 (Carte Ms 52: fol 410). The figure for 20.3.64 was estimated by simply adding £22,000 to the net figure.

3. Carte Ms 52: fol 407, this figure is the gross yield for one year ending 25.12.64.
4. TCD Ms 808: fol 223, this figure is the gross yield for one year ending 25.12.65.
5. Carte Ms 52: fol 55, this figure is the gross yield for one year ending 25.12.66.
6. TCD Ms 808: fol 256, this figure is the gross yield for one year ending 25.12.67.
7. These were derived by adding £22,000 to the net yields for each year.
8. For the Shaen farm management and incident figures total £53,200 and are broken down as £36,000 for all salaries and £6,500 for repayments - the rest does not effect the customs. Given that between 1671-73 we have a verified breakdown of management costs on each branch it may be calculated that customs administration accounted for 57% of management costs in 1671 and 56% in 1672 and 1673 (Carte Ms 52: fol 512-23). Thus, we may reasonably estimate these costs in the same proportion and derive a figure of £20,160 for salaries, but since £6,500 must be added for repayments giving a yearly average of £26,660 from 1676-82. This sum was deducted from the gross figures to give an estimated net yield.
9. Salaries and repayments totalled £31,376 in 1683; £40,399 in 1684; and £39,431 in 1685. A net figure was derived by estimating customs costs at 56% of the management costs for each year and then deducting that sum from the gross.
Graph I - Customs and Foreign Imports Excise, 1660-1685, giving a breakdown of Net and Gross Proceeds based on table 1.

£ '000s

Gross

Year ending 20 March

Year ending 25 December
Inland Excise and Licences

This branch of the revenue was a long parliament innovation which had been applied to Ireland in 1643.\(^1\) Being innovatory and tainted by memories of the great rebellion this branch's survival had seemed unlikely in England, but thanks to a determined court-inspired effort the excise was continued in return for the abolition of the court of wards and other feudal incidents.\(^2\) The excise, no doubt, had been as unpopular in Ireland as it had been in England, being the first tax of its kind, drawing excise duties from goods of native manufacture. Taking their cue from events in England, however, Mountrath and Orrery intended to offer parliament the abolition of the court of wards and feudal incidents in return for the continuation of the excise. The Irish government and legislature was in a far weaker position though, as nearly all its members had compromised themselves vis a vis the monarchy during the interregnum, and were anxious to have the titles to their estates confirmed. Bargaining from a position of strength the king forced the privy council and the parliament to accept an inland excise in perpetuity, rather than for life as they had first proposed, and used the carrot of passing the act of settlement rather than the abolition of feudal dues. Thus, the crown retained the court of wards and feudal dues in Ireland with which to make further bargains with parliament. It demonstrated well the inferior strength of the Irish parliament and the executive vis a vis the restored monarchy.

The act for the excise or new imposition was given the royal assent on 31 July 1662 along with the act of settlement. It had effect retrospectively from 25 December, 1661. Its major concentration was on an

excise for ale and beer and other strong waters, from which its major income was derived, but tin, iron, glass and cloth were among many items included in a very extensive book of rates. 1 Heavy penalties were intended for all breaches of the act. 2 The most interesting aspect of the act was the organisation it envisaged to implement this branch of tax collection. Five commissioners, aided by a surveyor, were to be chosen by Ormond to oversee its collection in Dublin and they were to possess the power to appoint and displace clerks and other officers and to pay their salaries. 3 A similar organisational network, under lord treasurer Cork's patronage, was to be set up in all other cities, towns and counties. 4 Careful accounts were to be taken and sheriffs and JPs were supposed to aid in the execution of the act whenever necessary. 5

The organisation of the excise never took the prescribed form of the 1662 act. In the first place it was farmed to Massareene and Orrery, who sub-farmed it by town and county. The branch continued in farm under three further managements from 1664 to 1682, probably being sub-farmed by county at first. When the Bucknall farm took over in 1669 the country was more evenly divided into 52 revenue districts. In 1683 plans to let the excise to farm on a yearly basis were abandoned in favour of direct collection. Included in excise collection was the yearly levy of 20/- on the granting of licences for selling ale and beer, which the government had failed to persuade parliament to set at 30/- pa. 6 This effectively boosted the excise by about a further £6,000 pa and was thought of as part of the inland excise.

