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Women's Peacebuilding Initiatives in the Benue Valley, Nigeria

Gender, Fundamental Human Needs and Conflict Resolution

By John Tavershima Agberagba

This thesis is submitted to the University of Dublin, Trinity College
in fulfilment of the requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

The Confederal School of Religions, Peace Studies and Theology

Supervisors: Professors Iain Atack and Gillian Wylie

September 2014
Declaration

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John Tavershima Agberagba
Summary

In this research, I investigate and provide a multi-disciplinary scholarly analysis of four grassroots groups of women peacebuilding in the multi-communal Benue Valley, Nigeria (BVN): to offer analysis of the causes of violent conflicts in the region with an emphasis on understanding the deprivation of human needs as a vital cause and to show how the women’s peacebuilding initiatives meet some of the unmet frustrated needs. I also discuss how the full impact of the women’s work is constrained by post-colonial patriarchal gender order in the BVN. Using the human needs theory (HNT) and some gender socialisation theories, I seek answers to three research questions:

1. What do the women understand as the causes of the four conflicts in the BVN?
2. What kind of skills, vision and initiatives do the women’s groups use in their peacebuilding work?
3. What is the women’s perception of the patriarchal social, economic and political gender order in the BVN?

Therefore, in Chapter 1—Research Introduction and Methodology, I explain the motivation for this research and how I use a qualitative research approach to conduct story interviews from 60 women on their peacebuilding initiatives in the BVN. Additionally, I elucidate my decision to transcribe my primary data and review secondary data. In Chapter 2—Research Theoretical Framework I: Fundamental Human Needs (FHNs), Conflict Analysis, Peacebuilding and Conflict Resolution, I define traditional leadership in the BVN, peacebuilding concept, conflict, FHNs, satisfiers and goods; analyse and demonstrate how protracted social conflicts (PSCs) in societies like the BVN manifest itself due to certain pre-conditions, dynamics and outcomes. I also analyse the five traits of satisfiers: destructive, pseudo, inhibiting, singular and synergic, and in the way each affects the satisfaction of FHNs.

In Chapter 3—Research Theoretical Framework II: Gender, Peacebuilding and Conflict Resolution, I examine gender socialisation, conflict and peace. I demonstrate how gender socialisation enables some women to recognise the satisfaction of vital needs in the resolution of PSC. However, gender socialisation is also responsible for excluding women from formal peacebuilding processes. Additionally, I critique the HNT and argue for a gender-sensitive concept of FHNs in the HNT. In Chapter 4—Research Background: Protracted Social Conflict (PSC) and Women Peacebuilders in the Benue Valley, Nigeria (BVN), I provide a background to four PSCs and particular peace initiatives founded by groups of women in the region. I define the region referred to as the BVN, give an overview of PSCs in the region from 1975-2000 and
present the background to what the HNT consider satisfiers—land, traditional titles and
democratic political leadership—over which people fight in the BVN. I also explain state and
federal governmental efforts at resolving conflict in the BVN and give a background of the
groups of women peacebuilding in the BVN.

Furthermore, in Chapter 5—Research Findings, I narrate extracts of the women’s stories in five
sections: section 1 narrates extracts of stories about the causes of the four conflicts in the
BVN; section 2 reports extracts of stories that trace how gender socialisation provides these
women with peacebuilding skills; section 3 recounts the vision these women have in relation
to the satisfaction of needs; section 4 details extracts of stories about particular women’s
peace initiatives in BVN and section 5 contains extracts of stories relating to gender social
order in the BVN. In Chapter 6—Research Analysis, I analyse extracts of the stories of women
peacebuilders presented in Chapter 5 and photographs taken during fieldwork in the BVN. I
analyse the causes of PSCs, women’s use of synergic satisfiers, and the exclusion of women
from formal peacebuilding work and conflict resolution processes in the BVN. Finally, in
Chapter 7—Research Conclusions, I present the conclusions reached when I investigated
women’s contribution to and the limits put on their involvement in peacebuilding processes in
the BVN. I present a theoretical conceptualisation of the women’s peacebuilding work as my
research’s contribution to peacebuilding work in conflict resolution studies; provide conclusive
evidence that the post-colonial patriarchal social, economic and political gender order
discriminates against women’s peacebuilding initiatives in formal peacebuilding processes in
the BVN. This is the primary reason for the difficulties which exist in implementing
international consensus that women need to be consulted and included in peacebuilding
processes (e.g. UNSCR 1325) in areas like the BVN. However, from the HNT perspective,
including these women who are engaged in peacebuilding work in the BVN in formal
peacebuilding work and conflict resolution processes will make a significant contribution to
sustainable peace in the BVN.
Acknowledgement

With deep gratitude

to

Prof. Iain Atack, Head of School, the Confederal School of Religions, Peace Studies and Theology, Trinity College Dublin

Prof. Gillian Wylie, Head of Discipline, Peace Studies, the Confederal School of Religions, Peace Studies and Theology, Trinity College Dublin

The Congregation of the Holy Spirit of the Irish Province, Dublin
For the 60 women I studied in the Benue Valley, Nigeria

For my mother, Ayar Beer Agberagba

And for my late father, Daniel Agberagba
# Table of Contents

Women's Peacebuilding Initiatives in the Benue Valley, Nigeria ....................................................... 1

Gender, Fundamental Human Needs and Conflict Resolution .......................................................... 1

Declaration ........................................................................................................................................... i

Summary ........................................................................................................................................... ii

Acknowledgement ............................................................................................................................... iv

Table of Contents ............................................................................................................................... vi

List of Figures ...................................................................................................................................... ix

List of Charts ..................................................................................................................................... x

List of Photos ...................................................................................................................................... xi

List of Tables ....................................................................................................................................... xiii

List of Abbreviations ........................................................................................................................... xiv

Chapter 1: Introduction and Methodology ......................................................................................... 1

1.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 1

1.2 Methodology ................................................................................................................................. 10

Chapter 2—Research Theoretical Framework I: ............................................................................. 31

Fundamental Human Needs (FHNs), Conflict Analysis, Peacebuilding and Conflict Resolution
......................................................................................................................................................... 31

2.1 Conflict and fundamental human needs (FHNs) ....................................................................... 31

2.2 Conflict analysis ........................................................................................................................... 41

2.3 Peacebuilding for conflict resolution ......................................................................................... 54

Chapter 3—Research Theoretical Framework II: ............................................................................ 65

Gender Peacebuilding and Conflict Resolution .................................................................................. 65

3.1 Gender socialisation, conflict and peace ...................................................................................... 66

3.2 Women’s socialised skills in peacebuilding ............................................................................... 85

3.3 Women’s initiatives in peacebuilding ......................................................................................... 89
List of Figures

FIGURE 1: CONCLUSION ON THE POST-COLONIAL PATRIARCHAL GENDER ORDER IN THE BVN .......................... 256

FIGURE 2: AN OUTLINE OF THE WOMEN’S THEORETICAL APPROACH TO PEACEBUILDING AND CONFlict RESOLUTION........... 258
List of Charts

CHART 1: OVERVIEW SUMMARY OF CONFLICT IN THE BENUE VALLEY .................................................................................................................. 111

CHART 2: PERCENTAGE REPRESENTATION OF RESEARCH INFORMANTS BY LGA .................................................................................................................. 140

CHART 3: GENDER REPRESENTATION OF 36 STATE GOVERNORS .................................................................................................................. 144

CHART 4: GENDER REPRESENTATION OF STATE HOUSES OF REPRESENTATIVES (SHR) FROM THE 36 STATES OF NIGERIA .................................................................................................................. 144

CHART 5: GENDER REPRESENTATION OF FEDERAL HOUSES (FHR) (SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATION) .................................................................................................................. 145

CHART 6: GENDER REPRESENTATION OF FEDERAL MINISTERS .................................................................................................................. 146

CHART 7: THE PERCENTAGE BY LOWEST AND HIGHEST LEVELS OF EDUCATION AND WOMEN FOR GENDER EQUALITY IN THE BVN .................................................................................................................. 234

CHART 8: THE PERCENTAGE BY LOWEST AND HIGHEST LEVELS OF EDUCATION AND WOMEN AGAINST GENDER EQUALITY IN THE BVN .................................................................................................................. 234
List of Photos

PHOTO 1: MAP OF NIGERIA INDICATING THE BENUE VALLEY IN GREEN COLOUR ......................................................... 1
PHOTO 2: TWENTY WOMEN AND 20 MEN AT WEP END OF PROJECT EVALUATION 2011 AT ATAGANYI, BENUE STATE ...... 25
PHOTO 3: ELEVEN WOMEN AND 10 MEN AT WEP END OF PROJECT EVALUATION 2011 AT TAKUM, TARABA STATE ........... 25
PHOTO 4: ELEVEN WOMEN AND 5 MEN AT THE WEP END OF PROJECT EVALUATION 2011 AT ADIKPO, BENUE STATE .......... 25
PHOTO 5: MARCH 1916 NIGERIA, THREE WOMEN AND A GIRL FROM THE BENUE VALLEY. THE GIRL IS WEARING A SHELL ON HER NECK AS A SIGN THAT SHE IS A VIRGIN ................................................................. 81
PHOTO 6: MAP OF NIGERIA BY LINGUISTIC GROUPS .............................................................................................. 109
PHOTO 7: THE TREE WHOSE SEEDS ARE USED FOR PAYING ROYALTY TAX ............................................................. 126
PHOTO 8: A SAMPLE OF THE SEED FOR PAYING ROYAL TAXES ................................................................................ 126
PHOTO 9: GRANITE STONES FOR SALE ................................................................................................................ 127
PHOTO 10: MAP OF PROTECTORATES IN NIGERIA 1900 ...................................................................................... 131
PHOTO 11: MAP OF THE FOUR NIGERIAN REGIONS IN 1963 ............................................................................. 131
PHOTO 12: SOME WOMEN PEACEBUILDERS FROM THE BVN AT A WEP TRAINING WORKSHOP IN MAKURDI ............ 133
PHOTO 13: SOME AGAPE SISTERS AT A MEETING IN ADIKPO, BENUE STATE .................................................... 134
PHOTO 14: SOME CWO WOMEN AT A MEETING AT ADIKPO, BENUE STATE ...................................................... 135
PHOTO 15: SOME WOMEN PC IN GWER EAST ALIJADE, BENUE STATE ......................................................... 137
PHOTO 16: WOMEN FROM ATAGANYI AND OMELEMU COMMUNITIES IN ATAGANYI ........................................... 138
PHOTO 17: SOME WOMEN FROM TAKUM AT WEP MAKURDI WORKSHOP .............................................................. 160
PHOTO 18: HOUSES AND PROPERTY DESTROYED IN ATAGANYI COMMUNITY ..................................................... 166
PHOTO 19: CWO COMMUNIQUÉ AND PICTURES OF THE PEOPLE THEY MET PROTESTING FOR PEACE IN KWANDE .... 176
PHOTO 20 (MEMORABILIA): TRADITIONAL LEADERS FROM KWANDE WITH PEOPLE FROM ADIKPO AND JATO AKA, BENUE
STATE AT WEP WORKSHOP IN MAKURDI .............................................................................................................. 190
PHOTO 21 (MEMORABILIA): THREE TRADITIONAL LEADERS, TWO FROM KWANDE AND THE OTHER FROM ADO WITH PEOPLE
FROM NIGER AND TARABA STATES AT WEP WORKSHOP IN MAKURDI .......................................................... 190
PHOTO 22: THE KWANDE TRADITIONAL CHIEF'S HOUSE BURNT DOWN ............................................................... 193
PHOTO 23: THE ATAGANYI COMMUNITY HEAD'S HOUSE BURNT DOWN .............................................................. 193
PHOTO 24: DEFINITION OF LEADERSHIP BY WOMEN AND YOUTHS STUDIED IN THE BVN ........................................ 197
PHOTO 25: YOUNG WOMEN AND MEN AT WORK .............................................................................................. 200

xi
PHOTO 26: MEN SHOWING OFF THEIR STRENGTH .............................................................................................................. 200
PHOTO 27: MEN SHOWING OFF THEIR STRENGTH .............................................................................................................. 201
PHOTO 28: YOUNG WOMEN WORKING ALONGSIDE YOUNG MEN IN ATAGANYI COMMUNITY .............................................. 201
PHOTO 29: WOMEN’S DAILY ACTIVITIES ............................................................................................................................. 207
PHOTO 30: A LOCAL DRINK SERVED AT A PEACE TALK BETWEEN ATAGANYI AND OMELEMU COMMUNITIES .................... 217
PHOTO 31: MEAL SERVED AT THE END OF PEACE TALKS AT ATAGANYI ............................................................................ 217
PHOTO 32: WOMEN AND MEN EATING IN DIFFERENT SPACES ............................................................................................. 218
PHOTO 33: THE PEOPLE OF ATAGANYI AND OMELEMU COMMUNITIES AFTER A PEACE TALK AT ATAGANYI ............... 219
PHOTO 34: AGILA WOMEN PURIFYING THEIR VILLAGES BY SWEEPING CONFLICT OUT ......................................................... 219
PHOTO 35: AGILA WOMEN EATING TOGETHER AFTER THE PURIFICATION RITE ..................................................................... 220
PHOTO 36: AGILA COMMUNITY CHIEFS WITH SOME WOMEN AFTER THE PURIFICATION RITE ..................................................... 221
PHOTO 37: THE COMMUNIQUÉ OF KWANDE AGAPE SISTERS .................................................................................................... 222
PHOTO 38: KWANDE WOMEN OUT PROTESTING AGAINST POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN ADIKPO .............................................. 223
PHOTO 39: AGAPE SISTERS AT A MEETING IN ADIKPO, KWANDE PREPARING TO GO OUT AND FEED YOUTHS .............................. 225
PHOTO 40: THE CONTENT OF BOXES IN PHOTO 35. THIS IS NATIVE BREAD MADE FROM LOCAL NUTS WITH AN EGG AND
VEGETABLES INSIDE ........................................................................................................................................................................... 225
PHOTO 41: SOME WOMEN RE-ENACTING HOW THEY GO ABOUT APPEALING TO YOUNG MEN TO SHUN VIOLENCE ............ 228
PHOTO 42: SOME WOMEN RE-ENACTING HOW THEY GO ABOUT APPEALING TO YOUNG MEN TO SHUN VIOLENCE ............ 228
List of Tables

TABLE 1: EXAMPLES OF FHNs, THEIR SATISFIERS AND GOODS ...................................................................................................................... 39
TABLE 2: MATRIX OF NEEDS AND SATISFIERS (CRUZ ET AL., 2009, P. 2025) ........................................................................................................ 55
TABLE 3: VIOLATORS AND DESTRUCTIVE SATISFIERS ........................................................................................................................... 59
TABLE 4: PSEUDO-SATISFIERS ............................................................................................................................................................. 59
TABLE 5: INHIBITING SATISFIERS .......................................................................................................................................................... 60
TABLE 6: SINGULAR SATISFIERS .......................................................................................................................................................... 61
TABLE 7: SYNERGIC SATISFIERS ......................................................................................................................................................... 61
TABLE 8: DOCUMENTED CONFLICTS IN THE MIDDLE BELT 1975-2000 ............................................................................................ 109
TABLE 9: SOME RECORDED COMMUNAL CONFLICTS IN TIV AREA OF BENUE STATE ............................................................................. 118
TABLE 10: SUMMARY OF WOMEN PARTICIPANTS IN THIS RESEARCH ................................................................................................... 139
TABLE 11: GENDER REPRESENTATION IN ELECTIVE BODIES FROM 1999-2011 IN NIGERIA ................................................................. 143
TABLE 12: SUMMARY OF SATISFIERS USED AND FRUSTRATED FHNs IN THE BVN ................................................................. 204
TABLE 13: DATA ON THE WOMEN’S VIEW OF THE USE OF VIOLENCE AS A MEANS FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT ........................... 212
TABLE 14: SUMMARY OF SYNERGIC SATISFIERS USED BY WOMEN IN THE BVN ..................................................................................... 231
TABLE 15: DATA ON THE NUMBER OF WOMEN FOR AND NOT FOR GENDER EQUALITY BASED ON EACH RESEARCHED COMMUNITY ...................................................................................................................... 233
TABLE 16: A POST-COLONIAL SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL POLARISATION/ANDROCENTRIC GENDER ORDER IN THE BVN ..................................................................................................................... 261
## List of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACN</td>
<td>Action Congress of Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADR</td>
<td>Alternative Dispute Resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AID</td>
<td>Acquired Immune deficiency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AS</td>
<td>Agape Sisters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATR</td>
<td>African Traditional Religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSU</td>
<td>Benue State University</td>
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<tr>
<td>BVN</td>
<td>Benue Valley Nigeria</td>
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<tr>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Certificate of Occupancy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPI</td>
<td>Corruption Perception Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSW</td>
<td>Commission on the Status of Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWO</td>
<td>Catholic Women's Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FBA</td>
<td>Faith Based Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBO</td>
<td>Faith Based Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FHN</td>
<td>Fundamental Human Needs</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HNT</td>
<td>Human Need Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INEC</td>
<td>National Election Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JDPC</td>
<td>Justice Development and Peace Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KMU</td>
<td>Kwande Market Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGA</td>
<td>Local Government Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAPEP</td>
<td>National Poverty Eradication Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCW</td>
<td>Nigeria Civil War</td>
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<tr>
<td>NFF</td>
<td>Nigerian Feminist Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NNIDC</td>
<td>Nigeria National Identity Card</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>Nigerian Population Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPFL</td>
<td>National Patriotic Front of Liberia</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDP</td>
<td>People's Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>PFA</td>
<td>Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Protracted Social Conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nation Security Council Resolution</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>WACOL</td>
<td>Women’s Aid Collective</td>
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<tr>
<td>WEP</td>
<td>Women Environmental Programme</td>
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Methodology

Photo 1: Map of Nigeria indicating the Benue Valley in green colour

Source: Nigerian High Commission London, UK

1.1 Introduction

Introduction about the author: Why am I interested in women’s peacebuilding initiatives in the Benue Valley, Nigeria (BVN)? I am Tiv from the BVN by ethnicity and a Roman Catholic priest of the Congregation of the Holy Spirit (C.S.Sp.—Spiritans). My father was a colonial police man and later a Nigerian police officer who married four wives, three of whom lived with us. My father beat his wives just as he did us, his children. My mother was the first wife, which means she deserved more respect, but because she protested her rights most, which displeased my father, who as a police officer, felt very powerful and made life miserable for my mother. My father had disagreements with his own mother and felt she had cursed him and would therefore not allow her to be fed in his house. However, my mother argued that it was her right to decide domestic affairs as the first wife and to feed the whole family, which included looking after my father’s mother; therefore, she could not stop feeding my father’s
mother. Eventually, my mother separated from my father over this issue. Nonetheless, my
father was a generous and loving person in many respects. He made sure his family met its
needs. Indeed our uncles, relatives and his friends came to our house for weekend parties
most of the time—very big weekend celebrations—with musicians invited to sing for guests. In
addition, my father used to buy an elephant head or a lot of bush meat so that we could share
with our neighbours. However, it was not only my father that made sure his family met its
needs, all the wives had productive initiatives—my mother was a seamstress, the second wife
was also a seamstress and the third wife had a small fresh fish business. The proceeds of these
small businesses were for the needs of our family. My father made the final decision about
family life and he disciplined us, the boys, while his wives reared all the children as well as
taking charge of discipline of the girls. The wives responsibilities also included making sure that
the family was well fed and stayed in harmony. Our family, a middle-class family, was admired
by others from the outside given the generosity of my father and his wives, but from the
inside, I had a lot of misgivings about the physical punishment in the house perpetrated by my
father on his children and his wives. In some ways I understood why my father beat his
children as a form of discipline, but I could not understand why he would also beat his wives,
especially my mother. This family experience made me question the meeting of family needs
and the relationship between women and men in the family.

Family friend: While I was in college, I knew a man, Matthew an educated man (pseudo name)
who used to help me, as my father was dead by now and I needed help. Matthew used to buy
school books for me and his wife, Grace (pseudo name), used to feed me very well. On my
part, I washed Matthew’s clothes and acted as nanny for Grace when I was on holidays.
Matthew was a good man but very jealous and would not let Grace talk to anybody. If she did,
she had to explain where she knew the person from and why she was talking to them. This
interrogation ended most of the tim e with Matthew beating Grace. Eventually, Grace left
Matthew. When he found his second wife, Martha (pseudo name), she knew me very well
because we were in college together. Before Martha was married to Matthew, she asked me
what I thought about her marrying him; I told her that Matthew used to beat the first wife,
Grace, hence my own misgivings about his conduct with women. However, Martha married
Matthew anyway and when he started beating her, she came and complained to me. I asked
Martha why she got married to Matthew in the first place and she replied that apart from the
beatings, Matthew was “very sweet”. Indeed, I had no doubt that Matthew was good as he
would buy me books and give me money to go back to college, but why beat his wife?
Guinea Conakry: I undertook a one year (Visiting Study Fellow) postgraduate “Foundation Course on Forced Migration” at University of Oxford in 1996/97 and worked, as the Director of Spiritan Refuges’ Work from 1997 to 2001 in Guinea Conakry, with refugees from Sierra Leone and Liberia. I was working in several camps with more than 50,000 refugees. I had a peacebuilding programme allowing them to reflect on cultural values and violence. One of the topics covered was violence in the family. One day, I asked a refugee who had four wives if he would agree that his wives could have four husbands or four other men. The man reacted angrily, he hit his hand on the ground swearing to God that he would have slapped me for asking him that question, but could not do it because I was a priest of God. However, he warned me not to ask him that type of question again. I wondered who had given the man the power to think that he could have four women in his life, but that the women could not do the same (Of course, I now know that it is patriarchy).

At the same time, while I and another colleague offered pastoral work as priests and some reflections on peacebuilding skills to refugees, there were religious nuns who taught refugees how to make local nutritious food for their families, business skills to set up small businesses and they also offered them small loans to set up their own small business. I could see a clear difference in the work we did and the work the nuns did. At some level, I felt the work of the nuns was much more appreciated by the refugees than that which we priests did. After I left the refugee work, I worked as a parish priest from 2001 to 2009 in Mexico, where my experience with families and indigenous communities showed that a lot of women worked very hard, but received little recognition of their work from their men. Thus, I continued with a quest to discover the reasons that men perceive women in this light.

MPhil studies: In 2009/10, I came to the University of Dublin, Trinity College to do a one-year International Peace Studies course. I wrote an M Phil thesis on religion and peacebuilding in Nigeria and the protracted conflicts in Nigeria. In it, I argued that Nigeria had been engulfed in a cycle of violent conflicts since the 1960s and that these conflicts were inter-ethnic, inter-religious and socioeconomic in nature. Multiple factors contributed to their existence and perpetuation. However, religion and ethnicity remained their most important contributing aspects, because, in Nigeria, religion and ethnicity were inextricable from the issue of power-based relationships: politics was directly based on religious and ethnic affiliation. Moreover, religion and ethnicity were boundary indicators that produced the basis for an “us and them” politics, and contributed to social segregation. I examined religion and conflicts in Nigeria using the human needs theory, looking at the root cause of conflicts and multifaceted approaches to conflict resolution in Nigeria. Furthermore, I used theories from post-colonialism, especially
postcolonial theology, and critically analysed religion and conflicts in Nigeria. Particularly, the
work of Catholic missionaries and the colonisers of Africa, thus helping me determine the
merits and weaknesses of Catholic mission work and conflicts in Nigeria. I also examined
Islam—the implementation of sharia law and the Boko Haram conflict in Northern Nigeria
where they aimed to stop Western education. I also examined Pentecostal pastors and
traditional healers and on how they accuse children of performing witchcraft in Nigeria. The
focus of my analysis was not to pass any judgments on these religious groups. It was to
discover the interests and the frustration of human needs that were involved in conflict in
Nigeria. The conclusion of my MPhil thesis suggested that Nigerians:

1. Deconstruct the view of one religion being better than another and one ethnic group
   being superior to another;
2. Need a leadership at the service of the people for the satisfaction of human needs and
   a problem-solving approach to conflict; and
3. Use all religions to systematically set up programmes to enable this type of leadership
   in Nigeria.

To achieve these conclusions I suggested that Nigeria needed a peace-building process from a
bottom-up and not a top-down approach. The task for further research was to find out if, in
reality, the frustration of human needs is the root of religious and ethnic related social
conflicts in Nigeria and a bottom-up peacebuilding approach for conflict resolution in Nigeria
was the solution.

Women as a choice of study: Given my own experience of women’s involvement in the
satisfaction of human needs, and my quest to find more about gender relations, I decided I
was going to study their methods. My original hypothesis of the women’s initiatives was that
the women would be working against violence, using non-violence methods, with little
understanding or tolerance of conflict in their communities. My early theoretical conceptions
were on non-violent strategies and problem-solving workshops approach to conflict resolution
and instead I found that the women had a sophisticated understanding of the causes of
conflict in their communities and chose, where they could, to address those directly. This is
what I present in this thesis. My study has led me to characterise the post-colonial BVN as a
society of extreme patriarch but before my study I thought of it simply a patriarchal society.
Although, I chose to study women, I chose a study that did not involve asking them to talk
about their religion for reasons that I explain below.
The complexity of religion in Nigeria: In my family, my father, his third and fourth wives, my mother and grandparents were Protestants, but his second wife was Catholic. I have relatives who are Muslims and we all grew up together. Some of my brothers and sisters are Protestant, some are Catholic and I am a Catholic priest. My mother became Catholic because I am a Catholic priest; she joined the Catholic Church but it was not a big issue for our family or the church she belonged to before because some members of our family are still Protestants and we have no problems with that, everybody is free to worship where they like. Our family is not particular in this as there are many other families like ours in the BVN. In addition, I spent a year (1986/87) doing my National Youth Service (NYC) in Ogun State—in the South West where there are as many Muslims as Christians; I was the secretary to the Catholic Youth Cooper's Association Ogun State. We worked with Muslim and Christian youths in schools and, to date, one may not differentiate who is a Muslim or a Christian at fetes because they “wine and dine” together as one human family.

My experience is that, within the BVN, just like my mother changed (we would normally use the word change rather than convert) from Protestantism to Catholicism, people change from one religion to another easily and in some cases belong to multiple religious group or churches at the same time. However, there are radical groups like the Catholic Charismatic Renewal which preaches within the Catholic Church and outside it that those who do not convert (born again) are damned; Pentecostal and Evangelical groups that aggressively proselytise members of other churches and other religions; and in some cases, changing from Islam to Christianity might be considered undesirable by a family. Nonetheless, the general situation of religions that helps co-existence in the BVN is that we do not discuss or criticise other people's religion as this might provoke conflict. It might be interpreted by religious fundamentalists as religious profanity with the consequence of visiting violence on the individual or group to which s/he belongs; this complicates religiosity in the BVN. Therefore, to choose religious cases and ask women to talk about them, required research designed with ethical sensitivity—the safety of participants. I could not guarantee this kind of research given the volatile nature of the BVN. Therefore, I decided that I would focus on socio-political case studies and avoid religious cases and thus my journey with women studies begins.

Introduction about women's peacebuilding: In 1915, about 1,000 women gathered in The Hague and demanded an end to World War I due to the huge number of human casualties and general human cost of the war. The same high human causalities have prompted more women from the 1990s to date to become involved in nonviolent ways of resolving conflict around the world including intra-state wars and other conflicts. Some of what has prompted more women
into peacebuilding are, firstly, a lack of respect for the rules of engagement in intra-state wars and other violent conflicts. Secondly, women are the people who deal most with depressed ex-combatant men at home where they help the healing process and help create a future for their communities after violent conflicts (Anderlini, 2007, p. 8). Thirdly, the cost of violent conflicts has created economic deprivation, political corruption, poor health care delivery, poor education in countries like Rwanda, Angola, Nigeria, Sudan, Liberia, Democratic Republic of Congo, etc. in Africa. All these deprivations affect women differently to men; as women are in many contexts socialised to give care in families, they need human security for their families, thus, women as caregivers heavily bear the cost of conflicts. Therefore, Pankhurst (2000) writing on “Women, Gender and Peacebuilding” emphasis, groups of women often have a stronger commitment to end violence and find long term peace than groups of men, and thus often constitute a highly motivated and able group of stakeholders for peacebuilding. This is why there is an international consensus that women need to be consulted and included in peacebuilding processes (e.g. UNSCR 1325) in places like the Benue Valley, Nigeria (BVN), although this is not being implemented in the formal political sphere of the BVN. I, therefore, find it important and necessary to research the women involved in peacebuilding work in the BVN.

Nonetheless, as Elisabeth Porter in Peacebuilding Women in international Perspective explains, “it is not that men’s contribution to peace is not significant, it is. Rather, it is that women’s contributions to peacebuilding usually are informal... rarely part of formal peace processes, so their stories often drift, unacknowledged” (Porter, 2007). This is what makes the task of researching what women do for peace necessary and urgent for me. Moreover, I would like to point out that while women’s work is informal, women constitute approximately 50% of the population in the BVN and the world. Therefore, ignoring them is bad planning as suggested by Anderlini in her (2007) work Women Building Peace: What They Do, Why It Matters. She argues that women know what the issues in their communities are: “women activists of Afghanistan, Nepal, Liberia, or Somalia are the best navigators of their own cultural and political terrain” (Anderlini, 2007, p. 228). Therefore, my research into women’s peacebuilding strategy in the BVN is researching how women are managing peace.

Additionally, Lisa Schirch and Manjrika Sewak (2005) in their work “Women: Using the Gender Lens” suggest that often women are socialised into fostering relationships and avoiding violence. Though researching women’s work allows us to learn from them, it also empowers them and women’s empowerment challenges sexism which, along with racism, classism and ethnic and religious discrimination, stem from the same belief that others are inferior or
superior (Lisa and Manjrika, 2005, pp. 97-107 cited in Anderlini, 2007, p. 76). In my case, researching women’s peacebuilding initiatives in the BVN is a contribution to challenging male domineering attitudes which constrain the full impact of women’s peacebuilding work. Despite the constraints, women continue to prove themselves to be successful peacebuilders due to their firm belief in the principles of inclusivity and collaboration which allows for strategic peacebuilding work across differences and borders (Lisa and Manjrika, 2005, pp. 97-107 cited in Anderlini, 2007, p. 76). Moreover, since women and men have different experiences of both violence and peace; I believe sustainable peace will be achieved in patriarchal societies when research helps us understand how women are handling power imbalances, property ownership, distribution of resources and discrimination against them both in private and public spheres. When the BVN and the world listen to women on how issues like family laws, land laws, property laws and/or general discrimination can affect them; then the BVN in particular, and the world in general, might stand a better chance of attaining sustainable peace.

Some scholars interested in gender and peacebuilding work have, since 2007, pointed out that while there are valuable reports, handbooks and toolkits on women’s good practices in peacebuilding, they present little scholarly analysis. There is, as a result, a lack of a conceptual framework to understand women’s peacebuilding work in conflict resolution studies (Porter, 2007 and Anderlini, 2007). These scholars have also argued that there are inadequate strategies to ensure the implementation of the international consensus, e.g., UNSCR 1325, which urges member states to take measures that support women’s peace initiatives and implement equal participation of women in the prevention, management and resolution of conflict (Anderlini, 2007 and Porter, 2007). While women’s peacebuilding work is largely under-researched, it is noticeable that as conflicts increase in numbers so does their peacebuilding work which leads Anderlini (2007, p. 231) to write that “women’s peace activism is not limited to any region, class, race, or religion. It is a global phenomenon that is growing every year and with every conflict”. This is true of Nigeria because of the rate at which conflicts arise in the BVN. It is also important to note that what happens in Nigeria has huge implications for the whole of the African continent as one in four Africans is a Nigerian. Therefore, there is a need for more research on how women perform peacebuilding work in the BVN. It helps to present women as subjects and not objects in a society like BVN where women are rarely taken seriously in the formal sphere. According to Dzurgba (2007), Okpeh (2007), Apenda (2007) and others (see 3.1.6), men in the patriarchal BVN refuse to sit down
with women and discuss peace; they argue that women lack experiential knowledge and rationality in handling peace processes.

Against this background, I use a multidisciplinary approach to investigate and provide scholarly analysis of four grassroots groups of women’s peacebuilding in the multi-communal BVN (Photo 1). I use the human needs theory—a political theory which belongs to conflict resolution studies, cultures which belong to sociology, and gender socialisation theories from gender studies in analysing the women’s initiatives. I argue that gender socialisation enables the women to approach conflict analysis and perform peacebuilding work in ways which in effect draw on the HNT. Moreover, I argue that initiatives like the UNSCR 1325, which advocate women’s inclusion in formal peacebuilding processes, struggle against a post-colonial patriarchal gender socialisation that polarises\(^1\) gender and teaches androcentric\(^2\) gender schemas to men and women. Thus, the same socialisation that enables these women to acquire skills to perform peacebuilding work informally disables them from formally peacebuilding, hence men’s accusation of women’s lack of experiential knowledge and rationality are socialised male prejudices. Additionally, I contend that the inclusion of these women in formal peacebuilding processes will make an impact on sustainable peace in the BVN.

Therefore, using the human needs theory (HNT) and some gender socialisation theories as my research theoretical framework, I seek answers to three research questions. HNT, which is the fulfillment of frustrated human needs as a means of conflict resolution, requires knowledge of the needs which are frustrated in the first place. As such, my first research question determines what the women understand as the causes of the four conflicts under consideration in the BVN. My second research question is about the kind of skills, vision and initiatives the women use in their peacebuilding work. Finally, I ask a third research question concerning the women’s perception of the post-colonial patriarchal gender order in BVN:

\^1 That is, the belief that what is acceptable or appropriate for females is not acceptable or appropriate for males (and vice versa) and that anyone who deviates from these standards of appropriate femaleness and maleness is unnatural or immoral (Wharton, 2012, p. 41-42).

\^2 That is, the belief that maleness and masculinity are superior to femaleness and femininity, and that male and masculinity are standard or the norm (Bem, 1993).
1. What do the women understand as the causes of the four conflicts in the BVN?

2. What kind of skills, vision and initiatives do the women's groups use in their peacebuilding work?

3. What is the women's perception of the post-colonial patriarchal social, economic and political gender order in the BVN?

I hypothesise that:

These groups of women in the Benue Valley, Nigeria (BVN) articulate and recognise that the frustration of the FHNs of subsistence, protection, cultural and political participation is at the root of violent conflicts in their communities. Gender socialisation in the region provides the women with skills to find synergic satisfiers for the satisfaction of the frustrated FHNs in their peacebuilding initiatives. However, their initiatives remain informal because the post-colonial patriarchal social, economic and political gender order discriminates against women in the BVN.

To elaborate this research work, I divide this thesis into seven chapters. The rest of this chapter explains my research methodology. Chapter 2—Research Theoretical Framework I reviews literature on fundamental human needs concerning how to rigorously analyse conflict and perform strategic peacebuilding work in situations of protracted social conflicts (PSCs). Chapter 3—Research Theoretical Framework II reviews literature that examines gender in peacebuilding work and conflict resolution. Chapter 4—Research Background presents the background of four PSCs and four women's peacebuilding groups in the BVN. Chapter 5—Research Findings narrates collected stories of the women peacebuilding in the BVN. Chapter 6—Research Analysis analyses the women's stories presented in Chapter 5 in terms of my three research questions and the theoretical framework. Finally, Chapter 7—Research Conclusions presents my research's findings, implications and further research recommendation. I conclude that one of the primary causes of PSC in the BVN is people's determination to meet their unmet needs of subsistence, protection, political and cultural participation at the individual and group levels; peacebuilding in the BVN requires the use of synergic satisfiers and the avoidance of destructive, pseudo and inhibiting satisfiers. The patriarchal gender socialisation of women in the BVN provides some women with an understanding that the frustration of human needs causes social conflict and, provides the women with skills for finding synergic satisfiers as peacebuilding tools to satisfy frustrated human needs in the BVN.
1.2 Methodology

This methodology section discusses my research approach, methods, ethical principles, data collection and data presentation.

1.2.1 Research approach

In this subsection, I discuss why I collect primary data asking for stories as a method of interviewing and how I chose relevant sites for data collection. I use a qualitative research approach one that emphases words rather than quantification in the collection and analysis of data (Bryman, 2012, p. 380). I rely on the women’s stories for the validity of my research based on the reasons below.

Stories: I collect stories as primary data to gain knowledge and analysis of the women’s peacebuilding initiative experiences in the cultural context of the BVN. I collect stories because, in the BVN, women’s domestic managerial, productive and reproductive roles (Moser, 1989) position them as the custodians of folklore (received knowledge) with respect to maintaining peace in the informal sphere. In their roles, women conduct peaceful rituals in the informal sphere to restore/maintain peace, fertility and the well-being of their communities. Therefore, the women transfer their wisdom and knowledge from one generation to the next through storytelling. As Ayangaor (2011, p. 121) affirms, a woman “in performance of her motherly role as a storyteller, she tells those stories that are cultural-bound-text transferred successfully into the attentive ears of her children”. Additionally, it is my experience from the BVN that asking a direct question may only get one a yes or no answer or a very short answer because it is perceived as “police interrogation”, but asking for a story about an event puts the respondent at ease as they do not feel they are being interrogated. Therefore, I interviewed the women asking them to tell their stories concerning their initiatives in peacebuilding and conflict resolution, an approach that helped me gain primary data for my research presented in Chapter 5.

Selection of relevant sites: Bryman (2008, p. 415) suggests that one selects sites, organisations and people because of their relevance to the understanding of social phenomenon. I chose the BVN because it has on-going PSCs and is a multi-communal area—with more than 100 ethnic groups—as I am studying women’s peacebuilding initiatives in situations of PSC in multi-communal societies. The region also contains women working in peacebuilding and conflict resolution to answer my research questions and test my hypothesis. Thus, I chose site case studies based on the following criteria:
1. There are women peacebuilding at grassroots level in the site; and

2. The site has the most common conflicts—traditional title, democratic political leadership and land PSCs—in the BVN.

I investigate conflict cases from Taraba and Benue states in the BVN (Map 1). I investigate no conflicts from Adamawa, Nasarawa and Plateau states (Map 1) because of safety, time and budget constraints; I lack funds to pay for bodyguards, and spend a long time in the field. Nonetheless, the states I study have on-going PSCs of the same nature (land, traditional title and democratic political leadership conflicts) as Taraba, Nasarawa, and Plateau states. My work, therefore, allows for inference as it is applicable to the entire Benue Valley region.

Furthermore, I adopt a case study strategy as I attempt to confirm or otherwise whether (a) the women understand that the frustration of human needs contributes significantly to violent conflicts in the BVN; and (b) whether they use synergic satisfiers\(^3\) in their peacebuilding activities for the satisfaction of the unmet human needs in the region. According to Robert Yin (1981; 1984, cited in Robson, 2002, p. 178), a “case study is a strategy for doing research which involves an empirical investigation of a particular contemporary phenomenon within its real life context using multiple sources of evidence”. Robson (2002, p. 179) explains:

- A strategy stands for a stance or an approach, rather than a method, such as observation or interview;
- Research is taken in a broad sense that includes, for example, evaluation;
- Empirical is relying on the collection of evidence about what is going on;
- Particular refers to a study of that specific case;
- Phenomenon in context is typically situations where the boundary between the phenomenon and its context is not clear; and
- Undertaken multiple methods of evidence or data collection.

Concerning a stance, I hypothesised, based on my theoretical framework, that the frustration of human needs forms the underlying cause of the four PSCs in the BVN, and also, that the women I investigate, articulate and recognise the frustration of human needs as at the root of violent conflicts and attend to the unmet needs in their communities with synergic satisfiers. Relating to research, I analyse these women’s work in the BVN using the HNT and gender socialisation theoretical perspectives. As for the empirical nature of this research, I collected data from four cases in the BVN. As regards multiple methods, I adopted individual and focus

\(^3\) Liberating means to satisfy a given need, but also stimulate and contribute to the simultaneous satisfaction of other needs (Max-Neef, 1992).
groups sessions for collecting the women’s stories about their activities, I was a participant observer and I took photographs to gain particular data from my informants from which I have formed a case narrative which is presented in Chapter 5. In this way, I justify my use of case studies in the study of some women’s peacebuilding initiatives—my studied phenomenon—in the BVN.

1.2.2 Research methods

In this subsection, I illustrate on why I adopted semi-structured, but specific questions, individual and focus group sessions for storytelling interviews, as well as photography, research methods and why I conducted a pilot study in my research. Research requires robust corroborative methods for validity and reliability. I use the principle of triangulation: multiple methods to ensure validity and reliability. According to Johnson and Christensen (2008, p. 451) and Bryman (2008, p. 379), triangulation can substantially increase the credibility or trustworthiness of research findings; and Sarantakos (2005, p. 145) suggests that research can achieve triangulation in five different ways:

1. Investigator triangulation: using multiple rather than single observations of the subject;
2. Methodological triangulation: using different methods to look at the same subject;
3. Sampling triangulation: collecting data in different locations and from a range of persons;
4. Time triangulation: using different times for the research e.g. longitudinal trend studies; and
5. Paradigm triangulation: using a number of paradigms to study the phenomenon.

I used methodological, sampling and paradigm triangulations. I achieved methodological triangulation by using four different methods for data collection, (1) semi-structured questions for individual and focus groups storytelling interviews; (2) photography; (3) participatory observation and (4) critical review of secondary data. To satisfy sampling triangulation, I investigated women from different social backgrounds and different locations in the BVN: Takum Local Government Area (LGA) from Taraba State; Kwande LGA; Awajir and Konshisha LGAs and Apa LGA in Benue State. I did not use investigator and time triangulations due to lack of funds, but also because my research is not a longitudinal study. However, I achieved paradigm triangulation by asking two convergent questions regarding two variables to check

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4 Triangulation is the term given when a researcher seeks convergence and corroboration of results from different methods studying the same phenomenon (Johnson and Christensen, 2008, p. 451).
consistency in participants' responses. On the causes of violent conflicts, I asked for the causes and the barriers to conflicts in the BVN. On the characteristics of satisfiers, I asked for the best things about peace and the worst things about violent conflict in a community. The combinations of these methods provide evidence to this research's validity and reliability. I conducted semi-structured questions for storytelling interviews as explained in the next subsection.

Semi-structured questions: I could have adopted unstructured or semi-structured questions for interviews. However, I choose semi-structured questions for my storytelling interviews because the field study was done when I had a clear focus on the issues for my study. As Bryman (2008, p. 439) explains, a research that begins with a clear focus and wants to address specific issues will more likely use semi-structured questions for interviewing. I did this research fieldwork after I had developed the theoretical framework and had copious contact with the women and their associate NGOs. Before going into the field, I reviewed the NGOs' websites, had telephone conversations with them and consulted documents sent to me. I therefore, had a clear focus at the time of my fieldwork. Furthermore, I adopted multiple case studies, so I preferred semi-structured questions to unstructured questions because I wanted a strong structure for analysing data across all of them. Bryman (2008, p. 440) suggests that research requires some structure in order to compare data across multiple case studies. This style afforded me the ability to analyse the content of the stories I collected from all the case studies based on specific questions. Moreover, with unstructured questions for interviews, I would have needed more time to gather relevant data in the field, but I had only three months to complete the fieldwork. I, therefore, preferred semi-structured questions to unstructured questions for sessions asking the women to relate their stories both individually and in focus groups (Appendix A). I used specific questions rather than general questions as I illustrate in the next subsection.

Specific questions for sessions: According to Fetterman (2010, p. 44), "specific questions probe further into an established category of meaning or activity", thus, I examine the women's activities by asking for their stories. The stories enable an analysis of what the women consider to be the causes of violent conflict in their communities and what they use in their peacebuilding activities in the BVN. Appendix A lists the specific questions I used in fieldwork. However, specific questions have the disadvantage of restricting participants from expressing their views freely. To counter this draw back, I guaranteed the women's free expression by the use of open-ended specific questions. As Fetterman (2010, p. 46) indicates, open-ended questions allow participants to interpret the questions in their own way. The use
of open-ended specific questions also avoided ‘yes’ and ‘no’ answers that can accompany close-ended questions, the alternative to open-ended questions. Close-ended questions can also restrict the way in which informants answer questions. I conducted my storytelling interviews in the manner presented below.

**Individual storytelling interviews:** At the beginning of each session, I read the objectives of this research as given in Appendix C to informants. I promised confidentiality, but without anonymity. I collected public and non-private data, including photography, as I did not necessarily need the research to be anonymous. I took group pictures of women so, as a result, my research cannot be anonymous. The women studied also wanted their pictures taken so as to be identified with their peacebuilding and conflict resolution activities. Nonetheless, a practical issue arose regarding the conduct of individual storytelling sessions: how long a session should last to allow relevant stories to be told in a non-stressful manner. After five pilot sessions, I discovered that after a one hour session very little new data could be collected, an indication that asking the women more questions after this amount of time might be stressful to them. I decided that one hour was the maximum period for any individual session, although the individual sessions conducted lasted between 45-55 minutes. In the field, after each session, I thanked informants, reviewed the session, and transcribed it before moving on to the next session. I could only use this approach for fifteen sessions as I later conducted multiple sessions on the same date because of time constraints. I, therefore, transcribed the last sessions at the end of the fieldwork. Appendix C presents this research’s complete format for individual and practical check lists before every session.

**Focus groups:** Using only individual interviews would have left me with an inherent problem in gathering more realistic data as some informants sometimes contradict what they have said earlier, but I could not challenge informants about this. In the same manner, I would not have known when an informant was only expressing the acceptable view of the group under study. To guard against these drawbacks, I used focus groups sessions to explore women’s stories on their peacebuilding initiatives in the BVN in-depth. Bryman (2008, p. 475) supports the usefulness of focus groups in this way as a researcher stands a better chance of collecting more realistic accounts of what people think because they are forced by their peers to think about, and possibly revise, their views. I found that at focus groups sessions, participants debated issues and challenged one another. Additionally, I encountered dominant personalities at focus group sessions. Three different times, some women took over the discussions and dominated the sessions despite a plea to give a chance/space for everybody to talk and the explanation that everybody’s opinion counted equally at the beginning of each
session as a ground rule for conducting a focus group session. In situations of violation of these ground rules, I re-read the guidelines again. The focus groups lasted between 40 – 55 minutes with a minimum of four to a maximum of eight participants per session in the seven focus group sessions conducted. Details of how I organised focus groups sessions are in Appendix B. While I primarily relied on the women’s stories about their activities, I also took pictures that complement the women’s stories and I was a participant observer.

Participant observation: I took on the role of participant observer because it helped me to gain better understanding and awareness of the women’s activities than listening and collecting their stories. The role of observer-as-participant according to David and Sutton (2011, p. 158) means that “the researcher spends time and may even live with a group, but is never really a full-time participant, though they may get involved in certain rituals and events”. Similarly, during the fieldwork, some of the women’s groups asked me to facilitate their group meetings, cover events as photographer and go out to accompany them in their activities. For example, when the community of Omelemu did not turn up for their inter-community peace meeting in Ataganyi at 4 pm in Apa LGA, Benue State, the leaders of the community of Ataganyi asked me to go and convince them to come. I went with some women and it took four hours of dialogue with the people of Omelemu to convince them to attend the meeting. The meeting could not be held that same day because it had grown too late, but the meeting was held the following morning at 10 am.

Furthermore, Robson (2002, p. 317) stresses that the participant observer be known to informants rather than operating covertly, which “means that as well as observing through participating in activities, the observer can ask members to explain various aspects of what is going on”. In light of this knowledge, I ensured that during the fieldwork my gatekeepers presented me to the women and local officials before getting involved in any of the women’s activities. I had four gatekeepers: the director of Women Environmental Programme (WEP), the woman in charge of women’s activities with the Justice Development and Peace Commission (JDPC), the presidents of Agape Sisters and the Catholic Women’s Organisation (CWO), and four key informants, one in each location of this research’s case studies. Consequently, after the presentation, I would ask some women to explain their activities and also visit some of the conflict sites to see destroyed property, such as burnt houses. In the community of Omelemu, I went to see the soup tree at the root of conflict there. It took three hours to travel there and back. During this time, those escorting me narrated the history of the conflict. This informs the kind of relationship I developed even before this research’s pilot sessions.
Pilot sessions: I questioned whether taking my research questions directly to the sampled informants would offend some. I also needed to gain experience with posing the questions in some sessions in the BVN, so I conducted a pilot study. I conducted four individual pilot sessions with two NGO personnel and two women performing peacebuilding activities. I conducted just one focus group session for the pilot study. I discovered that the questions did not offend the women's sensitivities. However, the pilot study gave me the opportunity to finalise my research questions. I reduced the individual questions from twelve to eight, the focus group questions from six to four and the questions for NGO personnel from eight to four. (See Appendix A for these research questions). Moreover, I did not know how long it would take to transcribe a session in the BVN environment so the pilot sessions gave me advanced practice in transcription. For an hour session, it took six to eight hours transcription for a session conducted in English and eight to ten hours' for a session conducted in a local language. It took two weeks to set up and complete the pilot study. Once I completed the pilot study and gained good knowledge of the fieldwork terrain, I began the collection of the research data.

1.2.3 Research data collection

I collected primary and secondary data in this research. This section explains how I decided on a research sample, gained access to the sample and my field schedule. I used purposive sampling as explained below.

Purposive sampling: I had a low budget for the conduct of this research because it was unfunded and I could only fund three month's fieldwork. Therefore, I struck a balance between time and cost in deciding on my sample method. I adopted purposive sampling because, according to Bryman (2008, p. 415), purposive sample aims at sampling cases and participants in a strategic way that only samples people relevant to research questions being posed. Purposive sampling also creates variety in the resulting sample so that the sample members differ from each other in terms of key characteristics which help research validity and reliability. Using this approach, I selected participating women on the basis of the variables defined below:

- Women in peacebuilding, to be sure that only women performing peacebuilding work participated;
- Small size, to enable in-depth data for the length of the study—three months; and
- Variety of women: participants from different social groups to acquire different views.
Furthermore, I used the theoretical saturation sampling method because this approach entails sampling informants until a researcher achieves theoretical saturation; selecting further informants on the basis of emerging theoretical focus (Bryman, 2008, p. 459). My research sample frame was 80 women.

I began conducting interviews with those women most knowledgeable, e.g. coordinators of groups of women peacebuilders, so as to make the connection between the activities undertaken and their relevance to my research questions. I had interview sessions with informants until I reached a theoretical saturation point: until no new or relevant data seemed to be emerging regarding any category of my research (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p. 212 cited in Bryman, 2008, p. 416). I reached saturation point at 60 out of the 80 participants. I conducted 25 individual sessions and seven focus groups with 40 women participants; I also had sessions with five women from the 40 focus group participants. For a breakdown of participants in this research, see Appendix D Tables One to Five. The appendix also gives participant’s demographic information. The individual interviews lasted between 40 to 55 minutes. I explain how I gained access to my sample frame in the next subsection.

**Gaining access:** I wondered whether my gatekeepers, as those who would make it easy for me to gain access to informants would ask what they stood to gain or lose from participating in my research. I wondered whether or not to bargain with gatekeepers. Indeed, some difficulties arose during the fieldwork that required me to bargain with one of my gatekeepers. Despite getting permission from the directors of the NGOs involved: Women Environmental Programme (WEP), the Justice Development and Peace Commission (JDPC) of the Diocese of Makurdi, Agape Sisters and the Catholic Women’s Organisation (CWO), access to participants did not prove easy. Additionally, I received permission from four Bishops within the fieldwork area: two bishops from the Diocese of Makurdi, the Bishop of the Diocese of Otukpo and the Bishop of Wukari. The Chiefs of Apa Local Government Area (LGA), Adikpo in Kwande LGA, Benue State and Takum LGA, Taraba State also gave permission for this research to be conducted. Their permission gave me freedom of movement, but it did not make interviewing the women involved in peacebuilding any easier.

Some participants wanted some benefit for participating in this research. They did not explicitly say it, but it manifested in non-attendance to scheduled sessions after two weeks. The women gave excuse after excuse, for not coming, one woman said “Oh! I had to go to farm that was why I did not turn up”; another, “My child was sick and I had to take him to the clinic”. Yet another said on the phone, “Oh! I have too much work today I cannot make it”, and one more, “I could not get transport to come you know”. This situation frustrated me. After
talking with my gatekeepers, I realised that some women expected something for participating in this research, but nothing had been given or promised to them. The problem arose because these women receive free food, transport and accommodation whenever they participate in any NGO programmes. So my relationship with NGOs meant they were expecting the same treatment for participating in my research. However, I had no funds for any elaborate payment to participants.

To resolve this problem, I took the recommendation of Bryman (2008, p. 409) that in circumstances like this, to play up credentials, and use past-work experience in finding a role within the research community, or a role in the organisation in order to gain access to informants. As I had some experience of working in peacebuilding, I used it to resolve the situation. I expressed my difficulty in getting women for conducting sessions to the director of Women Environmental Programme (WEP). I got a job to evaluate the end of a project review for WEP and WEP-facilitated meetings with some women associates of its organisation. In four meetings for WEP's end of project evaluation, I also conducted individual and focus groups interviews for this research. This happened in the communities of Ataganyi and Omelemu in Apa LGA, Adikpo in Kwande LGA, all in Benue State, and Takum in Taraba State.

Similarly, other key informants interested in this research helped me to gain access to the women informants in the other LGAs. As Bryman (2008, p. 409) suggests, key informants can often develop an appreciation of a research project and direct the researcher to situations, events or people likely to be helpful to the progress of the investigation. Key informants from Awajir in Konshisha LGA, Aliade in Gwer East LGA and Adikpo in Kwande LGA enabled me to carry out my work successfully. I resisted observing things through the eyes of the gatekeepers by conducting research sessions in the absence of the gatekeepers and their agents or key informants. In this way I avoided undue reliance on them for the data collected.

**Field schedule, June 1 to September 1, 2011:** Going into the field requires careful planning. From December 2009 to May 2011, I established contact with two NGOs: the Women Environmental Programme (WEP) and the Justice Development and Peace Commission (JDPC) to gain knowledge about their activities and the women's groups associating with them. I had telephone conversations, email exchanges and read website reviews. In the end, I conducted fieldwork from June 1 to September 1, 2011. The contact with the two NGOs from 2009 to 2011 provided me with information on the women peacebuilding activities in Adamawa, Taraba and Benue states. JDPC had 20 women associates between Konshisha and Gwer East LGAs among other women from other places, but the Konshisha and Gwer East women were sampled as they were directly involved in peacebuilding relevant to this research in the
Konshisha and Gwer LGA land conflict case study. Two women from the Catholic Women’s Organisation (CWO) in Adikpo Kwande LGA working in peacebuilding also formed the sample. I discovered a new group in the field, the Agape Sisters from Adikpo Kwande LGA—they numbered about 20. I added the 20 women to the 40 women associated with WEP from Ado and Apa LGAs in Benue State, and from Takum Taraba State to complete my research sample frame. On the whole, I had a sample frame of 80 women.

In the month of June, I conducted some individual and focus groups sessions in Makurdi LGA and Awajir, Konshisha LGA. In the month of July, I conducted some of this research fieldwork in Apa LGA, Benue State and Takum, Taraba State, and in August, I carried out the rest of the research work in Kwande LGA, Adikpo and Aliade, Gwer East areas of Benue State. I arranged for individual and focus groups interviews by phone then took two to three visits to every community to get to know the women before conducting interviews with individuals or groups. Additionally, my gatekeepers and key informants helped in organising and inviting me to gain access to women’s peacebuilding activities. I attended WEP’s capacity building workshop on peacebuilding networks in Makurdi for three days, two meetings of the Agape Sisters and also went out with the women on an occasion to re-enact their campaign against violence in Adikpo. In addition, I assisted at the inaugural session of the Peace Advocacy Network in the Middle Belt (PAN Middle Belt) for three days at Abuja the Federal Capital of Nigeria. These activities and others helped me to be a participant observer at some women’s peacebuilding activities in the BVN.

In addition to gathering primary data, I also gathered secondary data. I found some material on conflict in the Benue Valley at the Benue State University (BSU) in Makurdi. The director of the Department of Gender Studies at BSU organised some secondary data for me. The whole process of data gathering involves human interactions and good human relationships built on ethical principles as described below.

1.2.4 Research ethics

Good human interaction in research hinges on how a researcher treats its participants and avoids activities harmful to them. Bryman (2008, p. 118) gives four essential ethical principles that a researcher needs to consider while performing research: whether there is harm to participants, lack of informed consent, invasion of privacy and deception. As such, in this section, I present what I did to avoid harm to my research participants.

I completed an ethic clearance that asked me questions as to whether research like mine had been refused ethical approval by a review committee of the College or other higher-education
institute; if my research participants were a vulnerable group; if I was asking sensitive or potentially disturbing questions; and if my research involved material that was not of a public nature. I answered "no" to the questions, therefore "ethics release" was indicated and there was no need to pursue ethical scrutiny further. I then presented my research methodology chapter to my supervisors which included ethical research principles and my research consent form. My research methodology was discussed with my two supervisors; one of the points discussed was security in the areas that I was going to research. I assured my supervisors that as an insider to the area of my research I knew it very well, but I was not going to the areas that had current fighting on the ground in the BVN—Plateau, Adamawa and Nassarawa states. I was only going to Benue and Adamawa states that were safe at the time of my research field work in 2011. After the meeting with my two supervisors, I met with the ethic committee chairperson separately although she was one of my research supervisors and she agreed that it was alright for me to proceed with my field research. The result of the ethical vetting led me to conduct my research in the following ways:

1. I did not undertake a religious case study because this could have put the women in harm’s way—they could be accused of religious blasphemy (see Introduction—the complexity of religion in Nigeria).

2. I treated my research participants as autonomous agents, but also as those with some diminished autonomy since the BVN is an extremely patriarchal society where men are considered more important than women. Therefore, I visited traditional leaders and heads of households and received permission from them to interview the women who were my research participants. I slept in the houses of my research participants with the permission of their husbands or ate with some of the household male heads to discuss my research and assure them that my research was not undermining their families. To my research participants, I communicated the following directly with them:

3. **What are the benefits to you?** Your participation will be helping the understanding of what is the basis of women’s peacebuilding work and you will be helping the understanding of the causes of violence in your community such that it might help in the resolution of conflict in your community. I shall write a report of the research testimonies used in my thesis as feedback to your group. In addition, I shall invite you to ask any questions regarding how I used the testimonies.
4. **What are the risks?** I do not anticipate adverse effects during the interview, but interviewing you for more than an hour might be stressful, therefore, I shall be limiting my interview with you for just one hour. In the focus group, there is the risk that some participant may dominate the group discussion and this might be stressful to other members for the group, for this reason, we shall set ground rules before conducting a focus group. If someone dominates the group, I shall re-read the ground rules to remind the group of the house rules. If any concerns are expressed, you will have the opportunity to discuss your options with me.

5. **Will your information be confidential?** I shall conduct the interview or focus group in private so that what you say or the group says may remain with me and yourself or the group. Your identity and data will remain confidential. Your name will not be published and will not be disclosed to anyone outside of my two supervisors or persons delegated by Trinity College Dublin to do so.

6. **What if you change your mind?** If you volunteer to participate in this study, you may stop at any time. If you decide not to participate, or if you stop, you will not be penalised and will not give up any benefits which you had before entering the study.

7. **Permission:** My study has received the Irish School of Ecumenics, Trinity College Dublin Ethics committee approval.

Given the measures I took, my research minimised harm to its participants; since I finished my field work in 2011, I have kept in contact with my key informants, some research participants and some traditional leaders from the BVN. I have not received any complaints about my research work, but I have received well wishes and the hope that I shall be visiting them soon when I am back in the BVN. I shall now explain in brief the theoretical basis of my ethical methodology.

**Harm to participants:** The social science world does not accept research harmful to participants whether physical harm, loss of self-esteem, stress or “inducing subjects to perform reprehensible acts” (Bryman, 2008, p. 118). Most of these harms relate to sensitive research topics, private and or dangerous issues. However, this research deals with public peacebuilding activities carried out by women happy to be identified with their work. Nonetheless, I knew that some women could find the focus group sessions stressful because the method permits participants to challenge each other. I did not observe this harm occur overtly during the course of the fieldwork, but it may have occurred in some covert form. To guard against the other harms, I promised confidentiality to participants so that none of them
would be identified directly by any material used. As Lune, Pumar and Koppel (2010, p. 141) suggest, "if we promise confidentiality (i.e. we know who the subject is but we will never tell) we must keep our word". Thus, I refer to participants as informant 001 to 025 or focus group 01 to 07. In this way no individual participant can be identified with any particular statement in the findings. I did not promise anonymity because my research does not involve private/dangerous issues and also because I use photography as one of my research methods. Furthermore, the women I studied were aware that their photographs would be taken for the purpose of understanding and representing their peacebuilding activities. I obtained the consent of these women at all levels to conduct research as explained next.

**Informed consent:** I took informed consent seriously. Prospective research participants received as much information as possible so as to make an informed decision about whether or not to participate in this research (Bryman, 2008, p. 121). I explained the aims and objectives of my research to participants (Appendix C) before every session conducted. I explained the voluntary nature of their participation to informants and that they could withdraw from a session at any time and could still withdraw their data within two weeks after the conducted session and that only I and two supervisors or persons delegated by Trinity College, Dublin could examine the content of the research sessions. However, no one signed informed consent forms. Advice from my gatekeepers and key informants was that it would scare some women away from participating in my research. I checked this with the head of the Sociology Department at Benue State University (BSU) who confirmed that the local culture deals with a "gentleperson's agreement"—verbal word and not formal agreements in this context.

**Invasion of privacy:** The ethical principle of privacy concerns asking questions about activities which might be considered private in nature, such as income, religious beliefs and sexual activities. Religion is a sensitive issue in the Nigerian context; therefore, I avoided questions concerning religion and I asked no questions about income and sexual activities. I only investigated public activities. Nonetheless, I maintain confidentiality in this research. Transcribed text uses codes to identify participants and only group photographs are used. I

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5 I said that my research participants could withdraw their data within two weeks of their interview in my research consent form, but this did not exclude their data withdrawal after two weeks. Two weeks was the anticipated time I was around in any given community whereby research participants had easy access to me for data withdrawal. Indeed, participants were (and are) free to withdraw their data anytime from my research.
sought permission for every photograph taken during fieldwork. Research participants themselves at times asked for their photographs to be taken e.g. in the communities of Ataganyi and Omelemu Apa LGA, the Agape Sisters and the Catholic Women’s Organisation at Adikpo in Kwande LGA. The women participants want the world to identify them with their peacebuilding activities.

**Deception:** Researchers deceive participants when they represent their work as something other than what it is (Bryman, 2008, p. 124). I did not deceive the women as I always explained the aims and objectives of my research to informants (see Appendix C). Moreover, I promised the groups of women they could study a copy of this thesis if any of them want one. In this manner, I adopted best practice to increase the trustworthiness of this research.

**Trustworthiness:** This hinges on research quality—its validity, reliability and authenticity. Validity in the natural sciences deals with accurately measuring research data, but in qualitative research the term refers to whether the researcher observes, and identifies what s/he studies (Lune, Pumar and Koppel, 2010, p. 78; Mason, 1996, p. 24). To ensure validity, I used semi-structured questions for data gathering sessions. These questions specifically address the causes of violent conflicts and the type of women’s peacebuilding initiatives in the BVN. However, valid research also has to be reliable – consistent and repeatable. As Lune, Pumar and Koppel (2010, p. 78) argue, reliability relates closely to consistency and repeatability, it asks whether the data one collects mean the same thing each time across the different times and places. For this reason, I used semi-structured questions to ensure that the same questions are asked each time to gather data across case studies. These semi-structured questions also lend to the possibility of research being conducted in another area with conflicts in similar contexts to the BVN. Moreover, trustworthiness relates closely to authenticity.

**Authenticity:** Do I fairly represent different viewpoints among women in peacebuilding in the BVN? Or do I only represent a particular social group? I achieved authenticity by conducting storytelling interviews with women of diverse social groups. The women in the study range from the age of 25 to 54 years. Of the 25 women who individually told their stories, two hold university lectureships, five are secondary teachers, ten worked with local government councils, and eight are farmers and two are unemployed. I conducted storytelling interviews with a PhD holder, a PhD student/lecturer, three with master’s degrees, six with university degrees, and eight with tertiary non-university degrees, three primary school certificate holders and three with no formal education. Therefore, this research’s viewpoint encompassed women of different social backgrounds in the BVN.
Reflexivity: According to Bryman (2012, p. 393-394), reflexivity entails a sensitivity to the researcher's cultural, political, and social context; in particular how one accounts for the power relationship with those whom one studies. Therefore, I considered the morality of going into the field collecting data from some women and exiting the field feeling satisfied that knowledge gained will benefit humanity in terms of theory and how I, a Roman Catholic priest, considered a privileged person in the cultural context of the research, was going to use my position to the benefit of my informant. In addition, in the field, some women demanded benefits from my research. I judged the demand reasonable because I too benefit from it. I claim authorship of this work. Moreover, I became aware of how these women's groups struggle for their voices to be heard among men, their state governments and traditional authorities; the women wanted support in this respect. I responded in the following ways:

Gave women equal participation at meetings with men: I evaluated Women Environmental Programme's (WEP) end of project 2011 at which I ensured equal representation of women and men. 20 women and 20 men (Photo 2) participated in Apa LGA – the community of Ataganyi produced ten men and ten women, the Omelemu group also produced ten men and ten women. In Takum Taraba State, eleven women and ten men were included (Photo 3) and in Kwande LGA Adikpo Benue State, eleven women and five men (Photo 4) participated in the evaluation exercises.
Photo 2: Twenty women and 20 men at WEP end of project evaluation 2011 at Ataganyi, Benue State

Photo 3: Eleven women and 10 men at WEP end of project evaluation 2011 at Takum, Taraba State

Photo 4: Eleven women and 5 men at the WEP end of project evaluation 2011 at Adikpo, Benue State
I considered that women and men needed equal input on how the project went and how the project could be improved in the future. Equal participation of women meant that I spent three days instead of two in Ataganyi community, and postponed the final evaluation session in Takum from 10 am to 4 pm when the women could arrive.

