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Lieutenant-General Arthur Dillon: Jacobite at the Regency court 1715-1725

Doctor of Philosophy

2015

Kate Elizabeth Geange
Declaration

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Summary

This doctoral thesis examines Jacobite affairs between 1715 and 1725 by means of the Jacobite service of French Lieutenant-General Arthur Dillon. It investigates Dillon’s various roles and principal relationships entailed by his post as Jacobite representative to the French court during those years. The primary objective is to determine the consequences of Dillon’s service on the Jacobite political network, as well as to explore the significance of issues which permeated his service, such as influence, patronage, allegiance, loyalty and identity, as they apply to current historiographical thought on Jacobite exile.

Dillon’s roles and relationships within the Jacobite leadership network were primarily informed by his close connection to the French court. His position at the centre of French political activity helped to minimise the distance of the Jacobite cause from the centre of French power; however this advantage led to James’ reliance on Dillon. This dependence was emphasised by the multiplicity of roles which Dillon performed, as a diplomatic and a personal intermediary, a military patron, a transmission exchange, a plot designer and co-ordinator, and a financial and administrative manager. His importance to the Jacobite community meant that Dillon’s weaknesses had a serious impact on Jacobite affairs, most critically his lack of political acumen. His eventual forced retirement from his position by James was a consequence partly of his intimacy with the disgraced Earl of Mar, but primarily his own political ineptitude.

Though ostensibly his prime advantage, Dillon’s military rank became a weakness. The conflict between his two roles, half way between subject of France and of the Stuart King, created an ambiguity as to his loyalty. Dillon’s supreme problem was his personal conflict as to whether he owed his highest loyalty to James III or France, a conflict which has implications for the identity of Jacobite exiles, particularly Irish Jacobite officers.

This thesis makes an original contribution to knowledge firstly through an investigation of Dillon’s place within the Jacobite leadership during this period, and the consequences of his employment in this role for the Jacobite cause; and secondly through its exploration of the wider significance of Dillon’s employment on Jacobite affairs - a challenge intrinsic to the exiled Jacobite community, the collision of multiple allegiances commonly experienced by Jacobites in exile.
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Notes on the Text

Abbreviations

BN – Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris
AN – Archives Nationales, Paris
MAE – Ministère d’Affaires Etrangères, Paris
AG – Archives du Guerre, Vincennes, Paris
BL – British Library
Add. MS – Additional Manuscripts in the British Library
SPW – Stuart Papers preserved at Windsor Castle.
HMC – Historic Manuscripts Commission
TCD – Trinity College Library, Dublin
NLI – Irish National Library
ODNB – Oxford Dictionary of National Biography

Dating system

During this period Britain was continuing to use the Julian Calendar, while for the most part counties in Europe had changed over to the use of the Gregorian Calendar, which was 11 days ahead. The Gregorian Calendar is generally referred to by historians as the New Style. Since the vast majority of the correspondence studied in this thesis was sent within the continent, between France, Italy and Spain, dates in this thesis have been standardised to New Style.

Names

There are several individuals who were important to Dillon, with whom he had the most commerce. The frequency with which they therefore have to be referred means that they are generally only referred to by their last name or title, such as Mar, Atterbury or Inese. The only exception to this rule is in the case of James III, or the
Chevalier de St. George. This thesis covers a period restricted to after his father’s death; there can therefore be no confusion as to his name, so that he is referred to simply as James. Inese is now spelled as Innes, and modern historians usually use the modern spelling. However his name was consistently spelt throughout the Stuart correspondence as Inese, and I have decided to leave his name with that spelling. These rules have been followed throughout the thesis, including references in footnotes.

For ease of understanding I have maintained the same name for specific individuals throughout the thesis, even if their title changed during the period under investigation. This is the case for two principal characters discussed; John Hay, created Earl of Inverness in 1718, and James Murray, created Earl of Dunbar in 1721.

Quotes

All quotes retain their original spelling, but coded names have been de-coded, for the reader’s convenience. The code names used most commonly through the period, though varying substantially, include ‘Dutton’ or ‘Chivers’ for Dillon, ‘Knight’ or ‘Farmer’ for James, ‘Andrew’ for Queen Mary, ‘Martel’ for Mar, ‘Jackson’ for Lansdowne, ‘Onslow’ for Ormonde, ‘Horsley’ for Hay, ‘Morpeth’ for Murray and ‘Rigg’ or ‘Illington’ for Atterbury. Translations have been provided for quotes in French. I have referred to English translations of French documents when such translations have been provided in publications or alongside manuscript copies.
Introduction

This doctoral thesis examines Jacobite affairs between 1715 and 1725 through a case study of Arthur Dillon, Lieutenant-General of the French army and prominent Jacobite agent in Paris during those years. It investigates the interaction of relationships within the leadership of the Jacobite political network through the prism of Arthur Dillon, and the political and social implications of these relationships, and achieves this by focusing on Dillon's various roles within the Jacobite network and his principal relationships within this community and the external political world. The primary objective is to determine the consequences of Dillon's service in his role on the Jacobite political network, and the significance of issues which infused this service, issues of influence, patronage, allegiance, loyalty and identity. The conclusions are contextualised within current historiographical thought on Jacobite exile.

A small group of Jacobite individuals involved in leadership roles and plot negotiations in events between 1715 and 1725 are the pivotal focus. The investigation started with one individual, Arthur Dillon, and expanded as the network of individual Jacobites with whom he corresponded or had important links became further subjects, which led to an examination of the nature of the negotiations and relations between Dillon and the other individuals in the network. Dillon was chosen as a case-study through which to focus the investigation because of the depth and centrality of his involvement in the leading Jacobite network during this vital period, and therefore his importance to the Jacobite cause. More importantly Dillon's position as Jacobite ambassador to the French court gave him a central role in Jacobite relations with the French state, which was given an added dimension by his dual nature as a Jacobite French officer. He therefore inhabited a space at the intersection of Jacobite and French politics, which can give valuable insight into Jacobite relations with the French state during this period.

Indeed more broadly, concentrating on Jacobite transactions within and with France allows a fascinating and illuminating intersection into both foreign and domestic politics, given the unique nature of Jacobitism in France, as the domicile of both the core of the Jacobite army and the Jacobite nucleus of St. Germain-en-Laye. It is not
an area which has been looked into exhaustively, in spite of its importance for the
survival of Jacobitism and for the interests of the Wild Geese in France; large gaps
still exist within the study of this broad area (as elaborated on in the historiographical
analysis below), such as the underground networks of Irish Jacobitism. David
Bracken in his article ‘Piracy and poverty, aspects of the Irish Jacobite experience in
France’, specifically states that important research needs to be undertaken on
networks among the exiled Irish community in France, particularly among the
‘criminal subculture’.¹ Eamonn Ó Ciardha recommends further research on such
networks, as well as on biographical studies and “rumours of alleged and real links
between Ireland-based Jacobites and their continental counterparts”, particularly in
the correspondence of several Irish Jacobites (including Dillon) held in the Stuart and
various national archives.² He also calls attention to the need for historians to locate
exiled Irish Jacobite material within its contemporary political context, whether
British, Irish, French or other relevant European states.³
I aim to contribute towards this latter effort, locating Irish Jacobite material within its
French political context during the ten-year period under study, since it requires
much further attention. Only one work, a Masters thesis by Marcus Beresford de la
Poer, has specifically and thoroughly investigated some aspects of this issue.⁴ This
ground breaking work was widely referenced in the following historiography, with
its concentration on new material, ideas and subject matter. However it is still
virtually the only work to properly explore this issue, and is also quite broad-ranging,
as it covers a very large time scale. It is concerned as much with other issues of
French policy, specifically naval policy during the War of Spanish Succession, and
Irish piracy on behalf of and assisted by the French government, as with Jacobite
plots.
Cultural issues surrounding the Jacobite court itself, at Saint-Germain, Avignon and
Rome, were rather neglected in the past and have for the most part only recently been
explored. Barely a handful of historians, principally Edward T. Corp and Natalie
Genet-Rouffiac, have started to focus on the subject; the area is recognised as
needing extensive further attention. Genet-Rouffiac is the first historian to have

² Eamonn Ó Ciardha, ‘‘A lot done, more to do’: the Restoration and road ahead for Irish Jacobite
studies’, in Loyalty and Identity: Jacobites at home and abroad, ed. Paul Monod, Murray Pittock and
³ Eamonn Ó Ciardha, Ireland and the Jacobite Cause, 1685-1766: A fatal attachment (Dublin: Four
touched on the issue of the links between Irish Jacobites, St Germain and Versailles, in an article called ‘The Wild Geese in France: A French Perspective’. I have aimed to build on this work for the succeeding period of 1715 to 1725, contributing to specific elements of her research, and adding a new perspective to the debate.

The thesis outlines the principal events during Dillon’s occupation of his post as Jacobite representative to the French court, the multiple roles contained with this post, and the principal relationships he maintained within his political world. In order to determine his alignment within the political context, it examines the nature of his negotiations with his principal connections. The most significant facet of Dillon’s occupation of his post is its impact on the success of the network, as well as how his military role influenced his position.

Dillon’s effect on the Jacobite community through his performance of his role was substantial. Ostensibly his military rank was of prime advantage for his role, because of his acquaintance and interest with important French officials including Philippe d’Orléans, Regent of France from 1715 to 1723, and the assistance this could attain with military appointments for his compatriots. In reality however military position became the main drawback, producing a conflict between his two roles, his rank and continued proprietor-ship of his regiment, and his new Jacobite post, since he had effectively taken oaths to serve both the French King and the Stuart King. Dillon’s supreme problem was his personal conflict as to whether he owed his highest loyalty to James or France. This conflict is of primary importance because of its implications for other Jacobite exiles, particularly officers in the French army. The fundamental issue of identity for Jacobite exiles has as yet primarily been recognised in terms of nationality – particularly regarding the separate identities of English, Scots and Irish Jacobites, and their conflict with a unified Jacobite identity, or indeed with a potential French identity. The full implications of these multiple identities, and their impact on duty and allegiance have yet to be addressed. How Dillon’s own internal conflict affected his position as Jacobite representative to the French court is therefore the most important question which this thesis attempts to resolve.

The issue had serious effects through Dillon’s relationship with Philippe d’Orléans.

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Dillon exhibited a degree of submission towards and confidence in the Regent, retained from his previous service under Orleans’ command, and indeed reflected the reality that he still owed his official military duty to the leader of France. The Regent’s betrayal of Dillon’s trust (on several occasions and by various means) was assisted by Dillon’s standing within their relationship. The account of their relations can also contribute to an understanding of the French approach to Jacobitism.

Dillon’s relationship with James was primarily shaped by Dillon’s situation as the senior Jacobite with access to the French court. His close connection to and influence at the heart of French political activity might have minimised the remoteness of the Jacobite cause to that hub, but also accentuated James’ distance from Paris. This led to a certain amount of dependence on Dillon by James, emphasised by the multiplicity of roles which Dillon performed as part of his position, which included roles as both a diplomatic and a personal or advocate intermediary, a military patron, a communication pillar, a plot organiser and memorialist, and a financial and administrative manager.

James relied on communication from his trusted senior advisors, and therefore partly on Dillon for the most well-informed news from the court, and progress on the plots in which he was a central figure. James particularly counted on Dillon as a central pillar of this communication, to transmit his commands and other news to the outer reaches of the various Jacobite networks. Dillon’s other intermediary and financial roles, and his additional role as representative for Jacobite interests at court reinforced the dependency.

Dillon’s relationship with John Erskine, 23rd Earl of Mar, and Baron Lansdowne was also largely determined by their combined interest with James. His later dependence on the three as a group, the ‘Triumvirate’, meant that they came to assert much control over Jacobite affairs for the period from 1720 until the discovery of Mar’s treachery in 1724. Within the group Mar’s influence with Dillon, and even more over Lansdowne, became a principal feature, though claims of Mar’s dominance over Dillon were exaggerated by their enemies.

It was also not the primary or only reason for Dillon’s eventual estrangement from Jacobite activity. Dillon’s lack of political acumen when it came to his relations with foreign states had serious effects on Jacobite affairs. Of course the Jacobite’s limited options in Europe meant that they were essentially stuck in a political wilderness for most of this period, with no possibility of assistance from France, yet even less from
the majority of European states; the only other states that ever offered any hopes were Spain, Sweden and Russia, at very brief intervals. In that regard the Jacobites had to pursue the French state to some extent as virtually their only option, no matter how hopeless; Dillon’s recommendations could be somewhat justified. Nevertheless Dillon’s intermittent hopes of an improved outlook were continually unwarranted, wasting Jacobite efforts on a promise-less direction. His chances of achieving any diplomatic progress with the Regent were continually over-rated by himself, and were in fact very slight. His financial and patronage efforts held far better prospects, but Dillon’s want of requisite cynicism or political nous certainly impeded his ability to perform his duty with any profit, with both financial and diplomatic assistance, despite his other apparently advantageous qualities including his rank and social charm.

His forced retirement from his position by James was a consequence partly of his intimacy with the disgraced Earl of Mar, but chiefly of his own political ineptitude, impacted in turn by the conflict of interest of his dual allegiances, and therefore his unsuitability for the important diplomatic role he filled. Essentially Dillon’s identity, through his conflicting allegiances and loyalties, affected his ability to perform his Jacobite position, as well as his inherent trustfulness, injudiciousness, and inadequacy for the demands of his political role.

These conclusions as to Dillon have implications for current historiographical debates on the Irish Jacobite ‘Wild Geese’, their identity and their integration into French society, which constitute the principal conclusions of my thesis. This thesis makes an original contribution to knowledge firstly through its investigation of the role Dillon played within the Jacobite leadership during this period, and the consequences of his employment in this role for the Jacobite cause, subjects which have been entirely overlooked by historians. So too has been the significance of a challenge intrinsic to the exiled Jacobite community, and which this thesis has found to be a key feature of Dillon’s employment on Jacobite affairs – the problems created by the collision of multiple allegiances commonly experienced by Jacobites in exile.

The thesis is organised as a biographical narrative, with an analytical approach, so that instructive elements of the narrative are examined more closely within the core chapters. The primary theme is discussed throughout the thesis. It argues that Dillon
was not fitted for his post as Jacobite representative in France because of his political weakness, which consisted of his attachment and loyalty to old friends or commanders, and resulting faith in these perceived allies.

Chapter One addresses the period leading up to Dillon's occupation of his post, depicting the origin of Dillon's most important relationships in the context, with James and the Due d'Orleans, and of his Jacobite service. It describes his roles during the earliest period, and examines the consequences of Dillon's weakness as it was vital to the formation and misunderstandings of the Swedish plot, and enabled the manipulation of Dillon by the Regent, one of those supposed friends.

Chapter Two proceeds from Dillon's assumption of the official post, developing Dillon's primary relationships with other vital figures within the Jacobite leadership, Queen Mary, Inese and the Earl of Mar. It exposes other failures in his performance of his duties, particularly in achieving one of his most important responsibilities, obtaining funds for the Jacobite community, because of his personal weakness.

Chapter Three concentrates primarily on Dillon's place within the network, describing his patronage, communication, financial and intermediary roles, and the position he occupied within the Jacobite leadership, particularly as one of the Triumvirate faction. It demonstrates his persistently hopeful approach towards the French ministry, leading up to his contribution to the failure of the Atterbury Plot through his misguided trust in both the Regent and the Earl of Mar.

Chapter Four charts the process by which Dillon was gradually excluded from the leadership between 1723 and 1725, and eventually deprived of his post. It displays the way in which Dillon's fundamental weakness again affected the performance of his role, through his trust in the Duc du Bourbon during their negotiations, which, along with his close association with the Earl of Mar, led to his dismissal.

Methodology

The methodology of this thesis was first based on a problem-oriented approach, using the secondary material to help develop ideas on the primary sources, on possible lines of enquiry as well as for reference. However through the development of the subject matter this became a source-based approach, as the content of the main body of sources dictated major changes in the direction of the principal questions, most obviously by a narrowing of their focus.
A traditional methodology was applied consisting of “critical examination of the sources, and the achievement of a better sense of the historical context by an intense study of the primary material”, as still practiced by many historians such as Doron Zimmerman.\(^6\) Zimmerman justifies a political narrative style for history – a narrative constructed from archival elements - as the most effective style for Jacobite history, arguing that in using more methodological styles the historian can fall into the trap of attempting to make the evidence fit into the conceptual criteria or agenda of a template. Given the biographical nature of the subject matter, the most coherent way to organise the thesis was as a biographical narrative, with an analytical approach, so that instructive elements of the narrative are examined more closely within the text, after which the narrative is recommenced.

My own interest has always primarily been in cultural history, specifically in the field of the history of mentalities, in the exploration of thought-processes, unconscious assumptions and perceptions, everyday thought, collective attitudes, and forms of behaviour.\(^7\) I have been influenced by some existing historiographical approaches. Robert Darnton called for ethnographic studies of history, examining the way people of the past describe their reality and make sense of it, and the ways in which they deal with this reality.\(^8\) I have to some extent focused on these elements in my study of Arthur Dillon, by means of his relationships with vital figures, as well as by exploring the conflicts which existed within his reality, and determining how these conflicts affected his beliefs and actions. Socio-cultural oriented questions are a primary focus within the political context, as displayed in my concentration on beliefs surrounding migration regarding allegiance, loyalty and identity.

### Sources

The vast concentration of my primary source research has been the correspondence between members of the main Jacobite network held in archives in Britain, France and Ireland. Since Dillon was the starting point and principal subject of the thesis, manuscript research concentrated on papers relating to Dillon; unfortunately Dillon’s

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own personal Jacobite-related papers which had been stored at the Scots College in Paris were destroyed during the French Revolution. Almost the only papers of Arthur Dillon which have survived are letters (inbound, outbound and allusive) included in various Jacobite collections, primarily those within the Stuart Manuscript collection held at the Royal Archives of Windsor Castle. This series has been published in the Calendar of Stuart Papers up to the year 1718, which is available at Trinity College Library. All papers from after 1718 are only held at the Royal Archives; however they are available on microfilm.

These papers are almost solely made up of correspondence, including what survives of Dillon’s papers in the collection, which I have made the basis of my investigation into his communication and links to other Jacobites. There were some periods however for which the relevant microfilms were not available to interloan; this applies primarily to several months of 1719 and of 1724. For these periods I have tried my best to fill the gaps with other sources, such as British Library manuscripts, Dickson’s *Publications of the Scottish History Society Vol. XIX: The Jacobite Attempt of 1719*, and Glover’s *Stuart Papers Vol. 1: 1717-1725*.

Some few exceptions survive: some few of his memorials, expense accounts, receipts and other financial records among the Stuart manuscripts; a few of Dillon’s military reports in the French military archives at Vincennes; and some legal (notarial) documents signed by him in the Archives Nationales. There are also many other non-personal sources - those not personally created by Dillon - including many genealogical sources on his family and ancestry, as well as military records of Dillon and the regiment, also held in these French archives. However for the most part these documents are not related to his Jacobite business, and therefore do not shed light on the principal topic of this study. It is essentially correspondence, with a few memoire and memorial sources, through which Arthur Dillon’s relationships with the various people within and without the Jacobite networks can be constructed.

Unfortunately the destruction of Dillon’s personal papers has meant that no possible correspondence with Ireland survives, resulting in a complete lack of any evidence regarding his relationship with his family or any other correspondents in Ireland. Any evidence of Dillon’s correspondence with Irish members of the exiled community is also scarcely represented in the Stuart papers, where his correspondents are primarily

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the Jacobite leaders, such as James, Mary of Modena, Mar, Innes and Lansdowne. Ormonde and Daniel O’Brien are the only Irish representatives to have direct correspondence with Dillon survive in the papers. This is the primary reason why the focus of the thesis has been on Dillon’s relationships with the Jacobite leaders, rather than on any Irish connections.

There are obviously limitations to correspondence as a source, most important of which is the universal problem with any written source: the truthfulness or sincerity of the writer of any letter. John Tosh has very usefully described this difficulty, obviously linked to the wider historiographical debate over objectivity, which I make reference to in my summary of historiographical issues, and of which Tosh himself includes an excellent outline. Etiquette was another limitation to correspondence: the social conventions of letter writing were particularly formulaic during the eighteenth century, which could have limited the emotional honesty of the content to some extent. According to Katie Barclay it was a cultural practice limited by “shared cultural narratives or scripts”, and that it could not therefore “allow access to the free expression of the soul”. However the problems or limitations of correspondence are off-set by the insight which it gives to personal relationships, the way in which, unlike more formal, official sources, they include (certainly potentially, even mostly genuine) personal expressions and sentiment, accounts and description of everyday life and feelings, as well as real discussion of events, activities, stories and problems, and revelations of opinions, secrets and accusations, for the political side as well as the personal side of Jacobitism. This is all in a way which no other type of source comes near, even journals, diaries or memoires, which also have the drawback of being by one person, possibly written at one moment in time, even years after the events being described. There is certainly no other type of source which could be obtained from this distance in time which could cast as much light on the relationships within the Jacobite network of the main characters involved.

There is however a wide range of types of sources which I have studied and which have illuminated the political context and culture which existed around these principal characters, including journals or memoirs of various important court

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personages or Jacobites, memorials, treatises and family papers. British parliamentary proceedings, government minutes and reports have both elucidated incidents and displayed British information on and understanding of Jacobite affairs, including specifically of Dillon. Political correspondence, reports and memoranda between the French and British ministries held at the archives of the Ministère des affaires étrangères, and scattered through various Historic Manuscript Commission reports, have been very important in revealing the details of historical events and political negotiations, as well as more generally the policies and attitudes of the French leadership towards the Jacobites.

**Historiographical Context**

Many historiographical issues and debates are relevant to the questions in this thesis, most obviously those which have been discussed within Jacobite studies. The study of Jacobitism has, by its very nature, required assessment of the extent of ideological Jacobitism amongst the Tories. This question began with J. H. Plumb's argument in the 1960s that political stability grew throughout this period, because of Whig dominance. Geoffrey Holmes argued for the existence of 'ideologically motivated splinter groups' in both Tory and Whig parties. In contrast Robert Walcott believed that Jacobitism was more a dynastic than an ideological platform. Many scholars have however agreed on the very strong level of Jacobitism within the Tory Party, including Daniel Szechi, who thought that Jacobitism was completely entwined with the Tory Party, and that the Tory Harley Ministry was especially strongly Jacobite.\(^{12}\) Ian Christie claimed that about a quarter of the Tory MPs were strongly Jacobite, and another quarter sympathetic, though a slight majority supported the Hanoverians.\(^{13}\)

Eveline Cruickshanks developed Walcott's ideas of a dynastic struggle further, claiming that the Tory Party became predominantly a Jacobite party, attempting to restore the Stuarts with foreign assistance. This was because they were pushed out of political power in 1715, through the violent opposition of the Whigs and their exclusion from political office, which enabled the establishment of one-party

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politics. The treatment of Tories as enemies by George I and George II meant they had no choice but to support his enemy, James the Pretender, and become Jacobites. The importance of this argument partly rested on her original research among primary sources such as the Stuart MSS from Windsor Castle, State papers, French and Dutch diplomatic papers and papers of the nobility, like the Sunderland, Walpole and Devonshire papers. Linda Colley on the other hand claimed that the Tory Party did not completely disappear after 1715. Though gradually marginalised by the Whigs by being deliberately deprived of any political office, Tories were not forced into Jacobitism, as they were still making attempts to oppose the Whig ministry, and to win back power through a variety of approaches through the period. It made no sense to turn to Jacobitism, since their ambitions could just as well have been realised under the Hanoverians as under the Pretender. The rare occasions Tories did engage in Jacobite activity, she said, it was for practical reasons, not ideological ones.

Traditionally one of the major debates about Jacobitism has been whether it declined between the 1715 Rising and the 1745, and whether the 1745 Rising destroyed Jacobitism, as has been traditionally assumed. Daniel Szechi maintains the thesis of the decline of Scottish Jacobitism after 1716. He suggests with Margaret Sankey that after 1716 there was overt political and economic pressure on the Scottish elite to conform to the Whigs, and the culture of that elite ensured that it was possible and reasonable to be sentimental or cultural Jacobites but be obedient to the Whig regime, frustrating any serious Jacobite endeavours. Szechi also submits that the failure of the 1715 Rising discouraged the Scottish Jacobites, leading to a decline in Scottish Jacobitism. The exile and consequent poverty of their leaders affected the minor Jacobites, and those largely Protestant exiles found it harder to blend in to the Pretender’s Court, leading to many also becoming disaffected from the Cause. Conversely Clark emphasises the endurance of Jacobitism after 1715, pointing out that almost all propaganda during this period was Jacobite propaganda, though dismissing any real perpetuation after 1745.

18 J C. D. Clark, *English Society 1688 – 1832: Ideology, Social Structure and Political Practice*
Most recent debate on Jacobitism has focused on ideas of ideology and identity - the latter of which is one of the primary concepts explored in this thesis, in the context of the exiled Jacobites. Historians have looked at those elements of Jacobitism which might have alienated some sections of Scottish and English society, and attracted others. William Donaldson argues that some of the Jacobite ideologies in Scotland included the ancient Scottish ethnic enmity of Gaels or Celts against Anglo-Saxons. Another, held by the educated Jacobites, was that of the genealogical myth of the Scots, claiming descent for their ancient Royal family from Glannachus Glan, a Trojan. This was in opposition to the British royal genealogical myth of Brutus, both of which gave right of ownership of the British Isles to their respective peoples and royal lines.\textsuperscript{19}

Murray Pittock identifies two ideologies. The principal ideology is that of the conservative, traditional, rural elite, which also includes the genealogical myth, but claiming descent from Æneas, rather than Glannachus Glan. The main part of that ideology consists however in patriotism: disdain for the Union, reverence for the Highland tradition, and wish for the restoration of that culture. This reverence derives from a belief in the Highlander’s noble disdain for money and position (in contrast to Lowlanders), their elevation of honour and honesty, and their fertility. This caused them to believe that the restoration of the Stuarts would mean a restoration of the glory and wealth of Scotland; they would reverse the Whigs’ crimes, and restore customary rights. The King was a messiah, a deliverer of rebirth for Scotland. There were also, however, many Jacobite Freemasons, particularly among exiles in France; compared to these rural, traditionally Catholic Jacobites, they followed a very different, cosmopolitan, mystical ideology.\textsuperscript{20}

F. J. McLynn describes three main Jacobite ideologies: Scottish Nationalism; the doctrine of “divine, indefeasible right, passive obedience and non-resistance”; and Country ideology, encompassing a critique of corruption and nostalgia for the ‘golden age’. He stresses the difference between Scottish and English Jacobite ideologies. English Jacobites emphasised divine right ideology and the Country ideology, while Scottish Jacobites tended to emphasise Scottish nationalism, and also


\textsuperscript{19} Matthew Kennedy, \textit{A chronological genealogical and historical dissertation of the royal family of the Stuarts} (Paris: Lewis Coignard, 1705); William Donaldson, \textit{The Jacobite Song: political myth and national identity} (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1988).

a ‘providential and mystical view of the world’. Other historians such as Evelyn Cruickshanks emphasise the Scottish nationalist aspect of Jacobitism; she states that for many Jacobites the Stuart restoration was the only way to achieve complete independence for Scotland. Bruce Lenman likewise identifies similar characteristics to Pittock: the Highland hereditary right, Scottish nationalism, and belief that the Pretender’s accession was the will of God; that restoration of the Stuarts would bring the restoration of peace, prosperity and happiness.

Jacobite issues can occasionally be controversial, such as a longstanding debate over the extent of anti-Catholic sentiment and Protestant religious fervour, and how it manifested itself. Colin Haydon claims that the 1715 Rising revived anti-Catholic sentiment which had been diminishing, and created new anti-Catholic legislation, though the laws were frequently unenforced. Jonathan Clark emphasises Jacobitism’s strong association with Catholicism in the minds of the English, and mentions their ‘wide-spread antipathy’ to Catholicism, partly because of English fears for the future of the Anglican Church, and the constant fear of the growth of Catholicism in England. Bob Harris also demonstrates the very wide extent of anti-Catholic feeling, emphasising the influence of the contemporary image of the ‘infinitely devious and cunning Catholic conspirator’, and the anti-Catholic rumour-mongering of disaffected individuals during the 1745 Rising.

Irish Jacobitism has not been as hotly debated as other areas; the historiography is very sparse, as Éamonn O Ciardha points out in Ireland and the Jacobite Cause: a fatal attachment. Though a reasonably popular topic for nineteenth century historians like Macaulay and Trevelyan, J. G. Simms’ Jacobite Ireland 1685-91 was the only “detailed history of the period to appear for over fifty years”. Moreover in spite of its 1969 date it was a political and military account, as opposed to a more

24 Clark, English Society 1688 – 1832.
modern socio-cultural analysis. However much more attention has been given to the subject during the last 20 years. Murray Pittock’s *Poetry and Jacobite Politics in 18th Century Britain and Ireland* of 1994 is important historiographically, approaching the subject through poetry and the other literature of the marginalized peoples of the period. He attempts to “liberate eighteenth century literary history” from what he claims was a revival of the ‘incremental’ or Whig historiography in recent works, specifically Linda Colley’s *Britons*.\(^{28}\) Pittock’s work showed the importance of cultural analysis in a field which was still lacking such interpretation, while other historical fields were already moving onto post-structuralism, using the further step of linguistic deconstruction. In Ireland itself the topic also came under a resurgence of interest, with major authorities including Breandan Ó Buachalla and his major Irish work, *Aisling Ghéar*, as well as Brian O’Higgins, Marianne Elliott, Sean J. Connolly and Toby Barnard.

Until recently there was a general lack of attention paid to Irish Jacobitism, leading to holes in the existing knowledge and historiography of certain aspects of this subject. Part of the problem is the lack of documentation found in Jacobite studies generally, since the nature of Jacobitism meant it was forced to be underground and secretive. Its lack of evidence, and the misleading nature of much of the documentation that exists makes it very difficult to study.

Debate that has arisen in the area of Irish Jacobitism has focused on its importance: its strength within Ireland; its importance within Jacobitism (often perceived through its influence on their reigning monarch); and the strength of its threat to the Hanoverian crown. Most of the nineteenth century historians such as W. E. H. Lecky and Matthew O’Conor were typically Whiggish in their dismissal of the importance and strength of Irish Catholic Jacobitism.\(^{29}\) Later works have still tended to downplay Jacobite support in Ireland, from Richard Hayes, to Marcus Beresford de la Poer, to David Hayton’s 1981 article ‘The crisis in Ireland and the disintegration of Queen Anne’s last ministry’ and finally Thomas Bartlett’s *The fall and rise of the Irish nation the Catholic question 1690-1830*.\(^{30}\)

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Irish historians however were typically resolutely nationalist. Breandan Ó Buachalla and Brian O’Higgins have both defended the strength of Irish Catholic Jacobitism and attacked the harshness of the penal laws.Ó Ciardha fights strongly for the attachment of the Irish to Jacobitism, not just because of their Catholicism, but because of the continued relevance of and power held by the exiled royal family in Irish society through their right to nominate Irish Catholic bishops. He also aggressively criticises historians’ neglect of Irish language sources, particularly poetry, stating that “a failure to utilise this literature as a means of exploring the eighteenth-century Irish Catholic mentality magnifies the dangers of reading Irish history from exclusively English-language sources and state-papers.” This attitude is shared by many Irish historians, including Kevin Whelan, Gearóid Ó Tuathaigh and Vincent Morley.

One facet of Irish Jacobite history which has been slow to be recognised is that of Irish migration to Europe. In the nineteenth century interest was first shown in the ecclesiastical aspect, by historians such as Patrick Moran and Alphonsus Bellesheim, and the military exploits of Irishmen, by Edmund Hogan and John Cornelius O’Callaghan. The journals *Irish Ecclesiastical Record* and the later *Archivium Hibernicum* started to include articles on Irish ecclesiastical history in Europe. Early explorations of the topic exhibited the usual limitations of pre-modernist histories: nationalism and other prejudices, presentism and stylistic emphasis. During the early twentieth century the topic was for the most part avoided by both Irish and Jacobite historians, although an extremely important dimension within the histories of both areas. In the Irish context one reason for the general avoidance of the subject put forward by Thomas O’Connor is that Irish historians were daunted by the enormity of the task, because of the previous lack of research – a lack of definite

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[33] Ó Ciardha, p. 46;


population statistics and historiographical and methodological frame works, and difficulties with international archival material.\textsuperscript{37}

This unfortunate cycle was broken with Richard J. Hayes and his groundbreaking research in *Manuscript sources of the history of Irish civilisation*, as well as his *Biographical dictionary of Irishmen in France* and *Irish swordsmen of France* which present biographies of several of the most renowned Wild Geese and their families, including Dillon, O’Moran, and Lally, in very valuable detail, including references to their ties at court.\textsuperscript{38} A revival of the subject had started, as evidenced in the contemporary series *A new history of Ireland*, in which two articles on the subject, by J. G. Simms and John Silke, emphasised its new importance.\textsuperscript{39} Hugh Fenning and Patrick Fagan established greater access to sources. Patrick Clarke de Dromantin likewise contributed greatly to this historic record, with *Les oies sauvages memoires d’une famille irlandaise refugiee en France* providing detailed case studies of individual Wild Goose families in France.\textsuperscript{40} Other Wild Geese descendants, such as Renagh Holohan and Gilbert Tiemy, and other interested parties like Patricia Dagier and T. P. Whelehan, have also provided family or general histories of Wild Geese.

Clarke de Dromantin has also contributed estimated statistics of exiled wild geese to the historical record.\textsuperscript{41} Such statistics have become very important, particularly to military history. Military sources have been thoroughly scrutinized as Irish Brigade statistics have become a controversial subject within the discipline. Estimates of average regiment numbers during the late seventeenth and eighteenth century differ greatly. That is partly the fault of varying estimates by contemporaries, such as Sir

\textsuperscript{37} O’Connor, *The Irish in Europe*, pp. 9-10, 17.


Charles Wogan, who himself gave different numbers on different occasions, and Abbé MacGeoghegan, whose estimates were four times those of Wogan. Historians cannot therefore be expected to agree: Richard Hayes broadly supports the figures of MacGeoghegan, and bases his various estimates on these figures, but most other historians dismiss them. Colm James Ó Conaill is one such who has done his own calculations and ended up with estimates a fraction of those of Hayes and MacGeoghegan. Alternatively some historians, such as Harman Murtagh, turn to the memoir of one Chevalier Gaydon of Dillon’s regiment. Éamonn Ó Ciosáin accuses historians such as Murtagh of neglecting important records for the post Cromwell and pre-Williamite period in France, arguing that the numbers of Irish mercenaries were much higher than printed sources show. Louis Cullen drastically reduces his recruitment figures, arguing that they were vastly inflated by fearful protestant Irish officials; Ó Ciardha agrees, making the point that many leaving the country were in fact emigrating to the colonies. Much work still needs to be done on the subject to resolve this and other issues.

Some historians have become important in their field through their ground-breaking research. David Bracken has looked at fresh sources, in order to look through a new lens; by studying police and hospital archives throughout France. Bracken perceived previously invisible groups – the forgotten permanently desperate Jacobite wild geese who were forced into criminality through poverty. Liam Chambers has examined the literature of the exiled Irish Catholic intelligensia, looking at their academic contributions, and thereby discovering more of their intellectual philosophies and sympathies.

Much of the work done on Irish migration to Europe has focused on particular areas, such as migration to Spain. Spanish historians such as Igor Perez Tostado have started to recognise the influence of the Irish in Spain, and among Irish historians


Patricia O Connell has specifically looked at the Spanish Irish Colleges, and how they facilitated interaction between the two countries, and their cultures, in all contexts.\(^{46}\) 

Ecclesiastical history is one of the pillars of recent research on migration to France, since ecclesiastical records are one of the few forms of documentation of the Irish in France. The historical records of the Irish Colleges, French Universities, Orders, and regular clergy all have great potential to reveal details about the lives of Wild Geese. The major research works include Patrick Boyle, Micheline K. Walsh and T. J. Walsh, who have all studied the Irish Colleges of France; Hugh Fenning the Dominicans; Canice Mooney the Franciscans; and Brockliss and Ferte the Universities of France. Donal A. Cregan, and Cathaldus Giblin in his *A history of Irish Catholicism*, have both made important contributions to Irish religious history looking at the experiences of regular Irish clergy in France.\(^{47}\) The focus on specific areas of Jacobitism has meant there are still many gaps in the historiography of Irish migration to Europe, even within areas that have been studied, because of the general lack of attention paid to Irish Jacobitism or the early eighteenth century.

This thesis also contributes to a historiographical debate directly relevant to Arthur Dillon: the extent of integration of Jacobite migrants into French society. Historians including Louis Cullen, Kevin Whelan, Daniel Szechi, David Bracken and Colm James O’Conaill have minimised the extent of Jacobite integration, instead stressing the persistent desire of Irish and Scots exiled families to return to their homelands. Szechi is a leading exponent of this outlook. In both 1715, and *‘Cam ye over frae France?’* he describes in detail the problems/troubles and miseries of Scots Jacobites’ experiences of exile after 1715, which encouraged their strong desire to

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return home by whatever means necessary, and therefore led to the return of most of those who were able to take advantage of the Indemnity Act. 

David Bracken similarly emphasises the lack of success or integration of many exiles in his description of the poverty and misery that many Irish soldiers fell into in France, particularly after the demobilisation of sections of the Irish brigades in 1697, which left so many soldiers, and officers too, bereft of their livelihoods. Kevin Whelan requires two generations to have passed before allowing sufficient time for the integration of Irish families into French society. He does not appear to accept that integration could be possible for the first generation of migrants, because of the pain of exile; the “underlying resentment and unappeasable loneliness that exile could also induce”.

Cullen is another key figure to underline the stance above. He explains Irish mobility as the interaction between three factors: dynamism, persecution and poverty. Cullen concentrates on the decline and failed examples of permanent migration and assimilation, stating that “Irish military migration lacked a long term dynamic: it...progressively lost its role in Irish Catholic society.” His emphasis is on the permanent network between the Jacobite exiles and their family at home and the exiles’ desire and occasional attempts to explore means of return, sometimes successfully. Cullen depicts the remaining landed Catholic families as almost systematically exporting their younger sons to Europe, generally for military service, in order to preserve remaining land and wealth for the heir in Ireland; he contrasts them with the landless families who had become emigrees. Indeed such a system has been investigated by several historians within different Jacobite contexts. This has

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been stimulated by increasing attention on kinship and other social networks in wider academia, specifically sociology and anthropology.\textsuperscript{54}

In Scotland the extensive and intertwined kinship network of the elite ensured that, whatever the division by politics of individual family members, the extended family would pull together to protect the entire family, its name, honour, assets and welfare. The dynamics of this Scottish kinship network have been explored in the work of Szechi, Murdoch and Zimmerman.\textsuperscript{55} The European-wide Catholic network within which these kinship networks operated has become a focus of very recent historiography.\textsuperscript{56} The Irish equivalent has been described in the work of Cullen, Whelan, Murdoch and James O’Conaill.\textsuperscript{57}

In fact O’Conaill employs this framework to build upon Cullen’s use of the Dillon family itself as an exemplar of the ‘younger son’ system. He has written articles on the Dillon family in which he uses the familial network theory element of migration to explain the conversion to the established religion of Charles Dillon, Arthur Dillon’s grandson in 1767. Ó Conaill doubts the sincerity of the conversion given the long family history of Catholic Jacobitism. He argues that Charles converted to Anglicanism because his younger brother Arthur was able to assume proprietorship of the Dillon family regiment in the same year; with the family interests in France therefore kept intact, Charles ensured the continuance of the Irish inheritance for the future.\textsuperscript{58}

Ó Conaill claims that the Dillon family had a deliberate strategy, repeated through the eighteenth century, to send the younger son of the immediate family to France to pursue military (and in one case ecclesiastical) careers, while the elder son inherited


\textsuperscript{58} O Conaill, ‘Conversion and family identity’, pp. 275–6; Cullen, ‘The Irish diaspora’, p. 286.
the family title and estates. Thus the family split into two branches; the Irish branch, who rather withdrew from prominence in domestic politics after managing to regain their estates; and the French branch - open, active Jacobites, dynamically working for the Stuart family in France. In this way they kept their estates and sources of wealth while still fighting for their ideological cause – and building up a very influential and wealthy position and ties in their adopted country.

He concludes that the Dillon’s family identity ultimately trumped monarch or religion, stating “that the case of the Viscounts Dillon of Costello-Gallen suggests that the identity of the family was more tightly bound up in familial relations and expressed by means of their nobility and attachment to ancestral lands in Ireland than to any patriotic or religious loyalty.”

O Conaill’s argument highlights the great importance of familial pride, loyalty and attachment to elite Irish identity. This attribute of elite Irish families is of course well established in historiography, and frequently discussed in relation to kin networks.

Whelan emphasizes that family continuity was crucial to traditional land-owning families, and ensured by carefully nurturing family interests; elite families displayed their familial pride and attachment through their characteristic concern with genealogy, marriage patterns, kin obligations, patronage and hospitality.

O’Conaill’s claims address the issues of identity and loyalty explicitly experienced by Arthur Dillon, which is discussed in the conclusion.

Alternatively other historians describe the Jacobite exile in quite different terms.

Marcus Beresford, Guy Chaussinand-Nogaret, Patricia Dagier, Eamon Ó Ciosáín, Priscilla O’Connor, and Pat Clifford O’Donovan have all described the settlement and integration of exiled Jacobite families in France.

Patrick Clarke de Dromantin has comprehensively depicted their assimilation into French society in his two books,
Les refugiés Jacobites and Les Oies Sauvages as well as several articles. These books include depictions of many integrated families, where the first generation of migrants or exiles constructed a base, settled in their new home and slowly built up their resources for the next generation. They integrated their families so their descendants could be proper prosperous French citizens. There is no indication that these families had the intention or were simply waiting for an opportunity to return home; they wanted their descendants to have the chance to flourish in their new homeland.

Beresford, Chaussinand-Nogaret and Genet-Rouffiac have supported the idea that as these exiles gradually integrated into French society their link to the Stuarts weakened. Natalie Genet-Rouffiac argues that “For the Irish Jacobites exile had been chosen out of loyalty to the Stuart cause but when the focus of Jacobite activity left France, they didn’t follow. Eventually exile had prevailed on Jacobitism and the army gave them an useful way to become integrated into French society. Interestingly, this was done…by maintaining the symbols of their identity.” Even from the defeat at La Hogue in 1692, the chances of a successful restoration and thereby a return to Ireland were considerably diminished, and as time passed and success looked increasingly less likely, optimism and Jacobite activism and attachment among most Jacobites started to decline. This process, and the allied assimilation of the Wild Geese into French society over the next hundred years, is described in the form of three steps by Chaussinand Nogaret.

During the lives of the first generation there still existed some grounds for hope; Jacobite culture still revolved around this hope, and around the home of the Stuart monarchs at St. Germain. The death of Louis XIV, the succession of the Hanoverians and the failure of the 1715 Rising brought an end to this period, by

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which time the second generation of Jacobite descendants were young adults. The exiled families were really obliged to move away from relying on a Jacobite rebellion as a means to return to Ireland. After James was forced to move to Italy in 1717 the majority of Jacobites were left behind in France. The Jacobite court was a centre of political and therefore economic activity. When it moved away from St-Germain its prospects moved with it, in the form of resources and military action, and more generally the potential for a restoration which would enable a return to Ireland. This made the Court a less attractive place for Irish Jacobite exiles, who needed to find ways to survive and flourish as well as hope for the future; they therefore made further steps towards permanent integration into French society which in turn led to a waning of the sense of active commitment or duty to the Stuarts. By the third generation, around the time of the 1745 Rising (and most definitively after its failure), hope had essentially disappeared, and for the most part their activism and sense of loyalty to the Stuarts had all but vanished with it. The integration of these families was virtually complete; France was now their home or patrie.

The former alignment of historians tends to depict all Irish or Jacobite exiles as experiencing overwhelming difficulties, disregarding the fact that not all Jacobite migrants experienced exile in the same way, or necessarily felt their connection to Ireland so strongly. Not all exiles joined the regiments or settled in France because of devotion to the Stuarts or even had any particular Jacobite sympathy. As Thomas Bartlett, Frank McLynn and Hugh Douglas emphasise, the motivations of individual exiles, though not always clear, were certainly varied. Many Irish exiles had simply migrated for the opportunities offered in Europe, particularly in business, to encourage their own trading success and networks. Those who were Jacobite exiles were often as or more concerned about their employment prospects or future career advancement than Jacobite ideology, particularly those who found themselves without employment during the many French army re-organisations, but also those retained (primarily of officer class) who had military ambitions. They recognised a necessity of making a new home for themselves and their families; recognised the potential to create a prosperous future in France.

Of course some exiles did try to return, more commonly the English and some Irish noble families who had a chance to be granted pardon by the English government if their extended families had enough influence, though most found this impossible without once again swearing loyalty to Hanover, effectively leaving the Jacobite fold. The more common soldier or unsuccessful trading or opportunistic migrant might attempt to simply slip into the country unnoticed. The reasons varied: some were in fact homesick, others were condemned to poverty with a lack of income and/or a lack of opportunity to gain employment in France. In fact many recruits for the Irish regiments joined in expectation of returning soon as part of a Jacobite army, even within a year or two.

But there were also many exiles who were not attempting to return home, who had no intention or wish to return to Ireland. This would particularly be true of the economic or trading migrants above mentioned, who often settled permanently in France, after achieving a reasonable amount of success, which smoothed the way for integration. Sometimes this might also be because they had gained some success in their employment or military careers in France, whether loyal Jacobites or not, for instance those successful officers like Dillon. These various types of migrants or exiles intentionally settled in France, establishing their families there permanently. The lack of opportunity in Ireland played a part in the resolution of many such exiles. Whole dynasties of families permanently settled overseas. The implications of Dillon’s career on this debate are explored in the conclusion.
Political and Biographical Context

Dillons of Costello-Gallin

The Dillon family were landowners in Ireland from the Norman invasion, as the first Dillon, Chevalier Henry Delion (or de Leon) of Aquitaine, a ‘cadet’ of the Vicomte de Leon of Brittany, was rewarded with a huge tract of the west and midlands of Ireland for serving King John as First Gentleman and secretary. He became a member of the Irish Parliament and was created Premier Dillon, lord baron of Drumnany in 1172; he died in 1244. The Delion family solidified its position over the following centuries, building many abbeys and estate houses throughout its lands; over time it split into various lines, all of which came to have long-standing positions of influence in their local counties. In 1622 the head of the Dunimony line, Sir Theobald Dillon, was made 1st Viscount of Costello-Gallin by James I, in recognition of Sir Theobald’s loyalty and services rendered to the crown as an officeholder from 1582.

The line of Costello-Gallin were royalists and loyal servants of the Stuarts, even accompanying Charles II into exile on the continent, where they forged their links to the French army with the creation of the first Dillon regiment. The 4th Viscount, Thomas, regained his lands in Mayo, Roscommon and Westmeath after the Restoration. Thomas’ uncle Sir James particularly distinguished himself in France, eventually being promoted to Lieutenant-General, while Thomas’ sons also became high-ranking officers; the eldest, Charles, was promoted to Major-General and Governor of Tournai.73

Theobald, seventh Viscount Dillon of Costello-Gallin, raised two regiments for James II at the start of the war in Ireland. He died fighting for the Stuarts in the battle of Aughrim, in July 1691. His wife Mary, daughter of Sir Henry Talbot of Templeogue and niece of the Duke of Tyrconnell through her mother Margaret Talbot, was killed two months later at the siege of Limerick. Theobald was attainted, and his second son Henry Dillon (married to the daughter of Frances Jennings, who later became duchess of Tyrconnell), commanded one of his father’s regiments;

Henry however had become governor of Galway when it surrendered to William of Orange in July, and managed to procure his pardon in order to reverse the attainder. He was then able to inherit the family’s Irish estates, Theobald’s eldest son Robert having previously died.74

Theobald’s second family regiment was commanded by his youngest son, the Honourable Arthur Dillon, born in Roscommon in 1670. He renewed the family military tradition in France when the regiment was included in Mountcashel’s brigade and sent to France in 1690. On 1 June 1691 Arthur Dillon was confirmed Colonel-Proprietor of the second regiment by Louis XIV, though only 20 and therefore not yet of age. His cousin James Lally of Co. Galway commanded the regiment at first, while Arthur gained experience.75 He was soon commanding his regiment through various regional campaigns. In Catalonia with the Army of Rousillon under the Duc de Noailles from 1691, he led his regiment to success at the sieges of Rosas, Hostalric and Barcelona with great feats, then was deployed to Germany under Marechal Villeroi until peace was negotiated in 1697. His regiment retained independence (as it did through its entire 100-year history) and his leadership in the reformation of the Irish brigades. The regiment was sent to Italy under the Duc de Vendome when the War of the Spanish Succession broke out in 1702. Though Dillon himself was absent from Cremona, his regiment gained great renown as the saviours of Cremona for the French, commanded by Major Daniel O’Mahony in Dillon’s absence, for which the regiment was rewarded by Louis XIV with a rise in payment.76

From 1702 Dillon started to be promoted up through the ranks of the French army, firstly to Brigadier on October 1st 1702, after the battle of Luzzara, and to Maréchal de Camp by brevet on October 26th 1704 after distinguishing himself at Riva on Lake Garda, and at the capture of Vercelli. Dillon’s regiment was involved in the Italian campaign from 1705-1706, under the Duke of Vendome. Dillon and his

75 Liedekerke Beaufort, Une famille, un regiment, Dillon, pp. 8-9;
regiment were to perform heroic deeds to successfully defend at Castiglione delle Strivera on September 9th.\textsuperscript{77} Dillon's achievements there and in other important battles such as Cassano and Calcinato led to his promotion to Lieutenant-General (and governor of Toulon) on September 24\textsuperscript{th} 1706.

Dillon's regiment was then sent to Spain under the Duke of Berwick and the commander in chief the Duc d'Orléans from 1707 to 1710, where they were heavily involved at the sieges of Lérida and Tortosa. As Dillon had been promoted to Lieutenant-General he was sent to Piedmont to serve in the defence of Toulon, but must have re-joined his regiment in Spain in October 1707, as he was specifically mentioned in a memoir of the Dillon regiment at the siege of Lérida, and in dispatches by Berwick for his leadership of two battalions at La Vachette near Briançon.\textsuperscript{78} His military successes were complimented by Louis XIV, and in 1711 was rewarded by being created a comte and a member of the Order of St Louis. In 1713 he was moved to the army of the Rhine under Marshal de Villars, where his own command was instrumental in its success at the sieges of Kaiserslauern and Verastein.\textsuperscript{79} His active military service ended in 1714, when his last campaign at Barcelona under the Duke of Berwick ended the war of Spanish Succession.\textsuperscript{80} At the end of this campaign Dillon passed into the service of James Francis Edward Stuart, becoming his agent in Paris, and on 1 Feb. 1717 was created the official emissary to the French court, with responsibility for Jacobite relations with the French government. This major position meant he participated in and responded to

\textsuperscript{77} Mullen, f. 176; O'Callaghan, History of the Irish Brigades', p. 47.
various significant Jacobite events, particularly the major plots, specifically the 1715 Rising and the 1717 Swedish plot and 1722 Atterbury Plot. James also created him a Jacobite Baron and Viscount in his own right. On 24 June 1721 James further created Dillon the titular Earl Dillon. During 1724 Dillon was replaced as Jacobite representative, and estranged from the Jacobite leadership.

Around 1698 Dillon had married Catherine (or Christiana) Sheldon, a lady in waiting of Queen Mary of Modena and therefore resident at St-Germain. The daughter of Ralph Sheldon, equerry to the King, she was also the niece of another renowned Jacobite officer, Lieutenant-General Dominic Sheldon. They had five sons and five daughters together: two of his daughters became nuns in the Carmelite order, another two married into French and Irish noble families, and the fifth remained unmarried, while his four eldest sons all entered the family regiment. The colonel-proprietorship of the regiment was passed on through these sons. The youngest son, Arthur Richard, had become a priest.

Dillon was always greatly respected, widely known as an honourable man – O’Callaghan, in his History of the Irish Brigades, states that he was described as “a gallant and able officer, universally esteemed by the great generals of his time, and beloved by the soldiery.” According to some sources Dillon was also very handsome, with no ugly scars, in spite of his long military service, and a ‘fond’, though not perfectly faithful husband. He officially retired from French service in 1730, passing the colonelcy of the Dillon regiment on to his son Charles. He died at St-Germain on 5th February 1733, aged 63, though his wife Catherine lived on till 1757, at age 77. His papers were placed at the Scots college in Paris after his death, but were later destroyed during the French Revolution.

In Ireland, Henry Dillon, eighth viscount, died in 1714, upon which his son Richard became ninth viscount. Richard married Bridget, daughter of John Burke, Earl of Clanricarde, and sister of Honora Burke (who married first Patrick Sarsfield and later


the Duke of Berwick) - another prominent Jacobite family. Richard had no male heir however; in 1735 his daughter Frances married Arthur Dillon’s eldest son Charles, so that Charles returned to Ireland. When Richard Dillon died in 1737, Charles took up the Irish title tenth viscount of Costello-Gallin along with ownership of the Irish estates as well as having already inherited his father’s French title of comte Dillon (and the Jacobite title Earl Dillon). Charles and Frances moved to London, but they also had no heir, creating a problem when Charles died in 1741.

His brother Henry (Arthur’s second son) was next in line and so inherited the leadership of the family regiment and the French title of Comte as well as the Irish title and lands. However it was impossible for Henry to return to Ireland while he was fighting for the French in the regiment, a situation worsened by the war of Austrian Succession between Britain and France. The problem was resolved by Louis XV himself, who allowed, and in fact advised, Henry to leave the French service and return to Ireland, which he did in 1744, claiming the Irish title and lands, and giving up the colonelship of the regiment to his younger brother. This proved to be a wise and important decision, with Parliament passing an act in 1746 prohibiting fighting in foreign armies, carrying a penalty of a loss of titles and estates, and later, in 1756, making it a treasonous offence for British subjects. Having moved to London as 11th Viscount Dillon, Henry married Lady Charlotte Lee, daughter of the 2nd Earl of Lichfield, a strongly Jacobite family. Charlotte eventually inherited the Lichfield estates, upon the death of her uncle in 1776.

Henry’s younger brother James was killed leading the regiment at the battle of Fontenoy in 1745, having only taken up proprietorship of the regiment a year before. It then passed to Edward, the next eldest brother, who subsequently died in 1747 at the battle of Lafeldt. The last brother was unable to take up the proprietorship, as he had taken up a clerical career, ultimately becoming the very powerful, influential and wealthy Archbishop of Narbonne. This problem was once again resolved by Louis XV, who took the extraordinary step of allowing the proprietorship to rest in the hands of Henry, 11th Viscount Dillon until it could be taken up by his second son Arthur, simply because “I cannot consent to see, that a proprietorship, cemented by so many good services and so much blood, should go out of a family, as long as I may entertain a hope of witnessing its renewal.” This was not until 1767, when Arthur Dillon, grandson and namesake of Lieutenant General Arthur Dillon, reached

85 O’Callaghan, p.49, Ó Conaill, ‘Conversion and family identity...’, pp. 280-282
86 O’Callaghan, p.49.
the required age of 17, meaning a lapse of 20 years of direct leadership of the regiment – though according to O'Callaghan Henry stayed involved in the affairs of the regiment as much as possible.

The later Arthur Dillon was eventually promoted up to the rank of Lieutenant-General like his grandfather, becoming a reasonably prominent and popular figure, particularly respected for his military ability, though this prominence ended up becoming a liability during the French Revolution. His elder brother and cousin, both named Theobald, also achieved signal success during their careers in the regiment. He maintained very strong ties to court: Dillon's family moved within the most notable ranks of society, Dillon having married Therése-Lucy de Rothe, his cousin and lady in waiting to Marie Antoinette, and after her death married the Comtesse de la Touche, a cousin to the future Empress Josephine. His only daughter from his first marriage, Lucie, later married into the height of the French aristocracy, becoming the Marquise de la Tour de la Pin, and thereby daughter-in-law to the Minister of War; the sole daughter of his second marriage later married General Bertrand, aide-de-camp to Napoleon. Another distant branch of the same family through marriage, the Dillons of Kilcoman, created French peers of Terre fort by Louis XV, also achieved great success in France, with many members gaining high rank in the Dillon regiment; they forged close links with the latter generation of Arthur Dillon’s descendants. Arthur Dillon’s line were also distantly connected through marriage to the Fitzgeralds and Earls of Antrim, and to other branches of Dillons, such as the Earls of Roscommon and the Dillons of Dunimoney and of Streamstown.

The eldest son of Henry, the 11th Viscount, was the Hon. Charles, who was therefore in line to inherit the title and the family estates in Ireland as well as the Lichfield estates. To inherit the Lichfield estates however Charles was forced to change the

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87 *Nouvelle biographie générale*, pp.182-184.
88 Ibid., p.184; Hayes, *Biographical Dictionary*, p.62; Marquise de La Tour du Pin, *Memoirs*, pp. 16-19, 30-39, 44-50, 57-75. His grandfather had himself started creating ties to the French nobility by marrying one of his daughters to one Baron Blaisel, a French general: she would have been Arthur Dillon's aunt. His other aunt (also his mother-in-law) had been Viscountess Falkland, wife of the Jacobite sixth Viscount Falkland.
89 Dictionnaire de Biographie Francaise, Vol. XI, p. 353; Liedekerke Beaufort, *Une famille, un regiment, Dillon*, pp. 4-6, 32-36.
family name to Dillon-Lee, and conform to Anglicanism, which he duly did in 1767.\textsuperscript{91} Charles married Henrietta Phipps in 1776, daughter of Baron Mulgrave, another Jacobite connection. When Henry died in 1787, Charles inherited the Dillon title and estates, as the 12\textsuperscript{th} Viscount, and having converted, was able to take his seat in the House of Lords, as well as appointments to several offices. By the end of the eighteenth century the Dillons were the third wealthiest noble family in Ireland.\textsuperscript{92} Even after his conformity Charles still struck a problem inheriting the family title and honours in 1787, because of the very brief outlawry of his great-grandfather Theobald in 1690, and the lack of conformity to Church and State of his father Henry. His right to inheritance was finally granted by a committee because of the well-documented reversal of Theobald’s outlawry, and his own conformity to the State religion.

Charles, and the Dillon family, remained strong supporters of Catholicism through the political career of Charles’ son Henry Augustus.\textsuperscript{93} Henry Augustus had 11 children by his wife; the eldest son, Charles-Henry Dillon-Lee, succeeded him as 14\textsuperscript{th} Viscount in 1832. Through the nineteenth century the family seats were Dytchley in Oxfordshire and Loughglyn House, Roscommon, but at the very end of the century all the Irish estates were sold by the next heir, the nephew of Charles-Henry Dillon-Lee.

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline
Sir Theobald de Costello Gallin 1.\textsuperscript{m} Vicomte Dillon. & Lucas 6.\textsuperscript{m} V. \\
Christopher & Lucas & James Dillon \\
& Theobald, 7.\textsuperscript{m} V. & = Mary Talbot \\
Frances Hamilton & = Henry 8.\textsuperscript{m} V. & Arthur Dillon = Catherine Sheldon \\
Bridget Burke & = Richard 9.\textsuperscript{m} V. & \\
& Frances Dillon & = Charles 10.\textsuperscript{m} V. & Henry 11.\textsuperscript{m} V. & Brigitte & James & Laure & Edouard & Arthur Richard \\
& = Charlotte Lee & = Baron Blézelle & = Lucius, 6.\textsuperscript{m} Viscount Falkland \\
& & & & & & & & \\
Henrietta Phipps & = Charles 12.\textsuperscript{m} V. & Theobald & = Thérèse-Lucy Rothe \\
& & = Henry Aug.\textsuperscript{n} & & & & & & \\
& & = Lucy = Frédéric de la Tour du Pin & & & & & & \\
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\textsuperscript{93} Ó Conaill, ‘Conversion and family identity…’, pp. 282-288.
Jacobite relations with France

James II had considerable influence with Louis XIV during the early period of exile, even after the completely disastrous failure of the invasion of Ireland, and the following naval defeat at La Hogue. Queen Mary of Modena was very close friends with Louis XIV’s mistress and secret wife, Madame de Maintenon, who used her influence in the Jacobites’ favour; indeed the Queen was even on friendly terms with Louis XIV himself. The Stuart family maintained a frequent attendance at Versailles throughout those years, a state of affairs amply attested to by numerous memoirs and journals kept by Court attendees during this period.  

Louis XIV’s support could even have secured the crown for James II’s son, during negotiations for peace throughout the Nine Years war. The provision that James Frances Edward would be raised by William and Mary, likely as Protestant, to become heir presumptive to the throne, was secretly discussed and negotiated in detail for some time between the various powers in 1693, and later in negotiations leading up to the Peace of Ryswick in 1697. Both James II and Mary of Modena refused to even entertain the idea when it was eventually suggested to them by Louis XIV, as well as an offer of the vacant Polish throne.  

Such decisions on James part meant that Louis XIV became increasingly disillusioned with James II as the 1690s progressed, and he started to share the frustration of many of his ministers at James’ lack of capability, especially in the military arena. James was also soon seen as rather a contemptible figure by French courtiers. Louis XIV therefore grew more dismissive of both the abilities of Jacobite leaders and the potential of the cause, particularly as he was unwilling to break the newly-signed promise. His willingness to assist the cause practically continued to decline after James’ succession to his father’s honours, despite Louis’ impulsive

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death-bed promise to James II to acknowledge his son as king. Nevertheless the Jacobites still had far more plausible hopes of gaining French assistance under Louis XIV than they would under any other ruler. Leading up to 1708, direct negotiations with Scottish Jacobites drew Louis XIV into an attempted invasion of Scotland, a failure so complete that the French ships led by Claude de Forbin were prevented from even landing in Scotland. This ensured the abandonment of any further French military assistance for the rest of the war of Spanish Succession. The 1713 treaty of Utrecht further weakened any possibility of change from this stance.

An even more important factor was the death of Louis XIV, which led to major changes in the official French attitude toward the Stuarts. James’ legitimacy and rights to the throne were of little interest to the majority of influential decision-makers under the new French leadership. Louis XIV had at least been genuinely and deeply committed to the ideological principle of the Stuarts’ claim, as well as the interests of France, but the Duc d’Orleans, the new Regent of France, was not greatly concerned with the moral authority of James’ claim to the throne.97 Additionally Orleans’ relationship with the Stuart family had never been as warm as that of the Dauphin and other royal cousins. On the first arrival of the Stuart royal family to the French court a decision of Louis XIV on an important point of court etiquette to the disfavour of the future Duc d’Orleans caused long-lasting tension, which may have continued to influence his attitude towards the Stuart family in later life.98 Neither had he enjoyed a close personal relationship with James II.99 Of course Orlean’s experiences with the Jacobites and their cause were not all negative - he naturally held close ties to the Irish regiments during his periods of military command – but that was certainly not enough to convince him to personally espouse the claims of the Stuart family. The Regent therefore had little reason to desire to assist James outside of possible practical considerations.

On the other hand he had plenty of both personal and practical reasons to desire an alliance with Britain over an attachment to his Stuart cousins; from dynastic to international motives it was virtually his only real option. As soon as Louis XIV died Orleans needed to secure political control and entrench the Regency: he would thereby benefit by inheriting the throne in the event that Louis XV died before having attained his majority or produced an heir. This status was under threat by the claim of his cousin Philip V of Spain, who was theoretically entitled to the throne as a grandson of Louis XIV (although he had legally agreed to give up this claim). From a dynastic point of view the House of Orléans would benefit, as well as potentially injure his rival Philip V’s claim to the Spanish throne.

Moreover the alliance was equally in the interests of the state, which desperately needed a break from war as it simply did not have the resources to continue the war, .. Furthermore, eternal French strategy required crossing the interests of the Hapsburg Emperor at every turn, which meant preventing Britain from forming any alliance with the Empire which could turn against France. Added to all this, he had familial links to the House of Hanover – his mother Elisabeth-Charlotte was a devoted niece to Sophia, Electress of Hanover, mother of George I, giving him a closer relationship to the latter than to James.

It was therefore clear to the Regent’s anglophilic secretary-agent, the Abbé Guillaume Dubois, and increasingly to the Regent himself, that it was very much in his interest to further the peace previously negotiated with Britain into a formal alliance. The Regent was strongly influenced by his close relationship with Dubois, who had been his tutor, close ally during Orlean’s formative years, and later used this bond to carve out a career as one of Orlean’s most trusted advisors. He retained a hold on Orleans which, while it sometimes wavered, grew stronger as his Regency wore on.

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101 Pevitt, pp. 148, 181-182.


Dubois helped to persuade the Regent to cement the alliance with Britain in a treaty which he personally negotiated, signed on 28 November 1716. ¹⁰⁴ The Dutch then united to form the Triple Alliance on 4 January 1717.

