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FINANCE AND THE GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND,

1660-85

IN 2 VOLUMES

Volume I

by Seán Egan

Submitted for the degree of PhD to the
University of Dublin, Trinity College.

The research was conducted under the supervision of
Professor Aidan Clarke

Modern History Department,
Trinity College,
Dublin 2

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Acknowledgements

Acknowledgements are due to all those library staff who have been of assistance to me in my researches, particularly those of Trinity College Dublin and the National Library of Ireland.

My debt to the work of many individual scholars is acknowledged in the footnotes. I must also acknowledge the patient supervision of Professor Aidan Clarke, who has guided my research over nearly five years through the many phases of its evolution. Many of the ideas and themes in this thesis owe their development to Professor Clarke.

However, the greatest and sincerest acknowledgements are due to my wife, Morag, without whose constant encouragement, good humour and willingness to type endless re-drafts I am sure this thesis would never have been completed; in many ways this thesis is as much her work as it is mine.
Declaration

This thesis, either in part or in whole, has not been submitted as an exercise for a degree at any other university and it is entirely the result of my own researches.

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Seán Egan

13 June 1983
Declaration

This thesis, either in part or in whole, has not been submitted as an exercise for a degree at any other university and it is entirely the result of my own researches.
Traditionally, historians have viewed this period as being dominated by Ormond and that its only interest lies in its being the aftermath of the Cromwellian Settlement and prelude to the 1688 Revolution. This thesis re-evaluates both of these features. Firstly, Ormond's pre-eminence is reassessed, and it is shown that after 1671, at least, Ranelagh and the various English treasury ministers were the dominant force in Irish matters. Secondly, and more importantly, it is shown that these years marked a unique period of Irish history. The foundations for this reinterpretation are based upon viewing the government of Ireland through a financial perspective. Up until 1667-68, the crown's Irish policy was principally concerned with securing Ireland for the monarchy, but, as the king freed himself from the tule-lage of his Clarendonian advisers, the crown began to pursue the goal of political independence. The chief restraint on this was the crown's inadequate finances, which made it dependent on parliamentary aid. It was within the context of making himself financially and politically independent that Charles embarked on his Dover policy. Its Irish counterpart was the first endeavours, under Robartes and Berkeley, to ensure that Ireland should be solvent and require no more English money, as it had done up to 1667. Under Ranelagh's guidance in 1671, and with Danby's assistance as lord treasurer after 1673, the strength of the Irish revenue enabled Ireland's role in crown policy to be redefined: in 1672-3, Irish troops were used in England and Irish money paid to the privy purse. Ireland thus became a source of profit to the crown. After 1676, the treasury ensured that this profit was systematically collected and by the 1680s, the English treasury directed most Irish matters and Ormond, as lord lieutenant, was no more than a figurehead. When the Irish revenue was placed under the control of the treasury appointed revenue commissioners, the Irish government's subordination to the treasury was completed. By 1683, Irish money was being used to aid the crown's pursuit of political independence, by paying for troops in England and remodelling the Irish army. James II's accession to the throne ended the treasury's domination of Irish matters and the crown's Irish policy was once more redefined.

It is, therefore, the financial perspective, and particularly the treasury's domination of Irish policy, which throws new light on the conventional assumptions of the dynamics of this period. It was a unique period in which a clearly defined crown policy for Ireland evolved. Ireland's financial position, not its land settlement or its religious divisions, was the dominant feature, and formed the context in which the crown's policy and the motives of the leading political figures in Ireland are best understood.
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Dates, except when otherwise stated, are old style, with the year regarded as beginning January 1st.
Chapter I

INTRODUCTION
This thesis covers the years 1660-85 in Ireland, from the time of Charles II's restoration until his death. In terms of Irish history, these are traditionally seen as uneventful and insignificant years—a hangover from the interregnum and an unimportant interlude prior to James II's reign and the revolution. Certainly, in most of the recent works on Stuart Ireland, events from 1660-85 seem to have no intrinsic value, and only to add a very little to our understanding of James II's reign and the revolution. The traditional view of restoration Ireland has been based upon Carte's great Life of Ormond. 

This work is founded almost entirely on the Ormond Manuscripts and, consequently, leads to a disproportionate place being given to the duke in the history of the period; furthermore, Ormond's viceregal reign from 1677-85 is virtually ignored, partly because Carte left behind most of the manuscripts pertaining to these years in Kilkenny Castle. At the beginning of the century, Sagwell attempted to redress the balance somewhat, treating each of the lord lieutenants of this period with some equality. However, although Bagwell's work is very useful on the land settlement, and in setting out events chronologically, it gives no view of Ireland's place in the crown's policies, nor does it suggest that the crown had any Irish policy, apart from keeping the country compliant.

3. This material has largely been reproduced by the Historical Manuscripts Commission, Ormonde Papers New Series, vol III-VIII, (London, 1904-12).
5. ibid., vol iii, pp 22-27, 32-35, 51, 84-87, 89-92, 99, 119-23 and especially pp 125-47. This is also the approach in Prendergast, Ire and from the Restoration to the Revolution, (London, 1887).
last few years that historians have begun to study these years for their own sake. There has been work on the cattle acts and the land settlement, but these also tend to be seen more in terms of later developments.¹ Professor Beckett, though, in a series of articles and in his The Making of Modern Ireland, 1603–1922 has tried to evaluate the role of the English administration in Ireland.² Beckett’s work, along with James McGuire’s article on Ormond’s dismissal in 1669, are probably the only attempts to interpret events in restoration Ireland solely in terms of themselves.³ Interpretations of these years are, however, hampered by a severe lack of research into the period.⁴

This thesis, therefore, aims to evaluate events in Ireland from 1660–83 and to place an interpretation upon them, which, though having some relation to the interregnum and the proceedings in James II’s reign, will demonstrate that 1660–83 represents a unique and intrinsically significant period in Irish history, and that the crown’s Irish policy and its manifestation in Ireland was closely allied to the crown’s policies and hopes in England. The thesis is entitled ‘Finance and the Government of Ireland’, because the interpretation which I have placed upon the government’s policy in these years is through a financial perspective. In English history, Chandaman’s work on the revenue has reinterpreted events and policies, although the significance of his conclusions

⁴ For example, no Ph.D. theses have been completed on this period in Irish or British universities, and only a handful of MA theses.
Chandaman has shown that crown policy from 1660-85 was dominated by financial considerations. It was at the basis of the crown's relationship with parliament and dominated its foreign and domestic policy. Charles's Dover policy, Danby's pre-eminence and then Hyde's, were all part of the crown's frenetic search to be freed from all constraints on policy which resulted from inadequate finances. This thesis will demonstrate that the crown's view of Ireland was dominated by exactly the same considerations: Ireland was seen in terms of its revenue and the use to which that revenue could be put to aid the crown's policy. What marks Charles's reign out from James's is that, after 1685, the crown was largely freed from financial dependence on its parliament, and James was able to push towards his absolutist dream.\(^2\)

By interpreting the events of 1660-85 through a financial perspective, an entirely different view of the government of Ireland will emerge from the traditional one. Firstly, the conventional interpretation of Irish finances in this period will be reassessed. Twomey laid the foundations for this reinterpretation in his 1954 thesis on the financial administration of Ireland, 1660-70, but the chief change will come in our view of the 1670s and 1680s.\(^3\) For example, Irish subventions to the English treasury will be accurately stated for the first time.\(^4\) Evidence of the Irish revenue returns for these years will, however, support Professor

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2. ibid., pp 228 ff.
4. See Simms, 'The Restoration, 1660-85' in New History of Ireland ..., pp 440-41 & pp 442-43, where Ranelagh's secret payments to Charles have been confused with the farmers. The significance and impact of these payments have not been previously assessed either.
Cullen's views on the Irish economy at this time. Secondly, Ormond will no longer seem the most important, successful and significant figure in restoration Ireland. Thirdly, the personnel dominating Irish policy will be seen to be increasingly not the lord lieutenants, but Richard Jones, Earl of Ranelagh and the lord treasurer, Danby and first lords of the treasury, Essex and Hyde. These are figures about whom we know much and by delving in to the main events of the period more closely, it is relatively easy to readjust our view of their importance and impact. This is not so with the secondary figures, who provided the ideas, the schemes and the finances which these more pre-eminent men used. Chandaman has shown in English history that behind the scenes William Bucknall and Sir Robert Vyner, through their financial position, exerted as much, if not more, influence on royal policy than most of Charles's leading ministers, but no sound details about these men survive. A similar story can be told for the Irish history of the time. Shaen, Harvey, the Bences, the Forths, Deane, Muschamp, Sheridan, Morris, Dickenson and Strong are names that flit across the manuscripts, mentioned in grants, but of whom no biographies can be constructed. They are largely anonymous figures, hardly more than names, but the influence they had on Irish financial matters and, consequently on Irish government policy, was profound and of primary importance. Whilst it is relatively easy to suggest the motives behind the actions of the primary figures in this period, it is less easy with these secondary ones, about whom we know so little. Ranelagh, for example, was clearly motivated by the desire both for financial

2. See Chandaman, *op cit.*, p 63 & passim. It is impossible to pull together anything, but the barest biographies for these men, and for prominent Irishmen, the dearth of information is significantly greater.
and political gain. With the merchants and revenue commissioners involved in various intrigues, proposals and farms, we largely have to guess. By and large, the evidence suggests that these merchants only desired the use of Irish funds, in order to back mercantile adventures on a short term basis. We know that some, like the Forths, needed Irish money to save them from bankruptcy in England, whilst Muschamp, Shaen and Hayes, for example, clearly had political ambitions, but the motives of others must remain a calculated guess.

The chapters that follow will show that over the years 1660-85 Charles's Irish policy changed several times. These changes were directed towards the same end, of, firstly, making Ireland solvent and, secondly, of using Ireland in the crown's pursuit of freedom from any constraints on policy. The underlying theme of all these changes in policy was financial and, as a result, these were treasury dominated. It is the treasury's dominance of Irish and English policy which is the unique feature of Charles II's reign, particularly in so far as it affected the government of Ireland.

At the restoration in 1660, the government was faced with three major problems - the restoration of the old forms of government, which was fairly easily achieved, the land settlement, which Bagwell has dealt with at some length and the economy.¹ The inadequate sources of income to support a necessarily large army was one of the lords justices' greatest problems. With parliament's help, the army was reduced to a more affordable size and the hereditary revenue expanded to take account of costs of the establishment. Nevertheless, Ireland's finances

¹ Bagwell, op cit., vol iii, pp 11-50.
verged on crisis point up to 1667. In part, this was caused by supporting a still too large army, the uncertainties created in the economy by the land settlement, and the economic consequences of the Dutch war and cattle acts. From the crown's point of view, though, it was particularly unsatisfactory. The Irish parliament failed to clear the national debt of about £220,000 as the country was unable to pay all its taxes, and the Irish government had to be supported by a series of subventions.¹ These Charles could barely afford, as the English parliament had voted him insufficient supplies for his needs, and these subventions angered the English parliament, which felt the Irish government frittered away English money.

Up to 1667, Ireland does not seem to have had a defined role in the crown's policy. This, in part, was due to the fact that Charles was encumbered by Clarendonians, whose only desire seems to have been to restore the 1641 status quo and to develop a cautious non-interventionist policy.² This was certainly the case in Ireland up to 1667. The government of the lords justices, for example, concentrated upon keeping Ireland secure for the monarchy. This they largely achieved by concentrating on reducing the army to try to meet the crown's income, and by persuading parliament to vote funds. The government of the lords justices was mainly a preparatory operation, on the basis of which, Ormond rebuilt the Irish army into a loyal force, and then steered a land settlement through parliament which he hoped would achieve the widest possible acceptance. There was no interference from Whitehall in any of this, and, as Beckett has implied, the lord

1. See appendix.
lieutenancy of Ireland achieved a status and an independence it had not enjoyed throughout the seventeenth century.¹ Running a parliament, controlling Irish patronage unchallenged by any rivals in Irish matters at court, and serving as commander-in-chief of the army, Ormond's pre-eminence in Irish matters was unquestioned.

Ormond did not view it as part of the chief governor's role to interfere with the revenue. The revenue farms to which he agreed in the early 1660s were not particularly lucrative, but, as we shall see, financial problems were largely caused by areas beyond his control, such as the Dutch war of 1665–67, and the cattle acts, as well as incompetence and corruption in the Irish treasury. Similar financial incompetence on the part of the English Clarendonians led to their downfall in 1667, as it was to lead to Ormond's in 1669.

The years 1668–69 mark a turning point in the crown's overall policy as it sought, through the cabal, to pursue a policy aimed at making itself financially independent and no longer constrained. The investigations into the Irish treasury not only overthrew Ormond, but were an attempt by certain ministers to show that Ireland could be made solvent and no longer a drain on the English treasury. Ireland's role therefore, was for the first time clearly defined. In 1668–69, the treasury lords played an important part in the re-letting of the Irish farms, and Buckingham attempted to gain control of Irish affairs. Robartes's appointment as viceroy in 1669 was the Irish counterpart of Charles's Dover policy, by which the king aimed to free himself from all constraints on policy and to salvage his ailing finances.²

2. This is based on Chandaman, op cit., pp 221 ff.
The chief purpose behind Robartes's appointment was to investigate Irish finances further and to make the country solvent. Along with this, he was supposed to follow the pattern in England of severely retrenching royal expenditure. Irish finances had already been reordered by the new farm of the revenue.

Even as Robartes was made lord lieutenant, an Irish policy was not only being defined, but developed. In 1669, Charles resisted offers for a farm of the king's arrears in Ireland which would possibly have yielded a profit to his privy purse and might have cleared some of his huge national debt. Ireland's financial attractions had already been opened up to Charles as a result of the new revenue farm, by which he received £10,000 pa secretly to augment his English income.1

Robartes was believed to be in some way connected to Buckingham's cabal, but during his brief tenure of the lord lieutenancy he alienated all support both at court and in his own executive. His efforts to investigate Irish finances ended in fiasco, due to Ormond's opposition, and problems over the new farm, and his handling of the army led to his dismissal. His replacement, Berkeley, was chosen to undertake a precisely similar policy to Robartes's, but without the vindictive edge. His task was to make Ireland solvent, in which he was largely successful due chiefly to vast improvements in the revenue. However, Berkeley was the last lord lieutenant to govern Ireland with any degree of independence, for as Charles and his ministers began to realise that Ireland could afford to make a more positive contribution to the crown's wider schemes, interference from Whitehall increased.

1. of Simms, 'The Restoration, 1660-85' in New History of Ireland ..., p 442. The £10,000 pa was paid by the farmers, not Ranelagh.
This was, in part, because Berkeley cut himself off from his supporters at court by his conduct towards Orrery. Mostly, though, it was because Charles chose to gamble on implementing his Dover policy in full and Berkeley was not the viceroy he desired to forward the Irish part of this scheme. In 1671, Ranelagh had concluded his famous undertaking with the crown, whereby, in return for control of the Irish treasury up to December 1675, it had been covenanted that all the arrears to the king in Ireland would be collected, the national debt cleared, and Charles paid £80,000. The possibility of Ireland not just being solvent, but a source of profit to the crown thus opened itself up to the king. Furthermore, Ranelagh paid Charles £48,000 secretly as part of the undertaking as well as making various payments to prominent courtiers. This injection of Irish money could not have come at a better time, for Charles was faced with bankruptcy in 1671.\(^1\) Ranelagh also found the means to supply Charles with 1,900 troops, paid for by the Irish treasury, from 1672-74. This emphasised the usefulness both of Ranelagh and of the Irish army, but most importantly for the future, it illustrated that Irish arms and money could be used to support the crown’s English policies.

This change in policy in 1671 marked a further turning point for the government of Ireland. Ranelagh had proved that Ireland could be a source of profit to the English crown. In 1671, Berkeley ceased to be the effective governor of Ireland. The Irish committee in Whitehall took over the direction of Ireland, to be replaced by Essex when he became viceroy in April 1672.

During this interlude, a series of pro-Roman Catholic proclamations

\(^1\) Hence the stop on the treasury in January 1672. Chandaman, \textit{op. cit.}, pp 222 & 230-1.
were issued, and it was to be Essex's task to implement this pro-
Catholic policy in Ireland.

From 1672 onwards Whitehall, and particularly the treasury,
increasingly encroached upon the government of Ireland at the
expense of the lord lieutenant's office. Although Charles's
Dover policy disintegrated, both Essex and Ranelagh survived it,
the former being viewed as a champion of protestantism, the
latter becoming the new lord treasurer, Danby's great henchman.
Ranelagh persuaded Danby that Ireland would be a source of profit
to the English crown and both bent their efforts towards gaining
complete control of Irish finances and the Irish government.
Ranelagh achieved this by his immense influence with the king,
his presence at court, and his control of the Irish treasury, which
enabled him to issue Irish funds as he saw fit. The struggle
between Essex and Ranelagh for the direction of Irish policy
demonstrated Ranelagh's fine appreciation of where the source
of power lay, namely at court where decisions were made and in
control of the Irish treasury. The viceroy's defeat in his
attempts to stop the Irish government becoming subordinate to
the treasury was signalled by the decision to keep most of the
farmers' 1676 advance in England, to place a permanent payment
to the privy purse on the Irish establishment and to reserve the
overplus for English uses.

At least three factors had made this development in policy poss­
ible. Firstly, through his undertaking Ranelagh ran a ruthless
and efficient operation. He brought in money faster than any
previous vice-treasurer had managed. Much of this he achieved
through coercion and corruption, but its effect was to make the
Irish treasury more efficient. Secondly, the Irish economy
overcame with relative ease the financial difficulties caused by the Dutch war of 1672-74 and was in a position to yield a sizeable surplus above the establishment annually. Thirdly, Ranelagh's undertaking in effect cleared the Irish national debt, although a fresh arrear was created due to the exigencies of the 1672-74 Dutch war. This debt did not fall on the crown, however, but on the partnership in the undertaking, except for Ranelagh who received a pardon for all his debts.

The Irish government's subordination to the treasury was to continue right up to 1685. As we will see in the closing two chapters, the vast improvements in the Irish revenue made possible this policy of using Irish finances to augment the crown's English income. A clearly defined role for Ireland, and particularly Irish money, in crown policy was thus developed.

Up to 1679, this policy was directed by Danby and Ranelagh. The vice-treasurer continued to be a ruthless and efficient officer. Although he kept the Irish army in arrear by between 6 - 9 months, he only did so to aid his illegal practices and did not allow the debt to deteriorate. He ensured that the crown always received its privy purse payments on time. From 1678 onward Irish money (the surplus) was used to save 20 loyal companies for Charles which he would otherwise have been forced to disband. In 1677 an additional £7,000 pa was found from Irish funds to pay for court pensions. The subordination of the lord lieutenancy to the treasury in revenue matters was re-emphasised by the events surrounding Ormond's re-appointment as viceroy in 1677, when he reconciled himself to Ranelagh and agreed to leave the direction of treasury matters solely in the vice-treasurer's hands. From 1677 to 1679, the treasury unsuccessfully
attempted to increase its control over Irish finances further by trying to remove Shaen from the leadership of the farm and replacing him with its own nominee, Ryder.

Danby's fall in 1679 was of considerable significance for Ireland, but it did not lead to a change in the crown's view of Ireland and its place in royal schemes. The treasury did not relinquish its control of Irish matters and Essex and Hyde, as successive first lords of the treasury, sent stringent directives to the viceroy in Dublin and interfered increasingly in areas beyond the revenue. The major change for Ireland was in the personnel who ran the English treasury's Irish policy - Hyde eventually replaced Danby as the policy's chief director, and Shaen attempted to displace Ranelagh as the chief Irish financial expert at court. Between 1680 and 1682, Shaen's revenue proposals, backed by Hyde and opposed by Ranelagh, demonstrated that Ireland was effectively governed by the English treasury and that the source of power in Irish matters lay there. Thus, Shaen attempted to aggrandize himself both politically and financially by replacing Ranelagh as vice-treasurer.

The viceroy in these years had become no more than a compliant cipher carrying out Whitehall directives. Ormond's proposals for an Irish parliament were used and dropped as possible additional financial schemes, but they never in any way increased the viceroy's influence. He was kept ignorant of changes to the establishment, unconsulted on new revenue proposals and on how the Irish revenue would in future be spent. In the wake of the Popish plot, his task was simply to keep the Irish army and Ireland secure for the crown, and thus to ensure that Irish subventions continued to be paid to the king and the Scots regiment which had been sent from Ireland to Tangiers.
It was, of course, the Irish revenue and the record levels most branches attained in these years that enabled Irish money to be used to augment the English treasury and to keep the Scots regiment for Charles. These natural improvements were also the basis for Shaen's revenue proposals. Chapter VII quite clearly demonstrates that it was the buoyancy and well-being of the economy in these years that enabled the treasury to keep its firm control of Irish affairs and to continue its policy of using Irish money to benefit the crown in England.1

Ormond's sojourn at court from 1682-84 and the collapse of Shaen's revenue proposals led to the logical completion of a process by which the kingdom of Ireland was lowered to the status of a colony. The decision not to farm, but to manage the Irish revenue allowed Rochester (Hyde as was) to extend his control over the Irish revenue and over Irish matters. Through the five revenue commissioners, appointed by him without consulting Ormond, he invaded every facet of Irish government. He had complete control of both the collection and issuing of all Irish funds. The commissioners reported direct to Rochester, not to the Irish chief governor, and did not concern themselves only with revenue matters. Their success, however, was ensured by their ruthless efficiency in managing the treasury, driving out corruption and clearing all the newly accumulated national debt by 1685. Ranelagh's corrupt undertaking had tightened up the management of the Irish treasury and Champante, his deputy vice-treasurer, had ensured that his books and his methods did not fall into the disorder that had happened under Bellingham. The

1. The Irish revenue farm was not reset in 1678 as stated by Simms, 'The Restoration, 1660-95' in New History of Ireland ..., p 442 & Beckett, op cit., p 131.

(14)
1682-85 revenue commissioners completed this process. They were, of course, assisted in their work by the continuing improvements in the revenue which attained new heights in most branches.

At Whitehall the viceroy was unconsulted in most Irish matters, and the deputy lord lieutenant in Dublin was largely bypassed. The lord lieutenant became no more than an acceptable facade behind which Rochester and his commissioners directed their Irish policy. All this, of course, was a natural counterpart to Rochester's English policy, by which whigs were purged from government and corporations and the central control of all facets of administration was increased, preparing the way both for James's accession and a crown policy freed from any constraints or opposition. In 1684, however, this process of degrading the status of Ireland to no more than that of a colony run by departments in Whitehall was to reach its ultimate conclusion. York and Sunderland persuaded Charles to make Rochester lord lieutenant, but with his powers even more circumscribed than the previous incumbent's, for the power to make military appointments would be reserved to the king and thus to Whitehall. The crown's plan was to reform the Irish army and to use the Irish surplus to build a loyal force there which might be used to implement the crown's policy in England or Ireland should it meet any opposition. This was essentially York's policy and it never actually took off whilst Charles was still king. It marked a definite shift towards a more aggressive and more positive role for Ireland in crown policy. It was to ripen into a mature policy when Tyrconnell was made commander of the army and later lord deputy, by which time the army rather than Whitehall was in control of Ireland. Thus, we can see that the crown's policy and administration
from 1660-85 marks a very definite and unique period. Ireland, which had been a drain on England in the 1660s, was made solvent and ultimately a source of profit to the crown. Only at the very close of Charles's reign did the crown turn towards more sinister proposals for the use to which Irish money and arms could be put. That James was able to contemplate these plans was due to the health of the economy and the efficiency of the revenue commissioners who had cleared the national debt and left James unencumbered by debts in Ireland when he came to the throne.

In conclusion, therefore, we can see that the crown's Irish policy was closely allied to and based upon the state of the Irish economy and that the condition of the Irish revenue and the uses to which it was to be put was the central issue in Irish affairs from 1660-85. It is for this reason that the condition of the Irish revenue and the state of the economy is given such prominence in each of the chapters, as it provides the vital backdrop against which the chief events of the reign took place.

We can see quite clearly that it was not until the revenue was shown to have been mismanaged, the adequacy of the crown's Irish income demonstrated and the economy began to pick up naturally following the ending of the Dutch war, that the crown began to develop an Irish policy. The improvements in the revenue, though, as each chapter will illustrate, often bore most fruit for the crown and its corrupt officers, because the army, whose payment made up 85% of the establishment and nearly all the national debt, was so abominably treated. Ranelagh, for example, did not only show that the army could be a useful addition to the crown's meagre English forces, but that by paying it corruptly, his partners, the crown and the court could profit from it. The army's muted response to this ill-treatment is one of the remarkable features
of these years, but after 1682 the abuse of the army ceased and
from 1684 onwards the crown began to evolve a policy in which
the army would be the chief beneficiary of Irish money as it
was reformed and expanded.

It should be said too, that the growth in the treasury's control
of Irish affairs was largely made possible because from 1660-85
there were few constraints on whatever Irish policy the crown
chose to adopt. Up to 1667, apart from being uninterested in
Ireland, the crown relied heavily on the lord lieutenant and his
government to obtain agreement to a land settlement, to persuade
parliament to vote a reasonable income and to keep the country
secure. The parliament was so generous that it voted a hereditary
income which reached over £300,000 - far in excess of any Irish
establishment - thus enabling Danby, Ranelagh and Hyde to suggest
putting the surplus to English uses. The Irish government and
the viceroy became increasingly superfluous. All of the lord
lieutenants were successful in keeping the country secure and
the army compliant, and by so doing, allowed the English
treasury to run Irish affairs as it saw fit. Had an Irish parl­
liament been necessary, or had Ireland shown signs of unsettle­
ment, the crown would have found it necessary to rely upon its
government in Ireland, and this would have counteracted the
treasury's steady encroachment into Irish affairs and policy.
However, it was the settled nature of Ireland that allowed the
revenue to increase so rapidly and the English treasury to take
control of that revenue's destiny and in so doing, to become
the effective director of Irish policy.
Chapter II

THE FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATION OF THE LORDS JUSTICES,

1660-62
Maurice Twomey's neglected MA thesis, written in 1954, makes its most positive contribution to Irish history in outlining the restoration of the old monarchical financial system following the commonwealth's collapse and Charles II's assumption of his birthright. On the firm foundation of his work, that of Chandaman's in the England of that period and Barnard's writings on Ireland in the 1650s an introduction to the forms and personnel of the financial administration may be constructed, which will help to explain many later organizational developments. This chapter will deal chiefly with the state of the financial administration, the economy and the revenue, and the problems arising out of the Irish government's efforts to restore stability in finance and government. The way in which these problems were handled and solutions found in 1660-62 had a profound effect on developments over the next two decades.

In constitutional terms it was both possible and desirable to disregard the political and social upheavals that had taken place since 1641 and to restore the royal prerogative to its former preeminence, but in financial matters it was impossible.

to ignore the innovations of the past twenty years - the royal revenue had been transformed by the abolition of feudal payments and the introduction of the excise and quitrents.¹ The exchequer, formerly the cornerstone of the monarchical financial system, had been abolished under the commonwealth and replaced by a central treasury.² The ascendancy of the exchequer had been restored falteringly under Cromwell's Protectorship, but prior to 1660 it does not seem to have functioned as a full and proper court.² One of the first actions of the commissioners of the Irish government, following the restoration, was to secure the full reconstitution of the court of exchequer.⁴

This seemed to be the essential and minimal move necessary to restore the revenue and its administration to its pre-1641 position. The reorganisation of the revenue, however, was a more intractable problem than it at first appeared. The old forms of the exchequer had to take under their jurisdiction the excise and the quitrents, new taxes which there was no precedent for handling. Furthermore, the customs had recently been managed by farmers and the old network of collectors, searchers and so on had broken down, replaced by the farmers'.⁵

². Firth, The Last Years of the Protectorate, (London, 1909), vol ii, pp 133-34.
³. Twomey, op cit., pp 36-7. Generally on this see Howard, A Treatise of the Exchequer and Revenue of Ireland, (Dublin, 1776).
⁵. TCD Ms 748: The State of the Revenue of Ireland, 1693.
Finally, the disorder of Ireland's finances in 1660, the huge arrears owed to the army and the yearly deficit of £134,826 both made the proper ordering of Ireland's finances a prime concern and also tended to hamper and confuse efforts to reorder those finances.¹

The proper organisation of the revenue into districts, enabling the systematic collection of quitrents and the excise, awaited the great farm of 1669-75, which created the framework for their collection and was the basis for the later farm's method and that of the revenue commissioners.² Up to 1669 the levying of quitrents (and also the inland excise) was confused, badly superintended and ultimately of great loss to the crown.³ Arrears in crown rents and quitrents from 1660 to 1668 totalled £200,000, £151,000 of that being on quitrents, which in part could be blamed on the uncertainty and weakness of the economy in the early 1660s, although for the most part lack of organisation and direction in their collection must have been to blame.⁴ The relative failure of Ireland's financial administration in the 1660s was mainly caused, as we shall see, by the enormity of the problem faced, but difficulties were exacerbated by the fact that the

¹ Egerton Ms 2,542: fol 306, The Revenue of Ireland, 1660;
² Egerton Ms 2,542: fol 317-19, Issues of Ireland for One Year to June 1660.
³ TCD Ms 748; The State of the Revenue of Ireland, 1693.
⁴ See TCD Ms 808: fol 257-66, Commission Examining Accounts of Ireland, 28 Aug 1669.

(21)
organisation of that administration was inadequately formed in 1660 and left to fend for itself under the direction of Anglesey and Ormond.

Charles began reconstituting the Irish exchequer in August 1660.¹ Annesley (later created earl of Anglesey) was made vice-treasurer on 8 August 1660 as his father had held the position formerly under Charles I.² In effect the vice-treasurership (incorporating the receivership-general and treasurership-at-war) was the principal office of the exchequer, for the lord high treasurer of Ireland's position, held by Cork, was a sinecure.² The Irish exchequer was supreme in Ireland in all matters relating to the revenue, although in the course of the 1660s and 1670s, and especially under Danby, the English treasury's superiority over it became an accepted fact - "all revenues belonging to the king and all the accounts thereof are under the law and powers of this court."³ The chancellorship of the exchequer was supreme in all matters of equity, where the vice-treasurer's powers were circumscribed.⁵ Elsewhere the vice-treasurer was judicially the chief officer, but his main function was ministerial, for "he hath the care and charge of all his majesty's revenues of what nature or kind soever and is to receive, pay and account for the same."⁶ Thus he received debentures, made up by the

1. Liber Munerum Publicorum, vol ii, pp 45-52. This, in fact, shows that Bysse was appointed on 9 July 1660, Domville on 23 June 1660, and Temple on 10 July 1660. However, Annesley's appointment must mark the formal reconstitution of the court, for as vice-treasurer he was the senior judge and officer.
2. CSPI, 1660-62: p 34, King to Annesley, Aug 1660; Liber Munerum Publicorum, vol ii, p 45.
3. TCD Ms 748:no folios. The Constitution of the Exchequer in Ireland, 1693; Rawlinson Ms A236: fol 115 ff, A Constitution of the Exchequer of Ireland (incomplete); CPSI 1660-62: p 214 King to Lords Justices, 12 Feb 1661.
auditor in accordance with the establishment, to pay the civil list. Having paid the civil list he was supposed to pay the military by warrants prepared by the muster-master general and signed by the chief governor and commissary-general.\(^1\) Priority of payment, however, was usually given to the military list.

There were strict rules as to the payment of concordatums and other money letters from the king, which if they exceeded any overplus the vice-treasurer was personally liable to refund.\(^2\) All his payments and receipts were to pass through the hands of the clerk of pells otherwise they would be disallowed.\(^3\) As in England the attorney-general alone had the power to grant abatements or to discharge rents and all English bills had to be signed by him. Like the solicitor-general he could prepare fiats for patents for lands, estates and honours, but only the solicitor-general pleaded for the crown in court.\(^4\) In England the chief baron and the second and third barons took the treasury's accounts, but in Ireland their chief function was to hear all cases of law, equity and revenue.\(^5\) It was the function of the commissioners of public accounts to take the vice-treasurer's accounts, to whom he had to deliver his own books along with those of the clerk of

\(^{1}\) Rawlinson Ms A236;fol 116, A Constitution of the Exchequer of Ireland; TCD Ms 748;The Constitution of the Exchequer in Ireland, 1693.

\(^{2}\) Rawlinson Ms A236;fol 116, A Constitution of the Court of Exchequer; TCD Ms 748;The Constitution of the Exchequer in Ireland, 1693.

\(^{3}\) Rawlinson Ms A236;fol 116, A Constitution of the Court of Exchequer; TCD Ms 748;The Constitution of the Exchequer in Ireland, 1693.

\(^{4}\) TCD Ms 748;The Constitution of the Exchequer in Ireland, 1693.

\(^{5}\) TCD Ms 748;The Constitution of the Exchequer in Ireland, 1693.
pells and a copy of the establishment. The commissioners of public accounts were the lord chancellor, the chancellor of the exchequer, and the barons of the exchequer, although in Essex's time the lord lieutenant had himself inserted in their number. The commission to examine the vice-treasurer's accounts was appointed in March 1661 to take Anglesey's accounts due that month.

The chancellorship of the exchequer was returned to Meredith, an experienced government official. The attorneyship and solicitorship-general were filled respectively by Sir William Domville, so prominent in the convention, and the younger Sir John Temple whose abilities were soon displayed as speaker of the Irish house of commons. John Bysse was made chief baron of the exchequer attended by Sir Richard Kennedy and Thomas Denyon, the second and third barons. On the face of it this seemed an able, strong and not inexperienced team. However, little direction was forthcoming from the top and the exchequer failed to assert its supremacy, mainly because of Anglesey's absence in England and his accompanying negligence and devotion to a court career.

1. TCD Ms 748: The Constitution of the Exchequer in Ireland, 1693.
2. TCD Ms 748: The Constitution of the Exchequer in Ireland, 1693; see chapter VII.
3. Carte Ms 42: fol 1-2, King to Lords Justices, 10 March 1661.
4. Liber Munerum Publicorum, vol ii, p 49 (dated 6 Nov 1661, but clearly his patent must have passed earlier).
5. Liber Munerum Publicorum, vol ii, p 52 (Domville, 23 June 1660; Temple 10 July 1660); Bagwell, op cit., vol iii, p 5 and pp 19-20.
6. Liber Munerum Publicorum, vol ii, p 50 (Bysse, 9 July 1660), p 52 (Denyon, 29 Dec 1660; Kennedy, no date).
His deputy, Sir Daniel Bellingham was to prove to be a negligent and grossly inefficient officer.\(^1\) These failings were to be compounded further by the lord lieutenant's interpretation of his instructions which caused him to practise a policy of non-intervention in this area.

The lords justices in 1661-2 were too pre-occupied with settling the country, the economy and Ireland's finances in the broadest sense to interfere with the everyday running and organisation of the financial administration. To reconstitute the central control seems to have been seen as an adequate measure in itself, but the mechanics of quitrent and even customs collection seems to have been both muddled and ad hoc.

Formerly the hereditary revenue had consisted of the customs, crown rents, ale and aqua vitæ licences and some feudal fines. This had been wholly inadequate during the interregnum, yielding only about £70,000 pa when the cost of running Ireland soared to £336,000 pa.\(^2\) To alleviate this the excise was introduced in 1643, the assessment after 1649 and large monthly subventions sent over from England.\(^3\) In 1660 the resources at the disposal of the government were notably few and dissipated, and in November 1660 Bury and Mountrath, commissioners for the government, began

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1. See chapter V.
collecting crown rents through sheriffs and sub-sheriffs and ordered the collection of quitrents payable by the adventurers acts, but suspended since 1654, in an attempt to encourage plantation.\textsuperscript{1} In an effort to regularise quitrent collection at Easter 1661 a commission investigated the gathering of quitrents in order to discover the total of the tax, which was found to be £46,500.\textsuperscript{2} Other hereditary branches, like the customs, were collected on the government's own authority, presuming, as was inevitable, that the parliament would ratify their action.

The collection of crown rents and quitrents was not very successful, nor was the work of the whole administration. In February 1661 four provincial receivers-general were appointed to act as intermediaries between the collectors and central administration, in the hope that they would speed payments and the flow of money and they had the power to recruit employees to help them in their work.\textsuperscript{3} How unsuccessful they were is illustrated by the poor revenue yields of the early 1660s and their inefficiency exposed by the commission of investigation in 1669\textsuperscript{4}. In August and November 1661 proclamations had to be issued to try to hasten quitrent payments, and in February 1662 plans to reorganise the collection of quitrents appear to have been abandoned in order to

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1} Twomey, \textit{op cit.}, pp 57-8.
\item \textsuperscript{2} ibid., pp 58-9. This commission in fact showed that the net yield was only £31,339, allowing £2,753 for collectors' fees and allowances of £12,323.
\item \textsuperscript{3} CSPI, 1660-62: p 232, King to Lords Justices, 27 Feb 1661.
\item \textsuperscript{4} TCP Ms 808: fol 257-66, Commission Examining Accounts of Ireland, 28 Aug 1669; Carte Ms 52: fol 695-707, Receipts and Disbursements, 1660-71.
\end{itemize}
ensure the rents went directly to army payments.\(^1\) Not until the farmers took over their collection was anything like a satisfactory method discovered for their levying, which was open to the widest abuses up to 1669.\(^2\)

The customs were, however, the most important branch and towards the end of the interregnum, by farming it, Henry Cromwell raised its produce from £29,000 pa to £123,000 paid to the government in just over two years. (The farm rent had officially been £70,000 pa.)\(^3\) In June 1660 the farmers' contract was discontinued.\(^4\) In deference to their experience and their loss, and the fact that they ran the organisation for collecting this tax, the farmers were made commissioners of the customs after a considerable struggle at council against the influence of Irish Cromwellians who opposed them.\(^5\) The king had been making appointments of collectors and commissioners of the customs in early 1661 but these so conflicted with the Irish government's choices that he eventually conceded the decision making to the lords justices in April 1661.\(^6\) The collection of the customs soon proved so erratic and uncertain that the government began having thoughts of farming it.

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2. TCD Ms 748:no folios, The State of the Revenue of Ireland, 1693.
4. Ibid., p 45.
6. Carte Ms 42:fol 71, King to Lords Justices, 26 March 1661; Carte Ms 42:fol 79, King to Lords Justices, 29 March 1661; Carte Ms 42:fol 87, King to Lords Justices, 30 March 1661; Carte Ms 42:fol 166, King to Lords Justices, 26 April 1661; Carte Ms 51:fol 317, King to Ormond, 6 Sept 1661.
At the restoration Ireland's income was £208,000 pa, of which £108,000 came from the crippling and unpopular assessment. This left a deficit of £135,000 pa, caused because the military list came to £311,500 pa and the civil list about £30,000 pa. Most of the difference had been made up by monthly subventions from England, which the crown, in heavy debt, could not be expected to sustain. The huge military forces kept both in Ireland and England had to be severely reduced in order to prevent royal and national bankruptcy. In Ireland the necessity was both to increase the revenue, in order to match some of the requisite expansion in military expenditure compared to the 1630s, and believed to be indispensible following 1641, and to cut down expenditure, but not so much as to jeopardise national protestant safety and security. Customs returns looked promising at the beginning of the restoration. Nonetheless, returns for the year 1660-61 illustrated both the weakness of the economy and the revenue and that the emphasis would have to be on reducing expenditure rather than expanding yield. The total revenue came to £156,952, of which £30,000 was poll money and £39,000 from the English treasury, so that the hereditary revenue failed to yield £100,000 which was clearly inadequate. The civil list was duly

1. Egerton Ms 2542:fol 306, Revenue of Ireland, 1660; Egerton Ms 2542:fol 317-19, Issues of Ireland for One Year to June 1660; AD Ms 4731:fol 23, Objections and Answers about the Management of the Irish Revenue, Jan 1681.
3. ibid., pp 196 ff.
5. TCD Ms 808:fol 182, Annesley's Accounts, 4 Apr 1660-20 Mar 1661.
paid but the military list received only £29,000, less than half its due. This left a deficit of £162,000 for that year alone!

Initially at the restoration the financing of government was not the premier matter in anyone's mind. Settling the country, preventing risings of fanatics or catholics and satisfying the many and varied claims for land in Ireland were more pressing and important to ensure the certain re-acceptance of the monarchy. As the acceptance of the Stuart monarch in Ireland was secured, however, financial considerations became an increasingly urgent priority. In Ireland Charles kept power in the hands of the men who had led the convention, making them commissioners of the government, and from necessity accepting the de facto influence and direction of the Irish army and its leaders.

In London, however, the Irish committee appointed by Charles represented the old protestant interest under the leadership of the marquis of Ormond, although English cromwellians, such as Albemarle, the lord lieutenant, were represented. Robartes, the lord deputy, and Anglesey, prominent in 1650s politics, were also members.

The most important work this committee undertook was to decide that a parliament should be called in Ireland to settle the country and the revenue: it was to be a solely protestant assembly.

1. TCD Ms 808:fol 182-84, Annesley's Accounts, 4 Apr 1660-20 Mar 1661, although payments should only be for the nine months from June 1660 (the restoration) to March 1661.
4. ibid., vol iii, p 5; PRO PC2/55:fol 1, June 1660; CSPI 1660-62:p 1, Notes by Nicholas 20 June 1660.
although some questioned the practicality of excluding catholics.\footnote{1}
The real government of Ireland was left to Coote and Bury, whilst Orrery and Massereene maintained a strong say in the direction of affairs.\footnote{2}

Indecision and mistrust characterised the relationship between the commissioners of the government, suspicious of one another's motives and of their political rivals' actions.\footnote{3} This indecision and mistrust was further compounded by the long dispute over whether Robartes would come to Ireland: the commissioners of the government of Ireland were only supposed to be a stop-gap measure, but it was soon evident Robartes would not take up his duties.\footnote{4}

There was continued disorder in Northern Ireland and several cromwellians, including Henry Cromwell, were implicated in a plot to overthrow the government.\footnote{5} The commission granted in November 1660 to investigate the titles of 1641 rebels, it was feared, might also foment disorder.\footnote{6}

In these circumstances, and in spite of the growing impatience of the army for its arrears, Mountrath (as Coote was now known) felt obliged to recommend that the army could not be reduced to cut expenditure below thirty troops of horse and sixty foot companies (about 8,700 men)

\footnotesize{1. CSPI, 1660-62: p 2, Notes by Nicholas, 22 June 1660.}
\footnotesize{2. Bagwell, \textit{op cit.}, vol iii, pp 4-5.}
\footnotesize{3. Carte Ms 31: fol 3, Sir C. Coote to R. Coote, ? July 1660; Carte Ms 31: fol 5, Sir C. Coote to R. Coote, 23 July 1660.}
\footnotesize{4. Bagwell, \textit{op cit.}, vol iii, pp 5-6.}
\footnotesize{5. Carte Ms 31: fol 58, Bishop of Ferns to Montgomery, 27 Oct 1660; Carte Ms 31: fol 99, H. Cromwell to Ormond, 2 Jan 1661.}
\footnotesize{6. Carte Ms 31: fol 77, Montgomery to Ormond, 1 Dec 1660.}
without risking the danger of armed rebellion.¹

The Irish governors succeeded in maintaining peace and ensuring that there was no armed rising against the monarchy, but this was hardly unexpected as long as they kept control of the powerful Cromwellian army. However, the cost of maintaining that army threatened to undermine the shaky stability of the government, as the annual deficit stood at £194,000 pa.² The only expedient the governors could find was to begin collection of ancient rents and quitrents, thereby raising the annual income by £27,185 and cutting the deficit back to £166,135 pa.² Hence the necessity, inspite of their forebodings, for the government to reduce the army.⁴

The main difficulty the government faced was how to reduce its forces to a reasonable size without alarming the protestant interest and encouraging a catholic rebellion, and thus artillery, stores and men under arms continued at a rate so high that they threatened the nation's future solvency.⁵ In April 1660, just prior to the restoration, the convention in Dublin had levied a poll tax to keep the army quiescent as a stop-gap measure.⁶

This expedient, whilst awaiting the assembly of the Irish parliament, was reverted to in December 1660. In fact, the government

1. Carte Ms 31:fol 44, Mountrath to Ormond, 10 Oct 1660.
5. Carte Ms 31:fol 77, Montgomery to Ormond, 1 Dec 1660.
was given the choice of county levies or a convention which could vote supplies which would be allowed out of parliamentary subsidies, and chose the latter.¹

The protestant membership of the convention, mindful of the need to please the crown in order to secure their titles to their estates, were quick to acquiesce in the king's request for them to raise further monies at a convention before parliament met.² Perhaps they had been heartened by the fact that their champions, Orrery and Mountrath, had been joined with Eustace as lords justices: the temporary rule of the commissioners of the government was thereby made more permanent, recognising the influence of these Cromwellian army leaders.³ The convention duly obliged the crown, discussing the army and the revenue and voting a double poll tax.⁴ At Whitehall it was decided that parliament would meet on 8 May 1661 and to this end the work on Irish bills was speeded up.⁵

As the protestant gentry through the convention had declared its support for the reduction of the army, the lords justices felt able to implement a far-reaching retrenchment in both army personnel and expenditure.⁶ In order to secure a peaceful

¹. CSPI, 1660-62:p 140, King to Lords Justices, 18 Dec 1660.
². CSPI, 1660-62:p 140, King to Lords Justices, 18 Dec 1660; Morrice, Orrery State Papers, vol i, p 28, Orrery to Ormond, 2 Jan 1661.
⁵. CSPI, 1660-62:p 221, Nicholas to Lords Justices, 16 Feb 1661.
⁶. CSPI, 1660-62:p 224, Orrery to Nicholas, 20 Feb 1661; Carte Ms 31:fol 331-2, Orrery's State of the Revenue, 17 Oct 1661.
disbandment of the army a substantial amount of their arrears had to be paid off and these amounted to 23 months, only 8 of which had been incurred since the restoration. The plan was to reduce the army from 46 troops of horse to 30 and 106 foot companies to 60, i.e. from about 13,700 men to about 8,650. However, the king's decision to cashier troops in England with their arrears fully paid proved to be a costly precedent for the Irish government, which felt obliged to do the same to avoid mutinies and this delayed the process of disbandment. The army was reduced to 30 troops of horse and 66 companies of foot at a cost of £79,000. Ireland only paid for £31,618 of this, the rest was met by £48,000 from England. £19,500 had been provided for this end shortly after the restoration and, once it had been resolved to reduce the army, Charles borrowed £30,000 from the English financier Yyne for the disbandment, but this only came to £28,500 after exchange and interest had been deducted. The government had been £19,743 short of the £98,313 it needed to reduce the army to its target size. In order that it might be able to afford reductions in the future the army's current arrear was allowed to grow and the army's pre-restoration debt

implicitly written off.\(^1\) By cashiering these troops £72,792 pa was saved and the military list reduced to £218,929 pa.\(^2\) The government felt it had done its part to lessen expenditure and now turned expectantly to the parliament to do its duty to increase the revenue. This was the tenor of lord chancellor Eustace's speech at the opening session of the Irish parliament in May 1661.\(^3\) The clergy in convocation enthusiastically voted 8 subsidies to the government, but it soon became evident that the Irish parliament intended to vote no supplies until the declaration had been enacted and they were secured in their properties.\(^4\)

Having, at last, been put on a more permanent footing the leaders of the Irish executive could no longer postpone making positive decisions on the future of the government's finances. Tentative moves towards this purpose had obviously been made in the decision to reduce the army, which began in February 1661, but beyond this no clearly defined policy had been either planned or contemplated.\(^5\) Their interim report on government finances in January 1661 aimed at reducing their deficit but envisaged no plans beyond army reductions.\(^6\) The appointment of four provincial receivers-general in February 1661 to gather the expectedly

4. CSPI, 1660-62:p 345, Armagh to Nicholas, 1 June 1661.
5. CSPI, 1660-62:p 224, Orrery to Nicholas, 20 Feb 1661.
6. TCD Ms 808:fol 165-70, Lords Justices' State of the Revenue, 26 Jan 1661.
increased revenues illustrated the government's desire to organise revenue collection and also their optimism, but in itself it did little, nor was it accompanied by any measures in Ireland to improve finances. ¹ Disbandments were the most the Irish government could do pending parliament's assembly, but both government and parliament were duly encouraged by the crown's decision to send over £30,000 to help pay off the cashiered troops. ²

Inspite of the large reductions in expenditure Ireland's finances still needed a more severe overhaul. For the financial year 1661-2 £201,000 was gathered of which £11,000 came from England, £77,000 from poll money and only £113,000 from the ordinary revenue, which, though an improvement, left a deficit of about £56,000 for the year. ³ To this has to be added the huge debt to the army since the restoration, that is £93,772 up to 11 February 1661, the date of the disbandment, and £101,664 from then until 2 October 1661. ⁴

For these very practical reasons the Irish privy council asked Orrery to draw up a state of the revenue in October 1661, addressing himself to these particular problems and outlining a

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1. CSPI, 1660-62:p 232, King to Lords Justices, 27 Feb 1661.