Moreover, I enabled some women to address chiefs in a public gathering: At the request of the women in Takum, I went with them to meet the five chiefs of Tiv, Jukun, Keteb, Chamba, and Hausa ethnic groups in Takum. The women wanted me to formally present them to their chiefs as members of the Peace Advocacy Network in the Middle Belt so that their chiefs would cooperate with them in terms of managing conflicts. At this meeting one of the five women present addressed the chiefs asking for women to be present on the council of chiefs so that they too could participate in conflict management in their area. The chief who spoke on behalf of the others said that he believed, with time, women would be made part of the traditional council, but for the time being it appeared impossible. He did not elaborate further on this. Nonetheless, this male attitude leads us to other gender issues I encountered in the field.

Gender issues: I took into consideration whether I impinged on socio-cultural values of the BVN by studying only women. However, men in the BVN seemed unconcerned that I conducted storytelling interviews with only women. This surprised me and I enquired of the women why men seemed unconcerned. The women's response was “This is what men want: women separately and men separately, that is how it works here”. Though on two occasions men wanted to be part of focus groups, what they really wanted were benefits, if any, for participating in this research. Once they understood there were no monetary benefits, they happily went away. On the other hand, I paid the women transport and telephone airtime during the fieldwork of this research. The interviews and focus groups took place in primary school classrooms and parish halls to allow the women to remain undisturbed by others; so, women travelled from their homes to these places. This meant they needed bus/motorbike fees, about three euro per session per woman. In addition, I communicated with informants by mobile phones so they also needed airtime fees. It must be understood that in Nigeria, you pay to receive a call. Hence, I found it necessary to pay four euro per woman per session for telephone airtime. This seemed necessary because I felt it would be unjust to expect the women to bear transport and telephone costs while participating in this research. This helped to build vital human relationships amidst the informants' varied reactions to this research.

26
Reaction to this research: As a man and a Roman Catholic priest from Benue State, how did the women studied perceive me and this research? Some women wanted to know if this research would improve their wellbeing or their peacebuilding work in any way. The women raised these issues in all seven focus groups conducted. One woman said, "We have heard and seen many people come and do research, but nothing has come out of it for us, what is going to be different from your own research?" I explained to the women that I hoped this research will be published and that their activities would become widely known. I informed them that this could promote their work and perhaps the findings of this research might enable a proposal on how to make their peacebuilding activities form part of formal peace processes. That, it is hoped these proposals would be passed on to them. I felt inadequate in providing satisfying answers to the women studied on how this research would add value to their lives. Additionally, some women wanted to know why I, a man, was studying women. I explained how I perceived their work as important for peacebuilding and how government/traditional leaders pay little attention to it. Moreover, the two supervisors for this research, one a man and the other a woman, both consider the research participants' work as important. These answers helped some women to open up and participate actively in this research. However, this does not eliminate the issue of a man studying women and the difficulty for a man to understand these women's world views.

I believe that the best way to study these women would be in an equal relationship; however, the women perceived a power differential between myself and them. To show this power differential was evident the women asked me, as a Roman Catholic priest, to visit their chiefs and persuade them to work for peace in their domains. I met the five chiefs of Tiv, Chamba, Kuteb, Jukun and Hausa in Taraba State in the company of the women. I also held a private meeting with the second class chief of Apa LGA on behalf of the women in the presence of the Ataganyi community traditional head. The women were absent because transport could not be organised for them to attend this meeting. So, how does the issue of a power differential impact on the data collected? This cannot be ascertained, but the methods I used in this research corroborate what the women described regarding what they do and how they do it.

Insider—outsider: I found it a dilemma of how to position myself on the subject of insider/outsider researcher in the field and the implication of how others positioned me. My research communities comprised of five different ethnic identity groups: Tiv, Idoma, Jukun, Chamba, Kuteb and Hausa. I am Tiv—an insider to Tiv communities but an outsider to the other communities, so how was this going to affect my data collection? Hellawell (2006, pp. 484-485) points out that an insider is one who possesses a prior intimate knowledge of the
community and its members and an outsider is one who is not familiar with the setting and people s/he is researching. On the one hand, Burgess (1984, p. 23) argues that “being a stranger ... gives the researcher scope to stand back and abstract material from the research experience”. However, Schutz (1964, p. 34) argues that in some cases the nuances of the relationship known to the insiders, and often going back generations, may forever be withheld from the outsider. Form this stand point, s/he is without a history. Additionally, Hockey (1993, p. 199) points out that an insider may not suffer from cultural shock or disorientation, may be better placed to gauge the honesty and accuracy of responses, and the likelihood that respondents will reveal more intimate details of their live to insiders. Nonetheless, Hellawell (2006, pp. 493) examines the two positions and comes to the conclusion that a good researcher on reflection can realise that there are varieties of insider—outsider to be considered and that the knowledge of the two by a researcher might produce good research.

I was an insider at two levels—as a Tiv from the point of ethnicity and a Roman Catholic priest from the point of religion. Hence, I was an outsider to the Idoma, Jukun, Hausa, Kuteb and Chamba ethnic groups and the Muslims, African Traditional Religion, Protestant and Pentecostal churches. I would argue that my ethnic origin mattered more than my religious status in the collection of data. In the communities that are Tiv, I was able to conduct 23 individual interviews and focus groups with 19 women; this was from three of my four case studies. In these three cases, I was able to interview both Catholics and members of other churches easily in two communities. However, in one community, it seems religion was a factor as women from the Hausa/Muslim origin did not turn up for participation in the focus groups. At the same time, in the community that is completely non-Tiv I could only conduct two individual interviews and six women in one focus group. I got detailed information from the two women but little information from the six women in the focus group. Although there were Catholics in this community I did not use my insider status as a Catholic priest to influence access to participants. I did not want to avoid negotiating access to my research participants (see De Cruz and Jones, 2004), I believed that I would be abusing my power imbalance and would be causing harm to my research participants.
1.2.5 Research data presentation and data analysis

In this subsection, I explain how I presented and analysed my primary and secondary data.

**Primary data:** I present my primary data in Chapter 5 as research findings based on transcribed stories from 60 women informants. A problem arose in transcribing interviews for this research: should I transcribe "word for word" (Bryman, 2008, p. 454), or write up a polished presentation as a transcription that draws one into the reality of the women studied (O'Reilly, 2009, p. 228; Flemming, 2010, p. 158). A dilemma indeed, as Flemming (2010, p. 454) suggests that "one of the most difficult things to do is to represent real experience and real voices into a condensed written account". Furthermore, another difficulty arose because I conducted five individual interviews and four focus groups in the English language. I could transcribe these storytelling sessions word for word, but I conducted 20 individual and three focus groups sessions in a local language (Tiv). How could I transcribe word for word without interpreting the primary data from the Tiv language? I resolved this issue following Silverman's assertion (2010, p. 201) that one ought to be comforted by the fact that there is no "best" way of transcribing interviews, so one can transcribe as is appropriate for a research problem and theoretical framework. The theoretical analysis of this research revolves around what is said rather than how it is said.

**Secondary data:** Lune, Pumar and Koppel (2010, p. 326) warn that a great deal of text that we examine is written for some other purpose. Therefore, we consciously review material relevant and suitable for the subject matter in a study to meet academic standards. For this reason, I reviewed secondary data directly related to conflicts in the BVN. The secondary data constitute most of the examples used in Chapters 2 and 3 which inform the theoretical framework of this research.

**Interpretation of data:** I interpreted the data based on content and thematic analysis of my research findings. That is, I searched for the underlying themes in the story-material relating to this research's three questions (Bryman, 2008, p. 529): on what the women understand as the causes of the four conflicts (traditional title, democratic political leadership, land and economic resource) in the BVN; the kind of skills, vision and initiatives they use in peacebuilding and how they perceive the post-colonial patriarchal social, economic and political gender order with respect to their lives in the BVN. In doing this content and thematic analysis, I lay emphasis on what the women narrated rather than on how they narrated it.
Conclusion

In this chapter, I have introduced my research into women’s peacebuilding initiatives. I explained why women have become involved in peacebuilding work since 1915 when about 1,000 women demanded the end of World War I and why I am interested in their initiatives. I emphasised how patriarchal societies socialise women differently from men such that they experience violence and peace differently and thus some women practice mostly non-violent conflict resolution. I also noted, however, that women’s initiatives are discriminated against in formal peace processes by post-colonial patriarchal societies like the BVN. Additionally, I pointed out that research into women’s peacebuilding work might enlighten men and allow them to appreciate women’s work and agree to work with them in their peacebuilding methods for sustainable peace in the BVN. Therefore, I seek to answer three research questions and a hypothesis based on the human needs theory and some gender socialisation theory perspectives to help me investigate four groups of women (60 women) performing peacebuilding work in the BVN.

In this chapter, I also elaborated my research methodology: I have used a qualitative research approach collecting stories as my primary data. An approach that allowed the women investigated to describe their experiences in their own words to form case narratives. I expounded on why I adopted semi-structured but specific questions for individual and focus group storytelling interviews as well as why I used photography and participatory observation methods in my research. I have also explained my research ethical principles: how I avoided harm, sought informed consent, avoided invasion of privacy, and did not deceive but gained the trust of my research informants. Additionally, as part of my research ethics, I explained how I managed the power differences (reflexivity) between myself and my research informants. Finally, I elaborated on how I presented my primary research data, reviewed my secondary data and analysed my research data. Therefore, this chapter forms the basis of research on women peacebuilding initiatives in the BVN and the methodology I have used in conducting my research. I use the human needs theory (HNT) and gender socialisation theory perspectives to develop a theoretical framework for my thesis in Chapters 2 and 3.
Chapter 2—Research Theoretical Framework I:

Fundamental Human Needs (FHNs), Conflict Analysis, Peacebuilding and Conflict Resolution

Conflicts are not a game to be won or lost, but are often a struggle to survive, for well-being, freedom, and identity—all basic human needs (Galtung, 2004, p. viii).

In this chapter, I use the human needs theory (HNT) elaboration of fundamental human needs (FHNs) in conflict resolution studies to present the first part of my research’s theoretical framework. I argue that some of the protracted social conflicts (PSCs) in the Benue Valley, Nigeria (BVN) manifest because the region is a multi-communal and post-colonial territory that has communal discontent over unmet needs accompanied by poor governance. In this situation, some groups, seeking to meet their unmet needs, have mobilised using violence, but their socio-political leaders in the region have focused on using repressive strategies against their struggle. Therefore, I argue that peacebuilding for conflict resolution in the BVN requires the avoidance of violence and repressive strategies; rather, I find for the adoption of liberating means for the satisfaction of unmet needs. I present this discussion in three sections. Section 1 explains conflict and fundamental human needs (FHNs); section 2 focuses on conflict analysis in situations of protracted social conflict (PSCs) and section 3 analyses peacebuilding for conflict resolution in situations of PSCs.

2.1 Conflict and fundamental human needs (FHNs)

In this section, I define the term traditional leaders, peacebuilding, conflict, FHNs, types of FHNs, satisfiers and goods as used in this research.

Traditional leaders: It is important to clarify what I mean by traditional leaders in this research. In Nigeria, ethnic identity groups refer to their leaders as traditional leaders, but it is problematic from the point of view of scholarship. For example, the Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary defines tradition as “a belief, principle, or way of acting that people in a particular society or group have continued to follow for a long time”. Therefore, a traditional leader is one who is able to influence the behaviour of other members of a group to follow this tradition (Giddens et al, 2007, p. 144). However, it is problematic to argue for a tradition of the BVN as we know today because of historical antecedents. For example, the very notion of leadership and its exercise changed from pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial in the BVN.
Pre-colonial Tiv leadership (1890-1914): Political authority was in the hands of an assembly of elders (*mbatarev*) in a clan or kindred under whose collective authority matters affecting land and Tiv culture were entrusted. The elder’s assembly was checked by age-set organisations (*Kwog*) of young men who were circumcised and initiated into status cultural organisations like *Birmagh* (explained in Chapter 3); they were married and had a farm, as well as attended their age-grade meetings (Hagher, 1990, 188-189). Power/leadership was not in the hands of one person, decisions were arrived at by consensus among elders. While the elders controlled the young men and they depended on the elders for wives, plots of land to farm and their good health; the young men had rights to call the elders to order when it was generally assumed the elders were failing in their duty; such elders were detected and punished by the community (Hagher, 1990, p. 189). This was the custom of the Tiv in terms of leadership culture. However, the ethnic groups of Jukun, Chamba and Idoma from the BVN had kindred/clan heads and a constellation of subordinate officials presiding over their clans and ethnic identity group (Hagher, 2002, p. 14) although there were no paramount leaders; this was introduced in the colonial period.

Colonial period (1914-1960): The British colonial authority introduced a system of warrant chiefs as a political authority in all of the BVN. These colonial chiefs were responsible to the colonial authority and not the people. The colonial authority regarded them as the legislative spokesmen, the custodian of the culture of their people; they collected taxes, maintained law and order, recruited labourers as ordered by colonial authorities from time to time; adjudicated cases from their territories, secured the loyalty of their people to the colonial authority and they supplied basic social amenities to its people (Jibo, 2009, p. 100). Additionally, the British colonial authority introduced paramount rulers in the BVN; the Tiv got their first paramount ruler (*Tor Tiv*), Sgt. Makir Dzakpe, elected in 1946 and given his staff in 1947 (Ayangaor, 2011, p. 154), the district chief of Adoka was elected the first paramount ruler (*Och’idoma*) of Idoma in the same 1947 (Ochonu, 2013, p. 237); In 1914, the paramount rulership had been implemented with the *Aku Uka* for the Jukun, the *Gara of Donga* for the Chamba and *Ukwe-Takum* for the Kuteb (Ahmadu and Danfulani, 2006). Therefore, there was a major change in who defined and lead culture in the BVN. It was no longer between the people and their leaders, but between the leaders and the colonial authority with little input from the people.

Post-colonial period (from 1960 to date): For the Tiv, there is one first-class chief—the *Tor Tiv* (the chief of Tiv) found in Nassarawa, Adamawa, Taraba and Benue states. There are second-class chiefs known as *Uter* (fathers) that head a lineage system that is arbitrarily divided into
Local Government Areas (LGAs). The LGA's have also districts that are headed by third-class chiefs *Utyombaïoruv* (heads-man). Finally, there are kindred under the districts level, led by fourth-class chief *mbatarev* (men of the land). These chiefs are known as traditional leaders and the Tiv have a Traditional Council (TTC) comprising of the first-class chief, the Tor Tiv to the fourth-class chiefs. Its assembly is called *Ijirtamen* (the great judgement) (Iortyom, 1993, p. 5). All the ethnic identity groups from the BVN have the present first-class to fourth-class chief system. The traditional leaders were responsible for administrating land and resolving communal conflicts in rural areas before the 1976 local government reforms by the military government of General Olusegun Obasanjo. In his Land Use Decree 1978, he gave the powers of traditional leaders to Local Government Areas and State Governors (Zirra and Umar, 2006, p. 34; see also 4.2). However, all the chiefs—fourth-class to first-class still play an important role in the running of their ethnic groups especially in the area of settling rural land conflicts (Atel, 2004, p. 18). Therefore, I would argue that the BVN does not have a sustained tradition to call its culture a tradition or its leaders, traditional leaders. Rather, I would suggest that the BVN has had different cultures at different times (pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial) where culture is defined as "the way of life, especially the general customs and beliefs, of a particular group of people at a particular time" (Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary). Nonetheless, I shall continue to use the term traditional leaders as it is customary in the BVN to distinguish from individual title chiefs of which are numerous in the BVN, but it should be understood as referring to customary chiefs properly.

**Peacebuilding:** It is my understanding that often people demand peace in situations of conflict⁶ and what they seek is cessation of violence⁷. However, peace scholars like Johan Galtung and Christopher Pieper call this type of peace "negative peace" which means "the absence of violence and any other significant relations" (Pieper, 2008, p. 2548). Galtung (1998, p. 196) argues that this concept of peace addresses overt violence, but neglects covert violence, what he calls a "culture of violence". By "culture of violence" Galtung (1998, p. 196) means "those aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere our existence – exemplified by religion

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⁶ By conflict I mean "a perceived divergence of interests – where interests are broadly conceptualised to include values, needs, goals, and wishes – between two or more parties, often accompanied by feelings of anger and hostility" (Kurtz et al, 2008, p. 1557).

⁷ Violence is defined "as severe acts of physical aggression generally resulting in some degree of injury or even death" (Kurtz et al, 2008, p. 1557).
and ideology, language and art ... that can be used to justify or legitimise direct or structural violence”. Therefore, Galtung (cited in Pieper, 2008, p. 1548) suggests we work at securing “positive peace” i.e. “the absence of violence and occasional cooperation”. Pieper (2008, p. 1548) qualifies “positive peace” as seeking “unqualified peace” i.e. “the absence of violence and a pattern of lasting cooperation”. This is the object of peace-building that I argue for in this work.

Nonetheless, I do not argue for a “utopian society” or an “imaginary ideal society; literally meaning “no place” in Greek” (Pieper, 2008, p. 1548). Peace-building involves working to attain “unqualified peace” in existing societies such as some anthropologists argue exist. For example, Fry cited in Karolina Baszarkiewicz (2008, p. 1559) refers to peaceful societies of different sizes and geographical divides: From small communities (e.g. the La Paz Zapotec in Mexico) to populations in the thousands or tens of thousands (e.g. the Semai or the Fipa in Greenland). These are societies where people live in “unqualified peace.” In these societies violent conflict is not protracted. Baszarkiewicz (2008, p. 1570) writing on “Peaceful Societies” points out the principal characteristics of these peaceful societies are that their belief system does not accept violence as inevitable; they practice strong egalitarianism conducive to keeping peace; and they have socialisation practices that favour nonviolence over aggression.

In other ways, it is the practice of constant peace-building that enables these societies live together in “unqualified peace” and thus, ensuring non protracted social conflict.

The international community has realised the need for this long term peacebuilding due to persistent conflict in the world. In 1992, the UN launched its Agenda for Peace: “Recognizing that peace is not only the absence of conflict, but requires a positive, dynamic participatory process where dialogue is encouraged and conflicts are solved in a spirit of mutual understanding and cooperation”. Furthermore, in 1999 the UN launched the “International Year for the Culture of Peace”. At the launch, Mr. Federico Mayor, UNESCO Director-General acknowledged the need to move away from the cynical standpoint that “If you want peace prepare for war” rather that we must say “if you want peace, prepare for peace and try to build it in your daily life”. This is a clear commitment to long term peace-building in the International Community. Therefore, in 2003 (Report of the Secretary-General, Implementation

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of the United Nations Millennium Declaration, paragraph 40), the UN expounds on a more integrated approach to conflict prevention and development and in 2005 (Resolution adopted by the General Assembly, UN establishes a Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) as an intergovernmental advisory body, paragraph 98), the UN forms a Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) to bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery.

Right from 1992 peace-building was defined as “post-conflict action to identify and support structures which tend to strengthen and solidify peace to avoid a relapse into conflict” (UNESCO, 1992). However, within the UN, this principal objective was not achieved. As in 2007 Carolyn McAskie, the UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support in a lecture “The International Peacebuilding Challenge” agreed that “research shows us that too many post-conflict countries either fall back into violence or fail to get on the path to sustainable peace”. She gave Angola, Somalia, Haiti, Zaire/DCR and Burundi as examples in point where the root cause of conflicts were not addressed. These cases and others demonstrated how the international community failed in its objective in peace-building.

New initiatives have therefore emphasized the participation of local actors in peace-building. The UN Assistant Secretary-General in his report, In Larger Freedom, prepared for the World Summit in September 2005, called for support of countries’ activities and countries-level planning. In his words, “no part of the UN system effectively addresses the challenges of helping countries transition from war to lasting peace” (McAskie, 2007, p. 8). This indicates how the UN is trying to find new strategies to peace-building. As indeed, McAskie in her evaluation of the Peacebuilding Commission states that “the challenge, therefore, is to increase our understanding of why certain countries fall back into conflict and how we can prevent this and get them back on track” (McAskie, 2007, p. 15). One way forward that she suggested was the local ownership of peace-building by local actors as he argued “the concept of local ownership is paramount. A country must decide to engage with PBC, and its own priorities are at the heart of the work of the commission”. Thus peace-building is a way of reducing protracted violent conflicts around the world. However, as the international community has discovered above, a peacebuilding without understanding the root causes of conflict leads to conflict relapses. Therefore, I use the human needs theory approach which examines first the nature and root of conflict before applying a peacebuilding method.

**Conflicts:** By conflicts, I mean struggles over resources, ideas, values, wishes, and deep-seated needs. However, these conflicts differ from disputes, they refer to struggles between opposing forces, struggles with institutions that involve inherent human needs in respect of which
limited/no compliance exist and limits to people's ability to accept institutionally imposed conditions for unmet needs (Burton, 1996, p 21). On the other hand, disputes refer to arguments, debates or quarrels that can be settled by some form of power bargaining or by legal processes.

**Protracted social conflicts (PSCs):** By PSCs, I mean prolonged and often violent struggles (e.g. Lebanon, Israel, Iran, Pakistan, Nigeria, etc.) by communal groups over fundamental human needs (FHNs) such as protection, identity, freedom and fair access to political institutions and economic participation. These kinds of conflicts do not show clear starting and terminating points; they may remain latent for a period of time and then suddenly break into open violence, destroying life and property (Azar, 1990, p.2).

**Fundamental human needs (FHNs):** HNT uses more than one elaboration of human needs. However, I embrace needs theorists who adopt common language to explain FHNs. These theorists perceive FHNs and their satisfiers as non-material. Economic goods like beef, social goods like the crown of kings/chiefs and political goods (a seat in parliament) are material things or objects. In addition, the theorists refer to food, shelter and clothing as satisfiers and not needs in themselves. Moreover, they understand FHNs as non-hierarchical in nature given their origins and system of satisfaction.

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9 This theoretical research framework follows HNT according to the late renowned peace scholar Edward E. Azar who extensively researched the area of protracted social conflict (PSC) from the 1970s until his death in 1990. The work of Edward Azar has been re-evaluated in recent times by Ramsbotham, O., 2005. “The Analysis of Protracted Social Conflict: a Tribute to Edward Azar,” Review of International Studies (2005), 31, 109–126. Ramsbotham demonstrates that Azar's work remains significant in diagnosing the cause of PSCs in multi-communal societies such as studied here in Nigeria. This research also follows the work of John Burton (1990, 1996, and 1997) who illustrates how intractable conflicts manifest due to the frustration of FHNs. The work of the economist Manfred Max-Neef (1992 and 2009) also offers important insight into the HNT from the perspective of satisfying FHNs.

10 In this respect, the theorists used differ from the work of Assiter (2009) who holds that whatever social, cultural, class or other circumstances individuals find themselves in, they need water, food, clean air and clothing appropriate to their climatic condition and shelter (p. 87). While water, food, and clothing are needs for Assiter, they are satisfiers according to the authors used in this research.

11 The theorists used here differ in their presentation of FHNs from the work of Maslow (1954/87, 168) who developed a well-known theory on the hierarchy of needs and satisfaction as central to human functioning and well-being. In his other work, the Further Reaches of Human Nature, he developed a
The origin of FHNs: I follow the elaboration of FHNs according to the economist Manfred Max-Neef (1992, p. 203) who explains that common sense along with some socio-cultural sensitivity points to the fact that FHNs have existed since the origins of *homo-habilis* and, undoubtedly, since the appearance of *homo-sapiens*. In this sense FHNs derive from human evolution, implying a strong possibility that more FHNs will come into existence as human beings evolve. As such, FHNs develop at the pace of evolution, a very slow rate producing essential attributes related to human evolution and have their own satisfiers. According to Max-Neef (1992), FHNs are few, finite, and classifiable; they cut across cultures and all cultures share the same FHNs in all historical periods. This gender neutral definition of FHNs raises a question for my research: will I find men and women equally contributing to the understanding of FHNs in the BVN? I shall attend to this question in Chapter 3 under a gender critique of the HNT. However, according to Max-Neef (1992, p. 200) FHNs differ from wants. “Wants” refers to strategic interests that people hold; people can negotiate disputes based on wants, but people do not negotiate their frustrated FHNs in conflict. People strive to fulfil them rather than negotiate for their exchange as they would with “wants”.

The types and nature of fundamental human needs (FHNs): I refer to FHNs according to Max-Neef (1992 and Cruz et al., 2009) and Burton (1990, and 1997) who offer nine different types of FHNs. Max-Neef (1992) elaborates FHNs (axiological needs) as subsistence, protection, affection, understanding, participation, creation, leisure, identity and freedom. These FHNs are satisfied at three levels: at personal, the social group, and the environment; at the existential levels of being, doing, having and interacting. For Max-Neef (1992, p. 199) all FHNs interrelate in an interactive way with the sole exception of the need of subsistence—to remain alive; no hierarchies exist within the system of needs. Instead, simultaneities, complementarities and trade-offs characterise the process of satisfying FHNs. Similarly, Burton (1997, p. 19) elaborates FHNs as distributive justice, safety/security, belongingness, self-esteem, personal Pyramid of Human Needs: “first are the needs of food, water and shelter, second—safety and security, third—belonging or love, fourth—self-esteem and fifth—personal fulfilment.” For Maslow the lower the need in the pyramid, the more powerful the need is. Human beings share similar lower needs with animals, but the higher needs only refer to human beings (Maslow, 1973).

Interests include hobbies, ideologies and belief systems generally. Interests also refer to possessions, properties, investments and organisations that can promote such material interests. The difference between interests and FHNs in conflict signifies that people negotiate over material interests, but they are not likely to negotiate over conflict associated with identity and other needs.

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12 Interests include hobbies, ideologies and belief systems generally. Interests also refer to possessions, properties, investments and organisations that can promote such material interests. The difference between interests and FHNs in conflict signifies that people negotiate over material interests, but they are not likely to negotiate over conflict associated with identity and other needs.
fulfilment, identity, cultural security, freedom and participation. Burton (1997, p. 35) like Max-Neef (1992) conceives needs as universal and generalised across cultures and across societal levels from the interpersonal, family and international as well as not being hierarchical but complementary in nature. In this research, I use Max-Neef’s elaboration of FHNs because I also use his elaboration of satisfiers.

**Satisfiers**—means of fulfilling FHNs: The HNT I use considers FHNs as an inherent common human evolutionary heritage, but it considers satisfiers as particular means by which different societies and cultures aim to satisfy their needs (Cruz, Stahel, and Max-Neef, 2009, p. 2024). Satisfiers include everything which, by virtue of representing forms of being, having, doing, and interacting, contributes to the actualisation of FHNs (Cruz et al., 2009, p. 2010). For example, satisfiers include among others, forms of organisation, political structures, social practices, subjective conditions, values and norms, spaces, contexts, modes, types of behaviour and attitudes. For example, the HNT considers food and shelter as satisfiers for the FHN of subsistence and the curative and preventive systems and health schemes in general as satisfiers for the FHN of protection (Max-Neef, 1992, p. 199). In general, satisfiers behave in two ways: they change according to the rhythm of history and diversify according to different cultures and circumstances. In addition, satisfiers change due to factors such as individual, character, gender, physical and psychological condition or age and satisfiers do not have a one-to-one correspondence way of satisfying FHNs *per se*. One satisfier can satisfy various needs and a need may require satisfaction by various satisfiers (Cruz, Stahel, and Max-Neef, 2009, p. 2023). For example, for a parent to satisfy the FHN of affection for a son, they may require satisfiers such as friendship, food, shelter and education. In addition, according to Max-Neef (1992, p. 199), a mother breast-feeding her baby simultaneously satisfies the infant’s needs for subsistence, protection, affection and identity. However, feeding the baby mechanically might just be satisfying the FHN of subsistence and not that of affection and identity. Moreover, the HNT I use considers satisfiers, like FHNs, to have corresponding social, economic and political goods.

**Goods**: According to the HNT I use, goods are material things/objects that empower satisfiers to satisfy FHNs (Max-Neef, 1992, pp. 201-202). Goods (artefacts, technologies) behave in three different ways: they modify according to episodic rhythms (vogues, fashions, tradition) and diversify according to cultures and, within those cultures, according to social strata (Max-Neef, 1992, p. 204). For example, the satisfier—learning—for the satisfaction of the FHN of understanding has a good that has changed overtime: oral transmission of knowledge, scrolls, books and computers. In Table 1, I give some examples of FHNs, their satisfiers and goods.
### Table 1: Examples of FHNs, their satisfiers and goods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FHNs</th>
<th>Satisfiers</th>
<th>Goods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subsistence</td>
<td>Food, drinks, shelter</td>
<td>Rice, potato, water, oranges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>coffee, a house/flat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>Care, land</td>
<td>hospitals, hospices, house</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affection</td>
<td>Friendship, family, love</td>
<td>Chocolate, diamond, Jewry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding</td>
<td>Learning, literature</td>
<td>Computer, classroom, TCD library</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>Rights, work, political/traditional leadership</td>
<td>Senate sit, a crown of a king, an English teacher/professor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creation</td>
<td>Passion, curiosity</td>
<td>River Dance, Mrs Brown's Boys (comedy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leisure</td>
<td>Games, clubs</td>
<td>Football, drums, guitar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity</td>
<td>Language, religion, history</td>
<td>Irish, English, the Bible, the Quran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom</td>
<td>Equal rights</td>
<td>I can vote for the person I like</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>I can marry the person I like</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In summary, FHNs are finite, few and classifiable, and are the same in all cultures and in all historical periods; satisfiers are what render needs historical and cultural; and socio-economic and political goods are their material manifestations (Max-Neef, 1992). The HNT I use argues that conflicts arise where institutions or social norms frustrate an individual’s and/or a group’s ability to satisfy their FHNs.

**The relationship between FHNs and conflict:** I use the HNT elaboration of FHNs to provide an objective framework for offering an analysis of social conflict. The HNT (Azar, 1990; Max-Neef, 1992, Cruz et al., 2009; Burton, 1997,) argues that an intimate and reciprocal relationship between needs, needs frustration, satisfaction, human development and conflict existed and
that one of the primary causes of social conflict is people’s unyielding drive to meet their unmet needs at the individual, group and societal levels. Indeed, HNT maintains that aggression and conflict manifest due to institutions or social norms frustrating the satisfaction of FHNs. The FHN which institutions or norms frustrate requires satisfaction (Burton, 1987). In this situation, individuals might form identity groups\(^\text{13}\) (racial, ideological, national and others) to struggle for the satisfaction of their unmet FHNs. **People do not fight over FHNs per se but over satisfiers and goods; since it is satisfiers/goods that enable the satisfaction of FHNs.** For example, a group might fight over rights to speak their language in order to satisfy their FHN of identity and freedom. However, this elaboration of FHNs by the HNT makes me wonder about issues concerning gender inequality between women and men in the BVN which arose during my research work. It seems to me that the HNT has ignored this element of social conflict as it does not elaborate on gender equality as a FHN. This issue is discussed later in Chapter 3 under a gender critique of the HNT.

Nonetheless, Burton (1997) in his work, *Violence Explained — the Source of Conflict, Violence and Crime and their Provention*, suggests that the satisfaction of human needs are often frustrated, leading individuals and groups to use violence to satisfy their needs. According to Burton (1997), one of the ways that the meeting of needs can be frustrated is through “structural violence”\(^\text{14}\): covert violence (sometimes a result of economic sanctions, or discrimination imposed on people) carried out by legitimate social and political institutions.

Legitimate institutions might apply coercion to make people live with perceived injustices and deprivations such as an absence of job opportunities and more serious issues, like starvation (Burton, 1997, p. 32). Burton (1997, p. 33) argues that in situations of FHNs satisfaction frustration even an institution’s coercion to force compliance with the frustration of FHNs, there are situations and conditions which are beyond the capacity of an individual or identity group to accommodate the frustration of needs. In response to the frustration of meeting

\(^{13}\) An identity group is one in which individuals who share a particular characteristic, racial, ideological, national or other, come together to promote or to defend their roles. Although belonging to such a group may limit individual identity and role, it is also a means of promoting that identity role (Burton, 1996, p. 31).

\(^{14}\) Structural violence is a system that generates repression, abject poverty, malnutrition, and starvation for some members of a society while other members enjoy opulence and unbridled power. Structural violence inflicts covert violence with the ability to destroy life as much as overt violence, except that it does it in more subtle ways (Galtung, 1998, p. 196).
unmet FHNs there may be resistance to the imposed conditions, violent resistance if necessary. As a result, people can be observed fighting over land, physical security, food security, rights to education and democratic political participation for the satisfaction of the FHNs of identity, protection and freedom. Therefore, peacebuilding for conflict resolution in these cases requires enhancing the satisfaction of those frustrated FHNs.

However, Mitchell (1990) critiques HNT because it assumes FHNs can, in principle, be fulfilled without causing or promoting conflict: a scrutiny of the FHN for “protection”, reveals how it could easily lead to “dominance”; the FHN for “identity” could become the need for an out-group to fight another group as enemies; the FHN for “affection” could become the need for “admiration” or “status” or “success at the expense of others” (Mitchell, 1990 p. 156). A rebuff to this criticism comes from the works of Max-Neef, (1992) and Cruz, Stahel, and Max-Neef (2009) who demonstrate that “dominance”, “admiration” and “status” belong to pseudo satisfiers that should be avoided as a means of satisfying FHNs (see Section 2.3). Therefore, in a situation like the on-going PSCs in the multi-communal BVN that I investigate, I argue that there are pre-existent conditions and dynamics that have stimulated, generated and sustained PSCs in the region.

2.2 Conflict analysis

In this section, I analyse and demonstrate how protracted social conflict (PSC) in societies like the Benue Valley, Nigeria (BVN) manifest due to certain pre-conditions and dynamics giving rise to particular outcomes.

2.2.1 Pre-conditions for PSC

The pre-conditions that give rise to PSC in societies such as the BVN pertain to a multi-communal\textsuperscript{15} society and a post-colonial legacy of “divide and rule” where communal discontent exists over the frustration of the satisfaction of unmet FHNs that is coupled with poor/repressive governance.

\textbf{Multi-communal society:} Edward Azar’s (1990, p. 2) critical study of PSC concludes that the fundamental factor in PSC in multi-communal societies, such as persists in Lebanon, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Northern Ireland, Ethiopia, Israel, Sudan, Cyprus, Yugoslavia, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Iran, South Africa and Zimbabwe is the prolonged and often violent struggle by

\textsuperscript{15} The use of the term \textit{community} here is a generic reference to politicised groups whose members share ethnic, religious, linguistic or other cultural “identity” characteristics (Azar, 1990, p.7).
communal groups over the satisfaction of FHNs such as protection, recognition and freedom, fair access to political institutions and economic participation. According to Azar (1990), PSC incubates and grows best in underdeveloped multi-cultural communities. I find the BVN fits Azar’s characterisation of PSC regions as it lacks socio-economic development and it has more than 100 ethnic groups belonging to multi-religious groupings: Muslims, Christians and African Traditional Religionists (ATR). The Muslim group comprises Sunni (the majority), Shia and Ahmadiya forms of Islam. The Christian group includes Roman Catholics, Anglicans, Methodists, Presbyterians, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons) and many Evangelical and Pentecostal Christians. Many indigenous Nigerian Christian churches have also sprung up. However, according to Azar (1990, p. 7) it is not a multi-communal society that forms a precondition for PSC, rather it is that the multi-communal society has a colonial legacy of “divide and rule” as well as experiencing communal discontent with its leaders over the satisfaction of FHNs that establishes a pre-condition for PSC.

Post-colonial legacy and communal discontent: I argue in this subsection that a colonial legacy of “divide and rule”, historical territorial problems, and communal discontent over the satisfaction of FHNs characterised by poor leadership might stimulate PSC in a post-colonial multi-communal society. As Azar (1990) states, “the most significant factor related to PSC is communal discontent of a society with its leaders”. A leadership rooted in the colonial style of governance, Azar (1990) argues, applied the principle of “divide and rule” producing unique political landscapes and artificially incorporated multitudes of communal groups in one state in many parts of the world (India, Pakistan, Malaysia, etc.). This system promoted one group or a coalition of smaller groups to leadership, leading other groups to feel disfavoured. This explains why in many post-colonial multi-communal societies, a single communal group or a coalition of a few communal groups dominate state machinery. According to Azar (1990, p. 7), dominant groups often remain unresponsive to the needs of other groups, straining the social fabric of these multi-communal societies and eventually breeding fragmentation.

Similarly, conflict scholars describe the BVN in terms of Azar’s analysis. They argue that the British colonial regime embarked on this policy of “divide and rule” in Nigeria, playing one region against the other, or simply exploited the ethnic and cultural differences, to gain colonial control in the BVN. For example, Hagher (2002) argues in his book, Beyond Hate and Violence: Understanding the Tiv Struggle for Citizenship Rights and Social Justice in Nigeria that this policy dominated the British treatment of the Jukun and the Tiv ethnic groups (who live side by side in the BVN in two states: Benue and Taraba). Hagher (2002, p. 12) states that the British designated the Jukun to be ab-initio a Hamitic or half-Hamite ruling caste, a sacerdotal
hierarchy, who should control a number of loosely organised tribes like the Tiv. The British, using the system of indirect rule, promoted the Jukun to rule over the Tiv because they had no single central authority. Metz (1991) explicates this system stating, that under the colonial policy of indirect rule, the British imposed paramount traditional rulers on these stateless societies. These paramount rulers administered their subjects over such issues as land, policing, education, taxation and health care—all satisfiers for FHNs. Therefore, for these scholars this “divide and rule” tactic sowed the seed of conflict over economic resources like land and tradition/political power between the Jukun and the Tiv since the colonial times.

Similar “divide and rule” polices by the British colonial regime were implemented in the region of Jos, Plateau State—another part of the BVN. According to Ayaka and Yongo (2006), although the people of Jos, Plateau State: Gwang, Pyem, Angas, Jarawa, Gamai, Mwaghavulu, Ron and Birom were agriculturists; the British colonial regime discouraged them from developing any cash crop. Rather, the colonial regime forced them to supply labour to the mining industry. The bulk of these ethnic identity groups resisted working in the mines. The British regime imposed a heavy tax on them, but they paid their taxes and met some of their needs from excess sales of foodstuff and firewood in the mining camps. However, a combination of events further frustrated the fulfilment of their FHNs. First, repeated invasions of locusts destroyed their farms in the 1930s. Second, a strange disease wiped out their dwarf cattle in 1935. Third, the world depression of 1929-1935, pushed the mining companies to desperation to survive in mining. The miners adopted aggressive mining styles that created deep gorges and laid the foundation for gully erosion of arable land. They took over more and more fertile lands for mining tin. Furthermore, the colonial regime closed down the indigenous smelters arguing that it had smelters at Liverpool. It offered mining licenses to only qualified engineers, but the indigenous people had no qualified mining engineers. It also declared all land in Northern Nigeria as belonging to the Crown. The people only had a right to use land. All these events and measures meant the people of Jos, Plateau State lost their fertile lands just as most people became unemployed. These events and measures made the indigenous people agitate for adequate land compensation or, alternatively, that mining companies and private miners restore their land to its former fertility (Ayaka and Yongo, 2006, pp. 178-179). This situation, it seems started the social conflict that began in the 1940s, but continues to affect present-day Jos, Plateau State.

HNT also argues that the historical pattern of rivalry and contest among communal actors in post-colonial multi-communal societies can form part of a pre-condition for PSC. Azar (1990, p. 7) argues that colonial regimes formed multi-communal societies through colonising processes.
characterised by a disarticulation between the state/community leaders and its societies and it left behind artificially imposed European ideas of territorial statehood on a multitude of communal groups. Consequently, these kinds of states/leaderships impose integration, and incorporate distinctive and often conflicting communities into one political entity thus continuing to create a disarticulation between the state/community leaders and its people. The existence of this situation in states frustrates the satisfaction of FHNs and creates communal discontent generating tension and social conflict in multi-communal societies. Similarly, some political analysts in the BVN argue that a disarticulation exists between the state of Nigeria and its people gives rise to social conflict.

For example, Ayua (2006, pp. 63-66) in his work “The Historic and Legal Roots of Conflict in the Benue Valley” argues that the Nigerian state has failed to be fair in the distribution of state benefits to its citizens since its independence in 1960, contributing significantly to violent conflicts in the region: “The standard of administration has failed ... the state has been unable to maintain the semblance of objectivity and fairness in the redistribution of economic, social and political benefits/opportunities”. According to Hagher (2002, p. 64), this failure compels people to fall back on ethnic identity groups or other sectional lineage identity groups in the hope of achieving their needs. This occurs as the Nigerian state does little in developing infrastructure to enable its people to satisfy their needs. As Otite and Albert (2001, p. 298) observe, politics in Nigeria entails the working out of an acceptable formula for sharing the “national cake”. Sharing takes precedence over creation and generation of wealth through productive activity for the common good. My analysis is that this situation has created a

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16 One protracted issue in the political economy of Nigeria pertains to how the Federal, State and Local Governments share revenue from the sale of crude oil. It has its history in the colonial regime since 1914 and the formation of Nigeria as a country. From 1914 -1959, the colonial regime decided this formula. At that time, Nigeria had no known large quantity of oil reserves although they discovered oil in 1958. Since independence in 1960, all the different formulae evolved at various times have not gained acceptance by the State and Local Government tiers of the Federation (Adebayo, 1993; Danjuma, 1994; Mbanefoy and Anyanwu, 1990; Ndongko, 1981; Phillips, 1971).

17 Every month the 36 state commissioners of finance gather in Abuja the federal capital of Nigeria to “share” statutory allocations from crude oil receipts. It has come to be known popularly as “the national cake”. Nigeria, the 14th world producer of crude oil in the world, has made an after payment to the oil companies of about US$ 390 billion from the sale of crude oil from the 1970s to 2005 (Budina, Pang, and Wijnbergen, World Bank, 2006).
disarticulation between the State (Nigeria) and its people, as well as frustrating the satisfaction of individual and communal needs.

The frustration of the satisfaction of unmet FHNs: According to Azar (1990), the disarticulation between state/community leaders and their people can lead individuals to strive to fulfil their FHNs through the formation of identity groups (racial, ideological, ethnic, religious etc.). An identity group’s formation takes place in order to protect individual and communal physical survival and well-being. Azar (1990) asserts that this situation of disarticulation and physical scarcity of resources causes the satisfaction of FHNs to become uneven or unjust. That is, while one group of individuals may enjoy the satisfaction of needs in abundance, others do not. Thus the grievance over the satisfaction of needs leads to the formation of identity groups and the resulting manifestation of collective protest. This situation heightens tension, particularly in multi-communal societies because of differences among the different identity groups and when coupled with state/leader failure to redress grievances, cultivates a niche for a PSC (Azar, 1990, pp. 8-9). However, the deprivation of FHNs per se does not and may not directly give rise to PSC. Rather, it is the struggle to gain access to the superstructure of society’s social institutions, such as political authority, the market and access to social institutions for the satisfaction of unmet needs that may significantly stimulate PSC.

A struggle for economic resources and political power: According to Azar (1990), in multi-communal societies where states frustrate the satisfaction of FHNs, division of development projects depends on the level of access to economic decision-making which is determined by who holds political power. Since those groups in power have the means of control (the police and the army) and access to economic resources (development projects), they have the means to satisfy their unmet needs. Thus, other identity groups struggle for economic resources and political power heightening social conflict in two specific ways. First, the group in power uses force to maintain its power and uses unfair means of distributing development projects to its community. Second, the group in power refuses to accept the existence of the other identity groups. These two actions create mistrust in the community and aggravate the frustration of the satisfaction of FHNs which leads both groups to continue to struggle for access to economic resources and political power. If the ruling political elites recognised and politically accommodated alienated identity groups in communities, discord over the distribution of economic resources and political power could be managed satisfactorily (Azar, 1990, pp. 9-10). However, the dominating group’s refusal to recognise or accept other communal identity groups on the one hand fosters greater cohesion within victimised communal identity groups.
and works to promote collective violence and protract the conflict if no other means of satisfying needs exist. On the other hand, conflict may also escalate and/or be prolonged if the state/leadership continues to use repressive means to contend with discontent.

**Repressive governance:** According to Azar (1990), the suppressive reactions of governing individuals and political elite to communal discontent over the satisfaction of FHNs constitute the last pre-condition that can generate PSC in multi-communal societies. Azar (1990) argues that the deprivation or the satisfaction of FHNs of protection, access to political and social institutions, and the acceptance of communal identity groups (i.e., political pluralism) largely depend on social, political and economic interactions in a state. In the modern world, he asserts, the regulation of such interactions, and the satisfaction of FHNs pertains to the political authority called the state. The state has authority to govern and to use force where necessary to regulate society, to protect citizens and to help generate collective goods (Azar, 1990, 10). For this reason, the state generally influences the level of satisfaction or deprivation of FHNs by intervening or in mediating the satisfaction of FHNs. An ideal state characterised by a fair and just mode of governance enables the satisfaction of FHNs regardless of communal or identity cleavages and promotes communal harmony and social stability. However, most conflict ridden states tend to be characterised by incompetent, fragile and authoritarian government (Azar, 1990, p. 10). I would argue similarly poor governance in Nigeria contributes to social conflict in the BVN.

For example, the World Bank, IMF and Western governments including the US and EU claim Nigeria and other African states like Uganda have been riddled with corruption and "patrimonialism" to such an extent that they cannot guarantee minimum political and economic regulation to consolidate a social pact and achieve minimum legitimacy (Banegas, 2008, p. 9). Therefore, they are viewed as failed states that cannot enable their people to meet their unmet needs. Azar (1990) finds that multi-communal states fail to enable the satisfaction of FHNs because political authority tends to be monopolised by a dominant identity group or a coalition of hegemonic groups. Monopolistic groups tend to use the state as an instrument for maximising their interests at the expense of others. In the context of PSC, these groups use their political authority to monopolise the state and deny the state the capacity for successful governance—the enabling of the satisfaction of human needs to its citizens (Azar, 1990, p. 10). Conflict analysts argue that this kind of politics began in Nigeria during the British colonial regime and has continued to the present.

For example, Helen Chapin Metz (1991) suggests that the dominating politics practiced by larger ethnic identity groups like the Hausa in the north, Igbo in the east, and Yoruba in the
west, led to protests from minority ethnic identity groups who agitated for separate states in the dying days of the colonial system, and a panel was appointed in 1956 to inquire into their fears, but it found no resolution to the problem. After independence in 1960, ethnic identity politics led to agitation for the creation of more semi-autonomous states in Nigeria based on ethnic homogeneity/compatibility. Nigeria was three regions in pre-independence (Northern, Western, and Eastern, 1947-1962); in 1963, Mid-Western Region was created from Western Region. In 1967, 12 states were created by the military to replace existing regions. From 1967 to 1970, Nigeria fought a civil war when the former Mid-Western and Eastern regions wanted to secede and unite as one state called Biafra. In 1976, the military regime created seven new states and the present Federal Capital Territory called Abuja. In 1987, it created two new states followed by nine more in 1991. Finally, in 1996, the military regime created six more states. Nigeria is now composed of 36 states and a Federal Capital Territory in Abuja—forming a Federal system. Ethnic identity groups agitated for the creation of these states. Groups ask for states because Nigeria shares oil money between the federal, state and local governments, all tiers of governance, therefore, a group having its own state knows it has a share in the “national cake”. Although states have been created, Nigeria has not experienced political stability and good governance and but with a rapid population rise in Nigeria, the frustration of meeting FHNs continues for a growing number of people as Azar (1990) explains well.

Azar (1990) finds that politically unstable states with a weak infrastructural base and rapid population growth fail to enable the satisfaction of FHNs for the majority of their citizens because of their links with a colonial legacy of weak participatory institutions, a hierarchical tradition of imposed bureaucratic rule from metropolitan centres, and inherited instruments of political repression. In Azar’s (1990, p. 11) words, “in most protracted social conflict-laden countries, political capacity is limited by a rigid or fragile authority structure which prevents the state from responding to, and meeting, the needs of various constituents”. Similarly, Nigeria gained its independence from Britain in 1960, more than 53 years ago. Military dictatorship ruled Nigeria for 28 years of its 53 years of independence. In terms of civilian rule, Nigeria has had three failed republics; Nigeria began the fourth republic in 1999. All of which illustrates the political instability which Azar (1990) discusses in his analysis.

In terms of rapid population growth, Nigerians counted 45,926,250 in 1960; by 2010 this number rose to 158,423,000. Nigeria reached a population of 167 million on Monday October 31, 2011, the same day the world celebrated 7 billion people on Earth (Nigerian Population Commission (NPC, 2012). This growth rate translates into more unemployment and poverty on the streets of Nigeria with its poor infrastructural capacity. In the context of PSC, Nigeria’s
youths between the ages of 15 to 25, which constitute 40 per cent of the 167 million people live in poverty or are unemployed. The lack of political stability and a big population with a very high rate of unemployed youths forms a pre-condition for PSC. As Azar (1990, p. 11) explicates, a state with young people between the ages of 15 to 35 that cannot enable the satisfaction of FHNs for that group, produces potential rebels or guerrillas for any group conflict. The young men will most likely fight against the state or other groups so that certain identity groups can meet their unmet FHNs. Similarly, in the BVN, the existence of millions of unemployed youths has led to a problem of street culture. By street culture I mean a situation in which an individual who has no home or workplace spends a disproportionately large part of his or her time on the street and consequently liable to become involved in illegal or anti-social activities (Albert, 1997). In the BVN towns, some streets are crowded with idle young hands, such as the Almajiris begging for alms, different categories of hawkers and other street thugs. Those who want to start any civil disorder or violent conflict have frustrated groups of young people ready to act violently for the meagre payment. According to Ayaka and Yongo (2006, p. 182), these groups have aided in the Jos, Plateau State conflict.

In this section, I have argued that the principal pre-conditional factors that can and may stimulate PSC in a community are: The multi-communal nature of the community; a post-colonial legacy of “divide and rule”; communal discontent with leadership over the frustration of the satisfaction of unmet FHNs; a struggle for economic resources and political power; and a repressive governance in the community. However, these pre-conditional factors stimulate, but do not necessarily give rise to PSC.

2.2.2 Process dynamics for protracted social conflict (PSC)

Despite communal discontent, the frustration of FHNs, and the suppressive style of governance discussed in the last subsection, Azar (1990) finds that their existence or even recognition by communal groups may not lead to overt PSC. In this section, I argue that what is likely to heighten conflict to PSC level are the dynamics of identity group’s mobilisation strategies—the use of violence and state repression.

Identity group’s mobilisation and strategies: I would argue that one particular strategy that triggers PSC is the readiness of identity groups to use violence as a means to satisfying individual and collective FHNs. Azar (1990, p. 12) argues that communal action combined with communal discontent constitutes the most useful unit of analysis in PSC situations. This includes the mobilisation of an identity group (racial, religious, ethnic, culture or other) by its leadership who organise its people to take on the state or dominating identity groups. Usually,
the movement or mobilisation begins with individuals, but soon it becomes a collective fight for the satisfaction of their needs i.e. the FHNs of protection, identity, freedom and others (Azar, 1986, p. 31). For Azar (1990), the need to satisfy unmet FHNs incubates a latent PSC, but it waits for some triggers to begin to operate. A trigger may, but need not be, a trivial event (e.g. insulting an individual with strong communal ties). The trivial event tends to become a turning point at which the individual victimisation becomes a collective group issue. Collective recognition of individual grievances (or incompatible goals) naturally leads to collective protest. This collective protest when met by some degree of repression by leaders raises tension. The victimised communal identity groups begin to draw the attention of their constituents, not only to the event itself, but also to a broad range of issues (e.g. selective poverty and political inequality) involving communal security, access and acceptance to and from authorities. This spillover into multiple issues increases the momentum for organising and mobilising resources (Azar, 1990, p. 12). As the level of communal organisation and mobilisation becomes greater, communal groups attempt to formulate more diverse strategies and tactics, which may involve civil disobedience, guerrilla warfare or secessionist movements (Azar, 1990, pp. 12-14). According to Azar (1990), once events trigger violence, the conflict has an ingredient that can protract it, even if it is a single event.

Similarly, I find a single political appointment triggered the violence in Jos, Plateau State in May 2001; September 2001; November 2001; January 2002; May 2002; June 2002; and August 2002; a conflict that continues to date, 2014. According to Fwatshak, (2006, p. 266) the Federal government appointed a “settler” (Hausa-Fulani) Mallam Muktar as the Plateau State coordinator of the National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP). This agency provides some social allowances and benefits for the unemployed (Fwatshak, 2006, p. 267). The indigenous people lamented the appointment because they felt they were the ones most affected by poverty in the state. They questioned why a “settler” should be in charge of a programme pertaining to poverty eradication in the state. The people further argued that the “settlers” (Hausa-Fulani) rule them in Jos, while they had such opportunities not been given to other identity groups in their own states (Ayaka and Yongo, 2006, pp. 181-182). Thus, this one appointment triggered the current cycle of violence in Jos, Plateau State. However, it is the response of the state to such grievances that determines the course of a conflict.

Repressive state actions and strategies: Despite triggering social conflict, the state could resolve or at least keep the issue in check if it were to accommodate communal grievances by enabling an improvement in the satisfaction of individual and communal needs in the initial stage. However, Azar (1990) finds that states and dominating groups seldom employ
accommodation strategies. Rather, the politics and the economic norm of "winner-takes-all" prevail in multi-communal societies. The state acts with the belief that any authentic accommodation or concession may be perceived as a sign of defeat. Therefore, the state usually avoids such a strategy and employs coercive repression or instrumental co-option.

Similarly, the Jos, Plateau State violence began because the government refused to rescind the appointment of the "settler" as the head of the National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP) (Ayaka and Yongo, 2006, p. 182). Perhaps, the Federal government did not withdraw this appointment because in 1994 the appointment of Alhaji Sanusi Mato, A Hausa-Fulani from Bauchi, as the Chairman of the Jos North Management Committee was withdrawn on the protest of Jos Indigenes. This withdrawal caused violent conflict between the Hausa-Fulani and Indigenes in 1994 in Jos (Fwatshak, 2006, p. 266). Therefore, the army was deployed to preserve security in the state.

As Azar (1990) reiterates, in many cases, military responses constitute the core of state strategy in coping with communal dissent. Nonetheless, a hard-line strategy invites equally militant responses from the repressed groups. While the state believes co-option could serve to mitigate communal grievances, the oppressed group usually perceive this as a tactical manoeuvre to fragment the opposition and divert its attention. Identity groups and the state then adopt further coercive and repressive options leading to an upward spiral of violent clashes (Azar, 1990, p. 14). This scenario corresponds to the Jos, Plateau State case. The army stationed in Jos until 2013 had not prevented outbreaks of violence there. Rather, there was a prolonged conflict with an escalation of violence in the areas affected, seemingly confirming Azar's point (1990) that the dissatisfaction of multi-communal societies with its government, its strategy to meet unmet needs combined with the state refusal to enable its people to meet their needs, but rather adopting repressive tactics likely generates social conflict, sustains and prolongs it. Indeed, Fwatshak (2006, p. 266) asserts that the question of who controls Jos for "indigenous" and "settlers" is important because on it depends political and social benefits—political benefits like qualification to contest local elections, securing political appointment and traditional leadership, and social benefits like access (admission) to state-run institutions, and securing state scholarships. Hence both groups use of violence in their quest to control Jos, Plateau State. Therefore, the combined use of violence by identity groups and states give rise to PSC with particular outcomes.
2.2.3 Protracted social conflict (PSC) outcomes

In this section, I argue that, on the one hand, the majority of all identity group members in situations of PSC in the BVN frustrate their FHNs, on the other hand, the ruling elite from these identity groups from the BVN benefit from it. This dynamic ensures the protraction of conflict.

The majority of all identity groups' members involved in PSC frustrate their FHNs: The social, economic and political instability PSC create leads Azar’s critical study (1981, 1986, and 1990) of its pre-conditions and process dynamics to suggest that most classical conflicts involve win-lose outcomes in which winners and losers may be clearly differentiated. However, PSC produces a negative-sum outcome (most members of the parties lose) because of the innate behavioural properties of PSC: its protraction, fluctuation, and actor and issue spillover which play out in such a way that most members of the parties involved in the PSC tend to be victimised in the process. Azar (1990, p. 15) concludes that outcomes (military victories, negotiated agreement, etc.), insofar as they do not satisfy FHNs, cover-up a latent conflict which will cause further cycles of violence. The cycle of violence may continue as long as people continue to struggle to meet their unmet FHNs on both sides of the divide.

Moreover, Azar (1990, p 16) argues that the strong desire to satisfy FHNs pushes both parties to form/search for alliances of convenience with external actors. However, this state of affairs encourages dependency on external parties rather than reliance on the identity group’s own abilities and resources. The involvement of outside actors simply promotes and entrenches cycles of dependency, violence and despair such that communities lose control over their lives and access to the decision-making power as it becomes increasingly exercised by external actors (Azar, 1990, p. 17). Thus, the deterioration of physical security coupled with the exacerbating initial conditions of insecurity leads to a further loss of life and means of support for people in both communal groups. In these conditions, the state systematically halts development planning; it institutionalises underdevelopment through lack of investment for physical and social infrastructures, and replaces development with excessive military expenditure. Therefore, a vicious cycle of underdevelopment and conflict deprives not only the victimised communities, but also a majority within the dominant groups of economic resources for satisfying their FHNs (Azar, 1990, p. 16). Moreover, as conflict protracts, institutional deformity sets in: government institutions become weak and consequently cease to effectively perform their functions of regulation, extraction, allocation and arbitration; thus, communal cleavages become reinforced, and the prospect of cooperative interaction and community building become poor (Azar, 1990, p. 16). Therefore, both the dominant and victimised communities suffer from lack of institutional regulation, extraction, allocation and arbitration.
and cooperative intercommunal interactions over socio-economic resources; therefore, both groups suffer from the basic structure of satisfying their FHNs. In this manner the PSCs in the BVN frustrate the meeting of FHNs for the majority of people from all identity groups because of lack of development and the persistent violence in their communities. Additionally, the outcome of pre-conditional factors and process dynamics leads not only to overt violence, but also creates structural violence. Structural violence benefits the ruling elite in the BVN.

The ruling elite (identity groups) from the BVN benefit from PSC: Burton (1997) and Galtung (1998 and 2004) find that the dynamics of PSC might create a society with structural violence: a society where the rich get richer and the poor get poorer. Structural violence generates widespread abject poverty, malnutrition and even starvation. It leaves the majority of people with unmet FHNs, but the ruling elite get to satisfy their FHNs. This situation of deprivation and satisfaction of FHNs might keep generating the cycle of violence. As Burton (1997, p. 32) explains, deliberate frustration of people’s FHNs leads groups to adopt violence for the purpose of satisfying their needs. Although the legitimate social and political institutions that create structural violence use forced compliance processes in the expectation that people will conform; however, human ability to conform to leaders’ institutional repressive action will most likely reach its limits with exacerbated situations of human deprivation; people may mobilise and organise to resist the imposed conditions, they might adopt violent resistance if necessary (Burton, 1997, p.33). Consequently, the adoption of violence by both sides ensures poverty in the society, but the social and political elite get richer due to their access to economic and political power.

Ordinary people, however, live in multiple poverties. As Max-Neef (1992), in his work on “Human Needs and Human Scale Development”, argues, the frustration of the FHNs leads to poverties and not just material poverty. For example, lack of food, shelter and clean water leads to the poverty of subsistence. A system built on violence, weapons and bad health care leads to the poverty of protection. Authoritarianism, oppression and exploitative relations with the natural environment lead to the poverty of affection. The marginalisation of and discrimination against women, children and minorities may cause the poverty of participation. The imposition of alien values upon local and regional cultures, forced migration, political exile etc. will most likely lead to poverty of identity. These poverties form two mega (economic and political) poverties that generate pathologies which create conditions that protract violent conflicts (Max-Neef, 1992, p. 200). In the context of Latin America, Max-Neef (1992) argues that persistent economic pathologies are unemployment, external debt and hyperinflation and political pathologies are fear, violence, marginalisation and exile; these protract conflict in
Latin America. In the Benue Valley, Nigeria (BVN), my analysis is that the adoption of corruption as a satisfier by the ruling elite creates structural violence which results in the two mega poverties and the corresponding pathologies highlighted by Max-Neef (1992).

I would contend that corruption by, and disproportional pay to, the ruling elite are driving PSCs in the BVN. Nigeria has vast natural resources, and is the fifth biggest exporter of crude oil to the United States of America. The World Bank study reports (Budina, N.; Pang, G. and Wijnbergen, S., 2006), using 1970 payment as a benchmark, estimates that Nigeria gained an extra US$ 390 billion in oil-related fiscal revenue over the period 1971-2005. Yet Nigeria’s per capita GDP of US$1,113 in 1970 reduced to US$1,084 in 2000. Similarly, the average life expectancy of Nigerians in 1970 at 42.3 years only increased marginally in 2000 to 46.3 years. However, the average life expectancy of Nigeria’s neighbours who have less wealth rose from 45 to 54 years (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2012, p. 2). How did Nigeria gain US$390 billion in oil revenue within this period with no impact on the lives of Nigerians? Analysts suggest that the mismanagement of money gained from the sale of crude oil by its corrupt ruling elite contributes significantly to the frustration of FHNs for the general populace of Nigeria, making them poorer.

The endemic nature of corruption in Nigeria is illustrated in the 1996 study of corruption by Transparency International and Goettingen University which ranked Nigeria as the most corrupt nation among 54 nations listed in its study (Moore, 1997, p.4); again in 1998, Nigeria ranked as fourth most corrupt country of 85 countries based on the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (CPI) (Lipset, and Lenz, 2000, p.113); and in the 2001, CPI ranked Nigeria the second most corrupt country of 91 corrupt countries (Dike, 2005, p. 8). Moreover, “more than 70% of Nigeria’s national income goes into paying salaries and allowances of political office holders”; ex-President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria asserts that “he believes it is about US$1.7 million per year per senator, and a member of the house of representatives takes slightly less” (Odunfa, 2010). While this is the case for the ruling elite, the minimum wage in Nigeria is about US$1,800 per year. This disproportionate pay to the ruling elite provides evidence that the ruling elite benefits from this legitimate disproportional structural pay in Nigeria; but it creates poverty for the rest of Nigerians.
For example, according to the Harmonised Nigerian Living Standard Survey (HNLSS, 2010) Report, Nigerians living in “absolute poverty” continue to rise: 1980—17.1 million; 1985—34.7 million; 1992—39.2 million; 1996—67.1 million; 2004—68.7 million; 2010—112.47 million people. My analysis is that the socio-political situation in Nigerian creates structural violence, allows the ruling elite to enjoy wealth and unbridled power, but leaves the majority of Nigerians in abject poverty. Statistically, the number of people living in “absolute poverty” in the Benue Valley states stands at 74.2% Adamawa, 74.1% Plateau, 68.9 Taraba, 67.1% Benue and 60.4% Nasarawa (Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics, HNLSS, 2010). I would argue that “absolute poverty” forms part of what is sustaining the violent conflicts in the BVN. As Galtung (2004, p. viii) suggests, the bulk of Nigerians are struggling for survival, well-being, freedom and identity.

Therefore, in 2.2.3, I have argued that the root of the outbreak of violent PSCs in the BVN seems to be pre-existent post-colonial legacy of “divide and rule” in this multi-communal area with its identity groups’ discontentment over the frustration of unmet FHNs by its leaders has led to these identity groups fighting for economic resources and political power while its leadership is focused on repressive measures of excessive force to contend with discontent and/or ignores its people’s grievances. Moreover, the present governing system in Nigeria which has systematised political corruption and disproportional pay to political elected officers has created structural violence in the BVN where about 70% live in “absolute poverty”; my analysis is that this promotes PSCs in the region. Therefore, the outcome of this overt and covert violence situation is that 112 million Nigerians live in “absolute poverty” so the majority of people from all the identity groups do not benefit from the present system of governance, while, given Nigeria spends about 70% of its national income to pay political elected officers across identity groups, it is arguable that this political elite benefits from this system of governance. It is my belief that this system of governance is at the root of PSCs in the BVN. This situation presents a challenge to people concerned with performing peacebuilding work for conflict resolution in the BVN.