2. ibid, pp. 368-82.
3. ibid, p. 382.
4. ibid, pp. 383-4.
5. ibid, p. 394.
6. ibid, p. 511.
Graph 2 and table 2 follow a similar pattern to the customs figures, showing qualitative leaps in performance in 1671, 1677 and 1683. Excise returns tended to be affected by the well-being of external trade, for the customs were the major source for specie, and war years had a severe effect on this branch. The effect on the excise, however, was never quite so immediate, tending to depress this branch until long after other branches had recovered. Thus, the excise and licences yield continued to climb up to March 1667 inspite of the Dutch war and cattle prohibitions, but there was a severe downward trend in 1668 and 1669. The further fall in 1670 was mainly due to confusion in the treasury and that the farmers probably held back a large sum, so that gross proceeds may indeed have been much higher. Bearing in mind the fact that there was a delayed effect on the excise in adverse external circumstances, we can see why this branch peeked in the year ending 25 December 1672, when for the same period the Dutch war caused customs returns to collapse. We may also suppose that it accounts for the poor returns in 1676 and suggests that they fell in 1674 and 1675. Likewise the 1679 drought and the reimposition of the cattle acts seemed to have its depressing effect in 1681 and 1682. The excise, as Chandaman has pointed out, was peculiarly vulnerable to more than the normal economic vicissitudes affecting other taxes, and because of its preponderant dependence on ale and beer duties, on the barley harvest.¹ Lacking any figures for a harvest which was likely to vary from vicinity to vicinity no conclusions may be drawn on the cause and effect of this factor, except to note that it would have had a profound effect on the inland excise returns. Likewise, ale consumption was affected by the consumers' financial circumstances. The fall in excise returns from 1681-82 can be accounted for by lack of

¹ Chandaman, op cit, p. 49.
payment to the army, causing reports that brewing was being cut back due to depressed demand, which would have diminished this branch.

Under the three farms the average gross returns were £41,763 pa from 1664-70, £56,634 pa from 1671-73 and £74,043 pa from 1676-82. The average net figures showed a similar improvement rising from £35,463 pa for the 1664-70 period to £50,471 pa from 1671-73, up to £63,063 pa from 1676-82. These improvements were partly as a result of reorganisation, but more the result of several legal judgements in the 1670s which led to increases in the excise duties. The rise in average gross excise returns from 1683-85 to £88,075 pa and mean net returns to £81,403 pa reflected the vigorous prosecution of tax evaders, more diligent management and the reorganisation of its collection.
Table 2 - Inland Excise and Licences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year Ending</th>
<th>Gross Proceeds</th>
<th>Net Proceeds</th>
<th>Source (unless otherwise stated)</th>
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<td>£ 397</td>
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<td>£ 640</td>
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<td>20.03.63</td>
<td>£ 436</td>
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<td>20.03.64</td>
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<td>£53,722</td>
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<td>25.12.76</td>
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<td>(£55,184)</td>
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<td>(£67,086)</td>
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<td>£80,044</td>
<td>(£69,064)</td>
<td>Carte Ms 53: fol 601-02/AD Ms 18022: fol 52</td>
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<td>£75,245</td>
<td>(£64,265)</td>
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<td>(£84,961)</td>
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<td>25.12.85</td>
<td>£92,631</td>
<td>(£85,534)</td>
<td>AD Ms 18022: fol 53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures in brackets are estimates.

* Wine licences are included in these figures after this date.

1. Administration costs were estimated at £6,300 pa for the period 1664-71, based on the actual costs incurred in management by the 1671-73 farms. This figure was then added to each net figure so as to yield a continuous sequence of gross proceeds.

2. Excise management took up 19% of all administration costs in 1672 and 18% in 1671 and 1673. On this basis management costs under Shaen's farm were estimated at £6,480 pa, plus £4,500 pa clawed back for brewers allowances and insolvencies, giving a total cost of £10,980 pa, to be deducted from the gross figure.

3. These figures were derived by estimating excise management costs at 18% of the 1683-85 total administration costs and deducting that sum from the gross yield.