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future plan which might make Ireland solvent.¹ In this document Orrery foresaw that Ireland might be able to pay her own way in three years time providing that the king managed the revenue himself and did not farm it.² He recommended a cut in the soldiers' pay and allowances, a reduction in the numbers comprising full troops and companies and only paying the army for 12 calendar months pa, not 13 lunar months pa as had been the practice.³ By these reductions the cost of the military list would be lessened to £156,000 pa and it was hoped to diminish the civil list to £28,000 pa.⁴ It was estimated that there would be a £28,000 pa deficit still, but that this could be made up by subsidies and in three years, with an improved hereditary revenue, Ireland should pay its own way.⁵ Orrery and the council decided it was only reasonable to write off the pre-restoration army arrears of £159,000.⁶ To reduce the army to 60 companies of foot, plus the other retrenchments, meant cashiering 1,650 troops at a cost of £31,595, of which they proposed to pay only two-thirds.⁷ It was decided also to reduce the army's arrears by re-clothing them at a deduction of £39,680 out of their arrears.⁸


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The army would thus have been reduced to half its 1655 strength of about 14,000 men.\(^1\) The lords justices were hopeful that their recommendations would be followed and that they would pave the way for future stable government.\(^2\)

One difficulty the lords justices faced, and this feeling was shared by many Irish protestants, was that of political isolation. At court Charles's Irish advisers included Aungier and Ormond, supporters of the old royalist protestant interest, not the new one, and men untainted by a cromwellian past. The convention, therefore, had attempted to increase its voice at court in 1661, but Charles had resolutely forbidden it to send over any delegates.\(^3\)

Although placed on a more permanent footing, it must have been clear to the lords justices that their purpose was only to lay the foundations for a secure monarchy and that others would profit in taking over the reins of power.

In May 1661 all Irish grants were stopped pending the composition of a state of the revenue and recommendations thereon.\(^4\) It also served to ameliorate parliament, which was harangued at its opening by Eustace to find the supplies to pay off army arrears and to make the king's government solvent.\(^5\) The parliament was dominated disproportionately by adventurers and soldiers

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4. CSPI, 1660-62:p 326, Notes of Nicholas, 15 Apr 1661.
who feared for their estates. They were particularly fearful of the Irish party and continued to discredit them, with Mountrath's and Orrery's help, by discovering alleged plots. It was clear, however, that no permanent grants of money could be expected from a parliament thus dominated until they had been secured by their act of settlement. In the final analysis, though, by playing on protestant fears, the government was given a powerful weapon in its dealings with parliament over supplies. The major activity of the summer of 1661 was taken up with the Irish parliament sending over commissioners to discuss the bill of settlement.

Although the land settlement was the major pre-occupation of Irish protestants and of the government, more pressing was its need to re-order and to augment royal finances. At the end of July 1661 the lords justices prevailed on parliament, by threatening them with quartering the army on the country, to anticipate the recently transmitted poll bill, allowing it to be levied on 10 September 1661. This followed a detailed parliamentary examination of the method of poll tax collection which had revealed many shortcomings. It was in the same form as the 'double' poll of 1 March ordered by the convention, except that  

1. Carte Ms 31:fol 189, Kildare to Ormond, 26 May 1661.  
2. Carte Ms 31:fol 249, Clayton to Ormond, 18 July 1661.  
3. CSPI, 1660-62:p 345, Eustace to Nicholas, 3 June 1661.  
6. Commons Journal Ireland, p 407, 18 June 1661; p 415, 27 June 1661; p 422, 10 July 1661.
this time it was expected it would only raise £46,000 not the £80,000 optimistically anticipated in March. In total the poll money yielded £110,684 between 1660 and 1670, leaving an arrear on this branch of £48,686. The majority of this was gathered in the first 3 years: £29,654 in the year ending March 1661, £77,406 in the year ending March 1662. The commons also criticised the way in which rents were being collected, by anticipating them before they reached the exchequer by giving assignments to soldiers on these taxes, which in effect made the army responsible for their collection and was also a means of 'borrowing' on uncollected revenue. In August the government nominally yielded to this pressure, but it was impracticable as rents were so slowly paid, and in November officially allowed assignments to be issued once more.

For the most part the 1661 parliament remained prorogued whilst the government considered various bills to present before it. On the one hand the government was concerned about the bill of settlement, but on the other its main work was to lay the foundations for future and present financial security. The most obvious expedient for raising the revenue to meet the necessary cost of maintaining the standing army was by persuading parliament

1. Commons Journal Ireland, vol i, p 442, 30 July 1661.
2. Carte Ms 52:fol 696, Receipts and Disbursements, 1660-71; Carte Ms 52:fol 445, King's Charge, Rent and Debts, 1660-68.
3. TCD Ms 808:fol 182 and 185, Annesley's Accounts, 4 Apr 1660-20 Mar 1661.
to pass a bill establishing the excise and new imposts. It was proposed that the excise on foreign commodities should be for the king's lifetime plus 6 months and the excise on ale, beer and licences forever. For the perpetual part they had been offered £50,000 pa by a group of farmers which attracted the lords justices.\(^1\) To ensure the passage of this bill it was proposed that the crown should give up the court of wards which only raised £7,500 pa.\(^2\) Orrery felt sure that the offer of abolishing the court of wards was necessary if the crown was to receive the excise, but in this analysis he underestimated the vulnerability of the adventurers and soldiers still unconfirmed in their estates.\(^3\) Eustace, who was not allied to the adventurers and soldiers or to those protestants who had collaborated during the interregnum, displayed a more incisive understanding, advising that the bills for the excise and for abolishing the court of wards should be drawn separately and not as one bill as many expected.\(^4\) Furthermore, it coincided with the majority view of the English privy council which disliked combining the excise bill and court of wards bill into one piece of legislation.\(^5\)

Eustace's advice was sound and perceptive and that which the crown inevitably followed,

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3. CSPI, 1660-62:p 416, Orrery to Nicholas, 7 Sept 1661; Morrice, op cit., vol i, pp 37-9, Orrery to Ormond, June 1661.
5. CSPI, 1660-62:p 418, Nicholas to Eustace, 10 Sept 1661.
And I do humbly conceive that if his majesty do hold his hands from the great bill of settlement that the bill for the excise may pass without the bill for the court of wards; and until all the king's work be done that of the bill of settlement to be kept.¹

Whilst Orrery and Mountrath worked on the bill of settlement, seeing its successful passage as necessary to ensure co-operation from parliament for its financial programme, Eustace saw the possibilities for gaining concessions by delaying it.² These debates were put into a firm context in October 1661 by Orrery's report on the state of the revenue, which clearly illustrated that Ireland must shoulder a deficit of £28,000 pa for the next three years if his sanguine estimates of the economy proved correct, but which offered a rosier picture for the future.³ Orrery, in the light of this report, had to submit to the wisdom of Eustace's arguments and he suggested that the excise on foreign commodities ought to be perpetual, as he could not see parliament allowing it again once the land settlement was secure - a tacit acceptance by Orrery of the crucial role of the bill of settlement in settling the crown's finances.⁴

Thus Orrery persuaded the council to make it perpetual, but Eustace played his part too, for the council refused to delay the bills as Orrery desired, by playing on the fear that it would hold up the land settlement.⁵ This hamstrung any hope Orrery

5. CSPI, 1660-62:p 450, Orrery to Nicholas, 29 Oct 1661.
had to force the crown to accept his view that the bill of settlement should not depend on the revenue bills. A whole series of money bills, of which the excise was the heart, were transmitted and the lords justices felt confident these would lay the foundations for firm and secure government to follow.¹ There were long delays, however, whilst these bills were considered in England.²

Orrery and Mountrath, who had collaborated with and gained under the 1650s regime, championed the cromwellian interest of the adventurers and soldiers and were conspicuous in their opposition to the old royalist protestants, especially Ormond and Aungier.³ There were inevitably complaints that the court of claims was not favouring old protestants.⁴ Ormond was antagonised by delays in the payment of his £3,000 for his equipage as lord lieutenant.⁵ Nonetheless, the seeming power and influence of Mountrath and Orrery was deceptive: Charles used them as acceptable tools in Ireland to ensure a peaceful and secure restoration. Once he was more secure in England, and Ireland had begun to accept his rule it was inevitable that he should replace the justices with a ruler he could trust and that the new governor should come from among his devoted Irish advisers at court.⁶ The lords justices were congratulated on their hard work, and especially for their recommendations of 17 October 1661 which were to be the firm foundation of the government's financial

2. CSPI, 1660-62:p 460, Lords Justices to Nicholas, 6 Nov 1661; CSPI, 1660-62:p 477, King to Lords Justices, 26 Nov 1661.
3. Carte Ms 31:fol 199, Kildare to Ormond, 26 May 1661; Carte Ms 31:fol 256, Aungier to Lane, 19 July 1661.
5. Morrice, op cit., vol i, pp 39-40, Orrery to Ormond, 11 Sept 1661. This £3,000 was for Ormond's expenses in preparing his journey to Ireland as lord lieutenant; it was paid out of the concordatum fund for 1661.
policy coupled with the bills prepared for parliament, and were informed that Ormond had been made lord lieutenant and would in due course replace them.\(^1\) Clearly the lords justices had prepared the ground for the future to the crown's satisfaction and this was endorsed over the next few months by the way the crown accepted their financial plans.\(^2\) One minor alteration was the decision that innocents should pay old rents and those restored by 'mere grace and favour' the rents reserved by the declaration.\(^3\) On the whole, however, Orrery's paper of 17 October and his proposals were enshrined in the establishment adopted for 1 April 1662.\(^4\) At Whitehall alterations were made to the customs bill, forbidding farming it and reducing the number of commissioners to five.\(^5\) Orrery opposed farming of the customs although he keenly and unsuccessfully forwarded a scheme for letting the excise.\(^6\) Ormond headed a committee which adjusted the book of rates so as to maximise the revenue yield.\(^7\)

Nonetheless, it had been hoped that the money bills would come into operation from 25 December 1661, but delays were experienced which might affect Ireland's revenue for 1662.\(^8\) Most of the bills transmitted in October 1661 were money bills and strictures were suggested for them to prevent the farming of the revenue, at least not without the consent and advice of the chief governor.

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1. CSPI, 1660-62: p 455, Nicholas to Lords Justices, 5 Nov 1661.
2. CSPI, 1660-62: p 465, Nicholas to Lords Justices, 9 Nov 1661.
3. CSPI, 1660-62: p 465, Nicholas to Lords Justices, 9 Nov 1661.
5. CSPI, 1660-62: p 469, Amendments to Irish bills, 18 Nov 1662.
7. PRO PC2/55: fol 256, 22 Dec 1661, and fol 263, 14 Jan 1662.
8. CSPI, 1660-62: p 460, Lords Justices to Nicholas, 6 Nov 1661.
and council. Ormond, the newly appointed lord lieutenant, promised to take particular care to see them expedited and Orrery advised him to oppose any plans for farming the revenue. Delays in the bills and indecision over possible insertions caused the Irish government to proclaim that the customs and new imposts by the new book of rates would continue to be levied, so as to pay the army, after the expiration of these temporary acts at Christmas 1661. The Irish parliament continued to pass temporary bills allowing the collection of customs and excise for three months at a time, but could not at this stage be persuaded to vote the king perpetual or lifetime supplies whilst the future of their estates seemed in jeopardy. Acts such as the £30,000 compensation for Ormond seemed to make better progress. Furthermore, the annexing of certain revenues, such as the right to sell aqua vitae licences, impinged on former perpetual grants to those like Massereene, who opposed such measures until receiving compensation.

Delays in consideration of these bills seriously jeopardized Ireland's finances. Customs and excise had to be raised by proclamation, and Orrery pressed hard for the bills' return. Mountrath's death in December 1661 momentarily looked as though it would cause the automatic dissolution of parliament due to a

2. Carte Ms 31:fol 358, Ormond to Eustace, 16 Nov 1661; Morrice, op cit., vol 1, p 44, Orrery to Ormond, 20 Nov 1661.
4. Carte Ms 31:fol 428, Eustace to Ormond, 5 March 1662.
5. Carte Ms 31:fol 461, Considerations about Ormond's Act for £30,000, 17 Apr 1662; Carte Ms 31:fol 515, Lane to Ormond, 20 May 1662. This was an act to compensate Ormond for his losses during the civil war and interregnum.
6. Carte Ms 31:fol 480, Massareene to Lords Justices, April 1662; Carte Ms 31:fol 481, Orrery and Eustace to Nicholas, 21 Apr 1662.
7. CSPI, 1660-62:p 469, Proclamation by Lords Justices and
technicality, which would be financially ruinous, but this difficulty was overcome.¹ Eustace and Orrery were appointed lords justices and the commission for parliament hastily amended.² In the meantime the government had considered two new expedients to deal with Ireland's pressing financial difficulties. The first of these was the decision that two-thirds of the arrears to be paid troops at their disbandment would be placed on assignments due from quitrents, customs and excise, thereby lessening the pressure on the treasury and effectively placing the debts on dubiously solvent arrears.³ The second was a subvention.

In England the government had considered the lords justices' report, concurred with much of it, and decided to send over £100,000, which was to be lent by Vyner and repaid to him out of the assessment of several midland English counties at a cost to the crown of £130,000.⁴ The king had decided to give Ireland £80,000 as "the best means of clearing off debts and reducing our charge within the compass of our revenue."⁵ The extra £20,000 was for a regiment of guards to be raised in England.⁶ This new force of 1200 men would form the nucleus of the Irish army and, unlike the rest of it, would not be tinged with a cromwellian past and would thus be totally loyal and dependable.

¹. CSPI, 1660-62:p 479, Eustace to Nicholas, 19 Dec 1661; Bagwell, op cit., vol iii, p 24.
². CSPI, 1660-62:p 494, King to Attorney/Solicitor-General, 3 Feb 1662; Carte Ms 31:fol 588, Ormond to Lords Justices, 11 Jan 1662.
⁵. CSPI, 1660-62:p 505, King to Treasury, 7 Feb 1662.
⁶. CSPI, 1660-62:p 506, King to Treasury, 8 Feb 1662.
Thus the vast savings effected mainly by Orrery's recommendations and carried out in 1662 and 1663 reduced the Irish army to 7,000, thereby enabling the crown to raise a regiment of guards.\(^1\) The new establishment drafted in April 1662 envisaged a military list of £161,000 pa and a civil list of £27,000 pa.\(^2\) Ireland's expenditure had been reduced from £330,000 pa to about £190,000 pa, a saving of around £140,000 pa.\(^3\)

The foundations of the hereditary revenue in Ireland were finally laid in the first seven months of 1662, but unfortunately this is one of the most scantily documented periods and our chief source is the bare bones of the commons' journal. The bill of settlement was the first to be considered in the spring of 1662. There was some opposition on account of the changes made from the declaration by the English privy council, but Orrery persuaded the commons to accept it with the promise of a bill of explanation and the threat that if it was not passed there would be no revenue bills and the army would be quartered on the country.\(^4\) Royal assent for the bill was withheld until the revenue bills were all passed. Even so the commons baulked

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over the ale licences bill reducing them to one-third the proposed price at 10/- which meant that the bill had to be returned to London.\(^1\) Bills for wine and tobacco licences and for abolishing the court of wards were delayed in London until June, so that these would not be passed until after Ormond's arrival.\(^2\)

Desperate to have their bill of settlement receive the royal assent Sir Audley Mervyn, the speaker, offered the government, through Ormond, the kind of deal it had hoped for and held out for. Mervyn suggested that the parliament would pass the excise bill without the abolition of the court of wards.\(^3\) This illustrated the weakness of the Irish parliament which had in March 1662 declared it would only grant perpetual excise in return for the abolition of the court of wards, but fear of not receiving its act of settlement was a powerful weapon in the government's hands.\(^4\) Mervyn therefore went further and offered a perpetual hearth tax in return for the abolition of the court of wards.\(^5\) In response to this the English privy council ordered the bills for customs, excise and for subsidy to be put before the parliament at once. These revenue acts along with the act of settlement received the royal assent from Ormond on 31 July 1662.\(^6\)

Thus the government had achieved all it set out to gain without yet using the court of wards as a palliative to gain concessions.

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1. Commons Journal Ireland, pp 399-40, 30 and 31 May 1661.
2. Carte Ms 31:fol 524-5, Lords Justices to Ormond, 30 May 1662.
3. Carte Ms 31:fol 526, Mervyn to Ormond, 4 June 1662.
4. Commons Journal Ireland, p 480, 5 Mar 1662.
5. Carte Ms 31:fol 526, Mervyn to Ormond, 4 June 1662.
6. Commons Journal Ireland, p 553, 31 July 1662.
from parliament, and thereby ensuring that the hearthtax would be granted in return for that court's abolition. The bill of explanation had proved to be a powerful lever. The bill for eight subsidies of £15,000 each to be collected over the next four years, which replaced the poll tax, had been essential to the lords justices plans to clear current deficits. It was weakened as a measure because the recent double poll tax payments were to be allowed out of it. Therefore, when the lords baulked at the idea of their estates being assessed by the commons for the subsidies it was useful for the government to have the threat of not assenting to the settlement with which to bring them into obedience. In fact, there had been continual disputes between the upper and lower houses in the Irish parliament, as the commons struggled to assert its supremacy in revenue bills. In its efforts to ensure that it received its act of settlement the parliament had been compliant, but dissatisfaction was never far from the surface and raised its head on several occasions over collection of quitrents, the poll tax and levels of exchequer fees, all of which this parliament investigated.

Briefly, it should be noted that there were financial clauses in the act of settlement, later bolstered by the act of explanation, allowing for the levying of £300,000 from adventurers and soldiers in order to compensate the '49 officers and other royalists who

4. Commons Journal Ireland, pp 399-401, 30 and 31 May 1661.
had not been adequately compensated for their losses in land. The king was also a beneficiary in this to the tune of £50,000, which he hoped to use to build a palace at Greenwich. The point was that this money was not accountable to the treasury, for it was in effect a private treaty of compensation for the dispossessed. Alderman Alexander Bence and his brother John Bence collected these sums and the £50,000 due to Charles was effectively a privy purse payment, and only came into treasury calculations in 1666 when the financial crisis was such that Charles was forced to relinquish this payment in place of a subvention from the English treasury.¹

Ormond arrived in Dublin on 28 July 1662 to a difficult political and financial situation, but at the same time much had been achieved by the lords justices temporary administration, constrained as it was by the fears of rebellion and impermanence. By his instructions Ormond was ordered to overview finances and receive constant reports from the exchequer, but the day to day running of the revenue was left to the vice-treasurer and his court.² All revenue matters were to be conducted with the king through the lord treasurer of England, not the secretary of state who was to deal with all other affairs.³ Ormond tabled and had accepted several propositions which protected his powers as lord lieutenant to make grants and appointments and to ensure that he was consulted before any orders or grants concerning

¹. Twomey, op cit., pp 59-60.
². CSPI, 1660-62:pp 557-8, Instructions to Ormond, 14 June 1662.
Ireland were issued.\textsuperscript{1} As was to be the pattern of his grip on power he did his best to ensure that he held for all the world to see the visible trappings of a viceroy, which these propositions granted to him.\textsuperscript{2} Yet the basis of his government and the secure foundations on which it was built had been laid by Orrery's calculations and Eustace's political skill. By judiciously withholding royal assent to the bill of settlement, a hereditary revenue was granted to the monarchy which grossed £300,000 pa by the 1680s, far in excess of that existing at 1660.\textsuperscript{2} Even without the hearthtax (initially worth only about £14,000 pa if we subtract the price of abolishing the court of wards) the Irish parliament had been extremely generous and by 1670 the ordinary revenue exceeded expenditure on the establishment. Moreover, the mean yield from 1660 to 1671, when the revenue was boosted by parliamentary subsidies and English subventions, works out at a gross of £215,093 pa, which suggests that, but for the exigencies of war, Ireland should have met her expenses. Of course, the whole situation had been distorted by the huge civil and military costs inherited by the crown, which were ably and quickly reduced by the lords justices but which left the Irish government heavily indebted from the start. The lords justices had done excellent work, dealing capably and soundly with current finances and preparing the ground for a solid financial foundation in the future. Mismanagement by the lord lieutenant and the exchequer, the Dutch war and English trade restrictions prevented the Irish government from deriving the full benefits' from these generous parliamentary grants until the early 1670s.

\textsuperscript{1} Carte Ms 31:fol 544-46, Ormond's Propositions, 22 June 1662.  
\textsuperscript{2} Carte Ms 31:fol 544-46, Ormond's Propositions, 22 June 1662.  
\textsuperscript{3} Kiernan, History of the Financial Administration of Ireland to 1817 (London, 1930), pp 79-86.
Chapter III

THE FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATION OF IRELAND

UNDER ANGLESEY AND ORMOND, 1662-65

Section 1 - Financial and Political Problems, page 53
1662-65

Section 2 - The Irish Economy, 1662-65 and page 85
The Introduction of Farming
Ormond's replacement of the lords justices as chief governor of Ireland in July 1662 marked the establishment of a permanent and settled government of Ireland. The rule of the lords justices had been a period of necessarily extended expediency, replaced now by a single viceroy in whom was vested visible royal confidence and acceptance, marked by the bestowal of the more eminent title of lord lieutenant. It was Ormond's task, aided by Anglesey in financial matters, to build a solid home for the monarchy on the foundations laid by the lords justices. Ormond had both to complete and to extend their work. The land settlement, for example, had been passed, but in order to secure its satisfactory acceptance the viceroy had to prepare a suitable bill of explanation to placate all sides. Likewise in financial matters the skeleton of a healthy hereditary revenue had been put together by parliament and the government, but it was the lord lieutenant's task to augment that revenue and to encourage its growth. Reductions also had to be made in expenditure so as to bring it broadly within the compass of the revenue and the viceroy had both to complete and further this work. In these years, therefore, a critical and vital task had to be performed: the monarchy in Ireland had to be made secure. Beyond this, no clear Irish policy was defined or even considered. In order to judge the government's skill in handling this pragmatic approach and to assess the degree to which it was able to influence the financial situation, before being drawn into the financial crisis of 1665-67, the chapter will be divided into two parts. The main part will deal with the financial problems facing Ormond and Anglesey and their attempts to gain succour from the English treasury. The performance of the economy and the decision to farm several branches of the economy will be evaluated separately.
Initially, upon his arrival in Ireland, the new lord lieutenant was plunged into the tail-end of a parliamentary session in which he gave the royal assent to the act of settlement and to several of the major money bills. He found the regime, at least at first, to be more secure than he had expected, except for a few fanatic Scots in the North and a number of indiscreet but harmless priests and friars.  

It soon became apparent, however, that the financial situation was less clear and less certain. Anglesey compiled a report on 9 August based on Orrery's October 1661 figures, which balanced the debt to the old establishment (less £4,000) with the revenue expected in September 1662, which included the four subsidies then due and the English subvention.  

Twomey has seen this as an over-sanguine paper, but, in fact, Anglesey was well aware that there was at least £52,726 of current pay which no funds existed to defray. Neither complacency nor self-delusion characterised the government's understanding of its position, rather incredulity that the king's £100,000 subvention would not defray old arrears without running up new ones. All the government's assumptions, based upon Orrery's October 1661 State of the Revenue, were false or over-optimistic. The government was even

in doubt as to whether it could find the funds to continue cashiering the troops chosen for disbandment. Anglesey and Ormond thus resolved to cut government expenditure to the bone and hoped they might yet produce a quiescent army and country. Predictably Ormond appealed to Clarendon for the £30,000 security allowed to Vyner from the midlands assessments which had yielded Ireland's £100,000 subvention, but the king would not burden himself with repaying Vyner £130,000 at 10% interest.

In Ireland Anglesey made some efforts to bring order to the exchequer. In August the proclamation was issued calling on rents to be paid promptly on pain of prosecution and this served to shake up the exchequer in this work. The proclamation further forbade the issuing of assignments to soldiers for unpaid taxes, which had made the soldiery virtual tax-collectors and was very unpopular. How effective the proclamation was is in some doubt, and any improvement in tax collection was probably the result of advances in the economy.

During the autumn of 1662 Orrery's October 1661 calculations of the state of the revenue came under critical review. This was necessary because the revenue had failed to match his expectations and also because his figures were the accepted truth in


This evidence indicates a fall in quitrents, but a rise in the less valuable crown rents.
Whitehall. In defence of Orrery's paper it must be said, to use Ormond's phrase, "that computation and certainty are different things".\(^1\) Orrery's recommendations were sound and accepted as necessary to bring Ireland's expenditure down to a reasonable level. Only his estimates of the future revenue yield were incorrect, but elsewhere his figure-work was accurate.\(^2\) It would be hardly fair to blame him for that, but it did make nonsense of Ormond's optimistic claim, based on these figures, that Ireland should pay its own way after receiving the £100,000 subvention.\(^3\)

It was within this context, that the viceroy began to prepare the ground for a request for a subvention from England. He clearly understood that his first priority was to keep Ireland secure and the only sure means to that end, given the country's financial plight, was to appeal to England for funds. This was to be the pattern of his thinking throughout the years 1662-68. In many ways, however, the narrowness of his approach and his inability to see any solution for Irish problems beyond English funding was dictated by his primary concern to keep Ireland and its army secure for the crown. The greatest and most immediate threat to that security was, of course, lack of money. Ormond expected a sympathetic hearing from Clarendon and Southampton, warning that undesirable army reductions would be necessary if a subvention was not forthcoming, and claiming that his administration had been frugal in money matters.\(^4\) However, Ormond's patronising and

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4. Carte Ms 142:pp 32-33, Ormond to King, 12 Nov 1662.
dictatorial appeal to the king was not to be heard uncritically at Whitehall, for Charles, anxious to free himself from the tutelage of his father's servants, was lavishing friendship on Buckingham, and had raised Bennet to the chief secretaryship of state in October 1662.¹

The state of the revenue produced by the Irish government on 29 November 1662 showed an annual deficit of £59,000.² This left no doubt that the revenue fell far short of that expected by both the Irish and English governments. The yield from quitrents had been over-estimated by Orrery by £5,000 pa and a further £7,000 pa lost in quitrents due to the restoration of some Irish by the act of settlement. Changes in the book of rates had reduced the maximum customs yield by £6,000 pa, whilst a compromise with the commons on the cost of licences for selling beer, aqua vitae and wine brought down that branch by £10,000 pa.³ This reduced the maximum yield to about £128,270 pa which was £59,672 pa short of the total establishment of £187,952 pa.⁴ In addition to this annual deficit, there was an outstanding debt since the restoration of £219,500, most of

¹ Carte Ms 143:p 15, Ormond to King, 15 Oct 1662.
² CSPI, 1660-62:pp 637-8, State of the Revenue, 29 Nov 1662; CSPI, 1660-62:pp 524-30, Establishment, Apr 1662. According to the CSPI editor this state of the revenue contains an 'error' of £10,000 which would severely impugn the whole Irish administration as financiers. However, the 'error' does not lie in the annual deficit, wrongly corrected by the editor, from £59,000 pa to £49,000 pa. The £59,000 figure is correct, it is the establishment figure of £177,000 which is wrong - the £10,000 for concordatums not being mentioned in these calculations - although all sums were based on an establishment of £187,000.
which could be offset against the twelve subsidies, which
totalled £130,000, but there would still remain a £39,500 deficit.\footnote{1}
Additionally, there was the annual charge of £22,700 pa for the
regiment of guards, currently paid out of England (i.e. the
£20,000 of the subvention set aside for that purpose).\footnote{2} To
the Irish government's credit it had reduced the lords justices'
army arrears by £30,000, by computing these at the new lower
rates of pay in force since April 1662.\footnote{2} As the hearth tax would
not be available for another year the only solution to the
financial problem which the Irish government could offer was to
ask for a £60,000 subvention. This sum, Ormond claimed, would
enable the government to compound for many of the outstanding
debts.\footnote{4} To make the request more palatable it was dressed up as
an advance of two years pay to the regiment of guards plus
£14,500 and the viceroy re-emphasised the need to placate the
army which had been so ill-treated, and especially the regiment
of guards which was the most reliable military unit in Ireland.\footnote{2}
Moreover, Ormond could not see how the Irish revenue could at
present pay for the regiment of guards, as he had promised it
would, and he hoped that the English government would for the
time being continue to pay it as it was "their greatest defence".\footnote{6}

\footnotesize
   Mss 52: fol 90-1, Army Arrears, 6 Aug 1662; CSPI, 1660-62:
   p 638, State of the Revenue, 29 Nov 1662.
Sir James Shaen was entrusted with the task of putting this request before the English privy council and it proved no great help to the Irish government that they should have chosen such an intriguer, for he was all too willing to play the game of court factions. Increasingly the king's older advisers, like Southampton and the domineering Clarendon, were having to share political influence with Buckingham and Bennet. Furthermore, Sir Philip Warwick, secretary to Southampton at the treasury, had put some backbone into the treasurer, who was now less willing to capitulate to Clarendon and Ormond.¹ Shaen arrived at court to find the king in desperate financial straits, having spent both his current revenue and the Dunkirk money.² Clarendon and Southampton were too ill to consider the matter seriously until January and Charles was known to be under pressure from the treasury to resist it, in spite of Warwick's and Bennet's expressions of sympathy.³

Shaen's embassy went awry. He outlined Ormond's letter on the revenue and explained that Ormond intended to use the act of settlement to procure a £100,000 grant from the Irish parliament and that with a £60,000 subvention Ireland would be made secure and solvent.⁴ Flattered by being interviewed alone by the king he went further and offered to try to help Charles's financial embarrassment by raising a loan for him.⁵ Such alternative

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¹ See also 21 Jan 1662: Jnrte 2' Is of Me dating v. ' ith King, 23 Leo 1662 (58).
proposals were attractive and sensible, but unfortunately diverted Shaen from his main task, for he now endeavoured to become involved in royal finances, thus forwarding himself, and concentrating less on pressing for £60,000 out of the treasury.

With Clarendon and Southampton ill, and under Warwick's firm persuasion, Charles informed the Irish government that no funds were available from England and that the Irish government should retrench its expenses and explore Irish funds to make up the deficit.\(^1\) There was general disappointment at the king's answer but Shaen was told to press on.\(^2\)

The lord lieutenant, for his part, seemed staggered by the reply, but endeavoured to find funds to retrench expenditure and to discover some way of paying for the regiment of guards.\(^3\) An additional Dublin allowance to the regiment of guards had already been found by retrenching the number of privates in troops of horse and companies of foot, and an extension of this expedient seemed the only possibility for releasing funds to pay the regiment.\(^4\) All private grants were stopped and the money allocated to them issued to public uses, causing great outcry in many quarters and increasing the viceroy's enemies at court.\(^5\)

£25,000 was borrowed from the half year's value, money collected as compensation by the act of settlement, and re-allocated to

\(^1\) Carte Ms 32:fol 165, Shaen to Ormond, 23 Dec 1662; CSPI, 1663-5:p 2, Ormond to Bennet, 7 Jan 1663.
\(^2\) CSPI, 1663-5:p 428, Shaen to Orrery, 30 Dec 1662.
\(^3\) CSPI, 1663-5:p 2, Ormond to Bennet, 7 Jan 1663.
\(^4\) Carter Ms 32:fol 155, King to Ormond, 16 Dec 1662.
\(^5\) Carter Ms 32:fol 263, Order by Ormond & Council, 3 Feb 1663; Carter Ms 32:fol 155, Ormond to Bennet, 7 Jan 1663; Carter Ms 32:fol 281, Shaen to Ormond, 24 Feb 1663; CSPI, 1663-5:pp 7-8, Coventry to Bennet, 14 Jan 1663.
the payment of the army, but such a measure could only be temporary and did little to alleviate the huge deficit, enlarged even more by the realisation that the regiment of guards must be paid out of Irish funds.\(^1\)

Such measures made little impact on the basic problem and Ormond appealed once more for a subvention of £60,000, directing his appeal this time more directly to the increasingly influential Bennet.\(^2\) The lord lieutenant reiterated Ireland's debts and the government's incapacity to pay them and that a stop of grants did little to alleviate the problem.\(^3\) It was hopeless also to expect that the regiment of guards could be accommodated on the Irish establishment by the cashiering of eleven foot companies and five troops of horse (the equivalent in annual expenditure of paying the guards), for there was no money to pay them their arrears.\(^4\) It was re-emphasised that the Irish army was vital and that an expenditure of £60,000 now would ultimately prove remunerative.\(^5\) Ormond appealed for the £30,000 of the £130,000 assessment held by Vyner as security and hoped that the other £30,000 could be raised some other way.\(^6\)

As expected Clarendon supported his viewpoint, but Berkeley proved a useful ally too. Freshly returned from inspecting his

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3. CSPL, 1663-6: p 12, Ormond to Bennet, 21 Jan 1663.
5. CSPL, 1663-6: p 12, Ormond to Bennet, 21 Jan 1663.
6. CSPL, 1663-6: p 13, Ormond to Bennet, 21 Jan 1663.
presidency of Connaught he won over York and made some progress with Charles, but had less luck with Warwick and Southampton. However, whether a subvention would be granted seemed to hinge on the political permutations which evolved as the government prepared itself to meet parliament. The treasury hoped to prise more money out of the parliamentary session by demonstrating both the paucity of the revenue and the stringency of its control over expenditure - a subvention to Ireland would appear profligate, especially in the light of the £100,000 sent the year before, and it would upset treasury calculations which were intended to be laid before the session.

This forthcoming parliamentary session in England, which was to prove more troublesome than the previous one, was the vital backdrop against which we have to evaluate the English government's views and actions in assessing whether or not to grant this subvention.

Furthermore, at least one vital factor in the situation played on everyone's minds in both Dublin and Whitehall and had to be considered in all calculations. Throughout 1663, until it was closed in August 1663, the commissioners of the court of claims heard pleas from claimants. Although it did a good job in Ormond's opinion and in the view of several restored royalist protestants, the adventurers and soldiers and the older protestants, who had collaborated with and profited from the cromwellian regime, felt threatened by its judgements and that so many

1. Carte Ms 32:fol 230, Berkeley to Ormond, 3 Jan 1663.
catholics and Irish had been restored. The fear that this discontent might take the form of a rising of some sort only emphasised the importance of the army and the danger of having an empty treasury in Dublin, and it was a compelling factor in winning support at the council board, in the face of treasury opposition, for the Irish government's request for a subvention.

Meanwhile, Shaen continued to busy himself in his own intrigues, trying to raise a loan for Charles and to obtain the right to collect the adventurers' forfeited subscriptions. This did nothing to help the Irish government at a time when Anglesey's latest figures still demonstrated a deficit to meet current payments. In order to discourage any further grants being made on Irish funds Anglesey was ordered to pay all special warrants chronologically, which in effect meant that any new grants might never be paid in the foreseeable future.

Such efforts seemed unlikely to move the treasury and they were not enough to prevent Ireland from spiralling towards bankruptcy. On 9 February 1663 Southampton informed Ormond that the treasury was empty, reminding the viceroy that he had been fortunate to receive £100,000 in the previous year. This was also the view of the privy council which recommended further Irish retrenchments.

2. CEFL, 1663-5, p 18, Ormond to King, 7 Feb 1663.
4. Carte Ms 52: fol 23, Anglesey's Account of Debts and Receipts, 12 Feb 1662; Carte Ms 52: fol 506, Anglesey to Ormond, 13 Dec 1662; Carte Ms 52: fol 25, Ormond to Anglesey, 12 Mar 1663.
5. Carte Ms 52: fol 272, Southampton to Ormond, 9 Feb 1663.
To soften the blow Charles held out the hope that the English parliament might find supplies for Ireland and an interim committee was formed to discuss the possibility of a subvention and retrenchments for Ireland. Of the committee's members only Ashley and Southampton opposed an Irish subvention. News of discontent being aroused by the court of claims' judgements and fears for the Irish army's loyalty, quickly led to the king becoming a supporter of the Irish subvention. Bennet would appear to have been at the back of Charles's conversion to this viewpoint, persuading Charles that supplies should be sent forthwith. In order to prevent the crown from changing its mind Ormond reiterated the importance of the army and how desperately it required payment in a charged political atmosphere, in which so many protestants felt threatened by the court of claims' judgements.

In fact, it took a month, until 21 March 1663, before Clarendon was able to give the viceroy official word that the king would send a £60,000 subvention. The delays which followed were an excellent example of the inertial effect on policy that a court riven by intrigue and scheming could cause. Division among ministers in the restoration court severely hampered government

2. Carte Ms 46:fol 31, Bennet to Ormond, 17 Feb 1663.
3. CSP, 1663-4:p 29, Bennet to Ormond, 24 Feb 1663: Carte Ms 32: fol 287, Berkeley to Ormond, 14 Feb 1663.
5. CSP, 1663-4:p 38, Ormond to King, 12 Mar 1663.
and delayed putting decisions into operation, thereby severely handicapping the administration’s effectiveness and efficiency. Delay in this particular was caused by two events which ought to have been side-issues, but which in that highly personalised court enabled the offended parties to paralyse the granting of the subvention. This, at least, seems to be the most plausible explanation for the extraordinary delay in sending the subvention. The first of these was Ormond’s falling out with Berkeley. Berkeley was very influential with York and the powerful St. Albans and had helped Ormond to obtain the subvention. When Berkeley tried to have his leave of absence as president of Connaught extended Ormond opposed it. This was a pointless dispute, leading to a pyrrhic victory for Ormond, but gained at the expense of making Berkeley his sworn enemy. More important was the dispute with Bennet. This was a less tangible matter, but basically was concerned with weakening Ormond’s alliance with Clarendon. Since his promotion to senior secretary of state in October 1662 Bennet had sought to become Ormond’s chief ally, and, thus, he secured the Irish subvention in February 1663. Within several weeks, however, Bennet had complained to Charles about ill-treatment at the viceroy’s hands. The alleged ill-treatment was double-edged; in the first place, Bennet felt Ormond was not being reliant enough on him, using Clarendon’s agency too

1. Carte Ms 143: pp 32-47, Ormond to Clarendon, 19 Nov 1662. See also chapter VI on Berkeley’s influence and character.
2. Carte Ms 143: p 35, Ormond to Clarendon, 12 Nov 1662; Carte Ms 143: p 79, Hamilton to Ormond, 25 Feb 1663; Carte Ms 143: p 147, Ormond to Clarendon, 17 July 1663; Carte Ms 32: fol 635, Berkeley to Ormond, 30 June 1663; Carte Ms 32: fol 734, Berkeley to Ormond, 28 July 1663; CSPI, 1663-5: pp 115-6, Ormond to Bennet, 3 June 1663; CSPI, 1663-5: p 124, Ormond to Bennet, 10 June 1663.
3. CSPI, 1663-5: p 124, Ormond to Bennet, 10 June 1663; CSPI, 1663-5: pp 115-6, Ormond to Bennet, 3 June 1663.
5. CSPI, 1663-5: p 65, Ormond to Bennet, 25 Apr 1663.
often; and in the second place, Bennet was annoyed that his own bill for Irish lands was meeting resistance in the Irish parliament.¹ Realising how much this weakened him Ormond appealed to the secretary of state through his son, Ossory, and Colonel Vernon.² The differences were patched up and in consequence Ormond increased his reliance on the secretary of state.³

It must be emphasised, though, that Ireland's subvention and a decision on where the money was to be found had been delayed since February 1663 and Ormond's disputes with Bennet and Berkeley must have been largely to blame. Once the viceroy had patched up his disagreement with Bennet the movement towards receiving the subvention quickly gathered pace.

The Irish government had been overjoyed to receive confirmation that Charles intended to send a subvention to Ireland, promising that only lack of skill or hard cash would prevent these supplies from being put to good use.⁴ The king's decision had raised the Irish government's morale and in a more optimistic mood it hoped to achieve solvency soon and to keep a cash reserve for emergencies.⁵ A plan to farm the casual revenue was even considered, but a cautionary note crept in, warning that any delays in the subvention might be harmful, as would the prohibition of Irish cattle from England currently being mooted in parliament.⁶

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1. CSPI, 1663-5: p 65, Ormond to Bennet, 25 Apr 1663.
3. CSPI, 1663-5: pp 74-5, Bennet to Ormond, 2 May 1663: Carte Ms 32: fol 71, Anglesey to Ormond, 12 May 1663.
5. Carte Ms 143: pp 113-4, Ormond to Clarendon, 3 Apr 1663.
All this was just at the moment when Ormond fell out with Bennet. As the prohibition of Irish cattle looked more likely to be passed the viceroy warned it would upset his plans to farm the customs, ruining the receipts from that branch, and that Ireland would require "a constant supply ... out of England".

At home, however, Ormond and Anglesey concentrated on haranguing tenants to pay their rents in order to clear three months of current arrears due to the army. This army, moreover, was proving increasingly troublesome due to its lack of pay and the feeling of many of its Cromwellian members that they had been 'sold out' by the court of claims.

Although Ormond excused many of the army's number as Cromwellians by expediency, he warned that there were many undesirables in its ranks, but these could not be disbanded without English money to meet their arrears, which would finally leave the king with a dependable army.

The months of May and June, as the Carte Ms testify, were full of rumours of plots by Catholics, fanatics and Cromwellians. To forestall disaster Ormond ordered the immediate purging of the more militant dissidents in the army, but even amongst the government's most ardent supporters "the great change in property in lands made by the commissioners raise our jealousies sometimes to a very high pitch". The viceroy's increasing frugality with the public revenue in his endeavours to pay the army was quickly

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2. CSPI, 1663-5: pp 57-8, Proclamation by Viceroy, 10 Apr 1663.
3. CSPI, 1663-5: pp 82-3, Ormond to King, 8 May 1663.
4. CSPI, 1663-5: pp 85-6, Kingston to Bennet, 9 May 1663.
justified. On 21 May 1663, Blood, leading a band of desperate and dissatisfied cromwellians, attempted a coup in Dublin, but they were resisted in their efforts to seize Dublin Castle. Ormond had allowed the plot to ripen after he had discovered its existence, so as to catch as many malcontents as possible, but it also had the effect of re-emphasising in unequivocal terms that "we shall never be safe till the army may be punctually paid" and that the English subvention was urgently needed. The 'plot' enabled Ormond to go ahead with plans to reduce the army (excluding the guards) by one quarter. By these means, Ireland might be made more secure for the crown by purging republicans.