2.3 Peacebuilding for conflict resolution

In this section, I discuss the relationship between satisfiers and the satisfaction of FHNs for peacebuilding work in conflict resolution and I argue that peacebuilding for conflict resolution

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18 Absolute poverty” is measured by the number of people who can afford only the bare essential of shelter, food and clothing (Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics, HNLSS, 2010).
in situations of PSCs, like the BVN, requires the use of synergic satisfiers and the avoidance of destructive, pseudo and inhibiting satisfiers. Cruz, Stahel and Max-Neef\(^{19}\) (2009, p. 2024) point out that all human beings wish to fulfil their FHNs and find the frustration of FHNs undesirable. Indeed, for them, it is the satisfaction of FHNs that reveal the essence shared by all humans as sentient, social and self-reflective beings. As such, human beings in situations of PSC want to satisfy their FHNs. HNT explains that there is a dynamic interrelationship between FHNs, satisfiers and goods. Max-Neef (1992) illustrates their complementary relation in a matrix, and finds it neither normative nor conclusive as the matrix only gives some examples of possible satisfiers for particular FHNs. He agrees that a matrix completed by individuals or groups from diverse cultures and in different historical moments will vary considerably (Max-Neef, 1992, p. 204). Table 2 shows Max-Neef’s matrix. A study of the fields in the matrix shows that many of the satisfiers can give rise to varying goods. For example, field 15 of the FHN for understanding at the existential level of being contains satisfiers such as investigating, studying, experimenting, educating, analysing, meditating and interpreting. Max-Neef clarifies that these satisfiers give rise to social, economic and political goods that depend on the culture and the resources of a particular people. For example, economic goods might be books, laboratory instruments, tools, computers and social goods might be artefacts like exhumed or donated bodies etc. All these goods aim at empowering the doing of the FHN of understanding as means for teaching and learning (Max-Neef, 1992, p. 205).

Table 2: Matrix of needs and satisfiers (Cruz et al., 2009, p. 2025)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Existential/ Axiological</th>
<th>Being (personal or collective attributes)</th>
<th>Having (Institutions, norms, tools)</th>
<th>Doing (personal or collective actions)</th>
<th>Interactive (spaces or atmospheres)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subsistence</td>
<td>1/ Physical health, mental health, equilibrium, sense of humour, adaptability</td>
<td>2/ Food, shelter, work</td>
<td>3/ Feed, procreate, rest, work</td>
<td>4/ Living environment, social setting</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{19}\) In this section, this research theorises following the work of the economist, Manfred Max-Neef (1992) because his work develops a clear distinction between FHNs (inherent to our common human evolutionary heritage) and satisfiers (the particular means by which different societies and cultures aim to realise their needs). This work is considered to probably be the most important asset to the human needs debate (Cruz et al, 2009, p. 2024).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protection</th>
<th>5/ Care, adaptability, autonomy, equilibrium, solidarity</th>
<th>6/ Insurance systems, savings, social security, health systems, rights, family, work</th>
<th>7/ Co-operate, prevent, plan, take care of, cure, help</th>
<th>8/ Living space, social environment, dwelling</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Affection</td>
<td>9/ Self-esteem, solidarity, respect, tolerance, generosity, receptiveness, passion, determination, sensuality, sense of humour</td>
<td>10/ Friendships, partners, family, partnerships, relationships with nature</td>
<td>11/ Make love, caress, express emotions, share, take care of, cultivate, appreciate</td>
<td>12/ Privacy, intimacy, home, spaces of togetherness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding</td>
<td>13/ Critical conscience, receptiveness, curiosity, astonishment, discipline intuition, rationality</td>
<td>14/ Literature, teachers, method, educational and communication polices</td>
<td>15/ Investigate, study, educate, interpret</td>
<td>16/ Settings of formative interaction, schools, universities, academies groups, community, family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>17/ Adaptability, receptiveness, solidarity, willingness, determination, dedication, respect, passion, sense of humour</td>
<td>18/ Rights, responsibilities, duties, privilege, work</td>
<td>19/ Become affiliated, cooperate, propose, share, dissent, obey, interact, agree on, express opinions</td>
<td>20/ Settings of participative interaction, parties, associations, churches, communities, neighbourhoods, family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idleness</td>
<td>21/ Curiosity, receptiveness, imagination, recklessness, sense of humour, lack of worry, tranquility, sensuality</td>
<td>22/ Games, spectacles, clubs, parties, peace of mind</td>
<td>23/ Day-dream, brood, dream recall old times, give way to fantasies, remember, relax, have fun, play</td>
<td>24/ Privacy, intimacy, spaces of closeness, free time, surroundings, landscapes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creation</td>
<td>25/ Passion, determination, intuition, imagination, boldness, rationality, autonomy, inventiveness, curiosity</td>
<td>26/ Abilities, skills, method, work</td>
<td>27/ Work, invent, build, design compose, interpret</td>
<td>28/ Productive and feedback settings, workshops, cultural groups, audiences, spaces for expression, temporal freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity</td>
<td>29/ Sense of belonging, consistency, differentiation, self-esteem, assertiveness</td>
<td>30/ Symbols, language, religions, habits, customs, reference groups, roles, groups, sexuality, values, norms, historic memory, work</td>
<td>31/ Commit oneself, integrate oneself, confront, decide on, get to know oneself, recognise oneself, actualise oneself, grow</td>
<td>32/ Social rhythms, every day settings, settings which one belongs to, maturation stages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom</td>
<td>33/ Autonomy, self-esteem, determination, passion, assertiveness, open mindedness, boldness, rebelliousness, tolerance</td>
<td>34/ Equal rights</td>
<td>35/ Dissent, choose, be different from, run risks, develop awareness, commit oneself, disobey, mediate</td>
<td>36/ Temporal/special plasticity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In Table 2, the column of BEING registers attributes expressed as nouns. The column of HAVING registers institutions, norms, mechanisms, tools (not in a material sense), laws, etc. that can be expressed in one or two words. The column of DOING registers actions that can be expressed as verbs. The column of INTERACTING registers locations and milieus (at times and spaces) (Max-Neef, 1992, p. 207). The analysis of satisfiers and goods has implication for performing peacebuilding work in conflict resolution. Satisfiers have particular natures or characteristics: they affect conflict and conflict resolution differently.

2.3.2 Satisfier's characteristics in relation to conflict and conflict resolution

In this section, I use Max-Neef’s (1992 and Cruz et al., 2009) identification of satisfiers for analytical purposes in five characteristics: violating or destructive, pseudo, inhibiting, singular and synergic satisfiers (Table 3 to Table 7). The characteristics of satisfiers explain why complementarity and trade-offs are a feature of the process of needs satisfaction and needs frustration. That is, the choice of a given satisfier instead of others affects needs satisfaction, for causing conflict and conflict resolution. Outsiders/authorities can impose, induce and ritualise destructive, pseudo and inhibiting satisfiers on civil society. These satisfiers create, generate and, at times, cause conflict. However, synergic satisfiers, derived mostly from liberating processes that may arise, but not always from grassroots communities, stimulate the satisfaction of needs in a holistic way (Max-Neef, 1992, p. 205). They satisfy a given need, but also stimulate the satisfaction of other needs at the same time. Synergic satisfiers applied in situations of PSC may build peace significantly. Tables 3 to Table 7 give satisfiers by characteristic extracted from Max-Neef, 1992, pp. 208-210. Table 3 presents examples of destructive satisfiers:
Table 3: Violators and destructive satisfiers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supposed satisfier</th>
<th>Need to be supposedly satisfied</th>
<th>Needs whose satisfaction it impairs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Arms race</td>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>Subsistence, Affection, Participation, Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Exile</td>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>Affection, Participation, Identity, Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Authoritarianism</td>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>Affection, Understanding, Participation, Creation, Identity, Freedom</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Destructive satisfiers have a paradoxical effect: applied under the pretext of satisfying a given need, they not only annihilate the possibility of its satisfaction; they also render the adequate satisfaction of other needs impossible. For example, in the Jos, Plateau State conflict (2.2), the use of the army in an authoritarian way to ensure security has only worsened the situation of security for Jos inhabitants. Effective peacebuilding requires the elimination in use of destructive satisfiers in situations of PSC. Table 4 exemplifies pseudo satisfiers:

Table 4: Pseudo-satisfiers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Satisfier</th>
<th>Need which it seemingly satisfies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Chauvinistic nationalism</td>
<td>Identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Formal democracy</td>
<td>Participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Status symbols</td>
<td>Identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Charity</td>
<td>Subsistence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Stereotypes</td>
<td>Understanding</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Pseudo-satisfiers stimulate a false sense of satisfying a given need. Although they lack the aggressiveness of destructive satisfiers, they annul, in the medium and long term, the possibility of satisfying the need they were originally aimed at. For example, the existence of formal democracy in Nigeria since 1999 for the satisfaction of the FHN of political participation that should yield “democratic dividends” of prosperity has not materialised because of corruption (a pseudo satisfier) as a means of satisfying FHNs by the ruling elite in Nigeria. As such, formal democracy has failed to satisfy the FHNs of most Nigerians. Peacebuilding work for conflict resolution in this case requires moving away from an emphasis on simply conducting free and fair elections in Nigeria to grassroots methods for creating civic engagement for the satisfaction of FHNs. This requires the adoption of true democracy, as Galtung (2004, p. 54) suggests, democracy means the rule by everybody, but in reality only Swiss direct democracy runs close to this understanding because people in that system can participate via referendum, in the sense that citizens can take an initiative by signing a petition to demand a referendum. The power of the people to ask for referendum enables everybody involvement in decision making about governance. Table 5 illustrates some inhibiting satisfiers:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Satisfier</th>
<th>Need</th>
<th>Needs, whose satisfaction is inhibited</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Paternalism</td>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>Understanding, Participation, Freedom, Identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Over-protective family</td>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>Affection, Understanding, Participation, Leisure, Identity, Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Unlimited permissiveness</td>
<td>Freedom</td>
<td>Protection, Affection, Identity, Participation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Inhibiting satisfiers generally over-satisfy a given need, and seriously impair the possibility of satisfying other needs. For example, the Nigerian socio-political elite in their quest to satisfy their FHNs and own interest overpay themselves as political office holders and have an obsession with money (inhibiting satisfier). As law professor Itse Sagay points out, “Nigerian politicians are among the highest-paid in the world (Odunfa, 2010)”. Nigeria spends 70% of its
income paying elected political officers. This happens while 112 million Nigerians out of 167 million live in poverty (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2012, p. 4). To address the issue of overpayment for political office holders in peacebuilding work would require flattening the pay pyramid by giving fewer rewards for elected politicians (Galtung, 2004, p. 56-57). Table 6 exemplifies singular satisfiers:

**Table 6: Singular satisfiers**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Satisfier</th>
<th>Need which it satisfies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Programmes to provide food</td>
<td>Subsistence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Welfare programmes to provide dwelling</td>
<td>Subsistence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Ballot</td>
<td>Participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Nationality</td>
<td>Identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Gifts</td>
<td>Affection</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Singular satisfiers satisfy a targeted single need and they are neutral regarding the satisfaction of other needs. For instance, the Nigerian national identity card (NNIDC) or passport serves to distinguish Nigerians from non-Nigerians satisfying the FHN of identity, yet identity groups fight amongst themselves in the BVN. The satisfier NNIDC/passport which implies a united Nigeria builds little peace in the BVN. Finally, Table 7 gives examples of satisfiers used in peacebuilding work for conflict resolution—synergic satisfiers:

**Table 7: Synergic satisfiers**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Satisfier</th>
<th>Need</th>
<th>Needs, whose satisfaction it stimulates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Breast-feeding</td>
<td>Subsistence</td>
<td>Protection, Affection, Identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-managed production</td>
<td>Subsistence</td>
<td>Understanding, Participation, Creation, Identity, Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic community organisation</td>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>Protection, Affection, Leisure, Creation, Identity, Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic trade union</td>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>Understanding, Participation, Identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct democracy</td>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>Protection, Understanding, Identity, Freedom</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Synergic satisfiers satisfy a given need while stimulating and contributing to the simultaneous satisfaction of other needs. They satisfy FHNs in harmonious ways at the personal, communal/group and environmental levels. For example, potatoes produced from a self-managed farm will be goods, for the synergic satisfier food and also for the satisfaction of the FHN of subsistence if they are produced in a sustainable way that is healthy for human beings and the environment. Being a self-managed production, it will also stimulate the satisfaction of the FHNs of understanding, participation, creation, identity and freedom. Therefore, peacebuilding work for the satisfaction of FHNs in synergic ways requires a system that from the outset and throughout its process takes into consideration the capacity of permanently generating synergic socio-economic and political satisfiers/goods for the satisfaction of FHNs. According to Max-Neef (1992, p. 213), peacebuilding in these situations needs a development structure that gives rise to a healthy, self-reliant and participative satisfiers/goods, capable of creating the foundations for a social order within which sustainable peace will bring the growth of all men and women as whole persons in their environment.

This approach to peacebuilding work requires an understanding that "the very essence of human beings is expressed palpably through needs in their twofold characteristics: as deprivation and as potential"; in situations of conflict, in so far as the struggle for the satisfaction of needs engages, motivates and mobilises people, they are not just a deprived people, but a potential and eventually may become a resource for the satisfaction of FHNs. For example, the need to participate is a potential for participation and the need for affection is a potential for affection (Max-Neef, p. 201). The implication for this understanding is that those who are deprived of meeting their needs may become a resource who generate synergic satisfiers for the satisfaction of FHNs if synergic approaches are adopted and those who are frustrating the satisfaction of FHNs can potentially build a harmonious and progressive society if they agree to adopt synergic approaches for the satisfaction of FHNs in their communities. As I have argued above, Nigeria has a shortfall of synergic approaches for the satisfaction of FHNs. The task of peacebuilding work in the BVN necessitates finding synergic satisfiers for the satisfaction of FHNs. Therefore, in 2.3.2, I have demonstrated the five types of satisfiers, according to Max-Neef (1992): destructive, pseudo, inhibiting, singular and synergic in the way each affects the satisfaction of FHNs. This classification advances a critical tool for conflict and conflict resolution analysis for the purpose of satisfying FHNs in a given culture or context. It shows how to identify destructive, pseudo and inhibiting satisfiers associated with the frustration of FHNs that can generate and sustain PSC and it also illustrates the use of synergic satisfiers for performing peacebuilding work.
Conclusion

In this chapter, I argued that the HNT offers a conflict analysis approach for performing peacebuilding work based on the frustration and satisfaction of FHNs in multi-communal and post-colonial societies like the BVN. It establishes that the frustration of FHNs such as subsistence, protection, identity and freedom, coupled with the denial of fair access to socio-political institutions and economic participation may have generated the PSCs in the BVN. I have shown that the disjunctive legacies ("divide and rule" policy and the European ideas of territorial statehood) left behind by the British colonial regime in Nigeria may have laid a foundation for a political and economic environment that nurtures PSCs in the multi-communal BVN. Moreover, I have argued that there is structural (covert) violence in Nigeria as a result of a political corruption and institutionalised disproportionate payment (70% of Nigeria's GDP) to political elected officers. This has resulted in socio-economic underdevelopment which has generated poverty for the general populace in multi-communal BVN. Therefore, I argued that the situation is at the root of what stimulates, promotes and sustains PSCs in the region.

Moreover, I have argued that the HNT's classification of satisfiers according to the way by which they affect the satisfaction of FHNs: destructive, pseudo, inhibiting, singular and synergic explain its association with PSC and its resolution. The evidence I have presented in this chapter shows that the Nigerian authority/dominant socio-economic ruling elite impose destructive (excessive use of the army and thugs/militias), pseudo (formal democracy) and inhibiting (corruption) satisfiers on communities. The imposition of these satisfiers, it seems, frustrate the satisfaction of FHNs, generates and sustains violent PSCs in this region. Therefore, I have argued that peacebuilding work in the situation of violent PSCs in the BVN requires the use of liberating processes—synergic satisfiers/goods for the satisfaction of FHNs.

Furthermore, I raised gender questions about the HNT: It uses a gender neutral language in its elaboration of FHNs. The theorists have not distinguished between the needs of men and women; needs are seen as applicable in the same way to men and women. This is taking the gender inequality that exists between men and women in the BVN for granted. I attend to this gender concern in the next chapter under a gender critique of the HNT. Therefore, this chapter's discussion offers me a theoretical framework from the HNT perspective to go on to investigate and analyse some women's peacebuilding initiatives in the BVN. It raises some questions about women's peacebuilding work for the next chapter:
1. Do some women understand that the frustration of FHNs generates social conflict?
2. Are there women with skills and vision for finding synergic satisfiers in performing peacebuilding work?
3. How does patriarchal social, economic and political gender order affect women with respect to the satisfaction of FHNs in the BVN?

The next chapter will examine and discuss these questions.
Chapter 3—Research Theoretical Framework II:

Gender Peacebuilding and Conflict Resolution

A just and sustainable peace will require, at a minimum, the equitable satisfaction of human needs for security, identity, well-being, and self-determination (Christie, 1997, p. 329).

This thesis is concerned with women as peacebuilders in the Benue Valley, Nigeria (BVN). Over recent years a body of theory has developed to explain why and how women (as women) mobilise for peace. This chapter explores these theories — settling on the importance of gender socialisation to explain why many women acquire peacebuilding sensitivity and skills. Socialisation also explains women's sensitivity to frustrated fundamental human needs (FHN).

However, the human needs theory (HNT) has been gender blind and it is important to recognise that in a context where women's analysis and participation is ignored in formal conflict resolution processes, where women are not even considered “persons with a say” in the BVN. Thus, I address all three questions raised in the previous chapter: Do some women understand that the frustration of FHNs generates social conflict? Do some women use their skills and vision for finding synergic satisfiers for use in their peacebuilding work? How does post-colonial patriarchal social, economic and political gender order affect women with respect to the satisfaction of FHNs? I make the case that on the one hand, due to gender socialisation some women understand the frustration of human needs causes social conflict. In addition, that this socialisation provides some women with skills for finding liberating means to satisfying human needs. On the other hand, I argue that the same gender socialisation excludes women from formal conflict resolution processes. I illustrate this using gender socialisation theory perspective to critique the HNT for its gender non-sensitivity in elaborating FHNs. I contend that empirical studies show some women use liberating means for the satisfaction of FHNs in their peacebuilding initiatives; work arising from a sense of duty to care for those in need as opposed to an imposition by patriarchy. To discuss these arguments in this chapter, I seek first to define key terms for the chapter—ethics of care, gender and gender order and seek to understand how both genders mediate conflict and peace. As such, I divide the chapter into four sections. Section 1 examines gender socialisation, conflict and peace; section 2 analyses women’s skills in peacebuilding and conflict resolution, while section 3 examines women’s initiatives in peacebuilding and conflict resolution; and section 4 is a gender critique of the HNT.
Definition of terms

**Ethics of care:** It is an approach to morality that emphasises the concrete needs of people with whom we are in a relationship, is driven by emotions stemming from those relationships, and is understood as a social practice rooted in maternal relations rather than as a private disposition or feeling (Lawrence, 2012, p. 643). It is the vision that self and other will be treated as of equal worth, that despite differences in power, things will be fair; the vision that everyone will be responded to and included, that no one will be left alone or hurt (Gilligan, 1982, p. 63).

**Gender:** It is the formation of social relations, which include ways in which men and women relate to each other beyond that of personal interaction. Social relations that include the social categories of maleness and femaleness in every sphere of social activity, such as determining access to resources, power and participation in political, cultural, and religious activities; indeed, what different societies regard as normal and appropriate behaviours, attitudes, and attributes for women and men (Pankhurst, 2003, p. 166).

**Gender order:** This is the way patriarchal societies tend to be ordered—where men have predominant authority (in power relations) in families, traditional and civil institutions; have more control over incomes in families/society; receive much emotional care from women without social obligation to reciprocate; and in terms of gender symbolism, men control most cultural/civil institutions, and have higher levels of recognition, i.e. they and their activities are regarded as more important than women (Connell, 2005, p. 246-47).

3.1 Gender socialisation, conflict and peace

In this section, I illustrate how two opposing schools of thought (essentialism and socialisation) explain women’s and men’s involvement in conflict and conflict resolution. I proceed to examine essentialism first but come to the conclusion that, for various reasons, this theory does not explain the gendered division of conflict. I dig to the root of socialisation to analyse how both genders engage with conflict and peace. I argue that on the one hand, patriarchal societies socialise girls to be empathic, cooperative and socially attuned. Qualities its society

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20 The African Feminist Movement (AFM) in their charter define patriarchy as a system of male authority which legitimises the oppression of women through political, social, economic, legal cultural, religious and military institutions. According to AFM, patriarchy varies in time and space, and in accordance with class, race, ethnic, religious and global-imperial relationships and structures (Madunagu, 2008, p. 670).
deems feminine—a social construct that leads some women to be affectionate, sensitive, empathetic/sympathetic, warm, gentle, cheerful, shy and submissive, especially towards men. On the other hand, patriarchal societies socialise boys to be impulsive, aggressive and egocentric, qualities it deems masculine, a social construct that leads some men to be aggressive, competitive, ambitious, dominant, unemotional, independent and self-confident (Goldstein, 2001). In patriarchal societies, this feminine and masculine division becomes the socio-economic and political system's underlying understanding of what womanhood (being a woman) and manhood (being a man) pertains to be. This understanding arguably affects how both genders participate in conflict and conflict resolution.

3.1.1 Women’s peacefulness and men’s aggressiveness

Gender essentialist\(^\text{21}\) scholars argue that women and men as certain historically-observed facts and biological attributes indicates natural female and male differences, women participate naturally in making peace and men in generating aggression. Tobach (2008, p. 15) expounds that for essentialists, if one compares pre-historical pictures of relationships between women and men from artefacts, bones of hominids and other animals, they show females as nurturers and males as aggressors. In addition, essentialists suggest bodily differences in morphology and physiology between males and females indicate an image of women as naturally nurturing. That is, biology shows that only women can reproduce offspring, hence playing the natural role of nurturers, and that male aggression can be observed from men's productive activities similar to other male animals. Gender essentialists also point to women's lower testosterone levels and differences in women's brain structure as reasons why women perform more peaceful acts than men. They believe this makes most women likely to act emotionally rather than rationally, and behave in less challenging and competitive ways than most men. In the essentialist worldview, gender identity pertains to nature, and is permanent and unchangeable.

Furthermore, gender essentialist scholars argue that men occupy power and position of authority because, in their opinion, men's power status derives from their essential identity

\(^{21}\) Those who take gender divisions as given and monolithic—an argument that women are "essentially" different from men and men from women (Forcey, 2008) and the belief that their different appearance, internal qualities and behaviours are inborn and impervious to environmental influence (Liben, L., 2009, p. 235). This view is used to argue for the current women's social roles and thus provide socio-political justification for the subordination of women as well as natural sexual division of labour.
(i.e. the “true” nature of men). Therefore, women’s task at home looking after their husbands and children can be best explained in terms of women’s “true” biological nature (Badmus, 2009). This implies that, historically, women and men have tended to play roles natural to their identity. As Tobach (2008, p. 17) explains, from the essentialists’ point of view “gender difference becomes a matter of nature rather than nurture”. Hence, women’s activities in peacebuilding for conflict resolution should be seen as an expression of “some hormonal, physiological, or genetic process, or societal enforcement of nutritive and other “feminine activities” (Tobach, 2008, p. 17). These gender essentialist arguments raise some questions like whether men really like being aggressive? Are men the only ones born to be political leaders?

Provoked by these questions, other scholars of gender illustrate that society imposes fighting on men as they have to be dragged, kicked and screamed at into aggressiveness. Indeed, men need to be constantly brainwashed and disciplined once in fighting situations or in war, and rewarded and honoured afterwards to keep them in the masculine world (Goldstein, 2001, p. 253). Additionally, society has difficulties in getting men to fight. Goldstein (2001), in his book on war and gender, gives several accounts showing men’s reluctance to fight. For this reason, society resorts to methods like conscription and harsh discipline in raising and maintaining fighters. Such methods include the use of religious belief, war dance and drugs to induce fighters (Goldstein, 2001, p. 253). Brock-Utne (2009, p. 211) illustrates how the military ensures that men must be tough, strong, competitive, never weak or troubled by empathy for the “enemy”. Moreover, as will be shown below, evidence in the BVN suggests socialisation rather than nature accounts for associating maleness (masculinity) with aggressiveness and femaleness (femininity) with peacefulness. My analysis is that biology provides diverse potentials; however, culture limits, selects, and channels them. Culture directly influences the expression of genes, the biology of our body and gender roles (Goldstein, 2001, p. 2). Before providing evidence of socialisation in the Benue Valley, I explain how gender differences/roles arise.

3.1.2 Gender construction and socialisation theory

According to socialisation theory, patriarchal societies socialise individuals (men and women) to take on masculine and feminine gender qualities and characteristics to acquire a sense of self (Wharton, 2012, p. 37). People learn what constitutes maleness and femaleness. Although their gender expectations may not be fully realised, people learn that they will at some level be held accountable to them; they will be assessed in part on their “appropriately” masculine or feminine roles (Wharton, 2012, p. 37). For this reason, gender socialisation has two parties.
One party—a new born (boy or girl) encounters the social world through socially interacting with parents and caretakers. Party two, the socialising agent—the individuals, groups, and institutions\(^\text{22}\) pass on gendered cultural information (Wharton, 2012, p. 38). Social learning theory suggests that individuals such as parents or caretakers (women and men) act as outside agents who model gender differences in their target persons. It asserts that learning gender roles takes place through reinforcement by applying positive and negative rewards which children receive for engaging in gender appropriate and gender inappropriate behaviours (Mischel, 1970). Furthermore, learning takes place through observation and modelling (Bandura and Walters 1963). Thus, children experience gender appropriate roles primarily through forms of rewards and punishments and/or vicariously through experiences and observation. That is, through differential treatment of female and male children, parents and other socialising agents enable gender differences and gender roles in the behaviour of their children. Wharton (2012, p. 39) illustrates the mechanism of social learning, giving an example of a three-year-old boy who falls down and cries only to be told (a) “be a big boy and stop crying” or gets ignored. Or (b) the boy gets picked up and comforted immediately. He argues that the child’s future reaction to similar situations may depend on these reactions. The child picked up and consoled may continue to display his feelings of pain and displeasure through tears, while the child scolded, cajoled or ignored may gradually learn that crying or similar emotional expressions should not be expressed in these situations. Notwithstanding a parent (man or women) modelling, a child’s response does not only depend on the outside agent, children also internalise what society defines as masculine and feminine and they take on accepted gendered behaviours and roles as the cognitive approach to socialisation explains.

The cognitive psychological approach argues that people internalise gender meanings from the outside world and then use those meanings to construct an identity consistent with them. They acquire gender roles from the membership of a family, group or institution and the meanings people attach to that membership (Bem 1993; Howard 2000). The meaning attached

\(^{22}\) Sociologists define an institution as those parts of social life that are complex, on-going, and organised. They seem so regular and so permanent that they are often accepted as just “the way things are” (Wharton, 2012, p. 86). Friendland and Alford (1991, p. 240) suggest that institutions have “a central logic—a set of material practices and symbolic constructions”. Its logic includes structures, patterns and routines, and the belief systems that supply these with meaning. Within its logic are roles, positions and expectations for individuals (Wharton, 2012, pp. 86-87). Patriarchy is one such institution studied here.
to these roles helps, guide and explains the individual’s behaviour. Bem’s (1993) cognitive theory based on gender schema\textsuperscript{23} argues that cultures like American society strongly reinforce gender distinctions and children learn to use gender to make sense of their experience and process new information. Through this process children acquire traits and personalities consistent with their understanding of maleness or femaleness (Wharton, 2012, p. 41). In addition, the cognitive approach suggests that in such a society, gender polarisation abounds. That is, “the belief that what is acceptable or appropriate for females is not acceptable or appropriate for males (and vice versa) and that anyone who deviates from these standards of appropriate femaleness and maleness is unnatural or immoral” (Wharton, 2012, p. 41-42).

Furthermore, Bem (1993) argues that androcentric gender schemas exist in societies with strong gender distinctions. That is the “belief that male and masculinity are superior to female and femininity, and that male and masculinity are standard or the norm”. In this way, patriarchal societies develop gender order which deny both women and men the true nature of human beings, that both possess the capacity to develop masculine and feminine qualities—especially, human peacefulness.

As Gilligan (2011, p. 56) illustrates, humans (female and male) can be selfish and cruel, competitive over resources and mates. However, “the revolutionary insight is that by nature we are cooperative, relational beings, and our capacity for mutual understanding is linked to the survival of our species”. Similarly, neuroscientists Antonio Damasio (1994) and Joseph LeDoux (1996) illustrate humans as “hard-wired to connect emotions and thought”, and the work of evolutionary anthropologist Hrdy (2009, p. 164) highlights the importance of empathy, mind-reading, and collaboration that “flexibility was, and continues to be, the hallmark of the human family”. In this case the qualities ascribed as masculine and feminine can be acquired by both genders. However, the constructions of rigid gender dichotomies persist in many contexts including the example of patriarchy in the BVN.

3.1.3 Socialisation in the Benue Valley, Nigeria (BVN)

The patriarchal cultures in the BVN socialise both genders differently and strongly enforce gender differences. For example, the Tiv people—the largest ethnic identity group in the

\textsuperscript{23} Martin and Halverson (1981, p. 1120) defines gender schemas as naive theories that guide information processing by structuring experiences, regulating behaviour, and providing bases for making inferences and interpretations; the information that a culture defines as being appropriated for, or linked to, males as masculinities versus females as femininities.
valley—begin gender socialisation at birth. The family buried the umbilical cord of a boy under a red pepper shrub, in order for the child to grow to be a brave man, of fierce temper and a fighter. It buried a girl’s umbilical cord under the foot of a pawpaw, silk-cotton or fig tree so that she grows to be gentle in nature (East, 2003, p. 330). From then, parents/guardians socialise boys and girls to follow masculine and feminine patterns.

3.1.4 Socialisation of boys until manhood

The Tiv culture socialised boys until manhood emphasising the hierarchical power structure of men over women. Families taught boys that men command and control women, and they own society. This characterises manhood. Families socialised boys to attain these characteristics using a positive and negative reward system of respect/humiliation and status/undervalue in their communities. For example, at the age of five, boys were taught to kill crickets. This is the age at which Gilligan (2005, p. 734), writing about patriarchy in the US which also applies to the BVN, describes patriarchy orchestrating what it takes to be a “real boy”; implanting “patriarchal structures within the psyche, the internalisation of the father’s voice or law”. Although boys may resist this process, parents enforce gender socialisation by often vicious practices of inclusion and exclusion (Gilligan, 2011, p. 27-28) as we see in the example of boy’s circumcision in the Tiv culture. This system forced most boys to internalise cultural scripts of manhood (Gilligan, 2004b, p. 103). In the Tiv culture, many boys internalised the killing of crickets in the BVN quickly, young boys formed groups and went out to hunt and kill crickets with sticks. At the age of about 10, boys turned their attention to killing lizards with the use of raffia twin bows and wooden arrows. Fathers made catapults, and bows and arrows for killing birds for boys at 13 years (East, 2003, p.334), thus, by excluding girls from these activities associating arms (bows and arrows), aggressiveness and competitiveness with maleness. Boys took part in these activities until circumcision.

Boy’s circumcision (for complete description of this rite see, East, 2003, pp. 28-29): This was the rite of passage from boyhood to manhood. It began to mark a critical gender polarisation that “real boys” did not act like girls, and boys learned androcentric gender schemas that males were superior to women, commanded and controlled women, and that they were masters of their emotions. Boys who resisted this rite received brutal shaming or humiliation by being called girls (Gilligan, 2004b, p. 104). Boy’s circumcision in the BVN used to take place between the ages of 16-18. Today parents do it at birth in the hospital. Nonetheless, I explain it here because most of those in position of traditional and political authority today in Tiv passed through this rite as boys leading to the present cultural practices in the BVN.
The initiator (man) depicted himself as one who had powers to command and control good and evil; he was one who had accomplished *akombo*. The initiator polarised gender in the mind of a boy by reinforcing the concept that women did not look upon an *akombo*, indicating women's differences to men. He also sowed androcentric gender schema in him by referring to the "Moon as maiden and the Sun as male-child" indicating female inferiority to males. During the rite if the boy did the "hyena's thing" i.e. defecated, the father would call him a girl (East, 2003, p.32). In addition, the ritual initiator used androcentric gender schema, as he repeated that he had conquered women and beasts (compared women to animals) and the father insisted that his son be brave like a man and not behave like a girl, thus reinforcing gender polarisation values in the boy. According to Gilligan (2011, p. 42), "it conveys willingness on the part of fathers to sacrifice love for the sake of hierarchy and honour, but also, most subtly, the recognition that love is the enemy of patriarchy". From the human needs perspective, this is paternalistic behaviour, an attempt to satisfy the FHNs of protection and identity (the boy's character to be a man), but HNT (Max-Neef, 1992; see Table 5) shows that paternalism as a satisfier only pretends to satisfy a given need and ends up inhibiting other FHNs, in this case, the FHNs of understanding, freedom and identity. Nonetheless, being circumcised had its reward, the boy headed straight to his mother's place once his wounds healed. There, he ran after any chicken of his choice, caught it and ate it in his father's house. The young man identified with his father's kin, following the patriarchal lineage as Gilligan (2011, p. 91) argues. He did not necessarily identify with the father *per se*, he identified with the voice of patriarchal authority, the law of the father, and the internalisation of its demands. As a man, he represented the voice of patriarchy not his father *per se*. This gave him the authority to go to his mother's place and catch a chicken to celebrate his "manhood". Notwithstanding circumcision, a true man (man of importance—*shagbaar*) was initiated into the rite of Biamegh (an *akombo* of True-manhood).

**The rite of “true-manhood” (For complete description of this rite see, East, 2003, pp. 218-221):** This rite was performed by men who had mastered the lower *akombo* necessary for *tar*

24 It is Tiv's magic-religious practice by which a man acquires power to do things beyond his normal human faculties (East, 2004, p. 209).

25 The hyena is said to defecate when it is frightened. However, in Tiv folklore, the hyena is a powerful animal that attacks and kills even human beings. So to say the boy did the "hyena thing" affirms him as brave, rather than acknowledge weakness in him.
sorun (how to govern), thus it introduced them to a group that was charged with law and order in Tiv (Ayangaor, 2011, p. 118-119). This rite cemented gender polarisation and androcentric gender schemas that men were superior to women, commanded and controlled women. For example, during the rite, the initiate ran backwards and forwards shouting, "Mother, Mother, you have born a son indeed! I have eaten hot pepper! I have taken women both dark and fair! Today I have finished the Biamegh" (East, 2003, p. 220)! The initiate emphasised on how a man is hot tempered like eating hot pepper (under which the family buried his umbilical cord) and conquering all types of women described as dark and fair in complexion—he, now a powerful man, conquered women. However, at this time the rite presumed the male person to be under distress so his wife or a female relative calmed him down. Gilligan (2004a, p. 145) describes this as women picking up men’s vulnerability and sensing the potential for violence. So, one of his female relations or his wife uttered shrill tremolo cries declaring the man’s bravery, at the same time rubbing him with camwood (a reddish and relaxing cream) to calm him down, but also show his greatness with the reddish powder that enabled him to glow. In my consideration, camwood symbolised the colour of our blood, reminding the initiate and others that this was a matter of life and death, but also the colour of a ripe fruit—a matured man. Therefore, from the HNT perspective (see Table 3), the care given by the woman attended to the man’s physical and mental health satisfying his FHN of protection, but also stimulated the satisfaction of the FHNs of understanding, affection and identity.

At the end of the rite, the man went home and bathed. Then, he dressed up, broke into song, into the middle of the village, dancing the Biamegh dance, and throwing taunts at those who had not been initiated. He intimidated them so that they would do what it took to be initiated. He now belonged to the Biamegh group—true-men (East, 2003, p. 221). Men placed importance on this symbolic status because it gave them power, hoping to satisfy the FHNs of protection and identity, but as HNT argues, symbolic status belong to pseudo satisfiers (see Table 4). It does not always satisfy FHNs. It stimulates the false sense of satisfying male identity, but it makes most men "bullies" especially towards women and diminished masculinities as seen here in the taunts of the initiated man to his fellow uninitiated. Gilligan (2005, p. 734) argues that this patriarchy achieves "a hierarchy that controls access to truth, power, salvation and knowledge; ... splitting our minds from our bodies, our thoughts from our emotions, ourselves from our relationships". Nonetheless, Gilligan (2011, p. 167) acknowledges that "underneath the terror, the war, the bullying, there is the human face" in men. This manifested in the circumcision rite, by the boy defecating and in the true-man's rite,
by the man requiring a woman to calm him down. Hence, we see men's vulnerability to violence in reality. The socialisation of men differently meant different roles for men and women in the formal and informal sector of the BVN. However, before I explain these roles, I shall proceed to give an account of socialisation for girls until womanhood.

3.1.5 Socialisation of girls until womanhood

Patriarchal families socialise girls in the BVN to play three different roles in the informal sector: managerial, productive and reproductive. Moser (1989, p. 1801), writing in the context of Latin America, (which also applies to the BVN), explains that, as informal community managers, women undertake local community work in urban and rural contexts; they carry out community mobilisation, consciousness raising and conduct popular education. Women in their productive role act as income earners for their families and finally, women in their reproductive role bear and rear children. While these three roles, from the HNT perspective (Max-Neef, 1992, and Cruz et al., 2009), are linked to the satisfaction of the FHNs of subsistence, protection, understanding, participation, and identity with synergic satisfiers; it also “catches women in a psychological and political trap” (Gilligan, 1995, p. 124). The trap by which some men thinking that women should only offer their services in the informal sector and should not participate in the formal sector of community life as illustrated below.

Mothers introduce girls to the managerial role. Girls receive teaching in preparing meals and taking care of the household. My experience of the BVN is that mothers teach girls that the most important task for women is feeding their families—a lifelong project. That means that they have to know the rules of social interactions at meals, rules about receiving visitors and serving them food in such a way that each member of the family and visitor feels welcomed in the house. This includes the treatment of every individual according to his specific status in society. This role requires that girls learn to offer and re/distribute food and hospitality in the family and to others. They also learn to gather firewood to sell as income for the household thereby playing a productive role in the family. At puberty, mothers teach girls to pound corn

26 Moser (1989, p. 1801) refers to these three roles as “the triple roles of women”, but she also notes that the term is not original to her. Others like Bronstein (1982) have discussed the three ways in which Third World peasant women suffer in terms of “triple struggle,” and European feminists have also used the term to refer to the increasing parental caretaker roles of women (Finch and Groves, 1983, 1986). This research follows Moser’s use of the term to explain the context of women’s initiatives in finding synergic satisfiers for the satisfaction of FHNs.
(or other grains for flour). In formal times, once married, women cooked and fed their families, went to farm, cooked and fed their families again when they returned from farming. When cotton was a major source of income, as soon as the family ate, the women sat to pick the seeds out of harvested cotton wool. When evening came they put this away and cooked to feed their families again. Then washed everything up and sat down this time to spin the cotton till drowsiness overcame them, whereupon they went to sleep (East, 2003, pp. 337-338). Men who had cotton spun for them by their wives might weave cloth and buy cattle with these. Sometimes a poor man became rich entirely from his wife's work. So women brought economic prosperity to their household (East, 2003, p. 338). In the modern Tiv, women who are educated might be working and earning money more than their husbands or they may be running businesses that bring income into their families.

It is my experience that nobody really teaches the reproductive role to girls because it revolves around the subject of sex, a taboo in this cultural context. When girls marry, they learn about their reproductive role by facing up to its reality with their husbands. However, when a woman gives birth to her first and second child, and sometimes even the third child, one of the mother-in-laws (mother of the husband or her mother) come and assist her in childbirth and rearing (this can last from three months to one year). In the absence of mother-in-laws, an older woman plays this role. This is a task that was (and is) done in the past and in the modern BVN. From the HNT perspective (see Table 3), this socialisation enables some women to play informal roles satisfying the FHN of subsistence, caring for their families which attends to the FHN of protection, and creating a sense of belonging in their families satisfying the FHN of identity.

While this initiation of girls in the informal sector offers women the opportunity to do good works, the initiation to womanhood often means an initiation into a kind of selfless work that leads to a lack of self-connection—the loss of psychological vitality and courage (Gilligan, 1995, p. 124). This psychological conflict arises because women have to silence themselves to be with men, give up some relationships for the sake of matrimonial relationship and as such feel stranded, in confusing isolation and often filled with self-condemnation (Gilligan, 1995, p. 125). This was the trauma that my mother went through with my father and Grace went through with Matthew—the good man who used to buy me books and give me money to go back to school, both women eventually separating from their husbands, as both men would not stand their wives questioning their authority (Chapter 1, under Introduction about the author). In the BVN, patriarchy knew (and knows) how to forcefully subordinate women. It prohibited women from participating in hunting and fighting, decision-making and all formal sectorial
activities. Among the Tiv, although some women resisted, ensuring that they complied, a magic/spiritual cult called the **Swende** was invoked if a woman got involved in hunting or fighting (this magic/spiritual cult seized women with a cough). It was said to cause a pregnant woman to cough till she miscarries. In addition, it was an offense against **Swende** for a woman to step over the blood of a man who died a violent death, or to look upon a dog which had been killed. This was to prevent women from going to fight or become involved in violent activities. To set the **Swende** right, the price of a he-goat and a cock had to be paid by her or by her husband/guardian (East, 2003, p.228-229). Given this socialisation, therefore, patriarchy only permitted and continues to permit women to perform their three roles in the formal sector and excludes them from the formal sector as I shall examine next.

### 3.1.6 Gender socialisation in the formal sector of the Benue Valley, Nigeria (BVN)

Patriarchy safeguards gender differences and roles in the BVN in the formal sector. It begins this process in the family—as observed in the traditional cultures of the Tiv and Idoma people. Ochefu (2007, p. 64) remarks that the societies of Tiv and Idoma have the compound referred to as **Ole** and as **Ya** the basic unit of social, political and economic organisation. This unit consists of a man, his wife or wives, children and a number of relations and other dependent elements. The man heads the family—known as **Okani** in Idoma and **Orya** in Tiv. He has predominant powers and controls access to the means of production—distributes returns on labour and rewards deserving members of the compound unit. He also supervises the spiritual needs of the compound, invoking his ancestors as and when necessary.

In the community, the council of elders (**Mnzoo u mbatamen**) serves as the political administrative structure for the Tiv. The council of elders, a quasi-representative assembly in which the members represent genealogical families who constitute a compound, a kindred or a clan as the case may be, form the council. Only men qualify for the council of elders. Men who have been initiated in **akombo** like **Biamegh** (see 3.1.4 above) qualify based on old age and because they have gained power to control people and socio-economic activities. A man takes his place at the assembly because he has been an assistant or an apprentice who followed his master to council meetings and assisted him in arguing cases. Therefore, he has experience of participating at council meetings. The oldest man in the council is the chairman of the council (Dzurgba, 2007, p. 127).

However, old women are not eligible to inherit seats in the council because of their sex. Women are grouped with children. These two groups are said to lack old age, experiential
knowledge and religious legibility. Thus, women and children are expected to be obedient and loyal citizens, but community leadership is exclusively for old men who are eligible because of their physical, intellectual, emotional and religious ability to gain and use power to control people and socio-economic activities (Dzurgba, 2007, p. 127). Additionally, for the Idoma, Okpeh, Jr. (2007, p. 184, cites Ode, 2002) writes that based on cultural practices Idoma men have two basic principles concerning women: a) they emphasise that men are superior and more important to women, and b) that men are more “intelligent”, “significant” and “worthwhile” than women. This is why patriarchal men in the BVN cultures exclude women from formal decision-making. This cultural practice is a Nigerian problem in general as Apenda (2007, p. 226) who is from the BVN writing on “Culture as a Barrier to Women Leadership” in Nigeria states “the society here sees women as intellectually and psychologically immature to be allowed to participate in some responsible leadership positions”. Similarly, Ogiji (2007, p. 115) writing on “Gender Integration and the Socio-Economic Construction of Politics in Nigeria: A Generic Approach” points out that a lot of men brought up in their cultures believe in Nigeria that women are naturally passive and irrational. Rather, women take care of homes and have the unique roles of mothering and housekeeping (Apenda, 2007, pp. 224-225). I shall proceed to demonstrate how decisions are made at community assemblies (Mnzoo u mbatamen) given an example of clan case.

In 2011, while at home for my fieldwork, Francis (pseudo name) came telling me that James (pseudo name) the husband of his sister was beating her because she was complaining that James had married a fourth wife. She was complaining because Francis’s sister has seven children (three boys and four girls) with James, but he contributes little for their up-bringing. Francis told me that his family is paying the school fees of four of the children - one boy and three girls. He also said that James had economic trees but once he harvested and sold the fruits of his trees, he would use the money to marry another woman instead of taking care of his family. I suggested to Francis that he could convocate a clan assembly of his in-laws and that I would be willing to accompany him to the case. He accepted and convoked a clan assembly with his in-laws. On that that day, I was in the car with Francis and his two brothers. Their mother came to my side and said, “I hope father (priest) you will ensure that the issue is resolved peacefully and that it does not become a conflict?” I said nothing to her, but once she

However, this research will demonstrate later that this allegation is not based on evidence or fact but based on the social construction of gender. Chapters 6 and 7 will exemplify that women have experiential knowledge and rationality.
was gone I asked Francis why he had not invited their mother. He said to me that he invited her but she had replied that “a lion does not fear women” so, they, the men should go and resolve the issue. On our way, I suggested to the three brothers that they should ask for some economic trees to be set aside for the payment of the school fees of their sister’s boys at least. (I could not ask for the girls because girls do not have inheritance rights in Tiv culture) They agreed with me that it was a good idea.

After about two hours of discussion, Francis put two propositions to his in-laws: a) James should stop beating his wife and b) that the elders should prevail on him to set aside some of his economic trees for his boys to sell and pay their school fees. A discussion ensured over these propositions and the assembly would not accept any of them. (At this assembly, just as we did not come with women, the clan did not invite women to it; it was only Francis’ sister and the mother-in-law, but there were more than ten men representing their families in the clan.) At this stage I intervened and asked the mother-in-law if she had issues with her wife (the son’s wife). She said no that her wife was feeding her very well and she is happy with her. I then asked her what she thought about the suggestion that his son should set aside some economic trees for the payment of her grandchildren’s school fees. She agreed that it was a good suggestion. However, the oldest man in the clan who was presiding at the assembly said that what the woman had just said was nonsense; indeed that it was a sword in the family that was causing injury to the family. Nonetheless, the mother-in-law justified her answer by arguing that the clan’s assembly was not in support of the suggestion, but that it could not ensure that his son will pay his children’s school fees. So why can it not prevail on him to set aside trees for this good use?

In the end, the assembly of men said that they could not agree that economic trees be set aside for small boys (Francis sister’s children)—that would be vihin tar (spoiling the world). They also said that they could not agree that their son will stop beating his wife because it is cultural that a man should discipline his wife and that not even the courts could stop it. In fact, they said that Francis’ suggestion was a foreign culture, an imposition on them, but that it will not happen. One man said that he had four wives and he beats them to discipline them, they are his wives nobody can stop it. They described the request to stop beating the wife as “a man throwing a stone in the bush to see if there was somebody in it”; hence, they assured us that there were men in their clan to defend their culture. On the issue of their son marrying too many wives, they said that was up to his wife (Francis’ sister). She could deal with that, in fact, that their son had married two others before, but they left, so if his wife behaved well this one too will soon go.
In my opinion, it is the cultural socialisation I have elaborated above that is responsible for this kind of decision involving a woman. I had not anticipated that the men in the clan assembly would say out-rightly that they cannot agree to stop beating their wives and that even the courts could not stop them. This case was pivotal for my secondary review research at home. I met a lawyer who specialised in gender issues; she confirmed what the men in the assembly had said. She also facilitated me with material on gender issues in the Nigerian Constitution that I relate below. Just before I do this, surprisingly, in 2013, Francis beat his wife and she complained to me. When I asked Francis how he could do that, given that I had accompanied him to his in-laws to stop the beating of his sister. He laughed and said to me that I should know this “thing” (beating of women) is cultural, but that he was annoyed with his wife. He also said that he had some good news for me; he had invested about $750 on a local business for her sister—James’ wife with James permission so that her sister will work and pay the school fees of her other three children. I shall now explain how cultural socialisation which emphasis that women are like children and less rational than men and therefore should be disciplined by men (Ode, 2002; Dzurgba, 2007; Ogiji, 2007 etc.) has also subordinated women in Nigerian law such that even the courts cannot stop men beating their wives.

Nigeria is a member of the international community, and since 1985, it has signed without reservation and ratified the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). Given that Nigeria also ratified the Optional Protocol on CEDAW, which strengthened existing enforcement mechanisms, Nigeria has committed itself to be bound by the provisions of CEDAW and its Optional Protocol. Article 2 indicates that violence against women is a form of discrimination and article 16 of CEDAW requires state parties to take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations. Furthermore, it obliges state parties to specify a minimum age for marriage, and to make the registration of marriages compulsory. In addition to the international commitments, Section 1(3) Chapter I of the Nigerian Constitution enshrines equal rights of women and men; an equality in law.

In my view, given the cultural socialisation as elaborated above, the Constitution also provides for and protects the right to culture in the name of customary law. Dura (2014) argues that the Constitution ignores the fact that in Nigeria certain cultural practices are unjust and harmful to women. She argues for a change in the constitution, to provide a clause that prescribes such practices as null and void. In 2006 after a serious campaign by women’s groups for the domestication of CEDAW’s principles in Nigerian law; a bill was put to the National Assembly as “the Abolition of all Forms of Discrimination against Women in Nigeria and other Related
Matters” (Adamu and Para-Mallam, 2012, p. 808). This bill was voted down by the assembly in 2007. In dealing with the issue of discipline concerning women, Section 55(1) (d) of the Nigerian Penal Code provides that “Nothing is an offence, which does not amount to the infliction of grievous harm upon any person and which is done by a husband for the purpose of correcting his wife”. This subordination of women is also in the statutory provision of the Nigerian Police, a body charged with law enforcement. For example, its rule 122, states that married women are disqualified from enlisting in the police; a police woman who is single at the time of her enlistment must spend two years in the service before applying for permission to marry giving particulars of fiancé who must be investigated and cleared before permission for marriage is granted. Moreover, police women married to civilian husbands are disallowed from living in police barracks (Dura, 2014). Additionally, Section 126 of the Police Regulations provides that a pregnant and married woman police officer be granted maternity leave, but a pregnant but unmarried woman police officer be discharged from the force. Therefore, there is nobody to protect women in the Nigerian society if the police force that enforces laws subordinates women. Hence, customary practices such as polygamy and wife inheritance (discussed later), right of men to beat their wives in the name of discipline (like my father and Matthew, see Chapter one; Francis, James and the men in his clan), and others are entrenched, and in practice take precedence over equality in the BVN communities where they are carried out. It is therefore questionable whether the constitutional protection of gender equality makes a difference to women (like Francis’s sister and James’s wife) living in communities with a strong commitment to cultural norms and practices. I would contend that based on the evidence above that women, as opposed to men, do not have inherent equal rights with men according to the patriarchal culture in the BVN.

Women peacebuilding: Nonetheless, within the BVN, as a consequence of women’s informal work, women get the task of peacebuilding. As one historical example, the women’s cult known as *imgbianjor* (Photo 5), a cult of fertility in Tiv, which relate how they perform peacebuilding work.

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28 The cult of *imgbianjor* was an important institution for women. It protected young women from being violated by men. Mothers took their daughter to an old woman initiator into the *imgbianjor* cult. The initiator performed a ceremony and tied a snail shell round the girl’s neck to prevent anyone from violating her (East, 2003, p. 337). The snail shell served as the emblem for this cult. Any man who violated a girl with this emblem attached to her was said to become impotent. To set things right, he had to pay bride price for the girl (which is *sar-akor* in Tiv meaning to untie the snail shell).
Dzurgba (2007, pp. 127-128) shows that a female traditional institution called the *Imgbianjor* historically existed in Tiv, this institution empowered Tiv women to perform peacebuilding by its deity (akombo a ukase). The membership of *Imgbianjor* included all married women, both old and young. Women in *Imgbianjor* performed peacebuilding work during occasions of social and economic crises such as drought, famine, poor harvest, epidemic and violence with blood bathing. The women leaders invited all married women to their holy place where they performed religious rituals. After appeasement, propitiation and expiation had been made to the female deity (*Imgbianjor*), the women moved from the shrine and walked from one compound to another each carrying the leaves of *ikyura ukase* (the protection of women) in their right hand. They solemnly sang religious songs calling to the female deity to bless the land (*tar*) with abundant rainfall, foodstuffs, cash crops, good health and fertility in women, men and animals. At the same time, the women called upon the council of men to ensure protection, security and peace in the land. Women in the BVN continue to play this role in the informal sector, this was the role Francis’s mother was playing when she petitioned me to ensure the discussion with their in-law clan went well and it did not become a violent conflict.

Mother’s side: Furthermore, patriarchal Tiv applies its principle of masculine men associated with violence and feminine women associated with peace to the father’s side and mother’s side in Tiv culture. The *ityo* (or territorial based father’s people/land) represents a place for
men to claim land and earn influence, but is also considered the source of any sorcery (spiritual/physical harm) that can be directed against them. At the same time, the *igba* (mother's people/land) occupies a safe haven looked open for nurturance, shelter and security in times of danger, a place for men to live without fear for as long as they want (Keil, 1997, p. 191). This also explains why Francis's family (above) have accepted to pay the school fees of four children of their sister and set up a business for her, to pay the school fees of the remaining three children although she is married to another clan. Like the Tiv, the Chamba, Jukun and Kuteb who inter-marry, maternal uncles are believed to be the owners of the lives of children born by their sisters and these children can play pranks, feel free and have jokes including socially acceptable “stealing” with their maternal uncles (Ahmadu and Danfulani, 2006, p. 279). A Jukun man can go to his maternal uncle and enter his farm to help himself with bundles of corn; he might borrow his horse in order to go on a journey and a maternal uncle might even have to sell his only horse to pay for the debts of his nephews (Meek, 1931, p. 110). In the BVN, such nephews are peace emissaries, in time of conflict; they are the intermediaries for their father’s kinsmen and their mother’s kinsmen. Thus, they act as peace mediators who use the inter-marriage institution as peacebuilding block (Torkula, 200?, under the Igba Factor). In the times when Tiv people were “capturing” women for marriage—an *igba* (mother’s side) son would be sent with *ayande* (a symbol of peace) with a request to return the “captured” women (Torkula, 200?, under Kwase Ngohol). Additionally, according to Section 121 of the Police Regulations, women police officers are as a general rule to be employed on duties which are concerned with women and children; they are required to place the alphabet “W” before their rank (Dura, 2014). These reinforce gender polarisations in the BVN and offer reasons as to why most women may perform care work and may not take up male gender roles. As Gilligan (2011, p. 19) comments, “in the gendered universe of patriarchy, care is a feminine ethic, not a universal one. Care is what good women do, and the people who care are doing women’s work”. However, despite the potency of the gendered polarisation through socialisation described above, it is important to recognise that some women play different roles in conflict and do not follow the patriarchal script.

### 3.1.7 Gender complexity in conflict

In spite of men’s hierarchical power, command and control over women, women’s role in relation to conflict does vary. In situations of violent conflict, Pankhurst (2000) writes that there are different ways in which women live: as fighters, community leaders, social organisers, workers, farmers, traders, welfare workers, and many other roles—they could also play central roles in the process of conflict (Tefera, 2005, p. 113). For example, research on
women's involvement in conflict in Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan East Africa indicates women cooked and worked as intelligence officers (Tefera, 2005; Minale, 2001; El-Bushra, 2000;). Other research also indicates that in some wars, some women played both "peacebuilding" and "war-mongering" roles (El-Bushra 2000; Mukta 2000; Jacobson 2000). Additionally, a number of research works on war highlight women's direct involvement in violence or in motivating men in their communities to fight (Vickers 1993; El-Bushra 2000; Mukta 2000; Jacobson 2000). In West Africa, research in the state of Liberia shows that some women offered Charles Taylor's rebel group some "primary infrastructure of resistance" (Aning 1998a and 1998b); they contributed to Taylor's campaign during his early period of political support by facilitating his contacts with influential individuals in the West African sub-region who had the capability to support his ambition. Aning (1998a, p. 8) contends that America-Librierian women raised about US$ 1 million for Taylor's NPFL in their early campaign.

In the BVN, despite the static portrayal of gender relationships exemplified in 3.1.2 to 3.1.6 above, some women have been successful leaders in the past. For example in the late 18th century, Ojedi Umedei emerged among the Igala as a powerful leader (Apenda, 2007, p. 228). In the Hausaland (Northern Nigeria), women's access to political participation was exemplified by the Queen of Daura Emirate, one of the earliest women who held political power over men. In addition, Queen Amina of Zazzau was a renowned military and political leader whose exploits outlived those of Queen Daura. She waged wars on Hausaland and won them all, such that men of Kano and Katsina brought her tributes (Agaba, 2007, p. 75). In Nigeria during the civil war, women, teenage girls and young female adults, some married and with children, joined militias and the military (Uchendu, 2007, p. 113). Women recruited into the militia joined military procedures and operations, a requirement for infantry memberships. Women headed their own platoons, for example a women's militia platoon kept internal security within the Biafra area. The platoon leaders received training to use guns but not the rest of the platoon. Platoon leaders carried guns in order to protect themselves but also to distinguish them from their subordinates. Moreover, some women went to the war front as described by a male solder: "I know about three women in the Biafran army – gallant soldiers with us at the front; one came from Ubulu-ukwu the other from Ogwashi-uku and the third from Orlu" (Uchendu, 2007, p. 120). Other women took the initiative to spy on behalf of Biafra. Knowing full well that if caught they would end up like Faustina Oko, executed in Ogwashi-ukwu in 1968 for allegedly spying on the Nigerian federal troops for Biafran soldiers (Uchendu, 2007, p. 119). As well as enlisting, Enemugwem's (2009) research on the Nigerian Civil War demonstrates that, Obolo (Andoni) women played a significant part in the causes of the war and enlisted in
the Biafran army and paramilitary forces. The women performed broadcasting and propaganda duties and acted in the paramedical corps. In addition, after the war they contributed towards reconciliation, reconstruction and rehabilitation programmes in the war affected areas.

However, it is important to point out that although some women joined the military, the military continued to discriminate against them. Women militia members only received training for three weeks instead of the six months given to their male counterparts (Uchendu, 2007, p. 115). Some battalion commanders kept them busy with odd tasks in their administrative headquarters and others rejected them. Some gave women responsibilities as telephone operators, aides to quarter masters, issuing supplies to soldiers and new entrants into the army (Uchendu, 2007, p. 117). Notwithstanding, as telephone operators, they helped to coordinate combatants units in different locations and to pass information about enemy troops movement to Biafran army officers (Uchendu, 2007, p. 118). In addition, Uchendu (2007, p. 122) points out that the Biafran women who fought in the civil war received no payment. The army officers did not recognise their zeal for service and did not treat them in the same manner as they treated the male soldiers. The Biafran payroll included only male soldiers, it excluded female members and if found taking part in combat could be disarmed and sent back to camp.

As the discussion above demonstrates, both men and women can be peaceful and violent, and neither form homogenous groups. As Reimann (2002, p. 3) points out, the characteristics of gender is fluid and historically changeable. One cannot speak of a generic standpoint for women and men and one single notion of femininity and masculinity in a given society. Rather, one finds complex plural forms of femininities and masculinities, which, in turn, are constantly open to social challenges and change. It is important to recognise that all women and all men do not experience the dichotomised relationship between conflict and conflict resolution which the construction of gender socialisation suggests. To acknowledge that universal claims about women and peace cannot be sustained, throughout this thesis I refer to the socially constructed role of some (not all) women as peacebuilders in the BV. Nonetheless, I consider that the persistent influence and rigidity of the gender order in the BV does help to explain why most men and most women experience a structured gender division of violence/peace and public/private work which enables some women to develop ways of performing peacebuilding work for conflict resolution as work which arises from their practice of care.
3.2 Women's socialised skills in peacebuilding

In this section, I argue that gender socialisation enables some women to bring experiential knowledge and rationality in the form of coexistence, coalition-building, courage and determination to peacebuilding work in conflict resolution. This women's work belongs within the ethics of care. While admitting that these skills are by no means limited to women, it is the case that through gender socialisation, women are more apt to undertake work based on a sense of duty and not as imposed work (Gilligan, 2011, p. 24). As Gilligan (2011, p. 25) distinguishes within patriarchal culture, care is a feminine work—what good women do—but the ethics of care “heard in its own right and on its terms, it is a human voice”. It is a work that both men and women can do for the well-being of all human beings. Therefore, the ethics of care is the vision that self and others will be treated as of equal worth, that despite differences in power, things will be fair; the vision that everyone will be responded to and included, that no one will be left alone or hurt (Gilligan, 1982, p. 63). This is what the HNT requires for the satisfaction of FHNs as a peacebuilding measure; finding liberating processes for the satisfaction of unmet FHNs. I examine women’s peacebuilding skills beginning with women in the BVN’s use of the concept of coexistence.

3.2.1 Women's use of coexistence concept in peacebuilding for conflict resolution

I argue in this subsection that some women use the concept of coexistence (live and let live) acquired from gender-socialised experiences in their peacebuilding activities, because in societies such as the BVN, women have the task of running peaceful homes in a cooperative (no-coercive) way where a man may have many wives and many children. Women also organise other women for community work without the use of force. It falls to women to offer and distribute satisfiers in a caring manner to members of their family for harmonious existence. The concept of coexistence is important for women to succeed in a non-coercive way in their managerial role as mothers, head wife in a compound unit or as community women’s leader. Some women use this experience in conflict situations performing peacebuilding work. According to Porter (2007, p. 80) coexistence in peacebuilding implies some acceptance of the need to live with fundamental differences between individuals, groups and nation-states. In coexistence work, some women encourage antagonistic groups to avoid confrontation and seek resolutions that permit groups to overcome crises and live together despite conflicts of interest or irreconcilable differences. Coexistence work arises because of some women’s belief that it paves the way towards consensus and cooperation, and it
responds to the “alien other,” the “enemy” and accepts their right to exist. Weiner (2000, p. 20) suggests that without the concept of coexistence, there would only be dedication to struggle, victory or defeat. Therefore, to change the concept of win-lose, some women practice coexistence work as a strategy to try and gain win-win solutions. Weiner (2000, p. 15) argues that coexistence seems minimalist sometimes, often simply allowing antagonists to live in the same locality, but it can be a prelude to a durable peace. He defends the usefulness of coexistence work, particularly in ferocious conflicts between ethnic identity groups such as in Lebanon, Nigeria, Pakistan and Sudan. In addition, Kriesberg (2000, p 184) shows that coexistence helps people to move beyond destructive relationships. It motivates the propensity to push aside feelings of hate, fear, and loathing, to discard views of the other as dangerous and subhuman, and to abandon the desire for revenge and retribution.

However, does coexistence means accepting all differences and obliging others to abandon a search for justice? The answer is no, the women still analyse and reject relationships of domination, violence, sectarianism and racism. As Flax (1993, p. 111) points out, all differences are not equal nor do they deserve the same socio-political consideration. Squires (1993, p. 9) supports this argument, he argues that we do not celebrate all manifestations of otherness; we need principled positions to foster political articulation and ethical justification. Thus, Cockburn (1998, p. 24) illustrates how the women identify “the space between the differences” with examples of ways in which women seek commonalities, listen carefully and respectfully, and how the women are sceptical of damaging labels and are “intelligent in selecting agendas that they can work on, or setting aside issues that they cannot” (Cockburn, 1998). Therefore, these women’s use of coexistence skills is a rational process that does not accept all differences as legitimate.

Moreover, Chigas and Ganson (2003, p. 76) stress coexistence as a rational strategy to an end, the political importance in communicating an altered vision for society, a vision of shifting the social norm from one of ethno-national exclusion to one of tolerance, cooperation, and in some cases, multi-ethnicity. Porter (2007, p. 82) concludes that some women’s coexistence initiatives challenge exclusionary nationalist strivings of dominance. Since a lack of willingness for engagement in unresolved tensions over socio-political differences of visions can easily explode into conflict. Furthermore, coexistence as a skill is a rational strategy leading to coalition-building over common values and goals in peacebuilding for resolving conflict.
3.2.2 Women's use of coalition-building in peacebuilding and conflict resolution

In this section, I argue that by being able to give affective responses some women get people in a situation of conflict to listen to other perspectives that help in coalition-building. I have suggested that patriarchal societies socialise females to gain competence in empathy (the capacity to adopt another person's perspective) (Hoffman, 1977, p. 712). Although Hoffman (1977, p. 716) argues that boys and girls can equally assess how someone feels, he agrees that in some girls the "awareness of the other's feelings is more apt to be accompanied by a vicarious affective response". This vicarious affective response helps in forming coalitions in situations of conflict for conflict resolution. By being able to give affective responses some women convince people in a situation of conflict to listen to other perspectives. These kinds of women are not just using their emotions, but connecting them with thoughts (LeDoux, 1996). They enable others to feel understood and listened to, creating an environment for dialogue. As Porter (2007) explains, some women draw (think through) on their common tasks as mothers and/or nurturers to build coalitions across hostile differences. She relies on Young's (2006, p. 123) definition of politics as "public communicative engagement with others for the sake of organising our relationships and coordinating our actions most justly". Porter (2007, p. 84-85) argues that this definition helps us in examining women's coalitions because many women do not explicitly define their activity as political.