(208)
Graph 2: Inland Excise Returns, 1660-85

giving a breakdown of Gross and Net Proceeds based on table 2 (this includes licences).
Quitrents and Crown Rents

Whereas in 1660 the feudal dues in England were swept away, the peculiar circumstances of Ireland's 1660 settlement allowed them to continue in the form of the quitrent. This was partly because the crown was in a much stronger position, but partly also because there was some justification for their continuation in Ireland. The Irish parliament had been forced to swallow the excise in return for no concessions from the crown, save the promise to pass the bill of settlement, yet within that bill of settlement further financial concessions were yielded to the crown. Adventurers were to be granted their titles to estates in common socage, a feudal arrangement, in return for which money was given in lieu of military service.¹ Soldiers, on the other hand, held their lands in knight service in capite which they rendered by payment of an annual 'quitrent' in lieu of military service.² Given Ireland's recent history and the preponderance of the hostile native community, land holders were keen to accept the concept of paying a tax to the crown to maintain an army to protect their properties. There was no pressure to breakdown this area of the feudal relationship between crown and tenant. Thus, adventurers and soldiers paid yearly 3d per acre in Leinster, 2 1/4d per acre in Munster, 1 1/4d per acre in Connaught and 1d an acre in Ulster and 1s 6d for every pound's worth of house rent in corporations.³ The quitrent for Ulster was raised to 2d per acre by the act of explanation in 1666.⁴ Unfortunately, this act was rather arbitrary and took no account of the land's profitability so that several adventurers and

² ibid, p. 261.
³ ibid, p. 261.
soldiers found themselves paying taxes for large tracts of bogland or mountain, which was to cause constant pressure on the treasury and crown for remittals, granted during the 1670s.

Less palatable to the adventurers and soldiers was the decision to make adventurers pay one year's value of their 1659 rents and soldiers a half year's value of their 1659 rents, in order to compensate the '49 officers, royalists and the crown.¹ This was further altered in 1666 after the adventurers and soldiers had been forced to accept the confirmation of their title to only two-thirds of the lands they held in 1659, the rest being set aside for reprisals and compensation.² Adventurers and soldiers were to pay a full year's value of their rents, allowing a full remittance for sums paid by the 1662 act.³ The year's value was supposed to reach £300,000 in value, but if it fell short the government had to "make up the full and just sum of £300,000, and to cause the same to be assessed, distributed, raised and levied by such ways and measures as they shall think fit ..."⁴ The first £50,000 was to go straight to the king's privy purse, then £100,000 to compensate the '49 officers, £50,000 to compensate Ormond and the residue to be paid as particular rewards set out in the act of explanation.⁵ The year's value was separately managed by Anglesey in the treasury before 1666, but after 1666 the Bence brothers took control of it.⁶ Payments were made out of this fund by directions from the commissioners of settlement.⁷

The quitrents were not put in farm until the great farm of 1669, and there continued to be qualms in some minds about the ethics of farming

3. ibid, pp. 32-33.
4. ibid, pp. 32-33.
5. ibid, pp. 33-36.
6. CSPI, 1666-69:p 148, King to Ormond, 6 July 1666.
a branch which was essentially a feudal due and concerned the relationship of subject and crown direct. Originally, these rents were collected on an unwieldy county basis by the sheriff assisted by bailiffs.\(^1\) This method was superseded by the 1669 farmers, who appointed their own officers and divided the county up into manageable and effective districts for collection.\(^2\) This was the method continued in 1683 by the revenue commissioners and appears to have been used after 1685 as the model for excise collection too.

Quitrent returns were severely hit by the king's vulnerability to petitions and his weakening that branch by granting abatements. After 1669, however, when farmers took over this branch it proved to be the most dramatic area of improvement in revenue collection. Under management from 1660-68 huge arrears had accrued, but the farmers never tolerated the accretion of any notable quantity of arrears. Average gross and net returns under management from 1660-68 had been £46,145 pa and £39,145 pa respectively. The farmers divided their collection into 52 equal districts, rather than collecting on a county basis and harried the tenant for his rent using appointees whose major task was to ensure these rents were paid. From 1669-73 average gross and net returns lept to £75,045 pa and £68,720 pa. Abatements cut into these figures during the Shaen farm with average gross returns at £69,975 pa and mean net returns at £57,575 pa. This was the one area where direct management after 1683 had the least dynamic effect. In fact, the mean gross fell to £68,686 pa, although mean net returns rose slightly to £61,255 pa.

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1. TCD Ms 748: no folios. State of the Revenue, Ireland, 1693.
2. TCD Ms 748: no folios. State of the Revenue, Ireland, 1693.
### Table 3 - Quitrents and Crown Rents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year Ending</th>
<th>Gross Proceeds</th>
<th>Net Proceeds</th>
<th>Source (unless otherwise stated)</th>
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<td>£68,922</td>
<td>(£61,036)</td>
<td>AD Ms 18022: fol 53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures in brackets are estimates.

1. Between 1669 and 1673 the cost of administering this branch was about £7,000 pa, so using that as a yardstick, management costs for this branch between 1660 and 1668 have been estimated at £7,000 pa and added to the net figure to derive a gross yield.