In fact, the foundations for re-shaping the Irish army had been laid before Ormond's arrival in Ireland as viceroy. From a total of 8,384 men in April 1662 the army was cut in size, in line with Orrery's recommendations, to 6,992 men by September 1662. By these retrenchments the lord lieutenant was able to remove many malcontents, but as long as the army's pay was in jeopardy or arrear he felt unable to guarantee its loyalty. Retrenchments had enabled Ormond, first of all, to pay the regiment of guards an additional allowance and further disbandments allowed him to

1. CSPI, 1663-5: pp 85-6, Kingston to Bennet, 9 May 1663.
2. Bagwell, op cit., vol iii, p 37; CSPI, 1663-5; p 99, Churchill to Bennet, 23 May 1663; CSPI, 1663-5; p 103, Ormond to Bennet, 24 May 1663.
3. CSPI, 1663-5; p 103, Ormond to Bennet, 24 May 1663.
4. CSPI, 1663-5; p 109, Ormond to Bennet, 30 May 1663.
6. Carte Ms 143: pp 32-3, Ormond to King, 12 Nov 1662.
alleviate the strain on the revenue, by cashiering twelve companies at a cost of £24,190, although this only worked out at £21,350 pa by the new rates of pay. Ormond found it difficult to select men for disbandment, fearing that he might alienate loyal men.

The discontent of the army and the protestant landowners had probably been underestimated by Ormond, but, nevertheless, few manifested it in a show of disloyalty or support of Blood's attempted coup. Colonel Vernon's view of the plot, that the army, particularly the horse, could not be trusted and that, if it was not for Arran's regiment of guards, the army would have supported Blood, was an exaggeration, but it reinforced both the king's and Bennet's worries about Irish discontent, especially in the army. Certainly it ensured that the English government found supplies for Ireland. Ormond had taken the opportunity to reduce the army by a quarter to 1500 horse and 3,960 foot, by cutting the privates in each troop from 60 to 45 and in each company from 84 to 60. Some, like Vernon, would have preferred more horse to have been cashiered and to have replaced them with a trustworthy English regiment, for he still maintained that only one in ten of the army could be trusted. These reductions, however, enabled Ormond to remove more malcontents and to increase

1. CSP, 1662-65:pp 12-13, Ormond to Bennet, 21 Jan 1663; Carte As 42:Col 153, King to Ormond, 16 Dec 1662.
2. CSP, 1662-65:pp 14, Ormond to Bennet, 27 Jan 1663.
5. CSP, 1663-4:pp 102, Ormond to Bennet, 30 May 1663; Beckett, loc. cit., p. 13.
the soldiers' daily rates of pay.\textsuperscript{1} Aware that the royal regiment was all on which he could rely, the lord lieutenant's reductions had enabled him to place their pay on the permanent establishment.

Having repaired relations with Bennet, the secretary of state once more became the main vehicle through which the urgency of an immediate subvention was pressed.\textsuperscript{2} Blood's attempted coup in Dublin had shaken the English government out of its insouciance and inertia. Charles ordered an immediate inquiry into the plot and prorogued the Irish parliament.\textsuperscript{3} More importantly, with the spectre of '41' perhaps raising its head, the English house of commons had unanimously voted four subsidies for the king when Ireland's necessities, amongst others, had been presented to it.\textsuperscript{4} Won over by the idea that possibly the peace of all three kingdoms depended on properly supplying the Irish army the commons vote was easily passed, but every effort was still required to see that it was promptly executed by the lords and council.\textsuperscript{5} Troubled by the potential enormity of the Irish crisis the king decided not to wait for the subsidies to come in but ordered that £60,000 in English specie, currently in the Tower and being revalued, should be sent to Ireland forthwith.\textsuperscript{6}

Anglesey was dispatched to court to ensure that the subvention

\textsuperscript{1} OSFL, 1663-5: p 109, Ormond to Bennet, 30 May 1663.
\textsuperscript{2} Carte Ms 32: fol 577, Shaen to Ormond, 13 June 1663.
\textsuperscript{3} Carte Ms 47: fol 57, King to Ormond, 13 June 1663.
\textsuperscript{4} Carte Ms 42: fol 57, King to Ormond, 13 June 1663: Carte Ms 32: fol 577, Shaen to Ormond, 13 June 1663: Orange MS, vol III, p 58, Coventry to Ormond, 20 June 1663.
\textsuperscript{5} OCPL, 1663-5: p 139, Vernon to Williamson, 19 June 1663; Carte Ms 47: fol 57, Berkeley to Ormond, 30 June 1663.
\textsuperscript{6} Carte Ms 46: fol 61, Bennet to Ormond, 27 June 1663: Chandosman, 1663, p 296 & p 306 sqq. (69)
came in English coin. His presence at court was further necessitated by a plan to supply Ireland with 1500 foot and 700 horse which Ormond would only support if England bore the cost. Anglesey deferred this planned reinforcement and it was replaced by a scheme for 500 new recruits, but the viceroy would not accept them unless the subvention was raised to £100,000, which was of course a vain hope. Just as Ormond had feared, once it became clear that the coup's effects were not going to spread Warwick and others began to press that England's needs were greater than Ireland's. Therefore, although Anglesey succeeded in gaining the subvention in English coin, it did not in the end come out of the money in the Tower. Instead a bargain was struck with Vyner and Bakewell, who advanced £30,000 each, but at a profit to themselves, so that the subvention only totalled £55,580. The money reached Ireland in September 1663. In the same month Colonel Talbot's report on Ireland's unsettled condition served to reiterate the need both for the £60,000 and an acceptable act of explanation.

Throughout this whole negotiation, it should be emphasised, Ormond had placed complete trust in Anglesey, to whom he left the

1. CSPI, 1663–5: p 165, Ormond to Bennet, 10 July 1663; CSPI, 1663–5: p 174, Ormond to Bennet, 15 July 1663.
2. CSPI, 1663–5: p 165, Ormond to Bennet, 10 July 1663.
4. Ormonde Ms, vol iii, pp 76–7, Anglesey to Ormond, 22 Aug 1663.
5. Ormonde Ms, vol iii, pp 73–4, Ormond to Anglesey, 15 Aug 1663.
6. Ormonde Ms, vol iii, pp 76–7, Anglesey to Ormond, 22 Aug 1663; Carle Ha 52: fol 263, 14 Aug 1663; Carle Ha 52: fol 697–9, Receipts & Disbursements, 1660–71; Ormonde Ms, vol iii, p 68, Anglesey to Ormond, 4 Aug 1663; Ormonde Ms, vol iii, p 65, Anglesey to Ormond, 1 Aug 1663.
7. Carle Ha 52: fol 154, Anglesey to Kooch, 19 Sept 1663; Ormonde Ms, vol iii, p 39, Anglesey to Ormond, 29 Sept 1663.
8. Carle Ha 52: fol 92, Bennet to Ormond, 9 Sept 1663.
care of all financial matters. The only slight dissatisfaction he did express was that any of the subvention should have been lost in exchange to Tyner and Bakewell, but this criticism was clearly aimed at Warwick, not Anglesey.1

Anglesey had also been successful in persuading Charles to accept the scheme for 500 English recruits to reinforce the Irish army, on the proviso that their transportation was paid for by the English treasury.2 These were a useful addition to the Irish army in 1664, increasing the balance of non-cromwellian troops and allowing Ormond to give commissions to loyal officers.3 Those cromwellians remaining, who still made up the majority of the army, proved by their behaviour over the next two decades to be very loyal and patient troops, putting up with dreadful conditions of pay and service with barely a murmur and a handful of inconsequential mutinies to show for it.

Whilst Anglesey sorted out the subvention in England Ormond concentrated on curbing expenditure, making room to pay the 500 new English recruits and preparing a new establishment. The groundwork for this had been prepared in Anglesey's paper of 10 July 1663, before his departure for court. The annual standing charge had been reduced to £174,520 pa in this paper, including the regiment of guards' wages, mainly due to disbandments, but it took no account of an additional 500 recruits or

2. Ormonde ii, vol iii, p 73, Anglesey to Ormond, 15 Aug 1663.
rises in the soldiers' daily rates.¹ Even on these figures, Anglesey estimated a deficit of £17,520, but Ormond hoped to make up much of this by farming the customs at a good rate, rather than asking for further English money.² There were enough surplus officers to supply the 500 new recruits and the retrenchments had allowed him to include the cost of the regiment of guards on the establishment, which now totalled £196,000.³ By and large, the new establishment had been drawn up by Anglesey, with Ormond and his council only adjusting finer points in his absence, but what made it so acceptable to the crown was that, at last, Ireland could pay for its regiment of guards.⁴ Anglesey was worried that the viceroy had been persuaded to make too many temporary payments permanent and he urged further retrenchments, no doubt under pressure from the English council, such as further reducing quarter masters and trumpeters.⁵

Ormond and Anglesey had therefore turned Blood's attempted coup to their advantage, enabling them to purge the army and to obtain English funds. Nevertheless, discontent and uncertainty over the land settlement, which had been a prime cause of the coup, still threatened to undermine the Irish government's efforts to secure Ireland firmly for the crown.

Pressure on the crown in Irish affairs was mounting in financial and land matters. The commissioners of the court of claims had fled to England at the first opportunity without even asking for Ormond's permission.⁶ The bill of explanation was sourly received

2. Carte Ms 52:fol 193, State of the Revenue, 10 July 1663; Ormonde NS, vol iii, pp 98-9, Ormond to Anglesey, 28 Oct 1663.
4. Carte Ms 46:fol 110, Bennet to Ormond, 7 Nov 1663.
5. Ormonde NS, vol iii, p 111, Anglesey to Ormond, 1 Dec 1663.
by all interests at Whitehall, falling between several stools, but Ormond re-emphasised the calamities that would follow if it were not passed: a collapse in the revenue and rebellion, with financial resources too weak to counter either, and an army too small to quell anything but the smallest rising.¹

The changing relationship between the Irish government and its parliament reflected the growing rift in the protestant ruling class in Ireland, as different interest groups took divergent views on the land settlement. Ormond's arrival in Dublin had been greeted favourably by the Irish parliament in July 1662, especially when he gave the royal assent to the act of settlement along with several money bills.² The additional revenue bill (the hearth tax), as Mervyn had intimated, was warmly received, passing through the parliament with little incident, and was given the royal assent on 20 December 1662 in conjunction with a bill to abolish the court of wards, as had been agreed.³

The shortcomings of the act were not at this stage realised. Passed along with it was the controversial bill for granting licences to sell ale and wine, with the licence set at 20/-, a compromise between the 30/- desired by the government and 10/- by the parliament.⁴

The seemingly cosy relationship between the government and parliament was due to break down. In some ways this was inevitable, for the surge of royalist loyalty, born out of both genuine enthusiasm and expediency, was bound to peter out, as MPs became more concerned with how the government conducted itself and

¹. CSPI, 1663–5: pp 323–4, Ormond to Bennet, 29 Dec 1663.
². Commons Journal Ire, p 553, 31 July 1662.
used the supplies they had voted. This was certainly the
pattern in England. Likewise in Ireland, the commons especially
realised they had made great efforts and sacrifices to make the
government solvent, in fact free from parliament, in return for
the promise of a land settlement which all quarters believed
would be modelled to suit them alone. The sense of betrayal
the new English and cromwellians felt at the decrees of the
court of claims and later the balance of the bill of explanation
caused a deep rift between government and parliament - only the
threat all sides felt from the hostile native population main-
tained the tenuous unity of the protestant ruling class.2

The king was extremely annoyed by the reaction towards the
court of claims' decrees, but his efforts to harangue the
Irish parliament and to exhort it to greater loyalty fell on
increasingly deaf ears.3 The government found the commons
progressively troublesome and bills, such as Bennet's,
received strong resistance and an identifiable opposition began
to coalesce around MPs like Richard Jones, united in their
belief that the titles to their estates were threatened by
the court of claims' decrees and the vesting clause of the bill
of explanation.4 They believed there had been a 'sell-out'.
Such opposition found its most extreme expression in Blood's
attempted coup, which had the latent sympathies of several new

2. See above.
3. CSPL, 1663-5: p 13, Ormond to King, 7 Feb 1663; CSPL, 1663-5:
p 29, Bennet to Ormon', 24 Feb 1663.
English, cromwellians and soldiers. Although a committee of parliament investigated the plot with the privy council, parliament had to be prorogued to a later date, so that the provinces were not stripped of their local leaders at a moment of crisis by calling them to a parliamentary session. ¹

From the beginning of 1664 the political situation peaked towards a new crisis, caused mainly by uncertainty over the future of the bill of explanation, just at a time when the £60,000 subvention was supposed to relieve these tensions. Nervousness, distrust and a calculated desire by many cromwellians to defame the Irish catholics, whom they believed were being too favourably treated, culminated in a plethora of alleged Irish plots and risings, all based on the scantest evidence and truth. ² The financial situation responded in kind to the nervousness and distrust of the protestant community. Rents were coming in slowly, a trend which was reinforced by Anglesey's prolonged absence in England. ³ Bellingham, his deputy, was ordered to rectify this, but he was unable to devote himself fully to the task until he was excused from the lord mayorship of Dublin in April 1664 for the remainder of the year. ⁴

In order to forestall a new financial crisis Ormond instructed the army to be paid every six months, rather than quarterly, in the

¹. CSP, 1663-5: p 124, Ormond to Bennet, 10 June 1663; Carte Ms 46: fol 57, King to Ormond, 13 June 1663.
³. Ormonde MS, vol iii, p 134, Anglesey to Ormond, 5 Jan 1664.
⁴. Ormonde MS, vol iii, p 134, Anglesey to Ormond, 5 Jan 1664; Ormonde MS, vol iii, p 160, Anglesey to Ormond, 5 Apr 1664; CSP, 1663-5: p 386, King to Mayor & Council of Dublin, 7 Apr 1664.
hope that the army might be better paid that way and that the
exchequer would thus have time to sort itself out.¹ As Orrery
pointed out, this was a vain hope, for the soldiers' pay would
now be delayed six months instead of three and after that they
would still have to wait for assignments.² He aimed his critic­
isms not only at the army agents, who would profit greatly by
this scheme, but also at Bellingham and the exchequer for not
ensuring, as they had promised, that the army would be promptly
paid.³ These were the first hints of the financial mismanage­
ment which Orrery was to attack in 1667 and 1668. Moreover, the
new recruits from England had to be clothed and fed by their
officers, as they had arrived without pay or the prospect of it
and unsuitably equipped for military service.⁴ The January and
April 1664 quarters of pay had to be met before six monthly pay­
ments could begin, thereby placing a heavy burden on the certain
collection of the Michaelmas 1664 rents to meet the six months
pay which would be due by then.⁵ The government was ordered to
hold £10,000, not yet collected on the new impost and tonnage
and poundage, in reserve for the king's special service, that is,
in case of any emergency such as a rebellion.⁶ To achieve all
this within the context of a nervous and uncertain economy the

¹. Ormonde MSS, vol iii, 142, Anglesey to Ormond, 30 Jan 1664.
². Morrice, Orrery State Papers, (Dublin, 1743), vol i, pp 151-5, Orrery to Ormond, 21 Jan 1664.
³. ibid., vol i, pp 153-4, Orrery to Ormond, 21 Jan 1664.
⁴. CSPi, 1663-5:p 367, Orrery to Bennet, 17 Feb 1664.
⁵. Ormonde MSS, vol iii, Anglesey to Ormond, 27 Feb 1664.
⁶. CSPi, 1663-5:p 396, King to Ormond, 30 Apr 1664.
viceroy strictly adhered to his stop of all letters for grants and pensions, in spite of the enemies it made for him. Between July 1662 and May 1664 £46,707 had been wasted on special warrants by the king's letters, money which could and should have been more profitably spent on the Irish army or the national debts, and if Ireland's finances were to be sorted out it was the most obvious area with which to begin, but one which could win the viceroy many enemies.

The political crisis deepened at Whitehall as the cromwellian interest attacked the bill of explanation. In fact, neither the pro-Irish nor the pro-cromwellians were satisfied with it. Ormond's record as a royal servant came under attack and plans were laid for him to come to court. Anglesey's attempts to clarify certain points in the bitter debates on the bill of explanation looked likely to wreck it, even though it was not his intention to do so. A committee of the Irish House of Commons suggested further changes to the bill and Orrery prepared to travel to London in support of the cromwellian interest. In order to try to sort out the situation, Ormond left for London in May 1664, having appointed his son Ossory, lord deputy.

Ossory's first term as lord deputy, lasting from May 1664 to September 1665, was by and large uneventful. His government was

1. Carte Ms 46: fol 147, Bennet to Ormond, 23 Jan 1664.
2. Carte Ms 52: fol 253-66, Concordatam Payments, 1662-64.
3. CSPI, 1662-3: pp 323-4, Ormond to Bennet, 29 Dec 1663.
4. CSPI, 1662-3: pp 323-4, Ormond to King, 9 Dec 1663; Carte Ms 147: p 251, Ormond to Clarendon, 27 Jan 1664; Carte Ms 147: p 269, Ormond to Clarendon, 20 Feb 1664.
6. Carte Ms 147: p 251, Ormond to Clarendon, 27 Jan 1664; Ormonde Ms, vol iii, p 164, Anglesey to Ormond, 3 May 1664; CSPI, 1662-3: p 395, Licence to Ormond, 6 May 1664.
very much a caretaker one, all major decisions being taken in
Whitehall where the chief concern continued to be the shape of
the bill of explanation. In Dublin the lord deputy took measures
to defuse the growing sense of fear and crisis, moving against
renegade priests and friars who so upset the Irish protestants.¹
The preparation of bills to prevent horse stealing and gambling
and to encourage manufacturing and fisheries were the major and
uncontroversial work of the government.² At court the lord
lieutenant and others drew up a report on Irish affairs to
vindicate the form the bill of explanation had taken.² The
bill was re-drawn and considered in the greatest secrecy, but
its more unsettling features were not modified and Conway, for
example, believed it to be so pro-Irish that the Irish parliament
would never pass it.⁴

Thus the main concern was to keep Ireland settled and to try to
formulate a suitable and satisfactory explanatory bill. In the
financial sphere retrenchments were still necessary. In August
1664 this was exacerbated when the king was obliged to give
permission to allow £12,175 worth of special grants and warrants,
paid in the year 1663-4, to be passed by the Irish commissioner
of accounts.⁵ In order to eke out the government's few funds and
so as to create a contingency fund to meet any possible emergency,

¹. Carte Ms 33: fol 404, Walsh to Duchess of Ormond, 7 June
1664; Carte Ms 32: fol 405, Walsh to Ormond, 7 June 1664.
². C031, 1663-5, pp 553-4, Domville to Bennet, 17 Mar 1665;
Carte Ms 24: fol 79, Domville to Ormond, rec'd Mar 1665.
³. Carte Ms 32: fol 510, Order of Council, 2; July 1664.
⁴. Hastings, pp 366-7, Conway to Rawdon, 10 Sept 1664; Hastings,
pp 367-8, Conway to Rawdon, 4 Apr 1665.
⁵. Carte Ms 33: fol 580, Commissioners to Ormond, 27 Aug 1664.
Bellingham stopped one man's pay in each troop for the six months due at Michaelmas 1664.\(^1\)

The Irish revenue's future health, it was becoming increasingly clear, depended on whether or not the English parliament banned the importation of live sheep and cattle as it had threatened. The Irish council of trade, chaired by the merchant Sir Peter Pett, pressed for free trade between Ireland and England and a heavy increase on the impost on tobacco, wine, beer and foreign goods.\(^2\) On the basis of this report Ossory and his council advised that, if the cattle ban came into operation, Ireland's economy would collapse because cattle exportation was the main means of bringing specie into Ireland and the Irish government feared it would lead to a government collapse and a rebellion on the scale of 1641.\(^2\) As we shall see in the next chapter, these warnings did not fall on deaf ears, but Charles, contemplating a Dutch war, could not contradict his parliament in an issue over which it proved to be so sensitive.

In 1665 the Irish government was aware of two major problems in its preparations to meet the forthcoming parliamentary session - the bill of settlement and the revenue. In the first place, supplies were necessary to defend Ireland during the Dutch war, and also to meet the annual deficit estimated at £40,000 pa.\(^4\)

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3. Carte Ms 33:fol 677, Ossory to Ormond, 9 Nov 1664.

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However, the Dutch war would doubtless adversely affect Irish trade and increase the deficit and thus the proposed bill for 8 subsidies, to be collected at the rate of 2 a year, was inadequate as it would only raise £30,000 pa. Domville suggested two financial expedients. He advised that the crown could gain £30,000 pa if it took only the best lands by the act of explanation, although opposition to this would be strong amongst the vying interest groups. Secondly, he proposed that 4 subsidies a year should be levied during the present crisis. The Irish privy council made it clear that it would support any subsidies to cover the additional cost of the war, but, in a rare show of feeling, quashed Domville's plan for 4 subsidies per annum. Their reason was that they were alarmed by the delays in the bill of explanation - "The principal reasons which induced them to take this way was that the act of settlement now before his majesty is not yet returned ..."

The Irish privy council's decision on the subsidies clearly demonstrated the misgivings of the protestant community towards government policy. Moreover, some, like Conway, believed the bill of explanation was a betrayal of the English interest and thought, and no doubt hoped, that it would not pass the house of commons. Nonetheless, the opposition and Conway needed the security of an act of explanation - to throw it out would be

1. Carte Ms 34:fol 78, Domville to Ormond, rec'd Mar 1665.
2. Carte Ms 34:fol 78, Domville to Ormond, rec'd Mar 1665.
3. ESPI, 1663-5:p 553, Domville to Bennet, 17 Mar 1665.
disastrous for all sides, only prolonging their uncertainty, and
so their hope was to amend it somehow so as to suit their ends
and to placate their fears. The one weapon they held was the
government's desperate need for subsidies to finance itself, for
even a generous English subvention could not bale Ireland out. 1
Unfortunately for this group, which included all shades of protestant
opposition, the Dutch war and the accompanying surge of patriotism
and the need to find supplies to defend Ireland took their trump
card away from them, and made others realise that not to pass the
bill of explanation might encourage rebellion at a time when they
were involved in a fierce war with the Dutch, and England could
hardly help them quickly or effectively to defend themselves
against the hostile natives. Nor would the crown be keen to
defend them if they were the authors of their own destruction.

When the Irish government followed up these preparations for the
forthcoming parliament with an investigation of the revenue, the
situation they uncovered profoundly shocked them. In order to
pay both lists the £294,250 due to them for six months at Easter
1665, there was only £69,650, leaving a deficit of about £24,600. 2
This figure, however, included the customs and inland excise
rents due for the midsummer quarter and, since war had broken out,
the government expected these to be depleted by the customs
farmers' claims for defalcations. 3 A proclamation of 15 April
had ordered a quickening of rent payments, but this afforded

1. Carte Ms 34:fol 206-77, Ossory to Ormoni, 26 Apr 1665.
2. Carte Ms 34:fol 206-77, Ossory to Ormoni, 26 Apr 1665.
3. Carte Ms 34:fol 206, Ossory to Ormoni, 26 Apr 1665.
Additionally there had been a £12,000 increase to the national debt, for compensation to various parties granted by the crown, and the contraction of trade caused by the war. The eight subsidies clearly could not be levied in time to help the situation, and the government therefore appealed for "£60,000 transmitted hither in English money". This appeal was reiterated in June 1665 with the warning once more that the army would have to be paid partly in corn and cattle, which made it grumble and untrustworthy.

These appeals were ignored, for the king was too engrossed in anticipating English parliamentary grants, spending all he had on preparations for the Dutch war, which had the effect of making him more dependent than ever before on his parliament and necessary for him to placate it in order to gain supplies which he had already spent. Any subventions had to await Ormond's report on his return there. Ireland was in a miserable state by September 1665 when he returned. Although he expected to force the bill of explanation through the parliament, he discovered that the financial crisis had not been exaggerated, and he offered two expedients - the repeal of all English legislation that impeded Irish trade or a subvention of £30,000 pa for the foreseeable future. Any hope of the former was dashed both by

1. See Carte Ms 34:fol 206-07, Ossory to Ormond, 26 Apr 1665.
2. Carte Ms 34:fol 206-07, Ossory to Ormond, 26 Apr 1665.
3. Carte Ms 34:fol 207, Ossory to Ormond, 26 Apr 1665; Carte Ms 34:fol 292, Ossory to Ormond, 28 June 1665.
the king's need to placate the parliament and its decision not to repeal its temporary cattle acts, but to make them more effective and permanent.\textsuperscript{1} Ormond's major concentration, as it had been in 1662-63, was to be on gaining a subvention against a background in which Charles felt he could ill-afford to give Ireland the money for which it begged.

The seriousness of the Irish government's financial situation was constantly mirrored by its capacity to pay the army, and as the government's finances moved towards crisis, the army was consequently straitened. The army's pay thus suffered greatly in the period covered by this chapter. Between October 1661 and July 1662 arrears of £121,406 had accrued. This figure was reduced several times by computing the arrear at different establishment rates and was never paid to the soldiery.\textsuperscript{2} Anglesey's accounts demonstrate that the army was fully paid, in spite of some delays, from the time of Ormond's arrival (July 1662) until March 1663.\textsuperscript{3}

As we have seen, Anglesey also attempted to put an end to payment by assignments, both so as to encourage the better payment of the army and to lessen harassment of tax payers by soldiers.\textsuperscript{4}

In the financial year ending 20 March 1664 the army was fully paid, but there were long delays, reflecting the government's financial difficulties and causing Ormond to decide to adopt the system of paying the army six monthly.\textsuperscript{5} In order to achieve this


\begin{itemize}
  \item [1.] Carte As 46:fol 209, Arlington to Ormond, 11 Oct 1665; Carte As 77:fol 442, Conway to Ormond, 1 Oct 1665.
  \item [2.] Carte As 52:fol 12, 10 Months' Arrears, Oct 1661-July 1662; Carte As 52:fol 366, Payments to Army, 1661-2; Carte As 52:fol 92-1, Estimate of Army's Arrears, 6 Aug 1662; CSPI, 1662-63, p 672, State of the Revenue, 29 Nov 1662.
  \item [3.] TCD Ms 903:fol 197, Anglesey's Accounts, 22 Mar 1663.
  \item [4.] TCD, 1663-5:pp 57-8, Proclamation, 10 Apr 1663.
  \item [5.] TCD Ms 903:fol 193, Anglesey's Accounts, 20 Mar 1664; Ormond, vol iii, p 147, Anglesey to Ormond, 30 Jan 1664.
\end{itemize}
change over from quarterly to six monthly pay a great effort was
required to ensure that the army was fully paid by April 1664.1
As we have seen above, no heed was paid to Orrery's warnings that
it would only increase the length of time that soldiers had to
wait for assignments and that it was unlikely to achieve any-
thing but greater discontent.2 The crisis came when the Irish
government had to make heavy payments to those due compensation
by the half year's value, which it had borrowed in 1662 and 1663,
and when it had to pay out twice as much in grants (£14,343)
from the hearth tax than it yielded.2 Although the army received
its six months due in September, the government only had £69,950
left to discharge six months to the establishment in April 1665
when £94,250 was needed.4 The army thus fell into arrears
and its pay had to be made up in part by corn and cattle.5 As
was to be the pattern for the restoration period the army was
always the first to suffer, mainly because it accounted for about
35% of government expenditure, but also because it became pract­
is ed in taking the treatment without complaint. That it received
this treatment is all the more amazing when we consider how few
troops Charles had at his disposal.6 Thus, for example, the money
to fund an emergency reserve was found by making a reduction in
privates' pay for the six months due in September 1664 without
compensation.7 On yet another occasion £1500 was frittered away.

1. Ormonde Ms, vol iii, pp 147-8, Anglesey to Ormond, 22 Feb 1664.
2. Morrice, op cit., vol i, pp 151-55, Orrery to Ormond, 21
Jan 1664.
4. TCL Ms 333; fol 128, Anglesey's Accounts, 29 Mar 1665; Carte
Ms 54; fol 206-07, Ossory to Ormond, 26 Apr 1665.
5. Carte Ms 11; fol 207, Ossory to Ormond, 26 Apr 1665.
7. Carte Ms 154; p 38, Ormond to Bellingham, 26 Sept 1664.
on new liverys for the trumpeters and drummers. As the financial crisis of 1665-67 grew closer such wasteful expenditure had to be cut, yet the government continued to straiten the army upon which its survival depended.

Ormond's financial administration from 1662-65 can only be viewed as a holding operation. The preparations laid for a firm and thriving economy were quickly dashed by a Dutch war and English legislation over which the Irish government had no control. The Irish army was reduced but the savings were frittered away on special grants. More importantly, though, the political uncertainty over the bill of explanation translated itself into uncertainty in rents, land values and the economy, thereby only heightening the economic weaknesses under which the country still buckled. Added to this was the prohibitive English legislation which made recovery harder and precipitated Ireland towards a financial crisis in 1665-67 with which it was ill-equipped to cope.

(2) — The Irish Economy 1662-65 and the Introduction of Farming

The performance of the Irish economy and the decision to farm several branches of the revenue is integral to our understanding of the problem facing Ormond and his government in 1662-65. As ever external factors were to play a vital role, for the strength of Ireland's revenue depended on its overseas trade, for the value of the customs and excise affected other sectors of the economy because of the species that branch brought in and made the difference between solvent and insolvent government.

1. Carte MS 1/55 p 17, Ormond to Anglesey, 29 July 1664.
2. Carte MS 1/59 pp 113-4, Ormond to Clarendon, 3 Apr 1665.

(85)
What is most striking in looking at the revenue yield from 1662-65 is that, although the addition of the hearthtax and inland excise to the hereditary revenue improved the total yield from the ordinary revenue, none of the branches showed any signs of growth - the mid-1660s were years less of recovery, but more of stagnation. For example, the neat produce of the customs was £51,535 in the financial year 1660-61, and reached only £55,000 in the years 1663-64 and 1664-65. Overall, quitrents proved more enigmatic peaking at £48,479 in the year 1661-62, then dropping to £32,948 in 1662-63 and £19,261 in 1663-64. The recovery to £38,489 in 1664-65 was followed by a collapse of this branch over the next four years following the cattle prohibitions and Dutch war. The hearthtax proved a disappointment, but its yield increased from £7,857 in 1664-65 to £11,637 in the following year. The other new branch, the inland excise, quickly yielded high returns too, rising from £33,053 in 1664-65 until it fell away slightly in 1666-67.

Overall, therefore, from 1662-65 the total ordinary revenue grew from £92,000 pa and £96,000 pa in 1662-63 and 1663-64 respectively to £154,174 in 1664-65. This, it must be emphasised, in no way reflected the well-being of the economy, but mirrored the increased resources which the Irish parliament had made available to the government. Extraordinary additions to the revenue peaked at £136,443 and £190,374 in the years 1662-63 and 1663-64 respectively.

the vast majority of this being English subventions—£104,000
in 1662-63 and £55,880 in 1663-64. Irish subsidies, augmented
by the half year's value, only became available in any size in
the year 1663-64, too late to alleviate the crisis Ormond found
at Christmas 1662, hence the pressing need for a further English
subvention. In total yield the Irish revenue from 1662-65
ranged from £228,461 in 1662-63, £286,465 in 1663-64 and £195,354
in 1664-65.\textsuperscript{1} This was more than ample to cover an establishment
set at £187,000.\textsuperscript{2} Why then, it must be asked, was the Irish
government in increasingly difficult financial straits, given
that even in a stagnating economy extraordinary sources of
income made up the deficits from the hereditary branches?

Two immediate explanations spring to mind which contributed to
the government's problems. Firstly, there was the addition of
the regiment of guards to the annual charge at £23,000 pa which
could not be paid out of the establishment until 1 April 1664.\textsuperscript{3}

Secondly, there was the vast overpayment of concordatums and
special warrants in these years which frittered away the English
subventions.\textsuperscript{4} To these must be added Ireland's growing national
debt of £220,000 and the heavy cost of implementing retrench-
ments, because the cashiering of troops was expensive.\textsuperscript{5} A brief
look at Gorges's account of Ireland's arrears indicates the
inability of the Irish economy to pay both its rents and the
subsidies demanded from it by parliament: a mounting arrear of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1} Carte No 52: Col 695-707, Receipts & Disbursements, 1660-71.
\item \textsuperscript{2} Carte No 52: Col 275, Civil & Military Lists, April 1662.
\item \textsuperscript{3} CORI, 1662-63; pp 257-8, Ormond to Bonst, 22 Oct 1663.
\item \textsuperscript{4} Carte No 52: Col 695-707, Receipts & Disbursements, 1660-71.
\item \textsuperscript{5} CORI, 1662-63; p 637, State of the Revenue, 29 Nov 1662.
\end{itemize}
payment was inevitable. In a financial system where the revenue tended to be heavily anticipated any delay was disastrous. In the year ending 20 March 1663 the total revenue of £228,631, mostly made up of an English subvention (£104,000), cleared few debts but largely met the establishment. In the year ending 20 March 1664 the Irish exchequer achieved its total of £286,314 by borrowing from the half year's value, subsidies and an English subvention. This enabled the exchequer to keep a balance of £59,573 going into the financial year 1664-65, but much of this was swallowed up by repayments from the borrowed half year's value of £45,730 and £14,343 worth of payments directed by act of parliament out of the hearthmoney. Hence, Ossory was short £24,600 to pay the army at lady day 1665. The government had relied very heavily on the half year's value as a fund for borrowing, taking £46,000 between 1662 and 1665 and a further £3,500 in 1665-66, all of which was repaid fairly promptly.

The new lord lieutenant had occupied himself, as we have seen, chiefly with the revenue after his arrival in Dublin. The state of the revenue he uncovered demanded an English subvention if he was to meet both current deficits and long-standing debts. Efforts were made to end payments by assignments and salaried commissioners of the excise were appointed to boost that branch.

5. Carte Ms 74: fol 206, Orery to Ormond, 26 Apr 1665.
8. TCB Ms 200: pp 733-4, Proclamation, 15 Aug 1662; Carte Ms 12: fol 5, King to Ormond, 3 Oct 1662.
Ormond had retrenched the army, put a temporary stop on all grants and made efforts to quicken those in arrears of rent.¹ None of these measures, however, seem to have had any significant effects.

Elsewhere Irish trade was threatened by English parliamentary chauvinism. The navigation acts of 1662 seriously threatened the Irish plantation trade, but a weighty intervention by Ormond, backed by the Irish committee for trade, had the worst clauses affecting Ireland amended.² Ireland, however, had been expecting to increase its trading concerns considerably.³ The main market for its largely agricultural goods was England.⁴ In terms of revenue for the exchequer, it must be said, based on the figures for the year ending 25 December 1664, exports only accounted for 31.6% of the gross customs returns and imports 68.4%.⁵ The failure to find a market for these goods would therefore depress customs returns, but its main effect would be found in the payment of subsidies and rents when farmers failed to sell their goods. Herein lay the real danger of the proposed cattle prohibition of 1665.⁶ The lord lieutenant concentrated on the impact it would have on the customs returns, which it certainly depressed, but its real effect was on the amount of specie and internal trade that these markets brought to Ireland, for the customs

1. CSP, 1663-5: pp 12-13; Ormond to Bennet, 21 Jan 1663; Carte Ms 32: fol 288, Order by Ormond, 7 Feb 1663; CSP, 1663-5: pp 57-8, Proclamation, 13 Apr 1663.
2. Carte Ms 121: p 11, Ormond to Clarendon, 1 Sept 1662.
6. Carte Ms 121: fol 175, Ormond to Clarendon, 30 Apr 1663; Carte Ms 142: pp 113-4, Ormond to Clarendon, 3 Apr 1663.
revenue and especially the cattle trade were the motor that drove the Irish economy. Moreover, at a time when the Irish government seemed particularly vulnerable to internal attack, any legislation which diminished the revenue yield must have been as unwelcome to Charles as it was to Ormond. The number of MPs supporting a ban on the importation of live cattle from Ireland from July to December each year, when the animals were at their best, was large, for they were persuaded that Irish cattle had depressed their rents. Anglesey arrived in Whitehall in July 1663 to deliver a remonstrance against the bill, but Ormond's hopes that this would persuade Charles to withhold the royal assent was over-sanguine and displayed ignorance of Charles's need to placate his parliament and to secure further supplies from it. It is difficult to gauge the effects of this act, followed as it was by a permanent prohibition and the Dutch wars which badly affected Ireland's trade. What is clear, however, is that the customs returns certainly failed to blossom in 1664 and that crown rents, quitrents and subsidy payments fell further into arrears. More important for Ireland was that this cattle ban began the fatal shift towards dependence on European markets which was to prove to be the economy's undoing after 1683. Arrears in subsidy payments, quitrents and Ormond's

1. CSPS, 1663-7, p 124, Ormond to Bennet, 10 June 1663.
2. Ormonde MS, vol iii, p 53, Coventry to Ormond, 20 June 1663; Bagwell, op cit., vol iii, pp 69-70.
3. Carte Ms 52:fol 734, Berkeley to Ormond, 23 July 1663; Ormonde MS, vol iii, pp 66-7, Ormond to Anglesey, 1 Aug 1663; Bagwell, op cit., vol iii, pp 69-71; Chandaman, op cit., pp 204-5.
£30,000 in 1663 are also suggested by the fact that proclamations were issued to hasten their payment in the spring of 1663.1

By the end of 1663 the government opted for two expedients to try to ease its financial difficulties, but continued a policy of non-interference in the economy. Firstly, it produced a new establishment which included the regiment of guards.2 Secondly, as we shall see below, it took steps to improve the revenue yield by introducing farming instead of direct management.3 The relative financial calm of the year ending March 1665 was deceptive. Aided by an English subvention the revenue yield for 1663-64 had reached £286,465, helping the government to meet current payments, the cost of army retrenchments and some debts.4 The following year, mainly due to a collapse in the subsidy and the lack of supplies from England, this total fell to £195,354 which was insufficient to meet the government’s costs and debts.5 The crisis, however, was only realised when the government found it had insufficient funds to pay the military and civil lists its six months in April 1665.6

There were several reasons for the uncertainty and failings of the revenue. The king was intent upon war with the Dutch and this undoubtedly had its effect on trade even before hostilities

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1. *Carte Ms* 144:p 24, Ormond to High Sheriff of Tipperary, 11 May 1663; *Carte Ms* 144:p 25, Ormond to Orrery, 11 May 1663; CSPI, 1663-5:p 57, Proclamation, 10 Apr 1663.
2. CSPI, 1665-7:p 97, Ormond to Bennet, 22 Oct 1663.
broke out. Secondly, uncertainty over the bill of explanation created irresoluteness amongst Irish landlords and tenants, caused rents to fall or people to hold on to them in case they were dispossessed. Thirdly, the temporary cattle ban not only undermined the cattle markets, but must have severely weakened the Irish merchants' confidence. The Irish council of trade propounded a plausible theory of free trade and Petty, the economist, the insignificant effect of Irish cattle imports into England on the English economy. Neither these protests, nor Anglesey's remonstrance, nor Ormond's pleading arrested the surge towards mercantalist protectionism fired by an anti-Irish rhetoric. The Irish government made strenuous efforts to head off moves to make the cattle ban more stringent and permanent, but these efforts were a failure in spite of royal support for the Irish cause. Elsewhere Irish merchants were being excluded from the Canaries trade in the summer of 1665. All this must have seriously undermined confidence in the Irish economy and, whether or not it was merely jitters prior to the disastrous trade recession caused by the Dutch war, or an actual failure by Irish cattle merchants to find alternative markets for their goods, there was a definite downturn in Ireland's economy in the months leading up to the war. Although new rents and

5. See next chapter. Carte Ms 33: fol 677, Ossory & Council to Ormond, 9 Nov 1664; Carte Ms 34: fol 442, Conway to Ormond, 19 Oct 1665.
6. CSP, 1663-5: p 626, Dublin Merchants to Ossory, 17 Aug 1665; Bagwell, op cit., vol iii, pp 70-1.
quitre"nts did not plummet until the next financial year, the
evidence from Ormond's own estates point to a contraction in the
economy, where his rents for the year 1664-65 were £3,000 in
arrear in April 1665. By March 1665 the Irish government
realised it could not survive without further English subventions
or fresh subsidies.

Thus, we can see that the major factors that stagnated and
undermined the Irish economy were beyond the Irish government's
control, such as the royal decision to go to war with the Dutch,
which deepened Ireland's financial crisis from 1665 onwards
(see next chapter) and the English parliamentary decision to ban
Irish cattle imports. For its part the Irish government made
considerable reductions in its expenditure, though failing to
control extraordinary payments sufficiently. The Irish govern-
ment was unable to counteract the effects of royal policy and
English parliamentary legislation, but it did make a determined
effort in these years to increase the efficiency of its revenue
collection, by turning away from government management towards
the farming method which had been so roundly condemned by the
convention in 1660. In an administrative structure where there
was no professional civil service network farming was a viable
alternative, as the undertakers set up their own framework with
securities and penalties that ensured the effective and trust-
worthy co-operation of their employees. This was a major shift

1. Carte Ms 52: fol 695-707, Receipts & Disbursements, 1660-71;
   Carte Ms 33: fol 351, Setting of Ormond's Estate Rents,
   25 Mar 1664; Carte Ms 34: fol 318, Ormond's Rentals, 1665.
2. Carte Ms 34: fol 73, Lenville to Ormond, rec'd Mar 1665;
   Carte Ms 34: fol 206, Cassory to Ormond, 26 Apr 1665; Carte Ms 34:
   fol 232, Cassory to Ormond, 9 June, 1665.

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in policy which the government adopted in response to the worsening financial situation.

In the summer of 1663 Sir Peter Harvey, an Irish MP and merchant, headed a group which made a bid of £47,000 pa for the customs, which they upped to £49,000 pa.\(^1\) Sir Martin Noell, one of Harvey’s partners, then offered £50,000 pa, but after some negotiation Harvey and Noell agreed jointly on this figure.\(^2\) Dodson and Morris, the customs commissioners, warned that it was a wild overbid, but when the Harvey/Noell bid was transmitted to London Dodson and Morris took the opportunity to offer the crown £53,000 pa.\(^2\) The king thereupon recommended acceptance of the Dodson/Morris proposal, in spite of the fact that in the summer they had sworn it was not even worth £47,000 pa.\(^4\) Anglesey thought it would be a good bargain but Ormond distrusted the secrecy surrounding their offer, especially as there was evidence of collusion with the English customs farmers.\(^5\)

Ormond was ordered to make the final judgement between the Dodson/Morris and Harvey bids, giving it to Dodson/Morris unless a more substantial offer was forthcoming.\(^6\) Ormond deeply distrusted Dodson/Morris and some of the clauses they offered were very ambiguous.\(^7\) In consequence he opted for a strict inquiry into the efficacy both of farming over management, and the Dodson/Morris

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2. CSPI, 1663-5: p 179, Ormond to Bennet, 17 July 1663.
5. Ormonde NS, vol iii, p 69, Anglesey to Ormond, 8 Aug 1663; Ormonde NS, vol iii, p 73, Anglesey to Ormond, 15 Aug 1663; Ormonde NS, vol iii, pp 73-4, Ormond to Anglesey, 15 Aug 1663; PRO P22/56: fol 261, 14 Aug 1663.
7. Ormonde NS, vol iii, pp 84-5, Ormond to Anglesey, 9 Sept 1663;
bid compared with Harvey's.¹

Meanwhile, in London Morris pressed for a more positive letter of recommendation for his bid and a letter to ratify his proposed covenants, which was transmitted to Dublin and used to pressurize the viceroy.² Arguments over clauses and a possible advance continued long enough for Harvey to offer £256,000 pa and to impugn Dodson's covenants, proving that he intended to bury £20,000, due from the current excise at sale, in the proposed farm, which Harvey promised to return to the crown.³

Dodson and Morris could not deny these imputations and instead backed the customs commissioners report which was produced and clearly stated that management was preferable to farming.⁴ The customs commissioners, among whom numbered Dodson and Morris, claimed that if they were vested with powers similar to the farmers they could do a better job.⁵ Harvey easily showed how inefficient this method was, for in the past two years net receipts had been £31,698 and £36,640 from gross receipts of £50,112 and £57,500 respectively.⁶ The Irish government thus rejected the commissioners report, opting for a farm.⁷

Inspite of further wrangles the customs were at last set to Harvey

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¹ Ormonde NS, vol iii, p 88, Anglesey to Ormond, 28 Sept 1663.
³ CSPI, 1663-5: pp 259-61, Customs Commissioners to Ormond, 22 Oct 1663; CSPI, 1663-5: p 264, Ormond to Bennet, 11 Nov 1663.
⁴ Ormonde NS, vol iii, p 100, Ormond to Anglesey, 2 Nov 1663; CSPI, 1663-5: pp 283-8, Ormond to Bennet, 11 Nov 1663.
for six years at £255,000 pa in December 1663, supported by Anglesey who received assurances that monthly payments of the Dublin customs duties would be made to the exchequer to cover contingencies.¹ Noell and the two Bences (Sir Alexander and John) entered security for the farm's performance at £110,000. Ale licences and the inland excise had been set to farm for 15 months (at a rate equivalent to £27,000 pa) from 25 December 1663 onwards with the option to renew it.² In August 1663 Anglesey was instructed to let the inland excise and ale licences as they now stood by the acts of parliament, at £36,000 pa for six years to take effect from the conclusion of the present one.³ Harvey made a bid, which, in recognition of his industry in the customs farm, the king recommended.⁴ However, a bid from Orrery and Kingston of £33,000 pa clearly had precedence, and their agents, Gorges and Muschamp, had already sub-let it.⁵ Harvey, Noell and Bence offered £36,000 pa, and although Drogheda matched this figure, Harvey's group was given preference.⁶ Before the deal could be concluded a group of Dublin brewers, headed by Alderman Thomas Waterhouse, and supported by Ossory, offered £39,000 pa, which Bence and Harvey were obliged to match before finally gaining the farm for 6 years from 25 March 1665.⁷ The clauses they

¹. CSPI, 1663-5: p 300, Ormond to Bennet, 25 Nov 1663; Carte Ms 46: fol 118-9, Bennet to Ormond, 20 Nov 1663; Ormonde NS, vol iii, p 104, Anglesey to Ormond, 17 Nov 1663; CSPI, 1663-5: p 307, King to Ormond, 5 Dec 1663; Ormonde NS, vol iii, pp 144-5, Anglesey to Ormond, 9 Feb 1664; PRO PC2/57: fol 14 & 32, 19 Feb & 6 Apr 1664.
³. Ormonde NS, vol iii, pp 76-7, Anglesey to Ormond, 22 Aug 1663.
⁴. CSPI, 1663-5: p 320, Harvey to King, 22 Dec 1663.
⁵. CSPI, 1663-5: pp 401-2, Memo by Ormond, 11 May 1663; Carte Ms 32: fol 372, Gorges et al to Barry, 7 Apr 1663.
⁶. Carte Ms 33: fol 453, Drogheda to Ormond, 17 June 1664; Orrery & Kingston resigned their rights to the farm - Carte Ms 46: fol 195, Bennet to Ormond, 13 May 1664.
⁷. Carte Ms 145: pp 17-18, Ormond to Ossory, 23 July 1664; Carte Ms 33: fol 530, Ossory to Ormond, 12 Aug 1664; Nat Lib
accepted were modelled on the London ones and they appear to have sub-let the excise by counties, as Orrery and Kingston had done, although the precise details of their method are lost.  