Often what some women begin as a dialogue is a common language born of pain and grief—experiential knowledge that helps them to form coalitions based on their thoughtful empathetic mutual understanding of life. For example, according to Mariam Djibrilla Maiga the founding member and President of the National Women's Movement for the Maintenance of Peace and National Unity, Mali, the mechanisms used by this movement demand shared social values: "they emphasise parenting and families, and they also emphasise marriages and extended family networks" (Porter, 2007, p. 86). From the HNT perspective, these women come to the consensus that families and communities have unmet needs (Porter, 2007, p. 87). Therefore, the women form coalitions across borders that rely on common values and goals, satisfying the needs of subsistence, protection and identity, which should be the focus of attention rather than the divisive elements or interests often stifling group peace. This coalition building is a rational strategy that creates the environment for a re/distribution of satisfiers; however, it requires courage and determination for its success.
3.2.3 Women’s use of courage and determination in peacebuilding

In this section, I argue that being socialised to care and provide meals for the household year after year in the BVN requires courage and determination; skills used in peacebuilding work. In the BVN, in times of difficulties, men offer little help to women in providing meals for families. Women resort to their productive role to provide for the needs of their families (Moser, 1989, p. 1801). For example, East (2003, p. 377) remarks that, as farmers, the Tiv laugh at non-Tivs (traders who live among them); the Tivs call the traders “lazy people” because they farm for them. However, Tiv men sell their entire farm produces at the time of harvest; when food prices are cheapest. When the out-of-season time comes, Tiv women work laboriously collecting wood to sell to the traders living among them in exchange for cassava which their husbands sold at cheap price or cassava from the trader’s farms that Tiv men made for the traders. Thus, East concludes, Tiv men suffer from their improvidence (irrationality) and it is the women who have to sweat it out, but also make the ethical decision that they will provide meals for their families in this situation of crisis.

Additionally, meals are social and peaceful events in the BVN. Thus, providing meals presents a particular challenge of connecting emotions with thoughts (LeDoux, 1996) to women’s informal role in managing families. Men expect women to make sure that a peaceful atmosphere prevails in the home despite the difficulties in providing meals. So women plan and provide good meal menus, fix appropriate times and places that the family will eat and ensure that all in the family observe informal rules that govern meals. Moreover, women have to ensure that meals take place as kind events, calm times and/or as important getting together times (DeVault, 1991, p. 49). This process requires rational and experiential knowledge, testing Tiv women’s skills in bringing civility to meals, given that a typical Tiv house in rural areas comprises of 10 to 100 people (Atel, 2004, p). The process also requires courage and determination as women have to cross many personal borders (women’s and men’s). As families celebrate at the table, meals also come with risk, a possible lack of satisfaction or poor meals can lead to family break-up. Women tread boundaries very carefully to keep family members together. Some women take these skills, despite the risk, into conflict zones. As Porter (2007, p. 93) suggests, boundaries are not merely territorial or national demarcations of land, but they are cultural, ethnic, religious, gendered, sexualised and personal. Organising across borders requires defiance of acceptable norms and in conflict zones, entails high risks. Even so, countless examples can be found of women’s courage in building peace across borders. As Kofi-Annan (2000, p. 1) acknowledged at the Security Council meeting on “Women, Peace and Security”, many women have been building bridges rather than walls in situations of
conflict. He recognised that women's organisations at grassroots level foster confidence by organising across borders, both regionally and internationally.

Porter (2007, p. 93) suggests that some women organise across borders because most women's organisations do not have political affiliations and are thus in a position to provide supportive assistance, aid, trauma counselling, education and rights awareness campaigns to people regardless of ethnic or political differences. These women draw on the necessity to care for the needs of a suffering people to which political considerations are often secondary. For this reason, Anderlini (2007, p. 232) insists that women's approach to peacebuilding opens up communication and dialogue regarding acceptance that conflict affects all involved in it and so all affected parties should participate in the resolution of conflict. She adds that more than anything, the women connect reason with emotions as they roll up their sleeves and get on with the arduous business of recovery, helping the displaced, caring for ex-soldiers and orphans, running a business or entering politics. This task requires experiential knowledge and rationality, as well as courage and determination to carry on, especially when they do not have superior power to command and control others, but to act as subordinates to men. For example, Ojoh (2012, p. 51) gives the example of Women's Aid Collective (WACOL) of Southern Nigeria who at their annual meeting discuss (analyse) how to champion their rights and work towards the development of areas in conflict. Women of different faiths, including Protestants, Catholics and Traditional Religionists usually come together to harness a programme for the common good of their communities irrespective of what religious belief one professes. This helps their communities in fostering collaboration and trust.

Consequently, in 3.2, I have answered the second question that arose from Chapter 2 on the kinds of skills some women bring to their peacebuilding work. I have exemplified how some women bring their socialised gendered experiential knowledge and rationality that connects emotions and thought (LeDoux, 1996) to develop skills of coexistence, empathy for coalition building, courage and determination to their peacebuilding work. As such, I go on to examine how the women use their skills to inform their peacebuilding initiatives that attend to the satisfaction of human needs. Although HNT has been gender blind and patriarchal gender bias is against women, women's experiential knowledge and rationality in their families and communities leads them to perceive these needs.

3.3 Women's initiatives in peacebuilding

In this section, I argue that, as well as enabling women to develop peacebuilding skills, gender socialisation also attunes some women to recognising the root causes of conflicts in the
deprivation of FHN. I give examples of how some women rationalise that the frustration of needs causes conflict and the satisfaction of needs as vital to the resolution of conflict (East, 2003; Tobach, 2008; Christie, 2006, 1997; De la Rey, and McKay, 2006; Lazarus and Taylor, 1999). For example, in the BVN, the Tiv people offer hospitality to strangers (East, 2003, pp. 274-375 for the complete ritual). However, women provide this hospitality—offering a meal to visitors in a ritual way—and pay attention to the behaviour of the visitor. From this practice, women understand that needs frustration constitutes a source for conflict. Here, the women are the ones who offer hospitality and observe whether a man is of good character. This is a ritual that can create conflict, because a visitor who comes to a man’s house and does not receive good treatment feels enmity toward the family. Men refuse to stay over in the house of an unmarried man saying that nobody there can meet their needs. From the HNT perspectives, my analysis is that giving visitors meals is a rational act of rendering them respect—attending to the FHNs of affection and protection, and giving them a sense of belonging attends to the FHN of identity (Max-Neef, 1992, 2009). In this regard, women are the ones who have the experiential knowledge and rationality to re/distribute satisfiers for satisfying FHNs in the informal sector of society.

However, I would like to note that this same source of women’s skills and rationality subordinates women in their society. As West (1997, p. 136) alludes to this culture that attaches care work as part of women’s identity to provide such services free of charge in the informal sector of their society with no choice to participate in the formal sector thus women are dependent on a husband or men they serve. This has to change as care work is vital for human survival and, as such, needs to be practiced by both genders. Nonetheless, as Lazarus and Taylor’s (1999) research illustrates, some women reason that “meeting basic needs is a necessary requirement for peace, allowing people to grow and flourish, and reach their potential”. This experiential knowledge and rational vision allows the women to practice the satisfaction of needs as structural peacebuilding. For example, Christie’s (2006) research with women shows how women stress that the satisfaction of human needs is germane to all activity, including war-making and peace building. Similarly, Tobach (2008) reveals that women argue that the primary individual in situations of PSC requires clean air and water, food, sleep and safety in order to satisfy his/her FHNs of subsistence and protection. Yet again, De la Rey and McKay’s (2006) research with women in South Africa illustrates the argument that the women studied consider the satisfaction of FHNs as a priority in peacebuilding work. The women point out that “in a context where basic needs are met, people are more likely to
develop an appreciation of differences of culture, race, ethnicity and religion”. This work is in direct opposition to structural violence that generates poverties.

3.3.1 Women’s work for structural peace

In this subsection, I illustrate that the satisfaction of FHNs needs is a necessary structural peacebuilding in situations of PSC because the use of force is not likely to resolve it. In 2.3.7, I argued that structural violence frustrates FHNs and generates poverties that, any FHN frustrated leads to a particular poverty giving rise to poverties of subsistence, protection, affection, participation, and identity leading to violent conflicts. This is why Christie (1997, p. 321) suggests that violence can be averted by the satisfaction of FHNs; resolving conflicts can also occur by developing means of anticipating the satisfaction of and preventing the frustration of FHNs of identity and protection. Burton (1990, p. 3) invented the term “provention” because, he argues, prevention has the connotation of containment. Preventive approaches would identify steps that could be taken to remove the causes of an undesirable event, including conflict, by creating conditions that do not give rise to its causes. Christie (1997, p. 322) suggests that these conditions might involve, among others, collaborative behaviours and valued relationships. Some women have significantly developed non-violent ways by seeking collaborative behaviours and valued relationships in their peacebuilding work.

3.3.2 Women’s work against structural violence in Southern Nigeria

In this subsection, I demonstrate how some women use protest against structural violence to seek it ends. Structural violence frustrates their care work, which involves rational activities, such as preparing meals, washing clothes, bathing, play and interactions (Wharton, 2012, p. 164). Some women use protest to seek peace for performing their roles in their communities. The women calculate that outstanding ideals require team effort and group collaboration as well as individual accountability (Kouzes and Posner, 2007, p. 20). As such, protest in peacebuilding allows women from both sides to come together and participate in actions that lead to their vision of having peace in their communities. By coming together from both sides, the women reason that they will also gain strength in numbers. As Allmendinger and Hackman’s (1995, p. 43) research suggests, once women become a significant minority (i.e. greater than 10%), they gain power and cannot be easily overlooked by their male counterparts. Moser (1989, p. 1801), writing in the context of Latin America suggests that by this action, the women put direct pressure on the state or organisations to put infrastructure for the satisfaction of needs in place.
Similarly, in Southern Nigeria, some women organise protests against extreme government policies and social norms. They protest against local and state laws, and traditional and social norms that frustrate the FHNs of protection and identity (Ikelegbe, 2005, pp. 251-252). This is a rational process that involves the identification of grievances, a motion of adoption for protest then, the women proceed in procession with bells and drums to the community squares and to their leaders to present their grievances. When no satisfactory resolution comes of their protest, the women relocate en masse outside their communities (Ikelegbe, 2005, p. 252). How does protest in this manner qualify as a peacebuilding measure? In 2.1, I discussed how the deprivation or satisfaction of FHNs of protection and access to social and political institutions depends largely on social, political and economic interactions in a given state. People endow the state with authority to govern and to use force where necessary to regulate and arbitrate society needs, and to protect citizens and the collective goods (Azar, 1990, 10). For these reasons, states have the support of their citizens to promulgate polices of regulation, extraction, allocation and arbitration of the satisfaction of FHNs. Where state polices promote the deprivation of FHNs, people oppose them. That is, state policies that promotes systematic inequality in the distribution of economic and political resources in its society (Burton, 1996). Thus, by protesting, these women work against authoritative and exploitative governance that frustrates the FHNs of protection and identity and its effects on their communities. Furthermore, I examine how some women oppose traditional and social norms that create structural violence against some women identity groups.

3.3.3 Women's work against social norms that promote structural violence in Nigeria

In this subsection, I illustrate how some women are working against the disowning/disinheriting of women, girl's virginity and HIV tests, and a dress-code for women in Nigeria. Firstly, the tradition of the Igbo people of Southern Nigeria condemns divorce, it permits divorce only in cases of adultery. However, some men accuse their wives simply because they bear them no male sons. They accuse them of adultery in order to marry other women to bear them male children. A women's organisation called Women's Aid Collective (WACOL) fights against this cultural abuse of women and children. It offers them legal protection and facilitates the sharing of information and experiences between organisations. WACOL also fights against disinheritance of property, girls and widows in Southern Nigeria (Ojoh, 2012, p. 51). Secondly, the Nigerian Feminist Forum (NFF) and other groups of women have stopped an attempt by a private university to force virginity and HIV testing on Nigerian girls entering its institution. Moreover, NFF put an end to a federal bill sponsored by the
female chairperson of the Nigerian Senate Committee for Women and Youths, to institutionalise a dresscode for women in Nigeria. NFF together with other women's groups organised several press conferences and argued against the dresscode, they mobilised women to fill the hall where the public hearing on the bill took place (Madunagu, 2008, p. 669). They defeated the bill on the floor of the house because of their actions and its lack of public support. From the HNT perspective, I would argue that WACOLL, NFF and the other groups of women worked against the marginalisation of and discrimination against women which frustrates women's FHNs of protection and identity. In the next subsection, I illustrate how some women use synergic satisfiers for the satisfaction of the FHN of identity.

3.3.4 Women's use of synergic satisfiers in attending to the FHN of Identity

In this subsection, I demonstrate how some women from Southern Nigeria insist on peaceful resolution of land (identity) conflict in their communities. Azar (1990, p. 7) suggests that resolving or inflaming conflict depends on the level of disarticulation between the state and society as a whole and the way it mediates individual interests and needs. People want to satisfy their FHNs of protection, identity and others; the satisfaction of these needs can build peace for the resolution of PSC. On the question of whether the use of force can succeed in containing or resolving PSC; Burton (1990) argues that deterrence in practice will likely fail in conflicts concerning the frustration of FHNs. That is, power bargaining and negotiations may not resolve a conflict when the FHNs of protection and identity remain unsatisfied. Moreover, Lebow and Stein (1987) reviewed some historical cases in which deterrence failed, and they noted that deterrence works in opportunistic cases rather than cases based on the necessity to satisfy needs or vulnerability. Thus, Christie (1997, p. 321) concludes that, from a human needs perspective, the resolution of protracted identity conflicts often requires the satisfaction of needs.

For example, land conflicts in Nigeria pertain to identity conflict because, traditionally, people are identified with a particular land.29 For example, the Tiv of the BVN conceive their land to belong to their fathers—ancestors—and is, as such, sacred (Wegh, 1998, p. 23). Land cannot be owned as an individual property and it is not marketable because it belongs to the community. However, only men hold land in the name of their community (Atel, 2004, p. 20). Because of this, community identity approach attached to land, land conflicts are identity

29 This issue of land is taken up again in Chapter 4 under "Ownership and Use of Land in the Benue Valley".
conflicts. Some women have helped to resolve these kinds of conflicts. For example, Ojoh (2012, p. 46) reveals that some women in Abia State used the "ime udo" (to make peace) strategy to resolve land conflicts in Umuoriloku, Umuokpara in Umuahia South Local Government Area. Two communities, engaged in hostilities over land for years, resolved their conflict after the women wielded pressure on their husbands and lobbied their traditional leaders to dialogue for a peaceful settlement. The traditional leaders and elders relented and resolved this conflict in 2006. The FHN of identity relates closely to the need for protection.

3.3.5 Women’s use of synergic satisfiers in attending to the FHN of protection

In this subsection, I demonstrate, women when they have a chance in the political formal sphere, argue for the satisfaction of human needs as a peacebuilding measure. I give the example of how some elected women in South Africa opposed the accumulation of arms (considered a destructive satisfier—Table 3) and preferred synergic satisfiers for the satisfaction of the FHN of protection. In 2.1, I showed that fear of insecurity can generate conflict. People, therefore, need to respond in order to survive or develop. As such, violence may be defensively motivated. As Christie (1997, p. 318) argues, fear and the concomitant need for security may be prepotent not only in overt violence, but also in preparations for violence. The accumulation of arms to deter a would-be aggressor can incite fear and lead to an arms race or more violence. This results in the familiar "security dilemma" in which the pursuit of security through the accumulation of arms by one party results in greater insecurity in the other party who, in turn, seeks additional arms for security purposes. This is why Max-Neef (1992 or see Table 3) argues that the use of excessive arms is a destructive satisfier for the satisfaction of the FHN of protection which encourages PSC. Rather, the accumulation of arms should be avoided and synergic satisfiers be used, as exemplified by women in South Africa.

In South Africa, in the immediate post-transition years, some women strongly argued, advocated and defended a human security-centred national policy in respect to synergic satisfiers. In 1999 when the army proposed to purchase military equipment worth US$ 4.5 billion, these women analysed and objected to this proposal. The women argued that South Africa faced no external threats. In parliament, some women across the political spectrum, made a case against the arms purchase. Suzanne Fos, MP for the Inkatha Freedom Party, recalls that, "when [the women] spoke out, it wasn't about helicopters and dealing with obsolete equipment, it was about the amount of money being spent on the military when the country needed it so much more for development" (Anderlini, 2004, p. 27-28). Pregs
Govendar, a lifelong ANC member, voted the best parliamentarian of the year in 2002, resigned. She reasoned that "South Africa cannot afford such high military expenditure on arms while four million people living with HIV/AIDS have no access to treatment and care". In her official farewell speech, Govendar asserted that "in this globalised world, war makes the profit margins that peace does not. We have to say loudly No! No! No" (Anderlini, 2004, p. 27-28). Moreover, for some women the satisfaction of the FHNs of protection and identity requires socio-economic development.

### 3.3.6 Women's work attending to the FHN of economic participation

In this subsection, I illustrate how some women from Southern Nigeria protest against oil companies to gain development projects to create opportunities for employment and reduce poverty in their communities. In 2.1, I discussed that developmental needs expressed in the form of the frustration of FHNs of subsistence, protection and identity can stimulate PSC in multi-communal societies. Therefore, correcting and restructuring developmental needs depends on the level of access to economic decision-making; but the overall distribution of political power is what determines participation in economic decision-making. Groups (racial, ideological, national or others) therefore fight for political power so as to gain access to development projects. This struggle generates PSC. Thus, from peacebuilding perspective, Green and Ahmed (1999), writing on post-conflict development, suggest that we need to know what to reconstruct in order to not recreate the unsustainable institutions and structures that originally contributed to the conflict. In 2.2.3, I argued that the effect of corruption, an inhibiting satisfier used by political elite in Nigeria, promotes structural violence which in turn generates unemployment and poverty in Nigeria. In a situation like Nigeria, Busumtwi-Sam (2004, pp. 327-328) argues that development for the purpose of achieving peace should address economic collapse, widespread poverty, and resource-scarcity. It requires the generation of opportunities for employment, retraining and establishing clear targets for reducing poverty and inequality.

A number of women in the Niger Delta region have rationalised this kind of development in their peacebuilding efforts. In 2002, the Communal Women Organisations (CWO) directed mass action against the oil companies in Delta and Bayelsa states. About 200 CWO women of Itsekiri ethnic origin took over the Escravos Tank Farm in Delta state. They made the operations of Chevron in the territory impossible in July 2002 (Ikelegbe, 2005). Ijaw CWO quickly followed the action of its Itsekiri counterpart. They invaded four of the company's flow stations located in the Niger Delta swamp. The demonstrations disrupted the company's
operations, and trapped company staff in the occupied facilities. The siege lasted for 11 days. It resulted in a memorandum of understanding between Chevron and the women that brought some development projects to the area. Moreover, Ikelegbe (2005, p. 261) illustrates that in the first week of August 2003, women's protests shut down Shell's Amukpe and Sapele West oil flow stations. Ikelegbe (2005, p. 261) states that the women were demanding local development, employment and economic empowerment. They succeeded in establishing a skills centre, fish ponds, poultry farms and small scale businesses for women and youths in their areas (Ikelegbe, 2005, p. 260). This demonstrates how rational these women are in their peacebuilding work. However, as Ikelegbe (2005, p. 250) notes, these women's work remained largely informal, based on mutual support, leading De la Ray and Mckay (2006, p. 149) to point out that, generally, women's peacebuilding initiatives remain constrained through lack of power, voice and recognition by self and others. Women's initiatives remain non-state sponsored, therefore, lack force for replication and may attend to the satisfaction of FHNs for only a few groups of people. Even for a group, the initiatives might not satisfy needs equitably for the majority of those fighting in PSC.

Therefore, in 3.3, I have argued that many women understand that the frustration of FHNs causes conflict. There is evidence in the BVN that some women through their informal socialised managerial, productive and reproductive roles gain experiential knowledge and rationality that frustrated needs can cause conflict. Many women, consequently, identify synergic satisfiers for their peacebuilding work. I have illustrated how some women (in Nigeria and other African contexts) have used protest and legal means to oppose structural violence and work for structural peace in their communities. They have successfully opposed government policies on high taxation, high food and health care prices (Ikelegbe, 2005). Others offer legal advice to support and defend women and children, and prevent property disinheritance (Ojoh, 2012). To satisfy the FHN of protection, a group of women in the South African political sphere reasoned and opposed the accumulation of arms and preferred the supply of food, water, shelter and good health care as means of satisfying the FHN of protection in South Africa (Anderlini, 2004). From the HNT perspective, I argue that these examples of women's works demonstrate how women's peacebuilding initiatives are rational and necessary in situations of PSC. However, most of this work remains at the level of informal peace-processes. Consequently, their work only satisfies a small group of people's needs and the wider community in conflict have their needs unsatisfied. This situation diminishes the full impact of these women's work in their communities. Nevertheless, these initiatives provide evidence that including women's initiatives in state-sponsored peacebuilding work in conflict
resolution processes will positively impact on the satisfaction of FHNs for all segments of society. Therefore, some women’s peacebuilding work can be understood in the framework of the human needs theory, however, the gender neutral elaboration of FHNs is problematic.

3.4 Gender critique of the human needs theory (HNT)

In this section, I attend to the third question for this chapter: how does the social, economic and political gender order affect women’s lives with respect to the definition and satisfaction of FHNs? I attend to the question by way of a gender critique of the HNT. This critique argues that HNT problematically claims that FHNs are gender neutral (Reimann, 2002) and therefore, I seek a gender-sensitive concept of FHNs in the HNT. Thus, I examine certain notions, meanings, and perspectives inherent in the HNT. Three issues guide my critique: firstly, I consider the social construction of gender identities, analysing individual women’s identity by evaluating social norms, roles and gender symbolism (Reimann, 2002, p. 6). Secondly, I examine socio-economic gender structure on how far women and men participate in the formulation of FHNs in the BVN. And thirdly, I scrutinise the hierarchical power structure taken for granted in the HNT (Reimann, 2002, p. 6). Following Reimann (2002), my critique relates to patriarchal gender socialisation from the perspective of historical variability of gender polarisation and androcentric gender schemas. The first issue is how far the HNT can claim that FHNs are gender neutral in a place like the BVN.

3.4.1 Fundamental human needs and gender neutrality

HNT works with a gender neutral understanding of the “human being”. Max-Neef (1992, p. 200) states that FHNs are few, finite and classifiable; they cut across cultures: needs are universal and do not change. He appears to assume a priori sameness and interchange-ability of human nature, experience and needs. Along these lines, women and men have the same FHNs without any gender specific dimension (Reimann, 2002, p. 8). However, taking gender as a social construction of identity based on gender polarisation and androcentric gender schema, how can one maintain gender neutral identities? In the BVN, gender is historically variable, but hierarchically organised and institutionalised in the informal and formal spheres.

For example, before the arrival of the British colonial regime, the Tiv people practiced marriage by exchange of girls. When a father/guardian gave his daughter in marriage, the concluding words at the exchange by the male parties were:
Although the marriage contract has been concluded between us, you may do as you please with the body, but take care of the head. Should some need compel you, take your own property and use it, but give me mine alive. The other person agreed, and said that he also demanded the same (East, 2003, p. 121).

In this hierarchy, the father/guardian considered the daughter his property, a property he gave to a husband who could treat her as he liked. The only thing he could not do was kill the woman. The father or guardian reserved the right to kill the woman if a need arose for him to do so. In Tiv society today, women remain goods, indeed, inheritable goods along with houses, farms, farm produce, livestock and all movable objects (Atel, 2004, p. 19). In this culture, patriarchy considers women property and not humans per se. Can women in this region accept that FHNs are universal, unchangeable and gender neutral? My analysis is that in this cultural context, the HNT appeals to abstract needs and rules of rationality and control rather than to sensitive context evaluation of particular specific and gendered needs (Reimann, 2002, p. 6).

How much of women’s perspectives inform the understanding of FHNs in this culture is debateable. I would argue that men remain the primary need setters in this culture and women are not considered as human with needs. Therefore, as Reimann (2002) suggests, “to adopt and promote gender neutral universal human needs reinforces the privilege of men to marginalise and silence other groups like women”. This leads us to the second issue, that is, in the face of persistent gender inequality in the BVN, can women’s own strategic^ gender need (Moser, 1989, p. 1803) of being equal to men be met in a conflict resolution-based HNT?

3.4.2 Gender neutrality and the satisfaction of FHNs

HNT use of FHNs is to provide an objective framework for offering an analysis of social conflict, and its escalation to PSC. HNT (Azar, 1990; Max-Neef, 1992, Cruz et al., 2009; Burton, 1997,) argues that that there exists an intimate and reciprocal relationship between needs, needs frustration, satisfaction, human development and conflict. It argues that the frustration of FHNs contributes considerably to PSC such as those studied in the BVN. I would argue that, the HNT ignores the PSC existing between women and men in the BVN (the historical inequalities between men and women elaborated above and as I show below) with its elaboration of FHNs. It assumes a generic human nature which in turn drives the frustration and satisfaction of FHNs (Reimann, 2002, p. 7). Yet a gender sensitive perspective would stress that in this

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30 Moser (1989, p. 1803) defines strategic gender needs as those needs which are formulated from the analysis of women’s subordination to men. One such need is women’s desire for equality with men.
protracted social conflict between women and men in the BVN, men have the patriarchal "power of definition" of what counts as FHNs and satisfiers/goods and what does not. This raises questions regarding how much women have contributed to the understanding of FHNs, satisfiers/goods and how women and men can satisfy their FHNs equitably in a conflict resolution based on the HNT elaboration of FHNs; given the political power asymmetry, social change and historical variability in the way women and men socialise in the BVN. For example, within the Idoma group in the BVN, evidence shows that men have a long history of systematically excluding women from Idoma political life (Magid, 1976, p 93-95). Magid (1976) observes that Idoma men prevent Idoma women from participating in *Ojila* (village assembly) at all levels of their society, but this remains central to the political life of Idoma people. This subjugation, he argues, can be traced from ritual practices and activities in which women cannot participate. For instance, women cannot participate in secret societies and dance-groups belonging to the ancestral *Alekwu* cult (male cult). Men intimidate women by threatening with barrenness if they know the secret of a spirit mask (*Alekwu*). Furthermore, Agaba (2007, p. 77) provides evidence that men enforce compliance by heightening fears in women through the use of mystical sanctions against them.

However, Agbo (1991) argued that in all parts of Idoma and in other areas, women participated in the gathering of spirit masks. Indeed, the most important act of the spirit mask was performed by a woman called "patron" or "mother" (*enekwu*). In the preparation of the *alekwu-afia* ceremony, the action of a woman (a virgin or a woman beyond the age of child-bearing) filled up the mask with the spirit of the ancestors. She did this by passing a thread through a needle at midnight with her eyes tied (Agbo 1991, pp. 42-48). Even so this narrative raises questions: Why must the woman be a virgin, when it does not require men to be virgins as well? Thus, this remains a form of discrimination and subordination against women. Nonetheless, Agbo (1991, p. 43) insists that women also had their own groups (*ai-anya*) and titles in their respective communities. They formed dance-groups within which they contributed to the political development and the maintenance of law and order in their respective communities. For Agbo, women and men had equilateral systems. Thus, he suggested that the present total subjugation of Idoma women by men comes from Western colonial socialisation within Idoma culture.

Anshi (2007, p. 41) points to the Western philosophical tradition that informed the colonial understanding of relationships between women and men. He asserts that the philosophical and political traditions of the West excluded women from politics and leadership. For example, Aristotle treated a woman as a defective male in his philosophy of *the Reproduction*. He held
that women were lacking in rational faculty, a crucial quality necessary for ruling, and inferior to men. In the case of conception, only the body temperatures of men could conserve the animating principle, the soul, which they injected into women in coital conception. In Niccolo Machiavelli's political philosophy the Prince, he likened misfortune to women, reasoning they must be coerced to submit to men. While Jean Jacques Rousseau in his Emile mapped out a male-centred education for women; the core of such selective pedagogy aimed to teach women how to please and be useful to men when grown up; how to advise and console men in order to render men’s lives easy and agreeable. This he prescribed as the duties of women at all times and what they should be taught from their infancy. Furthermore, for Hegel, women in politics were bound to represent only particular interests of their families, no matter how much they tried to penetrate the formal political sphere. Hegel stated that "when women hold the helm of government, the state is at once in jeopardy, because women regulate their actions not by the demand of universality but by arbitrary inclination and opinions" (Hegel, 1977, p. 58). Thus, this vast Western political tradition had a pronounced influence on African cultures and the way African men treat African women today. This influence, Apenda (2007, p. 223 -224) concluded, caused Idoma women to be excluded from the highest organ of socio-economic and political decision-making in their communities today.

On the one hand, Agbo’s (1991) argument on the equilateral system for female and male societies and Apenda’s (2007) argument on the influence of Western philosophy on African men does show that in the pre-colonial period women had more rights than the colonial and post-colonial Nigeria (see also 6.3). The most equal of these societies were the Jukun and Chamba (see 6.3). However, in societies like the Tiv and Idoma, men did not treat women with equality in the formal space although women had more rights in the informal space than men (see also 6.3). Female societies operated and offered leadership in the informal sector concerned with women’s affairs. As Kasfir (1982, p. 92) points out, women’s social organisation were (and are) important to women but that they did (and do) not offer them access to the supernatural world (i.e. formal world), for this they depended (and depend) on men. Therefore, men were (and are) predominantly at the centre of politics and not women. My analysis is, therefore, that men more than likely marginalised and relegated women to the informal sphere before, during and after colonialism in Idoma culture. Indeed, Pierce (2013, p. 142) argues that colonial projects were frustrated as often as they succeeded and that what emerged was (and is) an intricate negotiation between the coloniser and the colonised. Thus, in a post-colonial cultures of the BVN, the HNT elaboration of FHNs without addressing the issue of power asymmetry implies that men will be in charge of decision-making in its conflict.
resolution systems while women will stay in the informal sector caring for their children, the elderly, etc. (Reimann, 2002, p. 8). One has to ask, whose conflict resolution the HNT discusses in the face of women denied human agency (Reimann, 2002, p. 18)? Indeed, Pankhurst (2007, p. 4) writing on “Post-war Truth Process, Reconciliation, and Women’s Stories”, finds that “in the design of policies for post-war reconstruction, women’s needs are often systematically ignored, and even deliberately marginalised”. Therefore, I would argue that for women in this culture the discourse on needs satisfaction in the HNT hides or disguises the social injustice women experience (Reimann, 2002, p. 18) and undermines the satisfaction of women’s strategic gender need—to be equal to men (Moser, 1989) and to influence their communities. It also overlooks the fact that social gender roles change during conflict and post conflict situations.

For example, in many conflicts women take up traditional male-dominated roles in the absence of men. However, in the post-conflict phase, the old socially gendered division of labour may be reinstated. Pankhurst’s (2008) work “Post-War Backlash Violence against Women”, shows that men, in post-conflict communities like Zimbabwe, Angola and other African countries even use violence against women to keep them away from economic, social, and democratic political participation because they perceive women as a threat to their own participation in these areas. How do women gain access to economic and political institutions in a gender neutral FHNs? A gender-sensitive perspective stresses that in the face of power asymmetry, neutrality perpetuates the status quo and reproduces power inequalities (Nordstrom, 1992, p. 269). A gender sensitive perspective asks who defines satisfiers for the satisfaction of FHNs and interprets them, from what perspective, and in the light of whose interests? Given the pervasive and subtle nature of patriarchy, Tavris (1992) insists that patriarchy defines what to measure and how to measure it, thereby obscuring inequality between women and men. It also raises a question about the kinds of synergic satisfiers agreed upon in a conflict resolution based on the satisfaction of FHNs using the HNT for a harmonious society: will they include women’s perspective?

3.4.3 Gender neutrality, gender socialisation and a harmonious society

HNT (Max-Neef, 1992 and Cruz et al, 2009) argues that the use of synergic satisfiers will likely build peace in situations of conflict because synergic satisfiers (liberating processes) satisfy a given need in such a way as to stimulate and contribute to the satisfaction of other needs. This will probably bring about a harmonious and progressive society. Indeed, as this thesis argues above, due to women’s managerial, productive and reproductive gender roles in the informal
sphere of society (Moser, 1989), some women have skills in finding and using synergic satisfiers. Men on the other hand, I argue, receive socialisation mostly on satisfiers (violence, hierarchy, power, etc.) that can easily become destructive, pseudo and inhibiting satisfiers. However, gender socialisation excludes a lot of women from economic and political participation. How would the skills of women be utilised in a conflict resolution based on the HNT elaboration of gender neutral FHNs in cultures like the BVN where men refuse to sit and talk with women about conflict?

Indeed, this culture gives rise to high levels of personal insecurity and different forms of gender inequality in war and peace time for women in the BVN. Therefore, the need for protection and justice matters a great deal to most women in everyday life in this region. As Karl (1995) suggests, in situations of PSCs, for many women, their main concern remains access to the economic and political institutions. Moreover, Pankhurst (2007, p.11) writing on “Post-war Truth Process, Reconciliation and Women’s stories”, stresses that there has been virtually no discussion about “gender reconciliation” in most truth commissions around the world; thus, my analysis is, even in truth commission designed to bring about a harmonious society women inequality to men gets ignored. Therefore, how does a conflict resolution based on gender neutral FHNs resolve this PSC between women and men in the BVN? A gender-sensitive perspective highlights that the gender-neutral understanding of a harmonious and progressive society based on the HNT disguises the gender-specific hurdles and “access barriers” for many women to participate in political and economic decision making. As such, a gender sensitive perspective would argue:

> only when women as the less powerful groups attain power and expand their view of how needs should be satisfied will men as powerful groups and society be challenged to satisfy their needs in ways that do not express, coerce or cause structural violence to less powerful groups (Reimann, 2002, p. 21).

Therefore, peacebuilding should be based on the underlying conceptual rationale that because men and women play different roles in society, they often have different needs (Moser31, 1989, p. 1800). I agree with Moser (1989) that women’s triple role is not recognised but women, unlike men, are severely constrained by the burden of simultaneously balancing these

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31 Moser (1989) and Molyneux (1985) do not talk of peacebuilding and conflict resolution per se but they provide a gendered theoretical and methodological analysis on incorporating gender into development planning that I apply here to peacebuilding and conflict resolution in the BVN.
roles of reproduction, production and community/family management work, therefore, this triple roles be recognised and addressed in peacebuilding for the satisfaction of FHNs. In addition, these roles are seen as "natural" and non-productive such that they are not valued. In contrast, the majority of men's work is valued with status and political power (Moser, 1989, p. 1801). For example, in the BVN, only men are given the special status of participating in formal decisions without the recognition that women are subordinate to men. Therefore, there is the need for peacebuilding to pursue women's strategic and practical gender needs in a situation of PSC to attain a harmonious society.

**Strategic gender needs:** These are those needs which arise from an analysis of women's subordination to men, which might lead to a more equal and satisfactory organisation of society than that which exists at present, in terms of both the structure and nature of relationships between women and men (Moser, 1989, p. 1803). In the BVN, strategic gender needs may include all or some of the following: "the abolition of the sexual division of labour; the alleviation of the burden of domestic labour, and childcare; the removal of institutionalised form of discrimination such as rights to own land or property, or access to credit; the establishment of political equality; freedom of choice over childbearing; and the adoption of adequate measures against male violence and control over women" (Molyneux, 1985, p. 233). The realisation of strategic gender needs for women to recreate a harmonious society is interconnected to women's practical gender needs in situations of conflicts.

**Practical gender needs:** These are needs which arise from the concrete conditions women experience, in their engendered position within the sexual division of labour, which are derived from the need for human survival (Moser, 1989). As Molyneux (1985, p. 233) wrote "they do not generally entail a strategic goal such as women's emancipation or gender equality ... nor do they challenge the prevailing forms of subordination even though they arise directly out of them". Therefore, peacebuilding requires meeting practical gender needs in the domestic arena, on income-earning activities, and also on community-level requirement of housing and basic services (Moser, 1989, p. 103). In fact, satisfiers such as food, shelter and water are required by all the family, particularly children, yet they are identified specifically as the practical gender satisfiers for women, not only by policy makers concerned with achieving development objectives, but also by women themselves. Both are therefore often responsible for preserving and reinforcing (even if unconsciously) the sexual division of labour, making it even more difficult for women themselves to recognise and formulate their strategic gender needs (Moser, 1989, pp. 1803-1804). Therefore, we need a just political and economic process that does not privilege one gender, but instead satisfies needs for self-determination and well-
being for all (women and men) in society (Christie, 1997). This is likely, I argue, to bring about a harmonious and progressive society in places like the BVN. Therefore, what does this critique mean for peacebuilding work using the HNT?

3.4.4 The implication for a gender critique of the HNT

A challenge arises from the critique of the HNT: there is a need to empower women and support their initiatives to become part of formal conflict resolution processes; a need to change the culture of male dominance over women in the formal sphere so as to attain sustainable peace in the BVN. This brings us to the international framework to include women in formal peacebuilding work and conflict resolution processes. Since 1995, the UN Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing: Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (PFA) put in place a framework which lists 12 critical areas of concern as obstacles to women’s participation in socio-political life. The PFA set out strategic objectives for the inclusion of women’s perspectives in the socio-political life of society: to “promote non-violent forms of conflict resolution”, to “promote women’s contribution to fostering a culture of peace”, to “take measures to ensure women’s equal access to and full participation in power structures and decision-making”, and to “increase women’s capacity to participate in decision-making and leadership”. At this conference, the international community began a serious campaign to include women at all peace processes and participation at political leadership. In June 2000, this campaign led the UN Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) to present a document indicating actions needed for the improvement of women’s status. It demanded gender equality in mainstream political peacebuilding work and conflict resolution processes. A major step taken in the direction of developing a programme and ensuring equality between women and men took place on the 31 October 2000 in the UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325, on Women, Peace and Security which urges UN Member States to implement equal participation of women in the prevention, management and resolution of conflict.

Porter (2007, p. 1) acknowledges that UNSCR 1325 can advance the recognition of women’s peacebuilding work because it advocates for an increase in women at all levels of peace processes and decision-making, conflict prevention, peace negotiation etc. Additionally, UNSCR 1325 has been signed and ratified by most member states including Nigeria. The draft Nigeria National Peace Policy article 2.20 (2009, p. 33) states, “at all levels of official public domain, policies shall be gender sensitive ... there shall be a conscious policy of ensuring reasonable balance between men and women”. However, like other countries, it lacks a strategy for implementation and thus Nigeria has failed women on implementing its gender
equality polices as seen in 3.1.6 and also shown in 4.6. As Anderlini (2007, p. 2) comments, the international community has no practical ways of enforcing UNSCR 1325, it talks more about women's involvement in peace forums than practices it. However, as Anderlini (2007, p. 232) points out, "the inclusion and empowerment of women in conflict prevention and peace processes is not simply idealism in the midst of international realpolitik. It is a necessary and infinitely pragmatic antidote to politics and business as usual, if the objective is sustainable peace". From the HNT perspective, I would contend that women's work—the satisfaction of FHNs with synergic satisfiers as a means of conflict resolution—counts for much.

Therefore, in 3.4, I answer the question: how does social, economic and political gender order affect women's lives with respect to FHNs? I have argued through a gender critique of the HNT that the HNT needs to engender the understanding of FHNs while trying to bring about harmonious and progressive society in situations of PSC in the BVN. That is, because the post-colonial BVN cultures are patriarchal societies where men are considered more important than women (Madunagu, 2008). As such, my analysis is that the continued exclusion of women in the BVN from formal social, economic and political life means that women have a particular FHN—women's equality with men—and should not be considered property for men. In this vein, I have argued that there is a need to empower women and their peacebuilding work to become formal conflict resolution processes. I have examined the international framework for women's inclusion in mainstream political peacebuilding work and conflict resolution processes: the 1995 UN Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (PFA), the call by UN Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) presentation on women's equality in 2000 and the content of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000). While this international framework has been passed by most member states of the UN, including Nigeria, they fail to implement it (see 3.1.6 and 4.6). As Porter (2007) and Anderlini (2007) suggest, the framework has no practical ways of enforcing its implementation. Therefore, I have suggested that there is a need to arrive at a strategy for implementing the UNSCR 1325, as the inclusion of women in formal peacebuilding work and conflict resolution processes will contribute significantly to building harmonious and progressive communities in the BVN.
Conclusion

In this chapter, I have explored theories about gender and peace. Claims that women are essentially peaceful were rejected but socialisation theory—and how this plays out in practice in the BVN—was shown to link many women to peacebuilding work. A link was then suggested between gender socialisation and human needs. The gender order "trains" women to be responsive to needs and to recognise synergic satisfiers. Their social positioning gives some women the experiential knowledge and rationality to understand that the frustration of FHNs generates social conflict. In addition, I have argued that empirical observations show that some women bring this experiential knowledge within the ethics of care skills of co-existence (Porter, 2007), empathy leading to coalition building (Anderlini, 2007), courage and determination (Ojoh, 2012) in peacebuilding work. From the HNT perspective, my analysis is that some women understand clearly that resolving PSC in their societies requires the satisfaction of FHNs and have undertaken initiatives to attend to the satisfaction of some frustrated FHNs. For example, some women protest against extreme government policies and social norms: against inflation, high prices of goods and services; others use liberating ways such as offering legal support; yet others defend and ensure that male family members do not inherit women and children against their wishes, nor disinherit them from their properties.

Problematically, however, I have found that the same social positioning that gives women skills for peacebuilding work in the informal space also hold women back from participating in the formal socio-political sphere, as such, holding them back from participating in formal peacebuilding work and conflict resolution processes. This situation, I have argued, is due to gender polarisation and the existence of androcentric gender schemas as post-colonial patriarchy in Nigeria claims that women lack the experiential knowledge and rationality of men. However, I have demonstrated in this chapter that this is not the case, the women’s work is backed by experiential knowledge and rationality and women bring this to the formal sphere if given a chance, as the women in South Africa did. Furthermore, a gender critique of the HNT reveals that FHNs require engenderment. While the HNT helps us understand the root cause of PSC in the BVN and prescribes a viable resolution, the abstract and rational concept of gender neutral FHNs require tempering with a gender sensitive perspective. Evidence of historical gender identity from the BVN demonstrates that a gender neutral acceptance of FHNs promotes gender PSC between women and men; as men exclude women from socio-economic and political life—they consider women their property. Thus, I have argued that a gender sensitive understanding of FHNs requires women to attain a FHN of equality with men—women’s strategic gender need (Moser, 1989).
Moreover, I called for the empowerment of women and their initiatives to become part of formal peacebuilding work and conflict resolution processes. I examined the international framework for the inclusion of women in the socio-political life of society which includes the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (PFA) and the UN Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1325, on Women, Peace and Security which emphasises women’s participation and perspective in state-sponsored peacebuilding work and conflict resolution processes. However, this international framework appears ineffective as it lacks a clear implementation strategy (Porter, 2007, Anderlini, 2007). It needs a practical strategy that will make governments and leaders of patriarchal communities accountable to the framework.

Therefore, this thesis’s theoretical framework from Chapters 2 and 3 provides the basis on which to study some women’s peacebuilding initiatives in the BVN. To determine if their work has an underlying theoretical concept (Porter, 2007) implying that it is rational work by using the HNT and gender socialisation theory perspectives to analyse it; to establish if the women understand that their work is undermined (Anderlini, 2007); and to see why it is difficult to implement UNSCR 1325 in post-colonial patriarchal society like the BVN. This, I do in Chapter 6 and 7. However, the task in the next chapter is to find and present:

1. Protracted social conflicts (PSCs) in the BVN;
2. Government resolution processes to resolve the PSCs;
3. Women peacebuilding for conflict resolution in the PSCs; and
4. The patriarchal social, economic and political conditions of these women.
Chapter 4—Research Background:

Protracted Social Conflict (PSC) and Women Peacebuilders in the Benue Valley, Nigeria (BVN)

In this chapter, I provide a background to PSCs and particular local groups of women peacebuilding in the BVN. This contextual background enables an understanding of the causes of violent conflicts in the BVN and an assessment of the significance, or otherwise, of women’s groups peacebuilding initiatives in the BVN in Chapter Seven. As such I attend to the four tasks set out in the previous chapter: to find (1) protracted social conflicts (PSCs) in the BVN; (2) government resolution processes to resolve the PSCs; (3) women peacebuilding in the areas within the PSCs; and (4) the patriarchal social, economic and political conditions of these women. Thus, I divide this chapter into six sections. In section 4.1, I give a background to the region referred to as the BVN and an overview of PSCs in the region from 1975-2000. In section 4.2, I present a background to satisfiers involved in PSC cases in BVN. In section 4.3, I relate the detailed background of four PSC cases in BVN. In section 4.4, I analyse what government is doing to resolve the four PSCs. In section 4.5, I outline the background of four local groups of women peacebuilding in the four PSCs found in the BVN. Finally, in section 4.6, I explain the socio-economic and political background of women in the BVN.

4.1 The Benue Valley, Nigeria (BVN) and its protracted social conflicts (PSCs)

The Benue Valley pertains to the geographical section of Nigeria referred to as the Middle Belt which incorporates communities within Adamawa, Benue, Taraba, Plateau and Nasarawa states (see Photo 1). The Benue Valley is multi-ethnic in nature. The edited works of Blitz (1965) The Politics and Administration of Nigerian Government show that a survey conducted by the British colonial regime in 1926 identified 416 tribal groups in Nigeria. They found 219 tribal (the word tribal is no longer in use, it has been replaced with a more acceptable word, ethnic) identity groups in the Middle Belt. About 100 different ethnic identity groups belong to the BVN. Some of these groups are the Tiv, Birom, Idoma, Bassa, Jukun, Afizere, Anaguta, Igede, Egbara, Hausa, Fulani, Taroh, Etulo, Chamba, Kuteb, Icen, Alago, Gwandara, Koro and Mumuye which co-exist in the region. Photo 6 indicates certain ethnic identity groups in Nigeria, but more importantly, it indicates the three linguistic identity groups studied in the BVN: Tiv, Jukun and Idoma allowing a reader of this research to locate the ethnic identity groups studied in the region.
The BN is engulfed in a series of PSCs. Table 8 shows twenty-five documented PSCs in the BN from 1975-2000. These conflicts start, stop, and then start again—they are on-going; I consider them as PSCs for this reason.

Table 8: Documented Conflicts in the Middle Belt 1975-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Nature of Conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Katsina Ala, 1975, 1976</td>
<td>Ikurav-Tieve and Kusuv,</td>
<td>Land</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Katsina Ala, 1993</td>
<td>Tongov vs Kusuv, Buruku LGA</td>
<td>Land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Katsina Ala, 1996</td>
<td>Shorite (Mbano)</td>
<td>Land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Goma</td>
<td>Ndzero clan and Damkor in Nassarawa State</td>
<td>Land involving two persons in two states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Vandeikya 1989, 1990, 1997</td>
<td>Mbaduku and Ego of Cross River State</td>
<td>Land</td>
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<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Ohimini 1997</td>
<td>Two Idoma communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Gwer West 1995, 1996</td>
<td>Tiv and Idoma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Ankpa 1993, 1994</td>
<td>Igala community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Kumo, Gombe 1997</td>
<td>Cattle herdsmen and famers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Fika, Yobe State 1982</td>
<td>Kare Kare, Hausa/Fulani and Bolewa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Nangare, Yobe State 1994</td>
<td>Muslims and Christians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>Jukusko, Yobe State</td>
<td>Nomads vs peasant famers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>Takum, Taraba State 1976</td>
<td>Chamba vs Kuteb</td>
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<td>21.</td>
<td>Takum, Taraba State 1984</td>
<td>Chamba vs Kuteb</td>
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<td>22.</td>
<td>Takum, Taraba State 1997</td>
<td>Kuteb and Chamba/Jukun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.</td>
<td>Jalingo 1992</td>
<td>Mumuye, Jukun-Kona and Hausa/Fulani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.</td>
<td>Mambila Pleateau Taraba State</td>
<td>Kaka, Wawa and Fulani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.</td>
<td>Ardo Kola</td>
<td>Fulani, Mumuye and Tiv</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The summary of PSCs in Table 8 illustrates 15 land, six traditional title, three political, two religious, and two mixed—ethnic, land and political cases. I present this summary in Chart 1 to enable a better appraisal of the nature of PSC in the BVN.
Chart 1: Overview summary of conflict in the Benue Valley

Chart 1 indicates land conflicts as the most common PSC, followed by traditional title and democratic political conflicts. For this reason, I concentrate my study on these three most frequent cases of PSCs in the BVN. The human needs theory (HNT: Max-Neef, 1992) considers land, traditional title and democratic politics as satisfiers for the satisfaction of fundamental human needs (FHNs). In the next section, I present a background that helps provide an understanding of why these are PSCs satisfiers in the BVN.

4.2 Background to PSC’s satisfiers in the BVN

In this section, I present a background on how Nigeria operates a two tier citizenship which promotes land, traditional title and democratic political leadership conflicts. One issue is that citizenship *per se* confers one to be a Nigerian, but without rights to traditional/political participation and access to communal resources such as free land. However, “indigeneship” confers one these rights. Moreover, Nigeria has been ruled by the military for 28 years since its independence in 1960 and they interfered with land administrative law which has made land adjudication difficult.

*Citizenship/indigeneship:* Nigeria has about 250 strong ethnic identity groups. According to Kabeer (2002, p. 17), Nigeria addresses the multi-ethnicity of its composition through a two-tier citizenship—citizenship and indigeneship—associated with rights and powers to belong to the federal, state and local councils. However, this two tier system is problematic. As Ayua (2006, p. 67) points out, the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria, and all other constitutions since
independence in 1960, comprehensively defines who qualifies as citizen of Nigeria, but the constitutions remain silent on who qualifies as an “indigene” of a particular place. For example, the 1999 constitution refers to the concept of “indigeneship” in Section 147(2) and (3), it provides for the appointment of at least one Minister from each state who should be an indigene of that state. Therefore, it is enshrined in the Nigerian Constitution that “indigeneship” is a formula for political participation without a clear definition of who is indigene. Nevertheless, Alubo (2000) explains, Nigerians equate “indigeneship” with ethnic identity descent. That means that to be born and to have an entire working life in a particular state does not qualify an individual as an indigene of that state. Instead, patriarchal lineage (ancestral home) gives one “indigeneship”. This means that certain rights such as election to traditional and public office can only be sought in the patriarchal ancestral home state irrespective of the strength of ties retained with that home. Under these circumstances, Alubo (2000) points out that non-indigenes experience various forms of discrimination in terms of placement of their children in schools, employment opportunities, access to land and other material resources.

Moreover, the patriarchal lineage system of “indigenes vs. non-indigenes” applies to the socio-economic and political life of Nigerians in the family and at clan, kindred and community levels. Indeed “indigenes vs. non-indigene” is a socio-economic and political principle of “us” and “them” where an “us” belong and can share socio-economic and political goods in the family and at clan, kindred and community levels while a “them” is excluded. Therefore, I would argue that the system is a platform for satisfying FHNs of subsistence, protection and identity in Nigeria. Kabeer (2002, p. 17) alludes to how individuals turn to their kin and ethnic communities for social, political and economic support. They do this because Nigeria operates no social welfare system; it has poverty alleviation programmes that target the poor, but these are organised mostly along political lines. This means that politicians get to determine who gets what. This allows politicians from the majority communities to make huge capital gains from the poverty alleviation programmes, what Kabeer (2002) calls “the politics of the belly”: one may only participate in the programme if s/he is a member of the majority ethnic identity groups or a member of the party in power in that locality. Thus, I would argue “indigeneship” excludes minorities from representation in traditional leadership, government, poverty programmes and the possibility of satisfying their FHNs. However, for those deemed indigenes, it seems to be an avenue for material accumulation and thus a source of struggle that generates and sustains PSCs in Nigeria. Moreover, only male indigenes have rights to free land, another satisfier linked to PSCs in the BVN.
The use of land in the BVN: The issue here is that the economic livelihood of most Nigerians in rural areas depends on owning land and the ability to use it productively. This explains why land conflicts constitute more than half of the documented conflicts in the BVN, see Table 8 above (of 25 cases, 15 are land conflicts). The land conflicts studied here arise principally from community boundaries and individual land ownership. These conflicts have become difficult to resolve because of changes in Nigerian land law. First, in pre-colonial BVN, traditional chiefs administered land and resolved communal conflicts, second, during the colonial period, there was the Land and Native Rights Ordinance of 1910; it had land in all of Northern Nigeria “under the control and subject to the disposition of the Governor” to be “held and administered for the common benefit of the natives of Northern Nigeria” (Francis, 1984, p. 6). By default, traditional chiefs administered rural land on behalf of the Governor with the British system of indirect rule.

Third, the military government of General Olusegun Obasanjo promulgated a Land Use Decree No. 6 of 1978 which was incorporated into the 1979 constitution and it is part of the 1999 constitution of Nigeria. This law distinguishes between urban and rural land; it gives powers of urban land to the Governor, but allocates powers to allocate land of between 500 to 5000 hectares without the consent of the Governor in the rural areas to the Local Government Administrations (LGAs). Both State and LGAs are to administer land giving “due regard to the native laws and customs existing in the district in which land is situated”. Nonetheless, it empowers the State and LGAs to revoke rights of occupancy for reasons of “over-riding public interest” without the requisite consent or approval; a breach of the conditions governing occupancy; or the requirement of the land by Federal, State and LGA, for public purpose (Land Use Act, Section 28 and 29). Therefore, in place of traditional chiefs, the military gave the powers to resolve land and social conflicts to State and Local Government Administrations (LGAs), but Zirra and Umar (2006, pp. 34-35) state in their work “Socio-Economic Dimension of Conflict in the Benue Valley” that “the present local governments system of administration has not developed an institutional mechanism for averting conflicts of these magnitudes (PSCs)” because of political instability in Nigeria.

So in reality, the traditional forms of land ownership where elders or chiefs decide who and where you own land still persist in rural areas. By law, only the Governor of a state or the LGA has rights to give a Certificate of Occupancy (CO) to a citizen in Nigeria. However, people live on land in the rural areas that they acquired from individuals and traditional chiefs without a CO. They consequently complicate the resolution of land conflicts, as parties with a financial advantage can “buy” the justice that would render the land’s ownership transferred to them
regardless of the CO status. Critiques hold that this law is monopolised by privileged groups and individuals—highly placed public servants, politicians, the economically powerful and friends of these privileged groups (Okpala, 1978 in Francis, 1984, p. 15). For the common person, lack of funds to cover legal expenses, delays in administration of justice and the overbearing influence of the rich and powerful makes it almost impossible to gain access to land, but causes violent conflict over land (Ako, 2009, p. 298). As Falana (1997, p. 193) points out, “the Nigerian legal system expects the person whose rights are being infracted to seek remedies and enforce these rights using their personal resources”. However, as most Nigerians are poor, Falana adds that the Constitutional provision effectively embargoes impoverished Nigerians from enforcing their civil liberties because of outrageous law court costs. Moreover, Kabeer (2002, p. 21) comments that the scales of justice favour those who can afford lawyers and the advice necessary; for the rest, even a small claim for justice can lead one to bankruptcy.

Section 4.2, therefore, illustrates that Nigeria operates a two-tier citizenship—citizenship and “indigeneship”. Citizenship only confers one with the right to be a Nigerian, but it is patriarchal “indigeneship” that gives one access to socio-economic resources such as land and traditional/political participation. Moreover, the convoluted Land Use Act of 1979 has made the resolution of land conflicts more difficult. People are, therefore, struggling for access to land, traditional titles and democratic political positions; this is why land, traditional title and democratic political positions appear to be trigger satisfiers for PSCs (see Tables 8 and 9) in the BVN.

4.3 Background to four cases of PSCs in the BVN

In this section, I examine the background to four on-going PSC cases (the first case appears in Table 8 (intra/inter-state: Benue and Taraba) as cases 19, 20 and 21, while the other three (intra-state: Benue) cases appear in Table 9 below) in the BVN. I begin with the case from Taraba State.

4.3.1 Taraba State: the Takum LGA traditional title Ukwe-Takum conflict

In this subsection, I present a background of the nature and evolution of conflict in Takum and those FHNs and satisfiers which identity groups fight over. Taraba State has a population of 2,300,736—1,199,849 male and 1,100,887 female (2006 Census) in fifteen Local Government Areas (LGAs), and it has eight urban areas: Wukari, Zing, Sardauna, Bali, Yono, Kurmi, Ibi, Gashaka and Jalingo—the last being the state capital. In this research, I study a traditional title conflict in Takum, Taraba State. This traditional title struggle triggered violent conflicts in
Taraba State in 1976, 1984, 1992-3 and 1997 (Ayua, 2006, p. 72). The Ukwe-Takum conflict remains unresolved and there has been no new Ukwe-Takum from 1996 to date 2014. Three identity groups fight for the traditional throne of Takum. The groups comprise of traditional and political elites from Kuteb and those of Chamba and Jukun. These groups have supporters from the Hausa and Tiv ethnic identity groups—all are inhabitants of Takum.

The nature and evolution of conflict in Takum (a detail analysis can be read from Ahmadu and Danfulani, 2006): The conflict over the title of Ukwe-Takum is centred on the claim to Takum town, Takum LGA and the Takum Chiefdom (Ahmadu and Danfulani, 2006, p. 289). Kuteb, Chamba and Jukun consider Takum a town of prestige such that each group believes being the Ukwe-Takum offers them ethnic superiority and control of the Chiefdom over other ethnic groups within it (Ahmadu and Danfulani, 2006, p. 289). Kuteb’s claim is that their presence in Takum dates back to 1500, the Jukun only arrived in 1800 and the Chamba arrived from Cameroon in 1830. The other groups like the Tiv and Hausa came much later; indeed that the first chief of Kuteb was installed in 1600 (Bagudu, 2003, p. 28). However, Chamba/Jukun claim that Kuteb were hill dwellers part of what constitutes Ussa LGA that it was their chiefs who brought Kuteb to Takum between 1880 and 1900 (Bagudu, 2003, p. 32). In fact, Chamba/Jukun claim that they conquered and subdued Kuteb hence their right to rule them in Takum (Isa, 2001, p. 10). However, analysts are of the view that it was the wars between Chamba and Kuteb that led the British colonial authority to create two districts in 1912 namely Zumper for Kuteb and Takum/Tikani for Chamber, the two chiefs lived in Takum but only had jurisdiction over their ethnic group to restore peace amongst them; before this creation, both had their own kindred/clan heads and leaders presiding over several clans of their ethnic group in and around Takum (Ahmadu and Danfulani, 2006, p. 288). Nonetheless, this separation did not bring peace in Takum. Therefore, in 1914 the British colonial authority merged the two districts, appointed a paramount chief of Kuteb in Takum, disposed and banished the reigning Chamba chief, Yamusa to Ibbi for trading in slavery (Isa, 2001, p. 10-11). This is the basis of Kuteb’s claims to the title of Ukwe-Takum—they have occupied it from 1914 to 1996. However, Chamba elite who feel aggrieved and deprived by the exclusive leadership of Kuteb to Ukwe-Takum argue that the British colonial authority banished their chief for punishment because they opposed the British rule in Takum, but invited in the Germans (Isa, 2001, p. 11). Hence, by right the title of Ukwe-Takum belongs to them—Chamba.

WEP (2011) finds that, since 1914, only three paramount chiefs have existed in this region: Wukari’s Aku-Uka for Jukun, Gara of Donga for Chamba and Ukwe of Takum for Kuteb in Taraba state. In the post-colonial Nigerian, Gazette No. 56 of Northern Nigeria of March 28,
1963, it confirmed the Kuteb traditional leadership in Takum and Ali Ibrahim Kufang a Kuteb was appointed as *Ukwe-Takum* in October 1963. However, in 1975 the military governor of former Benue Plateau State, Joseph Gomwalk, in Gazette No. 21 and 22 May, 1975 changed the law in the Takum area. This new law allowed for the chief of Takum to be a Kuteb, Jukun or Chamba. It also appointed a Chamba man to be the chairman of the selection committee. It reduced the number of Kuteb kingmakers from four to two and increased that of Chamba and Jukun from two to three each (Bagudu, 2003, p. 28). According to Joseph Gomwalk, the new law reflected the demographics of Takum (WEP, 2011, p. 38). However, analysts (Bagudu, 2003, pp. 29-30) believe that army retired General T.Y. Danjuma a Chamba sympathiser played a role in this new law promulgated by the military regime.

Moreover, in 1979, the state government re-composed Local Government Areas (LGAs) in such a way that created more tension among the ethnic identity groups in Takum. It moved some Kuteb villages from Takum to Ussa LGA (WEP, 2011, p. 37). Furthermore, the state government recomposed the local governments again in 1992. This was perceived by the Kuteb identity group as reducing their numbers in Takum for traditional and political electioneering reasons triggering a violent conflict. A group of Jukun and Chamba members attacked and killed Kuteb members. The Kuteb members were participating in their cultural festival Kuchichebe (a ceremony for the blessing of land for a bumper harvest). Jukun/Chamba fought on one side and Kuteb/Tiv on the other. In 1993, another violent clash took place between these ethnic identity groups at the same festival, although most of the killings took place in the rural areas of Takum. As a result, the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) banned this festival in 1993 (WEP, 2011, pp. 37-38). In 1996, the *Ukwe-Takum* chief died and a struggle erupted between the ethnic identity groups. Kuteb met and elected Mr. Albert Audu to ascend to the title Ukwe-Takum and continue the tradition since 1914, but Jukun and Chamba members objected. They insisted that the law of 1975 must be the basis of choosing the next *Ukwe-Takum*.

While this stand-off continued, according to WEP (2011), a letter from the government on April 28, 1997 recomposed the Local Government of Takum and Ussa. It transferred some Kuteb communities from Takum to Ussa and some Jukun and Chamba communities reverted back to Takum LGA. The Kuteb perceived this as a political strategy to reduce their numbers in Takum. Additionally, in October 1997, the military administrator of Taraba State, Amen Edore Oyakhire, sent a paper titled the “Comprehensive Brief on the Chieftaincy Stool of Takum Chiefdom Taraba State” to the Armed Forces Ruling Council (the supreme council of Nigeria at that time). The action of the governor created further fears among both Kuteb, and Chamba and Jukun ethnic identity groups. As Ahmadu and Danfulani (2006, p. 299) recount that there
was violence between Kuteb and Chamba/Jukun in November of 1997; this violence lasted for over a year. Three thousand lives were lost, over 100,000 people displaced and schools, a modern hospital and clinics, and residential homes were destroyed.

Fundamental human needs (FHNs), satisfiers and causes of violence in Takum: Ayua (2006, p. 72) argues that the ethnic identity groups fight over the *Ukwe-Takum* throne because it brings with it land, political patronage, economic benefits and cultural identity. Ahmadu and Danfulani (2006, pp. 293-294) argue that this conflict has continued because of the dominance of the military in post-colonial Nigeria; the Kuteb who form the majority of Takum do the hard work in Takum, but Chamba/Jukun who are minorities in Takum gain lucrative political positions at both state and federal levels because of their military godfathers. However, Danladi Audu, a Chamba man locates the root of the conflict in the “hatred and jealousy” the Kuteb nurse against Chamba/Jukun and their desire to subjugate and dominate them in Takum (Ahmadu and Danfulani, 2006, p. 300). Therefore, in order to gain political and economic benefits, the identity groups use the two-tier citizenship system (indigenes vs settlers) as discussed above. The Kuteb see themselves as the indigenes of Takum, and see the other groups as settlers. However, the Chamba and Jukun refute this claim as all groups want to ascend to the throne of *Ukwe-Takum* as indigenes of Takum. Applying the HNT, there are three second-class chiefs (Kuteb, Jukun and Chamba) that can ascend to the throne of *Ukwe-Takum*. They are fighting to meet their FHN of identity (the need to be part of a “big picture” in terms of culture). I presume that they have their FHN of subsistence (food, water, and shelter) met as local second-class chiefs. Since the elite of the Tiv and Hausa are also members of Takum community and they are not happy about their exclusion, I include them as parties to the conflict and as those who have to meet the FHN of identity too. My analysis is that this is why all the traditional elites of the five identity groups fight over the satisfier of *Ukwe-Takum* with a view to acquiring other satisfiers like land, political patronage and economic benefits. Other parties to the conflict are the supporters/fighters of the five ethnic and political/traditional elites. This group has their FHNs of identity and subsistence to meet. The FHN of subsistence

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32 By political patronage I mean the practice in Nigeria whereby every politician standing for a political post presents him/herself, carrying gifts to traditional leaders, asking for blessings. This blessing is what ensures that the candidate will also continue the patronage when they have won their elections.

33 The economic benefits that first-class chiefs like the *Ukwe-Takum* receive include a luxurious car, official police guard, house servants and a good salary paid by the government, including medical bills.
(need for food, water and shelter) is included for this group because 68.9% youths unemployment existed in Taraba State (Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics, HNLSS, 2010). This indicates the difference in the frustration of FHNs between the traditional/political elite who want to ascend to the throne of Ukwe-Takum and their supporters/fighters. Therefore, in this Taraba case study, the ethno-political elite from the five ethnic groups: Kuteb, Jukun, Chamba, Tiv and Hausa use the “indigene vs. non-indigene” citizenship to fight over the satisfier Ukwe-Takum. The non-elite actors fight for the ethno-political elite, but also to satisfying their FHNs of subsistence and protection. My assessment is that the identity groups mobilised using a destructive satisfier (fighting) and pseudo satisfier, “indigene vs. non-indigene”, instead of synergic satisfiers to satisfy their FHNs and this is protracting the traditional title conflict in Takum. In the next section, I present the background to PSCs in Benue State.

4.3.2 Background to Benue State protracted social conflicts (PSCs)

Benue State has a population of 4,219,244 people: 2,164,058 male and 2,055,186 female (Census, 2006). The ethnic identity groups in this state include Tiv, Idoma, Bassa, Jukun, Igede, Abakpa, Akweya Nyifon and Etolu. The Benue State Ministry of Local Government and Chieftaincy Affairs, has documented some conflicts in the Tiv area from 1990 – 2004 as presented in Table 9.