2. In 1671 and 1672 managing the quitrent collection took up 20% of administrative costs; in 1673 it took up 21%. Using these figures we can derive a salary cost of £7,200 pa under Shaen's farm to which £5,200 for abated quitrents must be added, giving a total of £12,400 pa, which was deducted from the gross figures to calculate a net yield.

3. Using the 1671-73 management costs as a model, 20% of each year's total management costs was estimated as the cost of administering this branch, and these figures were deducted from the gross sums to give a net yield.

(213)
Graph 3 - Quitrents etc. Returns, 1660-85

giving a breakdown of Net and Gross Proceeds based on table 3.

Year ending 20 March

Year ending 25 December
Hearth Tax

In England, the hearth tax was a unique addition to the hereditary revenue, for not only was it a new tax but it was granted as a clear addition in return for no crown concessions.\(^1\) Doubtless, the decision to opt for a hearth tax was in response to similar arguments and demands in Ireland and England. What is interesting about the tax, however, is that its origin, so far as it can be divined, seems to have been Irish, based on Petty's 'Treatise on taxes and contributions', written in 1662.\(^2\) Moreover, the decision to adopt an Irish hearth tax followed very quickly on the English parliamentary decision.\(^3\) In June 1662 Mervyn intimated that such a bill would be acceptable in return for the abolition of the court of wards, and thus by December 1662 the court of wards had been abolished in return for this additional tax. All houses had to pay the king 2/- pa for each stove or hearth and the constables, assisted by JPs, were to collect the tax, which was to be assessed by 'two reputable persons' in each parish.\(^4\) £20,000 of the tax, presumed to be its first year's yield, was allocated towards compensating officers of the court of wards.\(^5\) The act proved inadequate, for too many exemptions were possible and the tax rolls were inadequately completed. A new act in 1666 tightened up the administration, only exempted widows and ordered that those without hearths pay 4/- a year.\(^6\) The duty became payable each year on 10 January instead of in two installments.\(^7\) Attempts to tighten the act further and increase its yield and palatability to the current farmers failed. Indeed the

2. ibid, p. 78.
3. ibid, p. 77.
5. ibid, p. 509.
7. ibid, p. 182.
parliament rejected provisions for the farming of the tax. The
hearth tax farm was abandoned in 1668, but it went back into farm
from 1669 to 1682 when it was sub-farmed by county and barony though
nominally under a central control. After that date it was farmed
yearly on a barony or county basis, for this seemed to be the best
method of increasing its yield.¹

The hearth tax, almost without exception, showed a continual improve­
ment in its yield from the low of 1667 up to the end of the period.
Petty farming seems to have been the only viable method of collection,
as others were too cumbersome, costly and inefficient. After 1671 the
hearth tax was a steady slightly improving source of income but it was
relatively far less important than the customs, inland excise and
quitrents.

¹ Carte Ms 54: fol 5.
Table 4 - Hearth Tax

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<td>Carte Ms 53: fol 601-02/AD Ms 18022: fol 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.12.82</td>
<td>£30,095</td>
<td>(£27,835)</td>
<td>Carte Ms 53: fol 601-02/AD Ms 18022: fol 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.12.83</td>
<td>£31,041</td>
<td>(£29,943)</td>
<td>AD Ms 18022: fol 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.12.84</td>
<td>£31,646</td>
<td>(£30,232)</td>
<td>AD Ms 18022: fol 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.12.85</td>
<td>£32,953</td>
<td>(£31,573)</td>
<td>AD Ms 18022: fol 53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures in brackets are estimates.

1. Estimating management costs at £2,700 pa based on the actual figures for 1569 and 1570 (Carte Ms 52: fol 512-23) the gross yield was calculated by adding £2,700 pa to the net yield.

2. In 1571 4% of costs in management were for hearth tax collection; in 1572 the figure was 3.7%, in 1573 3.1%. Using a figure of 3.5% the annual management costs were computed to be £1,260 plus £1,000 for abatement, giving £2,260 pa as costs to be deducted from the gross so as to calculate the net yield.

3. Management costs were estimated at 3.5% of the total for 1683-85 and these figures deducted from the gross so as to compute a net yield.
Graph 4 - Hearth Tax Returns, 1664-85

giving a breakdown of Net and Gross Proceeds based on table 4.
Small Branches and Casual Receipts

This comprised several almost insignificant areas. Felons and fugitives goods, profits from the hanaper and greenwax, the first fruits and twentieth parts from the clergy and other casual receipts from 1660-71 average out at £4,409 pa. These were collected by the sheriffs until they were allowed to Ranelagh and his partners in 1671 (and incidentally estimated at £6,000 pa), and they were included in Shaen's farm from 1676-82. Before their inclusion in the great farm of 1669 wine licences were farmed separately and yielded £2,000 pa.