This did not mean that the Regent was immediately or devotedly committed to this path; after the death of Louis XIV he had been strongly inclined to reject the advances of Britain and look towards an alternative alliance with Spain, which also had its advantages, but this prospect was rejected by Spain. ¹⁰⁵ Even after the Triple Alliance was signed the Regent was in danger of being turned from this course by the French pro-Jacobite faction – and the sympathies of the French people did lean towards James. ¹⁰⁶ The Regent required a final push to further the alliance with Britain, which was provided by Spain, in the guise of Cardinal Alberoni’s involvement with the opposition faction plot against the Regent. ¹⁰⁷

The alliance mandated an official policy of enmity to and prevention of all Jacobite endeavours. This required France to use its influence on its small neighbouring state (while Britain additionally put great pressure on the Pope) to expel James from Avignon, as well as all ‘rebel subjects’ of the participants to the treaty, meaning all officially exiled Jacobites. James had first been banished from Saint Germain-en-Laye after the Treaty of Utrecht was signed in 1713, but the Anglo–French alliance had far more malign consequences for James. ¹⁰⁸

James’ absence from France was a very important factor for the majority of his exiled Jacobite subjects who lived in France, a huge barrier to Jacobite efforts and therefore their aims. The Regent’s compliance with British demands in the treaty was therefore very unfortunate for the Jacobites. It has been argued that it could actually have benefited James, and that it would have been better for James if Louis XIV had never recognised him as King in 1701, since James’ French support throughout the period impacted heavily on his popularity in England. A Jacobite army backed by

¹⁰⁵ Shennan, pp. 53-57.
¹⁰⁷ Shennan, pp. 43-44, 63-66; Pevitt, pp. 184-185; Wilson, French Foreign Policy, pp. 5(n), 8-10, 13; Ladurie, Saint Simon and the Court of Louis XIV, pp. 308-309.
French troops would never be accepted by the English population.\textsuperscript{109} However at the same time was unlikely that, without the tangible threat of French troops on the ground, the population would have accepted an invading Jacobite army, or even a purely home-grown Jacobite rebellion. Domestic support was simply too weak to succeed alone; the Jacobites were laid by the heel either way.\textsuperscript{110} Furthermore James's banishment to Rome probably did more to inhibit Jacobite actions than any other single action of a Hanoverian government, so damaging was the scattering and consequently fragmentation of important Jacobite figures it caused.\textsuperscript{111} Despite official French policy, James was not totally without influence in France; he occupied a genuinely significant political position there, as throughout the courts of Europe. James' presence raised valuable possibilities for French interests which gave him importance, primarily as a diplomatic pawn. The potential advantages he held for France in this regard were demonstrated most strikingly much later, in 1731, when France was able to use the Jacobite threat very effectively to bring Britain back to its close alliance.\textsuperscript{112} Militarily the greatest potential of a Jacobite rebellion (for any European political power) lay as a distraction for the British, forcing them to divert their forces from the central tableau of the European war to the peripheral site of the rebellion, whether England, Scotland or possibly Ireland. This would simultaneously ensure the over-extension of the British forces left in Europe (as was the case in 1745).\textsuperscript{113}

However the Jacobite leadership essentially had very little bargaining power within

\textsuperscript{109} Beresford, pp. 126-7.
\textsuperscript{110} SPW HMC, V, Mr. Downs to James, Jan. 6, 1717, pp. 527; Black, \textit{British Foreign Policy}, pp. 138-9, 143, 144, 146, 147, Black, \textit{Jacobitism}, pp. 142-3, 145; Szechi, \textit{Jacobite Movement}, pp. 85-7; Szechi, \textit{The Jacobites}, p. 85; Pittock, pp. 49-50; McMynn, \textit{The Jacobites}, p. 31; Pevitt, p. 127, 255.
\textsuperscript{113} Beresford, p. 59; Szechi, \textit{Jacobite Movement}, p. 94; Szechi, \textit{The Jacobites}, pp. 85-6, 197-198.
this alignment, since France did not need to go to the trouble of aiding a Jacobite rebellion to threaten Britain. As Jeremy Black points out: "Troop movements on the Channel coast were less expensive, easier to control, and likelier to succeed." France was therefore essentially able to use the Jacobite cause as a convenient and potentially advantageous tool in its relations with Britain.

Irish Regiments in the French Army

A history of Irish regiments fighting in the French army exists before 1690, but the incorporation of the essence of the Jacobite army into the French army after 1690 was far larger than at any time previously. In 1690 Louis XIV was greatly in need of more troops to fight on his front line in northern Europe, and refused to supply James with more French regiments without being provided with some of James' Irish regiments in exchange. Justin MacCarthy, Viscount Mountcashel volunteered to create a suitable force for exchange, which eventually produced three regiments, as organised on arrival in France: Dillon's and O'Brien's relatively small regiments, and Mountcashel's own more substantial regiment, making up the 'Mountcashel Brigade'. With the end of the war in Ireland at the end of 1691, the majority of the remaining army in Ireland followed these regiments into exile. Articles of the Treaty of Limerick stipulated that those men of the Jacobite army who chose to leave Ireland for France would be transported there at their enemy's expense; alternatively they could remain in Ireland, be pardoned and even keep their property if they swore the oath of allegiance to William and Mary. Around three quarters chose exile in France. On their arrival in France between October and December 1691, the troops were clothed, drilled and re-grouped in an attempt to fit them for service as quickly as possible before the renewed attempt to invade England in May (consequently dissolved by the naval defeat at La-Hogue). After the French defeat of La Hogue in May 1692, the French virtually abandoned any attempt to restore James to his throne. Louis XIV forced James to reorganise his regiments to distribute them amongst the French regiments, which were then reduced

115 Black, British Foreign Policy, pp.139, 149.
117 Simms, Jacobite Ireland, pp. 252-253, 258-260; Rowlands, An Army in Exile, pp. 5-7.
to seventeen: two cavalry and eight infantry regiments, two of horse guards, two of foot dragoons and three independent companies. Louis XIV also insisted that these Jacobite regiments exiled to France after the Treaty of Limerick be paid at the French regimental rate, rather than at the foreign rate; soldiers in foreign regiments in the French army were traditionally paid one ‘sol’ per day more than the French.\(^\text{118}\)

The pay of the Mountcashel brigade though, including Dillon’s regiment, was at first different from that of the other Irish regiments, since it had been actually been exchanged into the French army in 1690, as a foreign regiment. These regiments were therefore paid the extra sol a day, the rate having been negotiated by Lord Mountcashel into their formal contract of service; the Colonels were also to be paid “a sol in the livre, as well from the appointments of all officers, as from the funds for the general maintenance of their respective regiments”, in addition to their normal pay.\(^\text{119}\)

According to Arthur Dillon’s own grandson, also Lieutenant-General Arthur Dillon, in his history of the Irish regiments, the Irish regiment colonels or propriétaires had come over to France with a traditional right to a ‘feudal’ tax of each officer on the payment of each troop and appointment of officers.

Ces trois Regimens arrivés, comme il a été dit, en 1690, forment une Brigade, dite Brigade de Mountcashel et par leur capitulation avec Louis 14, ils obtinrent une haute paye pour les Officiers, et un Sou par jour pour chaque soldat, de plus que la solde ordinaire des Régimens nationaux. Les Colonels de ces trois Régimens jouissaient en Irlande, avant leur passage en France, du droit de poundage (ou vingtième), qui consistoit à prélever, à leur profit, cette somme sur les appointemens des Officiers, et la subsistence des Soldats.\(^\text{120}\)

[These three regiments arrived, as has been said, in 1690, formed a Brigade called the Brigade of Mountcashel and by their agreement with Louis XIV, they obtained high pay for the Officers, and a sou a day for each soldier more than the ordinary soldier of the regiments of that nation. The colonels of these three regiments, before their journey to France, enjoyed the right of poundage (or twentieth) in Ireland, which consisted of a deduction of a sum from the appointments of the Officers, and the subsistence of the soldiers, for their own profit.]

This right of the three regiment proprietors continued for most of the period of Dillon’s leadership. Its existence is confirmed by a specific ordonnance from Louis XIV, on 5 August 1698, which declared the continuation of this right for the leaders

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\(^\text{120}\) Dillon, *Observations historiques Sur l’origine*, ff. 10-11.
of the new reformed regiments of Lee, Clare and Dillon. It also officially recognised
that these commanders truly were ‘proprietors’ of their regiments. Indeed this was
common in the French army, where it was a tradition for wealthy families to
purchase regiments, and for this right of ownership to be passed down through the
family, just as Dillon’s regiment was. Louis XIV made this ordonnance because it
was being alleged that this ‘feudal’ right had been abused.

The ordonnance is actually printed in Dillon’s history.

Ordonnance du Roi, 5 Aout 1698
S. M., ayant eté informé que les Colonels des trois Régimens d’Infanterie
Irlandoise à son Service, ont toujours eu le son pour livre sur les paiemens faits
aux dits Régimens, tant sur les appointmens des Officiers, que sur la subsistence
des soldats d’icieux, et S. M. ayant pour agréable que les Colonels des Régimens
de Lee, Clare et Dillon, actuellement à son service, continuent à jouir de cet
avantage, l’intention espresse de S. M. étant qu’il soit retenu au profit des
Colonels des dits trois Régimens le sou par livre sur les appointemens des
Officiers d’icieux, et que des seize deniers retenus sur chaque soldat par jour,
pour la masse, il en soit pris quatre pour être remis aux dits Colonels, pour leur
tenir lieu du dit sou par livre, de la subsistence des dits trois Régimens; car telle
est notre volonté & c.

According to Dillon’s grandson, this state of affairs changed in 1718, when the three

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121 Guy Rowlands, The Dynastic State and the Army under Louis XIV: Royal Service and Private
122 Dillon, Observations historiques Sur l’origine, ff. 10-11.
123 Ibid.
proprietors of these regiments united with their subsidiaries to make an appeal to the
Regent to end this special payment. Dillon was obviously one of these three
proprietors. His grandson implies that the proprietors made this appeal because of the
levy’s iniquity: “se réunirent à eux en 1718, pour représenter à M. le Régent le tort
qu’écrourent les soldats par une retenue de quatre deniers par jour sur leur
masse” 124.

The appeal was therefore apparently made during the height of the Jacobite financial
problems, which gives Dillon’s story some plausibility. The three proprietors might
have felt some pressure to assist their impoverished comrades by making this
gesture, especially given the discrepancy of the rate with the other Irish regiments,
and the long-standing resentment over the original deal between Louis XIV and
James II which cut the wages of those other regiments.125 Dillon himself was
peculiarly awkwardly placed, since (as described in Chapters Three and Four) he
helped to co-ordinate Jacobite finances, and was responsible for applications to the
Regent regarding Mary of Modena’s pension, other grants and their eventual
distribution among legitimate beneficiaries.

Motivations aside, Dillon’s grandson claims that the Regent granted the request and
replaced the colonel’s ‘droit’ with an annual pension of 2700 livres granted by the
King, and which was later raised to 4700 livres.126 His reference to an ordnance
would seem to support the claim, though the last part of the story is contradicted by
other sources. According to O’Callaghan, the five Irish infantry regiments had
already been expressly granted the special ‘foreign’ rate in 1702, as a reward for their
notable feats which secured victory at the Battle of Cremona.127

O’Callaghan later quotes a pamphlet from 1727 by an English Whig, insisting on the
danger the Irish brigades posed to England, and which refers to those regiments in
the French army as being upon the normal French rate. The pamphlet is in fact
quoted as saying: “...I only mean to abolish the name of Irish forces abroad, by
incorporating them into French and Spanish regiments...Except General Lee’s, Lord
Clare’s, and General Dillon’s Regiments...very few will suffer by the change. The
Royal Irish...are upon French pay; so is General Nugent’s Horse, and the Duke of
Berwick’s Regiment of Foot; yet the officers have all along lived, as well as those of

124 Ibid., ff. 11-12.
125 BN, Richelieu, Fonds Français, Français 12161, Supplément français 3788, ‘Lettre d’un officier
Irlandais à son fils officier sur les affaires d’Irlande à la fin du règne de Louis XIV’, ff. 7-8.
126 ‘Lettre d’un officier Irlandais’, ff. 11-12.
127 O’Callaghan, Irish Brigades, p. 216.
the other Regiments; and what should hinder them from doing so under French, as well as under Irish, Colonels?"  
From 1692 French authority was increasingly established over the Jacobite army, which were still officially under the control of James and his secretary of war, Sir Richard Nagle. General administration of the Irish regiments was gradually put further under the management of the French ministers of war, who made the central decisions and therefore gave orders on regimental movements and ordered regimental inspection. French command of regimental inspection was increased in an attempt to improve their discipline. The regiments – every single member, whether foot-soldier or officer - had to swear an oath to the King of France, and the King also commanded promotion of the higher ranks of the Irish regiments – all above brigadier.  
The treaty of Ryswick in 1697 further solidified the command of the French state over the exiled Irish soldiers: between late 1697 and early 1698 all the Jacobite regiments were officially disbanded, with the regiments being reformed under the employ of King Louis XIV. This was a disaster for the Wild Geese affected, with only six regiments (1 cavalry and 5 infantry) being re-formed from fourteen, incorporating less than half the number of men (the Mountcashel Brigade regiments were unchanged). These remaining regiments were later variously incorporated into each other at different times through the eighteenth century, right up until the French Revolution, when the Irish Brigade was officially disbanded. Only three regiments in total remained by then: Dillon's, Berwick's and Walsh's - Dillon’s was in fact the only original regiment remaining intact since 1690 - and these became entirely French regiments, being allotted a regimental number.  
Guy Rowland’s excellent study of the link between the army, politics and social status explains the French military system and its political milieu, on which Dillon depended. The study established the dependence of the French military system on the court and its patronage network, which was a consequence of the fundamental role of

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the military within Louis XIV’s dynastic and absolutist regime. The innate link between the military and its rank and court politics ensured the crucial nature of a presence at court to promotion within the military because of this dependence, and therefore also ensured the opposite, the importance of high military rank at court, particularly as a ‘clientage broker’.  

The leading authority on French patronage during the early modern period is Sharon Kettering, who defines patronage as “a superior’s protection and support of an inferior” in its French sense. She also acknowledges the further meanings the term has in English, including recruitment to office-holding and the network itself - the system based on individual or group relationships, or ‘clientilism’.  

Kettering’s model of patronage networks sees their definitive feature as entailing a ‘obligatory reciprocity’. This created “expectations, an assured reliance, gratitude, and a bond trust and loyalty”, while also achieving the interests of those involved.  

Kettering’s detailed study of clientilism or brokerage at Louis XIV’s court portrays a system whereby courtiers close to the King held the power to exploit their position by “acting as brokers between those seeking an office, commission, patent, monopoly, pension or authorization, and those able to provide it”, negotiating an exchange between patrons and potential protegés in return for a fee/commission.  

The patronage network was especially important to the organization of the military, as the only way to ensure promotion (or other benefits). Officers necessarily required a patron who was a commander of rank with a presence at court, to nominate them for a specific commission. Louis XIV made appointments on the basis of those recommendations, commonly by the Minister of War, but also by all the highest ranking officers, especially the regiment colonels.  

Rowlands states that “colonels had to be consulted about officers joining their regiments if they had not nominated the candidate themselves.” Of course certain restrictions limited the colonel’s perogative, but nevertheless “Louis’s instinctive preference for promoting men

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within a regiment gave more influence to the colonels who knew their officers and could express views on their capacities.”

Regimental links formed a component of the patronage network which was an extremely important aspect of the military system for Jacobitism. The senior officer’s relationship with his junior officers usually resulted in such a patronage bond - the formal protection of the interests of their favoured subordinate. Many officers in the French army – in general as well as in the Irish regiments - were known to the regimental commander through previous or outside ties, such as kinship. Of course the bonds formed serving together on campaign were even more important, through the understanding, camaderie and fond friendship which resulted from such intimate circumstances. Arthur Dillon’s own deployment of regimental and other links were essential to his participation in the military patronage system, one of the most important elements of his Jacobite service, as is described in Chapters Two and Three of this thesis.

137 Ibid, p. 354.
138 Szachi, 1715, pp. 213-214
139 Rowlands, Dynastic State and the Army, pp. 354-355.
Chapter One – 1690-1716

The period of this chapter is that which led up to Dillon’s assumption of an official Jacobite post at the Regency court. For Jacobites this period was distinguished by the extinction of serious prospects of French support for the Jacobite cause. The death of Louis XIV on 1st September 1715 left his great-grandson Louis XV, at only five years old, as the new monarch; hence a Regent was needed to lead the nation during his extreme youth. As next in line to the throne the Duc D’Orleans was entitled to the Regency, but Louis XIV nominated the Duc de Maine as the prince’s guardian in his will. The Duc d’Orleans however acted as soon as the Louis died, calling a parlement meeting through which he managed to have himself named as the Prince’s guardian as well as Regent, and Maine as in charge only of the prince’s education. He thereby wrested control of the entire French state. He introduced the ‘polysynodie’, a central council with seven satellite councils, made up the most important members of the military and grandees, but still retained executive decision-making power for himself.

Previous to his death Louis XIV had reached a peace agreement with Britain in the Treaty of Utrecht, which Charles VI of Austria then acceded to in 1714, bringing an end to the war of Spanish Succession. The Regent had good reasons of his own to respond to British diplomatic overtures (see Contemporary Political Context, p. 33), and the subsequent failure of the 1715 Rising made it clear that supporting the Jacobite claim was a futile prospect. A few months after Britain made a defensive alliance with Charles VI, the Regent cemented the peace with Britain in a treaty alliance which his advisor Dubois negotiated, signed on 28 November 1716. As a result the Jacobites needed a sound hand directing their precarious relations with the French state during this period. Chapter One depicts how Arthur Dillon progressively came to assume responsibility for this role.

Dillon was Jacobite at the French court from 1717 to 1725, but his acquaintance with James Francis Edward Stuart started before the Rising. Indeed he would first have met the royal family long before this period, possibly even as early as the

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original transferal of Dillon’s regiment to the French army in the 1690 exchange of
regiments (see Political and Biographical Context). The regimental proprietors were
expected to report to James II at St. Germain as well as Louis XIV when sent back
from the campaign, and he kept up a correspondence with each regiment colonel.
They are also known to have regularly gone to St. Germain during the winter breaks
between military campaigns.\textsuperscript{141}

Though Dillon’s regiment was an official foreign regiment in French service rather
than a Treaty of Limerick Irish brigade regiment (technically under James’
authority), nevertheless it is likely he would have gone to visit St. Germains in this
early period. Dillon’s regiment proprietor-ship, added to his status as the younger
brother of the head of one of Ireland’s most well-connected, extensively-landed,
wealthy, and resolutely Jacobite noble families, made him one of the most prominent
of the Jacobite officers.\textsuperscript{142} It would certainly have been enough to gain him the notice
of the royal family.

Dillon married Christiana Sheldon between 1698 and 1700; the daughter of Ralph
Sheldon, equerry to James II, she was also the niece of another renowned Jacobite
officer, Lieutenant-General Dominic Sheldon.\textsuperscript{143} On his marriage the palace of St.
Germain-en-laye became Dillon’s official residence, since his wife occupied rooms
there as a lady-in-waiting to Queen Mary. With the succession of his son as James III
in 1701 Dillon would likely have been granted more official contact, particularly
with his swift promotions taking place in the years following, increasing his
prominence among the Jacobite court and community. (For an account of his career
see Biographical Context.) Dillon could possibly have travelled expressly to St.
Germain with other officers, after James’ accession, to submit to his new monarch.
Alternatively James could have met him for the first time when he made a visit to the
French military camps at Geneva and Briançon in the summer of 1712.\textsuperscript{144}

James did not have a particularly personal relationship with Dillon before his
selection to assist Bolingbroke as a Jacobite representative to Court, since Dillon was
for the most part resident with his regiment during his military career. Nonetheless
he obviously recognised Dillon’s skill as military leader and the importance this

\textsuperscript{142} Indeed his father Theobald had been considered particularly notorious for his Jacobite sympathies
by the Irish government, Beresford, p. 15.
\textsuperscript{143} Harman Murtagh, ‘Dillon, Arthur, Jacobite Earl Dillon (1670-1733)’ in ODNB; O’Callaghan, p.
48. The year of their marriage is unknown, but is likely to have taken place between 1698 and 1700 as
their eldest child was born in 1701.
\textsuperscript{144} Stuart Papers relating chiefly to Queen Mary of Modena, Vol. I, No. 220, pp. 365-366.
could have in any future invasions, as the Jacobite leadership were well aware of the potential usefulness of Arthur Dillon for their cause.

Dillon’s name was mentioned by plotting Jacobites in connection with invasions of Ireland as early as 1706-8, laying the seed for Dillon’s involvement in future plots. Two memorials from this period involve descents on Ireland: one of these plans for a landing near Londonderry and actually lists several important Irish Jacobite officers and nobles interested in Irish projects, including Col. Eugene MacCarthy, Brigadier Nugent and crucially, Lieutenant-General Dillon. Both memorials were officially dated at 1697, but Beresford has established that they must actually both be written by the same memorialist, Gordon O’Neill, and both from 1706-8, since Dillon is given the rank of ‘Lieutenant-General’ and his promotion to which was not until 1706; they therefore seem likely to be fore-runners to the 1708 Rising.\(^\text{145}\) The memorial must have been the original source for the information received by the English through Cadogan, their ambassador in Paris, that Dillon would be commanding three Irish battalions in the invasion, there were however no actual plans for his involvement, given his active command in Italy and the Alps at this time.\(^\text{146}\)

Dillon was one of a new generation of Irish Jacobite leaders who started to emerge from ‘the political and social wilderness’ in France, and who considered Ireland as a potential location for invasion plots. Previously the lack of Irish leadership after 1694 had obstructed Irish plots. English and Scots Jacobites rarely considered Irish invasion plots (Berwick being a notable exception), partly because of English fear of Irish regiments, and partly because of a belief that once England was regained, Ireland would naturally follow.\(^\text{147}\)

Dillon’s relationship with the Regent started at a correspondingly early period as his acquaintance with James. His first meeting with the Regent was in the context of their employments in the French army, in Italy or Spain. Dillon’s regiment was


involved in the Italian campaign from 1705-1706, under the Duke of Vendome, when, as Duc d’Orléans, he was sent to take over command in 1706. Orléans briefly visited Castiglione delle Strivera in July, and potentially encountered Dillon, at this stage a Maréchal de Camp by brevet, for the first time.\textsuperscript{148} The regiment was then sent to the Army of the Dauphiné in Spain from 1707 to 1710, under Berwick, and Orleans as commander in chief. A memoire by an officer of his regiment refers to Dillon’s presence at the siege of Lérida, recounting a story in which the Regent personally gives him orders, proving that the two met at this time.\textsuperscript{149} Moreover, Dillon’s rank of Lieutenant-General means he must have been in frequent contact with Orleans while he was commander of the Dauphiné army. As a Lieutenant-General he played an active commanding role, involved in formulating combat tactics as well as administration. He would even have been rotated with other Lieutenants-General to take high command in certain battles, as maréchal de camp du jour, reporting to the commander in chief or général en chef — and therefore must have met with Orléans during those stretches.\textsuperscript{150} By 1709 this period of contact between them was over, as a scandal created by the Duc’s involvement in potentially treasonous intrigue in Spain forced Louis XIV to keep Orleans in France, rather than continue to command that summer’s campaign in Spain.\textsuperscript{151} Orleans would have continued to hear of Dillon however, as Dillon wrote official dispatches and reports from Briançon during 1710 and 1711.\textsuperscript{152} Dillon was also mentioned in dispatches during the 1713 campaign at Kaiserslautern where his exploits and success at the siege were singled out for commendation.\textsuperscript{153} Berwick

\textsuperscript{148} Mullen, f. 176; O’Callaghan, Irish Brigades, p. 47; Pevitt, pp. 70-71, 74-75.
\textsuperscript{150} Rowlands, Dynastic State and the Army, pp. 269-271.
\textsuperscript{151} Pevitt, pp. 95-103; Shennan, pp.18-19.
\textsuperscript{152} AG, Archives Historiques, Cote A¹, MS 2247 Letters of M. de Dillon, 1710 (Extracts), Dillon to [Unknown], Juin 6 1710, f. 17; Dillon to [Unknown], Juillet 31 1710, f. 217; MS 2325, Dillon to [Unknown], Juin 10 1711, f. 77; Dillon to [Unknown], Juillet 13 1711, f. 119; Dillon to [Unknown], Oct. 31 1711, f. 288; Dillon to [Unknown], Nov. 20 1711, f. 295; HMC, Report One and Two of the Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts, Second Report, Appendix, ‘Manuscripts of the Right Honourable Viscount Dillon, Dytchley, Co. Oxford (Dillon Family Papers 1706-45)’ (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1874), p. 33a.
\textsuperscript{153} AG, Archives Historiques, Cote A¹, MS 2454, Expédition de M. de Dillon sur Kaiserslauter, prise de cette place et du Bateau de Wolfsstein, Marechal de Villars to [Unknown], Juin 11 1713, f. 53; Dillon to [Unknown], Juin 25 1713, f. 154; Marechal de Villars to [Unknown], Juin 29 1713, f. 177; De Pery to Orleans, Juin 29 1713, f. 191; HMC, Report One and Two, Second Report, Appendix, ‘Manuscripts of the Right Honourable Viscount Dillon’, p. 33a.
expressly praised his leadership in battle in different dispatches to Louis XIV over this period, recommending his actions at Briançon in these terms: “His activity and his vigilance cannot be surpassed; and your Majesty scarcely has an officer more capable of serving you well.” Orleans also supported Irish officers at court.

**Jacobite Service**

Dillon was always a committed Jacobite, but during his early life in France he pursued his military career, rather than actively serving the Stuarts. The reason for this could have been partly through necessity, partly through ambition to build a successful military career to better settle in France, particularly given the size of his family. At the peak of his career, rewarded and ennobled by the French monarch, Dillon suddenly decided to give up his military service in order to energetically serve his Stuart king. He passed into the service of James at the end of 1714. In 1713 Dillon applied to Madame de Maintenon attempting to gain an official post through her patronage at the end of the war. The war was obviously coming to a close, with France having fought itself to its knees, and therefore forced to make terms with the British and Dutch Empire. This could have forced out a high proportion of the active officers and soldiers in the French army, with a similar re-organisation of regiments as occurred in 1697.

Furthermore the chances of France being involved in further war at this point looked remote. Louis XIV - and after his death, the Regent - recognised that France desperately needed peace to recover from its exhausted state; moreover both determined to gain a lasting peace on any terms. It is possible that Dillon would have been retained within the reformed regiments of the peace-time army, both as Colonel-proprietor of his own regiment, and a skilled and experienced though still relatively young Lieutenant-General. But this option would not have been to his advantage with the lack of potential for further service and advancement. Moreover the possibility of Dillon’s enjoying a quiet retirement was an impossible luxury given the demands of his large family.

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If Dillon had previously planned to take up a bureaucratic post, as his application to Madame de Maintenon suggests, his decision to undertake Jacobite service was therefore rather sudden; not the product of long design. So what changed Dillon’s mind? If he had simply recognised that his military career had risen as high as it could, with the war’s end making it impossible to achieve further promotion through active service, he could have enjoyed the fruits of his labour and influence with a safe, profitable post or pension granted by an appreciative French king. The decision could have partly been driven by the sudden regime change after the death of Louis XIV in 1714; however Dillon need not have dreaded his treatment under Orleans’ Regency, given his previous service under his command – unless there had suddenly occurred a breach between himself and Orleans, leaving him in disgrace. Such a state of affairs has been inferred by the Dictionnaire de biographie francaise: “il fut toujours considéré comme un brillant et habile officier; ensuite, pour des reasons mal connues, il fut frappe d’une sorte de disgrace par le Régent”.

Harman Murtagh has suggested that Dillon’s Jacobite sympathies were becoming too pronounced and therefore politically inconvenient, which was blocking any further advancement in the military. If a breach occurred it could therefore have been because of some embarrassing incident which arose because of the strength of Dillon’s Jacobitism, or a more gradual deterioration in Dillon’s standing with Orleans. While the end of the war of Spanish Succession would have made further military advancement for Dillon doubtful anyway, Orleans could have blocked his advancement in other fields – like the type of political or bureaucratic post Dillon had specifically been seeking. If the death of Louis XIV suddenly rendered Dillon’s chances of a plum civil post (or other potential rewards for his long and renowned service) very questionable, with both the loss of Madame de Maintenon’s patronage and the accession to the Regency of a hostile Due d’Orleans, that might be an explanation as to why Dillon suddenly decided to leave active military service for the Jacobite cause.

But there is not enough surviving evidence to enable us to ascertain the truth behind the events; the entire scenario is purely speculative. Indeed if such a rift occurred it

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158 Murtagh, ‘Dillon’ in ODNB.
was more likely a result of Dillon’s decision than a cause of it - the Regent could hardly have been happy with his decision to leave his military post to actively serve James. If so, while the move might have won the temporary displeasure of the Regent, it was obviously not fatal for the connection. When Dillon was chosen to represent the Jacobites at court in early 1717 he had a valuable position with right of access to the Regent (Chapter Two).

Whatever the immediate impetus of Dillon’s decision, his move from his military post to serve James suggests he felt an element of guilt about his loyalty having been appropriated by the French king (through his military duties and oath), and therefore guilt for his failure to serve his rightful king during his French service. At the very least it demonstrates that Dillon was troubled by the switch in loyalty entailed by his military service and settlement in France. Transferring to Jacobite service meant that Dillon’s position with regards to duty and allegiance became very complex and ambiguous. Since he could not retract his military rank, he was forced to officially remain a high-ranking French officer, owing duty and fealty to the French crown, at the same time as devotedly serving James. Whether Dillon liked it or not, and in spite of his loyalty and importance to James, and position as James’ emissary, his military rank and oath meant that he owed his primary allegiance to the Regent.160 To a certain extent he had an obligation to take orders from the Regent – at the very least in a military context. The contradiction created great challenges for his later role as chargé d’affaires for James.

1715

Not long after Dillon entered Jacobite service, the 1715 Rising was launched in Scotland. James believed that Dillon would take a leading role in the projected invasions; he was to be commander of one of the ships transporting James’ army from France to join Mar’s rising in Scotland. A month later (while waiting to sail to Scotland), James gave specific instructions for these lieutenants-general, including Dillon, to accompany a messenger to Mar as soon as they could.161


161 SPW HMC, I, James to Bolingbroke, Oct. 10 1715, pp. 433-434; Instructions enclosed, Appendix, pp. 531-2; James to the Abbé Inese, Nov. 11, 1715, pp. 456-7.
Before the Rising Dillon had investigated possibilities among Irish Jacobites for a descent on Ireland, and rumours even reached Ireland that Dillon would lead an Irish invasion leading up to and during the Rising.\(^{162}\) After the failure of the Duke of Ormonde’s landing in the south-west of England, Jacobite leaders could not decide on a location for Ormonde’s second diversionary attempt. The lack of dominant Irish figures among the Jacobite leadership meant that Dillon assumed more prominence within the Irish community.\(^{163}\) James acknowledged this when he wrote to Bolingbroke that Dillon might be useful to Ormonde in Ireland.\(^{164}\) Ormonde and the other leaders were still attempting to follow James’ orders regarding a second diversion right up until February, when it became clear that James himself had been forced to return to France.\(^{165}\)

Dillon was even advocated as the perfect Jacobite general to lead an invasion of Ireland in a letter by a Capt. Burke from Dillon’s regiment to Bolingbroke. Burke writes: “Lieutenant-General Dillon, of all his Majesty’s subjects that served abroad, is the only properest person to command such an expedition because of his conduct and interest”.\(^{166}\) Dillon’s potential value in Ireland was also acknowledged in later plans during 1718 and in the Atterbury Plot (discussed in Chapter Three).\(^{167}\)

In the end the only descent on Ireland was that of two spies who James sent to report on the situation. However Father Ambrose O’Connor, an Irish Dominican, was only sent to Galway in May, after the invasion had already failed. He found that almost all principal Catholics had been arrested, but visited those who were left, including Arthur Dillon’s elder brother, Henry, Viscount Dillon of Costello-Gallin. All those O’Connor visited protested their loyalty and willingness to rise, but also expressed their disappointment that they were not informed beforehand of the plot.


\(^{163}\) Beresford, p. 131.


\(^{166}\) SPW HMC, I, Richard Bourke to Bolingbroke, Feb. 25, 1716, pp. 511-512; Hayes, Biographical dictionary, p. 60.

\(^{167}\) SPW HMC, VII, Dillon to James, July 26, 1718, pp. 86-87; O’Donoghue, ‘Ireland and the Jacobite Threat’, pp. 124, 148.
for the Rising. These Jacobites apparently told O’Connor that 20,000 men could be raised in Munster and Connaught, and Galway could easily be taken. He thus reported that a landing should be made in Clare or Galway, and that very few regiments were kept in Ireland.168 This was just one of the ideas that were raised for a new attempt, almost as soon as the Rising had failed.

Officially the Regent had banned all Jacobite officers in the French army from joining James’ invasion attempt (as even Louis XIV had stipulated) since he had no desire to violate the British treaty conditions; he also utterly refused to assist James with French troops.169 Before the Rising the Regent had consistently refused James’ frequent pleas for the assistance of the Irish officers: “…It is necessary my friends should know that no foreign help must be expected at present of men, arms or ammunition, and that particularly on this last occasion all the Irish regiments in the French service and even every officer of them were refused me…” Yet while the Rising was underway James seemed to anticipate that almost the entire Irish Brigade would join the invasion of Scotland.170 Some few officers of high rank such as Lieutenant-General Dominic Sheldon (Dillon’s uncle by marriage), Brigadier Nugent, Colonel-reformé Bulkeley and the Marquis of Tinmouth (Colonel), had been prepared to defy the ban. They managed to abandon their French regiments for Scotland, as part of a group of 20 officers who had accompanied Ormonde on his attempted landing, risking all for their devotion to their Jacobite allegiance.171 Perhaps the readiness of these few encouraged James to believe that the majority of the Brigade would similarly be prepared to undertake the risk.

However Dillon chose not to take the same very risky gamble as Sheldon, Bulkeley or Nugent, despite James’ acute need for his presence in Scotland as a skilled and experienced General. James actually petitioned the Regent from Scotland in January:

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169 NLI, Microfilm n.2497, *Ordonnance du Roy, Pour defendre aux Officiers des Regim ens Irlandois qui sont à son service de quitter leurs Regim ens pour passer en Escosse, sur peine d’etre cassée & privez de leurs charges du 6 Dec. 1715*, p. 93; SPW HMC, I, James to the Abbé Inese, Nov. 11, 1715, pp. 456-7; Berwick to Mar, Feb. 12, 1716, p. 500; General Hamilton to Mar, Feb. 13 1716, p. 504; Szechi, 1715, p. 88-89; Baynes, p. 20. This official policy was maintained throughout the Regency, and so likewise affected the plotting and attempted Risings of 1719 and 1722. Szechi, *The Jacobites*, pp. 77, 93.
172 Mullen, f. 239; O’Callaghan, *Irish Brigades*, pp. 303-305. The stories of these officers are expanded in the Conclusion.
"...asking that Dillon and Roth be sent to him along with the Irish and Scots regiments, but the Regent ignored these pleas." This therefore must have been the stumbling-block to Dillon’s martial participation; like Berwick, he could not disobey his official military commander-in-chief. Strangely, in spite of this letter, James still seemed to be under the illusion that Dillon was prepared to ignore the ban: even months later, James was convinced that Dillon had been about to join the invasion in Scotland when it failed.

**Jacobite Agent**

Dillon’s failure to accompany the Jacobite troops to Scotland meant that his earliest active involvement with the French government as a Jacobite agent thus became the negotiations over the 1715 Rising. While James’ troops’ attempts at sailing were being constantly delayed, and when James finally landed in Scotland, Dillon assisted Lord Bolingbroke’s attempts to win support from the Regent of France. The Regent apparently expressed concern at the poor condition of the army’s resources, and agreed to dispatch powder – but refused to also transport arms in case the British should hear of it. Dillon assisted Bolingbroke’s attempts to persuade the Regent to dispatch aid to the rebels. His involvement in these attempts is shown in a letter by General George Hamilton, a Scots officer in the Swedish army who had commanded Jacobite troops at Sheriffmuir, and had been sent as James’ agent and messenger to request aid from France. He became disenchanted with Bolingbroke’s apparent reluctance to allow him access to the Regent, so he turned to Dillon:

[I] asked [Bolingbroke] whether or not he thought it proper I should wait upon the Regent and deliver your Majesty’s letter according to your intention...I was put off till next day, and even to this I have not had the honour to see the Regent. General Dillon asked me if he should lay it before the Regent to which I readily agreed. When [the Regent] was told the state of your magazine, he was so much concerned that your Majestys person and the nation should be exposed to so great danger, that he ordered six thousand weight of powder to be sent immediately...

This example of Jacobite correspondence elucidates the importance of Dillon to the Jacobites through his links to court. According to the letter he has access to the

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174 *SPW HMC, III, James III, Warrant*, p. 497
175 *HMC, Mar and Kellie MSS, I, Chevalier to Mar, Nov. 15, 1715, p.514; Mar to James, Dec. 9, 1715, p. 516; Mullen, f. 239; Beresford, pp. 137-138; McLynn, *The Jacobites*, pp. 95-96.
176 *SPW HMC, I, General George Hamilton to James, Feb. 13, 1716, pp. 502-3; II, Dillon to Mar, May 23, 1716, pp.176-177.
Regent through an established presence at court but Hamilton obviously does not. Furthermore it indicates that Dillon had a rank which gave him direct access to the Regent upon application. His access to court and the Regent was particularly important for the Jacobites in the absence of James and those of his courtiers and secretaries who have joined him, and became more so with the departure of some of the formerly more important or trusted Jacobites, such as Bolingbroke. Bolingbroke was dismissed by James from the position of Secretary of State in March 1716, primarily providing a scapegoat for the rebellion’s failure. Mar was of course barred from entering France by his leadership of the rebellion, as was Ormonde and other prominent leaders of the Rising. Dillon was therefore left as the most notable of the Jacobite agents in Paris still part of the Jacobite leadership network and trusted by James, and one of the select few Jacobites to meet with the Regent and his officials. Only a very few individual Jacobites who had managed to become courtiers, or marry into French courtly families, had similar access to Court. Figures such as Eleanor de Mezieres (née Oglethorpe) or Olive Trant, were generally either less active or less trusted by their fellow Jacobites than Dillon. James increasingly allowed Dillon to take a more important role in the network, and a larger part of the plotting, and indeed, become the principal mediator with the French court.

In his role as an informal mediator Dillon met personally with the Regent for several

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177 Secretary of State and leader of the Tory party under Queen Anne, Bolingbroke had fled into exile on the Continent in 1714, to avoid prosecution for treason by the Whigs: H. T. Dickinson, ‘St. John, Henry, 1st Viscount Bolingbroke (1678-1751)’ in ODNB. The Duke of Ormonde was the most prominent Jacobite on the Continent at this time. After his impeachment by the Whigs in 1715 for treason, as a leading member of the Tories, he had joined the Jacobites on the Continent, despite having supported William from the beginning of the 1688 Revolution: Stuart Handley, ‘Butler, James, 2nd Duke of Ormond (1665-1745)’ in ODNB.


180 De Mezieres (along with her sisters Anne and Fanny Oglethorpe) and Trant were devoted Jacobites, and as involved in Jacobite activity as they could manage to attain. The Marquise de Mezieres was a daughter of the intensely Jacobite Oglethorpe family who married into the French aristocracy and thereafter used her increasing influence and vast wealth to promote Jacobite projects. Olive Trant was similarly deeply involved in Jacobite schemes. However as women their discretion was never fully trusted by James or several other leading Jacobites – and of course neither could possibly be placed as official Jacobite representative. For further on the Oglethorpe family and Olive Trant see Hayes, Biographical Dictionary of Irishmen in France, pp. 299-300; McLynn, The Jacobites, pp. 154-155.

181 SPW HMC, II, Mar to James, Mar. 17, 1716, pp. 19-20; Dillon to Mar, May 15, 1716, pp. 153-156; Mar to Dillon, May 19, 1716, pp. 167-168; III, Mar to Dillon, Oct. 1 1716, pp. 4-6; Mar to Dillon, Oct. 4 1716, pp. 17-21; Dillon to Mar, Oct. 17 1716, pp. 90-91.
purposes, to the mutual advantage of both parties. Dillon was occasionally summoned by the Regent, most often to explain (or excuse) James’ decisions or the actions of other important Jacobite figures. This included truthfully accounting for the behaviour of Jacobites if they had been reported to have violated French law:

...[The Regent] sent for [Dillon] yesterday, and told him that [Lord Stair] assured by way of representation that [James] and [Ormonde] were both parted from [Avignon]. I answered with some freedom, that I wished they were upon a good account. [The Regent] smiled and said, Pray let me know the truth of the matter. I assured him there was nothing of it...^182

He was also summoned to interviews to perform delicate negotiations, such as James’ expulsion from Avignon, described below.^183

Dillon had relatively open access to court during this early period of his Jacobite service; he seems to have had free licence to visit Court (rather than upon invitation only). During the period of the Regency until shortly before Louis XV’s majority (1722), the court located itself at the Palais Royal, the home of the Regent in the centre of Paris. Dillon’s ease is apparent from description and comments made throughout the Stuart correspondence; he meets with the Regent personally and frequently in this early period, requests and was granted interviews, as would usually be granted to official diplomats. ^184 This enabled the immediate delivery of messages from James, or in some cases Mar. A letter from Mar to James explains that Dillon would be sent to tell the Regent of his departure: “The Regent will soon know of your having left Lorraine...so we think of sending Mr. Dillon to him tomorrow or next day at furthest to let him know that, since it was not thought fit for you to stay in Lorraine, you was actually gone for Avignon, it being one of the places he thought you should go to...”^185

Dillon’s fundamental and unremitting object was obviously to lobby the Regent for support, although this often turned into petition for various favours for James or the Jacobites more generally.

Financial Assistance


^184 SPW HMC, II, M. De Magny to James, Apr. 13, 1716, pp. 81-83; Dillon to Mar, May 23, 1716, pp. 176-177; Mar to Dillon, May 26, 1716, pp.183-184; III, Dillon to Mar, Oct. 6, 1716, pp. 26-27; Dillon to Mar, Dec. 24 1716, pp. 343-344; L. Inese to Mar, Dec. 25, 1716, pp. 355; Queen Mary to Mar, Feb. 28, 1717, pp. 537-538; IV, Mar to James, Mar. 4, 1717, pp. 91-96; Dillon to James, Mar. 4, 1717, pp. 98-99; Dillon to Queen Mary, April 8, 1717, pp. 167-168; Mar to James, May 17, 1717, pp. 248-250.

^185 SPW HMC, II Mar to James, Mar. 17, 1716, pp. 19-20; accord. V, Mar to James, Oct. 1, 1717, pp. 90-94.
While the royal family might have started off with an ample income when they first arrived at St-Germain, having been gifted a very generous allowance from Louis XIV, the various re-organisations of the army regiments from 1697 left many Jacobite families dependent on the charity of St-Germain, while the royal family became increasingly less able to bestow it. The poverty and desperation of these families has been well-documented within Jacobite historiography. Queen Mary herself constantly imparted her personal income to alleviate their plight, as well as attempting to use her own influence at court – not an insignificant advantage given her intimacy with Madame de Maintenon, and even with Louis XIV, with whom she was very popular.

The situation was worsened during the following years, indeed each time James faced a new exile -whether from St-Germain-en-laye (1712), Lorraine (1716), and finally Avignon (1717). His courtiers had to be reduced with each move (leaving those left behind without employment, and still dependent on Stuart grants), particularly as the French allowance had been cut. The failed 1715 rising then brought many more exiles from Scotland (those who managed to escape), all in a desperate condition, having sacrificed everything to fight for the Stuart cause.

The independent pension paid to the dowager Queen by France made up a major part of the Stuart income, as well as the pension paid to her from Britain. These pensions were desperately important for the majority of the Jacobite community around Paris and St. Germain, as the means by which she paid many of her servants and funded charitable grants to struggling Jacobites; yet the French government considerably neglected it in the years towards the end of her life, with many payments severely delayed or even missed altogether. This put the circumstances of all Jacobites

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under severe strain, as they all attempted to pull together and give succour to those in
most need.  

The poverty of the entire Jacobite community at this time meant that Dillon, as
emissary to the Court, sustained enormous pressure from the entire Jacobite
community to induce the Regent to deliver on his promises of aid. Thus Dillon
regularly requested financial assistance; various gifts, grants or pensions, for the
royal family, members of the royal household, and particularly for various Jacobites
dependent on James’ own gifts and pensions. Thus, he displayed a facade of
forceful assurance, in spite of his politically weak, and often supplicatory position
representing Jacobite interests. On May 15, 1716 he informed Mar that:

The Regent’s continual promises to me about succouring our master...engaged
me to defer writing until I had some comfortable news...I was this morning with
his Highness near an hour, and summoned him with his reiterated promises on
this account. I made use of all the arguments I could think of in order to
convince him of the sad and melancholy situation our master is in...that his only
resource and entire dependence was on his Highness’s friendship and goodness
to him, in fine, if he abandoned him in this occasion, I had just reasons to
believe our master with the peers and noblemen about him would be reduced to
the last extremity. He heard all this with attention, and seemed much concerned
for the king’s ill circumstances, he answered what follows...‘Je vous assure que
je suis bien touche de la triste situation ou se trouve le Chevalier, son etat me fait
grande pitié...je feray de mon mieux pour luy envoyer quelque secours
d’argent’. [I assure you that I am touched by the sad situation in which the
Chevalier finds himself, I greatly pity his condition;...I will do my best to send
him some monetary assistance.]  

Since this is his own account, his apparent authority may be exaggerated;
nevertheless it shows that he commanded an hour long interview which bears witness
to a fairly important station at court. It is also an early examples of Dillon’s
susceptibility to appearances, and his ultimate faith in the Regent’s promises, which
he continued to display over the next few years.

**Patronage**

Dillon’s admittance to court facilitated an excellent entrée to influential court figures

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189 SPW HMC, I, M. De Magny to James, Apr. 13, 1716, pp. 81-83; II, Mar to Elphinstone, June 11,
1716, p. 219; Mar to Dillon, Aug. 21, 1716, p. 362; Dillon to Mar, Sept. 5, 1716, pp. 407-408; James
Ogilvie of Boyne to Mar, Sept. 9, 1716, p. 415; Corp., A Court in Exile, pp. 285-287, 290-291, 300-310;
190 SPW HMC, II, M. De Magny to James, Apr. 13, 1716, pp. 81-83; James Ogilvie of Boyne to Mar,
Sept. 9, 1716, p. 415.
191 SPW HMC, II, Mar to Dillon, Aug. 21, 1716, p. 362; Dillon to Mar, Sept. 5, 1716, pp. 407-408.
as well as the Regent himself, including courtiers traditionally sympathetic to the Jacobite cause, or on good terms with James (Chapter Three). Dillon also had his own connections to some of these figures through his military career. These connections proved useful for several reasons, including for gaining further access to the Regent, and particularly to his inner councils; such courtiers with Jacobite sympathies could gain and pass on news of inner-circle French affairs which would otherwise be inaccessible, as swiftly as possible. These figures, such as the Marechal d’Uxelles, would sometimes pass relevant information or advice on to Dillon.\(^\text{193}\)

Unfortunately this did not necessarily mean a word in the Regent’s ear, despite the manifold promises of these courtiers to this effect. Even a Jacobite connection as strong as that of the Duc de Berwick would not use up his credit with the Regent on such an attempt, as seen in Chapter Three. On those (rare) occasions these figures were prepared to extoll the advantages of supporting the Stuart’s cause, and although they may have occasional positive effect on the granting of small financial gifts, but had little to no effect on the Regent’s attitude or policy towards the Jacobites.\(^\text{194}\)

These courtiers would take care to announce their efforts to the Jacobites to ensure recognition of the favours:

> \textit{...The Duke of Lauzun} told me he came from his country house on purpose to speak to the Regent about the King’s concerns. He had told him how much he thought him obliged in honour and conscience not to abandon him, that for his part he meddled not with his leagues, past, present nor to come, but that, being the King’s humble servant, he could not but tell him how much his reputation would suffer, if he did not assist him at this time. The other asked him, what reason he had to believe he would not? And, on the little man telling him that the King’s circumstances could not be worse than they were at present, he promised to give orders in that matter that should be executed speedily. Though I lay no great stress on this promise, yet the little man having pressed me with abundance of protestations of his zeal for the King’s service to let him know what he had done, I shall never venture to see him more, if the King will not own in a short letter to him how well he is pleased with him…\(^\text{195}\)

Dillon acknowledged the uselessness of such attempts himself: “‘Tis very plain the Regent and chief advisors look on the King as one whose interest is quite drowned

\(^{193}\) SPW HMC, IV, Dillon to James, Mar. 4, 1717, pp. 98-99; V, Mar to James, Oct. 9, 1717, pp.111-112; Dillon to Mar, Dec. 27, 1717, p. 334; Dillon to Mar, Dec. 28, 1717, p. 339; VII, Dillon to Mar, Sept. 20, 1718, p. 302.


\(^{195}\) SPW HMC, VII, Sheldon to Mar, July 26, 1718, pp. 87-88.
and that he’ll never be able to overcome the immediate difficulties in his way. You may consequently believe their little regard for any representations in his behalf.”\textsuperscript{196}

These connections held the most value as patrons or patronage brokers at court, indeed patronage was one of the most important elements of Dillon’s role; through it he could assist the Jacobite community at large, as well as the cause. Of course Dillon held the most influence in regard to military promotions, but he also did his best to assist Jacobites in other areas. His attendance at court allowed him to be of material assistance to the Jacobite cause, by providing introductions to useful international connections: “I’ll write to [Walkingshaw of Barrowfield] without delay and send him a recommendation to Mr Cott (the Imperial ambassador at Paris), who, I am told, will be soon at that court.”\textsuperscript{197}

But of course the main advantage for Dillon was that he remained the proprietor of his regiment, in spite of his withdrawal from active service. Naturally therefore his main influence lay with the officer posts within his own regiment, as appointments of such posts were heavily guided by recommendations from high-ranking officers, particularly regimental colonels (see Introduction). Comments made by Murray at a later period demonstrate his importance for members of his own regiment in this regard:

\begin{quote}
...with one from [James] for the Marrishall in favour of M.' Wogan, which I shall deliver the first time I go to Versailles...But I should have thought that it would have been better for M.' Wogan to be present when it was delivered, not only because it would have put him in the way of soliciting the thing afterwards, but because he might have got Dillon to join in the matter which may be for what I know absolutely necessary since the commission desired would make him an officer in his regiment...
\end{quote}

Dillon also had some influence with other Irish regiment commander-proprietors, particularly the older generation, with all of whom he obviously had close relationships, and even kinship ties in the case of Dominic Sheldon.

Regimental links naturally remained very important, as another avenue of influence lay with French commanders with whom he had old bonds of comradeship. This group included several Marshals whom Dillon had formerly served under, who were now at court, in the innermost circle of government, such as Villars and

\textsuperscript{196} SPW HMC, VII, Dillon to Mar, Sept. 30, 1718, p. 302.
\textsuperscript{197} SPW HMC, III, Dillon to Mar, Nov. 17, 1716, p. 224; accord. II, Mar to Dillon, April 26, 1716, pp. 118-119; Mar to Dillon, July 17, 1716, p. 287; Dillon to Mar, July 30, 1716, pp. 319-320; Mar to Dillon, Aug. 14, 1716, pp. 346-347; III, Queen Mary to Mar, Nov. 19, 1716, pp. 232-233; V, Mar to Wogan, Nov. 25, 1717, pp. 234-235.
\textsuperscript{198} SPW, 79/140, Murray to Hay, Feb. 5, 1725.
Vendome. "If his Grace would speak to Gen. Dillon, when he went to Paris, to give me a line or two to Maréchal Villars that it was his Majesty’s desire at parting to recommend me to the Maréchal, that he would assistant me to a lieutenancy in his regiment or any other, without doubt I would be provided for."¹⁹⁹

These ties were perhaps not as effective an avenue as the former, French commanders not having the intrinsic interest in promotion of Irish Jacobite officers as Dillon and his fellow Irish commanders. This path could essentially only be used by Dillon for support of his own nomination or recommendations; he could not ask French commanders to nominate his sponsors themselves, within their own regiments. Irish officers could only be promoted within the Irish regiments, since ordonnances issued in 1694 and 1702 ensured that the Irish could only join Irish regiments.²⁰⁰

Dillon would be importuned both directly and indirectly for his assistance with commissions. Occasionally Jacobite officers would request his intercession personally.²⁰¹ But usually requests were made to James, in an appeal for him to use his influence. In these early years Dillon was the most obvious figure for James to ask for intercession on behalf of officers, given his Jacobite zeal, his willingness to assist his brother officers, and his ‘interest’ in the army. Indeed James actually gave hi responsibility for some of the newly exiled and desperate Jacobite officers. Mar wrote to Dillon stressing James’ desire for him to do his best to find positions for them all:

The King is exceedingly concerned that they may not suffer in France on his account, and, as he recommended it to you himself to do all for them you can with the French Court, so he earnestly recommends the care of them to you, and whatever appearances the Regent think fit to make above board as to them, yet it would be very hard and not very just to make them suffer in reality, which I hope he will not do...²⁰²

Requests sometimes came through James, asking specifically for Dillon’s assistance. At this stage it was less common for James to try some other route of influence, though he did occasionally – sometimes through the aforementioned Irish Jacobite commanders. The commanders likely co-operated to to assist poor Jacobite soldiers,

¹⁹⁹ SPW HMC, III, Patrick Savage to John Paterson, Feb. 7, 1717, p. 519.
by passing appeals on to those who could be of most assistance. 203

James also received requests for Mar’s intercession, since during this early period
Mar was more of an intermediary figure than Dillon, given his close relationship
with James. 204 On occasion Mar was specifically asked to pass requests straight onto
Dillon. 205 In reply to one of his recommendations Dillon informed Mar:

Mr. Fullerton of Dudwick was with me. He appears to be a discreet gentleman,
and by what he told me is a considerable sufferer, having lost an estate of £400
a year. The resource of carrying arms in the French troops at 4d. a day is a small
and comfortless way of living, without hopes of being made an officer, having
numbers of their own reduced, who expect with reason to be provided for and
replaced preferable to strangers. I’ll see him tomorrow, and, if he has a mind
to carry the musket, I’ll strive to place him the best I can. As to Sir H.
Crawford, whose ship was taken by a Swedish privateer, when he comes here,
I’ll recommend his interest to [Sparre] with earnestness. 206

His comments show that Dillon took his responsibilities seriously. He scrutinised the
circumstances and character of the officers, to preserve the credit and integrity of his
recommendations, but treated them with consideration and sympathy, and gave them
what assistance he could.

**Swedish Plot**

Dillon’s role at the French court meant he became responsible for the 1716 Swedish
plot spear-headed by Baron Sparre the Swedish ambassador to France. Moreover his
management and leading intermediary role in the negotiations with Sweden are also
an example of his central position within the primary Jacobite network during his
crucial period. 207 James first approached Sparre about the possibility of refuge after
being forced to leave France. 208 Plans emerged from various figures for another
rebellion. By the time Sparre made concrete overtures to Dillon in early 1716,

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204 SPW HMC, V, Major David Nairne to Mar, Sept. 17, 1717, p. 48; Lieut.-Col. John Steuart to Mar,
Nov. 5, 1717, p. 179; VI, Capt. Alexander McDonald to Mar, March 13, 1718, pp. 142-143; Mar to
Dicconson, April 28, 1718, pp. 126-127.
205 SPW HMC, II, Mar to Dillon, July 16, 1716, p. 286; Dillon to Mar, July 30, 1716, pp. 319-320; III,
Brigadier F. Wauchope to the Mar, Oct. 30, 1716, pp. 155-156; Dillon to Mar, Nov. 17, 1716, p. 224;
Patrick Savage to John Paterson, Feb. 7, 1717, p. 519.
207 SPW HMC II, Magny to James, Apr. 5, 1716, pp. 61-62; Dillon to Mar, May 23, 1716, pp. 176;
Dillon to Mar, July 15, 1716, pp. 281; Dillon to Mar, Aug. 17, 1716, pp. 349; Mar to Sir J. Erskine,
Aug. 27, 1716, p. 381; III, Mar to Dillon, Nov. 27, 1716, p. 263; Mar to Dillon, Jan. 11, 1717, pp.
430-432; Mar to Dillon, Jan. 12 1717, pp. 434-436; James to Bishop of Rochester, Feb. 15, 1717, pp.
525-527; Queen Mary to Mar, Feb. 28, 1717, pp. 537-538; IV, Mar to James, Mar. 4, 1717, pp. 91-96.
208 SPW HMC II, Mar to James, Mar. 17, 1716, pp.19-20; III, Mar to Dillon, Oct. 14, 1716, pp. 80-81;
Queen Mary to Mar, Oct. 29, 1716, p. 147; Murray, pp. 210-15.
Sweden was envisaged by key Jacobites as an ideal partner for a new plot.²⁰⁹

By May 1716 negotiations had started, and Sparre was waiting on instructions from his King. Dillon was actually given an official license, or ‘plein pouvoir’ from James specifically giving him power to negotiate in discussions regarding the agreement.²¹⁰ From the start Dillon maintained close contact with Sparre, and later Baron Görtz, becoming a very strong advocate for the plot, in spite of the obvious flaws and difficulties involved.²¹¹

From the outset, the plot had little chance of making much progress, given the fundamental conflict of misunderstandings between the two parties. While the Jacobites sought Swedish military aid, the Swedes needed finance, which the Jacobites undertook to raise from their supporters in England.²¹² Dillon personally wrote a memorial (to James) proposing invasion strategies, and commenting on the Swedish demands.²¹³ The negotiations ran into a constant barrage of problems, the most important of which was communication with the King of Sweden, and the length of time wasted on it. Sparre attempted several times to communicate with his King, but heard nothing, while Görtz would not relay any of the plans back to Charles XII. Several months passed before progress could be made in the negotiations between Sparre and Dillon.²¹⁴ A division opened up within the Jacobite


²¹⁰ SPW HMC, II, Dillon to Mar, May 15, 1716, pp. 153-156; Plein-Pouvoir to Dillon, Feb. 1, 1717, p. 497; Beresford, p.137; McLynn, The Jacobites, p. 41; Murray, p. 287.

²¹¹ SPW HMC, II, Dillon to James, July 26-27, 1716, pp. 309-311; Mar to Dillon, June 9, 1716, p. 213; Fanny Oglethorpe to Mar, Aug. 9, 1716, pp. 335-336; III, Dillon to Mar, Oct. 17, 1716, pp. 90-91; Dillon to Mar, Jan. 2 1717, pp. 387-388; Mar to Dillon, Jan. 10, 1717, pp.415-418; Mar to Dillon, Jan. 11, 1717, pp. 430-432; Mar to George Jerningham, Jan. 27, 1717, pp. 479-484; IV, Mar to Ormonde, Mar. 4, 1717, pp. 96-97; Mar to John Paterson, Mar. 30, 1717, pp. 150-151; Murray, pp. 289-317.


²¹³ SPW HMC, IV, Dillon to James, Memorial, September 26, 1716, pp. 77-80. In this memorial Dillon comments on the necessity of having the officers of the Jacobite troops James would depend on have direct allegiance to him, and obey him implicitly. He even writes: “You cannot doubt the submission and obedience of the said officers in every thing relating to your service.” These comments obviously stem from the experience of 1690-1692 and the Jacobite regiments since, with the difficulties which attended their first allegiance being towards the French monarch; however they are extraordinary given Dillon’s first-hand knowledge that James could not rely on any of the Jacobite regiment officers being able or willing even to leave their French posts in the event of the plot being carried out, given Berwick’s and his own previous refusal.

²¹⁴ SPW HMC, II, Dillon to Mar, May 15, 1716, pp. 153-156; Queen Mary to Mar, June 6, 1716, pp. 207-208; Mar to Dillon, July 6, 1716, pp. 257-258; Dillon to James, Sept. 12, 1716, pp. 427-430; Murray, pp. 286-7, 294, 297-8, 303.
network between those (Dillon and Robert Leslie) who wanted to solve this problem by sending a representative of James to Charles XII, and Mar, who wanted Sparre to be given powers by Charles XII to negotiate directly, since neither he nor the other Swedish ministers involved had that power.215

Fortunately the perfect solution came in the guise of John Erskine, who happened to be travelling to Sweden for personal reasons, so had an ideal cover. He was given instructions to travel to Hamburg and from there to contact a General Hamilton, a Jacobite who, rather conveniently, was in the service of Charles XII. The negotiations could then take place with Hamilton as intermediary.216 However events interfered; Russia had in the meantime gained possession of territory adjoining Sweden, meaning that Erskine was obliged to travel through Russian territory to proceed – which would then imperil the mission to Sweden. In the end he had to abandon the attempt altogether.217

Meanwhile Görtz refused to make any promises to the Jacobites supporting a rebellion, and only did so when forced. Moreover he restrained Sparre from making material advances with the Jacobites.218 The Jacobites again attempted to send George Jerningham, their own agent to negotiate. He was instructed to do his utmost to encourage the alliance and support the plot before Ormonde arrived with full powers of negotiation.219 Meanwhile Ormonde waited for Jerningham at Prague, to see how he would be received.220 At this point the British government uncovered the plot.

This débâcle is a perfect example of one of the greatest difficulties the Jacobites faced whenever they attempted to negotiate plots with foreign powers; foreign allies distrusted the discretion of some of their chief plotters:

Mr D[illo]n carried...Mr. de Ma[g]ny to our neighbour [Sparre] to propose new projects to him...M[ezieres] says...he will own to you that...he found him disgusted to see that Ma[g]ny must be at all the conferences, he looks upon the

215 Murray, p. 287, 298, 302-3; SPW HMC, II, Mar to Dillon, June 9, 1716, p. 213; Dillon to Mar, July 30, 1716, pp. 319-320; Mar to Sir J. Erskine, Aug. 6, 1716, pp. 328-329; Murray, George I, p. 287.

216 SPW HMC, II, Mar to Dillon, July 16, 1716, p. 286; Dillon to Mar, July 30, 1716, pp. 319-320; Mar to Sir J. Erskine, Aug. 6, 1716, pp. 328-329; Dillon to Mar, Aug. 19, 1716, pp. 357; Dillon to Mar, Aug. 20, 1716, pp. 358-359; Mar to Sir J. Erskine, Aug. 27, 1716, p. 381; Mar to Sir J. Erskine, Sept. 18, 1716, p. 448; Murray, pp. 287-8.


219 SPW HMC, V, Ormonde and Mar to Jerningham, June 5, 1717, pp. 546-548.

220 SPW HMC, V, Inese to Mar, Sept. 5, 1717, pp. 11-15; Dillon to James, Sept. 11, 1717, pp. 30-31.
success of all affairs to depend upon the secrecy, and he cannot expect that...this is the opinion the people of this country has of that fellow which is very unhappy, since it is absolutely necessary for him to be trusted. Our neighbour told Mr. D[illo]n why they brought Ma[g]ny...D[illo]n answered that he could answer for him as for himself and could trust him as such. Our neighbour is vexed to death for he cannot think the same...for God's sake endeavour to have less confidence put in him, for you cannot imagine the indifferent opinion it gives people of your affairs since D[illo]n seemed to be so enthusiasmed of him.221

This remained a persistent problem: a Jacobite community renowned for its indiscretion could not be trusted by foreign officials.222 In this instance, the Swedish ministers were caught out in early 1717, which exposed a plot that had been monitored by the British government for some time beforehand. In London the government arrested Count Gyllenborg, Görtz in Holland, and some other minor figures, Crucially they seized correspondence which enabled the British government to gain incriminatory evidence of the plot – sufficient to justify the arrests of accredited diplomats, which caused a huge international uproar.223

For the Jacobites the key failure of the entire episode stemmed from the trust placed by the Jacobite leaders, including Dillon and to a slightly lesser extent Mar, in their Swedish counter-parts. These two were the first to be convinced by the potential of the proposal, and the authenticity of the approaches of Spaar as a representative of the King of Sweden.224 Dillon gave an incredibly ingenuous recommendation of the proposal to Mar, apparently relying on the King of Sweden's gratitude for a sum of money for his further assistance:

[Queen Mary] told me [Southcott] has great hopes of procuring [money] from friends in [England], and the latter...confirmed the same to me. In my humble opinion offering whatever sum is got to [the King of Sweden] in his present urgent necessity would produce the best of effects, and engage him to such an acknowledgement as may prove hereafter most essential for [James'] interest. Though [the King of Sweden] should not

221 SPW HMC, II, Fanny Oglethorpe to Mar, May 23, 1716, pp. 177-179.
223 SPW HMC, IV, J. Menzies to [Charles] K[innaird], Feb. 5, 1717, pp. 529-530; Mar to James, Mar. 4, 1717, pp. 91-96; Dillon to James, Mar. 4, 1717, pp. 98-99; Lord, Stuarts Secret Army, p. 124; Murray, George I, pp. 318-323; Lenman, p. 187.
224 SPW HMC, II, Dillon to Mar, May 23, 1716, pp.176-177; Mar to Dillon, July 6, 1716, pp. 257-258; Dillon to Mar, July 30, 1716, pp. 319-320; Mar to Inese, Aug. 30, 1716, p. 392; Dillon to James, Sept. 12, 1716, pp. 427-430; Dillon to James, Sept. 26, 1716, p. 477; Rebecca Wills, Jacobites and Russia 1715-1750 (East Linton: Tuckwell, 2000), p. 45.
accept this offer, it will show Arthur’s willingness, and that his friends in [England] are still in a readiness to supply him. [James], [Ormonde] and [Mar] will judge better than any other of the good consequence this may have...  

Dillon’s recommendation was then passed on by Mar and Inese to James, despite Mar’s own early wariness of the Swedes: “We heard from [Dillon] about [the King of Sweden], but I cannot help thinking the [ambassador] told him little (for anything we know) for his 20 leagues travelling.” It was also primarily due to his pressure in promoting the proposal that it was pursued further, even by Queen Mary:

...[Dillon] will tell you all that relates to [King of Sweden’s] buseness, whichh, after all, is the most hopefull wee have, tho’ you will find that it is like to fail, if a good sume of money be not very soon given, upon which [Dillon] pressing me extremly to it, and he being the only good judge here in [the King of Sweden’s] affair, I have been persuaded to give [Southcott] a note of whicch you have here the copy...I hope the King will approve of this, for I was persuaded his service would suffer if I did not do it...