Table 9: Some Recorded Communal Conflicts in Tiv area of Benue State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>Communal disputes/violence</th>
<th>Period of eruption</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mbayev (Ushong LGA) Vs Ikyoiv (Ushong LGA)</td>
<td>March, 1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Mbachoughul (Guma LGA) Vs Mbanyiase (Tarka LGA)</td>
<td>March, 1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Gaav (Konshisha LGA) Vs Ukan (Ushong LGA)</td>
<td>February, 1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Mbagbam (Vandeikya LGA) Vs Mbajor (Vandeikya LGA)</td>
<td>February, 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Saghev (Guma LGA) Vs Tombo (Katsina-Ala LGA)</td>
<td>April, 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Utange (Ushong LGA) Vs Ukan (Ushong LGA)</td>
<td>March, 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Tongov (Katsina-Ala LGA) Vs Amua (Ukum LGA)</td>
<td>June, 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Mbayase (Gwer East LGA) Vs Ugambe (Konshisha LGA)</td>
<td>December, 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Mbaivende (Ushong LGA) Vs Ipav (Gboko LGA)</td>
<td>February, 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Mbaikyobo (ushong LGA) Vs Mbanor (Konshisha LGA)</td>
<td>February, 1998</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I investigate the two most frequent violent conflicts in Table 9: the Konshisha and Gwer East Local Government Areas (LGAs) land conflict and the Kwande democratic political leadership conflict.

Konshisha and Gwer East LGAs land conflict

I could not find any written background information about the conflict between Gwer East and Konshisha LGAs. However, the information I gathered during my fieldwork in 2011 reveals that the fighting concerns land. Of the 29 conflicts in Table 9 in the Tiv area of Benue State, eight involve the people of Konshisha: case 3, 1991, Gaav (Konshisha) vs Ukan (Ushongo); case 8,
1997, Mbayase (Gwer East) vs Ugambe (Konshisha); case 10, 1998, Mbaikyobo (Ushongo) vs Mbanor (Konshisha); case 12, 1999, Fulani pastoralists (Konshisha) vs Mbagbe (Konshisha); case 13, 1999, Mbalyem (Konshisha) vs Mbashima (Konshisha); case 14, 1999, Mbakighir (Konshisha) vs Mbashima (Konshisha); case 20, 2000, Mbayase (Gwer East) Vs Ugambe (Konshisha); and case 27, 2004 Mbayase (Gwer East) Vs Ugambe (Konshisha). I concentrate my investigation on the conflict between the people of Mbayase (Gwer East) and Ugambe (Konshisha) because this conflict occurred three separate times, in 1997, 2000 and 2004. It remains unresolved to date, 2014.

**Fundamental human needs, satisfiers and causes of violence:** Konshisha LGA has a population of 225,672: 115,395 male and 110,227 female; Gwer East has a population of 163,647: 82,283 male and 81,364 female (Census, 2006). Thus, this conflict affects a total of 385,319 people between Konshisha LGA and Gwer East LGA. From the information I gathered during my fieldwork, this conflict concerns land and generates disastrous economic and social consequences by displacing the population in large numbers and closing schools. According to my research informants the conflicts between Konshisha and Gwer East are about inter-communal boundaries between Konshisha and Gwer East people and people considered to be non-indigenes (settlers) who want more land for farming and other purposes. For example, Informant 007 said that the fighting between Konshisha and Gwer East people over farmland started when their forefathers like Genaga Dar were alive (about four generations ago—in the 1960s). Indeed, Dar demarcated lands between Konshisha and Gwer East people, but those demarcations are not accepted by many today. They insist on new demarcations, but the new demarcations suggested are not acceptable to everyone so no peace exist between Konshisha and Gwer East. Informant 007 further clarified that the new spate of serious fighting has continued on a yearly basis from 1993 to 2010. In addition, Informant 004 said that the fighting usually starts during the farming season; this is the time people clash over farm demarcation lines.

On the issue of non-indigenes trying to grab land, Informant 014 gave me the example of a non-indigene who wanted to bury his father on the land where he had lived all his life. However, the indigenes of the area refused to allow this burial to take place because by burying his father on the land, the man had a cultural right to claim its ownership. Each time the traditional burial was convoked fighting broke out. Fighting broke out in 2008, 2009 and 2010. It appears the intervention of the women investigated in this research after the 2010 fighting has stopped the violence but the man has not been buried as culture demands. Informant 014 said, “We do not know when they are going to bury this man. This is 2011 the
fear is that whenever they want to bury this man there will be trouble”. Those who are fighting in these two LGAs are all Tiv speaking, but the patriarchal “indigeneship” principle still applies as non-indigenes are called *mbavanya* (visitors—not-of-the-land) and indigenes are known as *many’a* (those-of-the-land). I argue that these groups mobilise using a destructive satisfier (fighting) and a pseudo satisfier, “indigenes vs. non-indigenes”, instead of synergic satisfiers for acquiring the satisfier land for the satisfaction of the FHNs of subsistence, protection and identity which protracts the struggle for land between Konshisha and Gwer East people.

**Kwande LGA political conflict**

In this subsection, I present a background to the Kwande political conflict; its evolution, sponsors and fighters, the destruction caused and the issues people fight over. Kwande Local Government Area (LGA) of Benue State covers 2,975 square kilometres. It has four intra-ethnic identity groupings for the purpose of local traditional administration: Shangev-Ya, Nanev, Ikurav-Ya and Turan. It has a population of 248,697: 124,904 male and 123,794 female (Census, 2006). Kwande social conflicts concern land, traditional title and political leadership. I study the democratic political conflict because it is a protracted conflict that has occurred in 2003, 2004, 2007 and was about to occur in 2011 before the intervention of Agape Sisters and Catholic Women’s Organisation who may have prevented in that instance. However, in 2012 violence broke out again over Local Government elections. Two factors contextualise why people remain desperate to win elections in Kwande: people’s livelihoods and the socio-economic conditions of the area. Firstly, the people of Kwande area are farmers who produce yams, rice, beans, millet, and palm trees for local consumption. They produce crops like peppers, tomatoes, and groundnuts in commercial quantities for export. For this reason, the Adikpo market in Kwande used to be, before the violent conflicts, a national market. Kwande LGA has virtually no commercial industries in its area now. Secondly, socio-economic difficulties existed in Kwande before the election violence started in 2003. Lyam (2006, p. 44), writing in the “Kwande Crisis: A Community Conflict of Many Interests,” points out that development gaps existed between the Turan/Ikurav-Ya and the Nanev/Shangev-Ya; the government needed to address equitable distribution of roads, schools, clinics/hospitals, water, etc. Moreover, that the relative higher density population in the Nanev/Shangev-Ya areas led to many landless families and that there was overdependence on poorly developed rural markets and a few other non-agricultural economic activities. Additionally, jobless youths were ready to do almost anything to earn a living before the post-election violence.
The evolution of democratic political leadership conflict in Kwande: According to WEP (2011, p. 19), since the 1983 general election in Nigeria, the people of Kwande resolved that anybody elected to a political office who did not perform well would lose the opportunity of re-election. By performance, the people meant the ability of the person to bring socio-economic development, including creating an environment for equity and equality in political representation, in the five Kwande areas. This is where the principle of patriarchal "indigeneship" applies: to be an indigene is to have access to the socio-economic resources of the community and it is the duty of a leader to enable this access. This is known as the principle of ya na wangbian (eat and give to your relation). As Wang (2004, pp. 136-138) argues that ya na wangbian (take and give to your brother) is a Tiv philosophy of fairness, equity and responsibility. The brother's needs are the leader's needs and the leader strives to apportion him what is his due. Therefore, a leader is instrumental in the promotion of social, political and religious harmony; a leader who deviates from this role becomes unpopular and a change of leadership is not only required, but is necessary. A leader can only deprive non-indigenes access to socio-economic resources.

Therefore, the people of Kwande held this as their guiding political principle in the Fourth Republic which began in 1999. WEP (2011) reports that Kwande people voted in large numbers for the People's Democratic Party (PDP), led by Ason Bur, in the 1999 general elections. They believed the PDP would bring socio-economic development to the area. They, therefore, voted against the All Peoples Party (APP) led by Paul Unongo, an experienced Kwande indigene, a politician since the First Republic. However, after four years in power, Kwande people observed that only close allies of the State Governor, Mr George Akume, benefited from the PDP-led government (WEP, 2011, p. 19). This means he was not observing the principle of ya na wangbian (eat and give to your relation—indigene), he was treating them as non-indigenes. Therefore, the people resolved to vote in a new government during the 2003 general elections. This generated a lot of tension in Kwande LGA between members of the PDP and the APP political parties.

As a result of the tension in Kwande, the Governor, Mr George Akume (PDP), deployed military personnel to control security in the area. However, some suggest that the military became an instrument used by the government of the PDP to intimidate opponents and that they killed, maimed and burnt down houses of opponents of the PDP (WEP, 2011, p. 19). The WEP report also asserts that the youths of the APP in the area organised themselves, burnt down and destroyed properties belonging to those they perceived to be behind the military presence in Kwande—members of the PDP. While all this went on, all the different political parties
resolved to vote the PDP out at the general election. They set aside differences and formed an alliance (WEP, 2011, p. 20). They formed a new party, the All Nigerian Peoples Party (ANPP) hoping to win the 2003 general election. When members of the PDP sensed the possibility of losing election, they became desperate. They became more aggressive and ruthless, using intimidation tactics and violence to ensure that the PDP returned to power. They used the slogan “to win at all cost” (WEP, 2011, p. 20).

However, on the day of the election, to make sure their votes counted, supporters of the ANPP mounted road checkpoints. They checked for fake ballot boxes or boxes stuffed with rigged voting papers. The WEP report suggests that ANPP youths caught some PDP members with ballot papers. They humiliated and punished these PDP members for attempting to rig elections (WEP, 2011, p. 21). While members of the ANPP searched all vehicles that passed that road, a military vehicle heading to a polling station located in Shangevya approached the home of a prominent PDP member Mr. Basil Kwembe, and the young men demanded to search the military vehicle too. Sensing the tension, the military agreed to be searched, but when returning through the checkpoint the military refused to be searched. The ANPP youths allowed them to pass, but booed and threw stones at them to register their displeasures (WEP, 2011, p. 20). The military retaliated by opening fire on the ANPP youths at the checkpoint, killing many of them. In return, members of the ANPP mobilised and went out to burn down the houses of prominent PDP members e.g., Chief Ashar Igungu, Azua Aongo and Terkura Pever (WEP, 2011, p. 22). The Independent National Election Commission (INEC) ultimately declared the PDP candidates the winners of the 2003 general elections in the Kwande area. This style of politicking also took place at the Local Government elections on 27th March 2004. On the eve of the election, ANPP youths attacked a PDP meeting killing four people. According to Lyam (2006, p.49), ANPP youths claimed the PDP was planning its latest strategy to rig elections again at this meeting. They, therefore, returned to violence, killing people and destroying property, in the style of 2003. Violent politicking repeated itself at the 2007 general elections. WEP (2011, p. 25) reports that, as the 2011 general elections drew near, many people in the LGA became afraid of similar occurrences to 2003, 2004 and 2007.

**Fundamental human needs (FHNs), satisfiers and the causes of violence:** WEP (2011, pp. 22-23) suggests that the political elite employed young men to intimidate, humiliate and kill when necessary in order to win elections, or to return themselves or their candidates to power. Young PDP men were paid by the PDP-led government on one side, and on the other side, young ANPP men were paid by wealthy members of the ANPP as both groups fought it out (WEP, 2011, pp. 22-23). In addition, these political elites brought in mercenaries to fight for
them on both sides (ANPP and PDP). Lyam (2006, p. 49) states that the youths on both sides used sophisticated weapons for the type of destruction caused. From the HNT perspective, my analysis is that there are political-elite identity groups who are fighting over the satisfier of democratic political leadership to satisfy their FHN of participation. A second group, the non-elite identity groups—those supporters/fighters of the elite from the two parties; they are fighting for the satisfiers of food, water, shelter, clothes, roads, schools and clinics/hospitals for the satisfaction of the FHNs of subsistence and protection. Both groups were mobilised using a destructive satisfier (fighting) and an inhibiting satisfier “rigging-elections” instead of synergic satisfiers for the satisfaction of their FHNs and interests they are, therefore, frustrating the satisfaction of FHNs in Kwande such that there is a protracted struggle for democratic political leadership in Kwande.

Apa LGA community conflict

In this subsection, I introduce Apa LGA, the nature of its inter-communal conflict, the genesis of its violence and what the two communities fight over. Apa LGA has eleven council wards/districts: Auku, Oba, Igoro, Edikwu 1, Edikwu 2, Oiji, Ikobi, Iga, Ofoke, Ojantele and Ugbokpo which is also its administrative headquarters. Apa LGA has a population of 96,765: 50,811 male and 45,954 female (Census 2006). A brief background of local livelihoods helps us to put this conflict in context. No industries or job opportunities, apart from farming exist in the area affected by the conflict. The two communities, therefore, fight over stones which have economic value for building construction.

The nature of conflict: According to WEP (2011), the communities of Ataganyi and Omelemu existed together for decades without violent conflict. The second-class-chief at Ugbokpo resolved conflicts which occurred between them. The people of Ataganyi and Omelemu paid royalty tax (in the form of collected seeds, Photo 8, of a soup making tree, Photo 7) to the Ojantele traditional head. The Ataganyi and Omelemu communities had no traditional head of their own, so both communities depended on the Ojantele district traditional head. Trouble started when the government wanted to elevate Ataganyi to the status of a district giving it independence from the Ojantele. The government elevated Ataganyi, but not Omelemu because the latter’s population is one-quarter of the former and Omelemu had to come under Ataganyi rule. WEP (2011, p. 33) finds that this government action infuriated the Omelemu elite. They complained that they did not want to be under Ataganyi rule, but under Ojantele rule as the Ojantele head had helped them gain recognition as a community in the first place. Despite their objection, the head to be, Chief Alexander Adoaonya informed the community
leader of Omelemu that, henceforth, he expected to be accorded the same respect as district head just as they did to the Ojantele. However, the Omelemu community refused to pay royalty taxes to the head of Ataganyi. They continued to pay their royalty tax to the head of Ojantele. This reaction displeased the people of Ataganyi.

Therefore, the head of Ataganyi ordered that no farm produce or any other item from Omelemu be allowed to pass through Ataganyi to the Apa commercial centre (WEP Report, 2011, p. 33). This was to punish the community for refusing to accept the leadership of the Ataganyi community. In spite of this situation, the head of Ataganyi sent messengers to Omelemu that he wished to discuss how the two communities could work together since Ataganyi was a true district and Omelemu under part of it. This infuriated the Omelemu elders, political elite and youths, but they did nothing about it; the tensions between the two communities rose, creating acrimonies in their everyday life (WEP, 2011, p. 33). To prevent an outbreak of violence, the LGA chairman suspended the official recognition of Ataganyi as district and its chief. However, the relationship between the two communities remained strained until violence broke out on July 15-16, 2008 over granite stones used for road and housing construction (see Photo 9).

Fundamental human needs (FHNs), satisfiers and the causes of violence: WEP (2011, p. 34) asserts that youths from Omelemu gathered granite stones to sell to the construction company Messers' Rockbridge Construction, which was handling the Adoka-Agatu road construction. The youths from Ataganyi requested that youths from Omelemu stop excavating the stones. However, the youths and elders of Omelemu refused to comply and claimed, as an autonomous community, they did not fear the Ataganyi people. Then, on July 15, 2008 two young men from the Omelemu community and a police officer from Ataganyi were killed. The corpses of these men have never been found (WEP Report, 2011, p. 35). WEP (2011, p. 36) finds that some of the political elite from the Omelemu community, because they had not been consulted about the creation of the new Ataganyi district, incited their young men to violence. The refusal of the Omelemu community to pay royalty tax may have contributed to this conflict, and the conflict over the extraction of granite stones triggered the violence. The issue of "indigene vs. non-indigene" occurs here: "non-indigenes" are considered non-royals (inferior) and they pay tax and answer to the authority of indigenes—the royal (superior) group. I would argue that this label of royal vs non-royal is a satisfier for the satisfaction of the FHN of identity and it is supposed to stimulate the satisfaction of other FHNs like freedom, protection and subsistence for the royal while frustrating the satisfaction these FHNs of identity, freedom and protection for the non-royal. Hence, both identity groups were
mobilised using destructive satisfier (fighting) and a pseudo satisfier, royal vs. non-royal, for the satisfaction of their FHNs and interests.

Photo 7: The Tree whose seeds are used for paying royalty tax

![Photo 7: The Tree whose seeds are used for paying royalty tax](image)

Photo 8: A sample of the seed for paying royal taxes

![Photo 8: A sample of the seed for paying royal taxes](image)
Given that this conflict arises from one soup-making tree (Photo 7) and small quantities of granite stones (Photo 9) the community extracts and sells, I argue that the commercial sales can only meet domestic demands for food, water and shelter. The underlying issue is that the royal political/traditional elite of the Ataganyi want to collect royalty tax as traditional head, which the non-royals of the Omelemu community do not want to pay. They want to pay royalty tax to the traditional head of the Ojantele community. My analysis is that this is what drives this conflict.

Section 4.3, therefore, has traced the background of four PSCs in the BVN. As such, answering in the affirmative the question that arose in Chapter 3 regarding whether this research can find PSCs in the BVN to study. The first conflict, the traditional title—Ukwe-Takum was fiercely fought in 1976, 1984, 1992-93 and 1997 and according to the women in Takum, any small matter in Takum now ends up in clashes between ethnic identity groups; this has happened in 2001, 2004, 2008 and 2010 as a result no new Ukwe-Takum has existed from 1997 to date, 2014. It reveals five identity groups fighting over this title. The second conflict is between the people of Konshisha LGA and Gwer East LGAs, who fight over land. Violence has so far occurred in 1997, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2009, and 2010. The third conflict arises in Kwande LGA, where the people fight over political leadership and where violence has occurred in 2003, 2004, 2007 and 2012. The fourth conflict, in Apa LGA, is between communities who fight over stones of commercial value and the payment of a royalty tax. This conflict started in 2008. None of these conflicts have been resolved to date. On the whole, the review of the character and purpose of violent conflict in the BVN in this section reveals that the predominant regional
identity groups involved in creating violent conflicts are ethnic, political, and economic identity elite groups with their supporters/fighters. These groups have mobilised using a destructive satisfier (fighting), inhibiting satisfier (rigging elections) and a pseudo satisfier (indigene vs. non-indigene or royal vs. non-royal) instead of synergic satisfiers to satisfy their FHNs and interests which I argue is protracting these conflicts. Moreover, my analysis is that the principle of patriarchal “indigeneship” is used to discriminate and oppress those considered “non-indigenes”. One needs to engage all the identity groups fighting in a peacebuilding effort based on the HNT as Max-Neef (1992) argues, the ethno-political elites and their supporters are all potential actors in adopting the use of synergic satisfiers for the satisfaction of FHNs in the situation of PSCs in the BVN. As such, the FHNs articulated in this section will help in analysing the work of the women peacebuilding in the BVN in Chapter 7 of this research. Next, I attend to the second question that arose from Chapter 3 concerning what the government is doing to resolve these four PSCs in the BVN.

4.4 Background to government peacebuilding in the BVN

In this section, I explain two types of peacebuilding the state and federal governments practice: the establishment of peace commissions and creating new semi-autonomous states in Nigeria. The first measure governments takes is to set up peace commissions to investigate social conflicts and make recommendations for solutions. However, they seldom implement recommendations made:

The Takum conflict: For example, the traditional title struggle in Taraba state remains unresolved albeit several peace committees have been established: the Suleiman Gurin (head of) 1985 Committee, to investigate the conflict surrounding the title of Takum; Yawe Garvey (head of) 1993 Committee, to investigate the conflict between Kuteb, Jukun and Chamba in April-May 1993 at Takum LGA; Abubaka Giret (head of) 1997 Commission; the 1998 Committee on the Resolution of Conflict Flashpoint in the Country headed by Major General B.S. Magashi and the Commission of Inquiry into the Created Chiefdoms, Emirates and Districts in Taraba State of 2006 headed by Dr. M.T. Liman (WEP Report, 2011). Men headed all these committees. The 1985 commission recommended that the new law of 1975 be repealed; reverting to the 1963 law which authorised that only Kuteb should succeed to the title of Ukwe-Takum, restoring the tradition created in 1914 by the British colonial regime. The 1993 commission looked into the question of which people first arrived at Takum, but could not establish who the first settlers were. However, it found that before the arrival of the British, Kuteb, Jukun and Chamba had parallel chiefs (known as headmen) side by side in Takum and
its areas (WEP, 2011, p. 40). It stated that the British colonial regime changed this when it set up a paramount title because it wanted a central authority to administer the local chiefs and their subjects regarding issues such as policing, education, taxation and health care (WEP, 2011, p. 40). Although the British recognised the chief of Tikari (Chamba) in 1896, they only came to recognise that of Kuteb in 1912; when it came to choosing the paramount chief of Takum, the British merged the headmen of Zumkum (Chamba) and that of Zumere (Kuteb) in 1914. The British regime chose the chief of Kuteb Ahmadu, and promoted him to first paramount chief (Ukwe) of Takum. The 1993 commission also pointed out that all the past Ukwe Takum had been Kuteb from 1914-1996: Ukwe Ahmadu Gankwe II, 1914-1926; Ukwe Hassan Ribbon Gonkwe, 1926-1929; Ukwe Ibrahim Kufong Zorti, 1929-1938; Ukwe Ahmadu Gyu Ahmadu, 1938-1963; and Ukwe Alh., Ali Ibrahim Kufan II, 1963-1996 (WEP, 2011, p. 41). Therefore, the 1993 Commission also recommended that the law of 1975 be repealed and the law of 1963 be reinstated.

According to WEP (2011, p. 42), the 1998 Committee found that the letter of April 28, 1997, on the re-composition of LGAs which took some Kuteb people to Ussa LGA, triggered violence in Takum. Moreover, it recommended that as the chiefs in these conflict areas have been a Jukun at Wukari, a Chamba at Donga and a Kuteb at Takum, the original composition of Takum and Ussa LGAs as stated in the letter of March 12, 1997 be restored. Furthermore, it called on the Federal Government to instruct the State Government of Taraba to repeal the 1975 law and reinstate the 1963 law so that Kuteb could produce the Ukwe-Takum. The 2006 Commission also recommended that the law of 1975 be repealed and the law of 1963 reinstated. However, none of these recommendations have been implemented by the Taraba state government and the throne of Ukwe-Takum has remained unoccupied from 1996 to date 2014.

**The Konshisha and Gwer LGAs land conflict:** The Benue State Government set up a committee to look into this conflict. The report from this committee has been submitted to government, but it remains unpublished and the conflict unresolved. At the moment there is no fighting on the ground, but any number of issues might trigger clashes again.

**The Kwande political conflict:** According to WEP (2011), in 2003, the Benue State Government set up a committee of enquiry into the conflict, which the ANPP boycotted. They argued that the PDP, as the party in government, was responsible for the conflict; as such, the PDP could not sit in judgement over itself. Additionally, the Senate of the Federal Republic of Nigeria set up a committee to investigate the cause of this violent conflict and its report of 24th June 2004 states:
The crisis was fuelled up by sentiments shared by the leaders of the All Nigerian People’s Party (ANPP) Mr Paul Unongo and Dr Iyorchia Ayu of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP).

These two named were the political leaders of the two parties at the time. Furthermore, an “All Kwande Peace Summit” took place, attended by prominent sons, daughters and mothers, politicians, community leaders and the oldest people in wards. However, Lyam (2006, p. 54) asserts that the local chiefs and political elite took over its control such that nothing of significance came out of it. It only highlighted the need for the law enforcement agents and constituted authorities to take over the running of Kwande affairs and that the activities of the Kwande Market Union be restored. This conflict remains unresolved as the 2012 Local Government Chairman election again resulted in violence.

The Apa LGA conflict: In the case of the Ataganyi and Omelemu community conflict in Apa LGA, the Benue State Government set up a peace committee to investigate the causes and to recommend a resolution to the conflict. According to WEP (2011), the committee was composed of Hon. Sunday Oligi (chairman), Hon. Prince Antenyi Antenyi, Hon. Oche Ogale, a representative of Apa traditional council, C.S.O Apa LGA, Hon. Amodu Idakwu, Hon. Maxwell Oyi and Gabriel Iyaji—all men. This committee had not submitted its report as of 2011. However, the Chairman of Apa LGA suspended the creation of Ataganyi as a district of its own. The Apa LGA conflict remain unresolved as the Omelemu community continue to refuse to pay royalty tax to the Ataganyi which seems to be at the root of the conflict. Therefore, as most of the reports’ recommendations remain unimplemented this peace commission peacebuilding and conflict resolution style seems ineffective.

The second peacebuilding style practiced by government is political—the creation of semi-autonomous internal states that ethnic-conscious identity group’s demand. Identity groups ask for states because Nigeria shares its oil money between the Federal, State and Local governments. So a group having its own state believes it will have more resources for development. Hence, Nigeria which existed as three British Protectorates pre-independence (1947-1959—Northern, Southern and Lagos as shown in Photo 10), has been divided into multiple internal semi-autonomous regions or states.
Nigeria gained independence in 1960; in 1963, it created a new region from Western Region as the Mid-Western Region (Photo 11).

Source: Online Nigeria

Photo 10: Map of Protectorates in Nigeria 1900

Source: Online Nigeria

Photo 11: Map of the four Nigerian Regions in 1963

Source: Online Nigeria
From 1967 to 1970, Nigerians fought a civil war when the former Mid-Western and Eastern Regions wanted to secede and unite as one state called Biafra. In 1967, a military decree replaced the regions with 12 states, and in 1976, a military regime created seven new states, and the present Federal Capital Territory called Abuja. In 1987, the military created two new states followed by nine more in 1991. Finally, in 1996, it created six more states whereby the Federal Republic of Nigeria now comprises 36 states and a Federal Capital Territory Abuja (see Photo 1).

Section 4.4, therefore, identifies a system of state creation as a means of conflict resolution in Nigeria. This explains our enquiry into the question of what the government is doing to resolve PSC in Nigeria. However, this system of basing the creation of new states around ethnic homogeneity/compatibility has not resolved PSC in Nigeria. Rather, there seems to be multiple violent conflicts in the BVN today (Table 8 and Table 9). Yet, the creation of more states seems to be the preferred solution. Wakili (2012) reports, some identity groups have demanded another 46 new states at the National Assembly of Nigeria (NAN). There are demands for two new states in the BVN—Amana from the present Adamawa State and Apa from the present Benue State. With 250 strong ethnic identity groups, it seems Nigeria is headed for 250 states. This does not seem to be a viable option and other solutions need to be explored. In this research, I study some women’s peacebuilding work as an alternative narrative for resolving PSC in the BVN. I next present the background of the women peacebuilders, attending to the third question that arose from Chapter 3 on whether women are involved in peacebuilding and conflict resolution in the region.

4.5 Background of women peacebuilders in the BVN

In this section, I present four grassroots groups of women peacebuilding in the four cases (Takum, Kwande, Konshisha and Gwer East, and Apa LGAs) of PSCs elaborated in 4.3. The women’s initiatives do not form part of formal peacebuilding work in the BVN. They support their initiatives mutually using personal resources. Most of the women belong to two NGOs: Agape Sisters, a faith-based association (FBA) and the Catholic Women’s Organizations (CWO) also a faith-based organisation (FBO), but there are a mixture of other women members too. These women have benefited from training in peacebuilding work from two NGOs: the Women Environmental Programme (WEP) based in Abuja; and the Justice Development and Peace Commission (JDPC) of the Catholic Dioceses of Makurdi in Benue State. WEP and JDPC receive funding from international organisations. WEP’s and JDPC’s backgrounds form part of the women peacebuilder’s background.
Women Environmental Programme (WEP)

The Women Environmental Programme (WEP) has UNESCO consultative status. It is based in Abuja, the capital of Nigeria. It helps train women all over Nigeria in peacebuilding. Informant 023 explains WEP activities:

WEP’s activities in peacebuilding started in 2001 when the Tiv and Jukun had troubles in Takum in Taraba State and the Tiv and the Alago in Nasarawa State... Our main objective is to empower women and to get them to the negotiating table because when it comes to violent conflicts women and children are always at the receiving end. But when it comes to negotiation or peace accords we can hardly find them there. We are trying to get them there at the local, national and international level because we are not just working in Nigeria. We are also working in Burkina Faso.

WEP offered training to women, youths and traditional leaders on creating a network for peacebuilding work in the Middle Belt, Nigeria. This was an intervention programme sponsored by the European Union. It was called “Connecting the Disconnect for Peace Building and Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)” in the Middle Belt—March to June 2011. I took Photo 12 at a WEP workshop in Makurdi.

Photo 12: Some women peacebuilders from the BVN at a WEP training workshop in Makurdi

Photo 12 presents women from Adamawa, Benue, Plateau, Taraba, and Niger States. They represented different groups as leaders/delegates at a WEP workshop from the five states.

The Justice Development and Peace Commission (JDPC)

The JDPC was established in 1975 by the Roman Catholic Bishops Conference of Nigeria to serve the Church’s social services. The JDPC of the Catholic Diocese of Makurdi was established in 1977. It focuses its activities on issues of human rights, women’s empowerment, peacebuilding, emergency response and good governance. The JDPC has formed Peace
Committees (PCs)—women and men in each of the parishes that the diocese has conflict. In 2008, JDPC offered training to the PC members on how to recognise early warning signs of impending violence in their communities through workshops. Therefore, PC members serve as gatekeepers for JDPC officials in their communities as well as carrying out their peacebuilding activities. I studied women members of PC in the Konshisha and Gwer-East LGAs.

The women of Agape Sisters – Kwande

Agape Sisters is an interdenominational FBA in Adikpo Kwande LGA, Benue State. The women started this group in 2000. It has twenty members at present who are mostly of Protestant denomination of NKST (Nongo Kristu u hen Sudan ken Tiv: Followers of Christ from Sudan in Tiv) with a few Roman Catholics among them. The preamble of their constitution defines their mission:

We Agape Sisters of Kwande Local Government, realising the need to consolidate our position in our environment, have decided to form a committee of friends in order to live in peace, unity and harmony as one family, dedicated to promoting Agape-hood understanding, welfare and quality of life among all Agape members and society in general.

This group became involved in peacebuilding work after the 2003 and 2004 crisis in Kwande LGA.

Photo 13: Some Agape Sisters at a meeting in Adikpo, Benue State

I took Photo 15 at a regular meeting of Agape Sisters in Adikpo, Kwande LGA.
The Catholic Women’s Organisation (CWO) Kwande

The Catholic Women’s Organisation (CWO) is an FBO of the Roman Catholic Church. Any woman who is Roman Catholic is free to become a member of CWO. They are organised at Small Christian Communities, Parish, Deanery and Diocesan levels. Their aims and objectives:

1. To help unite women of the parish to achieve spiritual growth through organisation of various activities such as retreat and seminars;
2. To establish good relationships with other societies in the parish in order to create interest, and aid in the resolution of present day moral, educational, social, cultural and economic problems; and
3. To foster a spirit of co-operation, unity and goodwill among all women societies irrespective of origin, social or educational status.

CWOs are known as “Mothers of the Church” in the BVN because of their efforts to ensure peace in their communities. I took Photo 14 at a CWO meeting in a parish-outstation of Adikpo, Kwande.

Photo 14: Some CWO women at a meeting at Adikpo, Benue State

Having presented the background of the two foundational NGOs to which most of the local women’s group belong and the two NGOs that have offered them training in peacebuilding, I now present the women’s group from the four PSCs communities; the women described themselves in their social, religious and ethnic identity backgrounds.

Women from Takum LGA, Taraba State

The women group from Takum described themselves as mothers, sisters, and wives and they were mostly Evangelicals as well as some Roman Catholics and Protestants: some of the women were from the Reformed Church of Christ in Nigeria (RCCN). Others were women from Christian Reformed Church Nigeria (CRCN); women from the Catholic Women’s Organisation
(CWO) and the Nongo Kristu u hen Sudan ken Tiv (NKST) and finally, there were women from the Reformed Ecumenical Council of Nigeria (RECON). Although these women are from different denominations and ethnic identity groups, all the women studied in this area emphasised that they were happy performing peacebuilding work together in Takum LGA. Therefore, this group of women’s initiatives transcend ethnic divide and religious beliefs. I took Photo 3 in the boardroom of Takum Local Government Area’s (LGA) chairman. The photo was taken at the WEP’s end of project evaluation. The women in this group insisted on holding this evaluation at the LGA headquarters because they wanted the LGA chairman to recognise their group for the purpose of peacebuilding in Takum, Taraba State. I conducted my storytelling interviews with eleven women between the ages of 19 and 54 years in two focus groups in Takum. Some of the women were primary and secondary schools teachers, others were farmers and traders.

**Women from Konshisha and Gwer LGAs, Benue State**

The women group working in these LGAs are mothers, sisters and wives who are part of Peace Committee (PC) which has been formed in Konshisha—Awajir and Aliade communities after JDPC offered them training on early warning signs of an impending violent conflict. There are twenty trained Peace Committee (PC) women, ten from Gwer East and ten from Konshisha Local Governments Areas and other women, who perform peacebuilding activities in the area affected by the conflict between Mbayase (Gwer East) and Ugambe (Konshisha) LGAs. Although these two LGAs are Tiv speaking communities, the PC membership is multi-religious: non-Roman Catholics and non-Christians indicating how their work transcends religious belief. Nevertheless, I could only find Roman Catholics and Protestants to conduct my storytelling interviews for data collection. I took Photo 15 on the day I conducted my research with the women in Aliade, Gwer East community.
I conducted fourteen individual storytelling interviews and eleven women participated in two focus group sessions. One woman was between the ages of 25-34; seven, 35-44 years and six, 45-54 years. Seven women were rural farmers, five civil servants and two unemployed. One held a postgraduate degree, two held university degrees, four held diplomas from tertiary institutions, one held secondary school certificate, one held primary school certificate, and one had no formal education.

Women from Kwande LGA, Benue State

In Kwande LGA, the Agape Sisters and Catholic Women’s Organisation (CWO) are mothers, sisters and wives performing peacebuilding work together and showing how their work transcends religious beliefs. There background is as given above; I conducted individual storytelling interviews with seven Agape Sisters and eight participated in a focus group session. One woman was between the ages of 25-34; three, 35-44 years and three, 45-54 years. All the seven were civil servants. Two held university degrees and five tertiary diplomas. I also conducted storytelling interviews with two CWO women. The two women were civil servants, one had a university degree and the other held a tertiary school diploma.

Women from Apa LGA, Benue State

The women—mothers, sisters and wives (see Photo 16) undertaking peacebuilding initiatives in Apa LGA are members of the Redeemed Christian Church of God (RCCG) and Pentecostal groups. As such, this is a group whose initiative transcends religious beliefs although they all
speak the same language—Idoma. This group of women attended the WEP workshop in Madurdi. The Apa group had two university teachers among them who work in Makurdi, but the rest had little education and were farmers in their communities. I conducted individual storytelling interviews with the two university teachers and six women, three from each community of Ataganyi and Omelemu participated in a focus group storytelling session. In this area, some women peacebuilders were more than 60 years old, but most of them were between 19 and 50 years. It is the latter group that participated in this research.

Photo 16: Women from Ataganyi and Omelemu communities in Ataganyi

Therefore, in Table 10, I present the summary of individual and focus group research participants from the four PSCs communities by LGAs.
Table 10: Summary of women participants in this research

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Community</th>
<th>Individual Participants</th>
<th>Focus Participants</th>
<th>Group</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Konshisha LGA, Awajir</td>
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<td>JDPC Personal</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Agila Apa LGA</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Apa LGA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Abuja</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Takum LGA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>WEP Personal</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
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<td></td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10 shows that I have answered the third question that arose from Chapter 3 on whether there are women engaged peacebuilding in the BVN. I have provided a summary of women participants in this research by LGAs and NGOs, and I have indicated individual/focus group participants. In total, 25 women participated in individual storytelling interviews and 40 women participated in seven focus group sessions. Of the 25 individual interviewees, five of them participated in the focus groups sessions as well, thus bringing the total to 60 women participants. I present in Chart 2 the percentage representation of the five LGAs participation.
This info-graphic (Chart 2) on the total number of participants in this research illustrates that 18% informants were from Takum LGA, 19% from Konshisha LGA, 20% from Gwer East LGA, 24% from Kwande LGA and 19% from Apa LGA. This percentage distribution indicates that there was a fair distribution (an average of 20%) of participation from all the LGAs in my research. I used individual and focus group storytelling interviews and participatory observation methods for collecting the 60 women’s stories on their peace initiatives. In the next section, I attend to the fourth question that arose from Chapter Three regarding the kind of patriarchal social, economic and political conditions the women live in in the BVN: from the human needs perspective, I would argue that while the women seek to have an impact on the conflicts around them, it is important to recognise that they do their work against a structural violence perpetuated by a post-colonial patriarchal gender order that inhabits their activities and influence.

4.6 Background to gender order in the BVN

In this section, I illustrate how the post-colonial patriarchal social, economic and political backdrop of the BVN manifests itself in citizenship/"indigeneship", ownership and use of land, and traditional/civil governance, all which discriminate against women. Therefore, I illustrate that there is a structural violence against women and a denial that women are indigenes in the BVN.
Citizenship/indigeneship: Nigeria expresses "indigeneship" in a gender neutral language, but men and women receive different importance in the BVN. Men generally consider women their property such that women's identity as separate beings is nullified. This can be observed in the Tiv Customary Law Part II (1985 and 1990 2.1) which states that a valid marriage according to Tiv law stands when:

(a) The woman to be given in marriage has reached the age of puberty, and expressed her willingness to marry in the presence of a witness, and (b) the woman's guardian has consented to the marriage in the presence of a witness, and (c) the bride-price or any part of it has been paid.

Here, the identity of the girl remains tied to her guardian, it does not depend on herself as an individual. In addition, once a man pays a bride-price, he thinks about and acts towards the woman as though he has bought a piece of property (Wang, 2004, p. 112). This leads to inequality between women and men, and is as such, a form of discrimination. This discrimination exists not only between women and men, but also between men and other men, women and other women. A man with several wives has higher status and position in his community than a man with one wife. Among women, the first wife has privileges that the second or subsequent wives do not have, such as being in charge of the other wives and the domestic affairs of the family. The differences between men, mostly deal with hierarchical status within the community; however, men do not consider other men as property, whereas men treat women as such. So the difference of a woman being a first or second wife does not remove her from the "property" category.

The Idoma Customary Laws treat women in a manner similar to that of the Tiv. The differences between its customary law and that of the Tiv are that "No woman shall be married unless she has reached the age of twelve years" (Idoma Native Marriage Law and Custom, 1970, Part II-Marriage, 1a), and on the death of a husband, an Idoma woman who elects to remain with the heirs of her late husband is "deemed to be the wife of whichever of the deceased husband's relatives eligible by native law and custom, subject to mutual consent" (Part V-Remarriage of Widows, 20). The issue here is that asking a 12 year old girl to consent to a marriage, I would argue, is child marriage. Moreover, this practise establishes wife inheritance. As such, patriarchy treats women as property in Idoma land too. This discrimination against women also relates to an important economic issue—the ownership and use of land—a source for food, water, and shelter.
Ownership and usage of land: Only men have rights to land ownership in traditional customary laws within the BVN. An important question concerning the land ownership situation arises when women find land to meet their need of subsistence (see also 6.3.1). They cannot own land due to customary laws and even in civil courts, customary law has been used to settle at least 80% of land conflicts to the disadvantage of women (BBC Africa HYS Team, 2011). Yet most women work to feed their families in Nigeria. As “Nigeria’s Report on the Implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action and Commonwealth Plan of Action” (2004, p. 7) confirms, “Nigerian women account for more than 60% of the agricultural labour force, contribute up to 80% of the total food production”. However, “women’s full and equal rights to own land and other properties are not recognised yet in legislation” (2004, p. 15). This clearly indicates that women are not considered indigenes in the BVN. If they were, they would be covered by the principle of ya na wangbian (eat and give to your relation). This principle is expressed in neutral terms in the Tiv language, but it is always systematically interpreted to apply only to men (eat/take and give to your brother) concerning the distribution of land. It is a structural violence against women as post-colonial patriarchal Tiv do not consider women to be relations/brothers and therefore not indigenes. Moreover, women cannot be traditional leaders and remain discriminated against in civil governance.

Traditional leaders/civil governance: According to post-colonial customary practices, women cannot be made traditional chiefs and cannot be voting members of a traditional council in the areas investigated in the BVN. This again raises the issue that women are treated as “non-indigenes” and their position remains undermined in traditional arrangements. Men do not treat women much differently in civil governance (see also 6.3.2). Table 11 illustrates how women continue to be marginalised in the political dispensation with less than 10% of women participating in the legislative arm of government since the return of democracy in Nigeria in 1999.
Table 11: Gender representation in elective bodies from 1999-2011 in Nigeria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>2011</th>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>100</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State House of Reps.</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
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<td></td>
<td>96.2</td>
<td></td>
<td>94.2</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>3.8</td>
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<tr>
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<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>Federal House of Reps.</td>
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<td>2003</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>%</td>
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<td>338</td>
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<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>Senate</td>
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<td>%</td>
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<td>%</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>2011</td>
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<tr>
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<td>106</td>
<td>97.2</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>91.7</td>
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<td>92.7</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8.3</td>
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<tr>
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<td>100</td>
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<td>1999</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>94.5</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
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<td>3.2</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>30</td>
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<td>100</td>
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<td>100</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC)

I present Chart 3 to Chart 7 to illustrate more clearly the political landscape of Nigeria: they indicate the extent of political gender imbalance in favour of men.
Chart 3: Gender representation of 36 State Governors

Chart 3 shows that women remain only a presence in the governorship leadership, in this political dispensation.

Chart 4: Gender representation of State Houses of Representatives (SHR) from the 36 states of Nigeria

Chart 4 shows that women represent less than 10% at state levels, despite women composing 49.5% of the Nigerian population (Census, 2006).
Chart 5 shows that the situation at state level replicates at the federal level, less than 10% of women represent the 49.5% of the Nigerian population who are women.

A similar gender imbalance manifests in the executive arm of governing, as male leaders nominate few women to policy positions. A summary of women appointed into political decision-making bodies in Nigeria as of 2003 shows that of ministers—24% were female, but 76% male; ambassadors—5.8% were female, but 94.2% male and two female Deputy Governors out of 36, and no female Governor of the 36 states. In 2012, only 25% of ministers were female compared to men's 75% and not a single woman governor of the 36 states in Nigeria. Again, Chart 6 clearly presents a lack of equality between women and men in executive governance in Nigeria.
Chart 6 illustrates women's inadequate participation in executive governance. Moreover, women do not stand a chance of being considered indigenes in the traditional/political leadership in the near future. This is because current traditional/political leadership do not believe in the inclusion of women in traditional/political leadership (see also 3.1.6). For example, the present Governor of Benue State, Gabriel Suswam, delivering a keynote address: “The Tiv Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow”, to the “First Tiv National Conference” on September 10, 2013 on the socio-political philosophy of Tiv stated, “Ya na wangbian”—take and give to your brother is a unique Tiv zoning formula evolved to enhance a sense of belonging. Thus Tiv tradition and politics go hand in hand”. He does not consider women in
this “unique formula” which in its correct translation is “eat/take and give to your relation” in which case women are included, but he translates it as “give to your brother” in which case women are excluded. For Suswam (2013) this was yesterday (see 6.3—this was not always the case), is today and will be tomorrow as such it is a culture/political system that accepts indigenous men belong, but continues to deny women a sense of belonging and as such to exist as non-indigenes in the post-colonial BVN. Therefore, given the gender imbalance in the post-colonial cultural/political landscape of Nigeria, I would argue that the cultural/political system has structurally subordinated women and has not mobilised the potential of women in governance and conflict management and leaves women’s cultural/political participation and the issue of gender equality seriously undermined.

Section 4.6, therefore, provides an answer to the fourth question that arose from Chapter 3 on how the post-colonial patriarchal social, economic and political gender order treats women in the BVN. It reveals that women fight a multi-layered conflict—for rights and recognition in society as individuals per se and not simply the property of another. Second, that the economic livelihood of people in the BVN depends on owning land and the ability to use it for economic production and sustenance, but women, excluded from land ownership are denied entry to this livelihood. Third, women cannot ascend to a throne or become voting members of traditional councils and, furthermore, the local political administration has so far continued to largely exclude women. Therefore, section 4.6 demonstrates that women are not considered “indigenes” in the BVN since they have no rights to own or inherit property and cannot participate in traditional leadership nor participate in democratic political leadership—all these satisfiers which indigenes have right to. From the HNT perspective, I conclude women have been treated as non-indigenes; they are denied “indigeneship”, and a structural violence against women exists in the BVN.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have answered the four questions raised in Chapter 3. The first was whether this research could find PSCs to study from the BVN. I examined four PSCs in the BVN. They reveal that the predominant satisfiers at the root of PSCs in the regions that predicate the use of violence are how citizenship/“indigeneship”, land, traditional title and political positions remain managed. In addition, the background to the four PSCs strongly indicates that ethnic, economic and political identity groups generate and sustain PSCs in the region. Second, concerning the question of what the government is doing to resolve these PSCs, I find that the government prefers to establish peace commissions, but these have not resolved any of the
PSCs. Moreover, the preferred option demanded by identity groups in Nigeria the creation of more states, has not brought much needed peace either. Nigeria has 36 states, and identity groups demand 46 more. With 250 strong ethnic identity groups in Nigeria; it seems destined for 250 states, an unsustainable system. Therefore, I find it necessary to find an alternative vision for the resolutions of these PSCs. This brings us to the third question on whether I can find groups of women peacebuilding for an alternative vision of the resolution of PSCs in BVN. I investigated four groups of women in the communities engulfed by the four PSCs. Women who are working along gender (as mothers, sisters and wives) and religious lines (as Christians, Muslims and African Traditional Religionists) to provide communality and strength to their work; showing that their work transcends ethnic divisions and religious beliefs.

As regards the fourth question: What is the post-colonial patriarchal social, economic and political condition of these women in the BVN? In this background chapter, I presented evidence that post-colonial men socially depersonalise women (consider them male property) and they cannot acquire their individual identity—married or unmarried. Economically, women cannot own land, that is they are denied the right to possess a major resource in this region which would allow them subsistence, protection and identity; and politically, at the moment women cannot ascend to any traditional throne and less than 10% of elected representatives are women, from the Presidency, Senate, House of Representatives, Governors, State Houses of Representatives to Local Government Chairpersons. Therefore, my analysis is that the post-colonial patriarchal men deny women “indigeneship” and have instituted a structural violence against women in the BVN; since indigenes have rights to socio-economic and political participation in their communities, but women are not granted these rights. Despite this structural violence (victimisation) against women, some women are actors/subjects in building peace in the BVN; this raises three questions for this research:

1. What do the women understand as the causes of the four conflicts in the BVN?
2. What kinds of skills, vision and initiatives do the women’s groups use in their peacebuilding work?
3. What is the women’s perception of the patriarchal social, economic and political gender order in the BVN?

I present extracts of the unique stories of the women studied in response to the three questions raised above in the next chapter.
Chapter 5—Research Findings:

Women’s Stories on Causes of Conflict, Skills, Vision, Initiatives and Gender Order in the Benue Valley, Nigeria (BVN)

Using the research methods of individual/focus group storytelling sessions and participatory observation for this research, I collected stories from 60 women on their peace initiatives in the BVN. I also took photographs as data for description and analyses. The stories and photographs form case narratives in respect to three research questions:

1. What do the women understand as the causes of the four conflicts in the BVN?
2. What kinds of skills, vision and initiatives do the women’s groups use in peacebuilding?
3. What is the women’s perception of the patriarchal social, economic and political gender order in the BVN?

I expanded the three questions to eight field guide questions. In this chapter, I narrate extracts of the women’s stories in five sections. Section 1 narrates extracts about causes of the four conflicts investigated; section 2 reports extracts that trace how gender socialisation enables these women with skills in their initiatives. While section 3 recounts extracts of the vision these women have in relation to the satisfaction of human needs in their work; section 4 illustrates extract of stories about particular women’s peace initiatives in BVN. Finally, section 5 relates extracts concerning the women’s perception of the gender order in the BVN. In each section, I present the extracts according to the four case studies I investigated: the Takum LGA (conflict over traditional title), the Konshisha and Gwer LGAs (conflict over land), the Kwande LGA (conflict over democratic political leadership), and the Apa LGA (inter-communal conflict).

5.1 Stories regarding the causes of social conflict in the BVN

I relate the narratives of the women addressing the root cause of violent conflicts in their communities in this section. I asked the women:

1. Thinking about the conflict in your area, what stories can you share with me about the causes of the conflict in your community?
2. Reflecting on the conflict, what stories explain the significant barriers to resolving this conflict?
5.1.1 Women’s stories from Takum LGA traditional title conflict

Informant 002 narrates that prohibiting people from ascending to traditional leadership acts as a barrier to peace:

One barrier is the prohibition of some people from ascending to traditional leadership because they are not from a particular family. Interested individuals fuel conflict in their communities because they are excluded. The so-called royal families should have to face other people at voting for the chieftaincy titles. An open contest will reduce violence, and it will make the chieftaincy title more acceptable to people.

In Focus Group 05, a participant explains how disagreements between traditional leaders discourage people from learning multiple languages and living in peace in Takum where five ethnic identity groups coexist:

Language is a barrier to peace. For example, before, people used to learn the language of one another, but it is at a stage where this has stopped because of lack of trust: a Kuteb man says he is not learning Jukun and a Jukun man says he is not learning Kuteb. This leads to people not understanding each other. Any little thing and there is no understanding between people because of the language barrier. So, during a crisis if a Jukun man does not hear the other speak Jukun, they take the person to be a spy. This is causing tension in the community. This is what the traditional title conflict brings; no agreement between traditional leaders means also disagreement between the people.

5.1.2 Women’s stories from Konshisha and Gwer LGAs land conflict

The women explain that lack of incentives for youths to attend school or find work, a leadership forced on the people, coupled with hunger, has led to greed and dishonesty over land acquisition. As Informant 019 asserts:

The problem is greediness, almost all our fighting is about land. People from another part come to settle in another place as a result of being members of a mother’s place. This is Tiv culture, to be hospitable as a mother’s place; that is why these men come and settle in their mother’s home place. What happens now is when the people that own the land want to do something with the land trouble starts. That is why I am advocating that we should stop giving land to people who are from their mother’s side to settle and make their homes. They should not be allowed to bring in their brothers to come and settle with them. The problem is that we need to be compassionate but now that we are killing ourselves, it is better to stop giving land to our relations from the mother’s side. Let everybody go and settle on his father’s side. But if you buy a plot of land, we know the
demarcation and that should be respected. But people should not be given free land or be allowed to acquire free land. This will help us stop fighting among ourselves...

For example, we have a man living up the road, this is his mother’s place, and he asked that he be allowed to rest here for a while before heading off to Makurdi, his father’s place. Now, when we started a programme of “Better Life for Women,” and our husbands gave us a piece of land close to this man, we farmed there for two years. In the third year, we went to farm and this man and his children came out with guns and knives to fight us. That was when I started campaigning that people who are not from one particular place should not be given land for free to settle and begin to feel at home. This is one of the principal causes of land conflict in our area.

Informant 006 reports that lack of incentives to attend schools and no jobs for young men contribute to fighting:

I think what adds to the fighting is because our children are no longer going to school because there are graduates without jobs. They want people to fight so that they can loot people’s property. Looting is on the minds of young men. If there is any small problem anywhere, they rush to the place to start fighting and loot the place. All these things contribute to fighting.

Informant 007 complains about unemployment:

Even those who have studied remain unemployed. I am blaming the government as those who are graduates have no jobs. If young men have jobs, they will not go and spend so much time in the bush planning evil. They will not go out there farming on a large scale so that it creates fighting for land. The young men need to have large farms to survive. So there are problems because of scarcity of land.

Informant 009 explains how politicians promise young men to pay them such that they fight for them:

The problem is we do not understand party politics; we understand party politics to be getting your food from the party. So, party politics has brought us division, poverty and a great set back in development. Politics make people spend all they have and they become desperate to get something back. Again, you know, we are farmers, so we have a lot of young men who were not trained. These young men are easy tools for people to use for violence. More so, there are young men who are educated and are graduates, but they are not employed. They are looking for work but there is no work. So when a party man comes with money and promises, just promise oh, to give 50,000 ($300) for a month they are ready to do what they say. Sometimes they only promise to give them a job after they have worn their elections. But these promises are never fulfilled.
In Focus Group 07, the women present poverty as a chief barrier to peace:

Truly speaking, poverty is the chief barrier. It is poverty that pushes some people do what they should not do. Viewing this situation, there are no jobs and no employment, our children have graduated from schools. Some of them are in the villages doing nothing. If there were employment, our graduate children will not be in the village with us at this time. They would have migrated to urban areas. We would not be facing this kind of crisis at this rate. So when they go to farm, they get angry because they have invested time to study in order to get good work, but they get nothing. This is the reason why, when there is even a small conflict, these young men get so angry out of proportion to the situation. This frustration leads to violent conflict easily. For example, I have four graduate sons in the village with me. How can a person not working not scratch his buttocks (not fight to get food)? They look forward for violent conflict so that they can loot other people’s property... poverty, poverty, leads to violent conflicts. Our children are graduates, yet there are no jobs for them. They are just walking on the village streets and this is a big factor in generating violence.

Informant 021 explains how indiscriminate and multiple land sales act as barriers to peace:

We must also discourage indiscriminate land sales. Land conflicts come from people who want to acquire more land. They want to acquire it by any means. This includes cheating and buying land that has been sold to another person. Sellers too, sell land to multiple persons and refuse to refund the money to any one buyer. They prefer to divide the buyers and let them fight among themselves. They do this by framing stories as to who is the first buyer and the fact that one buyer has not paid all the money, etc. They just cause confusion between them and then stand by the side to see them fighting each other. And you know these land cases are very difficult to settle in courts. The people do not have any certificate of occupancy. It is only based on a written agreement or by word of mouth.

Informant 021 asserts that it is rich brothers from the cities who send arms that are used for fighting:

We are the ones causing trouble. We start fighting and then invite our big brothers who are living in the urban areas. We call on these big brothers saying that they are the ones that have money so they should come and help us. They should come because somebody is fighting against their brothers. We do not call on these big brothers for progressive purposes like the building of schools, but for the purpose of buying bullets.

In Focus Group 01, the women trace how some traditional chiefs pass incorrect judgments as a barrier to peace:
What happens, leading to more violence, is that our traditional chiefs do not speak the truth or render justice. Some traditional chiefs are becoming too comfortable receiving bribes: they get free big SUV cars and money from subjects who are outside so as to compromise their decisions. I remember one secretary of a village who confessed that they went to settle a land dispute, the chief passed judgment in favour of one person, but the other came and gave money to the village head. He called his secretary and asked him to change the judgment but he refused. So he went and looked for another person who wrote the wrong judgment. However, when the judgment was submitted to the overall community head, he wanted to see the council's register book. When the secretary produced the register there was a disparity in the judgment so the community head asked why this was the case. The secretary said that he did not write the judgment and he did not know the author of the said document. So, some of our traditional leaders are not helpful, they are not helping matters.

Informant 006 explains how young people deciding where to farm and setting aside old people's original boundary decisions cause conflict:

I am 45 years old but I cannot show where my mother used to farm; even if I know some places I do not know all the places she used to farm before I was born or when I was young. The problem is that old people used to go survey the site for farming before. Now, young people say, this is where my father used to farm and this is the boundary. How do they know the exact boundary where their fathers used to or not to farm if their father is already dead? Perhaps, only their mothers know that, but they will not call women where they are discussing these things. Small children decide that this is where their fathers farmed and that nobody can change it. These are the things that are causing violent conflict over land.

In Focus Group 01, the women assert that giving money to LGA chairmen as a security vote acts against peace:

The chairmen of the LGAs (Konshisha and Gwer) benefit from the violent conflict. They get what they call "security vote money." So when they sit at judgment, they do not render justice. They want the conflict to continue so as to continue getting security vote money. This is a barrier to ending the violent conflicts between Konshisha and Gwer.

5.1.3 Women's stories from Kwande political conflict

Women in Focus Group 06 narrate that imposed leadership cause conflict:

They should stop imposing leadership on us. Imposed leaders do nothing for people. They only do what they want so people do not agree to be part of what they are doing. This is a great barrier for peace in Kwande. The
imposed leadership is self-centred such that even if young men of the PDP destroy property of another party member, it is accepted that they have not committed any offence. In the same manner, if young men of the ACN thieved from the PDP there is no problem for members of the ACN.\textsuperscript{34}

Furthermore:

Even a child wants some respect. It does not wish to be forced to do what it does not want to do. But here, every leadership is forced on us. When we say, we do not want a particular person to lead us, they visit us with violence and they insist on making sure that the person not wanted leads us. This does not go well with people. If we are given the chance to elect our leaders as we wish, there will be no fighting in our communities. Moreover, when there is conflict here we are not left alone to resolve it. They bring people from different places—outsiders with illness (HIV, TB). They rape our daughters and women, and destroy our property. These happenings add to our troubles.

Another woman from Focus Group 06 adds that hunger inflames fighting:

One other thing that is a cause for continued violence here is that our children are hungry. The youths do not have jobs they have graduated but are without jobs. So conflict is now a business for them. For example, the last pay check that the Local Government paid to workers, some Adikpo young men went to the LGA; they wanted to take away the money meant for workers. The young men now think that they can get money by carrying out violence. But it is because they are going hungry.

Informant 011 asserts that godfathers\textsuperscript{35} sponsor violence:

... Those who have godfathers (rich brothers from cities) know that they can get anything. So they go about snatching ballot boxes and elections from others. They loot but their godfathers come and defend them. It does not matter if elections are stolen. We need to change this notion of godfather. Godfathers are behind the violence in Kwande.

Informant 009 explains how non-payment of staff salary frustrates workers in Kwande:

I think that for peace to return to Kwande a woman will have to head the Kwande LGA. This is because at present there is dishonesty among men

\textsuperscript{34} PDP (People's Democratic Party) and ACN (Action Congress of Nigeria)

\textsuperscript{35} The term godfather refers to brothers and relatives, or rich people who sponsor their brothers or others for political elections.
who are in leadership. Even now, there is no payment of Kwande LGA staff, it is not just the chairman; it is also due to the generality of the people in the office. It is we the staff that are contributing to our suffering. When money arrives, it is the finance staff of the LGA that decides who to pay; it is not just the chairman of the LGA. It is the men in the finance department that decide to pay only a few and keep the rest of the money for themselves and feed into the ills of the chairman. These members of staff will tell the chairman, you can say to the people I am going to pay all of you, but in the end pay only half of the people, but nothing will happen to you. The finance staff members take away money without the knowledge of the chairman of the LGA. When we women want to complain then we are told that we are the ones causing trouble in the LGA. But when a woman was heading the finance department all salaries were paid to workers. There were no complaints. This was because the woman used to insist on paying workers. She was a God fearing woman but the men are not. As at present some people are owed four month’s pay. But you can see finance department staffs who are buying new cars.

In Focus Group 06, a woman confirms the issue of non-payment of salary as contributing to violence in Kwande:

Even we who are workers, we cannot do anything. We are not paid; sometimes after six months we get paid for one month. Sometimes, a small group is paid but they say we are all paid. And once we want to complain about this, our leaders become unhappy with us. They visit us with violence. So, this is our troubles, our leaders are the ones causing the violent conflict in our area.

Finally in Kwande, Informant 23 describes how traditional leaders are obstacles to peace in their domains:

The barriers are our chiefs; we used to have chiefs with discipline and they could also discipline other people. We no longer have chiefs with discipline, talk of them being able to discipline other people. We need to have honest chiefs, who will stand firm that they do not want violence in their communities. The chiefs need to take a zero tolerance for violence in our communities. The chiefs should also be able to deal with their sons who are living in the big cities and are the ones that give money for bullets and guns. The chiefs should be able to decide with their people without fear or favor. As at the moment, the chiefs take side and favour some people such that others will not agree with them. The chiefs are becoming too comfortable receiving bribes; they get free SUV cars, get millions from subjects who are outside and have money so as to compromise their decisions. As such, our chiefs have forgotten that they are custodians of the land and not destroyers of the land. But they are the ones destroying our land at the
moment. They are supposed to be good leaders; we need to convince our chiefs to stay the course as the chiefs of years past.

5.1.4 Women's stories from Apa LGA conflict

In Focus Group 03, two women state that extracting economic stones for sale (see Photo 9) triggered conflict in their communities, but they disagree on how they triggered the conflict. One woman states:

The cause of this crisis is that the community of Ataganyi refuses to allow Omelemu people to extract stones to go and build their primary school. There is a boundary problem over where the stones are. Some say that the stones are in Ataganyi others say the stones are on the side of Omelemu.

The other woman states:

The boys from Omelemu came to park stones from our village Ataganyi in order to sell. The people said they should not park the stones to sell again. This is the cause of this crisis between Ataganyi and Omelemu community.

However, for other women in Focus Group 03, something else happened before:

We have a problem over Ogbono tree (a tree for making soup—see Photo 7 and Photo 8). The Ogbono tree belongs to Ataganyi but was given to the people of Omelemu. But Omelemu people say the land on which the tree is, was given to them by the people of Ogyantele. They refuse to harvest the Ogbono tree and bring it to our chief. They no longer want to be part of Ataganyi community but that of Ogyantele. This is very painful for us it is like a son refusing his father. They want a chief of their own, this is the bottom line.

5.1.5 Photography

As a participant observer and at the invitation of the women's groups I investigated, I took Photographs 21-22 (used in 6.1.1) to indicate how people revere good traditional leadership and Photographs 22-23 (used in 6.1.1) to indicate what the people do to traditional leaders who are perceived as offering poor leadership. I also took Photograph 24 (used in 6.1.2) for a definition of positive leadership by women and youths at WEP's workshop in Makurdi. I also took Photographs 25-28 (which I used in 6.1.3) to illustrate how impoverished young men work alongside young women.
5.2 Stories on sources of the women's skills in peacebuilding work

I asked one question for stories in this section: when you look back on your life, your cultural and educational backgrounds, what stories inform your peacebuilding activities? In the course of my fieldwork, as a participant observer, I took Photograph 29 (used for analysis in 6.2.1) to illustrate women's daily care work and why some women argued that women are better than men at peacebuilding. For example, in Focus Group 01, a woman explains:

Even though, men call women the weaker sex, what women have in them is more than that of men. Something can happen now, men can react immediately, but women will remember their children and will not react immediately. This is because if they react, it will bounce back on their children. Men do not, why? Women have more wisdom for peace than men.

However, another woman disagrees:

Women also are fighting in the bush or are behind violence. Women say to their husbands go and fight, don't mind, I am behind you, nothing will go wrong. I shall go and give you food. If women will not go there, men too will be weary of fights. We see it with the Catholic Women Organization in the deanery of Taraku.

Despite this disagreement, the women narrated stories on how they have acquired skills to peacebuild as narrated below.

5.2.1 Women’s stories from Takum LGA traditional title conflict

In Focus Group 02, one woman asserts she got her inspiration from her polygamous background:

In my own case, I am from a polygamous family and you know there (laughing), there are a lot of things. But I thank my mother who was kind-of a peaceful person. My mother was the second wife. When the elder one would accuse me falsely, and I would be complaining, my mother would say she did not want me to complain. Sometimes I was beaten and my mother would still say that she did not want any complaints. My mother was the second wife and she was loved by my father. So she said if I complained it would be said because the man loved her that was why she was trying to manipulate him. My mother taught us to be peaceful and respectful to elders.
In Focus Group 05, two women obtained their skills from their mothers, one state:

Our mother trained three of us, she carried us to school. She taught us to be good farmers, now we are also training our children to be good farmers. We tell our children that if any of them go and steal, and if they get caught, they should tell people that their mothers are dead. This is because we cannot have children who are thieves in our house; our children have to be honest and truthful.

In Focus Group 05, a woman explains how she acquired her skills:

I thank God for my mother especially because my father had no time for us as children. My mother handled me with iron hand. My mother punished me for any offence I committed. My mother was a good disciplinarian. If there was a quarrel between me and that of any of my neighbours, my mother would beat-me-up because I was not supposed to be at that house. I used to think that my mother did not love me, but today I am happy. During the crisis and generally, I don’t normally leave my house to go around. So this has helped me to keep away from troubles. I am now training my children so that they too can stay at home doing their homework and house duties, rather than going about on the streets. I do not beat my children as my mother used to beat me. Once my children say they are sorry I leave them, but my mother would still punish me. I believe that if every parent teaches their children, there will be less violent conflict in our community.

5.2.2 Women’s stories from Konshisha and Gwer LGAs land conflict

Most women in this region received their skills from their mother’s teachings. Informant 003 narrates:

When my mother gave birth to me, she taught me that there are people in higher position than me: I should not think that I am the most powerful. I should consider my husband as more than me and that I should love others as myself. Since she taught me this manner of behaving, this helps me in this peace work.

Informant 003 asserts that her grandmother inspired her:

I grew up with my paternal grandmother. She used to say to me, my daughter if you are married and is beaten by your husband during the day; do not refuse to sleep with him in the night because it is “his own thing.” Do not refuse to speak to your husband when he has issues with. Open communication brings peace, these are things my grandmother taught me, and they help me in working as a member of the Community Peace Committee with JDPC.
Informant 004 narrates:

My grandmother was very good at intervening when there was a quarrel or fighting amongst people. If people were fighting she would not go near them to take a hand, but she used her peaceful manner of talking. She appealed to them and they would stop fighting. My grandmother was a woman who handled her household very well. Her husband had 17 wives and she was in charge of the household. There was no violence in the house, these 17 women used to cook and eat together with laughter. There was no quarrel among the women, she would not allow it. She was the most senior woman in the house. She had no male child but had a peaceful heart. So it is from her that I learned how to stop people from fighting and, that is why, I am able to separate people fighting. I do this using the power of words—my soft manner and calm voice.