Attempts to farm the new hearth tax have an even murkier history. In June 1663 Kingston came up with a plan to farm the hearth tax at £24,000 pa for ten years and £30,000 pa for a subsequent eleven years and Inchiquin and Carlingford were co-opted.  

It was an attractive offer for the government in the short-term as the hearth tax was only reckoned to be worth a maximum of £20,000 pa, but in the longer term the contractors could hope to improve the yield vastly and make a profit. Although they received a letter of recommendation from the king it was ordered that the farm would not be set for longer than seven years. By January 1664 lords Clancarty and FitzHarding were making tentative bids for the branch.

It soon became clear, though, that without an amended hearth tax act no one could farm it at so high a rate as was proposed, yet it was evident that without farming it the yield would remain poor. Increased bids for the hearth tax farm, it would appear, were dependent on the proposed amendments to the hearth tax act being accepted by parliament. Sir Peter Pett and Joseph Deane matched Kingston's, Carlingford's and Inchiquin's bid of

1. Carte Ms 8044: no folios, Excise Farm.
2. CSPI, 1663-5: p 134, Kingston to Bennet, 17 June 1664.
4. CSPI, 1663-5: p 144-5, Anglesey to Ormond, 9 Feb 1664.
5. CSPI, 1663-5: p 145, Kingston et al to King, 21 Aug 1663.
7. CARTe Ms 32: fol 372, Gorges et al to Barry, 7 Apr 1663;
8. Ormonde NS, vol iii, p 142, Ormond to Anglesey, 27 Jan 1664;
£30,000 pa, which for both groups depended upon the success of amendments. 1 When parliament hamstrung these amendments it ensured that the hearth tax took many years to reach the value of £30,000 pa, and, as we shall see, the government had to allow the farmers to give up their farm, having failed for its part to deliver the parliamentary amendments which would have made the farm viable. The organisation of this farm followed the English pattern, being set by counties and baronies. 2

Finally, it is worth noting that aqua vitae licences were farmed at £4,000 pa for seven years from May 1665 to Clifford, Carlingford, and Sir Chichester Wray, but this was more by way of a reward to them than a financial measure. 3

In the context of a stagnating and hesitant economy, farming had held out the promise of efficiency and certainty. The Dutch war and English legislation undermined these hopes, plunging the country into a deep depression. For the government, the situation was worsened by the uncertainty over how much the revenue would be diminished when the farmers claims for defalcations, to which they were clearly entitled by their covenants, were settled. 4

As to the farmers, their gain on these farms was two-fold; firstly, in profits, and secondly, in handling large sums of money with which they could finance their mercantile pursuits. Unfortunately, no evidence of this farm's profits or the farmers' motivation

The years 1662-65 saw the Irish government and the Irish economy being sucked into an economic crisis over which it had little control. To its credit, though, the Irish government had at least placed the revenue on a settled footing by farming its chief branches, which, given the administration's limited control and vision in this matter, was doubtless to its financial advantage. However, the political crisis, which sharpened and intensified these difficulties and created so much uncertainty, might have been dealt with more resolutely. The future of the land settlement cast a heavy shadow across the political and economic scene and this had the effect of making the 1665-67 financial crisis more severe and far-reaching than the war and English legislation had made inevitable.
Chapter IV

THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, 1665-67
When the Dutch war began in 1665 the faltering improvements in the Irish economy were seriously threatened. The consequent disruption of trade and the menace of Dutch privateers on Irish coasts soon caused a downturn in trade and customs receipts. The administration had been able to cope with its financial difficulties only with the aid of large subventions from England, which had been necessary until the Irish parliament was able to grant the government sufficient income to pay the establishment, and until subsidies had been granted to clear arrears accumulated since the restoration. From 1665 onwards, therefore, the English government and its parliament expected Ireland to pay its own way, believing that its finances were now on a sound footing. Certainly it neither expected to be asked for, nor really could spare in time of war, the money to pay further subventions.

Nonetheless, in September 1665 Anglesey gave notice of the crisis threatening the Irish government:

"His majesty hath a great people here, but 'tis a nation of poor. I much apprehend that if the act prohibiting the transport of cattle, and the war with Holland continue another year, here will be desolation and no possibility to maintain the army, there being no such thing as money and trade." 

In these words Anglesey signalled the two great problems with which the Irish administration was to be faced in 1666 and 1667 against the backdrop of an economic crisis; but the difficulties ran deeper. English ministers were now so pre-occupied with the war that the latest bill for subsidies and other Irish revenue bills had not been returned as promised, thereby causing a

further prorogation of the Irish parliament. Even if that parliament had been able to pass the money bills, Ormond doubted that the country would be able to pay the subsidies because of its poverty. The just defalcations claimed by the customs farmers jeopardized the army's payment which could lead to unrest and mutiny. To prevent such a crisis he appealed to the king to take one of two courses, either to repeal all English acts of parliament which obstructed Irish trade (especially to England and English plantations) or, more realistically but equally unpopular, to pay a new subvention of £30,000 per annum to Ireland.

The Irish government's only practical effort was confined to a stop of all payments not included on the Establishment in November 1665 until further notice. For the present Ormond was content that the English privy council should be considering Irish affairs and was even confident that Sir Richard Temple's bill to prohibit the importation of Irish cattle would serve to highlight, not increase, Ireland's problems. In fact, Ormond was more concerned with pushing the bill of explanation through the Irish parliament and one for eight subsidies of £15,000 each. The subsidies bill met with no opposition as this parliament was fully aware of the financial straits Ireland was in, and willing to vote the maximum it could afford in time of war. The bill of

6. CSPI, 1663-5:p 700, Domville to Arlington, 29 Dec 1665.
explanation met fierce opposition, however, led by the younger members and especially Richard Jones (later Earl of Ranelagh). On the crucial vote Orrery used his influence over the Munster MPs and the nays were defeated by 19 votes, enabling the bill to be passed almost unanimously just before Christmas 1665 once the opposition saw it was beaten.¹

Thus Ormond achieved what he considered to be his chief task, the steering of the land settlement through the Irish parliament with the maximum possible acceptance for it. Beyond this task he understood his chief purpose as lord lieutenant to be the suppression of Tories and maintenance of a loyal, quiescent army.² His view of his financial responsibilities was limited to petitioning the king on revenue matters, and only becoming involved in finance where the army's pay and therefore its discipline was concerned. Otherwise, he left financial matters solely in Anglesey's hands, and pursued a non-interventionist policy.

The viceroy was shaken out of his easy complacency by the news from Arlington that a total prohibition of Irish cattle seemed likely and that there was no chance of repealing any bills that obstructed Irish trade.³ Arlington's advice (to which Ormond and his privy council were only able to devote themselves after passing the act of explanation) was to ask for compensation from the English treasury.⁴ The Irish subsidies were likely

to do little more than make up for the falling receipts in the ordinary revenue occasioned by the war.

An investigation into the condition of the army soon revealed a sorry state. The army was so small (7,000 men) and its pay in such arrears that its effectiveness as a fighting force was severely hampered, and, furthermore, it was too thinly spread throughout the country to combat a sizeable invasion or rising. Clearly no English subventions had been required since 1663 because the army had borne the brunt of government retrenchments since 1662 at £82,672 pa. The Dutch war, though, made it necessary to mobilise the army and there was simply no money in the treasury to do this. The severe arrears of army pay could only be supported as long as the soldiers did not have to change quarters and pay off their debts. Furthermore, supplies of ammunition and other stores were urgently needed for the whole army.

The necessities of the Dutch war were wholly blamed for precipitating this crisis and for the moment neatly covered any charges of mismanagement by the Irish treasury. The government took care to demonstrate that previous English subventions had been wisely spent, and that their estimates of the future

2. Carte Ms 34:fol 575, Retrenchments since July 1662, 20 Jan 1666.
3. CSPI, 1666-9:p 12, Ormond to Arlington, 20 Jan 1666; Carte Ms 34: fol 572, Ormond to Arlington, 20 Jan 1666; Carte Ms 34:fol 547, Barrows to Ormond, 4 Jan 1666; Carte Ms 34:fol 567, Army's Arrears 1661-62, 20 Jan 1666.
4. CSPI, 1666-9:p 9, Ormond to Arlington, 17 Jan 1666; Carte Ms 34:fol 569, Ammunition needed for Ireland, 20 Jan 1666.
prosperity of the Irish economy had been upset by events beyond their control, such as plague, the restraint on the Irish cattle trade of 1664, shortages of coin, and hostilities with the Dutch; all of which had damaged Irish trade and prosperity.¹ So long as the war continued, it was represented, expenditure would outweigh the revenue by about £35,000 pa, but a panacea was possible in the form of an immediate subvention of £100,000 from England. This, together with the parliament's grant of eight subsidies over the next four years (£30,000 pa), it was promised, would enable the Irish government to compound for all arrears, to pay the civil and martial lists and keep them in sound condition for the future.²

Maximum pressure was to be put on the king to accept this appeal for funds, but £100,000 was far more than Ormond realistically hoped for at a time of war.³ Accordingly, he offered Arlington the alternative of either £100,000 now or £30,000 pa for the war's duration.⁴ The viceroy transmitted further papers as evidence of Ireland's insolvency and Charles appeared moved and promised to try to send a subvention which would "in a few years amount to the sum of money you desire."⁵ By the end of February 1666 Clarendon was able to promise £30 - 40,000 for Ireland some time

2. Carte Ms 34:fol 571-4, Ormond to Arlington, 20 Jan 1666;
   Carte Ms 34:fol 581, Account of Military List, 20 Jan 1666;
   Carte Ms 34:fol 583, Revenue Receipts to 20 Mar 1665, 20 Jan 1666.
3. CSP, 1666-2:p 21, Anglesey to King, 28 Jan 1666.
that year, and Sir William Coventry undertook to supply the defects in Ireland's ammunition promptly.\textsuperscript{1}

Whilst Ormond complacently waited for his friends in Whitehall to secure the expected English handout the situation in Ireland was worsening. Trade was so crippled that the customs and excise receipts fell to the lowest level recorded in the restoration period at £40,615 and in consequence the constant revenue in that year yielded only £125,016, which was the least amount the king's hereditary revenue voted to him by the restoration Irish parliament ever produced.\textsuperscript{2} The customs returns' steady fall in 1665 and 1666, exacerbated by the opening of hostilities with the French in February 1666, augured ill for the rest of the economy. If trade collapsed little specie would circulate, the economy would stagnate and, as indeed happened, in consequence the revenue from rents would collapse and the subsidies become harder to collect.

Throughout March the situation worsened with pillaging on the increase and the army verging on mutiny.\textsuperscript{3} Orrery pleaded with Arlington for a subvention to pay the army.\textsuperscript{4} Nearly two months after his initial request - on 21 March 1666 - Ormond requested that the subvention be placed "on a certain fund".\textsuperscript{5} However, two months of inertia on the lord lieutenant's part had bred

\begin{itemize}
\item[1.] Carte Ms 46:fol 262, Arlington to Ormond, 27 Feb 1666.
\item[2.] Carte Ms 52:fol 695-6, Receipts and Payments, 1660-71.
\item[3.] CSPI, 1666-9:p 56, Anglesey to Arlington, 17 Mar 1666.
\item[4.] CSPI, 1666-9:p 51, Orrery to Arlington, 2 Mar 1666.
\item[5.] CSPI, 1666-9:p 58, Ormond to Arlington, 21 Mar 1666.
\end{itemize}
complacency in the viceroy's allies. Neither Arlington nor Clarendon had yet spoken to Southampton about a subvention and Arlington was more concerned with Ormond putting his case diplomatically, not urgently. The lord treasurer made it clear that fitting out the fleet was now his chief concern. Ormond was offered some worthless prize ships at Duncannon in place of an English subvention, and told that Irish parliamentary subsidies would have to suffice to cover Ireland's present difficulties.

Whilst the Irish parliament had responded patriotically and had voted four additional subsidies of £15,000 each, Ormond reminded the treasurer that this money could not be collected at once, and money from England was still required to prepare the army for the field. Arlington and Clarendon soon gained Charles's support on this, especially after Anglesey produced his alarming state of the revenue at Easter 1666. The army was 13 months in arrear since 1660 and the Irish treasury £35,884 short to pay the army at two thirds normal rates its six months then due. The regiment of guards (six months in arrear), and the only truly dependable force in Ireland, verged on mutiny once rumours broke that the treasury would not be able to meet their current pay. In sheer desperation Ormond asked for £15,000 without delay.

5. Carte Ms 46:fol 284, Arlington to Ormond, 10 Apr 1666.
6. AD Ms 37207:fol 25, Ormond to Orrery, 10 Mar 1666; CSPI, 1666-9: pp 89-90, Anglesey's State of Revenue, 15 Apr 1666.
8. CSPI, 1666-9: p 91, Ormond to Arlington, 18 Apr 1666; AD Ms 37207:fol 25, Ormond to Orrery, 10 Mar 1666.
The report about the condition of the regiment of guards, coupled with the reduced request for £15,000 coincided with intelligence in Whitehall of an intended French invasion of Ireland. The king immediately ordered the preparation of £15,000 for Ireland, which was now available through the release of a fund which had been paying England's ally, the Bishop of Munster: in 1665 he had made a separate peace with the Dutch.\footnote{Carte Ms 292, Arlington to Ormond, 1 May 1666.}

The funds available to Ormond had diminished further because the St John of Dieppe made only £6,500 and a prize ship, said to be worth £10,000, had been ordered to England.\footnote{CSPI, 1666-9:pp 102-3, Ormond to Arlington, 4 May 1666.} The English subvention, being supplied by Sir Robert Vyner, the financier, was now severely delayed due to long argument over whether the Irish treasury or the English one would pay the interest on it and over his claim to 6% exchange.\footnote{CSPI, 1666-9:pp 102-3, Ormond to Arlington, 4 May 1666; Carte Ms 34:fol 685, Carteret to Ormond, 8 May 1666; Carte Ms 34:fol 704, Carteret to Ormond, 29 May 1666; Carte Ms 34:fol 704, Carteret to Ormond, 15 May 1666; Carte Ms 46:fol 298, Arlington to Ormond, 15 May 1666.} Ormond was outraged, but there was no alternative to Vyner and, although Charles said the English treasury would foot the bill for exchange and interest, only £13,000 was finally paid in May 1666.\footnote{CSPI, 1666-9:pp 108-9, Ormond to Clarendon, 16 May 1666; CSPI, 1666-9:pp 112-3, Ormond to Arlington, 22 May 1666.} Following these prolonged delays, and fearful of a French invasion, and the condition of the regiment of guards, Ormond requested a further £15,000 from Clarendon.\footnote{CSPI, 1666-9:pp 108-9, Ormond to Clarendon, 16 May 1666; CSPI, 1666-9:pp 112-13, Ormond to Arlington, 22 May 1666.} The king was again prodding his ministers into action when the sudden and alarming news of a mutiny at Carrickfergus at the end of May 1666 reached Whitehall. Ormond's worst
fears and prognostications seemed to have reached fruition, although it was hoped that his firm action and punishments would discourage any similar outbreaks.¹

The lord lieutenant was quick to turn a potentially disastrous event to his advantage, for he was well aware that if it seemed he was incapable of commanding or disciplining his army effectively it would lead to his dismissal. He washed his hands of direct responsibility for the mishap at Carrickfergus and found his officers and provincial commanders just as keen to blame the breakdown in discipline solely on arrears of pay, in case the like happened with their troops.² Ormond reiterated his appeal for a further £15,000 to avoid a similar event in the future.³ To usher on this business he sent over Sir James Shaen, as his special agent to represent the government's case, with a letter of recommendation to the king.⁴ As it happened, Shaen's agency was unnecessary for on 19 June Clarendon prevailed on the king to order a further £15,000 for Ireland from the city of London's £100,000 loan.⁵ Shaen stayed on at court, unsuccessfully trying to raise the subvention to £25,000 from the same source.⁶ Vyner also supplied this further £15,000, once

². CSPI, 1666-9:p 123, Ormond to Arlington, 30 May 1666; AD Ms 37207:fol 55, Orrery to Ormond, 2 June 1666.
³. CSPI, 1666-9:p 126, Ormond to Arlington, 6 June 1666.
⁴. CSPI, 1666-9:p 129, Ormond to King, 9 June 1666.
⁶. Carte Ms 46:fol 331, Arlington to Ormond, 10 July 1666; Carte Ms 34:fol 787, Shaen to Ormond, 30 June 1666.
more making deductions for interest and exchange. However, strenuous efforts by Arlington and Clarendon eventually procured the whole £30,000 which was transmitted in 1666 in October, with the English treasury paying for the exchange and interest.¹

Over eight months after Ormond had requested £30,000 pa, or a lump sum of £100,000, and over eleven months since Arlington had positively advised this course, the Irish government had received a subvention from England, but by the autumn of 1666 the problems facing the Irish administration were far greater than those of a year before when the original estimates of the country's necessities had been made. Much of the blame for the delay in the subvention must lie at Ormond's door, for his appeals had lacked urgency and he had complacently depended on his clarendonian allies putting Ireland's financial plight to a monarch who himself lacked adequate funds. Before leaving for England in order to oppose the cattle bills, Anglesey had drawn up an overly optimistic estimate of the revenue which implied that the martial and civil lists could both be fully paid and there would still remain £15,250, which could be kept as a reserve.² It was a poor estimate and Bellingham could not find the funds to meet the army's pay due at Michaelmas 1666.³ Ormond realised that Anglesey's estimate would misrepresent Ireland's wealth and case to the king and parliament. For the sake of the security of his own tenure of office, he asked Anglesey to revise his estimates and present them to the king, otherwise it would seem that the Irish administration was not insolvent, but mismanaged.⁴ The war was causing an increasing decay of trade,

² Carte Ms 52:fol 95, Anglesey's State of the Revenue, 31 Aug 1666.
³ Carte Ms 51:fol 6, Ormond to Anglesey, 2 Oct 1666.
⁴ Carte Ms 51:fol 8, Ormond to Anglesey, 12 Oct 1666.
the treasury was empty, the army mutinous and the country troubled. Against this background of crisis the very real possibility existed that the English parliament would totally prohibit the exportation of Irish cattle into England this session, which would have grave consequences for the now struggling Irish economy and a doubtless disastrous effect on the government's revenue.

The work of Cullen and Woodward has clearly shown that the effects of the cattle ban of 1667 were not so disasterous as contemporaries feared, and that Ireland soon compensated for this loss by turning to commodity goods in her exports and reorienting her livestock trade around European markets. The Irish cattle trade with England had grown in a stagnant European economy because it was one of the few countries with a livestock surplus, and England, especially London, provided a growing market for this type of goods. The prohibition of Irish cattle imports into England coincided, by a series of fortuitous accidents, such as European war and European livestock disease, with a shortage of livestock in Europe, particularly in France, which enabled Ireland to switch its cattle trade from England to Europe. This was possible as long as the king was not involved in European wars, when Irish trade, growing increasingly dependent on European markets, was particularly adversely affected because Irish merchants were excluded from even attempting to unload their livestock surplus on the British market. The cattle acts,

therefore, made Ireland's export trade and a large sector of her economy peculiarly vulnerable to the effects of a war.

In 1666, with the Irish government struggling to find funds to finance itself and with customs receipts collapsing, the English parliament's threat to the cattle trade seemed likely to destroy not only the most important source of customs revenue, but also the many farmers who subsisted in Ireland on that trade. The probable repercussions this would have on the rest of the Irish economy were alarming. No one was able to foretell then that Irish merchants were to be enterprising enough to break into the European markets or able to change their trading patterns. Furthermore, Ireland was to be freed from those constraints that prevented her trading with those countries with which the crown was at war (the war ended in 1667 in any case), enabling her to move freely into European markets and leading to a decisive upturn in trade in 1667 and 1668.

The cattle act of 1664 had inhibited Irish trade, but in Ireland it was seen as a temporary aberration, and confidently expected that the king would not allow a permanent act so detrimental to one of his kingdoms to be passed. This explains Ormond's unworried approach in late 1665. He had mooted the idea of lifting the temporary prohibition only to be warned by Arlington, who had consulted with the lord treasurer, attorney and solicitor

1. Ibid., chapter I passim; Woodward, loc cit., passim.
general, and the lord chancellor, that it was more likely that parliament would insist on a total prohibition of Irish cattle.\(^1\) Ormond casually dismissed the threat, but even as he wrote the news was coming over that Sir Richard Temple had just moved such a bill in the commons.\(^2\) Conway, supported by Richard Boyle and Sir William Petty, attempted to mobilise opposition to the bill, through Arlington.\(^3\) The latter persuaded the solicitor-general to speak against it, but it passed easily in the commons.\(^4\) The threat, however, was not to come from this parliamentary session, as it was prorogued, but in the next. Nonetheless, the commons had signalled its intentions.

During the financial crisis of 1666 the threat of a cattle ban was largely forgotten until the king's need for money to finance the war made it certain that parliament would meet in the autumn. Arlington despaired of preventing it and Conway was so sure it would pass that he recommended pursuing the question of compensation from the treasury, although his hopes of £100,000 seemed over sanguine.\(^5\)

A delegation of Irish lords was sent over to oppose the bill, comprising Anglesey, Burlington, Conway and Ossory. The case they presented was based on Ireland's poverty and the awesome

\(^1\) CSPI, 1663-5: p 642, Ormond to Arlington, 18 Sept 1665; Carte Ms 46: fol 209, Arlington to Ormond, 11 Oct 1665.


\(^3\) Carte Ms 34: fol 442, Conway to Ormond, 19 Oct 1665; Carte Ms 34: fol 464, Conway to Ormond, 29 Oct 1665.

\(^4\) Carte, op cit., vol iv, p 243; CSPI, 1663-5: p 652, Arlington to Ormond, 18 Oct 1665; Carte Ms 34: fol 442, Conway to Ormond, 19 Oct 1665.

economic consequences that a cattle ban would bring. They requested that, either by parliament or by act of council, retaliatory measures (not out of malice, but to preserve the economy) should be passed prohibiting English goods and that strictures on the export of sheep products should be removed. Most of all, though, they warned that huge subventions from England would be necessary to alleviate the effects of a cattle ban.

The brave speeches of Heneage Finch and other government supporters were duly swamped in the commons by 57 votes. The opposition to the Irish cattle trade was more determined and vehement than had been expected. The western merchants, bent on the exclusion of Irish cattle, had communicated their jealousy to the majority and frenzied the commons into an anti-Irish and anti-court position. Clearly the only hope of stopping the bill was in the lords, but by October 1666 Ormond had realised that, even though Charles and his chief ministers knew the cattle acts were detrimental to the crown's welfare, he might have to consent to it if he was to secure supplies. As the bill proceeded through the lords Clarendon's clumsy efforts to make friends for Ireland foundered. Conway pressed an audacious plan on Arlington. He asked for no subvention, but a parliament to

5. Carte Ms 35: fol 120, Conway to Ormond, 10 Nov 1666; Carte, op cit., vol iv, pp 262-74; Hyde, op cit., vol iii, pp 146 and 155-63.
prohibit English goods, to make Ireland's ports free and allow Ireland free trade in foreign ports. He also requested liberty of conscience so as to encourage non-conformist manufacturers to settle in Ireland. Arlington would have no truck with the scheme, especially when Conway claimed that the king could depend on 10,000 men from Ireland to implement his policies, fearing that if some of the council got wind of it, they would all be ruined. Conway, therefore, pleaded with Ormond to persuade Clarendon to take up this cause.

Neither Conway nor the Irish government were, therefore, able to put forward a viable or practical alternative to the cattle ban to a monarch dependent on his parliament for supplies. The initiative, therefore, was firmly taken by Clarendon's and Ireland's enemies. The cattle acts were seized upon by the younger members of Charles's council as a means of attacking Clarendon and his associates, and of demonstrating to the king (by putting themselves at the head of the opposition to the Irish cattle trade) that they could control parliament and deliver the supplies he needed. In the lords Buckingham preyed on anti-Irish prejudices and Ashley proposed degrading the Irish nobility and reducing Ireland to the level of a colony in terms of trade.

2. Carte Ms 35:fol 120, Conway to Ormond, 10 Nov 1666.
4. Hyde, op cit., vol iii, pp 136-41 & 129-33. Hyde was certain Buckingham led this movement; Bagwell, op cit., vol iii, pp 74-6.
5. Hyde, op cit., vol iii, p 146, the attacks were highly personalized; Carte Ms 35:fol 109, Brodrick to Ormond, 27 Oct 1666; Carte Ms 35:fol 120, Conway to Ormond, 10 Nov 1666; Carte Ms 35:fol 126, Conway to Ormond, 13 Nov 1666. By backing Buckingham Lauderdale saved Scottish cattle imports to England; for Ashley's motives see Hyde, op cit., vol iii, pp 129-31.
Arlington, seeing which way the wind now blew, threw his weight behind the logic of the opposition's case; they would deliver the supplies, Clarendon could not. His probable advice to the king was that suggested in the following to Ormond:

"Your grace doth very reasonably mind us how much it imports the king's service to mingle in all his councils the consideration of Ireland but till the cattle bill is seen on one side, and the king's succour from the parliament on the other (he wanted £1,800,000) I fear our endeavours and remembrances will be to little purpose." ¹

The lords passed the bill by 63 votes to 17.² Conway still professed that this bill could be turned to Ireland's advantage if English commodities were kept out of Ireland and Irish manufacturing industry encouraged.³ However, he was simultaneously issuing instructions to have his Irish cattle well fattened and sent over in January before the act took effect on 2 February 1667, and a similar panic doubtless gripped all major livestock producers.⁴ Clarendon's failure to halt the passage of the bill portended his downfall, and his impeachment was expected next session. More worrying for Ormond was the rumour that Monmouth might replace him as lord lieutenant, which, though unlikely, demonstrates how closely linked Ormond's fate was seen to be with Clarendon's.⁵ Arlington and Conway now pressed that Orrery

2. Carte Ms 35:fol 148, Conway to Ormond, 27 Nov 1666; Bagwell, _op cit._, vol iii, p 74.
3. Carte Ms 35:fol 148, Conway to Ormond, 27 Nov 1666.
5. Carte Ms 35:fol 148-9, Conway to Ormond, 27 Nov 1666; Ashley was also an unlikely contender, Hyde, _op cit._, vol iii, pp 146 ff.
should be sent over, as no other Irish peer had the skill or influence at court to save the situation for Ireland.¹

The king initially indicated that he would, nonetheless, not consent to the cattle bills if the word 'nuisance' was included as this would leave no loopholes for Irish merchants.² Much to the Irish peers' horror, however, he reneged on his promise, on Arlington's advice, in order to procure his desperately needed supplies.² In Dublin Orrery and Ormond consulted and decided that the viceroy should go to court to support a speedy peace which would put Clarendon in the ascendant and free Charles of the need for parliament and his dependence on Buckingham and Ashley.⁴ Practical considerations, such as the pressing need to find compensation for Ireland for her loss, took precedence over schemes of high politics to turn out Buckingham. The Irish peers once more requested a subvention and retaliatory measures against English products from the king.⁵ In October 1666 Anglesey drew up a state of the revenue to support their arguments showing that Ireland could not meet its expenditure without severe retrenchments and new sources of income.⁶

¹. Carte Ms 35:fol 149, Conway to Ormond, 27 Nov 1666.
². Hyde, op cit., vol iii, p 138; Bagwell, op cit., vol iii, pp 74-5.
³. ibid., vol iii, pp 75-6 - clearly it was Arlington, not Carteret, who persuaded Charles to sign the bill; Carte Ms 49: fol 385, Ormond to Burlington, 23 Jan 1667; Carte Ms 35:fol 30, Conway to Ormond, 14 Jan 1667; Carte Ms 35:fol 249, Conway to Ormond, 19 Jan 1667; Carte Ms 46:fol 440, Arlington to Ormond, 19 Jan 1667; CSPI, 1666-9:pp 287, Orrery to Conway, 2 Feb 1667; Also see Witcombe, Charles II and the Cavalier House of Commons, (Manchester, 1966), pp 55-6.
⁴. CSPI, 1666-9:pp 287-8, Orrery to Conway, 2 Feb 1667.
⁵. CSPI, 1666-9:pp 280-1, Ormond to Conway, 28 Jan 1667.
In the meantime the Irish privy council prepared a more detailed plea (drafted by Orrery) for the Irish peers to give to the king. Conway prepared the ground for its reception, particularly with Clarendon who advised that Ormond should request £50,000 in specie and freedom of trade for one year as recompense. The paper, presented to the king on 17 February 1667, was tailored so as to comply with Clarendon's advice, but it was substantially the same as Orrery's letter. Four requests were made: firstly, licence to transport all commodities (except wool) to those countries presently at war with the king; secondly, that Irish men be given equal rights with English men to trade with the plantations; thirdly, that a large part of the fleet be victualled in Ireland which would be cheaper for the king and provide an outlet for Irish goods; and finally, that a subvention of £50,000 (Orrery suggested £60,000) in English coin be supplied at once. This was a cogent and reasonable case that Orrery had prepared, demonstrating all his skills in their best light. Ormond fully endorsed the request and asked for Arlington's full assistance. When he heard the request, the king showed a readiness to accede to their desires.

1. CSPI, 1666-9:p 281, Ormond to Conway, 28 Jan 1667; CSPI, 1666-9:p 293, Orrery to Conway, 9 Feb 1667; Carte Ms 41:fol 452, Arlington to Ormond, 18 Feb 1667.
2. Carte Ms 55:fol 290, Conway to Ormond, 2 Feb 1667.
3. CSPI, 1666-9:pp 303-4, Memorial Presented to King, 17 Feb 1667.
5. CSPI, 1666-9:pp 299-300, Ormond to Arlington, 11 Feb 1667.
Nevertheless, there was a delay of about a month before Charles decided on what action to take to recompense Ireland. During that month the king and his advisers were pre-occupied with efforts, sponsored by Clarendon, to make peace which would free the king from his parliament.¹ Ormond feared that the peace manoeuvres might be used as an excuse not to supply Ireland, by arguing that her European trade would now not be impaired, and that the small stratagems, discovered by the Irish merchants, to evade the cattle acts made the cattle ban less severe than had been expected. In fact, the evasions were small, though well publicised, and largely ineffective.²

Arlington, Clarendon and Anglesey had penned the formal request for relief for Ireland, but Ormond’s fears that it would be severely attacked at the council board proved unfounded.³ With peace in the offing Clarendon was in the ascendant once more and it seemed the king might be able to dispense with the parliament in the near future, and so waverers, such as Arlington, now lent their full support to the chancellor and therefore to the Irish requests. By the end of March 1667 Ormond had received liberty to trade with the king’s enemies, permission to join in the plantations trade and the promise of £50,000, but in foreign, not English coin.⁴ Ormond was pleased both with the news of peace negotiations

and with the king's letter. He was, however, wary that these concessions might yet prove illusory. The necessary passports allowing Irish merchants to enter the plantation’s trade had not been sent, and the £50,000 had not, it appeared, been placed on a definite fund.\(^1\) Remembering the dilatory negotiations that had surrounded the actual transportation of Ireland’s last subvention, Ormond was right to be concerned. By mid-May there was no sign of the money and Southampton (who was on his deathbed) and Anglesey had been too indisposed to finalize the matter.\(^2\) Clarendon’s improved position, and consequently Ireland’s hopes for aid, were crushed at a stroke on 2 June by the naval disaster at Chatham. The king would once more need to call a parliament, which was outraged by England’s humiliation at Chatham, to vote him supplies. To obtain these supplies would mean a renewed reliance on Buckingham and the inevitable sacrifice of Clarendon. The chancellor’s supporters were quick to desert a sinking ship. Southampton had died and Arlington, without whom Clarendon was definitely lost, withdrew his support. Another consequential re-shuffle was that Carteret, the treasurer of the navy, and Anglesey, the vice-treasurer, exchanged offices.\(^3\) Carteret took this course to try to avoid the worst effects of a parliamentary investigation into the navy following Chatham. Anglesey’s motives were more complex. He was too unwell to continue in his Irish

1. CSPI. 1666-9:pp 338-9, Ormond to Arlington, 30 Mar 1667.
3. Carte Ms 35:fol 502, Brodrick to Ormond, 29 June 1667; Carte Ms 35:fol 504, Carteret to Ormond, 29 June 1667; CSPI, 1666-9: p 397, Ormond to Arlington, 16 July 1667.

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office, which required frequent travelling, and probably desired 
an entree into English politics.¹ Like Carteret, though, he 
could perhaps foresee a storm was likely to break over Ormond's 
head, following Clarendon's expected fall, and Ireland's insolvency 
seemed an only too likely point of attack. Impending difficulties 
and inquiries were signalled by some technical problems which 
delayed Anglesey's accounts for the year ending 20 March 1667 
being drawn up and audited.²

Ormond was anxious about the delay in placing the subvention 
on a definite fund, but attributed it to Anglesey's ill-health, 
when, in fact, it was because Anglesey and Carteret were too busy 
negotiating their escapes from their present offices.³ The delay 
could not have come at a worse time, for, following Southampton's 
death, the treasury had been put into a commission on 22 May 1667.⁴ 
The titular head was Albemarle, but its three leading figures 
were Ashley and Sir William Coventry (broadly speaking both 
supporters of Buckingham) and Clifford (Arlington's great 
apprentice).⁵ This combination immediately became a threat 
to Clarendon and Ormond when the disaster at Chatham occurred, 
for this finely balanced commission at once combined into an 
anti-Clarendonian alliance. Ormond was informed that the £50,000

1. Carte Ms 47:fol 162, Anglesey to Ormond, 29 June 1667; Carte 
Ms 49:fol 500, Ormond to Carteret, 6 July 1667. 
2. CSPI, 1666-9:p 557, Anglesey to Conway, 7 May 1667. 
3. CSPI, 1666-9:p 376, Ormond to Arlington, 15 June 1667; Carte 
Ms 46:fol 500, Arlington to Ormond, 6 July 1667. 
5. Witcombe, *op cit.*, p 63. In calling Coventry and Ashley 
supporters of Buckingham, this is meant in the broadest sense, 
in that they had similar views on Ireland and were all anti-
Clarendonians.

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A subvention would be assigned on the money due to the king by the act of settlement – a very remote and unreliable fund, and of course not representing a real subvention at all.¹ The lord lieutenant remonstrated the ineffectiveness of such a grant and suggested an unassigned fund in England it could be placed upon.² The necessity for ready money had, of course, increased as a result of the naval disaster, and the country had to prepare itself for possible invasion, whilst not having the cash available to do so effectively, and at a time when the army was worse paid than ever.³

The ending of the Dutch war did not in any way diminish Ireland’s urgent need for money.⁴ Ormond had both Carteret and Anglesey soliciting the king and the new commissioners of the treasury for a definite fund for the £50,000, but to very little effect.⁵

The treasury commissioners’ financial stringency and investigations, which were necessary to prepare the ground for a co-operative parliament, prevented Charles from finding a fund for Ireland.⁶ Consequently, the Irish government requested to be allowed to keep the prize ships presently in Ireland to augment their finances.⁷ These they were allowed, except one very valuable East India prize, and if these failed to reach £50,000, the difference would

1. CSPI, 1666-9: pp 382-3, Ormond to Arlington, 22 June 1667; CTB, 1667-8, pp 8 & 10, 7 June 1667.
4. CSPI, 1666-9: p 402, Ormond to Anglesey, 20 July 1667.
5. Carte Ms 49: fol 500, Ormond to Carteret, 6 July 1667; Carte Ms 35: fol 566, Carteret to Ormond, 23 July 1667; Carte Ms 35: fol 615, Carteret to Ormond, 9 Aug 1667.
be made up out of the £50,000 due to Charles by the act of
settlement.\(^1\) The prize ships were a disappointing source of
income, as the merchants obtained them by operating cartels
and thus only £13,784 was raised when about £40,000 was
anticipated.\(^2\) However, bearing in mind that Charles was now
found to be £2 million in debt, this was the maximum that Ormond
could have hoped for.\(^3\) Arlington discouraged further requests
for English financial aid, suggesting that Ormond try to raise a
loan on the £50,000 due by the act of settlement, but the
facilities to do so were non-existent without the credit of the
English treasury.\(^4\)

Clarendon's impending fall, with all its implications wrought an
abrupt change in the Irish administration. On investigation of
the revenue, the Irish government decided that it would require
no further English subventions:

"The council have been working diligently here for a week
at the revenue. The result is that though we find the
king is in greater debt to the army than he can soon pay,
yet it is not so much as I feared it would prove, 'or
more than I hope in time (if peace continue) to overcome
without being further burdensome to his majesty or to
his treasury of England." \(^5\)

To accomplish this retrenchments might be necessary and £30,000
in milled brass or farthings would help, but the latter would

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1. Carte Ms 35:fol 615, Carteret to Ormond, 9 Aug 1667; Carte Ms 46:fol 528, Arlington to Ormond, 10 Aug 1667.
2. Carte Ms 52:fol 697, Receipts and Payments, 1660-71; CSPI, 1666-9:pp 446-466 passim; Morrice, op cit., vol ii, p 275,
Orrery to Ormond, 23 Aug 1667.
5. CSPI, 1666-9:pp 451-2, Ormond to Arlington, 14 Sept 1667.

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The king was pleased that Ireland could pay its own way and Arlington casually brushed the matter of £30,000 in farthings into oblivion. Taking his cue from this, Ormond endorsed Anglesey's accounts in October 1667 with a disclaimer to any responsibility either for the vast majority of outstanding army arrears or for the larger English subventions, as well as demonstrating that Ireland would in future be solvent. Such disclaimers were a necessary part of political survival at a time when the parliament had commenced its impeachment procedures against Clarendon, and when it was clear that any attacks on Ormond would probably include criticism of his financial administration.

The king desired supplies and the parliament ministers it believed would not misapply the funds it voted. Buckingham and Ashley showed parliament that they were trustworthy ministers by investigating and attacking the financial administrators — the dead Southampton, Sir George Carteret and the great lynch-pin, Clarendon. English discontent with the Irish administration had been kindled by constant requests for supplies and increasing rumours of financial incompetence and corruption. Ormond did not claim to have any financial ability, nor did he possess any, and in a famous phrase told Orrery, "I cannot comprehend the mystery of that office (the treasury)." Orrery, however, had great

1. CSPI, 1666–9: p 452, Ormond to Arlington, 14 Sept 1667.
financial acumen. He castigated Ormond for his ignorance about treasury matters, and criticised the practice of payments by assignments and Anglesey's ineptitude. Moreover, he demonstrated the inadequacies of Anglesey's incorrect financial forecasts in 1666 and offered Ormond advice, which should properly have come from the vice-treasurer about keeping a £10,000 reserve for emergencies. It was not until mid-1667 that Orrery lent his weight to those critical of the Irish administration at the English court, for in late 1666 and early 1667 he was as distracted as all the other Irish peers in trying to modify the ill effects of the cattle acts, but he genuinely feared that abuses in the Irish treasury would prevent Ireland from surviving the effects of these acts. Rumours of abuses evidently abounded in London and Dublin, and Anglesey wrote to Ormond informing him that he had done everything that could be expected of a vice-treasurer, and at the same time making it clear that his deputy, Bellingham, actually 'fingered' the money and so any abuses would be through his actions, though he believed him to be quite honest.

Anglesey undoubtedly left his Irish employment to try to avoid an attack on his financial administration, although it probably only served to highlight that he had something to fear.

1. Morrice, _op cit._, vol ii, pp 70-72, Orrery to Ormond, 16 Oct 1666.
2. _ibid._, vol ii, pp 68-9, Orrery to Ormond, 12 Oct 1666.
3. See _AD Ms 37207 passim and above._
5. _Carte Ms 55_: fol 502, Brodrick to Ormond, 29 June 1667.
Initially, the Irish treasury benefited little from this change as Carteret was delayed in London whilst his administration of the navy was investigated and so Bellingham was kept on as his deputy as Carteret could not recommend a successor.\(^1\) Anglesey's accounts had already been delayed due to technicalities and the lord lieutenant feared that as neither Anglesey nor Carteret would be in Dublin to close Anglesey's accounts, and with Bellingham continuing as deputy the confusion would be increased.\(^2\)

These difficulties were intensified by the practice of payment by assignments which made all accounts uncertain, as there were always such disputes over payments, and in these circumstances it would be hard to persuade the army that Bellingham, whose integrity Ormond did not doubt (though the Irish privy council had questioned it) was not holding large sums in his hands.\(^3\)

Orrery, long suspicious of Bellingham's ability and honesty, was in no doubt. Formerly a reluctant supporter of the Clarendonian interest at court he lost little time in throwing his lot behind the schemers at court, such as Buckingham, with whom his quasi-machiavellian temperament had more sympathy, once the chancellor looked certain to topple.\(^4\)

In July 1667 he informed Ormond that he had written to his friends in England about the poor state of the Irish economy.

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1. *Carte Ms 35*: fol 530, Brodrick to Ormond, 6 July 1667; *Carte Ms 35*: fol 547, Carteret to Ormond, 11 July 1667.
3. *Carte Ms 47*: fol 170, Anglesey to Ormond, 27 July 1667; *Carte Ms 49*: fol 411, Ormond to Carteret, 20 July 1667.
He suggested that "the officers of the treasury have not done all they should" or else the army would not be 23 months in arrear, and that the government should appoint a commission to oversee the treasury's work.¹ The implication was that Orrery had communicated these views to his friends at court, and these friends were Ormond's enemies. Furthermore, Orrery's suggestions of investigation and future stringent control of the Irish treasury were peculiarly similar to the approach being taken by Ashley, Clifford and Coventry to the English treasury. Throughout the summer Orrery kept up a barrage of complaints to England (and Dublin) about the state of the army's pay and Irish defences, with its obvious implications of financial mismanagement.²

On behalf of the troops in Munster he addressed a complaint about assignments to Ormond which was an indictment of Bellingham's management; they had received only three out of six months assignments out of which six months fees were quite illegally deducted, Bellingham had dealt harshly with the '49 officers, and he had placed assignments on the quitrents and on subsidies, which parliament had reserved for arming the kingdom, a fund on which they should never have been placed.³ These were charges that were difficult for Ormond and Bellingham to refute and the lord lieutenant's only answer was to wish that his army was not so quick to grumble.⁴

1. Morrice, op cit., vol ii, p 228, Orrery to Ormond, 12 July 1667.
3. AD Ms 37208:fol 140-2, Orrery to Ormond, 9 Sept 1667; points are underlined in this letter which were to be emphasised in 1668 attacks on Ormond.