Up until 1667 the Irish treasury received a series of English subventions, totalling in all £240,780. These were paid directly into the Irish treasury. To these we must not forget to add the £50,000 granted by the act of explanation to the king which was diverted to the Irish treasury rather than the privy purse - this latter sum though was discounted against the national debt in Ranelagh's accounts. Also, Ireland acquired the profits of several prize ships, totalling £22,457, from 1666-69. In 1669 the treasury also received the benefit of the farmers' £70,000 advance.

Poll Money and Subsidies

In 1660 the government was granted a double poll tax by the convention, plus a further one in January 1661, in order to pay the army in anticipation of parliamentary grants. Although the poll tax yielded some £110,684, this fell £48,686 short of its expected yield. The poll tax

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was considered an unfair and inadequate tax and this was quickly illustrated by parliament's inquiries.¹ In order to collect the king's debts and to cut the Irish establishment to financially manageable proportions, further direct taxation was necessary. This was unpopular and only acceptable "as the particular instrument of extraordinary supply".² The dominant financial wisdom and theory was that the king should "live of his own", namely from his indirect taxes, the hereditary revenue. Only in special circumstances, such as in war time or those existing in 1660, would parliament vote the king direct taxes. In Ireland as in England parliament opted for the subsidy rather than the more profitable assessment, for the latter had been an unpopular tool of the commonwealth.³

The Irish subsidy was a tax of 2s 8d per pound for all royal subjects and 5s 4d per pound for all aliens worth £3 or more, rated on all moveable or immoveable goods.⁴ The subsidy was also a land tax rated at 4/- a pound for Irish men and 8/- a pound for all aliens based on the land's yearly profits. These taxes were leviable on all organisations and individuals possessing goods or lands in Ireland whether they were absentee or not.⁵ Commissioners, assisted by constables and bailiffs, and appointed by the lord lieutenant and the exchequer were chosen to oversee this work in every county, city, town and borough. Each town and borough had to have appointed to it between two and six honest inhabitants to do this work.⁶ The tax was to be paid

3. ibid, pp. 140-42.
4. Irish Statutes, Vol II, 1634-62, p. 350. (In fact this subsidy act is the one for 1665 and not 1662 as stated in the statutes, but materially this makes no difference to the discussion.)
5. ibid, pp. 349-51.
6. ibid, pp. 351-2.
to collectors who would return it with full accounts to the exchequer.\footnote{ibid, pp. 355-62.}

The trouble with this tax was that assessors tended to favour the rich and powerful and fell heaviest on the poor\footnote{Ormonde NS V, p 395, Longford to Ormond, 24 Aug 1680.} \footnote{Irish Statutes, 1634-62, vol ii, p 349; Carte Ms 31: fol 334, State of the Revenue, 17 Oct 1661.} \footnote{Harleian Ms 4,892:fol 130, Journal of House of Commons, 31 Mar 1666.} \footnote{Carte Ms 52:fol 695-8.}

The Irish parliament granted eight subsidies of £15,000 each payable over four years from 25 December 1661 and a further act for four subsidies payable in one year after the expiration of the last act.\footnote{Carte Ms 52:fol 695-8.} In 1665-66 the parliament voted eight more subsidies payable over four years, plus an additional two in 1667 if the war continued, as it did, until then.\footnote{Carte Ms 52:fol 695-8.} In spite of some delays the subsidy proved to be one of the most efficient sources of tax that the government tapped. There were yearly fluctuations, but overall by March 1671 £327,149 worth of the subsidy had been collected out of a total £330,000 voted - a yield of 99%:\footnote{ibid, pp. 355-62.}
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year Ending</th>
<th>Poll Tax (£)</th>
<th>Subsidies (£)</th>
<th>Money from England (£)</th>
<th>Prize Ships (£)</th>
<th>Other Sources* (£)</th>
<th>Total (£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20 March 1661</td>
<td>29,054</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>39,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>68,054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 March 1662</td>
<td>77,406</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>88,406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 March 1663</td>
<td>3,233</td>
<td>19,756</td>
<td>104,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9,545</td>
<td>136,433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 March 1664</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>99,670</td>
<td>55,880</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>34,275</td>
<td>190,404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 March 1665</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>40,524</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>618</td>
<td>41,180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 March 1666</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>16,936</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>20,464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 March 1667</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>63,514</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>8,672</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>102,552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 March 1668</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>14,212</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>10,780</td>
<td>8,894</td>
<td>34,861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 March 1669</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>39,703</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>714</td>
<td>10,701</td>
<td>51,118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 March 1670</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>23,034</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,290</td>
<td>72,540</td>
<td>97,877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 March 1671</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>9,795</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>28,623</td>
<td>38,467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total over 11 years</strong></td>
<td><strong>110,684</strong></td>
<td><strong>327,149</strong></td>
<td><strong>240,780</strong></td>
<td><strong>22,457</strong></td>
<td><strong>169,371</strong></td>
<td><strong>870,441</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* These 'other sources' are from the years value: they were borrowed to supplement the treasury which then had the obligation to pay those sums which these funds were meant for. In the year ending 20 March 1670, the £70,000 farmers' advance is included in the 'other sources' column.