Informant 007 illustrates how her grandmother taught her peacebuilding technique:

I grew up with my grandmother. My grandmother taught me to be merciful and peaceful. She taught me how to speak with a child peacefully. At no time did my grandmother speak to me forcefully. So my grandmother taught me peacefulness, this has entered my heart. I too, when I call my children, I use this peaceful, soft spoken language that helps them to listen to me.

My grandmother taught me that it is not every time that you speak to your child. It is when your child has come back and when you have given him food to eat; this is the time you speak to your child. This is the time you get the attention of your child and that is the time your child too pays attention to what you say. She said that if I stay in the middle of the house shouting: I do not like what the child is doing; s/he will not listen to me. She also said there are other times that I can speak to a child when the child will know that it is a serious matter. It is when I leave my son to go in and sleep and I go and knock on the door softly, enter and sit down, and talk with him in a soft tone. This is the time the child listens to a mother. At this time the child too has had rest. The child will hear my advice and it will penetrate his ears to the heart. So the child will be repentant, and will say to me, I shall never repeat this thing again. So if you have this way of talking to children, your children will not make you suffer, they will not refuse to listen to you. This is the reason why it seems as if women are more peaceful than men. This is the reason why it seems children listen to their mothers more than their fathers. Fathers have little time to spend with their children. Mothers spend more time with their children. Mother’s teaching is more peaceful than father’s teaching. Fathers’ use force, and beating, this is why children fear their fathers.
5.3 Stories of the woman's vision in relation to human needs

I asked two questions for stories in this section:

1. Think about conflict and peace in your community: what stories explain the best things about having peace in your community?
2. What stories explain the worst things about lack of peace in your community?

5.3.1 Women's stories from Takum LGA traditional title conflict

In Focus Group 02, some women express that their place has a bad name and can no longer attract government projects as the worst elements:

The inter-ethnic violence is a major setback for the village of Takun. Many things that Government should have given us, when they consider such proposal they say, Takum! That bad place! They take the project away. Last year, they said they were going to locate a university in Takum, but the next thing, we heard that it had been located in Wukari. Now the university is in Wukari. Again, before people used to come from Wukari to Takum to buy things, but now it is the reverse. The place is turned into bush and our neighbours are snakes. This is the result of violence to Takum.

On June 9, 2011, I observed at a WEP organised workshop in Makurdi, Benue State, in a discussion group of women from Takum as seen in Photo 17:

Photo 17: Some women from Takum at WEP Makurdi workshop

The women concluded that they need the following for peace in their communities:

We need education: primary, secondary and tertiary schools because the new world is full of technology/computers so children need to be educated
to understand technology in order to fit in the technological world. We need hospitals, clinics, and health facilities for antenatal care, for the reduction of infant mortality and youth’s death... At present children are sitting under the trees in most of our community schools, but the children of the rich are sent abroad to study under the best environment... Tap water is needed so that women will stop traveling for hours looking for water.

In Focus Group 04 a woman explains their aim for carrying out peacebuilding in Takum:

During the conflict, we did not have peace of mind, we did not have chance to go farming and to go to the market. But now it is peace time, we go to farm and market and work together freely as different ethnic groups. Our mission is to maintain this present way we are living together.

5.3.2 Women’s stories from Konshisha and Gwer LGAs land conflict

In Focus Group 07, some women express freedom and success in business as the best thing in times of peace:

Business is successful, trading goes on well, and I have fewer problems. During fighting I could not get cooked food. I hid, when I uprooted raw cassava tuber and ate, it gave me stomach pains. So freedom is the most valuable thing during peace time. This is not freedom to go and misbehave or steal from others. But it is the freedom to do legitimate business that brings joy and happiness.

Informant 004 states freedom to worship God as the best thing in times of peace:

The best thing about peace is that we are able to work together and worship together. I am a Protestant, but I can go to worship anywhere. We go about celebrating, dancing and enjoying our lives together with members of the Catholic Women’s Organisation (CWO). We do enjoy a lot during times of peace.

Informant 005 adds:

What is best about peace for us women is that we go about freely mixing with other women and we can borrow things from fellow women. We can also call our children and send them on errands, and they will go fast. Children too play and laugh when there are no problems.
For the worst element of community conflict, Informant 007 relates that the destruction of community heritage and the killing of loved ones rank highest:

They burn down houses and traditional heritage sites called “Idegh.” One community leader when he came back from a journey asked if the house was burnt and if the Idegh was also burnt. When he was told that yes it was burnt, he collapsed and died. The former Governor of Benue State when he came and saw that this community heritage was burnt, he cried. The worst thing about fighting is the killing of our husbands, and our children, we no longer have peace. We face a dilemma, are we going to mourn our husbands or our children? During war, even if we farm they come and destroy it. Even our seeds in barns are burnt down. For example, my yams seeds were burnt. I had 15 bags of cassava floor all burnt away. Some people die as innocent victims. In the fighting between the Tiv and the Jukun my brother was killed. He did not know that there was any fighting. He left Biam Market and was returning to the house when he was shot and killed. We took him and buried him in the market place. There was no road that we could carry him home for burial. ... It is painful for us. For some of our loved ones, we never saw their dead bodies. Some were killed and burnt, even the ashes we did not see. We did not even know the ground on which they were burnt. This is very painful this is the worst thing about war: the death of our loved ones.

For Informant 007, humiliation seems the worst thing:

We left our food in our home went and stayed in somebody’s house. In this house, they insulted us because we ate their food. They made fun of us. They accused us of eating too much with our children, but we are people who had enough food in our home for our children and ourselves. But when we were running away from violence we became wasted people. For example, when I ran away with my children and we hid in one house; they prohibited us from passing urine in any but one place. But with small children how were we going to control them to only pass out water in one place? So, there are many sufferings when there is fighting, there is too much suffering.

Informant 013 and 018 explain their aim of carrying out peacebuilding in their community, Aliade:

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36 A community heritage is a site where a people or race (ethnic group) guards its symbol for Being. It contains traditional (ritual) things for the protection of the people (race or ethnic group). To burn it means the community and people have lost their protection from the gods and power that they had for protection.
Informant 013: During the period of fighting there was too much trouble, we had no unity among us, there was no food and there was no money. This is why we women became troubled; we started mediating peace so that we can return to our normal lives. But since the fighting stopped, I think our lives are coming back. Now in the market a bag of Akpu (fermented cassava for cassava porridge) is only 200 Naira. Even 200 Naira the bag must be big; but it used to be 1000 Naira for a small bag of Akpu. Even people who had food in their farms could not go to farm and harvest their crops. They were afraid of being killed, but now there is no fighting so we are going to our farms. And there is plenty of food stuff at home and in the market. There are even old yams today in the market and it is trying to meet new yams so, we hope to maintain this way of living by our peace work.

Informant 018: Lack of peace of mind and killing of our loved ones: Fighting brings backwardness, everybody has seen what fighting has caused us. The destruction of our property, lack of food and the hunger that we have experienced has shown us that we do not need fighting. We are trying to change this by our peacebuilding efforts.

5.3.3 Women’s stories from Kwande post-election conflict

In Focus group 06, some women chose prosperity as the best factor in times of peace:

In times of peace, we see that people’s wellbeing is taken care of. People are prosperous, look good, and not as they look now in our place. When you enter a place of peace you see children, youths and adults well dressed, and you see good buildings. In Adikpo, we only see the buildings that our fathers built. The zinc on these buildings is rusty even so some of the old buildings were burnt down. There are no new buildings because of the fighting that has been going on in the town... So in time of peace people come out very clean and neat in good cars. Even if people want to ride on a motor bike it is a good motor bike. Normally, they have more than one means of transport. The motor bike is only for strolling around and not for travelling. So peace brings a lot of good things.

Informant 012 explains how she had to rebuild her father’s house three times; therefore, lack of economic progress appears the worst aspect during fighting:

My father’s house in K/Ala was rebuilt three times, how could we make progress? Each time it was rebuilt, it was destroyed through another conflict. My father who built the house first died because of fighting. But for many people they do not have someone who can rebuild their places for them. ... My father was not part of the fighting. He only went out to look for food for the family, but he was killed on the farm. If my father had been sick I will know.
In Focus Group 06, some women narrate that innocent people and women suffer most as the worst aspect:

When this fighting starts, often it is innocent people who suffer most rather than those who are the brains behind the fighting. In Kwande, often the fighting starts with members of political parties, but then those who suffer most are those who do not belong to any political party. Take for example, students, they die in numbers. Here (Adikpo Kwande), the fighting in 2004 killed a group of students who were going to school to write their exams. We saw those boys leaving for school and the next thing was that we saw they were brought back in wheelbarrows dead and deposited at the police station. These boys were not members of any political party.

When this fighting started some pregnant women were running with children in their hands and loads on their heads like camels and donkeys. Some of these women gave birth on the road. Some died on the road giving birth due to complications and lack of health care. So women suffer most, we get deaths from many causes. Again, the oldest man in our place was killed—Chief Gwaza Bull. He was not a party member, and he was against violence. When the fighting started at the market place, he was going there to stop them from fighting. But he was shot by a young man and he died there and then. We are very sad about it.

Another woman in Focus Group 06 on the issue of women’s suffrage in Kwande:

To add to what has been said, women are the ones that suffer most. This is because during fighting men run and leave women with children and goods and everything at home. You know, for women children are at their heart of everything. So, women suffer as children cry because of hunger and thirst. Women suffer because their children whom they love so much cry for food and thirst, but they can do nothing. In fact for women it is like dying alive.

In the same focus group, another woman explains how the frustration they have experienced in the family has led them to search for peace in Kwande:

In 2004 there was suffering; those who moved from town to the villages went with their families. But the villagers were afraid that those from the town will come and finish their food. People became frustrated as their family members were running away from them. How can you stay in the family house that your relatives have ran and left you alone? How will you stay there? Also, you know that when the fighting was going on, they use to go to peoples farms and destroy all the food that was planted and cut down economic trees. The cared less, it did not matter how big or how many hectares the farm was, it was destroyed. And you know that for some people, they had only economic trees but they were destroyed; they did not farm yams that are our staple food. So once their trees were destroyed
they too were destroyed. Again, people needed to pay for their son’s school fees. Some children stopped going to school because their parent could no longer pay their school fees. So these are the problems that violent conflict creates for us, that is why, we are working against violence and trying to maintain peace in our community.

Informant 022 relates that using children as thugs is the worst element:

The worst thing here is that our children are used as thugs while their children go studying abroad. This means they will come back and continue to lord it over our uneducated children at home. ... We gave birth to our children to give us a good name and teach them not to waste their lives. As far as we mothers are concerned it is very painful to see that our sons carry this bad name of being killers in the community. A mother does not want anybody to insult her son, even if he is a madman! What of listening to stories of a son who is killing other people?

Informant 023 laments that business visitors have left their town; this is the worst aspect of violence:

In our place all the visitors who are business people have left us. They could not do business again because there are guns with our young men who can attack traders and take their money. No business visitor wants to lose money at Adikpo market. The visitors come here to buy things from us farmers, but they cannot. You know, 100 tubers of yams used to cost up to 20,000 Naira. This year if you can get somebody to pay 4,000 Naira you thank your God. This is because visitors are no longer coming to the yam market. It is we the Kwande people who are suffering from this electoral violence. A lot of us here are farmers and this is the only way we can pay school fees for our children.

For Informant 022, lack of education for children is the worst thing:

This fighting contributes to the falling standard of education. We are producing half backed (unqualified) school certs because they spend only half the time that is required in the college to graduate. Right now, we have graduates of school certificates who cannot read and write or count numbers. What are we going to do with them? At the end of the day they will become degree graduates who cannot perform simple tasks required of them.

5.3.4 Women’s stories from Apa LGA conflict

In Focus Group 03, some women state that socio-economic development is the best thing in times of peace:
Development of all nature: social and economic development—human, material and structural development. If peace reigns ... the land is fertile we have a lot of water and everything so there is development. If there is peace, and there is unity; cooperatives are formed for development. Children too go to schools and the devil\(^ {37}\) will not use them.

In Focus Group 03, some women recall the destruction of their buildings as the worst thing:

They burnt down our houses and destroyed our buildings in the village of Ataganyi.

They took me round to see the village. I took the photos (Photo 18) below showing houses and property destroyed during the tour.

Photo 18: Houses and property destroyed in Ataganyi community

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\(^{37}\) The devil refers to people who can have bad influence on young men, e.g. recruiting them into thug clubs.
5.4 Stories of the women's peace initiatives in the BVN

In this section, I asked the question: think about your peacebuilding activities, can you share some stories of these activities with me?

5.4.1 Women's stories from Takum LGA traditional title conflict

In Focus Group 05, before explaining what their peacebuilding initiatives were, a woman explained why they were carrying out peacebuilding in Takum:

There was no development in Takum: nobody was going to school, people were dying from sickness. There was no development in the sense that Government was not looking at our community. This was because when they brought something it was spoiled. For example, the general hospital of Takum; people burnt it down and looted things from the hospital. Now, there is no hospital for the town. And if you are sick you have to go to a private hospital, but private hospitals are very expensive. You can only go to nearby towns to attend general hospital. Another example is that of the university: Takum was to get a federal university, but it was taken to Wukari because of the violence in Takum. We missed that opportunity to have a university for our children to attend close to their houses. They took the university to a place where there is peace. If there is peace we can see development and we can lobby for things, this is why we are working for peace in Takum.

Then, in the same focus group, a woman relates how she works in her neighbourhood talking to women in families to make peace:

I work with a group of 10 women. We talk to families to keep peace beginning with women and children. We know that some fighting broke out because of women's quarrels over children or land in the neighbourhood. For example, a week back one of my neighbours (a woman) told her husband a story, but we had told her not to tell her husband. A boy went and defecated in the family garden. The man was not there, so we said to her not tell her husband, but at night she told the man. This was after midnight, the man got up went and got that boy to come and eat the shit. The boy ate it and he became sick. Had It been that the woman did not tell her husband the story; the boy would not have been made to eat his shit. The boy has been vomiting and passing stool like that. If this woman had composed herself there will be no problem. The only luck is that the other family did not start fighting. In many cases the other family would start a fight. I went there and told them that it was wrong to make the boy eat shit. I also talked to some young men so that there will be no fighting because it is their friend who was made to eat shit.
Another woman in Focus Group 05 continues:

First of all, we are keeping peace among ourselves women in our communities. We work with women in the church. We women say that anything that we see that is not to the benefit of our communities, we shall try to stop it. This is because sometimes it is we women that give grounds for fighting to start. Women sometimes encourage their husbands and children to go and fight. So we are talking among ourselves that women should learn to keep peace at home, stop their husbands from going out to fight, and talk to their children not carry arms. Second, we are teaching our children the word of God so that they can keep peace. We also teach our children to keep peace in the schools that they should not fight among themselves. We also want them to stop telling lies and so on. Third, in our communities, we are trying to talk to people so that they can reconcile with one another over land conflicts. These are some of the things we are doing for keeping peace in our communities.

A third woman in Focus Group 05 emphasises:

We also encourage women to warn their children not to take part in violent conflict. We are talking to young men not to fight. We remind them that with conflict in our communities, we will have no development in our area. We say to them that when there is conflict we women suffer a lot. We are the ones to carry children and have lost our beloved ones so they should not fight.

5.4.2 Women's stories from Konshisha and Gwer LGAs land conflict

Informant 001 testified:

We call them women in peace building because they played a major role in the conflict between Konshisha and Gwer people. They were the ones who told us what was happening in their communities. They showed us who to go and meet, when, and where we could meet the important actors in the conflict. The women from both sides agreed to work together to build peace in their areas. Since the end of the violence we have continued to work with the women in peacebuilding.

In this case study, several women and a woman in Focus Group 01, before explaining what their peacebuilding initiatives were, explained why they were carrying out peacebuilding in their communities:

Informant 005: Yes, the things that I am doing so that fighting will stop are that I meet women from the other side; I say to them that we need to stop fighting. I have befriended women from the other side such that I have many women friends from the other side. I believe that if women are
friendly they can stop their husbands from going to fight. I also know that women can stop their children from fighting.

Informant 015: We are trying our best to stop violence in our place and looking for peace because with violence we will have only destruction of property and people. We have no development in our place since the violence started many years back. This is why we are doing peace-building to keep peace in our community.

Informant 017: Sometimes, we women meet at market places. You know, we women like conversation with one another. So we have also targeted these conversations for talking about peace in our homes and communities. We explain to women that peace will bring us development and that our children will go to school and they will be rich people in the future. The main point here is that women should teach their children and their husbands the way of peace. Women should teach their men and children very well that dialogue is the only way to peace and that violence bring backwardness to us.

Informant 019: I work with women because I believe women are the peacemakers in the homes. The children that go fighting are born by us. So if I call my son in the house and I say, I do not want to see you fighting again; and if another woman does the same, who is going to fight again? This is a practical way to stop fighting.

In Focus Group 01: A woman said: The way we are trying that fighting should reduce is talking with young men that if they know of any beautiful women from Gwer (other side of the conflict) let them tell us so that we shall go and courtship the women. This is because if we intermarry a husband will not go and fight his in-laws. The wife will often resist saying: if you go and kill my people, know that I shall not take it hands-down. So, the husband will sit down. Some young men have agreed with us so it is one of the ways we are build peace around us. This is also because a young man who is married to a family will not allow his friends to go and fight his in-laws. I have said to my friends down there that I shall give my daughter in marriage to one of their sons. They are very happy and they have replied to me saying so “have we returned to the good old-days of intermarriage?” I said yes! This was practiced by our ancestors and it helped maintain peace between us. They used to intermarry such that here in our place we had “their mothers” and in their place they had “our mothers” too. In this way peace was maintained there was no fighting among them. So, we are looking at different ways that can restore trust and confidence and bring peace. Once there is trust, lasting peace can be restored.
Informant 005 holds direct peace mediation, she narrates her experience:

Some young men from Gwer came and cut a tree and some young men from our side saw this. I heard them trying to confiscate the things that the young men had brought for cutting the tree. I intervened and told the young men from our side that they should not confiscate the things, but rather they should wait for the intervention of elders. I said confiscating tools will lead to violent conflict between the two villages. The young men listened to me and took the matter to the elders. This conflict was resolved peacefully.

Informant 014, the leader of a group of women intervened in a case, she gives a summary:

A man died in the family of Wade and a tomb was built, but the person was not buried yet. Ukange said that the place belonged to him: why were they going to bury somebody there. So this was how fighting broke out. This started in 2008, but we have contained this crisis. There is no more fighting, but the man is not yet buried. We do not know when they are going to bury this man. This is 2011 the fear is that whenever they want to bury this man there will be trouble.

We held a meeting and invited our parish priest, the police and the parties. My contribution at that meeting was that God gave us things God gave us land for free. God created trees in the bush and God made an herb called Asar (to-lose). So let us interpret Asar as to lose something. So if Wade says that even though he has built the tomb, but that he is ready to go and bury the person in another place there will be peace. And if Ukange says that this small piece of land that a tomb has been built, he can lose it there will be peace. I gave them another example of what I did in my village. That is, I used to farm on a land and got up to 20 bags of groundnuts. This is big land, it is not easy to farm 20 bags of groundnuts on a small piece of land, but one of my elders confiscated this land from me. He gave it to his sons. The people from my village said that my husband should go so that we could go and fight. I said to him, the people in the village are his elders if there is a problem they are the ones to stop it. Why have they not stopped it? Again, that he is a man of God, and civilized so, is he going to fight for land? I said to him, you are working and I am working, the little we have God will bless it and it will be enough for us. So for me, let it go and that was how it ended... So let them consider my example as an option on how to resolve this issue.

At this point Wade said “that he was going to leave the tomb. He was going to go and bury the person in the family burying ground.” Ukange said “if Wade has a burying ground for the family, let him go and bury the person. He has no problem, but the problem is where Wade wants to bury the
person is a tactic of claiming land. This is why he has said no that the person will not be buried there." So they all embraced themselves at this meeting.

In Focus Group 01, some women recount how they build peace by talking to their husbands and elders:

We women took time to visit our senior husbands and elders. We met with them last January 2010: we visited our chief Zaki Kwakwa. We said to him that the season for farming has come, this is the time for fighting, but since women have suffered enough, if fighting broke out, we are parking our things to our father’s homes. Not only that, at the time we were going to visit him, no woman dressed up well. We wore rags with the intention that if anything, we were going to go naked in his presence. The chief was very happy with us and he was angry with his subjects who wanted to fight. He called them and warned them. He also promised us that he was going to call and inform those who supported fighting by supplying arms not to send arms again. So since 2010 up till now we have not had violent clashes between Konshisha and Gwer.

Informant 004 narrates how women use a strategy of denying their husbands food and sex if they take part in fighting; and how they invoke a mother’s curse on their children who insist on going to fight:

I, as the President of Catholic Women’s Organization (CWO), when I go to deanery meetings, I speak to women on what to do at home. I say if you are woman, your husband wants to go and fight you should stop him. If he goes ahead, in the night refuse him sex. If that did not work, let your husband understand that if he did it again, you will park your things and be gone to your father’s home. In addition, if a man goes to fight, on his return there should be no food for him to eat. If it is a son, the woman should say my son please do not go and fight. Fighting lasts generation to generation. If the child is stubborn, she invokes a mother’s curse by saying, “If I am the one who has given birth to you I order you not to go and fight. If you go, you do not have my blessing. So if you go you will not come back.” This strategy works because our children and husbands know they do not have our support to go and fight.

Informant 016 explains how some women educate other women not to provoke violence in their communities:

38 In the Tiv, mothers can curse their children if they gravely offend or refuse to obey them. The people believe this to be effective that what mothers say happens to their children. This is part of a moral code of control by mothers to children in order to maintain peace/discipline.
We believe that it is up to women to say to their husbands, Stop! Stop! Do not fight. So, we teach women not to add insult to injury: if somebody is farming on their plot of land they do not go with fire telling the husband what has happened. Rather, they tell them in such ways that the husband will not go out with arms. We remind women that "they are homes," and that when fighting breaks out it is women who suffer most. So, if women push their husbands to go and fight because others should go away, women are the ones who suffer most. So if a man comes back home and says that that a group of men must leave the land, women insist that the issue be resolved peacefully. They direct the husband to the chief for peaceful talks. This is what we promote at our CWO meetings, as we go round each sector of the parish and at deanery level.

Informant 014 relates how making friendships in the neighbourhood works as a peacebuilding measure:

We try to educate people, especially women to be friendly with their neighbours because if anything happens to them friends are the first to attend to them. We tell them that they should allow people to pass through their compounds. There are people who do not allow others to pass through their compound, but what this means is that they do not know the type of people entering and leaving their community. It also means if an enemy enters their place, nobody goes to help them. This helps us in the community to unite ourselves. We are mixture of indigenes and visitors. In this way both groups talk and make friends with one another.

In Focus Group 01, a woman explains reconciliation amongst women themselves:

We met as women at our deanery meeting. We said to the Deanery Mother that our communities are not at peace. The women from Gwer and Konshisha are not eating together. So this is the time to reconcile ourselves. The Deanery Mother said to all the women, "violent conflict brings a lot of hardship to women. Women suffer, carrying loads on their heads and sleep in the forest. So, all the women from Gwer East, Gwer West and Konshisha should unite. They should unite in the spirit of our Mother Mary..." So we started eating together again. In the meetings the Deanery Mother who is from Gwer presents me first before presenting other women presidents. It is only then that we start our activities in the community.

In the same focus group a woman describes how women started a football league between communities as a peacebuilding measure:

We sat as women and discussed what could be done so that fighting could stop. As a result of this, we formed a football league between the three LGAs: Gwer East, Gwer West and Konshisha... they play football in fields that we mothers up-rooted trees and constructed for them. They play these
matches until about 7:00 pm. By the time they go home, they are tired and will no-longer go about drinking in the beer parlours. These are the places where they sit and conceive evil things. In this way, fighting has reduced in Konshisha and Gwer.

5.4.3 Women's stories from Kwande political conflict

In this case study, before explaining what their peacebuilding initiatives were, several women and a woman in Focus Group 06, explained why they were carrying out peacebuilding in their communities:

Informant 009: When we came back from the fighting, we members of Agape Sisters started peace mediation because it was women who suffered most during the fighting. It was women who were worried about their families; children were sleepless and could not eat. We wanted women to know that it is women who were at the losing end. It is they who were having their children go to waste. So we have been going from house to house and in the market places where women are selling to educate them on the consequences of violent conflict. Our aim is that women should educate their children to stop fighting. They should appeal to their husbands to stop fighting.

Informant 011: For us we are talking with our children about this fighting. We are talking to our children that they should stop fighting and study. A lot of children have stopped going to school. Often it is young people who do not have school certificate, or who were drop out from college that were used for fighting. These groups of youths were easy to get to go and fight for political parties and to fight for those who were in landed conflicts.

Informant 012: I come from a background of a lot of crisis. I was born from “Due” (pseudo name) where there is an ongoing conflict between two communities for decades. So when I got married here in Kwande, I also met crisis in Kwande. I have seen destruction of conflict and backwardness in fighting. This is why I am part of this group because I want to teach young men and my children that the biggest gift to be given is studies. After studies, the best gift is a job, but if you don’t study you cannot get a good job.

Focus Group 06: In recent times, there has been violent conflict here because of elections. This conflict has continued for many years, so this year we went out to campaign for peace. We told our youths that we are tired of carrying things on our head and children in our hands. This is enough and we no longer want to see them fighting each other from the political parties. Violence has brought set back in our place. For example, me who is speaking during the violence our house and business were burnt down. More than this, when this violence started Kwande people were all
scattered. Children and parents were divided. Children were living mostly
away from their parents as a result a lot of the children started taking
drugs: Smoking Indian hemp and other hard drugs. Some children started
thieving and some even joined armed gangs. These children became part of
the group causing violence in our community. This situation only happened
because of the violence in our community causing poverty. It is this need to
struggle against poverty and violence that has led us to do what we are
doing.

Informant 022 illustrates women protest campaigning as a form of peacebuilding:

We had a spiritual retreat with our parish priest, on this faithful day, the
topic was land conflicts. He cited how mothers had successes in stopping
this kind of carnage in other places. He cited the women of Abeokuta and
Aba who protested against policies of their government such that the
government did not do what it had intended to do. After this session, one
or two members started saying: we heard that women stopped carnage,
what of our place Kwande? We heard that it was women, why don’t we do
something? So we decided that we the Christian Mothers (women of
Catholic Women’s Organisation (CWO) were going to carry out a protest
campaign. We casted our minds back on how elections in Kwande had
resulted in terrible violence in 2003, 2004, and 2007. The politicians used
our children and our husbands to burn down houses. Our children killed
people for nothing other than just small, small money. But the children of
the politicians were abroad studying while ours were here fighting, and did
not go to school.

We thought about it and said we had to stop this carnage. We said we were
going to demonstrate peacefully against violence. We got out in the form of
crying and pleading with principal actors in this carnage. We said we were
going to see whoever born of a woman, who was going to reject the plea of
mothers. As for us, we wanted to cry out against this carnage. This was our
purpose. We went and spoke with the chairman of the Laity Council; he said
he was going to speak with the parish priest. He spoke with him, and as it
was something that was on the mind of the priest, he knew that it was
going to have a positive effect. He said he was going to be proud of us if we
did such a thing. And that it was going to be a good example for other
mothers, so he gave us the go ahead. We now wrote a communiqué, with
it, we went to see the Divisional Police Officer, the chief security officer in
Kwande. We explained to him that we had sensed that the 2011 election
too might be bloody, but we mothers were tired of running away with
children at our backs and loads on our heads like camels and donkeys. We
no longer wanted to hide in the bushes with our families again. We told him
that if anything happened we were going to come and sleep at the police
station with him. We handed a copy of the communiqué to him. We then
marched to Ter Kwande (Traditional Chief of Kwande) and we repeated our
complaints to him. He welcomed the idea, said he had a meeting on the same day with all the local chiefs of Kwande. He was going to spread the news to the local chiefs. They too had to take the message to the interior of Kwande people.

We then went to the chairman of the LGA. We were going in the sun with songs of praise. We also spoke to him and said, all that was happening in Kwande, he should know that he was the father of Kwande people. He was the one responsible for all youths, wives, husbands, women and men. Further, that if he agreed, he should hold firm our young men so that there will be no violence in the next coming elections. So we will not have to be going about in bushes with our children. More so, that our children will not have to go hungry; he agreed with us. He added that he was known as the Peacemaker of Kwande that he had that award from the Catholic Church of Christ the King in Vandikya LGA. Therefore, what we women came to do was a good thing. He went ahead and gave us mothers 20,000 Naira for soft drinks. But when we came back we took a decision: we went out fasting, and we were not going to break the fast with money. We wanted God to hear our prayers, so we went and paid the bills of poor people who had been discharged, but could not pay their bills at St. Monica’s Hospital Adikpo. We used all the money and did not touch any kobo (any cent). We also made sure that journalists were present with us. My words to all the personalities were recorded. We did not want a situation where we would be misquoted as saying things that will cause violence. We wanted to avoid falsehood from those who used every event to create troubles for Kwande. This event was reported in the newspapers as we have given to you (Photo 19). We went and ended the protest at the parish church. Our parish priest blessed us and we all left for our homes.
Informant 023 recounts women meeting their traditional chiefs to seek women’s equality on land inheritance, bride price[^39] and fertiliser for farming:

We also held a meeting and said that we wanted to be like our husbands. They should stop disrespecting us and humiliating us. So, we went to the local government chiefs (Ator). We told them that we wanted to be treated just like men. We are equals and they should be giving us land and if they give us they should not take it back again. It should remain our property. This also means we can sit and discus land conflicts that are creating fighting everywhere in our land. We also said when paying for bride price for our daughters they should not send us away as they have been doing. We should sit there so that we can share it with men. The men send us women away and ask us to go and kill the pig, but when we have killed the pig they come and take away the pig meat. They tell us to take salt, but when we take salt we have no meat but vegetables leaves only to cook. This is not good, we told the chief.

[^39]: Bride price is money a man pays to the parents of a girl for marrying her.
In addition, we wanted fertiliser to be given to us because it is women who weed farms, harvest and prepare food for the family. Yet they have denied us fertiliser they only give it to men, so we women should be given our fertiliser different from men. The chiefs promised that they were going to work on these demands and they agreed with us that we had genuine grievances. The chiefs said they were going to start with the fertiliser issue. Once there was fertiliser they were going to give women their own share different from men.

In Focus Group 06, some women relate how giving food and provisions to poor people and victims of violence in hospitals and a prison, as well as paying children’s school fees, works as peacebuilding:

Again our meeting has been helping poor people. There are many poor people here and part of the problem that is causing conflict is poverty. So we help people who are poor so that they do not go about fermenting trouble. We contribute amongst ourselves—food stuff—rice, yams, oil, and all the stuff for making food. We also bring soap and other provisions for the poor. We prepare the food, take the provisions and go out on foot or ask some husbands of our members who have means of transport to help us. We go to hospitals and visit people sharing food and distributing the things we have gathered. We also visit the Adikpo prison: we give food to young people who are victims of conflict in our area from both parties, and we pray with them. We do not discriminate; we give to all groups of people. We do not judge if they are guilty or not. We are also paying school fees of some children of those who were killed. This is to help these children do something valuable rather than being on the street. Being on the street means they can be taken up by those who want idle children to cause troubles. In this way too we end some violence in our area.

I was invited to an Agape Sister’s meeting and I took Photographs 39-40 (used for an analysis in 6.2.4) to illustrate women’s use of synergic satisfiers in their peacebuilding work.

Informant 010 expresses her gratitude to her group for their charity work:

I for one benefited from this group. My home and all my family properties were destroyed in the last fighting that took place here four years ago. It is this Agape Sisters who led others in feeding my family until we could feed ourselves. This kind of gesture was not only extended to me, who is a member, but to other parties involved in the conflict. This is why I strongly support this group’s work.

Informant 011 relates how they intervene with politicians who are sponsors of political thugs:

As mothers, we are confronting party notables or “big wigs” as they call themselves, who call our children to go and fight for them. We say to them
that we no longer agree that our children be used as political thugs. We also talk to our children so that they do not join up to such meetings. A lot of our children have seen reason with us mothers and ceased to join political youth groups that are used as thugs. We have sat with husbands and wives to help them come to agree on how to pay school fees for children. There are many cases in our community of husbands who do not want to pay school fees for their own children. Women are left to suffer to get school fees. We have intervened on several occasions and helped men see that they need to pay the school fees of their children. We have had success in this regard and we thank God for it. Again, we have a lot of problems worth thousands of Naira but we do not have money at this moment. Even the payment of our salaries, we have no pay for many months. This does not help matters, but in the time past 2001 and 2002 things were different. However, since 2003 things are no longer the same we are going down rather than up.

The Agape Sisters went out with me to enact how they travel asking young men to stop violence and as a participant observer I took Photographs 41-42 (which I used for an analysis in 6.2.4) of how women use synergic satisfiers in their peacebuilding work. In Focus Group 06, a woman recounts their house to house reconciliation activities:

Violent conflict has brought divisions in our families. Families are divided and no longer ready to help other members. This is why in our meetings, we try to reconcile families. We move house to house where there are misunderstandings, sometimes between a husband and his wife. We read some verses from the Bible, listen to the family story, and we give advice so that families reunite once again. Most of our missions succeed and so many people, responsible people in Kwande, push their wives to come and join the association. I give an example, me who am speaking, my husband used to be part of a group that was causing trouble in this place. Agape Sisters visited and talked with him on several occasions. One day, he told me that he was no longer going to be part of the group because our meeting was trying to bring peace. More so that when he went out people greeted him and called him Agape husband! Agape husband! So this meeting helps to reconcile people and gets some out of violence.

Informant 012 outlines how she teaches young men that violence only causes destruction:

I am able to show some young men that violence only brings destruction. Violence destroys even the little things governments have done for us. For example, I have been pointing out to some young men how they have destroyed the Nigeria Independent Electoral Commission (INEC) Secretariat in Kwande. I say to the young men living around the place that if they did not destroy this building they could have been security men in the place.
They could have gotten a salary rather than working as thugs for politicians. It is idleness that leads our young men to be thugs for politicians.

5.4.4 Women's stories from Apa LGA conflict

Informant 002 outlines how a group of women performed a ritual to wipe out violence in their communities:

In our community we wiped out violence by sweeping it out. The sweeping of the place took place on two occasions. We, the women's groups of the two communities, said that we were going to sweep violence out of our environment. We came together. You know that our conflict is between royals and non-royals groups. So, the first sweeping took place on the non-royal side. There is a church in the middle between the two sides. We women went to the church. We said prayers and then swept the whole village. We went from house to house sweeping, got to the major settlement and swept. So, we swept out violence completely. On the second day, we converged in the house of the traditional ruler. We went to church to say our prayers, and then started sweeping from the church, we swept the royal side. Women went to settlement sweeping and then later came back to the traditional ruler's place and rounded up the activity. The royal father (traditional chief) encouraged us that as women we should be leading in peacebuilding in our communities. So that was how we wiped out the violence, till today we have not gone back to fighting. The problem itself is not resolved, but there has been no fighting again.

I collected Photographs 34-36 to show the women performed this rite from WEP's archives (which I used for an analysis in 6.2.4) of how women use synergic satisfiers in their peacebuilding work. In Focus Group 03, some women indicated that eating together has proved a powerful means to unify them:

We eat together and pray together as a sign of making peace. We are eating together, we are worshiping together and we are talking together.

Another speaker:

We hold Christian conferences together between church members from the two communities over our crisis. We also encourage trading together: some people from Ataganyi come to sell here in Omelemu and some from Omelemu go to sell things to Ataganyi community. In this way, we are coming together and there is no problem again.

Yet another speaker:

40 This was done in Idoma culture, but there is similar ritual among the Tiv as seen in 3.1.6.
We are eating together and praying together as a sign of making peace. That is all that I want to say.

I was invited to a peace meeting where food was shared and as a participant observer I took Photographs 30-33 (which I used for an analysis in 6.2.4) of how women use synergic satisfiers in their peacebuilding work.

5.5 Stories on gender order in the BVN

In this section, I asked for responses to the following question: looking at the lives of women in your community, can you share some stories about what it means to be a woman?

5.5.1 Women’s stories from Takum LGA traditional title conflict

In Focus Group 04, women narrate the plight of what it means to be a woman:

A woman is not considered in our society. When a woman wants to say something they say sit down, you are a woman. Women are not considered in our society. We as women can only talk behind men or in private and not in public places. We can only talk to our children or men in a cool manner at home.

Another woman adds:

The chiefs do not have meetings with women: they say that this issue is not about women. They do not allow women to come among them. We do not have freedom to talk to our chiefs in public. Only behind the backstage can they allow us to talk with them. Women are not part of the chief’s council. We women are not represented in the council.

Moreover, in Focus Group 05, the women relate gender order in the region:

In this our community men say women are weaker cells so, in terms of decision-making, women are not considered. In terms of conflict women suffer most, but in terms of decision-making they are not considered. I don’t know where they learned all these things because the Bible tells us that women are helpers of men. You know that a small pot usually produces the best soup. If men will allow women to contribute, women too will give their best ideas. I also think that bribery is part of why men don’t want women with them. For example, when there is trouble the government usually sends money and the men share that money. If men will allow women to be part of them, women will not allow them to share that money. Since, if you want a good home, look for a good woman. Good women will not allow money meant for the community to be shared by a small group of people.
5.5.2 Women’s stories from Konshisha and Gwer LGAs land conflict

In Focus Group 01, a woman recounts that men do to women what God ordained:

It is a good thing to be a woman... because by nature this is what God gave to us. What men do to women is ordained by God. As God made women, women are supposed to be behind, men are to be heads. A woman should not be the head. So, a woman cannot regret for being a woman... When God made human beings, God said that a woman should be below and the man should be above her. ... This is why being a woman we love it, day and night. More so, at this time of fighting, we are happy to be women because we are peaceful. When we say to our husbands stop they will stop if they are good husbands.

However, another woman counters that God did not order women to be answerable to men:

For me, God said to Adam that he will create a helper for him. God did not say he was creating somebody for Adam to override. So men should have things in common with women. However, as human beings, some men are wicked they do not want to do anything with women. But this is not the way God created women and men. God made women to help men think together. God did not say that women should be answerable to men. So, men should take women along, they should be asking for women’s views so that we can help them.

Another woman comments that some women also want to control men:

These things are both ways, for some women when a man listens to them, they now turn to lord it over the man—giving him orders to carry out. These types of women want men to obey women. In this case, things will not work well. This is why some men who want to listen and take advice from their wives become apprehensive. They are also under pressure from other men not to do so.

Informant 005 believes women should participate in peace processes:

Women should be among those who participate at peace processes. So that if men came home and decided to change the judgment passed, their women could say no, this was not the judgment. I know when women feel convinced about things they are able to stand up to their men. Women at those early hours of the morning let their husbands know that the truth should prevail. Women would be able to help their men decide on the right judgment about land conflicts.
Informant 006 explains why men exclude women from decision making:

Men argue that they have brought women to their houses so what they decide is what women should do. Women have nothing to say about their decisions. But it is only here that women are not allowed decision making; only here in Nigeria. I am not educated but I was away from home and in some other places when there is discussion women may be given a place and permission to talk. However, in Benue State men are not trying to give a place to women.

Furthermore, Informant 007 explains how men do not allow women discuss land matters:

On matters of land, we women are not allowed to sit in the main square with men, but we are allowed to sit outside the circle. We can talk from there if we do not agree. Our talks from outside sometimes are considered important. These talks can become part of a decision of the men. Sometimes when we talk from outside the square, they shout back at us and say shut up, you women. But what the woman said would have been heard. ... And if it is something that needs to be addressed or acted upon, it will be addressed.

Informant 019 further explains how boys are given preference to speak before adult women:

If a woman is to speak, it is better for her son of two years to speak in her name. This is what happens in our place, but in places that God is feared, women are listened to because God said that a woman is man's helper. In other places your son of two years will be permitted to speak, but me who am 47 years as woman will not be given permission to speak. Likewise, women are not giving inheritance—only to their sons. So, for me, I take it that if my son has something it is mine. That is why we women try to influence our children so that they speak in our name as women ... So if my child has a part in his people, the mother also has a part.

Informant 013 supports the idea that women should speak through their husbands:

In the time past, women did not speak in public. They had to speak through their husbands. Sometimes, it would be a widow, but they would have to speak through their brother or brother-in-law in the house. So, men spoke the voice of women, but without accepting that they were expressing the views of women. However, in today's world, as more women are educated, some women say that they too will speak in public and elders should listen to them. But I do not think this is correct. This is because Tiv culture does not permit men to do something on the voices of women. For me I think it is better for women to hide in their husbands and throw arrows to the elders through their husbands.
Informant 016 also defends why women should depend on their men:

A woman is something necessary in the life of humanity that is why God made a woman from the side of a man. So a woman being a necessity, a woman is like a tool for work for a man. When you are going to farm, you take your hoe (tool) and get ready to go and farm. That is how a woman is to man—a man’s hoe.

Informant 017 agrees with women’s dependency on men, she ensures her husband protects her:

For me, I always tell my husband where I am going. Sometimes, I set a trap for him by not telling him where I am going. When my husband does not ask me, I ask him, “Why have you not asked me where I am going?” He will retort that since I am not gone yet he knows that I will tell him before going. I believe that men should protect women so that women can be at peace.

Nonetheless, Informant 014 asserts that in times of conflict men do not protect women, rather women protect men:

For me, I think it is women that protect men... Men who come back from fighting are taken care of by us women. They run and leave us to care for ourselves so, how can they protect us? We protect and sponsor them to fight. If they had the power to do something, it was because we were behind them. When they go fighting they have no time to protect us. We women suffer carrying house property and children running about. It is women who are in charge of the family valuables; so, for me, I feel that it is we women who protect men in times of fighting. It is true that men are our heads and look after us, but when in time of war we look after them.

5.5.3 Women’s stories from Kwande political conflict

In Focus Group 06, a woman traces how husbands consider wives as nothing:

Here, husbands consider wives as nothing, such that, even in the family, women cannot decide home matters. If you are with the parents of your husband or his brothers, if you as a woman see that something is wrong in the home and you want to say something, the brothers will accuse you of being a trouble maker. If your husband backs you up, he is accused of being like a woman and that the wife is imposing her will on him. If your husband is a drunkard, or you find out he is going out with women, you cannot comment. If you do, the parents will shout at you saying, did you not come and meet him in his house? How would he have met you if he was not going after women? So, violent conflict adds more problems to the existing
conflict between women and men, but it is men who have created this discrimination against women.

This type of suffering for wives is endemic, such that when a husband of a woman dies and leaves the woman; since there was no respect from the man, she suffers. Some women are no longer able to stay in their husband's place when they are dead. The wife has to go back to the father's home. And even in the house of her father things will not be easy for her. Also, there are women who have stayed with their husbands for many years, but have only female children. These women are seen to be nothing. They are seen to be wasting their time in the husband's place. They say that you have nobody to take care of you because you have no male child. In such a house, the woman has nothing to say in the way it is run. If you have a male child you can say something through your child. So, a Tiv man considers a woman as nothing, just property.

Additionally, in the same Focus Group 06, a woman relates that educated women take men's responsibilities yet receive no respect:

We thought that if a woman studied she will be given some consideration, but this is not the case. If a woman who has some level of education says something she is now mocked: Oh! She thinks she is educated and above us, is she? So she is now educated so as to impose her will on us, let her go away with her rudeness. She can go and impose her will on her husband. So what can a woman do in this Africa? We don't know. Educated women now pay school fees for their children. The women even pay bride price for themselves because their husband will refuse to pay it. Women are now paying to be married to men yet they have no respect from men. Women are now paying for farm work. It used to be men that farmed for women. This has now changed with educated women. A lot of men who are married to educated women now have left their responsibilities to their wives. Most will rather go and look for other women outside the home with their money. Women use their salaries to pay school fees, buy food in the house and do most things just for the sake of staying with a man. The man will never buy you clothes or any nice thing.

Another woman in Focus Group 06 relates how women remain insecure because they have to pay for the cost to bury their parents yet they have no inheritance rights:

Women have to face problems in the place they are married and in their proper father's home. When your father, mother and brother die, it is the woman who has to buy the coffin. She brings drinks and buys goats for food. You may be having well-to-do brothers, but the culture says women should bury their parents and brothers. But once the burial is over, men will now come and divide the inheritance without giving anything to women. If a woman bought some good things for their parents when they were alive,
these things will go to the wives of their brothers. The sister has no say in what is happening though you bought the things. The bottom line is that women are slaves to men. It is very painful.

Another woman adds her contribution on the burial issue:

If there are many sisters in a family and all the expenses are covered, like the buying of the coffin, the other sisters are told to bring a coffin in the pocket. That means they should bring money for buying a coffin in cash and deposit it with the elders. Sometimes, women will bring many goats yet the women may not eat any meat at the burial. The men will not kill the goats they will rather sell them later and share the money. So, women who brought goats for burial will go home hungry in the name of obeying tradition. In some cases, if a mother before her death suggested that some of her things should be given to a daughter; the boys will cry, “Is it girls who are going to inherit in this house?” This will lead to conflict and sometimes, the woman will receive a beating from her brothers. Sometimes, witchcraft will be meted on the woman because the mother wanted her to get something at her death. This can lead to this daughter dying, so women are afraid of saying anything about what happens in their homes. Women are slaves everywhere they go.

In the same focus group a woman states that in former times women had more respect than today:

In former times women had more respect than today. I give an example, I know for fact that when giving a girl to marriage, women used to get a whole pig to themselves. I witnessed it in my mother’s house. A girl was given to marriage and a pig was given to the women. This pig was pregnant, it gave birth to 12 piglets and no man came near it, only women shared these piglets. Today, men get all the goats, and yet come and share the pig, including even salt that is given to women. The men want the salt for their women. Not long ago, the husband of my younger sister went and paid her bride price. He gave 10 bags of salt, but the men came and took 5 bags saying this was for men. The pig that was killed, the men came for their share too. This is happening at the detriment of women who no longer have husbands. Women with husbands will have double share. This is another cheating that men have imposed on women. Widows now cannot count on the support of men when their husbands die. Pig and salt were things for mothers-in-law and had nothing to do with men. We do not know what has become of men.

Informart 009 laments that women do not have a voice at home or in the office:

In this our place, women do not have a voice at home. Women cannot voice out their complaints against violence in the community or at home as a
brother does to another brother. This will not be taken lightly. A woman can say what she wants, but it will not be taken as the Bible says that a woman should be helping the husband. Likewise, in the offices, women are not seen to be able to head a department. Even if a woman is qualified to fill a post she will be rejected by men. ... In my own case, when I speak to my husband and he does not listen to me, I tell my male children to intervene between the two of us. So sometimes my children will go behind me and confront him. He may later do what I said when I see him doing it I know that my sons have confronted him behind me. But I will not say anything since what I want is action and not to be vindicated.

In Focus Group 06, a woman asserted that she and her group were working so that women could own and inherit property:

We, now, want women to be given inheritance in their homes. This is, now, a necessity for us women. When a woman brings things or money to the family every son is happy. This money will be used to build the home, but once there is something offered to the woman the boys begin to complain. They would want to know since when women started sharing things with men. So, a woman who contributes to the building of a family, is she doing something bad? This is why we, women, are now campaigning for inheritance for women at home. We hope that your work will echo this campaign for women’s freedom. I hope you are going to do this with your work?

5.5.4 Women’s stories from Apa LGA conflict

Informant 002 describes how a woman who talks in a public meeting gets a bad name with her husband:

What I will say about this decision making thing; even as we are speaking, women are not involved in certain decisions. Even in the home, what a man will say to woman is that what I say is final. It is the same out there, in the community, except if it is women’s meeting. If it is not strictly women’s meeting and you want to talk and some time you are even afraid to talk because at the end of it all you will be given names. A woman who talks in any public meetings is given a bad name together with her husband. They would say, look at this man that cannot control his wife. When she gets out there, look at how she talks and behaves, they will call you names. I mean derogatory names. Women up to this level are not given due recognition to be involved in decision-making in our own communities. And then, when you go to a public meeting, even those that are living in the urban areas are ridiculed. I mean the problem is not only with men, but the entire society (rural and urban) because even women call other women such derogatory names. Even in offices, it happens. Men keep reminding you at whatever
level, remember, you are a woman and “you should do this” or “you should do that”.

In Focus Group 02, a woman from Apa explains how men forcefully silence women at formal gatherings:

You know God created man and woman but God did not call women slaves to husbands. God said women should be helping men. But men have misunderstood this section. Even though, men call women the weaker sex, what some women have in them is more than that of some men. But some men just don’t want to hear anything coming from a woman. Any woman who says a thing is shouted down, go and sit down; don’t you know that you are woman? You are a stubborn woman, but where is stubbornness here? Some react to women like this because, when they gather in their drinking place, some men will say to them that the man is very useless because he has been considering the decision of a woman. So the man will now say that he shall now go and prove to his wife that he is the head of the house. So this brings problems; so I think that if men receive advice from women and women receive advice from men there will be peace and there will be no violence in the society.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I recounted extracts of the stories the women I investigated told me. In 5.1, I recounted extract stories about the causes of conflicts in the BVN; 5.2 relayed the extract stories on women’s vision in relationship to the satisfaction of human needs in the BVN. In 5.3, I narrated extract stories about the sources/how these women acquired their skills in peacebuilding and conflict resolution; 5.4 related detail stories concerning the women’s peacebuilding initiatives in the BVN; and finally in 5.5, I presented the accounts of what the women said it means to be a woman in the BVN. These narratives are the evidence base for conflict and conflict resolution analysis of the four conflicts of traditional title, land, democratic political leadership and economic resource in the BVN in the next chapter.
Chapter 6—Research Analysis

In this chapter, I analyse the stories of the women peacebuilders that I presented in the last chapter and photographs that I took during field-work in the Benue Valley, Nigeria (BVN). I use the theoretical framework I developed in Chapters 2 and 3 based on the human needs theory (HNT) and gender socialisation theory to develop answers to my three research questions:

1. What do the women understand as the causes of the four conflicts in the BVN?
2. What kinds of skills, vision and initiatives do the women's groups use in peacebuilding?
3. What is the women’s perception of the patriarchal social, economic and political gender order in the BVN?

As such, I divide this chapter into three sections: the causes of protracted social conflicts (PSCs), women's use of synergic satisfiers, and the exclusion of women from formal peacebuilding and conflict resolution in the BVN.

6.1 Causes of PSC in the BVN

I use the human needs theory perspective to analyse stories from 5.1 in this section so as to evaluate what the women consider the causes of social conflict in the BVN to be. From the HNT perspective, my analysis of the women’s stories demonstrates that some traditional and political leaders in the BVN frustrate the satisfaction of unmet FHNs of subsistence, affection, understanding, cultural and political participation in the region. According to the stories of the women, this situation has led to social discontent that manifests in violent struggles over economic resources and political/customary power. I find the women articulated which different identity groups were discontented and identified the actions and strategies used to express their discontent. They also revealed the types of actions and strategies traditional/political leaders used to counter the identity group’s actions. As such, I argue in this section that the women analyse PSCs in their communities by identifying frustrated FHNs and the use of destructive, pseudo and inhibiting satisfiers by identity groups and traditional/political leaders leading to PSCs in the BVN.

HNT argues that institutions or social norms frustrate FHNs leading to aggressions and conflicts (Kok, 2007, p.2). Similarly, when I asked about the causes of conflict in their community, women in Focus Group 06 emphasised that even children wanted some respect such that adults founded better reasons not to accept imposition leading to conflict; especially, when politicians deliberately frustrated their political participation. Furthermore, I find the women argued that the extent of frustration in their communities tested the limit of people’s
conformity. For example, in Focus Group 07 the women asked how a person without work would *not scratch his buttocks* (i.e. not fight for his/her food). The rationale is that a person without work cannot easily find food, shelter and clothing and hence might fight for food, shelter and clothing. I would argue that in this situation, the women were saying that conflict arose over the frustration of unmet needs. Burton (1996, p. 21) argues in support of this view that when a conflict revolves around FHNs, people's ability to accept things as the way things are might reach its limit as they struggle to satisfy their unmet FHNs. Therefore, the women's stories I analyse rationalise that some traditional and political leadership discriminated against some of the socio-political elite who wanted to participate in democratic traditional/political leadership, impoverished young men and disempowered women; thus, this situation created the cycles of violence in their communities.

### 6.1.1 Poor traditional leadership

I maintain that the women investigated argued that in their opinion some traditional leaders frustrated peaceful living in their communities which led to conflict in three ways: (a) by not fostering trust and friendly relationships amongst different groups; (b) not acting fairly when they sat in judgement; and (c) not allowing democratic succession to their titles. From the HNT (Azar, 1990, Burton, 1997) perspective, I would argue that these three actions constitute pseudo strategies adopted by the traditional leaders in responding to communal discontent contributing to PSC instead of synergic strategies. A synergic strategy would have been a good traditional leadership that recognised diversity as opportunity and created an environment where diverse groups flourished.

Undeniably, I find (see 2.1 under Traditional Leaders and 4.2) traditional leaders in the BVN had the task of administering issues of land, policing, education, taxation, health care and social amenities which gave them the opportunity to enable diverse groups to flourish (Jibo, 2009). It is my experience that although the military rescinded this power in 1978 and gave it to federal, state and local governments; people still rely on traditional leaders to facilitate the resolution of conflict relating to these issues today because of political instability in Nigeria. Indeed, Informant 09 confirmed that traditional leader's play this role to ensure peace in their domains. For this reason, people normally love and respect traditional leaders, as the

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41 I am using the term traditional leaders as it is customary in the BVN to distinguish from individual title chiefs of which are numerous in the BVN, but it should be understood as refereeing to customary chiefs properly as discussed in 2.1 under Traditional Leaders.
custodians of the people including their land, as the protectors of the needs of the people. For example, in Photo 20 and Photo 21 some women and some youths at a two-day training workshop on peace network formation organised by Women Environmental Programme (WEP) on its project, “Connecting the Disconnect through Women and Youths for Peacebuilding in the Middle-belt Region of Nigeria,” in Makurdi took memorabilia pictures with the Kwande traditional leaders who honoured the invitation to join them at this workshop.

Photo 20 (memorabilia): Traditional leaders from Kwande with people from Adikpo and Jato Aka, Benue State at WEP workshop in Makurdi

Photo 21 (memorabilia): Three traditional leaders, two from Kwande and the other from Ado with people from Niger and Taraba states at WEP workshop in Makurdi
The women and youths invited me to take these pictures and show them to the "outside-world". Indeed, they were recognising these traditional leaders as understanding their role of challenging intolerances and encouraging them (women and youths) in their objective of achieving peace and good well-being in the BVN. However, not all traditional leaders were perceived as facilitators of good living promotion or protectors of citizens in their communities.

I find the women’s stories revealed that some traditional leaders did not foster trust and friendly relationships amongst different groups. These leaders were perceived to have lost trust in their communities. As Porter (2007, p. 88) contends, "Trust is the end product of respectful relationships. It has to be earned and can easily be lost". In the BVN, the principal reason for this situation was that some traditional leaders did not maintain good relations between themselves, so that their communities could handle conflicts better. For example, in Focus Group 05, the women specified that in Takum, different groups used to learn each other’s language (culture), but due to divisions among their traditional leaders this is often no longer the case; “a Kuteb man says, he is not learning Jukun and Jukun man says, he is not learning Kuteb language”. Similarly, other groups like the Tiv, Chamba and Hausa have refused to learn each other’s language. Therefore, these groups could not challenge intolerances between them as was the case before, when they were able to understand one another’s culture and traditional leaders aided this process. Consequently, Ahmadu and Danfulani (2006, p. 298) narrate that uncles who are supposed to guarantee the well-being of their nephews and nieces now reject them; thus failing in their responsibilities to children of Chamba/Jukun and Kuteb inter-marriages. In effect, they destroy one of the most important ancient peacebuilding institutions in the BVN (3.1.6, under The Mother’s side). However, Ahmadu and Danfulani are not entirely correct in their analysis because for the Jukun while the maternal uncle is supposed to facilitate the well-being of his nephew and nieces, he could also pawn or sell his sisters sons and the sister is obliged to agree to the will of his brother while the nephews are supposed to accept the servitude of their maternal uncle explaining in the saying, “Was it not he that bore me?” or “Am I not his umbilical cord?”(Meek, 1931, pp. 109-110). The maternal uncle of the Kuteb is not supposed to kill his sister’s sons but the killing of Kuteb sons by their maternal uncles could have triggered revenge and reprisal killings. From the HNT perspective, my analysis is that this situation frustrated the FHNs of affection and understanding for groups coexisting in Takum. This is why during the conflict, families withdrew their daughters from inter-Chamba/Jukun and Kuteb marriages; some of the children of such unions who followed their mothers thinking they were going home were either
rejected or killed, while some women who stayed in their husbands house lost their lives because they were considered spies (Ahmadu and Danfulani, 2006, p. 297). Of course, the traditional leaders could have prevented this from happening; therefore, I find that for the women, the attitude of some traditional leaders was protracting conflict in their communities.

In an ideal situation, if the traditional leaders were fair and just in their dealings with their people and amongst themselves, they would have contained conflict, promoted communal harmony and social stability (Azar, 1990, p. 10), but the women argued that some leaders showed incompetence.

Some traditional leaders exhibited injustice when they sat in judgement: I find this issue was of critical concern to women in the BVN. They argued that this was at the root of traditional title, land and political conflicts. Women in Focus Group 01 gave some evidence: “traditional chiefs are becoming too comfortable receiving bribes; they get free SUV cars, get money from rich subjects who are outside so as to compromise their decisions” over land, traditional title and political conflicts. These complaints were reiterated by Informant 023 that traditional leaders have forgotten that they are the custodians of the people and have become the “destroyers of the land”. In this case, the women identified some traditional leaders as part of the establishment frustrating people’s well-being in their communities. Therefore, as Azar (1990, p. 11) informs us: fragile authority/institutions prevent their communities from responding to, and meeting, their needs. Consequently, rather than love and respect traditional leaders as I showed in Photo 20 and 21, people attacked them in situations of conflicts. Consequently, rather than love and respect traditional leaders as I showed in Photo 20 and 21, people attacked them in situations of conflicts.
As the traditional leaders themselves said, this happened because people perceived their impoverished status to occur as a result of the incorrect judgement which seemingly created a sense of helplessness, immobilising anxiety and frustration among people in the BVN. The common person cannot pay the high cost of going to court for justice (Kabeer, 2002, p. 21). I would argue that if the common person cannot get justice from the courts because of poverty, and cannot get justice from traditional leaders because of corruption, where does s/he go?
s/he becomes frustrated. Furthermore, I find the women indicated that the undemocratic nature of this traditional institution itself generated conflict.

Some traditional leaders do not subscribe to democratic succession: This is another reason why the women identified some traditional leaders as at the root of protracted conflict in the BVN. As Informant 002 suggested, the prolonged conflicts in communities were due to the prohibition of some people from ascending to traditional leadership because they are not from a particular family. She said interested individuals fuel conflict in their communities because they are excluded. My analysis is that the women considered traditional leader’s fixed adherence to the status quo, where only certain families or groups could ascend to a throne, as defective behaviours. People no longer accepted this undemocratic institution. As Informant 002 asserted, “the so-called royal families should have to face other people at voting for the chieftaincy titles. An open contest will reduce violence, and it will make the chieftaincy title more acceptable to people”. In the absence of a democratic system of succession, I argue that these traditional leaders promoted polarised stereotype identity groupings of “indigenes” vs. “settlers” (non-indigenes) and royal vs. non-royal families that sustained conflicts in the BVN. From the HNT perspective, I would contend that this had negative implications for “settlers” and those other socio-political elite disqualified from contesting traditional titles. It frustrated the FHNs of identity and cultural participation for groups tagged as “settlers”, non-royals, or elite disqualified from participating in their cultural leadership. Furthermore, the women argued that a good political leadership may have been able to resolve these conflicts, but that the BVN lack good political leadership (see Photo 24) which further frustrated efforts to satisfy unmet needs in the region.

6.1.2 Poor political leadership

My analysis shows that the women maintained that poor political leadership manifested in three different ways: (1) a political approach of “winner-takes-all”; (2) mismanagement of development resources; and (3) poor access to land. From the HNT perspective, I argue that lack of good governance in these three ways frustrated the satisfaction of the FHNs of subsistence, protection, identity, freedom and political/cultural participation in the BVN. My analysis of the women’s stories as examined below is that the frustration caused by poor leadership contributed significantly to the cycle of conflicts in their communities.

Poor politics: I find the women investigated argued that a political stance that “the winner-takes-all” was responsible for political conflicts in the BVN. This affected the organisation of peaceful, free, fair and credible elections. As Informant 011 explained, “those who have
godfathers ... go about snatching ballot boxes ... It does not matter if elections are stolen”. In this case, I critique that politicians adopted force, intimidation and violence where necessary to win elections rather than produce good governance. As the women provided evidence that, “the imposed leadership is self-centred (Focus Group 06)”, and Informant 009 explained how imposed LGA Chairmen refused to pay worker’s salaries, therefore, people refused to be part of what it did. Consequently, they raised tension, violence and frustrated socio-economic development in communities.

Moreover, according to the women, political parties rewarded a perpetration of violence against their opponents. Women in Focus Group 06 illustrated that crimes committed by young men from both PDP and ACN were condoned by their political leaders. The women believed that both the economic power of the incumbent political party and rich political party members in opposition, known as “political godfathers,” funded militias and guaranteed them supply of weapons, which sustained the cycle of conflicts. Informant 009 explained in detail how the LGA Chairman colluded with the LGA finance department staff to deny workers their salary such that they frustrated the livelihood of the people in the LGA. Yet, the majority of the LGA workers saw the finance staff buying new cars. Consequently, from the HNT perspective, I would argue that they were likely to frustrate the FHNs of protection and political participation, and might adversely affect the satisfaction of the FHN of subsistence in the BVN.

I also find that the women argued that there was mismanagement of monetary resources that should have gone towards social and economic development in the BVN such as “security vote”.

**Poor management of security vote:** Some of the women investigated argued that poor management of the security vote formed part of the poor governance that encouraged conflict in the BVN. In Focus Group 01, the women explained that the chairmen of LGAs benefited

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42 PDP (People’s Democratic Party) and ACN (Action Congress of Nigeria)

43 The practice of setting aside a huge sum of money, ostensibly for disbursement on security matters in a state, but for which accountability is neither demanded nor given. For instance, on average, a Nigerian governor gets a minimum of N300 million per month as security vote—a sum enough to pay the minimum wage of 18,000 Naira to more than 16,000 Nigerians for a month. Some states allegedly set about N700 million as security vote per month. At: <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/05/insecurty-what-has-the-security-votes-secured/#sthash.9NklHZ2Y.dpuf> [Accessed July 8, 2013]
financially from continued conflict as they got the security vote money for each round of violence in their LGA's. Additionally, political parties (in power) benefited from this system as some of the security vote money assisted in maintaining a political hold on the LGA. Therefore, the women argued that security vote money became a means of politicking rather than a means of bringing security and peace to LGAs. They believed the politics of "winner-takes-all" and the abuse of the security vote money demonstrated that the use of violence and criminality was a legitimate route to political power for political parties in the BVN. As such Informant 009 explained, politics made people spend a lot of their wealth such that they were desperate to regain it back once in office rather than practice good governance. I would argue that this protracted situation was undermining democratic means of gaining political power and also denied the state the capacity to bring about progressive and harmonious society in the BVN (Azar 1990). According to the women, poor governance also extended to poor access to land—another important economic resource in this region.

**Poor access to land:** I find the point made by the women investigated was centred on the issue of who was defined "indigene" and "settler", combined with indiscriminate land sales and young men deciding where to farm: according to the women these remained key sources of tension resulting in prolonged land conflicts. As the BVN has little industries, its people’s socio-economic development depends largely on gaining access to productive land. However, the political leadership in Nigeria has not developed any robust juridical system to adjudicate land conflict (see 4.4). Therefore, traditional leaders take up the task, but according to the women, they did not always do a good job. For example, in Focus Group 01, a woman related how one secretary of a village chief confessed to the wrong judgment of a chief over land conflict in favour of one person. Additionally, Informant 06 alluded to young men deciding the authentic boundaries of their parents’ farms when they were already dead. When in fact they may not have known, but traditional leaders would not ask old women or their mothers to indicate the correct boundaries because culture does not permit women to discuss land matters. Although, one of the traditional leaders I met (at the WEP Workshop above) told me that he uses his discretion to consult with women when he had to decide boundary matters because he wanted peace in his domain. An attitude Informant 023 recommended traditional leaders needed to uphold, but that was not always the case. Consequently, Informant 021 concluded, rich "settlers", land buyers and young men recreated the scenarios of political "godfathers" funding militias or bringing in mercenaries who fought cycles of violence over land, undermining peace. Applying the HNT, I would contend that the women’s argument of poor access to land frustrated socio-economic development and it also frustrated the satisfaction of
unmet FNs of subsistence and protection in the BVN. These women and some youths at the WEP (2011) workshop argued that this lack of good leadership caused violent conflicts in their communities. They defined leadership as presented in Photo 24 below.