Dillon and Inese particularly placed their full trust in the Swedish ministers as co-conspirators. Dillon and Inese though had confidence in Görtz almost until his eventual arrest, based on the endorsement of Sparre. Dillon seems to have had no reservations whatsoever about trusting Spaare completely: “I should do the Baron the justice of saying that he seems to me entirely in your Majesty’s interests, and that he would esteem it a great honour to be useful to you...”

Not only was Dillon convinced of Spaare’s sincerity, he even attributed to him the possession of a greater degree of the King of Sweden’s confidence and authorisation than Spaare had given him reason to believe: “I infer from this and several other discourses [Sparre] had with me of late, that he has already [the King of Sweden’s] orders to treat with [James], and do perceive he has a mind to it, tho’ he pretends indifferency, which in my humble opinion is in order to make the best bargain he can.” The problem was that while Sparre was at least sincerely pro-Jacobite and desirous to consolidate the proposed alliance, if perhaps over-confident in his mandate to do so, Görtz had no real intention of building such an alliance at all – he

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225 SPW HMC, II, Dillon to Mar, Aug. 21, 1716, p. 360.
227 SPW HMC, III, Queen Mary to Mar, Nov. 19, 1716, pp. 232-233.
228 SPW HMC, II, Dillon to James, Sept. 12, 1716, pp. 427-430; Dillon to Mar, Oct. 17, 1716, pp. 90-91.
230 SPW HMC, II, Dillon to James, Sept. 12, 1716, pp. 427-430.
merely intended to appease the Jacobites with the promises of military support in the attempt to gain the financial exchange the Swedish government so desperately needed, the mission Charles had actually entrusted him with. Dillon, Mar and Inese failed to recognize his true objective.

This was despite Dillon and Mar both being aware of the Swedes’ desperate financial situation: “...You’ll see by his [Dillon’s] memoir to [James] that the portion required for clearing the mortgage is 8,000l., which in my humble opinion is a competent sum, and as much as can be expected of that side, considering the number of [the King of Sweden’s] creditors, whose claims he must be in a condition to answer at all seasons...” The knowledge that this was Sweden’s only real incentive to enter into the agreement should have wakened them to a realisation of the questionable nature of these ministers’ proposals, particularly after having been warned about those ministers. Mar had even been informed that Dillon was not wholly in Spaare’s confidence.

All three at least realised that Görtz was less dependable than Spaare, a realization which grew stronger as time went on, especially after their estrangement, when Spaare essentially decried his integrity to the Jacobites. However they continued to negotiate with him, hoping he could still be convinced, and even after his arrest by the British in February 1717 they continued to believe in the possibility of pursuing the negotiations, in which Spaare cautiously encouraged them. It was not until September that the Jacobites realized the reality of the situation, and the lack of any real intent or desire for a Jacobite alliance in Sweden. Dillon wrote to Mar that: “I read your letter to Queen Mary...Inese perused it likewise. Both he and Dillon are suspicious that the King of Sweden's emissaries dont act with much sincerity, and I

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233 SPW HMC, II, Fanny Oglethorpe to Mar, July 29, 1716, pp. 318-319; Fanny Oglethorpe to Mar, Aug. 9, 1716, pp. 335-336; Mar to Dillon, Dec. 22, 1716, pp. 334-335; Dillon to Mar, Jan. 2 1717, pp. 387-388.
234 SPW HMC, III, Dillon to Mar, Nov. 20, 1716, p. 239; Mar to Dillon, Nov. 27, 1716, p. 263; Mar to Dillon, Dec. 8, 1716, pp. 300-301; Murray, George I, pp. 309-311.
235 SPW HMC, III, Dillon to Mar, Jan. 9 1717, pp. 414 – 415; Mar to Dillon, Jan. 10 1717, pp. 415-418; Mar to Dillon, Jan. 11, 1717, pp. 430-432; Dillon to Mar, Jan. 12 1717, pp. 433-434; Mar to Dillon, Jan. 12 1717, pp. 434-436; Mar to George Jemingham, Jan. 27, 1717, pp. 479-484; IV, Dillon to James, Mar. 12, 1717, p. 118; James to Queen Mary, Dillon and Mar, Mar. 27, 1717, pp. 138-140; Mar to James, Apr. 5, 1717, pp. 159-163; Mar to James, June 4, 1717, pp. 313-315; Dillon to James, July 20, 1717, pp. 459-460; Dillon to James, Aug. 7, 1717, pp. 502-503.
wish their opinion may be ill grounded.” Inese went further and admitted that:

...I dare say Sparre will employ what credit he has, which I am afraid is not great, to turn things to the King’s advantage; at least we shall see what we have to trust to on that side, for Sparre hath promised Dillon to write to him the true state of the case and what may be relied on. By what Mar hints in his letter, for he doth not explain it, it would seem that now the King of Sweden's people are dealing underhand with King George;...To be sure Gortz must be at the bottom of this new application to King George, though it becomes him less than anybody to be concerned in that matter, after he has received of our money and been so roughly used himself by King George. But I remember from the beginning Mar had an ill opinion of him, and guessed better than anybody at his true character, for at that time I must own that both Dillon and Inese had a much more favourable opinion of Gortz. But what Sparre, who should know him better than any of us, said to Dillon, afterwards of him, confirmed that Mar made a right judgement of him from the beginning. And now it seems Gortz gives a new proof of his being a man not [to] be relied upon...^237

Dillon’s action had particularly important ramifications for his relations with the leading English-based Jacobites, particularly Francis Atterbury, Earl of Rochester. Since the primary concentration of the plot, at least in early stages, was on fundraising among English Jacobites, the consequences therefore fell on the leaders, with the loss of those potential funds, and subsequent loss of trust within the English Jacobite community. The anger of these leaders then fell on the Jacobites on the continent who were responsible for it, including Dillon. This episode cast doubt on Dillon’s capability for his role, which would linger through his tenure.

Historians have tended to pay more attention to the English branch of the plot, and have therefore rather diminished the importance of the French element. Dillon’s key role in the affair has also been overlooked; particularly the part he played in initiating and sustaining Jacobite credence and confidence therein. Dillon instigated the plot and must therefore take much of the blame for its failure. His unrealistically optimistic misinterpretation of Swedish intentions caused him to lead the rest of the Jacobite leadership into this deception.

^236 SPW HMC, V, Dillon to Mar, Sept. 4, 1717, pp. 5-6.
Avignon

The paradox of his dual allegiance, seems to have been deliberately exacerbated by the Regent’s treatment of him after his transfer to James’ service. Orleans’ exploited Dillon’s duty for his own ends, and sometimes to fulfil his obligations to his British allies. The Regent’s behaviour aggravated the contradictions of duty fundamental to his role, which Dillon was never able to resolve. The Regent’s exploitation of Dillon became a pattern of their relationship while Dillon occupied the post, first displayed when the Regent supported the demands of the British government by refusing to allow Dillon to fight in the 1715 Rising, but most effectively demonstrated when the Regent sent Dillon to convey his official warning forcing James from Avignon. It was resented by Dillon as an affront, since the Regent used his power over Dillon to emphasise his power over James.\(^{238}\) Perhaps it was a subtle way for the Regent to show any earlier displeasure at Dillon’s prior sudden decision to undertake service for James.

The Regent not only insulted the Stuart king by using Dillon to demonstrate his political weakness, but further insulted his subject with the contradictory nature of his own position; a reminder that his allegiance officially lay to the French state or monarch through his previous employment, promotion, honours and formal oath, which took precedence over his official allegiance to James.\(^{239}\) It was reinforced by his (presumed) command to Dillon to send reports back on both his own and James’ progress on their respective journeys.\(^{240}\) Additionally there was the insult to his dignity and rank, in being used as a political pawn, and indeed as essentially being

\(^{238}\) MAE, Correspondence Politique, Angleterre MS 297, Dillon to the Regent, Jan, 28, 1717, ff. 50a-51b; Dillon to the Regent, Feb. 3, 1717, ff. 66a-b; Dillon to the Regent, Feb. 11, 1717, ff. 100-101; Dillon to the Regent, Feb. 15, 1717, ff. 128a-b; Dillon to Mar, Oct. 12, 1716, p. 67; Dillon to Mar, Dec. 18, 1716, p. 322; Inese to Mar, Dec. 23, 1716, pp. 339-340; Dillon to Mar, Dec. 24, 1716, pp. 343-344; Inese to Mar, Dec. 25, 1716, p. 355; Inese to Mar, Dec. 28, 1716, p. 365; Dillon to Mar, Jan. 9, 1717, pp. 414-415; Mar to Sir P. Lawless, Feb. 3, 1717, pp. 508-509; Beresford, pp. 136-138.

\(^{239}\) MAE, Correspondance Politique, Angleterre MS 297, Dillon to the Regent, Jan, 28, 1717, ff. 50a-51b; Dillon to the Regent, Feb. 3, 1717, ff. 66a-b; Dillon to the Regent, Feb. 11, 1717, ff. 100-101; Dillon to the Regent, Feb. 15, 1717, ff. 128a-b; SPW HMC, III, Dillon to Mar, Oct. 12, 1716, p. 67; Dillon to Mar, Dec. 18, 1716, p. 322; Inese to Mar, Dec. 23, 1716, pp. 339-340; Dillon to Mar, Dec. 24, 1716, pp. 343-344; Inese to Mar, Dec. 25, 1716, p. 355; Inese to Mar, Dec. 28, 1716, p. 365; Dillon to Mar, Jan. 9, 1717, pp. 414-415; Mar to Sir P. Lawless, Feb. 3, 1717, pp. 508-509. This interpretation of the situation is supported by Beresford, pp. 136-137.

\(^{240}\) MAE, Correspondance Politique, Angleterre, MS 297, Dillon to the Regent, Feb. 3, 1717, ff. 66a-66b; Dillon to the Regent, Feb. 11, 1717, ff. 100a-101a; Dillon to the Regent, Feb. 15, 1717, ff. 128a-b,
treated as little more than a herald. There is also the possibility that the French leadership wished to remove Dillon from the centre of Jacobite activity, with the idea that giving Dillon the mission might disrupt any plots being developed by the Jacobites with the essential involvement of Dillon.

Speculation had been rife for some time that the Regent would have to exile James from France, a condition of the treaty then being negotiated with the British, so the Jacobites had discussed at length the course that should be taken if it was agreed upon (as looked inevitable). Dillon assumed a hardline position on this matter. Having sought the advice of courtiers from other courts in Europe, such as Sparre, he advised James to stay in Avignon as long as possible, as expulsion would play to the sympathies of European courts. Dillon defined the extent of such force to Mar: “he must not separate from [Avignon] without being obliged to it by the last extremities, such as having his house surrounded by troops and forced by the commander to leave it.”

The Regent’s order to convey the official message added insult to injury. Had the Regent knew of Dillon’s advice in this regard it might have been another reason to have chosen him as messenger, even the Instructions deferred to British demands by refusing to acknowledge James’ royalty - referring to James as ‘the person’:
« Qu’aînsy Monseigneur le Due d’Orleans… n’a pû se dispenser de se conformer a l’avis des Conś[e] et de laisser prendre a Sa Maj. te …l’engagem[...] d’obliger la personne qui est a Avignon…d’en sortir et de passer de l’autre costé des Alpes…[Thus the Due d’Orleans…could not refuse to conform to the opinion of the [...] and have a message carried to His Majesty of the engagement to oblige the person who is in Avignon to leave and pass through to the Alps...]”

Dillon’s resentment at the order is clear in his own account to Mar of December 18, 1716. He describes his reaction on receiving the news from one of the Regent’s...

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241 MAE, Correspondance Politique, Angleterre, MS 283, Memoire pour servir d’instruct. on à Monsieur Dillon, Lieut. gen’r l des armées du Roy allant à Avignon par ordre de son alt. 3e Royale, Jan. 8, 1717, ff.341a-343a;
242 SPW HMC, III, Memre to Mar, Oct. 17, 1716, pp. 88-89; Dillon to Mar, Oct. 17, 1716, pp. 90-91; Mar to Dillon, Nov. 22, 1716, pp. 244-245.
244 MAE, Correspondance Politique, Angleterre, MS 283, Memoire pour servir d’instruct. on à Monsieur Dillon, Lieut. gen’r l des armées du Roy allant à Avignon par ordre de son alt. 3e Royale, Jan. 8, 1717, ff.341a-343a;
245 MAE, Correspondance Politique, Angleterre, MS 297, Dillon to the Regent, Jan. 28, 1717, ff. 50a-51b; Dillon to the Regent, Feb. 3 1717, ff. 66a-b; - to Iberville, Feb. 15, 1717, ff. 71-72; Dillon to the...
ministers, on hearing that he would convey the order personally he made clear to the French ministry his unhappiness at this insult, demanding a letter of instruction from the Regent himself.

[Marechal d’Uxelles] sent for me yesterday, and kept me near two hours. His conversation rolled on [James’] present situation, and that he ought not by useless resistance disgust or disoblige [the Regent], who is in the bottom his true friend, and would willingly serve him when a favourable occasion offers. [Dillon] answered in general terms that he believed and was almost sure [James] reckoned very much on [the Regent’s] friendship, and had so great a regard to his and [France’s] interest that he would sooner sacrifice part of his own than act contrary to either...[Marechal d’Uxelles] seemed most pleased at this, and desired [Dillon] not to be out of the way; that [the Regent] would speak to him in two or three days in order to carry a message from him to [James]. [Dillon] insisted upon having an instruction signed, and alleged reasons for demanding it, which [Marechal d’Uxelles] could not disapprove...246

Dillon also demanded a maintenance pension for James as a compensatory gift from the Regent (particularly to make up for the assistance which could have been given from the Emperor if James resisted the Regent’s demand). Inese claimed that he had suggested this move to Dillon.247 This seems to have been a viable threat as James’ refusal to move from Avignon, would have greatly embarrassed the Regent, given his promises to this effect in the treaty about to be signed with Britain. Of course he had threatened to use force against James if necessary, but to actually carry out such a threat against a royal’s person would have been deeply embarrassing o him and the French king’s dignity.248 The public perception of such an act was reason enough for violence to be avoided if at all possible; as soon to be demonstrated by the European-wide outrage caused by the Emperor’s brutal treatment of Clementina Sobieska.249

Given Dillon’s attempts to secure a maintenance grant, the Regent actually admitted as much to Dillon:

The Regent seems apprehensive to a very great degree, lest [James] should not comply, and owned plainly to [Dillon] that would mightily embarrass him, and be extremely inconvenient for his affairs. He knew that the Emperor was for [James] standing out to the last, and that [the Emperor had writ to the Pope, to


be firm on that point, and that all others who were not friendly to France were of [the Emperor’s] mind, and would give [James] the same advice. Now [the Emperor]...gives a natural rise for [James] to say in his answer that he finds he cannot comply without disobliging and in a manner breaking with [the Emperor], and with most or all others from whom he might expect support and relief, and that therefore, though he has all imaginable inclination to please [the Regent], yet it were most unreasonable to expect that, to please him alone, he should break with all other friends, unless the Regent secured him beforehand of a reasonable maintenance to be duly paid him wherever he should go...Dillon] has done his part with a great deal of zeal, application and prudence.²⁵⁰

The Regent therefore seems to have been prepared to give in to the Jacobites’ demands for this grant - though only in the form of promises.²⁵¹ James would later (and in similar desperate circumstances outlined in Chapter Three) attempt to remind the Regent of the specific promise of a secret pension made at this time: “Allow me to remind you of the message you gave me by Mr. Dillon, when I left Avignon, « que dans la supposition du cas facheux, qui m’arrive aujourdhuy, vous auriez la bonté outre la pension secrete que vous m’accordates alors pour moy, de me continuer encore secretement celle de la Reine.... »” [that supposing that unfortunate case, which has arrived, you would have the goodness besides the secret pension which you then granted to me, to secretly maintain that of the Queen...] Having submitted to the promises of the grant at this stage, James would never actually receive the grant Dillon had so zealously fought for on his behalf. The Regent utterly outmanoeuvred Dillon, depriving James of even the merest compensation for the thoroughly damaging blow to his cause.

Dillon’s status as chargé d’affaires in Paris was formalised on February 1 1717, while in Avignon, making him James’ official representative at Paris and to the French court. Nevertheless his diplomatic position was just as delicate, as the Jacobites’ standing with the Regency government only grew even more vulnerable over the next three years. Britain and France extended their pact to the Dutch in the Triple Alliance on 4 January 1717, to guard against Spanish ambitions in Italy. Philip V of Spain’s tenacious hopes of assuming Orlean’s position in France, despite the Treaty of Utrecht’s prohibition, directed Spanish policy against rapprochement with France. His new Queen’s interest in regaining Italian territories for her children led Spain to take Sardinia back from Austria in August 1717, prompting Austria to join the Quadruple Alliance on 2 August 1718.

However the Regent did not dismiss Spain as a possible ally until the discovery of the Cellamare plot (after the Prince of Cellamare, Spanish ambassador to France) later that year – Cardinal Alberoni’s intrigue with the opposition faction of the Duc and Duchesse du Maine, which designed to replace the Duc d’Orleans with Philip V as Regent of France. The Regent then naturally exiled the leaders of the conspiracy, and declared war on Spain in January 1719. Cardinal Alberoni reacted by inviting the Duke of Ormonde to Spain to plan what became the 1719 rebellion. As a result the Jacobites were actually aligned with a state at war with France, and plotting against her allies, meaning that, as Chapter Two charts, through increasing exclusion of Jacobites from French political relevance, by the end of 1719 it became almost impossible for Dillon to maintain an official Jacobite presence.

Official Appointment

Dillon’s new role required tangible authorisation, in the context of his negotiations with the Swedish ministers. James therefore presented Dillon with a plein pouvoir, appointing him ‘minister plenipotentiary’, allowing him full negotiating powers on behalf of the King: “with full power to treat and conclude everything which may appear to be for the King’s advantage.” This gave him formal power to negotiate

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252 Shennan, pp. 43-44, 63-66; Pevitt, pp. 184-185; Wilson, French Foreign Policy, pp. 5(n), 8-10, 13; Ladurie, Saint Simon and the Court of Louis XIV, pp. 308-309.
253 SPW HMC, III, Feb. 1, 1717, Plein-Pouvoir to Dillon, p. 497; IV, Mar. 1, 1717, Mar to Charles
the alliance conditions and treaty stipulations with more freedom for his own
directive. James's state-less condition meant however that Dillon could not be an
official ambassador, but rather James's representative, or envoy, as James was no
longer officially recognised by France as the King of Great Britain. His father James
II had been formally acknowledged as King of Great Britain, and given full honours
as such at the French court throughout his exile. France was forced to recognise
William as King of England under the Peace of Ryswick, but Louis XIV decided to
acknowledge James II's son as the new King when James II died in 1701. France did
not formally renounce its recognition of James as the British sovereign until the
signing of the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, after which the French state designated him
as the Chevalier de Saint-Georges, previously a title conferred on him by Louis XIV
to allow him to serve in the French army incognito. Dillon's rank, service and duty to
France made him a very inappropriate choice to be Jacobite agent for France, but in some ways also peculiarly suited Dillon to the
position for the specifically Jacobite interest. At a basic level was his entitlement to
attend court, dependent on official authorisation of his noble class. The Dillon family
had been landowners in Ireland since the Norman invasion, and Viscounts of
Costello-Gallin since 1622. Not only did Dillon spring from an illustrious noble

Kinnaird, pp. 90-91; BNF Manuscrits, cote Français 12161, Supplément français 3788, 'Lettre d'un
officier Irlandais à son fils officier' sur les affaires d'Irlande à la fin du règne de Louis XIV, f. 10a;
Beresford, p. 137
254  Corp, 'Stuarts and the court of France', pp. 161-162, 171-176; Gregg, 'France, Rome and the
exiled Stuarts', pp. 52-55, 58-60, 72-73; Lucien Bély, 'L'incognito des princes: l'exemple de Jacques
255  Eoin Devlin, 'English encounters with Papal Rome in the late counter-reformation, c.1685-c.1697',
(PhD, Cambridge, 2010). Chapter Four. M. K. Walsh does not make this distinction in relation to
another representative of James, Toby Bourke, describing him as an ambassador in his article on
Bourke; however the use of the term can be justified in Bourke's case since Spain officially
recognised James as King of Great Britain during this period. Micheline Kerney Walsh, 'Toby
Bourke, Ambassador of James III at the Court of Philip V, 1705-1713' in The Stuart Court in exile
and the Jacobites, ed. by Eveline Cruickshanks and Edward T. Corp (London: Hambledon Press,
1995), pp. 143, 149.
family, he was also from 1711 officially a French noble, Comte Dillon, and a member of the order of St Louis. More important however was his military rank as Lieutenant-general. This made him a significant and very useful figure, particularly as a war-hero in various campaigns such as Kaiserslautern, only a few years before, which ensured credit and recognition in court circles. It was a far more prominent position from which to lobby various influential courtiers, including the Regent. The intrinsic association of the military with the politics of Louis XIV’s court meant that prominence and popularity at court was crucial to promotion within the military; conversely military rank and prestige was also highly regarded and advantageous in the court system. Dillon’s military rank was extremely important as a literal entrée at Court - an introduction providing access to individuals and their own networks. His fellow Jacobites recognized Dillon’s advantages, as acknowledged in a letter from Mar to Lord Oxford, the prominent Jacobite Tory leader in England:

...one advantage in [Dillon] is scarcely to be met with as to the King’s business at this time, which was, indeed, the reason of his making choice of him, viz., the entire confidence, the Regent has in him and the free access he allows him at all time, and his being also a particular friend of the King of Sweden’s agent made him the more fit for it, and these reasons still subsist, so that, if he be not called away from his post, it is of consequence to continue him.

On the same day that Dillon assumed office, James publicly recognised his loyalty by bestowing upon him Jacobite Irish titles of Baron and Viscount (a rare gesture that James usually tried to avoid). He judged Dillon to have demonstrated his fidelity through his service; the official patent for the title declared that the honour was granted “...in consideration of his remarkable services to himself and his father as appeared by his preparing to follow the King to Scotland...and also by a careful application both since and before that time in several weighty affairs in which the King had employed him and in which he has been particularly useful.” Even at this

257 Rowlands, Dynastic State and the Army, pp. 1-23, 269-72, 282-5, 296-300, 318-325.
258 See the Historiographical Context in the Introduction for an assessment of the nature of networks and their role within the French military.
early stage James had developed great confidence in him, of which he gave Dillon frequent assurances: "It never entered into my thoughts of your being of any party but mine. You know how satisfied I am with you, and how necessary I think you in my service... therefore give yourself not a moment's concern on these heads, but rest satisfied of my kindness and go on acting the upright part you have done..."\textsuperscript{262} James left most of the ability and authority to interpret the Jacobite position with the French government and its ministers up to Dillon, as almost the sole intermediary with the French court, and certainly the Jacobite representative with the most authority (a position which became clearer and more authoritative over time). His was to the greatest extent the formative and determining voice in such matters, and his influence with James in this regard would only grow during this period.

**Mary of Modena and Lewis Innes**

Contributing to Dillon's rank and significance within the Jacobite community, and his prominence within the network, was his close relationship with Queen Mary of Modena. This was a long relationship, he having possibly met her as early as 1690, as explained in Chapter One. After Dillon took up his Jacobite agency at Paris and St. Germain, he had grown increasingly friendly with the Queen, and they had a familiar, warm relationship. This state of affairs was no doubt helped by his wife's position in the Queen's household.

Dillon saw the Queen often, closely serving her interests; indeed was virtually the representative to the Queen for all Jacobite activity.\textsuperscript{263} In turn, she perhaps trusted him above all active Jacobites. In fact not long before her death a rumour spread through the community – seemingly an implication of just slightly too much intimacy in their relationship. Undoubtedly mere malicious gossip, it does not seem to have been taken seriously in the least by anyone of any importance at St. Germain. Dillon himself does not seem to have been worried about it, though alluding to it in letters to Mar:

\begin{quote}
I don't question you are informed of the injurious reports spread in England about Queen Mary and Dillon which occasioned some uneasiness to friends there. Whatever gave rise to it I can't determine, but malicious persons will still act their part, and, so the King's interest does not suffer by it, Dillon's share of
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{262} SPW HMC, V, James to Dillon, Feb. 23, 1718, p. 504.
the matter will give him little or no disturbance...

James trusted the Queen intrinsically, and she exerted great influence over him. She immersed herself in almost all the most closely-guarded Jacobite secrets, and remained informed and consulted in most matters by the inner circle. She was so central to affairs that the Swedish plot almost fell apart when the Jacobite leaders (particularly Dillon) insisted to their Swedish counter-parts that the Queen should continue to be involved in and informed of their plans, after the Swedish ministers refused to trust in her discretion. Dillon’s special relationship with Queen Mary therefore gave him another path of access to James, through which he could have a great deal of impact.

This alternate avenue of influence is clearly revealed through Dillon’s input in the matter of the search for a suitable bride for James. He personally induced the Queen to use her influence with James to promote the Russian princess as his future bride:

The brief manner that Ormonde explains the proposal of marriage makes Dillon presume he has given the King a more ample account of it... He went to St. Ger mains to have a further and clearer explication with Queen Mary about what was fit to be said to Ormonde in answer. After due reflection, Queen Mary consented to send an express to the King and to write by her own hand to Ormonde. Dillon insisted on both these points, and indeed thought both very necessary. As to the Czar’s offer about the marriage, it’s a steadfast proof of his sincere intention and his desire to unite with the King. He is able and actually in a situation of being most useful, his espousing the King’s interest in a certain manner may induce others to do the same...

Furthermore, he recommended Charles Wogan as the man most suitable to undertake the mission to search for a suitable bride. Dillon knew Wogan through his service in his regiment; James initially employed him after Dillon sent him on a mission to Rome. Dillon also acted (at least at first) as an intermediary between Wogan and his sovereign, a role with which Dillon eventually became very familiar, as detailed in later chapters. Dillon did not directly concern himself in the eventual daring plan of rescue of princess Clementina Sobieska from imprisonment in Innsbruck, though only because of his distance from the scene of action: “Since Ge. Dillon was

265 SPW HMC, I, James to Bolingbroke, Oct. 10, 1715, pp. 433-434; James, Oct. 10, 1715, pp. 531-2; II, Mar to Inese, May 19, 1716, pp. 164-167; Queen Mary to Mar, June 6, 1716, pp. 207-208; Mar to Dillon, July 17, 1716, p. 287; Dillon to Mar, Aug. 21, 1716, p. 360; Queen Mary to the Mar, Oct. 14, 1716, pp. 77-78; Inese to Mar, Oct. 27, 1716, pp. 141-143.
266 SPW HMC, II, Dillon to Mar, Aug. 20, 1716, pp. 358-359; Inese to Mar, Sept 12, 1716; Dillon to James, Sept. 12, 1716, pp. 427-430.
267 SPW HMC, V, Nov. 24, 1717, Dillon to James, pp. 226-228.
268 Mullen, f. 243.
269 SPW HMC, V, Mar to Wogan, Nov. 25, 1717, pp. 234-235; Mar to Dillon, Nov. 26, 1717, pp. 237-239.
still in Paris, Wogan confided his plans to Col. Lally...” Significantly, Wogan chose three of his fellow Irish officers from Dillon’s regiment (at the time garrisoned in Alsace) to assist him in the rescue too: Wogan’s uncle, a major (later colonel) Richard Gaydon, a distant cousin Captain Lucas O’Toole, and Captain John Misset.

For part of this period too, Dillon and the Queen were closely allied with a third party – Lewis Innes (Inese). The alliance developed naturally as the three grew closer together over time; essentially the remaining most important Jacobite figures living or spending large amounts of time at the court of St. Germain, and therefore spent much time together. Dillon and Innes often endeavoured to assist the Queen with her various missions and tasks, without needing specific instructions or orders from James.

A great benefit of their association was the close contact which it allowed, especially between Dillon and the Queen. This became so routine that individual channels of communication were not even needed. In a letter to Ormonde the Queen even remarks: “...I have not wrote to you of a long time, because I know that Dillon informs you constantly and exactly of all that comes to his or my knowledge relating to the King’s affairs, as he does me of what news he has of you...” It meant less repetition for James’s secretary (and sometimes James himself) as well as other Jacobites in the network in far flung corners of Europe. Jacobites embraced any labour-saving strategy, being liable to so much repetition of basic news and stories in their everyday correspondence. Mar made this very point to Dillon:

I reckon what I write to [Queen Mary] or [Inese] the same with writing to [Dillon], because when there’s anything to them concerning him or his affairs, they surely let him know it, and, when I have nothing to say but to acknowledge his letters, for saving writing, of which I have enough, I acknowledge them to whichever of the three I have occasion to write to, and I am mistaken if I have

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270 Mullen, f. 247.
272 Lewis Innes was a Catholic priest born in 1651, the brother of the leading antiquarian, Thomas Innes. He was educated at the Scots College, Paris, where he was ordained as a priest about 1676, and became the Principal of Scots College in 1682. Inese became an important courtier and almoner to the Queen at St. Germain when James II arrived in 1690. He was appointed ‘Almoner to the King’ in 1713, followed by Lord Almoner in 1714. When the court was forced to move to Lorraine in 1713, he became an advisor and political secretary to James, central to Jacobite activity: James McMillan, ‘Innes, Lewis (1651-1738)’ in ODNB.
273 SPW HMC, IV, Aug. 1, 1717, Queen Mary to Mar, pp. 484-485; V, Mar to Queen Mary, Sept. 30, 1717, pp. 86-87; Dillon to Mar, Oct. 1, 1717, p. 87; Dillon to James, Nov. 13, 1717, p. 195.
274 SPW HMC, V, Queen Mary to Ormonde, Nov. 22, 1717, p. 222.
not always acknowledged all [Dillon's] letters to one or other of them. 

Dillon later established a very similar relationship with Mar and Lansdowne (Chapter Three).

**Dillon’s weaknesses**

Despite Dillon’s apparent advantages to the Jacobites, his occupation of the post would not always be to their benefit, and it eventually became a handicap. As the Regent gradually grew more entrenched in his British alliance, and moved away from the Jacobites, the Jacobites’ (and Dillon’s own) position with the Regent grew increasingly nebulous, a situation which he failed to perceive. His obliviousness to this change, as well as his unwarranted trust in the French, can be seen in one of Dillon’s interviews:

\[\ldots\text{Dillon told the Regent that he received the King's orders to inform him of Peterborough's arrest and the circumstances, which he heard with attention and patiently. He approved the King's manner of proceeding, and said he could not do less after the reiterated advices he had of the ill design. The Regent showed much concern for the King and seemed well pleased that this was communicated to him by his commands, and indeed Dillon thought and thinks still that so doing was very necessary in order the Regent should be fully informed and prepared beforehand to answer Lord Stair, when the matter comes to question. The Regent asked if Peterborough was seized by the Pope's orders. Dillon answered the Cardinal commanding at Bologna sent a detachment of his troops to arrest and convey him to Fort Urbano. I was much surprised to find that the Regent knew the message the King received from an unknown person and from an unknown hand, and asked how he came by it. He answered, 'Puisque je vous en parle, vous voyez bien que je suis informé.' It may be that the King of Sicily's factor here sent the advice to his master and the same time informed the Regent of it. If it were sent by the latter, I have some reasons to believe he would have spoke to Dillon of it, who has been frequently with him since this report was publickly known. On the whole the Regent and chief people approve the King's behaviour and so does everybody in these parts...}\]

This behaviour was typical of the Regent, giving very little away, but showing a reasonably sympathetic façade to Dillon. The latter felt assured enough to impudently ask the Regent how he had gotten his intelligence on Jacobite affairs. The Regent repelled this with his dismissive reply – “Since I speak of it to you, you see that I am informed (of it)”. In this one sentence the Regent managed to caution that the Jacobite position with his government was not an alliance, with a right to intelligence of French affairs. The Regent always had the upper hand in their
dealings, as demonstrated here by their superior intelligence – his government could effectively hear into the most secret affairs of the Jacobite camp whenever they so desired, unlike the other way round. Dillon’s query displays his own naivety - his belief that a diplomat would have revealed all information he received on the Jacobites to Dillon himself.

Dillon exhibited the same weakness in regard to his interactions with other foreign powers, particularly the Swedish plot - which caused a few of the Jacobites around him to start to doubt Dillon’s political acumen.\(^{277}\) As a result a harsh light was shone on to his performance in the other areas which fell within his sphere, and more general criticisms were expressed about Dillon’s ability to perform his duties. A Robert Freebairn claimed that “In the meantime... others are not so well satisfied with Mr. Dillon’s management. Nobody doubts of his bravery and integrity, but most people think he is acting a little out of his sphere and complain of him for being slow and of uneasy access.”\(^{278}\)

Others criticised the lack of access.\(^{279}\) Only two weeks after Freebairn’s letter, Charles McMahon Forman complained that: “I acquainted Mr. Dillon as acting for his Majesty here with a few things... His not directing somebody about him to acknowledge three letters I wrote to him, and my not being admitted to see him several times I went expressly from Versailles to wait on him, discouraged me from meddling any more with news.”\(^{280}\) Similarly Harry Campion, an important Jacobite connection, blamed Dillon for not having properly passed on an introduction and message to the cautious English Jacobite Lord Orrery, thus preventing him from gaining access to Orrery and performing James’s wishes.\(^{281}\)

\[\text{[The king] will I believe be surprised to learn that [Mr. Campion] has not yet seen [L. Orrery] who has been now ten days in town, it is necessary therefore that matter should be explaind. [M. Campion] desired [Mr. Dillon] to lett [L. Orrery] know he would wait upon him if he would give him [.....]. Mr. Dillon at his first meeting only told [L. Orrery] that there was a person in town who was trusted by [the King] that would see him if he pleas’d, that he wont find him mentiond in a letter he then gave him, with ye cipher, so that [L. Orrery] made}


\(^{278}\) SPW HMC, VI, Robert Freebairn to Mar, March 29, 1718, pp. 216-217.

\(^{279}\) SPW HMC, VI, Charles Forbes to Mar, March 20, 1718, pp. 171-172; George Flint to Mr. Dempster, May 27, 1718, pp. 479-480; VII, Mar to Hamilton, Aug. 12, 1718, pp. 139-140; SPW, 51/129, Jerningham to Murray, Feb. 2, 1721, ff. 212a-b; 53/2, Tullibardine to James, April 4, 1721, ff. 8a-9a; 55/95, Freebaime to John Car, Nov. 10, 1721, ff. 173a-174a.

\(^{280}\) SPW HMC, V, Charles Forman McMahon to Mar, April 11, 1718, pp. 297-298.

\(^{281}\) The 4th Earl of Orrery was born in 1674 and was elected to Parliament in 1695, with Tory sympathies from the beginning. He gained office during the early years of George I’s reign, but was deprived of them after less than two years, upon which he turned to secret Jacobite conspiracy. See Lawrence B. Smith, ‘Boyle, Charles, fourth Earl of Orrery (1674-1731)’ in ODNB.
no answer; Mr Dillon is not to goe to [L. Orrery] but inly to meet him when [L. Orrery] sends for him, & this very [evening] will be ye second time of [Mr. Dillon] seeing him; [Campion] thought it would not be acting agreeably to [L. Orrery]'s caution to goe or even send to him but by [Dillon], to [...] channel, last night he putt a letter into [Mr. Dillon]'s hands, for [L. Orrery] but hardly expects an [answer] before the post will be gone...^*^

This was a fairly serious problem, primarily for the wider Jacobite world, given the alternate aspect of Dillon's role, acting as the intermediary representative of all Jacobites in France to James, as well as James' to his subjects in France. It indicates a disregard of his duty towards James' Jacobite subjects in France, but which had potentially worrying consequences for communication and the fulfilment of Jacobite plans, as well as the affairs of individuals and families. It could also, as shown above, potentially have disillusioned or repelled eager Jacobite supporters, agents and messengers.

The majority of complaints were specifically in terms of communication, Dillon's apparent problem in keeping up with his correspondence. Ordinary members of the extended Jacobite network commonly made allusions to unsuccessful attempts to get in contact with Dillon, or those who had been in frequent contact with him suddenly and inexplicably stopped receiving responses for lengthy periods of time.283

Brigadier Campbell was one of many: "I do not blame Tullibardine nor Glendaruel...only Mr. Dillon, from whom I never had but a line of compliment, for he does not own the receipt of my letters, much less answer them."284 H. Paterson, a Jacobite heavily involved in the network during this period, averred never having had any reply from Dillon to any of his letters.285

More importantly key Jacobite players also complained about the irregularity of Dillon's correspondence, including for important matters:

I am truly surprised at the silence of D[illo]n (whom we call Dutton), the man being otherwise hearty and zealous as ever I know any for [James'] service. I can only suspect he delayed answering till he had some positive answer from those he is dealing with, but at least he should have let [Mar] know as much, in case that be his reason But I shall now see him in a few days, and shall then be

282 SPW, 48/72, Campion to James, July 29, 1720.
283 SPW HMC, V, Brigadier Campbell to Lord Tullibardine, Sept. 18, 1717, p. 58; Richard Barry to Lord Tullibardine, Sept. 18, 1717, pp. 58-59; Brigadier Campbell to Tullibardine, Oct. 30, 1717, pp. 185-186; Mrs. Ogilvie to Capt. John Ogilvie, Dec. 13, 1717, pp. 603-606; VI, Murray to Dillon, Feb. 20, 1718, pp.85-86; William Gordon to John Paterson, March 1, 1718, p. 75; SPW 44/29, Jemingham to James, Aug. 3, 1719; 51/129, Jemingham to Murray, Feb. 2, 1721; 52/43, Jemingham to James, Feb. 20, 1721; 57/21, Thomas Southcott to Friend, Jan. 7, 1722.
284 SPW HMC, VI, Brigadier Campbell to Mar, March 26, 1718, pp. 198-199.
It was particularly concerning for them in the case of important documents or letters from others which Dillon had been given to forward on to other Jacobites— one of the most important aspects of his role as a pillar of the communication network (Chapter Four).^287

The problem had in fact started to become apparent soon after Dillon started to have an important role to play within the network, even James began to appreciate the former’s weakness. As early as mid 1716 Mar had had to pass specific orders (and dissatisfaction) from James to ensure urgently needed information and responses from Dillon:

> The King is very much surprised at your saying nothing all this time in return for my letters of 28 April and 1 May. It has very much embarrassed him on some of the subjects contained in them, which those who proposed these matters expected to have had answers to long ere now, and a meeting and conversation with your friend S[par]r[e], which seems to be of very great weight. His Majesty is likewise very anxious to know what hopes there is of Sweden receiving into that service those poor brave gentlemen...We are very impatient to hear from you of S[par]r[e] as to those points I wrote of in my last...we are very hopeful something good may come of it, therefore the King expects you will immediately write fully and particularly of them, that what is incumbent on our side may be set agoing...Those s[hi]ps who, we hope might be brought over must be tried and encouraged in time; else they will be lost, so all dispatch should be made in it...^288

This particular delay had hugely important potential consequences; at a time in which delays in the settlement of diplomatic negotiations could cause a breakdown of the entire project. It is a clear example of the detrimental effect of Dillon’s neglect on Jacobite affairs.

Critics highlighted the problem more frequently after the failure of the Swedish plot.^289 James had reason to question Dillon about such lapses on a few occasions. His defence to his monarch from one such charge seems surprisingly casual (and unconvincing): “As to the letter you mention that concerns Ormonde, which Mar...
addressed to Dillon to be sent to the King, I do not remember any circumstance relating to that matter, but am morally sure I forwarded all the letters directed to the King." Dillen never seems to have improved this quality, but was still being criticised for his neglect through the whole period of his employment; further details are provided in Chapter Three.

**Relationship with the Earl of Mar**

Complicating Dillon’s relations with other Jacobites was his association with John Erskine, the 23rd Earl (or Jacobite 1st Duke) of Mar. Dillon and Mar conducted their relationship through correspondence rather than personal contact at this time, since Mar, as Secretary of State, necessarily attended James during all his travelling throughout this period from Scotland to Rome while the former remained in Paris. In fact Dillon had possibly only actually met Mar in person once through the whole period up to the latter’s arrival at St. Germain in 1720, when delivering the Regent’s message ordering James from Avignon. Despite this Dillon and Mar grew increasingly close, until perceived as a united front with the Jacobite community. However Mar quickly acquired notoriety in Jacobite circles - his resentments, suspicions and machinations resonate in the Stuart correspondence, in fact he became one of the most controversial and incendiary figures in Jacobite history.

Born at Alloa in Scotland in 1675, Mar took his seat in the Scottish Parliament in 1696, thereby opening his career under the patronage of the Duke of Queensbury. Having obtained high political office from 1697; from 1706 he fostered connections with both Whig and Tory ministers, primarily Robert Harley and the Earl of Godolphin. Mar’s Jacobitism only emerged with his launch of the 1715 Rising: he had been perfectly prepared to be a staunch Hanoverian on the accession of George I, and would have stayed so had George I not snubbed him when he came to make his submission to his new King. Driven to such an impasse, he wholeheartedly

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290 SPW HMC, V, Dillon to James, Sept. 25, 1717, pp. 69-71.
291 SPW HMC, V, Dillon to James, Sept. 25, 1717, pp. 69-71.
292 SPW HMC, V, Dillon to James, Sept. 25, 1717, pp. 69-71.
switched his allegiance and his hopes towards the Stuarts. He contacted the Jacobites and shortly after took it upon himself to initiate the 1715 Rising, despite not having the least direct authority from James for such an action.

After the Rising James disregarded all Mar’s flaws and weaknesses and made him Secretary of State, as well as creating him a Jacobite Duke. Mar became James’ most intimate, closely trusted supporter, servant and friend, emphasizing his extreme gratitude to the man who had actually galvanized his only material (though disastrous) invasion. James’ subjects, particularly not those who fought in the ’15, did not share his gratitude to ‘Bobbing John’ attributing its failure to his incompetence; nor did the ‘old hands’ who resented his extremely high standing and intimacy with, and domination over, James, after his very recent and sudden conversion to the cause with the ’15. Mar never quite shook off this mistrust; what is more he carried with him his political animosities from before his defection to the Jacobite cause, particularly the inter-party disputes.294

James however ignored all the clashes and disputes, and all the many complaints and rumours about his behaviour. Resentments and tensions characterised the small, insular, poverty stricken and desperate Jacobite community made up of constantly stressed and edgy individuals, as is commonly recognised by historians.295 This internecine antagonism often included factional intrigues against fellow Jacobites. James, along with Mar’s friends and sympathisers, tended to blame the rumours on jealousy, and on factional conspiracies.

In addition to these factors, Mar also had a tendency to be resentful, acrimonious and over-sensitive. Dillon once wrote to James, in a copy of a letter from George Kelly, that he was “...leaving out what may displease Mar to avoid giving any occasion for new broils or dissensions, which have been but too frequent hitherto, and, if fomented, may prove more prejudicial to the King’s interest than the ancient quarrels

‘twixt those different parties...’ Dillon also attempted to pull himself out of the petty quarrels among his fellow Jacobites. Indeed he even asked James to excuse him from corresponding with the Bishop of Rochester, one of the most important Jacobites in England:

...I see plainly it’s morally impossible for me to correspond with the Bishop of Rochester without being subject to many reproaches, and therefore beg the King will either dispense me from corresponding with him, or, if he orders I should, will send me directions how I shall behave, and in a manner to avoid being taxed with breach of faith. I am very apprehensive of the last, in case anything wrote to me should draw a reproach, or rise in judgement against the author of it. Dillon knows nothing of party rage, is not acquainted with any of these gentlemen, has no other views but the King’s interest, to which if he can do no good, he will be in the last mortification to be the innocent cause of any strife or falling out ‘twixt persons equally necessary for the King’s service...

Atterbury and other English Jacobites’ had started to express suspicions about Dillon, in spite of James and Mar’s obvious trust, and his increasing importance within the network:

...Mar knows now... that the Bishop of Rochester and Lord Arran desired to be informed of the King’s affairs by particular messages...It’s to be observed that the message concerning this was addressed directly to Ormonde, and to Dillon only in his absence, so, if Ormonde were here when Kelly returned, in all appearance Dillon would not be informed of this private message.

Despite the mistrust of the English Jacobites, Dillon’s depiction of himself as neutral and innocent of aggression or petty antipathies, was not all empty pretension. A popular and respected figure within the Jacobite community in France, he kept himself reasonably free from Jacobite factionalism throughout this period, as a target of denigration or malicious gossip within the Jacobite correspondence. He is more frequently noted as an object of praise, particularly in terms of his social and personal qualities. Few doubted his reputation as a man of honour and integrity, a reputation noted by the cynical Due de St. Simon: «...de semblables promesses étaient appuyées par le témoignage du lieutenant général Dillon, homme de mérite et

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296 SPW HMC, V, Dillon to James, Nov. 24, 1717, pp. 228-229.
297 ibid, p. 228.
298 SPW HMC, V, Memoir of what Dillon wrote to the King about George Kelly’s message, Nov. 18, 1717, p. 213.
de probité. »

One of the most effusive in his praise was Scottish nobleman Lord Tullibardine:

...I cannot express the reputation his [Dillon's] merit and experience has accquir'd among all honest people when any thing of moment is to be undertaken did your Majestys affaires permit his coming to Scotland would be of the last consequence to fix the sure and intire gaining of this Kingdom in a very little time with out great hazard...

Even the worst of his enemies, during the darkest of times for him within the network (when he was finally dismissed), still remarked on his honesty, sincerity and Jacobite zeal (Chapter Four).

As the friend and ally of Mar however Dillon sometimes became entangled in his disputes. One such clash was the 1718 machinations of a faction with resentments against Mar, though Mar thought Dillon was also a main target. Devised by some of the principal Jacobites in England, Anne Oglethorpe, Lord Oxford and John Menzies, and carried out by agent Capt. John Ogilvie and his wife, Mar and Dillon also suspected the involvement of other Jacobite agents, including the Leslie brothers, Nathaniel Hooke, and possibly General Hamilton. The plot attempted to unshackle Mar’s increasing connection to Dillon, by circulating stories of Dillon’s alliance with Ormonde. The Ogilvies had also tried to create problems between Mar and Dillon on a previous occasion. According to Ogilvie in a letter to Mar:

...there was nothing but complaints of Mar’s usage of those that had stood by him...for those that were his friends he neglected, and those he caressed betrayed him, and made it their business to make him look little in every action he did...I was made to understand that the Bishop of Rochester was resolved to break the neck of the Scots interest, as he called it, Lord Oxford being included in that number, and that Dillon had declared himself freely on that head.

This scheme produced most of the negative comment mentioned above. Mrs Ogilvie accused Dillon of the above betrayal in letters to Mar and her husband. She also alleged that Dillon lied to Mar (primarily about her own reliability), engaged in petty
gossip with his fellow Irish officers, and had such radical ambitions for his family that he was willing to have his son brought up Anglican by Atterbury. She claims to have gotten these stories from Anne Oglethorpe, and Atterbury’s secretary. Mr. Ogilvie also accused Dillon of malice against both himself and Mar, and cast aspersions upon George Kelly, the messenger he had sent to England. The whole scheme, whatever its origin, first raised doubts about Lewis Inese’s suitability for involvement in the highest echelons of the Jacobite network. These doubts stemmed from his possible involvement in the attempts to split Dillon from Mar – specifically for leading Dillon to have doubts as to Mar’s and James’ confidence in him. James sent Dominic Sheldon to Dillon to assure him of James’ continued confidence in him, and he reported to James that:

...I could not perceive that any insinuations of Inese had made any impressions on him as to Mar, but he owned their informations from England did not always agree, and that, when that happened, he thought the safest way would be to rely on those who were probably best informed, and best capable of judging....In short he was so far from expressing any distrust of Mar to me, that he owned no friend of the King’s could advise his removal...

James believed no ill of Dillon, or that he could have been behind any of these ill designs, as shown by the uninterrupted and perfectly friendly commerce between both men. The incident eventually led to Inese’s dismissal by James for deliberately stirring up trouble within Saint-Germain:

But still the unfairness of Inese’s conduct was the same, this is fact and proved, but I own to you that I have more than suspicions as to other matters in relation to him: for I have the mortification to find that several of my late letters have been strangely misunderstood at St. Germain...You could not but see that I spoke very clearly and kindly to him, and yet I find it’s thought that that letter might look as suspecting you and the Bishop of Rochester of being against Mar, and as if Mar was picking a querelle d’allemand with us. At the same time, I have the mortification to find poor Dillon a little uneasy, doubting of my kindness, and thinking Mar is jealous of him, while the last is daily putting new correspondence into his hands and I writing to him as if he were my brother, for I really think him an upright honest man...I have daily greater reason to believe that it is, or rather must necessarily be, Inese, who causes all these jealousies and mistakes, that by diminishing the confidence people have in Mar, he might have more share in business. This is very clear to me, for it is impossible that an upright man like Dillon could be so strangely mistaken...

306 SPW HMC, V, Mrs. Ogilvie to Capt. John Ogilvie, Dec. 13, 1717, pp. 603-606; Mrs. Ogilvie to Mar, April 18, 1718, pp. 324-325.
307 SPW HMC, VI, Mar to James, April 13, 1718, pp. 306-307; Capt. John Ogilvie to Mar, April 18, 1718, pp. 327-331.
308 SPW HMC, VI, Sheldon to [James], April 18, 1718, pp. 322-323.
309 Ibid.
Yet Dillon himself continued to believe in Inese's honesty, and even defended him to James:

...I have executed your commands as to the last point and can affirm with truth that Inese received them in the most dutiful and submissive manner. By what you write to me I don't question your sufficient grounds, but I can't help saying that in all my dealings with Inese I found him a most upright man, extremely zealous and of a clear digested good judgement. I think myself obliged by principle of justice and honour to give this testimony, which is all I know of the matter. I presume the King will be informed of what Inese writes to Mar on this account.311

Mar even thought that Dillon had been manipulated and rather dominated by Inese:

"Inese acts the part, by what he says in his letter, of a prudent man, when he finds his designs fail and his ways found out. I do not think what Dillon says on it lessens what we formerly believed of his being governed by him..."312 Mar appears to have been convinced to at least some degree of the ease with which he trusted and was influenced by others.

From the first Mar had never considered Dillon beyond criticism; he was not blind to his faults. Despite his faith in Dillon's judgement during the Swedish plot, Mar could not have had absolute trust in him, for he actually specified to another Jacobite that certain information was not to be given to him: "....If this find you at Paris, you must wait on [Dillon] to whom I am to send the packet to give you, and I have written to him of you, but he knows nothing of [the Earl of Oxford] nor is it needful he should."313 This was nonetheless before he had officially been given his representative post and was not yet of the central importance within the network which he would be a few years later.

Mar's complaints about Dillon were for the most part the same as those made by other Jacobites, such as his frequent delays in replying to letters, or forwarding on the letters of others.314 There are also examples of Mar complaining about slightly more serious points, such as apparent avoidance of passing on long expected and important information.315

...[Mar] wrote to D[illon]n a good while ago by [James'] order upon that subject, but neither to that nor a letter since, of no small importance as matters stand, has [Mar] had any return, though there was time a good many posts ago to have had

311 SPW HMC, VI, Dillon to James, March 28, 1718, p. 210; accord. Dillon to Mar, March 28, 1718, pp. 210-211.
312 SPW HMC, VI, Mar to James, April 13, 1718, pp. 306-307.
314 SPW, HMC, V, Mar to Inese, Sept. 12, 1717, pp. 36-38.
315 SPW HMC, II, Mar to Inese, May 19, 1716, pp. 164-167; V, Mar to Inese, Sept. 12, 1717, pp. 36-38; Mar to Ormonde, Sept. 15, 1717, pp. 43-46.
it. This looks not a little odd of Dillon to us all here, and what can be his meaning I cannot imagine. [Mar] has had but one letter from him all this time, and in it there was not one word of his friend Spar[e], and that was the most important affair entrusted to him. Another has been with Spar[e] by Dillon's procuring, and wrote a long letter here upon that conversation, though not by any direction of Dillon, and I believe even without his knowledge. He might at least have acknowledged [Mar's] letter, and they being about [James'] affairs, and his particular order, adds to the oddness of his not doing so, but it would seen that he has greater affairs to take him up. Not hearing for him makes people here at a loss how to answer the letter with an account of the conversation with Spar[e]. By James' order [Mar] has again wrote to him, about getting those people into the Swedish service, and for pressing anew [the Regent] for a supply upon the growing expense and charge [James'] is necessarily and unavoidably put to. I write you all this that [Queen Mary] and you may know the better how to speak to him, and act in it otherways...”

Thus Mar recognised that Dillon could easily be manipulated; he might therefore have had genuine worries about his over-trusting nature creating problems for the Jacobites and the network.

**Provence Command**

Not content with having the Regent move James and his closest followers over the Alps, the British government urged him to do something about prominent Paris-based Jacobites, including Dillon and Mar, or those who returned to the French capital. However the Regent failed to pursue these requests with the rigour which the British desired. Over time the British gradually pressured the Regent to eject more Jacobites. In Dillon’s case, the Regent had a weapon which he could use to try to divert him from political activity.

In January 1718 the possibility arose that Dillon would be given a very profitable command in Provence for active military service by the Regent, highly advantageous from Dillon’s perspective. Rumours spread throughout the Jacobite community to that end, as evidenced by contemporary correspondence in the Stuart Archives.

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317 BL, Stowe MSS 227-31 John Robethon 1714-1719, MS 230, Dubois to Robethon, June 13, 1717, ff. 143-4; MS 231, Stair to Robethon, May 4 1718, ff. 79a-b; Stair to Robethon, June 10, 1718, ff. 95a-96b; Stair to Robethon, Aout 4, 1718, ff. 114a-115b; SPW HMC, IV, Mar to James, May 17, 1717, pp. 248-250; Mar to James, June 7, 1717, pp. 323-324; V, Dillon to Mar, Oct. 1, 1717, p. 87; Mar to James, Oct. 1, 1717, pp. 90-94; Gen. George Hamilton to Mar, Nov. 21, 1717, p. 220; VI, Dillon to Mar, June 14, 1718, pp. 524-525, VII, Dillon to Mar, July 2, 1718, pp. 3-4; Ormonde to Mar, Aug. 8, 1718, p. 126; Dillon to Mar, Aug. 23, 1718, pp.195-196.
Pressure mounted on Dillon to take up the offer in April, when the British ambassador to Paris, Lord Stair, officially complained of Dillon to his French allies. He in fact wrote to the Whig ministry about Dillon: "...One thing shocks me above all that Mr. Dillon, a Lieut.-General in the French service, dares take upon himself to act as the Pretender's minister here as openly as he does. It seems to me that it would be well to send me an order to speak somewhat strongly on this point..." Thus the Regent responded by promising to deal with his Lieutenant-General.

So sure was the certainty surrounding rumours of Dillon's departure, James even decided upon his replacement, James Murray, in concert with John Law. Dillon was still able to decline this command, as recounted later by an anonymous Irish soldier in a letter to his son:

Dans la nomination que fit M. le Regent, des officiers généraux pour servir dans la petite guerre que la France et l'Angleterre firent dernièrement contre l'Espagne, M. le Comte Dillon ne fut point oublié...Il remercie M. le Regent qui connaisoit son mérite, lui offrit le commandement de Provence, qui valoit au moins 30000£: de rente; il remercia encore, et representa à S. A. R.: qu'étant chargé des affaires de son Prince à Paris, il ne pouvoit se diviser. M. Le Regent Loua ses sentiments: mais il plaignit une conduite qui lui parut contraire au cours des Evenemens.

[...He thanked the Regent who, recognising his merit, offered him the command of Provence, which was worth at least 30,000 [francs] a year. [Dillon] thanked him again and told his Royal Highness that he was charged with the responsibility of his King's affairs in Paris, and he could not split himself in two. The Regent applauded his decision, but lamented behaviour which [appeared] so contrary to the course of history].

Dillon's decline of this command in order to continue his Jacobite service is confirmed in a letter later that year written by Dominic Sheldon, his compatriot and
his wife’s uncle. Though able to decline what might be called a bribe at this stage, the command also reminded Dillon of his service to the French state.

Pension Claims

The Regent’s manipulation of Dillon would have dire consequences for the marginal, impoverished Jacobite community with regard to the struggle for Mary of Modena’s pension money. Throughout 1717 Dillon continued his (unsuccessful) attempts to gain financial aid for James and the poverty-stricken Jacobites. Occasionally hopeful signs from the Regent, or hard (unfulfilled) promises encouraged him to believe the money would be paid: “General Dillon told me eight days ago that in a few days there would be money, but I see no appearance of it. I wish I may be disappointed, for, besides the said balance due to me, the subsistence is not paid for October either here or anywhere, so you may easily imagine what a clamour this makes…”

Mary of Modena’s death put an end to the very important additional income which her personal pensions had made to the Jacobite court. Dillon, with William Dicconson (who had been treasurer of the late Queen’s household) and Sheldon, had to take care of the Queen’s servants, the group affected most by the change. The Regent and his government expressed sympathy in their official statements, and promised to alleviate their desperate circumstances. Promises had been made to continue the Queen’s French pension to James; that all arrears would be paid in full, which gave some relief to a grief-stricken James, his advisors and the rest of the Jacobite community.

However delays ensued and people became desperate as their only source of income had dried up, and they could not draw on credit. References to this delay and ensuing

323 SPW HMC, VII, Sheldon to David Nairne, Sept. 20, 1718, pp. 303-304. Reference to the Regent’s offer of the command in Provence is also found by Dillon himself in a letter to James years later. SPW, 48/28A, Dillon to Ormonde, July 8, 1720.
325 McLynn, The Jacobites, pp. 132-133.
hardship resonates throughout the Stuart Correspondence, as evidenced by a letter to Mar\textsuperscript{328}:

...While her Majesty was alive, the distressed subjects had a constant supply from her, and a ready recourse to her bounty. But, Providence having deprived us of so charitable a mistress, God knows what now will be the fate and misfortunes of us poor forlorn creatures...The greatest part know not which way to procure a morsel of bread, and those, who, it's like can make some shift for a support, must be scattered into all four winds...We are reduced to a very hard dilemma.\textsuperscript{329}

Dillon continued to be entrusted with the task of persuading the Regent to make good his promises to pay both the outstanding pension money and grants. James personally directed (through Mar) to keep badgering the Regent at every audience about this matter: "You mention nothing of the affair of the pension for the King nor what is doing with the Regent in relation to it. He is very long in saying anything to it, which makes the King with reason uneasy. Some folks do nothing without being teased and I suppose all ways of that kind are taken with him for that and particularly by Dillon personally, for such things ought not to be let cool."\textsuperscript{330}

Despite repeated promises and a feed of small portions of the arrears, the Regent essentially failed to deliver on these promises. Though the constant delays and deferments caused Dillon to lose confidence in timely execution, he remained sanguine as to the Regent's intentions, believing the payments would eventually be made.\textsuperscript{331} As time went on the Regent's promises became more vague, until in August they could only be fulfilled when other matters were dealt with.\textsuperscript{332} Finally he


\textsuperscript{329} SPW HMC, VII, Mar to Dillon, July 22, 1718, pp. 74-76; VI, Fanny Oglethorpe to Mar, May 15, 1718, pp. 434-436; T. Bruce to Dillon, May 17, 1718, p. 440; James to Maréchal de Villeroi, May 28, 1718, p. 487; James to Duc de Nocailles, May 28, 1718, pp. 487-488; James to the Regent, May 28, 1718, pp. 488-489; Extract from letters from London, May 30 and June 2, 1718, pp. 504-505; VII, Dicconson to Mar, July 4, 1718, pp. 8-9; Mar to Ormonde, Aug. 6, 1718, pp. 118-119.

\textsuperscript{330} SPW HMC, VII, Mar to Fotheringham of Powrie, March 19, 1718, p.169; William Gordon to Mar, March 29, 1718, p. 216; Fanny Oglethorpe to Mar, May 15, 1718, pp. 434-436; Dillon to Mar, June 11, 1718, p. 515; Fanny Oglethorpe to Mar, June 17, 1718, pp. 539-541; Dillon to Mar, June 21, 1718, pp. 559-560; Menzies to Dillon, June 19, 1718, pp. 595-596; VII, Mar to Dillon, July 1, 1718, pp. 1-2; Dicconson to Mar, July 4, 1718, pp. 8-9; Fanny Oglethorpe to Mar, July 4, 1718, pp. 9-10; Mar to Ormonde, July 15, 1718, pp. 43-44; Mar to Fanny Oglethorpe, July 15, 1718, pp. 44-46; James to Dicconson, July 18, 1718, p. 55; Ormonde to Mar, July 18, 1718, pp. 56-57; Dillon to James, July 26, 1718, pp. 85-86; Dillon to James, July 19, 1718, p. 60; Sheldon to Mar, July 26, 1718, pp. 87-88; Dillon to James, Aug. 2, 1718, p. 104; Ormonde to James, Aug. 8, 1718, pp. 125-126; Panmure to Mar, Aug. 15, 1718, pp. 156-157; Dillon to Mar, Aug. 30, 1718, p. 218.

\textsuperscript{331} SPW HMC, VII, Dillon to James, Aug. 2, 1718, p. 104; Dillon to James, Aug. 9, 1718, p. 130;
suddenly issued a statement that the pension would not be continued (other than the remaining arrears) – justified officially because pensions were never continued after the death of anyone at the French court, including the late Queen, so an exception could not be made for a foreign Queen. The actual reason could have been, as James himself thought, retribution for the developing Jacobite alliance with Spain.

Yet even after this decision Dillon still thought he could talk to the Regent and persuade him out of it: “When the Regent’s spirits are a little calmed, I shall have a pressing and particular explication with him about the King’s concern, but there is no coming at him till the present tempest is over…” By the end of September Dillon finally realised that the Regent would not make good on his promises, particularly on application to the Regent’s advisor, d’Uxelles, upon which Dillon finally advised warning all those who were dependent on the promise of the pension of the end of their hopes.

Even while acknowledging here that there could no dependence on the Regent fulfilling his promises, Dillon still believed that certain events such as James’ marriage could be a spur for the Regent to grant a small part of his promise as a gift:

I have been twice with D’Uxelles this last week and have discoursed fully with him concerning the King’s particular affair and the reiterated promises that the Regent made, of which he was witness, to continue the same to the King that the Queen had in case of the latter’s decease. All this he agreed to...he did not question but the Regent would help the King, though, he feared, not in a satisfactory manner...there are no hopes or dependence on any former promises that are inconsistent with the Regent’s present ties of friendship and manner of thinking. After all I am persuaded that the Regent will do something for the King, though with an ill grace and not to satisfaction, and ‘tis my opinion that, when Dillon receives orders to inform him about the marriage, it will be the most proper time to push the matter to a conclusion...’Tis very plain the Regent and chief advisors look on the King as one whose interest is quite drown...This in short is...without doubt what occasions their not performing what was so solemnly promised...Now ‘tis declared that the Queen’s pension ceases since her death and that nothing is to be expected on that account except the arrears due, what will become of all the King’s people in Flanders, Holland and France? Will it not be proper to let them know without delay what they are to trust to, that they may be able to take some resolution either of going home or seeking their livelihood elsewhere?

He continued in this belief for several more weeks.


SPW HMC, VII, Dicconson to James, Sept. 12, 1718, 271-272.

SPW HMC, VII, James to Cardinal Aquaviva, Nov. 23, 1718, pp. 559-561.

SPW HMC, VII, Dillon to Mar, Sept. 13, 1718, p. 277

SPW HMC, VII, Dillon to Mar, Sept. 30, 1718, p. 302.

SPW HMC, VII, Dillon to James, Sept. 27, 1718, pp. 329-331; Dillon to Mar, Oct. 4, 1718, p. 359; Fanny Oglethorpe to Mar, Oct. 4, 1718, pp. 359-360; Dillon to Mar, Oct. 11, 1718, pp. 376-377;
Other prominent Jacobites had become a great deal more sceptical about the Regent’s promises, particularly Ormonde and Dicconson. Mar expressed his distrust of the delays and vagueness of the Regent’s promises, though Dillon’s continued optimism, particularly with the potential of James’ marriage gift, seems at times to have influenced him too.

Dillon himself never had any success in persuading the French to pay any of the arrears of the pension. Not until John Law made a deal with the Regent in 1719 that he fulfilled part of his promise to James, and finally ensured the payment of the basic arrears of the pension (Chapter Three). Law, already a significant promoter of financial schemes, had the necessary influence with the Regent to have a chance at successfully lobby for the payments, and only then because he was able to offer a deal. Dillon’s misplaced trust had an acute impact on the miserably poor debt-ridden Jacobite exiles, constantly being given false hope of payment. Dillon’s part in this affair added to the doubts about his capabilities, performance and function, at least when it came to his Jacobite role.