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English investigations of the king's finances inevitably turned towards Ireland, fuelled by the complaints of Orrery and other intriguers, and Ormond was ordered to transmit Ireland's yearly accounts since the restoration.¹ These were sent in October 1667 at a time when the English political context demanded that Ormond emphasise the strength of the Irish economy and that English subventions were not needed.² This did not prevent the treasury commissioners carping that Ormond had failed to offer positive advice on retrenchments which they believed necessary.³ On the same day Buckingham, Bridgeman, Albemarle, Robartes, Arlington and Morice were appointed a committee of foreign affairs, the new ruling cabinet.⁴ Buckingham's supremacy was beyond question and the threat to Ormond now most apparent. Carteret, not surprisingly in the circumstances, thought twice about taking up his Irish employment, and Orrery pressed Conway to bid for the place. Carteret, however, decided to stay on, realising he would be an unlikely victim of any attacks on Ormond's administration.⁵

It quickly became evident that Clarendon's enemies were Ormond's and attempts were made to impeach Ormond in November 1667.⁶ This initial attack on the viceroy and other allies of Clarendon was well orchestrated, but this old servant of the king was not so

1. Carte Ms 46:fol 528, Arlington to Ormond, 10 Aug 1667.
5. CSPI, 1666-9:p 470, Orrery to Conway, 15 Oct 1667; Ormonde MS III, p 278, Carteret to Ormond, 14 Sept 1667.
universally hated as the chancellor, and his influence too
great and as yet untarnished to unseat him so easily. It was
to take a more determined and sustained campaign in 1668 to
topple him. At the end of 1667 he was preparing himself to be
ready to leave for England at a moment's notice.¹

With the adjournment of the parliament, though, the storm against
Ormond for the moment abated. Carteret wisely accepted Bellingham's
request to retire as deputy vice-treasurer in December 1667
and replaced him with Edward Corker, who enjoyed a good reputation.²
Carteret addressed himself to the problem of retrenchments and
in the new year Ormond felt so optimistic as to hope for money
from England.³

The replacement of Bellingham with Corker and Anglesey with
Carteret might have looked like a promising attempt to re­
organise and straighten out the Irish treasury, but a closer
look at Ireland's extreme poverty in 1666 and 1667 and its
inability to meet the charge of the establishment demonstrate
that a complete overhaul of Irish finances was called for, not
merely a change in personnel. The scarcity of specie and long
drawn out accounting methods adopted by the Irish treasury meant
that the treasury's accounts were always several months behind
the current situation. Thus we should be cautious when gauging
the treasury's accounts by these figures, as often they indicated

¹ Carte Ms 46:fol 578, Arlington to Ormond, 7 Dec 1667; Carte
Ms 46:fol 579, Arlington to Ormond, 24 Dec 1667; Carte Ms 35:
fol 778, Conway to Ormond, 22 Oct 1667; Carte Ms 35:fol 873,
Conway to Ormond, 30 Nov 1667; Carte Ms 36:fol 25, Conway to
Ormond, 5 Nov 1667.
² Carte Ms 36:fol 46, Carteret to Ormond, 23 Dec 1667; Carte Ms
36:fol 57, Carteret to Ormond, 30 Dec 1667.
³ Carte Ms 36:fol 46, Carteret to Ormond, 23 Dec 1667; Carte Ms
42:fol 507, Ormond to Carteret, 21 Jan 1668.
the former condition of the treasury not the present one; they were not the only guides that Ormond used. To the lord lieutenant far more compelling evidence was available from the condition of his own estates where, for example, his tenants failed to pay their rents in October 1665. On several occasions he warned that the country was too poor to pay the subsidies that were voted.

The greatest measure of the nation's poverty was the dreadful state of army pay. Without credit and without English subventions, the Irish government had raised necessary cash by diverting those funds intended for paying the army its current wages to other uses. This was a cheap expedient as no interest was paid on the 'loan', but for a government so dependent on its army it had dangerous ramifications: the Irish army was never far from mutiny and its allegiance to the crown was still questionable. In an effort to alleviate the army's suffering, and to attempt to appease it at a time of war when it was needed, it had been ordered that the civil and martial lists should be fully paid before any other payments. As we have seen, Ormond constantly pressed the army's case in 1665/6, but in spite of severe retrenchments, the revenue was £36,000 short to meet the martial list in April 1666. The army was 19 months in arrear and the regiment of guards six months. The severity of the

1. This is especially true of Anglesey's/Bellingham's estimates; in these they failed to allow for the antique accounting system.

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situation could not be exaggerated: assignments were often insolvent and had huge reductions in them for clothing (an expedient for paying off arrears).1

Even the desperate scenes that Ormond depicted did not prise more than the minimum from the English treasury. It was not until May 1666 that Bellingham could send out assignments for the Lady Day pay and no extra money could be found to repair forts or to mobilise the army.2 It took a mutiny at Carrickfergus for a more realistic sum to be sent over.3 Nevertheless, Bellingham's methods left a lot to be desired. He assigned a large proportion of the Lady Day pay to the third subsidy which was not yet due, rather than on the Easter customs and quitrents.4 Effectively, this delayed their pay until September.5 For the six months due at Michaelmas 1666 the army was kept in like suspense, especially when it was realised that Anglesey had over-estimated the revenue available for paying the army by more than £15,000.6 Anglesey had publicly claimed in September that the funds were there to pay the army its six months, but in December, even though Ormond had signed the warrants, the assignments had not been sent down to the troops.7 Bellingham spent the autumn vainly looking for funds on which to issue the assignments, but he too saw no hope

1. Carte Ms 34: fol 547, Barrows to Ormond, 4 Jan 1666.
2. CSPL, 1666-9: pp 112-13, Ormond to Arlington, 22 May 1666.
3. CSPL, 1666-9: p 123, Ormond to Arlington, 30 May 1666; CSPL, 1666-9: p 126, Ormond to Arlington, 6 June 1666; Carte Ms 46: fol 315, Arlington to Ormond, 9 June 1666.
4. AD Ms 37207: fol 43, Orrery to Ormond, 18 Apr 1666.
5. AD Ms 37207: fol 55, Orrery to Ormond, 2 June 1666; Morrice, op cit., vol ii, p 11, Orrery to Ormond, 8 June 1666.
6. Ibid., vol ii, p 68, Orrery to Ormond, 12 Oct 1666.
7. Ibid., vol ii, p 97, Orrery to Ormond, 14 Dec 1666; Carte Ms 52: fol 95, Anglesey's Revenue Estimate, 31 Aug 1666.
except in a subvention. Ormond knew the treasury was in a disorganised state and asked for Anglesey’s presence in Dublin to manage it and see it was better administered. Ormond ignored Orrery’s advice on this matter and, pressed by the customs farmers’ claims for defalcations and the threat of the cattle acts, he despaired of paying the army except with English money. In the new year the assignments were issued, but the treasury’s situation was desperate - "The assignments to the army are out but before it can be hoped they will be paid new ones will be expected, but how they will be paid upon solvent grounds is the question". The government seemed to be paralysed by its own ineptitude in financial matters and especially in finding funds to pay the army.

As we have seen, Arlington and Clarendon promised Ormond subventions to stave off the crisis, which political circumstances in England never enabled them to send. Conway had suggested that another Irish parliament was the best financial cure, but for the Irish government, the only practical course was to delay payments as long as possible so that the country’s revenue did not become hopelessly anticipated. The army’s pay due at Lady Day 1667 was inevitably delayed whilst Ormond looked for funds from England, but by July 1667 the treasury was still £40,000

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1. Carte Ms 51:fol 14, Ormond to Anglesey, 30 Oct 1666; Carte Ms 51:fol 16-17, Ormond to Anglesey, 8 Dec 1666.
2. Carte Ms 51:fol 17, Ormond to Anglesey, 8 Dec 1666.
4. Carte Ms 51:fol 20, Ormond to Anglesey, 8 Jan 1667.
5. Carte Ms 46:fol 492, Arlington to Ormond, 18 Feb 1667; Carte Ms 35:fol 290, Conway to Ormond, 2 Feb 1667.
6. Carte Ms 35:fol 873, Conway to Ormond, 30 Nov 1667.
short for the six months due at Lady Day and a similar shortfall expected for the six months due at Michaelmas.¹ The army thus only received three months pay and all by assignments which were so unpopular with the populace and soldiery alike.² Orrery was furious, blaming the treasury's inefficiency.³ Furthermore, the fees of six months pay were deducted from three, and the three were assigned for January to March, skipping October to December, and thereby making it appear that the soldiers would never receive that three months.⁴ It was amid all this pressure, that Ormond had finally asked for the prize ships in Ireland.⁵

The mysteries of the Irish treasury were never so great as in the summer of 1667. Almost miraculously at the ending of the war the Irish economic situation suddenly looked far less gloomy to the government. No doubt the financial investigations commenced in England persuaded the Irish administration to review the revenue in a new light, but it clearly showed the shortcomings of the Irish treasury's estimates. After investigation the army's arrears (a full 12 months), though severe, were not expected to worsen and retrenchments were thought unnecessary.⁶ Ormond's brief view of the accounts in October 1667 seemed to suggest that in future the charge would be easily met by the revenue, and steps

1. CSPI, 1666-9; p 362, Le Breton to Conway, 14 May 1667; CSPI, 1666-9; pp 387-8, Ormond to Arlington, 29 June 1667; CSPI, 1666-9; p 394, Ormond to Arlington, 6 July 1667.
2. Carte Ms 51; fol 58, Ormond to Anglesey, 16 July 1667; Carte Ms 42; fol 411, Ormond to Carteret, 20 July 1667.
4. CSPI, 1666-9; pp 291-4, Orrery to Ormond, 9 Sept 1667; undertones of corruption were unmistakeable in this.
5. CSPI, 1666-9; p 415, Ormond to Arlington, 2 Aug 1667.
6. CSPI, 1666-9; p 483, Ormond to Arlington, 12 Nov 1667; Carte Ms 46; fol 554, Arlington to Ormond, 28 Sept 1667.
were even taken to reorder the method of revenue collection to its former way, by forbidding the issuing of assignments by the king's tenants, farmers and debtors for the payment of rents and debts.¹

There is no question that the chief reason for Ireland's economic plight in 1666 and 1667 was the Dutch war. The effects of this war were pinching the economy in 1665, but the opening of hostilities with the French in February 1666 cut off Ireland's vital European markets at a time when she was excluded from the livestock trade with England and trade with the plantations. The war certainly provided a catch-all for all complaints about the state of the Irish treasury, and Bellingham and Anglesey were able to mask their inefficiency behind it.² Orrery pressed for investigations into the treasury and suggested methods of closer supervision, but Ormond preferred to heed Bellingham's explanation that the war was totally to blame.³ The constant threat of a French invasion led to the adoption of Orrery's scheme for a protestant militia which was a great saving to the treasury, especially as local figures often found they themselves had to meet the cost of mobilising it.⁴

The war made the country unsettled but its gravest effects (in terms of the revenue) were on the customs returns, which

fell to such a low in 1666.\(^1\) The collapse of trade had severe repercussions; there was an even greater shortage of specie, rents and subsidies could not be paid, the economy contracted, and the hereditary revenue necessarily fell short as people could not pay their taxes. The customs farmers asked for a defalcation of £10,000 pa for the duration of the war.\(^2\) Orrery offered Ormond the alternative of a new customs farm which would reduce the defalcation to £5,000 pa during the war, but Ormond was unimpressed, convinced that the farmers yielded the maximum possible in difficult times.\(^3\)

The cattle acts combined with the effects of the war might well have completely paralysed Ireland's trade. The concessions sought and gained from England re-opened the European market to Irish merchants before the war had ended.\(^4\) Irish merchants were even allowed into the foreign plantations trade, except where it might prejudice the Canary Company.\(^5\) In 1667 Ireland's trade figures rapidly recovered to pre-war levels and the improvement in the economy - rents came in faster, the people were able to pay taxes and subsidies - and the government felt in a position to assert confidently that it would in future be able to pay its way.\(^6\) This rapid recovery was the result of peace but it was

1. Carte Ms 52:fol 695-6, Receipts and Payments, 1660-71; in 1666 the figure was £40,813.
2. Carte Ms 48:fol 92, Arlington to Ormond, 30 Mar 1667; Carte Ms 34:fol 577, Gethin et al to Anglesey, 19 Jan 1666.
3. Morrice, op cit., vol ii, p 149, Orrery to Ormond, 26 Mar 1667; AD Ms 37207:fol 210-11, Orrery to Ormond, 12 Mar 1667.
5. CSPI, 1666-9:p 572, Proclamation, 7 June 1667.
also facilitated by the trading concessions granted by the king in 1667.

Nonetheless, without English subventions, Ireland's total revenue for 1667 (£170,729) was the lowest figure recorded for the period 1661-85. The hereditary revenue had improved on the 1666 level but little of the subsidies had been brought in. The collapse of hearthmoney, quitrents and subsidies in 1667 reflected the economy's problems in 1666, particularly the contraction of trade. The recovery of 1667 in customs returns augured well for the economy's future well-being and is reflected in the 1668 figures when hearthmoney doubled, subsidies nearly tripled and the quitrents rose by £7,000. It was perhaps typically over sanguine of the administration to declare in October 1667 that Ireland could expect to pay her own way, but political realities and pressures from England meant it was a sensible declaration to make, and the ending of the war had greatly reduced the government's expenditure so that it seemed possible to pay the two lists. The establishment in time of peace was only about £190,000 and this was roughly within the compass of the Irish revenue, and to those in the Irish council who in any way understood economics the recovery of Irish trade argued for an improved overall revenue yield.

Finally, we should turn to the Irish parliament and the somewhat limited part it played in the financial crisis of 1666-7. The

2. TCD Ms 808: fol 227-237, Establishment, 1 Apr 1666.
3. of O'Donoghue, Parliament in Ireland Under Charles II, (MA UCD, 1970), in which no analysis of the dynamics of the parliament has been attempted. R. Jones for example, the leading opposition figure, is only mentioned once in the text of the thesis. My interpretation is based on Commons Journal Ireland, vol i, pp 656-749.
Irish parliament in 1665/6 had two main functions left to fulfill. The first was to pass the bill of explanation; the second, to provide extra funds for the war. However, once a vociferous opposition was formed in this parliament Ormond became keen to dissolve the parliament, particularly once the act of explanation was passed. If the eight subsidies granted by parliament were to be efficiently and properly collected in the country the MPs would be vital to the supervision of it. In a time of war too, the MPs, as leading local figures, would be better employed in the local militia than dissenting from the government in Dublin. At the least, Ormond said, he wanted to be rid of the expense of parliament, costing about £100 a day, and the protection of the members by privilege obstructed debt collection. Once the parliament had passed its bills Ormond desired to dissolve it.¹ The Irish parliamentary opposition, lead by Richard Jones, tried to avoid dissolution by offering the king four additional subsidies of £15,000 each.² However, Ormond feared it would delay putting the act of explanation into effect and possibly encourage Southampton to refuse a subvention, leaving the viceroy at the mercy of a belligerent parliament for funds.³ The subvention arrived, nevertheless, and the dissolution was only delayed until 6 August 1667.⁴

³ CSPI, 1666-9: p 84, Ormond to Arlington, 4 Apr 1666.
⁴ CSPI, 1666-9: p 175, Ormond to Arlington, 6 Aug 1666.
By this time the parliament had passed a bill for four additional subsidies (although it was encumbered by restrictions) and had managed to force their amendments to the additional hearthmoney bill on the government and they rejected a bill for farming that branch, in spite of Orrery's efforts to prevent them.\(^1\) As we have seen in the previous chapter, the government had already set this branch to farm to Sir Peter Pett and Joseph Deane, both partners in the customs farm.\(^2\) The parliament's desire not to have this branch farmed was ignored by an Irish privy council manoeuvre, but the parliament had, nonetheless, failed to improve the bill's defects in the way the government had promised the farmers, which meant that the farm was overvalued at £30,000 pa.\(^3\)

The Irish parliament, so chancellor Michael Boyle reckoned, had raised the king's revenue from £80,000 pa to £200,000 pa.\(^4\) The act of settlement had further settled £50,000 on the king which he intended to use to build Greenwich castle, and it seemed likely to be his first profit from Ireland.\(^5\) Very quickly though, it became a fund weighed down by pensions and debts. The king's £50,000 and indeed all the £300,000 voted by the act of settlement, could only be slowly collected in the country's dire economic condition. The benefits of the parliament's generosity were felt throughout the period by a steady and large hereditary

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1. AD Ms 37206: fol 208, Orrery to Ormond, 5 Feb 1666; Commons Journal Ireland, vol 1, p 721, 22 Mar 1666.
5. CSPI, 1666-9: p 128, Orrery to Arlington, 8 June 1666.
revenue, but the subsidies voted in 1665/6 really aided the government only after the war had ended, for only then was the country able to pay them.¹

The financial crisis of these years demonstrated the ineptitude of the Irish treasury and its officers. The crisis was bred by a complacency and inefficiency unable to cope with the financial questions thrown up by a major war. The financial administration had not been given the priority it deserved in Irish councils (likewise could be said about the English administration). Ormond saw it as of secondary importance and effectively delegated, not just the overseeing of it, but the responsibility for it, to others. The war had been costly and had brought economic and financial chaos to both kingdoms. Ireland had been doubly hit by the cattle acts, which were the result of a genuine grievance. The crisis of this war had brought about major political changes in the corridors of power at court.

The Clarendonians were out, and Ormond was a Clarendonian. By resisting Orrery's pressure to investigate the Irish treasury, Ormond showed how out of touch he was with the mood of the English court. The years 1666-7 had demonstrated beyond question the great shortcomings of the Irish financial administration and, by resolutely supporting his treasury officers and refusing to investigate them, Ormond left himself exposed to being charged as equally responsible for their mismanagement, when, as inevitably happened, the gaze of the English treasury commissioners,

¹ See Carte Ms 52: fol 695-6, Receipts and Payments, 1660-71.
fixed itself on Ireland's financial problems.

The crisis of these years had not been well handled and it was the resilience of Irish merchants and the economy which averted disaster. Ireland was able to adapt itself to new markets and trading concessions from England, like its subventions, were only grudgingly gained. That there existed the prospect that the government might be solvent again at the close of 1667 was no credit to the Irish government, but to factors such as trade and the return of peace, over which they had no control. All the Irish government had achieved in these years, like its Clarendonian counterpart in England, was to discredit its members as financial administrators.
CHAPTER V

THE FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATION, 1668-70:
A PERIOD OF REVIEW AND INVESTIGATION

Section 1 - The Inquiry into Irish Finances, 1668-69 page 142

Section 2 - The Irish Revenue, 1668-70 page 163

Section 3 - Robartes as Viceroy, 1669-70 page 187
To elucidate the strands of English and Irish political intrigue in these years is in itself a complex task, but in order to evaluate the political changes of this period it is necessary for us to have a firmer grasp of the financial context. The association between Ormond's fall and the investigation into Irish finances has only been loosely made,¹ and most recently brought into question by James McGuire, who rightly stressed the importance and influence of Charles's nascent 'cabal' policy.² The first section of this chapter will show how the crown's view of Ireland was changed by the inquiry into Irish finances, and how Ormond's dismissal marked the crown's first efforts to define a clear role for Ireland in its overall policy. After this we will look in some detail at the management of the Irish revenue, 1668-9, and especially the setting up of the farm of the great branches of the Irish revenue, and its relationship to the political development of the period. In this section prominence will be given to the largely ignored negotiation for a farm of the king's arrears in Ireland, the forerunner to Ranelagh's undertaking.³ Finally the financial administration of Robartes will be dealt with, attempting in the process to reassess his brief viceroyalty.

(1) The Inquiry into Irish Finances, 1668-69

The English inquiry into the Irish treasury is most fully understood in relation to, and has its origins in, the intrigue to remove Ormond from the lord lieutenancy. Articles of impeachment were drawn up, but not actually acted on, by parliament in


November 1667. Whether these were at the instigation of Buck­
ingham or not is a matter of contention.

More likely, it was the logical conclusion of the parliamentary attack on the Clar­
endonians, latched onto, but not initiated by Buckingham or Ashley. Ormond found these attacks in themselves quite worrying enough, especially when they were supported by petitions from the adventurers and soldiers, and complaints from the city of Dublin.

In response to this danger he laid plans to travel to court and defend himself personally there. At court the way was paved for him by his 'allies', as he saw them, Arlington, Clifford, Anglesey and Ossory. The former trio were all opposed to Buck­
ingham, but equally fearful of becoming victims of the parlia­
ment's wrath. The appointment of the committee for foreign affairs, which confirmed Buckingham's growing supremacy, coincided with criticism of Ormond's letter accompanying the Irish accounts. The viceroy's impeachment now seemed a real possibility and Arlington procured a letter, signed by the king, which could be sent at a moment's notice, giving Ormond leave to come to court.

Just at this time Dr Gorges returned to London from Ireland with a report on behalf of the Duke of York, which, if accepted, would

2. Carte Ms 35:fol 873, Conway to Ormond, 30 Nov 1667; Carte Ms 36: fol 25, Conway to Ormond, 5 Nov 1667; Carte Ms 35:fol 778, Conway to Ormond, 22 Oct 1667.
undermine the act of settlement. The wider implications of his arrival were not realised until he reached Lady Ranelagh's: the classic situation of Irish complaints coupling themselves with parliamentary attacks and opposition, as in Strafford's case, seemed inevitable. Gorges brought with him a list of grievances against Ormond, and the vindictive earl of Meath simultaneously presented a list of his own. The movement to impeach Ormond was coalescing into a definite form. Seymour was preparing articles against him, aided by Meath. There is no evidence that Buckingham sponsored these efforts. He was more interested in taking the lord stewardship from Ormond, for himself or, failing that, to have the post retrenched. Although Ormond's enemies were becoming increasingly identifiable and were in greater contact with each other, it was to take the arrival of Orrery to bond them into one group. In the last analysis the complaints against Ormond amounted to a 'frivolous list', and those said to be planning to replace him would have to find a more solid basis for his removal.

The foundations for so doing were already being laid, not by Buckingham and Ashley, but by Sir William Coventry. The Irish accounts and the failure to recommend retrenchments in October 1667 had not been well received by the commissioners of the treasury.

2. Carte Ms 36: fol 63, Brodrick to Ormond, 31 Dec 1667; Carte Ms 36: fol 199, Brodrick to Ormond, 29 Feb 1668.
3. Carte Ms 36: fol 104, Conway to Ormond, 14 Jan 1668.
4. Carte Ms 36: fol 202, Brodrick to Ormond, 29 Feb 1668; Carte Ms 48: fol 254, Ormond to Ossory, 25 Feb 1668; Carte Ms 36: fol 123, Forster to Ormond, 28 Jan 1668.
English financial problems and the impeachment of Clarendon delayed their fuller consideration until after the Christmas. In order to answer some of the treasury commissioners' complaints Aungier was dispatched with letters and papers from the Irish privy council in February, and the English treasury's response was very anxiously awaited by the viceroy. The complaints about Ireland's accounts had been drawn up by Coventry and centred on a huge number of extraordinary letters and warrants on which money had been paid out since the restoration. Ormond was accused of being over-generous in his allowance of defalcations to the hearthmoney farmers and unfavourable comparisons were drawn between the present administration and those of 1628-9 and 1638-9, which, it was alleged, had been able to pay their own way.

Before Aungier could arrive with the Irish government's vindication of itself, the treasury commissioners set to work to retrench the Irish establishment so that it would not cost the king the £30,000 pa it had hitherto. The committee for Irish retrenchments consisted of the treasury commissioners, both secretaries and the handful of Irish privy councillors present at court. Their aim was to reduce the establishment by £60,000 pa. The civil list was to be reduced to the size of Strafford's, and concordatums reduced from £9,000 pa to £4,000 pa. On the military list the general officers and general (Ormond) were to receive no pay unless the army was mobilised and it was to be reduced to a garrison force: 20 companies of foot and 6 of horse were to be cashiered and the king's guard

2. Carte Ms 147: pp 43-4, Ormond to Ossory, 24 Jan 1668.
3. Carte Ms 147: pp 43-4, Ormond to Ossory, 24 Jan 1668; CTB, 1667-8, p 254, 14 Feb 1668, Aungier arrived too late to affect the decisions on Irish retrenchments.
4. PRO PC2/69: fol 64, 21 Jan 1668.

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lessened. Such retrenchments were quite impractical and would leave Ireland open to rebellion, if its forces were so reduced.\(^1\)

They followed the English trend of retrenchment in government but went further, for the plan to deprive Ormond of his pay as general was clearly personally provocative.\(^2\)

On 5 February, with the treasury commissioners still not having transmitted their retrenchments, no doubt because they were too impractical and really designed only to provoke Ormond and appease parliament, Arlington suggested that Ormond send over his own recommendations on retrenchments (remembering they were now a political if not financial necessity). More importantly, after consulting Clifford and Ossory, he advised Ormond that now was the time to come to court.\(^2\) Furthermore, he recommended that Ormond should not appoint one of his sons as a deputy, as it would provoke jealousy, but nominate justices.\(^4\) Articles of impeachment and Irish grievances against Ormond had worried the lord lieutenant and secretary of state, but the parliamentary attack had petered out to be replaced by a formidable assault spearheaded by the treasury commissioners. The threat to Ormond now seemed more tangible and more likely to result in his ruin.

1. PRO PC2/60: fol 78-9, 31 Jan 1668; Carte Ms 36: fol 123, Forster to Ormond, 28 Jan 1668; Carte Ms 46: fol 587-8, Arlington to Ormond, 21 Jan 1668; Carte Ms 46: fol 589, Arlington to Ormond, 28 Jan 1668.
The lord lieutenant was even more anxious to travel to court when Orrery, who had been receiving overtures from Buckingham, asked for leave of absence to go there himself.\(^1\) Orrery had at least two obvious reasons for so doing - to add his own complaints to those of Meath and of Gorges, and to thwart Ormond's plan for a new Irish parliament. With typical bluntness Ormond confronted Orrery with the accusation that he was plotting his downfall, but the lord president deflected these doubts with the aid of chancellor Boyle.\(^2\) Under the faintest cover possible, however, Orrery continued his attacks by means of a 'private' letter to Sir Charles Wheeler, which became public, and which cast reflections on most of the ministers of state.\(^3\) However, Orrery's gout delayed his departure for about two months after Ormond's in April 1668.\(^4\)

Orrery was to be a key figure in the intrigue to overthrow Ormond. After the lord lieutenant he was undoubtedly the most influential figure in Ireland, and was the recognised spokesman for a large section of the pre-cromwellian settlers, who had compromised with that regime, as well as for the adventurers and soldiers. As such Ormond had kept him a close ally and found his aid invaluable in controlling the turbulent Irish parliament. Once that was dissolved Ormond's attitude to Orrery and the powerful group he represented changed. He may have felt the lord president overmighty in Munster, but more likely he began to see the necessity for calling a fresh parliament; the need for new allies arose.\(^5\)

2. This correspondence is in BM AD Ms 37,203:fol 188-204; & Morrice, State Letters of Roger Boyle, (Dublin, 1743), pp 339-43, Orrery to Ormond, 16 Nov 1668; Carte Ms 36:fol 351, Boyle to Ormond, 26 May 1668.
3. Carte Ms 36:fol 354, Boyle to Ormond, 2 June 1668.
4. Carte Ms 36:fol 325, Lane to Ormond, 16 May 1669; Carte Ms 36:fol 351, Boyle to Ormond, 26 May 1668.
5. See Lynch, op cit., p 126.
It was likely that neither the adventurers and soldiers nor the Munster MPs Orrery had so effectively controlled in the last parliament would hold the balance in this one, but the opposition. Richard Jones's promotion to the privy council and chancellorship of the exchequer should be seen in this light. Orrery, for his part, was jealous of Ormond's power and position, and anxious to see that the money due to the Ormond family by the act of settlement from the adventurers and soldiers should never aggrandize that family. If there were an Irish parliament, Orrery would ideally like to persuade the government that the country was too poor to pay the £300,000. He would, in fact, be in no position to persuade the parliament to do anything. A new parliament (doubtless supported by a government anxious to win its co-operation) was expected to prosecute Orrery for maladministration as lord president of Munster, and the opposition (ordinary country members who had opposed the act of explanation) were sure to tamper with the land acts to the detriment of the adventurers and soldiers and the pre-cromwellian collaborators Orrery represented.

The government would of course be so hard pressed for funds that it would accede to the former opposition's demands.

Upon his arrival at court Ormond presented the king with various proposals, ranging from a report on the state of the revenue to a request for the reconsideration of his instructions. The main

1. Carte Ms 48:fol 297, Ormond to Ossory, 24 Oct 1668;
   Carte Ms 36:fol 577, Jones to Ormond, 24 Nov 1668.
2. Carte Ms 36:fol 376, Jones to Forbes, 10 June 1668.
3. Carte Ms 36:fol 376-7, Jones to Forbes, 10 June 1668.
4. Carte Ms 36:fol 353, Boyle to Ormond, 2 June 1668. This was probably part of a government/opposition deal.
plank of this paper was the necessity to call a parliament, chiefly to confirm the decrees of the court of claims and to increase the king's revenue. Orrery arrived at court armed with reasons against its summons, centring on the idea that the adventurers and soldiers could not pay their £300,000 as well as parliamentary subsidies. Orrery set about vigorously opposing an Irish parliament at council, but, with Arlington's help, the argument swung Ormond's way. Richard Jones even conceived of a scheme, not endorsed by Ormond, for the counties, noblemen and bishops of Ireland to petition the king to call a parliament in Ireland at once.

Orrery's method of deflecting these anxious, and it seemed irresistible, calls for a parliament was quite masterful. Once again he evinced the nation's poverty and made assertions of financial mismanagement. These Anglesey could not conclusively deny, for the day to day accounts of the Irish treasury, long since requested, had not yet been copied or transmitted. Upon this point of attack Buckingham and the treasury commissioners became one powerful force with Orrery. They moved to a two-pronged attack. Orrery undertook to demonstrate that the king's receipts had been greater than his charge and to show that there should be no debt but a surplus. He promised that this would be

2. Carte Ms 36:fol 376, Jones to Forbes, 10 June 1668.
3. Carte Ms 48:fol 268-270, Ormond to Ossory, 30 June 1668; Carte Ms 48:fol 272, Ormond to Ossory, 2 July 1668; Carte Ms 36:fol 419, Jones to Forbes, 21 July 1668. Ormond was quite sure of Arlington's friendship.
5. Carte Ms 48:fol 274, Ormond to Ossory, 13 July 1668.
no reflection on Anglesey or Ormond, but perhaps on Bellingham, for whom the other two were responsible.\(^1\) The same day Buckingham and Bridgeman procured the king's signature for a commission to examine the Irish financial administration.\(^2\)

Ormond was absent whilst these intrigues overtook him and so also was Arlington, the latter perhaps to avoid taking sides.\(^3\) Ormond, who had previously suggested an inquiry himself, rather optimistically hoped it would vindicate his administration.\(^4\) He accepted Arlington's view that the commission would "only beget dust and noise, disappoint the calling of a parliament in Ireland and effect nothing else."\(^5\) However, Orrery was able to use this two-pronged attack to push aside all question of an Irish parliament until January 1669. Orrery, as the commission's chief adviser and informant, with Buckingham's aid, was able to use the commission as a vehicle to the overthrow of Ormond: Irish grievances and the English 'opposition' united in the inquiry into the Irish revenue.

As we have seen complaints against the Irish treasury were steadily multiplying after 1667. The initial inquiry of the Irish privy council into the revenue was received derisively on both sides of the water, and the English treasury commissioners

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1. *Carte Ms 43*: fol 276-7, Ormond to Ossory, 18 July 1668.
2. *Carte Ms 36*: fol 406, Knight to Ormond, rec'd 19 July 1668; *Carte Ms 51*: fol 427, Ormond to Arlington, 18 July 1668.
3. *Carte Ms 48*: fol 278, Ormond to Ossory, 21 July 1668.
4. *Carte Ms 43*: fol 279, Ormond to Ossory, 21 July 1668; *Carte Ms 43*: fol 280, Ormond to Ossory, 1 Aug 1668; *Carte Ms 46*: fol 629, Arlington to Ormond, 10 July 1669.

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pressed for the minute accounts to clarify matters.\textsuperscript{1} The resignation of Bellingham and Anglesey had done nothing to improve matters, in spite of the high expectations of Carteret's deputy, Corker.\textsuperscript{2} The whole method of the treasury needed to be overhauled, the abuses of the assignments system rectified. Carteret was even planning to sub-let his vice-treasurership to a profitable bidder (not necessarily a competent one).\textsuperscript{2} These stories of incompetence, abuses and corruption further aided Orrery's complaints.

A commission of inquiry was the logical outcome of these rumours. In the event, the committee chosen was not so obviously anti-Clarendonian and anti-Ormond as it might have been, and had been feared.\textsuperscript{4} Neither Ashley, Coventry nor Orrery were included. The commission was composed of Albemarle, Bridgeman, Buckingham, Robartes, Sir Thomas Osborne and Sir Thomas Littleton. Sir Heneage Finch (a supporter of Ormond) and Edmund Wyndham were later added, with Samuel Moreland and Edward Waller as secretaries.\textsuperscript{5} Their purpose was to inspect and examine all Irish accounts since the restoration, but in fact it "can intend nothing else but indirectly fastening a neglect upon my lord lieutenant's government ..."\textsuperscript{6} Ormond believed that Orrery's undertaking would come to nothing and that the inquiry would show that some warrants, contrary to orders, had been paid before the establishment.\textsuperscript{7} He did not, however, use his influence to try to

\textsuperscript{1} CSPI, 1666-69: p 470, Ormond to Arlington, 15 Oct 1667; Carte Ms 52:fol 183, Council to Ormond, 22 Jan 1668; PRO PC2/60: fol 69, 22 Jan 1668.
\textsuperscript{2} Carte Ms 42:fol 507, Ormond to Carteret, 21 Jan 1668.
\textsuperscript{3} CSPI, 1666-69: pp 593-4, Rawdon to Conway, 18 Apr 1668.
\textsuperscript{4} Carte Ms 48:fol 276-7, Ormond to Ossory, 18 July 1668.
\textsuperscript{5} Carte Ms 43:fol 278, Ormond to Ossory, 21 July 1668; Carte Ms 70:fol 105-7, Commission of Inquiry, 16 Aug 1668.
\textsuperscript{6} Carte Ms 36:fol 418, Jones to Forbes, 21 July 1668.
\textsuperscript{7} Carte Ms 48:fol 280, Ormond to Ossory, 1 Aug 1668.
stop the commission, only to ensure that its terms of reference did not allow investigation of himself. This was only partly because, as he said, it would vindicate him, for he realised that if he did not submit to this inquiry that the next session of the English parliament would take up the business.¹

The commission could not be expected to be favourably disposed to the viceroy. Bridgeman was an ally of Arlington's, but he was also firmly in Buckingham's camp, as were Osborne and Littleton. Albemarle was a mere decoration. Robartes, the lord privy seal, was no ally of the cavalier Ormond either. He was the leading presbyterian in government and he was courted by Buckingham as the latter flirted with the non-conformists at this time to advance his wider schemes.² Finally, there was Buckingham who was aided by Orrery in his attacks. Buckingham hated Ormond — by Hyde's own account even more than he hated the chancellor.³ He went to unusually active lengths to defame Ormond during the passage of the cattle acts and likewise to effect Ormond's overthrow in 1668-9. The motive seems to have been personal rather than political — a deep-seated jealousy of Ormond's power, prestige, prosperity and popularity, which he felt eclipsed his own.⁴ This had been fuelled by both Ormond and

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¹ Carte Ms 48:fol 290, Ormond to Ossory, 1 Aug 1668; Carte Ms 46:fol 631-2, Arlington to Ormond, 20 July 1668.
² See Lee, The Cabal (Illinois, 1965), pp 161-201 passim. This is the best account of Buckingham's life.
³ Hyde, op cit., vol iii, p 135.
⁴ ibid., vol iii, p 135.
Hyde who had treated him with considerable arrogance and
disdain during the interregnum and had kept him from the high
offices which he believed he merited, as the king's favourite
and friend, at the restoration.¹

Apart from questioning the personnel concerned, the inquiry was
dependent on the Irish accounts if it was to investigate the
Irish revenue properly. Duplicates of the Irish accounts could
not be found in the treasury.² Copies were requested from
Dublin but work on these did not begin until a positive order
was received.² The positive orders were not received until
8 September 1668, which was too late to serve the commissioners'
interim report, which was expected in a fortnight.⁴ The only
accounts transmitted were the final ones drawn from the minute
accounts.⁵ The revenue material that was hastened over only
demonstrated how incomplete and disorganised Bellingham's books
were.⁶

The committee of investigation first sat to hear evidence on
25 August 1668. Therefore, with no accounts on which to base
its inquiries Buckingham was anxious to sustain the momentum of
the attack on Ormond and keen that there should be no delay,
even though lack of firm evidence might prevent an unambiguous

¹. See Airy, Charles II, (London, 1901), passim.
². TCD Ms 808; fol 259, Commission Examining the Account of
Ireland, 1669; CTh, 1667-8, p 254, 14 Feb 1668; CTB, 1667-8,
p 417, 18 Aug 1668.
³. Carte Ms 52; fol 301, Boyle to Ossory, 20 July 1668.
⁴. Carte Ms 36; fol 466, Boyle to Ormond, 8 Sept 1668.
⁵. TCD Ms 808; fol 182-210, Abstracts of Anglesey's Accounts,
1660-67.
⁶. Carte Ms 36; fol 551-64, Concordatum payments, 1663-67;
Carte Ms 52; fol 221, Moneys paid by Warrants since 1662,
30 July 1668; Carte Ms 52; fol 258-91, Concordatum Payments,
1662-65; Carte Ms 52; fol 215, Establishment Payments
1662-65; Carte Ms 36; fol 440, Boyle to Ormond, 8 Aug 1668.
indictment. Orrery promised him the missing evidence, probably in the belief that he could conjure it up, but also to forestall any attempt by Ormond to re-open the question of an Irish parliament. For his part the lord lieutenant was desirous to exonerate himself before the English parliament, a body which could damage him more materially than the findings of a commission of inquiry, sat. ¹

Bellingham was the first officer to be questioned by the commission and he performed very badly. ² He demonstrated an amazing ignorance of his duties as deputy vice-treasurer, declaring that he had never seen the establishment by which he was supposed to be guided in making payments. He was unable to deny anything categorically, relying on the defence that his books were not transmitted and he could not recall the facts. ³ To Ormond his answers appeared insincere. ⁴ It reflected very badly on Anglesey and left little doubt (Bellingham had admitted as much) that private and special warrants had been consistently preferred to the establishment. This had overtones of corruption and Anglesey was to be accused accordingly. ⁵ Bellingham fared better at his second examination, but the damage had been done, and interest centred on Anglesey. ⁶

1. Carte Ms 48:fol 280, Ormond to Ossory, 1 Aug 1668.
3. Carte Ms 59:fol 705-6, Questions and Answers of Bellingham at Inquiry, 2 Sept 1668.

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As a postscript to Bellingham's handling of Irish finances, Carteret, who had recently arrived in Dublin, found his accounts in a terrible state, and the auditing of his accounts was consequently delayed. Complaints against the treasury and the farmers multiplied and Carteret felt the blame lay largely with Bellingham. In consequence he suggested removing Corker, who was Bellingham's son-in-law, but Ormond deemed it unnecessary and so he remained.

Only when the commissioners turned their attention fully towards Anglesey did Ormond at last admit that Orrery was indeed his enemy: until then he had held out hopes of reconciliation. There was little difficulty in demonstrating that there were great arrears on several branches of the revenue, but Orrery found it impossible to prove his undertaking to the king that receipts exceeded issues. Nonetheless, his assistance was invaluable to the commission as he remained their only ally with any kind of grasp of the Irish revenue. He presented them with two lists of particular questions to ask Bellingham and Anglesey, with which both had great difficulty. Anglesey was asked 15 recorded questions in all, but after a confident start he was forced to rely more and more on ambiguous answers. It

1. Carte Ms 36:fol 491, Carteret to Ormond, 26 Sept 1668.
2. Carte Ms 36:fol 495-6, Carteret to Ormond, 3 Oct 1668; Carte Ms 36:fol 458, Carteret to Ormond, 8 Sept 1668; Carte Ms 49:fol 610, Ormond to Carteret, 15 Sept 1668.
was impossible to pin particular indictments on him: the blame was often easily laid, as was the case, at the door of clerical error.¹ Read with an unbiased eye Anglesey's defence did not condemn him—without the minute accounts it was not possible to prove the case one way or another. If the commissioners of inquiry really wanted the 12 searching questions, enumerated by Osborne as inadequately dealt with, answered satisfactorily they must wait for these accounts.² Throughout September they pressed on, finding no more weak links like Bellingham. Ormond was tainted by implication, although not himself questioned, but Orrery and the commissioners could only have alienated the whole Irish government by their fierce and critical examinations of Shaen and Sir John Temple.²

If the commissioners of inquiry were to review and fully investigate the Irish revenue, which was a quite laudable aim, clearly the commission would have to sit many months longer, and perhaps send agents to Dublin. In order to achieve its short-term aim of denigrating the Irish financial administrators, and especially Ormond, and so as to achieve the maximum effect, it produced an interim report on 26 September 1668.³ Arlington grew noticeably cold and Ormond foresaw the end of his schemes for an Irish parliament. He was determined not to resign, but

¹. Clarendon Ms 82:fol 20-1, Questions put to Anglesey, Sept 1668. It is worth noting that Roman numerals were still used by the Irish treasury in its accounts up to 1668, but not so afterwards, which cannot have aided accuracy, see TCD Ms 808:fol 182-210, Anglesey's Accounts, 1660-67.
². Carte Ms 68:fol 188, Anglesey to Commissioners of Inquiry, 8 Sept 1668; Egerton Ms 3340:no folios, Questions to be repeated to Anglesey, Sept 1668.
³. Egerton Ms 3340:no folios, Examination of Shaen & Temple, Sept 1668.
⁴. Carte Ms 48:fol 290, Ormond to Ossory, 24 Sept 1668.
would prefer to be dismissed. To all observers now seemed the sure moment of dismissal. Even though tainted by Anglesey's disgrace, the lord lieutenant in fact came out of the affair much better than expected. Buckingham might be keen to remove Ormond, but the king was not, or if he was, he had no suitable replacement. Anglesey was suspended from his office as treasurer of the navy (a great victory for Buckingham) but Ormond's position remained unaltered. Littleton and Osborne succeeded jointly to Anglesey's place as reward for their hard work. Foolishly Anglesey incurred the king's further wrath by petitioning against this decision.

Ormond, in fact, believed that the interim report went some way to vindicate himself and Anglesey, and he blamed his enemies' influence for the unfavourable interpretation it had received. He was, therefore, keen to hasten the transmission of the transcribed accounts and still saw fit to recommend Bellingham to Arlington in a letter of October 1668. When the accounts began to arrive Ormond, to his great surprise, saw that they in fact added weight to the reasons given for suspending Anglesey. He now feared that there were gross errors in the revenue estimates he had brought over in April 1668 and that this would reflect badly on him. It would be impossible with this fresh

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1. Carte Ms 48: fol 288, Ormond to Ossory, 15 Sept 1668; Carte Ms 147: fol 86, Ormond to Ossory, 24 Sept 1668.
3. Clarendon Ms 92: fol 166, Anglesey's Petition to Parliament 3 Dec 1668; Carte Ms 48: fol 313, Ormond to Ossory, 12 Dec 1668.
evidence for the lord lieutenant to disassociate himself from Anglesey's disgrace.\(^1\)

The political ends to which the commission was intended were now quite clear: it had two genuine aims, the disgrace of Ormond, and the investigation and overhaul of Irish finances. As a tactical ploy the interim report had only been a partial success: Anglesey was suspended but Ormond, though his name was blackened, had not fallen. In Ireland it was believed a set of four commissioners, headed by Orrery, were to be despatched to govern Ireland and to investigate financial abuses there.\(^2\) Plans were not so advanced as this. Instead the commission despatched Dr Gorges as their agent in November 1668 to uncover more 'facts' for them.\(^2\) Ormond wrote to his son to keep Gorges under close surveillance, and it is unlikely that he made much progress in his work. He found the accounts too numerous and detailed to be transcribed in full and decided instead to spend his time searching the records for details about the size of Irish arrears.\(^4\) The Irish government, its individual members in fear of being accused themselves, stood solidly behind the lord lieutenant, proffering no help to the commission's agent.\(^5\)

Rumours were rife of Ormond's dismissal with Orrery expecting to be the chief beneficiary.\(^6\) Ormond found himself increasingly

\(^1\) Carte Ms 48:fol 309, Ormond to Ossory, 21 Nov 1668.
\(^2\) Carte Ms 36:fol 585, ? to ?, 28 Nov 1668.
\(^3\) CTB, 1666-8, p 472, 4 Nov 1668.
\(^4\) TCP Ms 808:fol 258, Commission Examining Account of Ireland, 1669.
\(^5\) Carte Ms 48:fol 310, Ormond to Ossory, 28 Nov 1668.
\(^6\) Carte Ms 36:fol 535, Carteret to Ormond, 7 Nov 1668; Carte Ms 36:fol 593, Brodrick to Ormond, 1 Dec 1668; Carte Ms 36:fol 595, Aungier to Ormond, 2 Dec 1668.
excluded from Irish affairs.\footnote{1} Orrery tried to concoct bribery accusations against the Irish administration, and the viceroy was embarrassed by an irritating order, later revoked, to pay the '49 officers before himself.\footnote{2} By the end of November, though, Ormond had not been dismissed and he secured the promotion of Richard Jones, former leader of the Irish parliamentary opposition and an enemy of Orrery, to the Irish chancery of the exchequer.\footnote{2}

The viceroy also persuaded Shaen, Orrery's erstwhile ally, to accuse the latter of taking bribes in the old farm of the customs.\footnote{4}

Nonetheless, it was evident that the king was under extreme pressure to replace Ormond.\footnote{5} Arlington and Clifford produced a clever compromise, which Arlington hoped would keep his friend happy and assuage Buckingham. Ormond would keep the name and honour of lord lieutenant, but others would govern in his place in Ireland, as had been the case with Albemarle. The lord lieutenant refused to listen, believing it would be an admission of guilt.\footnote{6} Thus he allowed this chance of compromise to slip away.

The trappings of power did not interest him, if his position seemed tantamount to dismissal, and he was unable to foresee that, if he was lord lieutenant in Whitehall, he might wield even

2. Carte Ms 36: fol 535, Conway to Ormond, 6 Nov 1668; Carte Ms 48: fol 292, Ormond to Ossory, 26 Sept 1668; Carte Ms 147: fol 89, Ormond to Ossory, 26 Sept 1668.
3. Carte Ms 48: fol 297, Ormond to Ossory, 24 Oct 1668; Carte Ms 36: fol 577, Jones to Ormond, 24 Nov 1668.
greater influence in the king's and Ireland's affairs. Perhaps he realised this would never satisfy Buckingham, who not only hated Ormond's power, but the prestige the titles themselves bestowed. The viceroy chose to thrash the matter out with the king, but Charles shied away from showing dissatisfaction to this old servant of his father.¹ The king's continual prevarication and his dislike of openly castigating a faithful servant for political reasons created an air of great uncertainty.² He was under relentless and incessant pressure from Buckingham.