### Table 6 - Gross and Net Revenue, 1660-85

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year Ending</th>
<th>Gross Total</th>
<th>Net Total</th>
<th>Gross Ordinary Revenue</th>
<th>Net Ordinary Revenue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20.03.61</td>
<td>188,302</td>
<td>155,887</td>
<td>120,248</td>
<td>87,833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.03.62</td>
<td>225,362</td>
<td>200,564</td>
<td>136,956</td>
<td>112,158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.03.63</td>
<td>266,048</td>
<td>228,461</td>
<td>129,605</td>
<td>92,018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.03.64</td>
<td>314,025</td>
<td>286,465</td>
<td>123,621</td>
<td>96,061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.03.65</td>
<td>230,485</td>
<td>196,256</td>
<td>189,305</td>
<td>155,076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.03.66</td>
<td>208,335</td>
<td>183,134</td>
<td>187,871</td>
<td>162,670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.03.67</td>
<td>264,374</td>
<td>230,628</td>
<td>161,822</td>
<td>128,076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.03.68</td>
<td>190,462</td>
<td>170,729</td>
<td>155,601</td>
<td>135,868</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.03.69</td>
<td>234,220</td>
<td>209,168</td>
<td>183,102</td>
<td>158,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.03.70</td>
<td>294,106</td>
<td>222,444</td>
<td>196,229</td>
<td>124,567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.03.71</td>
<td>275,080</td>
<td>249,401</td>
<td>236,613</td>
<td>210,934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.12.71</td>
<td>266,430</td>
<td>231,197</td>
<td>266,430</td>
<td>231,197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.12.72</td>
<td>247,069</td>
<td>211,238</td>
<td>247,069</td>
<td>211,238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.12.73</td>
<td>250,963</td>
<td>219,742</td>
<td>250,963</td>
<td>219,742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.12.74</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>250,000*</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.12.75</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>270,000*</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.12.76</td>
<td>261,302</td>
<td>208,102</td>
<td>261,302</td>
<td>208,102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.12.77</td>
<td>291,366</td>
<td>238,106</td>
<td>291,366</td>
<td>238,166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.12.78</td>
<td>293,159</td>
<td>239,959</td>
<td>293,159</td>
<td>239,959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.12.79</td>
<td>275,804</td>
<td>222,604</td>
<td>275,804</td>
<td>222,604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.12.80</td>
<td>298,061</td>
<td>244,681</td>
<td>298,061</td>
<td>244,681</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.12.82</td>
<td>285,468</td>
<td>232,268</td>
<td>285,468</td>
<td>232,268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.12.83</td>
<td>300,279</td>
<td>268,903</td>
<td>300,279</td>
<td>268,903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.12.84</td>
<td>319,168</td>
<td>278,679</td>
<td>319,168</td>
<td>278,679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.12.85</td>
<td>318,961</td>
<td>279,530</td>
<td>318,961</td>
<td>279,530</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The above are all derived from Carte Ms 52: fol 512-23, fol 695-6; Carte Ms 53: fol 601-02; AD Ms 18022, fol 52 & 53.

° Estimated

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Graph 5 showing Gross and Net Returns for Ireland, 1660-85, indicating the effect of extraordinary additions, which is based on Table 6.
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Stowe 205 Correspondence to Essex, Apr-Aug 1674.
Stowe 206 Correspondence to Essex, Sept-Dec 1674.
Stowe 207 Correspondence to Essex, Jan-May 1675.
Stowe 208 Correspondence to Essex, June-Dec 1675.
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