Ejection from Paris

As the Jacobites dealt with the consequences of Mary of Modena’s death, the Regent came under severe pressure from the British ministry to expel Jacobites from the country. Having previously paid lip service to these frequent applications, he now felt compelled to act against individual Jacobites, going so far as to issue an official order to his Intendants compelling all Jacobites to leave the country, though in the end it was not really enforced. The British continued to press for expulsions, and

Dillon to Mar, Oct. 18, 1718, pp. 403-404; Dillon to James, Oct. 25, 1718, p. 439, Dillon to James, Nov. 1, 1718, pp. 474-475.
338 SPW HMC, VII, Dicconson to Mar, July 4, 1718, pp. 8-9; Ormonde to Mar, July 18, 1718, pp. 56-57.
339 SPW HMC, VII, Mar to Dillon, July 1, 1718, pp. 1-2; July 4, 1718, Dicconson to Mar, pp. 8-9; Mar to Fanny Oglethorpe, Aug. 12, 1718, pp. 138-139; Mar to Orerry, Aug. 19, 1718, pp. 181-182; Mar to Dillon, Aug. 27, 1718, pp. 210-211; Mar to Dillon, Sept. 24, 1718, pp. 320-322; Mar to Dillon, Oct. 1, 1718, p. 345; Fanny Oglethorpe to Mar, Oct. 4, 1718, pp. 359-360; Mar to William Dicconson, Oct. 21, 1718, pp.418-420; Mar to Madame de Mezières, Oct. 26, 1718, pp. 441-442; Mar to Dillon, Nov. 29, 1718, pp. 579-581.
340 SPW, 44/17, James to Dicconson, July 16, 1719; 45/3, James to Law, Sep. 24, 1719, f. 12a.
341 BL, Stowe MS 231, Stair to Robethon, Juin 10, 1718, ff. 95a-96b; Stair to Robethon, Aout 4, 1718, ff. 114a-115b; SPW HMC, VII, Mar to Fanny Oglethorpe, July 15, 1718, pp. 44-46; Mar to Capt. John Ogilvie, July 17, 1718, p. 53; W. Gordon to Mar, July 26, 1718, pp. 88-89; Mar to Ormonde, Aug. 6, 1718, pp. 118-119; Dillon to Mar, Aug. 8, 1718, pp. 127-128; Mar to Fanny Oglethorpe, Aug. 12, 1718, pp. 138-139; Ormonde to Mar, Aug. 15, 1718, p. 155; Fanny Oglethorpe to Mar, Aug. 15, 1718, pp. 157-159; Dillon to Mar, Aug. 16, 1718, pp. 162-163; M. D’Argenson to Father Pacifique of
specifically focused on Dillon. To ensure the removal of his dangerous influence they explicitly accused him of plotting against Britain (and therefore by extension their ally, France). Sir John O’Brien first informed James of this on 29 October 1718, describing the situation thus:

...They accuse him of having been a long time and actually in commerce with the King's friends in England and that he, being an officer of experience, had laid before them all the practicable schemes that could be thought of in order to disturb the government there, that he managed and carried on the last business of Sweden that made so great a noise and might have been of fatal consequence... that he acts formally against the Regent and the common interest of his allies, wherefore they require with all instance he should be immediately secured in order to prevent future mischief. The Regent pretends to have private informations from persons here, which, if well grounded, might serve to verify or at least give some weight to the complaints from England.342

Under acute pressure to imprison or exile Dillon, the Regent finally had to do something definitive, though he perhaps preferred not to be seen to take orders from Britain by making such an openly strong disavowal of Jacobitism and James’ emissary. Dillon described the situation to James, and the necessity for James to make arrangements for Jacobite affairs in case the worst should happen:

...I have been with the Regent several times and in my opinion have answered all the objections against Dillon in a becoming manner. The Regent is extremely pressed by the ministry with England to secure Dillon, and though he may have some reluctance to comply with so unjust a request, I can't as yet say how this affair will end, but Dillon is resolved to have the interior satisfaction of supporting with firmness the character of truth and good principle, though he foresees, if not secured, that he will be sent from these parts, for which reason he thinks it necessary to give the King timely notice that measures should be taken to prevent the King's affairs from suffering by it, if the Regent by compulsion or otherwise should give any sudden orders about Dillon....You'll have, before this come, an account of the grievous complaints against Dillon, who will transmit by the next sure conveniency his material answers to the Regent and chief ministers.343

For the whole of November though the Regent delayed making a decision, while Dillon, banished from court, waited under constant threat of exile or imprisonment.344 He only narrowly avoided imprisonment in the Bastille; according

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343 SPW HMC, VII, Dillon to James, Nov. 1 1718, p. 475; Sheldon to James, Dec. 13, 1718, pp. 629-630.
344 SPW HMC, VII, Ormonde to James, Nov. 4, 1718, p. 494; Dillon to Mar, Nov. 8 1718, pp. 505-506; Dillon to Mar, Nov. 15 1718, p. 544; Dillon to Mar, Nov. 22, 1718, pp. 556-557; Cardinal Aquaviva to James, Nov. 23 1718,pp. 559; James to Cardinal Aquaviva, Nov. 23 1718, pp. 559-561; Cardinal Aquaviva to James, Nov. 23 1718, pp. 562; Cardinal Aquaviva to James, Nov. 23, 1718, pp. 562-563; Mar to Dillon, Nov. 29 1718, pp. 579-581; Dillon to Mar, Nov. 29 1718, pp. 586-587.
to Walkinshaw, a Jacobite in Paris, through the influence of his friends at court. James appreciated Dillon’s endurance, purely for the sake of his commitment to his duty and service to James. However, he had now less appreciation of Dillon’s utility or the necessity of him remaining in his post:

What has happened to Dillon was no small surprise and mortification to me, and he did not want so honourable a persecution to recommend him to the world and yet less to me. I hope though he will not suffer by this in his private affairs and I must provide for mine as well as I can, if he be removed, and indeed my consideration ought not to afflict him too much, for, as things now go with the Regent, I see little need of a man with him, and as for England many ways may be found to transmit letters to it... Finaly the Regent exploited the British ministry’s accusations against Dillon by ordering him to return to active service with the command in Dauphiné, a command he had previously declined, threatening him with imprisonment if he attempted to decline again. It seems to have been impossible for Dillon to escape the directive: during December and January he is mentioned in several letters as having to leave for Dauphiné. Dillon naturally did not simply accept being coerced in this way, but continually tried to escape his situation.

At this stage he was actually offered an alternative option to returning to Paris (if he managed to circumvent the Regent’s command). Dillon played very little part in the drama of the Spanish negotiations and 1719 Rising, limiting his involvement to what organisational assistance he could render from Paris. However in December 1718, during a period of serious negotiations between Spain and the Jacobites, Dillon received a Captain General’s commission from Spain via Ormonde. The Spanish leadership eagerly sought the services of such a talented military leader. Alberoni persistently offered an ‘employment deal’ calculated to appeal specifically to Dillon, with several bonus attractions:

... [Ormonde] has been very kindly received by [Alberoni]...[Ormonde] talked to her of [Dillon] whom she remembers with all the affection & esteem that is possible, & to be short desired me to propose to her that if she will come & live with [Spain], she will give her a commission of Captain General, the pay of which is two thousand Pistoles a year, she will also provide for her eldest son in the Army, & for her younger children in the Church, [the King of Spain] and [Alberoni] desired [Ormonde] to assure [Dillon] that they will have a particular care of her whole family, they desire that if [Dillon] approves of this that she

345 BL, Stowe Ms 232, Walkinshaw to Sir H. Paterson, Nov. 9, 1718, ff. 151a-b; Mar to Hamilton, Jan. 28, 1719, f. 177a-b; Mar to Sir H. Stirling, Jan. 25, 1719, ff. 179a-b; SPW HMC, VII, Cardinal Aquaviva to James, Nov. 23, 1718, pp. 562-563.
346 SPW HMC, VII, James to Sheldon, Nov. 21, 1718, pp. 552-553.
will not lose any time in coming to them. [Ormonde] desires the same of you, it will be I am sure for King James' good...

Dillon certainly considered the offer, if only in the context of his situation. It gave him all the more incentive to cast off his French commission, though at first without success. In January 1719 Ormonde describes Dillon to Alberoni as attempting to withdraw from the command, ostensibly in order to take advantage of their offer:

“...[Dillon] writes to me...that he feels all imaginable gratitude for the kindness of his friends, and particularly to [Alberoni]. He says that he is taking measures to be in a position to benefit by their kindness...” However he also describes Dillon as being puzzled as to how he will manage it.

In March however the Regent changed his mind about Dillon’s command, and recalled him from Dauphine, in spite of British objections, that it would enable him to continue working for James, and possibly join the Spanish invasion:

«Monsieur Le Duc d’Orleans vient d’ôter à Mons’ Dillon, le Commandement qu’il Luy avoit donné en Dauphiné. J’ai dit à S. A. R. [Sa Athesse Royale] que cela auroit un mauvais effet, si on laissoit Mons’ Dillon à Paris pour y faire les Affaires du Pretendant; S. A. R. m’a dit, qu’elle y mettroit bon Ordre. J’ai raison de croire, que si les Espagnols debarquent en Angleterre, Dillon a dessein d’y passer» [“The Duc d’Orleans removed Mr Dillon from the command that he had given him in Dauphiné. I said to his Royal Highness that letting Mr Dillon stay in Paris to operate the Pretender’s affairs would result in trouble; his Royal Highness told me that it would be taken care of. I have reason to believe that if the Spanish make an assault on England, Dillon means to join...”].

Perhaps the Regent’s change of heart merely reminded his British allies that they could not dictate French policy. Notwithstanding Whig ministers kept up their stringent demands of French action towards the Jacobites, and their alliance remained as close as it had ever been, in spite of those occasional complaints.

The Regent had offered French troops to help counter the Spanish invasion, and maintained the typical strictures against the Jacobites at the behest of the Whig leaders. This included maintaining the strict injunctions against Jacobite officers of the Irish regiments: “...The Regent in Paris had forbidden any Irish officer from

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351 Jacobite Attempt of 1719, Ormonde to Alberoni, Jan. 21, 1719, pp. 36-38; Ormonde to Robinson, Fев. 26, 1719, pp. 67-69.

352 The Jacobite Attempt of 1719, Stair to Craggs, March 11, 1719, pp. 229-231; Craggs to Stair, March 27, 1719, pp. 237-238.

353 The Jacobite Attempt of 1719, Craggs to Stair, March 27, 1719, pp. 237-238.
leaving his post on pain of being cashiered. This was to prevent them from running off to Spain where rumour said a Jacobite invasion of England was being prepared...354 He also kept a close watch on Dillon, given the events of the previous few months, and had allowed confirmation of his whereabouts in Dauphiné to be passed on to the British.355

The Regent might even have gone as far as imprisoning Dillon after his return. In August Ormonde stated that Dillon has informed him that “he is now at liberty.”356 He was certainly not able to perform at least one element of his Jacobite role. James asks Cardinal Gualterio for advice on what he can do about the loss of an established route to many contacts, which for French contacts has been made worse since Dillon “n’est plus a portée de se charger de pareilles commissions de ma part, et je ne connois point d’autre canal que le sien.” [(Dillon)...is no longer bearing the responsibility of equal commissions, and I do not know of any other avenue.] 357 This would account for the absence of the usual letters to and from Dillon between June (or possibly earlier) and August, after his apparent release.358 References to Dillon in this period also indicate a definite problem with his correspondence, though the reason for this is not clear: “…Which I have sent for a long time by the Channel of Mr [Dillon], and I doubt not of your having seen them. Since directions to him have become more un-certain, I desired some other friends where he is to put my Letters into his hands…”359

Ormonde seems to have been fairly close to Dillon, almost a confidante, as he makes several references to the Lieutenant General’s frustration and anger with the way he was being treated in France, particularly by the Regent, during this period. This treatment had apparently gone so far that he now changed his mind about (not) accepting a Spanish commission, and desired Ormonde to ascertain if the commission previously offered was still open for acceptance. His letters even make references to Dillon describing his treatment as ‘inhuman’: “By yesterday’s post I have received a letter from [Dillon]. He tells me that the Regent is raising large levies. [Dillon] is very impatient to have my answer, so that he may decide as to his

354 Mullen, f. 246.
356 *The Jacobite Attempt of 1719*, Ormonde to Alberoni, Aoust 23, 1719, p. 163.
357 SPW 44/103, James to Cardinal Gualterio, Sep. 8, 1719.
358 SPW 44/61, James Murray to James, Aug. 22, 1719; 67, Tullibardine to James, Aug. 19, 1719; 77, James to Dickson, Aug. 29, 1719; 104, James to Dillon, Sep. 8, 1719.
359 SPW 44/2, Menzies to James, June 19, 1719; accord. 29, Jemingham to James, Aug. 3, 1719.
course. He tells me that he has been inhumanly treated by the Regent..." Ormonde assured him that the previous offer remained open, and on the same terms.

In the end Dillon again failed to take up the offer, his family continued at St. Germain-En-Laye, and he continued to manage Jacobite affairs from in and around Paris. This puzzling since he went to such trouble to have the offer repeated, particularly since his situation at Court did not start to improve until 1722. One can only speculate; thus a decision to move his entire family to Spain was not as practicable as it might have at first appeared, with his four eldest sons serving in the family regiment, and his wife and daughters ensconced at the palace of Saint-Germain-en-laye. He might also not have been keen to resume military responsibilities, having retired from active duty, and turned down two previous opportunities in France.

Mar’s Resignation

Just as the whole affair of the Spanish rising came to an end a calamity hit the Jacobites which would have huge consequences on the administration of Jacobite affairs. After several years of intimacy between Mar and James, the former’s request to go on leave to a spa town to recuperate from ill-health in September 1719 turned into an appeal to resign as Secretary of State, pleading his inability to cope physically with the Roman climate. When James reluctantly gave him leave to travel to Bourbon, he attempted to travel via Switzerland where he was captured and imprisoned by the canton of Geneva, acting under persuasion from Britain. The wide-ranging mistrust of Mar within the Jacobite community became especially acute after Mar’s retirement from his position as secretary. Many Jacobites suspected Mar of having been imprisoned on purpose, to avoid having either to return to James in Rome or being sent on some other mission, and (after Mar made attempts to negotiate with the Whig government for his release) possibly also as an excuse to

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360 The Jacobite Attempt of 1719, Ormonde to Alberoni, Sept. 15, 1719, pp. 168-170; SPW 44/85, Ormonde to James, Aug. 30, 1719.
361 The Jacobite Attempt of 1719, Ormonde to Alberoni, Sept. 2, 1719, pp. 166-167; Ormonde to James, Sept. 13, p. 176; Ormonde to Alberoni, Sept. 16, 1719, pp. 177-179; Ormonde to James, Sept. 20, 1719, p. 180; Ormonde to James, Sept. 20, 1719, p. 180; James to Ormonde, Oct. 14, 1719, p. 267.
start secretly negotiating in his own interest.\(^{363}\) James obviously did not believe accusations of treachery.\(^{364}\) Until the unassailable proof displayed him in 1724 James never deviated from his great faith in Mar’s commitment to him and the cause, though he resented Mar’s decision to give up his Secretarial employment. Rumours against Mar continued to circulate through the Jacobite world though, in spite of James’ constant support.\(^{365}\)

Most historians have agreed with the claims of treachery, citing his negotiations for his release as the first attempt to abandon the Jacobites for a return to Britain, by negotiating a pension and promise of eventual permission to return in exchange for Jacobite secrets. According to Gregg, Mar insisted on taking the route to Bourbon because it would take him through hostile territory, leaving him vulnerable to capture by hostile forces, and thereby putting him out of the way of Jacobite plotting. Mar hoped to meet with the English ambassador Stanhope (then in Hanover) and negotiate a settlement to regain access to his lands and wealth, or at least some pension moneys owed him and his wife, with the assistance of the influence of Lord Sunderland, an old friend at the centre of the Whig administration. He possibly offered information on the Jacobites to gain these hopes, or for extra income in the shape of an English government pension (which was certainly agreed on eventually). Gregg even charges Mar with approaching the Whig ministry in a similarly disguised manner as early as March 1717 in Paris, and repeatedly over the next few months.\(^{366}\)

A more sympathetic historian has attempted to rehabilitate Mar’s reputation, rejecting accusations of decisive treason by stressing his innocent intentions. Maurice Bruce defended his acceptance of a deal with the government as merely a means to get the monies owed Mar through his estate, rather than any intention to betray real Jacobite information. In return he agreed not to undertake further Jacobite service, and not to return to Rome, as Mar told James.

...You’ll easily believe Sir that I wou’d take all the ways I could, w’ch were fair, in my writeing to L⁶ Stair to get out of my present difficulty...I told him further that I had been for some time quit wearie of business & that I was resolved to retire from it & live quietly in some corner of france, if I could be alow’d, without medling w’ any thing, where I hop’ I might recover a little of my health...Beside all this I had long been exceeding wearie of that post & had been only waiting for an opportunity of quitting it when I thought my doing so wou’d be of no prejudice to my Master’s service...By the last letter I had from

\(^{363}\) SPW, 44/53, James Murray to James, Aug. 16, 1719; 65, James Murray to James, Aug. 26, 1722; 45/13, Mar to James, Sep. 26 & 29, 1719.

\(^{364}\) SPW, 44/30. James to Mar, Oct. 5, 1719.

\(^{365}\) Thomson, Memoirs of the Jacobites, pp. 196-7.

\(^{366}\) Gregg, ‘Jacobite Career’, pp. 184-188.
In contrast to Gregg, and although believing later accusations against Mar to be more warranted, Bruce deemed him fairly innocent of purposeful treason. 

During and after Mar's imprisonment James incessantly showed his dissatisfaction with his decision and attempted to persuade him to return to his position in Rome, no matter how clearly and unequivocally he declared his intentions. James' attempts lasted until July 1720, the appeals becoming more and more aggrieved:

...I do not in the least alter my former opinion, and it is manifest to me that your present engagements are not obligatory that I cannot but still insist on your return here after you have taken the waters. The least appearance of anything that may look unfavourable in me towards you is what I can never think of and yet let me or you say what we please that must be the case except you return here for should I on any pretence whatsoever dispose of your place as long as there is hope of your liberty it will be in effect turning you out of it, for the pretences of your health of a p[...]
yory confinement or of your being more usefull in other places than here will never pass...After this I must again insist on the great difficulties of getting a proper person from England, and I must repeat again that the more I see into that matter, the less I think it probable that such a one can be found, but were there choices of persons to what difficulty should I be expos'd how to unite the opinions of the different sets of my friends in the choice of the same person; that very thing would & must become a new cause of disunion among them...whoever I should chuse would still be disagreeable to some set of people on t'other side & the inconvenciencys of a new Minister in a manner not of my own choice, & in some measure independent of me are very obvious. On t'other hand who is there on this side of the sea in all respects equal to such a charge. I am sure I know none, neither do you I believe either, so that you see to what a number of difficulties you will expose me by not returning...I cannot but hope that when you have consider'd it well, you'll acquiesce to my reasons...

This was despite the intervention of others, such as Dillon, attempting to convince James of the finality of Mar's decision; Dillon further tried to defend Mar's actions,
claiming that he could be of more use to James in Paris. Eventually Mar’s prolonged absence from James, in spite of the King’s direct order, followed by a final and unmistakeable refusal to join him in Rome. Despite his reluctance, and his anger at this act of disobedience, Mar’s intransigence forced James to accede to Mar’s resignation. He already realised the impossible nature of the task of finding a replacement for Mar.

This affair was part of the long-running saga over several years for James, in not being to appoint or keep a Secretary of State. Once James convinced himself of the permanence of Mar’s retreat from the position in 1719, he began an intense search for a new Secretary of State. Despite months of hunting he found only a severe lack of appropriate candidates. James Murray, later Lord Inverness, assumed some of Mar’s duties temporarily after he left Rome, and he only performed the purely secretarial aspects of the role, as he did not have the requisite abilities or even high birth to be considered for the sensitive post of Secretary of State. In fact Murray became almost more of a liability than a support, because of his extreme unpopularity among almost the whole of the Jacobite community.

371 SPW, 48/71, Dillon to James, July 29, 1720; 49/42, Dillon to James, Oct. 8, 1720.
372 SPW, 51/166, James to Mar, Feb. 8, 1721; 52/54, James to Mar, Feb. 22, 1721.
373 SPW, 45/150, Dillon to James, Jan. 22, 1720.
Chapter Three – 1720-1722

The period between 1719 and 1721, turned into a quiet interlude politically for the Jacobites, apart from the final success of the fulfillment of James’ marriage to Clementina Sobieska. The failure of the 1719 Rising (and the Cellamare conspiracy) had important consequences on broader diplomacy, as it proved the undoing of Cardinal Alberoni, the chief minister, leading to his exile from Spain at the end of 1719, and thus a dramatic shift in Spanish diplomacy.

Isolated in Europe, Spain was forced to concert peace with the Quadruple Alliance powers in the Treaty of the Hague in February 1720. Spain found it necessary to join the Quadruple Alliance powers with the Treaty of Madrid, establishing a much closer relationship with Regency France through betrothal and marriage ties with Louis XV and the Regent’s children. Final resolution of the terms was left to the negotiations of the Congress of Cambray, which then dragged on till 1725. The Regent cemented the alliance with Britain in a treaty which he personally negotiated, signed on 28 November 1716.374 Meanwhile Britain had signed accords with Sweden against Russia by early 1720, but aggravated relations with Austria, partly because of Clementina Sobieska’s escape from imprisonment.

Consequently the complete lack of any support for their interests in Europe forced the Jacobites to withdraw somewhat from plot formation, and rely on the hope of a fundamental change in the political situation, which for the most of the period looked extremely unlikely. Chapter Three assesses Dillon’s many other responsibilities which accordingly came to the fore during this period.

Jacobite Patronage

James unsuccessfully sought to gain assistance from Spain, mainly in the form of a substantial money gift, which did not materialise. The King of Spain deflected the appeals from Ormonde, saying that ‘the present posture of affairs’ wouldn’t allow any thing more to be done.375 Even more detrimental for the Jacobite community, he

375 SPW, 46/5, Ormond to James, 1720; 129, James to Ormonde, May 12, 1720.
told Ormonde in March 1720 that there would not be any more commissions for officers in Spain, meaning that there would be even fewer prospects for Jacobite officers. The King of Spain had “...provided for so many of our Kings subjects he could do for no more, and therefore...his Grace should not recommend any more without some very particular circumstance.” Ormonde took care to inform James of this so that he would not recommend any more to come, thereby causing them to waste their time and money on a pointless journey.

This put even more of a burden on Dillon, since it closed off the second most important alternative avenue for Jacobite employment, which further restricted the available options to pursue, as he was hardly in favour with the Regent at this point, and had little political credit. Dillon was unsure whether his intercession would make any difference with the French government under the prevailing political circumstances, even with special charity cases:

...Lullibardine... arrived here but indifferently equipped and without money, clanranald, loghiele, & glendarule came with him in yᵉ same condition...L'panmure presses extremely for some succour and complains very much of being in want, as to any solicitation to yᵉ court of France about restoring him or others in yᵉ same case to their estates, no advice can be given from hence untill tis known how the treaty of peace will be settled, and am much affraid that even then no great attention will be made here to such a proposal...

In fact between 1720 and 1722 James’ own interest with various powerful figures became just as, if not more, effective a path for Jacobite benefaction than Dillon. There appears to have been a slight upsurge during this period of requests from hopeful Jacobite officers directly to James, asking him to use his influence in their behalf. A Col. John Nugent claimed that if James recommended him he “can’t faile obtaining his desire of this court”; although in Nugent’s case Dillon had actually used his interest in the attempt to regain his officers’ post.

James had some influence through all three main components of the French nobility, military, clergy and courtiers. He had of course always had a large acquaintance in French society given his exposure to and frequent attendance at the French court

376 SPW, 46/23, Timon Connock to John Hay, March 18, 1720.
377 SPW, 45/27, James to Ormonde, Oct. 3, 1719.
378 SPW, 46/70, Dillon to James, Apr. 22, 1720; accord. 48, Dillon to James, April 9, 1720.
379 SPW, 46/14, Ringuenet to Naime, Mars 20, 1720; 121, Ormonde to James, May 11, 1720; 47/8, James to Dillon, May 21, 1720; 45, James to Dillon, June 2, 1720.
throughout his early life, and indeed there had always been some courtiers at
Versailles well disposed towards the cause. He continued contact with as many of
these friends and allies as he could until forced to leave France. This later gave
him an ability, however limited, to deploy his contacts. One such strikingly important
relationship was with a French noble M. de Magny. Magny made substantial efforts
to support the Jacobite cause, including speaking to more influential courtiers on
behalf of James, until around August 1716, when a rift seems to have occurred
because of his own resentment at James’ lack of distinguishing attention.
James’ relationships with these influential French figures did not rest solely on old
friendships; such powerful dignitaries would not have preserved their contact with
James if it did not provide any advantage. Regency politics naturally dominated the
situation, since many of these figures were involved with political factions persisting
from Louis XIV’s reign, which, though incidental to their core purposes,
sympathised more closely with the Jacobite endeavour than with the contemporary
British alliance. As in all courtly interactions in the Court patronage and brokerage
system, the potential for exchange of favours played a role in these relationships.
Naturally the primary aim for James, and his constant request of these contacts, was
never to lose an opportunity to promote the Jacobite cause to the Regent. But there
was another advantage in the interest of these individuals for the patronage of
Jacobites in France. James frequently asked these French nobles to act as sponsors of
individual Jacobites or families. Though the interchange was almost always one-
sided, James was occasionally able to reciprocate favours for some of these
figures.
Prominent among these nobles who maintained just such a relationship of mutual
interest with James was the Duc de Lauzun, who maintained an old relationship with
the Stuart family, having transported Mary of Modena and James to France in
1688. James was certainly able to return Lauzun at least one substantial favour by

381 SPW, 51/91, Mlle du Chausserais to James, Jan. 25, 1721; 54/31, James to Marquis de Clermont,
Juillet 20, 1721; 55/33, Marquis de Clermont to James, Oct. 11, 1721; 58/94, James to Prince de
Conti, Mars 23, 1722; 60/39, James to Prince de Conti, June 15, 1722; Rowlands, ‘Army in Exile’, p. 8.
382 SPW HMC, II, M. de Magny to James, Apr. 13, 1716, pp. 81-83; M. de Magny to James, April 17,
1716, pp. 97-98; M. de Magny to James, June 22, 1716, pp. 225-227; Mar to Dillon, Aug. 27, 1716,
pp. 380-381.
383 Ladurie, Saint Simon and the Court of Louis XIV, pp. 286, 288, 290-291, 300.
384 SPW, 47/45, James to Dillon, June 2, 1720; 83, James to Duc de Vendome, June 14, 1720; 99,
Dillon to James, June 15, 1720; Kettering, ‘Gift-giving and Patronage’, pp. 132, 142-147.
385 SPW HMC, VI, Dillon to Mar, May 13, 1718, pp. 430-431; SPW, 47/74, Duc de Lauzun to James,
June 11, 1720; 48/51, James to Duc de Lauzun, Juillet 21, 1720; 60, Duc de Lauzun to James, Juin 6,
recommending his nephew to the pope. The Duc de St. Simon, Lauzun’s old friend, shared some of the aims of the pro-Jacobite faction, and was himself an intimate of the Regent. St. Simon had enough sympathy with the cause to write to James, with the occasional promise of assistance. He even liaised with Dillon, as Dillon assured James: “he is a person of great truth and honour and a true well-wisher of yours, [Dillon] is very intimately acquainted with him, and allways depended on his good offices in yr majesty’s favour...”

Even Torcy, the Regent’s foreign minister, maintained some contact with James. He had a complicated relationship with Jacobitism, having been foreign minister under Louis XIV during the 1690-92 war in Ireland, and therefore the principal French minister to deal with a rather taxing ally. In spite of the tensions and Torcy’s antagonism towards the Jacobite cause at that time, he later belonged to the anti-British alliance (accordingly pro-Jacobite) faction during the early Regency period.

James had a much better bargaining position vis à vis the French clergy. His location in Rome, his ostensible influence with the Pope, and his entitlement to Irish bishopric nominations, all gave him some sway within the ecclesiastical sphere. This produced greater reciprocity and equality than with some of James’ other contacts, and therefore allowed quite a close and beneficial relationship, particularly with Cardinal de Noailles.

Noailles maintained direct and fairly regular communication with James, as well as with Dillon in Paris, as Dillon had originally encouraged their connection. Noailles’ had a personal influence with the Regent, until his fall from grace in 1718.
but he remained a prominent and powerful figure in France. He did what he could to influence the Regent towards the Jacobite cause, as well as trying his best to use his interest in society for the benefaction of individual Jacobites for whom James requested favours. Noailles came to have one of the closest relationships with James of any of his contacts in the French nobility. He was one of the most useful and reliable, as he made at least some effort on James’ behalf:

Sire... j’eus recue la lettre que Votre Majesté m’a fait l’honneur de m’escrire... je la portai a M. le Duc d’Orleans... Je trouvai dans S. A. R. les memes sentiments, et elle me dit qu’elle en avoit donné de nouvelles preuves a V. M... Elle sait combien elles doivent etre secretes, ainsi je ne doute pas qu’elle ne prenne tout le soin possible pour les tenir cachées... Je m’emploierai avec grand zele a tout ce qui regardera son service, et n’épargnerai rien de tout ce qui [dependra] de moi pour lui prouver mon [Zele] attachment...

[Sire...I received the letter your Majesty made me the honour to write me...I took it to the Duc d’Orleans...I found His Royal Highness maintained the same sentiments, and he said to me that he had given new proofs of it to your Majesty....He knows how important it is that this be secret, so I do not doubt that he will take all possible care to keep it hidden...I can only be happy if I can be useful in some way to your Majesty. I will do my best in all which relates to your service, and will spare nothing to prove my zealous attachment...]

Nonetheless James tried not to jeopardise this bond by requesting favours too often. Cardinal de Noailles in fact upheld this discrete alliance and contact with James for several years. Cardinal de Rohan also became a very important contact for James within the high-ranking French clergy. Aside from his ecclesiastical position, and membership of one of the most highly ranked families in France, he remained a leading member of government during the Regency, and he used that position to intercede with the Regent in behalf of James’ repeated pension requests as well as in support of pro-Jacobite policy. The favours James requested of the nobles sometimes included officer commissions, as some of them had interest with the minister in charge of commissions. Crucial

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393 SPW, 49/62, Dunkeld to James, Oct. 6, 1720; 57/81, Hay to Richard Gaydon, Jan. 24, 1722; 64, James to Cardinal de Noailles, Oct. 16, 1720.

394 SPW, 46/87, Cardinal de Noailles to James, April 1720.

395 SPW, 78/6, James to Cardinal de Noailles, Nov. 20, 1724; 21, James to Cardinal de Noailles, Nov. 27, 1724.


397 SPW, 58/5, Christopher Nugent to David Nairne, Feb. 15, 1722; 104, James to Cardinal de Rohan, Mars 27, 1722.

in this regard were James’ contacts of the highest military rank. He maintained a correspondence with several French Maréchals, some of the most influential figures, even leading ministers, of the Regent’s government for a time. These figures formed part of the factions of the ‘Old Court’ bloc, which did not look favourably upon the alliance with Britain for various reasons. The Duc de Villeroy, the most valuable of these figures, even directly delivered letters of courtesy from James to the Regent and Louis XV on occasion, giving James a highly useful alternate means of access. He provided a means of patronage for Jacobites, family members as well as officers.

The Due de Vendome and Maréchal de Villars also kept up a frequent correspondence with James, and both objects of favour requests. Villars also provided another (potentially covert) means of direct contact for James by accepting delivery of letters. Prince and Princess Vaudemont not only kept up contact with James, but the Prince also involved himself with Jacobite affairs. Dillon had a close acquaintance with almost all of these military commanders and still acted as James’ in situ point of contact.

The Duke of Berwick naturally provided a major avenue of influence, with the most potential for military patronage of any Jacobite contact – not only because of his military rank as a Maréchal of France, but because of his close personal relationship with the Regent. Berwick became part of the Regent’s innermost Council, for political as well as military affairs. Berwick had been an old comrade of the Regent, having served under his command during several campaigns, and their relations had always been friendly and fairly close. The Regent genuinely listened to his advice.

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399 Shennan, pp. 23, 43, 66; Ladurie, Saint Simon and the Court of Louis XIV, pp. 306-309, 312, 314, 326. These fluctuating groups varied in their ambitions, among them the Ducal or anti-Bastard faction led by the Duc de St. Simon.
400 SPW, 53/171, Villeroy to James, Juin 12, 1721; accord. 51/24, James to Villeroy, Feb. 16, 1721; 25, Villeroy to James, Jan. 6, 1721; 53/100, Villeroy to James, May 12, 1721; 54/122, James to Villeroy, Aout 22, 1721; 56/10, James to Villeroy, Dec. 1, 1721; 60/78, James to Villeroy, June 22, 1722; 168, Villeroy to James, July 15, 1722.
401 SPW HMC, VI, James to Maréchal de Villeroy, May 28, 1718, p. 487; SPW, 48/95, James to Villeroy, Oct. 28, 1720; 49/37, Dillon to James, Oct. 7, 1720; 53/76, James to Villeroy, May 3, 1721; 57/22, James to Villeroy, Fev. 1, 1722.
402 SPW, 47/83, Dillon to James, Aprill 29, 1720; 50/113, James to Villeroy, Feb. 19, 1721; 52/101, James to Villars, Mars 9, 1721, 170, Dillon to James, Mars 31, 1721.
403 SPW, 53/89, James to Villars, May 6, 1721.
404 SPW, 51/81, Vaudemont to James, Jan. 23, 1721; 109, James to Vaudemont, Jan. 29, 1721; 52/112, James to Vaudemont, Mars 10, 1721, 170, Dillon to James, March 31, 1721; 56/146, Vaudemont to James, Jan. 2, 1722; 58/20, James to Vaudemont, Fev. 22, 1722; 60/117, James to Vaudemont, July 4, 1722.
405 SPW, 46/82, Dillon to James, April 29, 1720; 114, Dillon to James, May 6, 1720; 47/4, Dillon to James, May 20, 1720; 49/37, Dillon to James, Oct. 7, 1720.
and greatly trusted him, placing a high value on Berwick's honesty, ability and commitment to the interests of France.\textsuperscript{406}

Despite his position however Berwick turned out not to be a particularly useful advocate, with regard to actually agreeing to patronage requests, whether because of his turbulent relationship with James, or a reluctance to use his position with the Regent for favours too frequently. He did occasionally acquiesce to sponsor specific officers, and proceeded with these promises, as shown by his success in at least one case – as might be expected given his political and military interest.\textsuperscript{407} Yet even these intercessions could be seen as primarily due to his sense of responsibility for his men, rather than his duty to James; the connection and affection he felt with his Irish officers was a trait which was widely acknowledged by his contemporaries and biographer.\textsuperscript{408}

James maintained contact with several officers from the Irish regiments and their descendants, as with Dillon. These officers were determined to show their absolute loyalty and devotion to the Jacobite cause by staying in personal contact with James and the Jacobite leadership, and making regular declarations and promises of this commitment and their readiness to perform their duty in service to James.\textsuperscript{409} This group included some other Lieutenant-Generals and regiment commanders who naturally held some sway over appointments within their regiments, such as Dominic Sheldon and Francis Bulkeley, who jeopardised their careers to participate in the 1715 Rising.\textsuperscript{410}

Similarly James could use the interest of any other Jacobites with access to court, including those Jacobite family members who had become courtiers in their own
right, such as Eleanor de Mezieres.\textsuperscript{411} This also now included John Law, whose intimate position of trust with the Regent guaranteed a priceless means of access to the ruler’s ear, as well as a vast scope of economic and political clout for the brief period of his role as financial advisor to the French government.\textsuperscript{412}

Of course Dillon himself was the most important Jacobite figure in regard to patronage though; it continued to be one of his most important duties as both James’ servant and as an Irish Jacobite. James occasionally asked him to take on cases of financial or non-military sponsorship, or simply recommendations, for Jacobite family members: “...As to Carnegy of boiseck when he comes I’ll tell him I have your orders to recommend him to [Mr. Law], as to what Concerns L.\textsuperscript{d} panmure I’ll strive to be inform’d from proper persons if it could avail anything to recommend such an interest to y\textsuperscript{e} Court of France, and in what manner...”\textsuperscript{413} In one instance Dillon, along with the Earls of Mar and Melfort, signed a petition of a poverty stricken Scottish Catholic convert family (of Sir John Wood of Bebegueny) for a pension, as a witness and supportive sponsor to their request.\textsuperscript{414}

By virtue of his post Dillon had gained international connections which could make the difference: “...betwixt you & me my poor father in law has very little credit any where, & so instead of applying to him I write to Dillon to see what he can do in Mr Keith’s favour by the means of some of the foreign ministers at Paris...”\textsuperscript{415} Dillon did his best to leverage any interest left to him via these avenues:

> The bearer is a very good friend of mine...I recommend him to your friendly offices in that place being fully persuaded of his worth and attention to deserve your esteem. I desire the same favours for him by your mediation near Sir H[enry], S[ting] to whom I pray my most kind and humble service. I shall own the favours both shall haue the occasion to do this Gentleman as a particular obligation...\textsuperscript{416}

Naturally though the focus was military; Dillon was still proprietor of his regiment,

\textsuperscript{411} SPW, 59/27, James to Madam de Mezieres, April 17, 1722.
\textsuperscript{412} SPW, 46/48, Dillon to James, April 9, 1720; 47/8, James to Dillon, May 21, 1720; 45, James to Dillon, June 2, 1720; 50/72, James to Law, Dec. 3, 1720.
\textsuperscript{413} SPW, 46/48, Dillon to James, April 9, 1720; accord. 44/111, James to Dillon, Sep. 12, 1719; 47/45, James to Dillon, June 2, 1720; 132, Dillon to James, June 25, 1720; 48/37, James to Dillon, July 15, 1720; 50/5, James to Dillon, Nov. 10, 1720; 51/140, James to Ormonde, Feb. 3, 1721.
\textsuperscript{414} BL, MS 39923, Miscellaneous letters and papers principally relating to Jacobites, 1668-1790, Petition to the Bishop of Nantes on behalf of John Wood, signed and sealed by Dillon, Mar, and Melfort, 20 May 1723, f. 42.
\textsuperscript{415} SPW, 51/140, James to Ormonde, Feb. 3, 1721.
and still had his old connections. James’ connections among the cardinals could be of no help in this arena: «...j’ay été bien aise d’apprendre les bontés que le Card. De Noailles a eu pour nous et pour M’le notre sœur et je ne manquerai pas de trouver quelque moyen pour luy faire scavoir combien j’y suis sensible j’ecrirai aussi par cette poste a [Dillon] pour qu’il vous rende tous les services qu’il pourra a l’egard de la commission... »[I am relieved to learn of the goodness that Cardinal de Noailles has shown for us and for Mademoiselle our sister and I will not fail to find some means to make known to him how sensible I am of it. I also command Dillon by this post to render you all the services that he can with regard to the commission...]

James also still received some requests specifically asking for Dillon to obtain their commission, given his role as a font of Jacobite military patronage:

...Sire comme dans ce tems malheureux je ne puis suivre autre metier que celuy de la guerre, j’ose encore supplier tres humblement V. M. de me recommander a M. Dillon pour obtenir pour moy quelque petite commission de lieutenat pour commencer, comme cela s’accore ordinairemen aux enfants des officiers tuéz dans le service...[^419]

[...Sire as in these unhappy times I cannot follow an alternative career than that of the military, I must again very humbly beg your Majesty to recommend me to Mr. Dillon to obtain some small lieutenant’s commission for me to start with, like that which is ordinarily accorded to the children of officers killed in service...]

For the most part though during this period Dillon’s real advantage (regarding the assistance of Jacobites) seems to have been as a connection to and intermediary with the French military leadership, rather than through his own direct intercession. James applied through Dillon to the Comte d’Evreux on two occasions; Dillon’s interest with his fellow regiment commanders remained fairly strong, as James apparently thought D’Evreux would be “glad to receive the honour of your command.”[^420] Other Irish regiment commanders could sometimes be reached through Dillon, despite James’ direct contact with several of them, as described above.^

Most useful were direct appeals to the French Secretary of State for War. Dillon’s location in Paris enabled him to personally meet with the various ministers who held


[^418] SPW, 49/62, Dunkeld to James, Oct. 6, 1720.

[^419] SPW, 49/7, Dunkeld to James, Sep. 20, 1720.

[^420] SPW, 47/100, James to Dillon, June 16, 1720; accord. 46/121, Ormonde to James, May 11, 1720; 54/76, James to Countess of Middleton, Aug. 3, 1721; 60/112, Comte d’Evreux to Christopher Nugent, July 3, 1722.

[^421] SPW, 50/5, James to Dillon, Nov. 10, 1720.
this post from 1715 to 1718 (Villars), between 1718 and 1723 (Louis Claude le Blanc), and from 1723 to 1726 (de Breteuil). The Regent’s ultimate successor, power of the Abbé Dubois was such that he was virtually in control of most administration, and Mons. Le Blanc belonged to the Abbe Dubois’ faction as a close ally.  

Nevertheless the majority of minor appointments were in le Blanc’s hands, placing inordinate value on the ability to apply personally to his interest. Dillon’s long-held personal acquaintance with le Blanc was therefore a great advantage.

…Mr de Dillon vous pourra expliquer de quoy il s’agit, et la situation present de mes affaires, elle est des plus favourible, et il me paroit, que la France peut en tirer son profit avec facilite. Je connois votre ardeur pour la Gloire et son avantage, et le grand et juste attachement que vous aves pour le Prince qui la gouverne, et ainsi je ne vous demande vos bonnes offices, qu’autant que vous seres vous-même convaincu qu’en me servant vous servés egalellement a l’un et a l’autre, J’ose dire que nos interets sont inseperables…

[Mr Dillon can explain his actions and the current state of my affairs to you, they are most favourable, and it appears to me that France can easily profit from it. I know your eagerness for Glory and its benefits, and the great and deserved attachment that you have for the Prince who governs it, and thus I do not ask for your assistance, since you will be convinced that serving me is exactly the same as serving yourself, I dare say that our interests are inseparable…]

James had so many officers requesting assistance in this regard he had to make a list of priorities in the application for commissions to the minister.

…As to…the Collonels List…if M. le Blanc can be prevail’d on to allow of a new List being made, it would certainly be much the best, and in that case I can provide for such persons as I think most deserving and in greatest want, for I still understand that the persons whose names are now on the List do not know it themselves, and by consequence I am entire master to chop & change as I please, tho’ it would certainly be better that even a few now on that List should profit of it, then the whole be taken away by proposing a change…

In fact by the end of 1722 Dillon’s personal influence had regained some of its importance - primarily through this acquaintance with le Blanc: “...I have directed Mr Dillon to do you all the good offices he can, on account of your pretensions in the Army, which was all I could do for you, not being in Correspondence my self with any of the french ministers. You may be sure Mr Dillon will do his best to serve you,

423 SPW HMC, IV, Inese to Mar, Apr, 3, 1717, pp. 156-15. From 1723 an acquaintance with Breteuil was equally important. SPW, 70/79, Nov, 22, 1723, Sempill to James; MAE, Memoires et Documents, Angleterre, MS 93 (19), des lettres adressées a lord Sempill par Jacques III et plusieurs agents jacobites, 1721-1782, Sempill to James III, May 1,1724, ff.47a-48a.
424 SPW, 54/20, James to M. le Blanc, Juillet 14, 1721.
425 SPW, 47/139, James to Dickinson, June 30, 1720; accord. 48/52, Dickinson to James, July 22, 1720.
and I heartily wish he may succeed, thô I fear it will not be so easy a matter..."\(^{426}\)

The renewed reliance on Dillon in regard to commission requests seems to have continued up until Dillon’s final exclusion from Jacobite affairs.\(^{427}\)

Dillon’s intercession certainly made a difference to military appointments of Jacobite soldiers, in an ancien regime military culture when recommendations from a superior officer were absolutely indispensable. There were unquestionably some cases in which his efforts were successful: “I most humbly beg leave to thank your Majesty for the [honor] and distinguished favour [donne] me in giving me a commission of Colonell which Mr. Dillon has very agre[ably] surpriz’d me with all my coming hither from England..."\(^{428}\) Dillon gave these officers a much faster and less circuitous route to the necessary echelons of influence.

Nonetheless Dillon had significant limitations on his ability to assist importunate Jacobites; not only the restraints on his influence, but his [immoderately heavy work (does it explain his ineptitude] load restricted the time and effort he could devote to the requests, limitation exacerbated the sheer number of requests: the overwhelming number of needy officers, and the severe lack of available posts.\(^{429}\) The lack of opportunities for promotion meant that these officers had little chance of success even with Dillon’s patronage; otherwise he himself didn’t seem to know much of the time whether he could depend on his applications, or even how much progress he was actually making with them. He often expressed doubt about the chances of these officers, downplaying expectations of success, or even the possibility of applying at all.\(^{430}\) On one occasion he specifically, and slightly impatiently, explained the exact problems to James:

...Lord Riverston’s pretensions & sufferings are well known to me, and would most willingly do all in my power to serve him, but as he obtain’d about ten months ago, by great favour in which I [some] share, from a lieu.\(^1\) to be made cap.m reform’d with a pension of 1500.\(^6\) a year, you may depend upon it, the court here would be much surpris’d at any new demand in his behalf in so little a compass of time, besides this you know promotions are not so frequent in full peace, nor indeed in war except on Emergent occasions, all this well consider’d, its very plain that my solicitation and even making use of your name would only produce a denyall, and perhaps render both ineffectuall in more essentiall matters. Major Jack Nugent your escuyer who is a man of service & merit, in

\(^{426}\) SPW, 64/40, James to Semple, Dec. 21, 1722; accord. 130, Dicconson to Hay, Jan. 4, 1723.

\(^{427}\) SPW, 76/169, James to Dillon, Sep. 18, 1724.

\(^{428}\) SPW, 51/142, Wogan to James, Feb. 4, 1721; accord. 64/128, James Nagle to James, Jan. 4, 1723.

\(^{429}\) MAE, Memoires et Documents, Angleterre, No. 86 (12), 1716-1746, Papiers de lord Sempill. *Dossier contenant des documents relatifs au même objet que le précédent*, Sempill to James, Jan. 3 1724, 256a-b; Sempill to James, March 12 1724, ff.265a-b.

\(^{430}\) SPW, 48/57, Dillon to James, July 23, 1720.
whose favour you order’d me to sollicite for coll.  

brevet can not obtain it at present, which is proof enough t’other would meet with a plain refusall, so that, except you require the contrary, I’m resolved not to make use of [James]'s name, nor [Dillon]'s small indeavours to no purpose... 

James must have been unduly optimistic in his expectations of the chances of attainment for the applications. Dillon’s past career was an advantage for this function of his post, but a limited one, inadequate to the demands that had to be placed on it by the desperate Jacobite community.

Communication

Dillon’s limitations became increasingly apparent in regards to another of his most important roles, as a nub of communication for all Paris-based Jacobites. James relied on Dillon to pass on any and all general news from his letters to him to all other Jacobites in his vicinity, in order to save the time and effort involved in repeating it to all his correspondents: “...I have not time to say much here, besides I depend on [Inese] and [Dillon] that they will inform you of all worth knowing...”  

James would frequently pass messages, even directions to individuals through Dillon’s own correspondence. This practice turned Dillon into a nerve centre of news transmission.

Even Ormonde received news through Dillon for a time, despite James’ close and frequent personal correspondence with him. As James explained to Dillon:

...It will be requisite that you continue to give the D. of Orm. proper informations from Paris, for were I to transmitt them to him it would be a vast loss of time. I do not indeed find an absolut necessity of informing the Duke of every little particular, but I think you should represent to Mr Law that [Ormonde] can be of no use in this matter but in as much as he is enabled to be it by the lights you give him, and to avoid all mistake or jealousy I shall only write to him on those heads in general from hence leaving it to you to transmit to him the necessary informations on proper occasions...

Dillon was perfectly placed for international transmission of news, advice and instruction via his own correspondence, with Jacobites engaged all over Europe.

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431 SPW, 50/33, Dillon to James, Nov. 18, 1720.
432 SPW HMC, III, James to Mar, Feb. 25, 1717, p. 536.
433 SPW, 48/19, James to Dillon, July 6, 1720; 44, James to Dillon, July 20, 1720; 54/112, James to Thomas Southcot, Aug. 17, 1721; 56/16, Hay to Mar, Dec. 2, 1721.
434 SPW, 48/77, James to Ormonde, July 1720; 49/1, Ormonde to James, Sep. 16, 1720; 97, James to Ormonde, Aug. 11, 1720; 51/140, James to Ormonde, Feb. 3, 1721; 52/54, James to Mar, Feb. 22, 1721; 55/142, James to Ormonde, Nov. 23, 1721; 55/80, James to Ormonde, Nov. 2, 1721.
435 SPW, 48/37, James to Dillon, July 15, 1720.
Dillon acted as an intermediary with English and Scottish Jacobites, and the leading Jacobite foreign emissaries such as Jermingham, Daniel O’Brien and Ormonde. Though details of Dillon’s English contacts are obscure, he certainly set up a (private) line of communication with the Earl of Strafford after his trip to Paris in 1720, from which Strafford could pass on to Orrery and Atterbury:

...I do not believe [E. Strafford] will enter into particulars except with [L. Orrery] and [B. of R] to whom he allready spoke his mind freely, I gave him some cant names which is all the cypher between us, and tho wee have agreed on a privat method for conveying letters I do not expect to hear from him directly but when he has something materiall to advise, I'm very sure however that he'll omit no occasion to promote paul's interest...

Even more importantly though Dillon was very often the means through which post was transferred. The Jacobite network had recourse to a few different means to transport their communication. The most common avenue of Jacobite communication was to transmit their post via several different routes - ‘channels’ or ‘canals’, chosen simply through proximity and availability. Dillon actually came to have his own (successive) channels of communication, which were even referred to as ‘Dillon’s channel’ by the multiple users. “...As to the management of correspondence my friends desire it may be carryd on through Dillons canal to whom they will on proper occasion send expresses as [I] will to them when necessary or write by a safe hand...” Dillon’s was one of the most frequently used channels, by many Jacobites, because of its range, and because it was seen within the network as one of the most secure. James himself would sometimes send letters for English Jacobites to Dillon to forward on in his more secure route.

However Dillon’s channel also sometimes ran into problems with security:

...I am under some anxiety about some [bills] I sent you in Sept. last...without some accident has happened to them, they must have come long since to your hands. I'm in hopes they are not fallen in to wrong ones, since I know they were once safe in [Dillon's]...I send you this by a new Canal which I take to be very safe...you have but to address to Mr. Steel under Cover to Mr Dundass Moret at Rotterdam and it will come safe to me, and often quicker than by [Dillon’s] canal, only that it will be necessary, that you should inform [Dillon], of any

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436 SPW, 44/7, James to Deicconson, Aug. 29, 1719; 49/35, Dillon to James, Oct. 7, 1720; 52/141, Sir H. Goring to Dillon, March 20, 1721; 53/155, Mar to Ormonde, June 2, 1721.
437 SPW, 48/55, Dillon to James, July 6, 1720.
438 SPW HMC, IV, John Paterson to Dillon, June 12, 1717, p. 347; VI, James to Jermingham, March 23, 1718, p.182; SPW, 47/63, James to Dillon, June 8, 1720.
439 SPW HMC, II, Apr. 5, 1716, Magny to James, pp. 61-62; VI, March 24, 1718, Mar to Hugh Paterson, pp. 188-189; VI, June 5 [OS], 1718, Menzies to Mar, pp. 533-534; SPW, 47/33, Sir Patrick Lawless to James, May 28, 1720; 48/17, James to Campion, July 5, 1720; 53/145, James to Orrery, May 30, 1721.
440 SPW, 45/51, James to Mar, Oct. 15, 1719; 48/19, James to Dillon, July 6, 1720.
thing that you write to me by the other Canal, w^th it may be felt he should know in the place where he is...I shall not trouble you wth a repition of what you will receive more amply & quicker from [Dillon]...^42

Loss of correspondence or severe delays regularly occurred, although the possibility that this could sometimes have been a by-product of poor security does not seem to have worried the Jacobite leaders as much as it should have.^43 In fact Dillon could be very careless in this regard. He even dismissed specific warnings from Ormonde that his correspondence from Dillon had been tampered with; Dillon instead accepted the Jacobite posturing of French bureaucrats:

"Ormonde suspects that Dillon's letters to him are intercepted at the post office here, but I dare answer the contrary, Monsr. Pajot and commis being very zealous for what regards the King..."^44 While gestures towards ensuring greater security were frequently made by Jacobite leaders, these measures were often ludicrously inadequate - Dillon once tried translating letters into French as such a strategy.^45

Jacobites, including Dillon, often used the normal mail delivery service in spite of the acknowledged danger: "I wrote to [Mar]...and do desire he will please hereafter to let me know precisely the days he receives my letters that I may be able to judge if any accident happens them in the post office; precaution on this score is necessary at present. If by chance this letter is opened the contents will be easily understood, but I could not do otherwise."^46 This practice continued for years after the end of the Rising.^47 Although the Jacobites invariably employed code, they could easily be broken. The persistent ability of British agents to decipher the code, exposing Jacobite plots, is amply demonstrated by the Atterbury Plot; a weak code preferred by the Jacobites enabled Walpole's code-breakers to uncover the details of the plot and indict most of the English conspirators.^48 Relying on code alone to hide

^42 SPW, 53/23, James to Earl of Arran, April 14, 1721.
^43 SPW HMC, III, Mar to Walkingshaw of Barrowfield, Feb. 3, 1717, pp. 509-510; Mar to Inese, Mar, 24, 1717, pp. 134-136; V, Ormonde to Dillon, Oct. 25, 1717, p. 154; Daniel O'Brien to John O'Brien, Nov. 7, 1717, pp. 181-182; SPW, 46/2, Dillon to James, Jan. 23 1720.
^44 SPW HMC, V, Dillon to James, Nov. 24, 1717, pp. 226-227; accord. IV, Dillon to Mar, Aug. 7, 1717, p. 503.
^45 SPW HMC, III, Mar to Inese, Dec. 1, 1716, pp. 275-276; IV, Dillon to James, July 20, 1717, pp. 459-460.
^48 SPW, 47/35, Lord Orrery to James, May 31, 1720; G. V. Bennett, The Tory crisis in Church and State, 1688-1730: the career of Francis Atterbury, Bishop of Rochester (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
messages was therefore very risky. Even Jacobite leaders could be impervious to the high security risks of their letters, in spite of the frequent acknowledgement of its importance.

When leaders recognised security to be of the utmost importance for certain highly sensitive letters, special messengers were used, disregarding the expense. Messengers were still a far from inviolably secure means of transport however, as messengers could (despite the efforts made to employ the most familiar, trusted men) betray or manipulate their secret messages, or other spies could interfere with their packages. Even Dillon sometimes acknowledged when this occurred: “tho the inclosed letter be dated the 15. Aprill it was only deliver’d me on the 7. instant with a flying seal which gave me the opportunity of perusing it, and making the following observations. The expression puis qu’il m’est permis &c. seems to import that ye contents have been communicated to the Regent and perhaps calculated with him…” Among the international diplomatic community Jacobite communication was notorious for its lax security and leaky channels of communication, a notoriety which is sustained within modern Jacobite historiography.

One example of this reputation is the story of Lord Bolingbroke’s indiscretion. Bolingbroke resumed an affair with his French mistress, Claudine de Tencin, immediately after his permanent exile to France – a mistress whom he actually shared with the Abbé Dubois. He is supposed to have revealed plans for the 1715 Rising, which Dubois passed to the British. It had also been rumoured that Arthur


449 SPW HMC, III, Mar to Dillon, Oct. 25, 1716, pp. 136-137; IV, Dillon to James III, July 20, 1717, pp. 459-460; V, Mar to George Lockhart of Carnwarth, Jan. 4, 1718, p. 366; VI, Lord Eglington to Mar, March 29 [OS], 1718, p. 285; Ezekiel Hamilton to Dillon, May 20, 1718, p. 452; Menzies to Mar, June 5 [OS], 1718, pp. 533-534; Sir H. Paterson to Mar, June 17, 1718, pp. 544-546; VII, Mar to Capt. John Ogilvie, July 17, 1718, p. 53; SPW, 44/122, James to Dillon, Sept. 16, 1719; 55/23, James to Ormonde, July 14, 1721.


452 SPW, 53/97, Dillon to James, May 12, 1721.


454 Saint-Simon, Historical Memoirs Vol. III, pp. 258-260; Ladurie, Saint Simon and the Court of
Dillon himself had been a lover of de Tencin at an earlier period, during his military career. The truth behind these rumours of course can never be established. Nevertheless they demonstrate the extremely damaging reputation which the Jacobites possessed for indiscretion and carelessness with highly sensitive information.

Even more important however than these weaknesses of security, and Dillon’s personal carelessness in that context, was his lack of efficiency, one of his greatest failures. His problem seems to have worsened over time, as he acquired responsibilities and came under greater pressure. He apparently even came to be held responsible by the community in general for the notoriously unreliable reputation of Jacobite correspondence: "...I hear poor [James’] Correspondence is still worse treated in [France’s] family. His Governour [G. Dillon] is blamed for it. [J. Hamilton] said he woud give you some Instances of the bad consequences it has had..."

Dillon seems to have been remarkably neglectful or careless of his correspondence given the volume of remarks on this failure from his fellow Jacobites, which is particularly surprising when its extreme importance to the Jacobites is taken into account – the importance, even necessity, of regular and reliable correspondence to the organisation and execution of their plans. The Jacobite network recognised, and indeed were almost fixated upon this necessity not only in the event of sudden decision-making (very likely in the Jacobite context), but in terms of security. The only way leading Jacobites could be sure letters had reached their destination, without being intercepted by agents, was for every person to carefully detail which letters they had received, and when, in their replies to the writers. Dilatoriness in responses, or in recounting these details, made it impossible to know whether certain correspondence routes were reliable and safe; whether letters were regularly delayed or missing because of the sender or through interception (or both).

Reasons for Dillon’s carelessness in this matter are inscrutable. He had frequent

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455 The rumour has been passed on into modern historiography through Charles Petrie. Petrie, The Jacobite movement, p. 279; Murtagh, ‘Dillon’ in ODNB; Corp, Stuarts in Italy, p. 19.

456 SPW, 53/2, Tulibardine to James, April 4, 1721; 173, Mar to Hay, Jun 16, 1721.

457 SPW, 55/95, Freebairne to John Car, Nov. 10, 1721.
bouts of illness, often given as an excuse for delayed responses, both by him and his regular correspondents, Mar, Inese, Lansdowne or Dicconson. He sometimes complained of his health to James; as the years passed he often added that he could not cope with the role, causing his recurrent illnesses, and he would occasionally request either a holiday or for his duties to be substantially lessened. Those close to Dillon or surrounding him, such as the Queen, Lieutenant-General Dominick Sheldon, and Ormonde, often supported him in these requests: “Sheldon arrived at Paris...and alighted at Dillon’s lodgings and had a long conversation with him...His answer was that he...owned he could not charge himself with more business than he could go through with, that not only his health but sight were of late impaired by the constant application he was forced to have to it, and truly that is but too visible...” Similarly some individuals had difficulty in accessing Dillon because of his frequent absences from Paris; trips into the country to recover his health after illness, or merely for holidays.

[Dillon] is still in the country, nor do I know of his having heard any thing as yet from [England] of what we have been so long looking for, tho I think if he had, he wou’d either have come to town or sent us word...You’ll hear that poor old Dominique is dead, & that has I believe kept [Dillon] longer in the country than he intended. He wanted the country air so much that it was pitty to draw him from it in this fine weather we have had this fortnight past, yet I could not keep my self last week from wrieting to him of those papers wch I mentioned in my last & that it was necessary he should see them...

By causing long-term absences from his duties, indeed even by merely preventing the necessary accessibility to the Jacobite community, his ill health had a knock-on effect of causing difficulties for the entire cause. But Dillon also displayed definite carelessness about both the security and regularity of his correspondence, which his

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458 SPW HMC, IV, Dillon to James, June 23, 1717, p. 382; VI, Dillon to Mar, March 27, 1718, pp. 204-205; Mar to James, April 9, 1718, pp. 278-280; VII, Mar to Hamilton, Aug. 12, 1718, pp. 139-140; SPW, 46/115, Dillon to James, May 6, 1720; 55/144, Mar to James, Nov. 24, 1721; 148, Lansdowe to James, Nov. 24, 1721; 56/6, Dillon to Hay, Dec. 1, 1721.

459 SPW HMC, VI, Dillon to James, March 28, 1718, p. 210; SPW, 48/12, Dillon to James, July 2, 1720; 53/97, Dillon to James, May 12, 1721; 54/173, Dillon to Hay, Sept. 22, 1721; 55/23, Dillon to Hay, Oct. 6, 1721; 58/12, Hay to Mar, Feb. 17, 1722.

460 SPW HMC, VI, Sheldon to James, April 18, 1718, pp. 322-323; accord. VI, April 17, 1718, Ormonde to Dillon, p. 321; VII, Sept. 20, 1718, Sheldon to David Nairne, pp. 303-304; Sheldon to James, Sept. 20, 1718, pp. 311-312; SPW, 57/94, Jan. 26, 1722, Mar to James.

461 SPW HMC, III, Bernard O’Berne to Mar, Jan. 31, 1717, p. 491; VI, James to Dillon, April 22, 1718, pp. 346-348; VII, General Hamilton to Mar, Sept. 6, 1718, pp. 250; SPW, 46/82, Dillon to James, April 29, 1720; 47/8, James to Dillon, May 21, 1720; 48/37, James to Dillon, July 15, 1720; 55, Dillon to James, July 22, 1720; 58/62, Mar to James, March 9, 1721; 64/154, Lansdowne to James, Jan. 18, 1723; MAE, Memoires et Documents, Angleterre No. 86 (12), 1716-1746, Papiers de lord Sempill. Dossier contenant des documents relatifs au même objet que le précédent, Sempill to James, 1723, f. 253a; Sempill to [Unknown], May 31 1723, ff. 259a-b.

462 SPW, 58/41, Mar to James, March 2, 1722.
state of health did not fully explain or excuse, as Mar acknowledged to James:

...I fear Dillon had delayed sending the Bishop of Rochester his letters, and, when Lord Oxford gets his sooner, it may occasion some more and new jealousies and tracasseries...I really believe Dillon’s having so much more business &c. than usual has occasioned his illness in a good measure, but, be that as it will, it is plain by James Murray’s letters that he does not write so much to them as they think he should...⁴⁶³

The negligence he displayed in this area is unaccountably incongruous with his care in other matters, and his hard work and passion for the success of the cause.

Nevertheless his central role within the wider Jacobite communication network meant that this failure had a serious impact on Jacobite affairs.

Dillon played an equally central role in Jacobite finances, involving the management of all Jacobite financial business in Paris. Dillon was partially responsible, acting along with William Dicconson and James’ banker Daniel Arthur, for James’ assets in France, including his monies in French banks.⁴⁶⁴ Dillon was the principal Jacobite responsible for the distribution of James’ own funds as and when directed by James: for instance payments to various individuals as rewards for service rendered; payment of his or others’ debts; or for reimbursement of expenses laid out in his service.⁴⁶⁵

James usually asked Dillon to manage payment of funds to officers and soldiers newly arrived in France, particularly those escaped from Scotland: “...I am truly concerned my circumstances do not allow me to send you such a supply as I could wish but I have ordered General Dillon to give you and the gentlemen with you what I am ashamed to name desiring you to look at the good will and not at the gift...If you come to Paris, General Dillon can inform you fully of such matters...”⁴⁶⁶ He also oversaw the large sums of money raised or donated by individuals for potential invasion plots - usually just its transferral to involved Jacobites, but on some

⁴⁶³ SPW HMC, VI, Mar to James, April 9, 1718, pp. 278-280.
⁴⁶⁴ Dicconson was an English Catholic Jacobite with a prominent role at St. Germain for most of his exile from 1699, having served as under-governor to James during his minority, as well as co-authoring a biography of James II. From 1709 he undertook his invaluable financial service for the court, when he was appointed Treasurer for Queen Mary; Paul Hopkins, ‘Dicconson, William (1654/5-1742)’ in ODNB.
⁴⁶⁵ SPW, 47/109, Dillon to James, June 18, 1720; 48/5, W. Dundas to Dillon, July 5, 1720; 73, Dillon to James, July 30; 82, James to Dicconson, Aug. 3, 1720; 49/69, James to Hay, Oct. 17; 50/18, Dillon to James, Nov. 12, 1720; 19, Hay to James, Nov. 12, 1720; 132, Colin Campbell to Hay, Dec. 30, 1720; 52/104, Thomas Higgonst to James, March 10, 1721; 54/173, Dillon to Hay, Sept. 22, 1721; 56/6, Dillon to Hay, Dec. 1, 1721; 59/39, James to Balmerino, April 19, 1722.
⁴⁶⁶ Reports on the Manuscripts of C.S.H. Drummond Moray Esq. Marquess of Tullibardine and Admiral Sir Thomas Gordon letters 1716-30, 16, April 29, 1720, James to Tullibardine, pp. 91-92; SPW, 46/122, James to Dillon, May 11, 1720.
occasions even organising its spending on provisions, arms and transport.\(^{467}\) Dillon and Dicconson took care of all the Jacobite fiscal affairs, specifically the distribution of pension money to Jacobite claimants, which John Law had managed to finally bring to a resolution.\(^{468}\) William Law, John Law’s brother, also assisted the Jacobites by obtaining another grant - though, as Dillon warned, even his ability to obtain such favours was limited.\(^{469}\) Dillon distributed this money by making a list of all the most needy (and deserving) recipients:

I do not well foresee that the case can happen in which it will be possible or convenient for me to establish a new and numerous List of pensions, On t’other hand I hope I shall not be always disabled from relieving those whose merit and wants deserve my consideration ...I would have you leave in M’[Dillon]’s hands a List of such of my subjects...as have no other support but myself, and with the help of that List, [Dillon] will be able to make a convenient and suitable distribution of what I may be able to order him from time to time to apply to that use...D[ill]on’s discretion must direct him in that matter, and considering the lights he may receive from the two above mentioned, and that they are to have the distribution of the mony, I do not think, that matter will give much trouble or embarrass to D[ill]on, who has indeed his hands full enough already: But to make it easier to him, and indeed to me, I wish it could be contriv’d, that it were not known such supplys came from me...by which means he’t be free from importunity...\(^{470}\)

As displayed above the list applied to future funds, expected to be mostly derived from donations or grants; James intended Dillon to make decisions, organise and distribute the funds among the appropriate destitute Jacobites in the community around Paris and St. Germain.\(^{471}\) He expected Dillon to manage the funds very carefully, making them stretch as far as possible in order to relieve the largest number of the most desperate Jacobites. Total success was obviously impossible - at least in satisfying all supplicants, but Dillon assiduously performed his duty, and did his utmost to alleviate the circumstances of his fellows, even, indeed especially, when the relevant funds had been exhausted.\(^{472}\)

\(^{467}\) SPW HMC, IV, Richard Barry to Dillon Mar. 4, 1717,, pp. 99-100; VI, Memorandum for Sir Peter Redmond, March 21, 1718, p. 177; Admiral Camocoe to Dillon, May 29, 1718, pp. 490-491; VII, Mar to Colin Campbell of Glendarule, Oct. 10, 1717, pp.130-132; Colin Campbell to Mar, Nov. 12, 1717, pp. 193-194; SPW, 56/57, James to Mar, Dec. 14, 1721; 59/23, James to Dillon, April 17, 1722; 55, James to Lansdowne, April 25, 1722.