In the new year Ormond again asked the king to clarify his intentions only to be met with a dissembling, though not pessimistic, reply.³

By this stage, Ormond was advertising that he desired to retire soon, and that he wished to return briefly as lord lieutenant, no doubt to show that he had been exculpated.⁴ Wisely Buckingham and Orrery did not intend to allow Ormond the power to counter-attack, which could only be enhanced by his vindication. Ormond was already gathering himself to strike back

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2. Carte Ms 48:fol 315, Ormond to Ossory, 15 Dec 1668; Carte Ms 48:fol 321, Ormond to Ossory, 2 Jan 1669.
3. Carte Ms 48:fol 308, Ormond to Ossory, 21 Nov 1668; Carte Ms 48:fol 323, Ormond to Ossory, 19 Jan 1669; Carte Ms 48:fol 327, Ormond to Ossory, 3 Feb 1669.
and the summoning of an Irish parliament was to be debated at council in February and Ossory ordered to prepare bills. In Dublin Jones urged the necessity of parliament to confirm the work of the court of claims, pressing Ormond to obtain a firm date soon. This time Orrery was unlikely to be able to prevent it, having failed to fulfill his undertaking to the king on the Irish revenue. With this threat to the lord president of Munster a new urgency arose to remove the viceroy and at last Gorges's report arrived, which pointed to severe maladministration and over £480,000 of arrears. The claim was a distortion, but the privy council's own report, which Ormond desperately commissioned, arrived too late to prevent his fall.

Using Gorges's report as a timely reminder of Ormond's implied corruption and financial inability, the plan Charles was persuaded to adopt was to create a new lord lieutenant who would fully investigate the Irish revenue on the spot and make Ireland profitable. "The whole intention of sending the lord Robartes was to find out maladministration", and also to prove that Ireland need not be a charge on England. The investigation of Irish finances, which had largely started out as a means of destroying Ormond had now formed the outline of a crown policy for Ireland, whereby the country should be efficiently governed and no longer a charge to England. For the first time since the restoration it seemed possible that Ireland might play a positive role in the crown's schemes.

The necessity of attempting to use Robartes's lord lieutenancy as a

2. Carte Ms 57:fol 14, Jones to Ormond, 14 Jan 1669.
3. Carte Ms 147:fol 95, Ormond to Ossory, 9 Feb 1669.
4. Carte Ms 147:fol 94-6, Ormond to Ossory, 9 Feb 1669; Carte Ms 52:fol 226-9, Jones's View of the Revenue, 27 Feb 1669; Carte Ms 52:fol 223, Jones to Ormond, 27 Feb 1669.
political cudgel with which to destroy Ormond was exemplified by Ormond's sponsorship of the so nearly successful impeachment of Orrery. 1

Ormond very well understood their intentions in making lord Robartes viceroy and so did the Irish government, which realised and resented that the new lord lieutenant was coming over to investigate their practices. 2

Although Orrery might have liked to have been made lord lieutenant himself, the result, broadly speaking, was the one he desired. The Duchess of Ormond's oft-quoted remark that "My Lord of Orrery is as little satisfied with this change that is made, and the Duke of Buckingham, as if my lord had continued" must in the context be seen as an attempt to comfort herself, a self-delusion. 3

If anyone was disappointed it may have been Arlington who might have hoped to gain from a re-shuffle. 4 What grated on Ormond's enemies so much was not the choice of his successor, but that he accepted the king's decision so philosophically and braced himself to undermine Robartes's investigations and attack his enemies with their own instrument, parliament. 5 Ormond had been turned out, there would be no Irish parliament and Robartes would indict both Ormond and the Irish financial administration. This result must have been of great personal and political satisfaction


3. Ormonde No, vol iii, p 442, Duchess of Ormond to Matthews, 9 Feb 1669 (the date is an error as Ormond was still lord lieutenant on 9 Feb).


to Buckingham, and Orrery must have entertained long-term hopes of being a great gainer by it. Neither then knew that Robartes's tenure would be a disaster, or that Ormond possessed the influence to attack them and ruin all their Irish schemes.

(2) The Irish Revenue, 1668-70

Against the background of these events, and not without bearing on them, the complex maze of the auction to farm the Irish revenue was unravelled. These extremely tortuous negotiations have never been fully dissected and in order to aid our understanding of them it is necessary to take a rigidly chronological approach to the matter.¹

By 1666, the following branches of the revenue were under farm; customs and excise, inland excise, hearthmoney and wine licences.² These were all farmed under quite separate arrangements with varying covenants and termination dates. The first three mentioned involved, by and large, the same figures, although the power-structure within each agreement varied. The farm of wine licences was set to lord Carlingford, Sir Chichester Wray and Sir Thomas Clifford. Sir Peter Harvey and Alexander Bence were the main influences in the inland excise farm; Sir Peter Harvey, Richard Gething and Joseph Deane in the customs and excise; and Sir Peter Pett and Joseph Deane in the hearth tax farm. By 1668, following Harvey's death in 1666, all these three latter farms became identifiable as one interest, dominated by Deane. As a result of

1. This is not to denigrate Twomey's very adequate account; see Twomey, op cit., pp 265-79, passim.
the Dutch war of 1665-7 the customs yield had fallen and the farmers retained large sums for defalcations.\textsuperscript{1} Large amounts were also claimed on the inland excise farm on account of the country's general poverty and the disruption of inland trade caused by the tories.\textsuperscript{2} However, the precise details of the farm's management have not survived. It is not possible to calculate to what degree they were either gainers or losers by their bargain. Of all the Irish revenue farms it is the least well-documented, and bears testimony to the poor surveillance Ormond's administration practised over the revenue and its farmers.

Until 1668 no efforts whatsoever were made by the government to intervene in the farmers' management. For example, Muschamp's complaint, that Bence was attempting to exclude him from executing his rights under the farm and that he was dividing it with arguments, went unheeded on both sides of the Irish sea.\textsuperscript{3} The collection of rents and of polemoney and hearth tax had been very laxly carried out by the government and at the same time the farmers generated many complaints against themselves.\textsuperscript{4} Carteret immediately concerned himself with this aspect in the autumn of 1668. He at once saw the farmers' methods of collection were corrupt and had much to do with the poverty of the country.

On all three branches they farmed they always paid the treasury by assignments, not by cash, and Carteret desired that they

\textsuperscript{1} Carte Ms 36:fol 495-6, Carteret to Ormond, 3 Oct 1668.
\textsuperscript{2} MacLysaght (ed), Calendar of Orrey Papers, (Dublin, 1941), pp 57-8, Bence to Orrey, 28 Feb 1668.
\textsuperscript{3} CSPI, 1666-9: p 196-7, Muschamp to Williamson, 25 Aug 1666. cf chapters VII-VIII, when government intervention greatly increased.
\textsuperscript{4} Carte Ms 36:fol 440, ? to Ormond, 8 Aug 1668.

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should be ordered to bring the cash to the treasury.¹ Carteret also complained of the weak position the government found itself in when haggling over defalcations - the farmers held the money (and had the use of it), which in September 1668 amounted to £35,000.²

In such circumstances everyone was ignorant of the true value of the revenue. The state and prediction presented by Ormond in April 1668 (probably based on Bellingham's calculations) reflects the extent of this ignorance. By 1672 it was projected the revenue would yield £180,000 pa, some £60,000 off the mark.³ The customs were estimated to be worth only £60,000 pa if farmed, and only small improvements visualised in the inland excise and the quitrents.⁴ At least there was an excuse for the hearth-money; the original bill for farming it, which would have improved its yield, had been rejected, and so it was set too high, only being worth about £22,000 pa.⁵ For the future improvement of the revenue, given the evidence as he understood it, Ormond was disinclined to rely on what he considered to be inflated bids and predictions in 1668, but rather the good affections of an Irish parliament.⁶

The auction for the farm of the Irish revenue quickly proved that Ormond had underestimated its value. The cause of this ignorance can be discovered in three factors. First of all, Anglesey and Ormond had failed to intervene in or oversee the

1. Carte Ms 76:fol 495-6, Carteret to Ormond, 3 Oct 1668. This enabled them to keep cash in their hands to finance trading ventures.
2. Carte Ms 76:fol 496, Carteret to Ormond, 3 Oct 1668.

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management of the farm as they should have. Secondly, many Irish officers had been negligent, if not downright corrupt in their financial duties, which Ormond himself freely admitted. 1

Finally, the farmers were not obliged to show their books to the government and were only eventually persuaded to do so after much wrangling with regard to their customs defalcations. 2

Nonetheless, they still held back huge sums and copies were not made of their books: they were only perused. 3 It is no surprise that the clauses for the 1669 farm were much stricter, therefore, and the farmers bound to give in regular audited accounts. 4

The current customs farm was not due to expire until 25 December, 1669, that for the hearthmoney at Easter 1672, wine licences May 1672, and inland excise 25 March 1671. Orrery had sponsored some anonymous bids for the customs and excise farm during the Dutch war, and did so again at the close of 1667, offering £60,000 pa for seven years with no clauses for defalcations in case of foreign war. 5 Meanwhile, in September 1667, Morris and Dodson made an offer of £70,000 pa for eleven years. 6 In January 1668 Deane travelled to London, with Ormond's letter of recommendation, to discuss the Irish customs farm, desiring no doubt to have it reset to himself and thereby to lose the question of defalcations in the new grant. 7 These opening

1. Carte Ms 52: fol 28, Ormond to Boyle, 8 May 1668.
2. CTB, 1669-72, pp 44 & 46, 26 and 30 Mar 1669.
4. Carte Ms 52: fol 485, Provisoes to be inserted in New Farm, 1669; Clarendon Ms 82: fol 117, Abstract of Farm between King and Bucknall.
6. Ormonde Ms, vol iii, pp 273-9, Petition of Morris & Dodson, 21 Sept 1667.
skirmishes suggested that the government could receive far higher bids than expected, but Ormond's experience with the hearth tax farm cautioned him that inflated bids were useless to the government, for they made its expenditure predictions very uncertain when yield failed to match the covenanted rent.

It is interesting to note that in 1668, unlike 1663, there was no real debate about the virtues or otherwise of farming as opposed to government management of the revenue. It was taken for granted that farming was the best method and Carteret was the only major figure to raise any objections, as he believed farming encouraged payment by assignments.\(^1\) Ormond, however, believed that, as there was a shortage of specie in Ireland, assignments had to be used and the soldiery were more likely to be able to extract money from the sub-farmers than were the farmers.\(^2\) Indeed, shortage of coin was a powerful argument for a farm, especially if it included a large advance payable in specie in Ireland. This was a decisive reason for the decision to let the whole revenue in one farm, for that way one large single advance was secured. The farmers (being one single identifiable group) could also supply the government with advances in time of dire necessity without always having to appeal to the English treasury, which had been the bane of the Irish government in the 1665-7 crisis.\(^3\) The Irish government might at last be

\(^1\) Carte Ms 36; fol 495-6, Carteret to Ormond, 3 Oct 1668.
\(^2\) Carte Ms 49; fol 636, Ormond to Carteret, 20 Oct 1668.
\(^3\) Carte Ms 52; fol 312-3, Ormond's Views on Farming, 10 Aug 1668.
able to finance and secure its own loans without English money or security.

Ormond had committed himself to supporting Deane before the official auction even began.¹ He saw the letting of all farmable branches of the revenue as the best way "to redeem the king's affairs out of the disorder they lie under".² Deane offered £67,000 pa for the customs, £45,000 pa for the inland excise and to advance £20,000. With this bid he raised the king's revenue from these two branches by £18,000 pa.³ This was the group that Ormond supported throughout the tortuous wrangles of 1668, and by advocating this farm ensured that Orrery and his other enemies would oppose it and set up others. All these various offers quickly found their way to the treasury board, and an advertisement was placed in the 'Gazette', announcing that propositions for farming the Irish customs would be heard in two months time.⁴ Sir John Temple's advice, as Irish attorney-general, was sought in the meantime and it was agreed that the covenants of the new farm should be approved by the Irish privy council, who could best judge what articles were most necessary.⁵

Morris and Dodson remodelled their earlier bid for the customs, realising that eleven years was longer than the king would let it for, offering £66,000 for seven years with a £20,000 advance.⁶

¹. CSP, 1666-69: p 565, Ormond to Arlington, 22 Jan 1668; Carte Ms 52: fol 392, Deane to Ormond, 19 May 1668.
². Carte Ms 49: fol 610, Ormond to Carteret, 15 Sept 1668.
³. Carte Ms 52: fol 317-19, Deane to Ormond, 30 May 1668; Carte Ms 52: fol 71, Anonymous Version of Deane's Bid, 30 May 1668.
⁴. CTB, 1667-8, p 378, 8 July 1668.
⁵. CTB, 1667-8, p 417, 16 Aug 1668. There is no evidence that the Irish privy council was consulted.

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Deane's and the Dodson-Morris proposals were heard at the treasury board in August. It was resolved that the customs and excise should only be farmed for a maximum of four or five years, and that the rent should be paid quarterly (not every six months as had previously been the case: this was a major reform which ought to cut down reliance on assignments and the unnecessary growth of arrears to the establishment).¹ The hearthmoney farmers were willing to surrender their farm and it was decided it should be re-let at a more realistic sum.² For the time being Ormond prevailed upon his fellow councillors not to let the inland excise as that farm was not due to expire until March 1671.³

At Ormond's request the auction was deferred until more Irish lords were in town.⁴ In the interval, despite the decision only to let the customs and hearth tax, all groups concerned themselves with enlarging their bids to include the customs, inland excise, hearthmoney and, in some cases, quitrents. Deane's

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¹ GTB, 1667-8, p 419, 20 Aug 1668.
² CTB, 1667-8, pp 423 & 426, 25 & 31 Aug 1668.
³ GTB, 1667-8, p 419, 20 Aug 1668.
⁴ CTB, 1667-8, p 429, 2 Sept 1668; Carte Ms 46: fol 633, Arlington to Ormond, 2 Sept 1668.
new proposal was brought into council by Ormond himself.  
He offered £168,000 pa for all four branches. The government 
was ready to consider this if Deane would advance £70,000, not 
just £50,000 as he had proposed. Moreover, the privy council 
ordered that the hearthmoney was not to be let for less than 
£22,000 pa, the customs £70,000 pa, and inland excise £55,000 pa. Effectively, therefore, Deane was only offering £22,000 pa for 
the quitrents, and his rivals soon produced more attractive offers.

In September two new parties had been set up. The first of these 
was sponsored by Conway and their principal was an Irish merchant, 
Daniel Arthur, along with Humphrey Taylor, a goldsmith called 
Hinton and Captain Kingdom. The second group had been set up by 
Orrery in the name of an Irish solicitor for the excise brewers, 
Hanway, the disreputable Tanner who had been involved in the 1663 
protestant plot in Ireland, with William Muschamp and Dr Gorges 
and his brother as accomplices. Deane believed these proposals 
were inflated and based wholly on his own and not on their 
own knowledge. It is interesting to note that Alexander

1. PRO PC2/61; fol 18, 25 Sept 1668.
2. Carte Ms 52; fol 370, Order of Council, 28 Sept 1668; PRO PC2/61: 
   fol 18-19, 25 Sept 1668.
3. PRO PC2/61; fol 24, 28 Sept 1668; Carte Ms 52; fol 37, Order 
   of Council, 25 Sept 1668.
5. Carte Ms 52; fol 327, Deane to Ormond, 7 Sept 1668; Carte Ms 49: 
   fol 638, Taylor's Proposals, Oct 1668.
Bence was involved in Taylor's group, which implies that Deane's supporters were looking elsewhere, but it also demonstrates the way in which these financiers covered themselves by attempting to have a finger in as many pies as possible. If Deane's proposal was not accepted Bence could still be in on the final agreement if he supported Taylor's also.

On the face of it, however, the weight of expertise and of the lord lieutenant seemed to rest with the present farmers and the new proposers, though a menace, might not be expected to succeed. On 5 October, 1668 it was resolved that all the revenue, bar the casual, would be let to farm. The king had shown his hand when the council pronounced its minimum requirements and the stage set for an increase in the size of bids to match Charles's expectations. Deane was unable and unwilling to compete. On 22 October Morris, Taylor, Muschamp and Deane, representing four different groups, were all heard. Taylor pushed up his bid and Muschamp responded with one of £210,000 pa with a £40,000 advance. Out of nowhere Clifford produced the bid of one Hallam at £212,000 pa with a £60,000 advance. Morris made some efforts to match this, whilst Deane, feeling out of his depth, enlisted Shaen's help in an effort to cast aspersions on all the other bidders. The farm now seemed there for Hallam's taking when, after hasty consultations, Muschamp and Taylor joined forces offering a £70,000 advance and £219,500 for all the revenue (save

1. Carte Ms 36:fol 535, Carteret to Ormond, 7 Nov 1668.
2. CTB, 1667-8, p 451, 5 Oct 1668.
5. CTB, 1667-8, pp 478-9, 9 Nov 1668; Carte Ms 52:fol 70, Morris/Dodson Proposal, November 1668.
the casual) for six years.¹ This final offer ended all bidding. Morris and Hallam were rewarded for their part in advancing the Irish revenue (Deane was not for he had refused to join in the final auction which had so dramatically raised the rent).² Certainly the speed with which Hallam withdrew from the contest suggests his bid may only have been a forcing one, a treasury contrivance ordered by the king.

The farm had been let for £50,000 more than the group Ormond supported were willing to give. For the treasury it was a great victory, having prised the maximum from the farmers by forcing up the bidding just far enough to persuade two of the major groups to join and make an improved offer. For Ormond, who had backed Deane, it was a defeat which cheered his enemies. He was convinced it would prove unprofitable (a further indication of the limitations of his understanding of the worth of the Irish revenue) and he had ethical objections to farming the quitrents.³

Muschamp and Taylor speedily moved towards agreeing their covenants with the crown.⁴ However, it seems, when asked to bring in their security they were unable to raise sufficient.⁵ They turned for security and for their advance of £70,000 to Sir William Bucknall and some other prominent London financiers.

² PRO PC2/61: fol 55, 11 Nov 1668.
³ Carte Ms 49: fol 652, Ormond to Carteret, 17 Nov 1668; Carte Ms 52: fol 312, Ormond's Views on Farming, 10 Aug 1668.
⁴ CTB, 1667-8, pp 493-4, 500 & 637, 25 Nov 1668, 13 Apr 1668 & 1 Dec 1668.
⁵ CTB, 1669-72, pp 43-4, 26 Mar 1669.
The king decided that as Bucknall and his partners had offered security for the advance they should become co-partners in the farm. Thus it was that William Bucknall, Ralph Bucknall, George and William Dashwood, John and Dannet Forth, James Hayes, John Breedon and Philip Jemmet came to join Muschamp and Taylor in the Irish revenue farm. The great London interest in the Irish revenue was instigated and insisted on by the crown, and not part of this London group's scheme to gain a stranglehold on the king's finances.

Bucknall and the Forths, however, were experienced enough and shrewd enough to drive a much harder bargain with the king if this farm, which the king had clearly shown he desired to go on, was to continue. They asked for an abatement of £15,000 pa, thereby reducing the yearly rent to £204,500 pa. The king was induced to accept this very easily. In the first place, should he turn to another group it would take months more to finalise the terms and the uncertainty over hearthmoney alone meant that branch was currently uncollected since March 1668. The king was not likely to receive such certain security from others as these great merchants and financiers offered. Moreover, out of the £15,000 pa abatement the king was to receive secretly to his privy purse £10,000 pa. This abatement was by proportion.

2. CSPI, 1666-69: pp 766-7, Warrant to Attorney General, July 1669.
4. CTB, 1669-72, pp 64-5, pp 67-8, 10 & 12 May 1669; PRO PC2/61: fol 145, 5 May 1669.
5. Carte Ms 50: fol 28, Ormond to Boyle, 8 May 1669; CTB, 1669-72, p 60, 28 Apr 1669.

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because the farmers did not come into possession of all the branches at the same time.\(^1\) For Charles it was the kind of offer he could not refuse. Thus he dismissed a new proposal by Morris, an attempt to resuscitate Hallam's, and Orrery's scheme by which he could have dispensed with the advance, which was so costly in the long term.\(^2\) Bucknall advanced £70,000 to the treasury in Dublin with minimal fuss and in August 1669 the indenture for the farm was finally signed, although the commission was delayed some time further.\(^3\) The commission was delayed because the farmers disagreed with Charles over the number of commissioners and their salaries. The farmers desired a strong commission to protect their interest, as only Muschamp and Taylor were ordinarily resident in Ireland. In the end their salaries were reduced.\(^4\) Once the commissioners' securities had been sorted out they at last set out for Ireland, although there was some delay in commencing their work as George Dashwood somehow lost the patent in the Irish sea in November 1669.\(^5\)

All the above negotiations, it must be pointed out, had been greatly complicated by the continual debate in council and at the treasury about the farmers' defalcations on account of the Dutch war, and also Morris's claim for defalcations on account of his

2. Carte Ms 50: fol 28, Ormond to Boyle, 8 May 1669; Carte Ms 52: fol 309-10, Anonymous Proposals, 23 July 1669; Carte Ms 52: fol 436, Remarks on the Farm, 6 May 1669; Carte Ms 218: fol 34, Proposal of Orrery, 19 July 1669.
4. CTB, 1669-72, pp 147, 147 & 156-7; 6 & 15 Oct 1669 & 9 Nov 1669; CSPI, 1666-69: p 785, King to Attorney General, Aug 1669; CSPI, 1670: p 30, Grant, 9 Nov 1669.
5. CTB, 1669-72, p 157, 9 Nov 1669; CSPI, 1670: pp 24-5, Leigh to Williamson, 13 Nov 1669.
commonwealth farm, broken up by the restoration. The customs defalcations were referred back and forth from Dublin to Whitehall several times. However, the farmers avoided having to comply with a royal order to pay up £27,000. This was due in part, firstly, to Ormond's support, secondly, because they allowed their books to be viewed, and, thirdly, because they gave up the hearth farm early (Bucknall's began on 25 December 1668) and that was deserving of some kind of royal favour. The farmers had fared even better with their claim for defalcations on the hearth tax, as they had not fully enjoyed the revenue, because the bill for the hearth tax had been rejected by parliament. They were, accordingly, allowed their defalcations and happily gave up the farm to Bucknall.

Once the revenue farm had been more or less settled negotiations were opened in the late spring for a farm of the king's arrears in Ireland outstanding since the restoration. The question of arrears was a contentious one. On occasion Ormond had been sent proposals about concealed lands and arrears were the basis of the commission of inquiry of 1668-9. Gorges was sent to Ireland in the autumn of 1668 to ascertain the exact figure. His computation, delivered to the king in February.

2. CTB, 1667-8, p 261, 24 Feb 1668; CTB, 1669-72, p 78, 7 June 1669; Carte Ms 50:fol 28, Ormond to Boyle, 8 May 1669; Carte Ms 48:fol 310, Ormond to Ossory, 28 Nov 1668.
3. PRO PC2/60:fol 88-9, 12 Feb 1668; CSPI, 1666-69:p 689, King to Deane, 21 Feb 1669.
4. CTB, 1669-72, pp 44 & 45; 26 & 30 Mar 1669; CSPI, 1669-70: pp 92-93, King to Bence, 21 Mar 1670.
5. Carte Ms 147:fol 43, Ormond to Ossory, 24 Jan 1668.
7. CSPI, 1666-69:p 627, Rosse to Ormond, rec'd 6 July 1668.
1669, revealed an arrear from 20 March 1660 to 20 March 1668 of £483,801.\(^1\) Ormond treated it with derision in his private correspondence and requested his son to draw up a true account.\(^2\)

Publicly Ormond attempted to lessen the damage, delivering to council on 12 February 1669 a powerful critique of Gorges's calculations, in which he estimated the arrears at no more than £203,809.\(^3\) Ormond's credibility as a financial analyst had by now been overstretched and neither king nor council would be impressed by an argument unsupported by facts and figures from the Irish privy council itself. These arrived too late. On the evening of 13 February Charles told Ormond he was to be replaced by Robartes.\(^4\)

As we have seen, the committee of inquiry's interim report had failed to unseat Ormond, but Gorges's had succeeded. His account, however, was distorted, revealing the total for arrears, but not for solvent or redeemable ones. Between 1669 and 1671 various estimates of the arrears were made, but, bearing in mind Ranelagh's 1671 calculation, the privy council estimate of £250,000 in October 1669 seems nearest the mark.\(^5\)

The significance of Gorges's estimate did not just lie in its being a lever to remove Ormond. The king encouraged bids for a supplemental farm of the arrears as a result of it, and after

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2. *Carte Ms 147*:fol 95-6, Ormond to Ossory, 9 Feb 1669.
4. *Carte Ms 48*:fol 331, Ormond to Ossory, 16 Feb 1669.
5. *Carte Ms 52*:fol 223-9, Jones to Ormond, 27 Feb 1669 (£158,000); Annabelly Misc Books No 4 Lib K:pp 82-7, Corker's Estimate (£43,000); *Carte Ms 52*:fol 342-4, Report of Barons of Exchequer, Oct 1669 (£145,000); *Hastings*, pp 377-8, Conway to Rawdon, 16 Oct 1669 (£250,000).
rejecting an initial approach he expected others. Buckingham and Orrery were the two foremost patrons of a scheme concocted by Gorges, whereby a large sum would be advanced on the arrears, a certain figure above the advance paid to the king and the rest kept by the farmers. Such a scheme was bound to be a great source of harrassment and distress to the subject as the farmers would be exacting in their desire to maximise profits. This thinking was the basis of Ormond's opposition to the scheme.

On 18 June Orrery, Buckingham, Thomas Elliot and Ned Progers induced the king to make an agreement with Bucknall, who was supported by Gorges, to farm the arrears for £130,000, of which £70,000 would be advanced. Neither of the secretaries of state, nor the treasury commissioners were privy to this deal.

However, in the course of the closing debates on this farm the king had second thoughts, and a fictitious bid for £300,000 was put forward, and Charles made it clear that he would rather collect the arrears himself than let them go for as little as £130,000. A new bid by Bucknall, which was no real advance on his first one, was rejected. Orrery unsuccessfully tried to bring the two sides together and the king decided not to farm the arrears, the £50,000 already advanced by Bucknall on the agreement was returned with interest - a gratuity of £1,000.

2. Carte Ms 50:fol 68, Ormond to Boyle, 1 Aug 1669.
4. Carte Ms 50:fol 60, Ormond to Ossory, 31 July 1669; CTB, 1669-72, pp 122-3, 29 July 1669.
5. CTB, 1669-72, pp 104 & 107, 12 & 19 July 1669.
6. CTB, 1669-72, pp 123-5, 29 July 1669; Carte Ms 52:fol 446, Bucknall's Proposals, 7 Aug 1669.
The king had rejected the scheme for several reasons. Firstly, there was the problem of having the present farmers' collectors gathering the arrears also, which though efficient would be unpopular. Secondly, the gap between what Bucknall saw as solvent arrears and what the king saw—a difference of some £170,000—was an unbridgable one. Thirdly, Ormond and the Irish privy council were producing calculations which seriously undermined Gorges's and made further investigation necessary. Fourthly, in the face of so many wrangles Orrery probably disowned his part in Bucknall's scheme and persuaded Charles to collect them himself. Finally, the king felt he was being rushed into a poor bargain, and many of his advisers, such as Arlington and Bridgeman, inclined him to that opinion, especially when they discovered that Buckingham and Orrery had persuaded the king to make a bargain without their cognisance. So it was that any schemes to use the king's arrears as a fund to pay off Charles's large public debts in Ireland (particularly to the army) were put in abeyance until such time as a more viable and attractive alternative could be offered.

The events of 1668-9 are over-shadowed by political and financial intrigues, and it is perhaps wise at this stage to take stock of the Irish economy in these years. Both 1668 and 1669 saw decisive upturns in the ordinary and extraordinary revenue. The totals for

1. CTB, 1669-72, p 107, 19 July 1669.
2. Carte Ms 48:fol 358, Ormond to Ossory, 27 July 1669; Carte Ms 52:fol 226, Arrears under Ormond, March 1669.
3. Carte Ms 50:fol 60, Ormond to Ossory, 31 July 1669.
4. CTB, 1669-72, pp 123-5, p 130: 29 July & 3 Aug 1669; Carte Ms 50:fol 60, Ormond to Ossory, 31 July 1669.
1668 and 1669 at £201,860 and £290,000 (which included the farmers' £70,000 advance) respectively were more than sufficient to meet the establishment.\(^1\) Although much of the latter sum consisted of extraordinary additions to the revenue, £194,000 had been raised from the ordinary revenue.\(^2\) This was inspite of a temporary fall in customs receipts (aided perhaps by the fact the farmers were not actually overseeing the farm from January 1669 to November 1669 because of delays in their patent). The inland excise figures also temporarily hiccoughed (probably due to the small amount of specie in circulation, as the customs collectors held onto the farmers' rents until they took up the farm) but these had been more than amply recompensed by the near tripling of the quitrents.\(^3\) Retrospectively, therefore, the Irish economy had never seemed healthier, signalled by the paying in of a large part of the arrears of the subsidies, a sure sign of recovery. During these two years, however, a strong body of evidence pointed to other conclusions about the well-being of Ireland.

In the first place, the economy's performance, during years of peace and recovery, was judged by 1666-67 figures reflecting the time of war, contraction and dislocation of trade, those for 1666 and 1667. Secondly, the multiplicity of claims of arrears due to the king in Ireland suggested corruption, ill-management and a country unable to pay its own way. Thirdly, the revenue

\(^1\) Carte Ms 52:fol 695-8, Revenue Abstracts, 1660-71.  
\(^2\) Carte Ms 52:fol 695-8, Revenue Abstracts, 1660-71.  
\(^3\) Carte Ms 52:fol 695-6, Revenue Abstracts, 1660-71.
papers presented by Ormond in 1668, under Bellingham's authorship, were often wildly off the mark and as the real accounts became available displayed that the administration had only a feeble grasp of its financial position. Fourthly, the commission of inquiry into Irish finances was not only an admission of a severe problem, but its whole purpose was to impugn the financial management of Ireland, which it achieved by innuendo and implication, if not fact. Fifthly, because of the long drawn out negotiations for the farm and the loss of the patent at sea, it was over a year after the farm's commencement before the farmers began to pay out their rent, so that a whole year's money was held back and there was a stop of payments until April 1670. Finally, inefficiency, shortage of coin and delays in payment of farm rent resulted in the army's pay falling further into arrears, but this was a temporary not a permanent problem which could be sorted out once the farmers were in full possession of their farm.

Within the context of this evidence it was difficult for the viceroy either to vindicate his financial management or even for him to make accurate forecasts in the short-term or long-term about the revenue. Ormond's initial estimate of the revenue in January 1668 at £232,775 for the year 1667 was no less than £60,000 out, but he only further harmed his reputation in June by producing an estimate which under-estimated the revenue by about £40,000 pa. Jones's estimates in March 1669 were far more accurate and clearly showed the Irish government could pay

1. PRO PC2/62: fol 51 & 55, 5 & 14 Jan 1670. No hearth tax had been collected since Mar 1668; CTB, 1669-72, p 60, 28 Apr 1669; Carte Ms 37: fol 56, Davies to Robertes, 26 May 1669.
2. See below.
3. Carte Ms 52: fol 701, Estimate of King's Revenue for 1667, 3 Jan 1668; Carte Ms 68: fol 194-6, State of Revenue, June 1668.
its own way. The English government was, however, more impressed with the alleged temporary shortfall of £60,000 to pay the army in April 1668 and Gorges's state of arrears. The fact that by September 1669 the government was only £3,000 short to pay the army was ignored, or put down to the change in government and administration (rather implausibly because Robartes had only just arrived). Claims that the arrears were far less than Gorges's estimates were also consistently ignored.

In these circumstances it can be understood why the treasury was so obsessed with Irish retrenchments throughout 1668-9. In part it was a political gesture, the continuation of the treasury's very necessary policy of financial stringency and retrenchments. In January 1668 the treasury disregarded Ormond's over-optimistic estimates of the Irish revenue, preferring to accept Coventry's analysis. A committee was set up to look into retrenchments and a serious attempt made to return to the establishment of 1640 and to cut expenditure by £60,000 pa. Whilst Ormond fought against these, Orrery showed his willingness to acquiesce in any cutbacks, thereby displaying his skill as a political opportunist. The lord lieutenant's arrival at court forestalled the severe measures advocated by some, and in deference to him the matter

2. Carte Ms 52: fol 394, State of Military Lists, 28 Apr 1668. See below - this shortfall was a fiction.
6. Carte Ms 52: fol 701, Estimate of King's Revenue in 1667, 3 Jan 1668; Carte Ms 147: fol 43-4, Ormond to Ossory, 24 Jan 1668.
was postponed until after the investigation into the Irish treasury was completed. Furthermore, unless Orrery could prove his calculations to the king there would be no need for retrenchments, and Ormond knew anyway that reductions in the army would not be favourably received by the parliament he proposed, which saw the army as its main defence against the hostile natives.¹

Once Ormond had been removed and replaced by a lord lieutenant whose chief task was to overhaul and re-order Ireland's finances, cut-backs could not be stopped. Ossory led a privy council in Ireland which felt that the policy advocated by Orrery, Buckingham and Robartes was ultimately damaging to Ireland. The degree of co-operation Robartes could expect from his executive was evidenced by Ossory and the council's recommendations on retrenchments in May 1669.² Their hostility, it should be remembered, was not just aimed at a political group currently in control which had tarnished all the Irish government with being corrupt and incompetent, but also at the fact that recent forecasts of the well-being of Ireland's economy were being ignored and Ireland's interests subordinated to political considerations. They recommended no reductions in the army, an increase in concordatum money, the importation of brass and silver specie and ships to protect Irish coasts from pirates.³

Disregarding this advice a committee was consequently appointed to make retrenchments.⁴ Meeting in June, July and August 1669

1. Carte Ms 48; fol 288, Ormond to Ossory, 15 Sept 1668; Carte Ms 36; fol 353, Boyle to Ormond, 2 June 1668.
2. Carte Ms 37; fol 56, Davies to Robartes, 26 May 1669 (this document is really by Ossory and his council).
3. Carte Ms 37; fol 56-7, Davies to Robartes, 26 May 1669.
4. PRO PC2/61; fol 157, 21 May 1669.

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its bark proved worse than its bite. Ormond was convinced that
the retrenchments would be severe but practical considerations,
such as Ireland's security, made this unlikely. The discussion
of the supplemental farm of arrears delayed its consideration
and Robartes was impatient to leave for Ireland, and had the
struggle been more protracted he would hardly have been there
by Christmas. In the event Ormond's good sense prevailed.

The king decided that the retrenchments should not be so severe
as first planned, and that 13 companies and troops expected to be
cashiered (over 1,000 men), would be spared until Robartes could
assess the situation on the spot. The retrenchments were most
severely felt in the civil list, reduced from £26,000 pa to
£16,000 pa in an effort to return to the civil list of 1639,
with the judges bearing the brunt of this. The military list
was reduced from £164,000 pa to £156,000 pa, mostly by cutting
back salaries to officers and governors of castles. Further
decisions would await Robartes's full investigations into Irish
finances, and on the English side there was no doubt that these
were both expected and thought necessary.

The Irish government had made some efforts to pre-empt its
critics by appointing, for example, a council of trade, made up
of merchants and privy councillors.

2. Carte Ms 50:fol 60, Ormond to Ossory, 31 July 1669; CTB, 1669-
    72, pp 78, 81, 96, 102, 107, 138; 7, 10 & 12 June, 7 & 19
    July, 15 Aug 1669.
3. Carte Ms 50:fol 68, Ormond to Boyle, 1 Aug 1669.
5. CTB, 1669-72, p 138, 15 Aug 1669; TCD Ms 808:fol 246-52,
   Establishment, 1669.
6. CSPI, 1666-62:pp 609-11, Proposals of Council of Trade,
   4 June 1669; CSPI, 1666-69:p 629, Ossory to Ormond, 17 July
   1669.
Richard Jones, both able financiers, had been respectively appointed auditor general in November 1667 and chancellor of the exchequer in November 1668. At the vice-treasury Carteret proved an efficient officer, working closely with Ormond. However, he found Bellingham's books in such a muddle that his own work was much delayed. He was very critical of the way Bellingham had paid the establishment by assignments, and, on the face of it, seemed the perfect accomplice to a reforming lord lieutenant like Robartes. During Robartes's brief tenure events contrived to worsen the situation. The commissioners and assessors of subsidies were harried in their work, and Anglesey and Bellingham prosecuted, but nothing could be done to sort out the question of the farmers' defalcations or to stop the delay in paying out the first years farm rent (in customs and excise, quitrents and hearth tax) until April 1670.

Briefly mention should be made of the money due from the adventurers and soldiers by the act of settlement. Orrery's intention was to persuade the king that this could not be paid or at least to ensure that Ormond's portion was not. Whatever happened the money collected was expected to fall short of the necessary

2. CSPI, 1666-69: p 593, Rawdon to Conway, 18 Apr 1668; Carte Ms 36: fol 57, Carteret to Ormond, 30 Dec 1667; Carte Ms 48: fol 270, Ormond to Ossory, 30 June 1668.
3. Carte Ms 36: fol 458, Carteret to Ormond, 8 Sept 1668; Carte Ms 36: fol 482, Carteret to Ormond, 22 Sept 1668; Carte Ms 36: fol 491, Carteret to Ormond, 26 Sept 1668; by October 1669 Taylor had replaced Corker as deputy vice-treasurer. Nat Lib Ire Ms 2351: fol 65, Lane to Ormond, 23 Oct 1669.
4. Carte Ms 36: fol 495-6, Carteret to Ormond, 3 Oct 1668.
6. CTB, 1662-72, pp 11-60 passim, 19 Jan-28 Apr 1669; PRO PC2/62: fol 51 & 55, 5 & 14 Jan 1670. The farmers were not allowed to bring over £40,000 in specie to pay their rents.
7. Carte Ms 36: fol 353, Boyle to Ormond, 2 June 1668; Carte Ms 36: fol 376, Jones to Forbes, 10 June 1668.
Try as he might, Ormond began to despair of extricating his £50,000 intact, and by 1669 he instead settled for a pension of £5,000 pa to make up the sum.  

The touchstone of the economy's well-being, it has been pointed out in the previous chapter, was the state of army pay. The army was not only the government's greatest creditor, but its pay was the greatest stimulus to Irish internal trade and economic life. No greater measure of Ireland's recovery can be found than the Irish treasury's action in April 1668, when there was sufficient cash in the collectors' hands to pay the army its six months then due in cash, and to pay the civil list in full. In September the cash was prepared to pay the army its six months then due, although a little had to be paid in corn - there was still of course huge arrears. All this points to the full recovery of Ireland's economy in 1668 and that there was sufficient specie in the country to keep the economy buoyant.

1. Carte Ms 37; fol 20-1, 27 Feb 1669.  
2. Carte Ms 36; fol 491, Carteret to Ormond, 26 Sept 1668; Carte Ms 50; fol 44, Ormond to Carteret, 10 July 1669; Carte Ms 37; fol 83, Temple to Ormond, 17 July 1669; Carte Ms 37; fol 64, Temple to Ormond, 5 June 1669; Nat Lib Ire Ms 2351; fol 31, Lane to Ormond, 5 Oct 1669; Nat Lib Ire Ms 2351; fol 65, Lane to Ormond, 23 Oct 1669.  
3. Carte Ms 52; fol 254, Ormond to Anglesey, 15 Apr 1668; CSPI, 1666-69: p 593, Rawdon to Conway, 18 Apr 1668; Carte Ms 68; Bellingham to Ormond, 8 Apr 1668.  
4. Carte Ms 36; fol 495, Carteret to Ormond, 3 Oct 1668. The army's arrears were ten months due from 1660-61, and twelve months from the years 1666-67.
Problems with setting up the new farm, as we have seen, delayed the farmers' payments until April 1670. Not even the £70,000 in specie advanced by the farmers made up for the money amassed and not paid out by the collectors of hearthmoney, quitrents and customs and excise in this period. In March 1669 it was necessary to pay the army their six months by assignments: the good work of the treasury (or perhaps we should say of the economy) in 1668 was thus undone.¹ The army's expectations had been raised by two sets of payments in cash and much of the trouble Robartes experienced with the army may be attributed to the return to payment by assignments. Major army retrenchments awaited Robartes's report, and it was difficult to find any certain fund with which to pay the army their arrears except the king's £50,000 due by the act of settlement.² By September 1669, though, the shortage of money caused by defalcations held by the old farmers and the delay in taking up the new farm had left the horse unpaid since September 1668 and the foot from December 1668.³ In theory there was enough money, save £3,000, to pay all that was due.⁴ Robartes was reluctant to force his army to accept assignments, but he had no choice.⁵ It must have been a great disappointment to him when the king refused to allow the farmers to transport a further £40,000 in specie to Ireland to pay their rent, instead allowing them until April 1670 to

   CSPL, 1666-69: p 763, Orrery to Conway, 27 July 1669; Carte Ms 37: fol 85, Temple to Ormond, 2 Oct 1669.
3. None of the 6 months due in March 1669 had yet been assigned.
pay it in.\(^1\) Thus, it can be seen, the shortfall in army pay of 1669 was purely the result of delays in taking up the Irish revenue farm.

(3) **Robartes as Viceroy, 1669-70**

In this final section the viceroyalty of Lord John Robartes, so brief and ill-documented, will be re-assessed, particularly with regard to the financial administration, which was to be his main concern (with the army) during his tenure.

Robartes was one of Charles's most eminent advisers, a sullen man,\(^2\) but one so utterly loyal to the crown that Charles made him lord president of the council during the troubled years of his reign's close.\(^3\) He had been appointed Albemarle's deputy in Ireland in 1661, but refused to take up the post believing himself to be worthy of the full title and power.\(^4\) He served out the 1660s as lord privy seal, a constant and efficient, though never dominant, figure throughout. As Buckingham courted parliament, firstly by attacking the financial administrators, and then by moving towards an alliance with the presbyterians, Robartes became a natural ally, for he was the foremost presbyterian peer and the only one in favour. Robartes enthusiastically joined in the attacks on Clarendon and Ormond. He was one of the original members of the committee of foreign affairs in 1667 and sat with

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3. DNJS, vol xvi, p 1226.
Buckingham on the committee of inquiry into the Irish treasury.¹ There seems to have been consternation on both sides of the water at the king's choice.² Orrery was believed to have been at the back of it, but judging by his reaction he too was surprised.³ No doubt Buckingham had designs on the lord lieutenancy for himself, but Charles would never appoint that faction leader to a position of such power, and in choosing Robartes he picked a man of fairly independent stature who was also an ally of Buckingham's. This alliance was very much a working one, which Buckingham and Orrery only came to realise as they discovered the control they exercised over Robartes was very limited in all matters (not just Irish affairs). It is unlikely that Charles realised quite what a stubborn and independent servant he had chosen. One of Ormond's greatest faults had been his inflexibility and his unwillingness to accept Arlington's compromise of November 1668. He had finally been impugned to such a degree that Charles decided to replace him in February 1669.

The question we must ask ourselves is why Charles decided to replace Ormond in February 1669 and why he chose Robartes. As

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¹ The committee of foreign affairs was, in effect, Charles's 'cabinet'.
² Carte Xs 49; fol 331, Ormond to Ossory, 16 Feb 1669; CSPI, 1666-69: p 691, Leigh to Williamson, 27 Feb 1669; CSPI, 1666-69: p 691, Orrery to Conway, 27 Feb 1669; CSPI, 1666-69: p 691, Rawdon to Conway, 8 Mar 1669.
³ CSPI, 1666-69: p 691, Orrery to Conway, 27 Feb 1669. Orrery's 'shady' past made him a non-starter for the post.
we have seen, a mass of tangled threads played their part. Buckingham hated Ormond, Orrery was threatened by Ormond's renewed efforts to summons an Irish parliament and they both put the king under relentless pressure to replace him. Ultimately the decision was Charles's alone, but as James McGuire has pointed out, it has to be seen within the context of a royal policy which was taking a new and bold direction at this time.¹

Charles was playing a double game: through Arlington and Clifford's management he was persuading the parliament to vote him a record assessment under cover of supporting the triple alliance, whilst through his highly secretive 'Dover policy' he allied himself to France, promising to declare himself a catholic. However, as Chandaman has pointed out, the motivation for this policy of Charles, ever a realist, was financial. From parliament he received a record sum, from Louis £150,000 and a subsidy of £225,000 pa for the duration of the projected Anglo-French war with Holland. Furthermore, the great lure of a Dutch war was not the commercial extermination of England's great mercantile rival, but the promise of vast Dutch prizes to supplement further the English treasury.² For Charles's financial plight was desperate: the total net revenue amounted to £839,000 in 1667-8, £884,000 in 1668-9 and £990,000 in 1669-70.² This was not sufficient to meet a yearly expenditure of around £1,200,000

¹ McGuire, loc cit., pp 304-12.
² Chandaman, op cit., pp 221 ff.
³ ibid., p 220.
and the king therefore looked to new means and policies, not only to pay his way, but to release him from his obvious dependence on parliament. Bankruptcy stared the crown in the face and only the extraordinary diligence and endeavours of the treasury commissioners forestalled the day until 1672. 1

If we accept the financial motive as being the prime one behind the Dover treaty, the replacement of the 'anglican Ormond' with the presbyterian Robartes must be seen less as an effort to assuage presbyterians in England and Ireland and to persuade Louis of his sincerity (though how the appointment of a presbyterian could achieve this defeats my reason), and more an effort to replace an incompetent financial administration with a competent one. 2 This, it seems to me, is the most logical explanation of these events and fits in sensibly with the facts. Within the context of Charles's financial worries Ireland was taking on a new role in the king's and his advisers' minds. Formerly, it had been simply seen as a potentially rebellious island that had to be kept quiet, but now it might play a part in Charles's vague schemes. The committee of inquiry into Irish finances and Gorges's report were political instruments aimed at overthrowing Ormond, but both pointed to the possibility of an Ireland which could pay its own way, perhaps even produce a surplus (of money or troops, depending on how the surplus was used) which the king could put to his own uses beyond that kingdom. 3 At the very least it offered the possibility that

2. cf McGuire, loc cit., pp 303-12.
3. Charles had told Louis that Orrery could be depended upon to lead an Irish army to support his declaration of catholcity. In spite of the unlikelihood of this (although I think Orrery opportunist enough to change his spots to suit even this), compare this to Lynch, op cit., pp 161-6 and McGuire, loc cit., p 309. The significance of this, in the light of later events and schemes, can now be more fully seen.
Ireland should no longer be a drain on or nuisance to England. When Gorges delivered his paper in February 1669, it seems, the king was persuaded to extend his inquiry into Irish finances by appointing a man to the lord lieutenancy, who could lead the investigations into Ireland's finances on the spot, initiate appropriate reforms, making the country solvent and quiescent. Robartes's task was to root out maladministration in Ireland and to reform its finances. He appeared admirably suited for the task, especially after sitting on the commission of inquiry where he had become conversant with Ireland's financial problems, although he did express doubts himself. He even tried to keep his options open, by attempting to persuade the king not to appoint a new lord privy seal until October in case he changed his mind.