**Photo 24: Definition of leadership by women and youths studied in the BVN**

![Definition of leadership](image)

It is my analysis that the women and youths reasoned that lack of purposeful leaders to lead people to the goal of satisfying their unmet human needs impoverished young men and disempowered women.

### 6.1.3 Impoverished young men

My analysis of the women's stories shows evidence that youths unemployment, lack of incentives to attend school, hunger and poor economic opportunity frustrated young men; the women distinguished these conditions as the possible root of young men's involvement in the cycle of conflict and the generation of violence in their communities:

**Youth's unemployment:** The women in Focus Group 07 highlighted how unemployed young male graduates were causing conflict because they were frustrated. Analysing the women's contention, I would argue that these women illustrated that the combination of frustrated male graduate farmers and male unemployed street graduates was producing large numbers of male youths that were used to spread violent conflicts. Informant 009 explained that because of youth's frustration some of these young men did anything including violence if they were promised 50,000 Naira ($300) per month by any politician although these promises were
hardly fulfilled. Therefore, the young men were taking to violence as a last resort because they did not anticipate any change in their situation and had lost patience (Burton, 1997, p. 113). From the HNT perspective, my analysis is that unemployed graduate youths without hope of getting work had their FHNs of subsistence, protection and identity frustrated which led to violent conflicts. As Max-Neef (1992, p. 200) argues, extreme unemployment is a pathology of economic poverty which generates fear and violence in communities because of frustration. According to the women this situation led other young men to refuse to attend school.

Young men refuse to go to school: Informant 006 said that children were no longer going to school because there were graduates without jobs. They wanted people to fight so that they could loot people’s property. I would argue that she implied that young men realised that even graduates remained unemployed and could not progress with their learned skills; they lost the pride felt by feeding themselves and their families (Bohannan and Laura, 1968). They were frustrated and it seemed to the women that this frustration pushed some male youths to use violence and criminality in order to find food. As Informant 006 commented, “if there is any small problem anywhere, they (young men) rush to the place to start fighting and loot the place”. Nevertheless, the women argued at the same time that poverty was at the root of all these issues: “it is poverty that pushes some people to do what they should not do (Focus Group 07)”. As Burton (1997, p. 96) points out, situations exist where “a child may commit a serious offence, but the conditions which triggered the behaviour could place the responsibility elsewhere”. Just like Informant 007 insisted that if young men had jobs they would not go and spend so much time in the bush planning evil, therefore, she blamed the government for the involvement of unemployed graduates in violence. The women also observed that these jobless young men were going hungry, another factor that caused violence.

Hunger among young men: Women in Focus Group 06 raised a possible major reason for continued violence in their communities; “The young men do not have jobs. They have graduated, but are without jobs. So conflict is now a business for them”. According to the women, young men justified their violence as a way to make a living. They cited an example of young men who went to hijack money payable to local government workers, “they wanted to take away money meant for workers ... but it is because they are going hungry”. In their opinion, hunger triggered violence in young men. I would argue that the women distinguished the violence as a social problem and not a criminal one. The women provided evidence that young men’s violence and criminality pertained to desperate measures—survival methods for
the existing unemployment and lack of economic opportunities for them to prosper; one more issue that frustrated young men.

Poor economic opportunities for young men and the instinct for survival appeared to drive some young men to act in ways that triggered inter-communal violence: In Focus Group 03, the women gave this as a reason why Ataganyi and Omelemu communities were fighting over economic stones for sale (see Photo 9). My analysis is that the quantity of stones visible in Photo 9 did not amount to any possible industrial usage. The stones seen on this road would not fill a truck load for three trips. The boys working on these stones (Photo 25) explained to me that, historically, the people extracted these stones to build their personal houses. It was lack of economic opportunity that drove them to extract them for sell by hand (Photo 25 – Photo 27). While individuals gather the stones, their identity groups (communities) own the problem because identity groups exist to protect individual and communal physical survival and well-being (Azar, 1990, pp. 8-9). Hence, the two communities fought over the stones.
Photo 25: Young women and men at work

Photo 26: Men showing off their strength
I would argue that to extract these stones using hands for sale indicates how frustrating the situation of livelihood is for these young men.

Moreover, due to the frustrating nature of the work, young men brought young women into what would normally be considered men's work. Before I shot Photo 25, I took pictures of
women carrying stones on their heads. The young women protested against the taking of any photos of them with stones on their heads. They argued that it was a man’s work and, as such, they were not happy to see any photographs of this nature. I deleted the shots in their presence in order to restore trust for my research work. However, the young men more or less posed for the camera (Photo 25 – Photo 27) showing their happiness with their pictures. I would argue that young men involving young women in this work shows the level of desperation on their part; allowing this challenge to their “manhood”. They were socialised to work apart from women (see 3.1.4), but it was an opportunity for the young women to show their men that they could also do men’s work.

For the women, this is a good thing, but for the young men, a diminishing of their status as men which could lead to increasing the violence in a conflict and also against women in homes. As one can observe in the two rites described in 3.1.4 on the “Circumcision of Boys” and the rite of “True-manhood”, violence and intimidation were exposed to initiates as means to use in situations of frustration. As Gilligan too (2004b, p. 100) finds, shame encourages violence in men, they use violence as an attempt to undo shame and restore manhood; that “as far as manhood is concern, whatever humiliations a man might suffer in the world at large, at home he is the master”. Husbands and wives working in situations like this one can heighten violence in the conflict and also at home. An example is given of how men turned their status anxieties into a conflict with women in the colonial BVN in 6.3.2.

Therefore, according to the stories of the women studied, the rationale for violence in their communities is arguably unemployment, lack of incentives to go to school, hunger and poor economic opportunity among young men which produces a male youths that has great difficulty in feeling comfortable in their communities. These disconnect the young men from the rule of law or the people that rule them. Therefore, applying the HNT, my analysis is that young men resorted to violence and criminality—destructive satisfiers—in order to satisfy their unmet FHNs of subsistence, protection and identity. Next, I shall turn to how the women provided evidence that the exclusion of women from land ownership affected their situation of needs and conflict in the BVN.

6.1.4 Disempowered women

In this subsection, I argue that the stories of women investigated, from the HNT perspective, provide evidence that local customs frustrated women’s FHNs of subsistence and protection because they denied women rights to own or inherit land. Consequently, some women were actively fighting, promoting and triggering violent conflict because they wanted to protect land
for farming in two particular ways: campaigned for “settlers” to be dispossessed of land and motivated husbands/sons to fight for land in situations of land encroachment.

Some women campaign for “settlers” to be dispossessed of land: Informant 019 analysed why she was campaigning for “settlers” to be disposed of land. Her group was farming under a programme, “Better Life for Women,” but a “settler” tried to take advantage of them. Their male leaders gave them a piece of land for farming in close proximity to the land on which the “settler” lived. This woman said that this man and his family came with guns to fight them on their third year of using this land. Since this happened, she campaigned for “settlers” to be driven off their lands. However, the unintended consequence was that this triggered repeated violence because each “settler” driven off land gave grounds for other “settlers” to organise violence against the indigenes of the place. Nonetheless, the woman argued that since the hospitality of the mother’s side (see 3.1.6) has been abused by the relatives from the mother’s side, it was better that they be sent away so that fighting over land with relatives of the mother’s side will stop.

Additionally, the women investigated provide evidence that there were women (not the women peacebuilders) who fought and motivated husbands/sons to fight over farmland because although only men have rights to own land, men established farms in the name of women. Women own the produce produced on the farm allocated to them by their husbands and control sales made from its produce (Burfisher and Horenstein, 1985, p. 12). These women also have the corresponding obligation to use the produce of their farm to meet the needs of their families (Bohannan, P. and L., 1968, p. 81 and Burfisher and Horenstein, 1985, p. 13). Thus, in situations of land encroachment over farmland, the women reacted forcefully. As Informant 016 (5.4.2) reported that her group found that, some women went to their husbands with “fire”—aggressively reporting about land encroachment. This pushed the men in their household to use force or take aggressive actions. Additionally, women in Focus Group 05 (5.4.3) observed how women sometimes encouraged fighting to start because someone was farming a piece of their farmland. They encouraged their husbands to go and fight to get the land back. In Focus Group 01 (5.3) the women recounted, “Women were also fighting in the bush”. In one of my study communities, the head of the community said, “It is good that you are studying women as peacemakers, but remember, some of them would not let us men rest at home; they insist that we should go and fight for land”. From the HNT perspective, I

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44 This is a farming association apart of the peacebuilding group this woman belongs to.
believe that the women's points regarding women campaigned for "settlers" to be dispossessed and motivated husbands/sons to fight for land, did so because their families were struggling to fulfil their unmet FHNs of subsistence and protection. Since these women sought land not for the purpose of retail sales but for farming—a cultural responsibility to put food on the table for their families.

Therefore, in Table 12, I summarise, from the HNT perspective, destructive and pseudo satisfiers as used for the satisfaction of certain FHNs, but conversely, which arguably frustrated the satisfaction of the FHNs of the vast majority of the people in the BVN; thereby, most likely generated and sustained the four PSCs in the region.

**Table 12: Summary of satisfiers used and frustrated FHNs in the BVN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identity groups involved in conflict</th>
<th>Destructive and pseudo satisfiers used</th>
<th>Need to be satisfied</th>
<th>Needs whose satisfaction the pseudo and destructive satisfiers frustrate for communities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Traditional leaders and socio-political elite</td>
<td>Violence; bribery (luxurious cars), promoting stereotype of &quot;indigene vs. settler&quot; and mono-group succession</td>
<td>Identity</td>
<td>Subsistence, protection, freedom, cultural participation, understanding, affection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political leaders and political elite</td>
<td>Militias/mercenary; politics of the &quot;winner-takes-all&quot;; creating confusion about land juridical system and mismanagement of &quot;security vote money&quot;</td>
<td>Political participation</td>
<td>Subsistence, protection, identity, affection, freedom, and political participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impoverished young men</td>
<td>Violence and criminality</td>
<td>Subsistence</td>
<td>Subsistence, protection, freedom, participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disempowered women</td>
<td>Campaigning for &quot;settlers&quot; to be dispossessed of land; motivating husbands/sons to fight for land</td>
<td>Subsistence</td>
<td>Subsistence, protection, freedom, cultural participation, understanding, affection</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the HNT perspective, the evidence in Table 12 would suggest that the women studied performed rigorous conflict analysis of PSCs in their communities. They identified how poor traditional and political leadership discriminated against certain elites who wanted to participate in traditional/political leadership; they impoverished young men and disempowered women such as likely frustrated the unmet FHNs of subsistence, protection,
identity, understanding, and political/cultural participation in their communities. According to
the women, these identity groups used violence for the purpose of attaining socio-economic
resources and cultural/political power in order to satisfy their unmet human needs and
interests. This situation for the women is arguably responsible for the four PSCs in the BVN. In
addition, my analysis is that the women also found that some women partake in the
mechanism generating the conflict. To this point, Ruddick (1989, pp. 165-166) acknowledges
that because some women play their part so well in promoting violent conflict, when some
women refuse to endorse violence, it also make a difference in peacebuilding. In this case, I
find the women peacebuilders and not the women fighters articulated the use of synergic
satisfiers—liberating ways as a means for peacebuilding in the BVN.

6.2 Women’s use of synergic satisfiers in the BVN

In this section, I use HNT and gender socialisation theory to analyse the stories from sections
5.2-5.4 in relation to the kind of skills, vision and initiatives the women’s group I investigated
used in their peacebuilding work. From the HNT perspective, my analysis demonstrates that,
due to gender socialisation, some women distinguished the use of synergic satisfiers for the
satisfaction of FHNs as an aspect of peacebuilding for a harmonious and progressive society in
the BVN. From a gender socialisation perspective, I would argue that, for 78% of researched
participants (Chart 7 in 6.3), their work is derived from ethics of care arising from a human
demand which begins with children’s reliance on mothers for preservation, growth and social
acceptability (Ruddick, 1989, p. 51); the were satisfying practical gender needs but also seeking
their strategic gender need (Moser, 1989). However, 22% of participants (Chart 8 in 6.3)
viewed their work as feminine work—just satisfying practical gender needs (Moser, 1989), but
I consider it work imposed on women by patriarchy. I also acknowledge in this section that this
same socialisation of women allows men to exclude women from participating in formal
peacebuilding in the region. As such, I present the work of this section in four parts with
regards to women’s gender socialisation, skills, vision and initiatives.

6.2.1 Gender socialisation

I find the women investigated in the BVN provided evidence (see Photo 29) that gender
socialisation allows them a position to respond with care to the human needs of children,
adults and the elderly in their society (Ruddick, 1989, p. 46) in pursuit of practical gender
needs (Moser, 1989). Photo 29 indicates tasks women perform in their communities related to
three core roles. They fetch water, wash clothes/children, support husbands, sew clothes for
the family, teach literacy classes, social and moral values to children, gather fire wood for
cooking, grind condiment for soup/sauce, light fire, cook food and pound food for eating; provide health care for the family, clean the house, and farm – all these activities relate to managerial and reproductive roles. Cloth making, pottery or artisan work, gathering fire wood and farming serve as family income—these activities pertain to these women’s productive role.

On the one hand, the post-colonial patriarchal BVN considers women’s work as feminine care, a consuming identity that requires sacrifice of health, pleasure, and ambitions which can be counterproductive for the well-being of children and women themselves (Ruddick, 1989, p. 29). As men consider women’s works to be feminine and inferior work, men overlook the big burden placed on women. As shown in Photo 29 the women lament with the acclamation “God help us o o ...!” I argue in this research that feminine care work, work only women must do, falls short of ethics of care work as it does not meet the requirement of justice, that is, it is unfair that the post-colonial patriarchy obliges women to do care work and does not oblige men to do likewise. Moreover, it does not allow for the satisfaction of FHNs in a synergic way for women and it makes it more difficult for women to pursue their strategic gender need—equality with men (Moser, 1989, p. 1804). I found that 22% of women participants (Chart 8 in 6.3) agreed with this sexual division of labour. However, as I discussed in 3.1.6, post-colonial patriarchal insistence of feminine care finds its basis in socially constructed sexual division of labour; it is not a matter of choice, is burdensome to many women and an institutional form of discrimination against them.
On the other hand, I find that through mother’s teachings “many women develop early a sense of maternal competence – a sense that they can and will care for their children (Ruddick, 1989, p. 29)” as a matter of ethical choice; 78% of women participants (Chart 7 in 6.3) expressed this choice. For example, women in Focus Group 06 illustrated, “educated women now pay school fees for their children ... Women are now paying for farm work. It used to be men that farmed for women. This has changed with educated women”. This implies that these educated women were unprepared to turn their backs on the children they brought into this world. This was not a patriarchal imposition as the women still want women equality with men (see 6.3), therefore, it was the women’s choice; a duty—an ethics of care. Consequently, this human care arises, as Gilligan (2011, p. 32) finds, from the fact that men and women seem to be inherently empathic and cooperative beings, harbouring within their self the capacity to love and live democratically with others. These findings suggest that “care and caring are not women’s issues they are human concerns (Gilligan, 2011, p. 23)”. In this sense, “caring requires paying attention, seeing, listening, and responding with respect ... care is a relational ethic, grounded in a premise of interdependence. But it is not selfless” (Gilligan, 2011, p. 23). From the HNT perspective, my analysis is that these women’s practice of ethics of care provided
them with skills required for the satisfaction of unmet FHNs. I now turn my examination to this human response which helped these women to acquire skills from children's demands of preservation, growth and social acceptance (Ruddick, 1989, p. 51).

6.2.2 Sources of the women's skills

In this section, I analyse stories from Section 5.2. I extracted the sources of the women's skills from the individual informant's stories (Appendix E, Table 2), 52% reported that their skills were from their mothers, 20% of the women's source was from both fathers and mothers, 24% learned their skills from their present peacebuilding groups and 4% felt that their skills were inborn. The data on focus groups is incomplete because not every participant in the focus group answered this question. The findings from the individual informants were a surprise as my literature review on socialisation in the BVN (East, 2003, Atel, 2004, Dzurgba, 2007, and Ayangaor, 2011) tended to suggest that girl's socialisation was conducted mostly by women such that this socialisation was mother oriented. I had also assumed with my knowledge of the BVN that this was the case. Therefore, to find 20% reporting that they got skills from their fathers and mothers, shows that fathers too are involved in socialising some of these women for peacebuilding and 24% reporting that they did not learn their skills from their family at all shows that some learned their skills later in life. However, in reporting their skills, only the women who reported that they got their skills from their mothers gave substantial account of how they were given their skills. They attributed their skills in peacebuilding to the practice of childcare. 78% of the women's care work arises from ethics of care—the satisfaction of practical gender needs and for 22% it works occurs as feminine care—work patriarchy imposes on women as I shall indicate. In this sectional analysis, I follow Ruddick's (1989, p. 51) concept of ethics of care and Moser's concept of practical and strategic gender needs (3.4.3) in analysing how the women's skills arise from human preservation, growth and social acceptability.

**Human preservation:** This constitutes a result of preservative love and protective work which mothers may engage in to ensure their children survive (Ruddick, 1989, p. 177). I find that for some of the women investigated, this was a source of their skills and the reason they were "fiercely committed to the values and survival of their people" (Ruddick, 1989, p. 177). I find the women were committed to determining which strategies restrict and constrain safety, development and conscientiousness in their communities (Ruddick, 1989, p. 168). One strategy the women asserted as ineffective was the use of violence as a means of resolving protracted conflict (see 6.2.3), but stopping violence required skills. Thus, Informant 004
expressed the source of her skills in stopping violence for peacebuilding arose from what she learned from her grandmother. The grandmother was very good at intervening when there was a quarrel or fighting amongst people. She appealed to them and they would stop fighting. I argue that this woman utilised social empathy—connecting emotions and thoughts (LeDoux, 1996)—the art of understanding people’s feelings, reading emotional cues and listening well to transmit communicative energy to stop violence without the use of force (Goleman, 1999, p. 188). Since minimal violence is required for the satisfaction of practical gender needs—feeding and housing the family. This is a rational liberating (synergic) work that can bring peace in a community.

However, I find that some human preservation practices indicated as sources for skills in peacebuilding by some women in the BVN appeared to accept women’s subordination. As Ruddick (1989, p. 79) reports, the protective work mothers engage in sometimes leads them to the task of holding relationships together—with fathers, grandparents and others—on which their children depend, but that such endeavours and attempts at harmony have their own risks. One such risk I find arose as mothers taught their girls to accept women’s subordination. As Informant 003 narrated, her grandmother taught her that even if she was beaten by her husband, she should not refuse to sleep with him because it is his “own thing”. She also taught her that open communication brought peace. On the one hand, this grandmother passed on the skill of open communication, a good skill for conflict resolution, but on the other hand, she also taught her to condone her husband’s abuse. This does not allow women who want to meet their strategic gender need—equality with men (Moser, 1989) to organise for it. For me, this was a feminine care attitude that sustained post-colonial patriarchy and did not qualify as ethics of care work. Nonetheless, the ethics of care which includes the pursuit of practical gender need practiced by 78% (Chart 7 in 6.3) of the women studied extended to human development.

Fostering human developmental: I find some of the women investigated acquired skills in peacebuilding as a result of care work with children; work they had done to nurture children’s development, including emotional, cognitive, sexual and social development (Ruddick, 1989, pp. 82-83). In this respect, Informant 007 recounted her grandmother teaching her to speak with children peacefully for their human development in situations of conflict. She taught her that the time to bring a conflict to the open with a child was when the child had already eaten and not before (meeting the child’s practical need first), that was when the child could listen. Furthermore, the conflict was to be presented in such a way as to preserve the dignity of the child, thus encouraging discussion. The child would then be able to empathise/sympathise
with the mother and recognises his/her error. So, Informant 007’s skills were passed on from her grandmother from whom she learned how to bring a conflict into the open and to help de-escalate it by inspiring discussions and finding possible resolutions. From the HNT (Goleman, 1999, p. 146) perspective, my analysis is that this woman showed social competence in sensing people’s developmental needs as she reinforced human development in children. The women studied also demonstrated skills that arose from the human demand for social acceptability, another skill that can be used in enhancing peaceful living.

**Social acceptability:** I argue that the demand for social acceptance allows mothers to “train a child to be the kind of person whom others accept and whom the mothers themselves can actively appreciate” (Ruddick, 1989, 104). This requires skills to influence positive change, effective tactics of persuasion to win children and people over, and fine-tuned presentations to appeal to listeners to convince them of a vision (Goleman, 1999, p. 169). As two women narrated in Focus Group 05 how they teach hard work, honesty and truthfulness to their children. Hard work, honesty and truthfulness, I suggest are some of the social virtues that help people to be accepted in their communities. In this case, the mothers tactically warned their children of the consequences if they were to break any of these virtues. The demand of social acceptability might also drive a mother to train, nurture her child to live safely, develop happily, and act conscientiously (Ruddick, 1989, p. 176). Thus, it may encourage a woman accomplished in building trust and bonds among individuals and groups to engage in problem-solving, and also enable parties to find resolutions, based on the needs of both parties regardless of the woman’s position in society (Goleman, 1999, p. 183). My analysis is that this skill was the most common in women peacebuilding in the BVN. Although excluded from formal peace processes, the women studied stepped into the public arena to peacebuild. Informant 007 captured this point clearly when she explained that her mother enabled her to build closeness using persuasion to establish commonality by engaging parties emotionally in order to arouse their interest in shared goals rather than individual interests.

However, it is evident to me that some of the women investigated had also indicated sources of their skills that resulted from the demand of social acceptability based on feminine care despite opposition to the self-development for women. That is, a feminine care “separated politically and psychologically from a realm of individual autonomy and freedom which is the realm of justice and contractual obligation” (Gilligan, 1995, p. 122). For example, Informant 003 explained her social awareness of people’s position in society, “my mother taught me that there are people of higher position than myself ... I should consider my husband as more than me. Since she taught me this manner of behaving, it helps me in peace work”. My critique is
that this helped her in the strategic reading of power relationships in situations of conflict and in identifying crucial social network for the purpose of peacebuilding. Nonetheless, this cultural and political awareness also constitutes the product of feminine care which can alienate women from themselves; from organising and attaining strategic gender need—the need to be equal to men in the post-colonial BVN (Moser, 1989). From the HNT perspective, I suggest that this denied women the FHNs of human identity and freedom. However, despite the dilemma of gender socialisation which at times placed care work and skills as only feminine; 78% the women’s skills arose from care ethics that enabled them to understand needs from the point of view of sufferers and their aspirations for the satisfaction of strategic gender need, hence, offered a vision, insisting on the satisfaction of needs using liberating ways—synergic satisfiers in the situation of PSCs in the BVN.

6.2.3 Women’s vision for peacebuilding and conflict resolution in the BVN

In this section, I analyse stories from 5.3 in relation to the vision most of the women studied bring to the satisfaction of human needs. I argue that this vision emanated from a reflection on the pre-conflict and conflict situations in warring communities. As Kouzes and Posner (2007, p. 107) in their book *Leadership Challenge* suggest, in aiming for the future one needs to look back to the past. Looking backward might enable one to see farther than just examining the future. What Ruddick (1989, p. 31) regards as a form of “maternal thinking”, in accordance with the philosophy of C.S. Peirce, which we are likely to employ when disturbed, so as to recover our equilibrium. It is also a vision that emanated from the different roles women play in their communities such that they wanted their communities to meet their needs.

**Looking back before conflict:** My analysis of the women’s stories reveals that the women enjoyed the peace that existed in their communities as they commented that they had food to eat; children, youths and adults looked good and well, dressed with dignity and lived in good and habitable housing (Focus Group 06 and Informant 007). Educational institutions provided good education to children and youths and elders/leaders protected communities so people felt secure (Informant 007 and 022). Business people invested successfully in the socio-economic infrastructure allowing for more prosperous businesses. Moreover, the BVN has fertile land and the region enjoys good rainfall most of the seasons, so farmers too prospered (Focus Group 02 and 07) and people went wherever they wanted to conduct business or to worship (Informant 004). From the HNT perspective, I would suggest the women showed this environment enabled people to satisfy most of their FHNs in the BVN.
Looking at the situation of conflict: My analysis shows that 100% of research participants rejected that violence be used as a means for the satisfaction of FHNs in the situation of protracted social conflict (Table 13).

Table 13: Data on the women’s view of the use of violence as a means for resolving conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Focus Group/Individual Informant</th>
<th>Violence</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>For the use of violence</td>
<td>Not for the use of violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Focus Group Informants</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td><strong>40/100%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Individual Informants</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td><strong>25/100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 13 (data extracted from Appendix E, Table 1 and Table 4 to 10) indicates that in all the focus groups and amongst individuals interviewed, 100% of the women rejected the use of violence as a means for the satisfaction of human needs. In rejecting violence, Informant 009 (5.4.3) said that it was women who suffered most during the fighting; who were worried about their families, children were sleepless and could not eat; Informant 011 (5.4.3) argued that fighting stopped children from studying; and Informant 012 (5.4.3) concluded, violence brought destruction and backwardness, this was why she was performing peacebuilding work, “teaching young men that the biggest gift in life is studies after which is a job, but that there can be no good job without studies”. Informant 013 (5.3.2) argued that during the fighting there was too much trouble, there was no unity among them, there was no food and there
was no money; Informant 015 (5.4.2) asserted that they were trying to stop violence and looking for peace because violence only caused destruction of property and people, it had stopped development in their community and Informant 017 (5.4.2) added that she taught women, men and children that dialogue was the only way to peace and that violence brought backwardness to their communities. Informant 018 (5.3.2) re-echoed that fighting brought backwardness—destroyed property and food such that there was no need for fighting. Thus, Informant 019 (5.4.2) argued that she worked with women because they were peacemakers who could stop their children and their men from fighting in their community.

Similarly, in Focus Group 04 (5.3.1) a woman said that during the fighting they could not farm or go to the market, but now that there was peace they could do both. This was why they were performing peacebuilding to maintain peace; in Focus Group 05 (5.4.1) a woman argued that they were building peace because fighting had stopped development and government no longer provided social amenities for them because they had destroyed a specialist general hospital and a market. In Focus Group 01 (5.4.2) a woman said they were performing peacebuilding because they want to stop fighting, and build trust and confidence in order to bring in lasting peace and in Focus Group 06 (5.4.3) the women argued that they were performing peacebuilding work because they were tired of carrying things on their head and children in their hands and that violence had brought poverty to their community. I would argue that this situation frustrated their practical gender needs and did not offer them their strategic gender need—women's equality with men (Moser, 1989). Therefore, I find the women investigated considered the use of violence a poor (less successful) strategy to satisfy unmet needs in situations of PSC; From the HNT perspective, my analysis is the women elaborated on how this situation frustrated the satisfaction of FHNs in the BVN.

**Looking forward to envision the future:** The analysis of the data of 78% of the women participants (Chart 7 in 6.3) indicates that these women want to attain a harmonious and progressive society, where there is minimum violence, and there is clean water, food, good healthcare, and quality education for all citizens. A society where children and youths grow and live with dignity, the elderly are cared for, women and men are equal, and a leadership that allows this to happen. From the HNT perspective, I would argue the women distinguished, that unattended frustrated needs led to continued conflicts in their community.

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45 This is a summary of these women's vision presented in "5.3, Stories of women's vision in relation to the satisfaction of FHNs in the BVN". 

213
6.2.4 Women’s use of synergic satisfiers in peacebuilding and conflict resolution

In this section, I analyse stories from 5.4 regarding women’s peacebuilding initiatives in the BVN. Using the HNT and gender socialisation theory, my analysis illustrates that the women used liberating processes (synergic satisfiers) in their peacebuilding initiatives: (a) inspired traditional chiefs to foster unity, (b) promoted access to land, (c) protested against political violence, (d) raised self-esteem, taught peace education, provided a football league for young men, and (e) bonded/networked women for peacebuilding.

Appealing to traditional chiefs to inspire the fostering of unity: I argue that the women articulated and recognised (6.1.1) that some traditional leaders did not foster trust and friendship among different groups and acted unjustly when they sat in judgement; thus, some of the women helped traditional leaders to bring people together—an act at the heart of human relationships to enable community living (Burton, 1997, p. 144). For example, in Focus Group 01, the women appealed to their chief’s role as custodian of the people to plan and prevent the reoccurrence of violence during the farming season. The women looked back and reminded their chief of the harm violence caused women and children in their community. They were also wearing rags to capture attention and arouse emotions and reflection for peace in their chief and elders. They asked the chief to call those involved in the conflict to resolve their conflict non-violently and to stop “godfathers” from sending arms for violence. My analysis of this initiative is that they encouraged the chief to begin an open discussion among the parties to resolve their conflict peacefully. I find the women insisted that one of the best ways of resolving conflict demands that all parties be involved in its resolution (Anderlini, 2007, p. 232). In this case, the chief responded with passion, resolving to do all in his power to stop the violence. The steps these women took, I suggest, were to rationally invoke their community-protection, community-preservation and community-repair (Ruddick, 1989, p. 79). From the HNT perspective, my analysis is that the women attended to the FHN of protection, as well as stimulated the satisfaction of the FHNs of subsistence and understanding.

Moreover, I find that the women challenged injustices perpetrated against women whereby local customs exclude women from owning or inheriting land (see 6.3 on why women are excluded from owning land). They resisted the kind of womanhood that implies the willingness to forgo rights for the sake of preserving relationships and keeping peace (Gilligan, 2011, p. 24). They were organising for their strategic gender need—to be equal human being with men.
(Moser, 1989). From the human needs perspective, I find they were resisting the frustration of the FHN of subsistence for single women/mothers and widows who had no husbands/guardians to acquire land for them. As Informant 023 narrated, her group initiated dialogue with traditional chiefs so that women, like men, would be entitled to land. They wanted land, inheritance rights for women like men, rights to get farm fertiliser without having to pass through men as middlemen. I contend that the women used a persuasive, psychological technique (Ruddick, 1989, p165), asking the chiefs to empathise with them on this important cultural and economic issue in the BVN. It is important to note that the chiefs agreed with the women that they had genuine grievances that needed attention in the chiefs assembly; the chiefs also agreed to start giving farm fertiliser directly to the women rather than passing it through men. Applying the HNT, I would maintain this peacebuilding measure sought to satisfy the FHNs of subsistence, but could also have stimulated the satisfaction of the FHN of protection for some women and their families. Additionally, I find some of the women promoted access to land for other impoverished groups.

**Promoting access to land:** I learned of two situations generating land conflicts from the women’s stories. The first involved “indigenes” driving away or refusing “settlers” rights to land irrespective of how long they had lived on it and second, conflicts over community boundaries.

**“Indigenes vs. settlers”:** I argue that on this issue the women peacebuilders took the long-term view of community relationships. First, they seemed to have discouraged negative identity group stereotyping of “indigenes vs. settlers”. For example, Informant 014, in a case over burial rights on a piece of land (in the presence of their parish priest, police and the involved parties), discouraged stereotyping by asserting that God gave them land for free. Maintaining that the starting point for owning land as a human being transcended “indigene or settler” categories, it arose from being children of God. As God’s children they needed to share land with one another. My understanding of this assertion is that it is a step to make people feel accepted, creates a sense of belonging and builds self-esteem for both parties (God’s people). Second, they encouraged open discussion by presenting the conflict in such a way as to preserve the dignity of both parties. Informant 014 followed this step, using an analogy; God gave them an herb called “Asar” (to lose), meaning that both parties could agree to lose, but a loss for any party in an agreeable way meant winning peace for both parties. This step helped negotiations enter stage three, orchestrating “a win-win solution” by treating each land case on its own merit rather than on the basis of “indigene vs. settlers” (Burton, 1997). As Informant 014 explained, if Wade said that even though he had dug a tomb to bury his
father—but considered removing it—there would be peace. Had Ukange said this land where a
tomb had been dug was a small piece of land—therefore, would leave it to Wade—there
would be peace. This was refusing closure, and inventing options, rather than accepting the
terms of the conflict based on “indigenes vs. settlers” (Ruddick, 1989, p. 93). In this way, I
believe she was inviting the parties to deal with this conflict seeking a common resolution
rather than an exclusionary solution. In this particular instance, Wade agreed to remove the
tomb and Ukange showed appreciation of Wade’s effort to resolve the conflict by thanking
him. From the HNT perspective, my assessment is that the women prevented violence and
promoted the satisfaction of the FHNs of protection, identity and understanding. Moreover, I
find that the women’s work of promoting access to land included helping peaceful settlement
of inter-community boundary conflicts.

Inter-community boundary conflicts: In these conflicts, I argue that some of the women built
peace by resorting to informal structures of their cultures, i.e. the use of their cultural and
political awareness skills. First, they drew on their service-oriented skills—meeting practical
gender needs (Moser, 1989), the women from antagonistic communities formed coalitions to
provide inter-communal meals (catering) during and after peace talks. As Porter (2007)
suggests, some women draw on their common tasks as nurturers to build coalitions across
hostile differences. Here, Photo 30 illustrates women in coalition serving drinks at a peace
meeting in Ataganyi community when Ataganyi and Omelemu communities met to discuss
their conflict over stones of commercial value. Photo 30 to Photo 32 illustrates a meal served
at the end of these peace talks. The two communities had brought two goats and a bag of rice
that their women cooked. This is meeting practical gender needs (Moser, 1989) for the whole
community, a work that should be acknowledged and valued such that women would be
considered a necessity in the formal resolution of conflict.

However, this work draws my attention to “the riddle of femininity – the choice between
having a voice and having relationship” (Gilligan, 2004a, p. 135). Men excluded women from
participating in the resolution talk, and by doing this work the women reinforced the riddle:
feminine goodness that is selfless but it is not in any meaningful sense about equal
relationships which was the reason they were not allowed in formal peacebuilding processes in
the BVN (Gilligan, 2005, p. 734). Men expected women to perform feminine care work and
forget about formal participation in community affairs. Therefore, men exclude women from
meeting their strategic gender need—to be seen as equal human being with them (Moser,
1989)—in this case to take places at formal conflict resolution meetings; from the HNT
perspective, the men likely frustrated women’s FHNs of political participation.
However, I found that the meal in this situation served the purpose of raising self-esteem for both male parties at the discussion, as both received equal respect and measure. I would argue that this gesture might facilitate the understanding of each other's perspectives helping the
male parties to arrive at a common resolution (Burton, 1996). However, I also find that while both parties eat together, women and men eat separately (Photo 32).

Photo 32: Women and men eating in different spaces

This maintains the division of life according to post-colonial patriarchal social construction of male and female in the gender order. The elders (men) got their meals first (Photo 31) then other men (Photo 32b), and then women (Photo 32a). This manner of serving again undermines women's strategic gender need (Moser, 1989) whereby elderly women would be served meals at the same time like their male counterpart, thus, showing the equal importance of women in society. Nevertheless, I find that the women from both sides prepared the food as a sign for peacebuilding. The men took this emotional and practical cue seriously by arriving at a resolution that allowed both communities to work together again. For example, at the end of the peace talks in Ataganyi, the leaders of the two communities asked for Photo 33 to be taken to demonstrate unity.
Furthermore, I find that once an agreement was reached the women consolidated it with purification rites (see Photo 34).

Photo 34: Agila women purifying their villages by sweeping conflict out

Source: WEP archives
For example, Informant 02 related how some women in Agila community purified their communities after an agreement was reached so as to ensure the implementation of the agreement and avoid reoccurrences of violence (Photo 34 – Photo 36). My analysis is that these women in Photo 34 a and b used their rational and emotional energies to organise and aid the implementation of the agreement expressing their passion for peace using their voices—singing and body gestures—sweeping the two Agila villages in the BVN. I believe that by this action, the women from both communities stamped their approval on the agreement by finishing the ritual eating together (see Photo 35), which demonstrated their unity of purpose. They choose a mission to maintain peace—they carried it out using their behind-the-scenes influence. This rite allowed the women to drive, stimulate and captivate the community’s (Kouzes and Posner, 2007), especially men’s, attentions regarding the importance for peace in the land i.e. the implementation of the peace agreement.

Photo 35: Agila women eating together after the purification rite

Consequently, the chiefs of their communities reciprocated and got along well together to foster trust and friendly relationships among different groups. Photo 36 indicated chiefs fostering trust among their own people. WEP took this picture on the last day of the purification ritual: the chiefs ate with the women and took a memorabilia picture to show their commitment to maintaining peace in their communities. According to Informant 002, since these women performed their rite, these communities have not returned to violence although the conflict has not been resolved. From the HNT perspective, I would argue that these women
prevented violence and promoted the satisfaction of the FHNs of identity, protection and understanding.

Photo 36: Agila community chiefs with some women after the purification rite

Moreover, I find that these women’s peacebuilding measures also included efforts at stopping political violence.

Protesting against political violence: I find that the women’s vision (6.2.3) for a harmonious and progressive society in the BVN aimed to minimise the use of violence as a means for satisfying unmet needs; therefore, the women protested against political violence in their communities by “pointing to the particularities of lives and life connection, to the many kinds of past work and present hope that violence destroys” (Ruddick, 1989, p. 177). For example, when the women (Photo 19) went out to protest against political violence in Kwande Local Government Area of Benue State, they articulated what happened during violence. They went about in the bush with children on their backs and loads on their heads like camels or donkeys. In addition, they articulated a justification for their actions: no society develops without peace, so, young men and husbands should stop acting as political thugs; traditional and political leaders with the security operatives should conduct peaceful, free and fair elections. With these justifications I discovered they coordinated groups of women and decided their protest strategy.

In the Kwande case, the Catholic Women’s Organisation and the Agape Sisters worked together. They went out to protest on different days, but I found they had the same petitions in their communiqués – Photo 19 and Photo 37 outlines their justifications in details.
AGAPE SISTER’S COMMITTEE OF FRIENDS ADIKPO
KWANDE BENUE STATE

28TH MARCH, 2011.

A communiqué issued at the end of the meeting of Agape sister’s committee of friends on the 26th March 2011.

PREAMBLE

We members of the association known as Agape sister’s committee of friends, Adikpo in Kwande Local Government Council hereby reviewed Local Government Council hereby reviewed the recent political activities in Kwande which portend danger, reminding us of our inglorious past which lead to the 2004 local Government elections crises.

As a people whose attendant consequences of these crises touched (women and children). We need no one to caution us again as the graves of our loved ones are still gazing at us, scars of injuries inflicted on people’s bodies have not vanished, the remains of our burnt houses which we have not been able to reconstruct. Last but not the least, the psychological trauma we as mothers (women) and of course our children went through. The meeting therefore resolved as follows:

1. Peace is a tool for development, no society has develop without peace
2. Call on all to shun violence and the use of our husbands and children for political thuggery.
3. We call on the caretaker chairman of Kwande Local Government Hon. Jonathan Terhumun Akpuru (JP). The divisional police officer (DPO) Kwande, the state security services (SSS) Kwande, the acting Terkwande the Tor- Geri. Adikpo and all relevant security and peace agencies Kwande Local Government to beef up security to forestall possible breakdown of peace in Kwande during the April 2011 elections.
4. We also call on peaceful, free and fair election come April 2011 elections in Kwande.

H.M. Alpoo
President
ASCOF

B.M. Ibor
Secretary
ASCOF

Next, I determined that the women went out, met, befriended and lobbied for their demands amongst all the important actors concerned with politics in their community (Photo 19 and Photo 38).
In this case, the women met their priest, pastor, traditional chief (Ter Kwande), the LGA Chairman, and some influential persons in Kwande (Photo 19). They presented their petitions in a non-threatening manner to preserve their dignity. In this way, they connected emotions and thought (LeDoux, 1996) by appealing to their roles as the fathers of Kwande, those responsible for the wellbeing of children, youths, wives, husbands, women and men. As such, the women tasked them to take responsibility, i.e. to restrain young men so that political violence will not happen again. By doing this, my analysis is that the women utilised their emotional strategy with significance and character (Kouzes and Posner, 2007). They solicited enthusiasm and commitment by arousing strong emotions and reflections for peace in their listeners.

I would argue that the women were not irrational, rather, as Ruddick, (1989, p. 95) argues, they tended to reject the demands of abstraction and instead looked closely, invented options, refused closure ... they learned to value connected ways of conversing and to question the consequences of what their listeners come to believe and the consequences of that belief. This
was why, as a result of the women’s protest, the 2011 general elections took place without any incident of violence in Kwande (Focus Group 06). From the HNT perspective, my analysis is that these women prevented political violence and attended to the FHN of protection, while also stimulating the satisfaction of the FHNs of understanding and political participation in their communities. Moreover, I find that while trying to stop violence, the women understood that young men constituted most of the foot militias and thugs in their frustrated situation. Hence, they sought to attend to some of their needs.

Raising young men’s self-esteem: The women had a feeding programme aimed at giving young men some dignity and respect. They provided evidence (6.1.2-6.1.3) that the protracted conflict in their communities had possible roots in poor governance which produced unemployed, unemployable, embittered and demoralized young men who seemed ready and willing tools for those who sought to perpetrate violence and criminality for their own gains. It seems logical to me that the women designed a feeding programme meeting their practical needs (Moser, 1989) to make the young men feel good and comfortable in their communities (Photo 39 and Photo 40). This programme intended to attend to young men’s human preservation, growth and social acceptability (Ruddick, 1989). As one can see in Photo 39, the women prepared and went out and offered raw food: rice and oil, cooked food and toiletries to young men in hospitals, prisons and poorer young men aiming to prevent them from becoming political thugs or joining militias in their community (Focus Group 06). These women were meeting practical gender needs building peace (Moser, 1989). My analysis is that this initiative challenged the exclusion of unemployed young men from satisfying their need for subsistence (Porter, 2007). This scheme had the possibility of creating dependence, but its main aims in this situation were raising optimism, stimulating resilience and renewing confidence in the young men. Therefore, this feeding programme was to help them consider abandoning violence and criminality. It is my experience that it was to help young men who had lost social positioning as responsible people (to feed themselves and their families) in their communities to find positive ways of repositioning themselves.
Photo 39: Agape Sisters at a meeting in Adikpo, Kwande preparing to go out and feed youths

Photo 40: The content of boxes in Photo 35. This is native bread made from local nuts with an egg and vegetables inside.

This programme enabled participants to recover from lost self-reliance as Informant 010 narrated her experience: her home and all my family properties were destroyed, but the
Agape Sisters led others in feeding her family until they could feed themselves. A gesture that was extended to other parties involved in the conflict as well. I, therefore, argue that the programme did not aim to create dependence; it was a liberating process towards recovery of self-reliance, a social re-positioning in this cultural context.

Moreover, it becomes clear that, given the importance of the feeding, as means of according dignity and respect, some of the women equally used a no-food and no-sex strategy to discourage sons and husbands from going out to fight. For example, Informant 004 described how her women's group coached other women to deny sex and food to their husbands and sons if they went out to fight as peacebuilding work. I would argue that the women did not perceive this no-food/sex method as violence or force per se; rather, it was a logical struggle with men who were endlessly fighting to regain their socio-economic needs and interest. By their action, the women reminded their men that there were worse issues for them if they pursued endless fighting: forgoing their social positioning in their family. That was why they were no longer fed and/or denied sex by their wives. Similarly, Ruddick (1989, p. 176) describes this as mothers' art of avoiding battles. It recognises when fighting appears no longer justified, but motivated by vengeance, battle pleasure, or inertia, and, as such, should end and peacebuilding should begin. Moreover, it does show how men in this cultural context are so dependent on women to fulfil their responsibilities as those satisfying practical gender needs (Moser, 1989). This dependency should influence men to value these women's roles in meeting practical gender needs but also accept their equality with men, however this is not the case in the post-colonial BVN (see 6.3). From the HNT perspective, my analysis is that feeding and sex used as described above prevented violence, but also gave young men some dignity in an attempt to satisfy their FHN of subsistence, as well as stimulating the satisfaction of their unmet FHNs of protection and identity. Another way I find the women attended to young men's human needs was to pay some of their school fees.

**Paying school fees for youths:** In addition to feeding some young men, some women helped young men's human development as a means of peacebuilding. They paid for the education of some children who belonged to families killed during conflict. The women helped the children to study rather than pass their time on the streets where they could have been recruited to act as political thugs or join militia groups responsible for violence and criminality in their community (Focus Group 06). Not only were the women paying school fees for some children, Informant 010 recounted that her group mediated in families so that fathers who had refused to pay school fees for their children changed their minds. This is a male responsibility, however, some men were neglecting it and it was causing conflict between men and women in
their families. From the HNT perspective (Cruz, Stahel and Max-Neef, 2009), my analysis is that by attending to young men's human development, the women satisfied their unmet FHN of identity, as well as stimulated the satisfaction of the FHNs of protection, understanding and affection. Moreover, I find that in addition to paying school fees for young men, the women also taught them how to act peacefully.

**Teaching peace education to young men as a peacebuilding measure:** Some women taught young men to be critical about conflict: to think, to question and to contextualise conflict (Burton, 1997, p. 143). For example, they taught that the Bible says “thou shall not kill”, also implies thou shall not fight when at school, and that children and young men should report offenses to teachers when in school and to parents when at home (Focus Group 05). I find peace-education also took the form of peace tutoring. Informant 005 intervened in situations of land conflict among young men, tutoring them on how to resolve land conflict peacefully. She taught young men that in situations of land encroachment, they were not to seize or confiscate farming equipment—hoe, machetes, diggers etc. instead, they were to send for an elder(s) who reported the matter to the chief and elders. She taught young men in such situations to remain composed and act with self-control, since the matter was dealt with by the elders of the community. This was to prevent the young men from acting aggressively which at times led to the confiscation of tools and subsequent violent conflict between two villages or groups.

Moreover, I find that the women speaking from their hearts solicited young men not to join militia groups as a form of peace education. Informant 011 declared that mothers appealed to young men not to join militia groups, and to leave youth clubs that supplied thugs to political parties. They appealed to their inner being, kindness and generosity to foster growth, to nurture a purposive life (Ruddick, 1989, p. 83). Similarly, Informant 012 related that she taught young men that violence only destroyed by showing them places, houses, and businesses that they had destroyed and explained to them that if they had not destroyed them, they might have become workers in one of these places. Finally, on speaking from the heart, the women in Focus Group 05 approached young men in situations of frustration (on the street) asking them not to plan violence or commit crimes, reminding them that the conflict in their communities was preventing socio-economic development (see Photo 41 and Photo 42). My analysis is that the women’s appeal does not only contain the rational basis of why there should be no violence, but it demanded that young men be loyal to their mothers as those who gave birth to them (Ruddick, 1989, p.83).
Photo 41: Some women re-enacting how they go about appealing to young men to shun violence

Photo 42: Some women re-enacting how they go about appealing to young men to shun violence

From the HNT perspective, I would conclude that peace education in the forms of teaching, coaching and speaking from the heart with young men on how to prevent violence by cooperating with elders and chiefs attended to the satisfaction of the FHNs of protection and understanding, but also stimulated the satisfaction of the FHNs of affection and identity. Moreover, I find that in attending to the needs of young men, the women knew that young
men had a great need for recreation, thus they addressed this need as a peacebuilding measure.

Provide an inter-community football league: Some women aroused young men's enthusiasm for friendship as a peacebuilding measure by establishing an inter-community football league. The league was to help young men in these communities to form supportive relationships based on mutual respect in the drive for inter-communal peaceful living. In Focus Group 01, the women recounted the creation of this inter-community football league between three communities (Gwer East, Gwer West and Awajir) involved in conflict over land so that their young men would be engaged in the evenings, instead of walking the streets at particular times where they may meet to plan violence and criminal activities. Applying the HNT, I would argue that this inter-community football league attended to the satisfaction of the FHN of leisure, but also stimulated the satisfaction of the FHNs of understanding, affection and protection. Furthermore, I find that having attended to some young men's frustrated human needs, the women moved on to address the lack of needs satisfaction some disempowered women suffered.

Bonding and networking women for peacebuilding: The women being investigated discerned conflict amongst themselves and used it as an opportunity to nurture collaboration as well as create a cooperative climate for peace in their communities. They built on their capacity to be analytical i.e. to question, to seek to understand other viewpoints, to get to the core of problems and to be holistic in their thinking for peacebuilding in their communities (Burton, 1997, p. 144). For example, in Focus Group 01, the women reported that they discovered women from Konshisha, Gwer East and Gwer West were not eating together. The president of this group said it was an opportunity to build peace. She called the women to a deanery meeting and reminded them of the consequences of violence. From there she inspired them to unite as a group in the spirit of their Mother Mary. She also reminded them of how violence prevented women from fulfilling their role of satisfying practical gender needs—feeding and housing their families; rather “women suffer, carrying loads on their heads and sleeping in the forest”. In this way, I would suggest the president invited them, “to move beyond destructive relationships” (Kriesberg, 2000, p. 184) since they had the capacity to live together in peaceful times, to build peace through conflicting times as well.

Furthermore, the women peacebuilders taught, coached and encouraged other women to seek collaborative and cooperative ways of resolving conflict in their communities. For example, in Focus Group 05, the women recounted how they mentored other women in families by sharing plans, information and resources to prevent violent conflict. My analysis is
that they asked women to be critical about conflict, i.e. to be attentive and search for long-term solutions in situations of conflict, and not just search for short-term resolutions. In this regard, they shared information on how to report cases of land encroachment in the neighbourhood i.e. not to encourage their husbands and children to go out and fight, but to encourage ways of resolving conflict peacefully by reporting land conflict in the first place to the chief/elders. For instance, Informant 016 taught women that if someone farmed on their piece of land, they should “not go with fire reporting” to their husbands or use inflamed emotions or anger to report such cases. She appealed to other women to act as home peace-makers reminding them that women suffered most when fighting commenced. Hence they should report land conflicts to their guardians or an intermediary (elder) first who called on the chiefs and involved their husband to resolve land conflict peacefully.

Moreover, I find that the women peacebuilders promoted peace networks among other women in their communities. For example, Informant 014 related that her group taught women in her community to make friendships and maintain a network, so that if a stranger entered their community, they passed word round quickly. They had a network comprising of “indigenes” and “settlers” which also helped build peace across cultural boundaries (Porter, 2007, p. 93). Moreover, the network offered support to reduce conflict among women as it created a sense of protection and common identity among them. Therefore, from the HNT perspective, by recognising conflict amongst its members and using the conflict as an opportunity to create a cooperative climate for peace; and by teaching and coaching other women to seek collaborative and cooperative ways of resolving conflict and forming peace networks amongst women, I would conclude that the women peacebuilders attended to the satisfaction of the unmet FHNs of understanding and affection, and stimulated the satisfaction of the FHNs of protection and identity.

Therefore, I find 12 liberating processes—synergic satisfiers—presented in Table 14 that I analysed the women investigated used for the satisfaction of unmet FHNs in the BVN.
Table 14: Summary of synergic satisfiers used by women in the BVN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Liberating processes—synergic satisfiers used by women</th>
<th>Need to be satisfied</th>
<th>Needs the synergic satisfier can stimulate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Appealed inspirationally to traditional chiefs to foster unity in their domains</td>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>Subsistence, identity, participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Appealed for land, inheritance rights, and fertiliser for women</td>
<td>Subsistence</td>
<td>Protection, identity, understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Protested against political violence</td>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>Subsistence, participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Discouraged stereotyping of “indigenes vs. settlers” over access to land</td>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>Subsistence, identity, understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Provided inter-communal meals at peace talks</td>
<td>Understanding</td>
<td>Protection, identity, subsistence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Carried out inter-community purification rituals to strengthen peace agreements</td>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>Subsistence, understanding, identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Fed youths to raise their self-esteem</td>
<td>Subsistence</td>
<td>Protection, understanding, identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Provided school fees for some youths</td>
<td>Identity</td>
<td>Protection, subsistence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Taught peace education to youths</td>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>Understanding, affection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Created an inter-community football league for youths</td>
<td>Recreation</td>
<td>Protection, understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Bonded amongst themselves women</td>
<td>Understanding</td>
<td>Protection, identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Formed peace networks</td>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>Understanding</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I would argue that Table 14 illustrates these women’s work arises from grassroots understanding (Max-Neef, 1992); a rational satisfaction of unmet FHNs in a synergic way—liberating processes. I find that this illustrates how important these initiatives were for peacebuilding in the BVN from the HNT perspective. Moreover, it demonstrates that the women had experiential knowledge in dealing with conflict: moving from rigorous conflict analysis (6.1) to strategic peacebuilding and conflict resolution. Furthermore, I find that the
women remained relevant in peacebuilding work in their areas as Informant 001 testified that women played a major role in peacebuilding in their communities since they were working together across communities. However, I find that these women's initiatives remained informal and therefore had less impact on PSC in the BVN because the post-colonial patriarchal socio-economic, traditional and political gender order in the BVN discriminated against women.

6.3 The BVN patriarchal social exclusion of women from formal peace processes

In this section, I analyse stories from 5.5 with respect to how the women perceived the post-colonial patriarchal gender order and their participation in formal peacebuilding processes in the BVN. My analysis of the women's stories presents significant evidence that social, economic and political actors socialised in the combination of pre-colonial and colonial patriarchy produced a post-colonial patriarchy that insisted on absolute authority in male family heads and male traditional leadership. These structures headed by men marginalised, and trivialised women's initiatives and excluded them from formal decision-making and, by extension, from formal peacebuilding and conflict resolution in the BVN. 78% of my research participants considered this exclusion an imposition by this post-colonial patriarchy; however, 22% of the participants accepted the exclusion as a “natural” division of labour (Chart 7 and 8). Evaluating the data in Appendix E, Table 3 and 10, I find that there were women of all ages and social status (married and single) that indicated their support for and against women's equality in the formal space. Therefore, age and social status does not seem to be a significant factor on whether participants supported or were against women's equality with men in the formal space of the BVN. However, education and the level dependency appeared to be significant in this respect and I present this data in Table 15.
Table 15: Data on the number of women for and not for gender equality based on each researched Community

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community</th>
<th>Gender Equality</th>
<th>Education: No formal education (N), primary (P), secondary (S), tertiary non-university (T), university (U) and post-university (PU)</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Takum</td>
<td>For</td>
<td>N 9 P 9 S 8 T 10 U 1 PU 1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Against</td>
<td>2 2 1 3 6 6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Konshisha and Gwer</td>
<td>For</td>
<td>N 1 P 2 S 1 T 10 U 1 PU 1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Against</td>
<td>2 1 3 6 2 6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwande</td>
<td>For</td>
<td>N 5 P 8 S 13 T 19 U 3 PU 3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Against</td>
<td>3 3 1 3 6 7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apa</td>
<td>For</td>
<td>N 1 P 1 S 13 T 19 U 3 PU 3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Against</td>
<td>6 6 1 6 75</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Table 15, I evaluate education and the level of dependency by applying values of four (40%) for those who have no formal education, five (50%) to those with primary education, six (60%) to those with secondary education, seven (70%) to those with non-tertiary university degree, eight (80%) to those with university degree and nine (90%) to those with post-university degree in Table 15. These levels are similar to the pay levels in the Nigerian government payee structure; I present the data in Charts 7 and 8 to demonstrate the significance of the level of education and perhaps the level of earning capacity that may have influenced the women to be for or against women's equality with men in the formal space of the BVN.
Chart 7: The percentage by lowest and highest levels of education and women for gender equality in the BVN

Chart 8: The percentage by lowest and highest levels of education and women against gender equality in the BVN
The analysis of Chart 7 and 8 reveals that the average percentage of research participants who wanted women’s equality with men in the formal space stands at 78% and 22% prefer that women be restricted to the informal space. The average highest level of education by percentage of those women who want equality with men is 85%—about a university education and the lowest is 55%—tertiary non-university education and the highest level of education by percentage for those who do not want women’s equality with men stands at 60%—tertiary non-university education and the lowest is 44%—primary education. These findings from Chart 7 and 8 suggest that the higher the level of education which includes the ability to support oneself, as 95% of the women who support gender equality were workers and 5% were unemployed in this group, the likelier they were to opt for women’s equality with men in the formal space. However, the lower the level of education and illustrating the level of dependency on men or cultural structures, as seven of the women in this category were farmers and one was a student, all of which would require men’s help to gain access to land and pay for studies, the likelier they were to accept women’s exclusion from the formal space in the BVN. I analyse the view points of the two groups with respect to women’s participation in their family and community structures next.

6.3.1 Family heads exclude women from formal decision-making in the BVN

The women I studied provided evidence that the fundamental reason for their exclusion from formal peacebuilding and conflict resolution in the BVN was the post-colonial patriarchal understanding of a woman as the daughter (Informant 009), wife (Informant 013), mother (Informant 019), and widow (Informant 013) of a male person, rather than an individual in her own right. Within this framework, post-colonial patriarchy considers a woman’s care work (6.2) in peacebuilding as selfless, “responding only to other’s desires and perceptions”, (Gilligan, 2005, p. 730) and satisfying practical gender needs (Moser, 1989). I find this was the source of women’s skills in peacebuilding, but also what deprived them from formal peacebuilding. The women in Focus Group 04 related this situation beginning with one woman and then becoming a chorus that women were not considered in the BVN, when they wanted to speak in the public they were shouted upon to sit down that they were women. Indeed, they talked to men in private or through their sons. This male attitude, I found was prevalent because post-colonial patriarchal men disapproved of a women’s perspective in formal decision-making (West, 1997, p. 145). This post-colonial patriarchy culture, 22% of the women studied accepted its rationale as “natural”, while 78% of women rejected its rationale because it did not take women seriously and saw it as unjust. In Focus Group 06, the women described it as men enslaving women. Indeed, the present post-colonial patriarchy in the BVN does not
appropriate both genders with equal human essence; it accords one (man) with humanness and made the other (woman) property. From the HNT perspective, this understanding denies a woman the FHN of human identity (full humanity) as her existential sense of actualising and interacting in the world as a human being depended on a man’s attitude that undermines her perspective. However, I find the post-colonial patriarchy systematically institutionalised male superiority in the family at two levels: the family as political and socio-economic units in the name of culture—a post-colonial culture, I argue and demonstrate next.

The family as a political unit: Based on the women’s testimonies (Focus Group 06), I find this post-colonial unit excludes women from formal decision-making in the family as men organise it hierarchically. They put a man at the head of the unit and as one who has authority over his wife(s), sons, daughters and other dependants. The dependants may be his brothers or relatives with their wives, sons and daughters. He co-runs the unit with other male members of this unit. This division has ethical, psychological and political implications of creating autonomous men and selfless women (Gilligan, 2005, p. 730-731). This seems problematic to me as Gilligan (2011, p. 18) asserts that “by elevating some men over others ... and all men over women, patriarchy is an order of domination”. Women in Focus Group 06 provided evidence on the kind of domination men have over women in the BVN: women were not allowed to take decisions even on home matters. Men argued that they brought women into their houses so women should obey them (Informant 006). I would argue that by this post-colonial attitude, men pushed women completely out of decision-making in their families in the BVN; however, this was not the case in the pre-colonial BVN—it was fairer and more just.

In the pre-colonial BVN the family as a political unit was not totally under the control of a man. For example, the Tiv called (and still call) the family tsombo—the umbilical cord which joins a mother to her child (Wegh, 1998). They understood the family as an organic matter which had its source in women whereby a lineage was perpetuated. Therefore, the woman was to bear as many children as possible and work for the family while a man was to be healthy to work for the family and the soil was to produce good crops to satisfy the needs of the family (Atel, 2004). Therefore, the woman’s contributions to the needs of the family were indispensable and her husband was just as much in need of her as she was of him. Hence, a woman held a great deal of authority and sometimes total control over domestic matters to the exclusion of her husband (Torkula, 2007, under Yamshe; Burfisher and Horenstein, 1985, p. 9). Moreover, a man with many wives had one of them as pendatyo (literally meaning where I lay my head) as head wife and if he had only one wife, she was the pendatyo (Chia, 1993, p.1). The pendatyo was in charge of domestic affairs and indeed she was the custodian of the man’s “heritage”
(what made him a family head), the man could not take a decision without consulting her and he feared the woman because she could destroy him by revealing his secrets of life as a man and she could make life impossible for him in the family. The ityo (family, lineage/clan) also treated her with much respect because when the man died she was the one who led them to their son's "heritage" (Chia, 1993, p.2). Moreover, the pre-colonial marriage systems de-emphasised materialisms as what was required most was two girls for exchange such that the two men treated their wives very well in fear of parallel retaliation against a sister in the other marriage (Torkula, 200?, under Non-Materialism; see also what was said on concluding marriage in Tiv—3.4.3).

Similarly, for the Jukun, a man held to his first wife arguing that "the first horse does not drink dirty water—only those do so which come after". This was the woman it was believed he took to Kindo—his place of rest; moreover, if a Jukun man lost a wife, he lost the custody of his children too (Meek, 1931, p. 389). So there was every reason to treat wives with much respect and dignity. In addition, marriages were conducted over several years and the parents on both sides scrutinised son/daughter-in-laws for good character—hard work and respect—if found wanting they were sent about their business (Meek, 1931, p. 377). Indeed, it was in the interest of both Jukun families that once a marriage was contracted that it should be permanent and as peaceful as possible (Meek, 1931, p. 375). It was during the colonial period that this culture in the BVN began to change. Perhaps, this has not changed completely, in the community were 75% of the women agreed with the separation of formal and informal space for men and women, the head of this community reminded me that I should note that these women I was studying also made life impossible for them—men at home if they did not do what they wanted. I lack more data to do critical analysis on this issue here because it is the community to which I was an outsider researcher and as a result I collected less data than the other communities.

Nonetheless, for the Tiv, the change came in the form of an abolition of the pre-colonial marriage by exchange of girls. It took the combined effort of the colonial authority, missionaries and Tiv youths to change this system. The colonial administration changed to pride-price in order to transform the marriage culture in line with its socio-economic enterprise; the missionaries saw the marriage by exchange as pagan practice and that their new coverts, the youths, were not able to marry when they wanted; the youths wanted to stop the situation in which a man spent all his life waiting for a girl in her family to get married. Moreover, young women wanted to be able to marry whom they wanted, to stop the practice of arranged marriages in which case sometimes they were given to deformed men against
their wishes (Torkula, 200?, under Yamshe). On the part of the Jukun, they were more matrilineal and less patriarchal, but became more patrilineal because the British administration was thought to be unsympathetic to anyone claiming custody of a sister’s children (Meek, 1931, p. 61). It was this socialisation between the BVN cultures, Christianity and the British administration that led to the present customary practise which is a combination of native law and custom and the British middle-class Christian norms (Okeke, 1999, p. 54).

Thus, I find the post-colonial patriarchy institutionalised gender imbalance in customary law by allowing men to marry more than one wife in the BVN. For example, the Tiv Customary Marriage Law (Order, 1990) No. 9i states, “there shall be no statutory limit to the number of wives a man may have at a time”, but No.9ii states, “it is unlawful for a woman to have more than one husband at one time”. The Idoma Marriage Law (Order, 1970) Nos. 6i and ii parallels the Tiv Customary Marriage Law. This law has no firm conditions and social network for women’s security in marriage such that it subjugates women; leaves them subject to humiliation, harassment, command and control by male members of the family unit as the women alleged (Focus Group 06). Applying the HNT (Max-Neef, 1992), I find the post-colonial patriarchal men grossly frustrated women’s FHNs of affection and understanding. Their being respected, having friendship or family, doing/making love or expressing emotions, or reasoning and interacting in an intimate way depended on men’s attitudes. As women in Focus Group 06 related that women cannot complain about conjugal fidelity in their homes because even the parents of their husbands harassed them. So violent conflict had exacerbated their problems with men, but it was men’s discrimination against women.

Based on these narratives, it is clear the post-colonial patriarchy in the BVN conceives of women as having no right whatsoever to question a man—the head of the family does. While women in Focus Group 06 understood this attitude to be male social construction; others in Focus Group 01 accepted it on religious grounds that “When God made human beings, God said that a woman should be below and the man should be above her”. However, other women in Focus Group 01 disagreed and argued that “God said to Adam that he will create a helper for him... So men should have things in common with women”. My analysis of the women’s narration is that women have rights to share their perspective with men on conjugal fidelity. Fidelity was an important issue in marriage during the pre-colonial days both men and women were held accountable. For the Jukun, a man who seduced a girl and had relations with her, was brought before the king or chief; he was beaten and heavily fined. At a marriage ceremony, both men and women took an oath of loyalty vowing to be true to each other for all
time (Meek, 1931, p. 390). When there was infidelity from either a man or a woman the other party protested reminding the offender that infidelity was an offense to the gods which attracted illness and the possibility of contracting venereal diseases. If the offender continued, the other party turned to senior members of the family who admonished the wayward husband or wife (Meek, 1931, p. 389). Similarly, the Tiv gave a girl a chance before marriage to disclose if she had been violated, if she had been, the man was made to propitiate the “ikyaarakombo” (pay bride-price) and the woman was cleansed such that she got married to the intended husband (Torkula, 200?, under Chastity and Fidelity). Therefore, families never condoned infidelity from any party in a marriage situation; this is a colonial and post-colonial development. Although customary law—the Tiv Customary Marriage Law (Order, 1990) Part III and the Idoma Marriage Law (Order, 1970) Part III—stipulates marriage fidelity, but it appears there is no will on the part of intermarried families, who have lost strong social ties, to enforce it and whereby out of 800 judges, only 195 are women, a percentage of 24.3 (Ashiru, 2007, p. 328) it is nearly impossible for women to get justice on the issue of conjugal fidelity. Yet some women tried to resolve their problems by inviting their sons to speak to their husbands since they did not get favourable attention from their parents (Informant 009). However, I would argue that this speaking through the son amounts to the denial of a woman’s independence, pursuing her strategic gender need (Moser, 1989); thus creating an understanding of a less accomplished self or self-belittlement and even self-betrayal (West, 1997, p. 82). Furthermore, it is likely that the love of a son by a subordinated mother may likely be felt as love by an unworthy mother as it does little to encourage the son’s sense of well-being or self-esteem (West, 1997, p. 92). From the HNT perspective (Table 2), I contend that this cultural practice amounted to the denial of self-esteem—a synergic satisfier for the son, and the denial of the woman’s FHNs of freedom of expression and participation in decision-making. Nonetheless, I find that this post-colonial institutional subordination of women was also found in the family as a socio-economic unit. The family as a socio-economic unit: For the Tiv and Idoma of the BVN, this post-colonial unit excludes women from owning or inheriting public property such as land, buildings, economic trees and any permanent structure, hence excluding them from formal discussion about resolving conflict concerning public property. In this family unit, local customs in the BVN assign formal authority to allocate economic resources and rewards to a man—the head of a family or other male members of that family (Ochefu, 2007, p. 64). This explains why Informant 007 declared that men do not allow women to sit in the “main circle” with them to discuss matters of land. Women only sat “at the back” and spoke from there. Women’s
perspective was considered, if men agreed, if not, the issue ended. Gilligan (2004a, p. 145) calls this, the riddle of femininity, “the choice between having a voice and having relationship”. Women have to give up their perspective in order to have relationship with men.