\(^{468}\) SPW, 44/77, James to Dicconson, Aug. 29, 1719; 45/3, James to Law, Sep. 24, 1719; 4, James to Dicconson, Sep. 24, 1719; 94, James to Dicconson, Nov. 17, 1719.

\(^{469}\) SPW, 47/132, Dillon to James, June 25, 1720; accord. 45/90, Dicconson to James, Nov. 13, 1719; 111, James to Dicconson, Dec. 11, 1719; 138, Dicconson to James, Jan. 15, 1720; 151, Dicconson to James, Jan. 22, 1720; 47/8, James to Dillon, May 21, 1720.

\(^{470}\) SPW, 46/57, James to Dicconson, April 14, 1720.

\(^{471}\) SPW, 47/8, James to Dillon, May 21, 1720, 26, Dillon to James, May 27, 1720; 45, James to Dillon, June 2, 1720; 50/58, James to Pannure, Dec. 1, 1720; 56/67, Hay to Mar, Dec. 16, 1721.

\(^{472}\) SPW, 48/11, Dicconson to James, July 2, 1720; 50/6, James to Dicconson, Nov. 10, 1720; 18, Dillon to James, Nov. 12, 1720; 53/85, Dillon to James, May 5, 1721; 111, Mar to Hay, May 19, 1721; 54/129, Dillon to Hay, Aug. 25, 1721.
Dillon's responsibilities included not only those remaining matters relating to various pension moneys, but the attempt to obtain the Queen's dowry from Prince James Sobieski. This affair best exemplifies the extent and nature of Dillon's involvement. James first asked Dicconson in September 1719 to take charge of the 600,000 livres of the dowry which was to be paid by James Sobieski from investments in the hotel de ville rents, (plus James' own investments in the same) under the direction of Dillon.\(^{473}\)

This became a real headache for both Dillon and Dicconson as they waited to deal with Peluchi and Spelach, the agents Sobieski sent to France to administer the dowry contract. The obstacles and corruption of the French legal bureaucracy and paperwork stalled Peluchi's attempts to liquidate the contracts. Dillon and Dicconson were forced to make several trips to Paris, chasing up contacts and trying various approaches to solve these problems.\(^{474}\)

Dillon was most visibly valuable to the Jacobites in this matter, where his influence and contacts could be of great benefit - if he only had the time to fully exploit them:

\[
\ldots \text{as yet it is very uncertain when we shall receive y' Majesty's mony, Mon.'}
\]

Peluchi is in Ropes to bring y' matter to a revision by y' Conciel de Regence, and labours in it all he can, but such proceedings are dilatory & uncertain, if [Dillon] had leasure to sollicite a little more his credit and acquaintance would be able to forward ye decision; but he must not neglect other matters to attend only to that....\(^{475}\)

James instructed that Dillon be given authority over the dowry money when finally secured:

\[
\ldots \text{care must be taken that whenever I get Peluchi's mony, what I have in the hotel de ville be given to [Dillon] to be both imployd together the same way. This affair of Peluchi's I fear is in a bad way, and I know not what course to take in it: My Contract of mariage gives me a just claim to 600\(^{th}\) livres of P.}
\]

James's mony on the hotel de ville...Whenever that mony is ready, [Dillon] may receive it, and as for any drugery that that affaire may require I would have him imploy poor Monnot in it. I would have you put in M', [Dillon]'s hands what you have of mine in yours...I would have you leave all your accounts in Mr [Dillon]'s hands, and what small matter may be due to me, I would also have you put in his hands...\(^{476}\)

\(^{473}\) SPW, 46/2, James to Dillon, Sep. 24, 1719; 4, James to Dicconson, Sep. 24, 1719.

\(^{474}\) SPW, 45/89, James to Dillon, Nov. 11, 1719; 90, Dicconson to James, Nov. 13, 1719; 112, Dicconson to James, Dec. 11, 1719; 114, Dicconson to James, Dec. 14, 1719; 124, Dicconson to James, Jan. 1, 1720; 138, Dicconson to James, Jan. 15, 1720; 46/4, Dillon to James, Jan. 1720; 12, Dicconson to James, Fev. 13, 1720; 13, Dicconson to James, Fev. 19 1720; 34, Dicconson to Naime, Apr. 1 1720; 44, Dicconson to Naime, Apr. 8 1720; 57A, James to Dicconson, April 14, 1720; 70, Dillon to James, Apr. 22, 1720; 71, Dicconson to James, April 22, 1720; 112, Dicconson to James, May 6, 1720; 134, Dicconson to James, May 13, 1720; 47/9, Dillon to James, May 21, 1720.

\(^{475}\) SPW, 46/71, Dicconson to James, April 22, 1720.

\(^{476}\) SPW, 46/57, James to Dicconson, April 14, 1720.
It was not until June 1720 that the matter was finally solved. James left all the final decisions and details of the matter to Dillon and Dicconson, partly because of convenience of access. Unfortunately, given his great financial need, James received only that part of the Queen's dowry which James Sobieski was readily able to pass on to him because of his own problematic financial situation. Luckily for relations between the two James' believed in Sobieski's intention to pay the dowry, and that his failure was due purely to his unfortunate situation through the deception of his servants.

The affair shows the depth of confidence and trust which James placed in Dillon at this time. James made several comments approving of the actions and decisions of both Dillon and Dicconson regarding those financial affairs and other matters. Though working in partnership with Dicconson, Dillon held the slightly senior position. Dillon acted partly as an intermediary from James, passing on his instructions, but also had the freedom to act according to his own discretion, making minor decisions when required, though usually in reference to and with the approval of Dicconson.

James corresponded with Dicconson, in which he would give direct orders, but more often than sent his orders through Dillon; on other occasions he ordered Dicconson to follow Dillon's advice and instructions.

Dicconson had a much more active role, taking care of much of the practical business and daily concerns, occasionally assisted in these by Dillon, though Dillon usually involved himself more with the managerial element. Essentially James' combined banker and accountant, Dicconson's official role dealt with Jacobite finances, the primary charge for which he was known through the Jacobite world. In comparison

477 SPW, 47/55, Dillon to James, June 4, 1720; 69, James to Dicconson, June 10, 1720; 111, Dillon to James, June 18, 1720; 125, James to Dillon, June 23, 1720; 131, Dicconson to James, June 24, 1720; 132, Dillon to James, June 25, 1720; 139, James to Dicconson, June 30, 1720; 48/2, Dicconson to James, July 1, 1720; 11, Dicconson to James, July 2, 1720; 19, James to Dillon, July 6, 1720; 37, James to Dillon, July 15, 1720; 38, Dicconson to James, July 15, 1720; 45, James to Dicconson, July 20, 1720; 69, James to Dicconson, June 10, 1720; 52, Dicconson to James, July 22, 1720; 50/70, Dillon to James, Dec. 2, 1720.

478 SPW, 47/125, James to Dillon, June 23, 1720.

479 SPW, 45/104, James to Dicconson, Dec. 4, 1719; 46/100, James to Dicconson, May 4, 1720; 137, James to Dicconson, May 13, 1720; 50/43, James to Dillon, Nov. 23, 1720; 54, James to Dillon, Nov. 28, 1720.

480 SPW, 45/2, James to Dillon, Sep. 24, 1719; 4, James to Dicconson, Sep. 24, 1719; 89, James to Dillon, Nov. 11, 1719; 90, Dicconson to James, Nov. 13, 1719; 112, Dicconson to James, Dec. 11, 1719; 114, Dicconson to James, Dec. 14, 1719; 115, Dillon to James, Jan. 2, 1719; 46/63, James to Dicconson, April 19, 1720; 70, Dillon to James, Apr. 22, 1720; 71, Dicconson to James, April 22, 1720; 122, James to Dillon, May 11, 1720.

481 SPW, 45/2, James to Dillon, Sep. 24, 1719; 4, James to Dicconson, Sep. 24, 1719; 94, James to Dicconson, Nov. 17, 1719; 46/21, James to Dillon, March 11, 1720; 8, James to Dillon, May 21, 1720; 46/57, James to Dicconson, April 14, 1720.
Dillon’s main concern was his representation of Jacobite interests in political and diplomatic terms, as both more central to his role, and usually more important and pressing. The significance of this role emphasises Dillon’s position and authority within the network.

Correspondence of the period reveals the extent to which James relied on intimates and advisors to make decisions, primarily through constant requests for advice and guidance from his intimates. This consequently creates an image of James’ personal dependence on these individuals, which has contributed largely to a historiographical perception of his weakness as a leader and potential ruler. Of course this dependence was natural, not to say unavoidable in the circumstances in which the Stuart monarch found himself bereft of kingdom, entirely reliant on the good-will of foreign monarchs for any grants of residence and income, and on the freely given service of his remaining faithful subjects - as much to uphold their royal image and prestige as for the practical necessity of that service. Thus James’ reliance on his intimates posed one of the greatest problems for Jacobitism, where his great trust of these favourites (often misplaced), was typically carried too far. James, blind to their defects and sometimes deceit, refused to hear anything against them – particularly in the cases of Mar, Murray and Hay. Since 1715 James had progressively and variously been dependent on Mar and then Murray as intimates, and relied on Ormonde, Magny, Dicconson, Inese, Dillon, the Oglethorpes, Law, Lansdowne, Hay, Atterbury and O’Brien, as well as Queen Mary. John Law’s authority for a brief period in French economics and government gave him such credibility that James increasingly depended on him not only for his personal interaction and interest with the Regent, but in seeking and relying on his advice in all areas of political interest for the Jacobite cause.

...had I no other proof of Mr. L-‘s sincere good will towards me, but what you mention to me of him in relation to Sr P. Lawless, that alone would certainly determin me to Confide intirely in his friendship and to be guided by his advice...I cannot but on this occasion expose to you my difficulties in relation to the Court of Spain...Explain this to Mr L- and let me know his opinion, for

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482 Bennett, p. 296; Douglas, p. 22; McLynn, pp. 189-195, 198-199.
483 Szechi, 'The image of the court', pp. 52-53;
484 SPW, 47/45, James to Dillon, June 2, 172048, 19, James to Dillon, July 6, 1720; 37, James to Dillon, July 15, 1720; 53/164, James to Law, June 9, 1721; 57, Dillon to James, July 23, 1720; 50/72, James to Law, Dec. 3, 1720. Law was the son of a banker who was left no inheritance and became a gambler. In 1694 he escaped prison in England to the continent. He proposed a scheme for a bank to Louis XIV in 1715, which was rejected but his ideas on finance became popular with the Regent, who gave him the authority to introduce his own financial system in France from 1716: Bonney, 'Law', in ODNB.
without it I am loath to make any step in that affaire, in which his confidence with Sr Patrick cannot but do good & enable him to form a better judgement of matters...Mr L- can judge better than I of the risk letters may run at present and therefore which ever way he thinks safest we ought to stick to when we write of matters of importance...''

In turn John Law (and his brother) keenly assisted and promoted the cause in any way possible, even offering to mediate in negotiations with the Czar, and donate money to such an attempt, in addition to supporting the Earl of Strafford in his attempts to persuade the Regent of the merits of supporting the Jacobite cause. James did all he could to further cultivate Law’s support and build the relationship, which Dillon encouraged. However some hints in contemporary Jacobite correspondence, including from Dillon, suggest that Law had less enthusiasm for cause than he professed to James. Even after the French economic crisis started isolating Law from his dominant position in France, instigating his eventual fall from grace, and enforced exile, James continued to rely on his advice, and constantly expressed worry and sympathy for his ‘good friend’ - though never forgetting how useful Law could be in his service.

James placed great trust in Dillon, possibly as much in this period as in Mar. Their relationship was on an easy, familiar standing. James described Dillon as one of his ‘true friends’, and wrote to him in a warm and confiding tone:

...[Campion] parted from hence...I have ordered him to speak to you of them without reserve, tho you know already so much of my thoughts on those matters, that he’l be able to say little now to you of them...I hope in God’s name all the venime is spilt and that I shall be no more plagued with these sort of complaints, for both my mind & body are down right fatigued with the trouble they give me...I cannot but foresee a new storm arising...but that I must bear with all the rest and when I have acted according to reason put my self above idle talk tho indeed when things go a certain length there is no passing them over unnoticed, and I have I hope at least some true friends, in all places who now that they will see that some peoples ill will sticks at nothing will in a

485 SPW, 47/100, James to Dillon, June 16, 1720.
486 SPW, 46/73, Dillon to James, April 23, 1720; 114, Dillon to James, May 6, 1720; 47/4, Dillon to James, May 20, 1720; 55, Dillon to James, June 4, 1720; 63, James to Dillon, June 8, 1720; 82, Oglethorpe to James, June 14, 1720; 84, Dillon to James, June 14, 1720; 102, Dillon to James, June 16, 1720; 102A, Dillon to James, June 17, 1720; 48/13, Dillon to Ormonde, July 2, 1720; 18, Dillon to Ormonde, July 5, 1720; 19, James to Dillon, July 6, 1720.
487 SPW, 45/141, Dillon to James, Jan. 16, 1720; 46/73, Dillon to James, April 23, 1720; 47/8, Dillon to James, May 27, 1720; 48/30, Dillon to James, July 9, 1720; 55, Dillon to James, July 22, 1720; 62, James to Dillon, July 26, 1720.
488 SPW, 47/82, Oglethorpe to James, June 14, 1720;
490 SPW, 48/17, James to Campion, July 5, 1720.
dutyfull manner take my cause in hand & look on the broachers and fomenters
of calumnies personally against my self as my greatest enemies…

He also made sure to show his appreciation and respect for Dillon in his letters,
expressing his confidence in his abilities, and his total reliance on Dillon’s advice
and assistance in the management of Jacobite affairs. 

...I own I did not expect that we should recover that great & what I lookd upon
as a desperat debt which you mention. It is very generous in those that repay
that mony, but when we have receivd it what is to be done with it?...Let me
know yours & [Dillon’s] opinion on the matter...As to what you say to S’ Will:
of Certificats, you and [Dillon] best can & indeed only judge of the advantages
and abuses which may attend your granting of them, so I can give you no
directions on that head from hence. What Gordon is in advance on account of
Mr [Dillon’s] orders is as I take it no great matter, and when I get mony, it shall
be repaid...

James, Dicconson and other members of the Jacobite community sollicited and
followed his advice on various issues.

James allowed Dillon the freedom to make many decisions, not only financial, but
other important decisions as to politics, diplomatic relations, and security:
...I write by this post a long letter to Campion...and you will see by it that as to
abram & past tracasseries I am intirely of your opinion...I leave it to your
consideration how far it may be of advantage to inform s’. harry more or less not
of greater secrets but of such transactions in this part of the world as may serve
to [encourage] the Czar in his good dispositions...

Such authority was rather a necessity in such a role as his, as the leading Jacobite in
France. James had in fact explicitly given Dillon this status when he was forced to
leave Avignon, sending notice to the Jacobite community that: “In the Chevalier’s
absence all his people in France and the Low Countries are to receive their orders
from [Dillon].”

James’ distance from the centre of French affairs, and Dillon’s fulfilment of his role
as Jacobite representative in France meant that he could better assist the king’s loyal
subjects in that period: “In this present situation of affairs you will easily believe
how uneasy it is to me to be at so great a distance, and I doubt not but that you’ll give

491 SPW, 46/122, James to Dillon, May 11, 1720.
492 SPW, 48/19, James to Dillon, July 6, 1720; 71, Dillon to James, July 29, 1720.
493 SPW, 47/63, James to Dillon, June 8, 1720; 48/37, James to Dillon, July 15, 1720; 53/145, James
to Orrery, May 30, 1721.
494 SPW, 46/26, James to William Dicconson, Mars 25, 1720.
495 SPW, 46/60, William Dicconson to James, April 15, 1720; 50/119, Dicconson to James, Dec. 22,
1720.
496 SPW, 48/19, James to Dillon, July 6, 1720.
497 Ibid.
498 SPW HMC, IV, Mar to Charles Kinnaird, Mar. 1, 1717, pp. 90-91.
me the best information & advice of friends with you in relation to my removal from hence whenever that may become fitting or necessary..."499

One of the king’s few most trusted Jacobites, the highest of the leaders of the network, he had the authority to make independent decisions:

...I am glad you have at last got some of the Queens mony, and approve of your conduct in not pressing at this time the payment of the rest for the reasons you mention. Those you allledge of employing that mony for a life rent in the late Queen’s name are very strong and as it is impossible for me at this distance to judge of those matters, I leave the placing of that mony entirely to yours and [Dillon]’s determination... As to what you mention to Sir Will: of the Collonels List, I again refer that to yours & [Dillon]’s decision...500

Thus Dillon gave directions not only to Dicconson but to other Jacobites in the network, even high ranking activists. James specifically ordered leading Jacobites in proximity to Dillon (other than Mar) to take directions from him; both his own instructions through Dillon, but also decisions (and advice) made by Dillon himself.501 James made Dillon’s standing clear to Jemingham, a diplomatic negotiator and significant figure in the Jacobite network.502

...I am very sensible Paris is not a very agreeable place for you to live in, but as to that nobody can judge so well as [Dillon], and ‘tis his directions you must follow both as to your place of abode and as to your conduct in case of a congress. As to any persons that may come over from Engl.4 at this time...’tis a nice matter for any who are not personally & intimately acquainted with them to discourse freely with them so that I think you ought to use great reserves with such persons except [Dillon] should in any particular case find the contrary necessary which tis not likely will happen...503

Dillon served as James’ intermediary for Jacobites in France. He informed James of appropriate news, including their Jacobite activities, intelligence and advice.504 In fact, as his primary correspondent in France, James heard much of the news of Jacobite activity in France through Dillon, even about leading Jacobites, such as Lansdowne, who kept up their own correspondence with Rome.505 James gave Dillon complete authority to make the decision as to what information should be thought necessary to be passed on to him: “...in General when you have any thing to Suggest

499 SPW, 50/43, James to Dillon. Nov. 23, 1720.
500 SPW, 47/139, James to Dicconson, June 30, 1720.
501 SPW, 48/17, July 5, 1720, James to Campion; 50, James to Seaforth, July 20, 1720; 56/142, Hugh Paterson to James, Jan. 1, 1722.
502 SPW, 47/18, James to Jemingham, May 24, 1720; 57, Jemingham to James, June 5, 1720; 136, James to Jemingham, Jun 9, 1720; 56, Jemingham to James, July 22, 1720; 52/119, James to Jemingham, March 15, 1721; 177, James to Jemingham, March 31, 1721.
503 SPW, 48/61, James to Jemingham, July 26, 1720.
504 SPW, 49/63, James to Mme Mezieres, Oct. 16, 1720; 53/129, Nicholas Geraldine to James, May 25, 1721; 53/135, O’Brien to James, May 26, 1721; 144, James to Dennis Kelly, May 30, 1721; 55/9, John Sempill to James, Sep. 30, 1721.
505 SPW, 49/112, James to Lansdowne, Nov. 4, 1720.
to me it will be necessary to inform Mr Dillon of it, you know the entire confidence I have in him as well as his integrity and Capacity, so that when you have communicated to him and to me what occurs to you we shall be better able to make good use of it..."\(^{506}\)

This element of his role involved representing the interests of these Jacobites to James (and occasionally Queen Mary), commending their zeal and service when appropriate, as well as patronage and charity recommendations. Before her death Queen Mary might also stand in as a proxy for James in these cases: "...Ile wait on [Queen Mary] tomorrow and shall not fail to make yours and friends complements, which I am sure will be very acceptable...Ile also talk about Mr. Scot’s concern, I supose he is in or about St. Germain, and may tell Mr. Dicconson his pretention..."\(^{507}\)

As James’ representative and intermediary in France, Dillon also performed a legal service for individual Jacobites similar to that which he executed through his financial role. He occasionally signed or witnessed notary documents for helpless Jacobites in legal matters, usually for men of his regiment and their families; his sons assisted him in this custom.\(^{508}\) Procuration, or acting as power of attorney, provided a means of income for certain Jacobites in the community (like Thadée Meagher or Anne Devienne), as displayed in Paris notarial records for this era, Dillon and his sons merely doing favours for their comrades.\(^{509}\)

International diplomacy remained the most important element of Dillon’s intermediary role. He performed the role of an ambassador but without the official title. He had originally been sent the official documented power to perform his representative role from James, who carefully re-affirmed his possession of such a document, to certify his official status and ability to perform negotiations with foreign ambassadors.\(^{510}\) Despite his recent problems with the Regent, and weakened position amid the echelons of power, he was still the Jacobite representative to the

\(^{506}\) SPW, 53/134, James to Southcott, May 25, 1721.


\(^{508}\) AN, Fonds particuliers, Minutier Centrale, Etude XVII - Jean Fromart, No. 571, Constitution de ville No.3321, Catherine O’Brien, Fev. 26, 1715; No. 572, Richard Colman, Mars 12, 1715; No. 602, Acte de Notorieté, Capt. Roger Flanagan, Oct. 12 1719.


\(^{510}\) SPW, 47/63, James to Dillon, June 8, 1720.
French State. When Ormonde wished to obtain leave to enter France, Dillon approached the French leadership on his behalf: "...I cannot comprehend [Ormonde]'s view in asking leave to come to the Country where you are, he mention'd to [James] that he had wrote to [Dillon] to obtain that leave, but [James] was not at all at a loss what Answer to make him, for he's pretty sure that 'twill not be an easy matter for [Dillon] to procure what [Ormonde] asks..."  

Dillon was the first point of contact and negotiation within France for any international partner. The Spanish ambassador to France, Sir Patrick Lawless, received specific instructions to negotiate with Dillon as the Jacobite representative.

...Lorsque V. M. [env]erra en France un Ministre soit au Roy T.C. soit pour le Congrès je l'offre a sa consideration s'il ne seroit pas a propos pour son service qu'un tel Ministre eut ordre de voir et de parler quelque fois avec M' de Dillon, dont le nom et le Charactere ne vous sont pas inconnus: J'ose repondre de sa probité et de son secret, et il pourroit dans les occasions donner quelques nouvelles d'Ang^e qui seroient utiles a V. M. car je dois luy dire le nombre de mes amis dans ce pays là est bien loin de diminuer, que leur zele augmente, et qu'ils n'attendent que l'occasion pour le faire ecclatter.^[512]

[When Your Majesty sends a Minister to the Very Christian King in France for the Congress, I offer for his consideration that it would be expedient for his service that this Minister have orders to see and speak for some time with Mr Dillon, whose name and Character are not unknown to you: I will answer for his probity and discretion, and he can on occasion give news of England which will be useful to Your Majesty because I must tell you the number of my friends in that country is far from diminishing, their zeal increases, and they only await the occasion to declare it.]

Dillon was therefore acknowledged as an official diplomatic intermediary within international diplomatic circles, and he had some standing on that stage. His reputation meant that his name was held in respect, to the extent that it could be used as a recommendation: "...You'l find here the copy of my letter to [Ormonde] which I wrote in french sign'd by my proper name, that it may be shewn to [the King of Spain] & bear ye more weight..."^[513] Of course this was helped by his internationally recognised reputation as a military commander, as demonstrated by the King of Spain's offer of a command in 1719.^[514]

Dillon's role in negotiating with (potential) international partners meant that he took on a central role in creating plots, specifically writing many Memorials outlining plans, and playing a part in the organisation of those details once determined:

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^[512] SPW, 46/117, James to the King of Spain, May 7, 1720.
^[513] SPW, 48/12, Dillon to James, July 2, 1720; accord. 52/171, Dillon to Ormonde, March 31, 1721.
^[514] Letter from a Minister of State at Turin, to a General Officer, Relating to the Expedition into Provence and Siege of Thoulon, 2nd edn. (London: John Morphew near Stationer's Hall, 1707).
...I am of opinion [the King of Spain] cannot refuse our master the troops now in his Service which are his own Subjects...the least he can do, will be to let you take what number of them you can bring with you in ye Ships which will be sent to you for that Service, if you could bring but a 1000. Good men with you, good store of arms and some money we cannot fail of Success, for with what [Dillon] can do here and what will certainly be done Elsewhere tis impossible to miscarry...\(^\text{515}\)

Through the multiplicity of his roles Dillon therefore played an important part within the Jacobite network during this period. It rendered him of great value to the Jacobites, readily acknowledged by some of his peers.\(^\text{516}\) Lansdowne emphasised his importance to James, warning what a disaster his loss (through sickness) would be to Jacobite affairs: "...Any mischance to see faithfull & so usefull a friend, would be the very worst accident that could happen to your affairs..."\(^\text{517}\) His significance was such that he was occasionally complained about by the Hanoverian leadership, and even explicitly mentioned in a letter of George I.\(^\text{518}\) Indeed during this period Dillon was the third most important Jacobite leader, after James and Ormonde; the three formed a triangle of Jacobite authority across Italy, France and Spain.

Dillon’s intimacy and influence with James even led to a growing familiarity in his manner with the king from 1719. James’ dependence on him possibly encouraged a slight change in Dillon’s style of writing to him. The essentially weak tone which the king seemed to adopt in communication with his favourites could have contributed to this. In one letter James’ directive for Dillon became more of a request, explaining the reason for the instruction, and virtually imploring his acquiescence:

...[The General] Proposed that if it came in your way you might [soon] [recommend] to the companion that I would take it kindly of him if he complyd with [b..]'s desire; if you may do as much if you find no objection against it for [J..] it appears b[..] is a little whimsical in his temper, yet I think tis reasonable for me to do what l ys in my power to entertain...his present good dispositions...\(^\text{519}\)

Dillon’s tone by contrast seems less formal and less submissive than previous letters, giving more of an impression of an equal footing between the correspondents. Like

\(^{515}\) SPW, 53/138, Sir H. Goring to Ormonde, May 26, 1721; accord. 52/179, W. Morgan to James, April 1, 1721.
\(^{516}\) SPW, 50/89, Dicconson to Hay, Dec. 11, 1720; 90, James to Jerningham, Dec. 13, 1720; 52/151, James to Ormonde, March 23, 1721; 57/94, Mar to James, Jan. 26, 1722.
\(^{517}\) SPW, 55/148, Lansdowne to James, Nov. 24, 1721.
\(^{519}\) SPW, 48/115, James to Dillon, Aug. 20, 1720.
Mar, he could be rather abrupt, even bordering on presumptuous, as where he questions James' decision-making:

...I deliver'd your packet to M'. dicconson and am concern'd you have granted his request to retire from busyness untill the present crisis in regard to the peace were quite over, I shall inform you more at large by next post of my reasons, not being well able to write much with my own hand at present. 520

Dillon would sometimes give unsolicited advice to James, framed as a request, it came close to instruction: “…this note is to remind you that I think it most necessary you should communicate to [Mr. Law] all your private dealings with [Dubois]…[Strafford] is secret and cautious which requires the same should be observ’d in his regard, I hope you have allready writt to him as mention’d in precedent letters…”521

The lack of proper deference in his tone could be attributed (in the case of coded letters) to an attempt to further hide identities, making sure than an overly obsequious manner does not give away the intended recipient. Nevertheless the change is too pronounced, and occasions of insolence too frequent to be completely accounted for by this factor. There are also exceptions where Dillon becomes as humble and eager to stress his devotion as any other Jacobite - perhaps as a defence against criticisms of too great familiarity. 522

James certainly warned him about his transgression on at least one occasion when he tried James’ patience. Dillon effectively countermanded the King’s order by stopping a packet that had already been sent. James carefully and kindly explains his worries about the consequences of Dillon’s decision and the ensuing embarrassment. He also still made sure to acknowledge Dillon’s genuine intentions, at the same time that he reminds Dillon of their respective stations: “I take very kindly of you the freedom with which you write to me. I am persuaded you have only my service in view and after that, there is no doubt that no business can go on if Ministers were not to advise with freedom, & than the Master decide as he thinks most reasonable.” 523

520 SPW, 46/114, Dillon to James, May 6, 1720; accord. 46/70, Dillon to James, Apr. 22, 1720; 73, Dillon to James, April 23, 1720; 47/9, Dillon to James, May 21, 1720; 49/9, Dillon to James, Sep. 23, 1720. That Mar also addressed James in a surprisingly familiar tone is remarked on by both Gregg and the Taylers. Edward Gregg. “The Jacobite Career of John, Earl of Mar”, in Ideology and Conspiracy: Aspects of Jacobitism 1689-1759. ed. by Cruickshanks, (Edinburgh: Donald, 1982), p. 183; Alistair and Henrietta Tayler (eds.), The Stuart Papers at Windsor, being selections from hitherto unprinted royal archives (London: Murray, 1939), p. 70.

521 SPW, 46/73, Dillon to James, April 23, 1720; accord. 46/70, Dillon to James, Apr. 22, 1720; 47/12, Dillon to James, May 22, 170; 77, Dillon to James, June 12, 1720; 112, Dillon to James, June 18, 1720.

522 SPW, 47/53, Dillon to James, June 3, 1720.

523 SPW, 50/54, James to Dillon, Nov. 28, 1720.
Dillon's attitude is exhibited in an episode which occurred during this period. Both he and Dicconson were completely overloaded with all the business they had to attend to. Dicconson hints at this, and the consequences for Dillon's performance of his duties.

...as yet it is very uncertain when we shall receive your Majesty's money, Mon. Peluchi is in Ropes to bring your matter to a revision by the Concile de Regence, and labours in it all he can, but such proceedings are dilatory & uncertain, if [Dillon] had leisure to sollicite a little more his credit and acquaintance would be able to forward ye decision; but he must not neglect other matters to attend only to that...  

James recognised this problem. He actually instructed Dillon to let Dicconson take care of the paper work, since his work was more important:

...if he thought it necessary to send a procuration to paris I advis'd it might be in M.' dicconson's name alone, which I believe you will not disapprove, your hands being full enough of matters of a higher nature, It will be fitt that M.' Dicconson and you discourse with young Chateaudoux on what he mentions in his letter in relation to your hostel de ville and when that is done you can discourse fully on your matter with M.' John Law and then let his advice be your rule as to your conduct in this affair whether before or after I am in possession of ye money...

In April of 1720 Dicconson requested much needed leave from his service of James, which James granted. However this action greatly upset Dillon because of the colossal escalation in work Dicconson's absence from business would entail. Dillon felt that he would be left to take care of all the Jacobite business in Paris, with very little support (despite Dicconson's assurances that he would still assist with affairs when necessary). He knew he could not cope without Dicconson, since he barely coped with his existing workload; indeed he believed it had already made him ill.

Dillon's reaction is described in detail by Dicconson:

...I shall most readily according to ye utmost of my power observe any orders your Majesty may hereafter think fitt to give me, and for that end shall not fay to lett both M' [Dillon] and S' William Ellis know where I am, & if I can be [assisting] to them in any kind shall on all occasions exert my poor abilities for the service of so good a Prince and the best of Masters...Having received your letter only this morning I had not much time to discours with M' [Dillon] about it, but I find him so avers from meddling in mony matters, & so unwilling I should have this place, that I have promised I will not go, till Peluchis business is ended, & will then be absent, as short a time as is possible, for he says he may be sick, & your matter it would be sad not to have some one here y' is au fait of y'...
Majestys business, I would therefore do, or suffer, anything rather than your Majestys concerns should be neglected... I will as your Majesty orders put my papers and accounts, and what belongs to y' Majesty into M' [Dillon]'s hands when I have this place, or give him y's key of my closett where they now are in order...528

Dillon rather impertinently questioned James' decision: “...I deliver'd your packet to M'. dicconson and am concern'd you have granted his request to retire from busyness untill the present crisis in regard to the peace were quite over, I shall inform you more at large by next post of my reasons...”529 James did not raise any objection to this behaviour however, accepting his complaint and giving him permission to encourage Dicconson to make his break as short as possible.530 Dillon apparently made the former feel so guilty that he promised to both cut short his leave and even continue to perform much of his previous business.

...I shall not fail to leave directions when I go from hence that what letters come to me while I am absent be sent to M' [Dillon],...but I find M' [Dillon] so avers from my being absent any considerable time, that I believe I shall not be long away...since it is published I am very little importuned, and by consequence may attend what ever I may be for y' Majestys service, which by the Grace of God I will ever perfore to y's utmost of my poor abilities so long as I live... there are indeed several things M' [Dillon] thinks would be very improper to make an alteration in, for example y'b' ordonnance for y'b' Colls mony is made payable to me, & I am obliged every four months to certify if all are alive, now he thinks it would be dangerous as well as troublesome/inconvenient to propose to y'b' Minister any change in that affaire; I am also accustomed to examine [&] syne y's Receivers demands for y's facts of [Provage] w'b' would be troublesome to M'. [Dillon] who has his hands so full of other matters...531

Only a few weeks later (and in spite of Dicconson’s sacrifices) Dillon was complaining of his own illness, and apologising for the need to move earlier than planned to recover his health – another example of his own state of health continuing to have an impact on Jacobite affairs.532 James still sympathised with his complaints, and specifically repeated the need for Dicconson to continue in his role, to assist him with minor matters: “... I was truly pleased that you prevaild upon Mr. Dicconson not to quitt business intirely hes a worthy man is on the feeling he is now will be of great use to me and...to you, for you are too necessary in great matters & too much loaded with them to have any leasure to apply yourself for smaller ones...” 533 His statement demonstrates the respect and appreciation James had for Dillon, his abilities, and his

528 SPW, 46/112, Dicconson to James, May 6, 1720.
529 SPW, 46/114, Dillon to James, May 6, 1720.
530 SPW, 47/8, James to Dillonz, May 21, 1720; 78, Dillon to James, June 13, 1720.
531 SPW, 46/134, Dicconson to James, May 13, 1720.
532 SPW, 47/53, Dillon to James, June 3, 1720.
533 SPW, 48/19, James to Dillon, July 6, 1720.
exertions in the Jacobite interest during this period.

**Approaches towards the French government**

The disrespectful tone is even more visible in Dillon’s forceful attempts to persuade James to communicate as often as possible with the Regent, Dubois and Law, in order to preserve some kind of connection with the Regent:

> ...In this Situation of affairs will not [the King] think it proper to write a Strong and feeling letter to y’ Regent for to assure him of his constant attachment to ye allegiance of France and to y’ Regent, particular friendship. He may make it plain that his own interest will require his sticking Close to both, as his only Security against y’ pretensions of ye protestant ligne, which reason will oblige him to regard as his proper Enemy any that would undertake to disturb y’ tranquillity of France, lett [the King] insist particularly on ye article of settlement made for y’ succession of this kingdom because its herin that most doubt is made of his concurrence. I fancy he can...shew his readiness to subscribe to any reasonable conditions that may be demanded of him, provided he be putt in power of perfoming...a letter of this kind may have its merit, and give room to other measures that friends here may take according to proper time and occurrences....**

James was much less convinced than Dillon about the usefulness of writing to the Regent, and reluctant to renew unnecessary communication, given his past disdain. For a long period during 1719 and 1720 James cynically resented France’s official policy towards Jacobitism: “...The reports you mention as to the Regents’ wishing me well we have also had here. We dispis’d them & laughd at then, & I have heard no more of them of late...”

James delayed, dismissed and refused Dillon’s suggestions, but Dillon persisted with the idea for months with various reasons and excuses for the necessity. Important announcements or occasions, such as births, deaths and marriages, provided particularly good opportunities to reinforce Jacobite needs, as far as Dillon was concerned, and he repeatedly admonished James on such occasions.

Dillon doggedly encouraged any advances that could possibly be made towards the French government, even when James had essentially given up all hope or even real desire for that alliance. He recommended putting most of their exertions into courting the French, reiterating advice to the king:

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534 SPW, 46/59, Dillon to James, April 15, 1720.
535 SPW, 48/77, James to Ormonde, July 1720.
536 SPW, 45/74, James to Dillon, Oct. 1719; 46/33a, Dillon to James, April 1, 1720; 101, James to Dillon, May 4, 1720; MAE, Correspondance Politique, Angleterre, MS 339, Correspondance de Destouches, Chammorel, chargés d’affaires, 1721-22, James to the Regent, Jan. 1, 1721, ff.6a-b.
[to]...pursue with fervency an entire understanding between France and Spain as the basis of his restoration and support, the second is, to incline more to France as the principal, and regard Spain as secondary, the third and most delicate point, is to remove all suspicions of becoming averse to the Regent's view, which is the touchstone that renders all things good or bad, and the only tie by which ye adverse party endeavours to fasten him. 537

Dillon even managed to convince James to restore his relationship with Berwick, as an additional and crucial link to the Regent. Berwick had a difficult and erratic relationship with his royal brother. When Berwick refused to disobey the commands of his military commander and ruler by leading the 1715 Rising, he lost James' trust for several years. The depth of James' disappointment and resentment at Berwick's decision is shown in a letter James wrote to Bolingbroke shortly after the Rising had failed.

...[Duke of Berwick] is so incommunicable and incomprehensible that as the surest way at present is the best, I have directed D[uke of] O[rmonde] to say nothing to him of the present resolutions. [Duke of Berwick] is now a cypher and can do no more harm, and if he withdraws his duty from me, I may well my confidence from him. I must confess I cannot but suspect that he hath been sooner or later the cause of the strange diffidence they have of me at the French court, where he never did me good, and where I would never put it in his power to do me harm... 538

This rift between the two is described in some detail by Sir Charles Petrie. He quotes from the Duke of Liria's diary (Berwick's eldest son), depicting the resentful and disrespectful behaviour of James towards Berwick and Liria during the period and a letter from Berwick to Liria. According to Liria the rupture proper started with the dismissal of Bolingbroke, who was a close friend of Berwick. 539

James continued to be very wary of trusting or even really reaching out to Berwick, despite Berwick's position with the Regent making it imperative for the Jacobites to be at the very least on a good standing with him. Dillon realised this, and started to encourage James to do more to involve him:

...As to [Berwick] and spouse, I think it is plain...that they intended to give an overture to a farther correspondence and perhaps a friendly explication with [the King] tis most certain that [Berwick's] present access and credit near [the Regent] may render him very usefull to [James] if sincere...and I think tis very probable he may become the reverse if barr'd from the hopes of reconciliation, your answer to him solves this last difficulty in some measure, but neither that, nor his letter to you are sufficient to make up matters with the confidence this conjuncture requires...[Berwick's] favour may not be of the same value in three months hence, therefore, could heartily wish a good understanding were

537 SPW, 47/9, Dillon to James, May 21, 1720; accord. 5, Dillon to James, May 20, 1720; 12, Dillon to James, May 22, 1720.
perclos'd whilst he is in a situation of being essentially serviceable...whatever his thoughts may be, mine will be always intent on what appears most conducive to [James’] interest, my opinion of him is, that a man of his character would not in the present Juncure profess a concern and wishes of prosperity to one in [James’] situation without having a real design to contribute thereunto, and good hopes of a favourable disposition to succeed...^540

James therefore decided to make advances to Berwick, sending him a conciliatory letter, though simultaneously making his usefulness to the Jacobite cause clear to him:

...I am the more sensible of it at this time that I see no body can so effectually promote my interest as your self, and there is no dispute but that your not appearing publicly in my affairs is the very thing which will enable you yet more to forward them in this juncture. The singular attachment you have for the Regent and the great & just esteem he hath for you cannot but give the greatest force to all such advices as come from you...^547

James thereby restored their connection and communication, and had ostensibly forgiven Berwick, profusely professing his trust in his letters.^542

...I am extream sensible of the zeal you express for me & of your desire of having measures to shew it me, you alone can judge when that may happen, & I have an entire Confidence in your friendship, that on a proper & reasonable juncture, you will trye the Regent on what relates to me; I am perswaded it hath been necessity & not choice that hath obliged him to appear otherwise than friendly for time past towards me, but that doth not hinder me seeing where my true interest lyes, nor will it make me neglect any opportunity of expressing any attachment both to what I have much at heart... I doubt not in the least of your best endeavours to serve me...^543

Eventaully Dillon also managed to convince James and the rest of the leadership that by a concerted diplomatic effort he, along with Ormonde, could persuade Spain and France to unite in a front against Britain. They were optimistic about their chances of succeeding in theendeavour, and of the willingness of each party to enter into an alliance under certain conditions.^544 By the end of the year however it had become clear that these misplaced hopes of French assistance rested on foundations of sand (as Berwick spelled out).^545 Spain naturally refused to support the Jacobites again without French assistance. Yet, even in the teeth of this absolute refusal, and the

^540 SPW, 46/142, Dillon to James, May 13, 1720; accord. 47/132, Dillon to James, June 25, 1720.
^541 SPW, 48/63, James to Berwick, July 26, 1720; accord. 62, James to Dillon, July 26, 1720.
^542 SPW, 49/26, James to Berwick, Oct. 1, 1720; 50/37, Berwick to James, Nov. 19, 1720; 108, James to Berwick, Dec. 18, 1720; 125, Berwick to James, Dec. 24, 1720; 51/63, James to Berwick, Jan. 19, 1721; 90, Berwick to James, Jan. 25, 1721; 52/72, Berwick to James, March 1, 1721; 62/123, James to Berwick, Oct. 21, 1722; 63/13, James to Berwick, Nov. 14, 1722.
^543 SPW, 49/26, James to Berwick, Oct. 1, 1720.
^544 SPW, 49/51, Ormonde to James, Oct. 14, 1720; 79, James to Ormonde, Oct. 23, 1720; 80, James to Dillon, Oct. 23, 1720; 98, Dillon to James, Oct. 28, 1720; 50/11, Dillon to James, Nov. 11, 1720; 49, Hay to James, Nov. 26, 1720.
^545 SPW, 50/3, Berwick to James. Nov. 9, 1720; 80, Ormonde to James, Dec. 9, 1720.
complete lack of concrete assurances from the Regent, Dillon maintained some optimism:

As it is plain in precedent letters that there will be a fair prospect to bring [the King's] case to a tryall towards easter term, he and lawyers should do all in their power for to dispose matters so as to be well prepar'd. [K. of Spain's] ingaging in ye African stocks damps in a great measure expectations that might be reasonably grounded on his assistance...therefore no stone must be left unturn'd to overcome the difficulties about [the Regent’s] plaiding our cause...  

Meanwhile James had accepted Dillon’s insistence as to the need to keep up the ties and contact with the French government by writing to the Regent on important occasions, as dictated by the social proprieties. The official announcement of the birth of Charles Edward provided such an opportunity.

...J'en ay une enti[e]re confiance, et celle que j'ay en vostre amitié est sans bornes, ma famille vous regarde comme son appuy veritable, et vous ne me rendez que justice Monsieur si vous estes persuaded que ma reconnaissance et mon attachement pour vous, n'auvant d'autre limites que ceux de mon pouvoir, petite a la verite a present...  

[...I am entirely confident in it, and that which I have in your friendship is without limits, my family regards you as a real support, and you only grant me justice Sir if you believe that my gratitude and attachment to you is constrained only by the limits to my power, little as that is at present...]

The Regent’s consequent acknowledgement of this announcement encouraged James to raise his expectations for the relationship. After the Whig minister Stanhope’s death vague hints were made to the Jacobites that the Regent might soon show slightly more sympathy toward the Jacobite point of view:

I told y'M: in my last of y^ 5. I thought it prudent not to see or mention his affairs to Mons.' S.' Contez, but since I hear he has Instructions about them from the Regent he was pleas'd to say that since ye discontents were so great In Eng.' & y'y. M. had such a number of Partisans well Inclin'd, they ought to give proofs of their Intentions, & then it would be time to judge how France stood affected. These things were communicated to me by y'^ Person to whom y' were spoke...  

Such hints seemed very promising to Dillon, who strongly encouraged James’ new optimism as to the Regent’s attitude towards James: “...Dillon to be sure enforms you of what a good friend I have in M'. le Duc. & I am doing all I can to Cultivate his friendship which may be of the greatest use especialy if the troubles in France

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546 SPW, 50/48, Dillon to James, Nov. 25, 1720; 67, Dillon to James, Dec. 2, 1720.  
547 SPW, 51/2, James to the Regent, Jan. 1, 1721.  
548 SPW, 51/111, Regent to Gualterio, Jan. 30, 1721; 52/53, James to Ormonde, Feb. 22, 1721; 83, James to Orrery, March 3, 1721.  
549 SPW, 52/138, Jemingham to James, March 19, 1721; accord. 87, Jemingham to James, March 5, 1721.
increase ... Lansdowne also stimulated these new hopes from his own perception of meetings which he held with the Regent himself. James thereby came to believe that while nothing could change with Dubois under the existing circumstances, if Dubois’ friendship were gained, or in his absence, the French government could be persuaded that his own restoration would be of advantage to France:

...I am but too sensible notwithstanding the present favourable disposition it will be hard to undertake anything effectual without foreign help... Mr. Dillon uses his best endeavours in France, where I have many considerable friends or either where I do not believe I have enemie except Abbé du Bois, I have been for some considerable time past doing what depended on me to gain him, but as yet I cannot discover whether he be to be gained, or not, or what alteration his friend Stanhope’s death may have made upon him, if he were favourably inclined or out of employment I should have great hopes but without one or t’other I fear it will be hard to prevail upon the Regent to be favourable to us, however we shall not be rebuted, and all probable means are & shall be used to obtain a succour...

Of course Jacobites tended to seize on good news, believing positive rumours and exaggerating opportunities. Even Ormonde and James occasionally fell victim to such rumours, in spite of their own knowledge of secret political affairs. Dillon especially clung to the slightest indication or rumours of change in political events, seeing any potential foreign policy change as a sign of an upswing in Jacobite fortunes, in spite of the utterly fruitless nature of past attempts and the persistently hopeless appearance of their political affairs with the French government.

His stated opinions to James as to Jacobite prospects appear genuine. It is unlikely he was exaggerating these expectations purely for James’ benefit - to increase his standing with James or vindicate his post; after all he had little to gain from grandstanding, when events would soon prove the accuracy of his. Unlike most Jacobites, Dillon was in the rare position of not depending financially on his post and therefore on royal favour. In fact, he essentially made a financial sacrifice by assuming his post, since it prevented his acceptance of a more profitable military or bureaucratic office. Rather, he shouldered the burden purely out his sense of duty and allegiance to the cause. It is thus credible that he was honest with James and the other leaders when it came to his views on the prospects of the cause.

550 SPW, 52/151, James to Ormonde, March 23, 1721; accord. 54/18, James to Mar, July 14, 1721; 23, James to Ormonde, July 14, 1721; 77, James to Orrery, Aug. 3, 1721.
551 SPW, 54/19, James to Lansdowne, July 14, 1721.
552 SPW, 53/46, James to Mr. Caesar, April 21, 1721; accord. 52/83, James to Orrery, March 3, 1721; 150, James to Mr. le Duc, March 23, 1721; 53/49, James to Orrery, April 22, 1721.
553 SPW, 47/72, Ormonde to James, June 11, 1720; 91, Ormonde to James, June 14 and 15, 1720.
Meanwhile Berwick’s renewed correspondence with James remained infrequent, and not very warm. James never completely forgave Berwick, as he still had reservations about trusting him. Tensions and resentments soon surfaced between Berwick and some Jacobites, including Dillon. The latter harboured a long standing resentment by an obviously longstanding resentment against the Marshal, yet was determined not to allow this to impede Jacobite opportunities.

...as to what [Berwick] alleged about reflections made upon him in one of [Mar’s] letters...I presume there is no real grounds for his complain on that score, and that it was only a pretext to have some excuses made to him upon it...I have strong reasons to believe that some medling persons in this neighbourhood to shew their zeal for [Berwick] and gain ye protection of so great a favourite, have insinuated to him that [Dillon] used all strategems to hinder [James’] reconciliation with him, and I find this invention has gain’d credit with some folks who I fear Judges of others by their own inclinations, my comfort is, that [James] who is a just & competent Judge knows ye truth of ye matter...I must own...that, tho he had twice ye power he has, I would sooner be reduced to ye greatest want than humble myself to ask him ye least favour, you'l easily believe this since I told [the Regent] when he gave me ye command of provence that I could not upon any account resolve to serve under [Berwick]...but as I regard ye use he may be to [James’] interest preferable to all other things, and that I know he can influence an enterprise in his favour with more facility than any other, I could heartily wish you were reconciled to him whilst he is in a situation to do essentaill service...a favourite whose reputation is so well established here... its judged he seldome proposes any scheme but upon sure grounds, this is [the Regents] opinion of [Berwick] when he thinks entirely devoted to his interest...554

Berwick certainly never achieved concrete financial, political or military aid for the Jacobites with the Regent (if he even attempted any such intercession); indeed his assistance essentially stretched only as far as accepting some of James’ patronage requests for certain officers, as described above. The relationship deteriorated even further over the next few years. James even advised the triumvirate leadership of Dillon, Mar and Lansdowne to be wary of putting too much trust in his professions of zealous service for the cause, or of informing him of any Jacobite secrets.555

...you on the place can best judge of the Duke of Berwick’s credit with the French Court and of his willingness to employ it in my favour and as there ought to be no exception of persons in some Cases you will do perfectly well to endeavour to enter into friendship with him, but I think it would be dangerous to say anything to him which we would not have the Regent know, and past experience makes me expect very little that he will be hereafter usefull to me, I wish I may be mistaken, and provided it is not put in his power to do hurt I shall

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554 SPW, 48/28A, Dillon to Ormonde, July 8, 1720.
555 SPW, 61/46, James to Lansdowne, July 26, 1722; 71, James to Dillon, Aug. 2, 1722; 111, Lansdowne to James, Aug. 17, 1722; 165, James to Dillon, Sept. 4, 1722; 79/111, Atterbury to James, Jan. 29, 1725.
desire no better than to owe him the obligation of doing good, but still take along with you that he is a french man, he & I have been on terms of Civility for some time past we write now and then to one another...his uncle’s [Marlborough] death may it is true diminish his caution in some respect, but it certainly will not make him less a french man...

His lack of trust was possibly exacerbated by Berwick’s apparent reluctance to attempt patronage favours which James requested of him, as well as by his continual failure to achieve (if attempted at all) any softening whatsoever in the Regent’s attitude towards the cause, the foremost mission James had tasked him with. The Duke of Liria on the other hand must have maintained some affection and sense of duty to James despite his father’s warnings to him about the King’s ungrateful behaviour, as he sustained his own correspondence with James well after Berwick had essentially given up on attempting to assist the Jacobite cause. He assured James of his zeal and “readiness to obey all your Majesty’s commands in all occasions.” He maintained a similar relationship with James as some of these aforementioned prominent French nobles, with both sides calling on each other for favours when required. Indeed by 1727 the rift seems to have been completely healed as far as Liria was concerned.

The Triumvirate

The formation of the faction of Dillon, George Granville, Lord Lansdowne and the Earl of Mar started relatively late. Mar finally arrived in Paris from Spa at the same time that Lansdowne joined the exiled Jacobites there, in July 1720. Lansdowne moved to Paris in order to settle his family’s financial situation by attempting to negotiate with the Whig government, however the South Sea Bubble put paid to and

556 SPW, 61/46, James to Lansdowne, July 26, 1722; accord. 111, Lansdowne to James, Aug. 17, 1722.
557 SPW, 49/26, James to Berwick, Oct. 1, 1720; 50/3, Berwick to James, Nov. 9, 1720; 54/75, James to Berwick, Aug. 3, 1721; 60/118, James to Berwick, July 4, 1722; 61/108, Berwick to James, Aug. 15; 62/123, James to Berwick, Oct. 21, 1722; 63/110, James to Dillon, Dec. 4, 1722.
558 SPW, 78/171, Due de Liria to James, Dec. 30, 1724; 79/129, James to Duc de Liria, Feb. 2, 1725.
559 SPW, 78/146, James to Duc de Liria, Dec. 22, 1724.
560 SPW, 45/130, Liria to James, Jan. 7, 1720; 76/57, James to Duc de Liria, Aug. 21, 1724; 140, Due de Liria to James, Sep. 8, 1724; 77/45, James to Duc de Liria, Oct. 1, 1724; 79/129, James to Duc de Liria, Feb. 2, 1725; 132, Duke of Liria to James, Feb. 3, 1725.
561 Petrie, Marshal Duke of Berwick, p. 308.
562 SPW, 48/57, Dillon to James, July 23, 1720; 71, Dillon to James, July 29, 1720. Lansdowne was born in 1666, a Jacobite from his youth, and a prominent Tory under Queen Anne. He became involved in plotting the 1715 Rising after he lost his political offices on the accession of George I. Eveline Cruickshanks, ‘Granville, George, Baron Lansdowne and Jacobite duke of Albemarle (1666–1735)’ in ODNB.
he settled there permanently.\textsuperscript{563} On his arrival in Paris Lansdowne he formed a close relationship with his fellow Jacobites in Paris, facilitated by his acquaintance with Mar. since the 1715 Rising, and had some knowledge of Dillon's correspondence with important English Jacobites during the previous years; moreover James specifically asked Dillon to make contact with Lansdowne and ascertain the extent to which he could be trusted with secret Jacobite affairs.\textsuperscript{564}

From that point on a triumvirate of Mar, Dillon and Lansdowne soon formed, and can be seen most clearly as a group of James' most trusted advisors. This involved constant interaction, enabled by their physical proximity, and high respect for each other, to the extent that they shared and discussed their ideas together almost daily. Their intimacy is clearly expressed by Lansdowne to Mar: "... I never had a secret from you nor never will. The present Instance is a proof of it... I hope [Dillon] will be here in the Evening, I shall have no scruples with him, esteeming it for the Service..."\textsuperscript{565}

In nearly constant communication, they frequently co-wrote their correspondence, or others would write to them together; Dillon often became the primary receptor for the post from overseas for all three.\textsuperscript{566} Their consensus of opinions especially would be written by or to one party, usually Dillon, as evidenced by Lansdowne's remarks to James: "I have forborne a great while being troublesome with any particular letter, M.' Dilllon communicating my thoughts with his own..."\textsuperscript{567}

Although Lansdowne had a less prominent position in the Jacobite network than Mar or Dillon - he did not have an official role as Dillon did, nor was he as influential or dominant as Mar – James started to place great trust in this newly arrived English grandee. Perhaps this stemmed from Lansdowne's obvious intimacy and standing with Dillon and Mar, but James was also (rightly) convinced himself and appreciated Lansdowne's genuine and innocent loyalty, and his understanding and perception: "you did well to speak freely to Ld Lansdown about Sr Robert Sutton that matter cannot be in better hands than his, and you can never err in following what directions you receive from him the Duke of Mar or Dillon, & as for Ld Lansdown himself he

\textsuperscript{564} SPW, 48/12, Dillon to James, July 2, 1720; 37, James to Dillon, July 15, 1720; Handasyde, pp. 142-147, 174-175.
\textsuperscript{565} SPW, 58/85, Lansdowne to Mar, March 18, 1722.
\textsuperscript{566} SPW, 51/23, James to Lansdowne, Jan. 4, 1721; 55/138, James to Lansdowne, Nov. 22, 1721; 57/39, Mar to Hay, Jan. 12, 1722; 60/66, James to Lansdowne, June 21, 1722.
\textsuperscript{567} SPW, 53/108, Lansdowne to James, May 19, 1721.
is well acquainted with the great value & particular friendship I have for him... 

His advice was certainly taken as seriously as that of either Mar or Dillon. The great respect marked itself in various gestures he made towards him, including and not least his appointment as Secretary of State.

James increasingly depended on these most trusted intimates, leading to a dominance of the ‘triumvirate’ within the Jacobite network. He relied especially heavily on the guidance of the group, not only asking for and considering their advice, but most often accepting it and directing his decisions accordingly. He even relied on them to make some of his most important decisions; indeed he hardly made any decisions on his own without consulting them.

The Triumvirate even grouped together to make decisions on affairs without James’ input. One particular occasion, according to Mar, required urgent action to be taken, and the three took it upon themselves to reply directly to the news from England:

In my last I gave you an account of what had past betwixt [Mr. Dillon], [Ld Lansdowne] & [D. Mar] on what had been sent from [Sr. H. Goring]. [D. Mar] afterwards turning all that affair in his head & the different consequences it might have in relation to [ye King] personally as well as to theat great affair in general, put his thoughts I am told, in writing upon it & sent it to [Mr Dillon] to be communicated to [D. Mar] that they two might make something out of it fit to be sent immediately to [ye King’s friends] wt [England], thinking it better to come from them to the last than from [ye King]...

A particularly clear example of their influence is revealed in James’ search for a Secretary of State. After being forced to let Murray go from the post, he himself dealt with all his business with the bare minimum of assistance for the ensuing months, while at the same time desperately searching for anyone who could perform basic clerical tasks, as well as a feasible candidate for the Secretaryship. James first consulted the English Jacobites as to potential candidates in England who could be brought to Rome; a process which produced no formal nomination.

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568 SPW, 54/21, James to Menzies, July 14, 1721.
569 SPW, 51/65, James to Lansdowne, Jan. 19, 1721; 55/82, James to Lansdowne, Nov. 2, 1721.
570 SPW, 54/170, James to Mar, Sept. 19, 1721; 55/19, James to Mar, Oct. 4, 1721; 59, James to Mar, Oct. 25, 1721; 91, Mar to James, Nov. 8, 1721; 114, Mar to Hay, Nov. 4, 1721; 69/42, James to Hay, Sep. 20, 1723.
571 SPW, 55/82, James to Lansdowne, Nov. 2, 1721.
572 SPW, 55/148, Lansdowne to James, Nov. 24, 1721; 67/98, James to Lansdowne, June 19, 1723.
573 SPW, 55/48, Mar to James, Oct. 20, 1721; accord. 55/36, Mar to James, Oct. 13, 1721; 56/114, Mar to James, Dec. 29, 1721.
574 SPW, 50/20, Hay to James, Nov. 12, 1720; 51/60, James to Mar, Jan. 19, 1721; 65, James to Lansdowne, Jan. 19, 1721; 52/54, James to Mar, Feb. 22, 1721.
575 SPW, 49/25(a), Memoire, James, Sep. 1720; 53/83, Dillon to James, May 5, 1721; Handasyde, p. 182.
James thus turned to the Triumvirate for a decision that might have been expected to be his own. Yet he asked each of the three not only to put forward suitable candidates but to discuss the problem between the three of them, and thereby make a decision as to which candidate to nominate.

...in relation to the choice of a new secretary...as it will be impossible for me to determine or fix on any one person without advice, I desire you & Dillon will think seriously & without delay on the matter, and let me know your opinion as to the choice of a person that I may be enabled to take my resolution, I am very sensible you will be both of you at a loss what advice to give me, but my affairs must greatly suffer, if I do not speedily fill the place, and if one cannot find a person one could wish, it is still to be hoped that one may find one, who may at least answer some ends, it is true the material part of business may while I am in health be done by myself, but the lesser sort of correspondence which is still necessary...must unavoidably be interrupted, while people have no body to address to but my self...In asking yours and Dillon's advice I expose neither you nor my self to any inconvenience...should my friends in England, which I don't believe, in the mean time propose some persons to me it is only a little trouble lost, whereas if I want for their return, without takeing any...much time will be lost in doing then, what I now propose to you...I shall expect with impatience yours and Dillon's return to this and I am very sure that both of you wish my person and cause too well not to do [a]ll that lyes on you, to extricate me out of the labyrinth in which I find my self.

This smacked of desperation on James' part. The lack of any Jacobites willing to undertake the job, who could fulfil any of its most basic criteria, had made the task almost insuperable. James had originally desired to find the ideal candidate; thus his plea to the triumvirate to suggest virtually anyone who might actually be persuaded to take on the job.

At last a group of English Jacobites suggested Lord Lansdowne, a candidate whom Mar and Dillon both greatly approved, though unsure as to Lansdowne's own agreement. James, convinced himself of Lansdowne's suitability for the role, and requested Lansdowne to undertake the position in his service. However, Lansdowne eschewed the role: family commitments in Paris made it impossible to travel to Rome at any point in the foreseeable future. This he did with great embarrassment, but no real reluctance, given that he had no wish to undertake such a difficult, controversial, thankless and altogether undesirable role. Lansdowne seems to have been glad to have an unassailable excuse, which James had no choice but to accept, if as a postponement rather than an absolute rejection.

...You will to be sure be acquainted with the difficultys Ld Lansdown meetts with in relation to his coming here, he has writ to me upon that subject a most

578 SPW, 55/160, Lansdowne to James, Sept. 14, 1721.
sincere & zealous letter but as the case stands with him it would certainly be a Cruelty in me to require his present attendance, and on t’other side it would not I think be convenient for me to decide immediady my self in the matter against his coming here...I have therefore made him a very kind reply, reserving the determination to himself, and that once done, it would not be proper for me that I should press to much directly my self for his decision, tho at the same time it is certainly very desireable that I should know it out of hand, that I may take my measures accordingly, I wish therefore that you & [Dillon] could so contrive matters with him as that I may have his answer out of hand...579

His desperation led James to entertain a vain hope of eventually persuading Lansdowne to take on the role. It took several weeks for him to realise that Lansdowne’s family affairs were such an obstacle that it was impossible to wait for his release from them.580 He does not appear to have held the rebuff against Lansdowne; subsequently elevating him to an Earldom, and in an early plan for what later became the Atterbury plot, James named Lansdowne as his acting Secretary of State and interim leader of non-military affairs in the event of a successful rebellion in England.581

With a viable candidate for Secretary of State still lacking, John Hay, Mar’s brother-in-law, became a temporary assistant, purely to relieve the king from the ‘drudgery’ of his affairs.582 In the end the continued lack of a decent candidate for the Secretary position meant that Hay ended up becoming more and more permanent, important and influential. Eventually James rewarded Hay by officially appointing him Secretary of State in August 1724.583

A perception existed within the Jacobite community that Mar tended to dominate the group. This can be seen as early as the end of 1720 when Hay stated that “[Mar] has more weight with a great many people here than [Dillon] and people are much freer with him as to what I can observe and I believe in most things Dillon follows [Mar’s] advice to the letter, tho there is other things where the point d’honneur is concerned

579 SPW, 55/19, James to Mar, Oct. 4, 1721.
580 SPW, 54/77, James to Orrery, Aug. 3, 1721; 54/160, Lansdowne to James, Sept. 14, 1721; 55/19, James to Mar, Oct. 4, 1721; 22, James to Mar, Oct. 6, 1721; 48, Mar to James, Oct. 20, 1721; 77, James to Orrery, Aug. 3, 1721; 82, James to Lansdowne, Nov. 2, 1721.
581 SPW, 50/128, James to Dillon, Dec. 30, 1720; 54/98, James’ Command to Mar, Aug. 11, 1721; 55/22, James to Mar, Oct. 6, 1721.
582 Hay was a son of the Earl of Kinnoull, born in 1691. He acted as an agent for Mar leading up to and during the 1715 Rising, and likewise had to escape to France on its failure. His connection to Mar assisted him at the Jacobite court, and he therefore followed the court to Rome where he became very useful to James. For further biographical information on Hay see Margaret D. Sankey, ‘Hay, John, of Cromlix, Jacobite duke of Inverness (1691–1740)’ in ODNB.
583 SPW, 76/100, James to Dillon, Aug. 29, 1724.
when all the world won’t byase him, which is an excellent Quality.” Mar did essentially lead the group, through his status as James’ ‘second’ (as previous Secretary of State and favourite), his Ducal rank, and his natural authority. Lansdowne also deferred somewhat to Mar’s dominant personality and standing, hardly surprising given Lansdowne’s recent introduction to the ranks of the exiled community. This deference pervades his correspondence:

...In obedience to your commands I have sent you K. C.s warrant and a draught for another upon that foundation only (for I will plead no merit of my own) desiring that this may appear to be an act of meer justice from our master... than to shew that no time should make such services be forgotten. I could say a great deal upon this subject, but to you it is un-necessary, I know you take it right and I have an entire dependence upon your friendship."

However the opposition faction fostered and amplified this perception. It gained traction during the later period of intense enmity between Mar and the faction, who asserted that Mar’s sway over Dillon had become increasingly intense, and that Dillon had become his pawn (see Chapter Four).

Historians of this period of Jacobite politics have not questioned the opposition faction’s denunciations of Mar’s control over Dillon and Lansdowne; Indeed, Gregg sustains this representation of the Triumvirate’s relationships, placing too much credence in the accusations of the faction in Rome and consequently overstating Mar’s domination of Dillon. He replicates the image of both Dillon and Lansdowne as Mar’s lackeys, referring to Dillon as Mar’s ‘chief agent in Paris’, and stating that “it is clear that the major decisions were made by Mar, and the other men unwittingly served as his dupes to cover his actions with their approval”. Bennett also reinforced this portrayal; “in Paris Dillon and Lansdowne were like clay in the hands of a man of stronger personality and superior intelligence, and imperceptibly he slipped into the position of director of the whole Jacobite enterprise.”