Thus, we can see the dual purpose behind Robartes's appointment: to sort out Ireland's finances and to discover conclusive proof of Ormond's incompetence. Buckingham continued his attacks on Ormond in England, embarrassed and angry that he had failed to disgrace his enemy totally. The earl of Meath's scandalous accusations were prosecuted with renewed vigour in the summer of 1669. Buckingham also attempted to have Ormond removed from the lord stewardship without success. In all these endeavours Orrery was his great ally, producing material and evidence to damn the former viceroy. There was no question, as we have

1. CSP, 1666-69: p 697, Orrery to Conway, 9 Mar 1669; Carte Ms 48: fol 333, Ormond to Ossory, 20 Feb 1669.
2. CSP, 1666-69: p 691, Orrery to Conway, 27 Feb 1669.
3. Carte Ms 36: fol 131, Council to Meath, 9 July 1669; Carte Ms 27: fol 146, Intelligence, 2 Mar 1669; Carte Ms 37: fol 155-6, Meath's Articles. 1669; Carte Ms 37: fol 290, Ormond to Spencer, 16 Oct 1669.
5. Carte Ms 50: fol 59, Ormond to Arran, 31 July 1669.
seen, of the real purpose behind sending Robartes, but Ormond sought to hamper investigations into his own activities by objecting to Robartes's instructions. All of the original drafts of Robartes's instructions pre-supposed guilt on the former lord lieutenant's part and made it clear that Robartes's chief role was to be as inquisitor.

You shall cause a strict inquiry to be made into all the mis­carriages and abuses which shall be so certified by the comm­issioners to have been committed, taking care that due reparation is made to us for what we have suffered, and that such things are prevented in the future.  

Ormond fought a fierce rearguard action against these, realising their full significance,

It is to be wished that in the whole course of the instructions relating to the army and the revenue, the maladministration of one and the ill-government of the other, should not be taken for granted, at least as far as it may reflect on the late lieutenant and present deputy.

This part of the battle Ormond won, and the instructions finally issued to Robartes differed little from those given to Ormond, and later to Berkeley, Essex and Ormond once more. However, the intention behind these re-phrased instructions clearly remained unaltered.

Orrery was doubtless the author of the new instructions. His influence on Irish affairs at court was at its zenith and Robartes often consulted him that summer. Charles knew how to

1. CSPL, 1666-69:pp 745, Draft Instructions, June 1669; CSPL, 1666-69:pp 742-46 passim, Notes and Drafts Instructions, June 1669; Carte Ms J7:fol 455-58, Robartes's Instructions, 28 June 1669; Carte Ms 59:fol 166, Draft Instructions for Robartes, 26 May 1669.
2. CSPL, 1666-69:pp 750, Ormond's Notes, 3 July 1669.
3. CSPL, 1666-69:pp 752-61, Robartes's Final Instructions, 23 July 1669; Carte Ms 52:fol 62, Ormond to Osseory, 31 July 1669.
use him like no other servant, giving him much work but little tangible in the way of reward. In Irish financial matters he was treated on a par with Carteret; for example, both were appointed to deal with aspects of the proposed farm of Irish arrears. After Carteret left for Dublin, Orrery became the chief negotiator in this scheme. It is likely also that Orrery dreamed up the compromise which ended the protracted struggle over retrenchments, deferring it to the lord lieutenant's report after his arrival in Ireland.

In England Ormond began his preparations to attack his enemies in parliament, culminating in the near-successful impeachment of Orrery in December 1669. It was a measure of Ormond's parliamentary influence that he was able to do so, but it was also a sign that the threat no longer came from a vengeful parliament, and that the actions and inquiries of Robartes in Ireland offered the real danger.

Much of the blame for the dismal failure of Robartes's brief administration must be laid at Ormond's door, for he waged a systematic campaign against the new appointee in Ireland before his arrival. He was helped by the fact that Robartes was not a popular choice. His behaviour and demeanour was arrogant and provocative; he was stuffy and either angered people or, as

4. Ormond's influence in parliament was seen in 1676-7, when Danby courted his support.
in Arlington's case, caused them to laugh jeeringly at him. Ormond added to the disrespect felt for his successor by broadcasting this information. Carteret, so essential an ally to a lord lieutenant who intended to investigate the revenue, remained openly loyal to Ormond and left Dublin in September 1669 just a few days before the new viceroy's arrival - a measure, perhaps, of his sympathies.

The campaign to neutralise Robartes was two-pronged: by the first Ormond sought to make him his ally, by the second to turn the whole Irish administration against him. The first approach proved abortive, the new viceroy seemed firmly in Buckingham's camp. In order to mollify him Ormond had directed Ossory to send all dispatches to the new not the old viceroy as he had been continuing to do. He had opposed a plan of the king's to keep all military appointments in his own hands, on the grounds that it was unfair to the new lord lieutenant.

Inspite of these efforts Ormond made no progress with this stratagem finding,

But a cold reception from him ... hence I may have reason to doubt (i.e. suspect) he will be desirous to find any faults that have been committed during the former government especially in the matter of the revenue.

Thus, Ormond embarked wholeheartedly on his campaign to secure the full loyalty of the Irish privy council. In this he was,

1a Carte Ms 46:fol 337, Ormond to Ossory, 8 Mar 1669; CSPI, 1662-70: p 1, Page to Williamson, 4 Sept 1669.
2. Carte Ms 50:fol 16, Ormond to Ossory, 14 Mar 1669.
4. Carte Ms 50:fol 66, Ormond to Davies, 1 Aug 1669.
of course, aided by having his son, Ossory, as lord deputy. He had begun this in February when Sir George Lane issued an apologia to several prominent Irish politicians for his master's dismissal. The news of his fall was ill-received in Dublin, for the administration knew it was as much a reflection on each of them as its head, and also many of the privy council owed their promotion, and therefore their loyalty, to Ormond's patronage. Temple's outpouring of sorrow at Ormond's dismissal was typical of many received by the former chief governor and is a measure of his privy council's loyalty. Such loyalty was quickly and easily capitilized upon, with Ossory as the acting head of government pending Robartes's arrival. In May 1669 the government defiantly refused to recommend any retrenchments. The Irish government refused to panic in the face of its new lord lieutenant, and the defections from Ossory and Ormond within the privy council, which might reasonably have been expected, did not occur. Copies of two letters Ormond wrote to Arran and Davies, asking them not to concur with any inquiries into maladministration undertaken by Robartes, are extant and may be representative of several that Ormond may have issued.

As he told Arran,

The general design though laid here must have its rise with the collection of matter against me in Ireland where my

1. A lucky accident, rather than a deliberate ploy, I think.
2. CSPI, 1666–69: p 695, Orrery to Conway, 6 Mar 1669.
7. Carte Ms 50: fol 59, Ormond to Arran, 31 July 1669; Carte Ms 50: fol 66, Ormond to Davies, 1 Aug 1669.
failings must suppose to have been, and in this nothing can be of moment without the concurrence of the council with the chief governor and that my friends are to be, as assiduous as possible to be till it appear what is intended.  

In this way Ormond ensured that his successor's privy council would be hostile to his endeavours, but not only because they would damage Ormond, but because necessarily some of their own number would be likewise impugned.

Robartes eventually arrived in Dublin to take up his post on 18 September 1669. He immediately made his attitude to the Irish government clear by waiving aside a delegation of the privy council, which was headed by Richard Jones, Sir Paul Davies and Sir Theophilus Jones, and travelling straight to the castle to be sworn in.  

Hostility towards the new governor was given vent at the glorious reception given to Ossory at his departure from Dublin.  

It seems, however, that Robartes set to work quite undeterred. Most commentators are very harsh on the lord lieutenant, but Lord Herbert of Cherbury gives us another view, extolling him for his hard work and pointing out the many abuses in the administration with which he hoped to deal.  

Robartes had the council meeting three times a week and he worked very diligently.  

Even when he fell ill the viceroy continued to meet his council and did not relax his stern style of government.  

1. Carte Ms 50: fol 59, Ormond to Arran, 31 July 1669.  
would have great difficulty running the government if his executive was unco-operative. Only total royal support could counterbalance this disadvantage. Ormond had set the privy council and lord lieutenant on collision course, only the king could ensure that the councillors, not the viceroy, were the chief casualties.

Impetus was given to Robartes's role as inquisitor and financial reformer by the completion of the committee of inquiry's report on the Irish revenue since the restoration: it also braced the Irish privy council to defend itself and its former head. The report was completed before Robartes left for Ireland on 28 August 1669, but it was not presented to the council in England until 22 September 1669. The report was phrased in the most critical language, each sentence loaded with innuendo and unsubstantiated remarks abound, such as,

We find the accounts generally to be kept in so ill a method that it is very hard for them who deal uprightly to clear all their proceedings by these books, and if any were disposed to deal otherwise the perplexity and confusion of these accounts would afford them subterfuge enough.

The report kept to its brief, concentrating on criticising Anglesey and Bellingham and only by implication tainting the lord lieutenant and his council, but at the same time obviously blackening both. The presentation of this report, coinciding as it did with Robartes's arrival in Ireland, reinforced the viceroy's plan to straighten out the Irish revenue. Anglesey's carelessness and incompetence was proven on several points and

1. TCD Ms 308: fol 266, Commission Examining Accounts of Ireland, 1669.
2. TCD Ms 308: fol 258, Commission Examining Accounts of Ireland, 1669.
he was charged with being £34,186 in debt to the king and proceedings recommended against him because of "apparent errors in the account" and because the accounts had not been audited correctly according to the letter of the law.\(^1\) The commissioners of accounts in Ireland, who audited the vice-treasurer's accounts always constituted the leading members of the Irish privy council (but not the chief governor), and thus all the leading Irish government officials were impugned.\(^2\) The whole administration was criticized for preferring private warrants to the establishment, which frittered away English subventions and implied Ormond was incompetent if not corrupt.\(^3\)

The actual substance of the report was not so damning that Ormond could not defend himself, but it ruined his reputation as a financier forever.\(^4\) The report's recommendations gave Robartes full scope to re-order the financial administration and, to investigate further Anglesey's methods.\(^5\) Process was also issued against Anglesey and Bellingham for their debts.\(^6\) Proceedings against Anglesey were suspended on his promotion to the privy seal in 1673, but those against Bellingham for £14,000 dragged on for some years.\(^7\)

\(^{1}\) TCD Ms 808: fol 258-63, Commission Examining Accounts of Ireland, 1669.
\(^{2}\) TCD Ms 808: fol 263, Commission Examining Accounts of Ireland, 1669.
\(^{3}\) TCD Ms 908: fol 264, Commission Examining Accounts of Ireland, 1669.
\(^{5}\) TCD Ms 808: fol 266, Commission Examining Accounts of Ireland, 1669.
\(^{6}\) TCD Ms 808: fol 266, Commission Examining Accounts of Ireland 1669; CSPI, 1669-73: p 640, Order in Council, 22 Sept 1669.
\(^{7}\) Carte Ms 17: fol 197-8, Barons of Exchequer report on Anglesey's Accounts, Dec 1669; DNB, vol i, p 479; CSPD, 1671: p 417, King to Lords Justices, 5 Aug 1671.
It is demonstrable, therefore, that, although the committee of inquiry, its interim report, Gorges's report and the final report were political instruments designed initially for destroying the Clarendonians in government, and especially Ormond, their secondary, and eventually more important role, was to illustrate that Ireland could be run at a profit. Robartes was hampered in his investigations into this possibility by Ormond contradicting his original instructions and mobilising the Irish executive against him. Even though he was armed with the committee of inquiry's recommendations and the king's full support, his efforts at investigation quickly foundered.

Nowhere was this more plainly evidenced than in his limited attempts at financial reform. He disregarded Jones's calculations and had his own drawn up which demonstrated that in theory at least there was all but enough revenue to balance the books.\(^1\) Strict instructions were issued to the subsidy assessors to hasten their work, but the early flurry of activity fizzled out.\(^2\) In the first place, Robartes was unable to pay the army in ready cash, because of the stop of payments by the farmers until April 1670. This severely undermined his authority and self

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confidence as he had specifically opposed it, warning against the dangers of issuing the army with assignments instead of cash.\(^1\) Furthermore, it was now impossible for Robartes to recommend any retrenchments in 1669 because the farmers' advance would have been vital to pay for the cashiering of troops, and all £70,000 of this had been earmarked for current pay. Secondly, the commission to abate quitrents, appointed in December 1668, had been dispatched in January 1669 "with more haste than satisfaction".\(^2\) The abatements recommended were far-reaching and in January 1670 in the teeth of Robartes's opposition, the farmers asked for defalcations on them.\(^3\) These incidents demonstrated that Robartes's authority could be undermined at court, if two such decisions as these which he expressly opposed were upheld.\(^4\) This emboldened the already hostile privy council against the lord lieutenant and reduced his attempted reforms to a shambles. In revenue matters he made no headway.\(^5\)

Opposition to Robartes's proposed reforms coalesced in his dealings with the army, whose payment and retrenchment were expected to be the basis of his financial reforms. Amongst his first tasks was an attempt to find a fund for the soldiers'

\(^1\) PRO PC2/62:fol 51 & 55, 5 & 14 Jan 1670; Carte Ms 37:fol 103, Robartes to Privy Council, 17 Dec 1669; Carte Ms 37:fol 488, Ranelagh to Ormond, 22 Mar 1670. (R. Jones had succeeded his father as Viscount Ranelagh in Nov 1669.)

\(^2\) Carte Ms 48:fol 313, Ormond to Ossory, 12 Dec 1668; CTB, 1667-8, p 500, 3 Dec 1668; Carte Ms 37:fol 14, Jones to Ormond, 14 Jan 1669.

\(^3\) Twomey, op cit., p 278; Carte Ms 69:fol 62, Information from Life of Ormond; TCD Ms 808:fol 274, New Farmers' demand for defalcations, 1669.

\(^4\) Carte Ms 37:fol 103, Robartes to Privy Council, 17 Dec 1669.

\(^5\) Carte Ms 37:fol 488, Ranelagh to Ormond, 22 Mar 1670.
arrears, and the likeliest candidate appeared to be the king's £50,000 due out of the act of settlement. On 27 September he sent out a strict order about the way the six months pay due to the soldiers was to be issued, and that it was to be paid in full and the officers were to ensure all debts were paid in their quarters. No officers were allowed to leave their quarters until the six months pay in assignments and six months in cash had been fully paid. Such a strict interpretation of his instructions was deeply resented by Irish officers (some of whom were privy councillors) and who were used to obtaining frequent leave to travel to England or Dublin. This was forbidden. Lord O'Brien's request for leave was turned down until he received the king's orders in February 1670. No exceptions were made and Lord Polliard resigned in indignation. Even Conway had to procure his leave of absence through Buckingham's request to the king, which caused Robartes to rebuke his sometime ally, Buckingham, in March 1670, a sure indication that his judgement, if not his nerve, had been shattered.

Robartes's greatest error of judgement was his acceptance of a petition from the soldiers of the regiment of guards against their officers for arrears. Robartes went further than he should in countenancing this paper, inciting the soldiers to

5. CSPI, 1669-70:p 29, Leigh to Williamson, 30 Nov 1669.
virtual mutiny, - "If any of them (the officers) do you any wrong, you shall always find me ready with an open ear to do you right". A commission of inquiry into these abuses was set up, consisting of Conway, Drogheda, Dungannon and Roscommon, and Robartes intended to broaden it into one of the whole army. Accepting the petitioners' word Robartes refused commissions to Arran (the commander of the regiment of guards) and all his officers.

Foolishly, Robartes had cut himself off from what was any lord lieutenant's greatest support at court, his secretary of state. This he had achieved by simply refusing to communicate in any form with Arlington, and by issuing warrants which were not countersigned by the secretary of state. Ormond complained to the king about Robartes's treatment of Arran (Ormond's son) and that he was inciting mutiny, and he was supported in this by an indignant Arlington. The king was still set on the same course for Ireland, and he confined his self to a relatively gentle rebuke of the lord lieutenant, warning him not to incite the soldiers against their officers, to remember the officers were men of quality, and to correspond with the secretaries of state as was the usual practice. Robartes promptly and surprisingly resigned and Berkeley was at once appointed in his stead.

1. Carte Ms 218: fol 33, Robartes's reply to soldiers' petition, 29 Sept 1669; Carte Ms 52: fol 75, Complaints of the Officers (against Robartes), 1669.
4. ESPI, 1669-70: p 56, King to Robartes, 1 Dec 1669.
5. ESPI, 1669-70: p 50, Robartes to King, 7 Dec 1669; ESPI, 1669-70: p 66, King to Robartes, 13 Jan 1670. It seems it took well over 1 month for Robartes's resignation to reach Charles due to inclement weather conditions.
time with regard to a proposed trial of Lord Charlemont by his peers.

It was unfortunate for Robartes that Ormond and Arlington were able to attack him at just the moment when Orrery was being impeached. The impeachment showed the weakness of the Buckingham group in the commons and it was the same session that was so generous to Charles and marked such a triumph for the 'undertakers', Clifford and Arlington, Ormond's allies (more often than not).

In these circumstances the king understandably sided with Ormond and Arlington, thereby undermining Robartes's position. Robartes showed himself to be quite unable to adapt to or accept criticism. His actions as lord lieutenant seem almost calculated to provoke his recall, which suggests that his illness of November 1669 may have been accompanied by a breakdown of sorts. All he desired was to retire from public life, and he ignored overtures to attack Ormond on his recall with the tenuous promise of the privy seal as bait.

His remaining months in Ireland, whilst he awaited Berkeley's arrival, saw his person and his office held in the lowest esteem and contempt imaginable. Ormond's influence and respect for his name meant few condemned the attempted impeachment of Orrery. The lord lieutenant used his negative voice against all grants; no work was carried out and petitioners consequently waited for Robartes to leave. His unpopularity could not be over-exaggerated. Officers, denied access to Dublin, openly

2. Chandaman, op cit., p 222.
3. CSPI, 1669-70: p 50, Robartes to King, 7 Dec 1669; Carte Ms 50: fol 82, ? to Ormond, 23 Apr 1670; Carte Ms 37: fol 512, Dempsey to Ossory, 22 Apr 1670.
5. CSPI, 1669-70: p 69, Leigh to Williamson, 29 Jan 1670; CSPI, 1669-70: p 71, Aungier to Williamson, 8 Feb 1670; Carte Ms 243: fol 49, Ranelagh to Ossory, 19 Mar 1670.
flouted his orders and came in anyway. None of his revenue reforms had ever taken root and, as Ranelagh pointed out, to have paid the army what they were due in cash and assignments "is not an achievement which either deserves our admiration or his vanity". Prose and verse attacking Robartes were published everywhere. Ormond had ensured that Robartes received a hostile reception from the Irish government, and his subsequent actions had earned not only their contempt but the army officers' too. The king's failure to support his representative's actions and wishes (which was wholly justifiable) undermined Robartes's standing and credibility. Robartes's great reforming lord lieutenancy was an utter fiasco.

Against the background of Irish economic recovery political and financial considerations in England had caused the crown to review its notion of Ireland's place within its overall strategy and policy. The review and investigation of Ireland's financial administration pinpointed and began a process of rooting out inefficiency in government, especially with regard to the revenue. Ireland's precise role in the developed policy of Charles for his kingdoms was as unclear as the jerky feints and manoeuvres the king made towards that nebulous and uncertain goal. What had been demonstrated, especially by the farm auction, was that Ireland could yield a far greater revenue than its old administrators thought possible. This made them redundant. It also lent weight to the school of thought which suggested to Charles that Ireland need no longer be a charge to England. In 1668-9

Charles saw the possibility of, at the least, freeing England from having to support Ireland, and it was Ranelagh, who in 1671 was able to translate this possibility into a viable scheme which promised Charles a tangible Irish profit, which he could use in England. The attempt to investigate Ireland's finances under Robartes failed, but it could not prevent the crown from continuing to think about the Irish revenue in the same terms. The hard reality of near bankruptcy made it necessary that the new course envisaged for Ireland's finances would not be abandoned: the means had to be found to ensure Ireland was at least solvent, perhaps, at best, profitable.
Chapter VI

IRELAND UNDER BERKELEY, 1670-72
John Berkeley of Stratton is one of the least well understood figures to have filled the lord lieutenancy. His prominence in the restoration court is often overlooked because of the magnified, but in fact relatively minor, role he played during the civil war and the interregnum. One primary aim of this chapter is to reassess his character and his tenure of the post. Had he died after his first six months in office he surely would have been remembered as one of the best lord lieutenants of the century - in popular opinion at any rate.

These years, however, are seminal to our understanding of the direction which Charles's Irish policy was to take in the 1670s and 1680s. On the one hand Berkeley's government in Ireland has been seen as the logical result of Charles's Dover policy, declaration of indulgence and courting of Louis; whereas on the other hand it was, in fact, the financial schemes of Richard Jones, Viscount Ranelagh, and embodied in his undertaking which demonstrated to the king that Ireland really could be a rich and regular source of royal income. Ireland in 1671 took on a real and vital function under Ranelagh's guidance, far removed from that envisaged under Robartes or Berkeley. This chapter will attempt to elucidate Ranelagh's undertaking and its significance to a bankrupt king and for the future of Ireland: the balance of power in government shifted dramatically from Dublin to Whitehall.

1. The best and most full account of Berkeley's life is in D.N.B., vol ii, pp 361 ff.
The greatest difficulty we face in examining these problems is that the years 1670-72 are the least well documented of the restoration period. Ormond's papers dry to a trickle, Berkeley left no extant papers and the treasury minute book for 18 August 1670 to 2 October 1671 is missing. In spite of these huge gaps in relevant material, it is possible to reconstruct the major events of 1671 and many details of the undertaking, although some of its deeper intricacies will probably always remain a mystery.

Only a matter of days after receiving Robartes's resignation Berkeley was chosen to be his successor. The joy felt in Ireland at the replacement of Robartes cannot be overestimated.

The last vestiges of Robartes's authority were undermined by a stop of all payments, and government held virtually in suspension

1. There is virtually no material covering these years in the Carte Ms, whilst that amongst the Ormonde Ms in the National Library of Ireland is mainly estate papers. Berkeley left no extant papers, nor did his secretary Leighton, and we are forced to rely heavily on the state papers which are thankfully quite full. The CSPI after 1670 is amalgamated with the CSPD, which is a pity for the Irish historian. Leighton and Berkeley were reasonably consistent correspondents compared with their predecessors. The greatest loss is in treasury papers, which seriously hampers our ability to understand the tortuous and bitter negotiations preceding Ranelagh's grant. The treasury minute book for 18 August 1670 to 2 October 1671 is missing and has been since at least the beginning of this century. This may be connected with events leading up to the stop of the English exchequer in January 1672 and the government might have felt it expedient to lose the book. GTR, vol III, 1669-72, pt 1: p 496.

2. CSPI, 1669-70: p 66, King to Robartes, 18 Jan 1670.


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pending Berkeley's arrival. 1 There were in fact high expectations of the new lord lieutenant. 2 To some extent this can be explained by the fact that any replacement would be well received after the hated Robartes. More importantly though, he had experience of Ireland, having resided there in 1662-3 as lord president of Connaught. He had sat at the privy council there and had been a major adviser to Ormond in that brief period. To add to those friends he had made during his stay in Ireland he could count those he had made at court and during the interregnum, for Berkeley was always surrounded by anglo-Irish cavaliers (often catholic ones too). His advancement to high office was aided by his kinsman the Earl of St Albans, and, more especially, the Duke of York who was his closest friend. 2 Despite being many years Charles's senior he was a particular companion of his, though not his confidante. 4 He was more palatable to the Irish government in another respect also: he had not been one of the inquisitors of the Duke of Ormond, nor was he openly hostile to that duke or any in the Irish government as Robartes had been. This is not to say, though, that he was not associated with the Buckingham cabal. To Buckingham and Orrery also he was a most acceptable choice. Personal hatred of Clarendon - the result of a private quarrel during the interregnum which had deprived Berkeley of a wealthy match - made him their natural ally. 5 All round therefore he seemed a far better choice than Robartes.

1. CSPI, 1669-70:p 85, Order of Lords Committee for Irish Affairs, 13 Mar 1670.
4. He was on close terms with the king, but was never one of his cabalists, CSPI, 1669-70:pp xv-xvi.
Against him there was the fact that at 62 he was the oldest man to have ever taken up the office and he had a reputation as a drunkard, but it seems clear that his appointment should not be portrayed as the great mystery that some historians have thought it to be.  

Berkeley's appointment has always been seen in the context of Charles's Dover policy in the narrowest sense. By choosing Berkeley with Leighton as his secretary the king placed two men of known catholic sympathies at the head of the Irish government. Charles thus indicated to Louis that he intended to comply with the terms of the secret treaty. In my view this was simply the fortunate by-product of Berkeley's appointment, which has distorted interpretations of the reasons for Charles's choice.

The purpose of Berkeley's administration was not to catholicise the Irish government, it was to run Ireland efficiently and profitably. Within the context of the financial crisis that had forced Charles to embark on his double policy of courting Louis and French money with one set of promises, and parliament and its money with another, Berkeley's tenure must be viewed as an extension of the same course and purpose that had been set for Robartes, but without its vindictive edge. As we shall see, Berkeley and Leighton were far less concerned with seeing the mass celebrated in Christ Church once more, than in improving efficiency in government and making Ireland solvent. Indeed the brief

2. It is difficult to place the exact timing of Leighton's conversion to catholicism, but it seems to have coincided with the increased imbalance of his mind in the later 1670s. See D.N.B., vol xi, pp 881-2, which is the best account of his life. Though sympathetic to catholicism, I think it unlikely he was a practising catholic in Ireland.
flurry of activity and letters in 1671-2, which are associated with Charles's efforts to reintroduce catholics into public life in Ireland, emanated from Whitehall at a time when Berkeley's power had been totally eclipsed, his successor chosen and Ireland ruled by the Irish committee.\(^1\)

The instructions with which Berkeley was issued differed little from Robartes's.\(^2\) In the revenue he was likely to be just as strict as Robartes and in this to be aided by a new vice-treasurer, Francis, Lord Aungier.\(^3\) He was also bound to be a better correspondent than Robartes had been and to see the importance of keeping friendly relations with Arlington.\(^4\) In the months preceding his departure for Ireland he kept in close contact with Orrery, frequently meeting Buckingham at his house.\(^5\) He even allowed himself to become mixed up with Shaen and wrote two letters in the great intriguer's favour.\(^6\) It was believed that Orrery and Berkeley had been given equal power in Ireland, but while Orrery's advice might carry equal weight with Berkeley's when both were at court, when both in Ireland Berkeley soon showed he was no one's drudge.\(^7\) Sir Ellis Leighton was made Berkeley's secretary and was his great confidante, but he was also a sworn follower of Buckingham and made it his business to keep Berkeley and Buckingham on good terms.\(^8\)

1. See below.
2. CSPI, 1669-70:p 78-81, Instructions to Berkeley, February 1670.
3. He was appointed vice-treasurer 11 Jan 1670, CSPI, 1669-70:p 60, Warrant to Attorney General, 11 Jan 1670.
4. Ormonde Ms, vol iii, p 444, Duchess of Ormond to Capt Matthew, 29 Jan 1670.
Some efforts were made at the treasury board to force further retrenchments on the Irish establishments without consultation with the Irish privy council. However, Berkeley and Ormond managed to persuade the treasury to compromise and await the lord lieutenant's own report from Ireland, although Berkeley did promise he could save £25,000 pa by retrenching officers without weakening the army. Berkeley resisted efforts to renew the discussion and the harsh new establishment many feared did not materialise. This was not because he refused to comply with the treasury's wishes, but because the establishment had been pruned to a dangerous level. The only addition to the charges on the revenue supported by the new viceroy was Boyle's petition for £1,200 pa; all others he had opposed at the treasury board. He was in no doubt that his task as lord lieutenant was,

the increasing of the revenue or lessening the expense, and to set forth the necessity of the latter that I may have the more general and more ready compliance in the former, which former I am full of hope that I shall effect in the space of one year if I be not disturbed or crossed by those who will not give themselves leisure to understand our affairs here.

Clearly, once he had arrived in Dublin, Berkeley put the emphasis more on improving the revenue than severely cutting back the establishment. The prominence of the revenue in his thinking is indicated by the fact that one of his first actions was to order

2. CTB, vol III, 1669-72, pt i, p 385, 13 March 1670; Carte Ms 242:fol 49, Ranelagh to Ossory, 19 Mar 1670.
5. A very clear change from his ideas in February 1670: see above and CTB, vol III, 1669-72, pt i, 24 Feb 1670.
that no grants be issued on the king's arrears until the king's debts to the establishment had been cleared. ¹ To facilitate this a commission of inquiry into the arrears due to the king was set up in August 1670. ²

Berkeley arrived in Dublin on 22 April 1670 to a sparkling reception. ³ Unlike his predecessor he happily joined in the celebrations, paying particular court to Arran and Ranelagh, two of the leading dissidents of Robartes's council. ⁴ Leighton promised to maintain a strict correspondence with Williamson, who handled Arlington's Irish letters. ⁵ The six months due to the establishment by Ossory's warrants, which Robartes had eventually neglected to pay, were ordered to be disbursed. This was not possible, for Robartes left Berkeley no authentic copies of the establishment and he had to send to the English privy council for one. ⁶ This early manifestation of carelessness and inefficiency was coupled with the realisation by Berkeley that his expenses exceeded his expectations, and that vital officers and advisers, such as Aungier and Shaen, were absent in London. ⁷ Unlike Robartes who had been dissatisfied with everything he had found, Berkeley was more tactful:

I have reason hitherto to be fully satisfied with all I find here, especially in those that have the honour to be of the council, who seem to mind his majesty's affairs here with great

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1. CSPI, 1669-70: p 153, King to Berkeley, 10 June 1670.
3. CSPI, 1669-70: p 111, Froode to Perrot, 22 Apr 1670.
7. CSPI, 1669-70: p 114, Berkeley to Arlington, 23 Apr 1670.
unanimity. We think ourselves secure of all enemies here but
one, which is want; and necessarily that we fear will come upon
us like an armed man by reason of the great arrears due to both
lists, and for the many assignments upon the establishment to
persons and for things that have no relation to the service
here ....

The paucity of the revenue was pinpointed therefore as the major
evil to be overcome, but the blame for this was no longer squarely
put upon the shoulders of the Irish administrators, but court
parasites. Nonetheless, he was determined to make the
functioning of the administration more efficient, for the possi-
ability of improvement here was evident. He began to make
inquiries about improving the postal service across the Irish
sea. He met the privy council frequently, keeping it to its
business, and made a point of hearing all petitioners and seeing
that they received speedy replies. Ever keen to improve his own
fortune he complained again of the vast expense of the office,
but to no effect. He also made it a major priority to keep in
close contact with Arlington, and through him with the court,
realising that failure to do so had been Robartes's chief undoing.

With Leighton's help Berkeley strove in this initial period
towards a greater efficiency in government. The Irish army was
organised into regiments within a month and prepared for a general
rendezvous prior to changing quarters. A new council of trade
was appointed in May 1670 headed by Ranelagh, and including Petty,

1. CSPI, 1669-70:p 118, Berkeley to Arlington, 30 Apr 1670.
2. CSPI, 1669-70:p 119, Leighton to Williamson, 30 Apr 1670.
4. CSPI, 1669-70:pp 125-6, Berkeley to Arlington, 10 May 1670.
5. CSPI, 1669-70:p 131, Leigh to Williamson, 13 May 1670.
Bence, Deane, Stepney, Stone and R Bucknall, whose aim was to be practical rather than idealistic. In order to keep the outlying parts of Ireland and England in touch with what was happening in Dublin, Berkeley initiated a Dublin Gazette, so that news about Ireland would no longer depend on private gossip. It should also be said that Berkeley hoped to be able to make some money out of this venture.

In between all this business Berkeley distracted himself not with wine and women, as was his usual practice in London, but in learning about Ireland and its government from the many records he found in the castle. Everyone was most impressed with him, especially compared to Hobartes. Much of the weight of his toil was shouldered by Leighton. He kept all the viceroy's business in his own hands, leaving none for the other secretaries. His appetite for work was phenomenal and he still found time to practise law to augment his income. Berkeley trusted him totally which, considering his capacity for work and efficient administration, was a wise decision. Leighton's corrupt practices only blighted his efficiency at the very end of Berkeley's tenue.

Aungier had originally taken over the vice-treasurership on 21 January 1670. His instructions were prepared by Ashley at the treasury board, based on those given to his predecessors - an

1. CSPI, 1669-70: p 126, Leighton to Williamson, 10 May 1670; Bence, Deane and Stepney were involved in the inland excise farm and had been part of the old customs farm; Stone and R Bucknall were commissioners for the new farmers of the revenue.
2. CSPI, 1669-70: p 131, Leight to Williamson, 13 May 1670.
5. CSPI, 1669-70: p 131, Leight to Williamson, 13 May 1670: Carte Ms 37: fol 536, Ranelagh to Ossory, 8 Aug 1670.
indication that the Irish treasury was considered subservient to its English counterpart. ¹ It would appear that James Cuffe, his brother-in-law, was his deputy vice-treasurer. ² It was an uneventful period in Irish treasury history in Dublin itself, although the events at Whitehall leading to the Irish treasury stop, Aungier's suspension and the handover of the treasury to Ranelagh were all of profound significance. ³ Bence, Deane and partners had been made commissioners of all the revenue not in farm on 21 March 1670, as compensation for not retaining their farm contracts, at 2/6 in every pound. ⁴ This would not have amounted to much between them as the casual revenue was no more than £6,000 pa, and this was the only unfarmed branch. Very little progress was made in the prosecution of Bellingham, said to owe £14,000 to the crown, and Corker said to owe £5,000. ⁵ A re-trial had to be ordered which only further delayed a conclusion to the matter. ⁶

Aungier's reputation as a financier cannot rest on this brief tenure of the office, but on the great work he carried out as a treasury commissioner from 1683 onwards. At best he proved competent under Berkeley, at worst he verged on the negligent. His reputation was severely damaged in 1671 when he produced a

¹. CTB, vol III, 1669-72, pt i, p 410, 20 Apr 1670; CSPI, 1669-70: p 127-31, Instructions to Aungier, 13 May 1670.
². Inferred from CSPD, 1671: p 313, King to Lords Justices, 10 June 1671; and CSPD, 1671: p 328, O'Neill to Conway, 17 June 1671.
⁴. CSPI, 1669-70: pp 92-3, King to Chief Governor, 21 Mar 1670.
⁵. CSPD, 1671: p 54, Berkeley and Council to Arlington, 27 Jan 1671; CSPD, 1671: p 98, Aungier to King, February 1671.
state of the revenue which was far too pessimistic to comply with the king's needs and mood, nor indeed did it really fit the facts.¹ When Berkeley arrived in Ireland he found there was £130,974 in view to pay the establishment its six months, which was ample.² He was unable to do so for some time because he lacked a legitimate establishment.² The viceroy was anxious to settle the revenue and to see the officers concerned with it operating efficiently, and he was angered by Aungier's prolonged absence from his post.⁴ Nor was Aungier very keen to stay long in Ireland and Berkeley had to order him to remain for the Michaelmas term to give judgement in several outstanding cases which had not been heard for four years due to the continual absence of successive vice-treasurers.⁵

The pressure for increased efficiency in the Irish treasury ultimately came from the crown's weak financial position, and Berkeley well understood that his chief task was to re-order Ireland's finances. In this he was only moderately successful. In the year and a half that Aungier exercised his office £49,990 was spent on extraordinary payments, which for a period of peace verged on the excessive, although it is difficult to see where savings could have been made.⁶ By far the largest figure was for £11,913, the principal and interest of £10,000 lent by

¹ Compare this to Twomey's glowing account of Aungier in Twomey, The Financial and Commercial Policy of the English Administration in Ireland, 1660-70, (MA UCD, 1954), p 290. As we shall see from the rest of this chapter Aungier's statement was not in touch with the growing prosperity of the Irish economy at this point.
² TCP Ms 672:fol 283, Account of Irish Treasury, 22 Apr 1670.
³ CSPI, 1669-70: p 118, Berkeley to Arlington, 30 Apr 1670.
⁵ CSPI, 1669-70: p 161, Leigh to Williamson, 18 June 1670.
⁶ Stowe Ms 200:fol 7, Extraordinary Payments not on establishment, since 21 Jan 1670 paid by Aungier, 23 Nov 1671.
Bucknall to the king in August 1669. As it was impossible to pay this out of the king's £50,000 due by the act of settlement, Bucknall was allowed to repay himself the sum out of the current farm rent. This money therefore was in effect Charles's first Irish subvention. The money would have been taken out of the treasury of 1670-71, although Charles received its benefit in 1669. This subvention could hardly be spared.

The revenue was now in an uncertain state and to stave off creditors the government had to increase its concordatum allowance, thereby increasing the establishment which went against the king's intentions and Berkeley's hopes. The situation was exacerbated by the remittal of quitrents which were expected to reach over £9,000 pa and which would seriously damage the revenue. It was feared also that many innocent catholics might be able to use their acquittals in the court of claims to free themselves from the obligation to pay the quitrent. As we will see below, Berkeley was able to prevent the abatements going too far, but only with the greatest difficulty. The lord lieutenant's other concern was to put constant pressure on the old revenue farmers to pay out the defalcations they held on the inland excise and customs. He had first tried to broach the matter at the treasury in March 1670. Deane prevailed in having it referred to Berkeley.

1. & 2. CSPI, 1669-70: p 247, King to Lord Lieutenant, 31 Aug 1670 (entered at this date, but originally dated 25 Nov 1669); Stowe Ms 200: fol 7, Extraordinary Payments, 23 Nov 1671.

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and his privy council in Ireland. Inevitably it was referred back to the treasury board in October 1670. In May 1671 the lord lieutenant began to pressurize the farmers once more, but they saved themselves by burying their debts in Ranelagh's undertaking, achieving an abatement of £41,000.

Measures in Whitehall therefore continually undermined Berkeley's efforts in Ireland, severely restricting his scope in financial affairs. In trade at least there was little interference from the court. In spite of poor weather conditions in 1670 the customs yield increased rapidly and the farmers were expected to be great gainers. The degree to which they were aided by the newly appointed council of trade was probably minimal, although it must have been a useful forum for Irish merchants to express their ideas to the government. Bucknall was, however, through his favoured relationship with the impoverished king allowed to ship £25,000 in specie out of Ireland free of charge in February 1671, which cannot have helped the economy. The great advances in the revenue of 1670 and 1671 were soon to be dashed by the Dutch war and the new plantations act requiring all plantation goods to pass through England first, paying customs there before coming to Ireland. This was to have its effect in the future.

1. PRO PC2/62:fol 76 and 85, 9 Mar and 29 Apr 1670.
5. CSPI, 1669-70:p 119, Leighton to Williamson, 30 Apr 1670.
6. CSPD, 1671:p 72, Order in Council, 10 Feb 1671.

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For the present the Irish economy was moving into a very prosperous period. The only financial thorn in the Irish government's side was the huge crown debt and Ranelagh's undertaking neatly removed this, making the prospect for the Irish revenue very rosy indeed. 1670 is the last year for which we have figures for the extraordinary revenue. After that date the value of arrears collected for the subsidies, poll money, half years value and so on cannot be safely ascertained as they were hidden in Ranelagh's accounts which were, of course, never produced. In 1670 the extraordinary revenue yielded £37,371, whilst the ordinary totalled £211,980. This was more than enough to meet the establishment and in 1671, as the new contractors took control of the whole farm, the revenue reached £259,430. None of these total figures include the casual revenue (out of which Ranelagh's commissioners were paid) estimated at £6,000 pa. Much of the improvement was due to a constant yield of about £68,000 for rents, an increase from £75,495 in 1670 for the customs to £90,549 and a large increase in the inland excise.\(^1\) The government, of course, did not receive this money but the farmers. Out of these totals came £28,159 and £35,243 for management and repayments in 1670 and 1671 respectively. In 1670 the king's rent would have come to £205,500 and in 1671 £206,500, not including abatements, with the farmers claiming they in fact lost just under £3,000 in 1670 (mainly on hearths and licences) and making about £18,000 profit in 1671, mainly on the customs.\(^2\) Although these massive totals

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1. All these figures are derived from Carte Ms 52:fol 512-523, Various Papers and Audited Accounts of the Forths' Farm, 1669-73 and Carte Ms 52:fol 695-698, Abstract of Moneys received and paid by Vice-Treasurer up to 20 Mar 1671.
2. Carte Ms 52:fol 523, Extracts of Farmers' Accounts, 22 Dec 1674.
for the yearly revenue indicated the strength of the Irish economy, once management costs and the farmers' profits were subtracted, the government only had a little over £205,000 pa in these years. Whilst this was substantially above the establishment of £172,000 pa, it was in fact very little if we consider that in 18 months £49,000 was spent on extraordinary issues, which means that in each year the surplus would no doubt have been exceeded.  

In revenue matters Berkeley's efforts had been initially thwarted and later superseded, but in his dealings with the army he met with more success. As we have seen, retrenchments in the military list were discussed before his departure for Ireland, and Berkeley undertook to reduce the establishment by £25,000 pa. It was a bold, attractive and quite impractical offer. Retrenchments were deferred to Berkeley's consultation with his privy council in Ireland, not exceeding the cashiering of 13 companies of foot and 7 troops of horse. Like Robartes, once he arrived in Ireland, Berkeley quickly saw this was not only impractical, but that it would seriously undermine the protestant colony's confidence and security. All payments were stopped by order in March 1670 until Berkeley's arrival. His first concern, as we have seen, had been to pay the six months due to the establishment in December 1668, which Robartes had neglected to pay.

The lord lieutenant's good intentions had been briefly

2. CTB, vol III, 1669-72, pt i, pp 368 and 374-5, 15 and 24 Feb 1670.
5. CSPI, 1669-70: p 114, Berkeley to Arlington, 23 Apr 1670.
obstructed by the absence of a signed establishment, but by the end of May the money was being paid.¹

Berkeley's drive towards greater efficiency in the army was aided by the death of the ageing Dungannon, marshal of the army. There was a furious race to succeed him, but Arran's express outrode the other two and Ormond secured the place for Sir Arthur Forbes.² He was to be an efficient and resourceful replacement. The regimenting, re-modelling and preparing of the army for the rendezvous took up much of the viceroy's time and energy in May 1670.² There were many who doubted the usefulness of regimenting it and changing its quarters, especially when it appeared that the officers might have to pay for the regiments' new colours.⁴ The rendezvous at the Curragh proved a great success. It did much to bolster up the army's morale and the keen rivalry of the different troops made for a splendid display.⁵ The general impression was that it was "the best army you ever saw", and that "no prince in Europe can show a better army of their number ..."⁶ Doubtless the soldiers were further encouraged to perform

1. CSPI, 1669-70: p 124, Berkeley to Arlington, 7 May 1670; CSPI, 1669-70: p 136, Berkeley to Arlington, 17 May 1670; CSPI, 1669-70: p 141-2, Rawdon to Conway, 27 May 1670. In order to secure their money the officers had to bribe the treasury officials, it would appear; CSPI, 1669-70: p 149, Mildmay to Conway, 4 June 1670.

2. CSPI, 1669-70: p 651, Orrery to Conway, 29 Jan 1670.


5. CSPI, 1669-70: p 149, Mildmay to Conway, 4 June 1670.

6. CSPI, 1669-70: p 170, Frowde to Williamson, 23 July 1670 (wrongly dated 23 June in Calendar); CSPI, 1669-70: pp 204-5, Aungier to Williamson, 26 July 1670; Carte Ms 37: fol 532, Ranelagh to Ossory, 26 July 1670.
well after Berkeley arrived at camp with £50,000 in cash for their pay. As a military man he understood that the army had to be well paid and he made it his first priority.