**Women’s land rights:** Nonetheless, for the Tiv, a woman has land rights as a married women living with her husband or as a widow living in her husband’s place, but an unmarried woman has no land rights (Burfisher and Horenstein, 1985, p. 7), however, she can farm the land that her mother uses if she stays in her father’s place; nevertheless, land rights are the birth right of a man who without land has no kin (Bohannan and Laura, 1968, p. 87). Moreover, given that post-colonial customary law permits polygyny, men take several wives but they do not treat them equally, one may have farm land, but others may not. They may be obligated to beg and yet have the obligation to feed their men or they are likely to be beaten (East, 2004, p. 341). Thus, in the context of the Land Use Act of 1978 (4.2) and from the HNT perspective (Table 2), my analysis is that women’s FHN of subsistence depends on owning and using land in this cultural context, but some men deny them these rights.

**Land inheritance:** Furthermore, women cannot inherit land either, only their male sons can do this. As Informant 019 argued, “I take it that if my son has something it is mine”. She influences her sons so they will speak for her needs. However, there are women who do not have male children as women in Focus Group 06 lamented, people conceive of a married woman who has no male child as wasting her time in that marriage because she has nobody to speak for her. I find women’s perspectives were considered through their father, husband, male sons or male guardians. The post-colonial patriarchy conceives of males speaking for and taking care of women’s needs in the formal space. This practice does not take into consideration that land, under the 1978 Land Use Act (see 4.2), no longer belongs to elders, but to the Local Government Areas and State Governors. This act recognises individual ownership to land to which men take advantage of free land in their communities for their exclusive use, but women cannot. Thus, in the present Nigerian, the post-colonial patriarchy expects women to sacrifice true relationship and defend manhood (Gilligan, 2004a, p. 145) as it deems men own women.

That is why customary law in the region stipulates that men will inherit women should their husbands die (Tiv Order, 1990, No 23 and Idoma Order, 1970, No. 20). While wife inheritance in the pre-colonial culture was to protect the disintegration of the family and to support the widow, this is not the case today (Torkula, 200?, under Kwase Dyako). Moreover, marriage emphasised consanguinity-belonging to a lineage or clan as such the family was a common heritage and the lineage or clan worked together; it de-emphasised conjugality where a man
and woman made their lives on their own. As such, everybody in the family, woman and man including all the family owned, belonged to the lineage or the clan (Bohannan, P. and L., 1968, p. 88-89). Today things have changed individuality is a common practice, customary law recognises conjugality and inherited wives are discriminated upon; they get the minimum from their “new husbands”, but they are not expected to complain otherwise they are labelled trouble makers (East, 2004, p. 347). Additionally, women who refuse their “new husbands” may be seen as claiming the wealth and property of the late husband to the exclusion of other members of the family such that at times property is seized from what is called “underserving wives” (Torkurla, 200?, under Over Exposure of Widows). It is my experience that in some cases, a woman in question may not know the “new husband” because he was not around her deceased husband; the man may have struggled alone with the wife and children or no children. Yet when he is dead, the extended family or lineage members appear for the distribution of what they still call their heritage. Therefore, from the HNT perspective (Table 2), I argue that men deny women the FN of cultural participation as their existential sense of self-determining beings, having equal rights with men, sharing in their culture and interacting in their family land—building and immovable property—depended on their husbands or male children.

Burial and property inheritance: I find this patriarchal belief that women should not own or inherit property persisted strongly in the BN as women in Focus Group 06 elaborated that women were burdened with funeral costs and yet forbidden by their brothers to inherit their mother’s belongings rather their brothers took them and gave them to their wives. Moreover, in cases of marriage gifts for women, men shared the gifts with women and that these were frustrating women’s livelihood. This family attitude was confirmed by a 35 years-old unmarried man I met, I asked him why he was not married as this was unusual; his reply was that he could not afford to pay burial costs. Indeed that this was a major problem for him to marry since in-laws were expected to cover the cost of funerals in the family of their wives. An elder in a community confirmed this and told me that if there was one cultural practice that was causing untold poverty in the BN, it was funeral celebrations. Yet, this is a colonial/post-colonial culture that has replaced a pre-colonial culture of women’s rights to inherit women’s belongings, and in-laws contributing according to their means at the death of a father in-law, and women only sharing women’s gifts received from in-laws.

In the pre-colonial and part of colonial periods, amongst the Tiv, an in-law was obliged to bring a cloth (according to his means) to bury his father in-law and not everybody in the family (Torkula, 200?, under the Tiv Culture of Death). Torkular (200?) makes it clear that materialism
was discouraged except in the case of wealthy person (shagbaor) in which case his wealth was used to cover the funeral expenses. He continues that today, however, in-laws are either coerced to cover the full cost of parents and relatives of their wives or tasked heavily in cash and kind towards burials. On the issue of a daughter inheriting her mother’s things, for the Tiv, this was a forgone conclusion, just as she could farm the land that her mother was farming which her brothers were obliged to give her (Bohannan and Laura, 1968), a daughter had rights to inherit her mother’s belongings. For the Jukun, a women’s property was heritable by her full sister or a half-sister by the same mother and she could chose to give some to the girls of a deceased sister as she saw fit (Meek, 1931, p. 107). Therefore, women’s property was women’s affairs and men did not interfere.

Similarly, in the case of marriage, it was (and still is) for the Jukun that mother-in-laws shared in the bride-price which included money, beer and animals as their right for weaning the girl. For the Tiv, it was (and still is) that mother-in-laws received (depending on the area as it varies from place to place) a big or got or large quantities of fish, salt, table, basin, chair, umbrella and containers for distributing the salt with all the families considered as sharing marriage animals together (iye-igo) (Torkula, 200?, under Increase Monetisation and Materialism of the Marriage Process). These things were (and are) only for women so any man asking to partake in the sharing was only taking advantage of the women due to lack of respect and lack of a body to enforce it today in the BVN. Indeed, a lot of what mother-in-laws received (and receive) went for buying things for their daughter for her new home (Meek, 1931 and Torkular, 200?). Therefore, the women’s complaints that “boys cry, is it girls who are going to inherit in this house?” and men shared in the in-law pig meat to my consideration is that the boys and men socially construe women as property, thus, concluding that property cannot own/inherit property in the post-colonial BVN.

I find the post-colonial men believe that excluding women from family political decision-making and ownership of land (despite the Land Use Act of 1978, see 4.2) as the most important economic and cultural resource appropriate and any women who deviates from this norm, are believed to be unnatural or immoral (Wharton, 2012). As Informant 019 admitted, women could not say many things because men ganged-up against them and sometimes some women joined in against the women who spoke up against their own subordination. Despite the fact that the 1978 Land Use Act and customary law permits women to own property (Ashiru, 2007, p. 320) and Section 1(3) Chapter I of the Nigerian Constitution guarantees equality for women and men in Nigeria. However, the issue is the lack of enforcement at cultural and judicial levels with a male dominated cultural and judiciary—out of 800 judges,
women have only 195 places (Ashiru, 2007, p. 328). My analysis is that the post-colonial male attitude frustrated women’s lives as either the social or economic actors of their community came to their defence. Rather, they remained “at the mercy” of men with no consequences (West, 1997, p. 145). Therefore, in the post-colonial political and socio-economic units of the family, women became institutionally subordinated and dependant on men’s attitude. I find the post-colonial patriarchy only guaranteed women’s right to “the maintenance of quiet and orderly domestic life” (Tiv Order, 1990, No. 11c; Idoma Order, 1970, No. 8 – 2e). It excluded women from formal decision-making and, by extension, excluded them from formal peacebuilding and conflict resolution. As such, the same socialisation that enabled these women’s skills at peacebuilding in the informal settings also became the source that enabled men to deny them peacebuilding influence in formal settings. It was the head of the family (micro society) that was the source of power for the wider society, and the family was its most important instrument of power which excluded women from formal participation in decision-making in the wider society.

6.3.2 Traditional leaders exclude women from formal peacebuilding in the BVN

I find that the institution of traditional leaders determines peacebuilding and conflict resolution in the BVN. However, traditional leaders perform this task in the absence of a stable political system that can render justice in social conflicts, as discussed in 4.2. This also explains why the stories in 5.5 do not mention how government resolution processes affect the women investigated. Government efforts at resolving conflict in the BVN involve setting up male dominated peace commissions to look into social conflicts and report to Government with recommendation (see 4.4). Governments compose the commissions with political elite members or retired army officers who are outsiders to communities involved in a conflict. They in turn invite people to appear before them to give submissions on the conflict based on local customs—traditional councils and its assemblies. An assembly comprises of a chief and his council, including family heads from the community. I find the right of men to participate in this institution derives from their position as family heads or family representatives, and since women are not allowed to be family heads/representatives (6.3.1), it excludes women’s participation. It largely silences women’s perspectives as they have to pass their concerns through men.

However, the pre-colonial BVN cultures had parallel systems that saw women participating actively in decision making in the formal space. For example the Chamba of Donga had Mala, the paternal aunt, or elder sister, or daughter of the paternal aunt of the king or Gara. She led
women and their concerns before the king like the *Angwu Tsi* of the Jukun (Lebeuf, 1963, p. 100). The *Angwu Tsi* was spoken of as “the wife of the king”, but she did not live with him, nor had they any marital relationships. She could be married but her husband was not an important personage in the kingdom. However, she had her own palace and court with principal officials; she was addressed with the same title as the king “Our corn”, “Our beans”, etc. (Meek, 1931, p. 340). In the absence of the king, she performed rituals for the kingdom and her palace was an asylum for all who had conflict with the king (Meek, 1931, p. 241); hence, the peacemaker in the kingdom. There were other important female personalities like the *Wakuku* (the king’s first wife) who was in charge of all the king’s wives, but the *Angwu Tsi* was the most important woman who administered women’s concerns at formal levels. For the Idoma, the women had a cult called *anjenu*—a spirited cult related to fertility that gave women ritual access to the supernatural world (formal space) which was otherwise an exclusive domain of male cults. *Anjenu* disciples were women although its priests were men for no other reason that it was a male domain. However, women could inherit *anjenu* shrines from their fathers and act as priestesses (Kasfir, 1982, p. 49). Tiv women were not allowed to participate directly in the formal space but through their domestic authority and the *pendatyo* system (where I lay my head) of head wife (6.3.1) she got women’s concerns addressed in the male exclusive assembly. Hence, the pre-colonial cultural practices had a much clearer structure for women’s participation in the formal space. Even were there was a separation of women and male structures it was a division that was task oriented more than hierarchal orientation and were there were inequalities a compensation was easily found (Lebeuf, 1963, p. 114). Therefore, it was during the colonial period that women’s dependence on men for participation in the formal space became common practice in the BVN.

During the 1914-1959 rule of the British authority in Nigeria, women and men opposed this occupation owing to the new forms of “oppression” the British appointed chiefs imposed on the people—there was rampant corruption and a heavy regime of taxes on men and an attempt to impose taxes on commodities women traded in the market places (Madichie, 2011 and Faseke, 2001). Nigerian women rose up against taxing women and the British set up the Watts Commission to look into their grievances. The result of the commission was that the British directed that women be employed in minor jobs, although they were not bared from any post that they were qualified, women were not to be appointed to posts of authority and supervision (Faseke, 2001, p. 34 cited in Madichie, 2011, p. 215). Faseke (2001, p. 38 cited in Madichie, 2011, p. 215) illustrates how many studies demonstrate that colonialism mercilessly impoverished Nigerians, most importantly women. However, she also commented that
Nigerian women achieved academic and educational advancement under the colonial rule; this was the mixed blessing of colonialism for Nigerian women. How come Nigerian women achieved educational advancement and yet were left behind in the colonial and post-colonial Nigeria? I would contend that the British attitude towards women was not inevitable rather it was only possible because Nigerian men drew on the pre-colonial gender cultural prejudices that suited them and enabled women’s oppression; a trend that continued into the post-colonial Nigerian. The British were mostly interested in the economic advancement of their empire and were ready to cooperate with men and women to achieve it. For example, in Sierra Leone, the Mende people put forward women in position of authority in order to avert British reprisals. The British accepted the women and worked with them, but still pursued their empire’s economic advancement (Little, 1951, p. 177 and 196). Therefore, if Nigerian men had wanted women in position of authority they would have achieved it. Rather, what happened was a male campaign to suppress women who sought independence—women’s strategic gender need (Moser, 1989) like men were doing.

Within the BVN, Ochonu (2013) offers analysis on how radical Western educated Idoma young men under the Idoma Hope Rising Union (IHRU), a union founded in the late colonial period to fight corruption and reform the Idoma Native Authority (NA); when they failed in their political agenda they resorted to reclaiming a cultural Idoma ethnic honour. This honour was pivoted on the patriarchal notion that unless a woman was under the control of man, she was a prostitute who posed a threat to public ethics. Although the moderate men among IHRU argued that Idoma women deserved the right to exist anywhere in Nigerian as all citizens of Nigeria did, the radical ones did not listen to these moderate voices; in fact, they considered the moderates as cowards and/or subversive male members of Idoma society (Ochonu, 2013, p. 252). Therefore, the city-dwelling Idoma women were perceived by their radical kinsmen as prostitutes who undermined Idoma honour.

How could Idoma women have made advancement if they were to remain in the villages or rural areas? The women were looking for opportunities—entry into textile and rail work—previously thought to be male exclusives that the British regime presented in the cities; the fact is the young men were suffering from status anxiety in the cities and their loss of control over women’s migratory activates this is what became an obsessions about ethnic honour (Ochonu, 2013, p. 229). Indeed, most of the women who left their rural areas were women who were rejected by returning World War II husbands who accused them and divorced them so instead of living in shame and disgrace the migrated to the cities, but IHRU wanted to send them back (Ochonu, 2013, p. 253). Was the attitude of radical IHRU male members due to
their Western education alone? No, IHRU were following and re-enacting the example of pre-colonial/colonial radical sacred societies like Ogbllo, Onyonko, Egbilo and Obagaiva, Abooga etc. who all over Idoma land were operated by large groups of young men for the purpose of correcting societal ills (Amali, 1992, pp. 56-57). These societies had powers from Idoma society to insult any member of its society regardless of social status. The societies were known for their vicious and regular attacks on women especially independent women they considered prostitutes and those they considered nagging and quarrelsome wives who were cautioned through insults to keep calm (Amali, 1992, p. 62). It was known that at times they insulted a woman and she went and committed suicide, especially the naturally vulnerable women it considered “ugly”, they capitalised on their physical looks to insult and humiliate the women (Amali, p. 61). Therefore, IHRU was as much re-enacting in the city what the sacred societies were doing in the rural Idoma land capitalising on vulnerable women some of whom were sent by their parents to work and gain money to help them pay the heavy colonial tax imposed on men, a tax that could not be paid in kind, but in the British currency that was hard to come by (Amali, 1992). However, anybody who did not pay had his head shaved with a razor blade, tied up and flogged in front of his wives and children and at times even wives of defaulter suffered humiliation before their helpless husbands (Ochonu, 2013, pp. 231-232). This is one of the roots of the post-colonial Nigerian elite basis for adopting extreme patriarchal cultural practices against women in the BVN. Practices that have found themselves in the Nigerian constitution, statuary and customary laws curved out by the ruling elite (see 3.1.6) with interpretations that affirm men’s rights from pre-colonial practices over women while ignoring any comparable dictates from the pre-colonial system that favour women’s equality with men in the formal space (Okeke, 1999, p. 53-54). A recent study on “Harmful Cultural Practices and Gender Equality in Nigerian” finds that the majority of Nigerian men sampled still believe they are superior to women and they are the bread winners of their families (Durojaye, Okeke and Adebajo, 2014). This attitude from the HNT perspective (Table 2) denies women their FHN of political participation in their communities. Since the post-colonial patriarchy disapproves of their being in solidarity, expressing opinion and interacting in political decision-making with men.

78% of the women I studied expressed disappointment regarding this system. For example, women in Focus Group 04 explained, “the chiefs do not have meetings with women. The chiefs said that the issues were not for women. The post-colonial patriarchy held this attitude as the norm and any attempt to break from it attracted disapproval from the institution. As Informant 002 narrated, women who talked at public meetings, as well as their husbands,
were called names (humiliated) by men. The men were accused of not being able to control their wives. It was for this reason that the women and men received insults, shame, harassment, intimidation and other means possible to make them conform. However, from the HNT perspective (Table 2), I would suggest that the post-colonial patriarchy frustrated women’s FHN of understanding in public decision-making as men constrained their being critical persons, having attributes to participate, and their ability to interpret events and interact at public decision-making.

Informant 002 expressed it further, stating that in the urban areas men ridiculed women and their male companions; they called women derogatory names if they ventured to talk in public domains where men discussed issues. Sometimes women also joined in ridiculing women for speaking publicly before men. It seems to me that this masculine attitude violated women’s dignity, and exacerbated women’s frustration, as they had to take it that nobody would redress these insults or that women had no rights in the face of their occurrence (West, 1997, p. 146). This scenario also repeated itself in office situations as Informant 009 commented, “likewise in the office, men conceive of women as unfit to head a department. Even if a woman is qualified to fill a post she will be rejected by men”. Women who went against this post-colonial patriarchal norm were vulnerable and subjected to humiliation, harassment and unhealthy competition in their workplace and in public decision-making and by extension, excluded from public peacebuilding and conflict resolution.

Section 6.3, therefore, responds to question three of this chapter on how the women studied perceived the post-colonial patriarchal gender order in the BVN. It defined a woman as the daughter, wife, mother, and widow of a male person, rather than a person or an individual in her own right. Furthermore, the post-colonial patriarchy’s customary structures, built around male family heads and male traditional leadership, granted second-class status to women in the family and society at large. Men were, therefore, able to exclude women from any direct influence over public decision-making because of their gender’s social construction. This is despite the evidence that this was not the case in the pre-colonial BVN. From the HNT perspective (Max-Neef, 2009, 1992—Table 2), my analysis is that men constrained women’s FHNs of identity as human beings, freedom of choice, their cultural and political participation and understanding. Moreover, the satisfaction of women’s FHNs of subsistence, affection and protection depended largely on male attitudes in the formal space without their consent. As such, I find that the very socialisation that allowed some women to satisfy FHNs with synergic satisfiers also disallowed them by causing them not to satisfy their FHNs in a synergetic way as it excluded women from formal peacebuilding. Consequently, I find that the post-colonial
patriarchy disqualified women from formal peacebuilding and conflict resolution over issues of land, traditional title, and democratic political leadership conflicts because it considered them non-party to these issues, thereby rendering these women's initiative less impactful in attending to the FHNs of the majority and had less possibilities of resolving PSC in their communities.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have used the HNT to analyse the women's stories from Chapter 5 to argue that the women I am studying performed robust conflict analysis in the BVN by indicating that poor traditional/political leadership discriminated against certain socio-political elite who wanted to participate in traditional/political leadership; they impoverished young men and disempowered women. Indeed that it was this poor leadership that frustrated the satisfaction of the unmet FHNs of subsistence, protection, identity, understanding and political/cultural participation of communities in the region. According to the women I studied, this situation generated and sustained PSCs in the BVN. My analysis also revealed, according to the women's stories, that the same gender socialisation that enabled women to develop peacebuilding skills in the informal sector also disabled their participation and perspective in formal peacebuilding and conflict resolution. I found that 22% of the women's work arose from feminine care—work "good women" did satisfying practical gender needs. However, I found that 78% of the women studied used their socialised skills from the point of view of ethics of care—satisfying practical gender needs, but also pursuing women's strategic gender need—equality with men. Therefore, they moved from rigorous conflict analysis to strategic peacebuilding in organising liberating processes: offered inspirational appeals to traditional chiefs and elders to foster unity in their domains, including appeals for land rights for women and "settlers"; protested against political violence; raised the self-esteem of impoverished young men by providing them with a feeding programme, paying school fees for some, providing peace education, and organising inter-community youths football league; and bonded and networked among themselves for the success of their peacebuilding initiatives. My analysis in this chapter demonstrates that these women have experiential knowledge and rationality in dealing with conflict: moving from conflict analysis to peacebuilding and conflict resolution. Indeed, this was a culture that women had better and more opportunities to perform in the formal space during the pre-colonial BVN.

However, I discovered women's disempowerment in the post-colonial formal sphere meant these initiatives did not form part of the formal peacebuilding activities in the BVN. I argued
that the post-colonial system of sole male-headed-household and sole male-traditional-leadership depersonalised women, denied them right to own land and thus found reasons (male prejudices) for excluding them at formal peacebuilding. Since the issues that generated PSCs in the BVN directly involved land, traditional titles and political elections, men kept women outside discussions. Therefore, the post-colonial patriarchal BVN rendered the women's initiatives less impactful and/or ineffective in the resolution of conflict in their communities. From the HNT (Max-Neef, 2009, 1992—Table 2) perspective, I argued that in this post-colonial cultural context, women lost their FHN of identity as human beings. Therefore, this chapter analysis provides the basis on which I arrive at this research's conclusion.
Chapter 7: Research Conclusions

The apparent gap in conflict resolution studies for underlying theoretical concepts on women’s peacebuilding work (Porter, 2007); the difficulty in implementing the international framework (e.g. UNSCR 1325) for including women participation and perspectives in formal peace processes (Anderlini, 2007 and Porter, 2007); and the refusal of men (Apanda, 2007; Dzurgba, 2007; Ogiji, 2007; Okpeh, 2007 and Ode, 2007) in the post-colonial patriarchal Benue Valley, Nigeria (BVN) to sit down with women and discuss peace in the formal space, arguing that they lack experiential knowledge and rationality, motivated this research. Using a qualitative research approach, I used the methods of individual and focus group storytelling interviewing, participatory observation and photography. I collected stories from 60 women on their peacebuilding and conflict resolution work in the BVN and analysed them. I conclude in this chapter that the women’s conceptual approach parallels the HNT in performing rigorous conflict analysis and strategic peacebuilding and conflict resolution. Moreover, my conclusion is that the international framework for including women in formal conflict resolution processes e.g., UNSCR 1325 struggles against a colonial/post-colonial patriarchal gender socialisation that polarises gender and teaches androcentric gender schemas to men and women in the BVN. Thus, the same socialisation that informally provided women with peacebuilding skills was the same source that disqualified them from formal peacebuilding and men’s accusation that women lacked experiential knowledge and rationality were male socialised (indoctrinated) prejudices. Rather, it is post-colonial men who have not engaged respectfully and in a serious intellectual manner with women on conflict resolution in the formal space of the region. Finally, I conclude that the inclusion of women like the ones I studied in formal peacebuilding will likely make an impact on sustainable peace in the BVN. I present my conclusions in three sections: research findings, research implications and recommendation for further research on the women’s initiatives.

7.1 Research findings

In this section, I present findings with respect to my three research questions and hypothesis:

1. The first question of this research asked what the women understood as the causes of the four protracted social conflicts (PSCs) in the BVN. Given the HNT (Chapter 2) as my framework, I hypothesised that “these women articulated and recognised the frustration of the FHNs of subsistence, protection, cultural and political participation as the root of violent conflicts in their communities”. The women recounted in their interviews in Chapter 5 and I analysed
them in Chapter 6 and found that the four PSCs in their communities were principally due to poor traditional and political leadership.

**Poor traditional leadership:** I found the women reported that poor leadership manifested itself in three ways (6.1.1): (1) some traditional leaders did not foster trust and friendly relationships amongst different groups rather they promoted the negative stereotype of “indigene vs. settlers” that drew the two sides into endless fights. (2) Yet other traditional leaders were not fair when they sat in judgement over land, traditional title, and political conflicts. Therefore, the women provided evidence that some socio-economic and political elites had ensured the continuation of endless violent conflicts. (3) In addition, some of the women reported that most traditional leaders did not want democratic succession to their titles. It transpired that there were royal families and non-royal families, and it seemed to the women that the two sides insisted on their rights to contest traditional titles, leading both sides to engage in protracted conflicts. Moreover, it emerged from the discussions in 6.1.4 and 6.3 that the institution of post-colonial traditional leaders backed by the family structure denied women’s rights to property ownership. The women in Focus Group 01, and Informant 016 cited that this drew some women to fight, and to instigate their husbands/sons to fight for land in order to put food on the table for themselves and their families. Applying the HNT, my analysis concludes that these factors frustrated the FHNs of subsistence, protection, understanding, identity and cultural/political participation in the BVN. Furthermore, I found the women argued that a good political leadership might have resolved these conflicts, but that the BVN tended to lack good political leadership which further frustrated efforts to satisfy unmet needs in the region.

**Poor political leadership:** I found the women (6.1.1) studied acknowledged poor political leadership contributed to conflict in their communities in two ways: poor politics and poor access to land. Poor politics for the women studied was the practice of “winner-takes-all” by politicians that prevented the organisation of peaceful, free, fair and credible elections; rather, it promoted rigid elections with mostly imposed political leaders in the BVN communities as a consequence. Whereas, the imposed leaders did not carry out socio-economic development; the informants believed that they mismanaged socio-economic resources in the name of the “security vote” (Focus Group 01 and 06). The women argued that the “security vote” paid for the leaders' competition with rich aggrieved opposition political elites by paying impoverished young men as thugs, militias and mercenaries, for the struggle to gain or sustain political power. Applying the HNT, I conclude that this form of politics frustrated the FHN of political participation and impaired the satisfaction of the FHNs of subsistence, protection and
understanding in the BVN. Moreover, according to the women, poor governance was extended to poor access to land, an important economic resource in this region.

**Poor access to land:** According to the women studied poor access to land existed in the BVN because poor political leadership resulted in a poor juridical system for adjudicating land conflicts (Informant 021, Focus Group 01). They reported that land was the main socio-economic resource most people from the BVN depended upon for their livelihood. Although traditional leaders stepped in to fill the gap in land conflict adjudication, informants stated that some passed poor judgements in exchange for economic benefits (Focus Group 01 & Informant 021). In their view, this resulted in aggrieved parties fighting, paying militias and importing mercenaries to fight for them; this protracted land conflicts and frustrated socio-economic development in the BVN (Focus Group 05 & 07). Applying the HNT, I conclude that poor access to land was a major factor that frustrated the satisfaction of the FHNs of subsistence and protection as well as impaired the satisfaction of the FHNs of identity and understanding in land conflict situations in the BVN.

Therefore, from the HNT perspective, I confirm question one’s hypothesis. My conclusion is that the women’s conflict analysis revealed that the causes of the four PSCs in the BVN were due to repressive traditional and political leaders who frustrated the satisfaction of FHNs of subsistence, protection, identity, understanding and cultural/political participation of its citizens. Thus, aggrieved socio-political elites who wanted to participate in traditional/political leadership, impoverished young men and disempowered women were engulfed in a prolonged struggle using what can be understood as destructive and pseudo satisfiers for the satisfaction of their unmet FHNs and personal interests. This explains why several governmental peace commissions, the 1985, 1992-1993, 1998 and 2006 commissions in the case of Takum LGA conflict; the 2003, 2004 commissions in the case of Kwande LGA conflict and the 2008 commission in the case Apa LGA conflict as discussed in 4.4, did not enable government or the parties to resolve the PSCs in the BVN. As Azar (1990) finds, parties subject to continual stresses of protracted conflict tend to become closed-minded. In such cases, proposals for political solutions become rare, and tend to be perceived by all sides as mechanisms for gaining relative power and control. My analysis in 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 confirmed that parties viewed political efforts by government and opposing parties in resolving PSC in their communities as attempts to gain advantage over them. Moreover, as Burton (1997) finds, in situations of PSCs over the frustration of FHNs people are likely to pursue the fulfilment of their FHNs rather than accept political solutions. One clear determination to satisfy the unmet FHNs meant the des-institution of “the mother’s side” (3.1.6) formally used as a means for
peacebuilding in the BVN for centuries; people from the mother’s side killed their nephews and nieces or killed inter-group married wives (6.1.1). A traditional ruler from one of my researched communities lamented that if he was killed those who will cry and regret most were those from his mother’s side who were fighting his father’s side. Therefore, it is my conclusion that the protracted social conflict in the BVN was the result of identity groups struggling to fulfil their unmet FHNs; they were fighting over traditional titles, land, democratic political leadership and stones of economic value which were satisfiers for the satisfaction of FHNs in the BVN.

Consequently, given the women’s gender socialisation, 100% of them rejected violence as a means for resolving conflict (6.2.3) given the reasons that violence brought a high human and material cost: it frustrated the satisfaction of practical gender needs and 78% saw it did not present an environment for attaining their strategic gender need—women’s equality with men (Moser, 1989). These reasons were similar to the reasons the 1000 women who gathered at The Hague in 1915 gave (high human casualties and high human cost) and demanded the end of World War I (1.1). Hence, I argued that they realised the use of destructive and pseudo satisfiers was the least successful strategy in the situation of PSCs and that, without attending to FHNs conflict was likely to continue in their communities (6.2.1-6.2.3); therefore, the women conceived a vision for peacebuilding and conflict resolution in their communities with liberating means—synergic satisfiers. It is to this vision that I turn next—the second question of this research.

2. The second research question asked what kind of skills, vision and initiatives the women’s groups used in peacebuilding and conflict resolution. Given gender socialisation theory (Chapter 3) and HNT (Chapter 2) as my framework for posing this question, I hypothesised that “gender socialisation in the region enabled the women with skills to find synergic satisfiers for the satisfaction of the frustrated FHNs in their peacebuilding and conflict resolution initiatives.” Analysing the stories of the women in Chapter 6, I confirm my hypothesis for question 2 that the women studied discovered (6.2.3) the use of violence and criminality by groups involved in PSCs in their communities to be the least successful strategy for the satisfaction of unmet needs, they strategised instead to use grassroots liberating processes (Table 12) for the satisfaction of some frustrated needs in the BVN:

1. They inspired traditional leaders to foster unity in their domains;
2. They discouraged negative stereotypes of “settlers vs. indigenes” insisting that conflict cases be examined on an individual basis;
3. They entered into dialogue with traditional leaders to demand land rights for disempowered women;
4. They protested before political rulers/elites to end political violence and demanded peaceful, free, fair and credible elections in their communities;
5. They fed, paid school fees, provided peace education and a football league for impoverished young men; and
6. They bonded with women in peacebuilding, created peacebuilding networks working with women involved in violence and 78% of the women demanded equal rights for women to participate in traditional leadership.

Comparing these women’s initiatives in peacebuilding and conflict resolution to government (male dominated commissions—4.4) responses to PSCs in the BVN, the women’s initiatives differed significantly. First, the government peace-commissions found and emphasised that the traditional title—Ukwe-Takum was the source of conflict in Takum LGA (4.4), but failed to realise it was a trigger to a wider discontent over the frustration of needs felt by identity groups in Takum which led to this PSC (4.3.1). Second, in the Kwande political conflict, the government seemed to have identified who started the violence and treated it as a simple election dispute (4.3.2), but failed to understand it was a trigger to a wider discontent for identity groups in Kwande, who since 1983 (4.3.2), decided that they wanted a political leadership that brought socio-economic development for the satisfaction of their unmet FHNs. Third, the Chairman of Apa LGA’s decision that only suspended the elevation of Ataganyi to a district of its own and Omelemu under it (4.4), failed to realise that the district issue was a trigger to a wider conflict over the payment of royal tax and lack of socio-economic opportunities that existed in these two communities. Moreover, I found that government responses identified conflict triggers and elite identity groups fighting, but failed to identify the frustration of needs for impoverished young men and disempowered women as part of contributing factors to these PSCs.

From the HNT perspective, my conclusion is that these women were aware of and responded to this governmental failure, with the help of their husbands (84% of individual participants were married), good willed men (16% of individual participants were single) and some traditional rulers and male religious leaders in their communities (of Takum, Aliade, Konshisha, Gwer and Kwande—6.1-6.2), they attended to some of the unmet FHNs in their communities with synergic satisfiers. Moreover, their use of synergic satisfiers was in contrast to the destructive and/or pseudo satisfiers used by socio-economic and political identity groups that generated and sustained PSCs in the BVN. The women’s initiatives were also different from
identity groups who wanted to keep dividing the BVN into smaller states based on ethnic homogeneity/compatibility as a peacebuilding measure which might lead to 250 states that I argued in 4.4 was unsustainable in the long run. Therefore, these women's work demonstrated that if they were included in formal peacebuilding and conflict resolution in the BVN, there were strong possibilities of using liberating processes (synergic satisfiers for the satisfaction of practical gender needs and women's strategic gender need), such as used by the women, for peacebuilding and conflict resolution. It is my conclusion that they would have followed the example of South African women (3.3.5) that opposed a US$4.5 billion expenditure on arms in parliament and argued the money be spent on the four million South Africans living with HIV/AIDS without treatment and care. Therefore, applying the HNT, I conclude that the women working together with political and traditional authorities could have enabled the resolution of PSCs in the BVN. However, I found that this important work, from the HNT perspective, was excluded from formal peacebuilding circles because the BVN post-colonial patriarchal socio-economic and political gender order discriminated against women; therefore, rendered the women's initiatives less impactful and/or ineffective in the resolution of conflict in their communities. This aspect of discrimination against the women in the BVN is the subject of the next section of this conclusion.

3. The third research question asked how the women perceived the patriarchal social, economic and political gender order in the BVN. Given gender theory and HNT as my framework, I assumed that "these women's initiatives remained informal because the patriarchal social, economic, and political gender order discriminated against women in the BVN". I found that the post-colonial patriarchal BVN demanded (3.1.3 – 3.1.6) that men played the productive role in the family and in the wider community in both informal and formal spaces. This role meant that men offered leadership over social, economic and political matters of families and communities. However, I found that the post-colonial patriarchy assigned three roles to women (see 3.1.5): managerial, reproductive and productive (Moser 1989); it tended to demand women's participation and perspectives only in the informal space if men agreed with this arrangement. Post-colonial patriarchy in the BVN tended to position women outside of formal decision-making (6.3); it considered men autonomous and expected women to be selfless and voiceless in their three roles. Figure 1 illustrates four characteristics that I found and argued as the world view of this post-colonial patriarchal approach concerning the gender order in the BVN.

Figure 1 shows that, socio-economically and politically, women lived like children and they never grew out of this state (circle 1, see 6.3.1). This was because this post-colonial patriarchy
conceived of a woman as the daughter, wife, mother and widow of a male person and not a person in her own right. Although 22% of the women investigated accepted this cultural norm as “natural”, 78% of them disapproved of it, and found it illogical and unjust (Focus Group 06, and Informant 019). In Focus Group 06, they called it slavery. Nonetheless, I found, as reported by the women in 5.5 and discussed in 6.3.1, that the post-colonial patriarchy in question socialised males to head families or communities (circle 2,). Additionally, post-colonial patriarchy ensured that only male family heads/other men adjudicated socio-economic matters; it tended to exclude women from ownership or inheritance of public property (circle 2, see 6.3.1) as post-colonial patriarchy seemed to consider women male property—property cannot own or inherit property. According to the women, post-colonial patriarchal men ensured that the head of the family (micro society) and other males (circle 3, see 6.3.2) remained the source of power for its wider society, and the most important instrument that enforced women’s exclusion from formal decision-making.

Moreover, I found that the post-colonial male traditional leadership and its council (circle 4, see 6.3.2) managed land tenure, property inheritance, customary law and conflict resolution. This silenced women’s participation and perspectives (they were always in circle 1)—they passed their concerns through men (to circle 4, see 6.3.2); men tended to exclude women
from public meetings because they considered it immoral or unnatural for women to lead them. Hence, by extension, the post-colonial male authority in the BVN refused to consider women's peacebuilding and conflict resolution efforts as important and did not bring them into formal community peace processes. These findings on gender social order are consistent with my findings in Chapter 4 - "Background to social, economic and political conditions of women in the BVN". Moreover, in 4.6 I found that, since the fourth republic in Nigeria (1999 - 2011), less than 10% of women participated in political decision making bodies at local, state and federal levels in the executive and legislative arms of government. This occurred despite women constituting 49.5% of the Nigerian population (Census, 2006), implying that half the knowledge of Nigerians may have been lost in managing peace in the BVN. Therefore, my analysis confirmed the hypothesis of my third question; my findings demonstrated that socialisation accounted for women's peacebuilding initiatives, but socialisation was also the source of why men denied women's peacebuilding in the formal space. These findings regarding the three questions provide me with a conceptualisation of these women's work, and arguably have implications for an understanding of the HNT; a demonstration of why there appear to be pervasive post-colonial patriarchal elite under value of women's work; and why difficulties may exist in implementing the international consensus on including women in formal conflict resolution processes e.g., UNSCR 1325 in the BVN. I turn to the conceptual implications of the results.
7.2 Research implications

**Theoretical conceptualisation**: One implication of this research's findings from the HNT and gender socialisation theory perspectives is that I am able to elaborate a theoretical conceptualisation of the women's approach in peacebuilding and conflict resolution: I found that the women peacebuilders, through their socialised roles, performed rigorous conflict analysis that enabled their peacebuilding in a strategic way (Figure 2).

*Figure 2: An outline of the women's theoretical approach to peacebuilding and conflict resolution*

I present Figure 2 which illustrates that in the BVN gender socialisation positioned the women in productive, managerial and reproductive roles (see Photo 29) in the informal sector of communities engulfed in PSCs. Through these roles, I analysed the women performed rigorous conflict analysis:

- **Identity groups**: they identified and evaluated groups involved in conflict e.g., poor traditional/political leaders (Focus Group 05), dissatisfied socio-political elite (Informant 002), impoverished young men (Focus Group 07), and disempowered women (Informant 019 and Focus Group 01);

- **Issues of discontent**: they scrutinised issues of discontent: (a) triggers—land (Focus Group 01), traditional titles (Focus Group 04 and 05), and political elections (Focus Group 06); and (b) the underlying issues for each identity group involved in the conflict. For example, the found that impoverished young men were unemployed
(Focus Group 07), hungry (Focus Group 06) and lacked economic opportunities for personal development (Informant 006);

- **Identity group activity**: they analysed each group’s strategy for satisfying their well-being e.g., they found young men used violence and criminality (Focus Group 07); evaluated each group’s actions e.g., some young men had become thugs and formed militia groups (Focus Group 06);

- **Leadership strategy**: the women scrutinised leadership strategy in response to discontentment e.g., for the young men, the women found poor traditional/political leaders (Informant 011) paid them to fight as thugs and militia in their quest to remain in traditional/political power.

I analysed the women’s views (6.2.2-6.2.3) and found that it was at this stage that they decided their peacebuilding strategy:

- **Women’s response**: the women judged that the means by which the leaders were responding to the discontentment of other groups were repressive i.e. lacked human development (Focus Group 06, 01 and Informant 021). They, therefore, decided on their peacebuilding initiatives employing their socialised skills in human development (Focus Group 01) and developed a vision (Focus Group 03, 06 and Informant 022) of a harmonious society by seeking liberating means and attended to identity groups involved in protracted conflicts in their communities. For example, in the case of impoverished young men, they provided food (Focus Group 06 and Informant 010), paid school fees (Focus Group 06), taught peace education (Informant 005, 011, 012, and Focus Group 05) and setup a football league (Focus Group 01).

Thus, my conclusion on the women’s approach is that, in their productive, managerial and reproductive roles the women perform rigorous conflict analysis by identifying groups fighting, scrutinising their issues of discontent (trigger and underlying), evaluating group’s strategy for meeting their well-being and the actions they take; scrutinising leadership quality, evaluating leadership strategy to respond to discontentment, and their actual responses. Then, the women judge the outcomes of group and leadership actions: the use of violence, criminality and bribery leads to PSCs in their communities. Therefore, the women perform peacebuilding work in a strategic way by using their skills and vision in human development to discover liberating ways for conflict resolution in their communities. Therefore, I have found the HNT useful in explaining the 60 women’s approach to peacebuilding in the BVN.

Moreover, my analysis has shown that these women’s approach has a lot of similar approaches to the HNT e.g. Azar’s (1990) conditions for protracted social conflicts (PSCs)
where the combination of communal discontentment leading to the formation of identity groups coupled with the frustration of FHNs and poor governance leads to PSCs. Additionally, the HNT and its insistence on finding the root of PSCs—the frustration of FHNs (Azar, 1990; Burton, 1997) and that of moving away from power analysis toward cooperative processes (Burton, 1986/87). In addition, the women’s approach tends to be similar to the elaboration and use of synergic satisfiers by Max-Neef (1992 and Cruz et al, 2009) for peacebuilding and conflict resolution. In particular, the women treated both poor traditional/political leaders frustrating the meeting of unmet FHNs and those (impoverished young men and disempowered women) whose FHNs were unmet as potential identity groups that could become the source for the generation of synergic satisfiers/goods for the satisfaction of FHNs for a harmonious and progressive BVN (see 2.3.2—Table 7). Thus, the women’s initiatives by being similar in approach to the HNT approach demonstrated that their initiatives had underlying conceptual knowledge. Therefore, I conclude that (a) the 60 women’s peacebuilding work in the BVN parallels the HNT elaboration of FHNs for creating PSCs and also in peacebuilding work in situations of PSCs. This fulfils Porter’s (2007) call for a detailed scholarly explanation—the underlying concepts in women’s peacebuilding work. (b) The BVN post-colonial patriarchy’s accusation (3.1.6) that women’s work lacks experiential knowledge and rationality is why men should not sit-down and discuss issues with them is based on socialised male prejudices and not based on fact or evidence as my research work proves in its case studies. I would contend at this stage that theorising these women’s approach through the intersection of the HNT and gender socialisation theory in the context of post-colonial Nigeria is my contribution to peacebuilding in conflict resolution studies.

**Gender neutral fundamental human needs (FHNs):** Furthermore, another implication of the findings of this research for the HNT is a challenge to its gender neutral elaboration of FHNs. I found 15 items of empirical evidence (Table 16) regarding the post-colonial patriarchal social, economic and political gender order that challenge in two particular ways gender neutral account of FHNs in the HNT for peacebuilding and conflict resolution in the BVN.
Table 16: A post-colonial social, economic and political polarisation/androcentric gender order in the BVN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social</strong></td>
<td><strong>Social</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Can be family head</td>
<td>1. Cannot be family head</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Can be traditional ruler</td>
<td>2. Cannot be traditional ruler</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Can be members of traditional council</td>
<td>3. Cannot be members of traditional council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Can participate in formal decision-</td>
<td>4. Cannot participate in formal decision-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>making</td>
<td>making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. A small boy can speak in formal</td>
<td>5. No matter the age of a woman, she</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gatherings because he is a man in the</td>
<td>may not speak in formal gatherings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>making</td>
<td>because of social construction of her sex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Not obliged to do care work</td>
<td>6. Obliged to do care work at all the times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economics</strong></td>
<td><strong>Economics</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Can own and inherit public property</td>
<td>1. Cannot own or inherit public property</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Can own and inherit land</td>
<td>2. Cannot own or inherit land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Can marry many wives as deemed fit</td>
<td>3. Cannot marry more than one man at a time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Men own women</td>
<td>4. Women are property to men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. House of representative &gt; 90%</td>
<td>1. House of representatives &lt; 10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Senators &gt; 90%</td>
<td>2. Senators &lt; 10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Ministers 75%</td>
<td>3. Ministers 25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. State Governors 100%</td>
<td>4. State Governors 0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Presidency 100%</td>
<td>5. Presidency 0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first challenge centers on the HNT (Max-Neef, 1992; Cruz et al, 2009 and Burton 1997) gender neutral definition of FHNs as the same—few, finite and classifiable across all cultures. The facts in Table 16 have demonstrated that in the BVN, the post-colonial patriarchal social, economic and political gender order constrained women's FHNs of identity as equal human beings with men, restrained their FHN of freedom of choice, and the FHNs of cultural,
economic and political participation. Moreover, the satisfaction of women’s FHNs of subsistence, protection and affection depended largely on men’s attitudes and perspective in the formal space with or without women’s consent. How much did the perspective of the women studied inform the understanding of FHNs in the BVN culture? Based on this research’s findings, post-colonial male authority had the primary power to decide what counted as needs in this culture.

Nonetheless, I also recognise that FHNs are derived from human evolution, implying that more FHNs will appear as human beings evolve (Max-Neef, 1992). Therefore, I find the HNT helpful in explaining the women’s groups peacebuilding initiatives, however, I also find that the HNT is gender blind or at best gender neutral in its elaboration of FHNs. It is at the level of satisfiers that it addresses gender differences, however, my findings demonstrate that the issue of gender addressed at satisfier level is deficient in the post-colonial cultural context of the BVN where women are not considered equal to men, but are considered property. Therefore, I strongly propose that the HNT be revised to add a tenth FHN as the FHN of equality—women’s strategic gender need (Moser, 1989): women’s equality to men as human beings both in informal and formal space without which FHNs seems to be solely men’s FHNs in this cultural context. This conclusion parallels Reimann’s (2002) assertion that “to adopt and promote gender neutral universal human needs reinforces the privilege of men to marginalise and silence other groups like women”. Additionally, Christie (1997) reiterates that we need to re-vision problem-solving in a way that lifts the dialogue out of a patriarchal framework. As I have demonstrated in 6.3 that the pre-colonial BVN had a socio-political system that offered women more participation in the formal space; among the Jukun and Chamba, women had almost equal powers with men in the formal space, among the Tiv and Idoma, women had almost complete control of the informal space. Therefore, a change offering women full equality with men will not be entirely a new thing in the BVN. Without changes, applying the HNT peacebuilding approach in the BVN might take the form that Pankhurst (2007) finds, in designing policies for post-war reconstruction, women’s needs are often systematically ignored, and even deliberately marginalised; rather, there is a call for women to be forced “back” into kitchens and fields.

The second challenge arises from the HNT use of FHNs to offer analysis of social conflict, and its escalation to PSC. HNT (Azar, 1990; Burton, 1997; Max-Neef, 1992 and Cruz et al, 2009) argued for an intimate and reciprocal relationship between needs: needs frustration, satisfaction, human development and conflict. This research’s findings have demonstrated clearly that this is ignored in the PSC between women and men in the BVN. Where women
have little or no social, economic and political freedom, post-colonial male authority deprives women of individual existence or personal meaning. My analysis showed that this post-colonial authority created social, economic and political gender inequalities in conflict and peace times for most women as seen from their stories in 5.5, analysed in 6.3 and summarised in Table 16. This constitutes a century long PSC between women and men that I traced in Chapter 3 and Chapter 6 showing how the colonial authority enabled the worst of the pre-colonial patriarchy to produce an extreme post-colonial patriarchal BVN. Therefore, my conclusion is that there is a PSC between women and men—a structural violence against women: post-colonial patriarchal authority considers women their property in the BVN. My analysis clearly demonstrated in 3.1.6, 4.5 and 6.3 that women were denied "indigeneship"/citizenship and undermined in the post-colonial BVN. For the 22% of women participants who accepted this post-colonial patriarchal system as natural, this was their choice, but for 78% of women, they wanted social, economic and political participation—a satisfaction of their strategic gender need—to be equal with men (Moser, 1989). They demanded change in customary practices with regard to public and land property laws so that they could own and inherit public and landed property. They demanded mutual respect from men and wanted to participate in family and communal formal decision-making bodies—they wanted to be counted as indigenes/citizens—not counted as property. This conclusion parallels Karl’s (1995) study that for many women in situations of conflicts, their main concerns remained focussed on access to economic and political institutions and Pankhurst’s (2003) work finds that gender inequity is one of the main cleavages of inequality in all societies as such it has to be addressed as part of peacebuilding. It is clear that without a gender sensitive elaboration of FHNs, applying the HNT as a means of conflict resolution in the BVN risks repeating and/or cementing the subordination of women who want to escape patriarchal gender order. This brings us to the issue of why women’s work is undervalued in places like the BVN and why it is difficult to implement the international consensus on including women in formal conflict resolution processes like the UNSCR 1325.

The UNSCR 1325 which urges member states to take measures that support women’s peace initiatives and implement equal participation of women in the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict, and women’s peacebuilding and conflict resolution initiatives in the BVN struggles against the post-colonial patriarchal gender socialisation framework I elaborated (see Chapters 3 and 6) in this research. This socialisation as discussed (3.1.3-3.1.4) began gender polarisation and androcentric gender schemas at birth and followed this with a programme for boys at the age of five and women from the ages of 11-13. It taught the patriarchal gender
order in rituals such as the circumcision of boys and the rite of “true manhood” to men—the male attitude that they command and control women and society. However, the same system (3.1.5) only taught girls and women to perform care work. Furthermore, my analysis (3.1.6 and 6.3) showed that post-colonial patriarchy deprived women of social, economic and political gender equality in statutory law, and customary law, only guaranteed them control over domestic life. The women (Focus Group 01, 04, 06, Informant 002, 007, & 009) reported that some men enforced it with humiliating and degrading treatment for those women who disobeyed, and rewarded and honoured those who obey it by labelling them—“good women”.

For the BVN post-colonial patriarchy, it transpired to me that its primary motivation was to keep peace and harmony in its society—the post-colonial patriarchal gender order. Therefore, it did not perceive any need for change in its order for a gender peaceful post-colonial BVN. This post-colonial patriarchal gender order accounted for the under value of women’s work in the BVN and those difficulties in implementing UNSCR 1325. Therefore, my conclusion is that asking a post-colonial patriarchal society like the BVN to accept women in a formal gathering with their initiatives might be perceived by its men as bringing disorder to their society. There is need for an evidence-based demonstration to post-colonial patriarchal societies that including women can make a difference—complements their work as I have demonstrated in my research. There is a need for a gender sensitive socialisation process in the post-colonial BVN that targets the family rather than the state or society to help change male attitudes towards women. Post-colonial patriarchy, as I have shown in this research (see 3.1.3-3.1.4), begins its work at birth and holds the family (see 6.3.1) as the primary actor in implementing its gender order and not society or the state per se. Therefore, I would suggest that taking the family for granted in this sense might mean continued under value of women’s hard work and difficulties in implementing UNSCR 1325. However, I envisage that taking the family seriously might better facilitate a change in post-colonial male attitudes towards women and UNSCR 1325 implementation. Therefore, one of the major findings of my research is that socialisation accounts for women’s peacebuilding initiatives, but socialisation is also the source by which men deny women’s peacebuilding in the formal space. Hence, I have arrived at the conclusion that further research on this topic should be on the kind of socialisation that will redress gender imbalance in formal peacebuilding and conflict resolution in the BVN.
7.3 Recommendation for further research

Four factors influence the further research investigation I propose for the BVN women’s peacebuilding initiatives:

1. I demonstrated the tension between the women’s work being feminine care work—work post-colonial patriarchy imposed on women as what “good women” do and that of ethics of care—work women themselves decided to do because of a sense of duty to care for those suffering or in need;

2. I demonstrated the need to engender the HNT and its elaboration of FHNs, and the need to implement CEDAW and UNSCR 1325 in the post-colonial BVN;

3. The women investigated wanted this research to impact on their initiatives—an issue raised in all the seven focus groups I conducted for this research; and

4. I promised the women that this research might find some social value arising from their initiatives.

It transpires that the primary conclusion of my research is that gender socialisation largely accounts for gender inequality in the post-colonial BVN and the difficulty in implementing UNSCR 1325. Moreover, taking Pankhurst (2000) into consideration, who warns of dangers in challenging gender relations head-on because of the risk of conflict that men even use violence against women to maintain their gendered roles as occurred in Zimbabwe and Rwanda and advises that the chances of success are vastly increased where the responsibility for changing cultural institutions is not left entirely in the hands of women, but is also the responsibility of men. I wish to investigate the possibility of setting-up a socialisation enterprise that might enable these women’s peacebuilding and conflict resolution initiatives to become part of formal or popular peacebuilding initiatives in the BVN. The primary motivation for this enterprise will be to help change attitudes and perspectives by impacting high quality skills for a self, peer and designated gender (male and female) sensitive leadership in communities through families, schools, markets and work places. This might ensure that both women and men attain equal citizenship rights in their society by attempting to deconstruct the androcentric and polarised gender order that leads men to exclude women from the formal space. It will seek to reconstruct co-responsibility for women and men in formal and informal spaces. I hope that this may contribute significantly to a successful application of peacebuilding and conflict resolution based on a gender sensitive HNT elaboration of FHNs and the implementation of CEDWA and UNSCR 1325 in places like the post-colonial BVN.
Having given a recommendation for a further research on these women’s initiatives, I reiterate that in this thesis:

1. I demonstrated that socialisation accounted for women’s peacebuilding initiatives, but socialisation also tended to be the root by which men denied women peacebuilding in the formal space. I showed that post-colonial patriarchy ensured that the male head of the family (micro society) and other males remained the most important instrument to enforce women’s exclusion from formal decision-making.

2. I found that these women’s peacebuilding approach involved performing rigorous conflict analysis by identifying groups fighting, their issues of discontent (trigger and underlying) when combined with poor traditional/political leaders who repressed their people culturally and politically using thugs, militias and mercenaries gave rise to PSCs; therefore, the women decided their peacebuilding initiatives using their socialised skills and vision in human development to use liberating ways of performing peacebuilding work and conflict resolution in their communities.

3. I found that it transpired these women’s peacebuilding approach paralleled the HNT elaboration of FHNs for creating PSCs and also for peacebuilding in situations of PSCs. This fulfilled Porter’s (2007) call for a detailed scholarly explanation for the underlying concepts in women’s peacebuilding.

4. I found that the BVN post-colonial patriarchy’s accusation that women’s work lacked experiential knowledge and rationality was why men did not sit down with them to discuss in the formal space based on socialised (indoctrinated) male prejudices and not based on fact or evidence. Rather, the women’s initiatives are excluded because post-colonial patriarchal men have not engaged respectfully and attentively in serious intellectual interchanges with women on how conflict resolution should evolve in the BVN.

5. I called for the revision of the HNT to include a tenth FHN of equality: women’s equality with men as women in the post-colonial BVN have a need for the FHN of equality—to be equal human beings with men and not male property without which in this post-colonial cultural context FHNs seem to be solely men’s FHNs. Thus, I concluded that without gender sensitive FHNs, applying the HNT as a means of peacebuilding and conflict resolution risked repeating and/or cementing subordination of women who wanted to get out of post-colonial patriarchal gender order.
6. Most importantly, I demonstrated that despite the post-colonial patriarchy rendering the women’s initiatives less impactful and/or ineffective in the resolution of conflict in their communities given the skills, vision and initiatives of these women peacebuilding, bringing them into formal conflict resolution will likely expand and complement, the socio-economic and political debate of conflict triggers (traditional titles, democratic political leadership and land accumulation), with wider underlying issues—the frustration of people’s needs as part of peacebuilding work in the BVN. The women will likely influence the inclusion of liberating ways—synergic satisfiers (see Table 13)—for the satisfaction of practical gender needs and women’s strategic gender need in the debate: the development of infrastructure for food, shelter and good health care; good education and jobs for youths; insisting on equal rights for women and men to own public property (land and others); inspiring traditional leaders to foster unity in their domain and promoting a democratic system of succession to traditional titles, and the conduct of peaceful, free, fair and credible elections: discouraging negative stereotypes of “settlers vs. indigenes” to enhance harmonious living in the multi-communal post-colonial BVN. The use of these synergic satisfiers is the work of 60 women’s experiential knowledge and rationality in peacebuilding: searching for sustainable peace, a harmonious and progressive BVN that might be applicable elsewhere in the world. This demonstrates a clear rational conceptual knowledge behind 60 women’s peacebuilding initiatives.

Therefore, in my consideration, women’s peacebuilding initiatives need to be included in formal conflict resolution processes for reasons of justice and fairness and for the reason that conflict resolution is improved when more voices and perspectives are included. Improvement arises, first, from the particular contribution the women peacebuilders make to formal conflict resolution and, second, from the general methodological improvement to formal conflict resolution that arises from gender diversity. Further investigation on other women’s initiatives similar to this research which followed Pankhurst (2000), Reimann (2002), Porter (2007) and Anderlini (2007) might aid an establishment of a larger body of conceptual women’s peacebuilding frame-work in conflict resolution studies.
Bibliography


Focus Group 03, Friday 8 July 2011. Session Conducted with 6 Women. Omelemu: Apa LGA.


Focus Group 06, 15 July 2011. Session Conducted with 8 Women. Adikpo: Kwande LGA.

Focus Group 07, 9 August 2011. Session Conducted with 4 Women. Aliade: Gwer LGA.


275


Informant 003, 7 July 2011. Session Conducted with a Woman. Awajir: Konshisha LGA.
Informant 004, 7 July 2011. Session Conducted with a Woman. Awajir: Konshisha LGA.
Informant 005, 7 July 2011. Session Conducted with a Woman. Awajir: Konshisha LGA.
Informant 006, 7 July 2011. Session Conducted with a Woman. Awajir: Konshisha LGA.
Informant 007, 7 July 2011. Session Conducted with a Woman. Awajir: Konshisha LGA.
Informant 009, 27-29 July 2011. Session Conducted with a Woman. Adikpo: Kwande LGA.
Informant 010, 27-29 July 2011. Session Conducted with a Woman. Adikpo: Kwande LGA.
Informant 011, 27-29 July 2011. Session Conducted with a Woman. Adikpo: Kwande LGA.
Informant 012, 27-29 July 2011. Session Conducted with a Woman. Adikpo: Kwande LGA.
Informant 013, 9 August 2011. Session Conducted with a Woman. Aliade: Gwer LGA.
Informant 014, 9 August 2011. Session Conducted with a Woman. Aliade: Gwer LGA.
Informant 015, 9 August 2011. Session Conducted with a Woman. Aliade: Gwer LGA.
Informant 016, 9 August 2011. Session Conducted with a Woman. Aliade: Gwer LGA.
Informant 017, 9 August 2011. Session Conducted with a Woman. Aliade: Gwer LGA.
Informant 019, 9 August 2011. Session Conducted with a Woman. Aliade: Gwer LGA.
Informant 021, 9 August 2011. Session Conducted with a Woman. Aliade: Gwer LGA.
Informant 022, Sunday 31 July 2011. Session Conducted with a Woman. Adikpo: Kwande LGA.
Informant 023, Sunday 31 July 2011. Session Conducted with a Woman. Adikpo: Kwande LGA.


Ochonu, E. M., 2013. The Idoma Hop Rising Union and the Politics of Patriarchy and Ethnic


Appendix A

Individual Guide Questions

1. Think about your peacebuilding activities, can you share some stories of these activities with me?
2. When did you start your peacebuilding activities?
3. When you look back on your life—your cultural and educational background—what stories inform your peacebuilding activities?
4. Thinking about the conflict in your area, what stories can you share with me about the causes of the conflict in your community?
5. Reflecting on the conflict, what stories explain the significant barriers to resolving this conflict?
6. Think about conflict and peace in your community: what stories explain the best things about having peace in your community?
7. What stories explain the worst things about lack of peace in your community?
8. Looking at the life of women in your community, can you share some stories of what it means to be a woman?

Focus Groups Guide Questions

1. Think about your peacebuilding activities - can you share some stories of your activities with me?
2. When you look back on your life, your cultural and educational background, what stories inform your peacebuilding activities?
3. Reflecting on stories about the conflict in your community, what constitute as causes and significant barriers to resolve this conflict?
4. Looking at the life of women in your community, can you share some stories about what it means to be a woman?
Guide Questions for Members of NGOs

1. Reflecting on your organisation's work in peacebuilding in the Benue Valley: what are the aims and objectives of your organisation?

2. Think back on the work your organisation has done, what are the issues covered in your activities?

3. What structures have you created on the ground for peacebuilding?

4. What constitute significant barriers to resolving violent conflict in the Benue Valley?
Appendix B

Focus Groups organisational structure

At the beginning of each session, this researcher made a formal welcome and offered an explanation of this research's purpose (Appendix C: Informed consent) to participants. Participants got an opportunity to ask questions about this research and then, this researcher set ground rules for the session:

1. Please give a chance/space for everybody in the group to talk and may I say that everybody's opinion counts equally.
2. For the purpose of recording, may I suggest you speak one after another!
3. We need a moderator/facilitator to guide this session. Who would like to moderate the session? We discussed this question in all the groups, the women preferred this researcher to moderate, so this researcher moderated all the focus groups sessions.
4. We have four questions for this session; they will be posed one after the other for your discussion.

At the end of each session, participants got the chance to ask this researcher questions about this research and expressed how they felt after participating in the group discussion. At the end of it all, this researcher thanked everybody for coming and participating.
Appendix C

Informed consent

I am John Tavershima Agberagba, a Roman Catholic priest of the Congregation of the Holy Spirit. I am a student at Trinity College Dublin, Republic of Ireland. I am here for my fieldwork.

This interview will help me to:

1. Collect data on some women’s peace initiatives in the Benue Valley, Nigeria.
2. Develop a greater understanding of the causes of violent conflict in the Benue Valley.
3. Use the HNT and gender theory to offer analysis of the causes of the violent conflicts, and women peacebuilding initiatives in the Benue Valley.
4. Write a PhD thesis.

Your participation in this research is voluntary. You are free to refuse to answer any question. You can withdraw from the interview at any time. You can withdraw your data within two weeks of this interview. Only I and my two supervisors or persons delegated by Trinity College Dublin to examine the content of this research may read this interview. This interview will be transcribed; personal and identifiable information will be codified to maintain confidentiality. Your interview may be used in my thesis. Do you have any questions or concerns about this research?

Asking permission for recording this interview: May I record this interview? And in case of focus groups: may I take your group’s picture and use it in my thesis?
Data on Participants:

Name:.............................................................................................................................................

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>□ 18-24</th>
<th>□ 25-34</th>
<th>□ 35-44</th>
<th>□ 45-54</th>
<th>□ 55 +</th>
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Gender Female □

Education: No formal education □ Primary school □

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<th>Secondary school</th>
<th>□ Tertiary non university degree</th>
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</table>

University degree □ Post-university degree □

Social group: Working class □ Non-working class □ Farmer □

Businesswoman □ Married □ Single □

Community:............................................................................................

Place of interview:............................................................................

Telephone(s):......................................................................................

After an interview: Thank you so much for participating in this research. It will contribute to the understanding of peacebuilding in the Benue Valley, Nigeria.

Evaluation of interviews: Through an evaluation, this researcher found what worked and was helpful, what was not and what this researcher forgot to ask. This helped this researcher to be more conscientious in the next interview. This researcher transcribed the interviews from the audio tapes immediately after each interview for the first 15 interviews.

Practical Check Lists before Interviews: this check list helped this research to review each time an impending interview/focus group session:

1. Familiarise with the place for the interview/interviewee or group members to help understand a person(s).

2. Check that the two recording machines worked properly.

3. Organise the interview/focus group in a quiet place.

Having two recording machines proved useful as during the fieldwork one machine broke in the field. If this researcher had no other machine, it would have prolonged this research fieldwork schedule.
Appendix D

List of participants by communities

**TABLE 1: GWER EAST ALIADE INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPANTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Age (25-34)</th>
<th>Age (35-44)</th>
<th>Age (45-54)</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Social group</th>
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<td>Farmer</td>
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<tr>
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292
### Table 2: Konshisha Awajir Individual Participants

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<th>Age (35-44)</th>
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### Table 5: NGOs Individual Participants

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Appendix E

Data extracted from the interviews with research participants from individual interviews and focus groups session on their sources of peacebuilding skills, the use of violence as a means of resolving conflict, and on gender equality.

Table 1: Data on women who are for, and those who are not for, the use of violence as means for satisfying human needs

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<th>Informant</th>
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<td>Awajir</td>
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Total 25
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Table 3: Data on women who are for, and those who are not for, women’s equality with men (with respect to women participation in the formal space, property ownership/inheritance rights)

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<td>Awajir</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Three informants reported that they acquired their skills from their studies; two said it was from their present peacebuilding group, and one person said she believes her skills are in-born.

---

66 Three informants reported that they acquired their skills from their studies; two said it was from their present peacebuilding group, and one person said she believes her skills are in-born.
<p>| | | | | | | |</p>
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302
Table 4: Focus Group 01 at Awajir-Konshisha

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Table 5: Focus Group 02 at Abuja

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Table 6: Focus Group 03 at Apa

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### Table 7: Focus Group 04, Adamawa Women at Takum

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### Table 8: Focus Group 05 at Takum

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304
Table 9: Focus Group 06 at Adikpo

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Table 10: Focus Group 07 at Aliade

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47 The question on the sources of women’s skills was not asked during this focus group meeting because of rain disturbance. The women asked to go home to attend to their families.