However this is not an entirely accurate depiction of their interaction. The triumvirate collaborated and minutely discussed their decisions, as is clearly shown by statements about their frequent meetings and in their correspondence. Furthermore they took decisions and conveyed opinions to James after the contribution and agreement of all three. Lansdowne himself made this point to

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584 SPW, 50/74, Hay to James, Dec. 3, 1720.
585 SPW, 55/72, Lansdowne to Mar, Oct. 30, 1721.
586 Gregg, ‘Jacobite Career’, pp. 184, 188.
587 Bennett, p. 243.
588 SPW, 56/107, James to Lansdowne, Dec. 27, 1721; 114, Mar to James, Dec. 29, 1721; 66/5, Lansdowne to James, Jan. 25, 1723; 6, Mar to Hay, Jan. 25, 1723,
James: "Since the arrival of these letters I have not seen [Dillon] nor [Mar]: till I have some serious discourse with them I must defer coming to any opinion what return may be advisable to make..." Mar did not make the decisions unilaterally, and he did not give orders to the other two. Dillon retained sufficient influence with James, and authority within the Jacobite network and community which enabled him to remain on virtually an equal footing with Mar during this period, and not in a position where he was obliged to simply carry out Mar's commands. Furthermore, Dillon always retained his own judgement and some independence from Mar. Indeed he had a forceful and authoritative personality of his own, perfectly capable of holding his own opinions.

Abbe Dubois

Dillon's confidence in the potential transformation of the Regent's course even applied to the most doubtful of prospects, the possibility of gaining the cooperation of the Abbe Dubois. Dubois emerged as the most powerful man in France during this period, by exercising dominance over the Regent. Dubois coveted a red hat; seeing himself as the new incarnation of Richelieu and Mazarin. For years he had desperately used all the influence he had for this effort, but all his attempts had failed. In early 1720 Dubois realised the contemporary political context gave him the perfect opportunity to play George I and James off against each other to make some progress in his ambition, by being appointed to a bishopric:

Deployant toute l'astuce de son caractere, Dubois trouva l'art de faire agir a la fois aupres de la cour de Rome les deux souverains qui se disputaient la couronne d'Angleterre, le catholique et le protestant. Il promettait a Georges ler de travailler a maintenir le Pretendant dans l'impuissance de lui nuire. [Employing all the astuteness of his character, Dubois found the way to make the two sovereigns, Catholic and Protestant, who dispute the crown of England, act at the same time on the court at Rome. He promised George I to try to ensure the continued weakness of the Pretender's position...]

Dillon and John Law pushed James to attempt to support Dubois' elevation,

589 SPW, 63/129, Lansdowne to James, Dec. 7, 1722.
591 Dubois, Mémoires secrets, Tome I, pp. 1-12; Ladurie, Saint Simon and the Court of Louis XIV, pp. 315-317.
592 Dubois, Mémoires secrets, Tome I, p. 12.
reasoning that if he gained this preferment for the ambitious prelate, he would become more amenable to the Jacobite cause in his vital position as the principal officeholder in France. James mistrusted Dubois; Dillon agreed but felt that his "present generous behaviour towards you is a good omen for what he intends to do herafter..." Law advised that it could do no harm, as long as they did not trust him too far. James agreed with this conclusion, though any intervention on his behalf seemed impossible. However the prospects soon improved, giving James some hope of success.

I had t’other day a long conference with the Pope civilitys & flattery s were not spar’d on either side, & that was the way I was advis’d to take to gain my point as to the Bp of Cambray & it succeeded for I think I may be sure that the Pope only waits for ane vacancy to give him the hat. The Bishop is to be informed of what past and tis to be insinuated to him that he is the more obliged to me for this last effort, that I made it to keep my word with him & the Regent a few days after I had receivd accts from England by which I perceived he was lookt upon there as the greatest opposer of my interest in France. If the fact be really true it will shew him I am not his babble, if it be false he will be piqué d’honneur to convince me of it...

Several Jacobites including Lord Orrery and Ormonde warned James about his corrupt reputation.

At this time the Regent supported Dubois’ efforts to obtain the preferment by writing to the Pope on his behalf. The Whig government in London, pleased with Dubois’ zealous support in their favour with the Regent, also supported him. James support had to be kept entirely secret, as open acknowledgement of his involvement in the matter would only create severe problems for James himself. James eventually succeeded in January 1721 in getting a promise of episcopal preferment for the Abbé. He was encouraged by Dubois’ expressions of gratitude and subsequent more gracious manner towards the Jacobites, but like Law, Ormonde and Mar, had little faith in him. Clement XI’s death in March 1721 put paid to the bishopric. Negotiations during consequent conclave took place on behalf of the Regent with the future Innocent XIII, eventuating in a highly secret deal whereby James would be granted financial

593 SPW, 47/63, James to Dillon, June 8, 1720.
594 SPW, 46/143, Dillon to James, May 13, 1720.
595 SPW, 47/5, Dillon to James, May 20, 1720; 63, James to Dillon, June 8, 1720.
596 SPW, 48/77, James to Ormonde, July 1720; 50/29, James to Dillon, Nov. 17, 1720.
597 SPW, 48/37, James to Dillon, July 15, 1720.
598 SPW, 48/69, Orrery to James, July 29, 1720; 49/51, Ormonde to James, Oct. 14, 1720.
599 Dubois, Mémoires secrets, Tome II, pp. 22-23; SPW, 48/19, James to Dillon, July 6, 1720.
600 MAE, Correspondance Politique, Angleterre, MS 339, James to Dubois, Jan 15, 1721, ff.18b-19a; SPW, 52/155, Mar to Hay, March 24, 1721; 53/31, Ormonde to James, April 16, 1721; 49, James to Orrery, April 22, 1721; 84, James to Ormonde, May 5, 1721.
aid by the Regent in return for supporting Dubois. The cardinal insisted on gaining James’ permission for the move, sending a messenger to him to be assured of James’ acquiescence. Once elected in May, Innocent XIII reneged on the deal, appointing his brother to the post. In his attempts to pursue the matter with Cardinal de Rohan, the Regent’s envoy in Rome, Dubois dismissed Jacobite aims with James’ involvement as illusory:

Comme le parti du chevalier de Saint-Georges se flatte de pouvoir faire quelques mouvements en Angleterre, capables de contribuer à son rétablissement, ils peuvent avoir pensé, qu’en engageant le pape à tenir en suspense la grâce que j’espère, je pourrais être plus dispose à entrer dans leurs vues, et à favoriser ce qui serait proposé à Son Altesse Royale. Mais je ne crois pas qu’il y ait rien de prochain à espérer; et quelques vues qu’ils aient à mon égard, s’ils étaient bien clair-voyans, bien loin de reculer une promotion en ma faveur, ils devaient désirer que je fisse incessamment revêtue de la dignité de cardinal. Je prends la liberté de faire cette observation à votre éminence, afin que si elle pouvait soupçonner que le roi Jacques eût eu cette pensée, elle prit les mesures qu’elle jugera à propos pour l’en faire désabuser.

[As the Jacobites flatter themselves that they will be able to undertake a rebellion in England capable of contributing to his re-establishment, they have thought that in persuading the pope to hold on to the favour of which I have hopes, I would thus be more disposed to sympathise with their views, and to use my favour on their behalf with His Royal Highness. But I do not believe that they have any hopes, and some opinion that they had about me were very clear sighted, very far from declining a promotion in my favour they must desire that I incessantly assume the dignity of a cardinal. I take the liberty of observing to your éminence, that if she suspected that King James had had such thoughts, she would have taken the measures that she judged appropriate to disabuse him of it.]

In the meantime, and in spite of Dubois’ double-part, and the reservations of other Jacobites, Dillon actually had enough confidence to send him letters which clarified events in Britain. He must have had some confidence in the possibility of persuading Dubois to lean towards the Jacobites, as he appealed to him to support their cause with the Regent.

Dillon also claims in a second letter a few days later to have been forced to keep a low profile for some time, preventing him from meeting openly with the Regent. According to Dillon this was because of rather ambiguous ‘jealousies’:

Monseigneur, Je me suis donné l’honneur de...vous envoyer un état des affaires de la grande Bretagne suivant des bons mémoires adressez du 24 avril...si mes éclaircissements peuvent vous être de quelque utilité suivant ce que Jay pris la

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601 Dubois, Mémoires secrets, Tome II, pp. 60-90; SPW, 53/84, James to Ormonde, May 5, 1721.
602 Dubois, Mémoires secrets, Tome II, pp. 116-117.
603 Dubois, Mémoires secrets, Tome II, p.164.
604 MAE, Correspondance Politique, Angleterre, MS 339, Dillon to Dubois, May 5 1721, ff. 85a-86b; Dillon to Dubois, May 10 1721, ff. 87a-b.
liberté de vous proposer par ma précédente Jeseray toujours preste d’obeir a vos ordres. Jesus persuadé monseigneur que vous n’ignorez pas les raisons qui m’empéchent de me presenter chez vous, instruit comm[e] Jesus que l’on fait épier mes demarches[s] et que mes visites pourroient reveiller de[s] Jalousies sans pouvoir être utiles Juste a ce que vous trouviez a propos de les rendre telles. Je vous envoie celles [y] par le ch.œ® obrien…il pourra me r’aporter les ordres dont il vous plaisir[e] m’honorer...605

[Monseigneur, I have been given the honour…to send to you a state of affairs of Great Britain following the memoires of the 24 April…if my clarifications can be of any use to you following the proposals I have taken the liberty to make in the preceding [memoire] I will always be ready to obey your orders. I am persuaded Monseigneur that you will not ignore the reasons which prevent me from presenting it to you personally, instructed as I am that my every step is being spied on, and that my visits could awaken jealousies without being of any use, until you decide to render them [useful]…I send you this by the Chevalier O’Brien…he can report back to me the orders you honour me with…]

According to Dillon, therefore, the French authorities observed his movements, so he felt he could not personally attend the Regent. It is not clear who authorised the surveillance, though he had been subject to unwanted attentions by the British government for some time, as would be expected given his role (in addition to the French information being passed on to the Whigs).606 In fact a year earlier he had apparently been under such close surveillance that a secret Jacobite travelling from England had been too scared to make any direct contact with Dillon, in case his sympathies were thus revealed.

...He made a very civil return with many excuses of his great concern that yᵉ circumstances of yᵉ times could not allow him to [receive] my visit…[Paulet] desir’d [Vaudemont] his old acquaintance and friend to assure [Dillon] that he was much afflicted not to be able to se him in the present Juncture, that [Stairs] had [spy]s upon him even in his lodgings, and was [ ] so much [suspect]ed by [Earl of N] and [the Ministry] that if it were known he confer’d with [Dillon] it would infallibly [ruin him]…and put it out of his [power] to be [useful hereafter] to [James]…607

Dillon sent another letter to the Regent in August, repeating these claims, and inferring that James’ ‘friends in England’ who would be ‘discouraged’ by his meeting with the Regent. He apologised very profusely, and pleaded for understanding for his absence from court. It rather feebly claimed that the Regent’s own instructions, when he sent Dillon to Avignon, had entitled him to be engaged on

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605 MAE, Correspondance Politique, Angleterre, MS 339, Dillon to Dubois, May 10 1721, ff. 87a-b.
607 SPW, 47/4, Dillon to James, May 20, 1720.
service for King James:

Monseigneur, Quoique Je n’ay pas eû l’honneur de me presenter depuis quelque
temps devant v. a. R. Je la suplirie tres humblement de croire que mon zele et
profond respect pour sa personne n’en ont pas esté moins ardents. elle aura la
bonté de se souvenir que ce sont les ordres dont v. a. R. ma chargé envers le
roy Jacques a avignon qui m’ont donné occasion d’estre employé pour ses
affaires. J’espere qu’elle me pardonnera d’avoir Jugé que mon honneur estoit
engagé a ne les pas abandonner dans un tem le moins favorable qui ait Jama[is]
esté pour ce prince, d’autant p[…] que mon exemple auroit pu entraî[né] le
decouragement de quelques u[n] de ses amis en angleterre…Je prens la liber[té]
de suplier v. a. R. qu’elle veuill[e] bien me permetre de paroi[n]te devant elle, et
m’accorder une audience pour des affaires que Jay a luy commu[niquer]. Je
tacheray de meriter la continuation de ses bontes a mon egard par le parfait
attachement et le tres humble respect avec les quels Jesuis. Monseigneur de v. a. R.
le tres humble et le tres obeissant serviteur de dillon.®°*

[Monseigneur, Since I have not had the honour of appearing before your Royal
Highness for some time, I humbly beg you to believe that my zeal and profound
respect for your person has not lessened. You will have the goodness to
remember that it was the orders to King James at Avignon which your Royal
Highness charged me with which gave me occasion to be employed on his
affairs. I hope that you will pardon my judgement that my honour was engaged
not to abandon him at a time which could not have been worse for this prince, in
as much as my example could have discouraged some of his friends in
England…I take the liberty to beg your Royal Highness that he would permit me
to appear before you, and accord me an audience to deal with some business
which I have to discuss with you. I will try to deserve your continuing goodness
to me through the complete attachment and deep respect with which I am
Monseigneur your very humble and obedient servant, Dillon.]

The letter also repeated earlier statements about the danger of his being seen to wait
upon the Regent in person. Ironically those English Jacobites were probably quite
right, given the information which the French themselves gathered about Dillons’
movements. These letters also demonstrate the ambiguity of Dillon’s role, forced to
negotiate a path through his obligations to both monarchs – his manner in these
letters demonstrates his perceived duty to the Regent as much as that obligated by his
service to James.

Dubois’ realised his dream of a Cardinal’s hat in July, partly thanks to James’
support of his appointment.®° Some, including James himself, still mistrusted
Dubois, but remained cautiously optimistic. Others naively thought that they had
thereby established a sort of limited alliance with Dubois.®° These Jacobites now

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608 MAE, Correspondence Politique, Angleterre, No. 339, Dillon to the Regent, Aoust. 19 1721,
ff.143a-144a.
609 MAE, Correspondence Politique, Angleterre, No. 339, James to the Regent, Juillet 16 1721, f.
127b; James to Cardinal Dubois, Juillet 26 1721, ff.130a-132b.
610 SPW, 54/29, James to Ormonde, July 18, 1721; 158, Ormonde to James, Sep. 14, 1721.
had enough confidence in Dubois’ favourable reception to any advances from their side to warrant putting forward the memorial through him. Dillon presented him with a memoir from three (anonymous) English Jacobite lords, through Cardinal Dubois if necessary. The three lords wrote an anonymous letter to Dubois on 31 July 1721 explaining that Dillon would present the memoir to him, requesting he pass the memoire on to the Regent:


[Presently, Monseigneur, three principal lords of different orders will come to present a memoire signed by them, to apprise you that their sentiments are unshakeable. It is Mon. Dillon, Lieutenant General, who is charged by these three lords to give it to Your Eminence for His Royal Highness and to pass on from King James the length and loyalty of his service, and his zeal – recognised on different occasions – can serve as enough of a guarantee that he will present nothing to your Eminence which has no solid foundation, and that he believes that his judgement conforms to the interests of France and to the glory of his Royal Highness.]

Dillon’s last letter to the Regent [above], written only three weeks after his missive to Dubois, attempted to gain personal access in order to present him with the memorial directly.612

Dubois expressed his appreciation to James for his assistance, and promised him a pension, but that was the extent of his gratitude.613 Even this promise turned out to be empty. James vainly waited for some mark of his gratitude, and became more sceptical as the months wore on; eventually he gave up all hope of any real support from him.614

Even at that stage, however Dillon still tried to ensure that James did not offend

611 MAE, Correspondence Politique, Angleterre, No. 339, [English lords] to Dubois, Aoust 1721, ff.138b-139b; Memoire sur l’état present des affaires de la Grande Bretagne traduit de l’anglois et signé par trois principaux seigneurs à Londres le 31 Juillet 1721, Juillet 31 1721, ff.139a-140a.
613 MAE, Correspondence Politique, Angleterre, No. 339, James to the Regent, Mai 6 1721, f. 88b; James to the Regent, Juin 13 1721,ff. 110b-111a; James to Dubois, Juin 13 1721, ff.113b-114a; James to the Regent, Juillet 26 1721, ff.128b-129b; James to Cardinal Dubois, Juillet 26 1721, ff.130a-132b; Dubois to James, ff.134b, 135a-b; SPW, 55/159, James to Ormonde, Nov. 29, 1721.
614 SPW, 55/65, James to Mar, Oct. 27, 1721; 78, James to Mar, Nov. 2, 1721; 80, James to Ormonde, Nov. 2, 1721; 137, James to Strafford, Nov. 22, 1721; 159, James to Ormonde, Nov. 29, 1721; 56/57, James to Mar, Dec. 14, 1721.
Dubois; acknowledging his ascent and trying to maintain a connection, taking care not to offend him and make their situation even worse:

...Were it not better when things stand so to endeavour to make the best of Cardinal du Bois & not to fall out w' him at this time? He does now the office of [Chife Minister] but I doubt much if y² Regent will care for his having the title...All this was talkt over last night betwixt [Lansdown], [Dillon] & [Mar], the two last were of the oppinion I have here wrote...\textsuperscript{615}

Of course, as is evident above, Dubois never had the slightest intention of supporting the Jacobite cause in any respect; such a move would run contrary to his machinations on behalf of the Regent. Indeed his thorough investment in the alliance with Britain, along with his control over state affairs, meant that Dubois essentially comprised the main obstacle to Jacobite hopes in France during this period, and was commonly recognised as such, including by James.\textsuperscript{616} The whole episode illustrates the blindness the Jacobites displayed when they wanted to be led on, and how they could so easily and often overestimate their support. Dillon was particularly guilty of this offence, since it was primarily his backing which originally encouraged James to the endeavour.

Atterbury Plot

Dillon and Lansdowne’s memorial to Dubois and the Regent attempted to gain assistance for the Atterbury Plot. The conspirators had been convinced of the new approach to the French ministry in consequence of the intrigues of John Plunket, Philip Neynoe and George Kelly. Plunket thought he had opened up a new line of communication with a French government now interested in the potential of a Jacobite rising, at a moment when relations with Britain had slightly deteriorated. He and Kelly persuaded several of the other key Jacobites involved in the plot of this possibility, including Dillon.\textsuperscript{617} Dillon’s own optimism about Dubois, and his readiness to be the pivotal party in the submission to the Regent, seems especially naïve, given his direct experience of French politics, and especially of the Regent’s recent attitude and policy towards the Jacobites.

The Atterbury Plot stemmed from an English Jacobite desire to respond to anti-government feeling after the crashing of the South Sea Bubble. Bishop Atterbury, the

\textsuperscript{615} SPW, 55/114, Mar to Hay, Nov. 4, 1721.
\textsuperscript{616} SPW, 53/96, Dillon to Jame, May 12, 1721.
leader of the Tory Jacobites, Lord North and Lord Orrery were prepared to organise the English faction into a Rising. Their two agents, Christopher Layer, a member of the old Jacobite gentry, and John Plunkett, a long-time Jacobite agent, arrived in Paris to discuss the plot with Dillon before travelling on to Rome to fine-tune the final details. The plotters now had to concentrate on raising funds from various sources and organizing the gathering of troops; these endeavours included the presentation of the memorial to Dubois and the Regent. Dillon became one of the principal conspirators. He kept up a key line of communication with the English element of the plot, primarily Plunket and Atterbury, through the agency of George Kelly. With Sir Henry Goring he devised the key features of the plot: these focused on the initiation of a general rising throughout England, starting with the capture of London, which would be supported by Irish regiments from France and Spain led by Dillon and Ormonde. Dillon commanded a significant element of the rebellion in terms of the preparations, the finances, and the purchasing of arms. Dillon’s intended role was to be even more significant, as a military commander-in-chief in the projected invasion. Dillon acted as intermediary with the Irish officers who intended to participate in the invasion (particularly within his own regiment of course), by relaying their orders. Indeed his link to these officers was key to the plot, especially

618 Atterbury was born in 1663 and became a scholar at Oxford, and was ordained as an Anglican clergyman in 1687. He gained notoriety and great popularity for his scholarly reputation and High-Church Tory politics, becoming a leader of the High Church party. He was appointed Dean of Christ Church in 1711, and Bishop of Rochester in 1713, meanwhile continuing to participate in Tory politics. After the 1715 Rising he became intermittently involved in Jacobite plotting. For biographical detail see D. W. Hayton, ‘Atterbury, Francis (1663-1732)’ in ODNB. William, 6th Baron North, was born in 1678 and became an army officer and devoted Tory with Jacobite sympathies during Queen Anne’s reign. The collapse of the South Sea Bubble led to his involvement in plotting the Atterbury plot: Lawrence B. Smith, ‘North, William, sixth Baron North, second Baron Grey of Rolleston, and Jacobite Earl North (1678–1734)’ in ODNB. For a detailed description of the plot see Cruickshanks and Erskine-Hill, Atterbury Plot.


620 SPW, 58/93, March 23, 1722, James to Kelly; 59/14, April 16, 1722, Kelly to Mar; Cobbett, Parliamentary History Vol. VIII, pp. 114-117, 128-129, 131-133, 135-142, 143-151, 153-158. Dillon also apparently employed an Irish officer from his own regiment, Christopher Glascock, to assist him with the Atterbury correspondence, according to the British parliamentary investigation into the plot. Cobbett, Parliamentary History Vol. VIII, p. 131


622 SPW, 59/6, April 13, 1722, James to ‘Friends in England’; 15, April 16, 1722, James to Rochester; 60/123, July 5, 1722, James to Mr. Cesar; accord. Fritz, p. 73.

623 BL, Stowe MS 250 Official transcripts of intercepted Jacobite correspondence, April to Aug. 1722, ‘Extrait d’une Lettre de M. Crauford à Paris’, June 7 1722; ff. 82a-83a; accord. BL, Add. MS
since the French government forbade Irish regiments from participating in any independent rebellion, as in 1715.

At first however the leadership, including Dillon, hoped to get around this factor by gaining the assistance of France, with both the involvement of the Irish regiments, and additional French troops; this was the aim of the Memorial presented to the Regent. During the next few months however France further strengthened its alliance with Britain in the Triple Alliance, which effectively stifled the participation of the troops. Nevertheless the Jacobites still hoped for the secret acquiescence of the Regent to the participation of some few regiments, so that he would simply take no official notice of their preparations and later pretend ignorance. This accounts for why Dillon temporarily believed he would be able to lead the Irish regiments in England.

The failure of the entire plot stemmed from poor Jacobite security and duplicity. The British government uncovered the plot through their international intelligence network: intelligence gathered from a combination of their allies, particularly the French ministry, their spies and Jacobite betrayal (principally by Mar). Lord Sunderland, recently First Lord of the Treasury, had started a secret, very cautious correspondence with the Jacobites. Controversy has surrounded this contact from its inception: James naturally suspected his motives - though still prepared to allow the possibility that he was genuine.

This secret became known to Dubois and the Regent, as the British ambassador to Paris, Sir Luke Schaub later reported:

...The Regent has even long suspected Lord S of holding a correspondence with the Jacobites...I was not inclined to give the least credit to a suspicion so injurious to a minister who had so much distinguished himself by his attachment to the King...nevertheless I was very anxious to converse with you on the suspicions of the Regent...But as I could not obtain permission to return to England, I thought that any communications made by letter would only embarrass you without serving the thing and for this reason I prefer’d being

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silent on a subject which appeared to me incredible: particularly as I found that Cardinal Dubois differ’d in his opinion with his master. Although he observed the Jacobites flattered themselves that Lord S_ was in their interests that this was not a sufficient motive to believe against such strong reasons to the contrary, on the mere ground of Lord Sunderland’s inclination to a Tory parliament... The Regent affected publickly to manifest his concern, but at the same time privately recommended the Cardinal to console himself, because the loss was perhaps greater to the pretender than to the King. In this stile he spoke to Col. Churchill and to me. He told us that the Jacobites who wished to gain him to their interests had for the last eight months assured him that Lord Sunderland had enter’d into engagements with the pretender...

When Lord Sunderland died in April 1722 Dubois thereupon immediately disclosed this correspondence, as well as the existence of the Jacobite plot, to the British foreign ministers - possibly with the Regent’s knowledge, though this is not certain. Dubois divulged as much information about the plot as he could find out over the next few weeks.

My Lord, Le Cardinal... vous suplie de ne point exiger de luy les noms de celuy qui a écrit ni de celuy à qui s’adresse la lettre dont cet avis est tiré; protestant qu’il les ignore lui même; qu’il sait seulement, que ce sont deux officiers de considération, et que celuy par qui il en a été averti, a eu la lettre entre ses mains, écrite moitié en Fran9ois et moitié en Anglois; mais qu’absolument il n’a pas voulu lui nommer les personnes, parcequ’il auroit crû se deshonner par là. Le Cardinal n’assure qu’il ignore de même les endroits d’ou la lettre est écrite, et oü l’on se propose de s’embarquer, de debarker et de faire éclater l’entreprise. Et il s’est defendu aussi de me nommer la personne de qui il tient l’avis. Mais j’ai lieu de conjecturer que c’est de Mons. Le Blanc Ministre de la Guerre. ... [My Lord, the Cardinal...begs you neither to demand from him the names of those who wrote nor those who addressed the letter from which this opinion is drawn; protesting that he does not know them himself; that he knows only that these are two important officers, and that the one by whom he had been notified, had had the letter between his hands, written half in French and half in English; but that he absolutely would not name the persons, because he believed he would be dishonoured by it. The cardinal assures you that he does not even know the places from where the letter is written, or where the enterprise is proposed to embark, disembark or make its main strike. And he also defends himself from naming the person who holds that opinion. But I have reason to conjecture that it is Mons. Le Blanc, Minister of War...]

However it is possible that George I knew of and approved Sunderland’s correspondence, which would heighten the probability of Sunderland’s insincerity in his overtures to the Jacobite leadership, and perhaps even Mar’s own early treacherous intentions by means of this contact. The general consensus among historians is that this provided the first tip off to the British government on the Jacobite plot. Though the specific source of the French information on the plot would not be revealed to the Whig government, according to Dubois it derived from Dillon and Lansdowne’s request for assistance. Indeed the Whigs received a continuous stream of the most reliable intelligence of most Jacobite movements from all European centres, including from the French leadership, who certainly betrayed the essence of the Jacobites’ proposal:

...We have received intelligence from Several quarters, that the Pretender is upon the point of leaving Rome, with an intention to come privately into Spain; and that the late Duke of Ormonde has made application to have leave to come into France...several of his adherents, particularly Wogan and Misset, are already landed in some Port of Spain...I am to tell you in great confidence, that We do know, that the Jacobites have had the boldness to sollicite the Court of France to grant them the assistance of troops, which has been refused. And We have likewise reason to believe, that they have ventur’d to negotiate the same thing at Madrid...

Dillon does not seem to have suspected this duplicity immediately. Rumours and opinions about the origin of the plot’s exposure spread through the network through the normal routes of correspondence. James hoped that Lord Sunderland’s letters and not a Jacobite traitor had betrayed the plot. He realised the plausibility of Dubois having informed the Whigs of the plot, but did not worry about that prospect, believing it to be a response to Whig suspicions first raised by Sunderland’s letters, and that Dubois could not have

635 BL, Add. MS 22517, Lord Carteret to Stanhope, June 4, 1722, ff. 111a-112b.
636 SPW, 60/26, Dr. Friend to Lansdowne, June 14, 1722; 36, Lansdowne to James, June 15, 1722; 66, James to Lansdowne, June 21, 1722; 61/151, Southcott to James, Aug. 29, 1722; Cobbett, Parliamentary History Vol. VIII, pp. 187-188, 189, 191.
provided enough proof to the Whig government to condemn individual Jacobites. Dubois certainly had no information of the Jacobites involved in England. Indeed at first James and the Jacobites still held out hope that the plans could be salvaged to some extent.

...I think our present business in Generall ought to be to prepare our selves on this side the best we Can, and to give all the encouragement we Can to our friends on t’other, if they will enter into the so necessary Union & Concert among themselves, so much the better, but even tho’ that were not so perfect as we wish, I should not entirely despair of being able to undertake something, for altho’ our different [.....] of friends should not communicate one with another with intire freedom, yet if they all agree in the reasonableness of a present undertaking and will each of them act their part in the execution much may be one, for if on receiving their different proposals & projects I find that the whole gives a reasonable prospect of success what else is there to be done but to have a time appointed and my orders sent for the execution in which it is not to be doubted but all will unite...

The Jacobites continued to raise funds and troops for a slightly altered version of the plot, while Walpole investigated the plot and gathered evidence to convict conspirators of treason. By this point even covert assistance would not be forthcoming from the French, so James looked for plans to find a way of obtaining the participation of the Irish regiments without the Regent’s permission. Even in November the Jacobite leaders still discussed the possibility of a domestic rising suddenly being initiated by the Jacobites in England:

...it appers to me by being appreized now from Dillon of particulars which I was not infonned of at the time from England that it may not be impossible we should have some sudden Call from thence, Dillon has writ to me on this subject, but all I could say was that our friends there were best judge of their own strength, & that if they were really resolved to undertake something that he certainly ought to go to their assistance with what arms & Officers he could get for I think I would be of ill Consequence as affairs stand at present, if any of us on this side of the sea should show any backwardness...

Eventually the trial and conviction of Christopher Layer, and particularly the mistreatment of Atterbury, under arrest in the Tower of London, caused the Jacobites on the Continent to fully realise the extent to which the plot had been exposed. The Whig ministry meanwhile tried their best to indict the principal

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636 SPW, 60/66, James to Lansdowne, June 21, 1722; 88, James to Lansdowne, June 28, 1722.
637 SPW, 59/55, James to Lansdowne, April 25, 1722.
639 SPW, 60/23, James to Orrery, June 10, 1722.
640 SPW, 63/48, James to Ormonde, Nov. 22, 1722; accord. 62/144, James to Sir Henry Goring, Nov. 2, 1722.
Jacobite figures, most importantly Atterbury. The only way they eventually found to do this was through the Earl of Mar.

In 1721 Mar had finally come to an agreement with the British government in exchange for a pension of £2000. To ensure his credibility with the Jacobites in the future, he made sure to inform James of the pension, and gain his written permission to accept it; naturally he pretended to James that he had simply been granted moneys owed by the government, with no mention of his obligations to the government in return. James trusted Mar so entirely as to accept this assurance. Mar even conferred with Dillon as to the appropriateness of receiving the pension, making sure to obtain the approval of another leading Jacobite even before writing to James.\(^{641}\) Dillon also had complete trust in Mar and accepted the same assurances as James, never imagining Mar would betray the Jacobite cause. Luckily Mar had made it clear in his letter that Dillon believed Mar received the pension without further obligation.\(^{642}\)

Nevertheless Mar seems to have been reluctant to betray Atterbury and his other fellow Jacobites. Indeed the Whig minister Carteret thought that despite his past resignation as Secretary of State and assurances to isolate himself from the Jacobites, Mar still had more sympathy with the Jacobite cause.\(^{643}\) He does not seem to have given the Whig ministry any information before the Atterbury Plot.\(^{644}\) But when Walpole’s investigations of the plot came to a standstill, he turned to Mar, deciding that the time had come for him to deliver on the agreement. He had the perfect means of acquiring the information the ministry needed to link Atterbury to all the documents found – to definitively establish his identity among the code names used. Walpole sent the Whig agent (spy) Colonel Churchill to Paris to call on Mar and demand the information. When Mar was threatened with exposure of the price he had agreed to pay for the pension, he was trapped, despite having never received more than £400 of his pension.\(^{645}\) By this means the ministry forced him to write a letter to Atterbury which betrayed his Jacobite code name; its references to a dog which had recently been sent by Mar to Atterbury’s sick wife enabled Atterbury to be identified as the addressee. Since the Whigs intercepted all Jacobite mail through the post office, this letter provided Walpole with the pivotal evidence to ‘convict’

\(^{642}\) SPW, 52/135, Mar to James, Feb. 3, 1721.
Atterbury in parliament by passing a bill of attainder against him, thereby forcing him into exile.  

Dillon played a significant part in the failure of the Atterbury Plot, just as he had in the Swedish plot. The primary causes of the failure of the plot were the presentation of the original memoire to the Regent, the subsequent lack of security in their correspondence, and then Mar’s betrayal. Dillon’s misplaced confidence (along with several other Jacobites) in Plunket and the veracity of his claims, his faith in the trustworthiness of the French leadership, and later his acceptance of Mar’s assurances as to the purity of his dealings with the Whig ministry, all allowed these failures.

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Chapter Four - 1723-1726

The Duc d’Orlean’s role as Regent came to an end in February 1723, when the young Louis XV came of age. Though he continued to hold a position of power and control, by essentially continuing to manage affairs of state in Louis XV’s name, this situation would only persist for a few months. After Cardinal Dubois died in August the Regent took full control over all administrative matters, which contributed to the deterioration of his own health. He died suddenly on 2 December 1723, after which the Duc de Bourbon took over his duties.

Only two months later Spain also underwent adjustment as Philip V abdicated in favour of his sixteen-year old son Luis; however by the end of the year he had regained the throne after Luis’ death. Philip V eliminated the threat of Hapsburg control of Spain through an alliance with Austria in the Treaty of Vienna in April 1725 – a reaction to Bourbon’s termination of Louis XV’s engagement to Philip V’s seven year old daughter. Bourbon upset the Spanish alliance so that Louis XV could produce urgently needed heirs, eventually finding him a queen in the older Marie Leszczynska, daughter of the Polish king Stanislaus. In return Holy Roman Emperor Charles VI gained Spain’s agreement to the Pragmatic Sanction of 1713, allowing his daughter Maria Teresa to inherit the Hapsburg kingdoms. France and Britain responded to this treaty by forging an alliance with Prussia through the Treaty of Hanover. By mid 1726 the unpopular Bourbon had been exiled from court after attempting to move against Louis XV’s tutor, Cardinal Fleury, who thus took control of government in France.

Despite his troubles with the French leadership from late 1718, Dillon had remained James’ principal and official agent in Paris. The Due de Lauzun described him as “chargé ici des affaires du roi Jacques, et officier général très distingué” when he sent for Dillon in January 1723, a month before his death, in order to have him return his collar of the Order of the Garter to King James.647 Lauzun had had a long-standing relationship with James as one of his connections at the French court. He had known Dillon for several years in this role, Dillon having passed on Lauzun’s

correspondence to James. Dillon was also definitely still acting as the principal liaison for the French ministry with the Jacobites at the end of that year, and had even regained some limited access to the Regent. By the end of 1724 however Dillon’s role had become untenable; this progression is outlined through Chapter Four. The death of the Regent meant he was no longer an obstacle to Dillon’s efforts on behalf of the Jacobite community; however other factors started to impinge.

Not long after the Regent’s betrayal of the Atterbury plot Atterbury and other Jacobites suspected Mar of complicity in the plot’s exposure, then later discovered covertly proposing a plot contrary to core Jacobite constitutional values. Dillon’s association with Mar’s betrayal resulted in James’ loss of confidence, and heralded the end of his role within the Jacobite community. The consequent involvement of Dillon’s wife and sister-in-law in the controversy surrounding James break with his wife Clementina Sobieska, and her decampment to a convent sealed his fate. From early 1725 Dillon had been cut out of all Jacobite activity, after which he maintained a semi-retirement at St. Germain. Such a change obviously had very important consequences for Jacobite affairs.

Discovery of Mar’s treachery

In September 1723, Mar had Dillon submit a Memorial to the Regent for his inspection. Dillon knew its contents, but seemingly accepted its presentation to the Regent at that point, because of the urgent time pressures, and of course on the proviso that James would later approve it. James knew of the Memorial, but did not realise its details and tenor until he received the copy Mar sent him, two months after it had been presented to the Regent. The Memorial put forward a scheme for France’s assistance of a Jacobite Rising which would essentially create an independent Scottish kingdom, allied to and partially directed by France. This could never be approved by either James or the majority of the Jacobite

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648 SPW, 47/60, Duc de Lauzun to James, Juin 6, 1720; 74, Duc de Lauzun to James, June 11, 1720; 99, Dillon to James, June 15, 1720.
649 SPW, 70/113, James to the Regent, Nov. 27, 1723.
650 SPW, 70/56, James to the Regent, Nov. 16, 1723.
651 MAE, Memoires et Documents, Angleterre, MS 86 (12): Papiers de lord Sempill, A Memorial touching the Interest of France, with respect to Scotland, England and Ireland, Mar to the Regent, 1723, ff.53a-54b.
community; indeed the very idea could even be seen as treacherous, especially in the form of an independent petition, without the approbation or knowledge of the King. Moreover, as historians have pointed out, Mar could not possibly have believed that it could ever have won the approbation of the King, or that it would influence the Regent.\textsuperscript{652} Hay and James thus concluded that Mar intended this treacherous document to be exposed and publicised, thereby discrediting James and his cause in England.\textsuperscript{653}

In the meantime Col. John Hay had travelled from Rome during the second half of 1723 to meet with Atterbury, who had just been exiled to the Continent: at this stage Hay harboured suspicions of Mar, so he sought to find out the truth behind Mar’s actions with James’ approval. When Hay finally met with him in Paris Mar actually informed him of the Memorial.\textsuperscript{654} Having been put on his guard by numerous allegations, James receipt of the Memorial uncovered the reality and extent of Mar’s treason.\textsuperscript{655}

Hay travelled on to Brussels to meet Bishop Atterbury in November, who himself suspected Mar’s part in his own conviction. He arranged with Hay to co-operate to find proof of Mar’s betrayal, to completely discredit him in James’ eyes.\textsuperscript{656} When Atterbury finally arrived in Paris he asked Mar for his papers, most of which Mar happily handed over; he somehow thought that these would clear him from any suspicions Atterbury might hold.\textsuperscript{657} Instead, on their inspection in June Atterbury wrote to James declaring that he had found proof of Mar’s betrayal. The treachery Atterbury discovered already known to James probably related to Mar’s pension from the British. This would account for why Mar had been prepared to give all his papers to Atterbury – he knew he could account for and or had James’ authorisation for anything which might otherwise look suspicious. Atterbury clearly thought that James’ consent for this and all other suspicious transactions always came at Mar’s request after he had already executed the transaction.\textsuperscript{658}

\textsuperscript{652} Gregg, ‘Jacobite Career’, pp. 192-193; Glover, Appendix, p. 74
\textsuperscript{653} SPW, 76/116, Hay to Macmahon, Sep. 2, 1724; accord. Hay to Atterbury, June 13, 1724, pp. 77-78; SPW, 76/11, Aug. 8, 1724, Hay to Atterbury; 145, Hay to Macmahon, Sep. 9, 1724; 78/149, Hay to Zeek Hamilton, Dec. 23, 1724;.
\textsuperscript{654} Gregg, ‘Jacobite Career’, p. 191; Cruickshanks and Erskine-Hill, \textit{Atterbury Plot}, p. 225.
\textsuperscript{657} Cruickshanks and Erskine-Hill, \textit{Atterbury Plot}, p. 226.
\textsuperscript{658} Ibid.; Fulkestone, II, Atterbury to James, June 19, 1724, p. 33.
James would now recognise the questionable nature of the pension though, having finally been brought to doubt Mar’s honesty. Previously he had simply trusted Mar’s assertions that the pension carried no obligation with it; he trusted that nothing could persuade Mar to betray him. Hay, Atterbury and Murray convinced him of the reality:

Forgive me Sir, if I endeavour to show you that [Mar]’s receiving a pension by your consent, and remaining thereafter in the secret of your business, could not but be of the worst consequences to you in all the different suppositions one could make as to his view in managing that matter. In general it appears that you can never gain but may lose by your ministers having correspondence with George’s; because, tho’ there were no proof of the last’s receiving money, yet it is known that the others are always ready to tempt them with it. But when one is sure that money is actually given, it’s much more natural to think, that the person who receives it, must deserve it in some shape or other, whatever he may pretend... 659

James’ previously raised suspicions having now apparently been confirmed, he finally turned against Mar. From this point Mar’s claims would count for naught, while all his actions would tell against him.

Unfortunately the fact of Dillon’s involvement with the Memorial meant that doubts now spilled over to Dillon, particularly since he had known of its premise. James, and particularly Hay, Murray and Atterbury, could not be sure of his innocence in this matter. Hay and Atterbury felt fairly sure of his honesty and Jacobite zeal however, and of course believed him to be led by Mar (Chapter Three); they therefore came to the conclusion that he had been duped by Mar into his involvement. 660 Moreover James so trusted him and his loyalty as to be sure of his innocence in any of Mar’s other duplicitous schemes. At least Atterbury had confirmed the lack of involvement of Dillon or Lansdowne in Mar’s betrayal of the Atterbury plot. 661

After the matter of Mar’s treachery had been displayed in Mar’s private papers, James ordered Mar to deposit almost all Jacobite correspondence in the Scots College in Paris, so that they could be permanently accessible to anyone James trusted enough to investigate the truth of his dealings. There could perhaps also have been suspicions by the Roman leadership as to Mar’s intentions about the papers, which could easily have been passed on to the British government, especially with Mar’s expulsion from the Jacobite leadership and ostracisation from the wider

659 Glover, Appendix, Murray to James, June 10, 1724, p. 72; accord. Fulkestone, II, Murray to James, pp. 9-10.
660 SPW, 76/11, Hay to Atterbury, Aug. 8, 1724.
661 Fulkestone, Vol. II, Atterbury to James, July 31, 1724, p. 47; Handasyde, p. 214
Jacobite community. The consequent exposure of all secret Jacobite dealings of past years, and revelation of so many essential and still relevant details, from cypher names of British sympathisers to communication channels, would severely hamper future schemes. James so distrusted Mar that he could not even fully trusted to discharge this basic order, and indeed from the offset Mar attempted to delay performing this charge.  

Meanwhile in Rome James had increasingly fallen under the spell of his new favourites, the Murray and Hay faction, with their ally Atterbury in Paris. As their influence grew James often sang their praises to others, extolling their zeal and loyalty, probably to cement the trust of other Jacobites towards these new unpopular favourites. Indeed these three tended to be rather alienating figures - thoroughly demonstrated by Clementina’s animosity towards the Hays and Murray, which would later cause a schism through the entire Jacobite community.

Their unpopularity had been due to a few factors, primarily their growing influence over James ever since Mar’s departure from Rome. Indeed Murray actually caused a rift to open between James and the majority of the exiled Jacobite community in Rome Murray’s perception of his own importance led many of the community, represented by Lord Pitsligo and a few others, to resent Murray’s authoritarian, condescending and exclusionary treatment of themselves. which was then exacerbated by his involvement in the ostracism of Lord Pitsligo from court. After Murray’s forced departure Col. John Hay, Lord Inverness, became James new chief secretary, and he and his wife became the new favourites.

These favourites turned increasingly hostile towards the Triumvirate; their distrust of

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662 SPW, 76/62, James to Mar, Aug. 22, 1724.
663 SPW, 76/20, James to Ormonde, Aug. 11, 1724.
664 James had placed Murray in charge of the official reception and care of Clementina, as well as some responsibility for administration during his own absence from Rome in 1719. From Clementina’s first arrival in Rome Murray excluded other Jacobites from proper contact with the new Jacobite Queen, ignoring the etiquette which should have been observed under the circumstances, which led Clementina to apparently think herself unpopular among her new subjects. James, whose knowledge of events primarily derived from Murray, thus blamed his subjects in Rome for not welcoming their Queen. The consequent resentment felt by Jacobites in Rome caused a small group led by Lord Pitsligo to think they should acquaint James with the truth; in the end however Pitsligo was the only one to write to James, who was accordingly incensed with what he thought was Pitsligo’s petty and inexcusable gripes. Pitsligo’s subsequent attempts to justify his behavior only made things worse, despite many of the exiled community (including Mar and Dillon) coming to his defence, and Pitsligo never re-joined the exiled community in RomeFurther details of this affair, along with Pitsligo’s own memoir, are included in Henrietta Tayler (ed.), The Jacobite Court at Rome in 1719 from original documents at Fettercairn House and at Windsor Castle, Publications of the Scottish History Society, 3rd Series, 55 vols. (Edinburgh: Scottish History Society, 1921-1964), 31 (1938), pp. 15-39, 49-107; Corp, The Stuarts in Italy, pp. 138-139.
Dillon stemmed chiefly from his association with Mar. However Atterbury had also had his own problems with Dillon, their relationship had been fraught with tensions from as early as 1717, despite Atterbury’s intermittent overtures of friendship:

…I have been very much to blame in not acknowledging many favors rec. from you: but [you] have heard of my long indisposition, & how incapable I have been for a good part of that time of all manner of busyness. Other reasons have concurr’d, with which it is needless now to trouble you: but you may be sure, that want of y’ Entire Regard for you, which is due to you from all the World, was none of them. Since y.’ [first] time I exchang’d Letters with you, I have ever maintained in my heart a Respect, that no time or Disuse of correspondence [can] lessen, I shall continue to maintain it while I live…

Dillon for the most part had a history of good relations with Hay, who originally held a high opinion of the Lieutenant General: “...Tho’ the King’s affairs were not to suffer by your [ills], I can assure you that the particular o[pinion] I shall always have of your personal worth [&] merit will always induce me to interest myself very much in what may concern you, which G[rati]tude obliges me in the highest manner to do…”

That state of affairs essentially lasted until Hay broke with Mar, while Murray remained close. Mar quarrelled with Murray repeatedly in the years following their exile; Dillon for his part became permanently alienated from Murray during his visit to Paris, while in 1721 a disagreement with Hay would have a lasting effect when Hay started to have his suspicions about Mar after the Atterbury Plot.

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665 SPW, 46/111, Atterbury to Dillon, May 1720.
666 SPW, 56/96, Hay to Dillon, Dec. 23, 1721; accord. 50/101, Hay to James, Dec. 16, 1720; 55/66, Dillon to Hay, Oct. 27, 1721.
667 Like Mar, Murray was also a brother-in-law of Hay, as Hay’s wife was Murray’s sister.
668 SPW, 45/67, James Murray to Mar, Oct. 23, 1719; 70, Hay to Mar, Oct. 24, 1719; 87, James to Mar, Nov. 9, 1719; 93, James to Mar, Nov. 16, 1719; 97, Mar to Hay, Nov. 18, 1719; 100, Mar to Hay, Nov. 25, 1719; 101, Hay to Mar, Nov. 25, 1719; 49/42, Dillon to James, Oct. 8, 1720; 55/24, Mar to Hay, July 14, 1721; 96, Murray to Hay, Nov. 10, 1721; 114, Mar to Hay, Nov. 4, 1721; 118, Murray to Hay, Nov. 17, 1721; 139, Murray to Hay, Nov. 23, 1721; 149, Hay to Murray, Nov. 24, 1721; 56/1, Mar to Hay, Dec. 1, 1721; 5, Murray to Hay, Dec. 1, 1721; 76, Murray to Hay, Dec. 18-20, 1721; 79, Charles Booth to Hay, n. d; Gregg, ‘Jacobite Career’, pp. 183, 185-186, 188-190; Glover, Appendix, pp. 30-34.
Negotiations with Russia

Before his final dismissal Dillon acted as intermediary for Daniel O’Brien’s secret diplomatic rapprochement to Peter the Great. Dillon had a close relationship with O’Brien; he had been not only a captain in Dillon’s regiment, but his personal aide-de-camp for 15 years. O’Brien had first taken up Jacobite service in 1716, when Dillon sent him to James as a messenger, recommending his honour and trustworthiness. O’Brien had even been sent on an earlier mission under very similar circumstances, the original mission to negotiate with the Czar, Peter the Great, for a potential marriage for James with his niece, Anna, Duchess of Courland, which Dillon, though not directly involved in the negotiations, had also been concerned with.

Relations with Russia had been established some time earlier, followed by several Jacobite attempts to pursue joint schemes - most notably an attempt to produce a tripartite alliance with Charles XII after the Swedish plot negotiations floundered, and a later, very similar attempt with Spain. Dillon sought to make another attempt during the Atterbury plot, attempting to meet with Russian diplomat Prince Dolkorowky, and even wrote an invasion Memorial expressly for presentation to the Czar:

... It appears to me that a connection of interests may probably unite [the Czar] and [the King of Sweden] in this conjuncture... I gave such a Memorial to the Factor in which I explained the facilities of compassing the point by an embersley of six thousand south scrooply disposed on the coast at or about Gottembourgh and to be rendered at his choice to [England] or [Scotland]...

James sent Daniel O’Brien to negotiate directly but covertly; the Czar, would not negotiate with the Jacobites unless the French were included, in order to draw the French into an alliance against Britain; he thought that the Jacobites would be able to expedite such negotiations.
Dillon had a degree of authority over the secret negotiations with Russia, sending his directions to O’Brien who reported back through him to James. James’ instructions were sent through Dillon, at least while O’Brien made his way to Russia, because of the potential difficulties of transport and security. Only O’Brien, Dillon and James would be conversant and involved in the negotiations:

…I direct M‘ Dillon to Send you with this my full Powers to treat and Co[nclude] an treaty with Such as the Czar may appoint for that effect, as there is no venturing by the Post to send you any Instructions in form this letter must supply any defect of that kind, and indeed it is impossibly to give you particular orders on the different events which may occur, or propositions which may be made to you…to the end that no little jealousies may obstruct the main point, you will correspond regularly with Mr Dillon and transmit directly to myself the same accounts…you will likewise send me une adresse how to write directly to you, and correspond with none in these parts of the world except M‘ Dillon and my self.675

At this time, O’Brien sought to bring up a significant matter directly to James; he willingly undertook the mission but he could not follow James’ orders if it put him in danger of losing his French military post, his only source of income.676 Meanwhile O’Brien resented having to submit to Dillon’s perhaps rather peremptory orders, possibly because his increased significance and elevation within the Jacobite network had given him the desire to be treated on rather more equal terms.677 He certainly became frustrated with Dillon’s protracted delays of his journey, which became acute enough that he circumvented Dillon, writing directly to James and Ormonde.678 This became more and more frequent, until their direct correspondence had become as established as that with Dillon.679 Delays and problems with communication severely affected O’Brien’s ability to even be received at the Russian court. Despite this James reiterated his instructions to keep reporting on the matter, and to keep Dillon in the loop, although discouraging intelligence forced James to give up on the negotiations.680

O’Brien finally gained acceptance as an official Jacobite envoy in September 1723, whereupon the negotiations started to make great progress. In spite of James’

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675 SPW, 62/82, James to O’Brien, Oct. 9, 1722.
676 SPW, 67/20, Daniel O’Brien to James, May 12, 1723.
677 SPW, 64/131, O’Brien to Ormonde, Jan. 5, 1723.
679 SPW, 67/29, Daniel O’Brien to James, May 19, 1723; 52, O’Brien to James, June 2, 1723; 70/12, O’Brien to James, Nov. 7, 1723.
repeated instructions O’Brien continued to write only to the king, effectively removing Dillon from the chain of correspondence and leaving him to manage Bourbon involvement in the dialogue with Russia. O’Brien therefore started to take on more significance even within the French negotiations, as the only authority familiar with Russia. This led to Hay apparently believing that O’Brien was manipulating and dominating Dillon, by deliberately keeping him in the dark: “...[Dillon] if he knows anything, thinks if sufficient that he know it, and lets [James] but seldom into his Secrets, or he his extremely ignorant himself, and I really believe he only knows what his Countryman S.’ Da.1 thinks fit to tell him, and he makes [Dillon] believe that he tells him every thing...” Thus Dillon’s exclusion from this mission lead on to his eventual marginalisation from all diplomatic negotiation, and contributed to his eventual dismissal from his post.

Negotiations with the Duc de Bourbon

James had long sustained an intermittent correspondence with the Duc de Bourbon, as the next in line to the Regency after Orleans, as well as a member of the French royal family. Dillon regularly acted as an intermediary, as with other members of the French nobility. Dillon advocated this relationship as a means to reconcile James to the Regent. Bourbon had in fact traditionally been more sympathetic to the Jacobites than to the alliance with Britain, and the Jacobites had more reason to be optimistic about his reception of their first advances than they would have about Orleans. However as far as Russia was concerned, Bourbon believed it would be best served by reconciling the Czar to the Elector of Hanover to encourage Russia to unite with the Anglo-French alliance – as opposed to alienating Britain and the alliance by supporting Russia in its anti-British policy and assisting a Russian-backed Jacobite invasion. Bourbon therefore started to manipulate Dillon: leading him on with positive promises and encouragement while undercutting the Jacobites from the negotiations by trying to resolve the tensions between the Czar and King George I.

Most members of the leadership, including James, remained unconvinced of

682 SPW, 77/95, Oct. 17, 1724, Hay to Murray.
683 SPW, 50/116, James to Duc de Bourbon, Dec. 12, 1720; 66/109, James to Duc de Bourbon, March 22, 1723; 155, James to Duc de Bourbon, April 9, 1723; 51/2, James to Duc de Bourbon, Jan. 1, 1721; 51/44, M, le due de Bourbon to James, Feb. 20, 1721.
684 SPW, 63/57, James to Duc de Bourbon, Nov. 23, 1722.
685 Szechi, The Jacobites, p. 113; Wills, Jacobites and Russia, p. 89.
Bourbon’s favourable intentions. However Dillon trusted Bourbon; he had confidence in his avowals of attachment, although not founded on any solid reason or past experience.

Hay criticised Dillon’s management of the affair, particularly his weak and compliant approach towards Bourbon: “...Mr. Dillon seems to be entirely overwhelmed in the Embasage he has been drawn into, and as to the King’s affairs, seems to wait, till he be sought after, in place of endeavouring to draw Mons.r Le Duc into a right way of thinking by advancing from time to time those reasons that may have most weight with him...” He even started to suspect Dillon of playing a double part, advising Atterbury to do his best to establish beyond doubt the nature of Dillon’s correspondence with the Duc:

...It is I can assure you a great mortification to the King to see that the service you can and are willing to render him and the good cause, should be obstructed by the most unaccountable humours of some persons at Paris, But I hope [...] the orders the King send Mr. Dillon by this post, of which the King himself gives you an acct., shall partly remove some obstacles, and the Instructions you may give to Dillon with relation to his conduct wt Mons. Le Duc, may soon enable you to discover what part Dillon will act for the future, and whether he acts a fair part towards you or not. It would be a great advantage if you could know whether Dillon Re-presents matters to Mons. Le Duc according to the King’s intention, which in the humour he is in one cannot be sure of...

Convinced of Dillon’s misguided judgement, James no longer considered him an appropriate representative. He encouraged Dillon to consult with and take the advice of Atterbury in his dealings with Bourbon, attempting to force him to give Atterbury a central role in the negotiations.

...the last accounts you gave me of Mons.‘ Le Duc’s dispositions towards me do not seem to denote a speedy resolution in my favour, yet I think that we should not desist from Soliciting him and Representing to him, whatever may contribut to [Induce] him to it...many arguments might be made use of in relation to the present Situation of England, on which nobody can give better lights than The Bishop of Rochester, I think it [...] necessary to Direct you to discourse with him frequently on these heads, his advice and opinion cannot but be of the greatest use to you...and I would have you Represent to Mons.‘ Le Duc, how necessary it would be both for his Service and mine, That he should know directly from the Bishop himself his opinion on the English affairs, which I am persuaded Mons.r Le Duc will have no difficulty in doing when he is well aquainted with the Bishops character, His Credit with the Loyal [...] and his great prudence and knowledge in the managem’ of affairs. In the mean time notwithstanding the former orders I gave you of communicating to none whatsoever what you knew of my affairs, I would have you now de[...] with earlier freedom and w’out reserve discourse about them with The Bishop and hide nothing from him, except those particulars on which Mons.‘ Le Duc and Mad.’ La Duchesse have

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686 SPW, 76/22, James to Atterbury, Aug. 12, 1724.
687 SPW, 76/31, Hay to Atterbury, Aug. 15, 1724; accord. 42, James to Atterbury, Aug. 19, 1724.
688 SPW, 76/63, Hay to Atterbury, Aug 22, 1724.
Dillon naturally suffered for the spread of gossip and rumour about Mar and himself which pervaded the Jacobite world. He realised the necessity of fighting back, to combat the rumours, especially when he started to receive accusations directly from James himself. Though obviously worried, he felt assured enough to contradict James’ apparent complaints about his pronouncements and transactions in a previous letter. However the very last sentence of this letter seems to indicate that James had complained of an earlier over-assurance in Dillon’s attitude, and objected to a managing or authoritative tone in previous letters.

...I have read over several times the copy of my letter to [the King] dated the 19th June, and to clear matters fully do send it here in plain terms...I must own I don’t think it so difficult to understand, and am very sure I did not intend it should be equivocal in any respect. It is true I repeat in this letter as I have mention’d in many others, that [Mons. le Duc] is a sincere well-wisher and must be refer’d to for timing of things &c. I have observed at the same time that good wishes alone were not sufficient to attain the end prepared, and have mention’d previous measures so clearly explained as to be veryfied &c...I must now beg [the King] will be intirely perswaded, that all I say here is not meant either to prove or defend, I know it appertains solely to him to direct, and that it is my duty to obey from whence I shall never depart...

Later in the month Dillon again robustly defended the honesty of his dealings and emphasised his loyalty:

...It is but just and reasonable [the King] should write whatever he Judges either necessary or conducive to the good of his service, on the other hand, when a person imployed and trusted acts with zeal and to the best of his understanding, and does all in his power to avoid reproche, I think no more can be expected, and as I flatter my self to be entirely in this case I can affirm what farmer writt of late gave me no manner of disturbance, and the less that I make no doubt but time and some reflection, which setts most things in clear light will shew my behaviour to have been both sincere and zealous, and perhaps convince [the King], that the small hints I gave him on severall occasions were not without plausible grounds. tho what [the King] writt gave me no disquiet for the reasons mention’d, I must own however that all the little storys spread here upon it, whereof many without the least appearance of truth, have been very disagreeable to me...I hope what is mentioned here will not be misconstrued, since it means no prejudice to any whatsoever and has no other end but the good of [the King’s] service. I take the liberty to return my most gratefull acknowledgement for all the favourable and kind expressions you were pleased to mention in your last in relation to me, and do hope I shall never omitt any thing in my power to deserve the continuation of your bounty and goodness...

By August 1724 Dillon got wind of the attempts of the Marquis of Monteleón, a

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689 SPW, 76/43, James to Dillon, Aug. 19, 1724; 42, James to Atterbury, Aug. 19, 1724.
690 SPW, 76/6, Dillon to James, Aug. 7, 1724.
691 SPW, 76/59, Dillon to James, Aug. 21, 1724.
Spanish emissary to Paris, to unite the Spanish crown with the French and British alliance. However he also trusted Bourbon's disavowal of such an alliance, as well as the sincerity of Bourbon's promises to him. Indeed Dillon actually proposed that James share information:

...[Monteleon] pretended to be much in your interest and most people concluded he was sincere, when the [Whigs Ministry] finding him a man of intrigue and superior parts very fitt to serve their purposes left no measure unattempted to gain him, they have succeeded so intirely, that none well inform'd doubt of his having acted for many years past in conformity to their desire...[Mons.' le Duc] is fully inform'd of all this and the person's character and past behaviour, he seems also to be well aware of his being wholly devoted to [D. of Hanover], and promised [S.' Patrick Lawless] that he [Mons.' le Duc] would take his measures accordingly...but in all events, I think there can be no inconvenience in [the King]'s writing to [Mon.' Le Duc's] by a safe canal and in plain terms to acquaint him with the informations he receiv'd in reference to [M. Monteleon]. I hope you will excuse the freedom I take in giving my own opinion which is intirely submitted, and you may be sure I shall not fail speaking home to Mad.' La Duchesse on this subject, and to M.' Le Duc himself when I can find a favourable opportunity...  

Dillon also encouraged James to cultivate the Irish Jacobite Sir Patrick Lawless, the new Spanish ambassador to France. Dillon passed on his worries to James about the Franco-Russian negotiations being derailed by the strengthening of the French alliance with Britain.

Thus Dillon retained contact with James at this stage, and remained informed on some matters. James even sought his advice, as on the matter of an Irish episcopal nomination, so he obviously still trusted Dillon to a certain extent. Nevertheless the comments James had made in recent letters would have awakened Dillon to the danger of his position. It must have been becoming gradually clearer that his intimacy with Mar meant he could not long remain untouched by Mar's new status, especially with the faction in Rome (now in an insurmountable position of influence with James) virtually his declared enemy, as well as Mar's.

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692 SPW, 76/60, Dillon to James, Aug. 21, 1724.
693 SPW, 76/58, Dillon to James, Aug. 21, 1724.
694 SPW, 76/97, Dillon to James, Aug. 28, 1724.
695 SPW, 76/7, Dillon to James, Aug. 7, 1724; 44, James to Daniel O'Brien, Aug. 19, 1724.
Naturalisation

Perhaps Dillon had sensed the imminent change when he decided to apply for a French bureaucratic post. He desired the vacant governorship of Thionville: but this essentially meant he needed to apply for naturalisation as a French subject, as he could not hold an official office without it. Dillon’s strong Jacobite devotion, and his personal awareness and difficulty with his conflicting allegiance is clearly demonstrated in this episode of his naturalisation. In spite of recent events, and the insecurity of his position, he must not have felt comfortable officially becoming a subject of France, and the French monarchy, without the authorisation of the Stuart monarch. In writing to James requesting his approval, he assured him of his continued Jacobite loyalty in spite of this naturalisation.

I have solicited m. le due for the vacant Government of thionville, he received my demand in a very friendly manner, and was pleased to express in kind terms his desire of being serviceable to me...I hope you will please to permit my being naturalised, and judge it proper to send me your permission signed which you may the more easily grant, that my being so shall never affect either my duty or true inclinations towards you and yours, and please god I shall never depart frome the same sentim. As to the second point, I see no remedy for it but a [change] for the [better] which I hope and wish may soon happen... Dillon did not actually wait to receive authorisation from James before going ahead with his application; in fact given the timing of the letters he must have applied before even sending the request to James, possibly immediately after meeting with Bourbon. Louis XV granted his request in August, but his appeal to James dated from the 28th of that month, and he did not receive James’ reply till 17 September; and of course it must have been even longer till Dillon received it.

Dillon’s ceremony of application therefore seems to have been more of a plea for approval, rather than a genuine solicitation for consent. Though James’ approval would be desirable, this constituted a personal, independent step with no risk to the Jacobite cause and a practical, personal decision. His request for a signed copy of the permission perhaps also suggests Dillon’s need for written proof in case doubts might later have been raised about it, another indication of his vulnerable situation within the Jacobite community at this time. However such a letter was not legally or officially necessary – it was effectively a declaration of sentiment, which would not have been contemplated by someone who did not genuinely feel the pull of attachment and primacy of duty to their former ‘true’ monarch.

696 SPW, 76/29, Dillon to James, Aug. 14, 1724; Dromantin, Les Oies Sauvages, p. 37.
697 SPW, 76/98, Dillon to James, Aug. 28, 1724.
698 AN, Series O/1 Maison du Roi, O1* 223, Naturalité, Aoust 1724, f. 211.
James did in fact send Dillon his written permission as requested, assuring him of the endurance of his belief in Dillon’s loyalty, and permitting him the privilege of foreign naturalisation. \footnote{SPW, 76/167, James to Dillon, Sept. 17, 1724.} It is therefore technically an official (even signed) declaration that Dillon’s loyalty to him could not be at risk by this ceremonial change in his nationality, a final, definite affirmation of formal allegiance to the French monarch.

**Exposure of Mar**

Despite James’ great disenchantment and consequent bitterness at Mar’s treachery, he did not immediately allow his perfidy, or the withdrawal of his own confidence in Mar to be officially acknowledged. Other than the Roman faction of Hay, Murray and Atterbury whose suspicions had uncovered the traitor, James only informed Ormonde of his treachery, partly due to his fear of provoking Mar into exposing important Jacobite secrets, and displaying James’ weaknesses. \footnote{Fulkestone, Vol. II, pp. 26, 36.} In addition, James also needed to know the exact circumstances of the affair, not least the depth to which certain other individuals, specifically Dillon and Lansdowne, had been involved or known about the treachery.

...I easily discover the inconveniencies of [Dillon’s] present conduct, and those of its appearing to the world that [Mar] has yet any share in my confidence, I have long foreseen some of them, but it often happens that letting an [evi]l grow, is the best method to be able at last to remedy it securely and effectually, and that I will certainly soon do, but I cannot determine on particular measures till I receive from Macmahon the Letters he is to bring me, and which will doubtlessly show the bottom of some Peoples present politiques, and enable me to act on sure grounds... \footnote{SPW, 76/22, James to Atterbury, Aug. 12, 1724; accord. Fulkestone, Vol. II, Atterbury to James, July 23, 1724, pp. 40-41.}

Nevertheless rumours about the affair had spread through the Jacobite community: those who had previously distrusted or been enemies of Mar eagerly lapped up treasonable accusations against him – and some believed the resulting accusations against both Lansdowne and Dillon. \footnote{Gregg, ‘Jacobite Career’, p. 192.} Conversely many Jacobites continued to support Lansdowne and Dillon, including Ormonde. \footnote{SPW, 76/21, Ormonde to James, Aug. 12, 1723; 79/111, Atterbury to James, Jan. 29, 1725.} The turmoil caused Mar to desperately attempt to justify his actions, including the Memorial, and re-establish
his previous standing and influence with James. However, he only made things worse for himself by continuing to blame the rival faction for all the allegations against him, which could only exasperate and antagonise James. He seemingly refused to appreciate the grip which the faction in Rome now had on James.