Throughout the next year the viceroy took particular care over the army's pay and in April 1671 demonstrated the depth of his concern by circulating the army to ensure that it had been paid 15 months in the last year, and the guards 12 months. Ranelagh's undertaking interrupted the smooth operation of army payment. The initial stop on the treasury of June 1671 delayed the issue of the March quarter. It was excepted from the stop in August 1671, but it had not been issued in November 1671 because Ranelagh's commissioners had not agreed upon a method for signing acquittances. Control of the army's payment was taken away from the viceroy completely by Ranelagh's undertaking, and Berkeley was unable to affect the speed and regularity with which it was paid.

In practical terms therefore, upon his arrival in Ireland, Berkeley's major concern soon became the army, ensuring it was paid up and presiding over a successful rendezvous at the curragh.

This smooth start had already met with some setbacks, however. In the first place the signed establishments were very slow in being despatched. Secondly, Berkeley won over his privy council by more than just charm, he positively criticised Drogheda and Roscommon who had

1. CSPI, 1669-70:p 184, Leigh to Williamson, 7 July 1670.
2. D.N.B., vol ii, p 361 ff, Berkeley had a distinguished military career in the west country and in Europe during the interregnum; CSPI, 1669-70:p 184, Leigh to Williamson, 7 July 1670.
3. CSPD, 1671:p 175, Order of Berkeley, 5 Apr 1671.
4. CSPD, 1671:p 328, O'Neill to Conway, 17 June 1671.
5. CSPD, 1671:p 423, King to Berkeley, 8 Aug 1671; CSPD, 1671:p 575, Rawdon to Conway, 18 Nov 1671.
6. CSPI, 1669-70:p 144, Mildmay to Conway, 4 June 1670; Carte Ms 37:fol 514, Ranelagh to Ossory, 17 May 1670; Carte Ms 37:fol 532, Ranelagh to Ossory, 26 July 1670.
been Robartes's only allies. This promoted the first wave of discontent and complaints against him, albeit from a despised minority.\(^1\) Thirdly, Aungier, the vice-treasurer, was delayed in London and his presence made more necessary when his deputy fell ill.\(^2\) Finally, Berkeley's initial investigation into the revenue presented a very unfavourable picture, suggesting that Ireland would be hard pressed to pay its own way.\(^2\) All in all, though, satisfaction with the viceroy outweighed any possible complaints.\(^4\) Amongst the privy council he singled out Ranelagh as his chief adviser (not a confidante), thereby displaying once more his ability to choose capable advisers.\(^5\)

As we have seen the new viceroy made every effort to maximise communications and understanding between Dublin and Whitehall. Unlike Robartes he did not oppose Williamson's salary of £100 pa for dealing with Irish correspondence, preferring to cultivate him as a useful ally rather than antagonising him.\(^6\) In spite of these efforts, the lord lieutenant found it difficult to make his councils heard at court. For example, he discovered that the government had many creditors who should be paid out of the concordatum money.\(^7\) This would be wholly impossible unless the concordatum allowance was increased, which, though running against the spirit of government policy, Berkeley demonstrated to be a necessity.\(^8\) Although he first made this request in July the

\(^{1}\) Carte Ms 37:fol 515, Ranelagh to Ossory, 17 May 1670; CSPI, 1669-70:p 136, Berkeley to Arlington, 17 May 1670; CSPI, 1669-70:p 140, Leighton to Williamson, 22 May 1670.

\(^{2}\) CSPI, 1669-70:p 143, Berkeley to Arlington, 28 May 1670.

\(^{3}\) Carte Ms 31:fol 516, Ranelagh to Ossory, 2 June 1670.

\(^{4}\) CSPI, 1669-70:p 156-7, Leigh to Williamson, 11 June 1670.

\(^{5}\) CSPI, 1669-70:p 149, Berkeley to Arlington, 4 June 1670; CSPI, 1669-70:p 203, Berkeley to Arlington, 24 July 1670.


\(^{7}\) CSPI, 1669-70:p 164, Berkeley & Council to Arlington, 22 June 1670.

concordatum allowance was not raised to £6,000 pa until 14 September 1670 even though the order passed council on 19 August 1670. The delay in execution of his requests for orders and letters was to be a constant source of friction and reflects the divisions in Charles's court which allowed this to happen.

The viceroy's lack of influence with the secretary of state and at court was also displayed in the matter of quitrent abatements. It was no help to Berkeley that Buckingham, his chief supporter, was so indolent and by 1670 in decline, as Clifford and Arlington demonstrated to Charles that they might be able to control parliament more effectively than Buckingham. Both for the sake of the establishment and the farmers Berkeley was naturally opposed to the abatements, for they undermined the revenue whose maintenance was his chief concern. The dangers of this course and the ever-increasing number availing of these abatements was constantly advertised by Berkeley, but his advice fell on deaf ears. Perhaps Arlington, for his own political reasons, was failing to communicate the lord lieutenant's advice, or perhaps the king chose to ignore it. Protestant alarm in Ireland rose when it was rumoured that innocent restored Irish were being granted abatements and the acts of settlement and explanation seemed threatened. Far from supporting this policy, (which we might expect if Berkeley were a supporter of the catholic interest) he despatched Leighton to court to express the government's opposition. Berkeley was pleased to be able to have the situation explained personally to the king by Leighton, and it probably prevented the remittals from being as vast as some had feared.
In the end they totalled about £45,000 of arrears and about £9,000 pa, which would, of course, diminish the annual revenue by that amount.¹

The Irish government was very disappointed with these abatements and Berkeley must have been especially so, as his chief task was to improve, not to deplete, the revenue.² Nevertheless, the remittals were not so far reaching as had been feared.³ This must be put down to Leighton’s arrival at court, for he would have been able to mobilise Buckingham’s support against large abatements. Arlington and Ormond both seem to have been involved in an effort to undermine Berkeley’s authority by supporting the quitrent remittals.⁴ Their motives were political, they desired to turn Buckingham’s allies (Berkeley and Leighton) out of Ireland, and probably for Ormond to return as viceroy. It is no coincidence, I think, that an allegedly indisposed Arlington was absent from the council meetings when Leighton pressed Berkeley’s complaints against the remittals.⁵ It seems very likely that he had not transmitted Berkeley’s opinions to the council. With Buckingham’s and Bridgeman’s help, therefore, Leighton ensured that the abatements were more palatable to the Irish government than had been feared. Once the king realised the financial savings...

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² CSPI, 1669–70: p 249, Berkeley to King, 2 Sept 1670.
³ Carte Ms 37: fol 542, Ranelagh to Ormond, 6 Sept 1670.
⁴ Carte Ms 37: fol 546, Ranelagh to Ossory, 14 Oct 1670.
⁵ Carte Ms 58: fol 213, Ranelagh to Ossory, 28 Oct 1670.
repercussions of such a policy he naturally sided with Buckingham and Berkeley.

The secretary of state's power in Irish matters was well illustrated in 1670. Arlington found it impossible to run Ireland or influence its government in the way he wished, but it was possible for him to delay and misrepresent Irish business. Conflict between Arlington and Berkeley, although never breaking into open hostility, was a constant drag on Irish affairs and severely damaged Berkeley's efforts to make the Irish administration more efficient, and to implement vital policies. The lord lieutenant's first complaints had concerned the irritating delay in transmitting the establishment. The letter for renewing corporations - verbatim the same as that granted in Ormond's time - was severely delayed, as was the commission for bringing in the king's arrears and the £2,000 pa addition to the concordatum fund. Furthermore, Williamson had allowed a grant of Chapelizod to Sir Maurice Eustace which freed him from the obligation to pay poundage to Aungier. Assurances were sent over that matters would be cleared up quickly, but even though the lord chancellor and Aungier were easily pleased, Berkeley refused to be, and his rage was only assuaged when Leighton returned and persuaded him to be less hostile.

Leighton's intervention did not dampen the lord lieutenant's rage, it only deflected it from Williamson and Arlington to the

procrastinating treasury commissioners. Clifford was, no doubt, at the back of delays there. Delays experienced at the treasury board were considerable and the lord lieutenant attempted to enlist Williamson's help to clear the air. Eventually he asked Arlington alone to deal with it. When the treasury commissioners finally reported on their Irish business, it amounted to a vote of no-confidence in Berkeley's recommendations and work of the last six months. His suggested inquiry into the lands of Athlone and letter prohibiting the making of brass money without licence were dismissed out of hand. The letter allowing the year's value to be paid by installments was accepted, but with the admonition that the '49 officers' composition was inadmissible and that Berkeley had been given orders about it in July.

Every department in Whitehall, seemingly with the king's approbation, appeared to be undermining the lord lieutenant's authority, yet the irony of the situation was that he had so far proved hard working and popular. Intrigue swept through the court with renewed vigour and Charles failed to support his viceroy and, according to Conway, "nothing is become more agreeable to him (the king) than complaints of Mr Johnston (Berkeley)". Ormond, ever anxious for favour and his lost vice-regal seat, accused Berkeley of showing too much favour to the non-remonstrant clergy, which drove a further rift between the viceroy and Ormond. Finally Berkeley

2. CSPI, 1669-70: p 304, Berkeley to Arlington, 15 Nov 1670.
3. CSPI, 1669-70: p 314, King to Berkeley, 29 Nov 1670.
5. Carte Ms 37: fol 532, Ranelagh to Ossory, 26 July 1670; Carte Ms 20: fol 93, Ormond to Berkeley, 22 Aug 1670.
had discountenanced Orrery when he had been in Ireland during the summer of 1670.

Orrery, for his part, had become an increasingly secondary figure in the intrigues of the 1670s, his influence shattered by his near impeachment. Orrery's support of Robartes had been ill received by the Irish administration. Few regretted seeing his near impeachment and his allies in the Irish privy council were sparse. Berkeley responded to this general feeling by humiliating Orrery during his visit of 1670 in an effort to court his executive. Although it made him popular with his privy council, it was a foolish move, for Orrery was the chief supporter of the policy that Berkeley as lord lieutenant was supposed to be pursuing. Once he alienated Orrery, (and through him Buckingham), Berkeley had no support at court and his authority could be undermined. Leighton had had to be despatched to hasten vital Irish business in the summer of 1670, but when Orrery returned to court he turned the viceroy's last support against him.

Orrery had been humiliated in Ireland. His allowance of £2,500 had been deliberately delayed. Berkeley had dealt fiercely with Orrery's deputy in Munster, Lord O'Brien, in the dispute with Limerick. More unreasonably, Orrery felt slighted in not being given both a regiment of horse and foot, and he made a point of avoiding audiences with the viceroy. In 1671, Berkeley even

4. Carte Ms 37: fol 516, Ranelagh to Ossory, 2 June 1670; Carte Ms 68: fol 207, Ranelagh to Ossory, 10 Aug 1670.
tried to give away the regiment he did hold to Lord Windsor.¹

Revenge was but a breath away, however, for Charles decided he needed Orrery's council and called him over to take his seat in the commons.² Undoubtedly, Orrery exaggerated his influence with the king, but his power over Buckingham, Berkeley's one true, if indolent supporter, cannot be underestimated. On his return to court it was no surprise that attacks on the lord lieutenant multiplied and were countenanced by the king.³ It was even rumoured that Orrery and Ormond might be reconciled to each other in their intrigues to displace Berkeley.⁴

It was in response to this growing isolation that he decided to despatch Aungier and Leighton to Whitehall in January 1671, in an effort to win back his lost allies and perhaps gain new ones - "Between them they shall take off some of the blows we aim at you from hence, and ease you of some of the trouble we give you".⁵ Neither Leighton nor Aungier appear to have made much progress.

They were accompanied on their journey by Ranelagh, who soon set about undermining Aungier's credibility by producing financial schemes that far outstripped any of the vice-treasurer. It seems likely too that as Ranelagh's credit with Buckingham rose, Leighton's fell. Berkeley was sick in Dublin and unable to help his emmissaries.⁶ Colonel Talbot's schemes for a fresh commission of inquiry into the act of settlement was countenanced at court to the great alarm of most Irish protestants.⁷

¹ CSPD, 1671: p 411, Orrery to Conway, 28 July 1670.
³ Hastings, p 378, Conway to Rawdon, 15 Nov 1670.
⁴ Hastings, pp 378-9, Conway to Rawdon, 17 Dec 1670.
⁵ CSPD, 1669-70: p 323, Aungier to Williamson, 6 Dec 1670; CSPI, 1669-70: p 330, Berkeley to Williamson, 31 Dec 1670.
⁶ CSPD, 1671: p 103, 25 Feb 1671, Leigh to Williamson.

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The lord lieutenant made one final effort to reassert himself, obtaining a licence to come to court on the pretext of private business.¹ His complaints lay in two main areas. Firstly, the placing of grants of pensions and rewards on the Irish establishment for the use of courtiers with no Irish connections, which put him in the invidious position of having to refuse them as was his duty. Secondly, the defalcations of the late farmers had not been sorted out which was to the great prejudice of the revenue.² Berkeley arrived in May 1671 and returned in less than two months.³ His journey was not a success. Not only had an ill-judged request for an English subvention been turned down flat, which he must have expected, knowing the dire financial position the crown was in, but Talbot was returning to Ireland and the commission of inspection of land titles expected to follow soon after.⁴ Berkeley's influence had been utterly shattered by the summer of 1671 and he returned to Dublin a viceroy without full royal support, which inevitably meant that his person and office would be degraded and disregarded in Dublin. With a powerless lord lieutenant unable to direct matters from the Irish capital, direction, if there was to be any, would come from the court.

It is against this background that we must view Kanelagh's undertaking. The undertaking was not so much a product of the situation

2. CSPD, 1669–70:p 279, Berkeley to Williamson, 4 Oct 1670;
   CSPD, 1671:p 262, Berkeley and Council to Arlington, 22 May 1671.
3. CSPD, 1671:p 281, Leigh to Williamson, 27 May 1671;
4. CSPD, 1671:p 383, Rawdon to Conway, 13 July 1671

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as the major contributory factor in undermining the viceroy's authority.

As we will see, Berkeley's failure to support Ranelagh's proposal further undermined his position. When Ranelagh's undertaking was accepted, Ireland took on a new role in the crown's policy. Ranelagh's undertaking made the viceroy, and the policy he and Robartes had represented, redundant. The disparate factions and ministers were being bound together in pursuit of a definite policy of financially freeing the king from dependence on his subjects. The undertaking was a significant part of this process, for it suggested that Ireland could play a tangible financial and military part in the crown's schemes. As a result, the crown began to take a more active interest in Ireland and to desire the firm control and use of its revenue.

Ranelagh's project had its origins in the proposals of Gorges and Bucknall in 1669 for farming the arrears, except that his scheme was far more comprehensive and wide-ranging, and potentially profitable to the crown. The question of the king's arrears had been a contentious one since Gorges produced his figures and continued to be so under Robartes's administration. By the covenants of the farmers' contract, a commission of inquiry had to be appointed to discover the debts due to the king or else they would lapse to the farmers.¹ These arrears were designed to pay off the crown's debts in Ireland and Berkeley issued particular orders that they should not be diverted to other uses.² The commission was delayed, much to Berkeley's

2. CSPI, 1669-70:p 153, King to Berkeley, 10 June 1670.
annoyance, but finally arrived in September 1670. Its principal commissioners were Aungier and Ranelagh. The various calculations of the last few years had raised expectations, but the work went on very slowly, only demonstrating the poor management of the auditor and making Ranelagh doubt that they would come to much.

Aungier spent the summer of 1670 preparing a detailed state of the revenue, which he transmitted in September 1670. On the face of it the picture it painted was not unfavourable, and by 1675 the king could hope to pay his establishment and to have cleared £16,215 over the five years. This surplus, however, was a drop in the ocean compared to the king's debt of £317,558. To defray this Aungier could only find solvent arrears totalling £109,215, leaving the king with a debt of £203,343 which could only be satisfied by an Irish parliament or an English subvention. As Charles hurtled towards bankruptcy such a state of Irish finances cannot have been well received, implying as it did that, even if Ireland were well managed, the English treasury must foot the bill for its debts. Furthermore, if Charles's pro-French policy ever took off, he could not expect a favourable response from a protestant Irish parliament. In these circumstances, Ranelagh's schemes appeared like a blazing torch at the end of a dark tunnel.

The court in 1671 was in turmoil. Retrospectively, it is hard to clarify the lines of Charles's policy, to contemporaries it must

3. Carte Ms 37;fol 546, Ranelagh to Ossory, 14 Oct 1670.
5. ibid., pp 1-3.
6. ibid., p 3.
7. ibid., p 3; BM AD Ms 4,761:fol 24, 'Objections and Answers about the Management of the Irish Revenue, Jan 1681.
have been impossible. Charles courted Louis in secret, less clandestinely with his sham treaty, and seemingly not at all with his support of the triple alliance. Each approach had its own significance and meaning, but all were bent towards the one purpose of making the crown solvent. As a sop to Louis catholics were countenanced at court as never before, but not just by the king.¹ Buckingham supported Leighton's open-handed approach towards the catholics in Ireland, seeing it as a natural counterpart of the (sham) Dover policy.² He also countenanced Talbot's plans for re-opening the Irish land question, as did Anglesey.³ Talbot's project went well and a commission was granted to inquire into the land settlement.⁴ Ormond and Finch opposed it bitterly, but the king was pleased to have the commission meet from September 1671 onwards.⁵ If Charles was to appear sincere in his secret treaty of Dover he could not very well oppose this, although it seems probable that he would not have allowed the overturning of the settlement. Talbot's high standing at court, exaggerated by his friendship with York and Charles's need to appear sincere to Louis, was a great help to Ranelagh in 1671. There seems to be no doubt that the pair entered into an alliance by which each would forward the other's project.⁶ In return for his help

² Orrery Ms:folder 22, Buckingham to Leighton, 21 June 1670.
³ HMC Ormonde MS, vol iii:p 446, Duchess of Ormond to Matthew, 14 Feb 1671.
⁵ Carte Ms 69:fol 69, Informations from a Life of Ormond (by Southwell); Carte Ms 69:fol 205, Order in Council, 4 Feb 1671.
⁶ CSPD, 1674:pp 162-3, Charges against Ranelagh, February 1674; National Library Ms 2354:fol 105, Ormond to Lane, 22 Apr 1671.
Talbot received a double payment of £2,200 (£4,000 in all) from the Irish treasury on the signing of the contract.¹

Ranelagh arrived at court in January 1671, one of the party who had come over with Aungier and Leighton, although his business was to sort out private matters with his mother.² The political flux at court and a meeting with his machiavellian mother sufficiently intoxicated Ranelagh to persuade him to throw himself wholeheartedly into the world of court intrigue. The possibility of political and financial advancement opened up before the young man, who soon showed that he had the skill to seize his opportunities. Information about the negotiations is scanty, but it is possible to reconstruct some of them. At the end of March 1671 Ranelagh produced a proposition for the Irish revenue based on Aungier's.² It became one of the major matters of discussion throughout April and May at the treasury board.⁴

1. Carte Ms 70:fol 424, Ranelagh to Bence, Deane & Stepney, 13 Apr 1672; Carte Ms 62:fol 156, Ranelagh to Stepney, 13 Apr 1672; CSPD, 1671:pp 313-4, King to Lords Justices, 10 June 1671.

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Ranelagh claimed that there were sufficient solvent arrears not only to pay off the crown's full Irish debt by December 1675, but he also undertook to pay the king £80,000 by December 1677. In the financial context, this was a most attractive offer. Ranelagh's assessment of the solvent arrears was largely based on Gorges's and Bucknall's scheme. The weight of opinion automatically turned against Aungier, not least because he was so close to Ormond. Aungier attempted to show that Ranelagh's proposals were unfair to the subject and especially catholics (thereby showing his understanding of the mood at court), but most persuasively suggesting that Ireland simply could not yield the huge arrears Ranelagh claimed possible.

Ranelagh deflected all criticism. His eloquence and wit were famous, and his ability as a financier far outstripped that of his detractors. Moreover, whilst Aungier had spent much time absent in England, Ranelagh had been a central figure in the Dublin administration and, as the chancellor of the exchequer, was more conversant with the state of Ireland's revenue and arrears than any other man. The undertaking was not so fanciful as its

1. BM AD Ms 4,761:fol 24, 'Objections and Answers about the Management of the Irish Revenue', Jan 1680 (?).
2. See previous chapter, BM AD Ms 4,761:fol 24, 'Objections etc. of the Irish Revenue, Jan 1680.
3. CSPD, 1671:p 202, Fairfax to Williamson, 25 Apr 1670; All the Ormond Ms material bears witness to Aungier's closeness to and reliance upon Ormond.
detra,ctors would have us believe, and Essex (himself a great financier) recognised that the proposal could succeed if well managed.\(^1\) Aungier's calculations were too tentative and, bearing in mind the crown's poverty, interpreted affairs too pessimistically. The undertaking went through in spite of all opposition. Its progress was delayed very little and on 10 June Ranelagh and his partners could at last crow at their victory over Aungier.\(^2\) The king was very pleased with his bargain.\(^3\)

Both Berkeley and Ormond had opposed the undertaking and for Berkeley it was an error of judgement which cost him the friendship of a man who was to become the most powerful influence on Irish affairs at court once the indenture was passed on 4 August 1671.\(^4\) Ranelagh had advised Berkeley that if he came over not to trust Arlington or Ormond for they were his enemies and "clogged his government".\(^5\) Berkeley disclosed this information to Ormond, who from thence forward became Ranelagh's greatest enemy, feeling particularly betrayed by the man he had advanced so high - "that I may have no more to do with so slippery and politic a blade".\(^6\) Berkeley thus made an enemy of Ranelagh, but his purpose in so doing - to win over Ormond - went awry, for the duke was disgusted by his ungentlemanly behaviour in disclosing Ranelagh's letter!\(^7\)

1. Stowe Ms. 214:fol 84-6, Essex to Arlington, 17 Mar 1674.
3. Ormonde Ms. vol iii, p 447, Duchess of Ormond to Matthew, 1 July 1671.
5. CSPD, 1671:p 243, Bolton to Conway, 30 May 1671.
The passing of the agreement was accompanied by a stop of all payments at the Irish treasury. This was a source of annoyance to the army which was expecting to be paid its quarter due June 1671, but was necessary so that James Cuffe (Aungier's deputy) and Sir Alexander Bence could jointly sort out the state of the treasury and Aungier's accounts. There were two noteworthy exceptions to this stop. Talbot was still to be paid his £2,000 and Ormond, after a struggle, had his pension of £5,000 pa exempted also. Ranelagh was granted a reversion of two pensions for life, totalling £800 pa, currently payable to the countess dowager of Tyrconnel and Sir James Dillon. This was, however, but the tip of the iceberg. Included as part of the undertaking were £9,400 worth of payments to Boyle, Ranelagh's two sisters, Lady Falkland and John St Leger. This is not to mention £4,000 paid to Talbot or various other sums to St Albans (£2,000) and others (totalling in all £14,724), which we know about. Clearly Ranelagh bought a lot of friends, but this is not to say that he was an easy touch, for he dismissed the claims of Progers and Elliot to a share, saying he had paid out enough.

Through the undertaking Ranelagh's influence was greatly advanced, for it was in his power to allow the king to make grants on the Irish revenue. We can be sure that Suffolk paid a price, for

1. CSPD, 1671:pp 313-4, King to Lords Justices, 10 June 1671.
2. CSPD, 1671:p 328, O'Neill to Conway, 17 June 1671; CSPD, 1671: p 365, Rawdon to Conway, 4 July 1671; CSPD, 1671:pp 313-4, King to Lords Justices, 10 June 1671.
4. CSPD, 1671:p 314, King to Ranelagh, 10 June 1671.
6. Carte Ms 52:fol 602, Payments on Letters of Bounty made by the Commissioners of the Treasury since their Undertaking, (1673?).
7. Orrery Papers, p 93, Ranelagh to Orrery, 3 Nov 1671, in this letter he admitted to having made £4,000 worth of gratuitous payments, but he is unlikely to have told his uncle the truth.
example, in gaining his grant of £30,000 from the year's value. During the course of the undertaking Ranelagh was able to use the money saved by disbanding 10 companies and 6 troops in 1672 to finance pensions of £2,400 pa to Buckingham, £3,300 for "several notorious Irish papists" and to reserve £13,700 for the so-called marine regiment (there was not one) which could therefore be diverted to other uses. In his grant Ranelagh had managed to leave out £41,895 of Aungier's arrears. He had left out £10,000 of insolvencies, £11,500 for a debt of the king to Bucknall, and halved the 10 months arrears. In return he made £9,400 worth of grants and promised the king £80,000 by Christmas 1677. This, however, was not the end of it. He made many payments beyond the undertaking, and the most important of these was to the king. Charles was finally seduced into accepting the undertaking by an offer of £48,000 into his privy purse, of which £12,000 had been paid by December 1671. These were the tangible reasons why Ranelagh's revenue proposals became the central plank in the crown's revised view of Ireland's place in its greater schemes. On 4 August 1671 Aungier was suspended as vice-treasurer and Ranelagh and the Irish treasury commissioners took over control of the Irish treasury.

1. CSPD, 1671-2:p 82, King to Ranelagh, 13 Jan 1672; CSPD, 1671-2: pp 106-7, King to Ranelagh, 27 Jan 1672; Probably compounded for 50%.
2. CSPD, 1674:p 164, Charges against Ranelagh, February 1674.
4. CSPD, 1671-2:p 10, Williamson's Notes, 4 Dec 1671; There is no evidence of when this sum was completed, cf Twomey, 'Charles II, Lord Ranelagh and Irish Finances' in ICHS Bull no. 89 (1960), pp 1-2, Ranelagh's privy purse payments are put at £10,000 pa, but the £10,000 pa referred to here was the money paid secretly to Charles by Bucknall and the Forths.
5. CSPD, 1671:p 425, Newsletter, 12 Aug 1671.

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At this stage it would be helpful to outline the undertaking. It was an agreement by which Ranelagh and his partners undertook to manage and defray all the Irish treasury's expenses from 25 December 1670 to 25 December 1675, with strict covenants that the establishment should not exceed £172,000. The farmers still collected their rents and paid those to the undertakers just as they had paid the treasury. All other rents not collected by the farmers were now gathered by Ranelagh and his partners. They also promised to collect all the king's Irish arrears, to clear all his Irish debts and pay him £80,000 by half yearly installments of £20,000 each from 25 December 1675 to 25 December 1677.\(^1\) They were to keep any excess revenue above that for their own use. They superseded the commission of inquiry into arrears and promised that all debts would be payable by a novel system of installments which would lessen the subject's hardship. All abatements of quitrents were to come to an end. The treasury commissioners thereby became managers of the revenue, severely reducing the chief governor's control over the revenue at the same time.\(^2\) Not only that, Charles had signed away responsibility for his entire Irish national debt to Ranelagh and his partners. The king was thus freed of this debt and it was transferred to these individuals. This was a risky business, for large amounts of money were involved, yet the only security offered for performance was the partners' personal estates. This Charles accepted because Ranelagh and his partners made substantial privy purse payments to him, and also because they took away responsibility for the debt from the crown onto themselves, but, most of all, because it was an ingenious and lucrative scheme which a king, who was to become virtually bankrupt in January 1672, had little compunction not to accept.

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2. Ibid., pp 1-31; BM AD Ms 4,761; fol 24-5, 'Objections etc. of the Irish Revenue', January 1681.
It must be reiterated, however, that this grant was for the management of the revenue; it was superimposed on the existing farm of the great branches of the revenue, but did not affect it. It was quite simply a farm of the Irish treasury and the office of vice-treasurer. Payments were now made to and issued by the treasury commissioners in place of the vice-treasurer. The court of the exchequer was still supreme in all revenue matters, especially in issuing process for alleged arrears, and Ranelagh was the chief judge in that court as chancellor of the Irish exchequer.

The undertaking originally consisted of 12 shares, Ranelagh holding 4, and the other 8 being held singly by Sir Alexander Bence, Sir James Hayes, John Bence, Robert Huntingdon, Richard Kingdon, Joseph Deane, John Stepney and George Dashwood. By their commission the rights of all nine shareholders were protected by naming a deputy for each who was eligible to sit on the commission if the shareholder was absent from Ireland as was likely to be the case for many. There is no question that Ranelagh believed his undertaking could succeed, if circumstances made that possible, but in the main he saw it as an opportunity to increase his own fortune and more importantly to enhance his influence on the king and at court. Ranelagh overnight became a major Whitehall figure. He did, however, have the foresight to persuade Charles to grant him (not his partners) an unconditional pardon for any debts he failed to pay. Thus Ranelagh

2. Rawlinson Ms A.238:fol 23-25, King to Revenue Commissioners, 4 Aug 1671.
effectively made his wealthy merchant partners responsible and liable for the king's debts should the undertaking fail.

Sir James Hayes had been attracted to the undertaking by ambition also, seeing it as an opportunity to increase his own power and wealth. Others had more pressing reasons for supporting the undertaking, and becoming sureties with Ranelagh for its success.

It may likewise be considered that this undertaking arose from a necessity which lay upon and compelled most of the said undertakers to get the management of his majesty's treasury into their own hands upon any terms. For Sir Alexander Bence, Alderman John Bence, Mr. Deane and Mr. Stepney on behalf of themselves and former partners were indebted unto his majesty for rent of their late farm of the customs and imported excise in the sum of £26,000 which themselves and new partners as much as in them lies have remitted for £3,000. Besides the said Sir Alexander Bence and Alderman John Bence did rest in debt unto the king for their late farm of the inland excise ... £27,000 ... remitted unto them for £9,000.2

This was a compelling motive for joining the undertaking, gaining an abatement of £41,000 out of £53,000 they owed the king for rent. The Bences particularly must have been keen to join the undertaking as Berkeley was pressing them to pay up in May 1671 and when he arrived in Whitehall.2 Deane's position as undertaker for the packet boat also gave the partnership control of the mail which passed between England and Ireland, which was to be a great advantage to them in their dealings, as it would give them early notice of letters of complaint.4 Dashwood, a very wealthy man, may well have been attracted to the undertaking as so many others he knew seemed to be flocking to it; whilst Huntington and

1. He was Rupert's secretary and a noted intriguer. His activities in the undertaking from 1677 onwards bear ample testimony to his ambition.
4. CSPD, 1671-2:Notes in Williamson's Hand, 7 Dec 1671.
Kingdon were more particular friends of Ranelagh and between the three they may have hoped to rule the undertaking much as they wanted.1

Ranelagh's influence in Irish affairs soon eclipsed all others. He intervened for Darcy whose grant had been opposed by Arlington, for example.2 In September he procured a stop of all payments except those he had undertaken "until further pleasure", thereby undermining the little influence Berkeley had in financial matters, which was supposed to be the central plank of his administration.3 Other letters were procured to hasten the handover of the treasury to Ranelagh and to quicken Aungier in stating his accounts.4 The lord lieutenant was instructed to give the undertaking particular countenance.5 It was ordered that all debts would be paid by installments in accordance with the undertaking, but this innovation went further and 8 half yearly assessments on the lands of Ireland were directed to be collected in accordance with the act of explanation, to make up the £120,000 which the year's value had fallen short of the £300,000.6 By November 1671 the undertaking was well under way, being managed by the commissioners, although there were still delays in payment whilst Aungier's books were sorted out.7 Aungier's resignation of the vice-treasurership symbolised the undertaking's complete takeover of the Irish treasury. It was understood that the acceptance

1. BM AD Ms 4,761:fol 214, 'Observations .. on Irish Revenue, Jan 1677, this is certainly true of Kingdon and a guess with regard to Huntingdon, but Huntingdon looms large in Ranelagh's schemes in 1677 to advance £36,000 to pay the army its current wages.
5. CEPL, 1671:p 498, King to Chief Governor(s), 21 Sept 1671.
7. CSPD, 1671:pp 574-5, Rawdon to Conway, 15 Nov 1671.
of the undertaking had been the first step towards Ranelagh's replacement of Aungier with the title of vice-treasurer, and Ormond even advised him to resign.\(^1\) He held out until 6 January 1672, finally surrendering it for £14,000 plus 10% interest.\(^2\) It is unlikely that his profit from this transaction was that great as he must have paid Carteret a considerable sum for the post.

As we have seen, the undertaking had taken control of the army's current and arrears payments away from the lord lieutenant, although Berkeley still remained responsible for the army's discipline and condition. The undertaking based itself on Aungier's revenue estimates, which put the army's debt at £139,001, which was in fact the lowest estimate made of this arrear.\(^3\) The 10 months arrears of the lords justices' time, already compounded for at 50%, was halved again from £40,789 to £20,395.\(^4\) Some officers within the army viewed this as a swindle and the regiment of guards saw the possibility of being denied 3 months out of their 12 months arrears. About 20 officers, mostly from the regiment of guards, petitioned the lord lieutenant on the affair. The petition was considered mutinous by the king. Although Berkeley was a military man of some distinction and experience and realised the importance of discipline, he too, it seems, was implicated in supporting the petition.\(^5\) They were all cashiered at once, including

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1. BM Harleian Ms 7056: Papers relating to Ormond's own time (no folios) 1673: Nat Lib Ms 2354: fol 223, Ormond to Matthew, 20 June 1671.
2. CSPD, 1671-2: pp 70-1, King to Berkeley, 6 Jan 1672.
3. See Aungier in Jones, op cit.; compare to CSP, 1669-70: p 97, Arrears of Military List, 31 Mar 1670, by Aungier, 3 Sept 1670 - this reckons it at £166,940; and CSP, 1669-70: p 252, Arrears of Military List due 30 Sept 1670, by Yarner (Muste-Master General), 3 Sept 1670, whose estimate was £142,282.
4. Compare the figures in Aungier, op cit., no page numbers.
5. CSPD, 1671-2: p 27, Rawdon to Conway, 12 Dec 1671.

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Lord Power, Sir Robert Byron and Colonel Ingoldsby, who were privy councillors. The severity with which they were dealt was thought to be extremely harsh. The express orders had come from the king himself, at Ranelagh's request, who represented the whole affair as mutinous. There was no question now that Ranelagh was the master of all Irish affairs. Moreover, the long term effect of this harsh discipline worked to his advantage, for the officers never forgot this example and in Essex's time were loath to complain openly about Ranelagh's actions for fear of similar treatment.

The lord lieutenant maintained day to day control of the army, which was vital once hostilities opened with the Dutch in March 1672, but overall direction of the Irish army's place in the crown's defences had passed to Ranelagh. It was his advice which found the king's ear. In preparation for the war 8 Irish foot companies were put to sea for service on the fleet. Ranelagh paid their current arrears and their expenses until they embarked. By June there were 1,000 Irish troops in England, formed into a regiment under the duke of York and paid for on the Irish establishment. In the previous Dutch war the Irish army had been used exclusively for Ireland's defences, but Ranelagh showed Charles it could be used for England's defence and to support royal policy there. By his undertaking Ranelagh had offered Charles more than desperately needed money, he offered him troops also which might be used either to fight his wars or to implement his policies.

1. CSPD, 1671-2:pp 26-7, Rawdon to Conway, 12 Dec 1671.
2. CSPD, 1671-2:pp 26-7, Rawdon to Conway, 12 Dec 1671; CSPD, 1674: p 165, Charges against Ranelagh, February 1674.
5. BM AD Ms 28,085:fol 17, 'The Discouragement of the Protestant Interest in Ireland in 1671 and 1672'; Orrery Papers, Ranelagh to Orrery, 1 June 1672.
Furthermore, these troops were paid by the Irish treasury, for an English parliament did not trust a Stuart sufficiently to vote him supplies to enlarge his English army.

Berkeley's authority had been debilitated by a number of factors. Firstly, he had attacked his influential supporter Orrery, thereby causing him to join with the rest of the court who opposed the viceroy. Secondly, Ranelagh's undertaking placed much of the lord lieutenant's authority and power in the young chancellor of the exchequer's hands. Thirdly, in spite of initial personal popularity and a general euphoria at his appointment, he started to make enemies in Dublin and, as his authority was undermined, began to neglect his business.

It has to be said that Berkeley can be tainted with possessing a corrupt streak, which, if held by other incumbents, they kept better hidden. For example, he had the reversion of a grant for a lease for lands worth £500 pa passed in Leighton's name though it was for himself. Leighton was more spectacularly prominent. Apart from profits on the gazette, from his practice as lawyer and from his fees as chief secretary, he made £600 in fees when regimenting the army and in 1672 attempted to clear £2,000 in fees from the new commissions for the army. His desire for self-aggrandizement reached its zenith in his election to the post of recorder for the city of Dublin in March 1672.

In fact, Leighton is probably the key to our understanding of Berkeley's failure. His influence with Buckingham was immense, for he was his "darling". His second journey to London in

1. CSPI, 1669-70; p 294, Berkeley to Arlington, 29 Oct 1670.
2. CSPI, 1669-70; p 131, Leigh to Williamson, 13 May 1670; CSPD, 1671-2; p 357, Leigh to Williamson, 20 Apr 1672.
3. CSPD, 1671-2; pp 257-8, ? to Williamson, 30 Mar 1670.
4. BM Harleian Ms 7056; Informations Relating to f Life of Duke of Ormond.
January 1671 seems to coincide with the dramatic reversal of Berkeley's fortunes. Berkeley had been living in domestic bliss and to his great joy his wife had given birth to a son. Soon after, however, during Leighton's absence in the new year of 1671 Berkeley became increasingly under the influence of Lord and Lady Clanbrassil. He procured a letter for that lord enabling him to travel to England with impunity from his father's creditors. Moreover, he allowed himself to become involved in a foolish plot of Arran's to capture the king with Lady Clanbrassil's beauty. The viceroy put all his eggs in this one basket and, as we have seen, flying in the face of the prevailing spirit at court, betrayed Ranelagh to Ormond as an enemy. It all backfired badly. Ranelagh became his sworn enemy, to add to all the others, just at the moment when his influence was about to peak. Lady Clanbrassil's beauty failed to win Charles's heart. Having failed to catch a king Lady Clanbrassil settled for a viceroy instead and moved into his apartments in Dublin Castle. By the close of 1671 Lady Clanbrassil, not Leighton, ruled the lord lieutenant. Berkeley's capacity for work shrank as that for wine and Clanbrassil rose. The reaction to the fire in the castle in May 1671 was symptomatic of the drift of protestant opinion: people were losing confidence in the lord lieutenant and feared a plot.

4. CSPD, 1671: pp 243-4, Botton to Conway, 16 May 1671.
Even Conway discovered that to get a grant passed it was necessary to obtain Lady Clanbrassil's approval, not Leighton's.¹

Williamson's notes of 17 December 1671 are a good indication of the state of intrigue to which Ireland and its affairs had been reduced. Ranelagh was attempting in every way he could to ruin Leighton with the lord lieutenant, in return no doubt for Berkeley's services to him with Ormond. Ranelagh was also involved in an intrigue with Cleveland to obtain Irish lands for her. In all this he was supported by Carlingford and Talbot. Shaen, it seems, was by now Berkeley's last hope at court and he attempted to gather a 'middle party' to support the lord lieutenant headed by Ashley and Lauderdale. He accused Leighton of betraying Berkeley, but Lady Berkeley put paid to his schemes by showing the letter to Leighton.² In such a maze of intrigue Berkeley could hardly expect to remain long as chief governor, and appears to have given up hope of doing so. The final blot on his record was the great row in the Dublin common council in March 1672, resulting in Leighton's election as recorder, and the repercussions of this event and the bitterness it left behind had to be dealt with by Essex.³

Thus we can see that Berkeley had lost control of the reins of government in 1671, and Leighton gave up his efforts at making the Irish government efficient and turned himself wholeheartedly towards his own advancement. Control of Irish affairs was

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¹ CSPD, 1671:pp 584-5, Rawdon to Conway, 25 Nov 1671.
² CSPD, 1671-2:pp 34-5, Notes in Williamson's Hand, 17 Dec 1671.
³ CSPD, 1671-2:pp 257-8, ? to Williamson, 30 Mar 1671; see Bagwell, op cit., vol iii, pp 106-7, for a brief account of this.
clearly locked in the hands of Whitehall. This was a necessary precondition for Charles to be able at last to show his hand and attempt to gain the nebulous goals towards which his ambiguous policies had been shaped. On 7 January 1672 he staved off bankruptcy by a stop of all payments for one year in England, allowing the government to begin to carry out its Dover policy. On 15 March 1672 the declaration of indulgence was issued, thereby paying lip service to the religious clauses of the Dover treaty, and hostilities opened with the Dutch. Berkeley had no part in this new direction, his powers totally superseded by Ranelagh and the Irish committee and then by Essex, the new lord lieutenant. Berkeley had become no more than the agency through which Ranelagh and the Irish committee issued their orders.

The minute book for the "commissioners for affairs of Ireland" survives for the period 31 August 1671 to 21 June 1672, when Essex's powers as viceroy finally appear to have superseded it. The minute book clearly shows that this committee was responsible for the government of Ireland in the last months of Berkeley's tenure. Over these months it met a total of 73 times, of which 78% of the meetings took place between September 1671 and March 1672. The committee was dominated by Rupert, its nominal head, who attended 82% of the meetings, Anglesey attending 77%, Ashley 70%, Trevor 82%, Lauderdale 63%, Chicheley 73%, Hollis 53% and Buckingham 45%. Essex, Arlington, Ranelagh and Clifford only joined the committee after Essex's appointment, by which time the new viceroy superseded its authority. This committee was

representative of that group which had supported the sham Dover
treaty. Those who may have known about the secret treaty were
only appointed after Charles had begun the Dutch war and issued
his declaration of indulgence.

Ireland was governed in the winter of 1671-2 by two groups, the
Irish committee and Ranelagh. Berkeley had no hand in or influence
on the major events in these months (his sympathies were irrelevant
as he wielded no power). The stop on all payments, other than
those undertaken by Ranelagh, stripped Berkeley of any influence
in financial matters, which was the key to his position and the
reason for his appointment. It was Ranelagh who advised putting
8 foot companies to sea, and sending troops to England during
the war, a policy which was to continue under Essex. At the
same time Charles had pre-empted his declaration of indulgence in
England by instructing Berkeley to allow catholics back into
corporations, which might have a profound effect on the member-
ship of a future Irish parliament. Indeed a policy of greater
tolerance towards catholics had been countenanced and forwarded
by Berkeley, but the impetus for it came from Whitehall, and even
though Berkeley and Leighton were personally kindly disposed to
catholics they were not responsible for the policy that so openly
pressed it. By that stage they had no influence on policy. In
December 1671 the lord lieutenant was directed to appoint catholic
JPs, of which 150 such appointments were said to have been made.

1. CSPD, 1671:p 501, King to Berkeley, 23 Sept 1671.
2. See next chapter. CSPD, 1671-2:p 134, King to Berkeley,
13 Feb 1672.
3. CSPD, 1671-2:p 166, King to Berkeley, 26 Feb 1672; CSPD, 1671-2:
p 185, Proclamation of Berkeley and Council, 8 Mar 1672.
Berkeley's powers were taken from him first by the committee of Irish affairs and then by Essex. Catholics were allowed into corporations, a general toleration was introduced, a new commission of inspection into land titles appointed which threatened the protestant land settlement, troops were withdrawn from Ireland and others disbanded.¹

The drift towards the reintroduction of catholics into Irish political and administrative life was not the work of Berkeley, it was the work of Whitehall. Essex's appointment has to be seen in the light of Charles's decision to issue the declaration of indulgence and make war with the Dutch. Essex was a suitable instrument for the Dover policy, Berkeley was not, for Berkeley's Irish role had been superseded by Ranelagh and his undertaking, which promised that he, not the lord lieutenant, could make Ireland profitable.

Berkeley's lord lieutenancy had been founded upon the same presumptions of Irish inefficiency and corruption that Robartes's had been. The difference was that Berkeley understood that the way to reform these was through co-operation not antagonism. Nonetheless his efforts failed. He was able to win over his executive, but failed to realise that in order to succeed he needed support at court, and by attacking Orrery he destroyed his influence with the court faction that had advanced him. Having done this he was powerless to prevent Arlington and Ormond from weakening his government by holding up Irish business at court.

¹. BM AD Ms 28,085:fol 17 and 19, 'The Discouragement of the Protestant Interest in Ireland in 1671 and 1672 (two versions).
Ranelagh's Irish schemes put debates on Irish policy onto a new level and for Charles placed them into perspective with his wider plans. Under Ranelagh's guidance Ireland promised to play a greater financial and military role in the king's thinking, not a passive but an active part. To a king facing bankruptcy and severely restricted in his options, Ranelagh's undertaking increased Charles's scope for action. Not only had Berkeley failed to produce the effects he had promised, but it seemed by Aungier's account that Ireland would require an English intervention. Ranelagh's more comprehensive scheme, made those of Orrery and Berkeley obsolete, especially as Ranelagh produced the goods, not just in privy purse payments, but in troops. The young Richard Jones had made himself an invaluable royal financial support, just at the right moment, when Charles's policies needed finance and when his own finances faced collapse. Ultimately therefore Berkeley's greatest error was in betraying Ranelagh to Ormond. He was not equipped to carry out Charles's new direction in policy and Ranelagh, now one of Charles's most influential advisers, was his enemy.

Berkeley cannot be admonished, as some have done, for not having tried; his first year of government is a model of effort and drive towards greater efficiency. Ultimately his enemies at court blocked all these efforts and the lord lieutenant slipped into his idle ways, but once Ranelagh had captured the king's ear Berkeley literally had little else to do. He might as well have

1. The classic account in this vein is derived from Bagwell, _op. cit._, vol iii, pp 98-100.
whiled away his last months in Dublin in the arms of Clanbrassil for quite clearly Irish affairs were ruled by Ranelagh and the committee for Irish affairs and he could influence nothing. The degree of confidence Charles had in him was well expressed in his letter of dismissal, forbidding him to make any appointments of either a civil or military nature. Ireland was to be guided now by Essex in Dublin and Ranelagh at Whitehall.

1. CSPD, 1671-2:1, A18-9, King to Berkeley, 30 Apr 1672.