Under the influence of Atterbury, Hay and Murray, James became steadily more worried about Dillon. They continually warned James about Mar’s excessive influence over Dillon and Lansdowne, and the effect it would have:

...in your affairs here upon a new foot, I have thought Delay requisite, yet I now begin to think & find it dangerous: as it gives him room to play a Game here very mischievous to your Interest w\textsuperscript{th} he is dividing & breaking by all possible methods, & laying a foundation for further merit with, & Rewards from your Enemys, even after he shall appras to be out of all your Secrets as well as your Service. How it comes to pass I know not: but of late He or his two Friends are more strictly united than ever, & more determined, in appearance, to stick by one another: & will probably be more & more so, till you shall please to act in such a decisive manner, as shall scatter at once all their little Arts & Contrivances. Till this be done I now see that Those who sincerely mean your Interest, & only Yours here, & elsewhere, can be of no use to it, & will have no credit, nor any heart to proceed...

His growing conviction of Mar’s intent to damage Jacobite affairs made him doubt Dillon’s willingness or ability to perform his duties and he expressed his concern to Atterbury:

My orders to [Dillon] about secrecy were general, without exception of things or persons, and it was a permission and not an order I gave him to impart these directions where he thought fit, as long as he [is] blinded and obsessed by some persons, he will never do right, but how to free him from them is the point, and how to put him under your sole Direction, which is what I have had, and have always in view...

This conviction led James to request that Dillon deposit certain secret Jacobite papers from the past several years with the Scots College. This eventually became a very important issue, with grave consequences for Dillon’s future within the Jacobite community. The request to Dillon stemmed from James’ concern about security. Dillon consented to perform the task once he had sufficient time:

...neither Dillon nor D. of Mar says one word about the depositing the papers,
so I suppose We shall soon hear That Dillon has performd his part, as I hope the D. of Mar will, after he has receivd the King's last order and Dillon is by this post ordered to demand them positively, and in case neither the King's letter to D. of Mar, nor Dillon's demand, should produce a compliance, That Dillon should push the affair so far as that the refusal may appear evidently a disobedience to the King's commands...

The command served to test Dillon's independence from Mar's dominance; would Dillon enforce his king's wishes, at the very least when it came to James' direct decree? James gave Dillon other specific orders in order to test his obedience and loyalty.

I have Directed Dillon to speak with entire freedom with the Bp of Rochester and to him alone, about my affairs, and to endeavour to engage Mons. Le Duc to have a free Communication with him, The effects of those orders will show me what further steps should be taken toward the having my affairs in France manadged in a manner conducive to my service for as it is, that is far from being the case, and tho' a certain person in that Country has been now for many months no more in my confidence, yet I see by experience the ill consequences, which must ensue, if I do not withdraw my confidence also from all those who shall continue to be influenced or rather imposed upon by him...

By the end of the month James had started to doubt even Dillon's willingness to carry out his orders.

A few days later Mar's continuing malign influence forced James to inform the most important Jacobites, especially Dillon, of Mar's treachery, and warned him in particular against continued confidential interaction with Mar. At the same time James ordered Dillon to continue attempting to gain Bourbon's support but to no longer make any unauthorised steps. Dillon effectively had to take his orders from Atterbury, consulting with Atterbury in all dealings.

...it was by no means proper to delay any longer writing my possitive & particular directions to Dillon in relation to the future managem' of my Affairs in France, I have Therefor added to the former order in relation to The Bishop of Rochester, That Dillon should take no Step in my affairs, without the Bp. participation, and that in concert w' him he should give you regularly the necessary lights and informations on my affairs. As to the D. of Mar, I acquainted him, Dillon, that I had withdrawn my confidence entirely from him, and that I should do so with all those over whom he should have any influence, Directing him to have no further communication with that Duke, in relation to my affairs, and that he should impart the [Secret] transactions relating to them to nobody whatsoever but to you and The Bishop. I have also write into England to Lord Orrery...to inform him & such of my friends as he has free communication with, of my Resolution as to the D. of Mar...I thought it necessary to inform you of these steps...They will effectually inabilitat The D. of Mar from obstructing

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710 SPW, 76/101, Hay to Atterbury, Aug. 29, 1724; 61, James to Dillon, Aug. 22, 1724
711 SPW, 76/64, Hay to Murray, Aug. 22, 1724.
712 SPW, 76/71, James to Ormonde, Aug. 26, 1723.
713 SPW, 76/89, Lansdowne to James, Aug. 28, 1724; 100, James to Dillon, Aug. 29, 1724; 124, Lansdowne to James, Sept. 4, 1724; 137, James to Ormonde, Sep. 7, 1724.
any longer my service…

This letter highlights the steep decline in Dillon’s standing with James from a leader to whom all Jacobites in France looked to for orders, to a tainted lackey of the treacherous Mar, whom he was definitively ordered to have nothing to do with. James also warned the rulers and his contacts at foreign courts of Mar’s new status, a necessary move given the previous position of Mar with James and within the Jacobite network.

...Mercer [The King] is resolved to putt a stop to D. Mar’s underhand dealings, and his conduct these two months past. I am persuaded without any more will have done it effectually friends in England will be fully apprised of the opinion [ye King] has of [Mar]...but in that case [Dillon] is involved over head and ears therefore I think [the King] has reason first to write to Dillon in plain terms about the D. of Mar forbidding his having any further correspondence with him...The King already acquainted M. Le Duc with his opinion of Ld Mar by a confident of his who was here some time after the Pope was chose...

Only a few days later James decided that essentially the whole Jacobite community had to be informed of Mar’s change in position, in order to prevent any slip in security by Jacobites giving away secrets to Mar through ignorance of his changed position. From this point on it can be seen how his fallen star increasingly caused a domino effect among those associated with him. James comments to Lockhart that he has withdrawn his confidence from Mar, as he “shall be oblig’d to do from all who may be any ways influenced by him.”

Hay actually recommended to Atterbury that they both ‘forgive’ Dillon, and make overtures towards Dillon and Mar in order to make an agreement with them in which both sides would make concessions. Their own concessions would include not publicly revealing Dillon’s involvement in the affair of the memorial. This sacrifice would all be in order to serve James’ interest, by giving Dillon the opportunity to absolve himself by withdrawing from Mar, as James desired, which would greatly impede Mar’s continued attempts to influence Jacobite affairs.

...[Mr. Dillon] wrote several letters...all in manner...a great dale of Submission and promises of Strick compliance with his orders...all I can observe from his Letters is That he would gladly get clear out of this scrape, but does not know the way; I observe you have conceal'd that you know That he deliver'd the Memoire, and it is certainly better that you should continue to do so; What I would propose Is that means Should be taken to insinuate a Sort of an

714 SPW, 76/137, James to Ormonde, Sep. 7, 1724; 147, James to Dillon, Sept. 10, 1724.
715 SPW, 76/100, James to Dillon, Aug. 29, 1724.
716 SPW, 76/96, Duchess of Lorraine to James, Aug. 28, 1724;
717 SPW, 76/114, James to Lockhart, Aug. 31, 1724.
Agreement betwixt D. of Mar & you, that no more noise should be made about past transactions, That D. of Mar Should be no more trusted in the King’s affairs, and that the mistakes of others Should be forgot...In this manner The good of the King’s Service I think would be provided for...I can’t think but D. of Mar would be glad to get off upon these terms, and I am sure [Dillon] & Ld. Lansdown ought to wish that this could be brought about...I am perswaded, The King’s telling Dillon That he was resolved to continue to employ me has been the chief reason of his softening so suddenly...

Dillon, inexplicably, did not accept these conditions. Despite the risk, which had been directly spelt out to him by James, he maintained contact with Mar, and refused to abandon their relationship. Moreover he made no effort to hide this from Atterbury or the Jacobite community.

Mar, too, refused to abide by the above conditions by keeping silent. He maintained his blandishments and delays with attempts to defend the Memorial. He also continued to assure James that his orders about the papers, and Dillon’s too, would be fulfilled – but that just a brief delay would result from waiting for a confirmation of these orders from James. The rival faction thereupon made many complaints of this behaviour, and attempted to defend James from Mar’s claim that he approved the Memorial, as well as defending each other from the latter’s various attacks. Hay wrote to Atterbury of Mar’s claims against him, and accusations against Hay himself:

…it is said by D. of Mar That you Spoke of the heads of the Memorial to Several, That he does not doubt byt you had your Information from me...He says That you told him that the paper and Scheme can be proved to be his, and who translated it into french, and that it was deliver’d to the D. of Orleans in Septem,’ last, He complains of a little unfair usage from you, because of your speaking to D. Lansdown and Mr. Dillon of the accusations you have made against him on other Subjects, which you had drawn from the papers he show’d you in confidence. Since you had Spoke to them freely on those Subjects before you spoke your mind to him upon them, tho’ he had been several times with you alone, after your perusing his papers, but he shows an indifferency [upon this head], as to these articles...The articles are his proposing an aliment for the King, a General Indemnity, and his accepting of money from My Lord Stairs when he was at Geneva...

Mar continued for many months to justify his memorial to the Regent in letters to Rome, seemingly unaware of James’ absolute conviction as to his treachery, and how irreparable was his position. He sometimes attempted to justify his behaviour through Dillon’s knowledge and sanction of his actions:

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718 SPW, 76, 101, Hay to Atterbury, Aug. 29, 1724.
719 SPW, 76, 149, Mar to James, Sept. 11, 1724; SPW, 77/15, Mar to James, Sept. 25, 1724; Gregg, ‘Jacobite Career’, p. 192.
720 SPW, 76/151, Murray to James, Sep. 11, 1724; 156, Hay to Atterbury, Sept. 12, 1724; 77/22, Hay to Murray, Sept. 26, 1724; 77/113, Oct. 24, 1724, Hay to Atterbury; 132, James to Atterbury, Sept. 5, 1724; 163, Hay to Hamilton, Nov. 11, 1724; 91, Hay to Orrery, Jan. 24, 1725.
721 SPW, 76/101, Hay to Atterbury, Aug. 29, 1724.
...Yr. Maj: knows, as well as Mr Dillon, that when I was oblig’d to apply to the Government of England for my liberty, when under promise to return to my prison at Geneve, all that was done in that affair & that it was done by y’ allowance & approbation, w’th I have under y’ own hand and you was not kept ignorant of the least title of it....The answer I wrote to it was concerted with Mr Dillon & showen to another principal friend of yrs here before it was send...I had not y’ allowance it is true, for giving that Memoriall of wch I’m accused that Mr Dillon carried from me to the late Duke of Orleans, nor was y’ Maj. Pleased ever to mention any thing to me of it upon the copie I sent you; But you know it was out of tenderness & regard for you that I took the load upon myself of giving it without y’ knowledge, and as soon as it was given...I sent you a copie of it & the letter I wrote with it...Granting I had been mistaken in that Memorial, it is plain it was well meant, and could not be done to hurt you, nor has it come out or been discovered by me...  

Several months later, in September 1725, Mar wrote an official ‘Vindication’ for public dissemination, which again implicated Dillon’s involvement in all events and actions – though by then it could not hurt Dillon, since he was as cut off from Jacobite affairs as Mar. Dillon’s unremitting association with Mar had been a fatal blow to his credibility.

The rival faction greatly exaggerated Mar’s manipulation and sway over Dillon; Mar did however deceive both him and Lansdowne on this issue of his betrayal of the Jacobite cause, as he did James and the entire Jacobite community. In communication with the British government for his own interest, he betrayed the Atterbury plot through his use of code in his correspondence, and later maintained his innocence of such an action. While shrewd enough to get as much pre-planned corroboration of his actions as possible, he cloaked his early attempts to acquire a pardon from the British ministry with James’ permission; he also obtained approval from Dillon. In this regard he did use Dillon’s ignorance of the treasonous substance of his transactions with the British to substantiate his story, a deception he repeated with his defence of his memorial to the Regent.

Dillon was attached to his close friend, partner and ally but not under his control. Convinced of Mar’s honesty and Jacobite fidelity, Dillon continued to believe in his innocence after his treachery had been confirmed by the faction in Rome. By the time Mar’s treachery had been revealed, the rivalry between the opposition faction and the Triumvirate was so intense that Dillon would never have believed their claims about Mar. Furthermore, he believed strongly in the capacity of that faction to make up any story which could discredit a member of the Triumvirate. How could he

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723 Glover, 61, Atterbury to Hay, Oct. 8, 1725, pp. 300-301.
possibly have been convinced of the treachery of his own long-time collaborator, even friend? James should not have expected him to be easily convinced, or ready to isolate himself from Mar. After all Dillon had previously shown himself willing to loyally defend a friend in disgrace (Inese, see Chapter Two). This time however his misplaced loyalty would only end in his own discredit.

**End of Dillon's involvement in Bourbon Negotiations**

At the start of September James apparently still held out some hope of the Duc du Bourbon's assistance for a new Jacobite attempt, though he also thought they had better hopes of the Czar acting for them alone than in concert with Bourbon:

...The D. of Bourbon would have the Czar patch up a Treaty with The Elec. of Hanover as a necessary preamble for the turning over a new Leaf and for acting afterwards in my favour. Mons. Le Duc still expresses much friendship for me and desire to serve me, but I own I do not understand these his present politicjs, and I have good reason to believe the Czar is very averse from entering in to them, and much more desirous to act a plain and open part in my favour...I hope The Bishops advice will be of the greatest use to Dillon for the Solliciting and Arguing on these matters with Mons. Le Duc, who I hope will not refuse to hear The Bishop himself...if in this Juncture you could prevail on Philip to write to the Duc of Bourbon in the manner I lately prepared, it might more than anything else contribute to induce Mons. Le Duc to come to a final Resolution on my Affairs...

James still had some confidence in Dillon, as he continued to employ him for the Bourbon negotiations, and to assure him of his respect for him and his belief in his zeal for the Jacobite cause:

...you may be assured that the good opinion I have of your zeal and affection for me will always make me think well of you, what you suggest for my service. I plainly see of how [great] a discouragement it must prove to be to the Czar should Mons. Le Duc make any new agreem' with England, before he has adjoudted matters with him, and therefor nothing certainly ought to be neglected by us to prevent the one, and hasten the other, They both know my readiness & willingness to give them the strongest Assurances of future [gratitude]...and if Mons. Le Duc really means me well, which seems to be still your opinion, Methinks the last words of my last letter to Mad. La Duchesse should determine him to enter into [particulars] with me, On which I cannot begin myself, being as much in the dark as I am, as to his present views, whether in relation to the intrest of France, or his own personally; It would be Therefor of great advantage If you could obtain good Information on those [heads], for with those lights I could act on sure grounds...In the mean time it might not perhaps be amiss, to make an attempt at this time towards my returning to Avignon, not that I can expect that Mons. Le Duc should publickly approve of my going thither, but if on your discoursing with him on the matter you could obtain his privat promise that he would not [mol]est me were I once there, I could easily continue to be in that territory, before he could know of my Journey time

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724 SPW, 76/137, James to Ormonde, Sep. 7, 1724.
enough to be able to stop my passage throw the French Dominions. The advantages of my being there preferable to Rome are manifest, and much might be said to Mons. Le Duc to convince him That it is ever the [interest] of France I should be there. I would have you discourse on this particular w' the Bp of Rochester, and after that mention the matter or not to Mons. Le Duc [accor]ding as you [two] find it expedient...

Indeed Dillon even managed to convince James to seek the assistance of Bourbon’s mother, La Duchesse de Bourbon, to use her influence with her son in their favour, as Dillon believed that she was genuinely sympathetic towards the Jacobites’ ambitions. James recommended she consult with both Dillon and Atterbury (particularly underlining Atterbury’s merits, as he had to Bourbon). However Hay and Atterbury continued to complain of Dillon to James. They did not trust Dillon’s abilities, and were sure that Bourbon was taking advantage of Dillon’s credulity:

...Mr. [Dillon] seems still to think that Mons. Le Duc is a true well wisher, tho I think his behaviour at the same time shows that he is resolved to do nothing [essential] for the King at least for some time, as a proof of this, he has presd the Czar to make up matters w' the E[ler] of Hanover as King of England. But the Czar has refused it absolutely, tho he he his willing to treat wt him as Elecr of Hanover. Monsr Le Duc amuses Mr. Dillon with telling him that nothing can be undertaken for the King till present differences between the powers he is now engaged with be adjusted, tho' it is very certain that he must meet with more difficulties in espousing the King’s interest after the conclusion of that Treaty...I don’t find Mr. Dillon has any notion of the strick friendship you observe to be established between England, France and Spain, and satisfies himself with Mons.' Le Duc’s polite answers, hoping that a little time will determine him in the King’s favour...

Other leading Jacobites, specifically those in England, were also worried about Dillon’s continued involvement in the Bourbon negotiations:

...By some acco. from England I am informed That a project is carrying on there under the suppositions That Mons. Le Duc is to connive at an attempt, where all the Irish troops in France are to be concern’d...Mons. de Ma[rs]h was charged as is said by L. Orrery, L Strafford, & Mr. [Cesar] with a message for Mons. Le Duc, where amongst other things, They desired That when Mons. Le Duc had any real design of entering into measures for an Invasion That He might treat [...] really with the King himself, & not communicat his good Intentions to the triumvirat at Paris, I am likeways inform’d that Mons. De Marsh was desired to communicat to the King the particulars of his Instructions...Is That the diffidence at least some friends in England have of certain persons on this side of the sea, tho' never so ill grounded, would always serve to [observat] any thing that might be attempted for the King’s service on

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725 SPW, 76/169, James to Dillon, Sep. 18, 1724; accord. 76/126, Dillon to James, Sept. 4, 1723.
726 SPW, 76/123, James to Dillon, Sep. 3, 1724; 156, Hay to Atterbury, Sept. 12, 1724.
727 James to Duchesse de Bourbon, Sept. 9, 1724, Glover, p. 115n; SPW, 76/147, James to Dillon Sept. 10, 1724; 156, Hay to Atterbury, Sept. 12, 1724; 169, James to Dillon, Sep. 18, 1724; 78/7, James to Atterbury, Nov. 20, 1724.
728 SPW, 76/135, Hay to Atterbury, Sep. 5, 1724.
Though James briefly maintained the hope that Bourbon’s expressed support or good wishes allowed for a possibility of eventual action, their approaches towards his mother failed to produce any results, and his patience was not endless. By the end of September James had lost any confidence he might have had in Bourbon: “...I hope...that the present extraordinary events will help to determine him to take some steps in my favour, for without some encouragement from him I see no gla[d] appearance of Mons. Le Duc’s taking any resolute measures soon in my behalf...”

Only the support of a third power could convince the French leadership to undertake active measures for the Jacobite cause, yet Dillon continued to be convinced of Bourbon’s intention to eventually assist them:

This gentleman [Atterbury] seems to lay no great stress on [the Duke of Bourbon]’s generall assurances of friendship and promises of service whenever the affairs of this kingdom are settled to satisfaction, and that the King of France’s interest permits undertaking something effectual in [the King’s] favour. I find [the Bishop of Rochester] is not far from believing those general advances to be only an amusement in order to compass other purposes, and what fortifys him in this opinion is [the Duke of Bourbon] continuing still to insist on [the Czar] adjusting all differences with England, which, if done, would certainly prove of great prejudice to the King’s interest. I made use of several arguments to prove, as is really my opinion, that [the Duke of Bourbon] is not insincere in his professions of friendship towards the King; that he is a true well wisher, and designs most cordially to do all in his power to restore him, when France and Spain are sufficiently prepared for such an enterprise...It is certain the present sistem is to preserve peace at any rate...

Additionally Dillon completely trusted Bourbon, with a foreknowledge of the Jacobites’ intentions, as well as sensitive documents. He specifically told Atterbury that he “need not be in the least apprehension” that Bourbon could be trusted with possession of Mar’s Memorial. Moreover Dillon made this assurance despite his knowledge that a similar scenario had led to catastrophe only two years previously in the Atterbury Plot.

To secure more explicit undertakings, Atterbury had actually suggested insinuating to Bourbon that the Jacobites had hopes of assistance from other avenues, (specifically the Czar), a plan which Dillon recommended to James:

Who knows but it may at least produce the effect of bringing the other to some point, however uncertain or remote the execution may prove?...Justice and the glory of relieving an oppressed Prince are strong motives for so great and

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729 SPW, 76/173, Hay to Atterbury, Sep. 19, 1724.
730 SPW, 77/7, James to Ormonde Sep. 22, 1724.
731 SPW, 77/52, Dillon to James, Oct. 3, 1724.
generous a monarch to encourage such undertakings, but it is not improbably but personal animosity against the Duke of Hanover for injuries received might have some share in it...

The latter sentence from Dillon betrays an incredible simplicity and naivety of political judgement. Hay believed that Bourbon had duped Dillon from the start, perceiving him as easy to manipulate and an advantage in his relationship with the Jacobites:

...and how could the King suspect That Mons. Le Due would enter into measures so evidently contrary to his interest, after all the professions of friendship made To the King by Mr. Dillon’s [canal], both from him & Mad. La Duchesse, neither can M'. Le Duc take amiss, That the King should shew himself sensible of the bad consequences that must follow to his interest from the late measures M'. Le Duc has taken, acting another past Mr thinks ought rather to be confronted a blindness, & consequently encourage M'. Le Duc to continue to impose upon The King and those employ’d by him as he has done of late upon Mr. Dillon...

As it turned out, and in spite of her good wishes, the Jacobites had even less possibility of the Duchesse de Bourbon’s assistance than they had previously had from Bourbon’s own promises. James perceived that Dillon had been as unwarrantedly optimistic as to their prospects through her means as he had previously been for Bourbon himself - Hay again thought this might be because of Dillon’s propensity to be manipulated, even by La Duchesse:

I don’t perceive that the King has any great encouragem’ to make use of Mad. La Duchesse Canal with Mons.’ Le Duc, after the usage M’. Dillon has met with, & the impositions that have been put upon him by her means. And if I believe that she has acted a sincere part w’ Dillon, tis evident she has been ignorant & imposed upon herself, w’ I really take to be the case, & consequently that she has no great weight with her son...

Once the last hope from the Duchesse de Bourbon had been extinguished, it brought an end to the negotiations – an inevitable result, in spite of Dillon’s original confidence. Notwithstanding the warmth of the personal feelings and sympathy Bourbon himself might have had for his cousin, there had never been any real chance that he would be tempted to relinquish the security, strength and practicality of the British alliance for the exposure and liabilities of a Jacobite one.

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733 SPW, 77/52, Dillon to James, Oct. 3, 1724.
734 SPW, 78/159, Hay to Atterbury, Dec. 26, 1724.
735 SPW, 79/122, Duchess de Bourbon to James, n. d., [received Jan. 31, 1725].
737 Wills, Jacobites and Russia, pp. 89-90; Széchyi, The Jacobites, p. 113.
Dismissal

The tensions in Dillon’s relationship with Atterbury emerged as a key factor in Dillon’s eventual exclusion from central affairs. He could not get on with the new favourite; nor could Atterbury get on with him. Dillon himself wrote to James, stating that his relationship with Atterbury was holding their co-operation back; even that their shared involvement put at risk his own involvement.

...in my humble opinion it is a question to be weighed, whether [Dillon’s] acting in conjunction with [Atterbury] may prove conducive to [the King’s] service or not. Y° King is no stranger to the frequent disputes and disagreements that happened between [Atterbury] and men of distinction, age, and experience of his own country and [religion] who acted Jointly with him, they complain’d of his incompatible humour and violent suspicious temper. Since therefore persons bred and born in the same climat, and of the same profession could not agree with [Atterbury], can it be well expected Mr Dillon will meet with better success, who had different education and is of another [Religion] for which it is necessary [Atterbury] should have due regard especially, which [ye King] is depending on the assistance of Catholick power’s. If it be taken for granted, that [Mar] is accused of schemes and counsels tending to popery, slavery, and arbitrary power &c. it is not naturall to presume his suspicions may extend further in relation to [Dillon], and if this way of reasoning should reach Mr le Duc, [B. Frejus] and the ministry here...may it not be apprehended, that [Dillon] Intimating his orders to act in concert with [Atterbury] may run the risk of being excluded himself from usuall confidence. I thought it incumbent duty to lay these considerations before [the King]...I hope he will easily believe they mean nothing else but the good of his service, without the least prevention against any person whatsoever...”

Dillon assured James that he had behaved as instructed, in spite of doubts about Atterbury - though showing a certain lack of awareness of just how important his obedience to James’ orders on the matter of his conferring with Atterbury was to James. His assurances were confirmed by Atterbury, in spite of their difficulties:

...[Dillon] was with me again last night...He shewed me yr Letter to [Duchess de Bourbon] & what you were pleas’d to say of me there...He discoursd me more freely & openly on your affairs than formerly: & from ye whole, I am confirm’d in my former opinion yt [Mr. le Duc]’s professions have no determind meaning, nor can be of any real use to [you], while [Mr Le Duc] pursuis ye Track he is now in – wch will lead him still farther & farther out of ye way of serving ye King & at last of a possibility of doing it...You will prhaps therefore to consider, whether this be not ye Time of pushing [Mr Le Duc] into clearer Explications of himself, & letting him see, that you cannot rely on general Assurances, wch ye very Steps he now takes must frustrate, & insinuating by this means (tho without saying it) that you may possibly turn you self to other Views & resolve not to neglect so extraordinary a Juncture...”

In spite of Dillon’s assurances and Atterbury’s confirmation, James succumbed to

738 SPW, 77/54, Dillon to James, Oct. 2, 1724.
739 SPW, 77/52, Dillon to James Oct. 3, 1724; 55, Dillon to James, Oct. 2, 1724
740 SPW, 77/47, Atterbury to James, Oct. 2, 1724.
their pressure to dispense with Dillon.\textsuperscript{741}

The rival faction argued that Dillon’s credulity towards Bourbon allied to the trust that had to be placed in him in his current role made Dillon unsuitable for both the French negotiations and his continued inclusion in the confidence of the leadership network. The faction deemed Dillon to be inadequate to the task, as well as utterly taken in by Bourbon’s deliberate misrepresentations:

...You will easily believe that [Bourbon] is fond of [Dillon], for several reasons, one of which may be his not having seen him in three or four months, and another his being able to manage him and make him believe every thing he thinks fit when he dos see him. In short, the question seems to be whether [James] will be [mastr] or not, and as a consequence of this whether his business is to be on a footing of having his secrets betrayed and his affairs sacrificed...it is necessary to take a resolution as to some things on which the good of the whole depends in a proper time...\textsuperscript{742}

Although convinced of Dillon’s personal fidelity to James, Murray and Hay also continued to believe in Dillon’s devotion to Mar, a suspicion fueled by the exposure of his transactions with English Jacobites on the French negotiations, which James had not been informed of.\textsuperscript{743} Hay speculated however that Mar had initiated this action without Dillon’s knowledge:

...‘tis really very odd if the Minister gave his consent to such a promise that [James] was not inform’d of it, or if the Triumvirat have taken upon them to advance a thing of that kind without authority will appear equally extraordinary, what is certain Is that most of the chief friends would not see the Messenger sent over...[James] has already informed some friends in Engld & those in Scotland with [Mar’s] situation wt him, and has added that he could have confidence in none that had a confidence in [Mar], or who were capable of being byassed by him any manner of way...May not [Dillon] have found the Minister well inclined and have got a promise of Connivance from him, providing friends on t’other side would enter heartily into a project, and at the same time have given the Minister such Impressions of [James] and those he has in confidence, in that he might desired [Dillon] to try friends on t’other side without saying any thing to [James] of his promise of connivance, tho that does not justify [Dillon] yet it is worth diving into, and a very little time will certainly discover it if it be so, I own I suspect this may be the case...\textsuperscript{744}

Hay’s representations to James of Dillon’s susceptibility to Mar proved particularly damaging. By now an aggrieved James believed Mar to be virtually a master-mind of malicious deceit and manipulation.

In consequence, James charged Atterbury rather than Dillon with meeting with

\textsuperscript{741} SPW, 77/114, Hay to Murray, Oct. 24, 1724; 135, Hay to Atterbury, Oct. 31, 1724.
\textsuperscript{742} SPW, 77/109, Murray to Hay, Oct. 23, 1724; 135, Hay to Atterbury, Oct. 31, 1724.
\textsuperscript{744} SPW, 77/57, Hay to Murray, Oct. 3, 1724.
Bourbon and as the sole envoy. Atterbury had been insinuated into the negotiations for some time, and James deemed him suitably conversant to replace Dillon completely. Hay complained that James told Bourbon that Dillon could not be trusted with the negotiations – and no longer had James’ confidence:

…I have very little to add as to the nature of Mr Dillon’s past dealings w’ Mons. Le Duc, only That the King’s opinion of My Lord Mar has been fully explain’d to friends both in England & Scotland, and Mons. Le Duc is well apprized of it, likeways as well as of the strict friendship that is betwixt Dillon & My Lord Mar, after this I think one may be able to draw some consequences, even from the manner M.’ Le Duc receives you, and if he declines hearing you, one may easily conclude that he will deal only with such a one as he is [Sure] he can manage, as he pleases…

One could conceivably ask why Bourbon would want to continue to negotiate at all when the Jacobite party themselves insisted that their former representative and primary negotiator could not be trusted? Which bore out Dillon’s apprehension on this exact point. However, he could not have realised that their apprehension reached Bourbon from James himself.

The exchange of Dillon for Atterbury could only hinder, if not ensure the failure of the negotiations, which would simply confirm the faction’s view. It also deprived Dillon of the chance to justify himself through an advantageous resolution of the negotiations. James had originally espoused an intention of making a final decision about Dillon once his performance with the negotiations had been seen; if James had ever been genuine about this intention, his subsequent actions defeated its purpose. Obviously James had essentially been convinced by the faction in Rome that the negotiations had foundered; Bourbon’s insincerity proved Dillon’s error of judgement and incapacity for office.

At any rate James now determined to dispense with Dillon’s service in this role. He still had support from many Jacobites who took his part and continued to believe in him, but this was not enough, certainly not once James had been convinced by the faction in Rome. He wrote to Dillon informing him that his continued association with Mar in defiance of James’ own warnings had made it necessary for James to withdraw his confidence in Dillon as his representative in the French negotiations.

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745 SPW, 77/96, Hay to Atterbury, Oct. 17, 1724, ff. 181a-182a
747 SPW, 77/47, Atterbury to James, Oct. 2, 1724.
James deemed this a political move only, and he still valued Dillon’s loyalty. He assured Dillon of his continued trust, despite his no longer being a member of the inner circle. Indeed he attempted to show his gratitude to Dillon, as well as his sorrow over the affair, by promising to use his interest in his favour. In October 1724 James delivered on this promise, writing to Bourbon to request a French bureaucratic post for Dillon; Bourbon actually sent orders for the fulfilment of James’ request.

The conclusion of this matter is mysterious; there is only one other allusion to it, by James in December, when he tells Dillon that he has once again recommended him to Bourbon. This would therefore imply that despite James’ recommendations, and Bourbon’s own order to that effect, Dillon did not receive the said post.

James also continued to write friendly letters towards Dillon, though for the most part with little of political import included.

...I shall make the proper use of the lights you give me & what [I write] to you on the 31. Oct. will not hinder my receiving from you such informations as you may have to send me hereafter on any occasion. A [witch] hunt is the furthest from my thought & that my withdrawing my confidence from you at this time should be interpreted as my having any ill opinion of you, I do full Justice to your zeal & loyalty & it is not nor shall not be any secret that I do so, I am ever [hopefull] that this step will at the present be of advantage as your [pretentions] in france, & the rather that I have [...] a second time recommended you to Mr Le Duc. You must not lett your self be disturbed with idle [reports] & [talk] my faithfull servants have had of late [but] too much to suffer on that account, but my conduct [direc]ts all as in really such right to shew them that I am incapable either of Receiving a wrong impression of [their] [...]cks or misinterpreting [..........] they [re]present to me with [a good] meaning which was I am sure [your case] & to pray be entirely at ease, [since] what hath past of late will only engage me to be more attentive in shewing you the [warm] regard I have for you...

James did still have enough faith in Dillon to allow him to assist Atterbury, and convey correspondence to Bourbon:

...a Memorial to be given to Mons.' Le Duc. I cannot but hope it may make some impression, and shall be glad to know how your new acquaintance proceeds & succeeds int that Negotiation, He is in the right to act with great secrecy in that affair, and it is sufficient if you inform me of the progress of it. You cannot have yourself on your side too much regard to the secret, and I suppose you will not impart any thing of the matter to any body, but at the same time give all the help and advice you can on proper occasions to the unknown person, to whose views you may be the more assistant, by your not being at this present juncture the same share in the managem’ of my concerns in France as formerly....

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749 SPW, 76/123, James to Dillon, Sep. 3, 1724; MAE, Correspondance Politique, Angleterre, MS 349, James to Bourbon, Oct. 15, 1724, ff. 75a-77a.
750 SPW, 78/67, James to Dillon, Dec. 9, 1724.
751 SPW, 77/169, James to Dillon, Nov. 12, 1724.
752 SPW, 78/67, James to Dillon, Dec. 9, 1724.
753 SPW, 78/22, James to Dillon, Nov. 27, 1724.
Dillon seemed sufficiently mollified by James’ blandishments to agree to continue to act in this very restricted capacity, though outside the central circle of affairs. The request came at the very end of Dillon’s involvement in negotiations, maintaining this element of his previous role as a communication intermediary for a few more months, until completely shut out from all affairs in February 1725. He used the continued link to support Lansdowne’s claims to innocence.

The ‘Roman’ faction revelled in Dillon’s dismissal, and once James had sent the letter lost no time in expressing their feelings about Dillon and his inadequacy for the post. They seem relieved at the sudden ability to openly vent long-held resentments on various issues:

... You answer yourself very right as to what you say of [Dillons] [..mission], he had no form of business, he was orderd to communicat all he knew to the B. long before & write that he had done so, his cyphers were too common to be made use of, and no danger in having them in his hands, as well as in the hands of many others he thought fit to give them to, he has no Correspondence with any body that is worth while, And never doing any business [James] affairs can never suffer from his keeping all he knows to himself. After this you won’t wonder that [James] did not use the common form with a minister, so very uniform already in all reports...

The faction also complained of Dillon’s decisions and behaviour in relation to certain people, as well as his slow execution of important business. They revelled in their ‘victory’ by distributing copies of James’ letter of dismissal to a few friends. Even at this stage however, and even amongst themselves, Dillon’s nemeses recognised his fundamental sincerity and devotion to the Jacobite cause.

James had to explain his decision about Dillon to the wider Jacobite community, many of whom had great sympathy for Dillon; he remained a popular and respected figure. At first James and the faction did not know how best to grasp this nettle, particularly given how their management of the similar situation with Mar had so drastically backfired. Dillon’s situation was slightly different from Mar’s however, since he had been employed by James in an official post. This made it both more

754 SPW, 79/135, James to Duchess de Bourbon, Feb. 3, 1725.
755 SPW, 79/48, Dillon to James, Jan. 15, 1725.
756 SPW, 78/130, Hay to Murray, Dec. 19, 1724.
757 SPW, 77/154, Hay to Atterbury, Nov. 7, 1724; 78/9, Hay to Murray, Nov. 24, 1724; 54, Hay to Atterbury, Dec. 5, 1724.
appropriate and more important for the change in Dillon’s position to become
publicly recognised and accepted as soon as possible.

...it might have been more reasonable for...circular letters to be write Declaring
that the King’s confidence was removed from him than D of Mar’s case since
the last has been no ways employed by the King publickly since the Kings
journey to Spain...As Mr Dillon was publickly employed by the King, it may be
necessary That H. M acquaint some people wt his having removed his
confidence from him, and That when anything occurs for the King’s service,
which may be thought necessary to be communicated to his Minister at Paris,
That they should address themselves to you in such cases, which I don’t doubt
but H. M. intends to do...\textsuperscript{759}

At first however James chose to write to individual, important Jacobites, trusting to
them to spread the news further, rather than make an embarrassing public
announcement. James universally stressed to these individuals the exact nature of the
dismissal, and the continuing trust he had in Dillon.\textsuperscript{760}

He informed Dillon’s friend Ormonde first, clarifying that the dismissal was in
relation to Dillon’s diplomatic role in negotiations, and because of Dillon’s
disobedience with his continued association with Mar:

...By last french post I acquainted Mr Dillon that on account of his union with
the Duke of Mar I had found it expedient to suspend for a time my former
confidence in him in relation to the private [negociations] conjuring on in
France at present in my favour. I have writ to Mr le Duc & P. Kurakin of this
alteration and of the true cause of it, & have endeavoured to [introduce] the
Bishop into clear confidence [on this occasion] after having provided for my
own Service, to [act] not only in the [...]test but [kindest manner] towards
Dillon who I hope for his own sake will alter his present ways of thinking...\textsuperscript{761}

James had enough attachment to and gratitude left for Dillon to attempt to lessen the
embarrassing consequences as much as he could. In addition he kept open the
possibility of Dillon’s return to his former position of trust.

Of course Lansdowne maintained a fervent and public defence of both Dillon and
Mar, to the extent that Hay even described him to the other faction members as
Mar’s ‘scribbler’.\textsuperscript{762} Nevertheless the entire leadership continued to believe in
Lansdowne’s sincere Jacobite devotion, persuaded that he was Mar’s absolute dupe,
who was utterly convinced of Mar’s innocence. James therefore continued to write
to him kindly, though he could no longer trust him with intimate affairs, especially
with secrets, because of his own continued intercourse with Mar.\textsuperscript{763} James also gave

\textsuperscript{759} SPW, 77/154, Hay to Atterbury, Nov. 7, 1724.
\textsuperscript{760} SPW, 78/97, James to Sir Henry Stirling , Dec. 15, 1724.
\textsuperscript{761} SPW, 77/142, James to Ormonde, Nov. 4, 1724.
\textsuperscript{762} SPW, 78/8, Hay to Atterbury, Nov. 21, 1724; accord. 77/142, James to Ormonde, Nov. 4, 1724;
\textsuperscript{763} SPW, 78/82, James to Lansdowne, Dec. 12, 1724; Glover, 39, Atterbury to Hay, May 14, 1725, p.
195.
countenance to Lansdowne publicly, in an attempt to counteract the devastating public accusations against him, as Lansdowne begged him to do:

...It is certain that in [England] they are one and all satisfied of [D. Mar's] conduct and talk accordingly now very freely and openly, but I am grieved to hear that [Ld Lansdown] also shares in their censures and somewhat of that kind is stirring here as well as there tho he has been all along by me and shall be treated with the utmost tenderness. He is I find very uneasie at these reports and inquisitive after th authors of them not considering that he himself gives the occasion and that while he acts that part he dos at present it is impossible but that reflexions of this kind should pursue his conduct... 764

There were also still a few English Jacobites, those who had had dealings with Dillon, who placed a high value on Dillon's ability and more importantly on his worth to the cause. 765 James had to mollify their declarations of disappointment in his removal of Dillon from his post:

...You cannot have a better opinion than I have myself of Mr Dillon but his former Intimacy with Duke of Mar, the influence the last had over him, & the share he had in negociating with the late Duke of Orleans unknown to me [since] likewise equally destructive to my interest & most of my native country made it of absolute necessity to remove him at this time from the confidence of my affairs which [this] will I am perswaded never hinder him from serving the cause in all such matters as I may [here] after think fit to employ him in... 766

Conversely, other Jacobites seemed to have no problem accepting Dillon's sudden disgrace:

...I received by last post yours of 15th December and am concern'd that one such as [Dillon] who has been so long trusted, should have given occasion for what you mention. I have had no commerce with him since [D. O'Brien] left this place and shall for the future punctually follow your directions. I have likewise heard something not very favourable for [Mar] to whom I likewise wrote by [O'Brien]; But as you are pleased to say nothing concerning Him I shall suspend my judgement... 767

As well as to the Jacobite community, James now had to make clear to all their diplomatic contacts that Atterbury had assumed Dillon's role, and that neither Dillon nor Mar could be spoken to or trusted with sensitive information any longer. 768 At the same time however he made sure to make clear Dillon's delicate status to these figures also:

...You cannot have a better opinion than I have of M.' Dillons loyalty and zeal for my service, which is not in the least altered by my having found it expedient to withraw for the present my former confidence in him, I thought it convenient

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764 SPW, 79/111, Atterbury to James, Jan. 29, 1725; accord. 79/53, Lansdowne to James, Jan. 15, 1725.
765 SPW, 77/154, Hay to Atterbury, Nov. 7, 1724.
767 SPW, 79/127, Sir Harry Stirling to James, Feb. 2, 1725.
768 SPW, 78/100, James to Torcy, Dec. 15, 1724.
to acquaint you with this step, and I must desire you at the same time to
Discourse with the Bishop of Rochester with entire freedom on what may
concern my affairs...\(^{769}\)

For some of these figures, such as Patrick Lawless, Dillon had always been their
primary contact and connection with Jacobitism, and they sympathised with his part
in the split. Indeed Atterbury even described Lawless as almost as intimately
associated with Dillon as the rest of the triumvirate:

\[
...T\text{he last of these [Sir Patrick Lawless] notwithstanding his professions of
duty I take to be as determined an adherer to the measures of the three as any of
themselves are and as difficult to be recovered, and have good reason to believe
that he was in the secret of the mischievous scheme and thinks his honour
therefore engaged in supporting that and the contrivers of it. His eyes therefore
will scarce be opened till [Dillon's] are which Sir (I must repeat it) is a work
reserved for you alone ...\(^{770}\)
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James explicitly explains his reasons for Dillon’s dismissal informing English
Jacobite Lord Orrery of the change:

\[
...I am dayly more and more convinced That some steps I have lately taken will
not a little contribute to the future tranquillity & security of my friends, as well
as to the essential good of my service...It is on those accounts That I have been
also obliged to remove my confidence from M.' Dillon, not but that I have still
the same good opinion of his Loyalty & affection, of which I have not the least
reason to doubt, But the influence w.\(^{ch}\) the D. of Mar had over him & the share
he had in those privat negotiations wt the D. of Orleans, which I formerly
mentiond, made this new step in relation to him of absolut necessity, while it
can be attended with no inconveniences to my Service, since he is as
impossible of betraying former trusts [as I find he was it to manage late
negotiations] as he was little able to serve me at this time in France, His
dependence on that Court being so great and so absolut, that the Ministers share
had but too great an advantage over him, as past experience shows, in
concealing from him their real views, & in stopping his mouth with fair words
& assurances...\(^{771}\)
\]

Essentially then, Dillon’s removal from the Jacobite sphere, and specifically the
leadership of those affairs, stemmed from James realisation that Dillon’s attachment
and loyalty to the French state had become a barrier to his fulfilment of the duties of
his post and Jacobite service. Dillon’s susceptibility to Bourbon’s declarations
blinded him to the realities of French interest, and therefore the probabilities of
political shifts, just as it had in earlier years with regard to the Regent, as James
finally realised. Dillon believed what he was told by the French leaders, especially
when they made any overtures towards the Jacobites, primarily because Dillon was
generally politically ingenuous, a man of integrity and honesty, too apt to believe the

\(^{769}\) SPW, 78/108, James to Sir Patrick Lawless, Dec. 16, 1724.
\(^{770}\) SPW, 79/111, Atterbury to James, Jan. 29, 1725; accord. 78/129, Hay to Atterbury, Dec. 19, 1724.
\(^{771}\) SPW, 78/94, James to Orrery, Dec. 15, 1724.
same of his contemporaries, and thus not cynical enough for politics.

Dillon was additionally predisposed to believe the French leaders. His previous familiarity with both Bourbon and the Regent for several years, his position of deference to the Regent’s personal military command during warfare, as well as allegiance to the sovereign of the French state, left him with a certain amount of trust in the Regent, and an enduring sense of their common interest. Jacobites regularly over-estimated the commonality of their interests with the French, particularly when making submissions to the French government. To an even greater extent than most Dillon could not separate the two - after all his own life, duties and attachments were completely entangled in both. His previous military career, as one deeply invested in the interests of the French state, blinkered his discernment of the great differences in their interests from the Jacobite interest. This made Dillon more inclined to believe that the French leaders themselves would eventually recognise where the commonality of their interests, and therefore to believe their occasional propitiatory statements or promises.

As important and dangerous as Dillon’s continued association with Mar was, his enduring tie to the French interest was the most significant factor in James’ decision. James could have dismissed Dillon much earlier had his continued attachment to Mar been of greatest importance; instead he waited to find out the results of the Bourbon negotiations, and Dillon’s performance therein. This letter is the only time he reveals this reason however, and only to an intimate. To all others the ostensible reason is his continued connection with Mar. “...It is fit you should know That I have acquainted L° Orrery with my having withdrawn my Confidence from M.° Dillon on acc°° of the influence Ld Mar had over him, and of the share he himself had in the D. of Mar’s privat negotiations w'. the late D. of Orleans...”

Atterbury became a temporary replacement for Dillon; James sent Daniel O’Brien as an agent to continue the attempted negotiations with Bourbon, reporting to Atterbury: “...In the mean time I send you also a Letter for M.° Le Duc in Daniel O’Brien’s favour, That in case you should have no other way of coming at M.° Le Duc, nothing may delay your sending Dan.° O’Brien to him, and that nothing may be neglected to open that way towards my having a free Communnation with the French Ministry...” Not long later James appointed O’Brien as the official appointee of

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772 SPW, 78/128, James to Atterbury, Dec. 19, 1724.
773 Ibid.
the post, the official Jacobite representative to the French State, which O’Brien filled until 1747; he was eventually ennobled him as the Jacobite Earl of Lismore.774

Did Dillon’s removal ultimately have a detrimental impact on Jacobite affairs? Despite Dillon’s inadequacies, the Jacobites had enjoyed some benefits from his occupation of the post; most importantly the benefits of Dillon’s position and interest in French society. His dismissal did affect Jacobitism’s political leverage, by limiting their opportunities. Even the faction in Rome acknowledged that no obvious or even appropriate candidate could replace him:

Mr. Murray is the person the King thinks most capable to serve him, but the objections that have been made, & the inconveniences that must follow upon his appearing at the French Court, are so very evident, and the advantage that must follow upon the persons so employed being unsuspected pleads ag’t him, Daniel Obryans being employ’d, may meet with as many other objections & The King can think of no other person whose character & circumstances may not be attended with more, so that all things consider’d I don’t see how the King can for the present settle the management of his affairs at the Court of France otherways than it is...775

His immediate replacement, Atterbury, did not have Dillon’s connections, his access to court or even his ability with French.776 The anonymous Irishman of ‘An Irishman to his son’ specifically indicted Atterbury’s replacement of Dillon in the role:

À peine ce General venoit il de laisser echaper des gracer qu’on lui avoit offertes, qu’il fut oblige de ceder sa charge a M. L’Evêque de Rotchester. Ce qui paroit singulier dans cette affaire, c’est que ce Prelat, qui venoit d’epuyer des disgraces en Angleterre hesita quelques [time] avant d’accepter cet Employ; et ne l’acceptea en Effet, qu’à condition qu’il ne seroit point obligé de dire les noms de ses Correspondans à qui que ce soit...

[Hardly had this General given up the favours which had been offered him, when he was obliged to cede his post to the Bishop of Rochester. What was strange in this affair, was that this Prelate, who had come to escape disgrace in England, hesitated for some time before accepting this employment; and essentially only accepted it on the condition that he would not be obliged to say the names of his correspondents...]

Even Hay, after all his criticisms of Dillon’s abilities, granted the one concession to his fitness for his role; that is, the simple route of communication between the two negotiating parties:

The Bishop of Rochesters infirmness, your having no pretence of going to

775 SPW, 78/159, Hay to Atterbury, Dec. 26, 1724.
Court, and Daniel Obyans dependence upon the Court, makes it impossible for the King at present to [send] the management of his affairs at the Court of France to his wish, without incurring many inconveniences w. h. I have represented in my letter by this post To The Bp. of Rochester, The which as I suppose you’ll see it, I shan’t trouble you any farther upon it.778

James (and therefore the wider Jacobite community) also now had to rely solely on his own contacts for patronage favours, since Dillon could no longer be used as a patronage channel — although he could still be asked by individual officers personally of course, independently of the Jacobite network. James recommended Murray to these contacts, the Bishop of Fréjus and Maréchal de Villars.779

Moreover Dillon’s centrality to much of the Jacobite administration previously meant that his loss became a great disruption, and he left a gaping hole in the organisation and direction of Jacobite affairs, which Dicconson could not completely fill by himself. Consequently in spite of Dillon’s own flaws in regard to efficiency and communication, the administration was left the poorer, and even more inefficient than under his management.

Final Estrangement

Dillon ended up further isolating himself from James and the active Jacobite network by drastically delaying any attempt to obey James’ orders to send all of his papers to him. This eventually caused of his final permanent disengagement from Jacobite affairs, along with his sister-in-law’s involvement in James’ estrangement from his Consort.

From his initial request in August 1724 James had repeatedly and vainly ordered Dillon to deposit the papers at the Scots College over the following months, in spite of the fact that Mar himself eventually deposited his papers.

As to the negotiation Dillon had about the sum of money advanced to the King of Sweden The King by this post orders Mr Dillon to give The B. of Rochester full information of all the steps taken in that affair, and to deliver to him all the original papers relating to it, as well as to inform him particularly of what may relate to any other affair w. h. he was charged, & w. h. he did not bring to a conclusion, In delivering up likeways the papers relating such affairs. As to the S. Article The King has already ordered Mr Dillon to send to him [w.] a particular accnt of the money past threw his hands... As to the last Article, The King in his letter to Mr Dillon orders him to deliver up to the Bp of Rochester any full powers, publick papers &c. w. h. he may have in his hands, & w. h. are not

comprehended in a former order The King sent to Mr Dillon of lodging certain papers in the Scots College…

When Dillon did respond he tended to either delay or avoid the question completely.

Why Dillon should have been so wilfully evasive on such an insubstantial matter at this point is rather perplexing. Perhaps resentment at his dismissal and shoddy manner in which he had been treated made him reluctant to obey James’ commands. It is entirely possible that his private correspondence contained material which he did not wish certain members of the rival faction to see.

Until this point James had maintained his conviction of Dillon’s sincerity. However his confidence in Dillon gradually waned following these dealings, and he started to doubt Dillon’s honesty, as exemplified by his sudden reservations as to Dillon’s fulfilment of his other responsibilities. In December 1724, his concern was such that actually asked Dillon to send him a final account of all his financial dealings. Dillon certainly made an effort to organise the accounts and send a report to James, though, more understandably, this task also took several months. Of course the rival faction thereupon cast aspersions upon Dillon’s management of Jacobite financial affairs and his scrupulousness with the funds which he had handled, specifically in having given Lansdowne Jacobite funds to pay his personal debts, without having first gained authorisation. Atterbury believed Dillon guilty of negligence, but innocent of any fraudulent misappropriation of the funds for his own benefit.

James first refused to make a decision about Dillon until he gained the final result of the audit of the Jacobite finances from the period of Dillon’s management. He even put off decisions as to the loyalty of other Jacobites: “You may depend upon the Kings Justice in all his actions, nothing can be said in your affair till Dillons accompts be laid before the King…” James consequently continued to affirm to Dillon his confidence in his loyalty in spite of these new doubts.

...the contents of it confirm me in ye good opinion I allwayes had of you I shall

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782 SPW, 78/67, James to Dillon, Dec. 9, 1724.
783 SPW, 78/39, George Waters to Dillon, Nov. 1724; 155, James to Dillon, Dec. 25, 1724; 79/9, Hay to Atterbury, Jan. 2, 1725; 80/3, Hay to Inese, Feb. 6, 1725; 5, James to O’Brien, Feb. 6, 1725; 64, James to Atterbury, Feb. 20, 1725.
be allways glad to See & to receive any information from you & ever desirous to [be]friend you on all occasions. Besides the former orders [Se]nt you in relation to the papers to be putt with the [.....] Scotland, & in respect of wch mony affairs which have passed thru your hands I find it [...] expedient to direct you at present. 1. Is put into the Bp of Rochester’s hands what apliess & addresses relating to my service, &...other papers...which may remain with you after your having placed withe Scotch Colledge the papers formerly directed to be placed there. 2. To Give the [Bp] a particular account of your transactions relating to the [money] formerly lent to [Swe]den...I doubt not of your exact compliance with these orders, & you may be assurd of my constant kindness to you. 786

Atterbury and Hay relentlessly encouraged James’ to suspect Dillon’s honesty. Hay constantly made insinuations as to his sincerity to the rest of the faction:

“...Monteleon going over does not look like a confirmation of what [Dillon] insinuated of his not finishing his affairs to his satisfaction at Paris.” 787 Indeed Hay presented alternative images of Dillon at various times, depending on which opponent he preferred to attack on any particular occasion. He was sometimes the genuinely but desirably obtuse victim of Mar’s duplicity: “...I am perswaded whatever Share M’ Dillon might have in that matter, he mean’d it for the real good of the service, and perhaps he was drawn into that as he was into other things...” 788

But at others hewas an architect of the Triumvirate’s machinations, in league with Mar. 789 Indeed sometimes Hay couldn’t even decide: “...What you say in answer to what I wrote to you of the Informations M.” 790 Dillon pretended to have of the B’ having fo[retold] his removal from business, shows plainly that either Dillon was imposed upon or had a mind to impose...” 790

Atterbury meanwhile sent negative reports about Dillon’s behaviour in Paris back to James, accompanying it with damaging inferences as to his obedience and loyalty:

...your orders sent hither (particularly those sent two posts ago) are not only not obeyed but trifled with and will be so still on till you are pleased to make those you send them to see that you expect a punctual and immediate compliance. I question not but what you have already said means as much but it is certainly not so understood, the behaviour upon them shews this but too plainly and while this is the case here and the firm & avowed union of the triumvirate with their few dependants continues these will be some distraction in your affairs here, and the hands you are pleased to employ...will be still more weakened...Submissive expressions I apprehend have no meaning if they are not followed by suitable actions and compliances which you Sir and you only can procure by letting those see who elude your commands that their conduct is understood. Mr. Dillon tells me at last not only that he has no such letter of

786 SPW, 78/155, James to Dillon, Dec. 25, 1724.
788 SPW, 78/83, Hay to Atterbury, Dec. 12, 1724.
notice as you writ about, but that no such was ever writ and sent which I doubt not is a mistake and springs from his unwillingness to give himself the trouble to look over his papers and if such little assistances are denied, you may judge Sir what likely hood there is of his communication lights of greater importance... 791

James depended on reports from Atterbury as to Dillon’s behaviour, obviously being well beyond the reach of first-hand observation, and with no other trusted source of judgement on hand. Thus, Atterbury and Hay’s influence induced James to disengage Dillon entirely from the leadership of Jacobite affairs. Their combined and relentless judgement successfully fostered James’ resentments and finally instigated mistrust even of Dillon’s sincere Jacobite attachment:

...That the King has the greatest hopes of success in his affairs now that they are in the hands of those who have nothing at heart but the good of his Service, who will acquaint him with the most [minute] details of their management, & who will follow his directions in their [strict] Sense, without endeavouring to [evade] and in a manner control his orders, which has been but too much the case in late management and which those concern’d, especially [Dillon] will find out I am afraid when [it is] too late. Since I have mentioned him I must own to you That it grieves me to see the part that he has acted after the many assurances the King has gave him of his confidence in him, and the good opinion he had of him, in spite of all that was past, which [prevailed] from the opinion the King had of his being imposed upon by those with whose conduct the King has no reason to be satisfied with, for my own part I had always a most particular value for him, and was a very great partizan of his. But now that he seems to take upon himself the answering for and protesting the evident faults of others, I am glad to hold my tongue...The King’s conduct towards him has been fatherly, but I am afraid he is not sensible of it... 792

James again repeated his requests to Dillon on the matter of the papers, specifying exactly the papers required, but Dillon merely made more promises to obey, while reserving the right to perform the orders ‘with leisure’, depending on his health. 793 James became increasingly impatient with Dillon’s intransigence, as months had gone by without Dillon making any effort to execute his orders on the matter of his papers, until he could no longer restrain his frustration in his letters:

...I cannot longer hide from you my great and just surprize at your having never yet executed the orders I sent you seven months ago about the papers, and at your never having given me any reasons for those delays, tho’ I have often mention’d those orders to you since, And I do Expect from you That in reply to this you will give a plain & positive account of your having placed them as directed, w^th is a Complyance to me, which I think you owe even to Yourself. 794

The impediments that Dillon’s delays created for the leadership is described in great

791 SPW, 79/111, Atterbury to James, Jan. 29, 1725; accord. 79, Murray to Hay, Jan. 22, 1725.
792 SPW, 80/5, James to O’Brien, Feb. 6, 1725.
793 Glover, Dillon to James, Feb. 26, 1725, pp. 125-126n.
detail by Hay, helping to explain why it played such an important part in James’ final decision about Dillon.

...The King has likeways latly sent other orders to Mr Dillon and amongst other things to desire him that he would send him the account of some money that passed throw his hands. The many changes there was of the French [money] at the time that some paym’s was made makes it impossible for [Accompts] to be [cl]eared w’ My [frie]nd, who are pressing for it, till Mr. Dillons [Acc]’ come; and I think if you have an opportunity It would be a service done to him. If you could prevail upon him not to delay this particular, as he has done that of lodging the papers, You’ll prevent the [outcries] of several people who may suffer perhaps considerably by delays, or at least who may pretend to do so till [acco’s] are shared with them, and remove those [jealousies] which the dilatoryness in performing the King’s orders may create...

Even at this point however Hay professed respect for Dillon’s integrity, and (really quite hypocritically) his ‘friendship’ for Dillon to Dillon’s friend, Inese:

...I am resolved to...Represent to you something relating to one you have a just friendship for, & who I can with truth say I always esteemd, & whose character I respected...If Mr. Dillon has communicated to you the Letters the King wrtil to him for this twelve month past...you can’t but have perceived the great kindness shown, and confidence, which the King show’d he had in him, & would certainly have continued had Mr Dillon shown the King That he would have conformed himself & acted in his affairs in the manner H. M. proposed...far be it from me from accusing any man of a fault, much more one of his honour & integrity, But I think I do him a Service, when I impart to a friend of his...some reasons that can’t but give the King a just uneasiness in proportion to the value he has for Mr Dillon...D. of Mar after some time delivered such a Box to you, Of which you acknowleged the Receipt, but to this day Mr Dillon has never perform’d his part. The papers are mostly blank Commissions &c. and Mr Dillon delaying the matter seems Surprizing To The King who expects a nice performance of what he directs...I have nothing in view in this but his honor and the good of the King’s service, and he may think what he pleases, but I’ll yield to none in the friendship I have for him...

James’ determination on this matter showed the extent to which he had withdrawn his trust from Dillon by this stage: “...I believe M. Dillon will be sufficiently satisfied that I expect to be obeyd by him in a very different manner than what I am, tho should he continue still refractory I don’t think my Service will suffer, since in that case I certainly will have no further dealings w’ him...”

In spite of Dillon’s official dismissal, and the treatment meted out to him, his wife maintained contact with the royal family. She even asked a favour of James, to use his interest in support of their son James’ application to the order of Malta, as well as continuing to send the traditional declarations of loyalty:

795 SPW, 80/3, Hay to Inese, Feb. 6, 1725.
796 Ibid.
797 SPW, 80/64, James to Atterbury, Feb. 20, 1725.
Your Majesty will be graciously pleas’d to accept of my most respectfull duties on ye beginning of this new year...Permit me at the same time to present my most humble thanks for the continual marks of bounty which your Maj’ is pleas’d to confer on my family, and particularly for the last favour bestowed on my son James by his admittance into ye order of malta mine and their constant prayers for your majestys person and family are ye only offering I can make and the zealous and dutyfull respect with which I am Sir your majestys most humble most obedient and most devoted subject and servant Sheldon Dillon.  

The affair does not seem to have alienated Christiana Dillon’s own Jacobite devotion. Perhaps she wished to ensure that her husband did not alienate the entire family permanently from their Jacobite connections, and the advantages it could bring – or even to repair the rift, if she wished to see her husband return to his former position in the inner circle of Jacobite affairs. Of course we can only speculate as to her reasons; nevertheless it is interesting to see her attempt to repair the family’s relations with James. It was obviously important to her, as demonstrated after Dillon’s death. James’ suspicions of Dillon’s honesty did not prevent him wishing to maintain good relations with Dillon’s family, and he successfully supported the application.

By April James was infuriated with Dillon’s persistent disobedience. As well as further letters to Dillon he sent orders to Atterbury, Murray and Inese to obtain and examine the papers from Dillon, and even sent Atterbury a letter for Bourbon, to be used if needed, to request him to enforce the order. Dillon’s behaviour mystified the leadership, who, despite their enmity, were aware of his intelligence and integrity. Atterbury and Murray opposed Bourbon’s intervention, worried about the furore and suspicions it would cause - and for no real benefit since even Murray did not think that Dillon would cause any harm with the papers. He expressed his confusion at Dillon’s actions though, saying that he was “really afraid that an honest man who is capable of it, must have some wrong turn in his head, for I cannot account for it otherways in any shape.” Atterbury however thought that Dillon wished to stir up trouble in England along with Mar. Inese for his part defended Dillon as far as he could, explaining his behaviour as probably just due to ‘indolence
and oddness’, rather than obstinacy. Dillon eventually delivered some papers up to the Scots College, primarily because of the threats of Bourbon’s intervention, but not until 17 June 1725, and nowhere near all the papers which had been ordered. According to Atterbury: “Of [Dillon’s compliance you have in part an account; and I hope will receive a fuller in due time, as to the other papers he was ordered to delivered; I mean cyphers, powers or printed papers, and forms &c., he may have in his custody. If he sends word of what is done, you may perhaps, Sir, think it proper to let him know in return, what is further expected.”

Dillon further delayed delivery of these last, pleading ill health, and then that the papers were at Paris rather than at St-Germains (where he had formerly stated them to be). Atterbury blamed Mar for Dillon’s excuses. James, for his part, almost abandoned the matter entirely:

_I see no appearance of his complying any further in my orders. They were peremptory enough before, and could only be repeated; and if he be not touched by his own honour he will be it yet less with any new orders. It will take up time to examine his letters for some years past, and when that is done I shall see what further is required._

He nevertheless gave warrants to O’Brien and Inese to attempt to force Dillon’s compliance with the remaining papers, because it contained certain papers which might be needed in the event of a future invasion attempt. James actually feared that Dillon might try to use these papers against the Jacobite cause:

_...if he can neither gett them, nor any account how they are disposed of, it will be fitt to consider what steps should be taken by me to prevent, in case of an Expedition, any ill use being made of such Papers; since it cannot be imagined that so manifest and obstinate a disobedience can proceed from any other cause, but the intention of making, or maybe having already made, an ill use of them._

James had had enough of Dillon’s behaviour and apparent disobedience, to such an extent that he (very unjustly) even suspected his sense of duty. Dillon countered the new orders by claiming that all of the papers which James had requested had been delivered; although some seemed to be missing. This effectively brought an end to the matter, since James could do nothing more to compel Dillon’s further

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804 Ibid, p. 165n.
805 Glover, 36, Atterbury to James, May 7, 1725, p. 187.
807 Glover, 46, Atterbury to James, July 16, 1725, p. 228; 51, Atterbury to Hay, July 30, 1725, p. 250.
808 Glover, James to Atterbury, p. 228n.
809 Glover, James to Atterbury, pp. 257-258n.
compliance. Dillon’s reputation for integrity however had managed to remain essentially intact, despite the late suspicions.  

**Jacobite Schism**

At the beginning of 1725, the problems leading to the breakdown of the royal marriage in Rome had not yet taken hold, but during the year these troubles would further cement Dillon’s estrangement from the centre of Jacobite affairs. Hay and Murray partially convinced James of Mar and Dillon’s ‘evil’ influence on Clementina and her faction. Dillon’s involvement was inferred from his wife’s sister, Dorothy Sheldon’s role in the matter, whose employment as a lady in waiting to Clementina he had originally facilitated:

> ...the increase of our family will necessarily require some more attendants and by consequence must oblige me to send for one or two Ladys more...who in all events will serve for some company and amusement to the Queen and even be for her advantage...In fine after having consider’d very well on the matter & discoursed of it with the Queen it appears to me that I cannot make a better choice then of Mrs Plowden & your sister in law Mrs Dorothee Sheldon, I look upon them both as very fitt for the present purpose, and as they are both single women, they will not draw upon me the expense of families & be more at liberty to come into this remote County. I desire therefore you’ll propose the matter to Mrs Sheldon directly since there can be no reason to hinder your doing that to her, for I am persuaded she’l be very willing to undertake the journey as you & your Lady will be it to deprive yourselves for me of what help she may be of to your family...tho I deserve little thanks from you for my choice of Mrs Sheldon whose personal merit engaged me to it, yet I own I was extreme glad of showing you and your worthy unkle the regard I have for his family...*

Dillon continued his involvement by confirming Mrs Sheldon’s acceptance of the post and helping to organise her journey to Rome.

The two families (Dillon’s and his wife’s) did have a close connection, which continued after Mistress Sheldon’s employment in Rome. Indeed Dillon had taken pains to maintain the recognition of the family connection, while James even acknowledged the connection to General Dominic Sheldon, as the uncle of both

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811 Handasyde, p. 214  
812 Glover, pp. 120-302; MAE, Correspondence Politique, Angleterre, MS 349, James to Duc de Bourbon, Oct. 15, 1724, ff. 75a-77a; James to the Duc de Bourbon, Oct. 31, 1724, ff. 135a-138b; SPW, 79/144, James to Mrs Dillon, Feb. 5, 1725.  
813 SPW, 48/36, July 13, 1720, James to Dillon. James specifically refers to Dorothy Sheldon as Dillon’s sister-in-law here (as well as in several other letters), verifying that she was Christiana Dillon’s sister, rather than her niece. Ralph Sheldon, former equerry of James II, was Christiana Sheldon’s father, and Dominic Sheldon was her uncle. Murtagh, ‘Dillon’ in ODNB.  
814 SPW, 48/115, James to Dillon. Aug. 20, 1720; 50/5, James to Dillon, Nov. 10, 1720.  
815 SPW, 55/27, C. Glasco to David Nairne, Oct. 6, 1721.
Dillon’s wife and Mistress Sheldon.\textsuperscript{816}

Dorothy Sheldon’s influence over Clementina grew steadily after her arrival in Rome, particularly since Clementina had no other lady-companions around her. Sheldon encouraged Clementina’s desire and attempts to gain more control over the management of her household, and of Prince Charles, which raised James ire. This only increased tensions between the Roman faction and the triumvirate, particularly after revelation of Mar’s treachery to James. Dillon’s continued association with Mar fostered James’ frustration, which in turn stimulated James’ resentment of his sister-in-law’s intimacy with the Queen.\textsuperscript{817}

In November James became angry enough at Dorothy Sheldon for her apparently insolent behaviour that he officially dismissed her from her post. Clementina responded to this removal of one of her few confidantes and friends (as well as the continued authority of the Hays) by leaving James and seeking refuge in a convent on 15 November 1725. Corp describes Clementina’s behaviour as being primarily due her desire to control her own household, an attempt frustrated by James. Her resentment of Murray and the Hays stemmed from her horror of any Protestant influence on the upbringing of her children, at a point when it seemed that both Murray and Marjorie Hay had assumed such roles. Unfortunately her action led to some in the Queen’s party spreading the (completely unfounded) rumour of James’ affair with Marjorie Hay (making her behaviour far more sympathetic than the less excusable prejudice against Protestants).\textsuperscript{818}

Naturally Clementina’s sudden and unwarranted action (as he perceived it) considerably shocked, upset, angered, and especially puzzled James, making him vulnerable to the belief that others were behind her actions. The ‘King’s’ faction accused Dorothy and the Triumvirate of being behind Clementina’s behaviour. James persuaded himself of Dorothy’s culpability and made insinuations to that effect in a letter to Clementina herself: “...It was true...that some time ago Mademoiselle Sheldon demanded her leave and the King had not been very pleased with her since, and he had good reason for removing her, and everyone had observed that the Queen’s inquietude came to a height only since he took his son from her hands and

\textsuperscript{816} SPW, 54/39, James to General Sheldon, July 20, 1721; 54/129, Dillon to Hay, Aug. 25, 1721; 56/33, Dillon to Hay, Dec. 8, 1721.

\textsuperscript{817} Corp, \textit{The Stuarts in Italy}, pp. 145-147, 149, 151, 153. For a detailed account of the events and context at Rome see Corp, pp. 144-172.

\textsuperscript{818} Ibid, pp. 163-166.
those of the women."  

Of course Dillon and especially Mar’s influence supposedly lay behind Dorothy’s behaviour. By this time James, along with the rival faction, had become bitter and jaundiced against Mar that he blamed Clementina’s behaviour almost entirely on him, despite his distance from the scene at Rome. It became the dominant narrative about the split: early historians cited Mar as the primary cause of Clementina and James’ split by spreading the rumours about James’ infidelity, because of his recent dismissal by James and his jealousy of Hay. Even some later historians have stressed Mar’s influence from afar, including Hugh Douglas who depicted Mar as having a malign sway over Mrs Sheldon and Clementina:

...Mrs Sheldon...was in an ideal position to spread rumours about disagreements between the King and Queen over the bringing up of the child. Under the evil influence of the Earl of Mar – another of those overt friends who were secret traitors – she inflamed Clementina into new quarrels and sowed the seeds of the slander that James was having an affair with Marjorie Hay, the wife of his staunchest supporter in Rome. Rumours of adultery were nothing new...but Mar succeeded in reviving them through this sinister woman...

We actually have Dillon’s own account of his feelings about the rift and accusations of him plotting with his sister-in-law:

«...Cette grace est bien consolante pour moy dans un tems ou la voix publique m'instruit qu'à Rome on veut m'impliquer dans un complot avec Mlle Sheldon ma Bellesoeur et autres pour causer la malheureuse separation arrivee dans la famille Roiale. Ce personage est tinoir, et si digne d'horreur, que je ne puis trop faire pour m'en deffendre. J'ay veu des ecrits publics que Mylord Inverness a fait publier icy, dans lesquels je ne reconnois que trop visiblement, qu'il a voulu me dessigner sans me nommer, il se meme employer l'autorite du Roy pour faire passer ses calomnies dans le monde. La confiance que je crois pouvoir justement placer dans la bonte du Roy, et l'honneur que j'ay d'etre connu de luy de puis longtems sur un pied bien eloigné du caractere dont on veut me no[ir]cir, m'ont porté a envoyer une declaration a sa majesté pour justifier mon honneur et pour luy demander justice de l'outrage que son ministre a voulu me faire...»

[Your favour consoles me at a time when rumours inform me that in Rome they are trying to implicate me in a plot with my sister-in-law Mlle Sheldon and others to cause the unfortunate separation afflicting the Royal family. The character [imputed to me] is, and so of horror, that it is impossible to defend myself with too much zeal. I have seen some public documents that Lord Inverness has had published here, in which I recognise only too clearly that he

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819 HMC, Drummond Moray, James to Clementina, Nov. 11th, 1725, p. 161.
would accuse me without naming me, he even employs the authority of the King to impose these calumnies on to the world. The confidence that I believe can justly be placed in the generosity of the King, and the honour in which I have always been regarded by him [...] have persuaded me to send a declaration to his Majesty to justify my honour and to demand justice from him [on] the outrage that his minister has inflicted on me...\(^{223}\)

Luckily for Dillon there were many Jacobites who did not believe the king’s faction’s accusations against Dorothy Sheldon, Dillon and Mar, and sympathised with the Queen. Naturally, given the family’s presence in Saint-Germain, sympathies lay with Clementina, and rumours even abounded of James’ infidelity.\(^{224}\)

By this time Dillon limited his contact with James and the Jacobite leadership to the formal correspondence with many Jacobite families, as, despite his own feelings as to how he had been treated, he still believed in fulfilling his duty to his ‘true’ King.\(^{225}\) Only a few months later he wrote to James to formally request permission for his daughter to marry or enter a convent, the proper and expected conduct of a loyal subject. It may simply have been a gesture, perhaps like his wife he also believed in the value of maintaining some contact, for the good of the family. Or perhaps he even wished to re-establish their relationship. James at least seems to have wished to re-establish their ties:

> Je suis bien aise d’apprendre par votre lettre du 9 Sep\(^{\text{bre}}\) qu’il se presente un établissement pour une de vos filles que vous croyez convenable d’accepter pour les raisons que vous me marquez; Comme je ne dois pas croire que votre attachement a moy puisse jamais varier de celui qu’ont eu pour moy tant de vos pares, vous pouvez etre persuadée du plaisir que je ressentirai toujours en apprenant ce qui peut etre pour l’avantage de vos enfans...\(^{226}\)

[ I am pleased to learn from your letter of 9 September that an establishment for one of your daughters has presented itself that you believe to be appropriate to accept, for the reasons which you state; As I cannot believe that your attachment to me could ever change from what it has been, you can be sure of the pleasure that I will always feel in learning of anything which could benefit your children... ]

Dillon died on 5 February 1733 at the palace of Saint-Germain-en-laye. James letter of condolence to Dillon’s eldest son on his death could be seen to demonstrate the endurance of James’ pique from the rupture, despite the apparent restoration of some

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\(^{223}\) Add MS 20310 Correspondence of Cardinal Gualterio with various persons, chiefly Englishmen, 1701-1728, Dillon to Cardinal Gualterio, 13 Jan. 1726, ff. 370a-371a.

\(^{224}\) Corp, *The Stuarts in Italy*, pp. 167-169.

\(^{225}\) From June 1725 he had stopped writing to James, as James states in a letter to Atterbury. Glover, p. 257n.

\(^{226}\) BL, MS RP 1257/1, Box 23 941\(^E\). *James Francis Edward Stuart: Letters to members of the Dillon family*, 1726-1740, James to Dillon, Sept. 1, 1726, f. 25.
good-will to their contact in 1726. It is rather terse for such a letter, especially taking into account their previous familiarity and the extent of Dillon’s service. It acknowledges Dillon’s loyalty, but praises only his military ability; the service he performed for James for so many years is not even mentioned. “I am hugely concerned for the account you give me...of the death of General Dillon your Father, whose zeal for me was, I am persuaded, always very sincere, and in whom I have lost one so capable to serve me in his own profession, in which he had justly gain’d so much honor...”

Instead the letter immediately goes on to request and give instructions for the deliverance of Dillon’s papers, the object of so much offense and estrangement: “...I cannot but take very kindly of you your having been so diligent & attentive in inspecting and sorting your Father’s papers...and I desire that all such may be put up in presence of M’. Dicconson, and then consigned by both of you in the Scots College at Paris, there to remain at my disposal...”

Despite this somewhat terse letter, his children retained to some extent the loyal attachment and sense of duty to James and the Stuarts which Dillon had instilled in them. The family carefully obeyed James’ instructions regarding the papers as soon as possible; they received notes from Dicconson confirming the reception of Dillon’s papers at the Scots College, and from James thanking them for this service. They continued to acknowledge the annual New Year tradition of sending their respects and good wishes to the royal family. Dillon’s widow, Christiana, also maintained contact with the royal family. She even applied for James’ influence again, on behalf of Henry Dillon, though rather inexplicably for a promotion within the Irish regiment of the Neapolitan army. James, in turn, made an effort to restore their previous warm relationship in his replies. The family maintained their loyalty to the Stuart line until the French Revolution.

829 BL, MS RP 1257/1, Box 23 941E, James Francis Edward Stuart, 1726-1740, William Dicconson, Witness Statement, March 22, 1733, f. 26a; BL, MS RP 1257/1, Box 23 941E, James Francis Edward Stuart, 1726-1740, James to Christiana Dillon, April 15, 1733, f. 26[2]c.
831 BL, MS RP 1257/1, Box 23 941E, James Francis Edward Stuart, 1726-1740, James to Christiana Dillon, Sep. 2, 1738, f. 119; BL, MS RP 1257/1, Box 23 941E, James Francis Edward Stuart, 1726-1740, James to Christiana Dillon, June 6, 1740, f. 27.
Conclusion

Colm James Ó Conaill claims that the Dillon family had a deliberate strategy to pursue the family’s interests by sending their younger sons to France to pursue military careers, while the elder sons inherited the family title and estates, which thus enabled them to hold on to their Irish lands and wealth, as well as build up a strong position in their adopted country. As expounded in the introduction, he provides as evidence the later conversion to the Established Church of one member of the family, Charles Dillon, which he claims could not have been sincere, and could likewise only have been to promote the family’s interests. Though emphasising the multiple identities of the Dillons - Irish, British, French, Jacobite and Catholic - he claims that these “multiple attachments shaped their identity, but...ultimate loyalty remained with the clan.”

It is however a broad claim to make for the entire family over several generations. It cannot be said at the very least of Arthur Dillon, who devoted himself to Jacobitism. For Dillon his patriotic and religious commitments, and above all his duty and allegiance to his natural sovereign, engaged his ultimate loyalty.

Dillon maintained contact with his brother’s family in Ireland, although no traces of their correspondence survive. He certainly included contacts in Ireland among his many international correspondents, partly for the purpose of ensuring valuable information and insight as to Irish affairs: “I enclose...an extract of a letter I received by a sure hand lately come from Ireland, the writer is a person who wishes very well to [the King]’s cause, thô not having the honour of being Known to him, and one who made it his business to know the Country thoroughly, so as to be able to render

837 This does not implicate a lack of such a correspondence, given both the loss of Dillon’s personal papers during the French Revolution, and the necessity for the family in Ireland of destroying or hiding any evidence of letters from such a staunch and well-known Jacobite as Arthur Dillon. Dillon must have maintained some kind of contact with his brother, given Charles Dillon’s trip to the family estate in Ireland immediately after his father’s death, and later marriage to his cousin. Indeed a reference is made during the British parliamentary debates over the Atterbury plot to a letter from Dillon to his nephew in Ireland having been intercepted. Cobbett, Parliamentary History Vol. VIII, p. 131.
a just account of it for [the King]'s use on a proper occasion.\textsuperscript{838}

He willingly acknowledged his Irish identity, and maintained connections with the Irish Jacobite community in exile; indeed he was recognised as one of its most important leaders.\textsuperscript{839} Of course he was related to many of the exiled Irish families, particularly those residing at St. Germain, through his wife as well as his own extended family. Dillon’s military role entailed a fundamental responsibility for a substantial population of Irish officers and soldiers; as demonstrated in Chapters Two and Three, he assisted the men and officers of his regiment whenever possible. He also prevented the reorganisation of the regiments which lead to further mass unemployment, and authorised warrants for the Hotel des Invalides.\textsuperscript{840}

Dillon served as an intermediary of sorts between Irish Brigade officers –those zealous Jacobites, anxious to do their part for the cause. He became the leading Irish Jacobite with whom to discuss Irish affairs, including the possibility of including Ireland in invasion plans.\textsuperscript{841} Even in plans for the 1719 Rising, in which he had little practical input, he attempted to make sure his fellow Irish officers were heavily involved, to take advantage of any benefit which might be gained thereby.

Moreover one of his responsibilities during the Atterbury plot was acting as intermediary with key Irish officers, as well as with the key players in the plot, Irishmen Plunket and Kelly. (Chapter Three). Further than that, his Irish links assisted him with key preparations for the invasion, including the transports which were his responsibility to organise:

\[\textsuperscript{838} \text{SPW, 79/50, Dillon to James, Jan. 15, 1725; accord. No. 49, Extract of a late letter from Dublin writt to Dutton by a person of credit & well versed in the State of his Countrey for farmers use, Jan. 15, 1725; Beresford, p. 145; O'Clirdha, Ireland and the Jacobite Cause, p. 219. The anonymous author of the letter written to Dillon was Sylvester Lloyd, later bishop of Killaloe: Patrick Fagan, An Irish bishop in penal times the chequered career of Sylvester Lloyd O.F.M 1680-1747, (Blackrock: Four Courts Press, 1993), p. 56.}\]

\[\textsuperscript{839} \text{He is even listed among subscribers to a contemporary tome about Ireland. Dermo'd O'Connor, The General History of Ireland Collected by the learned Jeoffiy Keating D.D., (London: J. Bettenham, St. James's, 1723).}\]

\[\textsuperscript{840} \text{SPW HMC, III, Dillon to Mar, Jan. 2 1717, pp. 387-388; Royal Irish Academy, De la Ponce MSS, 12 N 14, Warrant for Hotel des Invalides, Jacques Macdonell, Juillet 20, 1712, f. 47; Certificate of Invalidity, Hugh Devett, Aout 22, 1696, f. 48.}\]

\[\textsuperscript{841} \text{SPW HMC, VII, Leslie to Ormonde, Aug. 14, 1718, p. 155.}\]

\[\textsuperscript{842} \text{SPW, 46/33a, Dillon to James, April 1, 1720.}\]
...le nommé Jaques Roche Irlandois establi au Havre-de-Grace, fameux Contrebandier sur les côtes d’Angleterre, qui estoit venu ici il y a quelques jours pour arrêter un marché avec Dillon par l’entremise de Cairnie de St. Germain (Dillon n’ayant pas voulu que son nom parût) a esté renvoyé jusques à un autre occasion, ly, et les nommez Hayes et Murfey deux Irlandois qui ont leurs vaisseaux dans la Seine. Ces gens doivent s’obligier à tenir leurs vaisseaux prêts pour transporter en Angleterre le monde que Dillon leur envoyeroit...

...the said Jacques Roche, Irishman established at Havre-de-Grace, famous smuggler on the English coast, who came here some days ago to stop a deal with Dillon through Cairnie of St. Germain (Dillon having not wanted his name to appear) has been dismissed until a future occasion, as well as the said Hayes and Murphy, two Irishmen who had their ships on the Seine. These people were obliged to hold their ships ready to transport to England everyone who Dillon was to send them...

He was certainly greatly respected by the Irish community in return, as shown by the exalted praise of the anonymous officer of ‘An Irishman to his son’, who described him as «jouit en philosophe de ce contentement d’esprit, que produit d’ordinaire une conduite sans reproche». “having enjoyed the contentment of spirit usually engendered by a conduct without reproach.”

However despite maintaining contact with the Irish branch of the family, and preserving his Irish identity through his robust links within the exiled Irish community, Arthur no longer played a role in the Viscount of Costello-Gallin family’s Irish interests. His elder brother Henry held the title, which Henry’s son Richard ultimately inherited; he never expected that he or his own children should return to the Irish family estate. Arthur had been permanently exiled from Ireland; unlike his elder brother he would remain a traitor, convicted under the Act to hinder the reversal of several outlawries and attainders, which outlawed him from Ireland, and prevented his inheritance of any Irish estates. He acquired an independent French title and revenue, which were entirely separate from the holdings of the Irish branch of the family while he lived.

Dillon obviously had not completely given up all hope of return: his Jacobite role between 1715 and 1725 meant Dillon constantly worked towards a return to Britain.

856 Calendar of the State Papers, Domestic Series, of the reign of William III, 1698 (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1933), Proclamation, Jan. 28, 1698, p. 54; TCD, MS 750, No. 1, An Act of those persons that have reversed their outlawries by Special Warrant, June 20th 1694 (21), f. 194; No. 3, A List of the Adjudications at the Council Board, Adj. 15th June 1692’, f. 107.
and Ireland for all exiles. When potential invasion plans or memorials were being considered Dillon attempted to keep Ireland in the picture, including in his ‘memorials’. As O’Donoghue and Beresford have pointed out though, while Dillon and other Irish Jacobites supported an attempted Irish invasion, he realised that attempts through Scotland and England had much more potential. Indeed in the memorial which he wrote for the Swedish plot he states as much:

I presume the succour the King of Sweden grants will be destined for a descent on England. On this supposition a diversion in Scotland appears to me absolutely necessary and even indispensable, though it should be only of 10 or 15 hundred men of the Irish troops with some Scotch lords, officers and gentlemen...As to Ireland, a little project for that country can be made with small charges... Dillon seems to have placed less importance on an invasion of Ireland partly because of his understanding of the state of affairs there, which could have been sustained by his enduring correspondence with his brother in Ireland.

Nevertheless Dillon could never expect a return to Ireland for himself or his immediate family, or construct plans or a future based on that prospect, no matter how optimistic about Jacobite intrigues he might have been at various times. Nor did an unending, all-encompassing strategy exist to that effect - or to create a French conduit to expand the wealth and influence of the Irish Viscount of Costello-Gallin family. Dillon had originally gone to France as the leader of a regiment sent by James II into the French army in an exchange (a move made during the middle of the war, as well as before the succession of his elder brother to the title and lands). Dillon had chosen to lead his regiment to France, eager to pursue the potential opportunities for advancement from that path.

Consequently, and notwithstanding his maintenance of links to the Irish community, Dillon intended to build a prosperous and successful future in France. He achieved fairly comprehensive assimilation into French society, enjoyed a successful military career, open access to French court society, and French title and honours. As a member of a wealthy, connected family of the Irish nobility, he had less difficulty integrating into French society since, as has been noted in current historiography, ‘cultural and social solidarity’ eased exile for Jacobite elites.

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857 SPW HMC, VII, Dillon to James, July 26, 1718, pp. 86-87; O’Donoghue, ‘Ireland the Jacobite Threat’, p. 110; Beresford, pp. 144-145.
858 SPW HMC, IV, Dillon to James, Memorial, September 26, 1716, pp. 79-80.
Dillon’s children were all born in France and completely integrated into French society. His four eldest sons all served in the family regiment and he created ties to the French nobility by marrying one of his daughters, Brigitte, to the Baron de Blézelle, a French general. Another daughter, Laure, further extended the innumerable family links within the exiled Jacobite nobility by marrying the sixth Viscount Falkland. Two of his five daughters, Catherine and Frances, became nuns at a Carmelite convent in Pontoise, while the fifth, Marie-Elizabeth, never married.

Dillon’s eldest son Charles did eventually move to Ireland, as heir to the Irish title and estates, through marriage to his second cousin Frances, Richard’s daughter. This connection was made only after the new Viscount, Richard, had no sons however, so that it became necessary to ensure the preservation of the Dillon name with the Irish estates. 860 The rest of the family remained in France. Moreover this marriage did not take place till 1737, four years after Dillon’s death in 1733; it was not a deliberate ‘strategy’ envisaged or anticipated by the family years in advance, just as Dillon’s own career move had not been part of any such design.

Only four years later Charles’ died, and the next eldest brother Henry inherited all. Even then it was not until a law was to be passed by the British Parliament that threatened the legal possession of their Irish estates that Henry moved to Ireland, passing the colonel-proprietorship to the next eldest brother. 862 With the death of two remaining brothers in battle - - another problem materialised. 863 Fortunately Louis XV took the extraordinary step of granting that the proprietorship could rest in the hands of Henry, 11th Viscount Dillon until it could be taken up by his one of his sons, A deliberate plan or strategy then emerged for a younger son of the family to

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860 When it eventually became clear that the couple would not have a male heir, an attempt was made in 1729 to allow Charles Dillon to inherit the estate after Richard through petitioning the British Parliament, which was ultimately unsuccessful. The Historical Register, Containing An Impartial Relation of all Transactions, Foreign and Domestick. With a Chronological Diary of all The remarkable Occurrences, viz. Births, Marriages, Deaths, Removals, Promotions &c. that happen’d in this Year (London, 1716-), Vol. XIV. (London: R. Nutt in the Old Baily (No. LIV), 1729), p. 122. Charles made a further attempt after Arthur Dillon’s death - actually using the family’s influence with Louis XV to put pressure on the British government. It must have again been unsuccessful, since he married his cousin four years later. MAE, Correspondance Politique, Angleterre, MS 380 Correspondance de Chavigny, ministre à Londres, avril–juin 1733, Broglie to Chavigny, Juin 7, 1733, ff.250a-253b; Lettres au sujet de la restitution de son bien en Irlande, Charles Dillon to Cardinal de Fleury, Juin 5, 1733, ff.270a-271a.

862 This law, passed in 1746, was to deprive any who fought for Britain’s enemies from holding estates in Britain or Ireland, and was specifically aimed at those Irish officers in the French army like Henry Dillon, from simultaneously holding or inheriting land in Britain and Ireland. O’Callaghan, History of the Irish Brigades, p. 49; Ó Conaill, ‘Conversion and family identity’, pp. 280-282.

come to France to inherit the proprietorship once he had reached the necessary age of 17, which for Arthur Dillon, grandson and namesake of Lieutenant General Arthur Dillon, was not until 1767.

Henry’s second son Arthur Dillon became the epitome of the ideal his grandfather had tried to establish for his family in France; he led the family regiment for France for the rest of his life and was eventually promoted up to the rank of Lieutenant-General, like his grandfather and name-sake, becoming a reasonably prominent and popular figure. He also maintained very strong ties to court: Dillon’s family moved within the most notable ranks of society, as Dillon married Thérèse-Lucy de Rothe, his cousin (grand-daughter of Laure, Viscountess Falkland) and lady in waiting to Marie Antoinette. After her death Dillon married the Comtesse de la Touche, a cousin to the future Empress Josephine. His only daughter from his first marriage, Lucie, later married into the height of the French aristocracy, becoming the Marquise de la Tour de la Pin, and thereby daughter-in-law to the Minister of War; the sole daughter of his second marriage later married General Bertrand, aide-de-camp to Napoleon. Additionally, Arthur Dillon (senior)’s fifth son, Arthur Richard, had originally commenced a clerical career, as opposed to following in the footsteps of his father and four elder brothers; by this period he had become the very powerful, influential and wealthy Archbishop of Narbonne. The Dillon family maintained their strong and influential position within French society until the French Revolution.

Dillon (as well as other exiles) had had to do all he could to settle in France and assimilate into French society, to eventually regain, and possibly surpass, the status and prosperity he had left behind, first for himself and then for his children and their descendants. He achieved this so unreservedly that his descendants ascended to the very pinnacle of French society by the time of the French Revolution. The foundation that Dillon built for his children in France shows that he did not expect them to return to the Irish family estates, or that there was some kind of enduring family strategy to ensure that would happen.

Charles Dillon-Lee might have been prepared to convert to the Established Church for practical reasons, to take advantage of the opportunities such a move could

865 Nouvelle biographie générale, pp.182-184.
867 Hayes, Biographical dictionary, p. 60; Marquise de La Tour du Pin, Memoirs, pp. 16-19, 30-39, 44-50, 57-75.
provide, but this would seem to be a unique, and indeed independent move; not shared by any other member of the family. At any rate his personal conversion could only speak to his own feelings of identity, not the entire family. Moreover a natural family attachment does not detract from the individual’s commitment to Catholic and Jacobite ideals; one does not have to be at the expense of the other. Dillon naturally had as much patrician pride in his genealogy and family history (particularly of course its martial tradition) as his fellow peers, as well as affection for his extended family, its homeland and his compatriots; but it did not take priority over his Jacobite, or indeed his French, commitments, both of which dominated his life and career in France. O’Conaill rightly made the point that for each individual all their multiple loyalties shaped their identity; for Arthur Dillon himself, his identity was formed and shaped as much by his religious and especially Jacobite loyalty as his familial Irish ties.

Dillon’s multiple identities are also directly relevant to the question of Irish integration. As displayed above, despite Dillon’s continued attachment to his Irish identity, he was determined to assimilate into French society, rather than remain an exile or foreigner and outsider. He even ended up gaining French naturalisation - though he made sure to gain his monarch’s permission for that step.

Nathalie Genet-Rouffiac refers to Dillon as an example of the integration of Irish exiles into French society in several of her articles. She makes a study of the Irish banking family, the Arthurs, and describes them as providing “an example of an Irish network all over Europe, socially integrated into French Society but still in balance between national and religious fidelity to the Stuarts and success in France”.

However does Arthur Dillon conform to Natalie Genet-Rouffiac’s assessment of the Arthurs? Though Dillon and his family are a perfect example of thorough integration into French society by many exiles, he does not provide the same example as the Arthurs might in terms of balancing or resolving their ‘national and religious fidelity to the Stuarts and success in France’. Rather, he personally exhibited a bitter struggle to resolve his loyalties to both the Stuarts and France. It is therefore possible that the integration of Jacobite exiles into French society increased their internal conflict about their alternative identity and allegiance because of the obstacles to serving

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their ‘true’ king which were subsequently created, rather than easing their guilt, as claimed by Chaussinand-Nogaret.

Identity and allegiance have complex sociological meanings; a collective identity “is constructed out of a synchronic web of affiliations and sentiments. It expressed individual’s sense of belonging within a society or community.”\(^{869}\) This sense of belonging thus explains the core motivations behind feelings of identification with a collective such as a nationality, and loyalty and allegiance to that group and its leader. David Martin Jones states that “in seventeenth century accounts of government and the obedience due to it, the matter of allegiance and the oath that confirmed and performatively enacted it, were closely linked.”\(^{870}\) He claims that oath-taking retained key significance as to allegiance, obedience and loyalty in this period, even though such beliefs would gradually mutate in Britain during the course of the eighteenth century, as pragmatism and beliefs on the primacy of law and conscience began to assume more importance. Traditionally the obligation to the monarch contained in the oath was a ‘personal bond’, which imposed a moral obligation, binding the conscience of those that swore it.\(^{871}\)

For Dillon, devoted Jacobite and traditionalist, the original prime motivation for support of the Stuarts was adherence to the duty owed to their divinely appointed King. The oath therefore confirmed the natural allegiance owed to that king: “...The state oath and the problem of absolute obedience continued to be politically significant whilst political and religious allegiance were considered co-extensive, all subjects owing allegiance to the spiritual and civil authority of the person of the divinely appointed, hereditary ruler.”\(^{872}\) This association makes Dillon’s paradox clear; his military oath to the King of France had to be pitted against his natural loyalty to his rightful, divinely appointed sovereign, to whom he had also swore allegiance.

A handful of historians have noted the double allegiance to two different sovereigns which Jacobite officers and soldiers observed during this period. Guy Rowlands


\(^{871}\) Jones, Conscience and Allegiance, pp. 12-13, 14-17, 60-61, 75-76, 231-234, 243-244.

\(^{872}\) Ibid., p. 232.
refers to the "way it was possible in early modern Europe to have allegiances to more than one sovereign." Nathalie Genet-Rouffiac claims that "For the Wild Geese, service for France and loyalty to Ireland were never mistaken", primarily because even naturalized French citizens were always called (and perceived as) 'naturalised French', never just 'French'. Guy Chaussainand-Nogaret too does not seem to see a problem for the Wild Geese in their situation – at least not for very long:

Le roi hospitalier est allié secourable mais ne saurait se substituer au souverain de droit...Seule la retombee de l'illusion, après l'échec de la mission...entraînera le glissement d'une fidélité à une autre, du roi-martyr au roi régnant à la terre d'accueil, roi substitué... Le service du souverain étranger ne saurait mettre fin à leur allégeance première ni les éloigner de la cause pour laquelle ils sont en permanence mobilisables. Cette dualité d'appartenance définit un double service: celui du roi de France...ne saurait être d'abord qu'alimentaire. Ce n'est qu'au terme d'une inversion, dont le processus s'est d'ailleurs engagé très tôt, que l'on en viendra à confondre service et fidélité. L'assimilation sera alors achevée.

[The welcoming King had been helpful but could not replace the rightful sovereign...Only the collapse of the illusion, after the failure of the mission, would drive the conversion of one loyalty to another, from the martyr-king to the ruling king of the land of welcome, the substitute king...The service of the foreign sovereign could not put an end to their first allegiance nor could it distance them from the cause which they were always ready to serve. This duality of belonging defines a twin service: that of the king of France...was not sustained from the beginning. It was only through a reversal, a process which began from the earliest point, that service came to be associated with loyalty. Assimilation was thus achieved.]

These statements dismiss the personal quandary that some of these officers felt, throughout their careers, at being forced to split their loyalty, as well as the more pragmatic problems it raised.

The problems and importance of this conflict to the exiles themselves are only briefly referenced by Beresford, McLynn and John Murphy. Matthew Glozier gave more recognition to its significance in relation to the commanding officers of the Scots Brigade sent by Charles II to France in the 1670’s:

From 1676 to 1678, Charles II played a political game with British soldiers in France...but the key decisions, regarding the dismissal or retention of British forces in France, were essentially made by Louis XIV. Indeed, when the regiments were finally dismissed (in late-1678) it was to Louis rather than to Charles whom Colonel Dumbarton of the Scottish regiment turned...in truth they were the pawns of Louis XIV of France. As they were caught between the

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diplomatic machinations of Charles and Louis, the struggle to maintain the supply of recruits from home was just one of the issues with which the regiment’s commanders had to contend...It is, however, clear that both kings sought to exploit for their own ends the bonds of loyalty, credit and friendship, by which the commanders, officers and men of each of the regiments were bound.\(^{877}\)

The experience of these early foreign brigade officers in the service of France reveals a fascinating parallel to that of the later Irish regiment officers and commanders, such as Dillon.

Dillon certainly struggled with these same difficulties. His military rank made him first and foremost a servant of France, but he felt loyalty to the Jacobite cause throughout his life, giving up his active, high ranking military service to devote his efforts entirely to James’ service.\(^{878}\) Simultaneously a subject of France, through his military service, and of the Stuart King, he was subject to an ambiguity as to which party was owed his paramount duty, and therefore ultimate loyalty.

Dillon expresses his struggle in a letter he wrote to James in 1720, stressing his devotion, in spite of his military career.

...the best answer I am capable of making your majesty for your condescention and great goodness in honouring me with a letter full of so many gracious expressions is to give your m. the y° strongest & most sincere assurance that I shall dedicate y° rest of my life most faithfully in your service, and advance with y° utmost application your m.° interest. I doubt your Majesty has conceiv'd a better opinion of my capacity than it deserves, but such as it is be assur'd, Sir, it shall be most faithfully apply'd to promote that happy restoration of you and your royall family so much wish'd by all honest men in your three kingdoms. I ought here to excuse to your majestie some transactions in ye former part of my life w. ch gave but too much collour for insinuations of my want of that reall affection I ever had for your majestie and your royall parents, I must own Sir, that gratitude to a prince who shew'd me unbounded kindness in my youth made me follow & serve him assiduously, yet, I have the satisfaction that I never drew my sword against ye king your father directly, nor any employ'd by him or your majestie, for I allways took ye war in flanders where I constantly serv'd to be nationall, and refused y° offers of several forfeited estates tho I had occasion enough for them at that time...\(^{879}\)

This letter sets forth Dillon’s guilt at following his military career under the rule of an foreign prince, yet at the same time his attempt to maintain his allegiance to the Stuarts to the full extent possible by refusing to take personally advantageous offers of wealth or other benefits which would have required forswoering the Stuart cause.


\(^{878}\) Beresford, pp. 136-7; SPW HMC, III, Dillon to Mar, Dec. 18 1716, p. 322; Mar to Walkingshaw of Barrowfield, Feb. 3, 1717, pp. 509-510; Mar to Sir P. Lawless, Feb. 3, 1717, pp. 508-509.

\(^{879}\) SPW 47/53, Dillon to James, June 3, 1720.
Dillon’s position regarding taking orders from the Regent was complex. Although not under active commission as Lieutenant-General, and therefore not under the same obligation as to obey military orders when on duty, he still had to obey the Regent in regard to having to carry the message to James’ forced exile from Avignon in late 1716. After this episode he does not seem to have specifically been forced to obey orders from the Regent again – at least not through his own obligation. The only event which could possibly have had any impact on his duty in this regard was that he was given specific authorisation/warrant for his official role as James’ representative to the French state, a position officially acknowledged by the Regent. Perhaps the Regent’s recognition of his role created enough of a difference in his official status that he could not remain under the same obligation to obey orders from him - not unless he had returned unequivocally to French service by accepting the active commission offered him at the end of 1718.

After his rejection of the offer he never really regained the Regent’s favour. Indeed after the refusal he seems to have been regarded far less as a French officer, accountable to the orders of the French state, and more as a susceptible Jacobite leader, having to keep a low profile, and even in danger of being arrested. The most important reason for this shift in 1719 has to have been the British pressure on the French, specifically in regard to Dillon at this time. Dillon was certainly not important enough to the Regent or the French leadership, or enough of a military asset, to forego such focused pressure.

This apparent split with the Regent and his ministry, or slight by them, might account for why Dillon later seems to have been prepared to take an active part in the Atterbury plot invasion. He must have changed his mind about the extent of the deference he gave his oath (as well as the Regent’s direct orders forbidding officers from this action), since he assumed the role of commander-in-chief of the invasion plot. If so, Dillon’s anger and resentment at the Regent’s treatment of him in late 1719 and 1720 probably had a hand in this decision, weakening his feelings of loyalty, duty and obligation to the French crown. His altered position with the leadership and at court doubtless contributed to this effect.

As useful as the Jacobites hoped his military rank would be when he was first employed in his post, it proved more of a hindrance than a help. His aims for the post were to use his rank to gain greater access to and influence with the power-brokers at court, converting it into practical assistance for the cause. His rank was an advantage
in regards to court access and military links for patronage and influence. He did manage to achieve success in assisting some of his fellow Jacobites, primarily his fellow officers, in gaining employment. However the advantages of his military rank and connections were outweighed by the manner in which the French rulers manipulated Dillon’s duty and loyalty to the French state for their own benefit. Despite his persistent hopes, he was never close to obtaining the essential objective of his post, a reversal of the Regent’s foreign policy in the Jacobite’s favour. James arguably had no better candidate than Dillon for the post, (possibly apart from Daniel O’Brien, his eventual replacement); the Stuart kings’ followers were all notoriously weak ministers. Yet the question as to whether James had any other option but to employ him is independent of whether Dillon himself either was capable and fitted to the expectations of the post, or achieved any success.

Naturally Dillon exerted his utmost endeavours, and the contemporary political circumstances were so weighted against the Jacobites that it is possible that there was nothing anyone could have done to change the Regent’s foreign policy. However that does not mean that Dillon’s propensity to accept and trust every promise or sign of a slight softening in the French stance did not make a difference, by making it clear to the French leadership that the Jacobite option was avoidable, when their representative could be perpetually deferred and manoeuvred to the French advantage without making any practical commitment.

Dillon’s enduring feelings of allegiance and loyalty to the French state and monarchy partially blinded him to the divergent interests and duplicity of the French rulers, and thereby to the political reality of the Jacobite situation. The Jacobite political situation was weakened by Dillon’s misjudgement and miscalculations. In at least one case, the Atterbury plot, Dillon’s trust in the French leader proved disastrous to the Jacobites’ ventures. In several of the most important Jacobite endeavours he was involved in during his tenure, his misplaced faith in others produced adverse outcomes for the Jacobites, all which have been described in detail through the thesis: the Swedish plot, the pension negotiations, the Atterbury plot and the Bourbon negotiations. His double allegiance became a conflict of interest in such a post.880

880 In fact another Jacobite diplomat had previously possessed the same conflict of interest. Micheline Walsh states that Toby Bourke, Jacobite ambassador to the court of Spain 1705-1713, actually served two masters since his salary was paid directly by Louis XIV, even though he was appointed
Dillon has a wider, more general historical significance because he reflects a problem of identity with all Jacobite exiles, having permanently settled and built new lives in France. Were they Irish, English or Scottish subjects or French? Where did their loyalty lie - to their old homeland or to France, to their Stuart sovereign or to the French monarch? For most exiles this ambiguity of loyalty and identity might be expected to gradually resolve itself as Jacobites assimilated into their new homeland, as Chaussinand-Nogaret suggests. However if, like Dillon, they felt guilt for their inability to serve their ‘true’ king because of the necessary commitment to their new monarch, it would indicate that in fact the opposite was true. The integration of the exiles made the disposition of their loyalties more challenging.

Oscar Recio Morales has explored the issues surrounding identity experienced by Irish migrants in Spain. He suggests that “in order to understand more fully the experiences of the Irish in Spain, it may be more appropriate, indeed necessary, to think about a phenomenon of ‘multiple identities’ rather than a single set of identity markers”; like Jacobites in France, their main problem was “how to maintain the balance of different identities in order to achieve political, social and economic success in Spain.”

Morales suggests that the identity of the Irish community rested partially on political ‘ideologisation’ comprised of three strands which helped the Irish attain a privileged status; the mythic ‘Milesian’ Spanish origin of the Irish, capitalisation on their military service, and their constancy to the ‘true faith’; as well as on solidarity strategies of alliance and dependency within social and kinship networks, and links to Ireland. These elements served to protect the Irish community but also to limit the extent of integration into Spanish society; strategies used to counterbalance this limitation including adopting elements of Spanish culture and the language, and resolving problems with bureaucracy and documentation (especially in the quest to attain noble status). They had assumed a special and privileged ‘Spanish

Irish’ identity, distinct from their solely Irish identity. 882 Morales therefore claims that the key to resolving the problem of maintaining the balance of their different identities was ensuring that “they were considered a different and privileged nation in Spain whilst not being regarded as ‘extranjeros’ (foreigners).” 883 The balance became more difficult to maintain during the eighteenth century however, as foreigners fell under increasing suspicion by the Spanish nobility; it became harder for these ‘Spanish Irish’ to avoid being perceived as foreigners, and they stopped exploiting this identity. 884

Some of these features of Irish identity in Spain are common to France, particularly of course the capitalisation on military service, and their solidarity strategies of social and kinship networks, as well, of course, as the same strategies of and struggles with integration. However France presented even greater challenges to the Irish diaspora. The privileged position of the Irish identity described by Morales in Spain, did not exist, or was not created to anywhere near the same extent by the political ideologisation described, while they still encountered the same considerable limitations generated by their ‘foreignness’ and lack of French citizenship; this meant that the balance of multiple identities described by Morales was much harder to achieve.

Indeed citizenship provided one of the most important components of the identity paradox in France. According to Dromantin under traditional rights nationality was determined by place of birth, not by paternal nationality. 885 Foreigners residing in France had no entitlement to the *jus civile*, the rights of French citizens, but only the *jus gentium*, or universal rights. The *droit d’aubain* laws in France imposed the greatest restriction on foreigners in France from the sixteenth century; they gave the French monarch the right to claim the estate of any foreigner residing in France (or *aubain*) who died without legal heirs (who had to be French citizens). Certain sets of foreigners (such as citizens of traditional allies) were exempted from the *droit d’aubain*, but might still be subject to other penalties such as a specific foreign tax or *traitte forain*. Official naturalisation provided the only mechanism to avoid most of the difficulties adhering to foreign birth, thus obtaining the required *lettres de*

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884 Ibid, pp. 260-266.
naturalité, granted to any foreigner who had the intention of residing permanently in France.886

According to Charlotte Wells, the official interpretation of the aubain laws gradually changed during the seventeenth century; being identified with service to the State. Given the close association between monarch and state (‘l’etat, c’est moi’): “obedience to the king was the only acceptable sign of the citizen’s desire to be French. Citizenship thus lay in the individual’s allegiance to the King of France. That allegiance was always to be presumed to exist in French natives and naturalised...”887

Wells claims that a belief survived that “the condition of being French resulted chiefly from the citizen’s will to be French...”888 Gordon, too, states that “the defining features of French citizenship were...permanent residency on French soil and obedience to the king.”889

In fact the niceties of entitlement to the rights of a citizen caused some conjecture through the eighteenth century. Dillon’s grandson (also Lieutenant-General Arthur Dillon) actually claimed in his memorial that Irish soldiers had won the right to French citizenship according to some French laws enacted during the eighteenth century:

Ces droits sacrés de francois furent en outre conférés aux Irlandois qui suivirent Jacques Stuart, Roi d’Angleterre, à son passage en France, sans qu’il fussent obligés de prendre des lettres de naturalité. Louis 14 déclara, en 1704, qu’il regardoit les Irlandois catholiques, passés dans son royaume à la suite du Roi d’Angleterre, comme ses propres sujets, et vaulut qu’ils jouissent, dans le Royaume, des mêmes droits que les francois naturels, sans être obligés, pour ce, de prendre des lettres de naturalité...890

[These sacred rights of the French were also conferred on the Irish who followed James Stuart, King of England, to France, without being obliged to apply for the documents of naturalité. Louis XIV declared, in 1704, that he regarded the Irish catholics, come to his kingdom following the King of England, as his own subjects, and asserted that they enjoyed the same rights in the Kingdom as subjects born in France, without being obliged to become naturalised to obtain them.]

He further referenced later contributions to the debate: a case in May 1736

887 Ibid, p. 100.
888 Ibid, p. 120; accord. pp. 96-122.
proscribing tax farmers protesting at this status; a letter written to Chaptire des Lille in 25 Mars 1741, which confirmed that the Irish had the rights of French subjects; and finally a 1747 tribunal instituted by Parlement which analysed legal precedent, including an arret du conseil of 18 septembre 1747, to conclude that the Irish had never been considered as foreigners. Yet it seems that the right had no official status despite various attempts, and Irish exiles still needed to go through the process of naturalisation before being granted the same rights as French subjects. The claim of Dillon’s grandson is patently without substance, since so many exiles did go through the process; even officers and soldiers, despite both their formal oath of allegiance to the King, and despite the grant of naturalisation in 1715 to foreigners who had served in the French army for over ten years. These exiles deemed it indispensable for advancement, as well as convenience. Indeed, as described in Chapter Four, Dillon himself applied for naturalisation in 1724 in order to obtain a bureaucratic post.

For some Jacobite exiles the question of loyalty might have been merely theoretical, particularly during the close alignment of the Stuart monarchy with the objectives of the French State before 1714. The modern sociological solution to the dilemma acknowledges the possibility of multiple identities and therefore the permissibility of dual loyalties. However during this period such pluralism was inconceivable. For most it would have involved an irreconcilable contradiction, experienced in practice under certain circumstances after 1714, and by those employed in the French army. The contradiction might not have been clear when the later regiments first landed in France in 1691, in expectation of a swift return to Ireland in a second invasion, as well as the conception that the regiments comprised James’ army, though not under his direct command. However the state of affairs must have grown more obvious with time, for both the Mountcashel brigade and the later Jacobite Irish regiments.

891 BN, l’Arsenal, Imprimé 8°-H-30.042, Dillon, Observations historiques, ff. 48-52. These references are confirmed by O’Callaghan, Irish Brigades, pp. 31-32.
893 Ibid. Rouffiac states that 508 Jacobites were naturalised between 1698 and 1715.
The Mountcashel Brigade, after all, had specifically been incorporated into the French army, having been swapped in return for French regiments sent to Ireland. Thus they were universally acknowledged as being part of the French army, enjoying the benefits of the extra pay granted foreign regiments. Even for James II's army, it became increasingly clear after the very first re-organisation of the troops according to French orders, particularly when their rate of pay was made the same as normal French regiments.

From the very beginning of the Jacobite period the French leadership deliberately made efforts to ensure their authority over Jacobite troops (as explained in the Introduction); each member of the regiments had to swear an oath to his most Christian Majesty in opposition to any other monarch, other than the Stuart kings. No Jacobite soldier or officer could have had any doubt after the post-Ryswick re-organisation of the brigades (1697), which further solidified the command of the French state over the exiled Irish soldiers. The Irish regiments now officially passed into Louis XIV's employ. The exiles were completely unprepared for the end of the war; most had shared the expectation that the war would eventually end with the Jacobite army's return to Ireland. Even some later Irish recruits through the early eighteenth century joined under the illusion that they would be serving James, and eventually would return to Ireland as part of a Jacobite invasion. Instead, "it would become merely part of the large body of foreign troops enlisted in the French Army. For two generations the Irish Wild Geese would loyally consider themselves Jacobites...However, for all practical purposes the Irish regiments would now be in the employ of King Louis XIV and his heirs."

Of first importance, however, was the French monarch's control of promotion of the higher ranks of the Irish regiments. Natalie Genet–Rouffiac states that for Louis XIV this "was a good way to settle his patronage on the Irish officers whose career, eventually, depended on the Versailles patronage, not on their relationships to Saint-Germain." Consequently those Irish officers who had been personally promoted by

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896 Ibid., pp. 35-37.
899 Mullen, f. 106.
Louis XIV, acquired an even greater debt of service to the French monarch. This obviously includes Dillon, who, just as the other Irish officers, had always been dependent solely on royal French favour for his promotion to and up through the highest ranks.

According to Nathalie Genet-Rouffiac this aspect of military promotion (solely by French royal directive), was a deliberate strategy to attain a transfer of the loyalty of Jacobite officers from James II to France. For the French army these changes were a pragmatic necessity to gain more control over the behavior of the officers themselves, in order to avoid waste and corruption as much as possible, and to ensure unified organization and smooth efficiency, as well as a sense of unity, accord and fidelity to the French state and monarch throughout the entire army. A split between entirely different monarchs could only hinder its operations. It was hardly in the best interest of Louis XIV to have a whole section of the army owing their allegiance to another monarch.

With France at war with Britain for most of Louis XIV’s reign, an officer would in practice have been executing his duty to both royal parties by service in the French army; this would not necessarily be the case once circumstances changed. The timing could even be wrong in Louis XIV’s reign; a ripe opportunity for an invasion might arise, or circumstances in England become more favourable, yet the time still not be favourable from the perspective of the French state, for various military and diplomatic reasons. Moreover, from an ideological point of view, making an oath to Louis XIV could never be the same as making it to the Stuart monarch.

Once Louis XIV died and the Regent came to power, these shared interests diverged. In the event of an attempted Jacobite invasion, such as in 1715, James needed his notional Jacobite army, but this did not suit the Regent’s intentions for French interests. From 1714 Jacobite plotters could have little confidence that the Irish regiments would be taking part in restoration attempts.

That quandary is best attested by the experience of the Duc de Berwick. Berwick, the obvious Jacobite commander, could not, by virtue of his fealty to the French army, come to the King’s aid by accepting the commission as Commander in Chief of all

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his forces in the Rising. Berwick could not breach his honour, duty or oaths by disobeying direct orders, firstly from Louis XIV and then the Regent, especially as a naturalised French subject; Dillon found himself in much the same situation.

Berwick justified his decision in a letter to Mar:

...I can aver, I never promised to follow the King anywhere without the proviso of the French court's giving me leave...It was then granted; but after Queen Ann's death the late King of France thought it necessary to avoid any occasion of quarrel with the new Gouvernemen of England, and therefore not only recall'd his leave, but even forbid me positively from stirring; I did all that lay in my power to obtain the recall of that prohibition...Since the King of France's death I have used all my endeavours with the Regent, but to as little purpose...I am still ready to part, whenever the Regent will allow me, but 'tis neither consisting with my honour, my duty, my oaths, nor even with the King's interest or reputation, that I should desert like a trooper; it was with his Majesty's leave that I became a Frenchman, and I cannot now depart from the vast obligations I now have incumbent upon me, without breach of publick faith and gratitude...If ever proper occasions offer, you shall find me as zealous as any man to render the King service...

The letter clearly demonstrates Berwick's regret at not being able to follow his stepbrother and natural sovereign, but, nevertheless, underscores his own recognition and acceptance that his honour required him to follow the orders of the ruler he has sworn allegiance to by virtue both of his military post, and of his official adoption of a different nationality.

The dispute between James and Berwick which followed this decision, and James' subsequent resentment, considerably complicated the latter's feelings, as he expressed to his son a few months later:

[The King] always speaks of duty, as if he were master to allow people making their fortunes and seems to mean that he consents to your establishment in Spain only upon condition that you will abandon all whenever he will be pleased to call upon you: this is following his maxim again with me. Methinks that he should caress people, and not always speak of duty, of which perhaps he knows not the extent. We ought always to wish him well, and even render him service, but it is out of principles of honour, and we are not obliged to abandon all our establishment, and leave our children to starve for his projects or fancy...

James in fact recognised the change in Berwick's duty and allegiance with his complete change of nationality.

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904 SPW HMC, I, Feb. 12, 1716, Berwick to Mar, p. 500.
...you on the place can best judge of the Duke of Berwick’s credit with the French Court and of his willingness to employ it in my favour and as there ought to be no exception of persons in some Cases you will do perfectly well to endeavour to enter into friendship with him, but I think it would be dangerous to say any thing to him which we would not have the Regent know, and past experience makes me expect very little that he will be hereafter usefull to me, I wish I may be mistaken, and provided it is not put in his power to do hurt I shall desire no better than to owe him the obligation of doing good, but still take along with you that he is a french man, he & I have been on terms of Civility for some time past we write now and then to one another, and I shall take the first occasion to do so, his uncle’s death may it is true diminish his caution in some respect, but it certainly will not make him less a french man...906

According to James here, Berwick’s French naturalisation is the principal basis for this acceptance. It seems to be what makes the difference in James eyes between those Jacobites who owed their allegiance to him, or the French monarch. Later, when James reconciled with his half-brother, he delicately acknowledged this important point to Berwick himself. By recognising Louis XV as Berwick’s king, and Berwick’s attachment to France and the Regent, he reached out to Berwick through the most sensitive issue in dispute between the two:

...your king a well wisher of mine was what I could never doubt of... The singular attachment you have for the Regent...cannot but give the greatest force to all such advices as come from you, & the motives with which you may induce him to espouse my cause are so...manifestly for the interest of France as well as his own, that he cannot interpret your application on that head to any other view but your zeal for both... You have gain’d no small reputation in the defence of France and in keeping heretofore in concurrence with it the Crown on the King of Spain’s head...and may you have the unparalell’d advantage of deserving and enjoying in those nations all those marks of distinction and reward which their different sovereigns can heap upon you and your family...907

This letter therefore shows that James did recognise the existence of this competing loyalty, if only for Berwick, or only in regard to naturalisation. However he obviously had deeply-held emotions about the allegiance held by his subjects to other monarchs, as demonstrated by his previous behaviour towards his half-brother. Berwick’s emotion in his letter to Mar feels so genuine as to be undeniable. Nevertheless, Berwick’s position was perhaps slightly more complex. He was widely recognised as dedicated to his perceived duty to France, as the bearer of all his French designations: Maréchal of France; naturalised French nobleman and subject; and member of the governing Regency Council.908 According to one anonymous writer of the French political negotiations with Britain at this time, Berwick’s loyalty

906 SPW 61/46, James to Lansdowne, July 26, 1722.
907 SPW 48/63, James to Berwick, July 26, 1720.
to France extended so far as to make him recommend the alliance with Britain to the Regent, in spite of his Jacobite devotion:

...This Prince had, on many Occasions, given signal Testimony of his Conduct and Service of France; but never so much of his disinterested Zeal for her Honour and Safety as now. No Man in France could know so much as he of the Nature, Power and Circumstances of the British Nation...he was far from lessening his Opinion of the Danger to France, in renewing the War against a Nation so impetuous, implacable, and revengeful; and therefore, tho’ he was zealous for the Chevalier, yet he came presently into the Cardinal’s Sentiments on that Head, viz. That they should openly declare against giving any Assistance, &c. to the Chevalier: That they should give King George all the good Words imaginable. In short, that tho’ perhaps, by Connivance, something might be done; yet that all publick Assistance must be disavowed and disowned; that the British Envoy must have all the Civility possible used to him...

Later he also made attempts to reverse his outlawry in Britain, according to French diplomatic correspondence of July 1722. He presumably held hopes of success with such overtures by virtue of the position and influence he possessed in France, the extent of which might have given him a fair prospect at opening up negotiations with the British government on such a topic, though of course no guarantee of success, given his high and loyal profile and close relationship to the exiled Stuart king. It is impossible to know what his motivation for this action might have been, and it is open to wide interpretation, but neither his strong devotion to France’s interest, nor this possible desire to be able to return to Britain, necessarily conflicts with what was certainly a deep Jacobite attachment.

Berwick shares many similarities to Dillon, indeed the respective situations of the two were almost exactly the same – the only real difference was Berwick’s even higher rank and importance within the French army. Neither felt able to contravene their oaths in order to participate in the 1715 Rising. However Dillon’s sustained sense of duty to the Stuarts prompted him to permanently leave his active military duties at the end of the War of Spanish Succession, while Berwick retained his French military post and duties, and later shouldered an advisory French ministerial role for his friend and ally, the Regent. Berwick did not abandon or deny his Jacobite sympathies and obligations, but would not forsake his French duties and responsibilities for them.

909 Secret Memoirs of the New Treaty of Alliance with France: in which some of The First Steps in that remarkable Affair are discovered; with some Characters of Persons (Dublin; re-printed by A. Rhames, for E. Dobson, at the Stationers’Arms, 1716), p. 9.

910 MAE, Correspondance Politique, Angleterre, MS 342, Juillet 17 1722, ff.76a-76b.
This must have been a common dilemma for many Irish officers, caught between conflicting loyalties. Dillon's fellow officers had to decide which of their loyalties took precedence for them personally—a choice forced upon them when a Jacobite plot came to fruition, as in 1715. Several of his fellow officers, Lieutenant General Dominick Sheldon, Colonel Reformé Francis Bulkeley, Brigadier Christopher Nugent and the Colonel Marquis of Tinmouth faced agonising decisions, and the latter two, like Dillon, were colonel-proprietors.

Sheldon chose to serve King James, in spite of his French military rank and position. He abandoned his regiment and charge, and sailed with James himself to Scotland. Nugent sailed to the south coast of England with Ormonde, from where they were forced to return to France by the failure of an English Jacobite force to materialise. Nugent attached himself to James without official approval. After the British Government protested, the French Government deprived him temporarily of the command of his corps, and later transferred to his son, the Comte de Nugent, in 1716.

Luckily for Nugent, his disavowal of orders, in this case the specific ban on leaving regiments to sail to Scotland to assist James, did not have too severe consequences for him or his family. His son effectively inherited the Colonel-proprietorship, a relatively light penalty for the crime of leaving one's post. Nugent certainly resigned his post by leaving it, he could not have expected anything less.

The consequences for Tinmouth, Berwick's son, were very similar. He sailed to Scotland (according to Berwick) with gold donated by King Philip V of Spain, but was shipwrecked off the Scottish coast, losing all the gold and just making land with Bulkeley in a small boat. They escaped back to France together after the defeat and dispersal of Jacobite troops, and the Regent transferred Tinmouth's regiment to his

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911 Dominick Sheldon was a Catholic Gentleman of Warwickshire who first served with Charles II's forces sent to France for the third Dutch war in 1672, following which he fought in Germany and Flanders. He returned to England in 1678 and fought under the Duke of Ormonde as a Captain in the King's regiment during James II's reign. Sheldon led the first Wild Geese regiments over to France after the Treaty of Limerick, where he was appointed Colonel of the 1st King's Regiment of Horse. Sheldon served for three years in Germany and Italy with his regiment, leaving in 1704 with his promotion to Lieutenant-General. He died in 1721. R. Steele, 'Fitzjames' regiment of horse of the Irish Brigade in the French service' in *Irish Sword*, ii (1954-6), p. 188.

912 Steele, 'Fitzjames' regiment of horse', p. 189. Nugent became Colonel of the Fitzjames Regiment of Horse, at that time Sheldon's regiment, in 1706, when Sheldon resigned his Colonel-proprietorship in his favour. Before that he had fought with the regiment in Flanders and Italy as Maestre de Camp-General. He commanded the regiment (now Nugent's regiment) in Flanders until 1711, through the battles of Ramillies, Oudenard and Malplaquet. His son the Comte de Nugent held the proprietorship from 1716 until 1733.
father’s command.\textsuperscript{913}

Although punished for their defiance, the Regent was lenient on those Jacobite officers who did leave. They could not have expected this leniency, especially when one considers the Regent’s attitude towards the cause. His attempts to ally himself with the British during the period, showed him to be so much less sympathetic to the Jacobite cause than Louis XIV – indeed with such a ban proclaimed in the first place - the officers could only have expected the severest penalties for its contravention. Other officers incurred more severe punishment, through the deprivation of their post upon return, which meant complete deprivation for the majority of Irish officers. At least one officer, Major John Hepburn, did not even receive wages owed for his previous service:

My present necessities oblige me to lay before you the condition I am in for want of money to supply the wants of nature...What was due to me by the regiment I served in they utterly refused to send me, so I am obliged to have recourse to you for some supply...for I was, and am, always resolved never to serve any king without my rightful sovereigns’ approbation...procure me his recommendation where he orders me, and I will never go anywhere but with a resolution to embrace the first occasion whatever I find his service requires me to do, or his commands enjoin me...\textsuperscript{914}

The individual decisions of these officers to stay loyal to James by leaving their regiments to fight for him must therefore have been difficult. This is especially evident when contrasted against the reasonably steady income of their posts, as well as their military duty and oath of allegiance and loyalty to the King of France which they had all personally made on acceptance of service with France, as well as upon promotion to their own ranks.

A prime example is the position of John Nugent, an Irish officer and grandson of the Earl of Westmeath who would eventually succeed to the title. His situation, shed light on the trials and tribulations of the Irish Jacobite officer. He left his French officer’s post to serve James but in 1720 had to try his hardest to return to it after 12 years because of his desperate circumstances:

I desire you will do me the favor to tell the King that I humbly represent to his Majesty that there being now majors named to the Regiments of Horse in France, and...living idly without employment here on a smale alowence of my appointment of Capne reformed...to maintaine me, my wife and a numerous family. Having first consulted Mr Dillon and by his aprobation I have desired to be made Major to Coll. Nugent’s Regiment which the Comte Devereux was pleased to grant me...tho’ two of the Capnes in the Regiment did all they could to hinder my being named...I hope his Majesty will aproove of my proceeding...which shall never prove a hinderence to me at any time that his

\textsuperscript{913} O’Callaghan, \textit{Irish Brigades}, p. 303.

\textsuperscript{914} SPW HMC, II, Major John Hepburn to Mar, April 22, 1716, p. 105.
Majesty will be so gracious to imploy me and... I shall allwaise be ready to quit everything else to have that honor. You may imagine, Sir, that having quitted the Regiment to have the honor to be neare the King's person and being from it these twelve years 'tis not without much difficulty I could gaine on myself to returne back and that only to the rank of Capne which I had upwards of thirty years ago, and that no other consideration could oblige me to it but that of endevouring to procure bread for my wife and children...

A further example of the duty and allegiance many officers still felt are the many statements of fealty made to James on a regular basis, for occasions such as the New Year, and on special events, such as the birth of James' sons. Of course such affirmations of loyalty regularly occurred within normal correspondence. Officers, for the most part not involved in the active Jacobite networks, might have occasion to write to James, and would take the opportunity to repeat their vow of allegiance to James. A typical example is a statement by the Duke of Hamilton:

...And Tho' fortune has taken Delight in sporting with Events & Destroying hopes yet shall she never reach that principle of Allegiance, and Duty which I owe to your Majesty, and now attends with Impatience that Happy hour of your Majesty's Command to Imply it well and testifie by some eminent act of gratitude how much I am and I ought to be may it please your Majesty your Majesty's most obedient & most Dutyfull Subject & Servant, Hamilton & Brandon.

The Jacobite officers had no choice but to somehow resolve their personal feelings surrounding this paradox of loyalty. For the vast majority, their commonly impoverished circumstances caused dependence on their military posts with its income, and meant they had to give their ultimate loyalty to France and the French king, no matter how much they might have preferred to stay loyal to James. If an officer undertook some kind of service for James, the service was limited by the necessity to ensure he would not be endangering his post as a consequence. Daniel O’Brien warned James of this limitation; he would to loyally obey James orders’ for a mission but wanted to completely avoid any possibility of losing his French military post. Personal dilemmas of loyalty could perhaps have been resolved for them in this way - through personal recognition of their complete dependence on

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916 SPW, 45/78, Francis Bulkeley to James, Oct. 31, 1718; 51/133, Clare to James, Feb. 3, 1721; 64/128, James Nagle to James, Jan. 4, 1723.
917 SPW HMC, II, Col. J. Parker to James, Sept. 1716, p. 503; IV, Capt. Rigby to Mar, April 13, 1717, p. 190; Inese to Mar, July 13, 1717, p. 448; SPW, 51/142, Wogan to James, Feb. 4, 1721; 52/97, Capt. Urquhart to James, March 8, 1721; 134, John Nugent to James, March 18, 1721; 53/129, Nicholas Geraldine to James, May 25, 1721; 58/153, Sheldon to James, April 9, 1722.
918 SPW, 47/89, Duke of Hamilton to James, June 14, 1720.
919 SPW, 67/20, Daniel O’Brien to James, May 12, 1723.
their military posts for a living, enabling them to bury any guilt. In essence the problem could not have an absolute resolution; the officers found themselves in a Catch 22 situation, since the conflict would always exist so long as they fought in the French army. Some officers may never have achieved any personal resolution. Dillon occupied an atypically important role within Jacobitism, as well as a remarkably high military rank, so that the conflict between his roles is singularly evident. Nevertheless most devoted Jacobite exiles, some of whom held important roles in James' service, were similarly subject to a double allegiance, to an allegiance to a foreign power as well as their Jacobite sovereign. The examples of Dillon, Berwick and other officers illustrate that this double allegiance could have an impact on and even occasionally compromise Jacobite affairs. The conflict these officers experienced must therefore have been more widespread than a handful of individual cases. It can be concluded that the conflict of the double allegiance was a more important issue for Jacobitism on the Continent than has been previously understood.
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**UNPUBLISHED THESES**


Lieutenant-General Arthur Dillon: Jacobite at the Regency court 1715 - 1725

Kate Elizabeth Geange

This doctoral thesis examines Jacobite affairs between 1715 and 1725, using French Lieutenant-General Arthur Dillon, a prominent Irish Jacobite during those years, as a case study. It investigates Dillon’s various roles within the Jacobite network and his principal relationships within the leadership of the Jacobite political network and the external political world. The primary objective of the thesis is to determine the consequences of Dillon’s service in his role as the Jacobite representative to the French court on the Jacobite political network, as well as to explore the significance of issues which permeated his service, of influence, patronage, allegiance, loyalty and identity. These conclusions are contextualised within current historiographical thought on Jacobite exile.

Dillon’s roles and relationships within the network were primarily informed by his close connection to the French court. His position at the centre of French political activity helped to minimise the distance of the Jacobite cause from the centre of French power; however this advantage led to a level of dependence on Dillon by James. This dependence was emphasised by the multiplicity of roles which Dillon performed, as a diplomatic and a personal or advocate intermediary, a military patron, a communication pillar, a plot organiser and memorialist, and a financial and administrative manager. The consequent importance of Dillon to the Jacobite community, and meant that Dillon’s weaknesses had a serious impact on Jacobite affairs, the most critical of which was his lack of diplomatic skills and political acumen. His eventual forced retirement from his position by James was a consequence partly of his intimacy with the disgraced Earl of Mar, but primarily his own political ineptitude, and therefore unsuitability for the important diplomatic role he filled.

Though ostensibly his prime advantage, because of his acquaintance and interest with important French officials, Dillon’s military rank in fact became a weakness. The conflict between his two roles, half way between subject of France and of the Stuart King, created an ambiguity as to his loyalty. Dillon’s supreme problem was his personal conflict as to whether he owed his highest loyalty to James III or France. This conflict is of primary importance in terms of its implications for other Jacobite exiles, particularly Irish Jacobite officers.

This thesis makes an original contribution to knowledge firstly through its investigation of the role Dillon played within the Jacobite leadership during this period, and the consequences of his employment in this role for the Jacobite cause; and secondly through its exploration of the wider significance of a key feature of Dillon’s employment on Jacobite affairs - a challenge intrinsic to the exiled Jacobite community, the collision of multiple allegiances commonly experienced by Jacobites in exile.